State of Exception in the Mediterranean: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community [1st ed.] 9783030568726, 9783030568733

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State of Exception in the Mediterranean Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community

Nikos Moudouros

State of Exception in the Mediterranean

Nikos Moudouros

State of Exception in the Mediterranean Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community

Nikos Moudouros Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies University of Cyprus Nicosia, Cyprus

ISBN 978-3-030-56872-6 ISBN 978-3-030-56873-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Asking a Turkish Cypriot friend to describe to me in as few words as possible life in the northern part of Cyprus, she replied: We live in an aquarium. And when asked why “aquarium”, her reply was equally remarkable: Because in an aquarium everything seems “orderly”, “normal” and in place, but everything is fake and artificial. What is most important though, is that “the ones inside” the aquarium, are trapped outside their natural environment. They are outcasts. What is it, therefore, that forces many Turkish Cypriots to describe their life as “trapped” and outcast? Which is the “fake and artificial” structure which attempts to impose the feeling that everything is “in order”? But furthermore, which exactly are the social dynamics that help realize the “fake and artificial”? All these questions have also been a form of motive to study the evolution of the Turkish Cypriot community in a “close space”, as the northern areas of Cyprus have been for decades. This research constitutes the most basic part of an effort to understand the relations of a small community of people with a more powerful state. But above all, it is the result of a quest for answers to this basic question: How and why a very large section of the Turkish Cypriot community managed to dispute the bounds of a state of exception and how did it contribute to the transformation of relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey? In a few words, this monograph aspires to contribute to the wider concerns over the evolution of a community in a constructed state of exception; over the margins available v

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for reaction against the hegemonic projects as well as over the consequences this reaction has on the continuous effort for normalization of the state of exception. The research conducted for the completion of this monograph, developed from the postdoctoral programme of the University of Cyprus. Working for two years as a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Cyprus, I had the chance to study a large volume of primary sources with focus on the evolution of relations between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, and through this relation, the evolution of Turkey’s influence on Cyprus. In this way the conditions were created for the writing of this book, with focus on the construction of this peculiar state of exception and the strengthening of the Turkish Cypriot opposition. For reasons of particularization of analysis, this book deals with the 1964–2004. The choice of this period is not coincidental. The year 1964 marks the era the Turkish Cypriot community was enclaved in the state of exception. On the contrary, 2004 marks the culmination of the rupture of the Turkish Cypriot majority with the state of exception, by standing in favour of the 2004 referendum for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Even though 2004 did not mark a final breakthrough in ending the partition of the island, yet in the 40-year period the book examines the characteristic of social and political evolution in states of exception. This specific period is also characteristic of the dynamic character of a “colonial type” strategy of transformation of conquered areas, but also of the diverse contradictions such a strategy carries within it. On the basis of all the aforementioned, this book attempts to describe those “voices” which had been forced to marginalization, but survived and ultimately succeeded in creating the preconditions for the ideological collapse of the state of exception. Nicosia, Cyprus

Nikos Moudouros

Acknowledgements

Even though writing a book is a solitary affair, yet the research and study required to its completion are collective processes. The same applies in this case. This book could not have been completed without the contribution of many people to whom I owe thanks. Dozens of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot friends assisted me almost throughout my research. They answered my questions and patiently listened to my comments. They provided me with knowledge and new important information. They highlighted facts, the importance of which, could not be underestimated. Wherever possible they provided me with archival material. Their perspective was of fundamental importance for the wider understanding of the Turkish Cypriot community and its relationship with Turkey. What is most important though, is that they showed a genuine interest in my endeavour. In their own way, they encouraged me to continue and they fully adopted my concerns, irrespective of agreements or disagreements. I would like to extend my thanks and gratitude to them. I also extend my deepest gratitude and most sincere thanks to all my professors and colleagues, who were either directly or indirectly present throughout this research process. They were the ones who encouraged this endeavour. Discussions with them were always constructive and helped me with the understanding of the wider theoretical framework and analytical tools. I owe sincere thanks to the anonymous reviewers, who with their valuable comments and critique helped me to a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. Many thanks also go to staff

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at Palgrave Macmillan and especially to Alina Yurova for her kindness and patience in answering all my questions during this process. Last, but certainly not least, my most sincere thanks must go to Christina. Her patience and above all her dedication to my endeavour have been the catalysts for the completion of this book, which is dedicated to Aris and Ernesto. Their presence in our life, intense at all times, “delayed” this publication in terms of time, but definitely matured it in terms of thoughts and reflections. Any responsibility for errors or omissions lies exclusively with the author.

About This Book

This book examines the evolution of the state of exception in which the Turkish Cypriot community has developed and how its relationship with Turkey has been transformed. It aims at a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances which led to the emergence of a Turkish Cypriot state of exception, as well as the procedures which led to the strengthening of resistance against its normalization. For a more comprehensive decoding of the aforementioned, this book studies the presence of Turkey in the everyday life of Turkish Cypriots in the framework of colonial politics. It examines in detail the transformation of the Cypriot space as it resulted from the pursuit for normalization of the state of exception. At the same time however, this research underlines the ways in which the Turkish Cypriot opposition hinders the normalization of the state of exception through an alternative political programme against the partition of Cyprus. Furthermore, the book aims to contribute to the broader academic research on states of exception and non-recognized state structures, through analysing the ruptures caused in the hegemonic project. The research concerns the 1964–2004 period and is mainly, but not entirely, based on a large volume of primary sources.

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Contents

1

Introduction References

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Turkey in Cyprus, the Exception and the Turkish Cypriot Opposition Defining Turkey’s Role: Taming the Landscape of War and Ostracizing Cypriotness Defining the Partition: The Construction of Exception and the Creation of Opposition References

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13 13 19 31

Claiming the Homeland in a “State of Siege” Social and Ideological Foundations of the State of Exception A Reminder of the Exceptional Status: Opposition Against Normalization The Failed Efforts to Restore the State of Exception References

37 37

Ideological Awakenings Against the “New Homeland” Towards the Construction of a “New Homeland” Division Seeks Its Divisionists

71 71 78

45 54 64

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The Political coup d’état Against the Turkish Cypriot Opposition References

84 94

The Birth of the “TRNC” and Its Contradicting Interpretations A Nationalist Dream: The Turkish Cypriot State The Road to the Declaration The Separate State Through “Left Perceptions” References

101 101 106 112 122

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Cypriotism as Anti-neoliberalism Turkey’s Neoliberal “Exports” The Turkish Cypriot Identity Against Economic Integration Nationalist Restoration and “Criminalization” of the Left References

127 127 133 141 151

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Post-Cold-War Geopolitical Quests Re-Discovering the “TRNC” Through a “Great Turkic World” The Local Nationalist Reproduction of “TRNC” as a Security Provider to Turkey References

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Alternative Geopolitical Visions The Turkish Cypriot Left Meets the Settlers? The Political Defiance of the Left and the Restoration of the Right Islanders Who “Do Not Die”: Alternative Visions Beyond Integration References

181 181

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Towards the Ideological Collapse of Partition (Taksim) The Turkish Cypriot “ Maraz” Paves the Way for Upheaval The Colonial Gaze and the Reactions of the “Indigenous” References

157 164 175

187 193 200

205 205 213 223

CONTENTS

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The Victory of the “Parallel Society” The Regime “Ate Its Halva” The Ideological Epilogue of Denkta¸s References

229 229 243 248

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Conclusions The Post-Annan Period References

253 253 269

Index

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Episode 1: Describing how May Day was celebrated during the confinement of the Turkish Cypriot community in the enclaves, veteran trade unionist Mehmet Seyis (2015) said: “In those circumstances, such events were forbidden. They were identified by the dominant nationalist ideology as ‘betrayal’. That’s why organized groups of people who wanted to celebrate May Day went to taverns, sitting in silence, dressed in black. Others gathered in houses”. Dressing in black, he adds, was a form of protest. Episode 2: On 18 July 2008, two days before the 34th anniversary of Turkey’s military invasion of Cyprus, the front page of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper New Epoch (Yeni Ça˘g ) read: “Thirty-four years ago, they came claiming they would restore constitutional order. They created a puppet administration, dependent on them. They usurped the will of the local people by transporting population, which constitutes a war crime. They looted everything in the north of the island. They reached the ultimate stage, wiping out Cypriotness through policies of conquest. Turkification has been completed. Now is the turn of Islamization. Due to Ay¸se’s endless holidays, the owner of the house is exiled. Ay¸se is now getting ready to take the property title…” (Yeni Ça˘g 2008). These two episodes seem completely unrelated. Both in terms of time and in terms of content, they are presented as two unrelated “moments”. They both, however, constitute a fundamental aspect of the Turkish Cypriot community’s evolution: the aspect of reaction against © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_1

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the prevailing relationship between the community and Turkey and the reproduction of this relationship by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite. In the first episode, the veteran trade unionist describes the existence of a form of Turkish Cypriot opposition within the enclaves of the 1964– 1974 decade in Cyprus. Seyis’s report reveals Turkish Cypriot ideological forces which under conditions of complete exclusion, “quietly” and using symbolism, declared their reaction against the evolving authoritarianism. In the second episode there is a historical continuity, but there is also a qualitative difference. Opposition against Turkey’s domination continues, but it is expressed even more “publicly”. Particular political allegations and aspirations are openly expressed. In this particular example, it is Turkey’s policy in general, referred to as “Ay¸se’s endless holidays”, which is criticized. “Ay¸se goes on holidays” was the code name of the order given for the launching of the second military invasion of Cyprus in August 1974. In this way, the newspaper denounces the tutelage regime Ankara created in Cyprus. The article criticizes the colonization policy and the attempt to impose a particular identity. At the same time, it expresses concern over the process of alienation of the Turkish Cypriots. Such political messages, although not new in the Turkish Cypriot context, were “new” to a large section of the Greek Cypriot community. At least up until 2003, when the checkpoints opened for the first time, Greek Cypriot contact with the occupied areas of Cyprus was only through the tragic memories of war and destruction (Ioannou 2020). This contact was reproduced through the narratives of Greek Cypriot refugees and memories of pre-1974 Cyprus. In this context, the absence of the Turkish Cypriot community was deafening (Anagnostopoulou 2004). The Turkish Cypriots were absent as individuals, as a community, but also as different ideological identities and political visions. This absence, in turn, led to a lack of comprehensive knowledge of both the community itself and its relationship with Turkey, as well as of the changes in area of military occupation, i.e. the northern territories of Cyprus. The “Turkish Cypriot absence” was due to many factors. One of them was the fact that the partition of the island is real on the ground, but at the same time it is ideological as well (Yashin 2012, 10). The 1974 war is a tangible reality in substance, in everyday life, in the natural environment and the landscape of Cyprus. It is a reality reproduced through mass graves, checkpoints, fortifications, military camps, bullet-ridden buildings and bombarded ruins. At the same, time partition is also “imaginary”, i.e. it produces specific ideologies. The year 1974 is for all Cypriots, Greek

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Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, simultaneously memories, nightmares, dreams, ideologies and visions (Yashin 2012, 10). This combination of the partition’s reality with the production of a specific collective consciousness and of specific identities and ideologies in Cyprus results from the dynamic character and the evolutionary course of the Cyprus problem itself. It is also a result of political, social and economic changes which the very situation of partition has caused in recent decades. These dynamic characteristics often cannot be clearly expressed in the public discourse of all those who have lived for decades with the Cyprus problem. Both in the case of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, the general description of the division of Cyprus is embodied in the concept of status quo. The Greek translation of the word refers to the “existing state of affairs”; to the current or ongoing situation. The term that prevailed in the Turkish language also refers to the current “continuing situation” (sürer durum) (Erhürman 2010a). The concept of status quo therefore holds a sense of stillness and stagnation. It mainly describes the present, the current situation. This sense of stagnation can indeed epitomize the longstanding non-resolution of the Cyprus problem. It can express the continuation of an open political problem that seeks solution. However, this concept fails to describe the dynamic consequences and transformations that territorial division produces. The status quo alone cannot express the changes that have occurred and continue to occur in Cyprus’s society precisely because of partition. An important dimension that challenges the sense of stagnation is the relationship of Turkey with the Turkish Cypriot community. This particular relationship is not of course the only element that has changed in the modern history of Cyprus. However, the changes and shifts in the Turkish Cypriot community’s relations with Ankara are of particular importance on many levels. These relations and their transformation have played a decisive part in the evolution of the Turkish Cypriot community itself. They affected not only the social structure of the Turkish Cypriots, their political system and their economic development, but also their relations with the Greek Cypriots. The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the community has significantly affected the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and their own space; that is, Cyprus. Turkey–Turkish Cypriot relations have marked the course of the Cyprus problem and the ideological and political positions expressed for its solution. Furthermore, the course of these relations has influenced transformations in the wider geopolitical field of the Eastern Mediterranean.

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The aim of this book is to understand the role Turkish Cypriots themselves played in changing their relations with Turkey. Precisely because of the complexity of these relations, this book strives to avoid a simplified approach of viewing the Turkish Cypriot community as a “homogeneous extension” of Ankara’s will in Cyprus. The imbalance of power between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots is a given. However, this specific fact alone cannot describe the importance of social dynamics and developments in the Turkish Cypriot community. This book aims to precisely address the type and forms of power exercised by Turkey over the Turkish Cypriot community. It seeks to identify the consequences and reactions this power causes. It focuses more on the “details on the ground”. In this way it seeks to understand the differentiation between the Turkish Cypriot forces working as “passive recipients” of Turkey’s policies and those forces acting centrifugally, challenging the boundaries of the division politics. The main theme of this book is, therefore, the analysis of the transformation in the relations of Turkey with the Turkish Cypriot community during the period 1964–2004, through the Turkish Cypriot opposition. It does not present the opposition as a homogeneous, undifferentiated political situation. It recognizes the internal differentiations which emerged throughout the period researched. The Turkish Cypriot opposition is, however, a specific ideological and political group of actors who have stated their disagreement with the politics of partition in different ways. The concept of opposition, therefore, mainly refers to the politically expressed reaction against the strategies of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite, which aimed to finalize the partition of Cyprus. More specifically, the Turkish Cypriot opposition, in this book, consists of different Turkish Cypriot political parties, organizations and trade unions. They are, therefore, organized groups which by their political interventions have influenced the community’s relations with Turkey. This book focuses on the period 1964–2004. This is not a random choice. Due to the 1964–1974 bi-communal clashes, the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriot community lived within enclaves, separately from the Greek Cypriot community. Hence, 1964 is of particular importance as it symbolizes the first form of territorial partition. Turkey’s military invasion in 1974 effectively began a completely new era in the history of Cyprus—a result of the war and its consequences. Since Turkey’s invasion, the Turkish Cypriot community has been shaped in a completely different environment, created through the deep and violent reshaping of the entire social, economic and political fabric of Cyprus. Therefore,

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the significant historical weight of 1974, in itself, renders it necessary to the time frame of this study. Finally, 2004 also constitutes an important political moment. The majority of the Turkish Cypriot community voted in favour of the proposed solution to the Cyprus problem in the referendum. The Turkish Cypriot YES vote in 2004 did not only constitute a form of approval to a proposed solution to the Cyprus problem; as can be seen in this book, the 2004 moment was also important as it expressed a form of ideological rejection of the social, economic and political experiences that appeared with the 1974 partition. Therefore, the time frame of this study was chosen because it is characteristic of the course of the Turkish Cypriot community under the peculiar circumstances of confinement and isolation, as well as marginalization in terms of international legality. It was precisely these peculiar conditions, under which the Turkish Cypriot opposition emerged and reshaped the community’s relations with Turkey, that constituted a kind of challenge. Hence the decoding of these conditions requires a specific theoretical framework, which is presented in the second chapter of this book. The theoretical framework is divided into two basic aspects. The first aspect concerns the analysis of Turkey’s role in Cyprus. The role and strategy that Turkey deployed in Cyprus, and especially in the Turkish Cypriot community, is reflected through a broader utilization of the concept of colonialism (Lutz 2006; Ram 2015). With the 1974 military intervention, Turkey was supposedly aiming at the restoration of constitutional order, which had been jeopardized by the preceding Greek Junta and EOKA B military coup. The intervention was, however, the springboard to a deeper transformation of the island and of the Turkish Cypriot community’s social and political structures. From 1974 onwards, Turkey sought to develop a comprehensive normalization strategy of its presence on the island through the creation of a “new homeland” (Kızılyürek 2016). Hence, in this part of the second chapter, Ankara’s policy is studied in a context which highlights the dynamic aspects and the consolidation of a hierarchical power relation with the Turkish Cypriot community (Isachenko 2012). The second aspect of Chapter 2 deals with the analysis of the Turkish Cypriot space as a state of exception (Bryant and Hatay 2011; Constantinou 2008). Both the absence of international recognition and the institutionalized interventionism in the power structures of the northern territories of Cyprus constitute the confinement of Turkish Cypriots in a state of exception (Agamben 1998, 2005). However, this particular state of exception is

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understood through the contradictory process of the effort for normalization and the emergence of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, which by its actions brings the absence of normality to the fore. Chapter 3 of this book is a kind of introduction to the study of the formation of separate power structures in the Turkish Cypriot community. This formation does not begin in 1974, but about a decade before the war. Hence, the focus of this chapter is on the enclaves (Arslan 2014; Bryant and Hatay 2011). The enclaves are treated as areas of exclusion, where the Turkish Cypriots are effectively under siege. They are analysed as areas of production of a specific political activity against the “other” community, the Greek Cypriots. This chapter analyses the process of establishment of the state of exception, the double siege of the Turkish Cypriots and the development of the dominant ideological programme (Patrick 1976). However, the enclaves are also described as fields where the dominance of the nationalist elite met with alternative forms of existence and with other notions of belonging that opposed the dominant ones. This chapter gives special weight to the analysis of the emergence of political opposition to the specific structure of relations with Turkey and to the specific ideological programme of the nationalist elite. The fourth chapter of the book centres on the first period after the Turkish invasion and particularly from 1974 to 1981. The analysis in this chapter is centred around two aspects: the first is the exit of the Turkish Cypriots from the enclaves, their resettlement in the northern areas of Cyprus and the state-building process based on Greek Cypriot properties and funding from Turkey; the second aspect concerns the political and social organization of the Turkish Cypriot community within the new order that had been created (Bryant 2014; Dodd 1993; Sonan 2014). The emergence of political parties and the trade union movement was an important expression of the new dynamics. This chapter analyses the social and political relations, the social problems and the disillusionment of part of the Turkish Cypriot community when expectations did not match reality (Yashin 2005, 2009). The new dynamics culminated in the 1981 elections, during which the Turkish Cypriot opposition managed, for the first time, to create prospects for a new government. These prospects were finally challenged by the external intervention of Ankara, which prevented the formation of a government by the opposition forces. Chapter 5 deals with the proclamation of the TRNC in 1983. The creation of the secessionist state is described through the complex framework created by the different perceptions of the Turkish Cypriot

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community around the prospect of a second state in Cyprus (Billuro˘glu 2012). Thus the TRNC is analysed through the confrontational ideological frame of the Turkish Cypriot Right and Left and the different content given by the different sections of the community to concepts such as independence, the state or the right to self-determination. At the same time, the proclamation of the TRNC is examined in this chapter within the historical and political context of the time. In this way it is viewed as a dynamic evolution and not as a static element (Ça˘gda 2015; Kızılyürek 2002). This chapter therefore seeks to highlight the social and political impact of the particular period on the Turkish Cypriot community itself, as well as uncover the expectations nourished regarding the prospects of a separate Turkish Cypriot state on the island. The central theme of the sixth chapter is Turkey’s attempt at a neoliberal transformation of the occupied areas. The deep changes that took place in Turkey as a result of the 1980 military coup were gradually “introduced” in the Turkish Cypriot community and constitute the framework of important social and political shifts (Bozkurt 2016). This chapter studies the impact of the alliance between the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot elites, on the basis of a neoliberal programme (Gülalp 1993; Yalman 1997). The opposition alliance is then analysed. This alliance was based on the promotion of Cypriotness and the need for independence and autonomy of the Cypriot identity as a form of defence against neoliberal reforms. Finally, the chapter focuses on the forms of ideological marginalization of the Turkish Cypriot Left and the consequences of the rise of authoritarianism in the pursuit of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. Chapter 7 concerns the new conditions shaped by the post-Cold War era. The first part of the chapter describes the consequences of the Cold War on Ankara’s geopolitical vision, as well as the new dynamics created in relation to the position of the Turkish Cypriot community in Turkey’s foreign policy (Kaliber 2009; Kazan 2002). Through this new network of dynamics, the discovery of a “new TRNC” is described. The second part of the chapter presents the evolution of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite on the basis of the post-Cold War geopolitical vision of Turkey. In particular, it analyses the evolution of the ideological legitimization of the new role of the TRNC by the Turkish Cypriot forces that adopted the approach of Ankara in the context of the new era.

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Chapter 8 precisely analyses the reactions caused by the discovery of a “new TRNC”. A key issue of the shifts in the Turkish Cypriot community was the pursuit of enlarged political alliances by the opposition, as a method of dealing with the reinforced inclinations for the annexation of the occupied areas to Turkey (Sonan 2014; Mehmetçik 2008). This chapter analyses both the framework of the new opposition alliances and the new forms of political mobilization, such as civil disobedience. Furthermore, the catalytic consequences of ideological polarization, which prevailed throughout the 1990s, are also presented (Kızılyürek 2005). As analysed in this chapter, the marking moment of polarization in this period was the activation of far-right paramilitary organizations and the assassination of Kutlu Adalı. Chapter 9 analyses the gradual culmination of the ideological delegitimization of the secessionist state through the impact of the economic crisis and the organization of the opposition (Isachenko 2012; Lacher and Kaymak 2005). Special reference is made to the way Turkey has dealt with the crisis, as well as to the efforts for the introduction of a new “rationalism” and mechanisms to discipline the Turkish Cypriots (Balkır and Yalman 2009). However, the new facts created led to the creation of a broader opposition front, which decisively influenced the majority of the community. This chapter, therefore, describes the creation of the platform “This Country is Ours” and the key political direction of the opposition. The main body of the book ends with Chapter 10, which focuses on the peak moment of the social movement of the Turkish Cypriot opposition (Hatay and Bryant 2008; Tarrow 2011). This chapter describes the interconnection of the political demands of the opposition with the submission of the Annan Plan by the United Nations (Bahçeli and Noel 2009). The analysis concerns both the forms of evolution of the pro-solution Turkish Cypriot movement in the 2004 referenda and the subversive pressures created by the social movement against the nationalist elite. The epicentre of this chapter is ultimately the construction of a new hegemony in the Turkish Cypriot community, which questioned in a comprehensive manner the ideology of partition in Cyprus. Finally, the concluding chapter seeks to review the impact of the peak moment of the Turkish Cypriot opposition in conjunction with the failure to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem in 2004. The conclusions highlight the importance of the emergence and the gradual strengthening of the opposition in the partitioned landscape of Cyprus, while

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at the same time emphasizing the main impasses created in the post2004 period (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012). The analysis concerns firstly the transformation of Ankara’s approach to the situation of the Turkish Cypriot community and secondly the pursuit by the Turkish Cypriot prosolution forces of comprehensive change based on the dynamics which had emerged in the previous period (Erhürman 2010a, b; Hatay and Bryant 2011). The interconnection of these aspects and the transformation of the Turkish Cypriot opposition itself finally led to the following dynamics: the emergence of a new effort to normalize the state of exception and the partition of the island; the tension of uncertainty that marks the everyday life of the Turkish Cypriot community; and a change in aspects of opposition political demands, which place special weight on the emergence of autonomy from both Turkey and the Greek Cypriot community.

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Kazan, I¸sıl. 2002. “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, Seen from Turkey.” In The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union, edited by Thomas Diez, 54–69. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2002. Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs [Cyprus in the Grip of ˙ ˙ sim Yayınları. Nationalism]. Istanbul: Ileti¸ ———. 2005. Birle¸sik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti. Do˘gmamı¸s bir devletin tarihi [United ˙ ˙ sim Cyprus Republic: The History of an Unborn State]. Istanbul: Ileti¸ Yayınları. ———. 2016. Bir Hınç ve Siddet ¸ Tarihi. Kıbrıs’ta Statü Kavgası ve Etnik Çatı¸sma [A History of Revenge and Violence: The Fight for Status and Ethnic ˙ ˙ Conflict in Cyprus]. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. Lacher, Hannes, and Erol Kaymak. 2005. “Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-settlement in North Cyprus.” Mediterranean Politics 10 (2): 157–166. Lutz, Catherine. 2006. “Empire Is in the Details.” American Ethnologist 33 (4): 593–611. Mehmetçik, Mustafa Semih. 2008. “1974 sonrası Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik arayı¸sı ve siyasalla¸sma süreci” [The Turkish Cypriot Search for Identity after 1974 and the Politization Period]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by Mehmet ˙ Hasgüler, 146–222. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. Patrick, Richard A. 1976. Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963– 1971. Waterloo: Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies Publication. Ram, Moriel. 2015. “Colonial Conquest and the Politics of Normalization: The Case of Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus.” Political Geography 47: 21–32. Seyis, Mehmet, interview by Kanal Sim. 2015. Mehmet Seyis 1 Mayıs Belgeseli 2015 [1 May Documentary], May 5. http://www.kanalsim.com/video-izle/ 474/. Sonan, Sertaç. 2014. In the Grip of Political Clientelism: The Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Politics and the Politico-Economic Foundations of Pro-Taksim Consensus. Essen, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences University of Essen. Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Yalman, Galip. 1997. Bourgeoisie and the State: Changing Forms of Interest Representation within the Context of the Economic Crises and Structural Adjustment: Turkey during the 1980s. Manchester: Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, Manchester School of Social Sciences. Yashin, Yael Navaro. 2005. “Confinement and the Imagination: Sovereignty and Subjectivity in a Quasi State.” In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 103–119. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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———. 2009. “Affective Spaces, Melancholic Objects: Ruination and the Production of Anthropological Knowledge.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15: 1–18. ———. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Yeni Ça˘g . 2008. “Ay¸se hala tatilde” [Ayshe Is Still on Holiday], July 18.

CHAPTER 2

Turkey in Cyprus, the Exception and the Turkish Cypriot Opposition

Defining Turkey’s Role: Taming the Landscape of War and Ostracizing Cypriotness “The Turkish Armed Forces have begun their operation to Cyprus… In this way, we believe we provide great service to humanity and peace… We are going to the island not for war but for peace, not only for the Turkish Cypriots, but the Greek Cypriots as well…” (Ecevit 2011, 57). These statements were made by Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey, on 20 July 1974, only moments after the launching of the military invasion of Cyprus. Turkey decided to militarily intervene on the island, supposedly in order to restore the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus, defied by the Greek Junta and EOKA B military coup against President Makarios. The coup aimed at the union (Enosis ) of Cyprus with Greece, a development that subverted the constitutional order. This constituted an aspect of the legitimization that Ankara aimed to give to the military invasion. In fact, with his second statement after the completion of the Turkish military landing in Cyprus, Ecevit stated that: “The Turkish Armed Forces are in Cyprus for peace and not for war. They are not in Cyprus in order to invade, but in order to halt a brutal invasion… The recent Greek operation has not just been a coup to topple the government. It has been an operation aiming at the total destruction of the independent Cypriot state, an operation that violated those agreements which constitute the legal basis of the Republic of Cyprus” (Ecevit 2011, 57). © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_2

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These statements by the Turkish Prime Minister, are extremely significant at the time and in the context in which they were made. However, the content of the specific statements, combined with the experience of the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in the decades which followed, constituted an “explosive mixture”, clarifying the practical role of Turkey’s presence in Cyprus. The Turkish state activated aspects of “imperial” politics. Both through the military invasion and its subsequent presence in Cyprus’s occupied territories, Turkey has sought to legitimize itself as a force serving justice and peace. The specific “imperial moment” sought to transform Turkey into a conflict resolution force. It is not at all coincidental that the whole military operation was promoted as the “Cyprus Peace Operation” (Mutlu Barı¸s Harekatı). At the same time, however, the activation of military force in Cyprus was characterized by ideological references to “just war” (bellum justum) (Hardt and Negri 2000, 12). The concept of “just war” was based mainly on the perception that a state threatened with attack has the right to wage war. War is therefore glorified as a moral tool (Hardt and Negri 2000, 37–8). However, the aforementioned has not been the only aspect of the Turkish invasion and its ideology. The activation of military force was also the result of a specific geopolitical “gaze” by Ankara, which had for decades considered Cyprus as an area of potential threats. Particularly since the 1950s, the island had been transformed into one of the structural parts of an “encirclement syndrome” in Ankara’s geopolitical dogma. The Cypriot version of the “encirclement syndrome” was based on the following hypothesis: the transition of Cyprus to the sphere of influence of Greece, which retains its sovereignty over the Aegean islands, will mean the entirely “Greek” and thus “hostile” encirclement of Turkish shores. Ever since the 1955 London Conference on Cyprus, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rü¸stü Zorlu had stressed the importance of Cyprus for Turkey’s defence, particularly as Greece had full control of the Aegean islands (Esenbel 1993, 30–1). Cyprus’s geographical proximity to Anatolia has long been interpreted in a framework of production of the Cypriot geopolitical space on two axes. The first one is that, under certain circumstances, the island could turn into a threat for Turkey. The second one is the depiction of Cyprus as a geographical extension of Anatolia (Özkan 2015, 552) and therefore as an indivisible part of the national security policy of Turkey (Kaliber 2005, 325). In short, the Cypriot version of the “encirclement syndrome” transformed the issue of the “outside Turks”—that is, the supposed protection of

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the Turkish Cypriots—as the basis on which a very powerful aspect of Turkey’s national security developed (Uzer 2011, 83–4). The threat faced by the “outside Turks” confirmed the danger to the security of the “inside Turks” from a potential hostile encirclement. As a result, the coup and the goal of uniting Cyprus with Greece immediately multiplied the fears generated by the encirclement syndrome. If, in the popular Jewish song, the invasion and conquest of the Golan Heights by Israel were reflected as a victory “against the mountain which had been transformed into a monster” (Ram 2015, 24), the paraphrased adaptation of the concept in the case of Cyprus would depict Turkey’s military invasion as a “victory over the island which was transformed into a monster”. For many decades, Cyprus had been constructed as a spatial threat to Turkey’s national security; a space—“little monster”—where if the parexcellence national enemy (Greece) prevailed, then Turkey would face an existential danger. However, Ankara did not restrict itself to the “elimination of the threat”. The intervention and military dominance were followed by a deliberate strategy of transforming the spatial threat into an empty “virgin land” (Ram 2015, 28) on which a completely new order would be built. Therefore, Turkey’s presence in Cyprus after 1974 cannot be analysed solely in the context of occupying power. This book attempts to enrich the notion of occupying power to include the colonization processes carried out in the occupied areas of Cyprus. Colonization is viewed as a form of governmentality by which the colonial power attempts to govern the colonized population and control resources of the area (Shafir 1989). Turkey, through a colonial type of strategy, has not only activated military power. It has sought to normalize territorial partition and, in this sense, to normalize its presence. The concept of occupation is therefore a complex analytical category. It is not a static phenomenon. It has at its disposal a group of precarious “technologies” and power practices (Ophir et al. 2009, 17). Right after the military invasion, Ankara proceeded to the “construction” of the territory of Northern Cyprus. It created a whole new political and economic system. It built an area—a colony—which ontologically existed pursuant to dependence on Turkey. The dependence of the occupied area is the essential characteristic of the “colony” as a subset of a stronger authority (Stoler 2018, 48). The particular processes of constructing and normalizing the occupied area of Cyprus entailed a set of complex economic,

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political and social strategies (Ophir et al. 2009, 23–4) to pacify the wartime scenery that had preceded them. The effort to convert the northern territories of Cyprus into “normal Turkish territory” included procedures of defining “borders”, checkpoints, creating a specific economic model and an integrated political and administrative system, as well as settler colonization policies. Turkey sought to create a “new homeland” where the Turkish Cypriot community would develop in the decades to come. The “new homeland” as a product of political strategy should be distinguished by “perfection” (Lefebvre 1992, 281); that is, unity and homogenization of society. Thus, through these dynamics, the occupied areas were converted into a domain that was under the supervision of Ankara as a “Turkish province” (Hatay and Bryant 2011, 17). Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güne¸s, referring to the Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, told Turkish Cypriot trade unionists who had visited him in 1974: “I have a governor there” (Vali) (Tahsin 1993, 69). Thus, 1974 was, among other things, the moment when Cyprus, and especially its northern territories, ceased to be definitively perceived as “another country” (Mutluyakali 2019) by a very large section of the political system in Ankara. The invasion and subsequent creation of separate power structures was a turning point that added or even reinforced pre-existing elements of the “motherland–babyland” relationship (Anavatan –Yavru vatan). The concept of “motherland–babyland” had been one of the most dominant ideological shells of the political position for the partition of Cyprus (Taksim) and had been comprehensively expressed since the 1950s (Özkan 2015, 559). Furthermore, this phrase described the relationship claimed by Turkey in relation to the Turkish Cypriot community. The connotation was crystal clear: Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot community in particular, are under the auspices and tutelage of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has a kind of “parental right” and protection obligation to the Turkish Cypriot community. This phrase denotes a structural inequality. Turkish Cypriots are seen as neither equal nor “adults” in their relationship with Turkey (Bora 2017, 115). Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots should not be Cypriots in this relationship, either. Therefore, the elements of the “motherland–babyland” relationship concerned both the material and ideological levels of relations between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. This book engages in an effort to study the consequences of this relationship with the Turkish Cypriot community, particularly post 1974.

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In this context, the military invasion seemed to be initially victorious in its aim of partition of Cyprus. At the same time, however, 1974 released dynamics that led to the concretization of hierarchy between “motherland” and “babyland” through politics, economy and security (Lake 2008, 284). The concretization of inequality between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community was based on the very construction of “dominion” over the occupied area. The dynamic of the military occupation of an area and the creation of a particular territory are actions “fetishizing” power (Murphy 1996, 90). They are actions that from the outset include inequality as an ontological element. The core state seeks to immediately control and administer the integration process of the periphery. Such an effort for domination implies that the core state is economically, politically and technologically stronger than the periphery. Therefore, it can regulate the orientations of the periphery, impose policies and ensure exploitation (Ayyash 1981, 114). In the mid-1990s, Ümit Özda˘g, then assistant professor and later one of the most prominent members of the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), described the ontological dimension of the inequality created by the 1974 invasion as follows: “In Turkey–TRNC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] relations, Turkey is the active player. The TRNC is passive. This is the political relationship between the two countries. Turkey, after all, has the right of enforcement” (Yeni Düzen 1996). However, the clarification of the content of “motherland–babyland” in a ruler–subordinate relationship did not exclusively and solely concern the post-1974 structural and material reality on the ground. As mentioned earlier, inequality was also expressed in the ideological shaping of Turkey’s relationship with the Turkish Cypriot community. In the Turkish nationalist vision, the Turkish Cypriot community was “provincial and rural”. It has always been suspicious because it is in the vicinity of the “national enemy”. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots have been considered as historically “vulnerable” to impurity, mixture, inhomogeneity and cultural pluralism (Bora 2017, 116). Their proximity to the Greek Cypriot community has been in itself a kind of “national danger” that reproduced the need for vigilance and continuous “safeguarding from the threat of impurity” (Bora 2017, 116). At the same time that Turkish nationalism considered the Turkish Cypriot community as part of the “outside Turks”, it was also concerned about the prospect of treason, because of the trend of coexistence with Greek Cypriots. Turkish nationalism was ultimately suspicious of the

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quality of Turkishness of “its nationals” in the periphery. It constantly felt the need to clarify the content and reproduce the ideological and civilizational borders of the local population (Stoler and Cooper 1997, 5), namely the Turkish Cypriots. Since in the context of Turkish nationalism, Turkish Cypriots constituted nothing more than a “branch” of the wider Turkish nation (Bora 2017, 114), the political expression of their diversity was interpreted as intention for severance from the national body and therefore an act of treason. The politicized expression of Cypriotness was disturbing and dangerous to the nationalist edifice, since it highlighted two elements: first, Cypriotness debased the components of Turkishness; second, it implied a claim for coexistence with the Greek Cypriots (Papadakis 2005, 116). The possibility of the emergence of dissidents represented at the same time the prospect of political contestation of the righteousness of “imperial intervention”. Therefore, Turkey was forced to create a defence system against centrifugal forces—a system that could either absorb or annul the politicization of dissidents. The activation of military power, political and physical violence, repression and authoritarianism would not have been the only features of the occupation power system (Ophir et al. 2009, 17). Efforts to reduce the prospect of Turkish Cypriot reactions, or even the suppression of opposition, were needs that led to the activation of other operational functions of the occupation system. Concealment of inequalities and exploitation and alienation of the Turkish Cypriot community were some of the goals of the “sophisticated policies” that emerged, aiming at social control and assimilation of reaction. A typical example of the sophisticated approach was the creation of a vast system of mechanisms to prevent radicalization of the opposition. Welfare mechanisms, privileged distribution of resources of economic profitability, as well as public sector positions, acted as political “breakwaters” (Tu˘gyan 2019a), fending off possible opposition dynamics. They created a tier of local shareholders, who, at critical times, would have the role of suppressing opposition reactions. The effort to legitimize secession inside the Turkish Cypriot community, seems to have initially worked because of the “freedom and peace” rhetoric. This rhetoric kept bringing back memories for the Turkish Cypriots of the tragic 1960s (Yashin 2005, 118). However, just like in other cases of illegal entities and exceptional regimes (Caspersen, 2012, 83–4), the procedure of acquiring internal legitimacy has not been without problems. As analysed later in the book, the attempt to create a

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consensus was inconsistent and did not prevent the feeling of entrapment and alienation on the part of Turkish Cypriots. As early as the late 1980s, Alpay Durduran (one of the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot Left), criticizing the tendencies of acceptance of the partitionist order by a section of the Turkish Cypriot community, described the main contradiction in the efforts of the occupying power to create consensus as follows: “Indeed, we cannot say that we are suffering, for our prison has all the amenities of a three-star hotel; for we live in an open prison” (Yeni Düzen 1989).

Defining the Partition: The Construction of Exception and the Creation of Opposition “What is the TRNC? It is the total silence in four words… It is what has been established by force at a time of a coup in Turkey; it is what we learnt only when we asked those who had raised their hands and approved its establishment… What is the TRNC?… It is the reminder of the necessity for all of us to find a way out; it is the declaration of our disappearance if we do not assume our responsibilities”. This excerpt was written by lawyer and activist Tacan Reynar (2018) on the occasion of the anniversary of the TRNC declaration of independence in 2018. The censorious descriptions of the northern territories of Cyprus and the political structures that emerged post 1974 either as an “open prison” or as a “declaration of disappearance” of the Turkish Cypriots are not the only ones recorded in the public space. They are, however, indicative of the awareness of the negative consequences of the construction of a “new homeland” for the Turkish Cypriot community. Therefore, such censorious approaches create the necessity for a more detailed recording of the characteristics acquired by the northern territories of Cyprus post 1974. The colonialist elements of Turkey’s policy since the invasion have contributed to the Turkish Cypriot community being trapped in a state of exception. As Nasser Hussain (2003, 19) underlines, colonialism is the best historical example for the study of norm and exception. The state of exception and the concept of rule of law in a dialectic relationship were used and applied in colonies, both for suppression and oppression, as well as for normalization and development of colonialist capitalism (Shenhav and Berda 2009, 345). Therefore, in this book, the space in which the Turkish Cypriot community lives and develops, post 1974, is treated as a state of exception.

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According to Carl Schmitt (2006, 5), the sovereign is “he who decides on the exception”. The locus for this decision is ultimately the state itself. It is with this phrase that Schmitt defines the content of sovereignty in his book Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. The constituent element of this exceptional situation is the unlimited jurisdiction for suspension of the entire existing order. The state itself continues to exist, while the law is marginalized (Stratilatis 2016, 56–7). However, the decision of the sovereign for exception could also be studied as a logic beyond the specific state framework. For Giorgio Agamben (2000), the state is one of the structures through which the sovereign’s decision can be expressed. The power of the sovereign is the ability to declare the exceptional in different structures and orders. The importance of the shift of Agamben’s quests in relation to Schmitt lies in the focusing of sovereign power on a multitude of political structures, such as states, nonstate actors, the locus between states or even supra-state organizations (Biswas and Nair 2010, 5). As Agamben (2000, 40) himself points out, the “camp” is the most comprehensive expression of exception and exclusion. It is the locus where the state of exception asserts to achieve a permanent suspension of the law and to have a permanent spatial dimension. Consequently, in the same framework, different power entities that resemble states, act as states and have state functions, but that are in the margins of international law, could be studied. Enclaves, protectorates, secessionist entities and autonomous territories without international recognition are structures of power not recognized by existing international law (see Bryant 2014). Such areas are outside international political structures, are excluded and “outside” international law (Bryant 2014, 125–6). In many cases they exist and operate as “colonies”. The concept of “colony” in this case indicates a political space that has many common characteristics with enclaves, fenced landscapes and enclosed camps. It is a concept that refers to areas of entrapment and total dependence (Stoler 2018, 47–8); that is, areas with characteristics of exclusion from the outside environment and seclusion from the inside. One such case of this double siege are the illegal political structures and the territory in which the Turkish Cypriots have lived and developed for decades. The logic behind the creation of the General Committee (Genel Komite) and the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration (Geçici Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi) in the mid-1960s, when the Turkish Cypriots lived secluded in enclaves, was ideologically legitimized as the creation of

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temporary–transitional structures in a state of emergency. These were the two most important separate power structures in the Turkish Cypriot community in the decade 1964–1974. The “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devlet —“TFSC”), created in February 1975 (Constantinou 2008, 158), was also a kind of transitional structure. The unilateral declaration of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti—“TRNC”) in 1983 had been presented as a political act in response to the alienation of the Turkish Cypriot community from the Republic of Cyprus since 1963 (KKTC Anayasası n.d. (a), 12) and therefore as an answer to the state of exception. Furthermore, the fact that the “TRNC” was considered illegal by the UN Security Council is evidence that also verifies the state of exception (Constantinou 2008, 158). In addition to being identified as a secessionist entity outside international law, the power structure in the Turkish Cypriot community was also characterized by deep dependence caused by Ankara’s political interventions, as well as its funding of many of the “TRNC”’s functions. All of the above features are reflected in the concept of subordinate local administration used by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR 1996, 17) in the case of the Loizidou v. Turkey 1996 ruling holding Turkey as responsible since it exercises effective overall control over Northern Cyprus. The very constitution of the “TRNC” allows and secures Ankara’s intervention in the community’s internal affairs, either through the direct control of institutions (e.g. police and army) or through the creation of other institutions where non-elected Turkish state officials exert decisive influence. The so-called State Security Council (Cumhuriyet Güvenlik Kurulu) (KKTC Anayasası n.d. (b), 54) is a characteristic example. Provisional article 10 of the Constitution ensures that control of the “TRNC”’s internal and external security is the responsibility of the Turkish state. This particular article suspends the implementation of article 117, which regulates the creation of the Turkish Cypriot army (KKTC Anayasası n.d. (c), 78) and in this way reproduces Ankara’s influence, since all bodies such as the army, the police and the fire brigade are under the control of the Turkish Armed Forces. Further to that guaranteed by the Constitution, the presence and control of Turkey are multiplied and extended through the budget and different economic agreements. This is the route through which Turkey introduces “itself” to its “customer”. In reply to grievances and criticism by the Turkish Cypriots about injustices and lack of planning, just two

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years after the military invasion, Rauf Denkta¸s would say: “There is exaggeration. You have to accept that we are not in a normal situation. Thus it is a transitional period… We had been an administration in a war situation and could not afford to think of anything else. In such a situation we left the economic affairs to Turkey and we could do nothing more, but accept the model that came from Turkey…” (Birand 1976). As mentioned above, the Turkish Cypriot community is studied in this research as a community that lives and develops in a state of exception. It should be noted that this is not the only attempt to understand aspects of the history of Cyprus and the Cyprus problem through this particular analytical framework. The scientific works of Costas Constantinou (2008), Nicos Trimikliniotis (2018), Yael Navaro Yashin (2012), Daria Isachenko (2012), Bryant and Hatay (2011), Kudret Özersay (2004), as well as of Emilianides, Papastylianou and Stratilatis (2016), constitute very important contributions. In different ways, these scientific pursuits analyse aspects of the Cyprus problem, the Republic of Cyprus, and the evolution of relations between the two communities through the problematic situation emerging from the state of exception or the law of necessity. The element that this study aims to add is the analysis of the transformation of relations between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, precisely through the production of Turkish Cypriot opposition dynamics within this peculiar state of exception. The 1964–1974 enclaves and the northern territories of Cyprus from 1974 to 2004 are treated in this book as spaces where the Turkish community had been besieged, secluded and alienated. They are studied as places producing contradictions and conflicts. They are approached as spaces that have emerged through different forms of violence, clashes and states of emergency. Therefore, these politically and ideologically defined spaces constitute important aspects of the territorial and political partition of the two communities. However, in this book, the development of the Turkish Cypriot community, particularly after the 1974 invasion, is examined with primary focus on the emergence and reinforcement of alternative forms of activities that were contrary and politically opposed to the dominant concept of nationalism. The particular focus of this study is to attempt to examine the Turkish Cypriot locus as a “space of denial” (Jones 2012, 687); an area where hegemonic perception is confronted with the reinforcement of an alternative perception of Cyprus as a whole, beyond partition, but also with a Cypriot identity through the cultural pluralism of Cypriots.

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Therefore, the Turkish Cypriot state of exception and the partition of Cyprus, through this particular work, have a dynamic and fluid character. It is precisely through the particular fluidity of the construction of secessionist and illegal power structures that the Turkish Cypriot opposition’s evolution against the partition of the island emerges more fully. After all, elements of dynamic development and liquidity are characteristic of both legitimate and illegal power structures. Both sovereignty and states of exception are not phenomena of an instantaneous declaration. They are complex processes through time, in specific areas. They are processes which go through negotiating, questioning, resisting and the mediation of many actors (Yashin 2012, 43). In the same way a state seeks to politically specify its borders and to ethnically homogenize society, so can a secessionist entity or a state of exception promote similar goals. In both cases there are procedures of “self-confirmation”. The state becomes a state not only through the specific territorial area but also through the institutionalization of the particular area, through practices that differentiate and characterize the area in question (Isachenko 2012, 67–8). Analysing the concept of “governmentality”, Michel Foucault (1991, 103) underlined the importance government tactics have in determining what lies within the competence of a state and what does not. A state, or a particular power structure resembling a state, can be understood as a phenomenon that constantly seeks selfassertion and survival. As Yael Navaro Yashin (2006, 291) aptly notes, in terms of Foucault’s theoretical pursuits, the post-1974 Turkish Cypriot power structures have elements that resemble normal, recognized states. The Turkish Cypriot leadership made sure to attach the characteristics and practices of normal states to the administrative and political institutions. The “TFSC” in 1975, but even more the “TRNC” in 1983, “copied” many of the functions and institutions of Britain, the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey (Yashin 2006, 282). The “TRNC” may surprise, even if superficially, its visitors because of the “normality” in which it operates (Wall 2018, 6). It gives the impression of a normal state, acting as if it were a state just like all other states recognized by international law. In this sense, the secessionist state reaffirms the perception which underlines that exception is not completely outside the law. On the contrary, it is incorporated into the very structure of the rule of law, thereby creating fundamental contradictions in the production of sovereign power (Agamben 2005a, 23). In the state of exception, justice is marginalized, having previously secured some relation with the rule of law.

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At this point, the attempt to relatively normalize the state of exception arises. It is a fact that the 1974 war and the partition of Cyprus brought nightmarish experiences for all Cypriots. However, through the traumas and nightmares of war, life continued on both sides of the buffer zone. The “continuation of life” in the Turkish Cypriot community was also marked by the creation of illegal power structures, such as the “TFSC” and the “TRNC” (Ekici 2019, vii). The political system created by the occupation was designed in a way that sought to ensure an “intact” and “untouched” life. It was designed with the aim of imposing a sense of continuity of a normal—as much as possible—life for the people within the occupied area (Ben-Naftali et al. 2009, 31). The northern territories of Cyprus and more specifically the “TRNC”, are the creation of a war. It is a political locus that is not real, that “does not exist” (BBC 2005), as far as international law is concerned. It is illegal, but it continues to function. It is materialized on the ground, but also constructed at the level of ideology (Yashin 2012, 28). The “TRNC”, as a political structure, functions “completely outside science and logic” (Erhürman 2010, 108); that is, outside the known economic and societal rules. These characteristics often force the secessionist power structure to be framed by neglect and constituted as an “outcast” (Ekici 2019, 6). At this particular point, strong contradictions arise. On the one hand, the political system created after the war sought to be normalized. It sought to create dynamics of normalization through the “TRNC”’s identifiable state functions. At the same time, however, those were also the characteristics that clashed with the “exceptional status” of the political system. Any measurable and tangible functions of the “TRNC”, had historically been in constant tension with Turkey’s control and interventions (Yashin 2006, 291). The absence of international recognition of the “TRNC” in combination with Turkey’s tutelage status, were factors that prevented the state-building process from acquiring substantial features (Caspersen 2012, 76). Apart from characteristics of ghettoization, the particular state-building process placed the community in a liminal situation (Bryant 2014). Liminality is the framework of an uncompleted transition; the long-term entrapment in the midst of an illegal state of affairs that has not transitioned to another legal state of affairs. The life of the Turkish Cypriot community has for decades been a life on the threshold of international law and legality. It is a life characterized mainly by uncertainty and ambiguity (see Bryant 2014).

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According to the nationalist political programme, the partition of Cyprus helped secure Turkish Cypriots’ separate right of selfdetermination. They guaranteed the existence of Turkish Cypriots as a separate people in Cyprus. This was the basis on which the assertion that the invasion “liberated” the community was developed (Ekici 2019, 30). However, if the partition and the subsequent state-building process symbolized a kind of sovereignty and vindication for the nationalist front, for another great part of the Turkish Cypriot community it gradually came to symbolize its political and economic suffocation and social entrapment (Yashin 2005, 110). In this way the case of Cyprus proved that the political phenomenon of partition ultimately had complex consequences for the people and their socio-economic structure (Waterman 1984, 105). These consequences were, in fact, very pronounced. With the outbreak of bi-communal violence towards the end of 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community was transformed into a “community outside the state”. However, since 1974 and especially after the declaration of the TRNC in 1983, the community started to experience its “political disappearance”. The secessionist state not only failed to support the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot identity and the subjectivization of the Turkish Cypriots, but it also further marginalized and entrapped them (Kızılyürek 2018, 14). From 1964 onwards, the development of the community was surrounded by “bare life” characteristics within the state of exception. As Agamben underlines, one of the most important functions of sovereign power is the distinction between zoe and bios (Agamben 1998, 83). Bios is the politically defined way of life, characterized by rights. On the contrary, life is transformed, in the state of exception, to “bare life”, because it is essentially bare of its legal status and fundamental human rights (Agamben 2000, 40). In the case of Cyprus, therefore, the political ostracism of the Turkish Cypriot community, caused by partition, dictated the questioning of the characteristics of Turkish Cypriots as historical subjects. It dictated the questioning of their constitutional subject status, their rights and their obligations (Kızılyürek 2018, 14). The questioning of subjectivization in Cyprus history led a large section of the Turkish Cypriot community to live and develop under conditions of “exile”. The concept of exile symbolizes living in a “foreign land” (Schlink 2017, 7), where conditions and basic rules are determined by others. Life in exile is alienation; a life where the concept of homeland is lost. “Are you a real Cypriot or are you Turkish Cypriot?” This

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was the vexing question journalist Tümay Tu˘gyan (2019b), was asked; a question that forced her to reflect and describe the alienated life of a section of the community: “Even if estimated that our roots in Cyprus date back to 1571, after 450 years we are still strangers in our country. We are alone, squeezed between the south and the national shirt they have dressed the north with… The gravest consequence we have paid by the so-called ‘peace’ the war brought us, is that we have ended up homeless”. However, why does a quite large section of the Turkish Cypriots feel “homeless”? Why should a person that has not been forced to “geographically” abandon their homeland still feel that they live in exile? Why, for example, during the 2003 protests for a solution to the Cyprus problem, did demonstrators use slogans such as “I want my country back” (Yeni Düzen 2003)? Which was really the “country”, the “homeland” that this section of the Turkish Cypriot community felt they were losing? The answer lies in the power relations that developed in the northern territories of Cyprus. It lies in the dynamics of the tutelage imposed by Ankara and alienation, which reproduces the feeling of exile and displacement (Kizilyürek 2017). Therefore, at this point, the concept of “exile” is not used in a literal or spatial sense. It is used as a description of specific power relations that impose changes in conditions and rule without the active role of the subject. The process of change that leads to exile and alienation is not a natural and spontaneous process. On the contrary, it is a political process, a conscious strategy developed by others. The resulting alienation appears in a context that has already radically changed through the intervention ˙ of “foreigners” (Schlink 2017, 13). Ümit Inatçı (2008, 43) underlines the following transformation of Turkish Cypriot existence: “We lived as citizens of a common homeland, by the side of the other community, as the second largest community and responsible partner. Now, we live as ‘coastal trash’ of a larger nation”. With the consolidation of partition, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves “not considered” even for issues which directly concerned them. They were transformed into a community directly dependent on Turkish authorities (Kızılyürek 2018, 15). Thus, the peculiar state-building, was, for a very large section of the Turkish Cypriot community, the ultimate symbolism of their severance from the world. The TRNC emerged through a process of marginalization of Turkish Cypriot will. Instead of strengthening it, it ultimately challenged the claim for autonomous administration. Activating the concept of “seditious state” elaborated by Constantinou (2004, 6), it could be

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argued that, post 1974, the Turkish Cypriot power structure functioned in a “seditious” manner against earlier and different organized forms of authority and political will of the community. The Turkish Cypriot experience of separate state-building ultimately consists of a process of multiple and contradictory exceptions. This experience is at the same time an ongoing organic crisis. As pointed out earlier, the Turkish Cypriot exception regime tends to perpetuate its existence through a process of normalization. But at the same time, there are malfunctions that undermine its existence (Trimikliniotis 2010, 210). A key example of undermining the existence of the state of exception and contesting its sovereignty is the Turkish Cypriot opposition itself, because this opposition is a specific dynamic that constantly brings to the forefront the extraordinary and abnormal nature of the political system of partition. This dynamic is the key component of the present study. The Turkish Cypriot opposition is not a homogeneous political body. It consists of different political parties of the broader Centre-left. The key but not the only examples this study deals with are the Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi—CTP ) and the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtulu¸s Partisi—TKP ). The Turkish Cypriot opposition also consists of different trade and professional unions and civil society organizations. These Turkish Cypriot parties, organizations and bodies are characterized by their differences and disagreements. However, their particular heterogeneity does not seem to have created obstacles to the formation of political alliances against the partition of Cyprus and in favour of a federal settlement of the Cyprus problem. It is precisely here that the significance of Turkish Cypriot opposition is pinpointed. During the 1974–2004 period, which constitutes the main timeframe of this study, Turkish Cypriot opposition forces were actively working against the nationalist partition programme and Denktash power circles and promoted, to one degree or another, the position of a federal solution to the political problem. The existence and strengthening of the Turkish Cypriot opposition forces, as a main issue of the present research, shows the gaps that exist within exception regimes. It shows rifts in the hegemony, through which the policies of the partition system can be eventually challenged. The history of colonialism, as well as the evolution of neo-colonialism, shows that the colonial power wished to export its own law to the occupied areas. At the same time, however, the inability to fully annex these areas was also recorded (Benton 2002, 261). In her research on

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colonial-style conquests of territory, Catherine Lutz (2006, 594) explains that such strategies should not be understood as comprehensive and coherent operations. On the contrary, colonial-style conquests should be studied as actions that produce reactions and contradictions. They can only partly materialize their goals. Colonial-style strategies were based on the intensity of contradiction between the effort of annexation and the endurance of diversity of the occupied area (Stoler and Cooper 1997, 10). In the Turkish Cypriot case, it is possible to record gaps in the exercise of disciplinary functions that the state of exception attempts to impose. These gaps operate as alternative counter-arguments, as strategies of empowerment of counter-arguments, and even as escape routes for people entrapped in the state of exception (Constantinou 2008, 148–9). The Turkish Cypriot opposition activated “local knowledge” against Turkey’s colonial knowledge (Yashin 2012, 48). The concept of local knowledge is an analytical category that can further enlighten the different expressions of opposition. In essence, the local knowledge of the opposition against the partition of Cyprus is more than a denial of Ankara’s colonial knowledge. It is at the same time an indication that the state of exception constitutes a problematic, fragmented and questionable process. In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, the questionable status of the state of exception created by Turkey was evident through the very existence of the Turkish Cypriot opposition. The “exiled” inhabitants of the closed regime in the northern territory of Cyprus were “damned” by the rest of society. Agamben used, in his book Homo Sacer, the Italian words bando and bandum: sovereign power and naked life (Agamben 1998, 111) in order to underline exile, anathema and desertion of a person by the rest of society. However, Panayiotis Tsamouras emphasizes, in the Greek translation of this book, that these concepts refer to the description of bandits in Ioannina in the nineteenth century. Bandits were a group of plebs, characterized by their liberal spirit, austere lifestyle and their respect for family honour, but also by their rebellious tendencies against the Ottoman police. They lived on the margins of society (Agamben 2005b, 168–9). By conveying the concept of “bandit” to the Turkish Cypriot community, opposition to partition was initially “damned” and subsisted “on the margins of society”; however, its “rebellious tendencies” against the dominant power pointed to the prevailing abnormal state of affairs. It is a fact that in the balance of power between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community there is no question about who is the strongest.

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However, the 30-year experience from 1974 to 2004 has shown that the most powerful in the “village” does not have full control of the scene. Whoever is strong can indeed dictate the terms and sets the boundaries, but within the specific boundaries the weaker actors can find space to express their contempt. Many of the actors will recite their lines, but they will not passionately act their part (Scott 1985, 26). The daily resistance of the weak is not formal, it may not even be institutional. Most of the time it is silent and aims at small, immediate gains against the strong. However, the resistance of the weak is characterized by underground demands and can express the dissatisfaction of the subordinates (Scott 1985, 32–3). The aforementioned are not results of large and abstract processes. On the contrary, they are results of the specific experience of the weak (Piven and Cloward 1977, 20), namely the experience that moulds their resentment and eventually politicizes it against precise targets. In the tutelage status created by Turkey, the nationalist framework initially seemed to be hegemonic. However, as the present study shows, even in the context of an almost “undisputable hegemony” of nationalism, underground, in Turkish Cypriot society, alternative “whispers” survived, were upheld and ultimately empowered (Papadakis 2005, 102). These “whispers” were voices of opposition, political demands against partition, which were initially “not heard” (Papadakis 2005, 114). The persistence of the use of old names of sites and villages, the “silent” emphasis on Cypriotness in everyday life or even the activation of the Turkish Cypriot cultural capital against colonialism (Yashin 2012, 48), are some examples of these “alternative whispers”. It is no coincidence that many Turkish Cypriots referred to the “TRNC” as “made-up” (uyduruk devlet ). The Turkish word uydurmak, from which the aforementioned description of the TRNC derives, means “making up something fake, virtual” or “fabricate and falsify”. In this way the Turkish Cypriots express the negative concept of expediency behind the “TRNC”. They articulate the fabrication and the false dimension of the state created (Yashin 2012, 6). In exactly the same framework of realization of their entrapment, many Turkish Cypriots describe the TRNC as a fictitious creation, kurmaca (Mutluyakali 2019), a word which denotes the forged and fabricated dimension of power structures created following the 1974 invasion. This study of the Turkish Cypriot opposition highlights the almost immediate realization by a great section of the Turkish Cypriot community of the conditions of entrapment already imposed since the 1960s.

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Indeed, soon after the attempt to enforce the “permanence” of the new partitionist state of affairs in 1974, the alternative whispers showed that the new framework was neither viable nor convincing. The case could be that the specific locus of the “TRNC” was created through the “poaching” of the invasion and the hegemony of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite, but it is also a fact that in juxtaposition, the Turkish Cypriot opposition used its own means and tools to create its own alternative “locus”. The realization of alienation and exile did not downgrade but instead ultimately strengthened the assertion of “return to the homeland”. The Turkish Cypriots questioned the intended normalization of partition through their opposition to remaining “homeless” (Kızılyürek 2018, 22). The longing for return—to a place that had never been abandoned— eventually transformed into a political programme, causing ruptures to nationalist hegemony. The progressive emphasizing of Cypriot identity by the Turkish Cypriot opposition against the colonial-style Turkish influence was more than an expression of personal identity. It was far more an attempt to formulate the following political claim: for the community to ˙ be reinstated (Inatçı 2008, 40). The politicization of the Cypriot identity was, therefore, a stage in the creation of a unifying platform for all the Turkish Cypriot organized and non-organized forces that refused to integrate with the locus created for them (without them) by the Turkish military intervention and the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite. As recorded in this study, the gradual evolution of the efforts of the Turkish Cypriot opposition were concretized with the prevailing claim for a federal solution at the end of the period under consideration. The concretization of this goal meant the reintegration of the community into international legality, the state and power, but also the “return” to the Cypriot homeland (Kızılyürek 2018, 22). In this sense, for the Turkish Cypriot opposition, the federal solution of the Cyprus problem constituted, above all, the pillar of subjectivization of the community in Cypriot history. However, at the same time, through the intensity of Cypriotism as expressed by the Turkish Cypriot opposition, cracks were also recorded in the dominant shape of the “motherland–babyland” relationship. An attempt was made to redefine Turkey’s relations with the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot opposition reversed the concept of “gratitude” (¸sükran). It reversed the sacred relationship with Ankara and the perception of Turkey as the “saviour”. In this way, the Turkish

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Cypriot opposition turned “ungrateful”, but at the same time this particular “ungratefulness” was also a dynamic of uncompleted democratization of relations with Turkey (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 271).

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Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2017. “Yurt Ütopyadır” [Homeland Is a Utopia]. Yeni Düzen, 22 January. ———. 2018. Kayıp Özne. Aslında hepimiz melankoli˘giz [The Lost Subject: In Fact, We Are All Melancholic]. Lefko¸sa: Yeni Düzen Kitap. KKTC Anayasası. n.d. (a). Bölüm 1, Ba¸slangıç. [TRNC Constitution: Section 1, Introduction]. ———. n.d. (b). Cumhuriyet Güvenlik Kurulu, Madde 111 [Republic Security Council, Article 111]. ———. n.d. (c). Geçici Madde 10 [Temporary Article 10]. Lake, David A. 2008. “The New American Empire?” International Studies Perspectives 9 (3): 281–289. Lefebvre, Henri. 1992. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald NicholsonSmith. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Lutz, Catherine. 2006. “Empire Is in the Details.” American Ethnologist 33 (4): 593–611. Murphy, Alexander. 1996. “The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations.” In State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 81–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mutluyakalı, Cenk. 2019. “Buyurgan Siyaset” [Imperious Politics]. Yeni Düzen, 11 September. Ophir, Adi, Michal Givoni, and Safi Hanafi. 2009. “Introduction.” In The Power of Inclusive Exclusion. Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, edited by Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni and Safi Hanafi, 15–30. New York: Zone Books. Özersay, Kudret. 2004. “The Excuse of State Necessity and Its Implications on the Cyprus Conflict.” Perceptions IX: 31–70. Özkan, Behlül. 2015. “Making Cyprus a National Cause in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1948–1965.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15 (4): 541– 562. Papadakis, Yiannis. 2005. Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide. London and New York: I.B. Tauris. Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How the Fail. New York: Vintage. Ram, Moriel. 2015. “Colonial Conquest and the Politics of Normalization: The Case of Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus.” Political Geography 47: 21–32. Reynar, Tacan. 2018. “KKTC nedir?” [What Is TRNC?]. Yeni Düzen, 19 November. Schlink, Bernhardt. 2017. Yurt Ütopyadır [Homeland Is a Utopia]. Translated by Niyazi Kızılyürek and Hüseyin Tüccar. Lefko¸sa: Heterotopia Yayınları. Schmitt, Carl. 2006. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

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Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Shafir, Gershon. 1989. Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shenhav, Yehouda, and Yael Berda. 2009. “The Colonial Foundation of the State of Exception: Juxtaposing the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories with Colonial Bureaucratic History.” In The Power of Exclusive Inclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, edited by Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni and Sari Hanafi, 337–374. New York: Zone Books. Stoler, Ann Laura. 2018. “Colony.” In Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon, edited by J. M. Bernstein, Adi Ophir and Ann Laura Stoler, 45–58. New York: Fordham University Press. Stoler, Ann Laura, and Frederich Cooper. 1997. “Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking a Research Agenda.” In Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 1–56. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. Stratilatis, Costas. 2016. “H αδoξη ´ (;) καριšρα τoυ Carl Schmitt στην Kπρo: ´ H δημιoυργ´ια και τα πρωτα ´ šτη τoυ β´ιoυ της Kυπριακης ´ ημoκρατ´ιας απ´o σμιτιανη´ σκoπια” ´ [Carl Schmitt’s Inglorious (?) Career in Cyprus: The Foundation and the First Years of the Republic of Cyprus from a Schmittian ´ κης Perspective]. In H Kυπ ριακ η´ Δημoκρατ ι´α και τ o Δ´ικαιo τ ης Aν αγ [The Cyprus Republic and the Law of Necessity], edited by Achilleas Emilianides, Christos Papastylianou and Costas Stratilatis, 7–93. Athens: Sakoulas Publications. Tahsin, Arif Hasan. 1993. Geçmi¸si Bilmeden Gelece˘ge Bakmak. [Looking Forward Without Knowing the Past]. Lefko¸sa: I¸sık Kitabevi Yayınları. Trimikliniotis, Nicos. 2010. “H παρακμη´ τoυ κυπριακo´ καθεστωτoς ´ εξα´ιρεσης. Aπ´o την oργανικη´ κρ´ιση στην υπšρβαση τoυ ‘δ´oγματoς της αναγκης’” ´ [The Demise of the Cypriot State of Exception: From Organic Crisis to Transcendence of the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’. In Kυπ ριακ η´ Δημoκρατ ι´α 50 χ ρ o´ νια επ ωδυνη ´ π oρε´ια [50 Years of Cyprus Republic: A Painful Course], edited by Chrysostomos Perikleous, 209–233. Athens: Papazisis Publications. Trimikliniotis, Nicos. 2018. “The Proliferation of Cypriot States of Exception: The Erosion of Fundamental Rights as Collateral Damage of the Cyprus Problem.” The Cyprus Review 30 (2): 43–84. Tu˘gyan, Tümay. 2019a. “Sistemin Hissedarları ve Korku” [Shareholders of the System and Fear]. Yeni Düzen, 11 September. ———. 2019b. “Tarihin esas affetmeyece˘gi….” [What History Will Definitely Not Forgive…]. Yeni Düzen, 7 September. Uzer, Umut. 2011. Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy: The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and in the Caucasus. London: I.B. Tauris.

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Wall, Thomas De. 2018. Uncertain Ground. Engaging with Europe’s De Facto States and Breakaway Territories. Washington: Carnegie Europe. Waterman, Stanley. 1984. “Partition—A Problem in Political Geography.” In Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Directions, edited by P. J. Taylor and J. W. House, 98–116. Beckenham: Croom Helm. Yashin, Yael Navaro. 2005. “Confinement and the Imagination: Sovereignty and Subjectivity in a Quasi State.” In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 103–119. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2006. “Affect in the Civil Service: A Study of a Modern State-System.” Postcolonial Studies 9 (3): 281–294. ———. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Yeni Düzen. 1989. “Durduran: Kuzey Kıbrıs açık hava hapishanesi” [Durduran: North Cyprus Is an Open Prison], 9 June. ———. 1996. “Bak s¸ u konu¸sana!” [Look at Who Is Talking!], 11 July. ———. 2003. “Kıbrıs barı¸sa yürüyor” [Cyprus Is Walking toward Peace], 27 January.

CHAPTER 3

Claiming the Homeland in a “State of Siege”

Social and Ideological Foundations of the State of Exception The enclaves of the 1964–1974 period in Cyprus emerged as a result of violence between the two communities and the collapse of the bicommunal nature of the Republic of Cyprus. After the establishment of the Republic, paramilitary organizations continued to be active. In the Greek Cypriot community, the one that stood out among paramilitary groups was the “Organization”, under Polykarpos Yiorkatdjis, Minister of the Interior at the time (Kızılyürek 2009, 19–20). The “Organization” was preparing to impose changes in the Constitution and by implementation of the Akritas Plan, suppress any reaction by the Turkish Cypriot community (Stratilatis 2016, 63). In the Turkish Cypriot community, TMT (Türk Mukavemet Te¸skilatı)1 continued its underground actions and was arming, aiming to partition the island and form a second state on Cyprus (Stratilatis 2016, 63). The violence exercised by the paramilitary groups, the political pressure of extremist elements from both communities and the stance of the Greek Cypriot leadership, which sought to force the Turkish Cypriots into capitulation, were factors that reinforced the prospect of armed violence (Stratilatis 2016, 65). These factors were exploited by TMT, which also encouraged the alienation of the Turkish Cypriots from the Republic of Cyprus. A characteristic example is a confidential report by Rauf Denkta¸s, dated 12

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August 1963, where he indicated specific tactics the Turkish Cypriot leadership should follow in the event of Makarios proceeding with changes to the Constitution. He underlined that: “Whenever Makarios touches on Turkish Cypriot rights, Turkish Cypriots should distance themselves from ‘Makarios’ administration’, gradually acquiring a more independent status. Taking advantage of every step taken by Makarios towards the establishment of an ‘ethnic Greek Cypriot government’ we should also be taking a step towards the establishment of our own ethnic government. In the end, and if bloodshed and a civil war are avoided, a federal government will be established. If, however, this development is the result of a bloody war, then the island will be partitioned” (Kızılyürek 2016, 308). Against this atmosphere of suspicion, at the end of December 1963, armed clashes began, leading Cyprus to a first form of territorial and political partition. According to Richard Patrick’s (1976, 46–7) data, the period between December 1963 and the summer of 1964 was the most violent period of intercommunal conflict, during which 350 Turkish Cypriots and 200 Greek Cypriots and Greeks were killed. Immediately after the outbreak of the riots, the mass displacement of the Turkish Cypriots was completed very soon. The main reason was that the Turkish Cypriots were numerically a minority compared to the Greek Cypriot population. The violence of this period forced the smallest community to be displaced into areas where they could continue their life with members of the same community (Attalides 1977, 83). A supportive factor was naturally the immediate diffusion of fear which originated mainly from the possibility of more intensified attacks by the armed Greek Cypriot groups. Describing the feeling of the time, the veteran trade unionist Kamil Tuncel (2011, 268) wrote: “People started running scared… For some people, this was the moment that the Greek Cypriots would attack us and slaughter us all”. Up until late December 1963 a total of 22 Turkish Cypriot villages were evacuated, while in January 1964 the residents of 55 Turkish Cypriot villages were added to the long list of refugees (Gibbons 1969, 128– 9). According to data cited by Oberling (1982, Appendix 1), from December 1963 to August 1964, a total of 103 villages were evacuated. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report, dated 10 September 1964, up until then the total destruction of 527 houses was recorded as well as the looting of another 2000 homes in 109 Turkish Cypriot villages (UNSC 1964, 48). In September 1965, the Turkish Cypriot leadership published information that recorded looting incidents and

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damage in Turkish Cypriot properties in 102 different villages (Halkın Sesi 1965a). As a result of the conflicts, approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees, a number corresponding to a quarter of the community (Bryant and Hatay 2009, 3). The proportion of displacement for such a small community immediately set the base for a deep restructuring of its social and economic tissue. The enclaves were surrounded by sandbags that formed walls and trenches. For many years these bags would become a “permanent companion” for the Turkish Cypriots and a reminder that their life was constantly under threat (Eliçin 2013, 59). These spaces, however, formed areas where the “exception” gradually became the “rule”, while the population of the Turkish Cypriots acquired a dimension of a double bare life (Agamben 1998). On the one hand, the government of the Republic of Cyprus, because of the armed action of TMT, considered the community to be “insurgents” against the state order. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were also places of complete militarization (Bryant and Hatay 2011) and authoritarianism, where the inhabitants were transformed into leading a kind of bare life by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership. Kızılyürek describes the double bare life of the Turkish Cypriots as follows: “Suddenly Cyprus, as a country, did not exist. There was basically one prison, from which you could not escape. The outside was the Greek, the enemy who threatened you and inside was the Turkish military figure [pa¸sa] who ruled you. And you feared them both” (Christodoulou 2016). It should be noted that the deterioration of the social status of the community was the result of two factors contributing to the structuring of a double siege. First, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus took measures such as setting up barricades, stopping telephone communications and surrounding Turkish Cypriot villages and areas, creating obstacles to the normalization of the life of a very important part of the community (Patrick 1976, 49). It was a time when the state did not set clear boundaries between the paramilitary activities of TMT and those of the Turkish Cypriots in general. The enclaves gradually transformed into spaces where the government would try “to reshape the insurgents” (Scheipers 2015, 690–1). The concentration of the vast majority of the community in enclaves and the perception that the community’s existence legitimized, in a sense, Turkey’s possible military intervention, were facts that enforced security measures which adversely affected the entire Turkish Cypriot population.

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After the armed conflicts in Kokkina (Erenköy) in the summer of 1964, the government realized that it could not, in military terms, confront the Turkish Cypriot community. It thus proceeded to activate economic restrictions (Patrick 1976, 107). In mid-September 1964, the government issued a list of “strategic materials” that were forbidden to enter the enclaves, such as spare parts of machines and cars, electrical equipment, batteries, fuel, building materials and timber (Strong 1999, 135). The list was intended to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from accessing materials that could enhance their military equipment. But the fact is that the prohibition of certain materials decisively harmed both the potential for housing the refugees and the productive means within the community (Patrick 1976, 108). The economic isolation was such that it forced the UN to react against the government. According to the report of the UN Secretary-General (UNSC 1964, 63), “in some cases, isolation was so strict that it comprised a real siege. It was a sign that the government was seeking to impose a solution through economic pressure as replacement of military action”. Until mid-1964, the economic restrictions closed completely all roads providing food to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and, in many cases, basic goods such as flour, rice and sugar were not allowed (Plümer 2008, 28–30). In late 1964, and after several instances of pressure by the UN, the Makarios government began to relax the measures and to restore movement in some areas. However, a very large part of the community inside the enclaves had already been living in conditions of impoverishment. The second factor contributing to the double siege was the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership’s exploitation of the prevailing atmosphere, by deepening the gap between the two communities with additional obstacles to their contact. In the given circumstances, it sought to intensify the concentration of the Turkish Cypriot population in a separate geography. Indeed, this process was not smooth. Various accounts by officers of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) indicate that the organized armed groups exercised force and applied punitive measures to coerce the displacement of Turkish Cypriots (Strong 1999, 134). It was in these circumstances that the paramilitary activity of TMT surfaced. It transformed almost immediately from an underground organization into a kind of regular army (Bryant and Hatay 2011, 637), whose leadership assumed the decisive part of the process of an early separate state structure. This form of restructuring of TMT was expressed through the creation of a “militants’ system” (mücahit sistemi).

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The lower-ranked officers of the body of mücahit were leaders of TMT nuclei, former police officers of the Republic or former officers of the Cypriot army. The upper ranks with staff duties and responsibilities were occupied by officers of the Turkish army (Patrick 1976, 69). This military hierarchy was accompanied by remarkable political power. The head of TMT (Bayraktar), a senior officer of the Turkish army, was not under the control of any political authority. Following the findings of Achille Mbembe (2003, 30) on the role of armed bodies in situations of siege, it becomes evident that in the case of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the only substantial freedom was given to senior commanders, whose influence “crushed” politics and its institutions. Their activity was not limited to military matters, but rather they could impose political decisions and define orientations. The persecution, marginalization and silencing of any opposing voice within the Turkish Cypriot community was one of the typical duties of the TMT leader (Süreç 2014, 19–21). Military interventionism was of course one aspect of the new social reality of the enclaves. The other aspect was the depth of the militarization of the social reality. Through the mücahit system, the enclaves transformed into militarized areas, in the defence of which the entire Turkish Cypriot population was involved. According to the data from General Kemal Yamak (2006, 371–2), former commander of the Special Warfare Office (Özel Harp Dairesi) at the General Staff of Turkey, before the military intervention of 1974, the number of armed militants reached 11,174, half of whom had active responsibilities. The complete militarization of daily life virtually meant a new division of labour, which, in turn, contributed decisively to the violent exclusion of the community from the process of production (Arslan 2014, 609). In the example of the biggest enclave in Nicosia, more than half of the working hours of the male population were devoted to military activities such as guarding the barricades and fortification works. The working day began at eight in the morning and by eleven o’clock men were called to their military duties. Traders and small shopkeepers were forced to close their shops and to be present in their positions (Strong 1999, 146). Apart from the adult male population, the mücahit system included high-school and university students, whose service in military duties was naturally the main source of their livelihood (Hatay and Bryant 2008, 439), as a result of the collapse of production and impoverishment of the population. On the basis of the first aid package that arrived from Turkey in May 1964, the head of each family earned a monthly salary of 20 pounds sterling. Women in

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the labour force earned 10 pounds sterling, monthly (Bryant and Hatay 2011, 636). The aforementioned social situation eventually formed the basis upon which separate administrative institutions were built. The 1964–1974 era was a time when the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership, in cooperation with Ankara, undertook the creation of an immature structure with state characteristics. In many cases, these structures had similar features to the state that the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned. The institutions of the Republic of Cyprus were now governed entirely by the Greek Cypriots. The political leadership of the Turkish Cypriots and civil servants sought to reorganize their activity within the enclaves in a way that was reminiscent of a “state within the state” (Bryant and Hatay 2011, 632). About 17 enclaves were created in different geographical areas of Cyprus, the most notable being in Nicosia, which also formed the separate Turkish Cypriot administrative centre. There were of course other smaller enclaves of villages or of regions in the countryside, and the total of all Turkish Cypriots living in these separate units reached about 100,000 shortly before 1974 (Borowiec 2000, 65). Gürel and Özersay (2006, 351) estimate that over the course of the 1964–1974 decade, 80% of the community came to live in the separate structures that had been created. In this setting, in May 1964, the General Committee (Genel Komite) was created, which essentially reflected the executive power within the enclaves (Bozkurt 2015, 54–5). Head of the Committee was the VicePresident of the Republic of Cyprus at the time, Fazıl Küçük, while the head of TMT also participated. The political leaders of the committee included the President of the Turkish Cypriot Community Assembly, Rauf Denkta¸s; the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, Orhan Müderriso˘glu; the Minister of Defence, Osman Örek; the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Fazil Plümer; the Minister of Health, Niyazi Manyera; the Judge Mehmet Zeka and Members of Parliament Semsi ¸ Kazım, Halit Ali Riza, Necati Münir and Ahmet Mithat Berbero˘glu (Pınar 2013). At the same time, the General Committee set up committees at provincial level that operated as “Ministries” (Akkurt 2000, 112–3; Patrick 1976, 82–4). Under the conditions of an emergency situation created by the armed violence, the Committee operated as a kind of “revolutionary council” ˙ (Ihtilal Konseyi), where the leadership role was undertaken by the military (Bozkurt 2012, 37). The structure of the enclaves, therefore, bore the basic characteristics of a political-military organization, whose balance

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was greatly influenced by the military. The characteristics of this militarist perception that dominated the administration were reflected in the symbolic name “B.E.Y”, the opposition mostly used. This name describes the protagonists in power through the initials of the words Bayraktarlık (TMT military leadership), Elçilik (the Embassy of Turkey) and Yönetim (the Administration, that is the political wing of the nationalist elite) (Kızılyürek 2016, 460). A few years later, Küçük himself revealed the existence of a “revolutionary court” operating under the military leadership, which essentially acted in the direction of putting pressure on politicians with differing views on the ethnic conflict (Tahsin 2001, 72–3). Given that Küçük was also part of a great power struggle between military and political leaders,2 the above-mentioned testimony acquires new meaning in the effort to decode the ideological veil covering the state of exception. The armed conflicts, which were particularly intense in the period 1964–1967, created a favourable environment for the delimitation of the different demands and approaches within the community. The ideology of the state of exception was expressed through the need for national unity against the “national enemy”. Within this particular framework, the violence of Greek Cypriot paramilitary groups was presented as a threat to the “communal existence” of the Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, the community should be in a permanent struggle for survival, during which any ideological differentiation was deemed as treason. This dynamic relationship reveals that a state of exception can emerge as a practical expression of a particular ideological programme and be promoted by the dominant force as an ideal space for realizing their visions and goals (Ram 2015, 22). Rauf Denkta¸s himself, expressing the ideology of the state of exception, wrote in his memoirs: “I am terrified that there are Turkish Cypriots who recognize the government of Makarios and this number increases every day… Our slogan as community should be the denial and the questioning of the government of Makarios. We should make a wide propaganda for this purpose. Makarios’ government is not a legitimate government. The duty of every Turkish Cypriot is to not recognize it, to not pay taxes, to not cooperate with public officials” (Denkta¸s 1997a, 29). The existence of “disobedient” Turkish Cypriots operating outside the boundaries of exception formed a reason for the reproduction of oppressive policies against the “enemy within”; i.e. against different ideas that emerged within the state of exception.

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In his study regarding the dynamics of refugee camps, Turner (2015, 5) concludes that the population within the camps is perceived as a victim of history that should rightfully have care and attention, but under no circumstances an organized political opinion. Similarly, Fassin (2005) clarifies that in such circumstances the refugees can no longer express their political rights, but can only appear and sensitize public opinion with their wounds. Transposing this model to the case of Cyprus, it seems that life in the besieged enclaves was, for the nationalist leadership, confirmation of how the community was victimized by the “national enemy”. This meant the reproduction of a framework where any different view was politically criminalized in the name of the state of emergency. Denkta¸s’s reactions to this are enlightening. When a group of Turkish Cypriot trade unionists visited him in 1973 to submit their claims in view of the upcoming general strike, Denkta¸s accused them of serving foreign political interests. The trade unionists responded that the strike was a democratic right applied in every country, to which the Turkish Cypriot leader replied: “This is not ‘every country’” (Süreç 2014, 26). One of the basic concerns of the nationalist leadership was the prospect of the left centrifugal dynamics becoming stronger within the enclaves. The surveillance system created by the community’s military leadership devoted a lot of time to recording the activities of left-wing Turkish Cypriots. For example, O˘guz Kuseto˘glu, an informant of the TMT leader, informed him on 13 May 1971 that the leftist student Mustafa Muammer was using the Nicosia–Kyrenia line bus to disseminate communist propaganda to the passengers. Kuseto˘glu records Muammer saying, “Why not join AKEL and why not live together on this island?”. The account to the TMT leadership ends by reporting on the beating of that student (Kanol 2012, 59). This type of suppression against the centrifugal dynamics was a “tragic reminder” of the violence of the very near past. The oppressive environment of 1958 had not yet disappeared. The memories of TMT’s assassination attacks against left-wing Turkish Cypriots and trade unionists, culminating in May and June 1958 as an attempt to silence the political programme against partition expressed in the community, were tragically transferred to the setting of the enclaves.3 As reported by the teacher and trade unionist Arif Hasan Tahsin, “The days when you could see on the same page of a newspaper a paid announcement of someone saying that he had resigned from the trade union and in the adjacent column the photograph of his body covered in blood had not yet been forgotten” (Tahsin 2001, 116–7).4

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A Reminder of the Exceptional Status: Opposition Against Normalization A very large part of the literature on the state of exception highlights the minimal scope of the “secluded” society to resist (Minca 2007). Based on this reasoning, if the dominant force is the one imposing the state of exception (Schmitt 2005, 6–7), then it is this force that can prevent the emergence of any kind of resistance, even by applying extended violence (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004, 9–10). However, as Trimikliniotis (2010, 161) notes, the emergency situation is intertwined with the threat against sovereignty. The state of exception itself evidences the existence of opposing forces being reproduced as threats (Trimikliniotis 2010, 161). Dominance over the state of exception is exercised with contradictions; it is not homogeneous and leaves room for alternative activities (Jones 2009). The focus on the state of exception in the Turkish Cypriot case should lead to deeper analyses that transcend its boundaries as a domination strategy. The bare life of the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves was a moment of restructuring their identity; it was a process of searching for new forms of survival in a chaotic situation (see also Bryant and Hatay 2011). The creation of enclaves was the response to a situation of violence. But, at the same time, it was a new beginning. The old structures and hierarchies in this new beginning may lose their meaning, while new identities, political positions and demands emerge (Turner 2015, 6). The new life was thus characterized by a very specific and clearly delimited space. The barricades and the trenches not only recalled the emergency situation, but also delimited the Turkish Cypriot space as a separate one from the rest of society. They were the “outsiders”, the “excluded” from the whole. At the same time, this territorial status produced a new “indigenous” identity that enhanced the local features of the Turkish Cypriot identity. This reshaping of the Turkish Cypriot collective identity formed an act of distancing from the wider Turkish nation, but also a renewed dedication to the Cypriot homeland. Özker Ya¸sın (quoted in Bryant and Hatay 2011, 641) describes the above process as follows: “… But we didn’t stain our Turkishness. We proved that we are children worthy of our ancestors. All the Turkish Cypriots, from seven to seventy, Nicosians, Larnakans, Limassolians, Paphians, Famagustans, Turks from all over the island without exception, even in the island’s most remote corners

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where there was the smallest Turkish population bravely defended themselves against enemy hordes that were superior to them in numbers and weaponry … We Cypriots in the past were proud of our Turkishness and would say ‘How happy is he who can call himself a Turk.’ Now, however, we will feel pride both in being ‘a Turk’ and in being ‘a Cypriot.’ From now on we’ll brag, ‘How happy is he who can call himself a Turkish Cypriot.’”. This “irregular” situation for Turkish Cypriots eventually created the conditions for the gaps to emerge in the form of political crises, and of a parallel reality that survived despite the authoritarianism of the nationalist elite. In January 1967 Fazıl Plümer and Niyazi Manyera resigned from the General Committee. Plümer explained the reasons for their resignation in a letter to Denkta¸s, vividly describing the ideological and political crisis of the time: “In this country, it is as if we experience the last days of the collapsing old Ottoman era” (Denkta¸s 1997b, 26). Apparently, the Turkish Cypriot official used the term “collapsing” to refer to a dynamic, rather than a static, process, which was characterized by the problems and contradictions of the internal situation of the enclaves in the long term. Consequently, it would be important to examine, in greater detail, the economic, social and political foundations upon which this different understanding relied, and which largely comprised the ruptures of the state of exception at the time. One of the major problems of the Turkish Cypriot community during the period of the enclaves was the absence of productive activities. The instability and the militarization created the conditions for a more generalized exclusion of the community from production and led to its complete dependence on Turkey. This contradiction between the politics of Taksim and the lack of capital accumulation (Arslan 2014, 13), led the Turkish Cypriot leadership to more authoritarianism, and to the creation of a network of clientelist relations in order to absorb any reactions caused by the enclaved life. As it turned out, the efforts to overcome the above contradictions widened even further the vicious cycle since it could not solve the problems caused by the large-scale impoverishment of the population. This resulted in the strengthening of social criticism and of the opposing centrifugal forces. According to data from the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, the number of Turkish Cypriots who had to receive some kind of help from the Red Cross in 1964 was 56,000, 25,000 of whom were displaced, 23,500 were unemployed and 7500 dependents on injured or missing

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persons (Ertekün 1981, 217). The socio-economic situation of a great section of the Turkish Cypriot community was also recorded by an UNFICYP investigation, dated 16 August 1964. The investigation was conducted in 142 Turkish Cypriot villages and recorded that 40% of these areas faced huge shortages in flour, and bread supplies could only last for a few days. Additionally, the need for milk and dairy products was described as acute (UNSC 1964, 54). The per capita income of Turkish Cypriots in 1961 was approximately 130–135 pounds, i.e. 20% less than that of the Greek Cypriots, which reached almost 160–165 pounds. A decade later, in 1971, the per capita income of the Turkish Cypriots was 150 pounds— 50% less than that of Greek Cypriots, which was 300 pounds (Kedourie 2005, 653). In 1964, out of the 105.1 million Cyprus pounds of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Turkish Cypriots constituted just 5.1 million Cyprus pounds—approximately 5%.5 The situation of large population groups, such as refugees, farmers, civil servants and pupils or students, in correlation with the total dependency on Turkey, eventually became a strong foundation for the emergence of “underground currents” of reaction against the state of exception. The rapid displacement of populations was one factor that created problems. Another factor was the inability to solve them, especially by providing housing to the refugees. The economic isolation imposed by the government of the Republic of Cyprus effectively prevented the building of refugee settlements and premises that could essentially shelter the refugees (Bryant and Hatay 2011). The situation worsened in that many military officials forcibly prevented Turkish Cypriots from returning to their homes (Patrick 1976, 79). In many areas of the enclaves, the Turkish Cypriot refugees lived in abandoned premises or warehouses, often without basic infrastructure. As Tüncel remembers from his own personal experience, he managed to find shelter with his family in the area of Hamit Mandrez, a rather poor neighbourhood where dozens of people resided together, staying awake for many days (Tuncel 2011, 269). The failure to provide homes for this population and the concentration of large numbers of people in temporary settlements caused, apart from misery, serious health problems. 1965, for instance, was the third consecutive winter that the Turkish Cypriot refugees endured without any housing (Halkın Sesi 1965b), and this eventually contributed to the emergence of epidemics such as diphtheria (Halkın Sesi 1965c) that led to the first death of a five-year-old girl in October 1965 (Halkın Sesi 1965d).

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The description of the situation of refugees by Konur (1965), a columnist of Halkın Sesi, is very enlightening: “The view I came across was horrible. It was as if I had returned to the Middle Ages. As if that place where I had arrived took me five centuries back within five minutes. That view reminded me of the book Les Miserables by Victor Hugo; images that make any clean conscience cry”. Thus, a great number of the refugees, who experienced impoverishment and dependency on welfare, from that point on started to believe that the political and military leadership were not doing what was necessary to solve the problem definitively and to ensure their safe return. More importantly, a general perception that became embedded among this population was that protection of their communal existence was not guaranteed through the state of exception, as the nationalist forces insisted (Patrick 1976, 158). The situation was similar for the Turkish Cypriot farmers, the vast majority of whom either became refugees, or were unable to continue their production activity because of the intercommunal riots (Arslan 2014, 612). At the end of 1964, approximately 100,000 hectares of Turkish Cypriot arable land all over Cyprus had been abandoned (Plümer 2008, 31), while up to 1965, the Turkish producers could sell products through government councils only if they had settled their debts to the Republic of Cyprus (Patrick 1976, 110). Meanwhile, the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot civil servants from the state structures and their employment in the new structures of the enclaves created a huge financial burden on the budget of the Communal Chamber that could not be paid. Denkta¸s calculated in early January 1964 that approximately 3000 public servants and workers could not be paid, since this cost reached 300,000 Cyprus pounds (Denkta¸s 1996, 6). To overcome this problem initially, they received a grant from Ankara of a monthly salary of around 30 Cypriot pounds for every public servant regardless of previous salary (Sonan 2014, 83). At the same time, the expanded militarization of the enclaves and the inclusion of students entailed the restructuring of the education system. The compulsory recruitment of these young people created concerns among them and their families, as well as tensions in the structure of the mücahit system (Besim 2011, 88). The above economic and social crisis experienced by a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community was expressed in multiple ways at an ideological level. Very soon after the collapse of the bi-communal nature of

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the Republic of Cyprus, different approaches that questioned the orientations of the nationalist leadership came to the fore. By January 1967, Aydın Sami had sent a letter to close partner Rauf Denkta¸s, who was in Ankara, noting that: “To expect something today from the officers of the General Committee is unrealistic. There are people there who, along with the worthy old friends who are struggling for this cause, are pioneers in the mentality of a retreating policy and who conform to the idea that in the future we will live with the Greek Cypriots. Unfortunately, they are now the majority” (Denkta¸s 1997b, 15–6). A few months later, in April 1967, Denkta¸s publicly expressed the same concern even more clearly. In an interview in the newspaper Akın he notes: “There is a group of people who see our cause as a matter to be closed soon by granting certain rights. This group says that we should supposedly define our own policy on the Cyprus issue and, if necessary, to agree with the Greek Cypriot communists… I do not share this opinion. Even if our assumption is to give our community tranquillity, this cannot be done without Turkey” (Denkta¸s 1997b, 117). It becomes evident from the statements above that despite the powerful separatist lines of violence, the ideological background of the state of exception had ruptures. Outside the boundaries of the dominant order, an opposing expression was emerging which, according to the concerned views of Sami and Denkta¸s, claimed rapprochement and agreement with the Greek Cypriots and the autonomy of politics from Turkey. Indeed, the existence of these centrifugal forces gradually strengthened to the point that it “became majority” according to Sami’s personal opinion. Attalides (1977, 84) notes that these are expressions that confirmed the existence of a tendency for a different understanding of things “from below”. It thus becomes evident that a key part of the ideological differences that appeared in the enclaves focused on a totally different political programme, outside the limits determined by Taksim. The secluded Turkish Cypriot spaces were ultimately unable to suppress completely the appearance of demands such as cultural pluralism, which put forth the idea of coexistence and agreement with the Greek Cypriots, but also the need for autonomy from Turkey.6 The most organized reflection of these alternative political visions was the political spectrum of the Left, which, despite its weaknesses, managed to find ways to survive through the creation of a parallel socio-political reality.

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It was no accident that the first violent reactions of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite against the strengthening of all these elements, included the murder of the Turkish Cypriot Dervi¸s Ali Kavazo˘glu, member of the Central Committee of AKEL, and the Greek Cypriot Costas Misiaoulis, also member of AKEL, in April 1965. Kavazo˘glu, immediately after the outbreak of the intercommunal riots, sought to expand his political activity in two main directions. One was the immediate termination of the policy for partition pursued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This was the reason why, before his assassination, he was “warned” with threatening messages. On 30 October 1964 he received an anonymous letter, saying: “You bastard… The day that your soul will go to hell is near” (An 2011, 82). The second direction of his activities, which complemented an alternative political programme, was the effort to explain to the government of Makarios that his policy reproduced the foundations for the perpetuation of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist programme. Based on the personal testimony of Tüncel, Kavazo˘glu sought and had personal contacts with Makarios, during which he strongly emphasized the need to resolve the problems caused by the Turkish Cypriot social and economic collapse, as well as the need to review the policy of the economic isolation of the enclaves. Kavazo˘glu insisted that such policies facilitated the strengthening, rather than the weakening, of the manipulations of the Turkish Cypriot leadership (Tuncel 2011, 278). The assassination of Kavazo˘glu in 1965 on one hand was tragically reminiscent of the consequences felt by a Left opposition as recorded in the assassinations of 1958, but on the other, it was unable to stop the objective factors that reproduced social and political criticism against the state of exception. The murder of Kavazo˘glu may theoretically have operated as an action of definite distancing of the Turkish Cypriot community from AKEL and the wider left political programme. However, the “seal” of the enclaves and the seclusion of the Turkish Cypriots could not stop the re-emergence of new opposing processes against the nationalist programme. This conclusion is reached mainly through the experiences of the Turkish Cypriots in the cruellest enclave of the time, that of Kokkina (Erenköy). Kokkina was a territory of strategic importance that facilitated the transfer of artillery from Turkey to the Turkish Cypriot mücahit groups, because of its adjacency to the sea. Kokkina’s geographic importance was the main reason why in spring of 1964 armed forces began to move in the region. The aim of the state was to completely control the wider territory

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so as to prevent the import of weapons from Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in cooperation with Ankara, mobilized Turkish Cypriot students studying in Turkey with the aim of creating an armed nucleus that could maintain control of Kokkina and continue to provide artillery. During the outbreak of the intercommunal riots, small groups of Turkish Cypriot students enrolled in military training areas in Istanbul and Ankara (Korun 2015, 72). From late March until late June 1964, these student groups began to arrive secretly in Kokkina and formed an armed group of about 500 people (Bryant 2012, 175). The first conflicts began on 6 August 1964, and on the 8th of the same month the Greek Cypriots counterattacked, forcing a very large part of the Turkish Cypriot population of the villages in the wider region of Tylliria to move to the enclave of Kokkina (Korun 2015, 86–7). By the end of the conflicts in September 1964, a reverse course had begun for the Turkish Cypriots in the enclave. The students and few residents of the region were now totally surrounded, abandoned in the enclave and cut off from all assistance and resources (Bryant 2012, 176). Any economic activity had been completely terminated while hunger and poverty (Plümer 2008, 35– 6) gradually began to mark out the “bare life” of the people within the enclave. As Turhan Korun (2015, 91), one of the students in the enclaves, recalls, “those days 25 people shared one loaf of bread, trying to hold on to life with some porridge”. The deterioration of the social conditions and the deadlocks that appeared in the course of time caused even more reaction from the students. Ankara did not show any real interest and no military action was taken to help the enclaved. Life within the enclave began to initiate a kind of introspection in the students, concerning the situation they were experiencing and the objectives of the policy implemented that resulted in cases like the enclave of Kokkina. Alpay Durduran, who later became a leading figure of the Turkish Cypriot Left, was in Kokkina and described the situation as follows: “We felt a great anxiety. We were living with the feeling of being abandoned. The way we looked at things then was that Turkey hadn’t done its duty” (Bryant 2012, 176). The awareness that the enclaved students “were wasted” served as a catalyst for the revision of their views in relation to the military regime, but also against broader political orientations. This development resulted in the emergence of an unusual organization of students within the enclave that extended to the expression of collective demands, such as the return to their studies. The organized besieged students took dynamic measures such as boycotting

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their watch-guard duties and abandoning their military duties (Korun 2015, 103). The “rebellious” situation and their questioning of the discipline that the military leadership of the enclave tried to impose reached such extent, as Ahmet Tolgay (Bryant 2012, 177) notes, that the “Turkish Cypriots consciously stopped saluting even their commander”. Organized protests were often accompanied by setting fires at night (Bryant 2012, 177). By the summer of 1965, the enclave of Kokkina had turned into a small political centre of opposition against the policies of Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, challenging the dominant national programme. It was within this framework that the combination of perceptions of the Turkish Cypriot enclaved students with the Left expressed the dynamic of causing ruptures to the “irreversible” nature of the state of emergency. The Turkish Cypriots in the enclave of Kokkina, for instance, received messages of the speeches of MPs of the Labour Party of Turkey. The only radio station they heard was that of Anamur in Turkey—a region almost opposite Kokkina—which was broadcasting the sessions of the National Assembly. They could thus listen to the political speeches of Mehmet Ali Aybar, leader of the Labour Party, and of Çetin Altan, MP of the party at the time, whose words affected the worldview of the enclaved since “a left wind started blowing from the north toward Erenköy” (Korun 2015, 101). The secret introduction to the poetry of Nazim Hikmet and to literary works such as “All quiet on the Western Front”, in conjunction with the actual experiences of the students in Kokkina, gradually radicalized their reactions against the idea of war (Korun 2015, 101). One of the direct results of the above process, was the creation of the foundations for anti-nationalism as well as an alternative course for the Turkish Left. From the enclave of Kokkina emerged politicians of the Left like Özker Özgür, Naci Talat, Alpay Durduran and Hüseyin Angolemli (Bryant 2012, 179). It is no coincidence that the core of the Turkish Cypriot students found in the enclave of Kokkina, upon their return to Turkey, immediately joined the powerful—at the time—left movement in the country. In this way, the Turkish Cypriot youth found more fertile ground to expand to various political concepts such as imperialism and independence, but also to quests that could be adapted to the Cyprus context (Kızılyürek 2012, 172). Denkta¸s (1997b, 147) himself wrote about his personal experience with leftist Turkish Cypriot students in Ankara after a particularly intense gathering where he was a speaker: “I struggled to understand

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some of the young people’s questions. They use so many new terms and concepts from the left vocabulary that I got the impression I was listening to a foreign language. I answered trying to guess what they were actually asking… The discovery of a new language. A new language for a new culture. And such a culture is contrary to everything that we believe. Will the world follow the path that they show? And if so, where will this end?” This “incomprehensible”—as Denkta¸s puts it—Left language, expressing a new culture, translated into political confrontation between the Turkish Cypriot community of the time, entailed the overcoming of the ideological limits of the state of exception. It was the proof of the survival of a different political programme that emphasized the need for democratization, for cultural pluralism, for autonomy from Turkey, and a new interpretation of communal identity. The political activities of leftist students, both in Turkey and in Cyprus, gradually expanded and matured. Their claims derived from issues such as the abolition of military service and solving the problem of unemployment and even the call for a joint revolutionary action of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, because they believed that the existing partitionist political structures of the island constrained the true independence of Cyprus (Patrick 1976, 160; Öncül and Düzgün 1999, 22). Even though the real impact of the claims of the Turkish Cypriot youth may not be accurately recorded due to the structure of the community (large number of refugees, civil servants and farmers fully dependent on financial assistance from Turkey), it seems that their presence opened a parallel and largely “threatening” space opposite the nationalist elite. This period recorded intense protests against the new military leadership of the community that even reached the threshold of a “revolt” as confessed by TMT informants (Kanol 2012, 147). In his memoirs, Denkta¸s reveals a letter he sent to a person under the code name “Profesör” in Cyprus, which recommended that members of the Turkish Cypriot leadership should go to places where young students of Kokkina were frequently found because “views like the independence of Cyprus and perceptions that partition is an imperialist solution” were promoted there (Denkta¸s 1997b, 23).

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The Failed Efforts to Restore the State of Exception In addition to the shock caused by the deepening of power antagonisms (Zafer 1967a, b), the deadlocks of the Turkish Cypriot leadership seemed to be multiplying through the social reactions that clearly expressed the deep class differentiation. This aspect was described by Kutlu Adalı in one of his many literary texts. In his book “Interview: The March 9th Dialogue” Adalı describes the Turkish Cypriot social opposition in the period of the enclaves through a dialogue between a supposed president and a supposed intellectual. The “intellectual”, representing the community and the opposition against the “president”, namely the leadership, said: “For four years and three months the Greek Cypriots forbade the entry of many materials and products into the Turkish Cypriot sector. What did you do? Absolutely nothing! On the one hand, you created monopolies for the benefit of some people and on the other you allowed them to steal from the people with profits reaching 100%. What profit did the community have from all of this? A handful of rich people of the war! You encouraged smuggling and black-market trade. Not only did you close your eyes to the theft against the people, but you also aided it. You supported it!” (An 2003). By the end of 1967, the Turkish Cypriot power structures showed the symptoms of a deep crisis, which was mainly the result of their failure to reproduce themselves, but also because they were increasingly questioned. At this turning point, developments were marked by the attack of the National Guard of the Republic of Cyprus in the area of Kofinu (Köfünye) and Ayios Theodoros (Geçitkale) on 17 November 1967, during which about 20 Turkish Cypriots died (Strong 1999, 147). Following these attacks, diplomatic pressure on the Republic of Cyprus increased and the Makarios government was forced to lift some of the restrictive measures and controls on the enclaves, while the plans for initiating the negotiation talks on the Cyprus issue began. The double momentum at the time; namely, the peak of the internal crisis in the enclaves and the attempt for some normalization by Makarios, led the Turkish Cypriot leadership to an attempt to normalize the state of exception. In cooperation with Ankara and taking advantage of the instability in Greece due to the military junta, the Turkish Cypriot leadership proceeded to declare the Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration (Geçici Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi) on 28 December 1967 (Milliyet 1967a), which essentially constituted a

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step closer to the consolidation of a separate Turkish Cypriot authority in Cyprus (Milliyet 1967b). This move was certainly not accidental. It was made in full consultation with Ankara (Milliyet 1967c). Apart from the above, the creation of a new level concerning the separate Turkish Cypriot structures was also an attempt to integrate the reactions that caused the problems. As early as October 1967, the newspaper Zafer underlined the need to start solving the immediate problems of the people, such as housing the refugees, providing loans to farmers and stabilizing the salaries of members of the fighters’ body and of the public servants (Zafer 1967c, d). In this context, the creation of the new Turkish Cypriot administration was an effort to restore the nationalist hegemony that was under question. Initially, the Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration was received with relief by many parts of the Turkish Cypriot community (Akın 1967) because it could, in the long run, limit the authoritarian tendencies of the General Committee (Zafer 1963). A key element that led to this perception was the adoption of the “Fundamental Rules” (Temel Kurallar) published on 29 December 1967, which functioned as a kind of constitution within the enclaves (Denkta¸s 1982, 35). This text provided for a further separation of powers through the creation of a legislative and executive council7 that would have the role of a Parliament and a Ministerial Council respectively (Patrick 1976, 169). However, this attempt could not obstruct the dynamics of the “underground currents” in the community. The “limited degree of sovereignty” (Constantinou 2008, 147–8) prevented the full normalization of the exception in the sense that it did not absorb the social vibrations of the opposition. The ruptures in the “national unity” doctrine continued to force the Turkish Cypriot leadership to move towards suppression. Suppression was expressed more strikingly in the 1968 elections. The Republic of Cyprus announced its intention to hold presidential elections. Within the new environment created by the opening of negotiations on the Cyprus problem and the restructuring of the separate structures, the Turkish Cypriot leadership also announced elections for the VicePresident of the Republic on 25 February 1968 (Akın 1968a). This intention proved sufficient enough to create a new dynamic political mobilization. For the first time in many years, the Turkish Cypriots effectively questioned this atypical “one-party regime” imposed on them. As early as the end of January 1968, the Turkish Cypriot press reported on the possibility of the candidacy of the judge Mehmet Zeka as an opponent

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of Küçük (Akın 1968b), without excluding the possibility of the creation of a political party with its own candidate (Akın 1968c). Indeed, on 22 January, Mehmet Zeka announced his candidacy and sought to differentiate his positions from the dominant circles of the Turkish Cypriot leadership (Sonan 2014, 67–9). Zeka was a member of the General Committee but, from the beginning of the intercommunal riots, he expressed a different approach to the Cyprus problem. He had proposed a consensual policy based on which “instead of coercive measures that do not produce results, we could seek solutions that will reduce oppression by adopting a more moderate political approach towards the Greek Cypriots” (Denkta¸s 1996, 430–31). Although the candidacy of Zeka appears to have been supported by TMT circles that opposed Küçük, it is a fact that it disturbed the higher strata of the regime. The power circles supporting Denkta¸s considered that the emergence of a third political actor would change the balance in the competition between Denkta¸s and Küçük (Akın 1968d). However, on a more general level, Zeka’s candidacy represented a major rupture in the doctrine of “national unity” and legitimized oppositional tendencies. For this reason, the reaction was harsh. Mehmet Zeka was forced to withdraw his candidacy after pressure from the Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, Ercüment Yavuzalp (Feridun 2002, 70–1). Ankara essentially sought an open method of intervention and suppression in order to restore the ideology of the state of exception. Announcing the withdrawal of his candidacy, Zeka explained that he should not harm the “so needed unity of the community” (Akın 1968e). The headline in the newspaper Akın (1968e), which published the news of Zeka’s withdrawal, was revealing: “Because of the abnormal situation and in order to maintain unity, no elections will be held”. The “abnormal situation”, namely the state of exception, was activated to suppress basic rights and freedoms precisely at the time it felt threatened. The “abnormal situation” was reproduced at a time when a different political discourse was officially expressed—a type of discourse that reminded people of the necessity of overcoming this state of emergency. In the end, Küçük became Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus without elections on 15 February 1968. The method of suppression against the candidacy of Zeka did not ensure the marginalization of the opposition. It is a fact that the efforts of the nationalist elite to reach a consensus after the 1968 elections were unsuccessful. In 1971, Denkta¸s underlined that the poor economic situation of Turkey would have a negative impact on the Turkish Cypriot

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community; a development that would favour the opposition (Denkta¸s 1998, 7). The agony the Turkish Cypriot leadership experienced to incorporate the oppositional voices in the new system was also reflected in the efforts to create new job opportunities in the public sector, especially for young people (Süreç 2014, 14). In spite of these efforts, the drastic decrease in the living standards of the community, the alienation of Turkish Cypriot properties (Zafer 1969a) and the inequality in salaries (Zafer 1969b), opened yet another round of organized reaction. At this stage, the widening of the Turkish Cypriot opposition was mainly expressed by the organized Turkish Cypriot teachers. The Turkish ˙ Cypriot Teachers Union (Kıbrıs Türk Ilkokul Ö˘gretmenler Sendikası— ˙ KTIÖS) adopted a series of demands such as the introduction of new comprehensive salary scales, equality in the salaries of male and female teachers, the payment of social security and the provision of a widow’s pension to women who had lost their spouses during the period of the armed conflict (Zafer 1969c). Gradually, the outbreak of major strikes lasting until the second half of 1969 enabled the organized teachers to address the community as a whole. Their radicalization seems to have been based on the particular conditions of the social collapse that they experienced themselves in the education system of the enclaves. Özker Özgür (1999, 9), an English language teacher at the time and later leader of the Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi— CTP), described the process of politicizing teachers in the following words: “The teacher is by the side of the children of the people every day… When you start wondering from where the problems of students originate, you have already made the first step in politics”. Both the mobilizations as a form of expressing political demands, and the wider frame of the teachers’ demands, brought something new to the conditions that the Turkish Cypriot community was experiencing. It is true that the novel trade unionist ideas of teachers mainly included political demands such as the nationalization of banks and commerce, the fight against usury and the development of cooperatives in the economy (Zafer 1969d). All the above was placed under the general demand for a “change of the state of affairs” (Zafer 1969e), which caused even more reaction on the part of the community leadership. This was also the main reason why, in 1971–1972, the Turkish Cypriot teachers were in open confrontation with Küçük and the community leadership. The wider perception that the teachers advocated a general change at community level became “dangerous” for the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots. A typical example was the

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decision of the Trade Union’s Congress on 6 March 1971, underlining the slogan “no to capitalism, yes to socialism” (Tahsin 2001, 141–2). At the same conference, the Turkish Cypriot teachers also announced their position on the solution to the Cyprus problem, which underlined the necessity of creating a Federal Republic of Cyprus in which the community would be independent in its internal affairs and economy (Tahsin 2001, 142). The dynamic presence of teachers in the “parallel space” of the opposition and the range of their political demands, also influenced other strata of the community. Small shop owners, retailers and in particular civil servants, in many cases expressed similar positions, revealing a wider social reaction. As early as 1968, the pressure of the low living standards of civil servants forced them to seek an organized form of struggle. Their efforts certainly encountered many obstacles, since the leadership had effectively prohibited new students from coming into contact with any organization. The pre-existing Council of Turkish Cypriot Civil Servants (Memürin Kulübü) was a body that assimilated reactions rather than organizing them (Süreç 2014, 15). Gradually, a small group of young civil servants decided to set up a new organization under the name “Trade Union of Civil Servants of the Turkish Cypriot Administration” (Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi Memurlar Sendikası) (Süreç 2015, 15), which operated with a semi-legal status under the circumstances of the time. Gradually, through the widening of social reaction, the new organization gained ground, even creating a strike fund to support strikes (Halkın Sesi 1973c). This was a serious indication of the steady rise of politicization in the social strata in question, and the pre-existing organization reacted. Thus, in March 1973, it was decided to unify the two organizations and rename the newly founded body as “Trade Union of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Servants” (Kıbrıs Türk Amme Memurları Sendikası—KTAMS) (Süreç 2014, 18); a name that remains to this day. All the above processes surfaced the diverse demands of the opposition, which managed to survive through the “parallel social reality” of the enclaves. It is a truth that the dynamics of the “underground currents” were not enough to overturn the internal dominance of the state of exception. However, the circumstances of the time were such that the voices of the opposition could indeed be heard more loudly. Such a circumstance was the outcome of the 1970 parliamentary elections. As in the presidential elections of 1968, the Turkish Cypriot leadership decided to hold parallel elections with those in the Republic of Cyprus, so as to form the

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separate “Legislative Council”. The Turkish Cypriot leadership followed exactly the same tactics as before. It sought, in cooperation with Ankara, to fully marginalize the prospects of an organized opposition. They allowed for the presence of a single electoral platform under the guidance of Denkta¸s. The “National Solidarity Group” (Ulusal Dayanı¸sma Ekibi) included 59 candidates for the 15 seats of the Communal Chamber and 43 candidates for the 15 seats that corresponded to the community for the House of Representatives (Sonan 2014, 70–1). All those elected would form the new “Legislative Council” of the Turkish Cypriot Administration. Denkta¸s essentially sought to modernize this particular “one-party status” of the community by fully controlling the political dispute and giving the message that anyone who was openly opposed to the “national solidarity” programme would not be elected (Patrick 1976, 163). The group under his leadership was the only one in full composition in all the provinces of Cyprus, although a weak opposition made its appearance in the form of the “Green Island Group” (Ye¸silada Ekibi) in Famagusta, as well as some opposition personalities in Nicosia (Sonan 2014, 71). Given the circumstances, the predominance of Denkta¸s in the 5 July 1970 elections was extensive. Many important opposition personalities were eventually defeated (Sonan 2014, 71–2). However, outside the electoral process, this particular confrontation and its outcome laid the ground for a more comprehensive search for further political organization of the opposition. Ahmet Mithad Berbero˘glu, former member of the General Committee and member of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, emerged as the most important personality in the search for an opposition political party (Sonan 2014, 70). Berbero˘glu studied law in England, which strongly influenced his subsequent political activism. He very soon identified the problem of democratic deficiency and lack of democratic institutions in the Turkish Cypriot community, and more widely in Cyprus (Özuslu 2011, 19). From the beginning of his participation in the General Committee, he openly expressed his disagreement with the authoritarianism of the military structure and the polarization caused by the nationalist leadership (Pınar 2013). He believed that one of the formulas that would help to democratize the community was the creation of political parties, which, as collective entities, would help control the leadership and, in general, broaden the range of political life. “We thought that a political party had to be created immediately. There was a government, but I ask … how is the budget of this government

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prepared? There is no budget. Then how are the decisions of this government made?” (Özuslu 2011, 29). Berbero˘glu raised these questions and reached the conclusion that the political maturing of the community and the rationalization of its political structure were necessary steps in overcoming the state of exception. For this reason, Berbero˘glu believed that the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the structures of the Republic of Cyprus was a mistake. He thought that the community could force the Greek Cypriots to treat them as equals only through their active presence in the structures of power. “We should pass to the southern side of the green line, use our authority and make our existence recognized” he said (Özuslu 2011, 22). In this way, he promoted the notion that the protection of the Turkish Cypriots could not be safeguarded through the emergency state, but through the unified political space of Cyprus. Through this approach, Berbero˘glu promoted a political programme that removed the community from the divided political field of the enclaves and renewed its relationship with the whole of Cyprus. These central approaches were also reflected in the political programme of the new party. On 27 December 1970, after the electoral defeat, 13 founding members announced the creation of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP). The social composition of the founding members included professions such as doctors, lawyers and small and medium-scale businessmen. They were people with prior political experience who had been defeated in the previous elections (Patrick 1976, 164). Given the hardships in the enclaves, the new party very soon began to acquire a remarkable impetus. The founder of the Party himself claimed that by March 1971 the party had 2000 members, while the goal was to reach up to 4000 by the end of the year (Patrick 1976, 165). Given that civil servants and the mücahit members could not be party members, as well as the general political pressure on the opposition, the numbers and goals reported by Berbero˘glu confirm a wider social critique against the regime. Under these circumstances, CTP decided to run with its own President as candidate in the elections for the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus that were planned to be held on 18 February 1973. Five years after the 1968 elections and the confirmation of an intense political and ideological diversification within the enclaves, the Turkish Cypriot opposition was entering a new phase. At the same time, the antagonisms within the nationalist elite also seemed to reshape significantly. The 1973 elections and Ankara’s intervention for the candidacy of Denkta¸s effectively ended the longstanding political presence of Fazıl Küçük. On New

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Year’s Day in 1973 Küçük announced that he would not run as candidate because he believed that running for Vice-President would harm the unity of the community in a way that would require long-term efforts to recover (Halkın Sesi 1973a). The political mobility among the Turkish Cypriots was such that it did not go unnoticed by the Turkish press. Milliyet’s journalist Sami Kohen (1973) even referred to a “new period” for the Turkish Cypriot community characterized by “ruptures” that could only be overcome with Küçük’s withdrawal of candidacy. This period of “ruptures” in the Turkish Cypriot community indeed bore a new element of open expression of different political visions in the public space. From that point onwards, the political disagreement with the ideology of the state of exception was expressed openly in the public sphere, and as Berbero˘glu’s candidacy showed, this alternative voice now wanted to “measure” its own power and influence. The 1973 pre-election period in the enclaves in essence gave the opportunity to make the different views and visions dynamically public, both regarding the position of the community in Cyprus and the status of the island itself—political positions that pre-existed but that were expressed differently. Berbero˘glu’s candidacy as well as the presence of the CTP were agents expressing clearly the dividing lines within the Turkish Cypriots. For example, the leader of the new party insisted that every citizen should have the right to express his/her view as a key element of a democratic state, while the armed forces should stay outside politics (Halkın Sesi 1973d). In this way, he questioned the notion of “national unity” that seemed to monopolize the public space of the enclaves. Berbero˘glu stressed the need for refugees to return to their homes in safe conditions and reintegrate into the productive process. Economic growth, he said, “must cease to be a fantasy” (Halkın Sesi 1973d). He therefore reminded the people that the militarization of social structures and the alienation from the production process were consequences of the “exceptional state”; the result of a pending problem that had to be solved rather than a “normal” aspect of the life of the Turkish Cypriots. The positions expressed by Berbero˘glu and the CTP in resolving the Cyprus problem not only confirmed the differentiations, but also called for the continuation of an imaginary line with the past that reiterated the values of coexistence and independence. In particular, Berbero˘glu’s positions on the Cyprus issue were expressed as follows: “Without losing time, we must find a solution that guarantees the national unity and solidarity of our community, the security of life and property, which will provide for

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the continuation and the development of our national existence within an independent state based on the system of cooperation. This solution will give responsibilities to our community for the whole of Cyprus, it will enable us to benefit from the wealth of the whole island and should be based on a system of joint administration” (Halkın Sesi 1973d). For CTP, the distinct and autonomous ethnic-communal existence of the Turkish Cypriots referred to a common Cypriot and independent context. Based on this reasoning, overcoming the threat to the existence of the community, as manifested in the intercommunal riots, was something that could not be secured within the divided political and economic reality. On the contrary, based on the aforementioned programme, the survival of the community and its autonomous features depended on the degree of cooperation with the Greek Cypriots in the common administration, as well as on the degree of independence of the country. The reinterpretation of “national unity”, the independence of Cyprus as a form of cultural and political autonomy from Turkey, as well as the idea of coexistence with the Greek Cypriots, comprised issues that were brought up in the public sphere by the party and which overstepped the “red lines” of the exceptional state. In essence, they were placed outside the “national criteria” of the dominant power and put forth an alternative value system. The rumours alone of the possibility of another candidacy, such as that of Berbero˘glu, which was testing the ideology of exception, were enough for a new nationalist mobilization. The Association of Turkish Cypriot Resistance (Türk Mukavemetçiler Derne˘gi) published a release in support of Denkta¸s, in which it reminded people of the “national criteria” that the leader of the community should have: “The person who will become Vice-President and therefore the person who will lead the Turkish Community of Cyprus cannot be one of those who have exhibited behaviours detached from the national cause. It cannot be one of those who find the sacred institution of the fighters unnecessary, who think vote-hunting is a skill with demagogic promises that the Cyprus problem will be solved without Turkey. It cannot be the one of those who value the mandate of peacekeeping more than the great guarantee of the Turkish regiment and who, despite so many tragic experiences, have as their slogan the co-existence with the Greek Cypriots” (Halkın Sesi 1973b). This attempt to delegitimize the CTP and the candidacy of Berbero˘glu was a new form of “restoring” the red lines of nationalism. As in the ˙ case of Zeka, the Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, Asaf Ilhan, called

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Berbero˘glu into his office in an effort to make him withdraw his candidacy. Berbero˘glu initially replied that such a move could only be made ˙ after a party decision. The next day, Berbero˘glu informed Ilhan about the party’s negative decision, underlining that if he was elected the Ambassador would be declared persona non grata because he had exceeded the limits of his mandate in Cyprus (Özuslu 2011, 357). Finally, after several days of house detention” imposed on Berbero˘glu by armed police officers, the Party decided that insisting on his nomination would give the electoral process and the results a sort of democratic legitimacy, which in turn would prevent questioning the otherwise foreseen prevalence of Denkta¸s (Özuslu 2011, 38–9). On Friday 16 February 1973, Halkın Sesi (1973e) published Berbero˘glu’s decision to withdraw his candidacy. Without elections, Denkta¸s took over the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community, a position which he held for nearly 32 consecutive years.

Notes 1. A shadowy, anti-communist organization, created towards the end of 1967, aiming at the partition of Cyprus. Protagonists in the establishment and arming of TMT were, from the Turkish Cypriot side, Rauf Denkta¸s and Burhan Nalbanto˘glu, who cooperated with members of the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus and the Office for Special Warfare, which was under the Turkish General Staff in Ankara. For further details, see: Kızılyürek (2016, 151–61), Berksel (2018, 24–34). 2. Küçük was particularly annoyed by the increasing political influence and intervention of military leaders in the period in question. Articles published in the Turkish Cypriot press of the time reported on pressures for the resignation of Küçük communicated to Ankara, as the Turkish government did not recognize the “absolute authority” of political leaders in the community’s internal affairs (Zafer 1967a). 3. The assassination attacks against Left Turkish Cypriots are cited in the following: Kızılyürek (2016, 178–81), An (2005, 273–8). 4. Tahsin obviously refers to the tragic situation of Ahmet Yahya, an active member of the left-wing trade union organization of PEO, who was murdered on 29 May 1958. Before his assassination, however, he “accepted” the demand to publish his resignation from the trade union in the newspaper Halkın Sesi. Forcing left-wing people to a public declaration of resignation was, in fact, a method followed by TMT at the time. It seems that Yahya’s assassins had not learned about his public statement and

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went ahead with his execution. On the next day, the news of his assassination and his resignation statement were published side by side (Kızılyürek 2016, 180). 5. Cyprus GDP in 1960 was 93.1 million Cyprus pounds and the Turkish Cypriots produced 13 million (Safaklı ¸ 2017, 6–7). 6. For a comprehensive analysis on the structural features of Cyprus as a basis for the development of the political position regarding independence, as well as regarding cultural pluralism, especially in the frame of the Left, see Panayiotou (2006). 7. The members of the Executive Board were: President Fazıl Küçük, VicePresident Rauf Denkta¸s, Defence Affairs Osman Örek, Agriculture and Natural Resources Affairs Fazıl Plümer, Health Affairs Niyazi Manyera, Education and Cultural Affairs Semsi ¸ Kazım, Social Affairs, Municipalities, Charitable Foundations and Cooperatives Hakkı Süleyman, Justice Affairs Ümit Süleyman, Fiscal and Budget Affairs Rüstem Tatar, Transport Affairs Erol Kazım, Financial affairs O˘guz Ramadan (Zafer 1967d).

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———. 1996. Rauf Denkta¸s’ın Hatıraları, 1964 [Rauf Denkta¸s’s Memories]. ˙ Vol. 1. Istanbul: Bo˘gaziçi Yayınları. ———. 1997a. Rauf Denkta¸s’ın Hatıraları. 1965 [Rauf Denkta¸s’s Memo˙ ries].Vol. 2. Istanbul: Bo˘gaziçi Yayınları. ———. 1997b. Rauf Denkta¸s’ın Hatıraları, 1967 [Rauf Denkta¸s’s Memories]. ˙ Vol. 4. Istanbul: Bo˘gaziçi Yayınları. ———. 1998. Rauf Denkta¸s’ın Hatıraları. 1971–1972 [Rauf Denkta¸s’s Memo˙ ries]. Vol. 8. Istanbul: Bo˘gaziçi Yayınları. Edkins, Jenny, and Veronique Pin-Fat. 2004. “Introduction: Life, Power, Resistance.” In Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics, edited by Jenny Edkins, Michael J. Shapiro, and Veronique Pin-Fat, 1–21. London and New York: Routledge. Eliçin, Zehra. 2013. Kıbrıs’ta denizi görmeden. 60’lı yıllar [In Cyprus, without ˙ Seeing the Sea. The 60s]. Istanbul: Cinius Yayınları. Ertekün, M. Necati Münir. 1981. In Search of a Negotiated Cyprus Settlement. Nicosia: Ulus Matbaacılık Ltd. Fassin, Didier. 2005. “Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Policies in France.” Culture Anthropology 20 (3): 362–387. Feridun, Oktay. 2002. Ba¸shakim Zeka Bey [Chief Justice Mr. Zeka]. Lefko¸sa. Gibbons, Scott H. 1969. Peace without Honour. Ankara: Ada Publishing House. Gürel, Ayla, and Kudret Özersay. 2006. “Cyprus and the Politics of Property.” Mediterranean Politics 11 (3): 349–369. Halkın Sesi. 1965a. “Türk Sözcüsü, Makarios’un göçmenlerle ilgili son demecini cevaplandırdı.” [Turkish Spokesperson Replies to Makarios’ Last Statement on Migrants], 25 September. ———. 1965b. “Göçmen durumunu Türk hükümetiyle görü¸sece˘gim.” [I Will Discuss the Migrant Situation with the Turkish Government], 20 September. ———. 1965c. “Difteri Salgını ba¸sgösterdi.” [Diphtheria Outbreak], 8 October. ———. 1965d. “Rum barbarlı˘gının sebep oldu˘gu difterinin ilk kurbanını verdik.” [First Victim of the Diphtheria Caused by Greek Cypriot Barbarism], 10 October. ———. 1973a. “Dr. F. Küçük gazetemize verdi˘gi özel mesaj.” [Special Message from Dr. F. Küçük to Our Newspaper], 1 January. ———. 1973b. “Türk Mukavemetçiler Derne˘gi seçim kararını açıkladı.” [The Turkish Resistance Fighters Association Announced Its Election Decision], 1 January. ———. 1973c. “Memurun istekleri dile getirildi.” [The Requests of the Civil Servants Were Voiced], 11 January. ———. 1973d. “CTP programını açıkladı.” [CTP Announced Its Programme], 8 January. ———. 1973e. “Berbero˘glu adaylı˘gını çekti.” [Berbero˘glu Withdraws His Candidacy], 16 February.

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Hatay, Mete, and Rebecca Bryant. 2008. “The Jasmine Scent of Nicosia: Of Returns, Revolutions and the Longing for Forbidden Pasts.” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 26: 423–449. Jones, Reece. 2009. “Agents of Exception: Border Security and the Marginalization of Muslims in India.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27: 879–897. Kanol, Kani. 2012. TMT’nin ¸sifreleri [TMT’s Codes]. Lefko¸sa: Söylem Yayınları. Kedourie, Elie. 2005. “The Cyprus Problem and Its Solution.” Middle East Studies 41 (5): 649–660. Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2009. Daha önceleri neredeydiniz? Dünden bugüne Kıbrıs müzakereleri [Where Were You Before? Cyprus Negotiations from the Past ˙ to the Present]. Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları. ———. 2012. “Turkish Cypriot Left: A Historical Overview.” In Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation, edited by Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt, 169–184. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. ———. 2016. Bir Hınç ve Siddet ¸ Tarihi. Kıbrıs’ta Statü Kavgası ve Etnik Çatı¸sma [A History of Revenge and Violence: The Fight for Status and Ethnic ˙ ˙ Conflict in Cyprus]. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. Kohen, Sami. 1973. “Kıbrıs’ta yeni dönem.” [New Period in Cyprus]. Halkın Sesi, 12 January. Konur, Alp. 1965. “Göçmen durumu.” [The Situation of Migrants]. Halkın Sesi, 7 October. Korun, Turhan. 2015. Ben de yazdım (cehlin ilme galip geldi˘gi yıllar) [I Also Wrote (The Years When Ignorance Won Over Knowledge)]. Lefko¸sa: Havadis Yayınları. Mbembe, Achille. 2003. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15 (1): 1–40. Milliyet. 1967a. “Kıbrıs’ta Geçici Türk Yönetimi Kuruldu.” [Temporary Turkish Administration Established in Cyprus], 30 December. ———. 1967b. “Makarios: Hareket kanunsuzdur.” [The Act Is Illegal], 30 December 30. ———. 1967c. “Makarios Türk hükümetini protesto etti: Kuneralp istenmeyen adam ilan edildi.” [Makarios Protests the Turkish Government: Kuneralp Declared Persona Non Grata], 31 December. Minca, Claudio. 2007. “Agamben’s Geographies of Modernity.” Political Geography 26 (1): 78–97. Oberling, Pierre. 1982. The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus. New York: Boulder. Öncül, Tamer, and Öntaç Düzgün. 1999. Kıbrıs Türk Yüksek Ö˘grenim Gençli˘gi Hareketleri 1960–1981 [Turkish Cypriot Higher Education Youth Movements 1960–1981]. Lefko¸sa: Nacı Talat Vakfı Yayınları. Özgür, Özker. 1999. Yanılmayı çok isterdim. [How I Wish I Was Wrong]. Lefko¸sa: I¸sık Kitabevi.

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Özuslu, Sami. 2011. Ankara’ya kafa tutan adam (Persona non grata). Ahmet Mithat Berbero˘glu [The Man Who Stood Up to Ankara (Persona non grata). Ahmet Mithat Berbero˘glu]. Lefko¸sa: United Medya Yayınları. Panayiotou, Andreas. 2006. “Lenin in the Coffee-Shop: The Communist Alternative and Forms of Non-Western Modernity.” Postcolonial Studies 9 (3): 267–280. Patrick, Richard A. 1976. Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963– 1971. Waterloo: Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies Publication. Pınar, Naim. 2013. “Onikinci adamın sırrı.” [The Secret of the Twelfth Man]. Havadis Poli, 20 October. Accessed 13 February 2015. http://www.havadi skibris.com/Ekler/poli/149/onikinci-adamin-sirri/895. Plümer, Aytu˘g. 2008. Kıbrıs Ekonomi Tarihi. Sarsıntılı bir devrin anatomisi (1960–1974). [History of Cypriot Economy: The Anatomy of a Traumatic Period (1960–1974)]. Lefko¸sa: Rüstem. Ram, Moriel. 2015. “Colonial Conquest and the Politics of Normalization: The Case of Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus.” Political Geography 47: 21–32. Safaklı, ¸ Okan Veli. 2017. “1974 öncesi ve sonrası Kıbrıs Türk Ekonomisi: Rum ekonomisi ile mukayeseli de˘gerlendirme.” [Turkish Cypriot Economy Before and After 1974: Comparative Analysis with the Greek Cypriot Economy]. In Kıbrıs Türk Ekonomisinin Dünü ve Bugünü [The Past and Present of Turkish Cypriot Economy]. edited by Okan Veli Safaklı ¸ and Harun Se¸ ¸ sen, 1–41. Ankara: Detay Yayıncılık. Scheipers, Sibylle. 2015. “The Use of Camps in Colonial Warfare.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43 (4): 678–698. Schmitt, Carl. 2005. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Sonan, Sertaç. 2014. In the Grip of Political Clientelism: The Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Politics and the Politico-Economic Foundations of Pro-Taksim Consensus. Essen: Unpublished PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences University of Essen. Stratilatis, Costas. 2016. “H αδoξη ´ (;) καριšρα τoυ Carl Schmitt στην Kπρo: ´ ´ ημoκρατ´ιας H δημιoυργ´ια και τα πρωτα ´ šτη τoυ β´ιoυ της Kυπριακης απ´o σμιτιανη´ σκoπια.” ´ [Carl Schmitt’s Inglorious (?) Career in Cyprus. The Foundation and the First Years of the Republic of Cyprus from a Schmittian ´ κης Perspective]. In H Kυπ ριακ η´ Δημoκρατ ι´α και τ o Δ´ικαιo τ ης Aν αγ [The Cyprus Republic and the Law of Necessity], edited by Achilleas Emilianides, Christos Papastylianou and Costas Stratilatis, 7–93. Athens: Sakoulas Publications. Strong, Nicholas Paul. 1999. The Economic Consequences of Ethno-National Conflict in Cyprus: The Development of Two Siege Economies after 1962 and 1974. London: PhD London School of Economics, University of London.

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Süreç, Erdal. 2014. Bitmeyen BEY Dönemi. KTAMS ve Siyasette ya¸sanan süreç [The Never-Ending MASTER Period. KTAMS and the Process in Politics]. Lefko¸sa: Ate¸s Matbaacılık. ´ σ τ ην κ oρυϕ η´ [The rise Tahsin, Arif Hasan. 2001. H αν ´ oδ oς τ oυ Nτ ενκτ ας of Denkta¸s to the Top]. Translated by Thanasis Charanas. Nicosia: Diaphania Publications. ´ oυς και τ o Trimikliniotis, Nicos. 2010. H διαλεκτ ικ η´ τ oυ šθν oυς -κρ ατ καθεσ τ ως ´ εξ α´ιρεσ ης [The Nation-State Dialectic and the State of Exception]. Athens: Savalas. Tuncel, Kamil. 2011. Dü¸smana inat. Bir gün daha ya¸samak [Just to Spite the Enemy. Living for One More Day]. Lefko¸sa: KTÖS Yayınları. Turner, Simon. 2015. “What Is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp.” Journal of Refugee Studies 29 (2): 139–148. Accessed 2 February 2016. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fev024. UNSC. 1964. Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/5950, 10 September 1964, Paragraph 222. United Nations, New York: United Nations Security Council. Yamak, Kemal. 2006. Gölgede kala izler ve gölgele¸sen bizler [Traces in the Shadow ˙ and Us Becoming Shadows]. Istanbul: Do˘gan Kitap. Zafer. 1963. “Yine kendileri yıkıyorlar.” [They Are Destroying It Themselves], 17 November. ———.1967a. “Küçük in Bakanları istifa mı ediyor?” [Are Küçük’s Ministers Resigning?], 6 October. ———. 1967b. “Cemaat Meclisi açıklama yaptı.” [Communal Assembly Makes a Statement], December. ———. 1967c. “Kıbrıs Türkünün dayanması yeni s¸ artlara ba˘glıdır.” [The Endurance of Turkish Cypriots Depends on New Conditions], 13 October. ———. 1967d. “Yetki uyu¸smazlı˘gı nihayet halledildi. Cemaatimize yeni bir statü verildi.” [Jurisdictional Dispute Finally Resolved: Our Community Has a New Status], 29 December. ———. 1969a. “Toprak Satanlar.” [Those Who Sell Territory], October 27. ———.1969b. “Yürütme Kurulunda Skandal.” [Scandal in the Executive Council], 3 November. ———. 1969c. “Ö˘gretmenlerimizin istekleri.” [Demands of Our Teachers], 3 November. ———. 1969d. “Yönetimin bildirisi üzerine.” [On the Announcement of the Administration], 1 December. ———. 1969e. “Bir direni¸sin dü¸sündürdü˘gü.” [Thoughts Provoked by a Resistance], 15 December.

CHAPTER 4

Ideological Awakenings Against the “New Homeland”

Towards the Construction of a “New Homeland” “The emergence of ideological turbulence and the rise of the extreme leftist movements reached dangerous levels for the future of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State” (Sükan 1981). This was the assessment of the retired Turkish General Sükan regarding the results of the elections in the Turkish Cypriot community that took place in June 1981. In these elections, just seven years after the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot centre-left parties in opposition managed to surpass, in percentages and seats, the National Unity Party (UBP) of Rauf Denkta¸s and create the prospect of forming a government. It was precisely this perspective that symbolized, according to the General, “ideological turbulence”, a new pursuit of the society and “dangerous” for the future of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (“TFSC”). Some crucial questions arise at this point. Why did part of the political elite in Ankara consider the rise of “extreme leftist movements” in the Turkish Cypriot community to be dangerous? What was the dominant expectation for the future of the “TFSC”, which was questioned by

This chapter is based on an article published in The Cyprus Review Journal by the title: “The ‘New Homeland’ and the Turkish Cypriot Opposition in the 1974–1981 Period” (Moudouros 2017).

© The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_4

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the “ideological awakenings” of part of the Turkish Cypriot society? Why did such “problematic” upheavals emerge in such a short time after the military intervention? The search for answers to such questions requires a more comprehensive and closer look at the dialectical relationship developed between the presence of Turkey in Cyprus since 1974 and the social dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot community. In related academic research, the presence of Turkey on the island, particularly from 1974 onwards, is described in terms of “occupation” or as “colonial power” (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012, 12). On the basis of this particular phrasing regarding Turkey’s presence in Cyprus, the relation developed with the Turkish Cypriot community, is that of a core state–subordinate administration. The concept of a colonial-oriented intervention underlines the continuous effort of the core state to obtain maximum influence over the setting of the periphery (Doyle 1986, 40), i.e. the subordinate administration. According to Lutz (2006, 594), the notion of the modern empire can be employed to analyse a state project that aims to exercise control over all governmental practices and resources of a region outside of its own boundaries. The application of the above analytical framework in the case of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community after 1974 highlights the conversion of the space established in the northern part of Cyprus into a space of reproduction of the modernization of the core state, namely Turkey. At the same time, the specific space as an “imperial formation” reproduces, according to Stoler (2006, 128), zones of exclusion and constant exceptions. In short, the power structures of the northern territories of Cyprus from 1974 onwards and the international illegality created a state of exception (Constantinou 2008, 158). This irregular state of exception, into which the Turkish Cypriot community entered after 1974, was the result of complex processes. Turkey decided to intervene militarily in the island on 20 July 1974, supposedly to restore the constitutional order of the Republic that was challenged by the coup d’état against President Makarios. The coup aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece. The prospect of Union of Cyprus with Greece was perceived as a threat to the national security of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. As a result, Ankara decided to activate its military force in a “space of threat” which, after the military victory, is transformed into a bare “virgin land” (Ram 2015, 28) upon which an entirely new state of affairs was to be created.

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As noted by Mbembe (2003, 25), in colonized territories, the state of exception tends to become the rule. Such territories are accompanied by efforts to create an entirely new set of social and spatial relations on the ground. Similarly, in the case of Cyprus, Turkey activated extraordinary politics with the aim of creating the rule anew (Ram 2015, 22). Immediately after the partition of Cyprus, Ankara sought to normalize the conquered space by introducing a new rationale. It tried to normalize both its own presence and the new partitionist state of affairs through the production of what Ram (2013) calls a “peaceful war landscape”. The violent creation of two separate “national zones” would be the geographical basis upon which a degree of separation of the two communities would form a key element in a permanent settlement of the Cyprus problem (Scott 1998, 142). As noted by Sükan (1981), “In Cyprus the two communities were separated and their reunification is but a fantasy. The northern part is 100% Turkish and the southern part 100% Greek. It is an island with two opposing ethnic groups that have no possibility of living together”. The geographical division and the emergence of the notions of “northern and southern Cyprus” as separate political entities formed the legitimizing dynamics of the claim of regulating, solving or mitigating the ethnic and communal conflicts (O’Leary 2007, 888) that had preceded on the island. Beyond this, the geographical partition was the start of the creation of a new order by force (Kızılyürek 2016, 528– 32), the start of the development of a colonial rationale and taming of the war landscape through processes such as Turkification of the population and the space and structuring of a new economy. Thus, the rationalization of the partition included the creation of a “new homeland” for the Turkish Cypriot community. One of the most important founding elements of the “new homeland” was a large-scale population division (Kızılyürek 2016, 535). This spatial dimension of the new order in Cyprus entailed the massive displacement of people from the south to the north and vice versa, creating a purely Turkish region and thus alienating a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community from their homes and place of origin (Arslan 2014, 46). The movement of Turkish Cypriots from the south to the northern regions of the island was initiated on 20 July 1974 but escalated, in an organized manner, in the following period (Morvaridi 1993, 223). Reports in the Turkish Cypriot press indicate that by mid-November 1974 around 20,000 Turkish Cypriots had already moved from the southern to the northern regions of Cyprus (Zaman 1974a), while by December 1975 it

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is estimated that this number had risen to 40,000 (Hocknell 2001, 168). Other data refer to higher numbers of Turkish Cypriots moving to the northern areas, the figure reaching 45,000 (Sonan 2014, 81). Consequently, the composition of the population in the new state of affairs created by the war was dominated by the refugee issue. In an attempt to preserve, in the best possible manner, the basic characteristics of the social fabric of the community and to facilitate the restoration of economic life, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots sought to relocate the refugees from the southern regions to places and landscapes that resembled the ones they had left behind. It soon became clear that such an effort was impossible; it was a development that greatly increased the traumatic experiences at the core of the community (Scott 1998, 147). The Ministry of Resettlement was created in 1976 for the purpose of population relocation and was initially assigned two important tasks. The first was to distribute immovable properties for the housing of refugees and the provision of land for cultivation. The second was to assess the value of all the properties the Turkish Cypriots had left in the southern regions and to grant them property of equal value in the northern regions (Morvaridi 1993, 223). In 1977 the Resettlement, Land Distribution and Equiva˙ ˙ lent Property Law (Iskan, Topraklandırma ve E¸sde˘ger Yasası—ITEM) was endorsed, through which a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community took possession of Greek Cypriot properties (Morvaridi 1993, 223). At the core of this legislation lay the logic of awarding “points of equal value”. These points corresponded to the value of the land or immovable property that Turkish Cypriots had left in the southern regions. These could be redeemed against Greek Cypriot property use in the northern regions. This precise process of granting “points” was painful, traumatic, and caused profound social ruptures. Many years later, a large number of Turkish Cypriot refugees still did not have any guarantee on the property they were using in the new context (Scott 1998, 149). The delay in the adoption of legislation created additional problems, since its implementation legitimized, in political terms, the distribution of Greek Cypriot properties that had started in the summer of 1974 in the midst of chaotic conditions (Gürel 2012, 22). Through such arrangements, the Turkish Cypriot refugees from the southern part of the island were called on to renounce their rights over the properties they left behind. Essentially, they were forced to abandon their desire to return to their homes (Scott 1998, 143), since that was the only way to acquire what was necessary to survive in the frame of a “new homeland”. This strategy was a fundamental piece

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of the overall ideological background for the alienation of the Turkish Cypriot community from its past and its integration into the new divisive reality. Further to the above process, the Turkification of space was expanded through a broad campaign of renaming Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot villages with new “authentic” Turkish names (Yashin 2010). Originally this policy was implemented with the decisive role of special committees of the Turkish army (Copeaux and Copeaux 2009, 101), and acquired a more organized form with the establishment of the “TFSC” in February 1975 (Kızılyürek 2002, 291). The aim of this policy was to “erase the Greek Cypriot traces”, but also to create a more comprehensive status to the territorialization of the new Turkish entity, to delimit the owners of space (Turkish Cypriots) with new symbolisms and thus to distinguish them from the foreigners (Greek Cypriots) (Kızılyürek 2016, 560). In the same context lay the population movements from Turkey. Transfer of population from Turkey had started as a policy of reinforcing the new social division of labour. But eventually became a key pillar for the creation of additional pressures against the expression of the Cypriot identity of the Turkish Cypriot community (Kızılyürek 2005, 257). A key pillar of the normalization efforts of the new regime was the economy. The great inequality in the development of the two communities, preoccupied Ankara so intensely that it made a priority the issue of ˙ creating a new economic environment (Ipekçi 1974). This priority was not in the least accidental. Korkut Özal, Minister of Agriculture of the Government of Turkey at the time, said that “the military operation was over. Now the economic and social operation begins” (Zaman 1974b). Turkey and the leadership of the community foresaw that the perpetuation of the impoverishment of the Turkish Cypriots and the economic destabilization could create more ruptures in the state-building process (Wilson 1992, 120). Initially the material reality of partition appeared extremely attractive. So attractive and unprecedented that, a few years later, it was described by Fazıl Küçük (1980) as follows: “The Turkish Cypriots were found in deep wealth up to their chins. Such a great wealth that was never given to any other community in history”. Indeed, for many political and economic circles in the Turkish Cypriot community and Ankara, the attempt of building a separate state immediately after the invasion seemed to have serious chances of success and economic viability. In August 1974, the Ecevit government created the Cyprus Coordination Committee (Kıbrıs Koordinasyon Kurulu) led by Ziya Müezzino˘glu, who

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was responsible for the implementation of a state plan for the economy of the northern regions. In 1975, the Assistance Delegation (Yardım Heyeti) was established as complementary to the Assistance Committee in Nicosia and had the role of inspecting the implementation of infrastructure works financed by Turkey (Yalçın 1975). As Müezzino˘glu reported, “our goal was to assign a personality to the Turkish community, to revitalize the economy and aid the establishment of a state” (Birand 1976a). The economic basis of this policy was evaluated by the head of the Coordination Committee as quite strong. Soon after taking up his ˙ duties, Müezzino˘glu (Ipekçi 1974) stated that: “The natural resources and facilities of this area indicate that in a very short time it will be self-sustained”. The economic prospects that were supposedly opening up for the Turkish Cypriot community after the war were mainly based on the enormous extent of the movable and immovable property that Greek Cypriot refugees had to leave behind. Houses, premises, shops, factories, arable land, vehicles, warehouses filled with products, equipment and raw materials were transformed into one of the most important foundations of the economy of a dichotomous state of affairs (Sonan 2014, 88). The total value of the houses that Greek Cypriot refugees were forced to abandon was initially estimated at 250 million Cyprus pounds; 150 million Cyprus pounds was the estimated value of movable property from the houses, and equipment relating to the agricultural sector was valued at 7.5 million Cyprus pounds, while the value of livestock reached about 8.5 million Cyprus pounds (Hocknell 2001, 165). Up until 1977, the Turkish Cypriot authorities estimated that, in the northern areas of the island, there was a vast area of 1,279,099 hectares of arable land, of which 29,252 hectares belonged to the enclaved Greek Cypriots, 280,093 belonged to Turkish Cypriots and 872,778 hectares passed to the ownership of the Turkish Cypriot power structures in the form of nationalization (Sonan 2014, 89). According to figures published decades later, in 1974 there were 75,000 hectares of arable fields and a total of 3,750,000 citrus trees (Kıbrıs 2012). As far as other important business infrastructures were concerned, the Turkish Cypriot authorities estimated that Greek Cypriots were forced to leave a total of 3463 businesses. There were 230 industrial units, of which 138 employed more than five workers. In the tourism sector, there were 15,000 beds (Çelik 1990, 66). Immediately after the invasion, the northern territories of Cyprus accounted for

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30% of new investments in the industrial sector, 32% of the total employability capacity, and 26% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Saygun 1981a). Theoretically, the Turkish Cypriot community had at its disposal 48–60% of the total export potential of agricultural products, 47% of livestock production, 46% of agricultural production, 87–96% of the tourist facilities under construction, 65% of existing tourist facilities and 46% of industrial production (Hocknell 2001, 167). The state planning and the strong state interventionism chosen as the basic model for the new economy was the result of three main factors. The first was the absence of a strong business class in the community to undertake the investment venture of developing the private sector (Wilson 1992, 122). The second was the intention of Ankara to export its own economic development model (Gülalp 1985, 337) to the territory that it had previously controlled by military force. The third factor was the attempt to address the risk of popular delegitimization of the founding ideology of the new state of affairs. Apart from property sharing, the provision of public services, the safeguarding of wages and benefits, the provision of allowances to displaced persons or to families who had lost relatives in the conflicts and the creation of a large public sector with secured employment were all necessary policies for integrating Turkish Cypriots into new context and for absorbing any reactions (Bryant 2014, 130). This type of economic dependency in the early stages could only unfold through a state-led development. The importance of these three factors initially weakened the reactions of part of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite who clearly preferred a free-market model (Sonan 2014, 94). Within the frame of the Coordination Committee’s work, technical and administrative personnel were transferred from the state economic enterprises of Turkey with the aim of establishing the respective business units in Cyprus, as well as to train the local staff (Birand 1976a). In exceptional cases, economic planning was led by Turkish Cypriots who had experience in the Turkish state. A typical example of this was Alper Orhon, who undertook the task of establishing the Planning Ministry (Bozkurt 1974) and Ça˘glar Yasal, who worked for the creation of the Ministry of Tourism in Cyprus (Zaman 1974c). In the early stages after 1974, it was very difficult to start implementing a comprehensive economic programme immediately. Its basic directions were formed, but its full development could only occur after the collection of comprehensive economic data and statistics about the northern territories of Cyprus (Strong 1999, 158).

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The first comprehensive data on industrial infrastructure that Greek Cypriots were forced to abandon were recorded in relative detail in 1976 and 1977 in two reports. The first was the Report of the Special ˙ Committee of the Industry Sector of 1976 (Sanayi Kesimi Özel Ihtisas Komisyonu Raporu) and the second was the Newsletter on the Turkish Cypriot Federal State Industry Sector and its Potential, of 1977 (KTFD ˙ Sanayi Sektörü ve Imkanları Hakkında Bilgi Bülteni) (Saygun 1981a). Even without complete data, in a very short time, and under the guidance ˙ of Turkey, around ten large state economic enterprises (Kamu Iktisadi ˙ Te¸sebbüsleri—KIT) were created, which dominated over all sectors of the economy. Typical examples were the following companies: Cyprus Turkish Airlines Ltd (Kıbrıs Türk Havayolları), Turkish Industrial Enter˙ sletmeleri Holding Sirketi prises Holding Co. Ltd (Kıbrıs Türk Sanayi I¸ ¸ Ltd), Cyprus Turkish Maritime Co. Ltd (Kıbrıs Türk Denizcilik Ltd), Cyprus Turkish Petroleum Co. Ltd (Kıbrıs Türk Petrolleri Ltd), Cyprus Turkish Tobacco Industries Ltd (Kıbrıs Türk Tütün Ürünleri Ltd), Cyprus Turkish Tourism Management Co. Ltd (Kıbrıs Türk Turizm ˙ sletmeleri Ltd), Cypruvex Ltd, Banking and Insurance Services Company I¸ (EFIK Ltd), Import and Export Company (ETI˙ Ltd) and Alcohol Production and Sale Company (TASEL ¸ Ltd) (Rustem 1987, 223–4). In this way, industrial and agricultural production, foreign trade and transports, tourism and the banking sector were sectors that developed under a state planning model with five-year plans (Billuro˘glu 2012, 59–60). As noted by Strong (1999, 164), the northern part of the island soon became one of the most intensely state-led economies in Western Europe.

Division Seeks Its Divisionists O’Leary (2007, 904) notes that division seeks its divisionists—local agents that will support it, legitimize it and act as partners of the stronger external actor that had imposed it. In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, the internal agent of legitimization of the status created by the division of 1974 was the nationalist elite. For the nationalist elite, 1974 was a historical vindication of partition that had been adopted since the 1950s (Kızılyürek 2002, 290). The division of the island irrevocably confirmed that the two communities could not, and should not, live together (Kızılyürek 2016, 162). For the agents of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, the island was a geopolitical space that acquired meaning only if perceived as a projection of Turkey and the Turkish nation

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(Kızılyürek 2005, 385; 2017). Denkta¸s’s answer to Birand’s (1976b) question “Which should be the solution to the Cyprus problem?” was: “If there is to be life with rights, division is a precondition. The degree of division is also of importance”. As Cyprus alienated itself from its autonomous status, so did the Turkish Cypriots lose aspects of their Cypriotness. So long as Cyprus was merely perceived as the “babyland of the Turkish homeland”, the Turkish Cypriots were understood as part of the Turkish nation. The Cypriot identity could neither describe nor define the “Turks of Cyprus” (Vural and Rustemli 2006, 332). Apart from being unable to do so, should the Cypriot identity attempt to express the collectivity of the Turkish Cypriots, it would be rejected as anti-national and serving the communist danger. Ahmet Ötüken (1975) made a comment on this in Zaman newspaper: “Supporting positions such as ‘Cyprus belongs to the Cypriots’ or ‘an independent and democratic Cyprus without bases and armies’ serves Russian ambitions. Let us be sensitive on this issue and not leave a chance to those who seek goals outside the Motherland”. The delegitimization of the politicization of the Cypriot identity of Turkish Cypriots was expressed by Denkta¸s as follows: “If we are deceived into thinking we are Cypriots we shall boil in the Greek-Cypriot pot” (Dodd 1993a, 149). Within this ideological framework, the border dividing the island turned into one of the most important symbols of a separate Turkish Cypriot sovereignty (Yashin 2005, 109)—a separate sovereignty that was interpreted exclusively by the nationalist hegemony. Explaining the value of the “Peace Operation” for the community, O˘guz Korhan, member of the nationalist elite, said: “The most important thing was that we experienced the joy of having a secure territorial integrity with clearly defined borders” (KTFM 1981). In this space—the space defined by the invasion—there was no free field of mobilization for those forces that placed themselves outside the aforementioned ideological realm. The leading role of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite expanded redesigning the northern territories of Cyprus in a way that acquired features of governmentality that would enable separate governance from the Greek Cypriot community. Apart from the population relocation, the Turkish Cypriot elite had to immediately respond to the need to create and staff new administrative structures, the immediate operation of economic infrastructure (Olgun 1993, 272) and all necessary measures of covering the political vacuum caused by the war (Mehmetçik 2008, 147). The culmination of these processes was the declaration of the “TFSC” on

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13 February 1975 (Halkın Sesi 1975a). Based on Denkta¸s’s reasoning, this move would put pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to accept a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. At the same time, institutionalizing a separate Turkish Cypriot structure would help—according to the Turkish Cypriot leader—the economic growth of the community (Dodd 1993b, 104–5). On 18 February, again upon the insistence of Denkta¸s, the so-called founding parliament was created, with the primary task of drafting a constitution for the “TFSC”. This development was crucial, particularly regarding the composition of the founding Parliament. In addition to the 25 elected persons who had been members of the Turkish Cypriot Administration’s Legislative Council since the last period of the enclaves, Denkta¸s imposed the appointment of another 25 persons who were essentially under his influence (Sonan 2014, 110). He chose individuals from professional organizations and associations in numbers that ensured the majority of the nationalist right-wing in the founding parliament (Soysal 1975). He thus managed to put pressure on the opposition forces by seeking to control the coming political developments. On 8 June 1975, after many delays and disputes, the text of the constitution was adopted in a referendum (Dodd 1993b, 108). Even though the basic argument of Denkta¸s for the necessity of establishing the “TFSC” was that it would form one of the two constituent states of the Federal Cyprus, the partitionist provisions imposed were nevertheless substantial. An example was the first law on political parties, which reflected the main ideological parameters of the nationalist elite of the community. The law specifically stated that political parties could be banned for reasons such as: “The defamation or belittlement of the person or actions of the saviour of the Turkish nation and founder of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk, or the opposition to Atatürk’s reforms, the rejection of the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community is an inseparable part of the Turkish nation, the refusal of and the attempt to lift Turkey’s guarantor rights in Cyprus, the refusal of the legal existence of the peacekeeping operation made by the Turkish armed forces in Cyprus using the legal and natural guarantor’s jurisdiction of the Turkish Republic” (Kızılyürek 2005, 252). These references set the nationalist boundaries of the political activism of the community in the new context. They forced the political parties to work strictly on a communal level, cut off from potential bicommunal strategies that were seen as a threat to the separate Turkish Cypriot authority.

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In this way, Denkta¸s and the nationalist elite sought, and largely succeeded, to assign to the official position on a federal solution to the Cyprus problem a partitionist, rather than a unifying, content (Kızılyürek 2016, 565). In this context, they built close relations with the pan-Turkist movement of Turkey (Birand 1976c), as well as with the Islamic movement of Necmettin Erbakan, seeking thus to challenge the popularity of Ecevit among the Turkish Cypriots and to promote the deepening of the division (Birand 1976c). To do so, however, the Turkish Cypriot leader was at the time in need of a party that would function as a mechanism to legitimize partition both on an ideological and social level (Sonan 2014, 120–1). This party should function as an obstacle to the reappearance of the centrifugal opposing forces (Dodd 1993b, 109) that had already been organized within the enclaves in the period that preceded. It was precisely this opposition movement that forced Denkta¸s to proceed with the creation of the UBP in October 1975. As Sonan (2014, 122) reports, in terms of personalities and political objectives this party may be seen as a continuation of the “Cyprus is Turkish Party” (Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi), which appeared in the early 1950s. According to Sonan (2014, 122), the party was created by personalities of the time who already had political and economic influence in the community, people who already identified with the politics of Taksim. It was no accident that this ideological identity was reflected in the first article of UBP’s political programme as follows: “The elimination of existing threats against the Turkish community, the unity and protection of all its rights, the development of the areas of national security, politics, economy and society, depend completely on the development of the community as an inseparable and indivisible part of the Turkish nation” (Zaman 1975). In the context of reproducing the partitionist identity, and in view of the first general and presidential elections in June 1976, Denkta¸s and UBP developed a dual strategy aiming to marginalize the centrifugal “ideological turbulence” of the community. The first aspect of delegitimizing the opposition was the constant invocation and reminder of the state of exception. The creation of an “internal enemy” that was ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot community and that identified with the Left was a key tactic which reached its climax right after the military intervention of Turkey (Milliyet 1976). Denkta¸s himself, describing his role in this, said: “I’m trying to protect the community, both from the Greek Cypriots and from the extreme Left. My struggle is not over …

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If it were, so would be my duty” (Birand 1976b). Based on this rationale, the “national cause”, even after 1974, was pending. This pending issue imposed the perpetuation of the state of exception and hence of the concentration of powers in the hands of the leader. The existence of opposition parties, the emergence of new claims, and the politicization of disagreements with the leader’s programme, were perceived as “trea˙ son” and “disruption of unity” (Ipekçi 1976). Thus, nourishing fear and reminding people of the “communist threat” that could be a setback to the national cause (Yeni Düzen 1976a) were the main axes of the first campaign of the Turkish Cypriot leader and UBP in this new framework. In many election gatherings, for instance, Denkta¸s underlined the following: “If UBP does not become government with 25 seats (out of 40), then Communists will take over” (Halkın Sesi 1976). The potential for assumption of power by the “Communists” triggered the second aspect of the strategy to marginalize the opposition. Reproducing the state of exception, i.e. the pending national cause, not only aided in activating negative reflexes against a federal settlement of the Cyprus problem but also in conserving the foundations for satisfying the interests of the Turkish Cypriots who identified with the economy of partition. UBP made politics in a manner that transformed the “TFSC” into “its own property” (Mehmetçik 2008, 158). All the mechanisms of distributing the spoils of war were at its disposal and these mechanisms were activated intensely throughout the period before the 1976 elections. Mehmet Ali Birand (1976d) described the dependency that UBP’s power created by using the words of a Turkish Cypriot “Do you need a loan? Do you want a house? Surely you must know someone from the government. If you have no such aid, you are dead…!”. UBP rapidly turned into a patron-party concerning resource distribution. Partisan and bureaucratic mechanisms reproduced Denkta¸s’s power by developing a substantial clientele network. The perfection of this network was made evident before the elections. The exploitation of Greek Cypriots’ immovable and movable properties to attract votes was not something the nationalist elite tried to hide. To the contrary, large trucks were at the disposal of the party mechanism, and carried, until the last day before the elections, products, objects and other goods to voters in exchange for their support (Sonan 2014, 136). The general and presidential elections took place within these conditions on 20 June 1976. UBP managed to get 50.3% of the vote and 30 seats. The Communal Liberation Party (TKP) got 20.2% and 6 seats, the

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Republican Turkish Party (CTP) 12.8% and 2 seats, while the People’s Party (HP) got 11.7% and 2 seats (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 94). In the presidential elections, Denkta¸s prevailed with 76.6% against the 21.8% of the CTP candidate, Ahmet Mithad Berbero˘glu (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 86). Almost immediately after the first elections, UBP began to promote, even more pronouncedly, the idea of a unilateral proclamation of independence. This prospect was presented as a method that would coerce the Greek Cypriot side to accept the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots. The opposition parties, especially TKP and CTP, reacted against such a development, which they saw as a prospect of permanent division of Cyprus (Dodd 1993b, 111–2). As it eventually turned out, the stagnation of the negotiations, was not the only reason for the intensification of the idea of a separate state proclamation. In the period under investigation, the economic stagnation and the social problems began to strongly question the stability of the partitionist status quo. The repressive measures of UBP against the trade union movement came to a head. Up to October 1976, a thousand workers had been laidoff without compensation, while the number of those already registered as unemployed reached 3500 (An 2014). From the first months of 1977, inflation climbed to 44% and the budget of the “TFSC” had a deficit of about 10% (Dodd 1993b, 112). It was indicative of the general destabilization that UBP managed to draft the first five-year development plan in 1979, which would cover the period 1978–1982 (Yeni Düzen 1979a). This plan foresaw a growth of 7%; this was a goal that eventually proved to be far from realistic (Saygun 1981b). The economic growth rates were negative, while by the end of 1978, inflation reached 214%. Within such conditions, the discussions on the 1979 budget were marked by strong reactions by the opposition that stressed the increasing impoverishment of the workers. The reduction of the purchasing power of employees in 1979 reached 230% (Yeni Düzen 1979b), while the living cost indicator in 1980 rose to 46.01% (Candan 1981). The political cost of the economic destabilization soon brought serious restructuring. In the beginning of 1978, Prime Minister Nejat Konuk resigned. He was replaced by Osman Örek, who only lasted in the same position until November of the same year. Konuk and Örek’s resignations from UBP marked the first major rift in the Turkish Cypriot right-wing. In view of the new elections of 1981, Konuk created the Democratic People’s Party (DHP) which Örek soon joined, along with a small group of UBP MPs (Dodd 1993b, 114–7). Within this setting, the new UBP

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government, led by Mustafa Ça˘gatay, was forced to tread a fine line. In view of the reinforcement of the opposition movement, the government chose to confront it with repression. In May 1979, it signed a financial protocol with Ankara that abolished all barriers on imported products from Turkey. This protocol deepened the uneven economic integration, especially since Northern Cyprus imported 4500 different types of goods from Turkey while it exported merely 100 types of product (Yeni Düzen 1979c). In June 1979, the Ça˘gatay government issued a directive that banned the import of 108 specific products, the vast majority of which came from the Greek Cypriot community (Yeni Düzen 1979d). It thus sought to completely cut off the commercial contact between the two communities (Yeni Düzen 1979e), creating more prospects for a one-way integration with Turkey. In short, the period up to the elections of 1981 was marked by the questioning of the stabilization efforts of the partitionist environment. The Turkification of space and the economic planning progressed with many “distortions”. The structural weaknesses in production were accompanied by the lack of foreign exchange (Olgun 1993, 272), by setbacks in the clientelist network, constant increase in the cost of living and a general impoverishment of the community (Sonan 2014, 168). The party that undertook to represent the internal legitimacy of 1974, and to normalize the “new homeland”, was soon confronted by an enlarged social opposition that did not seem comply with the principles of the new framework produced by war.

The Political coup d’état Against the Turkish Cypriot Opposition “I could see that we had reached the end of our struggle. We would create political parties, we would have free elections, we would apply the rules of democracy as in Western Europe. We would shift to the parliamentary system and thus limit the powers of Denkta¸s within democratic frames. The army would be under civilian control and the Turkish Ambassador would no longer work as governor of Cyprus” (Tahsin 2012, 73). With these words, Arif Hasan Tahsin, head of the Teachers Trade Union, outlined his expectations from the events of the summer of 1974. For the Turkish Cypriot opposition, the exit of the community from the enclaves of the previous decade and its concentration in a “secure area” was

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recorded with different codes than those of a colonial-oriented normalization of space imposed by Ankara and the nationalist elite. The separate institutional structuring of the community, according to the expectations of the opposition, would create new areas of mobilization away from the siege of the enclaves. For instance, the organized teachers, and others, supported the creation of the “TFSC” because, as Tahsin notes (2012, 76): “In this way, young people would engage in politics, we would create a serious opposition and by taking command of the government, we would prevent the subordination of the community to Turkey”. As it soon turned out, the expectations of the Turkish Cypriot opposition came to nothing. Not two years from the military intervention, Birand (1976d) observed: “The Turkish Cypriot community reminds more of a boiling cauldron that complains about everything… Although it has been almost two years, the Turkish Cypriots have not overcome the shock of the events and have not managed to adapt to the new situation”. The state of affairs in which the Turkish Cypriots found themselves after 1974 was essentially a renewed situation of enclaves (Bryant 2014, 126). The power structures created were internationally illegal and completely dependent upon Turkey. They produced what Caspersen (2012, 101) describes as an “ambiguous statehood”. In this sense, the community was trapped in a new framework that reproduced the basic characteristics of the enclave life of the previous period. As noted by Douglas (2006, 12), once the primary reason for creating such an enclave disappears or weakens, then it collapses because of internal disputes and conflicts (see Bryant 2014). In the Turkish Cypriot case, when the community began to realize the lack of grounds for being placed in new enclaves (Bryant 2014, 127–8), it began to question the new situation. This questioning was the result of two dialectically related developments. On the one hand, the imposition of partition may have ended the conflicts between the two nationalist programmes of the previous period, but it contributed to the rise of a vulnerable “negative peace” (Ryan 1995, 85–6). In turn, this negativity was the result of the efforts to normalize the Turkish influence, the demand to erode the historical experiences of the community in its own homeland and the efforts to ˙ denounce the local mentalities and cultural references (Inatçı 2008, 40). This process constantly alienated part of the community from the “new homeland”. On the other hand, the concentration of the Turkish Cypriots in a new “unified geography” enabled the centrifugal forces to come into

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contact with the entire social structure and redefine the divided space as an area of conflict with the hegemonic nationalist programme. For the opposition, the military victory of Turkey was a “relief” that bore the expectation of renegotiating the relations of the community, not only with the Greek Cypriots, but also with the experience of the Turkish Cypriot authoritarian power. Berbero˘glu (1976) described the dual dimension of this relief as follows: “The peace operation found our community in a two-front struggle: on one side, we resisted against the Greek Cypriot administration which had deprived us of our constitutional freedoms and rights and which had the privilege to rule the country. On the other side, we struggled against the administration of Denkta¸s, who used the Greek Cypriots as a pretext to keep the Turkish Cypriot community away from freedom and democracy… We claimed that the peace operation removed the pressures exercised by the Greek Cypriot administration, but also it put an end to the Turkish Cypriot administration that was holding our community back from freedom and democracy.” It soon became clear that the second aspect of these expectations was not feasible. As mentioned above, one of the reasons for establishing the UBP was to set obstacles to the apparent rise of the opposition. In November 1974, eight opposition MPs established the “Freedom Group” (Özgürlük Grubu), as a further indication that Denkta¸s’s authoritarianism was under question (Ergün 1974). This group, as well as CTP, which was already established, prioritized the empowerment of the parliament as a means to confine the Turkish Cypriot leader’s powers and to exercise better control. The aim was to create a parliamentary system which would prevent the “dictatorial tendencies of Denkta¸s”, as noted by Fuat Veziro˘glu, member of the Group (Sonan 2014, 109–10). Although clearly weaker than the nationalist elite, the organized opposition was particularly dynamic. Its first cooperation was reflected in the effort to change the draft constitution of the “TFSC” filed at the founding parliament in April 1975. The joint statement of organizations such as alumni associations of universities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, of the Chamber of Architects and Engineers, of the trade union of Turkish Cypriot teachers and of CTP, stressed that the draft provided for an undemocratic constitution that strengthened the executive powers of the president against the legislative power. They warned that if the changes they proposed were not approved, then they would organize a campaign to vote against the constitution in the upcoming referendum (Cemal 1975). Eventually, they managed to reduce the executive powers of the president and to guarantee the right of the

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president to be re-elected for only two consecutive terms (Sonan 2014, 112). This first organized reaction against the nationalist elite continued immediately after the adoption of the law on political parties. Within a very short time, the Turkish Cypriot community moved to a multiparty system, leaving behind, in theory at least, the peculiar military regime of the period of the enclaves. Next to CTP, HP was established in August 1975 under Alper Orhon (Dodd 1993a, 109). This party brought together both those who opposed Denkta¸s from the period of TMT, and the circles that Orhon himself influenced (Kızılyürek 2005, 254). The Freedom Group, as well as the Turkish Cypriot teachers, had a strong presence in HP. Its name was deliberately chosen to refer to the ideological affinity with the CHP of Ecevit, while its political programme adopted the basic characteristics of social democracy and supported the federal solution to the Cyprus problem (Halkın Sesi 1975b). However, the distinct groups within HP failed to coexist for very long. In March 1976, a few months before the first elections, the main nucleus of the former Freedom Group, along with the younger representatives of trade unions such as Alpay Durduran and Mustafa Akıncı, left the party and founded TKP (Dodd 1993a, 109). The new party also adopted the federal solution to the Cyprus problem and emphasized the need to safeguard social rights through a “Cypriot version” of Kemalism (Bozkurt 1976). The Marxist Left eventually concentrated in CTP, which, by 1976, had made a substantial turn towards its left identity (Yeni Düzen 1976b), which was completed when Özker Özgür undertook the party leadership. As mentioned above, although the first elections of 1976 certified Denkta¸s’s dominance, they also made room for the organized expression of the opposition. As it later became evident, the presence of the opposition had multiple dimensions in the rupture caused in the founding principles of the new state of affairs. The different expectations of 1974, in conjunction with the polarization produced by the immediate collapse of these expectations, led to a diverse mobilization. The consequences of the partition, the deep dependence upon Turkey, the perpetuation of the authoritarian state of exception and its expansion through the clientelist network, set the preconditions for the dissolution of any prospect of “social peace” (Strong 1999, 216). As a result of social inequalities and the sense of enclaving, the influence of the dominant discourse about “freedom and salvation” subsided. The front-page article of the newspaper of CTP, Yeni Düzen, on 3 May 1979 noted: “for as long as workers

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watch the bank accounts of the rich become bigger, as they see those who became rich millionaires overnight from war looting, the more it becomes obvious to them whom the ‘national cause’ serves” (Yeni Düzen 1979f). In June 1979, Denkta¸s himself confessed that “now we are in the midst of a crisis both in our commercial and economic life” (Dodd 1993a, 117). The strikes immediately after the 1976 elections were quite intense. By August, around 4500 workers protested against the policy of lay-offs initiated by UBP (An 2014). In late 1976, the strikes expanded with the participation of organizations of Turkish Cypriot refugees. This was a development that forced UBP to adopt even tougher measures of repression against the trade unions. In early 1977, the polarization reached such levels that TKP officially for the first time called on the government to resign (An 2014). The situation remained equally intense in the next period. In 1978, the Turkish Cypriot trade union movement escalated its activities by announcing general strikes demanding reduction of the prices of basic goods, the adjustment of wages to the cost of living, a fairer tax system reform, the protection of collective agreements and the stabilization of the currency (Billuro˘glu 2012, 61). On 12 February 1979 one of the most dynamic strikes of the time was begun by workers in the Cypruvex company. The workers protested about wage cuts and the wider impoverishment of the community. Over the next few days, the strikes expanded in Morphou and Famagusta and employees of other companies like ETI also joined. The police tried to suppress the strikes by force. By 15 February, dozens of workers were injured and as many arrested. The political context of the protests expanded to the issue of defending democracy and confronting authoritarianism (Dede 1981). The radicalization of the workers’ demands eventually led the government to back down and by the end of February it was forced to sign a new collective agreement (Yeni Düzen 1979g). These events formed landmarks in the sense that the public debate about the ideological background of the division was now consolidated. Faced with the emerging social reaction, Denkta¸s and UBP chose the strategy of reproducing the state of exception. They sought to impose new regulations against organized trade union activity. At the same time, they sought to criminalize any effort to promote alternative approaches to the Cyprus problem. For example, during the period before the elections of 1981 they obstructed many joint initiatives of Turkish Cypriot ˙ s and PEO) (Yeni Düzen and Greek Cypriot leftist unions (e.g. Dev-I¸ 1979h). The Turkish Cypriot community moved to the next elections

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in a context of polarization and almost total collapse of the consensus that the clientelist network would supposedly produce. “Is the crisis ending? If you ask us, we do not return from Cyprus with optimistic impressions. The crisis is not over, it is just starting. Why? The image of peace in domestic politics is artificial”. This is how the reporter from Milliyet, Örsan Öymen (1978), described in the beginning of 1978 the failure to normalize the post-1974 state of affairs within the community. The acknowledgement of an artificial and hence vulnerable “peace” was a key component that impacted on the political choices of all actors in the Turkish Cypriot community before the elections of 1981. The overall setting was already stigmatized by the enormous social and economic problems. The mass displacement of Turkish Cypriots and their relocation to the northern regions of the island as a precondition for the homogeneity of the “new homeland” eventually proved to be a burden rather than a dynamic for the restart of economic activity (Wilson 1992, 120). The ideological and economic basis upon which the new property status of the community was built, and the notion of private property could, in no way, create consensus among the population (Scott 1998, 143). The spoils of war (ganimet ) was a new concept introduced into the daily vocabulary of the Turkish Cypriots and it influenced the daily routine of the people (Yıkıcı 2012). The prevalence of the use of the word “spoils” (ganimet ) in describing the property status after 1974 is not accidental. The Turkish Cypriots describe the situation in this way with a self-critical disposition and a moral commentary. It is a deeply politicized word that analyses the core of the social organization of the community after 1974. As Yashin (2009, 3) notes, the Turkish Cypriot community acquired a “body” with the “clothing” of the other community, which constantly reminded society of the extraordinary and abnormal situation in which it was imprisoned. The warehouses (ambarlar) in which the Greek Cypriot movable property was stored, and which was sold at very low prices, by priority to supporters of the nationalist elite,1 formed, on the one hand, a symbolism of the nationalization of the loot and, on the other, the demotion of the notions of “justice” and “transparency” at the level of foreign property (Kızılyürek 2005, 255–6). All of the above affected both UBP and the dynamicity of the centre-left opposition. The assessment that the autocracy of Denkta¸s-UBP was coming to an end was a generalized one. By the end of 1980, Turkish Cypriot commercial circles

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were expressing their concern about the loss of UBP’s power and sought to economically support the campaign of the party (Yeni Düzen 1981a). The 1981 elections were held in conditions of inertia in Cyprus (Kurtulu¸s 1981a), while the domination of Kenan Evren’s junta in Turkey in September 1980 paved the way to more intense interventions by Ankara in the political life of the Turkish Cypriots (Hasgüler 2006, 267). Faced with the rise of the Turkish Cypriot opposition forces, the establishment in Ankara did not hide its intentions to provide external assistance to UBP. Even in June, the month of the elections, the financial aid increased from 75 million Turkish lira to 300 million (Kurtulu¸s 1981b). This was combined with many visits by state officials who made clear that they preferred the perpetuation of the government of the nationalist elite. The almost total failure of the post-1974 domestic arrangement led Denkta¸s and UBP to transpose the political confrontation on a “metaphysical” level. The reproduction of the “internal enemy” intensified (Mehmetçik 2008, 168). TKP and CTP were accused of being “antiTurkish” and therefore “treasonous”. The joint declarations endorsed by both parties with corresponding Greek Cypriot parties, supporting a federal solution, multiplied the attacks by the Turkish Cypriot leader. The criminalization of the joint claim of the opposition in relation to the Cyprus issue was developed in the political discourse of Denkta¸s as follows: “They went to Sofia and signed a declaration of a sell-out. The day they come to power based on this declaration they will take you as a flock and will sell you to the Greek Cypriots” (Yeni Düzen 1981b). In the same vein, those who would not support UBP in the upcoming elections in June 1981 were “fans and servants of AKEL” (Kurtulu¸s 1981c). The candidacies of Ziya Rizki and Özker Özgür for the leadership of the community were presented by the nationalist elites as an “infernal plan” by the opposition with the aim of questioning the only leader who could claim the rights of the Turkish Cypriots on an international level (Yeni Düzen 1981c). However, the social dynamics were such that the reproduction of the state of exception not only failed to limit the rise of the opposition, but also strengthened it even further. The headline of Yeni Düzen on 19 June 1981 described the shift of approach as follows: “Our community is no longer the community of 1976… The workers have awoken and shout against the exploiters and looters” (Yeni Düzen 1981d). The experience of the Turkish Cypriots from 1974 onwards led to the conclusion

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that the vast majority of society did not experience any positive development. To the contrary, they found themselves in a disadvantageous position produced by the geographical displacement, by unemployment, by marginalization of the clientelist network and by authoritarianism (Mehmetçik 2008, 153). In short, the period between 1974 and 1981 sufficed to create the conditions for a more comprehensive transformation of the Turkish Cypriot community. This transformation, in turn, led a large part of the community to pursuits outside the imposed nationalist framework. The leader of CTP, Özgür (1981), described these new pursuits as follows: “In the elections of 1976, UBP had many spoils in its hands to distribute around. And so it did. Ms. Aydin Denkta¸s, leading the way and trucks following behind, visits one home after another. They gave refrigerators, armchairs, chairs, washing machines… The exploitative class was already in power. After 1974, the abundance of spoils made it easier for this class to stay in power. Our compatriots who gave their vote to UBP for a refrigerator have now understood that the problem lies in the system … Their purchasing power has reduced so much that they cannot buy meat to keep in the refrigerator that was given to them… Now, those who sweat to buy a piece of bread are approaching the elections in quite a different manner”. This situation led to the radicalization of the Left. Both CTP and TKP participated in the 1981 elections with political positions for the strengthening of state planning, as well as with positions on the nationalization of commerce, of social insurance and the strengthening of local governments as a way of removing the “authoritarian policies of UBP” (Kurtulu¸s 1981d). The results of the elections eventually confirmed, despite many difficulties, both the rise of the opposition and the first substantial rupture in the 1974 state of exception. In the parliamentary elections, UBP got 42.5% and 18 seats as opposed to 53.7% in 1976. TKP got 28.5% and 13 seats, CTP 15.1% and 6 seats, DHP 8.1% and two seats, while the Turkish Unity Party (TBP) of the settlers got 5.5% and 1 seat (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 96). Denkta¸s managed to keep the leadership of the community, nevertheless with an injured regime. He got 51.7%, losing over 20% since 1976. Rızkı got 30.5% and Özgür 12.7% (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 86). Based on the results, a coalition of the opposition parties (TKP, CTP, DHP) could potentially remove UBP from power for the first time. The political shock caused by this rebalancing was equally important both within the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite and in Ankara. In a

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moment of honesty, Denkta¸s reportedly said that “Since the Left has been strengthened, measures need to be taken” (Tahsin 2012, 85). The key aspects of the measures the Turkish Cypriot leader had in mind included the creation of mechanisms that would prevent the formation of a centre-left government and imposition of an ideological environment that would adopt the basic features of the coup government in Turkey. In other words, the creation of a conservative nationalist front that would suppress the centrifugal forces (Adlı 1981). “We can no longer hide the fact that different ideological camps have been created in Cyprus. The term nationalist front was used to highlight that there is a MarxistLeninist front among us” (Kurtulu¸s 1981e). Reaching this conclusion, Denkta¸s expressed his disappointment about the outcome of the elections ˙ at a press conference in Ankara, which he visited to invite Ilter Türkmen, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, to Cyprus. The conclusion by the Turkish Cypriot leader deserves more analysis. On the one hand, the admission of the failure to hide the undesirable opposing ideological camps that appeared in the community confirmed that the social consensus sought in the context of structuring a “new homeland” was in essence an artificial one. On the other hand, the acknowledgement that there was a Marxist-Leninist front among the Turkish Cypriots showed, in a perhaps exaggerated manner, that the formerly authoritarian monopoly of Denkta¸s to represent the community had suffered a heavy blow. “We do not wish to experience the damage of the enclaved community caused by Denkta¸s… Denkta¸s alone is not the Turkish Cypriot community and the elections are proof of that.” With these words, Kerem Adlı (1981), reporter from Söz newspaper, actually noted the following transformation: if Denkta¸s managed to become the ultimate representative of the Turkish Cypriots in Ankara using the military intervention and the ideological predominance of partition (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 217), then the elections of 1981 showed that part of the community had decided to “come to the fore” and make different political demands before Turkey. A few years after 1974, Ankara stood before “the other” Turkish Cypriots, whose presence had either been neglected or the object of repression. Therefore, suddenly a need emerged for an external force that would repair the wrongdoing. The victory of the opposition forced an external restoration of the exceptional situation in order to prevent the domination of the “unanticipated” Turkish Cypriot voices that expressed different orientations concerning the founding ideology of the “new homeland”.

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The basic direction of Ankara and Denkta¸s was to coerce DHP to accept a coalition government with UBP (Söz 1981a), and to exclude the left through a political coup of sorts. Within this context, the efforts to restore the state of exception included schemes of overturning changes to the Turkish Cypriot political system, including the abolition of the parliamentary system and the adoption of the presidential system (Kotak 1981). As far as Ankara’s moves were concerned, the events that followed the 1981 elections were quite clear months before. In early April 1981, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary parties were called to Ankara, where it was meaningfully pointed out to them how the circumstances of the military coup of 12 September 1980 came to be. In short, this was an implicit suggestion that a possible victory by the Left in the community would be interpreted as a threat to national interests and thus a reason for intervention. The restoration intervention peaked in August 1981 when Türkmen visited Cyprus and met with the leaders of the opposition parties. The aim of the meeting was to prevent the formation of a coalition government by the opposition. According to Özgür (1992, 99), Türkmen told him: “Since CTP is against NATO and against the NATO capacity of Turkey, then Ankara does not allow the party’s participation in government”. However, even after the government of Turkey had made its intentions clear, the Turkish Cypriot opposition parties continued their efforts to form a coalition. Denkta¸s insisted on not granting the mandate for government formation to any other party than UBP (Kurtulu¸s 1981f). So, by November 1981, the opposition had decided to file a joint motion of censure against the minority government of Ça˘gatay (Söz 1981b). Finally, on 10 December 1981, Konuk resigned from DHP after escalating pressure from Ankara, and thus any possibility of the opposition parties to form a government was lost. In March 1982, a last effort to restore the state of exception through the formation of a coalition government by UBP-DHP-TBP was made (Dodd 1993b, 122). Many years later, assessing those particular circumstances, Arif Hasan Tahsin (2012, 87) said: “The Turkish occupation showed its teeth … the existence of the Federated State could no longer benefit the community, nor could its cancellation harm it. The parties failed to protect our right to govern ourselves against Turkey’s usurpation”.

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Note 1. These warehouses were established after 1974 and were soon placed under the political management of the “Ministry of Finance”. In this sense, the distribution/sale of Greek Cypriot movable property was “state policy” (Sonan 2014, 136).

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Bryant, Rebecca. 2014. “Living with Liminality: De Facto Sates on the Threshold of the Global.” Brown Journal of World Affairs XX (II): 125–143. Bryant, Rebecca, and Christalla Yakinthou. 2012. Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey. Istanbul: TESEV. Candan, Jale. 1981. “Kıbrıslı Türkler ve biz” [Turkish Cypriots and us]. Kurtulu¸s , 30 January. Caspersen, Nina. 2012. Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Çelik, Vedat. 1990. “The Role of Industry in the Economic Development of the TRNC.” Ma˘gusa: Proceedings of Conference on Structural Changes in the Economy of North Cyprus Turkish Cypriot—German Cultural Association. Cemal, Akay. 1975. “Kıbrıs anayasası tasla˘gı, anti-demokratik olarak niteleniyor” [The Draft Cypriot Constitution Is Deemed Anti-democratic]. Milliyet, 6 April. Constantinou, Costas M. 2008. “On the Cypriot States of Exception.” International Political Sociology 2: 145–164. Copeaux, Etienne, and Claire Mauss Copeaux. 2009. Taksim! Bölünmü¸s ˙ ˙ sim Kıbrıs (1964–2005) [Taksim! Divided Cyprus 1964–2005]. Istanbul: Ileti¸ Yayınları. Dede, Kemal. 1981. “Bir grevin yıldönümü” [The Anniversary of a Strike]. Söz, 18 February. Dodd, Clement H. 1993a. “The Ascendancy of the Right: 1985–1993.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by C. H. Dodd, 136–166. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. ———. 1993b. “From Federated State to Republic 1975–1984.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by C. H. Dodd, 103–135. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. Douglas, Mary. 2006. Seeing Everything in Black and White: The Origins of Sectarian Violence and the Problems of Small Groups. Semiotics Online Institute. Doyle, Michael W. 1986. Empires. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Ergün, Mehmet. 1974. “Türk toplumunun siyasi hayatında yeni ve önemli bir a¸sama: Meclis’te özgürlük grubu olu¸stu” [A New and Important Stage in the Political Life of the Turkish Community: Freedom Group Formed in the Assembly]. Halkın Sesi, 2 November. Gülalp, Haldun. 1985. “Patterns of Capital Accumulation and State-Society Relations in Turkey.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 15 (3): 329–348. Gürel, Ayla. 2012. Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife: Turkish Cypriot Legal Framework. Oslo: PRIO. Halkın Sesi. 1975a. “Türk Devleti dün ilan edildi” [Turkish State Was Declared Yesterday], 14 February.

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———.1975b. “Alper Orhon Ba¸skan Seçildi” [Alper Orhon Was Elected President], 1 September. ———. 1976. “HP seçimlerde Denkta¸s’ı desteklemeyece˘gini açıkladı” [HP Declared It Will Not Support Denkta¸s in the Elections], 2 June. Hasgüler, Mehmet. 2006. Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu [The ˙ End of the Enosis and Taksim Policies in Cyprus]. Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları. Hocknell, Peter R. 2001. Boundaries of Cooperation. Cyprus, de facto Partition, and the Delimitation of Transboundary Resource Management. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. ˙ Inatçı, Ümit. 2008. “Kendini geri isteme iradesi olarak Kıbrıslı Türk Kimli˘gi: Sadece Kıbrıslılık” [The Turkish Cypriot Identity as a Willpower to Demand Oneself Back: Mere Cypriotness]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by ˙ Mehmet Hasgüler, 37–47. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. ˙Ipekçi, Abdi. 1974. “Kıbrıs’ta durum” [The Situation in Cyprus]. Milliyet, 14 October. ———. 1976. “Kıbrıs’ta muhalefet partisi” [Opposition Party in Cyprus]. Milliyet, 5 January. Kıbrıs. 2012. “Acı Gerçek” [The Harsh Truth], 31 July. Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2002. Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs [Cyprus in the grip of ˙ ˙ sim Yayınları. Nationalism]. Istanbul: Ileti¸ ———. 2005. Birle¸sik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti. Do˘gmamı¸s bir devletin tarihi [United ˙ ˙ sim Cyprus Republic: The History of an Unborn State]. Istanbul: Ileti¸ Yayınları. ———. 2016. Bir Hınç ve Siddet ¸ Tarihi. Kıbrıs’ta Statü Kavgası ve Etnik Çatı¸sma [A History of Revenge and Violence: The Fight for Status and Ethnic ˙ ˙ Conflict in Cyprus]. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. ———. 2017. “Yurt Ütopyadır” [Homeland Is a Utopia]. Yeni Düzen, January 22. ˙ Kotak, Ismet. 1981. “Kıbrıs’ta UBP yenilince mi sistemde hata aranmaktadır?” [In Cyprus Do We Search for Faults in the System Only When UBP Is Defeated?]. Söz, 9 September. KTFM. 1981. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Tutanakları [Minutes of the Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly], Dönem 1, Yıl 5, 13 February. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. Küçük, Fazıl. 1980. “Sayın Demirel’in Nasihatı” [Advice of Mr. Demirel]. Halkın Sesi, 2 August. Kurtulu¸s . 1981a. “Toplumlararası görü¸smeler çıkmaza giriyor” [Intercommunal Talks Head to a Deadlock], 13 March. ———. 1981b. “Seçim ayında yardımlar dört kat arttı” [Aid Increases Fourfold in the Election Month], 7 August.

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———. 1981c. “Kıbrıs Türkünü Rum yanlısı ilan etme˘ge kimsenin hakkı yoktur” [Nobody Has the Right to Declare Turkish Cypriots as Pro-Greek Cypriot], 8 May. ———. 1981d. “Toplumcu Kurtulu¸s Partisi seçim bildirgesi” [Communal Liberation Party Election Manifesto], 12 June. ˙ ˙ ———. 1981e. “Ilter Türkmen KTFD’ne davet edildi” [Ilter Türmen invited to KTFD], 24 July. ———. 1981f. “Hareketli günler ya¸sıyoruz” [We Are Going through Busy Days], 31 July. Lutz, Catherine. 2006. “Empire Is in the Details.” American Ethnologist 33 (4): 593–611. Mbembe, Achille. 2003. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15 (1): 1–40. Mehmetçik, Mustafa Semih. 2008. “1974 sonrası Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik arayı¸sı ve siyasalla¸sma süreci” [The Turkish Cypriot Search for Identity after 1974 and the Politization Period]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by Mehmet ˙ Hasgüler, 146–222. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. Milliyet. 1976. “Denkta¸s solcu muhalefete çattı” [Denkta¸s Attacks Leftist Opposition], 6 June. Morvaridi, Behrooz. 1993. “Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by C. H. Dodd, 219–234. Huntington: The Eothen Press. Moudouros, Nikos. 2017. “The ‘New Homeland’ and the Turkish Cypriot Opposition in the 1974–1981 Period.” The Cyprus Review 29: 135–158. O’Leary, Brendan. 2007. “Analysing partition: Definition, Classification and Explanation.” Political Geography 26: 886–908. Olgun, Ergun M. 1993. “Economic Overview.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by C. H. Dodd, 270–298. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. Ötüken, Ahmet. 1975. “Kıbrıs Kıbrıslılarındır sözü kime hizmet eder” [Who Does the Phrase Cyprus Belongs to Cypriots Serve]. Zaman, 14 February. Öymen, Örsan. 1978. “Kıbrıs’ta bataniyenin ekonomi politi˘gi” [The Economy Politics of Blanket in Cyprus]. Milliyet, 2 April. Özgür, Özker. 1981. “Köprülerin altında çok sular geçti” [A Lot of Water Has Flown under the Bridges]. Yeni Düzen, 13 February. ———. 1992. Kıbrıs’ta Demokrasi Bunalımları [Democracy Crisis in Cyprus]. ˙ Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi. Ram, Moriel. 2013. “Creating a Peaceful Place of War: Revisiting the Golan Heights Border Region.” Eurasia Border Review 4 (1): 77–93. ———. 2015. “Colonial Conquest and the Politics of Normalization: The Case of Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus.” Political Geography 47: 21–32. Rustem, Kemal. 1987. North Cyprus Almanac. London: Rustem K. & Bro.

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Ryan, Stephan. 1995. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing. ˙ Saygun, Ahmet. 1981a. “KIT’ler nasıl ortaya çıktı?” [How Were State Economic Enterprises Created]. Söz, 11 February. ———.1981b. “Ekonomi” [Economy]. Söz, 18 March. Scott, Julie. 1998. “Property Values: Ownership, Legitimacy and the Land Markets in Northern Cyprus.” In Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition, edited by C. M. Hann, 142–159. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sonan, Sertaç. 2014. In the Grip of Political Clientelism: The Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Politics and the Politico-Economic Foundations of Pro-Taksim Consensus. Essen: Unpublished PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences University of Essen. Soysal, Mumtaz. 1975. “Kurulu¸sun Ba¸slangıcı” [The Beginning of the Establishment]. Milliyet, 22 March. Söz. 1981a. “Dı¸s baskılar yoluyle sermayenin partisi UBP hükümeti i¸sgal ediyor…” [UBP the Party of Capital Remains in Government through External Pressures], 15 July. ———. 1981b. “Ça˘gatay’ın azınlık hükümetini devirmeyi öngören ortak deklerasyon dün açıklandı” [The Joint Declaration Aimed at Toppling Ça˘gatay’s Minority Government Was Make Public Yesterday], 20 November. Stoler, Ann Laura. 2006. “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty.” Public Culture 18 (1): 124–146. Strong, Nicholas Paul. 1999. The Economic Consequences of Ethno-national Conflict in Cyprus: The Development of Two Siege Economies after 1962 and 1974. London: PhD London School of Economics, University of London. Sükan, Haydar M. 1981. “‘Kıbrıs’ta neler oluyor’” [What Is Going on in Cyprus]. Milliyet, 22 July. Tahsin, Arif Hasan. 2012. Aynı yolu yürüyenler farklı yerlere varamazlar, Cilt 3 [Those Who Walk the Same Path Can’t Arrive in Different Places], Vol. 3. Lefko¸sa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları. Vural, Yücel, and Ahmet Rustemli. 2006. “Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot Community.” Mediterranean Politics 11 (3): 329–348. Wilson, Rodney. 1992. Cyprus and the International Economy. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Yalçın, Nilüfer. 1975. “Türkiye Kıbrıs’ta bir Yardım Heyeti kurdu” [Turkey Establishes an Aid Committee in Cyprus]. Milliyet, 23 March. Yashin, Yael Navaro. 2005. “Confinement and the Imagination: Sovereignty and Subjectivity in a Quasi State.” In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 103–119. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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———. 2009. “Affective Spaces, Melancholic Objects: Ruination and the Production of Anthropological Knowledge.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15: 1–18. ———. 2010. “The Materiality of Sovereignty: Geographical Expertise and Changing Place Names in Northern Cyprus.” In Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey, edited by Nikiforos Diamandouros, Thalia Dragonas and Caglar Keyder, 127–143. London: I.B. Tauris. ˙ Yeni Düzen. 1976a. “Iktidar Partisi UBP’nin karalama ve korkutma politikası sürüyor” [The Slander and Intimidation Policy of the Ruling Party UBP Continues], 12 June. ———. 1976b. “Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi” [Republican Turkish Party Election Manifesto], 29 May. ———. 1979a. “Birinci be¸s yıllık kalkınma planı 16’ya kar¸sı 18 oyla kabul edildi” [The First Five-Year Development Plan Accepted with 18 Votes Against 16], 25 January. ———. 1979b. “Bütçe görü¸sülmeye ba¸sladı” [Budget Discussions Begin], 22 February. ———. 1979c. “Ticarette Türkiye’ye tanınan imtiyazlara kar¸sı çıkıyor” [(He) Is against the Privileges Granted to Turkey in Trade], 24 May. ———. 1979d. “Ça˘gatay hükümetine de yol göründü” [Time for the Ça˘gatay Government to Go], 28 June. ———. 1979e. “Emirname ve Ticaret Odası” [Time for the Ça˘gatay Government to Go], 5 July. ———. 1979f. “Canımıza tak dedi” [We Are Sick and Tired], 3 May. ———. 1979g. “Cypruvex grevi zaferle sonuçlandı” [Cypruvex Strike Ends with Victory], 22 February. —. 1979h. “PEO heyeti barikattan geri çevrildi” [PEO Group Turned Away from the Barricade], 15 February. ———. 1981a. “Ramiz Manyera: UBP mutlaka iktidarda kalmalıdır” [Ramiz Manyera: UBP Should Definitely Stay in Power], 9 January. ———. 1981b. “Denkta¸s’ın yolu Vahdettin’in yoludur” [Denkta¸s’ Path Is Vahdettin’s Path], 12 June. ———. 1981c. “Cızırdayan Plak” [The Whizzing Record], 13 February. ———. 1981d. “Üretiyoruz… Yönetece˘giz” [We Are Producing… We Will Rule], 19 June. Yıkıcı, Özkan. 2012. “20 Temmuz sonrası Kuzey Kıbrıs ekonomisinin kısa geli¸simi” [The Short Development of the North Cyprus Economy after 20 July]. Ortam, 20 July. Zaman. 1974a. “20 bin göçmen soyda¸sımız iskan edildiler” [20 Thousand Migrant Brothers Were Settled], 20 November.

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———.1974b. “Askeri harekât bitti, ekonomik ve sosyal harekât ba¸slıyor” [Military Operation Is Over, Economic and Social Operation Is Beginning], 26 August. ———. 1974c. “Ça˘glar Ya¸sar Turizm ve Tanıtma Bakanlı˘gı görevine getirildi” [Ça˘glar Ya¸sar becomes the Tourism and Publicity Minister], 2 October. ———. 1975. “U.B.P. Program” [The Programme of UBP], 14 October.

CHAPTER 5

The Birth of the “TRNC” and Its Contradicting Interpretations

A Nationalist Dream: The Turkish Cypriot State “I feel like a family leader would feel when the doctors finally manage to save the mother who was slowly losing her life, and the child whose birth was delayed for artificial reasons. I thank God” (KTFM 1983a, 21). These words were pronounced by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denkta¸s, at the end of the extraordinary session of the parliament of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (“TFSC”), expressing his joy about the unanimous approval on the declaration of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). The idea and the act of a separate Turkish Cypriot state on the island was, for Denkta¸s, a natural development just like a birth. It was historically a longstanding demand and was delayed in its creation because of artificial obstacles. According to the ideological background of the Turkish Cypriot leader, the “TRNC” was, in a sense, the legitimate end of a historic course that may have been delayed but could not be cancelled. This kind of retroactivity that Denkta¸s attributed to the creation of the “TRNC”, on 15 November 1983, refers to a complex reading of this particular political act. On the one hand, the creation of a separate state in 1983 was an act of continuation, and perhaps a deepening of the dynamics released by the 1974 war. Not accidentally, a few years after the declaration, Denkta¸s underlined that: “The natural result of the peace operation of 20 July 1974 was that we salvaged our just cause and our independence, but also that we managed to make them specific in our © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_5

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state. Our highest duty is to protect our state” (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 274). On the other hand, however, it seems that the claim for a second state in Cyprus can be placed within the wider context of the policies of Taksim. In this sense, the historic roots of a separate Turkish Cypriot state within the ideological programme of the nationalist elite can be traced back to the period of the establishment of TMT. On the occasion of the 32-year anniversary of the establishment of TMT, a long-time partner of Denkta¸s, Fuat Veziro˘glu, noted the following: “It has been 16 years since the 20th of July, when the struggle of TMT resulted in victory… if we are to understand the present we have to look to the past. We have to live the 1958 period. The 20th of July did not fall from the sky, nor did it descend with a parachute. The same applies to the TRNC. The TRNC is the seed that TMT planted in 1958” (An 2002, 139). There are two documents that are often referred to in order to promote the view that the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite did not abandon the idea of creating a separate state, even after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. These two documents were found in the office of the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus at the outbreak of the intercommunal conflicts at the end of 1963 (Arslan 2014, 396). The first document was titled Interim Phase Plan (Geçici Merhale Planı). According to the document, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had consented to the Zurich-London Agreements only on the condition that the Republic of Cyprus would be a temporary phase on the road to the realization of the ultimate goal (nihai gaye), that is to say, the full independence (tam istiklal ) of the community (An 2002, 99– 100). The second document, dated 14 September 1963, largely referred to the economic implications and strategies in the event that the Republic of Cyprus Constitution was abolished or not implemented by the Greek Cypriot leadership. In case the constitution was abolished, the plan underlined that the Turkish Cypriot community would have to proceed with the creation of a separate state outside the framework of the Zurich-London Agreements (An 2002, 106–11). Regardless of the confirmation, or not, of the aforementioned confidential documents, it seems that the idea of a separate Turkish Cypriot state structure during the 1960s was retained among Denkta¸s’s political goals. Several decades later, he resurfaced this issue in an interview, stressing that the conditions of the intercommunal conflicts called for the creation of a second state, since on an international level the Republic of

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Cyprus continued to be recognized as the only legitimate entity, under the control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots were treated as minority (Gürkan 2005, 67). Despite being aware of the difficulties of such a venture because of the absence of a territorial concentration of the Turkish Cypriots, Denkta¸s believed that the separate statehood of the community was perhaps the only way to guarantee its political equality (Billuro˘glu 2012, 81). If the seclusion of the Turkish Cypriots in isolated enclaves in the 1960s prevented the creation of a separate state, the territorial concentration of the community in the north part of Cyprus after 1974 and the violent creation of a homogenized area formed facts that could support the emergence of a second state. For the Turkish Cypriot nationalists, the 1974 invasion symbolized the success of Taksim by enforcing borders and a separate social and economic formation for the Turkish Cypriots (Bizden 1997, 83). The new status quo created dynamics such as the complete separation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the existence of separate government mechanisms, which, according to General M. Haydar Sükan (1981), fully justified the claim for the declaration of a second independent state on the island. Shortly after 1974, Denkta¸s intensified his efforts to promote a confederal settlement of the Cyprus problem, the prerequisite being a separate state of the Turkish Cypriots. According to Glafkos Clerides, during his meetings with the Turkish Cypriot leader on 19 and 20 December 1974, the latter reiterated the goal of creating a separate state and even asked for its “twenty-four hour” unilateral recognition by the international community (Kızılyürek 2009, 46). Denkta¸s, of course, was forced to walk a fine line. Promoting the idea of a second state in Cyprus placed the government of Turkey in a difficult position. Ankara officially held the position of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem and sought to reduce international pressure after the military intervention (Kızılyürek 2002, 282). The creation of the “TFSC” in February 1975 seems to have been a conscious retreat by the Turkish Cypriot leader following Ankara’s objections to the potential unilateral independence of the Turkish Cypriots. In the face of Denkta¸s’s persistence about establishing an independent state in 1975, the Foreign Minister of Turkey at the time, Melih Esenbel, argued that the separate structure in the north of Cyprus should be limited to a “federated state” as the practical confirmation of the position for a federal solution in Cyprus. According to Esenbel, only in the

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case that the Greek Cypriots did not agree to a federal solution could new policies be planned (Gürkan 2005, 68–9). The basic working hypothesis of Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which formed the basis for the declaration of the “TFSC” in 1975, was that the Greek Cypriot side would be obliged to transform the Republic of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot Federated State and then the two parties would agree on the territorial boundaries and the powers of the central federal government (Dodd 1993a, 105). It is a fact that even this prospect did not satisfy Denkta¸s. The Turkish Cypriot leader believed that the Republic of Cyprus should be reduced to a communal authority or alternatively, the Turkish Cypriot community statehood should be internationally recognized as a distinct entity (Hasgüler 2004, 40–2). The Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite believed that this policy could gain ground in manoeuvring against possible delays by the Greek Cypriot leadership in the negotiation process. The key protagonists of the Turkish Cypriot right legitimized the necessity of unilaterally proclaiming independence using the notion of “Greek Cypriot intransigence”. For example, Mustafa Ça˘gatay, repeatedly declared in the parliament that the community should not remain without alternatives beyond the federation, nor should it depend upon the intransigent position of the Greek Cypriots (KTFM 1981, 16). However, despite objections from part of the government in Ankara concerning the prospect of the unilateral independence of the Turkish Cypriots, the 1974 military intervention and the occupation of territories formed acts that released multiple dynamics of a deep rupture in the political framework of the time, both in Cyprus and in Turkey (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 215). These new dynamics naturally affected the idea of the Cyprus federation as well. From 1974 onwards, the position for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem, at least as far as Ankara was concerned, formed a tool for legitimization at international level, but also the basis for conflicts internally. Therefore, while Ecevit appeared as the most stable supporter of a federation on a geographical basis, Necmettin Erbakan promoted the idea of a “veiled federation”. As the leader of Turkey’s Islamic Movement explained to the journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, “there must be a constitution that appears as a federation on the outside, but when the veil is removed a completely divided Cyprus would be revealed” (Birand 1979, 302).

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Denkta¸s made clear from the start that he could exploit the abovementioned delicate balances of the Turkish political system in order to serve his goals. The formation of the “Nationalist Front” (Milliyetçi Cephe) governments under the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel with the cooperation of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) formed important developments that helped to prepare for the unilateral declaration of independence in 1983 (Kızılyürek 2002, 282). The stabilization of the successive conservative governments in Turkey consolidated a particular ideological environment in Ankara that approached closely, if not completely, the ideological background of the Turkish Cypriot leader. Ambassador Ecmel Barutçu (1999, 14), who had headed the department for the Cyprus problem in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, admitted that after the resignation of the Ecevit government, the solution to the Cyprus problem became even more difficult. He explained that the governments that followed could not cope with the possibility of public reactions claiming that they were “giving away what Ecevit had gained”. Apart from the ideological setting created by the 1974 military intervention, a strategic development that helped to unilaterally declare independence was the military coup of 1980 in Turkey. The prevalence of the coup was a circumstance that opened new areas of activation for the Turkish Cypriot leader (Mehmetçik 2008, 175). The military coup of September 1980 resulted in the qualitative change of the power bloc in Turkey and as a result the military establishment headed the consolidation of the new state of affairs (Özkazanç 1998). This structure ensured the prominent role of the military in determining policies related both to domestic and foreign affairs. Especially up until the 1983 elections, the most important pillar of determining and implementing foreign policy was the National Security Council (NSC) (Balcı 2013, 160–1). The NSC was established as a power institution that could guide both the state and the political life at large. Under the 1983 Political Parties Act, the NSC secured a status higher than political parties themselves, as well as the authority to represent the Turkish state (Balcı 2013, 160–1; Efegil 2001, 148). Given the circumstances, even the elected government of Turgut Özal concentrated more on economic change (Gözen 2000, 117), without particular interventions on issues of security and foreign policy, which were monopolized by the military hierarchy (Yavuzalp 1996, 265). These balances eventually opened up the prospect for Denkta¸s to secure

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a degree of approval from Ankara on the declaration of a second state in Cyprus. As Denkta¸s himself confesses about his final decision on the matter: “I got the green light from some centres in Ankara. From the military and senior officials of the Foreign Ministry. It was not from the entire government” (Gürkan 2005, 71). In the same context, Satan and Erdo˘gan (2012, 450) underline that the NSC in Turkey supported the option of declaring the “TRNC”. Thus, the fluidity created by the military coup was an important fact that facilitated Denkta¸s’s initiatives, which had to be calculated at a time of sensitive circumstances. The former Turkish Cypriot leader explained the timing of the declaration of the “TRNC” in relation to the situation in Ankara as follows: “The point was to choose the right moment. The choice was made as follows: in Turkey a government is leaving and another is coming. The one leaving cannot influence us no matter what they say. On the other hand, the one coming will have to face a fait accompli. There was therefore no better time” (Gürkan 2005, 72). Indeed, November 1983 was the “best time” for Denkta¸s. When Bülent Ulusu ceded his prime ministerial duties to Turgut Özal after the 1983 elections (Ça˘gda 2015, 52), the latter would be left to handle the “hot potato” of the unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, he would have to manage the situation on the international level. Ambassador Ercüment Yavuzalp (1996, 230) admitted that in several meetings with the new Prime Minister of Turkey the latter made harsh remarks about the declaration of an illegal state in Cyprus. Özal pointed out that it was not at all right for a new government to be faced with such decisions without having prior information and involvement in the decision making.

The Road to the Declaration “The Left has strengthened, measures need to be taken” (Billuro˘glu 2012, 133). Denkta¸s stated this after the results of the elections in the Turkish Cypriot community in the summer of 1981. Although Denkta¸s himself managed to be elected for the second time in 1981 with a majority of 51.7%, the results deprived him of 20% of the votes. In the 1976 elections he had won 77.6% of the votes. The tendency to question the forces supporting partition was even more pronounced in the parliamentary elections. The new balance in the parliament opened the way for the cooperation of the opposition parties and for UBP’s removal from the

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government. This was the first major political “shock” for the party that primarily expressed the new partitionist political order. The rise of the Left to the point of becoming a power that could govern alarmed both the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ankara did not allow the formation of a left-wing government and in this way, just seven years after 1974, Turkey played the role of an “external force” that would restore the partitionist framework. The political context of the period was complemented by the stagnation in the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem, caused by the various controversies surrounding the internationalization policy of the problem that the governments of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus sought to implement. The response of Denkta¸s to the above context was to initiate contacts with various political and economic actors in the occupied territories in order to cultivate a climate in favour of the unilateral declaration of independence (Dodd 1993a, 125). Starting with the 1981 election campaign, the Turkish Cypriot leader, aware of the increasing pro-federal dynamics, clearly promoted the idea that the term “federated” should be deleted from the name “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”. He even believed that this name imprisoned the Turkish Cypriots in a dead-end policy that multiplied their socio-economic problems, while on the contrary, full independence would aid the smoother development of the Turkish Cypriot community (Billuro˘glu 2012, 87). Apart from the creation of barriers to the rise of the opposition through the redefinition of the hegemonic framework, the claim for a unilateral declaration of independence was, for Denkta¸s, a method of reproducing his own presence in power. Under the constitution of the “TFSC”, the President could only be elected for two consecutive terms, and these were completed with the 1981 elections. The renewal of Denkta¸s’s term could only pass through a change in the constitution and a total institutional restructuring of the community (Mehmetçik 2008, 175). Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Türkmen, even admitted that “we should not forget that an effort made with the establishment of the TRNC was to ensure the continuation of the Denkta¸s presidency” (Erol 2015, 305). In this sense, the restoration of the partitionist framework that took place with the open intervention of Ankara after the 1981 elections continued with the efforts of the Turkish Cypriot leader to modernize the separate structures in a completely new political environment.

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In early 1983, Denkta¸s gradually began to implement a strategy for the unilateral declaration of independence. This strategy had two broad axes: the first was to exploit the stagnation in the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem and to highlight the necessity for a new policy that would force the Greek Cypriot side to accept the equality of the Turkish Cypriots. The second was to integrate left-wing circles into the expressions of the necessity for independence and consequently to widen the social basis of support for the idea of a second separate state in Cyprus. The first pillar of action involved the necessity for a new policy of disengagement from the federal solution that was achieved through the cultivation of the position on the Greek Cypriot intransigence. The Secretary-General of UBP at the time, Enver Emin, stressed that since the Greek Cypriots were questioning the Makarios–Denkta¸s and Kyprianou–Denkta¸s High Level Agreements, then it was perfectly normal for the Turkish Cypriots to seek the choice of a separate independence (Yeni Düzen 1983b). Within this framework, it was supported that, due to the unpleasant developments in the Cyprus problem, the Turkish Cypriot community should proceed to change the parliament decision of 5 November 1976, which underlined the community’s commitment to the search for a federal solution to the problem (Eraslan 2009, 28– 33). The supporters of this idea claimed that the intervening period since 1976, in combination with the lack of progress in the negotiations, created new facts that should be included in a new political decision by the Turkish Cypriots (Dodd 1993a, 127). For Denkta¸s and the nationalist elite, the creation of the Federated State in 1975 and the decision of the parliament on a federal solution were practical expressions of goodwill on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. The “goodwill” for the Denkta¸sian establishment was translated into a temporary acceptance of an “inferior form” of administration and an expectation that Greek Cypriots would also take similar steps to agree a federal structure (KTFM 1983b, 59). Eight years later, the non-conversion of the Republic of Cyprus into a federated state signalled, for the same circles, the need for the immediate upgrading of the Turkish Cypriot administration to the same level as that of the Greek Cypriots (KTFM 1983b, 59), i.e. to state level. The clearest pretext for the thorough development of the will to change the unanimous decision of 1976 was the adoption of the UN Resolution 37/253 by the UN General Assembly on 13 May 1983 (Dodd 1993a, 125). This resolution confirmed, inter alia, the right of

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the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and substantial sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus; it demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Republic of Cyprus and condemned the illegal granting of property titles of Greek Cypriot property by the Turkish Cypriot side (UN 1983, 48–9). Fuat Veziro˘glu, who had already resigned from TKP and who supported the policy of establishing a separate state as an independent MP, described the UN resolution as a “decree of death for the Turkish Cypriot people” (KTFM 1983b, 58). The references to the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the entire territory, as well as the promotion of the concept of “one people”, were particularly disturbing for the Turkish Cypriot leadership, but also for part of the opposition (Göktu˘g 1990, 163). The nearly universal critical stance of the political parties towards this development eventually helped the Turkish Cypriot nationalists to further promote the need to “exercise a separate right to self-determination by the Turkish Cypriot people” (Billuro˘glu 2012, 93). Denkta¸s believed that the main reason for the adoption of such a resolution against the Turkish Cypriots was the delay of the community to create a higherlevel administrative structure (KTFM 1983b, 2). In the same context, he emphasized that only by moving towards the exercise of a separate right to self-determination by Turkish Cypriots would Greek Cypriots and the international community be forced to take serious steps to resolve the Cyprus problem (KTFM 1983b, 7–8). He even insisted that the Turkish Cypriots should take such political measures that would immediately clarify that there were two separate peoples in Cyprus with separate rights to self-determination, and consequently the decisions of international organizations should adopt the aforementioned reality (KTFM 1983b, 4). As part of the wider preparation for the oncoming unilateral declaration of independence, the Council of Ministers of the Federated State decided on 23 May 1983 to officially forward to the parliament a draft amendment to the decision of 5 November 1976. The new decision of the parliament was not only a change to the previous one made in 1976, but a completely new text with different political orientations. It was approved on 17 June 1983, after many controversies within parliament. The new text adopted the prospect of a unilateral declaration of independence. It started by underlining that the Turkish Cypriots were one of the two equal peoples of Cyprus who had the right to self-government and self-determination. This people—according to the new decision—had the

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right to live in their homeland freely, in a democratic system, and to be able to defend their national and cultural identity and their national rights (Eraslan 2009, 36–43). All the above, according to the decision, did not form an obstacle to the continuation of the talks for the establishment of a state within the framework of the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements (Dodd 1993a, 126). This decision was adopted by a majority of 33 MPs in favour and 6 against. Against stood the six MPs of CTP, which submitted its own proposal similar to the 1976 decision, underlining the need for autonomy of Turkish Cypriots within the frame of a federation (Dodd 1993a, 127). The existence of “the Turkish Cypriot people with safeguarded right to self-determination” (Eraslan 2009, 43) was one of the key elements of the parliament’s decision on 17 June 1983, upon which the declaration of the “TRNC” relied. The second axis of action moved in the direction of integrating part of the Left in the demand for a second state in Cyprus. A typical example of this effort was Denkta¸s’s support for the creation of the Union of Patriotic Intellectuals (Yurtsever Aydınlar Birli˘gi). Actors of different political structures undertook the work of the Union. High-ranking officers of the Embassy of Turkey and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were working through the Union. Members included Ahmet Okan and Do˘gan Harman, who were better known as Leftist intellectuals. In this context, texts that theorized on the issue of a separate independence and a separate right to self-determination were published from a leftist-oriented approach (Billuro˘glu 2012, 94). It was no accident that the concepts of independence, freedom and equality of the Turkish Cypriots were largely promoted by the Turkish Cypriot Right during this period. In this way, the activation of political concepts of a largely left-wing mobilization, even in a partitionist context, formed a tool for the Turkish Cypriot leader who sought to exercise further pressure on the Turkish Cypriot Left. Enver Emin emphasized the following: “The fact that some circles that base their political activity on the concepts of freedom, democracy and equality are now against the exercise of the right to self-determination is a contradictory approach that raises questions” (KTFM 1983b, 52). Within this framework, a few days before making the unilateral declaration of independence official, the parliament of the Federated State approved by majority an Emergency Bill (Söz 1983). In protest against the bill, TKP and CTP boycotted the parliament’s proceedings and organized a protest march (Halkın Sesi 1983a). According to the opposition, the enforcement of a state of emergency drastically limited the prospects

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for the democratization of the community, while it questioned in essence the basic philosophy of the Constitution of the Federated State (Halkın Sesi 1983b). The institutional safeguarding of the emergency state in the above-mentioned context was not accidental. It was the first phase of the “conspiratorial manner” by which Denkta¸s decided to proceed with the declaration of the “TRNC”. The second phase was even more indicative: On 14 November, the Turkish Cypriot leader invited the leaders of the political parties to dinner. There, he announced that the next morning he would declare the independent state and called for unanimous approval of the decision. After informing them that he had interrupted all telephone communications, he warned them that “the parties who would say no to the birth of the state would naturally be excluded from the new parliament” (Kızılyürek 2002, 284–5). The next morning, the establishment of the “TRNC” was unanimously approved. On 2 December 1983, the creation of a founding parliament was approved by majority, with the task of drafting a new constitution and promoting it in a referendum. Denkta¸s believed that a new constitution was necessary in order to strengthen the institutional structure of the new state. In this context, he wished to follow a similar process as the one for the creation of the Federated State (Dodd 1993a, 129). The opposition reacted to this prospect by arguing that a new constitution was unnecessary since the declared goal was the federal solution to the Cyprus problem. In the end, Denkta¸s’s proposal was adopted with 24 votes in favour and 16 against (Ça˘gda 2015, 56). The composition of the 1983 founding parliament consisted of the existing members of the House of Representatives and, additionally, of 10 members appointed by Denkta¸s himself, 19 members representing organizations, trade unions and extra-parliamentary political parties, and one member appointed by Fazıl Küçük. As in the previous founding parliament, there was lack of uniformity in representation, giving particular weight to power circles that supported the Turkish Cypriot leader. For example, Türk-Sen was repre˙ s by none (Ça˘gda 2015, sented by three members, and the leftist Dev-I¸ 59). On 23 December 1983, the constitution committee of the founding parliament was set up. Denkta¸s filed a draft constitution in January 1984 on the grounds that he could contribute to the drafting of the new text. Although his supporters raised again the issue of a presidential system, the proposals of the Turkish Cypriot leader led in another direction. However, they entailed the element of strengthening the executive powers of the

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president (Dodd 1993a, 130). The draft of the new constitution was completed in June 1984. Some initiatives on the Cyprus issue prevented the holding of a referendum in August 1984. In the end, the debate in the plenary of the founding parliament regarding the endorsement of the draft and its promotion to a referendum was completed on 12 March 1985. The text of the new constitution was sanctioned after fierce disputes and despite CTP and Arif Hasan Tahsin, who represented the trade union of teachers KTÖS, voting against it (Dodd 1993a, 131).

The Separate State Through “Left Perceptions” “Six years passed since then. In these six years, how close have we reached to the objective of establishing the Turkish Cypriot Federated State? Have we set the economic and social life of the community on healthy grounds? Have we defended the independence of Cyprus sufficiently? Have we made arrangements that would push toward a Federal Republic of Cyprus?… We cannot prevent partition or the annexation of Cyprus when we overlook the Constitution and the goals of the establishment of the Federated State, and when we keep talking about an independent Turkish state” (Yeni Düzen 1981). The above excerpt is taken from the speech by Özker Özgür, President of CTP, six years after the establishment of the “TFSC”. With these words, he introduced the different perceptions that the forces of the Turkish Cypriot opposition had on the Federated State, as well as on the concept of the separate power structures. It is true that, albeit from very different starting points and different goals, there were many political forces within the community that believed the creation of a state or an autonomous administrative structure was a necessary component for the survival of the Turkish Cypriots as a separate communal existence in Cyprus after 1974. For this reason, the idea of creating a federated state, which would comprise one of the two key parts of a future Cypriot federation, was strongly supported by the Turkish Cypriot left opposition. The decision of 13 February 1975, which established the Federated State, was important for this particular part of the opposition against Denkta¸s because it formed a barrier against the Turkish Cypriot leader’s partitionist tendencies. The emergence of this structure was deemed by Özgür (1981) as a comprehensive confirmation that the community would not be oriented towards actions challenging the independence of Cyprus or actions that would encourage the annexation of the island.

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At the same time, it was a superior form of autonomous administration of the Turkish Cypriots outside the boundaries of the pre-1974 enclaves and, in this sense, it formed a basis for improving the socio-economic situation of the community. For Alper Orhon, president of the People’s Party (Halkçı Parti), the creation of the Federated State and the resulting institutional restructuring of the community, formed important achievements that strengthened the parliamentary system against an arbitrary presidential system (KTFM 1979b, 26). In such a framework, the creation of the Federated State formed, for the Turkish Cypriot opposition, a basis for defending the autonomy of the entire Cypriot space from the risk of annexation to a foreign state, as well as offering a prospect of democratization away from the authoritarian conditions of the enclaves of the previous decade. The president of TKP, Alpay Durduran, for instance, stressed that the greatest guarantee for the independence of Cyprus and the prevention of Enosis (Union) with Greece was not only the very existence of the Turkish Cypriot community, but also the Federated State (KTFM 1979b, 11). The organized groups of Turkish Cypriot teachers also foresaw that through the political organization and institutionalization offered by the Federated State, the Left could “come out to the community with clear language and a loud voice” (Tahsin 2012, 80). The Turkish Cypriot opposition forces had a similar response to the decision of the parliament of the Federated State made on 5 November 1976, which clarified the community’s support for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem (Kızılyürek 2002, 291). This decision eventually formed one of the foundations for the defence of the federal reunification of Cyprus by those forces who were in conflict with partition. Although this decision was made on the initiative of Denkta¸s, it was soon transformed into an almost “holy text” by which the pro-federal forces of the Turkish Cypriots could defend themselves against the open aspirations of the nationalist elite for the creation of a second state on the island (KTFM 1983c, 9–10). Özgür believed that the Turkish Cypriot community could not gain influence at international level and press for the solution of the Cyprus problem because its leadership did not adopt the world values of the time. The values of anti-imperialism, of independence, territorial integrity and of the non-aligned identity of states were the only ones that could, according to the CTP leader, function as the “current currency” of international relations and have a positive impact on both the UN and the socialist states (KTFM 1979a, 75–6). The Secretary-General of the party,

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Naci Talat, criticized the promotion of partitionist positions, saying that: “The world is reacting against annexations and the cancellation of the independence of states. While such a reaction is recorded, we should avoid adopting views like ‘integration with motherland’ or ‘declaration of an independent state’. Who do we think we are for God’s sake? And who do we think we are threatening with such statements?” (KTFM 1979a, 86). It is, however, a fact that the developments that followed in the next few years did not justify the expectations of the wider Turkish Cypriot opposition. The multidimensional crisis caused by the Turkish Cypriots’ exclusion in the partitionist framework of 1974 influenced all the spheres of economic and social activity. It caused a form of depression even in terms of cultural references to the identity of the Turkish Cypriots (Yashin 2012, 7–8). Ankara’s open intervention after the 1981 elections, which prevented the formation of a government by the opposition forces, turned Turkey from a “saviour-state” into an “oppressor-state” in the eyes of part of the community (Mehmetçik 2008, 173). Precisely within this context, the promotion of an undefined concept of independence was positively received by the wider social strata (Mehmetçik 2008, 177–8). In a different manner and with a controversial perception, the idea of a fully independent Turkish Cypriot community could not only assimilate the reactions caused by the crisis of the partitionist framework, but it could also become a new local political vision. In a contradictory manner, independence became part of a live debate and confrontation between the Turkish Cypriot Right and the Turkish Cypriot Left. Mehmetçik (2008, 179–80) argued that the idea of an independent Turkish Cypriot state derived from the desire for a cohesive structure that could protect the things that the Turkish Cypriots felt they were losing due to the pressing problems of the time: the sense of belonging and the real ownership of space. This desire was bluntly depicted by Keskiner (1983a) in his text in the newspaper Ortam, who among other things highlighted that: “Independence… How nice it is to be independent. Without the need of anyone, to financially succeed, to stand on your own feet. To defend and protect democratic rights and freedoms. To save your country from international monopolies and smugglers. To produce modern policies and protect the conditions of freedom of thought. And to establish governments adapted to the free will of the people”. Therefore, for part of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, and more specifically the Left, safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot independence involved, in essence, the

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need to become independent and autonomous (Mehmetçik 2008, 178) from Turkey’s tutelage. An important part of the Turkish Cypriot Left, which positioned itself outside TKP and CTP, agreed with Denkta¸s’s position on the existence of two peoples in Cyprus. At the same time, however, the actors who represented this line of thought believed that the separate right to selfdetermination of the Turkish Cypriots should be exercised in the direction of a federal reunification rather than of the finalization of partition 1 (1982), the progressive ˙ (Billuro˘glu 2012, 107). For Sabahattin Ismail part of the Turkish Cypriots should defend the separate right to selfdetermination, since this was a modern Leninist principle that was later adopted by the international system. Based on this reasoning, the Turkish Cypriots, as a separate people from the Greek Cypriots, should exercise their right to self-determination in a way that would prevent the union and partition. At the same time, the columnist deemed it was necessary to combine the exercise of the right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination with an organized effort to overthrow the capitalist relations of production and the prevalence of the socialist transformation. A similar example of a “leftist interpretation” of the separate state was the position of the journalist Sener ¸ Levent. Levent called on the socialist states to immediately recognize the new entity a few days after the declaration of the “TRNC”. In his text “Listen to our Voice” (Levent 1983), he wrote: “In Northern Cyprus, a small state was founded, independent, non-aligned, resisting fascism, chauvinism and Zionism… In this small state that we founded there is no room for foreign bases… We believe that Greek Cypriot workers are also against the bases. Recognize us so we can fight by their side in the future”. The positions of the majority of the Turkish Cypriot Teachers’ Trade Union (KTÖS) revolve around the same context. A significant number of the trade union leadership believed that the community should pursue even more fervently its independence from Turkey (Billuro˘glu 2012, 107–8). They stressed that the creation of the Federated State had been supported by the trade union because it could serve as a basis for the democratization of the relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, for the removal of the influence of the Turkish military in the internal affairs of the community and for the strengthening of the opposition against Denkta¸s. However, in the course of time, it became evident that the community was unable to ensure its independence from Ankara, and consequently a new, superior state organization could help in this

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direction (Billuro˘glu 2012, 107–8). As Arif Hasan Tahsin (2012, 174) reported many years later, the Turkish Cypriot teachers supported the declaration of independence of the community as “independence from Turkey”. The two largest opposition parties adopted a different approach. TKP initially believed that the creation of a second state in Cyprus would form a development that would strengthen the dynamics of the partition of the island. The party adopted the view that the Turkish Cypriots had a separate right to self-determination, but they had exercised it wisely in previous years by pursuing a federal Cyprus. Following this line of thought, TKP emphasized that the right to self-determination existed not only in peoples, but also in communities, and in this sense the Turkish Cypriots had safeguarded this right through their separate electoral procedures and their separate political bodies (KTFM 1983b, 31–2). The president of the party, Alpay Durduran, insisted that the Turkish Cypriots should first prove, through their socio-economic development, that they were a coherent community and should not adopt adjectives such as “people” and “nation” that they could not argue for (KTFM 1983b, 32). A few months before the declaration of the “TRNC”, speaking in the parliament, he said: “Let us first promote that we are a community with our own particular interests… How can a community be taken seriously today when 60% of its budget is financed by Turkey?… In 1979, we decided to terminate our trade relations with the Greek Cypriots and with the rest of the world except Turkey. All these do not indicate that we are a community with its own particular interests” (KTFM 1983b, 32–3). In the beginning, CTP was even more critical of the creation of a second state on the island. The overall position of the party emphasized that the major conclusion of the developments since 1974, culminating in the elections of 1981, was the “futile” pursuit for independence. Rather, CTP believed that the community should be more focused on defending the local Turkish Cypriot culture and diversification from Turkey (Mehmetçik 2008, 174). In the same context, the party believed that the declaration of a separate state represented a violation of the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements, as well as of the unanimous decision of the Federated State Parliament of November 1976 (Yeni Düzen 1983a), that is to say of all the important binding texts for a federal solution. At the same time, for CTP, the idea of a separate Turkish Cypriot state was sufficient to permanently cancel all hopes for a true independence of the whole of Cyprus. The partitionist intentions formed the

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continuation of the efforts to marginalize the Left in both communities, as expressed by the coup by EOKA B and those that followed in the Turkish Cypriot community after 1974. Consequently, such a development would strengthen, according to the party, the perception of the international community that the Turkish Cypriots were nothing but a “strategic minority exploited by NATO” (KTFM 1983b, 38–9). However, as mentioned above, the two main parties of the centre-left opposition, despite their objections, were forced to support the declaration of the “TRNC” on 15 November 1983. They preferred to take this step in the face of the risk of operating in illegality. It is true, however, that the developments that followed the creation of the founding parliament and the new constitution confirmed, to some extent, the objections of the opposition. Soon after the declaration of the “TRNC”, TKP circles foresaw that Denkta¸s was more oriented towards the introduction of a powerful presidential system that would weaken the role of the parliament and, through that, the opposition itself (Ortam 1983a). The same concerns were highlighted by CTP, which believed that the composition of the founding parliament was a political expression of the aim to overthrow the equilibrium created in the 1981 elections. It was, in other words, a “confirmation of the dictatorial tendencies” of the Turkish Cypriot leader, who wished to impose an authoritarian presidential system (Ortam 1983b). The imposed appointment in the 1983 founding parliament of certain individuals who had failed to be elected as MPs in the 1981 elections, as well as the balances Denkta¸s created with the representation of specific organizations and trade unions, was yet another phase of an “external restoration of the state of exception”. As Merto˘glu (1983) noted, the way in which the founding parliament was created, and the results it produced from the start, opened up the prospect of substantial questioning of the independence of the Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, the way in which the Turkish Cypriot leader imposed the new founding parliament, with a specific “pro-Denkta¸sian” composition, soon transformed into a cause for the dissolution of any consensus previously created about the issues of independence and autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots. For the wider part of the opposition, the events that followed the declaration of the “TRNC” brought back to the collective memory the authoritarian period of the enclaves and of that peculiar single-party state of affairs (Süreç 1981). According to Naci Talat (1984), the founding parliament did not, in any way, reflect the will of the Turkish Cypriots and the inclusion of appointed

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members helped to serve the interests of non-elected and therefore nondemocratic power structures. Eventually, the opposition understood that the background of Denkta¸s’s actions was not the real independence of the community. As Rasih Keskiner (1983b) wrote on 8 December 1983: “The hat was removed and the baldness has been revealed! The true nature of everyone has been revealed, what they represent and who they support”. Such reactions were not at all accidental. The problematic composition of the founding parliament that served as a shield for the protection and consolidation of the new state of affairs was complemented by the content of the new legislation promoted by the nationalist elite, but above all by the provisions of the new constitution. In view of the referendum for the endorsement of the new “TRNC” constitution and the first elections in the new context, UBP undertook initiatives to change the law on the granting of citizenship. The opposition’s experiences on how the population of settlers was used as the “electoral dump” of the nationalist elite immediately triggered their defence reflexes. Arif Hasan Tahsin, the only spokesman for the teachers’ trade union in the founding parliament, voted against the specific regulation that introduced dual citizenship, among other things, and described this act as an attack on the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Alpay Durduran submitted a counter-proposal which involved the increase of the parliament’s powers and control in conferring new nationalities, which was rejected (Söz 1985a). Strong reactions were recorded by Rauf Denkta¸s, who had already left the National Unity Party, and who stressed that the change of the law on nationality provision would help the government import voters, something that was a repeat of the previous electoral confrontation (KKTCM 1985a, 6–7). The Republican Turkish Party had the same reaction (Söz 1985a). Intense debates also broke out due to UBP’s attempt to change the electoral law and to abolish the principle of proportional representation in the parliament. Many representatives of the opposition felt that this action aimed at facilitating the reproduction of dictatorial tendencies within the new Parliament (Söz 1985b). The element that completed the alienation of part of the Turkish Cypriot opposition from the new constitution and, more broadly, from the new structure under construction, was the revelation that certain articles of the constitution were imposed on the members of the parliament “from the outside”. On 1 March 1985, the founding parliament discussed the authorities and powers of the President of the “TRNC”. At some

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point in the debate, Arif Hasan Tahsin revealed that an unsigned text of “guidelines” was shared only among specific members of the founding parliament, all known for their connections with Denkta¸s’s power circle. The text Tahsin read stated among other things: “The approval of the TRNC Constitution and the election of its President are of great importance for the future of the struggle for freedom and the existence of the Turkish Cypriot people. The new constitution should safeguard the possibility of the Turkish Cypriot people to democratically govern themselves in a stable and effective manner. Because the struggle of the Turks of Cyprus has not ended. It must be strong against any other possibility… The struggle still continues, and for this reason it is imperative to have a constitutional structure, open to control and adjusted to democratic principles, but at the same time one that will allow for an effective continuation of the struggle in every field. Internal weaknesses should not harm our cause” (KKTCM 1985b, 46–7). The text concluded by clarifying that under no circumstances could the decrees issued by the President of the “TRNC” undergo parliamentary scrutiny and limitations (KKTCM 1985b, 47). The vital importance of this text was revealed through the indirect dilemma of a confrontation between democracy and stability. Democracy cultivated “internal weaknesses” that would be damaging to “continuing the struggle”. In this way, the text passed the message of the reproduction of the state of exception in the new context and by consequence of the “self-evident” need to restrain freedoms for the sake of the stability of an undisputed authority. The function of the “TRNC” as a new level of a state of exception was made official on 8 March 1985 by the majority approval of the provisional Article 10 of the new constitution (KKTCM 1985c, 93). According to this article, the Turkish army could continue to operate, assuming total responsibility for the internal and external security of the community “for as long as the defence, the internal security of the Turkish Cypriots and the international situation so required” (KKTC Anayasası, n.d., 78). A side effect of Article 10 was that both the army and the police of the northern regions of Cyprus fell directly under the control of the Turkish armed forces in Ankara. This meant that the Turkish army gained autonomous power and influence within the Turkish Cypriot community and its political system, while, at the same time, it ensured the introduction of Turkey’s post-coup phenomena in Cyprus. The privileged position of the Turkish army in the political life of the Turkish Cypriots highlighted the systematic nature of the state of exception, as well as the arbitrary

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reproduction of exceptions on the ground (Constantinou 2008, 158). For part of the opposition, the Provisional Article 10 symbolized, at the level of the constitution, the lifting or the questioning of the autonomy that Turkish Cypriots claimed from Ankara. Echoing the views of the organized teachers, Söz (1985c) ran this text on the newspaper’s front page: “With the new constitution we have renounced our independence and have now declared our dependency. The Turkish army is an interested party in our internal affairs”. As mentioned above, the final text of the new constitution was formed by a majority in the founding parliament on 12 March 1985. One important outcome of the discussions was the crystallization of the opposition forces that would support the vote against the new constitution on 9 May 1985 in the referendum. CTP and KTÖS took on the leading role on the “no” front as a follow-up to their representatives’ speeches in the debate in the founding parliament. According to CTP, the new constitution would have to be rejected because it was not a product of social consensus, nor did it express the concerns and demands of the wider strata of society. The party stressed that the new constitution was the result of an almost artificial right-wing majority, following orders from non-parliamentary, undemocratic power centres that focused more on protecting the privileges of the capital (Yeni Düzen 1985a). Apart from the class dimension in CTP’s criticism, the party highlighted the wider undemocratic nature of the new constitution that limited people’s freedoms and rights, strengthening the executive over the legislative and judiciary power, as well as the general authoritative environment introduced in the Turkish Cypriot community as a result of the coup d’état of 12 September 1980 in Turkey (Yeni Düzen 1985a). As Özker Özgür (1988) used to emphasize, it was as a “constitution, an imported product”. Arif Hasan Tahsin, echoing the main concerns of the organized teachers, clarified that democracy in the new constitution was a show-case, it secured the military administration, and protected the power circles of the previous era that had played a leading role in the looting of Greek Cypriot properties (Söz 1985f). The teachers’ trade union decided to organize a campaign against the new constitution because it increased the prospects of perpetuating the repression of the Turkish Cypriots and questioned any chances of community independence (Söz 1985d). Söz (1985e) reported that the text that came from the founding parliament was not a constitution “but a document of insult to the people and a trap”.

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Finally, on 5 May, the new constitution of the “TRNC” was approved by 70.1% in favour and 29.8% against (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 71). On 9 June, the presidential elections followed and Denkta¸s prevailed with 70%. On 23 June, the parliamentary elections were conducted—UBP secured 36.7% and 24 seats, CTP 21.4% and 12 seats, TKP 15.8% and 10 seats, while the newly established Renaissance Party (Yeni Do˘gu¸s Partisi—YDP) secured 8.8% and four seats (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 96–7). The parliamentary election results were clearly influenced by the wider referendum environment and by UBP’s successful efforts to change the electoral law. Based on the new law, the electoral threshold for entering the parliament was set at 8%, which favoured the first party that took the majority of the seats from parties or combinations that stayed out of the parliament (Ça˘gda 2015, 77). It is estimated that 17% of the votes were not represented in the new parliament (Mehmetçik 2008, 182–3), creating an environment that perpetuated the artificial support for the continuation of UBP’s governance, even in the form of a government alliance. Immediately after the elections, the UBP leader, Dervi¸s Ero˘glu, hastened to clarify that the only unfeasible alliance was between his party and CTP (Yeni Düzen 1985b). Consequently, both the TKP and the YDP, in theory, fitted in the nationalist elite’s plans for an alliance government. However, developments proved that Ero˘glu eventually preferred more substantive discussions with TKP, with which he formed the new government (Dodd 1993b, 136–7). The participation of TKP in this government proved to be more important for the party’s internal processes. From that point on, its left wing became weaker and TKP adopted a more centre-wing character (Mehmetçik 2008, 182). Upon the completion of the three electoral processes in less than two months, new political and economic structures emerged in the community, new legal and economic regulations were formed, and Turkey’s presence gained new qualitative features. At the same time, however, three important elements emerged which, in combination with the above, seem to have influenced the development of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially the forces of the opposition, at least until the end of the 1990s. The first element was the transformation of CTP into the main party of the opposition, with higher percentages than those of the second largest centre-left party, TKP. The second element was the parliamentary presence of YDP—a formation that emerged under the guidance of the Turkish embassy and which managed, to some extent, to gather the votes of the settlers. The importance of this development lies in the operation

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of this party as a key component of the imported transformation, through its support of the consolidation of the new political and social environment, at least until the end of the 1980s. The third important element was the effort by UBP to change the electoral law in a way that allowed it to reproduce its power. This scheming opened up the “pouch of Aeolus” and, as described in a following chapter, similar scheming in the early 1990s led to strong political restructuring that favoured the opposition.

Note 1. Well-known Turkish Cypriot columnist who later joined the far right.

References An, Ahmet. 2002. Kıbrıs nereye gidiyor? [Where Is Cyprus Going?]. Lefko¸sa: Everest Yayınları. ´ και Anagnostopoulou, Sia. 2004. Toυρκικ o´ ς Eκσ υγ χ ρ oνισ μ´oς . Iσ λαμ ´ διαδρ oμη´ τ oυ Kεμαλισ μo´ [Turkish Toυρκ oκ ´ π ριoι σ τ η δαιδαλωδη Modernization. Islam and Turkish Cypriots in the Entangled course of Kemalism]. Athens: Vivliorama. Arslan, Hakan. 2014. The Political Economy of State Building: The Case of Turkish Cypriots (1960–1967). Istanbul, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Istanbul Bilgi University. Aydo˘gdu, Ahmet. 2005. Tarihsel Süreçte Kıbrıs Türk Seçimleri ve Yönetimleri [Turkish Cypriot Elections and Administrations through History]. Ankara: BRC Basım ve Matbaacılık Ltd. ˙ Balcı, Ali. 2013. Türkiye Dı¸s Politikasi. Ilkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar [Turkish ˙ Foreign Policy. Principles, Actors, Practices]. Istanbul: Etkile¸sim Yayınları. Barutçu, Ecmel. 1999. Hariciye Koridoru [The Corridors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. Ankara: Yüzyıl Yayınları. Billuro˘glu, Ahmet. 2012. Kripto geldi mi? KKTC’nin ilanının perde gerisi [Has the Crypto Arrived? The Backstage of the Declaration of the TRNC]. Lefko¸sa: Söylem Yayınları. Birand, Mehmet Ali. 1979. Diyet: Türkiye ve Kıbrıs özerine pazarlıklar: 1974– 1979. [Blood Money: Negotiations over Turkey and Cyprus: 1974–1979]. ˙ Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. Bizden, Ali. 1997. “Kıbrıs’ta güç/iktidar mücadelesinin de˘gi¸sen yüzü: Kıbrıs(lı/Türk) milliyetçili˘gi” [The Changing Face of the Power/Strength Struggle in Cyprus: Cyprus (Turkish Cypriot) Nationalism]. Birikim 97: 79–91.

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Ça˘gda, Fadıl. 2015. Batmayan Uçak Gemisi. 1981’den 1990’a Kıbrıslı Türk Siyasetinde Dı¸s Baskısı ve Darbeler [The Nonsinkable Aircraft Carrier. The External Pressures and Coups in the Turkish Cypriot Politics from 1981 to 1990]. Lefko¸sa: Khora Yayınları. Constantinou, Costas M. 2008. “On the Cypriot States of Exception.” International Political Sociology 2: 145–164. Dodd, Clement H. 1993a. “From Federated State to Republic 1975–1984.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by Clement H. Dodd, 103–135. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. ———. 1993b. “The Ascendancy of the Right: 1985–1993.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by Clement H. Dodd, 136–166. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. Efegil, Ertan. 2001. “Foreign Policy Making in Turkey: A Legal Perspective.” Turkish Studies 2 (1): 147–160. Eraslan, Burhan, ed. 2009. Geçmi¸sten Günümüze Meclis’in Kıbrıs Kararları [The Cyprus Decisions of the Parliament from the Past to the Present]. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Yayını. Erol, Hande. 2015. “Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nin kurulu¸s süreci” [The Establishment Process of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]. Akademik Sosyal Ara¸stırmalar Dergisi 3 (17): 296–313. Göktu˘g, Güner. 1990. KKTC’yi hazırlayan siyasal nedenler [The Political ˙ Reasons That Prepared the Grounds for TRNC]. Istanbul. Gözen, Ramazan. 2000. Amerikan Kıskacında Dı¸s Politika: Korfez Sava¸sı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası [Foreign Policy in the American Grip: Gulf War, Turgut Özel and What Came after]. Ankara: Liberte Yayınları. Gürkan, Nezire. 2005. Zirvedeki yalnızlık kulesi. Rauf Raif Denkta¸s [The Tower of Loneliness at the Summit. Rauf Raif Denkta¸s]. Gazima˘gusa: Cümbez Yayınları. Halkın Sesi. 1983a. “Ola˘ganüstü durum yasa tasarısı onaylandı” [The State of Emergency Draft Law Is Approved], 12 November. ———. 1983b. “Sıkıyönetimsiz sıkıyönetim getirildi” [We Have Martial Law without a Martial Law], 13 November. Hasgüler, Mehmet. 2004. “Annan Planı Öncesi ve Sonrası Kıbrıs” [Cyprus Before and After the Annan Plan]. In Kıbrıs ve Gelece˘gi: Ekonomik-Politik bir tartı¸sma [Cyprus and Its Future: An Economic—Political Perspective] by ˙ Irfan Kalayıcı, 39–42. Ankara: Nobel Yayınları. ˙Ismail, Sabahattin. 1982. “Self-Determinasyon” [Self-Determination]. Söz, 11 February. Keskiner, Rasih. 1983a. “Ba˘gımsızlık” [Independence]. Ortam, 1 December. ———. 1983b. “Takke dü¸stü kel göründü” [The True Colours Have Been Shown]. Ortam, 8 December.

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Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2002. Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs [Cyprus in the Grip of ˙ ˙ sim Yayınları. Nationalism]. Istanbul: Ileti¸ ˙ ———. 2009. Daha Önceleri Neredeydiniz? [Where Were You Before]. Istanbul: ˙ sim Yayınları. Ileti¸ ˙ sbirli˘gi, Geçici Madde 10 [TRNC ConstituKKTC Anayasası. n.d. Savunma ve I¸ tion. Defence and Cooperation. Temporary Article 10]. KKTCM. 1985a. KKTC Kurucu Meclisi Tutanakları, 29. Birle¸sim [TRNC Constituent Assembly Minutes], 22 February. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 1985b. KKTC Kurucu Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [TRNC Constituent Assembly Minutes Journal] 33. Birle¸sim, 1 March. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 1985c. KKTC Kurucu Meclis Tutanak Dergisi [TRNC Constituent Assembly Minutes Journal] 38. Birle¸sim, 8 March. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. KTFM. 1979a. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Zabıtları [Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly Minutes], 2 November. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. ———. 1979b. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Zabıtları [Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly Minutes], 5 November. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. ———. 1981. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Tutanakları [Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly Minutes], 13 February. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. ———. 1983a. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Tutanakları, 1. Ola˘ganüstü Birle¸sim [Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly Minutes], 15 November. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. ———. 1983b. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Tutanakları, 2. Ola˘ganüstü Birle¸sim [Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly Minutes], 3 June. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. ———. 1983c. Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi Tutanakları, Özel Birle¸sim [Turkish Cypriot Federated Assembly Minutes], 13 February. Lefko¸sa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Meclisi. Levent, Sener. ¸ 1983. “Sesimize kulak verin” [Hear Our Voices]. Kıbrıs Postası, 18 November. Mehmetçik, Mustafa Semih. 2008. “1974 sonrası Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik arayı¸sı ve siyasalla¸sma süreci” [The Turkish Cypriot Search for Identity after 1974 and the Politization Period]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by Mehmet ˙ Hasgüler, 146–222. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. Merto˘glu, Hüseyin. 1983. “Per¸sembenin geli¸si Çar¸sambadan belli” [Coming Events Cast Their Shadow Before]. Ortam, 8 December. Ortam. 1983a. “Denkta¸s’ın gerçek amacı açıklık kazandı” [Denkta¸s’s Real Aim Is Now Clear], 1 December. ———. 1983b. “CTP: KKTC’nin ilanı diktatoryal emellerin tatminine dönü¸süyor” [CTP: The Declaration of the TRNC Is Turning into the Satisfaction of Dictatorial Desires], 1 December. Özgür, Özker. 1981. “Altı yıl önce bugün” [Six Years Ago, Today]. Yeni Düzen, 13 February.

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———. 1988. “Ya Demokrasi, ya demagoji ve yalan” [Either Democracy, or Demagogy and Lies]. Yeni Düzen, 11 January. Özkazanç, Alev. 1998. “Türkiye’de siyasi iktidar tarzı dönü¸sümü” [The Transformation of the Style of Political Rule in Turkey]. 10–11: no pages. Satan, Ali, and Sentürk ¸ Erdo˘gan. 2012. Tanıkların diliyle Kıbrıs Olayları 1955– 1983 [Cyprus Incidents through the Accounts of the Witnesses 1955–1983]. ˙ Istanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi. Söz. 1983. “Ola˘ganüstü hal yasası kabul edildi” [State of Emergency Law Was Approved], 12 November. ———. 1985a. “Seçmen ithaline devam ediliyor” [Voter Import Continues], 23 February. ———. 1985b. “UBP nisbi temsil ilkesini Anayasa’dan çıkarılmasını sa˘gladı” [UBP Removes Proportional Representation Principle from the Constitution], 26 February. ———. 1985c. “Ba˘gımsızlı˘gı yeni anayasayla geri çektik. Simdi ¸ de ba˘gımlılı˘gımızı ilan ettik” [We Withdrew Our Independence with the New Constitution. Now We Are Declaring Our Dependence], 13 March. ———. 1985d. “KTÖS: Bu anayasa oldu˘gu gibi sunulursa, kar¸sı çıkaca˘gız” [KTÖS: If This Constitution Is Presented as It Is, We Will Object to It], 20 March. ———. 1985e. “Bu anayasa de˘gil. Bir tuzak belgesidir” [This Is Not a Constitution. This Is a Trap], 20 March. ———. 1985f. “Arif H. Tahsin red oyu verdi” [Arif H. Tahsin Rejects], 13 March. Sükan, Haydar M. 1981. “Kıbrıs’ta neler oluyor” [What Is Happening in Cyprus]. Milliyet, 22 July. Süreç, Erdal. 1981. “BEY dönemine dönü¸s” [Return to the Period of MASTER]. Ortam, 8 December. Tahsin, Arif Hasan. 2012. Aynı yolu yürüyenler farklı yerlere varamazlar, Cilt 3. [Those Who Walk the Same Path Can’t Arrive in Different Places]. Lefko¸sa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları. Talat, Naci. 1984. “Barı¸s, Demokrasi ve Adalete Özlem” [Longing for Peace, Democracy and Justice]. Yeni Düzen, 28 April. UN. 1983. General Assembly, Thirty Seventh Session, 37/253, Question of Cyprus, 13 May 1983, 48–49. New York: United Nations, 48–49. Yashin, Yael Navaro. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Durham & London: Duke University Press. Yavuzalp, Ercüment. 1996. Liderlerimiz ve Dı¸s Politika: Bir Diplomat Gözüyle [Our Leaders and Foreign Policy: Through the Eyes of a Diplomat]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. Yeni Düzen. 1981. “KTFD’nin 6. Yılı törenle kutlandı” [The 6th Anniversary of the TFSC Celebrated], February 20.

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———. 1983a. “Ba˘gımsız devlet çı˘gırtganlı˘gı yeniden ba¸sladı” [The Bark for Independent State Starts Again], 18 January. ———. 1983b. “Enver Emin: Ba˘gımsızlık seçene˘gine gözlerimizi kapayamayız” [Enver Emin: We Cannot Shut Our Eyes to the Option of Independence], 25 January. ———. 1985a. “Süresiz sıkıyönetim içeren bir anayasa yapıldı” [A Constitution That Envisages Indefinite State of Emergency Has Been Prepared], 11 March. ———. 1985b. “Olası olmayan UBP-CTP koalisyonudur” [What Is Not Possible Is the UBP-CTP Coalition], 1 July.

CHAPTER 6

Cypriotism as Anti-neoliberalism

Turkey’s Neoliberal “Exports” The declaration of the “TRNC”, and the efforts to stabilize the new state of affairs, were followed by socio-economic changes strategically important for the efforts to structure a separate state in Cyprus. These particular efforts had emerged before the unilateral declaration of the “TRNC” and concluded in the period that followed. Their neoliberal orientation was a central feature; this was by no means accidental if one considers the wider framework in Turkey after the 12 September coup in 1980. As early as the mid-1970s, Turkey was in a period of deep economic crisis and destabilization. The main reasons that caused the crisis were inherent to the internal contradictions resulting from Turkey’s import substitution model of industrialization (Gülalp 1993, 36). In response to the economic and political crisis of the time, the government of Süleyman Demirel, which took office in November 1979, focused more on measures to open the Turkish market, to boost export trade, combined with measures to limit domestic demand, in order to meet the export need (Yalman 1997, 219). The new perception of economic growth was better reflected in the “24 January decisions” in 1980, on the basis of which the country had to move to neoliberal restructuring. This transition caused even more social contradictions (Keyder 1987, 217–21), which were not overcome until after the military intervention. The violence of the coup of 12 September 1980 contributed to the immediate restructuring of the political and economic system by creating the necessary © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_6

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conditions for the transition of the country into a neoliberal framework (Yalman 1997, 220). These developments influenced the Turkish Cypriot community significantly. Since the early 1980s, the unilateral declaration of “TRNC” was accompanied by a financial restructuring effort with a view to institutionalize capitalism even further (Tahsin 2014, 82). A major part of the restructuring included a gradual change in the way the Turkish state led the orientation of Turkish Cypriot economic development. The Coordination Committee, created in 1974, was turned into the Cyprus Affairs ˙ sleri Te¸skilatı) in 1981 while, a few years later, it Organization (Kıbrıs I¸ was upgraded to a Ministry portfolio under the political guidance of the Turkish Government’s Vice President (Tahsin 2014, 82). Between 1979 and 1980, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası) and the Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul prepared reports with proposals focusing on the need to liberalize the Turkish Cypriot economy and transform the northern regions of Cyprus into a free trade zone (Saydam 1986). Discussions on the implementation of a model of economic liberalization similar to that of Hong Kong culminated with Turgut Özal’s visit in early 1981 (Saygun 1981). One of the best-known Turkish officials, who oversaw the implementation of the 24 January decisions, Özal visited the occupied territories so as to come to an agreement regarding a programme of economic stability that would bear the main characteristics of the model chosen by Turkey. According to Özal’s own assessment, Northern Cyprus should adopt the model of free market, even to a wider extent than that of Turkey, since it had characteristics that helped in this direction (Yeni Düzen 1981a). Thus, from the first week of January 1981 when Özal arrived in Cyprus, processes to set the foundations for an initial neoliberal restructuring began. In particular, discussions intensified on the possibility of raising interest rates to meet Turkey’s standards (Hastürer 1981a). Efforts were made to change the commercial system implemented by the Turkish Cypriots through liberalization policies (Dodd 1993a, 117) and also the status of the State Economic Enterprises (Hastürer 1981b). Once Özal had taken office in Turkey, a period of further particularization towards the goal of taking the Turkish Cypriot community to the free market model followed. The Özal government placed more emphasis on imposing new investment areas within the Turkish Cypriot community, such as tourism (Tahsin 2014, 83). At the same time, efforts were made

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to intensify the trade links between Turkey and the “TRNC”, characterized by a unilateral and unequal direction of incorporating the Turkish Cypriot economy into the Turkish. A typical example of this is the Additional Trade Regulation Protocol finally signed on 14 November 1985, which included provisions that ensured the profitability of the Turkish business class that would become active in the Turkish Cypriot economy (Ortam 1985b). Among other things, this protocol provided that the products to be imported into Turkey from the “TRNC” would have tax added value that, in some cases, reached 50% (Ortam 1985c). At the same time, Turkish Cypriots were required to take measures to ensure that the taxes on imported Turkish products were reduced to zero in a short time, while any exports of any products (Turkish Cypriot or Turkish) from the “TRNC” to third countries would have to go through common councils of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot businessmen (Ortam 1985d). The content of the new commercial structure imposed through this protocol had, in effect, opened up the prospect of weakening local Turkish Cypriot industrial production through the reduction of exports,1 as well as the strengthening of the position of Turkish consumer products in the Turkish Cypriot economy. The additional trade regulation protocol revealed that Ankara sought to develop a new way of approaching its economic presence in Cyprus, which appears to have gone beyond enforcing neoliberal orientations. Since the beginning of 1986, it became clear that Özal was ready to implement “economic discipline” measures on the Turkish Cypriot community, particularly in relation to the funds allocated by the Turkish state for the financing of the Turkish Cypriot budget deficit. The “TRNC” budget for 1986 had a deficit of around 20 billion Turkish lira and the Turkish Cypriot leadership decided to ask for a new loan from Ankara to cover it. The Özal government agreed to allocate only 10.5 billion Turkish lira, of which 1.8 billion were disbursed as instalments for the repayment of pre-existing TRNC debts to the Turkish state (Ortam 1986a). In this way, and in the context of the drastic reforms that Ankara demanded from the Turkish Cypriots, the need to cover the deficit would turn into as yet another form of economic pressure for the pursued transformation. The fragmentary measures of the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish Cypriot economy took a more comprehensive form with the Turkey–TRNC Economic Cooperation Protocol of 1986 (Tahsin 2014, 84). This protocol became official when Özal came to Cyprus in July

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1986. The new measures sought to set up a comprehensive model for the transformation of the “TRNC”, which, regardless of their final outcome, were based on the prospect of developing trade, tourism and liberalizing the banking sector to attract foreign banks, as well as issues such as the liberalization of foreign exchange and the stimulation of investment in private higher education (Ortam 1986b). The “Özal package”, as it became known, was prepared on the occasion of the request of Dervi¸s Ero˘glu’s government for an additional 12 billion Turkish lira (Yeni Düzen 1986a) from Turkey. Turkey’s Prime Minister saw this demand as an opportunity to promote a profound structural change in the economy based on a comprehensive plan. The package began to take shape in Ankara between 19 and 23 June 1986, and the Turkish Prime Minister presented it during his visit in Cyprus on 2 and 3 July (Ça˘gda 2015, 73). These measures, at least at the level of initial planning, incorporated the aspirations of not only the Turkish political system but also of the strongest element of the Turkish business class. It was no accident that during his journey to Cyprus, Özal was accompanied by the economy’s “cream of the crop” (Erkut 1986), as he called the country’s business elite.2 For instance, the future of the Turkish Cypriot economy was a matter of great concern to the powerful businessman Sakıp Sabancı, President of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen ˙ ˙ s Adamları Derne˘gi—TÜSIAD), (Türk Sanayicileri ve I¸ who—in a report that he had published—proposed specific policies to overcome the scepticism of the Turkish capital in investing in the north of Cyprus. The “scepticism” expressed by part of the Turkish capital was, in fact, a clear expression of annoyance about the extent of state intervention and state planning in the economy; i.e. a framework that, in addition to the prospect of local production, also created large bureaucratic obstacles to business investment plans from Turkey (Tahsin 2014, 83). In particular, Sabancı supported a decisive policy of transforming the region into a freetrade zone in conjunction with “good governance” (Yeni Düzen 1986b). According to Sabancı, the experience of the Turkish Cypriot coalition governments did not ensure stability in decision-making, but was characterized by stalling and indecisiveness (Yeni Düzen 1986b). This report was also revealing as to the wider planning concerning the position of the productive sectors of the economy in the Turkish Cypriot community. This particular element of the Turkish capital did not wish to continue a policy focusing on strengthening the local industry and agricultural sector. The Sabancı report specifically stated that “The development of

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the industry and the agricultural sector in Cyprus and the expectation that Turkish businessmen will invest in state-owned enterprises are thoughts that cannot be realized in the short term” (Yeni Düzen 1986b). Turkey’s political leadership had a similar stance on this issue. Özal stressed that the main objective should be to abolish the protectionist philosophy, to weaken the industrial sector and to confine it to small manufacturing and packaging businesses (Yeni Düzen 1986c). Not at all accidentally, Özal’s visit was presented by the media as an initiative of passing the Turkish Cypriots into a fully liberal structure that provided for the economic integration with Turkey (Ortam 1986c). During his speech in the special session of the “TRNC” Parliament on 3 July 1986, the Turkish Prime Minister himself underlined that the Turkish Cypriots would be in a better place if they moved towards opening up their economy to the Turkish market as they would gain more opportunities compared to the Greek Cypriot community. He urged the community to take advantage of the example of the private Turkish business sector, which was the most decisive factor in the success of the model followed by Turkey after 1980 (KKTCM 1986a, 4197–8). The “Özal package” included measures that aimed at radical changes in the banking sector, the tax system, labour relations, wages and pensions of employees, and the creation of conditions for the privatization of state-owned companies. The package provided for the increase in interest rates, full liberalization in importing Turkey’s currency, the reform of the banking sector with the aim of facilitating the presence of offshore banking, the reduction of company tax that reached 25%, a drastic reduction in import taxes, the imposition of consumer taxes, the abolition of the state’s contribution to the social security fund (Dodd 1993b, 139), the abolition of the wage adjustment mechanism, the restructuring of the public sector with the aim of drastically reducing government expenditure and the detachment of state-owned companies from the state budget as a first step towards privatization (Yeni Düzen 1986d). The combination of measures that included shrinking the welfare state, imposing consumer taxes, cutting wages and pensions, along with encouraging the development of export trade and financial services, represented an effort to radically change the main features of protectionism that prevailed immediately after 1974 in the Turkish Cypriot community (Ça˘gda 2015, 75). The objective of leading the economy towards the free market, which was reaffirmed in the Turkey-“TRNC” economic cooperation protocol on 5

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December 1986, created the prospect of a substantial structural questioning of the local productive sectors (Bozkurt 2016, 145) and benefited a further integration of the community into Turkey through the most important non-productive sectors. A key figure among the supporters of the new economic strategy was the Turkish Cypriot leader himself. In an effort to push the political system towards the immediate implementation of the package, Denkta¸s presented the idea of the free market as a sort of panacea for all the negative phenomena that had prevailed in the community since 1974. Speaking before the Turkish Prime Minister on 3 July 1986, the Turkish Cypriot leader made a meaningful note that the model of the closed economy that was “given” to the Turkish Cypriots after 1974 did not suit the structure and the characteristics of the community. He even explained that as a result of this contradiction, the closed economy caused poverty and shortcomings, thus contributing to the strengthening of the need for market liberalization (Yeni Düzen 1986c). In any case, the group of economists who worked with Denkta¸s on the package had strong views on issues such as the shrinking of trade union freedoms, which they considered an obstacle to economic growth, as well as wage cuts in the context of a general change in labour relations (KKTCM 1986c, 4524). The public statements of the President of UBP, Dervi¸s Ero˘glu, occupied the same ideological space. Adopting the dominant ideological framework of Özal regarding the strengthening of a second state in Cyprus through the free market,3 Ero˘glu noted that the transformation of the “TRNC” into a free-trade zone could not but help the Turkish Cypriots to “stand on their own feet”, and at the same time, it would contribute to its future international recognition (Ortam 1986b). At the level of the Turkish Cypriot business elite, there was some difference of opinion at the initial stages when Özal’s intentions were made public. The transformation of the northern part of Cyprus into a free-trade area was a prospect that the Chamber of Commerce of the Turkish Cypriots could discuss in detail (Ortam 1986d). On the contrary, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Industry (Kıbrıs Türk Sanayi Odası) voiced concerns that seem to have derived from a key aspect of the economic package that questioned the Turkish Cypriot local productive capacity. Even before Özal’s visit to Cyprus, the Chamber of Industry had a negative disposition towards the new economic guidelines, acknowledging that the free-trade zone meant the disappearance of the

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already weak Turkish Cypriot industry. Instead, it called on the government to work in the opposite direction by boosting the industrial sector through measures such as low-interest loans from the Development Bank (Kalkınma Bankası) (Ortam 1986d).

The Turkish Cypriot Identity Against Economic Integration As stated above, the efforts for a neoliberal transformation of the Turkish Cypriot economy did not begin when Özal’s package was made public in July 1986. The original plans for this process had their roots at the end of 1980 following the upheaval of the coup in Turkey. There were strong reactions from the Turkish Cypriot opposition, as well as from wider parts of the community, since the efforts to adapt to the new regime that was imposed by the 24 January decisions and the military coup almost immediately had negative consequences. It could be argued that this new period from the end of 1980 until the end of the decade was, for the Turkish Cypriot community, a period of economic, social and political destabilization. The gradual and, in many cases, circumstantial liberalization of the economy caused, according to the trade union movement, the rise in interest rates, the reduction in real wages of workers, the gradual collapse of state-owned companies and cooperative credit institutions, as well as the imposition of imported consumer products from Turkey (Ortam 1985a). The cost of living for the population continued to increase rapidly as the policy of wage cuts prevailed (Dodd 1993a, 118). For the Turkish Cypriot opposition, there were at least two key issues that led to wider negative developments. The first issue was the conviction that the neoliberal restructuring of the economy formed a political deadlock that not only failed to help overcome the widespread crisis but contributed to its deepening. Hasan Hastürer (1981a) of the Turkish Cypriot Teachers Trade Union referred to the above issue as early as 1981, criticizing Özal’s plans: “The current economic system is undergoing a crisis. The remedies put on the table to exit the crisis cannot solve the problem … If the leadership persists and eventually increases interest rates, we will experience unpleasant developments for the workers. The remedies originating from the Friedman’s Chicago School will not treat the sick but will lead him to death”. The second issue, which was a major concern for the left-wing opposition parties, was the extreme pressure

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exercised on the workers’ living standards. The leader of CTP, Özgür, criticized the 1981 budget guidelines because they largely adopted neoliberal measures. In his speech to the Parliament, he noted: “The budget mirrors Friedman’s policies in Latin America. These policies are implemented in Latin American dictatorships without any concern about the limited bread on the table of millions of people and the tears of workers. This policy is implemented in the Turkish Cypriot Federal State by a government that shuts its ears to criticism. Wages are kept at a low level, there is a need for an increase in the products produced by state-owned companies, a policy of liberalizing prices is inflicted, and interest rates are indirectly increased” (Yeni Düzen 1981b). Apart from the above, however, the opposition forces expressed strong concerns about the reorientation of the entire social structure of the community from productive sectors of the economy towards nonproductive ones such as services, trade and the development of the banking sector. The rationale of this shift involved the perception that the Turkish Cypriots should not produce but should essentially turn into a consumer community that will satisfy its needs through products from the Turkish industry (Ça˘gda 2015, 75). Based on the estimates of opposition circles, the philosophy of imported neoliberalism required the reduction of government investment in the agricultural sector and industry and increased incentives for tourism and trade. Therefore, the promotion of the of services sector required the gradual elimination of state support for agricultural products, while the increase in interest rates had a negative effect on the loans needed by the local industrial sector (Ortam 1986e). For a great part of the opposition, the policy pursued by successive UBP governments since 1974 had, in any case, aimed at challenging state intervention in the economy and removing the protection it could give, to a certain extent, to workers. But the “formalization” of a neoliberal direction, imposed from 1981 onwards, formed a “golden opportunity” for the nationalist elite to distance the community from the policies that supposedly protected and strengthened local production and the internal market. As Özgür assessed as early as 1981, “The mixed economy provided by the Constitution has long been abandoned by UBP. Both economically and politically, the commercial bourgeoisie is the dominant class. This policy has been accelerating over the last few months disguised under the mask of liberalization. UBP aims to pursue this policy further, intensifying exploitation and strengthening the commercial bourgeoisie in every aspect” (Yeni Düzen 1981b).

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The “dominance of the commercial bourgeoisie” to which Özgür referred becomes meaningful in understanding the reactions of the Turkish Cypriot opposition against neoliberalism. The meaning is mainly found in how the Turkish Cypriot elite identified with the efforts to further alienate the community from the local production process; that is, with the basic orientation of Ankara’s new economic measures. In turn, the identification of the operation of Turkish Cypriot commercial capital with the marginalization of the community from production had, among many others, two determinant consequences. The first effect was class-oriented and concerned more about the pressure caused by the efforts to reinforce commercial capital in other sections of the Turkish Cypriot population. As described in Alpay Ertaç’s article (1985a) “The New Historic Block”, a key part of the hegemonic power block in the Turkish Cypriot community was the commercial bourgeoisie. According to the author, the hegemony of this class was facilitated by the fact that the productive forces did not develop normally through the expansion of the industrial sector. The result of this process was a weakness in securing a strong and organized working class to play a leading role in the opposition. According to Ertaç (1985b), the dominant orientation that focused on the profitability of the commercial bourgeoisie implied dependency on the Turkish market as well as the limited development of the Turkish Cypriot community’s agricultural and industrial sector. Apart from the workers’ concerns, reinforcing trade capital, in connection with the Turkish market, had also exerted more pressure at the level of small shop owners and small craftsmen in the community. By the mid-1980s, the Turkish Cypriot small shop owners were fully dependent on the course of imports and exports through the largest Turkish Cypriot commercial capital. Both the amount of trade and the prices of products were determined by Ankara’s strategic role in cooperation with Turkish Cypriot business circles. In this framework, the economic survival of small-to-medium commercial enterprises was very difficult (Aktunç and Tulga 1986). The second negative consequence foreseen by the opposition, as a result of the attempt at neoliberal transformation of the economy, was cultural in nature and touched upon the wider community. For these oppositional circles, the planned orientation to strengthen the nonproductive sectors would result in the perpetuation of alienation from production and hence the widening of the phenomenon of “moral

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collapse” (Ertaç 1985b). Raif Denkta¸s believed that the turning point in the change of Turkish Cypriot relations with Turkey was in 1974, precisely because it was then that the community became completely cut off from production. Raif Denkta¸s assessed the importance of not developing the productive sectors of the Turkish Cypriot economy as yet another basis for “social disease” and a process of enhancing the community’s extinction (Denkta¸s 1997, 25). Another part of the opposition, mainly from the Left, emphasized that the distancing from productive activities strengthened “external tutelage” and contributed to lowering the self-esteem and self-confidence of the community. In this sense, being wrapped up in non-productive activities not only had economic implications for the Turkish Cypriots but also threatened their very existence in Cyprus (U˘gural 1999, 52–3). In the above context, the criticism against the “right-wing management” of the economy was based on the following schema: for the nationalist elite of the Turkish Cypriots, the question of state planning of the economy was not strengthening local production but creating a network of clientele relations. The underdevelopment of the Turkish Cypriot productive forces, in turn, reinforced “external tutelage”, i.e. political and economic dependency on Turkey. Sevgül Uluda˘g (1986a) described the above schema in Yeni Düzen as follows: “Because they did not believe in the protection of the local industry and the state-owned companies, the UBP governments did not contribute to the transformation of the Industrial Group (Sanayii Holding ) into a beneficial business for the country. On the contrary, the directors they appointed and the policies they followed have led the Industrial Group to an economic collapse. The fact that the governments of UBP did not believe in the local industry or in the need to protect the Industrial Group was also made evident from their determination to abolish the protective taxes between Turkey and the TRNC”. What the Industrial Group symbolized is of crucial importance. For a large part of the opposition, this Group was a space for recognition of the productive forces. The effort to undermine the Industrial Group through the policies imposed by the “Özal package” was seen as a conscious strategy aimed at reducing the chances of turning Turkish Cypriots into a community of producers. Mehmet Seyis described the strategy of the transformation of the Turkish Cypriots into a “community of consumers” as follows: “Why was consumerism imposed on us? Because those who produce are organized, they claim rights, they do not

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accept others to speak on their behalf, they do not take orders. Because they are self-sufficient and they make decisions independently” (Kıbrıs Postası 2015). Therefore, the agony expressed by the opposition even before the official disclosure of the “Özal package” in essence went farther than a narrow interpretation of the economic level. The oppositional reaction to the ongoing structural change in the economy included concern about the danger of more authoritarianism by the regime and further dependence of the community on Turkey. The Secretary-General of CTP, Naci Talat (1984), warned about the evolving authoritarianism on the part of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite, saying: “These gentlemen see the future of their economic interests in the hardening of the regime. Those who have made a coup against democracy on the pretext of declaring a state are now preparing for new coups, promoting the rhetoric of ‘critical days’”. CTP deemed that the development of the framework within which the Turkish Cypriot community was operating, especially after the coup in 1980 in Turkey, was deteriorating in terms of democracy. The economic underdevelopment, Ankara’s claim for economic transformation and the years of experience from UBP’s governance led to a wider political crisis. The president of CTP underlined that the policies pursued by UBP prevented the development of the Turkish Cypriot community on the one hand, and on the other hand, they had direct adverse consequences for the operation of institutions such as justice, legislative power and education (Yeni Düzen 1981b). In early March 1986, a series of powerful strikes culminated in a public debate that included the issues of the Turkish Cypriot community’s relations with Turkey and the strengthening of pressure on the opposition. Indeed, the presence of TKP in the government coalition, in these particular circumstances, seems to have affected adversely the party (Dodd 1993b, 137), since the policies that were being implemented could not easily adjust to its ideological programme. The first case of strike mobilizations concerns the Turkish Cypriot Petroleum Company (Kıbrıs Türk Petrolleri), 52% of the shares of which belonged to a Turkish state-owned company. In early 1986, on the occasion of the discussions on the renewal of the collective labour agreement, representatives of Turkish state interests raised important issues about labour relations by initiating the neoliberal transformation in the microexample of the Company. They demanded the complete abolition of any compensations, the expansion of temporary work from three to twelve

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months, and the application of restrictive measures against trade union activities. (Ortam 1986f). In fact, the representatives of the Turkish companies persistently refused to meet with the trade union workers of ˙ s, as well as with representatives of TKP, who originally pursued Petrol-I¸ dialogue in an effort to overcome the tension. However, the ongoing confrontation led UBP, which was in agreement with the Turkish shareholders’ policy, to impose a ban against the strikes planned by the trade ˙ s announced union (Ortam 1986g). In the face of this decision, Petrol-I¸ publicly its intention to organize a general strike with other trade unions (Ortam 1986h, i). In this way, the epicentre of the crisis was the ownership status of the State Economic Enterprises and the balances in the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Almost all organizations of the opposition focused their criticism precisely on the structure of this asymmetric relation, which was reproduced by UBP’s disposition to accept this particular patronage model. For a large part of the community, the question of the ownership status of the State Economic Enterprises was a strong indication of hierarchical relations and thus touched upon the level of political dignity. Kemal Aktunç (1986) described this feeling as follows: “The dignified man of Cyprus has been disturbed by everything that has happened. Those who hold political positions should be by the side of the demands of the people. Our people did not vote for the President, Prime Minister and MPs to behave like the Yalova governor”.4 Although TKP was part of the government, it intensified its criticism of the behaviour of Turkish officials, which, in the party’s opinion, questioned the sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriots (Ortam 1986j). The criticism of Raif Denkta¸s revolved around the same ideological framework and proposed the full nationalization of the Petroleum Company as the only method of protecting Turkish Cypriot workers and strengthening the “TRNC” (Ortam 1986k). The second case of strike mobilization began in March 1986 at the Cypruvex Citrus Company. The original cause of the strike was the refusal by the company’s management to sign the collective labour agreement. Initially Morphou region was the main focus of the strike. From the very first days of the strike, the company’s management made clear that it was not prepared to enter into any dialogue. It cut off the supply of drinking water to the strikers and decided that it would not pay the previous month’s wages (Ortam 1986l). Due to the escalation of tension, solidarity mobilizations took place in the second largest citrus company, Sunzet, whose owner was the businessman Asıl Nadir. The police invaded

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the site to restrain the strikers, leading to the arrest of ten workers (Ortam 1986m). The escalation of strike action was handled by the government mainly in two ways. First, efforts were made to secure a prohibition order (KKTCM 1986b, 3017). Second, the UBP party structure was mobilized throughout the region with the aim of organizing strike-breakers and intimidating the strikers’ families (KKTCM 1986b, 3021). Finally, on the 11th day of the strikes, the police invaded the strikers’ premises and, after violent clashes, dozens of workers were arrested while others were transferred to hospital (KKTCM 1986b, 3022). Based on the information given before the parliament by members of the opposition, the role of the police chief in suppressing the strikes was decisive. In a brief he sent to the Turkish Ambassador, he named the strikers as “traitors of the motherland” (KKTCM 1986b, 3121). However, at the same time, these strikes showed the limits of the authoritarianism’s endurance. The opposition realized that it could indeed be mobilized on particular occasions as a result of the social endorsement of the demands for democratization of the relations with Turkey. For example, on the occasion of the strikes in the Petroleum Company, the Trade Union Solidarity Council (Sendikalararası Dayanı¸sma Kurulu) was created, which outlined clearly the problematic framework of Turkish–Turkish Cypriot relations and raised the issue of disengagement from Ankara (Ortam 1986o). In the years that followed, this particular platform of trade union cooperation succeeded in creating a distinct tradition of trade union solidarity, as well as “fronts of cooperation” on issues of democracy and on the solution of the Cyprus problem. Equally important in this context was the reaction of the people. According to CTP MP, Mehmet Civa, the number of strikers at the two citrus companies exceeded 1300, while another 600 people from the Morphou region took part in the mobilizations and offered many forms of solidarity with the strikers (KKTCM 1986b, 3022–3). Consequently, even before Özal’s arrival on the island in July 1986, the Turkish Cypriot community featured a strong social and political polarization. On one hand, there was the support of UBP and Denkta¸s for the “Özal package”, while on the other, there was a broad opposition from political parties and trade unions, which raised public issues with a different approach to economic development and issues that touched upon a key aspect of the Cyprus problem—namely, Turkey’s relationship with the Turkish Cypriot community and Ankara’s position on the island in general.

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TKP was among the main agents that opposed the “Özal package”, which was, however, part of the coalition government with UBP. Therefore, the stance of the party also affected the equilibrium of the executive structure that would undertake the implementation of the economic and political transformation. Days before the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, TKP executives publicly expressed their suspicion about the intentions and content of Özal’s new policy (Kansoy 1986). After the disclosure of aspects of this package, TKP made a relatively comprehensive effort to record its disagreements and make proposals for a different economic orientation. The party underlined that the package was a set of structural changes featuring the deepening of inequality in people’s incomes and further pressures on local production. As such, the policies promoted by Ankara opposed the political programme of the “government” parties, and therefore, its potential implementation would have to be decided by a referendum (Ortam 1986n). TKP SecretaryGeneral Mustafa Akıncı (Ortam 1986p) clarified that his party could not accept policies that would lead to the “economic and cultural collapse of the Turkish Cypriots” promoted by this package. At the level of proposing alternatives, TKP prepared its own economic policy, which was finally presented to both the Ministerial Council and to Denkta¸s (Ortam 1986q). Proposing an alternative “Cypriot economic package” that wished to address Ankara’s economic claims in a different manner was part of the broader framework of TKP’s perception, which stressed that: “Cypriots have already reached the point they could reach through foreign financial aid. Now, they have to think and give their views about passing on to a new situation” (Uluda˘g 1986b). However, most of the social opposition was expressed by CTP. Following the 1985 elections and the UBP–TKP coalition, CTP managed to establish deeper relations with the trade union movement and become the leading force of the broader oppositional front against the new economic strategy (Ça˘gda 2015, 75). CTP’s immediate reaction to the package included a range of economic and political issues. The party believed that if this type of transformation prevailed, it would accelerate the process of transforming the Turkish Cypriot community into a consumer society (Ça˘gda 2015, 76); it would increase the pressures exercised by the powerful Turkish capital on Turkish Cypriot producers (Yeni Düzen 1986e), while any intentions for trade union repression measures would further challenge democratic claims (Yeni Düzen 1986f). According to CTP, the overall experience—since the coup in 1980 in

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Turkey and the unilateral declaration of the “TRNC”—led to the conclusion that the intended neoliberal change could not prevail without the deepening of authoritarianism. Through the general orientation of the “Özal package”, the party foresaw the intensification of efforts to integrate the northern regions of Cyprus into Turkey; a development that would, in turn, open up prospects for the final partition of the island (Yeni Düzen 1986f). Linking neoliberal transformation with the complete integration of the Turkish Cypriot community into Turkey was the central political framework of the activity of the opposition. For most of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, the neoliberal change to the economy threatened the independence of Cyprus and the autonomy of the community (Sahin ¸ 1986). These particular aspects of the opposition rhetoric ultimately became the basis for the mass protests and general strikes against the Özal package at the end of July 1986 (Dodd 1993b, 140). These mobilizations were organized by the Trade Union Solidarity Council, which led to the deepening of the cooperation of 11 trade unions (Yeni Düzen 1986g). The trade unions’ ultimatum to Ero˘glu, which formed their protest manifesto, rejected the “Özal package” on the following two axes: this particular policy was the last example of a model in which “Ankara decides and Nicosia implements” (Yeni Düzen 1986h); the policies provided in the package ceded Northern Cyprus to “the exploitation of the Turkish bourgeoisie” and thus facilitated integration into Turkey (Yeni Düzen 1986g). The ultimatum also acknowledged that “The TRNC is a young, independent democracy trying to stand on its feet and create its own special personality. It is therefore obliged not to allow the creation of structures that will open the door to the dual Enosis, and to protect its Cypriot character” (Yeni Düzen 1986g).

Nationalist Restoration and “Criminalization” of the Left The parallel reality created by the opposition’s demands, in conjunction with UBP’s persistence in implementing the package, was a dynamic set up of two important interconnected processes. The first process was the gradual social delegitimization of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite. Acknowledging the empowerment of the social opposition and the relative isolation of the nationalist elite, CTP took the initiative to call for early elections (Yeni Düzen 1986i) from the beginning of August 1986.

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The party underlined that UBP’s intention to move unilaterally to the implementation of the “Özal package” had no popular legitimacy since it abolished the cooperation programme with TKP. Thus, early elections would be an opportunity to express the social opposition to the package and crate pressures towards a different economic path (KKTCM 1986d, 4367–71). The second process was not only the total rejection of the package, but also of the new economic guidelines that Ankara sought to impose from the early 1980s. As Sevgül Uluda˘g (1986c) recorded during the first eight months of 1986, a total of 20 long-term strikes were held, which the nationalist elite confronted with repression measures and lay-offs. The result of these two processes was deepening polarization at all levels of social life and confirmation of the opposition’s concerns about the increase of authoritarianism The ever-increasing authoritarianism was a key feature of the period up to the early 1990s and was marked by the following important aspects: the first involved a new effort for an “externally driven” restoration of the state of exception. The “Özal package” and UBP’s insistence on implementing it released direct and drastic pressures for serious restructuring of the entire political system (Dodd 1993b, 140). The aftershocks of Özal’s visit damaged the governmental coalition irreparably and set scenarios for the replacement of TKP on the agenda. In the end, TKP was forced to leave the government since the content of the Ankara package clashed with the programme it had agreed with UBP after the 1985 elections. As noted above, TKP’s negative reactions were strongly made even before the official announcement of the Özal package. Indeed, according to Özgür’s subsequent revelations, the Prime Minister of Turkey himself told TKP that “if you do not implement the package, there are others who will” (KKTCM 1986c, 4518). Özal’s remark was not accidental. It was an indirect referral to the Rebirth Party (Yeni Do˘gu¸s Partisi—YDP), which was founded as the political party of the Turkish settlers. YDP had emphasized its disapproval of the early elections proposed by CTP and said that “all potential coalition governments should be tested by the parties in the Parliament on the basis of the 1985 results” (Yeni Düzen 1986j). Indeed, a few days after the official announcement of the withdrawal of TKP from the government, processes for a new coalition were initiated between UBP and YDP. The new government was officially announced on 2 September 1986. YDP took over the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Dodd 1993b, 141). Denkta¸s immediately supported the

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new arrangement and publicly underlined the need to speed up the implementation of reforms and strengthen the economic ties between the “TRNC” and Turkey (Dodd 1993b, 141). The points raised by the Turkish Cypriot leader were precisely the main features of the ideological framework which, together with “external restoration” of the state of exception that was finally imposed, formed the centre of controversy for the next period up to the beginning of 1990. In the new coalition protocol, a clear reference was made to the necessity of “integrating Turkish Cypriots with Turkey in every field”. In addition, the governmental programme removed any reference to a federal solution to the Cyprus problem (KKTCM 1986c, 4529). These developments were enough to trigger reactions from the opposition, particularly CTP. The main opposition party believed that the readiness of the new right-wing government to implement the package along with the questioning of the federal solution, was evidence for the preparation of the material structure for the political and economic integration of Turkish Cypriots into Turkey (KKTCM 1986c, 4529). Apart from these observations, CTP also criticized the fact that these policies were planned in a context of total neglect of the Turkish Cypriots’ will. As Özgür pointed out in his speech to the parliament on the occasion of the discussion of the new government programme, “Since there is no possibility for the people to exercise their right to make a choice regarding the model that was imposed from outside, we will we continue to point out that our executive power is being usurped” (KKTCM 1986c, 4522). The second example of authoritarianism was recorded through an everincreasing “nationalist restoration” in the dominant ideological framework of the Turkish Cypriot community. The nationalist elite tried to ideologically and morally delegitimize the views of the opposition against neoliberal transformation, the positions in favour of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem, and the claims of the Left for the protection of the Cypriot identity. Only a few days after the visit of Özal and the strengthening of the reactions against the economic package, the Turkish Cypriot leader called on the press to make a self-censoring effort and not project criticism against the economic measures since they were “attacks against the motherland” (Ortam 1986p). According to Denkta¸s, relations between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey should not be the object of public debate. In the same context, Ero˘glu underlined that “among the Turkish Cypriot people there are Greek Cypriot traps. The hostages of the Greek Cypriots in the last few days have been mobilizing against

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motherland Turkey and against the struggle we give for our existence” (Yeni Düzen 1986k). The above statements of the nationalist elite leaders were not at all accidental, neither in terms of their content nor in terms of timing. As already mentioned, the “Özal package” became the reason for the expression of a broad social opposition, whose views and influence delegitimized the nationalist elite. Therefore, the lack of a social consensus on the measures, and the dedication of UBP and Denkta¸s to their implementation, was an explosive combination that led to the activation of coercion. In this way, CTP, as the leading oppositional force, was placed at the centre of the pressures of nationalist restoration. The whole period following the “Özal package”, at least until the early 1990s, was characterized by actions reminiscent of a sort of ideological “lynching” of the Left. In 1987 and 1988, daily developments in the Turkish Cypriot community were monopolized by the Babalar case (Ça˘gda 2015, 82). Babalar was the title of Özgür’s article published in Yeni Düzen newspaper on 16 December 1985. In this article, Özgür revealed Denkta¸s’s relationship with parastate circles in Turkey. As a consequence, the Turkish Cypriot leader took the president of CTP to court. Finally, on 28 December 1987, the Nicosia District Court ruled that Özgür and Yeni Düzen were obliged to pay £200 million Turkish lira (Yeni Düzen 1988a). This amount was the largest fine ever imposed in the Turkish Cypriot community after 1974. Initially, Denkta¸s’s legal claim against Özgür appeared to be a legal issue between two individuals. The political implications were understood only in the context of the historical confrontation of the two ideological movements represented by these two political leaders. But the astronomical cost of the trial “left no room for the case to be perceived merely as a legal matter” (Yeni Düzen 1988b). Besides, around the same time, other newspapers such as Kıbrıs Postası and Ortam were also facing similar prosecutions because they had published critical remarks against Ero˘glu’s policy (Yeni Düzen 1988c). The judicial prosecutions against the opposition press were part of the wider authoritarianism that was introduced to Cyprus through a series of political and economic transformations that had prevailed in Turkey since the coup d’état of 1980. Yeni Düzen (1988d) noted that the “TRNC” constitution, economic agreements and labour power transfers from Turkey formed part of the intended institutional and economic integration processes of Northern Cyprus into Turkey. At the same time, pressure towards the opposition was a symptom

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that proved the integration policies could not be implemented without the activation of authoritarianism. In the same context, Özgür stated that the unprecedented amount of 200 million Turkish Lira litigated against him was such that it formed a tool to silence the Left and the opposition more broadly (Yeni Düzen 1988e). The first spontaneous event to support Yeni Düzen was initiated by CTP members, who organized fundraising campaigns to pay the fine (Yeni Düzen 1988f). Meanwhile, Denkta¸s’s lawyer, Fuat Veziro˘glu, had already sent a letter to the newspaper asking for the payment to be made within three weeks, and in the case of failure to pay the fine, court proceedings would be initiated to confiscate the newspaper’s printing house (Yeni Düzen 1988g). Indeed, on 13 January 1988, bailiffs went to ˙ Ileri, the newspaper’s printing house, to make a record of the machines that would be confiscated. The next day they returned escorted by the police to execute the confiscation. However, they faced the printing house workers and other CTP members, who went on site to protect the newspaper (Yeni Düzen 1988h). This was the starting point of a mass ˙ mobilization that became known as the “resistance of Ileri”. The first day of the protests against the confiscation of the printing presses lasted for the whole day. It started in the morning, when secret police officers surveilled the workers’ movements, and continued until late at night, with protesters blocking all the efforts of the bailiffs to confiscate the machines. Special police forces mobilized against this widespread support for the newspaper and surrounded the area (Yeni Düzen 1988h). According to what Naci Talat revealed in those days, the police officers had orders to use violence and “clean up the area by force” if the protesters continued to occupy the printing house (KKTCM 1988, 3671). From the first day of the mobilization, delegations of TKP, trade unions, and ordinary citizens went to the printing house to help the workers. On 15 January 1988, the mobilization for the protection of Yeni Düzen’s printing house had taken on dimensions of a social resistance with wider implications. Apart from the CTP cadres, a great many other people took part in the mobilization, developing different forms of solidarity. Some people were carrying food and fruits to support the occupation of the printing house, others brought wood for fires. The headquarters of the newspaper Ortam undertook the uninterrupted release of Yeni Düzen during the first difficult days when the printing house was blockaded (Yeni Düzen 1988i). A coalition of 18 trade unions stood by the mobilization, and issued a statement underlining that the

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actions of the government aimed not only to silence the opposition but to eradicate it from the political map. The trade union movement believed that the workers’ resistance to the confiscation of Yeni Düzen’s printing house would eventually become a milestone in the struggle of the Turkish Cypriot community to move “from nomadic life to a democratic society” (Yeni Düzen 1988j). Finally, on 19 January 1988, the Supreme Court decided to suspend the confiscation until the trial of the appeal that Yeni Düzen and Özgür had submitted (Yeni Düzen 1988k). The multifaceted mobilization of the opposition, the social support, and the international criticism of the Turkish Cypriot leadership were developments that reminded the instigators of authoritarianism of its limits. For UBP, the mobilization of the opposition against Yeni Düzen’s printing-press confiscation was a “revolt against court rulings” (KKTCM 1988, 3688). Leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community implied this was essentially an act of “treason against the state”. According to UBP MP Yüksel Tüccaro˘glu, the political campaign that was initiated by CTP on the occasion of the events at the printing house touched the boundaries of anarchy and turned against the foundations of the “TRNC” (KKTCM 1988, 3693–5). The pattern of “national betrayal” that was used to describe the activities of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, and especially CTP, re-emerged even more markedly at a time that was anything but accidental for the course of the Cyprus problem. In early 1988, George Vassiliou, the new President of the Republic of Cyprus, launched several initiatives that eventually led to the resumption of talks between the two leaders in August of the same year. Up to the summer of 1989, the UN sought a gradual culmination of the process by preparing documents of convergence between the two sides and discussing them at the Vassiliou–Denkta¸s meetings during the last week of June 1989 in New York (Yeni Düzen 1989a). CTP’s assessment was that, in the event of a creative approach by the parties, the UN initiative was such that it could lead the Cyprus problem to a solution (Yeni Düzen 1989b). However, political circles in Ankara had different aspirations. They were particularly sceptical about the UN’s intention to discuss specific documents in New York and preferred to simply ensure the continuation of the talks (Yeni Düzen 1989c). Denkta¸s insisted from the outset that the talks in New York should not be carried out on the basis of the UN documents (Erçakıca 1989).

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In this context of mobility, CTP came face to face with a continuous intensification of the “nationalist restoration” process. As Özgür (1989a) revealed, Turkey’s Ambassador, Ertu˘grul Kumcuo˘glu, called him to the embassy to announce that if CTP had any aspirations of ever ruling, it would have to change its positions on the Cyprus issue. The pressure against the Left in expressing positions that favoured a federal solution peaked and soon gained a multifaceted content. In the summer of 1989, just before the leaders’ arrival in New York, Denkta¸s’s circles strongly criticized the policies of the Bulgarian government against the local Turkish-speaking population. The symbolism promoted by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist bloc was quite clear: a Socialist government oppresses the “Brother Turks”, confirming the anti-Turkish, anti-nationalist attitude of the Left in general. The developments in Bulgaria even became a theme of discussions in the “TRNC” parliament. The speech made by the leader of CTP on 2 June 1989 proved to be of significance. Condemning the assimilation policies as “policies to remove an identity – that is not in line with the philosophy of the Left”, Özgür noted: “Such practices should be stopped. Wherever they occur in the world, they must stop. Wherever they occur and whichever ethnic identity they involve. Whether they are Turks of Bulgaria, whether they are Turkish Cypriots or Palestinians and Kurds, all ethnic groups have the right to protect their identity and this right is guaranteed in the United Nations Charter” (KKTCM 1989a, 7798–9). On 5 June 1989, Özgür articulated his party’s position in an article ˙ Yüzlülük). This article in Yeni Düzen entitled “Double-Faced” (Iki commented on the developments in Bulgaria in the exact opposite direction to the one pursued by the nationalist elite under Denkta¸s. On the one hand, the assimilation policy of the Turkish element by the Bulgarian government is criticized, but, at the same time, it underlines the necessity of criticism and political mobilization against “every policy” of assimilation of ethnic groups and collective identities, such as the assimilation policies of the Turkish Cypriot identity pursued by Ankara (Özgür 1989b). The publication of the article caused strong political vibrations. The Turkish Ambassador, Kumcuo˘glu, reported Özgür’s position as “treasonous against the nation” as well as an indication of the levels of the hostile attitude of CTP’s president against Turkey (Yeni Düzen 1989d). Denkta¸s essentially demanded that Özgür “must live with the Greek Cypriots” and underlined the need to lift his parliamentary immunity

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(Yeni Düzen 1989e). On 9 June, the UBP parliamentary group called for a special session concerning “the speeches and articles of the CTP Chairman, Özker Özgür, whose content harmed the relations between Turkey and the TRNC” (KKTCM 1989b, 4). Within a few days, a wide “lynching campaign” against Özgür was spread (Yeni Düzen 1989f), which aimed at the ideological criminalization of the Cypriot identity as expressed by the Turkish Cypriot Left. A special session of the parliament was held on 14 June 1989 and reflected the political environment of the time. UBP MP Yüksel Tüccaro˘glu noted: “Özgür referred to the different structure of the Turkish Cypriots and their Cypriot identity … Which philosopher speaks of the concept of Cypriot identity to which Özgür refers? … Those who deny their race, those who surrendered to the so-called Cypriot identity that is a Greek Cypriot weapon, those assimilated by AKEL, have no right to talk about the past, present and future of the Turkish Cypriot people … Özgür proved by his articles and actions that he is a Greek spy guided by Moscow” (KKTCM 1989b, 12–5). UBP MP E¸sber Serakıncı said: “When we assess the announcements and actions of CTP, we see that there is solely one goal in the leadership and parliamentary group of this party. This goal is the separation of Turkish Cypriots from Turkey, the creation of a common front with AKEL under the banner of Cypriot identity and their prevalence in Cyprus in the name of the foreign centres on which they depend” (KKTCM 1989b, 30). In the same context, Dervi¸s Ero˘glu raised the question of banning CTP because of the party’s “proven disagreement with the principle that the Turkish Cypriots are an inseparable part of the Turkish nation” (KKTCM 1989b, 86). Kenan Akın (YDP MP) prompted the withdrawal of the CTP parliamentary group from the session when he mentioned that “When we conquer the whole of Cyprus, the policy of assimilation and Turkification that Özgür refers to will be first imposed on him … if an assimilation policy is to be carried out, it is for the sake of people like Özker Özgür” (KKTCM 1989b, 92). These developments peaked when the Turkish Embassy sent a letter in which it requested the return of the “special passport of the Republic of Turkey” that had been given to Özgür5 (Yeni Düzen 1989g). This was the most symbolic act of ostracism of the president of CTP from the concept of a “homogenous Turkish nation”, as well as the criminalization of the Cypriot identity expressed by the Turkish Cypriot opposition. In his reply, Özgür returned his passport and said: “Thank you for your unjustified letter requesting the immediate return of the special passport of

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the Turkish Republic No TR-A-223494. Let me clarify that by restricting my freedom of movement, you will not be able to embargo our freedom of thought and expression. I hereby return this passport” (Yeni Düzen 1989h). In light of the above framework, the initiative on the Cyprus issue seemed like a “means of salvation” to the Turkish Cypriot opposition. The problems at the negotiation table were abundant, but the new approach of Vassiliou gave some hope. Even in Turkey, the liberal circles of intellectuals had noted the momentum created by the change of Greek Cypriot leader. For example, Mehmet Ali Birand (1989) stressed that “For the first time, under the presidency of Vassiliou, the Greek Cypriots have begun to make significant and realistic steps. He says things that no one dared say in the past and his attitude is modest … We will get nowhere by constantly saying ‘everything is mine, I give nothing back, Greek Cypriots should be the ones to give’”. In Turkish Cypriot opposition circles, the initiative on the Cyprus issue was a good opportunity to publicly express comprehensive positions on the situation of the community in an environment of extreme polarization. A coalition of ten organizations and political parties led by CTP decided to hold a “support rally for a federal solution” (Yeni Düzen 1989i). In the first announcement from the organizing platform on 27 June 1989, it was stressed that: “We as Turkish Cypriots wish and demand a federal solution that will save us from uncertainty, transform us into citizens of a federation recognized by the world; it will make us autonomous in our internal affairs, partners in the sovereignty of Cyprus and will ensure our safety as well as a stable economy. It is clear that, from the point of view of the Turkish Cypriots, our communal existence and sovereignty are feasible only through the Federal solution” (Yeni Düzen 1989j). In this way, an important part of the Turkish Cypriot opposition put forth the federal solution as a notion guaranteeing its political existence. A federation in Cyprus, according to the organizing platform of the rally, would cancel any dependencies and ensure the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriots. The second pre-rally proclamation underlined that “We will defend our future as Turkish Cypriots, and we will scream all over the world that this country is ours” (Yeni Düzen 1989k). The slogan “This Country is Ours” (Bu Memleket Bizim), which eventually appeared at the rally of 27 June 1989, was a political turning point in the dominant ideological environment imposed during this period. It expressed a form of political agony about the developments of further integration

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of the Turkish Cypriot economy and political system into Turkey. Above all, however, this particular slogan expressed the claim of maintaining the community as a Cypriot entity on the island. Against the reinforcement of the political discourse promoting the federal solution, Denkta¸s and UBP chose once again to polarize the climate. Following the Turkish government’s refusal to allow Özgür and Akıncı to speak at an event on the Cyprus issue organized by the Dikili Municipality in Turkey at the end of July 1989 (Yeni Düzen 1989l), a special session of the parliament took place in August to decide on the Cyprus talks. The new decision was made by the parliamentary majority of UBP and stressed that “The Turkish Cypriot people are a totally separate national entity from the Greek Cypriots, with different roots, language, cultural traditions and religion. As independent people from the Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriots have the right to self-determination … the solution must be based on this right” (Eraslan 2009, 87–90). This particular decision was essentially a confirmation of the strategy that the Turkish Cypriot leadership would follow in the next period, both on the Cyprus issue and the relations between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The community entered the 1990s in a condition of deep polarization, whose key feature was the growing marginalization of the Cypriot identity of Turkish Cypriots.

Notes 1. Only a few days after signing the protocol, Ortam newspaper reported that many Turkish Cypriot products such as chocolates, shampoos, detergents and soft drinks stopped being exported to Turkey (Ortam 1985e). ˙ 2. As reported by Ilhan Üzgel (2004, 329), some of Turkey’s powerful businessmen, including Sakıp Sabancı, Ali Kocman, Sharık Tara, Feyyaz Beker and Halit Narin, accompanied the country’s Prime Minister to Cyprus. 3. As reported by Naim Pinar (2015), the central slogan with which Özal sought to ideologically legitimize the re-structuring of the Turkish Cypriot economy was “More Powerful baby-homeland” (Daha güçlü yavruvatan). According to the dominant ideological framework, Turkish Cypriots would empower the separate state-building through the free market; a development that would work for their benefit on the table of negotiations with the Greek Cypriot leadership for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

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4. The writer refers to the province of Turkey (Yalova) and thus underlines his critical stance against the transformation of the TRNC into a Turkish province. 5. This passport was given by the Turkish state to almost all Turkish Cypriot politicians as a “special arrangement” for their travelling abroad.

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———. 1986h. “Ankara karar verir Lefko¸sa uygular felsefesi artık terk edilmelidir” [The Philosophy That Ankara Decides, and Nicosia Implements Should Be Abandoned], 2 July. ———. 1986i. “Erken seçime gidilmelidir” [We Should Go for Early Elections], 31 July. ———. 1986j. “Erken seçim için henüz s¸ artlar yerine gelmedi” [Conditions Are Not Yet Right for Early Elections], 6 August. ———. 1986k. “Ero˘glu çizmeyi a¸stı” [Ero˘glu Went Too Far], 22 July. ˙ ———. 1988a. “Istinaf dosyalanıyor” [Appeals Case Is Being Filed], 1 January. ———. 1988b. “Durum tek kelime ile vahimdir” [In a Single Word, the Situation Is Grave], 19 January. ˙ basın davası daha açıldı” [Two More Lawsuits against the ———. 1988c. “Iki Press], 19 January. ———. 1988d. “Entegrasyon süreci” [Integration Process], 4 January. ———. 1988e. “Adaletin tek yanlı terazisi düzeltilmelidir” [The One-Sided Scale of Justice Needs to Be Fixed], 4 January. ———. 1988f. “Amaç CTP’yi ve Yeni Düzen’i çökertmektir” [The Aim Is to Destroy CTP and Yeni Düzen], 6 January. ———. 1988g. “Hedef Matbaamız” [Our Printing House Is the Target], 7 January. ———. 1988h. “Direniyoruz” [We Are Resisting], 15 January. ———. 1988i. “Te¸sekkür” [Thank You], 20 January. ———. 1988j. “Direni¸simize tam destek” [Full Support for Our Resistance], 16 January. ———. 1988k. “Karar Denkta¸s’ın” [Denkta¸s Will Decide], 19 January. ———. 1989a. “Yeni belge hazırlanıyor” [A New Document Is Being Prepared], 2 June. ———. 1989b. “Gelinen nokta son derece önemlidir” [The Point We Are at Is Vital], 26 June. ———. 1989c. “Çankaya’da de˘gerlendirme yapıldı… Kıbrıs için hassas dönem” [Evaluations in Çankaya… Sensitive Period for Cyprus], 22 June. ———. 1989d. “Büyükelçilik müdahalelerine devam ediyor” [The Embassy Continues with Its Interventions], 8 June. ———. 1989e. “Bu nasıl Ba¸skan” [What Kind of a President Is This], 9 June. ———. 1989f. “Çeteciler i¸s ba¸sında” [Gangsters Are at Work], 12 June. ———. 1989g. “Elçilikten bu kadar” [This Is It from the Embassy], 14 June. ———. 1989h. “Özgür pasaportunu iade etti” [Özgür Returns His Passport], 15 June. ———. 1989i. “Anla¸smaya destek mitingi” [Demonstration to Support the Agreement], 21 June. ———. 1989j. “Federal bir çözüm talep ediyoruz” [We Are Demanding a Federal Solution], 24 June.

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———. 1989k. “Bu ülkenin bizim oldu˘gunu dünyaya haykıraca˘gız” [We Will Shout to the World That This Country Is Ours], 26 June. ———. 1989l. “Kıbrıs Türklerine söz hakkı yok” [Turkish Cypriots Have No Say], 27 June.

CHAPTER 7

Post-Cold-War Geopolitical Quests

Re-Discovering the “TRNC” Through a “Great Turkic World” The end of the Cold War had a notable impact on the geopolitical goals and perceptions of many states. A totally new environment prevailed that essentially shaped a large part of the world in a way that forced the powerful capitalist states to review their geopolitical perceptions and goals (Murinson 2012, 3–5). The quests of the post-Cold War era also influenced considerably the aspirations for the new role and position that Turkey could, or should, have in the emerging new world order. The debate, both within Turkey and internationally, concerning the future of the country did not have a single focus. On the contrary, different, and sometimes contradictory, assessments were articulated. Initially, the view that Turkey’s geostrategic role and influence had weakened because of its gradual loss of importance as the cornerstone of Western policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was strongly expressed. Added to this assessment was also the belief that NATO would soon confront such a downgrade of its influence as new alternative security structures were underway (Sayarı 1992, 10–11). Another view was based on the belief that the absence of a “given enemy” (the Soviet Union) would not lead to the weakening of Turkey’s geostrategic importance, as prospects for “new enemies and threats” were recorded, including the destabilization in the region, the economic recession and the rise of nationalist movements with irredentist goals.1 © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_7

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In terms of the external impact of Turkey’s post-Cold-War quests, one of the most important factors was the strategic choices of the USA. The goal of the USA to intensify their influence in Eurasia eventually led to the strengthening of the country’s prominence. After 1990, the USA began to treat Turkey as an ally-state that could help to “cover up” the geopolitical gap left behind by the absence of the Soviet Union (Oran 2001, 230). In this way, Turkey gradually begun to be portrayed as a country that could turn into a model of development for the Eurasian hinterland (Bal 2000, 232). The aforementioned prospects, in turn, created a kind of euphoria in Ankara, as the initial concerns about the downgrading of its influence began to subside. Gradually, it became clear in Turkey that the collapse of the international bipolar system changed the country’s relations with the West on the one hand, and on the other it reinforced the belief that there were now prospects for an autonomous intensification of Turkey’s influence in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia (Kazan 2002, 56). This euphoria, however, was accompanied by subtle balances and intense contradictions regarding the content of Ankara’s new geopolitical quests. On the one hand, the restructuring in the region was understood in the light of instability and the reproduction of real, or artificial, threats. On the other hand, the geopolitical gap left behind by the dissolution of the Soviet Union was understood as an opportunity to spread the influence of Turkey (Kaliber 2009, 115–6). Sükrü ¸ Elekda˘g (1994a, b, c), a senior Turkish diplomat, published a number of articles under the general title “Strategy of Two-and-aHalf Wars” in Milliyet on 2 and 4 December 1994. In these articles, Elekda˘g sought to establish a theoretical framework for legitimizing his position that Turkey should increase its defence and security spending. The diplomat expressed the view that, unlike many Western countries that had reduced their defence spending after the end of the Cold War, Turkey could not afford this because of the critical geopolitical conditions in its region. According to him, the geopolitical conditions in Turkey’s geography created such threats against its national security and territorial integrity that the country was forced to reinforce its armed capacity to the point that it could carry out “two and a half wars”. A typical example of this was Elekda˘g’s belief that “We have good relations with all our neighbours in our geographical region. But Greece and Syria, which are countries that claim to have rights over our vital interests and territories,

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form priority threats for our country” (Elekda˘g 1994a). On the basis of this perception, Elekda˘g assessed that Turkey is externally encircled by Greece and Syria, and internally by PKK. These three “hostile actors” were distinguished by both separate objectives and joint actions since, according to the author, Greece and Syria supported PKK. These articles basically reflected the new quests of a very large part of the establishment in Ankara, as these had appeared in the post-Cold-War framework. The views expressed by Elekda˘g through his texts essentially articulated the return of an “encirclement syndrome”, according to which the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey comprised enemies claiming the territorial division of the country (Oran 2001, 236). Nourishing the notion of the threat coming from “untrustworthy neighbouring states” had a history and was expressed in Turkey through concrete readings of historical developments such as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Sevres (Tank 2002, 151). At this point, the inherent contradictions of the geopolitical vision emerged. The “encirclement” by real or artificial threats coexisted with the hope of maximizing Turkish influence. Turkey was presented as a country “at the centre of the witch’s cauldron” or as Çevik Bir (1998) described it, “a country at the centre of a crisis-ridden region”. At the same time, however, Turkey itself and its features were promoted through the prospect of the “only balanced actor” capable of absorbing the tensions of the time and spreading its own stability in the region (Oran 2001, 236). Turkey’s former Minister of Defence, Hikmet Sami Türk, underlined: “In the midst of disaster and restructuring, Turkey has always been, and continues to be, a pole of stability in the region. Fate has placed Turkey geographically at the centre of a virtual ‘Bermuda triangle’ of the post-Cold-War era where unpredictability and uncertainty regarding the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are encircling us” (Kazan 2002, 63–4). The contradictions borne from the relation of an “unstable region” and a “stable Turkey” intensified dramatically because of the emergence of new “imperial” aspirations in the Turkish foreign policy vision. More specifically, the emergence of new states in the Balkans, and the wider region of Central Asia, contributed to the construction of a nationalist realm that promoted the “great Turkic world” whereby Turkey was responsible for maintaining stability and development. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the previously weak and marginalized aspects of pan-Turkism came to the fore as legitimizing forces of the goal of

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expanding the influence of a “powerful Turkish state” (Kızılyürek 2005, 303). The previous, circumstantial constraint of Turkish nationalism within the Republican borders began to be disputed by the emergence of a “new geography of Turks”, who had little difference from the Turks living within officially defined Turkish state borders (Aydın 1995, 61). The above theoretical background questioned the traditional Kemalist notion of the “fixed and uncontested” borders of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli). The paroxysm about the existence of a “great Turkic world” not only sought to revise traditional foreign policy (at least at the level of public discourse), but it also approached key aspects of Kemalism as a “drawback” that constrained the true potential of Turkey. The tendency for “non-intervention” in other regions was criticized as a dogmatic barrier against Turkey’s ability and need to maximize its influence (Oran 2001, 221). In the same vein, the Kemalist doctrine “Peace in the Country, Peace in the World” (Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh) had gradually been put under revision. The previous understanding of this doctrine as a peace-making formula could not be situated in the new geopolitical context since this sort of interpretation would reduce the prospects of the country’s expansion into the emerging “great Turkic world” (Mufti 1998, 39–40). In this way, the beginning of the post-Cold-War era also signalled the release of an “imperial passion” in Turkish nationalism. In this new context, Turkishness resurfaced its aspirations for expansion beyond Turkey’s borders, resulting in the politicization of the vision about “a great Turkic world from the Adriatic Sea to China” (Aydın 1995, 61). In his speech to the National Assembly on 1 September 1991, the Turkish President, Turgut Özal, noted: “There is a historic opportunity before Turkey. If we do not make mistakes and if we remain firm, then our country can benefit from this historic opportunity, from this possibility that may reappear in 400–500 years. Dear fellow citizens, come enter this door, which God has opened for Turkey. This will put an end to the sufferings of the last 400 years” (TBMM 2011, 13). The opportunity to which Özal referred was essentially the goal of turning Turkey into a “model” of development and modernization for the new Central Asian states. As pointed out by Süleyman Demirel, who succeeded Özal as President of the country, Turkey had responsibilities regarding the integration of the new Central Asian states into the world market—responsibilities that stemmed from Turkey’s “distinct cultural, geographic and historical position”, which lay at the very heart of the new political and economic

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structure of the post-Cold-War framework (Aydın 2001, 381; Güvenç 2004, 914; Uzgel 2001, 86). Ankara’s “imperial aspirations” in the 1990s and the effort to identify some regions beyond the borders of Turkey as “Turkish” also affected Cyprus. After the end of the Cold War, Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community transformed into “fields” of confirmation of the Turkish influence which—according to the new geopolitical visions—should spread beyond the borders of the Kemalist state (Kızılyürek 2005, 307–8). The Turkish Cypriot community, and its living space in the divided region of Cyprus, transformed into a “space” constructed by political and ideological criteria that surpassed the geographic properties of the island.2 Understanding the way in which a “specific Northern Cyprus” and a “specific Turkish Cypriot community” were created in the 1990s is essential for understanding the political realities of the era and the strategies implemented. This is a key effort because the beginning of the post-Cold-War era marked Turkey’s attempt to underline the importance of Cyprus, not through a simple geographical classification, but also through ideological criteria. The immediate result was to place the “TRNC” and the Turkish Cypriot community itself in a context of continuous reaffirmation of Ankara’s insecurity while, at the same time, legitimizing the goal of spreading its influence (Kaliber 2009, 118). Therefore, Cyprus, the “TRNC” and the Turkish Cypriots were redefined by Ankara’s dual context: on the one hand, they formed “areas” whose control was completely and directly linked to the “survival of the Turkish state” and the “fate of Turkey” (Kaliber 2009, 114). They comprised, in other words, an ideological basis for a “state of exception” for the protection of the vital interests of the Turkish state. On the other hand, they formed an “experimental laboratory” where the effectiveness of pan-Turkist postCold-War visions could be tested. As Mümtaz Soysal stressed, “North Cyprus is a field of experimentation that shows what Turkey can do, how to do it, and how far it can go to do something for Turks outside of Turkey. If this experiment fails then it will be ridiculous to say great words and have big dreams for other regions” (Kızılyürek 2005, 304). A similar view was expressed by Sükrü ¸ Sina Gürel, who was Vice-President of the Turkish government at the time and responsible for Cypriot affairs: “We cannot benefit from our foreign policy if we retreat from our positions on Cyprus and the Aegean. Especially at this time, when we are talking about

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new horizons for the Turkish world, for Turkey as a great power” (Gürel 1993, 126). Based on this reasoning, the preservation of the partition’s status quo and the reproduction of this particular geopolitical equilibrium on the island after the end of the Cold War was proof of the greatness of Turkey. The reinvention of the “TRNC” in the 1990s through the aforementioned double framework was reinforced by the geopolitical circumstances and the power equilibria. Ultimately, developments in the Greece– Cyprus–EU axis proved decisive. One of the key elements in this framework was the view that the Greek state was following a strategy of encirclement regarding Turkey in a way that would cut it off from its only channels of supply; namely, the southern coast and the opening to the Eastern Mediterranean. Based on the above, the central axis of Greek politics was Cyprus, which confirmed the great importance of the island for the security of Anatolia and for the control of shipping and commercial routes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, a threat from Cyprus itself was recorded through the efforts of the Republic of Cyprus, along with Greece, to form the Unitary Defence Doctrine, to purchase the S-300 missile system and to complete the island’s accession in the EU. These policies were seen as a powerful reproductive basis for the “encirclement syndrome” and the notion of threat. This was a development that eventually had a decisive impact on the course of the Turkish Cypriot community itself throughout the 1990s. Turkey’s reactions gradually formed the conditions for the transfer of the “TRNC” to the heart of Turkey’s wider national security policy. These reactions shaped some qualitative features concerning Ankara’s perception of the “TRNC” as a geopolitical space. The hierarchical relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community acquired new features that multiplied the dependence and consequently the need for Turkey to be present in every aspect of Turkish Cypriot society. In July 1997, Turkey and the “TRNC” signed a joint policy statement stating that “Given the scale of the threat against Turkey as a result of the heavy artillery of South Cyprus and the support it offers to terrorism, the two sides stress that as Turkey is important for the security of the TRNC, so the TRNC is equally important for Turkey’s security” (Kaliber 2003, 196–7). This particular transformation of the “TRNC” into a security provider for Turkey contributed to the emergence of significant setbacks for the Turkish Cypriot community itself throughout almost all the 1990s. On

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the first level, the dynamics of a renewed “securitization” of the Cyprus problem resurfaced the view that “Cyprus is, more than anything, a problem for Turkey’s national security” (Koçer 2012, 249). In this way, the Turkish Cypriots “faded from view” and ceased to be the only legitimate element for Turkey’s presence on the island. The geopolitical circumstances of the time and the promotion of the Turkish Cypriot space as a field of “Turkey’s vital interests” (Kazan 2002, 57–8) substantially downgraded Ankara’s previous position regarding the security of the Turkish Cypriots. Downgrading the security of the Turkish Cypriots as Ankara’s “responsibility and mission” strengthened further the political and cultural disappearance of the Turkish Cypriot community. A small example of the externally constructed “non-existence” of the Turkish Cypriots is recorded in the words of the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Ramazan Mirzao˘glu, who, in 1999, underlined that “There is no difference between the current inhabitants of the island, i.e. between the Turks of Cyprus and the Turks living in Anatolia. The former came to Cyprus 428 years ago while the latter stayed in Anatolia. Race and blood are the same and it is a mistake to distinguish between them” (Copeaux and Copeaux 2009, 83). The deepening of the geopolitical crisis of the time caused the immediate “ostracism” of Turkish Cypriot particularities like the autonomous social structure and the Cypriotness of its identity. The Turkish Cypriots turned more and more into “Turks outside Turkey” whose role was limited to proving the grandeur of the “motherland” in the post-Cold-War framework. On a second level, however, the transformation of the “TRNC” into a source of security for Turkey created another strong movement. It built the foundations for the ideological recreation of Turkish Cypriot structures in a way that ensured they were custom-made precisely to fit this new role. If the “TRNC” was Turkey’s “guarantor of security”, then it would have to be characterized by social and ideological agents that would represent the tendency to disengage from the federal solution of the Cyprus problem. The marginalization of the community’s role as a Cypriot entity and its transformation into a security provider for Turkey perpetuated an ideological environment in which the pressure against the oppositional Turkish Cypriot forces increased sharply. In the same way, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite—which accepted not only the existence of the “TRNC” but also its promotion in a way that fully responded to Turkey’s post-Cold-War geopolitical vision—became fully legitimized.

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The Local Nationalist Reproduction of “TRNC” as a Security Provider to Turkey As Lacher and Kaymak (2005, 150) point out, nationalism needs its active reproduction. The perpetuation of national, ethnic or other conflict can revitalize a nationalist programme. However, a potential failure to implement promises of economic growth or independence may, at the same time, contribute to a legitimacy crisis for this programme. Indeed, almost throughout the 1990s, the nationalist programme in the Turkish Cypriot community was reproduced through a constant frenzy of conflicting political discourse, through the construction of internal and external enemies, and the promotion of partition as a form of protection for the Turkish Cypriots. It could even be said that the nationalist programme of this period was developed in a way that was adapted, in its basic aspects, to Turkey’s wider hegemonic vision of a “great Turkic world”.3 In this way the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite could, under certain conditions, place its positions in a wider framework of social actors that were active in multiple levels both in Cyprus and in Turkey. One of the main pillars of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist programme was the adjustment of the community to the context of the “great Turkic world” of the post-Cold-War period. This process passed, as expected, through key local actors. On the basis of the aforementioned programme, Rauf Denkta¸s was not merely a personality expressing the interests of the Turkish state in Cyprus. He was transformed into a personality that could reproduce Turkey’s influence with symbolisms for the entire nationalist imagination of the “great Turkic world”. Thus, the “TRNC” was ideologically transformed into a structure of “Turkishness outside the borders” and Denkta¸s into a grant supporter of the effort to export this particular Turkishness (Kızılyürek 2005, 309). In this ideological pattern, the “Cypriot aspects” of Turkish Cypriots were removed. The exemplary expression of the cultural vanishing of the Turkish Cypriot community was expressed by Rauf Denkta¸s himself in the mid-1990s as follows: “I am the birth of Anatolia. I am every bit a Turk. My roots are in Central Asia. I am a Turk with all my ‘being’, with my culture, my language and my history. I have my state and my motherland. Some start an artificial debate that there are Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, etc. There is neither a Turkish Cypriot, nor a Greek Cypriot, nor a Cypriot. And be

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careful! Never ask us ‘Are you a Cypriot?’, because you will be misunderstood. It will lead to a misinterpretation. Because in Cyprus there exists only one Cypriot and that is the Cypriot donkey” (Gündem Kıbrıs 2015). At a political level, the full ideological integration of the Turkish Cypriots and the “TRNC” into the broader hegemonic discourse that reproduced the “great Turkic world” signified that the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem could only be valid if they served Turkey’s interests. The Turkish Cypriot leader was also clear on this point: “Protecting the interests of the Turks of Cyprus means defending the rights that Turkey has in Cyprus. We exist because of these rights. What saved us is precisely these rights” (KKTCM 1998a, 3068). Based on the above, the rights of Turkey in Cyprus existed regardless of the presence of the Turkish Cypriot community (Talat 2005, 18). At the same time, the island, and more specifically the “TRNC”, ceased to be only the “homeland” of the Turkish Cypriots, and rather transformed—according to the TMT Fighters Association (TMT Mücahitler Derne˘gi)—“into one of the security grounds of Turkishness throughout the world” (Kıbrıs 1990a). The practical reflection of the above shift was immediately apparent at the negotiating table. During the talks between Vassiliou and Denkta¸s in late February 1990, the Turkish Cypriot leader insisted on securing a separate right to self-determination, as well as on the use of the term “Turkish Cypriot people” (Ergüçlü 1990a). Indeed, the first few days of the talks were spent on the question of defining the status of the Turkish Cypriots, which caused the UN Secretary-General some discomfort (Ergüçlü 1990b). Denkta¸s insisted on the fact that “The Turks of Cyprus are a people. As a people, they conducted a referendum. As a people, they made their constitution and now they are living under this constitution. No one can tell them to be a community… It should not be forgotten that people are what they define themselves to be. No one can tell them “you are that or the other” (Ergüçlü 1990c). Under these circumstances, the two leaders’ negotiations resulted in deadlock. Indeed, on 12 March 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 649 inviting the Secretary-General and the leaders of the two communities to continue their efforts for a federal solution to the problem. However, the new failure of the talks triggered a strengthening of the criticism against the Turkish Cypriot leader by the Turkish Cypriot opposition (Fırat 2001, 452). The persistence of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite in securing a separate right to self-determination was not at all accidental at that

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particular time. May 1990 was a month of parliamentary elections for the Turkish Cypriot community, and Denkta¸s, sensing the subversive dynamics of the time and the prospect of a stronger opposition following the failure of the recent talks, sought to build a specific ideological environment to completely neutralize the forces that supported the federal solution. The actions of the Turkish Cypriot leader that were already underway, while he was in New York for the negotiation talks, were based on three main fronts of confrontation: the first was to promote the position that Vassiliou’s refusal to accept a separate right to self-determination was a sort of confirmation of “the diachronic Greek Cypriot goal” to turn the Turkish Cypriot community into a minority (Ergüçlü 1990a). The second ideological front concerned the promotion of the idea that the solution to the Cyprus problem would only be possible after the recognition of the “TRNC” as a second state in Cyprus. Even during the days of the talks in New York, UBP Chairman Dervi¸s Ero˘glu proclaimed that “As long as the reality of the TRNC is not emphasized, as long as our right to self-determination and our will to have Turkey as guarantor with the unilateral right of intervention is not accepted, we will not sign any agreement” (Kıbrıs 1990b). The third front of conflict focused on the ideological attack against the Turkish Cypriot opposition. The polarization of the era, and the construction of pressure against the opposition prior to the elections of May 1990, was particularly pronounced the evening between 30 and 31 January. The illegal right-wing Cyprus Turkish People’s Movement (Kıbrıs Türk Halk Hareketi) circulated leaflets that threatened to kill cadres of the CTP, TKP and New Cyprus Party (Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi— YKP) (Yeni Düzen 1990a). This organization also took responsibility for previous bombing attacks against opposition officials and of the CTP headquarters (Ortam 1990a). In their proclamation, they criticized CTP for the use of socialist slogans, “co-operation with the enemy” and for attacks against the “TRNC” and the “motherland Turkey”. At the same time, they named TKP as a US ally and a rejecter of Turkish Cypriot self-determination. They referred to CTP chairman Özker Özgür and other party executives, such as Fadıl Ça˘gda, Ferdi Sabit Soyer and Hasan Sarıca, as “partners of the enemy and the Russian embassy with the aim of destroying the TRNC and cutting off the Turks of Cyprus from the motherland”. Alpay Durduran was accused of “insulting the TRNC, Turkey and the Turkish army”. The proclamation of the organization concluded by saying that if the aforementioned individuals were to continue their

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political activity, they and their families would be murdered without further warning (Yeni Düzen 1990b). This moment was a turning point in the construction of a nationalist atmosphere that would develop almost throughout the entire decade of the 1990s. The intensification of the public presence of extreme right-wing activity in the Turkish Cypriot community set the ideological ground upon which the separation between “national and anti-national forces” would be based (Soyer 1990). At a practical level this separation meant that the “national forces” had the task of protecting the character of the “TRNC” as a symbol of the existence of “Turkishness abroad” while they undertook to politically ostracize the “anti-national, traitorous forces”. For example, CTP’s harsh criticism of Denkta¸s’s intransigent policy that led the talks to new deadlocks was seen as an extension of the hostile Greek Cypriot machinations aimed at destroying the “TRNC” and “subjugating” the Turkish Cypriots. The Association of Nationalist Thought (Milliyetçi Dü¸sünce Derne˘gi), one of the far-right organizations, underlined in a statement that “The blaming of our leader Denkta¸s for the deadlock in the talks is the longstanding attitude of CTP and its leader Özker Özgür, who are puppets of Vassiliou and AKEL. The fact that Özker Özgür continues to be the representative of Vassiliou in the TRNC is treated with hatred by our people… The CTP gang seeks, with its ideas, words and actions, to eliminate the TRNC, betray the Turks of Cyprus, the martyrs and fighters… Özgür should be immediately deprived of TRNC citizenship, which he never accepted” (Kıbrıs 1990c). Meanwhile, the plans of the nationalist bloc concerning the May 1990 elections had already been initiated in the last few months of 1989 and focused on two key political axes. The first axis involved Ero˘glu’s intentions to change the electoral system. The main orientation was to adopt a form of weighted vote, in a way that would allow the first party that succeeded in securing rates of 25–30% to automatically gain the advantage of extra seats. According to Ero˘glu himself, this change would contribute to the formation of more stable governments, while generally facilitating the existence of an efficient one-party government (Dodd 1993, 148). As of 3 January 1990, UBP initiated intra-party discussions on the content of the changes, aiming to strengthen the first party with additional seats beyond the limits set by traditional proportional representation. Several party MPs stressed that UBP could gain at least 15 more seats, leading to the “return to single-party system conditions” (Ortam 1990b).

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A few days later, on 8 January 1990, the Council of Ministers approved the proposal for the new electoral law, which was then put forth in parliament for discussion and voting. According to the amendments, a party that managed to get percentages above 25% would directly gain 1/3 of the seats of the districts where it came first percentage-wise, and the remaining 2/3 would be allocated proportionally. Therefore, UBP sought to secure a large number of seats by majority rather than proportionally (Warner 1993, 200). Furthermore, the amendments terminated the horizontal vote and institutionalized a type of “state deputy” (Ortam 1990c). These changes were the reason that the opposition came to call the law the “avanta law” (avanta yasası), that is, a law that “ensured unlawful and unfair profit”. According to Hüseyin Duyar, UBP’s political objective in changing the electoral law was to cancel the multiparty life of the Turkish Cypriots and to establish a one-party authoritarian regime. The undemocratic nature of the electoral law would ultimately affect the notion of the welfare state. UBP, according to him, supported these changes because it realized this was the only way to remain in power (Duyar 1990). The key focus of the nationalist leadership on the need for “stability and effectiveness” of a strong executive power, as well as the underlining of the disadvantages of coalition governments (Ortam 1990d), expressed their concern about the social strengthening of the opposition. Further, they also expressed an awareness of the necessity to effectively implement the neoliberal orientation that was still incomplete. In this context, any mechanisms for democratic consultation and participation were redundant, to say the least (Dodd 1993, 148; Ortam 1990e). The second pillar of the nationalist bloc’s plans involved Denkta¸s’s resignation and the artificial creation of early elections for the Turkish Cypriot leader. In this way, the “presidential” elections that would normally be held in June 1990 were actually set for April, that is, at a time preceding the parliamentary elections. Holding artificially early presidential elections, in correlation with the specific ideological framework of the period, brought the Turkish Cypriot leader and UBP to a more advantageous position. They managed to create conditions for the unification of a large, right-wing, nationalist election campaign that began in the early 1990s and extended to the end of the parliamentary elections (Ça˘gda 2015, 154–5). Denkta¸s and UBP could move on a joint axis of marginalizing the opposition. The Turkish Cypriot leader himself was

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clear about the purpose of proclaiming early presidential elections: “Faced with back-stabbing by a certain political party regarding our national case, I am thinking of resigning and holding early elections in 45 days. I believe it is beneficial to turn the early presidential elections into a sort of referendum” (Kıbrıs 1990d). Denkta¸s’s clarification of “a political party that backstabbed” the national case finally proved to be one of the cornerstones of the ideological construction of nearly the entire decade. The main message of the election campaign was the “danger” surrounding the prospect of CTP’s strengthening and, more broadly, of those forces that opposed the basic features of the post-Cold-War geopolitical vision of Ankara and of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. CTP and its criticism of the efforts to move away from a federal solution formed “the main reason for the intransigence of the Greek Cypriots, who have linked their hopes in reaching a desirable solution with the reinforcement of CTP’s political power” (Kıbrıs 1990e). For nearly the entire Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite, the 1990 electoral process was not “a simple internal controversy”. It formed the personification of the “national case” that Turkish Cypriots were called upon to defend against the intrusions of foreign centres that intended to question the “TRNC” (Gazio˘glu 1990). According to the Association of TMT Fighters, the 1990 election process was a “third peace operation” that required a “complete national mobilization” to ensure Denkta¸s’s continued primacy (Kıbrıs 1990f). The same rationale underlined that, against the “dark plans” of foreign and internal centres (Kıbrıs 1990g), only Denkta¸s’s victory could secure the survival of the “TRNC”. In short, the nationalist elite redefined CTP and TKP as an internal “phalanx” of the Greek Cypriots and other foreign power centres. Even contact by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot opposition with Vassiliou and other Greek Cypriot politicians was enough to be interpreted by the nationalist bloc as evidence of their “foreign-guided” (Kıbrıs 1990h) and traitorous behaviour. An illustrative example was UBP’s full-page advertising campaign in Kıbrıs newspaper, in view of the 1990 May elections. A photograph of Özgür speaking with Vassiliou was printed, followed by the phrase: “We are against those who peacefully embrace the Greek Cypriots and lead the Turks of Cyprus to disaster. National Unity Party: The party of the people that created and gives life to the TRNC”.4

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In the meantime, the negotiation table, the wider developments in Greek–Turkish relations, as well as the dynamics of internationalizing the problem through the relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU, formed elements that were exploited by Denkta¸s and the nationalist elite to establish the ideological framework they were seeking to build. Following the failure of 1990, the UN Secretary-General submitted the Ghali Set of Ideas in 1992, which Denkta¸s approached in a negative manner. The Turkish Cypriot leader increasingly began to question the prospect of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. He used examples of partitions and collapse of federal systems after the end of the Cold War to indicate that it was preferable to opt for confederation and recognition of an independent state of Turkish Cypriots. The outcome of this particular initiative in the talks was again negative, while on 19 November 1992 the UN Secretary-General said in his report that the Turkish side was primarily responsible for the non-solution (Fırat 2001, 455–6). The new talks, which began on 24 May 1993, were held in New York between Clerides and Denkta¸s. The UN Secretary-General submitted a “mini package” of proposals on confidence-building measures. The Turkish Cypriot leader withdrew from the talks saying he would have to consult further on this package with Ankara and the parliament. Returning to Cyprus, he announced that he would not take part in the talks personally, and his spokesman during the technical committee talks in Nicosia would be Kenan Atakol (“TRNC” Foreign Minister at the time). The Secretary-General would not accept a representative other than the Turkish Cypriot leader and so the talks were interrupted in June 1993 (Fırat 2001, 458). This interruption of talks can also be seen as a turning point in the effort to formalize the strategy shift of Denkta¸s towards overturning the idea of a federal solution. For example, on 5 May 1994, Denkta¸s travelled to Turkey, where he had a round of meetings in various cities to promote his position for integration into Turkey as an answer to the possibility of the Republic of Cyprus joining the EU (Milliyet 1994a). In a meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Kenan Evren supported the prospect of abandoning once and for all the prospect of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem, underlining that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the division of Yugoslavia it became clear that the two sides in Cyprus could not create a federal structure on the island (Milliyet 1994b). Speaking at a meeting ˙ of the Bursa Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (BUSIAD),

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Denkta¸s said: “Unfortunately, the United Nations are supporting a federation that the Greek Cypriots want. But they cannot expect a federation between two communities that are so far apart. The federation cannot be forced… We have to say to the UN: ‘You have been discussing whether, or not, there will be a federation for twenty years now. It should be made clear to you by now that it cannot be…’. We should turn our backs to the world, we must unite with Turkey. This is the road” (An 2015). All the above-mentioned moves of Denkta¸s were not irrelevant to the efforts to create a particular climate within the Turkish Cypriot community that favoured abandoning the federation. Along with Ankara’s moves in the backdrop of developments of the time, such as the Unitary Defence Doctrine between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus and the accession process of Cyprus to the EU, Denkta¸s sought to secure local Turkish Cypriot legitimacy that would allow the pursuit of other solutions to the Cyprus problem. A typical example was the balances in the parliament that eventually led to the decision of 29 August 1994 with the majority of UBP and the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP). The new decision on the Cyprus issue stated that the Turkish Cypriot leadership would not continue the dialogue on the “confidence-building package” in the Cyprus talks if the Turkish Cypriots were not acknowledged as one of the two peoples in Cyprus, with an equal political and legal status. The decision stressed that in order to balance the military and defence agreements between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, the “TRNC” would proceed with agreements with Turkey to strengthen the areas of external security and defence. It underlined the necessity to initiate procedures to lift all financial constraints for complete economic integration between Turkey and the “TRNC”. One of the most important points of the new decision was that it abolished all preceding ones that recorded the federation as the only possible form of solution to the Cyprus problem (KKTCM 2009, 124–8). This was a period during which the Turkish Cypriot leader made it clear that the talks conducted on the basis of a federal solution served nothing but the loss of valuable time for the community. Indeed, in self-criticism, he pointed out that he himself was misled in participating in the talks “as if the Greek Cypriots would accept a federation based on equality, on cooperative sovereignty, on bi-zonality and the continuation of the guarantee and security agreements” (KKTCM 1995, 10–11). The process of the negotiations itself was presented as the main cause of the accumulation of deadlocks and of the daily problems of the Turkish Cypriots.

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The “entrapment” of Turkish Cypriots in the negotiations, according to Denkta¸s, prevented the community from devoting itself to efforts for recognition of a separated state (KKTCM 1998a, 3066) and, therefore, to a substantial basis for growth and prosperity. This rhetoric became more intense as the prospect of the Cyprus Republic joining the EU acquired more meaning and dynamics. Gradually, the EU transformed into a political and ideological axis on the basis of which the entire Turkish Cypriot society expressed an opinion in relation to the solution of the Cyprus problem (Balkır and Yalman 2009, 48). For the nationalist elite of the Turkish Cypriots, the EU and the dynamics that were released on the Cyprus issue, due to the EU talks with the Republic of Cyprus, formed direct threats to the vision of a separate state (Bahçeli 2004, 176) and also to the Turkish Cypriot existence itself as this was included in the nationalist political programme. Dervi¸s Ero˘glu reiterated that if the Unitary Defence Doctrine was the realization of the military union between the Greek Cypriots and Greece, then the integration of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU would be the completion of the political and economic aspect of the Union/Enosis. According to him, the countermeasure by the Turkish Cypriots should be to deepen their relations with Turkey (KKTCM 1998a, 3075). The deliberate identification of the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU before the solution of the Cyprus problem with a form of Enosis of Cyprus with Greece served to promote “phobic” syndromes within the Turkish Cypriot community. This identification kept resurfacing the historical phobias of the Turkish Cypriots about the possibility of their conversion into a minority under Greek Cypriot authority. The EU itself was presented as an institution that promoted the solution of the Cyprus problem through majority–minority population relations on the island (Bahçeli 2004, 176). In this ideological frame, the EU and the accession course of the Cyprus Republic were an “Anglo-American conspiracy” aimed at satisfying the historic and irreversible goal of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis with Greece (Kaymak and Vural 2009, 89). The possibility of Cyprus joining the EU before the solution of the Cyprus problem and the simultaneous accession of Turkey, was for Denkta¸s, a prospect “deadly and dangerous. A great trap and a camouflaged Enosis ” (Kıbrıs 1990i). Through such historical references, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership sought to deepen further the ideological division between the two communities in Cyprus, especially given the positive environment within the Greek Cypriot community in relation to the EU. Denkta¸s

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was constantly trying to prevent a similar positive climate forming within the Turkish Cypriot community (Kaymak and Vural 2009, 89), thereby serving the reproduction of a parallel axis of demonization of the profederal forces. Since the EU was presented as a “pro-Greek Cypriot” and therefore “anti-Turkish” political organization, then the Turkish Cypriot supporters of Cyprus’s accession to the EU were also referred to as “suspected of treason”. The crisis in relations between Turkey and the EU that peaked after the decision of the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 was reflected, almost immediately, in Cyprus. Within the ideological framework that prevailed in the Turkish Cypriot community, this decision created additional dynamics to advance the idea of a confederal settlement of the Cyprus problem (Kızılyürek 2005, 313). The fact that Turkey was not included in EU enlargement plans at this particular time was, in a sense, a “relief” for the Turkish Cypriot leader (KKTCM 1998b, 3016). Denkta¸s believed that he was now gaining a wider remit to exercise pressure on those who insisted on the federation. After the signing of a Partnership Agreement between Turkey and the “TRNC” in August 1997 (KKTCM 1998a, 3075), the government of the “TRNC” decided that the talks could continue only if these would be conducted between two states (KKTCM 1998a, 3076). A new phase, capping the efforts to abandon the prospect of a federal solution, was the majority approval by the “TRNC parliament” for the creation of the Partnership Council (Ortaklık Konseyi) with Turkey. The Council would be responsible for completing the financial and economic integration of the “TRNC” with Turkey, but also for the “partial integration into defence, security and foreign policy issues” (KKTCM 1998b, 3008). The creation of this Council was important as it was presented as a comprehensive alternative for the Turkish Cypriots to the prospect of the Cyprus Republic joining the EU (KKTCM 1998b, 3015). Thus, the accession process of the Cyprus Republic to the EU on the ideological background of the nationalist programme was introduced to the Turkish Cypriots not only as a threat, but also as a clear pressure for the marginalization of the Turkish Cypriot Left. The Turkish Cypriot leader even presented a coercive dilemma: “A man who defends this state has no right to give the message that we must continue the negotiations from the point of intercommunal talks. Especially after Turkey’s support, in my opinion, it is also a bit bold for anyone to want to continue from the point where we left off … I want you to say that we are a state, that we are not

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a minority and that we are not negotiating with anyone who treats us as a minority” (KKTCM 1998a, 3064). In this way, the parliament was eventually led to a new political decision on the Cyprus issue on 10 March 1998. Obtaining the majority support of the two parties of the right, UBP and DP, the parliament deemed that the EU decision in Luxembourg, in effect, abolished the framework and parameters for resolving the Cyprus problem. Any new initiative on the Cyprus issue should therefore be based on “the reality of the existence of two states” (KKTCM 2009, 132–3). Turkey’s new approach was finally expressed in the negotiations between Clerides and Denkta¸s that began in June 1997 in New York. The two pillars of Ankara’s approach included submitting proposals for a loose confederation but also continuing developing policies for the further integration of the “TRNC” into Turkey (Fırat 2001, 475). Finally, in November 2000, Denkta¸s withdrew from the talks; an act supported by a previous decision of the Turkish National Security Council (TSA) of 24 November 2000. The Turkish Cypriot leader insisted that the negotiations would be useful and effective if the equality of the two states in Cyprus was recognized (Tank 2002, 148).

Notes 1. In 1991, precisely this perception on the expansion of risks faced by the West became the object of discussion in the High-Level Meeting of NATO. It ultimately became the pretext for the decision to expand the activities of the alliance at world level. Gülnur Aybet, “NATO’s New Missions”, Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999, pp. 65– 78. http://sam.gov.tr/natos-new-missions/. 2. On the issue of the ideological construction of a region and its significance in the implementation of policies by an authority see Pace (2006, 32). 3. This reference is based on the analysis of Jessop and Sum (2006, 167). The authors analyse the emergence and empowerment of a political programme through its contradictions, as well as through its placement within the wider and more comprehensive hegemonic strategies. 4. From the newspaper Kıbrıs, 13 April 1990.

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˙ Uzgel, Ilhan. 2001. TDP’nin Olu¸sturulması [The Formation of TFP] In Türk Dı¸s Politikası Kurtulu¸s Sava¸sından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 1919– 1980 [Turkish Foreign Policy. Facts, Documents, Interpretations from the War of Independence until nowadays], Vol. 1, edited by Baskın Oran, 73–93. ˙ ˙ sim Yayınları. Istanbul: Ileti¸ Warner, Jonathan. 1993. “Political Choice. Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.” In The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, edited by Clement H. Dodd, 193–217. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press. Yeni Düzen. 1990a. “Terör tehdidi.” [Terrorism Threat], 1 February. ———. 1990b. “Fa¸sistler ne diyor? ‘Devleti soyan hırsızların’ ve s¸ ehitlere ihanet edenlerin’ vücutları en acımasız yöntemlerle ortadan kaldırılacakmı¸s.” [What Are the Fascists Saying? The Bodies of the ‘Thieves Who Rob the State’ and ‘Those Who Betray Martyrs’ Will Be Disposed of in the Most Merciless Ways], 1 February.

CHAPTER 8

Alternative Geopolitical Visions

The Turkish Cypriot Left Meets the Settlers? It is a fact that throughout the 1990s the nationalist programme seemed to obtain a hegemonic prevalence within the Turkish Cypriot community. As mentioned, the programme of the nationalist elite evidenced a liquid situation between the position of integration and confederation in the quest for an alternative solution to the Cyprus problem. At the same time, a basic aspect involved maintaining the balances within the “TRNC” in such a way that the illegal structure was replicated as a “security provider” entity to Turkey. However, the hegemonic elements of these aspects of the nationalist programme were not incontestable. Against the attempt to integrate the Turkish Cypriot community into Turkey’s wider geopolitical vision—an attempt which questioned its Cypriotness—the Turkish Cypriot opposition sought to develop more pronouncedly a different geopolitical vision. In full conflict with the alliance of the nationalist elite and Ankara, the different forces of the Turkish Cypriot opposition tried to build two political aspects: the first, to overturn the internal balances that consolidated the “TRNC” in a permanent state of exception, a security provider for Turkey; the second, to identify their persistence regarding a federal solution of the Cyprus problem with an even wider geopolitical dynamic—namely, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. In this way, the emergence of the two conflicting visions, which worked on multiple levels and with different “external interlocutors” (Turkey and the

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EU), gradually accelerated the emerging crisis and caused a deep strategic disorientation (Jessop and Sum 2006, 167). The ultimate expression of the crisis emerged in a clearer way in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In short, the Turkish Cypriot community came into the last decade of the twentieth century under intense social, political and ideological polarization. Apart from the failure of talks on the Cyprus issue due to Denkta¸s’s demand for separate rights to self-determination, Ero˘glu and UBP moved to finalize the other “internal aspects” of the ideological alignment of the “TRNC” with Turkey’s geopolitical vision. As stated in the previous chapter, the main steps in this direction involved the identification of the presidential with the parliamentary electoral campaign, as well as the promotion of the new electoral law (Ortam 1990a). For the Turkish Cypriot opposition, the particular time and political alignment of the two elections, as well as the specific electoral law imposed by UBP, formed different aspects of a broader nationalist goal; namely, to create the conditions for an ideologically homogeneous political system, challenging the boundaries between executive and legislative power. Besides, Denkta¸s strongly emphasized his anxiety to create a “parliament in harmony with his own policy on the Cyprus issue” (Yeni Düzen 1990a). The correlation of Denkta¸s’s continuing leadership of the community with the reproduction of UBP’s power over the entire “TRNC” spectrum was a combination that facilitated the questioning of the federal solution (Yektao˘glu 1990a). The key aspect of the opposition’s assessment of the electoral law and the wider conditions created by the nationalist elite in the community led to the conclusion that power could not be maintained through “normal democratic processes”. Mustafa Yektao˘glu (1990b) underlined in Yeni Düzen that UBP’s policies aimed to create the conditions for “protecting a delegitimized minority” against the democratic majority and the will for change. Erdal Süreç, Secretary-General of TKP at the time, made clear that the electoral law promoted by UBP had all the features that could lead to the abolition of the parliamentary system and establish a one-party regime (Ortam 1990b). The above essentially reflects aspects of the opposition’s reaction to the intended internal settlement of the “TRNC” in a way that would adjust to the wider geopolitical vision of Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite’s alliance with Ankara. On the one hand, the Turkish Cypriot opposition’s historic persistence in preserving and strengthening the parliamentary system as a form of defence against authoritarianism and guardianship was quite

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evident. On the other hand, a reaction was recorded against the reproduction of a state of exception, whose survival depended on the survival of the power of the Turkish Cypriot right. Faced with a tendency towards further authoritarianism of the regime which, at the time, also served the needs of Turkey’s goal in increasing its influence in the emerging “Turkish world”, the Turkish Cypriot opposition felt ideologically encircled by an oppressive environment (Yektao˘glu 1990c). The pressure was such that it forced the centre-left forces to set a new hierarchy in their objectives and political priorities. As Özgür (1990a) pointed out, in conditions of imprisonment of the will of the community, priority should be given to the issue of democratization: “First democracy, first freedom. First we get rid of the guardian and then discuss the differences between us”. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, a large part of the Turkish Cypriot organizations and parties of the opposition sought ways to enhance democratic cooperation. The rise of extreme right-wing actions with bomb attacks and open threats against the lives of officials of the opposition motivated the creation of wider fronts of struggle. The controversy over the electoral law that UBP sought to impose ultimately became the cause for the organizational deepening of the cooperation between the opposition forces. For example, by February 1990, the activities of the Democracy Forum (Demokrasi Forumu) (Yeni Düzen 1990b), which had been established in January through the cooperation of 15 parties and organizations of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, had intensified. The reason behind the formation of the alliance was a reaction to the change in the electoral law. However, the broadening of open violence against the Left led to a deeper politicization of the Forum, through which efforts were made for a more comprehensive cooperation against authoritarianism. Despite the different approaches of organizations in relation to the usefulness of electoral processes in a terrorist regime, a very basic common understanding of politics emerged—one which emphasized the threat to the Turkish Cypriot community’s existence in Cyprus. This perception encapsulated the political context of opposition actions throughout the 1990s. Quite deliberately, Fadıl Ça˘gda (2015, 146), a CTP member and MP who took part in the formation of the Democracy Forum, said that this collaboration was the protoplasm of the subsequent emergence of the platform “This country is ours” (Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu); i.e. the central organizational structure of the Turkish Cypriot opposition in the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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Acting on the priority of putting an end to the prospect of a monolithic ideological power system that would abolish pluralism (even under conditions), the opposition parties, along with the Yeni Do˘gu¸s Partisi (YDP), which participated in the government, decided to examine the prospects for joint action. On 4 January 1990, the Secretaries-General of CTP, TKP, YKP and YDP met in an effort to establish a common political programme against UBP’s schemes (Ortam 1990c). Initially, the parties sought ways to confront the changes in the electoral law from inside the parliament and then studied various scenarios in the case of elections under the new law. At this point, the main concern was to organize the four parties as a common front or umbrella-party, or to boycott the elections (Yeni Düzen 1990c). CTP was the first to propose boycotting the elections, which YKP initially supported. CTP’s view was that the electoral law was a form of “junta” and therefore the priority objective of the opposition should be peace and democracy by setting new forms of action outside the parliamentary framework (Yeni Düzen 1990d). However, the boycott of the elections was rejected by TKP and YDP, so CTP promoted the idea of forming a broad democratic electoral alliance of the opposition parties. Although YKP insisted on the boycotting, the other three parties proceeded with their plans to create an electoral front whose sole purpose would be to remove UBP from power, proceed to the immediate democratization of the electoral law and to early elections under new and more democratic conditions (Erçakıca 1990a; Yeni Düzen 1990e, g). This was the beginning of the formation of a broad political front by the opposition with the prospect of a strong presence in the parliament, and which was supposed to represent a social majority against the authoritarian tendencies of the Turkish Cypriot right (Yeni Düzen 1990d). From CTP’s perspective, this alliance could be a source of political pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leader to adopt a more flexible stance in the negotiations for the Cyprus problem. According to the party, the radical change in balances within the parliament could confine those tendencies that departed from the prospect of a federal solution, tendencies which Denkta¸s now openly espoused (Erçakıca 1990b). The efforts of the three parties to cooperate ended on 15 January 1990 when the Democratic Struggle Party (Demokratik Mücadele Partisi— DMP) was officially established. The emblem of the party was an “open

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palm” that symbolized the quest of society to stop the regime’s authoritarianism. Its founding declaration stressed, among others, that: “For years, our country has been governed with restricted democracy. Now, there is an effort to restrict democracy even further and to establish an authoritarian one-party regime through the change of the electoral law” (Ortam 1990d). The party was founded by persons initially unrelated to the opposition parties, and it was intended to promote the effort to tackle the undemocratic schemes as a key political platform (Ça˘gda 2015, 131– 2). Two days later, on 17 January 1990, the three parties (CTP, TKP, YDP) agreed to a joint ballot with DMP and to four key policy issues: the democratization of the electoral law; to make trials in court of all pending cases of corruption; the democratization of the state radio television station BRT; and finally the announcement of new early elections (Ça˘gda 2015, 132). The cooperation of the three parties in a joint electoral coalition was an important development that created both positive and negative dynamics. It underlined both the nature of social restructuring of the post-1974 era and the powerful restrictions that still existed against a comprehensive and subversive expression of these restructurings and ruptures. For instance, the search for common political goals between the two major Turkish Cypriot parties of the wider Left and the party that wanted to represent the population of the settlers created a complex “paradox”. On the one hand, the continuing reactions of a large part of the community against the policy of transferring Turkish population were still evident. On the other hand, this cooperation caused a fairly serious debate concerning the future and the content of the Left’s relationship with this particular population, which formed part of the everyday social, economic and political activity. These contradictions were particularly intense, difficult to resolve, and were largely reflected in the way CTP sought to promote this cooperation. The strong views of the party on the issue of population transfer directly reproduced the contradictions created by the efforts of joint political action with a party of the Right of the settlers. At the same time, YDP circles were also sceptical about their cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot left party because of its widely known positions (Kahvecio˘glu 1990a). Even after the formation of DMP, Özgür said: “The Turks from Turkey (Türkiyeliler) in Cyprus form a political obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus problem. But even if this party was fascist, we are working together to overthrow UBP and save democracy. The future of this party’s

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base is linked to international law. And this law does not allow them to be here. In an agreement, this issue can be resolved by a formula whereby some people will stay and some will go. Those who leave will have to be compensated and save their lives” (Kıbrıs 1990a). A different part of CTP viewed this cooperation as a dynamic of broader ideological changes in the population of settlers. According to this view, the stipulation of cooperation was a sign of change in the role of some settlers and their orientation in a more progressive direction. Hasan Erçakıca (1990c) explained that while the population transfer policy aimed at preventing a federal solution, to incorporate part of this population into a progressive policy turned it into part of a historic trend towards the solution, which reinforced DMP’s pressure on Denkta¸s. At the same time, the participation of this part of the population in the cooperation of the Turkish Cypriot Left could put an end to it being exploited as an element of the integration of the northern territories of Cyprus with Turkey (Erçakıca 1990c). In contrast to the above was the view of another part of the opposition regarding the founding of DMP. Mainly TKP circles pointed out that the emergence of this collaboration was positive in effectively confronting the Greek Cypriot propaganda about the role of the settlers. Sener ¸ Levent (1990) in particular noted that DMP’s electoral dominance could end UBP’s long-standing power while addressing the Greek Cypriot views about the settlers through the construction of a new “national unity of the population”. Apart from the contradictions reproduced at the party level of the alliance, it is a fact that part of the social reality witnessed a gradual emergence of opposition al tendencies in part of the settlers’ population. By the end of the 1980s, a portion of the Turkish population had already formed aspects of its collective identity on the basis of its economic, social and cultural marginalization. This part of the population felt like “secondclass citizens” in Cyprus and began to criticize the Turkish Cypriot political establishment. This tendency to criticize the existing order of things impacted on UBP, which was, in essence, the absolute expression ˙ of the political system and the monopoly of power (Inanç 2007, 137). Similarly, the emergence of social discontent facilitated, to some extent, YDP’s cooperation with the Turkish-Cypriot centre-left parties. As the head of the party, Orhan Uçok confessed that one of the main reasons he consented to building the election alliance was “pressure from the party base” (Kıbrıs 1990b).

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However, in the course of events, although social tensions were present, they did not manage to reach the level of an overall change in the views of the settler population, nor did they lead to a more progressive direction in the quest for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The unfulfilled expression of social discontent was evidently covered by orientations that led a significant part of the settlers in the direction of reproducing a dichotomous framework.1 The efforts of the YDP leadership to balance the contradictory environment were ultimately expressed in the change of stance between the 1990 parliamentary and presidential elections. While part of the DMP alliance, YDP expressed the will to overthrow UBP’s power. However, later, during the presidential elections, it supported Denkta¸s and called its members to behave “with a sense of national responsibility towards protecting the national affair, national rights and interests” (Kıbrıs 1990d). Thus, apart from the partial consensus reached in the parliamentary elections, the arrangement of political forces for the election of the Turkish Cypriot leader changed. Opposite Denkta¸s’s nomination, ˙ supported by UBP and YDP, stood Ismail Bozkurt, a joint candidate of TKP–CTP, while Alpay Durduran was the candidate of YKP (Ça˘gda 2015, 155).

The Political Defiance of the Left and the Restoration of the Right As noted above, the 1990 elections were carried out in an environment of absolute nationalistic frenzy, evidencing the overall climate that prevailed over the course of the decade. The most prominent feature of the political framework of the elections was the coalition between Ankara’s power centres and the majority of the Turkish Cypriot business world (led by Asıl Nadir) aiming to re-elect Denkta¸s and retain UBP’s power. On one side, there was part of the Turkish army and the Turkish embassy that made special efforts to influence voting settlers to support the electoral front of the Right (Ça˘gda 2015, 155). This effort was also complemented by Turkish interventions made openly on the TRT television channel. A special TV show, hosting Erol Manisalı and Mümtaz Soysal, promoted the idea that “the United States, England and the EEC sought to remove Denkta¸s from power by using ‘Trojan horses’ inside the TRNC so as to destroy it”. Extracts from the show were published in the newspaper

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Kıbrıs (1990e) on 21 April 1990 under the title “Your vote means your life”. The headline of the article was in no way accidental. Kıbrıs was owned by Nadir, and its role in reproducing this particular nationalist environment was decisive for almost the entire decade. On 21 April 1990, one day before the presidential elections, the Kıbrıs (1990f) front page title was “Do not Forget!”, attaching photographs from the Turkish Cypriot massacre in the villages of Maratha, Aloa and Santalari, as well as the famous photos of murdered Turkish Cypriots in a bathtub. Three days before the parliamentary elections of 6 May 1990, Kıbrıs (1990g) published notes by the Soviet diplomat Alexandir L. Manzhosin revealing CTP’s relations with the Soviet Union. The news was published under the title “The danger is great”, while a commentary in the newspaper entitled “The Moscow agents” reported: “The handwritten notes of the Soviet diplomat Alexandir L. Manzhosin have undoubtedly surfaced the cooperation of CTP with Moscow. The people of CTP provide the Russians with all kinds of information including military intelligence. God save us! If they come to power there is nothing they won’t do. If those who now do not have the power of the state do all this, who knows how audacious they will become if they manage to come into power? The Turkish Cypriot voter of course, realizes fully that he cannot abandon the lamb to the wolf. In this conscience, we will enter the 6th of May elections” (Kıbrıs 1990h). Indeed, several years later, it was revealed that in this period Asıl Nadir himself gave money to UBP ministers, who in turn bought voters.2 In this context, Denkta¸s eventually managed to get 66.7% of the votes, compared to 32.5% for Bozkurt and 1.25% for Durduran (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 88). In the parliamentary elections, UBP got 55.5% of the votes and 34 seats, while DMP got 44.3% and 16 seats.3 These results were indicative of the crucial change in balance imposed through the new electoral law. While UBP managed to get 55.5%, its representation in the parliament equated 68% (Kohen 1990). This result on one hand ensured the survival of UBP, while on the other it built the foundations for an authoritarian “one-party-state” by drastically reducing the opposition’s representation. A political space that got 44% of the votes was represented by only 16 seats. The two 1990 elections in April and May were perhaps the toughest in the Turkish Cypriot community since 1974. They were carried out in an unprecedented polarized environment. The pressure and effort to

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repress the opposition, combined with the simultaneous mobilization of all power structures for the benefit of UBP, were phenomena that took unprecedented dimensions. The report of the competent parliamentary committee that was authorized to examine the opposition’s complaints, although short, was quite comprehensive: groups of civil servants received extra salary one week before the elections without any legal process; the Ministry of Interior granted nationalities and electoral registrations to settlers even on election day; officials of the Turkish state campaigned to influence voters to vote for UBP; and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot media violated electoral bans in an effort to influence the final result (Sonan 2014, 182–3).4 Under the weight of these events, on 8 May 1990, DMP assessed the outcome of the elections and declared: “We will not allow this one-party dictatorship to be called democracy, which was created in an undemocratic manner, and we will not accept becoming pawns in a supposed democracy game” (Yeni Düzen 1990f). This statement was crucial. Part of the Turkish Cypriot opposition was putting forth, in a very clear manner, the need to delegitimize all the useful democratic tools that authoritarianism had employed to survive. For example, conducting elections, and the seeming operation of democratic representation institutions in a fully controlled context, formed mechanisms that were necessary to construct this “democratic mask”. Therefore, the removal of this “mask” and the public exposure of authoritarianism and of the restriction of democracy formed a very specific political goal for the opposition. On the basis of this rationale, CTP and TKP in particular began to express new concerns in the search for “other methods of oppositional strategy” that would create the opportunity to disclose the authoritarian control that hid behind the democratic mask of electoral processes. For CTP, the traditional parliamentary opposition was unable to prevent the regime’s authoritarianism, and therefore different efforts had to be made to broaden the social front of the opposition on the basis of democracy and peace (Erçakıca 1990d). A more concrete political expression of the need to move away from the “traditional parliamentary opposition” was recorded by Özgür (1990b) in an article in Yeni Düzen: “When we think of both elections together, the conclusion is that: There is no democracy in the TRNC. There is a puppet state. All doors are open to anyone who accepts becoming a tool of this state… In both elections, people living in the TRNC were harshly insulted. Their political will was oppressed. Their dignity was violated… We are forced to live in a puppet

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regime that has lost its legitimacy. You do not negotiate with a de facto dictatorship. You fight against the dictatorship.” Finally, on 10 May 1990, DMP decided to boycott the parliamentary proceedings by denying the parliamentary status of those who had been elected in its ballot. Further, this decision underlined that the struggle for democracy would continue outside the parliament by creating a platform of cooperation with the trade union movement and the other democratic mass organizations of the community (Yeni Düzen 1990g). This decision, unprecedented at the time, was not without political damage. When MPs were sworn5 on 18 May, 34 UBP MPs attended as well as two from YDP (Kenan Akin, Ahmet Ka¸sif) who did not follow the decision of the ˙ alliance (Yeni Düzen 1990h). A few weeks later, Ergün Vehbi and Ismet Kotak also decided to defy DMP’s decision. So only 12 elected members continued the boycott (Yeni Düzen 1990i). Despite the difficulties of the boycott, the dynamics created did indeed produce ruptures to the reproduction of authoritarianism that hid behind a democratic mask. As Hasan Kahvecio˘glu (1990b) wrote: “So far, it was the opposition that embellished the front-window of democracy. And UBP behaved as though there was democracy in this country, as if the Parliament represented our true will. Now, what we are trying is not to give this opportunity to UBP. Not to accept a role in its games. You will see that the resistance of half the country can change many things, very soon.” The boycott was the first clear act of political disobedience at an institutional level against Ankara and the local nationalist elite (Kızılyürek 2005, 262). In this sense, it managed, despite the difficulties, to express two important dynamics in the Turkish Cypriot community. The first was the blow to the legitimization of the state of exception that was forced to seek ways of reviving and surviving. This blow created new conditions that interrelated the issue of democratization with the solution of the Cyprus problem. Certain aspects, such as the absence of opposition from the parliament, and their substitution by UBP executives who were elected in by-elections6 the following year, created the conditions for a one-party regime without even the slightest democratic facade. In this way, it became clear, on an international level, that the forces supporting the federal solution were in a state of persecution; a development that put more pressure both on Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leader (Mehmetçik 2008, 188–9).

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The second noteworthy dynamic involved the restructuring within the nationalist elite, and hence the wider balance of the Turkish Cypriot political system. The boycott by the opposition provided the opportunity to demonstrate in the public space “the most serious political crisis since 1974” (Ortam 1990e), a burden which was ultimately unbearable for the nationalist elite to lift alone. In this way, a more dynamic oppositional activity became the reason for accelerating the public expression of existing internal power antagonisms within the nationalist elite. Almost immediately after the 1990 elections and with the political system in turmoil, different power actors—such as Denkta¸s on the one hand and Asıl Nadir on the other—sought to gain more control over UBP (Ortam 1990f). In the context of the rivalry with Ero˘glu’s power networks, Hakkı Atun, chairman of the parliament at the time and an esteemed UBP official, sent an ultimatum to the Prime Minister criticizing his authoritarian manner of government. The ultimatum was given in May 1992 and stressed the need for a more just electoral law, as well as the need to renew the party after decades of power and decay (Dodd 1993a, 159–60). Serdar Denkta¸s, who came first in the previous elections in Nicosia district and decided to run for Secretary-General of the party, was among those who took up this initiative. The answer of Ero˘glu was to abolish the position (Sonan 2014, 184) and reject all the claims of Atun’s letter. Thus, the “group of nine”, as it was known, left UBP and created the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti—DP) in July 1992. DP’s political programme included significant differences from that of UBP, particularly in relation to the concept of Turkish Cypriot nationalism (Dodd 1993b, 182). The new right-wing party underlined the importance of Northern Cyprus as the home of its inhabitants. The locality, the domestic dimension of the “TRNC”, was central to the programme. The new party gave more emphasis to the concept of state than to governance. The state was what, in the party’s view, should protect the individual and social rights. The state was a structure with a more decisive role in ensuring social harmony. Governance was a concept that referred more to the political management of the state-defined frameworks as well as to the development of society (Dodd 1993b, 183). Regarding the economy, DP acknowledged the existence of planning and mixed economy, but it strongly emphasized the need for private sector development, mainly through the privatization of state-owned enterprises (Dodd 1993b, 183).

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The intensification of antagonisms between the two main groups of the nationalist elite (Rauf Denkta¸s—Dervi¸s Ero˘glu) led to the announcement of early elections in 1993. The political context of this circumstance was particularly complex. The drive of the opposition and the breakup of the Right, with the resulting impact on the political system, led to an increase in CTP’s influence. The party came forth as a contender for power after it had previously turned into a key spokesman for the opposition and its demands. The increase in CTP’s influence in this particular setting was largely interpreted as an opportunity to partially “reinstate” the longstanding marginalized social strata represented by CTP. Amidst these dynamics, CTP eventually claimed its place and succeeded in becoming a partner in a “government” of cooperation with DP. Naturally, the presence of CTP in governance structures for the first time since 1974, even under conditions of nationalist polarization and wider social destabilization, was not an easy task. Within three years, 1993–1996, three DP–CTP governments (Sonan 2014, 188) were formed. The instability recorded at this time was the result of both the economic crisis imported from Turkey and the scepticism with which Ankara viewed the presence of a party such as CTP in the “TRNC” power structures. The reinforcement of a party that was in favour of a federal solution and of communicating with the Greek Cypriot community, its claims for Turkish Cypriot political control over security forces, and the party’s will to change the relationship of the community with Turkey at the level of “two equal states”, were facts that were not positively received by Ankara (Sonan 2014, 189). In this context, CTP eventually took upon itself the cost of the economic destabilization while, at the same time, it failed to stop the process of decay resulting from critical decisions such as the change in ˙ the Land, Asset and Equity Law (Iskan, Topraklandırma ve E¸sde˘ger Mal ˙ Yasası—ITEM). This legislation permitted the granting of titles to users of Greek Cypriot property, some of whom were settlers. This decision was interpreted by many as a great step away from the party’s traditional positions in relation to key aspects of the solution of the Cyprus problem (Mehmetçik 2008, 191–2). The turmoil created by CTP’s presence in the government of cooperation with DP was not limited to a socio-economic aspect. The pressures exerted because of the rise of nationalist frenzy around the Cyprus

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problem were particularly intense, and resurfaced the differences of the two parties regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem (Mehmetçik 2008, 193–4). The presidential elections of 1995 were therefore carried out in a context of abundant nationalist messages. Even though the Turkish Cypriot Right was split in two, with major candidates Rauf Denkta¸s and Dervi¸s Ero˘glu (Kızılyürek 2005, 263), they managed to monopolize the political process. In the second round of the presidential elections, the two main representatives of Turkish Cypriot nationalism confronted each other, with Denkta¸s as the final winner obtaining 62.5% against the 37.5% obtained by Ero˘glu (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 90). The overall dominance of the Turkish Cypriot Right over the political system was confirmed a few months later when the DP–CTP government collapsed and was replaced by DP–UBP’s government of cooperation. Not coincidentally at all, after the formation of the Right government, Ankara increased its financial assistance to the “TRNC” from $36.7 million in 1995 to $80.3 million in 1996, decreasing the credit from 8.3 to 6.3 million dollars (Sin 2018, 10). Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan did not hide his preference for such a government in the “TRNC” (Yeni Düzen 1996a). Based on information in the Turkish Cypriot press, he had a meeting with Ero˘glu and Serdar Denkta¸s during a visit in Cyprus, with the aim of pressing for the formation of a government of the Right, something which eventually happened (Fahri 1996; Kıbrıs 1996a).

Islanders Who “Do Not Die”: Alternative Visions Beyond Integration The monopolization of the political system by the Turkish Cypriot Right was, of course, one of the aspects of restructuring in the community. The wider political and social context continued to testify to the existence of the underlying opposition, which, however, was unable to fully express itself under pressure. The economic crisis and destabilization, along with Ankara’s open interventions aiming to put the Right back together and the rise of nationalism, seem to have become the precondition for maintaining and deepening political violence against the Left, which, as mentioned above, was on the rise by the early 1990s. The intensification of violence formed one of the basic tools of the regime in their effort to reproduce the particular right-wing arrangement imposed from the mid-1990s. At the same time, however, this violence gradually created

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the conditions for deepening the distance between the dichotomous status quo and a large proportion of the Turkish Cypriots. This contradiction could only be expressed in a very tragic manner. On 6 July 1996, the ultra-nationalist militant organization operating ˙ under the name “Turkish Revenge Brigade” (Türk Intikam Tugayı— ˙ TIT) murdered journalist Kutlu Adalı (Kıbrıs 1996b). The murder of Adalı was the peak and the most tragic point in the far-right, illegal militant activity, which opened parallel and complex processes in relation to the orientations not only of the opposition but also of the Turkish Cypriot community in general. On one level, the murder resurfaced the existence of “integration channels” between the northern territories of Cyprus and Turkey, which facilitated the import of all the strategic elements of the Turkish political system. Through these channels, the state of exception and the pressure against the Turkish Cypriot opposition were reproduced. A few ˙ made its appearance in Turkey, years before the murder of Adalı, TIT specifically in the city of Diyarbakır, where it also assumed responsibility for the murders of progressive journalists. Among others, the organization assumed responsibility for the assassination of journalist Ferhat Tepe, who worked in the pro-Kurdish newspaper Özgür Gündem (Yeni Düzen 1996b). The Turkish deep state could therefore operate with ease within the Cypriot space of exception, operating in exactly the same manner as in Turkey; namely, silencing alternative voices that did not fit into Ankara’s geopolitical vision. In the case of Cyprus, the strategy was to assume violence aimed at silencing those who supported the political line that disagreed with the transformation of the Turkish Cypriots into “border guardians of Turkishness” (KKTCM 1998a, 3091). Kutlu Adalı was indeed one of the most important supporters of this opposition line. As a columnist in the newspaper Yeni Düzen, he approached the efforts for Turkification and annexation to Turkey as yet another way of deepening the Turkish Cypriots’ dependence on Turkey, but also as a further step away from their true history. Contrary to the far-right activity, Adalı put forth “Cypriotification”, which he treated as a joint activity by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In order to achieve this, he believed that the Cyprus problem should be internationalized through the effective action of the opposition (Arslan 2014, 76). Adalı was one of the intellectuals who most consistently defended the Cypriot identity of the Turkish Cypriots after 1974. Like many others, Adalı was close to TMT circles in the difficult years of the 1960s. However, the 1974

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partition and the new reality of the Turkish Cypriots radically affected both his research and his wider cultural quests. Serving for many years as columnist in the newspaper Ortam and then in Yeni Düzen, Adalı opened, through his writings, a line of controversy against the hierarchical relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek 2015). He criticized the relation between “motherland and babyland” and put forth new demands in an effort to “subjectify” the Turkish Cypriots and their political, economic and cultural autonomy. His assassination can be interpreted as one of the saddest events of the polarization between those who believed that the Turkish Cypriot community was an extension of the Turkish nation and those who insisted on repositioning the community in its own (Cypriot) geographic and cultural space (Kızılyürek 2015). On a second level, the murder of Adalı made a very large part of the community aware that the “open channels” of integration with Turkey that were consolidated by the dichotomous situation in Cyprus not only facilitated the domination of the Turkish parastate but also the domination of all of the wrong-doings of the Turkish political system over the Turkish Cypriots. Relatively unknown to the Turkish Cypriots was the fact that the moral scruples of the political system in Turkey allowed for the use of violence as a tool of political activity and political settlement. A large part of the community believed that violence in Cypriot history was in the distant past, but Adalı’s murder instantly brought old memories back. Even historic members of the Right, such as Hakkı Atun, DP–UBP’s Prime Minister at the time in the DP–UBP coalition, confessed: “Listening to the news of the murder I was saddened to the point of shock. Because, for so many years we never discussed such a political event, we never had to discuss a situation that reached the point of murder… It is a blow to our democratic maturity and structure” (KKTCM 1996, 8599–600). In this context, the growing concerns of the Turkish Cypriots also related to the awareness of the social framework that would prevail in the case of an official integration with Turkey (Mehmetçik 2008, 192–3). On a third level, Adalı’s murder caused the Turkish Cypriot community to immediately become aware of the fact that Turkish Cypriots were part of Turkey’s strategic manipulations and interests and not a “historical subject” whose security was safeguarded by the Turkish army. Increasingly, the Turkish Cypriots realized that no one was interested in their views, culture, lifestyle and problems (Ergün 2004, 69–70). In this

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context, the Turkish Cypriots began to question the dominant ideological framework that preserved Ankara as the “guarantor of security” of the Turkish Cypriots. CTP’s announcement at the time stressed, “While we ask for an understanding on the position in favour of security guarantees… no one can justify the fact that people are murdered for their ideas” (Yeni Düzen 1996c). Questioning Turkey’s role as guarantor of Turkish Cypriot security was not something new. Indeed, Kutlu Adalı was one of the intellectuals who, from the beginning of the 1990s, had expressed the questions of the Turkish Cypriot opposition as follows: “Denkta¸s and UBP politics, the interventional policy of Ankara, as well as the nonsense that Asıl Nadir will save our economy, have all collapsed. They only seem to be standing with the bombs of the illegal organization Turkish-Cypriot People’s Movement, which smells of blood. It is difficult for me to say and write this, but I must: in the end, this is Turkey’s guarantee with 25,000 fully armed soldiers on the Turkish Cypriot side” (Yeni Düzen 1990j). In a particularly tragic way, Adalı’s above-mentioned thoughts multiplied as a result of his own death. In fact, they touched the entire state of exception and its reproduction mechanisms. CTP repeated that the blood of Adalı was on the hands of all those responsible for the “internal and external security of the Turkish Cypriots” as defined by Article 10 of the “TRNC” constitution (Erçakıca 1996). On a fourth, and perhaps more important, level, Adalı’s assassination brought strongly back to the fore the process of politicizing the concept of “protecting the community existence” of Turkish Cypriots. Adalı was one of the intellectuals who repeated the need to defend the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot identity. As noted by Ahmet Derya, a former teacher and trade unionist, Kutlu Adalı was an intellectual who stressed the notion of Cypriotness and of the Cypriot identity and fought for its survival (Yeni Düzen 1996d). Therefore, the loss of such a personality was something that mobilized the masses on the need to protect this identity, but also to underline that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were not the same thing. An explanatory note on the above was Yeni Düzen’s symbolic headline on 9 July 1996, inviting people to participate en masse in the funeral of the Turkish Cypriot journalist. Under the headline “Islanders Do not Die” (Adalılar ölmez), the newspaper wrote: “Take your jasmines, your carnations, your flowers and come… We will bid him goodbye to immortality. Islanders do not die.” The adjective “Adalı” means an islander. The symbolic pun by the newspaper referred to the difference of the island’s Cypriot identity from “mainland Turkey”. In this case, the “islanders”

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(Turkish Cypriots) felt the need to separate their own political mentality and values from what the political assassination of Adalı was trying to impose on them. Besides, it was not at all accidental that all opposition parties and organizations considered the tragic event as a violent attempt to remove the diversity of the Turkish Cypriot identity and thus challenge the autonomy of the community (Yeni Düzen 1996e). In this context, the funeral of Adalı naturally turned into a mass demonstration. Twenty trade unions made a joint three-hour strike on the day of the journalist’s funeral, while symbolic protests took place throughout the day (Yeni Düzen 1996f). This mobilization eventually turned into one of the most distinguishing moments in the culmination of delegitimizing the regime, which seemed to survive only through the use of violence and repression (Kızılyürek 2005, 266). The political momentum of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, as it emerged after the assassination of Adalı, was described by Sami Özuslu, who commented on the mass participation at the funeral: “The Turkish Cypriot community experienced yesterday one of the saddest, but at the same time, one of the most dignified days of its history. Kutlu Adalı’s funeral showed once again that the Turkish Cypriots, who are often described as “insensitive”, are in anguish for their island, their homeland and their identity” (Özuslu 1996). The four aforementioned symbolic levels of ideological displacement made evident by Kutlu Adalı’s murder were gradually reflected in the political views of the Turkish Cypriot opposition. The environment of pressure and nationalist frenzy created contradictions which enabled, even in the form of underlying currents and “silent reactions”, some alternative visions to mature and form a barrier to the integration policies. The Turkish Cypriot opposition realized that the transformation of the “TRNC” into a security provider entity to Turkey was becoming, on multiple internal and external levels, a threat to the Turkish Cypriot community’s existence. The predominant perception of the period that promoted the Cypriot geographical space as a vital area for Turkish national security essentially led to the conclusion that the Turkish Cypriot community was almost “unnecessary”. “It is not possible to keep the Turkish Cypriot community within the framework of security alone. It is not possible for the community to survive based on the rhetoric of national security alone”, said Mehmet Ali Talat (2005, 20). At the same time, the policies of further integration with Turkey impacted, in a catalytic manner, on the everyday life of the Turkish Cypriots. These

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policies were not just laws imposed on the Turkish Cypriots; rather they formed the way through which social, economic and political crises were imported into Cyprus (KKTCM 1998b, 3044); that is, new facts whose source and control was outside the reach of the Turkish Cypriot political system. In the light of this situation, the two largest parties of the Turkish Cypriot opposition sought to form their alternative proposals, taking into account both internal and external factors that pressed towards transforming the “TRNC” into a security provider entity to Turkey. CTP and TKP put down some common, but also some different, views on the broader orientations of the Turkish Cypriot community. A common perception was the necessity to democratize the relations of the community with Turkey. In order to do so, the hierarchical framework of relations between the “motherland” and “babyland” should end and consolidate the position that the motherland of the Turkish Cypriots was Cyprus (KKTCM 1998b, 3020). Consequently, political measures such as the establishment of the Cooperative Council between Turkey and the “TRNC” could not be accepted, neither could the option of a two-state solution in Cyprus (KKTCM 1998b, 3019–23). These two orientations, in one way or another, according to the two parties, would lead to the political extinction of the Turkish Cypriots and to the permanent loss of their autonomy (KKTCM 1998a, 3088). A common understanding between CTP and TKP was also the need for Turkish Cypriots to join the EU along with the Greek Cypriots. However, key aspects of this process within the wider context of the Cyprus solution were approached differently by the two parties. On the one hand, CTP stressed the need for a direct federal solution and integration of the whole of Cyprus into the EU, regardless of the course of European Union–Turkish relations (KKTCM 1998a, 3065). On the other hand, TKP underlined that the community should take into account both the integration policies imposed by Ankara and the policies of the Greek Cypriot community, such as the Defence Doctrine with Greece. On this point, TKP supported the idea of persisting with the goal of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem and joining the EU, but until its implementation, it insisted on measures to strengthen the “TRNC” as a policy that would guarantee an equal relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (KKTCM 1998b, 3031). Due to wider geopolitical developments in the late 1990s, the main feature of the alternative vision of the opposition was placing a strong

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emphasis on the need for Turkish Cypriots to join the EU. The process of full integration of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU was, in any case, one of the “external axes” that created an unprecedented polarization in the Turkish Cypriot community (Bahçeli 2004, 176). This polarization gradually turned into the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, in the face of unbearable pressure from the nationalist front. The EU progressively became a “political space – higher political structure” for the Turkish Cypriot opposition, where the Cypriotness of Turkish Cypriots could be expressed without pressure and limitations (Bizden 1997). A large part of the Turkish Cypriot opposition perceived the “Europeanization” of the Cyprus problem as an opportunity for equal participation of Turkish Cypriots in the political system of Cyprus by resolving the problem and equal expression of their Cypriot identity (Ramm 2006, 531–2). In other words, the accession of the whole of Cyprus into the EU after the Cyprus problem was resolved, at least in terms of identity, could certify what many Turkish Cypriots had believed for years: that Cypriots are “anyway more European than the Turks and the Greeks” (Ya¸sın 1998, 231). However, it was not possible to turn the positions of the opposition on the solution to the Cyprus problem and the accession to the EU into a tangible and concrete political programme of change before the late 1990s. The transformation of key features of the underlying currents into a political programme of change within the Turkish Cypriot community required a wider synthesis of elements and developments. Those ultimately formed the decisive developments that culminated in 1999 and thereafter and which were combined with the public and organized expression of the consequences of the profound social transformation of past decades. Therefore, the clearest moments of rupture in the hegemonic framework of the Turkish Cypriots were the sum of accumulated internal experience and dynamic restructuring from abroad. These two aspects, which led to ideological collapse and to upheavals, form the subject of the next chapter.

Notes 1. For instance, an article in Kıbrıs (1990c) reported that 28 members of YDP, coming from local organizations of Famagusta villages, decided to join UBP because they disagreed with cooperation with a party that was “against the national cause”—such as CTP.

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2. Reported by Sinasi ¸ Ba¸saran who was working as a journalist at the newspaper Kıbrıs (Havadis 2012). 3. 12 out of 16 elected members came from CTP and TKP (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 98–9). 4. Also, of interest is the fact that the parliamentary committee authorized to examine the opposition’s accusations was formed on 1 January 1994 and delivered its report on 4 June 1997 (KKTCM 1997, 195–8). 5. On the same day, the opposition chose to organize an open political event with voters. This event was largely indicative of the parallel and alternative—to the regime—political space that CTP and TKP pursued (Ortam 1990g). 6. UBP won 11 out of 12 seats in the by-elections. In this way, it obtained 45 out of 50 seats (Sonan 2014, 184).

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———. 1990b. “Senaryo ve Seçenek – 1” [Scenario and Option-1]. Yeni Düzen, 21 March. ———. 1990c. “Senaryo ve seçenek – 2” [Scenario and Option-2]. Yeni Düzen, 22 March. ———. 1990d. “Yeni Seçenek” [New Option]. Yeni Düzen, 8 May. ———. 1996. “Sorumlular” [Those Responsible]. Yeni Düzen, 7 July. Ergün, Mahide. 2004. Yolun açık olsun Kıbrıs [All the Best Cyprus]. Ankara: Piramit Yayıncılık. Fahri, Ülker. 1996. “Seffaf ¸ Müdahale” [Transparent Intervention]. Yeni Düzen, 26 July. Havadis. 2012. “Ero˘glu’na iki bavul parayı ben götürdüm” [I Took the Two Cases of Money to Ero˘glu]. Havadis, 19 October. ˙ Inanç, Gül. 2007. Büyükelçiler anlatıyor. Türk diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970–1991) [Ambassadors Are Explaining: Cyprus in Turkish Diplomacy (1970–1991)]. ˙ ˙ s Bankası Kültür Yayınları. Istanbul: Türkiye I¸ Jessop, Bob, and Ngai-Ling Sum. 2006. “Towards a Cultural International Political Economy: Poststructurulism and the Italian School.” In International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics, edited by Marieke de Goede, 157–176. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kahvecio˘glu, Hasan. 1990a. “Ortak tavır gerek” [There Is Need for a Joint Approach]. Ortam, 6 January. ———. 1990b. “Onurlu bir hareket” [An Honourable Act]. Ortam, 12 May. Kıbrıs. 1990a. “Üçlü ittifaktan ortak Cumhurba¸skanı adayı” [Common Presidential Candidate from the Three-Way Alliance], 2 March. ———. 1990b. “Muhalefet birle¸sti” [Opposition Unites], 4 March. ———. 1990c. “Denkta¸s istifayı dü¸sünüyor” [Denkta¸s Is Considering Resignation], 5 March. ———. 1990d. “YDP’den Denkta¸s’a destek” [YDP Supports Denkta¸s], 13 April. ———. 1990e. “Oyunuz hayatınız demektir” [Your Vote Is Your Life], 21 April. ———. 1990f. “Unutmayın” [Don’t Forget], 21 April. ———. 1990g. “Tehlike büyük” [The Danger Is Big], 3 May. ———. 1990h. “Mini Yorum: Moskova’nın Ajanları” [Mini-Commentary: Moscow’s Spies], 3 May. ———. 1996a. “Geni¸s tabanlı hükümet ça˘gırısı” [Call for a Broad-Based Government], 21 July. ˙ üstlendi” [TIT ˙ Claims Responsibility], 8 July. ———. 1996b. “TIT Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2005. Birle¸sik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti. Do˘gmamı¸s bir devletin ˙ tarihi [United Cyprus Republic: The History of an Unborn State]. Istanbul: ˙ sim Yayınları. Ileti¸ ———. 2015. “Kutlu Adalı cinayeti ve rejimin çökü¸sü” [The Assassination of Kutlu Adalı and Collapse of the Regime]. Yeni Düzen, 12 July.

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KKTCM. 1996. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 76’ıncı Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 8 July. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 1997. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 10 October. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclis. ———. 1998a. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1’inci Ola˘ganüstü Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 12 February. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 1998b. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi 38’inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 10 February. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. Kohen, Sami. 1990. “Sandıktan çıkan gerçek” [The Reality That Came Out of the Ballot Box]. Yeni Düzen, May 9. Levent, Sener. ¸ 1990. “DMP’nin önemi” [DMP’s Importance]. Ortam, March. Mehmetçik, Mustafa Semih. 2008. “1974 sonrası Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik arayı¸sı ve siyasalla¸sma süreci” [The Turkish Cypriot Search for Identity after 1974 and the Politization Period]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by Mehmet ˙ Hasgüler, 146–222. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. Ortam. 1990a. “Fa¸sizmin ayak sesleri” [The Footsteps of Fascism], 10 January. ———. 1990b. “Üç muhalif partinin ortak komitesi Hakkı Atun’a tepkileri duyurdu…” [The Joint Committee of Three Opposition Parties Voice Reactions against Hakkı Atun], 18 January. ———. 1990c. “Süreç: Dikta rejimine izin vermeyece˘giz” [Süreç: We Will Not Allow a Dictatorial Regime], 5 January. ———. 1990d. “Yeni Parti dün kuruldu” [New Party Was Established Yesterday], 16 January. ———. 1990e. “Bunalım sürüyor” [The Crisis Continues], 26 May. ———. 1990f. “UBP’de ‘Serdar’ krizi” [‘Serdar’ Crisis in UBP], 16 May. ———. 1990g. “Muhalefetsiz Meclis dönemi” [The Era of Parliament without Opposition], 18 May. Özgür, Özker. 1990a. “Önce Demokrasi” [Democracy First]. Yeni Düzen, 15 January. ———. 1990b. “Seçenek” [Option]. Yeni Düzen, 10 May. Özuslu, Sami. 1996. “Acının öfkeye dönü¸stü˘gü an” [The Moment When Pain Turns into Anger]. Yeni Düzen, 10 July. Ramm, Christoph. 2006. “Assessing Transnational Re-negotiation in the Post1974 Turkish Cypriot Community: ‘Cyprus Donkeys’, ‘Black Beards’ and the ‘EU Carrot’.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 6 (4): 523–542. Sin, Tu˘gba. 2018. “KKTC Ekonomik Göstergeler Raporu 2017” [TRNC ˙ sbirli˘gi Ofisi, Economic Indicators Report 2017]. Kalkınma ve Ekonomik I¸ TC Lefko¸sa Büyükelçili˘gi, Lefko¸sa.

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Sonan, Sertaç. 2014. In the Grip of Political Clientelism: The Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Politics and the Politico-Economic Foundations of Pro-Taksim Consensus. Essen, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences University of Essen. Talat, Mehmet Ali. 2005. Kıbrıslı Türkler için [For Turkish Cypriots]. Girne: Ünlem Yayınevi. Ya¸sın, Mehmet. 1998. “Three Generations, Three Identities, Three ‘Patrie’ within Twentieth-Century Cypriot Poetry.” In Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an Unimaginable Community 1955–1997 , edited by Vangelis Calotychos, 223–233. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Yektao˘glu, Mustafa. 1990a. “Yeni dikta rejimi” [The New Dictatorial Regime]. Yeni Düzen, 9 January. ———. 1990b. “UBP’nin gayri me¸srulu˘gu ve yeni seçim yasası” [The Illegitimacy of UBP and the New Election Law]. Yeni Düzen, 4 January. ˙ ———.1990c. “Ittifak Sorunu” [Alliance Problem]. Yeni Düzen, 23 January. Yeni Düzen. 1990a. “Demokratik bir seçenek” [A Democratic Choice], 21 March. ———. 1990b. “Demokrasi Forumu” [Democracy Forum], 5 February. ———. 1990c. “DMP neden kuruldu, ne yapmayı hedefliyor?” [Why Was DMP Established, What Does It Aim to Do?], 24 January. ———. 1990d. “Demokrasi için i¸sbirli˘gi ve boykot” [Cooperation and Boycott for Democracy], 6 January. ———. 1990e. “Hedef: Demokratik Seçim” [Target: Democratic Elections], 17 January. ———. 1990f. “Figüranlı˘gı kabul etmiyoruz” [We Won’t Accept Being the Extras], 9 May. ———. 1990g. “Milletvekilli˘gini reddediyoruz” [We Are Rejecting Becoming Members of Parliament], 11 May. ———. 1990h. “Buruk yemin” [Sour Oath], 19 May. ———. 1990i. “Sekersiniz ¸ be… Seker” ¸ [You are Sweet… very Sweet], 19 June. ———. 1990j. “Cumartesi eylem var” [Demonstration on Saturday], 18 May. ———. 1996a. “Erbakan’dan iç politikamıza müdahale” [Erbakan Meddles in Our Internal Politics], 24 July. ˙ Türkiye’de” [TIT ˙ Is in Turkey], 9 July. ———. 1996b. “TIT ———. 1996c. “CTP: Fikirler öldürülemez” [CTP: Opinions Cannot Be Killed], 8 July. ———. 1996d. “Cinayet yerine çiçek ya˘gmuru” [A Shower of Flowers Rather Than Murder], 8 July. ———. 1996e. “Sesimizi kısamazlar” [They Cannot Silence Us], 8 July. ———. 1996f. “Ölümsüzlü˘ge u˘gurladık” [We Send Off to Eternity], 10 July.

CHAPTER 9

Towards the Ideological Collapse of Partition (Taksim)

The Turkish Cypriot “Maraz ” Paves the Way for Upheaval The peak moment of the nationalist programme in the 1990s was expressed in the December 1998 parliamentary elections and the April 2000 presidential elections. In the parliamentary elections, the main rightwing parties got a majority of two thirds (Lacher and Kaymak 2005, 154). S∈pecifically, the National Unity Party (UBP) managed to get 40.4% of the votes and 24 seats, while the Democratic Party (DP) got 22.6% of the votes and 13 seats. In contrast, the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) got 15.3% and 7 seats, while the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) remained at 13.4% with 6 seats (Çarko˘glu and Sözen 2004, 128–9). Similar balances were brought about in the 2000 elections for the Turkish Cypriot leader. This particular “mysterious” (Güven 2003, 23) vote was carried out in a context of internal conflicts within the right wing, with power antagonisms between Denkta¸s and Ero˘glu. In the first round of elections Denkta¸s got 43.6% and Ero˘glu 30.1% of the votes; a development that signalled a second round of elections (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 91). However, three days before the second round, Ero˘glu announced his withdrawal, thereby renewing Denkta¸s’s political presence for another five years. Although many questions remain unanswered as to the details of Ero˘glu’s withdrawal, this development was brought about after strong interventions by Ankara in favour of Denkta¸s at a particularly critical stage for the Cyprus issue (Güven 2003, 23). The main candidates of the wider © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_9

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Left retained a low profile in the election results, perhaps confirming the more general ideological trends of the time. Mustafa Akıncı, leader of the TKP, got 11.7% of the votes, while Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the CTP, retained 10% (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 91). The results seem “reasonable and normal” if one considers the nationalist frenzy that prevailed almost throughout the 1990s, as well as the identification of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist programme with Ankara’s broader hegemonic vision. Ero˘glu emphasized that the talks on the Cyprus issue could not begin if the “TRNC” had not previously been recognized as the second sovereign state in Cyprus (KKTCM 1999, 36). He insisted that “the security of the TRNC cannot be perceived as something different from the security of Turkey” (KKTCM 2000a, 35). In the face of pressures from the opposition to immediately resume substantive talks, Denkta¸s made it clear: “Do not expect from me to sit at the negotiating table and behave as if I do not have my own state. Let no one expect me to bend my head and accept an administrative system that will force my people to migrate again and allow Greek Cypriots to come between us” (KKTCM 2000a, 6). The intensification of promoting partitionist approaches to the Cyprus problem was the basis upon which the Turkish Cypriot leader sought to develop his policy, even in the context of the initiation of negotiation talks in New York in late 1999 (Kıbrıs 1999a). This particular ideological framework seems to have been embraced at a social level by a very large proportion of Turkish Cypriots. For example, in a survey published in Kıbrıs newspaper (1999b) in late 1999, society’s support for a two-state solution was 38.5%, for a two-state confederation 14.5%, and for a federation 28.2%. In the same survey, 41.5% of respondents said they would vote for the UBP in the event of an election, 17.1% would support the DP, 17.4% the CTP and 12.6% the TKP (Kıbrıs 1999c). The intensification of nationalist symbolisms (Yashin 2012, 62) managed to reproduce support to a certain extent, but in the long run, it was unable to stop the deeper processes that were already underway in the opposite direction. In short, symbolisms of the nationalist programme clouded the landscape and created additional obstacles in understanding the explosive situation that eventually became a feature of the entire period from 1998 to 2004. This period, extremely short in terms of historical time, was, at the same time, a moment of particular density in subversive dynamics. It gradually led the majority of the Turkish Cypriot community away from “silent discontent” to mass politicization of the

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will to overthrow the status quo (Mehmetçik 2008, 195). This peculiar period was described by Talat as follows: “Such periods occur often. Because without them, there is no way for societies to transform, to gain their own consciousness and to create their own evolution” (Mehmetçik 2008, 195). Indeed, at the beginning of the period, perhaps no one could foretell the explosive upheavals brought about by the feeling of deplorable impermanency (Yashin 2012, 7) that was prevalent among the Turkish Cypriots. The continuing deadlocks in the Cyprus problem were complemented by the total collapse of the economy, which carried with it elements of a total breakdown. The disintegration of the economy had a negative impact on two dialectically linked axes. The first axis revealed the stagnation and destruction of almost every prospect of a local, independent production activity. On this same axis, the Turkish Cypriots were increasingly cut off from the productive sectors of the economy and were made dependent on the formation of new Turkish monopolies. As noted by journalist Hasan Hastürer, this period was marked by the transfer of more financial units, banks and businesses into the hands of Turkish businessmen, aided by hasty procedures (Hastürer 1999). “Production in our country has completely stopped. In rural areas there is poverty among the population. Shopkeepers are also impoverished, and our industry disappears because of one-sided integration policies. Beware, I repeat, one-way integration. All economic sectors are collapsing. We receive everything from Turkey, but nothing ever goes from here to Turkey” (KKTCM 1999, 59–60). Talat’s description of the socio-economic situation and the particular emphasis on the disappearance of the Turkish Cypriot productive sectors resurfaced the artificial, and therefore extremely vulnerable, concept of liberalization of the economy, which had been imposed as a model since the 1980s. Twenty years later, it was now clear that the structure of the Turkish Cypriot economy “prohibited” even the minor expression of free competition (KKTCM 2001a, 4429). It was no coincidence that military canteens of this period were revealed as a prime example of Turkish monopoly on retail trade with negative impact on both small and medium-sized Turkish Cypriot capital and small and medium-sized producers. The Turkish army transported duty-free and tax-free consumer products to its canteens in Cyprus, and acquired the privilege of selling them in the local market without valueadded tax. The operation of military canteens as conventional stores

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immediately created the conditions for unfair competition (KKTCM 2000b, 5851–2). As consumer goods sale-points, they were enormously profitable at the expense of Turkish Cypriot producers and traders. The military canteen administrations themselves undertook to advertise the favourable prices of their products through promo-leaflets comparing them to Turkish Cypriot supermarkets (KKTCM 2001a, 4430). The second key axis of the economic asphyxiation involved the strengthening of the one-sided integration, which, although widespread, was typical of the development of the Turkish Cypriot community’s trade relations with Turkey at the end of the twenty-first century. Imports from Turkey made by Turkish Cypriots between 1990 and 1999 reached $1.8 billion, while exports to Turkey were limited to $280 million during the same period (KKTCM 2000b, 5850). This imbalance in trade was indicative of a totally uneven economic relationship. In the late 1990s, the community was trapped in a vicious circle of deficits, which created additional dependence on Ankara as it was the only source of external funding. On the one hand, the Turkish Cypriot community largely continued on non-productive activities, while on the other its marginalization deprived it from the possibility of revenue generation. By 2000, 70% of the workers received their salary from the state, 18% were freelancers or small and medium-sized traders, and 3% formed the strongest business elite of the community (Yeni Düzen 2000a). In the same period, public sector employment reached around 80,000 people, while the central state fund was issuing approximately 55,000 cheques per month on various payments (Sonan 2014, 201). Depriving the community of its productive sectors and coercing it to rely on “state cheques” furthered the inability to finance the political structures. For example, in 1994, 76% of the “TRNC” budget could be financed from local revenues. However, in the period up to 2000, this figure dropped sharply to 55% (Sonan 2007, 10), dramatically increasing the dependence on Turkish funding. The aforementioned events formed the framework that created the prospect of ruptures in the seeming “nationalist tranquillity” that was promoted by the election results and opinion polls on the ideological and political trends of the community. Under the cloud of Denkta¸s’s dominion there was a community that “completely forgot how to laugh” (Yeni Düzen 1999) because of the social breakdown and deadlocks. Many Turkish Cypriots used the word “maraz” in describing how they felt about the Cyprus problem and their general situation (Yashin 2009, 4).

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This term expressed the situation of entrapment, the checkpoints, the financial blockade and uncertainty. Maraz was the expression of their political situation. Such an emotional state and the expressions to describe it soon laid the ground for politicizing and creating the first, initially small, prospects of rupture to the seemingly dominant Denkta¸sian context. As early as October 1999, organized Turkish Cypriot teachers went on daily strikes against the disintegration of the education system. Indeed, many of the strikes were stigmatized by the increasing tension and the use of violence by the regime (Avrupa 1999a). The lack of infrastructure and the constant import of teachers from Turkey were among the many criticisms made by the teachers’ trade union movement (Avrupa 1999b). Gradually, the scattered outbursts by Turkish Cypriot teachers were followed by intense protests and strikes by workers of the state-owned company ETI˙ who had not been paid for several months (Vatan 1999). The initially small protest movement ultimately managed to include social groups that traditionally supported the core of TRNC’s power, and that were even among its founding powers. For example, the Retired Fighters Association (Emekli Mücahitler Derne˘gi) held a protest to promote longstanding problems that were unresolved because of the growing financial crisis. They even pointed out that they were “the pillars of the state” and that the “shame for the situation was on the government” (Yeni Düzen 2000b). The seemingly small dimensions of social discontent, however, could not be nullified; this was because of wider developments in the socioeconomic context that enabled and reinforced the outbreak of a general crisis. At the beginning of 1999, a public debate began on the banking reform in the “TRNC”. The new law that was proposed aimed, among other things, to increase the minimum mandatory reserve for banks but also to link lending to stock, not deposits (Isachenko 2012, 108). The Turkish Cypriot bankers reacted to the possible restructuring of the banking sector, perceiving the law as an attempt to marginalize local banks and open up the sector in a way that would facilitate the total dominion of Turkish bank capital (Safaklı ¸ 2003, 225). As of October 1999, the fragile situation of the banking sector formed a central issue of warnings to the government based on economic factors. Eleven Turkish Cypriot banks assessed the bank sector’s situation in a joint report, which was revealed in the local press. According to the report, most of the problems of the banking system were caused by the privileges of “foreign banks”, that is, of Turkish banks. Turkish banks

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were acting more as centres transferring money abroad, contributing to rising interest rates and deteriorating living standards locally. At the same time, the report emphasized that the relevant laws guaranteed favourable treatment for Turkish banking institutions within the Turkish Cypriot economy, while Turkish Cypriot banks had no rights in the Turkish market (Avrupa 1999c). The disclosure of this report worsened the political controversy as the findings were directly related, at least by a part of the Turkish Cypriot business world, to the core content of the economic relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. While the strongest banking institutions were more focused on transferring stocks to do business abroad, the laws provided no substantial protection to Turkish Cypriot depositors (Avrupa 1999d). A typical, but not the only example, was the Turkish Bank (Türk Bankası), which in the 1990s came under Turkish capital control and changed its operation almost completely. According to press releases in 1998, the bank had reserves of 36 trillion Turkish pounds, of which only 3.5 trillion were given as loans to Cyprus (Avrupa 1999e). Against the backdrop of this turmoil, in December 1999, the Turkey’s Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) decided to put under its control the Yurt Bank, which had liquidity problems (Safaklı ¸ 2003, 227). This decision created further panic in the Turkish Cypriot community and many depositors hurried to withdraw their money from their local branch of the bank. In the face of this development, the government in the occupied territories decided to put the bank under state control and was forced to disclose that due to the transfer of large sums abroad, the problem of liquidity was also present in Cyprus (Kıbrıs 1999d). The bank soon gave away much of its stock in the form of unsecured loans to companies in Turkey (Kıbrıs 2000a). Over the next few days, a political avalanche of events was recorded in the Turkish Cypriot community. In early January 2000, the government decided to close a second bank, Everest Bank, and warned that if the situation of the two banks did not improve, they would be forced to proceed with their final liquidation (Kıbrıs 2000b). At the end of January, two more banks, Finansbank and Hürbank, formally informed that they were facing liquidity problems and thus Ero˘glu’s government-appointed state commissioners for their management (Ekmekçi 2000). Although the situation was becoming increasingly chaotic, the political elite reacted by reassuring the Turkish Cypriots. The repeated reassurances that the banking sector’s liquidity problems were manageable

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(Kıbrıs 1999e) were accompanied by a sort of “national certificate” from Ankara that the Turkish Cypriot economy would still be under the high protection of the Motherland. The Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, Sükrü ¸ Sina Gürel, who was responsible for the Cyprus affairs portfolio, assured that the transfer of funding from Turkey for payroll and investment development would continue without any problems (Kıbrıs 2000c). At the same time, Denkta¸s also used another form of pressure to control the initially small reactions by calling on the people “not to run to the banks and create a crisis that does not exist” (Kıbrıs 2000d). However, after a while, the reassuring statements of the authorities and the symbolic veil of “nationally secured” economy could not control the social discontent. The daily experiences of a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community resurfaced the decay of power structures and the total inability to respond to conditions of complete control by Turkey. The impact on the daily life of the society was immediate and catalytic. From January 2000, when the banking crisis began, to July of that year, a total of seven banking institutions (Yeni Düzen 2000c) were closed, causing a radical shift in power in this strategically important sector of the economy. The collapsing banks held deposits of $163 million in 58,000 accounts. This accounted for about 18% of total deposits, and the collapse of the banking system affected about 30,000 people (TCLB 2004, 3). According to the opposition’s estimates, within the first eight months of the crisis alone some 350 million Turkish pounds left the “TRNC” (KKTCM 2000c, 6358). From November 1999 until the end of January 2000, household spending on basic necessities increased by 38% (Selengin 2000). The social destabilization that was gradually emerging was followed by “anarchic” phenomena in the market. Many store chains refused to be paid with cheques of specific banks, and only accepted payments with cheques from the most powerful Turkish banking institutions (KKTCM 2000c, 6359). The liquidity problem took on a whole new dimension as in the first months of 2000 the state faced difficulties in paying salaries (Güven 2003, 37), while thousands of small and medium-sized businesses were on the verge of prosecution (Kıbrıs 2000e). In short, the political and economic situation entered a phase of a generalized crisis that could not be addressed. The sense of social paralysis had soon led to the widening of protests in a way that reinforced not only the demands of the community regarding the economy but also new political demands for a radical change. The depositors of banks who had

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collapsed realized that the state was unable to come up with substantial sources of compensation. Their discussions with the government led to an agreement providing for the payment of 18 equal monthly allowances (Sonan 2014, 218), but the wider economic situation and Turkey’s attitude did not enable this. This awareness initially led the depositors to set up their own organization (Kıbrıs 2000f). Most important, however, was the promotion of their wider views, which focused on the substance of the issue: economic developments and the crisis had features and roots that pointed to a process of total collapse of the “TRNC” (Avrupa 2000a). It is precise because of this specific assessment of the situation that depositors’ organizations, along with the contribution of the main leftwing parties, begun to influence the wider strata of the population and create further opposition dynamics. Not coincidentally, the mass mobilization of the depositors’ protest on 9 February 2000 was not confined to demanding the government’s resignation, but expanded to directions that raised more dynamic questions that doubted the operation of the “TRNC” itself (Avrupa 2000b). The slogans of the protesters touched on the issue of the alienation of Turkish Cypriots (“We have no identity, no geography, no money, where to go?”), the question of the hierarchical relationship imposed by Ankara (“When the banks were opened it was MOTHER, when they closed it became STEP-MOTHER”), as well as the issue of the internal operation of a state of exception that ultimately challenged the welfare of the community (“You are watching the collapse of the TRNC! You stole our children’s education money”) (Avrupa 2000c). In this sense, this particular mobilization was a countdown with many recipients. For the opposition, it was a reminder of the silent social dynamics that were still present. The social paralysis that had been dominant in the previous period under the veil of nationalist pressures began to be lifted with the emergence of this dynamic “underlying current” (Levent 2000). The opposition forces that went out in the streets as a result of the banking system collapse seemed more resolute at this point in time than in the past, and not at all willing to compromise (Fındık 2000). Part of the prevalent climate in society was reflected in the opposition press with headlines such as “It is time to rise up” (Yeni Düzen 2000d), “The government’s battery has run out” (Yeni Düzen 2000e) and “We have no more patience” (Yeni Düzen 2000f).

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The Colonial Gaze and the Reactions of the “Indigenous” The collapse of the banks was on one hand a realization for the opposition that “time had come to rise”, but on the other this realization worked in the opposite direction for the Turkish Cypriot power bloc and the Ecevit government. Social upheavals and signs of “revolt” were perceived as threats that could only be addressed through a broader plan of economic and political restructuring of the state of exception. The pretext for these plans was Ero˘glu’s request for additional $200 million funding (Kıbrıs 2000g) from Turkey. Ero˘glu himself argued that the crisis could not be overcome without a new loan agreement with Turkey (Kıbrıs 2000h), while at the same time he revealed the new economic policy guidelines he would follow by taking the first measures to reduce state expenditure (Çetereisi 2000). In this context, the additional financing of the Turkish Cypriot economy was followed by a political perception of drastic changes in the way Ankara decided to “restructure” the economic framework in Cyprus. On one level, the Turkish government refused to allocate new funds to cover the damage caused by the collapse of the banks, even arguing that “Ero˘glu’s promises” should be undertaken by himself. Gürel made it clear that “We have no resources to pay the bills of the TRNC banks… Cyprus is vital to us, but we are not thinking of paying that amount. Given that Mr Ero˘glu promised to pay this money to depositors, he is the one to find the resources…” (Yeni Düzen 2000g). For Ankara, therefore, the issue of creating new deficits was a “Turkish Cypriot responsibility”. More specifically, however, it was also the special responsibility of Ero˘glu, whom the Turkish government wished to wear down in view of the elections with Denkta¸s in April 2000 (Yeni Düzen 2000h). Apart from the creation of concrete frameworks to define the political balances in the “TRNC”, Turkey’s goal was extended to forcing Turkish Cypriots to take practical responsibility for their mismanagement of the economy. “Turkish Cypriots need to learn to fish on their own,” said Recep Önal, Vice-President of Turkey and head of the economy’s portfolio.1 On a second level, Turkey’s plans included a necessary “disciplining” of the Turkish Cypriots through policies of “restructuring” of the economy, which they themselves mismanaged. Characteristically, Ecevit then said that it would not be difficult for Ankara to finance the whole crisis, but that Turkish Cypriots had to be disciplined (Bila 2000).

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In this way, the Turkish government brought clearly to the fore a new concept of financial management of the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriots should implement austerity measures (Güven 2000). According to Ankara, the state itself was responsible for the economic destabilization of the Turkish Cypriot community. Consequently, the policies for overcoming the crisis would have to go through a radical change in the role of state structures in the economy. Indicative of the above was the content of a secret document prepared by the Turkish government’s Bureau of Cypriot Affairs that was communicated to the Ero˘glu government (Güven 2003, 36–7). Turkey’s assessment underscored that slow growth was due to the fact that the public sector became the most decisive factor in the production of products and services in almost all sectors, while its position as a primary employer hampered economic growth and development. At the same time, Ankara believed that the growing fiscal deficit was a result of the absorption of a large part of the public resources and it should therefore no longer be covered by Turkish resources (Yeni Düzen 2000i). On the basis of this assessment, the implementation of discipline meant a stricter monitoring of the reform programme by Ankara. Specifically, the key objective of the new financial package was to reduce deficits. It stated that Turkey’s loans would be denominated in dollars, would cover a three-year time frame, and would be released on the condition of austerity measures implementation in Cyprus. The course of the reform progress would be evaluated by a special technical committee of the Turkish state (Yeni Düzen 2000j). The conditions set by Turkey in relation to the release of the loan took the form of measures such as taxation of minimum wages and pensions, gradual increases in value-added tax, the overall reassessment of the tax exemption system, the abolition of the 13th month wage, the immediate suspension of hiring in the public sector, as well as accelerating the privatization process that should now include state-owned banking institutions as a whole (Arslan 2011). Thus the general philosophy of dealing with the economic destabilization and social turmoil took the form of socialization of the collapse of banks through the implementation of austerity policies. However, placing the state at the centre of accountability for the structural problems of the economy served as a form of collective punishment of the undisciplined Turkish Cypriots. Since the state was a “Turkish Cypriot affair”, then the consequences of the crisis would have to be shared with those who managed it. This logic not only served as a one-dimensional dynamic

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deteriorating the already poor financial situation of the wider Turkish Cypriot strata, it also began a radical change in the relationship of the Turkish Cypriots with the established structure of political and economic elites. This new element gradually created an environment in which the need for political change took precedence over all others (Balkır and Yalman 2009, 52). At the same time, the extorting manner by which Ankara decided to impose the new economic package, as well as the substance of its destabilizing policies, laid the foundations for a comprehensive transformation of economic relations. In essence, the banking collapse, as an opportunity for neoliberal restoration, marked the pursuit of a radical change of the “whole world” in which the Turkish Cypriots had lived since 1974. According to KAMU-I˙ S, ¸ the financial package of 2000 was a typical strategy of overturning all laws and procedures that existed after 1974 both at parliamentary level and at the level of employee–employer relations (Yeni Düzen 2000k). Making the key aspects of the package public, in the context of the experience of economic collapse, made a large part of the community politically express their desire to change their relations with Turkey itself. Ankara’s overwhelming reassurances that the Turkish Cypriot economy is under “high Turkish protection” (Avrupa 2000d) collapsed in the consciousness of the majority of the community in the same manner that the entire political system had essentially gone bankrupt (Kıbrıs 2000i). In the face of the continuing process of the Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU, the total economic collapse of the Turkish Cypriots, combined with Turkey’s “colonialist gaze” as expressed by the economic package, formed dynamics that significantly changed the notion of threat to the community. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots seemed “ready” for a new institutional integration internationally. On the other hand, the crisis reminded the Turkish Cypriots of a “conscious and pre-determined decision of cutting off” Turkish Cypriots from the production process as a result of the structure that Turkey built after 1974. As such, the economy could not be objectively adapted to the international environment and it therefore turned into a “threat” for the Turkish Cypriot community (Kıbrıs 2000j). In short, if for Ankara the main cause of the crisis was the “Turkish Cypriot public sector”, for the Turkish Cypriot opposition, the main responsibility was with the creator of that particular “sector” that eventually entrapped the Turkish Cypriot community and threatened its political survival. KTÖS described the financial measures as a

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“disaster package” (Yeni Düzen 2000l). Opposition newspaper Avrupa (2000e) presented Turkey’s new policy under the headline “Ankara pulled the rope!”. In the first protest demonstrations launched by the CTP, the dominant slogans were: “We told them there is fire and they threw gasoline” and “Our salvation is peace and federation” (Yeni Düzen 2000m). Within this multidimensional setting, the relations of dependence with Turkey eventually became understood as relations of entrapment and were therefore raised in the light of new disputes and questioning. Arif Hasan Tahsin expressed the collapse of Turkey’s ideological dimension among the Turkish Cypriots in this particular context as follows: “Turkey, do not get angry, and listen to me. Here is Cyprus. I do not know if the influence of Turkey and Greece will disappear today or tomorrow. I don’t even know if it will be replaced by America’s influence or not. But now everything is so clear… There is no more love in Cyprus for either Turkey or Greece” (Tahsin 1999). Therefore, at the heart of the escalating reactions of the Turkish Cypriot opposition was the legitimization and ideological collapse of the order as structured in 1974 (Balkır and Yalman 2009, 53). For this very reason, the opposition’s proposals to escape this deadlock included a comprehensive approach of political change that touched the entire spectrum of relations with Turkey and, of course, the core, which was the Cyprus problem itself. According to the Turkish Cypriot trade union movement, Ankara’s financial package could not objectively be a way out of the crisis because it reproduced one of its main causes, which was the community’s detachment from the production process. The trade unions that had the task of presenting an alternative political programme in July 2000 estimated that “The socio-economic policies implemented by the dominant circles cut the community off from production and created a structure entirely dependent on foreign forces, a parasitic and consumerist structure. The most recent crisis in the banking sector is a result of this very structure” (Yeni Düzen 2000n). With this statement, the trade union movement essentially assumed the role of challenging the “colonial knowledge” through which Turkey sought to reform the “TRNC”. The trade unions’ assessments made it clear that the main cause of the community’s socioeconomic and political deadlocks was precisely Turkey: “An important element that emerged from the discussions of recent days is that experts coming from Turkey and the Turkish state’s aid are treated as the ‘magic wand’. But it is well known that the current situation has been caused by

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the policies of experts from Turkey and the resources that were named ‘aid’” (Yeni Düzen 2000n). The trade union movement’s critical approach to Turkey’s relations with the community involved, on one hand, the disclosure of the colonial character of the “magic wand” and, on the other, a clear political statement of alternative proposals. The unions demanded the abolition of the use of the Turkish lira and the adoption of the Cypriot pound or the euro. They emphasized the need to radically change the structure of banks in order to prevent the use of deposits in the commercial activities of their owners. They demanded the reorientation of investments to reinforce production and to enhance the prospects for genuine public health and education (Yeni Düzen 2000n). In addition to restoring the importance of a mixed economy model and ending the copying of Turkish neoliberalism, the trade union movement complemented its political programme with demands to remove chauvinism from education, eliminate military influence in civic society, ensuring the free movement of all Turkish Cypriots throughout the island, as well as preparing the conditions for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem (Yeni Düzen 2000o). In essence, the trade union movement, had now proceeded with publicly expressing the coupling of economic demands with the fundamental issue of changing Turkey–Turkish Cypriot relations through the solution of the Cyprus problem. In the context of the general polarization created by Ankara’s open interventions, all the political parties of the Left insisted on transferring the police to be under the political control of the Ministry of Interior (Güven 2003, 31–2). In fact, Akıncı left the inauguration of the new police offices when the head of the Turkish army, Ali Nihat Özeyranlı, accused Turkish Cypriot politicians of being traitors seeking to confine the role of the army (Isachenko 2012, 75–6). In the following days, Özeyranlı reacted strongly,2 saying that “if you mix democracy with all this, it will sit on your stomach”. He even warned that “if the authorities do not defend the state, then the security forces will do so” (Güven 2003, 32). The open threat of a military coup was, of course, the real face of the confrontation. The public intervention of the General, however, sought, among other things, to authoritatively set the boundaries of democracy within which Turkish Cypriot political life could operate. Consequently, Özeyranlı sought to extend the scope of Ankara’s “jurisdiction” to the issue of disciplining the Turkish Cypriots. In addition

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to the financial aspect of the intended restructuring as described in the package, the General also attempted to document the ideological discipline of emerging opposition currents. In other words, he tried to stop the centrifugal dynamics that created ruptures to the partitionist framework and suppression was the method he chose to implement this. On the night of 7 July 2000, Avrupa journalists Sener ¸ Levent and Ali Osman (Yeni Düzen 2000p) were arrested on charges of espionage on behalf of Greek Cypriots (Güven 2003, 34). By 9 July, six journalists had been arrested (Yeni Düzen 2000q), creating conditions of terrorism against the opposition and dynamics of total social polarization (Avrupa 2000g, h, i). In this setting, the stance of the opposition showed that nothing would ever be the same. The reactions of the opposition organizations were immediate. Indeed, the intensity with which they were publicly expressed created the potential for new political developments, but also for the early maturation of subversive facts which would bring about parallel structures that would challenge the founding ideological foundations of the partitionist framework. On 10 July 2000, a wide collaboration of parties, trade unions and other progressive organizations issued a statement against the military’s intervention that was essentially an alternative political manifesto. The messages of this cooperation included the following: “Turkish Cypriots are living in a process of extinction. They are prevented from governing themselves. At a time when all political parties and organizations are demanding that the police be linked to the Ministry of Interior and the administration of the army to politicians, the military is threatening Turkish Cypriots and insulting our people. The administration of the Security Forces carried out a small coup by arresting the journalists and thereby, in essence, a coup against the will of the Turkish Cypriots… We demand the release of those arrested and the immediate release of Ali Nihat Özeyranlı from his duties…” (Yeni Düzen 2000r). In the following days, the coalition of the opposition expanded to comprise 31 organizations and political parties and it was decided to organize protest demonstrations. On 18 July 2000 a protest demonstration was held under the slogan “This country is ours” (Yeni Düzen 2000s). According to journalist Erdal Güven (2003, 42), this demonstration was the most massive in the short history of the 17 years since the declaration of the “TRNC”. One of the most important elements of the demonstration was the combination of mass participation with the variety of political issues raised. The political context included issues originating from the

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opposition against the “infliction of a disastrous economic package”, the “interference of the army in civil life”, and in favour of the release of the Turkish Cypriot journalists and of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem (Sonan 2014, 221). It was no accident that after the demonstration, the decision was made to set up the platform “This country is ours” (Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu); the most dynamic aspect of the opposition in the critical period that would follow. The mobilization of 18 July 2000 was of strategic importance on yet another level. In addition to expressing comprehensive political demands and the opportunity for a new organizational basis for the opposition, the statement “This country is ours” managed to express both the rejection of the partitionist framework and the survival of a previously “censored” political programme. This particular slogan and its practical application, through the activity of a broad popular cooperation in the form of a platform, marked a deep rupture in multiple axes. On the first axis, it intensified the demands for a total change of power structures. Turkish officials occupying senior administrative positions (e.g. army, police, central bank) would no longer be tolerated (Yeni Düzen 2000t). Therefore, the opposition strengthened aspects of the programme that aimed at consolidating Turkish Cypriot local authority as opposed to the Turkish guardianship. On the second axis, ruptures were observed as a result of a mass public review of Turkey’s role in Cypriot history. At this historic juncture, the opposition alliance did not question Turkey’s role in the 1974 invasion altogether, but made it clear that the army’s “salvation role” was only a matter of circumstance (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 252). This role was only accepted as an act of eliminating the prospect of the Union of Cyprus with Greece marked by the coup of 15 July 1974. In this context, the slogan “This country is ours” underlined the refusal of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to accept the continuing authoritarian and hierarchical relationship between the community and Turkey. Mustafa Akıncı very characteristically said: “We can no longer accept a relation based on ‘you are the small country and small you will remain’. We want a relation of equality with Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot people should be able to govern their own institutions. This is a necessary element of an independent state…” (Güven 2003, 43). The third axis of ruptures brought about by the platform “This country is ours” involved the fulfilment of the demand for a new relation of equality, challenging the role of the Turkish military and the wider

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concept of security (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 262). For example, the Patriotic Unity Movement emphasized that Özeyranlı’s statements were nothing but threats against the Turkish Cypriots (Yeni Düzen 2000u), while the Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Association made clear that “the role of the Security Forces Commander in safeguarding our security is no longer acceptable” (Yeni Düzen 2000v). If we consider the mass reaction and the speed with which this new level of opposition was organized, the conclusion drawn is the existence of an accumulated negative experience from the past that, in the new context, acquired a more comprehensive political “vocabulary” in order to be vocalized. The mass character of the reaction of the Turkish Cypriots, not only to the economic collapse and the imposition of austerity, but also to the intensification of the authoritarian ideological discipline through military interventions, evidences a previous shift in the perception of threats. Özeyranlı’s words and acts confirmed a pre-existing danger: that Turkish Cypriots were at risk of finalizing their condition as “stateless”. They were faced with the threat of finalizing their entrapment in a territory/colony in which their real power had been violently marginalized. So the speed of the reaction and the mass character of the platform “This country is ours” was not a moment of reflexive action, but an expression of a historic experience that had to be publicly recorded. An article in Yeni Düzen on 18 July 2000 states: “A potential surrender to behaviours such as those of the General will turn us into people without a homeland and without social organization” (Erçakıca 2000). This setting formed a “moment” of social upheaval resulting from the community’s longstanding entrapment. What was perhaps missing was a practical expression of this “explosion” that would deal the cards again in the political arena both within the Turkish Cypriot community and in Ankara. The context of the developments, and the polarization created by the total collapse of the institutions, ultimately created the conditions for this practical expression of a social explosion (KKTCM 2000e, 5721). On 24 July 2000, a few days after relatively smaller mobilizations (Yeni Düzen 2000w), the bank depositors took over the parliament building (Yeni Düzen 2000x). This provoked remarkable violence by the police forces. As a result of the repression measures, 19 people were injured and more than 200 people arrested, including many trade unionists and journalists (Avrupa 2000j). For the opposition, this development was the culmination of the political coup that had already begun with the actions of the head of the Turkish army. Avrupa (2000j) newspaper referred to

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the use of violence by the regime as follows: “The Ankara hawks attack Northern Cyprus. Extermination!” The opposition’s view of the nature of violence against demonstrators was not accidental. If the earlier days of July 2000 showed prospects for challenging the partitionist ideology, the taking over of the parliament became a turning point for the nationalist power bloc. Taking over a building—a symbol of the status quo—forced the nationalist circles in the Turkish Cypriot community and in Ankara to seek how to redefine their role. As Oktay Ek¸si of the Hürriyet newspaper observed, “the administration of Northern Cyprus has completely collapsed” and before this collapse a process of “purifying the TRNC” (Yeni Düzen 2000y) was necessary. In a similar vein, Denkta¸s’s supporters from Ankara called on the Turkish government to intervene immediately because now “the risk of supporters of Greek Cypriot positions within the TRNC” was increasing. Supporting “Greek Cypriot positions” was a form of betrayal, as was the “insult” aimed at the Turkish army chief. Therefore, in the nationalist context, the opposition deserved the consequences of “all necessary measures by state institutions” (KKTCM 2000e, 5735–6). Altemur Kılıç, one of the well-known nationalist journalists of the time in Turkey, was particularly poignant: “What Akıncı said about Turkey and the Turkish army is no different from what many traitors say … stupid Cypriots who are ready to become servants of the EU. Espionage is not achieved just by giving information to the enemy. Cooperation with the Greek Cypriots is no different from espionage” (KKTCM 2000e, 5752). It is true that the events of July 2000 created a political shock in Ankara. The fuzzy image of the Turkish Cypriots in Ankara, as the result of Denkta¸s’s long-standing monopoly, began to “clear” and illuminate, but in the opposite direction. This dynamic, among other things, formalized the Turkish Cypriot leader’s new attempt to completely cut off the opposition from any channel of communication with the Turkish government. Denkta¸s himself submitted an assessment report on the events culminating in the taking over of the parliament to the Turkish NSC (KKTCM 2000c, 6321). In doing so, he attempted to re-establish himself as Ankara’s exclusive interlocutor. This effort expanded to acts of demonizing the opposition. The parliament spokesman at the time, Hasipo˘glu, submitted his own report on the events of 24 July 2000, in which he clearly stated that the taking over of the parliament was carried out by “pro-Greek Cypriot forces” whose plans even included taking over the presidential house and the Turkish Embassy (KKTCM 2000e, 5723).

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The political frenzy with which the emergence of a more organized and determined opposition was confronted in July 2000 seemed to be “the last effort” for survival of a collapsing regime. It was no coincidence that the movements of Ankara and its local allies focused on the two axes that the opposition questioned—the issue of the economic reform, and the pressure on the prospect of a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. In January 2001, Ero˘glu finally accepted the new economic protocol requested by Ankara (Isachenko 2012, 75–6). At the same time, Ankara made sure to send messages that it would not accept “ceding” Cyprus without first securing Turkey’s European perspective. As Gürel said: “Why let one bird (Cyprus) leave our hands while we are not sure we will have in our hands another (the EU)?” (KKTCM 2001a, 4415). Therefore, the “purification of the TRNC” at a time of collapse was achieved through the Turkish Cypriots staying within a framework that would reproduce Turkey’s strategic interests and economic orientations. One of the key issues of the pursued “purification” was the removal of the TKP from the government. Its positions on equality between Turkey and the “TRNC” brought about the issue of Turkish Cypriot independence from Ankara (KKTCM 2001a, 4379). Its presence in power, therefore, could hinder the success of this “last effort” to restore the ideology of partition. Finally, on 12 June 2001, Ero˘glu presented the programme of the new right-wing coalition between UBP and DP. The orientations on the Cyprus issue were highlighted by the need for “integration with the Motherland” (KKTCM 2001b, 4343), while the socio-economic focus of the programme clarified the commitment to “free market conditions, to strengthening the regulatory rather than interventionist role of the state and to restricting its economic activities at the lowest possible level” (KKTCM 2001b, 4344). At the same time, the pursuit of repression of the opposition also included the creation of the National People’s Movement (Ulusal Halk Hareketi—UHH) as a farright response to the platform “This country is ours” (KKTCM 2001a, 4391). The formation of the new right-wing alliance was essentially a response to the rise of the opposition social movement, which sought to form an alternative perspective (KKTCM 2001c, 4516). Through the political mobilization of the opposition and the platform “This country is ours”, the July of 2000 seemed to become, on a symbolic level at least, a point of rupture against the July of 1974. If the July of 1974 was the symbolic beginning of the consolidation of the partitionist ideology, then the July

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of 2000 was the symbolic beginning of the overthrow of authoritarian principles that pursued the ideological and social legitimization of partition. It was clear for the opposition in July 2000, that the “TRNC” did not serve the Turkish Cypriot community’s interests; rather it violated them (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 262). Against this perspective, the infliction of a government coalition of the UBP and the DP now seemed “foreign” to the prevailing social dynamics. For the first time and in such a clear way, Denkta¸s and his power circles were gradually pushed to the isolation of social delegitimization. The reality of the Turkish Cypriots after the summer of 2000 led to the conclusion that the old power was artificially put “on the ventilator” without “social oxygen”. It is a fact however, that even though the opposition showed clear signs of multifaceted growth by the summer of 2000, what was absent for a comprehensive and subversive presence was perhaps some external dynamics. Both Ankara’s political orientation in supporting the “old power”, and the way in which the negotiations of the Cyprus problem had progressed up to that point, were two additional “external factors” that kept the nationalist establishment on “life-support”.

Notes 1. Commenting on the unequal commercial relationship of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, Recep Önal said: “Firstly you have to produce products of international and European standards and then we will buy” (KKTCM 2000d, 5542). 2. Among many others, he accused Akıncı of treason and asked Ero˘glu to remove the directors of the Bayrak Radio Television Corporation (BRT) because they supposedly censored his statements (Avrupa 2000f).

References Anagnostopoulou, Sia. 2004. Toυρκικ o´ ς Eκσ υγ χ ρ oνισ μ´oς . Iσ λαμ ´ και ´ διαδρ oμη´ τ oυ Kεμαλισ μo´ [Turkish Toυρκ oκ ´ π ριoι σ τ η δαιδαλωδη Modernization. Islam and Turkish Cypriots in the Entangled Course of Kemalism]. Athens: Vivliorama. Arslan, Hakan. 2011. “Neoliberal bakı¸sının tahakkümü altında bir yeniden yapılandırma sürecinden geçen Kıbrıslı Türk toplumunun siyasal iktisadına dair bazı tespitler” [Some Findings on the Political Economy of the Turkish Cypriot Community, Which Is Going through a Restructuring Process Under the Domination of a Neoliberal Approach]. Yeni Düzen Gaile, July 17.

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Avrupa. 1999a. “Ö˘gretmen patladı” [Teachers Explode], 23 October. ———. 1999b. “Dayatmalara hayır mitingi” [Demonstration to Say No to Impositions], 20 October. ———. 1999c. “Banka sava¸sı” [Bank war], 28 October. ———. 1999d. “Haydi göreve….” [Come on… Duty Calls], 30 October. ———. 1999e. “3,5 trilyon!” [3,5 Trillion!], 30 October. ———. 2000a. “Everestbank mudileri bankanın tasfiyesine kar¸sı” [Everestbank Depositors Are Against the Liquidation of the Bank], 1 February. ———. 2000b. “Hükümeti salladılar” [They Shook the Government], 10 February. ˙ ste pankartlar” [Here Are the Banners], 10 February. ———. 2000c. “I¸ ———. 2000d. “Kredi kanalı” [Credit Channel], 5 February. ———. 2000e. “Ankara ipi çekti!” [Ankara Pulls the Rope], 1 July. ———. 2000f. “Ne komutan!” [What a Commander!], 2 July. ———. 2000g. “Biri kayıp, biri tutuklu” [One Is Lost the Other Is Arrested], 8 July. ———. 2000h. “Ali Nihat terörü!” [Terror by Ali Nihat], 9 July. ———. 2000i. “Kıbrıs’lı Türkler yok ediliyor” [Turkish Cypriots Are Being Destroyed], 10 July. ˙ ———. 2000j. “Ankara s¸ ahinlerinin Kuzey Kıbrıs ata˘gı. IMHA!” [North Cyprus Push by Hawks. DISTRUCTION!], 25 July. Aydo˘gdu, Ahmet. 2005. Tarihsel Süreçte Kıbrıs Türk Seçimleri ve Yönetimleri [Turkish Cypriot Elections and Administrations through History]. Ankara: BRC Basım ve Matbaacılık Ltd. Balkır, Canan, and Galip Yalman. 2009. “Economics and the Politicization of Civil Society: The Turkish Cypriot Case.” In Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads, edited by Thomas Diez and Natalie Tocci, 48–65. Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press. Bila, Fikret. 2000. “Ecevit: KKTC disipline olmalı” [Ecevit: TRNC Should Be Disciplined]. Milliyet, 28 July. Çarko˘glu, Ali, and Ahmet Sözen. 2004. “The Turkish Cypriot General Elections of December 2003: Setting the Stage for Resolving the Cyprus Conflict?” South European Society and Politics 9 (3): 122–136. Çetereisi, Dilek. 2000. “Kemerleri sıkıyoruz” [Austerity Measures]. Kıbrıs, January 20. Ekmekçi, Hüseyin. 2000. “Hükümetten dört bankaya yeni yönetim” [New Management to Four Banks by the Government]. Kıbrıs, 29 January. Erçakıca, Hasan. 2000. “Ba˘gımsızlık ve bedeli” [The Price of Independence]. Yeni Düzen, 18 July. Fındık, Ünal. 2000. “Kıbrıs paraları unutulmadı” [Cyprus Money Is Not Forgotten]. Yeni Düzen, 11 February.

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Güven, Erdal. 2000. “Tercih de plan da belliydi” [Both the Choice and the Plan Were Clear]. Radikal, 22 April. ———. 2003. Helsinki’den Kopenhag’a Kıbrıs [Cyprus from Helsinki to Copen˙ hagen]. Istanbul: Om Yayınevi. Hastürer, Hasan. 1999. “Sahi, biz ne olaca˘gız” [Right, What Happens to Us]. Kıbrıs, 15 December. Isachenko, Daria. 2012. The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria. Hampshire & New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Kıbrıs. 1999a. “Rum’a mührü vermek, bize güle güle demektir” [Giving the Stamp to the Greek Cypriots Means Saying Bye Bye to Us], 2 December. ———. 1999b. “Halk iki devlet istiyor” [People Want Two States], 28 December. ———. 1999c. “COMAR vatanda¸sa sordu” [COMAR Asked the Citizens], 29 December. ———. 1999d. “Yurtbank krizi” [Yurtbank Crisis], 28 December. ———. 1999e. “Spekülatif haberlere itibar etmeyin” [Don’t Trust Speculative Reports], 24 December. ———. 2000a. “Türkiye’den 200 milyon istedik” [We Asked for 200 Million from Turkey], 4 January. ———. 2000b. “Everestbank i¸slemleri durduruldu” [Everestbank Transactions Are Stopped], 4 January. ———. 2000c. “Selamet” [Salvation], 6 January. ———. 2000d. “Kriz yatı¸stı” [The Crisis Has Subsided], 5 January. ———. 2000e. “Ekonomi Saray’da” [Economy Is in the Palace], 20 January. ———. 2000f. “Yurtbankzedeler toplandı!” [Victims of Yurtbank Gather], 16 January. ———. 2000g. “Türkiye’den 200 milyon istedik” [We Asked for 200 Million from Turkey], 4 January. ———. 2000h. “Ba¸sbakan Ero˘glu: Kredi anla¸smasına ihtiyaç var” [Prime Minister Ero˘glu: There Is Need for a Credit Agreement], 29 January. ———. 2000i. “Talat: Ekonomi ve devlet yapısı laçkalıktan kurtulmalı” [Talat: The Economy and the State Structure Should Be Handled Seriously], 7 January. ———. 2000j. “En büyük tehdit ekonomi” [Economy Is the Biggest Threat], 10 January. KKTCM. 1999. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1’inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 1 October. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2000a. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 1’inci Ola˘ganüstü Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 16 December. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi.

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———. 2000b. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 80’inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 4 August. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2000c. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 86’nci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 25 August. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2000d. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 73’üncü Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 7 July. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2000e. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 78’inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 28 July. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2001a. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 67’nci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 15 June. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2001b. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 66’ıncı Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 12 June. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2001c. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 68’inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 16 June. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. Lacher, Hannes, and Erol Kaymak. 2005. “Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus.” Mediterranean Politics 10 (2): 157–166. Levent, Sener. ¸ 2000. “Dipten gelen dalga” [The Wave from the Deep]. Avrupa, 10 February. Mehmetçik, Mustafa Semih. 2008. “‘1974 sonrası Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik arayı¸sı ve siyasalla¸sma süreci’” [The Turkish Cypriot Search for Identity after 1974 and the Politization Period]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by Mehmet ˙ Hasgüler, 146–222. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. Safaklı, ¸ Okan Veli. 2003. “Basic Problems of the Banking Sector in the TRNC with Partial Emphasis on the Proactive and Reactive Strategies Applied.” Do˘gus Üniversitesi Dergisi 4 (2): 217–232. Selengin, Pınar. 2000. “Mutfak harcamaları yüzde 54.6 arttı” [Kitchen Expenditures Increase by 54.6 Percent]. Kıbrıs, January 2000. Sonan, Sertaç. 2007. From Bankruptcy to Unification and EU-Membership? The Political Economy of Post-Nationalist Transformation in Northern Cyprus. European Studies Centre, RAMSES Working Paper 9/07, Oxford: University of Oxford. ———. 2014. In the Grip of Political Clientelism: The Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Politics and the Politico-Economic Foundations of Pro-Taksim Consensus. Essen: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Essen.

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Tahsin, Arif Hasan. 1999. “Darılma Türkiye, burası Kıbrıs’tır” [Don’t Get Upset Turkey, This Is Cyprus]. Avrupa, 15 October. TCLB. 2004. Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyetinde Ekonomik Geli¸sme ve Altyapı Yatırımları (2001–2004) [Economic Development and Infrastructure Investments in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]. Yardım Heyeti Ba¸skanlı˘gı, TC Lefko¸sa Büyükelçili˘gi, Lefko¸sa: TC Lefko¸sa Büyükelçili˘gi. Vatan. 1999. “Eti’de süresiz grev sürüyor” [Strike at Eti Continues Indefinitely]. Vatan, 7 October. Yashin, Yael Navaro. 2009. “Affective Spaces, Melancholic Objects: Ruination and the Production of Anthropological Knowledge.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15: 1–18. ———. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Durham & London: Duke University Press. Yeni Düzen. 1999. “Halkımıza gülmeyi unutturdular” [They Made Us Forget How to Smile], 28 October. ———. 2000a. “DPÖ’nün gelir da˘gılımı ve tüketim harcamaları anketleri yayımlandı” [SPO Publishes Income Distribution and Consumption Expenditure Surveys], 25 February. ———. 2000b. “Ölmemizi mi bekliyorlar” [Are They Waiting for Us to Die], 23 February. ———. 2000c. “7 ayda 7 banka” [7 Banks in 7 Months], 13 July. ———. 2000d. “Artık aya˘ga kalkma zamanıdır” [It Is Time to Rise Up], 5 July. ———. 2000e. “Hükümetin pili bitti” [The Government’s Battery Runs Out], 5 July. ———. 2000f. “Beklemeye tahammülümüz kalmadı” [We Don’t Have the Patience to Wait Anymore], 5 July. ———. 2000g. “Ankara’dan para yok” [No Money from Ankara], 27 July. ———. 2000h. “Kıskaç Operasyonu” [Pliers Operation], 29 July. ———. 2000i. “Gizli paketteki saptamalar” [Findings in the Secret Package], 1 July. ———. 2000j. “Gizli paketin hedefleri” [The Objectives of the Secret Package], 1 July. ———. 2000k. “Yeni paket tüm mevzuatı ortadan kaldırıyor” [The New Package Does Away with All the Legislation], 5 July. ———. 2000l. “Türkiye’den gelen paketin uygulanması için dayatma” [Pressure to Implement the Package from Turkey], 1 July. ———. 2000m. “Eylemlerimiz devam edecek” [Our Protests Will Continue], 5 July. ———. 2000n. “Türk Lirası yerine Kıbrıs Lirası kullanılsın” [Let’s Use the Cyprus Pound Instead of the Turkish lira], 10 July. ———. 2000o. “Sovenizm ¸ müfredattan çıkarılmalı” [Chauvinism Should Be Removed from the Curriculum], 11 July.

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———. 2000p. “Sener ¸ Levent tutuklandı” [Sener ¸ Levent Is Arrested], 8 July. ———. 2000q. “Bir tutuklama daha” [Another Arrest], 10 July. ———. 2000r. “Komutan derhal görevden alınsın” [The Commander Should Immediately Be Removed from Office], 10 July. ———. 2000s. “Bu memleket bizim” [This Country Is Ours], 13 July. ———. 2000t. “Tutuklamalar komplo” [Arrests Are Part of a Conspiracy], 11 July. ———. 2000u. “Özeyranlı’nın saldırıları, ele¸stiriden öte tehdittir” [Özeyranlı’s Attacks Are Not Criticisms, They Are Threats], 5 July. ———. 2000v. “Özeyranlı artık bu halkı koruyamaz” [Özeyranlı Can No Longer Protect This People], 25 July. ———. 2000w. “Bankazadeler 21 Temmuz’da miting yapacak” [Bank Victims Will Hold a Protest on 21 July], 18 July. ———. 2000x. “Kara Pazartesi” [Black Monday], 25 July. ———. 2000y. “Bizi ıslah etmeliymi¸sler!” [Apparently, They Need to Discipline Us], 27 July.

CHAPTER 10

The Victory of the “Parallel Society”

The Regime “Ate Its Halva”1 In December 1999, the talks between the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and the two Cypriot leaders, Clerides and Denkta¸s, began in preparation for the ground for direct meaningful negotiations. Although the first rounds of up-close talks were limited to determining their intentions, Kofi Annan filed a document before the two sides in November 2000, stressing that the effort was to find a solution for a sovereign, united and common state (Güven 2003, 65). In the face of this development, on 24 November, Ankara’s response was clear. Upon the conclusion of a meeting in the presence of the Turkish Cypriot leader, it was decided to terminate the talks. Denkta¸s himself emphasized: “We have reached a point where the talks are just a waste of time. Without our parameters being met, we feel we will be harmed if we continue the talks” (Güven 2003, 65). In this way, the alliance between Ankara and Denkta¸s did not want to acknowledge the explosive situation in the Turkish Cypriot community and the development of political mobilization that wished to overthrow the status quo (Kızılyürek 2005, 269). Not only did this alliance refuse to accept the creation of centrifugal forces within the community, it also believed that even in conditions of social upheaval it could continue its policy through the threat of annexing Northern Cyprus to Turkey. In early November 2001, Foreign ˙ Minister Ismail Cem reiterated that “The Cyprus issue is very important for Turkey’s security and for its position in the Eastern Mediterranean. © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_10

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Granting EU membership to Southern Cyprus means that Turkey’s interests are not considered… In such a case, Turkey may be forced to make tough decisions with consequences” (Güven 2003, 84). So 2001 appeared as just another “lost year” for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The impression of “yet another lost year” was translated by a large part of Turkish Cypriot society into a feeling of heavy loss. It was this perception of the emerging new dead-end that essentially formed a great mismatch between the Denkta¸s–Ankara alliance and the emerging Turkish Cypriot opposition movement. As had become clear in the period after the summer of 2000, the nationalist hegemony was losing ground. In contrast, the opposition’s rhetoric, despite the obstacles, found ways to gain ground among the broader strata of Turkish Cypriots and showed signs of mass politicization. In September 2000, Kıbrıs (2000) published an opinion poll, the results of which were quite different from the 1998 election results. Support for the federal solution to the Cyprus problem was at 31.7%, while confederation was supported by 27.2%. Annexation to Turkey remained at 7.7%. 57% of Turkish Cypriots were in favour of the prospect of giving back territories to Greek Cypriots in the event of a Cyprus settlement, with an overwhelming 97% backing EU membership. Within less than 24 months after the electoral success of the nationalist elite, the political views of the Turkish Cypriots once again showed the limits of the state of exception. Regardless of the different perceptions about the content of the Cyprus settlement, the vast majority rejected their experiences under this status. Mehmet Ali Talat described these views as follows: “There is a lot that has started to collapse. Not thousands, but tens of thousands took part in the protests and intense discussions took place among the people. The common view is that the only salvation is the solution of the Cyprus problem and EU membership” (KKTCM 2001, 4389). These specific social currents, which became even more pronounced in the period after the summer of 2000, constituted a new will that marginalized the nationalist discourse and gave room to criticism against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The persistent reminder of the nationalist rhetoric that the Turkish Cypriots lived in conditions of “peace and freedom” after 1974 was no longer embraced by the wider strata of society (Yashin 2012, 63). This sort of political discourse could no longer mobilize the community because the total collapse they experienced under the state of exception confirmed that the status of the

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northern Cypriot territories was a “zone of enclosure and alienation” instead of a “zone of freedom and salvation from the Greek Cypriots”. In turn, the awareness they were living in an “open prison” (Hatay and Bryant 2008, 430) evidenced, at the same time, that the wider strata of the community were not ready to be “deceived” by the nationalist political programme (Yashin 2012, 64). The more the nationalist elite insisted on presenting the “TRNC” as a “lifesaving gift” to the Turkish Cypriots, the more the masses turned to the “quest for a homeland” (Canefe 2009, 1244). Ero˘glu confessed on 18 April 2001: “If the current situation persists, then those out in the streets may crave the South … they will be distanced from Turkey” (Güven 2003, 77). On the basis of all the above, it could be said that the majority of the Turkish Cypriot community showed signs of an emerging social movement with subversive potential, which however, could not be practically expressed because at this particular time there was no decisive “political opportunity” from the outside. For the people whose life is led in despair, the existence of a risky, but potentially beneficial, collective action forms in itself an incentive (Tarrow 2011, 26). This fact had already been recorded in the community, in the context of the overall economic and political collapse of the regime. For the development of a subversive social movement, it was also necessary to have organized structures that would guarantee the stability of the mobilization (Tarrow 2011, 30). The massification of the coalition platform of opposition organizations was also an existing fact. The same was true in the case of the “cognitive framework” that characterized the organized structure of the Turkish Cypriot opposition. The platform “This country is ours” and the political context of the mobilizations of the previous period promoted an alternative common identity as well as the goals of this movement. A complement to the subversive potential of balances would be an external “source” with catalytic influence for the benefit of the organized opposition. As Tarrow (2011, 169) points out, the “political opportunities” are external and can therefore contribute decisively to securing sources of legitimacy for groups that lack internal support, legitimacy and access to resources. The emergence of “political opportunities” opens doors where previously there were only walls; such opportunities transform new social alliances into feasible facts and impacts on the correlation of forces. In the Turkish Cypriot case, the ideological and organizational formation of the opposition was present and already causing ruptures to the regime (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 243). In this case, therefore,

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the “political opportunity” would be the prospect of strengthening the subversive features of the opposition movement and of integrating its political agenda into an international context. The “political opportunity” could be transformed into a prospect of turning the opposition’s demands into dominant ones. That is, the longstanding identification of the federal solution of the Cyprus problem with the survival of the community as promoted by the opposition could transform into everyday political practice and activity for the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots (Mehmetçik 2008, 195). In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, the “political opportunity” eventually encompassed two central features that indeed helped surface the subversive features of the opposition’s social movement. The first was making the UN initiative to find a solution to the Cyprus issue specific by submitting a comprehensive solution plan. The second was the change in Turkey’s stance towards this specific UN plan-initiative. Just when everything seemed to be lost, at the end of 2001, Denkta¸s, perhaps becoming aware of the “dangers” of the opposition’s increasing pressure, initiated a direct meeting with Clerides. This was the beginning of the “diplomacy of dinners” (Güven 2003, 118), through which a new comprehensive UN initiative on the Cyprus issue was decided. This initiative ultimately resulted in the submission of a comprehensive solution plan, the renowned Annan Plan, to the leaders of the two communities on 11 November 2002. The role of the Annan Plan as a key feature of the “political opportunity” for the Turkish Cypriot opposition was not solely based on its content. Rather, it was enriched by the dynamics created by linking the solution of the Cyprus problem within a particular timeframe with the accession of Cyprus to the EU and the strengthening of Turkey’s European prospects. According to the timeframe of the first version of the UN Secretary-General’s draft plan, the two sides were called to sign the original agreement before the EU summit in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002. By 28 February 2003, the two sides would agree on all remaining issues and on 30 March 2003 the referendums would take place in Cyprus. On the basis of this initial timeframe, on 16 April 2003, a reunified Cyprus would sign the EU Accession Treaty (Mehmetçik 2008, 196–7). Even though Denkta¸s’s negative attitude suggested that the plan’s timeframes would not be adhered to, the idea alone of joining the EU in a new internationally accepted federal framework was the main “lure of prosperity” for the majority of Turkish Cypriots (Bahçeli 2004, 65).

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In a sense, the Annan Plan, with its specific timeframes, quickly became the basis for linking the opposition’s political demands with the broader geopolitical situation. This basis for connecting the opposition’s demands to the wider geopolitical context and making them widely embraced was ultimately complemented by the change of government in Ankara in the early general elections on 3 November 2002. The undertaking of the government of Turkey by the newly founded Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), and the policy it followed with regard to the UN initiative, greatly enhanced the “external sources” legitimizing the opposition while it significantly reduced Denkta¸s’s influence. Immediately after these elections, AKP President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan emphasized the need for drastic changes in Turkey’s policy on the Cyprus issue, which would depart from previous passive approaches aimed at protecting the status quo. The leader of the new governing party made it clear: “I am not in favour of perpetuating the policy we followed in Cyprus for the last 30–40 years. Cyprus is not a personal case for Mr Denkta¸s” (Sim¸ ¸ sir 2004, 257). This change in Ankara’s approach to the Cyprus issue was not only the result of foreign policy processes. It was also the result of internal antagonisms for power and of AKP’s efforts to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its internal rivals (Çelenk 2007, 349). AKP’s first and more comprehensive proposal for the solution of the Cyprus issue included the promotion of the “Belgian model”. In particular, the party’s election programme stated: “Our party believes in the need to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. There is no doubt that the solution will not ignore the existence, identity and right of selfdetermination of the Turkish peoples on the island. Establishing a state administration created by the two sovereign communities, as in Belgium, will benefit both sides. The accession of the Greek Cypriot side into the EU without the solution of the Cyprus issue will further complicate the Cyprus problem” (AK Parti 2002, 133). This proposal was significantly different from previous Ankara-oriented approaches that talked of a confederation. Despite AKP’s problematic references to “sovereign communities”, the aforementioned policy focused on one state solution (Çelenk 2007, 351). Indeed, it was precisely this reference to “a state in Cyprus” that prompted the immediate and fierce reaction of part of the military and the bureaucratic establishment, forcing the government to an initial retreat.

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However, these “grey areas” recorded in the changes in political balance in Ankara were not present in the case of the Turkish Cypriots. On the contrary, the momentum generated by the submission of the UN plan was catalytic and was almost immediately expressed by the subversion of political balances in the community. In August 2002, the platform “Common Vision” (Ortak Vizyon) was founded, and a few days after the official submission of the draft plan, it issued a statement supporting the plan as the basis for the Cyprus talks. This platform and its views immediately formed a change in power balances, especially given that 91 organized groups representing approximately 38,000 people gathered around it within a short period of time (Mehmetçik 2008, 197). The political subversion marked by the dynamic character of the Common Vision platform created the conditions that accelerated Denkta¸s’s isolation and linked even more strongly the opposition’s demands to the dominant geopolitical context. By the end of 2002, 51% of Turkish Cypriots stated that they did not trust the Turkish Cypriot leader’s approach at the negotiating table for the settlement of the Cyprus problem (Güven 2003, 146). These growing changes that were tipping the social and ideological balance against Denkta¸s, were of strategic importance. The general mobilization of the opposition managed to express a completely different will even through great difficulties. This development meant that Denkta¸s and the Turkish army no longer represented the will of the Turkish Cypriot community and thus, the longstanding political monopoly of the Turkish Cypriot leader broke permanently. From that point on, Denkta¸s ceased to be a “protector” of the Turkish Cypriot community’s interests; instead he became a source of reaction against the Turkish Cypriot majority’s ethnic-communal will (Anagnostopoulou 2004, 251). The deep questioning of Denkta¸s’s “nation-saving” role and his transformation into a “threat” to the future of the Turkish Cypriots was described by Talat as follows: “Denkta¸s does not trust the Turkish Cypriots and sees himself as a guardian of Turkey’s interests. Well, this is the main reason why we cannot govern ourselves” (KKTCM 2000, 5733). The completion of this ideological shift indirectly reinforced the prospect of matching the opposition’s efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem with the attempt to politically take down the Turkish Cypriot leader (Yeni Düzen 2000). The collapse of the ideological legitimization of Denkta¸s’s policy did not create a chaotic political vacuum. As a result of linking the Turkish Cypriot leader’s delegitimization with the proposal of a specific “solution

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programme” that gave a tangible perspective, the political shifts led to the emergence of an alternative pole. While support for Denkta¸s after the Annan Plan dropped to 27% (Kıbrıs 2003a), the support for the plan just over two months after it was announced exceeded 65% (Kıbrıs 2003b). From this point on, the “world” of Turkish Cypriots revolved almost exclusively around the Annan Plan and the prospect of a solution to the Cyprus problem, to the extent that the daily “enclosed” life of the community was brought to a halt (KKTCM 2003a, 1617). The plan itself turned into an alternative political programme with specific provisions for changes in the daily life of the community. In this way, each separate part of the wider opposition alliance could, albeit with different starting points and perceptions, identify reasons in the text to support it. This shift was observed across social classes. Significant parts of the commercial capital (Hatay and Bryant 2008, 433–4), the vast majority of civil servants, young people, trade unions and opposition political parties formed a strong expression of the opposing majority. The decisive difference from the previous period of ruptures in the nationalist context was that, at this stage, the social majority expressed by the opposition had a “political text” that was accepted internationally as legitimate. The intensity with which the Annan Plan inserted itself into the daily life of the Turkish Cypriots caused such turbulence that the overall political process changed dramatically. One of the most striking expressions of this change was the massive change in stance of the newspaper Kıbrıs (2003c), which published an “open letter” to Denkta¸s on its front page on 9 January 2003. The newspaper stated emphatically that the mass character of the people’s demand for the resignation of the Turkish Cypriot leader left no room for Denkta¸s to think that they were a minority of “traitor-collaborators” with the Greek Cypriots. The letter stated that if Denkta¸s would not accept the Annan Plan as the solution to the Cyprus problem, then he would have to take steps “to open the future of the Turkish Cypriots, who have no more time to lose”. Given the newspaper’s prior role in demonizing the Turkish Cypriot Left and supporting Denkta¸s in the 1990s, the implicit but clear call for the resignation of the Turkish Cypriot leader in 2003 can be perceived as one of the most significant symbolic moments in the change of orientation from part of the Turkish Cypriot capital (Yeni Düzen 2003b). The UN plan not only preoccupied the Turkish Cypriot community with the details of its provisions or various aspects of the state’s operation, it also worked much more as a moment of critical reflection of the

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past since 1974. The supporters of the solution saw in the plan a “political mirror” that brought back to the collective memory everything they wished to leave behind and isolate from their “future life”. The independent parliamentarian, Gülboy Beyda˘glı, repeating the talk he had with a demonstrator in the streets, said: “We no longer have expectations from you Members of the Parliament. From now on we are here and we will get the job done!” (KKTCM 2003a, 1618). The upheaval caused by the Annan Plan marked, at the same time, the collapse of a political class that could no longer respond to the speed with which society adapted to new developments. It is precisely this dynamic of “political opportunity” that not only led to the empowerment of the social movement, but also helped in rendering it as a sort of “parallel society” of the majority. Within the context of the above processes, and in conjunction with the timeframes provided in the UN plan, the Turkish Cypriot community was in a setting of total polarization. On 27 November 2002, the Common Vision platform carried out the first of a series of mass demonstrations in support of the plan to resolve the Cyprus problem and to demand Denkta¸s’s resignation. The mass rally on 27 November was a political shock in two respects (Mehmetçik 2008, 198). The first concerned the complete paralysis of the right-wing government that existed only in name. The second concerned the countdown that had begun to the end of Denkta¸s’s leadership. Even though the UN Secretary-General’s goal to get an initial signing of the solution plan was not met at the EU summit in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002, the political indications of interested parties became clear as well as the qualitative features of the confrontation between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. On the one hand, Denkta¸s was supported by the military and the bureaucratic establishment in Ankara (Mehmetçik 2008, 198). On the other was the Turkish Cypriot opposition movement that now expressed the social majority and which could, under certain conditions, derive support from the different approach of the new, yet weak government of AKP (Güven 2003, 217) regarding the solution process. The diplomatic failure in Copenhagen in December 2002 led to a new timeframe for the approval of the solution plan. Kofi Annan set 28 February 2003 as the next important date for signing his plan and submitting it to referendums in March 2003. On a political and social level, this development heightened the mobilization of the opposition and the overall level of polarization affecting Turkey’s daily political life. Within this framework, the second most massive demonstration of the Common

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Vision platform took place on 26 December 2002. The Turkish newspaper Milliyet reported on the event under the headline “The Cypriots rose up” (Özel 2002). Press articles of the period report on a participation of 50–60 thousand people (Mehmetçik 2008, 200). This size and potential of the movement increased the “despair” of the collapsing nationalist alliance. For Foreign Minister Tahsin Ertu˘grulo˘glu, the crowds at the demonstrations were a dangerous minority of “Greek Cypriot agents” causing damage to the national case (KKTCM 2003a, 1623). The implications of these perceptions in Ankara were expressed by a large part of nationalist intellectuals who approached the Cyprus problem as an opportunity to question the new AKP government. Hürriyet ’s columnist, Oktay Ek¸si, described the Turkish Cypriot supporters of the Annan plan as a group of “impolite and indecent people, ready to even accept the terrorism of EOKA in return for more money and other interests” (KKTCM 2003a, 1628–9). All this was accompanied by frequent visits by far-right groups of the “Hearth of Idealists” (Ülkücü Ocakları) (KKTCM 2003b, 1765) to Cyprus and the organization of “anti-rallies”, which reached the point of threatening that should Turkey lose the island, Cyprus would turn into a “pool of blood” (Kıbrıs 2003d). However, the nationalist reactions in Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, the intensification of forms of political terrorism, the overexposure of criticism of the UN solution plan (KKTCM 2003b, 1776), as well as the offensive references to the Turkish Cypriots who supported it, formed an artificial reality that had nothing to do with the emerging “parallel society”. Within this particular context, on 14 January 2003, perhaps “the largest political demonstration in the history of the TRNC” took place, in which “one in four Turkish Cypriots was present” (Milliyet 2003a). The dynamic character of the demonstration was such that the police were obliged to reinforce the checkpoints because of the possibility that the crowd would try to cross to the southern territories of the island (Milliyet 2003b). The size and determination of the protest was the definitive and imposing manifestation of the “other Turkish Cypriot community” before Ankara. The crowd turned into a historical denial whereby the artificial image of the Turkish Cypriot community comprising Denkta¸s, the Turkish army and the Turkish Embassy ultimately collapsed (Güven 2003, 34). On that day, AKP Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç was on the island to meet the Ero˘glu government. However, the political welcome of the protesters set the significant context of the situation. Ali Erel, president of the Turkish Cypriot

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Chamber of Commerce, when addressing the Turkish official said: “I welcome Arınç. I wish he could see with his own eyes the glorious uprising of the people and the moment when history is in the making” (Çolak 2003). Erel’s words confirmed the new balances between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community at that point in time. If initial support for the Cyprus initiative by the new AKP government at the end of 2002 served as a “platform” to expand the “political opportunity” for the Turkish Cypriot opposition social movement, then the 14 January 2003 protest laid the foundations for the reversal of the legitimacy dynamics. Now, it was the social movement in favour of the solution of the Cyprus problem that began to act as a “platform” for the protection and legitimization of AKP’s government in the face of threats coming from the “living forces” of the Kemalist regime. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül, gave strong reassurances that his country had the will to solve the problem and stressed that for the new government “the non-solution of the Cyprus problem was not a solution” (Kıbrıs 2003e). The leader of the governing party, Erdo˘gan, was particularly illuminating about the legitimization of his policy on the Cyprus issue that was made evident through the popular mobilization in the Turkish Cypriot community: “The Turkish Cypriot people finally want to reach a solution and express it in mass protests. We say this: if the citizens of Cyprus organize rallies and demand a solution, then no one can say that there is no problem in Cyprus” (Kıbrıs 2003f). In this context, the UN Secretary-General arrived in Cyprus on 27 February 2003, where he anticipated a response from the two leaders on whether there would be a High Level Summit in The Hague on 10 March, as well as a commitment to submit the plan to referendums (Yeni Düzen 2003c). Denkta¸s not only rejected the plan’s philosophy, but also closed the door on the prospect of a referendum (Yeni Düzen 2003d). In a sense, the visit of the UN Secretary-General to Cyprus and the disappointment with the results of his initiative fully unfolded the parts of a parallel opposition society. The general strike that took place on the day of Annan’s visit, combined with the claim for a referendum regardless of Denkta¸s’s intentions (Yeni Düzen 2003e), confirmed the following dynamic process: within the Turkish Cypriot community, the majority now lived in a different reality that was in direct conflict with the reality that the Turkish Cypriot leader sought to express. The “two communities” had virtually no common point of reference, and the support that the draft solution continued to gain forced even right-wing executives

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such as Salih Co¸sar to admit: “The people have decided. Solution and EU” (Yeni Düzen 2003f). From this point on, the Turkish Cypriot social movement took new forms, which contributed decisively to its further growth and influence. At the end of February 2003, this culminated in the events named “The Flames of Peace” (Barı¸s Ate¸sleri) (Mehmetçik 2008, 201). These events started in the village of Elia in the Morphou area and quickly expanded to the whole of the northern part of the island. The press of the period regularly published the programme of the “Flames of Peace” (Yeni Düzen 2003g), thereby enhancing the creation of a parallel structure of political activity completely outside the “borders” of the collapsing political order. The symbolism of the flames of peace reflected the popular support for a referendum. In this way, the Turkish Cypriot movement, in particularly difficult conditions, succeeded in ideologically unifying the alternative space of the opposition and massively mobilizing its political programme with a view to reaching the local core of society. In the face of this potential, the regime sought not only to attack the emerging “united space” of the movement, but also to dismantle it. On several occasions, the repressive forces surrounded the villages and areas where the flame of peace was to be lit, seeking to prevent people from participating (Yeni Düzen 2003h). They were thus creating new exclusions in the already enclaved status of the community; a fact that reinforced the reaction against the nationalist programme. Perhaps the most emblematic moment of the collapse of the nationalist programme was the growing campaign of the Turkish Cypriot youth demanding a solution and Denkta¸s’s resignation. At the beginning of 2003 the Operation Committee for the Salvation of our Future (Gelece˘gimizi Kurtarma Operasyonu Eylem Komitesi) (Yeni Düzen 2003i), a wide alliance of youth organizations, launched a signature campaign to support the Annan Plan (Yeni Düzen 2003j). The title of the committee referred to a completely different reading of the so-called “peace operation” of the Turkish army in 1974. In this framework, 1974 was approached by the Turkish Cypriot youth of the period from a more critical perspective, thereby broadening the pro-solution movement. The leaders of the youth alliance were people between 20 and 30 years old, Turkish Cypriot men and women who had, therefore, grown up in conditions of total exclusion and isolation. For this majority of young people, Denkta¸s was “the last defender” (Yeni Düzen 2003k) of a disintegrating regime and the main obstacle to a new future. These were the generations

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of the community who experienced the state of exception in the “worst of times” and this explains their radicalization at a time when a political opportunity appeared. The dynamism with which young people became protagonists in the movement in support of the solution plan and EU accession formed the most comprehensive sign that the community had now entered a period when fear and nationalistic taboos had radically declined (Arslan 2014, 81–2). The creativity and “Cypriot humour” that young people added to the popular mobilizations facilitated the dissemination and impact of the political context throughout Cyprus. For example, the slogan “Yes be annem!” [Yes my mother] calling to support the Annan Plan was not an invitation to simply accept a legal text. It was, among others, a political call to the Greek Cypriot community, and therefore an expression of transformation, of giving meaning again to Cyprus as a common homeland (Kızılyürek 2005, 384). It was a “voice” coming from the past, associated with the ideological transformation of the Cypriot space in the context of the opposition’s ideology. This was now the dominant ideology. This framework symbolized not only the bankruptcy and the collapse of partitionist voices but, at the same time, it questioned that “half the country” was an extension of Turkey; instead it put forth the notion of a common homeland with the Greek Cypriots (Kızılyürek 2005, 389). Consequently, the context and repercussions of the slogan “Yes my mother!” formed a “censored experience”, whose appearance in the public discourse once again exposed the state of exception as a militarized and enclosed space (Mishiaouli 2014). The public exposure of the state of exception as a closed, repressive and militarized space proved to be of strategic importance. It worked as the most difficult moment of a “bad regime”, a regime which sought to rectify its policy, but ultimately succeeded in increasing the influence of its opponents (Tarrow 2011, 157). As a result of the social uprising, the regime was forced to make the decision to open the checkpoints that had separated the two communities of the island since 1974. The decision of the Ero˘glu government was made on 21 April 2003 and came after consultations between the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara (Yeni Düzen 2003l). The decision to open the checkpoints seems to have been the result of multiple processes. It was the result of a social upheaval that the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara wanted to prevent. At the same time, it was also a practical response to negative decisions made by international courts against Turkey regarding the situation in Cyprus.

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For example, in February 2003, the case of the Turkish Cypriot Ahmet Cavit An in the ECHR ruled against Turkey, convicting it for obstructing his fundamental freedoms (An 2014). This development was significant, especially in a period of renewed interest by Ankara in improving its relations with the EU. Beyond the dynamics created by the decisions of international organizations, the opening of the checkpoints caused one of the greatest blows to the ideological framework of the state of exception, at least in this particular context. For the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite, the “clearly defined borders” signified an exemplary proof of the existence of a separate and independent people, a separate state and therefore the inability of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to coexist in a united political space. It was an ideological mechanism to remind the “danger of the Greek Cypriots” that never ceased to exist. In this context, the “border” signified the partition of the island, but also marked security against the “national enemy”. The “border” that had divided the two communities since 1974 thus formed a natural and symbolic signifier of the success of the nationalist programme of Taksim (Yashin 2012, 69–70). The “borders” in the Turkish Cypriot right-wing programme were a fluid concept. They were the result of particular political, ideological and socio-economic processes. They formed, therefore, a precondition for the social and territorial division of Cyprus. In the same way that a state seeks to define its space, politically delimit its borders and assimilate nation-wise its society, an illegal state or state of exception can pursue the same goals. There are “self-affirmation” processes in both cases. In the case of Cyprus, based on the separate power structures after 1974, the “border” signified a point of self-affirmation. It was a practical proof of state sovereignty. It was a fetish of power (Murphy 1996, 90) and reproduction of the idea of the existence of the “TRNC” as a structure exercising control over society. Denkta¸s’s “border” was a component and integral part of the setting in which he developed the idea and form of governability that prevailed for so many years. In the ideological context expressed by the former Turkish Cypriot leader, the notions of “border” and “checkpoint” were functions that underlined, in the daily discourse, the concept of inside and outside, “we” and the “others” (Hocknell 2001, 58). If the act of constructing a border separating the two communities was a political necessity for Turkish Cypriot nationalism, for the Turkish Cypriot Left, and more broadly for the opposition, it was perceived in a completely different way. The multidimensional nature of borders and

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checkpoints, by nature, leaves open prospects for different interpretations as to their role and content. As in many other cases, for the Turkish Cypriots, the post-1974 roadblocks were constructions of conflict. They produced different political positions in relation to the condition of the “open”, “closed”, “mild” or “hard” checkpoint (Hocknell 2001, 58). Even though for many decades the closed checkpoints of the “TRNC” acted as self-affirmations of a separate state sovereignty, they formed, at the same time, dynamics of subversion of the founding ideology of partition. On the one hand, at a geographical level, the closed checkpoints clearly marked the extent of power of the “TRNC”. However, on the other hand, in a contradictory manner, the boundaries of this power were not clear at all. For the Turkish Cypriot Left, and later for the wider political forces of the community, the closed checkpoints served to express their exile and exclusion (Yashin 2012, 73). It was a daily confirmation of their isolation, but also of the alienation of their identity as Cypriots. Over the years, the geographical border imposed by Ankara acquired such features that eventually the Turkish Cypriot opposition described the “TRNC” as an “open prison” or a “prisoner camp”. The continuing political and economic crises, the tight hold of the Turkish military establishment, and the repression combined with years of international isolation and single-way economic integration into Turkey, created the conditions for the search for “contact with the outside world”. In September 2001, the head of the Turkish Cypriot secondary education trade union, Ahmet Barçın, speaking to international press reporters, said: “Tell the world that the TRNC is an open prison. It is a big militarized zone and all the doors are locked. The only key to our freedom is to reach a quick solution with the Greek Cypriot side, EU membership and our integration with the rest of the world” (Smith 2001). On the basis of the politicization of the above emotional condition, the decision made in April 2003 to unilaterally open the checkpoints was accepted on the condition of further massification of the movement in favour of a solution to the Cyprus problem. The front-page headlines of some newspapers in support of the federal solution to the Cyprus problem were illuminating as to the opposition’s ideological coverage of the checkpoints’ openings. On 23 April 2003, Afrika (2003) published with the headline “All of Cyprus is yours”. It was noted that “29 years later our people meet the other half of their homeland today” (Afrika 2003). The headline of Yeni Düzen (2003m) published on 22 April 2003 said: “The status quo will collapse”. The

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front-page also stated: “We have approached the situation before 1974 … but then there were no time curfews. Those who think the Turkish Cypriot people are a ‘toy’ have opened the checkpoints for now! … But the Turkish Cypriots want more, they demand much more. Apart from taking a ‘walk’, the Turkish Cypriots are looking forward to the day when they will have an identity around the world”. Kıbrıs (2003g) newspaper wrote: “For the first time in 29 years!”. The opening of the checkpoints thus formed a flashback to the past. A past where, as the opposition put it, its main characteristics were not roadblocks and division (Sahin ¸ 2011, 589). The above political statements in the newspapers recalled a time when there was no “other side”, at least not in the hostile sense that Denkta¸s had imposed. The constant recollection of the period before the checkpoints was an explicit statement of opposition to the way that the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite presented the question of the coexistence of the two communities. The two communities lived together in the past and can do so again, was the underlying statement. Consequently, the opening of the checkpoints in 2003, among other things, was also a dynamic act that reminded a great part of the Turkish Cypriot community of what was “currently pending”, the “exceptional and uncanonical” situation in which they lived. In short, a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community was once again confronted with a situation in between the illegal regime and the legal situation that would result after the solution of the Cyprus problem.

The Ideological Epilogue of Denktas¸ Amidst this new setting created by the opening of the checkpoints and the deepening of the influence of the opposition claims for the immediate approval of the Annan Plan and the holding of referendums, the Turkish Cypriot community was moving towards the December 2003 elections. The political setting of the period was complemented by an additional development. Denkta¸s had once again rejected the prospect of referendums for the approval or rejection of the Annan Plan at the Hague Summit in March 2003. This move not only caused another blow to the Cyprus settlement procedure, but it also succeeded in deepening the conflict within Turkey. The AKP government had experienced a serious diplomatic defeat at the hands of the Turkish Cypriot leader and his alliance with part of the military establishment in Ankara (Bahçeli and Noel 2009, 241–2).

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Consequently, the Turkish Cypriot elections of December 2003 acquired historical significance. It was the vote that would judge, perhaps for the last time under these particular conditions, the resilience and dynamism of that part of the Turkish Cypriots who were seeking the way to the referendums. The political setting of the period transformed the December 2003 elections into an explicit political response to the dramatic developments in the Cyprus issue (Çarko˘glu and Sözen 2004, 122), and therefore their outcome would define the dynamics that would follow. For this very reason, and in contrast to almost all previous parliamentary elections, the December 2003 elections focused on one single issue: whether or not the Cyprus problem would be resolved on the basis of the specific UN plan and whether or not the Turkish Cypriots would accede to the EU (Çarko˘glu and Sözen 2004, 130). In this sense, the dilemma of the elections was clear; it revolved solely around the approval or rejection of a new economic, social, political and cultural establishment for the Turkish Cypriot community and for the whole of Cyprus (Kızılyürek 2005, 329). This single dimension of the December 2003 elections essentially forced the Turkish Cypriot community to position itself at the ballot, not through the political lens of general issues, but through a specific statement of approval or rejection of the draft solution plan and the prospect of EU membership (Çarko˘glu and Sözen 2004, 130). Thus, the elections were an “internal referendum” that would define the next and final initiative on the Cyprus issue, which would culminate with the referendums on the final solution plan in April 2004. The character of the elections and the vital implications leading to the peak of the solution process were also confirmed by the positioning of the political forces involved. Particularly notable was the dedication of the Turkish Cypriot opposition, which clearly expressed its support for the Annan Plan in its political programme. The formation of opposition social alliances was also illuminating as to the process of its ideological transformation. For example, CTP pursued an image of a party-front with the addition of the United Forces Alliance (Birle¸sik Güçler). TKP was transformed into the Peace and Democracy Movement (Barı¸s ve Demokrasi Hareketi—BDH). This made official the two formations’ efforts to expand their electoral influence beyond the political space of the Turkish Cypriot Left. The newly formed Party for the Solution and the EU (Çözüm ve Avrupa Birli˘gi Partisi—ÇABP), led by Chamber of

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Commerce President, Ali Erel (Mehmetçik 2008, 211), also joined the alliance supporting the solution. The overall support of these formations in the elections eventually added up to 51% (Kızılyürek 2005, 329). The core of this front that supported the Annan Plan was 48.3%, which comprised CTP (35.1%) and BDH (13.2%) (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 112). Even though this election was not directly concerned with the election of a leader of the Turkish Cypriot side responsible for the final negotiations, the result formed an explicit ideological marginalization of Denkta¸s. He was viewed as the greatest obstacle against the approval of the solution plan, and therefore the election result reinforced the prospect of Ankara setting the government aside (Çarko˘glu and Sözen 2004, 131–2). The above prospect was still present even after the formation of a CTP government with DP instead of BDH as expected (Mehmetçik 2008, 213). In addition to the dramatic effect of the electoral results on the internal balances of the Turkish Cypriot community, the dynamics it released also had a significant impact on Turkey. After the failure of the meeting in The Hague in 2003, two conflicting schools of thought on how the Cyprus problem should be handled from then on had essentially coalesced in Ankara. The first group argued that a solution to the Cyprus problem was still feasible and considered that the UN plan would be a tool of exchange for the progress in Euro–Turkish relations. However, the second group, along with Denkta¸s, considered that the failure in The Hague was a “small victory” in the move towards the great goal of preventing Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU. Cyprus and the negotiations formed an “experimental space” for this greatest objective (Kızılyürek 2005, 320). The result of the December 2003 elections, however, had obviously strengthened the first group and had multiplied and reinforced the perceptions within Turkey that supported the UN plan. The new order of things for the Turkish Cypriots enabled the AKP government in Ankara to again find again ways to bring the Cyprus issue process to a head. Already in January 2004, shortly after the failure in The Hague, Prime Minister Erdo˘gan was pushing the UN to restart the process. The call for re-initiation of talks on the Cyprus issue, as well as the acceptance of all the terms set by the Secretary-General of the international organization, such as arbitration, formed aspects of the Turkish government’s efforts to gain further international support (Çelenk 2007, 353). Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 23 January 2004 largely reflected the fragile balances of the ongoing conflict in

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Ankara. The NSC’s decision emphasized the support for the UN initiatives, accepted the negotiations of the Annan Plan, but also made explicit the need to take into account “the realities on the island” (Çelenk 2007, 357). In this way, at least publicly, there was a slight differentiation in the perceptions of the military leadership. But while the conflict continued, the AKP government decided to take things all the way. Within this new setting, the issue of a final outcome to the Cyprus problem was at the heart of the new Turkish government’s efforts to survive against all those who sought new deadlocks through Denkta¸s. This confrontation peaked at the final stages, just before the referendums of 24 April 2004 in Cyprus. The outcome of the final negotiation of the solution plan in Switzerland further encouraged the AKP government and its broader alliances that sought a more European orientation for the country. Turkish government officials believed that the end result of the Cyprus problem, for the first time in years, gave Ankara the moral advantage as the “intransigent side that seeks consensus” (Bila 2004). This dynamic ultimately had a major impact on the internal correlation of forces and on antagonisms for power in Turkey. The support of “YES” in the referendum by AKP, and the pro-European social alliance within Turkey, took the form of setting aside the military-bureaucratic establishment. Hasan Cemal (2004) described the focus of the controversy about the referendum as follows: “I have no doubt that the last castles of the status quo will begin to collapse in Turkey after the YES votes in Northern Cyprus on the 24th April referendum”. The above dynamics served, in essence, as a confirmation of the “inescapable”. For the “last castles of the status quo” the Annan Plan represented a “danger of cutting off the ties of Cyprus with Turkey” (Milliyet 2004a). Therefore, until the very last moment, AKP’s opponents in the Turkish state sought either to put an end to the referendum process or to remove the legitimization of the government while weakening the YES forces in the Turkish Cypriot community. For the first time perhaps in the institution’s history, the NSC met three times in one week to decide on the state’s position regarding the 24 April referendum. Apart from recording the “negative and positive elements” of the final plan, part of the Council’s military wing finally leaked to the press that this position should not be regarded as state policy (Milliyet 2004b). The disintegration of the traditional nationalist consensus on Cyprus within the power centres in Ankara was the most characteristic indication of the change in balances. This change was eventually expressed in a symbolic

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way by Erdo˘gan himself, who confronted Denkta¸s’s NO campaign in Turkey, stating that: “Whatever it is you have to explain, do it in Cyprus” (Karaku¸s 2004). The ideological epilogue for Denkta¸s was written in Cyprus. Residents of Limnitis village (Ye¸silırmak) in Morphou district forced the Turkish Cypriot leader to leave the open demonstration, which was organized in order to explain the reasons why the Annan Plan should be rejected on the 24 April. Denkta¸s, the leader of the community for half a century, was led to his car to the sound of the slogan “Peace in Cyprus cannot be prevented” (Milliyet 2004c)—a well-known slogan of the period—being rhythmically chanted by the Turkish Cypriot leaders of the spontaneous local mobilization. Five days after Denkta¸s was “driven away” from Limnitis, 64.92% of Turkish Cypriots voted YES to the Annan Plan (Aydo˘gdu 2005, 78). The outcome of the 2004 referendums ultimately did not bring an end to the Cyprus problem. This solution was not accepted by the majority of the Greek Cypriot community. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriot state of exception was led to a new stage of reproduction of its conditions of existence; namely the perpetuation of the dichotomous situation in Cyprus. It is a fact however that, at least for the Turkish Cypriot community, the outcome of the referendum marked the end of a 30-year cycle of exception with specific ideological, political and social characteristics. It was a moment of rupture with the past. The Turkish Cypriot opposition’s growth against the nationalist programme of Partition climaxed with the success of the YES campaign in the 24 April referendum. The result also marked the culmination of challenging the framework of values within which the “space” of partition and exception was constructed. It signalled the public expression of the community majority who rejected the so-far dominant sources of power that constructed and reproduced the divided space (Hirst 2005). In other words, YES in the Turkish Cypriot community signified the political will to create a “constant” collective identity in a legal environment. In this case, the “constant” would be the creation of a federal Cyprus. However, apart from the closure of a 30-year cycle of exception, the referendum result also marked the opening of a new cycle with specific and important features. The non-solution of the Cyprus problem, the regional and international changes, as well as the changes in the two communities after 2004, formed a set of dynamics that confirmed the following hypothesis: as in other cases, the case of the state of exception

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experienced by the Turkish Cypriot community recorded contradictory dynamics of normalization (Trimikliniotis 2010, 210). In this sense, the new cycle that opened, apart from the rupture with the past, was characterized by continuation to the future—continuation that concerned both the role of Turkey and issues relating to the structural dysfunctions that continued to undermine the Turkish Cypriot identity and existence. This new cycle and its new geopolitical context, therefore, carry a paradox of a symbiosis between the process of normalizing the exception and the opposition forces that continue to undermine it “by reminding of its existence”.

Note 1. Based on Muslim tradition, after a funeral the relatives and friends of the deceased are given halva to eat on 10 March 2003, during the critical meeting in the Hague on the Cyprus issue, organizations of the Opposition demanding the Annan Plan to be submitted as a referendum organized a demonstration, distributing halva. It was a symbolic “popular funeral” of the partitionist state (Yeni Düzen 2003a).

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———. 2003b. “Halkın iradesini yansıttık” [We Reflected the People’s Will], 9 January. ———. 2003c. “Açık Mektup” [Open Letter], 9 January. ———. 2003d. “Gazima˘gusa’da ‘Barı¸s’a evet, göçe ve içimizde Rum yerle¸siklerine hayır’ mitingi yapıldı” [‘Yes to Peace, No to Migration and Greek Cypriot Settlers among Us’ Demonstration Held in Famagusta], 6 January. ———. 2003e. “Kıbrıs sorununu çözmeye niyetliyiz” [We Are Determined to Solve the Cyprus Problem], 24 January. ———. 2003f. “Erdo˘gan: Kıbrıs’ta çözüm s¸ art” [Erdo˘gan: A Solution Is Necessary in Cyprus], 6 February. ———. 2003g. “29 yıl sonra ilk kez” [For the First Time in 23 Years], 23 April. Kızılyürek, Niyazi. 2005. Birle¸sik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti. Do˘gmamı¸s bir devletin ˙ tarihi [United Cyprus Republic: The History of an Unborn State]. Istanbul: ˙ sim Yayınları. Ileti¸ KKTCM. 2000. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 78’ inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 28 July. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2001. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 67’ncı Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 15 June. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2003a. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 26’ıncı Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 3 January. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. ———. 2003b. KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, 31’inci Birle¸sim [TRNC Republic Parliament Minutes Journal], 17 January. Lefko¸sa: KKTC Meclisi. Mehmetçik, Mustafa Semih. 2008. “1974 sonrası Kıbrıslı Türklerin kimlik arayı¸sı ve siyasalla¸sma süreci” [The Turkish Cypriot Search for Identity after 1974 and the Politization Period]. In Kıbrıslılık [Cypriotness], edited by Mehmet ˙ Hasgüler, 146–222. Istanbul: Agora Kitaplı˘gı. Milliyet. 2003a. “4 Kıbrıslılardan biri mitinginde” [One Out of Every Four Cypriots Is at the Demonstration], 15 January. ˙ sgal ordusu pankartı açıldı” [They Held a Banner Reading ———. 2003b. “I¸ Occupation Army], 15 January. ———. 2004a. “Soysal: Zafer de˘gil, rezalet” [Soysal: Not a Victory, a Disgrace], 5 April. ———. 2004b. “Tarihi MGK’dan mutabakat çıkmadı” [No Agreement in the Historic MGK Meeting], 6 April. ———. 2004c. “Denkta¸s’a protesto” [Protest against Denkta¸s], 20 April.

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Mishiaouli, Anna. 2014. “Turkish Cypriot Mobilizations of 2000–2013: Collective Action as a Non-Violent Movement.” Nicosia: First Annual Conference, Cyprus Association of Political Science, University of Cyprus, 21–22 November. Murphy, Alexander. 1996. “The Sovereign State System as a Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations.” In State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 81–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Özel, Menderes. 2002. “Kıbrıslı aya˘ga kalktı” [Cypriots Have Arisen]. Milliyet, 27 December. Sahin, ¸ Sanem. 2011. “Open Borders, Closed Minds: The Discursive Construction of National Identity in North Cyprus.” Media, Culture & Society 33 (4): 583–597. Sim¸ ¸ sir, Bilal N. 2004. AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs [EU, AKP and Cyprus]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. Smith, Helena. 2001. “Northern Cypriots Turn against Turkey.” The Guardian, 25 September. Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Trimikliniotis, Nicos. 2010. “H παρακμη´ τoυ κυπριακo´ καθεστωτoς ´ εξα´ιρεσης. Aπ´o την oργανικη´ κρ´ιση στην υπšρβαση τoυ ‘δ´oγματoς της αναγκης’” ´ [The Demise of the Cypriot State of Exception: From Organic Crisis to Transcendence of the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’]. In Kυπ ριακ η´ Δημoκρατ ι´α 50 χ ρ o´ νια επ ωδυνη ´ π oρε´ια [50 Years of the Cyprus Republic: A Painful Course], edited by Chrysostomos Perikleous, 209–233. Athens: Papazisis Publications. Yashin, Yael Navaro. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Yeni Düzen. 2000. “Denkta¸s demokratik anlayı¸stan uzak” [Denkta¸s Does Not Have a Democratic Approach], 24 July. ———. 2003a. “Statükonun helvası yendi!…” [Status quo Is Dead], 11 March. ———. 2003b. “Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası’ndan üyelerimize ve halkımıza duyuru” [Announcement from the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce to Our Members and People], 26 March. ———. 2003c. “Halk ne bilecek!” [What Do the People Know!], 28 February. ———. 2003d. “Biz sizden istifa ettik!” [We Resign From You!], 12 March. ———. 2003e. “27 Subat’ta ¸ yine meydandayız!” [We Are on the Streets again on 27 February], 22 February. ———. 2003f. “Halk kararını verdi: Çözüm ve AB” [The People Have Decided: Solution and EU], 25 February. ———. 2003g. “Ate¸s ile barı¸s ve AB arzusu” [Fire for Peace and EU Desire], 3 February.

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———. 2003h. “Tüm engellemelere ra˘gmen: Akıncılar’da ate¸s yandı” [Despite All Obstacles: Fire Was Lit in Akıncılar], 3 February. ———. 2003i. “Gençlik kararlı: Gelece˘gimizi kurtaraca˘gız” [The Youth Are Determined: We Will Save Our Future], 3 January. ———. 2003j. “10 bin imzaya ula¸sıldı” [Signatures Reach 10 Thousand], 3 January. ———. 2003k. “Gençler kazanacak” [The Youth Will Win], 8 January. ———. 2003l. “Sivil Toplumun Türkiye çıkarması” [Civil Society Go to Turkey], 22 April. ———. 2003m. “Statüko çö-ke-cek!” [Status quo Will Collapse!], 22 April.

CHAPTER 11

Conclusions

The Post-Annan Period In the 2004 referendum, the YES majority in the Turkish Cypriot community knocked on the door of legitimacy, the door of a common state as provided by the specific UN plan, and it therefore took a decisive step in the direction of total reinstatement of the Turkish Cypriots as citizens of a united Cyprus (Kızılyürek 2018, 15). The Turkish Cypriot YES majority in the 2004 referendum was the culmination of an effort for Turkish Cypriot subjectivization in Cyprus’s history, at least, as this effort had developed since 1974. The course leading to the outcome of 24 April 2004, on the Turkish Cypriot side, seemed like a “revolutionary process” since the idea of a Cyprus settlement was intertwined with the resolution of all fundamental and existential problems facing the Turkish Cypriots (Erhürman 2010a, 43). However, the failure to reach a solution, due to a Greek Cypriot majority rejection of the plan, left the door to Turkish Cypriot reinstatement as agents and subjects circumstantially shut. This “unfulfilled moment” was transformed into the basis for the sharpest contradictions created by the struggle between the process for normalization of the state of exception and the reproduction of all elements that were continuous reminders of the “exceptional” and abnormal situation (Agamben 2005). One of the most characteristic descriptions of these contradictions was expressed through the front-page title of Ortam (2004a) newspaper on 25 April 2004: “Bitter-sweet joy” (Buruk sevinç). The dialectic of contradictions the title described had the © The Author(s) 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3_11

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following dynamic: on the one hand the result of the referendum triggered feelings of joy and fulfilment in the Turkish Cypriot opposition, since YES had prevailed after decades of efforts and under conditions of pressure caused by the conscious alienation of the exceptional regime from the majority of the community. On the other hand, however, the joy and satisfaction were defined as “bitter-sweet” or “sour” because, not only was the effort for a Cyprus settlement not fulfilled, but furthermore one more cycle of uncertainty was inaugurated in an environment with new qualitative characteristics. The dialectic relation between joy/satisfaction and their sour/bittersweet property was the one that, to a great degree, influenced the development of the opposition political programmes in the period following the 2004 referendums. On the part of “joy and satisfaction”, the political interpretation of these particular feelings stood out more, namely the conviction of heralding a new era. For the broader front of the Turkish Cypriot centre-Left, the success of YES worked as an ideological declaration of a new “founding moment” that could overturn former, also “founding moments” of 1974 and 1983 (Yeni Düzen 2004a). The outcome of the referendum in the community was not interpreted as just a moment of expressing political will towards a specific plan for a Cyprus settlement. On the contrary, for a large section of the forces supporting a federal settlement, the specific result should have worked subversively against the whole previous experience of partition and the structures it built. YES was not just the acceptance of the specific plan for a Cyprus settlement. It was also the rejection of the Denkta¸s ideological framework (Ortam 2004b), its power structures and its social extension. Thus, the new “founding moment” of the opposition implied an effort to continue with the dynamics that had led to YES so that a completely “new life” would arise. This was a new and comprehensive “whole”, contrary to experiences since 1974. More specifically, the new “founding moment” was a claim to new power structures with external and internal aspects. As far as the “external aspect” of the construction of the new era was concerned, this should entail normalization of community relations with the international environment and consequently policies alleviating isolation, since it would imply abandonment of Denkta¸s’s position as “solution denier” (KKTCM 2004a, 1002). The dominance of YES at the referendum could have—in line with the aforementioned reasoning— contributed to easier access of the Turkish Cypriot community to the international system, thus marking a new, quite subversive, course at the

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level of international relations (Erçakıca 2004). Mehmet Ali Talat, the new protagonist in the post-referendum era, placed priority on the lifting of Turkish Cypriot isolation through the establishment of direct flights and legalization of trade through the Turkish Cypriot ports (KKTCM 2004b, 1116–7). The EU, keeping the promises it had given the Turkish Cypriot community, would have been the structure contributing to its integration to international legitimacy (Yeni Düzen 2004b). Even though the emphasis on the need for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem was not as intense as in the recent past, both Talat and all parties that had supported the Annan Plan reasserted that lifting of international isolation did not equal a solution to the Cyprus problem (Ortam 2004c). Even though relatively downgraded in intensity, the federal solution continued to be a structural component of the political rhetoric of parties that had supported YES in the referendum. If at the level of new-era “external aspects” the predominant aim was the lifting of isolation, at the “internal aspects’” level the Turkish Cypriot Left and centre-Left set as their goal the lifting of Denkta¸s’s ideological–political framework. Almost all of the Turkish Cypriot organized forces that had supported the federal solution to the Cyprus problem believed in the prospect of overturning key characteristics of the division legacy. In the post-referendum period, “yes ideology” should have been the central basis of political life, as well as the community’s relations with Turkey. Therefore, Rauf Denkta¸s, and the “visions of the past” he represented, should not have determined the orientations of the Turkish Cypriot political system. Yeni Düzen columnist Zeki Erkut (2004) described the hope for transformation of the communal political body on the basis of the new legacy of the referendum: “The people have overcome fear and loudly voiced their thoughts and feelings after years of oppression. Four decades of prejudices have been demolished, leaving nothing the community cannot debate. It debated the army issue, resisted the wrong policies of Ankara, resisted the deep state. The most important outcome is the collapse of the 40-year-old status quo. The Denkta¸s–Ero˘glu despotic government, based on pillage and partitocracy, has been overrun. The high percentage of ‘yes’ will send and should send Denkta¸s to the graveyard of History”. The ideological “collapse” of the four-decades-long status quo and the complete delegitimization of the “TRNC”, as it had appeared in previous years, presented the new Turkish Cypriot “founding moment” the chance to express specific political claims. YES at the referendum was

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the expression of the will for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem and for accession to the EU, but it was also the expression of the will for comprehensive reform of the community’s political order, as reflected in the provisions for the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State in the UN plan. A part of the Turkish Cypriot centre-Left therefore set the issue of intensifying the harmonization of the community with the acquis communautaire, something that would have led to the questioning of the authoritarian provisions of the “TRNC” constitution (KKTCM 2004a, 1004). In this way, it was considered that the Turkish Cypriot community would have been able to acquire the structural tools to continue the policy for an overall settlement to the Cyprus problem, while at the same time it would have been fortified in its efforts to contain military influence, for democratization, and for strengthening of the Turkish Cypriot political will in general (KKTCM 2004c, 1028–9). The new 2004 “founding moment” was therefore an aspiration for marginalization of the abnormal situation created in 1974. As Hüseyin Angolemli of TKP stated, YES in the 2004 referendum was the substantive response to the way the “TRNC” was founded and therefore a chance for the creation of a democratic political structure that would enjoy popular legitimization (KKTCM 2004c, 1029). However, as mentioned above, the side of positive aspirations, nurtured by the satisfaction of the dominance of YES in the Turkish Cypriot community, coexisted with the “bitter-sweet and sour” perspective of the unfulfilled moment. Right after the referendum, Mustafa Akıncı raised, even more clearly, the question of the survival of the abnormality of a non-solution to the Cyprus problem. He confessed that he was not pleased with the end result as the solution goal required YES majorities on both sides (Ortam 2004d). Years of effort and the eventual securing of one YES constituted an ideological rupture of tremendous importance. However, it was not translated to the specific unified political framework it had claimed to represent (Erkut 2004). This particular element caused huge disappointment. It reflected on the everyday life of the community and soon led to a drastic shrinking of the political scope and the apparent dominance of a Turkish Cypriot “end of History” (Erhürman 2010a, 43). The uprising that had led to the dominance of YES had been recorded as a way of breaking free from Turkey and for integration in international legality. This is why the failure to reach a solution gradually brought back “uncertainty” (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012, 20). That familiar concept came back to describe not only everyday life,

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the new economic situation and power structures, but particularly the anxiety resulting from changes in Turkish Cypriot relations with Turkey. The reasons for the prevailing frustration and the initial shrinkage of politics lay in a series of important developments that interacted both with each other and with the development of Turkish Cypriot relations with Ankara. Soon after the referendums it had become clear that the way pursued for lifting the isolation, on the basis of EU policies, would not be possible (KKTCM 2004a, 1004). During the same period, the then President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, did not appear very willing for the resumption of substantive talks with the Turkish Cypriots. He was oriented more towards efforts at generating pressure on Turkey through the Republic of Cyprus’s EU accession (Christou 2018, 158– 9). However, the most decisive dynamic that created new impasses in the Turkish Cypriot community was the combination of all the aforementioned with the recording of certain new orientations on the part of Ankara. The change in Turkey’s orientations had been somewhat unclear right from the beginning of the post-referendum period. However, gradually, the foundations of a different approach to the Turkish Cypriot community and the regime in the northern part of Cyprus were being laid. The Erdo˘gan government sought to immediately embrace the advantages offered both by its own positive stance in approving the UN plan in the referendums and by the popular mobilization of the Turkish Cypriots. For the ruling party in Ankara, the Turkish Cypriot YES, in combination with Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan, constituted “Turkey’s greatest diplomatic victory in the past 50 years” (Milliyet 2004). As such, the “victory” of the referendum should have been translated into international advantages. As a leaked telephone conversation between Erdo˘gan and Talat, shortly after the referendums, revealed, the Turkish Prime Minister had made clear that the lifting of the TRNC’s isolation was now the priority. To Talat’s insistent remarks that only a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem would satisfy the Turkish Cypriots, Erdo˘gan replied: “Don’t consider this at all now… what we are interested in, at this initial stage, is the embargo, that is the most important thing” (Kıbrıs Postası 2009). Erdo˘gan’s reply could have been interpreted as an effort to maintain the status quo of the 1974 partition. However, as later developments indicated, the moral precedence of YES to a UN plan was embraced by the Turkish government in a way that challenged aspects of the 1974

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status quo. The dynamics the government of Turkey wished to reinforce were more in the direction of maximization of the country’s influence in Turkish Cypriot everyday life, further than the de facto situation created by the 1974 invasion. Therefore, if for the Turkish Cypriot forces who supported the idea of a Cyprus federation the post-2004 period should have been a period of consolidation of communal will, for Erdo˘gan’s government it was a period of new economic, political and social “civilizing” of Northern Cyprus. This particular differentiation of aims and orientations between a section of the Turkish Cypriot community on the one hand, and Ankara on the other, constituted at the same time a change in their relations. The aforementioned new element at the socio-economic level of relations clarified to the community’s political protagonists that they had before them a completely new state of affairs. “This was a different Turkey”, Ahmet Uzun, Minister of Finance in CTP’s post-referendum governments, confessed. “Whenever we pleaded for money there was a Turkey that provided it… There is no such Turkey anymore. Before us stands a Turkey that says, ‘My friend, I won’t give you a penny more than what the agreement requires’” (Tümerkan 2012). The “other Turkey” the Turkish Cypriots were experiencing, was the “new Turkey” of Erdo˘gan. This Turkey aimed to enforce a neoliberal structural change without, however, this effort being manifested in “normal” examples. This was because in the Turkish Cypriot case the process of economic integration had, to a great extent, been completed in previous years. Thus, the liberal transformation was geared more towards the conversion of the incorporated territory into “normally Turkish”—that is, into a “normal” province of Anatolia (Kızılyürek 2018, 71). Thus, after failing to reach a solution in the referendums, confrontations in the Turkish Cypriot community gradually seemed to pick up from the point where they had stopped in the critical months of 2004. In the new cycle of confrontations, however, a wider cycle of power structures aspiring to transform the Turkish Cypriot community was included. Next to the Turkish government now stood international economic organizations and a very large section of the Turkish business class. For example, the Turkish Cypriot economy was transformed into a “study object” by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The focus of these pursuits was on ways of conveying “neoliberal orthodoxy” so as to overcome the malfunctions of the enormous public sector, the social security system and the traditional

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clientelist system (Tahsin 2014, 88). Different sections of Turkey’s business world also turned their attention in the same direction (Erhürman 2010a, 105). They gradually sought to lay the groundwork so that structural transformation be better adapted to the yes vote, the new “moral precedent”. One of the points of consensus of the Turkish bourgeoisie regarding the occupied territories was the need for neoliberal reforms, which, in its view, would halt the economic underdevelopment. Turkey’s strongest business circles had intensified their efforts to promote the private sector as the guiding force for growth and desired modernization. They proposed the adoption of a “free-market” model and restriction of the public sector in regulating the legal framework and in the creation of positive conditions for increased foreign investments. As part of this process, the abolition of privileges for public sector employees, and employees in general, was presented as a necessary and inevitable precondition for ˙ medium- and long-term prosperity (TÜSIADI˙ SAD ¸ 2009). Within this framework, the interest of the Turkish capital in intended modernization dramatically increased. The Turkish Industry and Business ˙ Association (TÜSIAD) formed a “Cyprus section”, aiming at more intensified intervention (Kıbrıs Postası 2011a). The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) worked for the creation of equivalents to Turkish structures and bodies like the Investment Advisory Council, as well as for the drawing up of proposals to speed up the operation of a compensation committee for Greek Cypriot owners of property in the occupied areas (Kıbrıs Postası 2010a). The Turkish Economy Bank (Türk Ekonomi Bankası—TEB) and the ˙ Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) have developed various programmes to increase foreign investment in the occupied areas, especially in the fields of tourism and private education. Turkey’s leading ˙ entrepreneurs’ organizations like TÜMSIAD (Kıbrıs Postası 2012a) and TUSKON (Kıbrıs Postası 2012b), decided to establish branches in the occupied territories to facilitate foreign trade. The Independent Indus˙ trialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSIAD), the expression par excellence of Islamic capital, also set up a branch in the occupied areas with the stated objective of integrating trade and industrial production into the world market. In fact, according to the head of the Cyprus branch, Okyay Sadıko˘glu, the association would seek to cultivate and promote “traditional culture and national values” in combination with the universal values of economic development (Havadis 2012).

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The Turkish Cypriot community faced other dilemmas, whose central core resembled that of the international state of affairs. The dominant characteristic of the austerity period worldwide were the impasses faced by governments because of social pressure for greater protectionism and pressure by international financial organizations for greater “discipline” (Bozkurt 2016). In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, it was the entrapment of the political system between social demands on the one hand and pressures for austerity and discipline by Ankara and its mechanisms, i.e. the Turkish embassy, on the other (Sözen and Sonan 2019, 130). The role of the IMF, the World Bank or the European Commission at the international level was, more or less, the role of Ankara and the Turkish embassy’s Assistance Committee (Yardım Heyeti) in the Turkish Cypriot community (Bozkurt 2016, 134). Perhaps the most definitive expression of this role were the three-year financial protocols as a more comprehensive socioeconomic intervention by Ankara in the structural transformation of the community in Cyprus. The change in the socio-economic orientations of Turkey’s power centres was gradually reflected in the handling of the Cyprus problem as well. As early as 2007, the military leadership of Ankara had made no secret of its aggravation over the tendencies towards autonomy of new Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, on issues facilitating contact between the two communities through the opening of new crossings (Bila 2007). With the election of Demetris Christofias to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008, such dynamics became all the more intense. With Tassos Papadopoulos, Ankara had secured the profile of the “side wishing for a solution”. This “convenience” was, however, reversed in the light of the new Greek Cypriot leader’s history and his relations with the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish government could no longer maintain the general stance of “showing will for a solution” without actually pursuing it (Erhürman 2010b, 62). The new convergences that gradually appeared at the negotiating table (Ortam 2009) increased both Ankara’s difficulty in maintaining a “moral precedent” as well as its suspicion over the orientation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The combination of Turkish socio-economic and political pressures on the Turkish Cypriots and an environment mainly characterized by the failure of the referendums eventually favoured by default the Left and more specifically CTP. The party had already, since 2003 and especially since 2005, found itself in the lead in the community. It had

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been the common denominator in governments up to 2009, and Talat was community leader until 2010. The failure of the referendums, the change proclaimed by Ankara to the economic development of the occupied territories and its suspicions with the Cyprus problem as focus, towards the end of Talat’s term in office, confronted CTP with the following “core issues”: the administration of power in a structure which the party political programme considered fundamental evidence of the non-viability of the partitionist status quo (Erhürman 2010b, 61), and the administration of this structure in a framework of intensified pressure by the Turkish government for its neoliberal “rationalization” (Erhürman 2010a, 39–40). In such a deadlock of “existential dilemmas” for the CTP, the formula devised focused on the concept of economic self-sufficiency and on the creation of an economy that would “stand on its own two feet” (Erhürman 2010a, 39–40). This particular formula sought to respond to the dilemmas of managing political power and the economy, community relations with Turkey, and the issue of remaining focused on a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. CTP’s specific effort emphasized that decreased dependency on Turkey and focus of economic development towards a Cyprus settlement would result from reform in budget structures (KKTCM 2004a, 982). On the basis of this reasoning, Turkish Cypriots should proceed with budget planning in a way that would suspend the system of deficit financing from Ankara and funds from Turkey would be channelled to development investments (Erhürman 2010b, 61). At this point, however, the idea of community economic selfsufficiency in the entirely new post-referendum environment created negative responses from dissenting circles. On the one hand the implementation of such a programme entailed the creation of local resources through the recreation of Turkish Cypriot productive forces. CTP would be forced to choose between two options. The first one was the taxation of large-scale business activity and the creation of greater pressure on circles of commercial and industrial capital, through more equitable distribution of income policies. The second was that of cuts in benefits and a reduction in social protection structures for the middle and lower social strata of the population (Erhürman 2010b, 62). The political and ideological dilemma of the party was finalized the moment it was called to choose in which of the two sides of the social alliance it would invest for the continuation of its relative hegemony.

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Since the outbreak of the world economic crisis in 2007, CTP had been experiencing pressure from two directions: on the one side were those parties of commercial capital that in previous years had supported the proCyprus solution movement. On the other was the trade union movement and the dozens of civil society organizations which formed the spinal cord of the “This country is ours” platform. None of these parties was willing to proceed to concessions in an environment of pressure created by the intensified economic crisis. At this particular point the party was faced with the three-year, 2007–2009 economic protocol: a text that provided a series of structural reforms that revived the philosophy of implementation of neoliberal reforms as a precondition for funding from Ankara (Tahsin 2014, 88). This particular protocol triggered the formal rupture of the social coalition that had forged the path towards YES in the 2004 referendum. For a very important part of the Turkish Cypriot commercial and industrial capital, the application of the protocol was not only a one-way road towards economic development; it also constituted an alternative to the need for a Cyprus settlement. A typical example is the announcement by the Economic Organizations’ Platform that stressed the necessity for economic reforms for a sustainable model, which if realized meant “the solution of the Cyprus problem would cease to be seen as our salvation” (Haber Kıbrıs 2010). Therefore, the Turkish Cypriot capital, or at least part of it, aimed to ideologically overturn the perception that the basic source of problems for the community was the non-resolution of the Cyprus problem. At the same time, in this way, it centred the following approach: the internal neoliberal modernization of the “TRNC” and hence the smoother incorporation of international trade could be the solution to the problem of the community’s isolation. Therefore, instead of the federal solution with the Greek Cypriots, a Turkish Cypriot– Turkish “settlement plan” was proposed, with capital as the common denominator. As expected, Turkish Cypriot trade union movement concerns moved in the opposite direction. The decline of relations between the CTP and the industrial elite, due to disagreements over economic protocol, did not prove to be a dynamic to “patch up” party relations with the trade unions. Indeed, CTP leadership’s flirtation with different sections of the business elite, as well as its general inability to maintain a critical stance against “new Turkey”, caused centrifugal dynamics within the organizations of the middle and lower strata of society (Erhürman 2010b, 63–4). Indeed,

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as early as March 2008, mobilized protests were triggered by a new phase of CTP–Turkish government talks over austerity measures (Yeni Ça˘g 2008). This was, again, indicative of the rupture in the traditional coalition of the Turkish Cypriot Left. Against this backdrop, CTP was forced to call for early elections in 2009, without previously been able to clearly articulate its concerns on the content of Turkey’s economic strategy. Consequently, it faced severe difficulties in reproducing its alliances and was at risk of isolation. It stood at 29.2%, down 15% compared with the 2005 elections. In contrast, ˙ UBP gained 44%. It returned as a one-party government under Irsen Küçük (Sözen 2009, 346) and undertook, not only to sign, but also to implement the provisions of the new three-year economic protocol for 2010–2012. However, in addition to the split of the social coalition and the double pressure faced by CTP, the period, especially after the 2007–2008 economic crisis, was characterized by disagreements with the “donor”. The concept of Turkish Cypriot economic autonomy and the strengthening of the local productive forces were elements confrontational and contrary to the transformation programme that AKP wished to impose. Indeed, the element that reinforced the feeling that Turkey considered the occupied areas in a different manner was the style in which Ankara officials expressed their political aims. For example, the then Minister of State Responsible for Cyprus Affairs, Cemil Çiçek, confessed before Turkish Cypriot businessmen in 2010 that “it is easier to find water in the desert rather than to exercise pressure on the ‘TRNC’ governments to proceed with reforms” (Kıbrıs Postası 2010b). This “peculiar grievance” of the Turkish minister was indicative of a colonial gaze over the Turkish Cypriot community—a frustrated gaze because of the defiance of the natives, coupled with a continuous pursuit of ways to fulfil the export of the metropolis’s (Durantaye 2012, 232– 4) modernization to the colony. This anxiety on the part of the Turkish government over the delay and the obstacles to the realization of its broader aspirations in Cyprus also escalated because of intensified Turkish Cypriot protests. From the early months of 2011, it was already evident that relations between the community and Turkey were entering a completely new phase. On the one hand Ankara “officially” appeared with huge investment activities and more comprehensive requirements in relation to the structural changes in the Turkish Cypriot economy (Hatay and Bryant 2011, 17). On the other hand, a substantial part of the Turkish

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Cypriot trade union movement perceived this “economic aggression” and the intensification of authoritarianism by the AKP government as tools for the further marginalization of both Cypriot identity and whatever was left as Turkish Cypriot in the area of small and medium-sized enterprises (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012, 28–9). The culmination of Turkish Cypriot reaction to the new framework was recorded in the mass rally of 28 January 2011 under the general slogan of safeguarding “community existence” (Toplumsal Varolu¸s Mitingleri). The rally was organized by the Trade Union Platform and aimed to clearly lay down the disagreements of large sections of society with the content of the three-year economic protocols (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012; Bryant and Hatay 2015). However, due to the pre-existing polarization in Turkish Cypriot–Turkish relations, 28 January was recorded as the day that “enraged Ankara” (Ankara De˘gil Lefko¸sa 2017). The political enragement and the disappointment with the “ungrateful” natives (CNN Türk 2011) were expressed in the most comprehensive way by Prime Minister Erdo˘gan. On 4 February 2011, after the first great Turkish Cypriot mobilization protest, Erdo˘gan stated: “During the last few days there have been provocative activities in Northern Cyprus in collaboration with the South. The most recent one was on 28 January. They tell us ‘go to hell’ and there is an apathy on the part of the administration. They have no right to such actions against Turkey. The most low-paid civil servants there get about 10 thousand Turkish lira and without any shame protest. Furthermore, they get a 13th-month salary every year. They tell us ‘Turkey get out of here’. Who do you think you are? I have martyrs there, fighters, strategic interests. Whatever business Greece has in Cyprus, strategically, Turkey has the same business. It is very suspicious that those who are fed (beslenmeler) by our country choose such paths. We support them, shouldn’t there be a positive reaction?” (Bianet 2011). The Prime Minister’s statements reflected an extreme form of paternalism. Given the new framework in the post-2004 period, the particular paternalism marked the formal closing of a cycle and the opening of a new one in Turkish Cypriot relations with Turkey. The use of the Turkish term besleme, to describe the Turkish Cypriots protesting against austerity, formed a deep ideological stance and a clear-cut description of the balances demanded by AKP government from then on. Besleme denotes a “foster child” (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012, 37). It refers to the traditional practice of “adoption” of a poor minor in a wealthier home and

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of his upbringing as a house servant. The derogatory characterization of the Turkish Cypriot community as “Turkey’s foster child” expressed the “master’s” anger against his “servant” and was a sharp rebuke of a father against the disobedience of his immature child” (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012, 37; Bryant and Hatay 2015, 45–6). At the same time, it was disappointment for the lack of “gratitude” and for the display of “ingratitude” from the “foster child” towards the master and saviour. Through Erdo˘gan’s statements, the notion of administering a Turkish district rather than an independent Turkish Cypriot state was given political prominence and reinvigorated, which was Ankara’s earlier line of ˙ argument (Insel 2011, 54–5). The “downgrading” of the Turkish Cypriot political regime into a Turkish district was even recorded in an especially sarcastic manner. Following Erdo˘gan’s statements in the Turkish Cypriot public space, it was stressed that “We no longer need a puppet government and president. One way or another, Erdo˘gan speaks like a colonialist. The state called TRNC should be annexed to Turkey and a governor should be appointed so we become a modern colony” (T24 2011). In this way, for many Turkish Cypriots the presence of Turkey in Cyprus was disassociated from Turkish Cypriot existence. Turkey was present without needing the “excuse” of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey’s influence was ideologically cut off from the mission of “protecting” the community (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012, 27, 37) and thus Turkish influence itself became the reason for reinforcing the claim of protection of Turkish Cypriot “communal existence” in Cyprus. The importance of Erdo˘gan’s statements against the “communal existence” rally of 28 January 2011, and even more the Turkish Cypriot community’s massive reaction on 2 March of the same year as a political response, are developments that necessitate a more careful analysis of the shift among Turkish Cypriots (Bryant and Hatay 2015, 45) particularly concerning their relationship with Turkey, as well as their position in Cyprus’s history itself. Moreover, the use of the protests’ general title as a claim to protect communal existence is in itself important. The concept of toplumsal could, in other cases, mean “social existence”. However, the historicity of the term and the political context make it clear that in this particular case, Turkish Cypriots emphasized “communal existence”— that is, the existence and therefore the need to respect an autonomous political entity based on a specific Cypriot communal identity. The intense and massive expression of agitation over “communal existence” expressed a particular form of resistance (Reis and Duranay 2013, 14) because

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the protests against the new AKP economic policy were not confined to the “economic aspect” of the protocols. On the contrary, they extended mainly against the political and ideological aspect of the normalization of the neoliberal reform of a “Turkish province” (Kızılyürek 2018, 71). The protests stressed “dignity” as a political means of resistance to the further alienation of the community from Cyprus. In this way the reinforcement of Turkish Cypriot ethnic-communal identity expressed in the post-2004 period had a dual purpose. On the one hand, it had been an expression of the maturing of a consciousness of autonomous power and the claim for it to be secured as such. For example, the slogan of the mobilizations that prevailed before the referendums, “This country is ours”, was extended: “This country is ours; we will govern it” (Bu memleket bizim, biz yönetece˘giz) (Hatay and Bryant 2011, 17). On the other hand, the reinforced ethnic-communal identity addressed the two “most powerful entities” associated with the Turkish Cypriot community. The most comprehensive expression of the aforementioned dynamics was the slogan: “Neither hostages of Turkey nor a patch for Greek Cypriots” (Ne Türkiye’ye rehin, ne Rum’a yama) (Kıbrıs Postası 2011b; Hatay and Bryant 2011, 19). The dual expression of the Turkish Cypriots’ claim for autonomy, which dominated the post-referendum period, was a result of the frustration caused by the failure of a Cyprus settlement in 2004, Turkey’s renewed colonialist perception, and the concentration of all contradictions arising from the historical experience of separate power structures on the island since 1974—in other words, the contradictions that emerged as a result of the Turkish Cypriot community’s entrapment in the Cypriot state of exception (Constantinou 2008). The evolutionary maturation and the more intense expression of this “bizarre” Turkish Cypriot power consciousness and demand for autonomy vis-à-vis the two “most powerful centres” was not, of course, an ideologically homogeneous and stable procedure. In this book, the emergence of Turkish Cypriot power structures, wholly dependent on Turkey, is traced back to the 1963 bi-communal conflict. However, the violent geographical separation of 1974 greatly intensified this process. The existence and operation of illegal structures (originally the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus but in particular the “TRNC”) were factors that, despite objections, created a power consciousness in response to the Turkish Cypriot community’s need for self-government. The state, the institutions, the symbols and the political and economic activity that was

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completely separate from the Greek Cypriots, were some of the elements that gradually integrated the Turkish Cypriot community into these structures and absorbed, to some extent, the reactions. Indeed, political parties such as the Turkish Republican Party and the Communal Liberation Party, which had traditionally been critical of the creation of partitionist political structures, came, with the passing of time, to be part of their administration. But this particular aspect of Turkish Cypriot self-government could not be fully satisfied; it could not be fulfilled. On the contrary, the power structures that emerged after 1974 maintained the Turkish Cypriot liminal situation (Bryant 2014). The contradiction of the illegal structures lies in the fact that they were, on the one hand, generating the political and economic integration of the Turkish Cypriots in power, and were therefore building the framework for the maturity of this power, but on the other hand, these same structures were undermining the prospect of this power being fulfilled due to the heavy shadow of Ankara at all levels. This complex and contradictory maturing process of the Turkish Cypriot power consciousness in a state of exception and entrapment also decisively contributed to the change of the Turkish Cypriot identity itself. It contributed to the change of the content of Turkish Cypriot selfdefinition and will for autonomy, initially in contradistinction with the Greek Cypriots and later in contradistinction with Turkey. The operation of power structures, however, coupled with the simultaneous undermining of this Turkish Cypriot authority by Turkey itself, were factors that partly determined a new perception of the community’s “honour and dignity”. This, above all political sensitivities of the community, has been expressed over the years with two key messages. The first was the assertion of an autonomous existence through the message of the Turkish Cypriots’ “political maturity”. Here, the need for and the assertion of independence and self-government beyond the stifling control of Turkey, but also away from the Greek Cypriots, is stressed. In other words, if in the collective memory of the Turkish Cypriots prior to 1974 the obstacle was the Greek Cypriots, post 1974 the obstacle was Turkey. The second message was an expression of anxiety reproduced by the status of “permanent liminality” (Bryant 2014). The anxiety concerns the undermining of the community status of the Turkish Cypriots and the threat of turning them into a political minority. An anxiety which is also expressed to both Turkey and the Greek Cypriots. Former European

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Affairs Adviser to Talat, Arma˘gan Candan (2011), has pointed out that “Even today we are fighting for our communal existence; we are holding rallies and we give them the name, ‘for our communal existence’. The struggle that started half a century ago so as not to become a minority and for political equality still goes on. How many generations have lived and still live in this headspace…”. The agonizing rhetorical question of “how many will still live with this anxiety” clarifies the politicization of the uncertainty and liminality reproduced under the state of exception. The impact of these phenomena on Turkish Cypriot identity has intensified since the failure of the 2004 referendums on the basis of alienation experienced by the community. The void caused by the lack of identification with a particular legal political state of order in the community’s homeland was brilliantly described by journalist Aysu Basri Akter (2012) in her article in Yeni Düzen newspaper on 6 January 2012: “My father was born during British administration. He saw the Republic of Cyprus. In his early youth he passed to Temporary Turkish Administration. He lived under Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, as well as under the Turkish Cypriot Federal State. As a matter of fact, he got married and had his children under the Turkish Cypriot Federal State. In the years of his maturity he managed to bring his children up in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He carried in his pocket at least three passports. In reality, however, none fulfilled his identity. I was born in a state I don’t remember. I grew up in a Republic that I was taught about. I lived in hope I almost learnt by heart. In my pocket I have three passports. There have been cases I have used all three at the same time, but I have not managed to explain my anguish… People who live in this land have carried, some three, others four passports. But, so many states, so many administrations, so many passports and IDs, failed to make this community happy. This land has raised a ‘lack of identity’ syndrome which is passed from generation to generation”. This confession is indicative of a Turkish Cypriot state of being, but also of the resistance it reproduces. With the Cyprus problem unresolved, the Turkish Cypriots remain in the liminality of unfulfilled integration procedures into power structures (Bryant 2014). They remain in the liminality of a state of exception. They remain in the uncertainty of “so many administrations and passports”, which have not allowed them total subjectivization (Kızılyürek 2018). However, the political expression of uncertainty post 1974 has shown that the basis of its reproduction—the state of exception itself—cannot be normalized. This is precisely because

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that uncertainty becomes at the same time the basis for the emergence of Turkish Cypriot community resistance. However, it should be noted that as the maturing of the claim of Turkish Cypriot autonomy post 1974 has not been a homogeneous and stable process, so the continuation of the conditions that gave rise to the Turkish Cypriot resistance cannot be considered “given and stable”. The ongoing limbo of the Cyprus problem, coupled with the historical volatility in Turkish Cypriot–Turkish relations and the political power of the Turkish state, form the transformation dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot resistance itself.

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Index

A Adalı, Kutlu, 8, 54, 194–197 Akıncı, Mustafa, 87, 140, 150, 206, 217, 219, 221, 223, 256 Ankara, 2–7, 9, 13–16, 21, 26, 28, 30, 42, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54–56, 59, 60, 63, 71–73, 75, 77, 84–86, 90–93, 103–107, 114, 115, 119, 120, 129, 130, 135, 137, 139–142, 146, 147, 158, 159, 161–163, 169–171, 174, 181, 182, 187, 190, 192–194, 196, 198, 205, 206, 208, 211–217, 220–223, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 237, 240–243, 245, 246, 255, 257, 258, 260–263, 265, 267 Authoritarianism, 2, 7, 18, 39, 46, 59, 86, 88, 91, 137, 139, 141–146, 182, 183, 185, 189, 190, 264 B B.E.Y (Bayraktarlık, Elçilik, Yönetim), 43

C Colonial, 15, 28, 72, 73, 216, 217, 263 Colonialism, 5, 19, 27, 29 CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi/Republican Turkish Party), 27, 57, 60–62, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 110, 112, 113, 115–117, 120, 121, 134, 137, 139–149, 166, 167, 169, 183–186, 188, 189, 192, 196, 198–200, 205, 206, 216, 244, 245, 258, 260–263 Cypriotness, 1, 7, 18, 29, 79, 163, 181, 196, 199 Cypruvex, 88, 138

D Denkta¸s, Rauf, 22, 37, 42, 43, 49, 63, 64, 71, 101, 118, 136, 138, 164, 192, 193, 255 ˙ s, 88, 111 Dev-I¸

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 N. Moudouros, State of Exception in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56873-3

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INDEX

DP (Demokrat Parti/Democratic Party), 171, 174, 191, 192, 205, 206, 222, 223, 245 Durduran, Alpay, 19, 51, 52, 87, 113, 116, 118, 166, 187, 188 E Ero˘glu, Dervi¸s, 121, 130, 132, 141, 143, 144, 148, 166, 167, 172, 182, 191–193, 205, 206, 210, 213, 214, 222, 223, 231, 237, 240 F Federation, 104, 110, 112, 149, 171, 173, 206, 216, 258 G General Committee, 20, 42, 46, 49, 55, 56, 59 Geopolitical vision, 7, 159, 161, 163, 169, 181, 182, 194 Greek Cypriot properties, 74, 109, 120 H Hegemony, 8, 27, 29, 30, 55, 79, 135, 230, 261 I Independence, 7, 19, 52, 53, 61, 62, 83, 101–110, 112–118, 120, 141, 164, 222, 267 Integration, 17, 75, 84, 114, 131, 132, 141, 143–145, 149, 160, 165, 170–174, 181, 186, 194, 195, 197–199, 207, 208, 215, 222, 242, 255, 256, 258, 267, 268

˙ ˙ ITEM (Iskân, Topraklandırma ve E¸sde˘ger Mal Yasası), 74, 192 L Left-wing, 44, 63, 107, 108, 110, 133, 212 Loot, 89 N Nationalism, 17, 18, 22, 29, 52, 62, 78, 160, 164, 191, 193, 241 Neoliberalism, 7, 134, 135, 217, 258, 259, 261, 262, 266 Normalization, 5, 6, 19, 24, 27, 39, 54, 55, 75, 85, 248, 253, 254, 266 O Opposition, 2, 4–9, 18, 22, 23, 27–30, 43, 50, 52, 54–60, 71, 80–87, 89–93, 106, 107, 109–118, 120–122, 133–146, 148, 149, 163, 165, 166, 168, 169, 181–186, 188–194, 196– 200, 206, 211–213, 215, 216, 218–223, 230–236, 238–244, 247, 248, 254 Özgür, Özker, 52, 57, 87, 90, 112, 120, 134, 135, 142–148, 150, 166, 167, 169, 183, 185, 189, 194 P Partition, 2–5, 8, 9, 15–17, 22–30, 37, 38, 44, 50, 53, 73, 75, 78, 81, 82, 85, 87, 92, 106, 112, 113, 115, 116, 141, 162, 164, 195, 222, 223, 241, 242, 247, 254, 257 Privatizations, 131, 191, 214

INDEX

Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration (Geçici Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi), 20

R Republic of Cyprus, 13, 21–23, 37, 39, 42, 47–49, 54–56, 58–60, 102–104, 107–109, 146, 162, 170–172, 181, 199, 215, 257, 260, 268 Restoration, 5, 74, 92, 93, 107, 117, 141–144, 147, 187, 215

S Sanayi Holding , 136 Self-determination, 7, 25, 109, 110, 115, 116, 150, 165, 166, 182, 233 Settlers, 91, 118, 121, 142, 185–187, 189, 192 Social movement, 8, 222, 231, 232, 236, 238, 239 State of exception, 5, 6, 9, 19–25, 27, 28, 43, 45–50, 53, 54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 72, 73, 81, 82, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 117, 119, 142, 143, 161, 181, 183, 190, 194, 196, 212, 213, 230, 240, 241, 247, 253, 266–268

T Taksim, 16, 46, 49, 81, 102, 103, 205, 241 Talat, Mehmet Ali, 165, 197, 206, 230, 255, 260 TFSC (Turkish Federated State of Cyprus), 21, 23, 24, 71, 75, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 101, 103, 104, 107, 112

275

This country is ours (Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu), 8, 149, 183, 218–220, 222, 231, 262, 266 TKP (Toplumcu Kurtulu¸s Partisi), 27, 82, 83, 87, 88, 90, 91, 110, 113, 115–117, 121, 137, 138, 140, 142, 145, 166, 169, 182, 184–187, 189, 198, 200, 205, 206, 222 Trade unions, 4, 87, 88, 111, 117, 132, 133, 138–141, 145, 146, 190, 197, 209, 216–218, 235, 242, 262 TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), 7, 17, 19, 21, 23–26, 29, 30, 101, 102, 106, 110, 111, 115–119, 121, 127–132, 136, 138, 141, 143, 144, 146–148, 151, 161–167, 169–171, 173, 174, 181, 182, 187, 189, 191–193, 196–198, 208, 209, 211–213, 216, 218, 221–223, 237, 241, 242, 255, 256, 262, 263, 265, 266 Turkish government, 128, 150, 161, 213, 214, 221, 245, 246, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263 U UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi/National Unity Party), 71, 81–83, 88–91, 93, 106, 118, 121, 122, 132, 134, 136–142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 166–169, 171, 174, 182–191, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 222, 223, 263 Y YKP (Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi/New Cyprus Party), 166, 184, 187