State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo [1 ed.] 9783942109239, 9783942109222

Citation preview

Arta Ante

State Building and Development

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo

disserta Verlag

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Arta Ante

State Building and Development

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Ante, Arta: State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, Hamburg, disserta Verlag, 2010 ISBN: 978-3-942109-23-9 Herstellung: disserta Verlag, ein Imprint der Diplomica® Verlag GmbH, Hamburg, 2010

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Dieses Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Die dadurch begründeten Rechte, insbesondere die der Übersetzung, des Nachdrucks, des Vortrags, der Entnahme von Abbildungen und Tabellen, der Funksendung, der Mikroverfilmung oder der Vervielfältigung auf anderen Wegen und der Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen, bleiben, auch bei nur auszugsweiser Verwertung, vorbehalten. Eine Vervielfältigung dieses Werkes oder von Teilen dieses Werkes ist auch im Einzelfall nur in den Grenzen der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der jeweils geltenden Fassung zulässig. Sie ist grundsätzlich vergütungspflichtig. Zuwiderhandlungen unterliegen den Strafbestimmungen des Urheberrechtes. Die Wiedergabe von Gebrauchsnamen, Handelsnamen, Warenbezeichnungen usw. in diesem Werk berechtigt auch ohne besondere Kennzeichnung nicht zu der Annahme, dass solche Namen im Sinne der Warenzeichen- und Markenschutz-Gesetzgebung als frei zu betrachten wären und daher von jedermann benutzt werden dürften. Die Informationen in diesem Werk wurden mit Sorgfalt erarbeitet. Dennoch können Fehler nicht vollständig ausgeschlossen werden und der Verlag, die Autoren oder Übersetzer übernehmen keine juristische Verantwortung oder irgendeine Haftung für evtl. verbliebene fehlerhafte Angaben und deren Folgen. © disserta Verlag, ein Imprint der Diplomica Verlag GmbH http://www.disserta-verlag.de, Hamburg 2010 Hergestellt in Deutschland

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

DISSERTATION Titel der Dissertation

State Building and Development: Two Sides of the same Coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo

Verfasser

Arta Ante M.A

Angestrebter akademischer Grad

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)

Wien, im July 2008

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 092 300 Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaft Betreuerin: o. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Eva Kreisky

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION Title of Dissertation

State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo Author

Arta Ante Diplome, M.A. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Dr. phil.)

Discipline: Political Sciences

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Supervisor: o. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Eva H. Kreisky

Vienna Universtiy, Austria July 2008

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Table of Contents

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................10 Statement of the Problem and Topic Selection ......................................................11 Structure of Work ..................................................................................................14 Research approach and Methodological considerations .....................................16 Clarifying the nomenclature ..................................................................................19 1. Theoretical Considerations: State-building & Development ........................20 1.1. State-building: approaches, definitions, concepts ...........................................20 1.1.1. Making sense of the state and its building ..................................................20 1.1.2. Following the trajectory of a concept: state-building ..................................22 1.1.3. State-building as a process ...........................................................................29 1.1.4. State-building, vs. nation-building...............................................................36 1.1.5. Building strong states: The premises of legitimacy based on Kalevi´s theory .....................................39 1.1.6. State-building and Democracy ....................................................................44 1.2. Development: approaches, definitions, concepts ............................................52 1.2.1. The confounding concept of development ..................................................52 1.2.2. History and evolution of a controversial term ............................................53 1.2.3. From Development Theory to Developmental Aid ....................................64 1.2.4. Development and Democracy .....................................................................68 1.2.5. Development and Gender ...........................................................................73 1.2.6. The Development-Security nexus ................................................................81 1.3. State-building and Development: Institutional implications. ..........................89 1.3.1. Political Development: Political System and Political Parties ....................89 1.3.2. Economic Development: Beyond the state-versus market dichotomy ........99 1.3.3. Social Development and the Social Capital Approach ............................107 1.3.4. Cultural Development: Following Migdal´s theoretical approach ...........117 1.3.5. Linking the micro with the macro level .....................................................125 1.3.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................136 2. Empirical considerations: The Case of Kosovo.............................................139 2.1. Introducing Kosovo .......................................................................................139 2.2. The historical battle and its myths ..................................................................141 2.3. Kosovo as an Autonomous Province..............................................................143 2.4. The "lost decade" of 1989-1999 .....................................................................144 2.5. Kosovo under "Re-Construction" ...................................................................146 5

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

2.6. Why Kosovo? .................................................................................................149

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

3. Political Domain ..............................................................................................152 3.1. Actors and Institutions ...................................................................................152 3.1.1. Local players and Settings: Voluntary socialization and Rationally legitimized institutions ........................................................................................152 3.1.1.1. Political parties and the political landscape in Kosovo .......................152 3.1.1.1.1 From political movements to "the non-violence party" ......................153 3.1.1.1.2 The opposition of the opposition: "the war parties" ..........................156 3.1.1.1.3 The postwar and modernization Parties .............................................159 3.1.1.1.4 The challenge of participation: the "refusal" parties ..........................161 3.1.1.1.5 General trends and reflections on Kosovo Political Parties ................163 3.1.1.2. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG): Kosovo´s "not yet"- Checks and Balances? ..............................................................................180 3.1.1.2.1 The Government and the executive situation .....................................183 3.1.1.2.2 The Assembly and the legislative process ..........................................190 3.1.1.2.3 The Judiciary and the legal situation .................................................195 3.1.2. International Players and setting ...............................................................202 3.1.2.1. UNMIK: Building the institutional capacity ........................................202 3.1.2.2. The Standards, before, with and beyond the Status: Preparing for Europe, the promised future ............................................................................................207 3.1.2.3. The Role of the SRSG and Liaison Offices ........................................213 3.2. Alliances, conflicts and co-operations ...........................................................218 3.2.1. Exploring the constellations of power in Kosovo politics .....................218 3.3. Security and politics .......................................................................................223 3.4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................235 4. Economic domain .............................................................................................238 4.1. Actors and institutions ...................................................................................238 4.1.1. Local Players and Settings: The Economic Enabling Environment ..........238 4.1.1.1. The Legal framework ...........................................................................238 4.1.1.2. Institutional and Policy Environment....................................................239 4.1.1.3. Infrastructure and Public Utilities .......................................................241 4.1.1.4. The key mechanisms in the Kosovo macro-economy ..........................242 4.1.1.5. Doing business in Kosovo: Too easy or too difficult? .........................244 4.1.1.6. Public Administration ...........................................................................248 4.1.1.7. The labour market and labour relations in Kosovo ..............................251 6

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

4.1.1.7.1 Labour market .....................................................................................251 4.1.1.7.2 Labour relations and voluntaristic associations ..................................253 4.1.1.8. The Human Development Agenda ......................................................256 4.1.1.8.1 Education ............................................................................................256 4.1.1.8.2 Public Safety Nets ...............................................................................259 4.1.1.8.3 Health Protection ...............................................................................261 4.1.2. International players and setting ...............................................................263 4.1.2.1. EU Pillar IV: Making Kosovo economy ready for Europe? ...............263 4.1.2.2. EAR: Incoherence in action? ...............................................................269 4.1.2.3. Kosovo Trust Agency and the privatization effects .............................271 4.1.2.4. International Safety Nets in Kosovo: WB, IMF and EU ......................276 4.2. Alliances, conflicts and co-operations ...........................................................279 4.2.1. Exploring the Constellations of power in kosovo economy .....................279 4.3. Security and the economy .............................................................................287 4.4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................292

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

5. Social Domain ..................................................................................................295 5.1. Actors and institutions ...................................................................................295 5.1.1. Local players and setting .........................................................................295 5.1.1.1. Civil society and the NGO plethora in Kosovo ....................................295 5.1.1.2. Media in Kosovo: Near sustainability? ................................................302 5.1.1.3. Government and UNMIK attitudes towards the Civil Society ............308 5.1.2. International players and setting ................................................................311 5.1.2.1. International Donors and INGOs role in social capital .......................311 5.1.2.2. UNMIK and its Pillar III OSCE approach ..........................................316 5.2. Alliances, conflicts and co-operations ...........................................................317 5.2.1. Exploring the potential for Social Capital in Kosovo ..............................317 5.3. Security and the social domain ......................................................................325 5.4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................329 6. Cultural Domain ..............................................................................................332 6.1. Actors and institutions ...................................................................................332 6.1.1. Local players and setting .........................................................................332 6.1.1.1. The law: a shared meaning in Kosovo? ................................................332 6.1.1.2. The Public Ritual: exploring master narratives in Kosovo ..................336 6.1.1.3. The Public Sphere and the culture of participation ...............................341 6.1.2. International players and setting ...............................................................347 7

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

6.1.2.1. The EU: bringing "Democracy" in empty shells? ...............................347 6.2. Alliances, conflicts and co-operations............................................................350 6.2.1. Exploring the implications of culture in state-building in Kosovo ............350 6.3. Security and the cultural domain ...................................................................357 6.4. Conclusions ...................................................................................................360 7. Overview of Main findings .............................................................................361 7.1. State-building and Development: key correlation points ...............................361 7.2. Kosovo: Quo Vadis? ......................................................................................367 7.3. Synopsis on general trends ..........................................................................374 8. Appendixes........................................................................................................376 8.1. Appendix 1 .....................................................................................................376 8.2. Appendix 2 .....................................................................................................377 8.3. Appendix 3 .....................................................................................................378 8.4. Appendix 4 .....................................................................................................379 8.5. Appendix 5 .....................................................................................................381 8.6. Appendix 6 .....................................................................................................382

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

9. Bibliography .....................................................................................................385

8

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

List of Figures and Tables

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 1: The basic grid of dimensions/The basic Model ........................................33 Figure 2: Hirschman and Parson Combined ............................................................34 Figure 3: Grounds for State Legitimacy ...................................................................41 Figure 4: Relationships between State and Legitimacy ............................................44 Figure 5: The four thresholds of democratization .....................................................46 Figure 6: The two channels of decision-making .......................................................48 Figure 7: Key interdependencies between development theories, models, objectives, measurement of performance and the role of developmental aid. .............68 Figure 8: Different emphasis in the study of development-democracy nexus ..........70 Figure 9: The Interdependence of the Three State Functions: Security, Welfare and Representation .......................................................................88 Figure 10: Comparative  presentation of main contemporary Social Capital studies ...............................................................................114 Figure 11: Analytical Framework for Institutional Development Outcomes in the State-building process .............................................................................................136 Figure 12: Political parties preferences in Kosovo, 2007 .......................................159 Figure 13: Kosovo Political Parties main features by Dec.2007 ............................178 Figure 14: Current position of Kosovo in the EU integration process...................213 Figure 15: Interrelationship between identified threats from Public Perception Perspective in Kosovo ............................................................................................292 Figure 16: Number of NGOs in Kosovo per Year ................................................299 Figure 17: Main Sources of Information in Kosovo ..............................................303 Figure 18: Media Sustainability Index 2006/2007 .................................................308 Figure 19: Kosovo Youth participation in the Public Sphere .................................345 Figure 20: Main findings from the application of the analytical framework in Kosovo .................................................................................................373 Table 1: Core Mechanisms in the Kosovo Macroeconomy ....................................244 Table 2: Business Conditions Index in Kosovo .....................................................245

9

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Acknowledgements This thesis was written in 5 years and many people contributed in one way or another to its finalization. I would like to take the chance and thank them here: My special gratitude goes to Prof. Eva H. Kreisky for accepting to supervise this Dissertation. I am obliged to her for her support and for offering the possibility for many stimulating as well as intellectually challenging discussions, which contributed, to the finalization of this project. Her suggestions in the field of political theories encouraged me to push the matter much further than originally intended. Thanks go also to Prof. Dieter Segert for giving me advice and time when needed. Thanks are due to my Privatissimum colleagues at Vienna University, for their inputs and for offering an exceptionally interesting academic experience, where intense intellectual exchange was made possible through a friendly and cooperative atmosphere. Their helpful comments on my ideas have been gratefully utilized for further work and reflection. I also want to thank Vienna University, Short-Term Research Scholarship Office for financing my Field Research in Kosovo, while special thanks go here to the European Stability Initiative (ESI) and Kosovo Stability Initiative (IKS) for offering me to use their office facilities and archives and especially to Rreze Duli for her hospitality and support as well as to ESI senior analyst Verena Knaus for her great help during my research stay in Kosovo. I am especially grateful to all the local and international people interviewed that with their willingness and support made my stay in Kosovo not only useful but also a pleasant experience. Special thanks go particularly to the staff of KIPRED, as well as to KFOS, USAID, OSCE and EU offices in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally I am grateful to my friends and especially to Aischa Riedler and Robert Rezabek who encouraged me in hard times by clearing up many doubts and insecurities in the process of this dissertation, what made the whole process of writing it much more enjoyable. Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to my parents, Violeta and Pellumb, my dear sisters Patrizia & Albana and my husband Wolfgang for their continuous encouragement and backing whenever I was going through rough times. Without them, this whole project would have been simply a nightmare. I dedicate this dissertation to all of you: thank you for being by my side!

10

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

0. Introduction 0.1 Statement of the Problem and Topic Selection The cases of post-World War II Germany and Japan set a standard for post-conflict state-building that has been unmatched ever since. Such interventions were huge comprehensive efforts that aimed to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction in these societies, and they demonstrated that under certain circumstances societies can be transformed, and real change can take place.1 During the 40 years of the Cold War period, there were relatively few attempts made to replicate this success, but with the end of this era, a new chapter in international relations began. The tide of globalization that had begun in the 1980s incrementally intensified and generated new economic, political, social, and even cultural contexts in international and local arenas. At the political level, the end of the Cold War era saw the disintegration of many eastern and third world states. The state-building agenda at the time was pursued through a standard "democratization" policy solution that intended to install mechanisms of regular elections and institutionalization of political parties, but which brought few results.2 Explanations of why state-building efforts in this period were so unsuccessful compared to those post-WWII remain unsatisfactory even today. The few positive results that US and UN mission interventions achieved, however, hinted at a clear handicap in understanding by academia and practitioners alike on how to transfer well-functioning public institutions into these contexts. The fact that this process requires not only a change of structures in the political domain, but also includes radical changes in other domains including the economic and social, situated in a given cultural context also affected by these changes, was simply ignored. Briefly, the West failed to understand what weak states need in order to be effective. Efforts made by UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali to introduce a broader approach to the state-building agenda, including economic and sociocultural elements, went mostly unheeded.3

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

After September 11, 2001, the state-building agenda included a new element of international security. The new assumption was that state-building should be a top priority of the international community, as weak and failed states are the source of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty to terrorism.4 In this case

1. 2. 3. 4.

Dobbins, James. 2003. America's role in nation-building: from Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. p xiii Holsti, Kalevi. J. 1996. The State, war and the state of war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.p183 Chesterman, Simon. 2004. You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building. Oxford: Oxford University Press.p2 Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. State-building: governance and world order in the 21st century. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press., p.ix 11

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the rationale became security, justifying a heavy military presence rather than a broad economic and sociocultural agenda. Critics of this approach suggested that if a military presence is unwelcome in a country, any undertaking to build a state, whatever idealist presumption it bears, would be destined to fail. At the economic level, based mainly on a neoliberal economic development agenda, many western governments and multilateral development agencies such as the IMF and WB undertook interventions to strengthen the market economies of developing countries. Operating in the framework of globalization, these agents viewed strong markets as a panacea for all problems. Although globalization has generated favorable conditions throughout the world by improving international commerce and promoting economic development in some countries, it has also contributed to the worsening of living conditions in the majority of developing countries.5 Globalization's promise of economic stability has not been kept, and the achievement of development goals in a short time proved elusive for all except a small number of "tigers" in East Asia. There have been many processes and factors identified as contributing to these low levels of achievement, but a prominent one has been the poor performance of the public sector, a key element of state.6 Hence, although it took some time to come to this conclusion, many academics and practitioners began to warn that it was the state’s weakness in developing countries that was the real obstacle to economic development. Accordingly, weak statehood was ascribed as a feature of developing countries and the obstacle to their development.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

At the social and cultural levels, the cases of civil war-torn states in many parts of the world have shown that the real reasons behind these conflicts were not cultural identity and social discontent, but economic misery and inept state apparatuses that were unable to serve their citizens. After years of violent conflict, the state structures of these countries were destroyed, their economies were almost inactive, their social capital had been torn apart, and the cultural context remained by and large vulnerable. In many of these cases, the international community in different forms has stepped into the conflict and ended up taking over governance functions from local actors. A perfect example in this framework is Kosovo, under the formal administration of the United Nations Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) as defined in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Almost a decade ago the international community intervened in Kosovo to end the Milosevic regime's violence against Kosovo's Albanians, and under the formal administration of UNMIK took over the interim functions of the government. The aim of the international community in Kosovo was to end the conflict and establish a democratic polity and market economy from scratch. Given the typically unsuccessful experiences of the international community when either of these processes failed in some way during previous interventions, the research question that the author posed

5. 6.

See Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalization and its discontents. London: Allen Lane. See Turner, Mark M, and David Hulme. 1997. Governance, administration and development: making the state work. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 12

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

in this highly complex situation was: If weak states remain such mainly due to their low economic development, and the main obstacle to economic development and a peaceful society is a weak state, then on what basis can the international community achieve its goals of building strong state structures/institutions and creating stable market economies that benefit society at large? Considering the author’s personal experience in developing contexts, followed by a research interest in state-building processes, it became clear that the missing link in this context was the failure to perceive these two processes as interdependent. The author found it therefore challenging to examine the interrelation of these two processes in a concrete post-conflict situation that she is familiar with, and where the processes were started from scratch. This should make it possible to find some explanations for the failed development interventions that have been personally experienced by the author, and that were judged as ineffective in affecting real change in the societies concerned. Being able to see beyond the “development” buzzword approach and to concretely scrutinize this process by placing it in a dependent correlation with the state-building agenda in a concrete context, gave the author a rare research opportunity that has been under-explored, and to whose extension she will hopefully contribute. Consequently, the main hypothesis posed in this study states that: State-building and development are strongly correlated with each other, such that only when they are positioned in a complementary interrelationship involving the political, economic, social, and cultural domains, with a prerequisite minimum level of security perceived in a multidimensional perspective, will the outcomes be sustainable.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

There has been a noticeable lack of cross-fertilization to date between theories of development and the emerging literature on state-building. The purpose of this study is to understand and analyze the implications of state-building and development approaches from an institutional and actors' viewpoint in the post-conflict situation of Kosovo, which the author has used as a case study. Based on a holistic approach, the author will attempt to expose this gap in the theoretical discourse, as well as at the empirical level, on the implementation of these processes and to suggest that they are part of the same approach. Therefore in order to develop a complete understanding of either of these processes, one has to consider the other as well and not treat them as separate phenomena. Only when posited in this constellation can their understanding contribute to sustainability and therefore successful outcomes. Building and strengthening the state and its institutions in Kosovo while coordinating this process with effective development strategies will be considered here as part of the same strategy, which is able to offer sustainable outcomes only in this complementary form. Other research questions that the author will attempt to answer include: What do state-building and development entail? What premises should be taken into account by supranational organizations such as the EU, United Nations, etc, in order to play effective roles in building strong institutions and fostering development for the long run? Were those premises considered in the case of Kosovo? Under what circumstances can the transfer of functioning public institutions across international borders succeed? Are those circumstances available in Kosovo? Is an 13

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

effective state a prerequisite for development, or is development a process that goes hand in hand with the state-building agenda? Hence, is an independent political status necessary for Kosovo to achieve the desired development? These are some of the research questions that the author will attempt to examine in this study, seeking to expose the increasing relevance of the interrelatedness between state-building and development at the theoretical as well as the empirical level, based on the discussion of these two processes in the case of an empirically investigated case study.

0.2 Structure of Work The content and methodological premises underlying this study serve a two-fold purpose over the entire work, aiming on one hand to point out the low cross-fertilization in the scientific discourse on state-building and development theories, while on the other to show the benefits of using the combined utility of this approach at the empirical level where implementation of corresponding policies takes place. Accordingly the work is presented in a dual structure with the first part focused on theoretical consideration of these processes, while the second part examines the tangible implications of the selected theoretical approach in the case of Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Chapter I offers a theoretical framework for the analysis of state-building and development and attempts to define these often disputed concepts. This requires a focus on the historical evolution of their discourse and their different connotations in order to clear up confusion over the different meanings these terms have been granted from the beginning. After following the historical trajectory of these concepts, the discussion directs attention to the interpretation of state-building and development as “never-ending” processes, where state structures and institutions in the security, political, sociocultural, and economic domains are to be built and developed while allowing for the smooth implementation of state practices. The multidimensionality of the term development will be understood as development of the whole range of political, economic, social, and cultural progress to which peoples in this context aspire. Efforts have been taken here to elucidate the vague distinction between state-building and nation-building in order to allow for a better and more specific use of these terms in this work. After having defined these two processes by extending their previously narrow theoretical borders through the inclusion of key features such as legitimacy, democracy, and gender, I will suggest that none of these processes can have a chance at success if the rule of law and security, perceived in a holistic way, are not assured. After locating my theoretical contribution within the broad theoretical discourse on this subject, I will also present the central hypothesis of this work. Accordingly, both state-building and development processes will be considered as operating in four major domains, the political, economic, social, and cultural, through the institutional frameworks available in these domains. Any intervention in one of these domains will be perceived as inevitably affecting the others. The aim is therefore to distinguish the relevant mechanisms in each of these domains that influence the processes of state-building and development and that should be taken into account for future 14

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

consideration. The chapter ends with the presentation of a new analytical framework in this field that will be applied in the empirical part. Chapter II gives a short historical introduction to Kosovo in order to better understand why it was selected as a case study for the application of the proposed analytical framework, and to better understand the final results. The other 4 chapters in the empirical section follow a repeated structure. Based on the analytical model suggested at the end of the first chapter, the actors and institutions of each of the 4 domains involved in these processes, are described first through the local setting and actors involved, followed by the international setting and its actors. The third part of each chapter's structure is an analysis of the information presented in the two first parts of the chapter, meant to focus discussion on the key issues that support or refute the hypothesis set out at the beginning of this study. Finally, at the end of every chapter the role of security is examined, perceived in a multidimensional perspective and particularly in terms of the rule of law. Security is regarded as the sine qua non for any undertaken effort, with concrete implications for each of the domains under consideration.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In terms of content, Chapter III focuses on the political domain and examines the variables and mechanisms of political choice including political parties and authority structures, i.e. the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government in Kosovo. In broader terms the analysis focuses on evaluation of the functional capacities of political institutions and the ability of local actors to positively meet the challenge of endogenous stresses and strains. Here the role of political culture in the form of the ability to create alliances and cope with conflict will also be examined. Profound scrutiny of the constellations of power in the Kosovo political landscape will give the reader a better understanding of the actors’ behavior and institutional outcomes under these circumstances. Finally, a depiction of the role of security institutions, their corollaries' functional capacities, and their ability to resist strains in the current Kosovo milieu, together with potential dangers, will offer the missing piece of the puzzle for an examination of this domain. The discussion of the economic domain, Chapter IV, moves beyond the classic state versus market dichotomy, and examines the premises for creating opportunities that make a direct contribution to the expansion of human capabilities and the quality of life. Avoiding this dichotomy, and favoring instead a model similar to that of the Scandinavian mixed economies which integrate these factors, form the main axis of discussion in this chapter. Therefore the author will focus on the availability and capacity of market mechanisms, their enabling environment, and state structures' competence to support such mechanisms through human labor market regulation and the human development agenda. Here the economic strategy, availability, and efficiency of international support and safety nets will be an indispensable feature to be examined, together with the security dimension of the economic field, encompassing not only law enforcement capacities but also the human security agenda. In Chapter V, analysis of the social domain focuses on social capital, including norms of trust, reciprocity, networking, bonding, bridging, and especially gender and its potential to contribute positively in the post-conflict society of Kosovo, as well as 15

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

to influence other domains. Thus the nature and extent of community social relationships, their attitude towards the government, and the role of the civil society, the press, and the media to foster social capital, and their attitude toward the authorities in Kosovo are put at the center of the analysis. As in the previous chapter, the role of international actors in promoting social capital generation will be scrutinized, together with the security premises that allow for such a process to take place. Finally, Chapter VI will focus on the cultural domain and will investigate the premises for building a state image, concentrating on the ability of the current law context to generate a shared and coherent meaning system for society in Kosovo. Furthermore, the role of the master narratives used in public rituals in Kosovo, and the public sphere as a space that encourages participation by all, are two other variables that will be examined regarding their influence on the building of the image of a state. Lastly, the premises under which international actors can transfer a western bureaucratic culture, and a description of the main master narratives that support the building of an image of the state, supported by an analysis of the security factors that support such an attempt, will be explored. The analytical model offered in the end of the first chapter will be presented again at the end of the study with the main findings resulting from the application of this model in the case of Kosovo. The aim will be to show the estimated sustainability of the institutional outcomes reached so far in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

0.3 Research approach and Methodological considerations The subjects explored in this study, state-building and development, are by no means original. Identifying patterns and models to approach them has preoccupied researchers for a long time, and they have occupied a central role in the modern social sciences. Although significant research has already been performed on each of them, any attempt at a combined approach has been more across the lines than fully integrated. This study takes this as a point of departure, and uses a wide range of sources to support the arguments presented in it. The most visible approach includes structural functionalism and makes use of key concepts like structure, referring in a very general sense to the structure of relations between various functionally and territorially differentiated organizations and institutions.7 Hence, apart from the influence derived from the structural functionalism of Stein Rokkan and its total system scheme including force, economy, culture, and law,8 other contemporary research approaches from the political sciences and areas such as anthropology, sociology, history, economics, and gender studies have been applied as well, but in a more limited form. These approaches are used simultaneously in this study, at times contextualizing the agency and considering the political economy and the circumstances under

7.

8.

Rokkan, Stein, Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek W Urwin. 1999. State formation, nationbuilding, and mass politics in Europe : the theory of Stein Rokkan : based on his collected works. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.6 Ibid. p.123 16

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

which it operates, at other times exposing the interdependency of the examined phenomena, and refurbishing the historical reconstruction of facts. This modus follows a circular movement that shifts from the aforementioned theoretical approaches to the real actors and phenomena by examining the concrete implications of them in order to turn back once again to the theoretical standpoint and confirm or negate the outcomes.9 It is understood that this approach can only be possible under eclecticism, but considering the multidimensionality of the subject under scrutiny it would be impossible not to be eclectic. As Stefan Breuer recognizes, not without irony, if it leads to a better understanding of this complex subject and the many different dimensions it entails by bringing some clearance to the labyrinths of knowledge, then the author accepts the eclectic label in good conscience.10 Likewise, the interdisciplinary and holistic approach that this study applies contributes to a better scientific approach through improved categorization and definition at the theoretical level, apart from improving the understanding of phenomena in their entirety.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The author is also aware that social science research proceeds through an interactive process between theory and evidence, which is what determined the examination of the analytical model generated from theoretical discussion through a case study such as Kosovo, which was assumed to offer the best context for verification of the main hypothesis. In this case the methodology employed to test the hypothesis and the derived research questions had to be qualitative in nature due to its emphasis on processes and meanings over quantitative measures of quantity, intensity, and frequency. Here, the empirical research proceeded from a comprehensive review of a variety of studies that had been carried out on pre- and postwar Kosovo, as well as from an examination of the evolving political, social, and cultural situations and their development through references to a number of key analytical texts. During the period of spring-summer 2006, the first interviews with international experts on this issue were held in Vienna. Later, a research scholarship allowed the author to collect data in the field. In Kosovo, interviews were conducted in Pristina and Mitrovica over a two month period from September to November, 2006. Organizations were selected according to their key roles in the development and state-building process in Kosovo. The selection was limited by time and the availability of those interviewed. Considering that the European Stability Initiative (ESI) think tank in Kosovo was the hosting institution for my research period, it was also the first to suggest contacts for the interviews. Later, new subjects were identified by interviewees during the field research.

9.

The author is grateful to Prof. Dr. Eva Kreisky for her contribution to the epistemological considerations of this work through her “Schematic Presentation of the Research Method Manual". 10. Breuer, Stefan. 1998. Der Staat: {Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien}.Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo. p.12 17

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The primary data was thus provided by semi-structured interviews with illustrative samples of experts and institutional employees in the local setting. Considering the topic, the data received was split between two main categories, local and international, and again categorized into four subcategories, the political, economic, social, and cultural domains. The main international organizations contacted were UNMIK and its four Pillars, as well as the office of the SRSG, while the local institutions included representatives of the PISG, various political parties, economic institutions, and civil society actors. Furthermore, crucial aid development agencies like USAID and UNDP, as well as key locally rooted think tanks like ESI, KIPRED, IKS, RIINVEST, ICG, etc, were contacted. It was observed that while local organizations tended to offer high-ranking officials, international donors were represented mainly by local program managers or low ranking officials.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Outside of official written materials, these interviews were considered the most direct means of gaining access to reliable information on past and current practices in Kosovo's state-building and development processes. The interviews were mainly conducted in the Albanian language, but English and German were also used according to the wishes of the interviewees. The instrumentation used was notes and tape recording, although the latter was perceived uncomfortably, especially by local political actors despite clarification at the beginning by the author about the ethical use of the data received. In these cases, notes served as a substitute. On some occasions instead of the semi-structured interviews, significant information was received through background interviews, which gave the informants more freedom and served the author in certain cases to better understand the setting and its rationale. In total 85 people were contacted, which was also the point where adequacy, due to collected data “saturation” levels and understanding, had been reached. Although all the data received contributed to the overall understanding of the phenomenon examined, 35 of these interviews were selected as especially noteworthy and cited in this work. The people interviewed will not be named here due to privacy reasons.11 While efforts were made to obtain the views of local actors, especially local experts involved directly in the state-building and development programs, the author also attempted to maintain a balance with data provided by international actors in order to reflect the highly internationalized context in which these processes operate in Kosovo. Attention was paid as well, as much as the context allowed, to maintaining gender balance among those interviewed. This was a challenge for the author, considering the patriarchal nature of the local context and the international organizations involved. Assessment reports, policy reports, local press archives, and information from a wide range of websites made available to the author by those interviewed, supplemented the data received from the interviews.

11. What will be cited in this work is the profession of the interviewed and their associated institution/organization, as well as the date and venue of the interview. The author preferred not to name the people here in order to protect their privacy and to avoid any misunderstandings that may occur on their behalf. 18

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Finally, it is also important to stress here that due to the fragile political situation at the international level, and for assuring clear and measurable data in a limited period of research time, the cutoff date for the data collected and applied in this study is 31 December, 2007. Even though since that time Kosovo has declared unilateral independence and been recognized by 69 out of 192 states12, including the USA and most European countries, and it has its own flag and constitution, a significant international presence will remain there for some time to come. Thus although the study itself reaches up to 31 December, 2007, the main findings presented here will remain valid even afterwards.

0.4 Clarifying the nomenclature The basic terminology in Kosovo is so contested that it is necessary to make some explanations before the study begins. The author will refer to the territory where the case study evolves as Kosovo because this is the accepted and used English form of the name. Although it coincides with the form used by the Serbs, in contrast to the Albanian usage of Kosove and Kosova, the choice of appellation in this study should by no means be taken as an expression of a political bias. In the same way, the names of other places will be used according to their conventional English language spelling.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

As for the terminology used to describe Kosovo’s residents, in the context of Kosovo where its inhabitants identify themselves mostly as Albanian and Serb, the author decided to avoid the confusion deriving from the taxonomy of the bordering countries, the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Serbia and their respective inhabitants, Albanians and Serbs, by calling the residents of Kosovo rather Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. For the sake of brevity these names were abbreviated as K-Albanians and K-Serbs. The corresponding “Kosovar” and “Kosovac” were generally avoided to save the reader confusion throughout this study. Although in Chapter 6 the proposed common identity referring to the "Kosovar" has an Albanian connotation, the author will use it here to describe a person from Kosovo independently from its descent, and is proposing it as a potential common Kosovo people identity label. Yet, in no case should the terminology used in this study be interpreted as favoritism for any of the sides involved in Kosovo’s conflicted political situation. In plain terms, to use the words of Tim Judah on this issue: “Do not look for bias in place names. There is none.”13

12. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo, Accessed 19/05/2010. 13. Judah, Tim. 2000. Kosovo: war and revenge. New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press. P.xi 19

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

1. Theoretical Considerations: State-building & Development 1.1 State-building: approaches, definitions, concepts "Make for yourself a . . . description of the thing under consideration, so as to see distinctly what kind of thing it is, in its substance, in its bareness, in its complete entirety, and tell yourself the proper name, and the names of the things of which it is composed, and into which it may be resolved. For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically and candidly every object presented in life, and always to look at things to see at the same time what kind of world this is, and what use everything performs in it, and what value everything has in relation to the whole, and what with reference to the individual...what each thing is, of what it is composed, and how long it is in the nature of this thing to endure." Marcus Aurelius14

1.1.1 Making sense of the state and its building There are many schools of thought on state-building. Deciding which is the best definition and choosing the right approach for its examination is very important for this work, especially in regard to the time element involved. I choose to focus mostly to the last three decades of this process and not to concentrate on the classic anthropological and historical definitions of state formation, which analyze the ways in which states were formed and shaped during past centuries. This will not prevent me, however, from making good use of their results. But, before defining state-building, i will firstly delineate here the state and its crucial features relevant to this study. The classic definition of a state for social science students during recent decades has been that of Max Weber, who defined the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."15 With the intensification of globalization, many scholars have been faced with an incrementally changing form of state, which contests Weber's formulation by suggesting that "an organization might qualify as a state whether or not it seeks to legitimize its use of violence, whether or not its authority is deemed legitimate, or whether or not it possesses or seeks to hold a monopoly on coercive authority".16

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Considering the latter description as more appropriate for the purpose of this study, and following Breuer´s arguments in the framework of a modern state, I will make use of his definition for the modern17 state. Here "the legitimate use of force" is 14.

15. 16. 17.

Quote cited from Warren Robert, 1940, in "The State in Society: A Series of Public Lectures Delivered under the Auspices of McGill University, Montreal, January 23, 1939 -February 10, 1939. Oxford University Press. London. p3. Weber Max, 1958, "Politics as a Vocation", in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press, NY, p78 Lustick. S. Ian., 1993, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. p3 The Modern concept used here does not bear any normative connotation whatsoever. It 20

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

not perceived as the main feature of the state: "The speciality of the modern state can not be only the monopoly of violence, as this has already been present in previous phases of state evolution, and neither its sovereignty, but rather in its modus of legitimacy18 which has a rational character"19. Bearing in mind the multidimensional approach mentioned previously,20 I will not apply the definition of Max Weber any further, but will instead utilize the state-in-society approach suggested by Joel Migdal, which differs from the classic Weberian definition and fits the image of a modern state. According to Migdal: "The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by 1) the image of a coherent controlling organization in a territory which is a representation of the people bound by that territory and 2) the actual practices of its multiple parts".21 Especially relevant here is the distinction that Migdal draws between what he calls the images and practices of states. While he stresses that images, implying perceptions, might be similar from state to state and shaped by historical contingence, practices, or the "routine performances of state actors and agencies", have "defied neat categorization"22. The latter can reinforce the image of the state, as visas and passports do, or weaken it. The image makes the state appear as an entity with two kinds of boundaries: 1) territorial boundaries between states23 and 2) social boundaries between the state, its public actors and agencies, and those subject to its rules.24 I have chosen Migdal´s definition for my case study of Kosovo where, as Migdal rightly recognizes, two parallel processes are currently being implemented. The first is the building of practices, while the second is the building of the state image. According to the results of my research, these two parallel and complementary methods of state-building operate in such a manner that the first is more visible and measurable than the second, which remains in the background due to the highly fragile political situation in the region. Thus, while the international community concentrates on building practices for the state including a bureaucracy and state apparatus, the building of an image of the state in Kosovo is also taking place, but is inconspicuous. Furthermore, the literature on state-building has identified several essential dimensions

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

means simply the newest state form. The relationship of legitimacy and state-building will be examined in Chapter 1.1.5 of this study Breuer, Stefan. 1998, Der Staat: Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien, Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo, p162 This approach was mentioned shortly in the Introduction part, 0.3 in this study. Migdal.S., Joel 2001, State in society, How states and societies transform and constitute one another,Cambridge University Press, UK, p 16 Ibid, p16 Cp. with the territorial concept of state from Max Weber in Gerth & Wright Mills, op.cit. p78 Ibid. p17 21

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

for state-building in the form of practices and functions. Some authors stress the capacity of states to function, which in this case means to articulate and aggregate interests, to formulate policies reflecting the welfare of the population, and to implement those policies. From this perspective, states are constructed mechanisms for processing diverse public interests into policies. Hence, state-building focuses on establishing authoritative institutions such as presidencies, legislatures, courts, ministries, local governments, police, and armed forces to carry out these functions.25 We will call these latter processes "practices" and use the concept as Migdal has. There is another dimension to state-building which relates to the legitimacy of institutions in the eyes of the citizenry. State-building requires that citizens are conscious of the state and generally support its underlying values and principles. Historically, states have employed various methods to inculcate popular support and legitimacy. A shared ideology articulating the core values of the state can, especially in successive generations, engender patriotism and loyalty. Symbols may also enhance citizen awareness of, and support for, the state. National anthems, flags, monuments, folk sagas, national myths, and the architecture of public buildings can become focal points for public pride and shared identity. It is not accidental that every postcolonial nation in the twentieth century has employed these symbolic means to forge a concept of statehood.26 Consequently, our case study will show that the process of state-building includes both a process of building state practices into a pristine structure and its institutions, and also a process of building the image of the state as a nation. In this study it is understood that these processes are complementary and typically occur together,27 but in order to delineate state-building for our purposes, we must first examine the evolving discourse on this concept.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1.1.2 Following the trajectory of a concept: state-building It is necessary to first discuss the historical evolution of the discourse on statebuilding and its various connotations, in order to clear up confusion over the different meanings this term has been given. As Waldner suggests: "State-building has multiple meanings, ranging from the initial differentiation of governmental functions from social institutions, to the centralization of power in absolutist states, to the proliferation and rationalization of state institutions."28,29 There is no clear data on when the

25. Smith, Gordon B, ed. 1999, State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future, M.E. Sharpe, NY, p 3. 26. Ibid p4 27. Chapter 1.1.4 elaborate on this issue in detail 28. Waldner, David.1999. State building and late development. Ithaca, N.Y., London: Cornell University Press. p21 29. For further reading on the exemplars of each of these approaches to state building, Waldner suggests Michael Mann, 1986, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to a.d. 1760, Cambridge University Press,; Perry Anderson, 1974, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London: Verso, and Max Weber, 1978, Economy and Society, ed., Guenther 22

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

term itself was first used, but it is clear that the discourse on state-building has evolved on its own. After following this trajectory and examining the different approaches, I will formulate my own definition of it. In their contributions to the study of state formation, and especially of its origins from an anthropological perspective, Service,30 Carneiro,31 Harris,32 etc, have attempted to examine the origins of the state and the forces that led to state formation in the developed world. Through a primarily materialistic cultural approach focused on primitive societies, these authors have drawn conclusions on the origins of state formation. Their research concerns the way that certain state structures come into existence, and the causes and conditions that lead to the building of states. For them, state-formation means simply the building of state structures due to outside material conditions.33 These theories are typically used in a different context, but they can help to explain how certain state structures are created due to the material conditions surrounding a country. Another discourse on state-building theory has appeared in the last three decades. This discourse concerns the degree of involvement of a country´s own government in the evolution of its state-society relations. This discourse considers a state already in a consolidated form, and concentrates on the relation of the state to society and its actors. Analysts like Charles Tilly,34 Peter Evans, and the influential Theda Skocpol35 and Joel Migdal36 reoriented their research toward the capacities of the state and developed theories seeking to explain the expansion of the state in the "first world". Skocpol's work has been very influential, creating a space for what came to be known as the "new institutionalism."37 New institutionalism, recognizing that inanimate ob-

30. 31.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

Roth and Claus Wittich, University of California Press; and Charles Tilly, 1990, Coercion, Capital, and European States, ad 990-1990 Basil Blackwell. Cohen, Ronald., & Service, R. Eleman R 1978, Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues. Robert L. Carneiro, 1970, A Theory of the Origin of the State: Traditional Theories of State Origins are Considered and Rejected in Favor of a New Ecological Hypothesis, in Science, vol. 169, Pt. 2, Sect. 1, No. 16, pp. 733-738. Harris, Marvin. 1978, Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures. London: Collins; and Harris, Marvin. 1990 Our Kind : Who We Are, Where We Came From, Where We Are Going. London: HarperPerennial, etc Cp. Barbara Price 1978, Secondary State formation, in Cohen, R., and Service.E. R, 1978, op.cit. Tilly, Charles.1985, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bringing the State Back In. eds. Peter Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge University Press, 1985, Cambridge, pp. 169-191. Skocpol Theda, 1985, in Bringing the State Back In, op.cit. Migdal Joel S. 2001, State in society, How states and societies transform and constitute one another, Cambridge University Press, UK For overviews of this literature, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Introduction" in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 23

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

jects do not "act", does not employ the concept of state autonomy but rather places institutions at the center of analysis, exploring how certain institutional designs affect the preferences of actors and the processes of political exchange. This definition of state-building refers to "the process of strengthening the relative power of the state vis-à-vis society and other non-state actors."38 In somewhat different terms, statebuilding can also be seen as the expansion of the organizational capacity of the state vis-à-vis society. Thus, state-building involves the expansion of the state's ability to pursue and realize specific policies and goals"39. In a state-building scenario where local and international actors participate, this theory helps to examine the indigenous processes of state building and political change as well as the institutions involved in these processes, especially with respect to state-society relations. At nearly the same time, European authors such as Stein Rokkan tried to develop a macro-model of european political development as a model for state formation, nation-building and mass politics in europe. The key purpose of Rokkan´s work is to combine central issues of classical historical macro-sociology with modern techniques for data collection and analysis, and to impose on the result a stricter form of theoretical systematization and empirical verification. Although Rokkan's strategy was primarily focused on democracy and nation- rather than state-building, and on the formation of military rather than welfare states, it is the state-building process that is of importance to this study. His concept of state- and nation-building is more complex than previous ones and includes four successive phases: □ The initial state-building process or Penetration Phase: a variety of cultural bonds across networks of local power-holders are established and a number of institutions are built for the extraction of resources for common defense, for maintenance of internal order and adjudication of disputes, for protection of established rights and privileges, and for the basic infrastructure requirements of the economy and the polity. □ The II or Standardization Phase includes the addition of larger sectors to the system (including the formation of armies and compulsory schools, as well as an emerging mass media to create channels for communication between the central elite and parochial populations. The media generates feelings of identity with the total political system, which may conflict with previously established identities built up through churches or peripheral linguistic elites.)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

□ The III or Participation Phase brings the subject masses into active participation in the workings of the territorial political system, typically through the establishment of privileges of institutions, the extension of electorates to organs of representation, and the formation of organized parties to

Comparative Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp1-32; and Peter A. Hall and Mary C. R. Taylor Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, in Soltan, Karol. E., Uslaner, Eric. M., & Haufler, Virginia. 1998. Institutions and social order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 38. This definition comes from Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bringing the State Back In. 1985, op.cit. pp. 169-191. 39. Evans, Rueschemeyer. & Skocpol, 1985, op.cit. pp. 351-353. 24

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

mobilize support as well as articulate and aggregate demands. □ The IV Phase or the Redistribution Phase represents the next steps undertaken in the expansion of the administrative apparatus of the territorial state. This typically includes the growth of agencies of redistribution, building of public welfare services, development of nationwide policies for normalization of economic conditions through progressive taxation, and resource transfer from the wealthy to poor individuals or regions.40

It is important to stress that Rokkan was aware of the impossibility of replicating such an itinerary in the newest of nations, especially those emerging from colonial rule, and therefore he insisted that new nation- and state-builders must begin from fundamentally different conditions and consider that they face a “different world".41 Generally, his models were meant to be indefinite, and in them structures prevail over actors, and variables often take the form of simple dichotomies. His fundamental concepts include structure- and boundary-building in relation to the three types of system building; namely the formation of political, territorial, economic, and cultural systems. His basic approach included drafting region-specific models, applying retrospective diachronic analysis, and giving priority to structural comparisons over actor analyses. The theoretical model of Stein Rokkan was mainly based on the Structural Functionalism and Social Systems paradigms. It was a milestone in the evolution of state formation and nation-building theories that laid the theoretical foundation for subsequent state-building attempts in third world countries. Rokkan emphasized the distinction between established western European nation-states and new postcolonial ones. He focused on a unified model of development to explore the possible configurations of conditions causing "slow and stepwise phase movement in the west", as well as sudden and often explosive concatenations of critical issues in the great majority of newly emerging polities of the twentieth century"42.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Notwithstanding his refusal to apply a European model to new postcolonial states, Rokkan still viewed the European developmental sequence as crucial, and suggested that new nations learn to develop new combinations of policies from a detailed analysis of the many facets of the European state-building experience.43 Rokkan´s theoretical framework will assist us in examining the European and international community state-building agendas in our case study, which exhibits the phases mentioned above. After the decolonization period, a plethora of new states appeared in the international arena. In parallel with the discourse on state-building and expansion in developed countries, another discourse was occurring in the third world over the construction of emerging postcolonial states. According to Hinnebusch, who examined the

40. Rokkan, Stein, Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derek W Urwin.1999, State Formation, NationBuilding, and Mass Politics in Europe : The Theory of Stein Rokkan : Based on His Collected Works. Vol. Comparative European politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p130 41. Ibid. p134 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. pp130-131 25

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

state-building process in Arab nations, the process of state-building institutionalizes state structures capable of absorbing expanding political mobilization, and of controlling territory corresponding to an identity community.44 In his view, state-building in Arab countries was accompanied by class conflict because imperialism had fostered dominant classes that privately appropriated the means of wealth production, notably land or natural resources (petroleum), at the expense of peasants. This stimulated plebeian revolts and political mobilization, which fragile state structures could not initially contain. This caused his definition of state-building to be modified to include the expansion and indigenising of imported instruments of rule used in 'primitive power accumulation', a typically violent process entailing the co-opting of some social forces and the exclusion of others. Only gradually after the 1970s did many individual states come to display increased stability as rentier monarchies and authoritarian republics were established as the dominant forms of state in the Arab world.45 The contribution of Vandevalle to the same discourse is also worthy of mention. He focused on the Distributive State, especially the example of Libya and its relationship with oil. According to Vandevalle the process of state-building is "the creation and extension of structures for organizing human political and economic life; that is, the growth of formal government vis-à-vis society, in a so-called rentier state".46 This perspective helps explore another approach to the state-building discourse, observing the effect of the covariance of state-building and legitimacy and democracy factors on the creation of structures.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the post-cold war period and the beginning of the globalization era another discourse emerged considering the influence of organized, active, supranational agents as the norm in state-building agendas. In this view, state-building actors and structures are subject to direct pressure from international consultants, financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, (WB), aid organizations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and western non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The aim of these international organizations is to craft particular political and economic institutions according to “international standards".47 The emphasis of the discourse was no longer on a state's ability to defend its borders, demanding both military and extractive institutions, but instead on its ability to compete economically, which mandates certain representative as well as market institutions. These should include institutions consistent with a democratic political system, a market economy, and free trade, that provide stable property rights and constrain predatory rulers.48

44. Hinnebusch, Raymond.,2003, The International Politics of the Middle East, Manchester University Press.Manchester, England. P73. 45. Ibid. p74. 46. Vandewalle, D., 1998, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, p6 47. Grzymala-Busse Anna Maria, & Jones Luong Pauline, 2002, Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism, in Politics & Society, Vol. 30 No. 4, Sage Publications, p536 48. Ibid. 26

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Su-Hoon Lee was one of the few authors to point out that "transnational factors are significant determinants of the expansion of the state vis-a-vis local society" as he noted the globalization trend at the time. By defining the state as a "social organization,"49 he defined state-building as "the extension or expansion of this social organization for extractive and coercive capacity as well as the capacity to incorporate citizenry"50. Deriving from the globalization discourse and based on world systems theory, his conclusions draw on the fact that state-building in the contemporary "third" world implies strong intervention by the "first" world, especially in the economic domain.51 This perspective on state-building is useful for examining the role of transnational constellations and economic factors in such a process. To expand the debate here, I will point out another type of state-building which has generally been referred to as "third party state-building"52 since the nineties, after previously being called peace-keeping operations. I am referring to post-conflict interventions by mainly UN troops, with the aim of rebuilding institutions destroyed by war or creating those previously absent, and therefore building for the most part a new state from scratch. The definitions of Richard Caplan illustrate the difference between state-building by indigenous institutions and third party state-building. The latter maintains decision-making institutions de jura and de facto in the hands of the international community, and is generally a mission of the United Nations. So, per Caplan, "State-building refers to efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first time, an effective indigenous government in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where the capacity has been seriously eroded."53 Caplan does not describe how effective a government must be for this purpose, but he stresses that in practical terms it depends on the criteria employed to measure effectiveness, and on the precise requirements of the analysts. He adds other criteria for state-building distinct from effectiveness, such as establishment of the rule of law, democratic norms and institutions, and a free-market economy.54

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Another discourse evolving from the same logic has emerged since September 11, 2001. This school of thought follows the security-oriented theories of the 1990s that focused on building or creating new states through the intervention of international, mainly US-led, missions because of the security risk that failed states may represent for the USA and the western world. As the 2002 US National Security Strategy states, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than it is by failing

49. Su-Hoon, Lee, 1988, State Building in the Contemporary Third World, (Ifes Third World Series, No 2) Westview Press, Portland, Oregon, p28 50. Ibid.p28 51. Ibid. p36 52. Caplan Richard, 2004 Jan-March, International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Global Governance, Vol. 10, Issue 1, p4 53. Ibid.p4 54. Ibid. 27

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ones". For Francis Fukuyama, "state-building, which is the the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones" 55, is one of the most important issues for the world community and today has risen to the top of the global agenda".56 Similarly, albeit in a more extreme manner, Robert I. Rotberg predicts that state-building will 'become one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral imperatives of our terrorized time."57 These acclamations are supported by the following facts: in August, 2004, the US government established a state-building department named the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and in February, 2005, the UK government's Strategy Unit Report on Investing in Prevention entitled An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response considered state-building as a key part of its 'partnerships for stability' agenda. The UN also agreed to the establishment of a proposed Peace-Building Commission to coordinate international activity in this area in September, 2005.58

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

During the Cold War, the UN Charter Framework of International Law emphasized the rights of peoples to self-government (Article 1.2), the sovereign equality of member states (Article 2.1), and the principle of non-intervention, by outlawing the threat or use of force (Article 2.4)59. After the end of the cold war, this framework was openly challenged and security concerns were focused on the rights of individuals, often posed as counter to the rights of states. States were no longer conceived of as the primary referent for security, and state sovereignty was no longer considered to be an absolute barrier to external intervention.60 Following the extended intervention in Iraq, ostensibly to protect Kurds and Marsh Arabs after the 1991 Gulf War, the external military interventions for humanitarian purposes in Somalia 1992-1993 and Bosnia 1993-1995, the acme of this new focus on the human rights of individuals rather than the sovereign rights of states was the NATO-led international intervention in Kosovo in 1999.61

55. Fukuyama Francis., 2004, State-building: Governance and world order in the 21-st century, Conrnwell University press, NY p. ix 56. Ibid. 57. Rotberg. Robert., 2004, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair', in R. I. Rotberg (ed.) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p42 58. Chandler David 24 October 2005 How 'state-building' weakens states, in Spiked Essays Accessed on March 2007 online at http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/ 0000000CADDB.htm 59. The UN Charter is available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. 60. For more information see the series of UN Secretary-General reports, starting with the ground-breaking 1992 Agenda for Peace which advocated a new interventionist era, declaring 'The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty…has passed.' in An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Democracy and Development, A/ 47/277 - S/24111,17 June 1992, §17., in http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html 61. Chandler David, op.cit. 28

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

This discourse will be elaborated here due to the new dimensions that the state as category has received through being placed once more at the centre of security concerns. In fact, after 9/11/01 the state-building agenda changed radically. This change is summed up in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy, which described failing states as more of a threat to the United States than successful ones.62 The state is therefore no longer viewed from the reductive perspective of the globalization era. It appears that states marginalized by the global economy, or weakened by conflict, can no longer be ignored or isolated but must instead be supported and aided in building their institutional capacities. This is also why Fukuyama argues for stronger states. I mention these different schools of thought here to make a crucial point: statebuilding is a multidimensional concept that implies a multidimensional process. Bearing this in mind, and reviewing the discourse on state-building to date, I give my own working definition of state-building in the following terms: - State-building includes the fundamental creation of state structures, i.e institutions when they are absent, or the recreation of these structures together with the strengthening of existing ones, within a defined territory. This occurs in the political, economic, social, and cultural domains, and is accomplished by the indigenous population of that territory, with or without the support of international authorities who may take control of, or simply advise existing institutions. After a basic sustainable capacity has been achieved, the state may be able to create the potential for further progress in the four above-mentioned domains in the lives of its indigenous population. For those who value concision, we can say that state-building is a process best expressed by the Zionist slogan: "to build and to be built by"63.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Due to length limitations I will focus mainly on my case study of Kosovo, and use it to illustrate an examination of the meaning of state-building as a multidimensional concept, and to analyze its practical relevance empirically. This examination of the process of state-building will include an examination of its corollaries, and their interdependency with the concept of development. 1.1.3 State-building as a process In a very interesting article, Carneiro argues from a "macro" perspective that stateformation is a continuous process where states form, absorb one another, and die out. He finds that states are generally becoming bigger and fewer, and that this trend is exponential.64 While much of his theory is not relevant to this study, it is interesting 62. Chesterman Simon. 2003, In interview by Priscilla Ryan,, Building a State in Iraq: Is There a Good Precedent? An Interview with Simon Chesterman.Columbia University School of International Public Affairs, Journal of International Affairs. Volume: 57. Issue: 1, p219 63. Lustick, S. Ian Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY. 1993. p26 64. Carneiro R., 1978, Political expansion as an expression of the principle of competitive Exclusion, in Cohen and Service, Origins of the state: the anthropology of political evolution, 29

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

to note the importance of Carneiro's main conclusion, that states are in continuous flux and that they are likely, according to his theory, to disappear as separate entities as they are incorporated into larger units65. Carneiro´s approach refers to all states, primitive and modern, and clearly points out their continuously changing structure. Since the state is considered in most mainstream literature as static, I mention Caneiro's theory here in order to point out additional literature that indicates the continuously changing processes of the state. In fact, most studies on state formation and building have been performed separately from studies of state behavior. This can be attributed to the state "building" metaphor that implies that once a state is "built," it is "finished" and can be observed in operation as an intact, completed entity.66 It can not be emphasized enough that state-building affects the concerned population in a "never-ending" process. Previously, state-building has broadly implied the building of states until they become final structures, despite the continuing participation of multiple external and internal actors. My contribution to demystifying this phenomenon is to stress that contemporary state-building means creating functioning structures and institutions (initially through externally generated processes) until local populations are able to (re)produce and maintain sustainable structures and institutions.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In my case study of Kosovo I will focus on a limited timeframe during this continuous process, and I want to stress that I will concentrate on evaluating the conditions required for a successful institutional building process, rather than analyzing the results of that process. Migdal´s definition of the process of state evolution clarifies that [the state]...is constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its interaction as a whole and of its parts with the others. It is a not a fixed entity; its organization, goals, means, partners, and operative rules change as it allies with and opposes others inside and outside its territory. The state continually morphs."67 How can something that is continuously morphing be created or built? The answer is simple: we do it every day. Indeed, we ourselves are the products of change. Norbert Elias reminds us that "our way of conceiving of human phenomena... makes us feel that one cannot come to grips with observed happenings as flowing events in speaking and thinking". He decries the process of defining change or dynamic processes only in relation to something static, and calls this phenomenon "Zustandsreduktion"(state-reduction). He argues that to see society as it is, one must view it as "it becomes": has become in the past, is becoming in the present, and may become in the future68.

65. 66. 67. 68.

op.cit. p205 Ibid. Lustick Ian. S. 1993, op.cit.p5 Migdal J. S. 2001, State in society, op.cit. p 23 This statement comes from a 1969 interview given in amsterdam. Johan Goudsblom and Stephen Mennell (eds.), The Norbert Elias Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) p 143, Cited in 30

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

This viewpoint fits the role of the state as an ethnic entity as described from the anthropological perspective of Cohen. He notes that the state creates a new role, that of citizen-member, and by doing so it has the capacity to unite differing groups under a centralized polity. So, no matter how ethnically disparate its segments may be, Cohen argues that the polity tends to be a culture-creating social entity which, when given enough time and not too many infusions of new ethnic groups, will cause the state to become culturally homogenous by creating a "polity-induced ethnicity". This process, Cohen concludes, is "continuous and never-ending"69 and "those who see the state as adaptive do not see it as perfect, indeed, adaption means the task is never done, because the environment being tracked is also evolving and changing."70 For Rokkan, state-building is also a four-pronged developmental process. Belonging to the structural functionalist school, Rokkan´s theory of state-formation and nation-building was very much influenced by Talcott Parsons and his social systems theories. Parsons discussion in Societies71 held special theoretical importance for Rokkan, and brought him to a reinterpretation of Parson´s schema. According to Rokkan's theory there are four main elements of state-building that interact with each other. These are shown in Figure1 below: FORCE, CULTURE, LAW, and ECONOMY. In Fig.1, below each of the poles in the two-dimensional field cutting across the central axis corresponds to a set of functional requisites for the development and maintenance of a territorial system. Per Rokkan, the following components must be available: K Some form of organization for the protection of borders through the use of FORCE K Some degree of acceptance of a common CULTURE expressed in linguistic and/or religious terms K Minimal standards for the adjudication of disputes and control of deviant behavior by LAW K The organizations responsible for maintenance of external borders and internal order necessarily depend for their survival on accommodation with agencies of the ECONOMY.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

He also recognizes temporal phases in the struggle to establish or reinforce each prerequisite, and identifies sequences of crises over such issues.72 This was Rokkan´s attempt to analyze political developments as processes of change toward the realization of a set of functional goals, and it has been extensively criticized While developing a parsimonious model of explanation, Rokkan proposed adopting Parsons´ “four-

69. 70. 71. 72.

Migdal Joel S. 2001, p 23 Cohen Ronald. 1978, State origins: A Reappraisal. In Claessen, Henry. J. M, & Skalník, Peter (eds.) The early states. The Hague: Moutoun Cohen Ronald. in Cohen and Service (eds) 1978, Origins of the state, op.cit, p17 Parsons, Talcott. 1966, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. Rokkan, Stein, Flora, P,, Kuhnle, S.and W Urwin. D.,1999, State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe : The Theory of Stein Rokkan, Based on His Collected Works. Vol. Comparative European politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.124 31

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

pronged paradigm of differentiation”.73 Parsons' scheme, which was created to establish a typology for early political systems, posited four clear processes of development from the “primordial community” to one with a low level of internal role differentiation, with a primitive, locally bounded economy, and a structurally embedded system of religious beliefs.74 Alternatively, Rokkan's multilevel model for the generation of structural profiles, presented in Fig.1 above, shows the primordial community tied to the differentiated community through four channels: the legal, military, cultural, and economic. This three dimensional model is utilized by Rokkan for the ordering of questions and data on historical political systems and their similarities/ differences.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This model allows us to characterize subject communities by their level of functional differentiation and dependence on central institutions, and by identifying the ways that they are tied to the total system. It also provides a framework to consider the internal and external resources of the major components of the central establishment, the forms of its alliances, and differences among elite sectors in their ability to marshal resources external to the territorial system. Finally, the model emphasizes similarities and differences in the process of change through time, and causes us to consider the center-periphery links established over time, as well as the responses of the periphery to successive thrusts from the center.75 (See Fig.1 below)

73. Ibid. p124 74. These levels include 1.establishment of regular institutions for settlement of disputes within and across close lineages as well as codification of rules of adjudication, 2. growth of militarily powerful conquest centers imposing physical control over the surrounding population through exaction of food, manpower, and other resources, 3. differentiation of a distinct class of priests, separation of mythology and ritual practices from the social structure of the local population, and incipient growth of world religions and missionary agencies, and 4. differentiation of technical skills from the underlying social structure and the growth of independent cross-local networks of craftsmen, merchants and freighters. Parsons, T. 1966, op.cit 75. Rokkan, Stein, Flora, P,, Kuhnle, S.and W Urwin. D.,1999, op.cit. p125 32

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 1: The basic grid of dimensions/The basic Model (Source: Rokkan, 1999:123)

Furthermore, Parsons' paradigm of functional differentiation inspired Rokkan to include the classification of decision-making systems presented by Hirschmann as exit, voice, and loyalty elements in order to achieve a more complex model of types of boundary transcendence and control in his scheme.76

76. Ibid. p126 33

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

According to Hirschman’s model, there are structures and processes at all levels of life that ensure some minimal maintenance of established systems. These loyalty mechanisms force component parts to stay within the given system. At the same time, there are also structures and processes ensuring communication within and among systems. In Hirchman´s model these are called voice mechanisms and they ensure regular supplies of information from both component parts and external sources regarding conditions that affect the functioning of the system. Finally, crucial to Hirschman´s model are also sources of change at all levels, such as breakdown, transformation, and transcendence. These are called exit mechanisms, and they allow for the transfer of a component part from one system to another, or the crossing of an established boundary.77 In trying to exploit the potentialities of Hirschman’s "exitvoice" paradigm while combining it with Parsons´"four-pronged paradigm of differentiation", Rokkan formulated a 3x4 matrix of Hirschman and Parsons dimensions. This model is presented below: ___________________________________________________________________________

Periphery Center Balance

Functional segments FORCE

CULTURE

LAW

ECONOMY

__________________________________________________________________________

Degree of Peripheral Integration: Entry variables potentially Voice Variables

Strength of extractive agencies, extent of opposition to such agencies

Strength of standardizing agencies strength of counteragencies

Strength of centrallyvs local regional legal traditions

Integration/ imposed separation of primary economy with/from city network

__________________________________________________________________________

Degree of Centre disstinctiveness Exit variables

Balance on internal vs. external resources of military agencies (alliances, territorial temptations)

Distinctiveness versus sharedness of religious and/or linguistic standards

DistinctivenessOpenness vs vs sharedness closure of territorial territorial legal economy system

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

__________________________________________________________________________

Temporal processes of system: -building: Loyalty variables

Penetration: Standardization: state-building Nation-building stricto-sensu

Equalization of rights of participation: Establishment of political citizenship

Redistribution of resources/ /benefits Establishment of social citizenship

__________________________________________________________________________

Figure 2: Hirschman and Parson Combined (Source: Rokkan,1999:125)

77. Hirschman, Albert. O. 1970. Exit, voice, and loyalty responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 34

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

According to Rokkan, this grid of dimensions can be used synchronically or diachronically to analyze changes in the structure of political systems over time. Using a dynamic logic, this model focuses on description at each stage of the successes or failures of efforts towards territorial unification and national identity-building. The grid of variables helps identify major factors in the internal structure that may affect the outcomes of these efforts.78 All the theoretical perspectives presented so far have one concept in common: they perceive the state as a continuos process in itself. Hence, it is logical to conclude that the process of state-building should include multiple processes such as the: K Creation and development of state structures and institutions in the military, political, sociocultural, and economic spheres that allow for dynamic but stable relations between people living inside that state´s territory. K Creation of conditions that allow for the smooth implementation of state practices. K Creation of conditions allowing for sustainable and crisis-resistant state structures, institutions, and practices . K Creation of dynamic but stable relationship(s) between state institutions and inter- and supranational institutions. K Creation and evolution of the state image, as an indigenous process guided principally by its own political elite towards a permanent "ethnic entity".79

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The reality of current state-building processes looks a bit different and entails other common characteristics. These current processes are generally: 1. rapid, taking place over decades rather than centuries like their historical western archetypes,80 2. dominated as much by informal structures and practices as by formal institutions, used to varying degrees by both actors seeking to establish their authority and those seeking to resist it,81 and 3. influenced and sometimes guided by international pressures, such as the influence of the European Union, the USA and international organizations like the UN, WB, IMF, etc. After considering this, I decided to examine a state-building process for my case study that reflects the creation of conditions for successful implementation of state practices and images, perceived as the beginning of a "never-ending" process. Instead of regarding states as static and consolidated results or unitary actors, and therefore concentrating on the emergence of formal structures, my focus is rather on statebuilding that comprises multiple processes as defined above. I will focus especially on the creation and development of structural and institutional frameworks through which policies are made and enforced, with the long-term goals of democracy and sustainability.82

78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

Ibid. p128 See Chapter 1.1.4 for a further elaboration of this concept. Rokkan, Stein, Flora, P,, Kuhnle, S.and W Urwin. D.,1999, op.cit. p134 Grzymala-Busse A, & Jones Luong P, 2002, op.cit, p.531 For a detailed description of the changing nature of the state since its beginnings see the excellent analysis of the State´s organizational phases in: Breuer, Stefan. 1998, Der Staat: 35

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

1.1.4 State-building, vs. nation-building It is essential to distinguish between the terms state-building and nation-building, as they are often confused in the academic literature. Although state-building and nation-building are often used interchangeably in the English-language literature, I deem it important to stress the distinction between the two. In this study the term state-building is intentionally meant to describe the processes described in the previous section, and not nation-building stricto sensu, as it has often been used in these circles 83 The American author who has attempted to clear up this confusion is Fukuyama, who explained that in the USA, the effort, science, or art of state-building has actually come to be commonly known as nation-building. Per Fukuyama, this terminology reflects the national experience of the US in which cultural and historical identity seems to be very much shaped by political institutions like constitutionalism and democracy. Furthermore, Fukuyama argues that Europeans84 tend to be more aware of the distinction between state and nation, and he makes it clear that nation-building in the sense of the creation of a community bound together by shared history and culture85 is well beyond the ability of any outside power to achieve. Consequently he concludes that "...only states can deliberately be constructed. If a nation arises from this, it is more a matter of luck than design."86 This perspective is in line with our argument that, especially in our case study, state-building involving a strong external factor concentrates on building the practices of state, per Migdal, that involve its public authority. Once these structures have reached a certain level of sustainability, we can then become concerned with nationbuilding as the creation of a state image. We must not forget that the latter process as

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

83.

84. 85.

86.

Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien. Orig.-Ausg ed. Vol. 55593, Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo The concept of nation-building was used especially among American political scientists a decade or so after World War II to describe the greater integration of state and society, as citizenship brought loyalty to the modern nation-state with it. So for example Reinhard Bendix focused on the expansion of citizenship and of rights to political participation. (See Bendix, R., 1977. Nation-building and citizenship: studies of our changing social order (New enl. ed ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.) while Karl Deutsch focused on the role of social communication and national integration in nation-building in Western societies (See Deutsch, K.. W. 1963. The nerves of government; models of political communication and control. New York: Free Press.) Compare here Stein Rokkan´s theory of state formation and nation building in Rokkan. 1999 op.cit.. By European "culture," Fukuyama means those parts of the nation that include language and religion, but Wolfgang Reinhard in defining nation includes the territory as well. Cp. Reinhard, W. (1999). Geschichte der Staatsgewalt eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfñgen bis zur Gegenwart. München: Beck. p440 Fukuyama, Francis. 2004, State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, p99 36

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

seen from a European historical perspective has always been guided mainly by the political elite of that country. In fact, nation-building is an evolutionary process that requires time, and is a social process that cannot be jump-started from outside. Examples of this are common in Europe and the rest of the world, i.e. the evolution of Italian city-states into a nation, of German city-states into the Zollverein customs union and eventually a nation, the multiple lingual and cultural groups of France into the nation of France, and the consolidation of China from warring kingdoms, which took a very long time. Nationbuilding has always been a result not only of political leadership, but also of changes in technology and economic processes such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions, as well as in communication, culture, and civil society.87 Within the context of Europe, Reinhard Wolfgang argues that nations, which he defines as "politically mobilized people,"88 exist only in relation to a real or imagined public authority (Staatsgewalt)89. Thus, in the evolution of history, the nation was the dependent variable and the public authority (Staatsgewalt) the independent one. This is why nations in the modern sense can only exist when there is a fully-developed public authority in place.90 The argument that a state should be in place as a fully developed structure before a process of nation-building can take place has been voiced by Leopold Senghor, who argues that in the context of a postcolonial landscape,"...[the colony]...must first become an independent state and only subsequently, the diverse peoples and cultures must be welded into a nation. The state would be an instrument to create a sentiment that transcends local "fatherlands" (tribes and other groups)."91

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

These arguments are central to my study. Following them and Cohen´s arguments mentioned in the previous chapter, it becomes clear that in the final phase of statebuilding as an "ethnic entity,"92 it is states that create a new role for their people: that of the citizen member. Thus, although nation-building will not be examined in detail in this study, I regard it as relevant to the long-term sustainability of the state, and inevitably intertwined with the state-building process. Jacobson also sees an inseparable link between the nation and the state: "The state is not only the 'government', it embodies the national myth, a sense of the national self, even a soteriological promise.... In the age of popular sovereignty the state is rooted in the people and 87. Stephenson, C. 2005, "Nation Building." Beyond Intractability, Burgess G, & Burgess, H. (Eds). Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Accessed on January 2007 online at . 88. "Nation ist das politsch mobilisierte Volk" quoting Alter 1985, 16, in Reinhard, W. 1999, op.cit. p 440 89. Ibid: p443 90. Ibid. 91. Langley 1979, p530, quoted in Holsti, Kalevi. J. 1996. The State, war and the state of war, Cambridge studies in international relations ; 51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.69 92. Cohen Ronald in Cohen and Service, 1978, op.cit. p16 37

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

in representing the people, and when the state is unable to maintain a coherent sense of nationhood, the legitimacy of the state itself is in question."93 Here we can relate to Branthwite who considers the psychological dimensions of "stateness" as another dimension of state-building, which can be connected to the idea of "building the image of state" as coined by Migdal. Branthwite explains that the psychological basis for statehood lies in group identity and the way national and ethnic identities form part of an individual's concept of self. The groups and categories that society assigns us to, or that we feel we belong to, contribute to an identity which gives individuals their character and reputation, a sense of belonging and security, and a distinction from others. Thus the basis for effective psychological statehood, argues Branthwite, lies in three features which are recognized by the people: 1) common shared characteristics such as culture, language, history, and traditional symbols of the country, 2) stable and enduring characteristics authenticated by tradition and passage of time, and 3) characteristics providing positive distinction from other groups. In this way identification with a state leads potentially to cohesion and conformity, so that national identity plays an integral part in welding a country together. Different forms of attachment to the state may be differentially successful in the integration they achieve.94 Hence, Branthwite concludes that "...statehood based on cultural identification is more likely to lead to cohesion and integration in a country, being based on stronger individual commitments to the group as a whole, arising out of the capacity of the country to satisfy individual needs."95

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

For Branthwaite this form of nationality rests on the utility of an image for satisfying collective needs for security, pride, and distinctive identity. By referring to institutional ideology96, Branthwaite describes the strong individual attachment of citizens to the state that occurs by internalizing the ideology of the country and adopting its principles as just and worthy. This depends on the ideology being truly assimilated into an individual's belief structure and not just parroted. It is exactly these values and beliefs that become fundamental justifications for an individual´s way of life. In

93. Jacobson David, 1996, Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship, pp4-6.,quoted in Migdal Joel, 2004, State Building and the Non-Nation-State, Article in the Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58 94. Branthwaite, Alan. 1993. " The Psychological Basis of Independent Statehood." In States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis, 1993(eds.) Jackson Robert and James Alan, Oxford University, NY. p61. 95. Branthwaite, Alan. 1993. op.cit. p62 96. For Branthwite Institutional Ideology focuses on the institutions, 'philosophies' and policies of the group, which are considered right and proper, such as free enterprise, freedom of speech, human rights, etc. 'Our' way of doing things is believed to be the best, whether it be a democratic system or socialist.The essential values of this type of nationalism are moral: people seek to live according to principles which they cherish and which justify their way of life. (Branthwite:1993, p47) 38

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

fact, these different forms of nationality produce different levels of cohesion, integration, and commitment to the state.97 In this way Branthwaite points out the positive effects of the nation by juxtaposing it to the state, without ignoring its negative effects. To support my argument I will quote Max Weber, who stressed that "the sociological meaning of a state is the observer-determined probability that individual action is grounded in the expectation that an authoritative framework for political competition exists, and if such probability is not there, then the state does not exist any more."98 The same point is illustrated by Joseph Strayer, who says "A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people, if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life."99 On this point we also agree with Lustick, who reminds us that the usefulness of juxtaposing state and nation is in showing shows us the constructed nature of states and nations, and their contingency. He also suggests "the potential for stability in their size and shape which can follow from deeply embedded, widely shared, uncontested beliefs"100 Finally, while I agree that in a postmodern globalized world, considering nationbuilding in the classic terms of the 20th century is regressive, I do agree that building nations in modern terms as local entities creating a sense of belonging regardless of the state´s constellation in an international context is a worthwhile goal. Building nations in this sense means creating cohesion in the population, which may influence the long-term stability and sustainability of the state. However it should be remembered that this process must originate from the local population. It is beyond the scope of this work to review the details of nation-building. Therefore I will concentrate mainly on state-building (as defined above) and less on the building of nations in the classic sense. Notwithstanding, as mentioned above these process are intertwined, and I cannot escape the duty of examining the premises available for constructive nation-building in the form of simple institutions built or sustained by indigenous or external actors in order to make the cohesion of diverse populations and their dedication to the state possible. Lastly, it is also within the scope of this study to suggest how these premises can be used or (re-)oriented to achieve peace and prosperity.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1.1.5 Building strong states: The premises of legitimacy based on Kalevi´s theory Holsti Kalevi´s conclusions on state-building indicate that unfortunately, the only currently viable model to follow is the form of the western territorial state.101 In fact, 97. Branthwaite, Alan. 1993. op.cit. p62 98. Weber Max. 1978, quoted and translated in Linz, S. d. G., Juan Jos. (1978). The breakdown of democratic regimes:crisis, breakdown, and reequilibration, Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p100 99. Strayer Joseph R. , 1970, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, N.J, Princeton University Press, p5. 100. Lustick, Ian. 1993, op.cit. p38 101. Holsti, K. J. 1996. The State, War and the State of War. Vol. Cambridge studies in international relations; 51, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p79

39

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

there is no dispute that the modern state is the sole framework for authoritative rulemaking, such that "only one form of political unit is recognized and permitted and this is the form we call the nation-state."102 Charles Tilly emphasizes the relevance of war as a factor in state formation, and Kalevi also maintains that war, in the latter half of the twentieth century, has primarily been used to create states in the western image, and to try to hold them together after their creation.103 As the concept of war is of little relevance here, I will instead focus on an analysis of Kalevi's concept of legitimacy in order to examine its possible implications for my case study. As Kosovo currently exists in a postwar phase, I can identify the prerequisites for building a strong state in terms of legitimacy. Hence, as Kalevi notes, in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the state we must identify those characteristics that contribute to both. Buzan Barry uses a state security perspective to illustrate these characteristics through "three interlinking components": 1) The idea of the state,104 which represents history, tradition, culture, nationality, and ideology. This is the affective aspect of the state; the forces, sentiments, and ideas that distinguish political communities from each other. 2) the physical basis of the state, which includes a defined territory, population, resources, and health, all being variable; and finally 3)the institutional expression of the state, which comprises the machinery of government and regime such as laws, norms, and the incumbent holders of state offices.105

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

For Kalevi these three elements of the state are interconnected, being "necessary if not always sufficient" for a state to remain coherent and maintain its basic functions. By criticizing those in the current literature106 who assess state strength solely by the instrumental capacities of statehood, i.e. the degree of institutionalization, delivery of surplus, capabilities for extraction of resources, etc, Kalevi emphasizes the idea of the state as determinant of its own fate. For him, instrumental conceptions of state strength fail to take note of two important aspects of legitimacy; 1) the principle on which the right to rule is based, known as vertical legitimacy, which entails authority, consent, and loyalty to the ideas of the state, and 2) the intellectual and emotional basis of political community, known as horizontal legitimacy. This entails the definition of the population over whom rule is exercised, and ways of dealing with the political role of the community.107

102. Smith. Anthony D.,1986, "State-making and Nation-building" in Hall (ed.) States in history, Blackwell ny p228 103. Holsti, K. J. 1996. op.cit. 104. On the 1, and 3. component Cp. Migdal 2001, op.cit. and the concepts of image and practices of the state. 105. Ibid. p83 106. Here Kalevi refers to Huntington´s 1968 book, Political order in changing societies, Yale Unversity Press, New Haven, and Migdal´s 1988 book, Strong states and weak states: state society relations and state capabilities in the third world. Princeton University Press 107. Holsti, K. J. 1996. op.cit. p84 40

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Referring to authority and consent, Kalevi makes a clear distinction between the popularity of a government and the legitimacy of the state. In attempting to complement Weber´s famous ideal typology on claims and titles to rightful rule, which consists of legal-rational traditional charisma tic bases of authority, Kalevi presents his own encompassing list of categories that legitimacy can be based on, depending on the historical and cultural setting:108 1) Force and might (or by virtue of a military victory, as in the case of Germany and Japan after WWII) 2) Religion (where authority is validated by the mystic quality of rulers as in the case of priestkings) 3) Heredity (ruler claims authority on the basis of lineage) 4) Leadership attributes (rulers validate their regimes through heroic deeds, or wisdom, as per Plato) 5) Ethnicity (a regime legitimizes itself as the "pure" incarnation" of a "people") 6) Ideological task (a group of leaders claim to have a special, historical task of national redemption, as in the case of Hitler or Milosevic ) or class victory, or "liberation" of the oppressed 7) Consent or contract (rule validated through mechanisms of consent such as elections, plebiscites, popular revolutions, or elite arrangements for sharing leadership, etc ) 8) Task achievement (rule validated through success in achieving a political/military endeavor, and for succeeding at the task of leadership during liberation movements) Figure 3: Grounds for State Legitimacy (Source: Adapted from Kalevi. 1996:86)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This in-exhaustive category list109 is of course written from the perspective of the rulers, therefore if it is not accepted by large segments of the population, either the rulers' claims must change or the rulers themselves must. When legitimacy claims concur with popular expectations, the result is a strong state. In this way, indicates Kalevi, rule is based on consent of one form or another, while legitimacy, per Rodney Barker, is "precisely the belief in the rightfulness of the state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority."110 It appears that to most current scholars, rule based on explicit consent through periodic elections is the only sustainable basis of vertical legitimacy. Horizontal aspects of legitimacy refer to the attitudes and practices of individual groups toward each other and to the state that encompasses them. Horizontal legiti108. Ibid p.86 109. I have to specify here that the list´s tabular presentation of these categories is not available in the book as such, but is the author´s adaptation of the book´s content on this issue. 110. Barker, Rodney, 1991, Political legitimacy and the state, Oxford University Press, p11, quoted in Holsti, K. J. 1996. op.cit. p87 41

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

macy can be high or low, and when lacking it presents a danger for the state. In this case, vertical legitimacy also appears as a danger to the state and its institutions if the political elite attempt to build a stronger foundation for their "right to rule" by excluding some segment of the population and creating an internal scapegoat for the regime's failures. Accordingly, any state, regime, or community that bases legitimacy on exclusionary categories contains an inherent weakness.111 My aim in this study is to examine an example of the state-building process to determine which dimensions of vertical and horizontal legitimacy contribute to the strength of a modern state. Vertical and horizontal legitimacy are composed of sentiments or habits based on a variety of institutions, norms, rules, practice, and attitudes. According to Kalevi, legitimacy in most modern states is performance-based, and the state must earn and maintain its right to rule through the provision of services including security, law and order, and a range of public welfare measures. Breuer also confirms that the defining characteristic of a modern state cannot be simply a monopoly on violence, as in previous phases of state evolution, or its sovereignty, but rather its modus of legitimacy must have a rational character. This happens in two ways: 1) obedience to objective orders legally implemented in an impersonal way, and 2) the idea that, in principle, this order can be changed any time.112 Bearing this in mind, I present Kalevi's list of eight prerequisites for (vertical and horizontal) legitimacy, forming a scale by which the strength or weakness of a state can be estimated:

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1) A fundamental prerequisite of vertical legitimacy is an implicit social contract; an implicit bargain between the state and the political community in the form of a reasonable balance between the demands of extraction by the state, and the expectation of service deliveries and participation by the population. 2) Consensus on the political "rules of the game" expressed as a reasonable agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game, in Buzan´s terms, the "institutional expression of the state."113 3) Equal access to decisions and allocations based on the basic rule that no group within the community is excluded from seeking political power and enjoying benefits.114 Per Kalevi: "There can be no strong sense of community within the state, if one segment of its population is proscribed from participating in politics in all its dimensions, or is systematically excluded from state

111. Holsti, K. J. 1996. op.cit. p88-89 112. Here the translation is mine, so I will present it in the original German to avoid misunderstandings: 1. gehörsam gegenüber einer „legal gesetzten sachlichen unpersönlichen Ördnung 2) und die Vorstellung dass diese Ordnung prinzipell änderbar ist" in Breuer, Stefan. 1998, Der Staat:Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien. Orig.-Ausg ed. Vol. 55593, Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo, p.162 113. Buzan, B. 1991. People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. p65, quoted in Holsti, K. J. 1996, p92 114. Although this is an important component of horizontal legitimacy, I stress that for Kalevi this component alone is not a sufficient condition for maintaining both vertical and horizontal legitimacy. 42

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

allocations of funds or services."115 4) The clear distinction between public and the private gain, relating to the distinction between the public and personal and rejecting the state as a platform for personal enrichment.116 5) Effective sovereignty where the state and its institutions are responsible (at least theoretically) for providing law and a reasonable amount of order, and so are internally sovereign. Hence the state has a legitimate use for force and "effectively controls or prevents illegitimate public or private violence".117 6) Ideological consensus vs. pragmatic politics: politics in strong states is more instrumental then fundamental, and has more to do with technical issues of means and priorities, than with the ends and causes. 7) Effective civilian control of the military, such that if the military takes over, then normal political activity is definitely excluded.118 8) International consensus on the territorial limits of a country, which means that its international legitimacy derives from recognition from outside the state. Thus political legitimacy must be also won from outside. If a nation is to participate fully and conventionally in international affairs, not only must the domestic population believe in their rulers' right to occupy office, but foreign states must recognize this authority diplomatically.119 A state, argues Kalevi, whose frontiers are contested or are not recognized internationally is inherently weak in the framework of a global world and division of labor. The basis for vertical and horizontal legitimacy is definitely of modern character and probably derives from a single political tradition, since most of these criteria are found in modern democracies and their underlying political philosophies. It must be stressed that these criteria are more dimensions than absolutes, and states that score high on all remain recognized as ideal types. It is rather a model which shows that even though states cannot compel their citizens to love one another, they can do a lot in regard to promoting tolerance and preventing discrimination. The same goes for other fields such as political, social, and economic inclusion.120

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 4 below serves as an illustration of Kalevi´s model of legitimacy. The three dimensions of the state per Buzan are in fact interrelated, but not sufficient to explain state weaknesses, so Kalevi adds the critical variable of legitimacy to it. Legitimacy is conceived in the two dimensions mentioned before: the vertical in the form of "the right to rule," and the horizontal as the limits and the criteria for membership in the political community being ruled. These two dimensions are interrelated in important ways and each of them is linked to the three Buzan components of the state. Sources of vertical and horizontal legitimacy are listed below them in no particular order, in

115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

Holsti, K. J. 1996. op.cit, p93 Ibid. p94 Ibid. Ibid p95 Rosen Stanley. and Hays, Peter. G. (eds.) 2004, in State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. Routledge. New York, p 195. 120. Ibid p96 43

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

close relation to the three state components situated in each corner of the triangle. This model by Kalevi should illustrate the arguments above in a concise way.

Figure 4: Relationships between State and Legitimacy (Source: Kalevi 1996:98)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Further on, I will examine the implications of this theoretical model for my case study of Kosovo. 1.1.6 State-building and Democracy Stefan Breuer has attempted to analyze the differences between modern and historical states.121 According to him, the difference lies in the rationality of the modern state, which from the structural perspective derives from capitalism´s objectifying effects, while from the actor´s perspective (Handlungstheoretisch), it derives from the

121. For Breuer the State is an organized system and an effectively legitimate authority (Herrschaft) 44

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

attempts of governed or dominated people to create an objective foundation for politics, administration, and law. Historical attempts to achieve this rationality are described by Breuer as "democratic revolutions."122 Meantime, when elaborating on the relationship between the rational state and democracy, Breuer insists that we must note the differences between existing types of democracy. Based on Weber´s consideration of democratic legitimacy,123 Breuer presents two main forms of democracy for consideration: 1) "eine erste, die ihre Anstrengungen darauf richtet, gleichsam den Augenblick der Umkehrung, in den Worten Victor Turners, den Schwellenzustand, die Antistruktur, festzuhalten und auf dauer zu stellen, und 2) eine zweite, die sich um den Aufbau neuer Institutionen bemüht und dabei Kompromisse mit den Alltagstypen der Herrschaft eingeht"124. By including the difference between the objective and subjective order, upon which Weber has based his authority types (Herrschafstypologie), we get four possible combinations of democracy: K. The first is the relation between the anti-structure and subjectivity which results in a kind of "allegiance democracy" (Gefolgschaftdemokratie)

K. The

second is direct (Versammlungsdemokratie)

democracy

or

"conventional

democracy"

K. The third is representative democracy, which is available only through "free representation".

K. The fourth is a combination of subjectivity with rational everyday forms of authority like administration, called "plebiscitary democracy" 125

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

From these four types of democracy, argues Breuer, only a combination of plebiscitary and representative democracies has reached a long term solution, with an elective affinity with the rational state.126 Based on this typology, Breuer differentiates between a democratization process based on a gradual appropriation of decision-making authority by representative bodies, which has a specific outcome for the rationalizing process, and a democratic revolution following abruptly occurring discontinuities. The first case produces a weakly limited "permeable" bureaucracy, while the second one a strongly limited, impermeable, almost autonomous organization that claims to handle in an objective way the interest of the public, independent

122. Breuer, Stefan. 1998, Der Staat: {Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien}. Orig.-Ausg ed. Vol. 55593, Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo, p168 (italics mine) 123. Cp.Weber, Max. 1976. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft:Grundriss d. verstehenden Soziologie (5., rev. Aufl ed.). Tübingen: Mohr, p156 124. Breuer, S. 1998, op.cit. p16. The English translaton of this text is: the first form which is preoccupied with maintaining the moment of change in form of an anti-structural lasting wave, and the second, preoccupied with the building/dev. of new institutions by making thereby compromises with everyday types of authority. 125. Ibid p169-173 126. Ibid p175 45

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

of individual preferences. These cases are illustrated historically by England (the former) and France (the latter).127 Breuer´s process of rationalization, or legitimization through democratic measures, is very similar to Rokkan´s democratization process, where the democratization of a polity is a process in which collective action and institutional change interact. Normative rules and effective procedures set limits or provide opportunities for action, and in turn come under pressure for change from collective movements128. The core of Rokkan's analysis of democratization as a process of institutionalization is his distinction between four thresholds, or locks as he calls them. He uses the image of a political movement which must overcome four successive barriers on its way to the centre of political decision-making (through a territory and through a social structure);129 1) the barriers to political opposition, or the legitimation phase, 2) political/electoral participation or the incorporation phase; 3) access to parliament or the representation phase; and 4) participation in government or the executive power phase.130

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 5: The four thresholds of democratization (Source: Rokkan,1999: 25) 'Dependent variables' (and variations)

Hypotheses (and 'independent variables')

(1) Legitimation of opposition: effective recognition of civic rights, esp. to communicate and organize (against power-holders) (early/late, easy/difficult, non-violent/ violent)

(1) The stronger the tradition of representative rule, the greater the chances of early legitimation of opposition and the slower and more continuous the process of enfranchisement (continuity of representative traditions).

(2) Incorporation: extension and equalization of political rights, esp. of suffrage and eligibility (of underprivileged strata) (early/late, step-by-step/sudden, continuous/ reversals)

2) The longer the history of continuous centre-building, the slower and more continuous the process of enfranchisement (state formation).

(3) Representation (access to): transition to electoral procedures easing the access (of minorities) to representation in the legislature (majoritarian/proportional representation)

(4) The greater the ethnic and/ or religious heterogeneity of the citizenry, the higher the pressures for PR (cultural heterogeneity).

(3) The higher the status of the dominant country, the higher the barrier to legitimation in the dependent territory and the more sudden the process of enfranchisement (geopolitical position).

(5) The more advanced the urbanization and monetarization, the higher the pressures for PR (economic differentiation). (6) The smaller the polity, the higher the pressures for PR (ease of communication, international dependence).

127. 128. 129. 130.

Ibid. pp175-176 Rokkan, S, 1999, op.cit p.24 Ibid. Ibid. 46

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

(4) Executive power (access to): introducing cabinet responsibility to parliamentary majorities, and improving the likelihood of minority participation in the executive (early/late cabinet responsibility, high/low chances of minority participation)

7) The likelihood of minority participation in the executive increases with (8) (a) the distance of largest party from majority point (party system); (b) the closeness and 'negotiability' of policy alternatives (cleavage structures); (c) the pressures from the international environment (geopolitical position, size of polity).

Rokkan´s attempt to offer explanations for these barriers, limited to single variables and relationships, is illustrated here in Figure 5. In this sense, for Rokkan democratization means first an institutional improvement of the opportunities for political participation, and secondly the influence available to the population of a territorial system via the removal, albeit never total, of the four above-mentioned barriers through the processes mentioned by Breuer above. By describing the typical sequences as processes of democratization and mass mobilization, Rokkan argues that any rising political movement has to pass through a series of locks or thresholds on its way inwards towards the core of the political system, and upward towards the political arena of decision-making131. He also adds that empirical changes in one of the thresholds will sooner or later generate pressure for change in the others, depending on the timing of the decision by the concerned polity.132 Rokkan's comparative analysis describes and explains the critical stages and major variations in the development of the rules of the electoral game in Europe since the late Middle Ages. While studying the development of European democracies, Rokkan also focused on civic participation in political decision making, which he considered an important factor for the democratization of Europe. He distinguished between three channels of citizen influence on decisions affecting the territorial collectivity: 1) the traditional channel, characterized by the resorting to kinship ties and local notables, 2) the electoral channel, characterized by formal rights of participation and standardized rules of representation; and 3) the organizational channel, characterized by recourse to collective action through functional associations organized across a variety of localities within the national or federal territory."133

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Although he identified the mass media as an additional channel of influence on government decision-making,134 he focused largely on the two channels that he called the 'electoral-territorial' (or the 'territorial-numerical') and the 'corporate-functional', expressed in his concept of a 'two-tier system of decision-making' as shown in Fig. 6.

131. Rokkan, S, 1999.,op.cit., p246 132. Ibid. p247 133. Rokkan, S, 1961, Mass suffrage, secret voting and political participation, Published in European Journal of Sociology, 2-1. p132 134. Rokkan, S.1966, Norway: Numerical democracy and corporate pluralism, pp. 109-110, in Dahl Robert. (ed.), 1966, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 47

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Figure 6: The two channels of decision-making (Source: Rokkan 1999:246) Electoral-territorial channel

Corporate-functional channel

Mass citizenry Formal equality ('one man - one vote') within territorially defined electorates ↓ Structuring of electoral alternatives: systems of political parties

Resource holders Inequality in the distribution of key resources (between citizens and foreigners) ↓ Structuring of resource organization: systems of corporate groups

Resources

- capacity of enfranchised citizens to give or withdraw electoral support, - capacity of other citizens to activate the moral commitments of enfranchised citizens, - capacity of all citizens to give or withdraw loyalty to the total political system.

capacity to mobilize, to control, particularly, to withdraw key resources: - commodities (farmers and energy agencies), - labour and services (unions/professional associations), - investments and technological innovations (corporate business).

Government

Government Interest of actual or potential office holders to maintain/gain the electoral support of voters as well as the attachment of all citizens to the polity. As the guardian of the rights of all citizens of its territory, the State enforces social and economic rights, legitimized through the electoral channel.

Interest of actual or potential officeholders to maintain/build up a stable economic basis for the state's staff and services, ultimately for its capacity of solidarity-building. As a member in the circuits of negotiations in the corporate channels, the State offers rights and rewards to groups controlling key resources.

State

The State constitutes the crucial link between the two channels of decisionmaking, as it embodies the legal order of the territory and holds the monopoly of the legitimate use of force:

Actors

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

-it claims the right to represent the solidarity of the citizen -it claims legitimacy beyond and ry, to embody a common identity above all temporary agreements

As it is typical of Rokkan, these analyses take the form of historical sketches and rudimentary explanatory models. Most changes and variations are only roughly classified, which makes it difficult to use his theory directly for my case study. Although Rokkan's model concerns mainly the European situation, we will keep his basic theoretical model in mind while exploring the case of Kosovo. There are also three other modern schools of thought providing useful frameworks for thinking about the relationship between state-building and democracy. The first regards state-building as a prerequisite for democracy, while the second notes the difficulties of installing democracy after the fact, and the third suggests a mutual depen48

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

dence between state-building and democracy. Especially relevant to this study are the conclusions of Linz and Stepan, who state that “democracy is a form of governance of a state. Thus, no modern polity can become democratically consolidated unless it is first a state.”135 They focus on the under-theorized and barely analyzed problem of "stateness", variously defined as the enforcement of “a claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory,” and as “the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract".136 They conclude that democratization requires among other things, “a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic regimes”137 Unfortunately, the formulations of Linz and Stepan can be confusing, in that at times they see stateness as a precondition for democratic consolidation, but at other times they portray “a usable state” as merely an arena of democratic practice, and they do not elaborate further on the abstract notion of stateness.138 Rose and Shin´s theory is more precise on this point, elaborating the stateness argument as follows: “While free elections are necessary, they are not sufficient for democratization. In many third-wave democracies, something is missing, but what is it? This answer they say is simple: the basic institutions of the modern state.”139 The answer to this question is very important for this study as it makes clear the necessity of institutions. Rose and Shin´s theoretical contribution puts forward a crucial point; nations of the first world, labeled as first-wave democracies, developed a modern state before universal suffrage was introduced, and then democratized towards a vibrant civil society and accountable governance based on an institutional foundation of the rule of law. By contrast, since 1975 third world countries have often democratized backwards by introducing mass elections without the benefit of those key institutions. “The governors of these new democracies thus face a double challenge: completing the construction of the modern state while competing with their critics in free elections.”140

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Although the distinction between democratization forwards and backwards is compelling, it blurs the boundary between state and democracy for this study. However, the theoretical perspective on the relevance of the institutions of the modern state and their positioning vis a vis western democracies will be examined below.

135. Linz, Juan., & Stepan, Alfred.1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. p7 quoted originally in Bratton Michael. and Eric Chang. 2006, State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa Forwards, Backwards, or Together? Michigan State University, African Political Regimes, in Comparative Political Studies Vo. 39 Nr. 9 Nov, Sage Publications p1080 136. Ibid. pp7-16 137. Ibid. p11 138. Bratton M. and Eric Ch. 2006, op.cit, p1062 139. Rose, Richard and Shin, D. Chull 2001. Democratization backwards: The problem of thirdwave democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 31, pp331-354 140. Rose & Shin, 2001. op.cit p336 49

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Another crucial contribution to the theory of state-building and democracy is Hadenius141 work which explores their connection further. Through a comparative historical approach, he argues that the emergence and consolidation of democracy requires a special kind of state. “Only certain institutional arrangements, tied to a certain mode of state, promote the evolution of the coordinated capacities required for the practice of popular rule.”142 Hadenius evolves the concept of the so-called “interactive state" which should be open for discourse in regulated ways with its citizens, including arrangements that lay the groundwork for political accountability. This form of state originally arose in parts of Western Europe and North America where “no decisions of any import could be made without negotiating with society’s leading groups”.143 The critical point in Hadenius study is that state-building initially facilitated regime change when aristocratic groups held the king accountable, but only later, when state authority was legitimized by democratic consent, could one talk about democratization. It should be emphasized that Hadenius includes elements of democracy in his conception of the state by stressing that states must enter interactively into accountable partnerships with civil society. This requires the decentralization of government authority, mobilization of civil society, and establishment of rules governing the relationship between citizens and the state, all central elements of the process of democratization.144 Consequently, democratization introduces institutions that link citizens to the state, while state-building increases capacities to improve mass welfare, and hence strengthens democracy. Vice versa, the decay of the state and the corruption of elites together contribute to a downward spiral of disorder and deprivation. This study will explore the conclusion of these authors that whatever the outcomes of state-building and democratization, they are both integral parts and equally important priorities best considered together and will therefore examine issues that deal with the current democratization process and the state structures, and their mutual dependence.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I will make one last remark here in order to consider another dimension of democracy as described by Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson in their studies of Russia. These authors argue that in in the case of ex-communist states, there is a tendency to identify the economy with the political system and to include economic elements such as the availability of consumer goods as part of their definition of "democracy."145 For the Russian sociologist Iuri Levada, this perception of democracy comes from the profoundly paternalistic orientation of the populace. He argues that the pa-

141. Hadenius, Axel. 2001. Institutions and democratic citizenship. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p130 142. Ibid. p131 143. Ibid. p199 144. Bratton M. and Eric Ch. 2006, op.cit.p1063 145. David S. Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, Changing Public Perceptions and the Crisis of Confidence in the State: The Yeltsin Legacy, 1999, in Smith, Gordon B, ed., StateBuilding in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future, M.E. Sharpe, NY, p163 50

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

ternalist mentality perceives democracy first as the gracious care of the ruling elite for its subjects, and obedience on behalf of the latter. This is clearly illustrated by public opinion surveys which invariably show that democracy is closely associated with order and material well-being. Here neither democratic participation nor democratic control over authorities is considered as important as these factors. This close identification of economics and politics makes a major turnaround in political trust unlikely until there is considerable improvement in economic circumstances. This final dimension is mentioned here as a contribution to the perception of democracy which will be examined in the case study.

51

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

1.2 Development: approaches, definitions, concepts 1.2.1 The confounding concept of development Much has been written concerning development and its corollaries. This term did not originate in the modern social sciences, but was appropriated from the French language, and the Oxford English Dictionary gives ten variations of its meaning. The first reference is from 1752 and quotes the French word développement in an English sentence.146 The earliest English uses refer to "development" as the unfolding of events or ideas according to someone's design or plan (presumably God's) in relentless stages, while later references point to the biological sequence of change from a seed to a flower. Further on, development described evolutionary biological change within the paradigm of Darwinism. The term appears also in the writings of Marx, where it refers to economic changes in society that are more qualitative than quantitative. In the meantime, classical economists regarded development as a physical transformation of land, labor, and capital into forms of greater economic productivity.147 "Development" and "growth" were considered synonymous in these conventional sources. The point is that after being used often and in a multiplicity of disciplines, development has lost its real meaning and it has become an almost empty concept.148 As Wolfgang Sachs notes: ...development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape ....the outdated monument to an immodest era. It has become a shapeless word denoting a concept of no content, which functions to legitimize planned interventions to solve the latest problem or crisis evident in the so called developing world, and all in the name of a higher evolutionary goal."149 Generally, development can be approached in two ways; analytically or normatively. In the former, it means a dynamic unfolding process that evolves, has its ruptures, and then re-evolves. It is understood as a process of the market and its functions, where the money metric dimension is primary. The latter approach attempts to determine what development should be in order to serve not only the market economy, but as Sen puts it, “to be a momentous engagement with freedom’s possibilities.”150

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

My definition of development will entail both the analytic and normative approaches. When analyzing which normative elements should be included in the concept of development, I will also examine international development theories and the

146. The Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, Oxford University Press, pp280-281 147. For more information see Meier Gerald, & Baldwin Robert. E. 1957, Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy. New York: Wiley. p1 148. Cp. Dirmoser, Dieter, Gronemeyer, Reimer, Rakelmann, Gerogia A. (Hrsg.) 1991, Mythos Entwicklungshilfe, Gießen. p13 149. Sachs, Wolfgang. & Schade, K. Friedrich 1991. Zur Archäologie der Entwicklungsidee: [acht Essays] Frankfurt: Verl. für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. p.10 150. Sen, Amartya K. 1999, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p10 52

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

evolution of this concept. Although I am aware that these theories may be somewhat controversial, it is only by juxtaposing their arguments that I will be able to discuss their perspectives and achieve a certain level of agreement. Such an approach will underpin my holistic approach by highlighting its dynamic character and being open to changes in future theoretical discussions. I agree that it is difficult to find a developmental concept that is accepted by everyone, considering the fact that in the scientific discourse, its meaning has been fragmented in a way that has removed its holistic character. Economic and socioeconomic definitions, for example, generally do not consider the anthropological and theological dimensions of the concept.151This fragmentation of the concept has also been noted by Michael Haas, who reiterates that the sociologists and political scientists who decided to use the term after World War II initially maintained the etiquette of the social sciences, with sociologists talking about "social development" and political scientists talking about "political development," thereby leaving "economic development" to economists. This continued until the late 1960s, when it become clear that these artificial distinctions no longer worked.152 For Haas the problem of defining "development" is more than simply lexical, it generates a conceptual dilemma composed of two questions. The first, dealing with the values of development, asks if the the goal of development is to reach a more physically comfortable world, or rather to achieve a life in which individuals have greater consciousness and personal fulfillment? The second, more a metaphysical question, asks if the process of development is just a sequence of economic decisions and events that leads to a psychological transformation, or if ideas must change in a society before certain economic decisions and events can proceed? For Haas, when deconstructing the paradigms of development, we end up with a dual focus; 1) a better way to understand alternative renderings of "development" by recalling the historical context in which theories of development arose, especially after WWII, and 2) the challenge of paradigms of development in accounting for developmental success in some societies but not in others, producing a diversity of explanations and a plethora of metaphysical formulations, which will be explored below.153

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1.2.2 History and evolution of a controversial term Before modern times, as Hünnermann notes, the concept of development was more of an anthropological and teleological one.154 For example, Leibnitz used the concepts of "evolution, developpement, and enveloppement" as self-explanatory meanings referring to the unwrapping of something available but still not accessible.

151. Hünnermann, Peter. 1990, Die übersehene Dimension. Anthropologisch-theologische Bedingungen der Entwicklung, in Weber Herman, (Hrsg), 1990, Entwicklung: Der Begriff und die Praxis (KAAD), Bonn, pp44-63 152. Haas Michael, 1992, Polity and Society: Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Science Paradigms, Praeger Publishers. New York. p15. 153. Ibid p15-17 154. Hünnermann, Peter. 1990, op.cit, p49 53

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

This reflected the philosophical thought of the 18th and 19th centuries, which related the concept of development to the optimistic view that individuals and societies were capable of creating a continually better world based on their capacities. Thus, development meant a process that was moving forward, constantly changing, and granting deliverance. Concerning this issue, Kant stated that while all creatures of this world are destined to develop fully and purposefully through their existence, humans are the only ones who make their development possible through their own activity.155 Following this logic, it is natural to relate to the current discourse on development that maintains development cannot be achieved by others or from outside, and therefore designates a process to be achieved mainly by the people in need of development.156 This is why I argue strongly in this study that developmental aid should be provided only to enable the evolution of peoples´ own abilities to solve their own problems. I will come back to this perspective at the end of this unit, after considering a selection of historical concepts of development. For the classical economists, development and growth were seen as closely connected with the distribution of products among different social groups, and the creation of surpluses by the production apparatus, as determined by technical production conditions. For Adam Smith and David Ricardo, development depended mainly on the surplus quota that flows to capitalist entrepreneurs as profit.157 For Marx and Engels, on the other hand, development is inevitable and results from an interconnection of the sectors of the economy and the polity. The universal stages of primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and eventually industrial communism reflect shifts in class dominance and struggles between rival classes in pursuit of selfinterest, and thus economic development. From this perspective, there is no "invisible hand" guiding the process, but instead there is a very visible dialectic struggle between the classes. Political changes therefore occur in response to changes in the modes of production.158

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It was Schumpeter who first distinguished between growth and development by moving away from the neoclassic school and its definition of development, while remaining within the same paradigm. For him, growth was “a gradual process of

155. Weyand, Klaus. 1963. Kants Geschichtsphilosophie: ihre Entwicklung und ihr Verhältnis zur Aufklärung (Kantstudien. Ergänzungshefte; 85). Köln: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag. The text is an adaptation of the following original German version: " alle Natureinlagen eines Geschöpfes bestimmt (sind), sich einmal vollstandig und zweckmäßig auszuwickeln", die Menschen aber "durch ihre eigene Tätigkeit die Entwicklung... dereinst zu Stande" bringen müssen" 156. Nohlen, Dieter, Nuscheler Franz. (Hrsg). 1993, HDW1, Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien. 3. Aufl., 1.Tsd ed. Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, p58 157. Di Muro Pasquale., Monni. Salvatore., Tridico Pasquale., 2006, Developement theories, economic policies and institutions: a dialectical evolution, in Demologos Project Working Papers, Available online at http://demologos.ncl.ac.uk/wp/wp1/disc.php. Accessed May 2007, p5 158. Haas M, 1992, op.cit p19 54

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

productive expansion where several goods of the same type are produced with the same methods,” while development was “a complex phenomenon leading to the total transformation of productive processes including the introduction of new goods.” Keynes preferred the neoclassical paradigm and perceived development as simply the progressive growth of the endowment of fixed capital.159 In fact, development became a distinct topic in economics only after WWII, and thus only then did growth and development evolve as distinct analytical and methodological terms. In this period theories of development generally followed the two main theoretical and philosophical schools of 18th and 19th century European thought mentioned above. Although both are concerned with the wealth of nations, they differ fundamentally on how development and growth should be achieved and how their benefits should be distributed within a society. For classicists and (neo)liberals, the interests of nations and social classes are compatible and harmonious, while for Marxists, dependists, and radicals, a definite conflict of classes and interests exists, requiring either radical social engineering or revolutionary change.160 In order to understand development, we must consider the role of social science in studies of change and development. Social sciences, especially sociology, were originally focused on the grand historical events marking change, be they revolts, new laws, technical inventions, or upturns in national productivity. Social science was founded in part to understand how the world's most productive societies of 19th century Europe could also produce such high levels of poverty. As many studies of European economic history have shown, changes occurring between the 12th and 19th centuries completely reshaped European society.161 Older societies, embedded in different types of personalistic feudalism, gave way to a single type of society based on a market economy focused by the differentiation of productive tasks162.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Consequently, classical sociologists who focused on changes in society described them in a variety of ways. Weber called it the `rationalization' of society. Marx wrote of the "alienation of labour from its product", and Durkheim discussed a newly differentiated labour market where before there had been only homogenous "mechanical solidarity." In this way, each theorist focused on changes across both society and social relations, and did not assume that a differentiated economic sector had always

159. Di Muro et.al., 2006, op.cit. pp6-7 160. Black, Jan. K. 1999. Development in theory and practice: paradigms and paradoxes. Boulder, Colo; Oxford: Westview. p22 161. Cp. the work of Polanyi, Karl. 1957, The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times. Boston: Beacon Press; Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Vol. Studies in social discontinuity, New York: Academic Press; Braudel, Fernand. 1988, La Dynamique Du Capitalisme. Paris: Flammarion; Durkheim Emile, Simpson George. 1968, The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press. 162. Waters Tony., 2000, The Persistence of Subsistence and the Limits to Development Studies: The Challenge of Tanzania. Published in Africa Journal, Vol. 70. Nr.4, Edinburgh University Press. p614, 55

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

been preeminent, as is now assumed by modern capitalism. They were concerned with the destruction of the old order, and not just the internal dynamics of the new. Unlike modern development theorists, (who will be examined further on) they emphasized that values other than market-mediated productivity, consumption, and class relations focused social action in feudal and peasant societies. In effect, they were aware that modern market activity was not the sole "dependent variable" in assessments of social change.163 Such arguments not only reiterate the holistic approach I use in this study, but make also clear that the concept of development should imply more than than just economic changes. In the years after WWII, the theory of economic growth applicable to the third world was established through political pressure from the USA, with the aim of influencing the postwar world. This was also supported by capitalist businesses to maintain access to the territories of the third World, by the nationalistic developmentalism of postwar replacement elites, and especially by the example of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Later, as the power and influence of the USA in the world increased, this growth theory was superseded by a more effective formulation of modernization theory (or doctrine) which maintained that poor countries should follow the same developmental path as rich countries.164 This theory was enthusiastically supported and elaborated by the American economic historian W.W. Rostow, who proposed a transition from underdevelopment to development through a series of steps or stages which all countries must pass. Hence, argued Rostow, underdeveloped countries at the stage of "preconditions" simply had to follow a certain set of developmental rules to become modern, which meant to take off in their turn towards "self-fueling economic growth."165 A temporal perspective is also found in Rokkan´s theory of system-building, which includes state- and nationbuilding processes166 influenced by the then-dominant theory of modernization, and develops the concept of phases by interpreting these basic processes as phases of development, in order to build an ideotypical sequence of system-building. Instead of accentuating the relationships between these processes, Rokkan accentuated rather a temporal sequence for these basic processes.167

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

To come back to our discussion, for the modernization theory, development meant "modernization" which was: "...a "total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced" economically prosperous and politically stable nations of the western world."168

163. Ibid p.617 164. Preston, Peter. W., 1996, Development Theory: An Introduction, Oxford, u.a, Blackwell Press, p153 165. Di Muro et.al., 2006, op.cit. p9 166. See Chapter 1.1.3 in this study 167. Rokkan, S., Flora,P. et al. 1999, op.cit p84 168. Moore, Wilbert., 1963, Social Change, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, p89 56

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Although the modernization perspective held sway until the 60s, it was strongly criticized for its ethnocentrism in perceiving modernity as western and its values as superior and desirable, and for its linearity.169 This form of the future as presented to "underdeveloped" countries, which was already present in the form of western societies, did not require the imagination and speculation evident in early evolutionary theorists such as Marx, Durkeheim, and Weber. Finally, modernization has been criticized for its strong orientation toward economic growth as a driving force, such that changes in social and political institutions were seen only in terms of their contributions to economic growth and as inevitable companions to or outcomes of such growth. Of course the results derived from such a theory did not match expectations, and by the late 1960´s the concept of development needed rethinking.170 Although it was clear that economists preferred to find economic explanations for economic phenomena, often by relegating non-economic factors as unexplained residuals, Talcott Parsons and the structural-functionalists attempted to apply sociological theory to the field of economics. They posited that the goal of economic modernization was actually institutional change in the form of "structural differentiation" into "functionally differentiated organizations", which is the origin of the Parsonian theory known as structural-functionalism. In criticizing economic theories as too narrow, the underlying basis of structural-functionalism is the view that economic change upsets the social order. They argued that the advice given by economists who pay no attention to society continually produces social turmoil. Rather than suggesting an interdisciplinary solution and an overthrow of the sectarian axiom, they proposed that sociological theory should study the intersection between the economy and society, which they still considered to be "differentiated from other systems," and claimed that "economic theory is a special case of the general theory of social systems."171 To save society from instability, they urged economists to reach out beyond their traditional narrow range of theoretical interests.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Another theoretical trend in the structural-functionalism paradigm is political structural-functionalism, represented chiefly by Almond, Coleman, and Verba in the USA, and by Rokkan in Europe. This trend appeared in the 1960s, when political scientists were more preoccupied with political structures than with economic improvements. Instead of a concern for development as a macro-historical process, the earliest flirtations involved the idea of "political development," which followed the Parsonian tradition of analyzing the polity separately from the economy and society.172 Within this school, Almond presented a set of functional categories to facilitate

169. One example of the criticism of Rostow´s modernization model is the 1974 Declaration of Cocoyoc from Mexico, who states that "Development is not a linear process that copies the experience of the wealthy nations: there are several ways, approaches and strategies to development. In fact it is diversity, a key to a successful modernization" cited in (Nohlen,Nuscheler et al. 1993:59) 170. Turner, Mark.M., Hulme. David., 1997, Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State Work. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p6 171. Haas M, 1992, op.cit. p36 57

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

comparisons across structures of widely diverse political systems by defining "modern political systems" as those with "structural differentiation." In this theory, modern polities have separate legislatures, political executives, bureaucracies, courts, electoral systems, parties, interest groups, and communication media, each performing primarily one function within the political system, whereas "traditional systems" have much less functional specificity.173 One especially well-known work of Almond and Verba is "The Civic Culture", where the authors argued that a democracy requires a democratic "civic culture," while conducting surveys of five different political systems in an attempt to figure out what this civic culture is. They argued that developing countries should bear in mind that "civic culture emerged in the West as a result of a gradual political development, relatively crisis-free, untroubled, and unforced", a remark that could hardly inspire new states to democratize. They also suggested that "the development of a modern polity, with its functionally specific political units and its structured form of political competition, must not take place in a way that will shake the original community," a comment implying that political change results from the political process alone. Such debate lacked economic variables, but it is relevant to our study as it reiterates that citizens are more likely to adopt attitudes of civic culture as their educational levels increase.174 To conclude, structural-functionalism, a deflecting approach derived from modernization theory, conceptualized development largely in terms of human intentions by ignoring economic data, and proposed that successful exemplars were to be emulated, not analyzed. Being interested only in social and political development, structural-functionalists were unwilling to admit that these phenomena might involve economic and physical components, therefore betraying a "metaphysical 175 shallowness."

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In order to to avoid the mistake of projecting the American model onto the world, the Diffusionism school was formed with Levy as his main representative, treating modernization in terms reminiscent of Marx's distinction between mental and physical labor. With his "ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power" Levy provided a materialist scale for measuring modernization.176 He assumed an inevitable and uni-

172. I find the argument of Fred Riggs relevant here, that the term "political development" came before its definition because it was a catchphrase that legitimated research grants for political scientists to study the third world. Published in Riggs, Fred W. 1985, Ethnicity: Intercocta Glossary: Concepts and Terms Used in Ethnicity Research. Pilot ed ed. Vol. International conceptual encyclopedia for the social sciences ; v.1, Honolulu: under the auspices of the International Social Science Council, Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis, COCTA 173. Almond, G. A, and Coleman. J. S, 1960, The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press 174. Almond, G.A, and Verba. S., 1963, The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 175. Haas M, 1992, op.cit.p54 58

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

versal process of development moving along the scale to higher levels of modernization, and thus to increasing inanimate sources of power. By following the known Weberian axiom that societies are undergoing progressive rationalization toward "universalistic, functionally specific" relationships, Levy explicitly stated the existence of a duality of societies in the world; modernized or not. He believed that imperialism served to bring non-modernized societies into a global social system and external intervention was needed to diffuse developmental dynamics.177 Arguing that all peoples pursue the goal of materialist improvement, and going even beyond Parsonism, Levy stated that modernization proceeds not merely from a set of "new ideas" but from the diffusion of new modes of social organization and more productive methods of economic activity. Levy criticized the successive stages of the growth paradigm by pointing out that these stages can be skipped when a country is willing to adopt the latest inventions. However, the process of modernization specified by Levy could not operate without a shift in values. Levy was not explicit on how attitudinal change occurs, but his axiom was that increased modernization is associated with a change from "deterministically oriented societies" to societies where "man can command his own fate." Levy posited that attitudes mediate the diffusion of changes in economic aspects of society by maintaining interactionism as his metaphysical assumption, and integrating both economic and socio-attitudinal concepts into his framework. In the end, diffusionists like Levy were criticized for failing to take their metaphysical assumptions seriously and ignoring the interaction between attitudes and economic realities.178 It was Huntington's mass society paradigm that first considered this issue, contending that development strategies would never succeed if they ignored the implications for political stability. Studies cited in his writings, however, correlated economic materialism more than attitudinal idealist conditions. By transforming the Leninist contention that a socialist revolution was avoided by bribing the upper proletariat with higher wages, he suggested gradually introducing external funding for political parties seeking to modernize a country. Although his thinking was similar to Lenin's economism, Huntington did not identify how economic bribes could change unruly attitudes. As the case of the Philippines showed, money lining the pockets of political leaders produced cronyism instead of development.179

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the mid-1960s the term development economics began to be heavily criticized by authors such as Dudley Seers. He criticized both the meaning of the concept and its measurement.180 For him development was the “reduction and elimination of 176. The diffusionism theory of Marion Levy, Jr., was presented in his book, Levy, Marion J.1966, Modernization and the Structure of Societies; a Setting for International Affairs. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 177. Haas M, 1992, op.cit. p28 178. Ibid. 179. Haas M, 1992, op.cit. P 54-5 180. Albert Hirschman was also one of the critics of the narrow meaning of development at the time. 59

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

poverty, inequality and unemployment within a growing economy.” This challenged the hegemony of economics in development theory and finally distinguished its meaning from that of economic growth. For Seers, the greatest error of neoclassical economics was universalizing the west’s experience; "The abler the student has been in absorbing the current doctrine, the more difficult the process of adaptation" to the developing world, notes Seers. To show how absurd this approach was, he characterized it as follows: "Calling a book that analyses the USA and UK “Economic Principles” is analogous to calling a book dealing with horses “Animals.”181 For Seers the development issue in a country is much deeper, and should relate to three fundamental questions: "What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned"182 It may be said that Seers work diversified theoretical thought on development through the 1970s and 1980s into concern for gender issues, social well-being, and political and institutional factors including representation, participation, human rights, and the relationships between local communities and their development. Hence, authentic development was seen as progress towards a complex of public welfare goals such as elimination of poverty, provision of employment, reduction of inequality, etc. Development started to become a multidimensional concept including more than just economic elements. Critics at this time did not dispute the altered emphasis in the definition of development, but rather disputed its practicality in the prevailing global context.183

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The Neo-Marxist Dependency School that included Fernando H. Cardoso, André G. Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Paul. M. Sweezy,184 among others, argued that the global economic structure was an exploitative system which generated and maintained "the development of underdevelopment" in nations on the periphery. This idea followed from the world systems paradigm of Imanuel Wallerstein, which had explained development in terms of the structural role a country plays in the world economy at that moment. Wallerstein concluded that core nations had, since the advent of

181. Seers, Dudley. 1963. The Limitations of the Special Case. Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics 25, 2, p77-98. 182. Seers Dudley, 1977, The Meaning of Development, International Development Review, Vol. 19, 22, pp2-7 183. Turner, & Hulme. 1997, p6 184. Cp. Cardoso, F. Henrique .1971, Politique Et Développement Dans Les Sociétés Dépendantes. Portugais Par Mylène Berdoyes. Paris: Anthropos; Frank, Andre. G. 1967, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America : Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press; Wallerstein, I. M.1976, The Modern World-System : Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Text ed ed. Vol. Studies in social discontinuity, New York: Academic Press; Sweezy, Paul. M..1972, Modern Capitalism and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press, 60

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

a world economy in the 15th-16th centuries, enforced a system of inequitable domination on the periphery through conquest, threats, market restriction, and industrial protection. These techniques enabled strong states to perpetuate the weakness of peripheral states. Frank posited that development could occur only when radical solutions took place, changing relationships in the world economy. Per Frank, "...these capitalist contradictions and the historical development of the capitalist system have generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centers, which appropriate that surplus, and further that this process still continues."185 While very different at first glance, Neo-Marxist and Modernization theories share striking similarities in their approaches to development. As Harrison argues, both these schools derive from the European experience, and were created by intellectuals socialized in these traditions. In fact, they both have visions of before (pre-modern, pre-capitalist society) and after (the modern capitalist society or the idealized socialist society) with an intermediary stage thought to exist at the moment in underdeveloped societies. Interestingly enough, neither of these schools paid much attention to the "views, ambitions, and wishes of those to be developed."186 Goals regarding improvements in both economic and non-economic conditions need to be agreed upon first by the people these improvements will affect. An attempt to create an alternative development strategy with this in mind was undertaken by the so-called neo-populists such as Schumacher, Nyerere, etc, who focused on small scale enterprise, the retention of peasant agriculture and nonagricultural petty commodity production, and on a world consisting of villages and small towns rather then industrial cities. Equality, participation, and self-reliance were crucial concepts in the definition of development in the neo-populist discourse187. The problem with the neopopulist approach is that their forms, means, and ends overlap quite often and are sometimes even identical.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the 1980s and 1990s a new cultural basis for civilization allowing for diversity needed to be combined with an emphasis on fulfilling basic human needs. The capability approach to development, with its representatives Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, accomplished this task by stressing a human development paradigm as a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being, social arrangements, and the design of policies and proposals for social change.

185. Frank, Andre. G. 1967, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America : Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press, p27 186. Harrison. David. 1988, The sociology of modernization and development, London: Unwin, Hyman pp151-152 187. Cp. Nyerere, Julius K. 1966, Freedom and Unity = Uhuru Na Umoja:A Selection From Writings and Speeches, 1952-65. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press; and Schumacher. Ernst. F. 1973, Small is Beautiful; a Study of Economics as if People Mattered. London: Sphere Books. 61

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Nussbaum evolved this approach even further in recent years as the foundation for a partial theory of justice.188 Sen perceived freedom, and not development, as the ultimate goal of (economic) life as well as the most efficient means of realizing general welfare. Overcoming deprivations is central to development. "Unfreedoms" include hunger, famine, ignorance, unsustainable economic life, unemployment, barriers to economic fulfillment by women or minority communities, violation of political freedom and basic liberties, threats to the environment, and lack of access to health, sanitation, clean water, etc. Freedom of exchange, labour contracts, social opportunities, and protective security are not just ends or constituent components of development, but are actually important means to development and freedom. Sen's welfare theory relies not on individual attainment of basic needs but on the capabilities of individuals, an approach he believes can draw on richer resources.189 From a set of feasible capabilities, Sen focuses on a small number of basic functions central to well-being, where well-being consists of the effective freedom of a person to achieve the state of being and doing, or a vector of functionings. He does not assign particular weights to these functionings, considering that well-being is a "broad and partly opaque concept," as well as intrinsically ambiguous. Instead he focuses on a small number of things such as being adequately nourished, avoiding premature mortality, appearing in public without shame, being happy, and being free. Freedom to attain, rather than the functionings themselves, is the primary goal, meaning that capability does not necessarily correlate closely with attainments such as income. Sen’s view of gender inequality adds to the discussion as it pertains to income distribution and intra-family issues.190 He denounces discrimination against women in schools, jobs, and other economic opportunities as lying behind the bias against care of females within the family.191

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, it was Martha Nussbaum who first seriously engaged in a dialogue between theories of sexual inequality in development and the "capabilities theory" of Sen. She challenges the traditional economic development models over the way they neglect the needs of women by ignoring the fact that economic development projects tend to benefit men more than women. Through empirical evidence she shows a strong correlation between gender inequality and poverty, such that when the two are combined, “the result is acute failure of central human capabilities.” Therefore human (economic) development must be "managed with a cognizance of the prob-

188. See Nussbaum, Martha. C. 1992, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press and Nussbaum, 2000, Women and Human Development:The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press 189. Sen, A. K..1999, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp1-53 190. Ibid. pp189-204 191. Sen, A. K.1992, Inequality reexamined. New York Oxford: Russell Sage Foundation Clarendon Pressp. p40-47. 62

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

lems of gender inequality and the treatment of women as a means to others’ ends in many development programs."192 Nussbaum furthers her human development argument by introducing the capabilities approach, calling its aim the provision of "the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires.”193 In her theory, the main obstacle to development is the way women are treated in such discourse, namely, as means to the ends of others, rather than ends in and of themselves. This is in fact a critical problem in current development practices affecting change in the lives of both women and men. Nussbaum’s argument does not necessarily accuse programs of an intentional bias, but rather of a bias resulting from gender hierarchies that preexist in the governments, social structures, and family structures of countries and cultures receiving aid or developmental assistance. Thus in order to achieve meaningful human and economic development, the focus should be on “…a principle of each person’s capability, based on a principle of each person as end.” Nussbaum argues that the capabilities approach can be applied across cultures, due to the universality of capability needs and certain values.194 The root of her argument is the quest to improve the quality of life by providing people with capabilities, or the means to successfully meet their own ends, which is the stated aim of development in both developed and underdeveloped countries.195 Nussbaum´s approach to values in economic development is relevant to the extent that it stresses the gender dimension of development which is crucial for this study, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.2.5. Lastly, most development theories, especially those of economic development, have been accused of being too "general, vague and/or chaotic".196 Thus, pessimism towards the concept of development as expressed in the current 'state' or 'status' of development economics, can be seen as a consequence of the abstract and unrealistic character of the concept of "development" itself.197

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Considering the selected theories presented here, it becomes clear that the struggle to define development is an ongoing and intense one. This is especially true when the semantic implications of this word are translated into concrete development projects that influence many lifes. The reality is that the concept of development requires a constant rethinking and renewal. Being a process, it should always be open

Nussbaum, M. C. 2000, Women and Human Development, op cit., p70. Ibid p1 Ibid. pp3-5 For more on Martha Nussbaum´s intellectual activity see this: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ faculty/nussbaum 196. Herrick, Bruce. & Kindleberger, Charles .P. 1988, Economic Development, 4th ed., McGrawHill International, London, P48 197. Ingham Barbara, Simmons Collin.eds.1987 Development Studies and Colonial Policy, Totowa,N.J:F. Cass..p100. 192. 193. 194. 195.

63

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

for criticism, and its theoretical and empirical considerations should always be compared in order to achieve optimal results. In order to remain faithful to the normative approach, and to stress the multidimensional nature of development (one of the aims of this study), I will use the following definition: Development is a continuing process that includes:198 K an economic dimension dealing with economic issues such as the creation of wealth and improving material living standards for all. K a political dimension dealing with political issues and democratic values such as human rights, political freedom, enfranchisement, participation, etc K a social dimension dealing with social issues such as health, education, a participatory civil society, employment, housing, etc K a cultural dimension based on the recognition of the fact that culture confers identity and self-worth to people through language, religion, public administration, etc.

I also recognize an ecological component to development as a commitment to ecologically sustainable development, so that present generations do not undermine the position of future generations, but for this study it is of lesser relevance.199 By the same logic, security will not be regarded as a dimension of development, although it will be treated as a prerequisite to it. This argument is further explored in Chapter 1.2.6. To conclude, at the present time the multidimensional nature of development has generally been recognized, and it is reflected in contemporary development studies that increasingly include the interactions between political, economic, social, and environmental problems when identifying local, international, and global approaches to them. In fact, as Piasecki and Wolnicki argue, solutions to specific problems lie in inclusive societies and institutions that promote growth by encouraging creativity, initiative, and learning. These initiatives may come from the public sector, the private sector, or from civil society. The objective of development should not be to create new societies, but to modify existing ones so that they become naturally viable, dynamic, and flexible in the global framework while remaining suitable for the needs and ambitions of their citizens.200

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1.2.3 From Development Theory to Developmental Aid "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual (spiritual) force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the

198. This list is modified from Gouled Denis,1992, Development: Creator and Destroyer of Values, published in World Development, Vol. 20, Issue 3, pp467-475 199. I use the word "component" in order to stress the fact that although I deem ecology relevant, I do not consider it a dimension. In empirical cases this component falls under one of the aforementioned dimensions in terms of policy consideration. 200. Piasecki, Ryszard, Wolnicki, Miron., Mar.2004, The evolution of development economics and globalization, Journal of Social Economics, Volume: 31 Issue: 3 pp300-314 64

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships which are grasped as ideas. hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance... hence their ideas..(/the ruling class)... are the ruling ideas of the epoch."201 (Marx & Engels: 1845-6:Online)

Under the auspices of Marx and Engels, we will now follow the connection between theories of development and actual developmental aid practices, in order to examine their implications in the field. I will make use of the categories of development defined by Menzel, as they best serve my purposes. According to Ulrich Menzel, development theory is the analysis of changes brought about in the industrial societies of North America, Western Europe, and to some degree in Asia, including economic growth, industrial success, and social mobilization and differentiation, as well as democratic change and progress in social welfare. Although he is aware of the impossibility of recreating these processes throughout the rest of the world, Menzel holds that development theories can be valid universal affirmations, and as ideals may contribute to the overall welfare of humanity. He reminds us that there is an analytical and a normative dimension to development and that with the help of the latter dimension, changes in the process of development can be foreseen, and the causes of underdevelopment identified through recognition of deviations from successful processes.202 Menzel´s four categories of applied development theory are stated in the following terms: K Development Strategies: theory-derived measures for preventing deviation from ideal development processes. K Development Models: consistently successful measures used as paradigms for development in other countries K Development Policy: the implementation of development strategies at the political level, including the identification and employment of special instruments for their realization. K Development Aid/Cooperation: the process of bi- or multi-lateral interaction between industrial and developing countries at the level of political actors, typically in support of developmental strategies.203

Apart from these four analytical categories defined by Menzel, I will consider four other categories in this study, as the following levels: 1) the theoretical and normative perspective, 2) the actors level, 3) the addressees level, and 4) the operating levels.204

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The theoretical and normative models mentioned in Chapter 1.2.2 can be divided into 1) Neoclassical, 2) Marxism, 3) Modernization, 4) Structural functionalism, 5) 201. Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich 1845-6, Collected Works, Vol. 1, Die deutsche Ideologie. Kritik der neuesten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten, 1st ed. 1932. Online Version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive Available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/ marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01.htm 202. Nohlen, & Nuscheler (Hrsg).1993, op.cit. p132 203. Ibid. 204. Ibid p 133 65

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Diffusionism, 6) Mass society, 7) Dependency, 8) Neo-Populism, and 9) the Capability approach. In the examination of my case study of Kosovo, developmental strategies derived from each of these theories compete with each other, such as strategies of integration vs dissociation, growth vs distribution policies, or participation vs a top-down approach. My investigation of development strategies currently operating in Kosovo will bear in mind the theoretical predispositions inherent in the theoretical models mentioned above as part of the research framework of this study. Furthermore, this investigation will consider the actors level and the actors' interest in following certain strategies. These actors may be internal or external, from industrialized or developing countries, from national institutions or international organizations, etc. The investigation will also be extended to the addressees level, with addressees being defined as those benefitting from development strategies, whether they are the middle classes, state elites, or poor of Kosovo. Finally, at the operating level my analysis will be concerned with the way these levels influence each other and development strategy in general on a local, national, regional, or international scale. In this way I will be able to examine the development process and current developmental aid programs in Kosovo being supported by the analytical categories mentioned above.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The concept of the role of aid has evolved in parallel with the evolution of development doctrine, as noted by several authors.205 This is why it is important to briefly examine the evolution of this role to date. Starting in the 1950s, the role of aid was seen mainly as a source of capital to trigger economic growth through higher investment associated with faith in the capacity of recipient governments to plan successfully and use aid efficiently. In the 1960s, the role of foreign assistance was still considered in economic terms, and was thought to be important for correcting savings deficiencies through an increased flow of foreign savings.206 The 1970s witnessed a major change in the role of aid, through a shift to different analytical frameworks and a multidimensional concept of development. A wider array of goals, instruments, socio-economic and political variables and institutions were considered, and it become necessary to develop a deeper analysis of underdevelopment. New issues began to be included in debates on the role of aid, i.e. poverty alleviation, inequality, employment, basic human needs, gender equity, macro-stability, sustainability, environmental protection, and political and social transformation. Moreover, policy analysis and the evaluation of both past performance and future potential roles for aid become more subtle, since an intricate web of forces and constraints had to be considered. Analysis of such issues and their links to foreign aid required not only economic theories, but those of the social sciences as well.207 In the 1980s, following the debt crisis, the role and concept of aid once again changed significantly. The primary purpose of aid became twofold; as a stopgap measure to save the shaky international financial system, and to encourage the implementation of ap205. Hjertholm, Peter., Tarp. Finn., (eds), 2000, Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future. Routledge, London 206. Ibid. p47. 207. Sherman Robinson and Finn Tarp in Hjertholm & Tarp, 2000, op.cit. p6 66

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

propriate adjustment policies in third world countries through conditional lending programs. In that decade, which was characterized by pro-market and anti-government rhetoric, there was a strong sentiment towards drastically reducing governmental aid and substituting private capital flow.208 Later in the 1990s, a strong and lingering case of aid fatigue was intensified by the rising fear that foreign assistance was generating aid dependency in poor countries. The effectiveness of aid conditions was also questioned. The socioeconomic crisis triggered by the Asian financial crisis engendered a fundamental re-examination of the role of aid and of the uncritical acceptance of the Bretton Woods paradigm and the "Washington consensus." The World Bank in particular took the leadership in advocating poverty alleviation and improvement of human welfare as the overarching objectives of development. The well-known critique of the IMF and its structural adjustment policy by Joseph Stiglitz in his book "Globalization and its discontents" clearly showed the failure in their rationale.209 Since September 11, 2001, the developmental aid policy discourse has included a security element.210 In fact, from that time, security and development have been seen as inextricably linked by the current rationale for developmental aid, which is now concentrated in poor and fragile states as a means to prevent them from becoming a threat to global security and development.211

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Lastly, this unit started with Marx´s words because I wanted to reiterate a crucial fact that has become clear from the arguments so far. In each period, the nature and scope of the prevailing development strategy, as well as the role of aid, have been largely determined by the conceptual state of the art and prevailing conditions at the time.212 It is this assumption that creates a huge incentive to investigate the conceptual framework of the development strategies, policies, and aid programs currently being applied to my case study, viewed as institutional expressions of the current ideas of the international ruling elite. Figure 7, I presents an adaptation of a model by Thorbecke illustrating the interdependency between development objectives and their conceptual framework and models, and stressing the relationship between development strategies and the role of developmental aid. 213

208. Hjertholm & Tarp, 2000, op.cit. .p 48. 209. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002, Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Allen Lane, 210. The security issue and its relation to development will be examined further in Chapter 1.2.6. of this study. 211. Stroke, Barry, 2004, Insecurity and Development: Don´t mix, National Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 6, p400-401 212. The conclusion is an adaption of Hjertholm, &Tarp. 2000, op. cit. p 47. 213. Thorbecke. Erik, 2000, The evolution of the development doctrine and the role of foreign aid, 1950-2000, in Hjertholm, P., Tarp. F., (eds), 2000, op.cit p17 67

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Figure 7: Key interdependencies between development theories, models, objectives, measurement of performance and the role of developmental aid. (Source: Adapted from Thorbecke, 2000:17)

1.2.4 Development and Democracy

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Development enhances the prospects for democracy because - and to the extent that - it enhances several crucial intervening variables: […] capacities for independent organization and action in civil society […] a more equitable class structure (with reduction of absolute poverty), and a less corrupt, interventionist, rent-seeking state. Where […] economic growth far outstrips these deeper structural and cultural changes, the level or probability of democracy will be much lower than that expected from the country's level of economic development. But where […] these intervening variables have emerged through different historical processes - including tradition and the deliberate and effective innovation of political leaders - the level or probability of democracy will be much greater than that which would be predicted merely from the country's per capita...214

The interaction between democracy and development has been subject to an increasing number of studies. Their complementarity and mutual reinforcement originates in the aspirations of individuals and peoples and in the rights they seek. History has shown that when democracy and development are dissociated from each other, failure results. Conversely, their interdependence can help both processes take root sustainably. In order to consolidate political democracy, it must be complemented by economic and social measures that encourage development, and similarly any devel-

214. Diamond, Larry. J. Juan. Linz, Seymour. Martin. Lipset (eds), 1995, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, p25 68

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

opment strategy needs to be reinforced by democratic participation in order to be successful.215 Colaresi and Thompson have explored the relationship between international conditions and domestic development in the forms of economic growth and democratization. Their findings suggest that international factors such as external threats, conflicts, and opportunities for trade can support or impede both democratization and economic development. Through a comparative procedure vis a vis international politics, they come to the conclusion that the international environment significantly influences democracy. So, not only internal factors influence the development of democracy but also external influences from other states and international organizations.216 The nature of the link between democracy and development requires further study. Previously, these concepts were largely considered independent of each other, while recently there has been widespread agreement in the literature over the close relationship between the two. In particular, the sustainability of equitable development is closely bound to democracy. Genuine democracy as characterized by the rule of law, respect for human rights, and recognition of the intrinsic dignity of all human beings, cannot be maintained unless people enjoy a minimum standard of living, which in turn requires a minimum level of development.217 Thus, I will attempt to review the literature on this topic by selecting and mentioning the theories most relevant for the purpose of this study, despite encountering many different conceptualizations and classifications. My goal is to show the interrelationship of democracy as a dependent variable of development and its multiple dimensions, as described above.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I will orient my research using a map created by Hyden Goran that includes the major theoretical approaches in this field. This map examines the establishment of democracy by using explanatory variables found at the structural, institutional, and human agency levels, in order to utilize them as points on a "continuum defining the extent to which democracy is a product of circumstances over which individual political actors have or don't have control."218 Development is thus considered here not only in socioeconomic terms, but also in terms of values and institutions that help shape political outcomes. In fact, development and democracy are both difficult concepts because they tend to mean different things to different people. As already mentioned in the previous chapters, the concept of development has changed consistently

215. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 2003. The interaction between democracy and development: executive summary. Paris: UNESCO International Panel on Democracy and Development, p10 216. Colaresi. Michael. and Thompson., William. R., 2003, The Economic Development and Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36 No. 4, SAGE Publications, pp381-403 217. Boutros-Ghali, B 2003, op.cit. p3 218. Hydén, Goran 2002, Development and democracy, An overview in Elgström Ole. and Hydén G., (eds),. 2002, Development and Democracy: What Have We Learned and How? Routledge. London., pp1-2 69

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

in the past, from being considered equivalent to modernization, to being concerned with overcoming social inequity and providing opportunities for individuals in the marketplace, and finally to promoting institutional improvements in the name of "good governance." A similar process has occurred with the definition of democracy, which has been subject of much debate as to whether it should be a "minimalist" concept useful for analytical purposes, or more encompassing to justify its substantive dimensions.219 To resolve this theoretical confusion, Hyden suggests mapping the main contributions from the literature on development and democracy along two axes. One axis is epistemological and methodological with 'structure' and 'agency' as endpoints, while the second is substantive in nature and differentiates between a focus at the 'elite' or 'mass' level. Hyden aims to characterize the mainstream of the literature on this subject, supported by these analytical dimensions, presented here in Figure 8.220 Figure 8: Different emphasis in the study of development-democracy nexus (Source: Hydén, 2002:3) Elite

Democratic Breakdown due to economic dependency (O´Donnel 1974, Evans. 1979)

Regime Transitions (O´Donnel, Schmitter andWhitehead 1986; Przeworski. 1991)

Economic reform affecting democratic transition (Haggard and Kaufman 1995)

Neo-institutionalsits (North, 1990; March and Olson. 1989) Constitutional design (Lijphart. 1977)

Structure

Levels of Economic Development (Lipset 1959)

Agency

Civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963, 1989) Values (Ingelhart 1977, 1997)

Class-based analyses (Moore 1966, Associational Life (Tocqueville 1835; Putnam Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992) 1993) Political oportunity approaches (Tilly 1975; Social movements (Tarrow 1998) Collier and Collier 1991)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Mass

According to this approach, structuralists adopt a historical perspective to explain the success or failure of democratization. They also tend to look at cases where democracy is already established. Because of their historical approach, they avoid 219. Ibid. p3 220. While I agree that this conceptual map is not necessarily complete, I find it useful as a relevant presentation for understanding the development-democracy nexus, which highlights important names associated with each approach, constituting a research tradition or focus that is established and generally recognized in the field of comparative politics. 70

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

discussing recent examples of democratisation. The only exception to this is literature that deals directly with the relationship between economic reform and democratization. This is generally the case in studies of developing countries that have adopted structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). This literature, like that dealing with democratic breakdowns due to economic dependence on external forces, is included on the structuralist side, because the variables are economic and thus underlie causes of political action.221 Approaches emphasising agency work from a shorter-term perspective, according to Hyden. They tend to discuss the processes by which decisions are made, and to focus on the choices political leaders make to foster their own interests. In the context of democratisation, they look at the extent to which self-interests are pursued with or without concern for a generally favorable "win-win" situation. Hyden considers agency not as an autonomous or free entity, but refers to it as "structured contingency". Considering that institutions figure prominently in this approach, the neo-institutionalist approach to the study of politics that emerged in the 1990s presupposed that institutions are designed by autonomous actors, making choices from the perspective of their own interests.222 These institutions tend to survive because they create a climate of predictability and trust, both of which are crucial for the consolidation of democracy. The Neo-Institutionalsits, seeing institutions in a historical light,223 argue that they are not merely means to promote greater efficiency but also serve a number of other objectives. North's notion of institutional path dependency also implies that human choice is not autonomous and free from influence by outside factors.224 Hyden lists Neo-Institutionalsits on the side of agency, due to their acknowledgment of the relative autonomy of choice.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Hyden holds Huntington's study on the third wave of democratization to be representative of elite studies on development and democracy, which is the third quadrant in our figure. This study is built on the premise that political scientists have accumulated enough knowledge about processes of democratisation to be able to tell the political elite which traps to avoid and which opportunities to seize.225 Hyden criticizes this approach and labels Huntington´s study at best a "bold attempt to mix theory and practice."226 Finally, the fourth quadrant of our figure contains studies focusing on the masses, or citizens at large, and their representatives who focus on values as well as

221. Ibid. p4 222. Ibid. p3 223. Here the author refers to the works of March, James. G. and Olsen, Johan. P., 1989, Rediscovering Institutions, New York: The Free Press. and March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., 1984, 'The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life', American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, pp738-49. 224. See North, Douglass C. 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 225. See Huntington, Samuel. P. 1991, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 226. Hyden, G. 2002, op.cit. p5 71

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

associations. Here Hyden refers to Almond and Verba's analysis of political culture which drew on political surveys to test the relationship between 'civic' values and democracy,227and to Inglehart´s study, which demonstrated a significant shift from materialist to post-materialist values among the population of industrialized societies, and contributes to a better understanding of the processing of human values and preferences in response to changes in material conditions.228 He also references Putnam´s study, stressing the relevance of long-term positive outcomes due to peoples collaboration in small-scale groups or associations able to generate trust, or social capital, a key ingredient for generating economic development or political democracy.229 Finally, he refers to Tarrow´s study of social movements, showing that civil society can be energized by concerted action around a specific issue that captures the minds of large numbers of people, and that political opportunity matters, and organized activity can make a difference in the short term.230 It is already clear that economic development shapes our world and determines the prospects for democratic government. Since Lipset´s study on this relationship, scholars have been discussing the impact of industrialization, modernization, and economic growth on the political decision-making process. The evidence collected unambiguously corroborates a straightforward thesis: in each and every empirical study a significant positive correlation between economic development and democracy is reported. Today, this positive causal relationship is an accepted scientific finding. Not only do many scholars strongly support such a causal link as logical and theoretically sound,231 but they have also demonstrated it convincingly in a large number of empirical studies.232

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It is relevant to this study to examine whether democracy or development is the dependent variable. Sen, for example, argues that developing and strengthening a democratic system is an essential component of the process of development and sees its significance in three distinct values which include its intrinsic importance, its instrumental contributions, and its constructive role in the creation of values and norm.s233 Instead of going into a "chicken or egg" circular argument, I will conclude that at this 227. See Almond, Gabriel.and Verba, Sidney. (eds), 1989, The Civic Culture Revisited, Newbury Park and London: Sage Publications. 228. See Inglehart, Ronald., 1990, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies, Princeton University Press and Inglehart Louis 1997, Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton University Press. 229. See Putnam, Robert., 1993, Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 230. See Tarrow, Sidney. 1998, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press. 231. See Huntington, Samuel., 1991, The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century (The Julian J. Rothbaum distinguished lecture series; v. 4). Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press.and Ingelhart, Louis E. 1997, Press and Speech Freedoms in America, 1619-1995: A Chronology. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press., etc 232. Doorenspleet, Renske, 2001, The fourth wave of democratization: identification and explanation, Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden University, the Netherlands. 233. Sen, A. K.1999, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 147-159 72

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

point in academia, agreement exists on only one basic and crucial point: Democracy promotes Development (while the reverse is not always true) and they complement each other. The political choices offered by democracy are linked to the social and economic choices offered by development.234 In fact, problems in much of the developing world today are more political, and the result of poor institutions and bad governance. This aspect of development theory has been underemphasized in the past.235 Therefore development requires good governance before anything else. The dominant problem in the developing world is not too much government, but rather weak government or none at all.236 Henceforth, by using Hyden´s theoretical map I aim to point out the complexity of the development-democracy nexus and to illustrate its multidimensionality in the approach used in the empirical part of this study. Such an approach will focus on examination of the consequences of development strategies for the kind of democracy and governance that Kosovo will employ in the future, as well as on the converse effects of the democratization processes on future development in the country. 1.2.5 Development and Gender "No true social transformation can occur until every society learns to adopt new values, forging relationships between men and women based on equality, equal responsibility and mutual respect"237 Boutros Boutros-Ghali

In order to avoid misunderstandings from the outset, when I refer to gender in this work I use the definition offered by Momsen; "the socially acquired notions of masculinity and femininity by which women and men are identified", and consider gender relations as "the socially constructed form of relations between women and men", and gender roles as "the household tasks and types of employment socially assigned to women and men which are not fixed and globally consistent and become more flexible with the changes brought about by economic development."238

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Gender has been a conspicuously missing component of development theory until recently. One of the aims of this study is to contribute to a reconceptualization of development in gender terms by examining the current theoretical framework on this topic. By taking a position on this discourse I hope to contribute to the general understanding of this term and its relationship to development in order to finally credit gender as an intrinsic factor in development.

234. Singh, Anita. I, Why Democracy Is Good for Development. Published in the UN Chronicle, Vol. 43, September-November 2006, United Nations Publications.p29 235. Elgström O, and Hydén G., (eds),. 2002, op.cit. pxv 236. Edwards Chris. Dec. 2005, Conversation with Francis Fukuyama, in Geographical Magazine Vol. 77.p2 237. Boutros-Ghali, B.1996, 'Introduction', in United Nations (eds), The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945-1996, New York: United Nations.p73 238. Momsen, Janet.H. 2004, Gender and Development,. London; New York: Routledge., p3 73

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The connection between development and gender, and especially the issue of development´s consequences for the subordination of women, was ignored in the literature on development until the early 1970s when Esther Boserup published a groundbreaking study. Until then, development policies were directed at women only in the context of their roles as wives and mothers, with focuses on mother and child health care and reducing fertility. It was assumed that the benefits of macroeconomic strategies for growth would automatically trickle down to the poor, and that poor women would benefit as the economic position of their husbands improved. Boserup challenged these assumptions, by showing that women did not always benefit as the household head's income increased, and that women were increasingly being associated with the backward and traditional by losing status.239 Although Boserup worked largely within the theoretical framework of "modernization", she offered an original interpretation of the relationship between tradition and modernity by showing the importance of the productive role of women, especially in certain types of agricultural economies. She associated the decline of this role with the spread of modern production methods under colonialism.240 Although Boserup did not explicitly theorize on the origins of male dominance, she saw it as implicitly rooted in the patriarchal nature of traditional societies, and made more oppressive by the androcentric outlook of male planning officials. Her analysis pointed out the correlations between women's work and factors such as population density, landholding and class differentiation. Although Boserup´s analysis has been interpreted as an expression of the neoclassical approach,241 her position can be qualified as a liberal, positivist, and broadly feminist view of development. Her work has become a milestone, as one of the first books to analyze the role of women in development.242

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

After considering Boserup´s thesis in the 1970s, international development agencies realized that women were being left out of development. Thus they made the integration of women into development a goal, especially in terms of development programs. Women in Development (WID) thus became the policy response to the concern that the fruits of development were not trickling down to women. The WID agenda combined with the rise of the women's movements in Western Europe and North America led to the establishment of women's ministries in many countries and 239. See Boserup, Esther., 1970, Women's Role in Economic Development. London: Allen & Unwin. 240. The distinction between "female" and "male" systems of farming, corresponding to the African system of shifting agriculture and the Asian system of plough cultivation, lay at the center of her analysis. 241. For example, Boserup suggests that the individual preferences of employers and workers determine the wage differentials between man and women, stating that employers tend to prefer male rather than female labor, while women prefer to work in family businesses rather than in large enterprises. 242. Morlicchio, Enrica 2006, Gender discourse in development, Demologos Project Working Papers, Available online at http://demologos.ncl.ac.uk/wp/wp1/disc.php, p1-16 Accessed 14 Juni 2007 74

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the institutionalization of WID policies in governments, donor agencies, and NGOs.243 The increasing strength of the WID movement also involved a certain amount of serendipity. Given that the earliest WID policies had been based on a notion that women were excluded from development, and on a feminist analysis of the patriarchal nature of the state and the ways that it ignored the interests of women, this new scenario opened spaces for the creation of women's organizations. Practically, women were also targeted as beneficiaries of these new organizations in order to give them access to international development funding.244 However, the WID anti-poverty agenda failed on its own terms as most of its income-generation projects were only marginally successful.245 This left women out of the mainstream of development strategies, and treated all women homogeneously, ghettoizing the WID group within development agencies. By the 1980s, WID advocates shifted from exposing the negative effects of development on women to showing that development efforts were losing out by ignoring women's actual or potential contributions.246 Since then there has been significant analysis of the need to reform the WID approach to development cooperation, and many have chronicled the shift from WID to Gender Analysis in Development (GAD), arguing for approaches informed by gender-based analysis of social relations, and even aspiring to the ultimate "empowerment of women."247

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

GAD is based on the concept of gender and gender relations as defined above, and analyzes the ways that development reshapes these power relations. Drawing on feminist political activism, gender analysts explicitly perceive women as agents of change. They criticize the WID approach for treating women as a homogeneous category, and emphasize the important influence of differences in social factors such as class, age, and religion in developmental results.248 These changes were not merely nominal. In principle, the change in discourse from the WID to the GAD approach, apart from changing the language and depoliticizing the field, pointed out what was already accepted in development circles; that it is not women per se, but gender relations in which women are subordinated, that are problematic. In fact, this analysis not only justifies the concentration of resources in women's development activities and their access to resources, but also points out the centrality of gender analysis in

243. Momsen, J.H. 2004, op.cit., p4 244. Jackson Cecile and Pearson Ruth, (eds), 1998, Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis and Policy., Routledge, London,. p10 245. According to Momsen, these programs often failed because they were set up on the basis of a belief that women of the South had spare time available to undertake these projects. 246. Momsen, J.H. 2004, op.cit. p6 247. See Kabeer, Naila, 1994. Reversed realities: gender hierarchies in development thought. London; New York: Verso.; Moser, Caroline .O.N.,1989, Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs’, World Development 17/11, pp179-182 and 1993, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training, London and New York: Routledge. 248. Momsen, J.H. 2004, op.cit, p7 75

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the development of effective policies at all levels.249 This approach included an extension of gender analysis from issues clearly concerned with women's reproductive roles, i.e. family planning, to economic roles such as income generation, and even to generic issues of macroeconomic planning, structural adjustment, and civil and political organization, which are clearly of general relevance.250 In fact, gender equality has become not only a desirable attribute, but even a developmental goal for agencies and policy-makers. Thus, proponents of GAD distinguish between '"practical" gender needs, such as items that improve women's lives within their existing roles, and "strategic" gender needs that seek to empower women and to increase women's ability to take on new roles.251 Gender analysts demand a commitment to change in the structures of power in national and international agencies.252

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The empowerment approach of the 1980s was regarded as an empowerment tool for the weak, best wielded through grassroots and participatory activities. Many institutions interpreted empowerment as a means for enhancing efficiency and productivity without changing the status quo. In the alternative development literature, however, many regarded empowerment as a method of social transformation and the achievement of gender equality, while others understood empowerment as a broad developmental process enabling people to gain self-confidence and self-esteem by allowing both men and women to actively participate in decision-making.253 The empowerment approach was also linked to the rise of participatory approaches to development and often involved working with women at the community level to build organizational skills. Over time the WID, GAD, and WAD254 approaches largely converged, and other approaches to gender and development evolved.255 One of these was the efficiency approach, a strategy utilized in the context of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), where gender analysis made good economic sense. It was rec-

249. Jackson and Pearson, 1998, op.cit. 250. Ibid p2 251. See Molyneux, M. 1985, Mobilisation without emancipation: women's interests, state, and revolution in Nicaragua, Feminist Studies Journal, 11/ 2, p227-254. and Moser, Caroline O. N., 1993, op.cit. 252. Derbyshire, Helen., April 2002, Gender Manual: A Practical Guide for Development Policy Makers and Practitioners, London: DFID, Social Development Division Accessed April 2007, Online: http://www.siyanda.org/docs_gem/index_implementation/genderman.htm 253. Rowlands, J., 1997, Questioning Empowerment: Working with Women in Honduras, Oxford Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Oxfam (UK and Ireland) [Distributed in USA by] Humanities Press International. 254. WAD (Woman And Development) is yet another approach, created in 1975 at the UN Women's World Conference in Mexico City, where the feminist approaches of predominantly white women from the North aimed at gender equality were rejected by many women in the South who argued that the development model itself lacked the perspective of developing countries. They saw overcoming poverty and the effects of colonialism as more important than equality. 255. Rathgeber, Eva. Maria, 1990, WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in research and practice, The Journal of Developing Areas 24/ 1, pp489-502. 76

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ognized that understanding men's and women's roles and responsibilities in the planning phase of development interventions improved project effectiveness. The efficiency approach was later criticized for focusing more on what women could do for development, than on what development could do for women.256 Ecofeminism, or Gender and the Environment (GED), was another heavily criticized approach to gender at this time. It was based on ecofeminist views, especially those of Vandana Shiva. GED posited an essential link between women and the environment, and encouraged environmental programmes to focus on women's roles.257 GED was criticized for considering women as a single category and for ignoring forms of domination other than gender-based ones. The current relevance of this approach remains in its strong opposition to standardized models of development based on environmental destruction, as prescribed by the IMF and other neo-liberally guided institutions to third world countries. In the late 1990s, the term gender mainstreaming came into widespread use with the adoption of the Platform for Action at the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on women.258 Gender mainstreaming attempted to combine the strengths of the efficiency and empowerment approaches in the context of mainstream development.259 Mainstreaming gender equality ensures that both women's and men's concerns and experiences are integral to the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all development projects, so that gender inequality is not perpetuated. It attempts to overcome the common problem of "policy evaporation" where the implementation and impact of development projects fail to reflect policy commitments.260 It should also help to overcome the problem of male backlash against women where womenonly projects are successful.261

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, the most relevant contribution in this field with normative implications for my study is the Capability Approach of Martha Nussbaum and Amarty Sen, which operates mainly in an individualistic meta-theoretical framework. Based on a radical critique of the utilitarian school of thought, this approach specifies how certain actors and attributes should be conceptualized. The utilitarian school of thought is criticized for failing to take account of "adaptive preferences" that include social traditions of subordination and prolonged conditions of poverty or intimidation, which may lead to lowered expectations and to exclusion of certain objectives from 256. Momsen, J.H. 2004, Gender and Development, Routledge, New York, p14 257. Shiva, Vandana., 1988, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development, London: Zed Books. 258. The 189 governments represented in Beijing unanimously affirmed that the advancement of women and the achievement of equality with men are matters of fundamental human rights and therefore a prerequisite for social justice. 259. Parpart, Jene, L., Rai Shirin. M., and Staudt Kathleen.,A. (eds.), 2002, Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World, Routledge, London, p8 260. Derbyshire, H., 2002, op.cit. 261. Momsen, J. H. 2001, Backlash: or how to snatch failure from the jaws of success in gender and development, Progress in Development Studies 1/, pp51-56. 77

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

individual's horizons. Since women often have lower expectations than men towards wages, freedom of movement, etc, the adoption of the criterion of utility gives rise to distorted evaluations from the gender perspective.262 Furthermore, Nussbaum and Sen argue that the ability of an individual to achieve well-being does not result only from their ability to be satisfied, but is dependent on the options available and the degree of liberty the person has to lead a life which is granted value. Sen recognizes the effects of a lack of opportunity, and affirms the possibility of choice as a function with intrinsic value. Therefore he warns us not to equate voluntary dieting and being forced to starve due to a lack of food. The capabilities approach does not take into account the quantity of utilities, but considers rather the chances each individual has in their actual life conditions. In this framework, capabilities are important only as a set of alternative combinations of active experiences endowed with value, from which an individual can choose. Sen names such experiences "functionings" as they indicate the functions of human beings as part of their intrinsic nature including accommodation, proper nutrition, not suffering from avoidable diseases, participation in community life, etc.263 Sen´s assumptions aim to place the power of people to formulate and implement their own life plans at the heart of economic and social policies.264 This approach draws attention to the inequalities under which women suffer within the family, in access to resources and opportunities, in recognition, etc, and it is relevant for us because its meta-theoretical framework is not restricted to a specific historic or cultural tradition. Such a constellation enables the formulation of universal rules stipulating that everyone be respected regardless of their diversity. Sen considers the reach of women´s agency as one of the most neglected areas of development and calls for a correction, stating that "nothing, arguably, is as important today in the political economy of development as an adequate recognition of political, economic and social participation and leadership of women."265 Sen goes so far as to name women's agency in development as "a crucial aspect of development as freedom,"266 confirming our earlier assumptions that gender issues are intrinsic to development.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Nussbaum´s approach is similar to Sen's, but instead of focusing on the role of capabilities in demarcating the space where quality of life assessments are made, it uses the idea in a more exigent way, and proposes a foundation of basic political principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees. 267 Nussbaum attempted to formulate a normative political perspective by concentrating on the definition of a list of

262. Nussbaum. M. 2000, Women and Human Development. The capability approach, Cambridge University Press, p78 263. Sen. A.K. 1999, Development as freedom, New york Press, p p189-204 264. Morlicho E. 2006, Gender discourse in development, op.cit.p9 265. Sen. A.K. 1999, op.cit. p203 266. Ibid. 267. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1995, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, pxv. 78

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

capabilities vital for every human being, and for which it should be possible to reach cross-cultural agreement. She differs from Sen, who never refers to a threshold of values but to the equality of capabilities. She bases her formulation of capability on the existence of a "basic social minimum" guaranteed to all, based on respect for human dignity. She posits a threshold for each capacity, beneath which the functioning of citizens can not occur, or is not accessible to them. The most important part of Nussbaum´s theory consists of developing a more complex model to distinguish between three types of capability; 1) basic capabilities including innate ones such as hearing, speaking, etc, 2) internal capabilities found in the mature state of a person, which suffice for the exercise of their requisite functions, and 3) the combined capabilities, which are internal capabilities combined with external conditions for the exercise of functions. Nussbaum recognizes combined capabilities as the best framework to consider rights, since in many countries women have only nominal rights of political participation, and cannot exercise these rights in terms of capabilities. The list of combined capabilities includes, but is not limited to,268 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3) bodily integrity, 4) cognitive capability; perceiving, imagining, thinking, 5) emotions, 6) practical reasons, 7) affiliation with and concern for others, 8) dependence on and respect for other species and nature, 9) humor and play, and 10) control over one´s own environment. 269 These capabilities are all considered as equally important, and have the status of universal norms which should be guaranteed by the constitutions of all countries. These guarantees must be recognized at the level of individuals, stresses Nussbaum, in order to enable the modification of dominance and of violent and discriminatory behavior, the main victims of which are women and children. Nussbaum makes clear that not only is the development of an individual's internal capabilities relevant, but a material and institutional context that can encourage them in accordance with the traditions and legislative approach prevailing in each context must be ensured.270 Nussbaum manages to reconcile a strongly universalistic approach, geared toward respect for multicultural norms of justice, equality, and human rights, with a respect for cultural differences and specific local characteristics. The complex structure of Nussbaum´s model gives greater emphasis to the central role of gender injustices.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The capability approach that Sen and Nussbaum have elaborated has given international development ethicists a challenging, richly nuanced, and fertile resource. It rightly identifies both the strengths and weaknesses of commodity-based, utilitarian

268. For a comprehensive version of this list see David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic, in Glover,J.and Nussbaum C.M., (eds), 1995, Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities., Clarendon Press, Oxford, England, .p 174 269. See Nussbaum M. Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice, speech held at 3rd conference on the Capability Approach: From sustainable development to sustainable freedom, Pavia 7-9 Sept. 2003. 270. Morlicho E. 2006, Gender discourse in development, Demologos Project Working Papers, op.cit., p12 79

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ethics. Building on and deepening the basic needs perspective, it positively evaluates development theory and practice by the criteria of valuable human capabilities and achievements. By recasting the traditional social ideals of human freedom, rights, and justice, the capability perspective has launched a new development paradigm.271 This paradigm is a crucial element of The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) signed in 2000, that sets out the goals of the United Nations for the current decade.272 Empowerment of women and the promotion of gender equality is one of the eight internationally agreed MDGs to be achieved in the next decade. In conclusion, overwhelming evidence drawn from comparisons at the national and subnational scales shows that societies discriminating on the basis of gender pay their price in increased poverty, slower growth, and lower quality of life, while at the same time gender equality enhances development. The aim here was to examine the interrelations between gender and development, and to provide an analytical syntax to view the debates illuminating the implicit theoretical positions and contradictions of much contemporary policy. The Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women states that "a transformed partnership based on equality between women and men is a condition for people-centered sustainable development.'273 This is why the theoretical approach followed here will focus at the level of individual development and the capabilities approach, while stressing the empowerment of women as both a means and an end to development, and thus an intrinsic part of it. In broader terms, development, the advancement of women, and achievement of equality between women and men are matters of human rights and conditions for social justice, and should therefore not be seen in isolation as women’s issues. They are and should be considered as essential to building a sustainable, just, and developed society. In fact, this study will show that the empowerment of women and equality between women and men are prerequisites for achieving political, social, economic, and cultural development by examining the ramifications of this theoretical approach to policy in the empirical section. 1.2.6 The Development-Security nexus

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

"The lack of security for the state and for its citizens is a major obstacle to political, social, and economic development. To escape from a downward spiral where insecurity, criminalization, and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing, social, economic, governance, and security dimensions of the domestic environment must be addressed simultaneously".274

271. Glover,J. and Nussbaum C.M., (eds), 1995, op.cit. p196. 272. For more information on the Millennium Development Goals see website: http://www.un.org/ millenniumgoals/ 273. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1996. The United Nations and the advancement of women, 1945-1996 (Rev. ed ed. Vol. United Nations blue books series; v.6). New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information.. p652 274. Regional Conference of the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working table III Security and Defense Issues-Security Sector Reform. Bucharest, 25 & 26 October 2001. 80

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Critical approaches to security have considerably reshaped the theoretical landscape of security studies in the last decade. Despite a huge body of literature, there remains a fundamental disagreement as to what actually counts as critical in this context. Scholars are still arguing in terms of schools of thought, despite increasingly fruitful cross-fertilization between critical approaches. The situation has been aggravated since 9/11/2001, when a "variable-geometry approach to weak states,"275 as Schwarz labels it, has emerged. This approach makes some weak states, such as Iraq, or Afghanistan the subjects of heightened discourse on security threats through underdevelopment, while others like Sudan are seen through the lens of the "new barbarism" thesis. While intervention in the former became a challenge and practically an obligation for the international community, argues Schwarz, the latter escaped this fate due to the absence of acute imperatives for action. Between these two poles lie states like Sierra Leone, where specific intervention policies are less influenced by the logic of the war on terror or the securitization of underdevelopment, but rather influenced by the concrete economic and strategic interests of the developed world. For Schwarz it would more appropriate to speak here of the imposition of a variety of "liberal peaces"276 on postconflict societies. Although the boundary between critical and traditional approaches to security remains blurred,277 I will attempt to assess here briefly the evolution of critical approaches to security studies by discussing their theoretical premises, investigating their intellectual ramifications, and examining how they coalesce around different issues relevant for this study. The aim is to analyze the development-security nexus through critical approaches to security in a state-building context.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the traditional and predominantly realist literature on international relations and states, the concept of security is defined primarily in external or outwardly directed terms. This concept is directed outside of the commonly accepted unit of analysis, the state itself. Accordingly, Ayoob, analyzing this literature with reference to Walt, defines security as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force,” especially of “the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war”. He recognizes that despite Walt´s affirmation of military power as the main focus of the field, military power is not the only source of national security. Moreover, military threats are not the only dangers that states face, although they are usually the most serious ones. As a result, security studies also include what is sometimes termed "statecraft"; arms control, diplomacy, crisis management, etc. Therefore, suggests Ayoob, Walt’s definition of security takes its philosophical basis from the fundamental realist assumption summed up by Lippmann half a century ago; “A

275. Schwarz, Rolf, 2005, Post-Conflict Peace-building: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation, SAGE Publications, Vol. 36 Nr.4 pp429–446, 276. Ibid. 277. For a detailed overview of traditional and critical security studies see Collective C.A.s.e, 2006, Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,; Security Dialogue, SAGE Publications, Vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 443-487. Paris, June 2005, Online at http:/critical.libertysecurity.org.Accessed 13 May 2006 81

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.” adding that "security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it."278 By accepting this definition of security as state-centric in character, Ayoob points out the emphasis on the primarily political connotations of the term and the statebuilding enterprise. Based on Easton´s definition of the political realm as referring to a separable dimension of human activity, he refers to "the political” as the arena of human activity concerned with “the authoritative allocation of values for a society.” So the state, perceived as engaged in the authoritative allocation of social values within territorially defined political and administrative entities, becomes the primary referent of security in his definition.279 This emphasis on the primacy of the political realm in the definition of security, however, does not mean that this realm can or should be totally insulated from other realms of human and societal activity when it comes to dealing with or analyzing security issues. It simply means that while retaining its primacy in the definition of security, the political realm must also be informed by these other arenas of human activity. This influence of other realms on matters that pertain to or have a bearing on security must be filtered and mediated through the political arena and must be directly relevant to that realm. Therefore, when developments in other realms such as the economy or ecology threaten to have immediate political consequences, or have the potential to threaten state boundaries, political institutions, or governing regimes, then these other variables must be taken into account as a part of a state’s security calculus.280

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The globally situated, multidimensional human security approach of Thomas stands in contrast to this realist state-centric approach to security. Thomas' approach involves a fundamental departure from orthodox security analysis in which the state is the primary referent object, and instead places human beings and their complex social and economic relations at the center of analysis. Thus, the human security approach represents an almost paradigmatic change in security studies. The primary referent object for security has implications both for understanding the sources of threats to security and for elucidating strategies to increase security. The human security approach existed previously, suggests Thomas, but the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpinned orthodox security and policy formation did not value it. A key argument in the security discourse is the anchoring of the security variable within the global capitalist economy and global social structures. That is why the

278. Ayoob. Mohammed 1997, Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective, in . in Williams C. Michael, and Krause Keith. (eds), 1997, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases Routledge.London.pp121-127 279. Ibid. 280. Ibid. 82

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

main focus and starting point, argues Thomas, is understanding security in terms of the real-life, everyday experiences of humanity embedded within these global social and economic structures, rather than the experiences of territorially defined sovereign states operating in a system composed of similar units. This does not mean that Thomas discards states as unimportant, but rather she suggests we rate their significance in terms of their contribution to human security, and not simply in terms of their own perpetuation. Considering the current context of globalization, Thomas perceives the interconnections between the evolving global economy, the state as intermediary, and the human experience of security, as vital. She places the security-development relationship at the heart of these matters. Understanding this relationship is the biggest challenge to be faced, argues Thomas, and she offers an "alternative to the realist, state-centric, militaristic, male-dominated terrain of orthodox security and strategic studies."281 Thomas puts it this way, "We have consciously chosen to privilege human beings, not the individual in the neoliberal sense, as the primary referents, along within state, experience of security."282 Her discourse is situated in a globalized context and globalization is interpreted mainly as the latest stage of capitalism, directly affecting human security by compounding existing or newly created inequalities in power and resources. This process is supported by a liberal ideology that places a premium on individual choice in the marketplace. So, per her discourse: "The emphasis shifts from the pursuit of the national interest to the fulfillment of human security."283

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Thomas differentiates between the security of the individual as conceived in the neoliberal sense, namely as the extension of private power and activity based around property rights and choice in the marketplace, and true human security. Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realized. This state of security is indivisible and cannot be pursued by one group at the expense of others. She indicates that human security entails more than physical survival, and suggests that it includes emancipation from oppressive power structures, be they global, national, or local in origin and scope.284 For Thomas, human security has both qualitative and quantitative aspects. At one level it is about the fulfillment of basic material needs, and at another it is about the achievement of human dignity, incorporating personal autonomy, control over one's life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community. It is therefore engaged directly with discussions of democracy at all levels, from local to global. The state can also play a role, varying along a spectrum from facilitating to obstructive. Human security therefore requires a starting point and a cognitive map different from those 281. Thomas Caroline. and Wilkin Peter. (eds), 1999, Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience. (Critical security studies). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. CO. pp1-3 282. Ibid.p2 283. Thomas C. and Wilkin P. (eds), 1999, op.cit. p3 284. Ibid.p5 83

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

of orthodox security, according to Thomas.285 She contends that human security is not best delivered by strong states, based on two fundamental assumptions: orthodox security ignores the nonmaterial dimension of human security, and it is simplistic in overlooking the fact that strong states remain strong at the expense of weaker states. Such relationships, which promote social contradictions at the national, regional, and global levels, are too fragile a basis for human security.286 In fact, the UNDP's Human Development Report focusing on the human security approach presented the following arguments in its support: "For

too long, security has been equated with threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world."287 "....Threats to human security broadly fall within seven categories: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political..."288 The human security approach has also been criticized for including the temptation to make the concept of security so broad that it comes to mean all things to all people. This tendency, however, has been debated in the critical discourse on security over the past decade. Buzan, for example, warns of confusion between human security and human rights; "...[human security]... proliferates concepts without adding analytical value. It also both drives towards a reductionist understanding of international security and reinforces a mistaken tendency to idealize security as the desired end goal....If the referent object of human security is the individual, or humankind as a whole, then little if anything differentiates its agenda from that of human rights."289

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

On the other hand, scholars like Macfarlane point out the difficulties that may be present when the concept of sovereignty is expanded to involve almost everything, especially when it comes to implementation at the policy level. He and others290 argue:"There is no intrinsic reason to favor narrow over broad conceptions of human security. The merits of the two positions can, however, be judged in terms of concep285. As a proof for the relevance of the human security approach, Thomas points to the direct relation between the level of entitlement to human security and the propensity for conflict. Based on the UNDP Human Development Index, during 1990–1995, 57% of countries experiencing war were ranked low in development. Thus the causal relationship between a lack of entitlement to material goods, health, and education, and war seems clear. See Thomas Caroline .2001, Global governance, development and human security: exploring the links, in Third World Quarterly, Vol 22, No 2, pp 159–175 286. Thomas C. and Wilkin P. (eds), 1999, op.cit. p4 287. UNDP, 1994, Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.p3 288. UNDP, 1995, Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.pp23-25 289. Buzan Barry.Sept.2004,,A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value, in Security Dialogue SAGE Publications Vol. 35, No. 3, pp370-371 290. Cp. Paris, Roland .Sept. 2004, Still an Inscrutable Concept, in Security Dialogue Vol. 35, no. 3, pp371-372 84

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tual value added and policy consequences.... the widening of the concept makes the establishment of priorities in human security policy difficult. Diluting the concept diminishes its political salience. The more comprehensive the sweep of human security, the less likely are the objectives of its proponents to be achieved."291 Owen´s suggestion of the threshold definition of security seeks to unify these different schools of thought by referring to the original UNDP definition of human security. By including threats in the definition according to their actual severity, this approach seeks to define human security not by an arbitrary list of threats, but by their actual effects on people. It proposes a hybrid definition, requiring sacrifice on the parts of both broad and narrow proponents. All threats would be considered, but only those that pass a threshold of severity would be labeled actual threats to human security.292

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Owen sees two parts in this threshold-based definition. The human security approach must recognize that there is no difference between deaths from floods, communicable diseases, or war, since all preventable harm could potentially become a threat to human security. In addition, varying harms require dramatically different policy responses. The definition must be selective, without limiting any harms that affect large numbers of people, e.g. ‘human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats.’ This wording remains true to the broad nature of human security, while clearly separating it from more general concepts of human well-being and development. Making the referent object "all human lives" sets the focus on the individual while indicating a universalist mandate.293 The "critical and pervasive" requirement for threats, on the other hand, establishes severity, immediacy, and scope as crucial parameters. From an unlimited number of possible threats, only the most serious ones are included. This definition sets the parameters and lets conditions on the ground determine what is and is not included. Out of an infinite list of possible threats, some will surpass a threshold and become human security concerns, while others will be dealt with through alternate mechanisms. Owen argues that more conceptual clarity is required in such a context. A definition must be able to separate and categorize all possible threats for meaningful analytic study. Categories are therefore established, under which all human security threats may be ordered. These are not threats themselves, but rather conceptual groupings, providing a degree of disciplinary alignment to an overarching concept. Human security is thus the protection of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal, and political threats. Consequently, the idea of a threshold-based conceptualization of human security requires the narrow 291. MacFarlane.Neil,S. Sept. 2004, Useful Concept that Risks Losing Its Political Salience in Security Dialogue vol. 35, no. 3, pp368-369 292. Owen, Taylor. 2004, Human Security: Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition, SAGE Publications, Security Dialogue Vol. 37 Nr.4 pp443–487 293. Ibid. 85

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

proponents to recognize that violence falls into only one of the six human security categories, that of personal security, and the broad proponents to recognize that, while important, not all development concerns (i.e education, environmental problems, etc) should be labeled as threats to human security. Owen recognizes some of these threats however, and agrees that they become human security concerns after surpassing a threshold. If that happens, a monitoring system to identify them and a security infrastructure to effectively mitigate the threats should be available, per Owen.294 As discussed above, two concepts of human security have been advanced in international debate. One is a broad notion captured in the phrase ‘freedom from want,’ stressing all threats towards the individual, ranging from a lack of development to environmental scarcities. The other is a narrow notion captured in the phrase ‘freedom from fear’, including only security threats directed towards the individual. To bring the discussion back to the realm of state-building, we will refer to Schwarz´s article suggesting that threats to citizens in reality often emanate from predatory rulers, corrupt judges, and in short, from the state itself. Thus, reshaping state-society relations becomes an end in itself, justified in the name of establishing or reestablishing human security. 295

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This liberal approach, argues Schwarz, is guided by a universal understanding of human liberty, dignity, and freedom. The inherent violence of this liberal concept of state-building becomes evident when we question the legitimacy of outside intervention, and ask if this process should be driven externally without the consent of the people.296 Considering the duality of the human security agenda in relation to statebuilding processes that on one hand view the state, and particularly the military, as potentially threatening individuals, but on the other hand aim to strengthen the state to create strong and legitimate polities, is difficult but offers possibilities for bridging the gap between security and welfare concerns.297 In fact, many academic studies contributing to an increasingly international consensus cite development as a precondition for security and economic development, and note its minimizing effect on the potential for violent conflict. They stress the necessity of creating opportunities for citizens in the form of political participation and economic well-being during postconflict situations. Cooper for example, suggests that the linkage between development and security must not be seen as creating individual opportunities, but as diminishing inequality between ethnic groups or regions. Through the offering of egalitarian welfare benefits across ethnic groups, the opportunities for rebellion might in fact be severely reduced.298

294. Owen, T, 2004, op.cit.p383 295. Schwarz, R., 2004, op.cit.pp 429–46. 296. See Krause Keith. & Jutersonke, Oliver. Dec 2005 Peace, Security and Development in PostConflict Environments, in Security Dialogue, SAGE Publications Vol.36 No.4, pp 447–462 297. Ibid. 298. Cp. Cooper, Neil., Dec. 2005., Picking Out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representation of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy, Security Dialogue, SAGE Publications 86

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The arguments listed here so far confirm my assumptions on the development-security link, and show that the provision of security is a precondition for development in terms of political, economic, social, and cultural well-being This is also illustrated by the concept of "security first". Major international organizations like the WB have embraced this approach and begun to emphasize the security dimension of statebuilding in their development programs. The complex nature of these interlinking elements calls for a nuanced approach, and the human security agenda of state-building and development programs must be seen as a parallel strategy aiming to establish both human development and human security to bridge concerns on security and welfare.299 Using Schwarz´s interdependent scheme, I will summarize the relations between the three core state functions; security, welfare and representation (see Fig.9). These issue-areas are not created ex-nihilum, but are de facto closely related, in some cases reinforcing and in others hindering each other. In this scheme, security stands apart because it is perceived as a precondition for both welfare and representation. Its value lies in the protection of physical existence against internal and external threats. In its internal dimension it borders on the domain of rule in which opportunities for exercising freedom and political participation are allocated among individuals. This both secures the preservation of the physical existence of the individual and serves its advancement. With regard to material needs, the latter is provided for in the domain of economic well-being by means of the allocation of economic gains and opportunities for achieving such gains.300 An increase in welfare also reduces external conflicts and supplies the necessary resources to provide security within the state by increasing the capacity for, and propensity to, political participation, prolonging the life expectancy of democracies and ultimately affecting the representational function of states.301

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

For Schwarz the real nexus lies in the way that individual and civil rights, citizenship, and minority rights are guaranteed within a state. Promoting the representation function of states in the context of state-building beyond the simple promotion of democracy implies the creation of an accountable government that can overcome social divisions through reconciliation. It also means building a genuine political community through a social contract, and educating citizens on peace and justice. Representation allows for peaceful external relations and for the nonviolent resolution of domestic conflicts, contributing to optimal solutions of redistribution problems within society and the state. Adequate representation promotes economic growth and social justice, and attracts investment, therefore making aid more effective.302 Finally,

299. 300. 301.

302.

Vol 36 No.4, pp463–478 Schwarz, R., 2004, op.cit.pp 429–446. Ibid. See Lipset, S.M.1959, op.cit. Putnam, R. D, et al. 1993, op.cit and Przeworski, A. 2000, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Vol. Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy, Cambridge University Press. Jensen, Erik. G, and Heller. Thomas, 2003, Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 87

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Schwarz warns that the evolution of these core functions in modern European states took centuries, and violence played an integral part in the process303 through local actor-driven processes. A deeper understanding of local dynamics is needed, and the notion of local ownership must be coupled with international standards on the reconstruction of viable states.304 Figure 9: The Interdependence of the Three State Functions: Security, Welfare and Representation (Source: Schwarz 2004:246 ) ___________________________________________________________________________________________

Impact on Condition

Security

Welfare

Representation

___________________________________________________________________________________________

Security

Security (peace, monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, secure property rights) is a necessary condition for welfare.

Welfare

Welfare reduces conflicts and provides the necessary resources to produce security.

Representation

Representation allows for peaceful external relations and for the nonviolent resolution of domestic conflicts. Representation offers optimal solutions to redistribution.

Security (peace, monopoly on the legitimate use of violence) is a necessary condition for political participation.

Welfare increases the capacity for and propensity to political participation and prolongs the life expectancy of democracies. Representation promotes economic growth and social justice. Representation attracts investment and makes aid more effective.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

___________________________________________________________________________________________

303. Schwarz refers to Tilly´s study on state formation in Europe and the role of violence in it. 304. Krause K. & Jutersonke, O. op.cit., pp 447–462, 88

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

1.3 State-building and Development: Institutional implications.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

So far I have considered several theories and approaches to development and state-building, following the history of these ideas and contextualizing and interpreting their meaning in order to locate my theoretical contribution within the general theoretical discourse on the subject. State-building is here understood to mean the process by which state structures and institutions in the military, political, sociocultural, and economic domains are built or developed, while allowing for the smooth implementation of state practices. The term development is understood to encompass the entire range of political, economic, social, and cultural progress to which peoples aspire. I will specifically explore these four domains (political, economic, social, cultural) in order to examine my theoretical assumptions in more detail, using theories consistent with the frameworks presented in previous chapters. The aim is to distinguish the relevant mechanisms from each of these domains that influence the processes of state-building and development, and that should therefore be taken into account when generating a new theoretical model in this area. I will then utilize this model in the empirical part of this study. The following chapters are concerned with these four domains and consider their interrelations within the institutional arena where both processes take place. 1.3.1 Political Development: Political System and Political Parties In this unit I will describe the concept of political development and develop an empirically testable process for its investigation in this study. This will require a multidimensional analysis to formulate a general proposition that can explain both the factors influencing political development, and its effects. Examining political development in a western-based intellectual enterprise is also inevitably dominated by a western normative bias, which should not be used as a universal principle for all others to follow. Following Tunde´s contribution to the topic, I will argue that my approach to processes of change (such as state building and development) views the "end result" of change as a continuous dialectical process, and thus as unknown.305 This is why I posit that when different countries experience political change or development, they will follow different paths and exhibit diverse patterns of political evolution.306 The constant variable that unites the entire process is, "the regularized prevalence of the mechanisms of political choice and the capacity to positively meet the challenge of endogenous stresses and strains, by overcoming or changing the dynamics of exogenous forces which could be dysfunctional to change or "political development" in the national policy"307.

305. Tunde Adeniran, 1975, The Search for a Theory of Political Development, Published in Transition Journal, No. 48., Duke University Press, pp25-28 306. Ibid p.27 307. Cp. Gerschenkron Alexander. 1962, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Esssays, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, p.7 Famous for his notion of late development, Gerschenkron´s major premise ruled out a simple replication of historical processes from country to country, as the environment within which change has occurred has 89

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Being aware that the process of modernization has typically been confused with development and considered as the prime vehicle of it, it is relevant to examine this approach. Originally, much of the literature on political development argued that industrialization and therefore modernization, which invariably lead to the development of new social structures and societal patterns, also lead to political development.308 Several models were built and concepts differentiated to establish and legitimize the relationship between political development and democracy, where the latter was defined more or less as the goal of the former. Democracy was considered as a given and a priori goal of political development, being the symbol of modernity itself.309 In broad terms, I agree that modernization eventually stimulates political development, and is a force for transition and change through which people are mobilized and activated for political participation through its agents including political parties, the military, the bureaucracy, etc. Studies have also found that democratic political development occurs when mass communication permeates society, and it is affected by education. This contributes to the growth of mass communication that occurs when literacy and educational levels rise in a society. Urbanization affects democratic political development primarily by increasing educational levels, which then increase mass communication. This suggests a model where interrelated causal propositions link modernization through a progress sequence to democratic political development.310

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The universal applicability of this causal model is questionable, as modernization is not the sine qua non for political development. While it is true that once a modernization process has started, its effect could be political development, this is not always the case. Adeniran notes; "its... [modernization]...course hardly provides its initiators with a definite image of the future."311 This is why, considering that developing countries evolve in myriad and perhaps unique ways, the West should be aware that developing political systems may embody "mixtures" and processes as yet unknown. As a matter of fact, there is much to be lost in closing off alternative definitions at this stage. Instead, open-ended political development models that specify the

308.

309. 310.

311.

varied greatly in different eras. Late developers, he argued, had to apply institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country to achieve the same industrialization. See Lerner Daniel 1958, The passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the middle east. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press. Here a commitment to modernity is shared which rests its notions of a system on the belief that the seemingly diverse aspects of sociopolitical change are actually related in a pattern of high covariation. Tunde A., 1975, op.cit. pp. 26 See McCrone Donald J and Cnudde Charles F., 1967, Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model The American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 72-79. Tunde A., 1975, op.cit. p 27. 90

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

continuity of development, but not necessarily its end point, are the right way to approach this issue.312 Notwithstanding this, modernization does allow individuals to be more involved in issues affecting their lives and destinies. It enables the creation of specialized and differentiated political structures, interest groups, and a centralized bureaucracy, and promotes organizational, technological, and attitudinal changes. The very presence of these elements could engender demands on the political system and propel popular participation. However, the mere existence of elements of modernization does not ensure a final stage of development. For that, these elements must be effective, in continuous and efficient operation.313 While the process of modernization stimulates political development, the process in itself leads to political development only when the changes that modernization initiates are absorbed by the system, and when the institutions created are sustainable in the long term. This requires that both the will to voice, and the capacity to meet demands are present in the system, which reiterates my assumption that political development is just one part of the development process. I am aware that the political development process is a specific one, comprising more than just political change, and distinct from modernization itself. As von Vorys put it, this process is one whose goal is a political system that can provide for the functional requirements of long-term persistence, and which will probably meet the tests of modernity, although it does not have to do so. It includes social, economic, and cultural changes, but its focus is the development of the governmental capacity to direct the course and rate of social and economic change. Its success will rest largely upon social and economic accomplishments, but its progress is measured in increments by the government's capacity to coerce and persuade. Political development, concludes von Vorys, "is a process which should accomplish its political goal."314 For Tunde this goal should be the preservation of public interest, of the rights and obligations of the individual, and the adoption of popular values for the purpose of statebuilding.315

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It is clear from this analysis that to examine the conditions influencing political development, we must include a set of interdependent factors from the social, economic, and cultural domains. Based on an analysis of a substantial number of writers on the subject, I have come to the conclusion that there are five prime correlates or determinants of political development. I offer a taxonomy of these five approaches to political development, drawing upon both traditional and contemporary sources, and studies of both "developing" and "developed" areas. These five approaches are the:

312. Packenham, Robert A.1966, Political-Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2. Jan., 1966, pp. 194-235. p 204 313. Tunde A., 1975, op.cit.p 28 314. Von Vorys Karl , 1965, March. Toward a Concept of Political Development, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358, No.1, pp. 14-19. 315. Tunde A., 1975, op.cit p 26 91

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

(1) legal-formal, (2) economic, (3) administrative, (4) social system, and (5) political culture.316 The legal-formal constitution prescribes such features as equal protection under the law, the rule of law, regular elections by secret ballot, federalism, and the separation of powers.317 The economic approach requires a level of economic development sufficient to serve the material needs of the members of a political system, and to permit a reasonable balance between economic aspirations and satisfaction.318 The administrative refers to the administrative capacity to efficiently and effectively maintain law and order, and to perform governmental output functions rationally and neutrally.319 The social system approach refers to a social system that facilitates popular participation in governmental and political processes at all levels, and the bridging of regional, religious, linguistic, tribal, or other divisions as necessary for political development.320 Finally, the political culture is perceived as a fundamental attitudinal and personality characteristic among the members of a political system, such that the members are able to accept the privileges and bear the responsibilities of a democratic political process.321 Recently, a considerable number of studies have supported the interdependence of the political development and economic development approaches.322 However, more attention has been paid to the social development and political culture approaches.323

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Having established political development as an open-ended process and explained its encompassing determinants above, it is time to define political development itself. The confusion that exists over the concept of political development derives from the fact that the political is often perceived as distinct from economic, social, and cultural development. Lucien Pye has explored ten categories of "political development" as (1) the political prerequisite of economic development; (2) politics typical of industrial societies; 3) political modernization; (4) the operations of a nation-state; (5) administrative and legal development; (6) mass mobilization and participation; (7) building of democracy; (8) stability and orderly change; (9) mobilization and power;

316. Packenham A. Robert 1964, Approaches to the Study of Political Development World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1. Oct., 1964, pp. 108 -109 317. See Theodore Woolsey, Woodrow Wilson,. Burgess, John W, and most comparative government text- books 318. See the works of Marx Karl, Rostow Walt, Lipset Seymour. M. , Coleman, James.S, etc 319. Ibid. Weber Max, Brzezinski Zbigniew, Wriggins Howard W, etc 320. Ibid. Deutsch, Karl, Lipset, Seymour. M, Weiner. Myron, etc 321. Ibid. Almond Gabriel., Lasswell, Harold., Parsons.Talcott., Pye Lucien, etc 322. Cp. Ruttan Vernon W, 1991, What Happened to Political Development? in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Jan., 1991), pp. 265-292. 323. The literature and studies in this field range in method from intensive, mostly qualitative, studies of single countries to extensive quantitative surveys of several or even dozens of countries. Empirical studies supporting the administrative approach are rarer, but not absent. 92

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

and finally (10) political development as an aspect of a multidimensional process of social change324. This last category is of special interest for this study, as the need for a theoretical framework for assessing development has led me to the view that political development is intimately associated with other aspects of social, economic, and cultural change. Like Pye, I regard this point as crucial and assume that any feature which may be relevant in explaining the power potential of a country must also reflect the state of the economy and the social order. Furthermore, I assume that it is inappropriate to try to isolate political development from other forms of development. Although to a limited extent the political sphere may be autonomous from the rest of the society, if sustainable political development will actually take place, it must happen within the context of a multidimensional process of social change in which all segments or domains of society can evolve simultaneously. Accordingly, all forms of development are related, simultaneously taking place within a historical context where specific influences from outside the society impinge on internal processes of social change, just as change in the different aspects of society, the economy, the polity, and social order all impinge on each other.325

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

These findings of Pye predict nonlinear development trajectories for developing countries, and warn of a range of problems that may arise when neglecting this perspective. There are three broadly shared characteristics of political development defined as its essential dimensions; 1) concern with equality in the political culture, 2) capacity of the political system and of authoritative governmental structures, and 3) the question of differentiation to non-authoritative structures. To compare the different courses of development and analyze their corollary problems, it is essential to note that problems of equality are generally related to the political culture and sentiments about legitimacy and commitment to the political system. Problems of capacity are generally related to the performance of authoritative structures of government, while questions of differentiation touch mainly on the performance of non-authoritative structures and the political process in society at large. The problems of political development, according to Pye, revolve around the relationship between the political culture, authoritative structures, and the general political process.326 One of the purposes of this study is to suggest the utility of combining the analysis of political development with other domains. Based on the arguments and analysis presented so far, I propose a set of variables for the examination of conditions influencing political development in my case study. These variables include; 1) an analysis of the mechanisms of political choice, in the form of Political Parties as well as authority structures, i.e. the legislative, judiciary. and executive branches of government, 2) an analysis of the functional capacity of authority structures as the capacity

324. Lucian W. Pye, March. 1965 The Concept of Political Development, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358, No 1, pp. 9-13. 325. Ibid. pp. 11. 326. Ibid. pp. 13. 93

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

to positively meet the challenge of endogenous stresses and strains, and finally, 3) an analysis of the political culture and the ability to create alliances and cope with conflicts as the fundamental attitudinal and personality characteristics of the members of a political system, such that they are able both to accept the privileges and bear the responsibilities of a democratic political process. Special attention will be given in this study to political parties and their development. Considering parties as essential to a modern stable democracy, "as much today as they were 40 years ago,"327 I will undertake an analysis of the political parties system in Kosovo using variables suggested by LaPalombara and Weiner as elaborated below. When Lapalombara and Weiner refer to a political party, they mean a locally articulated328 organization that interacts with and seeks to attract the electoral support of the general public, that plays a direct and substantive role in political recruitment, and that is committed to the capture and maintenance of power, either alone or in coalition with others.329 Political development in this context thus requires a certain level of political complexity and a high degree of organization.330 There are two alternative perspectives on political development in this sense; one where parties are seen as an outgrowth of the development process and as the culmination of processes of social, economic, and political change, and therefore dependent variables affecting other developments,331 or as independent institutional forces affecting political development itself.332

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

LaPalombara regards the emergence of political parties as a useful institutional index of the level of political development. He relates their emergence to the modernization process, which in turn generates the question of exactly what part of the modernization process facilitates this development. For LaPalombara, the answer lies in

327. Here they refer to the study made 40 years ago by Weiner, Myron. & LaPalombara, Joseph., 1966., Political parties and political development, Studies in political development Nr. 6, Princeton, Princeton University Press 328. Commenting on this book 40 years later, Lapalombra wrote: "It seems fair to say that the political party as it has existed in the past is in steady decline, so much so that even the definition of the political party we utilized four decades back may require revision...it appears that the existence of organizational articulation at the local level is no longer a necessary condition that would qualify an organization to be numbered in the political party category" See Joseph LaPalombara, 2007, Reflections on Political Parties and Political development Four decades Later. Published in Party Politics journal. Vol. 13. No.2 pp. 148 329. Weiner, M. & LaPalombara, J., 1966., op.cit. p29. 330. Ibid. p.5 331. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, considers political development as a dependent variable. He defines political democracy as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials, and also as a social mechanism for the resolution of the problems of social decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest to choose among alternative contenders for political representation. See Lipset, Seymour. M. 1959 Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, in The American Political Science Review, 53, pp. 69-105. 332. Weiner, M. & LaPalombara, J., 1966.,op.cit. p41 94

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the historical circumstances under which parties arise. Describing three common theories for the origin of the political parties, Lapalombara refers to three institutional theories that focus on the interrelationship between early parliaments and the emergence of parties; 1) historical-situation theories, 2) historical crises or tasks that systems were encountering when parties developed, and 3) developmental theories that relate parties to the broader process of modernization.333 I will make use of Lapalombara´s examination tools for the same purposes. In these institutional theories, Lapalombara makes use of Duverger´s theory postulating three phases in party development, in the following chronological order; the creation of parliamentary groups, the organization of electoral committees, and the establishment of permanent connections between the two.334 Duverger and Lapalombara agree that it is relevant whether parties were created internally or externally. Internally created parties come to life when a local organization and parliamentary connection is established as the result of initiative exercised by those already in the legislature or holding national public office. The latter are created outside the legislature and invariably involve a challenge to the ruling group and a demand for representation. These parties are a more recent phenomenon and are characteristic of developing areas, especially of nationalistic and anti-colonial movements. They receive their initial organizational impetus from various sources such as university students, intellectuals, etc.335 According to Duverger, externally created parties tend to be more centralized than internal ones, more ideologically coherent and disciplined, less subject to influence from the legislative contingents of the parties, and generally less willing to ascribe major importance to, or be deferential to the parliament.336 In the case of Kosovo, I will use these definitions to determine the parties' internal or external nature, and to make recommendations for their future development.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Lucien Pye and Sideny Verba use the concept of crises in the political system as historical-situational effects that political systems typically experience when they move from traditional to more developed forms.337 This is based on Max Weber's theory suggesting that there is an enduring impact of salient events in a nation´s history on the type of political system that develops, thereby explaining the differences among those systems.338 Lapalombara argues that the way in which political elites deal or cope with crises determines the kind of political system that will develop in the future. Such historical crises determine not only the context where political parties emerge, but are also a critical factor in determining the future evolution of the 333. Ibid, p7 334. See Duverger, M. 1959. Political parties: their organization and activity in the modern state (2nd English ed, rev ed.). London: Methuen 335. Weiner, M. & LaPalombara, J., 1966., op.cit., p8-11 336. Cp. Duverger, M. 1955, op.cit. 337. See Pye, L.&Verba, S. 1965, Political Culture and Poltical Development. Princeton, Princeton University Press 338. Weber, Max.et.al. 1949. The methodology of the social sciences. New York, The Free Press, pp 182-185 95

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

parties, being turning points in political systems. New institutions persist long after the factors that precipitated their creation have disappeared, and they establish memories in the minds of those who participated in these events, with subsequent effects on their political behavior. A crisis may be caused by a wide variety of "parametric changes" such as mass population movements and economic depression or changes in education, mass media, occupational patterns, or industrial or agricultural development. Multiple parametric changes may occur simultaneously. In this context Lapalombara identifies the three most salient crises; 1) the legitimacy crisis, which is more typical of nationalistic movements that emerge to change the existing governmental system, 2) the integration crisis, concerned with the problem of territorial integrity and more broadly with the processes by which previously divided ethnic communities come to accommodate each other, and 3) the participation crisis, involving rejection of the existing authority and resulting in individuals coming together to change the rules of the system and gain a share in control of the state apparatus.339 Based on this approach, I will examine the crises that precipitated the creation and development of the existing political parties in Kosovo, in order to understand the factors likely to affect their subsequent development. The same approach also includes several social division system categories identified by Lipset and Rokkan.340 The original four were 1)centre–periphery (region), 2) state–church (religion), 3) land–industry (urban–rural), and 4) owner–worker (class). These provided the basis for the emergence of European party systems at the turn of the 20th century. For a division to become politically relevant, three conditions must be met; 1)the division must distinguish between people using at least one potentially important characteristic, 2) individuals have to know which group to identify with, and most importantly, 3) political parties have to organize support and competition around the division, providing it with institutional expression.341 Lipset and Rokkan argue that once this last condition was met, the "freezing" of European party systems in the 1920s took place, resulting in an enduring relationship between the divisions and parties that has persisted ever since342.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The relevance of these four social divisions today has changed.343 Lapalombara recognizes that political parties nowadays are increasingly based not just on distinc-

339. Weiner, M. & LaPalombara, J., 1966.,op.cit. p14 340. Cleavage structures are very important to Rokkan´s theory. Cleavages are fundamental oppositions within a territorial population, which are more visible than other conflicts rooted in the social structure. It is exactly these “latent” differences, stresses Rokkan, that break up at critical junctures and “manifest” themselves in institutional traits in the process of political system building. (Rokkan 1999. p105) 341. Russell J. Dalton and Ian McAllister 2007; Political Parties and Political Development: A New Perspective. in Party Politics Vol.13: SAGE Publication, .p139 342. Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (eds),1967 Party Systems and Voter Alignments: cross-national perspectives . [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and others], New York: Free Press. 343. See Joseph LaPalombara, 2007, op.cit.141–154 96

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tions like social class, religion, or geography, but also on ethnic, racial, and other narrowly defined interests. Keeping in mind these latter distinctions, the social divisions that spurred the creation of the party system in Kosovo will be examined based on historic data and empirical data gathered in the field. The institutional background and the concept of crises are alone insufficient to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions for party emergence. The modernization process and technological change seem to have profound impacts on party emergence as well. Due to large social and economic changes, one must consider the appearance of new social groups. Moreover, Lapalombara argues that the increase in information flow and the expansion of cultural markets, technological growth, and transportation networks associated with spatial and social mobility result in a change in individuals´ perception of authority. Hence a certain level of communication between local and national units, as well as the secularizing effects of the educational system and urbanization, seem to be stimulants of political organization. The kind of traditional culture existing in societies, and its fostering of mutual trust, provide individuals with the experience and will to organize, which works in favor of political organization. Finally, political organization also presumes that a certain amount of secularization has occurred in the society, so that individuals believe in the capacity of change through their actions, as Lapalombara affirms, concluding; "parties will not in fact materialize unless a measure of modernization has already occurred."344

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Lapalombara also discusses other conditions that appear to bring different party patterns, competitive and the noncompetitive, into existence. Considering this, I will elaborate in the case of Kosovo only on competitive party systems, and concentrate on the types of party configurations in competitive systems, using Lapalombara´s fourfold classification based on the internal characteristics of the party and the way that political power is held. There are two main methods of holding political power; 1) hegemonic and turnover, with hegemonic referring to systems where the same party, or coalitions dominated by the same party, hold power over an extended period of time,345 and turnover referring to situations where relatively frequent change occurs in the party that governs or dominates the coalition, even if there may have been hegemonic periods; and 2) the ideological and pragmatic which refers to what these names denote. These characteristics deal with the party itself, and for Lapolombara are crucial data for judging parties' activities and future prospects.346 To conclude, in terms of a central tendency the following subcategories for the examination of parties are proposed; 1) hegemonic-ideological, 2)hegemonic-pragmatic, 3) turnover-ideological, and 4turnover-pragmatic.347

344. Weiner, M. & LaPalombara, J., op.cit. p14-19 345. These are situations that Giovanni Sartori would call predominant party systems in Weiner, M. & LaPalombara, J., 1966., op.cit., p137-176 346. Ibid.p36 347. Ibid. p37 97

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

These fourfold combinations that a party pattern may manifest will be used for the examination of political parties in the case of Kosovo, and to analyze the way parties relate to political development. These dimensions, however, are not causally related to each other. 40 years on, Lapalombra states that the political party as an institution is ubiquitous and present in all forms of the state and in all manner of political systems and governments.348 Based on the definition of political parties above, we can skirt the pitfall of associating political parties exclusively with democracy (or with countries where competitive elections occur), and assess the reach and grasp of all parties in power, perceived as their ability to rule, and responsibility in doing so.349 Additionally, it is relevant to look beyond the number of a country’s political parties, and to examine carefully and critically some important aspects of these organizations including their size, geographic spread, ideology, leadership and cadre characteristics, organizational articulation, internal decision-making arrangements, attitudes toward and intentions regarding existing institutions, and electoral capability and following. I will examine these party characteristics in the case of Kosovo in order to flesh out and interpret findings about the mobilizing capacities of its political parties.350

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Lastly, political parties are a crucial element in many transitional democracies, where they play a vital role in shaping the parameters, velocity, and presumably the eventual direction of political development. They will be treated as such in this study. "That is why still today where political competition appears to be the most intransigent and violent, it is the political parties, more than any other institution, that play a vital mediating role. Without them, elections would be chaos and anarchy would follow. Historically, in the West as well as elsewhere, this has been the strongest contribution that parties, party leaders and party systems have made to democratic political evolution."351

348. Joseph LaPalombara, 2007, Reflections on Political Parties and Political Development Four decades Later Published in Party Politics Vol. 13. No.2 pp. 141–154 349. Daalder, Hans (1966) Parties, Elites and Political Development in Western Europe, in J. LaPalombara and Weiner (eds) 1966, op,cit. pp. 43–78. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Katz, Richard S. (ed.) , 1987, Party Governments: European and American Experiences. Berlin: de Gruyter. and King, Antony (ed.), 1969, Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Skeptical Reflections, in Polity 2, pp112–41 350. See also Karp, Jeffrey A. and Susan A. Banducci, 2007, Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies, Paper prepared for the conference on Political Parties and Political Development, National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC, 31 August 2005 351. Joseph LaPalombara, 2007, op.cit. 150 98

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

1.3.2 Economic Development: Beyond the state-versus market dichotomy One does not have to spend long in Bosnia, or Gaza, or the lakes district in Africa to know that without economic hope we will not have peace. Without equity we will not have global stability. Without a better sense of social justice our cities will not be safe and our societies will not be stable. Without inclusion, too many of us will be condemned to live separate, armed and frightened lives. James D. Wolfensohn (1997, Speech352) Development, economic, social, and sustainable, without an effective state is impossible. WB (World Bank Report: 1997:18)353

Examining a country´s development also means considering those economic factors that underlie economic growth. Distribution of the fruits of economic growth should be a fundamental concern of governments and societies that are part of a development process. To follow such a strategy requires knowledge of the international and domestic economic fields, to be used by administrators and policy makers to offer opportunities, or place constrains on policies in the economic sector. In this study, these changes are assumed to be interrelated to changes in other domains, to reciprocally affect each other.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The rise of states as providers of order, security, law, and property rights made possible the rise of the modern economic world.354 The relation between the state and the economy is important for this study, especially after considering that until recently the economic development discourse has been evolving around a well-established state versus market dichotomy, which will be the focus of my theoretical discourse. As Fukuyama put it, it is safe to say that politics in the 20th century was heavily shaped by controversies over the appropriate size and strength of the state, starting with the world´s leading liberal states being replaced throughout much of the world by more highly centralized and active ones. The size, functions, and scope of the state have increased incrementally ever since, with average consumption by state sectors increasing from 10% of GDP after WWII, up to 50% or more (70% in Sweden) of GDP by the 1980s.355 The inefficiency and unanticipated consequences of this model of government led to strong counteraction in the form of Reaganism and Thatcherism during the 1980s and 1990s, characterized by the re ascendence of liberal ideas throughout much of the developed world. The main aim of this approach was to hold the line or even reverse the course in terms of state sector growth,356 while reducing the state sector's importance in terms of policy.

352. James D. Wolfensohn addressed to the 1997 World Bank, Annual Meetings, Hong Kong, September 23, 1997 353. World Bank, 1997, World Development Report, Hong Kong. p18 354. Fukuyama, F. 2004, State-Building Governance and world order in the 21-st. century, Cornell University Press, USA, p1 355. Fukuyama, F. 2004, op.cit. p3-4 356. Posner Richard, A, 1975, The Social costs of Monopoly and Regulation, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 83, No.4, pp 807-828 99

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Following these trends, the advice offered by international financial institutions like the IMF and WB, as well as the US government, was a package of measures known as the "Washington Consensus" which aimed to reduce the degree of state intervention in economic affairs.357 This consensus involved three main points, per Stiglitz; "Fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization were the three pillars of Washington consensus advice during 80-90´s."358 These policies paid little attention to issues of distribution and fairness, arguing that the best way to help the poor is to stimulate economic growth.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Trickle-down economics was one of the corollaries of the Washington Consensus, and was based on the belief that the benefits of growth will trickle down to the poor, providing a sort of panacea for development. The intellectual pedigree behind this model included Nobel Prize winners such as Arthur Lewis, who argued that inequality was good for development and economic growth, as well as Simon Kuznets who argued that while inequality increased in the initial stages of development, the trend later reverses.359 In other words, the basic assumption of this theory is that making huge sacrifices in order to attain macroeconomic goals involving economic and financial equilibria will bring about economic progress, and the benefits will ultimately trickle down through the entire population, including the poorest groups, and lift them out of extreme poverty. Thus the Washington Consensus' answer to underdevelopment was policies aimed at privatization and liberalization of markets, with governments focused on providing only essential public services. According to Stiglitz, when trade liberalization is done in the right way, meaning lowering tariffs and eliminating protectionist measures, and at the right pace so that new jobs are created while others are destroyed, there can be significant efficiency gains. The problem with these policies was that they became ends in themselves, rather than means to more equitable and sustainable growth. When these policies were pushed too fast and too far, they excluded other necessary policies.360 Fukuyama agrees on this point, and suggests that the Washington Consensus approach was not wrong per se, since the large state sectors of developing countries were in many cases obstacles to growth which could only be fixed in the long run through economic liberalization. Rather, the problem was that although states needed to cut back in certain areas, they also needed to be strengthened in others. Thus, although in theory this approach was well intentioned, the strong emphasis on the reduction of state activity was either misunderstood or deliberately misconstrued, and interpreted as a directive to cut back state capacity across the board. Not nearly as much thought or emphasis was given to the the state-building agenda. Hence the result in the developing world, argues Fukuyama, was that liberalizing economic re357. For more information on the Washington Consensus see the work of one of his creators Williamson John, 1994, The political economy of policy reform, Washington DC, Institute for International Economics. 358. Stiglitz J. 2002, Globalization and its discontents, The Penguin Press, U.K p53 359. Ibid.p78-79 360. Ibid. p54 100

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

form failed to deliver on its promise, and the reason for this lies in a basic conceptual failure to recognize the different dimensions of stateness and to understand how they are related to economic development.361 This argument supports a fundamental assumption of this work, so I will elaborate it a bit further here. Recently, many economists have concluded that some of the most important variables affecting development are not economic, but are concerned with institutions and politics, implying the building of the state rather than the market. In contrast to this pendulum’s two extremes, a different concept based on recent historical evidence has emerged that indicates those societies which have made the most consistent progress in recent decades are those that moved beyond the false state vs market dichotomy. Here lies a crucial point for the analysis of economic development; following a number of recent studies asserting the complexity of the road to development as compared to the "trickle-down" economics propaganda with its "invisible hand of the market" panacea, I aim to emphasize the interdependence of economics and other domains. Economics is in fact deeply rooted in, and unavoidably and reciprocally related to, other sectors of life and especially to the state. Based on UNDP Human Development Reports on developing countries giving a complete account of their development in recent decades, I have the necessary evidence to state that reality operates differently from basic neoliberal assumptions. While it is essential for a country to achieve economic stability and financial equilibria to increase its competitiveness and gross national product, this does not automatically trickle down or bring prosperity and development to all the citizens of the country.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, it is possible for these macroeconomic indicators to improve while the situation for the most disadvantaged sectors deteriorates or remains static, but this is then no longer development. Therefore, the UNDP warns that we must focus attention on the structure and quality of growth, because even when growth exists, the unemployment, marginalization, lack of participation, weakening of national cultures, and environmental degradation associated with it can make it "futureless".362 Thus instead of Washington Consensus policies, UNDP´s alternative model of development focuses on cooperation between the main social actors and active integration of the powerful latent forces of civil society that both extremes tend to marginalize. From this standpoint, a state can be rebuilt to meet new demands, to work in harmony with the forces of private enterprise, to achieve optimum results, and to promote and facilitate the development of an increasingly close-knit, strong, and active civil society.363

361. Fukuyama, F. 2004. p5 362. UNDP, 1996, Economic Growth and Human Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 363. Kliksberg, Bernardo, 2000, Rebuilding the state for social development: towards ‘smart government, , Vol.66, Review of Administrative Sciences Vol. 66, No. 2, SAGE Publications, p250 101

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

As Iglesias rightly notes, "the state is the main agent responsible for ensuring the great compromise between economic and social policy."364 Apart from the availability and functionality of market mechanisms, I will concentrate on social development as an important determinant in framing policy design for developing countries. By giving the social domain consideration when setting agendas for discussion, it becomes possible to increase participation. Setting up organizational mechanisms to enable the joint formulation of decisions at crucial levels also allows for a better management of development issues. Only in this way will it be possible to fully incorporate social and economic variables into frameworks for decision-making. In other words, generating a "social economy"365 requires integrated, rather than coordinated, economic, political, and social policy designs, as well as a reclassification of the economic and social domains in terms of their importance and access to the basic centers of power. Furthermore, an emerging model of economic development should consider the elements that endogenously shape a developing area, such as economic complexity, special regional peculiarities, institutions, and the values and culture of that country. This process should take place by reviewing three essential elements; 1) labour relations, based on a social pact involving workers in the beneficial effects of modernization and privatization, 2) culture and institutions which allow new institutional policies to include consideration for local elements and values, turning rivalries into cooperation and trust, and 3) international relations including multilateral relations and international institutions such as international compensating mechanisms, social benefits and cooperation, social forms of anti-dumping, social clauses for free trade, etc.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

What is therefore needed is more an integration rather than simple coordination of economic, cultural, political, and social policy design. This is why, according to Sen, development is a freedom that provides a perspective in which institutional assessment can be made systematically, and an integrated perspective is the only reasonable way to assess institutions. One must examine for example the market, the democratic system, the media, and the public distribution system as interconnected and also connected with other institutions, in order to see what they can do, alone or in combination. Viewing a market mechanism as advantageous, Sen notes that the development debate should not be posited as pro or con market mechanisms, since the existence of market mechanisms per se is not the problem. It is rather a matter of how prepared a society is to make use of "market transactions, unconstrained concealment of information, or unregulated use of activities that allow the powerful to capitalize on a asymmetrical advantage".366 This is where state relevance becomes crucial by requir-

364. Iglesias, Enrique, 1993, Economic and Social Reform: An Integral Vision, in BID/CEPAL, Reforma Social y Pobreze: Hacia una Agenda Integrada de Desarrollo. Washington, DC. 365. Kliksberg, B., 2000, op.cit. p251 366. Sen, A. K..1999, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p142 102

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ing markets to function better, with greater fairness, and with adequate supplementation, and also by assessing whether the market´s overall achievement is of general benefit. Furthermore, these achievements are also deeply contingent on the political and social arrangements of a country.367 Sen notes: "The Market mechanism has achieved great success under those conditions in which the opportunities offered by them could be reasonably shared. In making this possible the provision of basic education, the presence of elementary medical facilities, the availability of resources (such as land) that can be crucial to some economic activities (such as agriculture) call for appropriate public policies (involving schooling, health care, land reform and so on). Even when the need for "economic reform" in favor of allowing more room for markets is paramount, these non market facilities require careful and determined public action"368. After investigating various examples of this complementarity, Sen makes the core argument for the analysis of economic development in this study when he states that the far reaching powers of the market mechanism must be supplemented by the creation of basic social opportunities for social equity and justice by the state. This finding is especially relevant in the case of Kosovo, a developing country where public policy initiatives for creating social opportunities are decisive. Taking a look at currently affluent countries and their history of public action on social issues affirms what Sen assumes. It was the sharing of social opportunities that permitted a large range of population groups to participate directly in the process of economic expansion. This is why Sen´s theory of the human development approach as an essential element of development is so vital for this study. Sen perceives human development not as a luxury that only rich countries can afford, but as an ally of the poor through the creation of social opportunities which make a direct contribution to the expansion of human capabilities and the quality of life, i.e. the possibility of health care, education, social security.369 Furthermore, the rewards of human development impact people´s productive abilities, and indirectly economic growth, on a widely shared basis370 since improved health care and nutrition make the work force both more productive and better remunerated.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I will elaborate here in more detail on Sen´s theory in order to examine the relationship between human capital and its focus on human capability as an expression of freedom. According to Sen, in contemporary economic analysis the emphasis has 367. Ibid. 368. Ibid p142-143 369. Here Sen argues there is evidence that countries with low incomes that nonetheless guarantee health care and education to all actually achieve remarkable results in terms of life expectancy and the quality of life of the entire population. (Sen, 1999:144) 370. The following studies confirm Sen´s idea: "Hunger and Public action" 1989, Dréze Jan & Sen A.; WB, 1993 The east asian miracle, and 1999 World Development Report, James, W, McGuire, 1994, Development Policy and its Determinants in East asia and Latin America, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp205-242, etc 103

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

shifted from describing capital accumulation in primarily physical terms, to perceiving it as a process where the productive quality of human beings is integrally involved, i.e. through education, learning, skill formation, etc, in contributing to the process of economic expansion. Evidence for the emphasis on "human capital" can be found in several empirical studies in western countries, but the question relevant for this study is how "human capital" and "human capability" in Sen´s terms relate to each other. For Sen, both these approaches place humans at the center of attention. While the literature on human capital tends to concentrate on the agency of human beings in augmenting productive possibilities, the human capability approach focuses on the ability, or "substantive freedom," of people to lead the lives they value, and enhance the real choices they have. These two perspectives must be related, insists Sen, since both are concerned with the role of human beings and their actual acquired abilities. They differ only in that the "yardsticks of assessment concentrate on different achievements". This "crucial valuational distinction" between a human capital focus and a concentration on human capabilities is to a certain extent a difference between means and ends for Sen. The acknowledgment of the role of human qualities in promoting and sustaining economic growth, as significant as it may be, tells us nothing about the reason that economic growth is sought in the first place.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

If the focus is ultimately on the expansion of human freedom to live the lives that people value, then the role of economic growth in expanding these opportunities must be integrated into a more fundamental understanding of the process of development as the expansion of human capability to lead more worthwhile and free lives. The use of human capital as a concept concentrates on just one part of the picture, an important one that broadens the accounting of "productive resources", but requiring supplementation. Human beings are defined by Sen as much more than just means of production, they are in fact the ultimate reason for the exercise. One must go beyond the notion of human capital, after acknowledging its relevance and reach, while seeking to broaden and include the human capabilities approach. In my case study I will examine the direct role of human capital in development, where the function involved may directly enrich the quality of life of individuals, and also its indirect role, where the function causes further changes in other sectors of life such as the social, economic, and political. 371 Another crucial factor contributing to development is female education, which helps to reduce high fertility rates. This empowers women through increased employment and education, and increases their ability to influence family decisions. Hence, Sen proposes cost consciousness to developing countries as a method to direct human development through channels that are more productive to the quality of life. This may function either directly or indirectly by judicious use of public resources for pur-

371. Sen, A. K..1999, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p292-296 104

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

poses where the the social benefits are clear to all, unlike for example, military spending.372 In the case of Kosovo, a central question that will be examined here, concerns policy-making and the promotion of human development as well as the way the government channels resources in order to achieve sustainable development. The contributions of international actors and agencies in post-conflict scenarios such as Kosovo are of crucial importance to (re-)building and strengthening current institutions while shaping economic development. The key actors in such state-building efforts are and should almost always be local, but nevertheless international actors may and should play a critical role in creating the opportunity for local actors to establish legitimate and sustainable governance.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The transitional administration in Kosovo represents one of the most complex operations attempted by the United Nations, and it remains a challenge to study. The mission in Kosovo373 since 1999 is considered as a unique case in the history of the United Nations, which has seen the UN involved in a series of state-building activities where it has attempted to develop institutions of government by assuming some or all sovereign powers on a temporary basis.374 Therefore, conditions intended to influence a development process to which outside assistance is being delivered have embraced a variety of distinct purposes. Assistance in these cases may include incentives and rewards, or consequences for failure. This assistance rarely lives up to expectations, but still such carrots are available and are often useful to the development process, especially in the absence of sticks. Forms of assistance given on a conditional basis may be less attuned to local political circumstances. For example, macroeconomic conditions imposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, IMF, and WB, may give rise to disputes when applied in post-conflict reconstruction contexts. This reflects a tendency among donors to view complex emergencies as a "blip" on an otherwise steady developmental path. Providing developmental assistance in isolation from political strategies runs the risk of extending conflict or reinforcing structural violence that encourages a return to conflict. Sustainability should generally take precedence over temporary standards, although it is clear that determining what is sustainable when national institutions do not exist, or have been eviscerated, is also difficult. Donors may also underestimate the effect that conflict can have on a society, and the range of transitions that are required to move from war to peace, from a controlled to a market economy, or from autocratic to democratic governance.375

372. Ibid. p145 373. Kosovo and East Timor are both seen as unique cases. I will concentrate here only on the Kosovo case 374. Chesterman, Simon, 2005, State-Building and Human Development, Background paper for the Human Development Report 2005, UNDP Human Development Report Office, Occasional paper. piii. 375. Boyce, James K. 2000, Beyond Good Intentions: External Assistance and Peace Building’, in Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (eds), 2000, Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p367 105

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Discussions of economic reconstruction in postconflict areas often cite the Marshall Plan as a model. But, as Chesterman point out, the very different circumstances in which aid is delivered today point out the limits of this analogy. In fact, the Marshall Plan took place in an era when the benefits of government intervention were generally uncontested. Donor skepticism about the appropriate role of government in economic activity has recently at times challenged approaches to foreign assistance, standing at odds with the widespread view that a strong government lies at the heart of economic and political reconstruction.376 Hence, as will also be shown in the case of Kosovo, when assistance arrives, it is notoriously supply rather than demand-driven, leading to an expansion of bureaucracy in the recipient country, to inconsistency in disbursement procedures, and to a focus on projects that may be more popular with donors than they are necessary to the recipient country.377 A World Bank study regarding its role in postconflict reconstruction also supports our argument, and suggests a paradigm shift at the World Bank in recent years from trickle-down economics to a multidimensional approach to development. According to this study, the Bank´s policies should include a readiness to provide economic development policy advice during peace negotiations as well as providing postconflict development coordination, by reassuring leaderships on macroeconomic and external debt issues in collaboration with the IMF and key external donors. Furthermore, they stress a holistic approach in their recommendations and insist on including the definition of priorities in macroeconomic stabilization programs, the rebuilding of infrastructure, the restoration of human and social capital, and selectivity in macroeconomic and structural policy conditionality.378 This paradigm shift has been reflected in several other development programs in the last decade. The aim has been to amend development programs and practices to realize greater effectiveness by involving more precise targeting, capacity building, and improvement of bureaucratic management, which can also be used as a support target when linked to economic performance.379

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, externally-based development programs should use assistance as a kind of safety net, ready to intervene and help in crisis situations. This does not mean they should dictate to states and governments what they must do, independently of the consequences of their actions. Chesterman reminds us that: " States cannot be made to work from the outside. International assistance may be necessary but it is never sufficient to establish institutions that are legitimate and sustainable...international action should be seen first and foremost as facilitating local processes, providing resources and creating the space for local actors to start a conversation that will define

376. Chesterman, Simon, 2005, op.cit. p iv 377. Ibid. 378. Kreimer, Alcira. 1998, The World Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruction (OED study series). Washington, D.C: World Bank. p7 379. See for example case studies presented in Tarp, Finn. & Hjertholm, Peter. 2000. Foreign aid and development: lessons learnt and directions for the future. London ; New York: Routledge.. 106

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

and consolidate their polity by mediating their vision of a good life into responsive, robust, and resilient institutions.380 To conclude, in favoring a mixed economic model similar to that of most Scandinavian countries, I will concentrate on the following variables for the analysis of economic development in the empirical part of this study by including, (i) state mechanisms for assuring human capability, (ii) market mechanisms, and (iii) international emergency safety nets. The first variable sees the deterioration of states as a major obstacle to development and evaluates the state’s key role in setting up conditions for markets to operate in, while providing basic human capabilities as elaborated in Sen´s theory. Considering that markets in developing countries are vulnerable, recognition of their capability and functionality mechanisms is the second variable to be examined. Lastly, with widespread poverty and growing instability, the third variable examines the availability and modus operandi of international safety nets in the form of international organizations that sanction a politically sustainable path and serve as an insurance mechanism to protect vital human development.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1.3.3 Social Development and the Social Capital Approach It is almost impossible to analyze the social dimension without considering the social capital approach. For a term commonly used in social sciences, the concept of social capital is often poorly defined and conceptualized, meaning different things to different people. Although the idea´s intellectual history has deep roots in the 18th and 19th centuries from thinkers such as Mill, Weber, etc,381 the term itself has been coined only recently.382 Social capital is currently linked to concepts such as civil society, social connectedness,383 and theories of social exchange. The concept´s modern development came from three key authors, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, but other authors have contributed to current multidisciplinary theories as well. In its broadest sense, social capital refers to social relationships between people that enable productive outcomes. More specially, this term has recently been used to refer to stocks of

380. Chesterman, Simon, 2005 op.cit.. p52 381. See Bankston, Carl L. and Min Zhou. 2002. “Social Capital as Process: The Meanings and Problems of a Theoretical Metaphor?” Sociological Inquiry 72, Nr. 2, pp 285-317; Brewer, Gene A 2003, Building Social Capital: Civic Attitudes and Behavior of Public Servants, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Nr. 13 pp5-26, Sage Publications, Putnam, Robert,. 1995, Bowling alone: Americas Declining Social Capital, Journal of Democracy, Nr. 6 pp65-78; Lin, N. Cook and Burt, R.S. (eds) 2001, Social Capital. Theory and Research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, etc 382. See Bourdieu, P. 1983, Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital" in Soziale Ungleichheiten, Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2, ed. Reinhard Kreckel. Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co. pp. 183-98, Bankston & Zhou op.cit, Lazega and Pattison 2001 in Lin, N Cook and R. S. Burt op.cit; Putnam 1995, etc 383. See Roncevic Adam 2003, Social Capital: Recent Debates and Research Trend, Social Science Information, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp 155-183, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. 107

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems.384 Social capital is a complex concept with many types, levels, and determinants. Although different authors identify different dimensions and definitions of social capital, for this study it is important to reiterate that most of them agree on its multidimensionality, and its presence at the micro, meso, and macro levels. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine all the authors who have analyzed social capital, so I will focus on Bourdieu, Coleman, and especially Putnam, who I believe to be the most important to this study.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The contemporary literature on social capital began in the 1980s385and is primarily based on the work of the three authors mentioned above. Pierre Bourdieu was the first to bring the term social capital into present day discussions with his book Distinction, which was also the origin of the modern notion of social capital.386 He posits that different forms of capital such as the economic, symbolic, cultural, and social reflect the social relations through which privilege in position is reproduced, transformed, or attached to other distinct areas of activity. Through the notions of habitus and field, Bourdieu´s emphasis was upon the contextual, circumstantially defined, and therefore non-universal applicability or transposability of these concepts from one application to another for heuristic and investigative purposes.387 In fact, Bourdieu’s marriage of social and capital marked an attempt to address the relational and contextual as well as the social and the individual, deploying a notion of capital in its fluid aspect.388 His definition of social capital was criticized for its limited applicability, mainly within the broader framework of symbolic capital and of critical theories of class societies. His definition of social capital comprises: "...the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition, or in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.389

384. Szreter, Simon.,Social Capital, the Economy, and Education in Historical Perspective, Baron. Stephen. Field, John et.al . (eds) 2000, in Social Capital: Critical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 385. See Stanfield, & Stanfield. 1997, Where Has Love Cone? Reciprocity, Redistribution, and the Nurturance Gap, Journal of Social Economics Vol. 26, No. 2; and Hornburg, Steven P. & Lang.Robert E. 1998, What is Social Capital and Why Is It Important to Public Policy? Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 9, No.1, pp1-16. 386. Bourdieu, Pierre, 1979, La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, p670 387. McLellan, Gregor 1998, Fin de Sociologie? The dilemmas of multidimensional Social Theory, Published in New Left Review 230, pp58-90. 388. Fine, Ben. 2007, Eleven Hypotheses on the Conceptual History of Social Capital: A Response to James Farr, Political Theory Journal, Volume 35, Nr.1, pp 47-53 389. Bourdieu, Pierre, 1986. The Forms of Capital. In Richardson ,John G. Ed. Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education.Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. pp. 108

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Bourdieu's original work on social capital within the context of critical theories of society was very important, but compared to the normative approach of Putnam and Coleman, as Adam and Roncevic put it, contained "the least empirical analysis with only fragments of reference to it."390 Consequently, although I recognize that Bourdieu's theoretical contribution was crucial in shaping the term social capital, his work contains the least empirical analysis of social capital as compared to the other two authors. I will not be using his theory of social capital here, as it does not apply to the purpose of this study. Moreover, I intend to examine the influence of social capital in the context of a state-building, transitional, postconflict society, and to inquire into the conditions under which democracy can flourish there. Bourdieu´s theory is more appropriate to explain the way that privilege in position is reproduced, transformed, or attached to other distinct arenas of activity in established democratic states and their societies. Bourdieu´s theory of social capital operates in a different context from the one examined here. James Coleman, a sociologist who draws insights from both sociology and economics, defines social capital in the following terms; "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors whether persons or corporate actors within the structure".391 Coleman was a late participant in the “social exchange” debate that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, which sought to derive the social from the individual by accumulating psychologically motivated interactions. Coleman's work is relevant to this study due to the shift it represents from Bourdieu's individual outcomes to the outcomes of groups, organizations, institutions, or societies, a shift from an individualistic level to a societal level. For Coleman, social capital, like other forms of capital, is productive and makes possible the achievement of ends that would not be attainable in its absence.392

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The problem with Colemans´s approach, as Fine argues, is that the social cannot be derived from aggregating over individuals.393 In fact Coleman later adopted the "simple terminological expedient of substituting “capital” for “exchange"394 to escape this theoretical gap. The relevant argument here is that social capital deals with certain aspects of social structure that enable social action.395 Hence, Coleman´s con-

390. 391.

392. 393. 394. 395.

243-248 Adam Roncevic 2003, op.cit. pp 155-183 Coleman James 1988, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure, p98 Ibid Ben Fine uses the following sentence to illustrate it: "greenness is a property distinct from the set of objects that are green". in Fine Ben. 2007, op.cit. pp 47-53 Fine Ben. 2007, op.cit. pp 47-53 Adam and Roncevic, 2003, op.cited 109

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tribution will help to shift the focus of social capital from the individual perspective to the societal level, but will not be applied as a theoretical model in this study. Instead I will focus on the analysis of Robert Putnam, which was highly influenced by Alexis de Tocqueville and Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory. As a political scientist, he became known for popularizing the concept of social capital through the study of civic engagement in Italy. His definition of "Social capital...refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions."396 Putnam worked on the practical illustration of the term civic community, and defined it as "patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity", based on Tocqueville's classic work of social theory, "Democracy in America". Civic Engagement is one of the ingredients of civic community, and it implies active participation in public affairs, which consists of following what Tocqueville termed, "self-interest properly understood,"397 meaning self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, and aware of the interests of others. Political equality is another crucial feature of a civic community, referring to the equal rights and obligations for all citizens in such a community, bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation. Solidarity, trust, and tolerance are also immanent features of the civic community and imply that citizens in this community are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance. Finally there are associations and the social structures of cooperation, which refer to norms and values of the civic community that are embodied in and reinforced by distinctive social structures and practices.398

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

By referring to Tocqueville's work on the social conditions that sustained democracy in America, Putnam reiterates that civil associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government, both because of their internal effects on individual members and because of their external effects. For Tocqueville, associations inculcate habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness internally. She stresses that "feelings and ideas are renewed, hearts enlarged, and understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another."399 According to Putnam, this suggestion of Toucqueville is supported by evidence from civic culture surveys of citizens of five countries, including Italy, which showed that members of associations displayed more political sophistication, social trust, political participation, and subjective civic competence.400 This participation in civic organizations in-

396. Ibid. p167 397. Tocqueville, Alexis. d. & Mayer, J. P ed. 1969, " Democracy in America" Garden City, New York, Anchor Books, pp525-528 398. Putnam 1993, op.cited pp 88-90 399. Tocqueville, A.d. 1969, op.cited pp 513-515 400. See Almond, G. A. & Verba, S. 1963. The civic culture; political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 110

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

culcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors, concludes Putnam401 Putnam´s theoretical considerations are empirically tested in his book "Making Democracy Work",402 where the differences between regional governance in the north and south of Italy are explored, with the explanatory variable being civic community. Involved in empirical research403 and the formulation of indicators, Putnam developed a widely applied measure, the so-called "Putnam instrument,"404 which is best known and as an elaborate index of civic-ness including the following indicators:405 1. Trust in people and institutions For Putnam, trust lubricates cooperation, and the level of trust within a community is causally related to the likelihood of cooperation, which in turn breeds more trust. Personal trust becomes social trust through norms of reciprocity and networks.406 By describing the success stories of the industrial districts in north Italy, Putnam finds out what is crucial about these small-firm industrial districts: the mutual trust, social cooperation, and a well-developed sense of civic duty... in short the hallmarks of the civic community.407 Consequently, most forms of social capital, like trust, are what Hirschman called "moral resources", meaning resources whose supply increases rather than decreases through use, and become depleted if not used.408 2. Norms of reciprocity

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Social trust in complex modern settings, argues Putnam, can arise from two related sources: norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Norms are inculcated and sustained by modeling and socializing, including civic education and sanctions. Thus, norms such as those that support social trust evolve because they lower transaction costs and facilitate cooperation. The most important of these norms is 401. Putnam et. al. 1993, op.cited. p 90 402. Putnam, Robert. D., Leonardi, Robert., & Nanetti, Raffaela. Y., 1993, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester: Princeton University Press. 403. The next work by Putnam focused on the decline in civic engagement in the United States. In Bowling Alone Putnam identified a general secular decline in levels of social capital as indicated by membership in voluntary organizations. He used the example of bowling as an activity which used to be highly associational, representing not only recreational channels but also a source of social interaction, as a component of social capital in Putnam, R. D. 2000. Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. 404. See Roncevic Adam, 2003 op.cit and Paldam, Martin., & Svendsen, Gert.T, 2000. An essay on social capital: Looking for the fire behind the smoke. European Journal of Political Economy Nr. 16 pp 339-366. 405. Adam and Roncevic, 2003, op.cited 406. Putnam 1993, op. cited p.171 407. Putnam, op.cited p161 408. Hirschman, Albert, O 1984, Against Parsimony: three easy ways of complicating some categories of economic discourse, In American Economic Review, Proceedings Nr. 74, p 93 111

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

reciprocity, which is of two sorts; balanced/specific and generalized/diffuse. The former refers to a simultaneous exchange of items of equivalent value, while the latter refers to a continuing relationship of exchange that is at any given time unrequited or imbalanced, involving mutual expectations that a benefit granted now will be repaid in the future, e.g. friendship. The norm of generalized reciprocity is a highly productive component of social capital and it also facilitates the flow of information about technological developments.409 3. Networks According to Putnam, networks of civic engagement in the form of neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, mass based parties, and the like imply intense horizontal interaction. These networks are an essential form of social capital, and the denser such networks are in a community, the more likely citizens will be to cooperate for mutual benefit. Powerful beneficial side effects are created by these networks, including increases in interaction and interconnectedness, robust norms of reciprocity, facilitated communication, and an improved flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals. Furthermore, networks of civic engagement embody past success at collaboration as templates for future collaboration.410 Social networks also allow trust to become transitive and to spread, notes Putnam.411 4. Bonding and bridging social capital

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Two other features are defined by Putnam in Bowling Alone as chief components of the concept of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding refers to the value assigned to social networks between homogeneous groups of people, while bridging refers to that of social networks between socially heterogeneous groups. Criminal gangs therefore create bonding social capital, while choirs and bowling clubs create bridging social capital. The latter, apparently in decline, is argued to have benefits for societies, governments, individuals, and communities. The "Putnam instrument" will be used to examine the causal dependencies that the role of networks of civic engagement play in relation to other fields of life in Kosovo. Putnam's conclusion from the Italian experiment states that historical norms and networks of civic engagement have fostered economic growth and not inhibited it. Thus, a dense network of civic engagement is an indicator of growth, and similarly civic associations are tightly associated with effective public institutions. Putnam´s theory helps to explain why social capital, embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy rather than the reverse. Strong society means a strong economy, argues Putnam, and "economics

409. Putnam 1993, pp171-172 410. Ibid. pp173-174 411. Ibid. 169 112

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

does not predict civics but civics does predict economics, better indeed than economics itself," while "a strong society means a strong state".412 Putnam's theoretical model of social capital has been empirically tested by Rollin, who attempted to solve the empirical puzzle as to whether civil society is a bane or boon for democracies. He examined the effects of the pre-transitional strength and post-transitional density of civil society on state institutional performance among more than 60 states since the third wave of democracy. The results showed that the strength of civil society prior to transition, and its density post-transition, not only play a significant role in the deepening of political freedoms and civil liberties among transitional citizens, but also lead to better institutional performance. He suggests that Putnam’s major findings be extended in the context of third- and fourth-wave democracies,413 which concerns this study. Considering that this study is based on the assumption that the social, economical, political, and cultural domains in state-building and development contexts are interrelated, Putnam´s index of civicness will serve as a tool to examine the ambivalent causality of the political, economic, and cultural domains for the social one. Additionally, this index will serve the analysis of social development potential in Kosovo, based on the availability and capacity of social capital. Moreover, in addition to the variables developed and offered by Putnam, it´s worth mentioning the interdependence of human capabilities and social capital. Research studies have shown that the quality of life and educational level in a country strongly influence the development process. A recent World Bank study analyzing factors contributing to economic growth in 192 countries found that no less than 64% of growth could be attributed to human development and social capital. Therefore in this study, as Kliksberg says, "development cannot be seriously considered without taking into account the significant impact of human development in social capital as its "levers".414

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

To conclude, Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam are most commonly cited as the basis of contemporary discussions of social capital. Many authors have since expanded our understanding, particularly in regard to the suitable operationalization of social capital. But for the sake of clarity I am making use of research from Claridge, Tristan in 2004, who gives a comparative presentation of main contemporary Social Capital authors level of study in Figure 10 below.415

412. Putnam, op.cit. 176 413. Tusalem Rollin, F. 2007, A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and FourthWave Democracies, International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp361–386, Sage Publications 414. Kliksberg, Bernardo, 2000, Rebuilding the state for social development: towards ‘smart government, SAGE Publications, Vol.66, Review of Administrative Sciences 66/2, p251 415. For detailed info on Social Capital see Claridge, T. 2004, "Social Capital and Natural Resource Management', Unpublished Thesis, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. or visit his website at http://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/ 113

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 10: Comparative  presentation of main contemporary Social Capital studies (Source: Claridge, T. 2004, Online)

Putnam's features of social capital will not be applied uncritically, as gender is also a dimension of social capital although its ramifications, especially in developing societies, have been mostly neglected and remained under-recognized in the academic literature.416 Putnam´s social capital concept is generally conceptualized as genderblind, and little attention has been paid to gendered issues of power and hierarchy. According to several authors, a more complete picture of social capital is needed, specifically one that includes attention to the gendered and intergenerational conflicts and hierarchies within social networks. This is why the broader context of gender difference within social networks should be investigated.417 These authors also posit that social capital existing in a broader context of gender inequality can exacerbate women's disadvantages, as women remain excluded from the more powerful networks of trust and reciprocity existing among men. A recent empirical study has shown that women play a key role in community development, and that most community development organizations led by women define their efforts broadly by increasing the community's capacity and strengthening local democracy. To the extent that women-led groups contribute differentially to the development of social capital

416. Jonathan, Fox, & Gershman. John 2000. The World Bank and social capital: Lessons from ten rural development projects in the Philippines and Mexico." Policy Sciences Nr. 33, pp399-419. and Molinas, Jose R. 1998. The impact of inequality, gender, external assistance and social capital on local-level cooperation. World Development Nr. 26 pp413-431. 417. Norton, Andrew. 2001. The market for social capital. Policy, Autumn, pp40-44 and Silvey, Rachel, and Rebecca Elmhirst. 2003. Engendering Social Capital: Women Workers and Rural-Urban Networks in Indonesia's Crisis, World Development Nr.3, pp865-879. 114

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

by increasing community participation and trust by creating community networks and civic action, they in fact present a general model for community development efforts.418 One critique of Putnam is that he may consider the given variables as a panacea for development. Based on Theda Skocpol´s critique of "Bowling Alone", dealing with the decline of social capital in the USA, I want to stress what is crucial for this study. This is the fact that social capital does not evolve from nothing and from itself,419 but needs a supportive state and a functioning government to contribute to it.420 As Skocpol argues, when Putnam refers to social capital as "something that arises or declines in a realm apart from politics and government" he makes a fundamental mistake, since 20th century voluntary federations in the USA were often built from "top down, deliberately structured to imitate and influence the three tiers of U.S. government", and these organizations were often encouraged by parts of the federal government itself.421 In fact, historically speaking American civic involvement was encouraged, not discouraged, by government activities. This “classic civic” America, Skocpol argues, remained vital until the mid-1960s. Over the last third of the 20th century, mass-based, cross-class membership associations were steadily replaced by professionally led political advocacy groups with narrower missions and much more anemic membership.422

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Thus, argues Skocpol, U.S. history contradicts the premises of Tocqueville's romanticism, and political patterns and developments like levels of trust in government and rates of electoral participation, or attendance at public meetings, are treated simply as "dependent variables" in Putnam´s study. For Putnam it is clear that local voluntarism is fundamental, and the primary cause of all of this is healthy democratic politics and effective governance, in contrast to the dreaded "bureaucratic state." For Skocpol, U.S. civic associations were in fact until recently fostered by the institution-

418. Gittell. M et al. , 2000, Social Capital and Social Change:Women’s Community Activism L, City University of New York, Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 36, No. 2, November, pp 123-147, Sage Publications. 419. Cp. Sen 1999, and the human capability approach. 420. Later on, Putnam´s work became more critical, and by examining other empirical studies of European states he himself recognized that a civic community needs more than just people´s initiative. For a detailed study see Putnam. R. at al., 2002, Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press. Oxford New York, p396. 421. Theda Skocpol, 1996, Unravelling From Above, published in The American Prospect No.25, pp 20-25, Available at http://epn.org/prospect/25/25-cnt2.html. 422. Skocpol suggests several possible explanations for this watershed, including changes in communications media, new sources of financial support for political advocacy, the abdication of educated men and women from their traditional roles as community leaders, and the weakening of traditional institutions of civic mobilization. The newer structure of civic America is, she concludes, more oligarchical, dominated by professionals, and less likely to bridge different classes and places. 115

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

al patterns of U.S. federalism, legislatures, competitive elections, and locally rooted political parties423. To put it in Skocpol´s words: "The true history of civic associationalism in America gives the lie to notions propagated by today's government bashers and government avoiders. Organized civil society in the United States has never flourished apart from active government and inclusive democratic politics. Civic vitality has also depended on vibrant ties across classes and localities. If we want to repair civil society, we must first and foremost revitalize political democracy. The sway of money in politics will have to be curtailed, and privileged Americans will have to join their fellow citizens in broad civic endeavors. Re-establishing local voluntary groups alone will not suffice.424 Based on the arguments of Theda Skocpol, social capital should be analyzed as a composite of its disparate, yet interrelated, components. The building of initiatives should aim to improve the structure of social capital, rather than simply increase social capital per se. The development of social capital requires not only the active and willing engagement of citizens within a participative community, but also requires the support of government authorities.425 Lowndes and Wilson argue that the best way for governments to increase social capital is to be involved in indirect social capital building, referring mainly to local governments due to their ties with the local community.426

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to Stone, by linking social capital measurement directly to the theoretical understanding of the concept, one is able to recognize first that social capital is a multidimensional concept comprising social networks, norms of trust, and norms of reciprocity; secondly to understand social capital properly as a resource for action; and thirdly to empirically distinguish between social capital and its results.427 Per-

423. Skocpol, Th. 1996, Unravelling From Above, op.cited 424. Ibid. 425. See studies such as Bullen, Paul, and Jenny Onyx. 1998. Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities in NSW, CACOM Working Paper Series Nr. 41, pp. 49; Taylor, Marilyn. 2000. Communities in the lead: Power, organisational capacity and social capital Urban Studies Nr.37, pp: 1019-1035, and Warner, Mildred. 1999. Social capital construction and the role of the local state. Rural Sociology Nr. 64, pp373-393. 426. Lowndes, Vivien, and Wilson. David. 2001, Social Capital and Local Governance: Exploring the Institutional Design Variable, Political Studies Volume 49, Issue 4, pp629–647. 427. See contributions from Stone,W. 2001. Measuring social capital: Towards a theoretically informed measurement framework for researching social capital in family and community life. Research Paper, No.24. Evans, Peter. 1992. The state as problem and solution: Predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change.' in Haggard, Stephan., Kaufman, Robert. R., & Evans, Peter. B. (eds) 1992. The Politics of economic adjustment :international constraints, distributive conflicts, and the state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press; Rose, Richard. 1998. Getting things done in an anti-modern society : social capital networks in Russia (Studies in public policy; No. 304). Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde; Woolcock, Michael. 1998. Social capital and economic development: Towards a theoretical synthesis and policy framework." Theory and Society Nr. 27 pp151-208, and Woolcock, & Narayan. 2000. Social capital: Implications for development 116

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ceiving social capital as a multidimensional concept, my intention is to understand it in a causal ambilateral relation to other domains, i.e. the political, economic, and cultural. This method will serve as a sound basis for an analytical framework for the case study, and ensure that indicators relate to the theory, despite its complexity. I have identified the following instruments for analyzing social capital in my case study, based additionally on the synergy approach to social capital of Woolcock, Narayan,428 and others;429 1. the nature and extent of a community's social relationships, 2. formal institutions such as civil society, the press, and the media, and the interactions between them, and 3. the efforts of official institutions (local and international) to influence the positive manifestation of social capital cooperation, trust, and institutional efficiency in order to offset sectarianism, isolationism, and corruption. Also included are the institutional strategies based on these social relations, particularly on bonding and bridging social capital. To conclude, the variables identified for assessing social capital include; 1.the availability and the extent of social capital instruments such as trust, norms of reciprocity, networking bonding and bridging, as well as gender relations; 2. the nature and extent of a community's social relationships and formal institutions, and the interactions between them, and 3. government´s role in creating and expanding social capital. 1.3.4 Cultural Development: Following Migdal´s theoretical approach Culture is unifying: the state contributes to the unification of the cultural market by unifying all codes, linguistic and juridical, and by effecting a homogenization of all forms of communication … Through classification systems … inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals … the state molds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division … And it thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national identity. 430 Pierre Bourdieu 1998:45-46

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In Chapter 1.1.3, I mentioned that states are not static structures, but will be regarded here as dynamic organizations interacting with society by constantly shaping and being shaped by it. In this unit I will challenge the assumption that, according to Smith, "only one form of political unit is recognized and permitted....the "nation state,"431 and suggest that state-building in the 21st century is more than just the adoption of western state structures. It is in fact the beginning of a large-scale societal transformation, influenced by the state structures and institutions initiated in that country. Of course it must be recognized that capitalism and the western state model have been "exported" and are currently expanding throughout every continent. This

428. 429. 430. 431.

theory, research, and policy. The WB Research Observer Nr. 15, pp225-249. This view attempts to integrate the compelling work emerging from the networks and institutional approach of Woolcock, Michael and Narayan. Deppa 2000, pp225-249 Ibid. p. 236 Bourdieu P. 1998, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, Cambridge: Polity, pp45-46, Smith A. D., State Making and Nation Building, in Hall, J. A.1986. States in history. Oxford [Oxfordshire] UK ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell., p. 228 117

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

is precipitating massive dislocations, and mixtures and appropriations of new ideas and methods, as well as the inevitable reactions against them, and adaptations to local circumstances. These processes have diverted critical resources such as wealth, personal connections, and most importantly the representation of meaningful symbols, which has set off new and renewed battles, transformations, and accommodations throughout society in these countries.432 To examine these processes, one must investigate whether the prevailing moral or daily social relations of a country have been considered, and whether existing patterns of social behavior and meaning have been preserved, or new ones forged. More importantly, how are symbolic systems being generated and used to mold daily social behavior, and how does this influence the building of the state image and patterns of domination in this society? The theoretical approach outlined here is based on the premises of Pierre Bourdieu and Joel Migdal, which examine the way culture and meaning are (re-)shaped. In the framework of a multidimensional perspective on state-building and development, I will elaborate the mechanisms for analyzing the cultural domain using Migdal´s theoretical model of a mutually transformative state-society relationship. This will allow for an examination on how meaning is generated, transformed, or recreated during a state-building process. The concept of "mattering maps" will assist us in this enterprise. The term was originally used by Goldstein to describe how people place themselves in relation to others in their ordinary lives,433 but later the term was used in the context of state studies to describe how states can influence the way people decide what matters. Transformative states have attempted to influence these "mattering maps", their content, and the ordering of symbols and codes by determining what matters most to the people and deciding where struggles over domination take place within their boundaries.434

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Following the struggles of the domination argument in his definition of state,

Migdal uses the "field" concept of Bourdieu to highlight relationships in a multidimensional space, and to stress that the symbolic element is as important as the material one. The "very representation of the social world" is crucial for Bourdieu, and its central phenomena is the struggle. Every field is thus the site of a struggle over the definition of the legitimate principles of division in that field. For Bourdieu, even the state is a field of power, "a multidimensional space of positions", and "a contradictory entity that acts against itself."435 Accordingly, Migdal claims that two levels of analysis are necessary to understand this domination for the state; 1) one that recognizes its wholeness expressed in its image, and 2) one that dismantles this wholeness, 432. Migdal Joel S. 2001, State in society, How states and societies transform and constitute one another, Cambridge University Press, UK, p101 433. See Goldstein. Rebecca. 1983, The Mind Body Problem: A Novel, New York, Random Hause. p 22. cited in Migdal Joel S. 2001,op.cit p114. 434. Migdal Joel S. 2001, State in society, op.cited.p115 435. Bourdieu, P. 1985, The social space and the genesis of groups, Theory and Society Nr.14, pp723-744, 118

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

in favor of the examination of reinforcing and contradictory practices, and the alliances between its parts. State transformation will be examined here following Migdal´s model, in dual terms as applied to the case study. The process-oriented theoretical approach will be seen from the perspective of mutual interconnections between states and societies. Furthermore, the struggles that determine both this process and the way that states and societies interact with each other will be investigated in terms of the rules that guide people´s behavior in such struggles, together with the actors who may or may not benefit from them. Identification of the types of elements that unite people, and the constellations of power generated in this process, are especially important for analysis of the cultural domain. The divisions that create conflicting groups and the shared meanings that people hold about their relations with others, the state, or their place in the world are also relevant features in this context. Based on the idea that states and societies are dynamic in their relations, and to understand the different directions in which components of the state pull, Migdal first recognizes the forces that constitute the environments in which state actors operate. According to him, there are five types of social forces and groups that stand out as relevant factors impinging directly on state officials, which will be used as actor categories in the empirical section. They include; 1) supervisors (unelected state personnel and those not at the top of the hierarchy), 2) underlings, who are state employees directly or indirectly supervised, 3) peer staff in other agencies or politicians at roughly similar levels, 4) domestic social forces not part of the state organization, but originating within society (including clients of state policies, blocs of voters, contractors, etc, and also 5) foreign social forces from the international system.436

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Migdal suggests an anthropology of the state by introducing these five levels and their corresponding arenas of domination and opposition. Studying the parts of the state, as well as the relationships of these parts to each other and with society, in their own environment is critical for Migdal. As he states, "The more diverse and heterogeneous the arrays of pressure that various components of the state encounter on their different levels, especially when there are strong pressures applied by multifarious domestic and foreign social forces, the less likely it is that the state ends up with complementary behavior by its many parts and the less likely it is that it can successfully convey a coherent system of meaning."437 Thus, a common system of meaning is crucial for the survival of the state´s image, considering that states only remain intact when they are naturalized. This means that their dissolution becomes unimaginable to the state´s subjects, due to the deep impact the state has achieved on the structure of society and the people´s sense of meaning about themselves. The structure of society and the meanings people generate affect the state and its chances for survival. Migdal places the "mutually constitutive rela-

436. For a detailed description of these categories see the following unit on Institutions, where the role of actors will be considered. 437. Migdal Joel S. 2001, State in society, op.cited p124 119

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tionship" between state and society at the center of his theory, and suggests that this relationship shapes the form, content, and viability of the state itself. According to Migdals´s theory, there are three areas in which changes in society and the nature of state-society relations can "bolster or batter" the cohesion of the state and the meaning generated by it; 1) the generation of law in society, 2) the sharing of public rituals between state and society, and 3) the ongoing renegotiating of the rules of informal behavior in the public sphere. I will examine each of the categories presented by Migdal.438 The first area of state-society relations to be examined is law and the generation of meaning in the society. Instead of trying to understand this area in its raw form, Migdal suggests moving away from its conventional definition and conceiving it an a more pluralistic way. Thus, state law always has two sides. The first emphasizes social control, where states have adopted laws as efficient and predictable means to set limits and parameters for behavior by backing up their prescriptions with the threat and use of violence. This use has been directed at those inside and outside the state´s organization (i.e. citizens, tourists, etc). The other side of the meaning of law involves self-limitation by states through the creation of individual and property rights. In this context, especially in capitalist societies, law comprises the creation of islands of freedom from the state for individuals, which cannot be constrained and regulated by the sort of restrictive law found in the category of law as social control. Thus it is the centrality of the state that these two notions of law have in common. States stand at the center of self-limiting laws, as well as laws geared toward social control that determine the rights of individuals.439

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Where does the legitimacy of the law in the eyes of its citizens come from? Here Cover´s arguments further the discussion. Cover directs his analysis from an alternative to the state-centric viewpoint, that of legal pluralism. This implies multiple sets of laws in society, including those opposed to the state and others not controlled by the state but not necessarily in opposition to it, as well as yet others complementary to it. These can be formal codes, religious laws, or long-standing but less formal constructions such as the manor in feudal societies. They may also be quite loose and recent, consisting of the current views of various social groups on justice and proper behavior.440 Here a better question would be, as Finkel suggests, to find out if the (state) law should follow community sentiment, or the community should follow the path the law has laid?441 While in the legalist pluralist view the state law has often followed the path set by non-state law, this trajectory has not been always universally accepted. It is sure that 438. Ibid.150 439. Ibid. p152 440. See Cover. Robert. 1992, The folk-tales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in Minow Martha,et.al. (eds) Narrative Violence and the Law: the Essays of Robert Cover, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, p.174-175 441. See Finkel, J.Norman. 1995, Commonsense justice: Jurors´Notions of the Law, Cambridge, MA: Harward University press, 1995, p2. 120

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

law does shape and structure society through its rules and rights, by creating and maintaining hierarchy and dominance, while the converse is also true. Considering the powerful legitimating force of law, the (state) law and its relationship with other sets of laws therefore influences the ability of states to remain intact. For Migdal this occurs because laws (state and others) delineate a universe of meaning for people by deciding what is acceptable and right, and what is unacceptable and wrong, simply by asserting so.442 This broadly shared meaning for society is a key feature, or to use Durkehim's term a social solidarity, that improves conditions for a state´s cohesion. This is why state law, perceived by the population as distinguishing right from wrong, becomes a critical force for bringing together diverse groups with diverse concerns into a single political entity. If the state law does not fit with other sets of laws in the society as mentioned above, then it undermines its own ability to provide people with a needed sense of meaning in their lives, and therefore runs the risk of losing its legitimacy.443 In fact, significant social change can bring with it proliferation of sets of laws and legal meanings in any society, argues Migdal, which can be threatening to the cohesion of the state itself. On the other hand, if the law has been transformed by other sets of law and has created favorable conditions for combining diverse sets of law in the society, then the state will benefit from this renewed shared meaning within the society. Where this double transformation takes place, states are perceived by their public to know what is right, providing legitimacy based on the shared sense of meaning between the state and the society. Thus studying the law as the generator of shared meaning in the society, suggests Migdal, is a key point for studying changes in state and society. The interaction of different forms of laws, the transformation of state law, and the role of the judiciary may help explain the changing nature of state organizations and the importance of states in providing meaning central to peoples lives.444 Consequently, one of the variables examined in the empirical part of this study will be the generation of law, and its implications for Kosovo´s society. The second variable is:

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

­

The public ritual and the formation of master narratives

It is clear that despite their regular failures, many states overcome their inefficiencies and difficulties in meeting central goals for the population concerned, argues Migdal. Such things take place while the state gains loyalty and support not through the efficient allocation of public goods, but by blurring the line between state officials and citizens through the use of public ritual. This is the adoption of ceremonies that appeal to the particularities of their population, incorporating elements that are legitimated externally, rather than by their efficiency. The main elements of this procedure are the ritual and the ceremony, and these have come to be seen as intrinsic 442. Migdal Joel S. 2001, op.cited, p153-154 443. See. Cover, R. "Nomos and Narratives" in Minow. Martha et.al., op.cit. 1995, p150 444. Migdal Joel S. 2001, op.cited. p154-157 121

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

features of state images. Our understanding of ritual comes from Shils, who defines it as a "symbolically concentrated expression of beliefs and sentiments regarding ultimate things."445 Historically, elaborated rituals have been part of state practices since their beginnings, with ceremonies having the effect of forging the unity of the kings with the polity and of individuals with each other, by jointly supporting the state organization. As Migdal puts it,"rituals and ceremonies connect the sacred to the notion of the nation and the mundane institutions of the state. States and societies both shape and are shaped by rituals and the beliefs that they support."446 In order to better illustrate the effects of ritual and ceremony, Migdal uses the metaphor of a theatrical ring and hints at the similarities between theater and politics as two entities "mimicking and spilling in each other´s domain." By creating spectacles for public participation, as the theater does, state officials have sought to inscribe laws within spectators minds not as foreign influences, but as an inherent "self-imposed moral."447 More importantly, Migdal´s argument on the staging of politics considers the master narrative, or "controlling political idea" of a state elite as a stark counter-force to disintegrative elements favoring state dissolution. As Wilentz puts it, "(master narratives)...operate as the unchallenged first principles of a political order, making any given hierarchy appear natural and just to rules and ruled."448 The role of television in transforming the complexity and ambiguity of politics into a moral tale with a readily understandable content and lesson is huge, argues Migdal. In this way the elaborate ceremonies that we associate with states are actually ends in themselves, as expressions of a simultaneous unity among people where all are part of production. These ceremonies represent an order in which some command and others obey, with differing roles in the production. Thus it is state officials who play a leading role in forging and maintaining that master narrative which underlies the dramatic unity and reinforces positions of authority.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This theatrical metaphor has been presented by many writers as a tool used by states to mold and energize society, as if a kind of impresario of politics puts together a show starring the supreme leadership of the state. The success of this show will depend on whether the "audience" (the people) has been taken into account".449 That is why in order to create unity among the people, the state must shape itself to the key beliefs of society, as this collective model of an impresario also suggests. For state leaders this means creating a negotiation by relying on the skills of the theatre for achieving spontaneous cooperation between human actors. Finally, Migdal suggests 445. Shils Edward. 1975, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology , Chicago University Press, p154 446. Migdal Joel S. 2001, op.cited. p158 447. Here Migdal refers to Bryson, Scott. S. 1991 The chastised stage: bourgeois drama and the exercise of power (Stanford French and Italian studies. v. 70). Saratoga, Calif: Anma Libri. p.3 448. See Wilentz Sean. 1985, Rites of Power: Simbolism, Ritual and Politics Since the Middle Ages, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. p4 449. This is called the collective impresario model of Joel Migdal. 122

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

that elaborated ritual has been key in forging a semblance of oneness among disparate people and groups, as Thompson agrees, "(this kind of) ...theatre molds the images of power and authority and the popular mentalities of subordination."450 It is actually Geertz's conclusion that makes my point; "Thrones might be out of fashion and pageantry too, but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it".451 For Migdal, the ability of a state to remain intact depends on its ability to produce this "cultural frame" that Geertz refers to, by linking itself to the sacred in society through a set of rituals, and by transforming itself to fit into a cultural frame that has resonance among key elements of the population.452 Hence, the second variable will reflect the role of the master narrative used in public ritual in Kosovo, and its implications for the society. ­

Informal behavior and the public sphere.

Another factor crucial for the state´s ability to remain intact, and strongly influencing its image, lies outside its direct control but is a vital element for fashioning shared meaning in society and for creating the social unity that naturalizes and sustains the state. This dimension includes formal interactions in the public sphere. Based on Habermas' concept of the public sphere, Migdal refers to the debate on public issues by private people, which may include diverse practical discourses proceeding simultaneously on varied issues. This space is perceived as egalitarian and open to all. Here the arguments decide, and not the status of the arguer.453

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Furthermore, a public sphere includes not only the content of conversations but also the knowledge of the rules of the game and of how this give and take should occur. There are rules which refer to social interactions geared toward civic engagement, and these rules are preconditions for discussions that influence political decisions, which in their turn influence democracy. In a democratic culture, not only content but also the rules of the game and free participation in it are relevant, being crucial features of a democratic society. In fact, for Migdal, the arena outside the state is like a kind of non-state law, consisting of what people in society think is just, and a guide to proper behavior. In the public arena the state cannot always have sole control in the classic Hobbes sense, argues Migdal, but the effectiveness of the state rests on how well other sorts of implicit law or rules guide proper behavior, limiting at some level the deviance with which the state must deal.454

450. Thompson. Edward. P. 1974, Patriarcian Society, Plebeian Culture, Journal of Social History 7, pp389-890 451. Geertz Clifford, 1983, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropologie, New York, Basic Books, pp 142-143 452. Migdal. 2001 pp162-163 453. See. Calhoun, C. J. 1992. Habermas and the public sphere (Studies in contemporary German social thought). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. p1 454. Burke referred to these rules as "human links"which have no legal status, but act to constrain and restrict, as well as to give motion to the organized activity of a society. Cited in Hindson 123

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

According to Migdal, there are three common characteristics of the public space in modern times; 1) rules for engagement that have been and are constantly renegotiated, continuously expanding the public space with new groups and ideas due to modernizing processes like tourism, mass media, women´s liberation, etc, 2) claims for egalitarianism that energize the entry of new groups into the public space. Any group´s social basis for participation in the public sphere, whether class, gender, ethnicity or some other, can challenge others' feelings of entitlement to dominate public space, acting as a powerful demand, and third, 3) counterclaims precipitated by egalitarian assertions, leading to contentious struggles about who properly belongs in the public space. These struggles can eventually disintegrate the state itself, as in the case of Kosovo, where mutual claims of exclusion among ethnic groups exist. In fact, these claims and counterclaims put severe pressure on the unity of society.455 Here the current state in Kosovo must nudge diverse social changes in common directions by building complementariness, rather than fostering divisions, which should work to generate a stronger state. The third variable will measure the presence and efficacy of a public sphere based on these three mechanisms. To conclude, Migdal suggests that in order for states to survive, there must be a cultural frame allowing the state to create ties to people´s hearts and create meaning in society. This is the only way a state becomes naturalized, making its disappearance unimaginable. This process of "heart-binding" is best illustrated by the saying "the heart has its reasons which the mind does not suspect," and implies a realm of feelings and implicit understanding that goes beyond rational calculation.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The above-mentioned cultural aspects of state-society engagement could give signals of large changes in a society, warns Migdal.456 Through these three practices it is possible to identify potential changes of meaning in society that may force the state to adapt to a reconstitution of society. Changes in practices, participants, and meanings can, however, lead to increased social solidarity and unity by enforcing the unquestioned presence of the state. Here states can provide symbols, forums, and institutions that may increase the chances that social changes will dovetail to create social solidarity. Finally, if these types of social changes take place, they increase social stability. Hence, informal practices in the public sphere and other forms of non-state law can lead to greater public civility and tranquility by contributing to the strengthening of the state and lightening of its burden. A non-Hobbes state results that is not the only one responsible for all social security, but is also supported by non-state actors, who provide security in their own right. Such a state is in a position to use its resources much more successfully and not be overstretched, concludes Migdal. 457

Paul, and Gray Tim, 1988, Burke´s dramatic theory of politics, Brookfield, Vt, USA, Avebury, p8 455. Migdal. 2001, pp165-167 456. This is especially relevant when it comes to the participation of different groups and the emerging of new practices 457. Migdal 2001, pp168-169 124

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

My analysis of the cultural dimension will therefore focus on the examination of the three aforementioned cultural variables and their corresponding implications in the Kosovo case. This will serve the better understanding of the cultural domain and its role in state-building and development. This clearly must also include an analysis of bureaucracy. 1.3.5 Linking the micro with the macro level Based on a multidimensional approach to development, I have argued so far that in order for development and therefore change to happen, both individual action and structural transformation, ideally occurring congruently, are necessary. This means linking the micro and macro levels to forge an indispensable link for the analytical framework used in this study.458

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

At the meta-theoretical level I will make use of the "habitus" concept of Pierre Bourdieu to accomplish this aim. In his "Theory of Practice" Bourdieu aims to avoid objectivist, behaviorist accounts of human activity that deny agency, without resorting to their subjectivist opposite. By avoiding references to rules of social action, he notes that social regularities formulated by observers as "rules" can become a discourse in which such rules are supposed to "exist in people's heads and guide their actions".459 Through the use of concepts such as subjectivism and objectivism Bordieu develops a theory of practice.460 Subjectivism thus draws attention to the fact that objectivist maps of a culture present in form of laws, rules, and systems, edit out intentionality and individuality, or what is referred to as "agency". On the other hand, objectivism points out that individuality and intentionality are regulated by cultural contexts, meaning we can only "intend" what is available to us within a given culture. 458. I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Eva Kreisky for her valuable comment at this point, and for her suggestion on the relevant literature. 459. This echoes Wittgenstein's observation that "People use rules to assess the correctness of their actions; rules do not use people as the vehicles of their causal efficacy to generate actions" paraphrasing Wittgenstein in Mühlhäusler, Peter. & Harre, Rom. 1990. Pronouns and people:the linguistic construction of social and personal identity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell., p 7 460. Bourdieu borrows three insights from structuralism, which clearly influence his notions of cultural field and the habitus. First, structuralist accounts of practice start from the premise that people more or less reproduce the objective structures of the society, culture, or community they live in, articulated in terms of ideas, values, documents, policies, rituals, discourses, relations, myths and dispositions. This was expressed in the famous Lévi-Strauss observation that "myths think in men, unbeknown to them." Thus, while people think that they are employing various modes of communication like the sign systems in written and spoken language or bodily gestures, it is in fact those sign systems that produce them and their activities, thoughts, and desires. According to structuralism, sign systems not only "think" people into existence, but they also determine how people perceive the world. This means that "reality" is both produced and delimited by the sign systems we have at our disposal. Finally, Bourdieu borrows the term relational thinking from structuralism. Reality and people are ‘processed’ through the meaning machines that constitute our sign systems; but the signs in those systems mean nothing in themselves; they only "mean" insofar as they are part of a system and can be related to other signs in that system: we understand red as being not black. 125

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Reading across both subjectivist and objectivist approaches simultaneously, Bourdieu insists that practice is always informed by a sense of agency, as the ability to understand and control our own actions, but that the possibilities of agency must be understood and contextualized in terms of its relation to the objective structures of culture, referred to as cultural fields. For Bourdieu this relationship between field and habitus does not completely determine people's actions and thoughts, but no practice is explicable without reference to them.461 Bourdieu´s intention was to account for the "practical knowledge" of social actors, as the entire complex of habituated activities of ordinary living that people acquire through socialization. Together these make up a "practical sense" of how to act and react appropriately as they think, feel, talk, gesture, and organize social spaces. So, if the strategies and practices people employ in their everyday lives cannot be understood solely in terms of rational individual decision-making, or as determined by supra-individual structures, how can we account for them? The answer is that they are embedded in the habitus, which "once acquired ... underlies and conditions all subsequent learning and social experience".462 Consequently, Bourdieu attempted to develop a theory of action that would replace the subjectivist-objectivist dualism of classical social theory with its own problematic matching pair, "individual" and "society". He intended to thereby "escape from under the philosophy of the subject without doing away with the agent as well as from under the philosophy of the structure but without forgetting to take into account the effect it wields upon and through the agent."463

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Hence, objective structures produce people, their subjectivities, their world-view and, as a consequence, they also produce what people come to know as ‘reality.’ Therefore every thing, object, and idea within a culture has meaning only in relation to other elements in that culture. The reintroduction of habitus to account for the nature of the relationship between individual and society explained practice in its humblest forms, as well as rituals, the mundane economic activity of everyday life, etc. This escaped the objectivist action understood as a mechanical reaction "without an agent", and subjectivism which portrays action as the deliberate pursuit of a conscious intention, or the free projection of a conscience pursuing its own ends and maximizing its utility through rational computation.464 For Bourdieu, this sense is habitus, the partly unconscious taking in "of rules, values and dispositions", defined

461. Webb, Jen., Schirato, Tony et.al. 2002. Understanding Bourdieu. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: p36. 462. Bourdieu, P. 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, University Press, Cambridge pp72-95, and Bourdieu, P. 1990. The logic of practice. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.,pp 52-65 463. Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, Lois .J.D. 1992. An invitation to reflexive sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp121-122 464. Ibid. p 121 126

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

as "the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations…[which than produces]...practices".465 In other words, habitus can be understood as the values and dispositions gained from our cultural history that generally stay with us across contexts, and are therefore durable and transposable. These values and dispositions allow us to respond to cultural rules and contexts in a variety of ways, because they allow for improvisation, but the responses are always largely determined and regulated by our experience of a culture.466 This should not imply determinism, argues Bourdieu, as the habitus only disposes actors to do certain things. It provides a basis for the generation of practices but does not determine them. If habitual schemes are "generative", there must be some means by which agents draw on their habitus as a resource of some kind. In this context, rules are replaced with dispositions, which are equally tacit and unknowable. Bourdieu used this form of tacit knowledge to remove "rational choice" theory assumptions that the "rational individual choice" is the determining factor for what people do or say. His theory depends on the assumption of a "virtual apparatus," by means of which agents draw on implicit knowledge acquired through social experience and explicit socialization. This sphere of tacit knowledge, in the case of dispositions, internalizes at the individual level and externalizes in the case of collectivity, as the habitus is also a social phenomenon.467

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Hence, as an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus engenders all the thoughts, perceptions, and actions consistent with those conditions.468 Being socially embodied, it is at home in the field it inhabits, and perceives it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest.469 These generative schemes and dispositions are learned during the early years of life, and are thus durable. Inscribed in the "bodily hexis", they are habitual and non-reflexive, argues Bourdieu. The agent does what s/he "has to do" without posing it explicitly as a goal, beneath the level of calculation and even consciousness, beneath discourse and representation.'470 Habitus is in a sense entirely arbitrary, and there is nothing natural or essential about the values we hold, the desires we pursue, or the practices in which we engage.471 This does not mean that such practices are unmotivated, or that we act out of disinterestedness. On the contrary, all practices are informed by notions of power, politics, and self-interest. But, for a particular habitus to function smoothly and effectively, individuals must normally think that the possibilities from which they choose are in fact necessities, common sense, natural, or inevitable. Being used to thinking of an agent as any being that has the

465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471.

Bourdieu, P. 1977, op.cit. p. 78 Bourdieu, P. 1990, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Oxford: Polity. Jenkins, R. 1992. Pierre Bourdieu. London; New York: Routledge. p79 Bourdieu P.1977, op.cit. p95 Bourdieu.P.1992, op.cit.p127 Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, op.cit. p128 Ibid. p38 127

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

power to make things happen, in the habitus concept we face a human agency that perceives "the person" as the agentic power, located somewhere ambiguously behind/ beneath the agency of persons.472 Along with the notion of habitus, created by Bourdieu primarily to overcome the subjectivist-objectivist gap, the notion of cultural fields, created for the same reason, is of relevance to this study. A cultural field in Bourdieu's terms can be defined as a series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations, appointments, and titles which constitute an objective hierarchy, and produce and authorize certain discourses and activities. It is also constituted by, or out of, the conflict involved when groups or individuals attempt to determine what constitutes capital within that field, and how that capital is to be distributed.473 These cultural fields are assumed to be fluid and dynamic, rather than static entities, and are made up not only of institutions and rules, but of the interactions between institutions, rules, and practices.474 They are dependent on and influenced by other fields, as well as fluid and dynamic due to constant change in internal practices and politics and their convergence with other fields.475 Bourdieu uses the "field" notion as a metaphor for the metaphorical space where one can identify institutions, agents, discourses, practices, values, and so on, i.e. all types of concrete instances associated with the use of the term. But the term "field of power" in Bourdieu's sense is not perceived as the site of institutions and practices, but rather as a metaphor for the ways in which fields, particularly dominant ones such as the government field, actually conduct themselves. For example, the government has a responsibility to regulate, manage, and police the national community, and the mechanism it applies to fulfill this responsibility is power. In other words, the government is not the field of power, but is one of the sites in which power operates. This means that the use of "power" can be understood as a meta-field, or a macroconcept, to describe the ways in which individuals and institutions within dominant fields relate to one another and to the whole social field.476

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Here I can refer to Poulantzas´s conceptualization of the state as "every form of institutionalized power"477 to better contextualize Bourdieu's notion of power. For Poulantza, the state is made possible through institutions, but not only institutions,

472. Farnell, Brenda. 2000, Getting out of the Habitus: An Alternative Model of Dynamically Embodied Social Action. - Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Volume 6. Issue 3. p.397 473. See Bourdieu 1977. op.cit. pp93-94 474. Webb, J., Schirato, T.,et.al,. 2002, op.cit, p 22. 475. Ibid. p30 476. Web, J.,Shirato T, et.al,. 2002, op.cit.p 86 477. Exact German cited, "materielle Verdichtung eines Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Klassen und Klassenfraktionen, dass sich im Staat immer in spezifischer Form ausdrückt" or "institutionalisiertes, die Gesellschaft ordnendes Kräfteverhältnis" see Thilo Scholle 2006, in Globalisierung und die Theorie des Staates, Heft 4/2006 Transnational Concerns: Facetten der Globalisierung Einige Gedanken zum 70. Geburtstag von Nicos Poulantzas, pp120-121 128

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

functioning as factors of cohesion in a given society. Defined in functional terms, the state in this context comes to include every institution that contributes to cohesion.478 This line of argumentation is similar to Migdal´s state-society model where states are perceived at the core of the reinvention of the society through the use of symbols and institutions. This generates a constant mutual transformation of state and societies, leading to contending coalitions cutting across and blurring the lines between the two. This dynamic institutional arrangement is the right approach to study the state, seen as an "organization divided by and limited to the sorts of obedience it can demand"479 and necessarily examined in a historical, institutional, and culturalist approach, argues Migdal. These arguments are presented here to support the approach followed in this study, where institutions are perceived in functional terms and as arenas where power operates in the form of actors or structures influencing the processes of change and development in a society. Thus, having elaborated Bourdieu, Poulantzas,480 and Migdal´s theoretical assumptions, I will focus my discussion concretely on institutions as the field of power, and present them as analytical categories to be used in my investigation, the correct approach to highlight the human agency and structural interaction in the empirical section.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The term institution has two principal meanings in the social sciences; in management and organization theory an institution usually refers to a role or organization, while in economics and sociology an institution is often a rule or convention. I am aware of the major divergence between these two definitions, between role- and ruleorientations. The role-oriented type resides in deliberately constructed human groupings, while the rule-oriented one is diffused among a multitude of people. So, while roles have concrete reality, rules are mental conceptions. Slipping from one definition to the other is easy, for roles/organizations usually need rules/conventions to reinforce them, and vice versa. Moreover, both definitions refer to repetition in the way people act. In either case, an institution is understood to entail stability and persistence, and can have intrinsic and pragmatic value.481 From a broader perspective, institutions can be defined as the set of formal and informal roles/organizations or conventions/rules that provide the framework for human interaction and shape the incentives of members of society. Hence, an institution may define and constitute a particular social order with positions and relationships consisting of a system of authority and power. Furthermore, an institution organizes, coordinates, and regulates social interaction in one or more particular domains by defining context in the specific settings and times constituting its domain. It also 478. See Poulantzas, Nicos. A. 1973. Political power and social classes. London: NLB; Sheed and Ward. pp.44-50 479. Migdal J. 2001, op.cit p 264-265 480. Poulantzas theory of state and capitalism will not be further developed as it is beyond of the scope of this study. 481. Goldsmith, A. Arthur. 1992 Nov-Dec, Institutions and Planned Socioeconomic Change: Four Approaches Published in Public Administration Review Journal, Vol. 52, Nr. 6. pp. 582-587. 129

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

provides a normative basis for appropriate behavior, including the roles of participants in that setting, their institutionalized games, and interactions taking place in the institutional domain. An institutional rule complex also provides a cognitive basis for knowledgeable participants to interpret, understand, and make sense of activity in the institutional domain. By guiding and regulating interaction, social rules give behavior its recognizable, characteristic patterns, making these patterns understandable and meaningful for those sharing knowledge of the rule. Finally, institutions provide the core values, norms, and beliefs referred to in normative discourses.482 I will try to overcome this way the classic sociological problem of structure versus agency in institutions by intentionally favoring, and thus conceptualizing, a dialectic relationship between structures on one hand, and agents and forces of change on the other.483 In classic political science the structural element is normally assigned to institutions, constitutions, and other legal systems of norms and rules. The dynamic element in this analysis is individual or collective action, which is assumed to be relatively unconstricted by structural constraints. Individuals have been assumed here to be free actors. To the extent that their behavior is shaped, it is shaped by social factors.484

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I will juxtapose to this classic theory the assumption that structure and agency interrelate with each other and are part of the same habitus, in Bourdieu´s terms. Thus, I regard structure not as rigid as it is made to appear, but recognize its adaptation to meet changing demands, in often incremental and undramatic ways. On the other hand, I posit that structures are clearly shaped and modified by the behavior of the individuals who occupy them. Thus, despite agents' inability to always act autonomously, and the influence of structures' "embedded" values, I recognize that behavior is also based in part on individual volition and interest.485I am also aware that most human social activity is organized and regulated by socially produced and reproduced systems of rules that are universal within human collectivities. Such processes are often accompanied by mobilisation, by exercise of power, and by conflict and struggle.486 Social rules will hence be regarded not as transcendental abstrac-

482. See Schelling, Th. C. 1963, The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press; Burns, Tom R., Gomolinska, A. Meeker D. 2001, The Theory of Social Embedded Games: Applications and Extensions to Open and Closed Games. Quality and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Vol. 35 pp1-32. 483. Cp. Hay, Colin. 1995 Structure and Agency, In Marsh David and Stoker, Gerry (eds.) Theory and Method in Political Science. New York: St. Martin's. University Press. 484. Guy Peters B. & Jon Pierre, 1998, Oct. Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and Explanation Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 8, No. 4, p565-583. 485. Cp. Granovetter, Mark. 1985 Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." American Journal of Sociology 91, pp 481-510 and Fukuyama, F. 1995 Trust: social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York: Free Press. 486. See contributions of Burns, Tom R. & Helena Flam 1987, The Shaping of Social Organization: Social Rule System Theory and Its Applications. London: Sage publication; Burns, Tom R., & Marcus Carson, Actors, Paradigms, and Institutional Dynamics: The 130

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tions, but as embodied in the practices and institutions of groups and collectives of people, i.e. language, customs, codes of conduct, laws, family, community, etc, as well as in organizations such as business enterprises, and government.487 In the same way, I assume that human agents, together with groups, organizations, communities, and other collectives they are part of, are the producers, carriers, and reformers of institutions. They interpret, implement, adapt, and transform them, sometimes as cautiously as possible, other times radically. Such behavior explains much of cultural and institutional dynamics. That is why major struggles in human history revolve around the (re-)formation of core economic, administrative, social, and political institutions of society, or of particular regimes of rules defining social relationships, authority, obligations, and duties including the "rules of the game" for these and related domains. Social actors make use of institutions and maintain, adapt, transform, propagate, and (re-)interpret them. With experience, they accumulate complex situational knowledge and skills that are useful in implementing as well as adapting or reforming rules in concrete interactions.488 On the other hand, as stated previously, agents and their relationships are constituted and constrained by institutional complexities. They are the basis on which actors organize and regulate their interactions, interpret and predict their activities, and develop and articulate accounts of their affairs by carrying on critical discourses. Institutions are thus key contextualizing conditions as well as products of social interaction.489

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The case of modern institutions best illustrates my assumption. Institutions such as government agencies, democratic associations, or markets are organized and regulated in relatively separate, autonomous but interdependent domains, distinguishable from others on the basis of their distinctive rule complexes, and creating a specific moral order in terms of their own "rationality." The actors engaged in an institutional domain are oriented to the rule system that has legitimacy in this context, utilizing it to coordinate, regulate, and talk about social transactions. Differentiation into separate domains governed by particular rule systems and procedures involves interdependencies between domains, and poses a challenge for the actors to integrate and coordinate them. That is why modern institutions often consists of complex levels which combine different types of institutional and actor relationships including markets, bureaucracies, and various informal actor networks.490

487.

488. 489. 490.

Theory of Social Rule Systems Applied to Radical Reforms." in: Hollingsworth, J. Rogers ., Müller, Karl. H., & Hollingsworth, Ellen. J. 2002. Advancing socio-economics: an institutionalist perspective. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Baumgartner, Thomas. Burns, Tom, DeVille, Phillipe 2002, Actor-System Dynamics Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Modern Capitalism, Canadian Journal of Sociology. Volume: 27. Issue: 2. p193 See Ibid.196 Ibid. Machado Nora and Burns, Tom, 1998 Complex Social Organization: Multiple Organizing Modes, Structural Incongruence, and Mechanisms of Integration." Public Administration, Vol. 76, pp. 355-386 131

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

To conclude, institutions will be categorized here as the framework where human interactions and their results take place, but at the same time they are the framework that regulates and reshapes the form of these human interactions. There are various ways of classifying institutions, but I have selected three approaches depending on 1) the degree of formality, 2) different levels of hierarchy, and 3) the area of analysis.491 The first two are not relevant here, but I will focus on the third, which differentiates between various areas of analysis and is of more interest for this study. There are four categories falling under this level; the economic, political, legal, and social institutions. Rules that define the production, allocation, and distribution processes for goods and services, including markets, are typically placed under economic institutions.492 Studies of political institutions usually employ variables providing details about elections, electoral rules, type of political system, party composition, measures of checks and balances, and political stability.493 Studies related to law and institutions refer to the type of legal system, and to the definitions and traditional customs forming the basis of law. Studies on social institutions usually cover the rules dealing with access to health, education, and social security arrangements that have an impact on gender balance and generally govern relationships between social actors.494 Institutions may be endogenous or exogenous. In either case, the local setting is crucial for analyzing their effects. Most reviewed studies have found a strong positive correlation between the quality and performance of institutions on one hand, and development on the other.495 But, due to various methodological approaches and conceptual problems, the evidence on causation is still thin.496

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In order to address some of the crucial points in this study, I suggest a new analytical framework that maps out the most relevant channels of influence between institutions and development in a state-building and development process. My aim is to introduce the right instruments for the examination and evaluation of institutions in transitional contexts in the future. This model of analysis is my theoretical contribution to the scientific community on this issue. While I am aware that this model is not exhaustive for all factors contributing to development in a state-building process, I have focused on the most important ones that are causally interrelated to each other

491. Jütting, Johannes 2003 Institutions and Development: A critical Review, OECD Working Paper No. 210, p14 492. Bowles, Samuel. 1998, “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions”, The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, pp. 75-111. 493. Beck, Thorston 2000, New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions, Development Research Group, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 494. Jütting J.2003,op.cit p15 495. See Rodrik Dany, Sept. 2001 Intitutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants of Economic Growth, Available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/ growthintro.pdf, Accessed June 2006 496. Jütting J. op.cit. 2003 132

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

and therefore to the whole process. The framework developed here stresses the idea that institutions do not stand alone, but are embedded in a local setting and are influenced by historical trajectories and culture. Thus, in analyzing the impact of institutions on state building and development we will take into account; 1) the need to differentiate between exogenous and endogenous institutions, 2) the relevance of structures and the local setting, 3) the actor perspective and consideration of human actors as agents of institutional change or persistence, 4) the existence of different levels of institutions depending on the area of analysis as mentioned above, and finally, 5) the time factor. The areas to be investigated here include the political, economic, social, and cultural domains. For each of these theoretical categories, I have developed a set of variables that account for their developmental outcomes in a state-building process. In the political domain, the following variables will be examined: mechanisms of political choice including political parties and authority structures, the capacity of institutions and actors to positively meet the challenge of endogenous stresses and strains, evaluation of the functional capacities of these authority structures, and the political culture and its ability to create alliances and cope with conflict. In the economic domain, my analysis will include the following variables; the availability and capacity of market mechanisms and of state structures that support such mechanisms, the role of international safety nets in economic crisis situations, and finally an assessment of state programs to develop a human development agenda based on the human capability approach.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the social domain, the analysis will be focused on the social capital potential and influence in the country, including norms of trust, reciprocity, networking, bonding and bridging, and gender. This will help in evaluating the nature and extent of communities' social relationships with the government, as well as interactions between civil society, the press, and the media. In the cultural domain, the variables to be examined include; the law as generator of meaning in the society, including both official and informal laws, the public ritual and bureaucratic standards set by the international community, which influence the state image, and also the availability of a public sphere as a culture of participation in a conceptual space where only arguments count. Furthermore, besides the institutional level, "the local setting" will be crucial for the analysis of this case study. It is regarded here as determinant to know the traditions of a country, the history, and the social context, as well as historical, geographical, and other related information before any examination of institutions and their effects in a state-building and/or development process can take place. The “area of interaction” will be taken into account, too. The institutional framework creates incentives and disincentives for specific actions by human actors. Depending on the distribution of power and interest, actors undertake activities that determine an outcome which I will call a transaction cost. There are several levels of the area of in-

133

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

teraction to be identified with the help of Joel Migdal´s theoretical approach, which I will use in the categorization of human actors and their levels of interaction. Based on the idea that states and societies are dynamic in their relations, Migdal recognizes first the forces that constitute the various environments in which states actors operate. According to him there are five types of social forces and groups that stand out as relevant factors impinging directly on state officials. We will use these as actor categories in our case study. These levels include; 1) supervisors (unelected state personnel, not at the top of the hierarchy), 2) underlings, who are directly or indirectly supervised state employees, 3) peers in other agencies, or politicians at roughly similar levels, 4) domestic social forces, not part of the state organization, but originating from within society (including clients of state policies, blocs of voters, contractors, etc, and finally, 5) foreign social forces from the international system. The state never generates a single homogenous response to an issue or a problem, but instead produces a varied and ideally, coordinated set of responses. Migdal exposes the autonomy of various components of the state, and of the pressures generated at different levels of state hierarchy by different social forces. For better results, Migdal suggests studying the parts of the state within their environments, and also the relationships of the parts to one another. He presents a four level scheme of state organization from bottom to top including the trenches, dispersed field offices, central agency offices, and commanding highs. The trenches are at the bottom of the state hierarchy, dealing mostly with social forces, and they include tax collectors, police officers, teachers, and other bureaucrats mandated to directly apply state rules and regulations. They have continuous contact with the intended clients of official state policies, and are in the middle of pressure coming from within the state (state officials) and outside it (other social forces).

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The next level is a bit higher in the hierarchy. The dispersed field offices include regional and local bodies that organize state policies and directives for local application, or formulate and implement local policies. They include the bureaus, legislative bodies, courts, and police units working exclusively within a circumscribed territory within the state. The so-called implementors, generally middle level bureaucrats in the first and second ranks of field administration work, organize the execution of state policy in a given region. This level is more distanced from supervision by the state or society. Thus the dispersed field offices are an interesting nexus of power that draws domestic and foreign social forces from the provincial or local level.497 The next level in the state hierarchy comprises the agencies´s central offices, or nerve centers, where national policies are formulated and enacted, and where resources for implementation are centrally marshaled. These offices are staffed by national parliamentarians and heads of ministries or agencies of the state, and have the overall responsibility for the state´s attempt to penetrate and regulate society in particular realms of life, including limited social areas like education. The center for 497. Migdal Joel S. 2001, State in society, op.cit. pp 118-119 134

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

generating overall legislation may also be at this level, but without executive responsibility. Typically at this level, these head offices are engaged in an endless process of bargaining with each other, and in their routine negotiations they often face the pressure that their peers can bring to bear on them. Those in the central offices also sometimes deal with the most powerful forces in society such as large capital enterprises, political parties, labor unions, media, and religious organizations. These groups also influence the policy making process at the level of an agency´s central offices. The most intense pressures may come from within the capital city itself, both from inside the state organization and from other centrally organized social forces.498 The last level is the commanding heights, which bear the top executive leadership, a field which has not been considered enough in the social sciences. Top state leaders in fact face pressure from all ministers, and from different arrays of pressures originating in all arenas of dominance in state agencies. Thus, the forces pressuring the commanding heights come from a broader field than those affecting the lower levels of the state.499

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Migdal shows clearly that the state is not an organic, undifferentiated actor apart from society, but rather a space in which components of the state play differing roles in various arenas, and where the dynamic struggles for domination in society take place. These struggles include more than just getting to the political heights, but also include alliances, coalitions, and conflicts among social forces in multiple arenas and with different components of the state. It is precisely from this "cacophony of sounds" stemming from the different realms where parts of the state interact, that state actions are undertaken. Finally, the security domain is also a part of the analytical scheme proposed here. Considered as a multidimensional concept, its provision is a precondition for development in terms of political, economic, social, and cultural well-being, best illustrated by the concept of human security mentioned previously.500 Therefore, the first thing to do when analyzing the impact of institutions involved in state-building and development processes, is to check the availability and functionality of the rule of law, followed by human security considerations. Such an approach reinforces the fact that institutions are part of a state-building and development process, and therefore they need considerable time to evolve and change. Thus, their time span as a continuously evolving process should be taken into account. For the sake of clarity I present the variables described above and their interrelations in the form of a tabular analytical framework in Figure 11. With this theoretical contribution I hope to fill a gap in the studies operating on similar topics.

498. Ibid.p121 499. Ibid. p123 500. See the Chapter 1.2.6 on Development and Security in this study. 135

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Analytical Framework for Institutional Development Outcomes in the State-building Process

Local Setting

Political Domain: 1. Mechanisms of political choice 2. Functional capacity 3. Political culture

Area of Interaction Dis/ Incentives

Behaviour Transaction of Actors Costs (in 5 levels)

Distribution of Power

Endogenous Institutions

Security / Rule of Law

Exogenous Institutions

Economic Domain: 1. Functioning market mechanisms 2. State mechanisms for human capability 3. International emergency safety nets

Social Domain: 1. Social capital mechanisms 2. State role in social capital 3. Interaction with formal institutions

Cultural Domain: 1. Law as shared meaning 2. Public Ritual 3. Public Sphere

Time

Figure 11: Analytical Framework for Institutional Development Outcomes in the Statebuilding process (Source: Author 2007)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1.3.6 Conclusion In the two previous units I have discussed different theoretical approaches to development and state-building, followed the history of these ideas, and argued for the selection of theories that I deem necessary for examining state-building and development processes. In the third unit, I focused in more detail on theoretical assumptions stressing the interdependence and interrelatedness of the political, economic, social, and cultural domains. Based on the institutional expression of each domain, I elaborated an analytical framework for state-building and development that will be applied in the case study of Kosovo. In the political domain, based mainly on the theoretical approach of LaPalombara and Weiner, I suggested the utility of combining political development with other domains, and created a set of variables that will allow for exploration of the conditions influencing political development. This set of variables includes; analysis of the mechanisms of political choice, focusing on political parties as determinant indicators in shaping the parameters, velocity, and eventual direction of political development; the functional capacity of authority structures, and especially of the "checks and balances" of political powers, i.e. the legislative, judiciary and executive branches; and 136

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

finally the political culture, as the ability to create alliances and cope with conflicts when they appear, a crucial variable for predicting future political development. The economic domain, based broadly on the human capability approach of Sen and Nussbaum, emphasizes the fact that far-reaching powers of the market mechanism must be supplemented by the state through the creation of basic social opportunities for social equity and justice. Here the creation of social opportunities making direct contributions to the expansion of human capabilities and the quality of life, like health care, education, and social security, is the main topic of discussion. Moving beyond the classic state versus market dichotomy, I favor a model similar to that of the Scandinavian mixed economies which integrate both of these factors. The availability and efficiency of international safety nets, ready to intervene when crises appear, also play crucial roles in economic development. Correspondingly, three variables for the analysis of economic development process were identified, focusing on the availability and functionality of state mechanisms for ensuring human capabilities, market mechanisms, and international emergency safety nets.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the analysis of the social domain, I have recognized the relevance of social capital as a variable, based mainly on Putnam and Skocpol´s contributions to this concept. My aim is to link social capital measurement directly to theoretical understandings of the concept, in order to recognize the multidimensionality of social capital, including social networks, norms of trust and reciprocity, etc. Moreover, social capital will be applied as a resource for action, and empirically distinguished from its results. In this way I will provide a sound basis for analysis of the social domain, and estimate the potential for its future development despite the complexity of social capital as a concept. Here the variables identified for analyzing social capital are; the availability and extent of social capital instruments such as trust, norms of reciprocity, networking, and bonding and bridging; the role of the state in creating and multiplying social capital; and third, the nature and extent of a community's social relationships and formal institutions, and the interaction between them. Finally, in the cultural domain I will concentrate chiefly on the variables described by Migdal, and to a lesser extent by Bourdieu, which contribute to the building and cohesion of an image of state. These variables are; the law as a concept with a shared meaning, and its role in creating a common meaning system; the role of master narratives used in public rituals and their implications for building the image of the state; and the public sphere as a space where only arguments count, and not their authors. Finally, the role of bureaucracy as a complementary variable in building an image of the state, as well as its generating modus in the field, reiterates my understanding of cultural development and its role in state-building. To conclude, in considering institutions as a habitus of their own, and as the site of power through which all the aforementioned domains are (re-)shaped by human agency, I propose an innovative analytical framework that maps out the most relevant channels of influence between institutional development outcomes in a state-building process and introduce appropriate tools for examination and evaluation of such institutions. The role of local setting, of actors behavior according to the levels described by Migdal, and the endogenous/exogenous double nature of institutions, presented as 137

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

a long-lived process of change, create the right tools for the analytical framework presented in Figure 11.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the following chapters, this analytical model will be applied to my case study, according to the variables mentioned above. First I will give a short introduction to Kosovo, my case study, and give a glimpse of its history, in order to better understand the outcomes.

138

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

2. Empirical considerations: The Case of Kosovo Before I begin my examination of the case study as outlined above, it is necessary to give some background information on Kosovo and its history, in order to better understand and analyze the current situation. I posit that history is an important factor in any scientific analysis of a society, in order to fully understand its various aspects and functions. Thus, I will keep the historical perspective in mind throughout the study when examining events and institutions, aiming to better understand current events and predict future trends, although in this chapter I will limit myself to background information and concentrate on the time period of the last decade. Finally, I owe the reader an explanation of my choice of Kosovo.

2.1 Introducing Kosovo

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to Malcolm, the precise geographical borders of Kosovo as we know it today were created in 1945, making it a bit artificial to talk about the history of a territory whose defining borders have been a political reality only for the last few decades. In fact, the present borders of Kosovo as an autonomous province according to the post-1945 Yugoslav constitution are the products of long political history which corresponds in broad terms to physical facts. Kosovo shows a strong geographical identity501, especially due to the fact that it is ringed by ranges of mountains and hills that serve as natural geographical "borders."502 In these terms, the topography of Kosovo can be compared to a pot. Surrounded by high mountains on all sides (to the west and south up to 2,600 meters above sea level), Kosovo inhabits a geographical basin situated at an altitude of 500 meters, divided by a central north/south ridge into two sub-regions of roughly equal size503. Although the area is divided into fruitful valleys, it actually has little commercial agricultural potential. Kosovo is densely populated, with relatively large households, on average 6-7 persons per family, and relatively small farms.504 Kosovo is located in southeastern Europe at the heart of the Balkan Peninsula, and is surrounded by Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and "inner" Serbia. Kosovo was one of the eight constituent units of Yugoslavia; six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The removal of autonomy from Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989 was a key moment in a series of events leading to demands for independence, and to the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

501. See the attached map of Kosovo for detailed geographical information. Appendix 1 502. Malcolm, N. 2002. Kosovo : A short history. London: Pan. p1 503. European Commission & World Bank Survey, Nov.1999, Towards stability and prosperity - a program for reconstruction and recovery in Kosovo. Paper in support of the UNMIK. 504. Rasmussen, Niels. A. Oct. 2005, Kosovo Independence – De Jure vs. De Facto, DIIS Report, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen,, p18 139

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

and finally Kosovo505. Until 1989, Kosovo had been an autonomous province of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), considered part of Serbia although the majority of its inhabitants never accepted this arrangement. Although the figures are continuously changing, there are ca. 2 million current inhabitants of Kosovo, where ca. 88% are ethnic Albanian, 7% Serbs,506 and 5% other minorities.507 According to UNMIK information, Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society, a mixture of an Albanian majority and a minority of Serbs, Romas and Ashkaelia, Turks, Muslim Slavs or Gorani, and Bosnians. Actually, multi-ethnicity has been characteristic of Kosovo for centuries, with different ethnic groups inhabiting its territory under the rule of different administrations. At the moment this multi-ethnicity is merely empty rhetoric. Still, the Albanians and Serbs have been among the key ethnic groups in Kosovo for a long time, allowing both to claim to a certain extent the propriety of the territory.508 Kosovo has an area of 10,908 square kilometers, and includes 30 municipalities with Pristina as the national capital. The population of Kosovo is among the youngest in the region. 50% of the population are younger than 25, while 33% are younger than 15.509 Recent quantitative data is not available, but it is believed that the health status of the majority of the Kosovar people is more or less at the standard of a "developed" country.510 The illiteracy rate lies at 10.2% for females and 2.3 % for males. Virtually all children are initially enrolled in primary education, with equity between boys and girls, while at the secondary education level the net attendance rate for ages 15-18 differs between Albanians and Serbs. Although reliable data on this is not available, the majority of Kosovo Albanians are assumed to be muslim, with the rest Catholic and other religions, while the majority of Serbs are Christian Orthodox. The main languages spoken are Serbian and Albanian, but minority languages such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma are spoken to a lesser extent.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Kosovo´s industries including mining of lignite, lead, zinc, gold, and silver, as well as its chemical factories and electric power plants which were economically and militarily important for Yugoslavia, despite its predominately rural population. Mili-

505. Kosovo, T. i. I. C. o. 2000. The Kosovo report: conflict ; international response; lessons learned. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p34. 506. According to ESI Information the latest data available on Serbs, there are 130 000 Serbs left in Kosovo nowadays. See http://streaming.yale.edu/opa/approval/knaus_092507.mp3 507. Kramer H. Dzihic V.2005, Die Kosovo Bilanz, Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?LitVerlag, Wien, p11 508. Ruijsink, Saskia. 2005. Spatial Planning in Kosovo,. M.Scs. Thesis, Katholieke Universitet Leuven, Belgium, p19 509. UNFPA, 2003, Profile Kosovo, United Nations Population Fund, Pristina Kosovo, March 2003. 510. World Bank, 2001, (La Cava, Gloria, et al.) Conflict and Change in Kosovo. ECSSD, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development, Working paper No.31 140

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tarily, Kosovo was valued for its strategic position as a buffer against threats from the south and for its facility as a landing zone.511 Kosovo´s economy is in poor shape. It is highly dependent on imports, especially from its neighboring countries, and has extremely low exports. At the macro level, public expenditure shows a declining but still considerable dependence on foreign capital.512 Especially characteristic of Kosovo is the cash flow from its diaspora. In 2002, ca. 45% of total income came from cash remittances by the diaspora. Trade, retail, manufacturing, and agriculture are other important economic sectors in Kosovo. The latter, although employing the vast majority (over 40%) of the work force, is considered extremely unproductive and inefficient. In fact, it is the former sectors that add the most value to the economy.513 Dependence at the household level, considered as people receiving their main source of income from another person, stands at 77% for females and 36% for males. Legally, the administrative status of Kosovo as of December, 2007 is a province of the Serbian Republic of the ex-FRY, while Kosovo has actually been under UNMIK´s de facto Interim Administration, following Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, since June 1999.514 Having given a general picture of Kosovo´s situation, I would like to come back to the historical perspective mentioned before. Such a perspective will help to place events in their proper contexts and to explain the effects of crucial past events on current role- and rule-oriented institutions. To do this in detail would be beyond the scope of this study, so I will focus on the main events relevant to the current situation, outlined briefly as four historical eras; 1)the medieval period, which is significant for its explanation of the great battle and the two myths515, 2) the period before 1989, a period of autonomy under Tito´s Yugoslavia, 3) the period of 1989-1999, known as the "lost decade", and finally 4) the period after 1999, or the reconstruction period.516 Although in this study I will concentrate on the last period, it is inevitable that I will refer to the past and to the course of history before this time.

2.2 The historical battle and its myths

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The history of Kosovo is unavoidably related to the great Battle of Kosovo in 1389, and to the emergence of two myths from it. According to Malcolm and other historians,517 the history of Kosovo is interpreted differently by different ethnicities. 511. Clarck, Howard, 2000, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, Pluto Press, London, pxix 512. Ruijsink, S. 2005, op.cit. p15 513. ESPIG, 2004, Towards a Kosovo Development Plan - the state of the Kosovo economy and the possible ways forward. ESPIG (Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group) Policy Paper, no.1, Pristina, August 04. 514. Clarck, Howard, 2000, op.cit., p319 515. Malcolm, N. 2002. op.cit. pp 57-59 516. Malcolm´s book on Kosovo´s history considers events till 1999 517. See Malcolm, 2000, op.cit. and Detrez, R, 1999, Kosovo, de uitgestelde oorlog, uitgeverij 141

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Among these. the K-Albanians and K-Serbs518 differ mainly in two important aspects; they speak different languages, and follow for the most part different religions. So, while K-albanians are predominantly Muslim, the K-Serbs are predominantly Christian Orthodox. In their differing interpretations of history, they both refer to national myths which will be mentioned here because of their strong political function for national identification, contributing to the creation of a sense of a community, and mobilising people. Such myths are generally used as historical evidence to ‘prove’ the presence of each community as the first to live in Kosovo. Although both myths are based on historical facts, they are interpreted in completely different ways. While myths are not harmful in themselves, they have a real potential to become excuses for conflicts whose impact goes beyond innocence, as in the case of Kosovo. The Serbian myth considers Kosovo as the "cradle of the Serbs," while the Albanian myth claims that Albanians lived in Kosovo before the Serbs.519 Kosovo represents in this way both the central site of Serbian national mythology, as well as the historical shell of the Albanian “national renaissance", beginning with the 1878 League of Prizren. Serbs claim the “historical right” to Kosovo and see the Albanians as usurpers, while Albanians claim descent from the Illyrians, a "presence that pre-dated Serb arrival" by several centuries.520 Based on the historical facts, both groups have lived in Kosovo since at least the medieval period, when K-Serbs were the majority. During this period, Kosovo was under Bulgarian, Byzantine, and Serbian rule. Afterwards, Kosovo become the centre of the Serbian empire, due to its central location and the presence of mines. Serbs interpret this fact as proof that Kosovo is theirs. K-Albanians interpret this as evidence that the Serbs had taken "their" land as early as the medieval period, and believe that they were already present before this time.521

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The decisive moment in Kosovo's history is the battle of 1389, held in Kosovo Polje, and described by Serbs as their holy battle. In the middle of the 14th century, the Ottoman Turks began to conquer the Balkans. The Serbs were not eager to surrender and on June 28, 1389, this led to a historic battle. It is not clear exactly what happened, but the Serbian king Lazar and the Ottoman sultan Murat both fought, and both were killed. The battle was bloody, causing heavy losses on both sides, but in

518.

519. 520.

521.

Houtekiet, Antwerpen, available only in Dutch and accessable only by secondary sources in English. In order to avoid confusion with the inhabitants of Albania and Serbian state, I will use the term K-albanians for Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo, and K-Serbs for Serb inhabitants of Kosovo . Malcolm, N. 2002. op.cit. pp 59-80 Søren J. Petersen, August 2004, Conflict history: Kosovo, in International Crisis Group Website. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=58, and Malcolm 2002, pp23-40. Malcolm N, 2002 op.cit. pp23-57 142

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the end was indecisive. It is sure that the Serbian army was weakened, and in the 1450’s the Ottomans made their final conquest of Kosovo.522 The Serbian interpretation of the battle is as follows; King Lazar was a martyr who died for Serbia, the Ottomans took power immediately after the battle, and they suppressed the Serbs. Vuk Branković, the son-in-law of Lazar, is considered to be a traitor as he took the side of the Ottomans and facilitated their victory, although this is not based upon any historical evidence. Albanian historians, on the other hand, mention that Albanians had a prominent role in the battle. There is proof that ethnicities other than Serbs, including Albanians, fought against the Ottomans, but their prominence is questionable. To conclude, Serbs consider the battle as the ultimate proof that they have sacrificed for Kosovo, and that Kosovo is their cradle.523 Following the battle, and after centuries of Ottoman rule, Serbia and Montenegro conquered Kosovo and other adjacent Albanian-inhabited territories. In 1912, after 500 years under Ottoman rule, the territory was incorporated by Serbia, and at the end of the first World War, into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that constituted the first Yugoslavia.524

2.3 Kosovo as an Autonomous Province

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In 1919 and 1920 Serbia signed treaties confirming the transfers of Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina from Austria and Croatia, and of Slavonia and Vojvodina from Hungary. In 1929, these states together formed the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, named Yugoslavia. At the time, Kosovo was a province of southern Serbia within this greater Yugoslavia. The majority of the inhabitants of Kosovo at that point were K-Albanian. The Serbs did not recognize them, and started a process of "Serbanisation", by first offering only Serbian education, and later through complete ethnic exclusion from education. The Serbian government encouraged Serbs and Montenegrins to move to Kosovo. These immigrants were considered colonists by the population, causing a decline in the percentage of Albanians. Since the serb "colonization" process began, there have been violent conflicts between the two ethnicities. Serbs were aggressive in their oppression of K-Albanians, who often reacted with violence.525 During the German occupation in 1941, a major part of Kosovo was annexed to Albania, which was dominated by Italy at the time, while a minor part including the North and Trepča mines was annexed to Serbia. After WWII, in 1945, Kosovo became an autonomous region within the Serbian Republic.526After the fall of Tito's repressive security chief Rankovic in late 1960s, pressure built for greater autonomy. The result was that in 1974 Kosovo attained the official status of an autonomous 522. 523. 524. 525. 526.

Ibid. pp59-80 Malcolm, 2002, op.cit. pp59-80 Clarck, H., 2000, op.cit, p319 Malcolm, N.2002, pp315-333 Detrez, 1999 cited in Ruijsink, S. 2005, op.cit. 143

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

province under the Yugoslav constitution of the time. Formally remaining part of Serbian Republic, they had equal representation with Serbia in the Federal presidency.527 Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, the status of the autonomous province of Kosovo was almost identical with the status of a republic. This status allowed Kosovo its own administration, assembly, and judiciary, while it remained a member of Serbian and Yugoslav federal institutions, of the collective Presidency, and of the federal Parliament, where it had veto rights. The main difference between an autonomous province and a republic was that provinces did not have the right to secede from the federation, and were not considered bearers of Yugoslav sovereignty, as were the republics. This difference was explained by the fact that the Albanians, like the Hungarians of Vojvodina, were classified as a nationality (narodnost) rather than a nation (narod). Supposedly, this was because they had a national homeland elsewhere. Nations had the right to their own republic, but nationalities did not. In the national pecking order, there was an even lower category of national minorities, applied mainly to Roma, Vlachs, and Jews.528 During the autonomous period, the lives of K-Albanians improved significantly, as education and the press adopted the Albanian language. This period is worth mentioning here as the first time in which K-Serbs and K-Albanians lived together without major conflicts, and showed that peaceful coexistence is possible for them when conditions allow it. After Tito’s death in 1980, economic decline and ethnic conflicts between K-Serbs and K-Albanians introduced serious political problems. Serbian nationalism began to increase visibly. During the 1980s, although autonomy had brought emancipation, economic development could not keep pace with the fastgrowing K-albanian population and its rising expectations. The gradually diminishing K-Serb population complained that continued K-Albanian dominance in the province's government was creating pressure for them to leave.529 Under the presidency of Slobodan Milosevic, this lead to an increase of Serbian power and the beginning of the end of the autonomy of Kosovo.530

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

2.4 The "lost decade" of 1989-1999 The year 1989 marked a new beginning for the Balkans. Slobodan Milosevic used the tense situation on the ground to fuel Serb nationalist movements within the FRY, and to win the political capital that would entrench his rule. Political changes in the 1990s were characterized by the fall of socialism and the rise of nationalism.531 In 1989 Milosevic’s government transformed the Serbian constitution and revoked the 527. 528. 529. 530. 531.

Clarck, Howard, 2000, op.cit. Kosovo, T. i. I. C. o. 2000, op.cit. Clarck, H. 2000, op.cit. pp71-92 Detrez 1999 and Malcolm 2002. op.cit. Kosovar Stability Initiative, IKS, 2007, Post-War Reconstruction, Country Description , 2007. London: Tiri p8 144

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

constitutional autonomy of Kosovo after staging a vast rally of Serbs in Kosovo as an excuse to institute "emergency measures". After latching onto the nationalist Serbian intelligentsia's anathemising of K-Albanians, Milosevic used the Kosovo issue to launch a bid to lead Serbia. By 1991, K-Albanians were being expelled en masse from state institutions such as the police, the educational system, and state companies. Fearing extermination if they rebelled, K-Albanians choose peaceful civil resistance and retreated into parallel institutions, such as a self-funded and organized education system, as well as the beginnings of a private economy, all under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova refashioned the province's Communist party into the Democratic League of Kosovo.532 As Yugoslavia was unravelling, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the Federation, and the K-Albanian political elite also proclaimed independence in 1991. Despite the fact that this was not recognized by the remaining Yugoslavia (FRY), parallel elections were held by K-Albanians, who elected Rugova as president. In the meantime, police harassment and violence against them had became routine.533

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the context of the disintegrating Yugoslavia of 1991-1995, Belgrade neither fully reasserted nor fully relinquished authority in Kosovo. The police and army had security dominance, but nevertheless allowed K-Albanian parallel institutions to function. The K-Albanian diaspora channeled funds to the country through the "government in exile" and its prime minister Bujar Bukoshi. Kosovo's exclusion from the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement damaged Rugova's credibility with K-Albanian radicals, who formed the clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Although Rugova's LDK initially dismissed the KLA as an invention of the Serbian security services, continuous fighting between the KLA and Yugoslav police and security forces broke out early in 1998, and quickly spread throughout Kosovo, showing that this was not the case. After initial successes, the KLA was routed in the summer 1995 Serb army offensive that left 300,000 K-Albanians homeless by autumn. In the meantime, the Kosovo government in exile fielded the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK). After some initial cooperation with the KLA, they fell out, leaving the KLA western command to Ramush Haradinaj. Following a UN Security Council resolution, NATO demanded an end to violence and a ceasefire. US envoy Richard Holbrooke brokered a deal with Milosevic in October 1998 to reduce the presence of Yugoslav security forces in Kosovo, to allow OSCE observers into the province, and to accept NATO aerial verification.534 Over time, violence increased incrementally, and by the late 1990s civil war had broken out in Yugoslavia, eventually leading to international war. After the massacre of 45 civilians in Racak, Kosovo in 1999, the International Community (IC) organized the Rambouillet Conference in February of the same year, hoping to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. Kosovo´s negotiating team contained leaders of the peace movement and of the KLA. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, ne532. Søren J. Petersen, 2004, op.cit. 533. Kosovar Stability Initiative, IKS, 2007,op.cit. p9 534. Søren J. Petersen, 2004, op.cit. 145

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

gotiated with both sides. In Rambouillet, the IC demanded that Millosevic´s government declare Kosovo autonomous, but they refused. While this accord allowed a continuing role for Belgrade in Kosovo, it also provided for a wide-ranging NATO and international involvement. Even as negotiations were underway, Serbian security forces began a major offensive, undermining their credibility, and breaking the commitments made to Holbrooke the previous year.535 Serbia continued to ignore the principles established by the contact group at Rambouillet, obliging NATO to act upon its ultimatum with air strikes against Serbia. A series of precision-guided air strikes against strategic targets in the FRY began on 24 March 1999, continuing for 77 days. When the bombing ceased, Serbian forces withdraw from Kosovo, immediately after signing a technical military agreement between the NATO-led International Security Forces and the FRY on 9 June, 1999.536 Despite later evidence showing the Serbian military relatively undamaged, Milosevic capitulated in June, 1999 and NATO’s Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) was deployed. Afterwards, a peace treaty with Kosovo was signed, putting it under an interim UN administration.

2.5 Kosovo under "Re-Construction" Since 1999, the United Nations Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK) has been the new authority in charge of all civilian aspects of reconstruction, while NATO’s KFOR has responsibility for all military and security aspects. In the first stage of reconstruction, major efforts were made for emergency relief with UNCHR assistance. In June, 2000, UNCHR activities were phased out and the institution-building phase began.537 Kosovo is at the time of this writing guided by UNSC resolution 1244. Since 1999, K-Albanians have been returning, initially en masse, while many K-Serbs have left.538

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

UNMIK initially brought together four "pillars" to implement its mandate under UN leadership. Pillar 1 has changed during the reconstruction process, first dealing with humanitarian assistance under the UNHCR. In May, 2001 a new Pillar I was established, lead by UNMIK, and responsible for the police and justice. Since then, the four pillars were Pillar I, Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations, Pillar II, Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations, Pillar III, Democratisation and Institution-Building, led by the Organization for

535. For more info see Archives, N. R. C. News. 2001. Kosovo Conflict. Retrieved May 2006, www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Kosovo/inhoud.html, 536. The agreement is known as the Kumanovo Agreement and is available online at the NATO website: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm, Accessed 15 Sept.2006. 537. Llamazares. Monica. & Reynolds. Laina, L. Dec. 2003, NGO’s and Peace building in Kosovo, Working Paper No.13, Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies. pp6-7 538. Søren J. Petersen, 2004, op.cit 146

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Pillar IV, Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU).539 The administration of UNMIK is undertaken by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG),540 the leader of UNMIK.541 Following the first Kosovo national elections in 2001, UNMIK facilitated the creation of Provisional Institutions for Self Governance (PISG) which have gradually been given real power since 2004.542 They currently include the Office of the President of Kosovo, the Assembly of Kosovo, the Office of the Prime Minister, and 15 ministries, courts, and other institutions defined by the Constitutional Framework of 2001. However, the signature of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN (SGRG) is still required for any of the laws adopted by locally elected institutions to come into force.543 Several attacks on Kosovo's remaining Serb and Roma populations occurred through late 1999. In response, the French KFOR cordoned off north Mitrovica, and a northern enclave for Serbs was established. Under the demobilization agreement with KFOR, a remainder of the KLA reorganized into the unarmed "Kosovo Protection Corps" (KPC). The KLA had taken over de facto power in most municipalities before UNMIK arrived, with Hashim Thaci as “Prime Minister” of the KLA's “provisional government”. UNMIK convinced the KLA to enter a joint governing structure in early 2000. Rugova's party, the LDK, swept aside Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) in October municipal elections. A three-month stalemate after the first general election in November, 2001 ended in a grand coalition government. Ibrahim Rugova became president, and PDK´s nominee Bajram Rexhepi became the first internationally recognized Prime Minister of Kosovo.544

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The first elections held in Kosovo were the local (municipal) elections of 2000, followed by the national elections of 2001. A second set of local and national elections took place in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Except for the first local elections of 2000, all these elections were conducted using a "closed list" voting procedure, whereby citizens expressed preferences for political parties and not for individuals associated with them. Elections were organized by the OSCE and monitored by a large number of local and international monitoring organizations. They were all considered to have been democratic and fair, and none of the main political parties contested the final results. However, vocal criticism has been directed towards the "closed list" voting system on the grounds that it undermines the personal accountability of elected politicians and strengthens the power of political parties.545 As for

539. UNMIK Online 2007, http://www.unmikonline.org/, Accessed July 2007 540. The latest SRSG in Kosovo is Mr. Joachim Rücker who took up this post on 1 September 2006. 541. There have been six special representatives of UN Secretary-General since 1999 in Kosovo. 542. UNMIK Online 2007, op.cit. 543. Kosovar Stability Initiative, IKS, 2007, op.cit p11 544. Søren J. Petersen, 2004, op.cit 545. Kosovar Stability Initiative, IKS, 2007 op.cit. p11 147

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the K-Serb minority parties, the K-Serb Povratak coalition alternately participated in and boycotted the PISG. The hard-line Serb National Council dominating northern Mitrovica refused to recognize the PISG. After the fall of Milosevic in 2000 and his extradition to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague the following year, Belgrade accepted the Kosovo situation as a sort of suspended sovereignty. Because of UNMIK’s limited capacity to enforce and maintain unimpeded authority throughout the entire territory, parallel Serbian structures financed and controlled by the Serbian government exist in the northern parts of Kosovo, in the K-Serb section of Mitrovica, and in other K-Serb populated areas north of the Ibar River such as Zvecan, Zubin Potok, Leposavic, etc.546 UNMIK, EU, IC, and PISG representatives began discussing the future status of Kosovo only in October, 2005. While Kosovo progressed a lot in terms of physical reconstruction and institution-building in the first years after the war, three days of violent demonstrations and riots between K-Serbs and K-Albanians in March, 2004 were serious setbacks to the process of political and social reconciliation. The failure to define Kosovo’s status and premature donor withdrawal saw the economy slide from reconstruction boom into recession in 2003, with unemployment reaching around 60%. Tensions generated by these conditions exploded in March, 2004, causing a considerable number of casualties and widespread destruction of property. 19 people were killed, mostly K-Albanian, and nearly 900 injured. Over 700 homes were damaged, 4,500 people displaced, and 30 Serb churches and 2 monasteries were damaged or destroyed.547 The disorganized response of KFOR and UNMIK to these events harmed the credibility of these institutions, particularly among K-Serbs.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In April, 2005, the contact group announced that Kosovo would not be partitioned, form a union with any other state, or return to its pre-1999 status. Through summer 2005, UN Special Envoy Kai Eide assessed whether progress in democratic standards was sufficient to start final status negotiations. Despite assessing the KSerbs' situation as “grim,” he recommended commencement of status talks in October, 2005. The former Finnish president Marti Ahtisaari was appointed as Special UN Envoy to lead the final status talks in November, 2005.548 President Rugova of Kosovo died on 21, January, 2006 from lung cancer, delaying the first rounds of face-toface final status talks. Talks were held in Vienna starting on 17 March, 2006, focusing on decentralization and future status.549 At the time of this writing, the final status of Kosovo is as yet undecided, and any assumptions apropos remain speculative. The contact group gave strong indications that Kosovan independence will be favoured as

546. Rasmussen, N. Adal, Oct. 2005, op.cit. p11 547. International Crisis Group (ICG), Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report N°155, 22 April 2004, Online at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2627&l=1, Accessed September 2007 548. Eide, Kai, 2005, A Comprehensive Review of the situation in Kosovo, UN Security Council Doc. S/2005/635, 07.10.2005. 549. Søren J. Petersen, 2004, op.cit. 148

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the final outcome, stating that any settlement must be acceptable to all people of Kosovo.550

2.6 Why Kosovo? As I mentioned before, I feel I owe the reader of this study an explanation as to why I choose Kosovo as a case study to test my hypothesis on the ambivalent interdependency of state-building and development processes. The answer can be found in the current situation in Kosovo and in its fragile and relatively labile status, which is visible in its political, economic, social, and cultural domains. More specifically, the answer can be illustrated by the "Standards before Status" policy of UNMIK and its SRSG, Harri Holkeri, who in April, 2002 implemented this policy in an effort to defer the pressure for independence. The kind of policy proposed by UNMIK in Kosovo gave me the first impetus to question the relevance of such a strategy. For UNMIK, the emphasis was strongly on implementation of the “standards before status” policy, considered its “core political project”. Harri Holkeri regarded production of an implementation work plan as his most urgent task, clearly setting out the actions necessary to reach those standards. He was determined that Kosovo should make progress on the eight standards to be achieved by the PISG before final status could be addressed. Those standards focused on;5511) functioning democratic institutions, 2) the rule of law, 3) freedom of movement, 4) rights of return and reintegration, 5) the economy, 6) property rights, 7) dialogue with Belgrade, and 8) the Kosovo Protection Corps. In this way the clear political target of the K-Albanians, final status talks, would have a concrete implementation plan.552

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Discussion of the status of Kosovo was bound to the fulfillment of the standards in the areas above. At this point, the question I was pondering was; if Kosovo was about to fulfill all the standards as mentioned above, did this imply that there was a functional state with a monopoly on violence and able to supply the rule of law? Was there was a well-established bureaucratic machinery delivering efficient public services, functioning democratic institutions as well as a public sphere associated with a developed political culture, a functioning and prosperous economy, and finally an army able to defend the territory when needed? Briefly, this would have meant that Kosovo was first a well-developed democratic country with more or less western standards, before it could be independent. Such an approach raised questions for me. How can a country reach the standards mentioned above if they do not yet have a

550. By the time this thesis was being written, namely Dec., 2007, the "negotiations" were still officially going on. 551. For a detailed description of the Standards before Status see UNMIK web site available online at: http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarks_eng.pdf 552. Implementing "Standards Before Status" Policy Core Political Project for UN Kosovo Mission, Security Council Told. Security Council, 4910th Meeting (AM), Press Release SC/ 7999, Date 06/02/2004, 149

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

monopoly on violence, and therefore are not able to assure the rule of law, when most of its democratic institutions are just a few years old, when society has until recently been riddled with strong ethnic conflicts, and where the economy is at the level of an agricultural society? Moreover, this is all just beginning, so will it require an established a democracy, according to current standards?553 If these "standards" as mentioned above imply a western-like level of development and "status", and an internationally recognized democratic state, then does "Standards before Status" imply that development must occur before there can be an independent state, or is it rather vice versa? In fact, the essence of the 'Standards before Status' approach was that it required Kosovo's institutions of self-government to demonstrate that they were willing and able to protect the rights of all of Kosovo's ethnic communities, and had the capacity to act in a civilized way. This fundamental condition has been somewhat blurred by the tendency to incorporate every possible reform goal into the eight standards and 484 individual actions in the standards implementation plan, which categorizes each standard under the Four Pillars, each expressed in an institutional form. However, the basic principle was clear; unless Kosovo is multiethnic, it cannot aspire to independence.554 Despite the diplomatic character of the "standards before status" maneuver555, the question of ambivalent interrelatedness between state-building and development processes, visualized through "standards before status" challenged me. That is why I found Kosovo as the perfect example to expose this interrelatedness and decided to examine it profoundly and in a scientific manner, without falling into a "chicken or egg" debate. Indeed, as mentioned previously, after UN Special Envoy Kai Eide approved the assessment of progress on democratic standards in Kosovo, final status negotiations on the future of Kosovo began in October, 2005.556 UN Resolution 1244 did not specify Kosovo’s future status. Hence, the IC as represented by the contact group identified some basic principles that it believed should guide the settlement of Kosovo’s final status. A return to the situation before March, 1999 was of course ruled out.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I am more than aware that Kosovo’s final status must enhance regional stability and contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans. It must be based on multi-ethnicity with full respect for human rights, and include the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return safely to their homes. Kosovo must offer effective constitutional guarantees to ensure the protection of minorities, and promote effective 553. They themselves needed a long time to reach where they are today, and each of them is far from perfect. 554. The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo's Serbs, European Stability Initiative Paper, Berlin/ Pristina, 7 June 2004 555. In fact, the Standards before Status approach has been criticized by several authors as a "cart before the horse" approach, see i.e Serwer, Daniel 2004, Kosovo: Status with Standards Essay for the 5 Years of Stability Pact commemorative event on 8 June 2004 in Portoroz (Slovenia). www.stabilitypact.org. 556. Eide, Kai, 2005, op.cit 150

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

mechanisms for fighting organized crime and terrorism, while the status must also include specific safeguards to protect cultural and religious heritage. Finally, political, economic, social, and cultural sustainability must be ensured.557 Presently, Kosovo is on the way to deciding its future status while trying to fulfill the standards imposed by the international community. The European Union has regularly voiced its concern with respect to fulfillment of EU standards which could be interpreted as a sign of possible future EU membership for Kosovo,558 because as a journalist puts it; the way forward for Kosovo is not nation-building or even state-building, but memberstate-building.559

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Hence, it is within the framework of such a scenario that the case study will be examined, concentrating on the availability and capacity of institutions in these four domains: political, economic, social, and cultural. Each will be examined separately in the coming sections.

557. Rasmussen, N, A. 2005, op.cit. p13 558. See Heritage.org available online at: www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm681.cfm and OSCE.ORG available online at : www.osce.org/item/15631.html. Accessed July, 2007 559. Timothy Garton Ash, Why Kosovo should become the 33rd member - and Serbia the 34th, After going through hell, the former Serbian province is in limbo. It needs independence now, and the EU later, February 15, 2007, in The Guardian. 151

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

3. Political Domain 3.1 Actors and Institutions 3.1.1 Local players and Settings: Voluntary socialization and Rationally legitimized institutions 3.1.1.1 Political parties and the political landscape in Kosovo In March, 2000, regulation 2000/16 for the registration, operation, and dissolution of political parties in Kosovo was issued by the OSCE in cooperation with UNMIK,560 resulting in the registration of numerous parties, and the formation of a multiparty system. From the first elections in 2000 until now (Dec. 2007), none of the parties has gained sole power, forcing them to work together to form coalition governments. Kosovo has had relatively little experience with democratic procedures, but considering that four elections have taken place in the last eight years, all certified as free and fair, the people now have a real say in who represents them. It was only in the last elections of November, 2007 that "open lists" were introduced, theoretically contributing to increased choice and making the elections even more representative.561 By the time this work is being written, Kosovo has 42 registered political parties,562 as well as many other citizen initiatives active at the municipal level. They represent the breadth of Kosovo’s many communities. Yet few parties have a defined political affiliation or programme. For some parties, their priorities may be deduced from their names, but their political profiles are not well defined. Many parties have been working to change this, and have begun to affiliate with other established political parties in Europe.563

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the following chapter I will concentrate on the six main parties in Kosovo as representative of the full spectrum of parties, and analyze their origins, main differences, and general characteristics based on the theoretical model of Lapalombara presented in chapter 1.3.1. Furthermore, based on the party leaders and their strategies for the future, I will examine future opportunities and challenges for the development of the political system in Kosovo. For the sake of clarity, the findings will be presented in a tabular form at the end of this unit.

560. UNMIK/REG/2000/16, 21 Mars 2000 561. Before this time OSCE had a "closed list" system, where people voted for parties rather than candidates. 562. See list of Political Parities at the end of this Study. 563. Wnendt Werner , Head of OSCE, Kosovo, On European Political Perspectives, held on Pristine 22 June 2007. 152

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

3.1.1.1.1 From political movements to "the non-violence party" The K-Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo became a mass movement only in the late 1980s. It included two streams, a largely illegal one composed of Enverist564 and Marxist-Leninist groups with no common leadership or platform, and a semi-legal Titoist group composed of intellectual and cultural organizations, institutions, and industrial management bodies. In early 1989, this second party included members of the state administration, the parliament, and the League of Communists. Their efforts to organize into an institutionalized national movement remained unsuccessful, and after Milosevic´s "anti-bureaucratic revolution" the two streams merged into a single front.565 Consequently, the K-Albanian political movement evolving from 1989 to 1999 was more an alternative to Serbian politics than a substantial political movement of its own. This movement consisted of 20 political parties grouped together as an opposition block. With none of them in power, they were more an opposition to the state of Serbia as a political category, rather than to Serb political parties as such.566

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The inability of this movement to impose itself as a political force in Kosovo stemmed from its outdated communist ideological basis. This was an obstacle for the older political leaders of the time, many of whom had been imprisoned for their beliefs. They perceived the new K-Albanian movement as strongly anti-communist.567 The movement developed and attained a mass character mainly during the period of deepening interethnic distance and conflict in the FRY. According to a political analyst in Kosovo, this movement coalesced more through a concurrence of fortuitous events, rather than on the basis of any definite plan. According to him, one of the reasons for this disorganization was the continual harassment and arrests by Serb police of the political elite and K-Albanian leaders. Although they existed as tiny groups, opposition was kept alive by intellectuals mainly within the framework of their associations,568 as was the case in other eastern European countries at the time. 564. Enverists follow the ideology of ex-Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha. 565. This event was precipitated by the arrest of Azem Vllasi, the Kosovo communist leader in 1989, which left the movement leaderless. See Shkelzen Maliqi, 1990, Nyja e Kosoves, as Vlassi as Milloshevici, (The Kosova Knot, Neither Vllasi nor Millosevic; Ljubjana, Krt, pp 253-264 566. Maliqi, Shkelzen, 1998, Kosova Separate Worlds: Reflections and Analysis, Dukagjini PH., MM Pristina, p16 567. Titoists and Enverists, although previously considered great patriots and passionate nationalists, were by 1990 simply considered "old communists" and seen as followers of an ideology that had lost its prestige and credibility in the late 1980s. (See Maliqi, 1998, pp22) 568. Here I refer to the associations of writers, philosophers, sociologists, etc Although these associations (especially the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosov (APHSK) ) played an active early role, where they emerged as equal partners of other parties, as initiators of several petitions, declarations and announcements of political character, they decided to withdraw from the political scene as soon as it became properly organized. Its individual members remained active in various parties and party leadership, especially the SocialDemocratic party and the Democratic League of Kosovo parties. 153

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Thus in April, 1988, after unsuccessful negotiations with Serb political entities, some K-Albanian writers openly published a draft of a K-Albanian national program and found themselves promoted overnight to the status of prominent leaders in the mobilization of national forces. A resilient and increasingly sophisticated political culture has been developing among K-Albanians since 1989. Its roots were to be found not so much in the old political class of functionaries from the Titoist system, but rather in the intellectual circles that developed around the University of Pristina in the late 80s. Malcolm´s book confirms the previous statement of Maliqi, naming two organizations that played a key role in that field; The Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo, and the Association of Writers of Kosovo.569 Since the draft presentation, Ibrahim Rugova, who was president of the association at the time, became the central figure of the resistance for K-Albanians, and his interviews with the international and domestic press finally gave the K-Albanian population the voice they were looking for.570

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

As the tide of democratization swept across Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire also had their effects in the Balkans. With an adversary like the Serb regime who displayed a totalitarian, nationalistic ideology and attitude, the K-Albanians were happy in return to rely on the eastern European model of democratic counter-action which had proved effective in the fight against totalitarianism.571 With preconditions for opposition activity already present in the last days of the FRY, political organizations in Kosovo were faced with a pluralism that had a national bent, facilitated by previous government policy. One of the important organizations in Kosovo at the time, the Pristina branch of the Union for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UYDI), clearly exposed this gap. Originally a Yugoslav-Wide organization, the UYDI ended up divided when they sought to create a multinational membership as only 2 K-Serbs joined, compared to hundreds of K-Albanians. The Kosova Alternative, made up completely of K-Albanians, was a product of this divide and was the organization that shattered the League of Communists, afterwards playing a crucial role on the Kosovo political scene. It initiated the founding of a number of smaller parties and political movements such as the Social Democrats, the Green Party, etc, and served as the organizer for several political actions in Kosovo during that period. The leader of this democratic organization was Veton Surroi, who is now the leader of one of the current main opposition parties in Kosovo, the ORA.572 During the following decade, the main party in Kosovo was the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), founded on 23 December, 1989 and considered the national party of K-Albanians. Its intention was to operate throughout the FRY, which was 569. Malcolm Noel, Kosovo a Short History, 1998, op.cit. pp347-348 570. Maliqi, 1998, p25 571. In this way the Gandhian response of peaceful resistance chosen by the K-Albanians proved to be at least a propaganda success for achieving sympathy and a sense of affinity with the Albanian Community abroad, as well as with the international democratic public opinion. 572. Maliqi 1998, op.cit. p30 154

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

soon abandoned after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. According to the institutional theory of party formation by Lapolombara, et al, the LDK was formed on the national/ethnic model and was an externally created party of the nationalistic and ethnic movements type, which challenged the ruling elite in Kosovo in an institutional way.573 Now the LDK has almost 17 years of existence behind it and is the oldest party in Kosovo. It includes 36 branches in Kosovo, covering the entire territory and having four branches in the USA, Germany, Switzerland, and Norway, where many Diaspora K-Albanians live.574 Since its beginning, the LDK had a large membership draw based on the discontent of K-Albanians with the old regime, as well as the charisma of its leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. The goal of the LDK was to create a broad pan-Albanian front in which all groups in the population would find a place including women, youths, and children, an idea based primarily on the model of the old Socialist Alliance. Its intention was to fill the void left by the disintegration of the old Communist League and create a socialist alliance at the local level. Their main strategic issue has always been the final status of Kosovo.575 During its first months of existence, the LDK evolved into a power center with real authority in Kosovo. It took control of the K-Albanian bloc in parliament, as well as of the government, by dominating most of the K-Albanian political landscape, and became the main competitor of the Belgrade regime for the control of Kosovo autonomous institutions. This competition ended with the abolishment of Kosovo´s autonomy in June, 1990 by an act of the Serbian Parliament. One effect of this abolishment was a blossoming of K-Albanian political parties as an articulation of the feeling that it was time to show that K-Albanians had made the transition to a new system and were moving toward pluralism and democracy. Most of these parties did not survive as such, but many of their leaders created new parties that are still active today in the political scene of Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

At the time, the LDK considered itself as the legitimate heir of the old authorities in Kosovo, and as the only party truly representative of the national interest. As such it concentrated on fighting internal political rivals within Kosovo, instead of taking on the real political adversary, the Serb authorities. This tendency became especially clear after the LDK´s´refusal of smaller, energetic political parties, and these groups' proposal to establish a common political platform; "First Democracy, then the status of Kosova". The LDK branded this proposal a kind of national betrayal, with the argument that "political tea-parties" in Kosovo were trying to "trade the cause of Kosovo´s independence for a dubious democracy".576 It became clear then that the K-Albanian political organizations of the time were not genuine political parties, but

573. See the chapter 1.3.1 on Political Development and Political Parties in this Study. 574. See also website of the LDK Party http://www.ldk-kosova.eu/ldk/ 575. The call has evolved from "full" or "real autonomy" in the beginning to a "sovereign and independent state" in the end. See Maliqi 1998. p31 576. Their slogan was "Free election, yes, but in a free kosovo" See Maliqi 1998, p34. 155

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

merely pluralized elements of a national liberation movement, whose overriding goal was the establishment of an independent Kosovo. 3.1.1.1.2 The opposition of the opposition: "the war parties" The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a response to the LDK's "do-nothing" lethargic and almost hegemonic attitude during the political turmoil of the lost decade (1989-1999) in Kosovo. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), had as its leader the former head of the KLA, Hashim Thaci. It inherited the political structures of the former KLA, and thus was its political successor. The party was formed in December, 1999 and after eight years it remains a regional party, although it officially covers almost the whole of Kosovo with 32 branches.577 The beginnings of the PDK can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s when Tito's Yugoslavia began emancipating Kosovo's Albanians after decades of Serb domination and tight police control. Although many of the Albanians accepted the new opportunities, some of them, especially in Pristina's new University, still considered rebellion and secession the only worthwhile goals. The 1981 riots were a watershed, marking a sharp divergence between the K-Albanian society's "official" and "underground" streams. Throughout the next decade, K-Albanians defied the police and the prosecutors and courts arrested, tried, and imprisoned thousands of young activists. Many of these, driven by a romantic and deluded attachment to Enver Hoxha's Albania, fled abroad into exile and set up the LPK578 in 1982, with help from the Albanian secret service.579 Within Kosovo in 1990, under pressure from Milosevic's crackdown and annulment of autonomy, the official and underground streams reunited as the new LDK. Communist party cadres provided the organisational backbone, while significant numbers of former political prisoners joined them. At this time LDK branches sprouted throughout the diaspora, immediately surpassing the tiny LPK, which was viewed by some at the time as a "lunatic fringe".580

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Despite a temporary union of the PDK with the LDK in early 1998, the PDK began to act autonomously. While former political prisoners were leaving the LDK en masse, the KLA benefitted by causing further LDK defections, providing the LPK with political and financial leverage. The Rambouillet diplomatic conference intensified the cracks between rival K-Albanian blocs, and after the war was over and NATO had arrived in Kosovo in the summer of 1999, the KLA formed a provisional central government, displaced the LDK in all municipalities, and appointed directors to the most important economic enterprises. Its "self-elected" "prime minister",

577. See the website of the PDK Party http://www.pdk-ks.org/site/?id=1,0,0,1,a Accesed 07/ 2007. 578. LPK is the Popular Movement of Kosovo, the radical Kosovo Albanian exile organisation instrumental in founding the KLA, which is now a small, radical successor party led by Emrush Xhemajli. 579. International Crisis Group Europe Report N°163, 26 May 2005 Kosovo after Haradinaj, p 20 580. See Judah, Tim 2000. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. for a full account of the schism in Kosovo Albanian society and the LDK and LPK's leapfrogging of one another in attracting diaspora support. 156

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Hashim Thaci, then formed the PDK to contest the first municipal elections in 2000 after realizing that he would be punished by the voters in the first elections as a PDK party for the KLA's postwar arrogance.581 At this time Ramush Haradinaj, the former commander of the KLA, opted to set up his own party named AAK rather than join the PDK. Before focusing on the AAK as a party, it is important to shed light on the connection between the PDK, LPK, and KLA, which has been questioned in a report of the International Crisis Group (ICG), giving relevant insight into the KLA and its followers. According to this report, it was not clear to what extent the KLA was a property of the LPK circle which began organizing from abroad in 1993, dominating the rather remote KLA "general headquarters", and controlling the "Homeland Calling" fighting fund into which the K-Albanian diaspora paid millions of dollars in 1998 and 1999. According to ICG reports, the radical LPK intended to use the KLA to overthrow both the Serbian regime and the more moderate LDK. It seems that once in the field, the KLA developed multiple faces, with local and regional commanders as well as village militias operating independently of the "general headquarters" and each other. Even the aforementioned FARK forces assembled by the LDK's prime minister-inexile, Bujar Bukoshi, wore KLA insignia in the latter stages of the war. Anybody who wanted to could declare themselves members of the KLA. For many people, the KLA was simply a tool for liberation, to be retired after the war. Consequently, although today many veterans, invalids, and families of fallen KLA members support the PDK, they increasingly regard themselves and their respective associations "emerged from war" as primary stakeholders in the liberation army and "war values", rather than in current parties and politicians.582

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

On the other hand the AAK,583 while also derived from the KLA, had its main support from KLA circles in Dukagini's three northernmost municipalities, where its leader Ramush Haradinaj584 did not establish it as an explicitly KLA party. This was clear in the voting behavior of many former KLA fighters and young men in Decan, who voted for other parties such as the LDK in the October, 2004 elections, while 581. See International Crisis Group, Europe Report N°88, What Happened to the KLA?, 3 March 2000, and Europe Report N°97, Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?, 7 July 2000. 582. International Crisis Group, May 2005, op.cit. p19 583. The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, in Albanian: Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës 584. In the legislative elections of 24 October, 2004, the AAK won 8.4 % of the popular vote and 9 out of 120 seats in the Assembly of Kosovo, which made it the third largest political force. An alliance was originally formed by 5 parties, the: 1) Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (Partia Parlamentare e Kosovës), created originally by Veton Surroi, now head of ORA, 2) Civic Alliance of Kosovo (Aleanca Qytetare e Kosovës), 3) National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës), 4) Party of Albanian National Union (Partia e Unitetit Kombëtar Shqiptar) and finally 5) Albanian Union of Christian Democrats (Unioni Shqiptare Demo-Kristiane), but the third and the fourth left soon after the first election. The current president of the party is Ramush Haradinaj, who was the Prime Minister of Kosovo from December 2004 to March 2005. 157

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

still retaining an intense loyalty to Haradinaj as their "commander," and remaining ready to respond to his call for intervention.585 In fact, one of Haradinaj's intentions in creating the AAK in 2000 was to bridge the divide in K-Albanian society between LDK and PDK party followers.586 Initially mistaken by the PDK as a "sister party", the AAK followed a separate course from early on, as indicated by the inclusion of Mahmut Bakalli, chief of the Kosovo provincial Communist party in the 1970s, in its upper ranks. Haradinaj's decision to form his own party, rather than join the PDK and subordinate himself and the Dukagjini region to Thaci and the PDK had roots in both his independence as the KLA's Dukagjini commander, and his dissatisfaction with the paucity of Dukagjini representation, first in the KLA "general headquarters" and later in Thaci's provisional government. Originally, the AAK party had been established as an umbrella organization for smaller parties, including more radical and doctrinaire ones such as the LPK, LKCK587 and UNIKOMB.588 The latter had left the coalition by 2002, after disagreeing with Haradinaj over his lack of ideological baggage. The remaining parties such as the Alliance of Citizens of Kosovo (AQK), and the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), were building blocks of the AAK, which converted from a coalition of parties to a party in its own right at a party convention held in June, 2002.589

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

From the theoretical perspective, the PDK party's creation may be best explained by the institutional theories on the origins of political parties presented by Lapalombara et al, as an externally created party originating from nationalistic movements challenging the ruling group. The AAK's formation is better explained by historical crisis theories, concretely the participation theory, as originating from rejection of the existing authority (the LDK and PDK in this case), and creating a new party (coalition) to gain a share in the control in the future state apparatus. So, the AAK origins point to the creation of a new party aiming to overcome the postwar PDK-LDK divide by offering an alternative and getting their share of control in the future state apparatus.590

585. Author´s interview with Political Analyst at ICG Kosovo, November 17, 2006, Pristina, Kosovo 586. K-Albanian author Migjen Kelmendi goes so far as to say that immediately after the war, tensions were so high that Kosovo-Albanians were saved from the full consequences of a deep rift only by the International presence. See Kelmendi, December 2002-July 2003, Bosnia Report, at http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/ 587. The LKCK is a small radical party with branches in 11 Kosovo municipalities. It means literally the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo. Today it has almost no political power. 588. UNIKOMB is a small Kosovo Albanian political party that advocates the unification of all Albanian lands,with branches in 10 municipalities but almost no political power. 589. International Crisis Group, May 2005 , op.cit. p21 590. See Chapter 3 in this study. 158

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

3.1.1.1.3 The postwar and modernization Parties Kosovo´s political landscape in the postwar period is characterized by a plethora of new parties. According to the OSCE political parties register, there are 42 parties officially registered in Kosovo, including K-Serb parties that have until recently refused to take part in the election process, apart from minor exceptions.591 Based on the political parties preference poll performed by the Kosova Index Institute, three main parties will be considered here. Besides the LDK, PDK, and AAK considered above, I will focus on the ORA, LDD, and AKR parties. The ORA party is relatively new on the Kosovo political landscape, but ranked third in the 2004 elections. Bexhet Pacolli’s new AKR (Alliance New Kosovo) party was ranked third in the 2007 elections. The Democratic League of Dardania (LDD) followed in the wake of the dissolved LDK. The appearance of these new parties divided the political scene more than ever before.592 The expressed voting intentions presented in Figure 12 make the political fragmentation in the country clear.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 12: Political parties preferences in Kosovo, 2007 (Source: Kosova Index 2007 Online)

The ORA party, (in english "the hour"), stands for an independent, free, and democratic Kosovo.593 It was founded as the Civil List ORA594 in summer, 2004 by Veton Surroi, a K-Albanian media tycoon. In the legislative elections of October, 2004, the party won 6.2 % of the popular vote and 7 of 120 seats in the Assembly of Kosovo, and it has been serving as a strong opposition since than. In the November, 2007

591. Political Party Registration Office also available online at http://kosovoelections.org/eng/pfdf/ partieslist.aspx 592. Kosova Index Publications, Current political affairs in Kosova, April 2007, See also their website http://www.indexkosova.com/Publications/Pub_April07.html 593. The name of the party is sometimes abbreviated to (RPO). 594. In albanian, Lista Qytetare ORA 159

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

elections though, they fell short of the 5% of the vote needed to enter parliament595. From the theoretical perspective presented by LaPalombara et al, on the origins of party formation, the ORA is a typical product of modernization. It was created as a result of the modernization process taking place in the country. Its leader Veton Surroi is an intellectual product of the modernized world,596 and as such has always been politically involved as a citizen. After the war, he became a media mogul serving as a voice critical of politics, and lately turned to politics himself in order to influence the political decision-making process. His followers are mainly urban, and ORA party is one of the few parties, if not the only one, that has given special relevance to social and gender issues in the country, compared to other parties who fail to look behind the status issue.597

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) party,598 on the other hand, is the new liberal democratic party. It was founded on March 17, 2006, by Behxhet Pacolli, owner of the Mabetex industrial group.599 The AKR first took part in parliamentary elections in November, 2007 and won 12.1% of the vote,600 a very high percentage for a party not even two years old. This can be explained by the successful business background of its founder, who provided the party with significant support in Kosovo. In an April, 2007 survey by BBSS Gallup International/Index Kosova,601 the AKR was rated the fourth largest political party in Kosovo with 8% support amongst those surveyed.602 From the theoretical perspective of party origins of LaPalombara et al, the AKR has all the classic characteristics of a modernization party, with its leader being a product of the modernization process and focusing on the economic modernization of the country. The party is mainly based in Pristina and has urban followers, but due to its focus on economic issues, it also appeals to that part of Kosovo population which is

595. According to the law of Kosovo, parties must have more than 5% to claim a seat in the Parliament. 596. Surroi's father, Rexhai Surroi, was one of the very few Albanians to become ambassadors of the former Yugoslavia. His father was the Yugoslav ambassador to Spain and a number of Latin American countries. As a result, Surroi spent part of his life and was educated in the Spanish-speaking world. Surroi has a degree from the National Autonomous University of Mexico and speaks several languages. See wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Veton_Surroi 597. Interview with politician of ORA party, 8 November 2006 598. In albanian, Aleanca Kosova e Re, AKR 599. The Mabetex Group, founded in 1990, is the mother company of Mabetex and other companies founded and owned by Behgjet Pacolli. Its headquarters are located in Lugano, Switzerland. The company has offices around the world and specializes in construction and the renovation of large buildings. The Mabetex Group has had many projects in Russia and other former Soviet-republics.For more info see the website http://www.mabetex.com/ 600. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network,( BIRN) Life in Kosovo Debates Election Results. The Life in Kosovo TV debate a cooperative project between Kosovo public television, RTK, and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN, 22 November 2007 601. This survey showed the AKR lagging behind the LDK (26%), PDK (17%), and AAK (9%). 602. Kosova Index Publications 2007, 1-7 March 2007, op.cit. 160

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

in desperate need of overcoming the economic underdevelopment where they are currently situated603. The Democratic League of Dardania, (LDD)604 is a very new party, registered in April, 2007, by the former Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo, Nexhat Daci. It was the newest party to take part in the November, 2007 elections, receiving 10.4% of the vote. After the death of Ibrahim Rugova, and after failing to become the new leader of the LDK, Daci created his own new party, maintaining as a legacy the political philosophy of Rugova. He promised to follow these principles in the party program. The LDD had seven seats in the Assembly of Kosovo in 2007, following their defection from the Democratic League of Kosovo605. They currently have 24 branches in Kosovo and 13 branches elsewhere, but are mainly active in the capital and the main cities, with mainly urban followers. The LDD is a product of the political modernization process in Kosovo itself, being an internally created party in the line with institutional theories, created from local parliamentary groups operating in the political scene in Kosovo as a result of initiative exercised by those already in power and holding national public office. This is true of its current leader, the former president of the Kosovo Assembly.606 3.1.1.1.4 The challenge of participation: the "refusal" parties Finally, I will consider the main minority parties in Kosovo, focusing on the KSerb parties. Most of them though do not play a crucial role in the government of Kosovo, either because of their size and geographic spread or because, as is often the case with the Serb minority parties, they refuse to take part in Kosovo´s state-building. This refusal may be an internal decision of the party, or a directive from the Belgrade government, depending on the party and its leader. The government in Belgrade has frequently demanded that K-Serbs cut all the connections with Kosovo's institutions and government.607

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In broad terms, the rest of the Kosovo political scene is characterized by fractious parties of K-Albanians and K-Serbs, as well as a number of smaller parties representing other minorities in Kosovo. The K-Serb population is mostly represented by two large coalitions, the Serb National Council(SNV) and Serb National Assembly(SNA). The leading representatives of the Turkish population in Kosovo are the Turkish Democratic Union and the Turkish People’s Party. The Bosniak community is represented by the Party of Democratic Action, the Bosniac Party of Kosovo, and the Muslim Reform Party. The Roma community initially had the least obvious representation, with no parties at all. This may be explained with the diverse nature of the 603. See the AKR Party website for more information at http://www.akr-ks.info/ 604. In albanian, Lidhja Demokratike e Dardanisë 605. The party was initially named the Democratic League, but later Dardania, the ancient name for Kosovo, was added to avoid confusion with the Democratic League of Kosovo. 606. See the web site of LDD party, http://www.ldd-kosova.org/ 607. Author´s Interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, Pristina, 13 November. 161

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Roma population, such that no one party could represent the diverse interests of the constituent communities of Roma, Ashkaelia, and Egyptians. However in December, 1999 the Ashkaelia Democratic Party of Kosovo was established, with the stated aim of representation of the entire Roma population. This was followed by the Democratic Albanian Ashkali Party of Kosovo, and finally by the United Roma Party of Kosovo.608 The K-Serbs, on the other hand, who formed the Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) in 2004 have boycotted Kosovo's institutions and until recently have refused their seats in the Kosovo Assembly. Although there have been efforts from all sides to create new K-Serb parties609 interested in sharing power with Kosovo institutions, the situation remains critical. The last K-Serb party created, "New Democracy", was founded by the Return and Communities Minister Branislav Grbic, who plans to focus on minority and social rights. Grbic was formerly a member of the Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo (SDSK), and took his ministerial post after the SDSK leader Petkovic resigned the office in 2006 due to pressure from the IC over corruption issues. Slavisa Petkovic was the head of the little-supported Civic Initiative Serbia, a self-proclaimed leader and the only K-Serb winner from the 2004 election to join the governing coalition at the time.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Grbic, on the other hand, enjoys great support from the IC in Kosovo, and tries to present his new party as an alternative to other K-serbs "refusal parties." In his speeches, he invites all who are interested in living together in a multiethnic Kosovo to support his New Democracy party and to contribute to peaceful coexistence between K-Serbs and K-Albanians. The New Democracy Party stresses the need to work on the refugee return process, and considering that its head is also the Minister for Returns and Communities, its efforts are focused on convincing K-Serbs that Kosovo will become a multiethnic state for everyone.610 But Grbic's New Democracy party is doing a lot of wishful thinking. In reality, most of the K-Serb parties are headquartered in the K-Serb enclaves and remain separated, with only sporadic interaction with K-Albanian parties. Oliver Ivanovic is the leader of the SLKM, based in the Northern part of Mitrovica. As a self-proclaimed leader, he and his party coalition have not participated in any elections so far. As a well-known K-Serb politician in Kosovo, he is also called a "political chameleon"611 for his ever-changing positions, and continual "flirting" with different local and international actors. From the theoretical perspective of Lapalombara et al, the parties' origins in almost all minority cases can be explained by the historical crisis theory. Most of them initially faced the participation crisis, and later some faced an integration crisis in Kosovo after the war. Their followers are generally from Serbian areas and Mitro608. OSCE Document, Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, 15.02.2000 pp9-10 609. See Kosovo Serbs get new political party, By Blerta Foniqi-Kabashi for Southeast European Times in Pristina 12 August 2007. 610. Ibid. 611. Author´s Interviews with several political experts in Kosovo, November 2006 162

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

vica, and are tightly limited along ethnic lines. The situation of K-Serb parties having almost only K-Serb followers, mainly people living in the enclaves, is especially extreme. The refusal of K-Serb political groupings to participate in Kosovo´s political life and in its state-building and development project is based on political and strategical interests initiated outside of Kosovo. I will discuss this issue later in chapter 3.2.1. 3.1.1.1.5 General trends and reflections on Kosovo Political Parties The best time to gauge political life in Kosovo, and the attitudes of political parties in general, is usually just before elections. I will begin with the first general elections of 17 November, 2001 and their political outcomes which lasted until March, 2002. This election was followed by a difficult crisis in the political landscape of Kosovo. The three winning parties, the LDK, PDK, and AAK, were initially unable to agree with each other to create a functional government. It was only with the help of the IC in Kosovo,612 and after the arrival of Michael Steiner as SRSG, that they managed to find a consensus and create the first government from the three main parties, with no effective opposition.613 This lack of opposition came at the cost of democracy and political development in Kosovo, but considering the temporary nature of the IC presence, and the fact that the priority of the IC in Kosovo has been maintaining security and the status quo more than democracy,614 this outcome seemed inevitable. Western diplomats in Kosovo at the time decided not to intervene after the first general elections, but to let Kosovo's politicians come to a consensus themselves. This of course did not happen. None of the parties had an absolute majority of the seats in parliament, and bilateral talks between the LDK and PDK, the largest parties, took place only with the mediation of UNMIK, without concrete results.615

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Western diplomats recognized the necessity of intervening to resolve the crisis before it got out of control. It was already clear at the beginning of the political process in Kosovo that a political culture of negotiating was almost absent. Surprisingly enough, one exception was the AAK, who although the youngest party, showed high flexibility and political skills in negotiations with the LDK and PDK.616 It took weeks 612. The International community in Kosovo at the time was made of official representatives of Germany, Great Britain , and the USA. Later on France and Italy also joined. 613. Zeri Newspaper, Special Edition, Political Secrets of Kosovo during 2001-2004, Pristina, Kosovo, 12 Oct. 2004 614. Author´s Interview with Elections Expert and Researcher, KIPRED, 27 October 2006 615. The LDK initially demanded all the main positions in the government, showing hegemonic characteristics, but was obliged to split power with the two other parties. The PDK maintained the same position as the LDK and agreed that a coalition was possible only between all three parties and after some time gave up their bid for the prime ministership. 616. Having had 8 deputies elected in the first parliamentary elections in 2001, the AAK managed two ministerial places in the government on 28 February, 2002. The ministries were the Environmental Ministry and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. See Zeri Newspaper, Special Edition, Political Secrets of Kosovo during 2001-2004, op.cit. 16 October 2004 163

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

of international cajoling to bring the three main K-Albanian parties to a coalition agreement following the 2001 election. On this occasion international representatives were intensively involved in the process of forming the government. The outcomes resulted in an all-party unity coalition of Kosovo's main political parties with Ibrahim Rugova of the LDK as president, Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK as prime minister, and Nexhat Daci of the LDK as president of the assembly.617 In the second parliamentary election, a coalition of the AAK and LDK was formed618. This coalition was the country's first experience of a government with a real parliamentary opposition. Neither the parties nor the electorate were really accustomed to it. Voter loyalties were rather firm and largely determined by patronage and clan and regional ties. Considering that voters will not necessarily punish bad government performance, neither the government nor the largest opposition party had clearly defined the boundaries and framework for their interaction and competition.619 While the LDK-AAK governing coalition was developing and consolidating, the opposition PDK feared that it would be locked out of power long enough for its party structure to erode, meaning a loss of resources and patronage.620 Thus, the political struggle at this period was not so much ideological or a continuation of the societal schism of the 1980s, but rather a contest for behind the scenes control of resources. The PDK's approach was to hold on to whatever it had against LDK encroachment. The PDK's fear was revealed as ungrounded, considering its victory in the third parliamentary elections of November, 2007.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The LDK, the largest party in Kosovo, has inherited the former Communist party's network and modus operandi, until lately lacking any impetus for a different model. Even in the early 1990s, when it was a mass movement including writers, academics, etc, it never acquired democratic instincts, argues one ICG report. Its newspapers have been far from liberal. The party's electoral support has held firm despite several waves of defections since the late 1990s, and the lack of internal reform. Its main agenda is based on habit, the value of continuity, initial electoral success, and the iconic immutability of its leader, Rugova. All of these helped to keep the LDK in place as a central, virtually immovable feature of the political landscape until Rugova's death in 2006. With a war won for it by the KLA and NATO, and having ended up "on the right side of history", the LDK has found itself in a rare position lacking real pressure for change from within or without. Until recently, it has been assessed

617. The Economist, Oct 10th 2007, Political forces, in the Economist Intelligence Unit, 618. In the legislative elections held on October 24, 2004, the LDK won 45.4% of the popular vote, or 47 out of 120 seats (seven of which have now defected to the Democratic League of Dardania, LDD). The LDK thus remained the leading party, while the PDK won 29% and the AAK 9%. "ORA", took 6%. in Political forces, The Economist, Oct 10th 2007, op.cit. 619. ICG, International Crisis Group Europe Report, N°163, Kosovo after Haradinaj, 26 May 2005, p12 620. This would mean lack of access to government funds and jobs, even in the public institutions where it had acquired varying degrees of influence after the war, such as the University of Pristina and the public broadcaster, RTK 164

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

as the least accessible of the K-Albanian parties by researchers and journalists, even shrugging off some donors' offers of technical assistance.621 This immutability changed slightly after the death of Rugova in 2006 when a branch of LDK split off and created a new party, the LDD. Further research is needed to identify the character trails of the remaining LDK and its changing dynamics in the face of the outside political pressures after 2007. Until the last election, the LDK generally shied away from leading the executive. It had preferred to let others to do the spadework, or play the fall guy, while consolidating the benefits for its own network.622 While in a coalition with the AAK after Haradinaj's departure to Hague, the balance of power within the government shifted markedly in the LDK's favor although the prime minister at the time was from the AAK.623 The party´s underdeveloped internal democracy, and Rugova's mix of inactivity and authoritarianism made it vulnerable to a gradual internal takeover. Its formal structures risked becoming an empty facade after Rugova´s death by masking control by the unaccountable circles close to him. In fact, its party statutes do not stipulate secret balloting for party posts. Nominees for bodies such as the general committee tend to be determined by the leadership and are confirmed by acclamation, without open competition in party branches. Furthermore, the LDK appears to convene its general assembly only to satisfy UNMIK regulations. There have been two LDK general assembly meetings to date, one in 2002, and the other in June, 2004, just inside UNMIK's time limit. The voting for key party posts was again done by acclamation.624 Until his death, Rugova and his image played a huge role in molding the LDK party's presence. The preservation of his sphinx-like persona, and a strongly developed sense for inter-party positioning caused Rugova to gradually adopted a rigid, remote, and indolent "do nothing" style for himself and his party from the mid-1990s. He rarely left his gated residence, which was guarded until April, 2005 by a bloated parallel security structure rather than the Kosovo police. His character, and that of people close to him, shaped the party in such a way that any change in the party would have been called a treachery.625

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The LDK's internal environment however, eventually became gradually rougher. It is no longer a unified national movement, as became clear last year when the LDD split off from the LDK. The LDK has been intellectually hollowed out by defections

621. This inaccessibility of LDK was clear during interviews with LDK representatives by the author. 622. According to the ICG report, the LDK also allowed the opposition to take a leading role on the final status question, after an offer that President Rugova made to Hashim Thaci in March, 2005 with the condition that if it went wrong, the LDK would not have to take the blame. 623. The PM of Kosovo after Haradinaj´s departure was Bajram Kosumi. 624. ICG Report May 2005, op.cit. p15-16 625. Ibid. 165

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

and has fewer figures willing to maintain relations with other political parties, a bridging role that its late vice president Fehmi Agani used to play. Its affiliated newspaper "Bota Sot" until recently mounted vitriolic campaigns against party dissidents, defectors, and "political foes". A victim of its attentions attested the limits of party debate, "It will be very difficult for the LDK to change, because once you think differently…they treat you as an enemy".626 In fact, a recent analysis suggests "..from its birth, the LDK demonstrated stark authoritarian tendencies….dissenting and even questioning voices were always pushed to the side."627 During the 1990s, the LDK presidency never convened the parliament elected in K-Albanian underground elections, preferring to retain a political monopoly and limit debate. The LDK's control of the Kosovo Assembly during 2004 demonstrated similar characteristics by meeting in plenary session only after long intervals. This showed a possessive attitude by the LDK toward democratic institutions. Finally, after the death of Ibrahim Rugova in January, 2006, the LDK has faced a testing time. Mr Rugova's personal authority had kept the factionalism that was rife within the LDK in check. In December, 2006 Kosovo's new president Fatmir Sejdiu defeated Nexhat Daci, the former president of the parliament, in the LDK's long-delayed leadership election. However, the bitter and divisive nature of the contest underlined the deep factionalism within the LDK. Mr Daci and a handful of LDK members of parliament (MPs) formed the LDD party in January, 2007, thereby reducing the LDK's strength in parliament.628

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The PDK party, on the other hand, is the clear political successor to the KLA. It has wedded itself to the Drenica region, where its leaders Thaci and Krasniqi come from,629 and is popular with younger voters, as is the AAK, its "sister party". The PDK has been described by ICG reports as "Janus-faced: at its best, catering simultaneously to various constituencies in its bid to displace the LDK as Kosovo's leading political force; at its worst, its political development is hobbled by the need to balance incompatible interests and directions".630 Party leader Hashim Thaci's drive to make anti-corruption a key political theme in early 2004 fell flat due to widespread public perception that PDK ministers themselves were "not angels".631

626. According to an interview by the author with an International Crisis Group employee in Kosovo, assassinations of LDK officials from 1999 to 2002 created fear among party members. Almost all of them went unsolved but were generally attributed to the KLA and its successors without relying on empirical facts. 627. Paul Hockenos, 2003, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, Ithaca/ London, p. 230. 628. The Economist, Oct 10th 2007, op.cit 629. The link-up of LPK exiles with Drenica's kacak tradition of armed resistance produced the beginnings of the KLA and the celebrated last stand and death of Adem Jashari, killed by serbs along with dozens of his extended family members at Prekaz village in March, 1998, giving rise to a national cult over which the PDK has exercised semi-ownership. 630. ICG Report N°163, Kosovo after Haradinaj, 2005 op.cit, p17 631. ICG Report N°163, op.cit.ibid. 166

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Compared to other parties in Kosovo where Rugova, Haradinaj, and Surroi tower over their respective parties, Thaci has had to share the aura of the PDK as first among other grandees, such as in the first election, with the prime minister Bajram Rexhepi.632 Finding itself in opposition after several months, the PDK failed to carry out its declared intention to form a shadow cabinet. Instead, its energies were focused upon a campaign of accusations against government members of involvement in organized crime, terrorism, and murder, thus escalating political tension and security worries. This contributed to a loss of opportunities to build alliances within civil society, such as a campaign to amend broadcasting legislation that the PDK feared would pave the way for government control of broadcasting. Here, for example, the party stopped short of engaging the public, limiting itself to an appeal to UNMIK and giving the ORA party the opportunity to take the lead on this issue.633 The PDK party seems easily diverted from the long-term necessity of building its own support base and credibility. Under Thaci's guidance and his cautious statesmanlike stances on a range of issues over the last several years, as well as his long-term preference that the PDK develop as a social democratic party, the PDK managed to approach respected academics in Kosovo and raise the prospect of party reform.634 However, initiatives associated with this orientation remain stillborn. According to information received in interviews, it seems that only some senior figures do consistent work at party headquarters, with others turning up only when the possibility of a return to the government coalition is in the air.635 This leaves the party with a deficit of attention to detail in its work, creating a challenge for the party´s future and its electorate, especially considering that in the cities where the LDK's majority is vulnerable, no discernible PDK mobilization is occurring.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The third party to be considered here is the AAK and its leader Haradinaj, who was for a time the prime minister of Kosovo. According to ICG reports he is one of the "most powerful men in Kosovo", and remains so even today, despite an indictment from the ICYI in the Hague.636 Haradinaj created his own party in order to bridge the political gap between the PDK and the LDK by providing a political alternative that was missing at the time. His critique was oriented toward the PDK’s claim to sole legitimacy over the KLA legacy, as well as against the polarization of

632. A survey of (women's) voting behaviour published by the Kosovar Gender Studies Centre on 23 May, 2005 indicated that while roughly 60 per cent of LDK and AAK votes are attributable to the appeal of their party leaders, only around 40% of the PDK vote is attributable to Thaci. See "How Do Women in Kosova Vote?", available at www.kgscenter.org 633. ICG Report N°163, op.cit. p18 634. Enver Hoxhaj, also a University professor at the Pristina University for example joined the party PDK in 2004. 635. Author's interview with different political analysts in Kosovo. November, 2006. 636. According to the interview with ICG employee in Pristina, Kosovo on 17 November, 2006, "when the situation gets out of control it is actually Haradinaj and his associates, the ones who are able to calm down the masses and manage to be heard by them" 167

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

K-Albanian politics trapped in the PDK vs. LDK divide.637 Haradinaj's energy and authority held his party together and compensated for its lack of internal cohesion. Of the main Kosovo political parties, it has been the most rigorous about internal democracy. While much of its support derived from Haradinaj's Dukagjini KLA constituency, half of its leading politicians, including ex-prime Minister Kosumi, are from other parts of Kosovo or were not in the KLA. Until now, no natural successor to Haradinaj has appeared, and the party branches have weakened after Haradinaj's indictment by the Hague.638 In the beginning of his government, Haradinaj's assumption of the prime minister's chair attracted intellectuals into the party's orbit, but after his indictment this has practically stopped.639 Broadly speaking, the three largest K-Albanian political parties, the LDK, PDK, and AAK, strongly resemble each other. They all function in a top-down hierarchy, each carrying an overly large party branch structure that, due to the closed list election system, is partially insulated from local electoral outcomes, and is dependent upon the Pristina leadership for patronage and representation on the party list. Each of the newer parties has put up structures to match the LDK, which until the split of LDD, was the only real "national" K-Albanian party. Both the PDK and AAK are virtual regional parties in this respect. Each of these parties strives to possess as much as possible of the fixed "cake" of government, which is still largely shaped on the old communist model.640 The PDK and AAK are more popular with younger voters, and are particularly strong in their leaders' regional power bases. This is especially the case with the AAK in the Dukagjin region of western Kosovo, where Haradinaj was a KLA commander during the war.641

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Politics and leadership in Kosovo are mainly divided along ethnic lines and dominated by one single issue, the territory’s future status. All K-Albanian parties are committed to ensuring Kosovo’s complete severance from Yugoslavia. As one K-Albanian leader observed, "it remains the ultimate objective. There are many reasons why one chooses to enter politics but behind them all there is this one...Kosovo´s parties future is being dominated by the status issue, impeding the development of other important issues."642

637. ICG Balkans Report No. 88, What Happened to the KLA? 3 March 2000 p.10 638. Haradinaj resigned 8 March, 2005 after long-anticipated indictment by the ICTY; he turned himself in and was released on pre-trial bail in June, 2005. The expected violent reaction to his indictment failed to materialize; only a few non-fatal incidents occurred. Bajram Kosumi, deputy AAK leader, replaced Haradinaj. 639. ICG Report, N°163, op.cit. p11 640. Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) interview on 23, March 2005 with the former PDK official Bekim Collaku. Arguing against the retention of the narrow LDK-AAK coalition, he states: "the desire of the two coalition parties to grab most of the national 'cake' for themselves". "Kosovo leaders risk damaging EU hopes", available at www.iwpr.net. accessed October 2006. 641. The Economist, Oct 7th 2007, Political forces. op cit. 642. Author´s interview with Political analyst in Pristina, Kosovo, 2 November 2006. 168

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

In contrast, many K-Serb leaders are vehemently opposed to territorial separation or independence. Other minorities within the province are also represented by discrete, ethnically-centred parties and "all or nothing" goals that are aimed at their own ethnic preservation, as opposed to the preservation of the nation at large. The former leadership among the K-Serb population appears to have been personified by Slobodan Milosevic until the arrival of UNMIK, which produced a new cadre of leaders. Slowly trying to distance themselves from past leadership traditions, they emphasize the rights of a community that has become a net minority since Kosovo’s division from Serbia.643 From the theoretical perspective of Kalevi, the three main K-Albanian parties base their legitimacy on task achievement. They are as a rule validated through success in achieving a political or military endeavor, as in the case of the LDK for political (civil resistance), and in the case of the AAK and PDK for military endeavors, as well as the task of leadership during liberation movements.644 These parties' leadership dates from the pre-war period of the 1990s and remains as of yet unchallenged by the lower ranks, no matter what their performance over the last eight years has been. According to a politician´s opinion, the lack of experience of K-Albanian political leaders has cost the democratic development of Kosovo dearly. According to him, when the IC came to Kosovo, none of the political leaders active at the time took the initiative to coordinate a local response and present themselves as the leadership with a clear platform of what they thought was the best for Kosovo. According to him, "Rugova and Thaci were too busy fighting each other to present such a platform."645 This statement reiterates once again the lack of political experience of the K-Albanian political parties. Since then, according to the ICG, UNMIK and the OSCE have not pressed the political parties hard enough to develop internal democracy and transparent mechanisms and procedures. Furthermore, the weakness of UNMIK's approach has allowed the leadership elites to retain their monopoly. With Kosovo's unresolved final status, the parties' evolution has been put on hold, and none of them have developed a distinct policy profile and strategic development plan for their parties and Kosovo.646

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The "closed list" election system reinforced hierarchical and hermetic party structures, helping lock the leaders who had emerged from the war period into power, and dull the potential for evolution. As Horowitz puts it, "Nationalist list systems PR (proportional), repose great powers in party leaders to decide which candidates will have favorable positions on the parties' lists and thus have better chances of being

643. Gordon. Peake, C. Gormley-Heenan, Mari Fitzduff. From warlords to peacelords. INCORE Report, p38 644. See Holsti Kalevi on Legitimacy on Chapter 1.1.5 645. Author´s Interview with LDK Politician, Pristina 31, october 2006 646. Xhavit Haliti, PDK grandee, after being challenged at a seminar in 2005 to develop policies as the product his party must sell itself with, replied: "You ask too much of us. We just produce MPs". ICG Europe Report. op.cit p13 169

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

elected. When central party leaders have such power the sovereignty of the voter to chose the candidate rather than just to chose among the candidates, is thought to be impaired."647 Thus the "closed lists" have contributed so far648 to a fairly rigid, hierarchical model of Kosovo political parties, that can be illustrated by a member of parliament´s words, "if you want to become an MP, you need to be loyal to the central leadership."649 Furthermore, such a system reinforces party dependence on its leader figure, as in the 2002 elections where 71.5 % of the voters were happier with the party leader than with the party platform and the candidate list for the assembly, despite disagreement over their performance.650 So, instead of developing and sustaining the evolution of a shared national identity and security community, the parties have "planted themselves like rival trees striving for the light, with leaves and branches as their public faces and their mutual exclusivity reinforced by separate large root structures of rival intelligence, underworld, and criminal networks to feed and be fed by".651

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The role of the OSCE has been quite passive in this respect. It seems to lack a strategy for Kosovo's democratization in general, and has refused to intervene to optimize the electoral system, calling it a decision for Kosovo to make for itself.652A strong campaign mounted by Kosovo NGOs in 2004 for a change in the electoral system attracted much sympathy from parts of the international presence in Kosovo, but was brushed aside by the OSCE pillar and SRSG Holkeri.653 When questioned as to the purpose of elections, officials from UNMIK presented a raft of different and sometimes inconsistent answers. For the most part, however, officials used the language of democracy to justify ends based on a concern for security.654 According to the OSCE, if internal party democracy is guaranteed, any need for open election lists becomes redundant. This is a questionable conclusion based on a questionable

647. Horowitz, Donald, L. 2003 January, Electoral systems and their goals: a primer for decsionmakers. in Journal of Democracy Vol. 14, Nr.4 p 121 648. The last elections were made with the open lists system. 649. KIPRED, 2005 June, Reforming the electoral system of Kosova, Discussion Paper, 2nd edition, Pristina p29 650. Ibid p9 651. See Chapter 3.3 on the security party links in Kosovo. 652. According to their information this is an abdication of UNMIK's responsibility under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Recent literature on democratization in state-building contexts emphasises the need for intrusive outside intervention, and the creation of a wave of enabling structures, to set democratic institutions on a sustainable and peaceful path. See Roland Paris, 2004, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge. and Jack Snyder, 2000 From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict, New York, London. Kosovo intellectuals voiced the need for such an approach in late 1999. See Crisis Group Europe Report N°83, Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over, 13 December 1999, pp. 9-12. 653. ICG Report 2005, op.cit.p14 654. Chesterman, Simon. 2005, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p78 170

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

premise, especially after the OSCE has failed to take vigorous action to guarantee internal party democracy.655 As for their behavior in regards to gender equality, almost all of the parties interviewed by the author, except for the ORA, consider gender as an issue best "left to the women (Forum)" in the party, which hints at its secondary relevance for them. That these women almost never make it into leading decision-making structures of the party or government, and when they do it is only in a clear minority, seems to be of little relevance for Kosovo´s "mannerbundischen" political elite.656 From the institutional and legal perspective, following a decision by the Central Elections Commission in 2002 all political parties in Kosovo are obliged to have women represented as one third of candidates in their election lists. As a result, 33% of the members of parliament in the Assembly of Kosovo are now women, a great success indeed.657 But, although the legal framework is relatively democratic, the mentality of the political elite is not.658 The ORA party on the other hand, differentiates itself from all other parties in Kosovo. This difference is visible not only institutionally, but also in the political mentality of the party. Asked about their priorities, a party official mentioned three, including gender equality. The institutional form of this difference consists in the ORA party´s refusal to have a separate women's forum as other parties do. The interviewed ORA party official stated that, "...such structures were useful for the older parties as they were bringing women into politics, but nowadays we deem that such structures are outdated and do not serve the purpose of gender equality in society and politics. On the contrary, they now serve as a political ritual which pretends to have women incorporated de jure in their structures, but when it comes to decisionmaking, these women remain de facto excluded. So, the party´s leading positions remain reserved only for men."659

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The ORA party has decided to have gender quotas instead of a women's forum. The quotas consist of a minimum of 30% representation for each gender in all structures and organs of the party. Moreover, one of the three institutionally elected leaders of the ORA must be of the opposite gender. This structure is valid at the local levels and in all other instances of the party. The quotas refer to gender and not

655. Author´s Interview with Elections Expert and Researcher, Pristina, Kosovo. 27 October 2006. 656. Cp. Kresiky Eva, H. Das Gechlecht politischer Institutionen: Ergebnise einer historischen und aktuellen Spurensuche zu einer politischen Theorie des "Männerbündischen" in Kramer Hg.1995, Politische Theorien und Ideengeschichte im Gespräch. WUV-Univ.Verl. 657. For example, the percentage representation of women in the Kosovo Assembly is higher than that of women in the parliaments of the United Kingdom, the USA, France, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, The Czech Republic, Poland, Greece, Slovenia, and the Russian Federation. It is certainly higher than that of all other countries in the region of SEE. in Welcome to Kosova, Part two, p4 658. Author´s Interview with Gender Expert, UNIFEM in Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo. 6 November 2006. 659. Author´s Interview with ORA Party official, Pristina, 8 November, 2006. 171

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

necessarily only to women, thus they are genuine gender quotas. This gender priority has resulted in the board of the "Digital ORA" commission, (a kind of youth forum of the party) having 53% women members. According to the interview with the ORA Party official, except for one case, no men have been substituted by women simply to satisfy gender quota pressures, which means that the women in each of the ORA structures have received their positions because of their skills and capabilities and not solely due to quotas.660 This information exposes the real potential of women in Kosovo politics. What is needed is not only the correct structures and institutions, but also a real will to challenge them in order to facilitate the fair participation of women in decision-making processes. Moreover, the attitude of the ORA has contributed to women's empowerment not only in party politics, but also in politics in general. On the 12 commissions existing in Kosovo's political field, there are two women leaders, and one of these is a member of the ORA. Therefore, gender equality is considered a priority and it is taken seriously by the ORA, and does not merely serve as a placative for recommendations from the international community, as is generally the case in Kosovo.661 One of the newest variables presented by Lapalombara is the electoral base. The LDK, ORA, and LDD are faced with a largely urban electoral base. The AAK and PDK retain a rural electorate concentrated in the Dukagjin and Drenica regions, respectively. The more recent AKR is mainly based in the capital Pristina, but its electorate is quite mixed. The urban-rural divide remains deep in K-Albanian society, despite large postwar internal migrations.662 Before the November, 2007 elections, the actual political class of Kosovo faced a real crisis. The expressed voting intentions of respondents showed a drop in support for political parties that were in the Assembly, and increased support for the most recently formed parties such as the AKR.663 The immediate emergence of Behxhet Pacolli's party in voting preferences of the citizens of Kosovo was an indicator that citizens were looking for something new in the political scene. In this respect, citizens expected more employment opportunities, poverty reduction, and better living conditions from a political party formed by a businessman such as Pacolli.664

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the last election though, the PDK and its leader Hashim Thaçi got 35% of the vote. Afterwards the PDK and LDK agreed to form a government in December, 2007, whose key goal was to declare independence. The coalition, in which the LDK had 22% of the votes, occupies 62 of the 120 seats in Parliament. The rest of the par-

660. 661. 662. 663.

Author´s Interview with ORA Party official, op.cit Ibid. See Crisis Group Report, Collapse in Kosovo, op. cit., pp. 32-33. In a survey from November, 2007, respondents declared that if elections were held for the Kosova Assembly tomorrow, 34% would vote for the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), 15% for the Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK), 15% for the Alliance New Kosova (AKR), 7% for the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK) and 1% for the Reformist Party ORA. 664. Kosovo Index Publications, 2006, Kosovo In Crisis for Leaders and Institutions, op.cit. 172

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ties, the AAK, LDD, AKR, and ORA, will be in opposition while Kosovo’s Serb minority boycotted the elections, as expected.665 A great proportion of Kosovo's citizens protested their powerlessness against all parties by boycotting elections, at the same time remaining deprived of other means of legitimate political participation. These trends have not significantly influenced the actions of the major parties. In new and emerging democracies like Kosovo, the array of alternative means is very narrow. The lack until recently of serious options for constructively channeling citizens’ preferences into the decision-making process demands greater attention to the fundamental forms of political action. In fact, widespread electoral participation is essential as one of the most basic and important aspects of participatory decision-making in Kosovo. Thus, if distrust is growing along with a perception of powerlessness, corruption, and incompetence, Kosovo’s democracy is not headed in the right direction. Democracy certainly must be counted among the most important issues facing Kosovo in the near future. After all, it is one of the official key standards for membership in the EU. However, according to a KIPRED, "making cosmetic changes, without tackling the crux of political interaction" without adopting an open list-based electoral system will not bring Kosovar society far enough.666 With the open lists system introduced in last November's elections, the international community has repaired one of its greatest mistakes, and removed one of the main obstacles to democracy in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

As a matter of fact, democracy in Kosovo has had a very short life. Considering its history and circumstances over the last centuries, analyzing the democratic potential in Kosovo can be a depressing endeavor. Due to the conflicts that Kosovo has inherited, the ethnic divisions between K-Serbs and K-Albanians have been hardened by recent historic matters. The political structure in Kosovo has instituted ethnicity as the primary principle of political belonging, with the definition of political loyalties defined narrowly along ethnic lines, resulting in a a lack of swing votes that can be targeted by specific party programs.667 This leaves party affiliations to be based upon the leaders of the parties, or on sides that were chosen in wartime. There is little variation among the parties, and their programs and party affiliations simply follow as a rule ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic divisions. As exceptions there are the very new parties mentioned previously, who are bringing new themes of economic and social issues into the political agenda.668

665. World Briefing, Europe. 28.Dec. 2007 Kosovo: 2 Main Parties to Form Government, Agence France-Presse, 666. KIPRED, 2006, Voting Trends and Electoral Behaviour in Kosovo 2000 - 2004, Policy Paper Nr.6, p29 667. Pula Besnik, Co-governance 1999-2004, Much tutelage, less partnership, in Kosovo Five years later: What agenda for the future of Kosovo? Forum 2015, Published by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, p132 668. The AKR has the economy as the preferred topic in its party platform, while the ORA has the rule of law, the economy, and gender equality. Author's interviews with political party officials, Pristina. Oct-Nov.2006. 173

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The political culture, an important variable in the examination of the political development of parties, refers to the ability to play a fair and democratic political game by respecting its rules. All of Kosovo's political parties are at the very beginning when it comes to this aspect of political culture. To put it in the words of the ORA Party official: "all the parties in Kosovo are younger than their leaders and until now (2006) they have not had more than one leader. Thus one cannot talk of real political development in Kosovo, when each party has had only one leader so far669 and the oldest one is less than 17 years old. So, Kosovo parties are still in their "adolescent" phase."670 The Vienna negotiation talks were also a milestone in the political culture of Kosovo's politicians. The head of the AAK perceives these talks to have contributed positively to the inner dialogue and inclusive democratic principles that have improved within Kosovo political circles. This situation, associated with achievements on the implementation of standards, are thus seen as a sign that Kosovo's population is able to decide the future of Kosovo for themselves.671

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Looking at the trend of political development in general, it is clear that there will not be real political development in Kosovo as long as priority is given to party leaders and not their programs. The deciding element and priority for Kosovar parties thus far has been the charismatic nature of the leader identified with each party, orienting the voters to personal images and their nature, rather than the programme of the party. This has been confirmed by research on local parties in Kosovo, where, when the people talked about a party, they mentioned the name of its leader and not the programme of the party as its crucial element. The party program becomes therefore of secondary relevance. Being still a political teenager, the Kosovo political class has not had enough time to develop a real political culture and thus a democratic one. This will still require a long time. The absence of an "ideological anchoring" for the parties in Kosovo is another challenge facing their development. The parties in Kosovo are neither ideologically anchored in regards to their own domestic program, nor in international ideological settings like the International Socialist, European Social-Democrat, or Liberal parties. Entering the international setting would contribute to their cooperation and development, and help the evolution of their political mindset. This would then contribute to their institutional development in general. Being concerned primarily with the status issue, political parties in Kosovo have neglected the relevance of ideology and position themselves only as "center plus... right or left."672 This is of course reflected in party programs, which none of the parties, with few exceptions, have in a clearly structured way. Their current (2006) so-called programs are basically vague key669. The interview with the ORA Party official was taken after Rugova´s death, when there was not yet a new LDK leader. Thus all parties at the time had had only one leader. 670. Interview with ORA party official, op.cit. 671. ZERI Newspaper information 20 October 2004 Special Edition, op cit. p6 672. Almost all political Party officials interviewed gave a similar answer starting with "Center" ... than "right or left" according to their ambiguous ideological anchoring at the time... 174

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

words, including nationalistic rhetoric like "freedom, independence", plus the magic buzzword "democracy" that means everything and nothing in the some time. No wonder that many of them claim that they are still "...working on their party program".673 The parties' foreign policy, on the other hand, actually plays a vital role in their platforms and is at the top of their priority list. Generally associated with the EU and NATO entrance goals, foreign policy carries the weight of Kosovo’s future well-being, whether for statehood or for the economic development. So, there are few themes with regard to foreign policy that are not shared by all the main parties, leaving the parties with no discernible differences in their general foreign policy direction.674 Despite their common views on the main issues of foreign policy, pursuing them in practice and further tailoring these policies remains a challenge. According to Alush Gashi, the head of the LDK Parliamentary caucus, the paramount objective of Kosovo’s foreign policy should be that of exposing a new face of Kosovo while stressing that political party differences should end at Kosovo's borders. Others say that Pristina cannot afford any party differences in its future foreign policy.675

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, the greatest challenge facing political development in Kosovo is overcoming the handicapped interaction between K-Serb and K-Albanian political leaders. The unveiling in March, 2007 of the UN Special Envoy’s Package for the Future Status of Kosovo, commonly referred to as “The Ahtisaari Peace Package,” made direct interaction between both sides extremely complex. According to a report on the issue from the civil society organization PER, one conservative Serb group in Kosovo that had previously exhibited great trust in this organization´s neutrality676 refused to take part in its organized discussions. They were willing to continue consultation with PER privately, but not to engage in the wider dialogue, unless it was held in a multilateral setting outside of Kosovo.677 In this context the international community is especially important, considering that both leaders refuse to sit down with each other and prefer to discuss their concerns only with international representatives, despite their prejudices, such as the Serb National Council678 leaders who maintain that

673. Author´s Interview in Pristina with diverse parties officials, Pristina November 2006. 674. Author´s interview with PDK party official, 20 October, Pristina, 2006 675. Kosovo’s post-status Foreign Policy, September 2007, Forum 2015 (eds) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society Pristina. 676. The Project on Ethnic Relations’ (PER) has since 2005 been organizing the project “Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo,” conceived as a means of addressing the increasing tension and promoting constructive interaction between political representatives of Kosovo Albanian, Serb, and other ethnic communities. 677. PER Project on Ethnic relations, Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo Report, Prishitina 2006-2007, p4 678. In June 2006, PER held roundtable discussions with senior leaders of the two major political groupings of K-Serbs: the Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM), and the Serb National Council (SNV). 175

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

many international diplomats come to Kosovo with preconceived negative attitudes toward K-Serbs. The SLKM, an important coalition of Serb parties in Kosovo, has recently been especially concerned over the radicalization of the K-Serb political leadership, resulting in little room for moderate views. The main goal of SLKM policy is to preserve the Serbs in Kosovo and to improve their lot. To put it in their words, “If there are no Serbs in Kosovo, there will never be Kosovo in Serbia. If the lives of the Serbs in Kosovo do not improve, there will be no Serb returns to Kosovo.”679 Lately, many SLKM leaders have been increasingly willing to engage the K-Albanian leadership and Kosovo's institutions on resolving issues of significance before the final status is set. They do, however, stress that without having Belgrade on board, implementation of many agreements would be problematic.680 The strong dependence of almost all KSerb parties on Belgrade and its politics remains the greatest obstacle to overcoming this handicap. In order to bridge this ethnic handicap, an employee of the office of the SRSG in Kosovo, suggests the development of the economy as a good way to start. He argues that when it comes to cooperation between the two populations of Kosovo, K-Albanians and K-Serbs are not very different. In the end they both want the same things; they want jobs, better infrastructure, electricity, and education, but there must be a political process and willing actors from both sides to push the economic agenda forward. These "willing actors" are lacking, especially on the K-Serb side.681 It seems that current K-Serb politicians are not willing to take their responsibility. The refuse a Kosovo political agenda, and recognize only a Serbian one.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, the biggest problem that UNMIK faces in Kosovo, argues an employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, is that none of the K-Serb political leaders has political democratic legitimacy. Slavisa Petkovic, the ex-Minister for Minorities and Returnees, was the only K-Serb leader to participate with his party in elections and cooperate with the government of Kosovo until 2006, and he received only 500 votes, not a real basis for democratic legitimacy. Other K-Serb political leaders based in Mitrovica like Jaksic and Oliver Ivanovic (SLKM), did not participate in the elections and are simply self-proclaimed leaders. 682 Still, ostensible changes to the way politics is conducted appear noteworthy. All too recently, political differences were literally fought over. Although rancorous and difficult, politicians from Kosovo’s divided communities are now at least attempting to cooperate together through committees. Kosovo’s leaders have carved out enough space to have fitful co-operation, although few do so out of a desire to resolve the conflict. They, and those they represent, remain as wedded to their respective national objectives as ever, but given the depth of hostility and distrust that must be sur679. 680. 681. 682.

Authors Interview with SLKM coalition parties official, 10 November, Mitrovica Kosovo. PER Project report 2006-2007, op.cit. p6 Author´s Interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosvo, op.cit. Ibid 176

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

mounted to achieve some normalcy in politics, any political cooperation and tolerance is significant progress in itself.683 Lastly, one can optimistically say that the formation of the Kosovo political party landscape has succeeded in broad terms. The prerequisites and conditions set up by UNMIK fostered the creation of new parties, and as always the case initially in such situations, a great number of the parties currently operating in Kosovo will probably not survive in the long run. But the necessary structures exist, and especially for the main parties, their evolution until now has had positive results. Still, the immense need for further development of these party structures and their human development cannot be stressed enough.684 Broadly speaking, new ideas are required in the political party landscape in Kosovo concerning future scenarios and their ability to hold constructive political discussions. This will allow for an improved role of political parties in political development in general. The main challenge remains the "self-exclusion" of K-Serbs from political discourse, but the hope is that after the definition of their future status, KSerb parties will recognize the need to adapt to the new scenario and choose to participate in the political process.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Based on Lapalombara´s instruments for the evaluation of political parties, I have presented my main findings on the political parties of Kosovo in Figure 13 below.

683. Peake G, et.al. December 2004, INCORE Report. op.cit. p35-36 684. Mühlmann Thomas, 2002, Internationale Verwaltung am Beispiel des Kosovo, Dissertation eingereicht an der Fakultät für Human und Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Wien. Wien, September 2002, pp 126-127 177

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Figure 13: Kosovo Political Parties main features by Dec.2007 (Source: Author 2007) Party Features Years of existence till 2007

LDK

PDK

17

8

Ethnic lines, Kalbanian Mainly Urban

Ethnic lines Kalbanian Regional Rural

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Social cleavage systems Attitudes Instituwith tions are institutions used to maintain the status quo

AAK

ORA

AKR

LDD Serb Minority Parties 5 3 2 1 Range form 1-7 years Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic lines K- lines lines K- lines K- lines albanian K-albanian albanian albanian K.serb Regional Mainly Mixed Mainly Mixed Rural Urban (urban Urban ( urban & & rural) rural)

Not able/ willing to build alliances with civil society (not effective opposition)

Inst. are the bases of the state , they should be taken seriously

Institutions N/A 685 should be taken seriously (Strong opposition)

Assuming the same as LDK.

Institutions are albanian, thus refusal to participate

Regional / Strong support in Pristina Part of LDK electorate , Offices in 19 Municip.

Regional/ Strong support in serb inhabited areas, i.e Mitrovica, Offices up to 17 Municip.

Topdown hierarchy, more open compared to LDK

Wide coalitions, top-down hierarchy in single units, self appointed leaders

Geographic spread and Electoral capability686

National Mixed electorate Offices in 29 Municip.

Regional/ Strong support in Drenica Offices in 27 Municip.

Regional/ Strong support in Dukagjin Offices in 25 Municip.

Regional/ Strong support in Pristina Offices only in Pristina

Internal decisionmaking & arrangem.

Topdown hierarchy, Closed to outside interventions

Topdown hierarchy. Deficit of attention to detail in party's work

Open for change The most rigorous in internal party democra cy

Not author- N/A itarian, Leadership resigns after election losses to make room for new alternatives687

Regional/ Mixed electorate Offices in 16 Municip.

685. This sign means that sufficient facts to support the statement were not available. 686. Source is OSCE website of the List of Registered Political Parties in Kosovo, available under: http://kosovoelections.org/eng/pfdf/partieslist.aspx. See also Appendix 2 for a general list of Kosovo political parties. 687. One example of the non-authoritarian and democratic features of the ORA is the fact that the ORA leadership including party leader Veton Surroi resigned in an extraordinary party assembly held after the November, 2007 Elections. In a press conference, Surroi explained 178

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Organiza- Inflexible Problemtional and atically articulation Hierarflexible chic Few do real work, others show up only if chances to get in power Ideological Center Center orientation right si- left simimiliar to lar to soPeople ´s cial deParties in mocratic Europe parties in Europe Leadership OldApproach and Cadre school of leader characteristi commu- attracts cs nist -like young inintellec- tellectuals tuals " in- in the dolent party do-nothing " style Gender low low Relevance Women Women Forum Forum

Flexible, oft accomplished effectively requests from the IC

Flexible, N/A knowledge and working sharing

Center left

Center Left

Liberal Center Democr right atic

Range from dem. soc-dem. to ind. liberal, etc

Eagerness to learn and attract young intellectuals in the party

Democratic way of thinking, open mindset and modern young intellectuals

High potential to atract human capacities due to its strong financial situation

Self-appointed leaders trapped in a vicious circle

low Women Forum

high Gender Quotes

low low Women Women Forum Forum

Long Term EU/ Vision NATO

EU/ NATO

EU/NATO EU/ NATO

EU/ NATO

Claims Flexibility , Further research required

Old communist School like intellectuals with change pretensions

EU/ NATO

Inflexible officially , flexible unofficially.

low Gender Quotes but only in institutional form EU, some wishing return to Serbia

that this decision was based on an analysis of November 17, when his party did not pass the threshold to enter the Kosovo government. “To show some responsibility for the electoral failure, I, as the ORA party leader, resigned. ORA leadership did the same,” He added that the extraordinary ORA meeting had significant importance because what happened in the elections was analyzed thoroughly. See the article "Surroi and ORA leadership resign" at NewKosovareport.com, 10 January 2008. Available online at http:/ /www.newkosovareport.com/Press-Review/Surroi-and-ORA-leadership-resign.html, Accessed Oct.2007. 179

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Short Term Status Vision Independence

Status Independence

Status - Status - InIndepen- dependence dence, simultaneously with social & ec. dev.

Status Status Indeindepenpendence dence focus in ec. dev.

Protection for the minorities, animate the serb community for the political life

Political Culture

Military school thinking but recognizing the need to change.

Military school thinking but ready to learn and democratize

Democratic thinking, efficient opposition, open and young mindset, european level

Leader with european background but mainly in business field

Existent in form of oldschool communist parties mentality with pretentious to change

Caught in ethnic divisions discourses, unable to look further so far.

Estimated Turn-over Pragmatic, although not yet in government

First time in opposition Nov. 2007

First time in opposition November 2007

Mostly Refused to participate.688 The rest not categoriza ble

Existent in form of oldschool communist parties mentality.

Competitive HegeTurn-over Turnparty monicover systems Ideologic Ideologic Pragmatic

3.1.1.2 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG): Kosovo´s "not yet"- Checks and Balances? "Kosovo functions in a party based system; the judiciary, executive, and the legislature are all institutions that exist on paper. However, the party in power overshadows these institutions and ‘checks and balances’ between the institutions fall to pieces." - member of the opposition speech in the Assembly.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

From the historical perspective, before 1974 Kosovo's political decision-making structures were perceived by K-Albanians as a "lever of Serbian politics" rather than a real political entity.689 Starting with the period of the Yugoslav Federation and the 688. Kosovo Serbs and their leaders have continually refused to participate in provisional institutions. For example, in March, 2006, the Serbian coordination centre for Kosovo issued a directive that Kosovo Serbs working for provisional institutions should choose between Belgrade and PISG salaries. This led to a massive withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from public service. By the end of April, 70% of all Kosovo Serbs employed by provisional institutions had severed their relations with the PISG by formally resigning or closing the bank accounts into which their salaries were deposited. Consequently, the PISG started depositing those employees' salaries into a trust fund. For more information see the following document: Commission Staff Working Document, 2006 Progress Report, Brussels, 08.11.2006, p6 689. Interview with Senior Advisor at the office of the Vice Prime Minister of Kosovo, 1, Nov. 2006. 180

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

founding of autonomous structures from 1964 to 1974, Kosovo was faced with a dual status. On one hand it was part of Serbia, but on the other it had the features, borders, and competencies of a republic, without being named one. According to a political analyst interview, after 1974 Kosovo was an equal member of the federation with equal rights, and reached the level of a state in the federation, although with a somewhat different structure. Its ministers were part of the Yugoslav government and also took part in the Yugoslav Assembly, while having at least formally the right to veto, albeit never used. Hence, after 1974 Kosovo became an autonomous province, a legislative entity with a parliament, government, and a judiciary, although the last was not complete.690 In 1990, after Kosovo had been made an undisputed part of Serbia in 1989, the Kosovo declaration of independence was made by K-Albanians under the so called Kacanik Constitution. This began a parallel system of governance by the K-Albanians. After this declaration failed to be internationally recognized, Kosovo´s self-proclaimed government were obliged to go into exile for the following years, due to continual persecution by the Serb security apparatus. In 1992 the first K-Albanian elections were held, with international NGOs and unofficial observers monitoring. This election, although not officially recognized, was de facto accepted as such. At this time the parallel organizational structures were implemented, continuing for a 10 year period until 1999, when NATO bombing began.691 Since 1999 there have been eight years of reconstruction and institution-building processes under UNMIK and Resolution 1244.692

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In May, 2001 the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self Government was approved, setting out the division of powers between UNMIK and local administrative bodies called the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).693 UNMIK regulation 2001/9 was signed, bringing about a new stage in Kosovo politics by setting up the comprehensive legal framework for self-government. The Constitutional Framework on Interim Self-Government in Kosovo described the institutions which were to be put in the hands of Kosovo’s leaders and civil servants after the general elections of 17 November, 2001. This was perceived as a first step for guiding the people of Kosovo toward the establishment of democratic structures.694 Due to the un690. Author´s interview with Poltical Analyst in Pristina, op.cit. 691. According to a Senior Advisor on the Office of Vice Prime Minister of Kosovo, the last phase of Kosovo government will occur after final status and will involve emancipation from Serbian politics and its influence. Kosovo politicians should be able therefore to organize, and generate politics and policies without referring to Serbia. 692. Interview with Senior Advisor at the office of the Vice Prime Minister of Kosovo, 1, Nov. 2006. 693. In 2006, negotiations on the final status of Kosovo started, headed by former Finish president Martti Ahtisaari. His proposals, amounting to “supervised independence”, were submitted to the UN Security Council in March, 2007. However a political settlement was not reached and a US-EU-Russian Troika undertook 120 days of further discussions. These ended on December 10, 2007 with no agreement being reached. 694. From the introduction of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in 181

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

resolved status issue, UNMIK has been gradually transferring incremental administrative competencies to the PISG since 2001, while reserving some powers that are normally associated with sovereign states, such as these over foreign affairs. Officially the government of Kosovo, a very complex entity, is composed of these parts; 1) remnants of the UN Interim Civil Administration, headed by the SRSG, responsible for all powers not transferred, and retaining in any event the power to intervene,695 2) the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (the PISGs), comprised of the Assembly of Kosovo (AoK), the President of Kosovo, the Government, the Courts and any other institution prescribed, and 3) the Municipal governments of Kosovo.696 The powers or competencies given to the central and the municipal governments include overlapping jurisdictions in such areas as economy and finance, health, education, social welfare, planning, and environmental protection.697 To add to this complexity, in addition to these three levels of internationally recognized government, there are other parallel shadow governing structures operating in Kosovo.698 In many K-Serb enclaves, the authorities in Belgrade still support parallel education, health, and justice sectors regarded as better than their K-Albanian counterparts.699 The common governing structure between Kosovo political forces and UNMIK is called the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS)700 and it stresses the cooperation of Kosovo political forces and UNMIK on administrative management, so that these decisions are in conformity with the applicable law in Kosovo and all communities are fairly represented.701 The PISG include; 1) the Executive branch, including

695.

696. 697.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

698.

699. 700.

701.

Kosovo Document, available at http://www.assembly-kosova.org website. Accessed on December 2007. The SRSG retains responsibility for implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244, has oversight of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, and has the authority to intervene in the event of a violation of 1244 or of the Constitutional Framework (see Article 12 Constitutional Framework). UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45, provides in Article 2.1 that “The basic territorial unit of local self-government in Kosovo shall be the municipality.” See Appendix 3 at the end of this study for a comparison of local and central competencies of the government. According to the ICG 2003 report, Two to Tango, the diplomatic offices in Pristina are also considered crucial actors and deemed to operate as checks and balances on the system. Their activity in Kosovo will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3.1.2..3. Local Governance Assessment Report, USAID/Kosovo, February 15, 2003, p53 The Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) has been administering Kosovo since February, 2000 when it officially replaced all previous parallel structures for revenue collection and provision of public services. Intended as a provisional set of institutions, its work continues until democratic elections enable the establishment of a more permanent structure. Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws by the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Review Period: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003, Published by OSCE MISSION IN KOSOVO, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Rule of Law Section January 2005 p7 182

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the Government of Kosovo, with a prime minister elected by a majority of the Kosovo Assembly upon proposal by the President of Kosovo, 2) The Assembly of Kosovo, which elects the President of Kosovo, and 3) The Judicial System of Kosovo, appointed by the SRSG from a list endorsed by the Assembly after being proposed by the Judicial and Prosecutorial Council.702 In the following units I will examine these structures in more detail, based on the theoretical assumptions mentioned in the political development Chapter. This constitutes in broad terms an overview of the availability and capacity of the political system and authoritative governmental structures703, and later an analysis of the functional capacity of authority structures and their role as checks and balances in the political power fields of Kosovo. 3.1.1.2.1 The Government and the executive situation The Government of Kosovo includes the Prime minister, 15 ministries, and 30 municipalities, and is vested with executive authority, being responsible for the implementation of laws. The Constitutional Framework foresees that ministries and other executive agencies carry out functions within the competence of the Government, ensuring representation of members of the minority communities within this framework. All official documents of the Government are printed in both the Albanian and Serbian languages. UNMIK regulation 2001/19, concerning the executive branch of the PISG as amended, sets out the legal framework for government operations. It defines among other things the functions of the Prime Minister and ministers, and creates the organizational structure of the ministries by introducing the principals of civil service. The annexes to the Regulation entail descriptions of specific duties of the ministries.704

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The authority of the SRSG over the PISG is expressed in chapter 8.1 of the Constitutional Framework, which authorizes the SRSG to dissolve the Assembly of Kosovo and call for new elections if the PISG are deemed to act in a manner incompatible with UNSC Resolution 1244.705 With the Constitutional Framework, the SRSG has vested certain responsibilities in PISG with respect to preparing laws, i.e. in the fields of education, health, labor, and social welfare, domestic and foreign trade and industry, good governance, and human rights.706 In such fields both the

702. UNMIK, Civil Administration web site, http://www.unmikonline.org/civiladm/index.html Accessed Dec.2007 703. See Appendix 4 for a detailed list of Kosovo Institutions and main International Organizations in Kosovo as per November 2007. 704. Further details related to the legal framework of the executive branch of the PISG can be found in the following documents: UNMIK/REG/2001/36 On the Kosovo Civil Service; UNMIK/REG/2002/5 amending UNMIK/REG/2001/19 On the Executive Branch of the PISG in Kosovo, establishing the Ministry of Health (Annex I) and the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (Annex II). 705. UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9 of 15 May 2001, Chapter 8.1. 706. UNMIK REG 2001/9, Chapter 5.1. 183

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Government and the Assembly have the right to initiate and adopt laws and resolutions, the latter being non-binding declarations.707 Once legislation has been adopted by the Assembly in its function as the highest legislative body of the PISG, it enters into force only if signed and promulgated by the SRSG.708 A high UNMIK official describes this sort of legislative competence of the PISG as the exercise of legislative responsibility for and under the authority of the SRSG.709 The SRSG also retains some so-called "reserved powers",710 where it has sole and exclusive legislative power.711 While UNMK and SRSG both have executive powers, the Constitutional Framework and its subsequent regulations remain vague on the division of powers between UNMIK and PISG, and between the central and local levels of government. In fact, in the majority of sectors from trade to fiscal policy and judicial issues, the Constitutional Framework specifies that both UNMIK and the PISG have responsibility.712 The Government of Kosovo (GoK) works on an annual basis and presents its work in an annual report to the Assembly. It has developed its own strategy to reform the structure and organisation of its public administration. The administration was rebuilt in an ad hoc way in the period after the war. Ministries were created in several waves, as UNMIK gradually transferred competencies to the Kosovo Government. As a result, the structure of the administration lacks coherence. Similar duties are carried out by various ministries at once. This means that the internal organisation of ministries does not always correspond to their functions. The GoK created an action plan for tackling this problem, which is now being implemented. Donor support from the IC, which has moved away from the emergency aid and infrastructure provision characteristic of the postwar period, is now concentrated on building the capacity of the Kosovo Government to address the needs of its population.713

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In 1999, during the immediate postwar phase, no responsibility was given to local leaders, and no powers accorded to local politicians, as they were neither trusted nor thought capable of evenly discharging even basic administrative tasks. Power was in-

707. UNMIK REG 2001/9, Chapter 9.1.26 708. UNMIK REG2001/9, Chapter 9.1.45. 709. Hoefer-Wissing, Neithart. 2002 “UNMIK holds on to a share of power,” Focus Kosovo," February, 11. 710. These powers cover among others; sovereignty-related matters such as external relations, the administration of public, state and socially owned property and enterprises, railways and civil aviation, control over the civil registry database, and matters relating to the appointment and removal of judges and public prosecutors, protection of the rights of communities and cooperation with KFOR, the enforcement of public safety and order, defense, civil emergency and security preparedness See the UNMIK REG 2001/9, Chap.8.1 and 8.2.36 711. KIPRED, June 2005, Administration and Governance in Kosovo, Lesson learned and lessons to be learned, 2nd Edition Pristina/Geneva, p10 712. See the Constitutional Framework, Chapters 5, 8 713. Kosovo Factsheet, DFID in Kosovo website, Available on http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/ europe/kosovo.asp 184

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

crementally transferred to local leaders beginning with the municipal elections of 2000, and continuing in 2001 with elections for the province-wide assembly. After further elections in Kosovo, UNMIK adopted a policy of consistently co-opting local leaders and providing incentives to induce them to enter the process. The first government was a coalition between the PDK, LDK, and AAK, and the second was a coalition between the AAK and LDK, while the most recent one, following the November, 2007 elections, is a coalition between the PDK and LDK. Power is currently shared among politicians from different ethnicities, with the majority being K-Albanian. A complex system of checks, balances, and oversight is in place in order to avoid abuse. Leaders continue to work inter an international aegis, where all legislative bills are examined for perceived inequity and legislative positioning on the national question.714 The political and economic weight of the international presence means that they are in a position of profound influence for the conduct of politics, and for defining the parameters of what local leaders can do. In fact, Kai Eide´s Report in 2004 stressed the need for further transfer of responsibility: "Kosovo Albanian leaders are unanimous in demanding a further transfer of competencies to the PISG...In fact, this process has already come far...What the Kosovo Albanian politicians now seek – in an increasingly assertive way - is the transfer to the PISG of reserved powers under Chapter 8 of the Constitutional Framework... the time has come to expand the competencies and responsibilities of the PISG further."715

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The IC demand that Kosovo's leaders and population take responsibility for the creation of a stable and multi-ethnic society will only succeed, according to Eide´s report, if it is combined with an increasing degree of ownership in this society. Those powers and competencies that are not inherently attributes of sovereignty should be gradually transferred, with guarantees of proper implementation. In other words, the UNMIK should accelerate and expand the process of involving Kosovo residents in executive and support roles in reserved areas, while retaining decision-making authority, as it did in the case of the UNMIK Customs and Kosovo Police Service. UNMIK involvement in establishing consultative mechanisms with the PISG should insure a greater local involvement in such processes by providing them with needed relevant experience.716 The lack of experience in PISG structures can be illustrated by their public administration efficiency problems. Although its capacities have been further enhanced over the last few years,717 a lot still remains to be done. In an estimated population of

714. Besnik Pula ‘The UN in Kosovo: Administering Democratization’ in Florian Bieber and Daskalovski Zhidas, (eds) Understanding the War in Kosovo, London: Frank Cass, 2003. pp.204-206 715. Kai Eide Report, 2005, op.cit 716. Ibid. 717. The Public Administration will be considered more in detail in Chapter 4.1.1.6 185

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

approximately two million, Kosovo has quite a high number of public servants on its payroll (68,000). The absence of a general register of civil servants and of a related inventory of competencies, as well as unclear and overlapping distribution of tasks, make it difficult to match needs with available human resources. The independent oversight board and senior public appointments committee are not yet functioning effectively. The latter's decisions are not always justified and have not always been enforced, supporting concerns that the position of permanent civil servants is still vulnerable to political influence.718 Local municipal governments represent another level of government in Kosovo. There are 30 municipalities in Kosovo, which are more in the nature of "counties" in the USA than cities or towns. Each includes multiple urban settlements and villages, as well as rural, agricultural, and wooded areas. In each municipality there is one municipal government and an assembly made up of 17–31 people. Each municipal assembly elects a mayor and at least one deputy president. Three assembly committees are required for budget and finance, communities, and mediation, with the last two subject to a prescribed ethnic composition.719 Each municipality has a Chief Executive Officer and a Board of Directors, hired by the Municipality Assemblies. The directors guide the departments which in many cases have legally and practically confused relations with the national ministries.720

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

These structures have been in place since 1999. Additionally, to increase efficiency, UNMIK has set up a 5-region administrative structure, following boundaries established by KFOR in June of that year. Considering that there is no regional level of government indigenous to Kosovo, the question here is what happened to the older forms of village government?721 According to information received in my interviews, these forms seem to remain to various degrees in different parts of Kosovo. When present, they appear to be appointed or self-appointed, rather than elected. What authority they may now wield is unclear, since they have so far not been a focus of attention for the international community or academia. Thus, further research is needed to better understand their roles in the current context of the state-building enterprise. In fact, several studies have argued that the relationship between political parties, their electorate, and municipal governments is key to understanding Kosovo.722 This

718. See Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report , EU Commission Report, p8 719. K-Serbs boycotted the October, 2000 municipal elections. In December of that year the SRSG (Bernard Kouchner) swore in Serb councillors in a number of municipalities in order to install governments in those municipalities. This was for reasons which were accepted by the international community as over-riding at the time, but effectively ensured the continuation of what had been either self-appointed or old-regime (i.e., Milosevic, SPS) appointments, and the integrity of a parallel Serbian authority. The following SRSG did not entertain the possibility of a process of appointment, after the K-Serb partial boycott in October 2002. 720. USAID Kosovo Report 2003, op.cit. p53 721. These were authorised by the Yugoslav 1974 constitution. 722. Cp. Kosovo after Haradinaj, 2005, op.cit. on the relations of the political parties with local and regional leaders 186

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

is also reflected in the local political landscape, where the party that dominates a municipal assembly dominates its municipal government as well.723 The issue of K-Serb minorities is also relevant to local politics. Within the context of final status discussions, no topic has been more important than the resolution of issues associated with K-Serb minority, and the assurance that their rights and safety will be preserved. According to the Statistical Office of Kosovo, K-Serbs make up 7% of the total population.724 Concerns about minority rights have driven the adoption of a definition of “decentralization”725 for the status discussions that is quite different from how the term is typically used in development literature.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Generally "decentralization" is used within the context of an overall governance reform program. Due to its positive implications for enhanced participation and responsiveness, as well as improved public service delivery, decentralization is seen as an important component of any political and administrative government reform. In the case of Kosovo, these meanings and benefits are not denied, but the more important use of the term is political. Here decentralization has come to mean the process by which local autonomy will be preserved in order for minority rights to be ensured. That is, decentralization is seen as a political decision to assure the autonomy of municipalities where the majority of citizens are members of minority communities, so that these communities will have greater security and greater control over their own public decision-making and service delivery.726 Thus, it seems that K-Serbs and KAlbanians require decentralization for different reasons. The latter need “classic” decentralization with the aim of more effective governance, while for the former, decentralization is the major way to ensure their physical survival in Kosovo. The different discourses used behind the term on both sides hint at an asymmetry that generates problems in its implementation.727

723. Note in addition that many, if not all, villages in K-Albanian areas are dominated by one or another political party, usually either the LDK, PDK, or AAK. 724. See the Statistical Office of Kosovo’s SOK Web site: http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/ 725. Decentralization is one of the core goals of the final status document. Its philosophy is the idea of a multiethnic Kosovo, which involves K-serbs remaining. The point is then how to make this possible? Different ways must be found for K-Serbs to stay, maintain the same life style, and govern themselves within the limits of the legal framework. Belgrade's approach that the K-Serbs should have a high grade of autonomy, which is also the approach that the KSerbs themselves favor. This is the crux of the decentralization debate in Kosovo, and has also been considered in the status talks on the future of Kosovo. Author´s interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, op.cit. 726. USAID Kosovo Report 2006, Limited of Scope Assessment of Local governance in Kosovo, Final Report, p 1 727. The problem is that when it comes to decentralization, K-Albanians see great difficulties in this approach and are skeptical of it. This was made clear last year during a pilot project with five communes in Kosovo, implemented through pressure from the IC and the Contact Group. They had warned that if these projects were not be implemented, then the status process would not begin. Adding to the problem is the decentralization packet negotiated in Vienna, which is more extensive than claimed to the K-albanian population, and a clear vehicle for the 187

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Such politicization of “decentralization” creates challenges for administrators who have to make the system work, and chances are high that the political purpose of decentralization will conflict with its administrative objectives. The challenges created are further complicated by the current governmental system in Kosovo, where international administrators are working through UNMIK alongside Kosovo's emerging governmental structure, the PISG. All of whom are working against the background of unresolved status discussions, and within a context of achievement of the required standards. Furthermore, in the case of local government at least, even though the drafting of legislation continues, status talks have put the passage of laws on hold. As a result, Kosovo is run to a degree on the basis of administrative instructions, circulars, and memos instead of a solid legislative foundation.728 It is clear that the decentralization process has not been as effective and speedy as expected. A significant part of the problem is the difficulty in identifying institutionalized participation mechanisms for citizens that function properly and broadly at the central and local levels. The participatory mechanisms that do exist to date are ineffective and often ignored. Exceptions and examples of successful citizen action have already appeared, serving to show the types of mechanisms that may be established and built into all aspects of local decision-making in the future.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The events of March, 2004 have complicated these issues. Since then, K-Serbs have not participated in the work of the PISG, and as a condition of their re-engagement, have presented demands related to reconstruction and returns, prosecution of the perpetrators, security, and local government reform.729 The March 2004 experience exposed the urgent need to give K-Serbs greater authority over local administration in areas with a concentrated Serb population. So the process of decentralization, presented as a political and institutional framework to guarantee the continued presence of Serb minorities in Kosovo, is therefore also closely linked to the return process. K-Albanian leaders, although skeptical in the beginning, have come to understand the importance attached to this work by the international community and Serb leaders. They now generally welcome decentralization, as long as it is not designed as a cover for territorial partition.

protection of the K-Serb minorities in Kosovo. Author´s interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, November 2006, op.cit. 728. USAID Kosovo Report 2006, op.cit. p2 729. The K-serbs have so far shown almost no willingness to participate in the governing and social life of Kosovo. Thus, one cannot talk about integration here, but in the best case for a peaceful coexistence between the two populations. Eight years after the war, the eyes of the K-Serbs are still oriented to Belgrade and not to Pristina. Thus K-Albanians are justifiably worried when they see the Serbs' position in the status negotiations in Vienna, that they will try to enter through the back door of decentralization to create a kind of pseudo-solution as in Bosnia with the aim of a final partition of Kosovo. Interview with employee of SRSG office in Kosovo, op.cit. 188

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

It is still early to judge if there is a consistent commitment by both sides to this process,730 but while K-Serb leaders recognize that the IC is now listening more attentively to their concerns, they have also realized that remaining outside the political process could put the attention and support they now enjoy at risk, particularly when K-Albanians are taking steps to accommodate these demands. Recently, the tone in common interactions has become more conciliatory, and K-Serb leaders also seem more willing to participate in joint efforts.731 Belgrade's approach to the Vienna negotiation talks did not improve the situation. This position was characterized by the K-Albanians as a "third layer of government". Belgrade's line of discussion, pointing at clear lines of ethnic division, categorized Serb majority communes as a concern solely of the K-Serbs, leaving Pristina nothing to say concerning them. Their aim was to have direct links to Belgrade and other KSerb communes, creating suspicion among K-Albanians, who see it as a Trojan horse inserted by Belgrade to undermine the state-building process in Kosovo. Furthermore, at the local level leaders are not happy with this solution, considering that part of their territory and governing power will be unexpectedly removed from their jurisdiction, as in the case of Pristina's surroundings, and Gracanica. These are all points that hinder the implementation of decentralization, making a very difficult task for the future considering the complexity of the issue and its approval level in the K-Albanian population. The places reserved for K-Serbs in parliament and the government that remain empty, the Serb boycott of the 2004 elections, and the Belgrade government's request that K-Serbs cut all the connections with Kosovo institutions and government, are actions that have not breed trust and cooperation.732

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It is clear that the responsibility for bridging deep ethnic divides between the two main communities rests largely with local politicians, many of whom have long histories of involvement in the conflict. The tasks they face are quite challenging, but any achievement will require constituting a workable political culture amidst the context of a divided society. Even reaching agreement on day-to-day political issues is difficult, because each issue is infused with the wider national question, requiring negotiation of gaps of distrust on each side. Even now, many local leaders remain still divided over the main issue of the future status of the region. With a combination of

730. Kai Eide Report, 2004, op.cit. 731. On 26 March, the Committee on the Rights and Interests of Communities submitted to the Presidency a proposal asking it to recommend that the Government include representatives of non-Albanian and non-Serb communities in working groups for drafting legislation. At its 10 April meeting, the Presidency approved the Committee proposal and forwarded it to the Office of Prime Minister. On 9 May, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of Prime Minister sent a letter to the Presidency informing that the Government agreed with the proposal of the Committee for Rights and Interests of Communities and asked the Assembly to provide a list of legal experts belonging to non-Albanian and non-Serb communities, which would be invited by the Government to participate working groups for drafting legislation in the area of their respective expertise. See OSCE Mission in Kosovo Report 2007, On the Monitoring of the Assembly of Kosovo 1 March 2007 – 13 May 2007, OSCE Kosovo pp11-12 732. Interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, op.cit. 189

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

international support and pressure, they have crafted some working political arrangements and do manage to make day-to-day decisions.733 For this to continue and succeed, a UNDP Report claims that the capacity needed at the municipal level is substantial, but the situation is not as dire as it appears.734 The foundations for a sound system of public administration in Kosovo are in fact well established, and none of the weaknesses that exist should impede the transfer of competencies. It will take the actual transfer of these competencies to get the required systems and processes working, and to develop the skills of those who manage and administer government at the municipal level. It looks like there is significant variety among municipal capacities in every respect; administrative and management skills, the influence of corruption, the influence of party politics, minority concerns, etc, that need to be tackled. My broad impression of the functionality and capacity of the executive branch of the Kosovo government at both the local and national levels indicates that skill levels are mixed, capacity is thin, and international assistance remains necessary in at least in the short term, in order to be sustainable. Developing these capacities at the central and local levels will require consistent and broad assistance across the country from UNMIK, donors, and the PISG, who will have to seriously engage in a challenging and complex enterprise.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

3.1.1.2.2 The Assembly and the legislative process Another crucial institution in the PISG constellation is the Assembly of Kosovo. Examination of the Assembly is critical for determining the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of actors involved in democratic procedures and processes. The relevance of Parliament and its efficiency in drafting and adopting laws that correspond to the will and needs of the people of Kosovo is crucial for the political development of the country. As a new institution, numerous challenges remain for it in establishing a professional entity that is accountable and democratic. These range from technical difficulties, lack of professionalism,735 insufficient executive and legislative oversight, to weak cooperation and involvement of civil society elements, resulting in a lack of debate inside and outside the parliament on crucial issues. In this unit I will give an overview of the Assembly of Kosovo and its functional capacity in order gauge its progress so far. The Assembly is the legislative arm of the PISG, composed of 120 members elected by secret ballot. 100 of the 120 seats are distributed amongst all parties in proportion to the number of valid votes received by them in the election of the Assembly. In order to protect minority interests and rights, the remaining 20 seats are 733. Peake, G. at al. December 2004, INCORE Report. op.cit.p35-36 734. UNDP/Kosovo, 2005 The Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo Report, 04/2005 735. For an overview of the everyday functioning of the Assembly of Kosovo, see OSCE Report 2007 On the Monitoring of the Assembly of Kosovo during the period 1 March 2007 – 13 May 2007. For example, even after eight years of functioning, the use of unparliamentary language in the Assembly remains a problem. p7 190

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

reserved for additional representation of the rest of the communities in Kosovo, in proportion to the number of valid votes received in Assembly elections.736 The election is by secret ballot, and open to every person over the age of 18. The term of service in the Assembly is three years.737 In technical terms, the operation of the Assembly is generally positive, and its rules of procedure are by and large followed. Plenary session agendas are prepared in advance and formally adopted by the Assembly in its plenary sessions. After the adoption in June 2006 of an important reform package addressing shortcomings in executive oversight, financial accountability and transparency, these areas have been greatly improved. Public hearings have been introduced to give Assembly members the right to directly address the government without prior screening of the questions by the presidency. Political groups and committees have also been given the right to participate in the design of Assembly budget transparency measures.738 However, Assembly committees are not always able to fulfill their role in the legislative process, partly due to a lack of qualified staff in the secretariats of the committees. Executive oversight of the implementation of laws is also simply insufficient. The public information department has much to learn before it can be called an effective service provider to all Assembly members, and the legal translation section requires a much higher capacity. The issue of the involvement K-Serb members in parliamentary procedures remains a challenge. Eight of the ten K-Serbs who should be occupying seats in the Assembly have continued to exclude themselves from plenary sessions, choosing to participate to a limited extent, while the two Assembly members from the Serb Democratic Party do attend plenary sessions. In general, the role of the Assembly is deemed to have improved during the last eight years, and its working methods have been ameliorated.739

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The President, with a mandate of three years, is also elected by the Assembly. His main functions are to take action in the field of external relations in coordination with the SRSG, and following consultations with the political parties in the Assembly, to propose the Prime Minister to the Assembly. The President has the power to dissolve the Assembly, in agreement with the SRSG. He is also expected to report to the Assembly on the general state of affairs in Kosovo at least once a year, and present awards.740

736. 10 of these seats are allocated to parties representing the K-Serb Community, and 10 seats are allocated to other communities: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities (4), the Bosniak (3),the Turkish (2), and the Gorani Community(1). 737. See UNMIK website for info on the Kosovo Assembly: http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/ about_structure.php 738. Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report, 2006, op.cit. p9 739. Ibid. p10 740. UNMIK Website info on Government Structure, see http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/ about_structure.php 191

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

With membership in the European Union as a future goal, the Assembly of Kosovo faces a long and difficult process in making Kosovo's laws compatible with EU standards. Due to the unclear future status issue, the political leadership has lost itself in the process of status solution, and lacks a clear vision for afterwards that will enable and inspire the masses to follow them. Better cooperation between actors participating in the policy making process, such as UNMIK, SRSG, and the PISG and their institutions, could enhance positive outcomes and contribute to better functioning of the institutions themselves.741 The general aim of Kosovo's governmental public policy is to contribute to the expansion of democratic practices essential for building sustainable and democratic institutions, especially since it is becoming clear that the future of Kosovo lies within the EU. Thus, effective and efficient government practices are essential and must be employed to prevent detrimental drawbacks that may impact the economic development of the country and its sustainability. A clear vision and strategy is necessary, and should be explained to all actors involved in the legislative process, including citizens. Moreover, it is vital to change the "transit mentality" present in Kosovo, and propose solutions that will prevent Kosovo from moving backwards and keep it in a permanent transitional state. The most difficult obstacle facing the Kosovo Assembly remains the lack of commitment by the Kosovo government and party leaders to good governance, a transparent and accountable government, and to the rule of law. An OSCE official put it this way, "there are many young people qualified enough to be part of the state-building and democratization process but they do not get a chance because of the political culture in the country which favorites political clientelism and nepotism."742

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

If this does not change, the future of Kosovo as a functioning democratic state will be more in name and less in substance. Concretely, there is need for a change in mentality concerning the political culture and the thinking of the political class.743 Their inexperience is quite visible. To put it in the words of a Kosovo MP: "This is our first experience dealing with ourselves as legislators, and being members of parliament. We had some difficulties in the beginning in organizing ourselves, to plan and make it function, but a lot of those difficulties came from ourselves and our inexperience."744

741. KODI Report, November 2003, Kosovo´s Assembly: For the people opr for the Party? Pristina, No3, p23 742. Author´s Interview with Democratization & Governance Expert, USAID, Pristina, Kosovo. 13 November 2006 743. Problems confronting Kosovo political leaders at this point are more prosaic. The funding is often unavailable for running institutions effectively. The practical challenges of administration facing the often-nascent politicians have also been difficult. For example, the first two or three assembly sessions achieved almost nothing except for choosing a head of parliament. At this time the main negotiations occurred between the heads of the parties, while other levels like that of the advisors were neglected as there was no experience in that field. 744. Authors´s Interview with Elections Expert and Researcher, Pristina, Kosovo. op.cit, 192

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The OSCE has attempted to serve the needs of Kosovo's Parliament members and to support them, but the effectiveness of this effort remains to be seen. Some leaders have been inspired by the visits of politicians from other former conflict-torn societies who are now cooperating with one another. According to an OSCE democratization expert, one political leader in Kosovo cited the cooperation between Northern Irish politicians as motivation for him and his colleagues, while for others it has more to do with appreciation of the political reality, namely that some form of cooperation is inescapable for an administration to function.745 Another obstacle for the democratic function of the parliament is the involvement of civil society actors in the legislative process, which is generally perceived by politicians as unimportant. Considering that Kosovo began creating its state structures only in 1999, there have so far been few chances for civil society to influence public policy. In fact, Kosovo’s politics during the stated period had a number of “abnormalities” compared to a western model of developed democracy. According to the OSCE, these abnormalities occurred for mainly three reasons. First, they were due to the insufficient political culture of Kosovo's institutions, which lack the ability and experience to encourage active participation by the civil society. Its actors are not perceived by these institutions as stakeholders who must be consulted when drafting laws. The reasons for this lay in the history of Kosovo and its state-centered approach under years of communism.746 During later stages of democratic development, much of the involvement of civil society in the legislative process is left to the good will or personal connections between government and assembly officials and representatives of the civil society. It will take time until this informal approach is transformed into institutional communication, avoiding situations where input from civil society is required on a case-by-case basis. Finally, even though there are many organizations representing different groups of the civil society, their maturation and public profile does not always respond efficiently to calls to regulate problems in the society. 747

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In broad terms, Kosovo´s Assembly is still a young institution in a transitional country. Evaluations by several international organizations have found that its operation is still far below European standards, and that assistance efforts from the IC do

745. Part of the OSCE democratization program has also been cooperation between politicians from other politically naive countries in the Balkans. 746. In the book "Re-Conceptualizing the State", the authors argue that the rapid nature of statebuilding in post-communist countries serves to privilege elites participating in the initial stages of the transition.This prevents other actors from being involved in the process. This is because the same elites who create the initial legislative framework stand to function within and benefit from that very framework.These elites will thus have a direct influence on who has access to power and how it is exercised. This suggests that state-building and regime transition are simultaneous and possibly convergent. Grzymala-Busse Anna M, J. Lounge. Paula, 2002, Re-conceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism. Politics & Society, Vol. 30 No. 4, op.cit. p 535 747. Civil Society and the Legislative Process in Kosovo, Analytical Study at the End of the Second Mandate of the Assembly of Kosovo. Pristina, December 2007 OSCE Mission in Kosovo funded Study, Survey implemented by KODI Pristina, p26 193

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

not always achieve their objectives. Kosovo is presently going through a crucial period. The death of Rugova left the country in a kind of bemused political situation. Discussions on its future status are at the center of any political undertaking, while the degree of autonomy or independence to obtained is yet to be decided. This has brought about an abnormal situation where the status issue seems to be the only reason for political action.748 Kosovo needs solid and sustainable public institutions in order to overcome and survive the transitional period while looking toward its future in the EU. Therefore, the need for long-term involvement by the IC remains crucial, especially for Assembly activities. Their aim should focus on additional institution- and capacity-building, while assuring transparency and visibility in a sustainable manner. Here attention should be given to local absorption capacities, which must be incorporated in future development plans.749 A recent KODI report750 claims that due to the complicated system of governance and lack of a clear accountability structure, in combination with the inexperience and weakness of Kosovo’s formal institutions, the implementation of law in Kosovo has serious shortcomings. In fact the laws produced in Kosovo are generally satisfactory in terms of legal quality, but despite contributions by international experts and agencies, in most cases there is insufficient capacity among institutions to implement them.751 Regarding the implementation of law by the executive branch, OSCE reports state that many institutions have gradually managed to overcome their initial difficulties, and have achieved considerable success in the implementation process. Still, parliamentary oversight over the activities of the executive branch is necessary in order to ensure increased governmental accountability in the field of legal implementation. Here again, the need for further capacity building and strengthening is quite visible, considering that most of the ministries face a lack of sufficient resources in their legal offices.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

A general critique of the legislature of Kosovo has been that it produces laws without considering the budget effects related to them. According to an employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK, states are common law systems where legislation is a complement to the core governing rules that come from judicial decisions. Therefore if we compare Kosovo to a continental system, i.e France, it produces less laws than 748. According to the Head of Parliament at the time (2004), Nexhat Daci, "If the parliament of Kosovo does not manage to make Kosovo independent it should not exist" N.D See ZERI Newspaper, Op.cit. 14 October, Pristina, Kosovo 749. See for example Agency, EAR-Report 2006. Evaluation of the Support to the Assembly of Kosovo (AoK). EU/11/038/05, Project Evaluation. p5 750. Civil Society and the Legislative Process in Kosovo, 2007, KODI Pristina, op.cit.p27 751. This is gradually improving, as institutions grow in experience and maturity, but at the time of the research it was still a major factor of life in Kosovo. For background, see the recent OSCE Mission in Kosovo analysis on the implementation of laws in Kosovo, at www.osce.org/ kosovo. 194

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Kosovo, but this is because the former is an established democracy and the latter still a very young one. Thus France can rely on an extremely solid and established legal framework, which may require mostly updating and adjustment. In the case of Kosovo, this solid legal framework is currently being built, and the core is only under construction. The real problem, according to an employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK, is that the current law-drafting process is not satisfactory, and a lack of capacity and professionalism remain everyday challenges in Kosovo. On the other hand, it is better to have high quality laws than a high quantity. What is at stake is the legitimate desire of a population approaching a new status at the political and social levels to generate its own laws and have the final ownership that they have long been looking for. Such an approach, although it justifies to a certain extent the Kosovo Assembly's rush to produce their own laws, does not solve the problem of the questionable quality of these laws. Moreover, a considerable number of secondary laws are still missing in the legislation of Kosovo, but that is a process that will take a long time.752 All in all, the international community should continue to support the PISG in preparing draft laws, as a necessary task. Such assistance should not stop once a law is approved by the Assembly, but should continue through the implementation stage. The need for implementation monitoring mechanisms, especially on UNMIK's part, is still evident with respect to determination of the extent to which transferred competencies are properly assumed by the PISG.753 In this context, the strong non-institutional regulatory mechanisms relied upon by government, such as those based on family, clientelism, or personal connections, remain a challenge for Kosovo's political elite. Indeed, most people in Kosovo have more trust in their family or friends to resolve major problems than they would have in institutions, which again exposes the fragile nature of these institutions.754

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

3.1.1.2.3 The Judiciary and the legal situation In Kosovo, the road to a modern justice system with respect for human rights is proving to be long and difficult, and it has still a way to go. However, while both the local and international communities had hoped for quicker, better, and more focused results, few can doubt that lasting progress has been made. In the last eight years, under Pillar I and through its own Department of Justice (DOJ), UNMIK has overseen the reestablishment of a judiciary in Kosovo and confirmed the appointment of over

752. Author´s interview with employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK´s, November 2006, Kosovo 753. Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws by the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Review Period: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, January 2005 p23-24 754. Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld, May 2007, Human Security in Kosovo: A Survey of Perceptions, May 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. 195

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

380 judges at the local, district, and provincial levels, chosen from both majority and minority ethnic groups.755 UNMIK’s Pillar I authority encompasses the development of a legislative framework for the judiciary, the creation of an effective and efficient court system, investigation of allegations of judicial misconduct, and oversight of criminal trials prosecuted and adjudicated by international prosecutors and judges. Change has swept through Kosovo’s judiciary environment since mid-2005 at a rapid pace. Following the Kai Eide Report at the behest of UNMIK, the UN elected to fast-forward its “standards before status” approach to building institutions in Kosovo into fullfledged resolution talks.756 In doing so, it hastened the creation or formal recognition of a number of institutions in the justice field, including the 1. Kosovo Judicial Council757, supported by a secretariat and charged with setting administrative policy and providing administrative oversight of the judiciary and the courts, 2. the Ministry of Justice,758 charged with managing a variety of justice-related functions within the executive branch of government, including drafting of legislation, prosecution of criminal cases, representation of the government in civil matters, and training of prosecutors, and 3. the Kosovo Judicial Institute,759 whose mission to train judges and prosecutors in consultation with the KJC has been formalized.760 There are four main structures in the Kosovo court system; the Supreme Court of Kosovo, District Courts, Municipal Courts, and Minor Offences Courts, all responsible for the administration of justice in Kosovo. The judiciary in Kosovo is a sector with vital importance for the implementation of laws and the rule of law in general, but it is showing major functional deficiencies which I will describe in more detail below.761

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to many experts´opinions, the main obstacle for the Judiciary of Kosovo remains the multiple bodies of applicable laws, which are divided between several 755. See UNMIK Online 756. See “United Nations Security Council: A Historic Day for Kosovo,” Focus Kosovo November/December 2005 757. See UNMIK Regulation. 2005/52 758. See UNMIK Regulation. 2005/53 759. See UNMIK Regulation. 2006/23 760. The Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) was established as the successor to the Kosovo judicial and prosecutorial council in December, 2005. Nominations for the judicial council were approved by the Assembly in March, 2006, and members were officially appointed in April, 2006. 761. According to Kai Eide Report, Kosovo’s judiciary is an especially problematic issue. Additionally, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo's regular surveys of the judiciary give an impression of its critical situation. The Legal System Monitoring Section has issued nine public reports and eight semi-public reports which have analyzed the justice system from a human rights perspective and highlighted fair trial and due process concerns. These reports have included almost 200 recommendations addressed to the relevant authorities for specific actions to help remedy the shortcomings and help ensure responsible compliance with international standards.See Kai Eide Report,2005 op.cit, 196

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

authorities. Since UNMIK assumed its authority in 1999, the law in Kosovo has been composed of the following: K UNMIK regulations, including the Constitutional Framework of 2001 which established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and incorporates several international human rights instruments, and subsidiary UNMIK instruments, K Kosovo Assembly laws, as entered into force by UNMIK, K The law in force in Kosovo on March 24, 1989, the last day on which Kosovo held autonomous status within the former Yugoslavia, and finally, K The law promulgated in Kosovo after March 24, 1989 and before June 1999, insofar as it addresses a subject matter or situation not covered by prior law, UNMIK law, or PISG law, and is nondiscriminatory.

These confounding legal layers continue to stand in the way of the delivery of justice as judges are not always certain of the legal basis for their judgements.762 In technical terms, the constitutional framework defines the competence of the Assembly to appoint judges and prosecutors, thus potentially allowing for political or ethnic considerations to interfere in the selection process.763 Here the need for the establishment of an objective and merit-based recruitment procedure remains a high priority to create the basis for a sound, independent judiciary which is crucial for a young democracy. The efficiency of the judicial system is generally estimated to be low, and Kosovo’s judicial institutions have made little progress in recent years towards delivering effective service in civil and criminal justice. The length of procedures and case overloads, in the face of the low legal capacities of local staff remain problematic.764

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

European Commission reports describe Kosovo´s Judiciary situation in gray colors. Establishment of the new ministry of justice has been slow, with several drawbacks, while the courts face enormous problems in executing summons due to the fact that there is no civil register, most houses do not have a proper address, and KSerb court messengers are not available. Moreover, the long, time-consuming appointment procedures for judges are burdensome and do not allow for sufficient flexibility in transferring judges from one court to another. The same can be said for appeal and administrative procedures in the Supreme Courts.765766

762. Authors´s Interview with an employee of Judicial Development Division of UNMIK, 20 November; with an employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK 14 November, and with a Legal Expert and Lawyer, 7 November. Held in Pristina, 2006, Kosovo. 763. The draft laws on courts and prosecutors also suffer from the same shortcomings. 764. Poor case management is one of the key reasons for the existing backlog that now stands at over 45,000 cases and is increasing. A modern case management system is being implemented, but this is not always used by judges. 765. Despite this, the processing of administrative cases before the Supreme Court has seen generally positive development in recent years. 766. Kosovo (under UNRSC 1244) Progress Report, op.cit. pp9-10, 197

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Enforcement of judgments is a significant problem in Kosovo today, where many court decisions are not fully enforced due to personal threats. For example, there are reports of individuals threatening or applying force to stop judges from performing their duties. Some municipalities ignore court judgments or interim measures ordering them to perform or abstain from performing certain actions. The new criminal and criminal procedures codes enhance the role of prosecutors, who are now directing and supervising the work of the judicial police in the pre-trial stages of criminal proceedings. Major crimes are still dealt with by international judges and prosecutors.767 Relevant law on witness protection has yet to be adopted by the Assembly, and witness protection equipment has yet to be installed in the district courts, therefore no effective witness protection seems to be available at this time.768 Following the establishment of the Ministry of Internal affairs and the Ministry of Justice in December, 2005 as mentioned above, new ministers were appointed in March, 2006. This development, together with positive assessments of the SRSG in the interim review of competencies, led to the transfer of more responsibilities in April, 2006, including oversight of the Kosovo Police Service and Correctional Service. The introduction of regulations setting out a framework for the justice system in Kosovo has been a positive development for the whole system. A recruitment campaign for judges and prosecutors launched in April, 2006 with the support of the OSCE, and targeting members of under-represented communities, has brought some positive results.769 In the same month, laws relevant to the Kosovo Judicial institute were promulgated,770 establishing the institute as an independent body to coordinate the training of judges and prosecutors and of judicial and prosecutorial candidates. Development of judicial inspection capacities will be a long term challenge. Finally, one very important development in Kosovo´s Judiciary system was the cutting of past links between the executive and judicial branches. This occurred with the passing of responsibility for the administration of courts from the Ministry of Public Services to the Kosovo Judicial Institute.771

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Generally, we can say that the situation in the courts has improved since authorities successfully encouraged greater participation by ethnic minorities. In terms of legislative developments, the promotion of the Constitutional Framework for Pro-

767. One example is the prosecution and trial of cases related to the March, 2004 riots, which remains unsatisfactory due to a lack of diligence in the case of investigations by the local police, lenient sentencing, and a lack of cooperation from witnesses. 13 convictions have been pronounced out of the 44 cases run by international prosecutors, while 12 were dropped and the others are still pending. 768. Kosovo (under UNRSC 1244) Progress Report op.cit. 769. In fact, ten judges and two prosecutors were from under-represented communities, selected by the KJC. 770. The Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) was created to train young judges and prosecutors in Kosovo. The KJI and the Criminal Defence Resource Centre (CDRC) were built to ensure better equality legal institutions by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 771. Kosovo (under UNRSC 1244) Progress Report op.cit 198

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

visional Self-Government in Kosovo and the new procedural and substantive criminal codes, as well as the issuance of justice circulars, has filled some gaps in the legislative proceedings. Improvements in the way that courts deal with crimes involving sexual assaults, and on the assignment of defence counsels have been made. The Kosovo Chamber of Advocates (KCA), representing the defense bar, has played an important role in raising the standard of defense representation by drafting a Code of Conduct and providing training for its members. Overall, most judicial institutions have been established, major legislative reforms have modernized the judicial system, the standard of professional practice for judges and lawyers has improved, and the introduction of international judges and prosecutors has helped resolve sensitive interethnic and organized crime cases. 772 However, despite positive developments Kosovo´s Judicial system still has many problems to face. With respect to legal and judicial institutions, the authorities have failed to provide the courts with adequate office space to hold public hearings, and have resisted calls to increase judicial salaries to attract the brightest lawyers and to discourage corruption. A serious lack of institutional support for dealing with noncustodial sentences must be addressed, especially for juvenile offenders, so that alternative punishments can be used. Despite numerous recommendations from several organizations calling for better facilities for mentally ill offenders, adequate secure facilities are still lacking. While UNMIK has introduced a vast array of new laws, a number of areas that would have benefited from new or amended legislation have been left untouched.773

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to the OSCE, the judges of Kosovo have yet to lift their standard of practice to international standards. Continuous breaches of due process and fair trial norms occur throughout Kosovo, despite recommendations indicating which practices are in need of change. In particular, judges at all levels consistently fail to properly and fully explain their decisions on detention and punishment. A USAID study summed up the problem by saying that even after eight years of institution-building there is no shortage of problems, breaches of human rights norms still occur daily, new institutions need to be created or old ones improved, judges and prosecutors need salary increases, and amendments to the law are still required. Moreover, even after years of training, judges continue to repeat the same mistakes and defense counsels still fail to properly represent their clients.774 Much criticism has been leveled at the international judge and prosecutor program, which does not seem to be functioning properly, despite having been a necessary component in fighting interethnic and organized crime in the immediate postconflict period. Reasons for this vary from inadequate contractual arrangements for international judges and prosecutors, to the fact that procedures for case assignments 772. OSCE Report, 2006, Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System, 1999-2005 Reforms and Residual Concerns March 2006. p3, Pristina. 773. Ibid.p4 774. USAID Kosovo Report, 2006, Evaluation of the Justice Reform Activity- Kosovo, July 19, 2006, p 2 199

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

may breach international standards, and a failure to engage in mentoring, which has diminished the long-term benefits of the program. Although these problems could have been remedied without a large effort from the UNMIK, they were neglected and are still present in Kosovo, diminishing an otherwise successful initiative.775 Discussions of current court administration issues in Kosovo confirm my assumption that these institutions are the focus of the power struggles mentioned in Chapter 1.3.5. One critical issue is whether court administration should be under the control of the Ministry of Justice or the successor Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (KJPC). The interviewed employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK, which is also a legal expert in Kosovo, insists that only under a constitution can checks and balances in Kosovo be assured. Only clear constitutional mechanisms to protect the judiciary and allow for its independence from the executive and legislative branches can allow court administration to be under executive control without being a serious problem. This is a challenge for Kosovo, which does not yet have a constitution. One is currently being drafted, and when finished it will be an absolutely crucial factor in the quality of the judiciary. It must allow for a common law source, and avoid having different sources of power supersede each other through their hierarchies. According to the above-mentioned interviewed person, this is the Achilles heel that the international community should focus on, in order to consolidate the fundamentals of its state-building efforts by making possible a clear separation of powers for the young institutions of Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Experience in the Balkans shows that court administration can be misused to influence and pressure the judiciary, and care should be taken to prevent this in Kosovo. However, the Kosovo Minister of Justice made clear his intention to place court administration under his ministry, and although there were grounds to believe his reasons were personal, the arguments presented to the IC were deemed legitimate. After an impressive effort from this ministry, court administration was placed under control of the Ministry of Justice, although not without great criticism from Kosovo's civil society. Notwithstanding, the issue of court administration is not completely finalized, and remains open to debate. As one of the first institutions to be transferred to the control of the government of Kosovo, it is expected to face challenges over its human capacity and overall functionality in the future. Another concern regarding the judiciary is the professionalism of local judges and prosecutors. Notwithstanding the creation of several institutions and the hiring of new officials, the core of the judiciary is still composed of individuals who were employed before 1989, and thus typically retain a communist authoritarian mentality. In such cases, it does not help to set deadlines, as it is more a matter of modifying the overall attitude in this field, which inevitably takes quite some time. Although the IC has initiated training programs for young local staff during the past eight years, the preparation of international legislative drafts by local officials remains a challenge. It is thus very difficult to draft legislation in Kosovo, especially on issues that require a

775. OSCE Kosovo Report, March 2006 , Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System, op.cit. p4 200

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

high grade of expertise. Most of the local legal staff remains young and inexperienced in such issues, and officials at all levels share a lack of experience in dealing with the international legal issues in Kosovo´s past. It remains difficult to find experienced legal professionals in Kosovo who do not belong to the old authoritarian school. UNMIK's legal training and capacity-building projects in this area cannot be criticized enough. They take place in a discontinuous and accelerated manner, and only on weekends. These courses cannot form the basis for a systematic shaping of the young legal mentality. Compared to the EU, where young professionals graduating from law universities start working only after dedicating years to training and gaining experience in the field, Kosovo cannot afford such luxury. When UNMIK was formed in 1999, the university system was not functioning at all, while there was a strong and immediate need for a functioning judiciary. Moreover, there was strong political pressure to integrate judges that had been working before 1989, but who were not allowed to work under the Milosevic regime. This led to a preponderance of narrow-minded, older legal professionals. Encouraging and training young professionals remains the only real option, even though it will take time for them to master the knowledge and experience necessary to draft legislation. Thus again in this area, more time is needed.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The low salaries of judges, prosecutors, and local legal staff is often named as a reason for poor performance. The interviewed employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK does not accept this as a reason for the judiciary´s ineffectiveness. In fact, Kosovo judges and prosecutors are currently paid more than any other civil servants there.776 If sustainability in the judiciary is the long-term aim, then local staff need to accept that judges and prosecutors should not be paid much more than other civil servants unless and until there is significant economic development.777 This rule goes across the board, and should be valid for all professions in Kosovo´s checks and balances systems, not only for judges and the persecutors. In the coming years, there will be increasing pressure to build the capacity of new institutions supporting Kosovo’s justice system. But since UNMIK and other international organizations are already planning their departures, and many of their professional employees have left Kosovo, few experts remain to assist with creating mechanisms for the implementation and sustainability of these institutions. It is clear that the development, stability, and increased capacity of these new institutions will now rest in hands of the small remaining post-status donor community. Meanwhile, institutions key to legal integrity remain underdeveloped, as does the judiciary. Hence, achieving a strong and credible judiciary remains the main challenge in building Kosovo´s checks and balances, creating a handicap that has and will continue to undermine the effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the other pillars.778

776. A major part of Kosovo´s Budget is actually donations. 777. Author´s interview with employee of Judical Development Division of UNMIK, op.cit. 778. The author refers to the corruption problem present in the Kosovo Government, a well-known phenomenon in Kosovo Society. "That no one has been in prison for corruption until now 201

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Although much effort has been made to modernize the legal system through the adoption of a multitude of EU-compatible laws, Kosovo´s institutional integrity remains weak precisely because the judiciary is unable to effectively enforce the rule of law. It is therefore crucial to stress that any future intervention involving extensive institution-building should concentrate on developing a strong judiciary, coupled with an efficient police force and effective investigative bodies. While it is clear that this is a difficult task, especially for Kosovo which has undergone ethnic conflict and is still very much segregated along ethnic lines, it is also clear that unless this is tackled, donor funds would be wasted on training the civil service or setting up institutions that will not have much long-term benefit.779 The result of this would be easy to predict: a failed state in the EU's backyard. To conclude, regarding the efficiency and especially the sustainability of judicial structures in Kosovo, I will use the words of the interviewed employee of UNMIK´s Policy Division saying: "Is the judiciary going to be sustainable?... Yes!. Is it going to be perfect? No! ...considering that "perfect" is a matter of perception of what we expect...the IC should certainly expect that the rule of law will persist and be strengthened, but in order to do that... [the IC] should ensure that Kosovo is not left to its own devices. After all, it is a very young democracy and a society that has still a lot to learn....there is still need for assistance from the International Community....but in the form of support and advice rather than in an executive manner.We have to be patient and realize that things that are not working today as we expect, but will become better over the years...what we really need in Kosovo is simply more TIME for our common efforts!"780 3.1.2 International Players and setting 3.1.2.1 UNMIK: Building the institutional capacity

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Since June, 2007, UNMIK has been rapidly transforming from an agency with almost total authority over the government of Kosovo to one with an ever narrowing set of issues it maintains control over until its final withdrawal from Kosovo.

shows the (lack of) seriousness of the judiciary, while the Agency Against Corruption is an irony of its own" states a Politician, 31 October 2006 in the interview. While the employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK, suggests in the interview that "Corruption is there but until now we have not been able to prove that it exists because the investigations have dragged on, or it has been impossible to penetrate an organized society that is fundamentally corrupt, etc ....we would be cautious when we talk about it..... Corruption is a fashionable issue in the Balkans anyway." 779. Here it would be interesting to do further comparative research to better understand the challenges of imposing the rule of law in postconflict countries, and how a strong justice system can be developed in such environments. 780. Author´s interview with employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK, op.cit. 202

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Throughout its lifetime, UNMIK has been headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and has operated under the four “pillars” of authority. Only two of these pillars, the Civil Administration and Police and Justice are affiliated with UNMIK and report to the UN. The other two, the OSCE and the EU pillar, are affiliated with UNMIK, but report to other EU institutions. Although the latter two are important supports for governance in Kosovo, the key capacity-building institution is ultimately UNMIK, which has a crucial role to play through qualified and experienced personnel, in partnership with local officials.781 In this unit I will focus on the ability of UNMIK's two pillars782 to institute capacity-building measures as means to provide increased human potential to bring about desired changes in the institution-building process. Increased human and institutional potentials relate to each and every layer of policy implementation in institution-building programs, starting with the task of building those structures necessary to have a functional system, followed by the application of legislation to those structures, improvement of management skills, and strengthening of planning skills for older officials, as well as changing attitudes in support of a desired democratic culture.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Capacity-building is a structured and measured process for improving the ability of institutions to function regularly and to resist crises, thus surviving over longer periods of time and generating sustainability and stability. So far, capacity-building processes have occurred in several interrelated and interdependent stages, culminating in the provision of targeted training and development measures designed to improve performance at the individual and institutional levels. I maintain that for such processes it is crucial to employ a Socratic training approach, because the knowledge involved cannot and should not be handed over ready-made, but must be appropriated by the recipient through a process involving experience. Capacity-building efforts in state-building and development processes could then translate into effective local government by creating a cadre of technically trained personnel qualified to undertake the tasks at hand, as well as management expertise to direct it. In the case of Kosovo, UNMIK has recognized that low capacity is a constraint on the establishment and sustainability of its institutions. Local and international officials are faced with many problems due to an insufficient quantity and quality of staff for the task of self-administration. Low salaries and limited office space are issues of concern even today. The PISG´s lack of capacity in most areas was made clear in the report of Kai Eide, UN Special Envoy, on the state of Kosovo. He insisted that the transfer of authority and a robust intervention policy should be accompanied by a more ambitious and systematic policy of capacity-building. Other assessments confirming Kosovo´s weak and inexperienced institutions recommend giving them not only more responsibility, but a constant supply of relevant knowledge and expertise.783 Much has

781. Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, ICG Europe Report N°148, 3 September 2003, p2 782. The two latter ones will be considered in more detail in the following chapters. 783. Kai Eide Report, op.cited, Kosovo 2004. 203

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

been done to build capacity, as in the successful case of the Kosovo Police Service School784 where a systematic and evolving project has provided Kosovo with a remarkably well trained multi-ethnic police force. However, much remains to be done in a number of other areas.785 Interviews conducted in Kosovo reveal a constant refrain in many local institutions that although foreign assistance is perceived positively, little has been done to build real capacity within local organizations and to take capacity-building seriously. Many foreign assistance providers concede that due to a lack of time, little has been done to build the capacity of professionals in Kosovo, or to transfer skills to those who will soon be charged with running local organizations. Many of the people interviewed expressed a willingness to learn how to discharge the responsibilities of operating institutions, while others expressed frustration that foreign technical assistance was drying up without leaving significant progress behind.786 A USAID evaluation report on Kosovo stresses the necessity of further assistance targeted at building the capacity of institutions and individuals, especially as the pace of UNMIK’s exit process quickens, so that locals can learn to take responsibility and run their own affairs.787 A political affairs officer in Kosovo, regards the limited ability of the political class of Kosovo to deal with crisis situations, and their inability to respond under political pressure, as a serious problem. For him, "as long as they are used to giving the blame to the IC every time somethings goes wrong, and have the possibility of saying that they would like to do it differently but UNMIK, IC, KFOR, or another international entity has intervened, than there is not much we can do about it."788 Local politicians in Kosovo will never be able to take responsibility and learn how to deal with pressure from their own people unless they learn how to take responsibility for their own acts. Here the UN and its authoritarian approach has not necessarily played a supportive role in Kosovo. This is confirmed by an ICG report that suggests UNMIK should take a step back and allow mistakes to be made in Kosovo. Capacitybuilding is definitely needed, as long as it is not in the form of authoritarian interference, but if it instead allows local institutions like the PISG to do their job when authority is transferred to them, and thereby allows some mistakes to occur.789

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In regard to capacity-building efforts, the interviewed employees of the SRSG Office in Kosovo recognize three interrelated challenges to political development in Kosovo, which I will examine in more detail because they touch the core of the capacity-building discourse in this study. The first consists of the transfer of core com784. See Frank Harris, 2005, The role of Capacity-building in Police Reform, Pristina, Kosovo, Submitted by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 785. Kai Eide Report, 2004 786. Author´s interviews with local officials in Kosovo, November 2006, Pristina, Kosovo. 787. USAID Kosovo, 2006, Evaluation of the Judiciary, op.cit. p41 788. Authors Interview with employee of the SRSG Office in Kosovo, op.cit. 789. ICG Report 2003, Two to Tango, op.cit. p22 204

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

petencies from UNMIK to local institutions in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that were until 2007 under UNMIK control. These core competencies, like the Justice and Interior Ministry which were only recently transferred to the Kosovo Government, do not yet have a solid basis due to a lack of time. One critique made of UNMIK and its capacity-building program in this respect is the lack of coordination of institution-building processes with capacity-building processes to assure institutional and human sustainability in the local context. Capacity-building done through a trial and error process produces a "learning by doing" experience which would prepare local individuals for the transfer of competencies to local political institutions, and help to assure their long-term stability. What is needed in Kosovo is a coherent integration of activities and programs by international organizations, especially UNMIK and its pillars. Such assistance should be well integrated when targeting a recipient institution. Considering the experience so far, a quick intervention with no follow-up has little chance of effecting long-term change. That is why different activities should build on one another while being driven by a coherent assistance strategy.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

My interviews revealed that many capacity-building efforts undertaken by the IC in Kosovo have been sporadic, uncoordinated, and of limited duration, and have been carried out by many different actors. Under such circumstances the impact will necessarily be limited. Moreover, this process has been done quickly, and due to the time pressure, structures and institutions are being constructed without giving local individuals the necessary knowledge to make them functional. Local leaders have continually appealed for a more systematic approach and for assurances that the qualifications of those involved will match the needs on the ground. The best approach in this case would be to perform capacity-building according to local demands, while preparing local officials before introducing new institutions and structures. For a time-limited intervention like that of UNMIK, time is short and these tasks will be mostly the responsibility of follow-up international organizations remaining in Kosovo after the status issue is resolved. The OSCE for example, could be asked to identify areas where capacity-building is needed in order to draw up a more systematic plan of action for meeting existing requirements in the field.790 The second challenge mentioned by the interviewed employees of the SRSG office in Kosovo, is the matching of assistance offered with the absorptive capacity of local institutions, and the lack of focus on appropriate targets of assistance. Apropos this, a PDK Politician interviewed explains that local knowledge has not been well considered when it comes to this issue. Although there have been recommendations from local think tanks on this issue, mostly to local leaders, this has had more of a cosmetic effect and has not been considered seriously by international organizations.791 According to classic development aid literature, a recipient organization should fulfill three requirements before it qualifies as an appropriate target; 1) it should need the assistance, 2) it should want the assistance and be willing to provide 790. Kai Eide Report, op.cit. 2004 791. Authors interview with PDK Party Official, op.cit. 205

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the support to accept the assistance, and finally 3) it should have the capacity to absorb the assistance, which is unfortunately lacking in many cases in Kosovo.792 A list of EU pre-accession criteria have been attached to the "Standards before Status" motto, as will be explained in detail in the next chapter. In response, most local governmental and non-governmental stakeholders have become eager to get involved in order to cope with the pace of these requirements, despite their significant needs for capacity-building assistance. The experience of other countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, who are expected to join the EU in 2007, has demonstrated that the process of capacity-building for the successful implementation of the EU’s cohesion and structural policies is indeed a challenging and lengthy process. In the context of Kosovo, where public administration at the national and local levels is relatively new and lacks a bureaucratic tradition, these challenges will be even greater.793

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, the third challenge in the political development of Kosovo includes technical assistance to the opposition. Considering that the invigoration of democracy should include the opposition as well, UNMIK should have intervened more to ensure that this crucial player in the political process gets the proper attention and resources. Only in this way can the Assembly function properly and political development advance. So far, the parties that have controlled the government have benefitted from the lion's share of capacity-building assistance and policy advice from the international community. This leaves the opposition parties at risk, short of resources and access to knowledge. This is particularly a problem in Kosovo's difficult educational environment and its enclave status of recent years, with its consequent lack of qualified specialists. Therefore networks should be supported that enable the opposition to challenge the government adequately across the full range of its policies. If not properly addressed, this issue will have indirect effects on the quality of government policy, political competition, and political development in Kosovo overall.794 The need for capacity-building in the political domain in Kosovo became particularly clear during preparations for political representation at the Vienna negotiation talks. According to a local newspaper in December, 2004, the Kosovo political elite requested that Harry Holkery, SRSG at the time, support this process by organizing a capacity-building program specifically for the Vienna negotiations. This was one case where local politicians (mainly K-Albanians) felt their lack of capacities in negotiation skills and experience. Considering the very short period of time that the Kosovo political elite have been engaged in negotiations, starting a negotiation process with such little experience would have put them at a severe disadvantage vis a vis Belgrade with its hundred years of state and diplomacy experience. Thus, under 792. Cp. USAID Reports on Kosovo. 793. Ibid.p22 794. See UNMIK police memo reproduced by Express on 15 April, 2005, which reveals routine information-sharing with one of the party intelligence structures. Here rival party intelligence structures have had various tasking from KFOR, where the LDK Party s intelligence service is viewed as more professional. Crisis Group interviews with competent sources, 2003-2005. See ICG Report, Kosovo after Haradinaj, 2005, op.cit. 206

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

SRSG Holkery an intensive training of Kosovo's politicians and government officials took place under the capacity-building program.795 To conclude, capacity-building is the mantra of UNMIK operations in Kosovo, and the buzzword for all of its interventions. However, while UNMIK is winding down, efforts should be made to shift the focus of assistance from performing the role of government officials to providing enough qualitative assistance to Kosovo's people so that they can assume the reins of authority themselves, and achieve the desired sustainability after the departure of UNMIK. Even here, Kosovo has a long road ahead as it is not only the structures and institutions, and training of individuals that is necessary but also a change in the mentality of the people, which may require a change of generations before reaching the expected EU standards. 3.1.2.2 The Standards, before, with and beyond the Status: Preparing for Europe, the promised future Along with the rest of the Balkan region, Kosovo is currently embracing the European agenda, underpinned by the EU policy for the western Balkans, called the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). At the same time, ongoing talks under the auspices of the United Nations on Kosovo's future status are expected to be finalized soon.796A vision for integration of the western Balkans into the mainstream of the EU was presented at the Zagreb summit in November, 2000. During this summit, the countries of the region agreed to abide by the EU’s conditions and to use the SAP to prepare themselves for accession into the EU through the declaration of the Zagreb summit. Since 2002, Kosovo has been part of the SAP through the EU’s parallel track called the SAP Tracking Mechanism (STM).797

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Actually, Kosovo´s long road to the EU started with the “standards before status”798 policy, which was partly designed as a tool to manage the interim period until the international community was ready to address the question of final status.799 Michael Steiner, SRSG until July, 2003, undertook a rhetorical move to adopt "standards before status" as a motto, intending to focus energy on certain standards for Kosovo's institutions before status negotiations could begin. These standards remained decidedly unclear, and effectively this merely deferred the final status question.800 These standards were initially perceived as unrealistically ambitious and un795. ZERI Newspaper, op.cit. p7 796. European Communities, C. (2007). Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document for Kosovo for years 2007- 2009. Assessment Report, p4 797. See Zagreb Summit, 24 November 2000, Available online at: www.europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/, Accessed September 2006 798. See Appendix 5 for a detailed list of the Standards goals, benchmarks and requirements for Kosovo. 799. See Standards for Kosovo document, By UNMIK / PISG, presented in Pristina December 2003, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/docs/leaflet_stand_eng.pdf, Accessed October 2007 800. Chesterman Simon 2005, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, 207

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

achievable in the short term. In fact, K-Albanians and K-Serbs doubted the sincerity of the international community’s “standards before status” attitude.801 However, despite the original intentions of the IC, the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan was adopted in March, 2004, even though the K-Serbs decided not to participate in its preparation802 and implementation.803 Although there were problems with the operational and clarifying mechanisms necessary to implement this plan, it provided a useful overview of the requirements for transforming Kosovo into a modern democratic society. Judging from its level of detail and ambition, one could say that its implementation as a precondition for status discussions lacks credibility. The proclamation of a clear schedule for implementation of the plan by USA vice secretary of state Mark Grossman in 2005 was very important to ensure credibility. UNMIK and the IC in Kosovo realized that simply talking about fulfilling standards without fixing a clear timeline would not only be unproductive, but would also undermine the credibility of UNMIK, which was already fragile at the time. Michael Steiner therefore made a proposal to the Contact Group in 2003, suggesting that if results of the work on Kosovo's institutions to date were positive, then the Contact Group should begin a carefully managed process to solve the status issue. Independent of events at that time, work on fulfillment of the standards should have continued with a "Standards and Status" approach replacing "Standards Before Status". Although reaching the standards will be a long-term effort, which will last beyond the status issue and well into the process of guiding Kosovo closer to Europe, their main aim was for Kosovo's institutions to focus on a set of priorities reflecting the most urgent requirements.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In order to promote short-term progress and achieve credibility among the populations concerned, these priorities had to be realistic and achievable as well as visible, so they could lead to concrete results on the ground and a better climate between the majority and minority ethnic groups. Especially after the events of March, 2004, the initial focus was placed on return and reconstruction, and decentralized government and security, through standards directly supporting such priorities. An interviewed politician in Kosovo stated that the 2004 riots made clear that although all the standards necessary for the finalization of status are important, some of them have more priority over others. So, for example the availability and functionality of democratic institutions, as well as that of the rule of law and its implementation, must come first. These must be followed by the free movement and economic standards.804

801. 802. 803.

804.

and State-Building., Oxford University Press: Oxford. p229. Kai Eide Report, op. cited 2004, Kosovo ZERI Newspaper, op.cited, 19 October 2004, Pristina, Special Edition, Kosovo Political Secrets 2000-2004, While Belgrade was against such a plan and openly claimed its sabotage, arguing it would bring Kosovo closer to independence, Serb leaders in Kosovo accepted the plan behind closed doors in a meeting with UNMIK and western diplomats, but were obliged to criticize it in public due to pressure from Belgrade (as they did in the 23 October parliamentary election). Author´s interview with Politician and official of Kosovo´s PISG, 1 November, Pristina, 2006 208

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

All these areas are of crucial importance for bringing Serbs back to their homes and their leaders back to the political process. Giving minorities the conditions and political mechanisms necessary to ensure a dignified life in Kosovo was, and remains, the only way to move forward with confidence toward further transfer of competencies and more local ownership. A priority-based policy would also have sent an unambiguous and convincing message to Kosovo's Albanian leaders with regard to what is expected of them in order to proceed. Moreover, this would have increased the credibility of the IC with the local population, as well as increasing their effectiveness on the ground. Consequently, the eight Kosovo standards and their 32 subcategories, all managed by UNMIK, were integrated with the EU entrance standards (acquis communautaire). A European Commission position paper raised the possibility of the EU entering into contractual relations as a kind of preliminary process for joining the Stability and Associations Pact, with Kosovo suggesting a new openness to independence.805 In response to the European Partnership for Kosovo, Kosovo authorities adopted an "EU Action Plan" for the implementation of the European Partnership in August, 2006. Later, a new instrument called "Self Tracking Mechanism" was created, in the form of an agreement between the EU and UNMIK, which states that every law approved in Kosovo should be compatible with EU laws.806

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In legal terms, this means that the Constitutional Framework is coordinating Kosovar legislation with the acquis communautaire. In practical terms this should commit the PISG to European integration. According to chapter 5.7 of the Constitutional Framework, the PISG are responsible for aligning their legislation and practices in all areas of responsibility with relevant European and international standards and norms. This provision contains a clear quasi-constitutional obligation to harmonize Kosovo legislation with the acquis communautaire of the European Union.807 Such an approach has made the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo on paper the most developed constitutional text in the Balkans regarding a commitment to European integration. In practice, however, the PISG lack the necessary capacity and resources to undertake the required harmonization. The European Union has offered its support in this context by providing legislative and administrative assistance through various institutions such as the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), UNMIK and its EU pillar IV, and the newly established EU Office in Kosovo. In fact, until 805. A European Future for Kosovo, Brussels, 20 April 2005, Communication from the commission. A European Future for Kosovo COM (20.04.2005) Final 156. 806. Author´s interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo,, op.cit., 807. The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo, Chapter 5.7, says: The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall be responsible for aligning their legislation and practices in all areas of responsibility with relevant European and international standards and norms, with a particular view to facilitating closer economic, social and other ties between the people of Kosovo and other Europeans, and in awareness that respect for such standards and norms will be central for the development of relations with the EuroAtlantic community, in http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/ FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf, Accessed December 2007 209

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

December, 2007, no Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of European Integration were present in Kosovo to facilitate this process. Instead, PISG and UNMIK agreed in July, 2004 to establish an Office for European Integration Processes (OEIP) under the authority of the Prime Minister.808 A long-term, streamlined, and coordinated approach to European integration is clearly still missing. The major problem likely to arise in the context of harmonization with EU standards is the underdeveloped capacity and lack of sufficient resources in Kosovo to undertake legislative harmonization without the need to refer to outside sources. Capacity-building in this field is of utmost importance for Kosovo in order to support a self-sustaining process of integration into EU structures. Until now this process has been very slow, and coordination among the governmental mechanisms dealing with EU integration processes seems fragmentary.809 Adequately developing the institutional and legal infrastructure best suited to EU criteria remains Kosovo´s next challenge. The problems hindering Kosovo’s EU harmonization processes include the institutional capacity gap and the lack of human resources, as well as inadequate coordination among governing units. Until now the government has had difficulties in this regard. It has failed to make proper use of existing capacity-building facilities, while new initiatives in this area are in short supply. This is why the government should strengthen its institutional capacities involved in the EU integration process using available resources, and improve coordination between governmental mechanisms working on this process. Furthermore, steps should be taken to maximize the use of all existing mechanisms and capacities associated with the EU integration process, and continue with the creation of new ones.810 KIPRED, a Kosovo think-tank, believes that these problems can be addressed within a short period of time, but will require considerable financial means for their implementation, which Kosovo does not currently have. Only a successful solution to these issues can pave the way to addressing long-term problems such as strategic planning and the education and training of professional personnel to work on the EU integration process.811

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Moreover, the continuing ambiguity over a final political solution seems to be undermining progress towards EU integration. Kosovo will probably continue to be governed from Pristina, with the EU assuming the leading international role, meaning that the EU will remain an important partner both for Pristina and Belgrade. This is why the EU should continue to shape its strategy towards Kosovo, and use its influ808. See the Administrative Direction N0.2004/18, Available at the Office for European Integration Processes (http://www.pm-ks-gov.net/IMG/pdf Urdhresa_administrative_per_zyrene_e_Integrimeve_Evropiane _Anglisht-2.pdf Oct. 2007. 809. The Government of Kosovo is developing all the above plans to accelerate the process. However, as long as these remain at the planning level, they will not be sufficient to achieve objectives. Thus, there is a need to invest much more in human resources in order to have well educated and trained staff to execute these plans. 810. KIPRED Research Paper June 2005, op.cit. p10 811. Ibid. p12 210

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ence to ensure that K-Albanians and K-Serbs commit to respecting and facilitating each other's presence as well as participating in political and social dialogue on the EU issue.812 Kosovo is currently going through a difficult and uncertain negotiation process aimed at achieving an agreement on its future political status. Regardless of progress on the status issue, the issue of EU integration remains a continuing critical issue. Entry to the EU is unlikely to come soon for Kosovo, but the possibility is frequently used as a carrot to encourage a "European" approach to political life; "The way to Europe is not through ethnic separation but only, and I say only, through mutual tolerance," warned Hans Haekkerup.813 According to the interviews made with the employees of the SRSG office in Kosovo, it took some time before K-Albanians understood that the standards are not a goal in themselves, to be forgotten as soon as status is achieved, but instead they have a great deal to do with EU integration. This translates to permanent democratic standards, the rule of law, economic development, etc. This means the standards are not only a step towards status, but a long-term goal for the future of Kosovo. Since the IC's mantra in Kosovo was originally "standards before status", then "standards with status" and recently "standards beyond status" it is being acknowledged that this process is supposed to continue after the status issue is solved.814 Generally, the prospect of EU integration is perceived in Kosovo as the main engine for legal reforms, social transformation, and increasingly for economic development. That is why as EU membership gets closer, this trend will likely accelerate. From here on, the necessity of adopting adequate policies to enable this process will become a priority. The existing mechanisms, capacities, and policies dealing with EU integration are crucial for analyzing the prospects of Kosovo's integration. Furthermore, the EU should do its part as the hope for the future of Kosovo by formulating a clear development strategy through incentives and disincentives for the future status of Kosovo and beyond.815

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It is expected that Kosovo’s aspirations towards EU accession will, in the long run, drive its political agenda after the resolution of status. Kosovo, like the rest of the Balkans, has an open and clear European perspective. As Solana once said, regardless of the outcome of negotiations on the political status of Kosovo, “the EU has reiterated that the future of western Balkan countries is integration in the EU”.816 This objective is one of the few that is shared by all Kosovo political parties and people. It seems that Kosovo has an advantage in being united around the vision of inte-

812. 813. 814. 815. 816.

Kai Eide Report, op.cit. Chesterman, S. 2005, op.cit, p83. Author´s Interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, November 2006. op.cit. Author´s Interview with ESI Senior Analyst, 28 March 2006, Vienna, Austria Solana, Javier. “Bashkimi Evropian dhe rruga drejt paqes, prosperitetit dhe demokracise” (EU and the way to Peace, Prosperity and Democracy) ZERI Newspaper, May 9, 2005, p5 211

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

gration in the EU. The main challenge is determining how to make the vision possible and achieve this goal.817 Kosovo's institutions and policy-makers (local, regional, and international) must cooperate with each other and work seriously to make the EU vision a reality for the future. In technical terms, this means the PISG must further develop and increase their capacities in relation to the EU integration process. It is widely accepted that there are no shortcuts to European integration, and Kosovo is no exception. Hence, the ultimate responsibility lies in Kosovo’s ability to introduce the necessary reforms and adopt European standards and values. Experience has shown that Kosovo residents are particularly receptive to developing ties with sister organizations in surrounding countries, and they are receptive to the technical expertise of foreign experts who have a common experience and understanding of EU issues.818 The opportunity and credible incentive of EU membership have now been offered to Kosovo, which must seize the momentum. Kosovo should work at full speed to make progress in introducing the necessary reforms and achieve European standards while cooperating with the IC, the EU, and its regional partners.819

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The recent experience of other developing countries in the region provides invaluable lessons on how Kosovo should develop, and what mistakes it should avoid. Rhetorical expressions of will and commitment are insufficient if Kosovo does not adopt new policies and establish adequate mechanisms to deal with the growing complexity of EU integration. As ESI reports suggest, sooner or later in the process of member state-building, every country reaches a "tipping point" at which practically the entire political spectrum becomes focused on the common vision of a different society. It is this mobilisation of political energy that gives the EU integration process its extraordinary potency. In fact if it is seen form a distance, this transformation appears nothing less than miraculous, yet this miracle has already happened and been repeated in other European countries under diverse circumstances. A closer look at this process reveals that the "tipping point" is brought about by a set of institutional processes and the powerful incentives they generate. Of course the engagement of the EU is indispensable in this context. Empty rhetoric should not only be avoided by Kosovo, but also by EU officials, so that the promise of democracy is not empty. Serious and long-term involvement of the EU is therefore more than necessary along Kosovo´s way to EU membership. Its relevance is not only in practical terms but even more in symbolic terms. For the people of Kosovo, the EU represents hope for the future. As a country with a tragic past, a labile present, and a vague future, Kosovo needs the EU as a worthwhile common goal to reach in the future. If only for this reason, its presence becomes simply unavoid817. KIPRED Research Paper, September 2006, Kosovo’s Capacity for EU Integration Don’t let the grass grow under your feet! Paper No3, Pristina, p6, 818. USAID Kosovo, 2006, Limited Scope Assessment of local Governance in Kosovo, op. cit. p19, 819. Many Kosovar officials welcome assistance from surrounding countries, especially those with whom Kosovo shares a common legal tradition. Author´s interview with government officials in Kosovo. 212

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

able. To put it in the words of a PDK Party Official,; "If Kosovo is ever able to get into the EU, it will take at least 20 years, and when we get there, the EU itself is not going to be the same as what we know today. Problems will not be solved by themselves if we get in there. That is why, even in the worst case, the role of the EU is rather symbolic, but very helpful and implies a direction to head towards, while giving us hope for the future."820 The actual position of Kosovo in relationship with the EU is presented in Fig.14821 below: Application for membership Accession

Croatia

Opinion by the Commission

FYROM

Application for Membership SAA Implementation SAA - Albania (June, 2006) SAA

Serbia and Montenegro

Feasibility European Partnership

Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo

Figure 14: Current position of Kosovo in the EU integration process. (Source: KIPRED 2006, Online)

3.1.2.3 The Role of the SRSG and Liaison Offices The fates of UNMIK and the PISG are intertwined. One cannot succeed without the other. (ICG Report, 2003)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) office is part of UNMIK, and was created immediately after the NATO intervention in Kosovo. The Security Council resolution that established UNMIK authorised the Secretary General to establish an international civilian presence to govern the territory. Therefore, according to Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK was in Kosovo to provide; "...an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the develop-

820. Author´s interview with PDK Party Official, Kosovo, November 2006. 821. This figure is adapted from the originally prepared one by Wolfgang Koeth, Deputy Head of the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo, January 18, 2006. Source: KIPRED Research Paper 2006, Kosovo’s Capacity for EU Integration, op.cit. p5. 213

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ment of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo."822 .

Additionally, in its first regulation UNMIK asserted some plenary powers. All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the SRSG."823 This means that the SRSG was empowered to appoint or remove any person, including judges, holding positions in the civil administration. It is a well known fact that Resolution 1244 did not attempt to resolve the central issue in the Kosovo conflict and deal with the competing claims of K-Serbs and KAlbanians over the territory of Kosovo. Instead, it aimed to postpone discussion of Kosovo’s future while putting an end to violence in the province and reaffirming the international community’s continued support for the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav federation.824 This of course had a negative effect on the understanding of Resolution 1244 by international staff including the SRSG on its implementation, not to mention the ambiguity regarding cooperation between the PISG authorities and other local counterparts. The confusion inherent in the UNMIK mandate is best described through an anecdote of Bernard Kouchner, former SRSG of Kosovo, who is supposed to have said, "Every morning I read Resolution 1244 and try to make sense of it.”825 Such an ill-defined resolution offers a poor basis for positive achievements, particularly for a mission such as the SRSG in Kosovo. In other words, if one does not understand the job requirements, it is very difficult to achieve them. Additionally, the "dual purpose" agenda of every SRSG appointed in Kosovo, the UNMIK and national agendas, made the operation even more difficult for the everyday activities of the PISG.826

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to local newspapers, Hans Hekkerup, the Kosovo SRSG following Kouchner, made the ambiguous content of Resolution 1244 even more visible.827 He was heavily criticized during the initial negotiations between UNMIK and Kosovo political leaders in 2001-2002.828 Reasons for this criticism included his personal characteristics, a lack of motivation as political mediator, an overly conservative interpretation of his mandate in Kosovo, and a lack of clarity about his job requirements. His passive attitude during meetings with western diplomats on crucial issues

822. Chesterman Simon 2005, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building., Oxford University Press: Oxford. P126. 823. See the UNSC Resolution 1244, Issued in 1999, Paragraph 10 824. See UNSC Resolution 1244, Paragraph 11e. 825. Information received in the interview with Elections Expert and Researcher, Pristina, Kosovo. 27 October 2006. 826. Ibid. 827. Hans Hakkerup was the least on the five SRSG, UNMIK performance list till 2004. PDK Party went so far and accused him of standing in the way of the first negotiations at the time. 828. Especially USA diplomatic mission in Kosovo at the time played a huge role in these negotiations. 214

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

such as the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo was just one of the reasons. The conclusion of these discussions was unsurprising, none of the local participants agreed to the text for the adoption of the framework.829 Local newspapers described Hakkerup at the time as: "the wrong man in the wrong place".830 The relationship between UNMIK, the SRSG, and the political elite of Kosovo is a very complex one. UNMIK, for example, has had less consultations with the PISG than it did with Kosovo’s political leaders in the earlier Interim Administrative Council (IAC) period. The executive board of the IAC, composed of three K-Albanian political leaders,831 one K-Serb observer, and four representatives of UNMIK, was empowered to make recommendations to the SRSG, who could either accept them or advise them in writing of the "reasons for his differing decisions".832 Before the election of the government in November, 2001, UNMIK shared major policy initiatives with politicians and often gave them an opportunity to provide input. After the government was formed this consultation declined dramatically. According to Chesterman, bodies like IAC did not actually wield any real power.833 So far, the formal consultative mechanisms between UNMIK, particularly the Office of the SRSG, and key offices of the PISG such as the Assembly presidency and the Prime Minister’s office have been simply lacking. Although some mechanisms for consultation exist, i.e. the Transfer Council, the Economic and Fiscal Council, etc, high level consultation remains ad hoc, often depending on the good will of senior officials on both sides. Following Migdal´s theory mentioned in Chapter 1.3.5 of this study, this is a clear case where communication and proceedings at the highest level, the commanding heights, is influencing, in this case negatively, the proceedings in the trenches and the dispersed field offices.834 In fact, the apparent attitude of too many senior UNMIK staff that consultation need not be taken seriously has trickled down throughout the bureaucracy. UNMIK staff who do build relationships with local counterparts at the field level are often undermined by the lack of consultation at higher levels.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This situation gives the impression that instead of one cooperative and coordinated governing structure, the two parallel bodies of UNMIK and the PISG are administering Kosovo. The lack of consultation, especially in the early years of their existence, has had serious consequences for both bodies. UNMIK's initial failure to consult on the timing of planned dialogue with Belgrade undermined the work of the 829. Chestermann, S. 2004,. op.cit 830. ZERI newspaper, September 2004, op.cit. According to this newspaper, based on an information received from a western diplomat, Hans Hakkerup left Kosovo and his mandate very quickly without even making it public, and never come back after his Christmas holidays in 2001. 831. These political leaders, Ibrahim Rugova, Rexhep Qosja and Hashim Thaci were parties at the time of Rambouillet Accords of June 1999. 832. UNMIK Regulation 2000/1, On the Kosovo Joint Administrative Structure 833. Chestermann, S. 2004,. op.cit p132, 834. See Chapter, 1.3.5 op.cit, 215

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

first Prime Minister of Kosovo and almost brought the coalition government to collapse. Additionally, it impacted the government and civil society's acceptance of the benchmarks initiative when it failed to remind the Assembly of the importance of revisions to its rules of procedure. These failures brought this body considerable difficulties. Considering that UNMIK and the PISG share the same objectives, this lack of a formal senior-level consultation mechanism requiring sharing of information on activities and initiatives has been a significant failure of all SRSGs in Kosovo.835 The disarray of UNMIK also stems from a need for interior coordination between the different components of UNMIK itself. The main challenge is its inter-pillar coordination and cooperation, given that its policies must be shaped in a wider shared context, with priorities set jointly on the basis of a common strategy throughout UNMIK and with its local counterparts. Although much has been done to tackle this issue, joint strategic and operational planning between the pillars remains weak. This leads to parallel and uncoordinated action, and affects progress negatively by reflecting a lack of a shared sense of direction. Even though each pillar has different institutional “origins,” approaches and timelines, their strategic priorities, operational planning, and actions on the ground should be better coordinated.836

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The SRSG's ultimate authority and responsibility under Resolution 1244, even after governmental powers and competencies have mostly been devolved to the PISG under the current Constitutional Framework, is an additional problem for the development of political ownership in Kosovo. The SRSG not only has the ability to monitor and oversee, but also has the power to intervene and sanction any local institutions. He has the sole authority to annul or amend legislation that has already passed,837 while UNMIK maintains its capacity to oversee the activities of the PISG. But de facto, despite these powers, the number and scope of SRSG interventions in PISG affairs have been very modest. In fact, K-Serb and K-Albanian leaders describe a very cautious approach chosen by all the SRSGs in Kosovo so far, stating that a stronger policy has not been adopted despite the region´s need.838 Consequently, the advice of Kai Eide in his 2004 evaluation report on Kosovo was to balance further transfers of authority with a greater readiness by the SRSG to use sanctions and interventions. According to him, this would contribute to acceptance of the SRSG as the authority that sets the direction on the ground.839

835. ICG Report , 2003, Two to Tango, op. cited, p21 836. See the Kai Eide Report and its recommendations to UNMIK. 2004, op. cit. 837. On a number of occasions, the SRSG has intervened in the legislative process of the PISG. He has refused to promulgate laws judged to be in violation of resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework and has nullified resolutions of the Assembly considered to be beyond the scope of its competencies. Powers of intervention were also exercised through executive decisions to set aside the decisions of municipalities. 838. Author´s Interview with Political Expert and Ass/Professor Pristina University, 24 October 2006, Pristina 839. Kai Eide Report, 2004, op.cit. 216

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Considering his power in Kosovo, the personal character of the SRSG is very important and it can shape the image of the mission. This image also depends on the situation during his appointment. For example, four years ago the decisions taken would have been seen as much more controlling and complicated than they would have been six months before. Broadly speaking. the relationship of the SRSG with local political leaders has previously been more complicated than it is now, when it is perceived as more relaxed.840 In addition to the SRSG, diplomatic or liaison offices established by key countries have played another important role in the political life of Kosovo. These offices were placed in Kosovo after the NATO intervention in order to monitor and influence political developments, as well as to guide the substantial flows of aid entering the country during the postwar reconstruction phase. These diplomatic offices were critical for providing information to their capitals and to the permanent representatives on the Security Council, particularly in the early days of UNMIK. States used this information from the field to apply pressure to UNMIK through their representatives in the UN to ensure that critical objectives were met. Particularly the quintet of the five main contributing NATO countries (the USA, Germany, the United Kingdom, and later France and Italy) generally acted as a check on UNMIK, while providing policy guidance and assistance.841

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

These offices also facilitated relations between UNMIK and Kosovo’s political leaders, by putting additional pressure on politicians when needed. This was crucial early on when Kosovo´s own checks and balances were not yet working. Considering the ultimate authority of UNMIK, it needed a counterweight to maintain a democratic appearance. UNMIK thus needed to have a transparent and accountable image, with clear checks on its authority that are not inherent to UNMIK’s system. Its leaders are not elected, and its officials wield enormous authority with minimal mechanisms for accountability. Thus, it is clear that without strong intervention from these diplomatic offices, an important and effective check on UNMIK power would have been missing. The diplomatic offices have thus been described as the “balance wheel” in the system that keeps the relationship between UNMIK and the PISG on track. Representatives from these offices worked together at critical moments to intervene directly in the process. When the PISG was out of line, diplomatic officers met with assembly caucus leaders or government representatives. When diplomatic representatives disagreed with UNMIK policy, they sent clear and direct messages to UN Headquarters. While this arrangement worked well in the beginning, the relationship between UNMIK and diplomatic offices changed upon Steiner’s arrival, and since then the quintet's offices have had a less active and visible role.842 The transition from an emergency to a more routine political environment helps here to explain such a shift

840. Author´s interview with Political Expert and Ass/Professor at Pristina University, op.cit. 841. ICG Report, 2003, Two to Tango ,op.cit. p9 842. Ibid. op.cit, p10 217

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

in power and attention, but what is at stake here is the continuously diminishing constructive role of these liaison offices, leaving UNMIK accountable only directly to the Security Council. Moreover, SRSG Steiner's failure to meet and consult with donors, who are a critical source of technical advice and financial support, undermined UNMIK’s ability to deliver efficient policy initiatives. Not only has the ability of the diplomatic offices to act as a "balance wheel" been disrupted, but some of the diplomatic offices have been engaged in public and harsh criticism of the PISG, contributing to the erosion of their local credibility. An ICG report in 2003 criticized these diplomatic offices for not recognizing the need for support and encouragement of the PISG in its work, and suggested that they "save their harsh criticism for truly critical issues."843 It is understandable that UNMIK should be an example of accountability for Kosovo by welcoming criticism as an important democratic virtue, and not just talking about it. This is why the role of the diplomatic offices has been critical in ensuring that the institution-building processes works.

3.2 Alliances, conflicts and co-operations

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

3.2.1 Exploring the constellations of power in Kosovo politics In this unit I will give an overview of the main power constellations in the Kosovo political domain through an examination of the political actors and institutions, their coalitions, conflicts, and alliances during the last eight years. Furthermore, challenges and opportunities in this domain will be explored in order to identify potential future obstacles ahead for the Kosovo state-building project. I will start with the NATO intervention and the period when UNMIK was installed in Kosovo. At that time a kind of political tabula rasa reigned in the country, where neither the human resources, nor political structures existed to build on. Most of the political leaders in Kosovo at the time did not possess political mandates, and except for the few coming from civil society, most had military experience in their background. Compared to other countries in the region, Kosovo was thus faced with a double transition; 1)an economical transition, as a product of the former communist regime under Tito, and 2) the transition of a postconflict society bearing terrible consequences to overcome the trauma of the postwar situation. Moreover, no structures of a civil society existed, since former civil movements in the form of resistance organizations during the Milosevic era had become the political class, leaving so a gap. When UNMIK entered the scene, it was faced with huge challenges and had to build almost everything from scratch. Resolution 1244 created the first obstacles for UNMIK in the reconstruction of the country, the establishment of institutions, and preparation for future development, due to its vague definition. Some felt that UNMIK had to prepare Kosovo for its final status, but it was not allowed to make any decisions that could prejudice the out-

843. Ibid. p11 218

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

come of a final status. This vast political challenge for UNMIK improved only after initiation of the final status talks for Kosovo in 2004. The fact that the transfer of competencies to local leaders and institutions (the PISG) would only begin in 2004, and the transfer of competencies to the future international presence in Kosovo (EUPT) only after 2005, created another problem for UNMIK and the SRSG. After the final future status of Kosovo, no clean break will be made in the field of state-building. Instead, international structures and actors will still be present in the country, and will probably have to continue to take responsibility for governance in Kosovo.844 This presence will be visible on issues dealing with the implementation of the status package, and on issues where it is already foreseen that Kosovo should not have responsibility, i.e. foreign policy. Actually, UNMIK will have to stay in Kosovo as long as Security Council Resolution 1244 is in effect, which means until the Security Council has agreed on a new mission. Therefore UNMIK´s plan is that only after a new resolution is passed by the Security Council, and depending on the contents of the status package, will it decide how the phase out will be accomplished and how long it will take. From the UN mission's experience, it takes six to nine months to close a mission without negative consequences, but UNMIK will be faced with the challenge of having to manage it in a quite shorter time in Kosovo. The UNMIK mission was originally supposed to end in summer 2007, but according to Athissari, due to recommendations and political maneuvering still going on at the international level, UNMIK and the Kosovo political leaders had to wait for several elections to take place in Serbia, extending the mission on a continuous basis since November, 2006. This further pushing back of deadlines is the next problem on the list for UNMIK, which is struggling to be taken seriously as the patience of people and particularly extremists has already started to wear thin, creating a dangerous situation.845

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The problem that UNMIK is facing in such a scenario is that K-Albanian political leaders, who have typically played a very constructive role in their cooperation with UNMIK and in politics in general, have used the population's hope for the future status of Kosovo to reach their desired goals. Their power bases in the population have thus far helped to solve problems related to social tensions. In other words, the K-Albanian political leaders have unfortunately based all their political power on the issue of status in the hope that independence will be forthcoming. These hopes for independence find support in the Contact Group's London declaration, claiming that beginning in January, 2006 they would work to find a solution by the end of that year.

844. Interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, 2006 Kosovo. 845. This impatience became especially visible on 10 February, 2007 at a demonstration by VETËVENDOSJE! (Albanian word for "Self-determination") an extremist K-Albanian organisation pushing for quick independence while being critical of UNMIK and other IOs in Kosovo. UN police fired rubber bullets at unarmed demonstrators in Pristina, killing two and injuring 82. Afterward UNMIK arrested and detained the demonstration's organizer, Albin Kurti, the head of VETËVENDOSJE!. Amnesty International criticized UNMIK's conduct of his prosecution. See also http://news.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/7098/ 219

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Here UNMIK faced their next challenge. After repeating this information often to local political leaders, in November, 2006, the Contact Group's advice changed, now suggesting that UNMIK wait for the Serbian elections and postpone the final status decision once again. UNMIK saw itself obliged to postpone the final status decision once more, and therefore its phasing out deadline as well, in addition to having to deal with increasingly impatient political leaders. In this context, K-Albanian politicians rightly see a risk of losing their power and legitimacy with the population. This is "playing with fire" for everyone involved, bearing a high risk potential that could explode at any moment. According to interviews with political affairs experts in Kosovo, to add fuel to this fire, when K-Albanians leaders complained to UNMIK over this issue, they were answered with diplomatic games such as pointing tot the "fine print at the end of the page" and criticizing K-Albanians for not noticing it. This game went further, pointing out that the Contact Group statement does not actually clearly state that there will be a final solution for the status by the end of the year, but that they "will attempt to" find a negotiation solution by the end of the year. Serbian political leaders use such situations as justifications to conclude that "the negotiations are important, and not the solution of the issue by the end of the year", postponing the whole issue once again, and creating the impression of a vicious circle.846 It is an old political truth cited in many circles that the main challenges in a postconflict country rests not with the moderate sectors of society, but rather with its extremes and in that part of the society not controlled by the state institutions. The main concern is that extreme factions of society may exploit the momentum when situations become especially fragile, i.e. in the case of Kosovo, the status process being continuously postponed. In this case, two chief concerns have been raised:

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

1) Waiting for the elections in Serbia gives the wrong message. It gives the impression that the status process is heavily influenced by developments in Serbia, and that Belgrade is leading the status process talks. Considering that one of the guiding principles of the Contact Group is that neither side can block the process unilaterally, this is the wrong argument for building a fair and trusting dialogue between the two sides. 2) Kosovo is part of a bigger political game. Once Athissari has presented a final status package to the Security Council, no one knows how much time they will take to pass a new resolution. The known positions of Russia and China and the long times the SC usually takes for its decisions make the issue even more complicated. This is related of course to the fact that different interests from different actors on the SC influence the process, and although kept in the background, they still play a major role. The diplomatic maneuvering of different actors on the SC can take the form of a "deal or no deal" game, where it must be decided what price the EU or the USA will pay for getting Russia and China to approve a resolution. This makes it clear once

846. Author´s interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, November 2006, op.cit. 220

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

again that the Kosovo problem is not an isolated one and touches several fragile political areas in the world, such as Cyprus. What remains as the greatest problem for Kosovo is the Serbian politics of the last eight years, which give the impression Kosovo is seen as an "all-or-nothing" zerosum game. If the Serbs loose, they threaten to take to the streets, which shows, to use the words of a German diplomat, a total "Realitätverlust"847 from the Serb politicians. According to this diplomat, during all the negotiations, the Serbian politicians involved never gave the impression that they would work to find a difficult solution. Instead they displayed only an "all or nothing" approach.848 Here the EU countries will have to offer their EU accession "carrot" to Serbia in order to influence its attitude on the issue. K-Albanian political parties on the other hand, have been pushed and obliged to be part of an abnormal situation and constellation in Kosovo by the IC. Starting with the building of the Team of Unity, the IC has influenced the political party landscape by sitting the government and the opposition at the same table. For the time being, and until final status talks are completed, this is a good thing. It furnishes Kosovo's political leaders with a single unified voice on the Kosovo issue. In the long run, however, this may contribute negatively to the future political situation in the country, when the lack of experience with political debate becomes visible. The IC expected that Kosovo's opposition and government would leave their differences aside, even those politically legitimated in a democratic state, and from the beginning of 2006 would concentrate on the status issue at the Vienna negotiations. The aim of this action is for UNMIK to have control in the negotiating situation.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The wait for the end of the status talks has also contributed to a one year postponement of local governance elections planned for November, 2006. The message given here by the IC is another poor one. It implies that elections, the principle of a functioning democracy, may be postponed due to the status issue. It is now quite evident that the unresolved status issue is standing in the way of political development in Kosovo. On one hand, the political leaders of Kosovo, both Albanians and Serbs, must still learn how to deal with political pressure, and not simply blame the international community every time things go wrong. At the same time, political considerations dictate that leaders are not always held accountable for their actions, which means that the international administration does not at times discharge the full policing capabilities it has because of wider political considerations. One of the K-Albanian party leaders (Ramush Haradinaj) has been indicted for war crimes, yet little pressure was applied to deliver his indictment. Political calculations of the potential fallout and repercussions no doubt inform that decision. According to an INCORE report, the continuing support of Haradinaj as "the political leader" rather than his prosecution as "the war

847. The english translation for this word would be ""loss of the sense of reality" 848. Ibid. 221

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

leader" indicated the influence that international organizations have in shaping and determining the path of politics in Kosovo.849 Other challenges include the disillusionment and disappointment of K-Albanians towards the definition of final status and its perceived content. It is clear that K-Albanians would like to have full independence, but this will not come in the form that they expect. The next disappointment for them is that the details of status dossiers discussed in Vienna regarding the decentralization issue and the special relevance given to the Orthodox churches in these negotiations are almost unknown to K-Albanians in the trenches and dispersed field offices. The lack of knowledge regarding these important details creates a risk that even when Kosovo's status is defined and the Security Council has approved it, the political will at lower governmental levels in Kosovo to implement these laws might be low or nonexistent. Especially problematic is the fact that the power bases of political parties in Kosovo rest mainly in the trenches and dispersed field offices, which include the rural communities and communes. At those levels, local party leaders have already expressed their resistance on these issues. They consider themselves, rightly, as being mostly affected by such decisions and protest therefore against decentralization in the communes by expressing their refusal to implement it at the local level. This remains a big problem for Kosovo´s future that should be tackled as soon as possible.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The UNOSEK talks and negotiations in Vienna where these details have been decided were actually aimed at achieving a compromise on technical aspects, making it clear from the beginning that there would be no compromise from the Serb or K-Albanian side on the final aim of independence. In fact, between "independence at any cost" and "everything but independence" there is no common denominator. Here the IC was hoping to rely on issues of interest to both sides, such as decentralization, the protection of culture, and splitting of the WB debt, etc, but negotiations on even those issues failed. Although the Serbs conceded a bit, and the K-Albanians moved far from their original position, it was still not possible to build a bridge between the two. Thus, UNOSEK and Athissari attempted to construct a status package solution from the perspective of UN, based on the proposals of both sides, as an optimum and acceptable solution. However, given the depth of hostility and distrust that must be surmounted to achieve some political normalcy, any level of political cooperation and tolerance is significant progress in itself. The IC has been shepherding this process and has so far provided direction for the shaping of policies.850 The job of steering a middle course between competing and seemingly irreconcilable national objectives is a tricky one, exacerbated furthermore by the lack of a clear future. Although their ad hoc approach has brought a uniform frustration to all of Kosovo’s parties, the international over849. Peake, G. et.al. 2004, From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes, INCORE Report, op.cit. p 47 850. Chesterman S. 2001, Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and ‘Substantial Autonomy" August 2001, International Peace Academy Paper, United Nations, NY, See website: w w w. i p a c a d e m y. o r g 222

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

seers have succeeded in creating a setting where leaders can at the very least sit together, by shaping and controlling the parameters in which debate is allowed to occur.851 Finally, the "double standard" policies that have been applied in different situations by the IC and UNMIK have added to the challenge of partnership. Although there may have been good reasons for those standards to be applied, it has created situations where eyes have been closed and things allowed to happen that should not have. One excellent example of this is the case of Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo, which according to resolution 1244 should not exist. These structures have no legal basis, but the UN and IC have tolerated them from the beginning. This contributed to the fact that the biggest fear of the IC and UNMIK, namely the partition of Kosovo in the northern part of Mitrovica, has actually de facto taken place and has been present for eight years now. Thus, Kosovo and especially Mitrovica and its people are paying the price for the lack of the political will from the IC, which failed to intervene and stop the the parallel Serb structures due to fears of possible unrest. This has left the issue of Mitrovica to now be solved in the framework of the decentralization process. To conclude, a closer interaction and dialogue between all the international actors engaged in Kosovo is necessary to make sure that a new strategic approach can be elaborated, agreed on, and implemented. Without high-level attention, dedicated resources, and the strong and unified support of the broader IC, UNMIK will not be able to mobilize the strength, credibility, and resources required to carry out its responsibilities. The price for sporadic interest will be high, but the price for fragmentation will be even higher. The call of Kai Eide for a more concerted and coordinated engagement of all actors is thus the right message. Only in this way will the IC show it knows where it is going, and that it has the unity of purpose and stamina required for a coherent and specific exit strategy. UNMIK in Kosovo has recently been perceived by K-Albanians as having gone from opening the way, to standing in the way.852 It is time for the IC and UNMIK to lead the way and engage seriously in the state-building and development enterprise in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

3.3 Security and politics The complex nature of elements involved in the human security agenda mentioned in Chapter 1.2.6 caused me to categorize security in a state-building and development context as a parallel factor in the establishment of both human development and security, while bridging concerns for personal security and welfare. Based on Schwarz´s theoretical approach853 presented previously, and its summary of the interdependent nature of the three core state functions; security, welfare and representa851. Peake, G. et. al. December 2004, op.cit. 852. Kai Eide Report, 2004, op.cit. 853. Schwarz, R., 2004, Post-Conflict Peace-building: Security, Welfare and Representation, op. cit. pp 429–446. 223

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tion, I will examine the role of security in the political domain. I start with the idea that for political development to flourish, it is necessary to have a clearly settled legal background on security issues, and a safe political context where democratic political competition can take place. To put it in Schwarz´s terms, for democratic representation and political participation to take place, there should be a minimum of security and welfare in a country, and vice versa. Thus, my focus will be on the availability and functional capacity of security institutions in Kosovo, aiming to identify the political security necessary as a prerequisite for political development.854 Kosovo´s current security institutions include; the 1) Kosovo Force (KFOR), 2) Kosovo Police Service and CIVPOL, 3) Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 4) intelligence agencies, 5) private security companies, 6) Kosovo Correctional Service, and 7) Crisis and Emergency Management.855 Broadly speaking, the Kosovo security landscape remains overseen by extensive international involvement. Internally, it is policed by an international police force, while externally an international peacekeeping force guarantees its security.856 The domination of Kosovo’s security sector by international actors is a direct result of the 1999 conflict settlement. Together with the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, UNSCR 1244 designates the entire public security apparatus, including the judiciary, police force, prison system, and emergency services as reserved functions within the executive powers of UNMIK. The 2001 Constitutional Framework explicitly prohibits Kosovo’s PISG from establishing executive bodies to oversee, manage, and direct "reserved power" organizations and civilian management. The oversight of these bodies has remained the sole purview of UNMIK Pillar I (Police and Justice), COMMKFOR, and the SRSG, with the result that thousands of security practitioners, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, have come under the control of a handful of foreign civilians.857 I will consider each of these institutions a bit more in detail below: ­ Kosovo Force or KFOR

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

KFOR is a contingent of military forces from NATO and non-NATO countries, established in 1999 to secure Kosovo in the wake of the international military intervention. Under the technical military agreement signed by KFOR and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia at the close of conflict, the international security force is authorised to “take all necessary action

854. This unit is based mostly on KIPRED's research work and on author´s interviews with senior analysts of this institute in November, 2006, in Pristina, Kosovo. 855. This institute will not be considered in detail as it is beyond the scope of this study. It is simply named here. 856. Peake, G. et. al. Dec.2004, op.cit. p46 857. The resolution “identifies the international community as the sole legitimate entity with a mandate for law enforcement and the use of force in the region.”, KIPRED Research Paper,2005, Administration and Governance in Kosovo, 2nd edition, 2005, op.cit. p15. See the Resolution S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 224

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.”858 KFOR therefore has a mixed external defence and internal security role859. It provides a deterrent to any offensive irredentist sentiment in Serbia, secures parts of the border (although this responsibility is presently being transitioned to the police), provides static and mobile protection to minority communities, and acts as a potential back-up to the UNMIK police and the KPS in the eventuality that military assistance to the civil power is required during large manmade or natural disturbances. KFOR has incrementally ceded much of this role to other agencies recently, after initially being the primary force in charge of security in Kosovo. KFOR currently has three main tasks; a) external defence, b) protection of enclaves and religious sites, and c) assisting the police services in the event that they are unable to respond adequately to internal security challenges. This task is also known as military assistance to the civil power, and is arguably KFOR’s most important role at this time. However, there is no legislation stipulating how this extremely important, yet potentially problematic, assistance should be carried out. KFOR is not controlled by UNMIK, or by the Kosovo population, but receives military and political guidance only from NATO and the respective ministries of defence of its contributing nations.860

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

After its failure to stop the violence in March, 2004, KFOR has largely reconfigured to better deal with such situations, but the force is both too large and too small. Fewer soldiers can perform its day-to-day tasks, but there are not enough to cope with serious rioting again. As matter of fact, beyond defending Kosovo’s borders and preparing to do better against rioters than in 2004, KFOR’s approach to providing a secure environment for UNMIK’s work is minimal. It has failed to get convictions against extremist and organized crime groups, and in northern Kosovo it has not acted to reverse the creeping erosion of UNMIK’s authority, or moves toward partition. It has turned itself to the soft end of politics, producing TV advertisements for interethnic tolerance and cultural heritage, and attending municipal events. To put it in the words of an international civilian working in Kosovo “The only difference between us and them, is that we turn up in white cars, whereas KFOR in black cars”861

858. Military Technical Agreement between the international security force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999. Available under : http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/documents/mta.htm Accessed am 12 July 2006 859. KFOR’s mandate and objectives are set in UNSCR 1244, Annex 1 and Section 9 of which allocate its responsibility for: deterring hostilities and enforcing the ceasefire demilitarizing the KLA, establishing a secure environment for refugee returns, ensuring public safety, demining, supporting the international civil presence conducting border monitoring, and finally ensuring freedom of movement. 860. KIPRED & SAFERWORLD November 2005, Enhancing civilian management and oversight of the security sector in Kosovo,Pristina, Kosovo, p12. 861. International Crisis Group Europe Report, 28 July 2006, An Army for Kosovo? N°174, p10 225

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

­ Kosovo Police Service and CIVPOL

In 1999, UNMIK created the Kosovo Police Service, (KPS), whose personnel initially joined the UNMIK Civil Police (CIVPOL). Under Resolution 1244, the international civilian police in Kosovo under UN administration was required to be gradually replaced over time by local units of the Kosovo Police Service. Even with the promulgation of the regulation, the KPS remains under the authority of the UNMIK Police and Justice Pillar, and is headed by the Civilian Police Commissioner.862 It has all the relevant competencies of a police force, but its authority is superseded by International Police personnel, while its legal basis comes from UNMIK Regulation 2005/54. This regulation also contains the possibility of transferring competence to the Ministry of the Interior. CIVPOL is defined by two goals; first to guarantee law and order, and second to assure the development of a credible professional and impartial KPS. UNMIK, in co-operation with OSCE, have trained almost all KPS personnel starting in September, 1999. At the end of 2004, for example, there were a total of 7,021 personnel in the KPS with approximately 15% minorities, where 8% of them were K-Serb officers and circa 15% were women.863 The KPS is structured as a fully empowered police force to ensure that its development is proportionate with the responsibilities it will eventually take over. This has allowed the KPS to undertake increasingly more responsibilities, and to perform duties along with the UNMIK CIVPOL.864 The duties of the latter one include routine policing and criminal investigation.865 Although the relationship between UNMIK police and the KPS has suffered at the hands of a confused transfer process, the KPS has been successfully built up into a multiethnic and professional service that enjoys increasing public confidence866 Recently there has been a real and significant transfer of powers from UNMIK police to the KPS, exemplifying the changing nature of the security architecture in Kosovo. The UNMIK police presence in the territory has substantially decreased in parallel with a growth in KPS numbers and capacity, to the point where it now has operational control of 80% of police activity in the country. Although many key positions remain in the hands of international actors, in numerical terms this makes the policing architecture almost entirely local.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

There are, however, still fundamental hurdles to overcome before the KPS can be said to be appropriately managed and overseen by civilians. The KPS is not currently

862. This position is UNMIK appointee and is responsible to the Deputy of the SRSG or the Head of Pillar I 863. See UNDP Kosovo, December 2004, Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo 864. See KIPRED Document, March 2006, Kosovo´s Internal Security Sector Review, Stages I and II, Strategic Environment Review & Security Threat Analysis, Initial Findings. 865. Other duties include: high-risk policing in situations such as crowd control during violent demonstrations and civil unrest, for which it employs special police units as well as ensuring compliance with immigration laws and border regulations. 866. UNDP Kosovo, June 2004. "Light Blue": Public Perceptions of. Security and Police Performance in Kosovo, Pristina, p21 226

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

established or structured on a clear and authoritative legal footing,867 indicative of Kosovo’s entire security architecture, but exists as an attachment to UNMIK Police.868 With the support of the International Community, the capacity of the KPS in the fight against crime has been enhanced, but much remains to be done. A big challenge for the KPS is the historically negative perception of police structures in Kosovo, related to their association with the Serbian repressive police structures and their human rights abuses during the 1990´s. Here again, the lack of a democratic tradition or community policing in the framework of a democratic state becomes visible. Generally though, viewed with cautious optimism, the people´s trust of the KPS has grown substantially and this is a credit to the KPS´s professional work, as it is progressively equipped to take on internal security and border management. The KPS, is thus a success story for the IC, and is sometimes referred to as the "jewel in the crown" of international efforts in Kosovo.869 ­ Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)

The KPC is according to its mandate a civil protection organization. It officially came into being on 20 September, 1999.870 While KFOR signed the Kosovo Protection Corps Statement of Principles, UNMIK also promulgated a regulation that gave the KPC legal status under Regulation 1999/8, naming it “ a civilian emergency service agency". KPC’s mandate under this regulation stipulates that it shall not have any role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order.871 After this agreement, the SRSG and UNMIK took control of the KPC, while COMMKFOR was given responsibility for its day-to-day supervision. Taking a lead from their representatives on the ground, NATO and the UN Secretariat created an institutional successor to the KLA, finessing Resolution 1244’s stipulation that it be demilitarized

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Despite the organization´s clear mandate, successive attempts to enact a statute on Emergency Services through the Assembly of Kosovo have failed, with the result that there is no legal stipulation to coordinate KPC with other security bodies in Kosovo, including other civil emergency structures. Although its role as a civilian emergency service falls partially within the remit of the Ministry of Public Services’ Department 867. Despite UNMIK´s initiative in 2005 to draft a "Law on the Kosovo Police Service", which was to be promulgated according to the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP), the draft text was not debated and passed by the Kosovo Assembly, but promulgated by a SRSG decree instead. 868. See KIPRED 2005, Administration and Governance in Kosovo, op.cit, p18. 869. KIPRED, March 2006, Kosovo´s internal Security Sector Review, Initial finding, op.cit, pp13-25 870. This happened after KLA commander Hashim Thaci and KFOR commander General Mike Jackson signed an Undertaking on Demilitarization and Demobilization of the KLA, on 20 June, 1999. The KLA agreed to turn weapons in to KFOR over three months, and to comply with Resolution 1244, which set terms for ending the war and introducing KFOR into Kosovo. The resolution required that “the KLA and other armed groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the SRSG. 871. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/8, 227

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

of Emergency Management, the organisation is overseen by a combination of KFOR, the Office of the SRSG and a unit known as the Office of the KPC Coordinator. The KPC’s management structure and lines of accountability are such that K-Albanians have a significant, if inadequate degree of involvement in the organisation’s direction.872 Although its budgetary requests are reviewed by crucial PISG institutions, neither the Assembly nor other parts of the PISG are permitted to have legislative or executive oversight of its policies, which makes KPC in this important respect unaccountable to the public. It is therefore vital to tackle this issue, especially for an overly large and expensive organisation with a high need of reform like the KPC.873 The KPC's future remains completely opaque, and what is worse there is no policy, legislation, or strategic development plan being publicly articulated for it´s future. Of all the official security bodies, it has the most confused role. It is not allowed any security tasks, yet all sides see it as a vitally important security factor. K-Albanians place trust in it more than the KPS, KFOR, or UNMIK police, yet it is excluded from security transformation plans and has thus an uncertain future. Kosovo is therefore faced with a a quasi-military civilian emergency organisation, largely comprised of former KLA personnel, that lacks clear legal guidance in its work and requires a more substantial civilian management and oversight apparatus. Despite new proposals to create Ministries of the Interior and Justice for Kosovo, UNMIK does not appear to have a settled view on whether these bodies will take on the responsibility for overseeing the KPC.874

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The KPC, however, cannot be simply wished away. It is an established part of the institutional landscape, although perceived in widely differing ways by the key parties. It tries to project an image of discipline and apolitical service to a future Kosovo state. K-Albanians place enormous trust in it, but the IC regards it warily, as an embarrassment that it doesn't know what to do with. In fact, they purport to see it only in the present, the product of an interim compromise mandate875. K-Serbs tend to regard it with deep distrust in spite of a steady increase in the number of Serb recruits.876 Most KPC personnel endure rather than embrace their interim civil protection mandate, which indeed is neither what the K-Albanians nor the K-Serbs perceive the KPC to be about. In fact, most K-Albanians value it as Kosovo’s army-in-waiting. Unfortunately, bringing the KPC under full democratic civilian control will not be easy. This perception is strengthened by the fact that it has a military structure and

872. KIPRED & SAFERWORLD, November 2005, Kosovo, op.cit. p12. 873. It costed for example 15m Euros to the Kosovo Consolidated Budget in financial year 2004– 2005. 874. KIPRED & SAFERWORLD, 2005, op.cit, p13 875. This is one of the eight UN standards by which Kosovo’s readiness for final status will be judged. 876. For further information see the following document "Directives for the survival of the Serbs and the creation of conditions for significant returns to Kosovo and Metohija", The Parliament of the Union of Serb Municipalities and Municipal Units of Kosovo and Metohija, Session held on February 25, 2003, Northern Mitrovica. Kosovo 228

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

military ranks. But the really crucial question is whether the KPC is a barrier in the way of Kosovo’s future, or a flexible instrument that can aid Kosovo’s state-building?877 This will definitely not be resolved by ignoring it, but rather by placing it it at the centre of Kosovo´s future security sector development. ­ Kosovo Intelligence Agencies

According to KIPRED reports, the existence of intelligence agencies in Kosovo is a public secret that has only recently begun to be discussed in the public debate, finally breaking the taboo that has existed on them before. It seems that a plethora of intelligence services operate in Kosovo, which are at best tolerated,878 and at worst encouraged by the IC.879 Serbia´s Ministry of Internal Affairs operates a service that is believed to be one of them, but it will not be discussed here in detail as it is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that their influence, especially after the March, 2004 riots, casts doubts on the integrity of Serb KPS officers, and that their presence may have implications in the overall security situation in Kosovo.880 K-albanian political parties and organizations such as the KPC are also believed to have acquired intelligence capabilities. The intelligence services of political parties are a topic of regular media attention. Two main actors are known to be present in this field: the Institute for Strategic Research of Public Opinion (IHSOP), which is apparently affiliated with the LDK Party,881 and the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK), affiliated closely with the PDK Party. While IHSOP evolved from the former Ministry of Defence of the Kosovo Government in exile, SHIK emerged from the KLA, having as its head a member of the cabinet of the provisional government established by Hashim Thaci in 1999. The relationship between these groups is unclear, but their activities are thought to range from protection of party officials to gathering information on and intimidating political opponents.Though they are widely supposed to carry out illegal activities, these agencies appear to be tolerated and apparently even utilized by different parts of the international administration in Kosovo.882

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This sensitive and largely neglected issue was recently reported on and judged to be “significant in undermining confidence in security”883. In such a context, it is im877. ICG Report, 28 July 2006, An Army for Kosovo? op.cit. p13 878. See. ICG Report, 2005, Kosovo After Haradinaj, op. cit. Executive Summary 879. KIPRED Policy Paper, May 2006, Intelligence Agencies in Kosovo: Dismantling, osmosis, or integration? Nr.2, Pristina, p4 880. For more info see KIPRED November 2005, op.cit, p14 881. Security entrepreneurs appear to have grasped the opportunity for expanding their influence in the LDK party. In July, 2004 a previously unknown entity calling itself "Homeland Security", identifying with the FARK, and claiming to exercise oversight of the LDK, issued communiqués threatening party "deserters" and their families with violent consequences if they tried to draw away any more members before the elections. See ICG Report, 2005 Kosovo After Haradinaj, op.cit. p5 882. Following an article of Express newspaper in Kosovo in 15, April 2005. 883. See UNDP Kosovo, ISSR, 2006, Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review 229

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

possible to build bridges between groups in society that spy each other Now that Kosovo society needs unity to address its final status and development needs, it is being dragged backwards by warring parties involved in conspiracies. Senior government sources acknowledge that, "there are too many intelligence groups operating in Kosovo. It is a cancer". Furthermore, according to an ICG report quoting a senior LDK municipal official, "If, after all this publicity, the internationals leave these party intelligence services untouched, it will be awful for Kosovo…there will be no future, no use of a ministry of the interior, and the life of our citizens will not differ overmuch from the Milosevic era", and confirming a similar concern within the police, stating that "the KPS cannot dismantle the two party intelligence services. Only the internationals can do that..."884 Thus, the presence of unregulated intelligence services in Kosovo demonstrates a failure of the international administration and KFOR to establish the rule of law. It is therefore the responsibility of UNMIK and the diplomatic community to break up these party intelligence services under Resolution 1244, but UNMIK seems un-inclined to act. Its police command appears unwilling to dig into the world of party intelligence structures. UNMIK even maintains a public façade of ignorance as to their existence, with a mixture of condescension, insouciance, and evasion.885 The most it is prepared to contemplate is privately asking Thaci and Rugova to disband their services voluntarily, but little good will come from such an approach. The IC must choose between tolerance of shadowy intelligence structures, pronouncing them illegal, or incorporating them. It is time for them to decide whether to opt for transformation, osmosis, or integration. Further toleration of shadow structures is not only wrong, but also dangerous. It is very unlikely that the current services as such can be transformed into legal ones. This would be only a cosmetic effect. The issue of current shadow structures should be put on the table and discussed through a transparent process, so that their existence is on a clear legal basis as a professional service. Only in this way can they be transformed and have a future in the security landscape of Kosovo. Mechanisms of accountability and democratic control over these intelligence services should be designed and adhered to as a sine qua non for their institutional survival.886 ­ Private Security Companies (PSCs) - According to a report by Saferworld and In-

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

ternational Alert in 2005,887 PSCs started to operate in Kosovo shortly after UNMIK

884. ICG Report , 2005 Kosovo After Haradinaj, p30 885. Their attitude apropos is expressed as follows:"we trust that those who have been making allegations regarding the existence of so-called intelligence services illegally operating in Kosovo are acting in a serious manner, and therefore UNMIK takes seriously any such allegations". 886. KIPRED, May 2006 Intelligence Agencies in Kosovo: Dismantling, osmosis, or integration?op.cit. pp6-10 887. UNDP-South Eastern Europe August 2005, Small Arms and Light Weapons and Private Security Companies in South East Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity? Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Written by Saferworld and International Alert, 230

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

took over administration of the territory in 1999. In response to the emergence of these companies, in May, 2000 UNMIK introduced legislation regulating PSCs.888 Since then the industry has been flourishing.889 Some of these firms perform a public order role, helping to secure public events such as football matches, but the service most commonly offered is static security for buildings and goods. The private security sector in Kosovo is marked by the distinction between "local" and "international" PSCs, by the different security services they offer, and by their client base. While there is some degree of overlap in the range of services offered by these two groups, the "international" PSCs, unlike their "local" counterparts, are licensed to provide armed security guards.890 Although the KPS Protection Unit has been empowered to provide protection services for VIPs since 2004, officials tend to retain their own bodyguards. All PSCs must be registered with, and issued a business license by, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, but their control is weak. UNMIK´s control over the sector appears largely sufficient, but it remains to be seen how well a newly created Ministry of Interior will handle the oversight of these two and a half thousand additional security practitioners who may well acquire the right to carry firearms at some stage. The possibility of inappropriate links between PSCs and political parties and former paramilitaries makes the challenge even harder.891 ­ The Kosovo Correctional Service

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The Kosovo Correctional Service is the last of the security institutions that will be discussed here. KCS's legal basis is UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, outlining matters related to the coordination, organization, and support of the correctional service. The SRSG reserves the power to exercise authority over law enforcement institutions and the correctional service if it is be required. KCS includes five prisons and six detention centers. In February, 2005 the first two UNMIK detention centers were transferred to KCS control. This process has now seen the transition of all five detention centers, and a generally slow transfer of power to local staff, which is approximately 18% women. UNMIK will retain a small international presence at the prison (three people), and reserves the right to intervene should the prison regime break down. In recent years there have been a number of problems with the administration of prisons and detention centers in Kosovo. Conditions in these prisons remain a major challenge, and the continued assistance of the IC even after they are transferred to KCS control is very necessary. The KCS should continue to operate in an open and trans-

888. 889. 890. 891.

pp 96–108. Currently there are four main regulations relating to PSCs in Kosovo. Official records show 22 licensed companies employing some 2,579 guards, as of February 2005. See the UNMIK Reg. No. 2001/7 Sections 1 (c) and (d) and Section 3.2 KIPRED, November 2005, op.cit, pp14-15 231

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

parent manner, but if it is to be sustainable, IC oversight and monitoring of its activities are still needed.892 In broad terms, despite its merits, Kosovo’s security architecture clearly fails the democratic test. The lack of oversight of security agencies by citizens and/or their elected representatives that currently exists in Kosovo is not some novelty in the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict where stabilization, peace-building, consolidation, and control are the driving concerns. In Kosovo, the international community’s initial postwar judgement was that it was unsafe to allow popular will and local representatives to manage internal security, but whatever the truth and wisdom of this conviction eight years ago, in today’s environment expectations and legitimate interests are different. Thus despite good intensions, the international community has often delayed the return to normalcy, making local ownership of the security sector thereby more difficult to achieve.893 This is why the operational priorities of the IC and the main concerns of the international administration should now be democratic consolidation and development. Flawed but functioning democratically elected institutions of the PISG are in place, and the avoidance of genuine local involvement and civilian democratic oversight after the initial stabilization has come to inhibit the political development of the territory, probably to the detriment of long-term stability.894

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Hence, the political security in Kosovo is seriously curtailed by the unclear mandate of an international administration stretched between the conflicting objectives of substantial autonomy as provided under UNSCR1244, and the state-building aspirations of the Kosovo´s political elite. Considering that immediate stabilization, and not state-building and local empowerment as such, have been the priorities of the IC, this has produced a vague "state-building" mandate which generates institutional lability and therefore insecurity. Furthermore, the splitting of responsibilities between indigenous and international institutions, and the dichotomy of governance between local and international elements created from such a constellation, contribute to a vague division of responsibilities pushed from one side to the other and creating a confusing image for the public. This hampers an important element of democratic governance; accountability. This situation becomes even more dangerous when these relationships are subject to continuous change. To a broader extent, the relatively poor performance of governance layers acting in Kosovo, with poor service delivery in all fields, erodes people´s reliance on official structures for the obtainment of essential services. The unstable power base of PISG institutions comes less from the people and more from the international community, while the approval of the citizens for the government is based more on the expectations of status final outcomes and less on their institutional per892. KIPRED, March 2006, Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review, Initial Findings, op.cit. pp101-103 893. Welch Anthony. C. 2006, Achieving Human Security after Intra State Conflict: The Lessons of Kosovo, Kosovo Journal of Contemporary European Studies Vol. 14, No. 2,.August 2006 , pp221–239 894. KIPRED, November 2005, op.cit., p21 232

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

formance and capacity to deliver services.895 To add to the problem, some K-Serbs continue to view Kosovo institutions with deep suspicion and prefer to relate to Serb parallel structures instead.896 Thus the legitimacy of Kosovo institutions is limited to the predominant K-Albanian and non-Serb communities. The lack of trust among K-serbs for PISG and UNMIK institutions has kept them within their enclaves, which they view as a source of protection, but are perceived by K-Albanians as a security threat and an extension of the Belgrade regime. This situation generates a feeling of threat for both sides. This mistrust is reflected in the region, where PISG/UNMIK institutions enjoy increasing recognition, but there is still a reluctance to approach them. The government of Serbia especially tends to deny the legitimacy of Kosovo institutions, perceiving them as merely K-Albanian. This in itself is a perpetuating factor that fuels instability and political insecurity in Kosovo and the region. The coordinating and administrative capacity of governing bodies in Kosovo, especially at the national level, remains weak even considering the inexperience of public administrators.897 While the need for the enactment, drafting, and adoption of new laws to fill the gaps in Kosovo's legal system has been reiterated from all sides, not enough attention has been paid to their implementation. 898 This creates the feeling that neither domestic nor international security institutions respond properly to the needs of the citizens. In fact, most indicators show a poor performance in the implementation of laws, with several contestations once they are passed, and a selective approach to their implementation.899 The increasing dissatisfaction with Kosovo institutions is undermining their legitimacy, which could fuel serious unrest and may be a potential time bomb.900 The challenge ahead is to simultaneously improve institutional performance and support the populations concerned by increasing channels for the expression of dissatisfaction through legitimate and constructive legal means.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Asserting the rule of law, as the sine qua non for any institutional activity in the country, remains clearly the biggest challenge in Kosovo. With a police force that is still fragile, and a justice system regarded as the weakest of Kosovo institutions due to a high number of unresolved criminal cases, distrust is fed by a lack of legal sys-

895. KIPRED, March 2006, Kosovo´s Internal Security Sector Review, Initial Findings, op.cited pp12-25 896. Ibid. pp12-25 897. See OSCE Kosovo, Implementation of Kosovo Assembly laws Report II. and UNDP Kosovo March 2005, Assessment of Administrative Capacity, op.cit. 898. Author´s Interview with Legal Expert and Lawyer, 7 November 2006. Pristina, Kosovo. 899. KIPRED, March 2006, op.cit. pp12-25 900. According to ZERI newspaper, the March, 2004 riots were actually a sign of protest to the governing local and international institutions in Kosovo and presented the frustration of a population faced with economic and social problems, struggling to survive in their everyday life. See ZERI Newspaper, 12 November 2004, op.cit. 233

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tem capability. In fact, more than 46% of the people of Kosovo express distrust in the Judiciary.901 This explains why many citizens of Kosovo believe that the most important priority for the Kosovar leadership, after the resolution of the political status of Kosovo, is the rule of law. The creation of institutions governed by the rule of law will doubtlessly continue to be a major issue in Kosovo politics. In the meantime, the impression is that criminal perpetrators remain at large, unpunished, while violations of basic rules of property rights such as possession and ownership, fair competition, intellectual property rights, environmental protection, etc, occur quite often.902 For the coming EU Mission in Kosovo, the rule of law will be its raison d'être (its unofficial name is the EU Rule-of-Law Mission). This makes K-Albanian leaders privately relaxed about the prospects of a long mission. Their attitude towards the likely extent and powers of a post-status international presence is that of a fair and necessary mission which should include oversight of borders and customs. The official EU Planning Team began to establish itself in Pristina in 2006. While maintaining that the post-status international presence will need to draw its mandate from a Security Council resolution, international officials have acknowledge the utility of having a parallel invitation from Kosovo. K-Albanian politicians still worry about the context within which the EUPT will be established, and want it to be a tool to help Kosovo become a "normal country". The EU mission will include a variety of capacity-building, monitoring and executive roles, and embed the mission as far as possible within Kosovo police and judicial structures, while retaining its obligatory line of accountability to Brussels through the Representative.903 Review mechanisms and benchmarks will allow EU personnel to gradually scale back in numbers and functions as Kosovo police, prosecutors, judges, and other law enforcement professionals mature.904

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to an ICG report, the invited presence of international police can provide Kosovo with a shortcut to respectability. With foreigners responsible for handling corruption, organized crime,905 war crimes and inter-ethnic cases, K-Albanians would be relieved of facing up to some of the most unpleasant and dangerous aspects of consolidating their state. Thus, to put it in the words of a member of the Kosovo government “In a year’s time we’ll go to the EU and demand a visa-free regime. Why

901. CDRSEE & Medijski Centar Beta" 2005, Kosovo-Kosova: Coming to terms with the problem of Kosovo: the Peoples Views from Kosovo and Serbia", in KosovaLive, p10 902. KIPRED, March 2006 Kosovo´s Iinternal Security Sector Review, Stages I and II, Strategic Environment Review & Security Threat Analysis, Initial Findings, pp12-25 903. The police commissioner would probably be from Kosovo and accountable to the interior minister. 904. International Crisis Group Europe Report, 10 Nov 2006, Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky, N°177, pp9-10 905. Those controlling illicit streams of revenue in Kosovo’s economy would not feel especially threatened unless the EU mission proved more effective than UNMIK’s often squeamish, disjointed, and inexpert law enforcement operation. 234

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

not if the EU is running our police, courts and customs?”906 Thus it is very important for the future of Kosovo to give local leaders the ownership they require. In fact, they already insist on that ownership. The dialogue that the EUPT has had with local actors over the last months has brought views closer, and is clarifying things for all parties.907 For the time being it is the shared responsibility of Kosovars working through their political institutions and civil society to negotiate these challenges together with the international administration, which should retain some residual executive capacity on issues that Kosovars would have difficulty tackling alone, such as organized crime and terrorism. Furthermore, the international presence should also prepare the way of the security sector in the run-up to Euro-Atlantic integration. Building effective local ownership of the security sector is therefore a prerequisite for a sound and sustainable relationship between citizens, civil authorities, and the institutions charged with exercising coercive force on behalf of the state. This is thus the only sound basis for building political development. A successful security context in Kosovo can contribute to confidence not only in political development, but also in the development and improvement of all areas of life in Kosovo and the region. While the absence of political security is a perpetuating factor in regional instability and insecurity, reforms could help defuse the difficult security politics of Kosovo and of the region as a whole if handled well. If they are handled badly, individuals and groups willing to work outside the established political and legal framework will be strengthened, and the prospects for democracy in Kosovo and the region will not be promising.908

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

3.4 Conclusion So far I have focused on the creation of the Kosovo political system, which has begun practically from scratch, and the development of Kosovo's political parties. From the local actors perspective I have examined the main parties, their origins, their main differences, and their common characteristics. Based on party leaders and their strategies for the future of their parties, I examined in detail the future opportunities and challenges for the political process in Kosovo. Additionally, I undertook a detailed analysis of Kosovo´s Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance and their checks and balances, and examined their availability, their functional capacity, and their chances of sustainability, keeping in mind the political culture of actors participating in the process. My overall goal was to view political development in Kosovo through a heuristic perspective, and examine the role of this process in the general state-building enterprise of Kosovo. Finally, a diagnosis of the main security threats

906. ICG Report, 2006, Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky, op.cit., p9 907. Ibid. p10 908. KIPRED, November 2005, op.cit. p23 235

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

to the political security environment, and its challenges and opportunities was made, following the theoretical approach to security in this study. Broadly speaking, I can conclude that Kosovo’s democratic political development is at an early stage. Kosovo’s political nature can be defined by both alliances and fragmentation, and is rooted in a winner-take-all mentality. This foundation is further reinforced by the overlay of a post-communist system by a post-conflict society. The resulting political atmosphere is one of extreme competition, whereby the winners hold not only all the power, but also the financial resources of the state. The decisionmaking authority in such a context is therefore focused on self-preservation rather than planning and preparation for the long-term needs of the state. This generates a weak civil service with little interest in investing in a longer term cadre of professional technocrats able to stand the storms of political competition. The active participation of women in politics remains limited, with women citing numerous reasons for this. The gender quotas in parliament have improved the situation to a certain extent, but they have also served as a kind of "ceiling glass" for women, who generally remain a facade for empty democratic rhetoric in Kosovo politics. The same goes for the youth who feel underrepresented in political decision-making, a situation that can be blamed on the local and international actors in power over the last few years.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Thematically, Kosovo politics has been dominated and actually hindered by the unresolved status issue, while on the ground a near hermetic segregation of communities remains, apparently not a priority for political leaders. Nevertheless, leaders have shown a capability and capacity to cooperate with each other under the right circumstances. Although accused by local leaders of a lack of cultural awareness and dithering during decision-making processes, international administrators have been to a certain point the architects of enforced cooperation.909 Although this cooperation works imperfectly, the fact that it works at all is an achievement in and of itself. None of the top leaders have involved themselves in the process, but their decisionmaking and practical cooperation is borne out of the pragmatism of necessity. They have much more to gain by being within the system, with all its constraints, than by remaining outside it. Kosovo’s political landscape is evolving, and it is important that the political parties themselves begin to carefully consider their political profiles in addition to their election platforms and images. They have, as Werner Wendt put it, "the responsibility towards all communities in Kosovo to support a peaceful and democratic society".910 A better society can be realized only with better ideas and a developed political agenda. Their programmes should reflect the role of parties in a peaceful transition by including ideas and alternatives that are built upon the needs of the population they represent. Kosovo remains a newborn political entity, but it is on its way out of its limbo status. Yet, until its final status remains undecided, its political development will contin-

909. Cp. Peake G. et al. December 2004, op.cited 910. See Werner Wendt Speech, op.cit. 236

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ue to be undermined by uncertainty and political ambiguity. The aspirations and ambitions of the population cannot be handled by leaders that have policies without clear political perspectives. Political stability and its development will depend on functioning Kosovo institutions. However, this in turn depends on a strong sense of local ownership which cannot be achieved if the owners do not know what they own and what they are intended to govern. Hence, the need of a clear exit strategy for the IC in Kosovo is more than necessary, since success will not only depend on the ability to formulate a strategy, but also on the readiness of the entire IC to stay the course in a coherent and coordinated way.911 The problem of the uncoordinated and incoherent approach by international organizations operating in the political development agenda in Kosovo remains a challenge aggravated by their unclear mandate and staff mindset. The information received in interviews showed that they perceive their mission as being only technical and not political, ignoring the effects of their interventions in other domains (mainly "capacity-building") in the political development of Kosovo institutions. Finally, while many Kosovars criticize the IC presence in Kosovo for a lack of partnership, belated transfer of competencies and responsibilities, lack of economic and social success, and alack of vision for Kosovo´s future, the IC criticizes local transitional leaders and institutions for not performing as expected. The question is not who is right and who is wrong, but rather to get out of the simple "them and us" dichotomy and ask what political leaders can to do to show that Kosovo, its institutions, and its society are irrevocably on the path to guaranteeing security, democracy, and human rights for everyone and what can the IC do to support Kosovo's statebuilding efforts.912 Only if both international and local actors take ownership and recognize their successes and failures, willing to cooperate on an equal basis, will a way forward be possible for true political development in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The state-building and development process, especially in a post-conflict context, requires years or even decades, and it is unrealistic to suggest otherwise. Elections and limited development notwithstanding, international actors will remain in Kosovo for the foreseeable future, certainly with a strong military presence and a supervisory civilian authority such as the EUPT. Thus, I conclude with the words of Karl Popper that make the core of my arguments: "the transition to democracy requires for transformations in public mentality similiar to that which underpins respect for the rule of law"913. This will require a long time in Kosovo.

911. KaI Eide Report, 2004, op.cit. 912. See Michael Schmunk in Kosovo: Five Years Later: What Agenda for the Future, Forum 2015, op.cit. 913. Commented by Chesterman, Simon. (2004). in You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. Oxford: Oxford University Press, referring to an interview with Karl R. Popper, Moscow News, 25 Nov. to 2 Dec. 1990. p204, & p235 237

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

4. Economic domain 4.1 Actors and institutions 4.1.1 Local Players and Settings: The Economic Enabling Environment 4.1.1.1 The Legal framework A legal infrastructure in the form of a legislative framework approving legislation necessary for the proper operation of public institutions and the development of a market economy has been set up in Kosovo. However, there is still a lot to be done in regard to the proper development of this legal infrastructure, creating uncertainty among investors regarding their rights and obligations in Kosovo.914 From a legal perspective, the two following criteria are required for a functioning market economy: 1) clarification, assurance, and protection of the rights and duties of market participants, and 2) promotion and protection of transactions concluded between market participants for the exchange of the goods, services, and capital. Thus, in order to facilitate the indispensable transfer of goods, services, and capital in and out of Kosovo, the legal regime in the country should be in harmony with legal developments in neighboring countries, as well as conform to the relevant rules enacted by the European Community to facilitate trade and investment in the EU´s present and future member countries.915 Both of these developments have already taken place in Kosovo, following the Zagreb summit of 2002, where a closer integration of the western Balkans and mainstream Europe was launched, and the countries of the region agreed to abide by the EU’s conditions. Since 2002, Kosovo has become part of the SAP through the EU’s parallel track, the SAP Tracking Mechanism (STM), thereby fulfilling the criteria above.916 Legally, Kosovo is operating on a single framework for the implementation and monitoring of the SAP under the EU agenda.917

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Broadly speaking, Kosovo now enjoys a business-friendly legal environment with prudent fiscal management, a modern and efficient tax regime, institutions with a broad base and low uniform interest rates, and a light regulatory regime for private enterprise. Furthermore, the establishment of independent regulators signals a level

914. Ministry of Economy and Finance Department of international Economic Co-operation, 2004, The impact of donor activities on the economic development of Kosova, Pristina, Kosovo 915. Drobnig, Ulrich. & Jessel-Host. Chester, 2001, Reccomandations for the reform of the present Civil and Commercial Law in Kosovo. Max-Plank-Institut Für Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht. pp1-3 916. See the Zagreb Summit website for the 24 November 2000 outcomes. op.cit. Accessed September 2006 917. Council Decision of 30 January, 2006 on the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UNSC Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC (2006/56/EC) 238

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

playing field for domestic and foreign investors. A lightly regulated labour market is already in place, while the legislation on tax administration and a fledgling investment promotion agency are key components of an investor-friendly legal and institutional setup.918 Thus, the basic legal framework for business and commerce has been established and for the most part meets the standards required for building a modern market economy. However, the real challenge facing Kosovo is law enforcement, especially in the north and the minority enclaves where there is no compliance with UNMIK/ PISG law and no program to secure compliance with the law. Such failures have distorting effects on the market, and negatively influence both the business environment and the rule of law. Several Small and Medium Enterprise (SMEs) surveys made in Kosovo by the RIINVEST institute in recent years show that SME owners and managers in Kosovo consider the main barriers to doing business in Kosovo are unfair competition, a lack of important legislation, corruption, taxation, and access to financing. These are all typical of a turbulent business environment where there is a lack of capacity and little commitment to implement the rule of law.919

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Future challenges in this field comprise increasing capacity, establishing accountability, and taking responsibility for the implementation of existing laws. Ensuring the rule of law appears to be a very critical factor for further advances in creating a business environment conducive to economic development. More specifically the areas of concern include the inviolability of property rights through consolidation of the courts and police and improving the enforcement of contracts.920 Further research is needed to explore additional mechanisms of arbitration that could be used to improve the situation in this domain. 4.1.1.2 Institutional and Policy Environment Responsibility for the governance and management of economic development has been shared by UNMIK and the PISG. However, following the successful emergency phase of reconstruction and growth, which involved a construction boom, they have not been able to establish a suitable policy environment and conditions for stable and sustainable economic development. This institutional duality has at times led to uncertainty, ambiguities, and disagreement regarding responsibilities, competencies, authorization, and actions. During 2003 and 2004 the transfer of competencies to the PISG was very slow, and was followed by disputes between UNMIK Pillar IV, the EU, and the PISG concerning privatization issues and aspects of taxation and budget policy. In the face of political uncertainty, less than efficient governance with a marked lack of synergy has had an adverse impact on the economy.921

918. Author´s interview with Economic Expert, EU Pillar in Kosovo, 27 October 2006, Pristina, Kosovo 919. Author´s interview with Economic Expert, RIINVEST, 3 November 2006, Pristina, Kosovo 920. Wittkowsky, Andreas, Bajraktari, Elinor, Niksic, Orhan, 2005, Fuelling Kosovo´s Growth Engines, A strategic vision and Policy Priorities, Unmik EU pillar, Economic Policy Pillar, p3 921. RIINVEST, 2006, Towards Economic Viability of Kosova, Challenges, Policies, 239

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Recently, however, the PISG in particular have matured significantly. Following the 2004 elections, the government of Kosovo decided to embark on a Kosovo Development Plan (KDP), and has created the necessary institutional architecture for it. For the first time, the Kosovo government has taken the drivers seat for its own development plan, outlining two courses of action; 1) mobilisation of traditional sectors such as mining and energy, and 2) encouragement of non-traditional activities which have yet to be discovered. Still, corruption and cronyism remain problems at the national and municipal levels. According to a 2006 ICG report, cronyism seems to inform government choices of candidates for the boards of the public utilities and regulatory bodies, whose attitude is considered problematic. Ministers often display a communist-era desire to control the distribution of resources and an impatience with the policy and legislation agenda UNMIK has prescribed. The continuing uncertainty over property ownership related to the status issue does not help the situation.922 Price-gouging monopolies like the KEK (Kosovo Electricity Company), the Post, the Telecommunications corporation (PTK), and the Airport, constitute another problem for economic institutions in the country, burdening the economy with their oversized workforces and bloated wages.923 This drags down other sectors and is contributing negatively to the growth of private sector employment.924

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In general, the Kosovo institutional framework has not become a serious constraint to investment, but there is a real risk that an expanding economy may outgrow the weak institutional setting in Kosovo. A full institutional review may be necessary, and should be a rich subject for further research in this field. The most daunting institutional challenges at this time seem to be, 1) the inexperience of public institutions and weakness of the system underpinning their operations, and 2) the inadequate capacity of the emerging civil service in Kosovo. The broader economic policy environment seems to be consistent with the needs to avoid distortions in the market, and to support macroeconomic stability. Business is based mostly on self-financing and credit provided by the healthy new banking system created during the last eight years in Kosovo. The high interest rates and short repayment periods currently in place, however, remain inappropriate for serious investment undertakings. The government of Kosovo is trying to find ways to encourage increased competition in the credit market, including cooperation with international financial organizations and banks to provide credit lines with better conditions for the manufacturing and export sectors. The government should first seriously consider establishing a fast track in the courts for the enforcement of contractual businesses obligations and mortgages. Following the completion of free trade agreements with Albania and Macedonia, similar arrangements are being negotiated with other neighOpportunities, Pristina, p24 922. International Crisis Group Europe Report 17 February 2006, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, N°17, p5 923. While average monthly salaries of €200 are far below what the utilities pay, they are well above the €120 that the IMF considers the market rate. 924. International Crisis Group Europe Report, 2006, op.cit. p6 240

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

boring countries. The importance of regional integration for creating a better environment for investment in a small, landlocked territory like Kosovo cannot be overemphasised. 925 Finally, as stressed in Chapter 1.3.2, the government should not simply create an enabling environment for business, but should also stimulate the economy and in particular investment, through carefully designed and administered incentives. Here Kosovo´s government has particularly difficult budget constraints given its inability to run budget deficits, while the relatively short time of its existence and the inexperience of civil servants makes it particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking activity. The current investment promotion activities of Kosovo´s government are insignificant in comparison to the scale of the challenge they face. The need for coordinated mechanisms pushing for legislation and regulation of investment activity is high. This is especially important when a differentiation has to be made between investment in traditional and non-traditional activities, as the new activities have so far taken place in the traditional sector where firms are pricing each other out of the market.926 4.1.1.3 Infrastructure and Public Utilities With a positive perspective, one can say that the current infrastructure in Kosovo provides at its best for the most basic needs of the population and economy. The supply of electricity however, is not stable and blackouts are an everyday phenomenon, especially in winter. Thus, substantial power imports have been received in recent years from neighboring countries, especially Bulgaria and its thermonuclear reactor, until it was shut down following Bulgaria´s accession to the EU in 2007. This left many countries in the region obliged to find more expensive alternative sources. The fact that Kosovo is at least potentially the lowest cost power supplier in the region has been of no help yet. The existing supply deficit, coupled with the resumption of mining and smelting activities and the potential for exporting electricity, has resulted in proposals to rehabilitate the Kosovo A thermal plant and construct a new 1000MW power plant and associated lignite mines.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Telecommunications are currently the monopoly of a public provider which seems unable to provide quality service, while the mobile phone network is a virtual monopoly granted by UNMIK, with prices among the highest in Europe. The poor situation of telecommunications and IT services in general remain a serious challenge for business.927 What is needed in Kosovo is a broad upgrading of the energy sector in order to improve electricity supply security in support of development, as well as to export energy to the regional market and generate substantial revenue.928

925. 926. 927. 928.

Author´s interview with Economic Expert, RIINVEST, op.cit. RIINVEST, 2006, Towards Economic Viability of Kosovo, op.cit. pp 65-68 Ibid. Wittkowsky, et.al, 2005, Fuelling Kosovo´s Growth Engines, op.cit p20 241

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The main road infrastructure in Kosovo may currently meet basic needs, but secondary and especially rural roads are in very poor condition.929 Additionally, Kosovo is excluded from the transeuropean traffic corridors. In order to access the main corridors connecting other important commercial centers in the region such as Durres (Albania), Nice (Serbia) Skopje (Macedonia), etc, further improvements must be made to reduce transport costs, increase competitiveness, and facilitate regional and wider integration. Since 85% of the Kosovo population lives within a 20 km radius of one of the seven main cities, development of interurban and suburban transport networks is required in order to ease the urban/rural gap. These improvements could assist in ensuring a more productive use of resources in rural areas, and in reducing the trend of migration to cities.930 Maintaining and upgrading roads so that they can effectively respond to demands from the private sector, as well as improving connections with regional transport corridors to take full advantage of trade opportunities in the region, represents the next challenge to Kosovo´s economic development. 4.1.1.4 The key mechanisms in the Kosovo macro-economy

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The key mechanisms in the macroeconomy of a country include two main sectors;931 those exposed to the competitive world trading environment, e.g. the internationally traded sector, and those sheltered from direct exposure to international competitive trade, referred to as the non-traded sector. In simple terms, traded sectors include manufacturing, commercial agriculture, and market services directed at international markets, i.e. tourism. The non-traded sectors consist of everything else; utilities, building services, subsistence agriculture, most market services, and all public services. According to research by the ESI Think Tank in Kosovo, from an economic performance and competitiveness viewpoint the crucial sector in an economy like Kosovo's is likely to be manufacturing. Taking into consideration the European development experience so far, it is the manufacturing sector that will likely be the main “engine” of economic growth and therefore, for small economies like Kosovo, the one most likely to be exposed to international competition.932 Thus this sector will likely be a price taker, and the world market price will be the price set for traditional industry output. If this is the case, then the issue for this sub-sector will be to ensure

929. It is estimated that the capacity, condition, and traffic volume on main roads is such that normally it is necessary to spend 50-70% more time than expected to travel on roads meeting European standards between the main cities and Pristina, which has serious implications for the costs. 930. RIINVEST Kosovo, 2006.op.cit.p27 931. This unit is based on the analysis made by John Bradley and Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative (ESI) on Core Mechanisms in Kosovo Macroeconomy, see Bradley, J & Knaus G, August, 2004 Towards a Kosovo Development Plan, The state of the Kosovo economy and possible ways forward, ESPIG Policy Paper No. 1, Pristina, , p13 932. Bradley, J & Knaus G, European Stability Initiative, Towards a Kosovo Development Plan, The state of the Kosovo economy and possible ways forward, ESPIG Policy Paper No. 1 Pristina, August, 2004, p13 242

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

that costs like wages, energy, taxes, etc, remain low enough to price for the world market and still make a profit. Another challenge is that the manufacturing sector of Kosovo remains poorly researched and underdeveloped. All of Kosovo’s larger companies that developed under socialism are under management by the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), which has very limited information on the status of enterprises under its supervision. It is therefore almost impossible to evaluate the size or structure of this vital sector in the absence of a survey of manufacturing production. However, based on informal studies, it is possible to say that the production of construction components (i.e. bricks), which boomed in the immediate postwar period, is now in serious decline, while manufacturing activity in the area of food and drink remains small scale, facing erratic supplies of basic needs like electricity, and an uncertain growth potential in the domestic market. Other fiscal factors like the presumptive tax system, which has shifted to a profit tax, discourage growth while the dominance of the import tax distorts cost structures. Still, the tiny volume of goods exported from Kosovo are internationally competitive933. The weaknesses of the exposed tradable sector in Kosovo are currently a serious barrier to growth and development. According to Bradley and Knaus, the market services sector by itself is unlikely to become an “engine” of growth. The public sector is too constrained fiscally to drive the economy forward, even if that were considered desirable. On the other hand, argue these authors, a strategic aim of industrial policy in Kosovo should be the encouragement of businesses which are more technologically advanced than traditional firms, requiring an inflow of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI).

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The food and drink sector's output tends to be driven primarily by domestic and European demand, as well as the unit cost of production relative to European competitors. Competitiveness in this sector is particularly sensitive to the cost of inputs, while labour costs will have an impact on the amount of value added in Kosovo. Thus, for Bradley and Knaus, Kosovo’s agribusiness sector needs to be prepared for competition with European products and to meet basic food safety and quality standards in order to be competitive. Another crucial element in Kosovo's macroeconomy is the public sector, including Kosovo´s largest enterprises in terms of employment and capital. These include the KEK, PTK, Water, Waste, and Heating companies, as well as Pristina Airport, all currently under the authority of the KTA. For most of the postwar period their corporate governance structures were in continual flux, management was changing constantly, and donor driven investment decisions and problems with governance meant there were no long-term investment strategies, annual reports, or public audits. For Bradley and Knaus, taking into account the crucial importance of these companies and the cost and quality of their output, it is essential for the rest of the economy and particularly the manufacturing sector to address the shortcomings of their corporate

933. Ibid. 243

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

governance. These key components of the Kosovo macroeconomy, developed by Bradley & Knaus are presented in Table.1. 934

(1) The exposed (mainly manufacturing) sector will be driven by world demand, elements of domestic demand, and international cost competitiveness. The existing manufacturing base is small and fundamentally uncompetitive. Upgrading of technology will require direct foreign investment. Only this sector can provide an “engine” of wider-based growth and development in Kosovo. (2) The sheltered market sector (mainly services and construction) will be driven by domestic demand (influenced by the volume of remittances in a post-reconstruction period) and cost competitiveness (which influences potential import substitutes). This sector will only flourish if the wider Kosovo economy is flourishing. It cannot function as an “engine” of growth. (3) The public sector is policy-driven, but with a need to balance current budgets in a context where there is diminishing access to international donor finance for capital purposes. Relative to the present size of the Kosovo economy, the public sector is unsustainably large. (4) Wages paid in the formal productive sectors of Kosovo are probably determined in a simple type of bargaining model, and are influenced by factors affecting the supply and demand for labour – e.g. prices, taxes, and unemployment. The postwar construction boom may have distorted wage costs and created competitiveness problems for the embryonic manufacturing and service sectors. Wages from international organizations have created the biggest distortions. (5) The labour market in Kosovo is highly dependent on demographic factors, such as the high natural growth of the labour supply relative to EU labour markets and possibilities for (legal or illegal) labour migration. Present rates of unemployment and underemployment are at crisis levels Table 1: Core Mechanisms in the Kosovo Macroeconomy (Source ESI, 2004:14)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

4.1.1.5 Doing business in Kosovo: Too easy or too difficult? Since economic data on the business environment in Kosovo has been little more than anecdotal, a Business Conditions Index (BCI) assessment took place in 2005935 to provide local and international decision-makers with the means to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the business environment and identify priorities for policymakers wishing to increase the competitiveness of the domestic market vis-a-vis international competitors. From the local setting perspective, an analysis of the findings of this index provides this study with an assessment of the ease with which resources can move in and out of the market and a measure of the “business friendliness” of the public policy environment.936 Its examination in this unit will thus expose 934. Bradley, J & Knaus G, August 2004, op.cit. p14 935. BCI is a project implemented by Integra Consulting, usings the WB business methodology to evaluate the competitive position of Kosovo business relative to current and future trading partners. This index is designed to serve a number of valuable functions and guide the decisions of both domestic and foreign private business leaders, as well as to assist public sector policymakers at home and abroad. 936. See USAID Report on Kosovo Clusters and Business Support (KCBS), 2005, Kosovo is business friendly: the numbers prove it, online at http://usaidkcbsp.com/Presentations/ Business_Conditions_Index_2005.pdf 244

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the main opportunities and challenges for business in Kosovo, as an indicator of the efficiency of market mechanisms. This index considers seven components:937 1) Starting a Business: covers registration and administrative procedures and cost, capital requirements, etc, that are required to set up a business. 2) Hire/Fire Decisions: procedures of hiring and firing workers such as: duration of long-term fixed contracts, economic conditions used as grounds for dismissal, severance pay requirements, social obligations for redundancy, etc. 3) Registering Property: including all necessary procedures to transfer a property from a seller to a buyer as well as procedures used in case of disputes. 4) Access to Credit: including legal protections in collateral law, restrictions on assets for collateral, sharing of credit information, personal and business data protection, etc. 5) Protecting investors: measuring the disclosure of family and indirect ownership, public access to ownership and financial data, etc. 6) Enforcement of Contracts: procedures regarding debt collection and access to summary decisions, limitation of appeals, enforcement of court decisions, etc. 7) Closing a Business: this includes procedures, expertise of courts in foreclosure and bankruptcy, appeal processes, role and compensation for administers, etc, when a business is liquidated. Table 2: Business Conditions Index in Kosovo (Source: USAID, KCBS, 2005, Online)

Following this assessment, progress has been made in Kosovo towards creating an environment conducive to business development as compared to its eastern European neighbors. In fact, according to this assessment, Kosovo has a far more businessfriendly environment than any other former member of the Yugoslav Federation, and even outperforms some recent entrants to the European Union in some areas.938

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In broad institutional terms, this review suggests that the shortfalls in Kosovo are results of omissions and not commissions by political institutions, while the laws and tools for a transparent business-friendly environment are for the most part in place. One clear shortage in the overall examination of institutions is the ability to develop support for business laws, such as for example the development of credit bureaus. Although public leaders are essentially pro-business and support laws and regulations that limit government interference and oversight, perhaps even too avidly, following

937. Cp. World Bank, 2005, Doing Business: Business Conditions Methodology, Available at http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/3, Business Conditions Index, Accessed November 2007 938. For example, Kosovo’s ratings in hiring and firing workers were better than average for all of central Europe, outperforming all nine of those countries, except the Slovak Republic, in every single indicator. 245

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

through with the infrastructure-building needed to assure efficient compliance remains a huge challenge for the long run.939 The low barriers to entry and exit in Kosovo demonstrate significant ease in allowing businesses to move in and out of a market. Furthermore, with the fewest number of procedures (five) and the least number of days (23) needed to open a business, and with only nine months required to dissolve one, Kosovo businesses enjoy the most flexible market in eastern Europe. The only area in which Kosovo falls significantly short of its neighbors is the minimum capital requirement, being nearly three times the average per capita income, compared to an average of 65% for Balkan countries. The fact that there are no means to measure the cost of business dissolution to creditors is further evidence of a lack of the infrastructural investment needed to support a healthy business environment.940 Furthermore, regulations governing Kosovo businesses’ ability to hire and fire are also less burdensome than its neighbors'. Kosovo reported a perfect score in hiring procedures, with a dismissal cost equivalent to 28 days wages, the second lowest in the Balkans. Finally, despite its cadastral issues, Kosovo’s regulations governing property registration are also decidedly less troublesome than those in neighboring countries. The workload needed to register property in Kosovo is only 23 days, less than a tenth of the 255-day average for the rest of the Balkans and, surprisingly, half of the time calculated by the World Bank for high-income countries, i.e. western Europe and the USA. This can also be interpreted as a sign of quite simple institutional structures and therefore of a less than fully developed bureaucracy.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Despite significant changes, obstacles to doing business in Kosovo remain. The main challenge is access to credit, which has been confirmed by interviews with economic experts.941 However, blame for this does not lie with the banks, as their drive is for profit, but rather with the difficulty in registering collateral that drives up the cost of capital. At 22% of per capita income, the €220 needed to register collateral in Kosovo is among the highest rates in the world relative to income. Additionally, the lack of private credit bureaus greatly increases the risk of lending, eroding Kosovo’s credit ranking further. This is evident in the poor score on contract enforcement, with the cost of contract enforcement measured at 29% of unrecovered debt, among the highest in eastern Europe.942 A stable banking system has been developed in Kosovo, but its potential for lending is still small, and interests rates are very high. The lending conditions of commercial Kosovo banks are not favorable for private business development. Due to the unresolved political status issue and an underdeveloped capital market, commercial

939. For example, the very low rating for getting credit compared to other southeastern European markets has to do with the failure to assist the development of access to consumer information on creditworthiness 940. USAID Report on Kosovo Clusters and Business Support, 2005, op.cit. p2. 941. Author´s Interview with Economic Expert, UNDP Kosovo, 13 November, Pristina 942. USAID Report on Kosovo Clusters and Business Support, 2005, op.cit. p2. 246

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

banks offer loans with high interest rates in order to cover their business risk. The availability, cost, and duration (max. three years) of loans from financial institutions is thus a serious problem for business development in a situation where businesses lack financing and working capital.943 Furthermore, the very low Value Added Tax (VAT) rate of 15% compared to other countries in the region (20% in Albania and Serbia) appears to be a burden on the development of local capacities, and excessive delays in VAT refund processing detracts from competitiveness, even in the local market.944 Free trade agreements with Kosovo have already been signed by Albania and initiated with other countries. Trade with Macedonia and Serbia is subject to an agreement signed between Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and is not subject to customs duties. This puts Kosovo's producers at a disadvantage, since the largest share of Kosovo's imports comes from neighboring countries. The power situation, as mentioned above, is also a disincentive to investment by local producers and for attracting foreign investors. Power shortages are a huge constraint on all enterprises, imposing high operating costs, production losses, and reduced competitiveness, considering the need for alternative sources of power.945 High energy costs translate into less profit and are usually passed on to consumers through higher product prices.946 Other challenges for business in Kosovo are largely related to settlement of the final political status affecting policy-making, followed by the decline of donor inflows and diaspora remittances for investment in Kosovo. Here the Kosovo government should take measures to reverse this decline through increased foreign investment and increased exports. It is clear that the ambiguous political situation keeps foreign investment marginal, while exports suffer in this context under various trade barriers. Finally, although a certain stability has been achieved by adopting the Euro as an official currency, due to the inability of the Kosovo budget to run a deficit, this stability and Kosovo´s economic growth will be maintained only if favorable conditions for the creation of private capital are created.947

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The Business Conditions Index confirmed quantitatively what many have suggested long ago, namely that Kosovo has sufficient or even excellent business laws and regulations, but is lacking in followup through funding to assure their enforcement. It is the duty of the PISG in cooperation with the EU's future mission in Kosovo to

943. Hoti, Avdullah, 2006, Doing Business in Kosovo: Challenges and Opportunities, in Long Term Polices for Social and Economic Development, Special Issue on Kosovo, in Journal of the Nash Albanian Studies, SSEES-UCL, Tahiraj E, & Davies, P.S (eds) Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2006, p7 944. A world bank survey of SME in Kosovo in 2004 found that VAT refunds frequently require three months or longer to process. 945. The same World Bank Survey of SME in 2004 found that three quarters of all SME in Kosovo have purchased electrical generators to survive. 946. Hoti, A, April 2006, Doing Business in Kosovo, in Journal of the Nash Albanian Studies, op.cit.p8 947. Ibid. 247

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

focus its attention on implementation and enforcement instead of further regulation. With two simple steps, Kosovo can take great strides towards developing its business environment.948 In fact, the development plan for Kosovo suggested by the ESI Think Tank, recognizes a systematic, planned restructuring, with sustained external investment as the only realistic path towards a better economic “vision”. Within the next ten years, Kosovo is likely to be surrounded by neighboring states that are either EU members, or in the final stages of achieving membership. Hence any “vision” of economic development according to ESI should be dominated by two main factors: (1) The ability of the Kosovo government to put in place a domestic policy framework that will accelerate the transition to a fully functioning market economy, requiring at least initially that all available domestic sources of finance, however limited, focus on that goal; and (2) The ability of the Kosovo economy to make a gradual switch from the declining external donor funding of recent years to a more stable system of development support, similar to that currently available to new EU member states. Progress in this area will involve both a learning process for policy makers in Kosovo and a communication process addressed to the EU, and must precede any realistic possibility of securing significant outside structural assistance.949

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

4.1.1.6 Public Administration In this study, I have assumed that a neoliberal free market ideology can be a major obstacle to development in the absence of state control. Thus, on one hand the state is responsible for ensuring conditions for markets to operate in a healthy and competitive way, through the rule of law, property rights enforcement, and public administration services, etc. On the other hand, government is responsible for providing the right environment for human capabilities to develop according to Sen´s theoretical approach. In this unit I will concentrate on capacity and the challenges to Kosovo´s public administration as well as its effects on economic development, while in the following unit I will focus on the challenges and opportunities for human development. Public administration in Kosovo will be examined in light of international experience to date which shows an efficient public administration to be an essential precondition for a country´s economic development. While economists say it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for economic growth, the EU pays great attention to progress in public administration through its member-state building programme in countries that aspire to membership.950 Research in this field suggests that a stable

948. USAID Report on Kosovo Clusters and Business Support, 2005, op.cit. pp 3-9 949. Bradley, J & Knaus G, European Stability Initiative, Towards a Kosovo Development Plan, The state of the Kosovo economy and possible ways forward, ESPIG Policy Paper No. 1 Pristina, August 2004 950. See European Stability Initiative, (ESI) 1. February 2005, The Helsinki Moment, European 248

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

environment for investment is absolutely necessary for international investors.951 Not only do countries with efficient and honest public administrations, and consequent good governance, find it easier to attract investment, but economic analysis shows that they offer business a better return on investment.952 Additionally, it is also recognized that good governance is crucial for producing a stable social infrastructure, which is highly relevant for a healthy economy. According to UNDP reports, "without good governance, there will not be effective schools or decent health care".953 On the contrary, if the public administration in a country is inefficient and suffers from chronic corruption, its effects on economic performance are quite damaging. To put it in James´s words, "corruption debilitates the economy thorough embezzlement of public funds and failure to protect the public from profiteering... It subverts the ethos of the public service. And since the poorest are most vulnerable to the effects of corruption it magnifies social inequalities".954 In Kosovo, the problems of public administration are multiple and complex, but I will focus on the main ones here. Following the prolonged disruption of the educational system in the 1990s, the subsequent war, the exclusion of most of the population from work in public service during the lost decade, and the continuing lack of further education under the UNMIK administration, the shortage of skilled staff to fill public offices is a huge challenge. Moreover, staff appointments are often informed by patronage rather than merit, due to strong family and friendship ties in Kosovo society. The principle of appointment on merit seems unheard of at the national and municipal levels, leading to the appointment of poorly qualified staff and seriously undermining the representation of minorities. Although there is progress in this field, there is still much to be done.955 Poor pay rates for public servants at all levels also create little incentive to seek promotion. This perpetuates a poor image of public service among the population, not the least because many public servants treat the public unprofessionally. This inefficiency is enhanced by the over-sized employment (68,000) in public service as mentioned before. This is triple that of Slovenia, which has the same population as Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

951.

952. 953. 954.

955.

member-state building in the Balkans. February 2005, p1. also available at www.esiweb.org Facts that support such arguments can be found in a survey of international businesses by the World Bank in 1997, that showed that businesses were reluctant to invest in a country if they thought its government was unpredictable, or that its public institutions were weak or corrupt. See WB, World Development Report 1997. See the World Bank, World Development Report 1997, Business Survey Chapter UNDP. 2002 Human Development Report 2002 : Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York, ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, p64 Simon, James, April 2006 Reforming Kosovo´s Public Administration: Why it matters and what it Needs in Long Term Polices for Social and Economic Development in Kosovo, Journal of the Nash Albanian Studies Program, SSEES-UCL, Tahiraj E, & Davies, P.S (eds) Volume 1, Issue 1.p35 Author´s Interview with employee of Security Sector Assessment Team, UNDP Kosovo, 2 November, 2006. 249

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Broadly speaking, the institutional framework in Kosovo is stabilizing, and institutions have been slowly growing in capacity and self confidence. Many of the ablest and best-educated people employed by international agencies until now will have to go back to public service after these agencies leave, albeit at lower wages. Such factors give hope for public administration in Kosovo. If these challenges are tackled in the right way from the supply side by the International Community operating in Kosovo, and also from the demand side, then the chances for development will increase. The shortage of basic administrative skills in public administration on the supply side has not been addressed by international assistance focused on specialized subject skills, such as particular aspects of policing, education, or agriculture. For administrative officers faced with challenges every day, the greatest shortfall lies in fundamental administrative skills like business planning, budget management, legal drafting, ethical standards, etc. Unfortunately, little effective work has been done by UNMIK or donors to remedy this so far. 956 The creation of a management cadre whose legitimacy is based not on popularity but on its management capacity and is thus able to provide leadership that can shake up the administration is therefore required at the national level.957 At local levels of administration, more resources are needed in the municipalities for the decentralization process, as the creation of new, smaller municipalities, crucial for the final status issue, will allow minorities greater control over their own local affairs. Although this social investment costs money, it is necessary for the functionality of the decentralization project.958

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, there is a need for change in the culture and mentality of the population of Kosovo regarding their expectations from public services. Publishing statements of service standards that the public is entitled to expect, and creating effective channels of complaint would effect positive change in this area. Such mechanisms would strengthen the effectiveness and functional capacity of public services by involving people in the improvement of services offered to them. The raising of expectations of political leaders for service delivery from the ministries is another vital effort on this front. Although some mayors do have higher expectations, due to higher affinity with the point of delivery and therefore the trenches, the national level, or the commanding heights, has many shortages to overcome in this respect.

956. The challenges mentioned here are based on the UNDP Report 2004, on the Kosovo Capacity Assessment Project in 2005 and on a follow-up action plan developed by the Office of the Prime Minister, that have suggested accordingly where the necessary change is needed. For more info see the Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo, UNDP Kosovo, 2004, op.cit. 957. The challenge here again is that such a management enterprise will require raising salaries for the most senior staff, which will not be easy at a time when the IMF has requested a 10% cut in the civil service wage bill over three years, See Moalla-Fetini, Rakia. Kosovo: Gearing Policies Toward Growth and Development. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, 2005. p35 958. Author´s Interview with Local Governance Expert, 24 October, 2006, Pristina. 250

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Public administration in Kosovo is slow and bureaucratic for decision-making processes, and should be made more flexible, inclusive, efficient, and less focused at senior levels. Old fashioned methods inherited from the previous administration are used far too often. This limits the ability to launch new initiatives and does not fit modern administration requirements. Until the final status issue is resolved, however, this issue will dominate Kosovo politics. Afterwards the emphasis will move towards economic and social issues, and the government will hopefully be increasingly judged on its ability to perform and deliver. To put it in the words of James concerning what the Kosovo public administration must accomplish, "it sounds daunting," but when compared to most eastern European countries and their similar transition period 15 years ago, it is possible to predict that the same changes will occur in Kosovo too, but it will be a long road.959

4.1.1.7 The labour market and labour relations in Kosovo 4.1.1.7.1 Labour market In an aging Europe, Kosovo is an exception with one third of its population under 17 years old, and 58% of the population under the age of 25.960 The labour market has therefore some distinctive characteristics compared to other countries. In addition to the youth of the population, there are large numbers of immigrants, making up 18% of the total population. With such a young population and an annual net inflow in the labour force of up to 25,000 (circa 6% of current employment), the number of jobs must grow at least by 6% per annum for unemployment to fall.961 The labour market on the other hand, has a small active workforce of 0.92 million people, according to official data from Kosovo. Given Kosovo’s population of 2 million, this corresponds to a labour participation rate of ca. 46 %. This rate is not only low by EU standards, but also in comparison to the rest of the Balkans, where such rates normally do not fall below 60%. The reasons for Kosovo’s relatively low labour participation rate include its comparatively young population, with many of them too young to entering the workforce; an increase in cases when people leave the labour market prior to retirement age, due to a lack of demand for their professions; and finally the low skills of women and their social roles in Kosovo, which make entrance in the job market very difficult.962

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It is very difficult to find reliable numbers for employed workers in Kosovo, especially since estimates vary between sources. Thus any estimate would be rather spec959. Simon, James, 2005, Reforming Kosovo´s Public Administration: Why it matters and what it Needs, op.cit. 960. See for example , SOK 2001, Kosovo Labour Force Survey and RIINVEST, December 2002, Labour Force and Household survey, as well as ILO Report 2003. 961. Hoti, Avdullah. 2005, A background study on the labour relations in Kosovo, Assessment Report prepared at the request of Social Dialogue organisation, Pristina, Kosovo. 962. MLSW Kosovo Document, October 2006 , Kosovo Action Plan for Youth Employment, Pristina 251

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ulative. In broad terms, however, we can say that about two thirds of the 40% employed workforce are in the private sector, mainly in small enterprises, with one third in family businesses and/or self-employed, while informal employment accounts for one fifth of total employment963. Reasons for informal employment include the level of taxation, as well as complicated employment regulations, and a burdensome state bureaucracy. This burden and the present distribution of taxes have contributed to expanding the informal economy in Kosovo.964 Unemployment rates are the highest for unskilled and less qualified workers, affecting mostly youths aged 15 to 25 years old and women. A combination of several factors disadvantage women in the labour market in Kosovo, such as limited schooling for girls, and early marriage as supported by entrenched patriarchal attitudes among families and communities towards women's fulfillment of their traditional roles in the society.965 The Human Development Report (HDR) on Kosovo points out that women in Kosovo are generally more disadvantaged than men in terms of employment, education, opportunity for choice, and active participation in public life. The level of illiteracy among women is ca. 12 %, an exceptionally high figure, even among countries in the region (i.e. 1.7% in Albania).966 Of those women who are working, around 85 % of them are employed in the services sector, with 8% employed in manufacturing and trade, and 6% in agriculture.967 To tackle the problem of unemployment, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has established regional and municipal Public Employment offices in Kosovo, together with vocational training centers for identifying needs and providing training to the registered unemployed. These centers generally suffer from a lack of financial means and professional staff. Furthermore, the number of vacancies reported is very small considering that they are mainly filled by unemployed family or friends of officials of these offices. Furthermore, due to lacking finances, the training programs for registered unemployed are very limited, and with their limited functional capacity the employment offices do not seem to have clear guidance on what groups to target first.968

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Two important income-support programs with important bearings on the labour market have been introduced in Kosovo; a new pension scheme, and a poverty-targeted social assistance program. These are the main income transfer programs in place. While they represent a safety net for the poor, there are no schemes targeted explicit963. An important factor here is the significant informal economy in Kosovo. 964. See the RIINVEST, 2003, Household and Labour Force Survey 2003. Pristina 965. WB Report No. 32378-XK, June 16, 2005, Kosovo poverty Assessment, Promoting Opportunity, Security and Participation for all. 966. See UNDP Kosovo, 2004, The Kosovo Human Development Report 2004, Chapter II. 967. UNDP Kosovo, Second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo 2005, in cooperation with Riinvest Institute p13, available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/ docs/English.pdf, Accessed September 2007 968. RIINVEST 2002, Small and Medium enterprises, (SME) Development in Kosovo, Annual Report. Pristina 252

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ly at unemployed workers. A modest payroll tax has been introduced to finance a funded pension scheme. But the WB warns that policy makers should not unduly increase the payroll tax as a means of financing safety net programs, as low payroll taxes are a positive feature of the Kosovo labor market that keeps labor costs down, especially compared to its neighbors. Still, over time safety net programs focussing on the labor market will have an important role to play in increasing labor market efficiency and worker welfare, as the WB acknowledges. In fact, if they are well-designed, these programs facilitate the job search process and transitions between jobs, serving as a conduit for a better resource allocation, increased earnings, and higher employment in general.969 The legal agenda for labour market institutions introduced to Kosovo is neoliberal, and accordingly imposes few constraints on the demand for labour. This legal framework remains rudimentary and needs improvements. It provides less employment protection than other transitional countries, and issues such as wage determination are largely left to market forces, while taxes on labour are set at internationally low levels. The is no mandatory private sector minimum wage, and social partners are still looking for ways to establish the process of collective bargaining.970 The formal regulation of employment relationships was accomplished through the enactment of the Essential Labour Law, covering only basic well-known standards like non-discrimination, prohibition of compulsory labour, a maximum 40-hour work week, the minimum age for work (15), the form and termination of employment contracts, and general rules concerning the social obligations of an enterprise towards its employees. The law does not provide for detailed rules with respect to practical issues. However, considering the relatively new Kosovo labour market, certain rules could be helpful considering the high unemployment and the fact that most jobs are in small and medium-sized enterprises. From the perspective of a transitional economy, this legal simplicity could be argued to be a positive characteristic, as even a poorly educated employee/r can understand the meaning of selected articles. But on the other hand, due to its temporary and also general character the law has considerable drawbacks to be overcome in the long run.971

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

4.1.1.7.2 Labour relations and voluntaristic associations Labour market institutions have a role to play in facilitating labour mobility and in addressing conflicts in the market. In Kosovo, this labour market´s institutions and policies are still taking shape. Since 1999, Kosovo´s labour market has been operat-

969. WB Report No: 28023-KOS,17 May 2004, Kosovo Economic Memorandum, p71 970. See Hoti, A. 2005, A background study on the labour relations in Kosovo, op.cit. p17 971. For example, the law defines the duration of maternity leave as 12 weeks, with the employer obliged to pay for such leave. The employer pays for the sick leave of the employees only if the illness is the result of an accident at work or work-related. These solutions are the result of a lack of suitable social funds that could cover at least part of the costs of maternity and sick leave. 253

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ing under exceptionally little regulation.The lack of a collective bargaining framework left the market to determine wages until 2005. Hence, the wage discrepancy between men and women is about 10% (higher for men), a gap that is even wider in the private sector, according to WB data. The wage gap between K-Serbs and K-Albanians is almost insignificant in the public sector, but is quite visible in the private sector, with K-Serbs earning 36% less than K-Albanians. This may be due to less access to jobs and suitable opportunities resulting in accepting lower pay.972 The Ministry of Labour and and Social Work (MLSW) of Kosovo is charged with promoting social dialogue in the labour market. The Tripartite Advisory Council (TAC) is part of these efforts. Its aim is to discuss issues relating to the labour market such as legal activity in the field of social and labour policy, social assistance, unemployment, and the creation of nationwide collective agreements. Additionally, the labour market in Kosovo is quite influenced by voluntary associations, with the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce representing employers, and the Kosovo Confederation of Independent Trade Unions representing employees. The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (in Albanian BSPK) is a confederation of 17 trade unions for different professions. These labour organizations play a crucial role in the ongoing transformation of the Kosovo economy, and society in general. In fact they should continue to be an important social partner in the future development of Kosovo society.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

However, these unions have large shortcomings, and their functional capacity is questionable. Although representatives of these trade unions declare their support for market reforms in the country, it seems that their understanding of a market economy, and especially one in transition, is still insufficient. Moreover, the scarce financial resources of these organizations, which are due to low membership fees and low rates of payment, are serious challenges for the development of their future capacities in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. The reform of these federations and their regional structures will probably remain an issue for some time to come. The internal problems of the BSPK make it unclear whom it represents and from where its legitimacy derives: only its fee-paying members, or all employees in Kosovo? With the introduction of collective agreement under the framework of the TAC, the unions have managed at least in principle to overcome this problem, considering that the collective agreement was approved in 2005, but has not yet been implemented due to government budget problems. Faced again with social dialogue partners who assume responsibilities without estimating the real costs of their implementation, the trade unions have been mostly left to their own devices.973 Specific conditions of

972. World Bank Document Report No: 28023-KOS, Kosovo Economic Memorandum, 17 May 2004, p69. 973. Pupovci, D, Hyseni, H, Hima, A, Thaqi, A, 2005, Development perspectives of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, Analysis of the Organisational Development and of Human Resources, Education Center of Kosovo, Pristina, 2005, p14 254

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the labour market in Kosovo such as high unemployment and the sizable informal economy, make it very problematic to reach out to potential union members. Furthermore, the role of union demands in the ongoing privatization process, such as 20% income for worker´s compensation social funds, re-training and re-qualification, etc, make the whole situation more complex. Moreover, the activities of labour organizations in Kosovo are limited in their use of radical action due to the already fragile political situation in the country. Their arguments following a certain social and political maturity, realizing they must be very careful not to add fuel to the fire and worsen an already difficult situation that could have consequences for society as a whole. Thus, for the time being, their activity is only beginning and remains mainly concentrated on the legal framework of the labour market.974 The employers organizations on the other hand, are represented through the Commercial Chamber of Kosovo (in Albanian OEK). Their support for development, together with other business associations in the country, is also very important for the economy of Kosovo. Strengthening their capability is therefore crucial for their effective participation in the transformation of Kosovo´s economy, with their contribution of quality services for businesses. As an organisation based on voluntary membership, the Chamber has created a new challenge by adopting a modern organizational modus based on member needs. It seems that current levels of income generated through fees from a steadily increasing membership, as well as other income-generating activities, are sufficient to ensure the survival of the Chamber.975 Compared to modern standards, the Chamber needs to develop a more diverse structure of business support services with a higher degree of expertise and professionalism in its various functions. Today a majority of formerly socially owned enterprises in Kosovo are in-operational, and most of them are not likely to reemerge in their former scale when they are privatized. This development has left the Chamber in a rather problematic position institutionally, financially, and image-wise. An in-depth change management process has now started and aims to develop a strategic long-term plan for the OEK, as a prerequisite for a sustainable organisation in a democratic society. In this way the OEK can serve the interests of its business members at its best and will be capable of representing them better in the social dialogue.976

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Both employers' organizations and trade unions should be considered by the EU as crucial players in the future of transitional societies. In fact, the EU has made it a priority to ensure that those groups' concerns are taken into account in the EU devel-

974. Pupovci, D, Hyseni, H, Hima, A, Thaqi, A, 2005, Development perspectives of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, Analysis of the Organisational Development and of Human Resources, Education Center of Kosovo, Pristina, 2005, p15. 975. Kosovo Chamber of Commerce, 2005, Strategy and Vision of Kosovo Chamber of Commerce, EAR Kosovo 976. Ibid. 255

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

opment agenda, and to enhance their policy dialogue with Kosovo's institutions and administration in the form of development programs.977 How effective these programs will be, and how able these two local actors will be in influencing the labour market and its setting in Kosovo remains to be explored by further research.

4.1.1.8 The Human Development Agenda In this unit I will focus on human development in Kosovo as a chief factor in its economic development. Considering that Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe, most of the challenges related to political, economic, and social development during the ongoing transition period are first and foremost the challenges of young people. They are the ones who are going to be Kosovo’s future workers, business people, parents, citizens, and leaders. Based on Amartya Sen´s human capability approach, human development is considered to be an essential element in the economic development of every country, and not a luxury that only rich countries can afford. Thus the creation of social opportunities that contribute directly to the expansion of human capabilities and the quality of life will be examined here in form of educational opportunities, public safety nets for the poor, and the availability of health care in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

4.1.1.8.1 Education Broadly speaking, I maintain that an educated population is vital to every society’s overall social and economic development, including Kosovo. Therefore I will not consider the issue of education simply through the lens of preparing youth for the labour market or as the sole responsibility of students’ families and educational institutions, but rather as an issue requiring the committed support of society and the government's recognition of its rights and responsibilities to that end. The education system in Kosovo faces many challenges. While it was relatively decentralized from 1974 to 1990, individual schools were responsible for the quality of education and creating an appropriate learning environment. At that time, municipalities were responsible for pre-university and primary education, with the central government responsible only for higher education. During the lost decade of 1990-2000, K-Albanians faced a difficult time for their educational as well as political developments. After local decision-making autonomy over education was abolished, the K-Albanian community created a parallel education system at all levels, including universities.978

977. European Communities, Commission. Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document for Kosovo for Years 2007 - 2009. Assessment Report, 2007, p8 978. Nearly half a million young students were attending the primary schools, 81,000 students the secondary facilities, and 30,000 students the University of Pristina. See Sommers, Marc.& Buckland, Peter., Parallel worlds: Rebuilding the education system in Kosovo; IIEP Working Document, UNESCO, 2004. 256

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

In this parallel system, students were taught outside of formal school facilities, usually in private houses with funding provided through collection of an informal tax from the K-Albanian population as well as the diaspora. This parallel system continued until 1999, but had many deficiencies, resulting in a relatively poor quality of education and a limited breadth of subjects. Yet, at that time students were at least taught in their native language, a major change from the formal system. This parallel system affected the lives of many of today’s young people. Many of those educated in this under-resourced system did not acquire sufficient knowledge to continue on to secondary school or higher education. A significant percentage also left school completely unprepared to succeed in the labour market. After the end of the overt conflict, this parallel education system was formalized and the much-needed reconstruction of school infrastructure was initiated.979 Thus from 1999 to 2001, about 1,000 school buildings damaged during the conflict were repaired or rebuilt. The early education reform undertaken after 2000 was the replacement of the traditional Kosovo system with that used in most countries of the European Union. The new system includes nine years of compulsory education, the first five of which are primary education and the next four categorized as low secondary education, followed by three or four years of high secondary education. This reform was implemented, however, without corresponding changes in educational content or curriculum.980 In 2000, shortly after the decade-long parallel education, the old decentralized education system was abandoned and the Department of Education Science and Technology was established to centralize the system. In this way schools were deprived of the rights and responsibilities of financial management as well as personnel decisions.981 The result of this centralization is that schools do not have concrete and direct responsibilities for ensuring or maintaining educational quality. Moreover, municipalities do not receive educational funds from the central government based on important factors such as the number of students, ethnic composition, and population density, with the result that neither individual schools nor municipal authorities are motivated to seek greater efficiency in expenditures.982

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Several educational strategies such as the Education of Rural Population, Gender, and Youth Policies have been undertaken in Kosovo in the last few years to address education issues in Kosovo.983 These strategies and their related educational elements 979. UNDP Kosovo, 2006, Human Development in Kosovo Report 2006, p40 980. The traditional system in Kosovo differed slightly in mandating four years of primary education, followed by four years of low secondary education. High secondary education also consisted of four years. 981. For example, a central-level committee took over responsibility for appointing principals, and the appointment of individual teachers was delegated to municipalities’ education directorates. 982. UNDP Kosovo 2006, Human Development in Kosovo Report 2006, op.cit. p51 983. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Kosovo High Education Development Strategy 2005-2015, Pristina 2004, Available at www.see-educoop.net/portal/id_library.htm, Accessed 13 October 2006 257

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

were mostly uncoordinated, and little effort was made to ensure their effect. Kosovo needs an educational reform strategy that includes clearly defined priorities and clear financial implications for the required interventions. The selection of such measures should consider broad participation from all actors involved in the process, at all levels.984 What is especially striking in Kosovo is the inequality of inclusion in secondary education. Although a general improvement in secondary education enrollment has been made in recent years, the ratio of females to males at this education level is much lower than in mandatory education (0.79 vs. 0.92). Young women's' abilities and inclinations to continue school after primary education are affected by traditional patriarchal customs, especially in the rural areas. When compared among ethnic groups, the secondary education enrollment rate is highest in the K-Serb community, while the lower level of K-Albanian youth inclusion at this level derives from the legacy of the past, and is due to the majority of rural areas in Kosovo, where enrollment is much lower.985 General statistical data cannot provide an accurate assessment of the degree of interest shown by young people in attending school. Although enrollment levels at the mandatory level are high according to the sources mentioned above, they are much lower at the secondary level, and particularly low at the level of higher education. There are many reasons for this decline, including the difficult economic situation, lack of motivation to learn, substandard learning conditions, and long distances from home to school in some areas. Enrollment levels are particularly low at the University of Pristina, for example, due primarily to depressed economic conditions, considering that tuition fees there are as high as in Europe.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Additionally, there are now about 10 private universities and more planned to fill the gaps where Pristina university is failing. What is problematic though, is that there is no integration of K-Albanian and K-Serb students. The two parallel systems persist, but now it is the K-Serbs who have their own private educational system, financed by Belgrade. It seems that education will remain a major economic bottleneck in Kosovo if it cannot develop along with other changes in society. The abundance of young people should be an asset to Kosovo, but this will only occur if they are better educated, and the programs currently in place are inadequate for this. Innovation in business and domestic markets will be stunted if education is not improved. As the interviewedWorld Bank representative put it, "Kosovo needs educational policies to create employers, not just employees.986 Following the interviewed education expert's opinion, several things are required for the system to improve. The formalization of a quality assurance system for education is a necessity, together with a national qualification framework harmonized with the European qualification system. The concept of learning outside of the formal edu984. UNDP Kosovo 2006, Human Development in Kosovo Report 2006, op.cit. 985. Ibid, p44 986. Author´s interview with WB employee in Pristina, Kosovo. 19 October 2006. 258

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

cation system should also be considered by educational institutions in Kosovo, so that students who abandon school can have a second chance at continuing their education. Barring that, dropouts should receive assistance in gaining access to key skills and knowledge required for successfully entering the labour market. Through capacity building of human resources and improved motivation for skill acquisition, it should be possible to determine infrastructural needs and allocate resources accordingly.987 In 2006 the Government came up with educational priorities expressed through the “Platform of 3 E’s” including Education as a key component, and reflected in the 2007 budget, where educational funding has been increased to €7 million. Even this sum will not help, as there is a general decline in the Kosovo Consolidated Budget which will affect education as well. If one compares Kosovo with new members of the EU, their expenditures in education are not comparable. This is because most of these nations’ governments are providing funds to maintain and improve centuriesold consolidated educational systems. Kosovo, meanwhile, is essentially building a completely new system from scratch. Also, funding from state budgets in those countries represents only part of overall educational system expenditures, which also include income from other funding schemes including evolving public and private partnerships, or direct support from outside the public sector. Such additional funding sources are mostly non-existent in Kosovo988

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Given these present conditions, greater attention should be focused on raising awareness among decision-makers of the urgent need to improve the education sector in Kosovo. Learning is a cornerstone of society, and the quality of education provided to young people should be considered a major issue in Kosovo. External donors in general, and the EU in particular, appear little disposed to help. For example, while the EU Commission’s representative in Pristina sees the need to drastically improve Kosovo citizens’ freedom of movement in Europe, and to put circa 20,000 Kosovo students in European universities, EU member states are reluctant to facilitate visas for residents of Kosovo. In the field, it seems little or none of the EU’s assistance for Kosovo is going into education. The problem in orienting EU assistance toward this sector is that EU institutions have little experience and few competencies in education.989 In the meantime, this failure has a direct influence on the young people of Kosovo and their future. 4.1.1.8.2 Public Safety Nets Social welfare programmes designed and implemented by Kosovar institutions since the war are aimed at providing social assistance, and primarily at alleviating poverty. Schemes providing assistance to vulnerable families and individuals are administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW), including social 987. Author´s interview with Education Expert in Kosovo, Pristina, 3 November 2006. 988. UNDP Kosovo 2006, Human Development in Kosovo Report 2006, op.cit, p55 989. International Crisis Group Europe Report N°168, EU Visas and the Western Balkans, 29 November 2005 and the ICG Europe Report 2006, N°170 Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, op.cit. p5 259

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

assistance, basic pensions, support for war invalids and people with special needs, and a Trepca mine basic pension.990 Broadly speaking, the realization of social welfare programs depends on the sufficiency of public provision, the effectiveness of public interventions, and the extent to which delivery is equitable. In Kosovo, given the decline in international donor assistance, the vast bulk of public social spending depends on general budget resources. There is still a weak administrative capacity and fragile social cohesion in this sector, making the critical challenge for poverty reduction to protect the financing of essential services in health and social protection, while enhancing the effectiveness and equity of public social delivery.991 According to social welfare statistics, 42,052 families were receiving social assistance in all of Kosovo in December, 2005. The number of people registered to receive pensions is generally greater than the number of people actually receiving pensions, and the number of pensioners has increased by circa 10% in recent years. Pensioners who had registered with the former pension scheme and system face a serious problem as they can benefit only from the first pillar of a pension scheme, paying 40 euros per month, not even enough to survive in Kosovo. Those dependent solely on this source of income represent a very vulnerable segment of Kosovar society as they encounter serious difficulties in meeting living costs. Both social assistance and basic pensions represent important income sources for families with little or no income generating opportunities. In this regard, the WB estimates that these programmes do play an important role, composing up to 18% of the income for the poor and extreme poor. Sederlof and Verme's research estimated that if public assistance was withdrawn, the number of Kosovars in poverty would increase by 5%.992 Nevertheless, given that there is a huge number of poor and limited budget capacities, social benefit schemes should be targeted specifically to the most vulnerable sections of society, namely the extremely poor.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Due to the limited capability of the extremely poor to earn an income, economic growth in itself is insufficient to bring these people above the poverty line. There is instead a need for an adequate and targeted public safety net, and to build monitoring mechanisms that will ensure social transfers reach the most vulnerable. However, a variety of difficulties stand in the way of achieving this, namely the high level of unemployment and an inadequate and inaccurate database of would-be beneficiaries.993 This unavailability and low quality of data remains a serious concern, especially when discrepancies exist in the data gathered and presented by different institutions

990. UNDP Kosovo & RIINVEST, 2005, Second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo, op.cit. p21 991. World Bank Report No. 32378-XK, June 16, 2005, Kosovo Poverty Assessment, op.cit. p67 992. Sederlof, Hjalte. and Verme, Paolo., 2004 Kosovo, The Public Safety Net, An Analysis of its efficiency and effectiveness. WB Background paper for the Kosovo Poverty Assessment Report.p 12 993. Sederlof, H. and Verme, P., 2004, op.cit. p13 260

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

and organizations. This inconsistency hampers efforts to properly design and implement reform policies, and it creates difficulties in properly monitoring progress, leading to failures in the implementation of policy measures.994 The high level of unemployment in Kosovo is directly related to the economy, which is still fragile and heavily dependent on foreign aid. The high youth unemployment especially can be a potential trigger for youth migration or delinquent behavior, or both. Moreover, this contributes negatively to the participation of Kosovar youth in society activities and particularly in decision-making.995 Rural areas are hampered by a poor infrastructure, and rural-urban migration poses another problem in sustaining rural development. According to available information on Kosovo, the MLSW spends less than other countries in the region on social protection, even though it has the highest level of extreme poverty.996 Why this is so, one can only speculate, but donor money is on the decline and the Kosovo Consolidate Budget does not have many choices left. In the end it is also a matter of the priorities that the Kosovo government is setting. In this area, who is influencing what, and on what premises, remains to be explored. Still, considering the relevance of social programs for social inclusion in Kosovo, a successful strategy should be established for sustainable safety nets where all people feel they have an equal right to be valued members of Kosovo society. 4.1.1.8.3 Health Protection Health protection, just like education and public safety net, is quite poor in Kosovo. I believe that next to lack of income, health capability is the primary dimension of individual well-being and its development in a broader sense. With regard to the health status of the population of Kosovo, there is still considerable uncertainty in estimates, but available evidence points to very poor health protection, among the worst in southeast Europe.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Health around the time of birth and over the first year of life is a major problem in Kosovo, as indicated by current infant mortality rate estimates ranging from 18 to 49 per 1,000, up to 10 times higher than the EU average. Inadequate nutrition is a particular problem causing maternal and infant mortality and affecting a large number of children, even though the factors behind it are fairly well-identified and largely pre-

994. UNDP Kosovo & RIINVEST, 2005, Second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo. op.cit.p 22 995. According to a 2006 UNDP survey, youth participation was 4.1% in NGO projects, 3% benefited from NGO projects, 1.7% in trade union activities, 7.6% in public discussions, 11.2% in citizen initiatives, 25% signed a petition, 21.7% participated in public protests, 6.5% joined ‘Vetevendosja’ movement, the radical nationalist movements that has made several demonstrations even against UNMIK in the last years. 996. In 2003, Kosovo spent 5.8% of its GDP on social protection, but this figures is much higher for other countries in the region (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16.1%, Serbia and Montenegro, 13.1%, Slovenia, 17.0%), See WB Report No. 32624–XK, September 2006, Kosovo Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Vol. I. 261

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ventable. Child and infant mortality are crucial issues in Kosovo’s human development, although perinatal mortality in Kosovo has fallen since 2000, in 2004 it remained at one of the highest rates in Europe.997 These indicators reflect the inefficiencies of the health system, as well as the impact of risk factors that go beyond that system, such as social, economic and environmental factors, confirming once again my assumptions on the interrelationship of these factors. Quantitative information on health status in Kosovo later in life is scarce, and available data suggests that tuberculosis and disability are major problems. The incidence of tuberculosis has declined substantially in recent years, but is still 5 times higher than in western European countries, while 5 to 7.5 % of the total population have some kind of disability. Qualitative data further indicate that mental health problems are widespread, especially among young people,998 mainly due to the consequences of war and its effects at the psychological and emotional levels. Another health problem in Kosovo is the high exposure to health risks resulting from widespread environmental pollution. The major causes of environmental health risks come from: 1. outdated mining practices and industrial infrastructure that ignored environmental impacts; 2. poor housing conditions and quality of basic infrastructure services, and 3.weak environmental management systems. Furthermore, contamination of soil and foodstuffs by heavy metals and lead is one of the most serious problems in areas where mines and industrial facilities are located. In environmental hot spots, the lead intake of people eating local crops has been calculated to be more than three times higher than the WHO recommended maximum weekly intake, and about 15 times greater than EU standards.999 Studies conducted in the early 1990s also found evidence of lead poisoning in children from northern Kosovo, with blood lead concentration at birth in Mitrovica two times above the internationally accepted level. Water contamination is also a major environmental risk. Outdoor air pollution is most problematic around outdated industrial infrastructure, while in Pristina it is due to polluting and unregulated vehicular traffic.1000

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to a World Bank assessment of the sufficiency, effectiveness, and equity of public provision in health in Kosovo, while public spending on education in Kosovo is comparable with other regions, this figure is comparatively quite low for health and social protection. In terms of sufficiency, the overall provision of public health care services in Kosovo is acceptable. The present situation of the Kosovo health system is characterized by a quantitatively reasonable provision. This largely reflects efforts toward infrastructure restoration where many health facilities have

997. Begolli, Ilir et al. 2006, Analizë e gjendjes shëndetësore të nënës dhe fëmiut në Kosovë, (Analysis of Mother and Child Health Status in Kosovo) Dhjetor 2006, MoH-NIPH Tiranë. 998. UNDP Kosovo, 2006, Second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo, op. cit.p46 999. WB Report No. 32378-XK, 2005, Kosovo Poverty Assessment, op.cit, pii 1000. Other important health risks are the threat of an HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the prevalence of risky behaviors among youth. 262

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

been refurbished and re-equipped, and staffing of these facilities is mostly accomplished. Besides sufficiency though, the potential of public provision of health for the poor depends on the effectiveness of service delivery, as indicated by the level of gain in general well-being. A WB report on the effectiveness of health provision shows that the low quality of services remains a major impediment for an effective delivery of health care, although little information is available to examine the extent to which the public health system in Kosovo is able to deliver effective health interventions producing significant health gains. Finally, while the effectiveness of public social delivery refers to the actual welfare gain associated with intervention, an equitable delivery of public services is generally defined as the capacity for all eligible beneficiaries to be provided with the same quantity and quality of public services, regardless of their characteristics. Equity matters here because together with sufficiency and effectiveness, it is instrumental in making health services effective for the poor. In the health sector in Kosovo, this equity in service delivery is compromised by inefficient management and corruption that is causing undue out-of-pocket expenditures which proportionately hit the poor hardest. The health system in Kosovo is publicly financed and is meant to provide universal coverage with a generous exemption policy through the copayment principle. As a result, there should not be a significant proportion of the population reporting excessive costs as a main barrier to access. In Kosovo, the benefits of the system are compromised by mismanagement and corruption, undermining the provision of health care , especially for the poorest.1001 To conclude, in the health sector, the potential welfare gain associated with provision of services appears constrained by the poor quality of services, as evidenced by poor health statistics. Furthermore, the decline in external financial assistance for health, just as for education, raises concerns about the sustainability of public spending in this sector. Just as for education in Kosovo, none of the EU’s project assistance for Kosovo is going into health, and the lack of experience on the part of EU institutions and its assistance toward this sector affects the support the EU is able to give, leaving the health situation in Kosovo very vulnerable. In such a context where basic human capabilities are relatively insufficient, the prospects for human development look dire.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

4.1.2 International players and setting 4.1.2.1 EU Pillar IV: Making Kosovo economy ready for Europe? ..."you gave us freedom, but not a future" a Kosovo man to Kai Eide 1002

On June 10th, 1999, the European Union together with other international organizations were welcomed by locals to develop a comprehensive approach to stabilizing

1001. WB Report No. 32378-XK, 2005, Kosovo Poverty Assessment, op.cit pp67-78. 1002. Eide, Kai Report, 2004, op.cit. p1 263

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the Kosovo crisis and particularly its economic development.1003 This was the only direct reference in UNSCR 1244 to the European Union, and it became the basis for a serious commitment by the EU and its member states to rebuild, reconstruct, and develop Kosovo and its economy. There were no internal procedures or precedents to fall back upon, and the EU had never been on a "mission" itself, therefore the EU Pillar, named Pillar IV of UNMIK, simply had to be invented. Three months later, the EU Pillar was composed of seven commission experts plus support staff, headed by Jolly Dixon.1004 Since then the EU Pillar has been in constant flux. To better understand its policies, one must consider its unique setup and development. Its mandate and responsibilities together with its resources and internal structures have continuously changed over the years, resulting in a rapid turnover of staff .1005 No other international institution in Kosovo has experienced so many changes between the 1999 and 2007. The EU Pillar, and the institutions in which its staff plays leading roles, are responsible for an astonishing array of assets, people, and tasks. One of them for example, is The Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), responsible for the privatization or liquidation of more than 500 previously publicly owned enterprises and their assets throughout Kosovo.1006 Additionally, the Banking and Payments Authority, Kosovo’s Revenue authority, Customs, all Public Utilities, major concerns like the Trepca company, etc, are all managed, administered, or supervised by the EU Pillar. Initially the smallest of the four UNMIK pillars, it is the only one so far that has continuously extended in terms of personnel and responsibilities.1007 The EU Pillar's crucial activities have been focused on reconstruction and economic development across Kosovo. Working in close cooperation with the PISG and other major stakeholders, the EU Pillar has been responsible for Kosovo´s integration into the regional and global marketplace. Apart from its assumed leadership of the massive privatization programme through staffing and management of the KTA, the EU Pillar also supervises Kosovo´s international trade. Through its European office, the EU Pillar deals with the integration of Kosovo into regional economic initiatives of the Stabilization and Association Tracking Mechanism and Stability Pact.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Currently, while control of some areas of the economy remain reserved powers of the SRSG and are thus managed and administered by it, a large number of competencies have been transferred to Kosovo’s PISG. The EU lead role in Kosovo has cost it the lion's share of resources in military, financial, and human terms, focusing on the 1003. See UNSC Resolution S/R/1244, 1999, at www.un.org 1004. To avoid misunderstanding, I will refer here to the EU Pillar, or Pillar IV, of UNMIK, responsible for development of economic policies, and in the following unit to the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), the donor arm of the European Commission. 1005. For example the position of the spokesperson has changed hands four times during the first years. 1006. The Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) was created per UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 on 13 June 2002. 1007. KIPRED, June 2005, Administration and Governance in Kosovo. op.cit. p3 264

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

repair of war damage and of decades of underinvestment and neglect, as well as on increase of capacities of local administration, and so fostering broad reforms. The overall sum invested in Kosovo by all implementing agencies, almost fully financed by the European Commission, is over €1.6 billion. 1008 Despite achievements by the EU Pillar, there have been many failures along the way. According to a KIPRED study, the case of KTA management showed that a wide array of assets and responsibilities also requires a strong presence in the field, a good understanding of Kosovo's specific institutional and legal context, a familiarity with the legacy of Yugoslav socialism and public institutions, and a system to widely share and manage Kosovo’s scarcest resource: reliable information. The EU Pillar did not initially take this seriously. Indeed, EU has always had the smallest part of its staff outside of Pristina, having built up only a modest field presence, virtually assuring only scarce information.1009 Following this study, the evolution of the EU Pillar and its limitations are best illustrated by the example of its authority over the fruits of Kosovo’s socialist developments and its 400 or so socially owned enterprises (SOEs). Constrained by a severe lack of reliable information about the reality on the ground, hamstrung by its own limited administrative resources, and misguided by uniformed staff, the EU Pillar accidentally turned back to failed institutions of socialist Yugoslavia by creating inefficient and predestined-to-fail private institutions. As the World Bank stressed in 2002,1010 much of the important work in building institutions lies in modifying those that already exist in order to better complement each other, and to recognize what to build and what not to build in a particular context. Despite the EU Pillar's good intentions, there was enough evidence even from Yugoslav communist reformers, to recognize the institution of workers’ self-management as the Achilles heel of the Yugoslav economic system. John Allcock noted apropos, "taken together, the constitution of 1974 and the Law on Associated Labor contributed as much as any other feature of Yugoslavia’s history, to its eventual collapse.”1011

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Furthermore, although the EU Pillar has helped Kosovo experience an impressive and unprecedented flow of international reconstruction aid, its approach to long-term development has been heavily criticized, particularly by local experts. What distinguishes effective development strategies from pure reconstruction, suggest the critics,

1008. See the EU Pillar IV web-site available at http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/ about_pillar.php 1009. In the summer of 2001 as few as twenty-one staff working for the Department of Trade and Industry were responsible for monitoring more than 400 socially owned enterprises in Kosovo. Few of these international experts were familiar with Yugoslav socialism and its peculiarities, like workers self-management and socially owned property. The legal and practical meaning of specifically Yugoslav concepts like socially owned property continues to confuse international experts today. See KIPRED 2005, Administration and Governance, op.cit.p4 1010. See WB, 2002, World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets, 2001/2002 1011. Allcock, John B. 2000, Explaining Yugoslavia. London: Hurst and Company, p456 265

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

is a focus on developing local institutions and capacities. Only by understanding the strengths and weaknesses of existing structures is it possible to accomplish the lasting institutional change that is a precondition for sustained economic development.1012 Such an approach requires recognition of the information deficits affecting international organizations intending to reform an inherited institution or economic system. A sound and realistic reform agenda must be based on accurate information about the reality on the ground, and has to take stock of the status quo in the country, region, or sector concerned. Time should therefore be invested in gathering basic information in the field, analyzing the available data, sharing and coordinating with other agencies, seeking out local expertise, and retaining the institutional memory of the country.1013 The EU mission in Kosovo's future success will depend on its ability to learn how to examine and properly research the local context. Failure to achieve this will impede an informed policy debate, and is the reason for the misguided policy of reconstituting workers' self-management in SOEs in Kosovo. Additionally, a well-informed organization could have allocated donor resources more efficiently to improve the rural infrastructure and provide access to serviced land according to the needs of the private sector as well giving priority to property reform. The real challenge for international institutions working in an unfamiliar and ever-changing environment like Kosovo is to acknowledge their ignorance of the local context and to improve on it. Of course, efforts to gather and collect the necessary information for an informed policy debate are time-consuming, but in the long-run, the costs of a policy that fails due to ignorance outweigh the short-term benefits of quick solutions.1014

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The overriding goal of Kosovo´s economic policy, and its main challenge, is to bring about a substantial convergence towards European living standards within the next generation. This future in Kosovo will depend on a strong private sector. None of the new provisional institutions of government, the education system, or the healthcare system can function properly without a strong private sector, as the private economy of Kosovo constitutes the tax base. In order to successfully contribute to this vision of economic development, the EU Pillar should invest more time and resources in the triple challenge of gathering information, consulting with key stakeholders, and understanding the reality on the ground.1015 Furthermore, the EU Pillar's final aim should be to prepare Kosovo and its economy for membership in the European Union, and to help Kosovo embrace the European agenda. Formally, the EU Pillar's future assistance will support the development of Kosovo’s weak economy and its European and regional efforts to integrate, as well as to enhance the socioeconomic environment for all communities, creating a stable, modern, democratic, and multi-ethnic society based on respect of the rule of law. After a gradual approximation to the EC legislation, preparations for participating in

1012. 1013. 1014. 1015.

ESI, Lessons Learned Analysis, Kalesija Report. See www.esiweb.org Author´s interview with ESI Senior Analyst, 28 March, Vienna, Austria KIPRED, June 2005, Administration and Governance in Kosovo. op.cit p52 Ibid, p3-4 266

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

European Community programmes for bringing Kosovo closer to the EU can begin.1016 In reality though, a clear link between policies of the European Union in Brussels and those implemented by the EU Pillar in Kosovo is missing. The ICG and the European Stability Initiative (ESI) reports have criticized this gap, warning against an uncoordinated approach to development in Kosovo. ICG reports have pointed out that the area where the EU could make the most significant difference is rural development, considering the underuse of agricultural land in Kosovo. Until recently, small-scale agriculture employed 30 to 40% of Kosovo’s workforce, more than in any other part of Europe. Most K-Serbs and potential returnees are from rural areas, adding to an already vulnerable situation. Their access to markets is particularly restricted due to the limited freedom of movement. The EU policies towards Kosovo seem harmful in this regard. While Kosovo has free trade arrangements with almost all countries in the region, allowing foreign farmers to sell their products easily to its consumers, its own producers lack the infrastructure or experience to compete successfully even on their home ground. Farmers in EU candidate countries like Croatia, and Macedonia benefit from the EU’s pre-accession agricultural aid, but although Kosovo is in greater need, it does not qualify.1017

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, EU Commission officials are in general gloomy about the funding which the tight EU assistance budget for 2007- 2013 permits for Kosovo, and in particular they see little prospect for moves on visas, education, or rural development. Based on these reports, the ESI issued warnings similar to the ICG's in 2005, called the attention of Brussels policy makers to their proposal for the next seven years, and the strict separation in the type of assistance offered to candidates like Croatia and that offered to potential candidates in the region like Kosovo, who will not be offered support for rural development, cohesion, or human resource policies.1018 If EU governments proceed in this way, there will be serious political and economic consequences for these countries, meaning that those living in rural areas will suffer from inadequate education and training systems and seriously deficient infrastructures, and will see the development gap separating them from the rest of Europe as their immediate neighbors grow bigger. With this, the desperation of the countryside and declining industrial towns in Presevo, Mitrovica, or western Macedonia, will continue to grow. The politically least stable part of the continent will fall further behind and a new "European ghetto", comprising most of the Balkans' Albanians and Serbs, together behind a wall of visa restrictions, will be created in the heart of an integrated continent. This would make the vision of a lasting sustainability, according to the ESI, quite elusive.1019

1016. European Commission. 2007, Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document for Kosovo for Years 2007 - 2009. Assessment Report, op.cit. p13 1017. ICG Europe Report N°170, February 2006, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, op.cit, p6 1018. The other candidates were Bosnia and Albania. 1019. ESI, 2005, The Helsinki Moment, European Member state-building in the Balkans, op.cit. 267

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

In this regard, the ESI suggests, first changing the EU commission proposal in all its five components, including the regional, human resources, and rural development components, and making them available to potential candidate as well as candidate countries. Secondly, the EU should encourage candidate governments to prepare EU-compatible National Development Plans in order to build institutional absorption capacity for future EU assistance. In Kosovo, the former proposal is not occurring while Kosovo National development Plan's absorption capacity for future EU assistance is questionable. For the ESI, an EU-type strategy process, as used in all the new member states, would provide the most robust and logical process through which the Kosovo economy could eventually converge with the standard of living of its EU neighbors. Hence such a strategy is urgently needed. Even if Kosovo has a long way to go, and is in not yet in a formal relationship with the EU, development planning in Kosovo should not be pursued in a European vacuum, especially when the economy of Kosovo is firmly embedded in the encompassing economy of the enlarging EU.1020

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Anther point where the EU programme has met with criticism is its focus on overly bureaucratic procedures in the field. One study has suggested that the UN and EU missions throughout the Balkans should be rationalized as quickly as possible and supplanted by small multidisciplinary advisory teams, working alongside ministers and local civil servants. This would instill a sense of ownership and responsibility for institutional changes among local leaders. The local community would be encouraged to use its expertise, to learn from its mistakes, and to take responsibility for its actions. These advisory teams should report to Strasbourg and Brussels on the economic, political, human rights, and cultural progress of their assigned country, whilst standing back as far as is practical from day-to-day administration. Such a streamlined intervention would help to replace the apathetic leadership identified by Kai Eide, and generate a sense of direction and respect. This is why the EU needs to redouble its efforts to work alongside the local population to overcome regulatory and bureaucratic obstacles, so that opportunities can be capitalized on and Kosovo itself can reach out to EU.1021 Finally, another important criticism of EU policy makers concerns policies toward Kosovo emigrants. According to ESI reports, diaspora remittances have fallen significantly from their post-war high, when they funded the reconstruction of homes across Kosovo. Since the door to continuing migration has been shut, only the lucky few with close family in the diaspora are still able to go abroad through family reunification schemes. As a consequence, fewer than 15% of Kosovo families now receive regular remittances, and all the signs are that this is decreasing. In this scenario, the legacy facing a post-status Kosovo, is the cutting of a lifeline that has kept rural Kosovo afloat for the past generation. EU member states are applying simply inco-

Executive Summary. 1020. Bradley & Knaus, 2004, Towards a Kosovo Development Plan, op.cit. p31 1021. Welch Anthony C. August 2006, Achieving Human Security after IntraState Conflict: The Lessons of Kosovo, Coordinator of ISSR, Kosovo Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp221–239 268

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

herent policies, argues the ESI, by investing hundreds of millions of Euros in the stabilization of Kosovo, but at the same time slamming the door abruptly on further emigration from Kosovo. "If Europe is to be serious about finding a lasting political solution for Kosovo, it will need to identify ways in which rural Kosovars can find temporary work abroad, instead of the alternative of sending ever more policemen to Kosovo to deal with a new generation of angry and desperate young men".1022 So, they should work with Kosovar authorities to set in place migratory work agreements with parts of the EU in need of labour, in a way that is politically acceptable to European countries. This would require close cooperation between European and Kosovar institutions in fighting organized crime, and making concrete steps to allow Kosovars access to EU labour markets. Considering the loose rhetoric about the Europeanization of Kosovo as the way forward once status is resolved, the ESI warns that unless this Europeanization includes a focus on migration and access to European labour markets, it will remain no more than a slogan, with its benefits invisible to rural citizens. An EU policy that invests tens of millions of Euros to stabilize Kosovo and southeastern Europe without credible development policies is simply incoherent. Kosovo authorities similarly imitate this practice, relying on remittances to keep the rural economy alive, using them as informal safety nets. As the ESI puts it, "both the citizens of rural Kosovo and European tax-payers deserve better than a set of policies that are failing and bound to fail in the future."1023 The promise of Europe thus remains vague and incoherent for Kosovo. Unless this changes, Kosovo will remain an island of instability in the heart of Europe, exporting illegal migrants and importing peacekeepers.1024 4.1.2.2 EAR: Incoherence in action? The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) was established in February, 2000 as the EU’s main reconstruction arm in Kosovo. Its main goal was to support good governance, institution building, the rule of law, and the development of a market economy.1025 It was created in an attempt to improve aid distribution in Kosovo by drawing on the lessons learnt in Bosnia, namely that it takes a long time to distribute money from the headquarters in Brussels, hence a flexible unit in the field is necessary to prevent a lack of donor coordination. 1026

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Broadly speaking, at the level of project implementation all projects funded by EAR in Kosovo include an EU integration component to nurture awareness of the fu-

1022. ESI Paper, 18 September 2006, Cutting the lifeline, Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo, Berlin Available under www.esiweb.org, p2 1023. Ibid. p30 1024. ESI Lessons Learned Analysis, 3 November 2002, Western Balkans 2004: Assistance, Cohesion and the new boundaries of Europe. A call for policy reform, Available under www.esiweb.org 1025. EAR Kosovo, 1999 Action Prorgamme, Available at http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/ agency.htm, Accessed on 26 October 2006 1026. Author´s interview with employee of EAR.17 October 2006, Pristina, Kosovo. 269

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ture role Kosovo may play. The aim of the EU, through EAR, is to build a critical mass of understanding about EU integration. It also aims to ensure that Kosovo is on a path towards compliance with European legislation and its acquis communitaire in the future. Concretely, its main focus in Kosovo is to support public utilities, the housing sector, and especially the energy sector. Other important sectors for EAR are public administration reform and economic strategy and enterprise development.1027 As it is often the case with donors, EAR funds have decreased rapidly since 2003. However, the EAR has planned to invest a further 49 million Euros through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) program for Kosovo, which will be implemented in 2008. The EAR disburses funds mainly through foreign contractors, and its policy is to hire companies from EU member states. Those that do not fall into these categories are ineligible for contracts. Typically, activities costing under 150,000 Euros are internally advertised, those up to 2 million Euros are advertised both internally and externally, and those higher than 2 million Euros are advertised only externally. For some projects, foreign contractors are encouraged to subcontract to local organizations. The EAR has never contracted a local organization or company directly.1028

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Although its support in the post-reconstruction phase was indisputable, the EAR's investments since then have been more than disputable. Based on the information mentioned above, it seems that the EAR maintains that large "investments" can only be managed by EU member state firms which, although somewhat justified by the lack of local experience, hints at pseudo-support and the EU rather supporting itself and its private companies. For example, the case of EAR policy with regard to the energy sector company KEK shows doubtful behaviour. In spite of its large donations to KEK, the EAR’s policy toward KEK has been widely criticized. One of the most contentious cases was the awarding of a contract to the French company, Alstom, to revitalize and repair KEK, even though Alstrom was not perceived to have been the best company applying for the job. It is believed that the EAR hired Alstom because it was on the verge of bankruptcy, and 20,000 workers in France would have lost their jobs without a significant new contract. If Alstom’s engagement had produced tangible positive results on the ground, few would have criticized the EAR for this. However, Alstom’s performance at KEK was rather poor and led to insufficient provision of electricity, even eight years after the war1029 The EAR was also criticized by an implementing organisation for having confused or even having contradictory aims with regard to a project on minority returns to Kosovo. In 2005, the Pristina office of the EAR committed 5 million Euros for the return and reintegration of K-Serb refugees in Kosovo. At the same time, its Belgrade 1027. EAR Kosovo, June 2006, EAR Annual Report to the EU Parliament and Council: JanuaryDecember 2005, pp. 86-102 1028. Author´s interview with Artan Venhari, Task Manager for Economic Development, EAR, November 2006 1029. Kosovar Stability Initiative ( IKS) 2007, Reconstruction Survey, Kosovo 2007. London: Tiri, p19 270

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

office allocated more than double that amount, 12 million Euros, for the integration of K-Serbs in Serbia. CARE International, an implementing partner for the returns project in Kosovo, complained that the vast sums allocated for refugee integration into Serbia were undermining the sustainability of the return process in Kosovo, which is the preferred aim of the international community. In CARE’s experience, many K-Serb "returnees" were only coming back in order to sell their newly reconstructed homes and to eventually move back to Serbia.1030 Such an approach is at its best incoherent and counterproductive. To what extent these "incidents" are influencing Kosovo´s economic development, even for the simple reason of generating mistrust towards the EU mission in Kosovo, remains to be researched further. 4.1.2.3 Kosovo Trust Agency and the privatization effects Much ink has been spilled in the last few years analyzing the Kosovo privatization process and its management by the KTA and EU. The issue is in fact complicated, and therefore I will present a brief overview at the political, juridical and technical levels, and examine its implications for the socioeconomic reality in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The privatization process commenced one year after the end of the war in Kosovo. In the absence of appropriate legislation, it started with a commercialization program, creating 10 years lease contracts for the assets of productive Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The main objective of the privatization process was the transparent, expedient, and massive transfer of assets of the circa 500 SOEs into the private sector. The Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) regulation was promulgated according to this logic in June, 2002. Up to March, 2006, there have been, 145 SOEs tendered, almost 125 Million Euros banked, and circa 1,600 job guarantees made.1031 The process of “commercialization” of SOEs started as an interim measure while a privatization strategy was being designed. UNMIK opted initially for a process of commercialization that involved leases for a fixed period, generally of 10 years, in order to allow a commitment to invest with a reasonable time to get a return on that investment. This worked to a certain extent. For the first time since their mission in East Timor, the UN set up an administration on the premise that assets ownership in the country could and would be determined when the final status was decided. Hence, the KTA was created as an independent body mandated by UNMIK Regulation 2001/12 with the purpose of administering, supervising and even assuming control over Public and Socially owned enterprises (POEs and SOEs), and a mandate to take any appropriate action “to preserve or enhance the value, viability or governance”of those enterprises.1032 The privatization strategy promulgated in June, 2002 and adapt1030. Ibid. 1031. Hackaj, A. 2006, Socio-Economic effects of Privatisation in Kosovo: impact on growth and economic welfare, in Long Term Polices for Social and Economic Development, Special Issue on Kosovo, in Journal of the Nash Albanian Studies, SSEES-UCL, Tahiraj E, & Davies, P.S (eds) Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2006, op.cit. p2 1032. Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) Website, Available under www.kta-kosovo.org, Accessed in 271

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ed to Kosovo’s unique circumstances offered a compromise solution to three different concerns pulling in different directions; 1) employees’ rights, 2) creditors’ and owners’ rights, and 3) the use of SOE´land owners rights. 1) Recognizing the SOEs’ employees' right to a larger stake in their enterprises than the rest of population, even though the “social ownership” developed in the former FRY did not confer any actual transferable ownership rights, it was agreed that the social ownership element of the sales price would be 20% and this would be given to workers that had worked for the enterprise for at least 3 years. 2) Recognizing the rights of potential creditors and former owners, UNMIK insisted, and the PISG accepted, that all SOEs would be privatized and/or liquidated, and be subject to the 20% due the workers. The proceeds of sales would then be distributed to creditors, and the balance would be held in trust funds for the former owners until the resolution of Kosovo’s final status. 3) Finally, the SRSG overcame the philosophical difficulty of selling someone else’s property by creating a 99 year transferable lease on the land and building assets owned by SOEs upon privatisation. With this device UNMIK could declare that the land remained owned by the former owners even if they had to wait 99 years to recover it.1033

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, the administration of SOEs and POEs has little to do with privatization. The KTA was (and is) authorized to establish, on behalf of a SOE, one or several corporations in the form of limited liability companies or joint stock companies and to transfer to such corporations the rights and interests in all or part of the assets of the SOE concerned. The shares of this established corporation are then owned by the SOE and are administered by the KTA.1034 Under this authority, the KTA is entitled to sell and transfer part or all of the shares in newly established corporations on behalf of the SOEs, which formally own these shares. 1035 Proceeds from the sale of shares accrue to the SOEs, which owned the shares, but will be held in trust by the KTA for the benefit of creditors and owners of the SOEs. After the transfer of the assets of an SOE to a newly established corporation, the remainder of the SOE can then be liquidated1036 This procedure is the so-called spin-off procedure for SOE privatization. In fact, only the assets of an SOE are envisaged to be made available to the private sector, while the SOE as such is supposed to be liquidated. But the privatisation is limited only to SOEs, as POEs cannot become subject to spin-off procedures, and remain under the administrative authority of the KTA. In addition, the assets of the SOEs do not change as far as their legal status is affected. Socially owned immovable property

1033. 1034. 1035. 1036.

July 2007 Hackaj, A. 2006, Socio-Economic effects of Privatisation in Kosovo, Tahiraj E, & Davies, P.S (eds), op.cit. p4 UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/12, Section 8.1 UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/12, Section 8.4 UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/12, Section 9 272

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

stays as it is and does not become private immovable property when transferred to the newly established corporation1037 The powers of the KTA are vested in a board of directors made up of four internationals and four Kosovo residents who can delegate to the KTA Managing Director the power to carry out its ordinary business.1038 This board is expected to “exercise its independent business judgment,” but reports to the SRSG and is accountable to it for compliance with UNSCR 1244, UNMIK regulations, and any other applicable law. The KTA was charged with ensuring a transparent process, so consequently a special chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court has been established, primarily to adjudicate on matters relating to the privatisation process. It comprises three international and two local judges to guarantee the transparency of the privatisation and liquidation program. This body is funded by UN.1039 The functional capacity of the SOE and POE sectors is below the production frontier, due to the great need for capacity-building and investment in infrastructure, and environmental liabilities. The majority of them have inherited poor corporate governance,1040 complicated property title deeds. Many important documents are missing due to the war, the age of management is generally high, and production technologies and product lines are old and amortized.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The consequences of privatisation on employee equity are especially relevant to this study. According to Hackaj, a KTA expert, the privatization of SOEs has offered an equitable environment to its employees because salaries were scaled generously, and the company provides lifelong job security, a steady source of income, and fringe benefits including holidays, medical coverage, apartments, etc. In this system where profit is not the only important element, it was no surprise that productivity per employee increased immediately, and although a lower number of people have been employed, they have enjoyed more benefits. Furthermore, a return on labour was noticed, meaning that privatization reduced false employment levels and favored real employees. It is expected to increase absolute employee numbers in the mid- and long terms. One of the side effect of more stable work contracts and higher salaries is an increased ability of newly-hired employees to rise above the subsistence level. 1037. KIPRED, June 2005, The United Mission in Kosovo and the Privatisation of Socially Owned Property A critical outline of the present privatization process in Kosovo, 2nd Edition, Pristina, p10 1038. There was an intention to create a board comprising representatives of the most important stakeholder institutions in Kosovo, by including three ministers of the PISG, where one is from Serbian & other minorities, the President of the Trade Unions of Kosovo is the voice of the workers, and the international directors include a) the Deputy SRSG for Economic Reconstruction (EU) as chairman of the Board, b) the Deputy to the Deputy SRSG for Economic Reconstruction, c) the Deputy SRSG for Civil Administration (UN,) and d) the Managing Director of the KTA. 1039. See UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/12, sections Section 11.1, 15.1, 12.1,12.2.,12.3 and .Section 14.3. 1040. The Workers’ Assembly elects the Workers’ Council which recruits the Managing Director who is supposed to re-structure the SOE  273

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Moreover, a return on assets employed is expected, with old SOE employees getting an upfront cash payment of 20% of the privatisation proceeds before liquidation, comparable to what was offered during other privatisation processes in former Yugoslav countries. There is no data on the impact of privatisation on prices, but it appears that the privatisation process in Kosovo has allowed for "the emergence of a community of microgarchs, unleashing their entrepreneurial and productive potential"1041 The other side of the privatisation process in Kosovo concerns the juridical political perspective. Experts warn that the privatisation of socially owned immovable property (land and buildings) has not involved the PISG sufficiently, and has not taken into consideration the interests and the role of local governments, and municipalities. So, the latter have limited capacity to take advantage of opportunities to promote local economic development, and blame the KTA for this circumstance. According to other sources, although it is widely believed that municipalities have some general responsibility for KTA-managed services, their exact role is unclear. Local governments are represented on utility regulatory boards, but the power of those boards and the roles that municipal representatives should play are simply not well understood1042. When the Government and Assembly of Kosovo consented to the draft regulation on establishment of the KTA, neither institution took sufficiently into account that Kosovo’s newly established corporations could be purchased legally by the Government of Serbia, directly or through intermediaries such as private companies. Although there is no ethical reason which would prohibit such a transaction, considering the destructive role of the government of Serbia in Kosovo so far, it is likely that the privatization process will be exposed to serious danger if the major shareholder of a newly established corporation in Kosovo is the government of Serbia.1043 Finally, the confused triple legal framework mentioned in the previous unit on the privatisation of socially owned property does not really help. It is a hindrance in the way of the privatisation process, and on the broader economic development in Kosovo.1044

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

From the technical perspective, the privatization process in Kosovo has faced many problems. The value of enterprises sold so far was not in fact real, and the value of physical assets such as factory and other buildings has been undervalued, with no proper valuation based on financial statements of their business activities. The over-bureaucratization and lack of transparency of the KTA in the privatization process have contributed to an increase in uncertainty and a lack of trust in the mech-

1041. Hackaj, A. 2006, Socio-Economic effects of Privatisation in Kosovo, Op.cit.p6 1042. USAID Kosovo, 2006, op.cit. p 17 1043. KIPRED, 2005, The United Mission in Kosovo and the Privatisation of Socially Owned Property, op.cit. p21 1044. Author´s Interview with Legal Expert and Lawyer, 7 November, Pristina, Kosovo. 274

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

anism that manages the privatization process. This has of course a negative impact on attracting potential investors.1045 One of the most important problems with the privatisation process is that SOEs were sold to a limited number of new owners, mostly with limited financial capacities to refinance technological improvements in them, impeding the functionality and expansion of these companies in the future. Anecdotal evidence has shown that most of the private persons or companies who won a tender to buy an SOE made the purchase partially by using existing funds and partially with the support of loans from commercial banks, leaving them unable to invest in new technology and know-how. Adding to the problem, in a post-privatization period where many newly privatized SOEs have become joint stock companies, the new owners see no possibility as shareholders to sell their shares because there is no permanent stock exchange or organized market where they can be traded.1046 The current state of governance of Kosovo’s Publicly Owned Enterprises is no better. It is deemed to be poor, with no improvement during the last few years in the aggregation of development, productivity, or the competitiveness in the region or of individual companies. The fact that customers perceive the quality of public services to be poor, and that many people link their business activities to instances of corruption should be a wakeup call for reformers in the region. Therefore, instituting proper corporate governance practices in Kosovo POEs is an essential component of Kosovo’s democratic and economic development. This will contribute to healthy and transparent enterprises, lower the levels of corruption, make better use of public funds, and improve socioeconomic conditions in general.1047

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

To conclude, despite the geopolitical constraints and difficult macroeconomic situation, the privatisation process is moving the Kosovar economy closer to an optimal production level. Although there are many problems, the privatized enterprises are more productive, the economy as a whole is concentrating investment in profitable activities, and the subsidy burden on taxpayers is falling. To cement the progress in the transfer of property, as well as to continue its contribution to balanced and sustainable growth, the privatisation process also needs to provide conditions for an optimally equitable and broadly-based distribution of wealth. If there is a lesson to be learned from similar developments in western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, it is the significant political empowerment of propertyowning democrats. Invested with property rights they insist on adherence to the rule of law, and demand respect from their politicians and oligarchs alike. Only in this way can an economy allow for human capabilities to evolve and improve, and given

1045. RIINVEST Discussion Table, September 29, 2004, Transparency and Monitoring of Privatization, Held in Grand Hotel Pristina. Source RIINVEST office. 1046. KIPRED, February 28th 2005, Stock Exchange in Kosova: Why and How? Pristina, Kosovo p6 1047. RIINVEST, January 31, 2007, Corporate Governance in Kosovo: Reforming Publicly Owned Enterprises Institute for Development Research Pristina, Kosovo, p9 275

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

enough time and the right support from local and international actors, become functional and sustainable. Therefore, despite failures during the privatization process, the creation of a community of Kosovo microgarchs with economic power, able to seriously protect their interests and change their destiny while respecting the democratic principles of market competition may be considered a contribution of privatization to the creation of a modern, sustainable and democratic country.1048 4.1.2.4 International Safety Nets in Kosovo: WB, IMF and EU “Until the final status of Kosovo is settled, foreign direct investment, access to capital and markets and funding through concession loans shall remain limited.” World Bank, September 2006

Due to its political status, Kosovo is not like other areas in the Balkans which avail themselves of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (and IBRD) loans. It can receive only relatively small grants, because its undetermined status prevents it from signing the sovereign guarantee required by international financial institutions. Because of its non-member status, the IMF does not even have a formal program in Kosovo. At the request of UNMIK and later the PISG, the IMF has been assisting in institution-building and the formulation and implementation of economic policy in Kosovo, working closely with the WB and other donors.1049

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

WB support in Kosovo has been in the form of small grants given as Transitional Support Strategies, with a commitment of about $116 million provided for areas like economic reform and institution building, private sector development, education, health and social protection, the energy sector, infrastructure, etc. In addition to investment and adjustment policy support, the WB has also played a role, together with the European Commission, in donor coordination and the provision of policy advice and support, albeit with limited success. After the NATO intervention in 1999, the WB was the third biggest donor in Kosovo, operating through its own funds or managing various donor states' funds. Focused mostly on economic development and social issues after 2003, and guided by its human development agenda, it turned its focus to education and committed 40% of all donor funds to developing education in Kosovo.1050 Although foreign assistance grants like those of the WB, together with private inflows, have brought the Kosovo economy an exceptionally strong recovery immediately after the end of the conflict, the very dependence on such foreign inflows renders the gains achieved fragile and the underlying economy vulnerable. In order for an economy to be sustainable, it must rely on long-term sustainable solutions. As Serwer suggests, the lack of accessibility to international loans is a serious economic handicap for Kosovo that sharply limits job creation and economic progress, especially as both international assistance of other sorts and remittances are now declining. Additionally, Kosovo has been prevented from privatizing many state assets be1048. Hackaj, A. 2006, Socio-Economic effects of Privatisation in Kosovo, op.cit. p2 1049. World Bank Report No. 35262-XK. March 30, 2006, Interim Strategy for Kosovo, p15 1050. Ibid. p12-3 276

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

cause of its undetermined status and objections from Belgrade. While many SOEs in Kosovo are deemed largely worthless, they do tie up large quantities of real estate and other resources needed for the economic growth.1051 Another contentious issue related to the political status and negotiations with Serbia is that of Kosovo’s foreign debt (to the WB, IMF, etc) from the years before the war. The level of this debt is difficult to say with certainty, since development loans for projects in Kosovo were managed from Belgrade. According to WB sources in Kosovo, its lending to the former Autonomous Province of Kosovo dates back to 1970, with the last loan being approved in 1987. The former Socialist FRY was the official guarantor for all loans benefiting Kosovo, and while WB lending for Kosovoonly projects totaled circa $127 million, its lending for projects with multi-beneficiaries including Kosovo totaled $647 million. The proportion of this sum allocated to Kosovo cannot be precisely determined at this time.1052 Therefore, WB funds were present in Kosovo since the 1970s through development credits lent to the FRY, while after the wa,r the WB changed its strategy. Even when Kosovo is able to receive loans from the WB or IMF, the amount of new borrowing should be calibrated accordingly, depending on the magnitude of the debt that Kosovo may inherit from the former FRY. Due to a lack of information regarding the amount of debt Kosovo may inherit, all assumptions on these issues are speculative, and clarification on this issue will need to await the resolution of Kosovo's final status. After that, according to an IMF study, it must be shown that Kosovo's borrowing needs are consistent with its economy’s capacity to service debt. Several studies suggest that beyond a debt-to-GDP ratio of 40–50 percent the likelihood of debt correction rises, and the impact on growth turns negative, as the deterioration in the perceived creditworthiness of the country discourages investment.1053

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Until the status issue is solved, Kosovo's access to international borrowing will be based on the European Investment Bank (EIB) and several newly made agreements. The EIB's commitment to Kosovo has been over €75 million from 2004 to 2007.1054 A framework agreement between EIB and UNMIK was set up in order to facilitate the granting of loans for investment projects in Kosovo. It is expressly provided that UNMIK acts as a legal conduit and facilitator between the EIB and the PISG, in regard to EIB loans granted to Kosovo. The PISG acknowledge that obligations undertaken by UNMIK are undertaken for and on behalf of the PISG. However, any obligations,

1051. Serwer, Daniel 2004, Kosovo: Status with Standards, p3, Presented at the "5 Years of Stability Pact" commemorative event on 8 June in Portoroz, Slovenia. See the event website at www.stabilitypact.org. 1052. See the summary of past WB Projects in Kosovo, and Economic Reconstruction and WB Development in South-East Europe at http://www.seerecon.org/kosovo/wb/ wb_summary.htm, Accessed 15 July 2007 1053. See the study of Moalla-Fetini, Rakia, 2005, Kosovo: Gearing Policies Toward Growth and Development. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, op.cit. 1054. The agreement was reached between the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the UN, and UNMIK during meetings in Brussels and New York in July 2003. 277

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

undertakings, and commitments by UNMIK for the PISG under the framework agreement will be carried out by UNMIK in coordination with the PISG in accordance with UNSCR 1244. Matters pertaining to EC guarantees for EIB loans for Kosovo and the legal succession of obligations towards the EIB by any post-UNMIK administration remain still unclear.1055 From the legal perspective, there is a draft law on international financial agreements currently in place in Kosovo that addresses issues of financial liability, succession to rights and duties established, arbitration, choice of law, and the procedure to sign an agreement. Broadly speaking, no liabilities will be incurred against the UNMIK budget, but only against Kosovo's budget, and therefore obligations created under an international financial agreement will be binding upon the PISG and any successor government. In addition, the draft law regulates procedures to be followed before an international financial agreement can be signed by the SRSG, involving both the government and the Assembly. Despite initial skepticism from members of the Assembly expressing their concern about the fact that UNMIK would not guarantee financial obligations incurred under an international financial agreement, risking practical obstacles, the law has been adopted by the Assembly and promulgated.1056 According to UNMK, it is expected that such international loans or guarantees will become a significant form of investment financing in Kosovo, especially after taking into account the limited debt guaranteeing capacity of the Kosovo consolidated budget, but there should be a realistic consensus that international loans cannot fully substitute for donor grant support.1057

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Addressing Kosovo’s economic problems will require sustained and combined efforts by local authorities and the international donor community. Despite the loans that play a crucial role in the long-term development of a country, and form a necessary safety net in a globalized world, in the case of Kosovo this alone will not be the panacea for its problems. It is in general the continued involvement of donors, in whatever form, that can support the authorities’ policies until the economy’s fundamentals strengthen and governance and market institutions reach maturity. Considering the recent visible emergence of donor fatigue, it is important to reinvigorate the virtuous circle through which foreign assistance supports good policies and good policies provide a basis for continued donor support. To do so, clarity about policies and financing needs will be essential. Therefore not only loans are important, but also an increase in foreign assistance contribution to the domestic economy is necessary to improve its developmental impact, particularly as channelled through local budgets.

1055. UNMIK European Union Pillar, Kosovo Outlook 2004, Pristina, 13 May 2004, p17 1056. See UNMIK/REG/2004/30, On the Promulgation of the Law on International Financial Agreements Adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo. 1057. UNMIK European Union Pillar Report: Kosovo Outlook, May 2004, op.cit. 278

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

This will allow foreign assistance to play a greater role in Kosovo's development, at least until its status is clear enough to allow its accession to the standard international safety nets by reinforcing both ownership and transparency.1058

4.2 Alliances, conflicts and co-operations 4.2.1 Exploring the Constellations of power in kosovo economy With the legal and institutional framework in place, structural transformations are already on the way in Kosovo. Early signs of accelerated privatisation process are evident, such as an increase in the crediting activities of commercial banks, improved corporate governance of public enterprises, an increase in private investment in manufacturing activities, etc. Yet, these transformations are not irreversible, and Kosovo has a lot to do in order to keep the pace of transformation while making sure that the supporting institutions are consolidated and democratized. Many internal weaknesses, especially insufficient institutional capacity for handling complex transactions and resisting pressure from political and social conflicts, will need to be overcome. It is clear that Kosovar institutions are still weak and immature, but must cope with these difficulties while evolving and adapting themselves at the pace necessary to deliver tangible results to a growing population with high expectations.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, even compared to eastern European standards, Kosovo institutions remain feeble. In contrast to most of its neighbors, Kosovo did not need just a revamp and reorientation of its institutions toward a democratic and market-based model in the wake of the 1999 conflict, but rather a dramatic reengineering and reconstruction of its whole institutional fabric. One reason for this is the lack of government institutions before 1999. Even those ones in place at the time had just a primitive structure, and almost everything had to be built from scratch with virtually no institutional memory, and very few qualified people with government experience. Furthermore, all this had to be done in a terrain where the formal education system had collapsed, and the social fabric was badly torn apart by years of ethnic distrust and fighting. Although it has been politically incorrect until recently to call this process state-building, I will insist here that this is the correct term. Under this assumption, one lesson the IC has learned in the last few years regarding state-building is that repairing social fractures and erecting effective institutions is a long-term process, requiring sustained engagement and resources. At present, at least from the economic perspective, and despite considerable achievements, Kosovo is far from being self-sustaining.1059 It seems that there is a "vicious circle" happening in Kosovo, where the lack of political stability hinders economic development, and the lack of sustainable economic development impairs political stability. The socioeconomic reasons leading to this vicious circle have already been mentioned here. Unemployment, especially, is increasing the numbers facing a high level of poverty in the country, yielding a general 1058. Moalla-Fetini, Rakia, 2005, Kosovo: Gearing Policies Toward Growth and Development. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, p14-15 1059. Author´s interview with Economic Expert, EU Pillar IV in Kosovo, Pristina, 2006, op.cit. 279

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

feeling of dissatisfaction destined to increase the potential for revolt.1060 The lack of a clear development strategy from local and international authorities who generate ad hoc and separate development programs instead of linked sector strategies, spreads a feeling of confusion and insecurity about the future.1061 Furthermore, the lack of international safety nets, the delay in privatisation due to the status issue, etc, that make potential foreign investors in Kosovo wait before undertaking anything, are all important issues showing how the economic field is directly connected to the political field and the status issue. Inadequate capital management, idle funds, and a lack of funds for concrete loans to and projects in the private sector do net help the situation. Adding fuel to the fire are inadequate public services, poor roads and urban infrastructure, power and water cuts, expensive telecommunications services, non-functioning railroads, etc. The list is long, and although everyone understands the reasons for those problems, the difficulties in resolving them remain present in the Kosovar reality.1062 The absolute focus of most important political actors, who are generally also engaged in business activities, is the status issue, producing a lack of attention from their side to the concrete challenges in the social and economic domains. This will probably change after status resolution, but there is risk in the widespread belief that status will be the start of an economic wonder in Kosovo. With UNMIK downsizing, and its contribution to economic growth declining, the situation looks worse. Having been a source of employment for the educated local population, and having injected up to 100 million Euros into the local economy, mainly in the service sector, the negative effects of UNMIK's departure will be especially visible in the Pristina region and for the K-Serbs using it as a source of employment or rent and accommodation income.1063

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In broader terms, Kosovo is in a very delicate situation that is hindering its economic development. Investments are badly needed to improve the infrastructure and other elements of the public sector, as well as to create optimal conditions for the growth and development of the private sector. On one hand Kosovo has a permanent shortfall or chronic deficiency in financing these projects, and on the other hand, in the absence of a developed financial market Kosovo has a high rate of foreign deposit of its capital, as well as a budget surplus that must remain idle for a certain period of time. With the drastic cutback of donations and the denial of access to foreign loans so far, Kosovo is feeling more and more the lack of needed financial capital tot en1060. Author´s Interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, November 2006, Pristina, op.cit. 1061. Author´s interview with Economic Expert, Riinvest Institute, 3 November 2006, Pristina Kosovo 1062. Haliti, B The political economy of Kosovo, Between UNMIK Dilemmas and the time social bomb. Forum 2015, ed., Kosovo Five years later: What Agenda for the future, Pristina pp150-151 1063. UNMIK Pillar IV, July 2006, UNMIK´s Impact on the Kosovo Economy: Spending effects 1999-2006 and potential consequences of downsizing, Pristina p53 280

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

able the funding of required projects. This situation requires institutions to set up mechanisms that would develop and orient the financial potential toward projects in both the private and the public sectors, so that new jobs and better services for its citizens are created. Consequently, the prevailing conditions necessary to encourage economic development in Kosovo are missing. Reaching economic independence also enables a certain level of political independence. In the Balkan region, Kosovo has already been considered an "economic entity" with equivalent rights for regional and international cooperation, and the government of Kosovo has started to show positive signs toward solving common problems. While certain individuals have a good understanding of these proceedings, others both local and international have very little understanding of these occurrences. In this respect, at the institutional level the obligations of local and international institutions have not been fulfilled by their missions in accordance with the realistic expectations of Kosovo citizens, due to their inconsistent approach to economic development.1064 The reasons for such a grim picture are many, but I will focus on what I consider to be the most substantial one. Based on the work of Eyre and Wittkowsky,1065 and on my empirical research, I have enquired into the role of UNMIK and its institutions in the political economy of Kosovo, where UNMIK's lack of experience in postconflict economic development issues has been a crucial feature of the obstacles to future development in Kosovo. Considering that, the political economy of a long conflict is characterized by the absence of effectively protected property rights, this can induce illicit means of economic appropriation. According to Eyre and Wittkowsky, peacekeeping and conflict stabilizing international organizations that intervene in countries emerging from conflict are ill-prepared to deal with issues of establishment and enforcement of property rights. In the case of UNMIK, the mission had to deal both with a political economy distorted by violent conflict, and with the transformation of a pre-conflict socialist regime, by engaging in political disputes with actors interested in shaping the emergent postconflict economy. UNMIK had to face a hard choice between confronting issues like "pirate privatization", misappropriation of public assets, looting, and political corruption, or tolerating their consequences.1066

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

It should be taken into account that postconflict economies feature a wide variety of entrepreneurial actors, some of which are legitimate, at least in motive, and others criminal. Being clear on the behavior of those actors who are willing to appropriate

1064. Beqaj B. The political economy of Kosovo, Between UNMIK Dilemmas and the time social bomb. Forum 2015 ed. in Kosovo Five years later: What Agenda for the future, Pristina pp155-157 1065. Eyre , Dana. & Wittkowsky, Andrea,2002, The political economy of consolidating Kosovo: property rights, political conflict and stability, Frieden und Sicherheit, Electronic edition, Bonn, FES Library, 2002, p19 1066. Ibid. p19 281

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

assets, and their constellations of power based on alliances, it is to be expected that actions undertaken by the mission to oppose them will be controversial. The alternative would be to fail in confronting these actions, which is not really a solution, as this will result in a general atmosphere of lawlessness, the creation of antidemocratic political machines, and make the creation of a rule of law a system based on empty rhetoric. It is particularly relevant for this study to keep hold of this key conceptual lesson of UNMIK’s experience.1067 Furthermore, the transition and development processes imply conflicts of interest, due to changes generated in the patterns of entitlement and resource flow.1068 Eyre and Wittkowsky see those conflicts arise when changes in entitlements such as property titles, political structures, and regulation of markets, etc, take place. In a postconflict environment, they say, the IC is faced with the same areas of conflict as post-socialist reform governments, but has less stable conditions, because the actions of peacebuilding missions are not embedded in an existing structure of interests, culture, and political discourse. These arguments hint at the time factor mentioned in my theoretical discussion, stressing the need for these missions to be ready to carry on over a longer period than their calendars normally foresee. Hence, a huge obstacle for missions like UNMIK is the time factor, which is a good in shortage.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

A long-term approach to economic revitalization and postconflict democratisation and stabilization is a precondition for sustainable development. This approach should be based on a proper conceptual understanding of the linkages between core issues in the political and economic domains, such as property ownership, elections, and the democratization process. The words of an economic expert in Kosovo, illustrate these assumptions: "the EU Pillar IV has had problems in understanding Kosovo and its complex economic environment…they managed only recently to start to understand it. This means four lost years for the needy economy, which is quite a lot of time for a country like Kosovo".1069 Such an understanding although discussed to a limited extent in academic circles, is almost missing in the halls where missions like UNMIK are organized. It should be therefore made clear not only to academia, but also to decision-makers and international mission planners, that issues such as property rights and ownership are not just economic, but are core issues for stability and democracy in a country´s future.1070 From the technical perspective, the experience of recent years in Kosovo has made visible the need for UNMIK to temporarily administer enterprises, and to engage in the political activity which results from this engagement. Successful peacebuilding efforts may require the capability to engage in corporate governance, man1067. Ibid. 1068. Several studies have confirmed this already. See for example Verstegen, Suzanne September 2001.Poverty and Conflict: An Entitlement perspective. CPN Briefing Paper. Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik – Conflict Prevention Network, Berlin/ Brussels 1069. Author´s interview with Economic Expert, Riinvest Institute, 3 November 2006, Pristina Kosovo op.cit. 1070. Eyre, D. & Wittkowsky, A. 2002, op.cit. p21 282

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

age corporations, engage in audits and inventories, supervise local management personnel, communicate with workforces, and develop ad hoc procedures able to engage and balance many contending interests found in such situations. Although these efforts are controversial due to the structure of postconflict political economies, missions like UNMIK should learn to engage in the political disputes that follow efforts to shape such a political economy. Considering actors' transactions costs in this scenario, it is clear that the more a mission undertakes efforts to build an open and participatory political economy, the greater will be the resistance of those actors in privileged positions.1071

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Actors' behavior in a postconflict political economy, argue Eyre & Wittkowsky, is also influenced by the evolution of the conflict and the pre-conflict economy. If the conflict lasts long enough, pre-conflict economic patterns and power constellations may be completely destroyed. During a conflict, leadership power constellations in the political and economic domains change, and the power in these two domains becomes increasingly linked through illicit means and activities as money laundering, and the black economy. Honest politicians and business people are in this way put at a competitive disadvantage. This produces what the interviewed economic expert calls unfair competition in these words: "The economic philosophy applied in Kosovo is a kind of hybrid, that on one side follows a very liberal policy with unlimited export-import, and on the other side faces a lot of problems with the inability of the institutions, local or international, to assure the equal treatment of the subjects in the market. Although it is a liberal philosophy, it is hindered from the already unequal representation of the subjects in the open market. The main problem in Kosovo is the unfair competition, which means that there is a free market economy but there is an unfair competition going on. That is actually absurd. With unfair competition I refer to the unequal start of the individuals in the market and to the informal and black economy.1072 Apparently, after the conflict a new economy evolves from the structure of the conflict economy, because it is the patterns and processes of the conflict economy that critically shape the postwar political economy. Advantages gained by actors during the conflict will not be simply given up, and those most successful, by licit or illicit means, are at an advantage in the postconflict economy. In this context, failing to seriously engage in reform of the postconflict economy is not only hampering the economic development and democratization of the country, but also indirectly strengthening illegal networks of power.1073 Therefore, a deep understanding of the interrelationship of the economy and the political system, with its immediate consequences in other domains in a postconflict

1071. Ibid. p22 1072. Authors interview with Economic Expert, Riinvest Institute, 3 November 2006, Pristina Kosovo op.cit. 1073. Eyre , D. & Wittkowsky, 2002, op.cit..p23 283

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

scenario, should be the core savvy of the IC state-building and development missions. Particularly in the framework of the UNMIK privatization agenda, fundamental issues of the structure of the political economy, and the institutional structure of the postconflict economy, remain vital. Failing to confront these issues implies failing to deal with the social consequences of pirate privatization, and a failure to preserve the rights and interests of the average citizen. In the end, argue Wittkowsky & Eyre, "stabilisation is about making theft the exception, not the rule".1074

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In my theoretical assumptions, based on Nussbaum and Sen, I maintain that human capabilities, and particularly gender equality and the role of women in economic development, are crucial for a country's future. In Kosovo, UNMIK has failed to recognize that crucial role in a small economy such as this. Research by the UNIFEM on the economic situation of women in Kosovo showed that although women are significant players in the economic sphere through paid and unpaid work, outside and inside the house, their situation is in a state of flux. Although women contribute to, and actively participate in the economy, they still face persisting inequalities in access to economic resources, education, occupational sectors, economic decision-making, and treatment before the law in terms of inheritance and ownership of property and assets. This disabling environment denies women the right to economic autonomy.1075 In fact, the extremely low employment rates among women generate one of Kosovo’s most pressing economic problems, its high dependency ratio. Almost every employed Kosovar must support 4.78 unemployed people.1076 The low employment figure for women is a reflection of traditional attitudes on the role of women, which are proving tenacious. As Berit Backer wrote in the 1970s, it is only education that offers the main hope for changing such attitudes; “Women’s influence today is not so much the result of rebelling housewives as is the influence of education among girls. The fact that they can excel at school has changed the notion that ‘Women do not have the head for intellectual matters’ which prevailed before. In 1975 more girls than boys were attending the secondary school.”1077 Unfortunately, after the 1981 economic crisis in Kosovo this trend was reversed. The current percentage of women without primary education is over three times higher in Kosovo than for men. 70% of adult women have only a primary education or less. This leaves women extremely dependent on traditional household structures. This situation critical, especially in rural areas. Janet Reineck wrote that in late 1980s, a rural woman in Kosovo had little chance of economic survival on her own. She was destined to be economically and emotionally dependent on her husband and

1074. Ibid..p23 1075. Surtees, Rebecca, 2000, Women at Work: The economic situation and opportunities of Women in Kosovo. UNIFEM Kosovo, Pristina, p13 1076. Statistical Office of Kosovo: Labour Force Survey 2004, p. 15. 1077. Backer, Berit, 1979, Behind Stone Walls:Changing Household Organisation among the Albanians of Kosova Oslo, p100 284

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

his family. To be able to live peacefully among them, she had to earn the respect of the family and the community, and for this she had to fulfill cultural expectations that informed every part of her life.1078 In this context, some villagers try to offer education as a way forward to their children, at great cost and sacrifice, although most do not. For those that do, according to an ESI interview with a director of Lubishte’s primary school, the cost is enormous. If a father wanted his children to study, he would have to sell his land to finance it.1079 Here UNMIK and PISG policies have failed to intervene, by not generating a stipend system for rural families, which relates of course mostly to the cost of female education. This is because it is a matter of priorities set by decision-taking patriarchal structures, at the national and local levels, who want to retain traditional patriarchal structures. Therefore, the fact that nobody expects women to work provides the rationale to save on spending for their education. The economic and social opportunities for women in Kosovo remain even today constrained by traditional values, especially in the countryside. Most women are married by the age of 30, and it is considered a matter of shame for their family if they are not. Divorces remain extremely rare, due to a combination of social and economic constraints. In a society without efficient public safety nets, women have little chance of surviving on their own.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Whatever reasons may be named, there is no supportable rationale for women´s inequality in Kosovo. A successful transition and economic recovery will require that gender equality becomes a principal tenet and guiding principle of macro, sectorial, and social policies with a special emphasis on the education sector by both the Kosovo government and UNMIK. This is simply good economics. Women in Kosovo need to be equally recognized as principal actors in its development. Therefore, there is a huge need for strong local institutional mechanisms with the skills and competence to translate these principles into operational realities, by enabling women to be key participants and leaders. Although UNMIK has had some success in this respect, it has also been much criticized for not doing enough.1080 The European Union Mission in Kosovo (EUMIK) structure does not contain a specific unit to deal with gender issues, but it is however expected that this mission will involve a cross-institutional approach to gender issues1081. It is hoped that EUMIK, unlike UNMIK, will be ready to utilize the existing capacities, will, and enthusiasm of local NGOs active in the field of gender issues in Kosovo, which would in return allow for cooperation and partnership in developing joint projects. Additionally, EUMIK should make sure that reliable information from the field is available be-

1078. Reineck, Janet 1991 The Past as Refuge: Gender, Migration and Ideology Among the Kosova Albanians. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley1991, p.11 1079. ESI Paper, Cutting the lifeline, op.cit. p23 1080. Vuniqi Luljeta, 2007, Welcome to Kosovo! Part two, Kosovar Gender Studies Center, Pristina, Available at http://www.kgscenter.org/ 1081. See the website of the future EU Planning Team in Kosovo, www.eupt-kosovo.eu 285

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

fore any implementation starts, if it wants to be seriously involved in Kosovo and achieve meaningful and effective outcomes, which was not the case during the UNMIK administration1082. In the long term, the Kosovo Government must play its determinant part in its economy by implementing the right policies. Experience so far shows that the intensive programme of capacity-building should be continued, and the IC should support the PISG in this undertaking. Whether negative or positive effects will prevail in the post-status period, will largely depend on the mode of transfer of competencies and support from the international community. Any transfer of competencies should not be a single dump of responsibilities, but rather a gradual and calculated handover of authority. A transitory period in which the authorities and responsibilities were shared in a well-designed cooperative framework could be successful. If the sharing of authority by the PISG is not clearly defined with the IC, they will never be able to learn and will risk the "Balkan Dependency Syndrome", a form of behaviour already prevalent in Bosnia, where local leaders let foreigners do what should be their own work, handing over responsibility for unpopular decisions and failures as well.1083

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The economy remains Kosovo´s biggest challenge, but international and local attitudes aside, other major constraints have to be taken into consideration. The main challenge in the private sector is the legacy of the socialist era with its outmoded attitudes, equipment, and approaches. Kosovo, like the rest of the Balkans, suffers from being neither a low-cost environment, nor having the modern technology to boost productivity and allow it to compete in Europe. In order to move forward, the states must capitalize on their skills to streamline costs across all key sectors, including textiles, mining, retail, and commercial agriculture. Again, these actions come saddled with difficult decisions and high political costs, but the EU member states are no strangers to similar choices and could be strong supporters, advisors, and financiers for the fledgling Balkan democracies. Coupled with this is the problem of creating a proper regulatory and banking environment to support private investment. Although in the wake of the 1999, many wealthy members of the K-Albanian diaspora attempted to return and invest in Kosovo, after months and sometimes years of trying to work through the UN/EU bureaucracy, many simply gave up and returned to the more fertile investment opportunities in their adopted countries. The IC needs to redouble its efforts to work with the people of Kosovo to overcome regulatory and bureaucratic obstacles, so that opportunities can be capitalized on. Encouraging diaspora investors, and marketing to the broader investment community, are vital steps on the road to country´s recovery.1084 To conclude, the status resolution alone is not the solution, but the solution starts with resolution, which will improve the conditions for economic development. Nev1082. Author´s Interview with Gender Expert, UNIFEM, Pristina, Kosovo. 6 November 2006. 1083. The economist, Kosovo: The world´s news state, February 23th 2008, p31 1084. Anthony C.Welch, Achieving Human Security after Intra-State Conflict: The Lessons of Kosovo, Kosovo Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 221–239, August 200 286

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ertheless, status will not substantially change the performance of the economy if it is not accompanied by efforts to maintain and improve the achievements made so far. Kosovo has a long way to go, and the role of its government and political leaders as well as the future EU mission in Kosovo is to tackle these issues in a more competent way, than the previous UNMIK mission. The EU should engage substantially in a long-term involvement and gradually allow for a sense of ownership for Kosovo leaders. Using the famous "carrot and stick strategy",1085 the EU should require Kosovo´s political leaders to demonstrate a clear commitment to the respect of democratic principles and governance, and zero tolerance of corruption, and organized and financial crime. Only by following these requirements, and showing respect for human rights, protection of minorities, and the strict rule of law, will Kosovo approximate the acquis communautaire and the values on which the European Union is based, and be finally capable of turning its vicious circle into a virtuous one.

4.3 Security and the economy In this unit, I will examine security from the same perspective as politics. Based on Schwarz´s theoretical approach,1086 and its summary of the interdependent nature of the three core state functions, security, welfare and representation, I will focus on the welfare component, and argue that there can be no economic development if a great number of people are ill-educated, unhealthy, and living at subsistence level. These conditions create a high potential for political turmoil and unrest. The role of the rule of law, and security institutions and their financing is also crucial for sustainability in the long run.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

KIPRED sources state that the economy of Kosovo accounted for approx. 90% of the current account deficit in 2006, and its trade balance for that year was minus 1.028 billion Euros. This was the result of its trade relations with the world standing at the level of 1.113 billion Euros, 42.5 million of which are exports, and the rest imports. This has resulted in very high deficits, which have been financed by diaspora remittances, which are now decreasing, and directly or indirectly from IC spending.1087 Unless an economic wonder has occurred in Kosovo in 2007, these figures should remain quite similar. The answer to the question "what does this have to do with security?" is based on a simple fact, namely that budgetary implications directly affect the sustainability and efficiency of security institutions. In the case of Kosovo, both the KPS and KPC take a considerable share of Kosovo's consolidated budget, accounting for circa 10 % of the entire budget. Although an increase in both institutions' budgets is foreseen, until now donations (especially from the USA) remain a large part of the KPC's financing.

1085. Author´s Interview with ESI Senior Analyst, op.cit., 1086. Schwarz, R., 2004, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Security, Welfare and Representation, op. cit. pp 429–446. 1087. KIPRED, March 2006, Kosovo´s Internal Security Sector Review: Initial Findings, op.cit., p34 287

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The considerable reliance on donations for security institutions in Kosovo is a worrying trend, speaking against their long term sustainability and development. Hence, a continuation of the current gloomy economic situation relying on donor support could result in a reduction of the security institutions' ability to respond to security threats.1088 Moreover, the over-reliance of the Kosovo Budget (KCB) on custom duties (up to 70%) reflects both the current trade deficit and an unhealthy economy. From the security perspective, this is going to be a problem if corruption becomes a major issue in the customs service, which will probably happen as the donor presence decreases, creating an economic vacuum. The fear is that if the economy does not recover soon, the high levels of unemployment and poverty present in Kosovo will get even higher, which will encourage illegal activity and organized crime, which are already present in Kosovo and across the region.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In such a situation, the rule of law is the corner stone for future economic development. Creating a viable economy is indispensable for Kosovo´s future, but this will only be possible under an efficient rule of law that replaces the old system with a functioning property regime. Failure to do so will carry significant economic and social costs, and contribute to insecurity in the country. Without clear property titles there will be no investment in Kosovo. Without tradable and encumberable property titles, the private sector will be starved of fresh capital. Without a government capable of enforcing property rights, shopkeepers and small businessmen across Kosovo must resort to private security companies to protect their interests. The absence of clear, enforceable property titles creates a market for private protection agencies, substituting for the weak state. This undermines all international efforts to establish the rule of law and a safe and secure environment.1089 Although Kosovo has made some progress in addressing deficiencies in the rule of law through the standards before status process, the obstacles remaining in the way are numerous. Public confidence in the judiciary remains low, together with a widespread lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, despite an efficient and highly regarded police service. 1090 The discrepancy between demographic trends and economic development constitutes another threat to long-term development and security in Kosovo. If the state cannot adequately address the needs of a growing population in terms of health and educational services, the situation will further deteriorate without significant social and economic development. The consequence is that social and economic hardship associated with the lack of a secure future will bring desperation and uncertainty that can mobilize atavistic emotions, resulting in criminal and social upheaval. The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) of Kosovo in 2007 found that the high unemployment, the lack of economic development, and the widespread poverty

1088. Ibid. p40 1089. KIPRED, 2005, Administration and Governance in Kosovo, op.cit. p43 1090. Author´s interview with Legal and Security Expert, KIPRED, 26 October 2006, Pristina, Kosovo. 288

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

create an atmosphere of insecurity. Economic instability exacerbates problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, and high crime rates, contributing to the growth of mistrust of Kosovo’s key government institutions, both international and indigenous. This review also found that Kosovo's greatest security challenge lies in the promotion of economic development and in the dangers of political and ethnic extremism, organized crime, and social discord. All of these can be significantly diminished if, in partnership with its immediate neighbours and the EU, Kosovo can reinvigorate its frail economy.1091 Additionally, in order to ensure that Kosovo’s future, regardless of status, is one that encourages development by all means, this report argues that attention must be paid to areas not directly related to traditional security sector reform, but having nevertheless a telling impact on the lives of Kosovo’s citizens. There is little merit in having a well-regulated and efficient security sector if the population is unemployed, ill-educated, and unhealthy,1092with little or no prospects for the future. The fragile ethnic situation in the country is a good argument for this. The threat of internal division in Kosovo will probably remain present, and may even increase, if economic and unemployment issues are not comprehensively addressed. Infrastructure problems, such as the inadequate provision of electric power, will keep undermining economic growth and have the potential to spark public protest. In fact, when asked about the main constraints on their operations and economic security, businessmen in Kosovo said, "primarily it is the unreliability of the power supply, followed by unfair and informal competition and finally the high uncertainty in terms of economic and regulatory policy".1093 The weak system of public utilities, particularly electricity generation and distribution, is closely linked to the perception of the government’s ability to provide adequate services and build trust with its citizens.1094 Unreliable electrical supply is not only a social inconvenience, but an economic deterrent. Without a reliable electrical generation and distribution infrastructure, which is associated with the image of efficient public administration, Kosovo cannot demonstrate the kind of stable environment and governance systems required to support businesses and investments while guaranteeing return on those investments.1095

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The shortages in the economy produce poverty and a widening gap between the rich and poor in Kosovo. According to recent statistics, about 45% of the population in Kosovo is poor and 15% of the population is estimated to be extremely poor. Furthermore, 18% of the population is in danger of falling under the poverty line. This

1091. UNDP Kosovo, 2006, Internal Security Sector Review, (ISSR), Kosovo, op.cit.p10 1092. The education and health sectors in Kosovo are struggling against their legacy from the past, particularly at the institutional level, and are also suffering several drawbacks. 1093. Author´s Interview with Economic Expert, Economic Chamber of Kosovo, Pristina, 8 November 2006 1094. According to World Bank data, businesses lose an average of 5% of sales due to electricity challenges. 1095. WB, June 2005, Poverty Assessment report, and May 2005, Kosovo Monthly Economic Briefing 289

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

poverty level is not surprising when considering the slow economic growth. Without diaspora remittances, this condition would have been even worse.1096 That poverty generates a lack of security is nothing new. Several studies have examined the interdependencies of an unhealthy economy, poverty, and a lack of security. In Kosovo as well as in other countries, the experience of poverty brings a sense of vulnerability and a reduction in different dimensions of people´s well-being. It produces a lack of human capabilities, in Sen´s terms, to be able to control their own lives.1097 In Kosovo, the major risks occurring at the national, community, or household levels, affecting individuals in all three dimensions of well-being (income, health, and personal safety), show that a large share of the population could fall into poverty or remain in poverty as the result of a still unstable political situation and the related risk of an economic slowdown. The widespread exposure to health risks, largely resulting from environmental pollution, together with income insecurity and vulnerability to poverty are also related to economic security.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The combination of all of the above-mentioned interrelated factors, (risks of economic slow down and political instability) affects the security situation of the entire population in several ways. Environmental degradation can jeopardize the means of livelihood of the many households who rely on natural resources, the overall high risk of unemployment and precarious employment can create feelings of insecurity, the existence of constraints to internal mobility can reduce the capacity to mitigate income shocks, the occurrence of unexpected private health expenses can be catastrophic for households, and the low coverage of the current formal safety nets leaves many families exposed to extreme poverty. All these problems are present in Kosovo. Moreover, the households’ capacity to self-insure against temporary income shocks is based mostly on access to family-based networks and private transfers. The ownership of durables, another unofficial safety net, serves as collateral to access credit, or is sold to compensate for temporary loss of income or to cover unexpected expenses like health care1098. Consequently, not only is poverty in itself a threat to the stability in Kosovo, but its effects also influence that stability. The lack of a clear future and fears of declining social standards demoralise people and contribute to instability. Only through the hope of economic alternatives can a solution be found, and many people look to Europe for solutions, in both a physical and a practical sense. Emigration, legal and otherwise, is seen as an escape from the trap of a jobless, dead-end future. Even the closed door policy for young Kosovars espoused by the EU in Brussels just adds to the already fragile situation in Kosovo.1099 There is not going to be any peace without 1096. Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK), Social Statistics, Statistics of Living Standards, at Website: www.ks-gov.net/esk, Accessed September 2007 1097. Cp. Sen, A. Development as Freedom, 2001, op.cited 1098. WB Report No. 32378-XK, June 16, 2005, Kosovo Poverty Assessment, op.cit. p30 1099. Interviews by the author with Kosovo residents revealed that inability to travel freely (no visas) out of Kosovo as a major frustration for ordinary citizens. For additional info see also ESI, 2006, Cutting the lifeline: Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo, op.cit. 290

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

prospects for a future in Kosovo. Most of its residents are concerned with employment and the final status issue. Their insecurity derives from dissatisfaction with the lack of economic progress, as there can be "no peace with an empty stomach".1100 The same goes for Kosovo's minorities, who have no prospects of a future in Kosovo with unemployment rates reaching up to 90% in some areas.1101 ICG reports show that the K-Serb population is as isolated economically as in other respects, but despite the continuing mutual fear and suspicion, some contact does take place with Serb enclaves.1102 Therefore it will be vital to foster these commercial contacts between K-Serbs and K-Albanians in order to reduce poverty and economic isolation, and to generate a sense of cooperation and understanding between the two populations. To put it in the words of a politician interviewed, when discussing the separated K-Serbs and K-Albanians in Mitrovica, "when it comes to business though, they do come together."1103 Despite the ethnic divide, the population of Kosovo shares the same central concern about their security; the economy and its corollaries.1104 Although the K-Serbs are understandably more worried about their physical security than the K-Albanians, the latter declare that they feel physically safer, but less secure in terms of prospects and future stability.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 15 below shows the interlocking nature of all identified security threats in Kosovo.1105 Based on public consultation with Kosovo citizens, it illustrates their perception of security threats, placing the current economic situation at the centre of their concerns. Such threats are seen as being related to the poor economic conditions in Kosovo. Considering these threats as an interlocking whole is the major challenge and priority for Kosovo´s post-status authorities, who will have to address them in a holistic way. The future commitment of the EU in Kosovo, with the support in the rule of law, investments, and the hope of EU membership, is also a prerequisite to bringing the Kosovo people, "toward a bright horizon" as an employee of the Security Sector Assessment Team, UNDP Kosovo put it1106.

1100. Welch, Anthony. C. et.al. 2005, Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations and Assistance Agencies, Medford, MA: Feinstein International Famine Center & Tufts University, p26 1101. UNDP Kosovo, 2003, Factsheet No.1:Unemployment. Available at http/ /:www.kosovo.undp.org/Factsheets/factsheets/unemployment_may2003.pdf, Accessed 5 October 2006. 1102. International Crisis Group Europe, December, 19, 2001, Kosovo: a strategy for Economic Development, Report No. 123. Brussels, p2 1103. Authors interview with Politician of the SLKM coalition parties, 10 November 2006, Mitrovica, Kosovo 1104. The vast majority of people interviewed in the ISSR study cited the lack of jobs and prospects as the main threats to their human security in Kosovo 1105. This figure is a product of the UNDP, ISSR report, and dealt also with non-institutional subjects in Kosovo such as Private Security Companies and the regulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Gender Issues, Minorities etc 1106. Authors Interview w/ Security Sector Assessment Team employee, UNDP Kosovo. 11/2006 291

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Figure 15: Interrelationship between identified threats from Public Perception Perspective in Kosovo (Source: UNDP, ISSR 2006, Online)

4.4 Conclusion

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

After eight years of postconflict transition, the Kosovo economy finds itself at a critical junction. While there are many positive signs, including progress in institution building and macroeconomic stabilization, there are also reasons for concern. First and foremost, the pace of recovery has been too slow to meet people’s demands and expectations. Episodic ethnic flare-ups serve as a warning that the achievements of the past few years are still fragile, and that the economy could fall into a vicious circle where the lack of economic development hampers political and social stability and the lack of political and social stability undermines economic development. In this chapter I have examined the economic domain in Kosovo based on the theoretical approach presented in Chapter 1.3.2. From the local actors and their setting perspective, I investigated the enabling environment and the legal framework of the economy, and found that although most of the legal framework is in place, its law enforcement capacity is very weak. I reviewed the institutional and policy environment, and found that the most daunting current institutional challenges in Kosovo are the inexperience and weaknesses of public institutions and the inadequate capacity of the emerging civil service. Furthermore, I considered the infrastructure and public utilities, and gave an overview of key mechanisms in the macroeconomy of Kosovo. In order to find out where the economy of a country is heading, one needs to know the preconditions for doing business in a country and identify the advantages and disadvantages of potential investment in that country. After doing this, and show292

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ing that in this respect Kosovo is de jure ready but de faco far away from it, I concentrated on the labour market and its relations as other crucial factors in the economy of Kosovo, and showed how fragile this market still is. Finally, the human development agenda expressed through the education, health and social policies for the disadvantaged in Kosovo were also analyzed, and they presented a dismayed country. From the international players perspective I concentrated on the EU and its corollaries in Kosovo and Brussels, and questioned the coherence of their strategies in the field and in general for Kosovo´s future. Furthermore, I examined the socioeconomic effects of the privatization process of the KTA, and checked the availability of international safety nets from international financial institutions. After exploring the constellations of power in kosovo´s political economy, the winners and losers in such a scenario, and the inefficient role of UNMIK in this, I lastly assessed the security dimension from the economic perspective and exposed its frail character in this respect.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

From the local actors perspective one can say that for Kosovo to make the right choices, local authorities must take stock of their achievements so far, deepen their understanding of the challenges ahead, and develop appropriate policy responses. It is understandable that Kosovo’s deeply rooted problems will not be solved by any “quick-fix” solutions, but will require concerted initiatives and sustained efforts across a range of areas to kickstart a process of sustainable development in the country. The resolution of Kosovo’s final status would provide a start for the right enabling environment, to the extent that political uncertainty hinders investment and economic activity generally, but will not be the panacea for the problems of Kosovo. What Kosovo needs is a well-defined and widely-shared vision that will foster clarity, unity, and continuity, as well as provide a clear sense of direction and purpose for its population. Such a strategy will help align incentives and peoples’ reactions to these incentives, and will encourage mobilisation of resources and their efficient allocation. It will give Kosovo and its people a sense of a future orientation and will provide potential investors with a clear signal as to where the economy is going and what policymakers’ intentions are. Kosovo´s economy can recover and even become sustainable if the advantages that the land is offering are used in the right way by the local and international players in Kosovo. In the case of the latter, it is the EU that has to take on "this burden" and assist Kosovo in the recovery of its economy. To ensure success, the EU will need a cohesive approach to the region based on existing programmes and institutions, and not just empty promises. The justification is clear and the path, although difficult, is not impossible. The Kosovo challenge will continue to demand increasingly expensive financial and material commitments from the IC, and particularly from the EU. Their willingness and commitment to help will decide Kosovo´s future. As Patten said in 2002, "the EU intervention in the Balkans should have been the hour of Europe but we blew it. We could have acted decisively to ensure a peaceful

293

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

dissolution of the old Yugoslavia but we didn’t. We could have shown real leadership and vision but we were found wanting."1107

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Welch argues that Europe cannot afford to make this mistake again, as it is now in the more volatile world of the 21st century, and that the EU must show the courage and fortitude to "act decisively when faced with the challenge of creating order out of chaos and stability out of strife.....This is a challenge EU must meet to bring Southeastern Europe and Kosovo out of conflict into the EU."1108 With the coming EU mission in Kosovo, the EU will hopefully learn from the mistakes of its predecessors and allow the new Kosovo, whatever its final status, to find its own way, make its own mistakes, and grow as a society and a political entity.

1107. Chris Patten, Speech at UK Conference on Organised Crime, 2 November 2002, in Brown D & Shepard, A (Eds). The Security Dimensions of EU Enlargement. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p206 1108. Welch, Anthony, 2006, A successful Security Pact: European Union policy in South East Europe. In Brown D & Shepard, A (Eds). The Security Dimensions of EU Enlargement. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p205 294

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

5. Social Domain 5.1 Actors and institutions 5.1.1 Local players and setting 5.1.1.1 Civil society and the NGO plethora in Kosovo Based on Putnam´s theory mentioned in chapter 1.3.3, I will opt here for a broader definition of civil society, considering it as an intermediary and autonomous space between the state, households, and the market. Such a space is expressed in voluntary, non-profit, organized activity by members of society engaged in civil action to protect or extend their interests in promoting democratic values and good governance, and contributing through their horizontal interaction to the social development of a country through its social capital advancement. To better describe this space I will use terms that are in popular usage in Kosovo, such as Civil Society Organization (CSO) mainly for the older forms of civil interaction and Non-Government Organization (NGO) mainly for the newest ones. Both are differentiated from businesses by the absence of a motive to make and distribute profits among shareholders, and an aim to reflect the concerns of civil society, while they generally profess a single purpose as opposed to the multiple purposes of governments.1109 In Kosovo, both these forms have two usual roles of promoting citizen participation in public decision-making, and holding the state accountable for its actions.1110 Since 1999 though they have performed a third role, dealing with an extra level of “state” in the form of UNMIK and the SRSG, as the ultimate governing authorities. Finally, particularly NGOs have been serving lately as a source of (self-)employment for educated youth in the country.1111

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The civil society roots in Kosovo began long before the UNMIK presence. After the illegal imposition by Milosevic in 1989 of direct rule of the province of Kosovo by the Republic of Serbia, and the introduction of a violent and repressive regime that systematically denied K-Albanian their fundamental human rights, the conditions for a network of civic engagement were created among the K-Albanian population. The firing of thousands of K-Albanian workers from public companies, and in the health and education sector, as well as the removal of all vestiges of Albanian culture and language from the educational system, created the conditions for the development of

1109. Terry, Fiona Reconstituting whose social order? NGOs in disrupted states, in Maley W. et.al. (eds.) 2003 From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States. United Nations University Press.New York. p281. 1110. USAID Kosovo, 2004, Kosovo Civil Society Sector Assessment,, Pristina, p4 1111. In Kosovo circa 65 %of total population is 27 years old or younger 295

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

a unique experiment in social organisation and civic resistance that came to be known as "parallel structures". 1112 Faced with almost total exclusion from political, social, cultural, and economic life, and under a constant threat of violence from the state, the K-Albanians withdrew to develop a parallel and clandestine socio-economic system embracing private schools and universities, a health service, and even mechanisms for administering justice. This system was coordinated by a government in exile, and funded by a 3% income tax at home in Kosovo, with additional contributions from the diaspora. Its organisation was carried out by a small number of civil society organizations making use of volunteer labour available through community structures, family networks. and clan relations.1113 An example of the magnitude of the civil engagement was the Mother Teresa Society (MTS), which was officially registered as a humanitarian NGO in Belgrade in 1990, and was the centerpiece of the activities of these "parallel structures".1114 While most of the K-Albanian civil organizations were service providers, at the time they also entailed a strong political and national element. They were perceived as embodying the goals of the K-Albanian nationalist struggle, and of being the means of peaceful resistance to the Serbian regime. Other such organizations pursued this goal through advocacy on the world stage.1115 Despite the political connotations of many organizations at the central level, many local organizations representing other interests including the youth (i.e Pjeter Bogdani Club, etc), students (UPSUP), the disabled, (Handikos), radio and print media, etc, emerged in this period.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Women’s associations such as Motrat Qiriazi, Elena, Norma, Aureola, etc, were especially relevant in this period, with a primary focus on the promotion of gender awareness, women’s rights, and women's education in the traditional patriarchal society of Kosovo, where women were often poorly educated and seen as second class citizens. Early on, these and other CSOs had the broader goals of advancing democratic society and social development. As time went by, such goals tended to be overshadowed by the need to promote national resistance and nationalistic struggle. For some women's groups this meant a tension between pressure to consign women to

1112. See Clark, Howard. 2000, Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto, pp95-117 1113. INTRAC 2006, Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Sterland Bill (ed.) Praxis Paper No 9. p12 1114. The MTS in 1998 was running health clinics, employing some 7,000 volunteers, and providing health care and humanitarian aid to 350,000 people. In 1996, with aid from the World Health Organisation, it immunized 300,000 children against poliomyelitis. See Clarck Howard 2000, op.cit, 1115. For example, the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) also reported daily on human rights abuses by Serbian authorities, such as arbitrary detention, beatings, torture, and even murder. Other NGOs that drew the attention of the world to the plight of Albanian Kosovars by coordinating with international NGOs were Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group, as well as prominent human rights groups in Belgrade. 296

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

caring and service-provision roles and the desire to explore and promote new gender models1116 The case of the CSO Motrat Qirjazi1117 in Kosovo illustrates the connections between gender and nation identities at the time. According to Julie Mertus, the organisation´s activities were primarily literacy projects for rural women, but later on as things got worse for K-Albanians under the Miloshevic regime, they had to quit as "they had not negotiated well the relationship between gender and nation"1118. It seemed that local K-Albanian male leaders dissuaded women from attending classes that they felt emphasized gender identity above national identity. Further on, in their second start of the literacy project in 1995, they found a way to establish their credentials by demonstrating to both men and women that the education of women strengthened the nation. This worked so well that men started to think that if women were getting special attention like this for the benefit of the entire nation, they were felt neglected if Motrat Qirjazi didn't come "to see their women"1119. For Mertus, nationalism was becoming a powerful legitimizing force for organizing women, giving a legitimacy needed by women themselves as much as by men. To put it in Mertus words: ...[the Organisation MQ]..." ..helped women reconcile their national identity with a broader potentially transformative gender identity"1120 The less nationally oriented organizations at the time created other socially oriented forms of civics like the Pristina Women’s Network and the Rural Women’s Network, both major centers of innovation in civil society in the immediate prewar years. On the other side of the national divide in Kosovo, K-Serbian civil society was relatively inactive at the time, represented by small numbers of traditional governmentsponsored community and special interest groups, similar to those found throughout Yugoslavia in the previous communist period. Other ethnic minorities appear not to have been organized, pursuing their own marginalized battles for survival1121.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The fact that a large part of K-Albanian society mobilized during this period to work on a voluntary basis for the well-being of their community remains striking. One can even say that during this time most of K-Albanian society was mobilized to assist each other, and worked and acted like one huge CSO. Their main fields of operation included humanitarian activities, education, and health care services. Professional associations like the Writers and Journalists Association were also part of this civic mobilization, which abandoned the organisational structure of the ex-Yugoslav communist system and began operating as independent associations. At the

1116. Clarck Howard, 2000, p146, op.cit. 1117. In english the Association´ name translates to Qirjazi Sisters. 1118. Mertus, Julie Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains- the role of national identity in shaping and challenging gender identity in Sabrine P. Ramet (ed.) Gender Politics in the Western Balkans, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, pp176 1119. Ibid. 1120. Ibid. 177 1121. INTRAC 2006, op.cit. p12 297

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

time, all these organization were operated in a constraining legal environment for NGOs, allowing for only a limited number of them, and in an uncomfortable situation for the activists who were considered enemies of the regime.1122 After the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Kosovo´s civil society differed greatly. To the extent that an important aspect of civil society is counterbalancing of the government, a new situation was created. While the Albanian civil society was previously trying to counterbalance a Serb-dominated state apparatus, later on the ‘government’ was a combination of UNMIK at the macro-level and largely K-Albanian leaders at the the micro-level, in a troubled and uncertain balance with each other.1123 There were then three, rather than two sides to balance.1124 With the end of the conflict and the withdrawal of Serbian forces, the entire situation changed radically in the political and social domains of Kosovo. The arrival en masse of international donors at the onset of the postconflict era distorted the social capital building process already in place. In addition to the presence of NATO troops and the placement of Kosovo under an international administration, the social landscape was also deeply impacted by the influx of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), performing tasks such as the provision of humanitarian aid, refugee resettlement, and reconstruction. Their role is significant in the postwar mushrooming of new local NGOs, and will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.1.2.1. It is estimated that circa 2,000 NGOs were established in the first three years after the conflict, which meant roughly one NGO for every thousand Kosovo inhabitants, but no more than circa 150 of them were really functional.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The laws governing NGOs in Kosovo were laid down by UNMIK regulation 1999/22, which defines an NGO as a not-for-profit organization independent of political parties and "created for a lawful purpose in accordance with the UNSC resolution 1244". This regulation makes clear distinctions between "Kosovar" and "international and foreign" NGOs, and other membership-oriented associations and foundations dedicated to specific activities. NGOs may also require Public Benefits Status (PBS), which confers tax benefits and import privileges, but which also requires them to submit detailed financial reports to the authorities. After a quick look at the regulations and sample application forms, the simplicity and straightforwardness of the NGO registration process becomes clear. The three-page application form, required together with a founding act and a statute, all free of charge, was an obvious factor contributing to the explosion of NGOs created in the postwar period.1125

1122. Author´s Interview with Civil Society Expert, Soros Foundation in Kosovo, 12 October 2006, Pristina. 1123. See the Chapter 3.1.1.1. on the Political Parties history in this study. 1124. Wiberg, Hakan 1999 Roles of Civil Society: the Case of Kosovo Paper presented at the International Migration, Development & Integration, Tamas K. and Hansson M. (eds.) Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs p.98 1125. On Registration and Operation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Kosovo see UNMIK/REG/1999/22 298

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Furthermore, the generous resources put at the disposal of locals by the INGOs were instrumental in encouraging the formation of new NGOs. These resources included support in project funding, training, passing down of skills, etc., and at times a direct role in the creation of local NGOs1126. Thus while UNMIK took control of establishing the public administration and relief operations, it was supported by the arrival of the largest contingent of INGOs in the shortest time ever seen in a postwar setting1127 Their overwhelming dominance in postwar civil society, their policies and their preferences have exerted almost unsurpassed influence on the course of social capital and its future development in Kosovo. Figure 16 below illustrates the local NGO mushrooming trend in the immediate postwar context.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 16: Number of NGOs in Kosovo per Year

(Source: KCSF 2005:32)

In the 1990s, the CSOs were strong and covered most or all of Kosovo's territory, focussing mostly on their narrow agendas due to low fundraising opportunities. After the war, NGOs quickly became largely donor-driven and tended to justify their agendas in terms of acceptability to donors. In the beginning, the immediate priority of donors was the implementation of a wide variety of humanitarian assistance projects, followed soon after by a focus on restoring infrastructure and essential services. Being zealous in gaining access to local communities and finding vehicles for the distribution of aid, but also fulfilling a remit to strengthen civil society, INGOs made large 1126. The numbers are based on UNMIK, NGO Registration information. 1127. By the end of 1999, just six months after the end of armed conflict, there were 285 INGOs registered with the UN in Kosovo, compared to a dozen before 1999. See Scott-Flynn, N. 1999, Coordination in Kosovo: The Challenge for the NGO Sector', RNN No.15. London: Overseas Development Institute. 299

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

amounts of donor cash available to local organizations for undertaking short-term, localized projects, stimulating the above-mentioned "boom" in newly formed local NGOs.(LNGOs)1128 Many of the registrations of local NGOs were opportunistic responses to available cash, and there was a growth of small leader-dominated organizations lacking a social mission, professional skills, and organisational capacities. In many cases these hybrid LNGOs were totally dependent on single donors, and lacking a competent local staff, on "parent" INGOs who maintained foreign workers in key management roles. Thus when the immediate abundance of postconflict aid came to an end, some LNGOs were unable to adjust and ceased operating, while others still operating trace their origins to direct INGO intervention, indicating that this kind of artificial insemination of civil society can sometimes produce viable progeny1129 The civil society map produced by the Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) in 2005 included 350 NGOs, and gives a qualitative overview of civil society in Kosovo at the time. The statistics show1130 that the greatest number of them were located in urban centers, mostly in Pristina, and most of these organizations were working to advance the position of women in Kosovar society, with 25% operating in this sector, followed by youth organizations with 19%. The high number of womenfocused NGOs reflects the need for support of women in the face of great challenges, especially in the rural areas.1131 The high number of NGOs making gender issues their main agenda can also be explained by the fact that the civil society sector in Kosovo, different from other society sectors, does not have gender discrimination in its structures or staff selection. The numbers of women and man employed are quite equal, at 48% men vs 52% women. Furthermore, suggests the KCSF study, with local NGOs being dependent mostly on donor funding and trying to survive, projects were mostly conceived based on the agendas of international donors, rather than on proper needs assessments, resulting in overlapping activities. This generated only a partial meeting of the needs of the community. This is the case when the distribution of funds tends to be highly specific, and when donors find it more important to press certain broad buzzwords like "democratization," rather than seriously evaluate whether projects meet the real needs of the populations concerned.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Other problems that NGOs in Kosovo face include inadequate institutionalization and professionalism, and a huge need for capacity-building. Primarily directed to-

1128. Lipman, P. 1999, A Portrait of Resistance, On The Record Kosovo 1, Vol. 9 , No. 1. at www.advocacy.org. 1129. INTRAC 2006, Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Praxis Paper No. 9, p18 1130. It is difficult to give an exact number of actual active NGOs in Kosovo due to a lack of reliable statistical information. 1131. Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), September 2005, Mapping and Analyses of Civil Society in Kosovo, Pristina, pp11-59 300

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

wards service-provision, they have not developed strong constituencies and sparingly vocalize civic concerns and interests in the political process. This may also be due to the lack of transparency in UNMIK, the dominance of rigid party structures in politics, and an unfavorable legal and institutional climate contributing to the hindrance of the political power of civil society.1132 So far, the civil society in Kosovo presents an unusual set of plusses and minuses. Although some have failed or become inactive after the explosion of NGOs in 1999, others have developed a good number of robust structures. Networking is an impressive feature of the CSOs activity in Kosovo. At the national level, the Kosovo Women’s Network and the Kosovo Youth Network federate large groups of local organizations. The Gjakove Forum, working together with more than 40 NGOs in different sectors, is doing the same at the local level. On the bright side of the analysis, Kosovo is estimated to have a large, diverse, vibrant, and motivated civil society, with a tradition and experience of civic engagement. Being able to draw on a rich experience derived from having supplied essential services after the de facto Serbian state's withdrawal during the 1990s, many NGOs find the new state for the most part open to innovation and new ideas from civil society. Held in relatively high regard in Kosovo and typically enjoying good media relations, they have began to realize that foreign funding is decreasing and have initiated plans to move to self-sustainability. Compared to other countries in eastern and southeastern Europe, civil society in Kosovo appears to be considerably more sophisticated and active.1133

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

On the other hand, there are also real challenges facing the NGOs and their future sustainability. Along with the advantages, Kosovo civil society faces some unique difficulties. The two layers of government, of which only one is accountable to the Kosovo population, and the other to the UN Secretary General, create a strange new situation to deal with. As an example, civil society advocacy at the national level is unusually complex in Kosovo, due to this situation. With two levels of governance to deal with, NGOs can lobby the PISG with respect to devolved sectors e.g., education, health, and youth, subject to UNMIK’s veto authority, but for many important issues they must try to deal with UNMIK. To add to the problem, the SRSG and UNMIK have until lately shown little inclination to take civil society seriously as an entity in the political arena, putting a severe damper on the latter’s ability to promote citizen input to the state and to press it for accountability. Ethnic tensions have remained since 1999, and with the March, 2004 events, tensions have become undeniably more profound, making it even more difficult for the K-Albanian NGOs' bridging initiatives with k-Serb counterparts to have much chance to work. Thus, whatever trust existed before the March riots has not been restored, and the K-Serbs with their own parallel institutions have continued to withhold input from mainstream politics and public life. The parallel Serbian authority in

1132. Author´s Interview with Civil Society Expert, 17 November 2006, Pristina. 1133. USAID Kosovo, May 2004, Kosovo Civil Society Sector Assessment, op.cit. p4 301

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

northern Mitrovice, and its support for the small k-Serbian enclaves adds greatly to the difficulties here. The inexperience of Kosovo’s state structures is also a huge disadvantage for overcoming such difficulties. It is clear that those at the helm of the PISG have little background to draw upon in dealing with these issues. Thus, to expect a hallmark of mature civil society so quickly in Kosovo is not realistic. Many of the problems they face today are due to the end of the booming generosity of international donors. Other problems have to do with the political, economic, and social issues present in the country. Still, despite problems, in the Kosovo context, civil society must be aware of the circumstances in which it operates and make the best use of them to advance the interests of the sectors of society it represents. 5.1.1.2 Media in Kosovo: Near sustainability? Before 1989, the socialist Yugoslav state controlled the media in Kosovo, giving limited access to independent sources of information. A handful of independent KAlbanian and K-Serb media outlets were permitted to operate in a semi-underground fashion. Afterwards, from 1989 to1999, the media in Kosovo, mainly in the Serbian language, was closely monitored by Milosevic's Serbian regime with a severely restricted freedom of press in the Albanian language. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s there was only one daily newspaper in Albanian, Bujku, whose editorial policy was under scrutiny by the Serb regime.1134

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

By the end of the 1990s a few more daily newspapers, such as Koha Ditore and Zëri, were established, but they too operated under the watchful eye of the regime. With the vast majority of the Albanian staff being dismissed in 1990, the radio and television of Pristina, the only Kosovo-based public broadcaster at the time, was largely ignored by the K-Albanian population and all news broadcast in Albanian was received from abroad through the programmes of Radio Free Europe or Voice of America, and a daily two hours of satellite transmission from the national public broadcaster of Albania, TVSH. However, the atmosphere of conflict and violence towards journalists led to dangerous circumstances, and some of them were physically harmed or arrested.1135 With the end of the conflict in 1999, a large number of private radio and television broadcasters emerged, able to operate freely without the threat of repression or censure due to language or ethnicity. Although this is a positive development, most people interviewed during the author´s research period believed that Kosovo had gone from a repressed, over-regulated media environment to an under-regulated, and at times chaotic, media environment.1136 In fact the broadcast license system in Kosovo is quite chaotic. The chairman of the Independent Media Council (IMC) considers

1134. Author´s Interview with Press Media Expert, Pristina, Kosovo. 2 November 2006. 1135. Human Rights Watch, 1998, Report on Humanitarian Law Violations In Kosovo, See the website www.hrw.org 1136. Information received from several media experts in Kosovo confirmed this fact. 302

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

reducing the number of local stations in the Kosovo market as a high priority. The IMC seem to be especially weak at monitoring the performance of licensees, putting those that obey the rules, particularly copyright issues, at a disadvantage.1137 One look at the media landscape in Kosovo today makes this diversity clear. With approximately two million inhabitants, Kosovars can choose between three Kosovowide TV channels and four radio stations, as well as 111 local radio and TV broadcasters.1138 The print media on the other side has a more limited circulation, with eight daily papers and several periodicals with a combined maximum circulation of 30,000 copies. Most citizens rely on the electronic media for information, specifically television which accounts for 78.9% of information sources, with radio following at 10.3% and newspapers at 7.2 %. Television is consequently the main source of information and the basis for creating public opinion in Kosovo.1139

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 17: Main Sources of Information in Kosovo (Source: Kosovo Index Publications 2006, Online)

The media sector in Kosovo has made remarkable progress in its transition from a state-run to a free and independent press. As with the CSOs, with the end of conflict in 1999, substantial levels of donor assistance and a relatively open regulatory environment led to a proliferation of media entities. By 2001, the number of independent 1137. IREX Kosovo, 2007, Media Sustainability Index 2006/2007 The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia. Pristina 1138. For more info on the media in Kosovo, see the OSCE Kosovo website at http:/ /www.osce.org/kosovo/13419.html 1139. Kosova Index Publications, August 2006, Media Habits in Kosova, Media Survey in Kosovo - Wave 15. 303

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

electronic broadcasters had reached saturation levels, but subsequent reductions in donor assistance and a weak advertising market started a process of market-based consolidation. Donors have made a huge contribution to the building of three Kosovo-wide TV stations, the public television station RTK, and the private stations TV21 and KTV. They have also provided assistance to newspapers, local broadcast media, a news agency (Kosova Live), and media associations. Their contribution was mainly through rebuilding the production and transmission infrastructure for both print and broadcast media, mostly during the emergency phase of reconstruction, leaving its maintenance and sustainability today as a constant challenge for all media in Kosovo .1140 From the legal perspective, to ensure "the development and promotion of an independent and professional media in Kosovo", as well as implement a temporary regulatory regime, UNMIK established the Temporary Media Commission (TMC) in 2000.1141 The TMC was appointed by the SRSG, but by law was obligated to be independent in the fulfillment of the above responsibilities. Given that the TMC was always intended to be a temporary regulatory body, in 2005 the Kosovo Assembly passed a law creating the Independent Media Commission (IMC).1142 With the constitution of the council of the IMC, the responsibility for regulating broadcast media was finally passed from the TMC to the IMC at the end of August, 2006, and the former ceased to exist.1143 Since broadcast licenses awarded by the TMC were always considered temporary, they will be reissued by the IMC. Print media, on the other hand, are no longer under the supervision of the TMC/IMC, following the establishment of the Press Council in 2005, an NGO formed by leading representatives of print media, intended to serve as a self-regulatory system.1144

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The quality of Kosovo media remains low. After years of government control, the media are now renouncing decisions over editorial content to those bodies that issue press releases and hold news conferences. This is particularly noticeable in television news bulletins, where viewers are "fed a news-diet" of meetings, conference halls, and men-in-suits. Media professionals in Kosovo, well aware of the problem, have invented a name for it: "protocol journalism", implying that newspaper columns and radio/television news bulletins are dominated by politicians and their issues such as relations between UNMIK and the PISG or the status of the dialogue between Koso-

1140. USAID Kosovo, March 2004, Kosovo Media Assessment, p3 1141. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/36, On the Licensing and Regulation of the Broadcast Media in Kosovo, and UNMIK Regulation 2000/37, On the Conduct of the Print Media in Kosovo, in UNMIK Official Gazette, under www.unmikonline.org. 1142. Assembly of Kosovo Law 02/L15, On the Independent Media Commission and Broadcasting UNMIK Regulation 2005/34, On the Promulgation of the Law on the Independent Media Commission and Broadcasting adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo, See UNMIK Official Gazette, op.cit. 1143. Temporary Media Commission Press Release, September 2006, The Council of the Independent Media Commission Constituted, see website www.imc-ko.org. 1144. The name of this NGO was Temporary Media Commission Print Media 304

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

vo and Belgrade. As the Broadcasting Media Expert interviewee put it: "Two issues dominated Kosovo’s media during 2006: negotiations on the Kosovo´s final status and the political upheaval that followed the death of President Ibrahim Rugova."1145 This problem was clear to the author during her stay in Kosovo in 2006. It seems there is a serious lack of reporting on social issues important to citizens like health, education, technology, and the environment, although there have been improvements in the coverage of business and sports which remain popular in Kosovo. It is generally agreed that the Kosovo-wide broadcasters are basically fair and reasonably accurate in their reporting. However, the emphasis in the media as a whole appears to be on quantity rather than quality. There is no shortage of information on offer through Kosovo’s numerous media outlets, but there are few attempts to provide context or an explanation of how events impact the lives of ordinary people, showing a need for capacity-building toward more competent media. Furthermore, the professionalism of journalists continues to be dampened by the media’s much-criticized performance during the ethnic riots in 2004, while there is only a slight improvement in the plurality of news sources.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The challenge of minorities and the media, and its corollaries, remain. There have been improvements in fact, as the interviewed media expert suggests: “it is my impression that the three Kosovo-wide TV stations have increased coverage of minority issues in 2006, and, particularly on RTK, and the number of people from minority communities invited to take part in debates has increased as well.”1146 A KIPRED study on success stories confirms this, noting a change in attitude among the media covering interethnic stories extensively. Some media have contributed to the reconciliation efforts by seeking out stories of interethnic coexistence and publicizing them widely in a positive light.1147 Although things may have improved a bit, the media in Kosovo has serious bottlenecks when it comes to its bridging functionality. With a media predominantly in the Albanian language, the K-Serb population in the north and the enclaves relies overwhelmingly on Serbian media for its news and information, which are firmly oriented towards Belgrade. The newspapers for the K-Serbs are also from Belgrade, apart from one or two weekly or fortnightly magazines. In smaller K-Serb enclaves in other parts of the territory, however, there are indications that local radio stations are acknowledging some common interests with the media in Kosovo. According to a USAID Media Survey, despite the current dominance of K-Albanian media outlets, a variety of minority-language media exist and operate freely, particularly local radio and television stations. Print resources for Serbian language media are drawn from Belgrade, while donations have funded publications in other minority languages.

1145. Author´s Interview with Broadcasting Media Expert, 18 November 2006, Pristina, Kosovo. 1146. Author´s interview with Media and Civil Society Expert, USAID Kosovo. 20 October 2006 1147. KIPRED 2005, Governance and Administration, op.cit. 305

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

However, minority language media remain ghettoized, as do many of the readers and listeners they serve.1148 The level of viewership of RTK’s minority programs is unknown. According to a USAID Media Survey of Kosovo, K-Serbs did not watch RTK’s Serb-language programming. Instead, they preferred to watch programs and news from the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) and its re-broadcast by local stations. The commercial TV stations KTV and TV21 do not broadcast any programming in minority languages, but occasionally air programs aimed at minority interests such as the return of refugees.1149 Such a context leaves the K-Serbs and K-Albanians, as in the case of health and educational facilities, living in two parallel worlds of information. With respect to their watchdog position vis-a-vis the government, the media in Kosovo are relatively free to cover the views of government critics. Some officials even believe that in 2005, critical media coverage helped bring down the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Bajram Kosumi, following allegations that he had taken gifts valued at 20,000 Euros in violation of anti-corruption laws.1150 Later, the media picked up on allegations of financial misappropriation in the office of the former President of the Assembly, Nexhat Daci.1151 Additionally, a random sample of 28 days in early 2006 showed that seven Albanian-language dailies together carried over 150 articles on corruption, averaging about five articles on corruption per day.1152 Such critical coverage is, arguably, facilitated by the relatively wide spread of media ownership. Print media especially has been considered the strongest pillar in Kosovo civil society. They are particularly active, vocal, and dynamic, representing a variety of views and different positions in the Kosovo political spectrum. Further research of the print media's success and external factors supporting its development should be undertaken.1153

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Journalism in Kosovo was not always the safest profession, especially in the first years of the state-building enterprise. According to the OSCE, in 2002, 29% of journalists in Kosovo had been threatened during investigations, especially those re-

1148. USAID Kosovo, 2003, Craig Buck Memorandum on USG Support for Minority Media in Kosovo. Pristina 1149. USAID Kosovo, 2004, Kosovo Media Assessment, op.cit. 1150. Articles in local newspapers confirm this. See for example Burim Ramadani, Zbulohen parregullsi te medha financiare ne Kuvendin e Kosoves nen udheheqjen e Nexhat Dacit, (Huge financial irregularities in the Kosovo Assembly under the lead of Nexhat Daci come to light) Zeri Newspaper, 28 June 2006, pp 1-4; and S. Ahmeti, ‘Cohu: Asnje gjurme per superveturen (Wake up: no traces from the supercar) Kosovo Sot, 28 June 2006, p.3 1151. A flurry of articles appeared after the Auditor-General revealed that over 230,000 Euros were paid out at the end of 2005 to buy an official car, which a year and a half later had not been delivered. 1152. The periods covered are: 27 February-5 March, 2006; 13-19 March, 2006; 27 March-2 April, 2006; and 3- 9 April, 2006. The newspapers covered are: Koha Ditore, Express, Zeri, Kosovo Sot, Bota Sot, Epoka e re, and Iliria Post. 1153. Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2007, Reconstruction Survey, Kosovo, London: Tiri, op.cit. p57 306

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

lated to organised crime. However, although there are often speculations linking an attack with a journalist’s story, the exact reasons or motives behind attacks are rarely uncovered by the police, and such cases seldom end up in court. The lack of rule of law especially strong in the first years after the war may be an explanation for this. In most cases of attacks on journalists, speculation focuses on inter-ethnic, intraethnic, or factional rivalries and differences.1154 There have also been cases when attacks followed after journalists had published articles concerning public institutions.1155 A less serious, but nevertheless telling, case occurred at the end of 2005, when three people attacked a KTV team working on a report on corruption in the municipality of Gjilan. One of the attackers was alleged to be a municipal employee, while the others were relatives of the mayor. KTV filed a case in the municipal court, alleging disturbance during official duty, assault, and equipment damage.1156 This latter incident, together with the tense situation at the local level, may be the reasons why media coverage is relatively low at the local level where clan and family structures are stronger than in urban areas, despite the greater need for transparency there. According to a study on local governance made by an INGO in Kosovo, although the media in Kosovo is relatively well-developed, they have only occasionally engaged in critical and investigative reporting on local developments. Such reporting seems to be missing in the most important local newspapers like Zeri and Koha Ditore. In the past this watchdog function was ably provided by international organizations such as the ICG, ESI, etc, while local NGOs have started to fill this role only lately.1157 To conclude, the sustainability of qualitative media in Kosovo will take time. This opinion is confirmed by the Media Sustainability Index, where Kosovo media scored 2.59 out of 4. (See fig. 18) According to this report, if the resolution of Kosovo’s status succeeds in easing uncertainty and in releasing some of its economic potential, there is no reason why the media in Kosovo shouldn't continue to improve.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, most of the institutions are now in place to support and regulate an independent media, making it harder for politicians and others to exert control. However,

1154. The motive alluded to concerns interethnic and inter-party tensions. See the Commitee to Protect Journalists On Line, 10 September 2000, Journalists killed in Kosovo under http:/ /www.cpj.org/index.html 1155. For example, in 2004 Fatmire Terdevci, an investigative journalist of the daily Koha Ditore, was shot and wounded by unidentified persons. The perpetrators were never caught and the reasons for her attack were never established. However, the editorial board of the newspaper said that they did not exclude the possibility that she had become a target because of her stories. See CDHRF, January 2004, Raporti per gjendjen e te drejtave dhe lirive te njeirut ne Kosove, See the website http://www.cdhrf.org/Shqip/Vjetore/V2004sh.pdf 1156. Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2007, Reconstruction Survey, Kosovo, London: Tiri, op.cit. p58 1157. Baskin, Mark, 2004, Developing local democracy in Kosovo, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (IDEA), Kosovo 307

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

much will depend on how K-Albanian and Serb media cope with the challenges of reporting on Kosovo’s new position in the international community. . Unsustainable, Anti-Free Press (0-1): Country does not meet or only minimally meets objectives. Government and laws actively hinder free media development, professionalism is low, and media-industry activity is minimal.

MEDIA SUSTAINABILITY INDEX: KOSOVO

2.86

2.38 2.64

2.34

2.25 2.21

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

OBJECTIVES

SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS

2006-07

2005

2004

2001

2006-07

2005

2004

1.59

2.50

2.66

PLURALITY OF NEWS SOURCES

2001

2006-07

2005

2004

2001

1.79

PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM

2006-07

2005

1.78 2004

2001

2.63 2.62

2.30 2.35

2.16

2.50 2.45

FREE SPEECH

2006-07

2005

2004

2001

1.98

2.36

NEAR SUSTAINABILITY UNSUSTAINABLE MIXED SYSTEM UNSUSTAINABLE ANTI-FREE PRESS

SUSTAINABILITY

SUSTAINABLE

Unsustainable Mixed System (1-2): Country minimally meets objectives, with segments of the legal system and government opposed to a free media system. Evident progress in free-press advocacy, increased professionalism, and new media businesses may be too recent to judge sustainability. Near Sustainability (2-3): Country has progressed in meeting multiple objectives, with legal norms, professionalism, and the business environment supportive of independent media. Advances have survived changes in government and have been codified in law and practice. However, more time may be needed to ensure that change is enduring and that increased professionalism and the media business environment are sustainable. Sustainable (3-4): Country has media that are considered generally professional, free, and sustainable, or to be approaching these objectives. Systems supporting independent media have survived multiple governments, economic fluctuations, and changes in public opinion or social conventions.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 18: Media Sustainability Index 2006/2007 (Source: IREX 2007, Online)

5.1.1.3 Government and UNMIK attitudes towards the Civil Society As already mentioned, Kosovo is governed through two separate structures. One is the PISG, including the Kosovo Assembly, which is democratically elected and accountable to the people through universal suffrage, holding legislative and administrative powers except in the spheres of security and justice. The other is the monolith of UNMIK, presiding over the whole system as an extra-constitutional power. By retaining final authority in all spheres, its discretion over certain powers is not answerable to any entity in Kosovo including the supreme court, let alone the citizenry. There is thus an evident democratic deficit inherent in the system. While the PISG are fairly open to consultation with civil society, the reservation of most decisionmaking powers by the much more distant UNMIK renders it far less meaningful. This dual system of government has undermined the ability of citizen groups to affect public decisions purportedly undertaken in their interests.

308

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

To make things worse, the division of responsibilities between the PISG and UNMIK in areas where competencies are shared is quite complex. It is often difficult to sort out exactly which institution is responsible for what. In order to resolve this confusion, Kosovo´s population ends up assigning all powers to UNMIK, an authority perceived as highly opaque and inaccessible. Although there are widely circulated local media and UNMIK press releases do in fact report on daily affairs and government deliberations, the access to information on public affairs for most Kosovars stops at these official brief news blips. Is is clear that these official deliberations and decisions are not properly explained to the public and are thus practically impossible to contest.1158 The PISG show other problematic facets. Although many civil society representatives indicate positive relations with Kosovo government authorities, probably fostered by the previous involvement of the political class during the 1989-1999 period, their collaboration on important matters remains the exception rather than the rule. In the absence of institutional mechanisms, government and NGO communication tends to be mediated by personal contacts and is highly dependent on the disposition of individual politicians. The previous involvement of politicians with civil society also has negative effects, as the PISG continue to associate NGOs with the service provision role that civil society carried out during the period of parallel structures, and is sometimes mistrustful of NGOs, considering them competitors for the decreasing pot of international funds. NGOs, on the other hand, are reluctant to engage local governments, reflecting a historically conditioned K-Albanian suspicion of state structures1159. Under international pressure, some of the PISG actors have consulted NGOs on the drafting of new laws and creating policy in specific fields, but very often this help is sought too late to allow for a meaningful contribution from civil society. One notable exception is the drafting of a National Action Plan for Gender Equality, carried out over ten months by a multiethnic group of women’s NGOs and politicians in 2003.1160

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Kosovo's legislative agenda has been an obstacle for civil society. In fact there are many outside factors shaping the legislative agenda of Kosovo, often not springing from the needs of society. The complex system of governance shared by international and domestic agencies, its special legal and international status, and international scrutiny of its affairs, conspire to make Kosovo’s legislative agenda simply not transparent or clear enough for civil society to shape. Legislative priorities came from different sources, often in response to unexpected factors, leaving little space for Kosovo´s social actors’s input.1161

1158. Kosovar Civil Society Foundation. 2005, Mapping and Analyses of Civil Society in Kosovo.op.cit. p22 1159. INTRAC 2006, Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies, op.cit. p 27 1160. See Nietsch, Julia, 2004, Civil Society and Democratization in Kosovo: The Interaction between local NGOs and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG); OSCE Kosovo. 1161. KODI Paper, Dec. 2007, Civil Society and the Legislative Process in Kosovo, p133-137 309

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Furthermore, a study made with by request of the OSCE, from a local Kosovo think tank, KODI, found that the institutional capacity to absorb civil society’s participation is still relatively weak, as the institutions are still young and inexperienced. Here the Kosovo normative framework does not seem to provide enough to secure substantive participation by civil society in the legislative process. In addition, despite the promulgation of the Law on Access to Official Documents, information with the purpose of shaping public policy is also limited, due to the inexperience of the public administration and a lack of normative provisions that would require it.1162 At the local level, civil society advocacy is particularly weak, owing to key NGO weaknesses in needs identification, community mobilisation, and long-term planning. At the national level, despite the problems mentioned before there have been three high profile and professionally conducted advocacy campaigns that have commanded significant support from civil society and the general public. All three campaigns failed, owing to inaction on the part of UNMIK or vetoing of the PISG by the SRSG.1163 Another problem is financing from the PISG for civil society, influencing to a certain extent its sustainability. While municipalities are willing in some cases to provide premises, the Kosovo Government has only recently started to distribute grants of between 1,000 and 3,000 Euros on an ad hoc basis. Although there are exceptions, there is an almost universal conceptual denial among NGOs of the possibility of developing local funding sources such as membership subscriptions, charitable giving, fees for services, or business contributions. Reasons for this may be the impossibility of mobilising financial support from a society in which the majority cannot or will not pay for public amenities such as water and electricity.1164

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, the monitoring of NGOs, another crucial point for their efficiency, is supposed to be done by the NGO Liaison Unit (LU) within the Ministry of Public Services of the PISG, which suffers from resource and staff shortages. The lack of capacity of such an institution, with little information available, and a lack of monitoring capacity for keeping track of which groups are actively operating, makes their "monitoring" of little use. The poor performance of LU creates opportunities for the misuse of NGO privileges, which combined with the poorly defined process of Public Benefit Status mentioned above, clearly opens the door for abuse. An ad-

1162. The study analyzed factors within a framework labeled “the enabling environment,” which includes a number of factors that dictate the extent to which a civil society organization may effectively access and shape the outcome of a legislative process. In this framework, the topics for analysis were the government’s institutional capacity to accommodate public participation, the legal and constitutional mechanisms safeguarding citizens’ rights to influence policy, and the level of information available on what is legislated and how, all come together in creating the landscape of civic participation in policy making. See KODI 2007, op.cit. p177 1163. For example the last one was the Reforma 2004 Campaign, led by four leading NGOs, that mobilized a further 150 NGOs in their campaign to have the closed list electoral system replaced by open lists, in order to increase accountability in government. This was ignored by UNMIK. 1164. Author´s interview with Civil Society Expert, 17 November 2006 310

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

vanced legal framework is of no use if the enforcement wing is not up to the task. A fairly lax and permissive public regulation of NGO activities in Kosovo gives civil society organizations a remarkable freedom to act and pursue their goals, but the level of control to ensure their legitimate and proper activities is far from ideal.1165 5.1.2 International players and setting 5.1.2.1 International Donors and INGOs role in social capital As in other places in transition, after the war the international community stated its intentions for a democratization agenda in the social sphere of Kosovo. In the first years, though, they had to focus on the reconstruction and rebuilding of infrastructure. Only in 2002 did the issue of democratization start to become an issue in civil society circles, along with interethnic and institutional dialogue. The profuse funding that the donor community in Kosovo provided, especially in the immediate postwar period, deeply impacted the structure, orientation, and nature of future NGO activity. This globalizing force of international donors, applying generally uniform policy standards and success assessment measures throughout the regions of the world where they operate, contributed to a booming NGO sector in Kosovo. This impact turned this sector into the type of bustling field, witnessed throughout post-socialist and Third World states, in which foreign donors take the direct role in the "civil society development".1166

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to Mertus, the international community attempted to fill the space in Kosovo left by the dismantling of previously existing non-governmental structures by transplanting structures that had worked in other places but were actually inappropriate for Kosovo. The new aid structures in Kosovo encouraged people to create and operate through rigid NGO lines even when it would make more sense to work in another manner, such as through an existing community network as they did before. Donor money has contributed to the erosion of capable community structures and created tensions between the new haves and have-nots by seriously undermining existing social capital in the country1167. Moreover, the "Darwinian behaviour" of local NGOs made visible by the decrease of donor funding, indicated that the local NGOs that succeeded in funding were not always the ones with the greatest experience or legitimacy among their constituents. While some Kosovo NGOs are extremely capable and experienced, many of the newly minted ones reflect an ability to respond to

1165. Kosovar Civil Society Foundation. 2005, Mapping and Analyses of Civil Society in Kosovo.op.cit., p25 1166. See, for example, the studies of Kleinberg Remonda B. and Clark, Anine A.(eds.), Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1167. See the work of Mertus, Julie, 1999, The Liberal State and the Liberal Soul: Rule of Law Projects in Societies in Transition," Social and Legal Studies 8, No. 1 and Mertus, Julie 1999, Mapping Civil Society Transplants--A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America," University of Miami Law Journal and University of Texas Hispanic Bar Journal No. 1. 311

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

international demand more than older ones, who focus on real local needs, breeding trust and supporting real networking. International donors instead reward local NGOs that are willing to provide cheap service for international programs and penalize those who fail to obey the international agenda. In this regard, local human rights organizations that monitor the IC for human rights violations are particularly unwelcome. Here the top-down character of UNMIK and the OSCE becomes clear through their policies of recent years in Kosovo, focused on the "education" of the Kosovo public through explanations on the primary interest of citizens.1168 Both argue that citizens should cast aside the question of Kosovo’s political status and learn to exercise democracy by gaining a social and political awareness in a civil society. They even once offered a citizens’ survey as a tool for civil society to judge how the action of elected leaders matches requests expressed by people. When K-Albanian participants in the survey offered the view that Kosovo’s civil emergency force, the Kosovo Protection Corps, should represent the future army of Kosovo, the OSCE disqualified those opinions as proposals outside the realms of the Constitutional Framework.1169 It seems that the OSCE finds only those political desires that remain within the framework determined by itself to be legitimate. In this way the OSCE and UNMIK are not only ignoring the political awareness of Kosovo’s population and civil society, but they are also engaging in attempts to artificially narrow the field of politics by establishing criteria to determine what are legitimate demands and what not. The reason for this derives from the simple fact that UNMIK and the OSCE operate in Kosovo not only to support institutions but also as ruling authorities.1170

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Furthermore, many international donors in Kosovo have tended to favor the development of American-style advocacy NGOs, especially in the human rights field, even when they are inappropriate and ineffective. The purpose of advocacy NGOs is to "play an active role in advocacy and to hold public officials accountable for their actions."1171 These NGOs are successful when they promote civic participation and express public interest, but the danger is that they will promote only the most popular causes, usually at the expense of the real public interest. This problem is particularly acute in Kosovo where new NGOs came to light only due to quick INGO money. The effect was that the existing systems of community and national mobilisation were bypassed by INGO aid delivery structures, and in certain cases existing civil society organizations were deliberately weakened through the policy of providing large

1168. On the eve of local and national elections, UNMIK and the OSCE have conducted publicity campaigns in which they call on the citizens of Kosovo to focus on practical issues, such as electricity, roads, and schools, rather than on questions of Kosovo’s status. See Focus Kosovo, December 2003 Voices of Kosovo, UNMIK Kosovo 1169. OSCE Kosovo, 2001, Kosovo’s Concerns: Voters Voices, Kosovo Elections Report, pp.7-9 1170. KIPRED, 2005, A changing Society a Changing Civil Society, op.cit. 1171. Belloni, Robert 2001, Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Journal of Peace Research Vol. 38, No. 2, p 171 312

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

numbers of grants to new LNGOs. The effects were the dilution or dissipation of social capital in the local context. In a situation where the previous social actors become the new political class, leaving the social domain a shortage of effective actors, the IC could have engineered a civil society that would be a key mechanism for establishing democracy and social cohesion, contributing to the ultimate goal of a viable multiethnic society. Prejudicing the local context, the IC deemed established CSOs as unsuitable for achieving this goal, owing to their association with nationalistic struggle or possible links to the KLA, or doubts concerning their proper use of funds. In the postconflict period, they therefore limited their support to those elements of the parallel system that adapted to donor demands for professional operations and short-term project cycles. Some local CSOs like the CDHRF, a human rights organisation, continued to attract support, as did a large number of established women’s associations.1172 Here the agenda of the INGOs had positive effects, in that it managed to bring to the forefront of society issues that were not considered relevant by a patriarchal and ethnically divided society. Hence, by touching sensitive issues like interethnic communication, where there was a lack of motivation from both sides to engage, this kind of agenda had the positive impact of making clear the need for communication in coexisting circumstances.1173

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

By encouraging an NGO-led civil society, donors and INGOs attempted to build a non-political political opposition, or rather a non-nationalist voice, that would create tendencies in society to work against the divisively nationalist politics of K-Albanian and K-Serbian parties. This was the case with the K-Serb groups and existing associations that were active in the north side of Mitrovica, and failed to attract the support of international organizations because of similar fears about their connections to the Serbian regime in Belgrade. The intent to induce a depoliticized civil society is clear, and shows the positive impact of the donor-driven agenda to increase or reconstitute lost social capital through bonding and bridging activities, especially in the case of the multi ethnically oriented projects. The time since 2004 illustrates this with an increasing focus on minorities, especially K-Serbs. Many donors in fact shifted their funding policies to focus on programs centered around the protection of minorities and their rights. Following this change in donor policy, a number of local NGOs shifted their own activities towards organizing projects related to minorities. Further issues pushed by the donor driven agenda included communication with Belgarde, which is necessary for regional trade cooperation, and the gender issues mentioned above. Despite local actors' contributions to the gender equality agenda, the UNMIK decision that brought minimum women's quotas to parliament and other institutions, the law for the gender equality, the creation of the agency for gender equality, and other small scale projects empowering hundreds of women from both communities in Kosovo were due to INGOS and

1172. INTRAC. 2006, Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies, op.cit. 1173. Author´s interview with Besnik Tahiraj, op.cit. 313

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

donor pressure. Here gender, as one of the missing dimensions of social capital, was brought back into the social and political agenda of Kosovo. The INGO approach also had negative effects on the local setting through their overcrowding and uneven presence, which led to duplication, and created an unhealthy competition among LNGOs partners and also between INGOs and LNGOs. This competition seriously undermined the legitimacy and long-term sustainability of many local initiatives. An illustrative example is provided by the squabble over a women’s centre in the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica during the first months after the war, which due to ethnic tensions and a high number of displaced persons of all ethnicities, made Mitrovica an attractive location for many foreign organizations. In September, 1999, the aforementioned local women’s organisation, Motrat Qiriazi, opened a counseling centre near the town centre focusing on local traumatized women and their children. Two months later, an Italian NGO (ADAB), opened an almost identical centre next door without notice, and started to solicit clients from the same community of women that were being assisted by Motrat Qiriazi. The same thing was done by the Danish Refugee Council and CARE International, who were planning to open another trauma counseling centre for women located yet again, on the very same street.1174

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Consequently, while the vast amounts of donor funding during 2000 and 2001 created an environment conducive to NGO entrepreneurship, and encouraged civic activities and other forms of social capital in Kosovo, the Darwinian behavior followed soon afterward, especially between the local and international NGOs in Kosovo, as in the case of Motrat Qirjazi, exposing the difficulties local CSOs were facing in their long-term financial sustainability. These difficulties were due to a decrease in membership quotas, which inevitably had an effect on social capital generation in the long run for those local social actors. Additionally, even though some NGOs have performed admirable functions, the local public sees many of them as reflecting the values and interests of foreign governments and not the most pressing local concerns. This may generate lack of trust in the local population which contributes to the erosion of trust networks in the local environment, a crucial element for social capital in Kosovo. The quote below from Mehmet Kraja, a writer and cultural editor for Kosovo’s leading daily newspaper, shows the deep mistrust that certain segments of Kosovo’s population have towards civil society in such insecure times: "Alongside imposition, UNMIK uses enticement through privilege and money money in particular, which in Kosovo continues to be poured relentlessly towards those channels which seek the destruction of Kosovo’s Albanian identity and the creation of so-called civil society, without an identity or with a transplanted one. All NGOs in Kosovo ... are financed for this reason: that Kosovo’s new society not be

1174. On the Record Kosovo, 2000, The Birth and Rebirth of Civil Society in Kosovo, Vol. 10, Issue 4. 314

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

projected through Kosovo’s eventual independence, but that its status be made relative through a tolerant society and an abandoned identity".1175 As KIPRED notices, taking into account the fact that the western policy in Kosovo treats the development of civil society as one of the central indicators of Kosovo’s progress towards democratic change,1176and that the society has a deep legacy of independent, non-state organisation during the decade-long resistance to Serbian rule, the discrediting of civil society in the eyes of the public appears to be somewhat of an anomaly. Therefore, since many of the newly funded local NGOs are not designed to provide needed services, they appear to many locals as "completely useless" or "propaganda machines" for the internationals.1177 For Mertus, there is some merit to this scepticism, although most NGOs in Kosovo do work hard and are not propaganda machines. For local NGOs to be truly effective, they would have to scrutinize the internationals, and it is not a surprise, argues Mertus, that Kosovo NGOs are not funded and trained to undertake this task.1178 The issue of the sustainability of civil society after the donors leave is another challenge to the social capital in Kosovo. Local NGOs are considering what to do after the donors leave, and the alternatives they see include the possibility of raising funds through the commercialization of services and various profit-making activities. Such business-oriented thinking is not uncommon among many Kosovo NGOs, reflecting their largely entrepreneurial nature, as well as the highly competitive environment in which they vie for donor money.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

However, as historical experience in Kosovo and elsewhere shows, political and social activism and profit-making do not always go together and are definitely not signs of a rich social capital in the country. At best this is a sign of entrepreneurialism which is far away from a "for the best of society" perspective. On the other hand, few NGOs have seriously entertained the idea of generating funds from Kosovo sources, whether in terms of individual donors or businesses. Most warn that such a policy would open the door to pressure and influence from individual Kosovo businessmen. But the reality is that few NGOs have the possibility to profit from fund-raising through trusts, interest, and dividends in Kosovo’s underdeveloped market economy.1179 As Robert Belloni suggests in the case of Bosnia, "In a country where many

1175. Quote from Mehmet Kraja, Mirupafshim ne nje lufte tjeter (Goodby in another war), Pristina: Rozafa, 23, Cited and translated from Albanian in KIPRED June 2005, A changing Society, a changing Civil Society Kosovo’s NGO Sector After the War, Pristina p30. 1176. The critical importance placed by UNMIK and western policy on civil society development was confirmed by the inclusion of civil society standards in the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan. 1177. Selected from author´s interviews with local people in Pristina. November, 2006 1178. Mertus, Julie 2004, Improving International Peacebuilding Efforts: The Example of Human Rights Culture in Kosovo, in Global Governance, Vol. 10. 1179. KIPRED June 2005, A changing Society, a changing Civil Society op.cit. p25 315

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

are still plagued by subsistence problems, it is more difficult to mobilize citizens in the name of the public good rather than in their immediate self-interest."1180 Moreover, the shifting goals of donors, combined with a policy of short-term activities, has produced a segment of largely non-specialized NGOs, whose broad focus is democratization, reconciliation, and human rights, but whose specific goals and activities are ever changing. Given the dependency of the majority of NGOs on donor funding, economic pressures are undoubtedly the main factor in such flexibility. This leaves civil society in Kosovo with a vague idea of what their function really is. Although a large number of NGOs have been created, only a small number will continue to be active in the wake of donor downsizings and departures after most of these organizations have left Kosovo. However, it is clear that their impact on the civil society of Kosovo and in the social capital of Kosovo is going to be a lasting one. 5.1.2.2 UNMIK and its Pillar III OSCE approach UNMIK managed to perform its duty of NGO regulation, registration, and monitoring at an adequate level, while its Pillar III, OSCE’s contributions to CSO development is arguably also good. Charged with promoting democracy in the province, the OSCE role in promoting the media (together with USAID) and supporting its infrastructure development has been recognized by Kosovo's society. Moreover, in the NGO sector they have actively encouraged the registration of new local NGOs from the outset, offering free startup kits, training, information, and legal templates and guidelines for accessing donor funds. It has also established its own brand of 14 NGO resource centers in nine towns, ahead of any perceivable need or demand from NGOs for information and coordination at the local level. According to an interview with a civil society expert, this OSCE infrastructure setup, from the financial and capacitybuilding needs perspective, has been crucial for the life of the newest NGOs and their service provision. 1181

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Despite such achievements, the OSCE has been criticised by several local NGOs, who perceive the OSCE's top-down bureaucratic approach as a marked failure in its mission to develop an efficient civil society in Kosovo. Local think tanks have been accusing the OSCE of having a narrow and functionally defined role for NGOs to play vis-a-vis other parts of Kosovo’s society, trying to install mechanisms of centralized management and control in the sector. That is why one of the OSCE civil society initiatives, the NGO Assembly, intended to function as a surrogate parliament and umbrella organization for all of Kosovo’s NGOs, failed to attract any serious following. While the OSCE had certainly not intended to create a massive organisation just for control, the refusal of the majority of influential NGOs to join such an organization reflects both the suspicion that members of Kosovo’s civil society have against any type of massive organisation which purports to represent civil society, as well as

1180. Belloni, R. 2001, Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, op.cit. p.173 1181. Author´s interview with Civil Society Expert, op.cit. 316

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the flawed manner in which the OSCE attempted to unite NGOs under a single umbrella. Thus although the initiative produced neither the kind of centralized structure or homogenized, harmonious NGO image that the OSCE sought to manufacture, it is notwithstanding hailed by the mission’s former chief as one of its greatest accomplishments. While the OSCE continues to brandish its civil society development activities as one of the main pillars of its institution-building mission, its role in the sector's overall development seems to have been marginal.1182 With increasing doubt in the local and international arena as to whether Kosovo has a sufficient political and civic society to create and maintain a functional state,1183 the pressure for both these categories from the public is also increasing. The "closed lists" approach of the election system taken by OSCE Pillar III of UNMIK, despite some good reasons, has indirectly contributed to weak internal party democracy and limited the accountability of politicians to voters. Furthermore, the closed-list election system facilitated ossification of party hierarchies and their monopolization by shadow actors to capture government revenues and rent-seeking opportunities1184 This has had a negative effect not only on the civic and political participation of the people but also on their trust towards political actors and institutions, which are crucial elements of the social capital in Kosovo.1185 Notwithstanding, the future presence of the OSCE in Kosovo will remain necessary as a supervisory international presence, even in the aftermath of a final status solution. This will be vital to Kosovo’s maintenance of an efficient and active civil society sector, but a more in-depth approach to needs assessment in the Kosovo context and better cooperation and coordination with other donors must also occur.

5.2 Alliances, conflicts and co-operations 5.2.1 Exploring the potential for Social Capital in Kosovo

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I previously defined civil society as an intermediary and autonomous space between the state, households, and the market, through which individuals can establish and maintain active networks in voluntary association. For Putnam, networks of this kind connect people, build trust and reciprocity through informal associations, and consolidate society through altruism. Such activities, services, and associations that create networks constitute sources of social capital. In this unit I will examine the potential of civil society activity, in the forms mentioned above, to generate social capital in Kosovo. The idea that creating social capital will be strengthened by actions of the civil society also implies that the right social policy will help to restore lost trust, rebuild cooperation, facilitate the networking 1182. KIPRED June 2005, A changing Society, a changing Civil Society, op.cit. p30 1183. BIRN TV Documentary Film, January 2006, “Does anyone have a plan?” Brussels-based Kosovo journalist Augustin Palokaj, interview. 1184. ICG Europe Report, 17 February 2006 Kosovo: The Challenge to transition, N°17, op.cit. 1185. See Kosova Index Publications Website 2007 Current Political Affairs in Kosova, Stating that trust in institutions and the electoral system continues to fall. op.cit. 317

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

infrastructure, and create conditions for bonding and bridging the divided K-Albanian and K-Serb communities in Kosovo. This will then help to reintegrate those now marginalized back into the community.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The disadvantaged themselves should be considered as part of a bigger problem, namely the worsening political and social conditions which all communities currently face in Kosovo. In such a context, it would be as reasonable to expect those most isolated socially to reintegrate themselves, as it would be to expect an acutely ill person to cure his illness with better exercise. Therefore, the values of self-reliance and individual enterprise will not be considered here as more important than the social structural constraints of the local institutional setting. Instead of the paradox of politics filled with rhetoric about the community's need to cultivate "cohesion", "interdependence," and "reciprocity" as personal attributes, I will anchor my analysis in the social and institutional structures in Kosovo that either permit or prohibit the building of such features. Considering the holistic approach of this study, I want to reiterate here that the political and economic system is a determinant of both the character of civil society and of the use to which social capital may be put. Therefore, social capital will not be presented here as a panacea1186 for Kosovo' current social problems, but will be posited as the catalyst and missing piece in the puzzle for a better functioning state and society. Briefly, my intention is based on the idea that while it may be possible to have too much social capital, it is definitely worse to have too little. Concretely, the experience of Kosovo, as in other countries, shows that civil society development takes place in relation to development of the state and the market, and it reflects trends in the political and social culture of the country. Of course this does not imply that civil society necessarily has harmonious relations with either the state or the market, nor does it imply that civil society does not promote ideas and ideologies counter to the prevailing culture. In the case of Kosovo both these trends were previously present, but with the end of violent conflict, an institutional and economic void was created, and conflict by nonviolent means continued under the direction of local nationalists, together with the persistence of authoritarian political behaviour inherited from the communist FRY era. The immediate interim responsibility for reestablishing state administration and providing the security necessary for economic activity was filled by international authorities with the support of temporary foreign administrators (UMIK, OSCE) and INGO humanitarian agencies. Early attempts to foster an independent civil society under these conditions were simply premature. International expectations that civil society would provide an effective mechanism for creating a democratic culture were thus unrealistic, but the international control of both the political and economic spheres inevitably determined that civil society would adopt the international community as its constituency.1187

1186. See the Chapter 1.3.3 on Social development regarding Ben Fine and John Harris' criticism of the inappropriate adoption of social capital as a supposed panacea for promoting civil society organizations and NGOs, perceived as agents of development for the inequalities generated by neoliberal economic development. 1187. INTRAC, 2006, Civil Society Capacity building in Post-Conflict Societies, op.cit. 318

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The complicated system of governance and the ambiguity produced by the lack of a clear accountability structure, in combination with the inexperience and weakness of Kosovo’s formal institutions, made the situation even more difficult. The result was the strengthening of non-institutional regulatory mechanisms, such as those based on family, or client–like connections in society, with most people having more trust in their family and circle of friends to resolve major problems than in Kosovo’ institutions. Additionally, the weak judiciary and rule of law engender mistrust in security institutions and foster the ossification of old family patronage connections.1188 Yet, the traditional forms of civil society retain legitimacy and popular support in the community, particularly among K-Albanians, and already possess the vital qualities of internal coherence and resilience. However, in the aftermath of ethno-national conflict there was a real risk that traditional civil society would become a serious obstacle to state-building efforts by becoming the focus of continued struggle between national, political, and social interests. Moreover, fears of possible political manipulation and corrupt use of resources by local nationalist elites influenced the international community’s preference for stimulating the growth of an NGO-based civil society sector as part of the wider political project to engineer a new state founded upon a pluralist democracy and a liberal economy. The current humble results in terms of NGO performance, responsiveness, and sustainability, however, need to be further researched in comparison to the organisational advantages of traditional forms of civil society and the political dangers of attempting to exploit these advantages.1189

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the long run, the challenge of (re-)generating social capital in a postconflict situation such as in Kosovo consists of establishing favorable conditions for organizing and taking collective action. War-related trauma, the rending of social ties, displacement, and the destruction of livelihoods, all leave communities demoralized and disempowered. Under such conditions the rebuilding of trust and understanding between individuals through the facilitation of dialogue, with the aim of establishing teamwork and collective social vision, is a sine qua non for further development. Thus, restoring trust in Kosovan society remains crucial. Without trust, a “society” hardly merits the name. This may seem a terse summation of an exceedingly complex set of problems, but at least it serves to alert us to a challenge that all too often confronts residents of a disrupted society such as Kosovo. Divided along ethno-national lines, Kosovo desperately needs a reduction in nationally motivated antagonism, and a more concerted and lasting effort from international and local authorities to establish mechanisms for reestablishing social cohesion and generating ethnic reintegration in the country. The media and education are good examples of this situation. The media can play an important role in stimulating civil engagement and active participation in the social and political life of the country. Its impact will depend, however, on the level of 1188. Saferworld, May 2007, Human Security in Kosovo, A Survey of Perceptions, on http:/ /www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Human_Security_in_Kosovo_English.pdf, Accessed 18 May 2007 1189. INTRAC, 2006, op.cit. 319

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

trust it is able to engender. K-Albanian youth, for example, display a relatively high level of trust in the media. According to the 2006 Human Development Report, nearly three quarters of K-Albanians surveyed believed the media in Kosovo to be very credible, or credible up to a certain point. The wide gap between the two largest ethnic communities in this regard, with only one third of K-Serbs saying the same, hints at the huge divide in this area. Yet, even K-Albanians recognize the limitations of today’s media in Kosovo, including the fact that media outlets focus more on K-Albanian issues than those of other communities. This may be explained by the fact that KAlbanians compose the largest share by far of the population, but is no excuse for the representation gap created.1190 The impact of the media in improving cohesion between ethnic communities is also visible to the Kosovo population. In fact, both K-Serbs and K-Albanians see the media as an important mechanism for facilitating interethnic communication, and both agree that they should have access to each other’s media as a means of bridging their differences. But despite this relevant common position, little has been done by UNMIK, the OSCE or USAID (the main media investor), or even the PISG to tackle this issue seriously. Such a situation makes bridging even harder for both communities. To put it in the words of a K-Serb, “We live in two different worlds; We don’t hear each other’s opinions. There is no channel of communication to do so. Serbs listen to the Serb media and Albanians listen to the Albanian media. They have no common channel of communication.”1191

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

So, although the K-Serbs have established dozens of local radio and television stations, they have no Kosovo-wide media outlet, making it difficult to know what is going on outside of their localities. A proposal has been made to create a second public station in the Serbian language, but its implementation will take time. Even then, the main challenge will depend on the political elite, who will be faced not with the task of how to send encouraging messages, but rather how to transmit such messages correctly to the other side. The unprofessional handling of the situation by the media in such cases may cause panic and create refugees by ruining the little trust that has been built in the meantime. Thus, encouragement of political messages in the media is crucial at this time for Kosovo, but is also to be "handled with care".1192 The situation regarding education is very similar. Education in Kosovo is offered in five languages; Albanian, Serbian, Bosnian, Turkish, and Croatian, with minorities attending classes held in the language of the area where they live. The most by far are instructed in Albanian, with the next two largest (though far less common) languages being Serbian and Bosnian. The problem here is that the K-Serb community, retaining their parallel educational system, is not integrated into the Kosovo educational system. The teaching of two different curricula, which probably conflict with each 1190. UNDP Kosovo, 2006, Human Development Report 2006, Pristina pp75-87 1191. See the Conference Meeting Report, Strengthening Interethnic Political dialogue in Kosovo, Pristina, p4 1192. Conference Meeting Report, Strengthening Interethnic Political dialogue in Kosovo, Pristina, op.cit. 320

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

other's narratives, again renders two parallel realities in Kosovo. While K-Serb parallel structures have been tolerated by UNMIK so far for political reasons, the situation is now producing mistrust through institutional mechanisms, supported by the destabilizing interference of the Serb government. Such an approach translates to a further deepening of the perceived divide between these communities. Thus, the unwillingness of the Serb community to cooperate in this case depends on the political support received from Belgrade. The lack of detailed information on K-Serb education structures, with the most recent data on K-Serb minority education pertaining to the 2003–2004 academic year, adds to the problem, and no K-Serb schools have since reported any data to Kosovo institutions.1193 The role of education in generating social capital in Kosovo, particularly with respect to bridging the ethnic divide, can be illustrated by the words of an expert on education and civil society in Kosovo, who says: "...the main challenge in Kosovo remains the bad education, which enhances the division of a society. People that have studied outside Kosovo and are back now have not only acquired good skill but have also a better knowledge....while the ones that have stayed have been simply fed with mythology from both sides..."1194 Furthermore, the long history of economic underdevelopment in Kosovo has not translated into increased prosperity, despite current slow economic growth.1195 According to the 2004 UNDP Human Development Report, 47% of the population subsist on under 1.6 Euros per day. With poverty affecting all sections of Kosovan society, and with people living at the edge of their existence, it is very difficult to achieve high levels of civic participation and voluntarism despite well rooted traditions.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The case of participation by youth NGOs is an illustration of this scenario.1196 NGOs and civil society activities play an important role in establishing mutual confidence between people by strengthening their cooperation and ability to fulfill joint goals and stimulate active participation in the development of society. The ability of these activities to increase and improve citizens’ engagement in influencing government institutions is especially relevant to this study. According to the Human Development Report in Kosovo, only 6.5% of young people were directly engaged with an NGO, with the share being similar for all ethnic groups. The reasons for such low civic engagement and the lack of active participation by Kosovo youth were mostly linked to education, which is seen from parents as the only way to ensure economic security for the family. Other economic reasons hindering youth participation include

1193. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Kosovo (MEST) 2006, Kosovo Education, Science and Technology Development Strategy 2007-2013, Pristina, Kosovo 1194. Author´s interview with Expert on Education and Civil Society in Kosovo, 14 April 2006,Vienna, Austria 1195. In 2004, the GDP rate of 858 Euros ($1,071) per capita was still below the figure recorded for the province in 1985, a time when Kosovo had already long been the poorest region of Yugoslavia, and when their income was calculated to be a mere one sixth of the most prosperous Yugoslav republic of Slovenia. 1196. The survey comprised 1200 individuals aged 15 to 29. See UNDP Kosovo HDR 2006, op. cit. 321

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

the focus on immediately finding a job to support their families. It is clear that youths' interest is focused on activities that address pressing concerns for them and their families. Furthermore, a significant number of young people were discouraged by the lack of transparency in many NGOs, and were less inclined to volunteer for NGO-initiated projects that were often used as self-employment opportunities and viewed with suspicion due to corruption allegations. The same economic reasons are hindering the continuation of the recent tradition of voluntarism. K-Albanians' voluntarism in particular during the repressive regime was a direct result of discrimination and ethnic solidarity, and showed a tenacious will to survive in the midst of oppression. In the present context, they find themselves in radically changed political and economic structures, and are faced with a constant struggle to assure their economic survival. In this new context they must focus primarily on their own economic security rather than address issues affecting the larger community. The situation is especially aggravated now that members of the Kosovo diaspora no longer feel an urgency to support their compatriots in Kosovo, as no immediate threats to K-Albanian physical security exist. Current developments in Kosovo have effectively ended the period of institutional voluntarism, and it is clear that the volunteer spirit and tradition is not resonating among people in Kosovo. Apart from economic reasons, the decline of such an important feature of social capital, in Kosovo is also related to other changes in Kosovo’s political, social, and cultural conditions, showing once again how vital economic and social policies can be for generating social capital.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The political culture in Kosovo also plays a relevant role in the generation of social capital. A well-developed sense of civic duty is missing in all ethnic communities. To put it in an interviewee 's words :"...[in Kosovo]...the civil society...seems narrowly defined...and the responsibility of the individual citizen to act as a citizen is not understood even at the most intellectuals..."1197 The 2006 Human Development Report, examining the ability of Kosovo’s youth (up to 60% of the population) to have an impact on decision-making institutions related to their lives found this ability to be very low. This is because the institutions typically do not respect the rights of youth to participate, and the youths themselves do not consider their participation to be a civic responsibility.1198 The historical perspective helps to explains this double refusal. In a traditional cultural context, Kosovo has little culture of youth participation, due to the inheritance of a strong Balkan patriarchal family structure, making decisions for the entire family. Young people in Kosovo, especially in rural areas where such traditions are better conserved, have relatively limited engagement in the community and in the environment around them, leaving decisions to the elderly (mostly men). Even when they participate, this engagement is of a token nature, and is instituted without clear rules and obligations re-

1197. Author´s interview with Expert on Education and Civil Society in Kosovo, Vienna Austria, op.cit. 1198. UNDP Kosovo, Human Development Report 2006, op.cit. pp75-87 322

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

garding the rights of youth. The situation, particularly in rural areas, is similar for women.1199 This rationale causes many young people and women to believe that participation is not a matter pertaining to them, but an issue related to their parents and the elderly. Receiving little incentive to develop civic responsibility in school or at home, the young and women have a low awareness of the importance of civic engagement for themselves and society, therefore reinforcing patriarchal structures through a low level of participatory culture. Perceiving themselves as having no impact on institutions also creates a sense of public apathy. Institutions are also not seen to shape their lives to the extent seen in developed democracies. Naturally, people are less inclined to undertake change in such circumstances, which in turn have adverse effects on the capacity of civil society to influence decision-making There is no major incentive to organize civil associations and/or support those already existing, as this would require spending time and resources with a goal of influencing something that does not actually change citizens’ lives greatly.1200 Finally, with respect to bridging the divide between ethnic communities, experiences elsewhere have shown that it is possible to develop elements of a common civic culture or a culture of peace, even when the individual cultures of different groups are far apart. This occurs not by creating a hybrid culture, but rather by agreeing to see coexistence as a positive value and agreeing on ground rules for it, emphasizing positive cultural elements in common, and agreeing to see some areas of interaction as ‘neutral’. Experience also shows that this is often very difficult, and even if a success, it takes very long time, especially worrisome when time is a factor that has been ignored by the IC and its approach in Kosovo.1201

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Considering the great variety of development in other countries, when it comes to the definition of official languages, the relationship between religion and state, and legislation on the teaching of language, religion, and history, all of this could be examined in order to find potential approaches for Kosovo. But while it is one thing is to legislate this from above, in this case by UNMIK and PISG, it is another and much more complicated thing to create legislation that neither group sees as discriminatory. At the same time, the great variety just referred to also indicates that civil societies abroad, especially from countries that have undergone similar problems, may assist in the form of INGOs sharing experiences.1202 It seems that such bridging is possible for certain actors operating in the shadows of society. According to an ICG Report, people interviewed in Mitrovica note that powerful individuals, families, and groups on both sides of the ethnic divide collaborate in smuggling, trafficking, car theft, and other illicit activity, while maintaining a

1199. Tokenism occurs when it seems that young people have been given the right to expression, but in fact they have little influence or impact. 1200. KODI, 2007, op.cit. 1201. Expert on Education and Civil Society in Kosovo, Interview, op.cit. 1202. Wilberg, Hakan.1999, Roles of Civil Society, op.cit. p.98 323

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

political and social environment where it is taboo for ordinary citizens to work together. The division is fueled by the poor economic situation, where the decrease of donors' presence and money, leaves people few choices. The money that created an ephemeral boom, including that from the K-Albanian diaspora, tended to be used for construction rather than productive enterprises, while in Mitrovica, funds from donors were divided up informally by local elites. As a local businessman states: "The money was badly invested, just like in Bosnia, and not just because much of it ended up lining in somebody's pockets, but because of the quality of the projects themselves....[C]onstructing buildings enterprises.[is]...cheaper and easier to steal money from, while if you invest in production it takes too long, it is too complicated....Donors were only interested in doing something fast and nice, with concrete 'results'1203. The political situation does not offer an escape either, as the EU strategy in Kosovo is vague and ambiguous. One senior official in the UN administration in Kosovo even accused the international community of having focused overwhelmingly on keeping K-serbs and K-albanians apart, rather than engaging in a positive and broad institution-building effort. Here the key factor was the way in which European governments' ambiguity over Kosovo's eventual status has complicated institution-building work by prolonging it, as is reflected in the communities' attitudes. 1204

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Prolongation of the resolution of Kosovo’s status has contributed to increased fear and anxiety among Kosovo's communities, especially the K-Serbs who feared potential violence by K-Albanians. In this respect, although political leaders at the national and local levels have been at least partially engaged, the K-Serb community will need to hear more from Kosovo’s leaders that they care about them, and that their safety in the post-status period is ensured. This would decrease fear and insecurity, and reflect the seriousness of the Kosovo government in building a “new Kosovo” for all communities through involvement in bridging economic and social policies, and support of such activities at the national and local levels. In a conference held recently with K-Serb and K-Albanian civil actors, the former iterated that being involved in resolving concrete issues accelerates the process of reconciliation, but despite progress being made in the process of interethnic reconciliation, issues of who should apologize first, and conflicting interpretations of the past, persist.1205 To conclude, creating a population of local NGOs alone will not produce a civil society, much less social capital, in Kosovo. If state-building missions in postconflict situations are not taking their mission seriously and are unable to engage in efforts to produce a legitimate and regulated political economy, the field will be left open to the

1203. Cited in International Crisis Group Europe Report, 13 September 2005, Bridging Kosovo´s Mitrovica Divide, N°165, p12 1204. Richard, Youngs, 2004, International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p59 1205. Conference Meeting Report, Stregthening Interethnic Political Dialogue in Kosovo, Pristina, op.cit. 324

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

most advantaged and aggressive actors, who will be a great obstacle for critical voices in society. The challenge consists of looking beyond the immediate postconflict moment which demands progress in terms of immediate results in the distribution of humanitarian aid, education of citizens in unfamiliar political and economic ideologies, or the temporary bridging of ethno-political divides. State-builders must look beyond to the unknown territory of stable, independent sociopolitical entities and ask what kind of civil society, fulfilling what kind of role, should be supported in Kosovo in order to reach that. Such a civil society should be a society of citizens in the sense of Hanna Arendt, that of civic-minded publicly political people who are willing to engage in public participation with their commons as well as with institutions in order to have an impact on society as a whole. Currently, one cannot describe Kosovo´s civil society in this way, but a civil society activist in Kosovo suggest that, " So far, the citizens of Kosovo have not had a real chance to become empowered and have not become fully aware of the meaning of the notion of ‘citizenship.’1206 Empowering common citizens by giving them the capability to access goods and services that allow for a decent life, is the key to generating social capital in Kosovo. History has shown that when the proper conditions are in place, there is a good chance of it happening. Within a longer timeframe, and with certain economic and political conditions already in place, the social capital in Kosovo can regenerate. This will require dedication from all sides to the long state-building process, rather than immediate results. A long-term commitment to development is also necessary, in order to allow for locally generated social visions to evolve until community-oriented intentions are encouraged more than short-term self interest.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

5.3 Security and the social domain It is impossible to talk about security in the social dimension without mentioning the rule of law. As in other domains, the social one will simply not be sustainable without an efficient rule of law, no matter what measures are taken or policies implemented. In this respect, considering the complicated social context in Kosovo, the security of minorities presents one of the most serious challenges to long-term stability. Since 1999, the situation for the K-Serb minority has deteriorated, causing the creation of enclaves as "safe heavens," reducing freedom of movement and increasing a general feeling of insecurity. In recent years security concerns have made it difficult for K-Serbs to travel outside their enclaves. In such a situation, where there is a lack of basic freedoms, such as that of free movement, it is absurd to talk about anything else. Assuring the physical security of individuals is the foundation for building anything afterwards. If this does not occur, K-serbs will not feel safe , and they will simply come back to their rebuilt homes in order to sell them to K-Albanians and then leave for Serbia, where they feel safe. 1207

1206. Cited in KODI, 2007 op.cit. p233 1207. Author´s interview with OSCE employee, 10 November, 2006, Mitrovica, Kosovo. 325

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The process of self-isolation has been accelerating since 1999, and has cleared KSerbs away from arterial roads and mixed urban areas. With most of them restricting their movements around Kosovo and feeling under pressure to leave due to K-Albanian demographic encroachment, the lack of job opportunities in the K-Albanian milieu, or physical intimidation and violence, the chances for bridging the two communities remain low. UNMIK data confirming this trend shows that two thirds of the remaining K-Serbs live in fragmented pockets south of the river Ibar, including municipalities in the north, Leposavic/q, Zvecan, Zubin-Potok, etc, and one third live in the Serb-majority triangle above the Ibar river, in the northern part of Mitrovica. A recent poll of the K-Serb population showed that although outside travel is limited, it does take place, with 84 % regularly traveling outside their immediate area, only 10% of these with an escort.1208 Here, half of the K-Serbs cite the lack of public and personal security as their chief concern. Until September, 2005, a growing part of the minority was prepared to concede that the situation was improving, but as soon as something new happens, like the Strpce market bombing of November, 2005, the confidence built so far is instantly wiped out.1209 The Kosovo Police Service is not mature enough yet to manage this challenge, and although K-Serbs participate in the KPS, their trust in it remains low. Some accept the international security presence as their best available guarantee, while others wish for the return of Serbian forces or the right to police their own areas. Considering that the return of Serbian security forces is impossible at this point, most K-Serbs favor a long-term international military and civilian presence as a guarantee of their personal safety and rights. Only a situation where K-Serbs and other minorities feel safe can enable the creation of social cohesion and bring back trust in the other side. With Kosovo approaching statehood, Kosovo Police Service behaviour will influence this social development. As Bayley rightly suggests, "police are society’s most pervasive teachers about civic values”.1210

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

If the KPS are arbitrary, brutal, distant from the public, and close to the government of the day, Kosovo will remain unstable. To avoid that, the EU Planning Team1211in Kosovo is expected to play a crucial role as the new post-status presence, and are prepared to mount a police and justice mission to monitor and mentor the

1208. According to December, 2005 UNMIK polling in minority areas, of those who travel outside their areas only 1% said they experienced crime during the last six months of 2005: three in Mitrovica and two in Peja/Pec. 62% felt safe traveling in Kosovo, down from 74 % in November 2005. Proportionately less respondents from the Pristina and Gjilan/Gnjilane regions thought it unsafe to travel. 1209. See UNDP/RIINVEST Quarterly Opinion Polls at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/ publications/publications.asp. 1210. Bayley, David H. 1985, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers. University Press, p.197 1211. See Solana Javier and Rehn Olli, 6 December 2005, The Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo, European Council-European Commission, Brussels 326

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

KPS, as well as taking executive control of investigations into organised crime, corruption, war and inter-ethnic crimes, witness protection, etc.1212 The EUPT mission will hopefully improve the rule of law and the general security situation in Kosovo, which in turn will contribute to the improvement of civil society and media activity. The lack of the rule of law in Kosovo allows for intimidation and pressure by political groups and criminal organizations. Fearing coercion, freedom of speech and the editorial independence of journalists will be jeopardized and may account for weak development of investigative journalism. Only the rule of law can engender optimal working conditions for critical voices in the society, and encourage greater participation in critical approaches towards government. Finally, a strong and efficient rule of law and judiciary will help bring back the low trust in Kosovos institutions and generate participation in volunteer activities, especially as this has been decreasing due to doubts towards NGOs based on corruption allegations.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Security in the Social Domain is also challenged by the presence of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo. In their enclaves, the K-Serbs have maintained a parallel system of administration including courts, schools, hospitals, etc, which directly responds to the Serb government in Belgrade. Although UNMIK has never officially accepted these Serbian controlled structures, it has never made much effort to stop them from functioning, either.1213 These parallel structures are generally perceived by the K-albanian population as a political demonstration of Serbia´s presence in Kosovo, and also as an institutional embodiment of mistrust between the two largest ethnic groups. The persistence of these structures seriously undermines implementation of the rule of law in the entire territory of Kosovo,1214 and is a potential destabilizing element because it hinders the K-Serbs' integration into Kosovo society through the education and health care services.1215 The different curricula taught in the parallel educational structures fuels the machines of ideology and mythology, which breed mistrust, fear and insecurity. K-Serbs refuse to send their children to mixed primary schools within their municipalities because they are considered unsafe and unsuitable for their children, preferring to organize their own primary schools, often in private homes or sub-standard facilities. This parallel educational system is financed by the Serbian Ministry of Education and Sports, which pays teachers higher salaries than in Serbia, with the justification that they operate in extraordinary circumstances. The same teachers have until lately been receiving salaries from the PISG as well. This issue remains unsolved, and will at least until final status, will no sign of tolerance or serious attempts to find common ground between K-Albanians and K-Serbs regarding consolidation of the educational system1216.

1212. 1213. 1214. 1215. 1216.

International Crisis Group, 2006, Europe Report N°17 op.cit. pp7-9 KIPRED, 2006, Internal Security Review, op.cit. Kai Eide Report October 2005, A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo,op.cit. p5 See Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2001, Statistics on education in Kosovo, See OSCE Kosovo and UNMIK, October 2003, Parallel structures in Kosovo. Pristina 327

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The health care situation, which is generally bad in Kosovo, is perhaps even worse for the K-Serbs, who often experience problems accessing health care facilities. One of the reasons for the K-Serbs' lack of use of health care facilities in Kosovo is mistrust. Managed by K-Albanians, Kosovo's health institutions have almost no KSerb personnel, making K-Serbs feel insecure. The same mistrust is mirrored among non-Serb minorities in the north of Kosovo, where health institutions are run mostly by Serbs. Perceptions of this kind would cause serious security challenges in the event of any widespread epidemics or natural disasters.1217 The general lack of knowledge and common misperceptions, as well as the reluctance of PISG/UNMIK to overcome these obstacles, results in further isolation of the K-Serbs and a deepening of the divide. Consequently, Kosovo remains a divided society with little interaction between the majority K-Albanians and minority K-Serbs. This division is in large part because of a legacy from the past, as well as current KSerb feelings of insecurity in Kosovo. The lack of security produces a vicious circle, resulting in increased insecurity as created by the community divisions.1218

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

I am certainly not saying here that the responsibility for this division rests solely with the K-Serbs. It is clear that in the independence package being negotiated for Kosovo, the international community must have as its primary responsibility for future development the protection of minorities, if necessary through intervention by an international mission. Meanwhile, the K-Albanian contribution to this package already includes rights for K-Serbs and other minorities in at least three areas, comprising inclusion and representation in central institutions, and arrangements for involvement of the relevant countries of origin in fields such as culture and education. The crafting of the final settlement with the international community should be an occasion for the EU and its member states to increase the priority and resources they commit to the western Balkans. Furthermore a generous education assistance program and visa liberalization are needed for all communities, in order to expand their potential social capital. The EU should not spend more on its own post-status mission than on pre-accession structural funds for the new state. Apart from the protection of minority rights in Kosovo, there is one specific area where the international community should consider more decisive behavior and an intrusive mission; in northern Kosovo, and in particular Mitrovica, where the K-serb parallel structures defy UNMIK and PISG authority. Leaving a new Kosovo government to try to incorporate the north would invite a violent breakdown and would therefore be a huge obstacle to the future security of the region. A competent transitional international authority for the north is the only rational answer. On a daily basis many K-Serbs draw services and jobs from both the Serbian government and UNMIK/PISG, but their political loyalty to Belgrade remains the bottom line. For this to change will require action from UNMIK, the IC, PISG and the K-Serbs themselves. Only if the K-Serbs are actively involved and represent themselves in Kosovo institu-

1217. OSCE Kosovo, December 2003, Kosovo Minority Report, Pristina p42 1218. KIPRED, 2006, Internal Security Review, op.cit. 328

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tions will it be possible for minorities to have a future in Kosovo. Denial of the PISG with Serbian government backing brings self-isolation to the K-Serbs in Kosovo. Thus, a vital part of the cohesion process must focus on developing further civil society networking among K-Serbs and K-Albanians outside of official and parallel institutions of government, with international donors ready to assist.1219

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The civil society in Kosovo, including Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Gorani, etc, has a crucial role to play in building social capital in Kosovo. The Scandinavian countries also demonstrate that much can be done from above by an enlightened and benevolent state in cooperation with an active civil society, assisting in to bridging ethno-national divides and overcoming them, as in Spain, Northern Ireland, Finland, etc. The same civil society structures could serve other benevolent purposes as well. Specifically, they could operate as a kind of “early warning system” from the grassroots for Pristina to give timely indications when frustration, unrest, and tension are mounting. Their networks could serve as a path for civil society leaders to exhort their members, and through them the wider community, to refrain from antisocial behavior at times of crisis. If during the March 17th events, for example, the Kosovo Prime Minister had been able to spread his appeals for calm to the public through civil society networks and the media, the PISG effort to hold down violence might well have had a significantly greater impact. Assuring the rule of law and a strong judiciary that does not undermine its own activities is the sine qua non for building an efficient civil society. Furthermore, economic security is also very important for assuring the required independence of civil society, especially considering that in Kosovo this sector remains dependent on international aid, and many groups do not have sufficient financial or organizational capacity to sustain their activities in the long term. The future of many NGOs is now at stake, owing to reductions in international funding. To assure sustainable levels of development, the civil society in Kosovo will need further support from the international community in terms of capacity-building and the generation of income from the population through membership fees. Only in this way can they be accountable to their constituencies and able to advocate their interests on important issues such as education reform, the fight against corruption, economic and fiscal policies, election reform, and gender equality. Keeping in mind the holistic approach of this study, economic security is an area that touches not only civil society but the whole population, and in a context of physical insecurity and poverty, people would be struggling to survive rather than improving social capital. Therefore without the rule of law, economic security, and a stable political situation. social capital will not be regenerated in Kosovo.

5.4 Conclusion Almost eight years after the start of internationally sponsored democracy-building, Kosovo clearly exhibits features of a civil society that is heavily infected with

1219. ICG Europe, 2006, Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition., op.cit. pp22 329

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

democratic rhetoric, but empty of substance. Although there are clear civil society networking structures in Kosovo, the overall impression of its ability to exert influence over public policy, to generate trust and reciprocity, and to help bridge the ethnic divide between the two main communities is humble. One can argue that this depends on a series of factors that are out of the sphere of control of civil society, but while this may be true for the most part, it does not preclude an active and responsible civil society from fulfilling its own agenda. In this chapter, based on Putnam´s theoretical model I have examined the availability and potential of social capital features including trust, norms of reciprocity, networking, bonding and bridging, and the gender dimension in Kosovo. The local institutions involved in this analysis included civil society and the media, and their roles in the (re-)generation of social capital, as well as the roles of the government of Kosovo and UNMIK/PISG toward these actors. It is clear that despite critical voices from civil society and the media towards the current decision-making structures, much more can be done to improve it, despite the negligence of UNMIK or PISG.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Furthermore, I focused on the role of international donors in fostering social capital in postwar Kosovo. In a rush to "build democracy", despite pushing forward on some important issues like interethnic cooperation and gender issues, these actors have not assessed the local setting and taken into account the real needs of the Kosovo population. Community structures like the councils of elders were pushed aside and replaced with "modern" structures for the society, causing the need for significant adjustment time, during which civil society’s influence remains limited. Additionally, the ad hoc and unstructured donor coordination has often resulted in overlapping or even conflicting activities which negatively influenced local CSOs while the OSCE focused on infrastructure and funds provision, and maintained a bureaucratic top-down approach to the local CSOs. Finally, I explored the potential for social capital in Kosovo, and concluded that despite the recent civic tradition in Kosovo offering a high potential for social capital, the complicated political situation, together with a desperate economic state, present clear challenges to its regeneration and leave social development in a critical situation. The crucial roles that UNMIK, the EU, and especially PISG will have to play on economic and social policy in support of such a process are vital for the future, keeping in mind that security in such a scenario is the sine qua non for any social undertaking. Strengthening civil society and its influence should be one of the key goals of the Kosovo society and political elites, in preparation for its road to statehood. To put it in the words of the interviewed Civil Society Expert: "a state makes good sense only when there is an efficient civil society."1220 Developing a vibrant civil society cannot be done hastily and independently of sociopolitical conditions in Kosovo. Instead, the facilitation of conditions necessary to regenerate social capital in a postconflict situation must be comprehensive in terms of

1220. Author´s interview, with Expert on Education and Civil Society in Kosovo, April 2006, op.cit, 330

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

adjusting to the requirements of timing and institutional development. This implies a long-term engagement by the EU, whose democracy-building agenda will only make good sense if accompanied by the right mechanisms to assure an incremental and progressive transition of Kosovo into the EU. A lack of continuity and strategic direction for civil society would be a major hindrance to the development of an effective and sustainable state. Given the complexity of a postconflict environment and its social and political instability, the EU should support the civil society over a longer time frame, to allow it to find its way out of transition and have a constructive role in the state-building and development process in Kosovo.

331

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

6. Cultural Domain 6.1 Actors and institutions 6.1.1 Local players and setting 6.1.1.1 The law: a shared meaning in Kosovo? In Chapter 1.3.4, I stated that studying the law as the generator for shared meaning in society is crucial for identifying changes in state and society. Migdal argues that broadly shared meaning in society, as reflected in state law, creates a kind of social solidarity that helps improve conditions for a state´s cohesion. Perceived by the population as the delineation of right from wrong, it becomes a critical process bringing together diverse groups with diverse concerns into a single political force. On the contrary, if state law does not fit with other sets of laws in the society, it undermines its own ability to provide people a needed sense of shared meaning in their lives, running a high risk of losing its necessary legitimacy.1221 In Kosovo, this is definitely not the case, and a study in the mid-1970s revealed the coexistence of three legal systems there, regulating conflicts. According to Becker, a Norwegian social anthropologist who studied traditional family structures among K-Albanians, when talking about the law, the inhabitants of Isniq1222 covered everything from bills passed by the Yugoslav parliament to customs practiced at the village level, but they differentiated between the three legal systems that governed their lives. First was the Yugoslav national law ligji i shtetit (state law); second, there was Muslim law (sheriati) which was consulted on special occasions, but it was not quite clear when or by whom, and seemed to have little impact on the daily life of Isniq inhabitants; and third, an influential set of local rules in the village formed the customary code reflecting the predominance of blood relations, i.e. patrilineage, in their traditional social structure.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Before Yugoslav law come into power, these village inhabitants had mostly based their conduct on their own legal traditions, which were in many ways similar to the famous Code of Leke Dukagjini1223. In fact, argues Becker, the people of Isniq village followed their own set of common laws. Up to the second World War their customary law was active, but since the socialist Yugoslavia came into being, this customary law has been in a defensive position and was replaced by the modern constitution and

1221. See Chapter 1.3.4 of this study. 1222. The work of Berit Becker deals with household formation in a Kosovo village called Isniq during the 1970s. She discussed the origin, function, and development of the formerly predominant patriarchal family type which was typical of the whole region, in the case of Isniq, a village inhabited by Albanians. I will take it here as representative of the Kosovo rural area. See Backer Berit, 1979, Behind Stone Walls changing Household Organisation among the Albanians of Kosova, op.cit. 1223. The Kanun of Leke Dukagjini is the most famous customary code of the North-Albanians 332

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

legal system in general. Courts, judges, police, and prisons took over the handling of crimes. People knew the traditions and their rules, but at the level of social interaction they did not practice them anymore. What was left of the old customary legal structure was more what could be termed "codes of conduct." This covers the fields where the public law code cannot prescribe any particular behavior, but it also represents in a basic sense their "culture", and as such it seems to be very strong, with a tremendous capacity for survival. At a more private level it concerns the identity of the people of Isniq as an ethnic group, thus to refer to these rules is to state what is "Albanian" as opposed to "Serbian".1224 In post World War II Yugoslavia, according to Becker, the question of ethnic identity functioned as the framework within which the necessity of keeping certain traditions and rules alive was placed. "These are our customs" was a defence against an increasingly imposing macrostructure from the Yugoslav state, which was originally conceived of as Serbian dominance, but since l968 when the hegemony of Slav culture was reduced and the Albanian language and culture recognized in Kosovo, the attitude towards change and modernization in the form of, for example university education, was drastically altered. The possibility that "Albanianness" could be recodified and expressed in terms of participation in the modern institutions and social settings produced by industrial society was accepted as an alternative. The existence of the independent state of Albania especially, combined with its strategy for industrialization and development, had a strong impact on how broad the redefinition of Albanian cultural identity may be for the inhabitants of Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Particularly relevant here is the close connection between the concepts of custom, tradition, and that of ligj, (law). It endows customary ways of behaviour with an imperative status. To identify culture with law is a self-assertive way of saying "What we do is right and the way it is done is how it ought to be done".1225 According to Migdal´s theoretical model, such attitude confirms the law as the common denominator of a society that agrees upon what is right and wrong, and becomes through such a process, a common entity. When such a process and its results manage to become state law, we have strong cohesion, and the society finds its shared meaning. In the case of Kosovo, this process was already well on the way when the K-Albanians accepted Yugoslav law and welcomed in general terms the advantages of industrialization. It was overturned in 1989, as during the "lost decade" the K-Albanian population was faced with ethnic discrimination by the Serb state and its police, generating a resistant attitude (civil resistance) towards the Serbian state and its laws.1226 In 1999, after the NATO intervention in Kosovo, UNMIK restarted the lawmaking process in Kosovo. It was mainly undertaken by international legal experts 1224. See Backer B., 1979, op.cit. p55-58 1225. Ibid. 1226. This also had some negative effects on Kosovo women in rural areas, who according to the customary law, for example, were deprived of the right to inherit property, with some villagers refusing the official family law as a ‘Serb law’, and not in keeping with their traditions. See Cutting the life line ESI, 2006, op.cit. 333

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

with arguably their own cosmopolitan common legal language, communication structures, shared values, and goals, which were far from being the "mirror image" of the domestic population's1227. Furthermore, UNMIK was expected to act and legislate in accordance with domestic laws and legal traditions, which turned out to be a very complicated issue. Applying domestic law was particularly complicated due to Kosovo´s recent history of ethnic discrimination and lack of orderly government. For the purpose of legal continuity, UNMIK initially determined that applicable local laws based on the Austro-Hungarian legal tradition, influenced by a socialist heritage, and relayed through detailed codification in the administrative area, were in force until 24 March, 1999, the day the NATO bombing began.1228 This provision was later repealed in response to the local judiciary´s refusal to apply laws that were viewed as oppressive of the K-Albanian majority1229. Consequently, Regulation 1999/24 specified that the laws applicable in Kosovo were to be UNMIK Regulations and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder, as well as the laws in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989, the day before the Serbian government unilaterally ended Kosovo´s status as an autonomous province. A law in force after 22 March was declared to be applicable only if a subject matter was not covered by the laws in force before 22 March 1989, and if the law in question was not discriminatory, and complied with internationally recognized human rights standards.1230 Despite this provision, confusion prevailed regarding application of the law to special cases, as several potential sources of law had to be evaluated and it was unclear which laws should take precedence, including the customary laws mentioned above. Due to socio-political changes that had developed during the "lost decade", Kosovo´s pre-1989 law did not reflect the post-socialist realities of 1999 which lead to major uncertainties and confusion. To complicate matters ad absurdum, the law was implemented in the beginning by dual role actors, who were on one hand international civil servants, and on the other temporary quasi-government officials of Kosovo.1231

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This type of confusion lasted until the next one arrived. With the UNMIK promulgation of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo, drafted by international and local experts, provisional governmental institutions were set up, including the Assembly of Kosovo, the government, and the Office of the President of Kosovo.1232 Under the Constitutional Framework, the SRSG vested 1227. Korhonen, Outi. 2000 International Law Situated: An Analysis of the Lawyer's Stance towards Culture, History and Community. The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, pp44-50 1228. UNMIK REG., No.1999/1, on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, 25 July 1999/3 1229. See the Report of the UN Secretary General, 23 December 1999 1230. UNMIK Regulation No.1999/24 , Section 1.1 and Section 1.2 1231. Carlowitz, Leopold v. 2003, UNMIK Lawmaking between effective Peace Support and Internal Self Determination. in Archiv des Völkerrechts, Bd. 41, Hamburg pp 382-384 1232. UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9 334

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

certain responsibilities in the PISG with respect to preparing laws1233 governing the fields of education, youth, culture, health, labor and social welfare, transport and telecommunications, public administration, agriculture, spatial planning and environmental protection, domestic and foreign trade and industry, statistics, and tourism, as well as good governance and human rights.1234 In these fields, both the government and the Assembly have the right to initiate and adopt laws and resolutions, the latter's being non-binding declarations. Once legislation has been adopted by the Assembly, as the highest legislative body of the PISG, it only enters into force if signed and thus promulgated by the SRSG.1235 Eight years on, this is still the legal situation in Kosovo. If one adds here the fact that most K-Serb parallel structures use their own courts with their own legal system, derived from Serbia’s insistence on maintaining its own judicial structures in North Mitrovica in violation of Resolution 1244,1236 then we have in Kosovo, at least from the legal perspective, one of the most chaotic legal situations in the world, with bleak consequences for generating a uniform, consistent application of law for the citizens of Kosovo. This situation indicates how different sets of laws have interacted in Kosovo, and makes clear that current state law, mainly guided by UNMIK's "best practice" approach,1237 has been affected very little by other sets of laws in society, illustrating the marginal role of local actors in this process. Although things will get better once Kosovo has its own constitution, it will still take a long time. In other countries, the law-generating process is the result of public debates over long periods of time, producing changes in the mentality of the population concerned, and Kosovo is simply not there yet. In this sense it is impossible for Kosovo state law, in the current situation, with at least four legal frameworks in place, to create a coherent shared meaning in society.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The commitment of the PISG to EU integration brings some optimism to this dark legal mosaic. Pursuant to Chapter 5.7 of the Constitutional Framework, the PISG are responsible for aligning their legislation and practices in all areas of responsibility with relevant European and international standards and norms. This provision contains a clear quasi-constitutional obligation to harmonize Kosovar legislation with the acquis communautaire of the European Union. With this provision, the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo is being prepared to its commitment for EU integration. Later, when the status issue is clear and Kosovo has its own constitution, things will

1233. UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, Section 5.1. 1234. KIPRED, 2005, Governance and Administration, op.cit. p12 1235. The authority of the SRSG over the PISG as already mentioned in the chapter 3.1.1.2.3. authorizes him to dissolve the Assembly of Kosovo and call for new elections in circumstances where the PISG are deemed to act in a manner not compatible with UNSC Resolution 1244/1999. 1236. UNMIK Pillar I Police and Justice Presentation Paper in June 2004, p18 1237. The "best practice" approach refers to the best legal practices of the EU, which are deemed successful in countries where applied and are therefore used in Kosovo by UNMIK. Interview with employee of the Policy Division of UNMIK, op.cit. 335

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

definitely improve. At this time, the PISG lack the necessary capacity and resources to undertake the required harmonization in practice. While a long-term, streamlined, coordinated approach from the EU is yet to come, the good thing about such a law is the potential it bears in this scenario to generate a shared meaning in the society of Kosovo and create the much needed "glue" to cement the fragmented Kosovo society. 6.1.1.2 The Public Ritual: exploring master narratives in Kosovo This unit is based on the theoretical assumptions of Migdal on the staging of politics and the role of master narratives, posited to be the controlling political idea of a state's elite, operating as the unchallenged first principles of political order, that makes a hierarchy appear natural and just to rulers and the ruled.1238 I will therefore examine how the political elites in Kosovo are using symbols to communicate political legitimacy, and how the sentiments of people are confirmed through the symbols communicated in a way that assures congruence between culture and state politics as enacted by politicians. Such a process is clearly a one-way communication, with the masses absorbing what is communicated, seldom able to give their individual responses.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Moreover, the work of social anthropologist Aasmund Andersen will help in exploring concretely the public ceremonies held in Kosovo which are used as a medium to present messages of political legitimacy by the elites in power. For Andersen, in such ceremonies symbols are used as key tools for making "even the smallest puppetshow" stir the emotions of "passive onlookers". This scenario makes the show experience spectacular, and conveys a story that gives meaning to their world. The engendered relation between the enactment of political legitimacy and the audience in such cases must be sensed as pointing out the congruence between culture and policy. The sentiments of the audience are thus elicited, making them feel that the social order enforced by the state is legitimate and represents the people. Here symbols and myths intertwine with the Grand Story of the nation and participants feels a part of a process in which culture is reflected by the state. The more conforming the political life is, the more the actors of political representation will keep reproducing the sentiments of the masses. In this sense, political conformity restricts the possible choices of political actors.1239 One indication of this political conformity is the similarity of the political programmes of all K-Albanian political parties, followed by the conformity in TV news reporting. By looking at the patterns in which the political elite present themselves in public life, I will show the political conformity in Kosovo as well as the political elite´s position, perceived as actors in such a framework. The repetitive elements of

1238. See Chapter 1.3.4 of this Study, 1239. Andersen Aasmund, 2002, Transforming Ethnic Nationalism, The politics of ethnonationalistic sentiments among the elite in Kosovo, For the partial fulfillment of the Cand. Polit. Degree at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo, Available under http://www.aasmundandersen.net 336

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

public ceremonies are described by Andersen in three different forms, including political mass meetings such as political rallies and meetings organised by political parties; mass demonstrations, in particular a series of demonstrations for the release of K-Albanian political prisoners in Serbia; and commemoration ceremonies, such as the celebration of Flag Day (alb. Dita e Flamurit). Andersen suggests that these ceremonies are enforced by political conformity mechanisms that include 1) popular music, 2) the mother-child relationship as a symbol of national vulnerability, 3) the flag, and 4) mental geopolitical maps. In addition to Andersen's variables, I will also consider 5) the role of TV in Kosovo and its ability to reproduce conformity scenarios in large scale and so legitimize them. The first symbol is popular music. Following Andersen, as a vital part of public ceremonies in Kosovo, the time spent on music surpasses anything else, normally taking up two-thirds of the time of the event, (such as Flag Day events, where speeches last circa 20 minutes, and the concert afterwards lasts more than an hour). The music presented in such concerts is not randomly selected, but belongs to the political cosmology and Grand Story of the K-Albanian political discourse. The songs project traditional or modern nationalistic sentiments and patriotic virtues. While the traditional songs remind people about Albanian cultural heritage and restore pride and dignity in the ethnic group, the modern ones are modern only in form, but are still based upon traditional Albanian or Balkan musical themes, with many songs on patriotism.1240

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The main topic of these songs' texts, argues Andersen is the political strive for independence, together with many symbols frequently repeated in the popular culture in Kosovo, like the "battle for freedom", the eagle, a symbol encouraging people to make sacrifices for the nation, and helping a mother to turn her "heart into stone" and "speak like a man". In one of the songs, (The song about Zahir Pajaziti) Andersen also finds symbolism for territorial belonging using ‘homeland' as a female that "when she stands up", it is as if she is "the one who fights, through her sons". With the words "blood" and "oath" repeated often in such songs, Andersen finds extensive symbolic meaning that relate family and clan ties to territorial belonging, warfare, and feuds, and refers soldiers' commitment to fight, and its promise to realize the goal of liberation.1241 It is clear that in the political arena, argues Andersen, these songs legitimize political goals and ambitions, as well as confirm people's commitment to achieve them. So, "popular music is capable of doing something in the political arena that no speech can. It connects the culture and sentiments of the people, through the usage of meaningful symbols and metaphors, to the politicians and their institutional legitimacy."1242 Popular music that elicits sentiments by combining stories related to war with references to ethno-nationalistic myths is used in a way that legitimises the political 1240. Andersen, A. 2002, op.cit. pp130-131 1241. Ibid. pp130-131 1242. Ibid. pp130-131 337

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

strive for independence as the destiny of K-Albanians. The outcome is vertical integration, closing the gap between the political elite and the masses. Mothers and children as symbols of national vulnerability. Andersen finds such symbols used in mass demonstrations and commemorative ceremonies in Kosovo where the children or women in traditional costumes sign or perform theatre. Women, virgins, and children symbolize the nation and that part of the territory which needs to be defended, while the strength of the nation is measured according to men´s ability to defend their women.1243 Those who participate in liberation warfare are then representatives of families, whose suffering calls for sympathy, with their immense sacrifices of something as valuable as their sons. It also reflects men's ideal virtue in relation to women suggests Andersen. Men should be strong, brave, and sacrifice their blood for the nation, while women should be good mothers with a strong relationship with their sons, yet let them fight for liberation. Women sacrifice on behalf of the nation, allowing their sons to defend the motherland. They overcome their emotional attachment to their sons and "speak up like a man". In this way the most vulnerable part of the nation, women, take on the bravery of a man and of the eagle, for the defense of her threatened territory.1244 Death, sacrifice, and martyrdom are substantial components of nationalism, and become central themes in times of crisis and war.1245 The symbol of the flag is probably the most dominant and powerful symbol in the political struggle for independence by K-Albanians, and they have attached a lot of meaning and sentiments to it. When the Yugoslav federation had flags for ethnic minorities, the flag for the Albanian minority was red with a yellow star in the upper left corner. The Albanian flag, however, represented a reference to a country outside Yugoslavia, and it symbolized not only an ethnic community, but also its political claim for independence, argues Andersen.1246 The Albanian flag in Kosovo was therefore very important in the political campaigns of the first elections in 2000. The message of independence conveyed by the flag was according to Andersen no longer connected to a specific event where people's opinion was important. The elections had shown that all K-Albanians were unified when facing independence .

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Recently there has been an increasing awareness among the political elite that Kosovo needs a new flag if it is recognized as independent. The former president of the LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, presented his suggestion for the new flag the day after the LDK won the municipal elections of 2000. Although it was a widely held opinion 1243. See Duijzings, Ger, 2000, Religion and the politics of identity in Kosovo, London, Hurst & Co. pp20-21 1244. Duijzings, G, 2000, op.cit. p32. 1245. Andersen, A.2002, op.cit. 1246. There are also ceremonies in which the Albanian flag is primarily used for its ethnic connotations. When a house is built, especially in rural areas, a flag is raised on top of the building to indicate which ethnic group is settling there. In marriage ceremonies, the couple will drive around town in a car with a flag. In funerals the flag will be on top of the coffin, indicating the ethnicity of the deceased person. 338

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

that any new Kosovo flag should be based on the Albanian flag, bearing its red color and the eagle, the final decision on the Kosovo flag took a long time. For Andersen, the beginning of an ongoing debate concerning giving a Kosovo flag of its own, different from the Albanian, signaled the beginning of a new definition of the KosovoAlbanian identity, no longer considered the same as the Albanian one. Thus, as suggestions for a Kosovo flag appeared it became"...evident that nationalistic sentiments of the K-Albanians have made an important shift from orientation towards the Albanian state, relying on their symbols of representation, to making its own. In making new symbols of representation, the political elite was actively engaged in both emphasizing newly appeared sentiments and slowly contributed to changing the mainstream nationalistic sentiments as well."1247 But the Kosovo political elite were aware of the difficulties in deciding on a flag as the symbol of Kosovo, and therefore to be on the safe side, the intervention of UNMIK was seen as appropriate to avoid nationalistic sentiments taking over. In the proposals, a sketch of the territory of Kosovo become a widespread symbol of selfgovernance. This symbol has remained on the final flag that Kosovo has today.1248 The flag is partly the result of a design competition organized by the UNMIK/PISG, which attracted almost a thousand entries. The competition rules insisted that the final design must not use ethnic or national symbols or color schemes in order to ensure that it represented all citizens of Kosovo.1249

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Flag of Kosovo

Source Kosovapress

Mental geopolitical maps: For Andersen, the politics of Kosovo uses a geopolitical symbolic map, with a hierarchy of nations depending on their economical development. Western Europe is at the top of this hierarchy, and being considered an ally of the successful economic system of the EU is the main priority of K-Albanian 1247. Anderson, A 2002, op.cit. 1248. There are six yellow stars above the golden map of Kosovo, which are meant to symbolize Kosovo's six major ethnic groups: Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Gorani, Roma and Bosniaks, while the field which is blue, implies the colors of the EU flag. 1249. Kosovapress, 17 February 2008 Parliament adopted the flag of Kosovo state, Pristina, 339

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

politicians in Kosovo today. This is reflected in speeches, symbols, the usage of EU and US flags in the streets, the new Kosovo flag, and the fact that all K-Albanian political parties have NATO and EU integration as future goals.1250 Finally, the role of TV in Kosovo1251 will be briefly described here, but further research will be needed on the role of the TV in the public ritual of the Kosovo stateimage. According to my research, the phenomenon of protocol journalism described in 9.1.1.2 generates the feeling that the media are the mouthpiece of power in Kosovo. TV news bulletins that deal only with the final status issue and its corollaries contribute to the creation of a status myth enhanced by the aforementioned master narratives broadcasting, giving them deeper roots in people´s minds and hearts. Relating the status myth with a long wished for freedom, independence, or the geopolitical map of the EU, etc, the K-Albanian political elite have built a certain Grand Story theatre that has made the masses base their expectations on the illusion that as soon as the status issue is solved, Kosovo's problems will be also solved. According to the employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo, demythologizing the status myth is another challenge that lays ahead for Kosovo society and its elite. The day after the status will reveal the large variety of concrete problems that Kosovo has to face, and dealing with them will require more than empty words and a grand story theatre from the political elite.1252 Further research will be required to examine the change of the master narrative's role after the status solution in Kosovo. TV in Kosovo also plays a role in maintaining political conformity (total consensus) among the K-Albanian elite, in the name of the common goal of independence. This was best illustrated at President Rugova’s funeral. This marked a further unification of the competing KLA and LDK party traditions, where the KLA-derived Kosovo Protection Corps performed the honors, saluting his burial with volleys of gunfire.1253 This trend has also been enhanced by the IC, concerned with stability and security,who have been breeding a formal cohesion in the K-Albanian political elite, creating a kind of symbiosis and giving them additional legitimacy. The ICG Reports: "K-Albanians have become so used to wearing the masks that the international community requires of them that it is probably not even clear to themselves if the masks have now become a true face"1254.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Consequently, public TV broadcasters program with their uncritical state-like broadcaster attitude, reporting in a positive way on the activities of state institutions by covering news conferences and organized events involving UNMIK and PISG officials. The coverage is descriptive rather then analytical, and it is generally the Prime

1250. Anderson, A 2002, op.cit. 1251. In contrast to the previous chapter where I focused on the critical capability of the Kosovo media, I will focus here on the role of the media, particularly TV (Public Broadcasting) in building an image of the state. 1252. Author´s interview with employee of the SRSG office in Kosovo,, op.cit. 1253. ICG Europe 2006. Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition. op.cit. p20 1254. Ibid. p23 340

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Minister’s recent trip somewhere, the people and places he visited, and in the end the claim that the trip was “successful.” Needless to say, analysis of how the trip was successful, and what concrete results were achieved, is mostly missing.1255 Being mainly oriented toward K-Albanians and serving their master narrative, public broadcasters like the RTK not only fail to deliver the full quota of minority language broadcasting, but also use a different “minority” studio set for the daily television news bulletins, which increases the sense of ghettoization and strengthens K-Serb relations with Serbian media, and therefore the Serb master narrative. This kind of Grand Story theatre moulds the images of power and authority for the K-Albanian elite, and generates "popular mentalities of subordination"1256 in the KAlbanian population. From here on, the ability of a future Kosovo state to remain intact will depend on its ability to produce the "cultural frame" that Clifford Geertz refers to,1257 by transforming itself to fit into a cultural frame that has resonance among the key elements of the population, in this case, among all the main communities.1258 The challenge for Kosovo society will be to create a cultural frame where there is a place for every one of its citizens. So far, this cultural frame mostly provides master narratives for the K-Albanian, nationalistic, patriarchal elite, a narrative where women are used to breed fighters and are able to "speak as a man" and the KSerbs are in the best case, not part of it, or in the worst case the enemy. The K-Serbs have their own national Serb master narratives, but presenting them in the public space in Kosovo would be playing with fire. There is understandably a critical need for change of these master narratives. These changes in master narratives may take decades, if not centuries. The only hope is that geopolitical maps oriented toward the EU and integration may be able to generate a new identity for all Kosovo people by creating new and inclusive master narratives. This will not happen by itself, but must include strong economic and modernization reform through a process of industrialization in Kosovo, which will be able to create new identities based on new values. The already enhanced territorial identity, and the new high culture available in the country should be supported as crucial for the elite who can contribute to the implementation of selfgovernment and civic duty in which democratic norms and values will be central.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

6.1.1.3 The Public Sphere and the culture of participation “People have no faith in the potential of individuals to break from the status quo and bring about change. There is instead a vague assumption that one day everyone, all at once, will change the way they live, that at the same time all parents will send daughters to high

1255. USAID Kosovo, 2004 Kosovo Media Assessment Report 2004, op.cit. p5 1256. See Thompson. Edward P. 1974, Patriarcian Society, Plebeian Culture, op.cit. pp389-890 1257. Geertz refers to a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does the opposition to it See Geertz C, 1983, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropologie, op.cit. pp 142-143 1258. See Migdal. State in Society 2001. op.cit. pp162-163 341

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

school or let sons choose their own wives. No one believes that one individual or family can challenge the force of public opinion.”1259 (Reineck Janet, 1991:1)

As previously mentioned, an examination of the public sphere is crucial for the state-building and development process in Kosovo. The public sphere is defined as the potential for debate on public issues by private people, in the form of diverse practical discourses proceeding simultaneously on varied issues, generating a space felt as egalitarian and open to all, where arguments and status decide the victors.1260 The first thing to notice in Kosovo´s public sphere is the low participation of women, especially those from rural areas. Simple data illustrate this argument. According to the Human Development Index in Kosovo, one of the poorest countries in Europe, women are much more disadvantaged than men in terms of employment, education, opportunity for choice, and active participation in public life.1261 With the level of illiteracy reaching 12%, an exceptionally high figure even among the countries of the region, Kosovo has significant space left for increasing the awareness and commitment of its decision-makers on the importance of promoting gender equality and the participation of women in the public sphere. A research study in 2005 on the situation of Kosovo women showed that many had a lack of information on their rights due to low education levels. In fact, only 15% of the interviewed people had studied, and 75% of the women were unemployed. Thus, while gender equality mechanisms exist at the political level, many women remain unaware of their rights, of how to access the protection provided by new laws, or of how to utilize the services of an ombudsperson. Thus, implementing the laws and fully realizing the potential for social change remains difficult in Kosovo.1262

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, with such depressive figures on women's education, it is not surprising that very few of them make the breakthrough to senior public and political posts where their absence at decision-making levels is clearly visible. The role of women in the social, economic, and political development process is superficial rather than substantial. Meanwhile, there is little integration of women in formal income-earning activities and in managerial positions within the public administration. Despite the fact that Kosovo has created a good legal basis for ensuring gender equality, and that in recent years decisive steps have been taken to promote gender equality, there is no satisfactory progress in implementing this legislation. According to the Law on Gender Equality, equal participation of women and men will be achieved when either

1259. Reineck, Janet, 1991 The Past as Refuge: Gender, Migration and Ideology Among the Kosova Albanians. University of California, Berkeley, cited in ESI, 2006, Cutting the lifeline, op.cit. p1 1260. See Calhoun. Craig. 1996, Habermas and the public sphere, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, p1 1261. UNDP Kosovo 2004, Human Development in Kosovo Report, p46 1262. Kosovo Centre for Gender Studies, How do kosovo women vote? Pristina 2005, op.cit. p62 342

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

gender is represented by 40% in institutional bodies or authorities.1263 The mindset of decision-makers in the current political landscape in Kosovo is one of the problems. The interviewed gender expert, in Kosovo says apropos:"...our experience with the current and past SRSGs and other international decision-makers has shown that reaching gender equality does not depend only on the establishment of institutions. More important are the individuals within those institutions and their willingness to push forward changes..." [adding] "...UN has issued several resolutions concerning gender, one of them is UNSCR 13251264 that guarantees women´s involvement in Peace, and Security issues, but even UNMIK itself is not really implementing them as UN is in itself a patriarchal structure. This can be easily seen form the fact that there have been 6 SRSG in Kosovo so far and all of them were male. The same goes with the Heads of 4 UNMIK Pillars"1265 One of the most obvious shortcomings in this context has been the lack of women´s involvement in the crucial postwar political processes in Kosovo. In 2006, out of the two government cabinets, only one minister was a woman. The best example is the Kosovo Negotiation Team at the Vienna process of negotiations for the final status settlement, which had no women included on its team. When women activists in the country criticised the team for not including women in status negotiations, they were even ridiculed for it.1266

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In fact, "the transition period" has been used as an excuse by both the UNMIK and local PISG leaders to hide behind. The former used it to justify failures in administering Kosovo, and the latter to justify failures to secure stability, sustainable peace, and equal opportunity. Both sides do not want to face and address discrimination and patriarchal systems that negatively affect gender equality in Kosovo, and instead justify their failure to address discrimination by saying:1267 "...it is not time for it....right now we need to concentrate on independence and on creating our own state. Women´s issues can wait. They are not national priority"1268

1263. Why 40% instead of 50 % represents equal participation here is simply unclear here. 1264. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 was passed on 31 October, 2000. It was seen widely as a historic achievement in promoting and supporting the public role of women and women’s organizations in war zones and postconflict situations. It defines the actions to be taken in order to protect women and ensure that women can participate at all levels of peacemaking, peace building and peacekeeping. 1265. Author´s interview with Gender Expert, UNIFEM, Pristina, Kosovo, 6 November 2006. 1266. Kosovar Gender Studies Center, 2007, Welcome to Kosovo! Part two, available at http:/ /www.kgscenter.org/

1267. See Vuniqi Luljeta 2003 Kosovo and Serb Women overcoming patriarchies and prejudices through cooperation. The Women peace Coalition Conference, Organised by SARE: Space and time for equality. 1268. Cp. Kresiky Eva, 1995 Das Gechlecht politischer Institutionen: Ergebnise einer historischen und aktuellen Spurensuche zu einer politischen Theorie des "Männerbündischen" where she states that even ...Im harmonisierten Kräfteparallelogramm der Rechtsstaatlichkeit hat Frauenpolitik...ein prinzipiell "störendes" Gewicht" p158, in Kramer Hg.1995, Politische Theorien und Ideengeschichte im Gespräch. WUV-Univ.Verl. 343

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Thus the implementation of gender equality depends on many factors that can also impede such a process. One of them is the patriarchal mindset, accompanied with the lack of a practical mechanism i.e. a budget, to implement them, leaving men in Kosovo with the simple choice of spending money on "more important things," and women in their "offices" without tables or facilities, not to mention the necessary qualifications. Imposing a legal framework without taking its implementation seriously gives the impression that gender equality is a "value" imposed by the international community that has nothing to with the reality in Kosovo, creating empty token structures. The same thing has occurred in political party structures, and at the women's forum mentioned at chapter 3.1.1.1.3.1269 The test of Kosovo’s commitment to the legal frameworks created under UNMIK’s administration will also depend on the will of its political institutions to apply the concept of gender equality throughout public and social structures, as well as to improve its own human rights accountability locally, nationally, and internationally1270. It is clear from this scenario that gender inequality has a negative impact on balancing the opportunities, living conditions, and social status of women and men, and this negatively affects participation of women in the public sphere. When they do manage to participate in the public sphere, women are still not perceived as equal partners in discussions, and the arguments of women are clearly judged from the perspective that they come from women, and not on the arguments themselves. This issue is very important, especially because it shows that Kosovo society has a long way to go before a change in mentality takes place. If this issue is not addressed appropriately, Kosovo's society will run the risk of having circa 50% of its population improperly integrated into social, political, and economic developments, and therefore excluded from the public sphere.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

A strategy of re-industrialisation, especially in the rural areas, could be a good way to start to remove Kosovo from the vicious circle of underdevelopment. An ESI report also points out that under the accumulating pressure Kosovo faces today, there is every prospect for the traditional household to disintegrate, just as happened across the rest of the Balkans, with serious consequences for rural society. This would weaken the authority of the patriarchal family, and rural society may begin to lose its traditional passivity, as discord in the family erupts into the public sphere.1271 Thus, industrialization can start a process that will give women more opportunities for education and more awareness of their rights, thus getting away from their traditional roles and looking for better possibilities.

Statement was made available to the author from Gender Expert, UNIFEM, Pristina. 6 Nov. 2006. op.cit. 1269. Here the 30% women quotas for parliament imposed by the OSCE have played a positive role, as they had help made visible the women capability in the political life. 1270. UNDP Kosovo and Riinvest, 2007 Second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo, op.cit.p27 1271. ESI Paper, 2006 Cutting the life line, Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo, op.cit. pII 344

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The situation of Kosovo’s youth is not much different. Their ability to impact decision-making structures is also very low. As mentioned above in chapter 5.2.1., this occurs for two reasons; the lack of a traditional culture of participation, coupled with Balkan patriarchal decision-making elderly family members. Consequently, young people in Kosovo have a limited engagement with their community, and do not consider their participation to be a civic responsibility. For the same reasons, institutions and actors in the same habitus do not feel obliged to respect the rights of youth to participate. The result of this is that in 2006, only 7.6% of youth participated in public discussions. Figure 19 illustrates this better.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Figure 19: Kosovo Youth participation in the Public Sphere (Source: UNDP, HDR 2006, Online)

Faced with a dismal education system, political uncertainty, and economic stagnation, many young people are opting to leave instead of deciding to be involved in improving the situation in Kosovo. In spite of the evident frustration expressed by young people from all ethnic groups in Kosovo, it is apathy rather than anger that prevails. The findings of the UNDP 2007 report back this up; more than 60% of youth believe they cannot change their communities.1272 It is clear here again how the arguments and engagement of youth, due to their "lower" status, remain of a token nature. Together with women, they merely decorate the political system in Kosovo, with the exception of the ORA party that has managed to integrate them in its decision-making structures. Thus, the public sphere in

1272.

UNDP Kosovo, 2006, Human Development Report for Kosovo, op.cit. 345

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Kosovo also has little space left for the young. It is clear that public institutions and authorities should hear and respond to young people's concerns more in the future, and establish strong relations with them. Government institutions supported by the international community should collaborate on the development of programs designed to increase opportunities for participation by young people in all important circles of Kosovo society, so that their voices are also heard. Broadly speaking, debates on the public sphere are not taking place widely in Kosovo. For example, debates on public issues show poor attendance rates even on matters of immediate importance, like municipal public debates. It seems as if there is a hidden agreement among Kosovo society that governance issues are not discussed in public, but are left in the realm of the "experts". This mentality makes people reluctant to participate in public debates, especially when they relate to complicated issues of governance. A perception of debates as useful practices in themselves, regardless of the issue under question, or as exercises in public participation that help to tackle problems in an inclusive fashion and build democratic governance from the bottom up, does not yet exist in Kosovo.1273

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

According to Andersen, one of the reasons why there has not been much progress in this field relates to the fact that the whole political environment is focussed on the status issue, and no political actors will accept any other challenges until it is settled. While the establishment of municipal councils has created some focus on local development issues, this is regarded as politically irrelevant in comparison. Thus, further research is needed to identify the changes that will take place in the public sphere when independence is granted for Kosovo. Identifying for example, whether political parties will be able to develop a diverse set of political programs for development, and be able to involve all interest groups in a rational discourse on the best solutions for all, can rally popular support. This will be a challenge for all interest groups, in particular intellectuals and politicians. Such transformation will require the recognition of current weaknesses and a determination to develop a more positive political environment by encouraging new ideas and solutions for the benefit of all Kosovars. A truly democratic political discourse, suggests Andersen, will occur only when Kosovo political parties target their campaigns outside of their own ethnic groups, and electoral popularity and support is gained across ethnic lines.1274 Finally, Kosovo desperately needs a "social contract" between the K-Albanian majority and the K-Serb and other minorities. K-Serbs that have actively withdrawn their participation from the public sphere so far will also have to do their part in this process. Considering that over the last eight years the status issue has been the main topic of public discourse in Kosovo, further research will be needed to find out how this process will effect the participation of all actors the day after the status issue is settled. Kosovo needs a public sphere that goes beyond the issue of independence and 1273. KIPRED. 2004. Local Government and Administration in Kosovo. Policy research Paper Nr. 4. Pristina, p99 1274. Andersen, Aasmund October 24 2006, Challenges for the political discourse in Kosovo, Available online under http://blog.aasmundandersen.net/ 346

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

includes the participation of all citizens independent of gender, age, or ethnic group. It needs a democratic culture where there is not only relevant content, but also free participation and clear rules of the game. This delineates the crucial features of a democratic society. 6.1.2 International players and setting 6.1.2.1 The EU: bringing "Democracy" in empty shells? The reasons that Europeans aim to export democracy to eastern Europe and beyond have been generally ascribed to the EU's persevering essential identity, where a kind of kinship-based duty treats "Europeanness" and "democratic regime type" as two sides of the same coin. Apart from the need to strengthen the EU's own democratic legitimacy, which is crucial for encouraging new candidates to move towards consolidation of their own fragile democracies while democratic policies became increasingly blurred,1275 the EU commitment to rebuild a democratic Kosovo was also driven by a concern to defend "the identity of twenty-first century Europe"1276. Notably, according to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, the West intervened in Kosovo to protect "its values, not its interests", while for European Commissioner Emma Bonino, the EU's uniquely strong focus on humanitarian assistance is not a "policy...[but] an integral part of Europe's external identity".1277

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Despite the emotional tone of these statements, and the current identity crisis of the EU, which is beyond the scope of this study, it is not uncommon that the EU and the international community in general in Kosovo reflect such attitudes. It is as if democracy and values were simply a matter of listening to the right people, in this case the IC international staff, as the only true bearers of this message. How clear it may be to the IC operating in Kosovo that democracy is not a top-down transferred value, but rather a time-consuming process that includes changes in other structures of society, particularly the economy, will be briefly illustrated here using bureaucracy as a crucial attribute. During their stay in Kosovo the IC has been trying to introduce a democratic and open society, based upon a culture of transparency and anonymous bureaucratic professionalism within a legal regime. This implies not only the introduction of new social structures and administrative routines, but also cutting the close relationship between political life and social organisation. This process has been taking place over decades in western Europe, through industrialization and an increasingly anonymous society, and they have tried to transfer it to Kosovo, which is a quite traditional society. This is the background in which the democratisation of Kosovo has to be

1275. Kaldor, Mary. and Vejvoda, Ivan., Conclusion: Towards a European Democratic Space in Kaldor and Vejvoda, (eds.), 1999, Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, London, Pinter, p169 1276. Pond, Elisabeth., 1999, Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe, Washington Quarterly, Vol.22, Nr. 4, pp 79 1277. Richard Youngs, 2004 International Democracy and the West, op.cit, pp141-142. 347

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

viewed.1278 To understand the implementation of a democratic environment in Kosovo, one needs to look at the way the bureaucracy functions in Kosovo, and at the factors allowing for the creation of a modern bureaucratic culture as present in democratic western countries today. For Bourdieu, bureaucracy is perhaps the most powerful institution of government. According to him, it is the bureaucrats, "as a state nobility", who "caused the state to come into being by stating what it should be." Furthermore, "the bureaucracy ensures that the community too has a concrete identity"1279, because it acts as an intermediary between the state and the community, implementing the state's policies and providing the public with a contact point for government. In this respect bureaucracies are particularly important in liberal democracies because they are "proof" that the state is objective, disinterested, and legitimate. This is because the bureaucracy provides for the separation of powers that is the basis of liberal democracy, and because bureaucracy is characterized by accountability, meticulous record-keeping, and attention to procedure. This means that the everyday management of society, in the hands of bureaucrats rather than politicians, seems to be objective and neutral, and not "contaminated" by the particular interests of politicians, political parties, or lobbying groups.1280

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Perceived in this sense, the IC attempts to introduce a democratic rule of law, following western values and standards, in Kosovo are faced with a huge challenge. Predominantly concerned with introducing the technical aspects of good governance and professional bureaucracy, and thus its rules and institutional structures, the IC (UNMIK, EU, etc) in Kosovo takes for granted the key knowledge that the ideology of modern bureaucratic culture, developed over hundreds of years in Western Europe, was developed alongside industrialization and the market economy. In fact, it was the free labour market that made the workforce a commodity where workers sold their labour according to demand. The large movement of workers to cities and other industrial areas due to increased demand for labour followed this process, and accompanied by an agricultural sector needing less labour because of improved technology, deracinated the people from their local communities and kinship ties in traditional society. This process made social organisation and structures more anonymous. The resulting institutions dealt with anonymous clients, and in ideal cases the bureaucrats applied abstract procedures, rules, and regulations to the case of each client in a nondiscriminatory way, and the client was nothing other than a client, no matter who s/he was.1281 Considering that the development of modern bureaucratic culture rests upon the daily practical experiences of people, in the case of Kosovo most of the time re1278. Andersen A. 2002, op.cit. 1279. Bourdieu, Pierre 1994, Rethinking the state: genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field, in Sociological Theory Journal, Vol.12, Nr. 1, p15 1280. Webb, J. et.al 2002. Understanding Bourdieu. op.cit. p98. 1281. Andersen Aasmund, 19 April 2002 , Is Kosovo Modern Enough? JAVA Magazine, Kosovo, 348

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

sources and gains come through kinship network channels. The current preservation of great patriarchal households, or zadrugas, in rural areas hints at a society based mostly in agriculture.1282 The industrialization and urbanization processes begun in the 1970s under Tito´s regime did not last more than 15 years. They were soon reversed by the Milosevic regime, with its mass expulsion of K-Albanians from public institutions, and the collapse of the Kosovo economy,1283 which brought the return of subsistence farming and agricultural society. This is reflected in Kosovo's current reigning mentality where people related through kinship ties or friendly networks that may have the power to do something for you, are contacted first, rather than applying formally to the respective state institution. For Andersen, the visible gap between people's life experience and the formal structures of society makes one ponder why people in Kosovo should choose modern bureaucratic values and norms rather than their own networks, and so commit to the ideology of modern bureaucratic culture. From the experience in Europe so far, one can say that it was reforms in the agricultural economy that imposed these experiences on people's lives.1284 The international staff and their attitudes are definitely not the voices that can express the value of such an ideology1285. Being considered "mercenaries," looking only for good salary, and less like "missionaries" looking to help, the people of Kosovo are faced with a multitude of attitudes from them, far from idealistic principles. In fact, the international staff is generally making compromises to pursue their difficult operations, rather than worrying about ideal role behaviors. Sometimes local leaders observe a lack of cultural sensitivity in the international staff, exposed by their inability to speak local languages, or unwillingness to learn them. One of them said: "You know, internationals sometimes are pretty strange from my point of view. To be honest, they are coming with their attitudes, which I respect fully of course, but we have a different mentality here"1286

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

To conclude, industrialization is the key to starting changes in social structures and attitudes. As also Andersen suggests, only through it can a modern, professional bureaucratic system really exist, and determine attitudes toward the state and the population it serves. Devotion to this system then, creates the identity of citizenship. Citizens are citizens because of their equality before the laws and regulations of state and governmental structures, while their collective prospects lie in the virtue of the bureaucrats who implement these laws and regulations. It is only through this devotion and pride that traditional kinship networks can be subjugated to bureaucratic struc1282. See ESI, 2006, Cutting the lifeline, op.cit, 1283. The property system and the economy began to collapse in 1989, when the Belgrade regime instituted increasingly discriminatory property laws on the majority Albanian population. See UNMIK Reg. No. 2001/9/2 1284. Andersen Aasmund, 19 April 2002 Is Kosovo Modern Enough? op.cit. 1285. Apart from KPS recruitment, where such ideologies are used, the rest is not widespread in Kosovo. 1286. Cited in INCORE Report: From Warlords to Peacelords op.cit.p 46 349

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tures. Without a real industrialization strategy, the "democratic" bureaucratic structures imposed by the EU and more broadly the west in Kosovo will be nothing but an "empty shell" filled with democratic rhetoric about the values of "Europeanness" and the western world. Such an approach will create situations such as those in countries of the third world where transplanted "western structures" appear modern, but under the surface are operating as traditional networks.1287

6.2 Alliances, conflicts and co-operations 6.2.1 Exploring the implications of culture in state-building in Kosovo Kosovo is not a hinterland and no-man´s land. Kosovo has its own borders. Kosovo is not without people. Kosovo has its own people, and they are not only Albanians. Kosovo is not without history. Kosovo has its own history. Kosovo is not without capital. Kosovo has its own capital. Kosovo is not without a clue on what state-ness is and it is already building its own state. But who are the citizens of such a Kosovo? Who is "the Kosovar"? Does a "Kosovar identity" exist? In the latest editions of Oxford dictionary, including the newest words, a new word has been added: Kosovar. But have we added the word "Kosovar"to our dictionaries?1288 Migjen Kelmendi, in Who is the "Kosovar"? Pristina, 2005

These words hint at the identity vacuum in which the K-Albanian elite has been finding itself recently. The lack of debate in the public sphere regarding such issues has been an obstacle towards the formation of a new identity based on a new inclusive society, different from the prewar nationalist one. In a totally different historical, political, and economic context from 1999, the people of Kosovo face huge cultural changes that few of them are able to grasp and understand.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

So, on one side there are political transformations in the form of huge changes to state structures, starting from the Serb state's repressive structures, and up to the building of new international state structures under UNMIK. In this context K-Albanians do not feel themselves victims of the state anymore, and are trying to actively participate in the state-building process, while K-Serbs have mostly refused to participate in this process, perceiving it as an Albanian enterprise. On the other side there are economic transformations, sometimes expressed in form of "wild west" capitalism in a country where the government has almost no law enforcement capacities. Both of these changes are of course transforming the society by creating new tensions. The new context, with its rearrangement of social, political, and economic structures, has also contributed to the new Kosovo identity-building process. Ideally this identity would be a kind of "coherent system of meaning" as Joel Migdal puts it, which would be crucial for the survival of the state´s image through a naturalization

1287. See Andersen, A. 2002, op.cit. 1288. Kelmendi, M. December 2005 Kush asht Kosovari?( Who is the Kosovar?) Debat (Who is the Kosovar. a Debate) in JAVA Multimedia Production. TWINS, Pristina, Kosovo.Translation form Albanian is made from the author. 350

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

process. This means that the state´s dissolution becomes unimaginable to the state´s subjects, due to the deep impact it has achieved on the structure of society and the people´s sense of meaning about themselves. In this respect, this identity could be the product of a common language, religion, history, territory, or vision for the future, whose result would be a "Kosovar" and not a K-Albanian, or K-Serb.1289 Here I will examine briefly the main symbolic systems used to mold the daily social behavior in Kosovo society, that influence to a certain extent the building of the image of the state and its patterns of domination. I will identify those elements that unite people1290, and the constellations of power generated in such a process. Furthermore, the identification of divisions that create conflicting groups, together with the identification of shared meanings that people hold about their relationships with others, the state, or their place in the world, will also be considered.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The best way to describe the beginning of a new Kosovar identity-building process is the detachment of the K-Albanian identity from the Albanian. The language debate in Kosovo is a good way to illustrate this. Previously, the usage of the Albanian language in Kosovo was an indicator of the strength of the relationship between K-Albanians and the Albanian state. This common language was referred to as ‘gjuha letrare’, and it was a kind of "hochalbanisch.1291 After the war, Hochalbanisch was introduced as the first language in all TV and radio broadcasts based in Pristina.1292 People acknowledged that proper speaking is intertwined with social status, and represents the sort of symbolic capital, in Bourdieu's terms, in which they are perceived as closer to the high Albanian culture based in Tirana. While earlier the Serbian language provided a perception of closeness to the Serbian high culture based in Belgrade for K-Serbs, it was now the Albanian language that played such a role. Perceiving their own dialect as inferior, many K-Albanians felt they had to learn to speak "proper Albanian", which meant the Hochalbanich spoken in intellectual

1289. Although I am aware of the Albanian connotation of this naming, I will use it to describe a person from Kosovo independently from its descent, and am proposing it here as a potential common Kosovo people identity label. 1290. Cp. Kalevi H. 1996, and the concept of Horizontal Legitimacy of the state. See Chapter 1.1.5 1291. Gjuha Letrare was created at a Grammar Conference in Tirana in 1972, and is predominantly based on the Tosk dialect of Southern Albania, while the North speaks the Geg dialect. This language convention is both oral and written. In formal interaction, Gjuha Letrare is used. The process is similar to that of the creation of Hochdeutsch and the debates on it, where although the term refers to standard German, it has been perceived as misleading since it collides with the real meaning, where "hoch" refers to "high" in a cultural or educational sense, while the linguistic term simply refers to the geography of Germany. I will use the term "hochalbanisch" intentionally here, not to imply that "hochalbanisch" is culturally higher, but to better illustrate the inherent symbol and power of "gjuha letrare" usage and the debate on the Albanian language in Kosovo. 1292. There were continuously employees from Albania working in TV and radio stations, newspapers, and publishing houses in Kosovo very much for this reason. They proofread and corrected the language that Kosovo-Albanians produced. 351

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

elite circles in Albania. This attitude had almost adoring notes to it.1293 Taking into account the conformity towards the "Albanian Nation" and the "National Question", discussing any issue that dealt with challenging its application in Kosovo was until recently a very sensitive topic with connections to the political elite. Considering the unresolved status issue in the forefront of every discussion, the use of "proper Albanian" may be interpreted here as holding the power of the national question because, to put it in Bourdieu's terms, by controlling "legitimate language" through the structures of "meaning-making" and understanding, the K-Albanian political elite were able to ensure their legitimacy with K-Albanians on the basis of the "national question". In fact in 2002, the head of the PDK (the KLA-derived party) said in a debate on the identity of the Kosovo people initiated by Kelmendi, the K-Albanian publicist cited at the beginning of this unit, "The Kosovar identity does not exist, I don´t give up my flag for a state. I love the state and the flag".1294 Hence with the usage of the "legitimate" language comes the symbolic power which "brings things into being by naming them, and by making people see and believe a particular vision of the world".1295 Briefly, using "proper Albanian" meant simply serving the "national question", an approach used by some political leaders to legitimize their power.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In 2006, during discussions with several intellectuals, the author noticed the beginning of a debate within intellectual circles on the Kosovar identity, concerning hochalbanisch use in Kosovo. These emerging new circles, mostly made up of returning emigrants and students from EU and US universities, were playing an important role as mediators between the elderly kinship-based political culture and the international elite in the process of introducing democracy and governance according to international and European standards. The debate on the Kosovo identity elicited by these young intellectuals catalyzed the process of change, launching an identity redefining process for K-Albanians. Between western citizenships and UNMIK passports, many of these young people are trying to find their place in a world that seems to be currently somewhere between Albanian surrogate language and symbols, and an international interim peacekeeping mission territory with no clear future. Andersen explains this change in the attitude toward hochalbanisch as follows. Before the war, K-Albanians identified their language with hochalbanich, despite its slight difference with their everyday language, for a reason; the Serb regime with its anti-Albanian agenda generated an "external threat" which in turn engendered a "resistant culture" against all that is Serbian. What followed was a mobilisation of Albanian national feelings. With the NATO Intervention, Kosovo had its own govern1293. The author, being a native Albanian speaker, when using (hochalbanisch) standard Albanian during her stay in Kosovo to communicate with K-Albanians, has often been told how "beautiful" that sounds. 1294. Hashim Thaci, 20 Mai 2002, in Kelmendi M, 2005, Kush asht Kosovari, JAVA Journal op.cit.. p 77 1295. Bourdieu, Pierre 1991, Language & Symbolic Power, Harvard University Press, Polity, p164 352

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

mental PISG institutions, out of reach of Belgrade and under the protection of international institutions. In such conditions, to put it in Andersen's words: "the basis for strong conformity in stressing ethnic ties to the "motherland" (as opposed to the threatening "colonizing" Serbia) seemed to fall apart. As many anthropological studies have concluded: the less threatening "they" are, the less unification will exist among "us".1296 In fact, many of these young intellectuals who some years before would have felt guilty for not speaking "such a beautiful Albanian language" began to feel proud of their dialect. While this is true for the young elite, further research is needed to analyze how the processes of identity change has affected the broader masses of the K-Albanian population. On the Serb side, the problem of Serbian and K-Serbian language does not seem to be present.1297 The national feeling of belonging to Serbia proper is still very strongly present. During the author´s research in Kosovo, during an interview with a moderate K-Serb leader in Mitrovica, it come out that a certain process of recognizing the new reality, where Kosovo is no longer a part of Serbia, seemed to have been initiated. Here again further research will be needed to identify if such a "motherlanddetachment" process has also been taking place on the Serbs' part.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The flag discourse as mentioned in Chapter 6.1.1.2 remains along similar lines for both sides. The example of flags hanging symbols in the offices of Kosovo’s leaders, until 2006, are starkly illustrative of the different political philosophies and objectives they represent. In the room of a leader of one of K-Albanian parties, the Albanian national flag of a double-headed eagle on a red background hangs. The standard in the office of one of the K-Serb leaders bore the Serbian national colors of red, white, and blue.1298 Initial attempts by international administrators since the conflict’s end in 1999, to impose neutral symbols acceptable to all of Kosovo’s communities were unsuccessful, but later on the K-Albania elite were much more involved in finding a new flag for Kosovo. A real debate was taking place in late 2006, when the author visited Kosovo. This can not be said for the K-Serb leaders, who with Serbian support continue to hang Serbian flags in their offices, without showing the slightest willingness to change.1299 The flags clearly represent symbols of belonging to both populations. While most K-Serbs acknowledge that their community is also part of the "Kosovar" category, or "Kosovas" in Serbian, some of their leaders have indicated that they will not support the development of a Kosovo territorial identity, as they fear that this will support K-Albanian claims for independence. On the other hand, most K-Albanians see union with Albania as unrealistic for Kosovo today. Despite some popular senti-

1296. Andersen, Aasmund, 2002, Transforming Ethnic Nationalism in Kosovo, op.cit, 1297. The author is not aware of dialect changes that might be between Serbian language and and the K-serbian one. 1298. Gordon. Peake, et.al. From warlords to peacelords. INCORE Report, op.cit. p39 1299. The Kosovo flag has also been facing a similar process. See Chapter 6.1.1.2 on the Pubilc Ritual and the role of the new Kosovo Flag as a detaching symbol from the Albanian one. 353

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

ment behind it, union with Albania enjoys very little support in the population, as expressed by its party backing.1300 Yet, the mass interaction between the two Albanian societies grows, with Kosovo’s educational, cultural, and linguistic inferiority being apparent. Programs from Albanian private TV channels attract many more K-Albanian viewers than the contrary. Feeling linguistically inferior due to their dialect, which few can write competently, many K-Albanians do regard the Albanian flag as theirs and are likely to perceive any new symbols as an annoying imposition.1301 Regarding this, an ICG report notes: "statehood is not yet a fully imagined concept for Kosovo Albanians, with most of them having yet to make the leap from a generality of desired “independence” to the specific requirements of constructing a new state.1302 Education is also a crucial area for creating a common shared meaning system in society. The problem so far has been that K-Albanian kids are using Albanian schoolbooks, which are not free of mythology, and K-Serb schools use Serbian ones. It has been mentioned before in this study that the need for a common curriculum for all students in Kosovo remains the next challenge in building a Kosovar identity. One central element, touching the cultural tradition is the teaching of history. Even in Scandinavia, it took a very long time before the history taught in one country became at least roughly compatible with that taught in others. This was a already problem in the former Yugoslavia, where the history defined by the Communist Party with its emphasis on "brotherhood and unity" increasingly clashed with the collective memories of the Serb, Croat, Moslem, and other communities.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Such memories are social facts, defined by their very existence, which does not necessarily mean that they are "true". They may differ little, much, or totally from what professional historians tell us, if they agree at all, and they may of course be manipulated by state authorities as well as intellectuals.1303A major stumbling block for the reopening of Albanian-language schools in Kosovo as agreed several years ago between Rugova and Belgrade was that they were to follow the school curriculum of Serbia, which was unproblematic in mathematics, but highly problematic in history. A new version of that problem has reappeared in Kosovo now.1304

1300. A September, 2005 opinion poll showed that while support for union with Albania had doubled over a three month period, it amounted to only 10%. See UNDP, 2005, Early Warning System Fast Facts at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/ publications/publications.asp. and Vakti I flamurit te Kosoves Debate website at http://groups.googlegroups.com/group/ Pristina-team/. 1301. KTV news interviews, November 2005, and “Vakti I flamurit te Kosoves” website. 1302. International Crisis Group Europe 2006, The Challenge of Transition, op.cit. p 20 1303. The problem has re-emerged in a different from in almost all parts of Former Yugoslavia. The dwindling Serb minority in East Slavonia has its children in schools where they are taught the official Croatian version of (especially recent) history, and this is one of the reasons for its dwindling. While on the other side the Serb, Croat and Moslem schools in Bosnia- Herzegovina have separate history books. 1304. Hakan Wiberg, et.al. 1999, Roles of Civil Society: the Case of Kosovo/a, op.cit. p.66 354

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Having two parallel systems of education, the Serbs and Albanians are faced with two parallel histories. If there is to be a common curriculum, it should be sensitive to the specific cultural identities of different ethnic groups and serve as a glue for these different identities. The building of an inclusive education system that would accommodate the ethnic and cultural identities of all communities, including their history, language, and religion, is crucial in such a process. Here it is clear that textbooks tailored to communities’ cultures need to be free from ethnic prejudice, and should aim at establishing interethnic tolerance in Kosovo and inclusion for all.1305 A common curriculum for all communities, giving children of different ethnic backgrounds having a common base of knowledge, is the first step in developing a unified educational system and building common everyday realities based on personal practices, perceptions, and experiences instead hate-fueled mythologies. The same can be said about the media as a meaning-making structure, that is being more a force for division, with its language specific times, rather than shared meaning. The current situation offers few prospects for the future.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the area of religion, the issues look even dimmer. Religion, together with language as mentioned above, are key cultural markers containing central definitions of reality, or even defining reality for their societies. From this point of view, K-Serbs and K-Albanians have always lived in essentially different cultures. Most other internal divisions in European countries it is either language or religion, but rarely both, that defines otherness.1306 The Serbian and Albanian languages are mutually incomprehensible. A Serb is almost by definition at least nominally an Orthodox Christian, with the exception of the few Catholic Serbs. Like virtually all other groups, the Serbs have been largely secularized, at least until recently. K-Albanians are predominantly Moslem with the exception of few Catholic and an even smaller Orthodox minority, but with a high degree of secularization as well. For a long time this defined commonality with the Turkish rulers, until Albanian nationalism started to appear at the end of the last century, with language rather than religion as main emphasis. The bonds that have existed between local K-Serb and K-Albanian communities however have been across cultures rather than bonds defined by a common culture. Theoretically, one could conceive of two criss-crossing groups in Kosovo as cultural mediators; the Serbian-speaking but Moslem Gorani, and the Orthodox Christian Albanians. Both minorities are too small, however, to have any significant influence.1307 The common ground could here again be intensified secularization, generating a common basis for society to interact and creating its own new meaning system. This would require a radical industrialization strategy, especially for rural areas in Kosovo. With the absence of industrialization in Kosovo, rural areas are left to subsistence farming, similar to 17th century feudal Europe. This turns out to be the perfect situation for radical religious agents (orthodox or Muslim) to exploit by providing a cer1305. See Project on Ethnic Relations, (PER). 2007 Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo Report, Paper presented at the PER Conference, Prishitina,. p16 1306. Other exceptions we find Greek and Turkish Cypriots, or Estonians and Russians. 1307. Wiberg, H. 1999, op.cit. 355

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

tain economic security, in terms of eating and clothes as well as a sense of identity, which are both shortage goods in rural Kosovo.1308 It is clear that these processes are intensifying the divisions in Kosovo Society. A good example is a prominent KSerbian religious leader who is quoted to have said, “There is no such thing as Kosovars, there are only Albanians and Serbs"1309 The basic question of what will be the ultimate nature of the Kosovar identity remains open. As Migdal suggests, the more diverse and heterogeneous the array of pressures that components of the state encounter on different levels, especially strong pressures applied by multifarious domestic and foreign social forces, the less likely it is that the state will end up with complementary behavior by its many parts, and the less likely it is to successfully convey a coherent system of meaning"1310 This situation applies to Kosovo in its fullest form. There are too many arrays of pressure in the current Kosovo society, all pushing in too many different directions to convey a coherent system of meaning. The buzzword of the international community in such a case is "multi-ethnicity", ignoring the real implications of such an outcome. As the international community faces the challenge of defining Kosovo’s future, it must face also the fact that the multicultural diversity of the province is not a just a top-down formula or a technical detail of the mission, but a process that involves many other process from other fields, particularly the political and economic. The international community, primarily the European Union, should take this issue very seriously and focus its efforts on reestablishing the multiethnic character of Kosovo in order to discredit the belief that the Balkans are a region of inherent ethnic and religious hatred. It is now a great imperative to emphasize the notion of a new identity for the people of Kosovo, a Kosovar identity that will incorporate all minorities and that stress the idea of Kosovar citizenship. This new sense of identity could serve as a new definition for all Kosovo inhabitants, a harmonizing alternative to the divisive ethnic and religious backgrounds. Although it sounds almost impossible so far, Kosovo's people need to be provided with an alternative vision.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

For Andersen, territorial identity could be part of a "Kosovar'" identity, providing a basis for counterbalancing ethnic identities. This could be enhanced by good governance and functioning self-governance institutions able to deliver competent bureaucratic services as mentioned in the previous unit.1311 The state must service its population regardless of ethnicity and political affiliation, and take a supra-ethnic role by creating a homogenous culture.1312

1308. On this issue see KIPRED 2005. Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans? Policy Research Paper Nr 2, Pristina 1309. Andersen, A. 2002 Nationalism in Kosovo: The potential of the ‘Kosovar’ identity, available at http://www.aasmundandersen.net/docs/Kosovar_Identity_feb02_TexasPCA.htm#_ftn6 1310. Migdal Joel 2001, State in society, How states and societies transform and constitute one another op.cit p124 1311. See Chapter 6.1.2.1 of this study 1312. Aasmund Andersen, 2002 Nationalism in Kosovo, op.cit 356

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The already begun discourse and debate among the Kosovo elite on who is "kosovar," cited at the beginning of this unit, has already promoted reflections about the "Kosovar" identity and the potential of an independent state integrating all its ethnic communities. But this will not happen with a magic wand. Economic development and industrialization policies, particularly in rural areas, will encourage secularism and contribute to a more educated society capable of questioning nationalist mythologies. Furthermore, it will emphasize the beneficial aspects of harmonious interethnic coexistence, in order to convince people that they can and should work together towards the achievement of common and mutually beneficial goals.1313 Promoting an EU-oriented identity among Kosovo's peoples could be the new vision that all people of Kosovo identify with and share, but this is just a proposal. The issue of the Kosovar identity must be further researched and will be a kind of niche in identity studies to come. A future where people of Kosovo will refer to themselves as "Kosovars" before they mention their ethnic descent identity will take a long time.

6.3 Security and the cultural domain Finally, no discussion of culture in Kosovo would be complete without a discussion of security. The ethnic divide in the Balkans is closely tied to religious differences, but as the International Crisis Group suggests, K-Albanians do not define their national identity through religion, but through their language. They have a relatively relaxed approach towards observance of the forms of Islam. In fact Islamic fundamentalism, as understood with respect to the Middle East, has very little resonance in Kosovo".1314

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This does not mean that religious differences do not feature in ethnic violence in Kosovo, where Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries were natural targets for K-Albanian protesters during 2004 March riots. Some 35 religious buildings were destroyed during this time, and only intervention by the international presence and their cooperation with K-Albanian local leaders, who called on the masses to calm down, managed to save the rest1315. The burning of Orthodox churches and monasteries in March 2004 made their protection a prominent final status issue. Even Kai Eide´s report gave extensive attention to the issue. Given the rigid anti-independence line followed by some of the senior church hierarchy members, K-Albanians associate the Orthodox´s Church revival in the 1980s and 1990s with the Milosevic regime, and call the houses of worship built in Kosovo during that period, “political churches”. Some K-Albanian politicians verge upon justifying their destruction in the March 2004 riots, suggesting

1313. Ioannis Natsis, U.N. in Kosovo: 1999-2005, An Assessment of international administration, ELIAMEP Postgraduate Notes, PNO6.02, p12 1314. See also the International Crisis Group Europe 2001, December Kosovo: a strategy for Economic Development, Report No. 123. Brussels, p3 1315. See ZERI Newspaper, Special Edition, Sekretet Poltike te Kosoves ne vitet 2001-2004, 19 October 2004, Pristina, p19 357

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

that only these new churches that were targeted.1316 This view is that if the Orthodox Church wishes to gain acceptance in Kosovo, it must shed the Milosevic-era infrastructure, so that its true spiritual identity can emerge.1317 Although these statements may include some facts, there is no reason for anyone to burn the cultural symbols and heritage of others. In fact, the Orthodox Churches are as much a cultural heritage of the K-albanians as of the K-serbs, considering their territorial position and the historical intertwining of these two ethnic groups. Moreover, exercising religion is one of the fundamental human rights, or a basic capability to put it in Sen's terms. Religion is not a luxury, and when it is in the form of religious buildings, it is a cultural heritage that providing a feeling of continuity for people in their lives. It also may have the power to inspire hope and remind people of their creativity. Therefore their destruction is a cruelly decisive way to assert primacy and control, and becomes a symbol of the brutality and insanity of war. Thus, in attempting to reestablish a peaceful coexistence in the face of ethnic rivalries in Kosovo, protection of such cultural heritage requires special attention, and will be perceived as an integral part of the transition from war to sustainable peace, and as a prerequisite for economic and social development.1318 The necessity of the rule of law as the sine qua non for allowing citizens to apply their basic capabilities is crucial at this point. Being aware of its vulnerability in Kosovo, Father Sava Janjic, the Prior of Decan Monastery, warns that, "Whatever is decided about Kosovo’s status, there will need to be an international security force to guard [Orthodox Churches]..."1319 Without the rule of law and security, there will not be a peaceful common existence for the people of Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Another pressing issue in Kosovo is the concern over terrorism, which is neither naive nor unfounded. As the case of Afghanistan shows, fundamentalist terrorism is born out of failed states and economic desperation, not simply out of Islam. Such potent ingredients that support the growth of fundamentalism are actually present in Kosovo.1320 In fact, a study in 2005 by the Kosovo think tank KIPRED suggested that due to the neglect of rural K-Albanian communities, and the rigid stereotypes many international administrators have about Islam and its practitioners, a threat of Islamic radicalism may be emerging in the heart of Kosovo. According to this stud,y UNMIK and the OSCE, by blindly deferring care of the educational, housing, and nutritional needs of much of Kosovo’s rural population to organizations that promote the intolerant teaching of Islam-Wahhabism, have put the future stability of the region in danger. This neglect on the part of the international community, argue the authors, may

1316. See the interview with ex-Prime Minister Kosumi on the subject in the BIRN film “Has anyone got a plan?”, op.cit. 1317. International Crisis Group Europe Report, 2006 Challenges of transition, op.cit. p29 1318. WB, 1998, The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, op.cit. p32 1319. The Economist 2005, Rendering unto Caesar, 10 September, p.44 1320. Author´s interview with employee of the Security Sector Assessment Team, UNDPKosovo, op.cit. 358

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

be permitting the creation of social and cultural enclaves that will replicate much of what happened to Afghan refugees living in Pakistan during the 1980s; in other words the Talibanization of the K-Albanian Muslim population.1321 Here the slow pace of educational improvements in the province has allowed conservative Islamic traditions, funded by groups from Saudi Arabia, to gain a foothold1322 in Kosovo. For KIPRED, the fear of religious extremism in the province is present but not critical. Although Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have invested heavily in reconstruction throughout Kosovo, and in cases insisted that a mosque be the first building erected with money donated for village improvement, the secular culture of Muslims in the region has remained.1323 What is relevant for this study is that this source makes clear the economic reasons that people form rural areas get involved in such activities. Faced with few prospects for their future in terms of economic opportunity, education, and status, they are left with few choices. As a Kosovo journalist rightly notes: "The stakes for religious radicalization are as present as the possibility of radicalization for political or other social reasons."1324 Here it is the rule of law and economic security that are missing. There is now every justification for serious efforts by the EU to ensure that Kosovo comes through its current period of transition.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The issue of religiously inspired terrorism weighs heavily on the minds of many Europeans. This concern, coupled with the close relationship between ethnic divides and religious differences in the Balkans, and their fragile nature, adds to security concerns and reinforces the importance of seeing the region through its period of transition. The EU will have to assume a leading role and finish what the wider IC started, both politically and economically, by propping up the fragile democracies it helped create. The remaining international institutions, and the EU specifically, must demonstrate a collective vision for Kosovo based on the needs of the people, and focus on promoting good governance and rule of law.1325 Kosovo has been put on notice to create strong institutions, where the security of applying its own culture is guaranteed and where extremist religion is not the only way out of the misery. This notice has come at the political level, but it will only bring results if the economic and social climates are also improved.

1321. KIPRED 2005. Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans? op.cit. 1322. One example cited in the study concerns the Islamic Endowment Foundation’s support for 30 Koranic Schools in rural areas of Kosovo See KIPRED 2005. Political Islam Among the Albanians, op.cit. pp. 8 – 13. 1323. Welch A. 2006, Achieving Human Security After Intrastate Conflict, op.cit. p226 1324. Cited in Youth Despair of Decent Future in Kosovo, by Ferizi, Sokol 2007 in Moving On, Available in the following web site http://fellowship.birn.eu.com/movingon/articles/ ferizi.eng.html 1325. Welch, A. 2006. A successful Security Pact: European Union policy in South East Europe. op.cit. p201 359

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

6.4 Conclusions In this unit I focused on the implications of culture for the state-building and development process taking place in Kosovo. Based on Joel Migdal´s theoretical approach, and a to a certain extent on Bourdieu´s theory of bureaucracy and language, I examined the process of generation of an image of the state as a common shared meaning system that creates "mind maps" where people define their place in relation to the state and to the world. First, I focused on the law a factor that contributes to shared meaning in the society and examined the different legal systems operating in Kosovo. Due to too many forces available in Kosovo society now, a coherent system of meaning is simply not present. The availability of at least three kinds of laws, all with their own different system of meaning, is at best confusing. Furthermore, the role of the public ritual in shaping the image of the state in Kosovo through master narratives used in public ceremonies was examined, including; 1) popular music; 2) the mother-child relationship as a symbol of national vulnerability; 3) the flag, 4) mental geopolitical maps, and finally 5) the role of TV and its ability to reproduce political conformity scenarios. With the exception of geopolitical maps that hint at an EU future, the rest of the narratives are at their best contradictory.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The public sphere and the potential for debate on public issues by private people in Kosovo, in a space where arguments not status decide, was also explored. Here it was made clear that Kosovo´s public sphere needs to go beyond its independence and allow extended participation by all citizens independent of gender, age, or ethnic group. Kosovo needs a democratic culture, where there is not only relevant content, but also clear rules of the game. The role of the international community was also investigated, focusing on its role in democratization in Kosovo. The urgent need for a coherent industrialization strategy and market economy, from the EU was exposed. Lastly, I explored the potential for a "common kosovar identity" in Kosovo, and focused on the common shared symbols and master narratives in Kosovo society like language, religion, education, history, and the EU. The study showed that the EU at the moment has the highest potential to contribute to this common identity and have an impact to it, while the rest will take a long time to change. The same was valid in the security field where the presence of the EU in Kosovo could help Kosovo to confront its challenges by strengthening fragile Kosovo institutions and by offering needed economic support. This will give Kosovo not only a hand for now, but will provide for a future that Kosovo and its people desperately need. Finally, apart from a real engagement of the EU in Kosovo, time is needed to allow for cultural processes to evolve in a constructive way.

360

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

7. Overview of Main findings The underlying premise of this study was to serve a twofold purpose: to point out the low cross-fertilization in the scientific discourse on theories of state-building and development, and to show the benefits of using a combined approach at the empirical level where the implementation of corresponding policies takes place. Accordingly, in the first section this work considered the theoretical implications of these processes, while in the second section it examined the tangible implications of the selected theoretical approaches in the case of Kosovo. The author will now present the main findings at the theoretical level and show the implications of these findings in the case of Kosovo by predicting the estimated sustainability of these processes. To conclude, based on the experience of this study a prognosis will be made for future statebuilding and development efforts.

7.1 State-building and Development: key correlation points The main hypothesis posited in this study stated that state-building and development are strongly correlated with each other, such that only if they are positioned in a complementary interrelationship involving the political, economic, social, and cultural domains, where the prerequisite for any evolution is a minimum level of security, will the outcomes be sustainable.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The theoretical discussion presented here describes a state-building process where state structures and institutions in the military, political, sociocultural, and economic domains are built and developed while allowing for the smooth implementation of state practices. This discussion described development as a process encompassing the range of political, economic, social, and cultural progress to which peoples involved in these processes aspire. Both these terms represent interwoven processes composed of multidimensional entities that are interrelated not only with each other, but also with the context where they operate. In view of that, all forms of development are perceived as related, by taking place within a historical context in which influences from outside the society impinge on the processes of social change inside the society, just as change in the different aspects of the society, the economy, the polity, and the social order all impinge on each other. Hence the crucial mechanisms in each of these entities should be identified in order to channel the processes of state-building and development in the intended direction. The set of variables selected for the examination of political development focuses on the mechanisms of political choice, e.g. the political parties, as essential features of a modern and stable democracy, associated with “checks and balances” between authority structures. In order for these mechanisms to be more than simply decoration on the political landscape, they should be functional through their capacity to constructively meet the challenge of endogenous stresses and strains in their political context. The political culture materialized through the process of political development is then the remaining crucial variable in the political domain. It will reflect the 361

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

fundamental attitudes and personality characteristics of members of the political system, and determine the manner in which they accept the privileges and bear the responsibilities of a democratic political process. The theoretical assumptions for analyzing development indicate a perception of political development that is intimately associated with other aspects of social, economic, and cultural change. Any feature which may be relevant for explaining the power potential in a country must also reflect the state of the economy and of the social order. It would be erroneous to try to isolate political development from other forms of development. Although to a limited extent the political sphere may be autonomous from the rest of the society, for sustainable political development to take place, it must happen within the context of a multidimensional process of social change in which various segments or domains of the society can evolve simultaneously.1326

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

In the theoretical discussion of the economic domain, it became clear that an economy is hindered by weak state institutions and their ineptitude. Being in favor of a market mechanism as an advantageous possibility, the development debate here should not be posited as pro or con market mechanisms. The existence of market mechanisms per se is not the problem, rather it is more a matter of how prepared a society is to make use of "market transactions, unconstrained concealment of information, or unregulated use of activities that allow the powerful to capitalize on a asymmetrical advantage."1327 This is where the relevance of the state becomes evident, allowing markets to function better, with greater fairness and adequate supplementation, and to decide if the market’s overall achievement is of benefit to everyone. This is of course also conditional on the political and social arrangements of a country. That market mechanisms are necessary in a global world inhabited by homo economicus was thus tacitly implied in this study. The center of attention turned thus to the need for an enabling environment for the market mechanisms with strong state institution taking part, allowing for optimal function and sustainability. Accordingly, the provision of conditions for an adequate market economy is one side of the coin, whereas state control is solidly required in a market economy in order to allow for a fair distribution of profit in the society and to protect the vulnerable. Because even when the need for "economic reform" in favor of allowing more room for markets is paramount, non-market facilities also require careful and determined public action.1328 Thus the availability and capacity of market mechanisms becomes derivative to the state institutions' capacity to support such mechanisms. Such institutions include not only public administration and the education and health policies of the government, but also the judiciary and its enforcement capacity, along with parliament’s capability to initiate laws that sustain economic development. Hence, any attempts to develop the economic domain should focus first on strengthening the state, particu-

1326. Pye, L. March 1965, pp. 11. op.cit. 1327. Sen, A. K..1999, p142 1328. Sen, A. K..1999, pp142-143 362

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

larly its competence in law enforcement and its human development agenda. Considering that states and markets do not operate only inside national borders but in a global context, the crucial role of international actors and available safety nets in this domain becomes clear. Civil associations active in the social domain can contribute to the effectiveness and stability of a democratic government, both because of their internal effects on individual members and because of their external effects. The strength of civil society associations in a pre-transitional context, and their density post-transition therefore play a key role in the deepening of political freedoms and civil liberties among transitional citizens, and lead to better institutional performance. Thus, while historicallyrooted dense norms and networks of civic engagement have fostered economic growth, civic associations are powerfully associated with effective public institutions. This is why social capital, including norms of trust, reciprocity, networking, bonding, bridging, and gender, bears the potential to contribute positively to the social development of a country. Embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, social capital bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy rather than the reverse. A strong society means a strong economy, and while economics does not predict civics, civics does predict economics, much better than economics itself. It becomes then consequential to argue that a strong society means a strong state.1329

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The development of social capital requires not only the active and willing engagement of citizens within a participative community, but it must occur with the support of governmental authorities.1330 As a result, the best way for a government to increase social capital is indirect involvement in supporting its engendering processes. It is therefore relevant in this domain to explore the nature and extent of a community's social relationships, the civil society, the press, and the media and their attitudes toward the government, as well as the capability of the government to foster social capital. If the context is dominated by an international presence, then the influence of these actors on the conditions for social capital creation is unavoidable. These findings can be extended in the context of fourth-wave democracies,1331 based on the assumption that social capital can serve as a tool to examine the ambivalent causality of the political, economic, and cultural domains on the social. The cultural domain is another dimension that determines state-building and development processes. Studying the parts of the state in their environment, and the relationships of these parts with each other and the society is crucial. The more diverse and heterogeneous the arrays of pressure that various components of the state encounter at different levels, especially when strong pressures are applied by multifarious domestic and foreign social forces, the less likely it is that the state ends up with complementary behavior by its many parts, and the less likely it is that it can success-

1329. Putnam, 1993, p 176 1330. See Bullen & Onyx. 1998. pp. 49; Taylor, M. 2000. pp:1019-1035, and Warner, M. 1999, pp373-393 1331. See. Tusalem R, F. 2007, pp361–386 363

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

fully convey a coherent system of meaning.1332 A common system of meaning is crucial for the survival of the state’s image, meaning that its dissolution becomes unimaginable to the state’s subjects due to the deep impact the state has achieved on the structure of society and people’s sense of meaning about themselves. The structure of society and the meaning people generate will affect the state and its chances for survival. The state is thus placed in a social context and the nature of state-society relations can "bolster or batter" the cohesion of the state and the meaning generated through it. The generation of law is determinant to a broadly shared meaning for society, as it creates a social solidarity that improves conditions for the state’s cohesion. State law is perceived by the population as the delineation of right from wrong, and becomes a critical process that brings together diverse groups with diverse concerns into a single political force. Examining the law as a generator of shared meaning in society is a fundamental process for studying changes in state and society.1333 The sharing of public rituals between state and society shows that despite their regular failures, states still overcome their inefficiencies and difficulties in meeting their central goals due to state loyalty and support, not through efficient allocation of public goods, but by blurring the line between state officials and citizens through the use of public rituals. Its examination can explain the ability of the state to remain intact through the production of a "cultural frame" that makes people connect themselves to the sacred in society through a set of rituals, and transform so as to fit into a cultural frame that has resonance among key elements of the population.1334 The focal point for this analysis then becomes the role of master narratives in the public ritual, with its implications for the concerned society.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Finally, the ongoing renegotiating of the rules of informal behavior in the public sphere is another factor crucial to the state´s ability to remain intact, strongly influencing its image outside of its direct control, and a vital element in fashioning shared meaning and creating social unity, which naturalizes and sustains the state. Through these three practices it is possible to identify potential changes of meaning in society, which can induce the state to adapt to a reconstitution of the society. The process of cultural identity-building is necessary for states to survive, as there must be a cultural frame that allows the state to create ties to people’s hearts and meaning in the society, giving people self-worth and a sense of identification. This process of "heart-binding" is the only way for states to become naturalized and for their disappearance to become unimaginable. This implies a realm of feeling and implicit understanding that goes beyond rational calculation. In this rationale, the provision of security appears to be a precondition for development in political, economic, social, and cultural terms, as illustrated by the concept of "security first" offered in this study. The interdependence exposed by this study

1332. Migdal J. S. 2001, p124 1333. Ibid. p154-157 1334. Ibid. pp162-163 364

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

between the three core state functions of security, welfare, and representation (see Fig.9), reiterates that these issue-areas are de facto closely related to each other. Security is contemplated in this context as a precondition for both welfare and representation, which are representative of the social, economic, and political domains. Its value comprises the protection of physical existence against internal and external threats. In the internal dimension, security borders on the domain of rule in which opportunities for exercising freedom and for political participation are allocated among individuals, which secures the preservation of the physical existence of the individual and serves his advancement, respectively. With regard to material needs, the latter is provided for in the domain of economic well-being, by means of the allocation of economic gains as well as opportunities for achieving such gains.1335 An increase in welfare reduces conflicts externally and provides the necessary resources to provide security within the state, by increasing the capacity and propensity for political participation, prolonging the life expectancy of democracies, and thus ultimately affecting the representation function of states.1336

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

A real correlation consists, therefore, with the way in which individual and civil rights, and citizenship and minority rights are guaranteed within a state. Consequently, promoting the representation function of states in the context of state-building, and going beyond the simple promotion of democracy, implies the creation of an accountable government that overcomes social divisions through reconciliation. It also means building a genuine political community through a social contract, and educating citizens on peace and justice. Representation allows for peaceful external relations and domestically for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts, contributing to optimal solutions of redistribution problems within society and the state, while adequate representation promotes economic growth and social justice, attracts more investment, and makes aid more effective.1337 The complex nature of these interlinking elements shows the need for a nuanced approach, and the human security agenda of state-building and development programs must be seen as a parallel strategy that aims to establish both human development and human security, bridging concerns for security and welfare. The locus where these processes operate was expected to be institutional. Institutions were examined under the assumption that structure and agency interrelate with each other and are part of the same habitus, in Bourdieu´s terms. On one hand, structures themselves are not as rigid as they are made to appear, but can adapt to meet changing demands, often in incremental and routine ways. On the other hand, they are clearly shaped and modified by the behavior of the individuals who occupy them. Thus, despite agents’ inability to always act autonomously, and the influence of the structures' "embedded" values, behavior is also based in part on individual volition and self-interest.1338 Most of human social activity is organized and regulated by so1335. 1336. 1337. 1338.

Migdal Joel S. 2001, op.cit pp162-163 See Lipset, S.M.1959, Putnam, R. D, et al. 1993, Przeworski, A. 2000 Schwarz, R. 2005, op.cit Cp. Granovetter, M. 1985, and Fukuyama, F. 1995 op.cit. 365

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

cially (re-)produced rules and systems of rules that are universal within human collectivities and are often accompanied by mobilization, the exercise of power, and by conflict and struggle. Social rules are subsequently not just transcendental abstractions, but are embodied in the practices and institutions of groups and collectivities of people, just as language, customs, codes of conduct, and family are, as well as in different types of organizations such as business enterprises, government, etc.1339 Thus human agents, together with groups, organizations, communities, and other collectives they are part of, are the producers, carriers, and reformers of institutions. They interpret, implement, adapt, and transform them, sometimes as cautiously as possible, at other times radically. Such behavior explains much of cultural and institutional dynamics. This is why major struggles in human history revolve around the (re-)formation of core economic, administrative, social, and political institutions of society, or particular rules regimes defining social relationships, authority, obligations, and duties, including the "rules of the game" in these and related domains. Social actors make use of roles and institutions, which are the basis on which they organize and regulate their interactions, interpret and predict their activities, and develop and articulate accounts of their affairs by carrying on critical discourses.1340 Institutions are thus key for contextualizing conditions as well as being products of social interaction.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The case of modern institutions illustrates this assumption at its best. Such institutions as government agencies, democratic associations, and markets are organized and regulated in relatively separate autonomous but interdependent domains. Each are distinguishable from the others on the basis of their distinctive rule complexes making up specific moral orders and operating in terms of their own "rationality". Here the actors engaged in an institutional domain are oriented towards the rule system that has legitimacy in this context, in order to utilize it in coordinating, regulating, and talking about their social transactions.1341 The nature of the endogenous or exogenous institution will than determine the rule system used in the local setting, which is essential for analyzing their effects. If the field of interaction is composed of actors coming from different rule systems, then a so-called “area of interaction” emerges with its own rule system. Operating in a "local setting" requires knowledge of the context involved. Knowing the traditions of a country, its history, social context, and related geographical information are crucial for any intervention effort. The institutional framework of the local setting creates incentives and disincentives for the actors involved. Depending on the distribution of power and interest, they undertake activities that determine outcomes called transaction costs. There are five identified levels in this area of interaction for the categorization of human actors and their levels of interaction, starting with supervisors to foreign social forces from international systems. The final out-

1339. Baumgartner, Th. Burns, T, DeVille, Ph. 2002, p193 1340. Ibid 1341. Machado N., Burns, T, 1998, op.cit 366

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

come is an analytical framework that identifies the most crucial mechanisms for evaluating institutions' and actors' behavior during state-building and development processes. The developed framework locates institutions embedded in a local setting and influenced by historical trajectories and culture. The impact of institutions on these processes should therefore include; 1) the need to differentiate between exogenous and endogenous institutions, 2) the relevance of local structures and setting, 3) the actor perspective, considering humans as agents of institutional forces, 4) the existence of different levels of institutions, and finally 5) the time factor. Such an approach emphasizes the fact that institutions are part of evolving state-building and development processes, and therefore also need considerable time to evolve and change. Thus, their life span should be taken into account in a continuously evolving process. The main findings of this theoretical discussion are presented in the analytical model in Fig. 111342.

7.2 Kosovo: Quo Vadis?

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The analytical model suggested in the theoretical discussion was applied in the case of Kosovo based on a crucial variables analysis in each of the domains under scrutiny. Considering that state-building and development were perceived as strongly correlated with each other, the applied model examined the interdependence of the political, economic, social, and cultural domains with each other as well as with the security dimension in each of them. In the political domain of Kosovo, the mechanisms of political choice are present, but their overall performance and functional capacity remain weak. The political process and its nature are defined by fragmentation and alliances rooted in a winnertake-all mentality. This foundation is reinforced by the overlay of a post-communist system and a postconflict society, which hints at the lack of political culture in this respect. The resulting political atmosphere is one of extreme competition whereby the winners hold not only all the power, but also the financial resources of the state. Due to a shortage of resources stemming from the grim economic domain, the decision-making authority in such a context is focused on self-preservation rather than planning and preparation for the long-term needs of the state. This generates a weak civil service, with little interest in investing in a longer-term cadre of professional technocrats able to withstand the storms of political competition. The meager public sphere available limits the active participation of women and youth in politics, and they feel underrepresented in terms of political decision-making. The lack of clear strategies from those in power in recent years, particularly international actors but also local leaders, has contributed to a status quo that has lead to a worsening situation. The lack of political development is related to the unclear status of Kosovo, which engenders uncertainty and ambiguity. This affects the political process again

1342. See Chapter 1.3.5 of this study. 367

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

as leaders who have policies without clear political perspectives cannot implement the aspirations and ambitions of the population. Kosovo's political stability and development will depend on functioning institutions, but their current functional capacity is weak. A strong sense of local ownership could help to improve the situation, but this cannot be achieved if the owners do not know what they own and what they are intended to govern. Hence, the need for international actors in Kosovo to have a clear “exit strategy” and a clear vision of the future, together with a readiness to stay the course in a coherent and coordinated way, is urgent. The uncoordinated and incoherent approach of the international community in the political domain, illustrated by unclear mandates, ambiguous directives, and their staff mindset, remain challenges that hamper the overall state-building and development agenda in Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The unresolved status issue has dominated and even hindered the politics of Kosovo, while the segregation of communities in the field remains visible, an issue that leaders appear not to prioritize. Although leaders have shown a capability and capacity to cooperate with each other given the right circumstances, the fragmentation of Kosovo’s political landscape across ethnic lines is evident. This is of course related to the broader picture in Kosovo, where the simple focus of political parties remains limited to final status and Euro-Atlantic integration issues. It will take time until the political parties evolve and begin to carefully consider their political profiles in addition to their election platforms and the images of their leaders. A better society can be realized only with better ideas and a better developed political agenda. Their programmes should reflect the role of parties in a peaceful transition by including ideas and alternatives that are built upon the needs of the population they represent. Kosovo's democratic political development remains clearly at an early stage, pointing out the time factor that must be taken into account in this context. In a postconflict context like Kosovo, this process will need years, perhaps decades, and it would be unrealistic to suggest otherwise. Despite elections and limited political development, the international actors' presence in this domain will continue for the foreseeable future, certainly including both a military presence and a supervisory civilian authority. Here, a successful security context can underpin political development and contribute to confidence in political institutions in the country. While the absence of political security is a perpetuating factor in the country’s instability, if it is tackled in time then reforms could yet help to restore efficiency in the political domain and affect the regional context. If the issue remains unresolved, then individuals and groups willing to work outside the established political and legal framework will be strengthened and the prospects for political development and democracy in Kosovo will decline. Considering the existing challenges to developing a strong judiciary coupled with an efficient police service and effective investigative bodies, a comparative research approach is suggested here for future studies in order to better understand the challenges of imposing the rule of law in postconflict countries, and on identifying the mechanisms that contribute to development of a strong justice system in such environments.

368

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Analysis of the economic domain in Kosovo revealed an economy at a critical junction. Progress in institution-building and noteworthy macroeconomic stabilization are positive signs, but the pace of recovery has been too slow to meet people’s demands and expectations. The legal framework where market mechanisms operate is mostly in place, but its law enforcement capacity is very weak. The inexperience and weakness of public institutions and the inadequate capacity of the emerging civil service are hampering economic progress in general. The preconditions for making business in Kosovo are de jure complete, but de facto are far from it. While the privatization agenda has been driven to its utmost, regulation and development of the labour market, together with the human development agenda as expressed in educational, health and social policies for the disadvantaged, present a worrying picture of Kosovo. The approach guided by the EU has generated a new postconflict economy that contributes to unequal participation of subjects in the market, and will allow the already powerful to capitalize on an asymmetrical advantage. In addition, episodic ethnic violence outbreaks serve as a warning from the social domain that any achievements so far are fragile, and that the economy could fall into a vicious circle where the lack of political and social stability undermines economic development and where a lack of economic development hampers political and social stability.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The local actors and decision-making structures should take stock of their achievements so far, and develop appropriate policy responses in this context. Kosovo’s deeply rooted problems will not be solved by one “quick-fix” solution, but will require concerted initiatives and sustained efforts across a range of areas to kickstart a process of sustainable development. The resolution of Kosovo’s final status will provide a start for the proper economic enabling environment, to the extent that political uncertainty may hinder investment and economic activity more generally, but it will not be a panacea for the problems of Kosovo. Kosovo needs a well defined, widely shared vision fostering clarity, unity, and continuity as well as providing a clear sense of direction for the economic domain. Such a strategy will help align incentives and peoples’ reactions to these incentives and encourage the mobilization of resources and their efficient allocation. It will give Kosovo’s people a sense of future orientation and will provide potential investors with a clear signal as to where the economy is going and what policymakers’ intentions are in this respect. In order for Kosovo’s economy to recover and become sustainable, the advantages that the land offers must be utilized correctly by both the local and international actors. Considering the unavailability of international safety nets from the IMF and WB due to Kosovo's uncertain status, it is the European Union who must assist Kosovo in the recovery of its economics. To ensure success, the EU will need to provide a substitute for these financial safety nets in addition to a coordinated and cohesive approach in the economic domain based on existing programmes and institutions, instead of incoherent and empty promises. The reason is obvious, and the path difficult but not impossible. In the meantime the Kosovo challenge will continue to demand increasingly expensive financial and material commitments from the IC, and particularly from the EU.

369

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

The security sector of the economic domain, focused on the welfare component, showed that there can be no economic development if a great number of people are ill-educated, unhealthy, and living at subsistence level, all conditions that bear a huge potential for political turmoil and unrest. The role of the rule of law as the power to enforce laws remains feeble, and the decreasing financing of security institutions in the political domain shows a weak prospect in the long run for this variable. Furthermore, not only is poverty in itself a threat to stability in Kosovo, but its effects will also influence the stability of other domains. The lack of a clear future and fears of declining social standards, for example, demoralize the people and contribute to instability in the social domain. Only through the hope of economic alternatives can a solution be found, and many look to EU for solutions, making the EU's coherent intervention vital for the future of Kosovo in both a physical and a practical sense. Considering the risk that an expanding economy in Kosovo might outgrow its weak institutional setting, a risk which is large and under-researched in Kosovo, a full institutional review might be a task for further research in this field. More research is also needed to explore additional mechanisms of arbitration that could be used to realize the enforcement of the rule of law in a business environment. How effective EU development programs will be for employers' organizations and trade unions, and how Kosovo's institutions and administration will be able to influence labour market relations in their setting could not be identified by this study. Given the incoherent counterproductive "incidents" in the case of EAR in Kosovo, the influence they have had on future economic development in Kosovo remains to be further explored.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The exploration of social capital including norms of trust, reciprocity, networking, bonding, bridging, and gender analysis, and its potential to improve the postconflict society in Kosovo, showed that there are evident civil society networking structures in Kosovo, and at times they have been able to raise critical voices. The overall impression of their ability to exert influence over public policy, to generate trust and reciprocity, and finally to help on bridging ethnic divides between the two main communities, however, remains modest. The reasons for this include the heavy international presence in a small country like Kosovo, the shortage of resources, and the scarce political culture among political leaders, favoring a poor interaction with the civil society. The authorities should be much more engaged in supporting, and be willing to enter into discussions with, these actors. The role of civil society, especially in promoting gender equality in Kosovo, has been well-recognized and has contributed to a greater participation of women in the social domain. International donors in Kosovo have not assessed the local setting enough, and have not taken into account the real needs of the population. Existing community structures have been at times pushed aside and replaced with "modern" structures, causing a need for a significant adjustment time during which the civil society’s influence remains limited. Additionally, the ad hoc and unstructured nature of donor coordination has often resulted in overlapping or even conflicting activities, which have negatively influenced social development in the country. Finally, although the recent civic tradition in Kosovo offers a 370

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

high potential for social capital, the overall complicated political situation together with a desperate economic state present clear challenges to its regeneration and leave social development in a critical situation. The crucial role that UNMIK, the EU, and especially the PISG will play in enacting the right economic and social policies to support such a process are vital for the future, keeping in mind that the role of security in such a scenario is the sine qua non for any social undertaking to occur. Strengthening the civil society and its influence should be one of the key goals of Kosovo's society and political elite, in preparation for the building of a strong state. But developing a vibrant civil society cannot be done hastily and independently of other sociopolitical conditions. Instead, the endeavor of facilitating the conditions necessary to regenerate social capital in a postconflict situation has to be comprehensive in terms of adjusting to the requirements of timing and institutional development. This again implies long-term engagement by the EU, whose democracy-building agenda will only make good sense if accompanied by the right mechanisms to assure an incremental and progressive transition of Kosovo to the EU. A lack of continuity and strategic direction for civil society would be a major hindrance to the development of an effective and sustainable state. Given the complexity of a postconflict environment, and its social and political instabilities, the EU should support the civil society over a longer time frame, so that it can find its way out of transition and have a constructive role in Kosovo’s state-building and development process.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Even in this domain, assuring the rule of law and a strong judiciary are the sine qua non for building an efficient civil society in Kosovo. Meanwhile, sustainable economic security could provide the required independence, especially considering that in Kosovo this sector remains mostly dependent on international aid, and many groups do not have sufficient financial and organizational capacities to sustain their activities in the long term. To guarantee sustainable levels of development, civil society in Kosovo will need further support from the international community in terms of capacity-building, and from the population through membership fees for the generation of income. Only in this way can they can become accountable to their constituencies and effectively advocate their interests on important issues such as education reform, corruption, economic and fiscal policies, gender equality, etc. Economic security is in fact an area that touches not only civil society, but also the whole context. While experiencing physical insecurity and poverty, people struggle to survive, rather than to improve social capital. Therefore without the rule of law, economic security, and a stable political situation, social capital will not be regenerated in Kosovo. Further research is necessary in this domain to examine the humble results of NGO performance and sustainability compared to the organizational advantages of traditional forms of civil society in Kosovo, along with the political dangers of attempting to exploit these advantages. Research is also needed to investigate the external factors that supported the development of the print media and the internal conditions that contributed to its success, as it is considered the strongest pillar of Kosovo's civil society due to its particularly active, vocal, and dynamic presence.

371

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Finally, the premises for building a state image in Kosovo, and for producing a coherent system of meaning are also uncertain in the cultural domain. My research showed that due to many competing forces in Kosovo's society, a coherent system of meaning was simply not present. The availability of at least three kinds of laws, all having their own different system of meaning, revealed a confusing picture. Furthermore, the role of the public ritual in shaping the state image of Kosovo through the master narratives used in public ceremonies, showed that with the exception of geopolitical maps that hint at an EU future, the rest of the master narratives were at best ambiguous. In the public sphere, it was clear that Kosovo needs to go beyond the subject of its independence status and allow for extended participation by all its citizens independent of their gender, age, or ethnic background. It needs a democratic culture where there is not only content that is relevant and clear to its citizens, but also where the rules of the game allow for a common social solidarity outside the state’s control. The role of the international community in the transfer of a democratic bureaucratic culture process to Kosovo, and the urgent need for a coherent industrialization strategy from the EU in order to reach this, have exposed gaps in the cultural development process. Investigation of the potential for a "common identity" in Kosovo showed that the EU currently has the highest potential to contribute, while the rest of the examined aspects contributing to this process will take a long time to develop. The same was true in the security field, where the presence of the EU could help Kosovo confront its challenges by strengthening its fragile institutions and by offering needed economic support. This would give them a hand for now, but would also provide for a future that Kosovo and its people desperately need. Finally, apart from real engagement of the EU in Kosovo, time is needed to allow for cultural and other processes to evolve in a constructive way.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The cultural domain is the most under-researched part of this study, which is related to its undefined status. Further research is therefore needed for the examination of master narratives and their alteration after the status solution in Kosovo. Here the role of TV in the public ritual and the Kosovo state image needs additional investigation. Similarly, this may include identification of the changes taking place in the public sphere in the same period. Identifying for example whether the political parties will be able to develop diverse sets of political programs on solutions for development is one suggestion made here. Analyzing how the processes of identity change have affected the broader masses in the K-Albanian population remains a task for future studies, and the same needs to be done to identify if such an identity formation process is also taking place among K-Serbs. The insinuation offered here regarding the promotion of an EU-oriented identity among Kosovo's people to serve as a new vision for all is a proposal whose potential could be investigated in the future, since the issue of a common identity for Kosovo's people represents an obvious niche in identity studies to come. The main findings from the application of the analytical framework in Kosovo, presented in Fig.11, are presented again here in Fig.20 in the same form, but this time concrete data is given on the context and actors. In order to estimate the validity 372

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

of the main hypothesis, the author has added two extra values; 1.the state of the art the independent variable, for illustrating the main findings on institutional development outcomes found in Kosovo, expressed as the extent of examined variables, ranked as available, limited, and not available, and 2. the estimated sustainability, the dependent variable for the outcomes assessment, ranked high, intermediate, and low. The correlation between theses two extra values follows the subsequent rationale. If structures are available as such, then their estimated sustainability is high, as once in place these structures as such will probably endure. But in order for them to be sustainable in the long run and not just empty skeletons, they will have to be functional. If this functionality is limited, then their prospects for being sustainable are going to be intermediate, meaning they will depend on further support for their future performance. Finally, if structures or the required standards are not available at all, than the sustainability of the field concerned will be low, unless immediate action is taken. Thus for every ranking of final outcomes available, there will be an estimated high sustainability, for limited an intermediate one, and for not available a low sustainability score. State of the Art for Main Institutional Development Outcomes and their Estimated Sustainability in Kosovo,

Local Setting / Kosovo Balcan

Exogenous Institutions UNMIK EU OSCE etc.

Area of Interaction Dis/ Incentives

Behaviour of Actors (in 5 levels)

Transaction Costs

Distribution of Power

Endogenous Institutions PISG Community Networks etc.

Security / Rule of Law = limited/intermediary

Ranking State of the Art: available - limited - not available Ranking Estimated Sustainability: high - intermediary - low

Political Domain: 1. Mechanisms of political choice = available/high 2. Functional capacity = limited/intermediary 3. Political culture = limited/intermediary

Economic Domain: 1. Functioning market mechanisms = limited/intermediary 2. State mechanisms for human capability = limited/intermediary 3. International emergency safety nets = not available/low

Social Domain: 1. Social capital mechanisms = available/high 2. State role in social capital = limited/intermediary 3. Interaction with formal institutions = limited/intermediary

Cultural Domain: 1. Law as shared meaning = not available/low 2. Public Ritual = limited/intermediary 3. Public Sphere = limited/intermediary

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Time (8 years)

Figure 20: Main findings from the application of the analytical framework in Kosovo (Source: Author 2007)

The findings presented here show clearly that the estimated sustainability for state-building and development processes in Kosovo is an intermediate one. This means that the process is declining and will need serious and continuous support, especially from the IC and the EU, to be furthered. Although the initial intervention structure, in the form of UNMIK and its four pillars covering the military, economic, 373

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

administrative, and cultural fields reflected a wide-ranging approach, the modus operandi of this operation was fragmented, uncoordinated, and inconsistent. Hence if the approach of the IC and the EU remains along similar lines in the near future, then the prospects for Kosovo´s future remain dim. What Kosovo needs is an approach similar to that of post-World War II Germany and Japan, involving broad and comprehensive efforts to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction. This way societies can still be transformed and change can take place. Considering that the majority of the Kosovo population welcome an international presence and want their own state, this study results suggest that if the IC/EU want to do it right, the strategy to be considered should include: a fully integrated and complementary state-building and development intervention in the political, economical, social, and cultural domains and an efficient rule of law allowing for the rest to occur. Only in the framework of integrated state-building and development policies will the outcomes for Kosovo be sustainable in the future. The EU mission in Kosovo will hopefully learn from the mistakes of its predecessors and allow for the new Kosovo to find its own way, support it to extend all achieved results, and allow it to grow as a society and political entity on its way toward a common European future.

7.3 Synopsis on general trends

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This study was meant to serve a twofold intention; to point out the low cross-fertilization in the scientific discourse on state-building and development theory, and to show the benefits of using a combined approach at the empirical level where the implementation of their corresponding policies takes place. Accordingly, the theoretical implications of the processes presented here showed little cross-fertilization of crucial variables in the scientific discourse on the categorization and analysis of these processes with each other and with other relevant variables that influence their performance. The second part examined the tangible implications of the selected theoretical approaches in the case of Kosovo, where the main findings and their implications showed clearly that although efforts have been made by single actors to introduce a more holistic approach to state-building and development intervention, this has mainly remained within the borders of the individual areas concerned. So the harmful effects generated by isolated approaches have affected the overall outcomes of these processes. The vagueness applied as a normal modus operandi during these processes, and their concrete implications, have shaped certain actors' behaviors as reflected in their corresponding institutions. These institutions when exogenous, have ignored the local context, and when endogenous, have served as an excuse to escape responsibilities key to the processes outcomes. The lack of a so-called exit strategy has hindered the processes and their clear direction. This has subsequently been reflected in the four aforementioned domains, whose development has been held stagnant by the international actors and served the convenience of the status quo, disregarding the very dynamic nature of these processes.

374

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

This status quo, while on one hand materialized as a “time swamp” with international actors' “political flirting” as its main substance, has on the other hand pushed local actors to aim immediate results, taking no notice of the time perspective as a crucial factor in these processes, fabricating what Rokkan named “accelerating history” experimentation. The state was thus trivialized into a minimum of available structures where international actors have based their activity more on a kind of top-down “teacher-pupil” relationship rather than an equal partnership. That these state structures require further capacity building, resources, presence, and continued support at many levels in order to be successful and sustainable, is still not really clear to the international community, EU included. Failure to understand this will serve to furnish fraudulent local actors with the right “democratic appearing” structures and institutions to help them legitimize their power. From here on, the consequences of this scenario will be easy to guess. Finally, the real missing link in the intervention processes is coordination at the international, local, and intervening levels. Although efforts to coordinate have been undertaken, they have served an official appearance more than real outcomes. Its relevance cannot be stressed enough here, but further research is considered necessary to identify the main reasons behind the chronic “un-coordination” of actors involved in these processes.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

This study suggests a wide range of issues to be considered in state-building and development processes from the perspective of the case of Kosovo. It does not offer a “one-size-fits-all” solution or formula, but a platform for consistent consideration of these processes in the future. The lessons learned in Kosovo confirm that state-building and development are inseparable and should be considered as such when interventions on the ground are planned, in order to reach successful and sustainable outcomes. The main findings presented here may help to improve not only the understanding of these two phenomena at the scientific level, but also to improve the everyday lives of many people affected by the implications of erroneous understanding and application of these processes.

375

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

8. Appendixes 8.1 Appendix 1

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Map of Kosovo1343

1343. Source ICG Report 2005 376

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

8.2 Appendix 2

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

List of Registered Political Parties in Kosovo by November 20071344 Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo Albanian Liberal Party Albanian National Democratic League of the Given Word Albanian National Democratic Party Albanian National Unification Party Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Alliance New Kosovo Alliance of Independent Social Democrats of Kosovo and Metohija Bosniac Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo Bosniac Party of Kosovo Citizens' Initiative of Gora Democratic Albanian Ashkali Party of Kosovo Democratic Alternative of Kosovo Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo Democratic League of Dardania Democratic League of Kosovo Democratic Party of Bosniacs Democratic Party of Kosovo Democratic Party Vatan Democratic Union Green Party of Kosovo Independent Liberal Party Justice Party Kosovo Ecological Party Kosovo Objective Party Liberal Party of Kosovo National Front National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo New Party of KosovoPRSH - Albanian Republican Party ORA Party Party of Democratic Action Party of Democratic Integration People's Movement of Kosovo Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija Serbian Kosovo and Metohija Party Serbian People's Party Social Democratic Party - Kosovo and Metohija Provincial Organization Social Democratic Party of Kosovo Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo United Roma Party of Kosovo

1344. Source OSCE Kosovo Website. The current and future status of each party is subject to compliance with UNMIK Regulation 2004/11, On the Registration and Operation of Political Parties in Kosovo. 377

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

8.3 Appendix 3 A comparison of the Competences of the Central and Municipal Levels of Government in Kosovo, 2000/03.1345 Constitutional Framework 1346 Chapter 5, Responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government

On Self-Governance of Municipalities in Kosovo1347 Section 3, Responsibilities and Powers of the Municipalities

(a) (b) (c) (d)

(a)

(e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r)

economic and financial policy fiscal and budgetary issues admin & operational customs activities domestic & foreign trade, industry & investments education, science & technology youth and sport culture health environmental protection labour & social welfare family, gender & minors transport, post, telecom & IT public administration services agriculture, forestry & rural development statistics spatial planning tourism good governance, human rights & equal opportunity

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

(g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

(q)

1345. 1346. 1347. 1348.

providing basic local conditions for sustainable economic development urban & rural planning and land use licensing of building & other development local environmental protection implementation of building regulations & control standards service provision in relation to local public utilities & infrastructure (water, sewage, waste, local roads, transport & heating)...1348 public services including fire & emergency management of municipal property pre-primary, primary & secondary education primary health care social services & housing consumer protection & public health licensing of services & facilities fairs and markets naming & renaming of roads, streets & other public places provision & maintenance public parks, open spaces & cemeteries such other activities as are necessary for the proper admin of the municipality & not assigned elsewhere by law

Source USAID Kosovo 2003, op.cit. See the UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/09 See UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 For more info. see UMNIK Regulation No. 2000/49, On the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Public Utilities, available at Local Governance Assessment Report, USAID/Kosovo, Feb. 15, 2003, p54 378

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

8.4 Appendix 4 List of Kosovo Institutions by December 20071349 Assembly of Kosovo, Ministry Community and Return Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Rural Development Ministry of Culture, Youth, Sports and Non Residential Issues Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Kosovo Ministry of Energy and Mining Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning Ministry of Finance and Economy Ministry of Health Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Justice Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare Ministry of Local Government Administration Ministry of Public Services Ministry of Trade and Industry of Kosovo Ministry of Transport and Communication of Kosovo Presidency of Kosovo The Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo Official Gazettes Independent Media Commission, Kosova Chamber of Commerce, Kosovo Police Service, Kosovo Trust Agency, Office of the Auditor General, The Kosovo Property Agency, UNMIK Customs Service

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

International Institutions Council of Europe, Economic Initiative for Kosova, EU in Kosovo, European Court of Human Rights, European Union, International Organization for Migration (IOM), KFOR, Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, UNDP United Nations Development Programs Kosovo, UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNMIK United Mission in Kosovo, World bank for Kosovo, etc

1349. Source: Kosovo Government Website, available here: http://www.ks-gov.net/portal/eng.htm 379

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Municipalities of Kosovo Municipality of Artane, Municipality of Dardana, Municipality of Deçan Municipality of Dragash Municipality of Drenas, Municipality of Ferizaj Municipality of Fushë Kosova, Municipality of Gjakova, Municipality of Gjilan Municipality of Istog, Municipality of Kaçanik, Municipality of Klina Municipality of Leposaviq, Municipality of Lipjan, Municipality of Malisevo Municipality of Mitrovica, Municipality of Obiliq, Municipality of Peja Municipality of Podujeva, Municipality of Pristina, Municipality of Prizren Municipality of Rahovec, Municipality of Shtërpca, Municipality of Shtimje Municipality of Skënderaj, Municipality of Suhareka, Municipality of Vitia Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Municipality of Vushtria, Municipality of Zubin Potok, Municipality of Zveçan

380

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

8.5 Appendix 5

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

A detailed list of Standards before Status goals, benchmarks and requirements in Kosovo.1350

1350. Source UNMIK Online. http://www.unmikonline.org/ 381

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

8.6 Appendix 6

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Acronyms list AAK AKR AoK AQK CARDS CDHRF CIVPOL COMKFOR CSO DOJ EAR EAR EC EIB ESI ESI ESPIG ESPIG EU EU EUMIK EUPT FARK FARK FDI FRY GAD GED HDR HDR IAC IC IC ICG IDEA IHSOP IMC IMF IMF INGOs IREX ISSR JIAS K-albanians K-serbs KCBS KCSF

Alliance for the Future of Kosovo Alliance New Kosovo (Alleance per Kosoven e Re) Assembly of Kosovo Alliance of Citizens of Kosovo Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms Civil Police force Commander of KFOR Civil Society Organization Department of Justice European Agency for Reconstruction European Agency for Reconstruction European Commission European Investment Bank European Stability Initiative European Stability Initiative Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group Economic Strategy And Project Identification Group European Union European Union European Union Mission in Kosovo European Planning Team Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo Foreign Direct Investment Former Republic of Yugoslavia Gender Analysis in Development Gender and the Environment Human Development Report Human Development Reports, Interim Administrative Council International Community International Community International Crisis Group International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Institute for Strategic Research of Public Opinion Independent Media Council International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organisations International Research and Exchanges Board Internal Security Sector Review Joint Interim Administrative Structure Kosovo Albanians Kosovo Serbs Kosovo Clusters and Business Support Kosovar Civil Society Foundation 382

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

KCSF KDP KEK KFOR KFOR KJC KJI KJPC KLA KLA KPC KPS KSIP KTA KTA LDD LDK LDK LKCK LNGOs LPK MDGs MLSW MPs MTS NATO NGOS OEIP OSCE PDK PER PISG PISG PPK PSCs PTK SAP SAPs SDSK SHIK SLKM SNA SNV SOEs SOK SRSG STM TAC TCM TMC UN UNCHR

Kosovo Civil Society Foundation Kosovo Development Plan Kosovo Electricity Company Kosovo Force Kosovo Kosovo Peacekeeping Force Kosovo Judicial Council Kosovo Judicial Institute Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Protection Corps Kosovo Police Service Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan Kosovo Trust Agency Kosovo Trust Agency Democratic League of Dardania Democratic League of Kosovo Democratic League of Kosovo National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo. Local NGOs Popular Movement of Kosovo, The Millennium Development Goals Ministry of Labour and and Social Work Members of Parliament Mother Teresa Society North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-governmental organizations Office for European Integration Processes Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Democratic Party of Kosovo Project on Ethnic Relations Provisional Institutions for Self Governance Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Parliamentary Party of Kosovo Private Security Companies Post and Telecommunications corporation Stabilisation and Association Process Structural Adjustment Programmes Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo Kosovo Information Service Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija Serb National Assembly Serb National Council Socially Owned Enterprises Statistical Office of Kosovo Special Representative of the Secretary General, Tracking Mechanism Tripartite Advisory Council Temporary Media Commision Temporary Media Commission United Nations United Nations Commission on Human Rights 383

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

United Nations Development agency United Nations Family Planning Agency United Nations Development Fund for Women National Unity Uniteti Kombetar party United mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission In Kosovo United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution United States Agency for International Development Union for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative Union for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative Woman And Devolepment World Bank Women in Development World War Two

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

UNDP UNFPA UNIFEM UNIKOMB UNMIK UNMIK UNSC UNSCR USAID UYDI UYDI WAD WB WID WWII

384

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

9. Bibliography Allcock, John B. (2000). Explaining Yugoslavia. London: Hurst. Almond, Gabriel A, Coleman, James Smoot. (1960). The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Almond, Gabriel A, Verba, Sidney. (1989). The Civic Culture Revisited,. Newbury Park and London: Sage Publications. Almond, Gabriel A. Verba, Sidney. (1963). The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. AKR Party Website. http://www.akr-ks.info/ Aasmund, Andersen (2002). Transforming Ethnic Nationalism, the Politics of Ethno-Nationalistic Sentiments Among the Elite in Kosovo, University of Oslo. Andersen, Aasmund. (2002). Nationalism in Kosovo - The potential of the ‘Kosovar’ identity. http:/ /www.aasmundandersen.net/docs/Kosovar_Identity_feb02_TexasPCA.htm#_ftn6 Andersen, Aasmund. (2006). Challenges for the political discourse in Kosovo. http://blog.aasmundandersen.net/ Assembly of Kosovo, Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in Kosovo. Retrieved December 2007, http://www.assembly-kosova.org Backer, Berit. (1979). Behind Stone Walls:Changing Household Organisation Among the Albanians of Kosova. Bankston, Carl & Min Zhou. Lin. (2002). Social Capital as Process: The Meanings and Problems of a Theoretical Metaphor? Sociological Inquiry, Vol.72, Nr. 2 Baron, Stephen, Field, John & Schuller, Tom. (2000). Social Capital: Critical Perspectives. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. Baskin, Mark (2004). Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo. Kosovo. Baumgartner, Thomas., Burns, Tom & Deville, Phillipe. (2002). Actor-System Dynamics Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Modern Capitalism,. Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol.: 27. Nr. 2.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Bayley, David H. (1985). Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis. New Brunswick: NJ: Rutgers. University Press. Beck, Thorsten. (2000). New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy : The Database of Political Institutions. Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy. Begolli, Ilir et. al. (2006). Analizë E Gjendjes Shëndetësore Të Nënës Dhe Fëmiut Në Kosovë, (Analysis of Mother and Child Health Status in Kosovo). Belloni, Robert. (2001). Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2

385

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Bendix, Reinhard. (1977). Nation-Building and Citizenship : Studies of Our Changing Social Order (New enl. ed ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. Bianchini, Stefano & Schöpflin, George. (1998). State Building in the Balkans : Dilemmas on the Eve of the 21St Century (Europe and the Balkans international network) Ravenna: Longo. Boserup, Ester. (1970). Woman's Role in Economic Development. London: Allen & Unwin. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1979). La Distinction: Critique Sociale Du Jugement. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1983). Ökonomisches Kapital, Kulturelles Kapital, Soziales Kapital" Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co. Soziale Ungleichheiten, Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1985). The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups. Theory and Society, Nr.14. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1990). In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology. Oxford: Polity. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1991). Language & Symbolic Power. Harvard: Harvard University Press, Polity. Bourdieu, Pierre. (1998). Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Cambridge: Polity. Bourdieu, Pierre & Wacquant, Loïc J. D. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bourdieu,Pierre. (1994). Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. Sociological Theory, Vol.12, Nr. 1. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. (1996). The United Nations and the Advancement of Women, 1945-1996 (Rev. ed ed. Vol. United Nations blue books series; V. 6). New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information. Bowles, Samuel. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions. The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1. Bradley, John & Knaus Gerald (2004). Towards a Kosovo Development Plan, the State of the Kosovo Economy and Possible Ways Forward. Pristina, Kosovo. Bratton Michael. and Eric. Chang (2006). State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa Forwards, Backwards, Or Together? Comparative Political Studies, Vo. 39 Nr. 9.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Breuer, Stefan. (1998). Der Staat : {Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien} (Orig.-Ausg ed. Vol. 55593). Reinbek bei Hamburg: rororo. Brewer, Gene A. (2003). A Building Social Capital: Civic Attitudes and Behavior of Public Servants,. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Nr. 13. Bryson, Scott Stewart. (1991). The Chastised Stage : Bourgeois Drama and the Exercise of Power (Stanford French and Italian studies. v. 70). Saratoga, Calif: Anma Libri. Bullen, Paul, Jenny Onyx. (1998). Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities in Nsw. CACOM Working Paper Series, No. 41.

386

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Burns, Tom R & Flam, Helena. (1987). The Shaping of Social Organization : Social Rule System Theory With Applications. London ; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Burns, Tom R., Gomolinska, A. et.al. (2001). The Theory of Social Embedded Games: Applications and Extensions to Open and Closed Games. Quality and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Vol. 35. Barry, Buzan. (2004). A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value,. SAGE Publications, Vol. 35, No. 3. Buzan, Barry. (1991). People, States and Fear : An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Calhoun, Craig J. (1992). Habermas and the Public Sphere (Studies in contemporary German social thought). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Caplan Richard. (2004). International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Global Governance, Vol. 10, Issue 1. Carlowitz, Leopold von. (2003). UNMIK Lawmaking Between Effective Peace Support and Internal Self Determination. Archiv des Völkerrechts, Bd. 41. Chandler. David (2005). How 'State-Building' Weakens States. Spiked Online. Chesterman Simon (2001). Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and ‘Substantial Autonomy". Paper presented at the International Peace Academy Paper, New York. Chesterman Simon. (2003). Building a State in Iraq: Is There a Good Precedent? Journal of International Affairs.Columbia University School of International Public Affairs, Volume: 57. Issue: 1. Chesterman, Simon. (2004). You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chesterman, Simon. (2005). State-Building and Human Development, Background Paper for the Human Development Report 2005. UNDP Human Development Report Office, Occasional paper. Claessen, Henry. J. M & Skalník, Peter. (1978). The Early State. The Hague: Mouton. Claridge, T. (2004), "Social Capital and Natural Resource Management', Unpublished Thesis, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Clark, Howard. (2000). Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto. Cnudde, Donald J. Mccrone, Charles F. (1967). Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 1. Cohen, Ronald & Service, Elman Rogers. (1978). Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues. Colaresi. Michael. & Thompson., William. R. (2003). The Economic Development and Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36 No. 4.

387

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Coleman James. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94. Collective C.A.S.E. (2006). Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto. Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 4. Commission of the European Communities, (2006). Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report. Brussels. Commitee to Protect Journalists. (CPJ), (2000). Journalists killed in Kosovo. Retrieved April 2006, http://www.cpj.org/index.html Conference Meeting Report, (2007). Strengthening Interethnic Political Dialogue in Kosovo. Pristina. Consulting Integra, USAID (2005). Business Conditions Index: Kosovo is Business Friendly, the Numbers Prove It. Pristina Cooper, Neil. (2005). Picking Out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representation of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy. Security Dialogue, Vol 36 No.4. Corker, Robert, Rehm, Dawn Elizabeth, & Kostial, Kristina. (2001). Kosovo : Macroeconomic Issues and Fiscal Sustainability. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, (2004). Raporti per gjendjen e te drejtave dhe lirive te njeirut ne Kosove. http://www.cdhrf.org/Shqip/Vjetore/V2004sh.pdf Dahl, Robert Alan. (1966). Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahrendorf, Ralf. (1959). Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Demekas, Dimitri G, Herderschee, Han, & Jacobs, Davina F. (2002). Kosovo : Institutions and Policies for Reconstruction and Growth. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund. Department for International Development. (2007). Kosovo Factsheet. Retrieved December 2007, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/europe/kosovo.asp Derbyshire, Helen. (2002). Gender Manual: A Practical Guide for Development Policy Makers and Practitioners. Detrez, R. (1999). Kosovo. De Uitgestelde Oorlog. (Kosovo: The Postponed War)

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang. (1963). The Nerves of Government; Models of Political Communication and Control. New York: Free Press. Dirmoser, Dieter, Gronemeyer, Reimer, Rakelmansachs, Wolfgang. (1990). Mythos Entwicklungshilfe. GieÇen: Focus. Dobbins, James. (2003). America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Doorenspleet, Renske. (2001). The Fourth Wave of Democratization: Identification and Explanation,. Ph.D. dissertation.

388

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Drèze, Jean & Sen, Amartya. (1989). Hunger and Public Action (WIDER studies in development economics). Oxford: Clarendon. Drobnig, Ulrich. & Jessel-Host, Ch. (2001). Reccomandations for the Reform of the Present Civil and Commercial Law in Kosovo. Hamburg. Duijzings, Gerlachlus. (2000). Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo. London: Hurst & Company. Duverger, Maurice. (1959). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (2nd English ed, rev ed.). London: Methuen. EAR, Kosovo (2006). Evaluation of the Support to the Assembly of Kosovo (Aok). Paper presented at the EU/11/038/05. EAR, Kosovo (2006). Annual Report to the EU Parliament and Council: January-December 2005. Pristina. EAR Kosovo. (1999). 1999 Action Prorgamme. Retrieved 26 October 2006, http://www.ear.eu.int/ agency/agency.htm Edwards, Chris (2005). Conversation With Francis Fukuyama, Publishd in Geographical Magazine. Geographical Magazine, Vol. 77. Eide, Kai (2005). A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo,. Paper presented at the UN Security Council, Doc. S/2005/635,. Elgström, Ole &Hydén, Göran. (2002). Development and Democracy : What Have We Learned and How? (Routledge/ECPR studies in European political science). London; New York: Routledge : ECPR. ERP, KIM Info-Service, (2003). Directives for the Survival of the Serbs and the Creation of Conditions for Significant Returns to Kosovo and Metohija. Northern Mitrovica. Kosovo. ESI Lessons Learned Analysis, (2002). Western Balkans 2004: Assistance, Cohesion and the New Boundaries of Europe. A Call for Policy Reform. ESPIG (Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group), (2004). Towards a Kosovo Development Plan - the State of the Kosovo Economy and the Possible Ways Forward. pristina, Kosovo.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

EU Pillar IV. Website Retrieved November 2006, http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_pillar.php EU Planning Team. EUPT Organizational Structure. Retrieved December 2007, www.eupt-kosovo.eu European Commission & World Bank, (1999). Towards Stability and Prosperity - A Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo. Paper presented at the Paper in support of the UNMIK. European Communities, Commission (2007). Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document for Kosovo for Years 2007 - 2009. Paper presented at the Assessment Report.

389

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

European Integration Processes Office, Administrative Direction N0.2004/18. Retrieved December 2006, (http://www.pm-ks-gov.net/IMG/pdf/Urdhresa_administrative_per_zyrene_e_Integrimeve_Evropiane _Anglisht-2.pdf European Stability Initiative, ESI (2006). Cutting the Lifeline, Migration, Families and the Future of Kosovo. Berlin -Instanbul. European Stability Initiative, ESI (2004). The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo's Serbs,. European Stability Initiative Paper. European Stability Initiative, ESI (2005). The Helsinki Moment, European Member-State Building in the Balkans. European Union. Commission (2005). A European Future for Kosovo. Final 156. Evans, Peter, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Skocpol, Theda. (1985). Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eyre, Dana. & Wittkowsky, Andrea. (2002). The Political Economy of Consolidating Kosovo : Property Rights, Political Conflict and Stability. Frieden und Sicherheit, Electronic edition. Farnell,Brenda. (2000). Getting Out of the Habitus: An Alternative Model of Dynamically Embodied Social Action. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Volume 6. Issue 3. Ferizi, Sokol (2007). Youth Despair of Decent Future in Kosovo. Moving On. Fine, Ben. (2007). Eleven Hypotheses on the Conceptual History of Social Capital: A Response to James Farr,. Political Theory Journal, Vol. 35, Nr.1. Finkel, Norman J. (1995). Commonsense Justice : Jurors' Notions of the Law. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Focus Kosovo, (2005). United Nations Security Council: A Historic Day for Kosovo. Focus Kosovo. (2003). Voices of Kosovo. Foniqi-Kabashi, Blerta (2007). Kosovo Serbs Get New Political Party,. Southeast European Times. Forman, Shepard, Patrick, Stewart. (2000). Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery (Center on international cooperation: studies in multilateralism). Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner. Forum 2015, (2007). Kosovo 5 Years Later: What Agenda for the Future. Pristina.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld, (2007). Human Security in Kosovo: A Survey of Perceptions,. pristina, Kosovo. Frank Harris, (2005). The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform,. Paper presented at the OSCE Report, Kosovo. Fukuyama, Francis. (1995). Trust : Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis. (2004). State-Building : Governance and World Order in the 21St Century. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

390

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Geertz, Clifford. (1983). Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books. Gerschenkron, Alexander. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gittell. Marilyn, Ortega-Bustamante, Isolda, & Steffy.Tracy. (2000). Social Capital and Social Change: Women’s Community Activism. Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 36, No. 2. Goldsmith, A. Arthur. (1992). Institutions and Planned Socioeconomic Change: Four Approaches. Public Administration Review Journal, Vol. 52, Nr. 6. Goldstein, Rebecca. (1983). The Mind-Body Problem: A Novel (1st ed ed.). New York: Random House. Gordon. Peake, C. Gormley-Heenan, Mari Fitzduff. From Warlords to Peacelords. INCORE Report. Granovetter, Mark. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology, Nr 91. Grzymala-Busse Anna Maria,Jones Luong Pauline. (2002). Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons From Post-Communism. Politics & Society, Vol. 30 No. 4, Guy Peters B. & Jon Pierre. (1998). Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and Explanation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 8, No. 4. Hadenius, Axel. (2001). Institutions and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford studies in democratization). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. Haggard, Stephan, Kaufman, Robert R, & Evans, Peter B. (1992). The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Hall, John A. (1986). States in History. Oxford [Oxfordshire] UK ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell. Harris, Marvin. (1978). Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures. London: Collins. Harris, Marvin. (1990). Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came From, Where We Are Going. London: HarperPerennial.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Heritage.org, and OSCE.org, Kosovo in EU. Retrieved July 2007, www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm681.cfm and www.osce.org/item/15631.html. Hindson, Paul Gray, Tim. (1988). Burke's Dramatic Theory of Politics (Avebury series in philosophy). Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA: Avebury. Hinnebusch, Raymond A. (2003). The International Politics of the Middle East (Regional international politics series). Manchester; New York New York: Manchester University Press Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave. Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

391

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Hirschman,Albert, O. (1984). Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse,. In American Economic Review, Proceedings Nr. 74. Hockenos, Paul. (2003). Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press. Hoefer-Wissing, Neithart. (2002). “UNMIK Holds on to a Share of Power”, Focus Kosovo. Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, Müller, Karl H, & Hollingsworth, Ellen Jane. (2002). Advancing SocioEconomics: An Institutionalist Perspective. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Holsti, Kalevi. J. (1996). The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge studies in international relations ; 51). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horowitz, Donald, L. (2003). Electoral Systems and Their Goals: A Primer for Decsion-Makers. Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.4. Hoti, Avdullah (2005). A Background Study on the Labour Relations in Kosovo,. Pristina, Kosovo. Hoti, Avdullah. (2006). Doing Business in Kosovo: Challenges and Opportunities, in Long Term Polices for Social and Economic Development. Journal of the Nash Albanian Studies Program, Volume 1, Issue 1. Human Rights Watch, (1998). Report on Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (The Julian J. Rothbaum distinguished lecture series; v. 4). Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press. Iglesias, Enrique. (1993). Economic and Social Reform: An Integral Vision, in,. BID/CEPAL. Ingelhart, Louis E. (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Ingelhart, Louis E. (1997). Press and Speech Freedoms in America, 1619-1995: A Chronology. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Inglehart, Ronald. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization : Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, IWPR (2006). Kosovo Leaders Risk Damaging Eu Hopes. Europe, International Crisis Group (2006). Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition. ICG Report

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Europe, International Crisis Group (2004). Collapse in Kosovo. ICG Report. Europe, International Crisis Group (2003). Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG. ICG Report. Europe, International Crisis Group (1999). The Honeymoon is Over: Starting From Scratch in Kosovo. ICG Report. Europe, International Crisis Group (2006). Kosovo Status: Delay is Risky. ICG Report Europe, International Crisis Group (2005). Kosovo After Haradinaj. ICG Report. Europe, International Crisis Group (2006). An Army for Kosovo? ICG Report.

392

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Europe, International Crisis Group (2005). EU Visas and the Western Balkans. Europe International Crisis Group (2001). Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development. Brussels. Europe International Crisis Group (2000). Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? ICG Report. Europe International Crisis Group (2000). What Happened to the KLA? ICG Report. INTRAC (2006). Civil Society Capacity Building in Post-Conflict Societies:the Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. IREX Kosovo,(2007). Media Sustainability Index 2006/2007: The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia. Pristina. Jackson, Cecile & Pearson, Ruth. (1998). Feminist Visions of Development: Gender, Analysis and Policy. London: Routledge. Jackson, Robert H & James, Alan. (1993). States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis. Oxford New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University Press. Jenkins, Richard. (1992). Pierre Bourdieu. London ; New York: Routledge. Jensen, Erik G & Heller, Thomas C. (2003). Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Law and Politics/Stanford University Press. Jensen, Erik G & Heller, Thomas C. (2003). Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Johannes Jütting. (2003). Institutions and Development:a Critical Review. OECD Working Paper No 210. Joksimovich, Vojin. (1999). Kosovo Crisis: A Study in Foreign Policy Mismanagement. Los Angeles, Calif: Graphics Management Press. Jonathan,Fox, & Gershman. John. (2000). The World Bank and Social Capital: Lessons From Ten Rural Development Projects in the Philippines and Mexico. Policy Sciences, Nr. 33. Judah, Tim. (2000). Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Kabeer, Naila. (1994). Reversed Realities : Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. London New York: Verso. Kabeer, Naila. (1994). Reversed Realities : Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. London New York: Verso. Kaldor, Mary. Vejvoda, Ivan. (1999). Conclusion: Towards a European Democratic Space in Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe,. London: Pinter. Karp, Jeffrey A. and Banducci, Susan A.(2007). Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies. Political Parties and Political Development, Washington, DC. (Ed.). (1987). Party Governments: European and American Experiences. Berlin: de Gruyter. Kelmendi, Migjen. (2005). Kush Asht Kosovari? Debat (Who is the Kosovar. A Debate). JAVA.

393

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Kelmendi, Migjen. (2002). Kosovo Divide. Bosnia Report. King, Antony (Ed.). (1969). Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Skeptical Reflections. Polity, Vol. 2. Knaus Verena. (2007). ESI Senior Analyst Interview on Kosovo Yale: Yale university. KIPRED (2006). Voting Trends and Electoral Behaviour in Kosovo 2000 - 2004, Pristina Kosovo. KIPRED (2005). Stock Exchange in Kosova: Why and How? Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2005). A Changing Society, a Changing Civil Society: Kosovo’s NGO Sector After the War. Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2005). The United Mission in Kosovo and the Privatisation of Socially Owned Property. A Critical Outline of the Present Privatization Process in Kosovo. Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2006). Intelligence Agencies in Kosovo: Dismantling, Osmosis, or Integration? Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2004). Local Government and Administration in Kosovo. Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2005). Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans? Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2005). Administration and Governance in Kosovo, Lesson Learned and Lessons to be Learned. Pristina/Geneva. KIPRED (2006). Kosovo´s Internal Security Sector Review, Stages I and Ii, Strategic Environment Review & Security Threat Analysis, Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED (2006). Kosovo’s Capacity for EU Integration Don’t Let the Grass Grow Under Your Feet!. Pristina, Kosovo. KIPRED & SAFERWORLD, (2005). Enhancing Civilian Management and Oversight of the Security Sector in Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo. Kleinberg Aremonda B. & Clark Anine A.(eds.) (2000). Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kliksberg, Bernardo. (2000). Rebuilding the State for Social Development: Towards ‘Smart Government. Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 66, No. 2.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Kohl, Christine von & Libal, Wolfgang. (1992). Kosovo: Gordischer Knoten Des Balkan. Wien: Europaverlag. Korhonen, Outi. (2000). International Law Situated: An Analysis of the Lawyer's Stance Towards Culture, History and Community. The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International. Kosova Index Publications, Current political affairs in Kosova,. Retrieved April 2007, http:/ /www.indexkosova.com/Publications/Pub_April07.html Kosovalive (2005). Kosovo-Kosova Coming to Terms With the Problem of Kosovo: The Peoples Views From Kosovo and Serbia. KosovaLive. Kosovapress (2008). Parliament Adopted the Flag of Kosovo State,. Kosovapress.

394

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Kosovar Civil Society Foundation. (KCSF), (2005). Mapping and Analyses of Civil Society in Kosovo. Pristina, Kosovo: Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF). Kosovar Gender Studies. Center (2007). Welcome to Kosovo! Part two,. http://www.kgscenter.org Kosovar Gender Studies Center (2005). How Do Women in Kosova Vote? Kosovar Research and Documentation Institute (KODI) (2003). Kosovo´s Assembly: For the People Opr for the Party? Paper presented at the Report, No3, Pristina. Kosovar Research and Documentation Institute KODI (2007). Civil Society and the Legislative Process in Kosovo, Analytical Study At the End of the Second Mandate of the Assembly of Kosovo. Pristina. Kosovar Stability Initiative. (IKS) (2007). Reconstruction Survey, Kosovo 2007. Kosovo Chamber of Commerce, (2005). Strategy and Vision of Kosovo Chamber of Commerce. Kosovo Flag Debate Website, (2007)Vakti I flamurit te Kosoves. http://groups.googlegroups.com/ group/pristina-team/ Kosovo Trust Agency. (KTA) Retrieved July 2007, www.kta-kosovo.org Kostovicova, Denisa. (2005). Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space (Routledge advances in European politics ; 29). London: Routledge. Kramer Helmut, Dzihic Vedran. (2005). Die Kosovo Bilanz: Scheitert Die International Gemeinschaft?. Wien, Austria: LIt Verlag. Krause Keith. & Jutersonke,Oliver. (2005). Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments,. Security Dialogue, Vol.36 No.4. Krause, Keith & Williams, Michael C. (1997). Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kreimer, Alcira. (1998). The World Bank's Experience With Post-Conflict Reconstruction (OED study series). Washington, D.C: World Bank. Kreisky Eva H. (1995) Das Gechlecht Politischer Institutionen: Ergebnise Einer Historischen Und Aktuellen Spurensuche Zu Einer Politischen Theorie Des "Männerbündischen" in Kramer Helmut. (Hg.) 1995, Politische Theorien Und Ideengeschichte Im Gespräch, Wien: WUVUniv.Verl.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Lapalombara, Joseph & Weiner, Myron. (eds.)(1966). Political Parties and Political Development (Studies in political development 6). Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Lapalombara, Joseph. (2007). Reflections on Political Parties and Political Development Four Decades Later. Party Politics Journal, Vol. 13. No.2. LDD Party Website, . http://www.ldd-kosova.org/ LDK Party Website. http://www.ldk-kosova.eu/ldk/ Lee, Su-Hoon. (1988). State Building in the Contemporary Third World (IFES Third World Series, No 2). Westview Press.

395

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Lerner, Daniel. (1958). The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press. Levy, Marion J. (1966). Modernization and the Structure of Societies; a Setting for International Affairs. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Lin, Nan, Burt, Ronald S. et.al. & Cook, Karen S. (2001). Social Capital : Theory and Research (Sociology and Economics). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Linz, Juan J & Stepan, Alfred C. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Linz, Storch De Gracia, Juan Jos. (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes : Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (A Johns Hopkins paperback). Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lipmann, Peter. (1999). A Portrait of Resistance. On The Record Kosovo Retrieved 08 Januar 2006, www.advocacynet.org Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1960). Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics., Lipset, Seymour Martin & Bendix, Reinhard. (1959). Social Mobility in Industrial Society. London: Heinemann. Lipset, Seymour Martin & Rokkan, Stein. (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives : [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and Others] (International yearbook of political behavior research v. 7). New York: Free Press. Lipset, Seymour. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,. The American Political Science Review, Vol.53. Llamazares. Monica. & Reynolds. Laina,L. (2003). Ngo’s and Peace Building in Kosovo. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Working Paper No.13. Lowndes, Vivien and Wilson. David. (2001). Social Capital and Local Governance: Exploring the Institutional Design Variable,. Political Studies, Vol. 49 No.4 Lustick, Ian. (1993). Unsettled States, Disputed Lands : Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Macfarlane, Neil, S. (2004). Useful Concept That Risks Losing Its Political Salience. Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3. Machado Nora and Burns, Tom. (1998). Complex Social Organization: Multiple Organizing Modes, Structural Incongruence, and Mechanisms of Integration. Public Administration, Vol. 76. Malcolm, Noel. (2002). Kosovo: A Short History. London: Pan. Maliqi. Shkelzen (1990). Nyja E Kosoves, as Vlassi as Milloshevici, (The Kosova Knot, Neither Vllasi Nor Millosevic). Maliqi, Shkëlzen. (1998). Kosova: Separate Worlds. Reflections and Analyses 1989-1998. Pristina: MM Society ; Dukagjini.

396

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

March, James G & Olsen, Johan P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York London: Free Press Collier. March, James. G. & Olsen, Johan P. (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. American Political Science Review, Vol. 78. Marsh, David & Stoker, Gerry. (1995). Theory and Methods in Political Science (1st ed ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press. Mcguire, James, W. (1994). Development Policy and Its Determinants in East Asia and Latin America. Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2. Mclellan,Gregor. (1998). Fin De Sociologie? The Dilemmas of Multidimensional Social Theory,. New Left Review, Nr. 230. Meier, Gerald M & Baldwin, Robert E. (1957). Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy. New York: Wiley. Mengisteab, Kidane & Daddieh, Cyril K. (1999). State Building and Democratization in Africa : Faith, Hope, and Realities. Westport, Conn.London: Praeger. Mertus, Julie. (1999). The Liberal State and the Liberal Soul: Rule of Law Projects in Societies in Transition,". Social and Legal Studies, Vol.8, No.1. Mertus, Julie. (1999). Mapping Civil Society Transplants - a preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America. University of Miami Law Journal and University of Texas Hispanic Bar Journal, No. 1. Mertus, Julie. (1999). Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains - the Role of National Identity in Shaping and Challenging Gender Identity in Gender Politics in the Western Balkans. Sabrine P. Ramet (Ed.). Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. Mertus, Julie. (2004). Improving International Peacebuilding Efforts: The Example of Human Rights Culture in Kosovo. Global Governance, Vol. 10. Migdal. Joel, S.(2004). State Building and the Non-Nation-State. Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58. Migdal, Joel S. (2001). State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge studies in comparative politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Military Technical Agreement (1999). Agrement between the international security force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Retrieved 12 July 2006, Ministry Of Economy And Finance of Kosovo. (2004). The Impact of Donor Activities on the Economic Development of Kosovo. Ministry of Education,Science And Technology Of Kosovo. (2006). Kosovo Education, Science and Technology Development Strategy 2007-2013. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. (2004). Kosovo High Education Development Strategy 2005-2015. Retrieved Accessed 13 October 2006, www.see-educoop.net/portal/ id_library.htm 397

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Ministry of Labour and Social Works of Kosovo, (2006). Kosovo Action Plan for Youth Employment. Pristina. Minow, Martha, Cover, Robert, et.al. (1992). Narrative, Violence, and the Law : The Essays of Robert Cover (Law, meaning, and violence). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Moalla-Fetini, Rakia. et.al (2005). Kosovo: Gearing Policies Toward Growth and Development. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund. Molinas, Jose R. (1998). The Impact of Inequality, Gender, External Assistance and Social Capital on Local-Level Cooperation. World Development, Nr. 26. Molyneux, Maxine. (1985). Mobilisation Without Emancipation: Women's Interests, State, and Revolution in Nicaragua, Feminist Studies Journal. Feminist Studies Journal, Vol. 11 Issue 2. Momsen, Janet Henshall (2001). Backlash: Or How to Snatch Failure From the Jaws of Success in Gender and Development. Progress in Development Studies, Vol. 1. Momsen, Janet Henshall. (2004). Gender and Development (Routledge perspectives on development). London ; New York: Routledge. Morlicchio, Enrica. (2006). Gender Discourse in Development. Demologos Project Working Papers. Moser, Caroline. (1998). Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs P. World Development, Vol.17 Issue. 11. Moser, Caroline O. N. (1993). Gender Planning and Development : Theory, Practice, and Training. London ; New York: Routledge. Mühlhäusler, Peter & Harr, Rom. (1990). Pronouns and People: The Linguistic Construction of Social and Personal Identity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mühlmann Thomas (2002). Internationale Verwaltung Am Beispiel Des Kosovo,. Universität Wien, Wien. NATO Website: Kumanovo Agreement. Retrieved 15 Sept.2006, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/ a990609a.htm Natsis Ioannis, (2005). U.N. In Kosovo: 1999-2005, an Assessment of International Administration, P12. University of Kent, Canterbury.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

NewKosovareport.com (2008, Accessed Oct.2007). "Surroi and Ora Leadership Resign" At Newkosovareport.Com, 10 January 2008. NewKosovareport.com. Nietsch, Julia. (2004). Civil Society and Democratization in Kosovo: The Interaction Between Local NGOs and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). Nohlen, Dieter & Nuscheler, Franz. (1993). Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien (3. Aufl., 1., durchges. Nachdr., 6. - 10. Tsd ed.). Bonn: Dietz. North, Douglass Cecil. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norton,Andrew. (2001). The Market for Social Capital. Policy, Autumn 2001. 398

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

NRC News Archives, (2001). Kosovo Conflict. Retrieved May 2006, www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Kosovo/inhoud.html, Nucci, Larry P, Saxe, Geoffrey B, & Turiel, Elliot. (2000). Culture, Thought, and Development. Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Nussbaum Martha Craven (2003). Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global Justice. Paper presented at the From sustainable development to sustainable freedom. Nussbaum, Martha Craven. (1992). Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, Martha Craven. (1995). Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston, Mass: Beacon Press. Nussbaum, Martha Craven. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, Martha Craven & Glover, Jonathan. (1995). Women, Culture, and Development : A Study of Human Capabilities. Oxford New York: Clarendon Press Oxford University Press. Nyerere, Julius K. (1966). Freedom and Unity = Uhuru Na Umoja: A Selection From Writings and Speeches, 1952-65. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press. On The Record, Kosovo, (2000). The Birth and Rebirth of Civil Society in Kosovo,. Vol. 10, Nr 4. OSCE Kosovo, List of Registered Political Parties in Kosovo. Retrieved November 2007, http:/ /kosovoelections.org/eng/pfdf/partieslist.aspx OSCE Kosovo, (2000). Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo,. OSCE Kosovo, (2001). Kosovo’s Concerns: Voters Voices. OSCE Document. OSCE Kosovo, (2002). International Day of Journalism. Retrieved 13 April 2006, www.trepca.net/ 2002/05/020504-lajmi3-dita-nderkom-egazetarise-ne-kosove.htm OSCE Kosovo, (2005). Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws By the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Review Period: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003. OSCE Document OSCE Kosovo, (2005). Review Period: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

OSCE Kosovo, (2006). Kosovo Review of the Criminal Justice System, 1999-2005 Reforms and Residual Concerns. OSCE Report OSCE Kosovo, (2007). On the Monitoring of the Assembly of Kosovo 1 March 2007 – 13 May 2007. OSCE Document, OSCE Kosovo, Kosovo. Media in Kosovo. Retrieved 12 December 2007, http://www.osce.org/ kosovo/13419.html OSCE Kosovo (2003). Kosovo Minority Report. Owen,Taylor. (2004). Human Security: Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition,. Security Dialogue, Vol. 37 Nr.4.

399

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Oxford. University, (1971). The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Packenham Robert, A. (1964). Approaches to the Study of Political Development. World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1. Packenham, Robert A. (1966). Political-Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program. World Politics, Vol. 18, No.2. Paldam, Martin., & Svendsen, Gert.Tangraad. (2000). An Essay on Social Capital: Looking for the Fire Behind the Smoke. European Journal of Political Economy, Nr. 16. Paloka. Augustin (2006). “Does anyone have a plan?” On Documentary Film : BIRN TV. Paris, Roland. (2004). At War's End : Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paris, Roland. (2004). Still an Inscrutable Concept. Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, no. 3. Parpart, Jane L, Rai, Shirin, Staudt, Kathleen A. (2002). Rethinking Empowerment : Gender and Development in a Global/Local World (Routledge/Warwick studies in globalisation). London ; New York: Routledge. Parsons, Talcott. (1966). Societies Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. Patten, Chris. (2002). The Security Dimensions of Eu Enlargement. Paper presented at the Speech at UK Conference on Organised Crime, Manchester. PDK Party Website. http://www.pdk-ks.org/site/?id=1,0,0,1,a Peter Hays Gries, and Stanley Rosen. (2004). State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. Routledge. New York. Petritsch, Wolfgang, Kaser, Karl, & Pichler, Robert. (1999). Kosovo, Kosova : Mythen, Daten, Fakten. Klagenfurt: Wieser. Polanyi, Karl. (1957). The Great Transformation: [The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times. Boston: Beacon Press. Political Party Registration Office, Retrieved November 2007, http://kosovoelections.org/eng/pfdf/ partieslist.aspx

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Pond, Elisabeth. (1999). Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe. Washington Quarterly, Vol.22, Nr. 4. Posner, Richard, A. (1975). The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, No.4. Poulantzas, Nicos A. (1973). Political Power and Social Classes. London: NLB; Sheed and Ward. Prentice, Eve-Ann. (2000). One Woman's War. London: Duck Editions. Project on Ethnic Relations, (PER) (2007). Confidence Building Measures in Kosovo, PER Report Przeworski, Adam. (2000). Democracy and Development : Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

400

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Pye, Lucian W. (1965). The Concept of Political Development,. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358 No 1. Pula Besnik, (2005). Co-Governance 1999-2004, Much Tutelage, Less Partnership, Kosovo Five Years Later: What Agenda for the Future of Kosovo? Paper presented at the Forum 2015. Pula Besnik (2003). The UN in Kosovo: Administering Democratization, in Understanding the War in Kosovo, Florian Bieber and Daskalovski Zhidas, eds) (Ed.) London: Frank Cass. Pupovci, Dukagjin et. al. (2005). Development Perspectives of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo,. Pristina. Putnam, Robert D. (2000). Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Putnam, Robert D. (2002). Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. Putnam, Robert D, Nanetti, Raffaella Y, Leonardi, Robert. (1993). Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester: Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert, D (1995). Bowling Alone: Americas Declining Social Capital,. Journal of Democracy, Nr. 6. Pye, Lucian W & Verba, Sidney. (1965). Political Culture and Political Development (Studies in political development 5). Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Ramadani Burim, (2006). Zbulohen Parregullsi Te Medha Financiare Ne Kuvendin E Kosoves Nen Udheheqjen E Nexhat Dacit (Huge Financial Irregularities in the Kosovo Assembly Under the Lead of Nexhat Daci Come to Light). Zeri Newspaper. Rathgeber, Eva. Maria. (1990). WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice,. The Journal of Developing Areas, Viol.24. Issue 1. Rasmussen. Niels Aadam (2005). Kosovo Independence – De Jure Vs. De Facto. DIIS Report Regional Conference For the special Co-Ordinator of the Stability Pact For South Eastern Europe (2001). Security and Defence Issues-Security Sector Reform. Bucharest Rumania. Reineck, Janet (1991). The Past as Refuge: Gender, Migration and Ideology Among the Kosova Albanians. University of California,Berkeley.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Reinhard, Wolfgang. (1999). Geschichte Der Staatsgewalt: Eine Vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas Von Den Anfängen Bis Zur Gegenwart. München: Beck. Reuter, Jens & Clewing, Konrad. (2000). Der Kosovo-Konflikt: Ursachen, Verlauf, Perspektiven. Klagenfurt: Wieser. Richardson, John G. (1986). Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Riggs, Fred W. (1964). Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. RIINVEST (2006). Towards Economic Viability of Kosova, Challenges, Policies, Opportunities. RIINVEST (2007). Corporate Governance in Kosovo: Reforming Publicly Owned Enterprises. 401

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

RIINVEST (2004). Discussion Table on Transparency and Privatization. Paper presented at the Transparency and Monitoring of Privatization, Held in Grand Hotel Pristina.Kosovo. RIINVEST (2003). Household and Labour Force Survey 2003. Pristina, Kosovo. RIINVEST (2002). Small and Medium Enterprises, (SME) Development in Kosovo Robert L. Carneiro. (1970). A Theory of the Origin of the State: Traditional Theories of State Origins Are Considered and Rejected in Favor of a New Ecological Hypothesis. Science, 169, Pt, 2, Sect.1, No 16. Dany, Rodrik. (2001). Intitutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants of Economic Growth. Rokkan, Stein, Flora, Peter, Kuhnle, Stein, & Urwin, Derek W. (1999). State Formation, NationBuilding, and Mass Politics in Europe : The Theory of Stein Rokkan : Based on His Collected Works (Comparative European politics). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Adam, Roncevic. (2003). Social Capital: Recent Debates and Research Trend,. Social Science Information, Vol. 42, No. 2. Rose, Richard. (1998). Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society : Social Capital Networks in Russia (Studies in public policy ; no. 304). Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. Rose, Richard And Shin, Doh. Chull. (2001). Democratization Backwards: The Problem of ThirdWave Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31. Rotberg, Robert I. (2004). When States Fail : Causes and Consequences. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Rowlands, Jo. (1997). Questioning Empowerment: Working With Women in Honduras. Oxford Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Oxfam (UK and Ireland) [Distributed in USA by] Humanities Press International. Ruijsink, Saskia. (2005). Spatial Planning in Kosovo,. Katholieke Universitet Leuven, Belgium. Mcallister,Russell J. Dalton And Ian. (2007). Political Parties and Political Development: A New Perspective. Party Politics, Vol.13. Saferworld. (2007). Human Security in Kosovo, A Survey of Perceptions. Retrieved 18 May 2007, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Human_Security_in_Kosovo_English.pdf

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Schelling, Thomas C. (1969). The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. Schumacher, E. F. (1973). Small is Beautiful; a Study of Economics as if People Mattered. London: Sphere Books. Schwarz,Rolf. (2005). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation, Sage Publications,. Security Dialogue, Vol. 36 No. 4. Scott-Flynn,Nick. (1999). Coordination in Kosovo: The Challenge for the Ngo Sector. Rehabilitation Network Newsletter, No.15.

402

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Sederlof, Hjalte. and Verme, Paolo (2004). Kosovo, the Public Safety Net, an Analysis of Its Efficiency and Effectiveness. Paper presented at the WB Background paper for the Kosovo Poverty Assessment Report. Sen, Amartya Kumar. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Serwer Daniel, (2004). Kosovo: Status With Standards Essay for the 5 Years of Stability Pact Commemorative Event on 8 June 2004 in Portoroz (Slovenia). Www.Stabilitypact.Org. Shils, Edward. (1975). Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shiva, Vandana. (1989). Staying Alive : Women, Ecology and Development. London: Zed Books. Shpend Ahmeti, (2006). Cohu: Asnje Gjurme Per Superveturen (Wake Up: No Traces From the Supercar). Kosovo Sot. Silvey, Rachel, And Rebecca Elmhirst. (2003). Engendering Social Capital: Women Workers and Rural-Urban Networks in Indonesia's Crisis,. World Development, Nr.3. Simon, James. (2006). Reforming Kosovo´s Public Administration: Why it Matters and What it Needs in Long Term Polices for Social and Economic Development. Journal of the Nash Albanian Studies Program, Volume 1, Issue 1. Singh, Anita Inder. (2007). Why Democracy is Good for Development. UN Chronicle, Vol. 43. Skocpol, Theda. (1996). Unravelling From Above. The American Prospect, No.25. Smith, Gordon B. (1999). State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe. Snyder, Jack L. (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York : London: Norton. Solana Javier. Rehn Olli (2005). The Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo,. Brussels. Solana, Javier. (2005). Bashkimi Evropian Dhe Rruga Drejt Paqes, Prosperitetit Dhe Demokracise” (EU and the Way to Peace, Prosperity and Democracy) in ZERI Newspaper, p. 5. Soltan, Karol Edward, Uslaner, Eric M, & Haufler, Virginia. (1998). Institutions and Social Order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Sommers, Marc.& Buckland, Peter. (2004). Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo,. IIEP Working Document.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Søren Jessen. Petersen, (2004). Conflict History: Kosovo. Scholle, Thilo. (2006). Transnational Concerns: Facetten Der Globalisierung Einige Gedanken Zum 70. Geburtstag Von Nicos Poulantzas,. Globalisierung und die Theorie des Staates, Heft 4/2006. Spillmann, Kurt R & Krause, Joachim. (2000). Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International Cooperative Security. Bern ; Oxford: Peter Lang. Stanfield, J.R., Stanfield. J.B. (1997). Where Has Love Cone? Reciprocity, Redistribution, and the Nurturance Gap,. Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2.

403

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Statistical Office of Kosovo. (SOK), (2005). Social Statistics, Statistics of Living Standards 2003-2005. Retrieved September 2007, Website http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/ Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen Ann & Longstreth, Frank. (1992). Structuring Politics : Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge studies in comparative politics). Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Stephenson,Carolyn. (2005). Nation Building. Beyond Intractability. Conflict Research Consortium,. Steven Lang P. & Robert E. (1998). What is Social Capital and Why is it Important to Public Policy? Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 9, No.1. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Allen Lane. Stone, Wendy. (2001). Measuring Social Capital: Towards a Theoretically Informed Measurement Framework for Researching Social Capital in Family and Community Life. Research Paper, No.24. Strayer, Joseph R. (1970). On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Surtees, Rebecca (2000). Women at Work: The Economic Situation and Opportunities of Women in Kosovo. Pristina. Tarp, Finn, Hjertholm, Peter. (2000). Foreign Aid and Development : Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future. London ; New York: Routledge. Tarrow, Sidney G. (1998). Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics (2nd ed ed. Vol. Cambridge studies in comparative politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Marilyn. (2000). Communities in the Lead: Power, Organisational Capacity and Social Capitalr. Urban Studies, No.37. Temporary Media. Commission, (2006). The Council of the Independent Media Commission Constituted. Press Release www.imc-ko.org Thakur, Ramesh et.al (eds.) (2003). Reconstituting Whose Social Order? NGOs in Disrupted States, in From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States. New York: United Nations University Press. The Economist, (2005). Rendering Unto Caesar.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

The Economist. (2008). Kosovo: The World´s News State. The Economist (2007). Political Forces. The Economist. The Independent International Commission On Kosovo, (2000). The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thomas. Caroline, (2001). Global Governance, Development and Human Security:Exploring the Links. Third World Quarterly, Vol 22, No 2. Thomas, Caroline & Wilkin, Peter. (1999). Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience (Critical security studies). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 404

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Thompson. Edward. (1974). Patriarcian Society, Plebeian Culture,. Journal of Social History, Nr.7. Timothy Garton A. (2007). Why Kosovo Should Become the 33Rd Member - and Serbia the 34Th, After Going Through Hell, the Former Serbian Province is in Limbo. It Needs Independence Now, and the EU Later. The Guardian. Tocqueville, Alexis d. & Mayer, J. P. (1969). Democracy in America (Anchor Books ed ed.). Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Books. Tomuschat, Christian. (2002). Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment. The Hague: Kluwer International. Tunde. Adeniran, (1975). The Search for a Theory of Political Development. Transition Journal, No. 48. Turner, Mark M & Hulme, David. (1997). Governance, Administration and Development : Making the State Work. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Tusalem Rollin, F. (2007). A Boon Or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and FourthWave Democracies,. International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3. UN Security Council (2004). Implementing "Standards Before Status" Policy Core Political Project for UN Kosovo Mission. Security Council Told. 4910th Meeting (AM), Press Release SC/ 7999. UNDP (1994). Human Development Report. Oxford. UNDP (1995). Human Development Report. New York. UNDP. (1996). Economic Growth and Human Development. New York: Oxford University Press. UNDP. (2002). Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York, N.Y. ; Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP Kosovo. (2004). The Kosovo Human Development Report 2004,. UNDP Kosovo.. (2005). Early Warning System Fast Facts. http://www.kosovo.undp.org/ publications/publications.asp UNDP Kosovo. (2006). Human Development in Kosovo Report 2006. pristina. UNDP Kosovo & RIINVEST (2005). Second Millennium Development Goals Report for Kosovo. UNDP Kosovo (2006). Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

UNDP Kosovo (2003). Factsheet No.1: Unemployment. UNDP Kosovo (2004). "Light Blue": Public Perceptions of. Security and Police Performance in Kosovo. Pristina. UNDP Kosovo (2004). Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo 2004. UNDP South Eastern Europe. (2005). Small Arms and Light Weapons and Private Security Companies in South East Europe: A Cause Or Effect of Insecurity? UNDP Kosovo. (2005). The Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo Report 2005.

405

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

UNDP and RIINVEST. Quarterly Opinion Polls. http://www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/publications.asp. UNFPA (2003). Profile Kosovo,. Pristina Kosovo. UNMIK (2006). UNMIK´s Impact on the Kosovo Economy: Spending Effects 1999-2006 and Potential Consequences of Downsizing, Assessment Report. UNMIK. Kosovo Outlook 2004. Pristina. UNMIK Official Gazette, Media Regulations. 2006 Pristina UNMIK Facts on Kosovo Website. http://www.unmikonline.org/ UNMIK Civil Administration Website http://www.unmikonline.org/civiladm/index.html UNMIK. Assembly of Kosovo website http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_structure.php UNMIK Government Structure Website http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_structure.php UNMIK. Standards before Status Website http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarks_eng.pdf UNSG. (1992). An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, Democracy and Development, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted By the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A/47/277 - S/ 24111, §17. USAID Kosovo,(2006). Limited Scope Assessment of Local Governance in Kosovo. pristina. USAID Kosovo,(2003). Local Governance Assessment Report. Pristina. USAID Kosovo, (2004). Kosovo Civil Society Sector Assessment Report . Pristina. USAID Kosovo, (2006). Evaluation of the Justice Reform Activity in Kosovo, Pristina . USAID Kosovo (2003). Craig Buck Memorandum on USA Support for Minority Media in Kosovo. Pristina. USAID Kosovo (2004). Kosovo Media Assessment Report .Pristina Vandewalle, Dirk J. (1998). Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Vernon W. Ruttan. (1991). What Happened to Political Development? Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 39, No. 2. Verstegen, Suzanne. (2001). Poverty and Conflict: An Entitlement Perspective. CPN Briefing Paper. Von Vorys. Karl, (1965). Toward a Concept of Political Development,. ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358, No.1. Vuniqi Luljeta, (2005). Kosovo and Serb Women Overcoming Patriarchies and Prejudices Through Cooperation. Paper presented at the The Women peace Coalition Conference. Waldner, David. (1999). State Building and Late Development. Ithaca, N.Y. ; London: Cornell University Press.

406

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. (1974). Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Studies in social discontinuity). New York: Academic Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. (1974). The Modern World-System (Studies in social discontinuity). New York: Academic Press. Warner, Mildred. (1999). Social Capital Construction and the Role of the Local State. Rural Sociology, No. 64. Warren Robert, 1940, "The State in Society: A Series of Public Lectures Delivered under the Auspices of McGill University, Montreal, January 23, 1939 -February 10, 1939. Oxford University Press. London. Webb, Jen et.al. Schirato, Tony, & Danaher, Geoff. (2002). Understanding Bourdieu. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Pub. Weber, Max. (1976). Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft: Grundriss D. Verstehenden Soziologie (5., rev. Aufl ed.). Tübingen: Mohr. Weber, Max, Gerth, Hans Heinrich, & Mills, C. Wright. (1958). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford university press. Weber, Max, Shils, Edward, & Finch, Henry A. (1949). The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. Welch Anthony. C. (2006). Achieving Human Security After Intrastate Conflict: The Lessons of Kosovo,. Kosovo Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2. Welch, Anthony, C. (2006). A Successful Security Pact: European Union Policy in South East Europe. In the Security Dimensions of EU Enlargement. Welch, Anthony. C. et.al. (2005). Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations and Assistance Agencies, UK. Wiberg, Hakan (1999). Roles of Civil Society: The Case of Kosovo. Paper presented at the International Migration, Development & Integration Conference. Wilentz, Sean. (1985). Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Williamson, John. (1994). The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Wittkowsky, Andreas, Bajraktari, Elinor, Niksic, Orhan (2005). Fuelling Kosovo´s Growth Engines, a Strategic Vision and Policy Priorities,. Pristina, Kosovo. Werneer, Wnendt (2007). On European Political Perspectives,. Speech at OSCE Conference, Pristina. Wolfensohn, James D. (1997). Speech Addressed to the 1997 World Bank, Annual Meetings,. Paper presented at the World Bank, Annual Meeting, Hong Kong. Woolcock, Michael. & Narayan. Deppa. (2000). Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy. ,. The World Bank Research Observer, Nr. 15.

407

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Woolcock, Michael. (1998). Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.". Theory and Society, Nr. 27. World Bank (1993). The East Asian Miracle : Economic Growth and Public Policy. New York. World Bank (1997). World Development Report. Hong Kong. World Bank (2005). Doing Business: Business Conditions Methodology, http://rru.worldbank.org/ DoingBusiness/3 World Bank (2002). World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets, 2001/2002. World Bank (2005). Kosovo Poverty Assessment, Promoting Opportunity, Security and Participation for All. World Bank (2006). Kosovo Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Volume 1. World Bank & Yusuf, Shahid (1999). World Development Report, 1999/2000: Entering the 21St Century. New York. World Bank (2004). Kosovo Economic Memorandum. World Bank (2006). Interim Strategy for Kosovo. World Bank La Cava, Gloria, et al.) (2001). Conflict and Change in Kosovo. Paper presented at the ECSSD, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development. World Briefing, Europe (2007). Kosovo: 2 Main Parties to Form Government,. Agence FrancePresse,. Youngs. Richard, (2004). International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

ZERI Newspaper, (2004). Political Secrets of Kosovo during 2001-2004. Pristina, Kosovo.

408

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by

Der disserta Verlag bietet die kostenlose Publikation Ihrer Dissertation als hochwertige Hardcover- oder Paperback-Ausgabe. Fachautoren bietet der disserta Verlag die kostenlose Veröffentlichung professioneller Fachbücher.

Copyright © 2010. Diplomica Verlag. All rights reserved.

Der disserta Verlag ist Partner für die Veröffentlichung von Schriftenreihen aus Hochschule und Wissenschaft. Weitere Informationen auf www.disserta-verlag.de

Ante, Arta. State Building and Development: Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo : Two sides of the same coin? Exploring the case of Kosovo, edited by