Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End 9780814765425

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Stopping the Killing

Stopping th e Killin g How Civi l Wars En d Edited by

Roy Licklide r

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YOR K AN D LONDO N

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New Yor k an d Londo n Copyright © 1993 b y Ne w Yor k Universit y All rights reserve d Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Stopping th e killin g : how civi l war s en d / edite d b y Ro y Licklider . p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-5070- 2 1. Civi l wars . 2 . Wa r (Internationa l law ) I . Licklider , Roy . JX4541.S84 199 3 3 4 1 . 6 ' 8 - d c 2 0 92-3507 5 CIP New Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e printe d o n acid-fre e paper , an d their bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability . Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a cio

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For Our Children with Hope and in Memory of Fern Eilers Newman 1919-1992 the Gentlest Soul I Ever Knew.

Contents

Acknowledgments i x PART I . Introductio n 1. Ho w Civi l War s End : Question s an d Method s 3 Roy Licklider 2. Th e Unfinishe d Agenda : Negotiatin g Internal Conflict s 2 0 /. William Zartman PART II . Case s 3. Civi l Violenc e an d Conflic t Resolution : The Cas e o f Colombi a 3 7 Jonathan Hartlyn 4. Th e Peac e Proces s i n th e Sudan , 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 2 6 Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell 5. Th e Civi l Wa r i n Yemen , 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 7 0 9 Manfred W. Wenner

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6. Th e En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l Wa r 12 5 Stephen John Stedman 7. Th e En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r 16 4 Stephen John Stedman vii

viii Content s 8. Th e Endin g o f th e Nigeria n Civi l War : Victory, Defeat , an d th e Changin g o f Coalition s 18 9 James O'Connell 9. Th e Doome d Revolution : Communis t Insurgenc y in Postwa r Greec e 20 5 John O. latrides PART III . Theoretica l Issue s an d Problem s 10. Th e Cause s o f Peac e 23 5 Robert Harrison Wagner 11. Whe n Wa r Doesn' t Work : Understandin g the Relationshi p betwee n th e Battlefiel d and th e Negotiatin g Tabl e 26 9 Jane E. Roll 12. Politica l Order and the "Settlement" of Civil Wars 29 2 Harvey Waterman 13. Wha t Hav e W e Learne d an d Wher e D o We G o fro m Here ? 30 3 Roy Licklider Bibliography 32 3 Contributors 34 1 Index 34 3

Acknowledgments

One o f the pleasures o f this project ha s been meetin g an d working with s o man y peopl e wh o hav e foun d th e topi c worthwhile . M y primary debt is clearly to the contributors, not only for their written chapters bu t fo r thei r willingnes s t o participat e i n ou r ongoin g discourse i n various venues. W e i n turn drew liberall y o n the idea s of others at conferences o f the International Studies Association and the Internationa l Politica l Scienc e Association , bu t especiall y o n other participant s i n th e Conferenc e o n Civi l Wa r Termination a t Rutgers University in March 1990, including Henry Bienen, Barbara Callaway, James T. Johnson, Jack Levy, Manus Midlarsky, Paul Pillar, Bikash Roy, Luigi Sensi, D. Michae l Shafer , an d John Vasquez. Paul Pillar also read and critiqued al l of the theor y chapters . I have also personally benefitted immensely from responses to my papers a t th e Cit y Universit y o f Ne w Yor k Politica l Scienc e Conference, th e Conflic t Terminatio n conferenc e a t Haverfor d College, th e American Political Scienc e Association, th e Cente r for the Stud y o f Social Chang e a t the Ne w Schoo l fo r Socia l Research, and the Rutgers International Relations Colloquium as well as helpful individual scholar s like Robert Whealey. Charle s Tilly's advic e an d support ha s been invaluable . M y colleagues Jack Levy an d Michael Shafer critiqued my chapters in this volume in detail. I acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the United States Institute of Peace an d Rutger s University . Mos t importantly , Patrici a an d Virginia Licklider helped keep m e san e through the process.

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Stopping the Killing

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How Civi l War s End : Question s and Method s Roy Licklider Civil violenc e ma y b e rar e o r common , bu t i t i s alway s i n som e sens e extraordinary, & challenge to one of the basic assumptions of civil normality. -(Rule 1988 , 2 )

Our world is filled with violence of every sort , from the daily rando m killings o f childre n b y stra y gunfir e t o mas s murders an d large-scal e wars i n place s w e ca n hardl y locat e o n maps . Bu t eve n i n thi s en vironment o f violence , civi l wa r retain s a particular horror . Perhaps this is because o f the peculia r intensity o f many suc h con flicts. W e sa y tha t famil y fights ar e th e wors t becaus e th e degre e o f feeling i s s o deep , tha t yo u reall y hav e t o kno w someon e t o hat e them. James Rosenau (1964 , 73 ) argue s that the intensity stem s fro m the dept h o f prewa r tie s whic h hav e bee n destroyed . Certainl y th e degree o f persona l commitment , wit h it s resultin g herois m an d sav agery, i n societie s lik e Ulster , Lebanon , Cambodia , an d Angol a i s hard fo r outsider s t o comprehend . At a deeper level , civi l wa r reveal s th e fragilit y o f ou r own socia l peace. Coul d ou r ow n societ y eve r degenerat e int o th e anarch y o f Lebanon? The vision of people who would otherwise be living peacefully togethe r deliberatel y killin g on e anothe r retain s it s powe r t o shock. Th e peopl e i n Ulster , fo r example , see m muc h lik e thos e o f any Western industria l country ; i f they ar e unabl e t o maintai n socia l 3

4 Ro y Licklide r peace, wha t doe s tha t sa y about u s and ou r ow n future ? An y stabl e society ca n b e see n a s a suspende d civi l war , an d th e trouble s o f others remin d u s o f ou r ow n susceptibilit y t o th e condition . Afte r all, th e Unite d State s fough t on e o f th e bloodies t civi l conflict s i n history littl e mor e tha n a century ago . We know that i t ca n happe n here becaus e i t has . We als o worr y abou t civi l war s because , i n thi s increasingl y in terdependent world , the y ar e not private quarrels ; they attrac t out side involvement an d may escalate into international conflict s whic h will involv e u s directly . Som e o f th e mos t intens e Col d Wa r con frontations, fo r example , resulted fro m intervention s i n civil wars in the Third World in places like Korea, the Middle East, Vietnam, an d Afghanistan. No r is this simply a modern phenomenon; afte r all , the French Revolutio n ignite d a worl d war . Thu s th e en d o f th e Col d War i s unlikely t o en d thi s spiralin g cycl e o f involvemen t an d vio lence; indeed , i f anything , th e likel y outbrea k o f ne w civi l war s i n the former Sovie t bloc may increase it. Enlightened self-interest de mands that we learn how such conflicts begin and how they may best be ended . It i s particularly har d to visualize how civi l wars can end. Endin g international wa r i s har d enough , bu t a t leas t ther e th e opponent s will presumably eventuall y retrea t t o thei r ow n territorie s (war s of conquest hav e been rar e since 1945) . But in civil wars the member s of the two sides must live side by side and work together in a common government t o mak e th e countr y work . Ho w ca n thi s be done ? Sustained war s produce hatre d whic h doe s not end wit h the con flict. Afte r hal f a century, America n veteran s wer e outrage d a t th e idea o f including som e Japanese veteran s i n the fiftieth anniversar y ceremony o f the attac k o n Pearl Harbor . Ho w d o group s o f peopl e who have been killing one another with considerable enthusiasm an d success come together to form a common government? How can you work together , politicall y an d economically , wit h th e peopl e wh o killed you r parents , you r children , you r friend s o r lovers? O n th e surface i t seem s impossible , eve n grotesque . But i n fac t w e kno w tha t i t happen s al l the time . Fre d Ikle' s ap t title Every War Must End applie s to civil wars as well. The violenc e stemming from religiou s differences withi n Europe several centurie s ago has ended. England is no longer criss-crossed by warring armie s representing York and Lancaster or King and Parliament. The French no longer kil l one another ove r the divine right o f kings. Americans

How Civi l Wars End: Questions an d Methods 5 seem agree d t o be independent o f English rul e an d that th e Sout h should not secede . Argentine s see m reconcile d t o living i n a single state rathe r tha n several . Th e ideologie s o f th e Spanis h Civi l War now see m irrelevant , an d eve n th e separatis t issue s ther e ar e no t being resolved by mass violence. Mor e recently, two separatist wars in South Asia have produced the independent state s of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Conflic t i n th e are a remain s likely , bu t n o on e seem s interested i n extinguishin g th e tw o successo r states . Nigeri a expe rienced one of the most brutal civil wars of our time, but the violence ended 2 0 year s ago , an d while th e countr y i s politicall y unstable , the division s ar e no t th e sam e a s in the civi l war . Othe r case s can be foun d (includin g thos e i n thi s volume) . Someho w ne w societie s were constructe d afte r th e war , involvin g mos t o f th e peopl e wh o had fought o n opposite sides . But how did this happen? We know very little about the processes involved. Ho w ar e armed societies disarmed ? D o outsid e interven tions (militar y assistanc e t o on e sid e o r both, offer s o f mediation , humanitarian aid) help or hinder a settlement? Are lasting solution s more likely before o r after tota l militar y victor y by on e side ? Doe s it make a difference whethe r th e underlyin g issue s ar e ethnic divi sions or political differences , whethe r th e goa l ha s been separatio n from th e stat e o r conques t o f th e stat e apparatus ? I s peac e mor e likely when both sides are strong or when they are divided? Can the central issue s b e compromise d i n th e initia l settlement , o r doe s a draconian solution work best i n the long run? Why d o some "solu tions* ' last and others collapse? Most importantly, what can we learn from thes e experience s abou t th e circumstance s unde r whic h civi l societies may be constructed from civil violence? That is the central focus o f this book.

How Important Is Civil War? Jimmy Carter recently said that of the 11 6 wars since World War II, all but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were civil wars. (Jack Levy notes that Saddam Hussein would disagree, viewing Kuwait as part of Iraq.) Statements like these depend on the definitions being used, but the systematic studies of recent wars demonstrate the importance of civil war, n o matte r ho w i t i s defined . I n 197 3 Rober t Randl e asserte d that "since the first use of the atomic bomb against Japan, there have been at least 18 wars between states and 55 civil wars" (Randle 1973,

6 Ro y Licklide r x). Th e semina l Correlate s o f Wa r project identified , betwee n 194 5 and 1980 , 4 3 civi l wars , 1 2 internationa l wars , an d 1 8 extrasystemi c (colonial an d imperial) war s (Smal l an d Singer 1982 , 5 6 - 5 7 , 80 , an d 222). Pau l Pilla r (1983 , 21 ) list s 1 6 civil , 1 4 international , an d 9 extrasystemic war s afte r 1945 . Gantze l an d Meyer-Stame r (1986 ; cited i n Wallenstee n 1991 , 215 ) develope d a lis t o f 3 1 war s goin g on in 1984 ; 26 o f them were classified a s internal. Hug h Miall (1992 , 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 an d 124 ) constructe d a set o f about 35 0 conflict s betwee n 1945 an d 1985 . Fro m thi s he worke d wit h a subset o f 8 1 an d foun d 6 internationa l conflict s wit h majo r violence a s compared t o 2 8 civi l or civil/international ones . Ruth Sivard (1988) counte d 24 wars being fought i n 1987 , 2 2 o f whic h wer e civi l war s o r war s o f secession . The commo n groun d o f these studie s i s that civi l violenc e i s a major phenomenon i n th e curren t world . It therefor e seem s unreasonabl e t o omi t suc h struggle s fro m the ories o f conflict an d violence. Nonetheles s the y hav e receive d muc h less attentio n tha n interstat e conflicts , fo r reason s tha t ar e no t al together clear . Practitioner s ten d t o focu s o n individua l civi l strug gles rathe r than lookin g fo r patterns; few people , afte r all , ar e likel y to have had direct experience i n resolving more than one. Academic s might b e expecte d t o tak e a wide r view , bu t the y ar e sometime s restrained b y th e sociolog y o f thei r disciplines . Amon g politica l sci entists, for example, interstat e war is part of the field o f internationa l politics, whil e th e stud y o f internal war s is often include d i n anothe r field, comparativ e politics . Perhap s a s a result , th e ver y substantia l amount o f researc h o n interstat e wa r ha s ha d littl e impac t o n th e study o f civi l wars . Historian s ten d t o focu s o n individua l conflict s rather tha n generalization s abou t man y suc h wars , an d neithe r dis cipline ha s muc h contac t wit h sociology , whic h alon e amon g th e disciplines ha s produce d a substantial literatur e o n th e topic . Indeed, th e terminatio n o f civi l violenc e i s relevan t t o a wid e variety o f intellectua l fields o f study . The 'proble m of order' . .. i s often allege d to be the mos t fundamental o n the agend a of socia l science . . . . Mos t o f the majo r current s i n socia l an d political though t sinc e Hobbes' s tim e hav e contribute d somethin g t o th e debate on the origins of civil violence. Most of the key methodologies current among social scientist s toda y hav e served a s vehicles for arguments on the subject. As much as any other relatively delimited issue, it offers a microcosm of social scienc e thinking . (Rul e 1988 , x i and 3) Conflict resolutio n ha s focuse d primaril y o n les s violen t dispute s within state s an d interstat e wars , omittin g civi l wars ; th e recen t in -

How Civi l War s End : Question s an d Method s 7 terest i n wha t ar e ofte n calle d protracte d o r intractabl e conflict s (Kriesberg, Northrup , an d Thorson 1989 ) ha s begun t o compensat e for this and offers one way to bring these two different area s together. The immens e literatur e o n revolutio n ha s focuse d primaril y o n th e origins o f suc h conflicts , wit h ver y littl e concer n give n th e proces s by whic h the y end an d produc e majo r socia l impacts . Th e recen t concern wit h ethni c group s ofte n encourage s u s t o loo k a t conflict s among them, some of which escalate into violence; it is perhaps mor e important t o determin e ho w the y ca n coexis t i n th e sam e stat e rel atively peacefully , especiall y afte r the y hav e bee n killin g on e an other. Th e failur e t o en d suc h conflic t ma y sometime s produc e gen ocide an d policide, th e study o f which ha s developed into a specialty area o f it s ow n (Kupe r 1981 ; Wallima n an d Dobkowsk i 1987) . W e cannot seriousl y stud y politica l an d economi c developmen t withou t looking a t ho w civi l war s ar e ended . Th e lis t goe s on . Analysis o f civi l violenc e ha s focuse d o n explainin g it s origins ( a prominent exceptio n i s Gurr 1988. ) I t is particularly infuriatin g tha t two of the best books on internal war (Eckstein 196 4 an d Rule 1988 ) both explicitl y not e th e importanc e o f studyin g ho w suc h conflict s end an d then procee d t o ignor e th e topic . O f cours e thi s i s also tru e of interstate wars , whose causes hav e been extensivel y studie d whil e the equall y interestin g questio n o f how an d why the y end ha s been , for th e mos t part , curiousl y neglected . Little ha s change d i n th e quarte r centur y sinc e Harr y Eckstei n lamented: No question s abou t internal wa r have been mor e thoroughly neglecte d by social scientists, in any generation, than these long-run ones. . . . This neglect is most serious in what may well be the most crucial practical questio n that can be asked about internal war . . . : Ho w is it possible to re-establish truly legitimate authorit y afte r a society ha s been ren t b y a revolutionary con vulsion? How does on e g o from a "politics of aspiration*' to a settled civi c order? It is extremely common for internal war to grow into an institutional pattern o f politica l competitio n b y force , les s commo n fo r a truly "civil " society t o emerg e fro m a major internal war , excep t i n the very lon g run. What then are the circumstances unde r which the self-renewing aspect s of internal wa r become, o r may become , muted ? (Eckstei n 1964 , 28-29 ; cf . Modelski 1964b , 126 ) But doe s i t mak e an y sens e t o loo k a t civi l war s separatel y fro m large-scale conflic t i n general ? Afte r all , i f eve n th e expert s can' t agree o n th e distinction s betwee n civi l an d interstat e wars , wh y

8 Ro y Licklide r should w e expec t the m t o en d differently ? W e don' t reall y know , but ther e i s good theoretica l reaso n t o expec t tha t civi l war s may b e resolved differentl y tha n war s amon g states . In conflict s tha t ar e predominantl y civi l war s . . . outcome s intermediat e between victor y an d defea t ar e difficul t t o construct . I f partitio n i s no t a feasible outcome because the belligerents are not geographically separable, one side has to get all, or nearly so, since there cannot be two governments ruling ove r on e country , an d sinc e th e passion s arouse d an d th e politica l cleavages opened rende r a sharing of power unworkable. (Ikl e 1971 , 95) The civi l wa r tha t ensue s wil l b e a violent militar y struggl e betwee n tw o societies so committed tha t victory fo r one means extinction fo r the other . Thus a society organized as either envisions would be incompatible with the continued existence of the other; the alternative becomes Victory or Death, God or the Devil, Freedom or Slavery. Once the battle has been joined, the war i s tota l an d the outcom e i s see n onl y a s total victor y o r tota l defeat . Neither side at any stage can seriously contemplate any alternative to victory except death—i f not of the body then o f the soul. (Bel l 1972 , 218 ; cf. Modelski 1964b , 125-126 ; Pilla r 1983 , 24-25 ) This genera l argumen t i s develope d eloquentl y i n th e nex t chapte r in I. William Zartman's powerful analysi s of the difficultie s o f endin g civil war s base d o n a large numbe r o f curren t examples . If this i s true, w e woul d expec t civi l war s to be bot h mor e intense and more difficult to resolve tha n interstat e wars . There i s some sup port fo r both hypotheses . Hug h MialP s conflic t dat a shows that 15 % of internationa l conflict s involve d majo r violence , whil e a full 68 % of civi l an d civil/internationa l conflict s di d (Mial l 1992 , 124) . Pau l Pillar's data (1983, 25 ) sho w about two-thirds of interstate wars ending by negotiation a s compared to about one-third of civil wars. Usin g a somewha t modifie d dat a set , Stedma n (1991 , 9 ) foun d that , whe n colonial war s an d othe r "special* ' case s wer e eliminated , th e civi l war figures decline d t o abou t 15% . These dat a hav e somewha t ambiguou s implications . O n th e on e hand, casualtie s d o see m t o be highe r an d settlements mor e difficul t in civi l conflict , suggestin g tha t ther e ma y be interestin g theoretica l differences betwee n th e differen t sort s o f violence . O n th e othe r hand, whil e suppression , genocide , o r partitio n ar e certainl y possi ble, negotiate d settlemen t i n civil violence doe s in fact occur, as seen in th e case s o f Colombia , Sudan , an d Yeme n i n thi s volume .

How Civi l Wars End : Question s an d Method s 9

What Is a Civil War and When Doe s I t End? This line o f reasoning als o suggests tha t th e conventiona l definitio n of a civil war, large-scale violence between two or more groups holding sovereignty withi n a recognized state , i s inadequate. The prob lem i s th e notio n o f recognize d state , whic h i s essentiall y a lega l criterion. Usin g thi s definition , it' s no t clea r that , fo r example , th e Palestinian uprising in the territories occupied by Israel is a civil war, since on e ca n vie w Israe l a s a n occupyin g forc e rathe r tha n a rec ognized stat e i n th e occupie d territories . Similarly , a s Robert Mor timer ha s pointe d out , th e wa r i n Zimbabw e ca n b e viewe d a s a colonial struggle, since there was no legitimate governmen t i n place before th e en d o f the conflict . However, Ikle's argument suggest s that the particular intensit y of a civil war stem s from th e nature of the stakes, from th e expectatio n that after th e violence, regardless of the results, the participants will have to live together i n the stat e which is being shape d b y the con flict. Thu s w e us e th e ter m civi l wa r t o mea n large-scale violence among geographically contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after the conflict. In particula r i t incorporate s tw o differen t kind s o f criteria . (1) Ther e mus t be multiple sovereignty, define d b y Charle s Till y as the populatio n o f a n are a obeyin g mor e tha n on e institution . They pay taxes, provide men to its armies, feed it s functionaries, hono r its symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government the y formerly obeyed . (Till y 1978, 192) This criterion differentiate s civi l wars from othe r type s o f domesti c violence, suc h a s street crim e an d riots . (2) I n addition , a civi l war , b y ou r definition , involve s physica l violence to people. We have use d th e operationa l definition s o f th e Correlates o f War project: (a ) 1,00 0 battl e death s o r more pe r yea r and (b ) effective resistanc e (eithe r a t least two sides must have been organized fo r violen t conflic t befor e th e wa r starte d o r th e weake r side mus t hav e impose d a t leas t 5 % of its ow n casualtie s o n it s opponent), t o distinguis h betwee n civi l war s an d politica l massacre s (Small an d Singe r 1982 , 214-215) . As defined, th e term civi l war thus logically include s wars of conquest, wher e on e grou p trie s t o incorporat e anothe r int o th e sam e state, but ver y few o f them ca n be found afte r 1945 . (Even the Iraq i

10 Ro y Licklide r invasion o f Kuwai t remain s somewha t debatable , a s note d above. ) The Palestinia n uprisin g woul d b e include d i n thi s definitio n sinc e Arabs an d Jew s ar e likel y t o cohabi t som e states , regardles s o f th e outcome. Similarl y Zimbabw e become s a relevant cas e becaus e th e issue o f th e conflic t wa s th e natur e o f the governmen t whic h woul d control th e state in which most of the combatants expecte d to reside . But wha t doe s i t mea n t o sa y tha t a civil wa r ends? I t is common place, fo r example , t o sa y tha t th e America n civi l wa r ha s no t ye t ended, tha t the struggl e betwee n differin g culture s i n the nort h an d south continue s t o thi s da y i n variou s ways . Her e w e distinguis h between war an d conflict. Th e distinguishin g qualitie s o f war ar e multiple sovereigntie s an d violence , a s se t fort h above . Th e underlying conflict whic h triggere d th e violenc e ma y wel l continue , bu t if (1) the violence or (2) the multiple sovereignty ends, the war ends a s far a s w e ar e concerned .

Research Strateg y When this project began in 1987, thes e questions represented some thing o f a chicken an d eg g problem . Ther e wer e neithe r applicabl e theories t o tes t no r case studies whic h migh t b e use d t o generat e such theory . Moreover , th e proble m wa s clearl y large r tha n an y single person could handle. The obvious approach was a collaborative and iterativ e strategy , combinin g th e intimat e knowledg e o f spe cialists in particular example s with the broader interests of theorists, moving bac k an d fort h betwee n case s an d theory . To get started, I sketched out some very tentative ideas about why civil war s might end , includin g question s an d variables which migh t be relevan t (Licklide r 1988) . Thi s framewor k (i t wa s far from a theory, sinc e ther e wa s n o seriou s discussio n o f ho w thes e variable s were related to one another) is summarized in the following diagram : Independent Variable s | Precondition Antebellum polarit y | Communicatio Civil violence | ^ Willingnes Outside intervention _ J Establishmen

s fo r Settlement 1 n amon g participants 1 ^ s t o alter policies | " t o f minimal trust _ J

Settlement Terms (Outcome)] Dependen t Variable s Number of polities 1 ^ Futur e civi l violenc e Political participation \^ Population' s lifestyl e Centralization _ | Foreig n policy

How Civi l Wars End: Questions an d Methods 1 1 There were lot s o f problems with this initial framework , an d it was largely abandoned later. However, it did have the advantage of specifying that the reason civil wars end the way they do was interesting, that we were concerne d with the consequences o f such conflicts o n people, states, and the international system, and that the connections between thes e factor s shoul d no t be ignore d i n our research. In the secon d phase of the project, thi s framework serve d as the basis for a group of comparative case studies prepared by area experts with particula r knowledg e o f th e individua l conflicts . Thes e case s were t o be use d t o develo p an d refine th e origina l se t o f variable s inductively, hopefully allowin g us to move toward something close r to testable theor y about the conditions under which civil wars end. Clearly case selection was critical. We can all recite litanies of civil wars which see m endless—Ulster , Lebanon , Cambodia , etc . Bu t we seem t o kno w les s abou t thos e whic h hav e ended . Therefore , th e cases were deliberatel y chose n a s examples o f large-scale civi l violence which had ended, a t least for a considerable time . They wer e designed t o encourag e theory development. Clearl y the y coul d not be use d to test theory, sinc e they wer e al l "successful " in reducing conflict. Theor y testin g woul d requir e comparabl e case s i n whic h the violenc e ha d not ende d (althoug h eve n withi n thi s sampl e o f "successes," longitudinal comparison s wer e stil l possibl e by askin g why a settlement ha d not been reache d earlier). The case s were chose n fro m large-scale civi l conflict s whic h had ended, a t leas t fo r som e considerabl e tim e an d were identifie d b y the Small and Singer (1982) data . We classified a civil war as ended when th e leve l o f violenc e ha d droppe d belo w th e Small-Singe r threshold of 1,000 battl e deaths per year for at least five years. This criterion produced at least two apparent anomalies among the seven cases. Colombia 1957 was included because violence diminished for several years and, when it was renewed, involve d different contest ants and issues. The 197 2 settlement in Sudan was included because violence decline d fo r ove r five years , eve n thoug h th e agreemen t eventually broke down and resulted in renewed conflict wit h essentially the sam e participants an d issues. In order t o narro w th e focu s o f th e study , pre-194 0 case s wer e excluded. Thi s is a conventional strategy , especiall y i n the stud y o f international relation s because o f majo r change s i n th e powe r dis tribution o f the internationa l syste m fro m Worl d War II. However , several people pointed out that there was no obvious change in the

12 Ro y Licklide r fundamental problem s o f reconciliatio n an d stat e formatio n whic h this stud y addresses . Moreover , thes e processe s see m likel y t o tak e a very long time (generations is a term that gets used a lot), and postWorld War II settlements by definition haven' t laste d very long yet. Lastly, ther e is an enormou s literatur e o n som e o f the earlie r con flicts. In th e end , I decided t o ad d a chapter o n th e America n Civi l War to see if it would be usefu l i n the theory-building exercise , an d it wa s quit e helpful . Small and Singe r (1982 , 222) lis t 4 4 civi l wars which began afte r 1940 and classify al l but thre e as having ended (s o much for endles s civil wars) . Case s wer e selecte d withi n thi s grou p o n th e basi s o f their diversity and my ability to persuade a first-rate specialist in the conflict t o wor k withi n th e genera l line s o f th e project , sinc e ba d cases wer e no t goin g t o b e o f muc h use . Thi s i s obviousl y not a random sampl e o f the Small-Singe r post-194 0 dat a set , whic h itsel f is subject t o legitimat e question . However , sinc e th e case s were t o be used for theory development rathe r than theory testing, it seemed an appropriat e strategy . Th e seve n case s wer e th e America n Civi l War, Greece , Colombi a (1957) , Yemen, Nigeria, Suda n (1972) , and Zimbabwe. Th e initia l version s o f th e case s wer e writte n an d pre sented a t meetings o f the Internationa l Politica l Science Associatio n in 198 8 an d th e Internationa l Studie s Association i n 1989 . The case s ar e remarkabl y varie d i n a numbe r o f aspects , whic h makes them particularly useful fo r theory construction. They include three negotiate d settlement s (Yemen , Sudan , an d Colombia) , tw o total victories (Greece and Nigeria), and two mixed examples of military dominanc e combine d wit h negotiatio n (mor e negotiatio n i n Zimbabwe, les s i n th e Unite d States) . Som e o f th e conflict s wer e separatist (Nigeria , the United States, and Sudan, although the latte r is not entirel y clear) ; others wer e revolution s (Greece , Yemen , Co lombia, an d Zimbabwe) . Ther e wa s extensiv e outsid e interventio n in Yeme n an d Greece , somewha t les s i n Nigeria , Sudan , an d Zim babwe, and much less still in Colombia and the United States. Their only apparen t share d characteristi c i s that large-scal e civi l violenc e ended fo r a considerable tim e afte r th e settlement . The third phase of the project wa s to refine th e case materials by making the m mor e theoretica l an d mor e comparativ e an d t o mov e back agai n t o th e theory-buildin g process . Th e centerpiec e o f thi s activity wa s a three-day conferenc e i n March , 1990 , supporte d b y the United States Institute of Peace and Rutgers University. The case

How Civi l Wars End: Questions an d Methods 1 3 authors were brought together for the first time to discuss the case s systematically, alon g with severa l theorist s o n war termination an d selected member s o f th e Rutger s faculty , bot h t o enric h th e case s and to encourag e som e theorists to addres s the genera l questio n of how civi l wars end. Coincidentally, a conferenc e o n Interna l Securit y Negotiation s was held two weeks later at the Pau l Nitze Schoo l o f Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, supported by the MacArthur Foundation. It focused on a group of cases in whic h large-scal e civi l violenc e wa s currently being negotiated. This added a number o f fascinatin g case s an d some intriguin g the oretical idea s whic h ar e summarize d b y I . Willia m Zartma n i n th e next chapter . After som e discussion , participant s a t th e Rutger s conferenc e agreed o n th e centra l focu s o f th e research . Th e majo r issu e wa s agreed to be why some civil wars end so that large-scale civil violence is not resumed. Thi s ca n b e divide d int o tw o separat e questions : (1) Why does the fighting end when it does? In particular, wh y d o some civil wars end in negotiated settlements while some are fought until on e sid e o r the othe r attain s a total victory ? (2 ) Why doesn't the civil violence start again later, especiall y sinc e th e underlyin g issues often remai n when the killin g stops ? This stress on empirical relationships allows the apparatus of modern social scienc e t o be applied , hopefull y i n testing hypothese s i n ways that can be replicated . The advantag e o f this approac h is that people wit h ver y differen t politica l belief s ca n wor k togethe r an d hopefully reac h agreement on how these empirical relationships actually work, which would otherwise be very difficult. However , th e approach avoids a set of normative issues by implicitly assuming that violence i s bad and should be avoided . Bu t this ignores the reason s why peopl e choos e t o fight an d di e i n th e first place. Presumabl y the insurgent s sa w the pre-wa r situatio n a s intolerable, perhap s involving "structura l violence " wher e th e statu s qu o systematicall y injures people (Galtun g 1969) . For example, would Americans have appreciated a foreign mediato r wh o negotiate d a compromise set tlement o f ou r Civil War in 1862 , savin g hundreds o f thousands o f lives while leavin g slavery intact , o r was that sacrifice o f much of a generation justifie d b y th e goal s o f th e struggle ? Ar e w e studyin g this topi c becaus e w e ar e intereste d i n peac e o r becaus e w e ar e interested i n justice (acceptin g tha t there wil l b e n o agreement o n

14 Ro y Licklide r what tha t ter m means) ? An d ho w usefu l i s ou r researc h whe n th e two value s conflict ? We may try t o square thi s particular circl e by assumin g that onl y a "just " settlemen t wil l reall y assur e a lastin g peace , bu t th e em pirical evidenc e fo r thi s propositio n i s unclear . Alternatively , on e may argu e tha t ou r wor k i s purely theoretica l an d tha t i t doe s no t necessarily imply that policymaker s should be more concerned wit h ending violence than establishin g justice, although in fact mos t of us find the topi c interestin g precisel y becaus e i t seem s t o hav e polic y relevance. M y ow n positio n i s tha t violenc e i s clearl y no t a goo d thing and that the purpose of this project i s to suggest ways by which it ca n b e avoide d o r ended . Th e stud y doe s no t addres s eithe r th e empirical questio n o f how "justice " ma y be establishe d o r the nor mative issu e o f when a resort t o violenc e i s appropriate .

Framework fo r Researc h Most o f the cas e author s a t th e Rutger s conferenc e agree d tha t th e initial framewor k ha d bee n to o comple x an d no t particularl y usefu l in thei r work , an d w e spen t a good dea l o f tim e discussin g it . A s a result o f thes e discussions , I drasticall y simplifie d th e framework , focusing o n five factor s o r variabl e cluster s whic h seeme d relevan t in explaining wh y violence ended : issue s which cause d the conflict , internal politics of each side, military balance, activities of third par ties, and terms of the settlement . It was agreed that the cases would be revise d aroun d thes e factors . Thi s proces s reflecte d a se t o f guesses about explanations which can be formulated a s tentative (and sometimes conflicting) hypotheses . These will be refined here in light of the case studies and formulated an d tested mor e systematically in the future . (1) The nature of the issues which underlie the conflict is important, although its impact is unclear. The scope of the conflict can be define d in term s o f th e purposes fo r whic h th e wa r i s waged , (a ) W e ca n distinguish betwee n war s of secession and war s of revolution. I n th e latter category , th e insurgent s ma y see k t o chang e personne l (wh o hold certai n offices) , authorit y (change s i n governmen t bu t no t so ciety), o r structur e (change s i n societ y a s a whole); presumably th e conflict wil l be more intense and foreign interventio n mor e likely as we move u p thi s scal e (Rosena u 1964 , 60-69) .

How Civi l Wars End: Questions an d Methods 1 5 (b) W e als o hav e argument s tha t identity issues (ethnicity, race , nationalism, etc. ) ar e more difficul t t o resolve tha n economic or political issues, since the y provok e deepe r level s o f commitmen t an d are harde r t o compromis e (Gur r 1990 , 96 ; Wedg e 1986 , 56-57 ; Smith 1986 ; Rothchil d 1991 , 201-203) . A n alternativ e positio n i s that identit y issue s ar e easier t o resolve , eithe r becaus e the y ar e primarily symbolic (flying two flags together rather than one doesn't cost muc h more ) o r because securit y fo r on e sid e i n a conflict wil l increase th e securit y o f the othe r sid e (Burto n 1987 , 42) . Leaving aside the degree of difficulty, differen t strategie s may be more usefu l i n dealing wit h eac h typ e o f issue. Richar d Bensel ha s suggested, fo r example , tha t secessionis t conflict s ar e best resolve d by devolutio n o f power, whil e a revolution is best handle d by cen tralizing power an d defeating th e rebels . (2) Th e internal politics of each side will also be significant. Eac h side in a civil war is likely t o be a coalition, and successful politica l analysis wil l requir e tha t thi s b e take n int o account , (a ) Endin g a civil war involves a policy change by at least one side, perhaps both. Such a change is more likely to take place after a leadership change than with continuity, (b) Moreover , each side in a civil war is usually a coalitio n o f differen t factions . Interna l rivalrie s ma y reduc e th e ability o f the leadership t o enforc e unpopula r agreement s wit h the opposition; thus a strong leadership may be necessary for a negotiated settlement. Without such united leadership, the war may have to go on to its bitter en d because n o one i s strong enoug h t o chang e th e policies whic h maintai n it . Obviously , however , whil e unite d leaderships may be a necessary conditio n fo r endin g th e violence, the y are certainly not sufficient; one or more united leaderships dedicated to continuing the war can make any agreement impossible. But without suc h unity , negotiatio n ma y b e fruitles s (Zartma n 1989 , 274 275). (3) Th e military balance in the field is likely to be reflected at the bargaining table, although future expectations of military succes s or failure may be more important than the current situation (Modelsk i 1964b, 143-144 ; se e als o Jan e E . Holl' s chapte r i n thi s volume) . (a) Measurin g th e militar y balanc e i s ver y difficult , particularl y i f the conflic t i s being wage d usin g guerill a rathe r than conventiona l military tactics. Moreover, the notion of balance implies knowledge of the opponent's position a s well, an d that wil l b e eve n les s clear . There i s thus likely t o be considerabl e debat e amon g th e coalitio n

16 Ro y Licklide r members abou t wha t th e balance actuall y is at any give n time . As a result, prominent military outcomes will have a disproportionate im pact on the perceptions of the elites, often creating agreement among them o n issue s which hav e been lon g argued . (b) Zartma n (1989 , 266-273 ) ha s develope d th e concep t o f th e "hurting stalemate/ ' wher e eac h sid e i s willin g t o chang e policie s only if it believes that i t cannot achiev e its desired end s by violenc e at a tolerabl e cos t an d tha t it s relativ e positio n wil l declin e i n th e future. Th e hypothesis woul d be tha t a stable agreemen t i s possible only i f both side s believe thi s a t th e sam e time . (4) Third parties may encourage or inhibit the violence by actions ranging from militar y assistance to mediation in all its forms. Georg e Modelski (1964a , 28 , and 1964b , 126-129 ) argue s tha t "ever y in ternal wa r creates a demand fo r foreig n intervention. " The range of such activities is enormous. However, we know relatively little about their impact. Broadl y framed , wha t ca n thir d partie s d o t o mak e a settlement more likely? (a) A negotiated solution may be more likely if weapon s ar e give n t o th e weake r side , sinc e tha t wil l creat e a balance whic h ma y lea d towar d a hurting stalemate . Alternatively , weapons given t o the stronge r sid e may bring about a victory whic h will end the war quickly and with fewer casualties. A third possibility is that withholdin g weapon s from bot h side s may encourage both t o negotiate, (b ) Wha t kin d o f outsid e actor s hav e mor e o r les s influ ence unde r wha t circumstances ? Privat e partie s ma y b e abl e t o es tablish contact s wit h bot h partie s i n way s tha t governmen t cannot , and thei r lac k o f powe r makes the m les s threatenin g an d perhap s better abl e t o facilitat e negotiations . A n alternativ e mode l i s calle d "mediation with muscle," the idea that settlements will require pressure on one or both side s as well as good will and tha t government s are bes t abl e t o appl y suc h pressure . Ther e i s a considerable liter ature o n bot h mediatio n an d militar y assistance , bu t muc h o f i t i s anecdotal, an d i t ha s no t ye t bee n linke d t o ho w civi l wars end . (5) Assumin g som e sor t o f settlemen t i s reached , ho w lon g i s i t likely t o survive ? The nature of the polity which emerges from the settlement seem s likely to affec t it s duration an d what wil l follow it . (a) W e ma y labe l th e "liberal " o r accommodatio n hypothesi s th e argument that , i f rivals hav e been successfull y include d i n the gov erning process , a settlement i s more likel y t o survive . This positio n is supported by a massive literature o n conflict resolution , but ther e seem t o b e n o empirica l test s o f th e hypothesi s i n post-civi l wa r

How Civil Wars End: Questions an d Methods 1 7 societies. This in turn is related to the question of centralization, and it is interesting that one of our cases (Nigeria) was a federation both before an d after th e conflict . On the other hand, there is clearly a major risk in bringing former armed opponents into the national government; the techniques used in the Unite d State s to cop e wit h thi s dange r ove r severa l decade s after th e America n Civi l Wa r ar e particularl y interestin g (Bense l 1990, 405-413) . Thu s the "repressive " hypothesi s i s that stabilit y is more likely when governments are strong and unified and therefore able to deter future attempt s a t collective violence . (b) Asid e fro m th e structur e o f th e state , it s performance o n a number of issues may be important. How are the sides to be disarmed, for example ? Ho w ca n a common politica l syste m b e create d ove r different territories ? Moreover , eve n afte r settlemen t th e origina l issues underlying the conflict usually remain. Many people have been willing t o kil l an d di e fo r them ; how ca n the y b e handle d s o a s to avoid renewed civi l violenc e o n a large scale ? The third phase o f the projec t conclude d wit h th e cas e authors ' rewriting their initial papers, using the revised framework as a guideline and benefitting fro m the discussions and interactions at the Rutgers conference. I n a parallel process , fou r othe r conferenc e mem bers wrot e theoretica l studies , buildin g upo n th e case s an d discussions o f the conferenc e bu t informe d b y thei r ow n quit e dif ferent background s an d interests. N o attemp t wa s mad e t o impos e a common focus on these four chapters; their value consists precisely in their variety, in their demonstration of both the utility of different literatures an d approache s t o th e understandin g o f ho w civi l war s end and the illumination thrown on theoretical issues in various fields by analyzing this topic.

Where Ar e We Now? What did all this produce? Having used seven non-rando m case s to generate an d refine bu t no t tes t hypotheses , an y pattern s mus t b e labeled tentative i n the extreme . Perhap s the clearest lesso n i s that stable settlements can emerge under a remarkable variety of conditions. I n a sens e w e kne w thi s already ; th e case s wer e picke d a s examples of stable settlements, by our definition, and they were very varied. Perhap s more striking , w e hav e example s o f negotiated settlements to civi l wars , which we kno w t o be relativel y rare , i n sep-

18 Ro y Licklide r aratist an d revolutionary conflicts , wher e th e issue s ar e identit y an d otherwise, wit h an d without increase d unit y o f command , whe n th e military balanc e varies , wit h ver y differen t kind s o f third-part y in volvement (includin g non-involvement) , an d wit h postwa r regime s which stres s bot h accommodatio n an d repression . The secon d genera l poin t is that the five factor s which we isolate d do indee d pla y importan t role s i n explainin g ho w civi l war s end . T o be mor e precise, th e issue s which cause d the conflict , whil e difficul t to isolate , d o indee d see m relate d t o th e eventua l resolution . Th e internal politic s o f eac h sid e ar e clearl y relevan t t o decision s abou t termination, as are the military balance and the widely varied action s of third parties . Lastly , th e natur e o f the politica l settlemen t clearl y is usefu l i n explainin g wh y civi l violenc e doe s o r doe s no t rene w itself. These effects ca n be seen in our cases and can also be explaine d in theoretica l way s tha t ar e consisten t wit h othe r bodie s o f ideas . They can thus serve as the basis for hypotheses to be tested in furthe r work. Interestingly, however , thes e variable s hav e differen t sort s o f impacts unde r differen t circumstances . Thus , rathe r tha n a single pat tern whereb y civi l violenc e i s ended , i t seem s mor e usefu l t o con ceive of the termination of civil violence as a set of processes i n which there ar e certai n critical choice points. Selections a t thes e point s for m alternative strategies o f conflic t termination. Th e identificatio n o f thes e strategie s i s clearl y a majo r goal fo r futur e research ; alread y w e ca n distinguish , fo r example , between strategie s o f accommodation an d repression, bot h o f whic h seem t o wor k unde r th e righ t circumstances . Over time , th e questio n unde r discussio n ha s shifted . A t th e be ginning o f th e study , th e focu s wa s ver y muc h o n how the violence stopped. However , increasingl y th e questio n o f why it did not start again becam e mor e intriguing . I t i s eas y t o imagin e a numbe r o f contingent event s (death s o f prominent leaders , temporar y militar y setbacks, polic y o f outside r actors , lack o f supplies , division s withi n the coalition ) whic h migh t persuad e on e sid e t o en d civi l violenc e temporarily. Bu t i f the basi c problem s hav e no t changed , w e woul d expect th e participant s t o rene w th e violenc e whe n thes e circum stances changed , an d a s I . Willia m Zartma n remind s u s i n th e nex t chapter, suc h renewal s o f civi l violenc e ar e indee d quit e common . The nature of the settlement becam e mor e intriguing , an d i t soo n became clea r tha t w e wer e reall y talkin g abou t state formation i n a

How Civi l Wars End: Questions an d Methods 1 9 new guise. After all , on e definition o f a state is precisely a group of people wh o ca n wor k togethe r withou t killin g on e anothe r i n a n organized way . Moreover , th e postwa r problem s o f disarmament , demobilization o f at least two armies , and the likely collaps e o f the winning coalition in an environment where resource s will be scarc e and demands wil l b e hig h mean tha t effectivel y th e stat e wil l hav e to be recreated , eve n i f the governmen t ha s won th e conflict . Thi s reformulation o f the centra l questio n bring s i n a n entirely ne w se t of perspectives an d literatures with whose implications we ar e only now beginning t o wrestle. At thi s poin t i n th e project , i t seeme d imperativ e t o mov e th e discussion to a broader intellectual community . Thi s book i s the result. It is composed of three parts. The first lays out the problem in two introductory chapters . Min e set s fort h th e backgroun d an d intellectual assumption s o f th e project ; I . Willia m Zartma n then dis cusses the difficulties of resolving civil conflicts based on both theory and the case s analyzed a t the Nitz e Schoo l conference . The secon d par t o f th e boo k consist s o f th e seve n revise d case s of the ending of large-scale civil conflict. The authors do not address each of the many questions raise d above. Nonetheless , eac h cas e is framed i n term s o f thes e five type s o f questions . Th e resul t wa s a unique serie s of comparable cas e studie s o f the way s in which civi l war has actually ended . Th e chapter s ar e arrange d in roug h orde r of th e metho d o f settlement , startin g wit h th e example s o f negoti ation (Colombia , Sudan , an d Yemen) , followe d b y th e tw o mixe d cases (Zimbabw e an d th e Unite d States) , an d concludin g wit h th e two militar y victories (Nigeri a and Greece). The last part of the book builds upon these materials. Rather than a single conclusion , ther e ar e four differen t chapters , eac h writte n by a participant at the Rutgers conference looking at some particular aspect o f the settlemen t proces s in a theoretical, comparativ e way . Robert Harrison Wagner uses a rational-choice approac h to develop a uniqu e analysi s o f interstat e wa r terminatio n an d look s a t ho w similar processes wor k i n civil wars . Jane E. Hol l compare s th e relationship between military and political success in international and civil war termination. Harvey Waterman explores in more depth the complexities and ambiguities of the concept of a settlement in a civil war. I then tr y to bring th e case s together t o respond t o th e issue s raised in this chapter, to suggest wha t we have learned, t o evaluat e the projec t a s i t no w stands , an d t o sugges t a number o f differen t ways in which we can move forward in this important and challenging

field.

T W O

The Unfinishe d Agenda : Negotiatin g Internal Conflict s I. William Zartma n

Not al l interna l conflict s hav e bee n successfull y negotiated . Man y are stil l under discussion , negotiation s havin g been trie d bu t settle ment no t havin g bee n reached . Th e strikin g characteristi c o f al l of them i s the protracte d natur e o f the conflict . "Protracte d conflict " is a term formerl y take n t o refe r t o th e Col d Wa r (Strausz-Hup e e t al., 1959) ; it is now understood tha t internal , frequently ethni c con flicts are eve n mor e durabl e (Mitchell , 1992) . Mor e tha n interstat e conflict, interna l conflict s see m t o hav e th e abilit y t o continu e fo r decades an d arriv e neithe r a t victoriou s resolutio n fo r on e sid e no r at satisfactor y reconciliatio n fo r both . Wh y do internal conflict s las t so long ? Wh y i s negotiatio n s o difficult ? Ho w ca n a mutually satis factory solutio n b e foun d throug h negotiation ? As the prevalen t bipola r conflic t tha t ha s dominated ou r centur y fades away , th e salien t event s o f the en d o f the millenniu m ar e no t the parallel resolution of lesser conflicts but their persistence. Alongside the cases analyzed in this volume for their successful negotiatio n are a numbe r o f others , n o les s important , tha t ris e an d fal l i n in tensity, star t an d dra g i n negotiation , sometime s reac h a temporar y and artificia l "settlement, " onl y t o burst ou t al l over agai n late r on . This chapter is part of a larger project of Negotiating Internal Conflict (NICon) funded by the MacArthu r Foundation, whos e suppor t is gratefully acknowledged .

20

The Unfinished Agend a 2 1 The Eritrean conflict (Ottoway , 1993 ; Lyons, 1991) with Ethiopia delayed the disposition of the British-occupied, formerl y Italian colony unti l 1952 , whe n th e mor e develope d Eritre a wa s federate d with imperial Ethiopia ; the Emperor' s dissolutio n o f the federatio n a decade later brought on a war of national liberation, led eventually by the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF ) and other factiou s groups, tha t lasted ove r thirt y year s throug h a major revolutio n i n Ethiopia, punctuated by shifting fortune s i n the field and a number of ultimatel y abortiv e attempt s a t mediated negotiations . Th e final collapse o f the Ethiopian governmen t i n 199 1 brough t promise s o f a referendum i n Eritrea by 1994 , but the chicken had not yet been

hatched.

Next door , Britis h colonia l indecisio n abou t th e statu s o f the racially an d culturally distinc t souther n par t o f Suda n (se e chapte r 4 in thi s volume ; Deng , 1993 ; Den g an d Zartman , 1991 ; Den g an d Giffbrd, 1987 ; Assefa, 1987 ) created the context for military mutiny in 1955 , openin g a war that accompanie d th e declaratio n o f inde pendence fo r th e countr y a t th e en d o f th e year . Movin g towar d secession in despair of ever attaining their desired goal of federation in a single country, th e rebel s in the Anyanya movement reache d a mediated agreement in 1972 bringing a federation into existence. A decade later , afte r th e sam e Sudanes e governmen t tha t signe d th e agreement abrogated it, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A ) reopene d th e conflict , callin g fo r a revolutio n throughout the country an d coming severa l times near a negotiated agreement, only to have the government of the moment collapse and the process start al l over again. In southern Africa , tw o majo r factions o f the Angolan nationalis t movement continued their conflict even after one, the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), won control of the state with foreig n suppor t a t independenc e i n 197 5 (Rothchild , 1993 ; Marcum, 1978; Zartman, 1989, chapters 4 and 5; McCormick, 1991; Kitchen, 1987; Wolfers and Bergerol, 1983) . The other, the National Union for the Total Independence o f Angola (UNITA), gained competing foreign suppor t and, after the mediated agreement on neighboring Namibi a i n 1989 , engage d a numbe r o f mediator s t o en d hostilities and turn the war into an electoral contest. The agreement that wa s finally signed i n Estoril i n Ma y 199 1 ende d th e civi l war , but a judgment o n civil peace hangs on the conduct o f the election s in the fall of 1992 and the evolution of politics thereafter. Similarly ,

22 I . Willia m Zartma n the Fron t fo r th e Liberatio n o f Mozambiqu e (FreLiMo ) ha s bee n contested sinc e independenc e i n 197 4 b y th e Nationa l Resistanc e Movement (ReNaMo) , an d a numbe r o f countrie s sinc e 198 5 hav e attempted t o mediat e a n agreemen t t o brin g abou t a multipart y system (Isaacma n an d Isaacman , 1983 ; Isaacman , 1985 ; Kitchen , 1987). In Sri Lanka (Wriggins, 1993 ; Montville, 1990 , part III), the Tamils, a n enterprisin g minorit y wit h tie s t o compatriot s i n neighborin g India, accentuated thei r demands for greater recognition i n the earl y 1970s and developed a generational spli t over tactics, with the youn g Tamil Tiger s contestin g th e Tami l Unite d Liberatio n Fron t (TULF ) and waging a full-scale guerrill a war since 1983 . Direc t negotiation s brought th e partie s t o a searc h fo r a compromise , an d mediate d negotiations brough t India n arm y occupatio n o f trouble d areas , bu t neither ha s brought a solution. I n Spain (Clark , 1990) , a similar eth nic minority , althoug h withou t th e suppor t o f a major populatio n o f compatriots an d a stat e acros s th e border , lon g sough t self-deter mination a s a national Basqu e movement , despit e periodi c reconcil iation policie s an d bilatera l negotiation s fro m Madrid . I n Cypru s (McDonald an d Bendahmane, 1985) , a formula fo r power-sharing a t independence i n 196 0 wa s destroye d b y th e Gree k majorit y gov ernment, leadin g t o conflic t an d a negotiate d settlemen t i n 1964 ; another attemp t t o revis e th e regim e i n th e Greeks ' favo r le d t o a similar roun d i n 1967 ; an d a thir d le d t o a Turkis h invasio n an d secession o f th e Turkis h par t o f th e islan d i n 1974 . Conflic t an d negotiations hav e continue d sinc e then , wit h n o solution . In the Philippines (Druckma n an d Green, 1993) , a s in other Asia n countries, a communist-oriented nationalis t movemen t aros e to fight the Japanes e occupatio n an d the n continue d t o pres s th e demand s of a poor peasan t populatio n primaril y i n Luzon afte r independenc e in 194 7 a s the Hukbalaha p movement . Th e Huk s were wo n ove r b y a populist governmen t i n th e 1960 s bu t leftove r follower s an d ne w grievances amon g th e poo r an d th e Musli m population s i n outlyin g islands led to a second round of insurgencies by the National People s Army (NPA) , th e Mor o Nationa l Liberatio n Fron t (MNLF ) an d a number o f othe r groups . Som e o f the m foun d a mor e acceptabl e government i n th e chang e o f regime s i n 198 6 an d i n subsequen t negotiations bu t th e rebellio n ha s no t ended . Historic communal—the n interstate—conflic t betwee n Muslim s and Bantu s i n centra l Afric a wa s controlle d b y Frenc h colonizatio n

The Unfinished Agend a 2 3 but revive d i n Cha d i n 196 5 five year s afte r independenc e whe n southern administrator s replace d the Frenc h i n the nort h (Buijten huijs, 1978; Thompson and Adloff, 1981 ; Zartman, 1986). The northern rebels, organize d into factions o f the National Liberatio n Front of Chad (FroLiNaT), finally overthrew th e government i n 197 8 bu t then fel l t o fighting among themselves , a s one leade r (1978) , the n another (1982), and then a third (1990) evicte d his predecessor and met further rebellion, despite repeated mediations and negotiations. A power-sharing agreemen t negotiate d i n 194 3 a s th e basi s fo r Lebanese independence fell prey thirty years later to changes of the demographic balance o n which it was based, an d to the trigger o f a disruptive foreig n presence , th e Palestinian s (Day , 1986 ; Deeb an d Deeb, 1993) . The Lebanese civil war broke out among multiple political faction s o f multipl e religiou s communities , despit e repeated truces an d negotiations , unti l th e Syria n occupie r finally impose d peace i n 1990 . Ye t eve n th e extan t amoun t o f peac e depend s o n Syrian dominance, while civil strife stands waiting in the wings. With as many similaritie s a s differences , th e arriva l t o powe r o f th e Af rikaner lowe r clas s o f th e whit e minorit y i n Sout h Afric a i n 194 8 and their dispossession of the black majority on whom they increasingly depended for both the labor and consumer factors of economic growth le d t o a series o f majority outburst s o f increasing militanc y in 1960 , 1976 , 1984 , an d 1990 , alon g with a slowly rising terrorist campaign (Zartman , 1993b ; Cloete , 1991 ; Stedman , e t al. , 1992) . Negotiations i n the lat e 1980 s an d in 199 0 hav e bee n onl y prepa ratory t o mor e substantiv e round s o f revolutionar y proportion s i n the future . Als o simila r i n man y way s wa s th e situatio n create d i n 1958 i n Colombi a whe n th e nearl y twenty-yea r wa r termed la violencia was ended by a power-sharing agreemen t betwee n th e tw o elite factions , closin g ou t ne w socia l force s (se e chapte r 3 ; Garcia, 1993). Afte r 1970 , thes e forces , organize d int o th e M-1 9 Move ment, th e Revolutionar y Arme d Force s o f Colombi a (FARC) , an d lesser but equall y violent group s waged war on the Syste m an d the Establishment unti l severa l round s o f negotiation s throughou t th e 1980s gradually integrated most of the groups and prepared for the opening o f a new politica l system . Finally, i n Afghanistan (Bokhari , 1993 ; Dupree, 1986) , a Soviet invasion i n 197 9 impose d a government tha t met immediat e resist ance from the predominantly Islamic Mujahidin. A decade later, the US an d the USS R negotiate d th e withdrawa l o f Sovie t troops , bu t

24 I . William Zartma n the guerrill a wa r continued , despit e attempt s t o mediat e betwee n the governmen t remainin g i n plac e an d th e Mujahidi n supporte d from neighborin g Pakistan . There are other case s of protracted interna l conflicts; El Salvador, Cambodia, Rwanda , Somalia , Peru , an d Norther n Ireland , t o nam e a fe w (Zartman , 1989 , chapte r 3 ; Laitin, 1983 ; McClintock, 1989 ; Montville, 1990) could also be added to this list of thirteen headline grabbing cases. The selection here was random; the inclusion of other cases would strengthe n bu t no t fundamentall y alte r th e conclusion s and generalization s draw n a s answers t o th e initia l questions . Three different i f interrelated questions are being asked about th e protracted natur e o f internal conflicts . First , wh y are settlement s so difficult? Interna l conflict s las t a long time because negotiation s ar e as har d t o produc e a s victories . Mutuall y satisfactory , second-bes t settlements ar e unattractiv e t o partie s playin g fo r ultimat e stakes . "Protracted" mean s "extended, " imperviou s t o an y kin d o f settle ment. Second, why don't settlements stick? The cases show that most conflicts ar e many times settled, onl y to burst fort h again , a fire that will no t b e pu t out . "Protracted " her e mean s "recurrent, " eve n though apparentl y successfu l negotiation s occur . Third , wha t strat egies ca n b e devise d t o overcom e thes e problems ? "Protracted " means "intractable. " Therei n lie s th e answe r t o th e first tw o ques tions. I t i s mor e difficul t t o answe r th e third . Som e thing s on e un derstands bette r i n orde r t o kno w ho w t o overcom e them ; other s one understand s bette r onl y t o se e ho w har d the y ar e t o change .

Internal Conflic t an d Rip e Moment s One of the basic findings about the negotiatio n proces s in general is that i t function s bes t unde r condition s o f equality, an d indee d onl y takes place when the parties have some form of veto over each other's outcomes (Rubi n and Brown, 1975 , 199, 214-21; Zartma n an d Berman, 1982 , 57ff.) . Generally , ther e mus t b e a basic powe r equiva lence of the parties themselves even if their sources of power diifer . This conditio n ca n favo r conflic t resolutio n whe n i t take s th e for m of a mutually hurtin g stalemate , wher e th e countervailin g powe r o f each side , thoug h insufficien t t o mak e th e othe r side lose , prevent s it fro m winnin g (Zartman , 1989 , chapte r 6) . Also, th e partie s t o a negotiation hav e a n existence—an d therefor e othe r interests—in dependent of the conflict, an d therefore th e cost/benefit calculation s

The Unfinishe d Agend a 2 5 that contribute t o the dynamic s of their relationship—conflictual o r conciliatory—concern the proportion of their power and interests to devote t o th e particula r conflict , amon g other s (Zartman , 1991) . These conditions of negotiation are basically very different fro m the asymmetries whic h characteriz e negotiation s i n interna l conflic t (Zartman, 1993a ; Mitchell , 1991) . In interna l conflict , th e governmen t enjoy s a n asymmetr y o f power, bu t th e rebel s compensat e wit h a n asymmetr y o f commit ment. I n the beginning they see k a redress of grievances within the rules established by the government. Bu t when they get no satisfaction, thei r rebellio n enter s int o a ne w phase , protestin g bot h th e government's inattentio n to their grievance s an d its right to decid e the rule s b y whic h protes t shal l b e conducted . The y contes t th e legitimacy o f governmen t itsel f an d tak e o n a tota l an d exclusiv e commitment t o rebellion . Conflic t become s thei r raiso n d'etre ; re bellion becomes their sole concern . On the other hand, the government's capabilities are diluted and distracted by its many other concerns. Existence is not its only issue, and probably not its issue at all until the very end (when it may be too late). The desperation o f the power asymmetr y reinforce s th e rebels ' commitment , make s the m economize their resources, and counterbalances capabilities . Theirs is not just a romantic attachment to life in the maquis, to the lifestyle of an outlaw. It is the starting point for their cost/benefit calculation s (Pillar, 1983 , 24 , 162 , 245) . Anything less than their goal is an unacceptable cost, whereas total and ongoing struggle is not a cost but simply the normal condition of life. Thei r capabilities ar e magnifie d by their commitment . This situation gives the rebellion tremendous staying power, evening u p the otherwis e asymmetrica l relatio n wit h th e government . 'The guerrill a win s i f h e doe s no t lose, " note d Henr y Kissinge r (1969, 214) ; "the conventional army loses if it does not win." Since the rebellion' s onl y issu e i s existence , jus t no t losin g make s i t wi n by preserving its existence, even if it has not yet achieved conclusive victory. Since the government has other things to do, including maintaining security , no t performin g the m properl y make s i t lose , eve n if it ha s not undergone conclusiv e defeat . This situation leaves no room for many of the basic ingredients of negotiation. On the rebel side , there is little possibility o f trade-off s and compromise. Recognition is both their top and bottom line, with nothing in between to contribute to the give and take of negotiation

26 I . Willia m Zartma n and bargaining . Ther e i s nothin g t o giv e u p bu t th e rebellio n an d their commitment t o their cause, s o that once the agreement i s made to negotiate , remainin g trad e off s onl y concer n details . Fo r bot h sides, th e questio n o f vali d spokesmen , usuall y a preconditio n fo r negotiations, i s a zero-su m issue . Eac h sid e contest s th e other' s le gitimacy, sinc e to recognize th e clai m of the rebels to spea k for thei r population o r o f th e governmen t t o spea k fo r th e entir e countr y i s to acced e t o their principal demand . Sinc e ther e i s no agreement o n the legitimac y o f spokesmen , ther e i s n o conditio n o f equalit y be tween th e parties , anothe r forma l conditio n necessar y fo r fruitfu l negotiations. Furthermore, condition s which should lead to negotiation becom e comfortable outcome s i n themselves , rathe r tha n unstabl e precon ditions to search for a lasting outcome. I n internal conflict , stalemat e is stable an d supportable, a n acceptable alternativ e to losing for both sides, a compromise alread y favorabl e t o th e rebellio n rathe r tha n a costly deadloc k drivin g the partie s to negotiate . Stalemat e generall y means unrecognize d partitio n o f th e country , formalizin g i n the ex treme bot h th e rebellion' s grievanc e o f regiona l neglec t an d it s de mand for regiona l autonomy . T o th e governmen t i t provides on-the job experienc e fo r trainin g it s arm y an d a nationa l caus e fo r mobi lizing it s people . I n a revers e o f th e usua l situation , stalemat e i s compromise, negotiatio n i s one-side d victory . Eve n i n a dynami c sense, wit h th e up s an d down s tha t typif y insurgencies , stabl e mu tually hurtin g stalemate s ar e har d t o find. Th e governmen t see s a small improvement in fortunes as the beginning of its reestablishment of legitimat e authorit y ove r it s country ; th e insurgenc y see s a n up swing a s the beginnin g o f justified self-determination . Bu t i f th e in surgency weakens , i t merel y draw s bac k t o it s hills , bus h o r maqui s and t o it s referen t population , wh o ar e it s invisibl e redout ; i f gov ernment weakens , i t withdraw s t o it s capita l an d practice s it s rec ognized sovereignt y ove r a slightly smalle r part o f th e country . Th e mutually hurtin g stalemat e tha t i s almos t a prerequisite fo r negoti ation o r eve n fo r mediatio n i s characteristicall y absent , ye t neithe r side has the power—with rare exceptions—to dislodge the other fully. Fluctuating stalemat e become s a way o f life . Finally, when stalemate settles in, without being mutually hurting , it produce s polarization , no t pacification . Sun k cost s o n th e govern ment side , an d tru e belie f o n th e insurgents ' side , reinforc e eac h party's source of power and their desire to dig in and hold out. Rather

The Unfinished Agend a 2 7 than seein g a stalemate a s an indication o f th e maximu m eac h sid e can achieve an d then negotiat e fro m there , a s often happen s i n interstate war (as the history of boundaries indicates), internal conflic t parties retrenc h o n their elemen t o f strengt h an d harden thei r positions. Th e symboli c epitom e o f thi s situatio n ha s been th e statu s of th e Wester n Sahara n conflic t throughou t th e stalemat e o f th e 1980s, where each side clung to its element of strength—the Polisario Front to diplomatic recognitio n (commitment ) an d Morocco to military occupation (capabilities)—an d neithe r was willing to negotiat e because each hoped to pull the other onto its terrain of strength and defeat i t (Zartman , 1989 , chapte r 2) . Polarizatio n i s no t merel y a matter of positions but o f leadership styles , s o that stalemat e lead s to less conciliatory leaders , as Cyprus, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Sudan, an d Chad have shown . Stalemat e doe s no t produc e wha t i s sometimes terme d a reconciling o r composin g mentality , th e nec essary shift in perception that is needed for negotiation, but instead reinforces the winning mentality that makes negotiation impossible. The basic conditions of the insurgency lie at the root of this paradox: It is possible t o take refuge i n a winning mentality because th e unlikeliness o f losing hides the impossibilit y o f winning. In sum, the nature of internal conflict works against the component conditions fo r a rip e momen t fo r negotiation . Instea d o f movin g toward either a decisive escalatio n o r a decisive stalemate , interna l conflicts ar e characteristicall y indecisive , ye t thei r indecisivenes s produces extremis t leadership . I f eve r th e partie s d o becom e in volved in negotiation, usually through the insistent efforts o f a third party, the y continuall y loo k fo r way s o f seizin g a n opportunit y t o escalate thei r way ou t o f the stalemate , convincin g th e othe r party of their basic bad faith. The long histories o f painful negotiation s in Lebanon, Eritrea, Cyprus , Sudan , Sr i Lanka, and Chad are colorfu l testimonials to the difficulties .

Protracted Conflict s an d Normal Politic s To understan d th e ongoin g natur e o f interna l conflicts , on e ha s to go bac k t o th e basi c notion s o f politics . I n a n idea l conditio n o f internal governanc e tha t ma y b e referre d t o a s "norma l politics, " issues are brought before governmen t a s petitions an d are disposed of through appropriate policy responses. Absolute (o r time comparative) grievance s woul d b e handle d throug h measure s t o increas e

28 I . William Zartma n production o r othe r cause s o f resourc e availability ; comparativ e grievances would be handled through just divisions , allocations, and compensations. Productio n an d distribution , o r growt h an d devel opment, i n whateve r magnitude , ar e th e norma l concern s o f gov ernment. Thi s is true whethe r th e exercis e i s a rather underdevel oped on e o f limite d government , suc h a s a kin g dispensin g justic e under a tree, o r whethe r i t i s part o f the highl y comple x process of democratic governance in which the people send up not only groups of petitioner s accordin g t o th e issu e bu t als o delegate s an d repre sentatives to receive them an d dispense policy responses. The point, basically obvious , i s that norma l politic s i s a matter o f satisfactoril y meeting groups' concern s and grievances, of sending the petitioner s back home satisfied, an d not a matter of eliminating demands or even of conflict s o f interes t betwee n demandin g groups . Developmen t theorists hav e emphasize d interes t articulatio n an d aggregation , a s well a s output functions , a s the busines s o f normal politics . Internal conflic t occur s when thi s process breaks down . It begin s with disadvantaged, deprived or discriminated groups, since internal conflict involve s part o f society agains t th e rest , represente d b y th e government. I n som e cases, the conflic t i s a majoritarian protest , i n the nam e of the exclude d population a s a whole, and seek s to install a new and better system of dealing with anyone's grievances; in other cases o f minoritaria n protest , th e conflic t come s fro m a particula r group's sens e o f exclusion . I n eithe r case , a basi c elemen t i n th e initial stage s o f th e conflic t i s th e buildin g o f solidarit y amon g th e followers o f th e protes t an d o f legitimac y an d representativenes s among the leaders , tw o side s of the sam e coin . This is done i n onl y two available terms—ideologically fo r the majority an d ethnically fo r minority protest s (o r a combination o f the two) . These terms of solidarity ar e always partial inventions and alway s only partiall y inventions . Minorit y protest s aris e whe n peopl e fee l ascriptive blockages, that is , discrimination b y the majorit y becaus e of who they are, in predefined terms . Majority protest s appear when people fee l achievementa l blockages , tha t is , discriminatio n b y th e privileged minority because of where they ar e in the social pyramid. These senses of solidarity an d discrimination hav e both an objectiv e and a subjective component ; protest leaders need to turn the forme r into th e latte r an d arous e th e subjectiv e sourc e o f solidarity . I t i s because o f thi s objectiv e an d subjectiv e relationship , incidentally , that the ethnic component i n minority protests is always asserted by

The Unfinishe d Agend a 2 9 the protestors , conteste d b y th e governmen t an d debate d b y th e analysts. Thus Tamils, Basques , Lebanese , Moros , an d Eritrean s reinforc e an undeniable ethni c aspec t t o th e protes t wit h ideologica l appeal s and divisions . In Mozambique , banditry wit h ideologica l origin s de veloped a n ethni c base . Majoritaria n protest s i n Sout h Afric a als o combine ethnic and ideological appeals, while a minority, regionalist, ethnic protes t i n Suda n appeal s fo r majorit y suppor t b y turnin g it s protest ideological . I n Afghanistan , Mozambique , th e Philippines , and Colombia , non-ethni c protest s see k ideologica l solidarit y bu t suffer fro m ethni c divisions . Unlike states a t war with eac h other , thes e group s s o self-define d never surrende r an d neve r disappear . Thei r insurgen t organizatio n may suffer defea t an d its leaders may be killed, but the group remains and its sources of grievance stil l remain potentially alive . The strug gle i s no t ove r th e existenc e o f th e group , bu t ove r th e particula r deprivations i t suffer s an d th e effectivenes s o f th e mechanism s fo r handling them. The groups continue to exist, in a more or less heightened self-awareness because of the conflict and its outcome, and their existence continue s t o serv e a s th e basi s o f politics . I n sum , sinc e normal politics involves group demands, internal politics never really goes away; i t onl y becomes political , quiescent , normal . It therefor e make s a s muc h sens e t o regar d interna l settlement s as truces a s it doe s t o conside r interna l conflict s a s violent aberra tions. Interna l settlement s a t best provid e regime s an d mechanism s for handlin g grou p grievances , o r i n othe r word s fo r reinstitutin g normal politics . The y ar e onl y provisiona l settlements , i n tha t th e group wil l continue to monitor the m whil e practicing them t o mak e sure tha t th e ne w disposition s ar e effectiv e i n handlin g thei r prob lems. I f not , ne w incidents , ne w generation s no t exhauste d b y th e past struggle , eve n ne w group s create d b y th e pas t settlemen t wil l revive interna l conflict . Thus Eritreans, southern Sudanese, Cypriots, Tamils, and northern Chadians al l achieve d a settlemen t t o a previous roun d o f conflict , but the settlement in some way proved inadequate to their perceived blockages an d grievances . Th e Eritreans * an d souther n Sudanese * federations wer e abolishe d by centra l governmen t afte r a decade of more-or-less implementation , i n wha t amounte d t o a declaration o f internal war . Th e Cyprio t governmen t di d th e sam e thin g a t mor e frequent intervals , supported by hardliners from irredentis t Greece .

30 I . William Zartman Young Tamils, know n a s Tigers, wer e disillusione d b y th e pac e o f recognition achieve d by their elder s precisely throug h norma l politics, an d the y too k u p arms . Norther n Chadian s finally took ove r the central government after fifteen years of war, and then set about to continu e th e wa r amon g themselves , claimin g tha t th e repre sentative of their cause who won at any given time monopolized the benefits of power for himself, his ethnic group, or simply his friends, excluding othe r leaders, tribes, o r factions. In Angola, Mozambique , Lebanon , Colombia , an d an earlier Sudan, a new regim e wa s established—often b y negotiation—tha t sat isfied old combatants but created new losers, who then rose to challenge th e presume d settlement . I n som e cases , th e settlemen t marked a victor y ove r colonia l rule , bu t th e victor s neglecte d t o provide fo r al l the faction s an d groups amon g them . I n others, notably Lebanon, Colombia, an d Mozambique, change s brought in by new social forces, uneven demographic growth, and simply bad government brough t a new conflic t ou t of the ol d settlement . The lesson is that, precisely because internal conflic t settlement s are agreements to return to normal politics that necessarily leave at least th e informa l group s intac t t o pla y th e norma l game , agains t a background of conflict, exhaustion , and suspicion created by the rebellion, eac h suc h settlemen t i s necessaril y a trial-and-error affair , with the parties participating to see how it works. In symbolic terms, the arm s o f th e rebellio n ar e buried , ou t o f reac h unde r th e tria l regime, but ready to be exhumed when necessary again. Meanwhile, normal politics keep s alive the ver y group s that th e settlement dis armed.

Internal Conflict s an d Negotiate d Outcome s Since the situationally determined behavior of the parties is the cause of protracted interna l conflict , i t is useless t o provide prescription s that amoun t t o simpl y saying , "Sto p it! " While externa l rationalit y would suggest doing something else, such as negotiation, the internal logic o f each party dictate s extended , recurren t conflict . I t is ofte n seen a s a Prisoners' Dilemma Game , so the beginning o f a way out is for one or both parties to view the situation as a Chicken Dilemma Game, where continued conflict is viewed as even worse than giving in. But again, the fact tha t each party understand s this, an d tries to convince the other that protracted conflict i s worse than conceding,

The Unfinishe d Agend a 3 1 merely reinforce s it s own need to se e makin g concessions a s worse than conflic t (Brams , 1985 , chapte r 2 ; Snyde r an d Diesing , 1977 ,

108 ff.).

There ar e onl y a few way s ou t o f th e dilemmas , an d all depen d on a skilful us e of persuasion an d a reordering o f perceptions. On e returns to timing. Whereas "ripeness" has generally been discusse d as a symmetrical propert y preparator y t o resolution, the character istic asymmetr y o f internal conflic t suggest s tha t i t be examine d i n terms of one side alone (Zartman and Berman, 1982; Zartman, 1990). Rather than looking fo r a ripe momen t i n the attribute s o f the conflict, a search fo r a ripe momen t i n th e positio n o f on e sid e alon e can give som e clu e a s to ho w tha t party ca n ac t to bring the othe r to conciliation. I f either side follows u p a successful escalatio n with conciliatory terms , the condition s ca n be create d for a Chicken Di lemma perception and a move to conciliation on the other side. Similarly, i f on e part y seek s t o escalat e it s way ou t o f th e conflic t an d the othe r meet s i t wit h a n "escalatio n t o call " rather tha n a n "escalation to raise," checking but not overcoming, the functional equivalent of a stalemate is created that can favor a conciliatory outcom e (Zartman and Aurik, 1991 ; Pillar, 1983 , 247) . But why would it be i n the momentaril y stronge r side's interest , contrary to the preceding logic, to show itself conciliatory? The answer is not always obvious to the conflict part y but it is found in the understanding tha t victory i s at best a long shot , for eithe r side. As seen, unless it resorts to genocide, government cannot eliminate the side that the rebels represent, an d the rebels are not likely to eliminate government. That is a broad judgment and one that is not likely to be th e perception o f either part y muc h of the time , but it is the only one that provides the basis for an outcome reconciling minimal goals of both sides. There ar e histori c examples , non e o f the m conclusiv e sinc e th e cases referred to here are all incomplete. In 1984, after a successful military campaign, the Sr i Lanka government opene d a round table with th e Tami l insurgent s t o examin e appropriat e outcomes . Afte r the installation o f the new monarchial democracy , th e Spanish government opene d talk s with the Basqu e insurgents an d met man y of their grievances . I n Colombia , th e gradua l proces s o f negotiatio n conducted unde r presidents Turbay, Barco , and Gavaria took plac e under increasin g polarizatio n an d retrenchmen t b y bot h side s i n which both were strong and both increasingly persuaded of the im-

32 I . William Zartma n possibility o f victory; ther e wa s no galvanizing sig n o f ripeness no r clinching catastroph e bu t simpl y th e growin g feelin g o n bot h side s that th e conflic t wa s tearing the countr y apart , th e consequen t will ingness o f th e governmen t t o offe r a wide openin g o f th e politica l system, an d the willingness o f the insurgent s to trust th e offer , wit h no guarantee s o n eithe r sid e a s to th e stabilit y o f the outcome . Another way to find an answer in timing is to deal differently wit h different historica l phase s of the conflict . I n the beginning, the con flict is easie r t o resolv e becaus e solution s ca n b e foun d withi n th e framework o f the governmenta l system ; restiv e minoritie s grumbl e either becaus e the y ar e neglecte d o r becaus e the y ar e oppressed , and solutions to these two forms of grievance are conceptually easy . The implication s ar e clear . Ethni c conflict s ar e bes t handle d early , before the y ge t ou t o f hand, an d the y ar e best handle d throug h a n increased rol e i n thei r ow n o r genera l affair s an d a n eliminatio n o f blockages and discrimination. Above all, regional arrangements, such as thos e i n Suda n an d Ethiopia , shoul d b e implemente d an d re spected, sinc e their retractio n no t onl y restores the conflic t bu t als o exhausts a potential solution . In th e late r stag e unde r consideratio n here , however , whe n th e conflict ha s gon e t o th e poin t o f challengin g th e legitimac y o f th e system itself, it is difficult t o go back to first-stage solutions . Not only are specifi c response s exhauste d bu t th e proble m whic h the y ad dressed has changed in nature in the course of the protracted conflict . More radica l solution s ar e needed . Thi s i s a crucia l point , an d on e that th e "needs " schoo l ha s reache d towar d bu t faile d t o gras p i n its unquestionin g suppor t o f al l ethni c causes . Wha t i s require d i s not simpl y self-determinatio n fo r an y ethni c caus e a t an y stage , no r victory for internal rebellions over governments, but a new synthesis of the tw o sides ' demand s whe n th e conflic t escalate s beyond mor e local grievance s t o th e legitimac y o f the whol e governanc e system . At this stage, there i s no goin g back t o local solutions, and n o hop e of an escalation to one-sided victory. A totally new formula, involvin g the refor m o f both sides , is required . The bes t examples , stil l incomplete , com e fro m Colombi a an d Angola; South Africa, Sudan , an d Ethiopia provide a partial illustra tion a s well. I n Colombia , a new constitutio n an d a n openin g u p o f the syste m establishe d fort y year s earlie r t o en d la violencia wa s required a s a basis of reconciliation betwee n th e variou s rebel s an d the government. Simply allowing the rebels legal existence as parties

The Unfinished Agend a 3 3 within the ol d system o f two-party dominanc e wa s not satisfactory . In Angola, th e 199 1 accor d withhel d victor y fro m eithe r sid e an d transferred the conflict fro m the military to the political arena , with elections, coalitions, and accountable government as means to handle grievances. In South Africa, the outcome is obvious; only the way to get there is mined and unmapped. The optimal solution, again, is not a victory of one side over the other but a redesigned political system in which the right s o f th e majorit y ar e operativ e withou t th e right s o f th e minority or minorities being trampled. The dual threats of one-sided victories mark the outset of the path to that solution; unfortunately, toward the end of that path, one of the threats will be removed and only wisdom will kee p negotiation s o n track and keep the majorit y from eliminatin g th e minorit y (o r minorities) . I n Sudan , th e SPL A demands a reform—it use s th e ter m "revolution"—o f th e norther n government, includin g secularizatio n an d the sharin g o f power and resources. Simpl y returnin g t o regiona l autonom y i s n o longer suf ficient. In Ethiopia, ther e was an apparent victor y o f the Eritrean force s in mid-1991, an d the commitmen t o f the governmen t t o a referendum and independence for Eritrea within two years. While this may appear as simply a victory of the Eritreans and a defeat for the Ethiopian government , i n fac t th e outcom e a s discusse d als o include s economic association , interdependenc e betwee n portlan d an d hinterland, and other elements of cooperation. The case is an extreme, and like the Sudanese revolution, it has not yet come into full shap e or reality. Bu t i t to o illustrate s th e nee d fo r overarchin g solution s and new formula s a s the onl y way out of protracted conflict . Two othe r case s illustrat e th e uncertaint y o f presumabl y stabl e new outcomes, one already in force and the other generally accepted as the onl y stabl e outcom e towar d whic h t o work . I n Lebanon, a n apparent solution has come about only because it was imposed by a powerful neighbor, Syria. It is unclear whether the new governmen t represents a restoration of order tenable only as long as the neighbor remains or whether the neighbor's imposition itsel f is the mark of a newly restructure d system , th e onl y on e tha t coul d substitut e sta bility fo r conflict. I n Cyprus, mid-1991 wa s seen a s an opportunity for creativ e diplomacy , wit h th e Unite d State s helpin g exhauste d patrons troubled by other concerns—Greece an d Turkey—move the two Cyprio t partie s towar d a n equa l two-part y federation . Again ,

34 I . William Zartma n the stabilit y o f th e outcom e tha t purport s t o transfe r conflic t fro m military violenc e t o constitutiona l politic s wil l hav e t o be tested . The othe r hal f o f th e case s stil l elud e eve n a clea r notio n o f a resolving formula , le t alon e a n implemente d outcome . Wha t bu t a lasting defea t o f th e insurgenc y woul d resolv e th e conflic t i n Sr i Lanka, Mozambique , Spain , Chad , Afghanistan , o r th e Philippines ? But how could such a defeat b e engineered ? Desultor y negotiation s under variou s mediator s hav e gon e o n sinc e 198 6 i n Mozambique ; much o f the Basqu e insurgenc y ha s reached a n agreemen t wit h th e government i n Spain ; peac e ha s com e man y time s wit h th e defea t of the incumben t governmen t i n Chad, onl y to be broke n b y a new form o f the insurgency. Meeting the Tamil and Basque problems will require som e measur e o f regiona l autonom y an d muc h more ; eve n the typ e o f formula require d fo r th e othe r conflict s i s less clear . The othe r requiremen t wil l b e som e chang e i n th e militar y for tunes o f the partie s an d a corresponding chang e i n their leadershi p (in one or both parties). Both are necessary to bring about a revision in th e perception s o f stalemat e an d th e relativ e cost/benefi t calcu lations ove r toughin g i t ou t vs . comin g t o terms . Ye t the y d o no t guarantee a reconciliation, a s potential los t opportunitie s i n Suda n and th e Philippine s indicate , no r d o the y assur e tha t a n agreemen t will be stable , a s overturned victorie s an d agreement s i n Cha d an d Spain testify. These ingredients are only the preconditions to creative thinking abou t new , overarchin g formula s bringin g a reformed gov ernment an d a revised oppositio n togethe r to transform violen t con flict into politica l competition . An d eve n then , whe n th e necessar y conditions fo r a responsive, reconcilin g outcom e hav e bee n identi fied, i t mus t b e remembere d tha t the y ma y no t b e sufficien t condi tions, and produce n o guarantees, since the parties ar e only human , prone t o missin g opportunities , behavin g offensively , an d actin g stubborn enoug h t o botch a sure thing .

T H R E E

Civil Violence an d Conflic t Resolution : The Cas e o f Colombi a Jonathan Hartly n

In Colombia, from the late 1940 s to the early 1960s , some 200,00 0 Colombians die d during an extensive bloodlettin g know n simpl y as la violencia (the violence). In the 1980s , violence once again picked up force, an d by th e lat e 1980s , ther e wer e som e 2,00 0 t o 3,00 0 political homicides per year in a country that had an overall murder rate five time s highe r tha n tha t o f th e Unite d States . Thi s kin d o f violence i s not ne w t o th e country . Followin g th e majo r post-independence conflict s o f 1827-3 2 an d 1839-42 , th e countr y suffere d seven major civil confrontations i n the second half of the century as well a s numerou s othe r smaller-scal e regiona l conflicts . Th e "Wa r of the Thousand Days" at the tur n of the centur y (1899-1902 ) re sulted i n approximatel y 100,00 0 casualties . And , i n thi s century , prior to the violence of the 1940s , there was smaller scale civil conflict particularly i n the earl y 1930s . Yet, in addition to—and partially a s a consequence of—it s histor y of violence, Colombi a also has a rich history of accommodation and conflict resolution . A n examination o f how civi l conflict s en d coul d fruitfully examin e al l of these civi l conflict s i n Colombia. However , the goa l o f thi s paper i s th e fa r more modes t on e o f explorin g th e country's tw o mos t recen t period s o f violence , la violencia o f th e 1950s and the violence o f the past decade. 1 In particular, after considering th e definitiona l issu e o f whether thes e tw o period s o f violence can properly be considered "civil wars," three basic questions will be examined : 37

38 Jonatha n Hartly n 1. Ho w di d la violencia end , an d wha t factor s ar e mos t importan t in explainin g it ? 2. Wha t relationship , i f any , i s ther e betwee n th e curren t violenc e and tha t o f th e 1940 s an d 1950s ? 3. Wha t ar e th e short-ter m prospect s fo r a negotiate d en d t o th e current violenc e i n Colombia ? To anticipate , m y principa l conclusio n i s that th e Colombia n cas e suggests severa l factor s tha t nee d t o be incorporate d int o an y mode l that examine s conflic t resolution , particularl y wit h regar d to th e na ture o f th e polit y tha t emerge s an d th e longer-ter m consequence s of th e proces s b y whic h civi l conflict s end . Issue s relate d t o th e counterproductive consequence s o f a n initiall y positiv e conflict-re ducing arrangemen t an d to the autonom y an d coherence o f the stat e turn ou t t o b e o f critica l importanc e i n th e Colombia n case . The y are likel y t o b e o f particula r relevanc e i n nationa l context s wit h historical legacie s an d cultura l memorie s o f intens e violence , wher e one sid e i s no t decisivel y defeate d b y another .

Colombia an d Civi l War s The definition o f a civil war provided by Small and Singer is an armed conflict wit h militar y actio n ( a minimum o f 1,00 0 battl e death s pe r year) interna l t o th e country , th e activ e participatio n o f the nationa l government an d effectiv e resistanc e b y bot h side s (wit h th e weake r inflicting a t least 5 % of the fatalitie s i t sustains) . Fo r purposes o f thi s paper, th e definitio n wil l be accepted. 2 La violencia woul d appea r t o satisfy al l three criteria , althoug h more ambiguousl y towar d the end . In the absenc e o f cleare r statistics , i t woul d appea r tha t th e curren t violence coul d minimall y fit th e description . A littl e backgroun d i s i n order . I n Colombia , th e perio d o f la violencia bega n i n 194 6 a s a consequence o f a n unexpected, pivota l victory b y th e minorit y Conservativ e part y i n presidentia l election s to whic h th e majorit y Libera l party , badl y divided , presente d tw o candidates. Violenc e wa s mos t immediatel y a consequenc e bot h o f Conservative effort s t o replace Liberal public employees an d Liberal resistance. Then , violenc e wa s furthe r fuele d b y Libera l fear s tha t the Conservatives , a s a minority party , woul d attemp t t o consolidat e a permanen t gri p o n powe r b y forc e an d Conservativ e concerns , mindful o f earlie r Libera l exclusivis m fro m power , tha t i f they wer e

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 3 9 to lose the presidency they would be able to regain it only with great difficulty i f a t all . Althoug h thi s violenc e resemble d incident s sur rounding th e 193 0 election s (whe n th e divide d Conservative s los t the presidency t o the Liberals) , there wer e no w substantiall y mor e economically integrate d an d politically mobilize d group s in societ y as a consequence o f economic growt h an d diversification . In the 1940s , political sectarianis m and social mobilization inter acted in a more dynamic and explosive fashion than in the country's past. This process is difficult t o comprehend without understandin g the role of the country's two political parties. The parties, identifiable by the mid-19th century, divided the country politically while serving t o integrate th e nation . The serie s o f civi l war s in that centur y were channelled though bands that identified with the parties; party affiliation therefor e becam e a n ascriptive trait inherite d by familie s of all social groups . Subsequen t industrializatio n an d incorporatio n of the workin g class als o proceeded i n a bipartisan fashion , thoug h the Liberals gained more adherents in the country's growing urban areas. As one Colombia n analys t noted , th e parties ar e better characterized a s "deeply roote d subcultures than [as ] distinct program s for the conduct of the state or of economic development" (Sanchez, 1985, 796) . The violence increased dramatically in intensity following th e assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a Liberal populist leader, in April 1948—an individual wh o almost certainly would have been the sole candidate o f hi s part y i n th e 195 0 presidentia l election s an d thu s the likely winner. The regime finally broke down in November 194 9 when Conservativ e Presiden t Marian o Ospin a declare d a stat e o f siege, close d Congres s an d imposed othe r measures . Anothe r Conservative, Laurean o Gomez , ra n unoppose d an d won th e election s that had been move d u p to late 1949 . The inability o f some an d the unwillingness o f other elements o f the to p leadershi p i n bot h partie s t o negotiat e i n goo d fait h wit h each other ultimately led regional conflict s t o spiral into the breakdown of the regime, a "partial collapse of the state" 3 and one of the "greatest armed mobilization[s] of peasants . .. i n the recent history of the wester n hemisphere." 4 However , th e violenc e ha d differen t characteristics acros s regions , an d i t graduall y evolve d int o othe r modalities. Th e wors t casualtie s (wel l ove r th e 1,00 0 threshol d re quired b y th e operationa l definition ) wer e suffere d i n th e earlie r years, when the partisan motivation, strictly speaking, was strongest

40 Jonatha n Hartly n (see Figur e 3.1) . However , i t woul d appea r tha t man y o f the death s were brough t abou t b y smal l band s withou t centra l coordination . Mostly, the y sough t t o defen d thei r politica l positio n a t th e loca l level o r enhanc e thei r economi c well-bein g o r security ; ove r time , some developed a more explicit and radical political project, wherea s the action s o f other s bre d fear s amon g part y leader s tha t suc h wa s their intention. A t the sam e time, althoug h I am not aware o f precise casualty figures fo r police an d military, it is implausible tha t guerrill a groups di d no t inflic t a t least 5 % of the fatalitie s tha t the y received . In th e mos t virulen t perio d o f la violencia i n th e earl y 1950s , arm y and polic e troop s joined b y irregula r Conservativ e force s (an d pai d assassins) fough t Libera l an d Communis t guerrilla s an d mor e apol itical "bandits, " al l o f who m als o fough t eac h othe r o n occasion . I n some areas , vendettas between adjoinin g village s o f different partie s re-emerged; an d in others, the situatio n o f violence permitte d strug gles ove r lan d an d crop s t o expand . Levels o f violenc e decline d dramaticall y followin g th e militar y coup of General Gustavo Rojas in June 1953 , as he declared a general amnesty that was accepted by some 6,50 0 guerrilla s (see Figure 3.1) . However, i n late 195 4 an d in 1955 , army troops clashed with Liberal and Communist-organize d peasant s an d violenc e escalate d i n 195 6 as som e band s bega n movin g int o banditr y an d other s bega n t o ar ticulate mor e clearl y revolutionar y objectives . Eve n afte r th e tran sition t o th e consociationa l (power-sharing ) Nationa l Fron t betwee n Figure 3.1 La Violencia Fatalities : 1948-195 7 Thousands o f death s

Oquist, 1980 , 6-9 .

Year

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 4 1 the tw o parties tha t facilitate d th e remova l fro m powe r o f Genera l Rojas an d the retur n t o civilia n rule , fairl y hig h level s o f violenc e continued (se e Figur e 3.2) . Gradually , though , a s the centra l gov ernment reestablishe d it s authority , effectivel y integrate d loca l political leader s an d permitted th e arm y to operate , rebe l an d bandit leaders became isolate d an d most wer e eventuall y defeate d b y th e armed forces. 5 Communist guerrill a leaders, though, survive d army efforts t o destro y the m i n th e earl y 1960 s an d eventuall y joine d together i n 196 6 t o for m th e Revolutionar y Arme d Force s o f Co lombia (FARC). Definitionally, then , la violencia can be considered a "civil war," although i t mus t b e recognize d tha t th e partisa n dispute s tha t un leashed the violence gradually became superseded or even replaced by other conflicts in the country. As will be argued below, these two facts—that it was a civil war whose precipitating cause and principal channel wa s partisan conflict an d that this conflict generate d other s that to p part y leader s fel t ha d escape d fro m thei r contro l eve n a s over-all levels of violence declined—help to explain the way in which the conflic t wa s resolved. The violenc e i n Colombi a i n th e pas t decad e woul d appea r t o meet th e definitio n o f "civi l war " minimally. Th e numbe r o f fatalities, high as they are, do not appear to have approximated the highest levels o f fatalitie s o f th e perio d o f la violencia, an d th e country' s population i s roughl y doubl e wha t i t wa s i n th e 1950s . However , Figure 3.2 La Violencia Fatalities: 1958-196 6 Deaths

Year Oquist, 1980 , 7-9 .

42 Jonatha n Hartly n the curren t violenc e ha s resulted i n the deaths o f many prominen t political leaders, government officials , judges and journalists and has been reporte d mor e comprehensivel y b y the country's mas s medi a and internationall y tha n wa s the case i n a far more rura l an d lesseducated countr y 30-4 0 year s earlier . Governmen t statistic s illus trate how political violence has escalated from th e mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (Figur e 3.3) . These number s li e below th e definitiona l threshold (1,000) , but there ar e reasons t o believe the y underesti mate th e true exten t o f casualties. A n independent researche r has estimated violen t death s i n Colombi a i n the mid-1980s a t aroun d 16,000 pe r year (excludin g traffi c accidents) , of which som e 2,00 0 to 3,00 0 ar e attributabl e t o politica l violenc e (struggle s betwee n guerrillas and the military, death s by paramilitary squad s of leaders of organizations suc h as unions or peasant leagues , assassinations of local-level party officials o r elected officials, etc.) . Colombian huma n rights organizations asser t ther e wer e 3,45 7 politica l homicide s between 198 1 and 1986, between 1,00 0 and 2,000 in 1987, and about 3,000 i n 1988. 6 Thus, a s in the 1950s, othe r kind s o f violence tha n thos e tradi tionally considere d unde r th e guise of civil war have bee n contrib uting t o the incredibly hig h numbe r o f fatalities i n Colombia ove r the pas t decade . Thes e includ e death s cause d b y drug trafficking , private paramilitary groups' killing leftist leaders, perceived common Figure 3. 3 Militar y & Civilian Casualties : 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 5 Deaths

Year ••Military Death s i

H Civilia n Death s CZ 3 Military an d Civilia n Death s

Colombia, Ministeri o d e Gobierno . 1985 . Paz: Politica de la paz del Presidente Betuncur. Boqota .

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 4 3 criminals, or other "undesirables" (with apparent police o r military cooperation i n a t least som e cases) , violen t conflict s ove r lan d (in cluding large landowners' ousting peasants and Indian groups' seeking to defend their communal lands from encroachment), an d criminality, wit h regiona l variation s dependin g upo n th e loca l circumstances. The most important "public" and "political" violence is associated with the military, guerrill a groups, right wing paramilitary organizations, an d drug-trafficking group s (particularl y the socalled "Medelli n cartel") . Th e comple x relationship s amon g thes e groups and the destructive impac t on state capacity o f their violen t interactions are important factors in helping to explain the difficulties encountered in trying to bring the country's current wave of violence and civil conflict t o an end. Although numerically this does not represent the largest number of fatalities in the country, its prominence and it s impac t o n stat e institutions , particularl y th e judiciary , ha s facilitated the emergence or intensification o f common criminal and other kinds of violence.

Conflict Resolution : La Violencia in Colombi a The establishment o f the consociational National Front between the two traditiona l partie s i n 195 7 ca n be viewe d a s a negotiated en d to a civi l war . Tha t i s largel y becaus e la violencia wa s unleashe d through traditiona l part y channels . A s Gomez , th e Conservativ e president in the early 1950s, did little to stop the escalating violence and sough t t o perpetuat e hi s gri p o n power b y mean s o f a constitutional reform, Ospina and other elements of his own party actively encouraged a military coup against him in June 1953 (with the eager acquiescence of the Liberals, though most of their top party leaders were in exile). The new government, led by General Rojas, remained closely identified with the Conservative party (wit h the obviou s exception of the G6mez faction) which retained many important posts in his administration. However, as Rojas gradually sought to continue in power by promoting a new political movement outside of the two political parties, leaders of the two parties began seeking each other out and Ospina and his followers began backing away from the military government . Inter-party violenc e wa s not ne w i n Colombia, bu t th e threa t o f loss of power to a populist military officer and an emerging challenge of revolutionary violence by certain guerrilla groups were. Although

44 Jonatha n Hartly n the majority part y in the country, Liberal leaders saw the most likely route away from military government was to seek an agreement wit h Conservatives in which they pledged to support a Conservative can didate fo r th e 1958-6 2 term . Liberal s recognize d tha t Rojas , give n his Conservative leanings , would be unlikel y t o hand power ove r t o a Liberal, eve n a s Conservatives, because o f their stron g position i n Rojas* administration, were unlikely to sign an agreement that would require the m t o relinquis h substantia l power . I n 1956 , the Liberal s chose Alberto Lleras to direct thei r part y i n order t o seek a n agreement with the Conservatives. Lleras had played no direct role in the failed negotiation s betwee n th e partie s i n th e 1948-4 9 perio d (h e had been Secretary-Genera l o f the Organizatio n o f American State s at th e time ) an d thus , Liberal s reasoned , h e coul d hav e easie r per sonal acces s to Conservativ e leaders. 7 The Liberal s approache d Os pina first, bu t h e wa s reluctan t t o negotiat e wit h them ; h e fel t hi s standing withi n th e Conservativ e part y ha d bee n weakene d b y hi s association wit h Rojas and feared tha t i f he reached agreemen t wit h the Liberals that the wrath of Gomez would descend on him, furthe r hurting hi s reputation withi n hi s ow n party . Thus, Alberto Lleras sought out Gomez, who was in exile in Spain. In Jul y 1956 , th e tw o leader s signe d th e Declaratio n o f Benidor m (Spain) tha t calle d fo r a return t o republica n rul e b y mean s o f on e or mor e coalitio n governments . Gradually , a "Civi c Front " o f op position began t o gro w within th e country , a s Liberals continued t o promise the y woul d suppor t a Conservative fo r th e presidency . A n extensive documen t (th e "Pac t o f Marc h [1957]" ) wa s signe d b y leaders of the tw o parties (excep t fo r Gome z supporters ) callin g fo r civilian two-part y rul e wit h guarantee s fo r parit y an d alternatio n i n power, an d i n April th e partie s officiall y launche d th e candidac y o f Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia for the next presidential term. An unsuccessful attemp t by General Rojas on May 1 , 1957 , to place Valencia under arres t precipitated demonstration s tha t finally led t o Rojas* resignatio n te n day s later . H e wa s replace d b y a five-man military junta that formed a bipartisan cabine t and promised t o hold elections t o replac e itsel f i n Augus t 195 8 (whic h woul d hav e bee n the en d o f Rojas' presidentia l term) . The partie s no w face d tw o critica l issues . On e wa s to determin e the specifi c mechanism s b y whic h the y woul d provid e eac h othe r with mutual guarantees an d the other was to resolve the question of the presidentia l candidac y o f Valencia , supporte d b y Ospin a Con -

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 4 5 servatives an d Liberal s bu t t o whic h Gome z an d hi s follower s re mained unequivocally opposed . Llera s returned to Spain, where h e signed th e "Pac t o f Sitges " with Gomez . Thi s documen t calle d fo r a bi-partisan "Nationa l Front, " i n whic h ther e woul d b e parit y i n Congress an d i n th e cabine t fo r twelv e year s an d forma l incorpo ration of these promises into the constitution by means of a national plebiscite. Complex negotiation s continued . Th e conflic t ove r th e Valenci a candidacy was finally resolved by having a Liberal, non e other than Alberto Lleras , serv e a s the first president, institutin g presidentia l alternation and extending the Sitges agreement fro m 1 2 to 1 6 years so that the las t presidential ter m would be hel d by a Conservative. Thus, as it finally emerged, the parties' National Front agreement most o f whos e condition s wer e overwhelmingl y approve d by a national plebiscit e i n December 1957—sharpl y limite d th e operatio n of mechanisms of majoritarian representative democracy in the country, whil e permittin g th e civilia n transitio n t o succeed . Th e agree ment stipulate d tha t fro m 195 8 t o 197 4 th e presidenc y woul d al ternate betwee n member s o f th e tw o parties , an d tha t al l cabine t offices, legislativ e an d judicial post s and other government jobs not covered by civil service were to be divided equally between the two parties. Most measures would require a two-thirds vote in Congress for approval. 8 In explaining successful conflic t resolution , this project ha s identified fou r majo r cluster s o f factor s a s potentiall y significant : th e nature of the underlyin g issues , the interna l politics o f each side in conflict, the military balance in the field, and the role of third parties. All o f thes e ar e relevan t t o explainin g th e resolutio n o f conflic t i n the late 1950 s in Colombia, though the last one only minimally and indirectly. What was at stake in the conflic t i n Colombia? Here, i t is critical to identify no t only the degre e o r intensity o f polarization, but also the natur e o f the issue(s ) an d whether an d how the y evolve d ove r time. In the 1940s and 1950s, the central issue between the political parties revolved around control of the state to aid one's own adherents. Once that issue was resolved by the National Front agreement to share power equall y (an d exclusively), les s divided the to p leadership o f th e tw o partie s tha n unite d them . The y share d a mutual interest i n displacin g a military leade r wh o appeare d increasingl y interested i n extendin g hi s rule , blockin g a potentia l i f stil l wea k

46 Jonatha n Hartly n revolutionary threa t i n certai n rura l area s an d insurin g tha t inter party violence with its horrendous casualties and unpredictable con sequences woul d no t accelerat e anew . Furthermore , part y leader s received stron g support fro m economicall y dominant interests upse t with Genera l Rojas ' statis t an d populis t policies . Part y leader s di d not hav e significan t difference s regardin g th e country' s socio-eco nomic order or central political procedures or constitutionalism. This suggests tha t settlemen t o f conflict s b y consociationa l o r othe r ' 'power-sharing'' arrangements , such as occurred in Colombia in the 1950s, ar e probabl y easie r whe n th e conflic t i s ove r ho w t o "liv e and let live" (group autonomy) o r over how to share divisible good s (patronage). Two background condition s were also of vital importance; the fac t they were also present in the 1940 s when la violencia began, though, indicates they were not sufficient i n themselves. One was the historic population-wide identificatio n wit h th e tw o parties . A s the tumul tuous negotiation s inche d along , i t wa s eviden t tha t part y leader s were i n contro l o f collectivitie s wit h entrenche d loyaltie s an d th e principal stumbling blocks lay less in their ability to bring along their party followers tha n in generating inter-party trus t a t the leadershi p level i n th e fac e o f a spli t i n th e leadershi p o f on e o f th e parties . The othe r backgroun d conditio n wa s that, i f there wer e stron g his torical antecedents for violence in the country's past, there were also many prio r example s o f bipartisa n collaboratio n t o whic h leader s could turn. None of these, though, including failed effort s a t powersharing in the 1940s , had provided fo r equality between th e parties, nor been s o elaborate an d constitutionall y enshrined . As the proces s als o involved th e withdrawa l o f the militar y fro m power, i t was also necessary fo r th e political parties to address thei r fears an d concerns . Party leader s successfull y pursue d a strategy o f de-linking th e governmen t o f Genera l Roja s fro m th e arme d force s as an institution. They argued that in their view the attempts to create an independent political movement, his government's economic policies and most of the financial "irregularities" (corruption) were committed b y member s o f the "presidentia l family " an d a few civilian s closely tied to Rojas, not by the military. This strategy was facilitated by th e fac t tha t Rojas ' dictatorshi p wa s relativel y benign , eve n i n comparison t o othe r Lati n America n militar y government s o f th e 1950s. Pro-Rojas military conspiracies still emerged, including a major cou p attemp t i n Ma y 1958 . However , senio r militar y officer s

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 4 7 perceived tha t the Nationa l Fron t di d no t threate n the m eithe r individually or the armed forces as an institution; it promised, instead, to strengthen th e coherenc e an d improve th e image o f the militar y even a s i t provide d the m wit h considerabl e autonom y t o manag e their ow n internal affairs . As described above , th e interna l politic s withi n eac h part y wer e significant an d were i n par t relate d t o th e changin g circumstance s of th e violenc e i n th e countryside , t o th e militar y balanc e i n th e field. La violencia was unleashed because nationa l intra-part y lead ership wa s fragmented , particularl y i n th e Conservativ e party , though Liberal s wer e als o divide d betwee n regiona l "war " groups and a national "peace " faction. The national Liberal leaders did not condemn thei r ow n part y members ' act s o f violenc e no r di d the y feel the y coul d ignor e th e attack s an d counter-attacks b y th e Conservative-dominated polic e an d (les s often ) army . Ultimately , na tional part y leader s probabl y aide d thei r regiona l associates ; how ever, unlik e previou s civi l war s i n Colombia , i n th e perio d o f la violencia no national political figures took t o th e field. Why di d many o f th e sam e part y leader s wh o ha d helped ushe r in la violencia in th e lat e 1940s , successfull y com e togethe r som e ten years later? In this case, the horro r of the unexpecte d intensit y of la violencia the y helpe d t o unleash , somewha t unexpectedly , played a key role, as it did, as well, fo r the Roman Catholic Church which initially had backed the Conservatives but then became a firm supporter o f th e Nationa l Front. 9 I t certainl y wa s importan t tha t Gomez, the arch-Conservative figure overthrown in the 195 3 coup, was willing to negotiate a power-sharing arrangemen t with the Liberals, even if he did so at least partially with the hope that it would strengthen hi s ow n somewha t weakene d positio n withi n hi s ow n party. Thus , contrar y t o wha t appear s t o hav e bee n tru e i n othe r cases, in Colombia leadership change was not necessary for eventual agreement. On the contrary, the absence of such change meant that concessions—based o n a "politica l learning " o f th e violenc e thei r earlier intransigence ha d sparked and fear o f possible displacemen t from power—coul d b e mad e b y prestigiou s nationa l part y figures, with a positive impac t o n public opinion . By the late 1950s , violence wa s less clearly between demarcate d bands of one party or another. Thus, there was not a clear "hurtin g stalemate" between th e two parties. However , leader s of both parties recognized that efforts to establish one-party governments would

48 Jonatha n Hartly n almost certainly re-kindle partisan conflict . Liberal s deliberately un derplayed their potential power and majority electora l status, agreeing to complete parity in government an d eventually t o presidentia l alternation, bot h becaus e i t wa s unlikel y the y coul d succee d i n achieving hegemonic control given the fact the military governmen t was predominantl y Conservativ e i n orientatio n an d becaus e the y feared th e consequence s o f seekin g suc h control. 10 Conservatives , although well represented in the Rojas government, distrusted Rojas' intentions an d kne w tha t seekin g thei r ow n one-part y rul e wa s no t a viable option . Outside interventio n playe d a role , bu t onl y a relativel y mino r one. The United State s had no particular reaso n t o favor on e side in the civi l war ove r another , on e political party ove r another . Histor ically, the Liberal part y ha d retaine d extremel y clos e relations wit h the United States, and this had been especially evident during World War II when Libera l government s collaborated extensivel y wit h th e United States . Th e Conservatives , particularl y Gomez , ha d openl y supported Francoist and Falangist notions. Thus, Conservative effort s to lin k Liberal s an d Communist s togethe r di d no t convinc e Unite d States governmen t officials , an d prosecutio n o f Protestant s durin g the Gomez years did not please them either . Although "Communis t subversion" wa s accuse d fo r th e violenc e associate d wit h th e foogotazo i n 1948 , whic h overlappe d wit h th e presenc e o f numerou s foreign diplomat s fo r th e Nint h Internationa l Conferenc e o f American States , Liberal s wer e largel y no t tarre d b y th e charg e (whic h in any case was supported by little evidence). And, once Gomez came to power, h e was extremely solicitou s o f the Unite d States , and Colombia wa s on e o f the fe w Lati n America n government s whic h ac tually sen t a contingent o f soldier s t o fight i n Kore a a t th e reques t of the Unite d States . There is no evidence that the United States played any role in the 1953 militar y coup , althoug h i t probably welcome d Genera l Rojas * initial effort s t o pacif y th e country . Althoug h th e U.S . wa s preoc cupied b y th e violenc e i n Colombi a i n th e 1940 s an d 1950s , i t oc curred mostl y i n remot e rura l area s an d largel y di d no t threate n either strategi c o r privat e economi c interest s o f th e Unite d States . Eventually, however, the Rojas government met with strong hostility from th e Unite d State s government an d fro m internationa l financial agencies suc h a s th e Worl d Bank , becaus e o f Rojas ' flirting wit h Peronism, his populist economic policies and the growing oppositio n

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 4 9 from th e two traditional partie s which appeare d to be mor e secur e allies and to promise mor e stabl e economi c policies . Th e U.S . gov ernment an d the Worl d Bank withhel d credit s fro m Rojas ' government an d rapidly re-established the m fo r the interim militar y junta that replaced him and for the subsequent civilian government. However, the dominant economic fact during this period remained fairly constant through these three administrations: serious balance of payments problem s du e t o lo w worl d price s fo r coffee , th e country' s major export. The United State s supported part y conciliation effort s i n Colombia, bu t i n a passive rathe r tha n a n activ e sense . Suppor t fo r th e civilian Nationa l Fron t government s di d increas e a s strategi c fear s were heightene d followin g th e Cuba n Revolutio n (Castr o assume d power in January 1959) . I n the earl y 1960s , Colombi a became on e of th e "showcase' ' Allianc e fo r Progres s countries , an d the Unite d States provided extensive military aid to buttress Colombian counterinsurgency effort s agains t remainin g guerrill a groups , particularl y those that espouse d openl y revolutionar y o r Communist ideologie s (see Maullin , 1973) . In sum, one could argue that in Colombia the structural space and opportunity for negotiations to succeed by the late 1950s were high. Nation-wide identification wit h the two traditional parties made the establishment o f a third political movement, suc h as Rojas sought to bring about, extremely difficult. Levels of violence had already begun to decline , bu t th e populatio n recognize d it s partisa n origin s an d feared its continuation or intensification. Majo r economic actors, the Church, and in the background, international actors , all encourage d inter-party accord. National-level party leaders had not expected the ferocity o f violenc e the y ha d helpe d unleas h an d began t o fea r it s consequences a s well a s displacement b y th e ver y militar y govern ment they ha d helped bring to power; thus, they were more willing to compromise .

La Violencia o f the 1950 s an d th e Violenc e of the 1980 s The National Fron t arrangement wa s a conservative one . Though it was born out o f crisis , it s purpose wa s neithe r t o confron t directl y the socio-economi c aspect s o f th e breakdow n an d o f th e violenc e nor to seek to deepen political incorporation. Rather, the party lead-

50 Jonatha n Hartly n ers an d thei r socio-economi c allie s sa w th e Nationa l Fron t a t leas t in par t a s a restoratio n o f thei r rul e i n a mor e secure , "civilizing " fashion, a rul e tha t ha d bee n challenge d du e t o thei r previou s sec tarian partisan intransigenc e b y la violencia an d then by Rojas ' rule. At th e sam e time , a return t o civilia n rul e i n th e lat e 1950 s wa s essentially inconceivabl e withou t extensiv e mutua l guarantee s be tween th e tw o parties, such a s those embodie d in the Nationa l Fron t agreement. Th e majo r alternative s t o som e versio n o f share d two party rul e wer e extende d an d increasingl y unstabl e militar y rul e o r an attemp t t o promot e one-part y (Conservative ) rul e wit h th e like lihood o f kindlin g renewe d partisa n violence . I n bot h thes e cases , violence b y Communis t guerrill a group s o r radicalize d Libera l groups, combine d wit h banditry , coul d hav e intensified . Yet, on e ca n as k if suc h a lengthy, formal , an d rigid constitutiona l agreement wa s necessary . Th e Nationa l Fron t accor d reflecte d th e fact tha t nationa l politician s "learned " to distrus t local-leve l leader s and fear mass mobilization sinc e they had gotten out o f their control . Gradually, the violence came to an end, though some guerrilla groups spawned b y i t continue d t o exist . Variou s one s o f the m joine d to gether in 196 6 t o form the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombi a (FARC), th e country' s oldes t an d mos t significan t guerrill a organi zation, wit h tie s t o th e (Soviet-oriented ) Colombia n Communis t party. And , ne w guerrill a group s formed . I n th e 1960s , thes e in cluded the Castroite-influenced Nationa l Liberation Army (ELN) and the Maoist-oriente d Popula r Liberatio n Arm y (EPL) . I n th e 1970s , the mos t significan t guerrill a grou p t o for m wa s th e Movemen t o f the 19t h o f Apri l (M-19 ) whic h too k it s nam e fro m th e dat e o f th e 1970 election s i t felt fraudulentl y kep t th e presidency fro m Genera l Rojas, a t tha t tim e campaignin g ambiguousl y a s a Conservative an d as hea d o f hi s ow n populis t movement. 11 Thos e group s tha t ha d a rural orientatio n bega n thei r operation s i n area s o f pas t guerrill a activity i n th e country , an d a number o f thei r leader s o r adherent s had suffered a s a consequence o f la violencia (murder s of close famil y members, force d migration , etc.) . Som e buil t upo n regiona l tradi tions of resistance to central authorit y and promotion of self-defense , local democrac y o r self-defense . However , thes e "backgroun d con ditions" helped spawn renewed guerrilla activity and intensified civi c protest due to the evolution of the country under the National Front . The Nationa l Fron t perio d wa s on e o f dynami c socia l an d eco nomic chang e i n the country , a s the population double d an d becam e

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 5 1 substantially mor e urba n and educated, an d as the econom y diver sified and became more complex. However, these significant factor s were no t accompanie d b y mor e dramati c redistributiv e change s i n a country tha t began th e Nationa l Fron t with a highly unequa l dis tribution o f wealth an d income. I n particular, lan d reform wa s only weakly implemented . At th e sam e time , th e country' s socio-economi c changes , com bined wit h th e Nationa l Fron t regim e structure , whic h twic e re quired voter s t o elec t a presidentia l candidat e fro m th e opposin g party, led to a dramatic decline i n party segmentation. Fo r the first time i n th e country' s history , a n independen t electorat e emerge d largely in urban areas, potentially mobilizable by any party or movement. Additionally , coalitio n rul e encourage d part y factionalis m a s partisan conflict shifte d fro m inter-party relation s to intra-party negotiations. The parties became dominate d by regional politicians in control o f smal l captiv e electorate s wh o lacke d substantia l link s t o mass organizations . Politicians , particularl y o f th e minorit y Con servative party, were reluctant to change the model of coalition rule with its guaranteed acces s to governmen t resources . Ironically , th e return to competitiv e election s i n the 1970 s mad e it mor e difficul t for oppositio n movement s t o gai n electora l representatio n eve n a s the traditiona l partie s wer e increasingl y incapabl e o f channellin g dissent. Non-electoral opposition emerged or was strengthened: popular sector organizations , civi c strikes , an d guerrilla organizations. The regime confronted a growing legitimacy crisis as political actors sought to justify an d retain a political model (coalition rule) that no longer responded to the country's social structure, in part due to changes induced by the model itself. The problems of the 1970 s and 1980s reflecte d th e predicamen t o f a n unchange d regim e i n a changed society. Thus, the country would almost certainly have suffered considerabl e politica l turmoi l i n the 1970 s an d 1980 s i n any case. However , th e situatio n deteriorate d because o f the additiona l violence, corruptio n an d partial deflatio n o f stat e capacit y brough t about by drug trafficking an d by the complex alliances and forms of violence engendere d by drug-traffickin g groups . The problems of political violence of the 1980s were at most only partially attributabl e t o a "birt h defect " o f th e Nationa l Fron t re gime. Th e focu s shoul d b e mor e directl y o n th e inabilit y (an d fo r some, unwillingness ) o f politica l leader s t o transfor m th e regim e structure. Some form of coalition rule was almost certainly necessary

52 Jonatha n Hartly n to bring la violencia to an end, but th e rigid and excessively length y form i t took unde r th e National Fron t ha d conservative implication s regarding the possibilities for social reform an d made both the peaceful channellin g o f dissent an d the transformation o f coalition rul e t o permit such dissent exceedingly difficult. Th e structure of incentives (access to power, economic benefits, levels of insecurity and mistrust) for regiona l politician s an d economi c elite s le d the m t o oppos e changes tha t woul d hav e opene d u p th e regime . Thus , th e reason s for the growth in political violence stemmed in part fro m th e natur e of the polit y tha t emerge d fro m th e settlemen t bu t probabl y mor e from th e inability o f that polity to meet ne w challenges as the coun try's societ y an d econom y change d an d a s th e two-part y sectaria n identifications largel y disappeared . Eventually , dru g traffickin g wa s to represen t a n additiona l critica l facto r helpin g t o explai n furthe r escalation o f violence . The final outcome o f the curren t wav e of violence in Colombia is still unclear. Much of the attention o n violence in the late 1970s and early 1980 s focused o n that produced by the guerrill a groups. President Julio Cesar Turbay (1978-82) attempted to address it primarily by mean s o f a repressiv e response , whic h militaril y weakene d i n particular th e M-1 9 guerrill a group . Upo n assumin g office , Con servative Presiden t Belisari o Betancu r (1982-86 ) activel y sough t ''peace," including negotiation wit h th e guerrillas (amnest y an d political incorporation) an d political reforms (democratization) . He was able t o achiev e a truc e wit h mos t guerrill a group s i n 1984 . And , Betancur als o ushere d throug h a constitutiona l reform establishin g the popula r electio n o f mayor s (previousl y the y wer e appointed) , which, combine d wit h a degre e o f fiscal decentralization , wa s in tended to help open up the country's political process. Other reform s intended t o assur e oppositio n force s greate r representatio n i n Con gress, acces s t o th e media , an d s o on eithe r wer e no t approve d b y Congress o r wer e significantl y watere d down . However, Betancur' s effort s largel y faile d t o brin g peac e t o th e country. Political violence actually increased in his last years in offic e and continue d t o escalat e unde r th e subsequen t administratio n o f President Virgili o Barc o (1986-90 ) a s well. Thi s failur e i s best ex plained b y th e natur e o f the issue s an d th e interna l politic s o f eac h side. Division s withi n th e stat e a s wel l a s lac k o f unit y amon g th e guerrilla group s ove r whethe r t o giv e u p th e goa l o f seekin g stat e power militate d agains t th e succes s o f th e negotiation s ove r th e

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 5 3 1980s. Th e Colombia n arme d forces ' oppositio n t o negotiate d set tlements with the guerrillas wa s dramatically strengthene d by dru g trafficking group s durin g thi s period . Th e action s o f thes e group s and of state efforts to control them added multiple kinds of additional violence an d had a tremendous impac t o n state coherence . The military balance in the field has also been relevant. The state found itsel f unabl e t o defea t th e guerrilla s militarily o r to sto p terrorist violence o n the part of drug traffickers. A t the same time, the likelihood of a takeover of state power by guerrilla groups was always very low and probably diminishe d over the past decade. Unde r the Barco administration, this "military stalemate, " in the words of one Colombian analyst , combine d wit h th e problem s o f political legiti macy related to the exhaustio n o f the country' s politica l model , fa cilitated negotiation s i n 198 9 an d 199 0 wit h som e o f the guerrill a groups, principally the M-19. This led to their legal reincorporation, participation i n the 1990 s congressiona l an d presidential elections , representation i n the cabine t o f the Gaviri a administration inaugu rated in August 1990, surprising plurality victory in the special elections fo r representatio n t o a constitutiona l convention , an d activ e role in the convention in early 199 1 (Pizarro , 1990). Other guerrilla groups (principall y the FARC and the ELN) continue d their attacks against th e state , eve n a s relation s wit h dru g trafficker s move d i n cycles fro m violence—principall y kidnapping s an d terroris t bomb ings—to truce an d back again. Under th e Betancu r administration , th e problem s o f division s within the state and within guerrilla groups were further complicated by an ambiguous negotiating strateg y o n the part of the administration an d negativ e short-ter m economi c circumstances . Th e "peac e process" began auspiciously wit h the approval, in November 1982 , of th e broades t amnest y la w eve r passe d i n th e country' s history . However, the next stage was not clear. The government finally opted to negotiate truces directly with the various guerrilla groups, a process that cam e to fruitio n i n 1984 . Eventually , th e FARC created a political party, the Patriotic Unity (UP), to compete in elections. But, the agreements made no mention of handing over arms, though guerrilla groups promised t o hal t al l attack s an d kidnappings. Th e gov ernment, in turn, pledged to implement o r seek passage of a variety of political reform s an d social programs . Yet , soo n afte r th e truce s were signed, the administration announced it would have no money for socia l reforms . Th e nee d fo r economi c austerit y a t thi s critica l

54 Jonatha n Hartly n moment (symbolize d b y agreein g t o a n "enhance d surveillance " agreement wit h th e Internationa l Monetar y Fund ) wa s especiall y unfortunate. Other factors , however , als o militate d agains t th e succes s o f th e negotiations. Ther e wer e significan t division s withi n th e state , wit h the arme d force s skeptica l an d increasingly obstructionist . Th e con sensus regardin g th e nee d fo r politica l refor m amon g nationa l po litical leader s wa s difficul t t o translat e int o concret e actio n becaus e of occasionally tens e relation s between a Conservative presiden t an d a Liberal-dominated Congress , and between regional politicians fearful o f losin g thei r loca l powe r bas e t o ne w politica l movement s an d national leader s no t full y abl e t o contro l them . Guerrilla group s als o playe d a n ambiguou s game . Th e M-19 , which ha d mos t benefite d fro m th e amnest y progra m i n 1982 , the n sought to increase its military capabilitie s whil e pressing for politica l concessions fro m th e government . Coordinatio n amon g guerrill a groups wa s poor, an d even withi n som e o f them ther e wa s no agree ment over the objectives the y shoul d be seeking in negotiations wit h the government . A s a result o f these factors , by lat e 198 4 oppositio n to the peace process expanded beyond the military and initially skeptical political an d economic group s to growing sectors of public opinion. A final complicatin g facto r wa s th e increase d violenc e an d cor ruption engendered by drug trafficking. Narcotic s traffic wa s initiall y accepted i n Colombi a becaus e o f th e foreig n exchang e i t generate d and th e job s i t provided . I t wa s als o viewe d a s essentiall y a conse quence o f the U.S . deman d fo r drugs . However, i t gradually becam e a worrisome proble m fo r th e Colombia n government , becaus e o f it s corrosive impac t o n stat e institution s (especiall y th e judiciary), U.S . pressure, increase d domesti c consumption , an d th e bruta l tactic s o f assassination an d intimidation by drug traffickers seekin g to continu e to d o business , a s wel l a s t o gai n acceptanc e withi n Colombia n so ciety. With regard to negotiations with guerrilla groups, the negativ e effects o f violenc e b y dru g trafficker s wer e bot h indirect , b y con tributing t o a n atmospher e o f violenc e an d helpin g t o provok e th e collapse o f th e judiciar y o r th e capacit y o f th e stat e t o investigat e crimes successfully , an d direct , b y thei r apparen t targetin g o f left wing political figures an d social activists , sometimes alon e an d sometimes i n collaboratio n wit h others , suc h a s regiona l landowner s o r elements o f th e arme d forces .

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 5 5 A central example has been the violence and intimidation of leaders and activists of the leftist oppositio n party, Patriotic Unity (UP). The U P wa s forme d b y th e country' s oldes t an d larges t guerrill a group, th e FARC , i n Marc h 198 5 followin g th e truc e establishe d with the Betancur government in 1984. It was intended to symbolize the willingnes s o f th e guerrill a organizatio n t o rejoi n th e politica l process throug h electora l means . Unlik e wha t occurre d wit h othe r guerrilla organizations, the truce between the Betancur government and the FARC was never formally broken. However, as tensions built anew the FARC began to claim it was organizationally distinc t fro m the UP . The U P participated i n the 198 6 elections , winnin g a plurality o r a majority o f the vote s i n ove r a dozen municipalitie s an d 12 congressional seats (including seats in coalition with Liberal party factions). Fro m Januar y 198 6 t o Apri l 1988 , 33 4 member s o f th e UP and of popular organization s wer e assassinated , includin g thei r presidential candidate for the 1986 elections, 4 congressmen, 2 mayors, an d 1 1 mayora l candidates. 12 A self-reinforcing cycl e o f polarizatio n wa s established i n whic h UP leaders, lacking trust with regard to their personal safety and the democratic process, remained ambiguous with regard to the guerrilla option an d the us e o f force; thi s i n turn, helpe d right-win g group s (whether dru g traffickers , landowners , o r member s o f th e arme d forces) to justify the use of the violence against them. Shadowy death squads, o f whic h som e 14 0 wer e identifie d b y th e Barc o adminis tration, hav e take n responsibilit y fo r man y o f th e assassination s o f UP activists and leaders. In Barco's last years in office, thes e group s were involve d i n man y larger-scal e massacres . Give n th e seriou s threat to democratic institutions and democratic values represente d by the violent alliances and actions of the country's major drug traffickers, primar y supporters of many of these death squads, the Barco administration sought to stop their actions and bring them to justice. But, with a weak and penetrated state, its few successes were at best partial an d incomplete . It s greates t succes s wa s th e discover y an d death o f a major figure of th e Medelli n carte l i n Decembe r 1989 . Yet, among the many victims of violence ove r 1989-90 , ther e wer e three presidentia l candidates , includin g th e Libera l Lui s Carlo s Gal an, widely considere d th e likely winne r in the 199 0 election s i f he had lived, an d candidates o f both the UP and the M-19 . Never theless, by demonstrating its tenacity, the Colombian state prevented a process of further stat e collapse .

56 Jonatha n Hartly n The incredible violence generated directly by drug trafficking, an d the increas e i n criminality i t helped foster by its contributions t o th e collapse o f Colombia's judicial system , made the "politica l violence " of guerrilla groups appear to be just one more kind of violence, rathe r than separat e an d distinct . Th e countr y becam e "multi-polarized " rather than , a s the guerrilla s ha d hoped , "polarized " (se e Lea l Bui trago, 1988) . A t th e sam e time , stat e effort s seekin g thei r politica l reincorporation might have progressed further in the absence of drug trafficking, a s those oppose d to agreements with the guerrillas within the stat e o r fro m traditiona l sector s woul d hav e bee n missin g a critical, eve n i f a t time s onl y indirect , support . Guerrill a group s woul d also hav e confronte d a more coheren t state , perhap s bette r abl e t o enforce agreements and assure the physical integrity of political leaders, forcin g the m t o defin e thei r ow n objective s mor e clearly , eve n as the financial importanc e o f certain remot e area s unde r thei r con trol woul d hav e bee n muc h less . I n addition , cynicism , corruption , resentment, the loss of trust in public institutions, and the breakdow n of social solidarit y would als o not hav e reached current heights. (Fo r a mor e extensiv e discussio n o f dru g traffickin g an d Colombia , se e Hartlyn, forthcoming. ) A numbe r o f internationa l factor s bea r o n th e curren t violence . One has to do with drug trafficking. Th e United States has been muc h more intereste d i n th e "wa r o n drugs " tha n i t ha s i n effort s t o en d the political violenc e an d seek th e peacefu l reincorporatio n o f guerrillas int o th e country' s democrati c process . U.S . polic y regardin g drug traffickin g ha s shifte d slightl y ove r tim e towar d a n increase d recognition tha t a strategy focuse d primaril y o n the supplyin g coun tries wil l no t work ; i t ha s als o becom e somewha t mor e sensitiv e t o the constraint s unde r whic h government s suc h a s tha t o f Colombi a must operate . However , it s polic y effort s hav e stil l bee n mor e uni lateral tha n cooperativ e an d mor e focuse d o n boostin g th e militar y than on strengthening institution s or recognizing the underlying eco nomic imperatives . As the so-calle d Medelli n carte l grou p o f drug traffickers targete d government officials , journalists , politica l leaders , an d other s fo r as sassination, th e Colombia n governmen t increasingl y cam e t o vie w them as a national security threat. The precipitating event, especiall y in term s o f Colombia n publi c opinion , wa s th e assassinatio n o f th e popular Libera l presidentia l hopefu l Gala n in 1989 . Particularl y un der th e Gaviri a administration , th e Colombia n governmen t ha s

Civil Violenc e an d Conflict Resolutio n 5 7 sought t o distinguis h "naTco-terrorism " fro m dru g trafficking , an d has se t th e alleviatio n o f th e forme r a s it s immediat e goa l whil e insisting tha t th e latte r ca n only b e deal t wit h ove r th e long-term , on a cooperative, multilatera l basis . O n this basis, th e governmen t began movin g awa y fro m th e us e o f extraditio n o f dru g trafficker s to th e Unite d State s a s a tool , eve n befor e i t wa s banne d b y th e constitutional convention, promising leniency and trials in Colombia to trafficker s tha t voluntaril y turne d themselve s in . Severa l majo r figures of the Medelli n carte l turne d themselve s i n ove r 199 0 an d 1991, an d drug-related terrorist incident s declined . The U.S . governmen t ha s been unhapp y wit h th e ba n o n extra dition an d has continued t o pressure th e governmen t o n drug-traf ficking issues. Ai d ha s focuse d mor e o n boosting th e arme d force s and directly involving them in the drug issue, than on strengthening the police or the Colombian judiciary. Similarly, although it is widely recognized that the foreign exchange and employment generated by the drug traffic woul d not be nearly as important if more significan t debt-relief measures, more aid and more open trade practices were forthcoming, legislatio n in the U.S. Congress to facilitate these measures ha s bee n slo w t o gai n approval . Th e logi c o f th e Colombi a government is clear: over the medium-term, declines in drug-related terrorist violenc e an d recompositio n o f th e Colombia n judiciar y should facilitat e a decrease i n other politica l an d criminal violenc e as well. In contrast to many other on-going civil conflicts, there has never been a significant rol e fo r internationa l mediator s i n Colombia . A t certain moments, Colombian governments did seek cooperation from the Cuba n governmen t becaus e o f it s tie s t o guerrill a groups , bu t these links were neve r viewed as a determining facto r in explaining either the rise or the strategy of these groups. In specific instances , governments suc h a s thos e o f Felip e Gonzale z i n Spai n o r Carlo s Andr6s Perez in Venezuela, offered their countries as sites for meetings. Bu t Colombia n government s hav e resiste d involvin g interna tional mediator s in specific negotiations . Thus, th e behavio r o f th e guerill a group s i s bes t explained , no t by their international connection s but by how their own analyses of changes i n the internationa l system , particularl y i n the Sovie t blo c and i n Centra l America , hav e affecte d thei r goal s an d calculation s of likely success . Thes e change s includ e th e inabilit y o f th e Sovie t Union t o provid e aid , disillusionmen t wit h th e Cuba n model , th e

58 Jonatha n Hartly n defeat o f the Sandinista s i n Nicaragua , th e inabilit y o f guerrilla s i n El Salvado r o r i n Guatemal a t o realiz e thei r goals , and th e predom inance o f U.S . military migh t i n th e regio n a s evidenced i n th e in tervention i n Panama . Base d o n discussio n wit h M-1 9 leaders , Pi zarro (1990 , 21-23 ) consider s tha t thei r internationa l analysi s an d their wea k militar y situatio n wer e crucia l i n thei r decisio n t o pu t down thei r arms . Writing in mid-1991, the picture in Colombia appears marginall y more hopeful . Effort s towar d politica l reincorporatio n o f willin g guerrilla group s an d towar d politica l refor m continue . Th e M-1 9 demonstrated unexpectedl y stron g electora l successe s i n th e 199 0 elections an d gaine d a cabinet sea t i n th e Gaviri a administration . I t subsequently receive d a plurality o f votes fo r representatio n i n th e constitutional conventio n tha t successfull y re-wrot e th e Colombia n Constitution, institutin g a more democratic and participatory frame work. A ne w strateg y o f promisin g majo r dru g trafficker s trial s i n Colombia, reduce d sentence s an d a guarante e o f n o extraditio n t o the Unite d State s appeare d t o b e reducin g level s o f drug-relate d terrorism. Th e mos t dramati c succes s wa s th e surrende r o f Pabl o Escobar i n Jun e 1991 , a majo r figure o f th e Medelli n cartel . Yet , whether th e multipl e "stalemates " coul d lea d i n th e short-ter m o r even i n the medium-ter m t o a more long-rangin g peacefu l outcom e was far from obvious . Several major guerrill a groups continued thei r violent actions, several drug trafficking group s retained considerabl e power an d capacit y fo r violence , an d th e judiciar y an d othe r stat e institutions wer e stil l extremel y weak .

Concluding Reflection s In a country with a history of violence, such as Colombia, it is difficult to sort out the ways in which different period s of violence are related to eac h other . Bot h violenc e an d accommodatio n hav e stron g his torical antecedent s i n th e country , an d thu s bot h hav e significan t "cultural carriers" and are available as "options" at critical moments. There probabl y ar e youn g guerrilla s i n contemporar y Colombi a whose parent s fough t i n th e day s o f la violencia an d whos e great grandparents, in turn, were activ e in the turn-of-the-century Wa r of the Thousan d Days . I n addition , area s wit h a histor y o f guerrill a struggle against state authority hav e been amon g the most receptiv e to ne w guerrill a group s a s they hav e begun .

Civil Violence an d Conflict Resolutio n 5 9 Yet, ultimately, I would argue that this "culture" and "geography" of violence i s neither necessary no r sufficient t o explain the current outbreak o f violence, thoug h i t shoul d be considere d a n important contributory factor. If I had the data, I believe it would indicate that a significan t percentag e o f thos e committin g violen t act s toda y d o not have a direct link to la violencia, while many with such connections are not committing violent acts. Similarly, violence in the 1980 s has extended far beyond areas affected by la violencia in the 1950s , to rural regions of recent colonization an d to cities such as Cali and Medellin. Two other factors would appear central. First, the political framework of two-party coalition rule was superseded by a dynamic society that change d i n par t du e t o th e politica l structur e o f th e Nationa l Front itself . Th e Nationa l Front , i n som e guise , wa s probably nec essary to end la violencia. But, the attractio n of continued coalitio n rule remained high, for different reasons , for regional party leaders, major economic groups and international actors, long after there was any need for it. The Colombian case suggests that solutions to periods of violence may be imposed in too rigid a fashion an d may generate excessively powerfu l incentive s fo r their continuation pas t the time when the y shoul d b e changed . Coalitio n rul e helpe d transfor m a society an d reduc e traditiona l part y segmentation . Yet , i t wa s als o such a cozy arrangement that it resisted changing in the face of new societal demand s and pressures. The othe r facto r ha s to d o with stat e autonom y an d state capacity.13 Part of bringing la violencia to an end involved re-articulatin g state authorit y ove r disparat e region s o f th e country , couplin g re gional part y figures to centra l authorit y an d separatin g the m fro m guerrilla and bandit leader s who coul d then graduall y be defeated . In contrast, the ability of the Colombian state in the 1980s and 1990s to negotiate effectively wit h the guerrilla opposition and to proceed with democratizin g reform s ha s unquestionabl y bee n hur t b y th e actions o f drug traffickers. Th e stat e ha s been unabl e t o insure th e physical safety o f amnestied guerrillas or left-wing activists , or even of its ow n to p officials . It s judicial system , alread y inep t an d overloaded, largel y collapse d unde r th e intimidatio n an d corruption o f drug trafficking, eve n as the corrupting presence of drug money was felt, t o differing degrees , throughout Colombia n society. Successfu l conflict resolutio n require s functionin g stat e institutions , an d an y model of conflict resolution should incorporate directly issues related to state autonomy an d state capacity .

60 Jonatha n Hartlyn

Notes 1. Thi s paper borrows liberally from the discussion and analysis of these conflicts i n Hartlyn, 1988 . Fo r a table summarizin g the major protagonists and the nature and outcome of the 19th-century conflicts, see Hartlyn, 1988, 21-24; o n the period of la violencia, see Hartlyn, 1988 , 42-48 an d 54-74; and on the most recent period of violence, se e Hartlyn, 1988 , 191-9 9 an d 216-35. 2. Se e Smal l an d Singer , 1982 . I n m y view , wha t i s absen t fro m thi s definition is any discussion of the goals or objectives of the non-state actors. This should logically compris e som e political project , suc h as state power, or a related—i f les s ambitious—goal , suc h a s powe r sharing , partition , o r regional autonomy . I am not sur e that i t is helpful analyticall y t o conside r conflict betwee n group s suc h a s drug-trafficker s an d th e stat e a s a "civi l war" unles s th e trafficker s develo p a clea r politica l project , an d I woul d expect th e way in which such conflict s ar e resolved to differ fro m the way in which "civi l wars " come to an end. 3. Thi s is the basic thesis of Oquist, 1980, still one of the best treatments of la violencia, though hi s notion somewha t exaggerate s the extensio n and coherence o f the Colombian stat e in the 1940s . 4. Hobsbawm , 1963 , 16 , cited (a s Oquist above) i n Hartlyn, 1988 , 4 3 44. 5. On e of the best works on the "late violence" is Sanchez and Meertens, 1983. 6. Guzman , 1988 . The initial data of this Colombian sociologist was employed i n preparin g Sanche z e t al. , 1987 . Figure s fro m huma n right s organizations for 198 1 t o 198 7 ar e from Fellner, 1988 , 6 ; as she notes, these numbers refer to political assassination s targeted almost exclusively toward leftists o r critics of the status quo. For 1988, the figures are from Americas Watch Committee, 1989 , 1 . The multifaceted nature of Colombian violence is apparent in the fact that one splinter guerrilla group from the FARC took credit for a massacre of over 200 of its own members in late 1985, ostensibly on the grounds that they were al l "infiltrators. " 7. Detail s regardin g thes e negotiation s ar e base d o n tape d interview s with man y o f th e centra l actor s i n 197 9 wit h Lui s Pinill a t o whic h I was given access, interviews by this author with them in 1982, and other sources (Hartlyn, 1988 , 54-74) . 8. A 196 8 constitutiona l refor m provide d a partial dismantlin g o f th e agreement. I t reinstituted simpl e majorit y vot e fo r most measure s in Congress, opened elections to all parties, and eliminated parity in the legislative branch at the municipal an d departmental level in 197 0 and at the national level in 1974. Parity in the executive branch was extended until 1978 , after which th e majorit y part y wa s require d to offer "adequate an d equitable " representation i n th e executiv e branc h t o th e part y receivin g th e secon d

Civil Violenc e an d Conflic t Resolutio n 6 1 highest numbe r of votes in the elections. This representation wa s accepted until 1986 , when Conservatives refused participation in the government of Liberal President Virgilio Barco (1986-90). Unde r Barco, efforts t o reform the Constitutio n whic h woul d hav e remove d thi s requiremen t ultimatel y failed. However, in 1990, newly inaugurated Liberal President Cesar Gaviria offered cabinet representation to the (re-named) Social Conservatives as well as to the M-19, a guerrilla group turned political party, which both initially accepted. Political refor m effort s finally succeede d ove r 199 0 an d 1991 . Specia l elections i n December 199 0 determine d th e membershi p o f a Constituent Assembly whic h o n July 4 , 199 1 promulgate d a new, mor e expansiv e an d participatory Constitution , puttin g a n en d t o al l vestige s o f th e Nationa l Front agreement. 9. Thi s shift in the attitude of the Church was facilitated by compromise moves o n th e par t o f th e Liberals . Fo r example, the y permitte d a special preamble, affirming the centrality of the Church to the country, which they had removed in the 1930 s t o be reinserte d in the Constitution . 10. Th e fact that the Liberals thus had more to gain from an agreement and tha t the y allowe d themselve s t o b e " exploited'' b y th e smalle r Con servative collectivity is consonant with arguments regarding collective action (Olson, 1971 , 29-43) . 11. Unde r th e Nationa l Fron t rul e o f presidentia l alternation , i n 197 0 only a Conservative could be elected president. As General Rojas had always identified with the Conservative party he was a legal candidate. Much of his support cam e fro m poo r urba n Libera l sympathizer s wh o ha d n o Libera l candidate for whom they coul d vote. 12. Durin g thi s tim e period , 14 9 Liberal s an d 8 3 Conservative s wer e killed, including 5 congressmen, 1 1 mayors, and 11 mayoral candidates (de la Espriella, 1988 , 25 , citin g a document fro m th e Presidenc y o f th e Re public). Th e governmen t reporte d tha t 38 3 member s o f the arme d force s or the polic e wer e kille d i n 1986 , 40 8 i n 1987 , an d 19 9 i n thre e t o fou r months of 198 8 combattin g guerrilla s or drug-traffickers (Colombia , Offic e of the President, n.d. , 29) . 13. Helpfu l i n understanding thes e term s ar e the conceptualization s o f Skocpol, 1985 . State autonomy refers to the ability of the state to formulate and pursue objective s independen t o f societa l demand s o r interests ; stat e capacity refers to the ability of the state to implement its goals or objectives and depends on such essential factors as the integrity of its sovereignty and military control of its territory, as well a s its internal coherence an d administrative and financial capabilities.

4.1 Suda n 62

F O U R

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Sudan , 1971-1972 Donald Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l

Africa's civi l wars, and especially thos e which hold out the prospec t of the break-u p o f the state , ar e no t normall y amenabl e t o politica l compromise and negotiation. However, this grim scenario does have its notable exceptions. In the Sudan , a rather uniqu e process was set in motion that led, in 1972, to a negotiated settlement of a protracted civil war. Th e resultin g Addi s Ababa Agreemen t wa s implemented , and the country settled down to a near decade of seemingly peacefu l relations. Does a mere decade of peace justify th e conclusion that the Addis Ababa Agreement constitute s a case o f successfu l negotiations ? W e are incline d t o agre e wit h Nelso n Kasfir' s (1977 : 165 ) conclusion , put forwar d i n the more peaceful time s of 1977, that howeve r dee p the differences betwee n Northern and Southern politicians or among themselves, "th e agreemen t ha s amounte d t o fa r mor e tha n a mer e interlude i n war. " Suppor t fo r thi s vie w ca n b e foun d i n th e theo retical literature on negotiation an d mediation, such as Saadia Touval and I. Willia m Zartman' s (1985 : 14 ) remar k tha t successfu l negoti ations and mediation canno t be limited to "the final resolution o f all conflict an d the reconciliatio n o f the parties" ; rather, successfu l ne We wis h t o expres s ou r appreciatio n t o Lak o Tongun, I . Willia m Zartman , Aggre y A . Majok an d Robert O . Collin s fo r helpfu l comment s o n th e first draf t o f th e paper .

63

64 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l gotiations shoul d b e viewe d i n narrowe r terms , a s "th e conclusio n of an agreemen t promisin g th e reductio n o f conflict/ ' To gain a n insight int o th e proces s o f peacemaking i n the Sudan, we briefl y discus s th e conflict-makin g environment , emphasizin g how hostil e perception s an d stereotypes , varyin g religiou s an d ed ucational practices and values, and uneven regional development and cultural difference s affecte d th e conflic t process . W e the n tur n t o the processe s o f negotiation , analyzin g bot h th e favorabl e precon ditions uniqu e t o the Sudanes e situatio n a t the tim e an d the factor s explaining the specifi c negotiatin g succes s at Addis Ababa in 197172. Bu t th e negotiation s o n th e agreemen t canno t b e isolate d fro m the implementatio n process ; therefore , w e wil l loo k briefl y i n th e subsequent section at the processes of implementing the Addis Ababa settlement. And , finally, w e wil l relat e th e uniqu e t o th e general izable and will consider the implications of the Sudan's peacemaking process i n th e 1970 s fo r th e managemen t o f civil wars.

The Conflict-Makin g Environmen t Although seriou s cultura l an d socia l division s amon g people s an d subregions di d create intens e conflict s i n the Suda n (Wai , 1981:37) , these conflicts were not so all-encompassing as to prevent meaningfu l negotiations. Certainly , distinc t ethni c identitie s an d historie s rein forced b y regiona l separatio n an d uneve n economi c developmen t are likely to produce conflic t i n the best o f circumstances; this combination of factors did in fact lead to grave tensions as independence came and old stratifications between a dominant and more developed North an d a vulnerabl e an d les s develope d Sout h remained . Th e ensuing struggl e fo r ethnoregiona l equalit y ha s remained bitte r an d at time s violent , bu t w e stres s tha t i t di d no t preclud e negotiation s as such. In John Howell's (1978: 427) words: ". . . racial antagonism, while often strong , did not in itself create an insurmountable barrie r to a settlement onc e favourabl e condition s ha d bee n created " (als o Legum, 1988a : 2-3) . For Souther n Sudanese , th e struggl e wa s "agains t interna l colo nialism" an d mos t specificall y agains t wha t the y perceive d a s th e "cultural orientation of the Arab, Northern-dominated government' s policies towar d th e South, " somethin g tha t the y describe d a s con stituting " a for m o f oppression " (Wai , 1983 : 306) . Fo r Sudanes e government officials , wit h thei r powe r bas e in th e North, i t wa s er -

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 6 5 roneous t o vie w th e struggl e a s a racia l one ; no t onl y wa s th e de scription o f Northerner s a s a homogeneou s "Arab " collectivit y in accurate, but the country' s political syste m include d representative s from al l section s o f the populatio n i n positions o f power (Eprile , 72 : 3). Ethni c stereotype s clearl y existe d o n both side s an d created dis tance betwee n groups ; in the end , however , variou s ke y leader s di d manage to rise above sectional loyalties, displaying sufficient politica l will t o find a n accommodation . Thi s pragmatism , facilitate d b y th e encounters betwee n riva l elite s durin g th e negotiatin g process , showed ethnoregional leader s to be considerabl y les s totalist in thei r perceptions of one another than many observers assumed (Rothchild , 1986: 8 7 - 9 3 ; Amy , 1983 : 354) . Until th e 1940s , th e Suda n wa s a n exampl e o f low-leve l nationa l integration, wha t Al i A . Mazru i (1969 : 334 ) describe s a s a "bar e coexistence" o f ethnoregional identit y groups . This minimal leve l o f integration wa s a consequenc e bot h o f th e interpla y o f loca l force s and o f colonia l design . Th e openin g u p o f th e Sout h t o Norther n traders, administrators , an d religiou s proselytizer s sharpene d a n awareness of Southern isolation and vulnerability. Muc h more fright ening wa s th e intermitten t contac t wit h Norther n slav e dealers , a n experience tha t create d negativ e remembrance s an d image s amon g Southerners which remai n poignant t o this very day (Republi c of th e Sudan, 1956 : 4; Wai, 1981 : 29). After the initial encounters, remark s a Sout h Suda n Resistanc e Movemen t statement , There followed numerous ivory traders and adventurers, who turned to slaving whe n th e suppl y o f ivor y diminished . Th e disruptio n an d los s o f lif e caused t o people s o f th e Sout h by th e slave-trader s wa s extremely heavy , particularly among the Shilluk, th e Bari, and the smaller tribes of the Bahrel-Ghazal. Th e slave-trader s an d their privat e soldier s wer e mainl y 'Khar toumers' (Northern Sudanese). (South Sudan Resistance Movement, n.d.: 2) The division s introduce d b y Britis h administrator s compounde d the awarenes s o f collectiv e difference s i n grou p power , advantage , and opportunities . Britis h colonia l officials , determine d t o insulat e the Sout h fro m Norther n commercial , religious , linguistic , an d ed ucational practice s an d competition , pu t specia l administrativ e pol icies int o effec t (th e so-calle d "Souther n Policy" ) tha t provide d fo r the us e o f Englis h a s an officia l language , denie d tradin g license s t o Northerners, suppresse d Muslim religious activities, discouraged th e use o f Ara b name s an d dress , an d transferre d Norther n administra tors to the North. 1 The Souther n Polic y wa s abandone d i n 1946 , bu t

66 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l not befor e creatin g "fea r an d mistrus t i n th e min d o f a Souther n Sudanese agains t hi s fello w countryma n i n th e North . . . . " (Sout h Sudan Resistance Movement , n.d. : 17) . Mental and emotional bound aries betwee n Southerner s an d Northerner s wer e erecte d an d for tified, producin g tension s tha t woul d liv e o n i n th e perio d afte r in dependence. The paternalisti c colonia l polic y o n separat e ethnoregiona l iden tities an d developmenta l path s produce d conflic t largel y becaus e i t left th e Sout h wit h negativ e remembrance s o f contact s wit h th e North and unprepared for a shared fate in a common Sudanes e state . The protectiv e polic y o f allowin g th e Sout h "t o develo p alon g it s own lines " ha d a variet y o f harmfu l political , economic , an d socia l consequences (Grey , 1971 : 113) . No t onl y di d th e developmen t o f a Southern-based political consciousness and participation lag behind that occurrin g i n th e Norther n part s o f th e country , bu t relativel y few Southerner s ha d bee n recruite d int o th e country' s civi l servic e (as a consequence o f educational disparities and inexperience, South erners secure d onl y si x o f th e 80 0 senio r governmen t post s vacate d by Britis h officials jus t prio r to independence ) (Eprile , 1972 : 6 ; Col lins, 1985 : 8) . Separatio n inhibite d th e growt h o f a web o f politica l exchanges an d reciprocitie s tha t woul d hav e facilitate d elit e coop eration onc e independenc e cam e (Beshir , 1975 : 45-49) . Give n th e level o f Souther n suspicion s an d animositie s i t i s no t clea r whethe r increased pattern s o f political exchange s woul d hav e bee n sufficien t to unit e th e countr y afte r th e colonial-erecte d scaffoldin g ha d bee n removed, but it seems likely that at the least it would have promote d learned experience s wit h join t proble m solving . The South' s relativ e unpreparednes s fo r Sudanes e independenc e was eve n mor e apparen t i n term s o f th e subregion' s economi c ne glect. Th e Souther n Regio n wa s clearl y on e o f th e mos t disadvan taged in the Sudan , havin g a per capita income estimate d a t half that of th e countr y a s a whole an d onl y one-fourt h tha t o f th e relativel y advantaged provinces of Kassala and Khartoum (Internationa l Labou r Office, 1976 : 199) . A s of the 1970/7 1 Industrial Survey, 7 3 percen t of th e industria l establishment s producin g 6 6 percen t o f th e valu e of productio n wer e locate d i n Khartou m province ; i n th e South , virtually n o industrial activitie s were reporte d (Internationa l Labou r Office, 1976 : 289) . Cotton , th e country' s majo r cas h crop , wa s produced i n th e Gezir a scheme , jus t sout h o f Khartoum , an d th e coun try's infrastructure , i n term s o f railroad s an d communication s links ,

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 6 7 was heavil y concentrate d i n th e mor e develope d areas . Wel l migh t a leadin g Souther n scholar , Dunsta n Wa i (1981 : 37) , criticiz e th e Southern Polic y a s a cause o f uneven economi c modernization , con cluding that such deprivation lef t th e South "dangerousl y vulnerabl e to th e pursuit s o f th e North. " The consequences of a "protective" colonial policy were also painfully eviden t i n socia l an d cultura l relations . Determine d t o thwar t the sprea d o f Isla m t o th e South , th e Britis h assiste d Christia n mis sionaries whil e restrictin g Muslim s enterin g th e Sout h an d discour aging th e us e o f Arabi c b y administrativ e personne l (O'Ballance , 1977: 28) . Christia n mission s exercise d a decisiv e contro l ove r ed ucation, usin g thi s influenc e t o promot e a politica l cultur e distinc t from th e res t o f th e country . Rober t Collin s (1985 : 5 ) note s th e intended impac t o f this emphasi s o n th e proces s o f political recruit ment: . . . al l administrative staff, including clerical and technical personnel, speaking Arabi c were t o b e replace d fro m indigenou s sources . Loca l boys wer e to be procured from the mission school s and 'every encouragemen t shoul d be give n t o thos e i n charg e o f missio n school s t o cooperat e i n tha t polic y by sending boys into Government service / This polic y no t onl y inhibite d natio n building , bu t i t di d littl e t o overcome th e country' s uneve n development . Decade s afte r inde pendence th e subregional imbalances in educational opportunit y stil l persisted: aggregat e statistic s o n educationa l opportunitie s i n th e early 1970 s showe d th e Souther n school s enrollin g onl y one-sixt h as man y student s a s th e res t o f th e countr y (Internationa l Labou r Office, 1976 : 128) . And General Joseph Lagu, noting that the South erners were hopelessl y unprepare d t o administer thei r countr y afte r independence, blame d th e Britis h fo r offerin g th e people s o f th e subregion a n inadequat e educationa l trainin g (O'Ballance , 1977 : 151). In sum, class, culture, ethnicity, and region in the Sudan all tended to coincide and to reinforce one another. I n objectiv e terms , th e dif ferential rate s o f subregiona l modernization , cause d i n par t b y co lonial contact s an d policies, resulte d i n shar p cleavages between th e relatively advantage d people s o f th e Nort h an d th e relativel y dis advantaged people s o f the South . I n subjectiv e terms , unmistakabl e evidences o f uneve n developmen t becam e th e foundatio n fo r grou p antagonisms grounde d i n negativ e remembrance s an d curren t per ceptions. Althoug h ofte n buil t upo n fals e myth s an d stereotypes ,

68 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l these perception s (o r misperceptions ) gaine d a cumulativ e accept ance ove r time , wit h disastrou s consequence s i n term s o f intens e conflicts i n North-Sout h relation s i n th e postindependenc e period . Most importantly , th e commonl y use d dichotom y betwee n a n "Arab" Nort h an d a n "African " an d "Negroid " Sout h wa s a n ov ersimplification tha t greatl y distorte d reality . I n fact , a n intermin gling o f people s an d culture s ha d bee n pronounced , resultin g i n considerable heterogeneity o n both side s of the North-South divide . In th e Nort h (wher e som e 7 0 percen t o f th e country' s populatio n lives), the fou r millio n Arab s mad e u p nearl y three-fifth s o f the re gion's population. The Southern ethni c peoples are often re-divide d into clan s o r sub-ethni c peoples , increasin g th e complexit y o f th e demographic pictur e i n th e area . I n addition , whil e th e Sout h wa s homogeneously "African, " i t wa s divide d furthe r alon g religiou s lines, including a small number o f Muslims and Christians a s well as a substantia l numbe r o f peoples adherin g t o traditiona l religions . The overarchin g identit y a s a Southerne r o r Northerner , then , reflected subjectiv e and symbolic factors at least as much as objective reality. Historica l experience s wit h conquest , assimilation , an d ex ploitation, includin g slavery , combine d wit h curren t perception s o f difference t o create a separate consciousness . The objectiv e aspect s of uneven developmen t coincide d with the subjectiv e factor s o f historical enmities , memories , an d perception s t o produc e a powerfu l conflict-making situatio n i n th e Sudan . Bu t i t i s importan t t o em phasize tha t thi s combine d thrus t towar d conflict , stron g an d im pelling a s i t was , di d no t i n an d o f itsel f preclud e negotiatio n an d compromise betwee n Nort h an d South . Ho w wer e Norther n an d Southern leader s abl e t o ris e abov e 1 7 years o f civil war t o reac h a peaceful settlemen t i n the 1971-7 2 period ? To answer this, we turn to th e processe s o f negotiation a t Addi s Ababa .

The Favorabl e Precondition s The convergence of region, ethnicity, class, and religion contribute d to a deep and protracted conflict between the Northern-led Sudanes e state an d th e Southern-base d guerrillas . Nevertheless , b y th e lat e 1960s a numbe r o f genera l factor s facilitate d a constructiv e nego tiating process . Take n together , thes e favorabl e factor s wer e criti cally importan t t o the successfu l outcom e o f 197 2 because the y es tablished a contex t i n whic h strategicall y place d mediator s coul d

The Peac e Proces s i n the Suda n 6 9 overcome a stalemate o f power . A s Dougla s Am y (1983 : 358 ) ob serves, "th e contex t o f powe r i n whic h negotiation s tak e place " is critical t o th e succes s o f mediator y initiatives . I n th e Sudan , thes e facilitating factor s wer e uniquel y i n place , helpin g t o explai n tha t country's rather atypical success with negotiating an intense conflic t between acutel y divide d societa l groupings . Henc e i t i s importan t that we tur n at this point t o a discussion o f the main favorable preconditions that set the context fo r successful negotiation s in the Sudan in 1971-72 . 1. The Emergence of Identifiable Bargaining Parties As in many conflicts betwee n stat e an d ethnoregional interests , th e conflicting partie s wer e i n fac t coalition s o f factions , no t homoge neous parties. In the state coalition, President Gaafar el-Nimeiry had to balance divers e element s i n the arm y and bureaucracy. Th e resignations of the Defense Ministe r and the Chief of Staff prior to the February 197 2 negotiations, reportedly because of their aversion to meetings wit h th e guerrill a leaders , indicat e th e existenc e o f op position element s withi n the Northern coalitio n a t this critical tim e (O'Ballance, 1977 : 142 ; Beshir, 1975 : 105) . The Southern coalitio n was, if anything, more divided than its state counterpart. The Southerners disagree d strongl y amon g themselve s a s to mean s an d ends, and ther e wer e pronounce d split s betwee n th e element s wh o re mained withi n th e Suda n an d thos e wh o wen t abroa d t o Uganda , London, and Ethiopia as well a s between th e various elites in Khartoum an d i n th e South . A s on e o f th e mediator s note d regardin g negotiations with Southern leaders: "There were many groups, and the question came up many times—who is the one to approach. You have to approach many leaders, and not only those who think themselves leaders ; leadershi p change d quit e often " (Conflic t Researc h Society, 1973 : 2). As the civi l wa r dragged on, a number o f developments clarifie d the natur e of the bargaining parties and their key leaders. With the crushing of a military coup attempt in 1970, Nimeiry moved swiftl y to eliminat e oppositio n element s i n the army , th e Musli m Brotherhood, and the left (mos t particularly, the Communist Party). Among those eliminated was a Southerner, Joseph Garang, the Cabinet member responsibl e fo r Souther n affair s wh o supporte d regiona l auton omy but expresse d stron g reservation s abou t th e separatist-minde d Anya-Nya insurgent movement . Garang' s execution, alon g with th e

70 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l fall o f othe r activ e opponent s o f compromis e withi n th e arm y an d the Musli m fundamentalists, lef t Nimeir y wit h considerabl e freedo m to pursu e a political solutio n t o th e Souther n problem . Muc h o f th e responsibility fo r handlin g Souther n affair s wa s immediatel y trans ferred t o anothe r Southerner , Abe l Alier , wh o playe d a key rol e i n the subsequen t negotiation s wit h Souther n leaders . Although th e coalitio n o f Southerner s neve r reache d quit e th e level o f cohesivenes s manifeste d b y th e elit e aroun d Nimeiry , th e Southern Suda n Liberatio n Movemen t (SSLM) , le d b y Colone l Jo seph Lagu , di d com e t o represen t a reasonably unite d part y fo r ne gotiating purposes. Lagu's role in bringing together diverse Souther n interests i s most impressive . Consolidatin g hi s base o f power i n east ern Equatoria , Lag u the n wen t o n t o unit e th e variou s Anya-Ny a forces unde r hi s command . B y Augus t 1971 , Lag u ha d been s o suc cessful i n gaining support amon g Southern militar y commander s an d politicians tha t h e wa s i n a positio n t o announc e th e formatio n o f the SSL M an d to declar e himsel f it s leade r (O'Ballance , 1977 : 1 3 2 135). Lag u ha d bee n greatl y strengthene d b y th e leverag e gaine d from controllin g militar y supplie s funnelle d int o th e Suda n fro m abroad (allegedl y b y th e Israelis ) (Conflic t Researc h Society , 1973 : 2-3). The result was to establish the acceptability of the SSLM among its constituent s i n th e Sout h an d t o clarif y th e decisio n structur e within th e SSLM . This was important t o the negotiatin g process , fo r the Nimeir y stat e wa s abl e t o recogniz e tha t Souther n leader s coul d deliver o n th e bargains tha t the y ultimatel y struc k (Licklider , 1988 : 6). 2. Leaders Determined

upon

a Political Solution

It require s politica l wil l o n th e par t o f th e leader s o f th e mai n riva l parties t o th e conflic t t o extricat e themselve s an d thei r supporter s from a mutually hurtin g stalemate . Thei r sens e tha t tim e i s runnin g out and that both th e conflict an d their situation will worsen throug h inaction ma y impe l th e ke y leader s t o begi n th e difficul t searc h fo r a political solution . I n the Sudan , the competin g elite s did alter thei r preferences aroun d th e sam e time , reflectin g thei r join t realizatio n that the continuanc e o f the civi l war was likely to prove self-destruc tive. In other conflict situations , intransigence has seemed preferabl e to a t leas t on e o f th e parties ; a s a result, thei r militar y struggl e ha s continued, eve n escalated . Henc e th e paralle l movemen t towar d joint proble m solvin g ca n b e viewe d a s somewha t unusual , an d i t

The Peace Proces s in the Suda n 7 1 represented a n importan t facilitatin g facto r i n th e achievemen t o f the 197 2 settlement . Political preferences favoring a peaceful solution emerged on both sides around the same time, but for very different reasons . Nimeiry, recognizing that the Sudanese state was "soft" and therefore incapable of imposing its peace terms upon the South , was committed to overcoming th e deadloc k i n North-Sout h relation s wit h a series o f conciliatory initiative s (Africa Confidential, 1971:1) . Durin g th e 1969-72 period, he proposed a solution offering the South a degree of regional autonomy within a unitary Sudanese state ; replaced (th e executed) Joseph Garang as Minister of Southern Affairs with a moderate Southerner (Abe l Alier); asked Alier to begin discussions with the guerrilla spokesmen, leading to negotiations; appointed Alier to head the Sudanes e delegation a t the Addis Ababa negotiations; unilaterally ratifie d th e Addi s Ababa Agreement; an d promulgated th e subsequent Souther n Provinces Regional Self-Governmen t Ac t (Assefa, 1987 : 72; Kasfir, 1987 : 152) . Clearly, he was prepared to take calculated risks in dealing with hi s coalition opponent s o n the issu e of a negotiated solutio n o f the Souther n problem. I n achieving thi s objective, Nimeir y wa s abl y assiste d b y Abe l Alier , wh o playe d a key role in the successful negotiation s at Addis Ababa in 1972 . No t only was Alier's appointment a s head of the government delegatio n taken as a positive signal of the government's seriousness of purpose regarding the negotiations , bu t h e wa s to g o o n an d contribute importantly t o th e 197 2 settlement , puttin g fort h constitutiona l pro posals on regional autonom y tha t became th e basis for the fina l ac cord (Epps , 1971) . Within the Southern coalition, SSL M leader and Anya-Nya Commander-in-Chief Major-Genera l Lag u playe d a critically importan t role i n the proces s culminatin g i n a settlement. Onc e Lag u consol idated his position of political an d military leadership within Southern ranks , h e wa s abl e t o overcom e th e reluctanc e o f som e o f hi s commanders to begin negotiations and to respond positively to government overture s (Africa Confidential, 1971) . Seein g politica l ne gotiations a s inevitable , Lag u declare d himsel f read y i n Octobe r 1970 t o ente r int o seriou s negotiation s wit h governmen t represen tatives. "W e have been al l impressed/' Lag u wrote, that th e enemy now feel our pressure and would want to have talks with us. . . . We welcome the idea to prepare for talks becaus e w e ar e no t jus t trouble makers , w e ar e a people strugglin g fo r a cause , an d i f that ca n b e

72 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l achieved by talking we see n o reason why we do not accept t o talk. (Lagu, 1978, emphasi s in text). Although agreein g i n principl e t o talks , Lag u nevertheles s se t a number of preconditions before seriou s discussions coul d begin: that the Sudanes e arm y sto p al l hostilitie s an d sta y i n th e position s the y held at that time, that Southern Sudanese political prisoners be freed , and that th e Anya-Ny a b e recognize d publicl y a s "th e onl y elemen t to negotiat e wit h i n th e Souther n Sudan " (Lagu , 1978) . Subse quently, Lag u indicate d a willingness t o agre e t o Nimeiry' s precon ditions fo r talks . H e indicate d tha t i f th e Khartou m authoritie s showed themselves to be "sincer e and serious," his delegation woul d be willin g t o ente r int o negotiation s t o reac h a settlemen t o f th e conflict "within the framework of one Sudan" (Ankrah , 1971 ; 1972 : 63). No t onl y wa s Lag u prepare d t o b e cooperative , bu t h e wa s willing t o accep t Nimeiry' s non-negotiabl e principl e o n Sudanes e unity a s well. Fro m tha t poin t forwar d Lag u playe d a central rol e i n promoting th e peac e process—maintainin g th e unit y o f hi s delega tion, respondin g t o initiatives , an d deliverin g o n agreements . In brief, th e leadershi p skill s an d commitmen t o f Nimeiry , Alier , and Lag u t o th e peac e proces s durin g th e 1 9 6 9 - 7 2 perio d create d a uniquel y positiv e environmen t tha t facilitate d join t proble m solv ing. A s Nelso n Kasfi r (1977 : 145 ) concluded , " . . . th e decision s o f Nimeiri and Lagu to fully commit themselves to peace and the patient efforts o f Alie r fo r tw o an d a half year s t o establis h condition s per mitting thos e commitment s wer e crucial. " 3. A Mutually Hurting Stalemate By 1971 , a number of the actors involved in the conflic t i n the Suda n appear t o hav e become awar e tha t a mutually hurtin g stalemat e ha d developed betwee n th e Nimeir y stat e an d th e Souther n coalitio n o f forces. Thi s stalemat e wa s principall y o f a militar y natur e bu t in volved financial an d political element s a s well. I t was primarily wit h respect t o th e militar y aspec t o f th e stalemate , though , tha t leader s of th e stat e an d Souther n coalition s cam e t o recogniz e tha t a n im passe i n th e conflic t ha d bee n reached . Neithe r th e Sudanes e stat e nor th e SSL M possessed , no r seeme d likel y t o b e abl e t o acquire , such resource s a s to lea d t o a n overwhelmin g powe r disparity . A s a result, bot h coalition s cam e t o th e realizatio n tha t tota l victor y fo r one o r the othe r wa s no t possible . Thus , a n awarenes s o f th e fac t o f a mutually hurtin g stalemat e ca n be see n a s constituting a significan t

The Peace Proces s in the Suda n 7 3 factor leading to the search for a non-military settlement to the Sudan conflict. While a mutually hurting stalemate between th e two sides to the conflict ma y have been reache d a year or two earlier, onl y in 197 1 was there a willingness to recognize the implications of the stalemate. In the previous years of the conflic t neithe r Northern government s nor th e Anya-Ny a ha d succeede d i n gainin g th e uppe r han d mili tarily, ye t eac h sid e ha d pressed on , seekin g t o gai n a n advantag e on the battlefield. Durin g his tenure as President of the Sudan, from 1958 unti l 1964 , Ibrahi m Abbou d pursue d a primarily militar y solution with respect to the South, seeking to quell the newly emergent guerrilla army there. His failure to solve the Souther n problem was one o f th e reason s fo r hi s downfall . Whil e th e succeedin g govern ments of Premiers el-Khatim el-Khalifah, Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub, an d Sadiq al-Mahd i initiall y pu t forwar d politica l proposal s t o resolve th e conflict , the y to o reverte d to the use o f the military . Once in power, Nimeir y appear s to have realized the inability of the Sudanese state to press on to a military victory in its conflict with the SSLM. On August 1 , 1969 , for example, Nimeiry stated: 'Ther e is no military solutio n to the rebellio n in the south. " The period he spent fro m Novembe r 196 6 t o Decembe r 196 7 a s th e office r i n charge of restoring order in Torit, Equatoria province may have been important in leading him to this conclusion (O'Ballance, 1977 : 116). Other member s o f th e politica l elit e i n Khartou m a t this tim e als o doubted that a military solution to the Southern problem was possible and recognized the existence o f the mutually hurting stalemate (Africa Confidential, 1971: 1). A mutually hurtin g stalemat e suc h a s that reache d i n th e Suda n in 1971 is by no means an inevitable outcome in civil war situations. This stalemate must be understood in light of the fact that the Sudan was in many respects a "soft" state , wit h resource scarcity , limite d regulatory an d coerciv e capacit y withi n it s boundaries , an d wea k social relations among societal elements (Rothchild and Foley, 1988 : 234). Suc h state softness mad e it difficult, i f not impossible, fo r the Sudanese government t o win a military victory ove r the South , and it continually raise d the cost s of attempting t o d o so. Although the Souther n force s ha d fought thei r way to thi s stalemate, apparentl y the y lagge d behin d Nimeir y i n recognizin g tha t such a state of events had been reache d between Nort h an d South. After all, the Anya-Nya had become stronge r over the course of the

74 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l conflict, growin g fro m a small , nearl y unarme d forc e o f som e fe w hundred t o a movement , unifie d unde r Genera l Josep h Lagu , con sisting of 10,00 0 t o 12,00 0 men . Even though the Anya-Nya's actua l control ove r much o f the Sout h remaine d limited , it s armed strengt h and degre e o f popula r suppor t mad e i t a force t o b e reckone d wit h (Howell, 1978 : 426) . Nonetheless , event s i n 197 1 ma y hav e con tributed t o th e Anya-Nya' s realizatio n tha t i t coul d no t scor e a final victory ove r governmen t forces . Foremos t amon g thes e wa s a re duction i n it s wa r materie l arisin g fro m th e blockin g o f th e Israel i channels. A n agreemen t reache d i n Novembe r 197 1 betwee n Pres ident Nimeir y an d Emperor Hail e Selassi e ha d close d th e Ethiopia n line o f access . Anothe r rout e wa s cu t of f whe n Presiden t Ami n ex pelled th e Israeli s fro m Uganda . Certainly th e la g betwee n stalemat e an d remedia l actio n prove d hurtful t o bot h antagonists . A s on e observe r (Assefa , 1987 : 153 ) noted: "Th e Anya-Ny a ha d mad e th e Sout h virtuall y ungovernable , but an internationally recognize d secessio n wa s as far away as ever/ ' It had taken years for the conflict in the Sudan to reach a recognizable deadlock and yet more time was to prove necessary before the parties could com e t o grip s with thi s stat e o f affairs. Th e cost s t o both side s of battlin g t o a n impass e prove d extremel y high . Ye t ha d suc h a stalemate o f power no t bee n reache d an d had eithe r sid e continue d to believ e i n th e possibilit y o f a military triumph , i t seem s unlikel y that eithe r acto r woul d hav e been willin g t o conside r a non-militar y solution t o th e conflict . 4. External Pressures to

Reach Agreement

As note d above , initiatin g a peace proces s require s cooperativ e po litical decision s b y th e riva l leaders . Pressure s b y externa l actor s t o end a conflic t ar e no t likely , b y themselves , t o mov e antagonist s t o the bargainin g table . Nonetheless , th e action s o f regiona l an d inter national actor s may serve t o facilitat e th e negotiatio n process . I n th e Sudan, a number of external political factor s were at play throughou t the 17-yea r civi l war . Severa l o f thes e externa l pressure s appea r t o have been significan t i n influencing th e tw o contendin g coalition s t o seek a non-military settlemen t o f th e conflict . Ethiopia an d Ugand a wer e tw o regiona l actor s wit h a long-ter m interest an d significan t involvemen t i n th e Sudanes e conflict . Lik e the Sudan , Ethiopi a face d secessionis t challenges , mos t particularl y in Eritrea and the Ogaden. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF ) and,

The Peac e Proces s in the Suda n 7 5 after 1970 , the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF ) used the Sudan for arms running and refuge; in turn, Emperor Haile Selassi e allowed militar y supplie s t o be funnelle d t o th e Anya-Ny a throug h Ethiopia and gave saf e haven an d training to rebel troops. Suc h actions were indispensable to Anya-Nya forces and constituted a source of pressure on the Khartoum government; however, when the leaders of Ethiopia and the Sudan agreed in March 1971 to cease aiding and abetting eac h other' s secessionis t movements , i t ha d th e effec t o f facilitating an internal settlement between the Nimeiry state and the SSLM. Nimeir y an d the Empero r move d t o thi s agreemen t i n part because both the Anya-Ny a and the Eritrea n liberation movement s had grown strong enough to expand, and possibly to internationalize, what stil l remaine d essentiall y interna l war s (Howell, 1978 : 432) . Moreover, wit h the overthrow o f President Milto n Obote i n January 1971 , Ugandan pressures o n the conflic t i n the Suda n became critical. Lang i an d Acholi troop s oppose d t o th e Ami n coup fled to the souther n Suda n fo r safet y where , supporte d b y th e Sudanes e army, the y wer e abl e t o regroup . Durin g thi s period , plan s wer e afoot t o invad e Ugand a fro m easter n Equatori a t o restor e Obote . These actions were countered by Idi Amin who gave support to the Anya-Nya; among other things, the Anya-Nya was allowed access to a supply route through Uganda. These events came to an end when, in late 1971 , Nimeir y an d Amin signe d a n accord; Nimeiry agree d to terminate support for Obote's forces in exchange for an expressed willingness on Amin's part to curtail external access to the Anya-Nya through Uganda. The Ethiopia n an d Uganda n agreement s severe d th e tw o majo r supply route s t o th e rebels . I n addition , Ami n expelle d th e Israel i military missio n fro m Uganda . Thi s cu t of f Israel i suppor t fo r th e Anya-Nya, a n important facto r becaus e th e Israeli s ha d apparentl y become arms suppliers sometime in 1969 (Howell , 1978 : 430-433). Thus, the termination of Ethiopian and Ugandan support for Southern forces influence d th e Souther n politician s t o consider seriousl y an agreement wit h the Nimeir y state . Although non e o f thes e externa l factor s i n an d o f themselve s proved sufficien t t o impe l th e contendin g partie s towar d a n agreement, the y ma y hav e heightene d a joint awarenes s o f th e urgenc y to end the stalemate. In addition, implicit in many of the aforemen tioned influence s wa s th e possibilit y o f isolatio n tha t eac h o f th e antagonists could ill-afford—-diplomatic isolatio n for the governmen t

76 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l of th e Suda n an d strategi c isolatio n fo r th e Souther n forces . Th e coincidence o f a number o f thes e externa l pressure s i n 197 1 mad e both antagonist s awar e o f th e dimension s an d consequence s o f th e stalemate. 5. Mediator Actively

on

the Scene

The third-part y mediato r i n th e Suda n wa s no t remove d fro m th e scene o f the conflict , bu t rathe r ha d interacted wit h parties involve d in the conflict fo r a number of years before it s resolution; this appears to hav e facilitate d th e proces s leadin g t o th e Addi s Abab a Agree ment. Th e presenc e o f th e Worl d Counci l o f Churche s (WCC ) an d the Al l Afric a Conferenc e o f Churche s (AACC ) i n Afric a an d thei r ongoing contact s wit h variou s Sudanes e politica l leader s allowe d them, as mediators, to take advantage o f any windows of opportunit y that presente d themselves . Th e mediator s understoo d th e shiftin g negotiation context , th e ris e o f ne w actors , an d change s i n politica l will; the y wer e therefor e able , a t th e appropriat e moments , t o len d their service s an d to help mov e th e partie s beyond stalemate s i n th e negotiation process . The WC C an d th e AAC C had been involve d i n the conflic t i n th e Sudan, in one wa y or another, fo r a number of years. A primary for m of thi s involvemen t wa s engagemen t i n refuge e relie f efforts . I n ad dition, i n 196 6 a goodwill missio n fro m th e AACC visited the Sudan , seeking t o evaluat e th e situatio n ther e an d t o offe r it s service s fo r peace negotiations . I n 1970 , afte r som e year s o f exposur e t o th e conflict, th e WCC undertook a re-evaluation o f "what leadership th e World Council o f Churches should offer t o its member-bodies o n th e Sudan situation. " Accordin g t o Kodw o E . Ankra h (1972 : 61) , th e African Secretar y o f th e Divisio n o f Inte r Churche s Aid , Refugee s and Worl d Servic e o f th e WCC : We became convince d that anyone who had been awar e of the situatio n in the Suda n woul d not attribute th e proble m t o on e specifi c cause ; it ha d a complexity o f reasons—which migh t include religion , race , political, socia l and economic factors—all of which had combined to create a political problem. . . . W e furthermor e becam e convince d afte r exchangin g a serie s o f internal staff memoranda that we should advocate strongly that the Church leaders in Africa should approach the Sudan problem from a political angle. Thus, thei r presenc e a t th e scen e o f th e conflic t allowe d th e third party mediator s t o chang e thei r approac h t o th e conflic t whe n cir cumstances calle d fo r suc h a shift .

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 7 7 Because the y were activel y o n the scene , th e WCC and the AAC C were abl e t o asses s th e implication s o f change s i n leadership , th e emergence o f identifiabl e bargainin g parties , an d othe r event s a s they too k plac e an d mak e th e mos t o f opportun e moment s i n orde r to advanc e th e negotiatio n process . Amon g othe r things , WC C rep resentatives urged the SSLM, through its London spokesman, Madin g de Garang , t o creat e a consensu s positio n withi n th e Anya-Ny a b y resolving some of the internal problems that existed among the man y Southern groups. 2 Mediators wh o ca n recogniz e window s o f opportunit y an d us e them t o mov e th e negotiatio n proces s forwar d mus t b e see n a s fa miliar wit h th e conflic t an d th e partie s involved . On e WC C officia l put thi s well , declarin g tha t reconciliation effort s ha d to b e base d o n a long perio d o f preparation be forehand—perhaps five or six years. You had to nourish good relations with both sides , eve n i f ther e wa s n o hop e o f a settlemen t o n th e horizon . A relationship of trust was not unimportant, an d it took time to establish our reliability an d impartiality before peopl e woul d 'ente r int o confidentiality * with you. (Conflic t Researc h Society , 1973 : 23 ) In th e cas e o f th e Sudan , th e WCC' s an d AACC' s familiarit y wit h the conflict , thei r contact s wit h SSL M supporter s suc h a s th e Mak erere Group and the Kampala Committee, an d visits to the Khartou m government gained them the confidence o f the parties to the conflict . The presenc e o f a third-party mediato r activel y o n th e scen e wa s certainly no t sufficient t o move the conflicting parties to reach agree ment. I f there ha d been n o political wil l o n th e par t of the coalition s to reac h a settlement , n o amoun t o f effor t b y th e mediator s woul d have suffice d t o resolv e th e conflict . However , th e fac t tha t a me diator ha d bee n o n th e scen e fo r a numbe r o f year s mean t tha t i t could act when the moment was advantageous, facilitating agreemen t between th e actor s an d helpin g the m t o mov e beyon d deadlock .

The Proces s o f Negotiatio n In th e Sudanes e negotiation s o f 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 , th e five favorabl e pre conditions discussed above set a uniquely propitious context in which state-ethnoregional bargainin g coul d tak e place . Le t u s tur n no w t o the peacemakin g proces s itself . Followin g th e overthro w o f th e op pressive regim e o f General Ibrahi m Abbou d i n 1964 , th e ne w Prim e

78 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l Minister, Si r el-Khatim el-Khalifah , pursue d a more conciliator y ap proach t o th e South . I n particular , Khalifa h appointe d tw o South erners t o th e Cabinet , relaxe d th e stat e o f emergency i n the South , and invite d Southerner s insid e an d outsid e th e countr y t o a Round Table Conference i n Khartoum. After som e initial discussions on the normalization o f th e situatio n i n th e Sout h an d th e recognition s o f certain huma n rights , the Conference , unabl e to reac h a unanimous agreement on the system of government to be adopted for the South, appointed a twelve-man committe e t o mak e recommendation s o n a constitutional arrangement which would "protect the special interest of the South as well as the general interest of the Sudan" (Wai, 1973: 208). The 196 5 twelve-ma n committee , whic h me t fo r mor e than a year, rule d ou t separatio n an d centralize d unitar y government , an d proposed instea d a schem e o f regiona l autonom y withi n a unite d Sudan. Northern and Southern representatives disagreed strongly on whether th e Sout h shoul d b e considere d a s a unit (a s preferred b y the Souther n delegates ) o r divide d alon g provincia l line s (a s pre ferred b y the Northern delegates) ; however, there was broad agreement on the division of central and regional powers (Wai, 1973: 2 1 1217). Thes e proposals , whil e no t pu t int o effec t a t th e time , se t appropriate guideline s fo r th e Addi s Ababa settlement . With th e accessio n o f Saye d Saddi q al-Madh i t o th e premiershi p in 1966, the tone of North-South relations changed. The new regime, intent upo n encouragin g a n Islami c revival , urge d th e adoptio n o f an Islamic constitution. By departing fro m th e general guidelines on regional autonomy an d group rights set out by the twelve-man com mittee, the al-Mahdi and Mohammed Mahgou b regimes represente d a temporary break i n the progress toward a North-South settlemen t in the late 1960s . With the war continuing and these regimes unable to offer a way out of the impasse, it is not surprising that the military, led b y Nimeiry , decide d t o intervene . It quickl y becam e apparen t tha t Nimeir y favore d a new effor t a t political reconciliatio n wit h the South . In June 1969 , he announce d plans t o broaden th e amnest y fo r souther n oppositio n elements ; t o initiate a n intensiv e social , economi c an d cultura l progra m fo r th e South; to appoint a Minister o f Southern Affairs ; an d to train South erners to take up positions of responsibility. He thus offered th e goal of regional autonom y withi n th e framewor k o f a united Sudan , th e same objectiv e tha t ha d bee n pu t forwar d previousl y b y th e Roun d Table (Legum , 1971 : B55).

The Peace Proces s in the Suda n 7 9 In th e year s tha t followed , Nimeir y remaine d firmly committed to the objective of a political settlement that would give Southerners responsibility fo r loca l affair s i n thei r region . H e authorize d wor k on th e implementatio n o f th e regiona l autonom y plan , a task tha t was undertaken separately by Southern intellectuals and by Dr. Gaafar Mohame d Al i Bakheit , th e Ministe r o f Loca l Government , an d Sayed Abdel Rahman Abdullah, the former chairma n of the twelveman committe e an d late r Deput y Ministe r o f Loca l Government . Both implementation plans were similar in proposing to maintain the unity of the South, to have a head of the region with the status of a minister, to have a regional assembly and executive, an d to give the region the power t o rais e money throug h taxes (Nimeiri , 1971) . In brief, there was considerable continuity in the process—both in terms of personne l an d progra m specifics . Th e recommendation s o f th e Round Table and the twelve-man committee reached forward to the negotiations at Addis Ababa in 1971-72, creating linkages over time that narrowe d difference s an d facilitate d agreemen t o n th e final terms. An important variable was the willingness of both parties to engage in a n ongoin g proces s o f reciproca l concessions . Thi s willingnes s went beyond environmental factors and favorable preconditions and evidenced a political will on both sides to move toward a settlement. One of the most important example s of such reciprocal concession s involved the agreements by the Nimeiry state and the SSLM on the conditions eac h ha d set fo r entering int o negotiations . Th e govern ment of the Sudan asked that Southern representatives be individuals who ha d influence ove r thos e actuall y involve d i n th e fighting and that negotiation s b e conducte d withi n th e framewor k o f regiona l autonomy o f th e Sout h withi n on e Sudan. 3 I n turn , th e SSL M re quired tha t negotiation s tak e plac e i n a n independent , non-Arab , African state and that they make use of an African leader as mediator. The SSL M also asked that the Sudanes e governmen t recogniz e th e Anya-Nya a s "th e onl y elemen t t o negotiat e wit h i n th e Souther n Sudan" (Lagu, 1978). What is significant, then, is that the two parties agreed t o th e condition s tha t th e othe r se t prio r t o negotiations , thereby demonstrating that each was serious about embarking upon the process of political exchange . In addition to these concessions, which were critical for initiating the negotiations , a t least thre e othe r majo r sets o f concessions sur faced durin g the negotiations . First , Norther n representative s con -

80 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l tended tha t Arabi c shoul d b e th e country' s sol e officia l language , arguing tha t th e developmen t o f loca l language s wa s a par t o f th e national cultur e an d heritag e an d tha t th e existenc e o f tw o o r mor e official language s coul d prov e divisive . Southerner s sough t t o mak e English the official languag e of the Southern region, fearing that nonArabic speakin g Southerner s migh t late r b e disadvantage d whe n seeking governmen t positions . Th e issu e wa s resolve d b y bot h side s agreeing tha t Arabi c woul d b e "th e officia l languag e fo r th e Suda n and English the principal language for the Southern Region** ("Addi s Ababa Agreement, " 1972 , Chapte r III , Articl e 6) . Second, th e governmen t wante d a single nationa l arm y controlle d by th e centra l government . Th e SSL M argue d tha t ther e shoul d b e three armies : on e fo r th e Norther n region , on e fo r th e Souther n region, t o b e compose d o f Anya-Ny a troops , an d a thir d arm y t o guard Khartoum , t o b e controlle d b y th e centra l governmen t an d made u p equall y o f Northerner s an d Southerners. 4 Thi s prove d t o be a very contentiou s issue ; nevertheless , a formula wa s finally de vised whic h eac h sid e foun d minimall y satisfactor y an d whic h af fected onl y th e compositio n o f th e Souther n Defens e Corps . Th e armed forces in the Southern region were to consist of a unified forc e made u p o f 6,00 0 troop s fro m th e Anya-Ny a an d 6,00 0 troop s fro m the North . Suc h a formula me t th e desire s o f the Sudanes e stat e fo r one nationa l forc e an d th e Souther n coalition' s concer n fo r th e in corporation o f Anya-Ny a troop s int o th e army . Third, whil e som e Souther n politician s ha d favore d secessio n o f the Sout h fro m th e North , other s ha d sough t a federa l structur e between th e two regions. The North, on the other hand, had entere d into the negotiations urgin g limited regional autonomy fo r the South. Mutual concession s le d t o a n agreemen t whereb y th e South' s thre e provinces o f Bah r e l Ghazal , Equatoria , an d Uppe r Nil e constitute d a self-governing uni t within the Republic. A s Mohamed Omer Beshi r (1975: 110 ) observed : 'Thi s wa s no t a compromis e bu t a realisti c and practica l formul a whic h remove d th e tw o extrem e positions , separation and the status quo. Th e national aspirations of both partie s were satisfied. " These reciproca l concession s appea r t o hav e buil t u p a certai n minimal level o f trust on the part of both groups. They demonstrate d to eac h tha t th e sacrifice s entaile d i n a n agreemen t woul d no t b e unilateral. After 1 7 years of prolonged warfare, one could not expec t any singl e actio n t o creat e trus t o n th e par t o f a n adversar y party ,

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 8 1 nor t o legitimat e th e entir e negotiatio n process . However , th e re ciprocal concession s that wer e made di d serve to create a history of positive response s betwee n th e tw o group s an d t o build a networ k of relationships between them. Through reciprocal concessions, each side wa s abl e t o tes t th e negotiatio n proces s a t variou s stages , an d to receive concrete evidence s of its rival's political will to reach an d implement a settlement . A s part o f th e negotiatio n process , recip rocal concessions also encouraged participant s to alter their percep tions of one another. Growing interaction between the parties during the negotiations , combine d wit h th e giv e an d tak e o f concessions , prompted th e evolutio n o f perception s fro m totalis t one s towar d something mor e pragmati c i n natur e an d mor e conduciv e t o bar gaining outcomes . A n earl y exampl e wa s the North' s agreemen t t o negotiate wit h th e SSL M outsid e th e Sudan , i n Addi s Ababa . Suc h a concession accorded a certain degree of legitimacy to the Souther n movement, bot h becaus e i t met on e o f the Souther n politicians ' de mands an d becaus e i t place d th e partie s o n somewha t mor e diplo matically equa l term s tha n woul d hav e been th e cas e ha d the y me t in the Sudan . A n even cleare r exampl e o f evolving perception s wa s the government' s willingnes s t o treat th e SSL M as a legitimate bar gaining party i n the secre t negotiation s preceding Addi s Ababa (Niilus, 1973 : 12). Although perception s wer e altere d durin g th e negotiatio n pro cess, they remained within a certain range. For example, negotiations between th e contendin g group s coul d no t hav e occurre d ha d th e Southern coalitio n insiste d o n secession . Onc e th e Souther n politi cians agreed t o the Norther n government' s "on e Sudan " condition , the partie s the n diverge d o n interest s rathe r tha n principles . Inter ests prove d t o b e negotiabl e an d wer e somethin g o n whic h bot h sides were willing to make concessions. By acknowledging tacit limits and recognizin g tha t som e principle s wer e non-negotiable , th e tw o sides wer e abl e t o mov e forward , circumventin g issue s tha t migh t have le d t o deadloc k an d the breakdow n o f negotiations . As third-party mediator s th e WC C an d AAC C wer e involve d i n moving th e Suda n negotiation s forward . A s w e mentione d before , their familiarit y wit h th e conflic t an d thei r presenc e o n th e scen e were factor s enablin g thes e organization s t o ac t i n th e productiv e manner the y did . Wha t remain s t o b e explore d i s the natur e o f th e role played by these mediators and its importance to the negotiatio n process. W e argu e her e tha t i f th e five favorabl e precondition s w e

82 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l set ou t ar e i n place , a mediato r ca n pla y a facilitatin g role , bu t n o more than that. To borrow the language used by Douglas Amy (1983 : 356-360), i t i s possibl e t o spea k o f bot h th e importanc e an d th e unimportance o f a mediator withi n th e negotiatin g context . Some o f the importan t role s played b y th e WC C and AACC, suc h as promotin g contact s betwee n groups , hav e bee n examine d previ ously. I n addition, the tw o mediators helped t o facilitate concession s between th e contendin g partie s a t Addi s Ababa , offerin g formula s for the tw o group s to debate an d discuss, remindin g eac h sid e o f th e dilemmas face d b y it s opponents , recallin g wha t wa s a t stak e whe n the negotiation s gre w heated , an d slowin g dow n th e pac e o f th e negotiations whe n tha t becam e necessar y (Welton , Pruitt , an d McGillicuddy, 1988 : 182 , 185-186) . Th e mediators , an d th e ton e they set for the negotiations, may also have helped alter perceptions. For example, whe n agreemen t wa s reached a t the conferenc e o n th e question of the army, Canon Burgess Carr stood to pray aloud, cryin g as he di d so . Accordin g t o other s present , on e o f the general s i n th e Northern delegatio n wa s crying a s well, ou t o f admitted remors e fo r the slaughte r betwee n brother s tha t ha d take n plac e ove r th e year s (Assefa, 1987 : 142) . Why wer e th e WC C an d AAC C abl e t o succee d wher e othe r in termediaries (suc h a s th e London-base d Movemen t fo r Colonia l Freedom) ha d failed ? A t leas t par t o f th e answe r t o thi s questio n may b e foun d i n th e fac t tha t th e tw o group s wer e abl e t o gai n th e trust o f both o f th e contendin g parties . Th e North' s trus t ha d bee n at least partially wo n by the fac t that the AACC's 196 6 report , "Mis sion t o th e Sudan, " wa s somewha t sympatheti c t o th e North . Thi s became importan t late r becaus e th e governmen t ha d t o participat e if ther e wer e t o b e an y negotiations . Even thoug h a numbe r o f Southerner s ha d bee n pu t of f b y th e 1966 report , thei r trus t wa s graduall y gaine d by , amon g othe r fac tors, th e willingnes s o f the third-part y mediator s t o mee t wit h the m in places lik e Ugand a unde r the auspice s o f the Kampal a Committe e and th e Makerer e Group . I n addition , th e fac t tha t th e AAC C wa s an African organization , an d that som e o f the ke y mediators , amon g them Burges s Car r an d Kodw o Ankrah , wer e Africans , ma y hav e helped t o mak e th e third-part y mediator s mor e legitimat e i n South ern eyes . Finally , th e willingnes s o f th e mediator s t o provid e th e SSLM with money fo r travel an d lawyer's fees , thereb y empowerin g the Souther n coalitio n an d enabling it to participate mor e effectivel y

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 8 3 in the negotiations , probabl y reassure d th e Sout h tha t th e WCC an d AACC wer e no t inherentl y biase d i n favo r o f th e North' s position . In addition, the WCC an d AACC appear to have been abl e to pla y the rol e the y di d becaus e o f th e natur e o f thei r organizations . A s private, activis t organization s wit h relativel y limite d resources , th e WCC and AACC were unabl e t o either coerc e o r threaten th e actor s involved i n th e Suda n conflict . Thi s ma y hav e bee n ye t anothe r rea son th e tw o side s truste d the m s o muc h an d decide d t o allo w the m the needed leeway to facilitate th e mediation process. The mediator s were certainl y awar e o f wha t bein g a non-state acto r an d a private, non-partisan organizatio n mean t fo r the negotiatio n process. As Leopoldo J . Niilu s (1973 : 10 ) pu t it : There is no government which could call in bodies like the UNO or the OAU to 'intermediate ' between i t and its 'rebels' . For to do so would be t o give to th e rebel s forma l status , paralle l t o tha t o f th e government . However , bodies like the WCC and the AACC, which can give no diplomatic status to anybody can be made use of, provided, o f course, that they are understood to be objective and informed enough and not suspected of having their own stake to interfere i n a Nation's internal affairs . The fac t tha t th e WC C an d AAC C wer e privat e organization s wa s very importan t t o th e Suda n government . Thei r non-diplomati c an d unofficial statu s meant the y wer e abl e t o perform a n important face saving function . Onc e ther e wa s sufficien t politica l wil l o n th e gov ernment's par t t o embar k o n th e negotiatio n process , Norther n of ficials wer e abl e to tur n to the WCC an d AACC, which wer e alread y on the scene, to facilitate the process. Doing so meant the negotiatio n process woul d no t b e publicl y subjecte d t o th e pressure s o f stat e and other internationa l actor s an d that th e governmen t di d no t hav e to accor d th e Souther n coalitio n an y mor e legitimac y tha n i t wa s initially prepared to give. The unofficial statu s of the mediators, com bined with the private manner in which they handled the negotiatio n process, allowe d th e tw o partie s t o mov e graduall y awa y fro m thei r pre-negotiation stance s withou t losin g fac e an d legitimac y a s coali tions. This face-saving mechanism , whic h stem s from th e non-threat ening natur e o f privat e organizations , lend s the m a capacit y t o fa cilitate mediatio n processes . Thi s i s a capacit y tha t state s ten d t o lack. The third-part y mediator s di d hav e a rol e t o pla y i n facilitatin g the Suda n negotiations ; however , i t would b e a mistake t o overstat e their contribution . Th e WC C an d AAC C face d certai n limitation s

84 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l that prevente d the m fro m overcomin g a stalemat e reache d i n th e negotiations a t Addi s Ababa . Th e WC C an d AACC ha d only limite d power t o mak e credibl e threat s o r t o coerc e th e partie s involved ; once deadloc k wa s reache d i n th e negotiations , th e resource s the y possessed a s privat e organization s prove d insufficien t t o persuad e the partie s t o compromis e an d mov e on . Suc h a poin t o f deadloc k in th e negotiation s aros e ove r military/securit y issues , specificall y the futur e o f an army for the Sudan . Negotiations nearl y broke dow n at this point for neither side could be persuaded to make an y concessions o n thi s matter . Non e o f th e negotiatin g technique s tha t ha d been employe d in the discussions on other issues worked on this one. The WC C an d AACC , unabl e t o d o more , turne d t o a n arbitrator , Emperor Hail e Selassi e o f Ethiopia . The Empero r playe d a uniqu e rol e durin g th e negotiations , bu t one which should be see n as coming into play only when other effort s to keep th e negotiation s o n track ha d failed. Althoug h Hail e Selassi e was willin g t o hav e th e contendin g partie s mee t unde r hi s auspices , he insiste d tha t hi s rol e no t b e regarde d a s tha t o f a mediator. Thi s was mad e clea r t o th e WC C an d AACC , wh o wer e tol d the y coul d refer only to "His Imperial Majesty's good offices, under his auspices'* (Niilus, 1972) . This position ma y have stemme d fro m th e Emperor' s fear tha t secessionist s i n hi s own countr y woul d attemp t t o pressur e him t o submi t thos e conflict s t o mediation . Whe n deadloc k wa s reached o n th e military/securit y question , Cano n Burges s Car r wa s able t o persuad e th e Empero r t o us e hi s goo d office s t o attemp t t o settle th e matter . Th e Empero r me t separatel y wit h th e Norther n and Souther n delegations , puttin g a 5 0 - 5 0 proposa l t o the m b y which hal f o f th e arme d force s i n th e Sout h woul d b e Anya-Ny a troops (i.e., 6,000) an d half Northern troops. Concessions were mad e by eac h coalition , leadin g t o agreemen t o n thi s proposal . The Emperor' s formul a o n splittin g th e difference s wa s on e th e third-party mediator s migh t wel l hav e suggeste d themselves . A proposal fro m th e Empero r apparentl y move d th e negotiation s ou t o f deadlock whe n al l th e effort s o f th e WC C an d AAC C ha d failed , a n action largel y explaine d b y th e fac t tha t th e Empero r represente d a state with a substantial amoun t of implied coercive capacity . As such, he coul d threate n th e partie s involve d b y raisin g th e cost s o f stale mate shoul d the y fai l t o reac h a n agreemen t o n th e issu e a t hand . The Empero r coul d threate n th e Nimeir y governmen t wit h the pos sibility o f once agai n aiding the SSL M shoul d the Norther n coalitio n

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 8 5 prove recalcitran t o r o f n o longe r allowin g Sudanes e refugee s t o remain i n Ethiopia, thereb y flooding th e Suda n with refugees i t was ill-equipped t o handle . I n turn , th e agreemen t th e Empero r ha d signed with Nimeiry pressured the Southerners to reach a settlement with th e Suda n government ; dwindlin g militar y supplie s woul d no t only affec t th e fire-power o f the Anya-Nya , bu t i n th e longe r term , it might also weaken the unity of the Southern coalitio n itself. Moreover, he gave his personal guarante e agains t any reprisals or repression o f Anya-Nya returnees , shoul d th e Sout h reac h a n agreemen t on th e militar y issu e (Assefa , 1987 : 141) . Hence , th e Emperor , backed b y th e powe r o f a state activ e i n th e region , wa s i n a ver y favorable positio n t o influenc e th e tw o partie s t o th e conflict thereby helpin g t o overcom e a deadloc k a t a critica l poin t i n th e negotiations. Stat e an d privat e thir d partie s cooperate d i n a n effec tive manner, wit h th e Empero r backstoppin g th e private , unofficia l mediators at critical points, and this yielded impressive results in this instance.

Post-Agreement Relation s The successful negotiation s between the Nimeiry state and the SSLM at Addi s Abab a i n 197 2 brough t a n en d t o th e first Sudanes e civi l war. Althoug h suspicion s remaine d ver y muc h aliv e o n bot h side s (both Nimeir y an d Lag u ha d antagonize d thei r colleague s an d coa lition partners by their unilateral actions in ratifying th e agreement) , the agreemen t di d provid e fo r som e basi c rule s o f relationshi p fo r the period tha t followe d (Kasfir , 1977 : 143-144) . Thus the Sudan' s conflict proces s ha d gon e ful l circle , returnin g t o a hegemoni c ex change relationshi p unde r th e aegi s o f Presiden t Nimeir y an d hi s ruling coalition . Under th e provision s o f the Addis Ababa Agreement an d th e fol low-up Souther n Province s Regiona l Self-Governmen t Ac t o f 1972 , the Souther n Regio n (includin g th e province s o f Bah r e l Ghazal , Equatoria, an d Uppe r Nile ) wa s constitute d a "self-governin g re gion' ' within a united, socialist Sudan. A High Executive Council and Peoples Regiona l Assembl y wer e create d fo r th e Souther n Region , with authorit y t o dea l wit h a specifie d lis t o f regiona l subjects—i n particular the preservation of public order, internal security, efficien t administration, an d th e promotio n o f economic , socia l an d cultura l

86 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l development. Th e regiona l authoritie s wer e empowere d t o establis h a separat e budge t an d t o lev y regiona l dutie s an d taxes . The leadin g position o f the centra l governmen t i n center-regiona l relations wa s neve r i n doubt . No t onl y wa s th e centra l governmen t given exclusiv e authorit y t o dea l wit h a n extende d numbe r o f na tional matter s (defense , externa l affairs , currency , communications , customs an d foreig n trade , nationalit y an d immigration , economi c and social development , educationa l planning , an d public audit) , but the presiden t o f the Republi c wa s give n broa d authorit y t o organiz e relations between th e central ministrie s and the regional organs . The Peoples Regiona l Assembl y could , b y a two-thirds majority , reques t that th e presiden t postpon e th e comin g int o forc e o f an y la w whic h adversely affecte d th e welfar e an d interest s o f th e citizen s o f th e Southern Region ; however , i t wa s lef t u p t o th e presiden t t o deter mine whethe r h e woul d acced e t o suc h a request. Unde r th e 197 3 constitution, central-regiona l relation s remaine d ambiguous . Doug las Johnson (1988 : 5 ) note s tha t Nimeir y too k advantag e o f this lac k of clarit y t o interven e i n regiona l election s an d t o mak e economi c decisions withou t referenc e t o Souther n authorities . Shortly afte r th e Regiona l Self-Governmen t Ac t wa s pu t int o ef fect, Nimeir y appointe d a Provisiona l Hig h Executiv e Council , headed b y Abe l Alier , t o ac t a s the regiona l governmen t fo r a transitional 18-mont h perio d (Betts , 1974 : 2) . A serie s o f othe r step s intended t o reassur e th e Sout h followe d quickly . Lag u was commis sioned a Major-General i n the Sudanese Army and three Southerner s were appointe d t o th e centra l government . Th e Nimeir y regim e co operated wit h neighborin g government s an d th e Unite d Nation s High Commissione r fo r Refugee s t o repatriate , resettle , an d reha bilitate a half millio n o r mor e refugee s i n th e bus h o r livin g abroa d (Betts, 1974 : 3) and integrated 10,00 0 SSL M troops into the People' s Armed Forces , th e police , an d priso n force s (Alier , 1976 : 4) . A fi nancially-strapped, sof t stat e suc h a s th e Suda n whic h ha d jus t ex perienced a brutal civi l wa r woul d hav e ha d difficultie s healin g th e wounds o f th e past ; ye t fo r al l th e ange r an d resentmen t withi n an d between bot h coalitions , th e transitio n t o peac e prove d a s smoot h as coul d b e expected . Condition s wer e create d unde r whic h tie s o f reciprocity an d norm s an d rules o f interactio n coul d emerg e amon g politicians, fro m both North and South, in the future. Tha t this faile d to materializ e i s les s a commentar y o n th e peacemakin g proces s o f 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 tha n o n the short-sightednes s o f President Nimeir y an d his

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 8 7 entourage, as they sought to strike a balance between th e Northern dominated stat e coalitio n an d Souther n demand s i n th e perio d tha t followed. The Addi s Abab a Agreemen t represente d a positiv e beginning , but i t wa s u p t o th e politica l leaders , an d mos t especiall y thos e i n the Sudan' s rulin g coalitio n i n Khartoum , t o mak e thi s beginning a substantive reality. The integration o f Anya-Nya troops into the People's Arme d Force s an d th e holdin g o f election s fo r th e Regiona l Assembly i n th e Sout h i n Novembe r 197 3 wer e importan t sign s among other s tha t th e Nimeir y regim e remaine d seriou s abou t im plementing th e spiri t o f the Addi s Ababa Agreement. However , b y the mid-1970s , Southerner s ha d reaso n t o be concerne d ove r sign s that Nimeir y ha d begun t o shif t hi s priorities. Signs of a reconsideration o f Southern autonomy began to emerge soon afte r th e initia l transition period . Althoug h th e 197 3 election s to the Regiona l Assembly in the Sout h augure d well in terms o f th e introduction o f the democrati c process to this area, there were con cerns ove r Nimeiry' s interventio n int o th e proces s t o assur e Alier' s nomination a s the officia l candidat e o f the Suda n Socialis t Unio n fo r the presidency o f the Hig h Executive Council . Although som e hav e concluded tha t Alier , a key Souther n politicia n wh o ha d playe d a n important rol e i n th e Addi s Ababa negotiation s an d th e implemen tation process that followed, would likely have been elected anyway, Nimeiry's intercessio n a s presiden t o f th e part y wa s a n embarrass ment whic h weakene d Alier' s positio n i n the year s ahead. 5 A t leas t as serious was the harm done to the spirit of Addis Ababa; Nimeiry' s action "cause d som e misgivings" about th e procedures o n the elec tion and , mor e generally , abou t wha t seeme d a shak y powe r rela tionship betwee n th e centra l governmen t an d regiona l authoritie s (Africa Confidential, 1974 : 7) . By the mid-1970s, evidence appeared indicating that the Nimeir y regime ha d no t committe d itsel f full y t o a stanc e o f reconciliatio n toward th e South . Fo r example , Southerner s expresse d genera l dis appointment ove r th e leve l o f central expenditure s allocate d t o re build th e war-devastate d infrastructur e i n thei r region . Subse quently, Nimeir y too k a series o f actions which pointe d eve n mor e clearly t o a shif t i n regim e prioritie s awa y fro m compromis e an d accommodation. The result was most destructive of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Nimeiry, the advocate of a political solution in 196 9 and immediately after , backtracke d decisivel y fro m hi s earlie r positio n and thereby undercu t th e very agreement h e had once championed .

88 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l In th e eye s o f militan t Sudanes e leader s (an d mos t notabl y Dr . John Garan g d e Mabior , th e curren t leade r o f th e Suda n People' s Liberation Movemen t (SPLM ) an d Suda n People' s Liberatio n Arm y (SPLA)), a number o f stat e initiative s cause d a new flare u p o f guer rilla warfar e i n th e Suda n (Garan g d e Mabior , 1984 : 5 ; 1987 : 1 9 25). Th e mos t significan t o f thes e "provocations, " a s Garan g de scribes them , includ e th e following . First, becaus e hal f o f th e wate r passin g throug h th e Sud d evap orates, th e Nimeir y government , i n allianc e wit h Egypt , decide d t o build a 175-mil e cana l between Jongle i an d Malakal , thereb y savin g water t o b e use d i n Norther n Suda n an d Egypt . Som e Southerner s were highl y critica l o f thi s propose d Jongle i Canal , fearin g tha t th e drying effec t i n the swamp y Sud d are a would drai n pastures, dr y u p wells, chang e th e climate , an d generally undermin e th e Dinka' s pastoral lif e style . Despit e demonstration s agains t th e schem e i n Jub a in October 197 4 an d criticism from both Southern leaders and Western environmentalists , th e Nimeir y governmen t proceede d t o pla n and begi n implementatio n o f th e project . SPL A militar y force s at tacked th e Jongle i Cana l constructio n sit e i n 1984 , kidnappin g an d killing some foreign employee s i n the process, an d work o n the proj ect cam e t o a halt (Tinker , 1978 ; Kasfir , 1976 : 13) . Second, o n variou s occasion s Nimeir y intervene d i n Souther n ex ecutive an d legislative affairs ; he altere d electora l processe s an d dissolved legall y constitute d bodie s i n way s tha t Souther n politician s felt contravene d th e constitutio n (Garan g d e Mabior , 1984 : 5) . Third, Souther n member s o f th e Nationa l Assembl y proteste d against legislatio n tha t woul d hav e change d th e borde r betwee n North an d South , removin g certai n mineral-ric h an d prim e agricul tural lands in the Northern Upper Nile , Bentiu, and other area s fro m Southern contro l (SUDANOW, 1981 : 13 ; Garan g d e Mabior , 1987 : 21). Fourth, with Chevron's discovery o f a substantial oi l find in Bentiu district i n th e Souther n Sudan , Southerner s wer e hopefu l tha t a refinery woul d b e buil t i n thei r regio n clos e t o th e oi l find (Africa Confidential, 1981 : 1 ; SUDANOW, 1981 : 14) . Suc h a project woul d not only create economi c opportunitie s i n the Bentiu area, but migh t contribute to the development o f the region as a whole. These hope s were dashed , however , a s Nimeir y decide d i n th e summe r o f 198 1 to locat e th e refiner y a t Kost i i n th e North . Nimeiry' s decisio n le d to widesprea d resentmen t i n th e South , touchin g of f riot s an d ope n

The Peace Proces s in the Suda n 8 9 expressions o f studen t militancy . Th e followin g year , Nimeir y scrapped plans for an oil refinery, choosing instead to allow Chevron to lay a pipe line to the ocean at Port Sudan. The South felt betrayed by this decision and, not surprisingly, Garang's SPLA mounted efforts to prevent i t fro m being put into effect . Fifth, i n 1983 , i n a majo r bi d t o gai n suppor t fro m som e ke y Northerners, Nimeiry imposed Islamic Sharia law upon the countr y as a whole, including the South (Heraclides, 1987 : 227). Sharia law, which applies traditional punishments (including whippings, stonings and amputations) in certain specified cases as a means of "retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation'' (SUDANOW, 1983 : 8-12), is strongly opposed b y Southerner s wh o vie w i t a s a hars h lega l syste m tha t violates the human rights and cultural autonomy of the largely nonMuslim peopl e o f th e Sout h (Africa News, 1985 : 7 ; New African, 1984: 6-7) . Al l thre e o f th e Souther n regiona l assemblie s passe d resolutions in the 1983-8 4 perio d rejecting a proposed amendment to th e Suda n constitutio n tha t woul d impos e Sharia law an d urged that in any event it not be applied to non-Muslim peoples (Guardian, 1984: 7). By late 1984 , Nimeiry, under pressure from Western governments a s well a s leaders i n th e Souther n Suda n an d in Easter n Africa, backtracke d a bit, declarin g that he was suspending th e further use of Sharia law (Weekly Review, 1984 : 1; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 1984: 15). But the announced suspension was not a decision to end the application of Islamic law to non-Muslims, leaving Southerners apprehensiv e abou t thei r futur e i n a politically centralize d Sudanese state . And sixth , Nimeiry' s determinatio n t o redivid e th e Sout h int o three regions was viewed by Garang de Mabior (1984: 6) and many (but not all) Southerners as an effort t o weaken the South as well as an "abrogation " o f th e Addi s Abab a provisio n o n maintainin g th e region a s a singl e entity . Th e redivisio n o f th e Sout h followe d a n earlier decisio n o f th e Sudanes e governmen t t o decentraliz e an d devolve limited powers under the Regional Government Act of 1980 to five new regiona l government s i n the North . With thi s in place, Nimeiry was eager to extend the decentralization policy to the South, thereby increasin g hi s influenc e ove r riva l element s i n th e regio n (SUDANOW, 1983 : 1). Toward thi s end , h e receive d importan t encouragemen t fro m Vice-President Lagu, the champion of the smaller ethnic (non-Dinka) peoples i n Equatori a province . Arguin g tha t administrativ e decen -

90 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l tralization wa s necessar y t o promot e cultura l distinctio n a s wel l a s stability and progress in the South, Lagu struck out forcefully agains t what he describe d a s Dinka domination i n the area . H e wrote (Lagu , 1981: 3 , 7) : The truth . .. i s that many of the leaders of the Dinka tribe have chosen to mark time of [sic] th e issue o f decentralization s o as to effect th e spread of members of their tribe in all areas of the South, and thereby guaranteein g themselves the control o f any government forme d at any level. Th e annual intake to the police and administrative institutions are very clear revelations of this ambition. Other Souther n politician s (amon g them , som e importan t Dink a leaders) wer e quic k to challenge Lagu's call for redivision; one book let (Th e Solidarity Committee o f the Southern Members 4th People' s National Assembly , n.d. : 6 passim) describe d th e proposal s a s "na kedly tribal[istic] " an d a threa t t o th e unit y an d integrit y o f th e Southern Region . Nimeiry , preferrin g t o confor m t o th e guideline s agreed upo n a t Addis Ababa , initiall y prepare d fo r a referendum o n the issue. However, a s conflicts between the pro- and anti-divisionists became intense , h e abandone d thes e plan s and , i n Jun e 1983 , de creed th e Sout h spli t int o thre e regions . "B y tha t act, " write s Bon a Malwal (1985 : 34) , "h e too k th e 'final ' ste p whic h i n effec t totall y abrogated th e 197 2 Self-Governmen t Ac t fo r th e Sout h whic h ha d embodied th e Addi s Abab a Agreement. " Nimeir y an d hi s redivi sionist supporter s ha d won , bu t a t grea t futur e cos t t o th e peac e o f the country . Ominou s sign s soo n becam e evident , fo r the decre e o n redivision coincide d wit h a n increas e i n guerrill a activitie s i n th e South (Gueyras , 1983) . Step by step , then, Nimeir y subverte d th e very agreement h e ha d helped t o creat e a t Addi s Ababa . Hi s motive s i n thi s wer e les s tha n clear, although his desire to strengthen his coalition base in the Nort h appears t o hav e bee n a significant factor . A s Nimeiry' s bas e o f sup port shrank , h e tende d t o be increasingl y responsiv e t o the demand s made by mor e traditiona l religiou s element s i n the Nort h fo r Sharia laws an d th e redivisio n o f th e South , policie s whic h subverte d th e 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 peac e accor d (Gueyras , 1983) . Th e Anya-Ny a I I guerrill a forces emerge d a s a serious challeng e i n 1983 , soo n to be overtake n by Garang' s SPLA . Isolate d an d broadl y unpopular , Nimeir y wa s overthrown b y Genera l Abde l Rahma n Siwa r el-Dahab , hi s defens e minister, i n Apri l 1985 .

The Peace Proces s in the Suda n 9 1 The takeover of power by el-Dahab, and that of his legally elected successor, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the following year did little to restore the spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement. As peace disintegrated, leaders on both side s turned again to the militar y option, wit h the crueles t of consequences for the civilian population in the South. The fighting intensified, a s Garang's force s gre w an d gaine d contro l ove r muc h of th e rura l areas , an d a s th e Sudanes e army , supporte d b y well armed tribal militias, fought to extend its hold over the area (Gurdon, 1988: 11) . Al-Mahd i seeme d unprepare d t o accommodat e basi c Southern demands. To be sure , h e compromise d o n the issue of redivision, urging that Equatoria be accorde d a special status within a reunited South , an d took step s t o softe n (bu t no t t o abrogate ) th e system of Sharia law (Johnson, 1988 : 8; Legum, 1988b : 4). Garang, rejecting such compromise measures as insufficient, rule d out meaningful negotiation s with Khartoum until the al-Mahdi regime agreed to en d th e applicatio n o f Sharia laws, adop t a secular constitution , and restructur e th e country' s politica l syste m (Garan g d e Mabior , 1987: 22) . A t heart, then , th e tw o side s remaine d locke d int o diametrically oppose d position s regardin g th e government' s commit ment to the applicatio n o f Islamic principles. No r did this situatio n change following Brigadier Omar Hassan el Beshir's intervention and suspension of the constitution in 1989 . El Beshir's failure to remove Nimeiry's Sharia laws from the statute books, as well a s his appointment o f a ne w governmen t wit h substantia l connection s wit h th e Muslim Brothers , furthe r complicate d th e proces s o f reachin g an other political solutio n i n the Sudan.

Conclusion What ar e th e implication s o f Sudan' s peacemakin g proces s i n th e 1971-72 perio d fo r th e managemen t o f civi l wars ? As we sho w i n the bod y o f th e paper , th e emergenc e simultaneousl y o f th e five favorable preconditions in the Sudan was somewhat unique and contributed substantiall y t o th e achievemen t o f an agreement a t Addis Ababa. Certainly one would anticipate the existence of the first three favorable precondition s (th e emergenc e o f identifiabl e bargainin g parties, evidence o f a mutually hurting stalemate, an d the existenc e of leader s determine d upo n a politica l solution ) i n an y successfu l negotiation o f conflic t i n a deeply divide d society ; however , whe n these precondition s ar e combined wit h pressures by externa l polit -

92 Donal d Rothchil d an d Carolin e Hartzel l ical actor s conduciv e t o positiv e conflic t managemen t outcome s an d a mediator actively on the scene , then a uniquely propitious situatio n can b e sai d t o b e i n place . Certainly th e unofficia l mediator y agencie s buil t effectivel y upo n these favorabl e precondition s t o facilitat e th e peacemakin g process . Although th e WC C an d th e AAC C di d sho w grea t commitmen t an d skill in gaining the confidenc e o f the riva l parties, i n narrowing thei r differences throug h communicatio n an d caucusin g activities , an d i n coordinating thei r efforts wit h official authoritie s in Addis Ababa, w e contend tha t i t i s importan t no t t o overstat e eithe r th e roo m fo r maneuver of the third-party intervenors or their capacity to influenc e the disputant s i n a conflict o f thi s typ e an d intensity . Th e Sudanes e leaderships converge d i n their preferenc e fo r overcomin g th e dead lock throug h a political solution ; unde r thes e circumstance s th e un official mediators , backe d a t critica l moment s b y officia l externa l ac tors, wer e i n a fortuitous positio n t o promot e a mutually acceptabl e settlement. With th e Addi s Abab a Agreemen t i n plac e an d wit h initia l mea sures pu t int o effec t t o giv e substanc e t o th e accord , th e tw o side s to th e conflic t cautiousl y bega n t o edg e towar d peacefu l relations . Suspicions remaine d i n evidenc e o n bot h sides ; nevertheless , th e Addis Ababa settlement wa s viewed as something o f a beginning tha t might lead to positive outcomes. Yet even as the Sudanese elite began to work out norms of relationship and reciprocity amon g themselves , evidences o f mixe d signal s bega n t o emerg e a t th e top . Presiden t Nimeiry, a ke y champio n o f a politica l solutio n prio r t o th e Addi s Ababa Agreement, too k step s soo n afte r th e implementatio n proces s that undercu t th e spiri t o f th e accord . Then , a s h e becam e isolate d and i n nee d o f ne w coalitio n partner s i n hi s Norther n base , h e ini tiated a number o f policie s i n th e earl y 1980 s tha t contravene d th e terms o f the 197 2 Addi s Ababa Agreement. Th e Sout h fel t betraye d and guerrilla actions mounted rapidly. Nimeiry's sabotage of the very agreement h e ha d champione d undermine d th e fragil e norm s o f re lations slowl y developin g withi n th e elite . Moreover , th e unwilling ness of Nimeiry and his successors to respond generously to Souther n demands o n such issues a s the Sharia syste m o f law and the adoptio n of a secular constitutio n deepl y polarize d th e society . Clearly, th e fac t tha t th e conflic t cycl e ha s gon e ful l circl e ha s grave ramification s fo r th e Sudan . T o buil d th e necessar y coalition s and mak e th e require d adjustment s t o brin g abou t peace , onl y t o

The Peac e Proces s i n th e Suda n 9 3 see i t sli p awa y a s a consequenc e o f insensitiv e stat e policies , i s disheartening i n th e extreme . I n th e perio d tha t followed , cynicis m and distrus t cam e t o prevail , creatin g a kin d o f negotiatin g fatigu e that inhibite d th e nex t seriou s effor t t o negotiat e th e conflict . Wit h the cost s o f civi l wa r mounting , th e ne w leader s o f th e Suda n ma y find i t extremel y difficul t t o buil d suppor t withi n thei r divers e con stituencies fo r conciliator y moves . I f simpl e reciproca l act s ar e n o longer sufficien t t o mov e th e negotiatin g proces s along , the n some thing more—suc h a s eithe r a serie s o f conciliator y move s b y on e o f the antagonist s (preferabl y th e state , a s the stronge r actor ) o r a third party intervenor—-may be necessary to break out of the current stale mate. Such initiatives may be very difficult t o orchestrate where bot h coalitions ar e heterogenou s an d the stat e i s weak; eve n so , th e cost s of inactio n ma y i n tim e compe l a change i n polic y preferences .

Notes 1. A s late a s 1953 , th e Britis h governmen t stil l justified th e "Souther n Policy" as a necessary "protectiv e barrie r . . . against thos e who , whethe r northern Sudanes e o r Europeans, migh t tr y t o exploi t [th e Souther n peo ples]'* (Britis h Information Services , 1953 : 26). 2. Undate d documen t i n WCC Archives, Geneva . Th e three-pag e doc ument appear s t o b e th e minute s o f a meetin g betwee n WC C member s Leopoldo Niilus, Dwain Epps, Theresa Scherf, Jan Orner, and Kodwo Ankrah and the Sudanese-in-exil e Madin g d e Garan g an d Arthu r Aiken . Ankrah' s statement to de Garang and Aiken is "you make it easier if. . . you can solve internal problems in your camp, if you ca n bring them togethe r t o se e th e situation." 3. Al l Africa Conference o f Churches, 1971 : 1 . These ar e notes on the 25 Ma y 197 1 meetin g betwee n th e AAC C and "th e involve d parties, " in Kampala, Uganda. 4. Minute s o n th e thir d da y o f negotiation s a t Addi s Ababa , Feb . 18 , 1972, WC C Archives, Geneva . 5. Accordin g t o souther n Sudanes e informants , Alie r di d no t welcom e this move on Nimeiry's part and requested that his nomination be withdrawn. However, a s pressures wer e brought to bear he change d hi s mind an d accepted th e nomination , no t wishin g t o undermin e th e agreemen t (Majok , 1989).

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5.1 Yemen . Copyrigh t © 199 1 b y Manfre d Wenner

F I V E

The Civi l Wa r i n Yemen , 1962-197 0 Manfred W . Wenne r

Introduction The contemporar y stat e know n a s the Republi c o f Yeme n officiall y came into being on 22 May 1990 a s a result of the unification o f the two previousl y existin g Yemen i states : th e Yeme n Ara b Republi c (often known as North Yemen) and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (usually known as South Yemen). The previous experiences of the YAR and the PDRY were markedly different, i n both political and economic terms. For North Yemen, the most important political event o f th e post-wa r er a i s unquestionabl y th e civi l wa r whic h wracked tha t countr y fro m 196 2 t o 1970 , an d eventuall y resulte d in th e politica l syste m whic h signe d th e unificatio n agreemen t o f May 1990 .

Background North Yemen achieved de facto independenc e upo n the withdrawal of the Ottoman Turkish authorities from Yemen at the end of World War I. Responsibility for governance was turned over to the spiritual and temporal leade r of the Zaydi sec t o f Islam, known a s an imam; at the time the Zaydis clearly dominated the political and social, and quite probably the economic, systems. The specific individual, Imam Yahya ibn Muhammad , ha d led th e majo r domesti c politica l move ment agains t th e Ottoma n administration an d presence. 95

96 Manfre d W . Wenne r During hi s reign, whic h laste d unti l 1948 , Imam Yahy a strove t o accomplish a numbe r o f goals : (1 ) t o mak e Yeme n a s autarki c a s possible, s o tha t it s patrimony , territory , an d resource s woul d no t fall int o th e hand s o f other s (non-Zaydis) ; (2 ) t o asser t hi s contro l over the entire territory of the state as then constituted (an d perhaps additional land s which ha d been par t o f Yemen some 15 0 years ear lier); and (3) to create the ideal of a Shi'a state, i.e., a "church-state*' governed by a member o f the Prophet's House, headed by an imam, and committe d t o promotin g th e Shari' a a s th e "la w o f th e land. " Within thi s system, the non-Zayd i Muslim s in the population (Sunn i Shafi'is a s well a s othe r Shi'as , the Isma'ilis ) generall y ha d second class status , an d th e Jews constitute d a traditiona l dhimmi ("pro tected people" ) population . In general, Imam Yahya accomplished his goals; on the other hand, by 194 8 hi s autocrati c an d ofte n repressiv e policie s produce d a n organized effort— a revolution—t o brin g abou t significan t socia l change. Ima m Yahya' s son , Ahmad , wa s abl e t o pu t togethe r a counter-revolutionary coalitio n an d succeeded in re-establishing th e ancien regime. In barely altered outlines and operations, it continue d to 1962 , despit e som e assassination s an d abortiv e revolutionar y ef forts i n the 1950s . When Ima m Ahmad died in September 1962 , his son Muhamma d al-Bad r becam e Imam . Althoug h i t wa s widel y an ticipated tha t h e woul d institut e majo r reforms , h e neve r ha d th e opportunity t o d o so : on 2 6 Septembe r a coalition o f arm y officer s and their civilian supporters shelled his residence, assumed they had killed him , an d declare d th e creatio n o f the Yeme n Ara b Republic . The imam , however , survive d th e shellin g an d escape d int o th e rugged mountain s o f th e norther n are a o f Yemen . Th e traditiona l support o f the Zayd i imams has always come from thes e mountains : the fiercely independen t tribe s of this area have been strongl y com mitted t o th e caus e o f th e imamat e eve r sinc e it s foundin g i n th e ninth centur y A.D . However , th e norther n tribe s hav e no t alway s been unite d in their political goals and interests. The tribes of North Yemen ar e mor e lik e smal l nations , eac h wit h it s ow n networ k o f allies, it s ow n lands , its ow n se t o f interests, it s ow n town s an d vil lages, etc. Essentially they ac t as a small international system . In th e past, man y imam s desperatel y sough t t o cur b thei r influenc e an d power. Ima m Yahy a had trie d t o creat e a truly centra l authority , i n both political as well as legal terms, during his tenure. Despite these tensions, th e tribes , i n general , accepte d th e minimu m rol e o f th e

The Civi l War in Yemen 9 7 imamate in political terms, and strongly supported his religious role (as ima m o f Zayd i Muslims) . Therefore , i t wa s possibl e fo r Ima m Muhammad al-Badr to put together a coalition oisome o f these tribes for th e purpos e o f defendin g th e imamate , an d destroyin g th e re public. The countr y wa s soon i n the throe s o f a civil wa r to decid e the natur e o f the political system . For roughly the next eight years, this civil war affected ever y part of the country; no region or settlement wa s spared. It was not until the spring of 197 0 tha t a unified politica l syste m was once agai n in place, a t leas t i n theor y responsibl e fo r governin g al l o f (North ) Yemen. The followin g essa y seeks , i n five headings , t o analyz e variou s aspects of this conflict in order to contribute to a more synthetic and theoretical analysi s of the endin g o f civil conflicts. Thes e five headings are derived from preliminary work an d discussions undertake n under the leadership of Professor Roy Licklider, o f Rutgers University.

1. Th e Natur e o f the Underlyin g Issue s Tracing the origins of any civil conflic t i s an extremely difficul t an d complex task ; i t may be argued , a t least i n the cas e o f Yemen, that the revolutio n woul d neve r hav e take n place ha d not th e domesti c policies of Imams Yahya and Ahmad been so severe, restrictive , punitive and autocratic in nature. Without them, the intellectual, eco nomic, an d military oppositio n whic h eventuall y culminate d i n th e revolution migh t no t hav e developed . And , o f course , withou t th e revolution, ther e probabl y woul d no t hav e bee n a civi l war . Th e difficulty i s in the lin e of causality: at what point d o we decid e tha t the chai n should begin (o r end)? One thin g i s clear : t o begi n wit h th e revolutio n itsel f woul d b e completely inaccurate and inappropriate. One needs a discussion and analysis o f th e societ y a s a whole, an d th e frictions , divisions , an d conflicts whic h eventuall y prove d t o b e irreconcilabl e withi n th e traditional framework , an d therefore eventuall y le d to war. In on e sense , pre-Worl d Wa r II Yeme n wa s a relatively wel l in tegrated, relatively homogeneous society, if only because the various elements ha d developed organicall y an d rather isolated fro m man y of the political, economic , an d social currents prevailing elsewhere . The elite—i n th e politico-religiou s sphere , i n th e economi c arena ,

98 Manfre d W . Wenne r as well a s in social affairs—wa s relativel y homogeneous , i n the sens e that everyon e kne w whic h element s o f th e socia l structur e wer e included an d which were excluded . Perhap s of some importance wa s the fac t that the difference s i n overt wealth between th e highest an d the lowes t wer e no t egregious . There were , o f course , som e element s whic h wer e mor e closel y tied t o th e politico-religiou s leadershi p o f th e country . Foremos t among thes e wer e th e sayyids an d th e qadis. Th e firs t i s th e grou p of peopl e wh o ca n trac e thei r lineag e bac k t o th e Prophe t Muham mad, an d who therefor e enjoye d specia l statu s an d privileges (sinc e the imamat e coul d onl y b e i n th e hand s o f on e o f thei r numbers) . The secon d grou p i s a class o f educate d person s who , precisel y be cause of their education, enjoyed rank and position within the syste m (as administrators , civi l servants , etc.) . Eventually the "national unity*' which had been created as a result of the policies o f the Ottoma n Turks (i n the lat e 19t h an d early 20t h centuries) began to erode. Alternative ideas of political responsibilit y and publi c participatio n i n decisio n makin g bega n t o surfac e an d spread; alternativ e view s o f th e socia l structur e bega n t o b e heard ; alternative idea s o f socia l an d economi c justic e foun d greate r re ceptivity, an d last but no t least , disconten t ove r th e lo w standar d o f living bega n t o spread . As ha s happene d elsewhere , politica l chang e di d no t ste m solel y from progressive opposition t o the continuation of the ancien regime. Indeed, i n Yemen , a strai n o f progressiv e oppositio n eventuall y joined force s wit h a strain o f conservativ e oppositio n t o bring abou t the first attemp t a t politica l refor m i n 1948 . One particula r elemen t o f th e oppositio n warrant s specia l treat ment, however : the commercia l interest s of the Shafi' i portio n o f th e population. Th e foreig n trad e o f Yemen , limite d thoug h i t wa s a s a result o f the imams ' policy o f strictly limitin g al l foreign connection s and th e desir e fo r autarky , wa s almos t wholl y i n th e hand s o f th e Shafi'is o f th e sout h an d southwester n region s o f th e country—th e logical locatio n fo r suc h trad e links, via Aden an d the Red Sea ports. And, despit e effort s t o limi t Shafi' i economi c power , suc h trad e con tinued, leadin g to the development o f an economic grievance agains t the imam s which overlappe d th e politico-religiou s one , i.e. , th e fac t that th e imam s migh t possibl y b e accepte d a s "king" o f Yemen, bu t certainly no t a s religiou s leader , imam , o f th e Sunn i Shafi'is . In sum , then , thoug h ther e wer e significan t cleavage s withi n th e population, i t was no t unti l th e 1940 s tha t they becam e a significan t

The Civi l War in Yemen 9 9 factor i n th e politica l system' s viability . Th e decisio n b y th e revo lutionaries t o establis h a republic, however , heightene d an d exacerbated some of the earlier frictions and divisions. In one sense, then, the terms which the Western media used to describe the adversaries in the civil war were appropriate: "republicans'' vs. "royalists." The republicans wer e th e progressiv e politica l elements , th e economi c liberals, as well a s the social reformers and modernists; the royalists were th e conservativ e politica l element s wh o wishe d t o retai n th e traditional form s (an d sometimes th e content ) o f the Zayd i imami c system whic h ha d developed sinc e th e departur e o f the Ottomans . Such sweepin g generalization s alway s hav e thei r exceptions , o f course: there were elements among the republicans who did not wish to se e al l Yemen i traditio n an d cultura l pattern s swep t away , an d there wer e element s amon g th e royalist s wh o devoutl y wishe d t o see majo r reform s o f th e previou s imami c syste m adapte d t o th e social, economic , aft d political realitie s o f the en d o f the 20t h cen tury. The republicans sought, from the outset, to avoid having religious frictions an d divisions affect th e new political order : Shafi'is a s well as Isma'ilis were mad e a regular featur e o f the cabinet s which constituted an important part of the direction o f policy i n the republic . Nevertheless, it is somewhat ironic that the percentage of Shafi'is in republican cabinet s neve r approached equalit y wit h th e Zaydi s despite the fact that most observers believed that (a) the population of Yemen wa s approximatel y equall y divide d betwee n Zaydi s an d Shafi'is, an d (b ) fe w Shafi'i s supporte d th e royalis t cause , wherea s some significan t element s o f the Zayd i tribal element s (e.g . Shayk h Abdullah al-Ahma r of the 'Usaymat ) supporte d the republic . Can i t b e said , then , tha t th e republi c recognize d th e politica l equality o f th e Shafi'is , an d that thi s recognitio n wa s a n important part of the success of the republic? While this would make the story a coherent an d logical one , thing s ar e neve r tha t simple . First , th e Zaydis have, a s indicated, continue d t o dominat e th e politica l elit e of the republic (though this situation may change with the unification agreement), eve n thoug h certai n element s continue d t o resis t th e republic into the 1980s ; second, the level of economic developmen t and change whic h characterize d th e countr y sinc e th e earl y 1970 s seems t o hav e disproportionatel y benefitte d th e Shafi' i areas , thu s presumably "takin g the edg e off " th e political discrepancie s whic h exist.

100 Manfre d W . Wenne r How much o f the succes s of the republi c ma y one attribute t o its ability t o minimiz e identit y issue s (Zayd i vs . Shafi'i), a s opposed t o its abilit y t o dea l effectivel y wit h suc h tangibl e issue s a s economi c development, a n increase d standar d o f living, o r promotin g a mor e "open" socia l structure ? N o eas y answe r i s possibl e o r available , though on e would hav e t o argu e thes e ar e a n important par t o f th e republic's viability , especiall y afte r 1970 . One thing , however , i s clear : durin g th e civi l wa r years , whe n Yemen suffered on e of its periodic droughts, the republican govern ment was able to draw upon resource s from outsid e Yemen and provide food an d services in the area s under it s control which were no t available to th e royalis t side . In othe r words , the republic' s contro l over tangibl e resource s a t a critical juncture i n the conflic t contrib uted (thoug h t o wha t degre e ca n neve r b e reliabl y ascertained ) t o the perception that the republic's powers and influence were greater than thos e o f the royalists .

2. Th e Interna l Politic s o f Each Sid e The outcom e o f the Yemen i conflic t ca n be analyze d i n a variety o f terms; on e o f th e mos t usefu l fo r ou r purpose s i s i n term s o f th e coalitions which wer e create d o n both sides . However, fo r th e sak e of accuracy , i t i s essentia l t o distinguis h betwee n th e internationa l coalitions which were tied to the domestic forces, as well as the actual domestic coalition s themselves . A. International In vie w o f th e variet y o f internationa l tension s an d dispute s whic h characterized th e 1960s—a n importan t decad e i n what ha s becom e known to the historians as the "Cold War"—any local conflict almos t inevitably becom e internationalized , an d s o it wa s with Yemen . The foreign participants ' motives were quite diverse and involved "principles" and concerns often quit e distant from th e issues as perceived by the Yemenis. For example, those who supported th e imam and the ancien regime were concerned with such issues as the mode l for th e expor t o f revolution whic h i t seeme d t o represen t (Jordan) , the consequence s o f revolutionar y Ara b nationalis m a s a threa t t o an Ara b minorit y an d th e country' s influenc e i n a subregion o f th e Middle Eas t (Iran , an d th e Persia n Gulf) , o r close r t o home , a s a threat t o th e continue d existenc e o f a traditiona l Ara b monarch y

The Civi l War i n Yeme n 10 1 (Saudi Arabia) . Othe r mor e traditiona l politica l system s sa w a n in creased risk to their stability and influence a s a result of the existenc e and stated objectives of the Yemeni republic: Morocco, in the Middle East, an d Grea t Britain , amon g Wester n powers . On th e othe r hand , th e republic' s supporter s als o ha d multipl e motives. Th e Sovie t Unio n an d othe r state s i n it s Bloc , whic h pro vided most of the arms and equipment a s well as the credit s neede d to finance thei r purchase , see m t o hav e ha d a t leas t tw o distinc t motives: first , a n expansio n o f Sovie t influenc e int o wha t wa s per ceived as a highly strategic area of the globe (i.e., the Red Sea Basin, Bab al-Mandab , an d th e Hor n o f Africa , extendin g eve n int o th e Indian Ocean) , an d second , promotin g th e imag e an d influenc e o f the Soviet Union as an ally of the Arab states in their "battle" against Western imperialis m an d colonialis m i n th e Middl e Easter n region . These motive s presumabl y als o explai n Sovie t polic y towar d Sout h Yemen, given the role of the Britis h there, an d the (assumed , o n th e part o f Western analysts ) Sovie t desir e t o obtai n a naval base i n th e Arabian Sea . In some respects, the most important power was the United States. President John F. Kennedy wished to distance himself from the alignments an d policie s o f th e previou s Eisenhowe r administration , namely, suppor t fo r conservativ e an d monarchica l regimes . Conse quently, th e Kenned y administratio n chos e to recogniz e th e repub lican governmen t (i n Decembe r 1962) . Th e decisio n t o recogniz e the revolutionarie s ha d additiona l motives . Th e U.S . assume d tha t its bestowal o f diplomatic recognitio n woul d be followe d b y others , that thi s would provid e th e opportunit y an d justification fo r Egyp t to withdraw , an d tha t thi s would , i n turn , dete r Saud i Arabi a an d Jordan fro m providin g additiona l assistanc e t o th e royalis t faction , especially since both of these countries were dependent upo n American militar y assistance . In th e event , th e Unite d Nation s als o recognize d th e republica n government an d turne d ove r th e U N sea t t o them , an d som e 5 0 additional states followed th e American lead in granting recognition . However, Grea t Britai n wa s no t amon g them , Egyp t di d no t with draw, an d th e Saudi s did no t terminat e thei r support . In fact, th e American rol e was less than illustrious—bot h i n term s of its analysis of the issues involved, and its implementation o f mechanisms designe d t o ameliorat e th e conflict . Th e additiona l motive s and policies will be discusse d i n greater detai l below (se e section 4 , 'The Rol e o f Third Parties") .

102 Manfre d W . Wenne r B. Domestic Multiple motive s wer e a t wor k amon g th e domesti c participants , including ol d grievance s an d jealousies involvin g land , water , pres tige, influence , resources , an d th e like ; occasionall y rea l principle s were involved , fo r example , concernin g th e right s an d privileges o f groups, sects , an d th e like ; last but no t least , ther e wer e individual s (with followings ) wh o ha d thei r ow n agendas , som e o f whic h wer e quite principled , other s o f which wer e onl y o f immediate benefi t t o the individuals involved. The political life of Yemen has, in any event, revolved aroun d multipl e motive s fo r thousand s o f years ; i n recen t years, th e politica l an d socia l influenc e o f th e triba l group s see m t o have bee n th e mos t prominent . In the cas e of Yemen, the civil war brought t o the surfac e dispute s over land , ta x policy , commercia l an d trad e policy , religion , water , various an d assorte d civi l an d crimina l grievance s an d conflict s be tween families , clans , tribes , an d triba l confederations , th e rol e o f the governmen t i n conflic t resolution , etc . I n man y instances , thes e issues wer e raise d onl y whe n domesti c participant s (villages , tribes , etc.) wer e aske d o r coerce d int o takin g sides . The war , i n addition , produce d a number o f other, les s admirabl e motives fo r participation : th e siz e o f th e paymen t offere d b y othe r parties t o th e conflic t (domesti c and/o r foreign) , th e natur e o f th e weaponry bein g offere d a s a n inducement , th e choic e o f affiliatio n by a traditiona l opponen t o r riva l i n th e domesti c arena , specifi c individual grievance s agains t th e personne l o r policie s o f th e ol d government, etc . I n addition, ther e were offense s committe d agains t traditional moralit y an d principle suc h a s violations o f th e principl e of hijra (sanctuary/refuge ) b y th e Egyptian s and/o r th e republicans ; the indiscriminat e us e o f violenc e agains t othe r participant s (allies) , including poiso n gas , torture, massacr e o f innocent civilian s i n orde r to intimidat e opponents , a s wel l a s rea l o r imagined slight s t o triba l prestige, honor , etc . It is possible to argue (Dresch,1989) tha t the sheer scale of foreign support dwarfe d th e ol d comple x o f motives—social , economi c an d political; o n th e othe r hand , an y ful l accoun t o f th e wa r ha s t o tak e into accoun t thes e additiona l motivation s whic h remaine d relativel y "pure," localized , an d ofte n roote d i n triba l right s an d laws . Th e result wa s tha t som e triba l confederation s foun d themselve s split , with som e clans/element s sidin g wit h th e royalists , an d som e wit h the republicans . Ther e ar e too man y instance s t o tally , moreover , o f

The Civi l Wa r i n Yeme n 10

3

tribes switchin g thei r allegiances , ofte n durin g th e cours e o f th e conflict—sometimes fo r bas e reasons , sometime s o n matter s o f principle. Among th e non-triba l portio n o f th e population , th e divisio n o f support wa s relativel y clea r cu t an d obvious . Th e Shafi' i portio n o f the population, whic h owe d n o religious allegianc e to the imams an d which had , i n fact , bee n disadvantage d b y man y o f th e imams ' pol icies, overwhelmingl y supporte d th e republic . Sinc e th e tw o mai n sects ar e t o a larg e degre e geographicall y distinct , thi s mean t tha t the sout h an d southwester n area s o f th e country , wher e th e Shafi'i s are clearl y i n th e majority , wer e firmly pro-republican . Mor e im portantly—for th e outcome—wa s th e fac t tha t th e Zayd i populatio n was divide d i n it s loyaltie s t o th e republi c an d th e imamate ; som e very importan t Zayd i triba l leader s electe d t o suppor t th e republi c (for variou s motives) . (Thi s make s i t possibl e t o entertai n th e argu ment tha t ha d th e Zaydi s bee n united , the y woul d hav e succeede d in retainin g th e imamate , i n a t leas t som e form. ) I n man y instances , Zaydi tribe s an d triba l leader s invoke d n o mor e elevate d principl e in their decisio n concernin g politica l affiliatio n tha n who pai d more , or wh o provide d th e bette r weaponr y t o th e troops . I n othe r in stances, however , ther e were mor e elevate d principle s a t work: tra ditional loyalt y t o th e imamate , defens e o f wha t wa s perceive d a s Yemeni, a s oppose d t o th e "foreign " syste m an d policie s associate d with th e Egyptians , etc . The importan t poin t whic h need s t o b e made , i n sum , i s that th e domestic coalition s an d alignment s were , i n whol e o r i n part , influ enced a s muc h b y externa l participant s an d motives—a t leas t a t th e outset o f the conflict—a s the y wer e b y interna l ones : who coul d an d would provid e money , weapons , an d other supplie s (includin g food , clothing, etc.) . I t was only later , a s the Yemeni s became increasingl y alienated fro m thei r foreig n advisors , supporters , an d suppliers, tha t more clearly Yemeni motives and goals began to influence the proces s which eventuall y le d t o a settlement . The mos t importan t proces s o f coalitio n buildin g durin g th e con flict wa s o n th e sid e o f th e republicans . Thi s i s no t t o sugges t tha t there wer e n o differences o f opinion amon g the royalists , either wit h respect t o goals, o r the desirabilit y o f negotiations. However , i t too k longer fo r th e republican s t o admi t t o themselve s tha t the y coul d not completel y defea t th e royalists , an d tha t th e cos t o f continuin g was to o grea t i n term s o f Yemen i lives , resources , an d culture . Th e

104 Manfre d W . Wenne r royalists, though als o originally convince d tha t the y woul d be com pletely victorious , realize d earlie r tha n th e republican s (n o doub t due t o the natur e o f the force s arraye d agains t them—domesti c an d foreign) tha t th e onl y realisti c conclusio n t o th e conflic t wa s nego tiations. The "troubles" of the republican side begin with the development of their dependence upon their Egyptian allies and supporters, without whom, of course, the republic would hav e been defeate d rathe r early i n th e conflict . Whe n i t becam e obvious , a t leas t t o som e Yemenis, that a resolution of the conflict was not possible unless various (Yemeni) "hardliners " an d Egyptia n advisor s wer e eliminate d fro m positions wher e the y coul d thwar t o r a t leas t seriousl y inhibi t ne gotiations between royalist s and republicans, real progress began t o be made . C. The Process of Negotiations The financial, diplomatic , military , an d domesti c politica l cost s as sociated wit h th e conflic t le d th e tw o majo r externa l participants , Egypt an d Saud i Arabia , t o begi n th e proces s o f extricatin g them selves relatively early, i.e., only months after thei r first intervention. However, the y bot h wante d extricatio n and th e politica l victor y o f the part y the y wer e supporting . I t too k abou t tw o year s before ex trication became the top priority, instead of something to be accom plished as a side-effect o f seeing one's Yemeni ally emerge victorious. On th e othe r hand , bot h o f th e Yemen i grouping s similarl y be lieved tha t a complete victor y wa s inevitable , if , o f course , th e ap propriate ai d wer e provided . I t too k th e Yemen i participant s a fe w years to reach th e conclusio n tha t continuatio n o f the conflic t wa s a greater evi l tha n compromisin g o n th e characteristic s o f a new po litical order . The first maneuvre s actuall y too k plac e i n 196 3 bu t resulte d i n nothing mor e tha n mutua l recrimination s an d simila r accusations . The first effort s b y outsiders , th e Unite d State s and th e Unite d Na tions, t o ac t a s "neutral " mediator s wer e als o complet e failures . I t was not unti l th e Secon d Ara b League Summi t Conference , i n September 1964 , some two years after th e start of hostilities, that direc t negotiations betwee n Egyp t an d Saud i Arabi a took place ; these le d to a meeting o n neutral groun d (Erkwit , Sudan ) in November 1964 , at whic h tim e a national congres s i n Yemen, to be attende d b y rep resentatives fro m al l sides , was proposed. Thi s congress neve r too k

The Civi l War i n Yeme n 10 5 place due to significant disagreemen t i n the ranks of the republican s over the rol e of the Egyptians—the first clear signa l that ther e wer e doubts concernin g th e policie s o f the republic' s majo r supporter . There was, however, an important development within republica n ranks a s a result : th e ris e o f wha t becam e know n a s th e "Thir d Force/' a grou p o f well-respecte d republica n figures wh o reache d the conclusio n tha t negotiation s wit h th e royalist s wer e no t onl y desirable bu t necessary , sinc e onl y a compromise solutio n wa s possible. A number o f secret talk s between element s o f the republica n and royalis t side s took plac e i n 196 4 an d 1965 ; that the y wer e no t universally approve d wa s eviden t i n th e reaction s o f th e Egyptian s and those republican s wh o remaine d intransigen t (fo r example , Abdullah al-Sallal, one of the original conspirators and organizers). This disapproval, however, went even further o n occasion: one of Yemen's most respecte d statesmen , poets , an d long-tim e opponent s o f th e imamate, Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri, who was also an organizer of the Third Force, was found assassinate d (presumabl y by Egyptia n elements) shortl y afte r th e existenc e o f the secre t talk s wa s discov ered. One coul d argu e tha t hi s deat h wa s no t i n vain : hi s long-tim e associate, Ahma d Muhamma d Nu'man , organize d a Nationa l Peac e Conference shortl y thereafter , a t whic h h e trie d t o organiz e al l re public supporters who were prepared to compromise an d talk to the royalists. Th e resul t o f thi s meeting , hel d a t Khami r i n Ma y 1965 , was a conference i n Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in August, attended by mor e than 20 0 republica n an d royalis t delegates . Th e messag e t o bot h Egypt an d Saud i Arabi a seeme d clear : a substantia l numbe r o f th e Yemeni elite s wer e prepare d t o wor k ou t a compromis e withou t Egyptian an d Saud i participation . Evidently th e pac e an d directio n o f the meeting s affecte d Egyp t and Saudi Arabia: President Nasi r and King Faysal met in Jidda (als o in August ) i n orde r t o wor k ou t thei r ow n pla n fo r a settlemen t o f the conflict . Thei r join t proposal , announce d tw o day s later , wa s detailed, comprehensive, seemingly explicit, and included provisions for a plebiscite o n the for m o f government, a cease-fire, withdrawa l of troops, etc., as well as subsequent conferences to implement them . And, muc h t o th e surpris e o f many , th e first o f thes e conferences , at Hara d (November ) actuall y too k place , an d th e cease-fir e held . Attended b y neithe r al-Salla l (wh o clearl y disapproved ) no r th e imam, i t di d hav e representative s o f al l parties .

106 Manfre d W . Wenne r The optimis m whic h firs t prevaile d wa s soo n dispelled , however , when i t becam e obviou s t o th e attendin g Yemeni s tha t th e Jidd a Agreement ha d eliminate d bot h th e republi c an d th e imamate , an d that th e delegate s wer e ther e solel y t o choos e a governmental for m which wa s neither . Th e delegate s wer e soo n deadlocke d ove r th e form of government, th e technicalities o f the plebiscite, an d the for m of an y transitiona l government . Other event s soo n change d th e min d o f Presiden t Nasi r abou t coercing th e republican s int o acceptin g th e agreement ; th e chang e in Egypt' s policie s naturall y resulte d i n a change i n Saudi polic y a s well. Th e first o f thes e event s wa s th e larges t sal e o f militar y equip ment i n man y year s t o Saud i Arabi a b y th e U.S . an d th e U.K . Sinc e it include d man y type s o f sophisticate d equipment , includin g je t aircraft, i t seeme d designe d t o improv e significantl y Saud i Arabia' s military strengt h an d it s abilit y t o re-expor t materia l a t a critica l juncture i n relation s betwee n Egyp t an d Saud i Arabia , a s well a s i n Yemen. Second, th e USS R decide d t o suppl y th e republi c wit h militar y equipment an d advisors independently o f Egypt; evidently, thi s gav e some o f th e republic' s leader s th e confidenc e an d abilit y t o resis t Egypt's pressure to compromise wit h the royalists. At the same time, however, th e promis e o f Sovie t suppor t independen t o f Egyptia n control seem s t o hav e convince d th e Egyptia n presiden t tha t onl y by keepin g th e initiativ e i n th e defens e o f th e republi c coul d th e threat o f Sovie t penetratio n an d interventio n i n Ara b affair s b e lim ited. In othe r words , th e action s o f outsid e power s ha d immediat e re percussions an d effect s upo n th e policie s o f th e participant s i n th e Yemeni civi l war ; in this case , the y undermine d wha t ha d seemed t o be th e first rea l joint effor t t o brin g outsid e interventio n t o a n end . For th e lon g term , however , th e mos t importan t side-effec t wa s th e increasing perception amon g the Yemenis themselves tha t they wer e becoming pawn s i n th e politica l game s o f others . Negotiations an d othe r maneuvre s o f variou s kind s continue d throughout th e followin g tw o years ; mos t o f the m ca n b e charac terized a s desultory an d primarily designe d to gain a public relation s or indirect militar y advantag e i n the Yemeni theatre . I t was not unti l 1967 tha t meaningfu l negotiation s involvin g Egyp t onc e mor e too k place, an d the n directl y a s a resul t o f th e Egyptia n defea t i n th e "June War " of tha t year . Th e magnitud e o f th e defeat , an d it s con -

The Civi l Wa r i n Yeme n 10 7 sequences, mad e th e Egyptia n presenc e i n Yemen untenable . A t th e Khartoum Summi t Conferenc e (Augus t 1967) , Presiden t Nasi r agreed t o withdra w al l Egyptia n force s fro m Yeme n befor e th e en d of th e year—thereb y guaranteein g hi s receip t o f Saud i subsidie s fo r his severely damage d economy . Th e las t Egyptian troop s wer e with drawn fro m Yeme n befor e th e en d o f November . Unfortunately, thi s di d no t resul t i n increased Saud i security , no r did it accomplis h Saud i goal s in Yemen: Syria, Algeri a an d the USS R stepped i n t o fill th e weapon s an d financial requirement s o f th e re public. Once agai n externa l event s impinge d upo n an d directl y affecte d the polic y option s o f th e participants , thi s tim e development s i n South Yemen . A t th e sam e tim e tha t th e tw o majo r outsid e partici pants appeare d willin g t o compromise , a ne w se t o f circumstance s arose which forestalle d a settlement: the British withdrew fro m thei r South Arabia n holding s (th e Crow n Colon y o f Ade n an d th e Ade n Protectorates), an d hande d ove r th e rein s o f powe r t o th e Nationa l Liberation Front—n o frien d o f Saud i interest s i n souther n Arabia , and considerably mor e radica l i n its orientation tha n the republican s of Nort h Yemen . Th e Saudi s sa w themselve s require d t o mak e an other effor t t o dislodg e th e republicans , an d essentiall y agree d t o fund on e las t effor t o n th e par t o f th e royalist s t o accomplis h thi s end. When it failed, for the usual constellation o f reasons (see below), King Faysa l decide d tha t i t woul d b e mor e pruden t an d rationa l t o seek a n accommodatio n wit h th e republican s o f Sana'a , clearl y a more moderat e grou p tha n th e NLF . For th e nex t tw o an d one-hal f years , th e tw o side s settle d int o a rough stalemate—thoug h no t th e classi c "hurtin g stalemate/ ' Th e royalist effor t wa s undermine d b y it s ow n inconsistencie s wit h re spect t o goal s an d tactics , it s interna l rivalries , it s operation s i n th e relatively isolate d an d difficult mountai n fastnesse s o f the north , an d its subordinatio n t o Sunn i (Saudi ) financial an d militar y assistance . The republicans , o n th e othe r hand , wer e plague d b y sectaria n an d ideological difference s an d rivalries , no t t o mentio n conflict s withi n their rank s ove r th e relationship s wit h thei r foreig n advisor s an d suppliers. Apparently the primary, if not the only, point of agreement amon g a significant an d presumably majorit y elemen t o n both side s was th e opposition t o an y furthe r foreig n intrusio n o r manipulatio n o f th e Yemeni conflic t fo r external purposes . Ther e were , a s late a s the en d

108 Manfre d W . Wenne r of 1968 an d early 1969 , still significant opportunitie s for the royalists to defeat th e republicans (e.g . the siege o f Sana'a, which was resisted by a combination o f republican an d Soviet actions). This effort seem s to hav e been th e las t effort whic h th e Saudi s were prepare d t o fund ; when th e usua l lis t o f royalis t problem s enable d the m t o "snatc h defeat fro m th e jaw s o f victory, " th e hear t seem s t o hav e gon e ou t of both the Saudi and the royalist effort. I n March of 1969, the imam's deputy, Princ e Muhamma d ib n Husayn , th e stronges t an d most abl e leader of the royalists, resigned his position and abandoned the cause. In th e meantime , o f n o smal l importance , th e moderat e an d almos t exclusively Zaydi republicans had managed to defeat the Left (mostl y Shafi'i) decisivel y i n a battle fo r contro l o f th e republic . I t doe s no t seem inappropriat e to suggest that the final compromise, worke d out with Saudi encouragemen t i n th e Sprin g o f 1970 , wa s i n part easie r to achieve precisely because it was overwhelmingly Zaydis discussing the issu e wit h Zaydis . It would not be possible a t this point to list all of the many faction s which characterize d bot h sides ; this would requir e a detailed listin g of the tribe s o f Yemen an d their man y sub-unit s an d the changes-of side whic h occurre d betwee n 196 2 an d 1970 . I t i s quit e likel y tha t no one could (or ever did) have this information. The important poin t is tha t th e constellatio n o n eac h side , becaus e o f th e natur e o f th e tribes i n Yemen , reall y consiste d o f man y dozen s o f individua l "na tions" which sa w their interests affecte d b y th e man y cross-current s which characterize d th e war , an d change d thei r allegiance(s ) ac cordingly. This important fac t lead s to a few hypothese s concernin g th e end ing o f civi l conflic t base d o n th e Yemen i experience : HI: Th e large r the number o f factions withi n each side , the greate r the opportunit y t o reac h a compromis e solution , sinc e eac h side' s factions wil l find i t easie r t o find someon e o n th e othe r sid e wit h whom t o undertak e discussion s an d negotiations . H2: Th e larger the number of "players" who are recognized as part of the game, the easier it will be to develop a t least transitional peac e arrangements, sinc e ther e wil l alway s b e someon e wit h who m t o discuss/negotiate. H3: Politica l figures wh o d o not hav e complet e politica l security , i.e., wh o d o no t hav e unalloye d suppor t eithe r i n th e militar y o r i n

The Civi l Wa r i n Yeme n 10 9 the civilia n sector , bu t wh o hav e enoug h t o remai n activ e players , will b e mor e prepare d t o ente r int o compromis e arrangement s i n order to protect whatever influence, power, or perquisites might still be availabl e i n an y post-settlemen t arrangement .

3. Th e Militar y Balanc e i n th e Fiel d Although i t would be utterl y fallaciou s t o argue tha t weapon s alon e cause conflicts , the y ar e nevertheles s on e o f the factor s whic h nee d to b e analyze d i f on e i s t o understan d civi l conflicts . Clearly , th e types, amounts , an d capabilitie s o f weaponr y wil l b e a n importan t factor i n the decisio n to continue o r terminate a conflict. I n the cas e of Yemen, it i s definitely th e cas e tha t th e winnin g side , the repub licans, had acces s t o mor e sophisticate d weaponr y an d mor e o f it . When th e conflic t bega n i n 1962 , th e typica l weapo n o f th e Yemeni combatant o n both side s was a World War II Mauser, a Springfield, or , almos t a s often, a single-shot rifl e o f pre-World Wa r I vintage. With the onset of the civil war, and the subsequent participatio n of a number o f states with acces s to muc h mor e moder n weaponry , the type s an d leve l o f sophisticatio n o f th e weapon s use d i n th e conflict increase d dramatically . Withi n jus t week s an d months , th e number an d variet y o f semi-automati c an d automati c weapon s in troduced significantly affecte d th e fighting (and the outcome of some battles). In addition , entirel y ne w type s o f weaponr y wer e introduced : mortars, machine-guns (variou s calibres), bazookas, grenade launch ers, recoilless rifles, and major artiller y pieces. For example, by mid1964, eve n th e royalist s wer e receivin g 81m m mortars , 75m m re coilless rifles, 105m m and 155m m howitzers of Russian an d Chines e origin. Although at the outset only the Egyptians and their republica n allies were equippe d wit h Sovie t (an d Bloc ) weaponry , b y 196 4 b y far th e larges t par t o f th e militar y equipmen t bein g use d wa s o f "Eastern" origin . This is not t o sugges t tha t Wester n weaponr y wa s not used : sinc e Saud i Arabia , Jordan , an d Ira n wer e primaril y re sponsible fo r th e smal l arm s an d lighte r equipmen t bein g use d b y the royalists , much o f it was o f Western origins . Inevitably, considerin g th e terrai n an d th e eb b an d flow o f th e conflict, th e force s o f on e sid e o r othe r overra n th e suppl y depots , caches, villages, forts, etc. of the other side. This meant that by war's end there was an incredible mixture of weaponry on both sides. One

110 Manfre d W . Wenne r must add , however , tha t th e preferre d weapo n o f th e triba l force s associated wit h bot h side s was the AK-4 7 (Kalashnikov ) i n its many versions—primarily becaus e o f it s firepowe r an d reliabilit y ( a func tion of the simplicit y o f its design). In fact, th e biggest problem wa s not so much weaponry as supplying ammunition of the proper calibre and manufacture t o the levies , tribesmen, mercenaries , an d soldier s allied wit h one' s side . Mor e tha n on e battl e wa s lost o r wo n base d upon whic h sid e had a n adequat e amoun t o f ammunition . The Yemen i civi l war , however , wa s no t fough t solel y o n th e ground. Thi s wa s partl y du e t o th e terrain , whic h mad e armore d personnel carrier s (APCs ) an d tank s a s wel l a s jeep-mounte d re coilless rifles les s than usefu l o n many occasions. The terrain indee d practically guarantee d tha t airpowe r woul d b e employed ; althoug h there was some use of fighters, the most important weapon availabl e to th e republi c whic h th e royalist s di d no t hav e wa s th e bomber , specifically th e Su- 7 fighter bomber , Tu-1 6 mediu m je t bombers , and especiall y th e 11-2 8 ligh t je t bomber , whic h prove d usefu l i n maneuvering aroun d th e mountainou s valley s o f the north . I t i s difficult to be precise on such matters, of course, but it seems legitimate to argu e tha t th e airstrike s o f the Egyptian s agains t royalis t strong holds i n th e norther n mountain s wer e a major facto r i n weakenin g the strongpoint s whic h th e royalist s create d a s base camps , suppl y centers, o r comman d center s (includin g th e locatio n o f the imam). Briefly, then , th e Egyptian s wer e abl e t o monopoliz e th e skies ; further, thei r read y acces s t o APC s an d som e tank s t o cove r thei r movements alon g majo r road s an d track s o n man y occasion s gav e them a significant advantage . The sam e may be sai d for thei r us e of artillery. On the other hand, their dependence upon hardwar e ofte n left the m vulnerabl e t o th e effectiv e guerrill a tactic s use d b y th e tribal warriors of the imam, who knew the mountains and effectivel y exploited th e defiles, passes , and treacherous condition s to their ad vantage. A t th e sam e time , th e us e b y th e Egyptian s o f poison ga s delivered b y ligh t je t bomber s seem s t o hav e succeede d onl y i n totally alienatin g man y Yemen i elements (republica n a s well as royalist) from the Egyptians. (The use of gas was always officially denied ; however, it was acknowledged on the ground in Yemen, and plentifu l evidence wa s provided b y correspondent s an d neutra l observers. ) The intuitively attractive concept of the "hurtin g stalemate" does not provid e muc h explanator y powe r i n the cas e of the Yeme n con flict. It would be fai r to characteriz e a number o f distinct period s in

The Civi l War in Yemen 11 1 the development o f the conflict a s essentially stalemates ; they were, however, period s durin g whic h tim e th e partie s obtaine d ne w sources o f suppor t (weaponry) , re-cemente d o r re-invigorated var ious support systems (diplomatic , military , etc.) , or engaged in desultory negotiation s i n orde r t o "scor e points " i n th e internationa l community o r wit h potentia l allie s o r significan t powers . Neithe r side, i n these situations , fel t compelle d by th e situatio n (o r its projection int o th e nea r future ) t o negotiat e a n end to th e conflic t se riously. Neithe r side , i n othe r words , wa s sufferin g sufficiently—i n terms of casualties, economic costs, or whatever other criteria might be deeme d relevant—t o negotiat e a settlement seriously ; bot h be lieved that an extension of the conflict woul d lead to their eventua l victory. In sum, th e type s an d quantities o f military equipmen t availabl e to th e tw o side s demonstrate d grea t discrepancies , bu t th e repub licans ha d access t o fa r more, mor e varied , an d more sophisticate d equipment. However , i n the final analysis, equipment an d access to it wer e no t th e decidin g factor s i n the conflic t o r it s eventua l set tlement.

4. Th e Role o f Third Parties Third-party interventio n an d participation i n th e Yemen i civi l wa r was basically o f two types: (1) ai d and assistance to the combatant s and (2) mediation efforts . The rol e o f Egypt, an d the "progressive " force s whic h wer e it s allies and supporters in defense of the republic, and the role of Saudi Arabia, an d the "conservative " force s whic h wer e allie d wit h i t i n defense o f the imamate, hav e been covered above and need no further review . I n a n effor t t o b e complete , however , i t i s probabl y relevant t o ad d tha t n o potentiall y importan t thir d part y faile d t o become involved , eithe r directl y o r indirectly. For example: one of the "superpowers " of the time was involved on each side; all of the "progressive" regional states at the time were involved (Egypt , Iraq , Algeria, Syria) ; all o f the "conservative " re gional actor s were involve d (Saud i Arabia , Jordan , Iran, Morocco) . However, th e majority of European states chose not to get involved directly, with the single exception o f Great Britain, presumably because of its extensive regional interests at the time (in the Gulf states, including Oman , as well a s South Yemen).

112 Manfre d W . Wenne r Only tw o externa l partie s attempte d t o mediat e th e conflict : th e United State s an d the Unite d Nations . Neithe r wa s successful; a s the brief summar y whic h follow s shows , neithe r wa s reall y intereste d i n playing th e rol e o f neutra l mediato r o r arbiter . A. The

United States

The U.S . ha d recognized th e republi c i n December 196 2 a s a result of a comple x o f motives , includin g (a ) th e desir e o f th e Kenned y administration to demonstrate it s support for progressive rathe r than conservative monarchica l regimes ; (b ) th e desir e t o exercis e a moderating influenc e o n th e republi c a t a time whe n i t began t o receiv e Soviet militar y assistance ; (c ) th e desir e t o giv e Presiden t Nasi r a n opportunity t o withdra w gracefully , whic h i t wa s presume d woul d be possibl e a s a resul t o f th e America n decisio n (t o recogniz e th e republic), whic h i t wa s assume d woul d b e followe d b y a similar de cision o n the par t o f other governments ; an d (d ) the assumptio n tha t the America n decisio n woul d caus e supporter s o f th e imamat e t o limit or even end their assistance since all (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, etc.) were dependen t almos t entirel y upo n th e Unite d State s fo r thei r military equipment . The America n decisio n di d no t resul t i n al l o f th e expecte d con sequences; althoug h th e Unite d Nation s an d som e 5 0 countrie s fol lowed th e America n lead , Grea t Britai n di d not . An d Saudi Arabia , which clearl y feare d th e consequence s o f expande d Egyptia n influ ence an d a stron g republica n governmen t i n Yemen , wa s unwillin g to ceas e it s aid . Furthermore , Presiden t Nasi r di d no t withdra w hi s troops, sinc e h e interprete d th e event s i n the ligh t o f his experienc e with Syri a i n th e Unite d Ara b Republic . H e believe d tha t th e dis integration o f the first attempt a t Arab unity wa s not du e t o a failure of leadership o r commitment o n the par t o f Egypt, rathe r it was du e to th e treacher y o f imperialis t Wester n power s i n leagu e wit h Ara b reactionaries; i t was , therefore , unthinkabl e t o permi t thes e sam e forces onc e agai n t o stan d i n th e wa y o f bringin g progressiv e gov ernment an d idea s t o th e Ara b world . Despite thei r mutua l antagonis m an d recriminations , Egyp t an d Saudi Arabi a first expresse d a desir e t o en d th e conflic t b y earl y 1963; sinc e thei r opinion s ove r th e mos t effectiv e mean s wer e a t variance, i t wa s decide d tha t onl y a neutral mediato r migh t b e abl e to brin g abou t a n effectiv e agreement . The Unite d State s first attempte d t o fill thi s role , an d at the sam e time brough t i n the Unite d Nation s fo r th e sam e purpose . Presiden t

The Civi l War in Yemen 11 3 Kennedy sen t forme r Ambassado r Ellswort h T . Bunke r t o th e are a to undertak e th e necessar y negotiations , whic h wer e intende d t o produce a disengagement agreemen t between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Bunker, because of his circumspect and practiced methods, was able t o ge t th e tw o countrie s t o agre e o n a vague progra m whic h would be implemente d by th e Unite d Nations . O n the othe r hand, since he failed even to meet with any representatives of the royalists, they wer e understandabl y reluctan t t o accep t th e Unite d State s a s a neutral mediator . B. The United Nations The UN sen t its own emissary, Ralph Bunche, the n Undersecretar y for Special Political Affairs. He also made no effort to speak with any royalist representatives, an d indeed his actions were seen as so onesided that the Saudis even refused him permission to enter the country. The Egyptians and the republicans, afte r their consultations with the U.S . an d U N emissarie s concernin g mediation , apparentl y de cided tha t th e visi t o f th e tw o * 'mediators'' wa s a n opportunit y t o prove th e exten t o f thei r control , a s wel l a s th e justnes s o f thei r cause. A s a result, th e Egyptian s dispatche d additiona l troo p unit s and equipmen t t o Yeme n a t th e sam e tim e tha t th e republican s launched a campaign against two major towns in the eastern regions which had long been i n the hand s of the royalists. Using aeria l an d armored forces, th e Egyptian s drov e th e royalist s out ; immediatel y thereafter, th e republicans and Egyptians conducte d Bunch e to the area to demonstrate the extent of republican control in the east. Mr. Bunche returne d t o Cairo , indicatin g tha t h e ha d bee n mos t im pressed b y th e "seriousnes s o f purpose " an d th e strengt h o f th e republic. (Shortl y thereafter , o f course , th e royalist s wer e abl e t o return to the two strongholds. ) The result of the two visits was a decision by the United Nations Secretary General , U Thant, to create a United Nations Yemen Observation Missio n (UNYOM ) t o overse e th e agreemen t fo r whic h Bunker had laid the cornerstone: the phased withdrawal of Egyptian troops in return for a cessation of all aid on the part of Saudi Arabia to the royalist s an d a prohibition o n the us e o f Saud i territor y a s a staging pos t fo r royalis t incursion s an d attack s o n republica n posi tions. The two countries agreed, in addition, to permit UN observers access to al l areas of the countr y necessar y t o insur e compliance .

114 Manfre d W . Wenne r U Thant selecte d a s UNYOM commander Majo r Genera l Carl von Horn, formerly o f the Palestine Truce Supervisory Organization. Von Horn spen t a week discussin g hi s and the UN' s role in Cairo, Jidda, and various cities in Yemen, and prepared a less-than-optimistic bu t complete repor t o n wha t h e believe d woul d b e necessar y t o carr y out the UN mandate. Accordingly, in July of 1963, UNYOM officiall y began operations . However , i t was evident fro m th e outse t tha t th e size o f th e missio n (20 0 men) , combine d wit h th e natur e o f th e terrain, mad e i t impossibl e fo r UNYO M t o carr y ou t th e dutie s as signed t o i t (i.e. , t o attes t t o n o furthe r Saud i ai d an d th e phase d withdrawal o f Egyptian troops) . Within tw o months , von Hor n sub mitted hi s resignation , complainin g tha t UNYOM' s wor k wa s ham pered b y incompetence in the UN Secretariat, neglec t an d dismissal of his reports an d suggestions concernin g th e safet y o f his men, an d the unwillingnes s t o provid e adequat e fund s fo r equipment , main tenance, etc . One of von Horn's most revealing complaints about the UN's policies wit h respec t t o Yeme n wa s tha t th e UNYO M wa s prohibite d from havin g an y contac t wit h th e royalists . I t i s difficult t o imagin e a mor e unrealisti c directive : th e chie f o f a UN missio n designe d t o help brin g abou t th e en d o f a civi l conflic t bein g prohibite d fro m making contac t wit h on e o f the partie s t o th e conflict . One i s forced t o entertai n a t leas t tw o conclusions : (1) Th e U.S . was no t intereste d i n actin g a s a neutral mediator ; rather, fro m al l appearances , th e U.S . ha d mad e u p it s min d con cerning th e conflic t an d it s outcom e i n lat e 1962 . Then, whe n th e anticipated conclusio n faile d t o develop , U.S . policy seem s t o hav e been designe d t o forc e realit y t o matc h preconceive d notions . (2) Th e UN was no more interested tha n the U.S. in determinin g the facts of the situation, or in behaving in an even-handed (neutral ) fashion. I n fact , i t appear s t o hav e bee n completel y subordinat e t o the Unite d State s a s fa r a s it s policie s an d assessment s wer e con cerned. Some minor powers managed , a t least i n part, t o bring the majo r outside participants t o participate i n negotiations. President Ahma d Ben Bella of Algeria and President Abd al-Karim al-Arif of Iraq acted as intermediaries between President Nasir and Prince Faysal in bringing about the talks held at Erkwit, in November of 1964. The Crown Prince o f Kuwait helped to mediate between thes e same figures and bring abou t th e Jidd a Conference .

The Civi l War i n Yeme n 11 5 (NB: Th e Unite d Nation s missio n unde r vo n Hor n consiste d o f personnel fro m Sweden , Ireland , th e U.S. , Guatemala , Britain , an d Canada; i t was , however, materiall y assiste d an d dependen t upo n a mobile reconnaissanc e uni t o f som e 12 2 Yugoslavs , whos e move ments and reports were controlle d by a political commissa r who got his orders from hi s government, which in essence got its orders fro m the Sovie t Union . On e consequence , o f course, was that th e report s and th e activitie s wer e extremel y prejudicia l t o th e interest s an d actions o f the royalists. )

5. Th e Post-Conflic t Polit y It has been suggeste d tha t th e natur e o f the polit y whic h i s create d through th e resolutio n o f a civi l conflic t wil l affec t it s chance s o f "success." There ar e a t leas t tw o problem s o f verification wit h thi s thesis: (1) Settin g a standar d o f longevit y withou t a renewe d outbrea k of violence ; i n othe r words , ho w muc h tim e mus t pas s befor e an y political violenc e take s plac e an d ye t hav e th e ne w syste m b e de clared a "success" ? (2) Wha t kind s o f action s meri t consideratio n a s a "resumptio n of violence" ? D o assassination s count ? Wha t kind s o f domesti c vi olence—rebellions, riots, etc.—count? Does passive resistance to government polic y count ? What i f the governmen t doe s no t contro l al l of the territory o f the polity, yet there i s no overt violenc e betwee n the governmen t an d thos e wh o contro l th e othe r areas ? The civil war in Yemen and its resolution present some interesting alternatives t o othe r civi l conflict s o n a numbe r o f characteristics . For example: the Compromise of 1970 clearly integrated the forme r rivals int o th e ne w polit y (whic h wa s stil l calle d th e Yeme n Ara b Republic). Som e importan t member s o f th e royalis t entourag e (though not members of the old imamic family) wer e included in the new government , an d on e prominen t royalis t wa s include d i n th e new three-member Republican Council , the highest executive orga n of the new state. Moreover, royalists were integrated a t lower levels into the administrative agencies and bureaus of the new government , at leas t i n par t becaus e thes e individual s (qadi s an d sayyids ) ha d education an d expertis e whic h th e republi c coul d use . Another issue which intuitively seems relevant is the disarmamen t of participants—both i n terms o f actual weaponry a s well as psycho-

116 Manfre d W . Wenne r logical orientatio n (i.e. , t o th e us e o f weapon s i n orde r t o resolv e socio-economic an d political issues) . A s fa r a s the actua l equipmen t is concerned , th e issu e neve r arise s i n Yeme n sinc e th e averag e Ye meni mal e ha s alway s carrie d a weapon . I t wa s no t unti l th e lat e 1970s tha t th e thre e majo r citie s wer e abl e t o prohibi t th e publi c carrying o f firearms; i n th e remainde r o f th e country , i t is quit e common t o se e individual s carryin g weapon s (automati c rifles , es pecially). Th e onl y differenc e betwee n th e pre-civi l wa r perio d an d its aftermat h i s i n th e qualit y (type ) o f weapon s bein g carried . I n other words , n o effor t whatsoeve r wa s mad e t o disar m th e losin g side; t o hav e attempte d t o d o s o woul d hav e mean t a resumption o f the conflic t (perhap s eve n alon g differen t lines) . The secon d issue, is, o f course, a bit more difficult ; sinc e a n eight year civil war has the inevitable tendency t o promote the use of arms as a mechanism t o cop e wit h variou s type s o f social , economi c an d political disagreements , ho w doe s on e judg e whethe r o r no t th e participants hav e abandone d th e psychologica l tendenc y t o emplo y weapons a s a mechanis m fo r conflic t resolution ? On e side-effec t o f the civi l wa r wa s perhap s inevitable : th e inclinatio n o f th e arme d forces t o participate i n politics. Althoug h man y o f the cabinet s sinc e 1970 hav e bee n dominate d b y civilian s (especiall y technocrats) , there i s littl e doub t tha t th e Yemen i militar y ha s becom e th e mos t important domesti c playe r i n the politica l arena . O n the othe r hand , its role ha s been i n the natur e o f a background condition , th e frame work within which the civilia n technocrats an d political figures carr y on th e "gam e o f politics/ ' This is not to suggest that there has been complete domesti c peac e since th e en d o f th e civi l war . A complet e summar y o f event s sinc e that tim e require s acknowledgemen t o f two set s o f circumstances i n which ol d dispute s an d difference s flared anew . (1) Ther e wer e tw o politica l assassination s i n 1978 ; i n bot h in stances i t wa s th e presiden t o f th e republi c wh o wa s killed . Th e perpetrators wer e neve r found ; thei r motive s hav e alway s bee n un clear. I t woul d appear , however , tha t bot h assassination s ha d mor e to d o wit h Yemen' s foreig n relations , especiall y wit h Sout h Yemen , than wit h domesti c intrigues , politica l differences , o r conflicts . (2) Th e ol d politica l Left , whic h ha d bee n largel y decimate d i n the lat e 1960 s whe n th e republican s fough t eac h othe r fo r contro l of th e republic , emerge d i n th e 1970 s a s th e Nationa l Democrati c Front. I t attracte d a numbe r o f other , smalle r grouping s wit h a va -

The Civi l War in Yemen 11 7 riety o f grievance s agains t th e republi c an d it s policies , an d wa s funded by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), i.e., South Yemen, governed at the time by a radical Marxist regime. After numerous skirmishe s an d disruptiv e activitie s o n th e par t o f th e Front, the government decided upon a frontal assault on the positions and activities of the Front, and in 1982 essentially eliminate d it and drove it s few remnant s into exil e i n the PDRY. On th e othe r hand , especiall y sinc e th e defea t o f th e NDF , th e Ali Abdulla h Sali h regim e ha s encourage d th e developmen t o f ci vilian institutions at both the local an d national level , an d since th e mid-1980s, ther e hav e bee n fre e election s t o th e resultin g variet y of bodies. By the en d of the 1980s , th e Ali Abdullah Salih regime ha d succeeded in integrating nearly all elements of the society int o the political system ; th e onl y outstandin g exception s wer e th e al-Wazi r family, and most of the Hamid al-Dins. Indeed, the old qadi families and man y o f th e sayyi d familie s ha d alread y bee n integrate d an d become an integral part of the intelligentsia of the new system. Even the triba l element s o f th e nort h ha d bee n mor e o r les s include d (though occasiona l incident s o f oppositio n t o governmenta l polic y and administratio n wer e stil l a featur e o f th e syste m i n th e lat e 1980s). One of the most important criteria by which to judge the successor regime t o a civi l wa r woul d see m t o b e it s abilit y t o mee t "ne w challenges," i.e., cop e wit h th e variet y o f social , economi c a s well as political problem s whic h an y governmen t mus t confron t an d attempt to resolve. The Ali Abdullah Salih regime has had to confron t a particularly thorny and varied set of''challenges'' during its twelve years in power (a s of 1990) . In the foreig n arena , th e primar y challenge s cam e fro m variou s efforts from Saudi Arabia and the PDRY either to weaken or seriously alter the government's policies on a number of issues (both domestic and foreign) . Thi s include d tw o war s wit h th e PDR Y (197 2 an d 1979), a s well a s numerous campaign s in the norther n area s of the country to establis h the government' s legitimac y an d control. In th e domesti c arena , th e primar y challenge s wer e i n th e eco nomic sphere , du e to the fundamentall y wea k econom y an d its dependence upon foreign subsidies, loans, and aid packages, and in the political sphere where the government sought to gain legitimacy and establish its authority over various domestic groups (e.g. the tribes)

118 Manfre d W . Wenne r and regions , a s wel l a s provide th e populatio n wit h th e good s an d services which i t demanded . Perhap s the mos t important challenge , however, wa s th e searc h fo r legitimacy , tha t is , t o mov e beyon d simply militar y migh t a s the basi s fo r th e regime . I n thi s sense , th e regime ha s don e considerabl y bette r tha n mos t post-civi l wa r sys tems: it has supported th e creatio n o f various popular organization s at the local and national level, and permitted, eve n encouraged, fre e elections t o thes e bodies . At th e internationa l level , i n 199 0 i t succeede d i n puttin g wha t appears to be a permanent en d to the difference s wit h the PDRY by entering int o a unification agreement , creatin g a united Republi c of Yemen, i n whic h ne w stat e ther e wil l b e politica l partie s an d fre e elections (whic h includ e th e participatio n o f women bot h a s candidates an d voters) . An overall assessmen t woul d hav e to be tha t th e regim e had succeeded very effectively a t coping with a large number o f thorny an d rather varie d challenges .

Conclusions an d Commentar y Some assessmen t o f thes e variou s factor s an d th e informatio n in cluded abov e seem s appropriate . The first and possibly th e mos t importan t questio n is : what i s the primary reaso n fo r th e endin g of the conflict ? Wha t factor wa s most important in the thinking and behavior of the participants in deciding to en d th e war ? In th e answe r t o thi s question , w e nee d t o distinguis h betwee n the motives and behavior of the outside intervenors, and the motives and action s o f the Yemen i combatants . The action s o f Egypt an d Saud i Arabi a appea r t o hav e been mo tivated b y a numbe r o f factors : (1 ) thei r perception s o f th e conse quences of the victory or defeat o f their particular side in the Yemeni conflict upo n the political situatio n i n the Arab World; (2 ) their per ceptions o f th e consequence s o f th e victor y o r defea t o f thei r all y upon thei r ow n situation/positio n i n th e Ara b World ; (3 ) th e eco nomic cost s o f continuin g t o suppor t thei r client/factio n i n th e Yemeni conflict ; (4 ) their perception s o f the consequence s o f the con flict an d it s outcome o n th e positio n o f the Sovie t Unio n an d Grea t Britain i n th e Middl e Eas t i n general , an d i n th e Re d Se a region i n

The Civi l War i n Yeme n 11 9 particular. Las t and , i t woul d appear , least : (5 ) thei r relation s wit h the sid e the y supporte d i n Yemen itself . The action s o f th e Yemeni s themselve s ar e perhap s a bi t mor e clear, an d i t ma y b e argued , eventuall y significantl y affecte d th e policies and actions of their supporters. Clearly, Yemeni motives and policies change d durin g th e conflict , fro m th e assumptio n o f com pletely defeating th e opponent t o the position that negotiations with the opponen t wer e th e onl y feasibl e an d possibl e outcom e t o th e conflict. What wa s it , i n th e final analysis , tha t mad e i t possibl e fo r th e Yemenis t o com e t o a n agreemen t amon g themselves , an d directl y or indirectly make the departure of their various allies and supporters from th e Yemen i theatre o f operations th e onl y feasibl e choice ? Five factor s appea r t o be a reasonable summary . (1) The behavior of the Egyptians, whic h succeede d i n alienatin g increasing number s o f Yemenis, most especiall y thos e i n the repub lican camp . Thei r militar y action s an d policie s ha d alread y thor oughly alienate d th e royalists ; pronounce d cruelt y an d barbarou s practices i n field operation s le d t o retaliator y action s by th e tribes men, which only further infuriate d th e Egyptians, producing a spiral of viciou s behavio r whic h mean t tha t onl y rarel y wer e prisoner s taken. Their action s an d policie s towar d thei r Yemen i allie s eventuall y produced the impetus toward settlement with the royalists: an almost complete unwillingnes s t o permi t difference s o f opinio n withi n th e ranks of republicans; thei r unwaverin g suppor t (unti l th e ver y end ) of th e incompeten t an d slavis h Abdulla h al-Sallal ; an d thei r coun tenancing a variet y o f disgracefu l policie s designe d t o stam p ou t flexible approache s t o th e conflict . Thi s include d th e assassinatio n of Muhamma d al-Zubagr i an d th e incarceratio n o f suc h respecte d figures a s Ahmad Nu'ma n whe n thes e individual s woul d no t accep t the uncompromisin g an d fruitles s policie s o f thei r Egyptia n allies . The republican s increasingl y turne d o n th e Egyptians , considerin g them unrealistic , arrogant, an d meddlesome in the extreme, and decided t o us e othe r (ofte n secret ) mean s t o com e t o term s wit h th e royalists. (2) The policies of the Saudis. Althoug h the essence of reaction and opposition t o progressive force s because they provided militar y an d

120 Manfre d W . Wenne r financial ai d t o th e royalists , i t i s interestin g tha t the y wer e viewe d with considerabl e suspicio n b y th e royalists . Wha t motive s coul d a Sunni politica l system/stat e hav e fo r providin g ai d to a Shi'a cause ? The fac t tha t th e ima m an d som e o f hi s advisor s appeare d t o b e subservient to Saudi interests and goals raised considerable suspicio n among som e o f th e traditionall y stron g supporter s o f th e imamate / royalist cause . Withi n th e livin g memor y o f many participants i n th e conflict, Saudi Arabia had taken the oasi s of Najran and the provinc e of Asir—bot h o f whic h ar e considere d integra l part s o f Yeme n b y Yemenis. It shoul d b e noted , however , tha t ther e wer e considerabl e dif ferences betwee n th e tw o Saudi monarch s durin g whos e tenur e th e Yemeni civil war took place. Until November 1964 , the king of Saudi Arabia was Sa'ud ibn Abd al-Aziz, whose reputation was substantially tarnished by hi s profligate an d unsophisticated way s and policies; h e was replace d b y hi s brothe r Faysa l ib n Ab d al-Aziz , whos e politica l skills wer e substantiall y greate r tha n thos e o f Sa'ud . (On e quic k in dicator: Kin g Faysa l neve r demande d th e retur n t o th e thron e o f Imam Muhamma d al-Badr , presumabl y becaus e h e recognize d th e futility o f thi s a s a goal; hi s purpos e wa s t o hav e a reasonably sym pathetic buffer stat e created in (North) Yemen to counter the position and policie s o f th e Sout h Yemenis. ) (3) The presence of the Europeans (of various nationalities). Wha t motives drov e Christia n (an d atheist ) European s t o participat e i n a conflict thousand s o f mile s fro m thei r homelands ? Wha t di d the y hope t o gain ? T o re-creat e thei r pas t empire s i n th e Middl e East ? To humiliate Islam ? To control resource s whic h th e Yemeni s di d no t even kno w the y had ? (4) The mercenaries. Clearl y suc h person s wer e no t t o b e trusted , since thei r loyalt y an d assistanc e wer e availabl e fo r purchase ; wha t would happe n i f th e othe r sid e offere d t o pa y more ? Foreig n mer cenaries wer e onl y goo d a s trainer s i n th e us e o f sophisticate d mil itary equipment , sinc e thei r advic e o n tactic s wa s eithe r irrelevan t to th e Yemen i context , o r was possibly eve n designe d t o undermin e or weake n th e cause . The obviou s conclusio n i s tha t on e o f th e mos t venerabl e hy potheses i n the social science s appears highly appropriate if not full y confirmed by the Yemeni civil war: an external threat or danger tends to submerg e interna l conflicts .

The Civi l Wa r i n Yeme n 12 1 The Yemen i conflict , however , lead s t o a rathe r mor e specifi c hypothesis concernin g foreig n intervention : H4: Interventio n b y foreigner s i n a domestic conflic t wil l produc e a reactio n amon g th e indigenou s population , i n on e o r mor e o f th e following ways : (a) opposition t o the continue d presenc e o f the for eigner; (b ) growth in nationalist sentiment , i.e. , a re-assertion o f the particularistic features of the society and its culture which distinguish it from that of the intervenors (or any other system); (c) a concomitant growth i n xenophobia , generally ; an d (d ) a n increase d effor t t o us e the indigenou s cultur e a s a basis fo r a settlemen t o f difference s i n order t o avoi d furthe r interventio n an d action s by th e foreigner . H5: A civi l conflic t i n a polit y i s likel y t o b e resolve d withou t a division of the polity into separate successor states because both sides to the conflict , expectin g t o win afte r th e war , prefe r t o inherit th e population, territory , an d resource s o f th e entir e stat e rathe r tha n accept onl y som e portion thereof . Because Yemen is characterized by so many clearly distinguishable geographic a s well a s ethnic divisions , an d because fo r suc h a lon g period o f time i t wa s possible t o characteriz e th e conflic t a s a stalemate, ther e wa s a de facto divisio n o f the country . Th e republican s controlled th e so-calle d ''triangle' ' bounde d b y th e thre e majo r ur ban concentration s o f Sana'a , Ta'izz , an d Hudaydah ; th e royalist s controlled th e north , northeast , northwest , an d mos t o f the easter n regions. In fact , th e distributio n o f politica l powe r afte r th e compromis e which ende d th e civi l conflic t ver y muc h resemble d th e de facto division existin g durin g th e stalemate ; however , thi s i s misleading . First, th e royalist s di d no t exis t a s an organize d politica l forc e gov erning th e area s theoreticall y unde r thei r control ; rather , th e "au thorities' ' in these areas were the autonomous tribes—the same tribes which ha d insiste d upo n thei r autonom y unde r al l previous govern ments an d rulers . Second, althoug h th e centra l governmen t coul d no t an d di d no t control eve n 50 % of the territor y o f the stat e durin g the night-tim e hours, it was increasingly abl e to show its control ove r access to th e things whic h th e populatio n o f al l region s wanted : schools , clinics , roads, an d piped wate r systems . As it demonstrate d tha t i t wa s abl e to delive r suc h services , an d tha t significan t decision s wit h respec t

122 Manfre d W . Wenne r to the supply of an increasing range of goods and services were being made in the urban centers, the areas over which it could not exercise direct contro l bega n t o shrink . Th e triba l authoritie s simpl y coul d not compete . Third, a t leas t wit h respec t t o th e easter n regions , the discover y of oil in what was long one of the most independent o f areas resulted in a dramatic expansio n o f governmental authority . The point , o f course , i s tha t governmenta l authorit y an d powe r may not be solely a function o f military prowess; in Yemen, the ability to provid e th e thing s th e populatio n want s i s a far mor e importan t factor i n the government's efforts t o obtain legitimacy than its ability to field adequate polic e forces . This lead s to a few additiona l hypotheses : H6: Th e successo r governmen t afte r a civi l wa r mus t b e abl e t o demonstrate an d provid e a clear increas e i n the kind s of goods an d services whic h th e populatio n believe s i t i s entitled t o o r demand s (no doub t a t leas t i n par t t o mak e u p fo r th e deprivation s endure d while th e conflic t wa s stil l i n progress ) o r els e fac e a renewed out break o f civil violence . H7: Th e conclusion of a civil conflict will not only raise expectations among th e victors , who wil l expec t t o benefi t concretel y someho w from th e sacrifice s an d cost s paid—in status , prestige, jobs, income , access to goods and services, etc.; it is likely to raise the expectation s of the defeate d partie s eve n higher , sinc e ther e i s no furthe r justi fication whatever fo r th e deprivations an d losses associated with defeat o r th e conflic t itself . H8: A successor regim e whic h canno t mak e peace effectivel y wit h its former opponents ' supporter s an d allies will find itself in seriou s difficulty (economi c an d political) , includin g th e possibilit y o f re newed conflic t institute d b y precisel y thes e parties . In th e cas e o f Yemen , th e bigges t proble m wa s wit h th e Saudis : since s o man y o f th e norther n tribe s wer e tie d t o th e Saudi s a s a result o f thei r acceptanc e o f mone y an d weapons , the y wer e use d to intervenin g i n domesti c policy . And , sinc e th e governmen t wa s dependent upo n Saud i financial (budgetary ) assistanc e durin g thes e same years, the new government wa s considerably circumscribe d i n

The Civi l War in Yemen 12 3 its policy options . I t wa s not unti l Yeme n began t o expor t oi l fro m its newly discovere d fields that its government wa s able to exercis e greater independence i n both domesti c an d foreign polic y withou t incurring the wrath of the Saudis, usually displayed through endemic resistance t o governmenta l authorit y by suc h tribes a s the Sufyan .

6.1 Zimbabw e

124

S I X

The En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l Wa r Stephen Joh n Stedma n There is always something ne w comin g ou t o f Africa.—Plin y

At a time when Africa has become ou t of vogue fo r American politica l science, i t has become a remarkable laborator y fo r th e stud y o f con flict resolution . A t presen t i n Afric a thre e countrie s (Uganda , Zim babwe, an d Namibia ) ar e reconstructin g afte r civi l wars—th e latte r two ende d b y negotiation , on e countr y (Sudan ) ha s reache d agree ments t o en d civi l violenc e onl y t o find itsel f i n th e throe s o f civi l war again, an d four othe r countrie s (Angola , Ethiopia , Mozambique , and Sout h Africa ) hav e undergon e negotiation s i n th e las t yea r t o end violenc e an d brin g abou t ne w politica l orders . In thi s chapte r I examin e th e Zimbabwea n civi l wa r an d recon struction.1 I t i s a particularly compellin g cas e t o stud y becaus e i t i s one of the few cases in the world of a mediated, negotiated settlemen t of a civil war . I n the first sectio n o f thi s chapte r I provide a genera l historical overvie w o f th e case . I the n examin e th e successfu l ne gotiated terminatio n o f th e Zimbabwea n civi l wa r o f th e 1970 s an d conclude b y discussin g event s i n Zimbabw e sinc e th e wa r ende d i n April 1980 .

Historical Backgroun d In th e las t sixt y year s th e territor y encompassin g present-da y Zim babwe ha s ha d fou r differen t names—Souther n Rhodesia , Rhodesia , 125

126 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, an d it s curren t name— a fac t tha t tell s muc h about th e line s o f conflic t i n th e country . Th e "self-governing " col ony o f Souther n Rhodesi a wa s a hybri d possessio n o f th e Britis h Empire, somewha t aki n t o Bernar d DeVoto' s descriptio n o f T e x a s half hors e an d hal f alligator . Nominall y unde r th e contro l o f th e British, ye t de facto rule d b y it s whit e settlers , Souther n Rhodesi a was very much th e product o f its namesake, Ceci l Rhodes , who onc e said tha t i f i t ha d been i n hi s power , h e woul d hav e "colonize d th e stars." Rhodes , throug h forc e an d chicaner y agains t it s Africa n in habitants, ha d establishe d a foothol d i n th e territor y i n th e lat e 1800s. Rhodes ' Britis h Sout h Africa n Compan y ha d consolidate d it s rule ther e throug h a charter grante d by Britain . A key turnin g poin t in th e country' s histor y too k plac e i n 192 2 whe n it s whit e settler s were give n the opportunit y t o vote o n the futur e o f their new home . Their choice s wer e t o continu e unde r th e charter , join th e Unio n o f South Africa , o r op t fo r self-government . The majorit y o f white s chos e self-governmen t i n 1923 . No w for mally annexe d t o Britain , bu t wit h powe r devolve d t o it s whit e set tlers, Rhodesi a achieve d th e anomalou s statu s o f "self-governing " colony. Durin g it s histor y a white minorit y tha t neve r amounte d t o more tha n five percen t o f th e populatio n rule d ove r an d systemat ically oppresse d th e blac k majorit y i n Souther n Rhodesia . Souther n Rhodesia's 192 3 constitution , unlik e that of South Africa, committe d its peoples t o a "color blind" franchise (O'Mear a 1975 , 8) . Propert y and educational requirements , however , prevente d almos t al l blacks from politica l participation . Th e white s extende d thei r disenfran chisement o f African s t o socia l an d economi c affairs . Th e mos t im portant resourc e t o th e peopl e o f Rhodesi a wa s arabl e land , whic h from th e beginnin g o f th e twentiet h centur y ha d graduall y com e under th e possessio n o f the smal l Europea n population . I n 193 0 th e Land Apportionment Ac t legall y segregate d th e holdin g o f land , b y giving European s th e righ t t o purchas e i n th e mos t desirabl e agri cultural regions . Th e remainde r o f th e lan d wa s distribute d t o Af ricans. Ten percen t o f th e lan d was se t asid e fo r thos e African s wit h the resource s an d desir e t o compet e i n Rhodesia' s Darwinia n eco nomic environmen t o f th e 1930s . Th e remainin g 9 0 percen t o f Af rican lan d wa s committe d t o communa l farmin g i n area s calle d th e Tribal Trus t lands . This syste m o f lan d right s wa s furthe r codifie d i n 196 9 wit h th e passage o f th e Lan d Tenur e Act . Th e Act , whic h Rhodesian s wave d

The En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l War 12 7 as a banner of their racial enlightenment, "equally " divided the land into 45 million acres for blacks and 45 million acres for whites. Given the discrepancy in farming populations between the two groups, this "equal" distribution provide d the averag e white farmer 6,10 0 acre s compared t o seve n acre s fo r th e averag e Africa n farmer . Thi s agai n tells onl y par t o f th e story , fo r th e mos t fertile , ric h lan d wa s dis tributed t o th e whites , whil e th e African s wer e lef t parcel s o f arid , barren soi l (Austi n 1975) . The inequalit y i n lan d holding s mirrore d othe r importan t dis crepancies between black s and white s i n Rhodesia i n terms o f jobs, wealth, healt h services , governmen t expenditur e o n students , an d access to education. I n most case s such inequalities were reinforce d through law s designed t o depriv e th e blac k populatio n o f basic hu man rights . Fa r fro m seein g th e syste m the y ha d constructe d a s an affront t o human dignity, most Rhodesians saw their relationship with the African s a s a "partnership " betwee n "th e blac k hors e an d th e white rider " (Godfre y Huggin s quote d i n O'Mear a 1975) . The whit e community , self-containe d amids t a n ocea n o f blacks, forged a worl d vie w tha t denie d th e intelligenc e an d humanit y o f the Africa n people . Mos t white s kne w blacks onl y i n the contex t o f master and servant. In the 1950s a few whites, most of them members of families tha t ha d lived in Rhodesia sinc e the 1920s , attempted t o include black s i n th e politica l proces s throug h a gradua l reform o f the electio n roll . This movemen t ende d abruptl y i n th e lat e 1950 s as whites who had emigrated to Rhodesia during the post-World War II year s cam e t o dominat e whit e politics . Suc h white s forme d th e nucleus of the racial supremacist Rhodesian Front, which would find its leader i n Ia n Smith . Smit h an d th e Rhodesia n Fron t dominate d white politic s i n Rhodesi a fro m th e earl y 1960 s on . On e stud y es timated whit e liberal s wh o oppose d Smit h neve r constitute d mor e than 2 0 percen t o f the electorat e (Hancoc k 1984) . The influence o f new whites coming to Rhodesia cannot be under estimated. Th e bul k o f th e Europea n populatio n i n Rhodesi a wer e newcomers and, unlike their Afrikaner compatriot s south of the border, coul d no t clai m th e legitimatio n o f "bein g Africa n too. " Fo r most whites , th e Rhodesia n identit y wa s forge d i n a compresse d amount o f time , perhap s thirt y years . I n th e 196 9 census , fo r ex ample, there were 130,61 3 whites not born in Rhodesia as compared to 92,93 4 bor n i n Rhodesia . Whe n thos e white s unde r th e ag e o f twenty ar e subtracte d fro m eac h category , givin g u s whit e adult s

128 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n eligible t o vote , th e number s becom e eve n mor e dramatic : 115,36 2 European adult s born outside o f Rhodesia to onl y 29,78 5 European s adults wh o wer e Rhodesia n born . O f thos e no t bor n i n Rhodesia , 49,585 cam e fro m Sout h Africa, 52,46 8 cam e from th e United Kingdom, and another 10,000 mor e or so came from various former crow n colonies tha t ha d achieve d independenc e (Rhodesia , Centra l Statis tical Offic e 1971) . In the earl y 1960 s Britai n began pullin g ou t of its African colonia l possessions an d graduall y turnin g ove r powe r t o th e Africa n popu lations. When forma l Britis h decolonizatio n bega n t o accelerate , th e white minority government le d by Prime Minister Ian Smith rebelle d against th e threa t o f Britis h pressure s fo r majorit y rul e an d unilat erally declare d it s independenc e (UDI ) fro m Britai n i n 1965 . In th e ensuin g year s a guerrilla wa r sporadicall y erupte d agains t the whit e governmen t o f Rhodesia . Th e variou s liberatio n move ments, however , wer e spli t b y ideologica l an d ethni c divisions . Th e three importan t actor s wer e tw o partie s wit h militar y strength — ZANU (Zimbabw e Africa n Nationa l Union) , founde d b y Ndabaning i Sithole an d eventually le d by Robert Mugabe, an d ZAPU (Zimbabw e African People s Union) , le d by Joshu a Nkomo—and a political part y with a wide constituency—th e AN C (African National Council) even tually le d b y Bisho p Abe l Muzorewa . In th e earl y stage s o f UD I Britai n sough t t o negotiat e wit h th e Rhodesians o n th e term s o f forma l decolonization . Twice , i n 196 6 and 1967 , i n talk s o n th e battleship s Tiger an d Fearless, Britis h of ficials an d Ia n Smit h faile d t o gai n agreemen t o n th e questio n o f independence. Th e Britis h position , oppose d bitterl y b y th e whit e Rhodesians, wa s labelle d NIBMAR (n o independenc e befor e major ity Africa n rule) . In 197 1 a n agreemen t wa s reache d betwee n Si r Ale c Dougla s Home an d Ia n Smit h tha t wa s t o lea d t o th e forma l independenc e of Rhodesia—a n agreemen t tha t pu t th e likelihoo d o f majorit y rul e into th e twenty-firs t century . Th e British , however , stipulate d tha t the agreement had to pass a test of support from the black populatio n of Rhodesia . T o investigat e th e acceptabilit y o f th e proposal s th e British forme d th e Pearc e Commission , whic h wa s responsibl e fo r canvassing Africa n opinio n o n th e agreements . Thi s marked the first time tha t African s i n Rhodesi a wer e consulte d regardin g th e futur e independence o f thei r country . Sinc e mos t o f th e blac k nationalis t leaders (Nkomo , Sithole , Mugabe , an d countles s others ) wer e i n

The En d of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 12 9 prison or in exile, the task of organizing oppositio n to the proposal s fell on the shoulders of Abel Muzorewa, a United Methodist Bishop. The oppositio n campaig n wa s a stunning success : the Pearc e Com mission reporte d tha t th e overwhelmin g majorit y o f Zimbabwean s opposed th e term s o f th e agreement , thereb y sinkin g th e Smith Home pact. The guerrilla war that had begun in 196 5 ha d taken little tol l on white Rhodesia until 1972 . At the end of that year ZANLA (ZANU's army—the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army), using sanctuary in neighboring Mozambique , bega n implementin g a strategy base d on the politicization of the countryside and hit-and-run terrorist tactics agains t "soft " target s suc h a s schools an d farms. While th e de cision to intensify th e war against the Rhodesian governmen t pose d a rea l securit y threa t fo r th e whites , tw o factor s contribute d t o change th e militar y situatio n i n favo r o f th e revolutionaries . First , the collapse of the Portuguese authoritie s in Mozambique i n 1974 75 opene d a 60 0 mile-lon g sanctuar y fo r Zimbabwea n guerrillas . Second, th e draconia n anti-terroris t activitie s o f the whit e securit y forces drov e ten s o f thousand s o f rura l Zimbabwean s int o refuge e status across the border in Mozambique. These refugees provided a pool o f young an d willing prospectiv e guerrill a fighters against th e white regime. By 1972 many Africans concluded that, "Whites must be led down the garden path to the place of slaughter. Morality does not come into it" (Zvobgo , quote d in Flower 1987a , 126) . Rhodesia's geograph y an d the patter n of white settlemen t i n the country produced a way of life and a regime susceptible to guerrilla war. The most recent census at the time (1969 ) showe d a European population o f 228,29 6 an d an African populatio n o f approximatel y 5.4 million . Whil e Rhodesi a i s a country o f abou t 153,00 0 squar e miles (roughl y th e siz e o f Montana), a little ove r 7 1 percen t o f the European population (163,182 ) live d in the fou r citie s i n Rhodesia with populations o f ove r 45,00 0 (Salisbury , Bulawayo , Umtali , an d Gwelo).2 Salisbury alone contained 42 percent of the European sector. Anothe r 31,00 0 European s live d i n smal l town s an d villages , which lef t approximatel y 33,50 0 European s i n spread-ou t farmin g areas fa r remove d from urba n center s an d othe r farms . Th e 196 9 census put the number of Europeans who were "Economically Active . . . i n Agriculture , Livestoc k Production , an d Hunting " a t 7,39 6 (Rhodesia, Centra l Statistica l Offic e 1971) . Th e amoun t o f farmin g lands tha t wer e apportione d t o European s i n 196 9 fo r farmin g

130 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n amounted t o 4 5 millio n acre s (Bowma n 1973 , 12 ) o r abou t 6,10 0 acres per farming European. Each isolated farm, not easily defended , became a target fo r guerrillas . While the agricultural secto r employe d les s than 4 percent o f the European population , i t wa s crucia l fo r Rhodesia' s economy . I n 1975, fo r example , agricultur e accounte d fo r a littl e unde r 11. 5 percent o f th e Gros s Domesti c Produc t (Rhodesia , Ministr y o f Fi nance 1975) . Muc h o f Rhodesia's agricultura l cro p wa s tobacco fo r export, bundle d i n disguise d crate s an d shippe d t o a networ k o f middle-men, al l in a vast charade to beat internationa l sanction s that were impose d i n 196 5 an d 1968 . While th e Rhodesia n governmen t publicly maintaine d a stoic indifference toward s suc h sanctions , th e Rhodesian business community was reeling from their effects (Minte r and Schmid t 1988 , 220-225) . Other aspects of Rhodesia's demographic profile stand out: 85,000 Europeans wer e eithe r unde r th e ag e o f fiftee n o r ove r th e ag e o f sixty—too young or too old to fight i n a guerrilla war. The Rhodesian Army di d no t us e wome n fo r comba t duty , whic h mean t tha t it s recruiting pool was somewhere around 60,000 to 70,000 white men. Eventually, th e Rhodesia n Arme d Force s dre w o n th e Africa n pop ulation for their fight, but nonetheless all European males aged eighteen t o sixty were subject t o draft b y the en d o f the war in 1980 . As the war continued and more and more males were called and recalled to duty , th e econom y suffere d tremendousl y becaus e o f the los s of skilled whit e labo r an d management . At th e en d o f 1972 , however , onl y a fe w withi n Rhodesia' s in telligence and military command understood th e full implication s of a counterinsurgenc y wa r agains t blac k guerrillas . Th e wa r agains t the guerrilla s fro m 196 5 t o 197 2 ha d been successful , bu t ha d als o bred overconfidenc e withi n th e Smit h governmen t (Flowe r 1987a , 112). Th e openin g u p o f the Mozambica n fron t an d th e chang e i n black strategy had turned the military situation around. Ken Flower, head o f intelligence unde r Smith , write s abou t tha t tim e a s a transformation fro m " a winning position . . . [to] the stage of the 'no-win ' war, whic h laste d fro m Decembe r 197 2 t o 1976 " (Flowe r 1987a , 119). Fro m 197 2 on , a serious spli t emerge d withi n th e Rhodesia n government ove r th e natur e an d severit y o f th e guerrill a threat . Intelligence professional s lik e Flower argue d fo r th e nee d fo r polit ical settlement , whil e politician s withi n th e Smit h regim e believe d that th e wa r wa s winnabl e (Flowe r 1987a ; Moorcraf t an d Mc -

The En d o f the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 13 1 Laughlin 1982 , 25) . In the middl e between th e two group s wa s th e Rhodesian military, which needed the experience o f combat to sway it fro m Smith' s poin t o f view . Fe w o f thes e splits , however , wer e evident t o those outside th e government . T o its own citizen s an d t o the worl d outside , th e Rhodesia n governmen t seeme d a bastion o f unity. After th e Pearc e Commissio n ha d rule d tha t th e Home-Smit h agreement wa s no t approve d b y mos t Zimbabweans , th e Britis h sought t o was h thei r hand s o f th e affair . Thre e time s the y ha d ne gotiated with Ian Smith, three times their efforts ha d come to naught. Smith had developed almost a mythical reputation amon g the British for his negotiating style . As Lord Blake put it more bluntly, "Fo r Ian Smith negotiatio n wa s no t a matter o f compromise , bu t o f wearin g down one's opponent til l he concedes al l the points a t issue" (Blak e 1977, 362). Smith, himself, described his delaying tactics as "pulling the woo l ove r th e eye s o f the British " (The [London] Times, May 8 , 1978). While Smit h an d other s fel t littl e nee d fo r giv e an d tak e wit h Britain, thi s wa s no t s o concernin g Rhodesia' s relation s wit h Sout h Africa. Smit h wa s a n enormousl y popula r figur e wit h man y whit e South Africans , bu t wa s disdaine d b y thei r leader s becaus e o f hi s obstinacy in the face of their advice. When Smith was contemplating UDI, Hendri k Verwoerd , the n Prim e Ministe r o f Sout h Africa , ha d counselled agains t suc h a course. Whe n Joh n Vorste r replace d Ver woerd, h e referre d t o Rhodesi a a s "th e Achille s hee l o f Souther n Africa" an d urged Smith to reach some kind of settlement. Incident s between Rhodesian forces and ZIPRA (ZAPU's army) near the Sout h African borde r i n 196 7 ha d prompte d Vorste r t o provid e th e Rho desians with 2,00 0 paramilitar y police , helicopters an d pilots. Mor e importantly, Sout h Afric a wa s Rhodesia' s economi c lifeline t o th e outside world for militar y supplie s and equipment, food , an d oil. By 1976 a Rhodesia n intelligenc e briefin g admitte d tha t "Rhodesi a i s totally dependen t upo n Sout h Afric a fo r militar y an d economi c sur vival" (Flowe r 1987a , 132) . Smit h thu s ha d t o wal k a narro w lin e in his battle to thwart majorit y rule . He could try to appeal over th e heads o f th e Sout h Africa n leader s directl y t o thei r follower s fo r support, bu t doin g s o risked alienatin g "th e onl y leader s who coul d pressurize us " (I . Smith 1987) . To complete th e stor y o f socia l an d politica l chasm s i n Rhodesi a in the earl y 1970 s it is necessary t o loo k a s well a t the split s amon g

132 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n the blac k leader s wh o wer e fighting fo r Zimbabwe . Suc h split s wer e mostly mute d unti l th e earl y 1960 s whe n dispute s ove r th e capa bilities an d strategie s o f th e leader s le d t o publi c fighting betwee n the supporter s o f Joshu a Nkomo , wh o wen t o n t o foun d ZAPU , an d the supporter s o f Ndabaning i Sithole , Rober t Mugabe , an d Herber t Chitepo wh o le d ZANU . Whil e th e spli t originate d ove r th e abilit y of Nkomo to lead the nationalist movement, more layers of differenc e were added. Nkomo, although always stressing the national characte r of ZAPU , foun d hi s strengt h i n th e area s aroun d Bulaway o i n Ma tabeleland, wher e a n ethni c grou p tha t comprise d 1 5 percen t o f Zimbabwe's population—th e Ndebele—lived . Later , ideological , strategic, an d logistical difference s woul d als o emerge : ZAN U chos e a guerrill a strateg y an d aligne d itsel f t o Chin a an d locall y t o Mo zambique whil e ZAP U downplaye d guerrill a tactics , receive d arms , training, an d advice fro m th e Sovie t Union , an d based itsel f i n Zambia. Politica l partie s proliferate d eve n furthe r i n th e earl y 1970 s a s ZANU splintere d int o differen t wings , on e backin g Sithol e an d on e supporting Rober t Mugabe . Furthe r confusio n wa s adde d whe n Bishop Muzorew a forme d th e Africa n Nationa l Council , a n umbrella group withi n Rhodesi a forme d t o fight th e Smith-Hom e agreemen t in 1972 . The variou s black partner s (o r rivals, depending o n th e particula r day) pose d a problem fo r an y potentia l mediator . Regiona l leader s such a s Kennet h Kaunda , Presiden t o f Zambia , an d Juliu s Nyerere , President o f Tanzania , ofte n foun d themselve s exasperate d a t wha t Masipula Sithol e labelle d "struggle s withi n th e struggle " (Sithole , 1977). Whe n unit y wa s achieved briefl y i n 197 4 Sithol e (brothe r o f Ndabaningi Sithole ) eloquentl y describe d th e coalitio n o f th e dif ferent nationalis t factions : We must state at this point that the sai d declaration o f unity unite d sheep, foxes, hyenas , an d leopards. Th e sa d assumptio n wa s tha t th e fou r woul d realize that they had many things in common: They were animals and their common enemy in the bush was the lion. All that was needed for unity was to bring them around a table, sign a piece of paper singing "Ishe Komborera Afrika!" (Lord Sav e Africa) , an d al l woul d be well . Ye t we kno w tha t th e interests of leopards, hyenas, foxes, an d sheep do not necessarily coincide , even give n thei r common fear of the lion. (M . Sithole 1977 , 108 ) At th e en d o f 1974 , becaus e o f strategi c change s b y ZANL A an d more importantly , th e collaps e o f Portugues e authoritie s i n neigh boring Mozambique , th e struggl e i n Rhodesia intensifie d int o a full -

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 13 3 fledged guerrill a war . A s describe d earlier , tw o issue s originall y drove the conflict: majorit y rule and land redistribution. As the war progressed ne w issue s emerged : Wh o woul d rul e durin g th e tran sition to a new government? Who would supervise a cease-fire? Who would create a new constitution ? Between 197 4 an d 197 9 ther e wer e thre e effort s t o mediat e a settlement in Rhodesia. In 1974 Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, Rhodesia's neighbor to the west, and John Vorster, the President of South Africa, th e powerfu l stat e t o th e immediat e sout h o f Rhodesia, ha d attempted t o bring th e blac k nationalis t leader s o f Zimbabwe and Ian Smith, Rhodesia's Prim e Minister, t o the bargainin g table. Although th e effort s o f Kaunda and Vorster did not lea d to a settlement i n 1975 , thei r plan became th e blueprin t fo r tw o othe r attempts to solve the conflict—the effort s o f Vorster and Henry Kissinger in 1976 , an d the initiatives o f David Owen an d Cyrus Vance in 197 7 an d 1978 . Th e Kaunda-Vorste r pla n calle d fo r th e Fron t Line Presidents—the Presidents of the black countries bordering on Rhodesia—Kaunda of Zambia, Machel of Mozambique, Khama of Botswana, and Nyerere of Tanzania, who served as the regional patrons of th e blac k nationalis t movement s t o pressur e th e divers e move ments int o unifyin g a s a single negotiatin g voic e fo r th e blac k ma jority of Rhodesia. I n turn, South Africa, the countr y that Rhodesia depended o n fo r it s survival , promise d t o pressur e Rhodesi a int o accepting a transition to majority rule . The Kissinger-Vorste r effor t le d t o a British-ru n conferenc e o n Rhodesia, hel d i n Genev a i n th e autum n o f 1976 . Befor e th e con ference starte d in October, Kissinger had won a commitment to majority rul e from Ian Smith. But Kissinger had done s o by promisin g conditions to th e white s that di d not hav e th e suppor t o f the black movements or the Front Line presidents. The conference laste d for about three months without gaining approval o n a single issue. This experience se t th e stag e fo r the nex t attemp t t o solv e th e war , th e Anglo-American initiatives of David Owen an d Cyrus Vance. These leaders studied the Kissinger mediation and the Geneva conference, and decided tha t the partie s i n conflict wer e to o fa r apart to reac h agreement o n their own . Instead , th e Britis h an d Americans woul d put forward proposals which would develop a new constitution , establish a transitional governmen t whic h woul d carr y ou t fre e an d fair elections, an d implement a cease-fire betwee n th e warring parties. Th e principa l reason s fo r th e failur e o f the Vance-Owe n initi -

134 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n atives were , first, a n insistenc e tha t th e arme d guerrilla s o f th e na tionalist movement s woul d compos e th e nationa l militar y durin g th e transition, a proposal tha t th e whit e militar y characterize d a s a de mand for thei r surrender , an d second, th e alternativ e tha t Ia n Smit h developed awa y fro m th e negotiatin g table , know n a s th e interna l settlement. In 197 6 ZAP U an d ZANU , the n le d b y Rober t Mugabe , forme d the Patrioti c Fron t (PF). 3 Th e tw o movements , unde r th e pressur e of thei r regiona l allies , entere d int o th e allianc e i n 197 6 i n orde r t o present a unified bargaining face to the Rhodesians and any potential mediators. Th e coalitio n omitte d tw o black politica l leader s withou t military support : Ndabaning i Sithol e an d Bisho p Abe l Muzorewa . Sithole ha d originally bee n on e o f the to p leader s o f ZANU, bu t ha d been ousted in a party coup in 1974. Sithole claimed political suppor t in Zimbabwe, but was hampered becaus e o f his ethnic Nda u origins . The Nda u o f easter n Zimbabw e constitute d onl y 4 percen t o f th e Zimbabwean people . Muzorewa , a Shona-speaker , claime d muc h more extensiv e suppor t withi n Zimbabwe , includin g th e followin g of th e Africa n Nationa l Council . As the wa r intensified betwee n th e blac k guerrill a armie s an d th e armed force s o f th e whit e regim e i n Salisbury , Ia n Smit h entere d into talk s wit h Muzorew a an d Sithol e ove r th e formatio n o f a ne w government. Smit h cede d majorit y rul e t o th e blacks , bu t insiste d that th e whit e minorit y b e give n a disproportionate numbe r o f rep resentatives i n the nationa l legislatur e an d a blocking mechanis m t o veto an y legislatio n i t deeme d odious . O n Marc h 3 , 197 8 Smith , Muzorewa, an d Sithol e announce d th e signin g o f wha t cam e t o b e known a s "th e interna l settlement/ ' Th e agreemen t pledge d th e participants t o a government b y coalitio n unti l a n electio n coul d b e held to determine the leadership of the country. Smith and the white s were gambling that ceding the trappings of dominance but not yield ing its substance would attract substantial number s of guerrillas away from Mugab e an d Nkomo . Mor e importantly , th e ne w coalitio n hoped that the agreement woul d lead to the removal o f internationa l sanctions an d th e recognitio n o f th e government' s legitimac y b y world actors . The ne w governmen t stumble d throug h 197 8 unabl e t o wi n rec ognition from international actors and ineffective i n winning guerrill a desertions. As the war intensified th e government o f Zimbabwe-Rhodesia prepare d it s whit e an d black voter s fo r it s first elections t o b e

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 13 5 held i n April o f 1979 . I n what Britis h conservative s describe d a s a referendum on the new constitution of the country and in what others described a s a sham election, Muzorew a wo n a landslide fo r Prim e Minister with a reported 6 3 percen t o f the population voting . At the beginning of 1979 all parties to the Rhodesian conflict were committed t o alternative s awa y fro m th e negotiatin g table . A s on e American diplomat noted , "Rhodesi a had seemingly inscribe d itself on th e permanen t agend a o f th e world' s political-ethni c conun drums—Northern Ireland , Cyprus , th e Middl e East , Sout h Africa unamenable t o huma n persuasion o r reason " (Davido w 1984 , 13) . Yet by the end of the year an agreement betwee n al l parties would be reached at Lancaster House, and after a harrowing cease-fire an d election, Zimbabw e woul d b e grante d independenc e i n Apri l o f 1980.

The Militar y Situatio n As early as 1977 the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Offic e believe d that Rhodesia was losing the war to the guerrillas . In April o f 197 7 Peter Walls, head o f Rhodesian arme d forces, estimate d tha t 2,35 0 armed guerrilla s ha d infiltrate d int o th e country . I n January 197 8 the estimat e ha d climbe d t o 8,00 0 ZANL A guerrilla s insid e Zim babwe wit h ZIPR A forc e level s i n Zambi a ove r 8,000 . Gros s Do mestic Product for 197 7 wa s — 7 percent; defense expenditure s exceeded a million dollars a day; the inability of the Rhodesian regime to provide basic services to its farmers led to the decimation of livestock; and white emigration, the indicator that mattered the most to Ian Smith , totale d almos t 11,00 0 fo r th e year . Casualtie s fo r guer rillas, Rhodesian soldiers , an d civilians in 197 7 alon e surpasse d the totals in each category for all the years from 1972 to 1976 combined. Figures 6. 1 an d 6.2 an d Table 6. 1 provid e evidenc e o n war deaths, guerrilla infiltration int o Rhodesia, whit e flight, and general break down o f the country. 4 The objective military situation led to different subjectiv e assessments among the actors. As stated above, the Rhodesian military and intelligence establishment had concluded that the white military situation was desperate, an d that Salisbury needed a settlement t o the war. Ian Smith, however, wa s often buoyed by temporary successe s of the Rhodesian military, such as their highly destructive raids into Zambia and Mozambique, an d believed that the wa r could be won.

136 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n Figure 6. 1 Death s in the Zimbabwea n Civi l War, 1973-197 9

Figure 6. 2 Compariso n o f Guerrilla Strength an d White Flight

His belie f wa s predicate d o n th e assumptio n tha t eventuall y Britai n and the United States would recognize Abe l Muzorew a and lift sanc tions agains t th e regime . I n an y event , Smit h mad e clea r hi s pref erence fo r fighting o n unde r an y circumstances ; Smit h believed tha t even a losing war and possible death was preferable t o Patriotic Front rule. Bisho p Abel Muzorew a believed tha t the militar y situatio n wa s not desperate ; h e assume d tha t i n du e cours e mos t o f the guerrilla s would deser t ZAN U an d embrac e hi s leadership . On th e Patrioti c Fron t side , ZAN U an d ZAP U perceive d thing s differently. Mos t i n ZANU, an d especially Rober t Mugabe , believe d

The En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l Wa r 13 7 Table 6. 1 Indicator s of Socia l Collapse , Rhodesi a 1972-197 9

1972 197 339 24

A. Tourism (Visitors to Rhodesia—in thousands) 3 197 4 197 5 197 6 197 7 197 4 23 0 24 4 14 0 10 4 8

8 8

B. Ages of Men Eligible for the Draft Until 197 6 Jul y 197 6 Jan . 197 7 Jan . 197 9 18-30 18-3 4 18-5 0 18-5 9 C. Percentage of Rhodesia under Martial Law Sept. 197 8 Nov . 197 8 Dec . 197 8 Sept . 197 9 Dec intro. 5 07 09 09

. 197 9 5

D. Schools Closed in Rural Black Areas July 1977 Nov . 1978 300 98 6 E. Cattle Dips in Operation in Rhodesia 1972 197 8 8,000 1,50 0 that the y wer e winnin g th e war , an d tha t the y woul d defea t th e Salisbury regim e i n shor t order . ZAPU , o n th e othe r hand , believe d that th e Patrioti c Fron t woul d eventuall y wi n th e war , bu t a t a prohibitive cost . Nkom o an d hi s militar y leadershi p fel t tha t ZANU' s guerrilla strateg y coul d neve r brin g victory . A t som e poin t i n th e war a transition t o conventiona l wa r coul d b e necessary , whic h ZA PlTs leadershi p assume d woul d caus e a muc h large r regiona l con flagration. Finally , both of the Patriotic Front's patrons—Zambia an d Mozambique—were absorbin g heav y cost s fo r thei r suppor t o f th e Front, an d preferre d a settlemen t t o th e prolongatio n o f th e war . Two election s i n 197 9 create d a n opportunit y fo r mediatio n o f the war . First , Bisho p Abe l Muzorew a wa s electe d Prim e Ministe r of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia . Fo r th e first tim e i n fifteen years , someon e other tha n Ian Smit h woul d b e th e chie f decisio n make r i n an y pos sible negotiations . Th e electio n o f Muzorewa was embrace d b y bot h General Pete r Wall s an d Ke n Flower , effectivel y isolatin g Smit h i n the government . Tw o month s later , th e peopl e o f Grea t Britai n elected Margare t Thatche r Prim e Minister . Thatcher , whos e elec -

138 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n toral campaig n ha d stresse d recognitio n o f th e Muzorew a govern ment, caused all the antagonists to rethink the situation. In particular, the two elections provided a credible threat and inducement to bring all partie s t o a settlemen t conference . Th e Muzorew a governmen t needed recognitio n an d mos t participant s believe d Thatche r coul d give i t t o them . Th e leverag e o f recognitio n provide d a means fo r Britain to influence th e Muzorewa regime directly—no longer would Britain have to rely on South Africa for pressure against the Salisbury government. Recognition , whe n combine d wit h activ e suppor t fo r British mediation from Zambia and Mozambique, provided the means to promp t Patrioti c Fron t moderation. 5 After winnin g th e Prim e Minister' s offic e an d appointin g Lor d Carrington a s Foreign Secretary , Thatche r decide d i n June 197 9 t o proceed with another mediation attempt. British officials ha d studied the pas t failure s o f mediation an d conclude d tha t th e previou s pro posals had substantial flaws that in and of themselves suffice d t o sabotage any possible agreement. In the case of the Kissinger effort, th e fatal flaw concerne d Kissinger' s "packag e deal, " i n particular , th e provisions on white control of Defence an d Law and white veto over the Counci l o f Stat e an d th e Counci l o f Minister s (Renwic k 1981 , 7). In th e Anglo-America n initiative , the stipulatio n tha t durin g th e transition perio d th e arme d force s woul d b e base d o n th e guerrill a armies precluded whit e acceptance . An y ne w initiativ e woul d hav e to take from th e previous talks a core of a settlement, yet avoid these specific problems . The British study of past efforts conclude d tha t Smit h would fight any proposed agreement, and therefore, it would be crucial to isolate him fro m th e res t o f the Salisbur y delegates . O n the Patrioti c Fron t side, th e Britis h believe d tha t Mugab e woul d als o fight an y settle ment. Bu t th e Britis h recognize d tha t Mugabe' s reluctanc e di d no t stem fro m ideolog y o r principle . A s one diploma t stated , "Mugab e was convinced tha t h e coul d wi n outrigh t an d h e feare d riskin g th e gains he had already won. Mugabe was convinced that he would win an election, but wa s unsure h e would have a chance t o win an election. He believed i n armed struggle , because of Smith' 9 (Britis h Diplomat A. 1987) . In orde r t o pressure Mugab e the Britis h once again needed th e hel p o f th e Fron t Lin e Presidents . A s fo r Nkomo , h e "didn't nee d a lot o f pressure—he wa s the weak link in the Patrioti c Front. Lancaste r Hous e wa s hi s las t chance " (Britis h Diploma t A . 1987).

The En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l Wa r 13 9 The Britis h pla n wa s pu t int o actio n i n Augus t a t th e Common wealth Meetin g i n Lusaka . Unde r Lor d Carrington' s supervisio n a Commonwealth workin g part y consistin g o f Kaunda , Nyerere , Ja maican Prim e Ministe r Michae l Manley , Commonwealt h Secretar y General Shridat h Ramphal , Australia n Prim e Ministe r Malcol m Fraser, an d Nigeria n Foreig n Ministe r Majo r Genera l Henr y Ade fope, hammere d ou t a joint Commonwealt h positio n o n Rhodesia : The resultan t communique , approve d by al l th e head s o f government , af firmed thei r commitmen t t o genuin e majorit y rule , note d that the interna l settlement constitutio n was defective i n certain important respect s and accepted that it was the British government's responsibility to bring Zimbabwe to legal independence. It recognized that the search for a lasting settlement involved al l th e partie s t o th e conflic t an d appropriat e safeguard s fo r mi norities; that the governmen t formed unde r the independence constitutio n must be chose n throug h fre e an d fair election s properl y supervise d unde r British governmen t authorit y an d with Commonwealt h observer s present ; and tha t i t wa s th e Britis h government' s intentio n t o cal l a constitutiona l conference t o whic h al l th e partie s woul d b e invite d . . . The recognitio n that i t wa s Britain' s responsibilit y t o propos e a solutio n wa s a n essentia l element of the Lusaka communique. No less important was the commitment to fres h elections . Thes e wer e th e natura l corollar y o f a new constitutio n and the key to offering al l the parties an alternative t o continuing the war. (Renwick 1981 , 14 ) The Britis h ha d a clea r ide a o f wha t the y wante d goin g int o th e talks. Lor d Carrington' s strateg y fo r th e Lancaste r Hous e meeting s emphasized fou r factors . First , Carringto n woul d us e wha t h e calle d the secon d clas s solution—Britis h recognitio n o f Muzorew a an d re moval o f sanctions—a s a carro t wit h Muzorew a an d a s a stic k wit h the Patrioti c Front . A s state d earlier , th e Britis h ha d hinte d t o Mu zorewa tha t i f the P F wa s responsibl e fo r th e failur e t o reac h a set tlement, Muzorew a woul d gai n recognition . Th e attractivenes s o f the second-clas s solutio n i s tha t i t establishe d a bargainin g gam e whereby th e first part y t o wal k awa y fro m th e tabl e woul d lose : th e game, therefore , ha d a dynami c buil t int o it , s o tha t bot h partie s feared bein g th e first t o repudiat e th e negotiations . I n orde r t o pu t the utmos t pressur e o n th e Patrioti c Front , o n eac h issu e th e Britis h would tur n first t o th e Salisbur y delegatio n an d then , arme d wit h their acceptance, woul d put matters to the Patriotic Front on a "takeit-or-leave-it" basis . Second, Carringto n realize d that , althoug h thi s first facto r wa s a powerful leverage , i t was not enough. I t was crucial that both partie s

140 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n believe that they could win a fair election. If any party believed tha t it could not win, it would have reason to walk away from a settlement. Moreover, th e partie s ha d t o believe tha t th e Britis h would ru n fai r elections and that both parties would abide by the results, regardless of their outcome . Third, the British had determined beforehand tha t within the two delegations, they woul d have to work t o isolate those members wh o were oppose d t o a settlement: Ia n Smit h an d Rober t Mugabe . Fourth, Carrington realize d that Britain lacked sufficient leverag e with the Patriotic Front, an d therefore neede d the help of the Fron t Line Presidents to pressure Mugabe and Nkomo, especially Mugabe.

Lancaster Hous e The Lancaster Hous e Constitutiona l Conferenc e o n Rhodesia bega n in September 1979 . At the introductory session of the meetings Lord Carrington se t the tone for what would follow. Emphasizing that th e conference ha d th e backin g o f th e Commonwealth , Carringto n stressed tha t Britai n wa s determine d t o carr y ou t it s rol e a s deco lonizer. H e made it clear that the conference wa s a ''constitutional* ' conference, tha t sinc e the constitutio n wa s the most important issu e and caus e o f th e war , i t woul d hav e t o b e addresse d first: "i t i s essential t o the prospects o f success that w e should first seek agree ment o n our destination—which i s the independence constitution . If that can be achieved it will be necessary to decide the arrangement s to giv e effec t t o tha t agreement/ ' Moreover , h e state d tha t "i t i s illusory to think that any settlement can fully satisfy the requirements of eithe r side " (Unite d Kingdo m 1979 , Minute s Introductor y Ses sion). Carrington als o state d theme s tha t woul d recu r throughou t th e meetings: 1 ) Britain was acting on a mandate of the Commonwealth ; 2) Britai n wa s seriou s abou t assertin g it s decolonizin g responsibili ties; 3) the constitution was the key to the settlement, and only when that wa s solved, would the conferenc e procee d t o discussions abou t arrangements; 4 ) Britai n ha d lon g experienc e a s a decolonizin g power, whic h provided it with experience a t dealing with the stick y issues involved in the conference; 5) agreement would not come from the parties, but instea d woul d deman d compromise s o n al l parts; 6) independence di d no t mea n tha t on e side woul d win , bu t tha t al l sides would hav e a n equa l chanc e t o win a n election ; 7 ) the Britis h

The En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l Wa r 14 1 proposals would form the basis of the working document—othe r par ties' suggestion s woul d b e considere d bu t onl y insofa r a s they deal t with th e Britis h document .

The Constitutio n From the start , Carrington's dictatorial power was evident. H e mad e clear tha t th e onl y workin g documen t woul d be th e Britis h proposa l he put forth. While welcomin g an y revisions to these proposals, Car rington emphasize d tha t n o othe r document s woul d b e discussed . The agenda of the conference wa s decided in the first meetings. Bot h the Patrioti c Fron t an d the Britis h table d proposals. The Britis h pla n consisted o f thre e issues : 1 ) proposals fo r a new constitution , 2 ) th e plan for a transition period before elections , an d 3) the arrangement s for the cease-fire . Th e Patrioti c Front' s proposal envisione d first discussing th e transitiona l period—arrangement s an d a temporary con stitution—and the n movin g o n t o th e topic s o f th e independenc e constitution an d cease-fire . Carrington argue d forcefull y tha t th e constitutio n b e settle d first: the only way to end the war is to remove the reasons for it. . . . The approach of th e Britis h Governmen t ha s bee n t o discus s th e bes t wa y t o achiev e a solution wit h their friend s an d allies an d the partie s involved. I t was clear from these discussion s that the roo t o f the problem la y in the constitution . If the conference could agree on the constitution, it would remove the causes of the war, onc e agreemen t o n the constitutio n wa s settled, agreemen t o n other matters could come more easily (Unite d Kingdom 1979 , Minute s 1s t Plenary). Muzorewa seeme d t o bridl e a t the suggestion s tha t th e constitutio n was inadequate , an d insiste d tha t "th e peopl e o f Rhodesi a hav e al ready decide d o n the constitution " (Unite d Kingdom 1979 , Minute s 1st Plenary) . Carringto n prevailed , however , a s neither sid e wante d to wast e negotiatin g capita l s o earl y i n th e proceedings . The thre e side s table d proposal s fo r th e ne w constitution . Th e British proposal basically accepted most of the formalities o f the ne w constitution o f Zimbabwe-Rhodesia , bu t eliminate d th e discrimina tory provision s tha t Smit h ha d force d o n Muzorewa , mos t impor tantly th e blockin g mechanis m o f th e white s i n government . Th e British proposal s stil l containe d importan t safeguard s fo r protectin g minority interests . Th e mos t importan t o f thes e safeguard s wa s a n extensive bil l o f right s guaranteein g individua l freedoms , th e guar -

142 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n antee o f a n undetermine d numbe r o f whit e seat s i n a 100-perso n legislature fo r a perio d o f seve n years , remuneratio n fo r an y lan d that migh t b e redistributed , an d th e honorin g o f pensio n right s fo r white publi c officials . The Patrioti c Fron t spen t th e earl y meeting s insistin g tha t n o agreement o n th e constitutio n coul d b e reache d unti l th e arrange ments fo r th e transitio n wer e known . Mugab e sai d i t wa s essentia l to spel l ou t th e transitiona l arrangement s t o insur e tha t progres s towards independenc e wa s irreversible . O n thi s matter , however , there coul d b e n o compromis e o n th e Britis h part . Th e Britis h ha d learned fro m Genev a tha t ther e woul d b e n o en d i n sigh t t o th e conference i f the parties were allowe d t o renegotiate clause s at later dates i n the proceedings . Th e Britis h insiste d tha t al l matters havin g to do with the transition an d cease-fire woul d be addressed , but onl y after agreemen t wa s reache d o n th e constitution . Having los t th e procedura l battle , th e Patrioti c Fron t too k ai m a t the specifi c component s o f th e constitution . A t th e sixt h plenar y session Mugab e reproache d th e Britis h o n minorit y representatio n in Parliament : The Britis h proposal s variousl y cal l thi s minorit y 'European ' an d 'white.' Th e Patrioti c Fron t certainl y want s t o se e everyon e i n Zimbabwe represente d i n th e legislature , bu t I a m puzzle d tha t the Britis h Governmen t shoul d wan t th e ne w republi c t o star t of f with a constitution whic h divide d th e people . Al l people wh o liv e in Zimbabwe shoul d conside r themselve s a s citizens o f that coun try. I s i t possibl e t o cal l a sectio n o f th e communit y European ? Surely ther e ca n b e n o suc h thin g a s a European i n Africa ? Sim ilarly th e ter m 'white * coul d caus e problems . I s th e conferenc e being aske d to work ou t a chart of shades of colour and then agre e the percentag e b y whic h eac h shad e shoul d be represented ? Thi s is a racial approac h an d repugnan t t o ou r delegation . CARRINGTON: It wa s accepte d tha t th e idea l solutio n i s tha t th e peopl e shoul d think o f themselve s a s citizen s o f Zimbabw e rathe r tha n blac k o r white, Shon a o r Matabele . Th e cru x o f th e issu e i s ho w thi s i s t o be achieved . Th e politica l realitie s o f the pas t canno t b e ignored . Nor ca n th e hope s an d fear s o f th e people . MUGABE: I wis h t o underlin e th e fac t tha t th e wa r o f liberatio n ha s bee n waged t o destro y th e racia l basi s o n whic h societ y i n m y countr y

The End of the Zimbabwean Civi l War 14 3 has bee n constructed . Th e minorit y ha s acquire d certai n right s and privileges to the exclusion of the majority. The war has been waged against this exploitation. The British want us now to retain vestiges of that system. (United Kingdom 1979 , Minutes 6th Plenary) Ian Gilmour, Carrington's second in command, then answered that it ha d been agree d a t Lusaka that i t woul d be i n Zimbabwe' s bes t interests fo r th e white s t o sta y an d tha t th e provision s i n th e con stitution woul d b e necessar y fo r the m t o remain . H e als o pointe d out tha t th e civi l wa r ha d mad e th e arrangement s necessar y onl y temporarily. The plenary came close to dissolving into open rebellion as members of the Patriotic Front battered the British arguments on racial an d regiona l representation . A t th e en d o f th e meeting th e discussion turned to the guarante e o f civil servan t pensions. Ediso n Zvobgo, Mugabe's press officer, pointe d ou t that such civil servant s "might be regarded as public officers by some people, but by others as mercenaries. " Mugab e wen t a ste p further : "I f thi s i s t o b e a retrospective blessin g b y th e Britis h Governmen t fo r treasonabl e conduct, this should be clearly stated" (United Kingdom 1979 , Minutes 6t h Plenary). When n o progress was made at the nex t plenar y on Septembe r 18 , i t wa s agree d tha t i t migh t b e bes t fo r th e con ference t o work in bilateral meeting s awa y from the negotiating table. The Britis h would negotiat e separatel y wit h eac h team. The firstshowdown of the conference within the delegations came in th e Salisbur y team . I n meeting s fro m Septembe r 1 9 t o 21 , Ia n Smith argue d vociferousl y agains t th e dilutio n o f th e whit e safe guards an d insiste d tha t an y constitutio n ha d t o hav e a blockin g mechanism for the whites. Muzorewa and others supported the compromises put fort h by the British . The African member s of the del egation ha d neve r ha d an y fondnes s fo r th e whit e veto , an d Car rington and his aides had made it clear to the white members of the delegation that , whil e protectiv e measure s woul d be place d i n th e constitution, th e blockin g mechanis m ha d to go . I f not, Carringto n added, th e countr y woul d neve r gai n recognition. In a bilateral meetin g o n th e nineteenth , Carringto n presente d the Salisbur y delegation wit h specific numbers . Twenty seats out of a 100-perso n Parliament would be reserve d for whites, and seventy votes woul d b e necessar y t o amen d th e constitution . Eigh t o f th e twelve-man Salisbur y delegatio n includin g Davi d Smith , spok e i n favor o f changin g th e constitution . Ia n Smith , however , refuse d t o

144 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n back down , an d fo r mor e tha n a n hou r argue d wit h Carringto n tha t the mechanism s wer e necessar y "t o maintai n whit e confidenc e an d morale/' O n th e mornin g o f th e twentiet h i n a meeting o f th e fou r white delegates , Smit h foun d tha t h e ha d n o support . Th e ke y ap parently wa s a telegram fro m Genera l Pete r Wall s tha t underscore d the nee d fo r a quick agreement . This first showdow n cam e t o a n en d o n th e mornin g o f 2 1 Sep tember. Fo r tw o an d a half hour s Ia n Smit h argue d hi s position . H e had backe d of f hi s insistenc e o n th e whit e veto ; hi s insistenc e no w was base d o n " 'maintaining standards, ' b y retainin g th e dominan t position o f white official s i n the commission s fo r defence , th e publi c service, th e Arm y an d the police " (The [London ] Observer, Septem ber 23 , 1979 , i n Baumhogger 1984 , 1059) . On e Muzorewa delegat e said tha t Smith' s argument s wer e no t "practical , bu t philosophi c i n nature" an d tha t Davi d Smith , afte r listenin g t o Ia n Smit h g o on , finally stoo d u p an d said , "enoug h i s enough. " (UAN C Delegat e A . 1987) Muzorew a the n calle d fo r a secret vot e o n whether t o accep t the constitution : th e tall y wa s eleve n t o on e i n favor . Tha t evenin g the Salisbur y delegatio n publicl y announce d thei r acceptanc e o f th e new constitution . Bu t the y als o trie d t o pressur e Carringto n b y in sisting tha t sanction s b e removed , sinc e the y ha d fulfille d thei r par t of th e bargai n ("Statemen t b y th e Governmen t o f Zimbabw e Rho desia," i n Baumhogge r 1984 , 1060) . Carrington the n turne d t o th e Patrioti c Front . Th e P F hel d ou t for tw o week s i n disagreemen t wit h th e Britis h proposals . Th e Pa triotic Front ha d accepted the twent y sea t representation fo r whites, but stil l raise d objections ove r land, pensions , citizenship , protecte d rights, and form of constitutional government . O n October 1 a British diplomat, Derek Day, briefed representatives o f the Front Line Presidents o n the stalle d talks. Later that day these sam e representative s met with Mugabe and Nkomo to relay Front Line dissatisfaction wit h the progres s o f th e negotiations . Th e representative s emphasize d that, sinc e th e Fron t ha d accepte d th e difficul t issu e o f specia l rep resentation fo r the whites, the othe r less important issue s should no t halt th e proceedings . On October 3 the British tabled the revised constitution in specifi c detail. It failed to grant any concessions to the Patriotic Front. Withi n two day s Muzorew a ha d grante d hi s delegation' s acceptance . O n October 6 , Ia n Smith flew bac k t o Salisbury t o rally Rhodesian Fron t support fo r hi s rejectio n o f th e constitution . Whil e a t hom e Smit h

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 14 5 raised th e issu e o f whethe r th e constitutiona l change s ha d t o b e ratified by the Rhodesian Parliament. The British in conjunction with the Salisbur y delegatio n immediatel y squashe d thi s possibilit y b y contacting th e highes t rankin g judge i n Rhodesia, wh o gav e a n impromptu rulin g tha t ratificatio n wa s inappropriat e i n vie w o f th e circumstances. On October 9 th e Patriotic Fron t agai n tried to stic k by its positions. Carrington's responses on that day are revealing of the British intention t o arbitrate and not mediate a settlement. Fo r example i n responding to Patriotic Front demands for an executive presidency , Carrington states, "the British Government reached its decision only after ver y carefu l consideratio n o f all the arguments. " Other statements read like a judge's decree : "Th e Patrioti c Fron t sa y . . . the British Governmen t doe s no t tak e tha t view. " 'Ther e ca n b e n o question o f the Britis h Governmen t o r Parliament acceptin g suc h a provision . . ." "Th e Patrioti c Fron t hav e als o reiterate d thei r ob jections to the principl e o f dual citizenship . I n our view thei r fear s are misplaced . . ." "The British Government regard s it as essential that the Declaration of Rights be specially entrenched." "The British Government cannot accept those changes" (regarding land); on public service , "Th e Britis h Governmen t regard s i t a s eminentl y rea sonable tha t . . ." (Unite d Kingdo m 1979 , Minute s 11t h Plenary , emphasis added). When th e Patrioti c Fron t suggeste d "agreein g t o disagree " an d moving o n to discuss the transitiona l arrangements , Carringto n pu t his foo t down . Consideration s o f transitiona l matter s coul d no t b e taken before th e constitutio n wa s settled . I t wa s no t goo d enoug h to "agre e to disagree" and leave it . There must be agreement . Th e British Governmen t ha d take n int o accoun t al l side s an d ha d presented a constitution a s "the onl y basis on which it is now possibl e to reach full agreement a t this conference" (Unite d Kingdom 1979 , Minutes 11th Plenary). Matters would not be allowed to be reopened now o r i n th e future . Carringto n finished b y reassertin g Britain' s duty t o arbitrate: "Whe n th e Conferenc e canno t agree , whe n th e parties canno t agree , w e hav e a n obligation t o mak e clea r wha t i n our mind is fair and reasonable and we have done so" (United Kingdom 1979 , Minute s 11t h Plenary) . Carringto n the n aske d th e Pa triotic Front to provide a "definitive reply in two days" as to whether they would accept the constitutio n a s presented by the British , and left to attend the annual Conservative Party convention in Blackpool.

146 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n The P F coul d swallo w al l o f the concession s tha t Carringto n de manded, save one: what to do about land. One ZAPU delegate state d what wa s mentione d i n man y interviews : 'Th e lan d issu e wa s th e hardest t o accept, because i t involved such visceral feelings an d our mobilization had depended on land, thus we decided we had to make some kin d o f stand " (ZAP U Delegat e A . 1987) . Bu t wha t kin d o f stand? Hardliner s includin g Mugab e threatene d t o wal k ou t o f th e conference. Josia h Tongogara , ZANLA' s to p commander , warne d that Mozambiqu e woul d tak e awa y ZANLA bases. Mugabe insisted , and Nkomo told him if ZANU walked, it walked alone. The Patrioti c Front woul d hav e to break: Zambia would take awa y ZAPU's bases. Two day s late r a t th e nex t plenar y session , th e Patrioti c Fron t refused t o respond . Carringto n publicl y se t anothe r deadline . Ac cording t o Jeffre y Davidow , Carringto n als o approache d th e P F i n a bilateral sessio n an d presente d the m wit h a British offe r t o cove r some of the expens e o f reimbursing farmer s fo r lan d redistribution . This offe r "wa s pockete d b y th e Patrioti c Front' s leaders , an d di d not lea d t o a n immediat e chang e i n thei r stance " (Davido w 1984 , 62). The intransigence of the PF prompted both a search by third actors for som e kin d o f face-savin g measur e fo r Mugab e an d Nkomo , an d a har d lin e fro m th e British . O n Octobe r 1 5 Carringto n publicl y stated tha t th e conference , wit h o r withou t th e participatio n o f th e Patriotic Front , woul d resum e th e nex t mornin g t o begi n talk s o n the transition period. He added that until the guerrillas had accepted the constitution , h e woul d b e force d t o mov e o n with onl y the Sal isbury delegation . At this, Shridath Ramphal, the Secretar y Genera l of th e Commonwealth , publicl y rebuke d Carrington : th e Britis h mandate fro m th e Lusak a meetin g wa s fo r a n "all-parties " confer ence. Kenneth Kaunda backed Ramphal, calling Carrington's action s "not helpful" an d "negative." The Front Line Presidents in a special summit session backed the Patriotic Front, as did Nigeria's Presiden t Shagari. On the other sid e of the issue, South Africa sen t its Foreign Minister, Pi k Botha , t o Londo n t o pressur e Carringto n int o gettin g on wit h thing s an d recognizin g Muzorewa' s government . Between Octobe r 1 5 an d 1 8 th e Unite d States , i n respons e t o initiatives by Rampha l an d Carrington , gav e ambiguou s suppor t fo r a fun d tha t woul d hel p Zimbabw e bea r th e economi c burde n o f pensions an d compensatio n fo r land . I n th e word s o f on e ZAN U delegate: "Wit h th e United State s offer o f aid we had something w e

The End of the Zimbabwean Civi l War 14 7 could sell to the people. Th e Front Line State s told us, 'Yo u have a promise from the United States; if you feel lik e you have somethin g you can sell to the electorate, the n take it" (Mubako 1987) . O n the eighteenth th e Patrioti c Fron t announce d that , pendin g thei r satisfaction wit h th e transitiona l arrangements , "ther e wil l no t be nee d to rever t t o discussio n o n the constitution " ("Statemen t b y PF, " in Baumhogger 1984 , 1113) . The Transitional Arrangements Turning t o th e detail s o f th e transitio n period , Carringto n insiste d that i t woul d b e handle d wit h th e existin g Rhodesia n militar y an d police force s unde r direc t Britis h supervisio n wit h n o rol e fo r an y U.N. officials o r peacekeeping force, and in a two month period. The British wante d t o kee p thei r ris k t o a minimum. First , th e Britis h had no intentio n o f givin g thei r o r anyon e else' s troop s th e job o f stepping betwee n th e tw o arme d adversaries . The y wen t t o grea t pains to emphasize that any cease-fire woul d have to be largely selfenforcing. Instea d of peacekeeping forces, the British plan called for a small contingent o f Commonwealth troop s (n o more than 300) t o monitor th e cease-fire . Sinc e th e Britis h kne w tha t th e Salisbur y regime woul d balk a t Unite d Nation s involvement , the y ha d rule d out suc h a possibility. Second , Britain , whil e willin g t o tak e ove r power durin g th e interim , wante d t o minimiz e commitmen t o f resources and so decided that a British governor would use the existing police an d bureaucracies t o ru n the country . Finally , th e tim e ele ment wa s crucia l fo r maintainin g th e illusio n tha t th e electio n wa s "up for grabs. " As one Britis h officia l said , "W e felt mos t strongl y about a short transition period. If anyone found out who lost before the election , the n i t was all over" (Britis h Diplomat A . 1987) . On Octobe r 1 9 Carringto n presente d hi s genera l vie w o n th e transition. Onc e agai n donnin g th e mantl e o f legitimac y veste d a t Lusaka, h e demande d tha t bot h partie s accep t th e principl e tha t "there had to be fre e an d fair elections, properly supervise d unde r the British Government's authority , wit h Commonwealt h observer s present." Nkom o immediatel y aske d fo r clarificatio n o n th e ter m "British Government's authority. " Carrington replie d that "this refers to our responsibility for the conduct and supervision of the elections." Mugabe then answered that the Patriotic Front had their own proposals, and would need to wait to see the specifics o f the British

148 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n plan. Muzorew a announce d tha t th e Patrioti c Fron t proposal s wer e absolutely unacceptable , an d tha t afte r all , "fre e an d fai r election s have alread y bee n hel d i n Zimbabw e Rhodesia' ' (Unite d Kingdo m 1979, Minute s 13t h Plenary) . The pla n wa s equall y onerou s t o bot h Muzorew a an d the PF . For Muzorewa, "th e advent of a British governor with full legislative an d executive powe r coul d onl y mea n th e relinquishmen t o f powe r b y the bisho p an d hi s cabinet , a bitter pil l fo r a newly electe d govern ment" (Davido w 1984 , 69) . Mugab e an d Nkom o objecte d o n fou r grounds. First , relyin g o n th e existin g polic e t o kee p th e peac e of fered n o protectio n whatsoever . The y fel t tha t onl y a polic e forc e comprised of both Salisbur y an d Patriotic Front officer s woul d work . Second, sinc e th e transitio n governmen t di d no t incorporat e an y o f the liberatio n movement' s politica l o r militar y personnel , th e guer rillas were no t granted legitimacy o r equality. Their minimal deman d was equa l recognition . Thei r maximu m positio n demande d a full in tegration o f th e arme d force s wit h th e guerrilla s formin g th e cor e of th e army . Third , th e P F fel t tha t th e shor t tim e perio d wa s in sufficient: the y wante d th e opportunit y t o mov e mas s number s o f people fro m thei r refuge e center s bac k int o Zimbabwe . Fourth , th e Patriotic Front , fearin g tha t th e Salisbur y regim e woul d tr y t o ri g the elections, demanded a full registration o f voters—an arduous task that woul d tak e longe r tha n tw o months . Carrington, a s h e di d durin g th e discussion s o n th e constitution , sought Muzorewa' s acceptanc e befor e tha t o f th e Patrioti c Front . For tactical reason s Carringto n neede d Salisbury' s approva l t o kee p pressure o n Mugab e an d Nkomo . Thi s time , however , th e Britis h were not as confident o f the outcome. As Jeffrey Davidow has argued, "obtaining fro m Muzorew a hi s agreemen t t o ste p asid e an d transfe r power t o a Britis h governo r prove d t o b e th e singl e mos t difficul t task confrontin g Carrington " (Davido w 1984 , 69) . Thi s poin t wa s emphasized by on e o f the Britis h diplomats a t Lancaster House : "T o ask a government t o ge t ou t o f the wa y an d let yo u ru n it i s a toug h business" (Britis h Diploma t A . 1987) . In the cas e o f Muzorew a an d th e reques t tha t h e stan d down, th e British confronte d a spli t delegation . O n th e on e hand , Ia n Smit h chose th e issu e t o mak e on e las t stand : h e argue d tha t i f Muzorew a gave in , the n th e pat h woul d b e clea r fo r a Patriotic Fron t takeove r of th e government . Sithole , a s leade r o f th e opposition , however , desired ne w election s an d sa w tha t i f Muzorew a steppe d down , i t

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 14 9 would increas e hi s chance s o f electora l success . Muzorewa' s ow n deputies wer e adamantl y agains t th e concession ; thei r concer n stemmed from their own interests, for if Muzorewa lost power, then they would lose power . Sinc e the proposal s were pu t as a package, however, ther e wa s muc h tha t appeale d t o th e whit e member s o f Muzorewa's faction, especially Peter Walls who found appealing the provisions callin g for reliance o n the existin g securit y forces . Unlike their experience in accepting the constitution, the decision on whether Muzorewa would stand down was his alone. The British worked on two tracks. The first appealed to the Bishop's ethics and tried to convinc e hi m that steppin g dow n wa s the "right " thing t o do, tha t it was necessary t o giv e everyon e a n equal chanc e t o lea d a new Zimbabwe . Th e secon d trac k aime d a t Muzorewa's interest s and attempte d t o convinc e hi m tha t hi s los s o f positio n woul d b e temporary, tha t h e woul d wi n anothe r electio n an d regai n hi s position i n a matter o f months (Carringto n 1987) . Finally , on e ha s to take into account Muzorewa' s realizatio n tha t there was a real possibility that the PF might not, in Davidow's words, "gag and swallow" the transitio n conditions . I f so, the doo r woul d be ope n fo r Britis h recognition, bu t onl y i f Muzorew a first accepted th e Britis h terms. The British privately were tellin g the Bishop that acceptance of the transition b y th e Fron t wa s unlikely . O n th e twenty-eight h o f Oc tober when a response was requested by the British, Muzorewa, after a nigh t o f prayer , accede d t o thei r demand s t o ste p down . Fro m interviews with him and others in his delegation I am convinced that he di d tha t a s the "fair " thin g t o do . Bu t I a m equall y convince d that Muzorew a was completely certai n that h e woul d be reelecte d and would soo n regain his leadership spot . During the time Muzorewa deliberated, Lord Carrington had sent his Minister for African Affairs, Richard Luce, to visit the Front Line Presidents. Whil e th e mov e wa s in part to infor m the m o f the proceedings, i t wa s als o undertake n i n orde r t o buil d u p a reserve o f legitimacy fo r th e Britis h proposals . Thi s legitimac y wa s obtaine d just in time for the eight plenary sessions held between Octobe r 2 6 and November 1 . In plenary on October 2 6 the Patriotic Front presented a stinging analysi s o f Britain' s plan s fo r th e interi m period . Their ange r focuse d o n th e Britis h choic e o f usin g existin g polic e and administrators, who , the Patrioti c Front argued , coul d not possibly be impartial. For the guerrillas the plan was a recipe for violence and bloodshed . Havin g criticize d th e Britis h plan , th e Fron t the n

150 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n repeated thei r proposals : a si x mont h perio d befor e th e election ; security force s an d police mad e u p of both th e regime' s and the PF' s forces; a Unite d Nation s peacekeepin g forc e an d polic e force ; a n electoral commission ; an d a n interi m governmen t forme d o n a power-sharing basi s wit h equa l number s o f Patrioti c Fron t leader s on on e sid e an d Britis h an d Salisbur y leader s o n th e other . At th e eighteent h plenar y o n Octobe r 2 7 Ia n Gilmour , actin g o n behalf o f Lor d Carrington , responde d poin t b y poin t t o th e Front' s proposals. Th e resul t wa s a heated discussio n betwee n Gilmou r an d various member s o f th e Front' s delegation , bu t n o concession s o n the Britis h part. This prompted Nkom o an d Mugabe t o test th e Brit ish mandate. On October 28 they met with Michael Manley, Jamaican Prime Ministe r an d on e o f th e author s o f th e Lusak a communique , and Shridath Ramphal. This meeting wa s preparatory t o a showdown on th e Britis h handlin g o f th e negotiations . Whil e th e Common wealth se t u p a special meetin g i n London fo r October 3 0 t o discus s a Patrioti c Fron t cal l fo r chang e i n th e Britis h plan , th e Fron t als o went t o th e publi c wit h thei r case . Ediso n Zvobg o tol d th e press : "After ou r talk s toda y i t i s fairl y clea r tha t ou r positio n i s regarde d as ver y soun d b y th e Commonwealth . Doe s Britai n reall y expec t Nkomo an d Mugab e t o slee p i n Salisbur y guarde d b y Bisho p Mu zorewa's men ? W e migh t no t eve n se e th e en d o f a n election . Wh y should the y no t just kil l us? " (The [London ] Guardian, Octobe r 29 , 1979). The nex t evenin g a s Hig h Commissioner s an d representative s o f thirty-nine Commonwealt h state s were seeking a mandate from thei r superiors fo r a vot e o n Tuesday , Carringto n an d Manle y me t wit h Margaret Thatcher. The y sai d that many Commonwealt h leader s fel t that th e Patrioti c Front' s concern s wer e legitimate , a sentiment als o signalled t o Carringto n b y America n Ambassado r t o Grea t Britain , Kingman Brewster , o n behalf o f the Carte r Administration. Carring ton acknowledge d privatel y tha t th e Britis h wer e willin g t o bend o n some issues . The nex t da y th e Patrioti c Fron t wa s denie d a public victor y ove r Carrington. Afte r listenin g t o Rampha l an d th e Commonwealth' s Committee o n Southern Africa, the representatives o f the thirty-nin e states faile d t o endors e Patrioti c Fron t demand s fo r U.N . partici pation, and refused t o condemn th e negotiatin g effort s o f the British. In a very lukewar m statement , th e diplomat s "expresse d concern " rather tha n criticism . However , ther e wa s genera l agreemen t tha t

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 15 1 the tw o mont h electio n perio d wa s too shor t an d that ther e shoul d probably b e a strengthening o f th e Commonwealt h observe r tea m to the elections . While Carringto n ha d maintained th e mandat e o f th e Common wealth, i t ha d been mad e clea r t o hi m tha t th e Britis h woul d hav e to give up ground to the Patriotic Front. The conference, no w going into it s eight h week , wa s startin g t o unravel . Bot h th e Britis h an d the Patriotic Front turned to a brinksmanship style of bargaining. At the en d o f plenary o n November 2 , th e Britis h had asked for a definitive answer fro m both parties by Novembe r 5 o n the ful l forty two-point proposal for the transition period. November 5 was a significant deadline , becaus e th e Britis h Parliamen t tha t wee k wa s t o begin to debate on whether to continue sanctions against Rhodesia. When the deadline came, Muzorewa accepted fully the British proposals. The Patrioti c Fron t refuse d t o commi t themselve s an d gave the British a list o f concerns that they wante d addressed. That Muzorewa had accepted and the Front had not, put enormous pressure on Carrington an d Thatcher fro m th e Conservativ e Part y to recog nize Muzorewa' s governmen t an d t o lif t sanctions . Whe n anothe r plenary sessio n o n November 6 failed to elicit PF acceptance, Carrington decide d t o up the ant e the nex t day. As the twenty-eight h plenar y bega n o n Novembe r 7 Carringto n informed both delegation s tha t the British had introduced int o Parliament a n enabling bill that would set i n motion the necessar y paperwork for Rhodesia to be returned to British authority. While this inflamed th e Front , Carringto n refuse d t o relent. A t the en d of the brief plenar y Carringto n demande d a n answe r t o th e transitiona l arrangements the nex t day . Carringto n adde d that if he di d not receive one , h e did not know how h e coul d continue the conference . Carrington did not tell the Patriotic Front that Ian Gilmour was also to infor m Parliamen t that , whil e mos t sanction s woul d remai n i n force, the Thatcher government had no intention of renewing them. The Patrioti c Fron t di d no t atten d th e plenar y tha t ha d bee n planned fo r th e nex t day , Novembe r 8 , an d Carrington di d not receive a n answer . Carringto n too k th e opportunit y t o castigat e th e Patriotic Fron t i n public. Th e Patrioti c Fron t claime d tha t i t wa s a misunderstanding cause d b y th e failur e o f thei r reques t fo r post ponement t o reach Carrington. In lieu of the plenary meeting, Mugabe and Nkomo had met wit h Kenneth Kaunda, who had flown to London i n hope s o f breaking th e deadlock . Kaunda' s concer n ha d

152 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n been intensifie d du e t o a series o f Rhodesian attack s o n ZAP U base s in Zambia and economic an d transportation target s within that country, purportedl y t o minimiz e ZAP U infiltratio n int o Zimbabw e i n anticipation o f a n election. Zambia , alread y reelin g fro m thre e suc h attacks i n October , wa s furthe r deal t a blo w whe n th e Muzorew a government o n Novembe r 5 decide d t o us e foo d a s a weapo n an d halt maiz e shipment s int o Zambia . From November 8 to 10 , the British and Patriotic Front castigate d each othe r fo r thei r stubbornness . Whil e th e bickerin g continue d between th e delegations , Carrington , Kaunda , an d Thatche r thrashed ou t possibl e compromis e agreements . First , Carringto n de cided an d mad e publi c tha t ther e woul d b e a Commonwealth mon itoring forc e o f aroun d 1,20 0 soldier s t o supervis e th e cease-fire . While Carringto n ha d been loat h t o discus s th e cease-fir e befor e a n agreement o n th e transition , th e sharin g o f thi s informatio n woul d make i t easie r fo r th e P F t o understan d wha t wa s comin g i f th e negotiations proceeded . Second , th e Britis h woul d lengthe n th e in terim perio d fro m tw o month s t o twelv e t o thirtee n weeks . Sinc e part o f th e Front' s objection s t o a shor t interi m perio d wa s thei r concern t o resettl e refugee s i n camp s i n Mozambiqu e an d Zambia , the Britis h governmen t woul d undertak e assistanc e i n helpin g suc h resettlement. The Kaund a intervention helpe d t o brin g th e partie s together . I n plenary o n Novembe r 14 , Carringto n an d Mugab e discusse d area s of agreemen t an d disagreement . Th e Patrioti c Fron t ha d accepted a British Governo r wh o woul d rel y o n th e existin g Rhodesia n admin istration, an Election Council and British Election Commissioner, an d a party-list syste m o f voting. Area s of disagreement include d the ful l registration o f voters , th e natur e o f th e polic e force , th e lengt h o f the transition, the formation of a cease-fire commission , and the com position o f the peacekeepin g force . Carringto n the n spelle d ou t th e compromises th e Britis h woul d make : th e lengthenin g o f the cease fire, a n additio n o f mor e tha n 10 0 staf f member s t o th e Electio n Commissioner, an d a Commonwealt h monitorin g forc e rathe r tha n a peacekeepin g force . Carringto n rejecte d a cease-fire commission : 'The rol e o f the militar y forces o n both side s wil l be t o maintain th e ceasefire, fo r whic h the y wil l b e equall y responsibl e t o th e Gover nor^ (Unite d Kingdo m 1979 , Minute s 33r d Plenary) . A series of bilateral meetings between th e British and the Patrioti c Front wen t lat e int o th e nigh t o f Novembe r 14 . Th e Fron t ha d ac -

The End of the Zimbabwean Civi l War 15 3 cepted all of the British proposals, but hedged because they believed that the language of the agreements still provided differentiated sta tus to the tw o armies. The next da y in plenary Mugab e read a statement t o which Carrington quickly agreed: "In the light of the discussions we have had as a result of President Kaunda's proposals to the Prime Minister, if you are prepared to include th e Patriotic Front forces i n paragraph 13 of the British paper, we are able to agree on the interim proposals, conditional o n a successful outcom e of the negotiations on the ceasefire' ' (Unite d Kingdo m 1979 , 34t h Plenary , Conferenc e pape r CC(79)76, Novembe r 15 , 1979) . Th e adde d sentenc e read , "Th e Patriotic Front' s force s wil l als o b e require d t o compl y wit h th e directions of the Governor'' (United Kingdom 1979, Conference Addendum 1, November 15,1979). The finalconcession was a symbolic one. The sentence formall y grante d Nkomo and Mugabe what they had been fighting for—the acknowledgemen t tha t the y wer e equa l to the existin g administration . The Cease-fire Carrington fel t tha t the problem s o f reaching a n agreement o n th e cease-fire woul d be greate r than those encountered durin g the previous negotiations . Bu t h e als o fel t tha t hi s strateg y o f proceedin g issue by issu e wa s paying of f an d was providing th e momentu m h e had hope d t o achieve . O n Novembe r 1 6 th e Britis h table d thei r general proposals . Th e nex t plenar y sessio n fel l int o th e patter n o f the previous tw o months: the Patrioti c Fron t tabled their own proposals, Mugabe and Nkomo expressed displeasure at how the British were runnin g the conference , an d then Carrington asserte d that "a conclusion i s neede d withi n a fe w days " (Unite d Kingdo m 1979 , Minutes 35t h Plenary). The Patriotic Front proposal once again differed dramatically from the British outline. First , i t envisioned th e demarcation o f differen t parts of the country to be under the control of the guerrillas and the Security Forces . Th e Britis h rejecte d thi s ou t o f hand , feelin g tha t such a process would resul t i n the discussions ' being prolonge d indefinitely, with little prospect of ever reaching agreement. The heart of the Front's plan called for a peacekeeping force that would enforce the cease-fire . Th e British argued that the cease-fir e ha d to be self enforcing with the responsibility fo r maintaining the peace with the respective armies. Finally, the Front believed that during the cease-

154 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n fire, a star t shoul d b e mad e i n integratin g th e armie s an d polic e forces. The British countered tha t th e interim period would be use d for al l concerne d t o ge t thei r electora l messag e across , an d no t t o begin th e makin g o f a new Zimbabwe . On Novembe r 2 2 Carringto n table d th e ful l proposal s fo r th e cease-fire. Th e most important featur e o f the plan was that it would, take plac e i n tw o stages . First , th e Salisbur y troop s woul d b e de ployed to their main bases. Second, when the monitors had reporte d that th e troop s wer e a t thei r bases , th e Patrioti c Fron t guerrilla s would hav e t o gathe r a t assembl y point s throughou t th e countr y where they would then be fed an d monitored by the Commonwealt h force. Th e tim e spa n fo r thes e tw o stage s wa s seven t o te n days . At the same plenary that Carrington submitte d the ful l proposals , he als o took tim e t o respon d t o event s taking plac e i n the regio n a t that moment . O n Novembe r 1 6 South Afric a ha d announce d tha t i t would no t accep t "chaos " i n Rhodesia. Betwee n Novembe r 1 6 and 19 Rhodesia bombed five road bridges i n Zambia and destroyed th e last remainin g rai l bridg e tha t linke d Zambi a t o th e outsid e world . The destruction o f all transport routes out of Zambia put the country on the edg e o f economic collapse . Kaunda countered b y mobilizin g his country for war. The East German and Soviet embassies in Lusaka took rar e actio n an d officiall y warne d Sout h Afric a t o kee p thei r forces ou t o f Zimbabwe i f the Patrioti c Fron t cam e t o power . At th e tim e Rhodesia' s motive s wer e though t t o b e a searc h fo r leverage o n Kaunda , t o forc e hi m t o pu t greate r pressur e o n th e Patriotic Front . I n fac t th e bombing s ha d no t bee n ordere d b y Sal isbury's militar y commanders . Rathe r th e action s wer e undertake n by lesse r officer s temporaril y ou t fro m beneat h th e contro l o f thei r elders preoccupied a t Lancaster House. For these junior officers, th e destruction of economic targets did not constitute a major escalation ; the bombings were a way of turning on the heat a t Lancaster Hous e (Flower 1987b) . For Kaunda, however, the action was at the thresh old of crossing a tacit limit that coul d change the conduct an d scop e of the war . Carrington issue d tw o ultimatum s a t th e Novembe r 2 2 plenary . First, he demanded tha t both side s accept the British cease-fire pro posals b y Novembe r 26 . Second , h e urge d tha t "a s a n immediat e measure t o reduc e th e dange r o f a further escalatio n o f the conflic t . . . a n agreement should immediately be concluded in order to avoid any further increas e in tension between Rhodesia and Zambia." The

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 15 5 agreement woul d include Rhodesia n wor d that cross-borde r opera tions int o Zambi a would ceas e an d Patriotic Fron t wor d that ther e would be no further movement of personnel from Zambia into Rhodesia. Carringto n state d tha t h e ha d alread y receive d cooperatio n from Presiden t Kaunda , wh o ha d bee n i n touc h wit h Margare t Thatcher that day, and that he expected word from both delegations on this proposal by th e followin g morning . The plenary quickly dissolved into heated argument. Mugabe and Nkomo were irate that Carrington was drawing a similarity between the two forces and their actions. As to Carrington's deadline on the cease-fire, Mugab e demanded that the Salisbury delegation publicly state their unwillingness to talk directly with the Front, or the talks would not proceed. Tongogara, i n a more problem-solving way , expressed hi s frustratio n wit h no t talkin g directl y wit h th e Salisbur y delegation, becaus e * These ar e th e tw o force s i n conflict ; m y del egation canno t secur e a n agreement wit h Britain/ ' H e the n adde d that i t woul d prov e difficul t i n th e futur e fo r th e tw o side s t o si t down an d tal k i n Salisbury , i f the y wer e no t prepare d t o tal k i n London. Th e conferenc e ende d whe n Mugab e an d Nkom o pulle d their delegations, Nkom o warning Carrington "no t to come the following Monda y an d expect a n answer fro m m y delegatio n withou t discussions—the chairman will not get one" (United Kingdom 1979 , Minutes 37t h Plenary) . Th e tw o rebe l leader s gav e a n imprompt u press conference, "stil l shaking with anger . . . Asked what will happen when the Monda y deadline comes , so far as the Patriotic Front is concerned, Mr. Mugabe said there could be no question of toeing the line. Lor d Carrington, h e said , 'Ca n go to heir " (The [London] Guardian, November 23 , 1979) . Carrington's ultimatum prompted Mugabe to fly to Dar Es Salaam to mee t th e Fron t Lin e Presidents , wher e Mugab e publicl y state d that he woul d no t allo w hi s soldiers slaughtere d o n th e wa y t o th e assembly points and "General Walls gaining at Lancaster House what he failed to achieve on the battlefield" (quoted in Smith and Simpson 1981, 139) . Afte r th e meetin g i n Da r E s Salaam , th e Fron t Lin e Presidents, throug h thei r representative s i n London , lobbie d Car rington har d on three issues : the lengt h o f the cease-fire , th e nee d for close monitorin g o f the Rhodesian forces , an d the nee d for particularly close watch on the Rhodesian Air Force to prevent i t from bombing th e assembl y points. Carringto n grudgingly me t th e latte r demands but refuse d t o concede a longer cease-fir e period .

156 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n This was the only time where Carrington' s emphasis on arbitratio n had t o yiel d t o a softe r approach . Wha t i s intriguin g i s tha t whil e Carrington an d his staff, an d the Patriotic Front' s legal adviser s wer e playing a har d bargainin g gam e o n th e issue s o f th e cease-fire , a n informal coalitio n wa s formed between th e Patriotic Front' s militar y leaders and the British military advisers, who both felt that the stake s were to o importan t t o leav e fo r th e civilians . On e ZAP U delegat e remarked, "Th e onl y giv e an d tak e negotiation s wer e ove r th e mil itary transition and cease fire. . . . Thet*e were negotiation s then onl y because th e Britis h military were frightened ; the y ha d to listen if w e said yo u can' t d o somethin g i n twenty-fou r hours , fo r example . . . . Everyone wa s interested i n saving lives an d it was a matter of finding the best wa y o f doin g things " (ZAP U Delegate A . 1987) . Simb i Mu bako, ZANU' s membe r o f th e Patrioti c Front' s lega l team , wen t s o far a s t o mentio n Tongogara' s rol e i n moderatin g th e cease-fir e ne gotiations: I remembe r hi m sayin g (abou t th e numbe r an d locatio n o f th e assembl y points), "This is not a point on which to break the conference." You see the military peopl e kne w th e situatio n o n th e ground ; the y kne w wha t the y could live with; what they could get away with. For example, h e knew that so many would be abl e to be kept out of the assembl y points and he knew that w e coul d sen d th e majiba s (teenag e scouts ) int o th e assembl y point s and keep ou r best fighters out an d in the village s to work o n the election . The lawyers were much more theoretical because we didn't know what could happen on the ground/ ' (Mubak o 1987 ) An importan t piec e o f informatio n tha t wa s share d betwee n Ton gogara an d th e Britis h wa s tha t h e coul d reac h an y o f hi s troop s b y relay i n fou r day s (Davido w 1984 , 81-82) . Thi s dramaticall y un dercut th e Front' s bargaining positio n o n th e nee d fo r a long cease fire period . The P F gav e partia l acceptanc e o n Decembe r 6 , bu t mad e ful l approval conditiona l o n th e longe r cease-fir e perio d an d additiona l assembly points . Jus t whe n agreemen t seeme d imminent , th e PF' s conditional acceptanc e threatene d t o brin g dow n th e whol e settle ment. Th e conferenc e ha d becom e "bogge d dow n ove r precisel y how, where , an d when th e wa r would en d . . . " (Smit h an d Simpso n 1981, 148) . Carrington wa s forced t o cas h in on th e momentu m tha t ha d built to thi s poin t b y reportin g t o th e pres s tha t a settlemen t wa s onl y days awa y an d that, give n al l tha t had been accomplishe d s o far, th e

The En d o f the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 15 7 Patriotic Fron t coul d no t possibl y tur n thei r back s fro m th e nego tiation. Relyin g o n brinksmanship , Carringto n the n name d Lor d Soames Governo r o f Zimbabw e an d dispatche d hi m t o Salisbury . Both move s provoke d th e PF' s mos t belligeren t response s t o tha t date, wit h Mugabe' s pres s secretary , Ediso n Zvobgo , informing th e British pres s tha t Lor d Carringto n "ca n g o t o hell, " an d tha t "Thatcher ca n jum p i n th e Thames/ ' Zvobg o conclude d th e im promptu pres s conferenc e b y "brandishin g th e Britis h map s [o f th e assembly points] and giving a shake of his head into camera for eac h of th e televisio n network s there : T h e answer , Lor d Carrington , i s NO . . . N O . . . NO ' " (Smit h an d Simpso n 1981 , 150) . Just when th e edifice wa s about t o collapse, Samora Machel cam e to Carrington's rescue. Samora Machel passed a message to his chief aide i n London , Fernan d Ho n wanna t o giv e t o Mugabe . Honwann a informed Mugab e tha t th e wa r wa s ove r an d that , "i f h e [Mugabe ] did not sig n the agreement , h e would be welcomed back to Mozambique an d give n a beach vill a wher e h e coul d writ e hi s memoirs " (Davidow 1984 , 89) . After a final face-saving gestur e b y th e Britis h in grantin g th e Fron t a n additiona l assembl y point , th e Lancaste r House Accords were signe d on December 21 , the on e hundred an d second da y o f the conference .

The En d an d Beginnin g The signature s a t Lancaste r Hous e onl y signalle d a commitment t o a peaceful transition . The next two months would be more harrowing for th e participants than an y other tim e in the conflict. I n the word s of Lord Soames, the British Governor, "I t was a tinderbox, but, happily, no one struck a match" (Newhous e 1983 , 78). The fuel fo r th e fire was everywhere. In the first two weeks of the cease-fire, 22,00 0 guerrillas marche d t o assembl y points . ZANU an d especiall y ZAP U kept most of their best fighters ou t of the camps as a failsafe measur e in cas e the countr y exploded . Th e British , fearin g th e possibilit y o f a cou p fro m disgruntle d whit e soldier s o r a reneging o n th e cas e of the Salisbur y regime , wen t ou t o f thei r wa y t o b e toug h o n ZAN U in order to appease Muzorewa and Walls. In a not-very-subtle mov e the Sout h Africa n Arm y move d thre e division s t o th e Zimbabwea n border a s a reminder of what they would do in the event of "chaos/* Amidst threat s b y th e Britis h tha t the y woul d disqualif y ZAN U be -

158 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n cause o f voter intimidation , Mugab e feare d tha t hi s suspicions o f a double-cross migh t com e true . Two of the three individual s who were moderatin g influence s on ZANU at Lancaster Hous e wer e unabl e t o play tha t rol e durin g the election campaign . Tongogara , i n advance o f the ZANU delegation , had flown to Mozambique a week earlier than the signing in London in order to ready his troops for the cease-fire. Whil e in Mozambique he die d i n a n automobil e accident , which , amids t rumor s o f assassination, brought everyone' s nerve s to the edge. Then Mugabe , before leavin g London , announce d tha t ZAN U woul d ru n on its own in the election and not in coalition with ZAPU. This stunned Nkomo, as his strategy throughou t th e previous tw o years ha d been predi cated on coming to power in conjunction wit h Mugabe. But Mugabe, confident o f victory on his own, discarded his less powerful partner . British pressure kept building on ZANU until Mugabe had a direct talk with Soames. The talk was prompted in part by two assassination attempts agains t Mugabe . Soame s privatel y reassure d hi m tha t n o party woul d b e disqualifie d fro m th e election. Britain' s publi c pos turing against ZANU, however, prompte d Julius Nyerere two weeks before th e scheduled election s at the end of February t o say that he would onl y recogniz e th e winner i f it was Mugabe. This greatly angered Soame s an d his staff, becaus e th e whole electio n perio d an d cease-fire hinge d o n the believability o f a free an d fair electio n i n which any of the parties could win and which the other parties would abide. Nyerere' s statemen t threatene d th e confidence o f the whit e Rhodesians, becaus e i t was an implicit threa t tha t i f ZANU did not win th e election, th e war would continue . At Lancaste r House , th e British ha d an idea o f a feasible settle ment. But when the conference succeede d they were really not prepared t o implement th e agreement. A member o f Soames' staf f described th e transitio n a s " a giganti c gam e o f bluff , keepin g jus t enough Rhodesians obeying the Governor long enough to pull it off " (British Diploma t A . 1987) . Britain' s forma l statu s o f decolonize r became crucia l a t thi s point , fo r enoug h whit e Rhodesian s i n th e administration sa w the British presenc e an d authority a s legitimate. After th e election o f February 27-2 9 bu t befor e th e announce ment o f the electio n result s o n Marc h 4 , the British, knowin g tha t Mugabe wa s to win , contacted Mache l an d arrange d a meetin g i n Mozambique betwee n Mugabe , Flower , an d Walls . Machel' s aid e Fernand Honwanna "understood that if Mugabe won, he would need

The End of the Zimbabwean Civi l War 15 9 the Britis h an d a modus vivend i wit h Walls " (Britis h Diploma t A . 1987). A t th e meeting Mugab e offere d Wall s th e comman d o f th e new Zimbabwean army , a job he accepted . On March 4, 1980 , the election results were announced. Mugab e and ZAN U ha d wo n fifty-seven ou t o f on e hundre d seats , Nkom o had gained twenty seats , an d Muzorewa three. To a stunned natio n Soames, Mugabe, and Walls went on television that evening. Soame s began b y announcin g hi s dut y t o han d ove r powe r i n a n orderl y fashion. H e was followed b y Peter Walls, who appeale d "t o you all for calm, for peace. No hatred. No bitterness." The last speaker was Robert Mugabe : "Le t u s join together. Le t u s show respec t fo r the winners an d th e losers . . . . Ther e i s n o intentio n o n ou r par t t o victimize the minority. We will ensure there is a place for everyon e in this country. I want a broadly based government to include whites and Nkomo " (Quote d i n Flowe r 1987a , 267-268) . O n Apri l 18 , 1980, Zimbabwe was granted formal independence from Great Britain.

Reconstruction Upon taking power Mugabe issued a plea for racial reconciliation in Zimbabwe. He immediately undertook measures to instill confidenc e in those white s wh o chos e t o remai n i n Zimbabwe. Suc h measure s included keepin g Pete r Wall s a s hea d o f th e arme d forces , main taining Ken Flower as head of the Central Intelligence Office, naming Ken Norman, a white farmer, as Minister of Agricultural Affairs, and announcing that ZANU-PF fully intende d to abide by the Lancaster House constitution . Reconciliation, however , oppose s revolution. Th e former implies coming t o term s wit h one' s enemies , a preference fo r forgivenes s over retribution, a willingness to maintain continuity amidst change, and take n t o it s logica l extrem e a partnership betwee n ol d adver saries a t the expens e o f one' s ol d allies . Revolutio n involve s transformation, a powerful rejectio n o f th e past , a reversal o f fortune s between haves and have-nots. One often thinks of revolution as having losers and winners, and reconciliation as having all winners. This is an intellectual error . Both reconciliation and revolution have winners and losers, only the aggrieve d party differs. I n the case of reconciliation, the mos t bitter proponents o f fundamental chang e lose ,

160 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n in revolutio n the y triumph . Suc h i s the cas e o f an y negotiate d set tlement t o civi l war . The negotiate d settlemen t wa s no t favore d b y al l concerned . Those wh o viewe d Lancaste r Hous e a s a sell-ou t ha d fou r options : exit, th e choic e mos t preferre d b y hard-lin e whites ; grudgin g ac ceptance combined with a willingness to seek political change within the politica l system ; the rejectio n o f the agreemen t an d willingnes s to choose violence in opposition; and finally, acquiescence to change, either because of loyalty to Mugabe or ZANU, or because of feelings of powerlessness t o fight undesirabl e change . While Rober t Mugab e emphasize d hi s commitmen t t o revolu tionary socialism , h e chos e continuit y ove r chang e o n the mos t im portant issu e facing Zimbabwe : land. Having decided tha t the coun try's whit e farmer s wer e crucia l t o Zimbabwe' s economi c survival , Mugabe embraced thi s community, whil e rejecting th e hundred s o f thousands of land poor who believed that a triumph in the war would result i n the redistributio n o f the whit e farmers ' land . The policy of reconciliation practicall y disenfranchise d tw o formerl y crucia l con stituent group s of Mugabe: the land poor and the freedom fighters— the latte r euphemisticall y labele d "ex-combatants. " While Mugab e professed hi s desire t o work wit h member s o f th e white government and ZAPU, some within these groups hedged their bets. Mugab e force d Wall s t o resig n severa l month s afte r indepen dence whe n i t wa s reveale d tha t Wall s ha d urge d th e Britis h gov ernment t o initiate a coup agains t Mugab e whe n h e won electio n i n April. A n assassinatio n attemp t agains t Mugab e an d leadin g ZAN U officials faile d durin g th e summer . Violence did not end with the settlement of the civil war. Its bases, however, fundamentall y changed . Th e first majo r challeng e t o th e post-independence regim e came not from renewe d clashes of whites against blacks , bu t rathe r directl y fro m ZAPU , ZANU' s partne r i n the Patrioti c Front . Radical s within ZAPU , seemingly wit h Nkomo' s active encouragement , refuse d t o accep t th e ne w Zimbabwe , an d hid larg e stock s of weapons a t properties i n the countrysid e bough t by Nkomo . Al l o f thi s occurre d befor e a nationa l arm y ha d bee n forged betwee n ZANLA , ZIPRA, an d th e Rhodesia n Army . The problem s betwee n ZIPR A an d ZANL A an d thei r respectiv e political wings dominated Zimbabwea n politic s for much o f the decade afte r Lancaste r House . Essentially a political fight betwee n th e two movements , th e struggl e ha d overtone s o f ethnic warfare . Thi s

The End of the Zimbabwea n Civi l War 16 1 was inevitable , give n tha t Nkom o an d ZAP U becam e increasingl y based in Matabeleland, hom e o f the Ndebel e peopl e o f Zimbabwe. The first major outburs t o f violence too k plac e i n the fal l o f 1980 , prompted by an incendiary speech by a ZANU Minister, Enos Nkala, himself an Ndebele, in Matabeleland. Camps of ZIPRA followers, not yet disarmed , attacke d groups of ZANLA soldiers in the region . At another instanc e o f fighting between th e tw o armies , a newly con stituted brigade of soldiers, integrated from ZIPRA and ZANLA, was brought i n to quell th e violence . This competition between ZAPU and ZANLA took a different turn in 1981-1982 . Disaffecte d remnant s o f ZAPU' s armies , possessin g stocks of weapons no t turne d in to th e nationa l army , initiate d hit and-run terro r attack s agains t civilians , whit e farmers , an d government representatives in Matabeleland. Mugabe's government, which at firstused little force to stop this incipient insurgency, chose harsh, indiscriminate aggressio n agains t th e regio n i n th e hope s o f elimi nating these guerrillas, now referred to as "bandits" or "dissidents" by th e regime . Th e culminatio n o f th e terro r cam e whe n th e gov ernment unleashe d th e Fift h Brigade—a n all-Shon a brigade traine d by Nort h Koreans—agains t th e insurgents . Mos t reliabl e account s believe tha t approximately 1,00 0 Ndebel e civilian s died during the brigade's slash-and-burn campaign through Matabeleland. Even then the guerrillas refused to go away. Attacks on white farmers increased in th e nex t years . Th e violenc e ende d whe n ZAN U an d ZAP U reached a unity agreement in 1988 tha t merged the two parties and gave a few cabine t position s t o ex-ZAP U leaders. While Mugabe and ZANU-PF honored the Lancaster House constitution, they angered many of their allies and supporters by keeping intact securit y legislatio n (th e Emergenc y Power s Act ) fro m th e Smith regime, which it used to detain, harass, and torture suspecte d enemies of the state. It must be remembered that ZANU's policy of repression was not simply the legacy of the security state it inherited, nor wa s i t th e paranoi d terro r o f a regim e whic h cam e t o powe r through violence and saw enemies lurking behind every stone. Moreover, th e violenc e wa s no t th e triball y base d blood bath predicte d by Rhodesian whites, an image embraced by some of the "keenest " Western reporters at the time. ZANU's "paranoia" resulted primarily from the real threat that South Africa posed to an independent Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's independence came at a time of intense regional destabilization by the Sout h African government . I n the summe r of

162 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n 1990, i n reactio n t o change s i n Sout h Africa , Zimbabw e finally re pealed th e emergenc y legislatio n pu t i n plac e b y th e Smit h regime . One mus t b e carefu l abou t th e lesson s on e draw s fro m th e Zim babwe case . Jeffre y Herbs t argue s tha t Zimbabwe' s demographi c profile provide d fo r a n eas y abatemen t o f th e white/blac k conflict . What Herbs t call s a taci t economi c bargai n se t th e parameter s o f racial co-existence i n Zimbabwe. Whites wh o chose t o remain woul d live i n affluence , bu t woul d no t hav e direc t involvemen t i n politica l decision making . A gradual dwindlin g o f the white populatio n woul d gradually cede white land holdings to the regime (Herbs t 1990 , 2 2 1 227). As Herbs t suggests , Mugab e an d other s i n ZAN U hav e continue d to voic e th e goal s o f revolutionar y socialis m an d transformatio n t o obfuscate wha t have been mostl y pro-capitalist an d pro-Western eco nomic policies. Land, never a serious issue for the party in the 1980s , remained a proble m tha t ha s worsene d du e t o Africa n populatio n growth. Th e governmen t ca n spea k proudl y o f it s commitmen t t o equalization o f educational opportunitie s an d health care. In the cas e of the former , however , th e governmen t face s a stiff challeng e fro m producing hundred s o f thousand s o f schoo l graduate s wit h fe w op portunities fo r employmen t ahea d o f them .

Notes 1. Thi s chapter draws heavily from Stedma n 1991 . 2. Afte r independenc e th e name s o f thre e o f thes e citie s change d t o Harare, Mutare, and Gweru. Bulawayo stayed the same. 3. Sithol e had been leader of ZANU until 1974 when he was overthrown by members of the Executive Committee. For two years a fiercebattle raged for control of ZANU, and Robert Mugabe was chosen by the ZANLA guerrillas as thei r "spokesman. " Mugab e wo n th e suppor t o f thos e guerrilla s because of his refusal to countenance any negotiations with Smith. By 1976, Mugabe ha d not full y consolidate d hi s leadership withi n ZAN U an d could not afford to be conciliator y toward s any settlement . 4. Figure s are from Wilkinson 1980 ; Cilliers 1985; and Martin and Johnson 1981 . I n term s o f th e breakdow n i n civilia n death s int o white s an d Africans, Wilkinso n state s tha t a t th e beginnin g o f 197 9 th e cumulativ e figures were 31 0 whit e civilian s kille d an d 3,84 5 Africa n civilian s kille d (Wilkinson 1980 , 114) . 5. Th e leader s o f Zambi a and Mozambique wer e prepare d t o wor k fo r a settlement du e t o th e extensiv e cost s inflicte d o n thei r countrie s b y th e

The En d o f th e Zimbabwea n Civi l Wa r 16 3 war. As I stated earlier, Zambia had initiated the search for peace i n 1974 , and Mozambique ha d signalle d it s willingnes s t o wor k fo r a settlement i n 1978. Tanzania, as a Front Line State, expressed its willingness to work for settlement, bu t it had less leverage tha n Mozambique an d Zambia and had incurred lower war costs as well.

S E V E N

The En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r Stephen Joh n Stedma n We must remember, it is the most difficult proces s in the world to make two people o f one.—John Calhoun , 183 8

Over 620,00 0 soldier s die d i n th e America n civi l war , a staggerin g amount comparabl e t o man y o f th e mos t gruesom e prolonge d war s in th e worl d ove r th e las t te n years . Th e numbe r o f American dea d in tha t wa r approximate s th e numbe r o f America n dea d i n al l o f America's othe r wars combined. On e woul d imagin e tha t suc h a war would interes t scholar s o f comparative politics , an d political scienc e writ large . Afte r all , America , lon g discusse d i n term s o f it s excep tionalism, underwen t problem s o f politica l developmen t simila r t o those o f othe r countries , an d th e mos t importan t solution s t o thos e problems wer e forge d i n civil war , no t throug h civi l society . Ye t fe w works plac e th e America n civi l wa r i n comparativ e perspective , i n contrast t o th e million s o f page s devote d t o America n stud y o f th e war.1 This is a small attemp t t o rectif y tha t situation . I n thi s chapte r I describe ho w th e America n civi l wa r ende d i n orde r t o gai n insigh t into th e comparativ e proble m o f civi l wa r termination. I n particula r I address the followin g component s o f the endin g o f the war : 1 ) th e decision o f the Confederat e militar y in opposition t o its civilian lead ership t o surrende r t o th e Unio n armie s o f Gran t an d Sherman ; 2) th e relationshi p betwee n Souther n motive s fo r goin g t o war , th e course o f th e war , an d th e failur e o f th e Sout h t o pursu e a strateg y 164

The End of the America n Civi l War 16 5 of partisan, guerrill a war in 1865 ; and 3) th e relationshi p betwee n Northern motive s fo r th e wa r an d th e policie s th e Nort h pursue d toward the defeate d Sout h from 186 5 t o 1877 .

Spring 1865 : Political Intransigenc e an d Military Surrende r In earl y 1865 , afte r fou r year s o f a bloody war , th e Confederat e States o f Americ a foun d itsel f nea r militar y collapse . Toward s th e end of 1864 Southern morale suffered shatterin g blows. Union General William T. Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas proved that the Union could raid with impunity the heartland of the Confederacy; attack s b y Unio n Genera l Phili p Sherida n destroye d the Confederate hol d over the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, a crucial region for the feeding o f Confederate troop s and the defense of the Confederate capita l in Richmond; finally, Abraham Lincoln's reelection crushe d an y hope s fo r Norther n acquiescence t o a peace favorable t o th e South . B y January 186 5 Confederat e general s lit erally wer e watchin g thei r armie s disappear—tha t mont h alon e a staggering eigh t percen t o f Southern soldier s deserted . In Marc h o f 1865 , Genera l Rober t E . Le e visite d Confederat e President Jefferso n Davi s t o discus s the possibilit y o f som e for m o f negotiated surrender. Lee had concluded that the end was near and preferred a negotiated surrende r o n Northern term s t o th e contin uance of the war by remnants of the Confederate armies. He believed strongly tha t if the conflic t wer e t o evolv e int o a guerrilla partisa n war, th e consequence s woul d b e wors e fo r th e Sout h tha n fo r th e Northern armies of occupation. Jefferson Davis, however, refused to consider any talk of surrender, and Lee departed, having found Davis "pertinacious in opinion and purpose" (quoted in Ballard, 1986, 27). Jefferson Davi s wrote a letter to a friend about this meeting, stating, "W e both entere d into this war at the beginning o f it; we both staked everything on the issue, and have lost all which either public or private enemies could take away" (Davis to Bragg quoted in Ballard, 1986 , 28) . On April 4 Davis proposed to his cabinet " a war of persistent guerrilla-typ e harassment " an d pledge d "neve r t o giv e up." Th e proposa l foun d littl e sympath y amon g hi s subordinates , most of whom agreed with Confederate Secretary of War John Breckinridge, who "hoped the Confederacy woul d surrender as a country and not 'disband like banditti' " (Ballard, 1986 , 38) . One pro-Union

166 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n Confederate senato r wa s convince d tha t "Davi s woul d mak e n o peace 's o lon g a s h e shal l b e supplie d wit h th e resource s o f war* " (Ballard, 1986 , 57-58). This senator suffered fro m overoptimism . In early April Union troops threatened Richmond, prompting the Con federate governmen t t o flee fo r it s ver y survival . Whe n Davi s re ceived th e confirmatio n o f Lee' s surrende r a t Appomattox , h e stil l refused t o accept th e inevitabilit y o f defeat. O n April 11 , to a query about whethe r Lee' s surrende r mean t th e en d o f th e war , Davi s replied, "B y n o means . We'l l fight i t ou t t o th e Mississipp i River " (Ballard, 1986 , 59) . At th e tim e o f Lee' s surrende r a t Appomatto x th e Confederac y still possessed tw o larg e armies : one unde r th e comman d o f Joseph Johnston i n Nort h Carolin a an d th e othe r unde r Kirb y Smit h i n th e Trans-Mississippi. Johnston had recently taken command of the army in North Carolina, "wit h a full consciousnes s on my part. . . that we could hav e n o othe r object , i n continuin g th e war , tha n t o obtai n fair term s fo r peace " (quote d i n Ballard , 1986 , 24) . O n Apri l 1 3 Johnston, Genera l P. T. Beauregard, Davis' s cabinet, an d Davis himself me t t o discus s Confederat e alternatives . Bot h Johnsto n an d Beauregard urge d negotiations , an d al l o f th e cabinet , excep t Sec retary o f State Judah P . Benjamin, concurred . Davi s refused th e ad vice of those around him, but knew that he was isolated. He approved a meeting between Johnston and William T. Sherman, believing that such talks would prove t o his underlings tha t Norther n peac e term s would hol d littl e attractio n fo r them . When Johnsto n me t Sherma n th e Unio n genera l passe d o n th e news that Abraham Lincoln had been assassinated. Sherman, without consulting hi s superiors i n the North , establishe d hi s own term s fo r Southern surrender. Sherman, who by his own words had made Georgia "howl, " preferre d a lenient peace , an d develope d term s h e be lieved woul d hav e me t Lincoln' s approval . The y include d th e rec ognition o f presen t stat e government s i n th e South , th e reestablishment o f federal court s in thos e states , an d the guarante e of constitutiona l right s an d amnest y fo r al l Southerner s wh o ha d fought o r aided the Confederat e wa r effort. Sherman' s terms, which did not even addres s the questio n o f slavery, established th e prewa r status qu o a s a settlement . The Souther n cabinet , no w i n Greensboro , Nort h Carolina , me t to discus s Sherman' s offer . Predictably , Davi s believed tha t a guer rilla war was still preferable t o a settlement tha t di d no t provide fo r

The End of the American Civi l War 16 7 Southern independence. Hi s cabinet, however , wa s adamant: in the words of Stephen Mallory, then secretary of the navy, guerrilla warfare " would b e mor e disastrou s t o ou r ow n peopl e tha n i t coul d possibly b e t o th e enemy " (quote d i n Ballard , 1986 , 104) . Afte r Breckinridge refuse d t o suppor t movin g to the Trans-Mississippi t o continue th e fight, Davis, believing that Sherman's superiors would themselves rejec t Sherman' s terms, agreed to the settlement . Davis ha d calculate d correctly ; whil e Johnsto n waite d fo r wor d from th e Confederat e government , Sherma n informe d hi m tha t his offer had been overturned in Washington, D.C. Andrew Johnson, the Union's ne w president , an d Edwin Stanton , th e Unio n secretar y o f war, ha d chastise d Sherma n fo r oversteppin g hi s authorit y b y in cluding political terms of settlement in the military surrender. Sherman was allowe d t o offe r th e condition s Gran t gav e Le e a t Appomattox—a purely militar y surrende r wit h stipulation s providin g fo r soldiers unde r arms . Johnston , instea d o f waitin g fo r a ne w repl y from Davis , too k upo n himsel f th e tas k o f surrender , an d o n April 26 abandone d th e fugitiv e Confederat e government . As late as May 2, while on the run and with only a limited cavalry guard, Davis insisted that a small force could be mustered to continue the struggle . On e soldie r wit h Davis' s entourag e wrot e later : "We looked a t each othe r i n amazement an d with feeling s aki n to trepidation, for we hardly knew how we should give expression to views diametrically oppose d t o those h e ha d uttered" (quote d i n Ballard, 1986, 122-123) . Eyewitnesse s describe d Davis' s delicat e menta l balance: Poor President, h e i s unwilling t o se e wha t al l aroun d him see . H e canno t bring himself to believe tha t after fou r years of glorious struggle w e ar e to be crushe d into the dus t of submission. Mr. Davis seemed overwhelmed with a sense of the national calamity; he at times exhibited som e impatienc e an d irascibility, bu t I never witnesse d i n a man a more entire abnegation of self, or selfish considerations. He seemed to clin g obstinatel y t o th e hop e o f continuin g th e struggl e i n orde r t o accomplish the great end of Southern independence—his whole soul was given to tha t thought , an d a n appearanc e o f slacknes s upo n th e par t o f other s seemed t o arous e hi s indignation . I think th e ver y ardo r o f hi s resolutio n prevented hi m fro m properl y estimatin g th e resource s a t hi s command , (quoted in Ballard, 1986 , 112 , 126 ) Days later , th e remainin g Confederat e armie s i n th e Trans-Mis sissippi surrendere d o n their own , an d Union patrols capture d Davi s

168 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n and shippe d hi m t o priso n i n Marylan d wher e h e awaite d hi s fat e a t the hand s o f th e victors .

Some Issues an d Question s This stor y onl y mark s th e en d o f th e first stag e o f th e terminatio n of th e America n civi l war . Th e fat e o f th e Sout h i n th e perio d afte r defeat an d the policie s pursue d by th e Nort h wil l be addresse d late r in th e chapter . Fo r now , however , thi s stor y o f th e Confederacy' s last day s is rich in nuance fo r the discussio n o f civil wa r termination . First, th e issu e o f surrende r pitte d Jefferso n Davis , wh o believe d that th e Souther n caus e wa s nationa l independenc e an d therefor e uncompromisable, agains t man y o f hi s cabine t an d militar y leader s who wer e eithe r unwillin g t o bea r th e cost s o f guerrill a wa r t o achieve suc h independenc e o r define d th e conflic t differentl y tha n Davis an d coul d se e tha t som e o f thei r concern s coul d b e me t b y lenient term s fro m th e North . Second , i t wa s Davis' s generals—an d not Davi s o r his cabinet—wh o surrendered . Third , Davis' s desir e t o fight a protracted wa r prompted littl e o r no elite o r popular suppor t at th e time . This stor y raise s a number o f questions . First , wh y di d som e par ticipants o n th e Souther n sid e se e unconditiona l surrende r a s un acceptable? Tha t is , wh y di d Jefferso n Davis , eve n afte r obviou s military defeat , refus e t o surrender ? Why di d he vie w th e draconia n costs of continuin g th e wa r as preferable t o surrender ? Second , ho w did thos e Southerner s wh o wer e willin g t o surrende r defin e th e is sues a t stake , s o a s t o allo w the m t o surrender ? Third , whe n som e of th e Souther n leadershi p desire d t o fight a guerrilla partisa n war , why di d th e wil l o f th e peopl e continu e t o crumble ? According t o Beringe r e t al . (1986) , answer s t o thes e question s are to be found in comparison to other wars. Drawing on the exampl e of Paraguay's war against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay from 1 8 6 5 1871, whe n Paragua y los t ove r fifty percen t o f it s populatio n an d eighty percen t o f it s fighting men , the y argu e tha t ha d th e Sout h been convince d o f the righteousnes s o f its cause, i t could have mad e itself unconquerable t o the North. By continuing the war by differen t means, th e Sout h coul d hav e wo n it s independenc e agains t a n ov erstretched Norther n occupyin g force . This failur e o f th e Sout h t o fight a protracted , guerrill a wa r re sulted fro m a lack o f agreement abou t wh y i t went t o war in the first

The En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r 16 9 place, and the fact that the coalition that comprised the Confederac y contained laten t split s which becam e manifes t whe n th e cost s o f th e war becam e prohibitive. 2 I n th e word s o f Beringe r e t al. : the Confederates lacke d a feeling o f oneness, that almost mystical sens e of nationhood. They lacked a consensus on why they fought or what they stood for. Th e Confederat e natio n wa s create d o n paper , no t i n th e heart s an d minds o f it s would-b e citizens . Thes e difference s reflecte d a national wil l that did not equa l the demand s placed upon it. (Beringe r e t al. , 1986 , 64 ) The natura l counterpar t t o thi s interpretation hold s tha t althoug h the Norther n coalitio n als o ha d difference s abou t th e goal s o f th e war, suc h difference s wane d i n importanc e a s the Norther n people , leaders, and armies came to understand that, in the words of Lincoln, this was "a people's contest" : a total war that demanded tremendou s sacrifice t o achiev e a non-negotiabl e principle—i n thi s case , "on e nation indivisible." To paraphrase Philli p Paludan, the North , unlik e the South , learne d "wha t th e wa r meant " (Paludan , 1989 , 58) . Th e incredible cost s o f th e conflic t tende d t o galvaniz e Norther n com mitment whil e weakenin g tha t o f th e South . James McPherson (1988 ) argue s tha t a crucial par t of this proces s of defining th e stakes in the struggle and the willingness o f the Nort h to fight a tota l wa r wa s a n elemen t o f "contingency. " Tha t is , a t crucial time s i n th e cours e o f th e wa r event s conspire d t o harde n Northern determinatio n an d strik e a t th e Souther n wil l t o fight. I n McPherson's interpretatio n th e preexistin g sens e o f nationalis m o n both side s doe s no t matte r s o muc h a s ho w th e wa r affecte d tha t sense o f nationalism .

Ante-Bellum America : Ground s fo r Conflic t an d Extent o f Polarit y The debat e betwee n McPherso n an d Beringer e t al . i s significant fo r what th e argument s hol d i n common . The y agre e tha t th e South' s loss of the wa r was not du e t o the North' s overwhelmin g capabilitie s and resources . The y agre e tha t man y o n bot h side s lacke d th e wil l to fight suc h a war. Moreover , the y agre e tha t factiona l difference s existed o n both side s o f the war . These similaritie s between th e tw o competing interpretation s sugges t a furthe r puzzle . I f s o man y o n both sides lacked the will to fight the war , and there existe d factiona l differences o n bot h side s concernin g th e motivation s fo r war , ho w

170 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n and wh y di d th e war , a s costl y a s i t was , com e abou t i n th e firs t place? Most argument s o n th e origin s o f the wa r ca n b e reduce d t o th e question o f whethe r th e wa r wa s prompted b y th e slaver y issu e o r whether tha t issu e wa s symboli c o f a deepe r political , economic , cultural, an d ideologica l conflict . Thi s debat e relate s t o th e funda mental question of ante-bellum polarity and the extent of difference s between Nort h an d South . I woul d lik e t o sugges t tha t whil e im portant difference s existe d betwee n th e sections , ultimatel y ther e were importan t similarities—similaritie s tha t ha d a grea t effec t o n the cours e o f the wa r an d it s outcome . Many of the older scholarl y (an d often partisan ) treatment s o f the war portra y a n ante-bellu m Sout h tha t possesse d a fundamentall y separate (a s opposed t o distinct) cultura l identit y roote d i n politica l and economi c vision s incompatibl e wit h thos e o f th e North . The y argue tha t th e civi l wa r wa s i n essenc e fough t betwee n differen t nationalities. Beringe r e t al . (1986 ) disput e this : the Sout h wa s no t a separat e natio n an d ha d fe w o f th e attribute s o f imagine d com munity associate d wit h nationalism . O n thi s poin t the y elaborat e upon a line o f argument develope d b y Davi d Potter . A s Potter ele gantly argues , the thesi s o f competing nationalism s founder s o n th e shoals o f commo n sense . I f thes e region s ha d bee n s o hostil e an d incompatible, ho w the n d o w e accoun t fo r th e sixt y year s o f co existence tha t precede d th e conflic t an d th e relativel y shor t perio d of hostility between region s afte r th e conflict ? A s he points out, fo r every belief an d interest tha t woul d suggest a fundamentally hostil e separation, on e can easily point to beliefs tha t al l participants in th e war held in common, as well as cross-cutting economic interests that joined som e Northerner s an d Southerner s (Potter , 1968 , 98-100) . To explai n a n antagonis m whic h spran g u p suddenly , an d die d dow n sud denly, th e historia n doe s no t nee d t o discover , an d canno t effectivel y use , a factor which has been constant over a long period, as the cultural differenc e between th e Nort h an d South ha s been. H e need s t o identify a factor whic h can caus e bitte r disagreemen t eve n amon g a people wh o hav e muc h basi c homogeneity. N o factor , I woul d suggest , wil l mee t thi s nee d bette r tha n the feeling , widesprea d i n th e 1850 s i n th e South , tha t th e South s vita l interests wer e bein g jeopardized, an d that the regio n wa s being expose d t o the danger s o f a slave insurrection , a s a result o f th e hostilit y o f antislaver y men i n the North . Applie d t o th e sectiona l crisis , suc h a view o f the source s of frictio n woul d mak e possibl e th e explanatio n o f th e Civi l War , withou t

The En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r 17 1 making impossibl e th e explanatio n o f th e rapi d retur n t o unio n afte r th e war. No cultural explanatio n will d o this. (Potter , 1968 , 103 ) McPherson als o pay s homag e t o Potte r b y developin g a n expla nation o f th e civi l wa r tha t stresse s th e developmen t o f a factio n within th e North , th e Ne w Englan d abolitionists , tha t desire d th e revolutionary transformatio n o f the South's society, polity, and economy. Drawing on the work of Arno Mayer (1971), McPherso n assert s that the Sout h seceded t o preempt thi s revolution, an d therefore ha s much i n commo n wit h th e counter-revolutionar y movement s tha t had swep t throug h Europ e i n th e lat e 1840s . The historica l narrative s o f McPherso n (1982 ; 1988) , Potte r (1968; 1976) , an d Donal d (1978 ) tacitl y argu e tha t th e civi l wa r resulted fro m th e inabilit y o f America n politica l institution s t o re solve conflic t a s th e country' s societ y changed . Thes e scholar s por tray the road toward civil war as one of failed compromise, bargainin g processes o f incomplet e informatio n abou t intentions , radica l fac tions i n th e Nort h an d Sout h tha t eac h sid e though t o f a s repre sentative o f the othe r side , misperception amon g th e actors , an d th e gradual los s o f commitmen t t o negotiate d settlemen t an d constitu tional union . The institution s fo r resolvin g conflic t i n th e Unite d State s i n th e 1800s ca n be differentiate d int o those governin g competitio n withi n the natio n a s a whole an d those bounding competitio n ove r the slav ery issue . Th e former , o f course , consiste d o f th e Constitutio n an d the American political part y system: both were suppose d to functio n to protec t sectiona l interest s withou t plungin g th e natio n int o sec tional conflict . O n the othe r hand , th e institution s governin g slaver y in Americ a comprise d a se t o f rules , norms , an d expectation s pro duced b y historica l compromise s ove r a sixty-yea r period . Thes e compromises include d the prohibition o f the African slav e trade, th e secure recognitio n o f th e South' s righ t t o slavery , an d th e taci t ac knowledgement tha t th e Nort h woul d no t compl y wit h th e fugitiv e slave claus e o f th e Constitutio n bu t tha t th e claus e woul d no t b e enforced s o as to avoid civil disobedience. Th e single most importan t inviolate rul e wa s th e 3 6 - 3 0 lin e establishe d i n th e Missour i Com promise o f 182 0 tha t would determin e whethe r ne w territor y woul d be admitte d t o th e Unio n a s fre e o r slav e states . Potter an d McPherso n begi n thei r analysi s o f th e cause s o f th e civil wa r wit h th e Unite d States' s wa r wit h Mexic o i n 1848. 3 B y opening up new lands for annexation, the Mexican War forced North -

172 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n ern an d Souther n politician s t o confron t ane w th e slaver y question , which ha d bee n dorman t fo r almos t thirt y year s afte r th e Missour i Compromise o f 1820 . The spoil s o f th e Mexica n War—ne w territorie s i n Californi a an d New Mexico—force d th e slavery issue back on to the national agenda . The Compromis e o f 185 0 crafte d a series o f compromis e measure s that permitte d Californi a t o ente r th e Unio n a s a free state . Bu t on e of thes e measure s require d th e federa l governmen t t o enforc e th e Fugitive Slav e Act and to return slaves who had escaped to the Nort h back to their Southern owners. In states such as Massachusetts, wher e for al l intent s an d purpose s th e Ac t ha d lai n dorman t fo r years , fed eral authorities tried to enforce the Act. Abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garriso n revile d th e Unite d State s Constitutio n a s a pact wit h the devil , asserte d that there wa s a higher law than the Constitution , and organize d t o preven t federa l enforcement . This prove d t o b e th e first abandonmen t o f constitutiona l la w a s the compromis e tha t mad e possibl e a unio n o f states . Th e decisio n of Northern radical s to disobey an d circumvent th e law was mirrored by Souther n radicals , a s ''filibustered " se t sai l t o th e Caribbea n i n the hop e o f annexin g Cuba , Nicaragua , an d othe r point s sout h a s new slav e state s fo r th e Union . The Compromis e o f 185 0 prompte d Sout h Carolinian s fo r th e second time—183 2 an d th e Nullificatio n Crisi s bein g th e first—to threaten secessio n fro m the Union. Fo r the secon d time othe r Southerners ha d littl e spiri t fo r secessio n an d faile d t o suppor t th e Sout h Carolinians. Bu t if these othe r Southerners di d not believe th e Com promise o f 185 0 wa s worth leavin g th e Union for , neithe r wer e the y satisfied wit h th e half-measure s take n t o kee p th e Unio n a s one . I n the word s o f Davi d Potter , th e Compromis e o f 185 0 shoul d mor e accurately be called the armistice of 185 0 (Potter , 1976) . The decad e of th e 1850 s woul d se e repeate d battle s ove r th e slaver y issue , a civil wa r i n th e ne w stat e o f Kansa s tha t wa s a preview o f the large r war to come , an d a gradual escalatio n o f rhetoric , hostility , an d fea r about th e intention s o f Norther n an d Souther n leaders . I t mus t b e emphasized, however, that the decade of the 1850 s was also a decade of searchin g fo r politica l solution s t o th e proble m o f slaver y an d it s extension—evidence tha t secession wa s pursued only after other possibilities ha d bee n exhausted . The statu s o f ne w prospectiv e state s i n th e 1850 s constantl y threatened th e delicat e equilibriu m betwee n Nort h an d South , an d

The En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r 17 3 led t o majo r repudiation s o f th e large r institutiona l arrangement s concerning slavery . The first major repudiation occurre d in the writ ing o f th e Kansas-Nebrask a Ac t i n 185 4 whe n Stephe n Dougla s de liberately junked the key foca l poin t o f compromise, th e 3 6 - 3 0 pro vision o f th e Compromis e o f 1820 : by permitting Southerners to maneuver him into outright repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Douglas , a s many Northerner s believed, cam e clos e t o tampering with the Constitution. O f course, the Missour i Compromise was not part of the written Constitution, but it was an agreement that had almost constitutional status, having been observed loyally for more than three decades and having acquired, a s Douglas himself declared in 1849 , respec t a s a "sacre d thing whic h n o ruthless han d would eve r be reckles s enoug h t o disturb." (Donald, 1978 , 61 ) The Kansas-Nebrask a Ac t institute d th e rul e o f "popula r sover eignty" fo r determinin g whethe r a territory woul d ente r th e Unio n as a fre e o r slav e stat e an d se t of f a rush toward s Kansas . Norther n abolitionists, Missourians , an d Southerner s poure d int o Kansa s t o provide vote s fo r th e Kansa s the y desired . Althoug h th e number s favored a fre e state , Southerner s turne d t o violenc e an d cras s ma nipulation o f law s to ensur e tha t Kansa s woul d ente r th e Unio n a s a slave state . The resul t wa s "Bleedin g Kansas" : a civil war to preced e the large r conflagratio n betwee n th e states . What ha d bee n a trickle o f defectio n fro m th e institutiona l com promise upholdin g th e Unio n becam e a veritable flood: i n strategi c terms, a s eac h sid e witnesse d th e other' s abandonmen t o f th e rule s of bounded competition, the other defected as well. The final episode that destroye d th e regim e governin g slaver y cam e i n 185 7 wit h th e Dred Scott decision and the assertion by a Southern-dominated cour t that Congress ha d no power t o regulate slaver y i n the territorie s an d that slaver y i n th e Norther n state s wa s conceivable : slaveholder s could spen d tim e i n thos e state s wit h thei r slaves , wh o b y forc e o f law woul d remai n slaves . The regim e tha t regulate d slaver y i n th e Unite d State s ha d col lapsed wit h n o immediat e prospec t o f replacement . Wha t i s more , however, th e collaps e ha d als o irreparabl y damage d th e large r re gime tha t mediate d politica l lif e i n th e countr y a s a whole . Th e Constitution wa s defile d a s a bargain wit h th e devi l an d see n t o b e a lesser law than that of God; the Supreme Cour t was seen as a biased tool fo r th e Sout h t o impos e it s wil l o n th e North ; politica l partie s that had been nationa l u p until 185 4 wer e now sectiona l parties ; and

174 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n violence—justified b y a highe r end—ha d becom e a n appropriat e means t o forc e change . McPherson trace s th e disappearanc e o f nationa l politica l partie s directly t o th e Kansas-Nebrask a Act . I n thei r wak e ros e th e Repub lican party with its stated ideology o f "free men , free labor , and fre e soil," whic h Southerner s perceive d a s a direct threa t t o thei r inter ests. McPherso n argue s tha t man y i n th e Sout h believe d tha t th e party o f Lincol n desire d t o transfor m th e America n polity , society , and econom y fundamentall y an d tha t suc h a transformatio n de manded violen t opposition . Thi s was not entirel y misperception : vo cal, visibl e Northerners , callin g fo r jus t suc h a revolutionar y trans formation, playe d a n activ e rol e i n th e foundin g o f th e Republica n party. Th e Souther n erro r wa s t o mistak e th e rhetori c o f th e fe w a s representative o f the motive s o f the whole : Lincol n an d many i n hi s party wer e mor e tha n willin g t o liv e wit h th e continuatio n an d protection o f Souther n slavery . This perceptio n o f th e Republica n part y a s a revolutionary part y helps t o explai n on e o f th e paradoxe s o f th e America n civi l war : i n 1861 bot h side s wen t t o wa r professin g conservative , counterrevo lutionary aims . Th e Confederac y believe d tha t i t represente d th e essence o f wha t th e foundin g father s ha d intende d Americ a t o be , and argue d tha t i t wa s fighting t o preserv e Americ a fro m th e revo lutionary transformationa l zea l o f Northern abolitionist s an d Republicans. Lincol n an d mos t Northerners , o n th e othe r hand , sa w thei r war aims in much th e sam e way : a conservative respons e t o sav e th e threatened Union . The reasons that individuals on both sides fought i n and supporte d the civi l wa r var y an d canno t b e subsume d unde r on e issue . Th e Union an d th e Confederac y shoul d b e see n a s coalition s o f faction s with differen t motivation s fo r fighting. I n the Confederac y on e mus t distinguish betwee n th e die-har d "fire-breathing " secessionist s o f the seve n state s tha t secede d first an d th e leader s o f th e remainin g states (Arkansas , Nort h Carolina , Virginia , an d Tennessee ) tha t joined th e Confederac y afte r th e attack o n For t Sumter . On e mus t also distinguis h betwee n th e lande d uppe r classe s o f th e Sout h an d the yeoma n farmer . Whil e bot h poo r an d wealth y white s sa w gain s from slavery , suc h gain s accrue d disproportionatel y t o th e latter , a fact tha t place d limit s o n th e willingnes s o f th e forme r t o bea r th e burdens o f th e impendin g war . For th e die-har d secessionist s o f th e Sout h th e centra l issu e a t stake i n 186 1 wa s slavery , i n particula r whethe r th e peculia r insti -

The En d of the American Civi l War 17 5 tution woul d be afforde d th e protectio n require d fo r i t t o survive . Steven Channing's study of the politics of secession in South Carolina (1974) argue s convincingl y tha t secessio n wa s the produc t o f fear : a fear o f a future withou t slaver y o r a future wher e slaver y wa s an institution without protection. Havin g built a system based on dominance an d submission , violenc e an d cruelty , Southerner s feare d a domestic uprising of the victims of the system and also believed that the federal government would do little to protect slavery against the incitements o f Norther n abolitionist s wh o woul d provok e suc h a n uprising.4 Suc h fear s seeme d reasonabl e give n John Brown's insurrection a t Harper' s Ferr y i n 186 0 an d th e near-canonization , a s McPherson call s it, o f Brown by man y Northerners.

Why the Sout h Lost th e War Upon taking the office o f president o f the Confederacy, Davi s knew that "Southern nationalism at the beginning of 1861 was still a fragile and weak organism " (Escott , 1978 , 32) . Unlik e othe r Southerner s who had supported secession as a bargaining ploy to gain concessions from the North and expected either no war or a short war to come, Davis expected " a long and bloody" war. He knew that if the South was to triumph in such a struggle, it had to be unified in its purpose, and that hi s job a s president o f the Confederac y wa s to define tha t purpose. Davis also knew that the Southern states were a precarious, unstable coalition and that many within the coalition would not fight such a bloody contest for slavery. He therefore looke d to define th e Southern cause without recours e t o slavery, an d to do so, "the first step i n developin g Confederat e nationalis m wa s t o establis h inde pendence a s the South' s primary goal " (Escott, 1978 , 38) . Herein resided one of the first and fundamental contradiction s of the Confederat e wa r effort: th e meanin g o f independence wa s different fo r ruler and ruled. Fo r Davis, independence wa s tied to nationhood—a concept tied to the American Revolution: the South was fighting fo r a separate nation. Such a motive cannot be compromised: one is either a separate independent natio n or one is not. Indepen dence, i n th e discours e o f mos t Southerners , however , wa s no t an independence o f nation . Rather , independenc e i n th e ideolog y o f the America n politica l cultur e o f th e da y harkene d t o notion s o f individual rights and, by extension, to the states as the protectors of those rights . Individua l independenc e i s a matte r o f degree s an d

176 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n involves variou s trade-offs . Nationa l independenc e i s a n either/o r matter; eithe r ther e woul d exis t a Confederat e State s o f America o r there woul d not . Davis wa s a t a distinc t disadvantag e i n attemptin g t o inculcat e a feeling o f Confederat e nationalism . Fo r ove r sixt y year s th e Unite d States o f Americ a ha d create d a commo n history , commo n mythol ogy, an d commo n traditions . Davi s coul d no t appea l t o a commo n historical Souther n identity , an d instea d identifie d th e Souther n cause a s a conservativ e America n one—th e upholdin g o f th e Amer ican Revolutio n agains t a revolutio n bein g mad e i n th e North : At a time when many Southerners wer e reluctan t t o leave the Union, Davis identified Confederat e goal s wit h th e histor y an d tradition s o f th e Unite d States. Th e ke y t o th e effectivenes s o f hi s ideolog y wa s it s clai m tha t th e Confederacy wa s th e tru e embodimen t o f America n democracy . . . . Re peatedly h e sounded hi s main theme: that th e new Southern natio n was the true hei r o f th e foundin g father s an d existe d t o continu e th e wor k whic h they ha d begun . A s a supplement t o this , h e trie d t o demonstrat e tha t th e United State s ha d falle n awa y fro m it s heritag e an d becom e a lan d o f fa naticism, executiv e usurpations , an d tyranny . (Escott , 1978 , 170 ) Reid Mitchel l i n hi s stud y o f civi l wa r combatant s illustrate s th e difficulties o f fighting fo r Souther n independenc e whil e claimin g th e mantle o f America n nationa l legitimacy : The flag presentations, the patriotic speeches, the parades all celebrated th e war, an d they wer e al l elements o f a political culture commo n t o the Nort h and th e South . The most important referenc e poin t fo r thi s political cultur e was the American Revolution. Both the Union and Confederate armies kept the Revolution before thei r eye s i n systemati c fashion , b y celebratin g it s pas t event s a t appropriate times . Soldiers were reminde d o f their Revolutionary heritage , the herois m an d purity o f their forefathers , an d thei r ow n dut y t o emulat e them. Bot h armie s customarily observe d Washington' s Birthday , whe n th e Farewell Addres s wa s sometime s rea d alou d t o th e assemble d troops . Bu t the most significan t holida y on both side s seems to have been th e Fourth of July. . . . In general. . . Confederate symbol s were pathetically reminiscen t of the old American symbols , just a s the Confederat e constitutio n copie d th e Unite d States constitution, an d a s Confederate ideolog y wa s a parody o f American ideology. I t i s quite understandabl e tha t Confederates , wit h thei r commo n American heritage , shoul d continu e t o us e the ol d symbols , but th e powe r

The End of the America n Civi l War 17 7 of borrowed symbols to compel loyalt y is severely limited . However , the Confederates had no choice: they had to use American symbols because they regarded themselves as the true Americans. And historically, their claim to American symbols was hard to dispute . . . (Mitchell, 1988 , 20-22 ) The Sout h ha d enormou s advantage s i n term s o f siz e an d geog raphy that would have made it difficul t t o subdu e i f the Nort h had had to occup y it . Th e war , however , wa s fough t wit h hug e armie s in pitched battles, an d there was the expectatio n o n both sides that one overwhelmin g victor y b y eithe r sid e coul d determin e th e war. Since the war was fought in such a fashion, the morale of both sides hung in the balance o f each military battle. I t was the North , how ever, tha t first understood th e tota l natur e o f th e war , an d tha t a protracted conventiona l wa r effor t wa s necessar y t o prevail . Th e South, o n th e othe r hand , entere d th e wa r believing tha t i t woul d be a short one, and its confidence wa s bolstered by easy victories in the first battles of 1861 . Southern hope s als o rested o n foreign recognitio n an d aid. Confederate leader s believed tha t cotton— a commodity neede d b y th e mills o f England—woul d provid e necessar y leverag e o n Britai n t o gain its support. Bu t Britain was only one among five major powers in Europe, an d had as much a t stak e economicall y wit h th e Nort h as it did with the South. Three kinds of pressures prevented Britain from recognitio n o f the South . First , Britis h society wa s divided o n the question of recognition: while much of the upper classes desired to se e America' s democrati c experimen t com e crashin g down , th e working classes tended to sympathize with Northern goal s and purposes. I n essence th e Britis h working clas s sa w the Unio n a s a progressive force attempting to eliminate the remnants of aristocracy in the South . Second , th e wa r di d no t provid e a straightforward eco nomic sanction: while Britain had been dependent o n Southern cotton, the effect s o f a shortage o f the materia l were not felt unti l late 1862. Moreover , the British had much trade with the industrialize d North, and imported wheat and grains from its farmers. Third, Britain had to calculate the effects o f its recognition upon its relations with its Europea n rivals . Britis h fea r o f involvemen t i n a war wit h th e Union led to a policy of non-involvement unti l the Confederacy ha d established itself as a de facto nation and had militarily defeated th e Union. It is noteworthy, here , that British recognition and assistance might hav e brough t suc h a result, an d held ou t hop e fo r th e Con federacy throughout much of 1862 when the war was unquestionably

178 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n favoring th e South . I t wa s no t unti l th e battl e o f Antieta m i n lat e 1862 tha t Britai n decide d t o put th e recognitio n issu e aside , a move that wa s reinforce d b y Lincoln' s Emancipatio n Proclamation . The cours e o f th e wa r favore d th e Sout h i n th e first tw o years . Military victorie s an d possibl e foreig n recognitio n provide d muc h optimism t o th e Souther n cause . Wha t i s striking , however , i s ho w in a relatively shor t time, the Southern war-fightin g moral e was shattered. Afte r victorie s i n the wes t an d in Maryland an d Pennsylvania , the Sout h cam e face-to-fac e wit h th e pric e o f "independence. " Doubt aros e abou t whethe r tha t pric e wa s wort h it , an d wha t th e war wa s about . Beringer e t al . (1986 ) argu e tha t i t wa s precisel y th e lack o f sep arate identity—the foundatio n o f nationalism—that spelle d doo m fo r the Souther n wa r effort . An d i f w e accep t th e theorist s o f cultura l identity wh o argu e tha t wa r agains t a mutually define d enem y ofte n strengthens or creates the mystical feeling o f "imagined community " (Coser, 1964 ; Anderson , 1983) , th e lac k o f suc h a feelin g o n th e part o f th e Sout h i s eve n mor e striking . This vie w help s t o explai n Jefferso n Davis' s refusa l t o surrende r and the preferenc e o f mos t Southerner s fo r reunio n wit h th e Nort h to a protracted wa r for Souther n independence . Wha t doe s this sug gest fo r understandin g ho w civi l war s end ? I woul d lik e t o pu t for ward two explanations of Davis's behavior and what they might mean for wa r termination . First , on e coul d loo k t o wha t Davi s assume d the consequence s o f Northern victor y t o be. I t is possible tha t Davi s truly believed that a Northern victory would end in utter subjugatio n of th e South , o r i n hi s words , "slavery. " Th e cost s o f defea t migh t be s o draconia n tha t th e stake s wer e nothin g les s than survival . Sec ond, on e coul d posi t tha t Davis' s preference s wer e non-compromis able, o r lexicographic; tha t is , before Davi s woul d be willin g t o con sider the utility of various outcomes, hi s one overriding preference Southern nationa l independence—ha d t o b e met. 5 Perhaps a greater mystery tha n Southern secession wa s the North ern resistance to Southern assertions of independence. Firs t and foremost, althoug h th e slaver y issu e prompte d th e South' s driv e fo r au tonomy, mos t Northerner s di d no t fight t o eliminat e slavery . Abolitionists were a decided minority within the North, many Northerners wer e a s prejudice d a s thei r Souther n counterpart s toward s blacks, an d i t "remain s unclea r ho w th e North , wit h al l it s Negro phobia, coul d eventuall y consen t t o th e sudde n liberatio n o f fou r

The En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r 17 9 million slave s o n America n soil , and , shortl y thereafter , t o thei r en franchisement* ' (Fredrickson , 1981 , 151) . Lincoln primaril y wen t t o wa r t o preserv e th e Union , an d hi s actions wer e guide d b y politica l expedienc e i n orde r t o kee p th e Northern coalitio n together . A s Eri c Fone r observes , Lincoln full y appreciated , a s he would observe i n his second inaugura l address, that slavery was "somehow" the cause of the war. But he also understood the vital importance o f keeping the border slave state s in the Union, generating support among the broadest constituency in the North, and weakening the Confederac y b y holding ou t t o irresolut e Southerner s th e possi bility tha t the y coul d retur n t o th e Unio n wit h thei r property , includin g slaves, intact. I n 186 1 th e restoratio n o f the Union , not emancipation, was the cause that generated the widest support for the war effort. (Foner , 1988, 4) To furthe r understan d tha t abolitio n o f slaver y wa s no t th e primar y motivation o f Northerners i n 1861 , on e nee d onl y poin t t o the Crit r tendon-Johnson Resolution s o f Congress i n July 1861 , which limite d "the wa r t o conservativ e goals : th e preservatio n o f th e Unio n an d the restoratio n o f the rul e o f law ante-Sumner " (Paludan , 1989 , 8 7 88). The demand s o f fighting th e wa r effectivel y prompte d Lincol n (with muc h reluctance ) t o embar k o n emancipation—th e first ste p for thos e radical s i n th e Nort h wh o wante d a revolutionar y trans formation o f the South . Eve n emancipatio n wa s a compromise, how ever. I t wa s onl y bindin g o n Souther n slav e state s no t unde r Unio n control—a move by Lincoln to minimize hostility among those border slave state s tha t ha d staye d i n th e Union : Missouri , Kentucky , Del aware, an d Maryland . Lincoln face d a dilemma tha t woul d confron t th e Nort h through out th e wa r an d durin g reconstruction . O n th e on e hand , Lincol n came t o believ e tha t th e mean s an d method s o f wa r woul d hav e t o become total . H e full y supporte d Gran t an d Sherman wh o sough t t o insure tha t th e Sout h woul d b e s o militaril y defeate d tha t i t woul d never agai n contemplat e secession . O n th e othe r hand , Lincol n di d not believ e i n the tota l wa r goal s o f revolutionar y transformatio n o f the South' s institutions . H e believed , a s di d Sherman , i n a "lenien t peace." The Nort h unifie d behin d th e goa l o f militarily crushin g th e South an d it s spiri t o f rebellion . Bu t onc e havin g accomplishe d tha t goal, sever e difference s existe d whethe r t o build a new Sout h base d on the remaining vestiges of the past or based on new political, social , and economi c classe s an d arrangements .

180 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n

Reconstruction Reconstruction, o r th e policie s t o pursu e toward s thos e region s o f the Sout h that were conquered , spli t the Northern coalitio n that ha d successfully fough t th e war . A s lon g a s th e wa r wa s bein g fought , the coalitio n betwee n Norther n radicals , moderates , an d conserva tives remaine d intact . As Eri c Fone r observes , mos t o f th e earl y reconstructio n policie s were pursue d ou t o f militar y necessit y o r ou t o f politica l consider ations toward s endin g th e wa r a s quickly a s possible. Emancipation , the polic y tha t destroye d th e South' s peculia r institution , wa s itsel f a produc t o f strategi c considerations : "I t i s probabl y mos t accurat e to sa y tha t Lincoln , neithe r a n egalitaria n i n a moder n sens e no r a man paralyzed , lik e s o man y o f hi s contemporaries , b y racia l fear s and prejudices , di d no t approac h an y policy , eve n emancipation , primarily i n term s o f it s impac t upo n blacks ; fo r hi m winnin g th e war alway s remaine d paramount' * (Foner , 1988 , 6) . Lincoln sa w reconstructio n a s a means t o en d th e wa r a s quickl y as possible and as early as 1863 developed a policy which he believe d would signa l lenienc y t o th e Sout h an d therefor e induc e thei r sur render. Hi s pla n calle d fo r pardon s o f al l Confederate s willin g t o take a n oat h o f loyalt y t o th e Unio n an d an d th e readmittanc e o f reconstructed stat e government s int o th e Unio n whe n te n percen t of a state's populatio n vote d fo r reconstruction . Th e pla n calle d fo r the protectio n o f Souther n property , wit h th e exceptio n o f slaves , who wer e t o remai n emancipated . Lincoln's plan won few adherent s in either the North or the South. Within th e Unio n Republica n radical s believed tha t th e pla n di d no t go fa r enough . Thes e individuals , lik e Thaddeu s Stevens , believe d that nothin g shor t o f a political, economic , an d social transformatio n should be th e pric e o f Southern defeat . Suc h a transformation coul d only be brought about by vanquishing the planter class that prompted the rebellion : The whol e fabric o f Souther n societ y mus t b e change d an d i t ca n neve r b e done i f this opportunit y i s lost . Th e Souther n state s hav e bee n despotisms , not government s o f th e people . I t is impossibl e tha t an y practica l equalit y of rights ca n exis t wher e a few thousan d me n monopoliz e th e whol e lande d property. . . . I f th e Sout h i s eve r t o b e mad e a saf e republi c le t he r land s be cultivated by the toil of the owners or the free labor of intelligent citizens . This mus t b e don e eve n thoug h i t driv e he r nobilit y int o exile . I f the y go , all th e better . (Steven s quote d i n Sewell , 1988 , 189 )

The End of the American Civi l War 18 1 On the other hand, many Northern Democrats felt that Lincoln's refusal t o reestablis h slaver y prove d tha t h e ha d use d th e wa r t o expand its aims beyond those for which the Union originally fought . The Democratic party' s slogan durin g this period was , 'Th e Unio n as it was, the Constitutio n a s it is, the Negroe s wher e the y are. " Nor did Lincoln's policy achiev e its intended effect i n the South. Beringer e t al . (1986 ) argu e tha t Lincoln' s term s actuall y stiffene d Southern resistanc e a t that time because o f the impression tha t the ten percen t rul e wa s despoti c an d prove d Norther n inten t t o ru n roughshod over the people of the South. (O f course, given Jefferso n Davis's preferences fo r independence, i t is not clea r that an y more lenient term s would have gained Souther n acceptance. ) Lincoln wa s a firm believer i n reconciliatio n an d his goal s wer e essentially conservativ e (Fehrenbacher , 1987 , 117) . Reconciliatio n is necessaril y a polic y o f compromise , entirel y antithetica l t o th e fulfillment o f revolution. The seeds of conflict within the North over the course of reconstruction were present even before Andrew Johnson took ove r the presidency . Johnson's policies toward s the Sout h after 186 5 wer e essentiall y those o f Lincoln's . Johnso n offere d a lenient amnest y progra m fo r Southerners wh o ha d been involve d i n th e wa r effort , an d emphasized tha t i t wa s th e tas k o f th e defeate d stat e government s t o re construct themselves . Congress , wher e a coalitio n o f radica l an d moderate Republican s ruled , fel t tha t i t wa s th e responsibilit y o f Congress to set the terms of reconstruction. The radicals in Congress were assiste d in this battle wit h Johnson whe n man y o f the forme r Confederate state s electe d unrepentan t leader s wh o ha d activel y supported secessio n i n the first place. Publi c opinio n i n the Nort h was easily se t i n motion agains t Johnson a s violence agains t North erners and freedmen in the South became known. In this battle Congress held the trump card, as it could decide whether or not to seat those Southerners who were elected to office durin g self-reconstruction. Johnson's self-reconstructio n pla n faile d becaus e o f th e lac k o f repentance o n the part of those Southerner s who rallied to his plan and the widespread feeling among Northerners that 350,000 death s deserved som e sho w of submission o n the part of the South . More over, the states treated freedmen as second-class citizens, who, while no longe r slaves , ha d n o protectio n o r right s unde r th e law . Law s were immediately passed that would keep slavery in everything but name.

182 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n As oppositio n t o Johnson's pla n grew , Congressiona l Republican s had an alternative in hand. Northern Republicans saw reconstructio n as a n opportunit y fo r forgin g a coalitio n wit h th e freedme n an d former Souther n Whigs , thu s establishin g th e Republica n part y a s a national party . T o d o s o woul d requir e electora l suffrag e fo r th e freedmen, an d temporary restriction s agains t forme r Souther n lead ers from participating in state politics. Congress, over Johnson's inep t opposition, soo n passe d a constitutiona l amendmen t tha t gav e th e freedmen th e vote, a change that would have been unthinkabl e thre e years previously . Republican s assume d tha t th e politica l spher e would b e th e ke y t o th e successfu l integratio n o f th e blac k int o society. N o measure s wer e take n t o provid e th e ex-slave s wit h financial assistanc e an d land ; n o economi c integratio n int o societ y paralleled thei r politica l integratio n int o society . The threa t o f blac k suffrag e t o whit e supremac y i n th e Sout h served t o galvaniz e whit e resistanc e t o reconstructio n measures : The acceptance o f emancipation, o f course, did not commit Southerners to a policy of racial equality. Rather, they assumed that the free Negroes would be an inferior caste, exposed to legal discrimination, denied political rights, and subjected t o social segregation . The y ha d every reason to assume this, because these, by and large, were the policies of most of the Northern states toward their free Negro populations, and because the racial attitudes of the great majorit y o f Northerner s wer e no t muc h differen t fro m thei r own . White Southerner s were understandabl y shocked , therefore , whe n Radical Republicans, durin g th e Reconstructio n years , trie d t o impos e a differen t relationship between the races in the South—to give Negroes legal equality, political rights , and , her e an d there eve n socia l equality . . . . No w fo r th e first tim e whit e Southerner s organize d a powerful partisa n movemen t an d resisted Republican race policy even more fiercely than the civil population had ever resisted the invading Union armies during the war. (Stampp, 1980, 268) The rise of the Ku Klux Klan and other similar organizations durin g radical reconstructio n shoul d b e see n a s th e partisa n warfar e tha t had bee n missin g a t th e war' s end . Indeed , th e numbe r o f death s during some of the years after Appomattox, to the best of my reading, were sufficient t o qualify a s civil war under Small and Singer's criteria (1982). For example, McPherson states that in 1868 alon e there wer e 200 politica l murder s i n Arkansas, a substantial numbe r i n Georgia , and 1,00 0 politica l death s i n Louisian a (McPherson , 1982 , 544) . Obviously thes e figures suffe r fro m imprecision , bu t sugges t tha t i n a fundamenta l sens e th e civi l wa r di d no t en d i n 1865 .

The End of the American Civi l War 18 3 Having bee n provide d wit h th e vote , ex-slave s prove d adep t a t the art s o f politica l organizatio n and , i n conjunctio n wit h forme r Southern Whigs, were able to win the state houses and U.S. congressional seats of the Southern states. But with the rise of militant white opposition, th e succes s o f radica l reconstructio n woul d depen d o n the protectio n o f Norther n troop s an d th e abilit y o f thes e newl y elected government s t o rule . I n thi s the y wer e hampere d b y th e sheer cost s of the destructio n o f the civi l war , a national recession , and a Northern ideolog y tha t felt i t anathema to assist the Sout h to rebuild economically . Radical reconstructio n faile d fo r a numbe r o f reasons . Willia m Gillette points to the following: 1 ) administrativ e incapacity and the failure t o protec t pro-Unio n Southerner s an d freedme n fro m vio lence; 2) Norther n policies that were the product of political tradeoffs and therefore incoheren t i n their application to the South; 3) a constitutional traditio n that restricted policies suc h as land redistribution an d economic hel p t o th e freedmen , whic h woul d hav e enabled the newly freed slaves to compete fairly with Southern whites; 4) th e us e o f la w a s a "panacea, " o r th e belie f i n th e Nort h tha t social attitudes and limits to conflict in the South could be legislated; 5) racism in the North that accounts for the ease with which forme r radical Republicans turned their backs on the freedmen a s political partners. Finally , wha t is unstated in Gillette's book, bu t seems apparent is that there was a real desire amon g Northerners "t o get on with it" ; tha t is , a real impatienc e wit h reconstructio n a s a socia l experiment an d a rea l desir e fo r nationa l reconciliatio n (Gillette , 1979, 365-370) . Reconstruction prove d th e limit s of the radicals ' revolution. Th e free soil, free labor ideology o f the Republican party demanded the end o f slaver y i n th e South . Th e ideolog y demande d equa l right s and the vote for the freedmen a s the best insurance that they would survive and prosper afte r th e war . Bu t the sam e ideology balke d at providing th e freedme n th e governmenta l suppor t an d continue d protection tha t wer e necessar y t o achiev e th e revolutionar y trans formation o f the South . Another striking aspect of the limits of the revolutionary ideolog y of th e Republica n radical s concern s th e punishmen t o f th e seces sionists. It is important to note the lack of direct retributio n against those who made the rebellion . Onl y on e Confederat e wa s tried for war crimes—Henry Wirz, the commandant of the Andersonville pris-

184 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n oner-of-war camp . While Jefferson Davi s was arrested and spent tw o years i n federa l prisons , h e wa s neve r brough t t o tria l fo r treaso n and was paroled in 1867. The only action taken against the leadershi p of the rebellio n wa s th e temporar y forfeitur e o f rights o f voting an d office holding . Davi d Donal d (1978 , 175-183 ) attribute s thi s lack of retribution o r punishment o f the Southern leaders to a strict belie f in constitutionalis m amon g politician s o f th e North . In 187 7 Norther n white s made thei r peace wit h Souther n whites , as reconstructio n ende d an d nationa l reconciliatio n began . Suc h a reconciliation necessaril y mean t tha t someon e woul d lose . Radical s in th e Nort h abandone d th e blac k freedme n o f th e South , i n orde r that on e natio n woul d com e togethe r again . I t di d no t tak e lon g fo r the Nort h t o embrac e th e ne w ideolog y o f socia l darwinis m tha t would justify Souther n segregation of the freedmen. As George Fredrickson has so succinctly pu t it, "thi s last act of the drama of national consolidation tha t ha d begun wit h a struggle t o preserv e th e Unio n and destro y th e 'slav e power ' ca n b e see n fo r wha t i t reall y was— a Northern betraya l o f th e black s wh o ha d bee n emancipate d an d promised ful l citizenship " (Fredrickson , 1981 , 191) .

Concluding Observation s The policies pursue d by th e Nort h towards the defeate d Sout h wer e neither coherent no r consistent. I n the first three years after the war, two vision s o f a reconstructe d Sout h compete d fo r prominenc e i n the North . Th e vision s differe d o n th e exten t t o whic h Souther n social, economic , an d political institution s would have to be radicall y transformed i n order for the Sout h t o be incorporate d agai n into th e Union. Andre w Johnson' s polic y o f presidentia l reconstructio n pre ferred limite d change . I f full y implemented , th e Sout h woul d b e rebuilt b y th e aristocrati c plante r clas s tha t ha d initiated th e wa r i n the first place . Whil e black s woul d n o longe r b e slaves , Johnson' s policies woul d insur e the m inferiorit y an d subordinatio n t o thei r former owners . Th e polic y o f radica l reconstruction , advocate d b y the extremist s o f th e Republica n party , envisione d a ne w orde r i n the South , buil t b y th e newl y free d ex-slave s an d thos e white s wh o had oppose d th e Confederacy . B y grantin g politica l right s t o th e freedmen, radica l reconstructio n woul d eradicat e th e powe r o f th e former aristocracy . Thi s eradicatio n woul d i n tur n mea n a Souther n

The En d o f the America n Civi l War 18 5 economy built on the free-labor, free-soi l ideolog y that wa s part an d parcel o f the North' s vibran t industria l order . Both Johnson and the radicals' plans for reconstruction were based on assessments o f their politica l interests . Johnson believe d tha t hi s personal politica l ambition s wer e bes t serve d b y a quickl y recon structed South . H e hope d t o forg e a coalitio n o f Southerner s an d Northern Democrats , that woul d isolat e the radica l wing o f the Republican party. The radical Republicans, for their part, believed tha t their future powe r depended on creating a new political force i n the South based on the freedmen an d ex-Whigs. To accomplish this necessarily meant circumscribing the participation o f those Southerner s who ha d supporte d th e war . The institutiona l strengt h o f th e radica l Republican s prevente d Johnson fro m full y implementin g hi s policies . Johnson' s unwilling ness t o compromis e o n hi s progra m pushe d moderat e Republican s to embrace the radicals: within three years one of the most dramati c swings o f politica l ideolog y ha d occurre d i n th e Unite d States . I n 1865 radica l demand s fo r suffrag e an d equa l right s fo r black s wer e extreme positions in the North. By 1868 such demands enjoyed over whelming politica l support : th e extrem e ha d becom e th e main stream. But , a s has been argue d earlier , eve n th e policie s o f radica l reconstruction wer e piecemeal , no t uniforml y applied , an d hostag e to politica l consideration s i n th e Nort h throughou t th e perio d o f radical ascendancy . The two competin g program s o f reconstruction i n the Nort h ha d clear view s o f wha t a new Sout h shoul d loo k like . Tw o dimension s of the policies were crucial. The first dimension, discussed by Henr y Kissinger i n hi s stud y o f the peac e afte r th e Napoleoni c Wars , con cerns the retrospectiv e o r forward-looking aspec t o f the peace. Kissinger assert s that victor s can eithe r " crush th e enem y s o that h e is unable t o fight agai n . . . [or ] deal wit h th e enem y s o tha t h e doe s not wis h t o attac k again. " I n Kissinger' s analysis , a retrospective peac e i s the expressio n o f a rigid socia l order, clingin g to the only certainty: the past. It will make a 'legitimate* settlement impossible, because the defeated nation , unless completely dismembered , wil l not accept its humiliation. (Kissinger, 1957 , 138-139 ) The secon d dimensio n i s one o f totalization: th e victor s ca n assum e that the prior war was caused by specific, limite d grievances or the y can assum e tha t th e caus e o f th e wa r lie s i n th e ver y natur e an d character o f the opponent' s politica l an d socia l institutions .

186 Stephe n Joh n Stedma n The wa r aim s o f th e Nort h a s represente d b y Lincoln , Sherman , and Grant attempte d th e strang e amalga m o f crushing the enem y so that th e Sout h woul d b e unabl e t o fight again , wit h a vie w o f th e war tha t sa w Souther n grievance s a s limited, albei t uncompromisa ble. Thu s Lincol n pursue d a combination o f policies tha t woul d at tempt to destroy the will of the South to fight again, with the attempt to establis h a legitimate socia l orde r tha t di d no t involv e a revolu tionary transformatio n o f Souther n society . Th e radicals , however , hoped t o crus h th e Sout h an d then , throug h politica l an d socia l en gineering, create a newly transformed South , whose new institutions would be the basis for a new legitimate order. The crucial differenc e between th e policie s concerne d th e audienc e fo r considerin g whether a new orde r wa s legitimate : th e defeate d white s wh o ha d waged wa r agains t th e Nort h o r th e ex-slave s an d opponent s o f th e Confederacy wh o ha d wage d wa r alongsid e th e North . For the political an d social engineering o f the Sout h to have been successful, th e North would have had to provide much economic aid to rebuil d th e Sout h an d ongoin g federa l protectio n t o th e newl y formed governments. 6 Even with such assistance, radical reconstruction woul d hav e involved a long-term commitmen t fro m th e North . Neither th e assistanc e no r commitmen t wer e forthcoming , an d th e North onc e agai n face d a decisio n betwee n reconciliatio n amon g whites or continued social engineering of the South. The North chose reconciliation, a policy by definition a t odds with revolutionary transformation. B y 187 7 Nort h an d Sout h reache d a rather limite d bar gain: th e Sout h woul d neve r agai n conside r secessio n o r institut e slavery, the North woul d abando n th e freedme n an d accept a white supremacist South . On e mus t no t forge t tha t a policy o f reconcilia tion, a s much a s a policy o f revolution, ha s its losers.

Notes 1. Th e mos t note d exceptio n i s th e chapte r o n th e civi l wa r i n Moore , 1966. Paul Kennedy's recent tome (1988 ) discusse s the Civil War and argues that th e Nort h wo n becaus e o f preponderant militar y an d economic power . As I point out here, tha t interpretation i s at odds with most recent America n scholarship o n th e war , includin g tha t o f Beringe r e t al. , 1986 , an d Mc Pherson, 1988 . 2. Beringe r et al. , 1986 , dismis s the explanatio n tha t there was no mode l for fighting a guerrilla war at that time. They point out that Southern officer s

The En d o f th e America n Civi l Wa r 18 7 were familia r wit h Clausewitz' s writing s o n Napoleon' s Spanis h campaig n and the ability of partisans to harass and defeat larger armies. The argument that suc h a model wa s no t availabl e i s contradicte d b y th e experienc e o f some Southerners who fought tha t style o f war (Fellman, 1989) . A second argument on why the South did not fight a guerrilla war is that such a fight would have contradicted Southern concepts of honor. A recent biography of one of the South's partisan fightersmakes clear that he believed that "Southern honor" was incompatible with the demands of guerrilla warfare (Ramage , 1988) . 3. T o understand the lack of connection between separate cultural identities an d the onse t o f the civi l war, conside r the differentia l effect s o f the Mexican War on American politics an d society o f the time. I n terms of the web of meaning that surrounde d American lives i n 184 8 th e Mexica n War marked the culmination of the American mystical feeling o f imagined community. While the war did much to consolidate a single feeling of nationhood throughout the states (Johannsen, 1985), it also began a process of destroying the balance o f institutions that made the Unio n possible. 4. A n interesting compariso n o f th e rol e o f fea r i n perpetuatin g domi nation can be draw n from Sout h Africa today (Hugo , 1988) . 5. Fo r a discussion o f lexicographi c preferences , se e Elster , 1978 . T o give another example of such a preference, imagin e a voter who places the abortion issue above all others. The preference i s lexicographic, i f in terms of voting she/h e first chooses a candidate o n ho w th e candidat e stand s on the issu e o f abortio n rights . I f al l candidate s suppor t her/hi s positio n o n abortion, she/he wil l then g o on to choose amon g them based on positions on other issues. If only on e candidate ha s the correct position o n abortion, that candidate will receiv e th e individual's vote. 6. A n interesting parallel exists between the reconstruction of the South and the reconstruction of Germany after World War I. Keynes, among others, argued that i f Germa n militaris m wer e t o be replace d b y ne w democrati c institutions, then the Weimar government woul d have to be assiste d rather than punished for the previous war.

8.1 Nigeri a

188

E I G H T

The Endin g o f th e Nigeria n Civi l War : Victory, Defeat , an d th e Changin g of Coalition s James O'Connel l

Introduction: Th e Source s o f Conflic t It is difficult t o be precise abou t th e cause s of war. War results fro m a series of decisions in which events take on the meaning that persons and group s giv e them. 1 I n th e Nigeria n cas e there wer e underlyin g reasons for the drift toward s conflict, roote d in the geographical an d ethnic shape of a huge colonial-made state and in its pace and pattern of political and economic development. There were more immediat e sources i n th e politica l pattern s o f interactio n betwee n th e ethni c groups afte r independence . Thes e pattern s wer e heavil y influence d by the federal structur e fashione d fo r independence , by the uneve n spread o f skill s among th e peoples , an d b y th e locatio n o f oil. At independenc e (1960 ) Nigeri a ha d a federa l constitutio n tha t ran i n th e fac e o f received federa l theorizing : on e federa l uni t (th e Northern Region) was larger in size and in population than the othe r two federa l region s o r state s (th e Easter n an d Wester n Regions ) added together . Th e situatio n wa s not immediatel y improve d whe n the Northern and Eastern politicians combined to break the Western Region int o two state s (Wester n an d MidWester n Regions ) i n 1964 . However, though the move against the West and its dominant Yoruba groups create d strain s i n th e contes t fo r politica l powe r i n th e fed eration, th e basi c cleavag e withi n Nigeri a ha d lon g bee n betwee n 189

190 Jame s O'Connel l North and South. The majority Far Northern Musli m peoples (Hausa , Kanuri, and Fulani) had taken to modern education more slowly tha n the Middl e Bel t (th e souther n an d mostl y non-Musli m par t o f th e North) an d Souther n people s wh o wer e mostl y becomin g Christia n and sending thei r childre n t o mission schools. Unde r British rule th e Northerners ha d retaine d th e traditiona l socia l structure s o f thei r emirates, an d the y feare d a federation i n whic h th e federa l admin istrative structure s a s wel l a s th e commercia l an d industria l lif e o f the countr y woul d b e controlle d b y Southerners . At severa l time s durin g th e constitutiona l negotiation s befor e in dependence th e Norther n leader s ha d threatene d t o seced e fro m Nigeria, an d onl y thei r land-locke d situatio n ha d prevente d the m from seekin g t o implemen t tha t threat . Th e Southerner s i n th e in dependence negotiation s ha d accepte d reluctantl y a federation tha t left th e hug e Norther n Regio n intact— a solution whic h wa s strongl y supported b y th e Britis h administration—i n retur n fo r indepen dence's no t being delayed. They als o felt that their skills would bring them crucia l post-independenc e powe r an d the y migh t eventuall y re-shape th e independenc e settlement . A certai n politica l stabilit y seemed assure d a t independenc e sinc e th e first federa l governmen t was a coalition betwee n th e Norther n rulin g part y (whic h provide d the prim e minister ) an d th e Easter n rulin g part y (whic h provide d the finance minister—an d late r th e governo r general/presiden t a s well), whil e th e Wester n rulin g part y wen t int o constitutiona l op position. I n tha t wa y th e dange r o f a North-South spli t appeare d t o be averted . Independence politic s quickl y reveale d th e strain s o f a ne w an d artificial countr y wit h insufficien t tim e t o creat e a minimu m sens e of nationhood ou t o f several hundre d ethni c groups . Mor e seriously , constitutionalism—good la w an d a respect fo r th e rule s o f the game , not leas t i n no t pushin g opponent s t o th e wall—ha d no t mature d i n the insecurit y o f colonia l an d earl y independenc e politics . Capabl e leaders might have overcome som e of the problems, but the Nigeria n leaders wh o ha d bee n forme d i n th e politic s o f agitatio n di d badl y with th e politic s o f governing : man y prove d t o b e incompeten t i n running a stat e wit h moder n requirements ; mos t wer e tribalis t o r communal i n outloo k an d loyalties; an d too man y o f them wer e per vasively corrupt .

The Endin g o f the Nigeria n Civi l War 19 1

The Drift toward s Civil War A series of crises tested th e strengt h o f the politica l system . Under lying all the crises was a revolution o f rising expectations, especiall y among th e Souther n communities , tha t create d bitte r competitio n among th e elit e member s o f th e mai n ethni c group s an d tha t pu t immense pressure on politicians to deliver rewards to their followers . Slow economi c growt h le d t o a genera l strik e i n 196 4 tha t almos t halted the modernizin g sector s of the Souther n economy , disrupte d transport betwee n Sout h an d North , an d seriousl y frightene d th e federal government . Meanwhil e a mismanaged chang e o f vice-chancellors a t th e Universit y o f Lago s displaye d th e venomou s compe tition o f th e Yorub a an d Ib o intelligentsi a fo r publi c servic e post s and undermine d socia l trust . The move s agains t th e Wester n Region' s government , whic h in cluded installin g a Norther n allie d governmen t i n th e plac e o f a properly electe d governmen t an d which sa w a regional election blatantly falsified , damage d confidenc e i n just administratio n o f law. A federal electio n i n 196 4 tha t brough t a n artificiall y larg e Norther n majority int o parliament deprived Southerners of the hope of changing th e country' s governmen t throug h th e ballo t box . Previousl y a falsified nationa l censu s ha d consolidate d th e Norther n righ t t o a plurality of seats in the lower and more powerful house of parliament. The violence that erupted agains t the rigged Western Region election a t th e en d o f 196 5 finally brought disconten t t o a hea d i n th e South an d create d a n atmospher e o f violenc e i n whic h Souther n officers, mostl y Ibo, carried out a coup in January, 196 6 that topple d the federa l an d regiona l governments . Thos e officer s wh o initiate d the cou p di d no t manag e t o gai n power . Th e arm y hig h command , however, move d int o th e vacuu m an d too k ove r contro l o f govern ment. Significantl y th e arm y hig h comman d whic h wa s predomi nantly Souther n an d Ib o ha d t o conten d wit h a rank-and-fil e wh o were mostl y fro m th e Norther n Middl e Belt . The Northerner s wer e no t monolithi c becaus e the y divide d broadly int o Fa r Northerner s wh o wer e Musli m an d Middl e Belt groups wh o wer e becomin g Christia n an d spreadin g Christianit y among their communities like their Southern counterparts. They had little affectio n fo r th e 'ol d politicians ' an d waite d cautiousl y t o se e how th e ne w regim e woul d tur n out . Southerner s wer e mostl y eu phoric. However the army high command—the commander-in-chief ,

192 Jame s O'Connel l General Ironsi , was a n Ibo—made a series o f inept political decision s that culminate d i n a n unfortunat e decre e tha t appeare d t o abolis h the forme r federa l structure . Northerner s believe d tha t the y wer e about t o los e whateve r politica l powe r the y stil l possesse d i n th e country, tha t a hord e o f Southerner s woul d mov e i n t o tak e ove r posts i n the Nort h an d impede th e progres s an d prospects o f North erners, an d that public resource s woul d be denie d t o Northern com munities. Two event s brought th e countr y t o a greater crisis . I n May, 1966 , shortly afte r th e unificatio n decree , riot s broke ou t i n th e Norther n areas against Ibo s who wer e see n a s symbols of Southern dominatio n and wh o a s pett y official s an d trader s wer e resente d b y th e les s modernized Northerner s (O'Connell , 1967) . A great part of the sev eral hundre d thousan d Ib o populatio n i n the Nort h fled hom e t o th e East, althoug h man y ha d littl e t o whic h t o return . I n consequence , a great numbe r stil l remaine d i n the North , an d many returne d fro m the Eas t onc e la w an d orde r wer e apparentl y restored . Significantly Irons i ha d no t dare d t o us e hi s arm y t o protec t hi s fellow Ibos . Disconten t kep t simmerin g amon g al l group s o f North erners. Then i n July, 196 6 th e Middl e Bel t rank-and-fil e o f the arm y rebelled, turne d thei r gun s o n their Ibo officer s an d on their Easter n comrades, an d brok e th e federa l army . The y immediatel y con strained Norther n officer s t o tak e ove r th e runnin g o f th e country ; and they mad e the most senio r Middle Belt officer, Brigadie r Yakub u Gowon, arm y commande r an d hea d o f state . Th e broke n rum p o f the Easterner s i n th e arm y heade d fo r thei r ow n Regio n an d recon stituted themselve s i n militar y orde r unde r th e directio n o f th e Ib o military governo r o f th e Easter n Region , Brigadie r Odumegw u Ojukwu. The first instinc t o f th e Norther n arm y officer s an d me n wa s t o have th e Nort h seced e fro m th e res t o f th e country . Federa l civi l servants persuade d the m t o chang e thei r mind s an d reconstruct th e Nigerian federa l syste m b y creatin g mor e state s ou t o f th e existin g four regions . Th e Easter n representative s oppose d th e result , a s di d important politica l element s i n th e Fa r North . I n Septembe r a ver itable pogro m agains t th e Ibo s i n th e Nort h wa s launche d whic h betrayed man y sign s o f organization an d which kille d som e si x thousand Ibos , mostl y poo r peopl e sinc e b y tha t tim e th e well-to-d o ha d read th e sign s o f th e time s an d ha d lef t th e North . Norther n poli ticians an d collaborator s i n th e administratio n ha d cynicall y un -

The Endin g o f the Nigeria n Civi l War 19 3 leashed massacre s o f men , wome n an d childre n i n orde r t o brea k the unit y o f th e federatio n an d t o conniv e i n a mos t pervers e wa y with thei r counterpart s i n th e Eas t wh o possesse d th e sam e objec tive.2 The killing s shocke d an d stunne d th e country . Th e federa l gov ernment ha d a n uneas y conscienc e abou t th e killings , wa s desper ately tryin g t o re-organiz e a disorderly army , an d wa s los t i n inde cision and procrastination. The Eastern leader , Odumegwu Ojukwu , in consultatio n wit h hi s adviser s an d wit h th e agreemen t o f practi cally the whole Ibo intelligentsia and people, had no hesitation abou t what h e wanted t o do : he wanted hi s region t o seced e fro m Nigeri a and t o retai n entir e contro l ove r it s revenues , includin g it s oi l rev enues. H e buil t u p Ib o unit y aroun d th e solidarit y an d fea r o f hi s people; h e initiate d a world wid e driv e t o secur e sympath y o n th e grounds of the massacres to which the y ha d been subjected ; an d h e set about enlargin g his military forces an d equipping them. H e too k administrative ste p afte r ste p unti l b y April , 196 7 th e federa l wri t did not run i n his region an d it was in virtual secession . H e said that he was willing to compromise o n a form o f external associatio n wit h Nigeria bu t h e refuse d an y solutio n tha t di d no t giv e hi s are a ful l political sovereignty .

Civil War: Legitimacy , Numbers , an d Arm s Gowon, the federal leader , who was also seeking to buy arms abroad tried t o conciliate th e Easter n leadership . But, unde r pressur e fro m his own hawks, he offered littl e that wa s imaginative t o the Eastern ers, whil e Ojukw u an d hi s advisor s wer e unwillin g t o accep t an y compromise that retaine d the unity of the state . The country move d inexorably toward s civi l war . I n May , 196 7 Ojukw u formall y de clared th e secessio n o f hi s regio n an d establishe d th e Republi c o f Biafra. Som e tw o month s late r th e federa l governmen t sen t troop s across th e regiona l boundar y t o en d th e secession . Th e wa r woul d involve bot h blood y militar y struggl e an d starvatio n fo r Easter n ci vilians. It di d no t en d fo r tw o an d a half years . On a number o f occasions before th e war began a s well as during the war' s progress , Ojukw u migh t hav e secure d reasonabl e peac e terms, tha t is , term s tha t concede d greate r financial an d resourc e rights to the regio n an d left i t relativel y intac t territorially. Conces sions could be wrung from th e federa l sid e because the governmen t

194 Jame s O'Connel l was no t sur e tha t i t coul d wi n th e wa r an d because i t recoile d fro m the cost s likel y t o b e involve d i n pursuin g it . Bu t Ojukw u ha d cal culated tha t he coul d carr y the secessio n through— a calculatio n tha t he maintaine d lon g afte r i t wa s manifes t tha t h e ha d los t th e war . I t is also tru e tha t h e an d his peopl e feare d an y solutio n tha t gav e th e federal arm y contro l ove r th e Easter n Region . H e skillfull y rallie d his people , usin g th e fea r o f 'genocide ' tha t shape d Ib o psycholog y after th e Norther n killing s an d tellin g the m tha t t o fai l t o resis t th e Nigerian onslaugh t riske d widesprea d massacre . During th e wa r th e federa l troop s graduall y wo n territor y fro m the secessionists . The y regaine d initiall y th e area s o f th e Easter n minority ethni c groups , especiall y thos e o f th e Ibibi o an d th e Ijaw , who collaborate d wit h th e invadin g forces . Thes e minoritie s forme d close t o two-fifth s o f th e populatio n o f th e forme r region ; an d the y had in great majorit y oppose d secession , whic h they sa w as a Biafran captivity. Toward s th e en d o f th e wa r th e federa l force s controlle d large tract s o f territor y i n whic h th e soldier s treate d civilian s i n a humane an d considerat e way . Thoug h ther e ha d bee n severa l mas sacres durin g th e wa r b y federa l troops , thes e ha d proved t o be th e exception an d not the rule. 3 In fact, th e wa r was mostly fought alon g the mai n road s o n whic h th e federa l troop s advance d behin d thei r artillery fire. Th e village s i n whic h mos t peopl e live d wer e fortu nately awa y fro m th e road s an d remaine d relativel y saf e excep t fo r the dir e famin e situatio n i n man y areas . Durin g th e wa r n o guerill a action materialize d i n th e area s take n ove r b y th e federa l troops . Also, thoug h Ojukw u promise d tha t i n th e even t o f a conventiona l military defeat , hi s peopl e woul d fight o n a s partisans , n o effor t t o do s o wa s made . In militar y term s th e Nigeria n arm y wo n th e wa r becaus e i t ha d more troops , bette r equipmen t an d greate r supplies . Thes e advan tages offset th e shorter command lines of the Biafrans an d their mor e homogeneous forces . A t th e outset o f the war , when th e Britis h wh o were traditiona l militar y supplier s t o Nigeri a showe d som e reluc tance t o sell arm s to the federa l government , th e latter turned to th e Soviet governmen t whic h sol d the m plane s an d othe r equipment — and which supported the federal sid e throughout the war. The British quickly change d thei r polic y an d supplie d th e federa l sid e abun dantly and—from a British viewpoint—profitably. Th e Biafrans faile d initially t o bu y equipmen t an d ammunitio n fro m governmen t an d official sources , an d their inexperienced private buyers bought badl y

The Endin g o f th e Nigeria n Civi l Wa r 19 5 and expensively . Moreover , Biafra n foreig n exchang e bega n t o ru n out quickly . Thei r situatio n change d dramaticall y whe n Franc e in tervened t o suppl y wa r materials i n late 1968 . Bu t France onl y gav e enough ai d to prolong th e war and not enough t o enable the Biafran s to wi n it. 4 Th e Frenc h governmen t realize d that , i f i t steppe d u p supplies beyon d a certai n point , th e Britis h an d th e Soviet s woul d escalate thei r hel p sinc e bot h wer e b y the n heavil y committe d t o a federal victory . Th e Frenc h calculation appeare d t o be that , by mak ing th e progres s o f th e wa r difficul t an d prolonged , th e fissuresethnic an d personal—in the federal sid e as well a s the uneven qualit y of th e federa l militar y leadershi p woul d caus e th e federa l effor t t o falter an d th e Biafran s woul d b e abl e t o negotiat e a favorabl e set tlement. Th e Frenc h faile d t o understan d ho w desperatel y man y o f the federal group s looked on military an d political failur e and underestimated th e ke y rol e o f th e Middl e Bel t troop s an d officer s i n th e conduct o f th e war . By January , 197 0 th e civi l wa r wa s fo r practica l purpose s over . The Biafra n arm y ha d almos t exhauste d it s ammunition ; transpor t had practicall y ru n ou t o f fuel ; militar y moral e ha d broke n an d sol diers an d other s wer e turnin g toward s messiani c cult s i n th e futilit y of magical hopes ; it had become impossibl e t o recruit o r to conscrip t new troops ; th e mai n foo d growin g area s ha d bee n take n ove r b y the enemy; and deaths from malnutrition, especiall y amon g children , were multiplying . I n particular , th e will-to-resis t whic h ha d de pended so heavily on fear of large-scale federal massacres evaporate d as peopl e realize d tha t th e troop s ha d behave d wel l i n th e place s where the y ha d take n ove r an d tha t i n an y cas e th e troop s wer e mostly Middl e Bel t soldier s fro m people s wh o ha d bee n ver y littl e involved i n th e Norther n pogro m a s wel l a s Yorub a soldier s fro m a people wh o ha d no t bee n involve d a t all . Yet th e en d cam e quickl y an d unexpectedly . A t th e star t o f Jan uary, 197 0 Colone l Obasanjo' s Third Divisio n cu t throug h th e Biaf ran line s fro m th e sout h an d linke d u p wit h th e Firs t Divisio n a t Umuahia. Thi s manoeuver no t onl y cu t the remaining enclav e i n tw o but cu t of f th e Biafra n force s fro m thei r las t food-producin g areas . There wa s no w n o denyin g tha t th e en d ha d come . Ojukwu , wh o had issue d a defian t statemen t les s tha n tw o week s earlier , fle d o n January 1 0 to the Ivory Coast . Two day s later General Philip Effiong , the Biafra n chie f o f staff , surrendere d unconditionally . It ma y b e aske d wh y th e Biafran s accepte d Ojukwu' s decisio n t o continue the war when its tide had turned utterly against them. Apar t

196 Jame s O'Connel l from the fears of the resul t of defeat tha t continued t o be held almos t until th e end , the y als o misjudge d th e strengt h o f th e federa l coa lition an d hoped agains t hop e tha t it s will t o wi n woul d peter ou t o r that division s betwee n Yoruba s an d other s woul d weake n it . I n a sense the y hope d tha t a 'hurting stalemate ' coul d be establishe d an d continue lon g enoug h an d take sufficien t tol l o f the enem y t o enabl e them t o achiev e thei r basi c aims . Th e Ibo s als o overestimate d th e importance o f internationa l humanitaria n opinion , whic h the y thought migh t hal t th e federa l advance , an d misjudged th e wort h o f a popular sympath y i n Western countrie s tha t wa s no t o n th e whol e shared b y governments . Why di d th e Nigeria n federa l governmen t win ? I t wo n fo r a cumulative se t o f reasons : i t retaine d th e legitimac y o f th e interna tionally recognize d government , leavin g th e secessionist s a t a dis advantage i n arm s buyin g a s wel l a s lack o f recognition ; i t obtaine d general Africa n suppor t amon g countrie s tha t wer e nearl y al l afrai d of their ow n colonia l boundaries ' comin g unde r pressure ; i t derive d enough revenue s fro m petroleu m an d crops t o carr y o n the wa r an d acquire sophisticate d weaponry , whil e th e secessionist s wer e block aded b y th e smal l federa l nav y an d ra n shor t o f fund s fo r buyin g arms, mechanica l spar e parts , an d food ; i t wa s abl e t o recrui t an d equip a much large r arm y tha n th e Biafrans ; it s people s wer e rela tively unite d behin d th e war , whil e th e Ibo s ha d t o cop e wit h sig nificant dissen t fro m Ibibio , Ijaw/Kalabari , Ogoja , an d other groups ; and th e Ib o intelligentsi a hel d bac k fro m persona l commitmen t t o the fighting an d expected the less well-to-do an d unemployed to risk their lives . Above all , th e federa l sid e wo n becaus e th e Middl e Bel t peoples , especially the Tiv, Idoma, and other Northern minority groups which provided th e bul k o f th e federa l infantry , neede d th e federatio n desperately. I f th e federatio n wer e t o fail , the y woul d face , o n th e one hand , th e dange r o f Hausa-Fulan i dominatio n a s th e Norther n region became a country in the break-up of Nigeria and, on the othe r hand, th e fat e o f bein g lef t i n a countr y beref t o f th e oi l revenues . They use d th e federa l resources ; the y collaborate d wit h th e othe r pro-federal groups ; the y fough t bravely ; an d the y overcam e oppo nents who also fought bravely and whom they came greatly to respect in th e cours e o f th e war .

The Ending o f the Nigeria n Civi l War 19 7

The Shap e o f the End : Neither Nurember g Trial s nor German Miracl e In the final outcome there was no settlement wit h the secessionists . They were overwhelmed militarily. But inherent in the way that the federal governmen t ha d rallied its own side were terms that offere d a degree o f conciliatio n an d assurance t o the vanquished . Th e ne w twelve-state syste m ende d th e hegemon y o f th e ol d Nort h an d redistributed powe r evenl y throughou t th e federation. 5 Nonetheles s the Ibos suffered immediate disadvantages. First many of their areas and al l thei r mai n town s wer e devastated. 6 Second , Ibo s wh o ha d fled federal post s were fo r the mos t par t no t reinstated ; businesse s were destroye d an d coul d no t quickl y b e re-established ; th e East Central state (the new Ibo state) could not quickly afford to take on staff-—though i t di d ope n th e Nsukk a universit y quickl y afte r th e cease-fire. Third , Ibos were prevented fo r many years (an d in measure still are ) from returnin g t o the mai n Ibo commercia l an d manufacturing town, Port Harcourt, which lay outside the boundaries of their ne w stat e an d i n th e River s stat e whos e people s hate d an d feared Ibo clannishness and entrepreneurship. Finally , the Ibos had only on e stat e an d state rule r amon g th e twelv e official s wh o wit h Gowon mad e u p th e majorit y o f th e rulin g counci l o f state . A s a result they carrie d much less proportionate weigh t i n the post-wa r Federal Militar y Governmen t tha n thei r number s i n th e countr y should hav e give n them . Moreover , no t onl y di d th e Eas t Centra l Administrator, Ukpabi Asika, exercise little influence in federal councils bu t h e displaye d n o grea t initiativ e i n restorin g th e economi c life o f his state. Fortunatel y howeve r hi s lack of initiative was more than compensate d fo r b y th e energie s o f a people wh o ha d los t a war but no t their dignity an d their ambitio n to better themselves . However, a n endemi c lac k o f capita l bedevile d Ib o effort s fo r years. Influential federa l civil servants had resented Ibo competition in earlie r year s an d blamed thei r elit e counterpart s fo r bein g par t of th e caba l tha t ha d starte d th e secession . The y openl y declare d that there would be no 'German miracle' for the Ibo areas. Ordinary Ibos began to re-build their lives as best they could, and their communities quickly began to display the resiliency that had made them a powerful modernizing force within Nigeria. The elite exhibited for a time the schizoid reactions of those who had been forced back into accepting citizenship of the state which they had rejected; who suf -

198 Jame s O'Connel l fered th e humiliatin g comple x o f defeat; an d who wer e gla d enoug h to hav e survive d th e uncertai n en d o f a wa y tha t migh t hav e de stroyed them. But they also soon set about making new or old careers. However if there was going to be no 'German miracle,' there wer e also goin g t o b e n o 'Nurember g trials / General Gowo n implemente d hi s pledg e o f a general amnest y o n January 15, 1970 , and , asid e fro m a handful o f junior arm y officer s wh o allegedl y collaborated wit h th e Biafra n invasio n o f th e Midwest , ther e wer e almos t no war-relate d detentions . Hig h rankin g Biafra n officers , suc h a s Genera l Philip Effiong , reverte d t o thei r prewa r ran k i n th e Nigeria n army , wer e placed o n immediat e indefinit e leave , an d late r retired . Th e onl y civilia n leader known to have been arreste d was Ojukwu's chief economic adviser , Dr. Piu s Okigbo , an d that, accordin g t o hi s associates , wa s the resul t o f a local an d not a federal order . B y mid-1971, Dr. Okigbo had been release d and was running a consulting firm in Lagos with a large contrac t fro m th e federal government . (Stremlau , 1977 , 371-372 ) Some furthe r remark s ar e wort h making . First , i n th e aftermat h of the wa r there wa s a n extraordinary lac k o f endurin g bitterness . I t is tru e tha t Ibo s regrette d havin g los t th e bi d t o seced e a s wel l a s the opportunit y t o obtai n som e justic e fo r th e Norther n pogroms , and federa l group s resente d th e losse s tha t th e Ib o leadershi p ha d brought on them an d on the country. But to those who had witnessed the bitternesses o f Ireland or Spain fifty years after civi l war, Africa n capacities fo r settin g asid e hatre d wer e deepl y human e an d utterl y remarkable. Second , inter-communit y o r inter-ethni c war s amon g many Africa n group s i n th e nineteent h centur y displaye d a willing ness t o leav e group s wit h basi c socia l an d economi c integrity . I n Nigerian politic s partie s appeare d t o hav e los t tha t traditio n a s the y pushed opponent s t o th e wall , bu t i n the endin g o f a bitterly fough t civil wa r tha t traditio n o f clemenc y reappeared. 7 A t th e en d o f th e war both side s showe d mostl y relie f an d a will t o ge t bac k t o livin g ordinary lif e again . The en d o f th e war—lik e muc h o f it s course—wa s riddle d wit h ambiguities betwee n state d mean s o f action, th e logi c o f actions un dertaken an d face s presente d t o th e outsid e world . Thi s wa s tru e nowhere mor e tha n i n th e foo d blockad e durin g th e wa r i n whic h the federal governmen t made relatively half-hearted efforts for a long time t o impede secula r an d religious relie f efforts. Whe n th e federa l government eventuall y steppe d u p it s foo d blockad e i n a n effor t t o starve th e rebe l enclav e int o submission , i t neve r openl y admitte d

The Ending o f the Nigeria n Civi l War 19 9 it because of the Western outcry over the starving civilian population, especially the children. The federal governmen t had mostly lost the international propagand a battle eve r sinc e the Ibo massacres in the North and resented the pressures put on it to lift a blockade that it saw as vital to shortening the war as well as to winning it. Moreover, they could point to the blockade of Germany during both world wars that had evoked no equivalent condemnation. They attributed Western attitudes partly to Biafran propaganda and partly to the genera l belief in the West that the participants in the civil war were throwing lives awa y in a bloody conflic t tha t was being fough t ove r issue s of little rea l worth an d to n o purpose. However, bowin g t o foreig n pressur e toward s th e en d o f 1969 , the federa l governmen t agree d t o permi t a land corrido r acros s its territory to enable food to be delivered to the rebel-held areas. The government refused to permit other routes. Ojukwu had been having arms delivere d i n som e relie f plane s an d wa s usin g relie f plane s generally a s a cover fo r arm s planes. H e refuse d th e lan d rout e a s he also refused daylight plane deliveries. His government was willing to sacrifice lives for the prestige of sovereignty a s well as to prevent the deliver y o f food from harmin g the will t o hold out. 8 The differ ence betwee n th e leadership s i n this respec t wa s that Ojukw u was willing to sacrifice hi s own people wherea s Gowon and his advisors were at least dealing with a rebel people—and yet with a people that they wante d to re-integrat e int o their ow n country . The on e goo d sid e of the foo d controvers y wa s that it continue d to focu s worl d attentio n o n th e las t day s o f th e wa r a s i t move d inexorably towards a federal victory . In consequence, it spurred the federal governmen t t o ste p u p efforts t o dea l wit h hunge r immedi ately afte r th e wa r ended . I t als o strengthene d th e hand s o f thos e on the federa l sid e who were determine d t o prevent sporadi c massacres or large-scale looting with the end of the war. Moreover, these efforts offere d a n essential conciliatio n t o the Ib o intelligentsia and people a s the y acknowledge d tha t the y ha d los t th e wa r bu t tha t peace need not be impossible. They remained for a long time secessionist at heart but accepted that they had failed to carry their secession through . The y als o realize d tha t wit h th e en d o f th e wa r and the creatio n o f th e ne w state s th e ethni c groups , who m the y ha d carried unwillingly int o secessio n an d on whose lan d nearl y al l th e oil was, were about to acquire new state structures as well as federal support that made any new attempt a t secession impossible, a t least

200 Jame s O'Connel l in it s Biafra n shape . Ye t ther e wa s muc h politica l los s fo r Nigerian s in tha t th e representative s o f a n abl e peopl e accepte d thei r countr y for purel y pragmati c reason s an d ha d n o wis h o r intention t o creat e charismatic affectio n fo r o r emotiona l loyalt y t o th e politica l entit y within whic h the y lived . The Nigeria n civi l wa r made clear—a s hav e othe r civi l wars—ho w difficult i t i s for outsiders , whethe r government s o r othe r groups , t o intervene effectivel y withi n a country. 9 Th e Commonwealt h Sec retariat too k a n earl y initiativ e t o brin g th e side s togethe r bu t wa s simply shrugge d aside . Th e Organizatio n o f Africa n Unit y (O.A.U. ) made severa l effort s t o mediat e an d o n severa l occasion s (meeting s at Addi s Abab a an d Kampala , amon g others ) go t representative s o f the federa l governmen t an d Biafr a aroun d a table. Individua l head s of state, especiall y Hail e Selassie , th e Ethiopian emperor , undertoo k personal effort s t o fin d peac e formulae . All thes e effort s foundere d o n tw o intransigencies : th e Nigeria n leadership wa s unwillin g t o accep t an y solutio n tha t di d no t retai n Nigerian unity , a federal structure , an d a unified army ; and the Biaf ran leadershi p wa s unwillin g t o settl e fo r anythin g shor t o f sover eignty an d its own army. The Nigerians were willing to bargain abou t the shap e o f the federation—thoug h the y wer e hampere d b y havin g set u p thre e state s i n th e ol d Easter n Region , som e boundar y revi sions coul d almos t certainl y hav e bee n negotiated—an d the y wer e willing t o re-wor k th e allocatio n o f oi l an d othe r revenue s betwee n the federa l cente r an d th e states . Apar t fro m sovereignt y th e othe r sticking poin t fo r th e Biafran s wa s th e futur e o f thei r arm y a s wel l as thei r refusa l t o hav e federa l troop s o n thei r soil . Th e Nigerians , while insistin g o n a singl e army , wer e willin g t o conced e tha t fo r a time afte r th e en d o f th e wa r foreig n troop s migh t b e statione d i n the Easter n states , bu t th e Biafran s whil e the y though t the y coul d prevent a federa l victor y di d no t tak e u p thi s offer . Th e Ibo s ha d been traumatize d b y th e massacre s i n th e Nort h a s wel l a s by inci dents i n othe r area s that had threatened thei r live s an d caused the m to flee (O'Connell , 1969) . Bot h elite group s and the common peopl e shared a terrible fea r tha t endure d almos t t o th e en d o f the wa r an d that mad e agreement s requirin g trus t har d t o make . Outside negotiator s ha d n o influenc e o n a settlement i n th e war . There wa s finall y n o settlemen t bu t a federa l victory . I n a crucia l sense, outsid e negotiator s ca n operate onl y whe n eac h sid e t o a conflict is willing , n o matte r ho w initiall y hesitant , t o mee t th e othe r part o f th e way . The y ca n als o operat e bes t i f they ca n explai n eac h

The Endin g o f the Nigeria n Civi l War 20 1 side t o th e othe r an d remov e misconceptions . Anothe r caus e o f th e intransigence i n th e Nigeria n wa r wa s th e extrem e lucidit y wit h which eac h sid e saw the other—th e leadershi p group s had served in the sam e army , ha d gon e t o th e sam e secondar y school s an d mos t knew one another personally an d even intimately—and realized tha t each wa s pursuing incompatible goals . Yet the mediatio n effort s di d have som e effec t i n tha t the y helpe d t o conve y t o th e federa l lead ership ho w muc h futur e Nigeria n internationa l statu s depende d o n humane treatmen t o f the vanquishe d a t th e en d o f th e war .

Peace an d th e Re-formin g o f Coalition s The settlemen t tha t emerge d ou t o f the war has already lasted som e twenty years . Ther e i s n o indicatio n tha t th e immediat e cause s o f the civi l wa r hav e continue d t o endur e o r tha t i t coul d b e fough t again along the same lines of division. What is the explanation? Civi l wars ar e no t fough t al l ove r agai n onc e th e terminatio n o f the wa r not onl y prompt s th e dissolutio n o f th e politica l alliance s aroun d which i t wa s fough t wit h littl e hop e o f thei r bein g re-forme d bu t also creates ne w alliances . In th e Nigeria n cas e the Ib o leader s ha d used regional resources—political, administrative , and economic—t o mobilize a secession. The y challenge d th e whol e country , an d the y cowed th e Easter n minoritie s int o initia l submission . Once the y ha d lost , the y n o longe r ha d th e capacit y t o mobiliz e resources fo r renewin g th e war . Bu t onc e the y coul d n o longe r d o that, th e allianc e opposin g the m wa s n o longe r neede d an d a ne w system o f alliances began t o take shape . Crucial to the ne w politica l equilibrium was the twelve-state structure of the federation. It ended the ol d hegemon y o f the Nort h a s well a s impeding th e renewa l o f the civil war. In other words, if the Ibos had lost control o f a region, so had the Hausa-Fulani. With time the latter were to show that they could buil d politica l alliance s withou t th e nee d fo r th e forme r re gional apparatus . Bu t thi s tim e the y ha d t o negotiat e alliance s an d could no t mostl y dictat e the m a s i n th e past , an d ironicall y the y eventually ha d t o negotiat e with—amon g othe r Ib o leaders—Odu megwu Ojukwu when he had been permitted to return to the country after exil e an d ha d become activ e i n civilia n politics . Not onl y had th e Ibo s lost th e capacit y t o fight the wa r agai n bu t in threatenin g t o seced e the y ha d oblige d th e federa l ruler s jus t before th e war to announce th e creation o f new states. Even thoug h the Ibos in the hope of greater gains in carrying through a successfu l

202 Jame s O'Connel l secession ha d rejecte d thi s re-shaping , the y coul d stil l i n th e post war situation make the best of the new structures; they could develo p new alliance s in the ne w federa l politics ; and they coul d glea n som e satisfaction fro m th e wa y i n whic h thei r ol d enemies , th e Hausa Fulani, ha d als o i n goo d measur e los t politicall y i n th e outcom e o f the war . Once th e wa r ended , thos e problem s tha t underla y th e build-u p of conflict—a s distinc t fro m th e immediat e cause s o f th e war—re mained. Ethni c distrust , lac k o f good politica l leadership , difficultie s in creatin g constitutionalis m an d strain s o f rapi d socia l chang e wer e complicated afte r 197 0 b y a n unbalanced , oil-ric h econom y whos e resources wer e no t easil y translate d int o genera l economi c growt h and socia l development . Moreover , th e ol d North-Sout h divid e ha s proved difficul t t o overcome. 10 I n sa d irony , onc e th e Ib o secessio n had bee n eliminate d an d Ibo s ha d no t move d bac k t o th e Nort h i n great numbers , Musli m Northerner s experience d severa l fundamen talist religious upheavals. Sometime s Christians were the targets, but often Musli m extremist s fough t agains t on e anothe r i n fratricida l strife a s th e tension s tha t ha d le d t o th e Ib o pogrom s wer e no w unleashed withi n sociall y divide d Fa r Norther n communities . In recent Nigeria n politic s th e defenc e o f Islam—and Christianit y in reaction—ha s becom e a for m o f cod e fo r strain s betwee n Fa r Northern an d Souther n groups . Th e educationa l ga p betwee n Fa r Northerners an d Southern people s make s Islam an effective politica l ideology an d organizin g principl e tha t appear s t o avoi d th e tain t o f ethnicity an d ye t enable s claim s t o b e pu t forwar d tha t benefi t par ticular ethnic groups. The Iranian revolution has also influenced Muslim group s t o politiciz e thei r religio n an d t o adop t a harshe r an d more fundamentalis t lin e tha n Nigeria n Isla m ha s been accustome d to take . This religious cleavage which mimics the ol d North-South divisio n could in the long run prove more serious than confrontation betwee n straightforward ethni c alliance s sinc e it threatens ne w an d cherishe d modernizing socia l identitie s a s wel l a s embitterin g an d widenin g ethnic cleavages . Moreover , if Fa r Norther n group s threatene d t o secede, Southerner s woul d hav e les s incentiv e t o resist ; th e federa l coalition i n th e civi l wa r wa s determine d no t t o los e Souther n oi l resources, an d ther e i s n o comparabl e resourc e i n th e North . How ever, wer e th e Fa r North t o go , th e Souther n group s migh t quickl y find tha t th e secessio n principl e turne d int o a fission principl e tha t would benefit fe w i n the longe r run . The Northerner s ma y be give n

The Endin g o f the Nigeria n Civi l War 20 3 pause b y th e potentia l los s o f acces s t o th e oi l resource s tha t the y once sough t t o prevent th e secedin g Ibo s from takin g with them as well a s the discredite d ideolog y o f secessio n i n a country an d continent tha t hav e goo d reaso n t o fea r it . Wha t thes e consideration s suggest, finally, is how far Nigeria has moved from the sources of its first civil wa r and how strongly th e post-wa r situatio n ha s rendered a recurrence o f that particular conflic t mos t unlikely .

Notes 1. Fo r that reaso n i t make s bette r sens e t o talk abou t th e sources of war. 2. Participatio n i n the killings by certain arm y unit s adde d greatl y to the casualties. 3. On e of the worst too k plac e a t Asaba, a MidWestern Ib o town on the Niger, an d was a reprisal fo r an attack on federal troop s afte r a ceasefire. 4. D e Gaulle personally played an important role in the French decision to intervene. His motives seem to have been mixed : he disliked the size of British influenc e i n anglophone Wes t Afric a an d hoped t o extend Frenc h influence, an d he saw economic opportunitie s fo r France i n post-war cooperation wit h an oil-rich an d grateful Biafr a (Cronje , 1972) . 5. Ib o leaders had argued for some suc h state structure durin g the independence negotiation s an d in the subsequent er a of civilian politics. 6. Fo r example, the capital of the Eastern Region, Enugu, which I visited during the war, had not suffered much from shell-fire or fighting.But every stick of furniture had been removed; every movable object had been looted; and ever y doo r i n every hous e ha d been broke n down . Th e entire plac e looked uncannily and eerily lik e a doll's house without furniture . 7. Grea t personal credit needs to be given to the federal leader, Yakubu Gowon, wh o exercised hi s considerable influenc e consciousl y an d consistently in favor of clemency. 8. A considerable part of Biafra's foreign exchange for buying weapons came directly or indirectly from relief-linked operations. The relief agencies, for example, paid landing fees for planes bringing in relief aid! 9. I n his study o f the international aspect s o f the wa r John Stremla u devotes a long chapte r sectio n t o discussing wit h considerabl e insigh t the limited effect s o f outside diplomati c intervention s (Stremlau , 1977 , 372 387). 10. Th e most recen t arm y spli t an d attempt a t a military cou p (1990 ) was le d by som e Souther n officer s wh o wanted t o spli t Nigeri a int o two states, leavin g a Far Northern stat e landlocke d an d without acces s t o oil revenues. They did not mobilize much support, but they had hoped to capitalize on the existing North-South strains.

9.1 Greec e

204

N I N E

The Doome d Revolution : Communis t Insurgency i n Postwa r Greec e John O . Iatride s

The Greek communist insurgency of the late 1940 s has been viewe d as on e o f Europe' s majo r civi l war s o f th e twentiet h centur y (La queur, 1976 , 286) . Fo r a brie f momen t i t appeare d t o hav e th e strength no t only to overthrow by force th e Athens government an d replace i t wit h a revolutionary regime , but t o influenc e a s well th e emerging East-Wes t conflic t i n favo r o f the Sovie t Unio n (Acheson , 1969, 219) . Ye t suc h perception s prove d faulty . Durin g th e tim e when the communists could have seized control of the country, the y remained largel y ambivalen t an d o n th e defensive . B y 1947 , whe n the insurgenc y finally go t unde r way , th e governmen t ha d alread y mobilized a superio r forc e an d th e defea t o f th e communist s wa s merely a matter o f time. In fact , th e insurgent s wer e neve r abl e t o field a n arm y capabl e of victory while their opponents, united in their fea r o f communism, were determine d t o crus h th e revolution . Politica l an d militar y cir cumstances enable d th e Athen s governmen t an d it s foreig n sup porters to avoi d all dialogue an d reject ou t o f hand all possibility o f compromise. Thus , althoug h fundamentall y politica l i n it s origins , the conflic t i n Greece remaine d strictl y a contest o f armed strengt h in which th e tw o side s were overwhelmingl y uneven , an d the stag e was quickly se t fo r a winner-take-all outcome . Serious fighting lasted less than two years. Afterward, thos e of the revolutionaries wh o wer e no t kille d o r di d no t escap e abroa d lan 205

206 Joh n O . Iatride s guished i n prison, whil e thei r familie s an d supporters remaine d har assed an d powerles s fo r decades . I n short , th e relativel y quic k en d of th e Gree k civi l war , th e tota l victor y o f th e governmen t sid e an d the complet e banishmen t o f the loser s resulted from th e basic weak ness, poo r tactic s an d ba d timin g o f th e insurrection , an d fro m th e vastly superio r powe r o f th e domesti c an d foreig n force s tha t op posed it .

Postwar Greec e i n Revolutionary Upheava l Greece emerge d fro m th e Secon d Worl d Wa r a crippled an d polar ized nation . Abou t te n percen t o f th e populatio n ha d perishe d a s a result o f th e Axi s invasio n an d th e four-yea r occupatio n whic h fol lowed; many mor e wer e lef t maimed , emaciate d an d broken fo r life . Widespread destruction , pillagin g an d neglec t ha d paralyze d a traditionally wea k econom y an d sever e shortage s o f every kin d contin ued lon g afte r th e occupier s ha d left . Th e vas t majorit y o f Greek s were hungry and destitute an d their suffering wa s made more painfu l by the knowledge tha t others had enriched themselves i n black mar ket an d collaborationist activit y (Thomadakis , 1981) . Liberatio n ha d brought littl e promis e o f quic k recovery , particularl y sinc e th e gov ernment seeme d incapabl e o f securin g an d distributin g desperatel y needed relie f supplies . T o mak e matter s worse , shar p politica l di visions threatene d t o perpetuat e instabilit y an d lawlessnes s whic h would inevitabl y bloc k th e wa y t o economi c recovery . Thu s th e po litical crisi s woul d hav e t o b e addresse d first . There wa s universa l agreemen t tha t ther e coul d b e n o retur n t o the prewa r syste m o f government . Th e fascis t trapping s an d police state method s o f th e regim e o f John Metaxa s (1936-1941 ) ha d dis credited th e stat e machiner y an d ha d tarnishe d seemingl y beyon d repair the imag e o f King George II , who ha d been th e lat e dictator' s willing accomplice . Bu t ther e wa s violen t disagreemen t o n wha t should tak e th e plac e o f th e institution s o f th e recen t past . Greece's traditiona l partie s ha d bee n basicall y clientelis t follow ings o f prominen t personalitie s withou t a socia l progra m worth y o f the name . I n th e aftermat h o f year s o f passiv e acquiescenc e t o th e dictatorship an d enem y occupatio n the y wer e disorganized , demor alized an d ou t o f touc h wit h th e vas t majorit y o f Greeks . Mos t old school politician s appeare d t o envisio n a return t o th e pre-Metaxa s days o f a n Athens-centered an d paternalisti c parliamentar y govern -

The Doome d Revolution 20 7 ment (Legg , 1987 ; Petropulos , 1981) . Thi s was clearl y th e goa l o f British polic y a s well an d the basi c reaso n fo r Britain' s direc t an d decisive involvemen t i n Greek affair s throughou t th e war and postliberation years . An d althoug h ther e wa s debat e amon g Britis h of ficials concernin g th e retur n o f th e Gree k king , Prim e Ministe r Churchill considered the monarchy's early restoration the best guarantee tha t Britain' s interest s i n Greece an d the Easter n Mediterra nean would not suffer in the uncertain days ahead (Churchill, 1953 , 102-16, 283-325) . But Greece' s wartim e legac y als o include d a new an d powerfu l mass political movement whose vision clashed openly with the wishes of the bourgeois parties and of the British government. Built around the principa l resistanc e organizatio n (EAM ) an d it s militar y ar m (ELAS) and controlled by the communis t party (KKE) , this populist movement condemne d i n the sam e strong terms no t onl y th e hold overs of the Metaxas dictatorship and Nazi collaborators but also the king an d th e country' s traditiona l powe r holders . I n vagu e leftis t language it advocated sweeping purges, radical reform, social justice and the establishment of a "peoples' democracy." Its size, militancy and organization surpasse d anything th e countr y ha d ever see n before (Stavrianos , 1952 ; Woodhouse, 1981) . During the war the growing political divisions had led to violence, as in the mutinies of the Greek forces in the Middle East (Stavrianos, 1950) an d th e clashe s betwee n riva l resistanc e band s i n Octobe r 1943 (Hondros, 1983, 175-87 ; Woodhouse, 1982) . And although in the fal l o f 194 4 EA M had reluctantly entere d a government o f national unit y unde r th e prominen t Libera l Part y leader , Georg e Papandreou, a few weeks after liberation seriou s fighting broke out in Athens—in December 1944—whe n EAM refused to abide by a British-sponsored formula for the disarming of the resistance bands. This so-called Secon d Roun d laste d unti l earl y Januar y 1945 , whe n su perior British troops, rushe d t o Athens from Italy, drov e ELAS out of the capital and compelled the communist leadership to accept the disarming o f ELAS and agree t o a package containin g step s fo r resolving the more fundamental causes of the crisis—the Varkiza accord (Iatrides, 1972 , 320-24 ; McNeill , 1949 ; Richter, 1980) . Despite suc h a n inauspiciou s beginning , revolutio n an d all-ou t civil war were not inevitable in postwar Greece. Without a clear plan of actio n an d possibly discourage d b y Moscow' s aloo f attitud e th e communists had failed to exploit their military advantage in the final

208 Joh n O . Iatride s days o f enem y occupation : instea d o f seizin g powe r befor e Papan dreou's governmen t an d it s Britis h escor t coul d retur n fro m exile , they joined it as its junior partner. The horror s of the Second Round, which man y Greek s blame d o n th e communists , cos t EA M muc h o f its popula r suppor t an d brough t som e unit y amon g it s opponents , collectively self-anointe d th e "nationalists. " The Labo r governmen t continued t o commi t Britain' s prestig e an d deplete d resource s t o propping u p the Gree k authoritie s an d even th e Unite d States , how ever reluctantly , wa s beginnin g t o tak e a n interes t i n Gree k prob lems. Finally , th e Varkiz a agreemen t offere d reasonabl e prospect s for nationa l reconciliatio n an d stability . I n particular , beyon d th e disarming an d disbandin g o f th e resistanc e forces , i t provide d fo r a popular referendu m o n th e crucia l questio n o f th e king' s return , t o be followed by elections for a parliament to replace the one banishe d in 1936 . Thu s th e basi c framewor k fo r th e peacefu l settlemen t o f the ke y politica l issue s appeare d t o exist . It wa s no t t o be . Befor e th e en d o f 194 5 politica l tension s bega n to ris e agai n an d wit h the m th e leve l o f violence . Th e government , chosen b y th e Britis h fro m th e rank s o f th e "nationalist " politica l elite, had neither the authority nor the means to suppress lawlessnes s and introduce a credible progra m o f economic recovery . Mor e ofte n than not , rea l powe r belonge d t o th e stat e apparatus , largel y th e remnants o f th e Metaxa s an d occupatio n regimes , whic h regarde d the veteran s o f EAM/ELA S a s agent s o f Slavo-communis m an d at tacked them in the name of national survival. Something approachin g a "whit e terror " began t o swee p Greece . On th e opposit e side , severa l thousan d ELA S cadre s ha d defie d the Varkiz a agreemen t and , ignorin g order s fro m thei r superiors , remained arme d an d i n hidin g al l acros s th e countr y bu t especiall y in the regions along the Balkan frontiers. They were graduall y joined by other s wh o ha d a t first surrendere d thei r weapon s an d were no w fleeing right-win g persecution . Anothe r 5,000-6,00 0 arme d Slav speaking Macedonians , wh o ha d collaborate d wit h Tito' s partisan s during th e war , continue d t o roa m acros s Greece' s poorl y guarde d northern borders . A t firs t scattered , disorganize d an d o n th e defen sive, thes e me n i n th e mountain s o f Greec e pose d a threa t t o th e weak an d demoralize d Athen s governmen t whos e polic e wa s insuf ficient an d ill-trained to fight guerrillas in the countryside an d whose regular arm y wa s a s yet virtuall y nonexistent . B y 1947 , th e govern ment authoritie s had lost effectiv e contro l ove r more than half of th e country's rura l regions .

The Doome d Revolutio n 20 9 For more tha n a year afte r th e Secon d Roun d th e KK E showed no signs of contemplating arme d revolution an d did nothing t o encourage it s followers t o join th e band s i n th e mountains . It s chief , Nikos Zahariadis, who had spent the war years imprisoned at Dachau, appeared eager to consolidate hi s personal authorit y ove r the party and to intensif y it s confrontationa l bu t basically non-violen t tactic s against th e governmen t (Richter , 1987 ; O . Smith , 1987) . I n earl y 1946 a KKE delegation travelle d t o Mosco w t o see k th e Kremlin' s endorsement and support for armed revolutionary struggle in Greece but wa s advised instead t o continu e th e politica l effort , a t least fo r the time being (Iatrides, 1981 ; Partsalidis, 1978) . In February of the same year , befor e th e Kremlin' s respons e ha d bee n received , th e party's centra l committe e adopte d a set o f crypti c an d ambivalen t decisions and warned the government that unless the persecution of leftists wa s halted th e part y would boycott th e approachin g parlia mentary elections and there would follow "tragic consequences" for the nation . I n all probability, preparation s fo r arme d confrontatio n which the party called "arme d self-defense," wer e als o stepped up (KKE, 1988 , 241-54 ; Richter , 1987 ; O . Smith , 1987) . O n Marc h 30, 1946 , on e day before th e elections, a guerrilla band carried out a successful attac k o n the garriso n o f a small villag e a t the foothill s of Mt. Olympus. Although an isolated act, in retrospect this operation could be regarde d as the first battle i n the civi l war. All through 1946, politicians of various persuasions, united in their fear o f th e communist-le d movement , rotate d cabine t post s an d looked t o Britai n an d increasingl y th e Unite d State s t o rescu e th e country fro m it s domesti c an d foreig n enemies . Th e election s o f March 31, which were supervise d by American, British and French observers, change d little . Boycotte d b y th e KK E and others o f th e Left, the y produce d a clear victor y o f the conservativ e an d largely pro-monarchy Populis t Part y led by Constantin e Tsaldaris ; state institutions remaine d i n th e sam e anti-communis t hand s a s befor e (Mavrogordatos, 1981) . Th e government' s inep t handlin g o f Greek territorial an d reparations claim s succeeded i n antagonizing friend s and enemies alike and added fuel to the tensions that were mounting between Greec e an d its Balkan neighbors. I n September, a popular referendum returne d t o Athen s Kin g Georg e II , i n who m man y Greeks saw a symbol of continued allied support and of security from communist revolution . Whe n h e die d i n Apri l 1947 , h e wa s suc ceeded b y hi s younge r brothe r Paul . Wit h hi s German-bor n wife ,

210 Joh n O . Iatride s Frederica, th e ne w monarc h trie d t o personif y th e nation' s struggl e to surviv e (Frederica , 1971 , 95-140) . As if to underscore th e point tha t the battl e line s were no w firmly drawn, i n th e fal l o f 194 6 th e KK E established a common comman d structure fo r the guerrill a bands, whic h wer e collectivel y name d th e Democratic Army, to be led by "General " Markos Vafiadis, a veteran communist. Reversin g it s earlie r polic y th e part y no w launche d a vigorous recruitmen t effor t i n the rura l areas—-th e larger cities wer e under effectiv e governmen t control—an d a network o f trainin g an d supply center s wa s create d wit h th e hel p o f the communis t regime s to th e north , especiall y Yugoslavia . A yea r late r (Septembe r 1947 ) the KKE announced the transformation o f the Democratic Arm y int o a "forc e whic h wil l ensur e th e establishmen t o f a Fre e Greec e i n the shortes t possibl e time , startin g wit h al l th e norther n regions* ' (KKE, 1988 , 263) . Th e part y wa s promptl y banne d an d mos t o f it s leaders, who m th e governmen t no w charge d wit h sedition , fled t o the mountains . I n December , a "Provisiona l Democrati c Govern ment" wa s proclaime d i n th e Gree k mountain s wit h Marko s a s premier and minister of war. To earn credibility an d foreign recognitio n the Democrati c Arm y employe d heav y concentration s o f troops an d some artiller y t o attac k severa l larg e town s i n th e nort h (Fiorina , Grevena, Konitsa ) wher e th e sea t o f th e communis t governmen t might b e established . Althoug h repulsed , th e ferociou s fighting an d heavy casualtie s wer e a sever e tes t fo r th e Athen s governmen t an d its foreig n advisor s (O'Ballance , 1966 , 146-78 ; Woodhouse , 1976 , 203-59). The insurgents received no official recognition . Nevertheless, the y were publicl y heralde d b y Mosco w an d other communis t regime s a s heroic democratic fighters pitte d against "monarcho-fascists" in Athens. An d the y continue d t o rel y o n munition s an d supplie s o f ever y kind made availabl e t o the m primaril y b y Yugoslavi a an d t o a lesse r degree b y Albania , Bulgari a an d othe r member s o f th e Sovie t blo c (United Nation s Securit y Council , 1947 ; Howard , 1949 ; 1966) . B y 1947 relation s betwee n Greec e an d it s Balka n neighbor s wer e al l but broken , a s charge s an d countercharge s wer e trade d a t variou s international for a an d especiall y a t th e Unite d Nations , wher e th e Greek civi l war and its regional characte r emerged as a major irritant in th e growin g East-Wes t divisio n (Coufoudakis , 1981) . During 194 7 an d muc h o f 194 8 th e leve l o f violenc e continue d to ris e an d n o regio n coul d b e considere d saf e fro m attack . Th e

The Doome d Revolution 21 1 insurgents, wh o b y th e summe r o f 194 8 numbere d abou t 28,000 , took advantage of the long and virtually unguarded frontier and the rugged terrai n t o mov e abou t unobserved , suddenl y attackin g gar risons of mostly isolated and poorly defended settlements, often benefiting from vital intelligence provided by local sympathizers. As long as they operated essentially as independent guerrilla units they were highly effectiv e an d appeared capabl e o f pursuin g thei r tactic s indefinitely an d wit h devastatin g result s (Iatrides , 1981 ; Murray , 1954). At firstthe government's security forces were woefully inadequate for th e tas k a t hand . A newl y forme d regula r army , traine d an d equipped by British advisers for traditional border defense an d conventional warfare , lacke d th e numerica l strength , th e appropriat e weapons and the spirit to go after the guerrillas. Morale was seriously low a s the politica l loyalt y o f mor e tha n a third o f al l recruit s wa s uncertain whil e man y youn g me n sough t t o escap e servic e alto gether. Larg e number s o f field officer s lacke d comba t experienc e and, afrai d t o tak e th e initiative , settle d fo r defensiv e tactic s an d much long-rang e fire whic h wa s ineffectiv e an d wasteful. A t time s the stationin g o f troops wa s more a matter o f politics tha n militar y planning: influentia l politician s sough t t o hav e th e majo r town s i n their own districts protected before anybod y else's. During 1947 the army's effectiveness slowl y improved and the air force als o began t o com e int o it s ow n i n reconnaissance , bombin g and troop suppor t (Campbell , Down s an d Schuetta, 1964) . A large number of small-scale operations designed to locate and encircle the guerrillas gave the government force s much-needed experienc e but proved largel y ineffective : th e bands took evasiv e actio n an d gradually returned to their bases once the sweep had ended. But if 194 7 saw little militar y succes s o f the governmen t side , development s i n Greece, th e Balkan s an d th e internationa l aren a soo n thereafte r turned th e tide . A s th e government' s fortune s steadil y improved , and as its authority wa s gradually reestablishe d everywher e excep t the mos t remot e an d inaccessible areas , the insurgent s wer e le d t o their defeat an d destruction. During th e Secon d Worl d War, beyond contributin g emergenc y relief, the United States had refused to become embroile d in Greek problems, which it viewed as part of Britain's military responsibilit y (Amen, 1978 , 15-56 ; Iatrides , 1980 ; Wittner , 1982 , 1-69) . Afte r the war there was a growing realizatio n i n Washington tha t Greec e

212 Joh n O . Iatride s and muc h o f Europ e woul d nee d assistanc e t o rebuil d it s ravage d economy. Bu t American official s insiste d that th e Greek s had to pu t their politica l hous e i n orde r first an d sho w thei r abilit y t o benefi t from outsid e economi c support . I n th e spiri t o f the Declaratio n o n Liberated Europe contained in the Yalta accords, and to promote th e establishment o f stabl e governmen t i n Athens , th e Unite d State s played a leadin g rol e i n th e supervisio n o f th e Gree k election s i n March 1946 . By the end of that year Washington had concluded tha t Greece needed not only economic assistance and diplomatic suppor t but political and technical advice if it was to survive. In March 1947 , responding to Britain's announcement that it would soon discontinue aid to Greece and Turkey, the United States proclaimed the Truman Doctrine. The deepe r cause s of Washington's new-foun d dynamis m can b e trace d t o it s alar m ove r Sovie t aggressiv e behavio r acros s a broad fron t extendin g fro m German y t o Easter n Europ e an d th e Middle East. An immediate beneficiary o f the policy of "containing" the Soviet Union was destined to be Greece, in whose escalating civil war the Truman administratio n sa w Moscow's hand (Acheson , 1969 , 194-201, 212-26 ; Jones , 1955 ; Kuniholm, 1980 , 399-424) . The American involvemen t i n Greece i n the lat e 1940 s and earl y 1950s wa s all-pervasiv e an d it s impac t o n Gree k development s de cisive. Massiv e economi c assistanc e an d America n directio n o f vir tually ever y secto r o f stat e activit y produce d a measure o f politica l stability, improve d publi c service s an d confidenc e t o mos t Greek s that thei r crisi s woul d b e overcome . Official s i n Athen s an d Wash ington soon agreed that recovery and development were not possible unless firm governmenta l authorit y wa s first establishe d ove r th e entire country. This, of course, required the defeat o f the insurgent s and the annihilatio n o f the political forc e the y represented . Suc h an outcome woul d insur e th e surviva l o f Greec e a s a n outpos t o f th e western worl d an d serv e a s proof positiv e tha t Sovie t expansionis m could b e contained . Thu s the focu s o f the America n assistanc e pro gram becam e th e militar y effor t agains t th e communis t insurgents . In effect, th e Greek an d American government s adopted the dictu m which Churchil l ha d proclaime d durin g th e Secon d Roun d o f De cember 1944 : no peace without victory (Couloumbis, Petropulos and Psomiades, 1976 , 115-25 ; Fatouros, 1981 ; Pollis, 1981) . In retrospec t on e ca n onl y speculat e wha t migh t hav e happene d had the United States not intervened. Left t o themselves, it is highly unlikely that the Greeks would have been abl e to end their civil war

The Doome d Revolution 21 3 through negotiation an d compromise: after 194 6 th e ideological di visions an d mutual suspicion s wer e to o strong , th e publi c min d too inflamed, the political leadership in Athens too demoralized, and the bloodletting to o widespread . Withou t substantia l outsid e hel p nei ther side was capable o f clear militar y victory , especiall y sinc e th e British had neither the resources nor the political will to support the Greek governmen t t o th e bitte r end . Th e fighting could hav e con tinued fo r man y year s unti l mutua l exhaustio n ha d dictate d som e kind o f temporar y truce . However , fro m th e outse t th e insurgent s had enjoye d th e sympath y an d suppor t o f th e communis t regime s to the north , and especially Yugoslavia . Ha d the civil war remained stalemated fo r som e time , thes e regimes , an d perhaps Mosco w be hind them, woul d hav e foun d i t difficul t t o resis t being draw n into the conflict and to withhold assistance in sufficient amoun t as to give the insurgents the uppe r hand. Significantly, unti l 194 8 an d before his break with Stalin, Tito's "Balkan federation" scheme included a Greek component as well. Therefore, especially had the British withdrawn their limited military presence i n Greece a s they apparentl y had decide d t o do , Greece , o r a t leas t it s norther n regions , coul d have followe d th e othe r Balka n state s behin d th e "iro n curtain " before th e Unite d States coul d intervene. This is not, of course, what happened. British troops and missions remained i n Greece , givin g th e Athen s governmen t materia l an d psychological support . I n September 1947 , a t the insistenc e o f the Americans, th e Gree k governmen t underwen t radica l change . Tsaldaris relinquished the premiership to the octogenarian leader of the Liberal Party, Themistoclis Sofoulis, but stayed on as deputy premier and ministe r o f foreig n affairs . Fro m the n o n ke y appointment s needed the approval of the American embassy and economic mission, whose specialist s serve d wit h al l majo r departments . Th e militar y effort wa s supervised by a n American militar y missio n unde r a seasoned comba t officer , Genera l Jame s Van Fleet (Va n Fleet, 1967) , and severa l hundre d officer s wer e assigne d t o th e mor e importan t military commands . Althoug h th e matte r wa s give n seriou s consid eration i n Washington , America n comba t troop s wer e no t sen t t o Greece (Iatrides , 1981 , 215-16 ; Jones , 1989 , 79-94) . Britai n wa s persuaded to continue its military presence, even if diminished, thus staking the reputation of both principal western powers on the defeat of the Gree k communis t insurgency . By the spring of 1948 the government forces had greatly improved in strength, equipment, trainin g and, above all, in spirit. A series of

214 Joh n O . Iatride s carefully planne d an d wel l execute d operation s swep t acros s th e entire countr y an d i n hard-fough t battle s dislodge d th e Democrati c Army fro m it s principa l strongholds . Eve n thoug h b y tha t fal l th e insurgents ha d managed t o reinfiltrat e som e o f the sam e area s alon g the norther n border , th e en d wa s i n sight . Excep t i n remot e moun tainous region s wher e th e insurgent s ha d concentrate d thei r units , the governmen t ha d reestablishe d it s authorit y ove r th e country . I n the process , i t deprived th e insurgenc y o f whatever popular suppor t remained. Familie s of the insurgents and unarmed supporters move d across th e borde r int o Albani a an d Yugoslavia, wher e man y wer e t o settle permanently . Other s wer e relocate d t o mor e distan t lands , including th e Sovie t Union . In th e sprin g an d summe r o f 194 9 th e Democrati c Army' s mai n force wa s encircle d o n th e Grammos-Vits i rang e alon g th e Greek Albanian border and after ferociou s shelling , bombardment fro m th e air (includin g napalm ) and , finally, hand-to-han d combat , i t wa s mauled an d dispersed . Man y o f th e survivor s wer e take n prisone r while other s manage d t o flee int o th e communis t state s an d to exil e which fo r mos t wa s to prove permanent . A s a military forc e an d als o as a political movemen t th e communist s wer e finished. If th e outcom e o f th e civi l wa r wa s primaril y determine d b y th e strengthening o f the governmen t side , i t wa s als o significantl y influ enced b y th e tactic s o f th e insurgents . Th e Democrati c Arm y ha d been effectiv e a s long a s it operated a s a loosely structure d guerrill a force an d di d no t attemp t t o seiz e an d hol d territory . Bu t i n lat e 1947, t o achiev e it s politica l goals , i t switche d t o basicall y conven tional warfare , deployin g large , poorl y coordinate d unit s wit h littl e artillery an d no ai r support agains t sizeabl e town s defende d b y well equipped governmen t forces . Although individually its troops fough t well an d gave th e Athens governmen t a serious scare , the insurgent s were not adequate to this new task. Markos was sacked and Zahariadis took persona l command ; severa l Democrati c Arm y commander s were court-martialle d an d executed. Bu t Zahariadis could do no better. As a consequence o f these major setbacks the insurgents' moral e suffered badly , especiall y sinc e publi c sentimen t i n heretofor e friendly area s was no w turnin g decisivel y agains t them ; the govern ment's tacti c o f wholesal e relocatio n o f villager s als o deprive d th e insurgents of valuable informatio n an d support. Their reserves dwin dled, leadin g t o force d recruitmen t an d t o th e assignmen t o f front line comba t role s t o larg e number s o f women , resultin g i n highe r casualty rate s fo r th e insurgents .

The Doome d Revolution 21 5 Although the evidence is unclear, Markos' dismissal may also have been connected to the Stalin-Tito feud and to Yugoslavia's expulsion from th e Cominfor m i n Jun e 1948 . Accordin g t o som e accounts , Markos not only had opposed the switch to conventional warfare but had als o objecte d whe n th e part y leadershi p too k Moscow' s sid e against Tit o an d declare d itsel f i n favo r o f "autonomy " fo r Gree k Macedonia, a position which was anathema to an overwhelming majority o f Greek s (Eudes , 1972 , 241-356 ; KKE , 1987 , 299-316) . Whatever its specific policies and tactics, at the most critical turning point of the civil war the KKE leadership became badly (and openly) divided with disastrous consequences for its Democratic Army which was gradually cut off from its reserves and supply bases in Yugoslavia. The Stalin-Tito feud thus dealt a severe blow to the insurgents while strengthening the resolve of the Athens government to avoid concessions an d to secur e tota l militar y victory . I f compromise wa s no t a realistic possibility before th e summe r of 1948 , for the governmen t it was totally out of the question after that point. In just over a year the insurrectio n woul d be crushed . Once th e fighting had ende d an d the survivin g insurgent s wer e in prison o r abroad, th e governmen t attempte d t o appea r magnanimous and conciliatory, offerin g amnest y to those of the Democratic Army rank-and-file who were not accused of "common crimes. ,, But although the character of the government changed—Sofoulis die d in June 1949—th e state' s attitude toward the now-defeated insurgent s remained basicall y th e same : onl y "nationalists " wer e regarde d a s true an d trustworth y Greeks . Th e KK E remaine d outlawe d unti l 1974 an d for decade s t o com e it s follower s an d sympathizers wh o remained in Greece lived in hiding or under the watchful ey e of the police an d othe r interna l securit y agencies . Th e nation' s sens e o f identity, its culture and especially its educational systems at all levels had bee n permeate d b y a fanaticall y anti-communis t spiri t whic h would not fade until the 1970 s (Tsoucalas, 1981) . Thus, the military defeat of the communists was followed by their political banishment for another generation.

The Primar y Actor s Lack of effective leadershi p across the entire political spectru m was undoubtedly a majo r facto r bot h i n causin g th e civi l wa r an d i n determining its outcome. In the absence of systematic studies of the

216 Joh n O . Iatride s Greek leaders , institution s an d processes i n the 1940s , thi s key issu e can onl y b e reviewe d her e o n th e basi s o f impressionisti c observa tions. Because o f th e chronicall y fragil e natur e o f Greece' s politica l in stitutions, stron g persona l leadershi p wa s criticall y importan t eve n in time s o f relativ e stabilit y an d prosperity . A t th e momen t o f lib eration fro m th e Axi s occupatio n onl y th e mos t resourceful , broad minded an d pragmatic politica l leadershi p coul d hav e produce d th e sense o f nationa l unity , publi c confidenc e an d spiri t o f toleratio n needed t o harnes s th e country' s deplete d energie s t o th e tas k o f relief and reconstruction. Th e constitutiona l an d policy issue s whic h required prompt and authoritative answer s touched on the most fun damental aspect s o f th e Gree k stat e an d society ; benig n neglec t would onl y aggravat e a n alread y explosiv e situation . Becaus e o f th e severe shortag e o f vita l supplie s an d economi c resources , fo r mos t Greeks governmental action—o r inaction—spelled th e difference be tween relative comfort and hope on the one hand, and hunger, misery and desperatio n o n th e other . Lackin g a national politica l forum o f any kind, with country-wid e network s o f clientelist part y machiner y in tota l collapse , an d withou t widel y accepte d bureaucrati c institu tions t o serv e a s transmission belt s betwee n th e publi c an d th e gov ernment, ke y decision s ha d t o b e mad e entirel y a t the ver y to p an d quickly. I n a state tha t ha d no t develope d a strong traditio n o f par liamentary governmen t an d executiv e accountability , thi s situatio n placed th e nation' s heav y burde n o n ver y fe w shoulders . Politica l leadership coul d literall y sav e o r doo m th e country . In a nation o f politicians, would-b e leader s wer e i n abundant sup ply an d durin g th e interwa r year s man y ha d acquire d respectabl e reputations an d recognition. I n the Venizelist-republica n rank s suc h men a s Stylianos Gonatas , Nikolao s Plastiras , Panayiotis Kanellopou los, Georg e Papandreou , Sofocli s Venizelo s (so n o f th e leader ) an d Themistoclis Sofouli s (Venizelos ' successo r a s hea d o f th e Libera l Party) had established themselve s a s prominent nationa l figures. Th e conservative-royalist cam p boaste d o f suc h notable s a s Constantin e Tsaldaris, John Theotokis and Petros Mavromihalis, as well as a galaxy of lesser but stil l promising personalities . Bu t in the aftermat h o f th e Second Worl d Wa r non e seeme d t o posses s th e qualitie s neede d t o handle th e nation' s crisis . Althoug h th e reason s fo r suc h individua l and collective failur e ar e a matter o f debate , certai n generalization s appear t o b e valid .

The Doome d Revolutio n 21 7 Whatever thei r talent s an d capabilities , al l thes e me n ha d re mained under the shadow of their illustrious and domineering leader s who ha d regarde d thei r respectiv e partie s a s their persona l domain . With th e partia l exceptio n o f Sofoulis , the y ha d no t acquire d th e self-confidence, independen t visio n an d manageria l skill s t o gover n a trouble d nation . Whe n Venizelo s an d Panage s Tsaldari s die d i n 1936, th e issu e o f leadershi p successio n shoo k bot h camp s t o thei r core. Moreover , th e Metaxa s dictatorshi p condemne d the m al l t o total inactio n an d sen t man y t o priso n o r interna l exile . Th e enem y occupation whic h followe d mad e matter s worse. I n short, th e event s of 1 9 3 6 - 1 9 44 ha d stunted the growth of political leadership. In their minds, thes e me n ha d continue d t o liv e i n th e worl d o f th e 1920 s and 1930 s an d when liberatio n came they were no t equal to the task . As U.S . Ambassado r Lincol n MacVeagh , wh o kne w the m al l well , observed fro m Athen s i n Octobe r 1946 : Lack of leadership is certainly what principally ails this country at the present time—leadership whic h ca n se e beyon d politica l problem s whic h ar e no t only local in character but also completely out of date. The five-yearMetaxas dictatorship seems to have effectively prevented the rise of a new generation of politicians t o tak e th e plac e o f th e oldsters , wh o hav e no w com e bac k into the saddle, for lack of other leaders, and who still think in terms of the old struggle between Royalists and Venizelists, entirely missing the meaning of developments in Europe and the world which World War II and the rise of Russia have brought about. Small men, old men, and men entirely lacking in a sense o f realism whic h th e situatio n requires , ar e what w e ar e having to deal with now. As fo r th e othe r prominen t acto r o n th e politica l stag e o f Greece , MacVeagh concluded : " . . . th e Kin g wh o ha s been brough t bac k a s a 'solution ' fo r th e problem s whic h th e politician s wil l no t tackl e i s the sam e ol d muddle d indecisiv e figure tha t h e alway s was " (MacVeagh, 1980 , 7 0 3 - 4 ) . I n fact , th e sulle n personalit y an d steril e mind of King George II made him totally unsuited to be th e monarc h of th e unrul y Greeks . H e fel t a tota l strange r amon g hi s subjects , whose institution s an d cultur e h e regarde d wit h disdai n an d whos e language h e coul d hardl y speak , an d he live d fo r th e day s and hour s he could spend with his own kind, in England. Mor e the symbo l tha n cause o f division , h e remaine d unti l hi s deat h th e convenien t targe t for th e alienate d an d added fue l t o th e fire simpl y b y tryin g t o kee p his throne . The totall y inadequat e economi c resource s a t han d an d th e mag nitude of the recovery proble m adde d to the passivity an d indecisio n

218 Joh n O . Iatride s of Gree k politician s an d mad e the m tur n t o Britai n an d th e Unite d States fo r salvation . Couple d wit h a tradition o f subservienc e t o for eign influence , thi s attitud e invite d externa l manipulatio n an d re stricted eve n furthe r th e freedo m o f Gree k authoritie s t o tak e ini tiatives tha t migh t hav e fostere d politica l compromis e an d averte d civil war . Instead , the y sought , receive d an d carrie d ou t a stead y stream of rigid instructions emanatin g from the British and American embassies an d al l but eliminatin g th e possibilit y fo r accommodatin g even th e mor e legitimat e demand s o f th e Left . Finally, in the course of the enemy occupatio n and resistance mos t bourgeois politician s ha d develope d a pathological fea r o f commu nism, i n whic h the y sa w th e negatio n o f everythin g the y treasured . For al l thei r feuding , the y wer e unite d i n thei r convictio n tha t gen uine cooperatio n wit h th e KK E and its principal organ , EAM, woul d lead to the enslavemen t an d destruction o f the Greek nation. In their eyes, communis t leader s belonge d i n jail , no t i n th e cabinet . Al l through th e civi l wa r th e "nationalist " leader s remaine d convince d that negotiations with the insurgents were ou t of the question. Offer s of amnest y an d lenienc y wer e conditiona l o n th e willingnes s o f th e insurgents t o surrende r an d plac e themselve s a t th e merc y o f th e government. The communis t leadershi p o f th e 1940 s differe d fro m tha t o f th e bourgeois parties. Largely a nation of poor but land-owning peasants, tradition-bound, church-oriente d an d ye t fiercel y individualistic , Greece offere d littl e fertil e groun d fo r a communis t movement . Nevertheless, i n som e respect s th e KK E leadershi p labore d unde r the sam e handica p a s it s bourgeoi s opponents , excep t mor e so . I t was accustomed to obeying the commands of its Moscow-picked chie f and whe n h e wa s gone , a form o f collectiv e leadershi p contribute d to sluggishness , disunit y an d lack o f resolve. Alway s a very smal l an d often persecute d party , th e KK E ha d neve r bee n involve d i n th e governing process an d even it s parliamentary lif e ha d been shor t an d catastrophic. Afte r th e national election s o f January 1936 , the KKE's fifteen deputie s gav e th e part y th e chanc e t o pla y th e par t of powe r broker betwee n th e deadlocke d an d quarrelsom e Libera l an d Pop ulist parties . Althoug h secre t dealing s wit h bot h bourgeoi s partie s proved inconclusive, thei r revelation sparke d a violent reactio n fro m the arm y leadership—unde r Genera l Alexande r Papagos , th e com munists' nemesi s i n the civi l war—whic h threatene d a military take over unles s th e communist s wer e kep t ou t o f th e government . Thi s

The Doome d Revolution 21 9 communist''scare*' opened the way to the Metaxas dictatorship and produced the myth that the country had been saved from communist revolution. Unti l th e wa r came t o Greece , th e KK E was strugglin g to surviv e a s an undergroun d organization , decimate d an d demoralized by th e cleve r tactic s o f Metaxas * security polic e whic h con vinced many communists that they had been betrayed by their comrades. Moreover, throughou t it s trouble d existenc e th e KK E had trie d to steer a course between the dictates of Greek nationalism and the orders of the Comintern , particularl y a s they affecte d th e futur e o f Macedonia (Kofos, 1964). For the Slav-dominated international communist movement, th e KKE was the unwanted waif, to be used and abused in the interests of more important comrades such as the Bulgarians. Thus, in additio n t o thei r imag e a s bomb-throwing revolu tionaries, th e KK E leaders carrie d the stigm a of being willin g tool s of Greece's foreig n enemie s t o the north . The "anti-nationalist " label, whic h the KKE could no t shed , undermine d it s popularity an d during the period of occupation and resistance compelled it to seek cover behind the broadly based and clearly patriotic EAM coalition. With party secretary Zahariadis imprisoned at Dachau and others languishing in Greek jails, the burden o f KKE's wartime leadershi p fell upon a small circle of veterans of the proletarian struggle: George Siantos, Yianni s Ioannidis , Dimitri s Partsalidis , Petro s Rouso s an d Chrissa Hadjivasiliou. Lon g years of underground an d largely fruit less work, punctuated by party splits and purges, imprisonment and torture, had produced a generation o f colorless and dispirited plodders who nevertheles s continue d th e struggle . Cu t off fro m th e international communist movement and under the watchful ey e of domestic an d foreig n adversaries , the y sough t t o strik e a delicat e balance betwee n fighting th e foreig n occupier s an d preparin g fo r the da y when politica l powe r migh t a t last be thei r reward . Fo r all their dogma , disciplin e an d personal courage , the y wer e unsur e o f their strength and of the opportunities before them . Despite EAM's impressive achievements, a t the moment o f liberation they were no more confiden t tha t the y wer e fit t o gover n th e natio n tha n thei r bourgeois detractors . Thei r fram e o f min d is suggeste d b y th e fac t that for decades many seasoned communists believed that Siantos— who died in 1947—ha d been a n agent o f the Gree k an d British authorities al l through the resistanc e an d postwar years. Unquestionably th e central figure in the Greek communis t insurgency was Nikos Zahariadis. Born in Asia Minor in 1903, he became

220 Joh n O . Iatride s a labo r organize r an d professiona l revolutionar y i n Istanbu l an d fought i n the Russian civi l war, joining the Sovie t communis t party . He went to Greece for the first time in 1923 and rose quickly through the rank s o f th e party' s yout h organizatio n an d wa s name d t o th e central committee' s bureau . I n 192 9 h e wa s sen t t o Mosco w fo r training an d returne d t o Greec e i n 193 1 a s secretar y o f th e KK E whose leadershi p h e promptl y purge d o n instruction s fro m Stalin . Five years later the Metaxa s dictatorship place d him in solitary con finement wher e h e remained unti l the Germa n invader s sent hi m t o Dachau. When h e returne d t o Greec e i n Ma y 194 5 h e wa s 4 2 an d ha d spent a total often year s in that country , most o f them i n prison. By ideological indoctrination , persona l experienc e an d outloo k h e wa s much mor e a Soviet agen t tha n a Greek. Imperiou s an d short-tem pered, h e too k persona l charg e o f the part y an d quickl y turne d it s direction t o a bold an d unrelentin g confrontatio n wit h th e govern ment authorities . N o less than hi s ideological opponents , h e ha d n o use fo r th e ar t o f politica l compromise . Wit h th e hel p o f Markos , who had proven himsel f as a guerrilla leader durin g the occupation , Zahariadis buil t u p th e party' s militar y structur e an d b y th e sprin g of 194 7 h e launche d a n all-ou t insurgency . Whil e i t i s certai n tha t he receive d encouragemen t an d promises o f support fro m Belgrad e it is not clea r wha t signal s an d assistanc e h e receive d fro m Mosco w itself (Eliou , 1979-1980 ; Stavrakis , 1989 , 127-202) . Under hi s firm and harsh leadershi p th e part y performe d aggres sively and with a clear sense of revolutionary purpose. But Zahariadis made tw o error s which , together , wer e t o prov e fata l t o hi s move ment. First, his sense of timing was wrong: by the time he was ready to orde r th e part y rank-and-fil e t o battle , th e Athen s governmen t was stron g enoug h t o fight bac k an d th e chance s fo r a successfu l communist revolutio n i n Greec e ha d com e an d gone . An d despit e ambiguous signal s he apparently remaine d confiden t tha t i n the en d Stalin would somehow insure the victory of the party in Greece. His strategy wrecke d th e party , whos e rank s wer e decimated , an d cos t the countr y dearly .

Third Partie s The Gree k politica l crisi s o f the 1940 s wa s first and foremos t a domestic affair . Nevertheless , withou t foreig n involvemen t o n bot h

The Doome d Revolutio n 22 1 sides of the insurgenc y ther e woul d hav e been n o civil war. Withou t substantial suppor t from th e communis t regimes , an d the confidenc e that much more would soo n follow, th e Gree k communist s coul d no t have gon e beyon d th e stag e o f widesprea d banditry . An d withou t propping u p by Britai n an d the Unite d State s the postliberatio n gov ernments i n Athen s woul d no t hav e bee n abl e t o survive . I t hardl y needs sayin g that , i n decidin g t o becom e involved , outsider s wer e motivated no t b y an y genuin e sympath y fo r thei r Gree k clien t bu t by th e fea r tha t thei r client' s defea t woul d har m thei r ow n specia l interests i n th e region . The reputatio n o f th e Balkan s a s Europe' s powde r ke g wa s not , of course , entirel y undeserve d an d the Secon d World War did noth ing t o improv e matters , a t leas t a s fa r a s Greec e wa s concerned . Albania ha d serve d a s th e springboar d fo r fascis t Italy' s attac k i n October 194 0 an d successive Athen s governments continue d t o consider themselve s technicall y a t war with Tiran a as late a s the 1980s . Bulgaria ha d receive d Naz i Germany' s permissio n t o anne x Gree k Thrace, whos e populatio n i t proceede d t o brutaliz e o r expel . Al though o n the surfac e relation s wit h Yugoslavi a ha d been muc h bet ter, th e territoria l an d othe r aspiration s o f th e tw o state s continue d to b e a source o f friction . Afte r th e war , Gree k demand s fo r repar ations, frontie r adjustments , an d fo r "Norther n Epirus " (Souther n Albania) sharpene d division s eve n more . Thus, when Greece' s thre e neighbors establishe d communis t dictatorships , a n ideologica l di mension was added to traditional feudin g a s the "iro n curtain" cam e to coincid e wit h th e norther n border s o f Greece . During th e years of occupation an d resistance Tito' s partisans ha d sought to establish controlling influence ove r Slav-speaking guerrilla s in norther n Greece . Althoug h th e mov e ha d no t bee n particularl y successful, i t had planted th e seed s fo r cooperatio n i n the future . A s already seen , i n th e postliberatio n perio d veteran s o f th e EA M an d ELAS, fleeing fro m governmen t harassment , ha d found refug e i n th e neighboring communis t states , especiall y Yugoslavia . B y 1946 , ref ugee settlements—fo r example , Boulkes , nort h o f Belgrade—had be come base s o f politica l indoctrinatio n an d militar y training . I n ad dition t o clothing , shelter , foo d an d medica l supplies , Sovie t blo c countries made available to Zahariadis' agents quantities of weapons, including artillery , whic h playe d a significan t rol e i n th e armin g o f the Democrati c Army . I t i s als o saf e t o assum e tha t th e Tit o gov ernment gav e encouragemen t an d advice whic h influence d th e KK E leadership i n optin g fo r all-ou t civi l war .

222 Joh n O . Iatride s In fomentin g an d supportin g th e insurgenc y th e Tit o regim e ha d hoped t o achiev e tw o basi c goals : first, t o destro y Greec e a s the las t outpost of British—and later American—influence i n the Balkans and, second, t o se t th e stag e fo r th e establishmen t o f a communist "fed eration" in the region under Belgrade's aegis. If the Greek comrades , with Tito's help , coul d toppl e th e governmen t i n Athens, the y coul d safely be expecte d t o bow t o his wishes. Similarly , for Enver Hoxha' s regime i n Albania and Georgi Dimitrov' s i n Bulgaria, supportin g th e Greek communis t insurgenc y wa s th e mos t convenien t wa y o f neu tralizing an d perhap s destroyin g thei r enemie s i n Athens , thereb y adding t o thei r ow n security . But eve n befor e th e Tito-Stali n spli t i n mid-1948 , whic h prove d disastrous fo r th e Gree k insurgents , th e thre e communis t regime s i n the Balkan s acte d wit h considerabl e cautio n an d restraint . Th e sup plies provide d wer e neve r sufficien t i n quantit y o r quality t o ti p th e scales against the forces o f the Athens government . Th e heavy weapons, mechanize d transpor t an d eve n aircraf t th e insurgents ' hig h command expected neve r materialized. Instead , throughout th e civi l war the Democrati c Arm y face d seriou s shortage s o f ever y kin d an d had t o economiz e an d improvis e constantly . Equall y significant , de spite th e man y publi c word s o f support , th e communis t regime s would not extend official recognitio n to the insurgents. Perhaps there was littl e confidenc e tha t th e Gree k communist s coul d win . Mor e probably, Belgrade , Sofi a an d Tiran a wer e afrai d o f internationa l consequences, especiall y afte r ster n warning s fro m Washingto n an d London. An d afte r th e summe r o f 1948 , Tito' s regim e ha d ever y reason t o wish t o se e th e communis t insurgenc y i n Greece defeated . That th e Moscow-dominate d internationa l communis t movemen t wished t o maintai n a saf e distanc e fro m development s i n Greec e i s also forcefull y demonstrate d b y th e attitud e adopte d b y th e newl y created Cominform . No t onl y wa s th e KK E no t invite d t o join , o r even atten d the organizational meeting—nea r Warsaw , in Septembe r 1947—but i t ha d t o lear n o f thi s momentou s developmen t throug h press report s (Eliou , 1979-1980 , Jan . 12 , 1980) . Whe n th e Yugos lavs spoke at that meeting in favor of support to the Greek insurgents, the Sovie t delegatio n pointedl y ignore d th e subjec t altogethe r (Swain, 1989 , 47) . Elsewhere , th e Frenc h an d Italia n communis t leaders ha d expresse d thei r disapprova l o f th e KKE' s resor t t o full scale insurrection . Soo n after , whe n Tit o bega n pressin g th e Bul garians fo r a Balka n federatio n wit h Greec e a s a member , Stali n

The Doome d Revolution 22 3 ordered Tito and Dimitrov to appear before him and condemned the idea, settin g th e stag e fo r Yugoslavia' s forma l expulsio n fro m th e Cominform (Djilas , 1962 , 171-86) . In the absenc e o f solid proof, Moscow' s ow n involvement i n the Greek civil war can be evaluate d only on the basis of circumstantial evidence (Stavrakis , 1989 , 127-202) . Certainl y th e imag e o f th e Soviet Union as the greatest military power in postwar Europe, combined with development s i n the continent's easter n half, must have made it for the KK E a beacon t o be followe d t o ultimat e victor y i n Greece as well. For Zahariadis, who had spent his life serving Stalin's cause, th e succes s o f communism i n its struggle agains t th e Athen s regime wa s boun d t o hav e th e Sovie t leader' s endorsement . Con versely, it is difficult to believe that Zahariadis would have disobeyed had Moscow given the KKE explicit instructions to refrain from taking up arms against the government . What little is known suggests that in response to repeated appeals for assistance, Moscow's few direc t messages to the KKE leadership were ambiguou s an d temporizing, allowin g roo m fo r hop e tha t assistance might still come (Stavrakis, 1989,127-202; O. Smith, 1987, 175). In the aftermath of his "percentages agreement" with Churchill i n Octobe r 194 4 an d with muc h mor e importan t development s elsewhere, Stalin may have been stringing the KKE along to see what it migh t do , whil e avoidin g furthe r complication s wit h Britai n an d the Unite d States . However , a s the leve l o f violenc e intensifie d i n Greece and the Democratic Army took to the field, Stalin's attention was fixed not on Greece but on Tito, whose ambitious schemes Stalin was determine d t o crush . Thus , eve n i f th e Sovie t leade r ha d an y sympathy for the KKE, it was lost in the upheaval of his break with Yugoslavia. That the KKE dutifully too k Moscow's side against Tito was irrelevant and once again the Greek communists discovered that they were the least important and most expendable among the faithful. To be sure , th e Soviet s misse d n o opportunit y t o denounc e th e Greek government publicly as a reactionary regime bent on harassing and killing it s nation's democrat s an d threatening it s Balkan neighbors. At the United Nations Moscow and its satellites sought to condemn not only Greece but also Britain and the United States for their support o f th e authoritie s i n Athens . Bu t thi s flurry of diplomati c activity ha d more t o d o with th e tactic s o f the emergin g East-Wes t conflict across Europe and beyond than with the situation in Greece.

224 Joh n O . Iatride s Furthermore, i n th e 1940 s Anglo-America n influenc e i n th e Unite d Nations wa s strong enoug h t o neutraliz e Sovie t effort s t o exploit th e international organizatio n fo r Moscow' s ow n purposes . Fo r al l th e debates, investigator y commission s an d reports , th e rol e o f th e United Nations in the Gree k civi l wa r was to remain mostly symboli c and largel y vacuou s (Howard , 1966) . In particular, th e efforts o f Herbert Evatt , Australia's foreign min ister and president of the U.N. General Assembly during 1948-1949 , to brin g th e Balka n state s togethe r fo r purpose s o f mediatio n an d conciliation, prove d frustratin g an d ineffective . Openl y oppose d b y the Unite d States , th e Evat t initiative s foundere d becaus e mutua l suspicions an d hostilit y i n th e Balkan s prove d intractabl e a s lon g a s the majo r power s themselve s coul d no t agre e o n a formul a t o en d the conflict . I n the sprin g o f 1949 , a s the Gree k arm y was preparin g to attac k th e remainin g communis t strongholds , cautiou s Sovie t in timations to the United States that the major powers might cooperat e in enforcin g a solution t o th e Gree k crisi s wer e turne d aside : Washington viewe d an y prospec t fo r compromis e a s a victory fo r th e in surgents sinc e i t wa s boun d t o destro y moral e i n Athens . Moscow , possibly concerne d tha t a n emboldene d Gree k governmen t migh t invade Albani a an d brin g dow n th e Hoxh a regime—a s Athen s ha d secretly proposed to Washington an d London—apparently suggeste d to th e Democrati c Arm y tha t i t migh t suspen d it s activities , a t leas t temporarily, a s a gesture o f good will and moderation. Nothin g cam e of thes e move s an d althoug h th e Unite d State s woul d no t approv e an invasio n o f Albania , Gree k governmen t troop s crosse d int o Al banian territor y i n pursui t o f retreatin g insurgent s (Kontis , 1984 , 382-88). In th e highl y polarize d an d supercharge d climat e o f th e lat e 1940s, a crisi s whic h cam e t o b e regarde d a s a foca l poin t o f th e East-West conflic t coul d no t b e settle d throug h internationa l media tion. I n th e Unite d Nation s an d elsewher e n o neutra l groun d coul d be found as each side demanded a settlement o n its own terms. Unde r those condition s th e Gree k civi l wa r coul d onl y en d wit h th e tota l defeat o f th e weake r side . By an y standards , th e mos t influentia l thir d partie s i n th e Gree k civil war were Britain and the United States. Motivated by traditiona l power consideration s affectin g th e Easter n Mediterranea n an d th e Middle East , an d b y a growin g fea r o f Sovie t expansionis m i n bot h those directions , durin g th e Secon d Worl d Wa r Britis h official s ha d

The Doome d Revolutio n 22

5

shepherded th e Gree k governmen t i n exil e a s well a s the resistanc e movement. The y succeede d i n preventin g th e leftist s fro m gainin g control, particularl y durin g th e Decembe r 194 4 crisis , an d installe d anti-communist force s i n position s o f authorit y i n Athens . Militar y and economic assistance as well as continuous and direct involvemen t in the management o f Greek affair s had made British officials th e ke y decisionmakers i n everythin g bu t title . The experienc e prove d costl y an d frustrating : Britai n coul d sav e its Gree k client s fro m drownin g bu t coul d no t mak e the m stan d o n their ow n feet . I n Februar y 1946 , a s h e prepare d t o leav e hi s pos t in Athens , th e Britis h ambassado r reporte d t o hi s superior s tha t i n his considere d opinion , th e onl y rea l solutio n t o th e proble m wa s "to allo w a n elected Gree k governmen t t o appl y (afte r a plebiscite ) for membership of the British Commonwealth'' (Richter , 1986 , 4 2 1 25). Although the ambassador's suggestion to grant Greece dominio n status wa s dismisse d a s impractical , on e Foreig n Offic e officia l de clared: I stil l thin k tha t colonial treatment whethe r b y u s o r by som e trusteeshi p group is the only method which offers an y hope of nursing Greece towards solvency an d political stability . "Dominio n status* ' is meantime impossibl e because . . . Greec e i s a backward, extravagan t an d irresponsibl e countr y whose vanities are made greater and whose difficulties ar e therefore accen tuated because fo r both u s and the USSR Greece ha s strategic importance . (Richter, 1986 , 425 ) One yea r late r th e Labo r governmen t informe d th e Unite d State s that Britain could no longer carry the burden in Greece (an d Turkey). By Februar y 1947 , growin g America n concer n ove r development s in Europ e an d th e Middl e Eas t gav e th e Britis h ever y reaso n t o believe tha t Washingto n woul d no t allo w Greec e t o b e los t t o th e Soviet camp . Moreover , Britain' s recen t rol e greatl y facilitate d America's entr y i n Gree k affairs : th e institution s an d practice s o f foreign contro l wer e alread y i n plac e an d coul d b e expande d a s needed (Anderson , 1981 , 176-84) . As already indicated , th e Truma n administratio n decide d t o g o t o the ai d o f th e Gree k governmen t becaus e i t became convince d tha t the insurgenc y wa s a concret e manifestatio n o f Sovie t aggressio n which threatene d no t onl y Gree k bu t America n interests . I n lat e August 194 6 th e American embassy in Athens reported that the KKE was controlle d b y Moscow ; a mont h late r Ambassado r MacVeag h commented tha t "i n final analysis" the Sovie t Unio n was responsibl e

226 Joh n O . Iatride s for th e arme d struggl e i n Greec e (Iatrides , 1987 , 2 3 2 - 3 3 ; Unite d States Departmen t o f State , 1969 , 226-27) . I n Marc h 194 7 Mac Veagh told a congressional hearin g on the Truman Doctrine that "th e fellow t o blam e wa s th e fello w wh o control s th e littl e countrie s t o the nort h o f Greece , th e fello w wh o i s backin g them , righ t squar e back t o th e Mosco w Government ,, (Unite d State s Senate , 80t h Con gress 1973 , 40) . And in October 1947 , afte r visiting Greece, a senior U.S. arm y officia l reporte d t o hi s superiors , 'Th e Sovie t Unio n mus t be recognize d a s solel y responsibl e fo r th e existenc e o f seriou s in ternal strife in Greece. . . . I n essence the struggle in Greece is simply one phase , thoug h a n importan t one , i n th e worldwid e struggl e be tween th e United States and the Soviet Union" (Iatrides, 1987 , 236) . Such a perception o f th e characte r o f th e Gree k crisi s calle d fo r an all-out rescue missio n and the total defeat o f the communists sinc e America's securit y interest s an d reputatio n a s defende r o f th e fre e world wer e no w a t stake . Th e appropriation s whic h Presiden t Tru man requeste d fo r Greec e woul d b e th e beginnin g o f a program o f massive economi c an d militar y assistanc e tha t woul d continu e int o the 1950s . Moreover , America n official s soo n echoe d thei r Britis h colleagues' lamen t tha t Greec e wa s a "backward , extravagan t an d irresponsible country/ ' I n Februar y 194 7 th e first hea d o f th e eco nomic missio n reporte d tha t Greec e wa s no t reall y a stat e "i n th e Western concept, " tha t it s civi l servic e wa s a "depressin g farce, " and tha t it s governmen t wa s i n th e hand s o f " a loos e hierarch y o f individualistic politicians , som e wors e tha n others " (Iatrides , 1980 , 51). Gen . Jame s Va n Fleet , wh o heade d th e militar y mission , an d other America n official s though t tha t Greec e neede d a strong-ma n government whic h woul d no t compromis e wit h th e insurgent s (Ia trides, 1980 , 64-65) . While th e Departmen t o f Stat e continue d t o insis t o n a broadl y based governmen t o f moderat e politicians , i t preside d ove r th e es tablishment o f a n elaborat e syste m o f direc t America n contro l o f Greek affair s tha t wa s uniqu e an d unprecedented . Thus , i n a n at tempt t o separat e th e responsibilitie s o f th e embass y fro m thos e o f the economi c an d militar y missions , th e Departmen t produce d th e following lis t o f fields o f activit y i n whic h th e ambassado r wa s t o have th e uppe r hand : (a) An y actio n b y th e Unite d State s representativ e i n connectio n wit h a change i n th e Gree k Cabinet ; (b ) An y actio n b y th e Unite d State s repre sentatives t o bring abou t o r prevent a change i n the hig h command of the

The Doome d Revolutio n 22 7 Greek armed forces; (c) An y substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Gree k arme d forces; (d ) An y disagreemen t arisin g wit h th e Gree k o r British authoritie s which , regardles s o f its source , ma y impair cooperatio n between American officials in Greece and Greek and British officials; (e) An y major questio n involvin g th e relation s o f Greec e wit h th e Unite d Nation s or any foreign natio n other than the United States; (f) An y major question involving the politics of the Greek Government toward Greek political parties, trad e unions , subversiv e elements , rebe l arme d forces, etc . includin g questions involving the holding of elections i n Greece. (Iatrides , 1980 , 65 ) As might b e expected , a s a result o f thes e arrangement s an d for th e duration o f th e civi l war , Greec e wa s i n effec t governe d b y th e var ious American mission s in Athens and their superiors i n Washington. One particula r consequenc e o f thi s situatio n wa s tha t compromis e or eve n seriou s dialogu e wit h th e insurgent s wa s simpl y no t consid ered, a s th e mean s fo r thei r tota l defea t wer e no w available .

The Militar y Balanc e The ke y militar y aspect s o f the civi l wa r have alread y been outlined ; only a brief recapitulatio n wil l b e attempte d her e (Iatrides , 1981) . At firs t groupe d int o roamin g independen t bands , b y th e fal l o f 1946 th e insurgent s wer e brough t unde r a centralized headquarter s created b y th e KK E an d commande d b y "General " Markos . I n th e spring o f 194 7 Markos ' Democrati c Arm y coul d coun t o n abou t 17,000-20,000 "regular " troops , wit h anothe r 5,00 0 i n reserv e o r training abroad . Durin g tha t yea r an d th e firs t hal f o f 194 8 it s monthly recruitmen t rat e wa s perhap s abou t 1,000 , mostl y youn g farmers fro m smal l mountainou s village s i n th e north . I n 194 8 re cruitment becam e increasingl y b y forc e an d include d fo r th e first time larg e number s o f women wh o soo n represente d a t least twent y percent o f th e tota l comba t force . A hierarch y o f communis t "po litical commissars " an d a n elaborat e bureaucrati c syste m o f interna l security relyin g o n informant s o f th e wors t kin d suggest s tha t th e KKE an d it s militar y cadre s ha d littl e confidenc e i n th e loyalt y o f their troops . The Democrati c Army' s strengt h peake d a t abou t 28,00 0 i n Ma y 1948, an d fel l rapidl y afterwar d du e t o th e heav y fighting an d re verses o f that summer. Significantly , KK E leaders ha d estimated tha t to accomplis h it s objective s th e Democrati c Arm y woul d nee d a combat strengt h o f 5 0 , 0 0 0 - 6 0 , 0 0 0 , heav y weapons , moder n trans -

228 Joh n O . Iatride s port an d som e ai r support . However , b y th e followin g sprin g i t ha d risen onl y t o abou t 25,00 0 me n an d wome n unde r arm s an d abou t two-thirds o f tha t forc e too k par t i n th e final operation s i n the sum mer o f 194 9 o n Grammos-Vitsi . O f those, perhap s 5,00 0 escape d t o Albania and exile. Accordin g to government sources , durin g the fou r years o f fighting th e insurgent s suffere d 38,42 1 killed , 23,96 0 cap tured, an d 21,54 4 surrendere d o n thei r own . I n all , durin g 1 9 4 7 1949 mor e tha n 100,00 0 me n an d women fough t i n the rank s of th e insurgents. Some o f th e origina l guerrilla s ha d retaine d thei r persona l weap ons—mostly ol d rifle s an d pistols—fro m thei r day s i n th e resistanc e movement. I n 1946-194 7 the y adde d t o thei r arsena l weapon s an d equipment, includin g light mortars and machine-guns, anti-tank gun s and wireless sets , taken fro m governmen t troops . I n 1947-194 8 th e Democratic Arm y receive d fro m th e neighborin g communis t re gimes—mostly throug h Yugoslavia—quantitie s o f rifles , mortars , heavy machine-guns , grenades , panzer-fausts , mine s an d a fe w ar tillery pieces . Perhap s ten percent o f the insurgents ' arms, includin g most o f th e heavie r weapon s an d mines , wer e provide d b y foreig n sources. Th e endles s variet y i n th e weapons ' origin , vintage , typ e and calibe r wa s t o plagu e th e insurgent s al l durin g thre e civi l wars . As on e America n stud y concluded , th e Democrati c Army' s suppl y system " except i n the border area, coul d not support sustaine d com bat operation s an d faile d entirel y unde r th e demand s o f protracte d engagement" (Murray , 1954 , February , 56) . Th e static , positiona l tactics whic h th e insurgent s employe d afte r 194 7 reveale d thei r weakness a s a conventiona l militar y forc e an d doome d the m t o de struction. I n short , th e Gree k communist s neve r acquire d a n arm y strong enoug h t o accomplis h wha t the y se t ou t t o do . For th e governmen t force s 1946-194 7 wa s a painfu l perio d o f growth an d adjustment . Whil e a ne w arm y wa s bein g organized , trained an d equippe d unde r Britis h supervision , a hastil y forme d National Guar d and special "rura l securit y units " of armed civilians , all undisciplined and incompetent, wer e no match for the fast-movin g insurgents. Thei r conduc t turne d man y agains t th e government , while par t o f their equipmen t wa s seized by th e communists . B y th e spring o f 1947 , whe n a numbe r o f successiv e anti-guerrill a opera tions wer e undertaken , th e army' s strengt h ha d reache d 120,000 , with a n additiona l 50,00 0 i n th e Nationa l Guar d an d 30,00 0 i n th e gendarmerie. Badl y conceived and poorly executed, these operation s

The Doome d Revolutio n 22 9 failed to destroy the insurgents, who returned to the "cleared* ' area s as soo n a s the arm y ha d move d on . Nevertheless , th e governmen t forces graduall y too k th e initiativ e an d th e movemen t o f the insur gents' unit s wa s restricted t o ever-shrinkin g areas . In 1948 , with growin g American suppor t an d direction, th e arm y grew to 147,000, with another 51,000 in the National Guard, 26,00 0 in th e gendarmerie , 14,00 0 i n th e rebuil t nav y an d 6,50 0 i n th e newly formed ai r force. Tens of thousands of armed civilians assisted the authoritie s i n their districts . Equally important , th e governmen t forces wer e supplied with ne w and more powerful weapons , includ ing much-neede d pac k howitzer s (an d thousand s o f mules) , heav y mortars, recoilles s rifles , rocke t launchers , flame-throwers, napalm , reconnaissance plane s an d dive-bombers , an d moder n field com munications equipment . Thes e weapon s prove d extremel y effectiv e against th e bunker s an d fortifie d position s whic h th e insurgent s at tempted to defend in 1948 and in the final battles in 1949 . American officers wer e involved in the preparation of operations and evaluated their execution , ofte n ver y critically . Finally , i n Januar y 194 9 th e Americans requested an d secured the appointment o f General Alexander Papago s t o th e newl y create d pos t o f suprem e commande r with virtuall y dictatoria l power s i n matter s pertainin g t o th e wa r effort. B y then th e superiorit y o f th e governmen t force s ove r thei r opponents wa s overwhelming . The defea t o f th e insurgenc y wa s achieve d a t a ver y hig h cost . According t o officia l figures th e governmen t force s suffere d 8,44 0 dead, 29,49 6 wounded , an d 5,44 6 missing ; uncounte d number s o f civilians were also killed or injured a s a direct resul t o f the civil war in which land mines were used extensively by both sides . More tha n 700,000, or about one-tenth o f the total population, wer e forcefull y uprooted fro m thei r villages , man y neve r t o return . Thousand s o f actual o r suspecte d communist s languishe d i n concentratio n camp s on barren islands , whil e mor e tha n 25,00 0 childre n wer e take n b y the insurgent s ou t o f the country . Th e physica l damag e wa s no less extensive a s whol e village s wer e demolished , road s an d bridge s blown up , powe r an d telephon e line s destroye d an d mountainou s areas mad e impassabl e b y lan d mines . Death an d destruction are , of course, the mark o f civil war. What distinguishes the Greek case from mos t other conflicts in recent dec ades i s the ver y rapi d chang e i n th e militar y balanc e whic h i n tur n determined th e winner-take-al l outcome . Withi n th e spa n o f abou t

230 Joh n O . Iatride s a yea r th e insurgenc y los t th e militar y an d politica l momentu m a s the goal s i t had se t fo r itsel f became clearl y unattainabl e becaus e o f the domesti c an d foreig n factor s outline d above . Durin g th e sam e short perio d th e government' s strengt h an d resolv e gre w steadil y and tota l victor y becam e a virtual certainty . As long as the insurgent s hel d the militar y initiative an d their goa l appeared t o be th e establishmen t o f a communist regim e i n Greece , the governmen t wa s to o frightene d an d politicall y wea k t o see k a compromise. An d once the governmen t sid e had received th e Amer ican commitment o f support an d began t o secure th e material mean s to defeat th e enemy , i t had no incentive t o make concessions. Excep t for propagand a statements , neithe r sid e communicate d t o it s op ponent a willingnes s t o reac h a settlemen t base d o n compromise ; foreign factors also strongly militated against a negotiated settlement . On th e contrary , th e brutalit y displaye d b y bot h side s wa s a clea r indication tha t peaceful resolutio n o f the conflic t wa s not being con templated. I n short , wha t ha s bee n terme d a "hurtin g stalemate " that migh t hav e produce d a settlemen t throug h compromis e wa s never reache d an d th e civi l wa r wa s fough t t o it s bitte r end .

The Outcom e The Gree k civi l wa r ende d i n th e earl y fal l o f 194 9 wit h th e insur gents' crushing defea t an d their destructio n a s a political movement . Although th e victors soo n reverte d to their traditional infightin g an d the Populis t Part y fade d int o oblivion—t o b e replace d b y Papagos' s new conservativ e "Rally"—th e communist s remaine d fo r decade s banished an d stigmatized a s enemies o f the nation . With mos t o f th e KKE leadership scattere d i n exil e an d violentl y split , an d while vet erans o f th e Democrati c Arm y languishe d i n prisons , a fanaticall y anti-communist spiri t continue d t o permeate Gree k politic s an d cul ture an d t o characteriz e th e action s o f ever y agenc y o f th e stat e fo r decades t o come . Th e insurgents ' defea t coul d no t hav e bee n mor e total o r it s consequence s mor e lasting . The reason s fo r suc h a decisive , winner-take-al l outcom e wer e many an d complex , a s earlier portions o f this study hav e shown . Bu t the mos t critica l facto r wa s th e fundamenta l weaknes s o f th e insur gency a s a political movemen t an d als o a s a military force , resultin g in a dramatic imbalanc e betwee n th e tw o side s i n the civi l war . Thi s

The Doome d Revolutio n 23 1 domestic imbalanc e wa s furthe r accentuate d b y th e ver y differen t roles played b y th e foreig n patron s o f the Gree k protagonists . For all their early successes as guerrillas, once the civil war began the insurgents never acquire d a strong popular base. Generally per ceived a s revolutionarie s servin g thei r foreig n masters , the y coul d not rid themselves of the anti-nationalist label; the more they fought , the mor e feare d an d hate d the y became . A s a result, the y wer e no t able t o buil d u p thei r strengt h t o th e poin t wher e victor y ove r th e government force s migh t b e a realistic possibility . To be sure, Zahariadis' delay in ordering his followers to the mountains and the failure to procure military equipment in sufficient quan tity an d qualit y contribute d significantl y t o th e inheren t weaknes s of the Democrati c Army . Without massiv e suppor t fro m abroa d th e KKE could not possibly hope to topple the government ; an d despit e the many pleas and promises, such support neve r came. On the contrary, a t a critica l momen t th e Stalin-Tit o feu d disrupte d eve n th e relatively modes t suppor t networ k o n whic h th e Democrati c Arm y had com e t o rel y b y th e summe r o f 1948 . Nevertheless, at the root of the communists' problem wa s the fac t that the vast majority o f Greeks, however disillusione d with the rul ing elite s i n Athens , coul d no t brin g themselve s t o len d suppor t t o what the y perceive d a s the nation' s enemies . And once the benefit s of America n assistanc e becam e apparen t an d th e defea t o f th e in surgency came to be viewed as inevitable, most Greeks rallied behind the government . Thi s substantia l measur e o f nationa l unit y agains t the insurgent s improve d th e moral e an d effectivenes s o f th e gov ernment forces , no w greatl y expande d an d equippe d wit h al l tha t was needed t o defeat th e enemy . I n addition , th e Unite d State s an d Britain appeared determined to prevent outsider s from changin g th e balance betwee n th e tw o sides , thu s insurin g tha t th e governmen t forces coul d finish th e job . B y contrast , th e Sovie t Unio n seeme d unwilling o r unabl e t o rescu e a communist insurgenc y whic h i t ha d not inspire d o r activel y supported . Onc e th e civi l wa r ha d started , if there wa s a period durin g whic h th e outcom e wa s truly i n doubt , that perio d wa s very shor t indeed . In a negative sense Moscow contributed to the long-term outcom e of th e civi l wa r i n ye t anothe r way . Man y o f th e KK E leaders wh o managed t o escap e abroa d eventuall y reache d th e Sovie t Unio n where the y wer e settle d unde r condition s o f virtua l hous e arrest . Even fo r lesse r cadre s trave l wa s severel y restricte d an d al l "polit -

232 Joh n O . Iatride s ical" activit y wa s strictl y forbidden . Afte r 1953 , Stalin's successor s considered the m a s no more than a burden t o be tolerated. Couple d with thei r ow n bitter division s an d feuding , thi s enforce d inactivit y away fro m thei r homelan d prevente d th e Gree k communist s fro m continuing thei r politica l struggl e i n an y form . After th e 1950 s the climate in Greece began to change and a more moderate politica l cente r bega n t o emerge . Th e Cypru s problem , which straine d Gree k relation s no t onl y wit h Turke y bu t als o wit h Britain, the Unite d State s and the Atlantic allianc e a s a whole, damaged th e fortune s o f the conservative s an d le d t o a reorientation o f Greek politics. The gradual lessening of East-West tensions also contributed t o a mellowin g o f politica l passion s i n Greece . Bu t i t wa s only afte r th e fal l o f th e colonels ' junta i n 197 4 tha t th e KK E was legalized an d som e o f it s cadre s bega n t o retur n fro m th e Sovie t Union an d othe r countrie s o f Eastern Europe . B y then, a new gen eration o f communist leader s had emerged. Thus , if the Greek com munist insurgency ha d been doome d fro m th e start , its final chapter could no t be writte n unti l fort y year s afte r th e gun s were silenced .

T E N

The Cause s o f Peac e Robert Harriso n Wagne r

Because o f th e divisio n o f intellectua l labo r betwee n student s o f domestic and international politics , the cause s of civil and interstat e wars ten d t o b e studie d separately. 1 However , th e justificatio n fo r this division of labor is not as clear a s it is commonly believed to be. Writers in the Realist tradition have taught generations of students that internationa l politic s i s fundamentall y differen t fro m domesti c politics.2 It is different becaus e there i s no government a t the globa l level, and therefor e n o institution t o enforc e agreement s o r restric t the mean s peopl e us e fo r accomplishin g thei r objectives . Domesti c politics, however , take s plac e i n a n environmen t i n whic h govern ments try , wit h considerabl e (thoug h no t complete ) success , t o d o both. Kennet h Walt z ha s trie d t o captur e thi s distinctio n b y sayin g that internationa l politic s i s characterize d b y anarchy , whil e do mestic politic s i s characterized b y hierarch y (Waltz , 1979) . Violence, however , occur s i n both. Bu t ho w ca n th e us e o f forc e in the domestic arena be consistent wit h a hierarchical order ? Waltz says: The differenc e betwee n nationa l and international politic s lie s not in the us e of force but in the different mode s of organization for doing something abou t it. . . . A governmen t ha s n o monopol y o n th e us e o f force , a s i s al l to o evident. An effective government , however, has a monopoly on the legitimate I would like to thank Jack Levy, Roy Licklider, and Paul Pillar for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

235

236 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r use of force, an d legitimat e her e mean s that publi c agent s are organized t o prevent an d t o counter th e privat e us e o f force. Citizen s nee d no t prepar e to defen d themselves . Publi c agencie s d o that. (Waltz , 1979 , 103-104 ) Thus "hierarchy " seem s t o mea n simpl y tha t ther e ar e publi c au thorities, an d the y ar e expecte d t o hav e som e success . But thi s definitio n o f "hierarchy' ' applie s onl y t o "effective " gov ernments. Citizen s sometime s succee d i n defendin g themselve s against th e authorities , an d publi c authoritie s sometime s divid e int o warring factions . Th e resul t ma y b e ineffectiv e government , bu t i t is stil l par t o f domesti c politics . A s Walt z ha s written : The threat o f violence and the recurren t us e of force ar e said to distinguis h international from nationa l affairs. But in the history of the world surely most rulers have had to bear i n mind that thei r subject s migh t us e force t o resis t or overthrow them. If the absence of government is associated with the threat of violence, s o also is its presence. (Waltz , 1979 , 102-103 ) Indeed, Walt z writes , violenc e ma y b e mor e prevalen t i n som e do mestic political system s than i n the interstate system . Therefore " . . . no durable distinctio n betwee n th e tw o realms can be draw n i n term s of th e us e o r th e nonus e o f force " (Waltz , 1979 , 103) . Thus th e distinctio n betwee n domesti c an d internationa l politic s does no t reall y coincid e wit h th e distinctio n betwee n politica l be havior tha t i s constrained b y governmen t an d politica l behavio r tha t is not , i n spit e o f wha t Realist s say . I t woul d see m t o follo w tha t a n understanding o f th e cause s o f wa r amon g state s migh t b e relevan t to a n understandin g o f th e cause s o f wa r withi n states . Moreover , i f one focuse s o n politic s tha t i s no t constraine d b y institutions , whil e leaving t o other s th e stud y o f politic s tha t i s constrained , on e i s unable t o investigat e wh y institutiona l constraint s ar e sometime s ef fective an d sometime s not . An d i f one i s interested i n understandin g the rol e o f politica l institution s a s a mean s o f preventin g wa r a t th e global level , a n investigatio n o f th e cause s o f domesti c peac e migh t be a promisin g plac e t o begin . A s Ini s Claud e wrot e i n hi s classi c book o n th e managemen t o f forc e a t th e globa l level , " . . . th e pre vention o f civi l wa r i s th e functio n o f nationa l governmen t mos t relevant t o th e proble m o f orderin g internationa l relation s . . . " (Claude, 1962 , 269) . Thus th e divisio n o f labor betwee n student s o f domestic an d internationa l politic s ma y hav e inhibite d a n under standing o f both . The purpos e o f thi s pape r i s t o follo w thes e suggestion s an d se e where the y lead . Sinc e th e focu s o f th e discussio n wil l b e o n war ,

The Cause s o f Peace 23 7 whether a t the interstate o r domestic level, it will be useful t o begin by considerin g wha t a war is.

War A war is a contest, in which organized group s of people use weapons that wer e designe d t o woun d an d kil l each other , an d destro y eac h other's property. Contest s in the use of force occu r when th e us e of force i s oppose d b y th e us e o f force . No t ever y contes t i n th e us e offeree i s conventionally recognized as a war, however. If one group uses forc e agains t another , th e resul t wil l no t b e considere d a wa r unless th e victi m no t onl y decide s t o resist , bu t als o doe s s o wit h just enoug h succes s tha t th e conflic t last s a whil e an d produce s a significant numbe r of casualties. Therefore a war cannot be the result of the actions of only one group, and a war as conventionally define d need no t hav e been intende d b y an y o f its participants. 3 Contests i n th e us e o f forc e ca n tak e mor e tha n on e form . T o understand th e form s the y ca n take , i t wil l b e helpfu l t o conside r what forc e ca n b e use d fo r i f i t i s unopposed . Usin g forc e mean s doing physical har m t o people o r thei r property. I t includes , there fore, killing people, physically hurting or injuring them, and harming them b y doin g damag e t o third partie s o r t o things that the y value . One man may use force agains t another, o r threaten t o do so, either in order to remove another's resistanc e to his will (a s when one man kills anothe r i n orde r t o tak e hi s property) , o r i n orde r t o induc e another t o conform t o his will (a s when on e man tortures anothe r i n order t o induc e hi m t o revea l information) . It wil l be importan t t o bear i n mind that , whil e force i s often th e most effectiv e mean s o f gettin g one' s way , i t nonetheles s ha s im portant limitation s eve n whe n i t i s unopposed . Killin g peopl e pre vents on e fro m profitin g fro m thei r cooperation . Harmin g people , or threatening t o kill or harm them, may be less effective a s a means of inducing thei r cooperatio n tha n th e us e o f positive inducements . Another importan t disadvantag e o f the us e o f force , however , i s that it s intende d victi m ma y us e forc e t o resis t it . A ma n ca n us e force t o kil l anothe r ma n wh o i s trying, o r ma y try , t o kil l him; h e can try to destroy the means available to the other to use force against him; o r h e ca n tr y t o induc e th e othe r no t t o us e forc e b y harmin g him, o r threatenin g t o har m hi m i f h e doe s us e force . Thes e thre e methods of using force agains t the actua l o r threatened us e of force,

238 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r if not immediatel y decisive , ca n lead to thre e type s o f contest i n th e use o f force . I will cal l the m mortal combat, counterforce duels, an d contests of punishment, respectively . Mortal combat i s a contest in which the combatant s try to kill eac h other. A counterforc e duel , o n the othe r hand , i s a contest i n whic h the combatant s tr y forcibl y t o disar m (o r disable ) eac h other . Th e one wh o succeed s wil l the n b e abl e t o us e forc e agains t th e othe r without opposition . Th e outcom e o f morta l comba t leave s nothin g to be decided . A counterforce duel , o n the othe r hand , onl y decide s who get s t o us e forc e withou t opposition ; i t doe s no t decid e wha t form th e subsequen t unoppose d us e o f forc e wil l take , o r ho w ef fective i t wil l be . Both morta l comba t an d counterforc e duel s ca n lea d t o decisiv e outcomes i f the y ar e continue d lon g enough , bu t the y ca n als o b e stopped i f th e contestant s agre e t o d o so . A man engage d i n morta l combat wh o believe s h e wil l b e kille d ca n offe r t o b e disarme d in stead; if the othe r agrees , th e fight wil l stop . Someon e wh o believe s it likely tha t h e wil l b e disarme d i n a counterforce due l ca n offe r t o disarm himsel f voluntarily , an d ma y as k fo r som e compensatio n fo r saving th e othe r fro m th e necessit y o f continuin g th e contest . Thu s both these contest s can be ende d either by negotiation o r by fighting to a decisive conclusion . A contest o f punishment occur s when eac h adversary trie s to bend the othe r t o hi s wil l b y usin g forc e t o injur e o r har m hi m unti l h e does. I f th e mean s o f punishmen t ar e bein g use d u p i n th e contest , then contest s o f punishment ca n end i n the sam e tw o ways a s mortal combat an d counterforc e duels , sinc e i f a contes t o f punishmen t i s continued indefinitely , on e part y ma y exhaus t hi s mean s o f punish ment befor e th e othe r does , an d wil l thu s b e unabl e t o oppos e th e other's us e o f forc e agains t him . I f the mean s o f punishment ar e no t used u p i n th e contest , however , the n a contest o f punishmen t ca n only be ende d by th e voluntar y actio n o f the contestants , an d therefore b y negotiation. 4 Moreover , whil e morta l comba t an d counter force duel s ca n lead t o decisiv e outcome s i f continued lon g enough , they ma y instea d en d i n stalemate , an d thu s b e indecisive . I n tha t case they , lik e contest s o f punishment o f the latte r sort , ca n only b e ended i f th e partie s t o th e contes t decid e t o en d them . There is no reason, however, why contest s in the use of force mus t be symmetrical . On e adversar y ma y be trying to kill the other , whil e the secon d i s tryin g t o induc e th e first t o sto p b y harmin g hi m o r

The Cause s o f Peace 23 9 destroying thing s o f valu e t o him . Moreover , a counterforc e due l may be followe d b y a contest o f punishment, o r by a n asymmetri c contest i n which on e sid e continue s t o tr y to disar m the other , bu t the latte r no w trie s t o induc e th e forme r t o qui t b y harmin g him . Finally, both morta l comba t an d counterforce duel s are usually unpleasant in their own right, which provides a motive for ending them before they reach a decisive conclusion. Thus most contests of force include element s of a contest o f punishment, whateve r the primary form of the contest may be, and a stalemated counterforce due l may be indistinguishabl e fro m a contest o f punishment. It is the potentially decisive character of mortal combat and counterforce duel s tha t make s i t plausibl e t o spea k o f "winning " an d "losing" such contests. Note, however, that mortal combat is decisive only i f one' s ai m i s merel y t o kil l one' s adversary , an d on e o r th e other sid e succeed s i n doin g that . Counterforc e duel s ar e decisiv e only i n determining wh o gets to use forc e withou t opposition ; they do not determine the outcome of the unopposed use of force (which, as emphasized above, may be disappointing).5 And they may not even be this decisive if they lead to stalemate, or if they are followed, not by the unopposed use of force by the victor, but a shift by the loser to a strategy o f oppositio n b y punishmen t (a s whe n th e lose r o f a conventional wa r shift s t o guerrill a wa r agains t th e winne r instea d of accepting defeat) . Contests o f force betwee n o r among group s ar e rarely example s of mortal comba t (thoug h they obviousl y includ e man y instances of mortal combat) , sinc e whol e group s d o no t normall y tr y t o exter minate eac h other. 6 Conventiona l interstat e war s amon g th e grea t powers have rather been counterforc e duels , in which states sought to disarm each other by killing members of each other's armed forces and destroying thei r weapons , o r demonstrating thei r abilit y t o d o that convincingly enoug h that the enemy' s force s agree d to surrender instead.7 Terrorism, guerrilla wars, and some scenarios for fighting nuclear wars, on the other hand, are all examples of contests of punishment. Th e US government trie d to find and disarm its enemy in Vietnam, but found itself participating in a contest of punishment instead. Note, however , tha t states, to achiev e thei r objectives, nee d no t be abl e to disarm their adversaries completely ; they may only nee d to drive the adversary's military forces from particular pieces of territory that they control. 8 Moreover, even if a state has demonstrated

240 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r its abilit y t o disar m it s adversary , i t ma y choos e no t t o d o so , bu t t o use it s victor y o n th e battlefiel d t o extrac t concession s fro m it s ad versary instea d (a s di d th e victoriou s allie s i n Worl d Wa r I). Weapons, numbers , organization , an d territor y ar e al l importan t in determinin g wh o ha s a n advantag e i n contest s i n violence . Thi s fact provides a motive fo r cooperation i n the us e of force: by poolin g their resource s an d organizing , individual s ca n gai n a n advantag e over other individuals i n contests i n the us e o f force. I t also provide s an opportunity fo r a division o f labor: some peopl e ca n specializ e i n contests in violence, an d offer to support others in them, in exchang e for othe r thing s o f valu e (includin g som e o f th e resource s tha t ar e needed t o mak e o r acquir e instrument s o f violence) . But disagreement s ca n b e expecte d t o aris e amon g peopl e wh o decide to help each other in violent contests. And disagreements wil l arise betwee n specialist s i n violenc e an d thos e t o who m the y sel l their services . Ho w ar e thes e disagreement s t o b e settled ? Perhap s they wil l als o b e settle d b y th e us e o f force . Whil e thi s i s possible , however (a s when thieve s fight ove r how t o divid e u p a pile o f loot), it tends to make the coalitio n les s effective i n the us e o f force. Whil e fighting amon g themselves, it s members canno t direc t their energie s against their opponents; and those wh o are weak in the struggl e ove r dividing u p th e spoil s ma y elec t t o joi n th e opposin g sid e instead . Thus th e nee d o f individual s an d group s t o cooperat e i n th e us e o f force ca n b e a motive fo r settlin g difference s amon g the m i n a nonforceful way . Wa r an d peac e ca n therefor e eac h b e a caus e o f th e other. 9 In summary , then , war s ar e contest s i n th e us e o f force . The y occur whe n attempt s t o us e forc e ar e contested , bu t i n a wa y tha t is no t immediatel y decisive . Thu s war s wil l no t occu r i f (1 ) n o on e tries t o us e forc e a s a means o f gettin g hi s way ; (2 ) forc e i s used (o r threatened) bu t neve r contested ; o r (3 ) contest s i n th e us e o f forc e are alway s decide d quickl y an d withou t man y casualtie s o r muc h damage. Peace , therefore , ma y b e associate d eithe r wit h th e avoid ance o f th e us e o f force , o r it s unchallenge d o r effectiv e use . Wars are fough t b y group s an d no t by individuals . Thu s ho w con tests i n th e us e o f forc e ar e decided , an d whethe r the y wil l b e de cided quickly , depend s o n wha t coalition s exis t an d whethe r the y will persist . Th e differenc e betwee n domesti c an d international pol itics i s sometime s sai d t o b e tha t i n th e domesti c aren a th e us e o f force b y th e stat e i s no t subjec t t o seriou s challenge , whil e i n th e

The Cause s of Peace 24 1 international aren a one state' s us e o f forc e ca n be effectivel y chal lenged by other states. A state, however, is itself a kind of coalition, and it s abilit y t o defea t it s domesti c opponent s decisivel y canno t explain its ability to hold itself together. Thu s the supremacy of the state can at best be only a partial statement of the conditions for civil peace. If so, then the domestic and international arena s may not be so differen t afte r all , an d th e literatur e o n interstat e wa r ma y b e relevant t o understanding th e condition s fo r civil peace .

The Cause s o f International Wa r Wars are unpleasant, an d much o f the stud y o f them ha s been motivated by th e practical questio n o f how to prevent the m (o r whom to blame for them). As a result, the study of wars of all sorts focuses overwhelmingly on how they begin, rather than how they end. Once a war has begun, however, ending it often becomes a practical problem i n it s ow n right . Th e smal l literatur e o n th e ending s o f wars , therefore, tend s t o ignor e th e questio n o f ho w war s begin. 10 Ye t if one is interested in what determines whether adversaries are at war or at peace, it seems reasonable that one should investigate both how wars begin an d how the y end , an d expect som e systemati c relatio n between th e two . An y conditio n tha t cause d a war t o begin , on e might think, will cause the war to continue until either the condition ceases t o exis t o r th e adversarie s ar e unabl e t o continu e fighting. And there i s th e possibilit y tha t i f th e conditio n disappear s befor e either adversar y i s unabl e t o continu e fighting, th e wa r will none theless end . If so, then another effect o f separating the study of the beginnings of war s fro m th e stud y o f thei r ending s wil l b e tha t th e objec t o f one's study becomes poorly defined . Ther e i s a huge literature , fo r example, on the origins of World War I. But what was World War I? It was the whole militar y contes t that took place from the first shot that was fired until the armistice. If the war had ended much earlier, or taken a different course, then the war whose origins one is seeking might hav e bee n a very differen t wa r fro m th e on e tha t ha s bee n studied so much. Much of the literature on the causes of war tacitly assumes that , onc e begun , a war takes it s ow n autonomou s cours e until it reaches a decisive conclusio n (usuall y equated with the victory o f on e sid e o r th e other) . A closer loo k a t the wa y war s end , however, teaches us that this need not be true, and often is not true:

242 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r groups tha t decid e t o begi n a wa r ca n decid e t o en d it. 11 Thus , i f one want s t o explai n th e occurrenc e o f a wa r a s customaril y iden tified, explainin g it s beginnin g canno t reall y b e separate d fro m ex plaining it s ending , an d everythin g tha t happene d i n between. 1 2 The ide a tha t th e cause s o f wa r an d th e cause s o f peac e ar e in timately relate d ha s bee n mos t eloquentl y defende d b y Geoffre y Blainey, wh o wrote : For every thousand pages published o n the cause s of wars there i s less than one pag e directl y o n th e cause s o f peace . An d ye t th e cause s o f wa r an d peace, logically , shoul d dovetai l int o on e another . A weak explanatio n o f why Europ e wa s a t peac e wil l lea d t o a wea k explanatio n o f wh y Europ e was at war . A valid diagnosi s of war will be reflecte d i n a valid diagnosis of peace. (Blainey , 1988 , 3 ; see als o Wittman, 1979) Blainey mean t thes e statement s t o appl y t o wa r an d peac e amon g states. Bu t ther e i s n o reaso n wh y the y shoul d no t als o appl y t o wa r and peac e withi n states . According t o Blainey , th e relatio n betwee n wa r an d peac e i s sim ply tha t Wars usually en d whe n th e fighting nations agree on their relative strength , and war s usuall y begi n whe n fighting nation s disagree o n thei r relativ e strength. Agreemen t o r disagreemen t i s shaped b y th e sam e se t o f factors . Thus each factor that is a prominent cause of war can at times be a prominent cause o f peace. Therefore "[w]a r itself," h e writes, "i s a dispute abou t measurement ; peace, o n th e othe r hand , mark s a rough agreemen t abou t measure ment" (Blainey , 1988 , 122) . Unfortunately , Blaine y di d no t mak e entirely clea r wha t thes e remark s meant , o r wh y h e though t the y were true . Som e clarificatio n i s therefor e necessar y befor e w e ca n properly evaluat e them . Blainey's mai n thesis , I suggest , ca n b e reconstructe d i n th e for m of th e followin g simpl e argument , whic h I wil l cal l Blainey' s Argu ment: 1. I n orde r fo r a war t o occur , a t leas t tw o state s mus t b e willin g t o

fight.

2. N o stat e wil l fight unles s it s leader s believ e tha t th e expecte d consequences o f fighting ar e bette r tha n th e expecte d conse quences o f no t fighting. 3. An y outcom e o f wa r ca n als o b e achieve d withou t wa r i f al l th e potential combatant s agre e t o it .

The Cause s o f Peace 24 3 4. Al l leaders prefer n o war to war if the expected outcom e o f both is the same . .". No war will occur unless the combatants hav e different expectation s of its outcome. Interpreted i n thi s way , Blainey' s clai m i s to hav e identifie d condi tions that ar e necessary for war , an d therefore sufficient for peace. 13 Since th e wor d "cause " ordinaril y mean s a sufficien t conditio n fo r something, Blainey's book migh t hav e been bette r title d The Causes of Peace. Thi s argumen t implie s tha t on e o f th e cause s o f peac e i s convergent expectation s of the outcome s o f wars. If potential antag onists disagree about the consequences of a war between them , the n a wa r ma y occur , bu t nee d not ; i f the y agre e abou t th e outcome , however, then a war will not occur. At the beginning of a war, therefore, the antagonists must have different expectation s of its outcome; but if the progress of the wa r causes their expectation s to converge, then the war will end even if both sides are able to continue fighting . Unfortunately, thi s is not, a s it stands, a valid argument . Fo r suppose th e combatant s ar e uncertai n o f the outcom e o f war, but thei r expectations ar e identical . I f on e o r bot h th e combatant s ar e risk acceptant, then there may be no compromise outcome that they both prefer t o the lottery associated with war. 14 Thus at the very least th e conclusion t o Blainey' s Argumen t mus t b e change d t o read : .'. No war will occur unless the combatants are uncertain about the outcome of war, or disagree about what it will be. This amended conclusio n i s obviously stil l consistent wit h th e spiri t of Blainey's discussion . Unfortunately, however , th e argumen t i s still no t valid . Fo r sup pose tw o combatant s hav e identica l an d certai n expectation s o f th e outcome of war between them, but there is a range of possible agreements tha t bot h woul d prefe r t o fighting th e war . The n i t ma y no t be commo n knowledg e whic h agreement s eac h prefer s t o wa r an d which i t doe s not . Thu s on e ma y hol d ou t fo r a n agreemen t mor e favorable t o itself than th e outcom e o f war, believing tha t th e othe r would b e willin g t o accep t it . Th e othe r ma y the n decid e tha t th e expected outcom e o f war i s preferable t o th e expecte d outcom e o f bargaining. Moreover, suppose it were common knowledge which agreement s each side preferred t o war and which it did not. Bargaining over th e

244 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r terms o f a n agreemen t woul d stil l tak e time , an d i f th e combatant s believed the y wer e fa r apart in their expectation s o f the outcom e o f bargaining, the y migh t decid e tha t the expecte d outcom e o f war was preferable. Finally, suppos e bot h side s expec t th e wa r to be a contest o f punishment i n which neithe r will be abl e to disarm the other , an d therefore the y expec t th e militar y contes t alon e t o b e indecisive . The n fighting i s bargaining, an d each mus t compare th e valu e o f an agreement no w wit h it s expectatio n o f wha t agreemen t th e othe r wil l b e willing t o accep t afte r furthe r fighting. Th e fighting ca n end , there fore, onl y when th e combatant s hav e convergen t expectation s o f th e outcome o f bargaining . If it is to be valid , then, Blainey' s Argumen t mus t be furthe r mod ified, s o tha t it s conclusio n reads : .'. N o wa r wil l occu r unles s (1 ) th e combatant s ar e uncertai n abou t th e outcome of war, (2) th e combatants disagree about what the outcome of war will be, (3 ) th e combatants are uncertain about the outcome of bargaining, o r (4) th e combatants differ greatl y i n their expectations of the outcome o f bargaining. This i s no w a valid argument , sinc e i f non e o f th e hypothese s state d in th e conclusio n i s true, th e combatant s mus t prefe r negotiatin g t o fighting. I t ca n be summarize d b y sayin g tha t anythin g tha t contrib utes t o th e convergenc e o f expectation s o f th e outcom e o f wa r an d the outcom e o f bargainin g make s peac e mor e likely. 15 Even i f th e argumen t i s valid , however , th e conclusio n ma y stil l be fals e if on e o r mor e o f th e premise s i s false . Th e first premis e i s a consequenc e o f th e wa y "war " ha s been defined , an d therefor e i s not ope n t o muc h dispute . Th e secon d i s a weak rationalit y assump tion, whic h i s perhaps mor e controversial . On e importan t reaso n fo r questioning i t i s tha t th e expectation s o f leader s an d follower s ma y differ. Thu s leader s ma y b e willin g t o accep t a n agreemen t a s a n alternative t o war , bu t realiz e tha t i t woul d b e rejecte d b y thei r followers. This , however , i s no t s o muc h a fundamental objectio n t o Blainey's analysis as it is a reason for modifying i t to take into accoun t the relation s between leader s an d followers. I t implies tha t wars wil l be harde r t o en d i f follower s a s wel l a s leader s o n bot h side s mus t have convergen t expectation s o f th e outcome . The thir d premis e seem s quit e plausibl e a s long a s it make s sens e to distinguis h betwee n th e effect s o f wa r an d it s outcome . Thi s re quires tha t politica l leader s b e self-interested , an d therefor e car e

The Cause s o f Peace 24 5 only about their ow n side' s gain s and losses. Then th e damag e don e to th e othe r sid e by wa r wil l b e neithe r a gai n no r a loss t o them . If, instead , eac h take s satisfactio n i n th e sufferin g o f the othe r side , then i n order fo r th e third premise t o be true i t would be necessar y for the agreement tha t i s accepted instea d o f war to incorporate th e infliction o f punishment o n on e o r bot h sides . This seem s unlikely , and i f i t wer e possibl e the n th e trut h o f th e fourt h premis e woul d become questionable . The fourt h premis e i s also not very plausibl e i f the expecte d out come o f war i s the physica l exterminatio n o f one sid e an d tha t out come i s th e goa l o f th e othe r side . Note , however , tha t politica l absorption i s no t th e sam e a s physica l extermination . Physica l ex termination i s no t a ver y commo n motivatio n fo r th e us e o f forc e among states ; i t may , unfortunately , b e mor e commo n a s a motiv e within states . A more serious problem with the fourth premis e is that states may want t o fight in one wa r in order t o enhanc e th e credibilit y o f thei r commitment t o fight in others. If war is avoided, their reputation fo r fighting wil l no t b e enhanced , an d thu s th e fourt h premis e ma y b e false. Eve n so , however , th e poin t o f cultivatin g a reputatio n fo r fighting i s t o influenc e th e expectation s o f one' s adversarie s abou t the consequence s o f thei r usin g forc e i n othe r contexts . Thu s th e reason wh y th e fourt h premis e i s false wit h respec t t o on e conflic t may be tha t i t i s true o f another . It ma y a t first appear tha t on e o r anothe r o f these premise s mus t be fals e i f ther e i s a n incentiv e t o attac k first. Bu t a n incentiv e t o attack first really implies that, sinc e the outcom e o f war depends o n who begins it, it is not possible for the adversaries to have convergent expectations abou t th e outcom e unles s the y als o know wh o wil l at tack first. Thus an incentive to attack first may make it more difficul t to avoid war by making it more difficult fo r states to have convergent expectations o f th e war' s outcome . O n th e othe r hand , a s I hav e already emphasized , onc e someon e ha s attacke d an d therefor e ac quired an y advantag e associate d wit h attackin g first, th e incentiv e to attack first cannot explain why the war does not end immediately . There are , then , importan t circumstance s i n whic h on e o r mor e of these premises ma y be false . I t seem s likely, however , tha t thes e premises wil l ofte n b e true . An d whe n the y ar e true , convergen t expectations o f bot h th e outcom e o f wa r an d th e outcom e o f bar gaining wil l mak e peac e easie r t o achieve . Eve n then , convergen t

246 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r expectations wil l b e a sufficient conditio n fo r peace , no t a necessar y condition, an d therefor e ther e ma y b e peac e eve n whe n ther e i s n o consensus a s t o th e expecte d outcom e o f war . Thus Blaine y i s righ t whe n h e say s tha t "[expectation s . . . see m to b e a crucial clu e t o th e cause s o f war an d peace" (Blainey , 1988 , 55). I t i s importan t t o kee p i n mind , however , wha t sort s o f expec tations ar e relevant . Whe n h e say s tha t wa r occur s whe n state s dis agree abou t thei r relativ e strength , an d therefore tha t wa r is a "dispute abou t measurement/ ' h e seem s t o hav e i n min d factor s tha t influence th e outcom e o f a counterforce duel . Bu t a t other time s h e refers t o expectation s abou t th e outcom e o f bargaining, a s when h e says that wa r is a "dispute abou t bargainin g power " (Blainey , 1988 , 117). Thes e ar e no t th e same , an d bot h ar e important . Fo r substi tuting agreement fo r war requires that the combatants agree not only on th e subsequen t cours e o f th e wa r i f fighting continues , bu t als o on ho w t o divid e u p th e gain s fro m stoppin g it . This , however , ca n only b e decide d b y bargaining . An d bargainin g lead s t o agreemen t only whe n al l partie s prefe r som e agreemen t t o th e expecte d out come o f furthe r bargaining , whic h ma y no t b e tru e i f the y diffe r greatly i n thei r expectation s o f wha t th e outcom e o f furthe r bar gaining wil l be . Even thoug h Blaine y claime d tha t th e cause s o f wa r an d peac e were the same, and that if one understood why wars ended one woul d also understan d wh y the y began , hi s boo k i s abou t th e beginning s of war s an d no t thei r endings . Th e stud y o f peac e negotiation s b y Pillar (1983) , however, provide s strong support for his ideas (a t least as I hav e interprete d them). 16 On e o f th e mai n theme s o f Pillar' s book i s th e differenc e betwee n expectation s concernin g th e futur e course o f military operation s an d expectations concernin g th e futur e course o f negotiations , an d th e importanc e o f th e convergenc e o f both a s a precondition fo r th e negotiate d settlemen t o f wars. 17 Let u s follow Blainey , then , an d say that anything that contribute s to convergent expectation s o f the outcome o f war makes peace mor e likely. Wha t doe s thi s impl y abou t th e cause s o f peace ? Accordin g to Blainey, i t implies that the surest cause of peace i s war itself, sinc e the bes t wa y o f measurin g th e relativ e powe r o f state s i s t o hav e them tes t thei r powe r i n war against eac h other . Thu s decisiv e war s are followe d b y lon g period s o f peace , sinc e th e informatio n the y provide abou t th e powe r o f state s last s lon g afte r them . Ove r time , however, thi s informatio n become s ou t o f date , an d th e probabilit y

The Cause s o f Peace 24 7 of war therefor e increases . Similarly , Blaine y conclude s tha t a lopsided distribution o f military power is a potent force fo r peace, since this promotes consistent expectations of the outcome of war (Blainey, 1988, 108-119). 18 These inference s hav e two problems i n common, however . First , they see m mor e relevan t t o counterforc e duel s tha n t o contest s o f punishment. Contest s o f punishmen t ar e contest s o f will . I t i s no t clear ho w th e outcom e o f on e contes t o f punishment bear s o n th e outcome of another where the stakes may be valued differently. An d in contests of punishment, th e distribution o f military force betwee n the antagonists , whil e no t irrelevant , i s not decisiv e i n determinin g the outcom e (a s the wa r i n Vietnam illustrates). 19 Second, even with respect to counterforce duels , these inference s do not tak e int o accoun t th e effec t o f shifting coalition s o n the out comes of wars. If there ar e more tha n tw o possible participants i n a war, the n eve n i f there ar e convergen t expectation s o f the militar y outcome o f every possibl e war , ther e canno t b e convergen t expec tations of the effect o f State A's attempted us e of force agains t Stat e B unless i t i s also known wh o wil l suppor t Stat e A and Stat e B , and therefore whic h o f all the possibl e war s i n whic h Stat e A and Stat e B figh t o n opposit e side s wil l actuall y occur . An d onc e a wa r ha s begun, i t ma y no t en d unti l i t i s clear whethe r state s tha t hav e no t yet joined wil l still d o so , and unde r wha t circumstance s thos e tha t have joined migh t be induce d t o quit . Thus it i s not clea r ho w war s can b e decisiv e enoug h t o lea d t o lon g period s o f peace, sinc e th e outcome of some particular wa r need no t provide information abou t the outcom e o f anothe r wa r wit h differen t participants. 20 Fo r th e same reasons , i n a worl d o f mor e tha n tw o states , th e concept s o f "equal" an d "unequal " distribution s o f powe r ar e no t eve n well defined, sinc e i f state s ar e evenl y matche d whe n considere d indi vidually, ther e mus t b e som e coalition s tha t ar e superio r t o others , and vic e versa. 21 Let u s conside r th e secon d proble m first. I t i s as relevant t o un derstanding th e cause s o f domesti c peac e a s i t i s t o th e cause s o f international peace . Sinc e it ha s been discusse d mos t extensivel y i n the literature o n the balance o f power, however , tha t is the place t o begin.

Peace an d th e Balanc e o f Powe r Traditionally, th e concep t o f the "balanc e o f power" wa s associated with th e ide a tha t wea k state s woul d find i t i n their interes t t o join

248 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r together t o preven t th e hegemon y o f powerfu l states . This , i t wa s thought, wa s th e mai n mean s b y whic h th e independenc e o f state s could b e protecte d i n wha t Realist s woul d no w cal l a n anarchic sys tem. Thu s th e emphasi s o f traditiona l balanc e o f powe r theor y wa s on syste m stabilit y (meanin g th e noneliminatio n o f th e member s o f the internationa l system ) an d no t peace , an d th e relatio n betwee n the balanc e o f powe r an d peac e ha s been controversial . In recen t year s th e ide a o f th e balanc e o f powe r ha s com e t o b e associated wit h th e distributio n o f powe r amon g states . I n debate s about wha t distributio n o f powe r i s desirable , ther e ofte n seem s t o be a conflict betwee n th e goal s o f peac e an d stability . Stability , i t i s argued, require s equalit y o f power , sinc e equalit y maximize s th e probability tha t al l state s wil l b e abl e t o defen d themselves . Ine quality o f power , o n th e othe r hand , a s Blaine y suggested , make s convergent expectation s o f th e outcom e o f wa r mor e likely , an d therefore maximize s the probability o f peace. 22 But as we hav e seen , "equal" an d "unequal " distribution s d o no t hav e a clear meanin g i n a world o f mor e tha n tw o states , wher e on e ha s to tak e int o accoun t not onl y th e powe r o f individua l states , bu t als o alliance s amon g them. It i s precisel y becaus e th e possibilit y o f shiftin g alliance s make s it difficult t o anticipate th e outcome s o f wars that Kenneth Waltz ha s claimed tha t wha t h e call s "multipolar " internationa l system s ar e more pron e t o wa r tha n bipola r one s (Waltz , 1979 , 161-193) . Bu t no one , includin g Waltz , ha s eve r state d clearl y ho w t o recogniz e a bipolar internationa l system . I t i s clea r tha t i n a bipolar system , tw o states ar e muc h mor e powerfu l tha n th e others . Wha t i s no t clea r i s how muc h mor e powerfu l the y hav e t o be , sinc e i n ever y syste m i n which the three mos t powerful state s are not exactl y equa l an d there is n o ti e fo r secon d place , ther e mus t b e tw o state s tha t ar e mor e powerful tha n al l th e others . Muc h o f Waltz' s discussio n o f th e sig nificance o f bipolarity seem s t o assume , no t a particular distributio n of power amon g man y states , but a system o f only tw o states. 23 Thu s Waltz doe s no t reall y tel l u s wha t distributio n o f powe r i n multi actor system s minimize s uncertaint y abou t alliances . Blainey ha s rightly emphasize d th e importanc e o f convergen t ex pectations o f th e outcome s o f war s a s a caus e o f peace , an d Walt z has rightl y emphasize d th e fac t tha t uncertaint y abou t wh o wil l all y with who m make s fo r uncertaint y abou t th e outcome s o f wars . Le t us se e i f w e ca n combin e thes e clue s wit h th e logi c o f traditiona l

The Cause s o f Peace 24 9 balance of power theory to draw some conclusions about the relation between th e distributio n o f power an d internationa l peace . Suppose tha t th e militar y resource s o f eac h stat e coul d b e rep resented by a single inde x number , th e resource s o f states coul d b e combined an d used against other s in war, and the military outcome s of wars were determine d entirel y b y th e rati o between th e militar y forces assembled on each side, so that, in a counterforce duel , equality o f forces woul d lea d t o stalemate , an d superiorit y woul d lea d t o victory.24 Consider , then , a system o f five states in which eac h stat e has the sam e quantit y o f militar y resource s a s every othe r state , s o that th e syste m ca n be characterize d b y th e vecto r (60 , 60 , 60 , 60 , 60). The n an y combinatio n o f thre e state s coul d defea t th e othe r two, i f they coul d agre e o n ho w t o divid e u p the militar y resource s of the defeate d states . And any two states coul d defeat a third, i f no other stat e cam e t o it s aid . Suppose, o n th e othe r hand , tha t th e sam e quantit y o f resource s were distribute d a s follows: (150 , 100 , 20 , 15 , 15) . The n n o stat e would join th e first in attacking th e others , sinc e as soon a s the first acquired a n additiona l uni t o f resources , i t coul d defea t an y com bination o f other states , including it s forme r ally . For the sam e rea son, i f th e first stat e attacke d an y on e o f th e others , al l th e other s would have to come to its assistance, since only a combination o f all the othe r state s could successfull y oppos e th e first. Finally, th e sec ond o r third state s would no t wan t t o attac k th e smalle r ones , sinc e while the y di d s o th e first woul d b e fre e t o joi n in , an d thu s t o increase it s power . This , then , i s a syste m i n whic h al l uncertaint y about alignments has been eliminated , a s a result of the fact tha t on e state i s o n th e verg e o f dominatin g it . I t i s a syste m tha t migh t b e called "bipolar, " sinc e two states are much mor e powerful tha n an y of th e others . It s distinctiveness , however , i s th e resul t o f th e fac t that on e stat e i s so powerful tha t i t i s on the verg e o f being abl e t o defeat an y combinatio n o f othe r states . I n th e previou s system , b y contrast, ever y state has a long way to go before i t becomes a threat to all the others, and therefore som e states can lose a lot of resources before other s hav e a n incentiv e t o com e t o thei r aid . In thes e examples , however , th e onl y uncertaint y i s the resul t o f the interdependenc e o f the choice s o f th e actors ; onc e th e partici pants i n a conflic t ar e identified , th e outcom e o f wa r ca n b e pre dicted, an d thu s b y Blainey' s Argumen t nee d no t b e fought . Thu s systems wit h th e propertie s o f thes e example s migh t b e stabl e o r

250 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r unstable, bu t i n eithe r cas e the y shoul d b e completel y peaceful. 25 But i f ther e i s uncertaint y abou t th e outcome s o f wars , ther e wil l also b e uncertaint y abou t whe n an y stat e i s o n th e verg e o f hegem ony, an d thu s abou t wha t sor t o f oppositio n t o a n attempte d us e o f force a state ma y expect . Many people hav e claime d tha t a state tha t control s al l o f Europ e will b e clos e t o hegemon y i n thi s sense , an d conclude d tha t bot h England and the United State s have a vital interest i n preventing an y state from controlling the European continent. 26 Many people in both countries hav e als o dispute d thi s claim , however . An d if the leader s of German y ha d bee n absolutel y confiden t tha t th e leader s o f En gland an d the U S would adher e t o thi s principle prio r to World War I and World War II, their behavior migh t hav e bee n quit e different . Since i n both case s a lot coul d happe n befor e German y wa s clos e t o dominating th e continent , i t wa s difficul t fo r th e leader s o f th e U S and England t o communicat e wha t thei r respons e t o tha t possibilit y would be . After Worl d Wa r II , however , th e Sovie t Unio n wa s sufficientl y close t o dominating Europe that this possibility ha d to be face d prio r to th e us e o f forc e b y th e Soviets , rathe r tha n afte r i t a s in th e cas e of Germany , an d step s ha d to be take n t o communicat e ho w th e U S and Englan d woul d respond. 27 Moreover , sinc e Worl d Wa r II , th e size o f th e U S contributio n t o th e defens e o f Europe , a s well a s th e existence o f th e U S nuclea r deterrent , ha s facilitate d th e formatio n of an opposing force . Thes e ar e facts tha t hav e helpe d mak e Waltz' s concept o f "bipolarity " see m plausibl e i n spit e o f it s ambiguities. 28 Thus a plausible alternativ e t o "bipolarity " as the distinguishin g fea ture o f post-Worl d Wa r I I internationa l politic s i s that , unlik e th e hegemonic war s tha t precede d it , Worl d Wa r I I wa s fough t i n suc h a wa y tha t on e o f th e defender s agains t th e previou s claiman t t o hegemony wa s place d i n a near-hegemoni c positio n itself , tha t is , World War II ended wit h Sovie t troop s i n the middl e o f Europe an d poised t o advanc e furthe r t o th e West . A s a result , th e sor t o f un certainty abou t wh o woul d all y wit h who m tha t Walt z argue s wa s one o f th e cause s o f Worl d War I I ha s bee n minimized. 29 The lesso n o f th e simpl e example s discusse d above , therefore , i s that when al l states ar e far from hegemony , th e interest o f each stat e in preventin g th e emergenc e o f a hegemoni c stat e i s no t sufficien t to preven t wea k state s fro m bein g preye d upo n b y stronge r ones ; when on e stat e i s o n th e verg e o f hegemony , however , i t shoul d

The Cause s o f Peace 25 1 expect t o b e opposed , a s balance o f powe r theor y ha s traditionall y claimed, b y al l th e othe r state s i n th e system . I f potentiall y hege monic states are always successfully opposed , the n th e internationa l system may be stable. 30 If hegemony is to be prevented withou t war , however, then there must be convergent expectations of the outcome of a hegemonic war . An d if such a war i s to be a counterforce duel , then, a s Blainey ha s rightl y said , thi s wil l mos t likel y b e tru e i f th e challenger expect s t o be me t b y a n overwhelmin g concentratio n o f force. Bu t i f ther e i s roo m fo r disagreemen t abou t whe n th e chal lenger will have reached the point of hegemony, then there may not be convergen t expectation s concernin g wh o wil l join th e opposin g coalition, and therefore ther e may be uncertainty about the outcom e of a potential hegemon' s attempte d us e o f force . Thus the belief tha t ther e mus t b e a conflict betwee n th e goa l of stability, whic h require s equality , an d th e goa l o f peace, whic h re quires inequality, is the result of trying to analyze systems with more than two actors by using the logic of two-actor systems. In principle, both stabilit y an d peac e coul d b e achieve d i n multi-acto r systems , if attempt s t o us e forc e wer e alway s expecte d t o b e oppose d b y overwhelmingly superio r coalitions . This is unlikely in multi-actor internationa l systems , however, fo r two reasons . First , sufficientl y larg e opposin g coalition s hav e a n in centive t o for m onl y whe n doin g s o is necessary t o prevent anothe r state or coalition from acquirin g a position of hegemony. When states that ar e fa r from hegemon y us e force , othe r state s ma y hav e a n incentive t o joi n them , o r ma y hav e n o incentiv e t o oppos e the m and thus choose to sit on the sidelines instead. And second, the ver y reason why , i f there i s to b e peace , state s contemplatin g th e us e o f force mus t expect t o be oppose d by overwhelmingly superio r force , namely, uncertaint y abou t th e outcome s o f wars, i s also on e o f th e reasons wh y thi s requiremen t ma y no t b e met : ther e ma y no t b e a convergence o f expectation s concernin g whe n an y particula r stat e will hav e achieve d a position o f hegemony . Let u s no w conside r wha t al l thi s implie s abou t th e relatio n be tween th e distributio n o f power withi n state s an d domesti c peace .

The Cause s o f Domestic Peac e In th e literatur e o n internationa l politics , a syste m i n whic h state s agree t o cooperat e s o tha t th e us e o f forc e i s alway s oppose d b y

252 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r overwhelming forc e i s calle d a collectiv e securit y system . W e hav e just see n wh y a collectiv e securit y syste m i s no t a reliabl e wa y o f preventing internationa l war , an d th e limitation s o f th e balanc e o f power mechanis m a s a n alternative. 31 I n Claude' s summar y o f th e literature o n th e managemen t o f forc e a t th e globa l level , th e onl y alternative t o the balance o f power an d collective securit y a s a mean s of avoidin g wa r i s world governmen t (Claude , 1962) . Claud e point s out tha t writer s o n internationa l politic s customaril y equat e "gov ernment" wit h a n organizatio n tha t ha s a monopol y o n th e abilit y to us e forc e (Claude , 1962 , 223-242) . Governmen t ca n therefor e prevent wa r b y guaranteein g tha t th e us e o f forc e wil l alway s b e opposed b y overwhelmin g force . Claude, however , disagree s wit h thi s conceptio n o f th e relatio n between government s an d domesti c peace . H e says , i n th e passag e quoted a t th e beginnin g o f thi s paper : . . . I would argue that the prevention o f civil war is the function o f national government most relevant to the problem of ordering international relations, that government s canno t an d d o no t perfor m thi s functio n b y relyin g pri marily upon either police action against individuals or military action against significant segment s of their societies , and that government s succeed i n this vitally important task only when they are able to operate an effective syste m of political accommodation . (Claude , 1962 , 269 ) Yet government s d o us e forc e agains t dissiden t groups , an d Realis t students o f internationa l politic s ar e no t alon e i n emphasizin g th e importance o f th e expecte d us e o f forc e b y government s a s a de terrent t o politica l oppositio n an d domesti c violence. 32 Moreover , political accommodatio n tha t take s plac e i n a contex t i n whic h vio lence i s a likel y alternativ e mean s o f gettin g one' s wa y i s quit e dif ferent fro m th e sor t o f political accommodation tha t i s normally prac ticed i n stabl e democrati c societies. 33 Claude's objectio n ha s greate r forc e i f restate d i n th e followin g way: th e requiremen t tha t government s b e abl e t o oppos e th e at tempted us e o f forc e wit h overwhelmin g forc e i s unlikely t o b e me t if government s mus t ac t agains t large , well-armed , an d well-orga nized domesti c groups . Fo r eve n i f government s ar e likel y t o wi n such confrontations , ther e ma y b e sufficien t uncertaint y abou t th e outcome tha t civi l wa r i s possible. An d th e questio n i s not ho w gov ernments ar e abl e t o defea t thei r domesti c opponents , bu t ho w the y are abl e t o guarante e domesti c peace . Claude als o point s ou t tha t government s ar e themselve s jus t col lections o f individuals , an d th e abilit y o f a governmen t t o defea t

The Cause s o f Peac e 25

3

organized domestic opponent s doe s no t guarante e tha t it will remai n united i n oppositio n t o them . A s h e says : . . . i n a case of deep conflict withi n the civilian body of a society, organized forces o f rebellion ma y be buil t u p while th e organize d force s o f the stat e may brea k down ; thes e ar e likel y t o appea r a s tw o aspect s o f th e sam e process. (Claude , 1962 , 237 ) Civil war s are not alway s just conflict s betwee n th e governmen t an d its opponents ; the y ar e als o ofte n conflict s withi n th e government' s armed forces . Taken together , thes e objection s impl y tha t i f civi l peac e i s th e result o f th e expectatio n tha t th e us e o f forc e wil l b e oppose d b y the governmen t wit h overwhelmin g force , the n th e government' s opponents mus t no t expec t t o b e abl e t o organiz e a larg e forc e i n opposition t o it , an d th e governmen t mus t b e expecte d t o remai n united i n it s us e o f counterforce . See n i n thi s way , governmen t i s just a component o f a collective securit y system . Th e problem, then , is t o understan d wh y suc h a system i s possibl e withi n state s bu t no t among them . As Claude point s out , on e answe r tha t i s given t o this questio n b y the proponent s o f worl d governmen t i s that , t o b e effective , gov ernment mus t be abl e to impose control s o n individuals, an d not just subordinate unit s o f governmen t (Claude , 1962 , 243-255) . Claud e objects to this answer, however , o n the groun d that it falsely equate s the proble m o f preventing civi l wa r with th e proble m o f controllin g crime. Th e appropriat e analogy , h e says , i s rather wit h th e proble m of accommodatin g th e demand s o f larg e dissiden t groups (Claude , 1962, 255-271) . While Claud e i s right in calling this answer naive as a contribution to th e proble m o f preventin g wa r a t th e globa l level , however , h e is to o quic k i n rejectin g i t a s a t leas t par t o f th e explanatio n o f th e ability o f government s t o contro l domesti c violence . Claude' s ob jection amount s t o sayin g tha t thos e wh o argu e tha t government s control violenc e b y controllin g individual s assum e tha t individual s will neve r organiz e int o larg e group s tha t migh t challeng e th e forc e available t o governments . An d i n this , o f course , h e i s correct . Bu t in making this objection he overlooks the fact that governments ofte n have a n advantag e ove r thei r potentia l opponent s i n precisel y thi s respect, b y virtu e o f the fac t tha t th e forc e availabl e t o government s is already organized, wherea s its opponents must first organize them selves befor e the y ca n challeng e th e government . An d i n tryin g t o

254 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r accomplish this , dissident s mus t cop e wit h al l th e problem s o f col lective actio n tha t th e literatur e o n collectiv e good s an d th e Pris oner's Dilemm a ha s mad e clea r t o u s i n recen t years . This cast s a somewha t differen t ligh t o n Waltz' s statemen t tha t "[t]he differenc e betwee n nationa l an d international politic s lie s no t in th e us e o f forc e bu t i n th e differen t mode s o f organizatio n fo r doing somethin g abou t it, " cite d a t th e beginnin g o f thi s pape r (Waltz, 1979 , 103) . Th e ide a tha t th e forc e availabl e t o th e govern ment i s overwhelmingl y mor e powerfu l tha n th e forc e availabl e t o its opponent s i s n o bette r define d tha n simila r statement s abou t th e distribution o f military powe r a t the globa l level , sinc e i n both case s the distributio n o f power depend s o n wha t particula r coalition s wil l face eac h other . Th e advantag e th e governmen t ha s is, rather, ofte n an organizationa l one , wit h th e resul t tha t i t nee d no t fac e al l it s potential opponent s a t on e time . Thu s on e importan t differenc e be tween internationa l politic s an d domesti c politic s withi n man y (bu t not all ) countrie s i s tha t a t th e globa l leve l i t i s muc h easie r t o pu t together coalition s fo r th e us e o f force . Note tha t thi s is exactly th e opposit e o f what i s usually sai d abou t the effect o f anarchy on the achievement of common objectives: since at the globa l leve l ther e i s no governmen t t o enforc e agreements , i t is usuall y argued , cooperatio n i s mor e difficul t amon g state s tha n within them . An d thi s ma y wel l b e tru e i n man y areas . Bu t i n th e domestic arena , th e governmen t i s no t availabl e t o enforc e agree ments t o us e forc e agains t itself ; rathe r government s ac t s o a s t o make suc h agreement s mor e difficult . A t th e internationa l level , o n the othe r hand , tw o fact s facilitat e th e organizatio n o f coalition s fo r the us e o f force . First , th e numbe r o f independen t actor s i s muc h smaller, an d th e organizationa l problem s correspondingl y easie r t o overcome. An d second, th e effec t o f each government's contributio n to th e outcom e i s much greater , an d therefor e th e direc t benefi t t o each government fro m participating is more likely to exceed the cost . (Moreover, ther e i s no organizationa l proble m a t all to be overcom e before on e governmen t ca n us e forc e agains t another.) 34 One migh t objec t tha t thi s lin e o f reasoning i s at most relevan t t o the questio n o f ho w th e governmen t maintain s it s supremac y ove r its potential nongovernmenta l opponents , bu t ha s no bearing o n th e question o f ho w th e governmen t maintain s it s unity . Ye t th e sam e reasoning ca n b e extende d int o th e governmen t itself . Conside r members o f a platoo n contemplatin g mutiny . I f th e platoo n leade r

The Cause s o f Peace 25 5 issues a comman d an d a n individua l privat e i s th e onl y on e wh o disobeys, th e privat e i s i n trouble . If , o n th e othe r hand , n o on e obeys, the platoon leader is in trouble. Thus expectations about wh o will support who m ar e crucial i n determinin g whethe r forc e wil l b e met by overwhelming force. And potential dissidents within the government ar e ofte n a t a disadvantag e i n concertin g thei r action s a s compared to defenders of the government. Modern totalitarian state s have show n u s ho w fa r i t i s possible t o g o i n preventin g th e us e o f force agains t the state by making it difficult fo r the opponent s of the government (or the ruling clique within the government) to organize. These sam e state s hav e als o recentl y show n us , however , ho w fragile suc h way s o f suppressin g conflic t ca n be . Moreover , th e or ganizational advantag e o f th e stat e authoritie s ca n ofte n b e com pensated fo r b y th e existenc e o f other tie s tha t facilitat e communi cation, suc h a s thos e o f race , religion , ethnicity , o r geograph y (especially when reinforced by federalism), when they coincide with the incentive s tha t exis t t o us e forc e agains t th e government . In addition , a s I pointe d ou t earlier , th e ide a tha t convergen t expectations o f the outcom e o f war ar e th e resul t o f expecting tha t force wil l b e me t b y overwhelmingl y preponderan t forc e i s mos t appropriate t o war s tha t ar e expecte d t o b e decisiv e counterforc e duels. It is not clear what "preponderant force" means in the context of a contest o f punishment i n which it is not possible fo r on e side to disarm th e other . Becaus e contest s o f punishment canno t b e settle d on th e battlefield , i t i s often difficul t t o chang e eithe r side' s expec tation tha t furthe r conflic t wil l lea d t o a bette r outcom e tha n th e one the opponent is currently willing to accept, and therefore i t may be difficul t t o preven t suc h conflicts , o r bring the m t o a n en d onc e they begin. 35 Smal l force s skille d i n terroris m o r guerrill a warfar e have often bee n abl e to avoid being disarmed, an d to make life ver y unpleasant fo r thei r enemies , especiall y i f they hav e a foreign sanc tuary and source of supply. And, since foreign suppor t can be crucia l in sustaining the minimum level of force necessar y to wage a contest of punishment, th e expectation s o f th e anti-governmen t force s wil l be influenced no t just by the force availabl e to the government , bu t also by th e expecte d action s o f foreign governments . Thus Claud e i s righ t i n stressin g th e limitation s o f th e ide a tha t domestic peace is the resul t o f the preponderance o f force availabl e to th e governmen t a s compare d t o it s adversaries . Th e alternative , however, i s not, as Claude suggests, simply political accommodatio n

256 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r of thos e contemplatin g th e us e o f force , whic h Blainey' s Argumen t implies will in any case often be possibl e only if there ar e convergen t expectations o f th e resul t o f opposin g forc e wit h force . Rathe r th e alternative i s th e creatio n o f a situatio n i n whic h th e us e o f force , even i f unopposed, i s less attractive tha n alternative means of getting one's way . Thes e alternativ e mean s are , o f course , chiefl y economi c exchange an d th e us e o f a syste m o f rule s fo r makin g collectiv e choices. Contests i n violenc e ar e th e resul t o f usin g forc e t o oppos e th e use o f force . Suc h contest s wil l no t occu r i f force , eve n whe n un opposed, i s a n inferio r mean s o f achievin g one' s goals . Whe n ope n markets an d competitive politica l institution s exist , mos t people wil l prefer working for a living to armed robbery, buying what they nee d to stealin g it , hirin g peopl e t o wor k fo r the m t o usin g force d labor , taking people to court to using force to redress a wrong, and engaging in politica l activit y (o r movin g t o anothe r jurisdiction ) t o rebellion , even if th e probabilit y i s smal l tha t th e us e o f forc e woul d b e me t by force ; an d the governmen t itsel f will prefer t o help people enric h themselves an d the n ta x them , rathe r tha n us e th e forc e i t control s to confiscat e th e propert y o f it s citizen s arbitrarily . The n i t wil l no t be difficul t t o arrang e tha t anyon e whos e preference s ar e differen t from thes e wil l b e apprehende d an d disarme d b y th e force s o f th e government. I n these circumstance s domesti c peac e i s a property o f a comple x equilibriu m i n whic h th e superio r forc e availabl e t o th e government enforce s th e maintenanc e o f markets , courts , an d po litical institutions , whic h i n tur n reduc e th e government' s nee d t o use force . Thu s wha t sustain s peace i s not simpl y superio r force , bu t the entir e equilibriu m o f expectation s o f whic h forc e i s onl y on e component. 36 As Walt z emphasized , state s d o no t hav e a monopoly o n th e us e of force ; the y may , however , hav e a *'monopol y o n th e legitimate use o f force. " Thi s Weberia n phras e i s ofte n repeated , bu t seldo m defined. On e possibl e definitio n i s that i t simpl y stand s fo r th e com plex equilibriu m jus t discussed . In a n environmen t i n whic h th e prevailin g equilibriu m implie s greater reward s t o th e us e o f forc e relativ e t o it s alternatives , how ever, ther e wil l als o be incentive s t o tr y t o oppos e forc e wit h force . And the n i t wil l b e possibl e tha t tw o adversarie s eac h prefe r t o en gage i n a contest o f forc e t o allowin g th e othe r t o us e forc e unop posed, i n which cas e arme d conflict ca n be avoide d only i f they hav e

The Cause s o f Peac e 25 7 convergent expectation s o f th e outcom e o f suc h a contes t an d als o expect t o b e abl e quickl y t o agre e o n a mutuall y preferre d alter native.

From Civi l War to Domesti c Peac e As Blaine y (1988 ) ha s emphasized , man y discussion s o f th e cause s of wa r ar e reall y discussion s o f th e cause s o f conflict . Bu t conflic t i s ubiquitous, whil e wa r i s not . Eliminatin g conflic t would , o f course , eliminate war . Bu t eliminatin g conflic t woul d b e impossible , an d therefore i t i s fortunat e tha t i t i s no t necessar y t o d o s o i n orde r t o avoid war . Similarly, man y discussion s o f th e ending s o f war s focu s o n th e problem o f changing th e goal s o f the combatants . Fo r example, Ran dle says : The struggl e t o preserve o r to gain ideological o r power political value s is evident i n th e stage s jus t befor e a declaratio n o f war , an d tha t struggl e continues throughout th e wa r and during all phases of the negotiation s fo r peace. Indeed , th e struggl e ma y be intens e enoug h t o prevent agreemen t upon eve n minimu m term s o f a settlement. I n fact, al l case s wher e bellig erents refuse to consider a movement towards peace or are unable to agree upon peace terms after negotiation s have begun can usually be ascribe d to such intensely espoused ideological or power political values. . .. i f the parties are to achieve eve n a partial settlement , th e wa r must become deideologized. Th e value s that th e leader s o f the state s o r factions ha d hoped t o gain must be devalued. . . . the competitio n fo r values must diminish i n intensity below a certain level befor e peac e wil l be possible . (Randle , 1973 , ID Since war itself usually has the opposit e effect , suc h reasoning make s the endin g o f war s see m exceptionall y difficult . A s Ikl e wrote : Whatever the obstacles to an arrangement that would have prevented war, the use of violence itself engenders new obstacles to the reestablishment of peace. Fightin g sharpen s feeling s o f hostility . I t create s fear s tha t a n opponent might again resort to violence, and thus adds to the skepticism about a compromise peace. . . . more is expected of a settlement because both the government an d the people wil l fee l tha t the outcom e o f the war ought t o justify th e sacrifices incurred . (Ikle , 1971 , 107 ) Because th e goal s o f the participant s i n civi l war s are believed t o b e especially har d to compromise , civi l wars , som e claim , ar e harde r t o

258 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r end than internationa l wars . And if war makes conflict mor e intense , then i t may see m unlikel y tha t th e participant s i n a civil wa r will b e able t o coexis t thereafter , an d eithe r partitio n o r th e recurrenc e o f civil wa r ma y see m mor e likely . Most civi l war s ar e no t ende d b y negotiation , a fact tha t seem s t o confirm thi s pessimisti c reasonin g (Modelski , 1964b ; Pillar , 1983 , 16-26). On e migh t think , then , tha t i t would be usefu l t o find a way to foste r negotiate d settlement s o f civi l wars . Thu s Modelsk i wrote : As a method of terminating internal war, settlement has a number of features to commend it to the student o f politics. Settlemen t reduce s the amount of violence an d serves as a clear landmark beyond which the renewe d us e of violence becomes illegitimate. Settlement takes account of a wider range of interests and mirrors more accurately the state of political forces in society. Settlement, abov e all , i s a rational wa y o f ending a period o f violence an d the appropriat e metho d fo r inaugurating a period o f domestic peace. (Mo delski, 1964b , 149 ) But Blainey's Argument implie s that this reasoning may be mistaken . Wars wil l en d whe n th e combatant s hav e convergen t expectation s about th e outcom e o f furthe r fighting, regardles s o f th e goal s tha t led the m int o wa r in th e first place. Moreover , becaus e wa r convey s information abou t th e consequence s o f using force , wa r itself ca n b e a poten t caus e o f peace , an d civi l wa r ca n therefor e mak e a subse quent civi l wa r les s likely . We hav e seen , however , tha t Blaine y wa s unclea r abou t th e re lation between negotiatio n an d the outcom e o f war. Let u s therefor e examine mor e closel y th e implication s o f Blainey' s Argument , a s I have restate d it , fo r understandin g th e rol e o f negotiatio n i n endin g civil wars . As Pilla r ha s emphasized , wheneve r th e victo r o n th e battlefiel d cannot achiev e it s objective s merel y b y eradicatin g it s opponen t o r expelling i t fro m a piece o f territory , th e victo r require s th e loser' s cooperation, an d therefor e th e terminatio n o f wa r mus t lea d t o a t least taci t bargainin g (Pillar , 1983 , 3 8 - 3 9 ; se e als o Kecskemeti , 1958). Moreover , eve n adversarie s wh o hav e bee n decisivel y de feated i n counterforc e duel s ma y retai n th e capacit y t o engag e i n contests o f punishment i n th e for m o f guerrill a warfare . Thu s i f on e looks closel y enoug h on e ca n usuall y find evidenc e o f bargainin g between adversarie s eve n whe n on e o f the m accept s defea t o n th e battlefield an d surrender s it s forces . Th e rol e o f the outcom e o f th e military contes t i s the n t o determin e wh o ca n d o wha t t o who m i n

The Cause s o f Peace 25 9 the bargainin g tha t follows. 37 Thi s i s wh y bargainin g canno t begi n until th e combatant s hav e convergen t expectation s o f th e outcom e of battle , an d agreement s ma y no t b e kep t i f thes e expectation s change. Since wars are fought by organized groups, however, a distinction has to be mad e betwee n war s that lea d t o th e dissolutio n o f one o r more o f the combatant s (whethe r temporar y o r not) , an d war s tha t leave the organization of the participants intact (though their military forces may be destroyed). In the latter case, all the participants retain their identity a s well- defined adversarie s in the bargaining process . In th e forme r case , th e loser s o n th e battlefiel d ma y stil l retai n th e capacity t o resis t th e action s o f the victors , but th e victor s ma y no t confront a n easil y identifie d bargainin g partner . The endings of World Wars I and II illustrate this distinction. World War I ende d whe n German y an d it s allie s conclude d tha t furthe r fighting would lead to their defeat . The y agree d to an armistice tha t preserved th e militar y advantag e o f th e victors , an d thi s militar y advantage then influence d th e relativ e bargaining power o f the par ticipants i n the peac e negotiation s tha t followed . Thi s outcome wa s possible, however , onl y becaus e th e victor s wer e no t intereste d i n using their militar y advantag e t o en d th e politica l independenc e o f the losers . I n Worl d Wa r II , o n th e othe r hand , th e victor s o n th e battlefield di d no t wan t t o leav e th e politica l identit y o f th e loser s intact while they determine d thei r future , an d thus, while the loser s retained some ability to resist the demands of the victors, the victor s did no t confron t a single , well-organize d bargainin g partne r whil e determining th e fat e o f the defeate d countries . Pillar trie s t o captur e thi s differenc e b y sayin g tha t Worl d Wa r I ended b y negotiation , whil e Worl d Wa r I I ende d b y "capitulation* ' (Pillar, 1983 , 18-23). 38 But i f so, these tw o war s provide littl e sup port fo r th e ide a tha t negotiatio n i s a way o f shortenin g wars , pro moting compromise settlements, or fostering conditions in which war is unlikely t o recur , sinc e th e outcom e o f World Wa r I i s no t pref erable t o th e outcom e o f World Wa r I I i n an y o f these respects . If this is the difference betwee n negotiatio n an d capitulation, the n we shoul d expec t negotiate d settlement s o f civi l war s i n onl y tw o cases: war s o f independenc e i n whic h th e rebe l force s succee d i n disarming th e force s o f th e establishe d government , an d civi l war s of an y sor t i n whic h n o combatan t i s abl e t o disar m th e others , or , in other words, civil wars that lea d to a stalemate. Since rebels fight-

260 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r ing fo r thei r independenc e onl y nee d t o avoi d defea t i n orde r t o achieve their objectives, cases of the first type ought to be rare. Thus we shoul d expec t mos t case s o f negotiate d ending s t o civi l war s t o be characterized by military stalemate. It is not surprising, then, that Modelski concluded that *'stalemate is easily the most important condition o f a settlement" (Modelski , 1964b , 143) , or that Zartman ha s emphasized th e importanc e o f a "mutua l hurtin g stalemate " a s a precondition fo r makin g a conflic t "rip e fo r resolution " (Zartman , 1985, 224) . We have already seen , however , tha t a military stalemat e merel y transforms a counterforce due l into a contest in punishment, in which war become s indistinguishabl e fro m bargaining . Thu s i n decidin g whether t o accept som e proposed settlement , ther e ar e two ways in which a party to a stalemate might expect to do better if it continue d fighting instead : i t migh t b e abl e t o overcom e th e stalemat e an d achieve a military advantage , o r it s opponent s might , afte r furthe r suffering, decid e to settle for less. A negotiated settlement therefor e requires tha t al l partie s t o th e conflic t prefe r th e term s o f th e set tlement t o th e expecte d outcom e bot h o f furthe r fighting an d o f further bargaining. 39 It may take a long time to achieve the necessary convergence o f expectations , a s th e war s i n Kore a an d Vietna m il lustrate. Thus , whil e a stalemate ma y requir e tha t a war, i f i t i s t o be ended , mus t en d i n a negotiate d settlement , ther e i s n o reaso n to believe that the existence of a "mutual hurting stalemate" implies that th e wa r wil l end promptly . Modelski , i n arguin g fo r th e merit s of negotiate d settlement s o f interna l war , wrot e tha t " a stalemat e can alway s be contrive d b y internationa l action " (Modelski , 1964b , 143). It is important t o recognize that thi s is as likely to prolong th e war a s it i s to shorte n it . But d o negotiate d settlement s mak e subsequen t conflic t les s likely? I n thinkin g abou t thi s question , w e mus t no t confus e com promise wit h a chang e i n th e objective s o f th e partie s t o th e com promise. Negotiate d settlement s reflec t th e relativ e bargainin g power o f th e participant s i n a conflict , whic h i s based o n thei r ex pectations o f th e consequence s o f rejectin g th e settlement . O f course, afte r war s ar e ove r th e objective s o f th e adversarie s ma y change. But this is not guaranteed by the achievement of a negotiated settlement, an d i f th e expectation s tha t supporte d a settlemen t change bu t th e objective s o f th e adversarie s d o not , the n wa r ma y break ou t again . The fac t tha t a civil wa r ha s occurre d implie s tha t

The Cause s o f Peac e 26 1 the organizationa l advantag e o f governmen t ha s bee n overcome . Thus on e o f th e disadvantage s o f a negotiate d settlemen t ma y b e that, becaus e n o combatan t i s abl e t o disar m it s adversaries , a set tlement require s tha t al l th e adversarie s retai n som e semblanc e o f their organizationa l identitie s afte r th e war , eve n i f the y ar e dis armed. Whil e suc h a n agreemen t ma y facilitat e th e endin g o f on e civil war , i t ma y als o facilitat e th e outbrea k o f th e next . More importan t tha n th e wa y civi l war s end , then , i s th e natur e of th e politica l arrangement s create d afte r the y ar e over . I n light o f our previou s discussion , w e migh t distinguis h loosel y amon g thre e types o f possibilities , whic h I wil l cal l a balance of power, th e supremacy of the state, an d a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. As w e hav e seen , th e ter m "balanc e o f power " i s ofte n use d t o refer t o a particular distributio n o f powe r amon g potentia l combat ants whic h i s claime d t o promot e peace ; whe n use d i n thi s way , a balance o f powe r usuall y mean s a n equa l distributio n o f power , a term whos e meanin g i s not clea r in multi-actor systems . B y "balanc e of power" i n thi s context , however , I mean instea d th e expectation s of th e consequence s o f usin g forc e tha t le d t o th e settlemen t tha t ended th e precedin g civi l war , base d o n th e capabilitie s o f th e ad versaries tha t wer e demonstrate d i n tha t war , whateve r thei r distri bution might be. As Blainey pointed out, if these expectation s persis t in th e aftermat h o f the war , the n wa r ca n lea d t o peace , sinc e non e of th e adversarie s believ e tha t i t i s likel y tha t a renewal o f th e wa r will lea d t o a significantly differen t outcome . There i s n o reaso n wh y a balanc e o f powe r i n thi s sens e shoul d not lea d t o domesti c peac e fo r lon g period s o f time , s o lon g a s th e lessons o f th e previou s wa r ar e commonl y believe d t o remai n ap proximately valid . Obviously , however , thi s metho d o f keepin g th e peace i s a s fragil e a t th e domesti c leve l a s a t th e internationa l one , since man y thing s ca n happe n tha t wil l lea d antagonist s t o expec t a more favorabl e outcom e fro m th e attempte d us e o f force . By "supremac y o f th e state " I mea n a situatio n i n whic h n o on e can expec t t o b e abl e t o organiz e a militar y forc e capabl e o f chal lenging the forces availabl e to the establishe d government. Thi s typ e of outcom e wil l ofte n requir e no t onl y th e disarmin g o f al l bu t on e faction i n a civi l war , bu t als o effort s t o destro y th e organizationa l identity of the losers, and inhibit the organization o f dissident group s in th e futur e (includin g possibl e dissiden t faction s withi n th e rulin g elite). Finally , by a "monopoly o f the legitimate us e of force" I mean

262 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r the comple x equilibriu m describe d above , i n which the abilit y of th e government's force s t o overcom e dissident s i s guarantee d no t jus t by th e difficultie s potentia l rebel s fac e i n coordinatin g thei r actions , but als o b y th e fac t tha t ther e ar e nonforcefu l mean s o f collectiv e choice that most people would prefer to forceful mean s even if forceful mean s ha d som e prospec t o f success . (Thes e las t tw o type s o f outcome ar e best though t o f a s extreme point s o n a continuum, an d any particula r politica l syste m ma y contai n element s o f both. ) The last outcome, o f course, is not only likely to be the most stable, but woul d be considere d b y man y t o b e th e mos t desirabl e o n othe r grounds as well. It is not, however, a n outcome that is easy to achiev e as the resul t o f a negotiated settlemen t o f a civil war , fo r th e simpl e reason tha t i t ma y b e inconsisten t wit h th e maintenanc e o f th e bal ance o f powe r tha t provide s th e incentiv e fo r acceptin g th e settle ment. Adversarie s i n a civil wa r mus t b e concerne d abou t ho w an y agreement the y reac h will be enforce d i f their opponents choos e no t to keep it, and thus will be reluctant to abandon the option of forcibly resisting violation s o f the agreement . Bu t unles s the y d o so , ther e i s little chanc e o f creatin g a monopoly o f th e legitimat e us e o f force. 40 Pillar list s bot h th e Russia n civi l wa r an d th e America n civi l wa r among thos e tha t di d no t en d b y negotiatio n (Pillar , 1983 , 18-21) . One le d t o th e supremac y o f th e state , an d th e othe r ultimatel y t o a monopol y o f th e legitimat e us e o f force . Wha t determine s whic h outcome emerge s fro m a non-negotiated endin g t o a civil war ? I d o not kno w ho w t o answe r this question. Bu t it seems likel y t o me tha t two relate d factor s ar e important: th e fragilit y o r permanence o f th e coalition tha t win s th e civi l war , an d th e residua l bargainin g powe r of th e losers . (Th e studie s i n thi s volum e o f th e civi l war s i n th e United State s an d Nigeri a provid e som e suppor t fo r thi s idea. ) In thinking abou t war , everyon e tend s t o confus e th e outcom e o n the battlefiel d wit h th e politica l settlemen t tha t follows. 41 W e hav e seen tha t Blainey himsel f is guilty o f this confusion, despit e hi s statement tha t wa r is a dispute abou t bargaining power . Ther e i s also , a s we hav e seen , a tendenc y t o equat e bargainin g (an d compromise ) with negotiatio n betwee n equals . Thu s it is easy t o overlook th e fac t that eve n tota l victor y o n th e battlefiel d ma y leav e th e losin g sid e with significan t bargainin g power , an d therefore b e disappointin g t o the victor. These confusion s ar e the basis for the commo n belief tha t a compromise settlemen t o f a civil wa r is impossible , a s exemplifie d by th e followin g passag e fro m Pillar :

The Cause s o f Peac e 26 3 Stakes are usually less divisible in civil wars than in other types of war; the issue i s whether on e sid e o r the othe r shal l contro l th e country . . . . eac h side in a civil war is a traitor in the eyes of the other and can never expect the enemy to let it live in peace. The struggle for power becomes a struggle for survival a s the option s narro w to the singl e on e o f a fight to the finish. As a result, fe w civi l wars end through negotiation . . . . (Pillar, 1983 , 24 ) This reasonin g i n tur n i s the basi s fo r th e belie f tha t civi l war s ten d to b e intractable , an d tha t fosterin g negotiate d settlement s woul d be desirable . It should now be clea r that the reasoning behind these conclusion s is mistaken. Whil e ther e ma y b e n o roo m fo r compromis e ove r wh o will contro l th e country , ther e ar e many possibl e compromise s ove r the wa y i n whic h th e countr y wil l b e controlled. 42 Th e proble m i n settling civi l wars may therefore no t be th e absenc e o f possible com promises, bu t th e difficult y o f finding a way o f enforcin g a compro mise that does not violate its terms. And a negotiated settlement ma y make thi s mor e rathe r tha n les s difficult . Thu s th e complet e victor y of one sid e o n th e battlefiel d i s not necessaril y inconsisten t wit h th e achievement o f domesti c peace , stability , an d justice, an d a n effor t to foste r a negotiate d settlemen t instea d nee d no t promot e suc h conditions, o r eve n reduc e th e bloodshe d b y shortenin g th e war . Indeed, i t i s possibl e tha t on e reaso n wh y domesti c conflict s see m more intractable tha n international one s is that the ever-present pos sibility o f interventio n b y outsider s make s i t difficul t t o arrang e fo r a situatio n i n whic h al l combatant s ar e simultaneousl y pessimisti c about th e possibilit y o f improving thei r positio n b y furthe r fighting, and thu s on e o r th e othe r prefer s t o continu e th e wa r rathe r tha n end it .

Civil War and International Peac e We hav e see n tha t th e literatur e o n internationa l wa r has somethin g to say about the cause s of domestic peace. Wha t doe s thinking abou t the preventio n o f civi l wa r tel l u s abou t th e prospect s fo r interna tional peace ? Claude wrot e tha t In the final analysis, i t appear s tha t th e theor y o f worl d governmen t doe s not answer the questio n o f ho w th e worl d can be save d fro m catastrophi c international conflict . Rather , i t help s u s to restate th e question : Ho w ca n the world achieve the degree of assurance that inter-group conflicts will be

264 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r resolved o r contained b y politica l rathe r than violent mean s that ha s been achieved i n th e mos t effectivel y governe d states ? Thi s i s a valuabl e an d provocative restatemen t o f th e question—bu t i t ough t no t t o b e mistake n for a definitive answer . (Claude , 1962 , 271 ) The discussio n abov e doe s no t enabl e u s t o giv e a complete answe r to Claude' s question . I t doe s enabl e us , however , t o identif y th e most important part s to the problem. The y ar e many factors that will affect th e utilit y o f th e unopposed us e o f force , relativ e t o it s alter natives, on the on e hand , an d the convergenc e o f expectations abou t the outcome s o f contests i n the us e of force o n the other. Discussion s of th e effect s o n th e probabilit y o f wa r o f variou s form s o f inter dependence, includin g economi c interdependence , confus e thes e two factors . I t i s ofte n onl y i n retrospec t tha t th e cost s o f wa r ca n be see n t o outweig h an y possibl e benefits , sinc e wa r itsel f i s asso ciated wit h divergen t expectation s o f th e consequence s o f th e us e of force . Ther e ma y b e occasions , however , wher e th e gain s fro m the unoppose d us e o f forc e see m grea t relativ e t o th e gain s fro m trade; and the belief tha t the othe r sid e expect s wa r to be costl y ca n lead t o th e expectatio n tha t th e us e o f forc e wil l no t b e ver y effec tively opposed. 43 In th e mos t stabl e societies , thes e tw o set s o f factor s ar e com ponents of a complex equilibrium, in which the expectation that most people wil l find th e unoppose d us e o f forc e a n inferio r alternativ e reinforces th e expectatio n tha t thos e wh o d o us e forc e wil l b e op posed b y overwhelmin g force , an d vic e versa . Th e forc e tha t i s ex ercised b y government s i s onl y on e componen t o f suc h a n equilib rium. I t alon e i s no t sufficien t t o produc e it . Wha t i s no t clea r i s whether i t i s necessar y i f suc h a n equilibriu m i s t o exist .

Notes 1. Compare , fo r example , Blaine y (1988 ) an d Rul e (1988) . A recen t exception i s Goldman (1990) . 2. Fo r a recent discussion of the Realist tradition in the study of international politics, se e the essay s in Keohane (1986) . 3. Fo r a discussion o f some o f the implication s o f these point s fo r th e empirical literatur e o n the cause s o f international war , se e Mos t and Starr (1983). 4. Thes e distinction s expos e a n ambiguity i n the concep t o f a "war of attrition/' Mearsheimer (1983), for example, distinguishes between war s of

The Cause s o f Peace 26 5 attrition an d blitzkriegs; as he use s the terms , however, both ar e examples of ounterforce duels . An exchange o f limited nuclear countervalu e attacks, on th e othe r hand , woul d als o involv e th e attritio n o f eac h side' s forces , even though the weapons are targeted at population centers and not at each other. 5. Th e outcome of the recent war between the US and Iraq provides a striking illustration of this fact. 6. Thoug h man y people assum e that this is what a nuclear war would entail. 7. Thi s is what Clausewit z mean t by sayin g that "[w]a r is nothing but a duel o n a larger scale*' (Clausewitz, 1976 , 75) . This has sometimes bee n misinterpreted to mean that war is similar to the stylized contests in which gentlemen once defended their honor by dueling with swords or pistols, and thus might, lik e that custom, fal l ou t o f fashion. See , fo r example, Muelle r (1989, 11) , and Pillar (1983 , 28-29) . 8. Clausewit z acknowledge d thi s fact a s well (Clausewitz , 1976 , 69) . 9. Th e possibility that external threats might induce contending factions to compromis e thei r difference s i s a perennial them e i n th e literatur e o n international politics . Th e stud y o f the civi l wa r in Yemen included i n this volume suggests that this factor may have been important in the termination of that conflict . 10. A n important exception i s Ikle, 1971 , 106-131 . 11. Se e especiall y Pilla r (1983). 12. Fo r example, eve n if an incentive t o attack first helps explain why a war begins, it does not explain why, once it has begun and the owner of the first-strike advantag e is identified, th e war does not end immediately . 13. Thu s Blainey' s wor k i s consisten t wit h Bruc e Buen o d e Mesquita' s contention tha t th e stud y o f th e cause s o f wa r shoul d focu s o n necessar y rather than sufficient condition s (Buen o de Mesquita , 1981) . 14. Conside r a situation in which two people have tickets to a lottery in which there i s a 50% chance o f winning $1000 , bu t they ca n each instea d have some fraction of $1000 fo r certain if they ca n agree on how to divide it betwee n them . I f on e i s risk-neutral , the n h e wil l no t accep t les s tha n $500 as a substitute for the lottery ticket. But if the other is risk- acceptant, then he will demand more than $500. Ther e is therefore n o division of the $1000 tha t they both prefer t o the gamble . 15. Th e first two premise s i n this argumen t migh t temp t on e t o sa y as well that anything that increases the cost of war will make peace more likely. But if the leaders of State A believe that the cost of war will make the leaders of State B prefer no t to contes t thei r us e o f force, the y ma y decide t o us e it. And if each mistakenly believes this of the other, then war may be more likely. This is important to bear in mind in thinking about the effect of nuclear weapons on the probability o f war. 16. Se e als o the discussio n in Kecskemeti (1970) .

266 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r 17. Sinc e bargainin g occur s onl y i f th e bargainer s hav e divergen t ex pectations o f it s outcome , bargainin g i s necessaril y associate d wit h wha t game theorist s cal l incomplet e information . A t the tim e Pilla r wrote , how ever, bargainin g theory , lik e th e res t o f gam e theory , reste d o n th e as sumption tha t al l features o f the bargainin g situatio n wer e commo n knowl edge. Thu s Pilla r ha d t o wrestl e wit h th e proble m o f fitting a n analysi s o f rational behavio r wit h incomplet e informatio n int o a framewor k tha t as sumed complete information. Subsequent developments in game theory have made possible the analysis of rational behavior with incomplete information , and thus provided a foundation fo r furthe r investigatio n o f these problems . 18. Wittma n (1979) , lik e Blainey , emphasize s th e relevanc e o f under standing why wars end for understandin g wh y they begin . Wittman claims , however, tha t ther e i s n o relationshi p betwee n th e distributio n o f powe r and th e probabilit y o f war . Bu t thi s i s because h e assume s tha t th e distri bution o f power onl y affect s th e probabilit y tha t on e sid e or th e othe r wil l win, wherea s Blainey's clai m i s that th e combatants ' estimate s of the prob ability of winning are more likely to be consistent if the distribution of power is ver y unequal . Wittma n recognize s tha t inconsisten t expectation s mak e war mor e likely . 19. A s Mearsheimer (1983 ) ha s emphasized , eve n i f a war i s expecte d to be a counterforce duel , one side or another may believe it has discovered a strategy tha t enable s it to win quickly an d cheaply i n spite o f the balanc e of forces . 20. Thi s problem is all-too-briefly discussed by Blainey (1988,119-120), who does no t clearl y distinguis h betwee n expectation s concernin g th e out come o f a wa r amon g som e combinatio n o f states , an d expectation s con cerning whic h combinatio n o f states wil l fight. 21. Thi s problem i s discussed i n Wagner (1986) . 22. Se e especially Claud e (1962 , 11-93) . 23. In discussions of bipolarity, thi s ambiguit y i s often hidde n by state ments t o th e effec t tha t a bipolar syste m i s a syste m wit h onl y tw o Grea t Powers, where "Grea t Power " i s an undefine d term . 24. Thi s sort o f system, as well as the followin g example , is discussed in Wagner (1986) . 25. I n orde r t o focu s o n th e issu e o f system stabilit y rathe r tha n peace , I assumed i n m y article o n the balance o f power tha t th e outcome s of wars could be know n wit h certainty , but resource s coul d onl y be transferre d b y war; I thus avoided th e issue o f whether peacefu l settlement s coul d substi tute fo r wa r (Wagner , 1986) . Nio u an d Ordeshook , i n thei r variou s explo rations of the same problem, assum e that potential victims can always avoid war by preemptively transferring resource s to the attacking states; they also assume tha t th e outcome s o f wars ca n b e anticipate d wit h certaint y (Nio u and Ordeshook , 1989 ; Niou , Ordeshook , an d Rose , 1989) . Neithe r se t o f assumptions i s adequate fo r examinin g th e cause s o f peace.

The Cause s o f Peace 26 7 26. Se e especially Spykma n (1942). One must be careful no t to confuse the word ''hegemony* ' as used in the balance o f power literatur e with the notion o f "hegemony* ' i n th e literatur e o n "hegemoni c stability. " I n th e balance of power literature, a hegemonic state is one that is able to defeat , in a counterforce duel , any combination of other states. It is not clear what "hegemony** means in the literatur e o n hegemonic stability . 27. Th e emphasis in the US on deterrence after World War II is therefore not solely the resul t of the developmen t o f nuclear weapons. 28. Nuclea r weapons, on the other hand, have led to extensive debate s about what kind of contest offeree a war in Europe would be, and therefore what configuration o f forces woul d be adequat e to deter the Sovie t Union. 29. Thi s interpretation is reinforced by the dramatic effects of the recent collapse o f the Sovie t militar y positio n i n centra l Europe . Fo r a fuller dis cussion, see Wagne r (1991) . 30. Thi s is not enough to guarantee that all systems will be stable, however. Se e Wagner (1986 ) an d the work o f Niou an d Ordeshook. 31. Becaus e o f uncertainty , th e differenc e betwee n collectiv e securit y and the balanc e o f powe r i s no t a s clear-cu t a s the discussio n her e migh t imply. Th e nee d t o communicat e t o potentia l hegemon s tha t the y wil l b e opposed b y overwhelmin g forc e ca n be har d to distinguis h fro m th e vie w that "peac e i s indivisible'* and aggression everywher e mus t be prevented . Thus the ide a o f collective securit y an d the logi c o f th e balance o f powe r are ofte n confused , an d bot h hav e bee n invoke d a s justification s fo r U S foreign polic y sinc e World War II. 32. Se e th e discussion o f this subject i n Rule (1988) . Th e extensiv e literature on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a metaphor for social life in an anarchic environment ha s reinforced th e ide a that the cur e for war is to give a monopoly i n the us e of force t o government . 33. Blainey* s Argument implies that war can (almost) always be avoided by political accommodation, even in the absence of political institutions. But accommodation ma y requir e convergen t expectation s o f the consequence s of non-accommodation. I t is because thes e expectation s may differ tha t accommodation is not always possible. 34. O n the other hand, I have shown how the inability of states to enforce agreements abou t ho w t o divid e u p th e spoil s o f victor y ca n mak e inter national system s stable that would otherwise be unstabl e (Wagner , 1986) . 35. Th e war in Vietnam, the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestinian question, the Lebanese civil war, and the conflict i n Northern Ireland are all examples of the problem of ending contests of punishment when counterforce duel s are not decisive. 36. Fo r an interesting recen t attemp t t o identif y th e condition s fo r the existence o f such an equilibrium, se e Goldma n (1990) . 37. Consider , for example, the relation between the outcome of the war in the Persian Gulf between the US-led coalition and Iraq, and the bargaining

268 Rober t Harriso n Wagne r that is currently going on over future Iraq i policy on various issues, including treatment o f the Kurds . 38. Thoug h he notes that "the line between capitulatio n and negotiatio n can be fuzzy," partl y because of "the lack of a generally accepted definitio n of negotiation* ' (Pillar , 1983 , 15) . A n illustratio n o f thi s fuzzines s i s Kecskemetfs statement , contrar y t o Pillar , tha t bot h Worl d Wa r I an d Worl d War I I ende d b y "capitulation " (Kecskemeti , 1958 , 5-8) . Thi s apparen t disagreement is the result of the fact that Kecskemeti focuses on the outcome of the contest of military forces, which in both cases ended in the surrende r of the losin g side, while Pillar focuses o n the process leading to the endin g of a stat e o f belligerency , o r th e final settlemen t o f th e war . Confusio n between thes e tw o aspect s o f military conflic t i s pervasive i n the literatur e on both civi l an d internationa l war . 39. Not e tha t thes e expectation s ar e interdependent . 40. Consider , fo r example , th e situatio n create d b y th e recen t termi nation o f th e civi l wa r i n Nicaragua . Amon g th e civi l war s tha t Modelsk i counts as ending i n a settlement ar e the Chines e civi l war o f 1927-36 , th e civil war s i n Lao s i n 1953-5 7 an d i n 1960-62 , an d th e 195 8 rebellio n i n Lebanon (Modelski, 1964b, 150-153). These are not encouraging examples. 41. Fo r another discussio n o f this point, se e the chapte r by Jane E. Holl in this volume . 42. Se e the discussion in the paper by Harvey Waterman i n this volume. 43. Thes e line s wer e writte n befor e th e recen t invasio n o f Kuwai t b y Iraq, whic h provide s a nice illustratio n o f the point .

E L E V E N

When Wa r Doesn' t Work : Understandin g the Relationshi p betwee n th e Battlefiel d and th e Negotiatin g Tabl e Jane E. Holl

There i s a persistent , intuitiv e belie f tha t decisiv e succes s o n th e battlefield confer s victor y in war. This observation seem s so obvious as to be trite , ye t histor y record s man y case s in whic h belligerents ' claims to battlefield streamer s were fa r mor e secure tha n the objec tives for whic h those battles were fought . Prominen t case s spring to mind: America' s wa r i n Vietnam ; th e Sovie t Union' s faile d effor t i n Afghanistan; th e Israel i adventur e i n Lebanon . Clearly, however , i f wa r wer e suc h a consistentl y unprofitabl e enterprise w e migh t reasonabl y expec t t o observ e fewe r instance s of it. We suffer fro m n o lack of material for study , however; indeed , there are a number of examples since the Second World War in which decisive militar y succes s delivere d unambiguou s victor y i n war : Israel's Yom Kippur triumph; Britain in the Falklands; the United States in Grenad a an d Panama . I n certai n cases , wa r doe s work , bu t th e conflicting evidenc e regardin g ho w successfu l warfar e i s suggest s that there may be no clear or consistent relationship between activit y on th e battlefiel d an d th e achievemen t o f war aims . This chapte r investigate s ho w th e proces s o f wagin g a civi l wa r might shap e th e proces s o f terminating tha t war . Mor e specifically , it seeks to develop an understanding o f how the battlefield situatio n in civi l wa r affect s th e abilit y o f th e belligerent s t o reac h accom modation i n a negotiated settlement . 269

270 Jan e E . Hol l The central argumen t o f this chapter i s that even though wars are all about th e us e o f force t o resolv e contentiou s issues , over tim e a civil conflic t ofte n develop s t o the poin t wher e th e militar y activit y between th e belligerent s i s not th e deciding , o r eve n th e mos t im portant, factor in resolving the war. Moreover, belligerents often fai l to recognize this tendency, with the consequent effect tha t they incur unnecessary cost s (in terms of resources an d lives) that may, in turn, undermine thei r effort s t o achiev e specifi c wa r aim s i n negotiate d settlements. Remarkably, ho w a civil war is fought ca n have little t o do wit h ho w i t ends . Any attemp t t o understan d ho w battlefiel d development s facto r into civil war termination raise s questions regarding the us e of forc e as a policy instrument. However , th e comple x relationshi p betwee n the decisio n t o us e force an d the efficac y o f that choic e lies beyond the scope of this effort.1 W e seek to know how the process of warring can influenc e th e wa y i n whic h belligerent s i n a civi l wa r see k t o end a conflict . Whil e i t i s clea r tha t th e anteceden t condition s o f warfare matte r i n civi l wa r termination—a s the y invariabl y mus t i n all wars—understandin g ho w the y d o i s not th e tas k o f th e presen t effort.

War an d Politica l Purpos e One ca n thin k o f th e relationshi p betwee n th e applicatio n o f forc e and its political purpose as ranging on a continuum from th e extrem e of the perfect coincidenc e o f military an d political objective s t o th e complete disarticulatio n o f the two . In th e first instance, if political aims have been translate d clearly into battlefield objectives , the military effor t i n a war wil l mor e likel y confor m t o a larger, coheren t policy designed to achieve a set of objectives though t otherwis e no t obtainable. I n these cases , the progres s o f the war represent s a tangible inde x o f the achievemen t o f strategic aims , and i f the wa r ca n be brought t o an end throug h decisiv e military engagemen t th e political objectives of the war also will have been achieved. The Union's decisive defea t o f the Confederat e arm y i n the American Civi l War illustrates this relationship, as does the outcom e o f the Spanis h civil war i n thi s century. 2

When War Doesn't Wor k 27 1 At the opposite extreme, however, military accomplishments hold little political significance . Thi s condition seem s particularly true of long, protracted wars where, over time, the political value of military achievements become s harde r t o fix. Eithe r o r bot h side s ma y b e uncertain whethe r holdin g certai n terrai n o r defeatin g particula r units achieve s th e objective s o f th e war . Lebanon' s painfu l cas e makes th e point . Fo r long period s o f tim e i n that conflict , non e o f the man y competin g faction s coul d clai m militar y superiority , an d hence a dominant politica l position , wit h an y degree o f authority. 3 In these situations, the disarticulation of military instrument from political purpos e work s to imped e effort s t o brin g th e conflic t t o a conclusion. Warfar e become s littl e mor e tha n witles s destruction . The inability o f one or another side to establish clea r military dominance seems to reflect a situation in which few incentives exist, aside from war weariness or resource exhaustion , to settle. If neither side can impose its will through force, neithe r does either side feel com pelled to capitulate. Perhaps because these wars do not end through decisive militar y victory, th e battlefiel d achievement s matte r les s i n shapin g eithe r the term s o f th e settlemen t o r th e postwa r order . Th e notio n o f a 'hurting stalemate* captures the essence of this disjuncture (Zartman, 1989; Modelski , 1964b , 143-144) . Settlement s o f thes e kind s o f conflicts ar e often brought abou t by third parties that intervene decisively eithe r o n behalf o f one o f the belligerents, o r as bipartisan mediators. Clausewitz (1976 , book 1 , chapter 1 ) correctly observed that the most critica l aspec t o f militar y activit y i s th e degre e t o whic h i t accurately reflect s politica l objectives , an d that it is this associatio n that link s succes s o n th e battlefiel d wit h victor y i n war . Thi s fun damental relationship between the application of force and war outcomes anchors our effort t o understand the conditions under which the battlefield influence s effort s t o terminate a civil war. Civil war s seem particularl y suite d t o a study o f how th e battlefield-negotiation relationship ca n matte r i n wa r termination effort s for several reasons, all originating from the degree to which political and military objectives are more or less tightly or loosely connected. First, becaus e irreconcilabl e difference s ove r issue s o f governanc e generally precipitate a civil war , ther e are , a t least a t the outse t o f this kind of conflict , clea r notion s o f just wha t th e violenc e i s sup-

272 Jan e E . Hol l posed t o achieve : th e physica l destructio n o f th e oppositio n eithe r by killin g the m outrigh t o r by destroyin g thei r means—i f no t alway s their will—to resist by inflicting a military defeat. Indeed, by a margin of ove r tw o t o one , civi l war s ten d t o en d throug h decisiv e militar y achievements (Pillar , 1983 , 18-26) . I n thes e cases , focusin g o n th e military effor t an d it s relationshi p t o th e achievemen t o f wa r aim s gives us a relatively straightforward understandin g of how these wars end. A s wit h man y internationa l conflicts , clea r militar y succes s un ambiguously convey s politica l victory. 4 However, a numbe r o f interestin g case s illustrat e tha t civi l war s can b e conclude d throug h negotiate d settlement s (contrar y t o th e expectation that these zero-su m conflict s mus t end in victory fo r on e side an d defeat fo r the other). 5 In these analyticall y mor e interestin g cases, w e ca n examin e ho w th e ac t o f fighting itsel f influence s th e belligerents' pursui t o f th e objective s sought . Second, a civil wa r i s characterize d b y organize d violenc e occur ring within th e establishe d politica l border s o f a state. Thi s i s not t o suggest tha t civi l war s ar e characterize d b y well-traine d an d coher ently structure d militarie s opposin g eac h other ; indeed , civi l war s rarely presen t suc h a case. Rather , t o distinguis h civi l wa r fro m th e random, an d ofte n extensive , violenc e tha t frequentl y occur s i n un stable states , 'organized * violenc e refer s t o th e fac t tha t th e con tending militar y effort s ar e focuse d (mor e o r less) o n a n objective i n opposition t o eac h other . Indeed, i n civil wars, more so than international conflict , th e char acter o f th e opposin g militarie s ca n var y greatly . Th e centra l gov ernment ofte n ca n lay clai m t o th e nationa l militar y whic h i s usuall y better organized , equipped , an d traine d tha n it s adversary . Insur gents' groups, on the other hand, possess more political tha n military organization an d thu s ma y lack th e experienc e t o moun t effectiv e opposition. I n consequence , thei r militar y effor t i s usuall y mor e loosely organized , inconsistentl y an d inadequatel y trained , an d poorly equipped—ofte n relyin g o n a hodge-podge o f weapon s an d munitions tha t confoun d uni t trainin g an d complicat e sustaine d re supply. Thi s varianc e wil l hav e implication s fo r effort s t o terminat e a civi l wa r a s th e convention s fo r endin g wa r presum e a leve l o f organization and authoritative competenc e withi n the opposing side s that will permit negotiations (o r even capitulation) an d render agreements meaningful . Thus , civi l war s characterized b y asymmetrie s i n military organizatio n ma y prov e particularl y difficul t t o terminate i n ways othe r tha n throug h decisiv e militar y victory .

When War Doesn't Wor k 27 3 Regardless o f the relativ e exten t o f organizatio n o f th e belliger ents, however , th e inhabitant s o f th e war-tor n stat e ar e affecte d i n direct an d profoun d way s b y th e concentratio n o f force . Th e ex posure o f th e genera l populatio n t o intens e an d directe d violenc e magnifies th e importanc e o f wa r terminatio n efforts ; n o doub t th e searing experienc e o f civi l violenc e wil l affec t effort s t o en d tha t violence.6 Finally, it seems plain, particularly i n civil conflicts , tha t warfare will hav e a n enormous impac t o n the postwa r orde r o f the stat e i n which th e wa r occurs. Thus, th e natur e an d duration o f the battle s can retain their significance lon g after the smoke has cleared. In civil wars the manne r in which the wa r is fought ma y assume particula r salience fo r th e timin g an d characte r o f th e settlement . If , fo r ex ample, on e sid e mad e us e o f unusuall y bruta l tactic s o r subjecte d the civilia n populatio n t o indiscriminat e violence , wa r terminatio n efforts ma y be impeded . Belligerent s ar e no t unmindfu l o f the fac t that, in the aftermath o f a civil war, they may be force d to bear the responsibility for their violent acts without the security of their arms. If th e consequence s o f thei r brutalit y appea r grav e enough , the y may endeavo r t o forestal l a conclusion t o th e wa r unti l suc h tim e when memorie s o f particular atrocitie s hav e fade d o r othe r factor s work to mitigate th e effect s o f their deeds. Indeed , expectation s o f recriminations followin g a settlement ma y be s o abhorrent tha t th e belligerent act s t o preven t th e wa r fro m endin g b y reducin g th e intensity, frequency , o r duratio n o f militar y clashe s wit h it s oppo nent, thus causing the war to linger on interminably. This possibility notwithstanding, a civi l wa r conducte d a t relativel y lo w level s o f violence could also present a number of points at which negotiations might begin, thereb y enhancin g effort s t o terminate th e conflict . In sum , civi l wa r offer s a n exceedingl y appropriat e contex t i n which to uncover those points during armed conflict that might make ending the violence mor e or less possible. Thi s analysis of the stat e of the military struggle does not convey the ability to predict points at which a civil war will end, particularly since , a s noted, important military asymmetries between the belligerents characterize the conflict. Rather , i t seek s t o develo p a fulle r appreciatio n o f ho w th e activity o n th e battlefiel d interact s wit h othe r factor s withi n th e larger political context of civil war to influence the conclusion of the conflict.7 As note d above , ther e ar e a numbe r o f case s o f civi l war s tha t have bee n conclude d throug h negotiate d settlement . Bu t a s wit h

274 Jan e E . Hol l interstate conflic t som e o f thes e settlement s di d no t reflec t th e rel ative distributio n o f powe r betwee n th e belligerent s (o r eve n th e military balance that resulte d fro m pitche d combat) ; weaker partie s did much bette r i n settlemen t tha n the y ha d ove r the entir e cours e of the war, and belligerents that dominated the military contest were unable to realiz e the fulles t measur e o f their victories . These seem ingly incongruou s situation s ow e thei r occurrenc e t o th e fac t tha t over th e cours e o f th e wa r condition s givin g ris e t o othe r consid erations emerged, an d the military balance between th e belligerent s became a less important facto r informin g th e final shape o f the set tlement.8 At leas t fou r reason s ca n accoun t fo r th e diminishe d importanc e of the militar y instrumen t i n the wa r termination process . First, th e effects o f warfare ar e different i n civil wars where possible compro mise solutions exist than in conflicts where they do not. In the former , the wa r migh t b e settle d i n a numbe r o f possibl e ways ; therefore , escalation is generally les s profitable—yielding relativel y smal l gains for it s costs. 9 I n th e latte r case , successfu l escalatio n create s eve n further incentiv e fo r increase d level s o f violence , an d th e wa r ca n only be brought to an acceptable end when one side establishes clear military dominance . Second, th e intensit y o r duratio n o f comba t ma y matte r les s because a belligerent ma y com e t o valu e th e shap e o f the settlemen t far mor e tha n th e cost s o f continuin g t o disagree , thu s makin g tha t party les s sensitive to the cost s associated with prosecuting th e con flict.10 I n othe r words , thoug h extrem e o r prolonge d exposur e t o violence may induce "war weariness ,, and cause a belligerent to seek a way out o f a conflict, stron g desire s fo r a particular outcom e ma y dominate an d thu s caus e th e wa r t o g o on. Third, decision-maker s ten d t o evaluat e battlefiel d activit y mor e prospectively tha n retrospectively , an d thi s tendency affect s effort s to terminat e a civil war . Runners d o no t qui t race s because o f ho w far the y hav e come , bu t becaus e o f ho w fa r the y hav e ye t t o go . Though decision-makers are often move d to seek peace in situations where the y have experienced militar y setbacks, they may also do so in situation s wher e the y hav e th e tactica l uppe r hand . Finally, th e actua l fighting betwee n belligerent s ma y b e les s in fluential i n th e final settlemen t o f a civi l wa r because , ove r time , wars ten d towar d a greate r degre e o f internationalization , whic h introduces additiona l factor s externa l t o th e immediat e conflict ,

When Wa r Doesn' t Wor k 27 5 which, i n turn , ma y reduc e th e relativ e importanc e o f th e militar y contest (Rosenau , 1964) . Greater internationalization ma y expose or amplify factor s suc h a s reputationa l concern s o r th e effec t th e wa r is having o n extrinsic economi c interests . These factors , o r a reconsideration o f a belligerent's absolut e wa r costs, can com e to subver t the importance of the relative military balance and dominate the war termination calculus. Indeed, greater internationalization ofte n lead s to third-part y mediatio n betwee n th e belligerents ; man y civi l con flicts terminate d throug h negotiation s hav e bee n th e resul t o f th e active participatio n o f third-part y intermediarie s (Deutsch , 1968 , chapter 13) . The followin g discussio n examine s eac h o f th e fou r reason s out lined abov e i n more detail .

The Battlefiel d an d Wa r Terminatio n The effects of warfare are different in civil wars where possible compromise solutions exist than in conflicts where they do not. Clearly , not all civil conflicts ca n be ended through compromis e settlements . Indeed, i n mos t case s i t appear s tha t civi l wars ar e genuinel y zero sum; that i s to say , on e sid e achieve s gain s only a t another' s loss . A war over who governs a particular state is the most obvious example. Compromise solutions are usually not possible in these kinds of wars because neithe r sid e i s willin g t o conside r powe r sharin g arrange ments wit h it s opponent . I n consequence , th e tota l destructio n o f the opponent i s generally the objectiv e sough t by belligerents, wit h the effect tha t these types of civil conflicts are characterized, a t least for a time , b y considerabl e level s o f violenc e an d ar e remarkabl y resistant to negotiated settlements (Modelski, 1964b, 141-142; Ikle, 1971, 95) . Every effor t t o increas e th e intensit y o f suc h a civi l wa r entail s costs t o th e part y tha t undertake s th e escalation . 'Successful ' esca lation result s whe n a belligeren t realize s a ne t gai n fro m th e en deavor—a situatio n i n whic h th e cost s impose d o n one' s adversar y yield a n advantag e tha t excee d th e cost s one incur s by escalating. 11 Because a successfu l attemp t t o intensif y th e conflic t widen s th e margin o f differenc e betwee n th e belligerents , th e behavio r en courages future escalation . It no w takes less power (relativ e both t o one's forme r leve l an d t o th e powe r o f one' s opponent ) t o wide n

276 Jan e E . Hol l further th e advantage over one's adversary. Because the belligerent s recognize n o common groun d fo r compromise , strong incentives exist to exploit military successes; consequently, negotiated settlement s to thes e tota l civi l war s may prov e elusive . All civi l war s d o no t presen t condition s unde r whic h successfu l escalation encourage s a belligerent t o intensif y th e conflic t further , however (Pillar , 1983 , 160-172) . I n certai n civi l conflicts, possibil ities for compromis e suc h a s partition, separation , o r power-sharin g do exist , an d i t ma y no t alway s be politicall y profitabl e t o escalate , even i f th e escalatio n i s militaril y 'successful / Becaus e th e partie s are generall y awar e o f potentia l compromis e settlements , afte r th e initial phases of conflict th e leve l of violence tends to become mor e measured, it s momentum mor e controlled. Here , escalation is not as profitable a s i n civi l war s les s amenabl e t o negotiate d settlement s because o f the comparativel y smal l advantag e t o be gaine d relativ e to one' s positio n withou t escalation . I n thes e situation s th e bellig erents generall y acknowledg e tha t acceptabl e compromise s exist ; thus, intensifying a conflict simpl y to drive the settlement furthe r i n one's favo r makes les s sens e becaus e grea t effor t yield s onl y smal l gains. Th e advantag e achieve d throug h escalatio n i n thes e kind s of civil wars represents onl y a marginal improvement ove r the positio n previously held . I n othe r words , th e effor t require d t o achiev e a n improved positio n i s significantly greate r tha n th e margi n o f advan tage th e additiona l gai n conveys . In conflicts where a range of possible compromise solutions exists, ending th e wa r involve s negotiatin g th e distributio n o f th e dissat isfactory aspect s o f compromise unti l a mutually acceptabl e poin t i s reached. Onc e th e belligerent s accep t th e notio n tha t th e wa r ca n conclude withou t th e exterminatio n o r expulsio n o f th e adversary , the warrin g partie s develo p wha t ma y be characterize d a s a certain level of indifference regardin g the settlement—a number o f possible distributions o f gain s ar e mor e o r les s acceptabl e t o bot h parties ; consequently the costs of continuing to disagree are magnified.12 On e may escalat e successfully , bu t th e gain s from tha t escalatio n wil l b e comparatively sligh t (unles s a massive effor t i s undertaken t o driv e the settlement poin t t o one's extreme position), since the differenc e between acceptabl e settlemen t position s i s relatively narrow . Mar ginal gain s ar e increasingl y see n a s not wort h th e margina l costs . Finally, ther e i s th e mixe d case , wher e on e belligeren t believe s room fo r compromis e exist s whil e it s opponen t doe s not . I n thes e

When Wa r Doesn' t Wor k 27 7 situations, the adversary wit h the limited objective migh t easil y find itself waging war at a higher leve l than woul d otherwise be the cas e in orde r t o counte r it s mor e ambitiou s opponen t effectively . Con sequently, th e leve l o f combat i n these conflict s wil l tend t o excee d the valu e tha t th e belligeren t pursuin g limite d wa r aim s assign s t o its objectives . Thi s conclusio n illuminate s th e dilemm a inheren t i n conflicts o f asymmetrical motivatio n an d leads us to the secon d rea son why th e battlefiel d activit y o f the belligerent s ma y com e t o b e less influential tha n othe r factor s i n shapin g th e final settlemen t o f a civi l conflic t (George , Hall , an d Simons , 1971 , 218-219 ; Mack , 1975, 175-200) . The intensity or duration of combat may be excessive because belligerents value the shape of the settlement more than the costs of disagreement. I n wa r generally, an d in civil war specifically , a belligerent attempt s t o influenc e th e typ e o f settlemen t reache d b y manipulating th e cost s t o it s opponen t o f continuin g t o disagree . These disagreemen t cost s moun t ove r time , an d th e cumulatio n o f costs can come to play an important rol e in formulating a basis fro m which a belligerent migh t see k a n exi t fro m a civil war . Th e actua l effect th e cost s o f warfare hav e o n th e warrin g partie s depends , i n part, on whether a belligerent place s more importance o n achievin g its objectives tha n o n the effor t i t expends i n doing so (Pillar, 1983 , 169-172). A belligerent mor e concerne d wit h th e shap e o f th e settlemen t will be willin g t o undertak e less-efficien t militar y action s an d incu r higher cost s tha n woul d otherwis e b e th e case . I f it s opponen t i s similarly motivated , th e wa r wil l be intense . If its opponent i s more concerned wit h th e cost s o f the wa r tha n wit h th e precis e arrange ments unde r whic h i t coul d b e brough t t o a n end , however , tha t opponent will tend to relax its expectations regarding the issue under dispute an d conside r a wider rang e o f possible solutions . Escalation ca n serv e the wa r termination interest s o f belligerent s with markedl y divers e motivations . T o th e belligeren t tha t value s settlement mor e tha n live s an d resource s spen t i n it s pursuit, esca lation, regardles s o f its success, serve s usefull y t o amplif y disagree ment costs . These higher cost s may serve to prompt it s adversary t o undertake initiative s t o settle . T o th e combatan t mor e concerne d with th e mountin g cost s o f th e war , escalatio n ma y b e undertake n as a final pus h t o establis h a mor e favorabl e basi s fro m whic h t o pursue a non-military solution .

278 Jan e E . Hol l For partie s enmeshe d i n a civi l war , knowin g th e inclinatio n o f one's opponen t i s a useful, bu t no t necessary , elemen t o f th e esca lation calculus . Decision-makers hav e expectation s no t onl y regard ing thei r opponen t i n war, bu t als o regardin g ho w wa r function s a s a medium o f interaction. 13 Leader s ten d t o believe, intuitively , tha t they have strong incentives to perceive both their opponent an d th e combat situatio n correctly . Th e suppositio n i s tha t a complet e un derstanding o f the adversar y an d one' s relativ e positio n i n wa r wil l suggest a dominant operationa l strateg y t o achiev e one' s objective s (Kecskemeti, 1970 , 105-115 ; Jervis, 1976 , 109-110) . For example, combatants implicitl y believe tha t one' s opponen t desire s to be i n a superior, o r a t leas t tenable , positio n a t th e en d o f a conflict . Th e persistence o f this belief reveal s a n often-unarticulate d expectatio n that the opponent will undertake strategies in the conflict that reflec t some reasonable understanding of the distribution of power between the adversaries . Furthermore , expectation s regardin g th e desir e t o survive a war impl y tha t one' s adversar y i s operating i n the domai n of gains with respec t t o the final settlement. W e may safel y reserv e cases o f belligerents' voluntaril y enterin g a war wit h ever y expec tation o f losing fo r theatre . This conclusion ma y not alway s be warranted, however . I f an opponent believes himself to be in the domain of losses (that is, he only expects t o b e wors e of f tha n h e i s now) , i t stil l ma y b e rationa l fo r him to engag e i n or escalate a conflict. Extensiv e researc h ha s demonstrated tha t individual s ten d t o become ris k acceptan t whe n the y perceive themselve s t o b e operatin g i n circumstance s wher e the y will incu r a loss. Fo r example , whe n face d wit h th e certai n los s of $100 o r a n 80 % chance o f losing $15 0 (an d a 20% chance o f losing nothing), most elec t th e gambl e (Kahnema n an d Tversky, 197 9 an d 1984). Th e sam e logi c ca n b e applie d t o belligerent s a t war . I f a belligerent believe s it s positio n i s hopeless , ther e is little mor e t o lose by taking additional risks. Indeed, ther e may be surprising gains to be made . Thus, in some situations it may be possible to perceive accuratel y the intentions an d motivations o f one's opponent , because th e man ifested behavio r ca n be explaine d from a perspective o f either gain s or losses . Thes e situation s d o not , however , leav e on e withou t a course o f action , i.e. , force d int o immobilit y unti l th e situatio n i s clarified. I n thes e cases , a strateg y o f preponderance—tha t is , ov ermatching forc e t o th e objective s sought—allow s a belligeren t a

When War Doesn't Wor k 27 9 good chance of realizing its objectives irrespective of its opponent's intentions or motivations. The strategies one pursues may not be the most efficient , bu t thei r cost s ca n fal l withi n a n acceptabl e rang e given th e potentia l gain s t o b e achieve d an d th e uncertaint y re garding the opponent' s motivations . While i t i s usuall y th e incumben t regim e tha t ca n la y clai m t o resources that would allow it to adopt a strategy of preponderance, the insurgen t side—usuall y les s wel l equippe d an d manned—is no t necessarily without the means to emerge victorious. Clearly superior forces can be offset with more limited resources, provided one makes ingenious us e o f the intangibl e aspect s of warfare. Political will is one of the most critical intangible aspects of warfare that influence s th e conduc t o f a civil wa r an d the wa r terminatio n process. The ability of a party to wage war consists in the association of two factors : the tangibl e resource s availabl e an d the strengt h o f its political will to commit those resources to the achievement of the war aims . A n importan t question , then , i s i f a grou p i s move d t o armed conflict , doe s i t hav e no t onl y th e mean s t o wag e war , bu t also th e politica l wil l t o us e thos e mean s i n pursui t o f th e define d objectives? Par t of th e answe r t o thi s questio n lie s i n knowin g just how powerful a belligerent is. A belligerent's power capabilities—subject to some objective measurement—include the human and material wherewithal available for commitment t o a conflict . Supportiv e population , monetar y an d other form s o f aid , the siz e o f the organize d military , amon g othe r examples, are surrogate indicators of a combatant's power. However it i s measured an d valued, one' s capacit y t o wag e wa r depends o n available human and material resources, and these resources are objectively limite d an d knowable. Whil e on e recognizes tha t th e potential exist s fo r thir d partie s t o resuppl y belligerent s continuall y (suggesting that resources in a civil war might be effectivel y unlim ited), the point here is that there are objective an d subjective com ponents to warfare. 'Resources' is used here to capture the objective component. In contrast, political will is a difficult, i f not impossible, phenom enon to measure with any degree o f exactness or reliability. It s role in war , especiall y civi l war , however , i s undeniabl e (Clausewitz , 1976, chapte r 2 ; Howard, 1979) . Political wil l ca n b e though t o f a s a party's willingnes s t o bea r costs in pursuit o f the objective s o f a conflict. Hence , politica l wil l

280 Jan e E . Hol l reflects th e valu e place d o n achievin g th e wa r aims—i.e. , th e leve l of cost s deeme d acceptabl e t o incu r o n behal f o f thos e objectives . Appreciating the role of political will in war enables us to understand better th e relationshi p betwee n a belligerent's powe r an d th e wa r outcome. The valu e tha t a part y associate s wit h wa r objective s calibrate s the applicatio n o f its power capabilitie s i n the war. Fo r groups pur suing limited politica l objectives , th e us e o f the militar y t o achiev e those objective s i s politically constrained . Indeed , ove r th e cours e of th e war , tha t group' s valuatio n o f wa r objective s ofte n changes , with a corresponding influenc e o n the leve l o f resources committe d to the conflict , particularl y a s costs mount. I f costs rise to generall y unanticipated levels , a reconsideration o f the war objectives results . While sacrific e doe s initiall y creat e value— a fac t whic h n o doub t accounts, i n part , fo r a certain amoun t o f sustaine d suppor t fo r th e war—at som e poin t mountin g sacrifice s engende r a reconsideratio n of the wa r objectives . If a serious disjunctur e develop s between th e valu e that a belligerent assigns to the stated goals of the conflict an d the costs incurred or anticipated , the n on e o f two thing s occurs : either th e objective s are re-evaluate d an d determine d t o be wort h th e costs , or the cost s are determine d t o hav e exceede d th e valu e o f th e objectives , i n which case serious opposition to continued warfare will emerge fro m within th e grou p an d politica l activit y t o terminate th e conflic t wil l begin. Conventional notion s o f militar y victor y i n wa r impl y tha t i f a n opponent's militar y capabilit y t o wag e wa r ha s bee n virtuall y de stroyed, an y desire o n its part t o continue the fight does not matter , because the means to that en d no longer exist . However, i f we think of politica l wil l a s th e commitmen t o r willingnes s t o bea r cost s i n pursuit o f specifie d wa r objectives , the n th e strengt h o f tha t com mitment functions eithe r to unleash or constrain the war effort. Thus , if a belligerent i s no longer willin g to bear th e cost s associated wit h continued struggle , then th e powe r o f that belligerent t o wage war , no matter ho w great , become s essentiall y irrelevant . This relationship between will and capability offers a n explanation for ho w mor e powerfu l combatant s ca n lose war s t o les s capabl e adversaries. Politica l wil l i s a critica l facto r i n th e terminatio n o f conflicts i n which on e contestan t i s committed totally , whil e it s opponent pursue s a mor e limite d objective . Fo r th e adversar y tha t

When War Doesn't Wor k 28 1 perceives itsel f to be involve d i n a total war, the importance o f the shape o f th e settlemen t establishe s a much highe r cos t threshold , one tha t ma y exten d virtuall y t o th e whol e o f it s objectiv e powe r capability. This considerable tolerance for costs associated with pursuing vital objectives will dwarf that of its opponent, despite the fact that the opponent' s objectiv e powe r capabilit y ma y be fa r greater. Consequently, a belligerent perceiving itself to be involved in a limited wa r wil l cros s it s unacceptabl e cos t threshol d relativel y earl y compared to its opponent who is committed to total military victory, and the cost s of continued comba t wil l weig h mor e heavily fo r th e belligerent pursuin g limited objective s tha n for it s opponent . In general, the higher the political will, the greater the costs that can, and will, be borne. Conversely, th e higher the costs of the war, the greate r th e nee d fo r stron g politica l wil l t o continu e t o absor b those costs. Some combatants may be forced to limit the costs of the conflict s o as not to exceed the tolerance o f the political will, whil e simultaneously taking steps to bolster the political will to ensure that the cost s being incurre d or anticipated wil l be supported . In sum, then, differen t valuation s o f the shap e o f the settlemen t and the costs of disagreement between adversaries mean that abhorrence of war will not provide a basis for accommodation—belligerent s will not necessarily ceas e fighting or seek alternat e solutions simply because wa r is nast y business . I n those civi l conflict s wher e a belligerent confront s a n opponen t mor e concerne d wit h th e shap e o f the settlemen t tha n wit h th e cost s associate d wit h tha t settlement , the militar y activit y wil l weig h mor e heavil y t o th e part y pursuin g limited objective s unti l suc h tim e a s th e cost s ar e see n t o b e ac ceptably limited . Bu t rarely will a belligerent be willing to quit the contest altogether. Instead it will undertake to drive the intensity of violence dow n to a level tha t allows it to gain time fo r negotiation s that produce som e versio n o f a settlement tha t i s acceptable. Suc h de-escalation ca n work t o undermin e th e degre e t o whic h th e mil itary contest influence s th e endin g o f the war. Decision-makers tend to evaluate battlefield activity more prospectively than retrospectively, causing them, under certain battlefield circumstances—regardless of recent success or failure—to seek peace. During the course of a civil war, decision-makers continually reassess the value of continuing the conflict. I f they decide to continue, they face furthe r decision s regardin g th e leve l o f violenc e t o maintain .

282 Jan e E . Hol l The degre e o f militar y activit y form s th e basi s fo r adversaries ' ex pectations a s they conside r thes e decisions . Becaus e combatant s at tempt t o influence th e shap e o f settlement throug h manipulating th e costs o f th e war , the y expec t change s i n th e behavio r o f thei r ad versaries t o b e th e resul t o f change s i n thei r fortunes . Bu t change s in behavio r ar e les s th e resul t o f change s i n fortun e tha n the y ar e the resul t o f change s i n expectation s (Jervis , 1976 , 1 4 5 - 1 5 4 an d 181-187). I f an insurgent expect s the incumbent t o dominate certai n aspects o f th e conflict , th e insurgent' s behavio r wil l no t chang e jus t because th e existin g regim e does , i n fact , dominate . I t wil l change , however, if th e insurgen t expect s th e incumben t t o prevai l an d i t does not, o r if the insurgent expect s to prevail an d it does not . Thes e expectations appl y i n a similar wa y t o bot h side s o f a conflict . Thus th e 'critica l battle ' i s no t necessaril y th e on e i n whic h on e side achieve s a decisive victor y unles s i t i s als o th e on e tha t cause s the belligerent s t o revis e thei r expectation s o f th e futur e cours e o f the wa r (Pillar , 1983 , 201-203) . Therefore , manipulatin g th e cost s of wa r b y increasin g th e leve l o f violenc e i n th e wa r throug h esca lation wil l no t necessaril y caus e a n adversar y t o capitulat e o r seek a negotiated settlement , especiall y i f suc h escalatio n wer e expected . What, then , i s the relationshi p betwee n th e stati c situatio n o n th e battlefield an d th e belligerents ' expectation s regardin g futur e de velopments? Four different relationship s seem possible: A belligerent has experienced recen t victories and expects his fortunes to improve; a belligeren t ha s experience d recen t setbacks , bu t expect s hi s for tunes t o improve ; a belligerent ha s experienced recen t victorie s bu t expects hi s fortun e t o decline ; o r a belligerent ha s experience d re cent setback s an d expect s hi s fortune s t o declin e furthe r still . Al l o f these possibl e relationship s hav e implication s fo r wa r termination . A belligeren t wil l b e leas t willin g t o settl e a conflic t i f h e ha s experienced recen t setback s bu t expect s hi s fortune s t o improve . Certainly n o belligeren t want s t o initiat e o r conclud e negotiation s at what i t perceives t o be it s lowest point . Conversely , a belligeren t will b e mos t incline d t o settl e i f i t ha s experience d a recent victor y but expect s it s fortunes t o tak e a turn for th e worse . I n this position , one will be anxious to exploit a relatively advantageous position while it i s stil l possibl e (Pillar , 1983 , 245) . The two remaining relationship s present interestin g issue s for war termination. I f a belligeren t ha s experience d recen t setback s an d expects thing s t o continu e t o decline , th e natura l tendenc y woul d

When War Doesn't Wor k 28 3 be t o recogniz e th e objectiv e powe r balanc e an d capitulate . Th e interesting question is why belligerents in this position ever receive any consideratio n a t th e conclusio n o f a war whic h the y hav e los t badly. On e explanatio n coul d be tha t their adversaries misperceiv e the exten t t o which thei r opponen t ha s become disabled . A second explanation i s tha t thes e "loser* ' group s ofte n far e bette r i n wa r settlements tha n the y ' 'should" becaus e th e victo r ha s certai n in centives to gran t minor concessions i n order to avoi d incurring th e costs associated wit h havin g to conten d furthe r wit h the loser' s residual fighting capacity (Kecskemeti, 1958) . A finalreason is that the imposition o f draconia n term s o f settlemen t ma y resul t i n greate r instability i n the postwar order than does an outcome i n which th e losing side's sources of power simply are reduced to acceptable levels. If a belligerent has experienced recent successes and expects that things will onl y improve , i t wil l b e incline d t o press th e wa r effor t more toward total victory . Th e interestin g questio n the n becomes , when woul d a belligerent i n thi s positio n eve r agre e t o settl e or , indeed, see k a settlemen t o n term s les s tha n coul d b e achieve d through clea r military victory, whic h appear s to be a t hand? Pressure t o settl e th e conflic t shor t o f clea r militar y victor y ca n come from within the victorious side by groups motivated by a number of political reasons or those just weary of the war. Alternatively, pressure to constrain one's effort toward total victory can come from the international environment (Randle, 1970). In the absence of such pressures, however , th e tendenc y wil l b e fo r th e victoriou s powe r to press ahea d for a more complet e militar y victory . Nevertheless , perhaps th e ultimat e interest s o f the tacticall y superio r belligeren t are bette r achieve d throug h th e attritio n o f it s opponent' s powe r rather than the complet e destructio n o f every basis of that power. Whatever the belligerents' perceptions of the future course of the conflict, i t woul d appea r tha t prospectiv e evaluation s o f battlefiel d activity ar e more important tha n retrospective one s in determinin g the prospects for peace. Interestingly, success on the battlefield does not ensure the pursuit o f victory, just as battlefield failur e doe s not necessarily enhanc e th e opportunit y fo r a negotiated settlement . The military aspects of a civil war may be less influential in the final settlement because, over time, these wars tend toward a greater degree of internationalization. Th e interests, incentives , capabilities , an d

284 Jan e E . Hol l opportunities o f belligerent s combin e i n comple x way s durin g war . Wars focu s actors ' interests , an d thi s phenomeno n i s tru e no t onl y for thos e immediatel y part y t o a conflict , bu t als o t o certai n unin volved group s o r states . Whil e man y states , particularl y thos e i n geographical proximit y t o th e conflic t o r those wit h clos e economi c or cultural tie s to th e combatants , hav e significan t interest s i n a war, the opportunity t o act on those interest s and the incentives for doin g so—particularly i f actio n ma y brin g unwante d involvemen t i n th e war—may no t exist . As civi l war s approac h thei r concludin g stages , however , th e po tential cost s t o outsider s wishin g t o registe r thei r interest s i n th e outcomes ar e markedl y les s tha n earlie r i n th e conflic t becaus e clearer notion s o f just wha t sor t o f outcom e th e wa r wil l hav e ma y be emerging ; thir d partie s ca n join th e wa r wit h a greater certaint y of th e consequences . Therefore , ove r time , th e opportunitie s in crease fo r externa l actor s t o assum e a large r rol e i n it s settlement . Consequently, factor s othe r tha n th e militar y balanc e betwee n th e belligerents ca n become importan t element s shapin g a potential set tlement. Western styl e democracie s ten d t o thin k o f wa r an d peace a s mutually exclusiv e condition s i n th e internationa l environment . Bu t peace i s not solel y th e absenc e o f war, just a s the occurrenc e o f war does not necessaril y mea n the disruptio n o f a generally stabl e peace . Two factor s ar e critica l i n determinin g whethe r o r not th e endin g o f a civi l wa r will , i n fact , lea d t o th e creatio n o f a n environmen t i n which a n endurin g peac e adheres : first, a n appreciatio n o f ho w th e belligerents' view o f warfare a s a means of resolving disputes inform s both th e wa r effor t an d th e recognitio n o f opportunitie s fo r peace ; and second, a genuine understandin g o f the belligerents' general an d specific toleranc e fo r conflict . Tribal, familial , o r nationalis t quarrel s hav e give n certai n region s in the world a tradition of violence which , i n some cases , is centurie s old. Thes e deep-seate d tension s have , i n man y cases , bee n exacer bated b y convention s o f th e stat e system-—politica l boundarie s hav e been impose d tha t coincid e wit h neithe r cultura l realitie s no r long standing endowment s o f power an d authority withi n a region. Muc h of th e politica l landscap e o f twentiet h centur y Easter n Europe , th e continent o f Africa , an d th e Middl e Eas t reflect s thi s artificiality . Rather tha n functionin g t o contai n an d ameliorat e disputes , th e often-capricious politica l enfranchisemen t o f certai n cultura l an d

When Wa r Doesn' t Wor k 28 5 ethnic groups over others has resulted in frequent civi l and interstate wars. For people s mor e accustome d t o resolvin g dispute s wit h bullet s than barristers , civi l wa r ha s a decidedl y differen t impac t tha n fo r those les s pron e t o violence . Whe n wa r i s endemi c t o a stat e o r a regional subse t o f states, th e resolutio n o f a civil conflict take s on a markedly different characte r than one in which the belligerents view war a s a n aberration— a breakdow n i n norma l relation s (Eckstein , 1964, 1-32) . Though wa r ma y mean t o som e states that th e syste m is broken , fo r othe r state s th e occurrenc e o f wa r implie s n o suc h thing. To countries suc h a s the Unite d State s tha t vie w wa r a s an aber ration, th e en d o f a civil conflict i s often see n a s that poin t a t whic h the shooting stops, a point that usually, though no t always, coincides with the belligerents' agreeing to resolve the disputed issues without the force of arms.14 In raging civil wars, or for states more accustomed to th e presenc e o f violence , however , th e en d o f a wa r i s les s re strictive; wars end when the shootin g mostly stops. Thus when thir d parties an d th e stat e i n whic h th e wa r occur s hol d dissimila r view s of conflict , n o clea r consensu s emerge s regardin g wha t i t wil l tak e to hav e the wa r end . The internationa l system , a s a whole, ha s a certai n toleranc e fo r civil conflict ; states , correspondingly , hav e individua l level s o f tol erance fo r thi s typ e o f conflic t a s well . Whil e state s d o no t hav e unlimited tolerance fo r al l types of violence, neither ar e they incap able o f withstandin g th e incidenc e o f any neighborin g conflict , de spite a general dislike for war . Indeed, compellin g evidenc e fo r thi s tolerance i s the fac t tha t thoug h th e internationa l syste m ha s bee n regarded a s generally stabl e sinc e 1945 , war ha s been a n ever-pre sent fixture o n th e internationa l scene . A s Quinc y Wrigh t noted , "hostilities o f considerabl e magnitud e hav e occurre d continuousl y in on e part o f the worl d o r anothe r [sinc e World War II], under th e name o f aggression , defense , enforcemen t measures , intervention , reprisals, o r civi l strife—i n severa l case s resultin g i n ove r a millio n fatalities" (Wright , 1970 , 59) . Though th e incidenc e o f war is high (indicatin g a generally hig h tolerance for certai n type s of conflict), clearl y some threshold exist s above which tolerance for conflic t precipitousl y erodes . In any case, it seem s clea r tha t whil e som e ma y hol d th e stron g belie f tha t wa r is bad, states' behavior over the decades reveals a more differentiate d

286 Jan e E . Hol l approach to . conflict—wars ar e mor e o r les s bad, dependin g o n ho w and wher e the y ar e fough t an d wh o i s doin g th e principa l fighting. These tw o factors—th e genera l notio n o f warfar e (bot h o f th e belligerents an d the internationa l system ) an d the relativ e toleranc e for a particular conflict—implicitl y contribut e t o the recognition an d exploitation o f point s a t whic h a civi l conflic t migh t b e brough t t o an end. Th e interventio n o f third parties fo r th e purpose s o f endin g a civil conflic t present s perhap s th e cleares t evidenc e o f the degre e to whic h a civil wa r ha s becom e internationalized . Exploration o f the numerous and various reasons that third parties intervene i n civi l conflic t lie s beyon d th e scop e o f thi s chapter . Nevertheless, tw o genera l base s fo r third-part y interventio n see m evident: first, when th e war threatens to widen in unacceptable way s third parties interven e t o contro l th e spread ; an d second , thir d par ties' former involvement with one or another belligerent may sugges t a moral imperative that they intervene , particularl y as a civil conflic t appears t o g o o n withou t rea l prospect s fo r resolution . Britain' s in volvement i n terminatin g th e Zimbabw e civi l wa r illustrate s th e point. Thus, a s a civi l wa r become s increasingl y internationalized , ex ternal force s coul d moderat e th e effect s o f a belligerent's dominan t battlefield positio n i n orde r t o introduc e tactica l paus e an d prob e possible settlemen t initiative s t o se e whethe r o r no t th e condition s for achievin g a n endurin g peac e obtain . Internationa l influence s t o end th e wa r i n thi s wa y wil l preven t th e inevitabl e desire s fo r bel ligerents' short-ter m tactica l gain s fro m dominatin g a n appreciatio n of th e long-ter m strategi c cost s an d wor k t o undermin e th e imme diate militar y contes t a s th e principa l mean s throug h whic h bellig erents achiev e wa r aims . Moreover , third-part y withdrawa l fro m a conflict coul d have similar effects. Withou t the support of a powerful patron, belligerents ma y be force d t o ceas e thei r militar y effor t an d seek a settlement i n mor e peacefu l ways . Often , thir d partie s inter vene wit h a principal goa l o f establishing a basis for regional stabilit y in th e hop e tha t thi s goa l migh t b e attaine d a t a poin t fa r shor t o f total militar y victor y an d unconditiona l surrende r fo r eithe r side . Differing view s of conflict mean that often for external actors, a stable situation doe s no t requir e th e absenc e o f violence , onl y tha t th e principal belligerent s maintai n thei r violenc e a t acceptabl e levels . While on e ma y no t kno w wha t level s ar e precisel y acceptable , i t often become s clea r ove r th e cours e o f a civi l wa r wha t level s ar e

When War Doesn't Wor k 28 7 not. A s a n ai m o f wa r termination , a n 'endurin g peace ' shoul d b e envisioned no t a s a n eterna l stat e o f affairs , bu t rather , an d mor e realistically, as one that can be sustained long enough for indigenous institutions t o emerg e tha t ca n moderat e antagonism s an d broke r future conflic t i n less violent ways . Greater internationalizatio n o f a civi l conflic t introduce s othe r factors int o th e belligerents ' wa r terminatio n decision-makin g cal culus. Such things as reputational concerns, the effects of the warfare on extrinsi c economi c interests , an d absolute powe r consideration s (as contrasted wit h th e relativ e valuatio n o f powe r tha t dominate s wartime decision-making ) ma y com e t o matte r mor e t o th e bellig erents than who has the upper hand on the battlefield a s they con sider their postwar position in the larger context of the international community (Ikle , 1971 , chapter 4) . Even i n civi l war , a belligerent's reputatio n bot h a s warrior an d negotiator i s importan t fo r th e signa l i t send s t o it s adversary . It s importance, however , extend s beyon d th e immediat e conflic t an d influences outside observers. Similarly, the absolute power capability of a belligerent becomes an important consideration as the war drains assets an d prevent s thei r applicatio n t o othe r uses . Civi l war s ar e particularly debilitatin g i n this regard. The international syste m provides a wider context fo r evaluatin g the statu s o f one' s power ; evaluatin g one' s positio n withi n th e in ternational syste m i n variou s potentia l postwa r order s ca n caus e a belligerent either to seek peace more rapidly—if it perceives that its position wil l onl y erode—o r becom e obstinate—i f i t perceive s tha t its position ca n only be strengthene d with delay. 15 Belligerents ca n become concerned with how the costs of the war have diluted their ability t o conduc t affair s wit h othe r states , i n othe r issu e areas . A state greatly weakened by civil war, even if the incumbent leadership has the upper hand in that war, may be inclined to seek a premature settlement if it perceives that continued struggle serves to undermine its economi c o r diplomati c positio n wit h othe r states . Ove r time , then, th e internationa l aspect s o f a conflict ten d t o becom e accen tuated an d assume a larger rol e informin g th e timin g an d shape o f the settlement . Th e militar y contes t betwee n th e belligerent s be comes correspondingly les s important . As previously noted, greater internationalization of a civil conflic t creates opportunitie s fo r outsid e state s t o join a war as active participants. A civil war widened in this way accentuates the difficultie s

288 Jan e E . Hol l associated wit h managin g th e interactiv e relationshi p between one' s own incentives , perceptions , an d expectation s an d thos e o f one' s opponent b y introducin g th e complicatin g facto r o f coalitio n man agement. Either sid e to a civil wa r ca n exploi t th e vulnerabilitie s associate d with coalition s suc h a s the politica l integrit y o f the coalitio n o r command an d contro l o f forces . Th e ambiguit y tha t surround s civi l con flict ca n be mad e to work t o the belligerents' advantage . I t is neithe r necessary no r alway s desirabl e tha t th e incentive s o f coalitio n part ners perfectl y coincide ; civi l war s ar e ofte n characterize d b y un natural alliance s i n whic h formerl y unconnected , eve n hostile , groups join togethe r t o fac e a common threat . The primary belligerent tha t must combine wit h a disparate grou p of partner s i n a civi l wa r wil l expen d effort s tryin g t o forc e thos e partners int o a specifi c behavior . Th e tas k o f winnin g ma y b e achieved mor e easil y becaus e a range o f supportin g behavior s i s i n fact acceptabl e a s long a s al l shar e basi c preference s an d incentive s regarding simpl e victor y i n th e war. 16 In sum , th e longe r a civi l wa r lasts , th e greate r th e opportunit y for th e conflic t t o becom e internationalized . Th e involvemen t o f outside forces , eithe r a s activ e participant s o r a s adde d source s o f pressure on the belligerents, will cause extenuating factors to assum e greater importanc e t o th e belligerent s tha n th e simpl e militar y bal ance betwee n them .

Conclusion This chapte r sough t t o addres s broadl y ho w th e proces s o f wagin g a civi l wa r shape s th e proces s o f terminatin g tha t war . Mor e specif ically, i t endeavore d t o develo p a n understandin g o f ho w th e bat tlefield situatio n i n civi l wa r ca n affec t th e belligerents ' desir e fo r and abilit y t o reac h accommodatio n i n a negotiated settlement . Activity o n th e battlefiel d clearl y i s a n importan t facto r tha t wil l influence effort s t o terminat e a civi l war . Thi s chapte r ha s argue d that fo r a number o f reasons relatin g t o ho w group s conceiv e o f an d use forc e t o resolv e differences , a civil wa r can develop t o th e poin t where th e militar y contes t betwee n th e belligerent s become s onl y one o f a number o f factor s importan t fo r resolvin g th e conflict . Through th e years , countles s people s an d group s hav e trie d t o redress contentiou s issue s throug h civi l war . The y ofte n mak e thi s

When Wa r Doesn' t Wor k 28 9 choice believin g tha t conflic t i s th e onl y decisiv e ste p towar d th e resolution o f thei r grievances . Fo r lastin g resolution , however , th e war mus t als o work . Recognizin g whe n i t doe s no t ma y b e th e first step towar d endin g it .

Notes 1. Th e ric h literatur e o n th e cause s o f war s offer s a profusion o f arguments tha t addres s th e genera l us e o f forc e an d factor s inciden t t o th e onset o f conflict . Th e explici t relationshi p betwee n a war's beginning an d its end, however, has received markedly less systematic attention. In a typical treatment Geoffre y Blaine y writes : "War s usuall y en d whe n th e fighting nations agree on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength*' (1973 , 122 , emphasis original). Though Blaine y doe s g o o n t o identif y categorie s o f factor s importan t fo r understanding the onset of a particular war, the way in which the relationships betwee n thos e factor s enhanc e o r imped e effort s t o terminat e th e conflict remain s unexamined. 2. Ther e are, of course, extensive literatures on both of these conflicts. They share the characteristic that decisive military victory conveyed political victory by forcing the defeated side to capitulate. The difference, o f course, is tha t i n th e America n cas e th e victor s wer e th e incumbent s an d i n th e Spanish civil war, the insurgents dominated. 3. Systemati c analysi s o f th e torture d histor y o f th e fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon remains a future challenge for scholars. For a thoroughgoing journalistic accoun t o f these years , see Fisk , 1990 . 4. Th e American experience in Vietnam suggests clearly that battlefield supremacy alon e is insufficien t t o delive r victor y i n war. " 'You know yo u never defeated us on the battlefield/ sai d the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colone l pondere d thi s remark a moment. Tha t ma y be so, ' he replied, 'bu t it is also irrelevant* " (Summers, 1982 , 1) . 5. Pilla r (1983, 18-21) code s at least five cases in which a civil war was concluded wit h a negotiate d settlement : Yeme n (1962-1970) ; Jorda n (1970); Th e Suda n (1971-1972) ; Lebano n (1975-1976 ) an d Zimbabw e (1972-1979), though the durability of the settlement—such as in Lebanonmay suggest tha t this claim be mor e circumspect . 6. Th e argumen t her e i s simply that civi l conflicts , especiall y thos e o f long duration, cannot help but take a major toll on the afflicted population. For discussion s o f tw o civi l war s tha t includ e th e genera l impac t o n th e societies i n whic h the y occur , se e Oquist , 198 0 an d Fisk , 1990 . Fo r a n excellent general introduction to the role of domestic political factors in war termination (thoug h i n th e contex t o f interstat e conflict) , se e Ikle , 1971 , chapters fou r an d five. A more recent effor t tha t evaluate s th e strengt h o f

290 Jan e E . Hol l organizational explanation s as they infor m war termination decision s is Sigal, 1988. 7. Clearl y th e studie s o f wa r terminatio n tha t hav e take n interstat e conflict a s their focu s ar e applicabl e here . Civi l wars , however , ar e a t leas t as useful fo r understanding th e complex process of war termination, yet the y have receive d littl e carefu l examinatio n i n thi s regard . 8. This , a s noted, i s a limited study . T o understan d ho w th e battlefiel d relates t o civi l wa r termination , i t take s a s it s focu s th e ofte n unanticipate d tendency for military developments to become, under certain circumstances , less influentia l bot h i n effort s t o terminat e a civil conflic t a s well a s the final shape o f th e settlement . 9. Pilla r (1983 , 164 ) make s th e argumen t tha t th e dispositio n o f a conflict t o negotiate d settlemen t wil l hav e a n impac t o n th e leve l o f fighting and present s thi s positio n i n th e contex t o f wa r terminatio n a s a bargainin g problem. Th e presen t argumen t extend s Pillar' s analysi s an d suggest s tha t the activit y o n th e battlefiel d ha s importanc e beyon d th e exten t t o whic h i t informs negotiations . Becaus e civi l war s largel y appea r les s amenabl e t o compromise solutions , th e genera l utilit y o f warfare a s a means o f achievin g war aim s shoul d b e hig h fo r th e belligerents . Warfar e lose s it s potenc y a s a policy instrument , however , fo r a numbe r o f reason s t o b e discussed . Th e simple issu e o f whethe r o r no t possibl e compromis e solution s ar e presen t from th e outse t o f a civi l conflic t (o r emerg e ove r th e cours e o f th e war ) can functio n eithe r a s a n importan t sourc e o f strengt h o r a s a n effectiv e constraint o n th e fulles t applicatio n o f th e militar y instrument . 10. I t i s no t alway s obviou s t o belligerent s tha t possibl e compromis e settlements exis t i n som e war s an d no t i n others . Nevertheless , whethe r o r not a conflic t migh t b e settle d throug h compromis e i s a n importan t obser vation tha t ha s profoun d implication s fo r th e motivation s o f belligerent s i n war; when belligerents d o no t shar e the sam e vie w regardin g the possibilit y of compromise, th e effect s ca n be startling . Th e importanc e o f the phenom enon o f asymmetr y o f motivatio n wa s articulate d an d emphasize d i n th e work o f George , Hal l an d Simons , 1971 ; se e als o Pillar , 1983 , 154-155 . 11. Successful ' escalatio n i s simpl y base d o n th e relationshi p betwee n the gain s achieve d give n thei r costs . I n othe r words , a n escalatio n ca n b e characterized a s successfu l i f th e belligeren t i s bette r of f afte r escalatio n than before . Thoug h ther e ar e a number o f problem s wit h th e ter m 'bette r off,' decision-maker s ofte n hav e clea r perception s regardin g whethe r esca lation ha s conveye d advantag e alon g whateve r dimensio n the y determin e important. 12. Thi s simplificatio n i s use d onl y t o mak e th e poin t tha t th e effect s o f the military contest will be different i n civil wars where possible compromis e solutions exis t tha n i n conflict s wher e the y d o no t appea r accessible . 13. A comprehensiv e examinatio n o f th e vas t arra y o f internationa l an d domestic factors that contributes to the initiation and conclusion of hostilities

When Wa r Doesn' t Wor k 29 1 presents a daunting challenge an d may be ultimatel y unmanageabl e i n any single study. For important contributions on how key policymakers generally perceive an d interpret thes e factors , se e George , 1969 , an d Jervis, 1976 . Moreover, a considerable amoun t o f scholarl y wor k ha s been don e o n th e bargaining processes tha t g o o n between belligerents . Fo r a general intro duction see Snyder and Diesing, 197 7 and Young, 1968. Though these studies take interstate conflict as their principal focus, they do offer insights into the problems of bargaining in civil wars. 14. Th e classic description o f the American approach to war is Osgood, 1957. For extended discussions of national style in security decision-making, see Gray , 198 6 an d 1988 , chapter s 5- 6 an d Lord, 1985 . 15. Belligerents ' expectations regarding their status in the internationa l system followin g th e civi l wa r ofte n influenc e thei r terminatio n effort s i n important ways. Relevant discussions are contained in Modelski, 1964 b and Rosenau, 1964. Falk, 1971 approaches civil conflict and its termination from the perspective of international legality and includes case discussions of the postwar implications o f several conflic t settlements ; see als o Luard, 1972 . 16. Insigh t int o th e impac t o f incentive s o n behavio r ca n b e foun d i n March an d Simon , 1958 , 58-6 5 an d 132-133 . O n th e genera l use s an d problems of coalition warfare as they relate to civil conflict se e Deutsch and Kaplan, 1964 . The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official positio n of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the U.S. government. The author would like to thank Daniel J. Kaufman for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this chapter.

T W E L V E

Political Orde r an d th e "Settlement' ' of Civi l War s Harvey Waterma n

Whatever els e the y ma y be , civi l war s ar e conflict s ove r politica l order. They ma y arise when a n existing orde r is challenged an d their termination depend s on agreement o n a new one . The circumstance s of tha t agreement , therefore , ca n b e understoo d a s the re-creation of the conditions for a viable, common political order. Thes e condi tions may not, in the end, produce a viable order and levels of conflict may increase, perhaps even rekindling the large-scale violence calle d "civil war/ ' Th e commo n orde r create d ma y no t b e a centralize d one; indeed, it may, as a result of a separation, be an order maintained by tw o o r mor e autonomou s polities . Bu t th e endin g o f a civi l wa r clearly entail s agreemen t o n th e par t o f th e combatant s tha t th e incentives t o over t conflic t hav e decline d relativ e t o thos e fo r insti tutional accommodatio n an d that on e suc h institutional arrangemen t is acceptable for the moment. Understanding how civil wars end must therefore mea n understanding the changes in costs, risks and benefits perceived b y thos e wh o wil l mak e th e ne w order . That, of course, is not much more than a polysyllabic way of saying that civi l war s en d i n a dea l an d tha t th e dea l i s abou t politica l institutions. Nevertheless , i t i s wort h havin g sai d i t a t th e outset , I think, becaus e discussion s o f civi l wa r becom e s o entangle d i n th e fascinating detai l o f military dispositions an d intergroup negotiation s that on e ca n sometime s los e sigh t o f th e fac t tha t a constitutio n is , in effect, bein g written, re-written, reinstate d or promised a t the en d 292

Political Orde r and "Settlement'' 29 3 of almost ever y suc h war . Havin g sai d this, how d o we mov e o n to understanding i t better? Since, in some sense, all of political science is concerned, distantly or proximately , wit h th e natur e o f politica l order , ther e i s a wide gamut o f approache s fro m whic h t o choose . Traditiona l studie s o f constitutions, anthropologica l an d sociological studie s o f plura l so cieties, socia l psychological studie s of ethnic relations, politico-economic studies of incentive structures , th e political sociolog y o f mobilization an d collectiv e actio n an d th e politico-historica l stud y o f national political development all have something to offer—a palette richer than Hamlet's for the theater . For present purposes, we might best begin by reviewing what we think we know about the breakdown of political order and, thereby, about it s repair. Th e commo n them e I shall follo w i n all this is the constitutional deal. I shall sugges t that , a s in man y bargaining situ ations, the outcome is the acceptance of a deal that might have been had muc h earlier , an d tha t th e conflic t ha s serve d a s a necessar y demonstration tha t certai n alternative s wer e no t i n fac t available . And I shall conclud e that , amon g th e man y factor s tha t ma y affec t the outcom e o f a civi l war , i t i s th e natur e an d autonom y o f th e competing leaderships (th e institutions of authority) that are crucial to the makin g o f the dea l tha t end s the fighting.

Collective Actio n Armed comba t i s rarel y though t o f a s "collectiv e action, " a term more ofte n reserve d fo r wha t hav e bee n see n a s mor e "sponta neous"—or a t leas t mor e "domestic"—form s o f behavior involvin g large numbers of people. Yet most examples of collective action have been organized activities based on existing institutions or identities, with som e for m o f leadershi p makin g decision s o n behal f o f th e whole. Th e mobilizatio n o f large number s o f people i s always "domestic," even if they are then sent abroad for the intended activity. Even government s mus t provid e th e incentive s an d th e mean s fo r collective actio n they wish to sponsor. If mobilizing a national army can produce a kind of collective actio n on the par t of its members, surely we can see the mobilization o f internal armies contesting the national dea l i n the ligh t o f the collectiv e actio n literature . What does it tell u s that might interest the student of the endin g of civi l wars? 1 It tells u s that those i n power ar e likely t o mobiliz e

294 Harve y Waterma n when newl y threatened an d that thos e no t i n power ar e likely to do so when a new opportunit y arise s that increase s thei r incentives . I t tells u s tha t on e o f th e mos t commo n o f suc h opportunitie s i s th e perception o f a weakening o f centra l authority , ofte n accompanie d by a division amon g thos e i n power . I t tell s u s tha t provocatio n b y a wea k governmen t i s particularl y pron e t o resul t i n a violen t re sponse an d tha t politicall y ope n government s ar e les s likel y t o en counter violenc e fro m thei r challengers . I t tell s u s tha t violenc e i s instrumentally use d an d it s us e i s relate d t o th e weaknes s o f th e target. I t tell s u s tha t earl y successe s ar e a crucia l prelud e t o sus tained mobilization . Whence com e thes e eruptions ? I t no w seem s clea r tha t the y ar e almost invariabl y communal , based o n primary ties , preponderantl y youthful. Collectiv e action occurs when the participants see minimal risk an d ground s fo r optimis m abou t success . Whil e ther e i s muc h emotion associate d wit h thes e events , i t i s no t ver y helpfu l t o em phasize anger or frustration i n efforts t o explain its occurrence: emotions tend to follow as much as to precede action and sustained largescale action is the product o f fairly rationa l decisions based o n available information . Who are these people? Anyone can play, but there d o seem to be some patterns: Those motivate d b y threa t ten d t o be thos e who ar e already establishe d i n th e polity , whil e thos e motivate d b y oppor tunity ar e likel y t o be contestant s fo r ne w statu s (o r fo r th e re-cre ation o f ol d statuse s perceive d t o hav e bee n lost) . Whil e materia l goals ar e ofte n importan t i n th e mind s o f th e participants , consti tutional conflicts tha t ma y develop into civil wars invariably call primarily upo n conteste d statu s demands having to do with citizenshi p and/or ethnicit y (Bendix , 1969 ; Marshall , 1964 ; Mannheim , 1941 ; Rustow, 1970 ; Horowitz, 1971 ; Horowitz, 1985 , chapters 3-4) . Civil war s ar e occurrence s o f collectiv e actio n tha t hav e direc t constitutional stakes, are highly mobilized and sustained and employ organized violence . The y ar e responses , o n th e par t o f th e chal lengers at least, to governmental weakness or provocation or growing collective resources or the discovery o f new allies. If that is so, once the wa r ha s begun t o tak e it s tol l an d revea l th e militar y prospect s of the tw o sides , the endin g o f civil war shoul d be a matter o f read justing statuses , right s an d materia l benefit s t o th e postbellum bal ance o f threats, opportunities , risk s an d incentives . I t is , of course , rarely s o simple an d neve r easy .

Political Orde r and "Settlement" 29 5

Leaders Each ne w collectiv e politica l activity , includin g thos e tha t launc h civil wars , entail s willingnes s o n th e par t o f man y peopl e t o tak e certain risks , t o associat e themselve s wit h certai n ventures . Whil e doing so may certainly involve admissions that previous policies have proven unsuccessful , th e fac t tha t mobilizatio n ha s occurre d a t al l implies th e presenc e o f leader s willin g t o countenanc e it s us e fo r assertive actions. Popular feeling is not always aggressive or warlike, but th e par t o f i t tha t i s mos t loudl y hear d i n unsettle d situation s often i s and provides ready support to those who favor such action. Thus, from the point of view of leaders, a decision in favor of action is often a n "easy" one t o take. Making a deal to resolve conflicts is not so easy. Some expectations will have to be disappointed. Leader s will have to climb down from the height s o f earlie r rhetoric . Coalitio n member s wil l hav e t o b e satisfied. Reasonabl e concern s fo r th e minimu m condition s o f th e losers will ru n up against the ange r and fear o f the winners , aggravated by the conflict now ending. Each of the parties to the deal will have to satisfy a constituency, but each will have to make a deal less favorable than at least part of that constituency will wan t to accept. The dealer s wil l no t onl y hav e t o mak e th e deal , the y wil l hav e t o be willin g and able to insulate themselves fro m its repercussions. Case studies of pre- and postwar negotiations are replete with the heroics of clever diplomats and politicians and generals finding ways to turn some of these tricks. Indeed, it is one of the times in politics when individual s ca n matte r a grea t deal . Still , ther e ar e way s i n which collectivitie s ar e structure d an d leader s empowere d tha t largely determin e th e possibilitie s fo r solutions . Suc h question s a s why som e civi l war s ar e compromise d earl y an d other s ar e fough t to a bitter en d can be approache d a s questions abou t th e structur e of authority i n contesting group s and the natur e of coalitions. The relevan t literatur e her e i s th e extensiv e on e tha t describe s plural societie s an d th e "consociational " arrangement s tha t hav e been use d to enabl e settlement s afte r period s o f conflict an d to facilitate subsequent decision-makin g (Rustow , 1970 ; Lijphart, 1968 ; Daalder, 1974 ; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972 ; Horowitz, 1971 ; Horowitz, 1985) . Th e gis t o f thi s i s tha t accommodatio n take s plac e best whe n eac h collectivit y ha s a strong organizationa l expressio n that, i n turn , allow s leader s th e autonom y t o ac t o n it s behalf . I f leaders lack that autonomy, they ar e subject to competitive biddin g

296 Harve y Waterma n from individual s wit h ambition s t o replac e the m an d become unabl e to consent t o the necessar y compromises . The better establishe d th e organization, th e mor e likel y i t i s tha t th e leader s wil l enjo y th e necessary autonomy . Autonomy, however , i s neve r assured : wave s o f disconten t ca n upset eve n th e mos t oligarchi c o f organizations . Autonomy , there fore, need s no t onl y appropriat e organizationa l protectio n bu t als o a situatio n tha t favor s deal-making . Th e postwa r deal s i n Wester n Europe wer e mad e possibl e no t onl y b y th e highl y articulate d de cision-making structures of Catholic, Socialist, Protestant and Liberal subcultures bu t b y th e historica l circumstance s tha t induce d the m to suspen d thei r over t conflict s i n th e interes t o f bandin g togethe r against commo n enemie s o r commo n vicissitudes . I n a t leas t som e of these cases it can be argued that the fear of further conflict brough t the leader s t o term s an d tha t th e immediat e problem s o f postwa r recovery gav e the m th e autonom y t o d o so . Th e arrangement s the n lasted fo r som e tim e becaus e intrinsi c t o the m wer e provision s tha t discouraged direc t contac t o r competitio n betwee n thei r constitu ents. If on e wer e t o projec t thi s lesso n o n t o th e civi l war s o f recen t history, on e migh t expec t tha t the conditions for resolving civil wars are sufficient military risk to persuade the leaders to deal and sufficient economic and social trouble to persuade the followers to let them, even a t th e expens e o f strongl y hel d statu s goals . Thi s wil l b e facil itated i f th e pre-eminen t spokesperson s o f thos e goal s (e.g. , Ia n Smith, Jefferso n Davis , th e leade r o f th e Yemen i Royalists ) ar e cal culatedly o r fortuitousl y move d aside , reducin g th e persona l stake s of th e deal-makers . Constitutional deal s o f th e kin d unde r discussio n ar e inherentl y coalitional. Coalition s o f multiple actor s ar e usuall y see n a s a source of problems, sinc e the y increas e th e numbe r o f players who mus t b e satisfied wit h th e outcome . O n th e othe r hand , the y increas e th e possibilities fo r trade-off s an d accommodation s (a s i n Yemen) . Min imum coalition s tha t ar e sufficien t fo r parliamentar y government s may b e insufficien t fo r constitutiona l bargain s intende d t o en d civi l wars an d aver t ne w ones . Universalisti c rule s ma y hav e t o giv e wa y to specia l arrangement s designe d fo r on e o r more o f the contestant s in th e civi l war . Again , increasing the number of actors that must be included in a postwar arrangement helps to facilitate agreement when the leaders are autonomous and have not gotten themselves too far

Political Orde r an d "Settlement " 29 7 out on a rhetorical limb; when they are populist leaders subject to competitive bidding, accommodation will be very difficult and the required threshold of pain will rise accordingly, until the way to bid for power becomes the promise of peace, rather than war (Eisenhow er's " I wil l g o to Korea; " th e field commander s behin d bot h Smit h and Mugab e i n Zimbabwe) . The reference , above , to "statu s goals " can refe r t o a number o f ways in which group s o f people defin e themselve s collectively , bu t in most civil war cases these wil l be ethni c in some sense, especiall y if one understands "nationalism " t o be a generalized for m o f ethni c feeling. As Horowitz (1985 ) demonstrates , at its core ethnic conflic t is status conflict. Status , including ethnic status, is expressed throug h institutions. Even where these have not previously been codified int o formal organizations, civil war will do so in order to form the comba t forces tha t engag e i n th e war . Th e symbol s whic h giv e thes e orga nizations thei r meanin g ma y then becom e th e stickin g point s i n ef forts to conclude hostilities. This happens because the organizationa l changes usuall y demande d a s part o f a settlement com e t o be see n as representin g painfu l statu s concession s tha t len d themselve s poorly t o compromise . Th e hig h visibilit y o f suc h symbol s under mines leadership autonom y an d makes leaders especially vulnerabl e to being bid up by competitors for their jobs. In these circumstances, a deus ex machina from th e battlefield o r the international arena may be neede d t o bail ou t th e leadership . The staying power of the coalition created by a settlement i s itself a functio n o f th e autonom y o f th e leader s enterin g int o coalition , both as the deal is made and afterward. Her e the role of international intervention loom s large. It is not enough tha t the leaders have freedom fro m immediat e pressure s fro m below ; i f the dea l depend s o n foreign interventio n i t wil l fal l apar t whe n th e foreig n actor s lose interest o r coerciv e power . Thu s loca l leader s may well us e foreig n intervention a s their excus e fo r acceptin g a n unpopula r settlement , but the y d o s o at thei r peri l i f the settlemen t i s not on e tha t ca n b e lived wit h afte r th e foreig n promoters/guarantor s ar e gone . Fro m this, it may follow that intervention may hasten or delay the settlement of a civil war, but will usually have less to do with the shape of the settlement itself

The Settlemen t While in a larger sens e the settlement i s a constitutional deal , in th e short ter m i t i s also a n exercis e i n threa t reduction . Clearl y tw o o r

298 Harve y Waterma n more arme d camp s hav e muc h t o fea r fro m eac h othe r an d nee d a great deal of reassurance i f they ar e to lay down their arms. The cas e studies o f civi l war s mak e thi s ver y clea r an d describ e i t well . Th e search fo r reassurance , oddly , ma y b e a t cross-purpose s wit h th e search fo r a settlement. Her e i s wh y I think tha t ma y b e so : The norma l working s o f a reasonabl y stabl e polit y entail , a t th e highest politica l levels , a proces s o f conflic t management . Conflic t is expecte d t o occur , i s legitimat e withi n certai n circumscribe d bounds, and is channeled through the political institutions or through other institutions accepte d by them. This is most clearl y seen i n such matters as industrial relations, wher e mechanism s for bargaining an d for handlin g th e breakdow n o f bargainin g ar e base d o n th e expec tation of conflict an d the understanding that the parties have a mutual interest i n managing it within certai n parameters. These mechanism s work t o th e degre e tha t the y ca n stan d a certai n amoun t o f strain ; if conflic t become s to o violen t the y ar e perceive d t o b e inadequat e and ne w one s mus t b e devised . Indeed , th e occurrenc e o f civi l wa r is itsel f th e extrem e exampl e o f suc h a breakdown i n conflic t man agement: civi l wa r is the leas t manage d o f majo r domesti c conflicts . When violenc e break s ou t an d ne w reassurance s ar e neede d t o end it , thos e reassurance s ar e usuall y see n a s going beyon d th e cre ation o f mechanism s t o manag e conflict . The y are , rather , hope d t o be mechanism s tha t end conflict , tha t "resolve " rathe r tha n "man age" it . Tha t i s a tall order , al l th e mor e s o i f the civi l wa r has bee n fought wit h unconventiona l mean s an d ther e i s uncertaint y abou t whp ca n spea k fo r whom . Th e escalatio n o f violenc e i s followe d b y an escalation o f goals from managemen t t o resolution . I t is no longe r enough t o find a wa y t o dea l wit h existin g conflicts ; th e conflict s themselves ar e t o b e ended , becaus e th e though t o f one' s enemie s continuing th e conflic t b y othe r mean s i s s o threatening . Instea d o f an ongoing process of politics, demands come to be for an obliteration of th e origina l politica l conflict . This , perhaps , i s wha t i s mean t b y "winning." The perceptiv e reade r wil l hav e recognize d th e traditiona l vie w of th e balanc e o f powe r i n Europe . I n tha t view , on e pulle d one' s punches in war and foreign relations because today's opponent migh t be tomorrow' s all y an d th e ongoin g politica l proces s wa s assume d to continu e int o th e future . Th e popula r civi l war s o f ou r time , lik e the tota l war s o f ou r century , hav e shortene d th e perspectiv e o f political rhetori c an d hav e raise d th e stakes , b y makin g i t difficul t to vie w th e futur e a s n o mor e tha n a n adjustmen t t o th e past . War

Political Orde r and "Settlement " 29 9 may, indeed, be the continuation of politics by other means, but we have a hard time saying so and, consequently, a hard time bringing war to an end. Thus, war costs and military stalemates are often not enough to provide the political justification for settlement. That, in turn, is one reason why civil wars based on ethnic conflicts tend to require perceived military victories as a condition of their termination.

Violence Occasional, smal l scale-violenc e ma y be accidental , bu t large-scale , organized violenc e i s a matte r o f choice . I t i s a strategi c o r eve n tactical optio n deliberatel y take n i n the contex t o f a specific se t o f incentives, a product of cost-benefit analysis. Its occurrence is always idiosyncratic, n o matte r ho w "structural " th e underlyin g conflic t may b e see n t o be . Whethe r th e issu e i s on e o f loca l autonomy , economic competition , threatene d group status or adaptation to social change , violenc e i s typicall y see n a s on e optio n i n a defens e against change or as a response to the actual or anticipated violence of others. One reaso n th e endin g o f larg e scal e violenc e suc h a s civil war s is interestin g i s tha t th e beginnin g an d endin g o f violenc e ar e no t symmetrical problems. In a decisional sense, violence is easy to start, difficult t o stop. This is so well understood that the difficulty o f stopping violence become s on e o f the disincentive s t o startin g it . Onc e started, violence brings with it a web of commitments and costs that demand compensations difficul t t o arrange in a war-terminating settlement. Reveng e i s no t th e leas t o f thes e compensation s an d i t i s available onl y t o th e "victors, " who, i n turn, avai l themselve s o f it only by risking the settlemen t itself . The way in which this problem is resolved may perhaps be understood as a bargaining process in which what is being bargained is the definition o f magnanimity. Th e militaril y mor e successfu l part y defines its own reveng e (an d other compensations ) an d then publicl y accedes t o a lesser benefit i n return for the acceptanc e o f its terms by the less successful combatant(s) . It s magnanimity i s accepted by most of its own people because they "won" ; its terms are accepte d by the "losers " because the terms are magnanimous. (Th e Nigerian civil wa r i s a particularl y clea r exampl e o f this. ) Th e substantiv e settlement i s impose d b y th e winner s wit h th e connivanc e o f th e losers an d has a chance o f durabilit y becaus e th e acknowledgmen t

300 Harve y Waterma n of militar y defea t demonstrate s th e unavailabilit y o f alternativ e set tlements more desirable to the losers—ones that might have provide d incentives fo r revivin g th e origina l term s o f th e conflict . I n othe r words, a fresh basi s fo r norma l politic s ha s been established . The proble m o f violenc e als o bring s u s bac k t o th e autonom y o f leaders. I n a . civil war , ther e i s alway s a proble m keepin g violenc e under control , keepin g i t organized . Leader s ar e likel y t o find tha t they ar e spendin g a s muc h tim e controllin g th e arme d combatant s on their own side as they ar e defeating thos e on the other. Disarmin g the combatant s become s no t onl y a condition o f settlemen t fo r th e leaders but a condition o f continued leadership and autonomy withi n their ow n domains . I n th e fac e o f al l th e impediment s t o settlemen t mentioned above , the need to control violence eventually makes the opposing leaders conspirators in the search for a settlement tha t ma y allow them to retain their positions and influence. An d so settlement s occur afte r all . Violence, historically , tend s to be associate d with hard times. Participating i n violen t act s ha s substantia l cost s fo r th e participants ; a great dea l ha s t o b e a t stak e personall y i n orde r t o sustai n suc h participation, eve n whe n i t i s being coerced . Whil e fea r o f persona l or grou p physica l har m ma y b e th e dominan t motivation , th e at mosphere o f violenc e i n whic h suc h fea r take s roo t usuall y come s out o f economi c disaster s i n th e for m o f foo d shortage s and/o r mas sive unemployment . Thes e disaster s may be natura l o r artifactual; i n either case , the y ar e unlikely t o be muc h alleviate d by th e civi l war s that ensue . Ye t th e discussion s o f thes e war s an d thei r settlemen t barely touc h o n suc h economi c events . Wha t wer e th e economi c conditions a t the outbrea k o f the civi l war s i n Greece, i n Nigeria, i n Zimbabwe? We ough t t o know . An d yet , i t i s no t clea r tha t w e wil l b e muc h helped. Th e war s d o no t likel y en d becaus e economi c condition s have improved . The y en d i n politica l an d institutiona l settlement s that ma y sa y little abou t economi c affair s an d the rhetori c surround ing these events is focused on status and politics. Ironically, economi c suffering, havin g brough t peopl e t o violence , ma y i n tim e becom e one o f th e reason s tha t th e terminatio n o f violenc e i s accepted . There i s on e othe r aspec t o f th e violenc e tha t i s brough t ou t i n the case s bu t i s elsewher e insufficientl y emphasized . Someon e ha s to do th e violence . Armie s an d their general s d o no t alway s wan t t o persist in doing it. More often than not, they are the first to recogniz e

Political Orde r and "Settlement " 30 1 a stalemate o r an imminent loss and the one s most cognizant o f the human and economic cos t of the fighting. It is the politicians whos e commitments and personal standin g move them to want to press on in a losing or futile cause . In a number of cases (mos t clearly in the U.S., i n Yeme n an d i n Zimbabwe , perhaps ) th e wa r end s an d th e settlement is made because the combatants force the political leaders to swallow the bitter pill of a negotiated peace. Climbing down from the rhetoric of war becomes, not something that must be voluntarily agreed to, but a response t o a fait accompli.

The Stake s Why do some civil wars get fought "t o the death," with a surrender or annihilation in place of a constitutional "deal" ? Not surprisingly , the answe r would seem t o be tha t this happens when the stake s do not lend themselves t o suc h a deal, whe n th e loser s hav e n o legiti macy in the eyes of the winners. The case that most clearly fits that criterion i s the Gree k civi l war. Most modern civil wars end with an agreement that the losers can continue to exist as a collectivity bu t under constitutional rule s that reduce thei r autonom y an d relative power . I n th e Gree k case , th e Cold War context led the Greek government leadership to interpret the persistence of the Communist insurgency as a "Slavic horse" that would ultimatel y subver t th e polit y wit h th e hel p o f internationa l Communism. Th e ideologica l rhetori c o f th e tim e mad e i t almos t impossible t o contemplat e th e continuatio n o f politics wit h a chastened minority playing by any new set of rules. If "normal" politics could not include them, then they had to be annihilated as a political force and the costs of continuing the war had to be paid. Since those costs could be paid with th e hel p o f foreign powers , the y were . One ought to be skeptical o f arguments about human events that are based on the moving force o f ideologies. I t is always prudent to seek better explanations. The rebels were a rather small minority in the Nort h wit h relativel y littl e t o offe r an y ne w coalitio n an d they could be chase d ou t o f the country , s o that compromis e wa s never necessary for the strongly supported government. Yet the Greek case is a telling one : i n compariso n t o th e othe r civi l war s it appear s as an uncivil war, on e i n whic h th e rhetori c o f on e sid e i s no t simpl y heightened b y th e emotion s o f violen t conflic t bu t i s specificall y based on an ideology that rejects the "normal" politics on which any

302 Harve y Waterma n postwar settlemen t woul d hav e to be based. In this sense, the Com munism o f the Stali n perio d an d th e Col d Wa r tha t forme d aroun d it wer e not th e continuatio n o f politic s b y othe r means , an d th e resumption o f politics was not the n see n a s an option. No w that th e period ha s com e t o a definitiv e end , w e hav e a righ t t o hop e tha t the civil wars of our time will be more "settleable" and reach earlie r and therefor e les s costly ends .

Conclusion I hav e argue d tha t civi l war s en d i n a constitutiona l dea l an d tha t they ar e allowe d t o d o s o by th e fac t tha t th e wa r itsel f ha s dem onstrated that certain options cannot be imposed. I have emphasize d the decisiona l autonom y o f leadership groups as a help to deal-mak ing throug h consociationa l arrangements . I hav e distinguishe d be tween conflic t managemen t an d conflic t resolutio n an d accuse d th e latter goa l of being overambitious an d a n impediment t o a return t o normal politics . I n th e sam e spirit , I have foun d radica l ideolog y t o be equall y inimical to the remakin g of the constitutiona l settlement . Paradoxically, al l this emphasi s o n political institution s an d polit ical bargain s ha s ha d th e effec t o f highlightin g th e importanc e o f military matter s i n th e endin g o f civi l wars . Th e identificatio n o f winners and losers determines the options available to the settlemen t makers. The prospect of military reversals is one of the most powerfu l incentives t o deal . I n situation s wher e leader s ar e subjec t t o rhe torical outbidding , militar y o r economi c exhaustio n ma y ope n th e possibility o f biddin g o n behal f o f peace . Terminatio n itsel f mus t have th e suppor t o f th e militar y and , i n man y cases , i s force d o n political leader s b y militar y ones . Militar y victor y resolve s conflic t where it cannot be safel y managed . I t is little wonder that civil wars tend t o be see n a s "won" o r "stalemated " first, settle d afterward . Ultimately, however , a wa r canno t b e declare d "won " o r "sta lemated" unti l th e ne w politica l orde r ca n be discerne d o n th e ho rizon an d th e outline s o f th e ne w dea l clea r enoug h t o justif y th e risks o f negotiation . Societie s pa y a high pric e fo r havin g le t thei r problems com e t o th e poin t o f civi l war , but victorie s i n suc h war s need no t b e Pyrrhi c ones . Politica l orde r i s th e highes t o f socia l stakes.

Notes 1. Th e followin g summar y i s taken fro m Waterman , 1981 .

T H I R T E E N

What Hav e We Learned an d Wher e Do We G o from Here ? Roy Licklide r

The author s i n this book hav e attempte d t o explai n ho w civi l war s end and why they do not resume in terms of five questions or variable clusters: th e issue s i n dispute , th e interna l politic s o f th e variou s sides, th e activitie s o f thir d parties , battlefiel d outcomes , an d th e nature o f th e settlement . What , i f anything , hav e w e learne d fro m this exercise ?

Settlements unde r Man y Different Circumstance s Perhaps the clearest lesson is that settlements of civil wars can emerge under a remarkable variety of conditions. We have found settlement s of conflict s wit h separatis t an d revolutionary goals , unite d an d di vided contestants, intense warlike and peaceful activitie s and no action a t all b y thir d parties, battlefiel d victorie s an d stalemates, an d agreements rangin g from eliminatio n o f one sid e to status quo ant e to new constitutions with devolved powers and new central powersharing arrangements . To put this point more dramatically, there seems to be no simple, direct relationship between any of these factors and the termination of civil war . However, th e author s also agree that these five factors are important in determining the results in their cases, and there are clearly many similarities across individual cases which are consistent 303

304 Ro y Licklide r with plausibl e theory . Wha t ar e w e t o mak e o f this apparen t conun drum? In fac t thi s i s onl y a problem i f w e assum e tha t al l civi l war s en d in the same way. This heroic assumption was useful in the early phas e of th e project , sinc e i t allowe d u s t o brin g i n a wide variet y o f ma terials withou t makin g an y initia l judgments abou t ho w the y shoul d be divided . However , i t no w seem s mor e usefu l t o conceiv e o f th e termination o f civi l violenc e a s a se t o f different processes i n whic h there are certain critical choice points. Selection s at these points form alternate strategies o f conflict termination . Instea d of a single patter n which al l case s wil l follow , ther e see m t o b e a number o f differen t patterns. The case s hav e als o allowe d u s t o explor e th e relationship s be tween th e differen t individua l factor s o r variabl e cluster s an d th e outcomes o f civi l violence . Whil e ou r initia l idea s wer e ofte n ov ersimplified, rea l an d intriguin g theoretica l connection s d o see m t o exist, a s discusse d below .

Underlying Issue s Interestingly, i t was often difficul t t o isolat e th e underlyin g issue s i n the conflicts ; eve n th e distinctio n betwee n a war o f secessio n an d a revolution wa s sometime s elusive . Suda n i s usuall y regarde d a s a secessionist conflict , fo r example , bu t th e curren t rebellio n i s bein g fought t o restor e th e prio r Sudanes e constitution , s o i t coul d b e classified a s a revolution . O n th e othe r hand , presumabl y th e con stitution wa s attractiv e t o th e Sout h becaus e i t guarantee d regiona l autonomy. Ethnicit y i n particular prove d t o be a difficult concep t t o work with; most of the case authors argued that their cases did indeed involve some ethnic division s but also that the conflict wa s more than ethnic. Antagonist s sometime s manipulate d an d eve n invente d suc h identification issue s i n orde r t o increas e hatre d o f the opposition ; i n Greece, fo r example , th e rebel s wer e describe d a s "Slavo-commu nists," eve n thoug h th e vas t majorit y wer e no t Slavs . Thi s variabl e was thu s subjec t t o manipulatio n b y politica l leaders , wh o seeme d unworried about th e ris k of deepening animositie s which might limi t their freedo m t o negotiat e successfull y a t a later stage . This mad e i t difficul t t o evaluat e th e hypothesi s tha t conflict s fueled b y identit y issue s ar e eithe r harde r o r easie r t o resolv e b y negotiation tha n thos e involvin g othe r issue s (presumabl y politica l

Where D o W e G o from Here ? 30 5 or economic) . Nonetheless , w e ca n confron t th e issu e b y makin g some crude divisions among the cases. Of the seven examples, identification issue s see m t o hav e divide d th e contestant s mor e deepl y in Nigeria and Sudan (where separatist wars were fought by sides in which ethnic membership was important) and Yemen and Zimbabwe (where identit y group s contende d fo r contro l o f th e state ) tha n i n Colombia, Greece , an d th e Unite d States . W e ca n als o distinguis h between victories an d negotiated settlements, tha t i s settlement s i n which both sides retain significant militar y forces in being and have the optio n o f rejecting settlemen t term s if they s o choose. There i s n o clea r relationshi p betwee n identificatio n issue s an d negotiated settlement. O f the cases where thes e issues were important, there ar e two negotiated settlement s (Suda n and Yemen), on e intermediate case (Zimbabwe), and one total victory (Nigeria). When identification issue s wer e les s important , ther e wa s on e negotiate d settlement (Colombia) , on e intermediat e cas e (th e Unite d States) , and on e tota l victor y (Greece) . Sinc e thes e case s ar e no t rando m samples of a larger universe and all involve th e endin g o f civil conflict, we cannot definitively rejec t the relationship between the type of issue an d the kin d of resolution. Nonetheless , a t a minimum th e relationship needs to be demonstrated in comparative analysis before it is assumed to be true. The classic image of an identification conflic t i s two groups, each united b y interna l link s agains t th e other . I n fact , al l fou r o f th e conflicts w e hav e labeled ''identification* ' sho w a much mor e com plex pattern, wit h both side s being compose d o f coalitions of identification groups . The Nigerian government won in part because the population o f Biafr a include d man y non-Ibo s wh o woun d u p sup porting the government. In the Sudan, only about three-fifths o f the Northerners wer e Arab , an d th e Southerner s wer e divide d alon g religious and ethnic lines. Both sides in Yemen were coalitions , and groups routinel y defecte d fro m on e t o th e othe r fo r a variet y o f motives. Zimbabwe was probably the closest to a classic identification conflict, wit h th e divisio n betwee n black s an d whites , bu t b y th e Lancaster House conference ther e were black politicians in the government wh o wer e no t simpl y front s fo r whit e interests , an d th e ethnic division s amon g the rebel s wer e quit e serious. The necessit y t o manag e coalition s o f differen t identificatio n groups presumably moderates some of the extreme responses which civil war s tend to produce. Thi s suggests a pattern simila r to cross-

306 Ro y Licklide r cutting cleavages i n domestic politics , where actor s who are oppose d on on e issu e find themselve s unite d o n anothe r an d ar e thu s en couraged t o moderat e thei r hostilit y towar d thei r adversaries , sinc e they ma y wel l b e allie d wit h the m i n th e future . Nigeri a i s partic ularly interestin g since , i n orde r t o maintai n it s coalitions , th e gov ernment change d th e constitutio n i n a way tha t allowe d th e rebel s to b e integrate d fairl y easil y whe n th e violenc e ended , redrawin g the provincia l boundarie s an d givin g mor e autonom y t o th e prov inces. The addition o f black politicians to the Rhodesian governmen t must hav e mad e i t easie r fo r th e white s t o accep t th e ne w Zimbab wean government . Th e significanc e o f coalition managemen t i n civi l war terminatio n need s t o b e investigate d usin g a wider se t o f cases . Identification issue s are not irrelevant. The fear of ethnic violenc e prevented th e Biafran s fro m negotiatin g a surrender , eve n whe n i t was clea r tha t the y ha d los t th e war . Th e Gree k governmen t delib erately trie d t o pain t th e conflic t a s a n ethni c on e t o it s ow n sup porters, assumin g tha t th e conflic t woul d b e mor e intens e i f iden tification i s s u e s w e r e d o m i n a n t . A mor e strikin g cas e i s Reconstruction afte r th e America n Civi l War , wher e guerrill a re sistance wa s mounted afte r th e Souther n militar y defeat , no t t o sup port Souther n independence , bu t t o ensur e whit e supremacy ; th e identity issu e wa s thu s stronge r tha n th e politica l issu e o f indepen dence. Nonetheless , whil e identification issue s may thus increase th e intensity o f conflict , the y ca n be manipulate d b y elite s an d resolve d by negotiate d settlement s unde r th e prope r circumstances . Th e in itial issu e o f th e conflic t seem s les s importan t tha n othe r aspect s o f the situatio n i n it s resolution .

Internal Politic s o f Each Sid e The interna l politic s o f eac h sid e wer e ofte n important , bu t some times in ways that seemed contradictory . Decision s t o end a war are, by definition, policy changes . Our first hypothesis was that they wer e more likely to occur in conjunction with leadership change, sinc e th e new leadershi p wa s likel y t o b e les s committe d t o th e policie s o f previous leaders , ha d a n incentiv e t o d o somethin g different , an d might be mor e acceptabl e a s a negotiating partne r to the opposition . The case s sugges t a n addendum : leadershi p chang e i s likel y t o b e more importan t whe n polic y chang e i s substantial , tha t i s whe n th e side eithe r ha s los t th e wa r o r agree s t o a negotiate d settlement ; i f

Where Do We G o from Here ? 30 7 the sid e win s a military victor y an d can impos e it s will , leadershi p change wil l be les s necessary t o en d the war. A separate argumen t i s tha t decision s t o en d a conflict b y a negotiated settlemen t ma y wel l requir e strong, united leadership o n both sides (ironically , mor e than continuing th e war, which may be a sign of a weak leadership). This is likely to be a particular problem in civil wars where both sides are often alliances of disparate factions. These coalition s see m likel y t o com e unde r particula r pressur e a t several different times , (a ) Whe n the side is losing, the leadership' s control ma y be reduced . Bu t it ma y require a strong interna l lead ership to carry out a surrender, which is hardly likely to be a popular policy and which often occurs precisely when control over the armed forces i s tenuous, (b ) Coalition s ma y also be divide d whe n negoti ations ar e abou t t o begin , sinc e thi s force s the m t o specif y thei r priorities, ofte n undercuttin g th e ambiguit y whic h ha s helped hol d the coalitio n together . Negotiation s ar e thu s lik e budget s fo r do mestic political groups, forcing hard and often divisive choices to be made, (c ) Ironically , coalition s ma y also be undercu t whe n victor y is at hand. Victor y mean s tha t expectation s amon g th e victor s rise , wartime coalition s end , an d the automati c priorit y o f this issue de clines (Kaplan 1980 , 75) . In the Sudan, a negotiated settlement was facilitated by a shift t o more concentrated power on both sides. Nimeiry and Lagu were not political newcomers , but each was able to establish contro l o f hi s ow n coalition , a t roughly th e sam e time , i n processes whic h wer e quit e independen t o f on e another , s o tha t policy chang e seeme d appropriat e an d possible. Clearl y i t was also critical that, for different reasons, both decided that a settlement was in thei r bes t interests . However , thes e decision s d o no t see m par ticularly idiosyncratic ; othe r individual s i n their office s a t the tim e might reasonabl y hav e reache d simila r conclusions . Thei r person alities may have had more impact o n their abilit y to implement this policy change (by creating unity) than on the actual choice of policy. This was an unusually clea r cas e wher e unit y o n both side s helpe d bring about a negotiated settlement . Yemen, o n th e othe r hand , involve d tw o coalitions , neithe r o f which eve r seem s to hav e reall y solidified . Despit e this , both side s decided to opt for a negotiated settlement, exclude d people on both sides who opposed this strategy, and were able to reach an agreement and carry it out, a very impressive achievement. There was significant leadership change but no t much leadership concentration.

308 Ro y Licklide r Colombia involve d leadershi p chang e i n th e state , sinc e th e ex pulsion o f Genera l Roja s wa s critica l t o th e settlement . However , the leadershi p o f th e partie s di d no t chang e significantly , an d th e prestige an d power o f thes e establishe d leader s helpe d t o mak e th e settlement stick . Nonetheless , the rebel leaders controlled only som e of the forces opposing the government; as a result large-scale conflic t continued fo r severa l year s afte r th e settlement . Zimbabwe an d th e America n Civi l Wa r diffe r fro m th e othe r ne gotiated settlement s becaus e on e sid e wa s clearl y losin g militarily . It i s unusua l t o regar d th e America n Civi l Wa r a s a negotiate d set tlement, bu t ther e wer e stil l Confederat e armie s i n th e field afte r Lee's surrender, an d Jefferson Davi s never surrendered and was captured fleeing int o th e mountain s t o lea d a guerilla wa r whic h neve r materialized. In orde r fo r th e war s t o stop , th e losin g side s ha d t o mak e im portant polic y changes , whil e th e winner s ha d to chang e muc h less . In Zimbabwe , Mugab e too k contro l o f th e rebels , whic h wa s on e reason a settlement coul d be reached . Bu t the othe r requirement fo r settlement wa s that Ian Smith, who ha d strongly oppose d endin g th e war, be remove d fro m power; this leadership chang e involve d some thing ver y lik e a coup by th e militar y an d intelligence leader s o f th e Rhodesian government . Similarl y i n th e America n Civi l Wa r Lin coln's reelection (partl y because o f soldiers' votes) solidifie d hi s control o f th e Nort h an d marked th e effectiv e defea t o f th e South . Th e Confederate governmen t eventuall y cam e apart , wit h th e militar y surrendering o n it s ow n authority , isolatin g Jefferso n Davi s wh o wanted to continue the struggle. A settlement was facilitated in these two case s by power concentration on the winning sides an d leadership changes on the losing sides. The sequenc e i n both case s i s th e same . A chang e i n th e militar y balance i s followe d b y a leadership chang e o n th e losin g sid e whic h in tur n i s followe d b y settlement . Thi s suggest s tha t battlefiel d out comes ma y facilitat e settlemen t b y inducin g leadershi p change . Although ke y individual s wer e replaced , ther e wer e n o majo r changes o f leadershi p o n eithe r sid e durin g th e Nigeria n an d Gree k civil wars , th e tw o case s wher e n o negotiate d settlemen t prove d possible. Powe r seem s t o hav e bee n fairl y concentrated , bu t ther e was n o chang e o f leadership ; policie s didn' t chang e either , an d th e losing side s fought unti l their arme d forces wer e crushe d in the field and th e leadershi p itsel f wa s force d t o flee int o exile . Negotiate d

Where D o We G o from Here ? 30 9 settlements would presumably have required some sort of leadership change; whether i t woul d als o hav e require d mor e powe r concen tration i s unclear but entirel y possible , sinc e changin g a n accepted policy may well require more political power than preserving it even if it is clearly losing . On balance, then , th e case s sugges t tha t negotiate d settlement s are linked to leadership change and (perhaps) power concentration s on both sides, while military victories are facilitated by such change on the losin g side . Obviousl y thes e ar e necessar y rathe r than suffi cient causes ; leadership change s an d power concentratio n ca n certainly take place without facilitatin g a settlement. Bu t it seems very difficult t o bring about a settlement without such political change on the side(s ) fro m which policy chang e is required, o n the losing side if there i s one an d probably o n both side s if the militar y balance i s stalemated an d the resul t is a negotiated settlement .

Military Balanc e The militar y balanc e wa s clearl y a factor i n al l seve n settlements , although it was influential mainly as it shaped perceptions of the future rather than for its own sake. Zartman's concept of the "hurting stalemate" is deceptively har d to work with. "Stalemate" can be define d without undue difficulty bu t will not produce a settlement by itself; both side s must perceive th e curren t situatio n as untenable an d unlikely to improve in the future. (Thu s escalation which fails may actually lead to settlement, sinc e it demonstrates that the major goals of th e escalatin g sid e canno t b e achieve d a t a tolerable cost. ) Th e concept i s difficult t o operationalize withou t being tautological; w e want to know if a hurting stalemate exists in order to predict whether or no t th e partie s wil l alte r thei r policies , bu t w e onl y kno w i f i t exists i f th e partie s d o alte r thei r policies . (Druckma n an d Gree n [1986; 1993 ] have attempted to operationalize this concept and use it to predict th e initiation o f negotiations i n the Philippines. ) Such condition s see m t o hav e existe d i n Sudan , Colombia , an d Yemen, opening th e way t o successfu l negotiation s there . Th e concept als o help s explai n wh y n o negotiate d settlemen t occurre d i n Greece; th e battlefiel d situatio n shifte d s o quickl y tha t eac h sid e perceived itsel f a s either winnin g o r losing, wit h n o real incentive s for negotiations a t any time.

310 Ro y Licklide r In Zimbabwe, o n th e othe r hand , n o hurtin g stalemat e existe d o n the battlefiel d sinc e th e rebel s wer e winning . However , Britai n wa s able t o create suc h a situation b y persuadin g Mozambiqu e an d Zambia, th e rebe l suppliers , t o threate n t o cu t of f rebe l supplie s if a settlement wa s no t reached . While th e Confederac y coul d stil l hav e resiste d (an d di d s o ef fectively durin g Reconstruction) , al l concerne d i n th e surrende r shared the commo n perceptio n tha t the regula r Souther n force s ha d been defeated , an d th e individua l commander s surrendere d thei r separate forces . Thi s suggest s tha t th e hurtin g stalemat e i s jus t a special cas e o f a more genera l argument , tha t i f both side s share an expectation of future battlefield outcomes, fighting i s unnecessary, an d a settlemen t base d o n thes e expectation s shoul d b e viable ; a s Har rison Wagne r an d Jane Hol l note , thi s is a central conclusio n o f Blainey (1988 ) o n internationa l war . On the other hand, the fact that regular forces have been defeate d need no t signa l th e en d o f resistance. Clearl y i t means a n end t o on e stage of the struggle; the next question is whether a settlement base d on this military outcome shoul d be accepte d or the form o f the strug gle shoul d shif t t o civilia n resistanc e an d guerrill a warfare . W e d o not know whethe r thi s shift i s a common respons e t o military defeat ; while i t i s a commo n fea r whe n endin g civi l wars , i t i s difficul t t o find examples. Any group which has used conventional militar y forc e for som e tim e wil l find i t difficul t t o switc h t o guerrill a war , sinc e the two tactics require entirel y differen t mindset s an d organizations. Among ou r cases , th e tw o cleares t example s o f thi s shif t ar e th e United State s an d Colombia . No t onl y wa s politica l violenc e durin g Reconstruction i n th e Unite d State s abov e ou r threshol d definitio n of civi l war , bu t i t achieve d a rea l politica l end , th e abandonmen t of the Reconstruction government s an d the reestablishmen t o f whit e supremacy i n th e settlemen t o f 1876 . O n th e othe r hand , it' s no t clear tha t ther e wa s multipl e sovereignt y i n th e Sout h durin g thi s time; th e populatio n ofte n di d no t giv e allegianc e t o th e centra l government, bu t n o singl e organizatio n too k it s place . Violence continue d a t a fairly hig h leve l i n Colombia a s well afte r the settlement , bu t i t seem s t o hav e ha d relativel y littl e politica l purpose o r impac t excep t perhap s t o confir m th e wisdo m o f th e National Fron t syste m whos e rigidit y woul d late r b e partiall y re sponsible fo r th e developmen t o f anothe r civi l conflict . O n balance , then, guerrill a wa r doe s no t see m a likely consequenc e o f militar y

Where D o W e G o from Here ? 31 1 defeat, even in civil wars where this might have been expected given the hig h stake s involved. We d o no t kno w wh y th e defeate d side s i n Greec e an d Nigeri a did no t resor t t o guerill a wa r afte r thei r defeat . Perhap s th e shee r magnitude of the defeat made guerilla warfare seem too costly. However, th e America n Civi l Wa r suggests anothe r interpretation . Vio lence did not begin immediately in 1865 ; instead it began a year or two later, when the first Southern elections with blacks voting were held, an d it ende d wit h th e ne w settlemen t i n 1876 . Thi s suggest s that the violenc e wa s a response t o a settlement whic h wa s seen as unacceptable. When the settlement was changed, the violence ended as well. We may then have to look to the terms of settlement to explain why n o such pattern of violence develope d i n the othe r states, and we wil l d o so shortly.

Third Parties The role of third parties i n these conflict s varie d enormously. The y seem to have had no impact at all in Colombia. In the United States, third parties were important in a negative way, because they decided not to intervene (presumabl y o n th e sid e o f th e South) . I n Suda n external mediatio n was very helpful i n reaching a negotiated settlement, althoug h no t b y itsel f decisive . I n Greec e an d Nigeria thir d parties largel y determine d th e militar y balanc e an d therefor e th e course o f th e war , bu t externa l mediatio n attempt s wer e entirel y unsuccessful. I n Zimbabw e thir d partie s create d th e condition s which brought about a settlement through diplomacy. And in Yemen third part y interventio n seem s t o hav e create d a common enmit y toward outsiders which caused the two warring sides to carve out a settlement which they otherwise would probably not have reached. Third-party involvement can be categorized rather crudely as military ai d an d assistanc e o n th e on e han d an d mediatio n effort s o f various sorts on the othe r (Modelsk i 1964a , 24-26) . (1) Militar y ai d wa s clearl y critica l i n establishin g th e militar y balance in Nigeria and Greece, where the side with the most military assistance (i n bot h side s th e government ) won . Greec e i s a particularly strikin g cas e sinc e bot h side s receive d extensiv e militar y assistance, an d the decision by Yugoslavia to cut off this aid as part of its conflict wit h the Soviet Unio n was a major turning point leadin g to government success. In Nigeria and the United States, third parties

312 RoyLicklide r decided not t o interven e militaril y i n suppor t o f th e rebels , thu s allowing th e governmen t t o establis h an d maintai n militar y superi ority an d defea t th e rebe l forces . Strong externa l militar y suppor t t o governments seem s to militat e against a negotiated settlement; Greece and Nigeria are the two case s where suc h agreement s wer e neve r reached . A governmen t whic h expects t o wi n ha s n o incentiv e t o negotiate . Zartma n point s ou t i n his chapte r tha t interna l negotiation s ar e inherentl y asymmetric ; i f the rebel s canno t establis h som e sort o f militar y balance , the y hav e no leverage . It's no t clea r whethe r thi s sort o f balanc e increase s th e tota l amount o f violence . O n th e on e hand , if th e governmen t ha s n o reason t o negotiate , i t wil l presumabl y fight unti l i t wins . Bu t th e resulting violenc e ma y actuall y b e les s tha n th e consequence s o f dragging ou t th e conflic t ove r a lon g tim e b y creatin g a militar y balance by eithe r cutting ai d to the governmen t o r aiding the rebels . Modelski (1964b , 145-149 ) argue s tha t outsid e power s shoul d tr y to strengthen th e center parties between th e two extremes to reduc e violence. Clearl y w e woul d nee d t o kno w bot h whe n th e rebel s understand the y wil l los e an d ho w the y respon d t o thi s knowledge . The latte r choic e i s presumabl y influence d b y th e term s o f settle ment, whic h w e wil l discus s later . (2) Tw o examples show how the notion of mediation includes very different pattern s o f activity . Ove r a period o f year s churc h group s in the Suda n established credibilit y wit h both side s and opened line s of communication . Afte r severa l failures , th e tw o partie s wer e brought int o negotiation . Whe n th e negotiation s deadlocked , Hail e Selassie o f Ethiopi a wa s persuade d t o recommen d a settlement an d to back i t by threatenin g sanction s agains t both sides . The resul t wa s a settlemen t whic h hel d fo r ove r a decade an d which seem s t o hav e been undermine d primaril y b y th e willfulnes s o f the Sudanes e pres ident. Thi s was the embodimen t o f "quie t mediation" ; indee d muc h of thi s proces s i s stil l secret . On th e othe r hand , Britis h involvemen t i n Zimbabwe exemplifie s the concep t o f "mediatio n wit h muscle, " tha t third-part y interven tion i s mor e likel y t o succee d i f i t i s backe d wit h th e powe r eithe r to coerc e o r to give substantia l reward s and that, in the globa l arena , such resource s ar e stil l controlle d b y governments . A s th e primar y supporter o f th e whit e government , Britai n ha d a grea t dea l o f le verage wit h it s client . A s note d above , i t wa s als o abl e t o persuad e

Where Do We G o from Here ? 31 3 the rebels' regional supporters to apply pressure as well. The British used this leverage in a highly charged set of negotiations at Lancaster House in London which they controlled rigorously, producing a negotiated settlement against what they themselves thought were very heavy odds. (Another example of this technique was the Camp David negotiations, whic h hinge d o n pressur e fro m th e U.S . an d its will ingness to commit larg e sum s of money t o both Egypt an d Israel to facilitate a settlement.) While the distinction between thes e technique s is important and useful, i t can be overstated . In the Sudan case, it was still necessar y to involve a government which was able to threaten both sides. Moreover, th e Britis h base d thei r strateg y o n knowledg e fro m year s o f quiet negotiation , sometime s b y themselve s an d sometime s b y others, much of which had failed but which provided an information base o n which they coul d build. But when are third parties likely to intervene, what strategies will they use , an d when ma y they chang e thei r minds (a s in the cas e o f Greece)? A s usua l ou r ignoranc e is substantial , althoug h no t total . Donald Horowitz (1985, 273) notes that third parties to civil conflicts are likel y t o chang e thei r positions , sinc e the y wil l hav e multipl e objectives whic h ca n be use d i n bargaining wit h others . Perhap s it makes sens e t o tal k abou t "hurtin g stalemates " for thir d parties as well (th e regional power s aroun d Zimbabwe ma y be a n example o f this phenomenon) , althoug h i t i s probabl y har d t o creat e suc h a situation sinc e militar y ai d by itself i s usually fairl y inexpensiv e fo r a third party. Jane Holl in her chapter argue s that third parties are more likely t o intervene a s the civi l wa r winds down.

Terms of Settlemen t Settlements o f civi l violenc e ofte n d o no t hold . Thi s i s hardl y sur prising. A t the en d of a civil war , the stat e i s often lef t wit h inadequate social, political, and economic bases of support, general access to weapons, a sense that civil violenc e i s now expecte d rathe r than unusual, an d a massive demobilization proble m often involvin g two armies. Thi s sound s lik e a recipe fo r beginning rathe r tha n endin g civil violenc e (Rosena u 1964 , 74 ; Tilly 1978 , 219 ; Higha m 1972 , 52-53). T o put it differently, fe w of the conditions which led to the civil violence are likely to have been much improved by the ensuing carnage, other than reducing doubt about the military balance of the

314 RoyLicklide r major partie s an d th e consequence s o f no t settlin g th e underlyin g issues. J . Bowye r Bel l (1972 , 225 ) argue s tha t "civi l wa r inoculate s a natio n agains t a secon d attack/ ' bu t th e empirica l evidenc e doe s not entirel y suppor t thi s positio n sinc e i t simpl y ignore s faile d set tlements. Moreover, th e global syste m seems to be reducin g th e alternative s of government s whe n endin g civi l violence . On e logica l solutio n t o these kind s o f problems , especiall y thos e wit h som e ethni c o r re gional basis , i s secession , bringin g stat e an d natio n int o alignment . But ther e hav e bee n remarkabl y fe w successfu l secession s sinc e World War II (th e obviou s exception s ar e Israel fro m Palestine , Pak istan fro m India , Banglades h fro m Pakistan , Cyprus , an d th e recen t events i n Easter n Europe) , despit e man y separatis t conflicts . Th e most persuasiv e explanatio n o f thi s phenomenon i s probabl y tha t o f Donald Horowit z (1985 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 an d 272-277) , wh o argue s tha t while secessio n movement s ar e created domestically , thei r success i s determined b y internationa l factors , sinc e b y definitio n the y ar e weaker tha n thei r governments . However , othe r government s ar e generally reluctan t t o encourag e secessions , bot h becaus e s o man y would themselve s b e threatene d b y simila r movements i n their ow n country an d because th e governmen t unde r attack ca n make conces sions t o persuad e othe r government s t o sto p supportin g th e rebels . At an y rate , secessio n seem s t o b e unavailabl e t o participant s toda y except unde r ver y unusua l circumstances . (Th e mos t interestin g re cent cas e i s certainly th e Sovie t Union ; it is particularly strikin g tha t this i s secession withou t civi l war . I n any case , it' s not clea r thi s wil l change th e situatio n i n muc h o f th e Thir d World. ) If yo u can' t spli t of f a dissiden t grou p withi n a state , th e othe r extreme solutio n i s to kil l al l of its members o r at least it s elites (Bel l 1972, 224-225) . Bu t while genocid e i s easier technologicall y i n th e contemporary globa l system , i t has become mor e difficult politically . The ris e o f huma n right s a s a n internationa l issu e ha s pu t pressur e on som e ver y unlikel y government s t o behav e mor e acceptabl y toward portion s o f thei r ow n population . A less draconian strategy is to require or encourage mass expulsion of the losers. For example, perhap s 100,00 0 Loyalist s left th e Unite d States afte r th e America n Revolutio n ou t o f a total whit e populatio n of abou t tw o millio n (Evan s 1969 , 190) , a highe r percentag e tha n left Franc e afte r th e Frenc h Revolutio n (Rober t Palmer , cite d i n

Where D o W e G o fro m Here ? 31 5 Evans 1969 , 192) . However , thi s ha s als o becom e mor e difficul t i n modern times , althoug h ther e ar e a few example s suc h a s Cuba an d Vietnam; significant number s of rebels also fled th e country afte r th e failure o f th e Gree k revolution . Thi s chang e i s a majo r mora l im provement, bu t i t furthe r limit s th e flexibility o f government s i n dealing with major civil violence . Increasingly , disputant s are force d to coexis t i n th e sam e state ; th e questio n remain s unde r wha t con ditions ca n thi s b e don e s o tha t th e likelihoo d o f renewe d civi l vi olence i s reduced . The kin d o f polity whic h emerge s afte r th e settlemen t wil l pre sumably influenc e th e likelihoo d o f renewe d civi l violence . W e ca n examine th e ne w polit y alon g severa l differen t dimensions : power balance; participation, especiall y o f the losers ; policy choices i n area s like disarmament , demobilizatio n (o f a t leas t on e an d perhap s tw o or mor e armies) , economi c reconstructio n an d development , an d national security , whic h ar e commo n t o al l suc h regimes ; an d re sponses t o th e underlying issues o f th e origina l civi l war . Internal Power Balance Much o f thi s analysi s ha s assume d tha t negotiate d settlement s ar e a good thing , presumabl y becaus e the y en d th e conflic t wit h fewe r casualties tha n a total victor y woul d require . However , a number o f practitioners have suggested that negotiated settlements of civil wars are more likely t o break dow n int o large-scale violenc e tha n militar y victories. I n hi s chapter , Harriso n Wagne r reache s a similar conclu sion with a much more sophisticated analysis, arguing that negotiate d settlements ar e likely t o creat e balanc e o f power situation s i n whic h it will be difficult t o change the political and social structure to creat e a societ y i n whic h violenc e seem s unnecessar y a s a wa y t o resolv e problems. Our case s len d som e suppor t t o thi s argument . O f th e seve n ex amples, large-scal e violenc e brok e ou t afte r th e settlemen t i n Co lombia and the United States , while i n Sudan the settlemen t hel d fo r over five year s bu t eventuall y dissolved . N o fewe r tha n tw o o f th e three negotiate d settlement s thu s wer e followe d b y violence , a s opposed to neither of the military victories and one of the two example s of militar y dominance . A negotiate d settlemen t ma y no t b e a n un mitigated blessin g i f th e majo r objectiv e i s t o reduc e futur e large scale civi l violence .

316 Ro y Licklide r Participation The conflic t resolutio n literatur e argue s tha t conciliatio n o f a t leas t some of the losers is necessary i f the ne w polity is to be stabl e (Kapla n 1980, 7 8 - 8 4 ; Gra y 1980 , 154 ; Aza r 1986 , 3 3 - 3 5 ; Rothchil d an d Foley 1988) . Th e recor d o f th e case s o n thi s issu e i s mixed . A s on e might expect , th e thre e compromis e settlement s i n Yemen , Sudan , and Colombi a al l showe d a fairl y hig h leve l o f integratio n o f forme r rivals i n th e ne w syste m (otherwis e wh y woul d the y agre e t o th e settlement whe n the y stil l ha d militar y option s available?) . Mor e interestingly, thi s wa s als o tru e o f th e case s o f militar y dominanc e (Zimbabwe an d the Unite d States ) an d in one cas e of military victory , Nigeria. On th e othe r hand , i n Greec e th e defeate d leader s wer e no t al lowed bac k int o th e politica l syste m fo r ove r twent y years ; indee d that proces s o f integratio n i s stil l takin g place . Whil e thi s ma y b e repugnant t o outsiders , i t seem s t o hav e worke d i n Greece . Th e success o f thi s repressiv e polic y give s paus e t o th e assumptio n tha t such integratio n i s just an d necessar y fo r a lasting settlement . Ther e are certainl y specifi c reason s wh y th e polic y worke d i n Greece ; a s John Iatride s notes , th e rebe l leader s wh o wen t int o exil e i n th e Soviet Unio n angere d Stali n an d wer e dispersed , isolate d fro m on e another a s well a s from thei r base o f support i n Greece . Nonetheless , it i s strikin g that , whil e th e Gree k politica l syste m afte r 194 9 ha s not bee n especiall y stable , n o majo r politica l contende r seem s t o have foun d i t usefu l t o appea l specificall y t o th e peopl e wh o sup ported th e Gree k revolution , a s distinguishe d fro m th e partisan s o f the Worl d Wa r I I resistanc e movement . Thi s seem s t o suppor t Ia trides' argumen t tha t th e socia l bas e o f the Gree k rebel s wa s alway s weak an d wa s furthe r undermine d b y th e government' s succes s i n painting i t a s a n "anti-Greek " movement . I f so , thi s Puni c strateg y may b e effectiv e onl y i n case s wher e th e rebellio n wa s wea k t o star t with. O f course , a s Bikash Ro y ha s noted , thi s implie s tha t th e strat egy wa s irrelevan t sinc e any strateg y woul d hav e worke d a s well . Spain ma y b e anothe r example . We kno w les s tha n w e shoul d abou t th e mechanism s fo r suc h par ticipation, bu t a recen t stud y (Shugar t 1992 ) tell s u s a lo t abou t getting rebel s involve d i n elections . Policy Choices Integrating th e forme r enem y i s als o ofte n propose d a s par t o f th e solution fo r th e problem s o f disarmament, demobilization , economi c

Where D o W e G o fro m Here ? 31 7 recovery and development, an d national security. It is striking to see significant number s o f the opposin g arme d force s brough t togethe r in places like the Suda n (wher e Southerner s compose d th e persona l bodyguard o f th e presiden t wh o ha d bee n thei r enemy ) an d Zim babwe (wher e th e whit e head s o f the arm y an d intelligenc e syste m were kep t a t thei r position s fo r ove r a year b y th e rebel s afte r th e settlement). Yemen is an even more interesting case—weapon s wer e simply retained by most men o n both sides . People with administra tive experienc e fro m th e othe r sid e were als o used i n several cases , including th e America n South . Again Greece is the obvious exception, although not the only one. In the United States, for example, Confederate veteran s were elected to th e Congres s i n grea t number s an d man y Southerner s serve d i n the America n arm y durin g th e las t hal f o f th e nineteent h century . However, the y wer e exclude d fro m bot h th e militar y affair s com mittees in Congress and command positions within the military (Bensel 1990 , 411-413) . Postwar Policy toward the Underlying Issues This wa s sometime s difficul t t o determine , sinc e ther e wa s ofte n disagreement abou t wha t th e majo r issue s were . I n man y case s th e issue seems to have been remove d fro m th e political agend a by mutual consent. In the United States, for example , the eventual bargai n after Reconstructio n wa s that th e defeate d white s coul d contro l th e South a s lon g a s secessio n an d slaver y wer e excluded . Somethin g similar happene d i n Nigeria , Yemen , th e Sudan , an d Colombia . O n the othe r hand , i n Greec e th e governmen t simpl y impose d it s ow n policies wit h it s ow n personnel .

Coalition Maintenanc e an d Civi l War Terminatio n It may be useful t o sketch out a more dynamic framework fo r analysis suggested by this discussion. Given our definition, a civil war requires at leas t tw o substantia l coalition s o f individual s an d group s t o b e maintained ove r time; otherwise th e require d level s of violence an d political contro l can' t occur . Eac h leadershi p mus t preserve it s own coalition and attempt to undermine that of the opposition. Moreover , like any sizeable organization , eac h wil l develop organizationa l mo mentum, a tendenc y t o d o toda y wha t i t di d yesterday . W e hav e taken situation s i n which bot h side s ar e engage d i n large-scal e vio -

318 Ro y Licklide r lence, an d w e wan t t o kno w wh y the y migh t agre e t o sto p suc h violence an d the n no t resor t t o i t later . Given thi s approach , th e interna l politic s o f bot h side s become s absolutely critica l fo r th e analysis , bu t i t als o become s a dependen t variable—we wan t to explai n under what circumstance s interna l pol itics wil l chang e s o tha t bot h side s ar e likel y t o b e willin g t o agre e on som e sor t o f settlement . W e ar e throw n bac k o n othe r variable s to explai n wh y thi s migh t occur . Presumably th e coalition s wil l chang e polic y whe n the y perceiv e the cost s o f th e presen t polic y t o b e significantl y highe r tha n thos e of a n alternative . Obviousl y thi s oversimplifie s a comple x process ; there wil l b e disagreemen t amon g differen t member s a s t o th e weights assigne d to each, an d these perception s i n turn will be mor e or les s influentia l dependin g o n th e positio n o f th e individua l in volved. Moreover , tracin g suc h change s i n perceptio n i n curren t events or history can be quite difficult. Nonetheles s the simplificatio n focuses ou r attentio n o n tw o importan t set s o f variable s whic h wil l probably influenc e thes e estimates : battlefield result s o f current pol icies an d term s o f settlemen t whic h ar e perceive d t o b e available . Battlefield result s clearl y pla y a n important role , bu t the y ar e no t decisive b y themselves . Eve n i f on e sid e i s militaril y defeated , i t retains the option to resort to other forms of resistance, from guerrill a warfare t o passiv e resistanc e o f variou s sorts . No r i s thi s a n empt y threat; the communis t governmen t o f Poland in the late 1980 s foun d itself i n complet e militar y contro l o f th e countr y bu t unabl e t o ge t its citizen s t o wor k fo r it . Th e issu e the n i s no t resolve d b y deter mining whethe r on e coalitio n ha s suffere d militar y defea t bu t ho w it wil l respon d t o suc h a defeat . Our case s sugges t tha t indee d militar y defea t ofte n is see n a s a turning poin t b y man y o n bot h side s an d serve s a s a n importan t indicator o f th e cost s o f futur e resistance . Despit e rhetoric , n o sid e voluntarily fights unti l th e las t man , woman , an d child , an d whil e guerilla warfar e afte r militar y defea t i s clearl y possible , i t doe s no t often occu r in our cases. Thus it did not develop in Nigeria or Greece after tota l militar y defeats , i n Zimbabw e afte r a settlement avoide d an inevitable militar y defeat , o r i n Yeme n o r Suda n (fo r a t least five years afte r th e war ) afte r a militar y stalemat e le d t o a negotiate d settlement. On th e othe r hand , guerill a warfar e di d appea r afte r settlement s in Colombi a an d th e Unite d States , fo r quit e differen t reasons . I n

Where D o W e G o from Here ? 31 9 Colombia th e leader s di d no t contro l muc h o f th e fighting, whic h was not tightly organized; thus they could deliver onl y a portion of the rebel s t o thei r agreement . However , the y correctl y calculate d that this would be sufficient t o build a new government which could eventually reduce the level of conflict drastically, and this happened over time. In the American case, on the other hand, the rebel military leaders controlled thei r arme d forces , an d the surrende r wen t remarkabl y smoothly, including some armies still in the field. The problem arose later, wit h popula r revulsio n amon g whit e Southerner s ove r blac k enfranchisement, combine d wit h a n unwillingnes s b y man y whit e Northerners t o pa y a high pric e t o enforc e suc h enfranchisement . The result was a renewal of large-scale violence until the settlemen t was revised, leaving the South securely within the Union but disenfranchising black s fo r generations . Clearl y th e term s o f settlemen t were critical here. If the Union had said initially that all Confederate officers would be shot for treason, the Southern army would not have surrendered in 1865 . After the settlement wa s revised in 1876 , th e guerrilla violence disappeared . Obviously battlefiel d outcome s an d term s o f settlemen t ar e re lated. I f you want t o put pressur e o n the enem y coalition , yo u can offer hars h term s o f settlemen t i f the y expec t negativ e battlefiel d outcomes i n the future . Th e extrem e cas e i s Greece, wher e n o negotiations or formal term s were offere d a t all, and large numbers of rebels an d thei r supporter s wer e punishe d directly . O n th e othe r hand, we can imagine a situation in which all inhabitants of the area expect to be killed or deported from the country. Resistance is likely to be desperate ; somethin g lik e thi s seems t o hav e occurre d i n Nigeria for a time. This extreme exampl e points up the fact that there are always some terms of settlement, although they may not be stated explicitly (no genocide, for example). A reputation for keeping one's word may be helpful i n making terms of settlement palatabl e to the opposition a s well. Seen withi n thi s perspective , third-part y activitie s ca n pla y a n important bu t limite d role . A third party ca n keep a conflict goin g by persuading one coalition that it cannot be defeated since the third party will supply whatever supplies, support, or asylum is necessary to prevent it . Thes e assertion s by themselve s ma y no t be sufficien t if the coalitio n divide s fo r other reasons ; something lik e thi s seem s to have happened in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Moreover , third par-

320 Ro y Licklide r ties hav e muc h les s potentia l influenc e i n bringin g abou t a settle ment, eve n assumin g goo d will ; th e case s sho w clearl y tha t thei r impact i s limite d b y wha t th e local s ar e prepare d t o do . Although i t i s counter-intuitive, whethe r th e wa r starte d a s a rev olution o r a separatis t attemp t seem s les s importan t i n it s outcom e than thes e othe r factors , assumin g thir d partie s ar e involved . Th e issues certainly hav e some impact. Separatist movement s find it muc h more difficul t t o wide n thei r coalition s tha n revolutionar y move ments; ther e ar e fe w example s o f differen t separatis t group s unitin g against a singl e governmen t (Ethiopi a come s t o mind) . Moreover , separatist movement s ten d t o ge t les s foreig n suppor t becaus e mos t governments ar e reluctan t t o encourag e secessio n eve n fro m thei r enemies, agai n reducin g th e separatists ' abilit y t o buil d coalitions . These tw o factor s explai n wh y secessionis t revolution s hav e bee n s o much les s successful tha n political ones since World War II and some thing o f th e differen t interventio n record s o f th e tw o superpower s (Sensi 1991) . However , ou r case s sugges t tha t th e natur e o f the issu e acts as a background conditio n influencin g action s rather tha n a proximate caus e o f a coalitio n change .

Future Researc h We ar e left , then , wit h a numbe r o f intriguin g pattern s an d hy potheses. Wha t shoul d b e don e wit h them ? Ho w ca n w e mov e for ward fro m thi s point ? Ther e ar e severa l differen t path s fo r futur e research suitabl e fo r peopl e wit h differen t researc h agendas . (1) On e possibilit y i s to prob e som e o r al l o f these seve n case s i n more detail . Ou r deceptivel y simpl e framewor k actuall y put s grea t demands o n th e cas e authors . Th e questio n o f wha t issue s reall y caused th e initia l conflict , fo r example , i s extremel y difficul t t o an swer fo r an y o f thes e examples . W e ofte n kno w littl e abou t th e in ternal politic s o f bot h side s o r th e perception s o f differen t actor s o f the military balance on the battlefield an d their expectations of futur e success o r failure . Sometime s eve n th e action s o f thir d partie s ar e obscure, no t t o mentio n thei r motivation . An d an y discussio n o f th e settlement term s leads directly int o the question o f how the successo r state wa s formulated , wh y i t too k th e for m i t did , ho w i t migh t hav e developed i n differen t ways , an d ho w al l thi s influence d th e likeli hood o f futur e civi l violence , th e lifestyl e o f the population , an d th e behavior o f the ne w state . The discussio n o f these issue s by ou r cas e

Where D o W e G o fro m Here ? 32 1 authors ha s been exemplary , bu t non e o f them woul d clai m t o hav e the las t wor d o n thes e issues . (2) Anothe r approach would be to add more cases. I deeply regre t not acceptin g Rober t Whealey' s generou s offe r t o d o a cas e stud y of the Spanish Civil War. China and Vietnam would also be excellen t additions, not to mention the large number of anti-colonial struggles. The utility of the American Civil War case suggests that the approac h might be profitably pushed back into earlier historical cases, not only to civi l war s suc h a s th e America n Revolutio n (which , give n th e number o f colonist s wh o supporte d th e Britis h an d emigrate d afte r the settlement , coul d reasonabl y be calle d a civil war), the Gloriou s Revolution o f England, th e Frenc h Revolution , th e war s of religio n in Europe , th e Taipin g Revolutio n i n China , an d th e Grea t Mutin y in India , bu t als o t o war s o f conquest , potentiall y a ver y lon g lis t indeed. There is a variety of fascinating possibilitie s for comparativ e case studies , whic h ar e probabl y mor e usefu l tha n singl e examples . An interesting exampl e o f this strateg y i s Goldman 1990 . (3) Rathe r tha n analyzin g a few case s through a framework wit h several different variabl e clusters, a larger numbe r o f cases could b e included focusing on particular hypotheses. Our theory chapters suggest several intriguing possibilities suc h as the relationship betwee n terminating international and civil wars, the role of battlefield succes s in settlement , o r wha t sort s of settlements see m mor e likel y to last . Other possibilitie s includ e th e impac t o f outside actor s o n civi l wa r settlement, th e rol e o f shiftin g coalition s withi n on e o r bot h sides , the significanc e o f varying underlyin g issues , and the circumstance s of changin g goal s by on e o r bot h sides . This techniqu e ca n als o b e used t o explor e th e utilit y o f variable s exclude d fro m ou r analysis ; a number o f people hav e speculate d abou t th e effec t o f a strong vs. a wea k stat e o r a prewa r stat e whic h wa s democrati c o r not , fo r example, bot h i n initiatin g an d terminatin g civi l violence . (4) W e no w hav e a numbe r o f differen t dat a base s o n civi l war s from differen t perspective s (Smal l an d Singe r 1982 ; Pilla r 1983 ; Stedman 1991 ; Gantzel and Meyer-Stamer 1986 ; Sivard 1988; Miall 1992; Gur r an d Scarrit t 1989) . A systemati c compariso n o f thes e would b e helpfu l i n allowin g u s t o mov e towar d hypothesi s testin g on a broader scal e tha n a relativel y fe w cases , especiall y sinc e th e same example s ten d t o recu r i n cas e analyses . (5) W e nee d analyse s roote d i n differen t intellectua l tradition s and frameworks. The approach in this volume, borrowing from Jame s

322 Ro y Licklide r B. Rule' s analysi s (1988 , 178-179 ) o f Charle s Tilly' s work , see s large-scale violenc e a s purposefu l an d rational , reflectiv e o f per ceived collectiv e interests, an d one of several different type s of collective actio n whic h group s ma y us e fo r thei r ow n ends , in a word, political. I t i s probably no t coincidenta l tha t mos t o f the author s i n this volume are political scientists . This is emphatically no t the onl y approach t o explainin g th e outbrea k o f civi l violence , a s Rule an d others eloquentl y demonstrate ; analyse s o f the termination o f suc h conflict fro m thes e differen t perspective s woul d b e ver y usefu l in deed. Nor nee d w e be restricte d t o socia l scienc e an d history . Th e de velopment o f myth s t o explai n th e outcome s o f civi l wars , fo r ex ample, i s probabl y centra l t o th e proces s o f reconciliation , bu t w e know little about it. Indeed the whole concept of victory could profitably b e reexamine d (fo r a n evocativ e exploration , se e Carrol l 1980). (6) Thi s projec t ha s bee n iterative , movin g bac k an d fort h be tween theor y and cases. It may now be time to move back to theory, to tr y t o buil d o n wha t w e hav e learne d (particularl y i n Harve y Waterman's chapter ) t o try t o develop som e ideas about the process of state formation b y whic h civi l wars end, th e alternativ e strategies which ca n b e used , th e likelihoo d tha t suc h strategie s ca n remov e or reduc e th e us e o f large-scal e violenc e withi n th e repertoir e o f collective action (Tilly 1978), and the consequences of such strategies for th e people , th e state , an d th e internationa l system . Thi s i s th e area I hop e t o explor e myself . Clearly these are only some of the options available. Other peopl e will hav e othe r ideas , an d w e ar e fa r fro m bein g abl e t o sa y whic h will be the most useful i n our search for th e explanation o f how civil wars end .

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Contributors

i s associate professo r o f political scienc e a t the University o f North Carolin a a t Chapel Hill .

JONATHAN HARTLY N

CAROLINE HARTZEL L i s a Ph.D . studen t i n th e Departmen t o f Po -

litical Scienc e a t the University o f California, Davis .

JANE E . HOL L i s a majo r i n th e Unite d State s Arm y an d associat e professor o f socia l scienc e a t the United State s Militar y Academy , currently o n the National Securit y Counci l staff . o . IATRIDE S i s professor o f political scienc e a t Southern Con necticut Stat e University .

JOHN

ROY LICKLIDE R i s professor o f political science at Rutgers University , New Brunswick . i s professor o f peace studie s a t the University of Bradford i n the United Kingdom .

JAMES O'CONNEL L

i s professor o f political scienc e a t the University o f California, Davis .

DONALD ROTHCHIL D

STEPHEN JOH N STEDMA N is assistant professor o f African studie s an d comparative politic s a t the Paul Nitz e Schoo l o f Advanced Interna tional Studies , John s Hopkin s University .

341

342 Contributor

s

ROBERT HARRISO N WAGNE R

University o f Texas , Austin .

i s professo r o f politica l scienc e a t th e

i s associat e professo r o f politica l scienc e an d associate dea n o f th e Graduat e Schoo l a t Rutger s University , Ne w Brunswick.

HARVEY WATERMA N

MANFRED w . WENNE R i s associat e professo r o f politica l scienc e a t Northern Illinoi s University . i. WILLIA M ZARTMA N i s th e Jaco b Blaustei n Professo r o f Interna tional Organizatio n an d Conflic t Resolutio n a t th e Pau l Nitz e Schoo l of Advance d Internationa l Studies , John s Hopkin s University .

Index

Abboud, Ibrahim, 73, 77 Abdullah, Sayed Abdel Rahman, 79 Abolitionists, 171-175 , 178-17 9 Addis Ababa agreement. See Sudan , settlement term s Adefope, Henry , 13 9 Afghanistan, 4 , 23-24 , 29 , 34 , 269 , 319 African Nationa l Council . See Zimbabwe, internal politic s Ahmad, 96, 9 7 al-Ahmar, Abdullah, 9 9 Aiken, Arthur, 9 3 Albania, 210 , 214 , 221 , 222, 224 , 22 8 Algeria, 107 , 111 , 11 4 Alier, Abel, 70 , 71 , 72, 86 , 87 , 9 3 All Africa Conference o f Churches, 76 77, 81-84 , 9 2 Alliance for Progress, 4 9 American Civil War. See United States of America, civi l war Amin, Idi, 7 4 Amnesty, i n Colombia, 40 , 53 , 55 , 59; in Greece, 215 , 232 ; in Nigeria, 198 ; in United States of America, 166 , 180, 181 , 183-18 4 Anarchy, 235 , 248 , 25 4 Andersonville, 183-18 4 Angola, 3 , 21 , 33, 12 5 Ankrah, Kodwo, 82, 9 3 Appomattox, 166 , 16 7

Arabian Sea, 10 1 Argentina, 16 8 al-Arif, Abd al-Karim, 11 4 Asaba, 20 3 Asika, Ukpabi, 19 7 Asir, 12 0 Australia, 13 9 Bab al-Mandab, 10 1 al-Badr, Muhammad, 96, 97 , 105 , 12 0 Bakheit, Gaafa r Mohamed Ali, 7 9 Balance of power, 247-251 , 261 , 266 , 267, 298-29 9 Bangladesh, 5, 31 4 Barco, Virgilio, 52-53, 55 , 6 0 Bargaining. See Negotiations Basques. See Spain Beauregard, P. T., 16 6 Ben Bella, Ahmad, 11 4 Benidorm, Declaration of , 4 4 Benjamin, Judah, 16 6 Bensel, Richard, 1 5 Bentiu, 8 8 Betancur, Belisario, 52, 53 , 5 5 Blainey's argument. See Convergent expectations Botha, Pik, 14 6 Boulkes, 22 1 Brazil, 16 8 Breckinridge, John, 165 , 16 7 Brewster, Kingman , 15 0

343

344 Inde x British Sout h African Company , 12 6 Brown, John , 17 5 Bulawayo, 129 , 132 , 16 2 Bulgaria, 210 , 221 , 22 2 Bunche, Ralph , 11 3 Bunker, Ellsworth , 11 3 Cambodia. See Kampuche a Canada, 11 5 Carr, Burgess , 82 , 8 4 Carrington, Lord , 138-15 7 Carter, Jimmy , 5 , 15 0 Case studies , 10 , 1 1 Casualties, 9 , 10 , 11 , 312 ; i n Colombia , 37, 3 8 - 4 3 , 56 , 60 ; i n Greece , 228 , 229; i n Nigeria , 192 , 193 ; i n Unite d States o f America , 164 , 168 , 181 , 182; i n Zimbabwe , 135-137 , 161 , 162 Causes o f war . See Issue s Census, Nigeria , 19 1 Centralization. See Federa l structure ; Settlement term s Chad, 2 2 - 2 3 , 27 , 30 , 3 4 Chevron, 8 8 Chicken Dilemm a Game , 30 , 3 1 Chitepo, Herbert , 13 2 Choice points , 30 4 Churchill, Winston , 207 , 212 , 22 3 Civic Front . See Colombia, settlemen t terms Civil war , an d conflict , 10 ; an d interstate wars , 7 - 8 , 19 , 20 , 24 , 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 , 2 6 3 - 2 6 4 ; an d negotiation , 24-27, 257-263 , 271-272 ; i n Colombia, 8 , 11 , 12 , 19 , 23 , 3 6 - 6 1 ; definition of , 9 - 1 0 , 60 , 115 ; i n Ethiopia, 21 , 27 , 32 , 33 , 125 , 320 ; i n Great Britain , 4 , 321 ; i n Greece , 12 , 19, 2 0 4 - 2 3 2 , 300 ; importanc e of , 5 6; i n Jordan , 100 , 101 , 111 , 112 , 289; i n Lebanon , 3 , 23 , 27 , 29 , 33 , 268, 269 , 271 , 289 ; i n Nigeria , 5 , 12, 19 , 1 8 8 - 2 0 3 , 262 , 299 , 300 ; i n Spain, 5 , 198 , 270 , 289 ; i n Sudan , 8 , 11, 12 , 19 , 21 , 6 2 - 9 3 , 125 , 289 ; i n United State s o f America , 4 , 5 , 11 , 12, 13 , 19 , 164-187 , 262 , 270 , 289 ,

296, 301 ; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic , 8, 12 , 19 , 9 4 - 1 2 3 , 265 , 289 , 296 , 301; i n Zimbabwe , 9 , 10 , 12 , 19 , 1 2 4 - 1 6 3 , 289 , 296 , 297 , 300 , 30 1 Coalition management , 3 0 5 - 3 0 6 , 3 1 7 318. See also Interna l politic s Cold War , en d of , 4 Collective securit y system , 25 2 Colombia, amnesty , 40 , 53 , 55 , 59 ; civil war , 8 , 11 , 12 , 19 , 23 , 3 6 - 6 1 ; casualties, 37 , 3 8 - 4 3 , 56 , 60 ; constitutional convention , 53 , 57 , 60 ; democracy, 45 ; dru g trafficking , 42 , 43, 50 , 51 , 5 3 - 5 9 ; guerrill a war , 4 3 - 4 4 , 5 0 - 5 8 , 54 , 58 , 310 , 315 , 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ; interna l politics , 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 3 - 4 8 , 59 , 308 ; issues , 29 , 3 8 - 4 3 , 4 5 - 4 7 , 305 , 317 ; landowners , 43 , 54, 55 ; land , 50 ; leadership , 47 , 5 0 51, 308 ; map , 36 ; militar y balance , 45, 53 , 309 ; mutua l hurtin g stalemate, 4 7 - 4 8 , 309 ; negotiations , 4 3 - 4 5 , 53 ; participation, 41 , 4 9 - 5 2 , 306, 316 ; peasants , 39 ; Protestants , 48; redistribution , 50 ; Roma n Catholic Church , 47 , 49 , 60 ; settlement terms , 30 , 3 1 - 3 3 , 4 9 - 5 2 , 59, 6 0 - 6 1 , 306 , 315 , 316 , 317 , 3 1 8 319; stat e capacity , 43 , 50 , 5 3 - 6 0 ; third part y intervention , 45 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 54, 5 6 - 5 8 , 311 ; Unio n o f Sovie t Socialist Republics , 57 ; Unite d State s of America , 4 8 - 4 9 , 54 , 5 6 - 5 8 Commitment, 25 , 24 5 Commonwealth, an d Greece , 225 ; an d Nigeria, 200 ; an d Zimbabwe , 139 , 140, 146 , 147 , 150-15 2 Compromise o f 1850 , 17 2 Conflict resolutio n theory , 6 - 7 , 16-17 , 37 Conquest. See Wars o f conques t Consociational democracy , 46 , 2 9 5 296. See also Settlemen t term s Constitution. See Settlement term s Contest o f punishment , 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 , 244 , 247, 254 , 260 , 26 7 Convergent expectations , 2 4 2 - 2 6 4 , 289, 31 0 Correlates o f Wa r project , 6

Index 34 5 Counterforce duel , 238 , 246 , 247 , 248 , 251, 254 , 258 , 260 , 265 , 266 , 26 7 Credibility, 24 5 Critendon-Johnson Resolutions , 17 9 Cuba, 49 , 172 , 31 5 Cyprus, 22 , 27 , 29 , 30 , 3 3 - 3 4 , 232 , 314 Dachau, 209 , 21 9 el-Dahab, Abde l Rahma n Siwar , 90 , 9 1 Davis, Jefferson , 1 6 5 - 1 7 8 , 184 , 296 , 308 Day, Derek , 14 4 DeGaulle, Charles , 20 3 Democracy, 32 1 Development, 7 , 2 8 Dimitrov, Georgi , 222 , 22 3 al-Din, Hamid , 11 7 Disarmament, 17 , 19 , 298 , 313 , 3 1 5 317; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic , 1 1 5 116 Douglas Home , Alec , 12 8 Douglas, Stephen , 17 3 Dred Scot t decision , 17 3 EAM, 207 , 208 , 218 , 22 1 East Germany . See Germa n Democrati c Republic Effiong, Philip , 19 5 Egypt, 101 , 1 0 4 - 1 1 4 , 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , 31 3 Eisenhower, Dwigh t David , 101 , 29 7 El Salvador , 2 4 ELAS, 207 , 208 , 22 1 Elections, 316 ; i n Angola , 21 ; i n Greece, 208 , 209 , 212 , 227 ; i n Nigeria, 191 ; i n Sudan , 87 , 90 ; i n United State s o f America, 165 , 182 , 183, 308 , 311 ; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic, 117 , 118 ; i n Zimbabwe , 126, 133 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 , 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 141 , 147-159 Emancipation Proclamation , 178 , 17 9 England. See Grea t Britai n Enugu, 20 3 Epps, Dwain , 9 3 Eritrea. See Ethiopi a Erkwit, 104 , 11 4 Escalation, 3 1

Escobar, Pablo , 5 8 Ethiopia, civi l war , 21 , 27 , 32 , 33 , 125 , 320; an d Sudan , 69 , 7 4 - 7 5 , 8 4 - 8 5 , 312 Ethnic divisions , 5 , 7 , 15 , 32 , 3 0 4 - 3 0 6 . See als o Issue s Evatt, Herbert , 22 4 Expulsion, 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 . See also Settlement term s Faisal. See Faysa l ib n Ab d al-Azi z Falklands, 26 9 FARC (Revolutionar y Arme d Force s o f Colombia), 41 , 49 , 53 , 5 5 Faysal ib n Ab d al-Aziz , 105-107 , 114 , 120 Fearless, 12 8 Federal structure , 17 , 32 ; i n Nigeria , 189, 192 , 197 , 2 0 0 - 2 0 2 ; i n Sudan , 78, 80 , 8 9 - 9 0 ; i n Unite d State s o f America, 18 6 Fiorina, 21 0 Flower, Ken , 137 , 158 , 15 9 Framework, 1 0 - 1 1 , 14-1 7 France, an d Nigeria , 195 , 203 ; revolution, 4 , 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 , 32 1 Fraser, Malcolm , 13 9 Frederica, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 Fugitive Slav e Act , 17 2 Fulani, 190 , 196 , 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 Gaitan, Jorg e Eliecer , 3 9 Galan, Lui s Carlos , 55 , 5 6 Game theory , 266 . See also Prisoners ' Dilemma Game ; Chicke n Dilemm a Game Garang, Joseph , 6 9 - 7 0 , 7 1 de Garang , Mading , 77 , 9 3 Garang d e Mabior , John , 88 , 8 9 - 9 1 Garrison, Willia m Lloyd , 17 2 Gaviria, Cesar , 53 , 5 6 - 5 7 Genocide, 7 , 8 , 3 1 , 245 , 314 , 319 ; i n Nigeria, 194 , 195 , 20 0 George II , 2 0 6 - 2 0 9 , 21 7 German Democrati c Republic , 15 4 German Federa l Republic , 19 7 Germany, 187 , 199 , 22 1 Gilmour, Ian , 143 , 150 , 15 1

346 Inde x Gomez, Laureano , 39 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 4 7 Gonatas, Stylianos , 21 6 Gowon, Yakubu , 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 , 197 , 199 , 203 Grammos-Vitsi range , 214 , 22 8 Grant, Ulysse s S. , 164 , 179 , 18 6 Great Britain , civi l war , 4 ; an d Falklands, 269 ; Gloriou s Revolution , 321; an d Greece , 2 0 7 - 2 1 3 , 218 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 5 , 227 , 231 , 232 ; an d Nigeria, 190 , 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 , 203 ; an d Sudan, 6 5 - 6 8 , 69 ; an d Unite d State s of America , 177-178 ; an d Yeme n Arab Republic, 101 , 106 , 107 , 111 , 115, 118 ; an d Zimbabwe , 126-129 , 133-135, 136 , 1 3 8 - 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 , 286. See also Norther n Irelan d Greece, an d Albania , 210 , 214 , 221 , 222, 224 , 228 ; amnesty , 215 , 232 ; casualties, 228 , 229 ; civi l war , 12 , 19, 2 0 4 - 2 3 2 , 300 , 3 0 1 - 3 0 2 ; an d Commonwealth, 225 ; an d Cyprus , 29, 232 ; elections , 208 , 209 , 212 , 227; an d Grea t Britain , 2 0 7 - 2 1 3 , 218, 2 2 1 - 2 2 5 , 227 , 231 , 232 ; guerilla warfare , 208 , 211 , 214 , 231 , 309, 318 ; interna l politics , 2 0 9 - 2 2 0 , 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 ; issues , 2 0 6 - 2 1 0 , 3 0 1 - 3 0 2 , 304, 305 , 306 ; junta, 232 ; leadership, 2 1 5 - 2 2 0 , 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 ; Macedonia, 208 , 215 , 219 ; map , 204 ; military balance , 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 , 209 , 2 1 0 - 2 1 5 , 2 2 7 - 2 3 0 , 311 , 312 ; mutual hurtin g stalemate , 230 , 309 ; negotiations, 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , 224 ; participation, 232 , 316 , 317 ; Secon d Round, 207 , 208 , 212 ; settlemen t terms, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 , 214 , 215 , 2 3 0 - 2 3 2 , 316, 317 , 319 ; stat e capacity , 226 ; third part y intervention , 2 0 7 - 2 1 5 , 218, 2 2 0 - 2 3 2 , 311 , 312 ; an d Unio n of Sovie t Socialis t Republics , 205 , 2 0 7 - 2 1 5 , 218 , 2 2 0 - 2 3 2 , 311 , 316 ; and Unite d Nations , 210 , 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 , 227; an d Unite d State s o f America , 2 0 8 - 2 1 3 , 218 , 2 2 1 - 2 3 2 ; weapons , 210, 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 222 , 2 2 7 - 2 9 9 ; an d Yugoslavia, 208 , 210 , 2 1 3 - 2 1 5 , 2 2 0 223, 228 , 31 1

Grenada, 26 9 Grevena, 21 0 Guatamala, 11 5 Guerrilla warfare , 15 , 255 , 258 , 3 1 0 311, 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ; i n Colombia , 4 3 - 4 4 , 5 0 - 5 8 , 54 , 58 , 310 , 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ; i n Greece, 208 , 211 , 214 , 231 , 311 , 318; i n Nigeria , 194 , 311 , 318 ; i n Sudan, 7 3 - 7 4 , 90 , 92 , 318 ; i n Unite d States o f America , 165-168 , 1 8 6 187, 306 , 310 , 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ; i n Yeme n Arab Republic , 110 , 318 ; i n Zimbabwe, 128 , 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 , 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 , 135-137, 31 8 Gwelo, 12 9 Gweru, 16 2 Hadjivasiliou, Chrissa , 21 9 Harad, 10 5 Harare, 16 2 Harper's Ferry , 17 5 Hausa, 190 , 196 , 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 Hegemony, 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 , 26 7 Hierarchy, 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 High Executiv e Council , 85 , 86 , 8 7 History, 6 Honwanna, Fernand , 157 , 15 8 Horn o f Africa , 10 1 Horn, Car l von , 11 4 Hoxha, Enver , 222 , 22 4 Hudaydah, 12 1 Hurting stalemate . See Mutua l hurtin g stalemate ibn Husayn , Muhammad , 10 8 Ibibio, 194 , 19 6 Identification conflict , 3 0 4 - 3 0 6 . See also Issue s Identity issues . See Ethnic divisions ; Issues Idoma, 19 6 Ijaw, 194 , 19 6 Ikle, Fred , 4 , 9 India, 22 , 314 , 32 1 Indian Ocean , 10 1 Integration, 316 . See also Settlemen t terms; Participatio n Intensity, 3

Index 34 7 Internal politics, 15 , 17-18 , 240-241 , 244, 247 , 295-297 , 306-309 , 317 320, 321 ; in Chad, 27 ; in Colombia, 38-39, 43-48 , 59 , 308 ; in Cyprus, 27; in Ethiopia, 27 ; in Greece, 209 220, 308-309 ; i n Lebanon, 27 ; in Nigeria, 191-196 , 308-309 ; in Sudan, 27, 69-72, 89-91 , 307 ; in Sri Lanka, 27; in United States of America, 164-169 , 174-186 , 308 ; in Yemen Arab Republic, 100-109 , 116-117, 307 ; in Zimbabwe, 127 128, 130-137 , 141-161 , 30 8 Internal power balance, 315 . See also Settlement term s Internal Security Negotiations , Conference on , 1 3 International war . See Interstate war International politics, 235-26 8 International Monetar y Fund, 5 4 Interstate war, 4, 237-241 , 263-264 , 285-286 Intervention. See Third party intervention Ioannidis, Yiannis, 21 9 Iran, 100 , 111 , 202, 26 7 Iraq, 5, 9-10 , 111 , 114 , 267-26 8 Ireland, Republic of , 115 , 19 8 Ironsi, 19 2 Islam, in Nigeria, 190 , 191 , 202-203; in Sudan, 65, 67 , 68 , 69 , 78 , 89 , 91, 92; in Yemen Arab Republic, 95 , 96 , 120 Israel, 9 , 314 ; and Egypt, 312 ; and Palestine, 267 ; and Lebanon, 269; and Sudan, 70, 74 , 75 , 89 ; Yom Kippur War, 26 9 Issues, 5, 12 , 13-14 , 17-18 , 28-29 , 235-268, 271-272 , 275-278 , 294 , 301-302, 304-306 , 315 , 317 , 320 , 321; i n Afghanistan, 23-24 , 29 ; in Angola, 21 ; in Chad, 22-23 ; in Colombia, 29 , 38-43 , 45-47 , 305 , 317; in Cyprus, 22 ; in Ethiopia, 29 ; in Greece, 206-210 , 301-302 , 304 , 305, 306 , 317 ; in Lebanon, 23 , 29; in Mozambique, 21-22 , 29 ; in Nigeria, 189-194 , 202 , 305 , 306 , 317; in Philippines, 22 , 29 ; postwar

policies, 317; revolutionary or secessionist, 320 ; in South Africa, 29 ; in Sri Lanka, 22, 29 ; between Spain and the Basques, 22 , 29 ; in Sudan, 21, 29 , 64-68 , 304 , 305 , 317 ; in United States of America, 164-165 , 168-179, 185-186 , 305 , 306 , 317 ; in Yemen Arab Republic, 97-100 , 305, 317 ; in Zimbabwe, 125-131 , 305, 30 6 Italy, 22 1 Jamaica, 139 , 15 0 Japan, 5 Johns Hopkins University, 1 3 Johnson, Andrew, 167 , 181 , 182 , 184 185 Johnston, Joseph, 166-16 7 Jonglei Canal, 8 8 Jordan, 100 , 101 , 111 , 112 , 28 9 Justice, 13-1 4 Kalahari, 19 6 Kampuchea, 3 , 2 4 Kanellopoulos, Panaviotis , 21 6 Kansas, 172-17 3 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 173 , 17 4 Kanuri, 19 0 Kaunda, Kenneth, 132 , 133 , 139 , 146 , 151-152, 15 5 Kennedy, John F., 101 , 112-11 3 el-Khalifah, Si r el-Khatim, 73 , 7 8 Khama, 13 3 Khamir, 10 5 Khartoum Summit Conference, 10 7 Kissinger, Henry , 133 , 13 8 KKE, 207, 209-215 , 218-23 2 Konitsa, 21 0 Korea 4, 48 , 260 , 29 7 Kosti, 8 8 Kurds, 268 Kuwait, 5 , 9-10 , 114 , 26 8 Lagu, Joseph, 67 , 70 , 71-72 , 85 , 86 , 89-90, 30 7 Land, in Colombia, 50 ; in United States of America, 174 , 183 ; in Zimbabwe, 126, 129 , 130 , 133 , 145 , 160 , 16 2

348 Inde x Land Tenur e Act , 126-12 7 Land Apportionmen t Act , 12 6 Laos, 26 8 Leadership, 2 9 5 - 2 9 7 , 3 0 6 - 3 0 9 , 3 1 7 318; i n Colombia , 47 , 5 0 - 5 1 ; i n Greece, 215-220 ; i n Nigeria , 190 , 202; i n Sudan , 7 0 - 7 2 , 8 5 - 9 1 . See also Interna l politic s Lebanon, 3 , 23 , 27 , 29 , 33 , 268 , 269 , 271, 28 9 Lee, Rober t E. , 165-16 7 Legitimate us e o f force , 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 , 256 , 261-262 Levy, Jack , 5 Lexicographic preferences , 178 , 18 7 Lincoln, Abraham , 165 , 166 , 174 , 178 , 179, 181 , 186 , 30 8 Lleras, Alberto , 44 , 4 5 Luce, Richard , 14 9 M-19 (Movemen t o f th e 19t h o f April) , 50, 52 , 55 , 6 0 Macedonia, 208 , 215 , 21 9 Machel, Samora , 133 , 157 , 15 8 MacVeagh, Lincoln , 217 , 2 2 5 - 2 2 6 Maghoub, Mohamme d Abmed , 7 3 al-Mahdi, Sadiq , 73 , 9 1 Manley, Michael , 139 , 15 0 Maps, o f Colombia , 36 ; o f Greece , 204 ; of Nigeria , 188 ; o f Sudan , 62 ; o f Yemen Ara b Republic , 94 ; o f Zimbabwe, 12 4 Markos (Vafiadis) , 210 , 214 , 215 , 220 , 227 Massacres, 9 Mavromihalis, Petros , 21 6 Mediation wit h muscle , 16 , 3 1 2 - 3 1 3 Metaxas, John , 206 , 207 , 217 , 21 9 Middle Bel t people , 190 , 192 , 195 , 19 6 Military balance , 15-16 , 1 7 - 1 8 , 19 , 34, 2 6 9 - 2 9 1 , 2 9 9 - 3 0 1 , 303 , 308 , 3 0 9 - 3 1 1 , 3 1 3 - 3 1 4 , 318 , 320 , 321 ; in Afghanistan , 34 ; i n Chad , 34 ; i n Colombia, 45 , 53 , 309 ; i n Greece , 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 , 209 , 2 1 0 - 2 1 5 , 2 2 7 - 2 3 0 , 309; i n Mozambique , 34 ; i n Nigeria , 193-197; i n Philippines , 34 ; i n Spain , 34; i n Sr i Lanka , 34 ; i n Sudan , 34 ,

7 2 - 7 4 , 91 , 309 ; i n Unite d State s o f America, 165-166 , 177 , 310 ; i n Yemen Ara b Republic , 1 0 9 - 1 1 1 , 309; i n Zimbabwe , 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 , 1 3 0 137, 31 0 Missouri Compromise , 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 Morocco, 101 , 11 1 Moros. See Philippine s Mortal combat , 23 8 Mortimer, Robert , 9 Movement o f th e 19t h o f April . See M-19 Mozabmique, 2 1 - 2 2 , 12 5 Mozambique, 2 1 - 2 2 , 29 , 30 , 34 , 125 ; and Zimbabwe , 129 , 130 , 132 , 135 , 137, 139 , 146 , 152 , 157 , 158 , 162 , 163, 31 0 Mugabe, Robert , 128 , 132 , 136-137 , 140-162, 297 , 30 8 Multiple sovereignty , 9 , 1 0 Muslim. See Isla m Mutare, 16 2 Mutual hurtin g stalemate , 16 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 26, 260 , 271 , 309 ; i n Colombia , 4 7 48; i n Greece , 230 , 309 , 316 ; i n Sudan, 7 2 - 7 4 , 91 , 309 ; thir d parties , 313; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic , 107 , 110-111; i n Zimbabwe , 31 0 Muzorewa, Abel , 128 , 129 , 1 3 4 - 1 5 9 Myths, 32 2 Najran, 12 0 Namibia, 21 , 12 5 Nasir, Gama l Abdel , 105-107 , 11 4 Nasser. See Nasi r National Front . See Colombia , settlement National Liberatio n Arm y (ELN) , 50 , 53 Ndebele, 132 , 16 1 Negotiated settlements , 8 , 12 , 16 , 1 7 18, 3 0 - 3 4 , 2 5 9 - 2 6 3 , 2 6 9 - 2 9 1 , 305 , 311, 315 ; i n Sr i Lanka , 31 . See also Settlement term s Negotiations, 24 , 25 , 2 5 8 - 2 6 3 , 310 ; i n Colombia, 4 3 - 4 5 , 53 ; an d equality , 25, 26 ; i n Greece , 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , 224 ; i n Nigeria, 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ; an d spokesmen ,

Index 34 9 26; i n Sudan , 68 , 7 1 - 7 2 , 7 6 - 8 5 ; i n United State s o f America , 1 6 6 - 1 6 8 ; in Yeme n Ara b Republic , 1 0 4 - 1 0 9 ; in Zimbabwe , 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 , 1 4 0 - 1 5 7 Nicaragua, 172 , 26 8 Nigeria, amnest y in , 198 ; casualties , 192, 193 ; census , 191 ; civi l war , 5 , 12, 19 , 1 8 8 - 2 0 3 , 262 , 299 , 300 ; an d Commonwealth, 200 ; elections , 191 ; federal structure , 189 , 192 , 197 , 2 0 0 - 2 0 2 ; an d France , 195 , 203 ; genocide, 194 , 195 , 200 ; an d Grea t Britain, 190 , 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 , 203 ; guerill a warfare, 194 , 311 , 318 ; interna l politics, 1 9 1 - 1 9 6 , 306 ; Islam , 190 , 191, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ; issues , 1 8 9 - 1 9 4 , 202 , 305, 306 , 318 ; leadership , 190 , 202 , 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 ; map , 188 ; Middl e Bel t people, 190 , 192 , 195 , 196 ; militar y balance, 1 9 3 - 1 9 7 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; negotiations, 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ; oil , 189 , 193 , 196, 200 , 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ; an d Organizatio n of Africa n Unity , 200 ; participation , 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 , 2 0 1 - 2 0 3 , 316 ; settlemen t terms, 1 9 7 - 2 0 3 , 316 , 318 , 319 ; starvation, 198-199 ; thir d part y intervention, 1 9 4 - 2 0 1 , 203 , 3 1 1 312; an d Unio n o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics, 194 , 195 ; weapons , 1 9 4 195; an d Zimbabwe , 139 , 14 6 Niilus, Leopoldo , 9 3 el-Nimery, Gaafar , 69 , 7 1 , 72 , 73 , 78 , 79, 8 5 - 9 0 , 92 , 30 7 Nitze Schoo l o f Advance d Internationa l Studies, 1 3 Nkala, Enos , 16 1 Nkomo, Joshua , 128 , 132 , 137 , 138 , 144, 146 , 147 , 150-16 1 Normal politics , 2 7 - 3 0 Norman, Ken , 15 9 Normative issues , 1 3 - 1 4 North Yemen . See Yeme n Ara b Republic Northern Ireland , 3 , 24 , 198 , 26 7 Nsukka University , 19 7 Nullification Crisis , 17 2 Nu'man, Ahma d Muhammad , 105 , 11 9 Nyerere, Julius , 132 , 133 , 139 , 15 7

Obasanjo, 19 5 Obote, Milton , 7 5 Ogoja, 19 6 Oil, i n Nigeria , 189 , 193 , 196 , 200 , 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ; i n Sudan , 8 8 - 8 9 ; i n Yeme n Arab Republic , 12 3 Ojukwu, Odumegwu , 1 9 2 - 1 9 6 , 198 , 199, 20 1 Okigbo, Pius , 19 8 Oman, 11 1 Organization o f America n States , 4 4 , 4 8 Organization o f Africa n Unity , 20 0 Organizational advantage , 2 5 3 - 2 5 7 , 261 Orner, Jan , 9 3 Ospina, Mariano , 39 , 43 , 4 4 Outside intervention . See Third part y intervention Owen, David , 13 3 Pact o f Marc h (1957) , 4 4 Pakistan, 5 , 31 4 Palestinians, 9 , 10 , 2 3 Panama, 58 , 26 9 Papagos, Alexander , 218 , 229 , 23 0 Papandreou, George , 207 , 208 , 21 6 Paraguay, 16 8 Participation, 1 6 - 1 7 , 315 , 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 ; i n Colombia, 41 , 4 9 - 5 2 ; i n Greece , 232, 317 ; i n Nigeria , 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 , 2 0 1 203; i n Sudan , 65 , 80 , 86 , 87 , 317 ; United State s o f America , 1 8 0 - 1 8 6 , 317; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic , 1 1 5 118, 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 , 317 ; i n Zimbabwe , 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 148 , 1 5 8 - 1 6 2 , 31 7 Partisan warfare . See Guerill a warfar e Partition, 8 Partsalidis, Dimitris , 21 9 Patriotic Front . See Zimbabwe , interna l politics Patriotic Unit y party . See U P Paul, 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 Peace, 1 3 - 1 4 Peoples Regiona l Assembly , 85 , 86 , 8 7 Peoples Democrati c Republi c o f Yeme n (South Yemen) , 95 , 107 , 116 , 117 , 120; an d Grea t Britain , 111 ; an d Union o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics , 101

350 Inde x Peoples Republi c o f China , 132 , 268 , 321 Performance o n postwa r issues . See Settlement term s Persian Gulf , 10 0 Persian Gul f War , 267 , 26 8 Peru, 2 4 Philippines, 22 , 29 , 3 4 Pinilla, Luis , 6 0 Plastiras, Nikolaos , 21 6 Poland, 31 8 Policide, 7 Political will , 2 7 9 - 2 8 1 Political science , 6 Political parties . See Interna l politic s Popular sovereignty , 17 3 Popular Liberatio n Arm y (EPL) , 5 0 Port Harcourt , 19 7 Portugal, 129 , 13 2 Power, 2 5 Power balance , 315 . See also Settlement term s Power-sharing, 46 . See also Settlemen t terms Prisoners' Dilemm a Game , 30 , 26 7 Protracted conflicts , 7 , 20 , 2 4 Ramphal, Shridath , 139 , 146 , 15 0 Realism, 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 , 248 , 25 2 Reconstruction. See Settlemen t terms , United State s o f Americ a Red Sea , 101 , 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 Regions. See Federa l structur e Repression, 316 . See also Settlemen t terms; Participatio n Republic o f Yemen . See Yemen , Republic o f Reputation, 28 7 Research strategy , 10-1 7 Revolution, theor y of , 7 . See also Issue s Revolutionary Arme d Force s o f Colombia. See FAR C Rhodes, Cecil , 12 6 Rhodesia. See Zimbabw e Rhodesian Front , 12 7 Risk-acceptant, 243 , 265 , 27 8 Rojas, Gustavo , 40 , 41 , 43 , 44 , 46 , 48 , 49, 50 , 60 , 30 8

Rousos, Petros , 21 9 Roy, Bikash , 31 6 Rutgers University , ix , 1 2 - 1 3 Rwanda, 2 4 Sa'ud ib n Ab d al-Aziz , 12 0 Salih, Al i Abdullah , 11 7 Salisbury, 12 9 al-Sallal, Abdullah , 105 , 11 9 Sana'a, 108 , 12 1 Saudi Arabia , 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 104-108 , 1 1 1 114, 117 , 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 Scherf, Theresa , 9 3 Secession, 314 . See also Settlemen t terms Second Ara b Leagu e Summi t Conference, 10 4 Selassie, Haile , 74 , 8 4 - 8 5 , 200 , 31 2 Separatism. See Issue s Settlement terms , 5 , 1 6 - 1 9 , 24 , 38 , 121, 261 , 273 , 2 9 2 - 3 0 2 , 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 , 311, 3 1 3 - 3 1 7 , 320 , 321 ; i n Angola , 30, 32 , 33 ; i n Colombia , 30 , 3 1 - 3 3 , 4 9 - 5 2 , 59 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 316 ; i n Ethiopia , 29, 32 , 33 ; i n Chad , 29 , 30 ; i n Cyprus, 29 , 3 3 - 3 4 ; i n Greece , 2 0 5 206, 214 , 215 , 2 3 0 - 2 3 2 , 311 , 315 , 316, 319 ; i n Lebanon , 30 , 33 ; i n Mozambique, 30 ; i n Nigeria , 1 9 7 203, 311 , 316 , 319 ; i n Sr i Lanka , 29 , 30; i n Sout h Africa , 32 , 33 ; i n Spain , 316; i n Sudan , 29 , 30 , 32 , 33 , 6 3 64, 8 5 - 9 3 , 316 , 317 ; i n Unite d States o f America , 165 , 166 , 1 8 0 186, 316 , 317 ; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic, 115-118 , 1 2 1 - 1 2 3 , 316 , 317; i n Zimbabwe , 125 , 141-147 , 159-162, 316 , 31 7 Shagari, 14 6 Sheridan, Philip , 16 5 Sherman, Willia m T. , 164-167 , 179 , 186 Siantos, George , 21 9 Sitges, Pac t of , 4 5 Sithole, Ndabaningi , 128 , 132 , 134 , 148, 16 2 Smith, Ian , 1 2 7 - 1 4 9 , 162 , 296 , 297 , 308

Index 35 1 Smith, David , 14 3 Smith, Kirby , 16 6 Soames, Lord , 157 , 15 9 Social science , 1 3 - 1 4 Sociology, 6 Sofoulis, Themistoclis , 213 , 216 , 21 7 Somalia, 2 4 South Carolina , 172 , 17 5 South Africa , 23 , 29 , 33 ; an d Zimbabwe, 126 , 128 , 130 , 133 , 139 , 146, 154 , 157 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 South Yemen . See Peoples Democrati c Republic o f Yeme n Southern Province s Regiona l Self Government Act , 71 , 8 5 Southern Rhodesia . See Zimbabw e Southern Policy . See Sudan , issue s Spain, Basqu e conflic t 22 , 29 , 34 ; civi l war 5 , 198 , 270 , 289 , 321 ; an d Colombia, 48 ; settlemen t terms , 31 6 Sri Lanka , 22 , 27 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 3 4 Stakes, 9 Stalemate, 2 6 - 2 7 , 260 , 271 , 309 ; i n Yemen Ara b Republic , 107 , 1 1 0 111. See also Mutua l hurtin g stalemate Stalin, Josef , 213 , 215 , 220 , 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 , 231, 232 , 31 6 Stanton, Edwin , 16 7 Starvation, 1 9 8 - 1 9 9 State formatio n afte r civi l war , 1 8 - 1 9 , 3 2 - 3 3 , 32 2 State capacity , 321 ; i n Colombia , 43 , 50, 5 3 - 6 0 ; i n Greece , 226 ; i n Sudan , 71, 72 , 86 , 9 3 Strategies o f conflic t termination , 30 4 Structural violence , 1 3 Sudan, Al l Afric a Conferenc e o f Churches, 7 6 - 7 7 , 8 1 - 8 4 , 92 ; amnesty, 78 ; civi l war , 8 , 11 , 12 , 19 , 21, 6 2 - 9 3 , 125 , 289 ; elections , 87 , 90; an d Ethiopia , 69 , 7 4 - 7 5 , 8 4 - 8 5 ; federal system , 78 , 80 , 8 9 - 9 0 ; an d Great Britain , 6 5 - 6 8 , 69 ; guerrill a war, 7 3 - 7 4 , 90 , 92 , 318 ; interna l politics, 27 , 6 9 - 7 2 , 8 9 - 9 1 , 307 ; an d Islam, 65 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 78 , 89 , 91 , 92 ; and Israel , 70 , 74 , 75 , 89 ; issues , 21 , 29, 6 4 - 6 8 , 304 , 305 , 317 ; Kampal a

Group, 77 , 82 ; leadership , 7 0 - 7 2 , 8 5 - 9 1 , 307 ; map , 62 ; Maker e Group , 77, 82 ; militar y balance , 34 , 7 2 - 7 4 , 91, 309 ; mutua l hurtin g stalemate , 7 2 - 7 4 , 91 , 309 ; negotiations , 68 , 7 1 - 7 2 , 7 6 - 8 5 ; oil , 8 8 - 8 9 ; participation, 65 , 80 , 86 , 87 , 316 , 317; refugees , 86 ; Roun d Tabl e Conference, 78 , 79 ; settlemen t terms , 29, 30 , 32 , 33 , 6 3 - 6 4 , 8 5 - 9 3 , 316 , 317; stat e capacity , 71 , 72 , 86 , 93 ; third part y intervention , 70 , 7 4 - 7 7 , 8 1 - 8 5 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 93 , 311 , 312 , 313 ; and Uganda , 69 , 74 , 75 , 82 ; water , 88; Worl d Counci l o f Churches , 7 6 77, 8 1 - 8 4 , 9 2 Sufyan, 12 3 Sweden, 11 4 Syria, 2 3 , 3 3 , 107 , 111 , 11 2 Ta'if, 10 5 Ta'izz, 12 1 Tamils. See Sr i Lank a Tanzania, 132 , 155 , 16 3 Thant, U , 113 , 11 4 Thatcher, Margaret , 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 1 5 0 152, 15 5 Theories, 10 ; an d cas e studie s 11 , 1 2 Theotokis, John , 21 6 Third part y intervention , 4 , 5 , 12 , 16 , 1 7 - 1 8 , 27 , 265 , 271 , 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 , 2 8 3 288, 303 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 3 , 3 1 9 - 3 2 0 , 321 ; in Colombia , 45 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 54 , 5 6 - 5 8 , 311; government s vs . privat e partie s 16; i n Greece , 2 0 7 - 2 1 5 , 218 , 2 2 0 232; i n Nigeria , 1 9 4 - 2 0 1 , 203 , 311 , 312; i n Sudan , 70 , 7 4 - 7 7 , 8 1 - 8 5 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 93 , 311 , 312 , 313 ; i n Unite d States o f America , 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 , 3 1 1 312; i n Yeme n Ara b Republic , 1 0 0 115, 117 , 1 1 8 - 1 2 3 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; i n Zimbabwe, 1 2 6 - 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 , 286 , 310,311, 312-31 3 Tiger, 12 8 Tito, Josi p Broz , 208 , 213 , 215 , 2 2 2 223, 23 1 Tiv, 19 6 Tongogara, Josiah , 146 , 155 , 156 , 15 7

352 Inde x Torit, 7 3 Tribal Trus t lands , 12 6 Truman Doctrine , 21 2 Tsaldaris, Constantine , 209 , 213 , 21 6 Tsaldaris, Panatges , 21 7 Turbay, Juli o Cesar , 5 2 Turkey, 212 , 225 , 23 2 Uganda, 125 ; an d Sudan , 69 , 74 , 75 , 82 Ulster. See Norther n Irelan d Umtali, 12 9 Uncertainty, 244 , 248 , 266 , 267 , 2 7 8 279 Union o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics , 267, 314 ; an d Afghanistan , 269 ; an d Colombia, 57 ; an d Greece , 205 , 2 0 7 215, 218 , 2 2 0 - 2 3 2 , 311 , 316 ; an d Nigeria, 194 , 195 ; revolution , 262 ; and Yeme n Ara b Republic , 101 , 106 , 107, 108 , 111 , 118 ; an d Zimbabwe , 132, 15 4 United Nations , an d Greece , 210 , 2 2 3 224, 227 ; an d Yeme n Ara b Republic , 104, 112-115 ; an d Zimbabwe , 147 , 150 United State s o f America , amnesty , 166, 180 , 181 , 183-184 ; Cam p David accords , 313 ; casualties , 164 , 168, 181 , 182 ; civi l war 4 , 5 , 11 , 12 , 13, 19 , 164-187 , 262 , 270 , 289 , 296, 301 , 321 ; an d Colombia , 4 8 - 4 9 , 54, 5 6 - 5 8 ; elections , 165 , 182 , 183 ; federal structure , 186 ; an d Grea t Britain, 177-178 ; an d Greece , 2 0 8 213, 218 , 2 2 1 - 2 3 2 ; an d Grenada , 269; guerill a warfare , 165-168 , 1 8 6 187, 306 , 310 , 311 , 315 , 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 ; internal politics , 164-169 , 174-186 , 308; issues , 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 , 168-179 , 185-186, 305 , 306 , 317 ; land , 174 , 183; Mexica n War , 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 , 187 ; military balance , 165-166 , 177 , 310 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; negotiations , 166-168 ; an d Panama, 269 ; participation , 180-186 , 316, 317 ; revolutio n 4 - 5 , 176-177 , 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 , 321 ; settlemen t terms , 165, 166 , 180-186 , 316 , 317 , 3 1 8 -

319; slavery , 166 , 1 7 0 - 1 7 5 , 1 7 8 182, 184 , 186 ; thir d part y intervention, 177-178 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; Vietnam War , 269 , 289 ; an d Yeme n Arab Republic , 101 , 104 , 106 , 1 1 1 115; an d Zimbabwe , 133-134 , 136 , 146-147, 15 0 United Nation s Hig h Commissione r fo r Refugees, 8 6 United Kingdo m o f Grea t Britain . See Great Britai n United State s Institut e o f Peace , ix , 1 2 13 United Nation s Yeme n Observatio n Mission, 1 1 3 - 1 1 5 United Ara b Republic . See Egyp t University o f Lagos , 19 1 UP (Patrioti c Unit y party) , 5 3 - 5 4 , 55 , 59 Uruguay, 16 8 Vafiadis, Markos . See Marko s Valencia, Guillerm o Leon , 4 4 Van Fleet , James , 213 , 22 6 Vance, Cyrus , 13 3 Varkiza accord , 207 , 20 8 Venizelos, Eleutherios , 216 , 21 7 Venizelos, Sofoclis , 21 6 Verwoerd, Hendrik , 13 1 Victory, 5 Vietnam, 4 , 247 , 260 , 267 , 269 , 289 , 315, 319 , 32 1 La violencia. See Colombia , civi l wa r Vorster, John , 131 , 13 3 Walls, Peter , 137 , 144 , 149 , 157 , 1 5 8 159, 16 0 War, cause s of . See Issue s War. See Interstat e war ; Civi l wa r Wars o f conquest , 4 , 9 - 1 0 al-Wazir family , 11 7 Weapons, i n Greece , 210 , 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 222, 2 2 7 - 2 9 9 ; i n Nigeria , 194-195 ; in Yeme n Ara b Republic , 106 , 1 0 9 110, 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 Western Sahara , 2 7 Whealey, Robert , 32 1 Wirz, Henry , 183-18 4

Index 35 3 World Counci l o f Churches , 7 6 - 7 7 , 81-84, 9 2 World Bank , 4 8 - 4 9 Yahya ib n Muhammad , 9 5 - 9 6 , 9 7 Yemen, North . See Yemen Ara b Republic Yemen Ara b Republi c (Nort h Yemen) , assassination, 116 ; civi l war , 8 , 12 , 19, 9 4 - 1 2 3 , 265 , 289 , 296 , 301 ; creation, 9 5 - 9 7 ; disarmament , 115 — 116, 317 ; an d Egypt , 101 , 1 0 4 - 1 1 4 , 118-119; elections , 117 , 118 ; an d Great Britain , 101 , 106 , 107 , 111 , 115, 118 ; guerrill a war , 110 , 318 ; internal politics , 1 0 0 - 1 0 9 , 116-117 , 307; an d Islam , 95 , 96 , 120 ; Isma'il i sect, 96 , 99 ; issues , 9 7 - 1 0 0 , 305 , 317; Jidd a Agreement, 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 , 114; Jews , 96 ; leadership , 307 ; map , 94; militar y balance , 1 0 9 - 1 1 1 , 309 ; mutual hurtin g stalemate , 107 , 1 1 0 111; Nationa l Peac e Conference , 105; negotiations , 104-109 ; oil , 123 ; Ottoman Empire , 95 , 98 ; participation, 1 1 5 - 1 1 8 , 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 , 316; poiso n gas , 110 ; qadis , 98 , 117 ; republicans, 99 , 103-104 ; royalists , 99, 103-104 ; an d Saud i Arabia , 1 0 0 101, 1 0 4 - 1 0 8 , 1 1 1 - 1 1 4 , 117 , 1 1 8 120, 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 ; sayyids , 98 , 117 ; settlement terms , 1 1 5 - 1 1 8 , 1 2 1 123, 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 ; Shafi' i sect , 96 , 98 , 99, 100 , 103 ; stalemate , 107 , 1 1 0 111; Thir d Force , 105 ; thir d part y intervention, 1 0 0 - 1 1 5 , 117 , 1 1 8 123, 311 ; tribes , 9 6 - 9 7 ; an d Unio n of Sovie t Socialis t Republics , 101 , 106, 107 , 108 , 111 , 118 ; an d Unite d Nations, 104 , 112-115 ; an d Unite d States o f America , 101 , 104 , 106 , 111-115; weapons , 106 , 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 , 115-116; Zayd i sect , 95 , 96 , 97 , 99 , 100, 103 , 108 . See also Yemen , Republic o f Yemen, Republi c of , 9 5 Yemen, South . See Peoples Democrati c Republic o f Yeme n

Yom Kippu r War , 26 9 Yoruba, 191 , 19 6 Yugoslavia, 208 , 210 , 2 1 3 - 2 1 5 , 2 2 0 223, 228 , 31 1 Zahariadis, Nikos , 209 , 214 , 2 1 9 - 2 3 1 Zambia, 132 , 133 , 135 , 137 , 139 , 146 , 152, 1 5 4 - 1 5 5 , 162 , 163 , 31 0 Zimbabwe, casualties , 1 3 5 - 1 3 7 , 161 , 162; civi l war , 9 , 10 , 12 , 19 , 1 2 4 163, 289 , 296 , 297 , 300 , 301 ; an d Commonwealth, 139 , 140 , 146 , 147 , 1 5 0 - 1 5 2 ; cease-fire , 153-157 ; declaration o f independenc e (UDI) , 128; economi c sanctions , 130 ; elections, 126 , 133 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 , 1 3 7 138, 141 , 147-159 ; emigration , 1 3 5 136; an d Fron t Lin e States , 133 , 138 , 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 , 155 , 163 ; an d Grea t Britain, 1 2 6 - 1 2 9 , 1 3 3 - 1 3 5 , 136 , 1 3 8 - 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 , 286 , 310 , 3 1 2 313; guerrill a war , 128 , 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 , 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 , 1 3 5 - 1 3 7 , 318 ; interna l politics, 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 1 3 0 - 1 3 7 , 1 4 1 161, 306 , 307 ; Interna l Settlement , 134-135; issues , 1 2 5 - 1 3 1 , 305 , 306 ; land, 126 , 129 , 130 , 133 , 145 , 160 , 162; leadership , 307 , 308 ; map , 124 ; military balance , 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 , 130-137 , 310; an d Mozambique , 129 , 130 , 132, 135 , 137 , 139 , 146 , 152 , 157 , 158, 162 , 163 , 310 ; mutua l hurtin g stalemate, 310 ; negotiations , 1 3 4 135, 140-157 ; an d Nigeria , 139 , 146; participation , 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 148 , 1 5 8 - 1 6 2 , 316 , 317 ; Pearc e Commission, 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 , 130 ; an d People's Republi c o f China , 132 ; settlement terms , 125 , 1 4 1 - 1 4 7 , 1 5 9 - 1 6 2 , 316 , 317 ; Smith-Hom e pact, 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 , 130 ; an d Sout h Africa, 126 , 128 , 130 , 133 , 139 , 146, 154 , 157 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 ; an d Tanzania, 132 , 155 , 163 ; thir d part y intervention, 1 2 6 - 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 , 310; an d Unio n o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics, 132 , 154 ; an d Unite d Nations, 147 , 150 ; an d Unite d

354 Inde x Zimbabwe, (Continued) States of America, 133-134 , 136 , 146-147, 150 ; and Zambia, 132 , 133, 135 , 137 , 139 , 146 , 152 , 154 155, 162 , 163 , 310, 311 , 312-31 3 Zimbabwe African National Unio n (ZANU). See Zimbabwe, interna l politics

Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). See Zimbabwe, internal politics al-Zubayri, Muhamma d Mahmud, 105 , 119 Zvobgo, Edison, 143 , 150 , 15 7

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