Strategic Currents: Issues in Human Security in Asia 9789814345491

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Strategic Currents

Issues in

Human Security in

Asia

yang razali kassim editor

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the contributors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the school or the institute.

Copyright © 2011 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Published by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University South Spine, S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Telephone: 6790 6982 Fax: 6793 2991 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.idss.edu.sg

National Library Board Singapore Cataloguing in Publication Data

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Strategic Currents. [Volume 3], Issues in human security in Asia / edited by Yang Razali Kassim. 1. Climatic changes—Asia. 2. Natural disasters—Asia. 3. Emergency management—Asia 4. Nuclear energy—Asia. 5. Nuclear energy—Southeast Asia. 6. Asia—Politics and government—19457. Terrorism—Asia. 8. Piracy—Asia 9. South China Sea 10. Asia—Foreign relations—1945I. Yang Razali Kassim. II. Title: Issues in human security in Asia. 2011 DS525.8 S89 v. 3

Produced by BOOKSMITH ([email protected])

ISBN 978-981-4345-48-4 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-4345-49-1 (eBook, PDF)

Co-published for distribution by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg First published in 2011

‘Human security is not a concern with weapons —it is a concern with human life and dignity.’ – UNDP Human Development Report 1994

The Strategic Currents series Strategic Currents: Issues in Human Security in Asia Yang Razali Kassim (Editor). Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2011) Strategic Currents: Emerging Trends in Southeast Asia Yang Razali Kassim (Editor). Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2009) Strategic Currents: Marking the Transition to the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Yang Razali Kassim (Editor). Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (2006).

Contents Preface

xi

CHAPTER I

Climate Change and Natural Disasters Mely Caballero-Anthony & Sofiah Jamil

Japan’s Mega Disaster: Managing Vulnerabilities

3

Paul Tapponnier & Kerry Sieh

Catastrophe in Haiti: A Repeat Lesson for Asia

6

Alan Chong

The Haiti Earthquake: Protecting Small States

11

Yang Razali Kassim

From Aceh to Chile: Is ASEAN Prepared for Another Disaster?

14

Nah Liang Tuang

Urban Search and Rescue: Boosting Intra-ASEAN Self-Help

17

Yang Razali Kassim

Australia and Climate Change: The Changing Weather in Climate Politics

19

Sania Nishtar

Pakistan’s Flood Disaster: An Unprecedented Humanitarian Crisis

22

Evan A. Laksmana

The Indonesian Military and Disaster Relief: Potential Pitfalls and Challenges

25

Yang Razali Kassim

Indonesia’s Twin Disasters: Will the Next Big One Reach Singapore?

28

CHAPTER II

Energy Security Barry Desker

Japan Disaster: Nuclear Power after Fukushima

33

Alvin Chew

Japan Disaster: End of the Nuclear Industry?

36

Contents C. Raja Mohan

Japan and India: Towards Nuclear and Security Cooperation

38

Ryan Clarke, Nur Azha Putra, Mely Caballero-Anthony & Rajesh Basrur

Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Will it Enhance Human Security?

41

Alvin Chew

Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Competition or Cooperation?

43

Joshy M. Paul

Japan-China: Spat Over Nuclear Arsenal?

46

Eric Frécon

Environmental Issues: Challenges or Opportunities for Indonesia?

49

Koh Swee Lean, Collin

The Yeonpyeong Attack: Shooting Down Denuclearisation

52

You Ji

Yeonpyeong: Tough Test for China’s North Korea Policy

55

Kwa Chong Guan

A Second Nuclear Age in Asia?

58

CHAPTER III

Health, Food and Water Security Yang Razali Kassim

Tunisia’s Revolt and Food Insecurity: What it Means for Southeast Asia

63

Paul P. S. Teng

Global Food Price Spiral: Causes and Consequences

66

P. K. Hangzo

Food Shortages: Urban Food Security in an Age of Constraints

69

Arpita Mathur

Arsenic Poisoning of Water in Bangladesh

72

Bill Durodié

Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Crafting a Response

75

Contents Zhang Hongzhou

China and Global Food Security: Conflicting Notions

78

Yang Razali Kassim

Water Insecurity in the Himalayas: Emerging Tensions and Lessons for ASEAN

81

Bill Durodié

Pulp Friction: Southern Environment or Western Agenda?

84

Arpita Mathur

Water Disputes in South Asia

87

CHAPTER IV

Governance, Politics and Identity Mushahid Ali

After the Facebook Revolution: Whither Egypt?

93

Yang Razali Kassim

Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the Model?

96

Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury & Yang Razali Kassim

Libya and the United Nations: Whose Responsibility to Protect?

99

Yang Razali Kassim & Nur Azha Putra

Responsibility to Protect: How should Southeast Asia Respond?

102

Samuel Chan

Our Road Out of Afghanistan

105

Joseph Chinyong Liow & Farish A. Noor

Religion and Identity in Malaysia

108

Chan Wen Ling

When Islamists Play by the Rules Yet Change the Game

111

Akanksha Mehta

Countering India’s Maoist Insurgency: The Need for Strategy, not Operations

114

Choong Pui Yee

More than a Cake Party: Evolving Protest in Malaysia

117

Contents Adri Wanto

Indonesian Islam: What Went Right

120

CHAPTER V

Terrorism, Cyber Security and Cyberspace Rohan Gunaratna

After Osama bin Laden: Will Al Qaeda Survive?

125

Alan Chong

Diplomatic Confidentiality: The Real Lesson of Wikileaks

128

Kumar Ramakrishna

The MSK Family Affair: Is Blood Thicker than Water?

131

Arabinda Acharya & Fatima Astuti

Chink in Jakarta’s Armour: Tightening Counter-Terrorist Financing

134

Mohamed Abdul Saddiq

Whither e-Jihad: Evaluating the Threat of Internet Radicalisation

137

Kumar Ramakrishna

Self-Radicalisation and the Awlaki Connection

140

Ashok Sawhney

Cyber War in the 21st Century: The Emerging Security Challenge 143 Yeap Suyin & Jenna Park

Countering Internet Radicalisation: The Need for a Holistic Approach 146 Tuty Raihanah Mostarom & Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin

The Internet and Women: Avenue for Female Jihadists

149

Samuel Chan

The SAF in Cyberspace: The Image of Defence and the Internet

152

CHAPTER VI

Maritime Security and Piracy Ashok Sawhney

Somalia Two Years On: Making the Anti-Piracy Drive More Effective

157

Contents Samuel Chan

Fighting Piracy: Another First for the SAF

160

Sam Bateman

Killing Pirates: Dilemma of Counter-Piracy

163

Joshua Ho

The Malacca Strait: Will It Remain Safe?

166

Sam Bateman

The Bay of Bengal: A New Sea of Troubles?

169

Robert Beckman

The South China Sea: Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in Claims?

172

Sam Bateman

The South China Sea: When the Elephants Dance

175

Yang Fang

The South China Sea: Problems and Progress in China’s Position

178

Li Mingjiang

The South China Sea: Emerging China-Taiwan Cooperation

181

Joshua Ho

Piracy in the South China Sea: Lessons from the Gulf of Aden

184

CHAPTER VII

Diplomacy and Non-Traditional Security Pradumna B. Rana

The G20 Summit: How Asia Can Strengthen Its Voice

189

Barry Desker

The G20: Should Europe Give Way to Asia?

191

Tan See Seng

The ASEAN Regional Forum at 17: The Curse of Ad Hoc-ism?

194

C. Raja Mohan

Embracing Myanmar: India’s Foreign Policy Realism

197

Yang Razali Kassim

The Singapore Global Dialogue: Heated Start to Strategic Debates

200

Contents Joseph Chinyong Liow

Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Baggage of Blood Brotherhood

203

Yang Razali Kassim

Railway Land Swap: New Light on an Old Issue

206

Barry Desker

Is Indonesia Outgrowing ASEAN?

209

C. Raja Mohan

East Asian Security: The United States Wants a Bigger Indian Role

212

Barry Desker

ADMM Plus Defence Cooperation: Rise of a New Player

215

Yang Razali Kassim

ADMM Plus: New Twist to Old Security Issues

218

Tan See Seng

The East Asia Summit 2010: Big Step Forward, or Business-as-Usual?

221

Yang Razali Kassim

Indonesia, the U.S. and Australia: New Age, New Issues Our Contributors

224 227

Preface

This volume is dedicated to the study of Human Security in Asia. Conceptually, it resides within the broader framework of Non-Traditional Security. Human security is still very much a contested concept. This notwithstanding, there is no disagreement among scholars that, at the core, human security is about the wellbeing of the individual—in contrast to the well-being of the state. This well-being of the individual is measured in terms of two basic freedoms: freedom from want and freedom from fear. An individual who is free from deprivation of his basic needs, such as food, water and shelter, can be described as a secure person. A society that is free from fear for its safety can equally be deemed as a secure society. Human security therefore views security not in terms of the traditional notion of security of the state but the non-traditional concept of the security of the individual. Hence, human security is people-centred. The definition of human security reached a conceptual highpoint in 1994 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued a Human Development Report, which defined human security as “not a concern with weapons” but “a concern with human life and dignity”. The UNDP identified seven categories of threat to human security: environment, food, health, economy, personal, community and political. There are four key characteristics of human security as defined by UNDP: that it is universal, interdependent in its components, is preventive and is people-oriented. Scholars see the UNDP version of human security as an organising concept in security studies. This volume focuses on human security at a time when security of the Asian person is increasingly under siege from the forces of nature and man-made disasters, especially in the last few years. There has been an increase in the numbers as well as the frequency of natural calamities around the world. All of them triggered consequences that led to human tragedy and suffering; some even generated political consequences. The year 2010 began with a major earthquake in Haiti. Though geographically distant, it had lessons for Asia. Since that event, several major earthquakes had erupted in Asia. In 2011, one of the worst earthquakes to hit Japan caused a tsunami and, later, a nuclear disaster. xi

Strategic Currents is a periodic volume based on the regular series of commentaries by staff and affiliates of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). This issue continues what hopefully will become a tradition of republishing select articles adapted from RSIS Commentaries, in the case of this particular volume, since January 2010. These articles include some perspectives on major events that rocked the world in 2011 with implications on human security in Asia, such as the triple disasters in Japan, Wikileaks, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the Arab uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. This is the third volume of Strategic Currents. The first was published in 2006 by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies to mark its transition to RSIS. The second was published in 2009 by RSIS in co-publication for distribution with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). Yang Razali Kassim 2011

xii

Chapter i

Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Mely Caballero-Anthony & Sofiah Jamil

Japan’s Mega Disaster: Managing Vulnerabilities Paul Tapponnier & Kerry Sieh

Catastrophe in Haiti: A Repeat Lesson for Asia Alan Chong

The Haiti Earthquake: Protecting Small States Yang Razali Kassim

From Aceh to Chile: Is ASEAN Prepared for Another Disaster? Nah Liang Tuang

Urban Search and Rescue: Boosting Intra-ASEAN Self-Help Yang Razali Kassim

Australia and Climate Change: The Changing Weather in Climate Politics Sania Nishtar

Pakistan’s Flood Disaster: An Unprecedented Humanitarian Crisis Evan A. Laksmana

The Indonesian Military and Disaster Relief: Potential Pitfalls and Challenges Yang Razali Kassim

Indonesia’s Twin Disasters: Will the Next Big One Reach Singapore?

Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

Mely Caballero-Anthony & Sofiah Jamil

Japan’s Mega Disaster

Managing Vulnerabilities While Japan is renowned for its disaster preparedness, the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster pose immense strain on its ability to manage complex emergencies. The nuclear crisis should come as a reality check for other states pursuing nuclear energy plans, including ASEAN.

Japan’s earthquake on 11 March 2011—and the tsunami that followed it—is the strongest on record in the country and has been dubbed as Japan’s worst crisis since the Second World War. The increasing ferocity and unpredictability of these natural disasters seriously challenged Japan’s record of effective disaster management capabilities and high safety standards. As the country grappled with the ensuing threat of multiple nuclear meltdowns after explosions at three nuclear power plant (NPP) reactors in Fukushima and a leak at a NPP reactor in Onagawa, questions were being raised as to the overall impact of these developments. This disaster is a critical reality check for Southeast Asia as the region continues to consider nuclear energy as a means for sustaining energy needs and economic development. The Japanese experience has shown that dealing with the latent threats of nuclear safety issues would require more than reliance on advancements in nuclear science and technology.

Managing Japan’s Triple Disasters

As Japan counted the human and property cost of its triple disasters, it was engulfed in an uphill task in managing disaster relief operations as well as mitigating further damage to the NPPs. The death toll surpassed 18,000 within weeks of the tragedy while almost two million households were without power supply and 1.4 million without running water in the colder northern regions of Japan. Moreover, Japan’s ageing population also faced higher vulnerabilities in terms of health and safety. This situation got worse when the government started rolling blackouts in a bid to conserve energy—energy that would be needed to maintain the cooling systems in Japan’s NPPs to avoid nuclear meltdowns. The lack of clean water not only severely affected public health and sanitation, but also set back the critically needed cooling of the

Mely Caballero-Anthony and Sofiah Jamil are respectively Head and Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for NonTraditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

In the light of the increasing unpredictability and intensity of natural disasters, setting a high safety standard is obviously a must if the region wishes to go nuclear.

nuclear reactors. In a desperate move, Japanese NPP operators used seawater to cool the NPPs, running the risk of further damage and corrosion of the NPP equipment. The blackouts affected livelihoods as stalled economic activities in the industrial sector exacerbated an already ailing Japanese economy, let alone the massive costs of damage from the earthquake and tsunami. These estimates did not take into account the fallouts from predicted aftershocks with a magnitude as high as 7 on the Richter scale that could cause further damage to the NPPs. Nuclear experts have, however, suggested that a Chernobyl-like explosion was unlikely given advancements in nuclear technology. Nevertheless, steps were taken to evacuate residents living in areas surrounding the NPPs and to screen residents for exposure to radiation.

Managing Japan’s Energy Needs

While these measures are commendable, on hindsight more could have been done prior to the earthquake. For instance, it was barely five years ago that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP experienced a fire and a leak as a result of an earthquake measuring 6.8 on the Richter scale. Most NPPs in Japan have only been designed to withstand earthquakes up to 6.5 on the Richter scale. Moreover, assertions by anti-nuclear groups in Japan that point to the tendency to conceal information about safety procedures during inspections do little to boost public confidence. In fact, there were reports that the damaged NPP reactor in Fukushima was to be de-commissioned in February 2011 but had its operating licence extended by 10 years. A possible reason for the licence extension: 30 per cent of Japan’s energy supply is generated from nuclear energy. While some may be quick to criticise Japan’s substantial dependence on nuclear energy, it is also important to realise that nuclear energy is a way for Japan to diversify its energy mix. Japan, like other Northeast Asian countries, depends on oil imports from the Middle East. Energy diversification was a crucial means of facilitating economic growth with cheaper sources of energy while enhancing Japan’s sense of energy security. Although Japan has been the best example in Asia in terms of disaster preparedness and the use of advanced technology in NPPs, it is high time to review the processes governing the building of NPPs in Japan.

Reality Check for Southeast Asia

The current situation in Japan has even caused policymakers in the United States, Switzerland, Germany and India to put future nuclear energy plans on hold. Germany has gone a step further to forego nuclear energy completely within a decade. In Southeast Asia, where the demand for energy sources is growing rapidly, it is likely that governments would still consider the nuclear option, while keeping a close watch on the situation in Japan. Nuclear energy is included in Malaysia’s Economic 4

Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

Transformation Programme, and there are plans to build a regional nuclear monitoring facility by 2014. Vietnam seeks to build two NPPs along its southern coastal province of Ninh Thuan as early as 2014 while Thailand is considering building an NPP by 2020. It is therefore vital that ASEAN countries take environmental impact assessments seriously. They should also further enhance their disaster management capabilities so that they can respond to potentially complex emergencies. In the light of the increasing unpredictability and intensity of natural disasters, setting a high safety standard is obviously a must if the region wishes to go nuclear. Achieving Japan’s preparedness capabilities is only the minimum benchmark for the rest of the region, notwithstanding the cracks in the system that have been exposed by the recent nuclear disaster. SC

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STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

Paul Tapponnier & Kerry Sieh

Catastrophe in Haiti

A Repeat Lesson for Asia The earthquake that devastated Haiti on 12 January 2010 may not be the last that we will see. There are lessons for Asia, indeed the whole world, as we prepare for more earthquakes in the coming years.

Another hammering home that we are not living sustainably on our dynamic Earth! Large disasters developed a doleful cadence through the first decade of the twenty-first century. First it was India, then Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan and China. And now, in the first month of the century’s second decade, it is Haiti. The anguishing post-earthquake scenes of monumental devastation have become all too familiar. In the last half of the last century we built too much, too inadequately, in too many dangerous places, with too little regard for how the Earth works.

Sudden Rupture

The Haiti earthquake was caused by the sudden rupture of a tectonic fault that traversed the entire length of a long peninsula, which jutted out to the west from the capital city, Port au Prince. The rupture occurred at quite a shallow depth, as earthquakes go, and ran for a few tens of kilometres just southwest of the impoverished city of about two million people. The proximity of the fault rupture and the lack of infrastructural defences conspired to magnify the severity of the catastrophe. The death toll may well exceed the 40,000 each of the 2001 Bhuj and 2003 Bam earthquakes in India and Iran. It could even exceed the nearly 100,000 deaths that resulted from both the 2005 Kashmir and 2008 Lungmen Shan earthquakes in Pakistan and China. The fault that generated the earthquake in Haiti is well known to geologists as the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden Fault Zone (EPGFZ) (see Figure 1). It is part of the northern boundary of the Caribbean Plate, which currently moves about 2 cm/yr towards the northeast relative to North America. A pretty predictable neighbour, wouldn’t you say? Preliminary seismological data suggest that it was a section of the fault west of the city that ruptured on 12 January 2010. In less than a minute, the mountains south of the fault slipped eastwards by a couple of metres, likely over a length of about 70 km. Paul Tapponnier is Professor and Head, Earthquakes and Tectonics Group, Earth Observatory of Singapore (EOS), Nanyang Technological University. Kerry Sieh is Professor and Director, EOS. This commentary appeared in The Straits Times on 20 January 2010.

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Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

History amply shows that the EPGFZ Unless we embrace a new manhad the potential to produce large, destructive Nature paradigm, we are in for earthquakes. Two in the eighteenth century an endless litany of what has just were particularly well recorded. Moreover, re- happened in Haiti. cent measurements of deformation of the region using GPS satellite technology had singled out the fault as a site of dangerously accumulating crustal strain (at a rate of 7 to 9 mm/ yr). Warnings of the potential for damaging earthquakes, as well as calls for more detailed scientific study, had been issued in recent years, most recently after small shocks occurred beneath the city in September 2008. In the second half of the eighteenth century, it was not just one, but two huge earthquakes, only 19 years apart, that razed the colonial town of Port au Prince. As related by French Historian Moreau de Saint-Méry, the first one, on 18 October 1751, devastated the whole region between Léogane and Gonaives. It even toppled several buildings in the Spanish harbour of Santo Domingo, more than 250 km to the east, suggesting a fault rupture east of Port au Prince. It was followed by strong aftershocks for about two months. Within Port au Prince, only one masonry building did not collapse. The second earthquake, on the evening of 3 June 1770, was more violent than the first. It turned the reconstructed town into a vast field of ruins, where only aligned trees marked the tracks of former streets. Aftershocks continued for four months. Several small shocks that jolted the region in the preceding three years were unrecognised portents of the great earthquake to come.

The Fate of Port au Prince

Why is it that Port au Prince was no more prepared for the 12 January earthquake than it was for the twin events two and a half centuries ago? The answer is quite simple: Just as we humans cannot hear sounds or see colours that are emitted at frequencies beyond what our ears or our eyes have evolved to perceive, we are not naturally attuned to events that happen less frequently than every few decades. We teach our children to look both ways before crossing the street, because cars come by every few seconds or minutes. We regulate the financial markets because financial debacles occur every few decades. But a seismic, volcanic or climatic disaster that might occur every few centuries or millennia or even longer! Should we lose too much sleep over them? For civilisation’s future the answer is most assuredly “yes”. We no longer live as a primitive humanity, where our natural senses are adequate for our survival. Our modern civilisation, dependent upon intricate machines and complex economic, political and cultural institutions, will likely not make it without paying attention to the science that has enabled us to extend our “eyes” and “ears” to see and hear the inner working of Earth’s tectonics and climate. And once we perceive these dangers, we will need to utilise the powerful “hands” that modern planning and engineering have given us to build safely. This is particularly appropriate for Port au Prince and Haiti. It is quite plausible that the recent earthquake is the beginning of a sequence of such events, analogous 7

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

but likely not identical to that of the late eighteenth century. We now know that large earthquakes on long-quiescent, “locked” fault zones commonly trigger one another, and hence cluster in time. It is thus reasonable to suspect that another large earthquake will strike the city in the coming decades, as happened more than two centuries ago. Given the location of the 12 January 2010 fault rupture, this second quake will likely emanate from a section of the EPGFZ a bit farther to the east, now pushed closer to the brink of failure by stresses imparted by the sudden slip on the Miragoane-Petionville segment. Cities in a similar fix include Istanbul in Turkey and Padang in Indonesia where history has shown that clusters of earthquakes are common and where science has shown that another one is likely within the next few decades.

Lessons for Asia

Insofar as this tragic event focused the world’s attention on Haiti, it could well be a last chance to turn things around there. Recall the billions of dollars that poured into Aceh for its reconstruction after the great 2004 earthquake and tsunami. Those who developed the plans for using the money and the goodwill that would likely continue to pour into Haiti would do well to expect another shock at least as violent within the next few decades. This means that it would be smart to rebuild the physical and human infrastructure of Port au Prince to be more resilient to another strong shake. An investment in scientific infrastructure would be an important part of that resilience—to measure the strains as they accumulate and understand possible forewarnings. The lessons of the Haitian earthquake apply here in Asia as well. We, too, have earthquake-generating faults close to some of our important cities. Istanbul sits just a few kilometres away from a great fault that failed progressively across Turkey throughout the twentieth century. The only section of that great fault that has not yet broken is the underwater section nearest that great city straddling the boundary of Europe and Asia. Mandalay, the famous ancient city of northern Myanmar, lies less than 10 km from the Sagaing fault, whose northern stretch has not ruptured since the M ≈ 8 Ava earthquake of 23 March 1839. Myanmar’s new capital, Naypyidaw, straddles a section of the fault that has not broken in recorded history. In Sumatra, Padang is only 40 km from the Sumatran fault— a fault very similar to Haiti’s EPGFZ. Bukittinggi sits virtually atop it and Banda Aceh half way between two of its branches. Wellington, New Zealand, has a similar fault running right through the city. So do the suburbs of Manila. At the dawn of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Haitian tragedy illustrates in exemplary fashion the dangers that super cities, megacities and their hinterlands face from natural hazards. We are largely unprepared, overexposed and naturally disinclined to do things differently. Unless we embrace a new man-Nature paradigm, we are in for an endless litany of what has just happened in Haiti. SC

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Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

Figure 1

The Fault Zone in Haiti

Port-au-Prince

Enriquillo Plantain Garden fault zone (EPGFZ)

The EPGFZ is clearly visible (between the dark arrows) in satellite imagery on Google Earth. The large white arrows indicate the sense of motion of the fault. The block north of the fault moves west relative to the block on the south. We call this type of fault a leftlateral (or sinistral) fault, because an observer looking across the fault from one side would see the other side of the fault move left during a big earthquake.

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STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

Figure 2

Cities With Similar Seismic Situations Myanmar

Istanbul

Yangon

Bukittinggi Banda Aceh Padang

Many of the world’s cities are in a seismic situation akin to that of Port au Prince. Turkey’s Istanbul is only a few kilometres from the North Anatolian fault, a right-lateral (dextral) fault. This entire 2000-km long fault has slipped in large, destructive earthquakes in the past century, except the underwater section nearest Istanbul. In Indonesia, Sumatra’s Bukittinggi and Padang lie close to the Sumatran fault, but fortunately the nearest sections ruptured in the early to mid-twentieth century. The two strands that embrace Banda Aceh, however, have not broken in historical time and may be poised for a large earthquake. In Myanmar, Mandalay, Yangon (formerly known as Rangoon) and Naypyidaw are near the Sagaing fault, parts of which have not broken for more than 140 years. 10

Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

Alan Chong

The Haiti Earthquake

Protecting Small States The earthquake tragedy in Haiti offers lessons in how the world should prepare well in advance for such non-traditional security threats. Small states should focus on good governance while the international community should exercise rehabilitative soft power.

With a population of 10 million and a territorial size of 27,750 square kilometres, Haiti qualifies as a quintessential small state. It is also representative of a small state that has been repeatedly traumatised by a history of anti-colonial struggle, multiple missteps in domestic governance, and the ravages of tropical storms, floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. The quake that struck on 12 January 2010 should not only call the world’s attention to a calamitous death toll in excess of 100,000. It is also a lesson in the omissions of governance as well as in how the international community should invest in building a rapid reaction disaster corps on the same level of priority that one would accord politico-military crises. It was an intolerable situation that some six days after the quake, the spectacle of public looting, widespread hunger, and unattended dead bodies remained the lot of the Haitian people. It was also telling that many international television news crews were doubling up as both incidental rescuers and recorders of suffering. As a result, Haiti’s suffering cruelly dramatised the old adage of bystanders twiddling their thumbs while a crisis unfolded in a faraway location. While the ground realities of delivering relief may be more complex than what the images suggest, the tragedy served as a timely wake-up call for a collaborative demonstration of rehabilitative soft power from states of all sizes and ideologies.

Vulnerability and Domestic Governance

For nearly four decades, the small state lobby in the Commonwealth had articulated the profile of trauma for small states. Size did matter to the nature of government and internal political dissension. When various groups across the political spectrum cannot cooperate, and ordinary citizens are socially atomised, a civil war will wind a bloody path with mounting casualties within a confined territory. Likewise, when non-traditional security threats posed by Mother Nature in the form of earthquakes and hurricanes strike, size matters. Alan Chong is Associate Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

The lack of strategic depth for the population’s refuge, or for the dissipation of the oncoming forces of nature, produces an equally horrendous outcome for the population. The Commonwealth reports by the small state lobby have consistently argued for both the international community as well as small state populations to foster good governance to mitigate crises when they occur. The scale of Haiti’s destruction should not obscure the equally important drama of the political vacuum precipitated by the utter breakdown of law and order. Reports filed by various international news agencies confirmed that the survivors of the quake had to confront the uncertainties of food delivery, the absence of central information clearing authority and the visible absence of police forces. A few voices blamed the Haitian president, Rene Preval, for being non-existent during his people’s hour of need. Concurrently, it was the U.S. military that served as de facto government by securing the airport for aid deliveries that, in any case, quickly generated into bottlenecks without pre-existing organisations in place to distribute the materiel efficiently. The sceptic might object that the scale of the disaster was simply overwhelming for any aid effort to cope. But it must surely be acknowledged that small states must prepare organisationally for the contingency of disaster in confined spaces. A rehearsed civil defence plan is indispensable as a first line of defence for any small state.

One country’s fate could well be another’s in the future.

Soft Power of the Aid Givers

As the inconclusive climate change summit in Copenhagen in 2009 has shown, small states must still rely in great measure on the magnanimity of the rest of the international community in tackling humanitarian crises arising from natural disasters. One spokesperson of the Alliance of Small Island States had tellingly commented that nobody in his right mind would want to leave his homeland as an “environmental refugee”. This was not just a technical point but also an emotional one. The nation-states that enjoy large strategic depth in relative terms ought to practise empathy towards their territorially less well-endowed brethren. This is because of the fact of natural geographic inter-dependence. An earthquake can generate tsunamis that spiral in all directions from the epicentre. No territorial boundary within range of nature’s wrath will be spared. Additionally, seismologists will point out that the tectonic plate boundaries recognise neither ideology nor hard power superiority; tectonic plates shift according to the logic of subterranean magma flows on a common planet. In these ways, it is laudable that countries as diverse as China, South Korea, Japan, Australia and the United States have been among the first to dispatch recovery and humanitarian teams to Haiti. The Asian response is particularly heartening given that emerging great power rivals could easily channel their new status into acts of international kindness that will do far more for their public standing than nuclear programmes. Aid giving in the name of a common humanity is also the concrete manifestation of practical idealism in action. Interestingly, this is something that Singapore subscribes to as a pillar of its foreign policy of being a good international citizen. 12

Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

Helping Oneself, Helping Others

In time to come, when one reflects upon the lessons of the dreadful Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010, the latter will contain kernels of wisdom about how a small state needs to prepare to help itself, in anticipation of constructively utilising the outstretched hand offered by the international community. The physically unaffected members of the international community should also embrace within their respective national security visions a solemn declaration that humanitarian disasters caused by Mother Nature cannot allow power politics to get in the way of the spirit of global charity. One country’s fate could well be another’s in the future. Yes, we must all bow in silence before those who lost their lives in Haiti, but also in recognition that Mother Nature recognises no boundaries when she unleashes her fury. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

From Aceh to Chile

Is ASEAN Prepared for Another Disaster? The natural disaster in Chile, like the one in Haiti, is yet another test of Southeast Asia’s readiness in global humanitarian relief—five years after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. How prepared is ASEAN for another human tragedy?

The earthquake disaster in Chile, just a month after the 12 January 2010 quake in Haiti, is yet another wake-up call for Southeast Asia. The region needs to be constantly ready to face the new phenomenon of increasingly frequent natural calamities; the next one may well be in the neighbourhood, again. The Chilean disaster, which triggered tsunami alerts throughout the Pacific, came hot on the heels of the one in Haiti. How has this trend in calamity shaped our humanitarian instincts for the plight of others, and how have public responses influenced relief policies of states?

The Case of Southeast Asia

In January, at the height of the disaster in Haiti, Singapore joined the rest of the world to extend humanitarian assistance to the Caribbean state. In stark contrast to the swift and impressive humanitarian relief extended to Aceh during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the aid to Haiti stood at US$50,000. The paltry size drew gasps of disappointment among some Singaporeans. The Straits Times ran no less than two commentaries by its staff writers. The first, on 23 January 2010, tellingly, was entitled “Is Singapore doing too little for Haiti?” The second article a week later was headlined “Disaster Relief and the Politics of Giving”. The writer characterised the aid as “realist tokenism”. Reactions in the blogosphere were more unkind. Some said they were utterly ashamed at the small figure. Others suggested it would have been better not to give at all. How was it, they asked, that South Korea, being in the same Asian region as Singapore, could send an aid mission to Haiti, on top of an aid package of US$1 million? The government’s response to the criticisms was swift. Just two days after the 23 January article, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement urging Singapore’s aid to be seen in context.

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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Singapore, the ministry said, did not see When the next disaster strikes itself as a major donor country and, for obvious anywhere in the region—or resource constraints, could not extend the same elsewhere around the globe—let’s amount of assistance for every disaster around hope ASEAN lives up to its name the world. Aid had to be prioritised. That meant as an important part of the global some would get more while others less. Where community. not much could be done by Singapore to make a difference to the global humanitarian relief efforts—due to distance and speed of delivery, for instance—a symbolic show of sympathy would be better than doing nothing, the MFA spokesman said.

Doing the Right Thing

The significance of all this? It showed how sensitive the government has become to the humanitarian instinct of citizens to tragedies elsewhere. In future, we can expect more of such public pressures on the state to do the right thing. Interestingly, Singapore is not the only country where the state has to react to the criticisms of citizens over humanitarian issues. In Thailand, the government too came under public criticism for giving too little aid to Haiti—even less than Singapore’s at US$20,000. The amount of assistance was raised twice until it reached at least US$380,000. In addition, Thailand also extended rice aid and dispatched medical teams. Thais felt embarrassed that its government’s offer of aid was less than even Cambodia’s and Indonesia’s. Jakarta, perhaps in gratitude for the world’s assistance to Aceh during the 2004 tsunami, offered a wide-ranging list of humanitarian workers as well as medical supplies.

ASEAN’s Disaster Preparedness

Other ASEAN countries had also been responsive to the growing trend of global humanitarian relief efforts. The Philippines pledged a medical team while Malaysia set up a special Foreign Ministry Fund to mobilise assistance from Malaysians. The 2004 tsunami that wreaked havoc in Aceh and other parts of Asia was the first major disaster to test ASEAN’s capacity to deal with humanitarian tragedies. The Chilean disaster would not be the last. We can expect more natural disasters to come that will challenge the humanitarian instinct of governments and the peoples of the region. Is ASEAN prepared to deal with the next major calamity? Has the grouping developed its capacity to deal with such a future? A quick look at the evolution of the region’s disaster preparedness shows that some fundamentals are taking shape. In July 2005, barely a year after the tsunami off Sumatra, ASEAN foreign ministers met in Vientiane, Laos, to sign an Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. The pact covered the A to Z of disaster management—from disaster risk identification, prevention and mitigation to disaster preparedness and emergency response. Completing the systems building are institutional arrangements such as setting up “national focal point and competent authorities”. In other words, each member state will have a focal point that acts as the link with ASEAN’s region-wide effort. 15

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In fact, an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) has been provisioned for. Presumably it is to coordinate all the national focal points in the 10-member states—to forge a cohesive response to any major disaster in the region. It is no exaggeration to say that the AHA Centre is one of the most important institutions to emerge within ASEAN, given the growing need for humanitarian relief around the world.

Will it Work the Next Time?

Indeed, disaster preparedness is one of the key elements of the ten-year Roadmap for an ASEAN Community by 2015. The roadmap was adopted by ASEAN leaders at their 2009 summit in Cha-Am, Thailand, thus enshrining disaster preparedness as a must-do strategy for the future. Clearly, ASEAN has been responsive to the urgent need to build a region-wide system and infrastructure to prepare for disasters and tragedies ahead. This system is, however, a work-in-progress. It would not be a surprise if there are gaps in capacities both at the regional as well as national levels. But as the ASEAN states respond to the crisis in Chile, as they do to Haiti and others, it would be timely to see how the AHA Centre—in other words, ASEAN as a group—plays its role in global relief efforts. When the next disaster strikes anywhere in the region—or elsewhere around the globe—let’s hope ASEAN lives up to its name as an important part of the global community. SC

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Nah Liang Tuang

Urban Search and Rescue

Boosting Intra-ASEAN Self-Help Natural disasters such as the earthquakes and tsunamis in the Indian Ocean off Sumatra in 2004 and in Japan most recently highlight the importance of qualified Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams. ASEAN’s lack of such vital rescue expertise needs to be addressed.

The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and the most recent Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on 11 March this year have highlighted the power of Mother Nature to wreak havoc. Thousands of people had died and many more were trapped within collapsed urban structures, straining search and rescue operations. Such rescue duties especially fall upon the shoulders of specially-trained and equipped Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams. Unfortunately, only a few ASEAN countries have local USAR capabilities. The rest have to call upon foreign USAR assistance during a crisis. This situation should be rectified because foreign USAR teams take time to deploy. Suring this lag, urban disaster victims who might have been saved may die from their injuries or deprivation.

Disaster Preparedness in ASEAN

Vietnam is prone to typhoons like Typhoon Xangsane in 2006 and Ketsana in 2009. Myanmar has been battered by Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and both Indonesia and Thailand have suffered from the 2004 tsunami on Boxing Day, 26 December. In all these cases, built-up settlements ranging from villages to major cities were severely damaged or destroyed with casualties and fatalities ranging from the hundreds to many tens of thousands. It is evident that many lives would have been saved if domestic USAR teams were activated in the immediate aftermath of these natural calamities. In ASEAN, however, only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have established official USAR agencies. Additionally, according to the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) of the United Nations, only Malaysia and Singapore have USAR teams that are trained according to INSARAG guidelines and have operational experience. For example, the Special Malaysian Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (SMART) has seen action in the West Sumatra Padang Earthquake of 2009 while Nah Liang Tuang is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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Singapore’s Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) was deployed to Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 tsunami. As Southeast Asia has not seen the end of catastrophic natural calamities or manmade urban disasters such as the collapses of high-rise buildings due to shoddy construction standards, every ASEAN country should establish INSARAG-certified USAR teams in all major cities.

How the Situation Should Be Improved

As Malaysia and Singapore seem to have the best-trained and organised USAR teams in ASEAN, it would make sense for the two countries to extend their expertise to other ASEAN states without established USAR organisations like Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar and even states like Thailand and the Philippines. These other ASEAN states can seek to improve their USAR capabilities by sending delegations of civil defence/rescue personnel to either Malaysia or Singapore to learn from their more established counterparts. Alternatively, handpicked training staff from either SMART or DART could be sent on short advisory stints to the other ASEAN countries. In Singapore, the training of nascent ASEAN USAR teams could be coordinated under the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP). The SCP could act as the liaison body to match the training expertise of DART under its parent organisation, the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), with interested ASEAN rescue teams. To assist some of these new USAR teams with their initial equipment requirements, the SCDF could even transfer some of its older USAR hardware to the former as a token of ASEAN solidarity. This would make operational and economic sense if the equipment was about to be phased out but was still serviceable. Politically, such an offer of assistance could be made at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting for Home and Interior Affairs Ministers.

Sustainability of Assistance

While the human reasons associated with ASEAN brotherhood serve as an idealistic basis for offering training assistance to embryonic USAR teams, some policymaking quarters might ask for tangible geopolitical justifications to back this initiative. To these officials and especially those who are Singaporeans, two reasons may come to mind. The first is that of soft power cultivation. Having trained USAR teams from all over ASEAN promotes respect for Singapore’s civil defence capabilities, enabling it to speak with authority and influence internationally on disaster-related topics. This is another way for Singapore to “punch above its weight”. Secondly, the provision of such assistance helps to lubricate the wheels of ASEAN diplomacy. This will earn goodwill for Singapore and allowing it to better mediate in disputes between other ASEAN states if ever called upon to do so. Additionally, this goodwill can also ease bilateral negotiations between Singapore and other ASEAN members over other contentious issues. The deficiencies in USAR capabilities among ASEAN countries, most of which require such specialist capabilities, must be urgently addressed, especially given the growing frequency of natural disasters in the region. SC 18

Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

Yang Razali Kassim

Australia and Climate Change

The Changing Weather in Climate Politics The rise of Julia Gillard as Australia’s prime minister had given Kevin Rudd the dubious honour of being probably the first political leader to fall victim to climate change. What does this mean for Asia’s drive to tackle global warming?

Australia’s new Prime Minister Julia Gillard called for fresh federal elections on 21 August 2010, following her take-over as leader of the Labour Party from Kevin Rudd. The elections were to be Labour’s first popularity test since the disastrous climate change summit in Copenhagen in December 2009. That summit led to an end in Rudd’s premiership after only three years. Unsavoury words had been used to describe his political demise—a stab in the back, a vicious political assassination, a nasty coup, just to name a few. To be sure, there were many domestic reasons for his fall, though they largely had to do with his growing unpopularity. No matter how you call it, one thing was clear: Rudd was probably the first victim of climate change politics, at least in the Asia Pacific. On this score alone, the elections were significant as the region awaited to witness how the political impact of climate change would unfold from Australia.

Rudd’s Climate Change Policy Revisited

Among the host of factors that undermined Rudd’s standing was his climate change policy, which faced resistance, post-Copenhagen. His fall would have repercussions beyond Australian politics—including Southeast Asia—as Gillard, his successor, sought to roll back his geopolitical moves and mould her own foreign policy. When Rudd won the federal elections in 2007, he linked his victory to Australians’ growing concern for climate health. He described climate change as the greatest moral challenge facing Australians today. Indeed, Australia is one of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters, with the economy driven substantially by coal-related energy. On assuming power, Rudd pushed for a cap in Australia’s emission of greenhouse gases. Australians bought into the climate change rhetoric as they realised how global warming could eventually haunt them through famine, worsening drought and rising sea levels. Rudd soon pitched his popularity to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit by pledging Australia’s emissions caps. Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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In so doing, Rudd was one of the very few political leaders who pushed for a global campaign for climate change. Tragically for him, the Copenhagen Summit proved a disaster and Rudd paid the price. A Lowy Institute poll found that public sentiment in Australia shifted away from a strongly pro-climate change policy. Australian mining companies, which wield a strong influence on the economy, baulked at the move to introduce an emissions tax that would directly hit their bottom line. This forced a delay of Rudd’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) till at least 2012 and put pressure on Labour to contain its declining popularity. Rumours flew that Gillard, who was then Rudd’s deputy, was not loyal to him—an accusation Gillard took strong exception to. The upshot was an internal party challenge to Rudd’s leadership. The issue was settled when Rudd surprisingly stepped aside when he realised that the core party leadership had deserted him for Gillard.

By implication, the rise of Gillard means that the small “c” could also suggest a smaller profile in international climate change policy.

New PM’s Climate Change Policy

The new PM clearly had to pursue Australia’s climate policy differently. She had gone on record as saying that she believed in climate change. In other words, she was saying she was no climate sceptic. But while her commitment to climate policy was not as strong as Rudd’s, she could not completely abandon it either. Certainly, she would not want to pursue it in a way that would cost her her votes. PM Gillard was also likely to pursue energy efficiency more than any radical moves at cutting greenhouse gases. What is clear is that Australia under the new PM will not be a champion of climate change policy to tackle global warming. Her predecessor’s aggressive policy would have raised Canberra’s international profile. But Australia under Gillard will not be pursuing such ambitions to boost Canberra’s position as a regional power. Her declaration not to follow through with Rudd’s “big Australia” immigration policy will also mean no “big Australia” ambitions on the world stage—climate change posturing included.

Asia Pacific Community

In this context, Rudd’s incipient foreign policy of pursuing an Asia Pacific Community (APC) will also see a reversal. Gillard will be a more inward-looking leader without pretensions for a global role for Australia. This will make ASEAN more comfortable. When Rudd came to power and floated the idea of an APC, many in the ASEAN capitals were none too pleased. The proposal proved worrying for its exclusivist aim of involving mainly the “key nations” in the region such as the United States, China, Japan, India and Indonesia. ASEAN felt threatened because it sees Australia as usurping its role as driver of the Asia Pacific regional architecture. Rudd’s exclusion of ASEAN as a group—Indonesia was to be invited in its own right—would marginalise ASEAN’s central role in geostrategic system building. Given the ruffled feathers in the ASEAN capitals, the APC idea eventually got watered down. It has now shifted—to paraphrase the symbolically significant language 20

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of Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo—from a potential “Community” with a big “C” to a “community” with a small “c”.

New Climate Change Posture?

By implication, the rise of Gillard means that the small “c” could also suggest a smaller profile in international climate change policy. A more inward-looking Australia under Gillard will tone down Canberra’s climate change diplomacy. But there is nothing to prevent her from stepping it up again in future. If and when she does so, will she be tempted to revive Rudd’s ambition of a bigger and more influential Australia—including his climate change diplomacy? SC

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Sania Nishtar

Pakistan’s Flood Disaster

An Unprecedented Humanitarian Crisis The 2010 monsoon-related floods wreaked havoc in Pakistan. Decades of development outcomes have been wiped out and critical human security challenges have been precipitated. It is critical to build Pakistan’s capacity to cope with the unprecedented crisis.

The 2010 monsoon-related floods in Pakistan, described as the worst humanitarian disaster in the world today, had unprecedented consequences. In the short term, 17.2 million people had been affected, 1.2 million houses damaged, many razed to the ground and 3.2 million hectares of standing crops inundated. No fewer than 7,820 schools and over 200 health facilities had been partially or totally destroyed. Twenty per cent of the land mass of the country—more than the entire land mass of Italy—had been affected. In some of these areas, access became a major issue with roads and bridges washed away. There had been colossal damage to communication and irrigation infrastructure in many badly hit areas. As the tragedy unfolded, the true scale of the disaster became evident. Millions of poor people in the riverside communities of the Indus were pushed further into poverty; their economic assets damaged and their adverse dependency ratios compounded. This, coupled with the environmental consequences of millions of decaying cattle carcasses and damage to sanitation infrastructure, posed significant threats to the health status of displaced and vulnerable populations.

Calamity amid Competing Priorities

Pakistan’s civil society, armed forces, international development and relief agencies and government were spurred into action, but the sheer scale of the disaster seemed to have overwhelmed all, in particular the government. The involvement of grassroots religious organisations in the relief operations, some of them labelled as fundamentalists, indicated their level of entrenchment in communities. These grassroots dynamics created an imperative for the government to act as a stronger steward at this stage.

Sania Nishtar is the founding president of the NGO think tank Heartfile, a health policy group in Pakistan. It is linked to the consortium of Asian think tanks on non-traditional security studies (NTS-Asia). The consortium is coordinated by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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The calamity had hit at a time when the Unfortunately, Pakistan had country was grappling with many competing limited institutional capacity to priorities. The internal security situation was strategically plan and cope with unpredictable, a war was ongoing and fiscal these challenges. constraints were grinding. There was lack of clarity in governance norms at the overarching level as many things were being reshaped. The federation’s relationship with its provinces was being redefined under a constitutional amendment and a new formula for fiscal federalism. Drastic changes had been made in the local government system. Many processes were, therefore, in a flux. This, coupled with Pakistan’s systemically weak governance capacity, posed an impediment to rescue and relief, and constrained efforts aimed at rehabilitation.

Magnitude of the Response

There were many questions about the effectiveness of governance upon which successful relief, rehabilitation and further strategic planning hinged. Five points were crucial: Firstly, coordination was critical at every stage. Pakistan’s indigenous population and diaspora had stepped in to help, as had the international community. Unfortunately, the country did not have a regulatory framework in place to allow full expression of the potential contribution of volunteers, nor did it have frameworks that could enable civil society engagement in a structured manner. It was critical to develop institutional mechanisms, so that Pakistan could leverage on the strength of many strong civil society organisations and the socially committed private sector, which had been mobilised in response to the crisis. Secondly, resources were and would continue to be an issue. The initial response to the crisis was below expectations; additional support was sorely needed to meet the United Nations’ estimates in the short term. In the medium- and long-term, support must also be commensurate with comprehensive damage assessments. However, the Pakistani government would have to institutionalise oversight mechanisms in order to overcome the trust deficit. This deficit plagued its relationship with donors. As a result, disbursement channels outside of government entities were forced to be explored.

Priorities and Climate Change

Thirdly, there were a number of short-term priorities. Consolidation of information streams in every sector—health education, infrastructure, livelihood, etc—was one of them. This was to obviate current duplication and multiple channels of information flow. In the short-term, the government of Pakistan must also facilitate speedy import of essential food items. This is so that cartelisation—a dominant feature during commodity shortages in Pakistan—would not come into play to exploit the situation. Fourthly and in the medium term, once relief was over, the task of rehabilitating the victims of a vast humanitarian tragedy and economic revival must get underway. Plans for reviving industrial and agricultural output, rebuilding infrastructure and supporting poor communities in a post-disaster situation would have to be developed and 23

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

implemented. This could not happen without additional resources being effectively utilised. Low priority expenditures had to be diverted to focus on aid, just as establishment costs had to be cut back. The critical question of increasing Pakistan tax-to-GDP ratio and policy discussions on reform of GST had become relevant, now more than ever. Lastly, the flood disaster also prompted an analysis of Pakistan’s capacity to cope with climate change. To a certain extent, the true scale of the disaster could not have been predicted; however, an advisory had been issued on 26 June 2010, indicating that there would be an increased risk of flash floods. Several reports had previously drawn attention to the risk that was looming—with rapidly receding glaciers Pakistan was vulnerable to flooding followed by periods of extreme drought. In fact, experts had indicated that this may be one of the first footprints of the greenhouse effects in the sub-continent. Unfortunately, Pakistan had limited institutional capacity to strategically plan and cope with these challenges. The report of a Task Force on Climate Change had not translated into policy. The country’s disaster management frameworks developed subsequent to the October 2005 earthquake had not been functioning well. Hence, ideas were mooted to create new commissions and institutional mechanisms. However, the top-down models of centralised bodies and installation of parallel structures would not work unless certain governance norms were ingrained.

Politicised Governance

The floods were also a reminder of the highly politicised nature of governance in the country. The unusual diversions of floodwater as a result of the politics of canal breaches had had a role to play in flooding many areas. This was an illustration of how influence was wielded and power abused. At a more overarching level, inefficiencies in governing the Indus had come into focus—in particular, weaknesses in regulating the mighty waterway and the ill-planned settlements that had developed around it. Pakistan has a mammoth task at hand, and many competing priorities. Progress depends on the quality of governance, commitment of its leadership and the level of international support. The lives of millions of impoverished people in the riverine communities would be at stake if the country and international community failed to accord due attention to them. SC

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Evan A. Laksmana

The Indonesian Military and Disaster Relief

Potential Pitfalls and Challenges

The triple disaster that struck Indonesia in 2010 has led to the deployment of the Indonesian Defence Forces (TNI) to provide disaster relief. What are the potential pitfalls and challenges of increasing the military’s role in disaster relief and management?

Following the 2010 “triple disaster” in Indonesia—the major flooding in Papua, the tsunami in Mentawai Islands and the volcanic eruption in Central Java—the Indonesian Defence Forces (TNI) was deployed to provide search and rescue assistance and other emergency relief. This involved several battalion-size units from the Army Strategic Reserve Command, Marines, Air Force Special Forces and others. This was but a recent example of the TNI’s “traditional” role of being deployed in nearly every large-scale disaster Indonesia has seen. Such a role was a by-product of their operational preparedness and wide-ranging territorial structure across the country—making them a natural first responder. This was further underpinned by Law No. 34 of 2004, stipulating that the TNI could play an active role in responding to disasters and humanitarian crises as part of their Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) doctrine. The Army has also reportedly formulated guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Several military units have also been seconded to the National Disaster Management Agency (BPNB). In addition, a Presidential Decree in 2009 created the Disaster Relief Rapid Reaction Force (PRCPB) under the TNI Commander. Yet, with this increasingly institutionalised role, some have asked that the TNI be more involved in pre- and post-disaster management, not just during the emergency response. Lessons learnt from the experience of other militaries, however, suggest that assigning the TNI to execute more HADR missions while providing them with a larger role in the pre- and post-disaster periods have significant consequences and potential pitfalls.

Potential Pitfalls of HADRs

Firstly, military resources are best suited for high-intensity, short-term assignments, while post-disaster relief and reconstruction could take weeks and months. Also, HADR

Evan A. Laksmana is a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, and an adjunct lecturer at the Indonesian Defence University. He had been Visiting Associate Fellow with the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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missions require different training, more airlift capability, and different type of vehicles than the typical conventional forces. There is also the need to have an organisational culture and ethos that not only grasp humanitarian principles, but also encourage patience, restraint and flexibility. Secondly, deeper and longer engagement of the military in HADR may be detrimental over time for civil-military relations. To begin with, HADR operations require soldiers to undertake civilian tasks—possibly raising civil-military tension. Also, militaries often prefer to modify disaster responses to fit more closely with their own training and abilities, especially when officers on the ground are at odds with the civilian officials. These “dual chain of command” issues will be more pronounced without institutionalised mechanisms and training for civilian-military interface during disaster response and management. Thirdly, while the military is ideal for rapid response, long-term deployment in HADR could move them away from their professional mooring as experts in the “management of violence”. This will further undermine readiness, effectiveness and professionalism in the long run by depriving them of the time to train their war-fighting missions, by causing wear and tear of military equipment, by diverting resources and through other spill-over impacts. Fourthly, increasing the military’s role in pre- and post-HADR management might create too much dependence, while providing less impetus to empower civilian disaster actors. Such dependence is problematic when we consider that a standing peacetime military is generally administrative in posture, or with a minimum number of soldiers. As such, when a large-scale disaster suddenly strikes, the military may not necessarily have all the immediate strength and necessary resources—especially when military facilities themselves are hit. Finally, the “militarisation” of civilian functions in disaster management might raise tensions with international donor agencies and NGOs. This would complicate aid relief at a time when a single standard operating procedure has yet to be formulated. Also, in countries where the government itself is cash-strapped and the military is without sustained training in HADR, angering international donors will be counter-productive. These potential pitfalls, however, do not imply that the TNI should not be deployed at all in HADR. Instead, they suggest that if Jakarta intends to increase the role of the TNI in disaster relief and management, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) should address two main challenges beforehand.

Without addressing these challenges, a hasty decision to provide more leeway for the TNI in disaster management might actually spell worse disasters to come.

Challenges Ahead

Firstly, the MoD along with the TNI Headquarters must revisit its organisational structure, education and training, as well as Orders of Battle. This is because not all military units are on stand-by calls for disaster, nor do they have sustained training in HADR. Indeed, within the TNI, only a select few technical units—mainly the Combat Engineers 26

Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

and Health Battalions—have the specialised skills and training with a direct disaster response application. Also, the TNI’s overall Orders of Battle still focus on domestic security with around 60 per cent of its forces consisting of territorial and intelligence officers, with another 30 per cent consisting of infantry and strike forces—which are unsuitable for sustained HADR deployment and management. Consequently, as the recent deployment suggests, the number of combat engineers and health battalions were so small that infantry troops and Special Forces provided the bulk of the disaster relief brigade. Secondly, the MoD should support efforts to boost the civilian capacity of local governments and other agencies involved in disaster management and relief. This is not only to ensure a well-structured system to be in place at the local level—hence improving the pace of relief—but also because it would reduce the country’s dependence on the TNI that may not always have the necessary resources on the spot. Without addressing these challenges, a hasty decision to provide more leeway for the TNI in disaster management might actually spell worse disasters to come. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

Indonesia’s Twin Disasters

Will the Next Big One Reach Singapore? The twin disasters that struck Indonesia in the last week of October 2010 were a timely alert that the region must be better prepared for the worst. Scientific predictions point to a bigger earthquake, and possibly a killer tsunami in the years to come.

On 25 October 2010, Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono rushed back from the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi. A major 7.7 magnitude earthquake had just struck off Sumatra’s Mentawai Islands, triggering fears of another tsunami since the one in 2004, which savaged Aceh and killed some 230,000 people across 14 countries. As it turned out, this second tsunami was much less deadly, taking away some 500 lives. But the Mentawai earthquake was quickly followed the next day by a volcanic eruption in Mount Merapi in central Java, which killed at least 38 people. Although the combined death toll was not massive, the back-to-back disasters in Sumatra and Central Java have raised fears that both the Mentawai earthquake and the Merapi eruption could be linked. If so, this could be ominous for Indonesia. Volcanologists believed Indonesia may have been spared another major catastrophe—for now. But experts had warned that the big one was yet to come.

The Next Big One

Professor Pan Tso-Chien, director of the Institute of Catastrophe Risk Management, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), was at a World Bank forum in Seoul on the eve of the Mentawai earthquake where he predicted that Sumatra was ripe for another major shock. The forum, ironically entitled “It’s Not Too Late: Preparing for Asia’s Big Earthquake”, noted that few Asian cities, except for Japan and New Zealand, had proper earthquake mitigation programmes. Similar forecasts had been made by NTU’s Earth Observatory of Singapore (EOS), which had been monitoring the region’s geological trends. Its director, Kerry Sieh, had been widely quoted that the 7.7 magnitude Mentawai earthquake was a foretaste of worse to come. In its website, the EOS assessed that the 25 October quake was a large aftershock of the magnitude 8.4 Sumatran earthquake three years earlier on

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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Climate Change and Natural Disasters CHAPTER I

12 September 2007. Basing its assessment on In the end, however, individual the analysis of the U.S. Geological Survey, the ASEAN countries, especially EOS expected a more severe earthquake off the Indonesia, must be responsible for western coast of Sumatra up to magnitude 8.8 the safety and well-being of their within the next few decades. own citizens. Start with disaster The EOS, in collaboration with the Indo- prevention. nesian Institute of Science (LIPI), runs a network of GPS instruments to monitor tectonic movements along the west Sumatran coast and the Mentawai Islands. LIPI’s earthquake geologist, Danny Hilman Natawidjaja, saw the Mentawai earthquake as either part of the healing process following the 2007 incident or part of a wounding process that would lead to a bigger rupture of a fault line known as the Sunda megathrust. According to EOS, scientists say such a rupture was inevitable because of strain that had been building up in the Sunda megathrust where two tectonic plates interact. Based on the patterns of large earthquakes over the past seven centuries, the EOS added that scientists believed the current sequence of earthquakes would eventually culminate in a much larger earthquake, even approaching the size of the killer earthquake of magnitude 9.1 which triggered the 2004 tsunami. “Exactly when that might happen isn’t clear. As they said previously, it could be in 30 minutes or in 30 years,” said the EOS. Natawidjaja had been warning of the need for infrastructure development to factor in the threat of earthquakes in the vicinity of Sumatra, including the Sunda Strait where Krakatau is located. The proposed Java-Sumatra bridge across the Sunda Strait would be particularly vulnerable.

Impact on Singapore

Also potentially vulnerable would be high-rise buildings in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, according to the EOS, citing a recent research. It had assessed that if a giant earthquake struck again off Sumatra, some high-rise buildings in these cities could be affected by ground shaking. It said tall buildings constructed above soft soils might be at high risk because ground motion from distant earthquakes could be amplified. The EOS did simulation studies to determine how ground motion from such a huge Sumatran quake would affect buildings in eight major cities in the region: Padang, Bengkulu, Palembang, Pekanbaru and Jakarta in Indonesia as well as Singapore and the Malaysian cities of Kuala Lumpur and Penang. These cities were considered because they lie within two fault lines of the Mentawai megathrust segment. The results were reported in the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. Given their proximity, Padang, Bengkulu and other major cities in Sumatra would be most vulnerable to structural damage from a powerful Mentawai-area quake. The studies also investigated whether buildings in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were adequately resilient. Ground shaking could also affect high-rise buildings far away because low-frequency seismic waves travel great distances. “Such waves are amplified in areas where the soil is soft,” said the EOS in its website. “As such, tall buildings in the two capital cities are ‘relatively brittle’, and it is crucial 29

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

to investigate their performance under the kind of sustained ground shaking that would occur in a powerful Sumatran quake,” the research concluded. The EOS said that the findings could help cities plan mitigation strategies such as retrofitting buildings to make them more earthquake-resilient.

Responding to Future Disasters

Given the scientific evidence, the question is clearly not if, but when the next major catastrophes would occur. Killer earthquakes may trigger killer tsunamis. Both are occurring with greater frequency. Singapore and the ASEAN region clearly have to be prepared for the storm ahead. At the level of the individual ASEAN states, disaster preparedness seems to come in varying degrees—from those who are well geared to those who are worryingly still ill prepared. Indonesia, which is part of the world’s most volatile earthquake belt—the Ring of Fire—will suffer the most and, therefore, must step up its act. At the regional and international levels, ASEAN has been actively preparing for the worst. At its 2010 summit in Hanoi, ASEAN ramped up its collaboration with the United Nations in disaster management. Both would cooperate to develop disaster management strategies, following their successful joint response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. An ASEAN-UN joint response would be crucial in future. In the end, however, individual ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, must be responsible for the safety and well-being of their own citizens. Start with disaster prevention. SC

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CHAPTER II

Energy Security

Barry Desker

Japan Disaster: Nuclear Power after Fukushima Alvin Chew

Japan Disaster: End of the Nuclear Industry? C. Raja Mohan

Japan and India: Towards Nuclear and Security Cooperation Ryan Clarke, Nur Azha Putra, Mely Caballero-Anthony & Rajesh Basrur

Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Will it Enhance Human Security? Alvin Chew

Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Competition or Cooperation? Joshy M. Paul

Japan-China: Spat Over Nuclear Arsenal? Eric Frécon

Environmental Issues: Challenges or Opportunities for Indonesia? Koh Swee Lean, Collin

The Yeonpyeong Attack: Shooting Down Denuclearisation You Ji

Yeonpyeong: Tough Test for China’s North Korea Policy Kwa Chong Guan

A Second Nuclear Age in Asia?

Energy Security CHAPTER II

Barry Desker

Japan Disaster

Nuclear Power after Fukushima Japan’s nuclear crisis triggered by the recent earthquake and tsunami has raised fundamental questions about the future of the global energy industry and energy security.

The tsunami that crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on 11 March 2011 unleashed fears of massive radiation in the surrounding Japanese countryside. While the Japanese government has established a 20-kilometre exclusion zone around the plant, many governments have advised their citizens to keep at least 80 kilometres away. Although the earthquake and tsunami probably took more than 25,000 lives and has caused the displacement of thousands more, world attention has been focused on the dramatic efforts to prevent a nuclear meltdown. The mood in Japan has shifted against the use of nuclear energy and Prime Minister Naoto Kan has shied away from clarifying whether Japan will proceed with the earlier planned construction of 14 nuclear plants. China has delayed the construction of new nuclear reactors, the ruling Christian Democrats in Germany lost an important state election over the nuclear issue and Southeast Asian states, which were once eager to climb on the nuclear power bandwagon, have begun re-thinking their stance on the issue. France is pushing for international standards on nuclear safety. These developments occur even though there have been only two fatalities so far from radiation leaks in Fukushima.

Shifting Oil Trend

The Fukushima incident took place when it appeared that the nuclear power industry was on the cusp of a period of growth. Increasingly, states appeared to be turning more to nuclear power in an era of rising fuel prices, concerns about the greenhouse gas effects of fossil fuels and a slowdown in production of hydrocarbons. Even in our part of the world, crude oil production has declined. Production levels in Malaysia and Brunei have flattened and Indonesia has become a net importer.

Barry Desker is Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

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There is a growing concentration of production, especially in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Russia set to account for almost 40 per cent of global oil production by 2025. Increasingly, these oil and natural gas resources will be controlled by national oil companies rather than by multinational oil companies. One fear of consumers is that such companies will be more responsive to domestic political imperatives than price signals. This wariness of being held hostage to external policy decisions has led to the revival of interest in nuclear power in the past decade. The current generation of nuclear power reactors has lower costs of power generation, vastly improved safety features and state of the art waste and proliferation management capabilities. With rising electricity prices, these nuclear power plants are economically competitive. Even land-scarce Singapore is studying the long-term feasibility of nuclear energy. The pressure will grow for technological adaptations and mitigation measures that could reduce the need to rely on a nuclear power alternative.

Back to Oil and Gas?

However, the issues raised by the Fukushima disaster are likely to result in a slowdown in current plans for the expansion of nuclear power generation, especially in the West. The exceptions are likely to be in Russia and China. Their governments will be less influenced by domestic pressures centred on fears about the safety of nuclear power. They will be more concerned about the need for cleaner fuels and about greenhouse gas emissions as they face increasing pressure at international negotiations on climate change. India, Brazil and Southeast Asia are likely to follow their lead, despite the cautious initial reactions of these states to developments in Fukushima. After Chernobyl, it took more than a decade for proponents to revive interest in nuclear power as a source of overcoming the risk of rising energy insecurity. As it takes 15–20 years to ramp up nuclear power generation owing to the lead time required for the commissioning of nuclear power plants, the delay arising from Fukushima will mean that nuclear power is likely to be a significant factor in electricity generation only after 2030. This highlights the continuing global dependence on oil and natural gas and the search for “clean” coal and other alternative technologies. Russia’s emergence as an energy superpower will grow as it possesses the largest global reserves of natural gas, together with Iran and Qatar. It also has one of the world’s largest recoverable coal reserves. Elsewhere, energy insecurity will be the catalyst for technological innovation. The United States and China will lead the way in pioneering the development of clean coal technologies and carbon capture and storage. Alternative energy sources, such as biofuels, will attract increasing attention. But there will be a need to move beyond the current generation of food-based biofuels, which have resulted in rising food and commodity prices.

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Energy Security CHAPTER II

Search for Energy Resilience

The challenge will lie in reducing the lag between technological breakthroughs and their adoption commercially. In the energy sector, it has taken about 25 years for new technologies to be widely available. For example, natural gas technologies have been widely available since the 1970s but natural gas has only slowly emerged as a competitor for oil-based fuels. High costs of investment and the sunk costs of plant and equipment represented by existing technologies have been a deterrent in the adoption of new technologies. The ongoing nuclear crisis in Fukushima has focused attention once again on the challenges posed by the desire of states to enhance their resilience against volatile petroleum prices and their quest for energy independence. While nuclear power is now much safer, the public imagination globally is captured by the negative impact of scenes of refugees from the Fukushima locality and billowing smoke from the nuclear plants as well as reports of land and seawater contamination. The pressure will grow for technological adaptations and mitigation measures that could reduce the need to rely on a nuclear power alternative. SC

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STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

Alvin Chew

Japan Disaster

End of the Nuclear Industry? The nuclear crisis in Japan severely aggravated the twin disasters from the earthquake and tsunami. Will this result in a catastrophic meltdown, as experienced in Chernobyl more than two decades ago, and trigger a global retreat from the nuclear energy industry?

Japan was thrown into its worst national crisis since World War II when a devastating earthquake of magnitude 8.9—later upgraded to 9—occurred on the floor of the Pacific Ocean. It culminated in a tsunami that overturned marine vessels, uprooted buildings and led to many deaths in the Sendai region in north-eastern Japan. Compounding the twin disasters was the shutdown of the nuclear facilities at the Fukushima power plant following explosions. The Dai-Ichi nuclear reactors at the Fukushima power plant are Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) with an operating history as old as 40 years. Reactor-1, where the top of its containment building exploded, had been in operation since 1971. In February 2011, its operating license was extended by 10 years. All the reactors at the plant take in enriched uranium as fuel, except for Reactor-3, which accepts reprocessed fuel that contains a mixture of plutonium content. The nuclear crisis occurred when the cooling system of the reactor was destroyed in the wake of the tsunami. On-site staff frantically tried to prevent overheating of the reactor by dousing it with seawater. Efforts to defuse the pressures on the reactor core were critical to prevent a fallout of radiation particles into the atmosphere.

Lessons for the Rest of the World

Japan’s nuclear industry has been under stress in the last 10 years following a series of nuclear accidents mainly due to operators’ negligence. Nuclear facilities are frequently subjected to seismic activities in the country, but the structural integrity of the reactor building remains intact, preventing the possibility of any nuclear meltdown. Most accidents on nuclear power plants are caused by a string of events that compromise the overall operability of the plant. In 2007, an earthquake in north-western Japan caused fire and radiation leakage in the ancillary buildings of the KashiwazakiKariwa nuclear power plant. All the seven reactors on the plant had to be shut down to

Alvin Chew is Adjunct Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he specialises in nuclear energy issues.

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Energy Security CHAPTER II

limit any further damage. While the nuclear industry places high emphasis on protecting the nuclear reactor core, additional protection is needed for related facilities and infrastructure. A good point to learn from this nuclear crisis was the effective evacuation of the residents to a safety zone 20 kilometres away from the plant, in spite of the massive disruption in transportation caused by the tsunami. There was a relatively calm atmosphere among the evacuees as iodine tablets were handed out to protect against harmful radiation. The composure of the community greatly assisted the relevant authorities to concentrate on salvaging the affected nuclear facilities.

Impact on ASEAN Countries and Beyond

With the interest on nuclear energy heating up in the ASEAN region, the nuclear crisis in Japan will undoubtedly stir attention among the Southeast Asian countries – as it has globally. Throughout the world, the crisis provides a favourable platform for antinuclear activists to pressurise governments to halt their civilian nuclear programmes. In Thailand, the prime minister announced that nuclear energy was unlikely to be on the agenda as the country geared up for the coming election. Critics of nuclear energy in Indonesia, a country with frequent seismic activities, have voiced their concerns on safety and governance issues, pressing the government to delay plans for developing nuclear power plants. However, the long-term interest in nuclear energy remains undaunted in the region. Vietnam will proceed to bring in their reactors by 2020. For Malaysia, the government has said it is willing to learn from the Japan nuclear crisis, stressing that the civilian nuclear power programme is still very much intact. Energy planning for the future requires looking beyond the conventional fossil fuel generation plants. The growth of the nuclear energy industry in the region will have to be complemented by a boost in electricity production as well as expertise. Therefore, the demand for a reliable base load power source, which is a requisite for economic growth in the region, will place nuclear energy high on the planning list. Worldwide, nuclear energy will continue to grow as a source of power in the production of electricity so critical for economic growth. The belief in a nuclear renaissance is not founded solely in the movement towards a greener environment. Most of the new nuclear reactors to be built will be in China whose quest for energy has resulted in the government investing heavily in nuclear energy as well as other resources. We can, therefore, expect that most countries will proceed with the building of new nuclear plants. It is unfortunate that Japan resides on the Ring of Fire, but Tokyo is unlikely to be deterred from continuing with the operation of future nuclear power plants. However, we can anticipate an increase in domestic opposition to nuclear energy in Japan and elsewhere arising from the Fukushima incident. It is a risk that most nations have to contend with. But certainly, with more than 400 nuclear reactors operating throughout the world, it is a testament that the advantages of nuclear energy outstrip any fears of a nuclear disaster. SC 37

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

C. Raja Mohan

Japan and India

Towards Nuclear and Security Cooperation Japan’s global and strategic partnership with India is acquiring two new features— cooperation in civil nuclear energy and the establishment of a “Two plus Two” dialogue. The new elements will mean Japan-India relations will no longer be marginal to the security politics of East Asia.

Japan has underlined its determination to deepen its security partnership with India, launching negotiations with New Delhi on civil nuclear cooperation in June 2010 and unveiling the first comprehensive strategic  dialogue in quick succession in early July. Despite the frequent changes in Japan’s political dispensation during the last few years, Tokyo has persisted with its decision over the last decade to establish a strategic and global partnership with Delhi. Tokyo’s talks with Delhi on 28–29 June were about ending Japan’s past reservations over atomic energy cooperation with India. Its “Two plus Two” dialogue with Delhi on 5–6 July was focused on building an institutional framework for security cooperation in the future.

“Two Plus Two” Strategic Dialogue

India is only the third country, after the United States and Australia, with which Japan has a “Two plus Two” dialogue, which brings ministers and officials from the foreign and defence ministries of Japan and its partner countries into one room at the same time. Japan’s latest outreach to India brings into relief the growing importance of their bilateral relationship that has long been marginal to the geopolitics of East Asia. As major power relations in Asia enter a period of flux amidst the rise of China and the widely perceived American decline, Japan and India appear to be drawing closer. Yet, there is no denying the fact that Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s government has chosen to court a bit of domestic political controversy early in its tenure by opening negotiations with India on civil nuclear cooperation. Opposition to nuclear cooperation with non-members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a long-standing policy of Japan. Although the NPT itself

C. Raja Mohan is Adjunct Professor of South Asian Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, and Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express, New Delhi.

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Energy Security CHAPTER II

does not bar civil nuclear cooperation with Nevertheless, the possibility of non-members of the treaty, Japan, in an effort deeper security cooperation to demonstrate its arms control credentials, has between Japan and India will insisted on such a policy. India has not signed draw attention in Beijing and other East Asian capitals. the NPT and is unlikely to ever do so. After India conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998, Japan denounced them strongly, announced sanctions and suspended high level exchanges with India. As India gradually broke out of its international isolation after the nuclear tests, Japan too began to reconsider its harsh approach to India. It slowly withdrew sanctions and eventually normalised bilateral relations. During then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to India in April 2005, the two sides announced their plans to establish a strategic and global partnership.

Nuclear Commerce

Even as Tokyo and Delhi intensified their engagement since then, it seemed that there would be little room for nuclear energy cooperation between Japan and India. The announcement of the historic U.S.-Indian nuclear initiative in July 2005 by U.S. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, began to pose new challenges for Japan’s nuclear policy towards India. Tokyo eventually endorsed, somewhat grudgingly, the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear initiative at the Nuclear Suppliers Group in September 2008. As Russia, France and the United States rushed to conclude commercial nuclear agreements with India, Japan seemed to stand aloof. But it could not do so for too long because of a number of reasons. For one, the French and American reactor vendors have complex tie ups with leading Japanese nuclear engineering companies for the supply of components. Put simply, the French company Areva, the U.S. corporations Westinghouse and General Electric cannot sell in the Indian market until Japan has a formal agreement for nuclear cooperation with India. Besides the demands from Washington and Paris, Japanese companies too have been lobbying for a new approach towards India. Meanwhile, under pressure to create more jobs in Japan, Prime Minister Kan’s cabinet approved on 18 June a new economic growth strategy that among many other things called for increasing exports of infrastructure packages. Nuclear power plants are part of this package. The dangers of Japan falling behind the rest of the international community in taking advantage of the nuclear commerce with India were brought to Tokyo’s attention when Seoul announced plans in mid-June to conclude a bilateral agreement on atomic energy with Delhi.

Implications for Asia

While Japan’s prospective nuclear cooperation with India is important, the expansion of their bilateral security cooperation might be far more consequential for the future of Asian geopolitics over the longer term. During Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Tokyo in 39

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

2008, the two sides unveiled a declaration on bilateral security cooperation that pointed to many shared interests, including the free flow of energy and natural resources and the protection of sea lines of communication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Peacekeeping, disaster relief, anti-piracy and humanitarian operations are among the other areas identified by the two sides. The intent to expand the interaction between the security establishments of the two countries was fleshed out in greater detail when then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama visited India at the end of 2009. As part of that detailed work plan, top officials of the Japanese and Indian foreign and defence ministries met in Delhi in July for the so-called “Two plus Two” dialogue. Both the Japanese and Indian national security bureaucracies tend to be cautious in undertaking new ventures and are ponderous in implementing them. The progress the two sides make on defence cooperation, then, is bound to be measured rather than dramatic in the near term. Nevertheless, the possibility of deeper security cooperation between Japan and India will draw attention in Beijing and other East Asian capitals. SC

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Energy Security CHAPTER II

Ryan Clarke, Nur Azha Putra, Mely Caballero-Anthony & Rajesh Basrur

Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia

Will it Enhance Human Security? The debate on nuclear energy appears to place too much emphasis on the operational security aspects at the expense of millions of impoverished people in Southeast Asia. It is still unclear whether nuclear energy could make electricity available to masses.

Nuclear Energy for Human Security

Two issues come to mind when assessing the viability of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia through the lens of human security. Firstly, can nuclear energy be deployed without compromising human safety and accelerating already-worrying signs of environmental degradation in the region? Secondly, can nuclear energy really enhance human security? Both questions are particularly salient as political stability in the region can be tenuous and that the region itself is vulnerable to natural disasters, namely earthquakes and typhoons. Hence, if human security is to be understood as ultimately about human development and welfare, it naturally raises the question whether nuclear energy can enhance human development. In the context of Southeast Asia, can nuclear energy alleviate poverty? Or will it simply be a means to an end—a national strategy to secure economic growth via energy security through the diversification of respective national energy mixes and resources? Or will the nuclear energy project in the region create new conflicts and exacerbate environmental degradation, such as the controversial hydroelectric dam projects which have led to the deterioration of river ecosystems and population displacements in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand? At a 2010 conference on “Nuclear Energy and Human Security” organised by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), nuclear experts and policy analysts agreed on one thing: while nuclear energy has the potential to deliver sustainable energy security and human security, it would not be possible without sound national governance.

The Criticality of Good Governance

Good governance and proper regulation in managing potential nuclear energy programmes is an absolute necessity. It plays a key role in ensuring that nuclear energy brings about real Ryan Clarke, Nur Azha Putra, Mely Caballero-Anthony and Rajesh Basrur are, at the time of writing, Visiting Research Fellow, Associate Research Fellow and Associate Professors respectively at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. They are attached to the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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progress in the realm of human security. Furthermore, best practices that ensure non-discriminatory access will also lay the groundwork for larger regional frameworks later down the line. Nonetheless, there is one primary question to ask when thinking about ASEAN nations that are seriously considering nuclear energy programmes: will the additional electricity generated be loaded onto the existing grid structure or will it spark the development of new grids? Vietnam, for instance, has achieved somewhat of a revolution in its rural electrification programme. The government has constructed a major line that runs the entire length of the country (north to south), which enabled the development of various sub-grids into new areas in the countryside. Economists and other development experts have also hailed the government for ensuring that the Vietnamese people enjoy non-discriminatory access. Nevertheless, these experts also warned that while an extended national electricity grid would reach more households, it would also inevitably lead to an increase in the national demand for energy. As far as human security is concerned, Vietnam’s rural electrification programme plugs its people into the national economy, which then gives them a stake in its future. Going one step further, the effective provision of electricity may also play a decisive role in consolidating national identities, enhancing the “we” feeling, especially in multiethnic nations that have suffered from internal instability, or outright civil war. However, other ASEAN nations that are debating the nuclear option, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, do not enjoy a Vietnam-type situation, partly due to their fragmented, archipelagic geography. Given the current political and economic climate in Southeast Asia, effective and consistent governance is a key variable. It is critical in ensuring that nuclear energy is made available and affordable to households in the countryside, rather than just for urban and coastal industries. This is not simply an act of philanthropy; it is a crucial factor in sustainable national development.

Given the current political and economic climate in Southeast Asia, effective and consistent governance is a key variable.

Role of Civil Society

However, it is important to note that governance is not simply about formulating incentives and disincentives to guide the flow of electricity generated from nuclear power. Governance must also translate itself into various forms in order to effectively manage operational, environmental and proliferation risks. This is something that will inevitably involve a multi-level approach with the active participation of non-governmental and civil society organisations (NGOs and CSOs). Aside from effectively harnessing scientific expertise and technical know-how, there must be strict adherence to international treaties on proliferation. This will require a strong regional enforcement mechanism. Further, local CSOs and NGOs must be adequately consulted by governments—not simply appeased—in order to benefit from their local knowledge, avoid unnecessary environmental damage, and ensure that a critical mass of the community is on board. On the other end, CSOs and NGOs must realise that their role, similar to that of academics, is to provide objective analysis with the aim to inform and influence policy in a rational manner. These organisations should be considered important nodes within the framework of nuclear energy governance, not as antagonists outside of it. SC 42

Energy Security CHAPTER II

Alvin Chew

Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia

Competition or Cooperation? Southeast Asia is expected to see the operation of its first nuclear power plant by 2020. While this will alleviate concerns over energy security and carbon emissions, will the advent of nuclear reactors spark a nuclear energy race in the region?

Southeast Asia will have its first nuclear power plant on stream by 2020. Vietnam has already announced to host a two-reactor station to be built by Russia. The reactors are the first of the 16 that Vietnam has planned to meet its increasing energy demand. Other nations in the region have also expressed interest in pursuing nuclear energy. Singapore is conducting a pre-feasibility study to get into the nuclear game.

Vietnam’s Surprising Lead

Vietnam, which is expected to receive financial assistance from Russia for its first nuclear plant, has emerged at the forefront in the regional charge towards nuclear energy. It has abandoned the waiting game as its appetite for electricity in the upcoming years grows, overcoming the past stigma of the nuclear industry. Global climate change concerns could have reinforced its decision, but for a developing country, Vietnam’s quest for energy to propel its economy has greatly superseded the concerns about global warming. Nuclear energy aims to reconcile the twin dilemmas of energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear energy serves as a source for baseload energy supply and does not emit any carbon dioxide in generating electricity. Nuclear energy will therefore help reduce the problem of global warming. Yet, the Southeast Asian region is far from being considered advanced in terms of technological progress. The emerging economies in many parts of the world have embraced nuclear energy as an alternative to conventional fossil fuels. In China, nuclear reactors are being constructed at a phenomenal rate that will see an additional 108 reactors to its current fleet in 15 years’ time. Oil-rich nations in the Gulf adopt the lucrative strategy of exporting oil and gas while switching to nuclear energy for their domestic desalination purposes. These countries acknowledged the criticality of nuclear power for their economic growth.

Alvin Chew is Adjunct Fellow of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he specialises in nuclear energy issues.

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It is high time that this already established technology makes its way into Southeast Asia.

Time for Southeast Asia

It is high time that this already established technology makes its way into Southeast Asia. The developing region can benefit from the technological boost flowing in and the training of highly skilled operators to prepare for their first reactor in 2020. Already evident when a new entrant decides to operate a nuclear reactor is the numerous technical cooperation forged between it and the various nations that already have the technical know-how. In addition, educational institutions and international contractors will want a share of the pie. We are also witnessing a renewed interest in nuclear energy in the other ASEAN countries. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have all proposed to operate nuclear power plants in their countries. Riding on the wave of the global climate change agenda is a relatively weak argument for these developing nations; ultimately it is the perfectly legitimate reason of economic growth that shapes their energy policies. Furthermore, these nations see the technological and even strategic value of having nuclear power plants—an avenue to build up technical competence and engage internationally on nuclear-related matters. Nuclear energy also plays the role, paradoxically, of boosting the safety profile of a nation. Highly trained specialists are required to operate nuclear power plants and adhere to the safety standards and international safeguards of fissile materials. A strong emphasis on safety culture needs to be cultivated in society for the responsible handling of nuclear power plants. Given the close proximity of its Southeast Asian neighbours, the onus of safety in managing a nuclear power plant sited in Vietnam is not only on Hanoi; the entire ASEAN region has a part to play in ensuring that the best safety frameworks are in place. Nuclear power plants offer the potential for the regional countries to cooperate in this realm.

Regional Cooperation

To be sure, nuclear energy is not a new idea in Southeast Asia. The region had mooted it for the past few decades. Indonesia has a long-standing history of pursuing nuclear energy. Over the 40 years, it has built up the largest nuclear infrastructure in Southeast Asia, with three research reactors and a large pool of qualified staff. Thailand and Malaysia have also developed bodies of expertise to operate their research reactors. However, operating a full-fledged nuclear reactor for the purpose of generating electricity requires a different set of skills. With an established infrastructure, these countries will embark on an accelerated learning curve when they decide to have their first operational nuclear power plant. Singapore is making efforts to ensure that it is not left out in the game. In carrying out a pre-feasibility study, it is building confidence in the international community that its decision is not an impulsive one. The outcome of its pre-feasibility study is inconsequential to Vietnam’s nuclear energy expansion. Singapore understands the need to be continuously engaged in Southeast Asia—a region that will see a confluence of technological advancement in the future. 44

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Regional technical cooperation is crucial in addressing the challenges posed by having nuclear energy in Southeast Asia—from the front-end of uranium supply to the back-end issues of waste management. There are clearly lessons for the region from countries already operating nuclear power plants. Southeast Asia has 10 years before the first Vietnamese reactor comes on stream. It is indeed a very short time to make the region a model for nuclear cooperation. But the clock is ticking away. Can we do it? SC

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Joshy M. Paul

Japan-China

Spat Over Nuclear Arsenal? A spat over nuclear arsenal between China and Japan could upset the status quo in East Asia. An ardent propagator of nuclear disarmament, Japan seeks China to comply with other superpowers on nuclear disarmament. Will this Japanese posture, started by Hatoyama, continue under the new prime minister Naoto Kan?

In a trilateral meeting of Japan, China and South Korea over regional security issues in 2010, Japan uncharacteristically urged China to cut its nuclear arsenal or at least stop stockpiling more atomic weapons, which may disturb, if not undermine, the prevailing status quo in East Asia. Japan raised this issue in the Fourth Trilateral Foreign Ministers Meeting that was attended by then Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, China’s Yang Jiechi and then South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yu Myung-hwan in the South Korea’s southeast city of Gyeonju from 15–16 May 2010.*

China’s Reaction

The sharp message from Japan that China should “at least make efforts not to increase the number of its nuclear weapons and “show its commitment” to nuclear disarmament”, had opened up the possibility of a new round of diplomatic rivalry. China predictably reacted strongly to the suggestion. The Chinese minister said in reply that “China’s nuclear policy is transparent, legitimate and above reproach”; he nearly walked out of the talks. Recently the United States and Russia had decided to reduce the deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 each, 30 per cent less than the limit set in a 2002 treaty. China, the fourth largest nuclear power with about 240 operational warheads, has not given any commitment to reduce its stockpile. On the other hand, Beijing is modernising its delivery system with credible second-strike capability. The Telegraph recently reported that China is constructing a secret nuclear submarine base to bolster its capabilities in the Pacific. Although Japan is under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, increasing nuclear stockpile in East Asia is a cause for worry for Japan.

Joshy M. Paul is MacArthur Visiting Associate Fellow at the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

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Japan’s “Active” Diplomacy on Nuclear Disarmament

Fuelled by historical legacies and territorial disputes, and China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia, the Japan-China rivalry is likely to be unpredictable in the years to come.

As a victim of a nuclear device in World War II, Japan has recently pursued nuclear disarmament as a major component of its foreign policy options. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan has pledged to “work towards a nuclear-free Northeast Asia”. While addressing the Diet in January 2010, Foreign Minister Okada said that Japan would pursue “active” and “dynamic” diplomacy, and would be taking the lead role on global issues such as nuclear disarmament. Although then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama faced domestic criticism of his unimpressive attendance at the global nuclear summit convened by President Barack Obama in April 2010, Tokyo considered advocacy for nuclear disarmament as the thrust to raise its global position. In February the same year, Japan and Australia jointly called for “a world of decreased nuclear risk” and considered “ideas” and “practical steps” towards such a global order. One of the major aspects of such “ideas” was “enhancing the effectiveness of the security assurances”—something that Japan sought from China.

From a Pacifist to a “Constructivist” Security Policy

Japan under Hatoyama, brief though his premiership had been, had sought to “construct” a favourable security environment upon which Tokyo could propel its role and position in Asia. He sought to “change” Japan’s domestic and foreign policy including demanding that the U.S.-Japan relationship be based on an “equal footing”. Although the Futenma issue was resolved and Hatoyama was out of office, this DPJ policy might continue under his successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan. A clear indication of a possible continuation of Hatoyama’s policy was seen when Kan promulgated, in his first Diet speech, “an exhaustive cleanup of post-war government” and “a foreign and security policy grounded in a sense of responsibility”. Before taking over the Prime Minister’s post, Kan told Reuters that “we can have relations with China, India, Vietnam and other developing countries in which we complement each other in technology and economic structuring”. Although Kan might not pursue his foreign policy agenda aggressively, he considered Japan as a politico-economic power in Asia. Japan feels, however, that China is a major long-term threat to its security in spite of both countries having agreed to enhance relations in a “mutually beneficial” manner. Tokyo is wary about China’s military build-up, especially its development of blue water naval capabilities. China occasionally flexes its military muscle targeting Japan. This was manifested again in an encounter between two Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) destroyers, the Choukai and Suzunami, and several Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, including a pair of submarines and eight destroyers. The incident took place approximately 140 kilometres west-southwest of Okinawa in mid April during an exercise mission to the Pacific. The incident prompted a formal protest from Japan. 47

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In early 2009, China deployed cruise missile-laden destroyers around energyrich gas fields in the East China Sea, and conducted training exercises in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. To counter the looming threat from China, Japan is increasing its own defence capabilities and promoting a strategic relationship with friendly countries like Australia and India (other than the United States) in order to maintain the regional balance in Asia.

Tokyo’s Changing Defence Posture

Of late, Japan has initiated some changes in its defence structure. In 2006 it upgraded the Self Defence Agency to the Ministry of Defence, and deployed its maritime forces in the Indian Ocean for refuelling mission to the U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Tokyo is also enhancing its naval power. In the fiscal 2010 defence budget, the government earmarked funds for acquiring new tanks and building a new helicopter-carrying destroyer to enhance the military’s deterrence and response capabilities. In November 2009, Japan commissioned a 248-metre long naval ship DDH-22— Japan’s largest military vessel since World War II. Defined as a “helicopter-carrying destroyer”, it is expected to, among other roles, keep China’s active maritime activities in the disputed area in check. Indeed, a robust naval capability is the centrepiece of Japan’s defence-oriented security policy. Fuelled by historical legacies and territorial disputes, and China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia, the Japan-China rivalry is likely to be unpredictable in the years to come. SC *The foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea, Katsuya Okada and Yu Myung-hwan respectively, have both stepped down since this article was published.

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Eric Frécon

Environmental Issues

Challenges or Opportunities for Indonesia? Indonesia has been one of the world’s largest carbon emitters. Green energy business could offer Jakarta new opportunities to clean its reputation as well as sustain its economic growth.

Indonesia’s good name is today threatened by a statistical polemic relating to its carbon dioxide emissions. According to a 2007 report sponsored by the World Bank, the country is the world’s third largest emitter. Although Indonesian experts have asserted that the waters of Nusantara—the Indonesian archipelago—absorb more carbon than they release, the country has the highest deforestation rate in the world. According to the Riau Bulletin, about 1.08 million hectares of forest are lost annually to widespread illegal logging (in Riau Islands), farmland conversion and forest fires. In addition, a 2007 report by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) mentioned that the number of fire hotspots tended to increase in Indonesia in the period 2001–2006. Indeed, rainforest cover has steadily declined from 82 per cent in the 1960s to 53 per cent in 1995, and 49 per cent in 2005 according to the Mongabay website on tropical rainforests. Because of the fires that eliminate the forests and because of the disappearance of “carbon sinks” like trees and peat bogs, Indonesia is seen as a major polluting country. In 2009, a WWF-Hokkaido University report explained that the Riau province alone accounted for average annual carbon emissions equivalent to 58 per cent of Australia’s yearly emissions, or 122 per cent of the Netherlands’ emissions.

Reconciling Ecology and Economic Development

The puzzle for the Yudhoyono administration is challenging: how to provide energy to 240 million Indonesians as well as investors, without aggravating Indonesia’s image as a major polluter. On the one hand, development requires bringing connectivity to remote areas, which helps address the problems of separatism, criminality as well as regional grievances. The mission of the president is to protect the human security of his fellow citizens and to unify the more than 17,500 islands by developing both communication and access to electricity. To meet the president’s goal of sustaining the current dynamic economic

Eric Frécon is Post-doctoral Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he is attached to the Indonesia Programme.

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growth, there also has to be an increase in the national power grid’s generation capacity, especially in the Batam-Bintan-Karimun Free Trade Zone. Moreover, to attract foreign investments, Indonesian authorities have to regulate the activities of the oil, mining, paper and palm oil companies operating in the forests. On the other hand, Yudhoyono must now proceed carefully. The president has to take into consideration the environmental factor if he is to present Indonesia as a model of development on the international scene. To reconcile these national and international interests, he must explore new ways. The following can be considered:

Indonesia has successfully encouraged economic growth while containing the problem of terrorism. Now is the time for “green energy”.

Towards a “New Green Deal” in Indonesia

In the archipelago, there are several opportunities in the field of renewable energy. These may subsequently also create employment and new opportunities and niches for local and foreign companies. First of all, wind turbines. Generally, these either ruin the landscape or make excessive noise. The trend is now to plant these turbines at sea. Though this may pose a hazard to merchant vessels and fishermen, Indonesia could place the turbines in territorial waters far from the main sea lines of communication. East Nusa Tenggara is the windiest area but it would be much better to invest in waters to the south of Java. In parallel to the plans for setting up solar panels in the Sahara to power Europe, wind turbines in this part of the Indian Ocean could provide electricity to the crowded Indonesian islands. Secondly, as the Indonesian coastline is 54,700 kilometres long with several straits cutting across the archipelago, tide power could also be an interesting option. In the past, companies have already offered to deploy turbines that could turn the Malacca Straits’ flow velocity of two metres/second into electricity. Thirdly, government support for geothermal power projects is relevant. The “Ring of Fire” which traverses Indonesia regularly demonstrates its “power” through terrible earthquakes. For example, in just one day—25 October 2009—six earthquakes with magnitudes ranging from 5.0 to 6.1 hit Indonesia. The Geological Office of the Indonesian Department for Energy lists at least 83 volcanic sites. This geographical context explains why Indonesia has the largest geothermal reserves potential in the world—40 per cent or 27 GW in 60 fields.

Investment in Geothermal Projects

After the introduction of a geothermal law in 2003, the Yudhoyono administration is turning words into action. Following the 10,000 MW power project in 2006, a second 10,000 MW programme has been set up by the state power firm PLN (PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara) and independent private power producers. This later programme should generate 48 per cent of its power from geothermal plants, compared to less than three per cent (807 MW) of the energy mix in 2008. PT Pertamina Geothermal Energy 50

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was scheduled to spend US$130 million in 2009 to finance development of a number of geothermal power projects. Foreign countries support these initiatives. In October 2009, the head for Asia and Oceania of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation said that Japan would invest in sectors like geothermal energy in Indonesia. In 2008, Japan gave US$200 million to Indonesia to reduce its carbon emissions. In July 2009, for the same purpose, Jakarta received a US$300 million loan from the French Agency for the Development (AFD) for the second tranche of the Climate Change Programme Loan. The Global Environment Facility also supports the development of geothermal power in Indonesia. Thirty-six fields were ready for detailed exploration or exploitation in 2008. Nevertheless, such developments must be safe and sustainable for both the surrounding population and for the investors. For that, local authorities must avoid delays in the implementation of regulations and licensing approval. Indonesia has successfully encouraged economic growth while containing the problem of terrorism. Now is the time for “green energy”. In the past, Egypt became a major power producer by canalising the Nile floods, which previously had regularly devastated its banks. Perhaps it could be the same destiny for Indonesia—if it is able to turn troubles from the earth into opportunities. SC

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Koh Swee Lean, Collin

The Yeonpyeong Attack

Shooting Down Denuclearisation The North Korean artillery attack on South Korean-controlled Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010 constitutes the worst provocation amidst tension on the Korean Peninsula since the Cheonan incident. Could this episode effectively end all hope for denuclearising the peninsula?

On 23 November 2010, the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched a massive artillery barrage on the Yeonpyeong Island, which is controlled by South Korea. The attack was reportedly in response to the failure of the South Korean military to heed Pyongyang’s warning to stand down from war games on the island, which Pyongyang saw as a provocation. This attack left two South Korean military servicemen dead, scores wounded, and a rapid emergency evacuation of civilians from the island, which is perilously close to the contested sea border in the Yellow Sea. In a surprising turn of events, the South Korean defence minister resigned following domestic criticism of Seoul’s handling of the incident. This incident was the worst since the alleged North Korean sinking of the South Korean Navy corvette ROKS Cheonan in March 2010. Could this string of events threaten to end efforts to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula?

Not the First Time, Probably not the Last

Ever since the two Koreas signed the armistice, which ceased active hostilities of the Korean War in 1953, a series of armed provocations had taken place from time to time between the opposing Korean forces. Until the meltdown of its economy, precipitated by the dissolution of its primary sponsor at that time—the Soviet Union—Pyongyang had harboured dreams of eventual unification, by force again if necessary, of the entire Korean Peninsula under its rule. Infiltrations of armed agents, assassination attempts, for instance, were employed as means to undermine Seoul. In the 1990s, provocations from North Korea resumed, albeit at a lower tempo compared to during the Cold War. Most notable of all had been the 1996 Gangneung submarine infiltration attempt, which ended bloodily for both sides before all North

Koh Swee Lean, Collin, is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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Korean infiltrators were hunted down. With a Can this latest attack be turned plummeting economy, such provocations have into an opportunity to revive been largely subsumed by maritime incidents the stalled Six-Party Talks particularly in the disputed sea border known to denuclearise the Korean as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Peninsula? Sea. Naval forces from both Koreas jostled with each other to safeguard their maritime rights to the disputed zone, which largely characterised the “Crab Wars” between the two countries. Unlike the 1970s “Cold War” between the United Kingdom and Iceland, however, the inter-Korean “Crab Wars” have been much more violent. Inter-Korean naval skirmishes, involving loss of lives, had taken place near Yeonpyeong Island in 1999, 2002 and 2009, when North Korean patrol boats crossed into the South Korean side of the NLL. Prior to November 2010, the worst incident erupted when the Cheonan was sunk, with significant loss of lives, by what had been later determined to be a torpedo fired from North Korean mini-submarine.

Nuclear Trump Card too Valuable

Throughout the series of provocations by Pyongyang, the trend was apparent: tensions would erupt arising from those incidents, but they would be short-lived. Seoul would hurriedly deescalate the tensions and later demonstrate goodwill towards Pyongyang through the provisions of aid and offers of dialogue. A major reason for doing is Seoul’s quest to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions, though the desired outcome has not been forthcoming even after the Cheonan incident. The question one needs to ask is no longer why North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island, but what this whole string of provocations actually means for denuclearisation efforts in the Korean Peninsula. Ever since the first North Korean nuclear test in 2007, little meaningful progress had been made to encourage Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions. Despite carrots in the form of economic aid on one hand, and sticks in the form of sanctions on the other, what Seoul and its allies in the Six-Party Talks got in return had been continued North Korean reticence. The time has passed for meaningful progress in denuclearising the Korean Peninsula. With an economy in shambles, a large but technologically-inferior conventional military force compared to its southern brethren, Pyongyang’s only hope to fulfil its multiple strategic objectives—extortion of economic concessions, credible deterrence against perceived American military aggression, as well as to stay relevant on the international stage—lies in its nascent nuclear arsenal of an unknown quantity. No matter how rudimentary they may be, the nukes helped change the rules of the game in favour of Pyongyang. The nuclear trump card serves as the centrepiece of Pyongyang’s Military-First Policy, which will likely be perpetuated by Kim Jong-Un, the heir-apparent of the regime. Inexperienced and without credentials to boast of, the younger Kim needs the top brass of the KPA as his powerbase. As such, not only will the Military-First Policy look set to continue, again at the expense of the average North Korean citizen’s well-being; 53

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

but also, Pyongyang’s bellicosity may continue well into the future, promoted by the nuclear trump card which serves so many different uses for the regime. Clearly, one of these is the ability to deter any reprisal from Seoul to Pyongyang’s provocations, as the Cheonan incident and the latest Yeonpyeong artillery attack had shown.

Shooting Down Denuclearisation Efforts

Pyongyang’s possession of the nuclear trump card has actually emboldened the hawkish elements within the ruling regime to initiate provocations against South Korea. Nuclear weapons not only served the purpose of strengthening North Korea’s bargaining position vis-a-vis other members of the Six-Party Talks, from which it could demand for concessions; but they also served well as a shield behind which Pyongyang could deter or withstand likely reprisals to its provocations. Can this latest attack be turned into an opportunity to revive the stalled Six-Party Talks to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula? The ball is in Pyongyang’s court, but uncertainty and pessimism is very much in the air. SC

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You Ji

Yeonpyeong

Tough Test for China’s North Korea Policy Beijing is caught in the crossfire between the two Koreas. It is a victim of Pyongyang’s recent provocations but has to swallow the bitter fruit. It is high time for Beijing to review its overall strategy towards North Korea.

Hardly had the dust of the Cheonan incident subsided than North Korea’s artillery shelled the South Korea-controlled Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010. This reignited the inter-Korean armed confrontation. The on-going naval exercise in the Yellow Sea between the United States and the South had escalated Pyongyang’s agitation. It saw the exercise as a provocation. The exercise also unnerved Beijing, which saw the presence of a U.S. aircraft carrier in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for military purposes as a grave threat to its national security. Both Koreas put their armed forces under the top-level alert. The U.S. 7th Fleet had been mobilised. Japan ordered its cabinet ministers to stay in the capital in case of any emergency meetings. China’s State Councillor, Dai Binguo, promptly visited Seoul on 27 November, just three days after Beijing postponed its foreign minister’s trip to South Korea in apparent protest against the U.S. carrier’s presence in the Yellow Sea. This move revealed Beijing’s new assessment of the explosive situation in the Peninsula: Beijing’s Korea policy is facing its biggest test since the end of the Cold War.

Logic of China’s “Neutrality”

Despite President Lee Myung-Bak’s personal plea for Beijing to take a fair stance on the Yeonpyeong incident, Beijing had been silent on the shelling, although it criticised Pyongyang for the civilian casualties. It simply called on both sides to stay calm and de-escalate the tension. This apparent stance of neutrality was not acceptable to Seoul. In fact, both the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events substantially hurt China’s strategic interests. Its relations with the South suffered a major blow. Moreover, the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul security architecture had tightened on Pyongyang with the indirect goal of hedging against China. The presence of a U.S. carrier in the Yellow Sea for the first time since 1995 had a profound military and domestic impact on Chinese national

You Ji is Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Associate Professor at the School of Social Science and International Relations, University of New South Wales.

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interests. The combat zone of the exercise was only 170 kilometres away from Chinese territory. The carrier’s striking distance put Beijing well within range of a direct attack, and the U.S. spy planes in the exercise not only monitored North Korea’s troop movements but also China’s. The question then is why Beijing had taken a so-called “neutral stance” on the Korean clash, which amounted to rendering support to the North. China did not see the North’s artillery attacks the way they had been depicted in the West. To Beijing, the North’s part in the Cheonan incident was also not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Beijing saw the logic in Pyongyang’s stance: the Yeonpyeong attack was not an isolated act but one in a series of retaliations over disputed waters. The Yeonpyeong shelling was Pyongyang’s response to repeated war games at its doorstep. It was out of proportion but within its context. However, this rationality was not the key to Beijing’s neutrality. The key was China’s genuine worry about the survival of the North Korean state. Beijing knew that its “neutrality” was a bad choice but under the circumstances other choices might be worse if these contributed to Pyongyang’s collapse. China, as do the other regional states, was not ready to cope with the fallout of a major crisis in the Peninsula. North Korea—officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—was at its most precarious: domestically, the failed financial reform deepened its economic crisis. The political succession might trigger fragmentation of the political system, as Kim Jong Il’s divide-and-rule style will cause the inevitable elite power struggle. Externally, Pyongyang was facing mounting security pressure, as Washington and Seoul started to contemplate the military option to solve the DPRK challenge. For instance, both Seoul and Washington have now concluded that denuclearising North Korea is possible only through regime change—not negotiations. This had eroded the hitherto tacit consensus with Beijing on the issue. Preserving the DPRK served Beijing’s overall security needs. Neutrality is a means to an end and not the end in itself. Although the price thus paid was very high, it was still the lesser of the two evils.

Punishing Pyongyang through cutting aid may mean China punishing itself.

Chinese Influence on the North

China was under new pressure to rein in Pyongyang. This raised an old question of how much influence Beijing had on the DPRK. Given that China meets a large proportion of the North’s energy and food needs, its influence is proportionally large. Yet using economic aid to change North Korea’s behaviour is a one-off and irreversible weapon, as it is linked to the DPRK’s survival. Punishing Pyongyang through cutting aid may mean China punishing itself. Fundamentally, what emboldens Kim Jong-Il is his apparent belief that none of his neighbours has the stomach for war. Although Washington does weigh the military solution vis-à-vis Pyongyang, it is still highly reluctant to use force, which is opposed not only by China but also by its own ally, the South. Yet this confused signal—of war avoidance on the one hand but heightened military pressure on the other—becomes 56

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the stimulant for Pyongyang to act provocatively, short of a real war. What Beijing can do against this brinkmanship is limited. Moreover, it has no control over U.S. actions against the North, should these be through sanctions or war exercises, to which Pyongyang has to respond, often in ways not approved by Beijing.

Bleak Future

Beijing’s Korea policy is status-quo oriented. This status quo is defined by two key elements: the first is the North free of nuclear weapons and the second is the United States refraining itself from launching any regime-change strike against Pyongyang. This is a sensible policy but it has been challenged on two fronts. The DPRK will cling to its nuclear power; and the United States and its allies will be more inclined to unseat the Kim dynasty after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events. Beijing’s choices will become increasingly narrower and harder in the years to come. It is high time for Beijing to review its overall DPRK strategy. SC

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Kwa Chong Guan

A Second Nuclear Age in Asia? Russian and U.S. ratification of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty marks the start of a new effort towards a “world without nuclear weapons”. There will be renewed calls for Asia to accept denuclearisation. Asia, however, has a more complex multi-polar nuclear strategic environment.

On Saturday, 5 February 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchanged the documents of ratification at the Munich Conference for a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). This means that the two old Cold War superpowers can now jointly turn their attention to persuading other nuclear-armed states to also reduce their nuclear arsenals and work towards disarmament. This New START, together with the agreements for nuclear security from the inaugural Nuclear Security Summit convened by President Barack Obama a year earlier, and the 62 follow-on actions agreed to in the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Committee, positions the United States to further reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons for its national security. China can expect to be a target of U.S. and Russian persuasion to cut-back its nuclear inventory. Efforts to alternately persuade and coerce North Korea to return to the negotiation table to disarm will intensify. India and Pakistan will be faced with renewed persuasion to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). How will the Asian nuclear-armed states respond to these new pressures from the United States and Russia to denuclearise?

Asian Positions

The Chinese will probably remind that they are in-principle ready to join nuclear arms control talks after Russian and U.S. nuclear forces decline to Beijing’s level, or Beijing achieves parity with Russian and U.S. nuclear forces. It is difficult to envisage either Russia or the United States acceding to Beijing’s position. For North Korea, all the three major nuclear powers in Asia must ask themselves, “What is Pyongyang’s interest to return to the negotiating table?” Its potential nuclear capability injects a high degree of uncertainty into its games of bluster with Seoul and

Kwa Chong Guan is Head of External Programmes at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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forces Beijing, Moscow and Washington to ac- But what if the starting cord it the attention it craves for. Not only Bei- assumption is not the desirability jing, but the United States is also entrapped by of a nuclear free world, but the these games of bluster and brinksmanship their durability of nuclear weapons? allies engage in. On the Indian sub-continent, the three major nuclear powers are also ensnared by their different strategic interests in the regional security dynamics, over which they have little influence. Do these developments indicate the emergence of a second nuclear age—as some analysts have termed it—in Asia? This second nuclear age is to be characterised by discontinuity from the old Cold War logic of disarmament, non-proliferation and the non-use of nuclear weapons, or what has been called a “taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons.

Thinking the Unthinkable in Asia

In the old Cold War an earlier generation of nuclear weapons strategists such as Herman Kahn pushed the U.S. security community to think the unthinkable consequences of a nuclear war and go instead for détente with the old Soviet Union. The continuation of this thinking the unthinkable had led George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, who were dubbed “the four horsemen”, to issue their now classic op-ed essay in the Wall Street Journal of 4 January 2007 calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. Has there been a similar thinking of the unthinkable consequences of a nuclear war by the Asian nuclear-weapons-armed states? The continuing build up of not only nuclear warheads, but also their delivery systems by Asian nuclear weapon states suggests a rather different perception of the value and use of nuclear weapons. Two of the Asian nuclear-armed states, China and India, have publicly declared a no-first use of nuclear weapons, but the other Asian nucleararmed states have not. For them, it would appear that nuclear weapons are not only to deter nuclear attacks by others, but also deter defeat in a conventional attack. This suggests a rather different logic driving the desire to possess nuclear weapons in Asia and understanding of their non-use from that encapsulated in the New START or the NPT and other arms control protocols. Understandably, the response of the two old Cold War superpowers to this more complex and multi-polar nuclear strategic environment in Asia is to try to impose their Cold War logic of the NPT. This logic gives the right to only them, plus three others (who are perhaps not coincidentally, the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council), to deploy nuclear weapons—and expect the rest of the world, including Asia, to concur. For some of the Asian nuclear (and non-nuclear) weapons states, these aspirational calls to sign the NPT and other arms control protocols smack of hypocrisy.

Durability of Nuclear Weapons

The challenge for the non-nuclear weapon states of Asia must be what is their role in the strategic environment which nuclear multi-polarity has made more uncertain and 59

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complex? Is their role to add to the aspirational calls to denuclearise and disarm? It is a given that we all must continue to persuade not only the nuclear-armed states, but all others to ratify the NPT and other International Atomic Energy Agency protocols for nuclear security. But what if the starting assumption is not the desirability of a nuclear free world, but the durability of nuclear weapons? In such a scenario, then the non-nuclear weapon states and the multilateral regional institutions—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)— which they are members of, must then start thinking the unthinkable when their nuclear armed neighbours engage in brinksmanship which may spiral out of control. Can they, and if so, how do they crisis-manage a worst-case scenario of escalating confrontation between their nuclear weapons-armed neighbours? What can they do when another Cheonan class corvette, or Yeonpyeong Island incident or Kargil breaks and threatens to spiral out of control? Or, if the Chinese and U.S. navies have another stand-off in the South China Sea? How do they mediate and intervene in such a worst-case scenario? The challenge for the non-nuclear weapon states is to not only join the aspirational calls for denuclearisation and disarmament, but also start thinking the unthinkable of how to crisismanage a confrontation between their nuclear-armed neighbours. SC

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CHAPTER III

Health, Food and Water Security

Yang Razali Kassim

Tunisia’s Revolt and Food Insecurity: What it Means for Southeast Asia Paul P. S. Teng

Global Food Price Spiral: Causes and Consequences P. K. Hangzo

Food Shortages: Urban Food Security in an Age of Constraints Arpita Mathur

Arsenic Poisoning of Water in Bangladesh Bill Durodié

Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Crafting a Response Zhang Hongzhou

China and Global Food Security: Conflicting Notions Yang Razali Kassim

Water Insecurity in the Himalayas: Emerging Tensions and Lessons for ASEAN Bill Durodié

Pulp Friction: Southern Environment or Western Agenda? Arpita Mathur

Water Disputes in South Asia

Health, Food and Water Security CHAPTER III

Yang Razali Kassim

Tunisia’s Revolt and Food Insecurity

What it Means for Southeast Asia The Tunisian uprising that toppled the Ben Ali government was waiting to happen. Regime decay caused by repression, corruption and autocratic rule has been eating into the system. Were climate change and food insecurity the hidden triggers that caused the political tremors?

Did climate change and food insecurity have a hand in the Tunisian revolution? In this surprising people power revolt that exploded at the start of 2011, the usual recipe for an uprising was at play—fundamental underlying issues like repression, autocratic rule, corruption and growing unemployment. But the trigger or the immediate cause, significantly, was fuel and food, especially rising food prices. The rising food prices that shook Tunisia—and brought down the Ben Ali government—came at a time when global food prices broke record highs at the turn of the New Year. Erratic global weather patterns caused by climate change have affected the supply of crops and grains. The resulting shortage pushed up prices, hitting the unemployed worst, and unleashing the long-standing pent-up resentment that has since transformed into, and inspired popular protests beyond Tunisia—into neighbouring states such as Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. In other words, what we are witnessing now in North Africa and the Arab world is the political impact of climate change. The implications are obvious: what if the global climate gets worse, and food scarcity turns into a huge global crisis affecting human security? Will Southeast Asia be spared from such a dire scenario?

Rising Prices and the Tunisian Revolt

It all began on 17 December 2010 when an unemployed engineering graduate burnt himself when his fruit and vegetables push-cart was taken away by overzealous authorities. His death shocked not only Tunisia but also the rest of the Maghreb and Arab world where self-immolation is unprecedented. Taking one’s own life, just as suicide bombings, is against their religion, Islam. That it was resorted to speaks immensely of what must have been the intense frustration of the people. The act resonated immediately with the wider population, triggering a revolt against the Zine Ebidine Ben Ali government. With equally unprecedented speed, the regime fell and the leader fled

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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into exile. The protests have since spread across North Africa and the Middle East . Significantly, copycat self-immolations were also reported in Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania and even Saudi Arabia. This new trend deserves close watch. Egypt and Syria, worried that they too might be engulfed, immediately raised food subsidies to offset the impact of rising food prices. The current protests in Egypt are demanding lower food prices—in addition to major political and economic reforms. The problem of volatile food prices in North Africa is reminiscent of the 2008 global food crisis that led to riots in many countries—only worse this time. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, global food prices at the start of 2011 have exceeded the 2008 levels. Three years ago, the main causes of food insecurity and volatile prices were rising fuel prices and crop failures due to climate change-induced natural disasters in food-producing countries. These same factors were at work again to cause the food insecurity and public restiveness that have since swept North Africa and the Middle Easr. After Tunisia, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak was next to fall. At the time of printing, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was fighting for his political life.

As Tunisia has shown, the Southeast Asian region, just as the rest of the world, has entered an era of vulnerability and must be prepared for the political impact of climate change.

Implications for Southeast Asia

Food insecurity was also being felt in Southeast Asia. At around the same time that North Africa was rumbling, Indonesia announced steps to offset rising prices. Indonesians began to feel the pinch when the price of chillies shockingly outstripped the price of meat. President Yudhoyono has urged Indonesians to deal with the food shortages by turning their houses into “home food gardens”. The president has identified inflation caused by escalating food prices as one of the main challenges facing the country this year. Speaking at the World Economic Forum later on 27 January 2011, Yudhoyono urged the G20 to make food security a top priority in its agenda, warning that rising food prices could lead to more social and political unrest. He warned that the next economic war could be over scarce resources if rising food prices, poverty and population growth were not effectively addressed. Singapore, too, had been feeling the heat of rising food prices. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said rising food prices were due to the adverse weather conditions in China and Australia, although he assured Singaporeans that domestic prices would stabilise soon. Thailand told producers of major food items not to raise their prices while Vietnam tightened control of rice exports and increased food stockpile. The “Tunisian Scenario” is not exactly unprecedented in Southeast Asia in the political sense. In 1998, the long-serving authoritarian Indonesian leader, Suharto, was brought down by people power. Although there were many factors that conspired against him, one of the key triggers was rising fuel prices. Earlier in 1986, the unpopular Philippine president, Marcos, was also toppled by a people power revolt. In the 1990s and in more recent times, public rumblings were also seen in Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia, althought these were more politically driven. 64

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How Southeast Asia Should Respond

As Tunisia has shown, the Southeast Asian region, just as the rest of the world, has entered an era of vulnerability and must be prepared for the political impact of climate change. As President Yudhoyono suggested, food insecurity and volatile prices caused by natural disasters, which in turn are the consequences of climate change, will be one of the immediate triggers of political instability in the region in years to come. In anticipation, Southeast Asian countries therefore must not fall short on good governance and good economic management. At the same time, ASEAN as a grouping must be galvanised to prepare well for future crises stemming from natural disasters, climate change and food security. SC

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Paul P. S. Teng

Global Food Price Spiral

Causes and Consequences Food prices have been trending upwards. Unchecked increases have social and political repercussions. Speculation on food as a commodity has contributed to the spiral. “Market panic” and “herd mentality” must be checked to avoid volatility.

The local and international media have been reporting extensively on the global food price spiral since the beginning of 2011. This reflects concern that price increases of common food items may lead to serious effects on the poor and middle class and indeed destabilise societies. In January 2011, the riots in Tunisia and the shortage of chillies in Indonesia were but two recent manifestations of the phenomenon. There are serious consequences from unchecked price spirals and the real causes of the increases must be addressed.

The Spiral and Its Consequences

Current global prices of grains are already about 50–70 per cent higher than in mid2010, according to United Nations agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Private sector investment and trade groups confirm these. Food price increases impact directly on the twin spectres of hunger and poverty. Domestic food prices are dictated by commodity prices such as wheat, corn, rice and soybean. FAO data show an upward trend in prices in 2010 which continues into 2011. Food prices have increased in Asia up to 20 per cent, with countries like India and Indonesia showing double digit price increases, but much less for countries like Taiwan and Korea. Food is an important component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which has also shown double-digit increases in some countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam because food is a big part of the CPI. In the ASEAN region, the prices of some food items are particularly sensitive to production shortfalls—such as wheat in Australia, and rice in Thailand and Vietnam due to flooding.

Paul P. S. Teng is Senior Fellow and Adviser to the Food Security Programme at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), as well as Professor at the National Institute of Education (NIE), Nanyang Technological University. He has held leadership positions at the Worldfish Centre, International Rice Research Institute, MONSANTO Company and American universities.

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From 2007 to 2008, rising prices put ba- However, because of the link sic food items beyond the reach of the poor and between poverty, hunger and food middle class, precipitating civil disobedience insecurity, several countries are in at least 43 countries. According to the FAO, on a tinderbox and any further urban households were among the hardest hit, price rise or supply shortage may especially the lower income groups which spent lead to civil unrest. a higher proportion of their earnings on food than the richer class. By some estimates, up to 50 per cent of a poor family’s income may be spent on food (such as in the Philippines), compared to less than 25 per cent of a family’s income in more economically well-endowed countries such as Singapore and Taiwan. During the same period, stocks of the major traded grains were at a record low and the perception that there would be supply shortages triggered action by several governments to stop exports. The subsequent spillover effects led to market panic. So far in the new year, foodrelated civil unrest has occurred in several countries in northern Africa, not only Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria. The latest reports from the WFP show that in 24 countries, the overall cost of the basic food basket is more than 20 per cent above the five-year average! Food fears have precipitated countries like China, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, India and Russia to take pre-emptive action such as reducing tariffs on some imported food items, fixing prices and encouraging people to grow food.

Reality Check on Causes

Food price spirals result from shortages caused by interruptions in supply, or through speculation. In the short term, governments can avoid disruptions in supply caused by over-reaction that result in a freeze on exports. Extreme weather events and biosecurity factors (insect pests, diseases) which reduce the surplus production necessary for export are difficult to deal with. Speculation on food commodities is nothing new but in this globalised world with instant access to news, it is easy for some to profit from shortfalls. Many of the underlying problems which produced the sharp increases in food prices and increased the number of hungry over the past decade have not gone away. Some of these longer term factors need to be addressed, such as competition for land use and diversion from food production; climate change; falling water availability; rising energy costs; use of food/feed biomaterial for biofuel; and resource scarcity (including declining arable land). A reality check must also include a hard look at the production levels of grain and the surplus entering the world market. On the average, only 11–12 per cent of total corn (maize) production is traded yearly. Similar figures are: rice 3–7 per cent traded; wheat 18–20 per cent traded; and soybean 22–23 per cent traded. Wheat prices started their rise when Russia embargoed wheat exports in June 2010 due to domestic shortage caused by adverse weather. China recently announced that over two million hectares of wheat have been affected by drought. The effects of floods and droughts in various parts of the world are also being closely watched. 67

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Looking Ahead

Reports indicate that on balance, the current supply of key grains is still acceptable. Current food prices remain higher than their pre-spiral levels and may still go up. Looking ahead, some analysts have forecast grain commodity price rises of 10–15 per cent, resulting in a 8–9 per cent rise in food prices in Asia. Barring any sudden decision by exporting countries to turn off the export flow of grains, and any further extreme weather conditions, most experts agree that there need not be a repeat of the 2007–2008 crises. There appears to be enough buffers for several months in “powder keg” countries which rely on imported grains. At least nine countries worldwide have taken some steps to ease price rises. More may be expected to do so in the coming months. However, because of the link between poverty, hunger and food insecurity, several countries are on a tinderbox and any further price rise or supply shortage may lead to civil unrest. SC

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P. K. Hangzo

Food Shortages

Urban Food Security in an Age of Constraints Seventy per cent of the world’s population are expected to live in urban areas by 2050. Food production should also feed this larger, more urban and richer population. It is time that urban centres take charge to usher in a new era of “urban green revolution”.

The world is bracing for a food crunch. Amidst the growing food shortages, in part due to climate change, there is an “urban green revolution” emerging. As cities burgeon in size, they are growing food to feed themselves. To understand this emerging phenomenon, a Food Security Expert Group Meeting was convened in Singapore on 4–5 August 2010 by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It was attended by representatives from academia, the policy and think-tank communities, private agribusiness firms, urban planners, and humanitarian organisations. Aside from drawing attention to the issue of urban food security, the two-day meeting also discussed Singapore’s role in the global food system.

“Urban Green Revolution”: Food Security’s Next Wave

Food security and agriculture is largely considered a rural phenomenon and discussed primarily in the context of rural poverty. The Green Revolution, which occurred between the mid-1950s and the mid-1990s, for example, was largely a rural phenomenon. Encompassing changes to crop varieties, agricultural practices and broader social, economic and political change, the Green Revolution led to a substantial increase in gross world food production. This coincided with rapid economic development in a number of developing countries. Even more remarkable was the fact that despite an increase in the number of people from 3 billion in 1960 to 6.7 billion in 2009, per capita agricultural production still outpaced population growth. Ironically, these successes contributed to public complacency about food and agriculture. This complacency manifested itself in decades of faltering public commitment to investing in agriculture in developing countries.

P. K. Hangzo is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University where he is attached to the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. He was previously an education consultant in India.

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The share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to agriculture, for example, dropped significantly, falling from a peak of 17 per cent in 1979 to a low of 3.5 per cent in 2004. The combined effects of public complacency, low stockpile of staples, declining agricultural yield, declining investment, population growth, rising income levels, dietary change, climate change and the global financial crisis was a food crisis in 2008 when food prices climbed to their highest levels since the 1970s. This crisis triggered riots across the globe—particularly in the teeming, impoverished cities of the developing world, where many people spend a major portion of their incomes on food. Whereas in the past issues of food security, livelihood, and agriculture resulted in peasant revolts in rural areas, it has now become an urban phenomenon manifested in unrest among the urban poor, the urban working class and the urban under-class.

Urban agriculture is the growing of food crops and the raising of farm animals within and around cities. It plays an important role in enhancing urban food security.

New Challenges, New Complexities

Challenges to urban food security have become even more acute as (urban) population continues to rise. For the first time in history, urban population equalled rural population in 2008. By 2050, about 70 per cent of the world’s population are expected to live in urban areas. At the same time, world population was projected to reach 9.1 billion in 2050 (34 per cent higher than today) with a large proportion of this increase expected to come from urban areas. How does the world feed this teeming mass of urban population? Feeding a larger, more urban and richer population requires food production to increase by over 70 per cent. This must be done in the face of changing consumption patterns, the impacts of climate change and the growing scarcity of water and land. Rural agriculture alone will be insufficient to meet the future needs of food in urban areas. Only an “urban green revolution” will help countries secure food for their population. To do this, urban agriculture must be stepped up to supplement food supplied from the hinterland and rural areas. Urban agriculture is the growing of food crops and the raising of farm animals within and around cities. It plays an important role in enhancing urban food security. This is because the cost of supplying and distributing food to urban areas based on rural production and imports continue to increase and do not satisfy the demand, especially of the urban poor. Urban agriculture also contributes to economic development, poverty alleviation and social inclusion of the poor. It also contributes to the overall greening of the city and the productive reuse of urban wastes.

Role for Singapore

Urban food security has already been a major concern for small, highly urbanised citystates like Singapore. Due to size limitations, Singapore relies primarily on imports, 70

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buying more than 90 per cent of its food requirements from 31 countries in 2008. Conscious of the pitfalls of over reliance on imports, Singapore adopted an approach which aims at ensuring food supply resilience by maximising local farm productivity through the upgrading of local farm production capability. It is also aimed at investing in overseas food zones, overseas contract farming and sourcing from non-traditional sources or existing sources that are not major exporters to Singapore. Singapore can be an important player in regional food security. Given its role as a stable regional financial centre, it can serve as a catalyst for venture investment funds. It can also facilitate and inspire technology transfers, best practices, processes, and business models and standards. Singapore is also home to a number of research-oriented local and foreign agribusiness firms. By harnessing the knowledge and expertise of these firms, it can take the lead in developing high yielding seed variety, fertilisers, pesticides etc. Singapore’s efficient port and logistics can also help the country establish itself as a regional food processing and distribution hub. Food processing has already been pursued vigorously in the country with export totalling US$3.4 billion in 2009—an increase of nearly US$1 billion since 2005. The Singapore Food Manufacturers’ Association (SFMA) predicted food exports by Singaporean firms to reach US$4 billion this year. The growth of exports from Singapore can be attributed to the increasing number of local manufacturers which now stands at 781 compared to 677 in 2005. This, in turn, is a result of the rise in demand overseas for food products made and processed in Singapore.

Feeding People, Keeping Countries Stable

The Food Security Expert Group Meeting in Singapore raised important questions about the state of urban food security. There was a consensus among participants that urban food security has now become one of this century’s key global challenges requiring urgent attention. Although urban agriculture has been around for a long time it has not been thought of seriously. It is time to give it serious consideration in order to feed the everincreasing urban mouths. Eventually, it is not just about feeding people but also about keeping countries stable. SC

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Arpita Mathur

Arsenic Poisoning of Water in Bangladesh Arsenic poisoning of water is a serious problem in Bangladesh. It has significantly negative physical and social impact. There is an urgent need for the government to take effective steps to salvage the situation.

One of the major targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the global population without sustainable access to safe drinking water. While the MDG Report 2010 appears to indicate significant progress to this end, there are still parts of the developing world that do not have access to even basic needs like clean water and are exposed to serious health hazards. In locating such threats and concerns, particularly in South Asia, the most noteworthy problem is the presence of arsenic in drinking water in Bangladesh.

The Problem

A study published in Lancet in July 2010 amply corroborates the fact that 35 to 77 million people in Bangladesh are affected by arsenic through drinking water. The problem is also afflicting a number of other countries including India (West Bengal), Argentina, Mongolia and Chile. What makes this issue critical in Bangladesh is the fact that more than 90 per cent of the dependence for drinking water is on groundwater, which remains highly arsenic-laced. Arsenic—a toxic natural metallic odourless and tasteless substance—is released into groundwater in Bangladesh due to natural causes. It arises out of the aquifers of deltaic and alluvial sediments and deposits—part of the country’s geography. Groundwater is trapped in aquifers, which are layers of porous rock or sand between layers of non-porous rock. This arsenic poisoning is concentrated in shallow aquifers, not too deep beneath the earth’s surface. In that sense, Bangladesh’s planned transfer of dependence from surface water to shallow tube wells for drinking water in the 1970s did not prove to be the remedy it was meant to be. The Bangladesh government, with UNICEF assistance, had turned to a massive programme for digging tube wells to provide safe drinking water in the 1970s, when

Arpita Mathur is Research Fellow at the Centre for NonTraditional Security (NTS) Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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there were widespread health-related problems like diarrhoea as a result of contaminated surface water consumption. While those problems seemed to have been resolved, bigger health hazards arising out of arsenic contamination plague the populace today.

There is clearly a need to give the highest priority to the supply of safe water. It is a critical factor for health and human security in the country.

Magnitude

The UNDP Human Development Report 2009 ranks Bangladesh at 146 in the world on the basis of life expectancy, adult literacy, enrolment in education as well as purchasing power parity and income. Clearly, Bangladesh has yet to achieve development in many aspects. On the health front, the World Health Organisation acknowledges a decline in infant and child mortality and greater life expectancy at birth, even as it warns of other health issues like malaria, AIDS, heart diseases and cancer as areas of concern. A Country Cooperative Strategy drawn out by the WHO in conjunction with the Bangladesh government has called for “ensuring equitable and sustainable access to safe water supply”. A 2008 UNICEF report reveals that of the total number of 4.7 million tube wells in Bangladesh, as many as 1.4 million had traces of arsenic—more than the level delineated by the Bangladesh government which stands at 50 parts per billion. There are more than 8,000 villages where 80 per cent of all tube wells are contaminated. While these statistics speak volumes about the criticality of the situation, there is much more to be worried about. Apart from the problem of drinking water, arsenic also enters the food cycle through a number of ways like irrigation with the same water infecting agricultural produce. The situation gets compounded further by the fact that food, especially when the main food grain, rice, is also cooked in the same water.

Impact

The physical and social impact of slow arsenic poisoning has been devastating. The principal fallout in terms of impact on health is in the form of arsenicosis. The symptoms of arsenicosis include lesions and hard skin, gangrene and in more serious exposure, can even lead to cancers of the skin, lungs and kidneys. The only remedy to reverse the process is to first ensure the supply of clean drinking water, followed by a nutritionally rich diet—a distant possibility for the already poverty-stricken and undernourished rural population. The social impact can be as damaging as the physical one. Due to the relative ignorance of especially the rural population, a great deal of social disgrace is attached to the affected persons. The impact on women is even greater as the onset of related symptoms affects their married life with husbands choosing to leave them, even as the unmarried women find it difficult to find a match. The sufferers of arsenic poisoning are socially ostracised and the situation worsens in the poverty-stricken rural areas where treatment is either not available or is too costly. 73

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Response

Bangladesh’s predicament is clearly enormous. Even though the government is working in an integrated way with organisations like the WHO, UNICEF as well as NGOs towards finding a solution, much is left unaccomplished. This laxity is partly because the urban areas remain largely unaffected. Cleansing arsenic-laced water is both financially taxing and difficult on the ground for the government. Yet, it is essential to take a few steps to alleviate the quandary. At the grassroots level, there is a clear case for increasing awareness both about the presence, causes as well as impact of this arsenic problem in order to partly handle the physical and social fallouts. Moreover, alternative sources of safe drinking water have to be devised. This can be done by cleaning surface water supplies wherever viable or through steps like rainwater harvesting and distribution. There is clearly a need to give the highest priority to the supply of safe water. It is a critical factor for health and human security in the country. This urgency has to be incorporated into governmental plans and policies—especially health policy. There must also be effective implementation. Any delay would have disastrous consequences—both in terms of health and social impact. There also remains a gap in the regional-level response to this serious problem. Organisations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) address health problems like AIDS and tuberculosis. But it should also include basic problems arising out of lack of clean drinking water in their discussion matrix. Since Bangladesh and India are both members of SAARC, common efforts can be undertaken to solve the problem through technological and on-ground assistance. SC

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Bill Durodié

Infectious Disease Outbreaks

Crafting a Response

A conference in Singapore organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies examined the worldwide response to the outbreak of H1N1 influenza in 2009. The lessons learnt from earlier outbreaks, such as SARS in 2003, are more limited than had been assumed.

Outbreaks of infectious disease have a global impact. So, no matter how well prepared a country may be, it is still dependent on the actions of its neighbours. This provides a good reason for all to be well prepared and ready to cope—making international cooperation a critical factor. It was with this rationale in mind that some 100 experts and officials from across Asia and beyond, including high-ranking representatives from the United Nations and the World Health Organisation (WHO), met in Singapore in 2010 to discuss measures to improve their systems. Central to their discussions were the responses—both health and non-health—to the worldwide outbreak of H1N1 influenza. Some key questions were debated: What did the pandemic alert a year earlier accomplish? How much did the efforts cost? Were health officials right to use the terminology they did? And, how much attention did providers and the public pay to them anyway?

SARS: Not a Good Model

New public health measures emerged in Asia subsequent to the first outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza in Hong Kong in 1997. Then, after the anthrax incidents in the United States, soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks there, governments worldwide started to pay more attention to the possibility of, and need to be able to cope with, biological threats. The outbreak of an unexpected virus, SARS, in 2003 then allowed countries to test these new procedures and look towards implementing better ones. But SARS may not have been a particularly useful model, as learnt by attendees at the conference organised by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Bill Durodié is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University. He coordinates the Health and Human Security programme within the school’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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SARS was unique. It had a different pathology to H1N1, as indeed do other forms of influenza. Accordingly, the use of thermal scanners to detect cases at border entry points across the region yielded no detections this time around. It could only be justified by some officials as a supposed means to reassure the public that something was being done. Margaret Chan, the head of WHO and who was previously Director of Health for Hong Kong, had been criticised then for not acting swiftly enough to tackle the outbreak of SARS there. So now, on raising the WHO’s six-point alert-level for pandemics from level 4 to level 5 on 29 April 2010, she announced that “it really is all of humanity that is under threat”, moderating her language only somewhat the following month prior to announcing a full-blown pandemic in June. Accordingly, countries went into response overdrive. China, the country that probably faced the most international criticism in relation to SARS for failing to report suspected cases, did the most. It erected what one conference participant called “a great wall against the virus”. Towards the end of May 2010, all passengers on inbound flights were subjected to screening by technicians clad head-to-toe in biohazard suits. Anyone found with a higher than normal temperature would lead to the entire flight being quarantined.

Poverty, however, remains the single clearest indicator of future health problems, both for individuals and countries.

Time: The Critical Dimension

None of these measures, including social distancing through the closure of schools and other public facilities, could be said to have “worked”. Intriguingly, some countries with fewer protections in place also noted significantly fewer cases, although this could have more to do with different reporting procedures, as well as the need to maintain various political and reputational agendas. The former Chief Scientific Adviser to the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence, Professor Sir Roy Anderson, showed a computer model of viruses and the speed of their global spread. It seemed to suggest that, at best, what countries can do is “buy time” by delaying the full onset of an outbreak, and thereby allowing scientists to develop a vaccine. The key was to switch from containment to mitigation, but also to take the time to explain this move carefully to the public, as had been done in Singapore. The more apocalyptic pronouncements of some officials could also have been contained. As one delegate lamented, there was a growing tendency among public health professionals “to reach for the megaphone” and seek to conduct their affairs through the media at such times. In the long run, this could only damage the reputation and institutions of science. It could also demoralise the countless primary care providers all countries truly rely on. The low uptake of vaccination for H1N1, particularly among the populations of Western countries that had stockpiled vast quantities of the antiviral drug Tamiflu, was also discussed as a cause for concern. Maybe, it was suggested, this had been the only active way in which people could register their opposition to the way the episode had been managed. 76

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Certainly, politicians in France and Germany, as well as elsewhere, were by then expressing their concerns as to the huge expenditure poured in this direction. The French, in particular, according to some sources, expended nearly two billion euros in this exercise, amounting to three times the allocation for cancer research in that country over a four-year period.

What About the Future?

How then, should officials manage such incidents, caught, as they are, between the equally unappealing poles of being accused of having done too little too late, or too much too soon, and thereby alarming the public either way? There was broad agreement that much more ought to be done in terms of improving laboratory capacity across the region. When a future infectious disease does become manifest, this is what will be the key—along with an adequate supply of trained and equipped doctors and nurses, and an infrastructure to match. Poverty, however, remains the single clearest indicator of future health problems, both for individuals and countries. Accordingly, it might not be too much to hope more from those richer nations that are currently concerned by the lack of preparedness of their neighbours for dealing with such a situation. But what they could do is put more effort into ensuring growth and economic development, rather than try to anticipate the unknown elements of pandemics that have yet to emerge. SC

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Zhang Hongzhou

China and Global Food Security

Conflicting Notions

China is central to international efforts to address the global food security challenge. However, the Chinese interpretation of the concept of food security is problematic. It is outdated and diverges from the international norm.

The new year began with global food prices rising to the highest level since 1990. They even exceeded the 2008 price hikes that sparked deadly riots across the world. Although not attracting as much worldwide attention as the global financial crisis, food security could be the gravest challenge to humanity. It means a lot more than simply putting food on the table. To tackle the food security challenge, international cooperation is important, but efforts of states are critical, particularly China. Being the most populous country in the world, China is central to international efforts to address the growing global food insecurity. However, there is a serious potential concern with China’s position: The Chinese interpretation of the concept of food security is outdated, and at variance with that of the larger international community.

Chinese Interpretation of Food Security

The Chinese equivalent of food security is liangshi anquan. But it can be translated to either food security or grain security, and both have been used interchangeably by Chinese officials and academic researchers. However, no clear official definition of liangshi anquan has been given. Nonetheless, as far as official policy is concerned, liangshi anquan is generally referred to grain security. And according to China’s first official grain security plan, liangshi anquan is mainly about boosting grain production.

International Definition of Food Security

Internationally, food security, according to the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), is defined as existing when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. The concept

Zhang Hongzhou is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He studied at Harbin Institute of Technology in Heilongjiang, China, before graduating from NTU in Maritime Studies.

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of food security includes both physical and The Chinese interpretation of economic access to food that meets people’s di- the concept of food security is etary needs and their food preferences. It has outdated, and at variance with two main points. One is that food security is not that of the larger international just about food supplies; it is also closely related community. to affordability of the food. The other is that the objective of food security is to ensure all people a healthy and active life, far beyond just sustaining life. Hence the term “food” here should include not only grains, but also other agricultural products such as meat, milk, eggs and fruits. The importance of grain to the Chinese can never be overemphasised. Self-sufficiency of grain supply is vital for China’s liangshi anquan. However, it may not go as intended if China focuses too much on grain supply while neglecting the production of other agricultural products. With rapid economic development and cultural changes, the dietary needs and food preferences of the Chinese have changed dramatically. The Chinese are consuming less and less grains and vegetables, but more and more meats, eggs, fruits and aquatic products. These changes imply that China’s interpretation of the concept of food security is increasingly outdated, and thus inadequate. There are serious domestic and international implications.

Domestic Implications

Strongly influenced by the concept of liangshi anquan, Chinese policymakers have implemented many agricultural policies to expand land usage and improve grain productivity to safeguard the national grain supply. In recent years, China has introduced a variety of agricultural supporting policies to boost its grain production, ranging from easing taxes on agriculture to subsidising seeds. Statistics released by the Chinese authorities suggest that these policies have been very effective in boosting China’s grain production. However, when the concept of China’s liangshi anquan is broadened from simple grain security, particularly grain production, to the notion of food security as defined by FAO, the impact on China’s otherwise impressive grain production is reversed. Firstly, it is far from sufficient to stress grain production alone to guarantee the Chinese people’s access to food. Moreover, some policies encourage the farmers to invest more in grain production through the continuous raising of grain prices. But increased prices make grain more expensive for the consumers. Secondly, although China’s annual grain production has dramatically increased in recent years, the production of other important agricultural products have experienced significant fluctuations. The underlying principle of some major agricultural policies is to increase the supply of land as well as investment in grain production. However, given the limited total arable land and financial resources, the dramatic increase in the use of land for wheat, for example, has been achieved at the expense of other crops. 79

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Global Implications

The vital role of China in addressing the global food security challenges means that the divergence in understanding and defining food security will inevitably have serious global repercussions. Firstly, it is very difficult for the other countries to cooperate effectively with China to tackle the global food security challenge when the concept of food security is interpreted differently. Secondly, China’s tight control and frequent intervention of its grain trade may cause tension and instability to global grain trade. Thirdly, given the importance of China’s demand for other agricultural products in the international market, such as beans, meat, sugar, fruits and vegetables, the fluctuation of those products as a result of China’s overemphasis on grain production could destabilise the international market. The food security challenge needs to be seriously addressed internationally and domestically. Being the most populous nation in the world, China has a very big role to play. The effective management of the challenges should start with a clear and appropriate definition of the concept of food security. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

Water Insecurity in the Himalayas

Emerging Tensions and Lessons for ASEAN Climate Change is triggering water insecurity in the Greater Himalayan region, raising new sources of tension that may embroil India and China in future conflict. These emerging tensions need to be managed. There are also lessons for ASEAN.

Global warming is melting glaciers in the Himalayan mountains—the “Water Tower of Asia”. The region is the common source of major rivers that flow into at least four countries—China, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. Climate change is also causing drought and disruption to the flows of these rivers, leading to the displacement of people downstream and triggering migration from Bangladesh into India. Indeed, India has even built a border fence to stem the flow of “climate refugees”. The resulting water insecurity is a potential source of tension affecting these countries. But the most worrying is the potential conflict between the Asian giants—China and India—beset as they already are by historical strains. Concerned by the long-term ramifications of rising water insecurity, diplomats and former ministers in their private capacities as well as academics, analysts and journalists from the four countries met in Singapore on 2–3 December 2010 to brainstorm possible cooperation among the four nations referred to as the “Himalayan River Basin Countries”. Hosted by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), the meeting was organised by the Strategic Foresight Group (SFG), a think-tank based in India with a global reach. The SFG recently put up a report entitled the “Himalayan Challenge: Water Insecurity in Emerging Asia” which formed the backdrop of the Singapore meeting. The guest of honour of the workshop was Mr Tan Gee Paw, Chairman of the Public Utilities Board, Singapore’s water agency.

Water Insecurity

The SFG paper asserts that in the next 30–40 years, water will be one of the key drivers of the Asian political and security agenda. The prospects for economic growth in Asia, already much influenced by security trends in East Asia, will depend on geopolitical

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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stability in the Himalayan sub-region as well. This is due to the positions of China and India as rising economic giants with a huge appetite for economic resources as well as water. Growing populations in both countries will add further pressures for more clean water, which is depleting due to climate change. China reportedly plans to divert the upper section of the Brahmaputra, known as Yarlong Tsangpo in Tibet, to overcome its water shortage in Western China. This move has caused anxieties in India, Nepal and Bangladesh. China has denied such reports when India took the matter up at the highest level. Workshop participants agreed that the need for cooperation is urgent, especially given the strategic implications in economic, water, environmental, health, food and security terms. The paper was in part triggered by a conference in Mumbai in 2008 which assigned the SFG to address the issue of water security in view of the melting glaciers and the flow of the Himalayan-originating rivers, namely the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers into China, and Brahmaputra and Ganges into India and Bangladesh. Another major river that draws its source from the Himalayas is the Mekong, Southeast Asia’s longest river which flows into China’s Yunnan province and five ASEAN countries—Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

The problem of water insecurity in Southeast Asia, as in the Himalayan region, is not yet critical at this stage—but is certainly emerging.

Lessons for Southeast Asia

Water insecurity in the Himalayan River Basin therefore has clear but under-studied implications for mainland Southeast Asia, especially in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), which includes the five ASEAN states and China. Vietnam has complained about China’s dams on the Mekong, which, it says, interrupted the flow of water into southern Vietnam. Yet, analysts note that Vietnam too has caused anxieties in neighbouring Cambodia when Hanoi built a large dam in 2003 without consulting Phnom Penh, as required of members of the Mekong River Commission. There are obvious lessons for Southeast Asia from the Himalayan sub-region experience. The first lesson is that water is a trans-boundary issue—a point emphasised by the participants of the Singapore meeting. This compels the need to cooperate. Secondly, cooperation is not easy to forge without political will and mutual trust. This was a point equally emphasised during the discussion—reflecting the divisive undercurrents that have generally bedevilled relations in South Asia, including the Himalayan River Basin sub-region. Both issues—the trans-boundary nature of water insecurity and the need for political will and mutual trust—are equally critical for Southeast Asia. The difference is that the Southeast Asian region, since its integration into a single bloc as ASEAN, has gradually overcome the trust deficit. Indeed, there are three ways in which ASEAN has addressed intractable issues, according to Mely Anthony, head of the NTS Centre, which hosted the meeting. 82

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The first is through summitry. ASEAN leaders have learnt that they could overcome inertia, resistance and roadblocks at the level of their bureaucracies by setting the tone from the top through their summits. By meeting regularly, leaders of the ASEAN core—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand—have over time dramatically reduced the historical mistrust among themselves. Secondly, as the ASEAN experience becomes less conflictual, leaders pushed for accelerated economic development, which in turn engenders greater mutual trust.

Managing Water Insecurity

Thirdly, after four decades of existence as a regional bloc, ASEAN today has shifted into higher gear: it has transformed itself into a more structured group, with legally-binding rules and even addressing sensitive issues that were previously skirted around, such as human rights. The problem of water insecurity in Southeast Asia, as in the Himalayan region, is not yet critical at this stage—but is certainly emerging. Of the five ASEAN members that are dependent on the Mekong for livelihood, four—Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam—are relatively new to the ASEAN approach to resolving disputes. The ASEAN structure and culture of working together as a family—the ASEAN Way—will be severely tested should tensions from water insecurity in mainland Southeast Asia spill over. The ASEAN Way will be a useful umbrella to manage a water crisis. It may even be relevant for the Himalayan River Basin sub-region in its quest for managing the emerging water insecurity. SC

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Bill Durodié

Pulp Friction

Southern Environment or Western Agenda? Campaigns against big pulp and palm oil producers in Indonesia appear to be driven by local activists on the ground. In reality, they are facilitated by huge budgets and shaped by agendas emanating from the West.

Pulp and paper production is big business. So is palm oil. Steady global demand for paper and packaging, combined with increasing interest in bio-fuels and replacement fats for the food industry, have made these some of the largest and fastest-growing industries in Southeast Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia alone, now account for 85 per cent of world palm oil production, and their share of the wood, pulp and paper business is rising rapidly too. There are good reasons for this. Aside from access to low-cost labour, the fact is that biomass simply grows faster in the tropics than in North America or Europe.

Big Business, Big Problems

Such developments are not without their problems. Struggles between firms for a lucrative market can be intense. Competitors from other sectors and regions may be willing to support any argument that discredits their rivals. And Western governments are concerned that these advances put them at a disadvantage, too. On top of this, numerous environmental activists and community campaigners have emerged in recent years accusing these industries of ignoring land rights, polluting waterways, logging illegally and contributing to global warming. These have now attracted the attention of the media and regional policymakers. A recent BBC documentary that explored deforestation issues in Indonesia, led Unilever—one of the largest food manufacturers in the world—to launch a supposedly independent review and then terminate contracts worth tens of millions of dollars with its suppliers there. For a developing country, this is a significant setback.

Micro Management

From the corporate perspective it may appear as if producers are trapped in a conflict with a swarm of Lilliputian detractors—well-intentioned but misguided, energetic Bill Durodié is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He coordinates the Health and Human Security Programme within the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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young people, from countless non-governmen- Over the last few decades a tal organisations. These fly para-gliders and negative narrative has emerged in helicopters over plantations on reconnaissance the West that presents ambition missions, build dams to prevent effective soil as arrogant, development as drainage, and foment resentment towards busi- dangerous and success as selfish. ness among local communities, international agencies and eventually the companies’ own customers and host governments. Some firms, seeking to prove otherwise, have sought to be seen to be acting in a more responsible fashion. They have hired security contractors to prevent illicit tree-felling on their concessions. They have supported schemes to tag wood. They have established schools and clinics to ensure local communities benefit from their activities. They have even handed land over to establish nature reserves. But in reality, this is to view the situation upside-down. Eco-warriors are a manifestation of the problem, not the problem itself. Their tactics, to presume guilt by documentation rather than by factual evidence, first emerged elsewhere. And far from being small and disconnected, they are simply the visible expression of a far more coherent, but invisible force.

Negative Narratives

Among world leaders, confidence in the economic system today is threadbare. In addition to declining political support and legitimacy, contemporary elites in the West lack a sense of greater purpose through which to steer world affairs. The protestors in Indonesia and elsewhere simply reflect this inner loss of certainty. They are indulged to a remarkable extent by multinationals and governments keen to latch on to anything that appears to offer popular engagement. Over the last few decades a negative narrative has emerged in the West that presents ambition as arrogant, development as dangerous and success as selfish. The instigators of this are not the youthful idealists establishing camps in the forest, but disillusioned politicians and officials. They have been supported by an army of writers, academics and social commentators, who seem determined to show that things are always getting worse and that the cause, as well as the victim of this, is human-action itself. The consequence has been the creation of a cultural environment within which social advancement is viewed with suspicion. Singapore itself has been on the receiving end of this through the recent publication of a report purporting to show it as the worst environmental offender in the world. In reality, this was for having the temerity to develop a city at the equator on limited land.

Western Jihadists

Far from being involved in a David versus Goliath-like struggle against “big business”, organisations such as Friends of the Earth International are huge concerns in their own right. They do not even receive the lion’s share of their income from public donations, as some presume. A cursory look at their accounts reveals them to obtain well over 80 per cent of their funding from foundations and governments. 85

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For instance, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds Hivos—a Netherlandsbased civil society group with direct links to campaigns in Indonesia—for up to twothirds of its annual €100 million (S$200 million) budget. In its turn, Hivos is listed as a partner to Aidenvironment who, through a former associate of Friends of the Earth, conducted the supposedly independent review of operations in Indonesia that led Unilever to pull out. These groups also send teams of Western activists in search of purpose and an identity to discover themselves in the jungles of Southeast Asia. There they interact with local groups—or “indigenous people” as the campaigners patronisingly call them—encouraging these to share their concerns, according to strategies they learnt back home, and with a view to enhancing their credibility. Whether donors to U.S.based philanthropic foundations or European taxpayers even know that they are funding other, Western-based NGOs to mount campaigns against businesses in Indonesia is anybody’s guess.

Need to Engage

The real problem has been the failure of industry to engage the public in a wider debate over these issues. This has allowed campaigners to seize the moral high-ground by appearing concerned. While it is a minority of society that engages with these issues, the majority of these are effectively opposed to business and development. And even when they concede the need for the latter, this is always argued for on a small-scale basis. Small may be beautiful, but the reality is that big is better. It is more efficient and potentially cleaner. In addition, celebrating small, localised production is a means to entrap communities where they are for the indefinite future. Unfortunately, individual firms are not best placed to make these arguments. They have their own vested interests. But for the benefit of the people of this region and beyond, it is high time a few enlightened individuals sought to establish an organisation to represent the needs and aspirations of all. SC

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Arpita Mathur

Water Disputes in South Asia Several factors drive water disputes in South Asia. To solve the problems, it is critical to involve even China. Solutions must foster the sharing of water resources through increasing dialogue and building mutual trust.

South Asia is mired in disputes over water resources despite being blessed with three large rivers: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Indus, as well as their tributaries. These disputes emanate from the trans-boundary nature of these rivers, which disregard man-made political and geographical boundaries. The tussle for water resources among India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal is now getting complicated with the entry of China into the calculus. Increasingly under pressure to address its own water woes, China is taking steps that could create new apprehensions over water in South Asia. The region has two prominent basins—the Indus Basin in the west and GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna Basin in the east. The waters in the Indus Basin begin from the Tibetan plateau in China, proceed through northern India and eastern Pakistan, and finally drain into the Arabian Sea. The six rivers of the Indus system (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) are critical to both India and Pakistan. The GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna Basin is India’s largest river system, with a basin covering an area of 1.7 square kilometres.

Disputes in the Region

Despite the existence of many bilateral treaties, friction over water resources in South Asia persists. India seems to be particularly involved in inter-state water frictions by virtue of its location and the fact that it shares borders with all other countries in the region. For instance, on the western frontier, India and Pakistan have differences over the interpretations of the long-standing Indus Water Treaty 1960. Pakistan has also been raising concerns over India’s construction of dams. Similarly, on its eastern frontier, India and Bangladesh, which share 54 transboundary rivers, have a mechanism for cooperation in place through the Ganges Water

Arpita Mathur is Research Fellow with the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. She was previously Associate Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

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It is obvious that China’s geographical position as an upper riparian state gives it a strategic leverage that has implications for the rest of the region.

Treaty. Yet, there are problems over water resources that aggravate political tensions between them. Bangladesh alleges that it does not receive a fair share of water. The Farakka Barrage built by India across the Ganges and India’s proposed plans to link the rivers have also raised concerns in Dhaka in the past.

Why the Disputes

The South Asian region faces a number of challenges that sets off and catalyses the water tensions. First, it is a heavily populated region, with over 2.5 billion people. If China is included in this statistics, the pressure on these finite water resources gets further accentuated. Second, most countries in the region are facing water scarcity, as a result of which many people do not have access to sufficient drinking water and sanitation. With the burgeoning population, water stress will only grow. For instance, demand for water resources in India is expected to double and exceed 1.4 trillion cubic metres by 2050. Besides, Pakistan faces the greatest water crunch. According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006–2007, water supply was just a little more than 1,000 cubic metres per person. Climate change in the Himalayan Basin increases the problem of water insecurity manifold. According to reports, current trends indicate that the three major Himalayan rivers could become seasonal rivers once glaciers melt in the coming three decades. The problem of water scarcity exacerbating hydro-politics gets worsened by the fact that most of these countries, being agrarian economies, require water-fed irrigation facilities. Water resources are also required to feed the demands of industrialisation and urbanisation. The thirst for energy, especially hydro-power, is both widespread and pressing. Aggravating the gravity is the gross mismanagement of water resources and lack of adequate water storage facilities. The regional water disputes are also clearly a legacy of the colonial past. The partition of the sub-continent did not coincide with the trans-boundary river systems in the region but was based on religious parameters. The lack of trust, confidence and political acrimony marking the partition of India and Pakistan, and then the creation of Bangladesh, still resonates in resource disputes.

The China Factor

China and Tibet in particular are key factors in the water dynamics of the region. This is simply due to the fact that many of the rivers of the basins in the region originate from the Tibetan plateau, making it the uppermost riparian country. Enmeshed between China and other South Asian countries, India becomes a middle riparian power. It is obvious that China’s geographical position as an upper riparian state gives it a strategic leverage that has implications for the rest of the region. Therefore, there are anxieties among the lower riparian states over the Chinese advantage on these resources. China’s thirst for water resources is due to its huge population and water scarcity in parts of the country. The concern over China’s alleged ambitious plans to harness and utilise 88

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waters originating from its territory generates anxiety in the lower riparian states. They fear the impact on their own supplies and environment. This is worsened by the lack of transparency, interactions and discussions, amid mutual misperceptions and suspicions.

The Way Ahead

Disputes over water will only worsen in the future, considering that there are enough drivers pushing the region closer towards the brink of a serious water-stress conflict. The way ahead requires the region to minimise and control the clear risks arising from these disputes. First, the spirit of sharing of these trans-boundary rivers has to be fostered, considering the growing water scarcity, growing demands and the compelling need for interdependence. Countries in the subcontinent, including China, have their respective developmental needs to take care of. This can be done best if there is camaraderie and understanding among them. It is critical to depoliticise water as an issue, bring all these countries to the table and increase dialogue and transparency among them. Second, it is important for these countries to develop their own efficient water management systems as well as learn best practices from others to minimise wastage and ensure conservation. Bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation and coordination are essential. Regional mechanisms like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can be effectively used for this purpose. South Asian countries also have to involve China in all these efforts, considering that it is increasingly becoming a critical actor in the regional water disputes. SC

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CHAPTER IV

Governance, Politics and Identity

Mushahid Ali

After the Facebook Revolution: Whither Egypt? Yang Razali Kassim

Post-Mubarak Egypt: Is Indonesia the Model? Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury & Yang Razali Kassim

Libya and the United Nation: Whose Responsibility to Protect? Yang Razali Kassim & Nur Azha Putra

Responsibility to Protect: How should Southeast Asia Respond? Samuel Chan

Our Road out of Afghanistan Joseph Liow & Farish A. Noor

Religion and Identity in Malaysia Chan Wen Ling

When Islamists Play by the Rules Yet Change the Game Akanksha Mehta

Countering India’s Maoist Insurgency: The Need for Strategy, not Operations Choong Pui Yee

More than a Cake Party: Evolving Protest in Malaysia Adri Wanto

Indonesian Islam: What Went Right

Governance, Politics and Identity CHAPTER IV

Mushahid Ali

After the Facebook Revolution

Whither Egypt?

After the ouster of President Mubarak by the Tahrir Square revolution, the Army has taken over control. Given the popular support it enjoys, will the Army retain its hold and produce the next president of Egypt?

The 18-day Facebook uprising in Egypt, which culminated in the 11 February ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, has been hailed as the triumph of the people over a despotic regime. However, Mubarak handed over the running of the Egyptian government to a supreme council of the armed forces headed by Field Marshal Tantawi, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister. This military council is to arrange for the transfer of authority to a civilian government to be elected under a reformed constitution within a year. The cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, hastily formed by Mubarak before his departure, has resigned. So has the newly appointed vice-president Omar Suleiman, to whom Mubarak had earlier handed over some of his powers. The People’s Assembly, whose election in 2010 had been challenged as fraudulent, has been dissolved and fresh elections would be called under the reformed constitution.

Unanswered Questions

The Egyptian Revolution in Tahrir Square may have succeeded in driving President Mubarak from office, but it has raised questions about the future direction of the country. Will the committee set up to reform the constitution include any representative of the youthful Friends of Facebook who led the uprising? Will new political parties be allowed, including the Muslim Brotherhood? Will there be a leadership role for the armed forces? Foreign observers have assessed that the military has emerged as the real winner of the people’s uprising in Egypt. Some Western observers fear that the alternative to military rule is an Islamic theocracy. Others suggest that Egypt could follow the Turkish model where the military stays in the background while an elected Islamic party runs the government along secular lines.

Mushahid Ali is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He spent five years in Cairo as Counsellor in the Singapore Embassy from 2005 to 2010.

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The Egyptian demonstrators have hailed the role of the Army in protecting their right to demonstrate and expressed confidence that the Army will pave the way for restoration of democratic and fair elections to elect a new government. The Army has pledged to fulfil all the demands of the people in making the transition to a freely elected civilian government. However, the Army has also called on the people still occupying Tahrir Square to go home and resume their normal lives. Some protesters want to stay on to make sure that the Army will carry out the promised reforms.

It is ironic that the protesters had to look to the Army to provide the leadership for the transition to a new order.

Army and Leadership

The youthful reformists have good reasons to be wary of the Army’s real intentions. The Army has been in effective control of the country since the 1952 revolution, which ousted the royalist regime. The Army was at the forefront of the drastic measures taken by the regime to introduce socialist policies, expropriation of private enterprises of allegedly pro-royalist Egyptians, expulsion of Western commercial firms, nationalisation of key industries and installations such as the Suez Canal, and the persecution of suspected opponents of the regime. Under successive military presidents—Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak—the Army was given charge of defence industries and allowed to run its own farms and factories for producing food and supplies for the armed forces, besides homes and social amenities for its officers. Senior military officers were appointed to senior management positions in government ministries and agencies, while those of Lieutenant-General rank were appointed governors of provinces and key ministers such as defence, security and aviation. After 40 years of leading and running the administration, the Army remains the single most capable organisation to take over the government in which civilians play subordinate or backroom roles. The Army has been the hardwire framework of Egypt while the civilian-led cabinet ran the economic and services sectors and the powerful security services kept order with their police-state methods of suppression of dissent and subversion.

Army and Politics

This situation is also the case in the political arena, which was dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party whose leading members were former military or security officers. The opposition parties were emasculated and the well-organised Muslim Brotherhood was driven underground, declared an illegal organisation because it mixed religion with politics. The result, according to Egyptian scholars, was political stagnation and desultory economic growth that failed to keep pace with the exponential increase of Egypt’s population. Social inequities widened with 40 per cent of the population living below the poverty line. It is therefore not a surprise that the Facebook demonstrators, while 94

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gaining unprecedented success in mobilising popular opposition to the Mubarak regime, have not been able to put forward or identify any single leader or group who could provide an alternative leadership for a post-Mubarak order. One or two veteran diplomats, like former IAEA Director-General Muhammad El Baradei, and Arab League Secretary-General and former foreign minister Amr Moussa, were touted as possible presidential candidates. However, their ground support and political organisation is doubtful. The leading inspiration of the Facebook revolution Wael Ghoneim, a Google marketing executive, has disavowed any political ambitions. So has the Muslim Brotherhood.

Irony of the Revolution

It is ironic that the protesters had to look to the Army to provide the leadership for the transition to a new order. They should not be surprised if in the process the Army puts forward its own candidates for leading positions in the new government. Although the Army has pledged to make constitutional reforms to ensure free and fair elections, the way would be open for some reformist members of the old ruling party, the NDP, or the armed forces, to run as independents in the presidential elections. Given the popularity of the Army, one should not be surprised if one of the Council of Generals is elected as the next president of Egypt. The people who elect him can only hope that the next president will bring into his government representatives of a broader segment of the population and appoint as ministers men and women of integrity and ability who will work for the benefit of the people and prosperity of the country as a whole. The Egyptian revolution that began in Tahrir Square has a long road ahead to its destination. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

Post-Mubarak Egypt

Is Indonesia the Model? As post-revolution Egypt ponders its new state superstructure, various models have been assessed by Egypt watchers. Indonesia is increasingly being seen as a possible model.

Now that the Mubarak regime has been deposed, many views have been offered on the likely polity of the new Egypt. Several models have been cited. Two stand out: Iran and Turkey. Increasingly, the Indonesian model is also being heard. All three are Muslim majority states. Some watchers, like former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, believe Indonesia is the most appropriate model for Egypt to follow. President Obama, who grew up as a child in Indonesia, has made comparisons between Egypt and Indonesia in the aftermath of the uprising. There have been reports about the United States possibly making a pitch to the caretaker military regime in Egypt to consider the Indonesian model. The White House apparently is studying various precedents, including Indonesia, to assist Egypt in its democratic transition. Former Indonesian foreign minister and ambassador to Cairo, Hasan Wirayuda, recently delivered a message from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sharing the president’s thoughts on the Indonesian model. There are obvious similarities between Egypt and Indonesia. But how apt a model is Indonesia for Egypt?

Egypt 2011 and Indonesia 1998

The most striking resemblance between Egypt 2011 and Indonesia 1998, when Suharto fell, was, of course, regime change and the pivotal role of “people power”. Mubarak and Suharto were both generals—from the air force and army respectively—who became political leaders. Like Suharto, Mubarak was thrown out after three decades of authoritarian rule. Both amassed power partly on the back of fears of external and internal threats. And both were brought down eventually by a confluence of latent incendiary factors triggered off by economic hardships—rising food prices in the case of Egypt in 2011, and rising fuel prices amid the Asian financial crisis in the case of Indonesia in 1998.

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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Significantly, both fell when the military Post-Mubarak Egypt can learn refused to lend support. In the case of Egypt, it from Indonesia, but it will have led to the military taking over interim power— to be an Egyptian solution— at least until an elected government comes in— determined by Egyptians making the change something like a silent coup. themselves, through democratic In the case of Indonesia, the military reformed choice. itself and withdrew from politics. For regime preservation, both Mubarak and Suharto played up the threat of Islamist extremism—partly to buttress their own position and win foreign support. Mubarak was deposed without him reaching reconciliation with his nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood. Suharto, towards the end of his rule, reconciled with his Islamic constituency. The irony for Mubarak was that he was thrown out not by the Muslim Brotherhood but by the wider population through people power. The irony for Suharto: the Islamic constituency could not, and would not save him when his fall became inevitable—also under the pressure of people power. In both Egypt 2011 and Indonesia 1998, the fury of a long-suppressed people was devastating. The impact was irreversible, though Egypt 2011 was less messy and less bloody than Indonesia 1998.

The Indonesian Model

To be sure, talk about the appropriate model for Egypt is presumptuous. After all, even the Egyptians are grappling with it. The last thing the world should do is to impose a model on them. The Egyptians have the right to decide their own future. Whatever it is, the final shape of the new Egyptian polity should be the product of a national consensus of all the political forces in the country, with no groups left out. This process of forging a national consensus is what the Indonesians do very well; they call it musyawarah dan mufakat. Being inclusive, it also ensures system stability. There are signs that the caretaker regime in Egypt is doing this as the political system is being redesigned. But assuming Egypt post-Mubarak decides to follow the Indonesian model, what would it look like? To begin with, it will not be like Iran. The new Egypt will not be a theocracy because Indonesia is not a theocracy. It will also not be like Turkey, where a secular government is run by an Islamist party, the AKP. The Islamist bloc in Indonesia is currently not enjoying wide national support. But this can change over time should the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) become more adept as a political player in the democratic system and grow in stature. The highly popular Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will be even more adept than the PKS and the Islamic bloc in Jakarta combined. The Indonesian model, if adopted by Egypt, could see the disparate political forces, including the Brotherhood, forging compromises through coalitions. Egypt will also not be a military-dominated state, which Indonesia no longer is, in this post-Suharto Reformasi era. The Egyptian Army will disengage from politics like its Indonesian counterpart. But the Indonesian model also means the military still prevails behind the scenes—just like in Turkey. While the military defers to civilian rule, it does 97

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not prevent generals from rising to the presidency through democratic channels. The current president, Yudhoyono, is a former general who shed his uniform to successfully contest the elections. If the Indonesian model were emulated, then the Egyptian polity would be a multiparty parliamentary system with a civilian presidential leadership. Indonesia is a nontheocratic state that accommodates in a fine balance the three major forces of secularism, Islam and the military. These are also the key forces that will determine the future of the new Egypt.

Too Much, Too Soon

The Indonesian polity post-Suharto is stabilising and its economy growing—but only after a decade. Restructuring the political system cannot be rushed. The post-revolutionary euphoria in Indonesia led to what I call “democratic diarrhoea”—too much loosening of the system too fast. It did not take Indonesians too long to realise that an uncontrolled proliferation of political parties in the name of democracy is not necessarily a good thing. Now they are trying to downsize the party system to a more manageable size. Devolving power to the regions too fast through decentralisation can also lead to complications. Now they are trying to refine this. After 12 years, post-Suharto Indonesia is still work-in-progress. Reordering Indonesia is an unfinished business. Post-Mubarak Egypt can learn from Indonesia, but it will have to be an Egyptian solution—determined by Egyptians themselves, through democratic choice. SC

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Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury & Yang Razali Kassim

Libya and the United Nations

Whose Responsibility to Protect? As the blood letting in Libya continues, and the hapless protesters battle a repressive regime that has shown no qualms to slaughter its own people, the eyes of the world are focused on the United Nations. To its credit, the Security Council has acted in strong terms. Is this enough?

The humanitarian tragedy in Libya triggered by the harsh response of the Gaddafi regime to the people’s revolt has provoked international moral outrage. While the United Nations has to respect the sovereignty of its member states, the question increasingly being asked is where sovereignty ends and international intervention begins. Notwithstanding this dilemma, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously on 26 February 2011 to impose sanctions on the Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi and his inner circle, including his family. The UNSC also called for an international “war crimes” investigation into “widespread and systematic attacks” against the Libyan people and referred the case to the International Criminal Court. As if this was not enough, the Council further imposed an arms embargo against Libya, an international travel ban against relevant Libyan officials, and froze the Gaddafi family’s assets. In an action almost equally significant, U.S. President Barack Obama, in a telephone call to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, said Gaddafi had lost the “legitimacy to rule” and should “leave”.

Responsibility to Protect

Not unexpectedly, the draft resolution was hotly debated. The referral to the International Criminal Court attracted some hesitation, in particular from China, known to be circumspect on such issues. But Beijing ultimately relented, wanting, no doubt, to also be on the right side of history. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan did take the position that sanctions would do the Libyan people rather than Gaddafi more harm. But the tipping point came when Libyan diplomats themselves enthusiastically backed the draft and appealed for international intervention. But will this resolution be enough to arrest the slide in Libya towards a full-fledged humanitarian crisis?

Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore. He was formerly foreign minister of Bangladesh and ambassador to the United Nations. Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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With each passing hour, more blood is being shed in the streets of Tripoli and elsewhere in Libya. The cry of anguish in Libya grows shriller and more painful. Is there something more that the United Nations and the Security Council can do to bring succour and comfort to the Libyan people? The answer to this is, yes. This brings us to the UN doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect”, or “RtoP”, as it is generally known. It was adopted by world leaders at the UN World Summit in 2005 and is contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the “Outcome Document” adopted as a “reforms package”. RtoP rests on three principles: Firstly, each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (These four elements are important and each was chosen after much careful debate and consideration). Secondly, the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII (of the UN Charter) to protect the population (from the four catastrophes). Thirdly, however, “should peaceful means be inadequate, and the national authorities manifestly fail (to act), then the international community can take collective action in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis, in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate”. Here, military intervention sanctioned by the United Nations is not precluded, but only as a last resort. Since its adoption, RtoP as a doctrine has never been implemented through any Security Council resolution. Critical to this concept is the fact that the international  community also has the responsibility to prevent such a situation from occurring in the first place that would warrant external military intervention. In 2008, when the Myanmar government appeared inactive despite Cyclone Nargis devastating parts of the country, the then French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner pushed for a hardline RtoP calling for some form of international intervention. But it seemed too much like a back-door attempt at regime change. His call failed to generate any significant support. Since its adoption, RtoP as a doctrine has never been implemented through any Security Council resolution.

RtoP on Libya

But the Libyan case is different. The efforts to bring about “regime change” here need not be a “back-door” endeavour. There is a crying need to do it now to end the excruciating human sufferings of the Libyan people. The Security Council has already agreed that war crimes are being committed in Libya by the ruling group. It is obvious that all peaceful means to resolve the crisis have proved futile, and the domestic authorities have manifestly failed in their responsibilities. If there ever was a time for collective action through the Security Council legally, morally, and in practical terms, it is now. If there ever was a situation ripe for the application of the principle of the RtoP, it is Libya. In fact by adopting the UNSC resolution on 26 February, the implementation of the RtoP principle in its “hardcore” form has already begun. Significantly, however, the 100

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resolution did not skirt around this but explicitly invoked RtoP to justify the punitive actions on Gaddafi, his family and his coterie of key supporters. The resolution cited the Libyan regime’s “responsibility to protect its own population”. What is required now is another back-to-back resolution. This one could include two things. The first is the proclamation of a “no-fly zone” to prevent Gaddafi’s air force from striking at a protesters’ march upon Tripoli. The second is the issuance of “arrest warrants” against “war criminals” as the key personalities in the Gaddafi regime have been labelled. But given the obvious sensitivity of all these punitive moves, especially over military intervention in the air or on the ground, the United Nations must be mindful of its limits. Nothing must be done to open itself up to accusations that it is taking Libyan sovereignty lightly—notwithstanding RtoP—or worse, it is promoting a neo-colonialist project. The United Nations has rightly taken upon itself the mantle of protector of the helpless, for that body alone represents the aspirations of the entirety of humanity. If the United Nations fails, it will also signal the failure of the international community. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim & Nur Azha Putra

Responsibility to Protect

How should Southeast Asia Respond? The emerging doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) may have been endorsed by world leaders but the primary challenge as to how to get it implemented remains. RtoP may mean different things to different states. There are fundamental issues that have yet to be fully reconciled.

As a new and fledgling doctrine in international relations, it is as contentious as it is, some say, revolutionary. This doctrine—responsibility to protect, or RtoP—may be slowly gaining traction, but it remains immensely controversial. This is at least the key message from a regional consultation held recently among scholars, analysts and civil society actors from the Asia Pacific region. The nub of the controversy is the inevitable clash between two principles: the sovereignty of states and the responsibility of the international community to protect human lives in situations of failing states.

Reconciling Clashing Principles

How does one reconcile the two contesting principles? Can they indeed be reconciled? How does the international community come to the rescue of citizens whose own states are unable or unwilling to protect them from mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity? And how can this moral urge to protect be pursued without violating the principle of state sovereignty? This tension between the two doctrines in international affairs was intensely debated at the Singapore meeting, organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Led by the RSIS’ Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, the meeting ended with one clear impression: it’s early days yet for the doctrine of RtoP. It has a long way to go before it becomes as entrenched as the Westphalian principle of inviolable state sovereignty. To be sure, world leaders had endorsed the doctrine at the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations. But the deep-seated attachment to the sanctified idea of sovereignty is still too strong for a warm embrace of RtoP: the fear of foreign interference in domestic affairs is overpowering. Indeed, it is feared, RtoP may be used to justify interference in the guise of international humanitarian intervention. This was exactly

Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Nur Azha Putra is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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the controversy arising from the Myanmar gov- Going forward, RtoP needs to be ernment’s failure to come swiftly to aid its own demystified. people in the face of Cyclone Nargis. France felt provoked to urge the world community to invoke RtoP. But Indonesia, despite its new posture as a promoter of human rights, rejected linking humanitarian aid with RtoP. But if RtoP is not meant to include international humanitarian intervention, what is it? Where does RtoP begin and where does it end?

Evolution of RtoP

RtoP as a doctrine began in 2001 when it was propounded by a group of international human rights advocates in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It was led by Gareth Evans, the former Australian foreign minister, and Mohamed Sahnoun, special advisor to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. In 2004, Annan created the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to identify major threats facing the international community and come up with new ideas to meet these challenges. The panel then endorsed what it termed as the “emerging norm”—the responsibility to protect people from “avoidable catastrophe”, specifically the four types of mass atrocities mentioned earlier. This norm rests on three pillars. Firstly, sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes. Secondly, when these states are unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility falls on the wider international community. Thirdly, intervention should be through peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means, though military action may be undertaken as a last resort, if endorsed by the United Nations. In 2005, at the UN’s World Summit, 191 world leaders unanimously endorsed the RtoP doctrine. A year later, the UN Security Council included references to RtoP in two of its resolutions, thus reaffirming the emerging doctrine. And thus was laid the foundations for a new “global moral compact”, as some called it. The World Summit resolution notwithstanding, the fundamental tension between sovereignty and responsibility to protect remains a critical hurdle. Not surprisingly, Ban Ki Moon, Annan’s successor as UN Secretary-General, tried to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable in the clever phrase—the “abiding principles of responsible sovereignty”.

The Southeast Asian Context

Despite the inherent tension, the Singapore consultation on RtoP ended with a consensus that the doctrine should not be precluded from the Southeast Asian region. But how? Two issues repeatedly emerged. Firstly, how to convince Southeast Asian states to adopt the three RtoP pillars as an integral package. For example, they may agree to the first pillar that underscores the state’s responsibility to protect. But they may reject the third pillar that the international community has the equal responsibility to intervene in the event of failure by the state. Secondly, how to persuade Southeast Asian states to institutionalise the RtoP doctrine both at the national and ASEAN levels. Unsurprisingly, the key impediment to RtoP in Southeast Asia is the fear of foreign 103

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interference. Southeast Asian states fear that RtoP would be taken as a licence to intervene in their domestic affairs. There is also the underlying apprehension of RtoP leading to twenty-first century neo-colonialism—a tool by the West to advance its economic agenda or even subjugate weak Asian states once again. There seems also the misguided notion that RtoP need not apply to Southeast Asia because crimes against humanity such as those that happened in Darfur, Rwanda and Bosnia, would not occur in this part of the world. But did Southeast Asia not live through the Killing Fields of the Khmer Rouge’s Cambodia in the 1970s?

Way Forward: Demystifying RtoP

Going forward, RtoP needs to be demystified. The misconceptions should be immediately addressed to promote human security as a global public good and thus a policy priority. To achieve this, the RtoP doctrine itself has to be clarified almost endlessly, if necessary. Although RtoP is slowly gaining ground, it is far from having captured the public imagination in Southeast Asia. SC

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Samuel Chan

Our Road Out of Afghanistan Singapore’s contribution to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan is growing. We must be clear of our policy and strategy to meet pragmatic goals and be wary of an open-ended commitment. In August 2010, a 52-man UAV Task Group was deployed to Tarin Kowt to aid ISAF operations in Southern Afghanistan.

Since the inaugural deployment of a five-man dental team from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) five years ago, Operation Blue Ridge—the codename for Singapore’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan—has grown steadily. Today, ground units with various combat support (engineer, artillery) and combat service support (medical) specialisations operate in two provinces, together with liaison elements at Kandahar Air Field and Headquarters ISAF in the Afghan capital, Kabul. Recent announcements by the Government of Singapore indicated the possible deployment of a KC-135 aerial refuelling tanker and an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Task Group. In August 2010, a 52-man UAV Task Group was deployed in Tarin Kowt to aid ISAF operations in Southern Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is Our Concern

The raison d’être for Operation Blue Ridge is simple. “The global terror threat is a key reason why Singapore contributes to international security,” explains Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean, and “Afghanistan is at the frontline in the global fight against terrorism”. Singapore is part of a 43-nation, 86,000-strong coalition operating under the UN-mandated ISAF umbrella with the aim “of assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority and creating a secure environment”. However, two issues deserve to be addressed. The first is Singapore’s policies—“actions designed to accomplish political goals”— towards Afghanistan. Deploying troops, providing training programmes and briefings for Afghan officials on healthcare, judicial matters, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, aviation, water, and waste management, illustrate responsibility and the policy of

Samuel Chan is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is with the Military Transformations Programme. He spent some time in Afghanistan in 2006 as Jebsen Research Fellow at the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in Kabul.

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helping others in need. Establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in June 2006 reflects the policy of friendship. The concern here is on the clarity of policy relating to Operation Blue Ridge. We cannot remain in Afghanistan perpetually so what is the “end state” we seek? We must be cognisant that Afghanistan is unique. As Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew notes, “nobody has ever made sense out of Afghanistan” and “trying to make a country out of Afghanistan is a distraction [for America]”. Our policy must incorporate tangible goals to benefit Afghanistan. Furthermore, our policy must be based on goals set by ourselves, perhaps in consultation with partners, but never ones dictated to us. Meeting the goals we set for ourselves is our “end state”. But what can we really do as a small state? The fact is, we can make a difference by leveraging on our strengths. We can build, train, mentor and advise.

That contest, however, is not for us to decide. Our duty is merely to help the Afghans help themselves.

Matching Means and Ends

The second outstanding issue is our military strategy. If our policy is to build, train, mentor and advise, then our strategy—“the distribution and application of military means to fulfil the ends of policy”—must be clear. In Bamiyan province, for example, we can leave a legacy to the people by helping to pave—either by hand or by pocket— the Pul-i-Mattak-Bamiyan-Maidan Shar road. Since 2002, the central highlanders have asked for this road, more than anything else, to realise their economic potential but to no avail. We can also train and mentor the Afghan National Army (ANA), not in the arena of war fighting, but in combat medicine, for instance. By training the ANA trainers, we can help them help themselves. Our Medical Corps possesses the training, education and operational experience, which make it second to none in SAF, perhaps one of the best internationally. We can also advise our coalition partners, not how to fight a counter-insurgency or to eradicate drugs, but on culture and values. There is more in common between Afghan and traditional Asian culture and values than meets the eye. In helping Afghanistan, we also help ourselves. The SAF is a learning organisation and Afghanistan is a combat zone with rich pickings. The question is whether we are willing to pick the fruits (lessons) hanging from the Tree of War. Once we meet our tangible goals, it is time to bring our soldiers home with the satisfaction that we have completed the mission with a clear conscience. In directing such a policy and initiating such a strategy towards Afghanistan, Singapore is not being selfish. It is acting simultaneously in its own interest and in the interest of the Afghan people. It is working within our means to reach ends we have dictated for ourselves.

Managing Expectations

But what of victory? The reality is that the best the international community can hope for is “non-victory”—no victory, no defeat. As long as ISAF remains in Afghanistan, the Kabul government will not fall but the insurgency will also not end either. Then again, 106

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ISAF will leave one day, perhaps one day sooner than later. As U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates recently announced, the transfer to Afghan security forces will commence “no later than July 2011”, predicated on ground conditions. Patience, however, is a virtue on the insurgents’ side. “The Americans have all the wrist watches but we have all the time,” so they say. Besides, where else have they to go? Victory then becomes the prize in a clash of wills between the Afghan government and its opponents, a contest where “the conventional army loses if it does not win, and the guerrilla wins if he does not lose”. That contest, however, is not for us to decide. Our duty is merely to help the Afghans help themselves. This is reflected in the timeless words of the legendary British officer T. E. Lawrence: “It is better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and your time is short.” SC

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Joseph Chinyong Liow & Farish A. Noor

Religion and Identity in Malaysia The controversy in Malaysia over the use of the term “Allah” by the Christian community once again raised the underlying tension between religion and identity in the country. What does this mean for Prime Minister Najib Razak’s unifying cry for a 1Malaysia?

The church-burning incidents in Malaysia in January 2010 had dealt a potentially fatal blow to Prime Minister Najib Razak’s vision of 1Malaysia. But tragic as they were, the events were not altogether surprising. Indeed, the events following the Malaysian High Court’s decision to allow non-Muslims to use the term “Allah” were merely symptomatic of the nature of religious politics in Malaysia today. To begin with, one should consider the etymological roots of the word “Allah” and consider its import for both Muslims and Christians. It is an Arabic word. But because Arabs are themselves culturally and religiously diverse, the term “Allah” is used by both Arab Muslims as well as Arab Christians. When the Copts of Egypt celebrate their Christmas mass, for example, the Coptic Pope begins his sermon with the phrase “Bismillah” and uses the word “Allah” throughout.

Historical Roots

The significance of this cannot be underemphasised. The word “Allah” is as important to Arab Christians as it is to Arab Muslims, for it stands for the concept of a singular, universal God. It literally means “The God”, with a capital “G”, denoting a singular deity, confirming the fact that both Christianity and Islam are monotheistic faiths. Thus the reluctance on the part of some Christians in Malaysia to abandon “Allah” may stem from the fact that they are aware that “tuhan” does not have the same connotation. What’s more, “tuhan” may appear in the plural form (“tuhan-tuhan”), or “gods”, a meaning more appropriate for polytheistic faiths. Historically, we know that “Allah” has been used by Arab Christians and other Christians across Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the term has been used by both Catholics and Protestants since the arrival of Christianity in the archipelago. Even now, at every Easter and Christmas celebration across Indonesia, Indonesian Christians sing

Joseph Chinyong Liow is Associate Dean and Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Farish A. Noor is Senior Fellow at the school.

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the praises of Allah—the singular, universal Indeed, the events following the God. They cannot understand what the fuss is Malaysian High Court’s decision to about in Malaysia, and why Christians ought to allow non-Muslims to use the term use another word to denote the singular, uni- “Allah” were merely symptomatic versal God. Is it not the case that “Allah” means of the nature of religious politics in Malaysia today. precisely that? This common belief in a singular universal God binds Muslims and Christians together, as they come from the same Abrahamic tradition and believe in the same prophets. Lest it be forgotten, the prophet Adam was neither Muslim nor Christian, but simply a prophet of Allah.

Islam and the Constitution

Though freedom of worship is constitutionally guaranteed in Malaysia, Islam is enshrined in the Constitution as the sole official religion of the country. In addition, the Constitution accords shari’a law equal status with civil law in jurisprudential matters concerning the private lives of Muslims. Islam assumes further salience by virtue of the fact that the chief criterion for the definition of “Malay” in the Constitution is that he or she must be Muslim. Such is the intimate relationship between ethnicity and religion that someone converting to Islam has become popularly known to have “masuk Melayu” (become a Malay). The role of Islam at the core of Malay identity has gained greater prominence because two other pillars upon which that identity was once constructed—namely language and royalty—no longer have the same currency they did decades ago. No doubt the Malay language remains politically important. But precisely because the state has implemented an education policy based on the primacy of Malay in the national curriculum, knowledge of the language is no longer the exclusive prerogative of Malays. Similarly, Malaysian royalty today has a highly problematic relationship with the Malay ruling elite. The rulers are seen by the latter as competitors for legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. Moreover, royalty have undermined their own legitimacy in the public eye because of a number of controversial episodes and scandals.

Religion and Ethnicity

The centrality of Islam has been further augmented by the state-orchestrated discourse of Malay primacy encapsulated in the concepts of ketuanan melayu (Malay primacy) and “bumiputra rights”. Remarkably, even as the opposition Islamist party Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) has gradually toned down its brand of religious politics, the ruling UMNO has persisted in employing exclusivist racial and religious discourse. Indeed, though ethnicity has long been the primary identity marker for Malays in Malaysia, there may well be a shift from ethnicity towards religion, with Malays seeing themselves first as Muslims, rather than Malays. The church-burning incidents of 2010 and the government’s seeming inability or 109

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reluctance to take resolute action against certain segments of the Malay-Muslim community, are sobering reminders of just how far the country is from the goal of national unity, as envisioned in the concept 1Malaysia. And of course, 1Malaysia cannot materialise without the support of Malay-Muslims, who happen to be the vital constituency whose support Prime Minister Najib seems to be losing. SC

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Chan Wen Ling

When Islamists Play by the Rules Yet Change the Game The upgrading of the PAS Supporters Club to a legal entity, complete with party constitution amendments that recognise the new wing, makes the PAS promise of “PAS for all” self-fulfilling. It provides the party an opportunity to lead the change away from race-based politicking.

PAS, or the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party for short, is an Islamist opposition party that has been consistent in its use of democratic means to pursue its political goals—seeking wider support through elections to gain representation at state and federal levels, denouncing violent political protest, and pushing for change and development through proper channels. Though participation in the Malaysian political environment has shaped the PAS of today, the party itself has had an impact on the political dynamics in Malaysia. The upgrading of the PAS Supporters Club into the PAS Supporters Congress in 2010 can be read as an experimental departure from communal-based politics, led by PAS, historically a Malay-Muslim party.

From Club to Congress

In the past, whether cooperating with UMNO, or joining the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah and later the Barisan Alternatif, PAS has always been more comfortable keeping to its traditional target audience of Malay-Muslims. Power sharing and governing states, however, has given PAS hands-on experience in plural politics. The party appears to have become more pragmatic in its idealism, accepting that groups with interests different from it have a legitimate role in the political process. On the other hand, PAS studiously rejected UMNO’s blandishments to join forces to form a Malay unity government in order to uphold Malay dominance—ketuanan Melayu. The PAS Supporters Club, an initiative of PAS’ National Unity Bureau and consisting of non-Muslim members, was created right before the 2004 general election, to make PAS more acceptable to the non-Muslim electorate. However, the hard-line stance PAS took during the 2004 elections made it difficult for the club to attract its target audience. A post-mortem of the dismal 2004 electoral performance had PAS undertaking party reforms that included going out of its way to engage the non-Muslims. The club has functioned as a platform for non-Muslims especially within PAS-governed

Chan Wen Ling is Senior Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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states to give feedback to the party, as well as to provide opportunities for engagement between PAS members and the non-Muslim community to foster racial unity. Since reaching out to non-Muslims via talks, workshops, dialogues, official statements and its PAS Supporters Club, PAS has confidently contested in previously Barisan Nasional (BN) strongholds, with a substantial number of non-Muslims voting for it. PAS’ moderate message and focus on the substance of Islamic principles rather than Islamic semantics, coupled with its close cooperation with the People’s Justice Party (PKR) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), may have attracted many protesting against BN. However, bringing down the barrier between PAS and the non-Muslim community would have been extremely difficult without PAS Supporters Club members paving the way, and PAS leaders willingly stepping up to share the party’s stand on Islamic governance and the place of non-Muslims in such a polity. The 23 May 2010 launch of the PAS Supporters Congress was an attempt to appeal to more non-Muslims, dispel their fears towards the Islamist party and to acknowledge the undivided support of existing supporters, especially in assisting the party machinery during the 2008 general election and the subsequent by-elections. According to PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang, the party was serious about appointing non-Muslims to the Senate to represent Malaysia’s multi-racial society, and was also granting the wing powers to nominate non-Muslims as candidates in the next general election. He stated, “PAS is trying to unite the various races by opening its door to the non-Muslims. We reaffirmed our commitment to unity when we decided to upgrade the PAS Supporters Club to being equal to the youth, women and ulama wings.” There are 20,000 registered members made up of Chinese, Indians, Siamese and Orang Asli, in the Supporters’ Club that have been inducted into the new congress. The number is estimated to double with the more structured congress. The congress’ top leadership would be invited to attend central PAS leadership meetings, as well as send representatives to the annual PAS Muktamar (general meeting). Discussions were under way to allow members of the congress to vote in future party elections, which would make them full-fledged PAS members. The current party constitution states that all PAS members must be Muslims. PAS also welcomed any progressive input for the party. As an Islamist party, the accommodations and power offered to non-Muslim PAS supporters is certainly helping to establish its credential as a multi-racial party.

To read any gains in non-Muslim support as acquiescence of a PAS Islamist agenda could well be its undoing.

Implications of the New PAS Supporters Congress

The Pakatan Rakyat (PR) opposition coalition which comprises PAS, PKR and the DAP at the core, rejects race-based politics, and aspires to usher in a new political trend based on a multi-racial approach. The launch of the PAS Supporters Congress has shown the potential of the Islamist party to lead such a change. PAS has a solid grassroots network. Though the PAS leadership is made up of many voices (such as the ulama and professionals), in the face of internal conflict, it has been known to close ranks to present a 112

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unified front after intense debate. Conversely, internal conflicts within PKR—a professed multi-racial party within PR that would have been seen as the driver of such a trend—tend to end in party defections. This indicates that the ability to resolve internal conflicts and manage differences within a party is essential for the stability needed to steer change in the system. For PAS to successfully drive the change towards more multi-racial politicking, it would depend largely on how the party deals with disagreements and demands of the new PAS Supporters Congress. Settling the disagreements and demands as it would internal issues, would certainly have a more positive outcome than dealing with them as a threat by outsiders gaining too much influence on the internal affairs of PAS. The party should also keep in mind the reason why most non-Muslims chose to join the club and now the congress—they deem PAS to be multi-racial, open to suggestions and feedback, just and efficient in its governance—albeit with Islam as a guide. To read any gains in non-Muslim support as acquiescence of a PAS Islamist agenda could well be its undoing. SC

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Akanksha Mehta

Countering India’s Maoist Insurgency

The Need for Strategy, not Operations There has been increasing attacks by Maoists in India, highlighting their growing strength. The government, which seems to be faltering, needs to develop a multi-pronged strategy to address issues of security, development and governance in Maoist-affected areas.

With its spread, mobilisation, organisation and increasing tactical sophistication, the Maoist (Naxal) insurgency has established itself as India’s “gravest internal security threat”. From the rural, jungle operations, the Maoists are now moving towards urban centres with an ever-increasing target set—government, key infrastructure and even civilians.

Growing Maoist Infrastructure

Currently active in 223 districts across 20 Indian states—30 per cent of the country— the Maoists are also linked to leftist groups in neighbouring countries through the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). They are even reported to be getting support from leftist groups outside the region, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines. In addition to having claimed 2,100 lives between 2005 and 2009, the Maoists are destroying valuable infrastructure including railways, schools, hospitals, policing and government institutions. Moreover, the Maoists have come to run substitute governance structures in their strongholds, making a mockery of India’s core political and judicial institutions, and placing natural resources and economic investments in these areas at serious risk. The May 2010 attack on a private bus near Gadiras in Dantewada district of the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh illustrated the strength of the information and structural networks of the Maoists in their strongholds. However, the April 2010 attack, which claimed the lives of 76 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force, highlighted significant loopholes in the government’s counter operations. The Home Affairs ministry concedes in a security report that left-wing extremists operate in the vacuum created by weak governance structures and take advantage of prevalent dissatisfaction. They also exploit feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among the underprivileged and

Akanksha Mehta is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. She has conducted field research on the Maoist insurgency in India.

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remote segments of the population. As such, it is necessary for the government to develop a multi-pronged strategy that counters both the violence and its root causes.

The Maoist insurgency has permeated a vast expanse of the country, undermining its very core institutions.

Inadequacies of Current Operations

The formation of a successful counter-strategy has been difficult, as the Maoists have emerged as a rather diffused enemy. Several sections of the tribal population are ambivalent in this insurgency, leading to confusion over the different leanings among the armed insurgents, tribal sympathisers and innocent tribal villagers. Moreover, within the Maoist movement, there exist several factions (with several strands of Leftist ideology) that often divide and consolidate. This has rendered the “Maoist ideology” and the goals of the movement rather unidentifiable. It makes it difficult for the government to counter them and formulate an appropriate strategy that would defeat the armed insurgents without alienating the tribal villagers who are not in the Maoist camp. Operations to combat Maoist violence (such as Operation Green Hunt launched in March 2010) had been largely unsuccessful, as the security forces were not provided with adequate training and resources to fight the rebels. While units stationed in Maoist areas were given some training in guerrilla warfare, their weapons, arms and ammunitions, as well their networks and structures of communication and intelligence gathering are inadequate to counter those of their adversaries. For instance, in the April 2010 attack on a government security unit in the Dantewada district, the security personnel were unaware of intelligence inputs, and were inadequately trained and commanded. This made them commit several tactical errors, rendering them easy targets for the rebels.

Poor Coordination

The poor coordination between local police, intelligence agencies and the paramilitary personnel in the region was caused by political differences and related factors. Furthermore, current operations were built on an insufficient tactical understanding of the insurgents. This was also highlighted during the Dantewada attack wherein security personnel, following protocol, took cover in the neighbouring forests after the initial explosion. However, Maoist insurgents, aware of this protocol, had booby-trapped the neighbouring forests with mines, resulting in more casualties. Owing to India’s federal polity, the Maoist insurgency (classified as a law and order issue) falls under the control of the governments of individual states. However, as Maoists operate on several border areas, a counter-operation in one state merely leads to the spill-over of Maoists to the neighbouring state. Political differences between neighbouring state governments have thus further hampered the success of operations against the rebels. India’s development and governance initiatives aimed at combating the root causes of the insurgency have also been unsuccessful so far. The failure of these initiatives 115

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can be largely attributed to the deep-seated corruption, bureaucracy and political rivalry, which is endemic to India. It is, however, also crucial to note that the government cannot develop what it cannot control. The Maoists run parallel government structures in their strongholds, asserting their presence with both violence and political and economic control. This has made it difficult for the government to deliver development projects to these areas.

Strategy, not Operations

There is clearly a lack of proper understanding of the threat as well as insufficient cooperation and resources. Worsening this is the poor implementation of policy initiatives to address issues of governance and development. The combined effect is that the Indian government has been churning out largely ineffective counter operations, not a solid, multi-pronged counter strategy. The Maoist insurgency has permeated a vast expanse of the country, undermining its very core institutions. Long-term initiatives to address the inadequacies of development and governance in Maoist-infested areas, along with measures to degrade operational capabilities of the rebels are extremely important. It is, therefore, critical that the security forces are provided with adequate training, resources and a protocol based on a strong understanding of Maoist tactics. At the same time, the Indian government has to re-establish firm governance structures and demonstrate significant political will in the administration of development projects in the Maoist-affected areas. SC

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Choong Pui Yee

More than a Cake Party

Evolving Protest in Malaysia Malaysians created a new definition for protest by throwing cake parties. This has interesting implications for the government and the way protest is evolving in Malaysia.

After Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak tabled the 2011 budget on 16 October 2010 in which he allocated a whopping RM 5 billion (S$2.3 billion) to build a 100-storey skyscraper in the capital Kuala Lumpur, an anonymous Malaysian created a Facebook page entitled “1M Malaysians Reject 100-storey Mega Tower”. The objective of the page was to rally one million like-minded Malaysians to oppose the building of the Mega Tower. Within two weeks, the page added 200,000 friends, mostly Malaysians from different ethnic groups and ages. In effect, a new protest group had been formed.

A Different Kind of Cake Party

To commemorate its first month on 16 November 2010, the group called for a cake party celebration. Eight locations in different cities of Malaysia were selected to hold this cake party that evening. In addition, Malaysians working in Singapore and Texas were to have their cake parties overseas to show solidarity. Justifying the reason for the cake celebration, the administrator of the page wrote: “This is not the first mega-project, but this is the first time a mega-project is facing organised resistance from the bottom-up. No mega-project from now on can be bulldozed against public opinion. That’s why we celebrate!” On the evening of the cake party itself, there was tightened security in several locations marked for the cake party. In Kampar in the state of Perak, 14 policemen were deployed at the McDonald’s outlet selected for the party. Despite early warning that there would be policemen stationed, there was still a handful of people who turned up at the McDonald’s outlet for the cake party. They included students from the nearby University Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) campus who joined the cake party despite being warned against it by the Vice-President of UTAR. Similarly, there were some

Choong Pui Yee is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. A graduate of the University of Malaya, she is attached to the Malaysia Programme.

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A question that needs to be addressed is how the Malaysian government will handle such forms of protest, especially if the cake party has a snowball effect.

security guards in the Suria KLCC building in KL who dispersed the small groups congregating around the fountain for the cake party.

Implications of the Cake Party

On the surface, there seems nothing significant in small groups of Malaysians meeting publicly to eat cakes together for a cause. However, a closer look at the event may reveal farreaching implications. Firstly, the way the cake-parties were started showed that Malaysians have found the safest and fastest way for organised protest, which is through the virtual realm. In this case, Malaysians have utilised the social network platform, Facebook, to attract like-minded netizens to make their voices heard. All they needed to demonstrate their displeasure over the “Mega Tower” project was to make a few clicks on their computers in the comfort of their home. Besides, they could conceal their real identities. Hence, the virtual platform has made protest easier, safer and perhaps much more effective. While the virtual realm can be dismissed as a non-tangible platform, one can hardly dismiss its effectiveness in rallying large numbers of like-minded Malaysians for a particular cause. The numbers joining the page is the best evidence of this. Furthermore, although it began as a protest over the Mega Tower, the page has now expanded to become a platform for discussions on good governance and other socio-politico issues concerning Malaysia. Secondly, by celebrating its turning one month, the virtual page was also building up a sense of solidarity among its members. Those who attended the cake parties no doubt found the experience exciting and symbolic as well as a bonding event. They are likely to share this experience in their net postings, thus building up the sense of community among page members. Perhaps it may even embolden Malaysian netizens to come together on other issues in the future.

Creative Non-Partisan Dissent

The “cake party” has essentially showcased the creativity of Malaysians in opposing government policies. Aware that any outright protest is fraught with risks and the danger of arrest, they have moved on to a quiet and creative way of protesting—one that is not disruptive, but is nimble and has the potential of strengthening the solidarity of like-minded Malaysians. Also worth highlighting is that the protest was a non-partisan effort—the sole purpose of the cake party was for Malaysians to come together to oppose the building of the Mega Tower. A question that needs to be addressed is how the Malaysian government will handle such forms of protest, especially if the cake party has a snowball effect. Essentially, it will definitely be harder for the authorities in the battleground of the virtual realm. Anyone can post a random call in the Internet to rally like-minded citizens for a common cause. And it will be difficult to stop them when there is a call to act. Any hard action will only serve to create more bad publicity for the government especially when most 118

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Malaysians are consumers of Facebook. Finally, any action the government takes may not be effective in stemming criticism of it in the Internet. It may just propel Malaysians into more creative ways of expressing their opposition in the virtual realm. It has to be said that Malaysians have illustrated their innovativeness and political acumen in the use of the Internet as a protest platform. However, one can only hope such ways of protest will not turn ugly, since not all calls for action against the government may be as civil as this injunction to eat cake. Lastly, in the spirit of Malaysia Boleh, perhaps cake eating for many Malaysians will be loaded with meaning from now onwards. SC

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Adri Wanto

Indonesian Islam

What Went Right Muslims in Indonesia are well-known for their moderation. The local culture and traditional texts of Islam is the most dominant factor in influencing and shaping the moderate character of Indonesian Muslims.

Indonesian Muslims live in the largest Muslim country in the world and are wellknown for their moderation. They embody the key ideas of democracy, tolerance, freedom, respect for human rights and equality. Instead of establishing an Islamic state, a majority of Muslims are actively involved in promoting democratic institutions. Many questions have been raised as to the factors that facilitate Muslim moderation in Indonesia, and specifically how democratic is Indonesian Islam? To answer these questions, I argue that the local culture and the Islamic texts used in traditional Islamic boarding schools are the two most dominant factors in moulding inclusive and tolerant Muslims in Indonesia.

Islamic Law and Local Culture

Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch colonial scholar, had written about the Indonesian community in Mecca in the 1880s. Hurgronje pointed out that the relationship between Muslims in Indonesia and in the Middle East was very unique. On the one hand, the Indonesian people sought knowledge and inspiration from Muslims in the Middle East, but they then adapted this knowledge to their local culture which was different from the source. Hurgronje considered it as adaptive and intelligent of the Indonesian people to blend Islamic teachings with their local culture to create a very rich religious synthesis. In Islam, culture is usually referred to as ‘urf or ‘Adah. The twenty-first century Islamic scholar, Muhammad Yusuf Qardhawi, explained that ‘urf is the habits and behaviour of people in everyday life which become hereditary customs. Because the ‘urf is an inseparable part of a person, it is used in formulating the fiqh (Islamic law). Muslims in Indonesia recognised that there were many cultures that existed in the pre-Islamic era, some of which were Islamised and adopted by Prophet Muhammad.

Adri Wanto is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he is attached to the Indonesia Programme. He studied at a Pesantren in West Sumatra (Nurul Yaqin, Padang Pariaman), Indonesia.

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This indicates that Islam was not born in order As Indonesia’s case highlights, to eliminate the entire culture that developed in religious harmony and sociopre-Islamic Arab society. Prophet Muhammad stability prevail when Islamic law created many rules of customary law that legal- is positioned in synthesis with ised Arab society, to make space for the prac- local tradition. tice of customary law in the Islamic legal system as long as the law was not against Islamic principles. For instance, the haj was practised in Arab societies long before Islam arrived. Pre-Islamic Arab societies also conducted worship at the Kaabah, although they were idolators. After the arrival of Islam, the practices continued with some changes. For example, idol worship was terminated. The tawaf—one of the rites of the haj involving walking around the Kaabah at the beginning and the conclusion of the pilgrimage—was previously performed naked by pre-Islamic Arab society. The Prophet banned this and Muslims instead carry out this worship fully dressed till today. The laws established by Prophet Muhammad and his successors (sahabat) always took into account the evolving culture of the community. In the establishment of fiqh we can see the influence of different cultures in the laws that were created. Abu Hanifa, one of Islam’s four great imams, took advantage of customs and social habits of a diverse range of communities as a secondary source to the law as long as they did not contradict the Quran. Similarly, Imam Malik was influenced by the indigenous communities in Medina when developing fiqh theory.

Fiqh and Flexibility

One important history that explains social influence in the cultural constructs of Islamic fiqh is related to the phenomenon of Imam Shafi’i, another great imam of Islam after the Prophet. Social conditions and circumstances affected most of his thoughts on fiqh law. The clearest example of this is the emergence of the so-called qaul qadim (old statement) and qaul jadid (new statement) in the spectrum of thought of Imam Shafi’i. Originally, Imam Shafi’i made a statement for fiqh. However, later this statement became qaul qadim (old statement) because he came across a new situation that led him to create a new statement or qaul jadid. This indicates the flexibility of fiqh. Many of Islamic book references (kitab kuning) used in the traditional Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in Indonesia highlight the need for Muslims to apply awareness and wisdom when making historical reflections or interpreting Islamic fiqh thought in the early Islamic period. This perspective of Islamic law teaches that new approaches must be in accordance with the legal consciousness of society, namely law that was formed by environmental awareness, or with the local culture and traditions. It is necessary to consider the traditions of the indigenous people when formulating local forms of Islamic law in Indonesia. This concept is based on Islam’s egalitarian characteristics, so that all cultural elements in Indonesian society can be a source of Islamic law. This argument denies the idea that only Arab culture can be the basis for the formulation of Islamic law. 121

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Religious Harmony and Social Stability

Not all ‘urf or culture conflicts with Islamic teachings and therefore, they can be used as the source of Islamic law. The late president Abdurrahman Wahid, when he was leader of the Islamic organisation Nahdahtul Ulama (NU), conceptualised local Islamic teachings. According to him, localised Islamic teaching is interpreted as an attempt to hold on to the cultural roots of Indonesia, while still trying to create a religious community. In his thinking, Abdurrahman Wahid tried to place Islam and other cultures in a position of dialogue. From this basis, he refused to accept any movement adopting a hegemonic position whether privileging “Islamisation”, “Arabisation” or “the formalisation of Islamic teachings in the cultural sphere”. In the context of Indonesia, the Indonesian formulation of Islamic law is very important. This idea can develop two important paradigms in localising Islamic law. The first is contextual. Islamic law is understood as a doctrine associated with the dimensions of the time and place. Changing the time and place must influence the interpretation or ijtihad (individual interpretation) in Islamic law. Since Islamic law is adaptive it can be applied to every era and place (fi kulli zamanin wa fi kuli makanin). Secondly, Islamic law respects local traditions as long as these traditions are not in conflict or can be reconciled with Islamic principles. Therefore, Islamic law should consider local tradition and should not view it as an object that must be defeated. As Indonesia’s case highlights, religious harmony and socio-stability prevail  when Islamic law is positioned in synthesis with local tradition. SC

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CHAPTER V

Terrorism, Cyber Security and Cyberspace

Rohan Gunaratna

After Osama bin Laden: Will Al Qaeda Survive? Alan Chong

Diplomatic Confidentiality: The Real Lesson of Wikileaks Kumar Ramakrishna

The MSK Family Affair: Is Blood Thicker than Water? Arabinda Acharya & Fatima Astuti

Chink in Jakarta’s Armour: Tightening Counter-Terrorist Financing Mohamed Abdul Saddiq

Whither e-Jihad: Evaluating the Threat of Internet Radicalisation Kumar Ramakrishna

Self-Radicalisation and the Awlaki Connection Ashok Sawhney

Cyber War in the 21st Century: The Emerging Security Challenge Yeap Suyin & Jenna Park

Countering Internet Radicalisation: The Need for a Holistic Approach Tuty Raihanah Mostarom & Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin

The Internet and Women: Avenue for Female Jihadists Samuel Chan

The SAF in Cyberspace: The Image of Defence and the Internet

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Rohan Gunaratna

After Osama bin Laden

Will Al Qaeda Survive? Osama bin Laden has been killed. Will the organisation he built, Al Qaeda, and the vision he set for it, outlive him?

Since its birth in Peshawar, Pakistan, on 11 August 1988, Al Qaeda has suffered a series of significant splits and losses. Despite this, it has demonstrated its resilience. A by-product of the anti-Soviet multinational Arab mujahidin campaign, the group has sustained its momentum as an ideological and an operational vanguard. Whenever Al Qaeda suffered the loss of operational capability, heightened motivation has always enabled the group to recover. Nonetheless, the death of Osama bin Laden on 1 May 2011 may be different. Osama—or “bin Laden”, as the West calls him—had been, until his death, the principal architect of Al Qaeda. He was also the unifier of the network of like-minded groups in Asia, Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East, and the driver of a global movement of supporters and sympathisers. Is his death a killer blow? Will core Al Qaeda, the Al Qaedadirected network of groups, and the Al Qaeda-inspired global movement recover from this loss?

Al Qaeda at the Core

Al Qaeda is managed by an Emir (Commander or Prince) responsible to the Majlis Shura (General Command Council). Of the ten members that staff the council, six of them head committees—the military; security and intelligence; administration and finance; fatwa; information; and political. The six committees were headed by Osama from Saudi Arabia (Political Committee), Ayman al Zawahiri from Egypt (Information Committee), Subhi Abd Al Aziz Abu Sita alias Muhammed Atef from Egypt (Military Committee), Mustafa Abu Al Yazid alias Sheikh Sai’d from Egypt (Administration and Finance Committee), Saif al Adel from Egypt (Security and Intelligence Committee) and Abu Hafs from Mauritania (Religious Committee).

Rohan Gunaratna is Professor and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is the lead author of Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero (2011).

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Of the 10 active members of the Al Qaeda Majlis Shura at the start of the U.S.-led coalition campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, only one is alive today. Except for al Zawahiri, all the other leaders were either killed or captured by 1 May 2011. Nonetheless, all those killed or captured have been replaced, although not by commanders with long experience. The overwhelming presence and dominance of Egyptians in the leadership positions of Al Qaeda is a result of its merger with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in May 2001. Immediately after the merger, Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, al Zawahiri, wrote and released the “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner”, which became the blueprint for its war with its enemies. With the death of Osama, al Zawahiri is likely to profoundly influence and shape Al Qaeda’s core, its international network and the wider movement. The historical animosity and the hidden rivalry between the Egyptian and the non-Egyptian members of al Qaeda may surface. Today, the ideological virus of “global jihad” spread by Al Qaeda has spread both in the global south and in the global north.

Internal Attrition

Since its origins, the Al Qaeda rank-and-file has witnessed continuous attrition. Just a year after its formation, the ideological father of Al Qaeda, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, was killed. Although Osama and his mentor had parted ways over differences in strategy, Azzam’s death in 1989 was compensated by the entry of al Zawahiri as an ideologue. While Azzam wanted to fight occupiers of Muslim lands, al Zawahiri was determined to mount attacks to replace “false” Muslim rulers and “corrupt” Muslim regimes with pious leaders and Islamic states. Al Zawahiri influenced Al Qaeda’s trajectory from a guerrilla group that fought the Soviet army to a terrorist group attacking non-military targets. After the U.S. and the U.K. put pressure on Khartoum to expel Osama in the mid1990s, Al Qaeda lost its base in Sudan. Its sudden relocation from 1991 to 1996 to Afghanistan led to major financial losses for Al Qaeda. Attrition reached an unprecedented level from 2002 to 2011. The CIA drove the hunt for Al Qaeda in Pakistan after most of the Al Qaeda leadership and their families crossed over to the country in late 2001 and early 2002. To date, over 600 Al Qaeda leaders and members have been killed or captured. Although it has replaced every leader killed or captured, the quality of Al Qaeda deteriorated. After Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was captured, Al Qaeda could not stage a single operation of the scale of 9/11. Under severe pressure from many directions, Al Qaeda transformed itself from an operational organisation to an ideological, advisory and a training outfit. Although Al Qaeda plays a significant role in conflict zones from Afghanistan to Iraq, the biggest challenge it faces today is at the strategic level. In the eyes of the Arabs, Al Qaeda has failed to remain relevant to the uprisings in the greater Middle East from Mauritania to Oman.

The Future

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a global consciousness. He captured and steered a platform called the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders. With Al Qaeda at its centre, this platform provides ideology, training, finance and weapons to like-minded groups in Asia, Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East. By guiding Al Qaeda to select its targets carefully and by conducting spectacular attacks, Osama inspired and instigated an outer ring of activity. Driven by the power of ideology and limited operational support, Al Qaeda and its associated groups has been able to capture the imagination of resentful, angry and frustrated Muslim youths to attack the West. Although puritanical in his views, Osama harnessed modern communication methods to disseminate his message. His message was simple and clear: The U.S. and its allies and friends are targeting Muslims and Islam and it is the duty of good Muslims to defend the faith and the faithful. Osama has left behind a lean and mean Al Qaeda as well as an energised network of disparate groups and a loose movement of home-grown cells and individuals willing to kill and die. Statements, mostly eulogies, issued by Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Islamic Maghreb, Iraq, Afghanistan and Jerusalem have demonstrated their determination to continue the fight.

Twin Challenges

Both the ideology and methodology of Al Qaeda unleashed by Osama will persist in the foreseeable future. The post-Osama world faces two challenges. The first is to counter the ideology of “global jihad” (global armed struggle) popularised by Osama. The global jihad virus has infected a tiny minority of the Muslim community to different degrees. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, where nearly a million Muslims died, even mainstream Muslims became susceptible to Osama’s message. In future, most Muslim terrorist and extremist groups will fight against their local enemies in addition to the U.S. and its allies and friends. The second is to counter suicide attacks popularised by Osama after Al Qaeda’s iconic attacks on America on 11 September 2001. Osama accomplished this feat not only by infecting a segment of the Muslim masses but also by providing the know-how to conduct suicide attacks. Deviating from mainstream Islam, Osama popularised the belief that the pinnacle of Islam is jihad (armed struggle) and the pinnacle of jihad is martyrdom (suicide attacks). Through 9/11, Osama demonstrated to the world the enduring impact of mass fatality and casualty attacks on iconic, high-profile and strategic targets. Suicide terrorism, as popularised by Al Qaeda, will remain an active global phenomenon in the foreseeable future. No group can rival the influence of Al Qaeda and Osama in shaping the contemporary wave of terrorism. Today, the ideological virus of “global jihad” spread by Al Qaeda has spread both in the global south and in the global north. Had the U.S. not been distracted by invading Iraq, Osama would have been killed or captured much earlier, and the U.S. would have deterred an escalation of the global threat. SC

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Alan Chong

Diplomatic Confidentiality

The Real Lesson of Wikileaks The Wikileaks controversy is not simply about the triumph of a liberal philosophy of holding governments accountable for their secret diplomacies. It is not just about nefarious governments scheming against one another. It should provoke reflection about the advantages of confidentiality in aiding effective diplomatic communication.

On 28 November 2010, the maverick website Wikileaks.org claimed to have published 251,287 U.S. Embassy cables, billing it as “the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain”. Its website claimed this would provide an unprecedented level of scrutiny into U.S. foreign policy. On the face of it, this would have been a researcher’s dream come true. Every foreign news desk journalist would be preoccupied for months in combing such a rich trove of political mea culpas and backroom deals. But the sheer timeliness of the majority of the cables addressing the geopolitical issues that occurred following the 9/11 terrorist attacks calls into question the operational wisdom of Wikileaks’ action. Another controversy is the source of the original leak—the rogue idealism of a certain Private First Class Bradley Manning of U.S. military intelligence. Every other government referred to in the leaked documents privately took umbrage at such disclosures while maintaining a stony public silence about the ultimate consequences of information leakage. Both top U.S. foreign policy officials, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defence Secretary Robert Gates have slammed Wikileaks’ action as irresponsible, fearing it would endanger America’s diplomatic standing and its information sources. The embarrassment of making public private comments by kings, presidents and ministers is symptomatic of a wider issue raised by Wikileaks—the price of good diplomacy. That price is confidentiality.

Being Diplomatic

Diplomacy is fundamentally a practice of official communication between representatives of nation-states. Government officials make up the bulk of these representatives. Occasionally, ex-ambassadors and ex-ministers play their parts in conducting state-tostate ties through think tanks. But rarely do ordinary citizens get assigned formal roles. The point is that historically, diplomacy was conducted as an exchange among elites

Alan Chong is Associate Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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under the assumption that sincere communi- Wikileaks and idealist rogues cation was best managed through channels of should take note of the virtues level-headed emissaries insulated from the pas- of the locked bag labelled sions of public opinion. “diplomatic confidential”. After all, the man-in-the-street is unaccustomed to the need to keep passions in check when negotiating interests; while filibuster and various types of posturing—samples of which were exhibited loudly by North Korea in recent weeks—are a measured instrument of conveying pressure. For the seasoned diplomat, pressure ought to be calibrated in order to succeed in convincing the other side. In that regard, the Wikileaks’ exposure of indiscreet remarks by assorted dignitaries on nuclear programmes, their neighbours’ leaders, leadership vanities, etc., need to be understood in some form of studied context. World public opinion should not react with umbrage simply because one president treated his or her counterpart with derision behind closed doors. Personal views can be offered to make a policy point to third parties. Occasionally, harsh words are used strictly in private to vent frustration productively to aides and allies in equal measure to provoke proactive diplomacy. Obnoxious words can be deployed as the indirect means for nudging diplomatic players towards embracing strategic stability in tense confrontations. Being the undisputed military superpower, it is not surprising that the United States employs “sharp elbows” occasionally, as the International Herald Tribune put it. Even China too, treads a fine line between its private communication with its counterparts in the Six Party Talks over North Korea’s periodic outbursts.

Appraising Confidence in Confidentiality

Confidentiality is a virtue in diplomacy because it allows candour to penetrate the sometimes-dissembling behaviour of open diplomacy. In the history of diplomacy, there have always been two channels: the public and the private. The former serves the needs of posturing, or if a comprehensively win-win situation can be derived, the triggering of public acclaim for an arms control agreement or a peace treaty. The private channel serves to clear the air of the fog of propaganda for negotiation from the real baselines of national interest. Most successful diplomatic engagements are conducted through this duality of channels. In this way, the much-hackneyed phrase “going forward in negotiation” can reflect genuine progress. This progress begins with private expressions of reservations, untested prejudices and other stereotyped assumptions being aired. The counterpart responds likewise, in private. Then the horse-trading takes place. Occasionally, both sides will resort to the public channel to jockey for world sympathy without fully letting public opinion in on the talks behind closed doors. In this way, in fits and starts, like the slow boring of hard wooden boards, diplomacy makes its mark. The great arms control treaties of the Cold War occurred this way. So did the successful rounds of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its predecessor GATT. 129

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Asian Diplomacy and Confidentiality

In Asia, governments appreciate confidentiality far more. Sceptics might argue that it is because there are too few liberal democracies to make transparency matter. But this misses the point about constructive diplomacy among Asian states that are newcomers to one another following decolonisation, which began a mere six decades ago. Diplomatic confidentiality kept unruly passions at bay such that ASEAN could come into being and welcome even its erstwhile Cold War adversaries into its ranks. Quietly too, China, Japan and South Korea have kept a lid on territorial tensions through back channel communication. They are trying with Pyongyang’s latest outburst too, notwithstanding Washington’s harder line on North Korea. Wikileaks and idealist rogues should take note of the virtues of the locked bag labelled “diplomatic confidential”. SC

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Kumar Ramakrishna

The MSK Family Affair

Is Blood Thicker than Water? The announcement that Singapore JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari had been sheltered by three family members focused attention on how family ties can come in the way of national security considerations. In the final analysis, there can be no excuse for harbouring family members intent on doing the wider society harm.

Following his daring escape in 2008 from the Whitley Detention Centre, it had emerged that three family members of Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah leader Mas Selamat Kastari (MSK)—his niece, brother and sister-in-law—had knowingly harboured him from the authorities.  The three were subsequently arrested and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to 18 months. This affair had caused much soul-searching. In particular, 32 out of 100 people interviewed by The New Paper—one in three— reported that had one of their own close relatives who was a wanted fugitive sought them for shelter, they would have provided it—knowing full well that they were breaking the law. One respondent, a 23-year old student, hit the nail on the head by commenting that he would give such a relative refuge because in the end “blood is thicker than water”. What are we to make of all this? If one in three Singaporeans would willingly shelter wanted terrorists who may later go on—as MSK clearly intended to—wreak havoc on society at large, are we as a nation in big trouble?

The Four Social Circles of Violent Extremism

To answer this question requires perspective. Terrorism experts like Marc Sageman have noted that family ties or kinship forms merely one circle within which a militant may find himself enmeshed. Militants of the JI and Al Qaeda ilk are frequently and simultaneously part of three other social circles of violent extremism: a religiousideological subgroup (worship); a casual subgroup of like-minded friends (friendship) and a relationship with a respected spiritual-operational mentor (discipleship). In short, the four social circles of kinship, worship, friendship and discipleship overlap and the individual militant is located at the centre where all the four circles intersect. What is important to note is that the relative importance or size of these four overlapping circles with the enmeshed militant at their intersection need not be static.

Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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The relative sizes of each circle may fluctuate over time—with respect to a particular individual militant—as well as from militant to militant. In the case of MSK, we can only speculate at this juncture that for some reason—perhaps the apparent decimation of the larger JI support network in Singapore since 2002—the kinship circle loomed large relative to other social circles. The pull of kin also seems to have been true for the “Smiling Bomber” Amrozi, who consistently sought after his revered elder brother and senior JI leader Mukhlas. For Imam Samudra, another of the 2002 Bali bombers, however, it was the discipleship and friendship circles that seemed to nurture his violent extremism. He was inducted into the Darul Islam separatist movement in Indonesia (from which JI later emerged) through a respected schoolteacher and former Darul Islam commander. Samudra had also been deeply influenced by a friendship circle of Afghan veterans from all over the world. The discipleship circle seemed to have the greatest pull on the former JI operational chief Hambali—who saw in the late Abdullah Sungkar a much-needed father figure. For other Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore JI members, the communal exposure to the sermons of the charismatic cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir created an influential worship circle whose effects on their psyches persist to this day.

In short, blood may well be thicker than water, but there can be no excuse whatsoever for harbouring those who would do the wider society harm—kin or not.

Implications

There are implications here for three constituencies: non-Muslim Singaporeans, the relevant authorities and families of JI detainees. First, non-Muslim Singaporeans must recognise that just because MSK’s family sheltered him does not mean that the families of other JI detainees should also be viewed suspiciously. To hold such a “they-are-allthe-same” attitude would be counter-productive and undermine social cohesion. Nevertheless—and this is the second point, the MSK family episode does suggest that counter-ideology and pastoral counselling work among the immediate family members are important measures that should be continued, and if policy resources permit, further intensified. Third, the MSK family affair reiterates the operational importance of “deep diving” into the detailed life histories of wanted militants, to assess the relative importance of the four social circles of violent extremism in their lives. As part of this process, key influencers and trusted points of contact for each wanted militant—be they family, friends, disciples or fellow worshippers—can be identified.

Is Blood Thicker than Water?

What about the implications for the JI detainee families in particular? This brings us back to the disturbingly candid comment of The New Paper respondent that “blood is thicker than water”. Actually, if one were to consult with evolutionary psychologists, there would be sympathy for such a view. One of the core tenets of evolutionary psychology is that close relatives are driven—at an unconscious level—to support one 132

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another, often at great personal cost. This is because their shared genes are compelling them to co-operate to ensure that there is, above all, genetic propagation from generation to generation. From this vantage point, the actions of MSK’s family members are actually understandable, as one in three Singaporeans seem to attest. But just because something is understandable does not make it excusable. We are all shaped in significant ways by our genes but we are not slaves to them. We can make a choice informed by moral, social and religious considerations. This is precisely why the comments of the Deputy Mufti of Singapore on the actions of MSK’s family deserve greater attention. He stated that “the tendency to help, protect or defend a family member or next-of-kin is a natural instinct of a human being”. Nevertheless, he insisted that it is “not acceptable in Islam, if in doing so, it will jeopardise the peace and security of society and the country”. In short, blood may well be thicker than water, but there can be no excuse whatsoever for harbouring those who would do the wider society harm—kin or not. SC

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Arabinda Acharya & Fatima Astuti

Chink in Jakarta’s Armour

Tightening Counter-Terrorist Financing The 2010 verdict of a South Jakarta court against Saudi national Ali Abdullah Al Khalaewi exposes the limitations in fighting terrorism at the strategic level by targeting the money that terrorists use. There is a need for a more comprehensive regime against terrorist financing.

On 27 June 2010, Ali Abdullah Al Khalaewi performed “sujud syukur” (prostration in gratitude) in a South Jakarta Court when the judges sentenced him to one-and-half year’s imprisonment for “immigration violations”. The judges rejected the primary charge that Ali financed the 17 July 2009 hotel bombings as the prosecutors failed to provide evidence linking Ali’s money to the attacks. The judgement was a severe setback as it exposed one of the weakest links in Indonesia’s overall counter-terrorism efforts. The judgement also came at a time when three senior members of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the group led by radical cleric Abu Bakar Baasyir, faced prosecution for funding a militant training camp in Aceh. According to the police, Haris Amir Falah, Hariyadi Usman and Dr. Syarif Usman

provided Rp.400 million ($44,000), Rp.150 million ($16,000); Rp.200 million ($22,000) respectively for the camp. JAT’s leader, Baasyir, was arrested on 9 August

2010.

What Went Wrong?

According to his indictment, Ali admitted to giving money to Iwan and Syaifudin Zuhri whom he described as his business acquaintances. Iwan managed the Internet cafe in Kuningan, West Java—the business that was funded by Ali. Syaifudin was also the guarantor for Ali in his immigration applications. Ali acknowledged that his business earned a profit between Rp 400,000 ($44) and one million rupiah ($110) per month, and as partners both Iwan and Syaifudin received shares of the same. The critical points of Ali’s indictment were his links with Syaifudin, an accomplice of Noordin Mohammad Top and the one who recruited the two suicide bombers

Arabinda Acharya is Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. An Indian national, he specialises in countering the financing of terrorism. Fatima Astuti is Senior Research Analyst at RSIS. Born in Indonesia, she has worked with several human rights organisations in Indonesia.

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involved in the July 2009 bombings, and how Targeting financing is an Ali’s money was used to fund the operation. important counter-terrorism tool Unfortunately, the indictment was relatively as it degrades terrorists’ ability vague on this. It only recorded the meeting in to recruit, indoctrinate, train and May 2009 between Syaifudin and Noordin on operate. the plan to attack two hotels but failed to provide links between the money in Syaifudin’s possession and his activities in supporting the execution of the bombings. Moreover, the charges could not be substantiated especially since Syaifudin himself was killed in a police raid in October 2009. Thus, though the security forces in Indonesia had been successful in getting at perpetrators of attacks and foiling plots, the radical elements kept perpetuating the cult of violence through indoctrination, recruitment, training and financing. They were able to do so due to a rather ambivalent legal regime both against terrorism and terrorist financing in the country.

Weak Regimes, Weaker Implementation

In 2001 Indonesia was listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) report. It was only in 2003 that Indonesia adopted the global AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism) standards through the enactment of Law No. 15 on Countering the Act of Terrorism and Law No. 25 on the Criminal Act of Money Laundering. Jakarta also set up the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), its Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), to monitor and investigate suspicious transactions. However, the regime was not only inherently weak and ambiguous. There was still much to be desired in respect of implementation of the AML/CFT standards. Three specific issues should be considered:

Legal ambiguity

Firstly, under the Money Laundering Act, assets employed directly or indirectly for terrorist activities would be regarded as the proceeds of crime and hence cognisable. However, the Act does not explain what a terrorist activity is or what constitutes employment of the money for the same. This has resulted in myriad interpretations and subjective applications of the provisions of the Act. Moreover, as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its offshoots are not proscribed, it is not possible to criminalise provision of funds to these organisations.

Lack of intra-agency coordination

Secondly, coordination among different agencies appears to be less than optimal. According to PPATK, up to 30 November 2009 it had handed over 1,071 suspicious transaction reports (STR) to the law enforcement agencies. Of these, there had been no feedback on the 22 reports which involved terrorist funding. Though this was not unique to Indonesia, the lack of intra-agency cooperation and coordination had repeatedly been proven to be a definite hindrance in counter-terrorism operations. 135

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Inadequate financial investigation

Thirdly, obtaining convictions for a person specifically indicted on terrorist financing charges has always been an onerous task. This is due to difficulties in linking the money from that individual to the terrorist group, or otherwise showing complicity in a terrorist act. Normal investigations, which focus mainly on the tactical/operational aspects of the crime and the perpetrators either overlook or fail to produce actionable intelligence to successfully prosecute terrorist financiers. Investigation of terrorist financing, which requires specialised skills and capabilities, seems to be lacking in Indonesia.

Moving Forward

Ali’s case highlights two important points. Firstly, legitimate business ventures were being misused by terrorists with impunity due to an ambiguous legal regime against terrorism and terrorist financing. Secondly, there was an urgent need for Jakarta to make financial investigation an integral part of its overall counter-terrorism operations. Curiously, this continued to elude the concerned agencies, despite the fact that Indonesia learnt valuable lessons from the financial investigation conducted with the support of the Australian agencies following the 2002 Bali bombings. Indonesia was also successful in convicting Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, brother of Hambali, for his role in financing the 2003 Marriot bombings. Though this was largely due to Gunawan’s own admission of the offence in court, it was a major counter-terrorism success given the fact he did not commit any other cognisable offence that could have incarcerated him. Targeting financing is an important counter-terrorism tool as it degrades terrorists’ ability to recruit, indoctrinate, train and operate. Thus, Indonesia needs to fine-tune its CFT regime by making it more comprehensive and unambiguous in terms of definitions of “terrorist groups”, “terrorist offences”, or “terrorist financing”. The PPATK needs to be strengthened and empowered for a stricter enforcement of AML/CFT standards. Besides, the international community must help develop the financial investigation skills of concerned agencies through programmes to assist in capacity building. SC

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Mohamed Abdul Saddiq

Whither e-Jihad

Evaluating the Threat of Internet Radicalisation The detention of Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid, like the handful of others before him, has left a lot of unanswered questions. What exactly was the threat to Singapore given his intentions were directed externally? Furthermore, is the Internet the root cause as widely alluded to?

On 4 April 2010, Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid, a 20-year-old full-time national serviceman in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), was detained for two years under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA). The common thread in the radicalisation of Muhammad Fadil and others such as Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader, Muhammad Zamri bin Abdullah and Maksham bin Mohd Shah before him who were detained under the ISA was the exposure and desire to address “injustices” towards Muslims in places such as Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq through armed jihad. The two key questions that remained unanswered were: What role did the Internet play and what threat did these individuals pose to Singapore?

Stemming Radicalisation

It seemed that their desire for action was directed at overseas conflicts and theatres. However, the identification of individuals who were willing to fight overseas is the most powerful indicator that radicalisation is metastasising. As was seen in the United Kingdom, once a national demonstrates a desire to go abroad and fight, it may be only a matter of time before this radicalised individual considers conducting operations domestically. As such, it is important to stem radicalisation before it gets to this stage. Thus, while Singapore has at least a moral obligation to prevent terrorism from occurring anywhere if it can, there is a perception of a looming direct threat to Singapore, demonstrated by the continuing threat of radicalisation. Given the lack of a direct threat to life and property in Singapore, some may argue that the detention was an overreaction on the part of the authorities. However, from a security standpoint, it seems that it is always better to overcompensate on safety than fall short. The most important question is this: Why does radicalisation still occur, given all the laudable counter radicalisation efforts and community engagement efforts?

Mohamed Abdul Saddiq is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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The emphasis in countering radical ideas should therefore not only focus on online measures; it must begin offline—where the seeds of radicalisation are sown.

Is the Internet the Root Cause?

According to media reports and statements by authorities, Fadil’s self-radicalisation was a result of his fervent search on the Internet for jihadist propaganda and videos. The threat of online radicalisation is taken as a given. But does the Internet serve as a cause or merely an accelerant for radicalisation? The emphasis on the concept of online radicalisation ostensibly removes the agency of individuals to make judgements independently, but instead casts them as mindless automatons readily susceptible to the unparalleled horrors that the Internet seems to pose. The apparent pervasiveness of websites espousing jihadist views, as hostile and aggressive as they appear, ultimately does not explain the radicalisation of an individual. Jihadist websites and the extreme rhetoric contained therein may be notable for spreading propaganda that aim to cast aspersions on Western hegemony, but they are not the engine of radicalisation. Rarely, if ever, do people alter their views after exposure to radical websites. More often than not, they tend to seek out information that serves to reinforce their original views. This is, arguably, why cases such as Fadil’s remain the exception rather than the norm since the majority of Muslims are not of radical leanings and would not seek radical websites or pay any heed to such sites if they chance upon them while browsing the Internet. Some experts see Internet forums as more damaging than “passive websites” since people actually bounce ideas off one another, creating an “echo chamber” effect. This gives the illusion of strength in numbers as an affirmation of a radicalised individual’s beliefs. It remains unknown whether Fadil’s reported “contact with Awlaki” meant communication with the U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki or exposure to Awlaki’s materials or videos. The former could have expedited Fadil’s radical fervour but he arguably would not have gone searching for Awlaki if he had not had a radical bias in the first place. As mentioned, Fadil and the three detained before him were “outraged” by the apparent injustices suffered by fellow Muslims in conflict areas such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan among others.

Policy Solutions

This anger is one of the major ingredients in the process of radicalisation—it is a sort of powder keg that begins offline. This powder keg may be ignited if this anger resonates with personal experiences and be amplified by radical ideologies (as individuals), which could be reinforced through participation in a group such as an online forum. There is also the danger of confirmation bias. It was revealed that Fadil searched the Internet for jihadist propaganda and videos and was influenced by the ideas of radical Muslim clerics such as Awlaki. While there is undoubtedly a correlation between his Internet activity and his radicalisation, no causal connection has so far been found. The distinction is important, because claiming a causal link leads to policy solutions. 138

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If the policy solutions fail to address the causes of radicalisation, they may misallocate counter-radicalisation resources. Following the announcement of the detentions, there were calls for stricter punitive legislative measures against online religious extremists and racial chauvinists. Such measures are, arguably, useful only on a superficial level as only the symptoms, not the cause, are being tackled. To address the root cause of the issue, other observers call for an increase in counter-ideology/narrative websites so as to compete with the already wildly proliferating radical Islamist materials. However, this would have limited success given the tendency for users to gravitate towards sites that conform to their original bias. Rather than online, these “counter-ideology” debates and dialogues should be propagated offline in a more prominent way, perhaps in open debates where the community at large can be educated. Instead of shielding the young and the community at large from radical ideology—which is at best a stop-gap measure in the vast World Wide Web, parents, religious and community leaders should discuss openly with their children and youth, much like how sexual education is now being approached, and thoroughly debunk these radical ideologies. The idea is to plant seeds of resistance offline against radical materials online and not let them make up their minds only after coming across such materials. The traditional media should also be utilised to constantly spread such counter-narratives. The emphasis in countering radical ideas should therefore not only focus on online measures; it must begin offline—where the seeds of radicalisation are sown. SC

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Kumar Ramakrishna

Self-Radicalisation and the Awlaki Connection The July 2010 arrest of three Singaporeans for jihadist tendencies underscores the continuing challenge of self-radicalisation through the Internet. Early warning indicators and a whole-of-society approach can help address this.

Thanks to the Internet, jihadist ideologues such as the charismatic Al Qaeda leader, Anwar Al-Awlaki, enjoy a global reach. That this reach extended even into Singapore’s homes had been underlined by the news that a full-time national serviceman had been detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA), while two other Singaporeans had been issued with Restriction Orders, for being radicalised by Awlaki. The episode underscored the importance of two factors: first, recognising the early warning indicators of religious extremism; and second, the ability of Singaporeans to recognise distorted religious teaching when they encounter it online or elsewhere.

Self-Radicalisation

That a full-time Singaporean national serviceman had been self-radicalised to the point of wanting to wage militant jihad overseas reinforced the uncomfortable fact that transnational terrorism remained a clear and present danger. Moreover, the threat emanated not just from JI and related transnational terror networks. Self-radicalised Singaporean individuals like 20-year-old Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid who evidently bought into the virulent global jihadi ideology of—and even made direct online contact with—the likes of the Yemen-based Al-Awlaki must also be considered. Fadil was certainly attracted to global jihadist ideology as reports indicated that he had wanted to fight in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan alongside Awlaki. While Fadil was detained under the ISA for two years, two other Singaporeans, freelance religious teacher Muhammad Anwar Jailani, 44, and his student, Muhammad Thahir bin Shaikh Dawood, 27, were placed under Restriction Orders by the Ministry of Home Affairs as well. It seemed Al-Awlaki, through CDs of his sermons, had radicalised both Jailani and Thahir, too.

Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is the author of Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalisation in Indonesia (2009).

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Anwar Al-Awlaki: the Common Thread

The faster we are able to forge a whole-of-society response to violent extremism, the better.

That Awlaki appeared to be the common thread linking the three Singaporeans was significant. He had been in the news especially over the past year or so because of his reported influence on radicalised high-profile individuals elsewhere. One such individual was Major Nidal Hassan, the U.S. Army psychiatrist who perpetrated the Fort Hood shooting incident in Texas last November. Awlaki was also implicated as a radicalising influence on the failed underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to bring down an American commercial flight en route from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. A few of the September 11 2001 Al Qaeda hijackers had apparently heard Awlaki preach before the 9/11 attacks as well. Awlaki could speak excellent English and comes across as a charismatic individual—factors that may help explain the wide appeal of his sermons on YouTube. Very tech-savvy, he apparently also has a Facebook page. Awlaki’s popular, folksy sermons glorifying the cosmic war against the United States and its allies were the very sermons that Fadil had accessed online. Those were the very sermons that Jailani had been motivated enough to distribute via CDs to his students and even members of the public. Those were the very sermons that had apparently moved Thahir to actually fly to Yemen and seek out even deeper physical immersion in a jihadist milieu. It should be noted that Awlaki has been called the “bin Laden of the Internet”. He is the epitome of what some call “jihadist cool”. The cold, hard fact that he had influence on the three Singaporeans named in the latest announcement suggests that these appellations are worryingly accurate.

The Radicalisation Conundrum

Self-radicalisation remains a concern because of the Internet. Anyone who is sympathetic to extremist views can access extremist websites, participate in online chat-rooms and get sucked into the extremist worldview by being immersed in a virtual online community of religious extremists—with little recourse to alternative, more rational, points of view. This is called the “echo chamber effect”. It is not just Singapore that is at risk but all countries where there is a high degree of Internet connectivity. Anyone can be potentially self-radicalised via the Internet. This time it was a national serviceman. Tomorrow it may be a university student. Another time it may be an office worker. It really depends on the individual’s state of mind at that point in time. There really is no fixed profile. There may be risk factors though. A sense of personal dissatisfaction—even humiliation—at one’s lot in life is one common factor. A profound sense that one’s wider religious community is not getting the dignity and respect it deserves is another. A search for solid spiritual moorings amidst a fast-paced, globalised world that offers a frighteningly overwhelming array of lifestyle and moral choices is yet one more factor. Until more concrete facts emerge about the backgrounds of these latest radicalised Singaporeans, we can only guess what their respective “radical pathways” were. 141

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Implications

The need to develop greater sensitivity to “early warning indicators” of religious extremism seems to suggest itself. That this latest case occurred within the SAF should not be taken to mean that the challenge is unique to the SAF. The challenge is germane to all sectors of society—government, private businesses and educational and grassroots institutions. How then can a sensible whole-of-society approach to managing the risk be fashioned? Firstly, the well-respected moderate Muslim scholars in the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) clearly have a key role to play. They should be supported in focusing greater effort on educating leaders in government, the security forces, private businesses, the tertiary education sector, as well as grassroots and religious organisations, to identify early warning indicators of religious extremism in their respective social spheres. Secondly, reputable Muslim organisations such as the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) should intensify initiatives to promote religious education that clearly differentiates scriptural truth from distortions. In this respect, it is gratifying that MUIS was able to weed out Jailani from its list of accredited religious teachers through its rigorous Asatizah Recognition Scheme. If Jailani’s lack of formal credentials had not been discovered, Al Qaeda ideology, through Jailani, would have been able to influence many more Singaporeans. Religious education should include programmes to hone the critical thinking faculties of ordinary citizens towards what they read, see and hear on the Internet and on CDs that they chance across. Lastly, there is scope for religious and community institutions, relevant government agencies and think tanks to work together to identify best practices in building “theological and ideological firewalls”. Such firewalls would help “immunise” the wider population against violent extremist ideas perpetrated by the likes of Al-Awlaki. The faster we are able to forge a whole-of-society response to violent extremism, the better. SC

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Ashok Sawhney

Cyber War in the 21st Century

The Emerging Security Challenge The “Google spat” between China and the United States in 2010 has brought to fore the possibilities of subverting the “cyber commons”. Cyber attacks have the possibility of unleashing great havoc on the very functioning of a networked, modern state.

The unexpected blow-up between the United States and China in 2010 over Google’s accusation of Chinese hacking into its sites for what Google deemed as clandestine purposes has exposed a new but larger security challenge. Many critical infrastructures in most countries have been built for reliability and round-the-clock operation, but not for security. They have had little or no cyber protection as the traditional concept revolved around physical security. Today however, infrastructure is interconnected with computer networks, accessible from anywhere in the world. It is, therefore, imperative that critical infrastructure like power, water, and essential services like hospitals, transportation and communication, prepare for the havoc that cyber attacks can cause. Even militarily, a war could be won or lost without a shot being fired. However, cyber war must not be confused with cyber crime, which is also prevalent and growing, but for purely monetary gains.

Evolution of Cyber War

Nation states or non-state actors who have chosen the asymmetric warfare route to bridge the technology/capability gap find cyber-war tools effective. Cyber-space research and monitoring companies have detected efforts from at least 15 countries— including China, Russia, Taiwan and the United States—trying to get inside industrial control systems clandestinely. However, having pin-pointed the country of origin, it was almost impossible to determine whether the exact source was a military organisation, an intelligence agency, terrorist group, criminal or an individual. Cyber attacks, as a prelude to confrontation between nations, first emerged in the Russia-Estonia conflict of 2007, when the computer screens of Estonians trying to

Ashok Sawhney is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a retired Indian naval commodore and was previously also Director of Naval Operations and Naval Attache in Washington, D.C.

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do business with their government online were frozen. In 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia, the cyber attacks grew more widespread and the Georgian government had to move its online activity to servers in Ukraine. More recently, in December 2009, South Korea reported an attack in which North Korean hackers may have stolen secret defence plans, outlining the South Korean and U.S. strategy in the event of war on the Korean peninsula. The United States is a leading source of “hacktivists”, who use digital tools to attack government websites, computer systems and censoring tools in Iran and China. These efforts are known to be supported by U.S. foundations, universities and even the federal government. The Bush administration had reportedly used cyber attacks on insurgent cell phones and computers in Iraq, and on computers related to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. In other words, the same tools are being used today to serve different ends, ranging from stealing intellectual property, fighting for and against democracy, to controlling nuclear proliferation. It would be better to act now towards international cooperation through transparency, rather than wait for a major disaster.

Dilemma and Possible Solutions

The cyber arms race is ongoing. It has been determined that it is simply not enough to build defensive systems to restrict access to computers. “Mutually Assured Destruction” deterrent lessons from the Cold War are not applicable, since it is almost impossible to determine the identity of the attacker in the case of a cyber attack. This has led to the pre-emption doctrine, which advocates going into foreign computers to destroy malicious software before it can do any harm. However, this would amount to an act of war, and since each nation is today as much, if not more, dependent on the cyber domain as any other, it would also suffer damage in a counterattack. Solutions to overcome the cyber-war threat are necessary at the national as well as the international level. Some of the possible solutions at the national level would be greater security consciousness of all users; putting organisational structures in place to overcome lapses; and regulatory frameworks by governments, which tend to vary. India, China and Germany are reported to have the highest levels of regulation, while the United States has the lowest. Critical systems should be stand-alone, as far as possible, and not linked to the Internet. A comprehensive approach involving all sectors—government, industry, business and academia—is essential. In addition, because of the widespread use of personal computers and the Internet, active participation of the cyber citizenry as a whole is necessary. The importance of adequate budgetary allocation is highlighted by the fact that banks and financial institutions have fallen shy of implementing the necessary stricter security measures due to cost constraints. Since cyberspace has no boundaries, international cooperation is essential. However, this presents severe challenges. Everyone talks of creating norms of network behaviour between states. There has also been talk of “international laws specific to cyber security” as also “rules for cyber engagement”. But before all this can be attempted in a meaningful manner, governments 144

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need to bring cyber activities, normally clouded in secrecy, out in the open for a debate leading to innovative solutions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its annual report for 2010, highlights the problem: “Despite evidence of cyber attacks in recent political conflicts, there is little appreciation internationally of how to assess cyberconflict. We are now, in relation to the problem of cyber-warfare, at the same stage of intellectual development as we were in the 1950s in relation to possible nuclear war.”

Urgent International Cooperation Needed

The modern, inter-connected world, created in large measure by gainful utilisation of the “cyber commons”, is under threat due to dubious utilisation of the same commons by some. It is essential to not only overcome this threat by taking security measures at the national level, but to also find innovative means through international cooperation. This is probably even more essential than safeguarding the nuclear threat, as the trigger for a cyber war is not only held by responsible nation states, but also by individuals who could be terrorists or just irresponsible teenagers. It would be better to act now towards international cooperation through transparency, rather than wait for a major disaster. SC

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Yeap Suyin & Jenna Park

Countering Internet Radicalisation

The Need for a Holistic Approach The detention of Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid in 2010 adds to the numerous examples of individuals who embraced radical ideologies via the Internet. To counteract this growing trend, both government and community may have a role to play.

By all accounts, Muhammad Fadil Abdul Hamid appeared to be an ordinary Singaporean citizen pursuing a diploma at a local polytechnic when he was first exposed to extremist religious ideologies on the Internet. He became radicalised, contacted the radical Islamic preacher Anwar al-Awlaki and a suspected Al Qaeda recruiter with the hopes of undertaking militant jihad in places such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Chillingly, Fadil appeared to be following the footsteps of fellow Singaporean Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader, a lawyer and lecturer who also became self-radicalised by extremist contents on the Internet. These two cases demonstrate that even in the absence of a recruiting jihadist network in Singapore, the Internet can nonetheless act as a forceful substitute. The phenomenon of self-radicalised individuals via the Internet is not exclusive to Singapore alone. Perhaps the most well-known example is that of Younes Tsouli, the son of a Moroccan diplomat residing in the United Kingdom. Tsouli started off as a netizen looking for extremist materials and later evolved to become a producer of extremist materials himself. The recent examples of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Major Nidal Hasan, and Faisal Shahzad all share a common thread in that the Internet was a feature of their radicalisation process.

Irresistible Allure of the Internet

The notion of the Internet as a double-edged sword is well documented, and the attending dangers of Internet usage extend to all walks of life, from gaming addictions to sophisticated cyber crimes. However, in the field of religious radicalisation, the Internet proves to be a particularly dangerous medium in view of the following characteristics. Firstly, the Internet is an unlimited repository where radical content can easily

Yeap Suyin and Jenna Park are Associate Research Fellows at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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be uploaded and accessed. Secondly, it is diffi- Given the gravity of the dangers cult to monitor and track every individual who at hand, another option to searches for and accesses such content. Thirdly, consider is collaboration between such individuals have the comfort of accessing the government and the private radical content from their own personal space sectors. instead of having to go through the inconvenience of physically attending radical religious gatherings. Fourthly, the Internet empowers a netizen to evolve from a mere consumer to a producer of extremist materials, while conferring on them the relative safety of anonymity. Most importantly, not confined by time and space, the Internet brings together like-minded individuals from all around the world to form a virulent network of extremist ideas.

Possible Counter Measures

While extremist content on the Internet may not always be the starting point of radicalisation, it is no doubt a strong “facilitator”, especially among those who are young, vulnerable and seeking direction. Countering such radicalisation through the Internet therefore requires the collaborative efforts of both government and society, involving both “hard” and “soft” options. The hard options available include ensuring that there are appropriate legislation and policies dealing with web content that instigates violence. For example, Singapore’s Media Development Authority’s Internet Code of Practice requires all licensed Internet Service Providers to use best efforts to ensure that what is listed as prohibited material is not broadcast; this includes, inter alia, material that “glorifies, incites or endorses ethnic, racial or religious hatred, strife or intolerance”. The recent arrest of two Singaporean teenagers for posting racist comments on Facebook clearly illustrates the employment of such hard measures in the domain of Internet usage. Social networking websites such as Facebook, MySpace and YouTube, which have evolved into powerful social institutions in themselves, should consider implementing tougher policies against allowing extremist materials such as lectures of Anwar AlAwlaki on their websites. While there needs to be a balance between observing rights of free speech and censorship, the freedom to express oneself is not unbridled and always subject to the greater good of society. In this connection, to allow Al-Awlaki’s messages to be easily accessed on such websites borders on being morally and socially irresponsible.

Government-Private Sector Collaboration

Given the gravity of the dangers at hand, another option to consider is collaboration between the government and the private sectors. An encouraging example can be found from the recent signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Swiss authorities and eBay in a bid to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property through the Internet. In similar vein, authorities of concerned countries can collaborate with the private sector players such as YouTube and Facebook to filter out radical contents from their websites. 147

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It must be recognised that there are limits as to what the government and Internet service providers can do to prevent radical messages from reaching its intended target, especially for those who actively search for such contents. Families and the wider social circle of an individual, which includes teachers, friends and religious mentors need to be proactive in ensuring that an individual does not become enamoured by radical materials. The role of parents is especially crucial in nurturing the correct mindset for the young. Tools such as Internet filters are useful in allowing parents to monitor and protect their young from negative influences. In the final analysis, there is no one specific remedy that can cure the evil of online extremist contents. However, the implementation of the above suggestions may act as the building blocks of an effective “firewall” against online extremist ideologies. SC

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Tuty Raihanah Mostarom & Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin

The Internet and Women

Avenue for Female Jihadists Analysts of online extremist websites have noticed a recurrent trend of jihadist attempts to engage women in the cyber world. There also appears to be more women supporters utilising the virtual domain to express their activism.

A key development in the Islamist extremist movement online is the increasing effort to actively engage women. Currently the approach stresses traditional roles provided by women: guides on how to become good Muslim women, wives and mothers, conforming to the Islamist ideal that a Muslim woman should prioritise and devote her life to nurturing her family and supporting her husband. Upon scrutiny, such guides at times include an appeal to support husbands or sons waging armed violence and to produce a new generation of fighters. In addition, there are the videos of mothers of “martyrs” displaying their pride and sacrifices, usually coming from war-torn areas in the Middle East.

Politicisation of Women

The growing attention is accompanied by an increasing though indirect politicisation of women through the cyber domain. Numerous sites have included videos of women speaking on contemporary issues such as calling out to Muslims to defend the wearing of the niqab in Europe, as well as images of women participating in demonstrations. This appears to be providing the foundation for the shifting debate on the permissibility of direct female participation in armed jihad. There seems to be high-level support within Al Qaeda for a more active role for women. A December 2009 message by Ayman Al Zawahiri’s wife, Umaymah Hasan Ahmad, lent authoritative voice to the numerous articles urging women to support those they regard as mujahideen. American Colleen Renee LaRose, also known as “Jihad Jane” used the Internet to offer herself as a martyr in a plot to kill a Swedish cartoonist with an Al Qaeda bounty. Belgian Malika El Aroud, known online as Oum Obeyda, one of the most prominent Internet jihadists in Europe, used the cyber world to implore both male and female participation in armed jihad. This is more than just a “Western

Tuty Raihanah Mostarom and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin are Research Analysts at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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phenomenon”. Websites also increasingly post pictures of women, usually in Arab countries, holding weapons or cartoons of mujaheedahs or female fighters, suggesting a perverse form of women’s liberation. While still small in number, women in Southeast Asia are not escaping the attention of the jihadist. A key regional site, Arrahmah.com and its influential forum has seen a noticeable increase in female “participation” (participation here at the very least referring to females supporting the cause of the extremists). One celebrity cause was the trial of Putri Munawaroh, the wife of terrorist suspect Adib Susilo who was killed in one of the raids carried out by Indonesia’s Detachment 88 in late 2009. A group, “Support Freedom 4 Putri Munawaroh”, consisting of both men and women can be found on Facebook. They solicit donations, which they claim, support Putri Munawaroh’s family visits and keep her morale strong. To date, the impact has been limited. Numerous female “fans” expressed their support to Munawaroh that she remains patient until her release. Lastly, there are also a small number of blogs that are said to be run by females, creating a safe haven for women to participate in the movement.

However, it is essential not to overplay the “threat”: there is still no evidence that there will be an increase in the number of female terrorists following the increasing trend online.

Implications of Rising Trend

There are two key implications of this Internet trend. Firstly, the real world traditionally restricts opportunities for women to participate. The cyber world bypasses the physical prohibitions. Hence, the extremist Islamist potentially gains wider support for and perhaps participation in the cause of armed jihad. The sites are still largely couched in offering traditional roles for women—as mother and as the “first school” of her children. This starkly illustrates the generational commitment to the struggle, and the efforts to thoroughly groom the next generation. There is cause for worry that such ideologies will begin to be instilled while the children are still young, from within the family. Policymakers need to be aware of such trends, and so do those who work closely with families—such as those in social service. This will enable them to pick up telltale signs. Secondly, the jihadists are learning that women can play a wider and perhaps active role. While still stressing the important role women play in transmitting the ideology and maintaining the morale of the fighters, they also recognise that women can support and even take part in actual combat. Policymakers need to be aware of the changing nature of the threat and work with a range of partners. This is to develop and detect early warning signs that radicalisation is occurring among women. One particular effort can be seen with the female research team initiative at the Prince Naif Chair for Intellectual Security Studies at the King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. It is tasked to research on “signs of intellectual extremism in women” and is made up of a group of highly qualified women in various fields, such as the social sciences, to help identify and address concerns in this area. 150

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Avoiding an “Alarmist” Response

However, it is essential not to overplay the “threat”: there is still no evidence that there will be an increase in the number of female terrorists following the increasing trend online. Nonetheless, there is the need to be aware that the female audience is now being increasingly targeted. Given the restrictions that Muslim women traditionally face in some patriarchal and highly conservative societies, the appeal may be very strong, not just for ideological reasons but to gain a sense of empowerment and virtual emancipation. SC

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Samuel Chan

The SAF in Cyberspace

The Image of Defence and the Internet The Singapore defence establishment has effectively harnessed the strength of the Internet as part of its “diplomacy and deterrence” efforts. There is, however, ample room for improvement if it seeks to fully reap the intangible benefits associated with a presence on virtual space.

The ubiquity of the Internet in the developed world is an undeniable fact. It has progressed beyond a mere tool to access information to become a sine qua non of daily life for many. Technological advancements have eliminated accessibility issues and advance gadgets such as the Apple iPhone epitomising the age-old Yellow Pages tagline to “let your fingers do the walking (surfing)”.

Harnessing the Net

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) has been quick to capitalise on the advantages of presence on the Internet. General news reports on the MINDEF web-portal are often “faux pas free”, rapid and cogent thanks to a dedicated team of reporters and webmasters. This is supported by an easily accessible spread of sources such as speeches, facts, photographs and videos for netizens with a general interest. The three individual services of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), the army, navy and air force, also carry the latest newsletters and showcase their respective capabilities, organisations and assets on their individual sites. MINDEF’s reach is further extended through the use of popular sites such as Flickr, Blogspot and Facebook to publicise certain public events. Beyond the proliferation of information, MINDEF has also taken the environmentally and far-sighted route by placing popular publications online. Pioneer magazine— the one-stop portal for defence news in Singapore—appears on the web as Cyberpioneer in both English and Malay. The power of the Internet is further harnessed through video clips on Cyberpioneer TV hosted by YouTube, which is impossible in print form. For the academically-inclined, Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, carries editorial-reviewed essays from defence personnel and academics, both local and foreign, and is accessible free of charge online. Back copies of both Pioneer and Pointer are available on their respective domains.

Samuel Chan is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is with the Military Transformations Programme.

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Other important aspects of MINDEF’s For MINDEF and the SAF, the presence on the Internet include three intangi- bottom line is to remember that ble benefits. Firstly, information transparency someone is always watching. forms part of the subliminal aspect of deterrence. This does not translate into the absence of aggressors but serves as a warning of the SAF’s operational capabilities. Secondly, it serves to bolster the confidence of domestic audiences in the state’s ability to defend itself and hold its own during international operations. Finally, it serves as a tool for national education, especially to the younger and tech-savvy generations that enlist for national service annually.

Room for Improvement

However, there are various shortcomings that tarnish the image of the defence establishment on the Internet. The Net can amplify positive upsides and in an equal manner make negative shortcomings appear glaring. Two shortcomings are currently evident. The first is the absence of biographies of the uniformed leadership and the second is the number of outdated and derelict websites. Listing the biographies of the top brass in the SAF is essential for two reasons. The most obvious is that people need to know who is leading the organisations, especially parents who entrust their sons and daughters in service to the country. Even states with threats to national security, such as Israel and South Korea, provide insights into the “who’s who” of their conscript-based militaries while retaining the quintessential requirement of operational security. The possibility of forming “personality cults” around popular officers is also eradicated with the SAF’s periodic, perhaps rapid, renewal in key uniformed leadership positions. The second and equally compelling reason is predicated on “leadership by example”, a core value of the SAF. The experiences of general-grade officers and senior warrant officers embody service excellence and selflessness – a yardstick for service personnel, both active and reserve, to emulate. Undoubtedly, some pundits will be quick with the “scholar” remark but a cursory survey often showcases the “soldier” before the “scholar”. The list includes, but is not restricted to, Lieutenant-General Neo Kian Hong (East Timor, 2000), Chief of Defence Force; Brigadier-General (BG) Tan Chuan Jin (Tsunami Relief Operations, 2004, and who has since retired from the SAF and made the transition to politics), Commander of the army’s Training and Doctrine Command, and BG (Dr) Benjamin Seet (Congo, 2004-2006), Chief of the SAF’s Medical Corps (SAF MC). The top brass aside, the image of the SAF will be enhanced by addressing outdated and derelict websites. This is not so much a matter of operational readiness as it is about “professionalism”, another core value of the SAF. If one thinks of first impressions and the intangible benefits listed earlier, it is not hard to reason why this must be addressed. Websites maintained by the Singapore Command and Staff College (SCSC), the Singapore Advanced Schools (SAS), the SAF Music and Drama Company, and the SAF Band deserve kudos for keeping current. 153

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Those who will benefit from an update include the SAF MC website where the “latest” overseas operation of the medical corps listed is “Operations Bengkulu 2000”; the SAF Peacekeepers Website has not been updated since 2003 even though Singapore has continually contributed to “the service of peace”; Officer Cadet School (last updated 14 January 2009), and the Specialist and Warrant Officer Institute (28 May 2009). As the defence establishment continues to harness the Internet as part of its effort to meet the objectives of diplomacy and deterrence, it will undoubtedly improve. While by no means perfect, the speed of information proliferation obliges its information tsars to “do it well the first time and do it once”. For MINDEF and the SAF, the bottom line is to remember that someone is always watching. SC

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CHAPTER VI

Maritime Security and Piracy

Ashok Sawhney

Somalia Two Years On: Making the Anti-Piracy Drive More Effective Samuel Chan

Fighting Piracy: Another First for the SAF Sam Bateman

Killing Pirates: Dilemma of Counter-Piracy Joshua Ho

The Malacca Strait: Will It Remain Safe? Sam Bateman

The Bay of Bengal: A New Sea of Troubles? Robert Beckman

The South China Sea: Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in Claims? Sam Bateman

The South China Sea: When the Elephants Dance Yang Fang

The South China Sea: Problems and Progress in China’s Position Li Mingjiang

The South China Sea: Emerging China-Taiwan Cooperation Joshua Ho

Piracy in the South China Sea: Lessons from the Gulf of Aden

Maritime Security and Piracy CHAPTER VI

Ashok Sawhney

Somalia Two Years On

Making the Anti-Piracy Drive More Effective The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously on 30 November 2009 to extend the mandate for member countries to conduct anti-piracy operations off Somalia. A review is needed to boost the effectiveness of the multi-national effort.

Naval ships from as many as 20 countries have been deployed in anti-piracy patrols off Somalia since 2009. Despite this presence and the measures taken till now, the International Maritime Bureau has reported that there were 445 acts of piracy during 2010 and 410 during 2009 as against 293 in 2008.

Effects of Increasing Piracy

The Somali pirates have been proving to be tactically ingenious. After the arrival of warships in the Gulf of Aden, the pirates have extended their hunting ground up to 800 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean. This means that virtually any vessel sailing between Europe and East Africa or the Persian Gulf/South Asia, is potentially at risk of attack. At risk are not only the vessels sailing through the Suez Canal, but also those that go via the Cape of Good Hope. In the meantime, oil transportation costs are beginning to go up on account of increased insurance cover of up to US$1 million for a medium-sized tanker, as well as due to re-routing of vessels to avoid the Somali coast. The disruption caused to the shipping industry by piracy is dramatic, but the outcome in human terms is also considerable. In 2010, Somali pirates held 1,181 seafarers hostage, eight of whom were killed and 13 injured.

Making Anti-Piracy Efforts More Effective Unified response for optimum utilisation of resources

Naval ships from a large number of countries and groupings are deployed in anti-piracy patrols in the area. These include at least 20 countries and represent a wide variety

Ashok Sawhney is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a retired Indian naval commodore and was previously also Director of Naval Operations and Naval Attache in Washington, D.C.

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of political, economic and individual interests, signifying the absolute necessity of weeding out the piracy menace. There is, therefore, definitely a common meeting ground and purpose, which is also mandated by the UNSC resolution. However, all ships are not deployed as a UN Peace Keeping Force (UNPKF) under a unified command as they ought to be for centralised coordination and optimum utilisation of scarce resources over vast ocean areas. The existing groupings include the U.S.-led CTF 151, the EU Naval Task Force and the NATO Force. The remaining ships from China, India, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia etc, operate independently. This arrangement naturally causes duplication of effort/resources among other lacunae. The present efforts by the U.S. Navy to achieve some kind of overall coordination, or rather de-confliction, in the form of monthly “Shared Awareness and De-Confliction” meetings at Bahrain, are naturally inadequate. What is required is a unified command structure and centralised coordination, as for land-based UNPK missions, which have been ongoing in almost all parts of the world. Such an arrangement would be acceptable even to countries that are presently deploying their navies independently.

It is essential to ensure that the menace of piracy does not get out of hand and start affecting the global economic system adversely.

Coastal operations

The UNSC’s specific mandate authorises naval ships deployed for anti-piracy patrols to “enter the territorial waters and undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia”. It would be prudent to focus the available effort on the Somali coastal areas so as to target the pirates while they are breaking out to sea. This will limit the sea area to be kept under surveillance. The available air and satellite surveillance effort could be best utilised for this purpose. In addition, as outlined in a Russian proposal, another element of the UNPKF could carry out land operations in these coastal areas, in coordination with the naval element, so as to eradicate the bases/hide-outs of the pirates ashore. This would be in line with the recent UNSC call for “more crucial and robust ways” to deal with the pirates. It is understood that some such action may be forthcoming because of the recent reported build-up in Djibouti of Special Forces from a variety of countries.

Measures by merchant vessels/companies/owners

It was reported that at least 25 per cent of the merchant vessels do not follow the guidelines issued by the International Maritime Organisation, making them more vulnerable to hijacking. States must pressurise companies to conform to the guidelines. In addition, it is high time that ship owners/companies adopted some uniform “piracy hardening” measures on board ships such as crew training, visual/radar look-out for early warning, safety nets, higher speeds/manoeuvres, fire hoses as water cannons and other access denial measures which would be certainly cost effective. The desirability and ethics of payment of ransom amounts by ship owners is also being debated as it is one of the major factors contributing to the increase in incidents 158

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of piracy. With the unified anti-piracy operation under UN mandate hopefully coming about in the near future, there should also be a uniform, deliberate response to demands of ransom, and not the individual, panic-stricken reaction by ship owners seen today.

Legal framework

The legal framework for efficient, credible and timely trials ashore of arrested piracy suspects needs to be worked out by the United Nations and enunciated. This needs to be done on priority so that the naval ships on patrol are not saddled with the additional burden of maintaining a large number of arrested pirates on board, thereby bringing down their effectiveness in their primary mission. It is essential to ensure that the menace of piracy does not get out of hand and start affecting the global economic system adversely. Equally important would be to restore the “freedom of navigation and safety at sea” principles cherished by the world at large. All nation states must come together under the UN umbrella and pool in available resources jointly, including for some innovative and robust measures, to make the ongoing multi-national anti-piracy efforts more effective. SC

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Samuel Chan

Fighting Piracy

Another First for the SAF The appointment of a Singaporean naval officer to lead CTF-151, a multi-national antipiracy mission, highlights Singapore’s steadfast commitment to global security. The navy’s professionalism will be further enhanced by valuable operational lessons and experiences.

A Singaporean naval officer, Rear Admiral Bernard Miranda, was for the first time appointed to lead a multi-national anti-piracy mission, underscoring Singapore’s commitment to global security. Established on 8 January 2009, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is a multi-national flotilla mandated to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy and maintain maritime law and order. It covers a vast area of responsibility that includes the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In conjunction with other ships from the European Union Naval Force (CTF-465) and Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (CTF-508), these task forces represent an international effort to ensure a safe passage for international shipping through waters flanked by lawless regions. RADM Miranda successfully led CTF-151 from 20 January 2010 to 21 April 2010 and transferred command to RADM Lee Beom-Rim of the Republic of Korea Navy. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) is currently at the helm of CTF-151 for a second time. Singaporean RADM Harris Chan assumed command of the task force from Commodore Abdul Aleem of the Pakistan Navy on 31 March 2011.

Three Key Objectives

Consisting of more than 30 ships and aircraft from 17 nations, CTF-151 has three key objectives. First, deter piracy through a show of force. Second, guide and assist ships travelling along the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor by responding to distress calls and encouraging ships not to surrender immediately. Finally, aid nations like Somalia and Yemen establish indigenous anti-piracy capabilities. The latter, however, remains a long-term goal given current realities. Even though Somalia’s Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke promised to eradicate piracy by 2011, the fact remains that his government only controls a few districts of the capital Mogadishu while the pirates roam freely in areas beyond government control.

Samuel Chan is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is with the Military Transformations Programme.

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The report card for CTF-151 on its second This epoch-making event anniversary has been positive but the threat of also presents the SAF with piracy remains a clear and present danger. The the opportunity to reward presence of patrols conducted by the interna- commanders and further tional naval armada has slowed but not eradi- strengthen the practice of cated piracy. Furthermore, since ships are no meritocracy. longer easy prey, the pirates have had to work harder, resulting in an increasing number of attacks – 214 vessels in 2009, up from 111 in 2008; the latter of which represented a 200 per cent increase from 2007. The United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme also notes that pirate attacks are now further into the Indian Ocean. In October 2009, the Singapore-flagged container ship Kota Wajar was seized with 21 crew north of the Seychelles, some 800 nautical miles off the Somali coast. Both ship and crew were released in December only after a US$4 million ransom was paid. Most recently, the Singapore-flagged chemical tanker MV Pramoni was hijacked with a crew of 24 on New Year’s Day in the Gulf of Aden en route to Kandla, India.

Singapore and the CTF-151

The command of CTF-151 has experienced many firsts since inaugural commander Rear-Admiral (RADM) Terence McKnight of the US Navy (USN) took the helm. McKnight’s successor RADM Michelle Howard was the first African-American woman to command a US Navy ship and is the first female graduate of the US Naval Academy to attain flag rank. Succeeding Howard was RADM Caner Bener of Turkey, which heralded the Turkish navy’s first command of a combined task force. Relieving Bener was incumbent commander RADM Scott Sanders, the first reserve Admiral from the USN to command a combined task force at sea. As a civilian, Sanders is the Vice President of Wyle Laboratories. Adding to the list is RADM Bernard Donald Miranda of the RSN, Singapore’s first coalition commander at sea and the second Singaporean officer to command a multi-national force. In 2002, Major-General Eric Tan Huck Gim from the Singapore Army led 3,300 troops from 26 countries as UN Force Commander in East Timor. Having served with distinction in the SAF for 32 years, he retired from the SAF in 2005 and with his experience was later appointed Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Security Sector and Rule of Law in Timor Leste. RADM Miranda’s tour was challenging in three ways. First is the complex maritime picture arising from the number of ships spread across the vast area of responsibility. Second, CTF-151 is almost as large as the entire RSN. Finally, there are the unique challenges – such as culture and doctrine – associated with multi-national operations. This is where command and operational experiences during a challenging career with the RSN becomes invaluable. With key appointments such as Commanding Officer (CO) of the RSS Persistence, CO of 191 Squadron, and Commander of the RSN’s 3rd Flotilla, RADM Miranda is undoubtedly endowed with the firmness and responsibility demanded of coalition command. His wealth of operational experiences is 161

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also undeniable, having served in the North Arabian Gulf as lead operations planner, Mission Commander and Deputy Commander Task Force Ashore. For his devotion to duty and country, RADM Miranda has been decorated with the Public Administration Medal (Bronze) (Military) and the Overseas Service Medal (Bar Enhanced). This epoch-making event also presents the SAF with the opportunity to reward commanders and further strengthen the practice of meritocracy. It is current practice to allow officers serving in an international capacity to adorn higher ranks on a “temporary” basis to match their appointments before reverting to their “original” ranks at the conclusion of their tour of duties. There are, however, two reasons to eradicate this practice. First, this is to prevent coalition partners and untrained observers from concluding that exemplary performances result in “demotions”. Second, if an SAF officer is successful in leading a multi-national command, has he/she not displayed the competence and respect demanded of both rank and appointment? Surely with the distinction that a successful multi-national command brings to both the SAF and Singapore, the very least the defence establishment could do is to recognise and honour the individual with that which has been rightfully earned. SC

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Sam Bateman

Killing Pirates

Dilemma of Counter-Piracy The January 2011 storming of a hijacked ship off Somalia by South Korean navy commandos, resulting in the killing of eight pirates, has met with considerable acclaim. The success, however, has not resolved the debate over international counter-measures against piracy.

South Korean Navy commandos successfully stormed and secured the release of the chemical tanker, Samho Jewelry, early on Friday, 21 January 2011 after it was hijacked several days earlier by Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea. Eight pirates were killed in the action, five were captured, and the master of the ship was shot in the stomach. In another equally dramatic raid, shortly before this incident, the Malaysian Navy successfully freed a hijacked Malaysian-flagged chemical tanker Bunga Laurel soon after it was seized by Somali pirates. There was no loss of life although three pirates were wounded.

Same Goal, Different Approaches

These two actions had marked differences. The raid to release the Bunga Laurel was launched within hours of the initial hijacking and only after the military was assured that the crew was locked in a safe “citadel” and would not suffer harm. The action was similar to earlier successful operations to secure the release of hijacked ships. For example, in April 2010, Dutch marines released the German-owned container ship Taipan from pirate control. In a similar engagement in September 2010, U.S. marines released another German ship, the Magellan Star. Both actions occurred without casualties. In another incident, the mere arrival of a warship drove pirates off a hijacked ship after the crew had immobilised the vessel before hiding away. The risks of casualties are much higher if an assault is delayed for several days. The pirates will be better prepared to defend the ship and may be holding the crew hostage after finding their hiding place or “citadel”. This appears to have been the case with the Samho Jewelry with reports that members of the crew were told to lie on the deck before the commando assault commenced.

Sam Bateman is Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval commodore with research interests in piracy and maritime issues.

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The release of the Samho Jewelry provided a morale boost for the South Korean military after last year’s sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the North Korean shelling of a border island. The South Korean foreign minister announced the successful operation at a diplomatic reception in Seoul, receiving cheers from those present. The action was enthusiastically reported by the international media.

Somali pirates caught in the act should be subject to proper trial despite the difficulties of bringing them to justice.

Risks of Escalation

Despite acclaim for the Korean action, it could have undesirable consequences. It opens up questions whether violent assaults should be made on hijacked ships in circumstances when there are high risks of loss of life to the assaulting forces, the ship’s crew and the pirates themselves. Such actions could lead to an escalation of violence off Somalia. Already there are reports of the Somali pirates threatening revenge against South Korean ships and crews. The international shipping community remains generally opposed to employing armed security guards onboard vessels passing through high-risk piracy areas. Reasons for this include fears about the risks of escalating violence and of injury to the crew and damage to the ship, as well as the uncertain legal implications. Similar considerations apply to military assaults on the pirates holding hijacked ships. Following the Samho Jewelry incident, the European Union Naval Force operating off Somalia said it would not follow suit in storming ships to secure their release for fear of endangering hostages. It is a moot point now whether Somali pirates should be attacked and killed just because they have hijacked a ship. Ideally, Somali pirates caught in the act should be subject to proper trial despite the difficulties of bringing them to justice. The rule of law should prevail. The storming of the Samho Jewelry was successful but it could easily have gone wrong with the death and injury of innocent members of the crew. Seafarers are potentially the innocent victims of piracy if violence is allowed to escalate in the fight against Somali piracy. From a seafarer’s perspective, it would be better to be held hostage onboard a ship anchored off Somalia for several months than dead! There have been other incidents when crew have been killed as a result of the military assaulting a hijacked ship. In November 2008, the Indian Navy sank a Thai fishing vessel believed to be acting as a pirate vessel with the death of the pirates and all but one of the vessel’s crew. In April 2009, a French military operation to free the yacht Tanit resulted in the death of the yacht’s skipper and two pirates.

Policy Implications

Dealing with piracy off Somalia is a vexed issue with widely diverging views on how best to deal with the pirates. However, it is important that the international community reaches some common ground on the preferred response to a hijacking incident. Both the United Nations and the International Maritime Organisation have been working 164

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towards that end but with mixed results so far. The escalation of violence should be avoided as far as possible. There are now warships from many countries conducting counter-piracy operations off Somalia. Some are coordinated as part of the European Union’s efforts or through one of the international task forces organised by the U.S. Navy. Others operate independently. All have their own national rules of engagement (ROE) prescribing how and when force might be used. These differing ROE allow a variety of responses and this can lead to problems. The Koreans might argue that the release of the Samho Jewelry was their own business. The ship was Korean-owned, on the high seas, and Korean nationals were onboard. However, “spill-over” consequences of the action should not be ignored, particularly with regard to the possibility of escalating violence and of collateral damage to ships and their crews. International agreement on preferred actions to secure the release of ships hijacked off Somalia is essential. SC

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Joshua Ho

The Malacca Strait

Will It Remain Safe? The Republic of Singapore Navy issued an unprecedented advisory in March 2010 for shipping to improve security measures while transiting the Malacca Strait. It shows the continued need for vigilance despite the many security measures implemented so far.

In the early hours of 4 March 2010, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) issued an unprecedented advisory, warning of a possible terrorist attack in the Malacca Strait. The RSN’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC) sent out an alert for shipping to improve security measures while transiting the Strait. The advisory warned of the possibility of a terrorist group planning attacks on oil tankers and also other large vessels with dangerous cargo passing through the Strait. Without identifying the group, the advisory also mentioned the likely mode of attack—the use of smaller vessels like dinghies, speedboats or even small fishing vessels like sampans. The timing of the advisory was a surprise because of the perception that the Malacca Strait was a safe international passage due to the slew of security measures by the littoral states since 2004. These included coordinated air and sea patrols, intelligence sharing and operational coordination between the regional navies as well as the setting up of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in November 2006. ReCAAP is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia.

New Areas of Vulnerability

An examination of the ISC annual report for 2009 revealed new areas of vulnerability. The data indicated a shifting of attacks from the northern part of the Malacca Strait to the Singapore Strait and the southern part of the South China Sea. The number of attacks in the South China Sea in 2009 had increased five-fold over 2005 levels, with the attacks mainly occurring off Pulau Damar and Pulau Mangkai in the vicinity of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Given the number of measures that had already been implemented by the littoral states, what more could be done to improve security and prevent a possible terrorist attack on shipping, especially in the new areas where ships are vulnerable?

Joshua Ho is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he coordinated the Maritime Security Programme.

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Conduct of joint patrols in existing and new areas

The RSN advisory of a possible terrorist attack had shown that security could not be taken for granted.

The first possible move is to conduct joint patrols in existing and new areas. The current arrangement for the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) only requires that each country patrols its respective territorial waters. But given the length of the coastline and the limited number of ships available to the littoral states, there is a need to pool available assets and jointly patrol the more vulnerable areas. As the South China Sea has been highlighted as a new area of vulnerability, it might also be necessary to extend the patrols to the southern part of the South China Sea.

Setting up a regional operations and intelligence centre

Secondly, there is a need for greater sharing of information and a single point of contact for ships traversing the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Currently, ships report their positions to the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) in Port Klang in Peninsular Malaysia when they transit the Malacca Strait and then to the Port Operations Control Centre (POCC) in Singapore when they transit the Singapore Strait. The ships are no longer monitored when they transit the South China Sea. It is necessary to have a single point of contact in the Malacca and Singapore Straits to which the ships report their positional information to and are tracked and to have that reporting continued when the ship transits the South China Sea. This regional centre could be located either in Malaysia or Singapore. The RSN’s IFC is uniquely suited for this role. If ships are to be monitored on a near real-time basis, it would be good if data from the Automatic Identification System (AIS)—a coastal tracking system—can be shared between the littoral states or if AIS transmissions are tracked using low orbiting satellites. The littoral states might also consider the setting up of a regional Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) Centre to collect positional data of shipping at longer ranges. This centre could be co-located with existing information sharing or fusion centres. With new sources of information and the use of analytical tools and databases, the regional centre could in future provide timely and perhaps even real time warning and response to ships plying regional waters.

Regional arrangements for small craft transponders

Thirdly, there should be better monitoring of potential threats like small craft. Currently, among the littoral states, only Singapore has mandated that ships below 300 gross tonnes be fitted with a transponder system to monitor their positions within Singapore’s waters. The littoral states might want to consider a regional arrangement where such transponders are installed on all small boats and for this information to be shared to allow for better monitoring of potential threats.

Use of armed guards onboard ships

Lastly, there may be a need for legislation to allow armed guards onboard. The situation in Somalia has shown that with a large area of operations, it would be impossible 167

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even for an international naval coalition to be present throughout. The Somali pirates have also shown that when a group is determined enough, passive measures currently practised are not sufficient to prevent a boarding. The record has shown that none of the ships that embarked armed guards has been hijacked. There is a need to consider new national legislation to allow armed guards onboard ships and to govern their usage. The marine insurance industry would also need to be consulted, as they may not extend cover to an armed crew. However, the insurance industry can be persuaded as integrated insurance and security solutions have been marketed since 2009 in response to the situation off Somalia. An example is the “Hart Swinglehurst-Protected Gulf of Aden Transits”, which have been marketed since December 2008.

Making the Malacca Strait Safe

The RSN advisory of a possible terrorist attack had shown that security could not be taken for granted. Even when security measures have been implemented, it is still possible for terrorist groups to target ships once a weakness has been identified in the regional security arrangement. Hence, there is a need for regional countries to pool together their resources, share information in a more intense manner and integrate their actions to stay ahead. The consequences of not doing so may be unimaginable. SC

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Sam Bateman

The Bay of Bengal

A New Sea of Troubles? The Bay of Bengal has emerged as a new “sea of troubles” in the Asia-Pacific. This is due to disputes over offshore oil and gas, and conflicting claims by littoral countries to extended continental shelves.

Until recently, the Bay of Bengal attracted little strategic interest compared with other maritime areas in the Asia Pacific, particularly the South and East China seas, where there are serious sovereignty disputes and tensions. However, the Bay of Bengal has now become another “sea of troubles”.

New Tensions

In November 2008, Bangladesh and Myanmar naval vessels confronted each other in a part of the bay claimed by both countries. This was in an area where valuable hydrocarbon reserves are known to exist but no maritime boundaries have been agreed. Tensions flared again in October 2009 when Bangladesh became concerned about a military build-up by Myanmar in the border area, and the intimidation of Bangladeshilicensed survey vessels by Myanmar patrol ships in disputed waters. In response, Bangladesh sent additional naval vessels to the area. Myanmar had earlier warned against oil companies with concessions granted by Dhaka going ahead with surveys in this area. Meanwhile, other maritime jurisdictional problems in the Bay of Bengal simmer away. Bangladesh and India have a long-running maritime boundary dispute. In December 2008, Myanmar lodged a submission to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) relating to an extensive extended continental shelf in the bay. This met with strong opposition from its neighbours. On the positive side, the parties agreed to take their maritime boundary disputes to international arbitration. Bangladesh and Myanmar recently agreed to put their case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) while Bangladesh and India agreed to settle their maritime boundary dispute under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with appointments to the arbitral tribunal made by the President of ITLOS. Sam Bateman is Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval commodore with a research interest in the law of the sea and maritime issues.

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As countries more actively pursue the exploration and exploitation of offshore energy resources, relations in the Bay of Bengal have the potential to deteriorate.

Maritime Boundaries

Waters such as the Gulf of Thailand and the Bay of Bengal pose major problems for maritime boundary delimitation. This is because in some parts of these concave features, agreement between three or even more countries is required before a full set of boundaries can be

established. Due to the bay’s concavity, Bangladesh at the top of the bay becomes what is known as a “zone-locked” country with potentially only a small exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Geographically it is locked between India and Myanmar. Its maritime boundaries with Myanmar and India will at some stage reach a tri-point where the boundaries with these countries intersect and trilateral agreement is required.

Extended Continental Shelf Submissions

India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have all lodged submissions with the CLCS in relation to an area of “outer” or “extended” continental shelf located beyond their respective EEZs in the Bay of Bengal. India’s submission was subsequently protested by Myanmar and Bangladesh, and Myanmar’s by India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh has not yet made a submission to the CLCS. It has until 10 years after its ratification of UNCLOS in July 2001 to do so. It will undoubtedly be another controversial submission. Just as in the South China Sea, and elsewhere in the world, it will show how CLCS submissions introduce a new dimension to the complexity of maritime boundary disputes. The CLCS will not consider submissions in disputed areas. The Commission is scientific and technical rather than legal. Its task is to ensure that the outer limits to the continental shelf, as submitted by states, are consistent with the complex criteria prescribed in UNCLOS. Any recommendations made by the Commission are also specifically without prejudice to the delimitation of maritime boundaries.

Need for Cooperation

A cooperative approach is required to the Bay of Bengal. All the littoral countries (Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar) are parties to UNCLOS. Thus, they have a strong obligation under Part IX of that convention to cooperate with regard to protecting the bay’s marine environment, managing its resources and coordinating their scientific research policies. However, there is little indication that this is occurring. The Bay of Bengal is a semi-enclosed sea under UNCLOS Part IX because it consists “entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and EEZ of two or more coastal states”. At its mouth between Sri Lanka and the Nicobar Islands, the bay is about 650 nautical miles wide. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) provides a possible forum for maritime cooperation. The main focus of BIMSTEC is on economic and social development, as well as the management of climate change and natural hazards. There’s already a BIMSTEC Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crime and Illicit 170

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Drug Trafficking. As well as the littoral countries, the Maldives, Nepal and Thailand are members of BIMSTEC. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is another prospective forum for dialogue but Myanmar is not a member. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) includes all the Bay of Bengal littoral countries and potentially could use its good offices to mediate against tensions in the bay.

Looking to the Future

Arbitration of the disputes may be long and complex. The Bangladesh-Myanmar case is the first maritime boundary dispute to go before ITLOS, which was especially established under UNCLOS to deal with law of the sea disputes, but so far has only handled relatively minor cases, mainly associated with fishing. There will be “winners” and “losers” concerning taking these cases to international arbitration. In choosing to go before an independent umpire rather than pursuing bilateral negotiations, the parties have someone else to blame should the case go against them. This might be important for Bangladesh, which by virtue of its geographical handicap as a “zone-locked” country, has a hard case to argue. Geography does not treat countries fairly! As countries more actively pursue the exploration and exploitation of offshore energy resources, relations in the Bay of Bengal have the potential to deteriorate. It is likely to remain a “sea of troubles” for some time to come. SC

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Robert Beckman

The South China Sea

Worsening Dispute or Growing Clarity in Claims? In May 2009 Malaysia and Vietnam made submissions to extend their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles into the South China Sea. China objected to their submissions. While adding a layer of complexity to the South China Sea disputes, the submissions and objections also clarified the claims of the competing states.

One of the sources of the increased tension in the South China Sea of late is the steps taken by Malaysia and Vietnam in May 2009 to extend their continental shelf claims into an area in the South China Sea beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from their coastlines. Under the 1982 UNCLOS a coastal state has the right to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nm from either its mainland or its islands. It may do so by submitting technical information on the shelf to the CLCS, a body of scientists established by UNCLOS. The deadline for most states to make submissions was 13 May 2009. However, states could also meet this deadline by submitting preliminary information to the CLCS.

Joint Submission by Malaysia and Vietnam

Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission on 6 May 2009. Vietnam made an additional submission on 7 May 2009. China objected to these submissions. The Philippines objected to the submissions of Malaysia and Vietnam, made a partial submission in an area outside the South China Sea, and brought its baselines law into conformity with the UNCLOS provisions on archipelagic baselines. China and Brunei have submitted preliminary information. While the submissions and accompanying objections are very complex, the practical effect of these submissions has the potential to have a significant impact on the South China Sea disputes. The joint submission of Malaysia and Vietnam suggests that they have taken the position that sovereign rights to the resources in the South China Sea should be determined by principles governing the continental shelf as measured from the mainland coast. By not measuring their continental shelves or EEZs from any of the islands which they claim in the South China Sea, they have in effect taken the position that no islands

Robert Beckman is Director, Centre for International Law and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore, as well as Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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in the South China Sea should be entitled to The note contains no language more than a 12 nm territorial sea—the maxi- suggesting that China claims that mum permitted by UNCLOS. all the waters inside the dotted Understandably, China vigorously object- line are its territorial waters or ed to the submissions of Vietnam and Malaysia. historic waters, or that it has any It pointed out in a note verbale (or diplomatic historic rights in the waters inside note) to the UN Secretary-General that the sub- the dotted line. missions of Vietnam and Malaysia are in an area subject to a maritime dispute, and that consequently the CLCS is not permitted under its rules to consider them. Notwithstanding this, the submissions of Malaysia and Vietnam reflect their positions on how the hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea should be allocated.

China’s Note to the United Nations

It can also be argued that China has clarified its claim in the South China Sea through its note verbale objecting to the joint submission of Malaysia and Vietnam. China stated that it “has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” This would suggest that China is claiming sovereignty over the islands and their “adjacent waters”, which can be interpreted to be a 12 nm territorial sea. Furthermore, China’s claim to “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” in the “relevant waters” can be understood to be a reference to the EEZ and continental shelf measured from the islands. On the face of it, the wording of China’s Note appears to be consistent with international law and with UNCLOS. However, China also attached the infamous dottedline map to its Note. The dotted-line map was first produced by the Chinese government in 1947 and has nine dashes drawn in a U-shape around the islands in the South China Sea. Although China has used this map on several occasions, it has never clarified its position on exactly what it is claiming inside the dotted line. This has led some to conclude that China is claiming all the waters within the dotted line as its territorial waters or historic waters. Such a position would be contrary to UNCLOS. While much attention has been given to the dotted-line map attached to China’s note verbale, it should be remembered that the Note does not assert sovereignty over the waters in the dotted line except for the waters “adjacent” to the islands that arguably only refers to a 12-nm territorial sea. The note contains no language suggesting that China claims that all the waters inside the dotted line are its territorial waters or historic waters, or that it has any historic rights in the waters inside the dotted line. This suggests that China’s claim is only to the islands inside the dotted line, and to the maritime zones that can be generated from such islands, a position consistent with UNCLOS.

An Emerging Common Framework

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If so, the evolving position of the ASEAN claimants would be that continental shelf claims should determine access to the hydrocarbon resources, and that none of the islands should be entitled to more than a 12 nm territorial sea. The position of China will likely be that it has sovereignty over all the islands and that at least some of them are entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of their own. Therefore, there will be a substantial overlap between the EEZ and continental shelf claims of China and the ASEAN claimant states. The fact that the claimant states appear to be taking steps to make their claims in the South China Sea consistent with UNCLOS is a very positive development. However, fundamental differences remain. The continental shelf submissions have not resolved the underlying disputes on sovereignty over the islands. In addition, disputes are likely to arise on the issue of whether any of the islands is entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of its own. There are also potential disputes on how to reconcile the overlapping maritime zones measured from the islands with those measured from the mainland. Nevertheless, the fact that all of the claimants are making their claims consistent with UNCLOS establishes a common framework which should make it easier to explore possible solutions. SC

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Sam Bateman

The South China Sea

When the Elephants Dance The situation in the South China Sea has deteriorated recently. The three key players— China, the United States and Vietnam—can all accept some responsibility for the deterioration and should now mediate their differences.

The South China Sea has long been a vexed issue. While China, Taiwan and Vietnam each claim sovereignty over all the islands and reefs of the sea, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines claim some of the Spratly islands. These conflicting claims cause problems both within ASEAN and between ASEAN countries and China. The Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) agreed between ASEAN and China in 2002 was a significant achievement that has helped to keep the situation in control.

Deterioration in the Sea

However, the situation has deteriorated recently. Three key players have emerged— China, the United States and Vietnam. These are now the “elephants” of the South China Sea whose dancing around disturbs the stability of the region and worries other regional countries. When elephants are dancing, smaller creatures can get trampled. In this case, the smaller creatures are the other Southeast Asian countries. China and Vietnam become “elephants” due to the extent of their sovereignty claims, recent assertive actions and the growing tension between them. The claims by China and Vietnam to all the features of the sea are the most intractable aspect of the sovereignty disputes. The United States is the new bull “elephant” in the South China Sea through its status as a global power with important regional interests. It has declared a “national interest” in preserving freedoms of navigation through the South China Sea. U.S. Secretary of Defence Gates stated at the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue that the United States is not taking sides with the sovereignty claims but opposes any action that threatens freedom of navigation.

Sam Bateman is Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval commodore with a research interest in the law of the sea and maritime sovereignty issues.

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All three “elephants” should accept some responsibility for the current situation. They need to mediate their differences and pursue preventive diplomacy initiatives.

Origins of the Current Situation

Two events are the initial “triggers” of the current situation. The first was the incident in the South China Sea in March 2009 when the United States’ ocean surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable was harassed by Chinese vessels in an area south of Hainan. China claimed the operations of the Impeccable were marine scientific research requiring Chinese consent, and were prejudicial to the defence and security of China. The United States, on the other hand, argued strongly that the operations were a legitimate freedom of navigation available to other states in a country’s EEZ. This incident became one “trigger” for the present situation because it increased the sensitivity of China to U.S. operations in the South China Sea and alarmed the United States. On the U.S. side, it demonstrated a possible Chinese threat to the freedoms of navigation and over-flight. The U.S. interest in these freedoms in the South China Sea is mainly associated with military ships and aircraft. There seems little doubt about their availability to commercial shipping. China has stated on several occasions that it respects general freedoms of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea. The second incident leading to the present situation is the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam in May 2009 to the CLCS. This amounted to a claim by these countries to the resources of the entire southern part of the China Sea. This was highly provocative to China. Predictably there was a furious response with China protesting that the submission “seriously infringed China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea”. As the CLCS will not consider submissions relating to an area subject to a sovereignty dispute, the submission by Malaysia and Vietnam may be seen as a political gesture that only served to inflame the situation.

Next Steps

All three “elephants” should accept some responsibility for the current situation. They need to mediate their differences and pursue preventive diplomacy initiatives. China and the United States should ensure that their differences in Northeast Asia, including over Taiwan, do not spill over into Southeast Asia. They should more actively pursue dialogue to reach a common understanding on issues of the law of the sea, including a common understanding of the rights and duties of states in an EEZ. They might reactivate their Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to manage incidents such as that involving the USNS Impeccable safely. They should also avoid “tit for tat” naval exercising in the area. China and Vietnam, as well as other claimant countries, should closely observe the spirit of the DOC and endeavour to expand it into a binding code of conduct. China should remove the ambiguity associated with its ubiquitous U-shaped line claim in the area, and clarify just what precisely it claims in the South China Sea. The U-shaped line extends south nearly to Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and encloses even Louisa Reef off 176

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Brunei. It has been variously referred to by China as its “historic waters”, an EEZ covering the entire South China Sea, or simply as the geographical limit of features claimed by China in the sea. The recent incident involving a Chinese patrol vessel forcing the release of a Chinese fishing vessel arrested by an Indonesian patrol boat for fishing in Indonesia’s EEZ, shows the problems that can arise. While this incident may have occurred within China’s U-shaped line, it was clearly within Indonesia’s EEZ as established by the boundary agreement with Vietnam. That agreement has never been protested by China.

More Carrots than Sticks

The United States could also contribute more constructively to the situation. Rather than wielding a big “stick” with naval exercises and operations, it could bring more “carrots” to the scene by offering skills and expertise to help manage the marine environment, resources and safety at sea. This suggests a role for the U.S. Coast Guard and other national agencies rather than one for the U.S. Navy. The ultimate tragedy of the South China Sea is that while the sovereignty problems are unresolved and the present situation continues, the sensitive marine environment of the sea is not being protected, marine habitats are being destroyed, fish stocks are being over-fished, and cooperation for good order at sea and marine safety is lacking. All stakeholders in the South China Sea should act to redress this situation and institute effective arrangements for functional cooperation to deal with these important issues. SC

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Yang Fang

The South China Sea

Problems and Progress in China’s Position China’s South China Sea policy is not clear enough and has always been criticised by regional countries. While it may not change its South China Sea policy fundamentally, China seems to be lately adopting a more open-minded approach.

China has announced that it is working with all of the 10 ASEAN countries to formalise the 2002 DOC dealing with the South China Sea territorial dispute. Despite China’s reluctance to internationalise the issue and stick to a bilateral solution to the problem, its overture to ASEAN has been seen as Beijing’s willingness to defuse the tension.

Criticism over Ambiguities

China has reiterated its position on the South China Sea on many occasions. However, the remarks expressed by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs are usually vague and lack elaboration and explanation. This can easily cause mistrust. The mistrust has deepened after news that China considered the South China Sea as one of its “core interests” together with the issues of Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. However, Chinese officials have neither acknowledged nor explained this position, which was reportedly attributed to the Chinese government. Among Chinese scholars, there have been doubts about the credibility of the news as well as criticism of the validity of the policy. China’s claim is based on a U-shaped broken line that, on its map of the South China Sea, encompasses almost the entire waters while at the same time not specifying what features and waters China has claimed. Its legal status has been questioned repeatedly by other countries. However, the Chinese government has yet to formally explain what exactly has been claimed by China. In countering the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations’ CLCS, China used in its note verbale (or diplomatic note) on 7 May 2009 the U-shaped line officially to defend its maritime territorial claim in the South China Sea. This is the first time that China had used the U-shaped line to assert its claim in the context of the international community. In the text of its note verbale to the United Nations, China

Yang Fang is Associate Research Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. She graduated in law from Huaqiao University, China.

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used the terms “adjacent waters” and “relevant The mistrust has deepened after waters”, but did not explain the legal definition news that China considered the for either term. As suggested by some scholars, South China Sea as one of its “core such as Professor Robert Beckman from the interests” together with the issues Centre of International Law, National Univer- of Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. sity of Singapore, China could strengthen its position if it could justify its claims in accordance with the 1982 Law of Sea Convention (UNCLOS).

A Positive Trend

Even though China has verbally rejected the internationalisation of the South China Sea issue, it has essentially been involved in some multilateral cooperation, such as the signing of the 2002 DOC and conducting joint seismic surveys with Vietnam and the Philippines in 2005 (though the latter was suspended in 2008 due to domestic pressure in the Philippines). And recently, Beijing’s ambassador in Manila, Liu Jianchao, confirmed that China and ASEAN countries have begun discussing a formal code of conduct based on the 2002 DOC. In the diplomatic storm with the United States at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2010, China’s strong opposition was mainly aimed at ruling out America’s involvement. China’s conflict with the United States regarding the South China Sea issue has to be carefully examined within a broader context. The two countries have already tussled over a long list of contentious issues such as the conflict over the Korean Cheonan incident, the Taiwan arms sales issue and the value of the yuan. Nevertheless, both China and the United States downplayed their differences over the South China Sea issue during the ASEAN defence ministers’ summit in Hanoi in October 2010. China now appears to be taking a more open-minded approach in dealing with the disputes. Though the Chinese Defence Minister, Liang Guanglie, avoided mentioning the South China Sea disputes in the meeting, he had made a statement that was seen as conciliatory. China was willing to help establish a regional “security mechanism”, he said, while highlighting a few areas for cooperation, including dealing with maritime security issues. Additionally, China has officially conveyed its willingness to pursue a peaceful approach with all the claimants and will not hinder the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, which is a major concern for the United States.

Code of Conduct

The DOC was signed by all ASEAN nations and China in 2002 to encourage the claimants to exercise self-restraint so as to reduce the tension. It also encouraged claimants to build mutual trust and confidence among themselves and to conduct maritime cooperative activities. However, the DOC is not legally binding and is not effective in pressurising claimants if they are non-compliant. Countries did exert a certain self-restraint after they signed the DOC in 2002, but there had been some skirmishes over fishing activities, resource exploration rights and some other non-military conflicts. 179

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The South China Sea disputes in the near future could be better managed based on a more comprehensive and effective code of conduct. It is possible that the new code will incorporate sanctions into the draft to restrain countries from carrying out activities that would hamper the interest of the other claimants. Countries will have the obligation to comply with the rules and are encouraged to conduct joint cooperation pending the settlement of the disputes. Once a code of conduct is achieved and consensus is forged among the claimants, a peaceful environment in the South China Sea can be created and sustained. However, as divergences exist among all claimants, it may take a long time for them to conclude a code of conduct. And pending the final outcome, it is possible that some minor conflicts will continue to occur in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the code of conduct will be a crucial tool for ASEAN countries and China to mediate their South China Sea disputes. In this regard, China’s willingness to formulate a stronger code of conduct to manage the South China Sea dispute is a significant step forward. SC

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Li Mingjiang

The South China Sea

Emerging China-Taiwan Cooperation Proposals for cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan in the South China Sea have emerged. Beijing and Taipei could join hands to tackle non-traditional security challenges in the area. Such cooperation will have a significant impact on the South China Sea disputes.

There have been growing calls for cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan in the South China Sea. These proposals have come from not only the scholarly community but also the policymaking circles on both sides. How likely are these proposals to be adopted by either side? How could the two parties cooperate in the South China Sea? What impact could such cooperation have on the South China Sea disputes?

The Proposals

For a long time, scholars in mainland China and Taiwan have held the view that the two sides could and should cooperate to protect their common interests in the South China Sea. But for obvious reasons, such an idea has rarely gained favour at the official level. The two sides, however, have been organising joint seminars on cooperation in marine scientific studies. So far, seven such seminars have been held. As a reflection of, and perhaps encouraged by, the improved cross-strait relations, the seventh joint seminar was held in August 2008 whereby Chen Lianzeng, the deputy minister of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration, attended. Chen called for concrete cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan to prevent and reduce maritime disasters and joint efforts to protect the common maritime interests of the two parties. Participants at the seminar further suggested that maritime cooperation be included in the talks between the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). The calls for cross-strait cooperation in the South China Sea intensified in recent months. In November 2009, at a nominally academic setting in Taipei, Lieutenant-General (retired) Li Jijun, former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Military Science and former director of the General Office of China’s Central Military Commission, suggested that Beijing and Taipei coordinate their defence activities in the South China

Li Mingjiang is Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was previously a diplomatic correspondent for Xinhua News Agency.

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Sea. During the Chinese parliamentary sessions in March 2010, Huang Jiaxiang, the political commissar of the PLA Navy Southern Fleet, unequivocally stated in an interview that the Chinese navy could cooperate with Taiwan’s navy in the South China Sea. Major-General Luo Yuan of the Chinese Academy of Military Science also proposed during the same parliamentary sessions that Taiwan could probably allow Chinese naval vessels to have access to logistical support at the Itu Aba (Taiping) island, the largest island in the Spratlys currently under Taiwan’s control, in the case of a crisis in the South China Sea. At a cross-strait maritime forum held in Taiwan in late March, Chen Yue, a senior official with the Chinese State Oceanic Administration, noted that Mainland China and Taiwan could also forge cooperation to safeguard the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) island and the islands and islets in the South China Sea. Chiau Wen-Yan, deputy minister of the Environmental Protection Administration of Taiwan, proposed that Mainland China and Taiwan could possibly work together to transform the Taiping island into an international peace park and to engage in archaeological activities in the South China Sea. Chen endorsed Chiau’s proposals.

The idea of Mainland ChinaTaiwan cooperation in the South China Sea is not wishful thinking. The two sides have almost the same claims in the South China Sea.

What Cooperation Could be Possible?

The idea of Mainland China-Taiwan cooperation in the South China Sea is not wishful thinking. The two sides have almost the same claims in the South China Sea. However, it may be premature to expect the realisation of the specific proposals outlined by both sides so far. It should instead be emphasised that any substantive cooperation involving the naval forces of both sides would not be feasible in the near future. Given the lack of military mutual trust between Mainland China and Taiwan, it is difficult to imagine that the two sides could agree to substantive military cooperation in the South China Sea. Decision-makers in Taiwan in particular are still far from prepared to engage with their mainland counterparts to forge security cooperation in the South China Sea, fearing that such moves could backfire in the local political atmosphere. Nevertheless, the dramatic improvement in cross-strait relations in recent years has made it possible for the two parties to cooperate in certain functional areas, for instance, anti-piracy, anti-trafficking, anti-smuggling, search and rescue, environmental protection, and scientific studies in the South China Sea. Given the fact that both the mainland and Taiwan have expanded and intensified their maritime patrols in the South China Sea and more Taiwanese fishing businesses are moving southward in the area, Beijing and Taipei may find it useful to coordinate their fishing policies and join hands to protect their fishing communities. In fact, bilateral cooperation on less sensitive maritime issues has emerged. In late 2009, Mainland China and Taiwan signed an agreement to regulate the cooperation between their fishing sectors. Their cooperation in tackling various maritime challenges in the Taiwan Strait could be extended to the South China Sea area. Such incremental 182

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steps of cooperation could possibly lead to more substantive collaboration in the South China Sea in the non-traditional security areas. The prospect of such formal cooperation could be consolidated if the KMT wins the Taiwanese presidential election in two years’ time and its Mainland China policy does not fundamentally change.

Possible Impact on the South China Sea Disputes

Functional cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan would bring significant pressure on other claimant states in the South China Sea. For years, claimant states have been discussing possible cooperation in the South China Sea to deal with various non-traditional security challenges, which are outlined in the DOC. China has in recent years significantly improved its capability in dealing with these maritime challenges. Mainland China and Taiwan working together could play an active role in dealing with these challenges. Regional states would soon realise that their interests could be at stake if they chose not to participate in these activities. Alternatively, they could opt to oppose and confront the joint activities of Mainland China and Taiwan and, as a result, create crises in the South China Sea. Given the ongoing trends in the South China Sea disputes, other claimant states would most likely decide to join such cooperative measures, although one has to admit that there are many uncertainties. This scenario, if it eventuates, will significantly stabilise the South China Sea. SC

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Joshua Ho

Piracy in the South China Sea

Lessons from the Gulf of Aden There has been a marked increase in the total number of piracy incidents against ships in Asia in 2010 compared to previous years. In terms of location, the South China Sea stood out. Can the counter-piracy actions in the Gulf of Aden be applied to the South China Sea?

The annual report released by the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in January 2011 noted a marked increase in the total number of incidents or piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia in 2010. This compared unfavourably to the period of 2006–2009 when there was a 60 per cent increase in incidents over the numbers in 2009. Much of the increase can be attributed to incidents occurring in ports and anchorages but one area stood out—the South China Sea. In 2010, 17 actual incidents were reported in the South China Sea, the highest number of incidents reported during the five-year period from 2006–2010. The number of incidents also represented a 55 per cent increase over 2009, which also saw an increase of 120 per cent over 2008. Most of the incidents occurred in international sea lanes off Pulau Anambas and Pulau Mangkai. What is a cause for concern is that the boats being targeted have not been limited to small slow-moving ships like tugs alone, but also included bulk carriers, container ships as well as product, oil, LNG and chemical tankers. If nothing is done to curb the number of incidents in the South China Sea, the upward trend since 2009 is likely to persist into 2011. What can be done? It is useful to look at what has been done in the Gulf of Aden to see if the same counter-actions can be applied to the South China Sea.

Combined Patrols

Since the end of 2008, there has been an increase in coordinated anti-piracy patrols conducted in the Gulf of Aden. These patrols were by three groups of countries—the European Union, those under the combined coalition task force, CTF-151, and those operating independently such as China, India and Russia. The patrols comprise both sea as well as maritime air patrols. The conduct of the combined patrols have been

Joshua Ho is Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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successful, as piracy in the areas under patrol have dropped and forces at the scene have successfully thwarted several attacks as well as intercepted and detained numerous pirates. Given the success of anti-piracy patrols not only in the Gulf of Aden but also in the Malacca Strait, perhaps it is time to examine if the concept of the Malacca Strait patrols could be extended to the South China Sea. As many of the attacks have occurred in the sea lanes, it may be worthwhile examining if a coalition involving not just the littoral states but also comprising the users of the sea lanes can be involved to provide such patrols.

Reporting to Communications Centres

Supporting and facilitating protection efforts by the naval forces in the Gulf of Aden are various communications centres to coordinate communication between vessels in transit and military forces on site. These include the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), an initiative by the European Union forces, which provides a 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden. There is an interactive website for communication of the latest anti-piracy guidance to industry as well as for shipping companies and operators to register their movements through the region. Other centres that perform similar functions in the Gulf of Aden region include the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office, the NATO Shipping Centre as well as the Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO). Although a regional centre for the reporting of piracy incidents in the South China Sea exists in the form of the ReCAAP ISC, ships only report to the centre after an actual or attempted piracy attack. It may be worthwhile examining if ships should report to the centre before transiting the sea lanes in the South China Sea. Such information can then be passed on to the law enforcement agencies on the ground to enable them to focus on the more vulnerable areas or protect the more vulnerable ships. To perform this function adequately, the ReCAAP ISC may need to become an operations centre that is manned 24/7.

Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor

In the Gulf of Aden, an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) has been set up along the sea lanes where ships are recommended to route through when transiting the Gulf of Aden. The IRTC allows the naval forces on site to conduct concentrated patrols in the corridor thereby greatly reducing the geographical area required to be covered. There has been a marked decrease in the number of attacks on ships that use the IRTC. Since many of the attacks occurred in a stretch of the sea lane in the South China Sea, the littoral countries may want to consider implementing a similar corridor to focus law enforcement efforts in order to mitigate the scarce number of patrol craft available and the large area of operations to be covered. The current piracy situation in the South China Sea is a cause for concern due to the dramatic increase in its numbers over the last two years. More so, many of the 185

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incidents have happened in international sea lanes. While the incidents have not been severe at the moment, this should not prevent the littoral countries—Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore—from taking action. A lack of commitment might be seen as a weakness, which could prompt further acts of piracy. When performed without checks on a sustained basis, these acts of piracy could easily get out of control, like in the Gulf of Aden. SC

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CHAPTER VII

Diplomacy and NonTraditional Security

Pradumna B. Rana

The G20 Summit: How Asia Can Strengthen Its Voice Barry Desker

The G20: Should Europe Give Way to Asia? Tan See Seng

The ASEAN Regional Forum at 17: The Curse of Ad Hoc-ism? C. Raja Mohan

Embracing Myanmar: India’s Foreign Policy Realism Yang Razali Kassim

The Singapore Global Dialogue: Heated Start to Strategic Debates Joseph Chinyong Liow

Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Baggage of Blood Brotherhood Yang Razali Kassim

Railway Land Swap: New Light on an Old Issue Barry Desker

Is Indonesia Outgrowing ASEAN? C. Raja Mohan

East Asian Security: The United States Wants a Bigger Indian Role Barry Desker

ADMM Plus Defence Cooperation: Rise of a New Player Yang Razali Kassim

ADMM Plus: New Twist to Old Security Issues Tan See Seng

The East Asia Summit 2010: Big Step Forward, or Business-as-Usual? Yang Razali Kassim

Indonesia, the U.S. and Australia: New Age, New Issues

Diplomacy and Non-Traditional Security CHAPTER VII

Pradumna B. Rana

The G20 Summit

How Asia Can Strengthen Its Voice The G20 provides an unprecedented opportunity for Asian countries to be heard on matters related to international economic policies. How can Asia further strengthen its collective voice at the G20 Summits?

The G20 Summit is a process that is still evolving. No one can predict how and where it will end up. The group was self-appointed as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation”. There are important questions related to membership and agenda that need to be addressed. But, like it or not, the process is here to stay. At the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, President Obama categorically announced that the G20 would replace the G8. Two G20 Summits were held a year later, in Toronto on 26–27 June and in Seoul on 11–12 November 2010. The Toronto Summit, among others, took stock of the implementation of exit strategies from the expansionary monetary and fiscal policies of the world’s major economies. The Seoul Summit selected two additional longer-term issues for discussion. The first was financial safety nets to better insulate emerging markets from systemic instability. The second was actions to close the development gap, especially for the poorest. Issues related to climate change were also addressed in the G20. So how should Asia respond?

How Should Asia Respond?

Asia is represented in the G20 by six countries—China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and—if it is defined as part of Asia—Australia. In addition to pursuing their bilateral agenda, say with the United States or the European Union, how can the Asian members of the G20 jointly synergise and leverage their growing economic and political clout into more effective participation in the G20? How can Asia collectively strengthen its voice in the G20? Three suggestions could be offered. Firstly, realising the centrality of ASEAN in Asian regional architecture, Asian countries should lobby to formalise the membership of the ASEAN representatives in the G20. Under the present G20 practice of inviting representatives of regional groupings, the ASEAN Chair and the ASEAN Secretary General participated at the London and the Pittsburgh Summits. The ASEAN Leaders’ Statement from the Hanoi Summit of 9 April 2010 Pradumna B. Rana is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. He was previously Senior Director at the Asian Development Bank’s Office of Regional Economic Integration.

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states that “ASEAN strongly believes that it can contribute to the deliberations of the G20 through the continued participation of the ASEAN Chair and the ASEAN Secretary General in the future G20 Summits”. In addition, however, strong diplomatic efforts are required by Asian countries to formalise and regularise the participation of ASEAN representatives in future G20 Summits. Secondly, Asian countries should organise meetings of the “expanded” ASEAN+3 just prior to the G20 Summits to coordinate policies and develop common views and opinions to support the participation of the ASEAN representatives in the G20. After the Asian financial crisis, a number of fora for policy coordination has been established such as the Executives’ Meeting of East Asian and Pacific Central Bankers and the ASEAN Surveillance Process. Among these, the most comprehensive and the one with the strongest technical support is the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) which brings together finance ministers and deputies of 13 countries (ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea). A system to monitor financial sector vulnerabilities and early warning systems of banking and financial crises have also been established. Recently Singapore announced that it would establish an ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office by May 2011 to support the ASEAN+3 ERPD. Reflecting their growing economic weight and linkages with other countries in the region, India, Australia and New Zealand should also be invited by the ASEAN+3 to join their policy coordination meetings. The deliberations of the “expanded” ASEAN+3 prior to the G20 Summits would provide a robust agenda for the ASEAN representatives to table at the Summit.

The G20 has provided an unprecedented opportunity for Asian countries to be heard on the reform of international monetary and financial architecture and other issues. The onus is now on the Asian countries.

Global Governance Group

Thirdly, Asian countries should coordinate their views and positions with those of developing countries in other regions of the world by joining and supporting the informal Global Governance Group (or the 3G) convened by Singapore under the auspices of the United Nations. This group presently comprises about two dozen small and medium states from around the world (of which six are from the Asia Pacific—Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam) which have come together to develop a constructive dialogue on coordination and cooperation between G20 and non-G20 members. The 3G has put forward several important ideas in a UN document. The UN Secretary General should be an active participant in all aspects of the G20 process. The G20 should also undertake consultations as widely as possible with the non-G20 members before the G20 Summits. Furthermore, the G20 should allow non-G20 states to participate in ministerial and other gatherings and working groups involving senior officials/ experts on specialised issues. And finally, the G20 should continue the practice of inviting established regional groupings to the Summits. The G20 has provided an unprecedented opportunity for Asian countries to be heard on the reform of international monetary and financial architecture and other issues. The onus is now on the Asian countries. SC 190

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Barry Desker

The G20

Should Europe Give Way to Asia? As the G20 takes firmer shape and evolves as the premier world forum to manage the global economy and finance, fundamental shifts are taking place. It is time to ask whether Europe is over-represented and should give way to Asia.

South Korea hosted the G20 meeting on 11–12 November 2010. From Singapore’s perspective, the meeting was important as it discussed critical issues facing the global economy. As a major global financial centre, Singapore had a keen interest in the issues addressed in Seoul. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was officially invited to the meeting as one of five non-G20 nations invited to attend the Seoul Summit.

Economic Power Shift

One of the key areas of focus in Seoul was exchange rate policies and the impact of external imbalances. We are witnessing increasingly complex structural problems that might hinder global growth. It is essential that global financial safety nets are strengthened by improving International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending facilities and enhancing the links between regional financial institutions and the IMF. Arising from the global economic meltdown of 2008, there are renewed demands for a new global architecture that will include an enforcement mechanism for oversight of financial aspects of global governance issues. As an economic power shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific occurs, global economic institutions need to reflect the contribution of different regions to global prosperity. Europe is over-represented in the G20 with participants from Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy and attendance by Spain and the Netherlands, while only South Africa is included from Africa. The IMF still reflects the power balance at the end of World War Two, despite the recent agreement to increase China’s contribution to its budget and the decision to allocate two European seats to emerging markets by the end of 2012. Similarly, the United Nations Security Council, the premier global political and security institution, has the victors of the Second World War as its permanent members

Barry Desker is Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, and Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

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with the right of veto. As the European Union (EU) claims that it has a common foreign and security policy, it is time for the United Kingdom and France to yield their seats to an EU representative, allowing an emerging economy such as India or Brazil to take the vacant slot. Other aspects of this pattern of Atlantic dominance are even more curious. The President of the World Bank is always an American while a European heads the IMF. While it is a convention that a European can head the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Renato Ruggeiro of Italy and Pascal Lamy of France have done so), the United States has never served as the head of the WTO or its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This is ironic, as major problems within the WTO have resulted from the EU’s attempts to export its regulatory framework into the WTO. One example is the EU insistence on the dreadful notion of “geographical indications” that link a product to a place. Champagne can only be sold as champagne if it hails from the Champagne region of France. No wonder wine dealers are now using varietal identifications such as Sauvignon Blanc, Merlot or Chardonnay. Perhaps it is time for Iran to claim ownership of the Shiraz wine grape!

Another debate is about the issue of legitimacy versus efficiency.

Legitimacy versus Efficiency Debate

Another debate is about the issue of legitimacy versus efficiency. Some countries that are not part of the G20 may have legitimate concerns that their voices are not being properly heard. It is important that the G20 endeavour to establish an institution of global governance that meets the interests of nations and peoples beyond its membership. It should be perceived as the custodian of global interests, not the advocates of the interests of more powerful states. One result is that there is resistance when the outcomes of these more selective gatherings are presented for adoption by the larger global community. The pattern is one of resistance and opposition by countries representing the one billion who are left out of the processes of globalisation. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has been deadlocked by the inability to provide substance to the claim that it is a “development” round. Significantly, the Seoul Summit was the first G20 Summit not hosted by a member of the Group of Eight industrialised economies or G8. The G20 could serve as a bridge between the developed and developing countries. Europe has focused on strengthening global regulation, using as a model, the processes of EU integration and regulation. However, Asian states as well as many developing economies have emphasised the importance of deregulation. In many developing economies, economic over-regulation has been the bane of development economists. The Asian emphasis has been on increasing the role of the private sector while the tendency towards over-regulation has been associated with inefficiency, corruption and the heavy hand of the state. There is therefore a fundamentally different approach to regulation compared to Europe. 192

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South Korea, like other Asian economies, has enjoyed strong economic growth. It will come under increasing pressure to re-value its currency and to focus on domestic demand. It also faces rising protectionist pressures in the United States and Europe. Seoul therefore faces many of the challenges confronting China and other Asian economies that have enjoyed an economic boom amidst a global recession. South Korea is well placed to draw attention to these Asian concerns to other members of the G20 and to lead the Asian push for a re-balancing of global institutions. SC

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Tan See Seng

The ASEAN Regional Forum at 17

The Curse of Ad Hoc-ism?

At 17, the ASEAN Regional Forum remains largely ineffectual concerning the region’s serious security challenges. So long as ASEAN—the core of the forum—maintains an ad hoc approach to regionalism, the utility of the ARF as Asia’s premier security institution will at best be limited.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) celebrated its turning 17 in July 2010 by fêting “ASEAN Centrality” at its annual confab in Hanoi. The forum also adopted a “Plan of Action” for implementing the ARF Vision Statement. Supporters of the ARF were quick to praise this development as a step forward in the forum’s anticipated evolution from a talk shop to a “more action-oriented” organisation.

ASEAN Safe, for Now

Significant as this latter decision was, it nonetheless played second fiddle to the entrenchment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia’s regional architecture. Hailing the gathering in Hanoi as “quite a triumph of ASEAN diplomacy”, George Yeo, the foreign minister of Singapore, went on to note: “All the major powers in the world now accept that the regional architecture for Asia as a whole should be built around ASEAN at its core, and ASEAN should [therefore] play a leading role in Asia’s security.” ASEAN’s default position in the “driver’s seat” of Asian regionalism is safe—for now. Yet no amount of self-congratulation can hide the fact that the ARF is woefully inadequate for addressing Asia’s most serious security problems. Contentious issues that have long dogged the ARF continue to hog the limelight—the Korean peninsula, Myanmar, the South China Sea—with no regional solution in sight, none at least that the ARF can satisfactorily furnish. The sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan earned but a terse statement from the ARF ministers, nothing more. Myanmar’s recalcitrant generals continue to defy the international community’s admonitions at will. The South China Sea dispute, relatively tranquil following the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, has flared again due to the growing assertiveness of some claimant states.

Tan See Seng is Associate Professor and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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Ad-Hoc Regionalism

The ARF is an ad hoc creation The foregoing problems highlight anew the formed specifically in response to acute limits of the ARF, notwithstanding its post-Cold War uncertainty. bragging rights as the region’s premier security organisation. Students of the ARF explain the forum’s ineffectiveness as the outcome of its failure to evolve beyond confidence building to preventive diplomacy, a more intrusive and demanding form of security cooperation. Crucially, failure is but a consequence of ASEAN’s longstanding preference for an ad hoc approach—strategies devised for a specific problem or task—to regional cooperation. Thus understood, the formation of the ARF in 1993 arguably served a specific purpose: the need (from ASEAN’s viewpoint) to stabilise Asia’s fluid and uncertain postCold War security environment by institutionalising a dialogue process—managed and mediated by ASEAN—involving the major powers and Asian countries. As a talk shop, the organisational features of the ARF—the “ASEAN Way” of institutional minimalism, consultation, flexible consensus and informality—served the inter-governmental forum reasonably well in the early years when its primary activities comprised confidencebuilding measures that were neither intrusive nor binding. Subsequent attempts by the ARF to adopt preventive diplomacy faltered in the absence of structural attributes and rules-oriented conventions that, together with a requisite collective will, could have made a key difference in the forum’s hitherto frustrated quest for deeper cooperation. Ad hoc regionalism would rear its head again in 1997—with the formation of the ASEAN+3, in response to the Asian financial crisis— and in 2005—with the creation of the East Asia Summit, in response to a variety of specific challenges.

Reactions Against Ad Hoc-ism

Few today are convinced that the boom in institutions is the right panacea to address Asia’s problems. Of late, the ARF has had to contend with rival visions that sought to streamline Asia’s cluttered architecture and foster strategic coherence. Proposals from Canberra and Tokyo faced a quiet exit in the wake of the unexpected departures of their respective champions, Australia’s Kevin Rudd and Japan’s Yukio Hatoyama, from high office. Were either vision to be fulfilled—Australia’s more so than Japan’s—ASEAN would likely have been sidelined in regional affairs, since both proposals emphasised the need for some type of concert of powers at the core of the regional architecture. Ironically, neither proposal found a ready audience among the very beneficiaries who had the most to gain from their realisation. Washington supported neither proposal. But it has echoed calls to streamline the regional architecture and make problem solving a key priority for existing organisations. In their own way, the Americans riled ASEAN with talk in 2008 of upgrading the Six Party Talks into the core security mechanism for Northeast Asia. This elicited harried reactions from ASEAN leaders, who feared what such a development could mean for the ARF. With four major powers within its ranks, a successful Northeast Asian security institution could well lead to the marginalisation of the ARF in regional affairs. 195

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Living with Ad Hoc-ism

The ARF is an ad hoc creation formed specifically in response to post-Cold War uncertainty. Within its limits, the forum has helped to regularise dialogue among former Cold War foes and brought communist China into the regional fold. Serious problems abound, however. Importantly, it is not just non-ASEAN countries that are unhappy with the ARF. Arguably, the establishment of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus Eight—comprising ASEAN and eight dialogue partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States)—is an effort by ASEAN to develop practical security cooperation in Asia. Further, the newly enlarged East Asia Summit (EAS) now boasts the same members as the ADMM+8. The potential for competition between the ARF and ADMM+8 on one hand, and the EAS on the other, cannot be ruled out. These developments possibly reflect local disenchantment with the ARF, despite the stock rejoinders ASEAN typically issues in defence of the forum. Ultimately, it is tempting but incorrect to dismiss regionalism in Asia as an extempore exercise—the other ad hoc-ism, as it were—though one could be forgiven for thinking so when considering Asia’s variegated architecture. On the occasion of the ARF’s seventeenth year, it is clear the ad hoc approach to regional cooperation is not going to disappear any time soon, so long as ASEAN leaders believe it useful to their purposes. SC

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C. Raja Mohan

Embracing Myanmar

India’s Foreign Policy Realism India’s constructive engagement with Myanmar has reached a new intensity with its hosting of Senior General Than Shwe for five days at the end of July. Delhi’s strong imperatives on counter-terror cooperation, border management, resource security, and overland transit routes mean there is no incentive at all for Delhi to elevate ideology above national interest in its policy towards Myanmar.

India’s decision to embrace Myanmar’s Senior General Than Shwe—recently dubbed as one of the world’s worst dictators by Washington’s Foreign Policy magazine— has drawn much criticism from the West. In hosting Senior General Than Shwe for a five-day visit at the end of July 2010, India would seem to have drifted a bit too far even by its new standards of realpolitik.

India’s Growing Tribe of Realists

Having been at the receiving end of Western pressures to engage Pakistan’s military rulers in the past, India’s foreign policy establishment is not impressed with the argument that nations should not engage repressive regimes. Delhi’s growing tribe of foreign policy realists argues that the United States, with all its power, has not been able to make democracy promotion a consistent element in its foreign policy. If Washington had to continually trade its political values in the pursuit of larger national interests, for example in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Delhi has an enduring political imperative to engage its neighbours, irrespective of their internal political orientation. In Delhi, no other political consideration can outweigh a simple geographical fact: India shares a long land frontier with Myanmar that runs a little longer than 1,600 km. With turbulent minorities on either side of the border, many of them engaged in armed insurgencies for decades, India and Myanmar have expanded cooperation between their security forces since the mid-1990s. If security is an important element of border management, so is the economic development of their shared frontiers. At the end of Than Shwe’s visit, India agreed to invest more in road links between the two border regions and promote local as well as regional trade. Much like Beijing, which has developed infrastructure in the regions of Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province, Delhi wants to develop transport corridors

C. Raja Mohan is Adjunct Professor of South Asian Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express, New Delhi.

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Myanmar offers the land-locked regions of India and China natural gateways to the open seas and international markets.

linking its remote North Eastern provinces with cities in Myanmar. During the Burmese leader’s visit, India announced grants and loans totalling close to US$250 million to build new roads and modernise the old rail network in Myanmar.

India’s Land Bridge to Southeast Asia

That India sees Myanmar as a natural land bridge between itself and Southeast Asia is well known. Delhi has agreed to develop road and rail networks, some in collaboration with Southeast Asian countries, to link India to the South China Sea through Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. While those trans-regional projects might take up a long time to materialise, India has given priority to connecting its mainland with the remote provinces of the North-East through the territory of Myanmar. Currently goods from India move to the North East through a narrow corridor called the “chicken’s neck” just above the northern tip of Bangladesh. Ideally transit arrangements through Bangladesh would be the best way of linking India with its own North Eastern provinces. Delhi and Dhaka, however, are some distance away from negotiating comprehensive arrangements for overland trade and transit. Meanwhile, India has sought a shorter multi-modal transport corridor into the north-east through Myanmar. When completed, this project will allow India to ship goods from Kolkata to the Sittwe port on Myanmar’s Arakan coast. From there, the goods will move up the Kaladan River and then by road to the state of Mizoram in the north-east. This involves upgrading the port facility at Sittwe, dredging the Kaladan River to make it navigable and roads across the border. Myanmar also offers many natural resources that are so vital for the sustained economic growth of India, which has emerged as the second fastest growing economy after China. Given its world wide quest for energy and mineral resources for an economy that is growing at about 8 per cent, it is not surprising that Indian companies are actively participating in the exploration and exploitation of oil and other natural resources in Myanmar. Indian industry, until recently cautious about the Myanmar market, has begun to look for major manufacturing opportunities. One of India’s leading industrial houses, the Tatas, is all set to start production of heavy trucks in Myanmar.

Than Shwe’s Wooing of India and China

Senior General Than Shwe, who visited the Tata facilities at Jamshedpur in eastern India, is welcoming other Indian groups to take advantage of Myanmar’s abundant natural resources and cheap labour. India’s diplomatic outreach to Myanmar is seen widely in terms of a rivalry with China. While Delhi does seek to compete with Beijing for influence in Myanmar, the ground reality could be quite different from this assessment. Take, for example, the fact that Indian companies own nearly 18 per cent of a gas field off the Arakan coast that will feed the Chinese pipeline to Kunming in Yunnan that is now under construction. Meanwhile, the idea of joint development projects in Third World countries has begun to enter the official dialogue between India and 198

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China. Myanmar may well present the first theatre where Delhi and Beijing could take up joint economic, energy and transportation ventures. Myanmar offers the land-locked regions of India and China natural gateways to the open seas and international markets. It also holds the key to managing the vital border lands of the two Asian giants. Delhi and Beijing, despite their very different political systems, have similar and growing stakes in Myanmar’s political stability and economic development. That, in turn, gives Myanmar’s generals the space and time to fob off external pressures for internal change. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

The Singapore Global Dialogue

Heated Start to Strategic Debates Asia’s new forum to debate global issues kicked off with a surprisingly fiery exchange between China and Japan over their latest dispute in the East China Sea. Can Asia be at the forefront of international discourses on strategic issues?

The inaugural Singapore Global Dialogue on strategic challenges in September 2010 got off to a heated start, as China’s rise dominated the debates, with prominent opinion leaders engaged in rare open exchanges. Indeed, China’s game-changing emergence was a recurring theme. Inevitably, the territorial maritime dispute between Japan and China grabbed attention, leading to a sharp repartee between a Chinese scholargeneral and a former Japanese deputy foreign minister—even as the fracas was being resolved by Tokyo.

Timely Forum

Japan’s timely release of a detained Chinese ship captain failed to defuse the dispute; Beijing instead demanded an apology and compensation—which Japan rejected. The new crisis was their worst in years. The Singapore Global Dialogue witnessed the spillover as the two protagonists—China and Japan—crossed swords openly. The Singapore Global Dialogue from 23–24 September 2010, the first by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), is designed to be a premier platform for an Asian voice in global debates on strategic issues. In that respect, the international forum was fortuitous. Speakers underscored its utility, pointing to Singapore’s location as a natural meeting point to discuss trends and changes in world order. Among the keynote speakers were Singapore’s cabinet ministers K. Shanmugam and Tharman Shanmugaratnam as well as top policymakers and former leaders like Australia’s John Howard, China’s Tang Jiaxuan, America’s Paul Wolfowitz, Japan’s Hitoshi Tanaka, Indonesia’s Nur Hassan Wirajuda, India’s Shashi Tharoor, Malaysia’s Andrew Sheng and Singapore’s Tommy Koh. President S R Nathan was guest of honour at the event, sponsored by Temasek Holdings. The deliberate invitation to former policymakers, being out of office, allowed a freer airing of views—as shown by the sharp exchanges on the China-Japan dispute. Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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The dialogue also debated other major themes like trans-national threats and the future of global governance. But it was the rise of China that kept many participants abuzz.

Transnational threats were another major challenge debated.

The China Challenge

Former Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan set the ball rolling with an oblique aim at the United States and its allies when he urged all countries to abandon “a Cold War mentality” and “zero sum thinking”. Emphasising that a growing China would not seek hegemony, he said Beijing welcomed a U.S. role in regional peace and stability. In the evolving regional architecture, China supported ASEAN’s central role and would like to see it remain in the driver’s seat. China, he said, was against the creation of new mechanisms for regional cooperation. During question time, he went on the offensive, admonishing Japan for what he described as its inexplicable stance over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands with the detention of the Chinese captain. A Japan expert who had served as a diplomat in Tokyo, Mr Tang rebuked Japan for its “tough and unreasonable attitude”. Accusing it of harbouring “a special agenda”, he said Tokyo’s intention to charge the captain amounted to a formal challenge to China, leaving Beijing no choice but to react strongly. On the same day, Japan surprisingly released the Chinese captain. This was promptly announced at the forum by former deputy foreign minister Hitoshi Tanaka. He described the incident as an “accident” arising from the political transition in Japan. Tokyo, he added, had no interest to make it an issue “because Japan effectively controls the islands”. That remark sparked a sharp rejoinder from another Chinese speaker, Major-General Zhu Chenghu, dean of the Defence Affairs Institute, the National Defence University of the People’s Liberation Army. General Zhu reminded Mr Tanaka that the disputed islands were annexed by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and were to be returned to China in accordance with a post-war international agreement. To suggest that Tokyo controlled the islands was offensive to China, he said. General Zhu, who has a reputation for bluntspeaking, created a stir recently when he warned the United States that any attack on China over Taiwan would invite a nuclear response. The rise of China was also a key theme raised by former premier Howard and Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam. Mr Howard said China’s emergence should not be seen as a threat as Beijing desired peace for its economic progress. Mr. Tharman saw China’s rise as a game-changer. China’s first game-changing impact was when it opened up in the 1980s and joined the global economy. China is now changing the international game again as it moved up the value chain, which will have wide-ranging repercussions on the global economy.

Transnational Threats

Transnational threats were another major challenge debated. There was broad consensus, Mr Tanaka said, that non-traditional security threats were emerging as a critical 201

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issue given their impact on economic prosperity and human security. Yet, greater coordination is lacking at the regional and international levels to respond to such issues. He proposed trans-national threats as a major agenda for the East Asia Summit (EAS). The United States and Russia could be invited to join the EAS to address emerging global concerns such as energy security, disaster relief, piracy and counter-terrorism. In a keynote speech earlier, Singapore’s Law Minister and Second Home Affairs Minister K. Shanmugam spoke about the threat of jihadist terrorism in Southeast Asia. Ramesh Thakur pushed for collective global action on non-traditional security issues such as climate change, terrorism and human security lest they provoked conflict and instability. Shashi Tharoor said new threats like climate change, poverty, famine and illiteracy make states insecure but they required new responses from the international system. Both Thakur and Tharoor were former senior UN officials.

Global Governance

But trans-national threats cannot be addressed effectively without improving global governance. There was agreement that non-traditional security issues like climate change, natural disasters and pandemics needed effective governments to tackle them. Prominent Singapore thinker Tommy Koh said global problems like climate change urgently needed global solutions. Yet, speakers noted the growing crisis of confidence in global governance. A fundamental flaw of the UN Security Council, according to Professor Koh, was that members looked after their own national interests. Otherwise, he said, there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the primary institutions of global governance, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation . He was not, however, optimistic of the prospects of global governance, at least in the short term. In a nutshell, the Singapore Global Dialogue was off to a good start. Its position as a key forum for Asia’s voice in global strategic debates can only grow as Asia itself rises. SC

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Joseph Chinyong Liow

Indonesia-Malaysia Relations

Baggage of Blood Brotherhood Notwithstanding the long history of ethno-cultural fraternity between the peoples of Indonesia and Malaysia, the relationship between the two countries has been marked by a pattern of friction and discord since the pre-colonial era. An appreciation of this history is critical to our understanding of the undercurrents to the recent spats between Indonesia and Malaysia.

To the casual observer, recent spats between Indonesia and Malaysia may seem perplexing. After all, we are talking about two peoples who share a similar language, culture and religion. Of course, there is sound historical basis to this view. The Malay hikayat (saga) provides insights into the inter-connectedness of an Indo-Malay world spanning southern Thailand to the central Indonesian island of Java and beyond, where a regional system of commerce, intermarriage and diplomacy was already thriving before the arrival of colonial powers. Anthropologists and linguists have identified cultural commonalities (and differences) that define an Indo-Malay identity independent of the influence of Western colonialism. Essentially, it was geographical proximity that facilitated the sharing of common linguistic roots, religion, cultural practice and statecraft among the peoples of the archipelago. In fact, so intimate were these historical ties that leaders of both Indonesia and Malaysia commonly refer to their relationship as one anchored on “Malay blood brotherhood” or Malay rumpun which, when translated into English, approximates the notion of Malay racial and ethnic “stock”.

Melayu Raya

During the colonial era, rumpun became politicised in anti-colonial discourse. Early nationalist movements in both Indonesia and Malaysia were not averse to the creation of an Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) or Melayu Raya (the Greater Malay kingdom) established on precisely such notions of ethno-religious identity. Indeed, a unified IndoMalay state almost came into being towards the end of the Second World War, when nationalists from the Malay Peninsula led by Ibrahim Yaacob pressured their Indonesian counterparts as well as the retreating Japanese military administration to include British Malaya as part of independent Indonesia. Though unsuccessful, it was not until Joseph Chinyong Liow is Associate Dean and Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also the author of The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (2004).

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the formation of independent Malaya in 1957 that talk of Indonesia Raya gradually subsided. Enduring cultural and ethnic commonalities notwithstanding, the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has in truth seldom been harmonious. Talk of rumpun papers over a long record of tension—at times, even conflict—between the leaders and peoples of the two countries. For instance, the reason for the failure of the Indonesia Raya vision was precisely the inability of both countries to reconcile some fundamental differences, such as the role and place of the traditional elite in the post-colonial state. After the Second World War, Indonesia was engulfed in a four-year revolution against their Dutch coloniser’s intent on re-establishing their control of the archipelago. The revolution was targeted not only at the Dutch, but also vestiges of the old pro-Dutch feudal order in Sumatra, and to a lesser extent in Java, leading to the decimation of the sultanate families by revolutionary youth movements. Meanwhile in the Malay Peninsula, returning British forces were welcomed and eventually played an important role ensuring the security of Malaya during the communist insurgency that followed. Compared to their reception of the British, reactions of the Malay elite to the Indonesian revolution were notably less convivial. The old aristocratic Malay ruling class were appalled at the regicide that took place in Sumatra. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya and a member of this ruling class, noted in his autobiography:

Thankfully, cooler heads have prevailed among the respective political leaderships, who have refrained from playing to the gallery.

“The Rulers who had enjoyed sovereignty and prestige under the British rule were concerned. After independence, they had seen how many thrones in India, Pakistan, and Indonesia had toppled. What would be their fate if the British left? Would the people accept them? They felt that they would be at the mercy of the Malay extremists. The general pre-Merdeka feeling was that this country would go the way of our neighbours, from prosperity to poverty, from happiness to sadness and from peace to violence. Even Datuk Onn, the founder of UMNO and a great Malay leader, had shared the views of the Rulers and others against complete independence.” The reluctance of the aristocratic Malay elite to support the Indonesian revolution was not lost on its leaders. On the occasion of the Tunku’s visit to Jakarta in 1955, President Sukarno reportedly turned to him during a public rally and patronisingly proclaimed: “Here is a man I am trying to persuade to fight!” Events such as these no doubt set Indonesia-Malaysia relations off on the wrong foot, and perpetuated a cycle of acrimony that can be traced back to the early kingdoms of the Indo-Malay world. As a scholar of Indonesia, Merle Ricklefs, once observed: “The Sultans of what is now Malaysia rarely battled the rulers of Siam or Burma. Rather, their alliances and conflicts were with peoples from Aceh to east Indonesia. The Bugis and Makasarese of Sulawesi traded widely in Southeast Asia, but their political and trade heartland was the MalayIndonesian archipelago. When a Javanese king had grand imperial pretensions, it was 204

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to other states in the archipelago that he turned for tokens of obeisance—which they, under most circumstances, refused to give.”

Like Teeth and Tongue

Recent diplomatic altercations between Indonesia and Malaysia—be it over domestic helpers, national songs, local cuisine or territory—must be understood in the context of enduring patterns of rivalry and discord that have long defined the relationship between the peoples and leaders of these two countries who, as the Indo-Malay saying goes, are as close as “gigi dan lidah” (teeth and tongue). Today, spats between the two countries have led to mobilisation in the streets (mostly in Indonesia) and over cyberspace. Thankfully, cooler heads have prevailed among the respective political leaderships, who have refrained from playing to the gallery and leveraging on disputes in order to gain political mileage. The point to stress is that given the cyclical patterns of friction rooted in fundamental issues of national identity and memory between Indonesia and Malaysia, strong leadership will always be needed to break the impasse of history. Attention can then be oriented towards areas of mutual benefit and successful bilateral cooperation, while downplaying points of contention. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

Railway Land Swap

New Light on an Old Issue The Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister’s statement in Parliament in 2010 that the Malayan Railway land in Singapore did not belong to Malaysia but was leased sheds new light on an old issue. Was this the reason for the breakthrough in bilateral ties?

Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister Richard Riot Jaem’s statement in Parliament on 28 June 2010—on the landmark deal for a swap of Malayan Railway land in Singapore—has shed new light on an old issue. Responding to a question from an opposition PAS MP, the deputy minister unveiled what had hitherto been little known to the public in Malaysia and Singapore.

Railway Land Lease 1918

As reported by the national news agency Bernama, Jaem dismissed the PAS MP’s allegation that the railway land in Tanjong Pagar was to be sold to Singapore. “The land is not ours,” he said. Rather, it had been leased in 1918 for 999 years from the Straits Settlements, of which Singapore was then a part. “The Singapore Railway land leased was 434.26 acres (173.7 ha). Out of this, 352.52 acres (141 ha) was to be held by the Federal Land Commissioner for a period of 999 years while 81.74 acres (32.7 ha) was for perpetuity. If the land were no longer to be used for rail services, it was to be returned to the respective Straits Settlement without compensation whatsoever. As such, such allegations are not true because the land is not ours,” he was quoted by Bernama as saying. The Straits Settlements were a British colonial construct comprising Singapore, Malacca and Penang. It was dissolved in 1946 with Singapore becoming a crown colony separate from peninsular Malaya, which eventually became the Federation of Malaya. The 25 October 1918 agreement, known as the Singapore Railway Transfer Ordinance, gave the then Federated Malay States use of the land. But the land would have to be reverted—without cost, if the transfer was without cost—if it was not used for railway purposes. The deputy minister’s statement gives a totally new light to the long-running saga of the Malayan Railway (KTM) land in Singapore since it became a hot issue in the 1990s. The general perception in both Malaysia and Singapore had been that KTM Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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land in Singapore was Malaysian territory—a For long, it had been thought that residue of history. Singapore was part of Malay- the KTM land in Singapore, being sia from 1963 to 1965. Upon this thin strip of Malaysian state land, would land runs the Malayan Railway, from Tanjong never be sold. Pagar to Woodlands and across the Causeway to Johor Bahru and the north of peninsular Malaysia. The land had long been seen as belonging to Malaysia because KTM was a stateowned entity, though it was subsequently corporatised in 1992.

Significance of Jaem’s Statement

Jaem’s statement, however, clarified for the first time that the KTM land did not in fact belong to Malaysia because it was “leased” from the Straits Settlements in 1918. It was also probably the first time that the Malaysian public learnt of the 999-year lease. Significantly, the 1918 agreement also stipulated that should the railway land not be used anymore for its intended purpose—that is, for a railway line—then the land would revert to the Straits Settlement concerned, in this case, its successor entity, Singapore. Another significant point was that the land concerned, should it be vacated, would revert to the transferring party, in the words of Jaem, “without compensation whatsoever”. Hence, his assertion that the issue of selling the KTM land in Singapore did not arise. The larger significance of Jaem’s statement is over the issue of sovereignty. For long, it had been thought that the KTM land in Singapore, being Malaysian state land, would never be sold. Jaem’s statement has turned the issue of sovereignty on its head; it is Singapore’s sovereignty that is hinged to the KTM land. As long as KTM land existed in Singapore as state land, it could be argued that this affected Singapore’s sovereignty. But because the Malaysian leased ownership of the land is based on a historical agreement, Singapore has to respect the law. Malaysia was no doubt aware throughout the preceding two decades that it would lose ownership of the railway land should it move its station from Tanjong Pagar to Woodlands. Hence, the mutual recognition that the most rational solution would be through joint development of the land to be vacated by the shift. The deal tentatively agreed by the two Prime Ministers to resolve the KTM land imbroglio is based on this understanding. Singapore is prepared to realise the market value of the KTM land in offering Malaysia a 60 per cent stake of the joint holding company for its development. Singapore is also prepared to swap the KTM land at Tanjong Pagar, Bukit Timah, Kranji and Woodlands for other parcels in downtown Singapore of equivalent value. So what was legally supposed to be returned for free will now largely be paid for by Singapore—at a price that is now the subject of mutual valuation and final negotiations. A Malaysian paper, The Star, reported that a valuation exercise in 2009 estimated the total land value to be up to S$4 billion (RM 9.5 billion).

The Larger Picture

Significantly, the debates in Malaysian circles to date had been in defence of the 1918 agreement. Shahrir Samad, the former minister from Johor, in another report by 207

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Bernama, urged Malaysians to move away from “nostalgic-romantic sentiments” to a future arrangement that would benefit KTM and Malaysia. UMNO Supreme Council member Norraesah Mohamad said the new deal would turn a “sleepy asset” into a high value commercial venture. UMNO Youth leader Khairy Jamaluddin said the new agreement would allow Malaysia to monetise its assets in Singapore. “Malaysians must know that the Tanjong Pagar land cannot be utilised for anything other than a railway station.” Nevertheless, this major shift in the railway land issue would not have been possible had there not been a new mindset at the very top of the Malaysian leadership. Under Prime Minister Najib Razak, we are seeing a government that is prepared to break new ground in seeking mutual accommodation for mutual gain. Singapore’s leadership has also contributed to this major shift by not being too calculating, and showing that Singapore can also think out of the box to secure a more harmonious long-term strategic relationship. The end result is not just a resolution of the railway land issue, but also possibly a settlement of other outstanding issues that have bedevilled bilateral ties for too long. SC

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Barry Desker

Is Indonesia Outgrowing ASEAN? Indonesia’s democratisation has been accompanied by calls for a foreign policy that is not only more assertive but also more autonomous of ASEAN. Is the growing democracy also unleashing forces that will lead to more strident nationalism?

Of late, there had been a debate within Indonesia on whether Indonesian foreign policy should look beyond ASEAN. These observers contend that Indonesia should see itself as a major emerging power like Brazil, South Africa, India and China with global interests and concerns. Indonesia’s post-independence foreign policy has reflected the changes in its political system. In the 1960s, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy emphasised the role of the progressive New Emerging Forces and attracted strong support from the communist bloc and newly independent states while engaging in an undeclared war with his closest neighbours who were backed by the West. By contrast, after 1965, Suharto focused on ties with the United States and Japan while consolidating links with states surrounding Indonesia. Indonesia’s foreign policy was conceived as a series of concentric circles: ASEAN, the West (as investors and trading partners) and multilateral engagement (United Nations, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, OIC and the Non-Aligned Movement, NAM).

Push for a Shift in Foreign Policy

However, in the post-Suharto era, Indonesia’s participation in the G20, the rise of China and the belief that a power shift is occurring from the Atlantic to the Pacific has led Indonesian analysts to argue that Indonesia should play an independent role commensurate with its growing international influence. Critics of the constraints on Indonesian foreign policy highlight the lack of a capacity to act independently arising from its commitment to ASEAN. Proponents of a post-ASEAN foreign policy such as Rizal Sukma argue that “Indonesia should free itself from any undeserving obligation to follow the wishes of any state or a grouping of states, including ASEAN, if by doing so we sacrifice our own national interests.” Indonesian decision-makers believe that a two-speed ASEAN exists. The newer

Barry Desker is Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, and Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS.

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members of ASEAN such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam emphasise state sovereignty, non-interference and non-intervention and approach issues such as human rights, freedom of expression and democracy hesitantly. The older ASEAN members are more positive on these issues that have been raised by Indonesia but they have not been as willing as Indonesia to push for their inclusion in ASEAN agreements. Critics such as Jusuf Wanandi and Rizal Sukma feel that ASEAN has failed to adjust to the new global environment and is stuck in an authoritarian mind-set. Such critics see Indonesia as an outlier within ASEAN even though it is by far the largest state in the region.

The picture that emerges is one where democratic governance in the post-Suharto era has led to increased public pressures on the political leadership.

The Pro-ASEAN School

However, key foreign policymakers such as President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa contend that ASEAN is central to Indonesian foreign policy, even as Indonesia plays an active role in the G20, the Muslim world and multilateral diplomacy. Its ASEAN membership provides Indonesia with informal influence in these other international fora, as it is perceived as representing a much larger ASEAN entity. Within ASEAN, Indonesian negotiators have been pushing the boundaries of discussions on issues such as democratisation in Myanmar, the need for an effective ASEAN human rights commission and the establishment of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. However, ASEAN’s consensual decision-making processes have meant that Indonesia has achieved considerably less than its maximum objectives. This has resulted in domestic Indonesian criticisms of President Yudhoyono as he is perceived as indecisive, lacking conviction and seeking to appease Indonesia’s neighbours. Unlike the autonomy of policymakers during the Suharto era, the new reality is that the Indonesian government has to pay close attention to domestic opinion as expressed through the media, rowdy street demonstrations and fiery speeches by members of parliament. Critics have been quick to utilise the democratic space created since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. Elected parliamentarians have blocked ratification of agreements reached by the executive branch such as the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore. Indonesian analysts criticised the compromises entailed in reaching agreement on the ASEAN Charter. Relations with Malaysia have recently been strained by the strong public reaction to conflicting territorial claims, maritime boundary disputes, treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia and the belief that Malaysians regard Indonesians as poor cousins.

More Strident Nationalism

Used to top-down agreements and Suharto’s willingness to provide space for Indonesia’s neighbours, the other members of ASEAN, particularly the founding members, have not adjusted easily to the impact of Indonesia’s young democracy on bilateral relations. 210

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Increased public involvement in decision-making in Indonesia has been accompanied by strident calls for Indonesia’s interests to be upheld and mass political mobilisation against perceived slights against Indonesia. Nevertheless, there are continuities in foreign policy that should be noted. Over the generations, Indonesian policymakers and the politically articulate public have shared the view that because of its size, natural resources, strategic location at the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and presence of the world’s largest Muslim population who are regarded as religious moderates (a significant factor in a post-9/11 world), Indonesia is entitled to deference in the region and influence internationally. Indonesia’s relative weakness because of the strong centrifugal tendencies within the state arising from recurrent conflicts over ethnicity, religion, race and class is forgotten in periods when central authority is strong and Indonesia’s international prestige is high. The picture that emerges is one where democratic governance in the post-Suharto era has led to increased public pressures on the political leadership. The consequence is a more strident nationalism and a focus on the global stage. However, this re-alignment of Indonesian foreign policy will not represent a turn-away from ASEAN. Indonesia will be engaged in a continuing quest for leadership within ASEAN while seeking recognition as a leading emerging power through global groupings such as the G20. SC

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C. Raja Mohan

East Asian Security

The United States Wants a Bigger Indian Role As the United States and East Asia scramble to cope with the rapidly shifting balance of power in the region, Washington is expanding consultations with Delhi on Asian security and is extending strong support to India’s own “Look East” policy.

The United States is intensifying its engagement with East Asia amidst the rise of China, Beijing’s new tensions with Japan and the Southeast Asian nations, and the search for stronger regional institutions. As it does so, the Obama administration is encouraging India to play a larger role in Asia and the Pacific. This new emphasis was underscored in President Barack Obama’s visit to India in November 2010. In a series of conversations with this writer in Washington ahead of that visit, senior administration officials saw Asia emerging at the top of the bilateral agenda between the United States and India. Issues relating to Asian security and economic architecture figured prominently during President Obama’s first visit to India. Under-Secretary of State William Burns stressed that the United States places “special emphasis on the role India plays in Asia in ensuring order, balance and security”. Contrary to the earlier fears in Delhi that Obama might look at India through the narrow prism of South Asia, his administration sees cooperation with India as important for the future of East Asia. “I think it is fair to say that the United States does not characterise the engagement with India as confined to either South Asia or East Asia,” Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia told this writer. “Our discussion with India now covers the full range of issues relating to South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and global issues as well,” Campbell emphasised.

East and South Asia: A Blurring Distinction

India, too, believes that the distinctions between East and South Asia can no longer be sustained. Its top officials argue that if a larger role for a rising China is inevitable in the subcontinent, so too is a bigger Indian footprint in the Western Pacific. “We have global

C. Raja Mohan is Adjunct Professor of South Asian Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express, New Delhi.

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interests, the Chinese have global interests. All While China looms large over the major powers are not only inter-dependent the new geopolitics of Asia, on each other, but also are dealing with each Washington would not want to other across a whole range of issues, none of define U.S. engagement with which recognises some artificial geographical the region in terms of a zeroconstruct like South Asia or East Asia,” India’s sum game. National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon told an audience in Washington in September 2010. The Obama administration would like to see India step up the pace and scope of its engagement in Asia. Campbell also stressed that the United States fully supports India’s Look East strategy. “We would like to see India’s role in Asia manifest itself in terms that go beyond declarations of intent,” Campbell added. While India has expanded its economic, political and security ties with East Asia in recent years, the region wants India to raise its game. At the United Nations, the United States intensified its engagement with East Asia by reaffirming its commitment to the alliance with Japan as Tokyo and Beijing sparred over their maritime disputes. Obama also met the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), who are increasingly concerned about Beijing’s assertion of its expansive territorial claims over the South China Sea.

Core of a New Map of Asia

While China looms large over the new geopolitics of Asia, Washington would not want to define U.S. engagement with the region in terms of a zero-sum game. The U.S. emphasis, instead, is on deepening old alliances, building new partnerships, engaging China, and creating an enduring Asian security order. Similarly, India too wants to strengthen its cooperation with China while elevating its own position in the construction of a new Asian order. Campbell sees multilateralism in Asia during the 1990s as being essentially trans-Pacific. Over the last decade, however, it has become centred on pan-Asian integration. “In the new phase, India, along with the United States, must have a much larger role in shaping the Asian economic institutions and its security architecture,” he said. ASEAN’s recent decision to include the United States and Russia in the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Obama administration believes, will create the “core of a new map” in Asia that might frame the international relations of the region in the future. The entry of Washington and Moscow makes the EAS inclusive and brings all the actors relevant to the security of the region under a single umbrella. On its part, India is welcoming the U.S. entry into the EAS and is eager to engage the United States in the Asia Pacific. As Menon, the Indian National Security Adviser, sees it: “Traditionally, India and the United States have viewed each other across the Eurasian landmass and the Atlantic Ocean. We get a different perspective if we look across the Pacific, across a space that we share and that is vital to the security and prosperity of our two countries.” 213

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The Obama administration has already had at least two rounds of consultation with India on East Asian security issues. Both Washington and Delhi were pleased with the tenor and substance of their dialogue on East Asia and hoped to institutionalise it. A changing Asia was the backdrop when President Obama and PM Singh met in Delhi in 2010. SC

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Barry Desker

ADMM Plus Defence Cooperation

Rise of a New Player

The ground-breaking ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Eight convened for the first time in October 2010. The emergence of the ADMM Plus will have implications for ASEAN and the evolving regional security architecture.

Until 2006, when there was an agreement to hold annual meetings of ASEAN ministers of defence, defence cooperation took place on a bilateral basis within ASEAN. A significant defence-related development in the Asia Pacific is the agreement on an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM Plus Eight, or ADMM Plus, for short) process as an integral part of the ADMM. The defence ministers of the 10 ASEAN states together with their counterparts from China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia and the United States, met for the first time as a group in Hanoi on 12 October 2010.

ASEAN Security Community

The establishment of the ADMM took ASEAN a step closer to the realisation of the ASEAN Security Community. It is envisaged that ASEAN will be at the centre of the ADMM Plus. The ADMM Plus will be open and inclusive, and uphold the ASEAN principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and respect for national sovereignty. It is conceptualised as a defence and security forum, not a military alliance. The ADMM Plus provides a framework for confidence building and should facilitate the handling of emerging traditional and non-traditional security issues such as maritime security, terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. ASEAN regards the ADMM Plus as a means of engaging the major powers and facilitating constructive and co-operative norms of behaviour. It is unlikely that the ADMM Plus process will move beyond the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in addressing traditional threats such as major power rivalries, bilateral conflicts and regional tensions such as India/China border issues, Kashmir, conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and the risks of nuclear proliferation arising from North Korea’s acquisition

Barry Desker is Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. This is an excerpt of his paper presented at the Putrajaya Forum in Putrajaya, Malaysia from 13–15 October 2010.

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Nevertheless, on defence-related matters, the ADMM Plus will increasingly overshadow the ARF, which is seen as a foreign ministry-dominated institution.

of a nuclear weapons capability. While the annual meetings will provide an opportunity to discuss these issues informally and enable bilateral exchanges such as the meeting of the Chinese and Japanese defence ministers, it is unlikely that there will be significant breakthroughs on the resolution of these disputes

at this new forum. Nevertheless, on defence-related matters, the ADMM Plus will increasingly overshadow the ARF, which is seen as a foreign ministry-dominated institution. The ARF is too broad in its membership and overtaken by the rapid progress of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) institutions. The establishment of the ADMM Plus structure would reduce pressures for U.S. and Russian membership of the EAS. This would ease concerns within ASEAN that such an expansion of the EAS (ASEAN+6) could lead to a Chinese focus on the APT (ASEAN+3). Another concern to be assuaged is the emergence of the APT as the primary framework for regional cooperation in East Asia that excludes the United States. The worry is that the APT could be the basis of a Chinese-dominated security framework in East Asia if there were no other overlapping institutions.

Will the ADMM Plus be Different?

My assessment is that the ADMM Plus would form part of a lattice framework of complex inter-dependence involving participating states engaged in cooperative security. While critics will fault the addition of one more structure into the alphabet soup of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, the ADMM Plus could quickly distinguish itself by agreeing on concrete areas of cooperation. It could be developed as the key institution in the Asia Pacific promoting practical cooperation among the militaries of the participating states including exchanges of personnel, meetings of chiefs of defence forces, intelligence chiefs and heads of military academies, besides the annual meeting of defence ministers. The ministers could agree on participation in multilateral search and rescue exercises; training in counter-terrorism operations, maritime security and anti-piracy; courses in best practices in peacekeeping as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, before proceeding at a later stage to joint land, sea and air exercises, partnerships in peace operations and post-conflict peace-building. The most significant role of such an inclusive institution, which brings together the major powers as well as the smaller states of the ASEAN region, is that it will help to shape a cooperative regional order. Competition in the region can be expected and there will be limits to multilateral engagement, especially in the initial years of the ADMM Plus process. However, interactions through this process will result in more candid exchanges over time, increased familiarity with different political styles and cultural norms and beliefs and enhanced opportunities for informal contacts and concrete, practical defence cooperation. 216

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From an ASEAN perspective, instead of regional security institutions being shaped only by the perspective of the United States, the ADMM Plus will have a central role for ASEAN—a grouping of small and medium powers—while providing an opportunity for the engagement of the United States and China, the two states at greatest risk of being engaged in a competitive relationship in East Asia, as well as major regional powers such as Japan, India and Russia. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

ADMM Plus

New Twist to Old Security Issues The inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) is the latest move by ASEAN to influence and shape the regional security architecture in a changing global order. Significantly, it is kicking off by tackling non-traditional security challenges.

Soon after its inauguration in Hanoi on 12 October 2010, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM Plus) billed itself as a “milestone in ASEAN history”. Indeed, its significance is not just for ASEAN but also the wider Asia-Pacific region. There have been countless regional meetings of ministers. But never before had defence ministers sat down together in a large group, and in a formal setting—with a structured agenda to discuss peace, stability and development in the region. That’s a breakthrough. Moreover, this first-ever summit of defence ministers in the Asia-Pacific region included some of the world’s military powers. The eight invited countries were the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Defence ministers of major military powers coming together for a common purpose is rare, in fact unprecedented. So the emergence of this new platform to promote understanding and cooperation among them is a feat. There is now a common desire to meet and talk, though where this will lead to remains an open question. Still, with the creation of the ADMM Plus, the ASEAN-driven regional architecture that addresses political and security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region is now more complete. Indeed, the ADMM Plus met against the backdrop of new perspectives on security—as well as new twists to old security issues.

Changing Security Perspectives

Though the participants were defence ministers, their immediate agenda was security of a new kind—not of guns and bombs, but security of the non-traditional variant. They focused on five core issues for immediate cooperation—disaster relief, peacekeeping, military medicine, maritime security and counter-terrorism. In fact, since the ADMM forum proper was initiated by ASEAN in 2006, the key areas for collaboration included humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and even working with civil society organisations on “non-traditional security” issues. Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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These are non-sensitive issues and there- This increasingly important fore easy to attract consensus and agreement. dimension—non-traditional This non-controversial approach eases every- security—will get growing one into the cooperative mood, which will en- attention in a changing regional able the ADMM Plus to tackle the tougher is- order. sues later. But there is also a new logic to this emphasis: security today has been redefined. While traditional security refers to states having to prepare for war to defend their sovereignty, non-traditional security today means protecting the well-being of the citizen from non-military threats. Because the threats and challenges are also increasingly trans-national—meaning they cut across borders— countries have to cooperate more closely to deal with non-traditional security issues. As the Chairman’s Statement noted, complex and trans-national security challenges “are beyond the scope of any country to handle alone”. The region is also prone to natural disasters. Failure of states to deal with calamities can also lead to instability and cross-border problems such as forced migration. In such emergency situations, it is more often than not the militaries that are most ready, most equipped and most organised would extend humanitarian assistance. The militaries are increasingly finding themselves confronted not by the prospects of war and conflict but by the prospects of human disasters, which, if not handled well, can also lead to conflict, insecurity and instability. All this is a recipe for a more explosive region down the road. The best way to deal with such a future is to prepare for it through cooperation. Significantly, the immediate challenges identified by the ADMM Plus were climate change, natural disasters, trans-national crimes, infectious diseases as well as maritime security and terrorism. Indeed, the ADMM Plus also agreed to deepen cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

Old Issues, New Twists

At the same time, long-standing traditional security issues are not going away. The ADMM Plus met against the backdrop of new tensions in the region sparked by old bugbears. Two of these stemmed from current flashpoints in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Beijing has caused some restiveness in the region with its new assertiveness over its claims to these waters. In the case of the East China Sea, this had led to an unprecedented war of words with Japan. To the south, reports of Beijing upgrading its South China Sea claim as a “core interest” have generated tension with the United States and some nervousness within ASEAN. The broader regional concern is its impact on maritime access to vital sea lanes that are the lifeline of world trade and commerce. Significantly, several of the protagonists in these disputes were present at the Hanoi meeting, namely the defence ministers of China, Japan and the United States—three of the key players whose postures and policies are critical to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. Surprisingly, the rising tensions over these issues seemed to have toned 219

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down in the run-up to the ADMM Plus summit. Was the emergence of the ADMM Plus a factor for the lowering of temperature?

ADMM Plus and East Asia Summit

The ADMM Plus is the new kid on the block in the evolving regional security architecture. It will further entrench ASEAN’s position as a major player in the world of security diplomacy. By starting off with a focus on non-traditional security issues—such as climate change, natural disasters, infectious diseases, trans-national crimes and terrorism—the ADMM Plus is plugging a major gap in tackling these new dimensions in security. Equally important, the ground-breaking ADMM Plus was established just before the 2010 EAS—with the participation of the foreign ministers of two world powers who attended the ADMM Plus, the United States and Russia. This can only mean that this increasingly important dimension—non-traditional security—will get growing attention in a changing regional order. SC

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Tan See Seng

The East Asia Summit 2010

Big Step Forward, or Business-as-Usual? The East Asia Summit 2010 has been described as a “significant step forward” following the inclusion of America and Russia. But until deep-seated tensions over perceived Chinese hegemony and doubts about ASEAN centrality are judiciously managed, the Summit will likely stall than flourish.

On 30 October 2010, the EAS met in Hanoi for only the fifth time. The meeting confirmed the entry of Russia and the United States into the EAS—a “significant step forward”, according to Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong—thereby enlarging the group from 16 to 18 members.

EAFTA or CEPEA?

Calling for a moratorium on expansion and a period of consolidation, Mr. Lee identified the Summit’s next crossroads: To establish an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) comprising ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, a move favoured by China, or the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), a Japan-sponsored idea that links East Asian economies with those of India, Australia and New Zealand? Refusing to see these as either/or options, Mr. Lee, possibly with a nod to simmering differences between Beijing and Tokyo on the shape and substance of East Asian regionalism, urged his fellow EAS leaders to “be ambitious and let both projects advance to maximise benefits.” Ambition indeed. Forging a leaders-led group that boasts the major powers as members is no small achievement. But the roadblocks that stand in the way to meaningful collaboration are not insignificant, and no EAS leader, not least Mr. Lee, is unaware of them. The boldness of his proposal—pursue the EAFTA and CEPEA plans concurrently—implies that he believes those roadblocks are not insurmountable. On the other hand, the proposal is a tacit yet acute reminder of worrisome political dynamics that persist and pervade East Asian affairs. At least two longstanding concerns are noteworthy, both which, if left unattended, could keep the EAS in indefinite limbo or, worse, cause it to regress. Tan See Seng is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at RSIS. This commentary is based partly on research conducted for the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Asia Security Initiative.

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But if this is as far as the EAS goes, then the maintenance of ASEAN centrality is at best Pyrrhic.

Accommodating China

First, in a critical sense, the EAFTA and CEPEA plans reflect deep tensions in East Asian regionalism. The founding of the EAS in 2005, initially with China’s enthusiastic backing, was quickly followed by tense disagreement. On the one hand are the countries that favoured the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand. On the other hand, there is China’s insistence that membership should be kept to the ASEAN+3 countries (the ASEAN 10 plus China, Japan and South Korea). While China eventually acquiesced to a 16-member EAS, hints abounded that Chinese interest in it had dimmed, a perception further enhanced when the prospect of U.S. involvement in the Summit was subsequently broached. Initially, opinion was divided over whether the ASEAN+3 or the EAS was the designated vehicle to fulfilling the shared vision for an East Asian Community. Crucially, at their 2009 Summit at Hua Hin, Thailand, EAS leaders clarified that the ASEAN+3 was to be the “main vehicle” for building the Community, “with ASEAN as the driving force”. Yet the concern refused to go away. The EAS continued to run feasibility studies on the CEPEA idea, with at least one report claiming that the GDPs of Summit countries would increase by two per cent. Here, one might be forgiven for imagining the clarification on the ASEAN+3 at Hua Hin as a possible concession to China in return for the continued emphasis on the CEPEA. Diplomatic niceties aside, some worry over China’s putative dominance of East Asia. According to this logic, the incorporation of India and Australia, and now Russia and the United States, into the EAS would furnish the rest of East Asia with options by which to balance China’s enormous economic and diplomatic heft. While there is broad agreement that the CEPEA makes good economic sense—possibly more so than the EAFTA alone—political and strategic considerations also weigh heavily in the overall calculi of countries backing the CEPEA.

Centralising ASEAN

Second, the aura of indispensability that once shrouded ASEAN is today fraying. Harried efforts are being made to reiterate its continued relevance in regional affairs. According to George Yeo, Singapore’s foreign minister, big power interest in the EAS is “a triumph of ASEAN diplomacy” because it is an explicit acknowledgement by the powers—which did likewise at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July—of “the centrality of ASEAN” in Asian regionalism. Singapore’s chief diplomat could not be clearer: “We [ASEAN] do not want the agenda to be taken out of our hands.” Presumably, the concern to maintain ASEAN as the centre of gravity in regional affairs arose in the light of challenges to its position as the fulcrum of the region’s architecture. Proposals from Australia’s Kevin Rudd and Japan’s Yukio Hatoyama on a new regional vision for Asia raised doubts about an ASEAN-based architecture. Both visions relied instead on various formulations of big-power concert as the preferred foundation on which to build a viable architecture. Unsurprisingly, neither formulation was acceptable to ASEAN. 222

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Serendipitously for ASEAN, both proposals sputtered when their chief backers, Rudd and Hatoyama, lost their premierships. Inherent flaws notwithstanding, the proposals broached a concern shared by many about ASEAN centrality: Is it the means to a more prosperous and secure Asia, or an end in itself? Will an ASEAN-led EAS be the uber-institution where pressing regional concerns are seriously addressed, or will it merely serve as a platform for ASEAN to preserve its own primacy, potentially at the expense of broader regional interests?

EAS 2010: Monument or Footprint?

There is no question the 2010 Summit constitutes a milestone of sorts. That the world’s major powers have seen fit to join the EAS is a good indication that ASEAN, as Singapore’s George Yeo put it, is “alive” to the big boys. But if this is as far as the EAS goes, then the maintenance of ASEAN centrality is at best Pyrrhic. As William Faulkner once mused, monuments only say, “At least I got this far”, whereas footprints say, “This is where I was when I moved again”. The joint pursuit of the EAFTA and the CEPEA—and keeping the eyes of all Summit members on the prize—is a worthwhile step forward not only for the EAS and the region as a whole, but equally for ASEAN in proving itself a regional player of consequence. SC

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Yang Razali Kassim

Indonesia, the U.S. and Australia

New Age, New Issues

The rescheduling of Obama’s visit to Jakarta twice in 2010 should not alter the fact that the United States and Indonesia are entering a new age in ties driven by “green issues”. This new phase is also extending to Australia. What does this mean for the region?

The twice-postponed visit of President Barack Obama to Indonesia—from March to June, and then to November 2010—did not detract from one significant fact: the United States and Indonesia are on the cusp of a new era in bilateral relations. The world’s most powerful country and the world’s largest Muslim democracy are entering a “new age” in ties. This will be marked by a major shift from Washington’s long-standing obsession with traditional security issues and human rights to new concerns—or what is increasingly being referred to as non-traditional security, ranging from climate change and energy to trans-national crime and terrorism.

Green Diplomacy

This new phase in U.S.-Indonesia ties is captured in the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (CPA) that was supposed to be signed in March 2010 when Obama was originally scheduled to visit Indonesia. From Jakarta, Obama was due to travel to Australia but that too was postponed. Indonesia had indicated that it would not wait till June to get this new agreement with the United States off the ground. It showed Jakarta’s eagerness to move ahead with relations with the United States—and away from the old paradigm that was the hallmark of the Bush era. In the past, during the Suharto years, Indonesia-U.S. ties had been punctuated with tension and acrimony over human rights at a time when the military dominated and the authorities were strong-fisted in local politics. Post-Suharto, Indonesia is taking on a completely different persona. It has transformed itself into a champion of human rights and democracy in Asia—at least in Southeast Asia. U.S.-Indonesia ties now have new drivers. These are the non-traditional security issues that will be a major part of the CPA. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009 mentioned the need for stronger partnership in energy and food security. Her counterpart, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, speaking to a U.S. audience in March Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies.

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2010, identified the “wide range of sectors” in Indeed, climate change diplomacy the CPA that would include not just energy and has also altered the content and food security but also environment, health and emphasis of Australia-Indonesia good governance—apart from the usual areas relations and foreign policy. of education, science and technology and trade and investment. Reflecting the new thrust on green issues, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke was to lead a clean energy trade mission to Indonesia a month later.

Indonesia’s Redesigned Foreign Policy

This updated thrust in U.S.-Indonesia diplomacy—or what can be called “Green Diplomacy”—reflects a congruence of mutual interests in a new age dominated by climate change. This diplomacy is increasingly being defined by “green issues”—reflecting the extensive and pervasive impact of climate change on a wide range of human activity. But this new dimension may also have a lot to do with Jakarta’s changing foreign policy priorities as a result. We are seeing a more assertive Indonesia in the area of green or environmental issues. Nothing reflects this better than the major role played by Indonesia—hosting COP13, the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali in 2007 that built up to the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 (COP 15). Jakarta is also emerging as a major and responsible player in leading the region on “green issues”. One example is the Manado Ocean Conference to conserve marine and coastal resources. Another is the Coral Triangle Initiative to conserve marine biodiversity. This project now involves regional countries like Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. Indonesia even initiated the F-11 or Group of Eleven tropical forest nations to push for the conservation of tropical forests. All these initiatives did not exist in the 1980s or 1990s. They reflect how fundamentally changed Indonesia’s foreign policy has become.

Indonesia and Australia: New Issues

Indeed, climate change diplomacy has also altered the content and emphasis of Australia-Indonesia relations and foreign policy. It appears that the Australians are more engaged with the Indonesians than the Americans when it comes to green diplomacy. This came out clearly during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s visit to Canberra in March 2010 when he cited the “green” initiatives that Jakarta has taken, such as the F-11 and the Manado Conference. Indeed, the CPA with the United States was preceded by a Comprehensive Partnership with Australia in 2005, which President Yudhoyono described as a “watershed”. This declaration on partnership with Canberra was closely followed a year later by the Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation, also known as the Lombok Treaty. Yudhoyono billed the Lombok Treaty as a landmark for Indonesia because it enabled a “forward-looking” partnership in the fields of both traditional and non-traditional security. 225

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Interestingly, Yudhoyono identified “new issues” among the key challenges facing Indonesia-Australia ties going forward. These new issues first surfaced to define bilateral ties in recent years in the form of tsunami, terrorism, people smuggling and drug smuggling. But more broadly, the Indonesian leader said, the new issues have evolved around climate change, financial crises, infectious diseases and terrorism—among many more. While in Canberra, Yudhoyono stressed the critical need for their partnership to develop the capacity to deal with these new issues.

Regional Impact of Green Diplomacy

While the United States is a world power, Indonesia and Australia are regional powers. When three such powers align their interests in a constellation revolving around climate change, there is bound to be an impact. One clear impact will be on the broader landscape in the regions that affect them. Indonesia’s new diplomacy will certainly affect ASEAN, which is also increasingly grappling with climate change and non-traditional security issues. Indonesia traditionally dominates ASEAN until the fall of Suharto. But of late, Jakarta is becoming more assertive of its “free and active” foreign policy. It is unlikely that Indonesia’s green diplomacy, which brings it closer to the United States and Australia, will be at the expense of ASEAN. If at all, it will see Indonesia resuming its leadership role in the grouping. SC

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Our Contributors

STRATEGIC CURRENTS Issues in Human Security in Asia

The following profiles of the contributors are correct at the time of writing: Adri Wanto is Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He studied at a Pesantren in West Sumatra (Nurul Yaqin, Padang Pariaman), Indonesia. Alan Chong is Associate Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Alvin Chew is Visiting Researcher at the Gulf Research Centre in Dubai and Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Akanksha Mehta is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. She has conducted field research on the Maoist insurgency in India. Arabinda Acharya is Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. An Indian national, he specialises in countering the financing of terrorism. Arpita Mathur is Research Fellow at the South Asia Programme and the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. She was previously Asociate Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Ashok Sawhney is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. A retired commodore from the Indian Navy, he had served as Director of Naval Operations and naval attaché in Washington, D.C. Barry Desker is Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, and Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS. Bill Durodie is Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He coordinates the Health and Human Security Programme of the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. C. Raja Mohan is Adjunct Professor of South Asian Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express, New Delhi. 228

CONTRIBUTORS

Chan Wen Ling is Senior Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Choong Pui Yee is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. A graduate of the University of Malaya, she is attached to the Malaysia Programme. Evan A. Laksmana is Researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, and Adjunct Lecturer at the Indonesian Defence University. He had been Visiting Associate Fellow with the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Eric Frecon is Post-Doctoral Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he is attached to the Indonesia Programme. Farish A. Noor is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Fatima Astuti is Senior Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Born in Indonesia, she has worked with several human rights organisations in Indonesia. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore. He was formerly foreign minister of Bangladesh and ambassador to the United Nations. Jenna Park is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Joseph Chinyong Liow is Associate Dean and Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also the author of The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (2004). Joshua Ho is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, where he coordinated the Maritime Security Programme. Joshy M. Paul is MacArthur Visiting Associate Fellow at the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also Associate Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. 229

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Kwa Chong Guan is Head of External Programmes at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Koh Swee Lean Collin is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Kerry Sieh is Professor and Director, Earth Observatory of Singapore (EOS), Nanyang Technological University. Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Li Mingjiang is Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was previously a diplomatic correspondent for Xinhua News Agency. Mely Caballero-Anthony is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Mohamed Abdul Saddiq is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Mushahid Ali is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He has spent five years in Cairo as Counsellor in the Singapore Embassy from 2005 to 2010. Nur Azha Putra is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Nah Liang Tuang is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Pradumna B. Rana is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was previously Senior Director at the Asian Development Bank’s Office of Regional Economic Integration. 230

CONTRIBUTORS

Paul P. S. Teng is Senior Fellow and Adviser to the Food Security Programme, Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) as well as Professor at the National Institute of Education (NIE), Nanyang Technological University. He has held leadership positions at the Worldfish Centre, International Rice Research Institute, MONSANTO Company and American universities. Paul Tapponnier is Professor and Head, Earthquakes and Tectonics Group, Earth Observatory of Singapore (EOS), Nanyang Technological University. P. K. Hangzo is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University where he is attached to the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. He was previously an education consultant in India. Rajesh Basrur is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University where he is attached to the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. Robert Beckman is Director, Centre for International Law, and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Rohan Gunaratna is Professor and Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is the lead author of Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero (2011). Ryan Clarke is Visiting Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University where he is attached to the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. Samuel Chan is Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is with the Military Transformations Programme. He spent some time in Afghanistan as Jebsen Research Fellow at the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in Kabul. Sam Bateman is Senior Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval commodore with a research interest in piracy and maritime issues.

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Sania Nishtar is the founding president of the NGO think tank Heartfile, a health policy group in Pakistan. It is linked to the consortium of Asian think tanks on Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS-Asia). The consortium is coordinated by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Sofiah Jamil is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Tan See Seng is Associate Professor and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Tuty Raihanah Mostarom is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Yang Fang is Associate Research Fellow at the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. She graduated in law from Huaqiao University, China. Yang Razali Kassim is Senior Fellow and Editor, RSIS Commentaries, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also with the School’s Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. Yeap Suyin is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. You Ji is Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Associate Professor at the School of Social Science and International Relations, University of New South Wales. Zhang Hongzhou is Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He studied at Harbin Institute of Technology in Heilongjiang, China before graduating from Nanyang Technological University in Maritime Studies.

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