State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns 9781138494831, 9781351025423

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State and Tribes in Syria

State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns explores the policies of the successive Syrian governments towards the Arab tribes and their reactions to these policies. The book examines the consequences of the relationship between state and tribe since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and its withdrawal from Syria in 1916 until the eruption of the Syrian civil war. Throughout history and up to the present day, tribalism continues to influence many issues related to governance, conflict and stability in the Middle East and North Africa. The book provides a dissection of a crucial, but neglected axis of the current crisis on the relationship between the state and the tribes. The research draws on data gathered through interviews with members of Syrian tribes, as well as written literature in various languages including English, Arabic and French. The book combines the research focus of political scientists and anthropologists by relating the local patterns (communities and tribal affiliations) to the larger system (state institutions and policies) of which they are a part. State and Tribes in Syria: Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns advances our knowledge of an under-­studied component of the Syrian society: the tribes. Therefore it is a vital resource for students, scholars and policymakers interested in Syrian Studies and Middle Eastern Studies Haian Dukhan holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of St Andrews. He has worked for governmental and non-­governmental bodies inside and outside Syria for many years, on issues related to development, counter-­ terrorism and peace settlement. He is currently teaching Politics and International Relations at the University of Leicester and is engaged in a research project on the intersection between tribalism and sectarianism at the University of St Andrews.

Routledge/St. Andrews Syrian Studies Series Edited by Professor Raymond Hinnebusch Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St Andrews

Editorial Board: David Lesch, Trinity University, Texas Yezid Sayigh, Carnegie Research Centre, Beirut Christopher Phillips, Queen Mary University, London Eberhard Kienle, Institut Française Proche Oriente (IFPO) This series aims to be the major venue for the dissemination of research on modern Syria. Although it will not neglect Syria’s past, the focus is on the current conflict. It showcases work that locates cutting edge empirical research within innovative theoretical frameworks from all disciplines on, for example, social movements, civil wars, intervention, identity conflicts, failed states, post-­ war reconstruction, authoritarian resilience and non-­state governance. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria The Democratic Option of Islamism Naomí Ramírez Díaz The Syrian Uprising Domestic Factors and Early Trajectory Edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady State and Tribes in Syria Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns Haian Dukhan For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/­ middleeaststudies/series/RSASSS

State and Tribes in Syria

Informal Alliances and Conflict Patterns

Haian Dukhan

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Haian Dukhan The right of Haian Dukhan to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-49483-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-02542-3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To Innes and Theo who make me happy every time I see them smiling

Contents



Acknowledgements

viii

1 Syrian tribes: why is it important to know about them? 

1

2 Tribes and the state: from the rise of Islam to the French mandate over Syria

26

3 Arab tribes and the rise of the nation-­state in Syria from 1946 until 1970

49

4 From enmity to amity: Hafez al-­Assad and the Arab tribes in Syria from 1970 until 2000

70

5 Bashar al-­Assad and the Arab tribes in Syria from 2000 until 2010

101

6 Tribes and tribalism in the Syrian uprising and civil war

127



Conclusion

159



Index

165

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Raymond Hinnebusch for his valuable guidance and support during my PhD years. Thank you, Raymond, for encouraging me to develop my own ideas and helping me to become an independent researcher. Great acknowledgement is also due to my second supervisor, Dr Timothy Wilson, who helped me and guided me during the whole process of the PhD. My thanks also go to the sponsoring institution, which gave me the opportunity to conduct this research and complete my education – namely the Asfari Foundation. I am most thankful to the Foundation’s trustees and staff who supported me in the most difficult times during the conflict in Syria. I would also like to thank my family (Innes and Theo) for their love and support. Special thanks go the following people for assisting me with my research: Sheikh Mohammad Mzeid Tarkawi, Sheikh Nasser al-­Hariri, Sheikh Ahmad al-­ Melhem, Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir, Sheikh Mus’ab al-­Tahan, Asaad al-­Meshrif, Sofian al-­Meslet, Mohammad Hassan, Mohammad Zaal al-­Saloum, Mekhlef Said, Ahmed Amin and many other people from Syria. Special thanks go to Professor Dawn Chatty and Dr Troy Sternberg from the University of Oxford, Dr Jørgen Christian Meyer from the University of Bergen, Dr Sune Haugbølle from Roskilde University, Dr Omar Imady from the University of St Andrews, Dr Christopher Phillips from Queen Mary University of London and Dr Fiona Mccallum from the University of St Andrews. Thanks also to Ruth Masson, Tony Wilson, Dara Conduit and Badirkhan Ali.  I am deeply grateful to the following institutions for funding my participation in conferences and workshops when presenting the results of my research: The University of St Andrews (Centre for Syrian Studies), The University of Manchester (The Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World), The Australian National University (Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies), The Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), Wenner-­Gren Foundation, The University of Buckingham (Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies), Roskilde University (The Department of Society and Globalisation), The University of Bergen (Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies), The Amer­ican Political Association (APSA), The London School of Economics (Middle East Centre) and The University of Oxford (School of Geography).

1 Syrian tribes Why is it important to know about them?

Introduction Throughout history and up to the present, tribalism continues to influence many issues related to governance, conflict and stability in the Middle East and North Africa. Many civil society advocates argue that tribal affiliation in the Middle East has diminished, as evidenced by the disappearance of intertribal conflicts. Despite this, kinship loyalties continue to play a significant role in the everyday life of the Middle East, from employment in the public sector to recruitment in the army and security apparatus to competition between families and clans for many of the government positions and other social services provided by the state. Most research on the Middle East after the Arab Spring has tended to focus on the emergence of democracy and civil society while others have focused on Islamism and Jihadism. Most recently, the Arab Spring was accompanied by the resurgence of sectarianism, extremism and other social phenomena, which at the sub- or trans-­state levels, has been empowered by the weakening of states. Although tribes have also been empowered, the resurgence of tribalism was not studied deeply. Political scientists who focus their research on the political processes of the Middle East tend to concentrate on state institutions, state policies and national parties. By contrast, anthropologists who are interested in politics limit their focus to segments of communities and tribal affiliations. This book attempts to do both by relating the local patterns to the larger system of which they are part. Throughout history, tribes have always existed alongside states. It is only in the twentieth century, with the rise of modern bureaucratic states, that tribes have become weaker as a form of organisation. In states that remained more traditional and whose economies depend more on agriculture than industry, however, tribes continued to have power and influence. After the departure of the old imperial powers from the Middle East and the rise of the nation-­states, many governments in the region sought different means to bring the tribes under their control. Government officials justified their policies in different ways, starting from the mobility of the tribes which challenges the borders between states, to the tribes’ loyalty to their kin groups instead of the state and finishing with the tribes’ military capacity that has proved challenging to the state authorities over

2   Syrian tribes and their importance time. There are many examples of the tribes becoming strong enough not only to occupy large territories within the state but even to set up their own states. Lancaster (1981) describes the state-­like nature of the Rwalla tribe in Syria. Lewis (1987) records a similar attempt in 1929 by the leader of the Fad’an tribe who announced his own state in the governorate of Raqqa. The tribal regions in Syria that constitute 70% of the country’s landmass have been the scene of recurrent political struggles between the Arab tribes and the central state. This political struggle has manifested itself in different forms, ranging from direct military confrontation to co-­optation. The main feature of tribal society studied in this book is extended kinship and family ties that influence the role of the tribe vis-­à-vis the central state. To understand the role of the tribes and their influence on Syria’s stability and instability, it is necessary to explore the roots of this issue in the state’s formative years which start with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the mandate period and the establishment of the first nation-­state in 1947. It is also necessary to analyse the structure of the Syrian state and the process of tribal integration into the state system, showing how the creation of the modern state influenced the role of the tribes and how the tribes, in their turn, played a major role in stabilising the Syrian state and destabilising it at a later stage.

The importance of the book and the questions that it seeks to answer The significance of this study stems from different factors. Firstly, after the Arab Spring that was followed by fierce civil wars in Libya, Yemen and Syria, it was clear that many of the events in those countries were motivated by tribal tendencies (Boutaleb, 2012). The Libyan, Yemeni and Syrian cases provide exemplary models of the phenomena of the resurgence of tribalism in the arena of political action in the Middle East. In the Syrian case particularly, both the Syrian regime and the opposition forces have been working since the early days of the uprising to mobilise the tribes on their side. Understanding and analysing the status of the tribe and its role in the recent uprisings/civil wars will enable the reader to access data on the most important social and political events in the Middle East which suffer from a marked deficiency of study. Secondly, tribalism has proved remarkably enduring. The creation of the modern state in the Middle East certainly posed a serious threat to tribal identity and structure in the region (Fattah, 2010). The threats were numerous in the Syrian case and included methods such as drawing the administrative boundaries of the state, settlement projects for the tribes, abolishment of the tribal legal system and the centralisation of power in the hands of government officials supported by a large military body. Despite these measures and after decades of state formation in the region, tribal identity has not disappeared. Rather, it continued to thrive while changing to adapt to the modern world. This book looks to understand why tribal culture still persists in the modern political system of Syria which will complement other prior studies on state formation in the Middle East and the dilemmas of the

Syrian tribes and their importance   3 state system in the region. Thirdly, while the persistence of tribalism remained a puzzling issue for many researchers, the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East has been a more complex issue for them. While some authors focus on the role of coercive apparatus in preserving Arab authoritarian regimes, others talk about the role of international support in keeping authoritarianisms in power (Bellin, 2004; Ghalioun and Costopoulos, 2004). Very few, such as Alon (2009), have analysed how authoritarian regimes ‘incorporated tribalism into the political order’ to extend their legitimacy and survival (p. 2). Therefore this book, by focusing on how tribalism was one of the factors that secured the regime’s survival in Syria, will contribute to a wider research area on the factors that led to the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Fourthly, the new states that emerged in the Middle East in the twentieth century had to accept new borders that had not existed before; however, some states continued to treat the citizens of their neighbouring countries as part of their own constituencies (Khoury and Kostiner, 1991). Because of the blood ties that existed between the tribes of Syria and those in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan, these countries continued to extend their influence in to Syria. By showing how different countries in the Middle East have meddled in the affairs of others because of and through kinship bonds, this study will contribute to other studies on the malfunction of the Arab states’ system and other issues associated with sovereignty and the mandate countries’ division of the Middle East. This book aims to explore the policies of the successive Syrian governments towards the Arab tribes and their reactions to these policies and the consequences for the relationship between state and tribe, from the fall of the Ottoman Empire and its withdrawal from Syria in 1916 until the eruption of the Syrian civil war. The book develops a new understanding of the linkages between environment, economy and government policies as they affect the tribes and their relationship with the state. It seeks to answer the following questions: • • • • • •

What was the policy of the state towards the tribes and how did they react to it? What kind of relationship existed between the state and tribal leaders? How did it affect the political role of the tribes in Syria until recently? How did management or incorporation of the tribes facilitate regime consolidation or state formation? How did the state policies towards the Kurds and the Islamists affect the position of the tribes in Syria? What role do the tribes play in the current uprising/civil war in Syria?

Geography and population Geography The tribes studied in this book inhabit four geographical regions of Syria. These four regions include al-­Badia (Arabic: ‘the Steppe’), al-­Jazira (Arabic: ‘the

4   Syrian tribes and their importance

Map 1.1  Tribal regions in Syria.

Island’), Hauran and the Syrian part of the Golan Heights in the countryside of Quneitra. These four regions will be known as ‘the tribal regions’ in this study. Each of these regions will be described briefly below: Al-­Badia stretches over an area of 10 million hectares which constitutes 40% of the country’s land area, and it extends over large parts of central and eastern Syria (IFAD, 2012). Its administrative borders include parts of the governorate of Deir Ezzor to the east, parts of the governorates of Raqqa, Aleppo and Idlib to the north, and parts of the governorate of Hama, the countryside of Damascus, Homs and As-­Suwayda to the west and south of the country. The northern border of al-­Badia is marked by the Euphrates River. The Syrian Steppe is a continuation of the arid Arabian Plateau extending in an arc from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf (Chatty, 1986). The Syrian Steppe is a dry area with low rainfall and poor quality soils that is principally used for providing pasture for the livestock of the tribes (FAO, 2004). Several important oases are located in the Steppe such as Palmyra and Sukhnah (Shoup, 1990). These oases are important centres for irrigated agriculture and trade with the tribes. North of the Euphrates River lies the fertile region called al-­Jazira. It was given the name of The Island because it is located between the Euphrates River to the east and the Tigris River to the west. It extends over parts of the governorates of

Syrian tribes and their importance   5 Deir Ezzor and Raqqa and dominates most of the areas in the governorate of al-­ Hassakeh. It covers 20% of the country’s land area and is characterised by a flat geography, which spreads across a large swathe of the Euphrates River Basin, as well as the Khabur and Tigris River Basins (Mhanna, 2013). The area has historically been inhabited by Arab and Kurdish nomadic tribes. Over time, the majority of them settled down and started practising agriculture. The region produced large amounts of wheat, cotton and barley in addition to holding large reserves of oil (Ababsa, 2009). The region receives an average annual rainfall of 200–250 millimetres which allows agriculture to be more productive here than in al-­Badia. Hauran is the name of the fertile plains near the Jordanian border and the frontier with Israel. It stretches over the governorates of Sweida, Dar’a and parts of Quneitra. The majority of its population work in agriculture. In the nineteenth century most of the inhabitants of Hauran were the descendants of Bedouin (Toth, 2006). Hauran is a region of settled Bedouin (Chatty, 2014). Tribal affiliation is widespread in Hauran and is a source of identity and pride for the majority of its inhabitants. The Syrian part of the Golan Heights is situated in southern Syria, bordering the countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, the Syrian governorates of Daraa and the countryside of Damascus. This area has supported agricultural activities such as wheat growing and pastoralism (Bromiley, 1994). After the 1967 war between Israel and Syria, the Golan Heights were divided between the two countries. Nearly all members of the al-­Fadl tribe were displaced from their villages in the Golan Heights and mainly settled in the countryside of Damascus since then. Members of the Nuim tribe in the Syrian part of the Golan Heights have continued to live in their villages up until now. Population One of the factors leading to the confusion about the number of Bedouin in Syria is the fact that the term ‘Bedouin’ is used to describe settled and semi-­settled nomadic groups (Nahedh, 1989). ‘Bedouin’ continues to be used for any individual with a nomadic background. Semantically speaking, ‘Bedouin’ is derived from the Arabic badawi, which is usually interpreted as ‘desert dweller’ (Cole, 2003). The Arabic word for nomadism, badawa, derives from the root b-­d-w. It means the way of life and living in the desert, the opposite of settled life (Jabbur, 1995). Badu is an antonym of ‘sedentary’, ‘urban’, which is ‘hadr’ in Arabic. I will use the phrase ‘Arab tribes’ in my book because it is more acceptable among the different segments of the tribes in Syria. While interviewing people from Hauran, they refused to be called Bedouin because they have always been farmers, according to them. Many interviewees from the al-­Jazira region also refused to be called Bedouin because they are Shawi (non-‘noble’ tribes). Even many interviewees of al-­Badia insisted that they are ‘Arab tribes’ rather than Bedouin. Historically, Syria’s nomadic population has been declining, going from 13% of the total population in 1930, to 7% in 1953 and less than 1% in 1982, yet tribal authority and solidarity proved capable of surviving in changing conditions, i.e.

6   Syrian tribes and their importance agricultural settlement or urbanisation (Hinnebusch, 1989). The previous spokesman for the coalition of the tribes in Syria, Mahmoud al-­Dougeim, stated that the tribes constitute 55% of the social structure of the country, and even the Kurds and Turkmens are organised into tribal structures (Abu-­Zayd, 2013). The Alawites are divided into four major tribes: the Khayyatin, Hadadin, Kalblya and Matawira (Firro, 2005). The Druze are divided into three major tribes: al-­Atrash, al-­Amer and al-­Hinidi (Interviewee 1, 2015). The Kurds are divided into many tribes, some of which are Amikan, Biyan, Sheikan and Jumus (Tejel, 2008). Although the Alawites and the Druzes are tribally organised, their sectarian identity remains predominant and stronger than their tribal identity. The same could be said about the Kurds whose ethnic identity is stronger than their tribal identity, which is why these three groups are not included in the scope of this book (al-­Ayed, 2015). Syria’s population reached 24.5 million in January 2011 (Central Office for Statistics, 2011). Out of this population, 1.7 million live in Deir Ezzor, 1.0 million in Raqqa, 1.6 million in al-­Hassakeh and 1.1 million in Dar’a (ibid.). If we exclude the Kurds from these statistics, we could say that 80% (3.4 million) of people living in these governorates belong to Arab tribes. Additionally, 10% (1.3 million) of the citizens live in the governorates of Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Hama and Quneitra who, according to the same source, number 4.5 million in Aleppo, 2.1 million in Homs, 2.1 million in Hama, 2.1 million in Idlib and half a million in Quneitra. The total number of people who are members of Arab tribes would, by this count, be 4.7 million. This means that Arab tribes’ population in Syria would amount to 19.34% of the whole population living in a region that covers 70% of Syria’s total land area. This number is very close to the statistics (15%) of Chatty (2013) and the Syrian researcher Abdul-­Nasser Al-­Ayed (2015) who published a few studies on the role of the tribes in the Syrian conflict. The tribes used to live in portable, black tents made from woven goat hair and they moved from one area to another looking for grass and water for their herds (Elphinston, 1945). More permanent settlements have only played a minor role in the tribes’ survival, though they have had relations with cities and their markets in order to sell their products and to procure daily necessities (Marx, 2006). The primary economic activity of the tribes was, and to a certain extent still is, animal husbandry through the natural grazing of sheep, goats and camels (Jabbur, 1995). Tribes have usually spoken Arabic dialects that differ from those spoken in urban centres (Cole, 2003). Other cultural markers such as tattoos, hairstyles, clothing, headdresses and veils have existed among them and have distinguished them from sedentary people in the villages and urban centres (ibid.). The growing sedentarisation of the tribes in the twentieth century has increased the number of tribesmen who are involved in agricultural pursuits (Manzardo, 1980). Salzman (1980) argues that working in agriculture does not contradict nomadism, noting that ‘the shift between nomadism and sedentarism, and between pastoralism and agriculture, as a current circumstance and set of activities, is in many respects not such an absolute break’ (p.  13). Arab tribes, whether they are nomadic or settled, farmers or herders, are people, regardless of the source of their livelihood, who claim an Arab

Syrian tribes and their importance   7 tribal identity and are governed by the traditions, laws and conventions of northern Arabia tribes (Toth, 2000).

Tribal mapping The tribe in Syria, as in the rest of the Arab world, is divided into smaller parallel sections – ‘asha’ir’ (clans) and ‘afkhad’ (lineages). Tribes could also sometimes be branches of a larger confederal system called tribal confederations that are ‘politically unified under a central authority’ (Khoury and Kostiner, 1991: p. 5), like the Aneza and Shammar confederations. In this section, I have tried to provide a complete list of the names of the most well-­known tribes in Syria today. In my survey of the Arab tribes in Syria, I consulted with Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir of the Baggara tribe, Sheikh Mohammad Mzeid Terkawi of the Turki tribe, Sheikh Ahmad Sa’d Melhem of the al-­Jabbur tribe and Sheikh Nasser al-­Harir of the al-­Hariri tribe. I have also used some of the most important books written by historians, travellers and researchers who travelled to Syria or who come from Syria itself, including Muller’s (1931) book in French, En Syrie Avec Les Bedouins. Les Tribus Du Desert; the Syrian historian Zakaria’s (1983) book in Arabic, A’ishair al-­Sham (Tribes of the Levant); the German archaeologist Oppenheim’s (1939) book in German, Die Beduinen; Lewis’ (1987) book, Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800–1980 and Jabbur’s (1995) book, The Bedouins and the Desert, Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East. Facing the same problem that Jabbur encountered in his survey, I found that some researchers promoted the clan to a tribe or promoted the tribe to a confederation or demoted the confederation to a tribe, while others placed the clans at the same level as the tribes. In the table below I try to be as accurate as possible. It should be noted that tribes with a small population or those which did not have a political role in Syrian history or contemporary times are not mentioned in this table. It is nearly impossible to estimate the number of people each tribe consists of, however, historical studies and the general knowledge of local inhabitants can tell us which tribes are bigger than others, based on their distribution, their grazing land and the number of villages they have. The purpose of this mapping is to go beyond identifying the names of the tribes in Syria and to provide brief information about each one, including the political and social importance of each in Syria’s contemporary history and in recent events, thus highlighting the importance of this study. Below is a list of the names of the major confederations or tribes followed by a brief description that includes location and any other significant information. •

Shammar: It is a large tribal confederation that emigrated from the Arabian Peninsula to Syria and Iraq in the seventeenth century. It settled down in al-­ Jazira on the Syrian–Iraqi borders that did not exist at that time. After the French-­British mandate of Syria and Iraq, the confederation was split between Shammar of Syria, headed by Sheikh Dham al-­Jarba, and Shammar of Iraq, headed by Sheikh Ajil al-­Yawir. The most important tribes of this confederation are al-­Khursah and al-­Aslam. They are settled in different

8   Syrian tribes and their importance

•

•

•

•

•

v­ illages in al-­Hassakeh governorate. The stronghold of Shammar is the town of Tal Alw where its Sheikh and his family live. Owing to the oil boom in the Arab Gulf, Shammar tribesmen emigrated back to Saudi Arabia in large numbers. Therefore, their current numbers in Syria are small but they continue to have power and influence because of their kinship ties with their relatives in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In order to counterbalance other large tribes like al-­Jabbur and Tay in al-­Hassakeh, Shammar allied itself with the Kurds in the recent civil war. al-­Jabbur: One of the largest tribes in the al-­Hassakeh governorate. Historically it has always existed on the right side of the Khabur river. It was part of the al-­Jabbur tribe in Iraq until the Sykes-­Picot agreement divided the region and thus split the tribe into two sections. With the passage of time, large parts of this tribe settled down in the city of al-­Hassakeh. Its leader was Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-­Meslet who passed away in 2006. Sheikh Abdul Aziz was the brother-­in-law of the late Saudi King Abdul Aziz and played an important role in facilitating the relationship between the Syrian regime and the Saudi monarchy. This tribe played an important role in aiding the Syrian regime in crushing the Kurdish uprising in 2004. Tay: It is a prominent tribe in al-­Hassakeh governorate that is split between Syria and Iraq. They settled in large numbers in the city of Qamishli that became their sphere of influence. It is headed by Sheikh Mohammad al-­ Fares, a member of the Syrian Parliament. This tribe played an important role in quelling the Kurdish uprising alongside the al-­Jabbur tribe in 2004. For more details on the role of Tay and al-­Jabbur in crushing the Kurdish uprising in 2004, see Chapter 5. Adwan: This tribe ranks fourth in size in the al-­Hassakeh governorate. It mainly inhabits the town of Ras al-­Ayn on the Syrian–Turkish border. Its Sheikh, Mohammad al-­Helew was a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years. He defected from the Syrian government in the early months of the Syrian uprising and then came back to Syria to live in al-­Hassakeh after the government pardoned him. Baggara: One of the largest tribes in Syria that is split between Syria and Iraq. It is located on the left bank of the Euphrates River in the governorate of Deir Ezzor, making the village of Mhemidieh its stronghold in that region. Part of the tribe migrated to Aleppo in the nineteenth century and settled in the countryside there. It was headed by Sheikh Raghib al-­Bashir who was a member of the Syrian Parliament during the French mandate and the independence period. He was followed by his son Nawaf al-­Bashir who was a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years. He joined the Syrian opposition and became one of its main figures after the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2012. He came back to Syria in 2017 after the Syrian government pardoned him and he has been recruiting members of his tribe to fight alongside the regime militias in Deir Ezzor. Aqaydat: The second largest tribe in Deir Ezzor. They also exist in smaller numbers in Iraq. Part of the tribe migrated to Homs and Hama in

Syrian tribes and their importance   9

•

the nineteenth century and that is why the tribe exists in that area of the country too. This tribe consists of a few clans of different ancestors that allied with one another in the eighteenth century to confront the camel-­ riding Shammar coming from the Arabian Peninsula, and managed to drive them north to al-­Hassakeh. The most important clans are the Sheitat, Bakir, Bu Kamil, Mashahda, Bu Khabour and Hasoon. The traditional Sheikhly families of the Aqaydat were the al-­Hifl of the Bu Kamil clan of the village of Dhiban, the Nijris of the Bu Hassan clan of the village of Sweidan al-­Shammiyya, and the al-­Dandal of the Hasoon clan of the village of al-­Sweyiyah (Heras et al., 2017). One of these Sheikhs was Sheikh Aboud Jad’an al-­Hefel, who was a member of the Syrian Parliament in the 1940s until his death in the late 1980s. He was followed by his son Khalil who continued to be a member of the Syrian Parliament until he was assassinated by an unknown opposition group in Deir Ezzor in 2012. Sheikh Faisal Nijris of the Aqaydat tribe was a renowned member of the Ba’th Party and a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years. Sheikh Dham Dandal of the Hasoon clan was a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years too. The Aqaydat tribe played an important role in stabilising the regime of Hafez al-­Assad through joining the army and security apparatus in large numbers. For more details on the Aqaydat and their role in the Syrian army, see Chapter 4. Busha’ban: A large group of clans mainly inhabiting the governorate of Raqqa, but also present in small numbers in al-­Hassakeh and the countryside of Aleppo. It is believed that they are distantly related, however, they united to face the waves of the camel-­riding Fad’an tribe coming from the Arabian Peninsula to Raqqa in the seventeenth century. The following are the most important clans of this tribe. Firstly, the Sabkha clan which historically competed with the Afadilah, also a Bu-­sha’ban clan, for power and influence in Raqqa. It was headed by Sheikh Anwar Rakan who was followed by his son Abd al-­Mohsen who became a member of the Syrian Parliament during Bashar al-­Assad’s reign. Secondly, the Afadilah clan which was historically headed by the Hweidi family of whom Sheikh Mohammad Hweidi was a member of the Syrian Parliament during the French mandate, to be followed by his son Faisal who became a member of the Syrian Parliament during Hafez al-­Assad’s rule. He was also a prominent member of the peasants’ union in Raqqa. Thirdly, the al-­Walda clan which is headed by Sheikh Shawakh Ahmad al-­Bursan. This clan was moved gradually to the al-­Hassakeh governorate after their villages were merged by the creation of the al-­Assad lake. They were granted new lands on the Syrian–Turkish border to create the Arab belt, as will be seen in Chapter 4. Its leader, Sheikh Shawakh, was awarded a permanent membership of the Syrian Parliament for his services in creating the Arab belt. Fourthly, the Bu Bana clan, which inhabits villages in the countryside of Aleppo near the Manbej area. The clan was led by Sheikh Dayyab al-­Mashi who was a member of the Syrian Parliament for more than fifty years. His clan played an important

10   Syrian tribes and their importance

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role in assisting the Syrian regime, quelling the Muslim Brotherhood protests in Aleppo in the 1980s. For more details on the Busha’ban clans and their role in supporting Hafez al-­Assad’s regime, see Chapter 4. Aneza: It is a large tribal confederation that migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to Syria in the seventeenth century alongside Shammar. Its tribes settled down in different parts of Syria. It should be noted that with the oil boom in Saudi Arabia, large parts of this confederation migrated back for better economic opportunities. Many of them kept Syrian citizenships and continued to move back and forth between Syria and Saudi Arabia, though their numbers in Syria decreased dramatically. For example, nearly 95% of Rwalla tribe members left Syria completely, which is why they are not mentioned in this survey. The tribes who decided to stay in Syria continued to have influence and prestige because of their wealth and their connection with the royal family in Saudi Arabia. This is a list of the names of the Aneza tribes in Syria. First, the Fad’an tribe which migrated to Syria in the eighteenth century and settled down in the Raqqa governorate thereafter. One of its most important leaders was Sheikh Mujhim Ibn Mheid who declared Raqqa an independent state after the withdrawal of the Ottomans from Syria in 1916. He was a member of the Syrian Parliament during the French mandate that awarded him many gifts for supporting their battles in Deir Ezzor. The tribe’s latest leader, Khalil Kashish, was assassinated by the Islamic State, after its capture of Raqqa, for his connections with Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the Hasanah tribe which inhabits villages to the east of Homs city with their main stronghold in the Bouida village. Their leader, Sheikh Trad Melhem, was among the tribal leaders who entered Damascus with King Faisal after the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916. Its current leader, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Trad Melhem, is a member of the Syrian Parliament and continued to support the Syrian regime until now. Thirdly, the Sba’ah tribe that inhabits areas around Palmyra. Their numbers decreased dramatically because they migrated back to Saudi Arabia. Those who decided to stay in Syria are among the few tribes that still practise a completely nomadic life by raising large numbers of camels. Its leader, Sheikh Trad al-­Mershid, lives in Saudi Arabia and considers himself more of a Saudi citizen than a Syrian. Fourthly, the Turki tribe which inhabits villages between Homs and Hama. Their numbers decreased to a large extent after the majority of its members migrated to Saudi Arabia. Its current Sheikh, Mohammad Mzeid Terkwai, holds Saudi citizenship and lives in Riyad. He was considered one of the most prominent Syrian opposition figures after the Syrian uprisng in 2012. For more details on Aneza and their connection with the royal family in Saudi Arabia, see Chapter 4. al-­Fadl: It is a tribe that is divided between the governorate of Quneitra in Syria,the countryside of Damascus and the Beqa valley pastures of Lebanon. Its leader, Sheikh Emir Mahmoud Faour, was among the three Bedouin leaders who entered Damascus with Emir Faisal in 1917. His son, Sheikh Faour Faour, was a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years. The

Syrian tribes and their importance   11

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latest Sheikh, Fadl al-­Faour, passed away a few months ago after many years of membership of the Syrian Parliament during Hafez and Bashar al-­ Assad’s reign, representing his tribe for the Quneitra governorate. al-­Zoubi: Despite the fact that this tribe, alongside al-­Hariri, consists mainly of peasants who have been growers of cereals for centuries, they are however akin to the Bedouin in their values and mode of conduct (Batatu, 1999). Al-­Zoubi is spread across at least 16 villages in the governorate of Dar’a with a strong presence in and around Dar’a city. This is a tribe that extends into Jordan where large numbers of them have Jordanian citizenship. The al-­Zoubi tribe gained power and political influence in the Ba’thist era of Syria when they joined the Ba’th Party in large numbers. This tribe was preferred by Hafez al-­Assad to al-­Hariri as a main supporter in the Hauran region. Many of its tribesmen were members of the Syrian Parliament, including Mahmoud al-­Zoubi, who was the Prime Minister of Syria for many years. This continued to be the case until the rise to power of Bashar al-­Assad who moved his support to Al-­Hariri. For more details on Mahmoud al-­Zoubi during Bashar al-­Assad’s reign, see Chapter 5. al-­Hariri: This tribe has always competed with the al-­Zoubi for power and influence in Hauran. Historically, it was headed by Sheikh Mohammad Al-­ Hariri, who was a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years. He was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Nasser Al-­Hariri,who became a member of the Syrian Parliament after Bashar al-­Assad came to power and continued to be until he defected from the Syrian regime as a result of its violence against the protestors in Dar’a in the early days of the uprising in 2012. For more details on tribal dynamics in Dar’a during the uprising, see Chapter 6. Nu’im: This tribe, in particular, is widely dispersed, across different Syrian governorates. It exists in the governorate of Quneitra, Dar’a, the countryside of Damascus, and it has a strong presence in villages around Homs and Idlib. Its members did not have a strong political role during Hafez al-­ Assad’s reign, owing to a schism among the tribe’s members involving the murder of one its Sheikhs. Their Sheikh in Homs is Mohammad Sfouk Nassif, who managed to become a member of the Syrian Parliament. He defected from the Syrian regime after the Syrian uprising and took refuge in Saudi Arabia. The Sheikh of Nu’im in Quneitra is Radwan Tahan who has served as a member of the Syrian Parliament for many years. He has played an important role in trying to strike deals between the regime and different rebel groups in the countryside of Damascus and Quneitra. Ammur: This tribe inhabits areas in the governorate of Homs in the countryside of Palmyra. With the passage of time, they settled in large numbers on the outskirts of Palmyra. Some of its tribesmen, like Mohammad Said Bkheitan, gained prominent positions in the army and security services. For more information on Mohammad Said Bkheitan and the Ammur tribe, see Chapters 4 and 5. Fawa’ira: This is one of the most powerful tribes settled in the city of Homs, mainly in Baba Amr district. They played an important role in the

12   Syrian tribes and their importance

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early days of the uprising against the regime in Baba Amr in 2012. Mahmoud al-­Fadous is the Sheikh of the tribe and he is a member of the Syrian Parliament and continued to rally for support for the regime even after the uprising in 2012. Hadidiyn: This tribe inhabits areas in the countryside of Aleppo, Hama and Idlib. There have been some allegations that the tribe was originally Alawite from Haddadun tribe and was forced by the Ottomans to convert into Sunni. The tribe is headed by Sheikh Nuri al-­Nawaf al-­Saleh whose sons were sentenced to death by Jabhat al-­Nusra for their cooperation with the Syrian regime during the current Syrian civil war. The Hadidiyn tribe played an important role in helping the Syrian regime crush the Muslim Brotherhood revolt in 1982. For details on this subject, see Chapter 4. Mawali: The majority of this tribe has settled in around 60 villages in the countryside of Idlib. They also exist in small numbers in the countryside of Homs. The tribe is led by Sheikh Jamal al-­Shaysh. It was among the first tribes to carry arms against the Syrian regime during the Syrian uprising in 2012. Bani Khaled: This tribe exists in the governorate of Homs and settled in large numbers in the district of Baba Amr in the city of Homs. Although the real leader of this tribe is Talal al-­Basha, the Syrian regime of Hafez al-­ Assad supported Ahmad Nazal al-­Sheikh to lead the tribe and become a member of the Syrian Parliament, representing his tribe. This was one of the techniques employed by the Syrian regime when one of the tribal leaders did not comply with the system. For more details on manipulation of tribal ties during Hafez al-­Assad’s reign, see Chapter 4. Bani Ezz: The stronghold of this tribe is the village of Abu Dali in the countryside of Idlib. The Sheikh of Bani Ezz, Ahmad al-­Darwish, who is a member of the Syrian Parliament, played an important role during the civil war in creating a tribal militia to preserve security in his region and fight alongside the Syrian regime forces. Albu Saraya: This is the third largest tribe in Deir Ezzor after Aqaydat and Baggara. The traditional Sheikhly family of this tribe is the al-­Fayyad family. Its Sheikh, Mhanna al-­Fayyad, is a member of the Syrian Parliament and was arrested by Islamist fighters when they captured Deir Ezzor in 2013. When they released him at a later stage, he escaped to Damascus where he started working on recruiting people from his tribe to join the national defence militias of the Syrian government. When the Syrian army drove ISIS out of Deir Ezzor, Sheikh Mhanna was among the militias that entered Deir Ezzor.

Methodology My research for this book, though not necessarily in its actual socio-­political form, started long before the work on this book, as the initial contact with the Arab tribes came during a professional experience that extended from 2004 until

Syrian tribes and their importance   13

Map 1.2  Distribution of tribes in Syria.

2012. The review of some of the literature (academic literature, government, donors and international organisations’ reports) and historical information, as well as contact with the tribes concerned in this research, started during a work experience placement. This experience combined working with international organisations such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and government bodies such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Commission for al-­Badia Management and Development. In general, my methodology involves a review of, and creation of a database derived from, the literature written on the tribes, including academic texts, media outlets and material published on the internet. I have also used direct interviews which occurred during my visit to Turkey in July 2014 and Skype interviews with tribesmen and influential tribal leaders. The literature review started by focusing on the rare academic publications on the tribes of Syria including Dawn Chatty (1986), Jonathan Rae (1999), Sulayman Khalaf (1981), Norman Lewis (1987) and Jibrail Jabbur (1995), as well as other publications in Arabic by Zakaria (1983), al-­Khaled (1998) and Daher (1986). While none of these publications is focused purely on the political role

14   Syrian tribes and their importance of tribes or deals directly with the relationship between the tribe and the state, these authors touched on political issues in different parts of their research. I focused on those sections of their research and built on them to develop my own research. Some Syrian authors writing in Arabic, like Kredieh (1999), al-­Hasan (2013) and al-­Meslet (2001) belonged to different tribes and so each tried to glorify the role of their own tribe in Syrian history, and hence information produced by these authors was valuable but had to be verified through the interviews. The Syrian uprising that started in 2012 and the resurgence of tribalism during it led many journalists like Hassan Hassan (2012), Rania Abouzeid (2012) and Liz Sly (2014) to talk about the role of the tribes during the Syrian conflict. Their online articles involved interviews with tribal leaders that included brief discussions about the relationship between the state and the tribe in Syria. These online articles have been reviewed carefully and proved very useful in understanding the connection between the current role of the tribes and their past relationship with the state. Different reports produced by international organisations like FAO, UNDP and IFAD on the environmental degradation of the Syrian Steppe, the drought in Syria and land tenure systems were important in helping me understand the relationship between the tribe and the state in contemporary Syria. The age of the internet has led to the proliferation of data produced by the tribes themselves and establishing a website for each tribe has been a prominent phenomenon (Boutaleb, 2012). Old interviews in Arabic with Syrian tribal leaders published on their own tribes’ websites provided a valuable source of information on some tribes. I travelled to Turkey in July 2014 where I spent one month in Gaziantep, about 70 km from the Syrian border. More than 100,000 Syrian refugees live in the city currently. Large numbers of these refugees belong to tribes coming from Deir Ezzor, al-­Hassakeh, Raqqa, Aleppo and Homs. Some of my friends who work for international organisations there introduced me to several of their contacts from the tribes whom I managed to meet and interview during my stay there. Interviews were recorded via a smart phone with the consent of the interviewee and all were later transcribed in Arabic. Some of the people I interviewed were comfortable knowing that I was conducting research for my PhD and that their anonymity would be maintained, while others had misgivings on the whole nature of research. For more on the limitations of the study, see the next section. The number of interviews that I conducted in Turkey was insufficient for my research and I therefore had to start thinking of alternative methods to recruit more participants for it and from this grew the idea of using social media. In the twenty-­first century, the internet has become a ‘a multi-­functional medium capable of facilitating communication, mobilisation, organisation and networking on a multitude of scales, from the local to the global’ and has thus inspired companies, government bodies and academics to use it as a way for researching, interpreting data and predicting future trends (Cantijoch et al., 2014: p. 2). In this regard, the concept of ‘social media’ networks is of high importance and I will try to clarify what the term means, using Kaplan and Haenlein’s

Syrian tribes and their importance   15 (2010) definition of it as ‘a group of internet applications that build on the technical foundations of the web and that allow the creation and exchange of user generated content’ (p. 61). They classify content community sites such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube as social media websites. Facebook has had over 845 million users since 2012 who spend more than 9.7 billion minutes per day on the site (Wilson et al., 2012). Scholars from a wide variety of disciplines including law, psychology, politics and information technology have recognised the importance of Facebook and have started using it as a medium to observe behaviour, test hypotheses and recruit participants from many countries and demographic groups (ibid.). The Arab uprisings were accompanied by a sharp increase in the use of social media websites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (O’Donnell, 2011). The purpose was to mobilise a large number of protesters and convey the image of public protests to the international media as TV channels cannot have reporters on the ground in authoritarian states. Moreover, as the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war that led to the displacement of millions to countries all over the world, more people have to use social media as a way to keep updated with the developments taking place on the ground and to keep in touch with their relatives scattered across the globe. Taking all these factors into consideration, I set up a Facebook page titled ‘Arab Tribes of Syria’. The page content was purely in Arabic. I invited a few friends of mine who belong to tribes to like the page and asked them to share the page among their friends. The description on the page presented it as a page that is interested in the Arab tribes of Syria, their past, present and future. The page admin was anonymous and was only revealed to those who decided to do an interview with me. Initially, I posted non-­political issues such as photos of previous renowned Sheikhs, beautiful places in the Syrian Desert and extracts of Bedouin poetry. In less than two months, the number of members in the page reached upwards of 3,000 people. The number of such members has exceeded 10,000 at the time of writing this book. I then started to raise political issues for discussion. For example, I posted a photo of Sheikh Dayyab al-­Mashi and I quoted him saying, ‘I sent my tribesmen to support Hafez al-­Assad to fight against the Muslim Brotherhood in Aleppo’, and asked members in the page to give their opinion on the role of the tribes in supporting Hafez al-­Assad’s regime in suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood revolt in the 1980s. I started to receive some comments and I knew from those comments that these people could potentially benefit my research. The next step would be to contact those people privately through the profile that shows my full name and what I am doing. My message included a brief introduction of myself, what I was working on in terms of PhD research and asked whether they would be happy to speak to me via Skype, phone or answer my questions in writing. Out of every ten people contacted, approximately one person was willing to speak to me but because the page included thousands of members, I ended up recruiting more than 30 people for my interviews. The majority of interviews were conducted via Skype, WhatsApp messenger or Facebook messenger. When these participants were not able to answer my questions on issues they did not

16   Syrian tribes and their importance know fully or had not heard of before, some even introduced me to other participants who were able to help. Some tribal leaders invited me to meet them in person during a conference they were attending in Oslo but time did not allow for this and we continued to communicate via Skype. Interviews were transcribed in Arabic and the main themes that support my research were integrated into the written text of the PhD. Some of the interviewees were telling stories about their tribe, their Sheikh or other incidents they were asked about. Stories have increasingly been recognised as important in social science and as long as they are used to illustrate or explain a model that has already been rigorously demonstrated, they can also play an active role in the development and evaluation of hypotheses (Gelman and Basbøll, 2014). Stories or anecdotes that were useful in supporting my main argument were translated into English and integrated into the text where appropriate. I checked the truthfulness of the stories and anecdotes by asking other interviewees whether they had heard the same story or not. All the stories that support my research have been cross-­checked with more than one person. The majority of those who were willing to speak to me oppose the regime in Syria, so, to get a more balanced view, I tried to get in touch with some people who live in regime controlled areas and support the regime’s policies. The other social media platform that was used for this research is YouTube. YouTube is one of the most popular video-­sharing sites in the world and it allows individuals to create and share media content with millions of other users worldwide (Cantijoch et al., 2014). Ajami (2012) described the Syrian civil war as ‘the first YouTube war’. He argues that the Syrian civil war was not brought to the outside world by journalists and TV channel reporters who are on the ground. Rather, the majority of its news was broadcast via YouTube after the events were recorded on mobile telephones. Because international media outlets were banned in Syria, the main source of information was private videos, sometimes taken by shaking hands and uploaded to YouTube (ABC, 2011). YouTube proved to be an important source for this research as well. For example, the Syrian regime media activists used YouTube as a way to show tribal support for the regime by streaming videos of loyalty tribal conferences. In other cases, some tribal leaders used YouTube as a way to announce their defection from the Syrian regime and their support of the opposition. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also used YouTube to promote the organisation and recruit more fighters. Some of these videos included information on the organisation’s relationship with the tribes in the areas it rules. The use of existing YouTube videos as data is increasingly common as it is easier for research to be undertaken with videos that are already available rather than videos generated by researchers for research (Jewitt, 2012). This could be extremely helpful, especially in cases of conflict where accessing the area could pose risks to the researcher.

Limitations of the study While conducting this research, a number of challenges have emerged which made this work difficult and occasionally dangerous. First, the fact that there is a

Syrian tribes and their importance   17 war in Syria prevented me from being in the field to interview people directly, accessing government reports and making field trips to the tribal regions. Even before the war took place, conducting research under the authoritarian regime was an extremely difficult task. While conducting research on Bedouin settlement in Syria in 2010, Dukhan (2014) argues that: The Syrian government’s reservations about any criticism prevented access to ministerial data and to the tribes themselves at grassroots level. The Syrian government was always reluctant to permit researchers much access to the communities and the regions of the tribes. Yet some access by qualified researchers through international projects did exist and such studies happened every few years. The majority of these studies were of an economic and environmental nature and the political relationship of the regime with the tribes was hardly discussed in international organisations’ reports. The large influx of refugees to Turkey and the neighbouring countries provided me with alternative ways of interviewing people in those countries, though travel to Lebanon and Jordan was not possible due to visa complications. While I was in Turkey, in Gaziantep trying to find people from the tribes to interview, many individuals had doubts about the nature of the work conducted. Many people refused to talk to me, suspecting that I was working for the military or security apparatus. Situations like this could have posed a direct risk to me. Gaziantep was a relatively safe place in 2014, but in 2015 there was a big blow to the freedom of journalists and researchers in Turkey when ISIS militants assassinated two Syrian activists and researchers in the city (Williams, 2015). As a PhD student covered by the university’s insurance, I could not return to the field without approval from the Risk Assessment Committee. The second challenge was with social media research. Facebook and YouTube proved to be very useful but some ethical considerations arose. Interviewers must normally seek the permission of interviewees if revealing their identity when writing up research for publication. Some participants agreed to have their identity revealed in the published work; however, given the current security situation in Syria, ‘it is possible that the interviewees’ safety may be compromised if their opinions or behaviours gain attention after being re-­ published in a different format’ (Cantijoch et al., 2014, p. 76). Therefore, it was necessary to anonymise the identity of the interviewees when publishing this work as a book. Debates over the structure and function of tribes In one of the most important books on the relationship between tribes and states titled, Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, more than ten researchers contributed to the book but they seem to have no agreement on the precise ­definition of a tribe. Because the term has been used to describe different kinds

18   Syrian tribes and their importance of groups, it is virtually impossible to produce a single clear definition covering all of these social formations (Khoury and Kostiner, 1991). ‘Tribe’ may be used loosely to describe a localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct in terms of customs, dialect or language and origins (Tapper, 1983). A short definition provided by Ernest Gellner, prominent Middle East sociologist, states that ‘a tribe is a local mutual-­aid association, whose members jointly help maintain order internally and defend the unit externally’ (Gellner, 1983: p. 437). For a large number of researchers, tribes act as political units based on kinship solidarity. For example, Ibn Khaldun, an important sociologist whose work is still cited when talking about tribes in the Arab world, argues that the assabiiyyah (cohesion or solidarity) is the feeling that enables the tribes to conquer the urbanised regions. After conquering the cities, the tribes start to gradually lose their assabiiyyah in the urban setting, leading to new conquests by other tribes that still retain the desert cohesiveness (Darling, 2007). Smith (2014) defines tribalism as a ‘traditional sentiment of blood unity that unites the members of the group to one another against all other groups’ (p. 1). The most commonly used principle regarding solidarity between tribesmen is Evans-­Pritchard’s (1969) segmentary lineage model. This model was presented in his book, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People, published in 1969, in which he describes the socio-­political organisation of southern Sudanese tribes. The model was later used to describe tribal dynamics in the Middle East. Evans-­Pritchard argues that although tribes may have leaders, their executive powers do not exist, so how can order be maintained in the absence of central authority? According to him, society is ‘symmetrically divided into subgroups until the stage of the nuclear family is reached’. The tribe is divided into smaller parallel sections – ‘asha’ir’ (clans) and ‘afkhad’ (lineages). In times of serious conflict, family members support one another based on kinship ties and if things become more difficult, they bring in distant relatives to help them even though they rarely see them on a daily basis. This is best expressed in the Arabic proverb, ‘I against my brother; I and my brother against my cousin; I and my brother and my cousin against the stranger’ (Bates and Rassam, 2000: p.  260). Many researchers have abandoned the segmentary lineage model, arguing that alliances between different units rely on other factors, distinct from the political ones. Among these were Emanuel Marx (1977) who argued that tribes are not primary political units, but economic subsistence units with a complex range of institutionalised relationships. According to Hourani (1991), the economic processes of rural Syria tended to produce tribalism, whether they were pastoral or agricultural, because the need for certain types of cooperation such as pastoral migration and harvesting provided the incentive for the formation of cooperative groups at the village or herding group level. In this regard, tribes are often depicted as nomadic, pastoralist and sometimes as peasants. Nomadism is defined as the movement of the household during the annual round of productive activities (Salzman, 1980). Pastoralism is defined as animal husbandry by natural grazing with some access

Syrian tribes and their importance   19 to crop cultivation (Chatty, 1986). Peasantry refers to family farmers who work in agriculture and animal rearing as the main means of livelihood (Shanin, 1973). After defining these terms, I will try to link them to the Arab tribes in Syria to examine the main debates around the ways in which the tribes could be nomadic, pastoralist or peasant. According to Jabbur (1995) and Mahhouk (1956), tribes in Syria can be divided into different types according to their traditional degree of nomadism. The most nomadic are those who secure their livelihood by raising camels and roaming deeply into the desert (e.g. the Sb’a tribe). Another type of tribe includes those who raise sheep and cattle but move less often than the previous type of Bedouin (e.g. the Bani Khaled tribe). They usually live on the outskirts of cities that hold large market centres. The third type of tribe is those who secure their livelihood by combining pastoralism and land cultivation and thus they were historically inclined to settle (e.g. the Hariri tribe). The three groups dressed like nomadic Bedouin, ate the same food and followed similar social customs of tribal honour and hospitality (Provence, 2005). On the other hand, (Interviewee 2, 2015) notes that she does not tend to classify the Bedouin in the way mentioned above because these are terms that were introduced by the British and French during their mandates over Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, and they strongly suggest that the nomad is backward and irrational and that settled farming life is modern. One prominent anthropologist with rich field experience in the Middle East believes being ‘Bedouin’ does not necessarily mean being nomadic or pastoralist. This approach then includes the self-­ identification of many Bedouin who have settled and no longer herd livestock (Eickelman, 1989). As Madawi Al-­Rasheed (1991) noted, the term ‘Bedouin’ referred not only to nomadic groups, but also to sedentarised tribes that ‘shared a set of images of themselves with regard to their tribal origin, values, attributes and qualities’ (p.  119). Recent archaeological evidence in the region suggests that Bedouin have moved back and forth between mobile livestock herding and farming over the centuries (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1996). It is unrealistic to consider the Bedouin in Syria as purely nomadic, roaming the desert all around the year, or as purely pastoralist, depending on raising animals as the only means of subsistence, or as purely settled peasants who depend mainly on agriculture to survive. The data clearly indicate that the Bedouin are engaged in complex and demanding forms of raising animals, cultivation and other types of jobs. As we look at the tribes in Syria, it becomes clear that there is a close interplay between grazing and cultivation, between the desert and the sown (Toth, 2000). There is an important debate that continues to the present day, even among the tribes themselves, about the different classes that the tribes have. Arab tribes in Syria are divided into ‘noble’ (Asil) and ‘common’ (Shawi) tribes. Historically, the common tribes were sheep herders who had to stay near their agricultural lands to find pasture for their herds, while the noble tribes roamed the desert herding camels and thus were more mobile and had greater prestige than the common tribes (Chatty, 1986). Interestingly, this dichotomy still exists

20   Syrian tribes and their importance between the two groups where the noble tribes consider themselves as the only Bedouin and call the other tribes Shawi or Fallahin. Some researchers like Todd et al. (2006) argue that ‘only the noble tribes qualify to be called Bedouin’ (p. 37). According to them, noble tribes trace their descent to Qahtan and come from the south of the Arabian Peninsula while common tribes descend from Adnan and come from the north of the Arabian Peninsula. They became Arabs through adoption of the language and customs and through marriage. With the passage of time and after the introduction of trucks and the decrease of the importance of the camels in mobility, the majority of the noble tribes started to raise sheep and goats too, so their economic and military superiority to the common tribes decreased. What revitalised this dichotomy was the discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf, in an area mainly inhabited by the camel herding tribes. Therefore, possessing larger sums of money than the common tribes made them consider themselves once again of a higher status. Whether nomadic, pastoralist, peasant, common or noble, what distinguishes the Arab tribes from other segments of the Syrian society in this study are four characteristics: 1 2 3 4

‘Kinship ties’, whether real or fictive, play a major role in defining the group and its actions ‘Common interests’, which include trying to get economic and political benefits for the group as much as possible A ‘homeland’ where each tribe, no matter how dispersed it is, still considers a certain town or village its stronghold where the majority of its tribesmen live and ‘Political authority’, which refers to the leader of the tribe that represents its interests internally and externally.

Framework for analysis The book will deal with the relationship between the state and the tribes through a framework which describes how relations between them go through a ‘natural history’ or ‘life-­cycle’ resembling that described by Ibn Khaldun (Baali, 1988), Vico (1968) and Turgot (1750). Tibi (1991) argues that in this succession, tribes become urban and are then overthrown by other tribes; there is no progress and the world does not move forward. Edward Said (1978) qualifies such views as attitudes reflecting the spirit of orientalism. It should be made clear here that this book does not follow such a line of argument. Rather, I try to present a historical framework for understanding the relationship between the state and the tribes. Firstly, when the state is strong, the tribes are weak and when the state is weak, the tribes are strong. Secondly, when tribes engage with states, there is a range of possible results. A tribe could be co-­opted, recognising state authority but maintaining its organisation. A tribe could also be coerced into the structure of the state with the aim of ending its distinct tribal culture (Salzman, 2016: p.  212). Submission is one of the tactics that tribes resort to when the state is

Syrian tribes and their importance   21 strong, to keep the structure of the tribe intact. Tribes compete with each other for power and influence and they sometimes create an alliance with the state against a competing tribe to subdue the opposition. This continuum of possibilities – co-­optation, coercion, submission and alliance – will be illustrated with the Syrian case of state-­tribe relations. Thirdly, the process of state formation in the Middle East has gone through various phases regarding state relations with the tribes. During the last century nationalist and socialist ideas that considered the tribes obstacles to development have spread, along with modernisation which therefore needed tribes to be eradicated as solitary social units, at least where regimes saw themselves as carrying out a modernising revolution, as was the case for the Nasserite and early Ba’thist regimes in Syria (1958–1970). Fourthly, when authoritarian states enter the phase of power consolidation and lose their revolutionary ideology, they begin to tolerate tribal patterns of organisation in order to divide and rule the ­population. The regime therefore rules indirectly by co-­opting the tribal leaders. Patron–­client relationships grow between the state and the chiefs of the tribes who become responsible for guaranteeing the distribution of resources gained through patronage, to their tribesmen. The period of Hafez al-­Assad’s power consolidation corresponds to this stage. Fifthly, as authoritarian regimes evolve into a post-­consolidation stage where the need to access economic resources, notably private investment is prioritised, the regime favours the privileged groups such as crony capitalists at the expense of former popular constituencies. This is paralleled in the tribes where the economic stratification between the Sheikhs and their tribesmen increases with the passage of time. Eventually Sheikhs pull out of the tribal system altogether to join the economic upper class, leaving their tribal populace without economic support. The weakening of the patronage networks leads to alienation of the tribesmen from their tribal leaders and from the regime. In Syria, this corresponds to the stage under Bashar al-­Assad (2000–2010). Sixthly, this causes the tribesmen to lead a revolt against the state and tribal bonds play an important role in activating and mobilising the protest movement against it. This corresponds to the stage of the Syrian uprising. To complete the cycle, the post-­ uprising reconstruction of authority in Syria will depend, as it always has depended, on deals between the new state elite and the tribes.

Structure of the book This book will cover the relationship between the tribe and the state from the Arab Revolt in 1916 and the role of the Arab Syrian tribes in it, to the current Syrian uprising-­turned-civil war in 2016, focusing on the role of the tribes in it. Thus it will follow a chronological order, focusing on a century that witnessed the rise of the first nation-­state in Syria in 1946. This first chapter provides a tribal map of Syria, and lays out the methodology and the framework of analysis governing the relationship between the state and the tribe. The second chapter will be a historical introduction to the rise of Islam and its relationship with the

22   Syrian tribes and their importance tribes. Ottoman and French policies towards the tribes will be explored in detail in this chapter too, which will shed light on how the weakness of the state gives strength to the tribe by providing many historical examples. The third chapter will focus on the rise of the first nation-­state in Syria from 1946 to 1970. This is an important era in the history of the Syrian state with regards to its relationship with the tribes, where the former tried to strip the latter of any power and influence they had. Modernisation and development policies were used to curtail the tribes’ traditional grazing system and their legal system as well. The fourth chapter will explore how the authoritarian regime of Hafez al-­Assad revived tribalism as a way of sustaining its power and patronage networks. The fifth chapter tries to analyse how Bashar al-­Assad’s narrowing down the base of alliances that included the Alawites and the Sunni bourgeois class of the major cities led to the marginalisation and the impoverishment of the tribes. The last chapter will explore the role of the tribes in the Syrian uprising and other tribal dynamics within the Syrian conflict. The conclusion tries to outline general patterns in the state-­tribe relationship in Syria and how these have changed over time.

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2 Tribes and the state From the rise of Islam to the French mandate over Syria

Introduction Anthropologists and political scientists are interested in studying and analysing the histories of the various societies they focus on. For them, it is very important to understand the historical events that shaped societies rather than dealing only with the current events. Studying history provides us with knowledge of the dynamics of a society and the changes that have occurred within it over time. In this regard, it is necessary to understand the long history of contact between the tribes and the various states that have governed Syria. This chapter starts by providing an historical introduction to the relationship between Islam and the tribes in Northern Arabia. It then briefly discusses the connection between the different Islamic Caliphates that ruled the region and the tribes until the takeover by the Ottoman Empire. Many writers refer to the period extending from 1840 until 1947 as the ‘age of the Sheikhs’ (Schoel, 2011: p. 102). Syria was under the rule of the Ottomans and the French authorities during this era. In the ‘age of the Sheikhs’, the Ottomans and later the French co-­opted tribal leaders by granting the Sheikhs honorary titles and private land holdings which led to the emergence of rich and powerful tribes which constituted a major problem for the formation of a nation-­state, as we will see later on. They also tried to gain control over the tribes by various means including the use of new technologies such as rifles and automobiles (Schoel, 2011). This chapter will argue that from the advent of Islam until the French mandate over Syria, different dynasties, states and ruling elites depended on the tribes to extend their rule over the remote areas of the country and benefited from the tribes’ military capacity. Therefore, the tribes have always enjoyed considerable independence regarding their own affairs and at times when the state became weak, the tribes encroached on the state’s boundaries, which led to conflict between the tribe and the state.

Historical introduction In the deserts of Northern Arabia, the Arab tribes have raised sheep and goats for millennia. The domestication of the camel was a turning point in the life of the tribes because it granted them greater mobility that allowed them to exploit

From Islam to the French mandate   27 the desert interior. The camel’s ability to bear heavy loads in addition to its resilience in enduring severe climatic conditions enabled the tribes to get out of their desert surroundings and establish connections with the settled areas. Around the fifth century AD, regional powers started to look upon the tribes of Northern Arabia for military support. The Persian Empire to the east competed with the Byzantine Empire to the west and the Himyar Kingdom to the south in Yemen over influence and dominance of the Arabian Peninsula (Adler, 2000). The Himyar supported the large Kinda tribe in Central Arabia, while the Byzantines subsidised the Ghassanids on the southern borders of Syria and the Persians financed the Lakhmids in Mesopotamia (Chatty, 1986). As a result of this international competition, large amounts of money reached the Arab tribes which led to the establishment of important caravan cities like Palmyra and Petra which flourished in Northern Arabia. However, it was Mecca, under the leadership of the Quraysh tribe that became the nexus of trade and pilgrimage in the wider region (Rae, 1999). Tribal engagement in raiding, feuding and fighting among themselves for livestock and territory continued until the seventh century ad. Coming from a tribe himself (the Qurayish tribe) the Prophet Mohammad preached the religion of Islam in Mecca and Medina in the early years of that century. His political, religious and military leadership framed an inclusive structure whereby the tribes had a common, God-­given identity as Muslims (Salzman, 2008). He adapted all the powerful tribal traditions of personal honour, brotherhood and tribal solidarity to strengthen his community (Chatty, 1986). By the end of his life, he had bonded together much of the settled and the moving tribes of the region. He subjugated the tribes and found an outlet for their war-­like spirit by unifying them in the face of the infidel enemy (Kay, 1978). Mohammad’s policy failed to dissolve the tribes. Instead it adapted them to the structure of the new state: the Islamic Umma that can be seen as having evolved from a tribal federation (Tibi, 1991). As Smith (1987) argues, Organized religions, particularly after the first enthusiastic phase, have had to come to terms with existing economic and cultural divisions, especially if they have received political expression; and as a result, we find religions often reinforcing, if not igniting, ethnic sentiments with which they have coalesced to form distinctive religious-­ethnic communities. (p. 35) Despite the fact that Islam brought many tribes together, tribal identity and Islamic identity have been in constant struggle ever since and every Muslim with a tribal background continued to live in a dilemma over how to balance the compulsions of the tribal background and the teachings of the Islamic faith (Ahmed, 2013). After the death of Mohammad in ad 632, the unity of the tribes began to fragment and his successor, the Caliph Abu Bakr, had to subjugate the tribes again using military force (Veccia, 1977). After unifying the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula again, the successors of Mohammad, Abuk Bakr, Omar and Uthman,

28   From Islam to the French mandate waged military campaigns to conquer places outside their region. These campaigns were carried out mainly by Bedouin warriors (Chatty, 1986). Arab tribes were led out of the peninsula by the Caliphs’ generals to attack the two great empires to the north, Byzantium and Persia (Kay, 1978). In a very short time, these two grand empires fell to strong attacks from the Bedouin tribes who gradually started to settle down in the newly conquered areas.

Arab tribes, from Islamic conquest to the Mamluks (635–1517) Thirty years after the death of Mohammad, the Umayyads, who have strong tribal affiliations, took over Islamic rule and made Damascus their capital. The life of the Bedouin seems to have been regarded as a reflection of past grandeur by many Umayyad Caliphs who continued to send their children to the Bedouin to acquire a tough education and desert virtues (Chatty, 1986). The following extract from a poem recited by Maysoun, the wife of the Umayyad Caliph Mu’waiyya, reflects the attitude mentioned above: ‘A tent that flutters in the wind is more comfortable to me than a great palace. The stubborn young camel following the caravan is nicer to me than a swift mule’ (ibid.). The Umayyds were the first Islamic government that formulated a specific tribal policy (Shoup, 1990). Bedouin troops were encouraged to settle in constructed garrison towns such as al-­Basrah, al-­Fustat and al-­Kufah (Hasan, 1978). Tribes coming from the Arabian Peninsula were separated from the non-­Arab population to prevent inter-­marriage with the local people in order to maintain Arab identity and to conserve the tribes as an organised force, ready to fight further battles at the borders of the Islamic Empire. New tribes were not allowed to move into any region unless they had close blood ties with the tribes inhabiting the region prior to the Islamic conquest in order to prevent infighting and keep the Caliphate stronghold stable. In this regard, Syria was a restricted area for all tribes except those related to the Bani Kalb which were established in Syria long before the rise of Islam (Hasan, 1978). The collapse of the Umayyad state marked the end of their tribal policy. In contrast to their predecessors, the Abbasids who ruled Syria from 750 until 1258 removed restrictions on tribal migration (Shoup, 1990). As a result of this policy, new groups entered Syria and three large tribal confederations managed to gain control of most of the rural areas of Greater Syria. The Qaysi gained control of the area of northern Aleppo while the Bani Kalb controlled the area around Damascus and the Bani Tay ruled the region of Transjordan and large parts of Palestine (Kennedy, 2013). The Abbasids were not popular in Syria and so they moved the capital from Damascus to Baghdad. Arab tribes were seen as more loyal to the Umayyads so the Abbasids removed them from the Caliphate armies and replaced them with dependent slave and client forces (Lapidus, 1991). Moreover, the Abbasids replaced the Arab Sheikhs with administrators drawn from the former Byzantine and Sasanian bureaucracies. In doing so, the Abbasids started to replace Arab rule with a kind of coalition government in

From Islam to the French mandate   29 which Iranian and Baghdadi Shiite scribes shared power with Turkish military slaves (Dennett, 1950). Anti-­Abbasid feelings started to appear in different parts of rural Syria. The death of the Abbasid Caliph al-­Mutawakel led to the rise of a rival Caliphate, the Fatimid, in ad 909 (Brett, 2002). The Arab tribes of Syria found themselves in an autonomous area where these powers competed, the Fatimids in the south, the Byzantines in the north and the Abbasids in the east, so they made use of the situation by establishing semi-­autonomous states such as the Hamadanis in 927 in Aleppo, the Jarrahids in 977 in Palestine and Bani Amr in 1070 in Tripoli (Shoup, 1990). Around the eleventh century, Turkmen tribes from Central Asia moved into northern Syria and pushed the Arab tribes into the desert (Zakkar, 1971). The Turkmen tribes played an important role in assisting the Seljuks to move into Syria and assert their rule over it. The Seljuks did not depend on the Arab troops and restricted recruitment into the army to Turkish and Kurdish soldiers (Peacock, 2015). The Seljuks were followed by Atabeks and then by the Ayyubids. These three dynasties were non-­Arab (Turkish and Kurdish) and excluded the Arab tribes from their rule. They were powerful military regimes and brought repressive measures against the tribes who were pushed into the marginal regions for the most part as the central government extended its authority over most of the rural areas (Gibb, 1976). The Mamluks who were also non-­Arab replaced the Ayyubid dynasty in Syria. Around this time, the area was under threat of military campaigns from the Crusaders and the Mongols. In order to face the military crisis surrounding them, the Mamluks set up a series of frontier forts from which they patrolled the desert (Shoup, 1990). These forts were used to push the tribes out of the cultivated areas and restrict them to the desert and the marginal zones. The Mamluks were not Arab themselves so they did not trust the Arab tribes to fight with them against their enemies. Although the Mamluks managed to defeat the Mongols and the Crusaders and keep them away from Syria, continuous military action consumed the kingdom which was no longer able to spend money and manpower on protecting its frontier zone (Amitai-­ Preiss, 2008). Seeing that the Mamluks had become weak, a number of Arab tribes in Transjordan rose in a rebellion against them in 1501, capturing and sacking both Karak and Jerusalem (Peake, 1958). The Mamluks managed to defeat the tribes but their authority over them was never re-­established. The Ottomans defeated the Mamluks near Aleppo in 1516 and in the same year, they captured the rest of Syria and proceeded to rule it for the next 400 years.

Arab tribes and the politics of the state in the early Ottoman period (1516 until 1841) The Ottomans had initially tried to impose order and discipline over the tribes. The tribes had been semi-­autonomous for the last few decades during the Mamluk rule and it was difficult to reinstate restrictions. Tribes in Syria resented the stationing of troops in forts such as Palmyra and Karak (Hitti, 1970). For the first 100 years of Ottoman rule over Greater Syria, tribes were pushed back into

30   From Islam to the French mandate the remote desert regions, which led to an extended period of prosperity and expansion of the agricultural areas (Chatty, 1986). In the middle of the seventeenth century, the attention of the Ottoman Sultans was focused more on the Empire’s expansion into Europe and administering their Balkan territories than on the marginal areas of Syria. Hourani (1946) notes that troops were withdrawn from the districts of Damascus and Homs to support the Sultan Mohammad IV’s second attempt to conquer Vienna in 1529. This marked a period of rapid decline in effective Ottoman rule in large parts of Greater Syria. The Ottoman Empire was one of the superpowers in the world but its long-­term engagement in external wars with the Russians, the Safavids and other European countries made it unable to focus its attention on its internal front. For about 300 years of Ottoman rule in Syria, the tribes scarcely paid taxes to the Turkish government and they were very rarely intimidated by Turkish troops (Grant, 1937). Inter-­tribal wars continued and khuwa (protection fee) continued to be imposed on farmers and other weaker tribes by the powerful tribes. A large number of camel-­raising tribes began moving north from the Arabian Peninsula towards Syria looking for pasture and escaping the repressive Wahabbi movement in the eighteenth century. With this, they were challenging the rights of the tribes that were already established in Syria. The large tribal confederations of the Aneza and the Shammar exploited the reduction in power of the Ottoman Empire and continued to migrate towards Syria for a period that extended over 150 years. Moshe Ma’oz (1968) describes the coming of the Aneza to Syria as the greatest threat to both the Ottoman authorities and the Syrian rural population alike. He describes the Aneza as a confederation of nomadic tribes who had migrated from Najd during the eighteenth century and gained control over the area from the Euphrates to the Jordan and from Aleppo to Najd. During this period, the once powerful Mawali tribe were forced by the Aneza and the Shammar out of their grazing lands and were confined to the area between Aleppo and Hama, away from the Orontes River (Lewis, 1987). At a later stage, the Aneza and the Shammar started fighting and the latter was forced north to the Euphrates River in al-­Jazira. The common tribes which were already living there fought with the Shammar, lost the fighting and were made to pay khuwa to the Shammar. The fighting between the tribes led many peasants to neglect and desert their villages in the Euphrates River Valley. In response to this, the Ottomans tried to settle Turkmen tribes along the banks of the river where they were given lands that had been abandoned by their peasant proprietors (Masters, 2013). The Ottoman officials who were posted to the major cities of Syria found the tribes to be strange and puzzling to deal with. They gave the name of ‘Arabistan’ (the country of the Bedouin) to the Syrian Desert (Masters, 2013). Apart from the fact that the Ottomans were busy with their external wars, controlling the tribes was a difficult task because of their mobility. The tribes employed camels and horses and incredible knowledge of the terrain that they controlled. It was not until the arrival of the rifle in the nineteenth century that the Ottomans managed to break the tribes’ stranglehold on the rural areas (ibid.). The

From Islam to the French mandate   31 ­ ttomans were primarily concerned with the safety of the pilgrims travelling O from Damascus to Mecca. Sultan Sulayman had a new, less difficult road mapped out and ordered a number of new garrisons to be built on the route to protect the pilgrimage (Shoup, 1990). These garrisons were not enough and gave only minimal protection from possible raids by the tribes. Tribes whose territories were along the pilgrimage route received annual payments called surra from Ottoman authorities and in return they were expected to ensure security along their portions of the route (Toth, 2000). Conditions in Greater Syria remained much the same until the Egyptian invasion of 1831. One of the main objectives of Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt was to keep the tribes in check. Ibrahim Pasha had a large army in Syria that was estimated at 40,000 soldiers (Fawaz, 1995). He tried to ensure that their demands of wheat and grain were met. This demand for agricultural products stimulated the demand to increase the area of land under cultivation and the need to protect it (Lewis, 1987). For this purpose, Ibrahim Pasha sent some of his troops down the Euphrates Valley to occupy Deir Ezzor and establish a garrison there to maintain order in the area (ibid.). The Syrian historian Ahmad Wasfi Zakaria (1983) talks about this period, saying that Ibrahim Pasha forced the tribes to respect the authority of the state and protected the peasants from their attacks. Many peasants went back to their deserted villages and started cultivating their lands. Yet, as soon as the Egyptian army left Syria, the tribes went back into their old habits of raiding and looting. (p. 114)

Arab tribes and the politics of the state in the late Ottoman period (1840 until 1917) Modernisation policies from Tanzimat to Sultan Abdulhamid II There was a serious attempt at reform within the Ottoman Empire after 1840, known as the Tanzimat period, whereby new radical administrative reforms were tried (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009). At the time of these reforms, Ottoman interest in Arab and Kurdish subjects was increasing. This may be related to the experience of the Balkan crises and the Treaty of Berlin (1875–1878), in which the Ottoman Empire lost some two-­fifths of its territory and one-­fifth of its population (Krasner, 1999). The Ottomans had clearly become aware of the threat that the separatist movements in the Balkans posed to the stability and the future of the Ottoman Empire. The state had a project to prevent the deformation of its territories and generate Ottoman loyalty. The Ottomans sought European advisers to set in motion administrative reforms (Tanzimat) designed to bring the Ottoman state into the nineteenth century (Rogan, 1999). The reforms set up by the Ottomans differentiated between the centre and the periphery. The indigenous people, namely the tribes, living in the periphery, had to be assimilated

32   From Islam to the French mandate into the rest of the society in order to ensure the security and stability of the Empire. Trying to bring stability to the Empire’s central Islamic lands, the Ottoman authorities decided to pacify the Arab tribes using different methods which will be looked at in detail below. Since Ottoman modernisation took a long time to implement, more ‘traditional’ methods were used, particularly at the beginning of the pacification effort in the early nineteenth century. More modern approaches were only used later in the century. Subjugating the tribes Ibrahim Pasha’s methods of dealing with the tribes were not forgotten and the Ottoman authorities wanted to do as he had done: to subjugate the tribes and to establish the authority of the government in every corner of the country (Lewis, 1987). The first signs of a change in the balance of power between the tribes and the forces of the government appeared when the Ottoman fifth army corps were strengthened and deployed in large parts of the countryside. The Turkish regular army (Nizam) in the two Syrian provinces of Damascus and Aleppo numbered between 15,000 and 20,000 (Rae, 1999). A more aggressive attitude towards the tribes was adopted and larger and stronger expeditions were sent to attack them, with or without justification. For example, in 1843, the Wali of Aleppo sent a large number of soldiers to punish the Mawali tribe for intercepting traffic along the highway to Aleppo and its villages (Rae, 1999). The campaign succeeded in arresting eight Mawali Sheikhs. In return, the Mawali kidnapped the state tax collector and demanded the return of the Sheikhs in exchange for the state officer. The Aneza, relatively new to the region and untamed by the Aleppo authorities, were considered the most substantial threat to rural security at the time (Lancaster, 1981). Driven into the west by the drought, while camping near the river Orontes in the district of Hama, the Aneza were harassed by the irregular cavalry sent by the governor of Damascus and then attacked by a force from Aleppo reported to include 2,000 infantry and 400 irregular cavalry (Lewis, 1987). Other tribes of the Aneza close to the Euphrates were hunted down until they reached the banks of the river where the Ottoman soldiers robbed them of their flocks and surrounded them with a military cordon, forcing them to work in agriculture for a few months (ibid.). These tribes of Aneza made their escape southward to the desert in the countryside of Homs and never returned which explains the rarity of the Aneza tribesmen on the banks of the Euphrates nowadays. In Transjordan, the Bani Sakhr who had previously raided continuously in their region, suffered at the hands of a punitive expedition that forced them to submit and made them pay the costs of the expedition (Allinson, 2015). One of the new methods employed to constrain the Arab tribes was to transfer Turkmen tribes from Anatolia, settle them in strategic locations and employ them as a state police force (Douwes, 2000). The Ottomans, who sent expeditions to punish the tribes in Jordan for harassing Hajj caravans in 1867, attempted to establish settlements of loyal Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the

From Islam to the French mandate   33 ­ aucasus in areas dominated by Bedouin (Frantzman and Kark, 2011). It was C the first time in history that the troops of the Ottoman Empire used the rifle in their battle against the tribes, who were still using the sword in the 1860s. This tilted the balance of power towards the Ottoman in their military expeditions against the tribes but before long the tribes themselves were able to acquire the rifle. Another factor that led to a decrease in the power of the tribes was the appearance of the railways where each station had a little fortress that enabled the Ottoman authorities to move their soldiers quickly and easily into remote areas. The presence of the Ottoman military in permanent positions in the desert was minimal. Forces deployed in the desert could do little to protect the margins of cultivation and check the tribes’ migration. In 1845, Namik Pasha, governor of Aleppo, drew up plans for a system of fortified posts and villages along the desert line (Rae, 1999). At each garrison a detachment of infantry and artillery was to be stationed (ibid.). The main threat in the north was the Fad’an who summered near the desert line by the Euphrates (Rae, 1999). Building garrisons brought some peace to the cultivated areas because it protected them from the tribes’ raids. Two large garrisons were built in Deir Ezzor and Palmyra which were used to secure the Euphrates road where, by the end of the nineteenth century, foreign visitors could reach the ruins of Palmyra with relative ease (Lewis, 1955). Maintaining the garrisons was, however, expensive and it proved difficult to continuously supply them. The efforts to subjugate the tribes under the direct rule of the Ottoman state failed because they were over-­reliant on military power (Rogan, 1999). The tribes had little interest in cooperating with a state that used coercion instead of creating a system of incentives to gain adherence to the Ottoman rule of law. Moreover, military campaigns were expensive and tended to disrupt the local economy (ibid.). Troops left in remote garrisons were difficult to supply and they were often left vulnerable to attack from the surrounding tribes (Ochsenwald, 1984). The Ottomans’ battle to subjugate the tribes was a burden on the state treasury and so alternative policies were adopted. Divide and rule The second method that the Ottomans used was to exploit inter-­tribal rivalries and conflicts between the tribes themselves. This was an Ottoman practice that was used against the Druzes and the Maronites. Tribal disputes over grazing rights, and the desire for revenge over a death or disagreement on leadership were used by the Ottomans to promote strife, making the warring parties weak and easy prey for Ottoman intervention. The long-­standing feud between the Aneza and the Shammr, the Sardiyah and the Bani Sakhr were exploited to keep these powerful tribes hostile to each other (Shoup, 1990). One of the tactics included provoking strife between rival factions within one tribe. For example, in 1851, Muhammad Qubrusi Pasha, Wali of Aleppo invested Sheikh Jad’an Ibn Mheid of Fad’an as a chief of the Aneza tribes and then

34   From Islam to the French mandate visited his camp personally between lake Jabbul and Jabal alAhass where he was received with honour and the tribesmen announced their submission to the Sultan (Lewis, 1987). This made public the fact that the Wali favoured Jad’an, one of the two leading Sheikhs of the Fad’an and so his rival, Daham Ibn Qa’ishish, was antagonised. Previously, Daham had been nominated as the chief of the Aneza. Therefore, he rebelled against the Wali’s choice, made trouble against the desert line and was attacked by the government troops supported by Jad’an (ibid.). Every new Wali adopted this pattern of replacing the chiefs and each sheikh ‘strove to obtain a better bargain by showing how much harm he could do’ (Lewis, 1987: p. 27). Another tactic of the divide and rule policy included supplying friendly tribes with arms from the Ottoman army itself to support these tribes in securing the desert line set up by the Ottomans. (The next sections and chapters show that the French would do the same and so would Assad’s regime, to gain the support of the tribes against the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s.) The first tribe that secured access to rifles from the Ottomans was the Hadidiyn (Rae, 1999). When the Fad’an raided the Hadidiyn in 1869 and looted 15,000 of their sheep, the Hadidiyn were successful in retrieving all their plunder because they had guns while the Fad’an still used swords at that time (ibid.). Arming some tribes and leaving others without arms was a strategy to encourage the formation of local and provincial military alliances using Bedouin mobility, knowledge of the lands and material talents to control other unruly tribes. Another feature of the divide and rule method was to employ certain tribes as desert police. After trying to subjugate the Mawali for years, the Ottomans made a deal with them, employing them to monitor the desert between Aleppo and Damascus (Masters and Agoston, 2008). Some tribes of the Aneza were used around Deir Ezzor on the Euphrates to check the movements of the Shammar and the Hanadi were entrusted to patrol Palestine (Shoup, 1990). The divide and rule policy remained one of the main tools available to the governors of Damascus and Aleppo while the central authority of the Empire was busy sending troops to war overseas. In the short term, the policy proved to be successful because it weakened overall opposition to the state, however, the policy was short-­sighted because the direct result was endless feuds in which the inhabitants of the villages bordering the desert were the main losers. Inducement policy The Ottomans, like their predecessors such as the Romans and the Persians, followed a policy of granting privileges to tribal leaders including bribes and other inducements. For example, they encouraged the tribes to adopt a loyal attitude towards the state by giving them a stake in the orderly conduct of administration and trade (Douwes, 2000). The dominant tribal factions were granted privileges like the right to levy toll, and were offered lucrative contracts for the provision of camels and horses for the protection of caravans, convoys or even cultivated areas (ibid.). Tribes involved in the provision and protection of the pilgrimage

From Islam to the French mandate   35 received sizeable payments known as surra in order to facilitate the passage of the convoy of pilgrims (Oppenheim, 1939). Moreover, the Ottoman authorities granted agricultural lands to Sheikhs who were expected to gather taxes from their tribesmen (Lancaster, 1981). Additionally, the Ottomans registered land in the name of Sheikh Faour of Fadl tribe in the Golan where his tribesmen settled and began to combine farming with pastoralism (Chatty, 1977). The Sheikhs of the loyal tribes were treated with honour and received yearly payments. In return for these favours, they policed the desert and the cultivated border lands and at times provided auxiliaries to support Ottoman military efforts (Masters, 2013). It became a policy in the second half of the nineteenth century to bestow honorary titles on many Sheikhs such as ‘Agha’, ‘Bey’ and even ‘Pasha’ (Douwes, 2000). The Wali of Aleppo presented the leading Mawali Sheikh, Muhammad al-­Khurfan, with ceremonial robes, allocated him and his followers a grazing land along the river Dhahab and assisted them on occasion against their own tribal enemies (ibid.). The policy of alliance marriage was also adopted by the Ottoman authorities. For example, in 1846, the Wali of Aleppo Abdullah Bey married one of the daughters of Sheikh Daham of Aneza (Rae, 1999). This marriage enabled Abdullah Bey to benefit from the activities of the Aneza in the region and to be able to collect the regular state tax himself from the Aneza and other tribes in the region of Aleppo. The policy of bribes and other inducements adopted by the Ottomans had its own drawbacks and could sometimes imply the state was weak (Rae, 1999). The weakness of the state was expressed in certain cases in which the tribes only established friendly relationships with the state when the state duty exacted on the sales of their herds in the markets was decreased by half (Lewis, 1987). Settlement policy The Ottoman authorities used diplomacy and financial inducement in the form of land grants in order to settle the nomadic Bedouin tribes. Some families of the Hadidiyn and the Mawali tribes responded to Arslan’s Pasha Plan to settle them in 1860, beginning to cultivate and establish villages in the south of Aleppo (Rae, 1999). The Hadidiyn and the Mawali were sheep herding tribes and were familiar with cultivation so they were aware of the advantages of reaping their own crop instead of buying it from nearby villages, however, their farming was ‘desultory’ and they had no strong attachment to the land (Lewis, 1987). Some of the tribesmen were afraid that they would be recruited to the Turkish army should they have a permanent registered residence (al-­Faour, 1968). As it was seen in the previous section, the Ottomans granted tribal leaders large tracts of lands intending to induce them into settlement. For many Sheikhs, the land titles turned them into privately wealthy landowners who started to hire peasants to work the land for them as sharecroppers (Chatty, 1986). At this stage, Sheikhs hired peasants who would live on the land that was granted to them rather than their own tribesmen. They were concerned that agriculture may lead their tribesmen to settlement which would lead to conscription in the

36   From Islam to the French mandate Ottoman army. This can be demonstrated in the case of Sheikh Jad’an Ibn Muheid of the Fad’an and Sheikh Faour of the al-­Fadl who were both granted permission to register land in their names which enabled them to convert this ownership into power and influence over the peasants in their region (ibid.). Settlement during this period (1850–1900) was little more than a theoretical option for the tribes because continued nomadism was economically and socially more attractive to them (Lewis, 1987). In short, there was no economic reason to change because the market for camels and sheep was still profitable. Continued nomadism also maintained their freedom of action and autonomy because the tribes’ mobility was their strength (Nelson, 1973) as it enabled them to evade state control. Despite the Ottomans’ settlement plans, the great majority of the tribes remained nomadic, with a few exceptions who were attracted to agriculture in the boom years of the 1850s and 1860s. Bureaucratic penetration The elements of the modern Ottoman state created by the Tanzimat were applied to the periphery in stages. The first step was introducing the institutions of state bureaucracy and judiciary manned by civil servants who were moved among several posts in different provinces of the Empire (Rogan, 1999). For example, in 1868 the Ottomans established a Governorate of the Desert in the Syrian Steppe (Toth, 2006). This was along the Euphrates River in Deir Ezzor which has been governed from Aleppo before (Masters, 2013). This new governorate was created to become the major wheat producer after pacifying the tribes (ibid.). The other mission that this governorate was entrusted with was to keep a register of the tribes in the Syrian Desert. The second step of the Tanzimat reforms was to try and transform individuals in autonomous communities into Ottoman subjects. In this context, the establishment of the tribal school in Istanbul could be seen as an attempt to foster loyalty among the peripheral communities. By order of Sultan Abdulhamid II, a school was opened in Istanbul to provide education for the sons of tribal leaders (Rogan, 1996). The school was an example of social engineering aimed at fostering an allegiance to the Ottoman state within one of the most alienated segments of its society: the empire’s Arab tribes (ibid.). The Tanzimat reforms came too late as they were a desperate attempt to prop up a collapsing state. The new Desert Governorate failed to impose law and order in the Euphrates Valley so the vision of adapting the area for large-­scale wheat production did not materialise. Moreover, the tribal school was closed in 1907 after operating for 15 years and despite graduating waves of tribal youth, the Ottoman authorities lacked funding to keep it running.

First World War, the Arab Revolt and tribal loyalties In addition to accumulated tribal grievances created by the Ottoman reforms, the situation was made worse in the Levant by drought and locust infestation, the

From Islam to the French mandate   37 effects of which were greatly aggravated by the blockade imposed during the First World War on food imports from Egypt that had traditionally fed the population of the region in hard times (Masters, 2013). This political and economic situation made the tribes more prone to resistance and joining the Arab Revolt. Throughout the last period of Ottoman rule, new political ideas were emerging and the concept of Arab nationalism was gaining support (Chatty, 1986). In the years between 1910 and 1916, the crucial period for early Arab nationalist identity formation, Arab intellectuals used the theme of the noble Arabs of the desert in many of their publications (Schaebler, 2004). The image of the Arab tribes of the desert inspired authors like Butrus al-­Bustani, who was probably the first to write with pride about the notion of pure Arab blood (Hourani, 1983). In his book, Umm al-­Qura, Abd al-­Rahman al-­Kawakibi undertook a celebration of the Arab tribes and the Arabian Peninsula previously unheard of in Arab political literature (Schaebler, 2004). To further the cause of Arab independence, the Arab nationalists had to make use of the sheer manpower and military strength that the tribes possessed. This was advanced by the discourse in their literature that changed the image of the tribes from rebellious and barbarous outlaws of Ottoman order into victims of Ottoman injustice and from there turned them into heroes (ibid.). Although the majority of the tribes were illiterate and had no access to this literature, Sharif Hussein tried to use Arab nationalist ideas to incite the hatred of tribal leaders against the Ottomans who were described by him as the occupiers of the Arab lands (Alweimin, 2011). It is important to stress here, that the majority of tribal leaders who decided to join the Arab Revolt did not do so out of a belief in the cause of Arab nationalism. Rather, they were motivated by promises from Sharif Hussein that their economic and social status would be better in the promised Arab state after the defeat of the Ottomans, in addition to the payments that they received from the British army. On 5th June 1916, Hussien Ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, called for a revolt against the Ottoman rule. With the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, the Ottoman authorities in Syria tried to devalue Sharif ’s call for a revolt by reviving and encouraging tribal loyalties to Ottoman rule using a combination of interest and fear. The government flattered tribal leaders through the awarding of decorations and titles (Rogan, 1999). Those suspected of sympathies for the Arab Revolt suffered arrest, interrogation or even execution (ibid.). The Ottomans made a desperate campaign to recruit soldiers and many people from the tribes were conscripted to join it (al-­Faour, 1968). On the other hand, Sharif Hussein and the British agents in the region established contact with the leaders of the Arab tribes in the Syrian Desert and gained reassurance of their support for the Allied advance northwards (Hourani, 1946). Sharif Hussein formed an army that consisted of 30,000 Bedouin fighters (Khalaf, 1975). These were mainly from the Rwalla, the Bani Sakhr, the Agyal and the Howeitat tribes (Murphy, 2008). To create this army, Hussein made deals with these tribes who all had to be paid. Many of these tribes were capricious warriors fighting furiously when the looting was good (Khalaf, 1975). To connect the Arabian Peninsula with the Levant, the

38   From Islam to the French mandate leaders of the three Arab tribes around Damascus, the Rwalla, the al-­Fadl and the Hassanna, threw their support behind Amir Faisal’s movement for independence from Ottoman rule (Chatty, 1986). The Aneza tribes in Syria decided to join the revolt based on the decision of their kinsmen in the Arabian Peninsula who lost a lot of their economic privileges after the railway between Damascus and Medina was established (Sawan, 2015). This deprived them of the economic benefits they used to reap when they were entrusted to protect the pilgrims’ caravans from Damascus to Medina. On the other hand, the Ottomans formed local militias in Jordan from small local tribes that were loyal to them and the Ottoman resistance to the Arab Revolt’s advance was intense at the beginning. Most of the tribes in the region east of the Jordan River and the town of Karak were ‘firmly in the Ottoman camp’ and fought against the Hashemite forces (Rogan, 2011: p.  152). They feared repercussions and losing the money they had received from the Ottomans for their loyalty. The Ottomans also manipulated the old rivalries between the Hijaz and Transjordan tribes by depicting Hussein’s forces as a group of tribes that wanted to capture the Transjordanian territories and enslave their tribes. The Anglo-­Hashemite army managed to defeat the Ottoman tribal coalition in Jordan. The tribes fighting with the Ottomans in Jordan decided, at the last minute, to go through the motions without engaging in battle because they were secretly sent gold by Lawrence who promised to save their lives after the war (Rogan, 1999). The strategic goal of the Arab Revolt was to push north and link up with tribes in Syria and Mesopotamia. Though lacking military discipline, the Bedouin tribes fighting with Sharif knew the land intimately and could travel through the terrain at great speed (Khalaf, 1975). In September 1981, Amir Faisal entered Damascus accompanied by Sheikh Trad from the Hasanah and Sheikh Nuri Sha’lan from the Rwalla (Chatty, 1986). Correspondence between Sheikh Trad and Sharif Hussein before announcing the Arab revolt shows the support of the former for the Arab Revolt in Syria ­(al-­Hasan, 2013). In the north of Syria, Ibn Muheid of the Fad’an tribe supported the Arab Revolt in the Aleppo region when his forces attacked Ottoman military barracks and released prisoners from it (Kredieh, 1999). In the east of Syria, Sheikh Ramadan Shlash of the Aqaydat tribe sided with the Arab forces and helped defeat the Ottoman forces in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor (ibid.). Historians concentrate on the Hashemites and their alliance with the British and do not mention the ‘rebellious people of the desert’ and their important role in overthrowing the Ottoman rule in Syria (Schaebler, 2004: p.  197). The majority of the Arabs who fought against the Ottomans came from the Arab tribes. The urban population were already weakened by the hunger induced by the war so they chose not to participate in the revolt. It is questionable whether Amir Faisal’s forces could have ended Ottoman rule in the Arab land without tribal support. The Arab rule of Syria lasted less than two years and was later shattered by the imposition of the French mandate to Syria and Lebanon. By 1920, the French defeated the forces of King Faisal outside Damascus and asserted their control over the rest of Syria. The next sections will show how the French mandate authorities dealt with tribal issues.

From Islam to the French mandate   39

Arab tribes and the French mandate policies (1919 until 1947) As soon as the French extended their power over Syria, they tried to impose law and order all over the country. This required pacification of the tribes who were difficult to rule. The French established two military units which specialised in tribal pacification. The first was called ‘Controle Bedouin’ while the second was named ‘Meharistes’. While the first was tasked with maintaining security along tribal migratory routes, the second was tasked with gathering information about the tribes, their customs, leadership, genealogy, etc. (Neep, 2012). With the passage of time, the French realised that power alone does not always work and therefore they needed to employ other techniques to achieve their goals. The following sections will try to explain how the French ruled in the tribal regions of Syria and how they used the tribes as leverage against the nationalists. The pacification of the tribes At the beginning of the 1920s, the French were confronted by a series of rebellions in different parts of Syria against which they deployed military repression, notably employment of aerial warfare. From the Druze in the south, to the Alawites on the coast and Hannanu’s rebellion between Aleppo and Turkey, some Arab tribes also confronted the French mandatory authority. The tribes, most notably the Fad’an, under the leadership of Hajim Ibn Mheid, proclaimed an independent state based in Raqqa by the Euphrates, supported by the Turkish (Rae, 1999). They issued a declaration that confirmed this defiance and the protest against the French occupation of Syria (Lewis, 1987). Frustrated by their loss of Syria, the Turkish government supplied the Fad’an with artillery and machine guns. For more than a year, the Arab flag continued to fly over Raqqa until the French attacked the Fad’an from the air and the ground. The Fad’an camps were scattered and their state was finished as they had to retreat towards the Turkish border and camp there. It should be noted here that there was a struggle over the leadership of the Fad’an between Hajim Ibn Mheid and his nephew Mujhim Ibn Mheid who supported the French against his uncle and assisted them in capturing Aleppo in 1920. The French continued their campaign in the tribal regions and in 1921 orders were given to send troops to Deir Ezzor to put down a rebellion by the Aqaydat tribe (Velud, 2000). The main action took place in October of that year when the Aqaydat was bombed from the air and their camps were besieged until Deir Ezzor was secured and became stable (Lewis, 1987). Some other tribes, sympathetic to the Great Revolt in 1925, tried to rise against the French at the same time. Sheikh Ismail al-­Turk of the al-­Hariri tribe in Hauran joined the revolt supported by King Abdullah of Transjordan (Khoury, 1982). The French army intervened against al-­Hariri with support from the al-­Zoubi tribe who stood fully with the French who managed to regain areas taken by the al-­Hariri. Sheikh Ismail was forced to seek refuge in Jordan (al-­Jundi, 1960).

40   From Islam to the French mandate During the early years of the French mandate, inter-­tribal warfare was a common phenomenon in many parts of the country inhabited by the tribes. This was a result of the feuds and rivalries over the lands that were registered in some Sheikhs’ names during the Ottoman period. In addition to the above, raiding was one of the main financial resources of the tribes. The weak tribes that could not repel the stronger ones had to pay a protection money tax to them. Various tribes also claimed regular tribute, khuwa, from the sedentary cultivators or other weaker tribes (Elphinston, 1944). After the French had restored order by military means in the urban areas of Syria between December 1920 and summer of 1921 (Velud, 2000), the approach of using the ‘stick’ was adopted against the dissenting tribes. For example, in the spring of 1921, a quarrel took place between two large sheep herding tribes, the Mawali and the Hadidiyn, which developed into a bloody warfare in the district of Ma’rrat al-­Nu’man (Khoury, 1982). The French army intervened using its superior military power against the competing sides, forcing both tribes to surrender and sign a deal to preserve peace in their region. In general, the military pacification campaigns waged by the French produced good results. However, two important points are worth noting in this regard. Firstly, in his book ‘En Syrie avec les Bedouins’, Muller Victor (1931) who lived with the tribes of Syria for many years, offered the following advice to the French authorities: It is easier to keep the tribes onside than it is to force them. Seduction is better than constraint. What the tribes need is to be led, to become malleable, to transform their mentality. Perhaps, if we had understood the real nature of tribal raiding, we could have started that way. (p. 159) He suggested that as long as the objective of raiding was to seize animals from the herds of enemy tribes, then raiding was harmless and should be allowed to continue. Secondly, trying to repress tribal warfare and imposing peace could lead to tribal solidarity that could evolve towards something similar to the sentiments that rose against the Ottomans, i.e. nationalism (Neep, 2012). While the practice of using force was not completely stopped, it was suspended, to be used by the French authorities only when necessary. The mandate management of the tribal regions Until the opening of Suez Canal, Al-­Badia was recognised historically as a transit route between the East and the West (Grant, 1937). As a result, desert routes in Syria were neglected for a time until 1923 when a desert motorway between Damascus and Baghdad was opened (ibid.). In the same decade, the British and the French agreed to construct an oil pipeline across the Syrian Desert from Kirkuk in Iraq to Tripoli and Haifa (Hourani, 1946). Therefore, for the French, the tribal regions in the eastern part of Syria were a strategic area where they needed to guarantee continuous safe commerce and travel to Baghdad.

From Islam to the French mandate   41 While this part of Syria provided economic opportunities for the mandatory powers, it also posed serious risks. This area was home to an estimated 18,000 warriors from the tribes, armed with German and Turkish rifles left over from the First World War (Lewis, 1987). Their migration was a threat to the French plan to achieve socio-­political stability. Because of inter-­tribal relations that crossed boundaries and extended to the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, the French were concerned that links between Syrian tribes and their kin elsewhere could make these tribes potential channels for transmitting ‘radical Wahhabism to the Levantine population’ (Neep, 2012: p.  189). There was also a fear that the British mandate authorities in the neighbouring countries, Jordan and Iraq, would entice the Syrian Bedouin to leave, which could direct a blow to the French economic policy in Syria. Thus, strategic, economic and security issues needed to be managed rather than solved with coercion. The French decided to define particular territories for each of the major tribes. In collaboration with the British mandatory authorities, the French held a series of tribal conferences to formally divide the regions among the tribes spread across Syria, Iraq and Jordan (Rae, 1999). The recognised Sheikhs of the tribes were obliged to ensure the safety of the passage of goods over their tribes’ territories and to impose peace upon the tribes in their respective regions. The aforementioned Meharistes military unit divided the country between the al-­Badia (the Steppe) and the Ma’murah (the settled area) and created what it called a security line between the two areas. Tribes were not allowed to cross to the Ma’murah without permission from the French authorities. They were also obliged to hand over all their weapons once in the Ma’murah (ibid.). To solve feuds over grazing lands, the French drew lines and directional arrows on the tribes’ seasonal migration routes, which they tried to ensure that the Bedouin would adhere to (Neep, 2012). As long as they did not disturb the settled population, the tribes were encouraged to settle their own disputes and conduct their everyday life according to their traditional customary law (urf   ) (Chatty, 1986). Moreover, the French started a programme to dig new wells, restore old underground water systems and increase the number of mobile schools and mobile clinics in the tribal regions (Grant, 1937). To help monitor tribal migration within Syria and outside it, the French introduced a system of nomad identity cards that included registering any weapons, births, marriages and deaths (Thomas, 2003). Based on their previous experience with the tribal system in North Africa, the French initiated a system in which Sheikhs were co-­opted by giving them policing, military and financial means; in turn, they should keep the steppe and its populations in check for the mandate power (Velud, 2000). In a similar way to the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, the French issued a law that confirmed the right of the tribes to own land they brought under cultivation (Kark and Frantzman, 2012). This meant that the tribal leaders became wealthy as a result of receiving financial aid and land plots from the French in return for their loyalty to them. This allowed the French to use the tribes as leverage against the nationalists as we will see in the next section.

42   From Islam to the French mandate Using the tribes as a counterweight to the nationalist movement There is much literature about the rise of ethnic and sectarian rivalries between Sunnis and Alawites, Arab and non-­Arabs, Muslims and non-­Muslims during the French mandate period (Van Dam, 1996). There is not much information, however, about the divisions that existed between the Bedouin tribes and the urban and rural worlds of Syria. After many years trying to pacify the tribal regions using force, the suggestion was made to the French mandatory authorities that they may wish to use conciliatory policies that encourage a separate tribal identity that could be used against the nationalist movement. To weaken the movement of Arab nationalism that they considered a challenge to their authority, the French adopted the policy of divide and rule. The plan was to set rural groups in the countryside against the nationalists in the major cities and minorities like the Druzes and the Alawites against the Sunni majority (Khoury, 1987). The French divided Syria into six autonomous regions: one each for the Druze, the Alawites, the Turkish population in Alexandretta, a state for Damascus and Aleppo and a separate administration for the Arab tribes in the Syrian Steppe (Rae, 1999). The tribes were allowed to enjoy considerable autonomy in managing their own affairs. In order to use them as a counterweight to the nationalist movement, the tribes received generous treatment under the mandate. The French planned to rule indirectly through an authority structure that co-­opts the chief as a primary middleman between his tribe and the encapsulating power (Salzman, 1974). Tribal Sheikhs started receiving financial subsidies as well as military equipment from the French authorities in order to assure their loyalty (Thomas, 2003). Sheikhs were identified as the legitimate voice of their own tribe and the arbitrators of any disputes arising between their tribe members. In return for these awards, grants and subsidies, the tribes became a big asset for the French in their battles against the nationalists. In July 1920, Mujhim Ibn Mheid assisted French troops entering Aleppo. He exerted his influence northwards to achieve an agreement with Kurdish and the Shammar tribes creating a buffer zone of tribal allies who would support the mandate cause (Velud, 2000). Additionally, while fighting against Hananu’s rebellion in Aleppo in 1921, the Hadidiyn were sent against the Mawali who were assisting Hananu, and pitched battles were fought (Rae, 1999). The Hadidiyn received 12 additional villages, which had been confiscated from the Mawali since they were loyal to the French throughout Hananu’s rebellion (ibid.). During the nationalist struggle against the French, the Great Syrian revolt erupted between 1925 and 1927. It started in the Druze region and spread to all other areas of Syria, particularly the major cities like Damascus, Aleppo and Homs. The majority of the Arab tribes, with a few exceptions, decided to stand aside and played no major role in the revolt (Rae, 1999; Neep, 2012). After succeeding in quelling the revolt, the French understood that their conciliatory policies towards the tribes were bearing fruitful results. This encouraged them to further their policy and be even more generous to the tribes. The French tried to

From Islam to the French mandate   43 undermine the nationalist landowning elite of the cities through a system of land grants to the tribal Sheikhs (Rae, 1999). Substantial land grants were made to tribal Sheikhs in different parts of Syria, particularly north-­east al-­Jazira (Chatty, 2010). Moreover, to balance the nationalist bloc in the Syrian Parliament, a number of Sheikhs were appointed by the French as members of the Syrian Parliament. Emir Faour, Sheikh Milhem and Emir Sha’lan were among the 12 French-­appointed tribal deputies (Chatty, 2013). When the nationalist members submitted a bill calling for an end to the French mandatory rule, only one of these deputies appeared to vote while the rest abstained from taking a position (Chatty, 2010). The nationalists would retaliate when Syria gained its independence from the French as we will see in the next chapter.

Tribe–state dynamics throughout history The ebb and flow of state authority in the periphery has been a constant feature in the history of Northern Arabia. Ibn Khaldun, mentioned in the first chapter, talks about this cycle between the tribe and state. The Khaldunian cycle remains a valuable theory for understanding the socio-­economic and political consequences of the historical interactions between the tribe and the state in the Middle East (Fattah, 2010). According to Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory, as long as the state is strong, the tribes submit by adapting themselves to their economic and political environment. Once the state becomes weak, it becomes vulnerable to revolution by the tribal people it tried to dominate (Khaldun, 1377). Throughout history, empires, competing for power and influence in Northern Arabia, depended on different local tribes to achieve their economic and political purposes in the region. The Persian and Byzantine Empires made alliances with tribes in Northern Arabia to achieve their dominance in the region. These tribes became involved in proxy wars between the major powers. This continued to be the case until the rise of Islam when the Prophet Mohammad managed to create a tribal alliance to face these empires and conquer them. This is considered an important point in the history of the relationship between the tribe and the state because the tribes, which always seemed to be fighting each other, had been united for the first time by a religious identity to fight external enemies. Although assabiiyyah exists between members of the same tribe, it does not unify them with members of other tribes unless there is an enormous threat to the existence of all. Arab tribes needed religion to activate assabiiyyah between each other. Islam enabled them to restrain themselves and cooperate in a common cause (Lapidus, 1991). It could be said that the state of Islam exploited tribal ties for its conquests, however, it weakened tribal identity at the expense of the growing Muslim identity. This unity between the Arab tribes created by Islam did not last for long and as soon as the Prophet Mohammad died, disagreements started to rise between his potential successors, and the tribal coalition began to collapse. This again proves the validity of the Khaldunian cycle. With the death of the Prophet, the tribes saw weakness in the state he built so took this as an opportunity to rebel against it. His successor, Abu Bakr, brought the state back to

44   From Islam to the French mandate strength when he drove back the rebellious tribes and forced them back to the path of Islam. Since that time, every Muslim with a tribal background has been divided between belonging to his own tribe or to the Islamic Umma. The Umayyads were themselves an alliance of tribes that sided with the Caliph Muawiya Ibn Abu Sufyan against the Prophet’s cousin Ali Ibn Abi Taleb (Bewley, 2002). This could be considered a victory of the tribal identity over the Islamic one. Muawiya built his state along tribal lines and tried to prevent the Arab tribes from mixing with other ethnicities in Syria in order to keep the alliance stable. The Abbasids excluded the tribes from their rule and depended on Turkish military slaves, therefore as soon as their dynasty weakened and collapsed, the tribes established their own emirates in Syria (the Hamadanis and the Jarrahids). The following dynasties (the Seljuks, the Ayyubids and the Mamluks) took repressive controlling measures against the tribes when they were strong but as soon as they became weak, the tribes played an important role in deforming them by taking part in rebellions against them, exploiting their military and economic weakness. The Ottoman Empire conquered the Middle East in 1516 and was a strong state. According to the Khaldunian cycle, the tribes would be expected to submit to its authority. Although the Ottoman Empire authority was supreme at the external front, it was not strong enough at the internal front to keep the tribes disciplined. For around 300 years of Ottoman rule, the tribes in Greater Syria managed their own affairs independently and continued to attack the cultivated areas and state run cities. Fearful of losing other territories like the Balkans, the Ottomans shifted their attention to the periphery in Syria. Increased Ottoman activity in the Arab frontier was the beginning of a decline in tribal power and autonomy that would continue into the early years of the First World War (Toth, 2006). The balance of power was clearly tilted towards the Ottoman Empire as the introduction of machine guns during this era enabled the state to subjugate the tribes using heavier military equipment. This, however, did not last long as  the tribes were able to acquire the same military means that the state had, exploiting the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and taking part in a large revolt against the Ottomans that led to their departure from the Arab lands. The emergence of aerial bombardment by the Western Imperial Powers turned the balance of military power against the tribes and in favour of the state. Had the French wanted to crush the tribes and establish a real modern state, they could have done so but their policy of ‘divide and rule’ required strong and independent tribes in order to counterbalance the nascent Syrian nationalist movement. This enabled the tribes to remain important actors in the Syrian political scene until independence in 1947. Another aspect of the Khaldunian theory is that the tribes are themselves the main state-­builders or empire-­builders; the empire declines when the former tribal-­leadership-turned Sultans, lose touch with their former tribal followers and rely on settled troops or mercenaries. This was the case with the tribal leadership that played a significant role in the creation and later disintegration of most of the Islamic empires such as the Umayyad and Abbasid (Khoury and Kostiner,

From Islam to the French mandate   45 1991). The emergence of superior military equipment and efficient transport system in the modern period, starting in 1870, halted the power of the tribal leaders who had ceased to be state builders. State building passed into the hands of settled people, a reflection of how the power balance has turned against the tribes with the rise of the modern bureaucratic state in the Middle East that was ‘imported’ first by the Tanzimat, then the French occupation and was continued by the independent state as we will see in the third chapter. This balance of power was restored when Hafez al-­Assad, coming from the rural areas himself, made an alliance with the tribes and their leaders in order to build up his authoritarian state as we will see in the fourth chapter.

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3 Arab tribes and the rise of the nation-­state in Syria from 1946 until 1970

Introduction This chapter explores the interactions between the Arab tribes and the different independent governments that ruled Syria after the French mandate. During this period, the government’s economic and military power increased and the tribes were exposed to various forms of interference from the state. Ideology was considered an important tool for justifying state policies towards the tribes who were considered vestiges of the Arab past and an embarrassment in the contemporary world (Shoup, 1990). Based on this ideology, harsh measures were taken by the state to eradicate tribalism and nomadism. For example, large parts of the lands that were granted to the Sheikhs by the Ottomans and the French were confiscated by the state as a result of land reform measures. The state tried to break tribal power and extend its control into their regions by abolishing their traditional grazing system (hima), suppressing their customary law (urf ) and initiating settlement projects. This chapter argues that the rise of the nation-­state in Syria weakened the power of the tribes to a great extent because it granted long term power to the central government which was, for the first time in history, able to direct a strong blow to the tribes using its military and economic force.

Tribes and the independent state 1946–1958 Before the French troops left Syria, they handed over the responsibility of the tribes to the Syrian Ministry of Interior Affairs which held all the coercive means it required to end tribal autonomy (Lewis, 1987). The autonomy that the French had granted to the tribes was considered a betrayal to the liberal forces. Lina al-­ Hasan (2013) narrates the story of the quarrel that took place between the national bloc and the tribal bloc in the Syrian Parliament when Akram Hourani wrote a bill to the Syrian Parliament suggesting the abolishment of all tribal privileges. This suggestion led to an argument between Hourani and Sheikh Trad Melhem of the Hasanah who ended up pointing his pistol at Hourani. The police intervened and suspended the parliamentary session. Sheikh Trad was assassinated in Damascus following his argument with Hourani. While some Nu’im

50   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 tribesmen were accused of the crime, others referred to the secret role of Hourani in facilitating this assassination (ibid.). After the tribes were used as leverage by the French against the nationalist bloc, the newly independent government aimed to convert the tribes from an ‘unruly’ population into obedient citizens ruled by state law. Thus, this government followed an aggressive tribal policy that aimed to strip the Bedouin of their privileges and power (Chatty, 2010). Firstly, settling the tribes was considered an important part of the government’s strategy to weaken them. The Syrian Constitution of 1950 put forward the outline of the tribal policy. Article 158 stated the following: 1) the government shall endeavour to settle all the tribes. 2) A temporary law shall be enacted to regulate the affairs of the tribes until the completion of their settlement. 3) A special budget for the settlement of the tribes shall be allocated. (Awad, 1959: p. 8) Secondly, the government tried to abolish all the regulations that gave the tribes some kind of autonomy. For example, the ‘law of the tribes’ issued by the French in 1940 was annulled in 1953 and replaced by Decree No. 124 (Rae, 1999). The decree stated that only tribes that had been listed as ‘nomadic’ could carry arms within al-­Badia. The Minister of Interior Affairs had the power to remove any tribes from the ‘nomadic list’ and if he did so, the tribe would be reclassified as a settled community and reversion to nomadic life would not be possible (ibid.). Thirdly, when choosing their representatives in the parliament, the constitution of 1950 stated that ‘special provisions shall be included to meet the special circumstances of the tribes in order to make it possible for them to elect their representatives in the parliament’ (Awad, 1959: p. 8). Seats allocated for Sheikhs in the parliament were reduced in number. There were nine tribal seats during the French mandate whereas after 1950, they were only allocated six seats (Rae, 1999). In response to this procedure, tribal leaders organised a conference in 1954 in Damascus during which they elected a committee that was given the task of trying to make the government reverse its decision (Al-­ Masoudi, 2012). Akram Hourni accused Saudi Arabia of funding the conference and therefore trying to incite the tribes against the state (ibid.). Fourthly, a number of laws were issued in 1952 and 1953 to check the growing power of Sheikhs who controlled large areas of lands without the previous authorisation of the state (Mahhouk, 1956). Article 22 of the new constitution established the basis for land ownership, which considered land that was not used by the tribes for grazing or agricultural purposes to be state owned (Daher, 1986). Fifthly, the government established five boarding schools for the children of the tribes in different parts of the country in order to entice them into settling down after finishing their education (al-­Khaled, 1998). Sixthly, to bring its sovereignty to the outlying tribal regions, the government posted gendarmerie with the aim of imposing law and order and preventing an influx of arms for the Arab tribes

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   51 (Lewis, 1987). The case of Sheikh Ibn Mheid, chief of Fad’an is particularly illustrative of the trend of the increasing power of the state in the tribal regions. Suleiman Khalaf (1981) tells us how Ibn Mheid publicly gathered all the criminals in his region and said to them ‘Now I cannot protect anyone’ (p. 93). The government police forces entered his house in search of people who had committed public offences. The new authority of the state’s institutions started to dismantle the local traditional framework, which the tribal leaders had been able to preserve for so long. Implementation of the above policies was difficult in the early years of the state because there were frequent changes in government in addition to the emergence of pressing matters such as Palestine. The different governments that ruled Syria after independence failed to understand the strength of the tribal ties in Syria though the government theoretically achieved the expansion of its authority to the tribal regions. Practically speaking, however, the government procedures had very limited influence on the tribes’ autonomy and power. In fact, some of the tribal regions prospered and their Sheikhs became wealthy as their areas became open to agriculture that produced half of the country’s wheat and a considerable amount of barley, as we will see in the next section.

Agricultural revolution and Bedouin settlement Until the 1940s, the land in Syria was still cultivated using traditional animal-­ drawn wooden ploughs. The majority of the tribes still lived in tents and migrated with their tribesmen when the need for water and grass arose. Agricultural development in the tribal regions, particularly to the east and north of the country, was slow. By the middle of the decade, machinery started to be used in cultivation and some Sheikhs became more interested in agriculture than in raising sheep and other animals (Lewis, 1987). This agricultural revolution in ­al-­Jazira was sparked at the beginning of the Second World War, which led to a dramatic increase in the price of wheat (Rae, 1999). Even when the war was over, wheat prices continued to soar. The second phase of this revolution happened when cotton prices around the world increased as a result of the Korean War (Lewis, 1987). This crop required continuous irrigation so those who profited most were the tribes on the Euphrates who used motor pumps to move water from the river to the fields (Keilany, 1973). Of al-­Jazira agricultural land, 90% was owned by 40 Sheikhs at that time (Khader, 1984). Merchants and other businessmen from Aleppo and Damascus went to the Sheikhs in the al-­Jazira region and offered them a deal. These entrepreneurs offered tractors, steel ploughs, seeds and the large amount of capital required to achieve modern agricultural work. In return, the Sheikhs accepted the deal and took 10–15% of the profits (Ababsa, 2009). As time passed, the Sheikhs were able to buy their own machinery using the money they had made which enabled them to manage their own farming operations. The area of land ploughed, sown and harvested in Syria doubled during the 1940s and then doubled again in the following decade as a result of the newly introduced machinery (Lewis, 1987).

52   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 The tribal leaders’ lust for money increased significantly and most tribal leaders amassed great wealth. The new social structure witnessed the agglomeration of large areas of lands under tribal leaders who employed some of their tribesmen as sedentarised peasants (Khalaf, 1981). In some cases, tribesmen were working for the Sheikhs without wages. When the crop was ready, Sheikhs would send their closest relatives to take everything, leaving their tribesmen, on many occasions, with nothing. Only the worst land that was not ploughed was left for grazing all year round (Lewis, 1987). Many tribesmen were unhappy with the new developments because their traditional way of life had been disrupted and they gained nothing from these changes. Certain phrases were used to express their feelings of alienation from the Sheikhs. For example, some tribesmen of the Fad’an said, ‘We used to ride and camp with the Sheikh and his family. We were all people of the camel then. Now, they ride in their fine cars and we never see them.’ (Lewis, 1987: p. 162). Such feelings were shared by a large number of tribesmen throughout the country who became landless or were left with very limited land for grazing. Abdallah Hannah (2003) narrates how Sheikh Abdul Aziz Meslet of the al-­Jabbur tribe and Sheikh Ragheb al-­Bashir of the Baggara tribe and many other tribal leaders expelled many of their tribesmen from their lands so that they could be cultivated with tractors. The Sheikhs started to register the land in their names without the consent of their tribesmen. The statement of one of the tribesmen towards this behaviour reflects the detachment that had developed between the tribesmen and their leaders: ‘The person who kicks out his tribesmen from his land is not a real Sheikh because he loses his strength and glory by doing that.’ (Khalaf, 1981: p. 124). The transformation of the Sheikhs into feudal lords disconnected them from their traditional patterns of social interaction, responsibility and political dialogue with their tribesmen (Khalaf, 1981). The Sheikhs were no longer dependent on their tribesmen to support them socially or financially as they were able to secure their own resources. Moreover, this situation changed the balance of power between the common and noble tribes as some of the former became wealthy and as a result politically active. For example, Mujhim Ibn Mheid, Sheikh of the Fad’an, which was once the wealthiest and most powerful tribe in the Raqqa region, recognised the new situation with good grace by giving his daughter in marriage to a Sheikh of Afadilah (a common tribe) (Lewis, 1987). The steady process of extending cultivated land was addressed by the tribes in two ways. Some tribesmen began cultivating land and working as farmers for their Sheikhs while others maintained their nomadic lifestyle while beginning to reduce their migration and grazing as a result of the diminishing availability of pasture land (Chatty, 1986). This rapidly expanding agriculture led to the marginalisation of the pastoral economy of the tribes (Khalaf, 1981). This pushed numerous tribesmen to leave Syria completely and move back to their traditional homeland in Najd. As the Sheikhs’ wealth grew, their relations with urban notables became stronger. Fearing their increasing political activity and cooperation with the capitalists, the liberal forces represented by the Ba’th Party and the People’s Party in

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   53 the Syrian Parliament, tried to combat this growing political and economic power. Therefore, in 1956, these parties introduced a parliamentary bill calling for Sheikhs to be brought under close administrative control (Manzardo, 1980). The tribal Sheikhs in the parliament unified under the tribal bloc and, supported by the nationalist party (merchants and the city elite), were able to negotiate changes in the bill in their favour, maintaining their power and economic freedom (Chatty, 2010). In 1958, the Syrian Parliament voted for a union with Egypt in what was called the United Arab Republic. This was a crushing blow for the tribes and their leaders as we will see in the next section.

Abdel Nasser crushes the tribes 1958–1962 The Ba’th Party members, as we have seen in the previous section, were in an antagonistic situation with tribal leaders but they were unable to overcome them on their own. The union with Egypt, which the Ba’thists lobbied for, was seen as an opportunity to settle scores with their political opponents by gaining powerful influence in the government of the Syrian region during the union with Egypt (Izzeddin, 1981). After the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Syria and Egypt, a socialist system was founded in Syria. This period of the late fifties and early sixties witnessed the implementation of drastic measures against the tribes on social, political and economic levels. It seems that Nasser’s social background had played an important role in his political activity after seizing power in 1952. His family belonged to the peasants’ community in the village of Beni Moor in Upper Egypt (Woodward, 1992). Therefore, he had early experiences of the poor conditions of rural Egyptians and the way in which their life was dominated by the Omdas.1 Espousing socialism and Arab nationalism, Nasser saw tribalism as an antagonism to the peasants and Arab unity. This may have contributed to his early involvement in trying to limit tribal power to support the peasants’ community to which he belonged. He believed that liberation of the peasants and the elimination of feudalism was a first and necessary step for any kind of social progress in Egypt and Syria. Only three days after announcing the union between Syria and Egypt, President Nasser conducted a visit to Syria to celebrate the achievement. Part of his visit to Syria took him to al-­Hassakeh governorate where he met with tribal leaders (Interviewee 1, 2014). Sheikh Abd Alaziz al-­Meslet ordered 300 sheep to be slaughtered and cooked in honour of President Nasser’s visit. Friendly conversations were exchanged between Abdul Nasser and tribal leaders and he asked each one of them which tribe they belonged to. In return, the tribal leaders asked Abdul Nasser which tribe he belonged to which he answered ‘Bani Mura’ (al-­Jaberi, 2013). Despite the friendly atmosphere that surrounded the visit, Abdul Nasser, who came from a poor peasant family, was shocked by the extravagance and luxury that tribal leaders had in Syria while many of their tribesmen were landless and lacking basic necessities. Therefore, on the 28th September, a few months after the union, President Nasser revoked the law of the tribes of 1956, which was a modified form of the

54   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 law of the tribes issued by the French in 1940 (Lewis, 1987). This decree was a clear sign that the tribes must cease to possess any separate legal identity and thus the role of the tribal bloc in the Syrian Parliament was disabled (Chatty, 2010). It indicated that tribes and their Sheikhs must be subject to state civil law and as a result, they would have the same duties and rights as other citizens of the UAR (ibid.). As a result, the Sheikhs no longer had any authority over their tribesmen and they should not exercise any legal functions. Tribal boarding schools were closed and children of the tribes had to join the same schools as other Syrians (Daher, 1986). The decree was aimed at curtailing and destroying the jurisdiction of the tribes’ leadership known as urf. This procedure and its consequences will be discussed in detail in a separate section. Another change that seriously affected the tribal structure in Syria was the abolition of their ­traditional grazing system known as hima as part of the land reform measures. The reasons behind this act and its consequences will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter as well. Another important measure implemented after the union with Egypt was the passing of land reform laws that had a great impact on the whole agrarian structure of Syria. Law number 134 was passed on the 4th September 1958 and placed a limit on the ownership of agricultural land (Khalaf, 1981). The main objectives of this land reform were (a) to redistribute expropriated land in small plots among landless peasants, (b) to improve agricultural productivity and (c) to put an end to political, economic and social feudalism (Keilany, 1964). Akram Hourani, Vice President of the UAR by then, hailed the decree and said that ‘the tribes no longer constitute a state within the state and that this decree freed the tribesmen from slavery to their Sheikhs’ (Thompson, 2013: p. 215). Many tribal Sheikhs had their land expropriated for redistribution. Sheikhs and their families were openly discriminated against in the application of the new law (Shoup, 1990). Some tribesmen were granted tracts of land from between 10 and 50 hectares in the steppe area (Leybourne et al., 1993). The major flaw in the reform was its failure to make distinctions in the productivity of land depending on region, soil, climate, etc. (Hinnebusch, 1989b). The writers of the new land reform law copied it from the programme instituted in Egypt without modifying it to meet the different demands of Syria’s agricultural areas (Shoup, 1990). After the above mentioned procedures, delegations of Syrian landowners, including tribal leaders, travelled to Cairo to meet with Nasser and try to persuade him that recent decrees and decisions undertaken by his government were unsuitable for the Syrian region of the UAR (Jankowski, 2001). In the meeting they stated to Nasser that ‘Our reception halls are closed. We cannot regale our guests and we cannot feed the hungry anymore’ (Lange, 2006: p. 950). Their arguments failed to convince him to change his policy. Moreover, a badly planned revolt was attempted which involved the Sheikh of the Fad’an, Nuri Ibn Mheid (Lewis, 1987). He received arms and money from the Iraqis who gave him sanctuary after his conspiracy was revealed. According to Lewis, Nuri may have felt more tribal affinity with Nuri Said’s Iraq than with the Egyptian politicians who had declared their intention to strip Sheikhs of their power and their land.

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   55 After their protest against Nasser’s decisions, a few Sheikhs were arrested by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This was accompanied by a severe drought that hit the region and lasted for many years. The Rwalla tribe claim to have lost about 85% of their camel herds (Lancaster, 1981). The government did little to help the tribes overcome this catastrophe. These near-­famine conditions drove some tribesmen to seek work in the cities and drove others to start leaving Syria. Without political influence or economic resources, many Sheikhs, particularly those with kinship ties with Saudi Arabia, saw no reason to stay and left to live in Saudi Arabia. Some sections of the Aneza tribes left for Saudi Arabia, particularly the Fad’an, the Sb’a and the Rwalla (Chatty, 2010). This situation continued until Hafez al-­Assad came to power. Abdul Nasser’s policies sharply diminished the power and prestige of tribal leaders. The separation from Egypt was a brief period of ease for them as we will see in the next section.

Tribes after the separation from Egypt The union with Egypt did not achieve what the Ba’thists, who were marginalised by Nasser, had hoped. It ended with a coup that was not only supported by the Ba’thist army officers but also by industrialists and landowners who were badly affected by the application of the socialist decrees that resulted in the nationalisation of their companies and banks and the agrarian reform laws that decreased their land ownership. Nasser blamed what he described as the reactionary forces for the failure of the union. He stated that the people of Syria and Egypt hoped that unity would bring them freedom and socialism but the ‘dictatorship of landowning and capitalism ruled Syria before the union and continued to work against the union after 1958’ (Heydemann, 1999: p. 93). The separation from the UAR was a huge relief to landowners, the bourgeois class and tribal Sheikhs. The objectives of the coup were translated into policies by the new government. The process of denationalising banks and industrial companies started and the terms of the agrarian reform law were revised to suit the interests of landlords. New legislation was passed ‘which increased the maximum amount of both types of land’ (irrigated and arable) that could be held by one person and permitted the owner to select the land regardless of the rights of the people who had been settled on the land under the 1958 law (Holler, 1964: p. 33). The new law of agrarian reform ‘No. 3’ was passed by the new government and it aimed to undermine the foundations of the 1958 law (ibid.). The size of individual plots was increased to 200 hectares for irrigated lands and 600 hectares for non-­irrigated lands (Keilany, 1980). The size of permitted landholdings in al-­Jazira was increased and the Sheikhs in this region were also allowed to keep the same amount for their wives and for each child, with no maximum on the eligible number of dependents (Atallah, 1966). Parliamentary elections were held in 1961 and the results were strikingly similar to those of 1954 during which the power of the landed/tribal oligarchy was restored (Rabinovich, 1972). Tribal leaders in the governorate of Raqqa and

56   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 Deir Ezzor returned to Damascus as members of parliament (Khalaf, 1981). In a matter of weeks, they resumed their influential social, economic and political roles; however, the electoral process of 1961 reflected a radical change in the mechanisms by which Sheikhs motivated their tribesmen to vote for them. The traditional forms of securing political loyalty from the tribesmen were undermined. Tribesmen had lost faith in their Sheikhs whom they saw as people who could no longer secure the interests of all their tribe members. Rather than relying on the loyalty of their tribesmen, Sheikhs bought a significant portion of their votes (Khalaf, 1981). For example, Sheikh Hweidi of the Afadilah spent 360,000 Syrian pounds of his family wealth in order to succeed in the elections (ibid.). Thus the Sheikhs seem to have completely pulled away from their fellow peasants/tribesmen. Abolishing the nationalisation measures and curtailing the agrarian reform antagonised nationalists who regarded the new regime as ‘reactionary’ (Rabinovich, 1972). These measures were not in place for long before the Ba’thists seized power in the 1963 election and continued the political mobilisation that Nasser had left incomplete.

The Ba’th Party and the seizing of power in 1963 The Ba’th Party tried to build itself a base in the government, in parliament, in the army and in rural areas and so, by the 1950s, it was an ascendant political power. Since independence, many schools were opened in the tribal regions which allowed many people from the tribes access to education, leading some of them to university. Much of the tribal youth joined the Ba’th Party while studying in Damascus or Aleppo as it was a movement that preached the ideals of equality and revolution against the oppression that these youths had experienced from their Sheikhs. The Ba’th Party had an educated leadership drawn from rural towns and villages which was capable of expressing rural discontent (Hinnebusch, 1976). The preaching of agrarian reform ideas enabled the party to recruit people among the peasantry and hence undercut the urban dominance of politics under the oligarchy (Warriner, 1962). The party opened branches in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen which granted it unique Pan-­Arab stature and prestige (Hinnebusch, 2002). When the party started to gain a foothold in the tribal regions, it needed assistance from the members it had who were from the tribal community itself. The case of the party branch in Deir Ezzor is particularly illustrative of this situation. The party branch was founded through the sponsorship of Jallal al-­Saddyid who came from a prominent family in the Baggara tribe (Hannah, 2012). With time, Jallal al-­Saddyid was able to recruit more people from the tribes to the party as a result of his good personal links to the tribal elite (Hinnebusch, 1989a). The new generation of Ba’thist recruits were strongly influenced by the party ideology to the extent that these youths began to reject the tribal values of loyalty and revenge (ibid.). In response to the measures taken by the government during and after the separation from Egypt, various political and social groups who opposed the new

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   57 regime began to coordinate their activities. On 15th October 1962, massive demonstrations erupted (Al-­Akhras, 1972). The protesters condemned the Syrian government for its reactionary policies, demanding the application of the socialist decrees issued during the union. The separatist government responded with arrests and banned newspapers advocating these political ideas. The Ba’th Party newspaper (al-­Ba’th) was banned and some of its journalists and editors were arrested (ibid.). Disturbances increased and the government was unresponsive towards the people’s demands. The Ba’th Party did not hope to change the balance of power through parliamentary elections, knowing that the parliament was dominated by landlords, tribal Sheikhs and notables. On 8th March 1963, scores of peasants, workers and students marched towards government buildings and attacked the houses of the Prime Minister and other political leaders ­(al-­Akhras, 1972). The houses of a few Sheikhs who were members of the Syrian Parliament, like Sheikh Faisal Hweidi, were among those stormed by the protesters (Interviewee 1, 2014). Under the order of the secretive revolutionary council of the Ba’th Party, army units moved into Damascus on the same day, overthrowing the ‘separatist’ government, declaring that their movement intended to realise the goals of the Arab people through unity, liberty and socialism (Seale, 1988). Since that day, the major goal of the Ba’th Party was to speed the process of modernisation which entailed incorporating the tribes into a more settled society. The Party would endeavour to achieve this through different measures justified by their ideology as we will see in the next sections.

Tribes and tribalism in Ba’thist ideology The ideology of the Ba’th Party had a strong impact on Syrian politics. The ideology was exclusively Arab, carrying the slogan of ‘one Arab nation with an eternal message’. An understanding of Ba’thist ideology is essential for understanding contemporary Syria and this is best found in official party documents: its constitution, statements of policy, the Muntalaqat (Ideological Report) of the Sixth pan-­Arab Congress of 1963 and the writings of Ba’thist leaders, principally, Michel Aflaq, one of the main founders of the party (Devlin, 1979). This section will highlight the main texts in Ba’thist ideology that reject tribalism and nomadism and will try to briefly explain why tribalism was considered an obstacle to achieving the main goals of the party i.e. ‘unity, liberty and socialism’. An official party document on the party’s view of sectarianism, regionalism and tribalism stated that the party ‘considered that any social struggle that was based on regionalism, sectarianism or tribalism’ would be a struggle that threatens the livelihood and the existence of the people. Therefore, the party stated that Arabism in its humanitarian sense is the fundamental bond which binds people together and that any other loyalty is a deviation from the principles of nationalism which guarantee the progress of the Arab people (Van Dam, 1996: p. 146). The nomadic nature of the Arab tribes was specifically criticised in the Party documents. The Ba’th Constitution stated that

58   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 nomadism is a primitive social state. It decreases the national output and makes an important part of the nation a paralysed member and an obstacle to its development and progress. The party struggles for the sedentarisation of nomads by the grants of land and for the abolition of tribal custom (Art.43). (Devlin, 1979: p. 154) Aflaq, the party theoretician and co-­founding father (with Bitar) stated that that the Ba’th ideology of modernisation explicitly sought the transformation of traditional ‘tribal nomadic’ values into progressive socialist pan-­Arab ideology (Aflaq, 1976: p. 22). In the 1960s, the party announced its three main goals which are ‘unity, liberty and socialism’. For the Ba’th, the solution to the problems in the Arab countries lies in their unity. The Arabs have always formed one nation and their reunification in one state is the party’s main goal (Rabinovich, 1972: p. 10). The problems created by colonialist powers in the Arab world divided them into tribes and sects who made the pursuit of unity rather like the pursuit of an illusion. The struggle to unify the Arab world does not aim only to end political borders but tries to reform the Arab citizen’s personality by overcoming tribal, sectarian and ethnic divisions that exist in his community. Tribalism is associated with the struggles of certain groups to gain political rights or even independence from the state. Tribes in the Middle East were viewed by the Ba’th Party as ‘independent groups’ where kinship continues to divide individuals from the larger Arab nation (Bates and Rassam, 2000: p. 268). For the Ba’th Party, the path to liberty lies through struggling against the economic power and political domination of big landowners, businesses and commercial magnates in order to enable the people to live their lives without interference (Kaylani, 1972). For the party officials, landowning tribal Sheikhs who emerged as a new class in the 1950s began exercising political and economic control over their tribesmen to perpetuate their dominant position in society. Suleiman Khalaf narrates how these Sheikhs became agrarian capitalists who started driving Cadillacs and even began employing what are locally referred to as abid (in Arabic, slaves) as house servants and coffee makers (Khalaf, 1981). The liberty that the party seeks stands against this feudalism and tries to curb the enslavement that tribal leaders were exercising over people. This idea was enshrined in the original Ba’th Party constitution of 1947: ‘We are in need of the formation of the free, responsible independent, self-­conscious Arab individual (...) who is oblivious to tyranny, injustice and repression.’ (Hopwood, 1987: p. 133). When coming to power, the Ba’th Party announced that socialism had now emerged as a reality. According to Aflaq, socialism means rejection of the ‘putrid system’ where a few enjoy life while the rest go hungry (Abu Jaber, 1966: p.  111). ‘Article 28’ of the constitution states that all citizens are equal, thus exploitation of others is prohibited (ibid.). This conflicts with the deep-­ seated social cleavages that have pitted one class against another in Syria

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   59 (Antoun, 1991): landlords vs. peasants, tribal Sheikhs vs. tribesmen. In the tribal system Sheikhs and their families are at a higher level than the rest of the tribe and some tribes are more noble than others. The main Ba’thist strategy was aimed at social levelling, demolishing class inequalities that controlled property and the means of production (Hinnebusch, 1991).

Land reform and sedentarisation projects As we have seen above, the 1958 land reform procedures were badly and prematurely enacted. Moreover, during the short period after the breakup of the union, the maximum size of landholding permitted was raised. This was a period of relief for the Sheikhs who had started to lose their holdings during the union. Abdallah Hannah (2003) tells us how, after the UAR government was overthrown, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Meslet drove his car around the villages that he owned in 1961, telling his tribesmen ‘Your comrades have gone. I have nothing to give you. Go and complain to the new government and let us see what it can do!’ (p. 70). Sheikh Abdul Aziz meant that land reform measures could not be enacted after the fall of the union government and that his tribesmen could do nothing now because the new government would not support their rights. When the Ba’th Party took over in 1963, it introduced new land reform measures against landowners and accelerated the pace of the expropriation and redistribution of land until it reached its climax in 1966 (Keilany, 1980). This section will try to explain why these measures were taken by the Ba’th Party and how they affected tribal leaders and tribesmen respectively. It will finish by examining the party’s sedentarisation programmes which had the aim of settling more Bedouin and turning them into agriculturalists. The Syrian population suffered from a very unequal distribution of land before the onset of land reform under the UAR and then the Ba’th. This unequal distribution of land varied from one region to another, but overall, tribal leaders controlled 70% of irrigated lands and vast rain-­fed tracts (Khader, 1975). These were large landholdings that enabled them to maintain political and economic control over their tribesmen. For example, the al-­Brahim family of the Hadidiyn owned around 40,000 hectares while Rakan Ibn Mheid of the Sba’a owned around 30,000 hectares and the estates of the Shammar Sheikhs in al-­Jazira were considerably larger (Chatty, 2010). This situation established the structure of class exploitation and some forms of internal contradiction in the tribal system. Tribesmen started to work to serve the economic and political interests of their Sheikhs without receiving any relative benefit in return. The Sheikhs’ main concern became securing their own interests and the conditions of their domination i.e. buying property and houses in the city, providing the best education available for their children and trying to hold political positions. The increasingly worsening conditions of the tribesmen, in addition to their sense of deprivation, provided the appropriate conditions for land reform (Hinnebusch, 1982). As soon as it came to power, the Ba’th Party wanted to shift the balance of power from the city, where merchants, industrialists and large landowners were

60   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 concentrated, to the rural areas. Therefore, the big reforms of the Ba’th Party were not confined to the cities but also targeted the tribal regions of the country. Land reforms were obviously one of the main tools of the new regime in achieving this change, aiming to limit private land ownership and distribute the surplus among the peasants and tenants. For the purpose of implementing land reform measures in the tribal regions, expropriation committees were formed (Hinnebusch, 1989b). The Ba’thist government had no sympathy for the Sheikhs. Their agricultural properties were confiscated along with those of other landlords and feudalists. In the Raqqa governorate, these committees expropriated properties from the Sheikhs, leaving them with very small parcels of lands while others were left with nothing (Khalaf, 1991). For example, half of the land held by the Sha’lan family of the Rwalla tribe (about 60,000 acres) was confiscated in the name of agrarian land reform (Chatty, 1986) while the Fad’an Sheikhs lost all their land and the paramount Sheikh of the Afadilah lost most of his (Hinnebusch, 1989b). Land reforms destroyed the economic base of the Sheikhs and reversed their social status. The political power of this class was shattered completely and as a political class, they have nearly ceased to exist. Suleiman Khalaf (1981) describes this shift when he conveys what one of the Sheikhs of the Fad’an said to describe his situation before and after the reforms: (Kuna bil n im wasurna bil jahim), ‘we were in paradise and now we are in hell’. When their lands were confiscated, Sheikhs became economically powerless. After the destruction of their material base, represented by the large lands they owned, they were alienated from the political process as well when they were ousted from the public organisations set up by the Ba’th Party. With regards to the effect of land reform on the tribesmen themselves, three trends can be noted. Firstly, those who had a direct connection to the Sheikhs and had benefited from their previous feudalist position, left Syria with them to camp in Jordan, Iraq and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Many Syrian tribesmen started to work for the oil companies in the Arab Gulf or serve in the armed forces of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Lewis, 1987). Secondly, for another group, agriculture was more promising and large numbers of the tribesmen settled down to cultivation. Ba’thist policies favoured the tribesmen successfully cultivating much of the land which had been confiscated from the Sheikhs. Thirdly, a relatively small number of the tribes remained nomadic but they started to herd sheep rather than camels. It is likely that more tribesmen settled down in the wake of the land reform of the 1960s than in any comparable earlier period (Lewis, 1987). Government efforts to settle the tribes met with some success in al-­Jazira where conditions for settled farming have been improved through irrigation and agricultural development, but they were not very effective in al-­Badia where no favourable alternatives could be offered as a substitute for the pastoralist nomadic way of life (Nyrop, 1971). Of the Mawali and the Hadidiyn tribes, 24% built houses after 1963 (Lewis, 1987). The Turki tribe may be taken as an example of a tribe where most of its people were formerly nomadic but after 1968, the majority of its

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   61 members built houses on the land that had been a state domain and was allocated to them as part of the land reform procedures (ibid.). To encourage the settlement of the tribes and to train them to become farm labourers, the government set up many state farms in the tribal regions where tribesmen were paid by the government in return for planting trees and raising animals (Ababsa, 2009). A further measure to increase the land available to settle the tribes in was the opening and distribution of state owned land (amlak dawlah) in the tribal regions at nominal rates or free of charge (Rae, 1999).

Abolition of hima (traditional grazing system) In Arabic hima means ‘protected’. The term relates to a grazing system traditionally used by the Arab tribes to preserve rangelands for a specific use. This section will examine the importance of hima for the tribes and try to analyse why it was abolished by Abdul Nasser’s regime during the union with Syria. It will also try to understand why the Ba’thists, despite their harsh measures against the tribes, accepted the reintroduction of hima as a system of rangeland management. This traditional tribal system regulated grazing rights by giving each tribe the right to use a certain piece of land for grazing and so it limited the number of cattle per tribe indirectly (Dukhan, 2014). The system has two components that have protected the rangeland from deterioration for centuries. The first is limiting access to the land and the second is assigning the responsibility of maintaining the land to particular tribes. This system was intended to protect and regenerate the vegetation in grazing areas by means of a temporary ban on grazing and the restriction of grazing rights to a specific group (Meyer, 1982). Moreover, hima played an important role in regulating the type of livestock allowed to graze on certain lands. For example, goats were considered the most destructive type of animal in their grazing pattern. Therefore, there was an agreement to restrict or ban goats from the majority of hima lands (Shoup, 1990). Hima was not a practice limited only to the nomadic tribes. Even settled peasants used the system to preserve and maintain large pasture areas (Gerholm, 1977). Both nomads and peasants used the hima system. The system existed and functioned as part of assabiiyyah, a part of tribalism that was considered one of the major ills of the past era by the Nasserists. To explain how hima is related to assabiiyyah, we should know that most hima areas were set aside by khmsah within a tribe (Shoup, 1990). A khmsah consists of a group of people who take responsibility for protecting their rangeland. If another tribe tries to use an area without proper permission, khmsah can rely on the assistance of other members of the tribe to defend it (ibid.). Cole (1982) argues that hima had the potential to lead to conflicts between tribes as the rights to the use of the hima areas were maintained by custom and tribal military force. The states of the Middle East abolished the system, claiming that this would end inter-­tribal conflict. Some claim that the main aim of abolishing hima was to weaken the socio-­political autonomy of tribes as groups (ibid.). Moreover, to

62   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 justify abolishing hima, Nasser’s government, followed by the Ba’thists, used the concept of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, a term invented by the Amer­ican ecologist Garrett Hardin whereby he argues that a human being would not exercise restraint in the use of common resources unless coerced by an external agent (Hardin, 1968) and therefore hima allows abuse by individuals, given common ownership of livestock and common rights to land (Shoup, 1990). Hima was banned as part of Nasser’s land reform measures in Syria and the system was then not used for a decade (Gari, 2006). Hinnebusch (1989b) describes this damaging change to the tribal system as the breakdown of the hima system. According to him, this breakdown weakened traditional tribal rights and attachment because the land became a commons which none had the right or incentive to protect. When the Ba’thists came to power, they took harsher measures in applying the ban on hima; grazing or camping was prohibited in the first three months of the winter growing season (FAO, 1969). Summer bans on grazing were strictly enforced as well. Research by Omar Draz, a Syrian consultant who worked for FAO in the Middle East, led him to the conclusion that hima was alive despite government efforts to impose a modern system of management in the tribal regions (Triulzi, 2001). Omar Draz advised the Syrian government to reconsider its decisions regarding hima and thus return control over rangeland management to the tribes (Chatty, 2010). In 1968, the Ba’thist government, despite considering tribal practices anarchic and backward, acceded to initiating a hima based programme (Meyer, 1982). The programme, based on Draz’s recommendations, included the establishment of cooperatives based on the acceptance of tribesmen rather than force or intimidation (Draz, 1969). The aim was to establish cooperatives which were tribally identical, based on the traditional grazing area of each tribe. The acceptance of this programme by the Ba’thists was surprising. Shoup (1990) argues that ‘the concept of community property was appealing to the socialist nature of the Ba’th Party’s ideology and the fact that hima was an example of Arab socialism overshadowed its tribal origins’ (p.  200). In other words, the government saw this programme as a method of spreading its doctrine of Arab Ba’th Socialist ideology among the tribes in the same way as it used other public organisations to spread its socialist nationalist ideology. Two major problems emerged when trying to apply the hima cooperatives system. Firstly, Sheikhs started to compete for the position of leading the cooperative during the elections by bribing people in their region. Hence, to a certain extent, the system led to the rise of feudalist power again. Secondly, old hostilities resurfaced between some tribes. Several tribal raids were carried out against each other in order to obtain fodder (Wardhe, 1979). These raids were thought to be an indication of the reappearance of assabiiyyah. The system of reviving the hima, despite its problems, had succeeded in regenerating the rangelands which paved the way for its continuation for many years to come (Chatty, 1986). This continued to be the case until Bashar al-­Assad came to power when drought destroyed the majority of hima cooperatives.

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   63

Abolition of urf (traditional legal system) Throughout history, the application of law in the tribal regions has never been in the hands of the state. The Arab tribes followed a customary law known as urf. Urf is a system of rules that emerged in the deserts of the Middle East to solve problems between individuals of Arab tribes (Bailey, 2009). The need for this system emerged because of the absence of any authority that could offer legal alternatives in places that are remote from the major cities. It was used by the tribes to preserve law and order in their region in accordance with their culture. This section will try to investigate why urf was abolished in Syria and what alternative sources of law emerged to substitute it. Before the union with Syria, Abdul Nasser abolished Shari’a and communal courts in Egypt, trying to bring everyone under the jurisdiction of civil courts (Izzeddin, 1981). After announcing the union between Syria and Egypt, tribal law was abolished by the unionist government that tried to treat the tribes in the same way as the rest of the citizens under state law (al-­Faour, 1968). All crimes and offences would be dealt with by the state’s police and legal institutions. The reasons underlying Nasser’s decree to abolish urf could be summarised as follows. Firstly, to strengthen the unity between the citizens of both countries, it was necessary for Nasser to merge the identity of the tribes with the larger identity of the state where the status of ‘kinship’ becomes subordinated to that of citizenship in the state. Secondly, the procedure aimed to contribute towards establishing security in the remote areas by preventing raiding and any attempts to continue it. Thirdly, since tribes had strong kinship connections with Iraq and the Gulf countries that were considered ‘reactionary’, they could pose security threats to the new emerging state. These family bonds gave them the chance to escape from one state to another whenever they wanted. It was necessary to include the tribes under new state law so as to punish anyone committing a crime and seeking refuge among his kin across a state border (Oweidi, 1982). Many problems have emerged when trying to apply the state law to the tribes. For example, certain categories of what state law considers a crime were not considered as such by the tribes. Revenge killing (thar) is considered honourable by the tribes whereas it is regarded as a capital offence by the civil courts. Imprisonment and fines, as imposed by the new state law, were types of penalty unfamiliar to the tribes who relied on different measures such as vengeance (intiqam), compensation (diyah) or samah (forgiveness) (Oweidi, 1982). Moreover, the civil law did not adhere to certain parts of urf. For example, the cases of ird (the honour of the family), considered a serious crime by the tribes, are treated as a minor misdemeanour by the civil courts (Dodd, 1973). Additionally, the tribes often find state legal procedures to be time consuming when the procedures are prolonged or highly complicated. Despite the official decree that abolished urf, the tribes continued to settle large parts of their affairs through urf but with the state supervising in one way or another. For example, Louise Sweet (1960) describes how both state and tribal law functioned in the Tell Toqaan area. An informant provided an example

64   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 of the choice between state and tribal law. This informant had once shot and wounded a thief from the Mawali tribe who was in his uncle’s compound. The man’s kin demanded a payment of 1,000 Syrian pounds for the loss of the man’s foot, however, his uncle went to the government and had the state consider the case. The Mawali tribe was put under pressure and decided to send a Jaha (a  group of persons of social rank and prestige from each tribe) to the uncle crying for mercy and kissing his hand. As a consequence, everything was cancelled out and the case was solved by both parties according to urf (ibid.). This example illustrates the way in which the state arrived at a compromise between imposing its authority on the tribes while trying to maintain their loyalty to the state. The abolishment of urf played a major role in integrating the tribes in the new nation-­state set up by Abdul Nasser and later, the Ba’thists. Despite the flexibility that the state showed towards certain parts of urf in accepting it by its judicial institutions, tribes, on the other hand, have come to accept their incapacity to maintain certain customs such as carrying weapons openly, or offering protection for killers and escaping the state by crossing national borders (Khalaf, 1990). The tribes’ insistence on receiving diya (blood money) and solving many problems according to their tribal law is an indication of their resilient social structure that helps them perpetuate tribal affinity.

Tribal reaction to the Nasserists’ and Ba’thists’ measures Widespread migration to the Arab Gulf came as a response to the strict measures against Sheikhs. For example, most of the Rwalla tribe left Syria for Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Large numbers of the Sb’a, the Fad’an and the Turki tribes of the Aneza confederation left Syria for Saudi Arabia. It should be noted that large scale migration took place within the noble tribes because their status had been degraded in Syria to that of the common tribes that they had considered lower to them and because their relatives in Saudi Arabia offered them residence permits on the territories of their country. Lancaster (1981) describes how the Rwalla tribe reacted to the Ba’thist land reform measures by retreating to Jordan which was hostile to Syria at the time. From there they waged economic warfare on the Ba’thists in terms of smuggling. The Sheikhs saw smuggling not only as a means of making large sums of money quickly but as a means of retaliation against the Syrian government that, according to them, had treated them unfairly. The Syrian government had to deploy troops in the area, complete with arms, trucks, tanks and helicopters to contain smuggling (ibid.). Some tribal leaders tried to plot against the union with Egypt and the Ba’th revolution by cooperating with Iraq or Saudi Arabia, attempting to plan a revolt or participate in a military coup. Nuri Ibn Mheid of Fad’an tribe plotted a revolt against Nasser’s rule assisted by the Iraqi government (Lewis, 1987). He received money and arms from the Iraqis and took refuge in Iraq when he was exposed by the government. Saudi Arabia and Jordan planned to topple the

The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   65 Ba’thist government in Syria. They found the dissatisfied Syrian Sheikhs to be fierce opponents of their government so they transferred an initial sum of $70,000 to some Sheikhs in order to coordinate a coup that failed to achieve anything (Mann, 2006). Colonel Hatoum also attempted a military coup against the Ba’thist government in 1966. Many Sheikhs were accused of being part of the coup and so they were interrogated and arrested because they were considered to be a potential threat to the government (Khalaf, 1981). Despite land reform measures, some Sheikhs have sometimes chosen to undermine the performance of the new state, using their resources to corrupt state officials or deprive them of influence with sectors of the population (Hinnebusch, 1976). Some Sheikhs divided their lands among family members so that some of their holdings could escape the effect of land reform law (ibid.). There were cases when some Sheikhs rejected land reform measures, such as Sheikh Trad Ibrahim of the Mawali who clashed with government forces many times around Aleppo, telling them that he will never give up the land he inherited from his father (al-­Hasan, 2013). State measures during this period were not harmful to all tribe members. Some tribesmen, particularly those who belonged to the common tribes, saw the Nasserists’ and Ba’thists’ measures as a way to escape domination by noble tribes and landlords from Aleppo and Raqqa (International Crisis Group, 2011). They also benefited from land redistribution and social promotion via party structures (ibid.). It is important to indicate that the resistance to the state by some factions of the tribes who were affected by its policies was largely confined to the pre-­Assad period, after which state and tribe had some reconciliation.

Conclusion In the early years of independence, the government adopted a set of policies which ultimately aimed to abolish all privileges enjoyed by the tribes, subjecting them completely to the authority of the state. The weakness of the nascent government institutions, combined with the internal and external political turmoil, prevented the state from executing its measures completely which allowed the tribes to continue being an independent body from the state. When the Nasserists and Ba’thists came to power, they tried to exclude the tribes from the political field, attempting to break their strength and redirect their loyalty towards the state. The increasing involvement and interference of the modern state represented by the Nasserists, and later on the Ba’thists, and their bureaucratic organs of government opening up tribal areas to state control, have had no strong effects on the tribes. Their policy was merely more extreme than previously and allowed the tribes less room to manoeuvre or manipulate the state to their own advantage. The growth of state authority was accompanied by a number of important changes. Firstly, security was firmly established in the tribal regions and the traditional authority of the tribe lost some of its rationale. Secondly, Sheikhs lost much of their prestige as many of their functions were gradually assumed by

66   The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970 state agencies due to the abolishment of hima, the suppression of urf and land reform measures. Thirdly, in place of the Sheikhs, new powers connected to the party and its popular organisations have emerged. These young men were educated and able to articulate the new national ideology in their region (Hinne­ busch, 1976); however, this new young leadership still depended on tribal affinity to preach the party ideology in their region. The case of Jallal al-­Sadyed is particularly illustrative of this situation.

Note 1 Omda is an Egyptian word equivalent to Sheikh in the Syrian rural area and was often used to mean ‘landlord’ in rural areas.

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The rise of the nation-state 1946–1970   69 Shoup, J. (1990) Hima: A traditional Bedouin land-­use system in contemporary Syria and Jordan. PhD Dissertation. St Louis, Washington University. Sweet, L. E. (1960) Tell Toqaan: A Syrian Village. Detroit, Ann Arbor Publisher. Thompson, E. F. (2013) Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East. Harvard University Press. Triulzi, L. (2001) Empty and Populated Landscapes: The Bedouin of the Syrian Arab Republic between ‘Development’ and ‘State’. Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives, 2, 30–47. Van Dam, N. (1996) The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba’th Party. London, I. B. Tauris. Warriner, D. (1962) Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. London, Oxford University Press. Wardhe, H. (1979) Hema, a Grazing Management Experience in Syria, unpublished manuscript. Woodward, P. (1992) Nasser. London, Longman.

4 From enmity to amity Hafez al-­Assad and the Arab tribes in Syria from 1970 until 2000

Introduction Hafez al-­Assad came to power after a military coup that he named the ‘Correctionist Movement’ in 1970. After coming to power, the main themes in his official policy statements were domestic unity and stability as a way to resist Imperialism and Zionism. This chapter will try to investigate the relationship between Hafez al-­Assad’s regime and the Arab tribes from 1970 until his death in 2000. This investigation will explore which factors led to the new rise of the Arab tribes in Syrian political life since the 1970s. None of the works on Syria published so far has dealt so extensively with these matters. In comparison to the previous periods discussed in this book, it could be argued that Hafez al-­Assad adopted relatively flexible policies towards the tribes. For example, some Sheikhs who left the country as a result of the strict Ba’thist measures against them were invited to return. Tribes were allowed to solve disputes among themselves according to the traditional way that was previously banned by the Nasserists in 1958. Some tribal leaders were also able to regain large areas of their lands that had been confiscated as a result of land reform measures. Hafez al-­Assad managed to integrate the tribes into the structures of his authoritarian regime like the parliament, the army and the Ba’th Party which provided another mechanism of patronage that was beneficial for both sides. In this way, tribes and Sheikhs became strong actors on the Syrian political scene, and were able to exert considerable leverage vis-­à-vis the Islamists and other ethnicities like the Kurds. The oil boom in the Gulf region was just getting into full swing and many of the Syrian Sheikhs were needed to play an important role in facilitating the relationship between the Syrian regime and the Gulf States. Despite the above flexibility shown by al-­Assad’s regime towards the tribes, I will argue that his attitude towards them remained tentative and selective. For example, the government did not abolish the agrarian reform law and only certain Sheikhs regained part of their lands. Many of the tribal leaders who had left Syria in the previous periods did not return. In fact, many of the common tribes, those called shawi tribes, increased their presence in the Ba’th Party and the Syrian army to strengthen their position against the (noble) tribes that have always considered the shawi tribes as of a lower status than them.

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   71 This chapter starts by discussing Hafez al-­Assad’s need to widen his support base, particularly in the Syrian rural areas of which the tribal regions constitute a large part. It then goes on to explore how effective his co-­optation strategies were in allowing the tribes to be used as counterweights to the Kurds and the Islamists. The chapter ends by exploring the main structural changes in the tribal community at the end of the twentieth century.

The ‘Correctionist Movement’ and widening the base of alliances The 1967 war, in which the Syrians and the Egyptians were defeated by the Israelis, was a turning point in the history of the Ba’th Party. The defeat deepened the divisions between party members who had different views on how to conduct domestic and foreign policy. The radicals wanted to continue the existing measures of land reform and nationalisation and export their revolution to what they called conservative ‘reactionary’ regimes, particularly the Arab monarchies in the Gulf region. On the other hand, the moderates, headed by Hafez al-­Assad who was the minister of defence by then, called for national unity domestically and Arab unity regionally in order to face Israel. A struggle for power started between the two camps. The 1967 defeat had played to the interests of al-­Assad. The economic crisis that started as a result of military spending made the Syrian populace lose faith in the arguments of the radical faction. This rivalry was reflected in agrarian reform policy which in turn had affected many tribal leaders. While the radicals wanted to initiate a new batch of land reform measures, the moderates objected to that. For example, the radicals refused to rent out the lands expropriated from tribal leaders in the ­al-­Jazira region to investors from Aleppo and tribal leaders1 for fear of reviving the strength of tribalism that had been weakened in the aftermath of the 1963 revolution (Hinnebusch, 1989b). As we will see later, when the moderates gained power, they prioritised agricultural production over ideological arguments. The moderates were probably more pragmatic as they realised that the state did not have the capacity to establish cooperatives or state farms in al-­Jazira. After three years of continuous struggle, during which the two parties were not able to reach a compromise on how to conduct domestic and foreign policy, Hafez al-­Assad led a military coup against the radicals and took power in November 1970. From the moment he seized power, the new leader wanted to give the impression that his rule did not rely solely on the military and thus he presented his military action as the ‘Correctionist Movement’, intended to answer the Syrian people’s demands and fulfil their aspirations. In a smart move designed to show that public opinion mattered to him, al-­Assad relinquished his military rank and called for a referendum through which the citizens of the country were asked to approve his nomination as the president of the country (Ma’oz, 1988). The referendum which granted al-­Assad 99.2% of the vote in 1971 was intended to prove that he was not reliant on the army for authority but had public legitimacy as well.

72   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 Al-­Assad followed a certain strategy to broaden the support base of his rule. Firstly, he made sure he had loyal men in the military, the Ba’th Party and major government positions. The main pillars of power in Syria were the Ba’th Party regional command and the Ministry of Defence. A distinctive feature of the crucial figures in the army leadership and the Ba’th Party regional command was ‘the continued and extremely strong representation of the Alawite officers and of personalities from Lattakia region in particular’ (Van Dam, 1996: p. 122). While appointing Alawites in these positions, ‘extended family relations and membership of certain tribe and clans have been of essential importance’ (ibid.). The second part of al-­Assad’s strategy included gaining the consent of the groups that were dissatisfied with radical Ba’th measures, notably the city-­based groups that belonged to the bourgeoisie merchants. Al-­Assad also tried to keep the support of the peasants and other groups in the countryside (Rae, 1999). In this way, al-­Assad broadened the base of his regime and co-­opted a large proportion of the rural Sunnis, particularly from Deir Ezzor and Hauran regions, into the party leadership, government institutions and popular organisations like the peasant union (Hinnebusch, 1982). Since independence and because of the French mandate’s reliance on minorities in the army, using them as leverage against the Sunni Muslims, the ascendency of Alawites to prominent state positions started to make the Sunnis fear that the balance of power was tilting against them. To dilute such fears, al-­Assad was careful not to identify himself as a leader of the Alawites. Thus he tried to play a balancing role between the different sects of the Syrian community. Hafez al-­Assad was trying to make sure that all communities enjoyed full representation in his regime so he appointed many Sunnis in high positions. Indeed, many senior officials, including three of the vice-­presidents and the defence minister, were Sunni Arabs (Pipes, 1990). In each governorate of the country, the positions of governors and chiefs of military and civilian security branches were divided among the communities according to their size (ibid.). Three months after taking power, the new leader set up what was then called the People’s Council (Parliament) (Holmstrom, 1973). The council included 87 Ba’thists, 8 communists and 36 representatives of workers and peasants (Hopwood, 1987). In a marked departure from previous Ba’thist measures against tribalism, the People’s Council had one tribal Sheikh from Raqqa (Sheikh Jassem Hweidi) and another from the countryside of Aleppo (Sheikh Dayyab al-­Mashi). The Islamists were represented by Ahmad Keftaro who was one of Syria’s Sufi figures. A few months later, a ‘nation-­wide system of popular councils of local administration’ was set up (Khalaf, 1981: p. 215). In each of Syria’s 14 governorates, local council elections took place. Candidacy for this council was not limited to Ba’thists. Of the council members, 51% had to be workers, peasants, merchants and intellectuals (Seale, 1988). The local councils were not meant to deal with political issues but mainly with everyday life: social, economic and cultural affairs and problems. The purpose was to ‘delegate certain aspects of state authorities to bodies elected at the governorate level’ (Khalaf, 1981: p.  215). Again, some of the traditional elite were elected in the local councils and this

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   73 was a marked improvement for them compared to the conditions they experienced in the sixties when they were deprived of participation in any electoral process. To integrate all of Syria’s political elements into a single Syrian multi-­ party coalition or front, in March 1972 the National Progressive Front was created (Holmstrom, 1973). Led by the Ba’th Party, the Front included the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Union, the Arab Socialist Movement and the Organisation of Socialist Unionists (Galvani, 1974). Several leaders in this front were given seats in the cabinet (Seale, 1988). In his first speech to the Syrian people, al-­Assad talked about the need for reconciliation and national unity after years of fragmentation and disagreement (Seale, 1988: p. 11). To distance himself from the view that Syrians held of their previous leaders, al-­Assad went on a tour of the Syrian governorates. This did not focus on the major cities of Syria like Aleppo and Damascus but instead led him to many cities in the tribal regions including Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and ­al-­Hassakeh. The author was told how whole villages in the countryside of Deir Ezzor took to the streets to greet him (Interviewee 1, 2014). Many historians talk about how al-­Assad, during his visit to Sweida, paid tribute to Sultan Pasha ­al-­Atrash, the Druze nationalist leader who had led the Great Syrian Revolt against the French mandate (Rae, 1999), however, little is mentioned in the literature on Hafez al-­Assad’s invitations to tribal leaders who had left the country due to Ba’thist measures against them, to return home as in the case of Sheikh Faisal of Hadidiyn tribe (ibid.). These steps show how much national unity and reconciliation were important features of his policies in the early years. Political control over Syrian society was achieved through populist authoritarian means that were not solely dependent on the coercion of the majority of the public but also provided access to the political arena for certain social groups through developing networks of patronage (tribal, ethnic or sectarian) (Albrecht, 2010). What existed in Syria after Hafez al-­Assad’s rise to power was a system which distributed national resources following a political calculus of powers and loyalties (Zubaida, 1993). One of the main co-­optation strategies that the Syrian regime used to balance various segments of the society with each other was ­creating patronage networks that were spread through popular organisations, the military and security services, the parliament and other government institutions.

Hafez al-­Assad’s tribalisation policies After the end of the French mandate and the rise of the nation-­state, the successive Syrian governments sought to de-­tribalise the country and thus a large proportion of the political power in the tribal regions passed from the tribe to the state as we have seen in the previous chapter. In particular, the Ba’th Party sought to undermine independent social structures and to detach individuals from the web of tribal or family connections, regarding that as a requirement for creating a ‘modern civil society’ (al-­Khafaji, 2000: p.  261). In the 1970s, the Ba’th Party changed its policy, but not its ideology, towards the traditional structures of society. This change of policy came as a result of the shift in the ruling

74   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 system from a party hierarchy to a system controlled by one person: Hafez ­al-­Assad. Al-­Assad did not solely depend on the Ba’th Party in building the networks of his power base but also used traditional social ties to achieve this purpose. The creation, revival and manipulation of tribal networks by Hafez al-­ Assad, called in this context ‘tribalisation policies’ because it led to the resurgence of tribalism, was an instrument to expand his power base where he was at the centre of patronage and loyalty and to mobilise large sections of the Syrian community in the countryside. For the tribes themselves, tribalisation policies could ‘confer various advantages on the rest of the tribe’ and increase their benefits from the distribution of economic means and various honorary political positions (Abd al-­Jabbar and Dawod, 2003: p. 119). Tribalisation was implemented through different levels: Firstly, at the reconciliation level, Hafez al-­Assad invited the tribal Sheikhs who left Syria during the previous periods to come back to the country. He personally sent Alawite messengers to Sheikh Faisal al-­Sfuk of the Hadidiyn tribe in Jordan, apologising for the way he had been treated and asking him to return (Chatty, 2010). He also invited back Sheikh Dham al-­Jarba of the Shammar confederation who left Syria after the land reform measures. Al-­Jarba came back to Syria and died in his house in al-­Hassakeh in 1976 (Interviewee 2, 2014). Sheikh Rakan Mershid of the Sb’a tribe was also invited to come back from Saudi Arabia (Kredieh, 1999). Although he made a decision to leave Syria for good, Sheikh Rakan started to visit Syria frequently after al-­Assad’s invitation for him to return (Interviewee 1, 2014). Moreover, in order to get the support of the traditional tribal leaders, the Syrian regime maintained an ‘open door policy’ towards them where they were encouraged to visit government officials at any level and discuss their tribes’ problems (Manzardo, 1980: p. 24). Since the 1970s, land reform measures in Syria have become ‘more responsive to pragmatic than ideological concerns’ (Springborg, 1981: p. 199). The Syrian government decided to stop the policy of the ‘nationalisation of tribal land’ (Manzardo, 1980: p. 25). Instead, certain territories were assigned to certain tribes for their exclusive use in return for maintaining them (ibid.). In its attempt to conciliate tribal leaders, the regime started a process of ‘reviewing abuses’ in the implementation of land reform (Hinnebusch 1989b: p.  92). Some lands were returned and the majority of these were in the eastern governorates (ibid.). Certain tribes like the Haddidiyn for example received more lands during al-­Assad’s reign than they had lost during the Ba’th period in the 1960s (Interviewee 3, 2014). We have seen in the previous chapter how urf (tribal law) was abolished during the union with Egypt. Contrary to this procedure, al-­Assad encouraged disputes between tribes to be solved through urf (Chatty, 2010). This was confirmed during all my interviews with tribesmen who told me that homicides between tribes were often solved by sending a delegate from certain tribes to the one that had had one of its members killed and solving the problem through urf. The government accepts the agreement and records this in the court files as a ‘tribal agreement’ (Interviewee 4, 2014). Secondly, at the economic level, Hafez al-­Assad realised the importance of the tribes for the national economy. Bahhady (1981: p. 258) argues that the tribes

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   75 ‘occupy a vital position in the agriculture of Syria’. Tribes provide the country with 75% of the meat, 21% of the milk and 4% of the wool produced each year (al-­Samman, 1981). Agriculture constitutes 22% of the total GNP and pastoral products comprise about 35% of the total agricultural income (ibid.). The departure of the Rwalla tribe, with their large herds of sheep and camels, from Syria during the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the strict socialist measures and the oil boom in Saudi Arabia was regarded as a strong blow to the Syrian economy (Interviewee 1, 2014). It was feared that the rest of the Syrian livestock raised by the tribes would be removed from Syria if no measures were taken to encourage their stay in the country (ibid.). This problem was dealt with through a number of initiatives, according to Hinnebusch (1989b). The government made credit available to tribes wishing to invest in their herds. Emergency fodder stocks were created and fodder exports stopped to ensure supplies during droughts. Artisan wells were dug and enclosures were constructed in flood paths to keep rain water in different parts of the Syrian Steppe to provide water for herds (ibid.). Hospitals, schools and veterinary units were established in most of the tribal regions. The services were not sophisticated, but for the tribes, unlike the French and the independent governments following the Mandate, Hafez ­al-­Assad’s regime took ‘their needs into consideration’, as one of the Raqqa residents informed me during an interview (Interviewee 4, 2014). Thirdly, at the public relations level, tribal Sheikhs were allowed to reopen their madafas (guest houses) that had previously been considered signs of backwardness. The regime used to send delegates to those madafas to give condolences for the death of a tribal Sheikh or one of his close relatives. In every national or religious occasion in which Hafez al-­Assad met with public figures, tribal leaders were among those people. On a few occasions, the Syrian TV channel would show a tribal delegate visiting the presidential palace to announce their obedience and loyalty to the President and then give him the tribal robe (abaya) that he would wear publicly to show that he was one of them. In fact, there were many pictures and posters of Hafez al-­Assad in tribal dress. Sheikhs in each Syrian governorate were given seats in the Syrian Parliament as representatives of their tribes and regions. This will be discussed in a separate section. Fourthly, on a cultural level, the media played an important role in making ‘Bedouin’ and ‘tribal’ accepted norms in Syrian society. The media was mainly controlled by the Syrian regime and no film or TV series could be produced without the approval of the security service that has certain apparatus which censors cultural productions in the country. For example, Bedouin TV series, or musalsal badawi, as Syrians used to name them, have increased in number since the 1970s (Prager, 2014). The Syrian film industry seems to have been the first to produce this kind of TV series in the whole Arab world. Famous Syrian actors played the role of Sheikhs trying to speak in the Bedouin dialect, and often depicted tribes as the autochthonous Arabs. Interestingly, people who live in the major cities of Syria cannot easily understand many dialects spoken in the Syrian countryside. The TV series mentioned above made the Bedouin dialect easily understood among Syrians in general. Moreover, tribal poetry became very

76   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 popular in Syria because it was supported by the state media that adopted many poets from the tribes, like Ummar al-­Farra who composed many poems in the Bedouin dialect that would be shown on TV during national celebrations. The resurgence of Arabic literature on the tribes after the 1970s is an indicator of the regime’s flexible policy as this was banned under the previous governments from 1958 until 1970. The government sponsored a yearly festival called ­al-­Badia Festival in Palmyra city in which Arab tribes from all over Syria were encouraged to attend and present their traditions and culture to the Syrian community through performances of Bedouin folklore, dancing or reciting poetry. Recognising the tribal presence and power in Syria, Hafez al-­Assad was convinced that their lands could not be managed by the regime’s security forces alone (Chatty, 2010). He revived and built tribal networks within the tribal regions through financial and moral means to expand his regime’s rule in the countryside indirectly. While this policy has clearly enabled the regime’s authority to extend into the tribal regions, it has led to the resurgence of tribal solidarity, assabiiyyah, and to strong sentiments of tribal affinity.

Tribes as a bridge to the Arab Gulf A large proportion of the Arab tribes in Syria are branches of a confederated system called Qabila. The majority of confederations in the Levant and Mesopotamia originated in the Arabian Peninsula and migrated north with Muslim conquests in the seventh century and others later in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century searching for water and grazing for their livestock. Among the most prominent of these groups are the Aneza and the Shammar confederations of tribes from Nejd who had established themselves firmly in the tribal regions and controlled the important trade routes and pilgrimage caravans between Damascus and Baghdad and Damascus and Mecca (Toth, 2000). Tribesmen across the region had always been able to move freely to visit their relatives, conduct ­pilgrimages and take part in the funeral or wedding celebrations of their fellows. The Sykes-­Picot Agreement, however, divided Mesopotamia and the Levant in 1916 and created borders between these states that still exist today. These borders ‘split the tribes that spanned from Syria, Iraq and Jordan all the way to the peninsula’. (Hassan, 2012). Nevertheless, relations have been maintained. King Abdul Aziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia conducted two or three informal visits to Syria to meet his relatives from the Hassana and the Turki tribes. ‘He ate in our house and then he went deer hunting with my father in the desert in 1950’ as I was told by one of the Hassana’s tribesmen in Palmyra. Many of the families of the Aneza and the Shammar confederations in Syria used to receive financial grants from King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the Saudi Kingdom (Interviewee 3, 2014). These grants are called Sharha, i.e. yearly or monthly financial aid that was given by the Saudi King to his relatives or acquaintances after the establishment of the Kingdom, even if they were not living in the Kingdom. The tradition has been legalised by the Saudi treasury, which made a list of Sheikhs and families who receive these grants regularly.

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   77 During his war to unite what is today Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz sought cooperation from the tribes in the Syrian Desert in the north to defeat his rival, ‘the Rashidi dynasty in the northern Arabian peninsula’ (Sunayama, 2007: p.  17). According to Seale (1988: p.  294), King Abdul Aziz advised his sons, while on his deathbed ‘to keep an eye on Syria’ because any expansion of Iraqi, Jordanian or Egyptian influence on Syria would be a threat to Saudi interests. Such political and social factors may have caused the Saudis to hold the control of Syria dear to their hearts. Since the King’s death in 1953 and until the Ba’th revolution in 1963, Saudi Arabia tried to influence Syrian politics through different means. It bribed certain Syrian political factions composed of large-­scale landowners, merchants and tribal leaders, funded Syrian newspapers to manipulate propaganda and affect election results and encouraged coup attempts according to its interests (Sunayama, 2007). The 1963 Ba’th revolution marked an important change in Saudi-­Syrian relations. The Ba’thist rulers had classified Arab regimes as either ‘progressive’ or ‘reactionary’ and would only cooperate with the former. Tribal Sheikhs, through their association with outside regional powers that were considered reactionary i.e. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, were deemed part of the reactionary circle as well. Some of the Sheikhs who did not leave the country during the union with Egypt were interrogated and asked questions such as, why do you go to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states? (Khalaf, 1991, p. 72). They were also asked about their relationship with the reactionary regimes there. After taking power in 1970, al-­Assad tried to change his Ba’thist predecessor’s (Salah Jadid) policy, which threatened to ‘overthrow’ the reactionary oil states (Stanley, 1990). He worked on broadening Syria’s ‘inter-­Arab base’ by dropping the reactionary-­progressive distinction (Galvani, 1974: p. 3). Al-­Assad saw the expansion of the regular army as a way towards military recovery, comforting Israel and restoring the Golan Heights (Hinnebusch, 1989a: p. 137). All this required détente with ‘the conservative Arab monarchies’ which were the only countries that could finance this growth (ibid.). On the other hand, the Saudis were pleased with al-­Assad’s takeover in Syria because they saw him as someone who could be used to check Iraqi radicalism in 1970s when Iraq provided refuge to groups opposing Saudi rule and even provided them with a radio station which broadcast to Saudi Arabia (Chalala, 1988). Various authors have discussed the main factors that brought Syria and Saudi Arabia together, focusing mainly on Syria’s need to mobilise financial resources to confront Israel and the Saudis’ need to counterbalance Iraq or to restrain Iran. Other arguments involve historical and cultural factors through which the ‘closeness of the two countries was a natural extension of a long-­standing historical social connection which existed for decades’. (Sunayama, 2007: p. 4). This section illuminates the contacts between Syrian and Saudi tribes at the societal and leadership levels and argues that the existence of ‘shared identities’ played an important role in the formation of their policies towards each other. The Syrian regime’s main tool to improve its relations with the Arab Gulf, mainly Saudi Arabia, was the manipulation of personal contacts with Syrian

78   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 tribal leaders who are related to the royal family in Saudi Arabia. For many Sheikhs in the Middle East, marriages are arranged with other prominent families, even those in other countries, in order to exercise alliance building as a strategy to strengthen the family’s position in the region (Peterson, 2007). Many of the Arab Gulf princes are married to women from Syrian tribes. For example, the Syrian regime approached Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-­Meslet of the al-­Jabbur tribe because he is the brother-­in-law of the late Saudi King Abdullah. Both of them were married to women from the Sha’lan family of the Rwalla tribe. Sheikh Abdul Aziz used to travel between Syria and Saudi Arabia and worked as an adviser on Syrian domestic politics for the Saudi royal family (Interviewee 5, 2015). After the 1970s, his son was appointed as a member of the Syrian Parliament and as the head of the Syrian-­Saudi brotherhood committee in the Syrian Parliament because of the popular support that he enjoyed in Syria and Saudi Arabia (ibid.). Moreover, Rifaat al-­Assad had good relations with the Saudi royal family (Drysdale, 1982). He is the brother-­in-law of King Abdullah (both have wives from the same Shammar tribes in the Syrian al-­Jazira). Abdullah, Crown Prince by then, played an important role in fixing the disagreement between Rifaat and Hafez and in facilitating his return to Syria for visits in the future (ibid.). The other tribal leader that played an important role in improving the relationship between the two countries was Sheikh Abdul Aziz Melheim of the Hasanah. The Hasanah is a tribe of the Aneza confederation from which the royal family of Saudi Arabia is descended. Hafez al-­Assad realised the familiarity of this person with the Saudis and hence appointed him as a member of the Syrian Parliament in 1976 and he still holds this position now. He used to attend Damascus airport whenever a formal Saudi delegation visited Syria (Interviewee 1, 2014). During one of the late King Abdullah’s visits to Syria with the attendance of Rifaat al-­Assad, the then Vice President, Rifaat asked the Saudi Prince about his connection to Sheikh Abdul Aziz Melheim. The Prince lifted his finger and referred to Abdul Aziz who was also attending the meeting and said, ‘Oh Rifaat! This person is my cousin’ (Shdadeen, 2008). In his paper Schoel (2011) narrates the story of a quarrel between the Hasanah and the Fawa’ira tribes in Homs in 1979. The quarrel starts when members of the Fawa’ira tribe shoot and kill two members of the Hasanah tribe. Since the event took place during the troubles between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime wanted to avoid additional unrest in the country. Hafez al-­Assad sent the Governor of Lattakia to the Hasanah’s guesthouse and advised them to prevent the ‘bloodshed between the two tribes by any means necessary’ (Schoel, 2011: p. 98). Thamer Melhim, whose son was killed, responded: ‘I do not fear the government nor do I fear the Fawa’ira. They are using the protection of the army to graze in our lands and we will not be silent’ (ibid.). Two months later, the Hasanah tribesmen attacked the Fawa’ira households and killed more than 50 of them in one attack. The Syrian regime intervened, arrested the assailants and decided to hang all of them. Before doing so, the Hasanah contacted King Khaled Ibn Abdul Aziz who, despite being on a visit to Morocco, sent a delegation to President al-­Assad

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   79 immediately. The Syrian authorities told the Saudi delegate that those who conducted these acts were criminals and smuggled Amer­ican weapons from Lebanon to conduct this attack. ‘But no,’ answered the Saudis ‘we provided them with these weapons. So in God’s name, let them go and forget about it’ (Schoel, 2011: p. 102). The Syrian regime then pardoned those involved in the events with the condition of avoiding any future clashes with the Fawa’ira tribe. The story presented above shows the close contact that the royal family of Saudi Arabia kept with their relatives in Syria. The Syrian regime provided their relatives with political backing and the Saudi family granted financial subsidies in return. For example, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Melheim was able to arrange for a grant of 200 million dollars from Saudi Arabia to Syria in the 1990s to improve the road networks in the countryside of Homs where the Sheikh’s village is located, close to many Alawite villages (Interviewee 1, 2014). The rulers of other Gulf countries supported different tribes. For example, the annual Palmyra camel race served as a cover for Qatari support for the Hadidiyn tribe and other tribes (Schoel, 2011). Kuwait had connections with Sheikh Abdul Karim Ma’at of the Bani Ezz tribe in the countryside of Hama (Interviewee 1, 2014). They supported him financially during his electoral campaign for the Syrian Parliament. The relationship between certain tribes in Syria and other Gulf countries seems to be very much that of the patron and client. Gulf countries provide these tribes with money and sometimes arms, as mentioned in the above example. In return, the supporters expect loyalty and some indirect pathways into Syrian politics (Schoel, 2011). The Syrian regime benefited from these inter-­tribal relations in different ways. Firstly, since members of tribes like the Hasanah and the Turki from the Aneza confederation were able to cross borders freely and legitimately, they were exploited by prominent figures in the Syrian regime to smuggle arms and drugs and therefore create a black market that was lucrative for both sides (Dukhan, 2014a). Secondly, these bonds provided a way for the Syrian regime to get rid of a large number of unemployed people from the tribal regions who immigrated to the Gulf for economic reasons (ibid.). The Syrian government adopted an ‘open door policy’ where the authorities left the choice to its citizens as to whether or not they should migrate and no coercion was used to make them stay in their homeland (Winckler, 1997). The Syrian workers’ migration to the Arab Gulf started in the 1970s and then increased dramatically, bringing a large quantity of remittances to the economy on a scale of $600–900 million per year (Perthes, 1997). The Arab Gulf monarchies gave priority to Syrians who belonged to tribes related to the monarchies when awarding work permits, hence the large number of Syrian workers in the Arab Gulf who come from the Arab tribes.

Tribes as a counterweight to the Islamists The tribes in Syria were used by the regime to balance political opponents. In this case, the main opponent to the Syrian regime was the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has been unable to gain a foothold in the Arab tribes

80   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 because of the patronage and relative influence afforded to the tribes by the Syrian regime (Alon, 2009). The Muslim Brotherhood ideology is based on trying to foster the Qur’an and Sunnah as the ‘sole reference point for … ordering the life of the Muslim…. community … and state’ (Kull, 2011: p.  167). Although the tribes in Syria are adherent to the Sunni faith, political Islamic ideology is undesirable in ‘the tribal cultural system because it reduces the ability of the tribe and the tribal elite to balance the distribution of patronage and influence received from the more powerful’ actor in the state, i.e. the Syrian regime (Ledger, 2010: p. 41). This section will start by highlighting the moderate form of Islam practised by the tribes and how traditions are prioritised by the tribes over Islamic rituals. It will try to explore why the Muslim Brotherhood failed to recruit people from the tribes and will finish by providing a few examples which prove that al-­Assad ‘took advantage of the tribes in his war against the Muslim Brotherhood’ (Al-­Ayed, 2013) by receiving support from different tribes in the governorates of Hama, Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Tribes were known for failing to adhere to the rules of Islam. Hence, one can find the following passage in the Quran:  The Bedouin are stronger in disbelief and hypocrisy and more likely not to know the limits of what [laws] Allah has revealed to His Messenger. And Allah is Knowing and Wise. And among the Bedouin are some who consider what they spend as a loss and await for you turns of misfortune. Upon them will be a misfortune of evil. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. (Surat at-­Taubah, 97–98) (Quran.com, 9) Similarly, ‘The Bedouin say, we have believed. Say, you have not [yet] believed; but say [instead], ‘We have submitted, for faith has not yet entered your hearts.’ (Surat Al-­Hujurat, 14) (ibid.). More recently, Alois Musil, the Western explorer and writer, travelled extensively in the Arab world and tells us that he never saw a single tribesman performing the obligatory five daily prayers (Musil, 1927). During most of my interviews with tribesmen from Syria, on the issue of practising Islam, I was told that ‘Tribes do not have any specific ideology because they want to live in peace and not conflict with others’ (Interviewee 6, 2014). ‘Our women go out freely and milk the goats whenever they want. We are not used to restricting them.’ ‘For us, Islam is an innate issue. Tribal belonging is more important for us than the Islamic one’ (Interviewee 1, 2014). Throughout history and up to the present day, primordial sentiments of tribal allegiance often took precedence over religious ideology in the Arab world (Fandy, 1994). After the Prophet’s death in 632, competition arose between the Qurashi tribes over who would succeed Mohammad. Although many Muslim historians claim that Islam was the ‘dominant factor in deciding’ the successor, historical records suggest that tribal consensus was the most significant factor in choosing Abu Bakr (Fandy, 1994: p. 44). The confrontation between Islam and the tribe in modern Arab politics is clearly discernible in the Gulf states, Yemen

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   81 and Jordan, and to a lesser extent in Syria (Dukhan, 2014b). In these countries, the governments supported tribal leaders in the parliamentary elections to balance the Islamists. Voters in these Arab countries, especially in rural areas, ‘appear to be swayed more by their family and tribal loyalties’ than by their religious ideology (Ford and Andoni, 1993). ‘The Muslim Brotherhood cannot co-­ exist with the tribal community because it has a religious leadership that is supreme and hence will compete with the tribal leadership instead of compromising with it’ to quote (Interviewee 6, 2014). With the Ba’th Party’s rise to power in 1963 and specifically with Hafez’s take-­over in 1970, political power started to shift from the big cities to the periphery. After the 1970s, less than one third of the Syrian cabinet came from Damascus and Aleppo (Devlin, 1984). In contrast, the provinces of Lattakia, Homs, Hauran and Deir Ezzor filled more than two fifths of the posts (ibid.). State resource flows were directed to benefit these regions as they had previously been marginalised. Al-­Assad’s regime devoted substantial resources to the countryside in the form of agricultural services, electricity, health and education facilities (Devlin, 1984). On the other hand, while the Muslim Brotherhood was strong in Damascus and other Syrian cities, the movement had barely any foothold in the countryside (Batatu, 1982). Even though the Muslim Brotherhood tried to reach the agricultural villages of the countryside and ‘approached the tribes of the region’, their attempts were in vain (Abd-­Allah, 1983). The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was predominantly urban in nature, unlike the Egyptian Brotherhood, which had most of its support in the rural areas of the Nile Valley (ibid.). The lack of support for the Muslim Brotherhood indicates that by and large, Syrian tribes and their relatives in the cities were not ‘prepared to risk the material gains’ they had acquired during Hafez’s reign for a movement stemming from the same societal group that had always despised them and looked down on them (Devlin, 1984: p.  18). The Islamists’ arguments focused on the ‘overrepresentation of Alawites’ in the regime since Hafez’s military coup (Lobmeyer, 1991). Al-­Assad tried not to let the Alawite dominance become too obvious and thus tried to ensure that more Sunnis were promoted to leadership positions in the government, the Ba’th Party and the military to a certain extent (ibid.). Although the merchants of Damascus had a strong influence on Hauran and the merchants of Aleppo dominated Deir Ezzor, tribal divisions favoured the interests of the regime (Batatu, 1982). Many of the Ba’thists in these two governorates were descended from tribes like the al-­Zoubi, the al-­Hariri and the Aqaydat who opposed the Brotherhood movement (ibid.). In the following paragraphs, a few examples will be given to show how the tribes supported al-­Assad against the Muslim Brotherhood. Jonathan Rae (1999) describes how Jamil Al-­Assad, Hafez’s brother, visited Boueidar, the stronghold of the Hadidiyn tribe, in 1981. Boueidar is the head of a triangle of different villages inhabited by the Hadidiyin in the Hama, Aleppo and Idlib governorates (Interviewee 7, 2014). They are located in very strategic locations and were considered the first line of defence for the regime in its battle against the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid.). Jamil asked the Hadidiyn to be the

82   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 g­ overnment’s ears and eyes in the countryside of Hama and Aleppo and to monitor movements between the two governorates (Chatty, 2010). They were asked to observe the flow of guns from the Iraqis to the Brotherhood movement and to prevent the desert from becoming a refuge for their members (ibid.). Many informants told me that the Hadidiyn joined an association established by Jamil Al-­Assad called ‘Ali al-­Murtada’, which was mentioned in Seale’s book about Hafez al-­Assad (Seale, 1988: p. 427). ‘Ali al-­Murtada’ is the name of an old Alawite Sheikh (Rae, 1999: p.  222). The organisation approached certain tribes in the countryside based on the argument that these were originally Alawite and were forced to become Sunnis by the Ottomans (Sadiq, 1993 cited in Van Dam 1996: p.  123). It has been alleged that the name Hadidiyin came from the Haddadun which is one of the main Alawite tribes (Interviewee 7, 2014) and that they had to change it after they were forced to convert into Sunnis by the Ottomans. Joining this association was beneficial for the Hadidiyin who were armed through the defence brigades of Rif ’at al-­Assad (Rae, 1999). A plot of fertile land of some 900 ha surrounding Kaumah villages was granted to the Sheikhs of Hadidiyin (ibid.). In return, the Hadidiyin built military checkpoints around Hama, watched the desert, captured some members of the Muslim Brotherhood who wanted to escape to Iraq after the bombing of Hama and handed them to the Syrian regime (Interviewee 7, 2014). In Aleppo where the Muslim Brotherhood also had a strong presence, the Syrian regime sought the aid of the tribes in the countryside near the city to confront the Islamists. From 1979 onwards, the regime faced demonstrations, strikes and escalating violence that paralyzed Aleppo (Drysdale, 1982). Sheikh Dayyab al-­Mashi, one of the leaders of the Busha’ban tribe in the countryside of Aleppo, admitted in the documentary, ‘A Flood in Baath Country’ directed by Omar Amiralay in 2003, that he sent his tribesmen to Aleppo in the 1970s to help President Hafez al-­Assad fight against the Muslim Brotherhood (Dukhan, 2014b). During those hard days, my tribesmen marched in the streets of Aleppo cheering for the life of the president. We opened the shops in the market and broke the strike. The next day, the president sent us Major Abdul Karim Idris, from the state security to thank us for our national deed. We asked him to send our regards to the president and tell him that this was our duty. (Amiralay, 2003) The Bu Bana tribesmen2 tricked the Brotherhood members and marched with them in one of their demonstrations in Aleppo (Interviewee 8, 2014). Once they reached the city centre, they used the weapons given to them by the Syrian regime to disperse the demonstration and arrest some of the Muslim Brotherhood members (ibid.). To reward them for their loyalty, Sheikh Dayyab al-­Mashi was granted a permanent seat in the Syrian Parliament. Additionally, the villages of his tribe were provided with electricity and the majority of his tribesmen were exempted from military service (ibid.).

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   83 In Raqqa where the Ba’th Party had a strong presence, the existence of the Muslim Brotherhood did not exceed a few educated individuals who had connections with the merchants of Aleppo and tried to preach some of the movement’s ideas among the tribes of the governorate (Interviewee 9, 2014). These people tried to organise a strike in the market of Raqqa in solidarity with Hama and Aleppo. Sheikh Faisal Hweidi, of the Afadilah clan gathered the merchants and shop keepers in his guest house in Raqqa and told them that ‘We will not allow this strike to happen and any shop that will be closed; my clan will open it by force.’ None of the shops in the market closed and the strike failed (Interviewee 9, 2014). According to the informant, the services provided to the governorate by the regime were good and the tribes did not want to risk losing them. In Deir Ezzor, the heavily tribal governorate, tribal ties extend beyond the Syrian–Iraqi borders uniting the two countries (Dukhan, 2014a). Here, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to penetrate the tribes to help them smuggle arms from Iraq into Syria. It succeeded in recruiting Sheikh Dandal Jabr from the Bani Sakhr tribe who had been a member of the Ba’th Party at a previous time (Saadedin, date unknown). He used his position in the tribe to smuggle arms from Iraq and got his tribe involved ‘in the troubles’ (Interviewee 10, 2014). He organised a meeting with the tribal leaders of Deir Ezzor in 1982 to incite them to revolt against the regime (ibid.). All the tribal leaders who attended the meeting rejected his call because they were aware that the Muslim Brotherhood did not recognise tribal leadership and if the movement succeeded in toppling the regime, it would clip their wings and rescind a lot of the advantages given to them by al-­Assad’s regime. When the Islamists were defeated in Hama, Sheikh Dandal Jabr escaped to Iraq to live under the protection of Saddam Hussein’s regime. ‘Hafez understood that the Alawites could not rule the country on their own so he cultivated Sunni allies who were marginalised and despised by the city people as well’ (Rubin, 2008: p.  50). When the Muslim Brotherhood revolted against the regime, the tribes did not support it because they were less religious than their urban counterparts and many of them had benefited from services provided to their regions by al-­Assad’s regime. The majority of them were relatively secular, finding the Ba’th Party’s principles more to their taste than the Muslim Brotherhood’s (ibid.). The regime undermined the power of the Muslim Brotherhood in the tribal regions through policies favouring the tribes over the people of the major cities. The tribes supported the Syrian regime against the Muslim Brotherhood both because of the dramatic improvements in their living standards since Hafez al-­Assad came to power and because their leaders restored the prestige and respect lost to them during the Nasserite and the Ba’thist eras.

Tribes as a counterweight to the Kurds The Ba’th Party argued that the lands inhabited by the Kurds, whether in Syria or Iraq, were ‘an integral part of the Arab world’ and therefore, for the Ba’thists,

84   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 Kurdish self-­determination was impossible since it contradicted this claim (Mcdowall, 1996: p.  223). This section will try to explain why, despite being proposed in 1963, the implementation of the Arab belt project did not take place until Hafez al-­Assad came to power. It is important to note that most of the studies conducted on this topic are biased either towards the Kurds or the Arabs and it is very difficult to read or hear objective opinions on this issue as it is still very controversial even at the time of writing this book. Arabisation of the Kurdish region in Syria, located in al-­Hassakeh governorate, began in the 1930s during the French mandate when the Arab nationalist government began to encourage the Arab tribes (the Tay, the al-­Jabbur and the Shammar) to settle down in return for land grants and subsidies (Barout, 2014). The turning point in the relationship between the central government in Damascus and the Syrian Kurds in al-­Hassakeh was in 1962. In that year, Iraqi Kurds revolted against the Qasim regime in Baghdad and held all the north of Kurdistan in Iraq. (Tejel, 2008: p. 50). Qasim failed to crush the revolt and his opponents contacted the Kurds and verbally promised them Kurdistan’s autonomy (Chaliand, 1992). Based on previous experiences of losing its territories to Turkey and Israel, the Syrian government felt that its territorial sovereignty was in danger again. The first measure that the Syrian government took was conducting a census in al-­Hassakeh province with the aim of ‘differentiating between Kurds who had the right to live in Syria and those who had illegally entered Syria from Turkey or Iraq after 1945’ (Montgomery, 2005: p.  10). The census stripped 120,000 Kurds of their Syrian citizenship (ibid.). In 1963, the Ba’th Party took power in Iraq and power in Syria soon followed. Baghdad resumed its war against the Kurds, supported by Syrian aircraft and a Syrian armoured force of 6,000 men (Vanly, 1992). A mass media campaign started against the Kurds with slogans like ‘Save Arabism in al-­Jazirah!’ and ‘Fight the Kurdish threat!’ (Vanly, 1992: p. 151). The economic value of the region, in terms of agriculture, as the primary cotton and wheat producing region of Syria, was such that the Syrian government became concerned about Kurdish domination of such resources (Yildiz, 2006). Kurdish nationalism began to spread in Turkey in the 1960s and the Kurds established different revolutionary groups there (Heper and Sayari 2012). Arab tribes constituted a barrier between the Kurds of Syria and those of Iraq but there was no human barrier between the Kurds of Syria and Turkey and the concern was that the Kurds of Turkey would encourage their fellows in Syria to join any military action against the central government in Damascus. The idea of settling Arab tribes on the Syrian–Turkish border was intended to prevent this possibility. The Ba’thists asked Muhammad Talab Hilal, the head of the political security apparatus in Hassakeh to conduct a study on the Kurdish issue in the region and suggest solutions. The report is available in Arabic online and suggested many measures to ‘eliminate the Kurdish danger’ (Hilal, 1963). The measures that are relevant for this study include ‘the colonisation of Kurdish lands by Arabs and the creation of collective farms for the new Arab settlers’. (Tejel, 2008: p. 61). In his study Hilal suggests using members of the Shammar confederation

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   85 because they are the poorest people and their ‘Arab belonging’ is guaranteed (Hilal, 1963). Out of all the points proposed by Hilal, the government focused on the two points mentioned above. The plan was not implemented until 1973 for various reasons. Firstly, there was a divide between the Ba’thists themselves on a united policy towards the Kurds. There were some who opposed the idea of settling Arabs in the Kurdish region. The arrival of Hafez al-­Assad ended this disagreement since he had the final word on domestic policy issues. Secondly, the members of the Shammar confederation who were suggested for the project were already migrating to Saudi Arabia in large numbers due to the oil boom there and the kinship ties they had with the Aneza tribes. Therefore, settling them down in the Kurdish region was not sustainable in the long run. Thirdly, the discovery of further oil reserves in Hassakeh governorate in the early 1970s may have contributed to the implementation of this plan out of the concern that al-­Hassakeh had the largest population of non-­Arabs in Syria and should the Kurds choose autonomy, the country would lose its largest oil reserves (Sherry, 1996). Since taking office, Hafez al-­Assad tried to convince the tribesmen of the Tay and the al-­Jabbur to move up north and settle down in the Kurdish areas but these tribes were not motivated to do so (Interviewee 11, 2014). This led to a lack of human resources to implement the project. The creation of Lake Assad took place in 1973 and this led to the submersion of 66 villages located on one of the banks of the Euphrates River (Ababsa, 2011). The people who lost their villages belonged to the al-­Walda clan of the Bu-­sha’ban tribe in Raqqa. The number of people who moved differs sharply from one source to another. Some sources confirm that the maximum number of people moved was 25,000 (about 4,000 families) (Nahar and al-­Mustafa, 2013) while others estimate the number at around 60,000 (Ababsa, 2011). The Arab belt was some 10–15 kilometres wide and 375 kilometres long, from Ras al-­Ayen in the west to al-­Malikieh near the Syrian–Iraqi border (Sherry, 1996). The movement of the clan members started in 1973 and continued until 1975. People were moved by truck at the expense of the government. The first to move was the leader of the clan and his family and they settled in the village of Raha. A member of the al-­Walda clan mentioned that not all the clan members agreed to move to al-­Hassakeh. Some preferred to move to other parts of Raqqa. The leader of the clan, Sheikh Shawakh al-­Bursan, was asked to move personally to al-­Hassakeh to encourage the largest number of his clan members to move (Interviewee 12, 2014). They were tempted by the regime, which told them that the area was very fertile and good for agriculture. They were also reminded that they were Arabs and part of their duty would entail defending the Arab land being taken by non-­Arabs coming from Turkey (ibid.). One of the main reasons that convinced Sheikh Shawakh al-­Bursan to move with his clan members to al-­Hassakeh was the power and prestige that he would gain through collaborating with the regime. Many informants stated that the government built a house with a big guest’s room (madafa) for the Sheikh and his family in the village of Raha. Once he moved to al-­Hassakeh, Sheikh Shawakh al-­Bursan became a member of the

86   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 Syrian Parliament for his governorate (ibid.). The al-­Walda clan was considered a very small clan and was able to strengthen its position (financially and morally) vis-­à-vis the larger and stronger tribes like the Tay and the al-­Jabbur by becoming a client for the Syrian regime. Other members of the al-­Walda clan, in particular the cousins of Sheikh Shawakh al-­Bursan, were awarded important positions at the government institutes in al-­Hassakeh governorate. During an interview with (Interviewee 13, 2014) of the Shammar confederation, I was told that one of Sheikh Shawakh al-­Bursan’s cousins became the state judge in al-­ Hassakeh and another became the general inspector of the government in the governorate itself. While most foreign sources describe the settlements built for this clan by the Syrian regime as ‘exemplary villages’, information during interviews indicated that the villages were very basic and each house consisted of only two or three mud rooms without sanitation. Services improved with time and hospitals and schools were established later. The government set up 15 state farms for the villagers and encouraged them to work in cotton and wheat production (Ababsa, 2011). Artisan wells were dug by the government to provide them with water. After a while, the clan became known as al-­Magmoreen (the drowned) rather than going by their real name. In the words of a few Kurdish people, ‘the government built these clan members’ home for free, gave them weapons, seeds and fertilizers and created agricultural banks that provided loans. Forty one villages were built within three years. Arab tribesmen were encouraged to move and settle in the area but Kurds were not allowed to move to this region’ (Yildiz, 2006). The available literature provides two contrasting narratives for the situation of the Kurds during the implementation of the Arab belt project. Authors like Montgomery, (2005) and Yildiz (2006) mention that families from 300 Kurdish villages along the Syrian–Turkish borders were ordered to leave their homes and resettle in the non-­Kurdish interior of Syria like Deir Ezzor. Others like Barout, (2014) and Nahar and al-­Mustafa (2013) argue that no Kurdish families were forced out of their villages. One or two villages for Arabs were constructed between each Kurdish village and the next. From different interviews I conducted with Arab and Kurdish inhabitants from the region, I was able to confirm that the Arab belt villages were constructed on reform lands that were confiscated from Kurdish landlords such as Asfar wa Najjar and Ma’mar Bashi in 1958 and 1963 (Interviewee 14, 2014). Therefore, Kurdish families were not displaced as a result of the project that was established on state owned land. There was little to no relationship between the Kurds and the Arabs when the Arabs had not learned Kurdish or been fully integrated into their physical or cultural environment (Tejel, 2008). Kurds called Arabs settlers or occupiers and looked down on them as a lower class that had previously raised sheep and was now attempting to compete with them in growing cotton and wheat (Interviewee 14, 2014). Villages grew to be either purely Arab or purely Kurdish where marriage between the two ethnicities was a rarity. In conclusion, it could be said that the Syrian regime succeeded, to a certain extent, in creating a new demographic situation in a densely Kurdish area. It

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   87 instrumentalised the tribal assabiiyyah by telling members of al-­Walda that they were protecting the borders of the Arab land. In 1986, during a Kurdish protest, the Syrian regime sought assistance from the al-­Walda clan in the belt region to suppress the protest and a young Kurdish girl was killed while several Kurdish protesters were being arrested (Yildiz, 2006). The Al-­Walda clan has become the eyes and ears of the Syrian regime on the Syrian–Turkish border in an area where the regime did not want to invest a lot of money in building military barracks as it has other priorities in the south at the Israeli front. The Arab belt project was halted by Hafez al-­Assad within three years of its initiation but the status quo remained unchanged (Meyer, 1990). Having stabilised his power and assured his position in the country, Hafez al-­Assad tried to balance ‘redistribution and coercion’ to manage the Kurdish problem and avoid losing control of the entire Kurdish population (Tejel, 2008: p. 62).

Tribes in the army, security apparatus and Ba’th Party The army Historically, tribes would avoid serving in the national armies of their countries. They used to be mobile because their lifestyle required them to migrate from one region to another looking for water and grass for their livestock. Serving in the army restricted their freedom and mobility. After the French mandate, the central government in Damascus wanted to exercise its sovereignty over the entirety of the Syrian territories, so in 1953, tribesmen were recruited to the army, served their obligatory period and returned home as civilians (al-­Faour, 1968). In 1954, the government allowed nearly all the tribes in the border regions to carry arms as part of the national defence system (ibid.). According to al-­Faour, there were 40 regular soldiers for every 139 families of the al-­Fadl tribe on the Syrian–­ Lebanese border in 1961. For the tribes, service in the military became their main chance for education and training in skilled labour (Shoup, 1990). Comprehension of the kinship ties and Hafez al-­Assad’s reliance on people from the same sect, tribe and social level are important in understanding how the country functioned. Hafez al-­Assad was the first ruler in the history of Syria to be of peasant extraction and he was unreserved in declaring this (Batatu, 1999). This is something that army officers, who came from the tribes, admired in him since they felt an affinity with the rural class that he came from. In addition to constructing his power based on a network of personal Alawite clients dominating strategic levels of the army, al-­Assad built an alliance with Sunni officers (Hinnebusch, 1976). Junior army officers from certain tribes were promoted and entrusted with sensitive military roles and while all strategic positions with the Syrian army had been filled by Alawite officers, other important but less strategic positions were filled by officers who came from the Arab tribes. The army became an important channel for achieving some sort of social mobility for individuals and groups who came from marginal communities and underprivileged rural classes including the tribes (Khalaf, 1981). For certain

88   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 tribes in Syria, especially the common tribes (shawi), serving in the army provided employment and generous financial allowances that were not easily attainable otherwise (Fathi, 1994). Prestige and status were emphasised by giving these people, who were once poor and marginalised, access to the higher circles of the state and community (ibid.). On the other hand, certain tribes, especially the noble ones, abstained from joining the army. (Interviewee 3, 2014) from the Aneza confederation stated that it was a shame for a Bedouin to serve in the army. ‘The tribes that joined the army were poor and marginalised and for them the army was a very good source of income’ (ibid.). From different interviews conducted with tribesmen from many Syrian governorates, Hafez al-­Assad seemed to have chosen army officers from certain tribes to help Alawite officers in regions where the Alawites are not present in large numbers. For example, in the eastern countryside of Homs, the Amur tribe had a large number of army officers, one of whom was Mohammad Said Bkhetan who started his career in the Syrian army and later became head of the national security office. Through Bkhetan’s support, members of the Amur tribe took prominent positions in the Syrian army in the governorate of Homs. In Deir Ezzor, the Aqaydat tribe became a human reservoir for the Syrian army. One of the villages of Deir Ezzor, Mu Hasan, had probably the largest number of army officers in the entire Syrian countryside and was named ‘little Moscow’ for that reason (Walid, 2013). The army was a channel of access and opportunity between state and village (Hinnebusch, 1989a). Nawaf al-­Fares, one of the prominent men in the Aqaydat tribe in Deir Ezzor, was promoted to head of military security in Lattakia in 1990 (Interviewee 1, 2014). Some might argue that the aforementioned men rose to ‘prominence in their capacity as competent citizens and not as members of a particular tribe’. (al-­Abd, 2013). That said, none can deny that the recruitment and development of the Syrian army was rife with nepotism and preference was given to the relatives of army officers (Ledger, 2010). Once an army officer reached a high rank, he would support more of his tribesmen in their application to join the army (ibid.). Using sectarian or tribal language in the army was banned and these networks supporting ‘cousins’ and relatives were covert but the security services were aware of them (Interviewee 15, 2014). Sunnis being appointed to top military positions by those who oppose the regime was an attempt to disguise the regime’s narrow ethnic and geographic base (Oslon, 1982). The purpose of this study is not to take a position regarding the Sunnis’ lack of power in the army, rather, it tries to show that Sunnis who came from particular tribes were trusted and promoted to higher circles in the Syrian army than Sunnis coming from the cities. All the available evidence indicates that in the Syrian army, men from the countryside dominated (Devlin, 1983). Of these rural people, Alawites, followed by shawi tribes from the countryside of Deir Ezzor and Homs in particular, were substantially overrepresented compared to their proportion in the population at large (ibid.). Solidarity among tribesmen played an important factor in the recruitment process. Alawites constituted the master intellect of the Syrian army while shawi tribes constituted the backbone (Interviewee 15, 2014).

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   89 Security apparatus Due to their ability to operate in varied terrains, particularly in desert and mountainous regions, tribes have historically been sources of local intelligence despite the pitfalls of their changing loyalties (Taylor, 2005). During their mandate to Syria, the French Intelligence Services used the tribes as a valuable source of information by relying ‘on indigenous intermediaries from Sheikhs to shepherds to secure their entrée into clan groups’. (Thomas, 2003: p. 546). The country’s intelligence service followed the French template until 1970 (Rathmell, 1996). Tribes were not keen on joining the security force but Sheikhs continued to constitute an important source of information about their regions for successive Syrian governments. To consolidate his power, Hafez al-­Assad tried to guarantee that the majority of the security elite were Alawite. Expanding the traditional patronage networks of Syrian society, al-­Assad included other disaffected groups within the security structure so that these services employed 15% of the country’s total workforce (Chatty, 2010). The main structure of the Syrian security apparatus designed by al-­Assad was triangular with the angles representing military security, security of state and political security (Wege, 1994). Each security branch had a major sectarian representation, i.e. military security was dominated by the Alawites, security of state was dominated by Sunnis (mainly shawi tribes) and political security was dominated by a mix of minority groups (Alawites, Christians, Druzes) (Interviewee 16, 2014). Shawi tribes that had high representation in the Syrian army were overrepresented in the security of state department as well. The task of the security of state apparatus was to collect information on everyday life. Since people in the governorates of Raqqa, al-­Hassakeh and Deir Ezzor would regard Alawites as intruders, it was necessary to employ Sunnis for this task. The majority of security agents in the governorates mentioned above came from the Aqaydat tribe in the countryside of Deir Ezzor (Interviewee 17, 2014). Shawi tribes of Deir Ezzor were despised and mistreated by the people of the city so when al-­Assad recruited them to the security of state department, they were more loyal to the regime as it had elevated their status to that of the Alawites themselves (Interviewee 15, 2014). The strategy of recruiting shawi tribes into the security apparatus was useful because they were less likely to feel empathy for the wider segment of population they might be called upon to arrest, torture or execute based on orders from the regime (Sadowski, 1988) since shawi tribes were looked down upon by the urban people of Syria as poor and illiterate. When members of these tribes became members of the security services, they did not have sympathy for the people who once mistreated them and discriminated against them. Additionally, they were not attracted to urban based Islamism. Al-­Assad’s allies were never restricted to just the Alawites and he manipulated them all, to ensure the loyalty of the security officers and protect his regime from the threat of military coups (Sadowski, 1988). The tasks of the security branches sometimes overlapped but the aim was that they checked each other

90   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 (Perthes, 1997). By pluralising the security networks and balancing them against each other, al-­Assad ensured that no single security branch could arrogate to itself enough power to enable it to overthrow the regime (Batatu, 1999). The Ba’th Party In 1967 a disagreement between al-­Assad and his colleagues took place regarding the relationship between the Ba’th Party and the public. Some of al-­ Assad’s colleagues believed that ‘the party should close in on itself to protect party militants from the infiltration of opportunists’ (Seale, 1988: p. 146). Hafez al-­Assad believed in opening the party to new members and bringing in political allies (ibid.). Al-­Assad’s coup in 1970 was considered a victory of the second group. As a result of an amendment to the Syrian constitution of 1973, the Ba’th Party was given a unique status as the ‘leader of the state and society’, ushering it into all areas of public life (BBC, 2012a). Party cadres were recruited from the community, particularly educated young men from the rural areas of Syria (Hopwood, 1987). When it came to the tribal regions, the Ba’th Party was mostly active in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Dar’a. While some argue that traditional rural notables (Sheikhs) were eager to serve as representatives of the party, adding their prestige and knowledge of local conditions to the party’s arsenal (Sadowski, 1988), others argue that the Sheikhs had lost their former privileges and their power had been undermined by the loss of their patronage connections to the local party organisations (Hinnebusch, 1989a). In fact, most of the tribal leaders chose not to join the Ba’th Party and decided to be considered politically independent; however, these Sheikhs encouraged their sons and family members to join the party. Khalaf (1981) narrates how joining the Ba’th Party enabled educated members of the Afadilah clan to rise to a position as local party comrades that offered them access to the government amenities and brought benefits to their families and village communities. Four peripheral governorates, Lattakia, Dar’a, Sweida and Deir Ezzor contributed 75% of the Ba’th Party Regional Command (Oslon, 1982). Two of those governorates, Dar’a and Deir Ezzor, had provided over 45% of the total membership of the Regional Command (ibid.). When recruiting people in the tribal regions, the Ba’th started to turn the hierarchy of political power in that area upside down by accepting the membership of people from lower social strata in the villages (Hinnebusch, 1989a). For example, the son of a former household slave (from a shawi tribe) for the Fad’an (noble tribe) Sheikhs became the head of the party peasant union in Raqqa (ibid.). Likewise, in Dar’a, the son of a small butcher who came from a smaller, less powerful clan, worked himself up through the party hierarchy to become the branch secretary of Ba’th Party in the city (ibid.). In a similar vein to the army and security apparatus, joining the Ba’th Party as a member of certain clans from one tribe or when coming from a certain tribe was to gain power and influence that would enable them to counterbalance other clans from the same tribe or other tribes. For example, the Bu-­khabur clan who inhabit the village of Mu-­Hassan

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   91 mentioned earlier is considered one of the weakest clans of the Aqaydat tribe and some the Aqaydat tribesmen would cast doubts upon their ancestral belonging. The same goes for the al-­Walda clan that moved to al-­Hassakeh for the Arab belt project. The Ba’th Party reconfirmed our Arab identity particularly when tribes like the Tay and the al-­Jabbur did not consider us as a real tribe. They considered us inferior to them because we were poor and did not have sufficient political power. (Interviewee 12, 2014) According to (Interviewee 10, 2014) from Bani Sakhr tribe in Deir Ezzor, ‘It was the grubby small tribes that joined the Ba’th Party because it gave value and meaning to their existence when they were nothing before the Ba’th revolution.’ In Hauran, there has always been rivalry between the main two tribes: the ­al-­Zoubi and the al-­Hariri. The Al-­Zoubi used the Ba’th Party as a ladder to ascend to prominent government positions and gain superiority over the al-­Hariri (Interviewee 6, 2014). Under al-­Assad, the Ba’th Party became a vast patronage network (Hinne­ busch, 1989b). Many people joined the party as a strategy for protecting and ‘diversifying the interests’ of their tribe (ibid.). In the case of the son of a small butcher mentioned above, Hinnebusch describes how this party cadre managed to bring roads, electricity and water to his village and hence ‘through the levers of patronage, local government office was controlled by locals, not Damascene people’ (ibid.: p. 242). Despite laws and regulations on grazing, those who had representatives in the Ba’th Party like the Amur tribe, continued to dig wells in al-­Badia and their flocks were allowed access to grazing reserves when permission was officially denied. In return, accepting the membership of more people from the tribes served the regime well in the surveillance process. The objective was to observe and report the political orientations of other rival groups (tribes) (Perthes, 1997).

Tribal representation in the Syrian Parliament Tribal representation in the Syrian Parliament ranged from 10% to 12% from 1936 until the Ba’th Revolution in 1963. During these 27 years, there was constant struggle between the liberal and social forces and the tribal leaders over reducing, increasing or cancelling tribal representation in the Syrian Parliament. When the Ba’th took over, the Syrian Parliament was dissolved and a revolutionary council composed of 95 people ruled the country, however, none of these people were tribal Sheikhs (Al-­Ayadeh, 2009). Tribal leaders were completely excluded from the political scene for a period that lasted seven years. In 1971, Hafez al-­Assad set up the parliament (called the People’s Assembly of Syria by then) and appointed 172 members to it without elections (Ziadeh, 2013). In addition to representatives of the business and religious circles of the

92   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 country, al-­Assad appointed tribal leaders to the council in an attempt to develop a bond of mutual confidence between him and the people (Holmstrom, 1973). The number of tribal leaders appointed was very small (only 3%) in comparison to previous years when tribes were represented in the parliament; Al-­Assad did not want to give the impression that he was departing from the Party’s ideology of denigrating tribalism and sectarianism. Parliamentary elections were first held in 1973, then approximately once every four years (1977, 1981, 1986, 1990 and 1994) (Perthes, 1997). The seats were divided between the Ba’th Party and other parties under the umbrella of the National Progressive Front. Until 1990, independent candidates had very little chance of being elected if they were not on good terms with the regime (Perthes, 1997). Only particular Sheikhs were chosen to run for the independent seats. Tribal representation did not exceed 4% until the 1977 elections. The majority of the Sheikhs who represented their tribes in the councils of 1971 and 1973, like Sheikh Faisal Hweidi of the Afadilah in Raqqa and Sheikh Dayyab al-­Mashi of the Bu Bana in Aleppo, belonged to the common tribes. Therefore, al-­Assad favoured tribal leaders from the common tribes with regards to representation in the council to indicate that he supported the lower classes of the community rather than the higher ones. The year of 1977 marked an increase in tribal representation, up to about 8%, as some of the popular Sheikhs or their successors appeared again. Sheikh Abdul Aziz Trad Melhem of the Hasanah was elected from Homs governorate. This could be understood as a sign of the intention to improve the Syrian regime’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Aboud Jad’an Hefel of the Aqaydat tribe in Deir Ezzor, who had consistently represented his tribe during the 1950s and early 1960s, emerged in the council again. The Syrian regime enlarged the parliament membership in 1990. The number of representatives increased to 250 of which around one-­third of the seats (80) were reserved for independent candidates (Perthes, 1997). Around 30 of these 80 independently elected members of the parliament were tribal leaders (Chatty, 2010). This was the highest proportion (12%) that tribal representation reached in the history of Syria. It is noted that tribes like the Shammar, the Fad’an and the Rwalla (noble tribes) were no longer represented since they departed the country in large numbers, leaving for the Arab Gulf, clearing the arena for the common tribes. Although the electoral process often encourages appeals that bridge sectarian and tribal ties, tribesmen tended to vote for their Sheikh in most cases, mainly because ‘having a member of one’s tribe’ representing them in the parliament means that one is part of a politically significant group (Layne, 1987: p. 131). The assumption that the Sheikh could control the votes of his tribesmen was, however, not always accurate. Therefore, in many cases, rather than relying on tribal loyalties, a significant portion of electoral votes were purchased (Khalaf, 1981). Sheikh Abdul Aziz Melhem of the Hasanah in Homs would raise a big tent in front of his house and serve big mansafs (rice and meat) during the election campaign (Interviewee 1, 2014). It was not only his tribesmen that voted for him. There were also Alawites, Christians and other Sunnis who provided the religious composition of Homs city (Interviewee 1, 2014). The election campaign of Sheikhs did sometimes

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   93 raise an outcry within a particular group of Syrian intelligentsia as they viewed this as a resurgence of ‘tribalism’ (Layne, 1987). For example, the government gave two seats to tribal Sheikhs of the Hasanah in Homs in 1994. Abdul Aziz Melhem used to represent his tribe in the countryside of Homs but in that year, his nephew Abdul Karim ran for candidacy too and won another seat (Interviewee 1, 2014). The third seat was given to Sheikh Mahmoud Fadous of the Fawa’ira tribe in Homs. This meant that all three seats for independent candidates in the countryside of Homs went to tribal leaders. Alawites and Christians were excluded from that list. People began to make satirical jokes about this issue like ‘All the people who won the elections were Bedouin. We should call the Syrian Parliament the council of the tribes. Is this historical city unable to replace those old backward people with young educated men?’ (Interviewee 1, 2014). According to these intellectuals, tribalism is a regressive form that is used as a ladder upon which one climbs to a seat as representative (Layne, 1987). The distribution of parliamentary seats was a means of patronage (Perthes, 1997). For tribal leaders who represented their tribes, parliament has been a place that supplies wasta (mediation) for the deputies’ clientele and constituencies and draws attention to forgotten local problems (ibid.). Some tribal leaders used the judicial immunity granted to them as members of the parliament to smuggle drugs and pieces of antiquities, or worked with officials from the regime to purchase and distribute illicit commodities and bribe customs officials (Batatu, 1982; Interviewee 1, 2014). On the other hand, many others, in their capacity as members of the parliament, negotiated terms for providing fodder for their tribes’ herds, secured the digging of artesian wells and were able to deal with issues such as lack of medical treatment or sluggish progress in a development project. To conclude, tribal representation in the Syrian Parliament was not a reflection of government policy, but rather an expression of the tribes’ strength in their regions (Chatty, 2010). The overrepresentation of the common tribes refers again to their ascendency on the Syrian political scene in comparison to the noble ones.

Structural changes in tribal community by the end of the twentieth century Tribal structures have been challenged in two major ways, from within and from outside. Both aspects will be explained respectively: The external challenge was caused by the Syrian regime’s policies and this relates to the system of Sheikhdom (chiefdom) of the tribes. This is best described by Sheikh Nawaf al-­Basheer of the Baggara tribe: Hafez al-­Assad’s regime created new forms of class structure. He dismantled the power of the tribes from the inside by side-­lining the traditional tribal Sheikhs and replacing them with people who have ties to the intelligence services. The Sheikh’s role, position and authority within his own tribe changed and sometimes diminished. (Abouzeid, 2012)

94   Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000 This could be true for certain tribes whose leaders refused to cooperate with the regime and become part of its patronage networks (Interviewee 7, 2014). Two clear examples of the above policy are the Fawa’ira and the Bani Khaled tribes. The traditional leader of the Fawa’ira is Hamid Shibly who had a disagreement with the Syrian regime, which decided to put him under house arrest and later replace him with Mahmoud Fadous, from another family of the Fawa’ira tribe. Mahmoud Fadous had close links with the security apparatus in Homs and kept his position as a member of the Syrian Parliament from 1994 until the time of writing this book. The Bani Khaled tribe was traditionally led by Talal al-­Basha whose authority was challenged by Ahmad Nazzal, supported by the Syrian regime and the Saudis. Ahmad Nazzal took over the Sheikhdom of the Bani Khaled tribe and ran as a member of the Syrian Parliament from 1994. For many tribes, this resulted in a reduced cohesiveness and the fragmentation of the tribe (Schoel, 2011) as some tribesmen decided to side with the new Sheikhs and some decided to back the old ones. The internal challenge was caused by the gradual weakening of kinship ties; A variety of factors like education, physical mobility, settlement and urbanisation have contributed to the changes in the traditional social familial relationships (Fathi, 1994). The settlement of the tribes in the towns and cities made tribesmen focus on different sets of values and priorities. The integration of tribal members within the modern economy entailed adopting industrial values to interact with others they did not know in the city (ibid.). Some of them achieved a large measure of economic security that enabled them to break away from their tribe and neglect their kinsmen (Marx, 1990), however, for those who remained unemployed or those who worked for the minimum wage, they tended to live in tribal residential enclaves and maintain strong ties with their kinsmen who inhabited the same tribal territory. Tribal leaders, who were once secure in their belief that they spoke for all members of the tribe started to face growing dissent and opposition within their tribes (Fathi, 1994). Their policies and decisions became less acceptable to the younger generation of the tribe and in some cases the implementation of these decisions did not extend beyond the Sheikh’s family and other senior elders of the tribe. Many of these Sheikhs could no longer maintain their ‘hospitableness and generosity’ and lost much of their prestige because they no ‘longer had the economic resources to entertain and economically support their tribesmen’ (Schoel, 2011: p.  106). The lack of economic power and prestige of some Sheikhs led to their failure in winning parliamentary seats as in the cases of the Nuim and the Baggara tribes. Moreover, increased education within the tribes led to the emergence of a young educated class that did not give up on the importance of the tribe as a mutual-­aid association but did not accept the traditional authority of the Sheikhs out of the belief that Sheikhs are corrupt and their main interest lies in securing financial interests for themselves and their families. This led to a split within the tribe itself between the ‘modernists’, represented by the educated who refused to recognise the traditional authority of the Sheikh, and the ‘traditionalists’, represented by the uneducated who maintained their

Hafez al-Assad and the tribes 1970–2000   95 loyalty to the Sheikhs. In some cases, the latter category collected money to build the Sheikhs’ guest houses which served as residences (Costello, 1977).

Conclusion According to the cyclical pattern, tribes should be weak when the state is strong. It could be argued that the Syrian state was strong under the rule of Hafez ­al-­Assad and therefore tribal structures should have been weak. Although Hafez al-­Assad’s regime was militarily strong, his state lacked all the forms of popular legitimacy necessary to support his rule after the military coup by which he assumed power in 1970. Therefore, he integrated the tribes and their cultures into the state to enhance the political power of his rule. The tribes were supposed to fulfil some specific roles to advance consolidation. ‘Hafiz understood that the Alawites could not rule the country on their own so he cultivated Sunni allies’ who were marginalised and despised by the city people as well (Rubin, 2008: p. 50). Hafez al-­Assad utilised the tribes in the construction of his authoritarian power and used them as tools to fight the Muslim Brotherhood and Kurdish attempts to gain autonomy (Dukhan, 2014b). The regime depended on tribal support during difficult times and a tribal presence in the Syrian army, alongside the Alawite one, has contributed to the regime’s stability. The regime created patronage networks, with the tribes co-­opting their leaders with the aim of strengthening its traditionally loyal supporters in the rural areas of the country. The migration of noble tribes from Syria to the Arab Gulf reduced their numbers and thus their ability to be represented politically in Syria. This opened the door for the ascendency of the common tribes who joined the army and Ba’th Party in large numbers alongside the Alawites. In contrary to all the previous times in history when the noble tribes were stronger than the common ones, this era witnessed the rise of the common tribes who allied with the Alawites to counterbalance the urban people in Syria. Despite this, the regime continued to woo the noble tribes as a way to connect it to the Arab Gulf monarchies and their financial aid. This was made clear by the respect that leaders of the Aneza received during al-­Assad’s reign.

Notes 1 Tribal leaders from Al-­Jazira and investors from Aleppo had partnerships to grow cotton based on an agreement between both sides. More details about this period are provided in Chapter 3. 2 The Bu Bana is one of the clans of Bu Sha’ban tribe tribe. It is mainly located in Manbje/the countryside of Aleppo.

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5 Bashar al-­Assad and the Arab tribes in Syria from 2000 until 2010

Introduction The death of Hafez al-­Assad and the ascension of his son, Bashar, to rule, brought an end to the state-­society dynamics that his father worked on for decades (Dukhan, 2017: p. 71). Hafez al-­Assad built an authoritarian state that rested on patronage networks that connected his regime to the society. It is these networks that secured the regime’s survival. These networks allowed the state to become the major source of employment for the tribes and to clientelise their Sheikhs through distributive social policies (ibid.). In contrast to his father’s reign, these patronage relationships became affected by the policies of privatisation and liberalisation. Syria’s own oil revenues have been declining since the 2000s as a result of the decline in production (Butter, 2015). In order to be able to support the declining public sector in a volatile environment, Bashar al-­Assad revived the private sector, thus appeasing the bourgeoisie (Hinnebusch, 2012). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 meant that this large economic and military sponsor of the Syrian regime was no longer able to support its Middle Eastern allies. To access investment from the capitalist world as a substitute for aid, the regime followed a new set of liberal policies that enabled it to integrate into the global community. Privatisation and liberalisation of the economy have created new economic and social players that transformed the populist nature of the authoritarian regime into a regime connected mainly with the bourgeoisie and upper class, neglecting the rural tribal constituency that was a vital part of Hafez al-­Assad’s authoritarian state. Drawing on data gathered through interviews as well as written literature, this chapter will explore the policies that Bashar al-­Assad directed towards the Arab tribes in the period extending from 2000 until 2010. The chapter starts by outlining how Bashar al-­Assad narrowed the coalition of his rule to depend mainly on his family and the city merchants while excluding the lower and middle strata in the periphery. It will then trace the disintegration of the social contract between the regime and the tribes as a result of the former’s failure to deliver adequate development services in their regions. Losing the support of the tribes undermined the stability of the regime, resulting in clashes between the different tribes themselves, the tribes and the Kurds and the tribes

102   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 and the Druzes, which will be investigated in detail in this chapter. Using policies similar to those adopted by his father who used the tribes as leverage against the Islamists and the Kurds, Bashar al-­Assad’s regime’s encouragement of Syrian tribal youth to join the Iraqi insurgency against the Amer­icans will be explored in detail. The regime’s tolerance of Iranian missionary activities in the tribal regions and its accommodation of Islamists’ activities in those regions erased the regime’s secular foundation. This chapter will argue that Bashar al-­ Assad’s policies towards the Arab tribes chipped away the regime’s ideological pillars and threatened the longer-­term cohesion of its social base which paved the way for the uprising to start in the tribal regions.

Bashar al-­Assad and narrowing down the base of alliances During Hafez al-­Assad’s reign, the state was comprised of three institutions: the Ba’th Party, the military apparatus and popular organisations. These pillars played a major role in connecting the top of the regime to its base but these pillars were being gradually eroded after 2000 (Dukhan, 2017: p.  73). At the very top there was a shift in the balance of power within the elite, against rural Sunnis. The regime gave a free hand to the al-­Assad-Makhlouf family, which led to the overconcentration of opportunities and patronage in the hands of the regime’s elite, at the expense of the regime’s traditional clients in the rural areas (Heydemann, 2007). On the other hand, as part of Bashar’s campaign to fight against corruption, a few Sunni figures were ousted from the regime’s inner circle. The campaign reached its highest point when the Syrian media started accusing the previous Prime Minister, Mahmoud al-­Zoubi, from the al-­Zoubi tribe in Dar’a, of corruption (Gambill, 2000). The Syrian media announced that al-­Zoubi’s assets had been confiscated and that he was no longer part of the Ba’th Party Regional Command (Ghadbian, 2001). Before al-­Zoubi, a highly-­placed Sunni officer, long serving army Chief of Staff under Hafez, General Hikmat Shihabi from al-­Bab was accused of embezzlement and corruption and was dismissed from his position as a result (Moubayed, 2001). This was seen as an attempt to clear any rivals to Bashar’s rule from his path. At the same time, the regime embarked on a set of liberalisation policies that have mainly benefited the urban upper middle class, the Syrian bourgeoisie and certain tribal leaders (Dukhan, 2017: p. 75). During Bashar’s decade of power, a private business class started to become prominent. A major part of this Syrian business community ‘grew under government patronage and care’ (Seifan, 2010: p. 9). Another part was established by the children of government officials (ibid.) and tribal leaders who enjoyed special privileges and influence. For example, the sons of Sheikh Mahmoud al-­Fadous, leader of the Fawa’ira tribe in Homs were granted significant trading concessions in Homs (Interviewee 1, 2014). The growth of this group of ‘awlad al-­sulta’ (children of authority) in the tribal community alienated them from the rest of the tribe and created striking class divisions within the tribe itself (Dukhan, 2017: p. 76).

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   103 In the tribal regions, the dismantling of state farms and the renting out of undeveloped land confiscated during the land reforms put an end to 43 years of collectivist experiments in the field of land reform, including 38 years under the rule of the Ba‘th Party. (Ababsa, 2009a: p. 34) The majority of those who benefited from these reforms were tribal leaders who were linked to the regime’s leadership. For example, Mohammad Said Bkheitan’s family members of the Amur tribe were allowed to herd their cattle over large areas of state-­owned land near Palmyra while other members of the same tribes were banned from doing so (Dukhan, 2017: p.  75). Despite continuous complaints from other tribesmen to the peasant union and the Ba’th Party branch about these concessions granted to Bkheitan’s family, no one seemed to give the issue any attention. Economic liberalisation meant that the regime started to restructure its social base away from the lower-­middle classes (Hinnebusch and Zintl, 2014), of which tribes constitute a large proportion. The regime started to move away from its populist authoritarian phase towards a phase in which public sector assets were appropriated by the President’s clan and those who support them (ibid.). There was also a perception that favouritism toward Alawites was increasing. Many tribesmen were asked why they opposed Bashar al-­Assad’s regime and many of them answered that they no longer benefited from the oil and gas fields that exist in their lands: ‘Where are the Syrian oil revenues?’ (Macleod, 2011). Deir Ezzor has a huge proportion of the country’s oil and gas which were estimated, according the International Monetary Fund in March 2010, to enable the state to earn about $3 billion per year – money, the tribes say, they see precious little of (ibid.). Abu Khalaf from the Aqaydat tribe said, ‘We see foreign and Syrian companies working in the oil fields but our sons have no jobs in these oil companies.’ ‘We get the bad smoke, the pollution and diseases, but no money’ (ibid.). Nizzar al-­Assad, a Syrian businessman, came from the Syrian coast to Deir Ezzor and established a huge oil company that collaborated with Petro Canada to invest in oil and gas fields located mainly in the eastern part of the country that is inhabited by the tribes. Of those who were employed by Nizzar’s company, 90% were people from the Syrian coast, i.e. Alawites, said a tribesman from the Baggara tribe (Interviewee 2, 2015). ‘Very few of our tribesmen were given basic jobs in this company like dustmen, truck drivers or cleaners.’ ‘We were deprived of the oil wealth although the Syrian constitution states that when a natural resource is discovered somewhere, people who live close to it, have the priority to get the jobs and the benefits’, added the same interviewee. In another interview with a tribesman from the Tay tribe, he stated that, It was not only the oil jobs that we were deprived of. Even teaching vacancies with the ministry of education in al-­Hassakeh were taken by the Alawites who

104   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 came all the way from Lattakia and Tartous to teach our children. We had many unemployed people who had university degrees, sitting at home and doing nothing while people who had high school certificates were given the priority to teach in our schools. (Interviewee 3, 2016) Certainly, the second layer of the regime after the Alawites continued to be people from the tribes of Hauran and Deir Ezzor. Although prominent figures from the tribes continued to rise in the state apparatus, like Mohammad Said Bkheitan from the Amur tribe who became the Assistant Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command of the Ba’th Party and Ryad Hijab from the Sukhni tribe who became the Prime Minister, these figures belonged to very small tribes that did not have demographic or political weight on the ground. It is noted during Bashar al-­Assad’s reign that he was dependent on small tribes to support his rule. Both the Amur and the Sukhni tribes mentioned above are looked down upon by other tribes like the Baggara and the Aqaydat. At the base of the regime, its penetration of society was withering. With high population growth, the state institutions were no longer able to provide the same level of employment as they had previously done. Al-­Assad regarded the party apparatus and the worker and peasant unions as obstacles to economic reform and thus he ceased to fund them which disabled their powers of patronage (Hinnebusch, 2012). After witnessing a drastic decline in the economic rewards received from the regime during Hafez’s reign, tribes started to become less of a stable base for the regime. This was demonstrated by clashes between the different tribes and the Kurds, the tribes and the Druzes and the tribes themselves, which indicated that the regime was starting to lose its major constituency as a result of the withdrawal of its economic benefits. In contrast to the previous era during which the countryside of Syria benefited from Hafez al-­ Assad’s policies, only certain cities, such as Damascus, Aleppo, Tartus and Lattakia, were reaping the benefits of the economic opening, and poverty ratios were significantly higher in tribal areas (Khatib, 2011). By 2005, Syrian opposition figures, including some religious and tribal leaders like Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir of the Baggara tribe, signed the Damascus Declaration which was a statement that called for ‘peaceful, gradual’, reform ‘founded on accord, and based on dialogue and recognition of the other’ (Wright, 2008: p. 232). A tribesman from the Baggara tribe said that the National Council of Damascus Declaration was very active in the tribal regions and many tribal youths from different tribes joined the council and supported its calls for reform in the country (Interviewee 2, 2015). The regime responded with repression, arresting 22 members of the National Council of Damascus Declaration (The Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2007). Sheikh Nawaf hosted a conference for the opposition in his guest house in Deir Ezzor in 2006 named: ‘the Declaration of Deir Ezzor’ which led to his arrest for a couple of months by then. The aforementioned situation led the regime to narrow down its coalition from party and state institutions and major Sunni figures to revolve around the

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   105 Alawite and in particular the al-­Assad clan which was considered by many as a dangerous move for al-­Assad’s regime. The regime developed primordial features and became more Alawite compared to the Hafez times (Wieland, 2012). Members of the new regime were not the same as those who had surrounded Hafez al-­Assad. The regime’s ruling class were no longer the sons of the rural middle class that Hanna Battatu neatly described1 (Perthes, 2004). Rather, the new rulers came mainly from the Alawite sect and urban middle classes (ibid.).

Development and ‘modernisation’ policies in the tribal regions After coming to power, Bashar’s first speech stressed the ‘need for a strategy of development that is comprehensive and has clear steps and measures to achieve it’ (Seifan, 2010: p. 7). Although Bashar al-­Assad tried to follow in his father’s footsteps by investing in development projects in the rural areas, Bashar’s regime failed to create broad co-­optation of the tribes as his father’s had. This section will argue that the Syrian government’s efforts during Bashar’s reign concentrated on the development of ‘useful Syria’ comprised of Damascus, Aleppo and the Syrian coast. As a result, the tribal regions were neglected. In combination with the government and non-­government bodies’ neglect of this region, the situation has been worsened by a prolonged drought in the tribal regions. The ecological and economic situation has contributed to a sharp increase in internal migration, especially to Damascus, Homs and Aleppo and external migration alike (Danish Immigration Service, 2010). This migration was described as ‘the largest internal displacement in the Middle East in recent years’ with 65,000 families being driven to the cities of Damascus, Homs and Aleppo between 2006 and 2010 (Ababsa, 2014: p. 209). This led to the transfer of complete tribes from the countryside to the suburbs of cities, creating belts of poverty in the surrounding deprived outskirts of the cities. The problem of poverty was acute in the tribal regions of the country, particularly in the north-­east, which led to the loss of the socio-­economic livelihoods of thousands (Abboud, 2014). Poverty was generally more prevalent in rural areas than in the urban areas of Syria (62% in rural areas) with the north-­eastern part (Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and al-­Hassakeh) having the greatest incidence and severity of poverty (UNDP, 2005). Official data published in 2005 indicated that unemployment reached an average of 20% across the country with a particular rise in the al-­Jazira region to the east and in the southern region where unemployment reached 51% (Ziser, 2007). Stephen Starr (2012) described the situation of the people in the Syrian al-­Badia during his visit to Palmyra in 2009. He noticed that children were visibly malnourished, sitting in rags on street pavements, and young men with no jobs or entertainment would drive motorbikes around the town for hours without education, healthcare or any positive outlook for the rest of their lives. To tackle these issues, Bashar al-­Assad issued a presidential decree in 2006 to establish the General Commission for al-­Badia Management and Development (Dukhan, 2017: p.  78). Having its headquarters in Palmyra, the

106   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 commission’s aim was to develop al-­Badia through economic and social development programs that included increasing fodder production, establishing pastoral and environmental reserves, digging wells and stabilising sand dunes (Louhaichi and Tastad, 2010). The commission failed to tackle poverty and unemployment issues in the tribal regions for many reasons. Firstly, the majority of its directors were from Damascus, Homs and Aleppo and had no knowledge or experience of how to deal with local problems. They were employed to lead the commission in Palmyra without giving people from the tribes the opportunity to deal with their issues themselves. Secondly, the commission was rampant with corruption, spending most of its resources on staff who worked for the commission rather than on serious issues like drought or poverty. Thirdly, the commission focused to a large extent on wildlife and environment conservation, ignoring the tribes’ main problems. For example, Haian Dukhan (2014) describes how the commission set up a protected area around Palmyra in 2009 in a joint project with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature to protect endangered species of birds which live in the project area for six months of the year. The protected area, according to Dukhan, has led to the impoverishment of the local tribes by limiting their grazing area and pushing them out of the protected area. Conservation efforts and funds have been directed to protect six birds, ignoring the needs and requirements of the nomadic tribes that have inhabited the project area for centuries. Fourthly, the commission was unable to solve many critical issues that emerged in the tribal regions. For example, in 2007,2 tribesmen from the Mawali tribe attacked the headquarters of the Petro Canada Company as it had oil concessions in the traditional grazing land of the Mawali (Dukhan, 2017: p. 79). The commission was asked to mediate between the company and the tribe and find a solution that would satisfy both sides. The only intervention from the commission was to arrange a meeting with the Sheikh of the Mawali tribe and threaten him with asking the Syrian army to interfere militarily against his tribe. Instead of finding a solution based on providing basic job opportunities for tribesmen in exchange for the use of their traditional grazing land, the commission was playing the role of security apparatus and not a development agency. During Bashar’s era, the regime was trying to foster a new civil society under the control of the presidential family as an alternative to the Ba’thist institutions. With regards to non-­government bodies’ development efforts, the First Lady Asmaa al-­Assad set up ‘the Syria Trust for Development’ which hoped to emerge as a pioneer of the development sector in Syria by trying to manipulate the sector into being compatible with Bashar’s overall approach to social reform (De Elvira, 2012). In this category, the Fund for the Rural Development of Syria (FIRDOS) focuses on conducting development initiatives in the rural areas of the country. FIRDOS is active in six governorates (Aleppo, Idlib, Lattakia, Homs, Hama and Quneitra) (Donati, 2013) none of which is in the eastern part of the country which was badly stricken by poverty and unemployment. According to a member of the Tay tribe in al-­Hassakeh, the First Lady visited many rural areas of Syria where FIRDOS had development projects but she never paid a visit to the eastern part of the country that was struck by drought (Interviewee

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   107 3, 2016). The only project that FIRDOS was involved in with regards to the tribes’ development was the Bald Ibis birds’ protected area, which hypothetically aimed to develop the living conditions of the Amur tribe in the protected area. Asmaa al-­Assad visited the protected area to observe the endangered species of bird and to be internationally visible as a protector of nature but she never met with anyone of the Amur tribe who were gradually kicked out of their traditional grazing land to set up the protected area. The drought that hit the entire Middle East in 2008 was terrible for Syria and forced the country to seek international aid and food supplies for one million tribesmen living in the north-­eastern governorates of Raqqa, al-­Hassakeh and Deir Ezzor, the poorest region in Syria (UN, 2010). Although the drought was a natural phenomenon that was outside the regime’s control, many human factors either led to this situation or aggravated it. Firstly, the overuse of underground water resources where people were allowed to dig wells irresponsibly led to the depletion of rivers like the Balikh and the Khabour (Ababsa, 2014). Secondly, despite the fact that the Tigris River crosses Syrian lands, the Syrian government did not invest any money in bringing the water to al-­Hassakeh governorate. It was only on the 7th March, one week before the uprising, that Bashar al-­Assad laid the first stone of a $2.1 billion irrigation project on the Tigris River (Ibrahim and Razzouk, 2011). Thirdly, overgrazing as a result of increased herd numbers caused rapid desertification. The herds were mainly not owned by the tribes. After 2000, many businessmen from the cities established commercial livestock enterprises by renting pastures in the tribal regions, organising the delivery of stock, meat and dairy products to the markets, damaging the local resources (Dukhan, 2014). Fourthly, the removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs (Hinnebusch, 2012) like fuel, fodder and fertilizers have left the tribes hit by the drought without any hope of recovery. Between 2006 and 2009, around 1.3 million tribesmen were affected by the drought and an estimated 800,000 people lost their livelihoods and basic food supplies (Solh, 2010). During this period, yields of wheat and barley dropped by 47% and 67%, respectively, and livestock populations plummeted (Erian et al., 2011). In 2009, 42% of the tribes suffered from anaemia due to a shortage of dairy products, fruit and vegetables (Ababsa, 2014). Hundreds of villages were abandoned in the eastern part of the country because people were no longer able to afford to pay for water to be brought to their villages after the sharp increase in fuel prices (Interviewee 4, 2014). This disaster accelerated the migration of whole tribes from the countryside to the suburbs of major cities in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Palmyra. This led to the creation of impoverished tribal belts in the outskirts of the cities. This is best described by Kilcullen and Rosenblatt (2014) when they said that the tribe had come to the city, planting itself outside and growing in. Tribesmen brought their customs to the city. They turned their slums into compact versions of their mud houses and tents. It was not poverty, but tradition, that had put a whole family in one room. (p. 36)

108   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 Tribal society no longer chiefly referred to people who lived in their tribal land but also to those poor migrants living in the slums surrounding Syria’s cities. Three examples of these tribal belts around Damascus, Homs and Palmyra will be described briefly. The first example is the Hajr Aswad district in the countryside of Damascus (Dukhan, 2017: p. 81). After the wave of drought, Hajr Aswad became a hub for migrants from al-­Hassakeh, particularly the al-­Jabbur and the Tay tribe. Migratory influx was huge and upon their arrival, tribesmen were looking for a house to rent. One of the most challenging issues was a chronic housing shortage, which has led to a dramatic rise in house prices and an increase in the construction of informal housing units. According to Khaled al-­ Jaberi, a tribesman from Tay who moved to live there, people looked down upon them. ‘They called us gypsies when we belong to the big important tribes. It was such a catastrophe for us’ (al-­Jaberi, 2014). Under such conditions, school dropout rates were high and enrolment has significantly declined (UN, 2010). Crime rates were on the rise in Hajr Aswad due to poverty (IRI News, 2009). The new residents of this impoverished district were unable to find permanent employment and it was difficult for them to access health services. A sense of solidarity continued to exist between the tribesmen who moved to Hajr Aswad. People who managed to get a job were helping their families and those who were close to them. The second example is the Baba Amr district in Homs (Dukhan, 2017: p. 81). It is one of the poorest districts in Homs. The district attracted large numbers of migrants from the Fawa’ira, the Nu’im and the Aqaydat tribes who settled in it. Many young tribesmen from this district used to go and work in the construction sector in Lebanon to make money for their families. Feelings of sectarianism were on the rise among those tribes who saw the Alawites in the city living in better conditions and having better jobs (Interviewee 5, 2014). This district would be an anti-­regime hotbed during the uprising. The third example is Brykat district in Palmyra in which tribes of the Amur and the Bani Khaled were forced to settle, under the pretext of wildlife and environmental conservation. Dukhan (2014) describes how the tribes in Brykat live in conditions of extreme poverty, surviving on the produce from a few sheep, goats and chickens. Their houses were built randomly without construction licenses and there are no organised streets or proper sanitation services, water or electricity (ibid.). Families are large and the birth rate is very high. This population density in such a small area has negative consequences for public hygiene especially when living spaces are mixed with the care of livestock (ibid.). While it could be argued that Bashar al-­ Assad’s reign caused the impoverishment of the tribes, who were left to face their deteriorating natural environment and had to pay the price for this without any real support from the government, it should be stressed that higher fertility rates among the tribes, in addition to precarious agriculture where rainfall is irregular, causes an unsustainable situation that could be more than state resources could deal with. Under Bashar al-­Assad’s rule, policies of economic liberalisation affected the agricultural sector too. The new policy included the privatisation of all Syrian state lands according to decision 83, made on 16th December 2000 (Ababsa,

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   109 2014). This led to the ‘renewal of large latifundia, which exceed all property ceilings fixed by the successive land reform laws’ (Ababsa, 2011: p. 106). This was a clear contradiction of the Ba’th Party ideology that aimed to limit private ownership of land. Of those who received land from the government, 80% did not use their lands but sold them. The main purchasers were Sheikhs of the Hleissat clan who used the lands for their large sheep herding business (Ababsa, 2014). Some Hleissat Sheikhs confirmed this to Ababsa by saying that the Hleissat are the ones who buy this land because it is our land! We, the former owners, received only 30 hectares out of thousands of hectares we had a long time ago. We do everything to get our land back, confiscated by the Nasserists and the Ba’thists. Why did not the government simply give us our land back? (Ibid.) This was indeed a counterrevolution according to the description of Bush (2002). In other Syrian governorates like al-­Hassakeh, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform started to redistribute the land according to decision 83 as mentioned above. The distribution favoured Arab tribesmen over Kurdish farmers during this process (Ababsa, 2009a). Two tribal leaders and their families benefited most from the redistribution of the lands. These were Sheikh Mohammed Meslet al-­Melhem of the al-­Jabbur and Sheikh Mohammad al-­Fares of the Tay (Interviewee 3, 2016). The land blocks received by both Sheikhs seem to have come as a reward for their role in crushing the Kurdish uprising in 2004. The above section showed that the Syrian government failed during Bashar’s reign, not only in providing support to the tribes afflicted by the drought, but it also caused the rise of an upper class within the tribes that benefited from the regime’s selective reforms while leaving the rest of the tribesmen facing an impoverished daily life.

Supporting the Iraqi insurgency and the tribes’ role After the Amer­ican decision to invade in Iraq in 2003, hundreds of Syrian fighters started flocking to Iraq to fight with Saddam Hussein’s regime against ‘the foreign aggressors’. Even after the fall of the regime and the onset of insurgency against the Amer­icans and the new government of Baghdad, many Syrians continued to cross the borders and fight with the insurgents. This section will argue that the Syrian regime manipulated the kinship ties that exist between Syrian and Iraqi tribes and used them as a tool to recruit fighters in order to confront the Amer­ican presence in Iraq. It will also show that the majority of the Syrian youth who joined the Islamic insurgency after 2003 came from Deir Ezzor and al-­Hassakeh because of the links between tribes on either side of the border (Felter and Fishman, 2008). Syria was against the military invasion of Iraq. Bashar al-­Assad appealed to Arab leaders requesting that they do not provide any military or logistic support

110   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 to the Amer­icans in their attack on Iraq (ibid.). Syria’s relationship with Iraq had improved gradually under Hafez al-­Assad, after a long period of rivalry, but became better still under his son when the Kirkuk-­Banis pipeline became active after two decades of closure (Perthes, 2004). After it became clear that the Amer­ican war to oust Saddam Hussein was inevitable, Bashar al-­Assad visited the governorate of al-­Hassakeh (Gambill, 2004). He met with many tribal leaders who had links with the Iraqi tribes (Interviewee 4, 2014). Bashar al-­Assad also visited Deir Ezzor during this period and made an unusual speech in which he praised the Aqaydat tribe’s history in its struggle against the French mandate in the Syrian national resistance (Yutuka, 2010). As soon as the attack on Iraq took place, al-­Assad called the opposition in Iraq a ‘legitimate resistance’ (Wieland, 2012: p.  205). When the war started, the Syrian regime did not only oppose it verbally but implemented actions against the Amer­icans. Syria started shipping military equipment to Iraq on the eve of the war and as the war became imminent, the Syrian government started facilitating the movement of Syrian volunteers to fight alongside Saddam Hussein’s regime (Ziser, 2007). Several distinct waves of volunteers travelled to Iraq to fight Amer­ican forces and the first wave that travelled to Iraq prior to the US invasion consisted of a considerable number of tribal fighters from eastern Syria (Anonymous, 2008). Apart from the Syrian regime’s encouragement for these tribesmen to go to Iraq, there were other factors that contributed to this movement. Firstly, Saddam was a beloved man among the Arab tribes of eastern Syria. During an interview with a tribesman from the Tay tribe in al-­Hassakeh, he stated that ‘Saddam Hussein lives in the heart of each tribal Sheikh. Saddam Hussein defeated Iran and protected the eastern front of the Arab nation. Saddam Hussein supported the Palestinian resistance and that is why we all love him’ (Interviewee 6, 2014). Secondly, Syrian tribesmen were envious of the resources that Saddam’s regime poured into developing the tribal regions of Anbar Province while their region was neglected by al-­Assad’s regime (Anonymous, 2008). They felt that by joining Saddam’s army, they would attain a status similar to that of the tribesmen in his country. Thirdly, Iraqi media has always emphasised Saddam’s own tribal roots, which made him seem like a better leader to the tribesmen in Syria than their young president and his ruling elite who mainly came from the larger cities or the coast. During this period, the mobilisation of Syrian youth to go to Iraq was publicly promoted. The Mufti of the republic, Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, called for Muslims in all parts of the world to join the Jihad in Iraq (al-­Haj, 2003). Sermons repeating the Mufti’s message were broadcast from mosques in Abu-­Kamal, the border city with Iraq and different parts of Deir Ezzor and in border areas, houses were donated for volunteers to live in while many religious and tribal leaders organised transportation and accommodation for them in Iraq (Anonymous, 2008). One of the most important tribal leaders known for his role in recruiting fighters to go to Iraq was Fawzi al-­Radi,3 one of the main figures of the Bani Sakhr tribe in Deir Ezzor. One of Sheikh Fawzi’s acquaintances, confirmed that this man opened his madaf (guest house) for tribal youths who wanted to go and fight in

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   111 Iraq (Interviewee 7, 2015). He mentioned that Iraqi television praised Sheikh Fawzi’s role in the recruitment process many times. Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explained that ‘Al-­Rawi was appointed to his position in the Syrian Ba’ath Party by the Syrian president Bashar al-­Assad in 2003’ (Rubin, 2010). Levitt also noted that the Treasury Department found that Radi ‘is supported financially by the Syrian Government, and has close ties to Syrian intelligence’ (ibid.). Fighters from the al-­Jabbur, the Tay, the Aqaydat and the Baggara went from Deir Ezzor and al-­Hassakeh in large numbers, to join their fellow tribesmen in Iraq, motivated by the tribal solidarity. Ultimately, the war lasted less than 21 days and Saddam Hussein’s regime fell. Many of the Syrian tribal youths were killed by Iraqis who opposed Saddam Hussein, while many others managed to flee back to Syria (Interviewee 8, 2015). After the invasion, Saddam Hussein’s half-­brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-­Hassan al-­Tikriti, and many of his other relatives escaped to Syria as well (Lesch, 2012). Sabawi was one of the leading organisers and financers of the insurgency in Iraq and was on the US government’s list of the 55 most wanted Iraqis (ibid.). It is believed that Sabawi was hosted by some of his relatives from the al-­Jabbur tribe in Syria. This was confirmed by an interview with Sufian Meslet of the al-­Jabbur tribe who mentioned that his grandfather, Sheikh Ahmad al-­Meslet, was hosted by Sabawi when his lands were confiscated by the Ba’thists in 1963. The al-­ Jabbur tribe wanted to repay the favour by hosting the fugitive Sabawi. Syrian intelligence asked them to either hand Sabawi to them or ask him to leave. Sabawi was attracting US attention and hostility that the regime was afraid of. ‘According to our tribal customs, we cannot give up someone who sought our protection.’ (Interviewee 8, 2015). According to these customs, a dakhil is any person who approaches a group seeking refuge from others (Shryock, 1997). Instead of handing the dakhil to the Syrian authorities, Sabawi was urged to leave Syria by the al-­Jabbur tribe. He went back to Iraq and was later arrested by the Amer­ican army. When the Iraqi regime fell, the Syrian regime did not want to see a stable Amer­ican presence so close. Therefore, it encouraged the insurgency that took place against the Amer­icans even though it appeared to be of Islamic extremist origin. Again, the eastern region of Syria was a major crossing point into Iraq for Islamist fighters until late 2007 (O’Leary and Heras, 2011). Syrian tribesmen who had immense knowledge of the terrains on both sides of the borders and had family connections in Iraq benefited from the payments they received for smuggling fighters and weapons into Iraq (ibid.). To fully understand the nature of the connection between the Syrian tribes and the Iraqi insurgency, a closer analysis of the Sinjar records4 was conducted. Firstly, among the Arab nationalities fighting in Iraq alongside the Iraqis, Syrians (8.2%), Yemenis (8.1%) and Algerians (8.1%) were the most common, respectively (Felter and Fishman, 2007). Secondly, according to the records, Syrian membership in the insurgency varied widely between different regions of Syria except for Deir Ezzor, which accounted for 34.3% of the Syrians listed (ibid.). Thirdly, the Sinjar records also

112   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 explain recruitment methods. Those recruiting most jihadists were ‘ikhwan’ (brothers), though this does not necessarily refer to Muslim Brotherhood members (Rubin, 2010) but rather recruitment of a family member within a clan or tribe. Fourthly, the Sinjar records also reveal the mechanism through which foreign fighters managed to cross from Syria to Iraq. Tribes on both sides of the border have been working on smuggling pharmaceuticals, petrol, cigarettes and other commodities since the two countries were formed. Livestock, particularly cattle, goats and sheep are moved in large flocks by Bedouin shepherds who move their flocks across borders to be picked up and moved to market by trucks owned by tribes on the other side of the border (Anonymous, 2008). In the same way, fighters were crossing the border between Syria and Iraq, often using the same tracks and trails as the livestock smugglers who will often move both livestock and humans at the same time and bribe border officials for this (ibid.). In October 2008, the United States targeted a suspected individual inside Syria who was accused of aiding the Iraqi insurgency (International Crisis Group, 2009). A US official confirmed that the targeted person, named Abu Ghadiya, was a Syrian national who was aiding the Iraqi insurgency and was involved in smuggling weapons and fighters to Iraq (ibid.). Abu Ghadiya is believed to be one of the local tribal leaders of Aqaydat tribe and has connections with Syrian intelligence (Interviewee 7, 2015). The Syrian regime not only manipulated its tribes into supporting the Iraqi insurgency but created a bridge with the Iraqi tribes to influence the domestic policy in that country. In 2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a delegation of Iraqi tribes headed by Sheikh Hussein Ali al-­Shaalan visited Syria and met with Bashar al-­Assad who asserted his support for ‘peaceful resistance’ to the Amer­ican occupation (Strakes, 2011: p. 245). During the summer of 2004, more than 160 tribal affiliates, headed by Sheikh Mish’an al-­Juburi, visited Syria and met with Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, who confirmed that Syria would continue to support the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. In an interview with David Lesch, al-­Assad referred to the dialogue that his country set up with the Iraqi tribes in order to achieve peace and stability there. According to him, ‘We hosted many delegations from the Iraqi tribes and conducted dialogues with them’ (Lesch, 2012: p. 24). The Syrian regime overtly manipulated tribal ties between Syria and Iraq in order to win nationalist legitimacy by standing against the invasion. The majority of the Syrian fighters in the Iraq war did not join because of Jihadist ideology, as much as they were driven by a mixed sense of Arab pride and tribal solidarity as this section has shown. Kinship ties between tribes were continuously manipulated for political purposes within the ruling dynasties of different empires (Barfield, 1991).

Tribal clashes: the regime is losing its grip Although al-­Assad’s father’s reign witnessed a major conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood that spanned a few years, the tribal regions of Syria were mainly

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   113 stable as was discussed in the previous chapter, however, the era of Bashar al-­ Assad witnessed major instability where clashes between different tribes, other sects and ethnicities seem to have erupted in different parts of the country, indicating that the regime had lost its leverage over the social dynamics of the Syrian community (Dukhan, 2017: p. 83). This section will briefly describe these major clashes that became a distinct feature of this era and will try to analyse the common themes lying behind them. The first important clash took place between the Kurds and the Arab tribes in 2004 in al-­Hassakeh governorate. On the 12th March 2004 there was a football match between a local team from al-­Hassakeh and another from Deir Ezzor in the town of Qamishli (Yildiz, 2006). Reports state that the problem was started by the fans of the Deir Ezzor team who were associated with the tribes of Iraq and sympathised with the toppled Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein (Savelsberg, 2014). The fans of the Deir Ezzor team chanted slogans praising Saddam Hussein and insulting the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani, for their role in toppling the regime (Tejel, 2008). The Kurdish team responded with chants praising President George Bush (Gambill, 2004). A battle between the people of Deir Ezzor and their fellow Arab tribesmen from al-­Hassakeh erupted in the stadium, during which the Arabs used knives, stones and sticks (Danish Refugee Council, 2007). Syrian security forces opened fire on the Kurds, only killing six of them (Tejel, 2008). This clash was followed by violent protests and riots from the Kurdish population in different parts of al-­Hassakeh (Danish Immigration Service, 2010). The Syrian army did not have a strong presence in the eastern part of the country and it could not therefore confront the angry Kurds without support (Interviewee 6, 2014). It therefore sought assistance from the Arab tribes in the governorate (Savelsberg, 2014). The al-­Jabbur tribe has a strong presence in Hassakeh and was entrusted to protect the government buildings there. They were allowed to take up arms, surround the government buildings and protect them (Interviewee 4, 2014). Tay tribe, headed by Sheikh Mohammed al-­Fares was entrusted to defend the other major city in the governorate: Qamishli (ibid.). The Kurdish movement was suppressed with estimates suggesting that around 40 people were killed, with over 100 injured and more than 2,000 Kurds were jailed (Lowe, 2006). The second important clash took place between the clan of the Jawabrah and the Druzes in the southern governorate of Sweida in November 2000 (Tejel, 2008). The clash took place as a result of a long-­running dispute over grazing and property rights. The event that took place in 2000 was the breaking point in a series of troubles between the two sides when tribesmen of the Jawabrah herded their cattle into a field owned by Druze farmers (Interviewee 9, 2015). This resulted in armed clashes between the members of the Jawabrah and the Druze farmers, which led to the death of a man from Aawaj family in Sweida. The peasant union in Sweida sent a telegraph to President Bashar al-­Assad asking him to limit the Jawabrah’s transgression of their lands but the telegraph was ignored. As a result, the people of Sweida protested in the street, asking the regime to end the problem. Some activists exploited the protests and started to

114   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 chant for reform and freedom of speech in the country. The regime responded by shooting at the protestors and arresting many of them. The regime was accused of siding with the Jawabrah clan based on the fact that the security services in Sweida had benefited from the smuggling activities of this clan. The clashes between the Jawabrah and the Druze were renewed which led to the death of 12 Druze farmers, pushing the government to interfere militarily and arrest many people from the Jawabrah clan. It is worth mentioning that these clashes resurfaced again during the civil war because the regime had only used repression to deal with them. The third clash took place between the tribes of the Shammar and the al-­ Jabbur in al-­Hassakeh governorate in August 2005. The clash started when a tribesman of the Shammar killed a man from the al-­Jabbur based on allegations of sexual molestation of a girl from the Shammar (Awsat, 2005). The underlying reason for this clash was that Shammar tribe sided with the Kurds in their uprising against the regime in 2004 and decided not to take part in suppressing the revolt with the Tay and the al-­Jabbur (Interviewee 7, 2015). The honour crime was just an excuse to take revenge for a long series of troubles escalating between the two tribes. Seven thousand tribesmen of the al-­Jabbur attacked the Shammar and burnt their houses in al-­Hassakeh (ibid.). This pushed the Syrian security forces to deploy 3,000 men to control the situation and this ended with the deportation of all the Shammar tribesmen from al-­Hassakeh city and the arrest of many people from the al-­Jabbur tribe. The fourth clash took place in April 2007 between the clans of the Sabkha and the Afadilah in the governorate of Raqqa (Donati, 2013). The clash started after objections from the Afadilah clan because Sheikh Mohammad Faisal Hweidi lost his parliamentary seat in that year to Abdul Mohsen al-­Rakan, Sheikh of the Sabkha (Syria News, 2007). The Afadilah clan accused Sheikh Abdul Mohsen al-­Rakan and his followers of electoral fraud (ibid.). They protested in the streets and chanted against the governor of Raqqa who was accused of collaborating with the Sheikh of the Afadilah clan to forge the election results (Interviewee 10, 2014). The Syrian security forces had to surround the governor’s place and use tear gas to disperse the protestors (ibid.). The governor came up with a conciliatory solution for both clans whereby both Sheikhs were given a seat in the parliament (Syria News, 2007). The fifth clash also took place in Raqqa governorate. Ababsa (2005) narrates an interesting story of how members of the al-­Walda clan whose former lands and homes were submerged by the Assad lake, protested against procedures that registered their traditional pasture land as state land, and then illegally sold it or it was rented by the Raqqa Agriculture Directorate to people who do not live in or know the village. The tribesmen started to shout ‘Corruption is sucking peasant blood!’ (ibid.: p.  41). The governor of Raqqa went to the village with some officials and asked the protestors to calm down but they started to throw stones at the officials, who had to retreat quickly to their cars and speed back to Raqqa (ibid.). Many letters were sent to the President, the Minister of Agriculture and the Ba’th Party Regional Command (ibid.). Again, many tribesmen

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   115 were arrested and brought to Raqqa’s political security branch instead of finding a satisfactory solution to the problem. Many common themes can be found from these different clashes between the tribes, spread across the country. Firstly, it is clear that the violence in different parts of the country had a certain ‘irrational, spontaneous, expressive’ dimension (Braud, 1993: p. 28), indicative of an anger that had been accumulating for too long. These social groups were not able to express their anger or frustration for a long time so when the regime started to show signs of a soft hand towards them, they vented their anger over old grievances: ‘Inability to preserve law and order further turned many tribes against the regime.’ (International Crisis Group, 2004: p.  37). Secondly, the neo-­liberal policies adopted by Bashar al-­Assad reduced bribes and economic advantages provided by the regime and thus reduced the regime’s ability to expand its patronage networks. During Hafez al-­Assad’s reign, tribal challenges were solved by distributing economic opportunities to the Sheikhs and their tribesmen. After 2000, reduced revenues from the state triggered different rivalries around grazing sources, parliamentary seats and economic advantages: ‘As tribal conflicts were played out on the streets, people realised that the government’s influence was waning’ (International Crisis Group, 2004: p.  37). Thirdly, these clashes showed the disintegration of the social contract between the Syrian regime and its rural constituency in the periphery. The new social contract reversed the relationship with the tribes and replaced them with the bourgeoisie and the capitalist class of the cities. Fourthly, Bashar al-­Assad’s regime continued to use the Arab tribes to counterbalance other ethnicities and religious sects in the same way his father did by using the tribes to reduce the growing Kurdish influence in the north and the Druzes’ calls for reform from the regime in the south. The regime realised that it did not have enough of a military presence in the north-­eastern part of the country which led it to form the 17th Reserve Division in Raqqa in 2004 in an attempt to impose law and order and show its existing military capabilities (Interviewee 6, 2014).

The spread of Shi’ism and the rise of Salafism among the tribes In the absence of state authority in the periphery and with the retreat of material gain from the state services, foreign powers or ideologies sought to intervene and substitute their influence for that of the state. In this case when the state was weak and had little impact on tribal polities, foreign powers, often acting on behalf of the state, exploited tribal polities in their own struggles and for their own interests as could be seen with the spread of Shi’ism and the rise of Salafism among the tribes (Beck, 1991). The spread of Shi’ism among the tribes – myth and reality ‘When I visited the semi-­arid plains of eastern Syria, known as al-­Jazira, tribal leaders whispered stories of Iranians roaming the Syrian countryside handing out

116   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 bags of cash and macaroni to convert families and even entire villages to Shiite Islam.’ Andrew J. Tabler writing for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 2007. Syria has never had a large number of people who belong to the Shiite sect, but since 2000, the media in the Middle East has been constantly talking about an increase in conversions to Shi’ism, encouraged by Iran within the Alawites as well as among the Arab tribes. This section tries to investigate the truth of these allegations by questioning different resources and interviewing several tribesmen. It will argue that conversion to Shi’ism within the Arab tribes did not happen on a large scale but was mainly limited to certain families that that have traditional Shiite origins and that a large number of the other converts from the tribes in Syria converted for financial gain provided in the form of aid from Iran. Hafez al-­Assad preserved strategic connections with Iran after the Islamic revolution in 1979. He maintained the secular nature of the state, allowing Sunni scholars who are mainly Sufis to act on the religious stage of the country. He restrained the Iranian religious presence in the country to the extent of closing down institutions funded by Iran (Sindawi, 2009). When Jamil al-­Assad, Hafez’s brother, created Al-­Murtada Society in 1981 with the purpose of spreading Shi’ism among Alawite circles and marginalised Sunni circles, the regime decided to dissolve it at that time and a number of its followers were arrested at the end of 1983 (Al-­Haj, 2010). Hafez al-­Assad did not, however, object to the Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Kuftaro, establishing schools for Quranic studies across the country, including in the Alawite region on the coast (Sindawi, 2009). Contrary to his father’s policies, Bashar al-­Assad could not maintain the balance that his father created with regards to Iranian missionary influence. It is noteworthy that Bashar al-­Assad visited Iran more than any other country between 2000 and 2004 (Goodarzi, 2006). Public campaigns to spread Shi’ism among Syrians were allowed to take place through mobile phones, TV programmes by Shiite preachers and covert religious celebrations in Damascus (Sindawi, 2009). While celebrating Ashura Day in 2008, the new Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Hassoun, gave a sermon during which he made statements that were sympathetic to Shiite beliefs like Ali being God’s proof for His creatures (ibid.). Numerous factors strengthened the relationship between Syria, Hezbollah and Iran, mainly the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the assassination of Al-­Hariri in 2005. These circumstances put Bashar al-­Assad’s regime under huge pressure and led it to allow Iran to conduct its missionary activities in different parts of the country, including the rural areas. Iran’s ideological appeal has been universalistic: to appeal to Islam and downplay sectarianism, while at the same time, using the readymade networks of Shiite clergy and movements like Hezbollah as its proxies in the regional power struggle (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). One of the main regions targeted by the Iranian missionary activity was the eastern part of the country in an attempt to solidify the Shiite axis extending from Lebanon to Iraq and to try and break tribal Sunni connections between Syria and Iraq. This of course conflicted with al-­Assad’s use of Sunni tribes to intervene in Iraq after the US invasion which led to a sectarian war in Iraq. After

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   117 this, Iranian missionary activities in the tribal regions were applied via different methods: Firstly, financial inducements played a major role. For example, many tribesmen were given agricultural loans in the name of Muslim solidarity and there was no pressure to repay them (Sindawi, 2009). Moreover, in certain cases, free medical care was provided through charity hospitals such as the Red Crescent Hospital in Raqqa (ibid.). Iranian Shiite missionaries sometimes offer cash or basic necessities such as oil, sugar, rice and butter to the Sheikhs and their tribesmen (ibid.). Secondly, the renovation of ancient Shiite shrines in Syria was used as a method of promoting Shi’ism among the tribes. For example, Mariam Ababsa (2009b) wrote a paper about the process of Iran building a Shiite shrine over the tombs of Ammar Bin Yasir and Uwais al-­Qarni, companions of the Prophet Mohammad who died at the battle of Siffin, waged between Muawiya and Ali in 675. She describes how the Iranians exploited the presence of the shrine to conduct missionary activities among the local tribes in the region. Weekly teaching sessions were held in a small school adjacent to the shrine where tribesmen were invited to attend. Religious conferences were organised at the Arab Cultural Centre of Raqqa which was attended by the Iranian ambassador of Syria and many tribal leaders of Raqqa (ibid.). Thirdly, educational inducements were provided for the tribes as well. For example, many schools were opened in the countryside of Deir Ezzor, particularly the village of Hatla where a large number of its tribesmen had converted to Shi’ism (Al-­Hussein, 2007). At the beginning of 2006, a Shiite religious college was opened in the town of al-­Tabaqa in Raqqa governorate with an enrolment of more than 200 students (Sindawi, 2009). Scholarships were granted for study at Qumm and Teheran for many children of tribal leaders (Sindawi, 2009). The son of Mohammad al-­Fares, Sheikh of Tay, and the son of Hamid al-­Jarba, Sheikh of Shammar, were given scholarships to study free of charge at the University of Tehran (Interviewee 2, 2015). Many students of the Baggara tribe were offered the chance to study at the school associated with the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab in Damascus where their tuition fees were fully paid in addition to a monthly stipend (ibid.). The Baggara tribe was particularly targeted by Iranian missionary activity because they claim to be Hussaini, tracing their ancestry back to al-­ Hussain, son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Mohammad (Naffakh, 1971). Indeed, relatively large numbers of the Baggara tribe (the Bu Badran clan) converted to Shi’ism in the village of Hatla in the countryside of Deir Ezzor based on the fact that their ancestry goes back to Ali Bin Abi Taleb (Interviewee 2, 2015). About 10% of the total population of 30,000 living in the village converted to Shi’ism (Sindawi, 2009). Fourthly, honouring the tribal leaders by inviting them personally to visit Iran and meet with its leaders was an effective way to gain their hearts and minds. This was confirmed by one of the leaders of the Baggara tribe who said that Iran respects their social leaders, unlike the Arab Gulf countries that did not attempt to build any bridges with them (Interviewee 2, 2015). Based on an invitation from the Iranian ambassador to Damascus, many tribal leaders visited Iran in 2006 (al-­Hasnawi, 2009). This trip was made

118   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 by a group of tribal leaders headed by Hamid al-­Jarba, Sheikh of the Shammar, Faisal al-­Arif, Sheikh of the Khafaja tribe and Awwad al-­Awamleh, Sheikh of the al-­Wahb clan in the countryside of Aleppo (ibid.). The visitors would come back loaded with presents and sums of money (ibid.). Fifthly, Iranian missionary activity in Syria was enhanced by the tourist activities of Shiite pilgrims conducted to holy places in Syria. The Syrian and Iranian governments promoted Shiite holy places in Syria as destinations for Shiite pilgrims from all over the world (Pinto, 2014). There were more than six flights per week and 1.1 million Iranians have visited Syria since the revolution which led to the spread of Iranian influence and accelerated Islamisation in Syria (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). Shiite shrines built in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor attracted thousands of pilgrims from Iran. In 2003, following the re-­opening of the Iranian-­Iraqi and ­Syrian–Iraqi borders, Iranian pilgrims visiting Najjaf and Karbala were able to easily visit Syria afterwards. The number of Iranian pilgrims reached 270,000 in 2006 (Ababsa, 2009b). Thousands of these pilgrims would conduct visits to the local tribes, presenting them with gifts and telling them about their religious rituals (Interviewee 10, 2014). This brought the Shiite ideology closer to the hearts of some tribesmen who were influenced by the behaviour of the pilgrims. Saudi Arabia considers the tribal regions of Syria as within its sphere of influence and so was apprehensive of the Iranian missionary activity. Its scholars encouraged some Syrian tribal youths to publicly criticise the Iranian activities. The famous Saudi religious scholar Salman al-­Awda warned in 2006 that ‘Shi’ism is spreading apace in Syria’ and suggested that this expansion among Sunnis constitutes playing with fire (Sindawi, 2009). The previous Syrian Vice-­ President, Abdul Halim Khaddam, who defected from al-­Assad’s regime in 2005 stated in a public interview in 2006 that the Iranian ambassador in Damascus has more freedom to wander around in Syria than its own Prime Minister (al-­Jamal, 2006). He accused the ambassador of exploiting the poverty of the tribes and building shrines in their regions with the objective of strengthening Iranian influence in that part of the country (ibid.). In conclusion, during Hafez al-­Assad’s reign, the Shiite population in Syria was mainly restricted to the Syrian coast, Homs, Aleppo and Idlib. With the rise of Bashar al-­Assad to power, there has been a dramatic change in this structure, particularly in the eastern part of the country where new people started converting to Shi’ism. This conversion came as a result of Iran’s desire to increase its social base and establish the Shiite crescent. Since the tribes in Syria are socially bound to those in Iraq, the process of converting them to Shi’ism is vital for Iran in extending its influence over the whole region. Two strategies have been adopted to achieve this purpose. The first is to trace the origin of certain tribes to the Prophet’s family and thus convince them that they were originally Shiite and were forced at some point in history to become Sunnis by the Ottomans. The second is to lure them with money and financial aids. Although these two methods were fundamental elements for the spread of Shi’ism among the tribes, the number of those who converted was exaggerated by most resources and it did not exceed a few thousand across the whole of the tribal regions.

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   119 The rise of Salafism among the tribes After 2000, the tribes could no longer depend on the regime’s economic policies of support and thus its members shifted their attention and loyalty towards another network that helped them satisfy their needs, i.e. the Islamic sector. This section will try to argue that the withdrawal of the regime’s services from the tribal region have ‘jettisoned the Ba’athist ideology and left a vacuum which Islamism would compete to fill’ (Hinnebusch, 2012: p. 98). These Islamic groups are mainly of a Salafist nature with strong regional connections to the Arab Gulf. This was enhanced by the regime’s tolerant policies towards the Islamists which were an attempt to mobilise the masses against the Amer­ican threat in Iraq. First of all, it is important to mention that the era of Bashar al-­Assad’s regime has witnessed a great deal of flexibility towards the Islamists. This was manifested through a series of steps taken by the Syrian government. Firstly, the regime issued a decree allowing those who were in political exile, including Islamists, to come back to the country (Khatib, 2011). Secondly, the regime released many political prisoners, including some of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who had been in prison since 1982 (Landis and Pace, 2007). Thirdly, the regime repealed a previous law issued in 1982 which prohibited the wearing of headscarves in schools and universities (Ziser, 2007). Fourthly, the regime lifted a long-­term ban on prayer in Syria’s military bases (Ahmad, 2010). Fifthly, the regime allowed the people to enter the mosques and pray outside prayer times in addition to allowing them to hold public festivals on religious occasions like the Prophet’s birthday (Moubayed, 2006). Many factors led to the rise of Salafist ideology among the tribes in Syria. Firstly, the war in Iraq and the involvement of many tribal youths in the fight with ‘al-­Qaeda in Iraq’ led to them returning to Syria at a later stage loaded with Jihadist ideas to spread among their fellow tribesmen. Secondly, the migration of tribal youth away from Syria to GCC countries (most prominently Saudi Arabia) is the reason for the increased Islamic adherence among tribal youths in Syria where some of these youths have noticeably changed their dress and grown their beards in a way that suggests an increase in the power of Saudi-­style Islam over Syrian rural tribal youth (O’Leary and Heras, 2011). This large scale migration of Syrian youth to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave them the chance to mix with their relatives who subscribe to the Salafist ideology and thus bring it back to Syria in the form of booklets, DVDs or charity money. ‘The Salafist trend in Syria receives financial backing from within Saudi Arabia, where 900,000 Syrian expatriates reside’ (International Crisis Group, 2009: p. 25). Thirdly, because of the difficulties that tribal migrants face while trying to adjust to the large towns due to poverty, a feeling of being neglected by the state has arisen in them which resulted in a return to religion (Zisser, 2005). Fourthly, the ability of people to watch satellite TV channels that are not censored by the government for the first time in history ‘led to the emergence of a new movement towards Islamic awareness, with predominantly Salafist features, which was opposed to the Amer­icans and the Arab regimes in general’ (al-­Haj, 2010: p.  38). Fifthly, the regime’s

120   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 repression of the emergence of any liberal institutions has pushed the people towards an extremist form of Islam. According to Yassin Haj Saleh, the Syrian intellectual, ‘The crushing of independent, free political life in Syria has fostered a rebirth of sectarianism in a framework of traditional or family-­centric memberships’ (Yassin Haj Saleh quoted in Landis and Pace, 2007: p.  18). Sixthly, charity money (zakat) coming from Islamic charities in the Arab Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait or from Syrian youths working in those countries, was used to build mosques, schools and medical clinics and to sponsor students doing Islamic studies (Khatib, 2011). While the regime had good control over the urban Sunni communities in the major cities, ‘Salafism spread unopposed’ through the socially deprived countryside where it enjoyed particular success in areas such as Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, which retain a tribal structure and are linked through kinship/working migrants to the Gulf Arab states (Lund, 2013: p. 9). Two examples of the rise of Salafism in these governorates will be briefly presented. The first is the town of Shuhail which is located in the countryside of Deir Ezzor, to the east of the Euphrates River. It is inhabited by the Bakir clan of the Aqaydat tribe. Large number of its youths migrated to work in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s and the 1990s. After the Amer­ican invasion of Iraq, the town became a transit point for fighters heading to Iraq. Some of those youths came back to Syria and took leadership positions in Jabhat al-­Nusra, Al Qaeda’s franchise in Syria. The town later became the main stronghold of Jabhat al-­Nusra in Syria during the uprising. Many of these tribal youths started to refuse to recognise the authority of the tribal Sheikh because they considered him to have been appointed by an apostate government (Interviewee 11, 2018). Tribal authority was weakened at the expense of the religious authority. Embracing Salafism allowed new, young leaders to emerge at the expense of the traditional leaders (Roy, 2017). Shuhail was one of the rare places where talking about Jihad was possible during Friday sermons. It is estimated that 5,000 people joined the insurgency in Iraq from this town between 2000 and 2008 (Interviewee 11, 2018). The second example is the town of Slouk in the countryside of Raqqa. It has a population of 77,000 (Snpsyria, 2017). The majority of its residents belong to the Geis tribe. The retreat of government services in the town forced thousands of its young people to migrate and work in Lebanon. Many of the youths in this town went to Iraq to join the insurgency there. One of those youths was Hadi al-­Ekal who came back to Slouk in 2008. He preached Salfist Jihadist ideology among his tribesmen in the town. He and his group were arrested and put in Seydnaya prison by the Syrian government in 2010. The arrests of Jihadists in Syria and those who came back from Iraq took place after huge pressure was exercised by the US on Syria to stop supporting the insurgency in Iraq. It is worth mentioning that Hadi al-­Ekal was released at the beginning of the Syrian uprising where he came back to his town to join Jabhat al-­ Nusra, which took over Raqqa in 2012. In conclusion, the rise of Salafism in the tribal regions of Syria came as a result of the war in Iraq and the interaction between the tribes of Syria and their relatives in the Arab Gulf, exacerbated by the regime’s openness towards the

Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010   121 Islamists with the purpose of creating legitimacy and manipulating the Islamists as a tool against the Amer­ican presence in Iraq. This is certainly the point where the interests of ‘the tribes and the interests of the Islamists might diverge’ (Roy, 2017: p. 11).

Conclusion Following neo-­liberal policies forced Bashar al-­Assad’s regime into huge unexpected challenges because for decades the regime was considered to be the provider of social support for its constituency. Domestic security and social balance were jeopardised when Bashar al-­Assad came to power in 2000 (Dukhan, 2017: p. 87). Bashar wanted to modernise the Syrian state so he followed neo-­liberal policies, not realising how destructive this could be for the regime’s social base. The withdrawal of state services from rural areas has created frustration among the tribes. These policies, accompanied by severe drought and the malfunction of development agencies, have polarised the tribes and endangered the socioeconomic conditions that stabilised the country for a long time. The government’s liberalisation policies were also ignorant of realities on the ground. Lifting the government’s subsidies on agricultural products and fodder for livestock led to the collapse of rural communities in the tribal regions. The drought displaced hundreds of thousands of people from where they had settled, to the suburbs of the major cities in waves of migration. The displaced people, mainly from the Arab tribes, were cut off from lines of governmental development and support and were left to face their the increasing challenges of living in the city on their own. On the other hand, the regime continued to co-­opt some tribal leaders whose economic and political interests became connected to the regime’s elite. These Sheikhs neglected their tribesmen and became invested in their personal interests and those of their close family. Allowing Iran and the Salafist movement to gain a foothold in Syrian domestic policy was another factor that weakened the regime’s legitimacy as the sole provider for its own people’s basic needs. All of the above factors played an important role in eroding the domestic security and social balance that Hafez al-­Assad had worked for decades to build and thus triggered the civil unrest now underway in Syria (Dukhan, 2017: p. 87). It was the tribal regions that have been marginalised and impoverished by the regime’s policies where the spark of the uprising started and where its most fierce battles were later waged.

Notes 1 Hanna Batatu – Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics. 2 From the author’s personal experience of working with the General Commission for al-­ Badia Development. 3 Most resources spell his surname as Fawzi al-­Rawi when it is actually Fawzi al-­Radi.

122   Bashar al-Assad and the tribes 2000–2010 4 The Sinjar records are some al-­Qaeda documents captured by coalition forces near Sinjar, Iraq.

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6 Tribes and tribalism in the Syrian uprising and civil war

Introduction Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in March 2015, debates have been ongoing about the roles of urban versus rural people in igniting and leading the Syrian uprising. The Syrian uprising seems to be the first in the Arab world that was sparked in rural areas or in the outskirts of cities that are inhabited by rural people. Affluent parts of the cities (including Aleppo, Damascus and Homs) did not play a major role in the uprising. The Syrian uprising appeared to be the revolt of ‘periphery against centre’ unlike the protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt that were led by the urban classes of the capital and major city centres. Rural Syria, where the protest movement was most prevalent, is home to the majority of the Arab tribes who played an important role during the peaceful protests and later during the armed conflict. When the protests started in the country, tribalism played a major role in the restive areas of Syria in mobilising the youth in the protest movement against the regime. As soon as the peaceful protests in the country transformed into violent confrontations, large-­scale campaigns were initiated by the regime and the opposition to win over the tribes and use them militarily and politically in their battle over Syria. At first glance, it may appear that some tribes allied with the regime while others allied with the opposition but the divisions are not so clear-­cut. Many tribes were split into clans that are supportive of the regime and those that oppose it. After two years, the Syrian uprising turned into an armed conflict that involved the regime, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and many other participants. The Syrian writer Yassin al-­Haj Saleh described the situation as the collapse of the national framework of the Syrian conflict (Saleh, 2013). By this, he meant that the conflict in Syria was no longer a domestic struggle. It had become a regional proxy war, principally between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but with important roles played by Qatar, Turkey and Iraq (Phillips, 2016). The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East extended to the tribes where the latter tried to make use of its kinship ties with the tribes and thus mobilise them to its interests and the former used money to build and train tribal militias to fight for the regime. Islamist groups like ISIS and the Kurds became prominent actors in the conflict and they both tried

128   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war to manipulate the tribes for their own interests. Therefore, the tribes moved from being actors in the Syrian conflict to being tools used by outsiders. This chapter will argue that tribal kinship ties were (and are still) used by the Syrian regime, the opposition, the Kurds, the Islamists and international powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, USA, Russia, etc.) to mobilise and direct the peaceful and armed activities of tribesmen to further their interests in their battle over Syria. This, in turn, has resulted in the fragmentation of the tribes and their Sheikhs into competing clans that were mainly instrumentalised by outsiders during the Syrian conflict.

Tribes and collective action in the Syrian uprising The main issue that this section tries to deal with is the fact that major mobilisation started in places like Dar’a, Homs and Deir Ezzor rather than in Syria’s main cities like Damascus and Aleppo. I argue that the tribal concepts of honour, support and revenge played a considerable role in both igniting and maintaining the protest movement in the early days of the uprising (al-­Ayed, 2015). The people in Dar’a were able to rise and revolt against the regime first because of their strong tribal networks that enabled them to support each other which gave them a high degree of interconnectedness that was instrumental in enduring the severe repression of the Syrian regime (Leenders, 2013). The regime’s repression was a source of motivation instead of a reason for submission for the tribes in these three cities. In 2011, two female teachers were arrested by the Syrian regime in Dar’a because they did not prevent their students from drawing graffiti on the school’s walls (Interviewee 1, 2017). Their arrest was considered a violation of all women in the tribal society. This is a matter of high sensitivity in the tribal society and invoked the tribal idiom of honour which is a recognised reason for the group taking action against the aggressor (Ahmed, 2013). At a later stage, the school children who drew the graffiti were also arrested by the political security branch in Dar’a where they were beaten and tortured in prison (International Crisis Group, 2011). A tribal delegation went to meet with Atef Najeeb, the head of the political security branch in Dar’a, who is also Bashar al-­ Assad’s cousin (Dukhan, 2012). The delegation asked Najeeb to release the children imprisoned for writing anti-­regime slogans on the wall of their school. In a traditional gesture, they took their headbands off and placed them on the table, saying they would take them up again when the matter had been resolved (ibid.). The headband is the symbol of manhood and chivalry in tribal traditions. Therefore, when making a request, tribesmen would traditionally take off their headband expecting the other person to reply positively. By way of response, Atef is said to have taken the headbands of the senior tribal leaders from the table and thrown them into the rubbish bin (al-­Abtah, 2011). Moreover, he reputedly told the tribal delegation to forget about their children and to go home and have new children and, if they lacked the fertility to do so, that they should send their wives to his office and he would ensure they left pregnant (Sands, 2011). This was too much for the tribal leaders to accept. As a result, the first protest took

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   129 place on 18th March and the main chant was ‘We would rather die than be humiliated.’ The tribal leaders, who had always been treated with respect by Hafez al-­Assad, and who understood the tribal code of revenge and honour well, could not accept being humiliated by Atef Najeeb. Tribal solidarity played an important role in recruiting more people in the early days of the protests. The first demonstration to take place in Dar’a was organised by networks of tribesmen from the al-­Zoubi and al-­Masalmeh tribes (Al-­Khafaji, 2016). Therefore, ‘Friday of the Tribes’ was held in recognition of Syrian tribes participating in protests against the Syrian regime. As the regime’s violence towards the tribes in Dar’a escalated, tribesmen in Dar’a started chanting for other tribes in Syria to protest in support of their demands. The word fiz’a, which means the taking up of arms in defence of a martyred relative or honoured individual, was used frequently in Dar’a’s early protests and is believed to have been a motivator for protesters from other tribes in Homs and Deir Ezzor (Dukhan, 2014). Therefore, after Dar’a, it was the governorates of Homs and Deir Ezzor that played an important role in the uprising. Protesters in both places invoked the notions of tribal justice and dignity to explain their rage over the regime’s actions (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012). Some demonstrations were conducted in a way that was similar to a tribal gathering (Yasmin Syria, 2016). In other instances, cultural expressions and folklore were adapted to frame protesters’ demands and grievances and to deliver their messages (Leenders, 2011, p. 254). For example, Bedouin poetry recitals were used by the young protesters to seek support from other tribes and to encourage those who were hesitant to join the uprising (Rkhoms1, 2012). The repression and torture exercised by Syrian security forces in their attempt to stop the peaceful protests pushed the revolution towards ‘collective violence’. The outline of this theory can be summarised briefly. The primary sequence in collective violence starts with the ‘development of discontent’ and then proceeds to the ‘politicisation of that discontent’, and finally achieves ‘actualization in violent action against political objects’ (Gurr, 1970: pp.  218–221). The armed violence, which came as a response to the regime’s violence, corresponds to the concept of intiqaam, which means revenge for real or perceived offenses committed against one’s kin (Dukhan, 2014). Members of the Arab tribes in Syria are bound by honour to take vengeance upon aggressors, which, in this case, were the Syrian security forces who were deemed hostile towards the members of the tribe. Murdered tribesmen were mourned and revenged not only by their relatives in Dar’a, but also by other tribal kinsmen in Homs and Deir Ezzor (O’Leary and Heras, 2012). Tribesmen from the Fawa’ira and Bani Khaled tribes in Homs told the BBC in 2011 that Homs was boiling because the government security forces were shooting with cold blood at the tribes who felt insulted and wanted to take revenge (BBC, 2011). ‘The regime made a big mistake when its security forces killed protesters from the tribes who believe in revenge’, a Syrian activist told the Global Post newspaper (Flamand and Macleod, 2011). Rather than a ‘foreign conspiracy’ instigated by Islamic fundamentalists who probably only existed in very small numbers in the early days of the uprising, many

130   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war Syrians who were living in rural parts of Syria say that those shooting at the security services were motivated by what the tribesmen call ‘tribal justice’ and ‘self-­defence’. Another tribesman told the national newspaper that if the government does not punish those who shoot at people from his tribe, they will kill a government security man because they believe in ‘an-­eye-for-­an-eye’ (Sands, 2011). A tribesman from the Fawa’ira tribe stated that the situation in Baba Amr is not like Damascus because, if the army comes down to fight his tribe, they will stand and fight even if they know that they will lose because they cannot accept being humiliated (Interviewee 2, 2015).

The underlying reasons for the uprising among the tribes Tribal honour and revenge might be the triggers that pushed tribal youths to protest against the regime, however, the underlying reasons for their decision to join the protest movement are much wider than these two issues. The underlying reasons for many tribesmen joining the uprising in Dar’a, Homs and Deir Ezzor, in a period that is considered much earlier than their fellow Syrian citizens elsewhere, were discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Classical theories suggest that people participate in a revolution against the state to express grievances that could stem from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Gurr, 1970). Political and economic grievances discussed in the previous chapter played a major role in the uprising’s beginning in Dar’a. The death of Mahmoud al-­Zoubi in 2000 was seen by many people in Dar’a as an arranged assassination to pave the way for Bashar al-­Assad to inherit his father’s rule (Al-­Sulayman, 2013). Accusing al-­Zoubi of embezzlement and arresting many of his friends and relatives in Hauran after Bashar took power in the same year was a bad start for the young leader’s policies in Dar’a (ibid.). Bashar al-­Assad’s regime appointed Alawites in two major positions of power in the governorate in 2001. The first was Atef Najeeb as the head of political security and the second was Faisal Kalthoum as the governor (DP News, 2011). Najeeb and Kalthoum gave most of the economic concessions in the governorate (opening factories, mobile and internet networks) to Rami Makhlouf and made it extremely difficult for people from the governorate itself to get any opportunities. This leads us to the economic grievances factor. Dar’a ‘had its economic struggles, such as drops in subsidies and salaries’ (Sterling, 2012). Although agriculture in Dar’a is not rain fed, the drought in the north-­eastern part of the country put increasing pressure on Dar’a’s economic and agricultural resources. Thousands of wells were drilled illegally which lowered the region’s ground water supply (Arnold, 2013). The cost of the licence to dig an artesian well rose to more than two million Syrian pounds (al-­Sulayman, 2013). The economic reforms initiated by Bashar al-­Assad benefited the urban areas but these reforms reduced agricultural subsidies and increased fuel prices, which had negative effects on agricultural productivity in Hauran, leading to high unemployment among the young generation that was working in this sector. The basic services in Dar’a such as sanitation were declining and the local councils

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   131 were rampant with corruption (al-­Sulayman, 2013). The grievances that the tribes of Dar’a had were similar to those of the tribes in Homs, Deir Ezzor, ­al-­Hassakeh and Raqqa. The previous chapter showed how establishing the General Commission for al-­Badia Management and Development in the countryside of Homs did not benefit the tribes at all and that the majority of its directors came from the major cities or the Syrian coast, having no knowledge or experience of how to deal with local problems. Despite the existence of ample reserves of oil and gas in the tribal regions, drought and lack of employment opportunities eroded state legitimacy and weakened its patronage networks, making the tribes available for anti-­regime mobilisation should a spark ignite the fire. Some people might question why the protest movement in al-­Hassakeh and Raqqa came later than in other tribal regions. In fact, tribes were told by their Sheikhs in al-­Hassakeh that if the regime collapsed, the tribes would face retribution from the Kurds, who blame them for siding with the government during the uprising of 2004 (International Crisis Group, 2011). This might explain why even when the protest movement reached al-­Hassakeh, the number of people who took to the streets was much smaller than in Deir Ezzor, Dar’a and Homs. Strong clientele networks between the regime and tribal leaders in Raqqa delayed the protest movement for a few weeks in the governorate (Birke, 2014). These Sheikhs employed groups of thugs to hit the protesters and disperse them (Interviewee 3, 2014). Tribal Sheikhs prevented young people from gathering in the central square for a whole year, however, the tribesmen broke the rules that the Sheikhs laid down for them and finally managed to organise a big protest in the central square, attempting to pull down a statue of former President Hafez ­al-­Assad in March 2012 (Khaddour and Mazur, 2017).

Sheikhs as ‘guarantors’ Both Hafez al-­Assad, and later Bashar, created a system of clientelism between their regime and influential tribal Sheikhs. By establishing alliances with particular tribal leaders, Hafez al-­Assad and later his son Bashar, were able to maintain control of large sections of the Syrian community without needing to deploy a large number of security personnel in the tribal regions. As much as they both relied on the Alawites to fill most strategic military and security positions, they also relied on tribal leaders and their tribesmen to join the Ba’th Party and state institutions. They paid careful attention to the tribal and sectarian backgrounds of their top ranking commanding officers. On the 18th July 2012, after Defence Minister Dawoud Rajiha was assassinated in a bombing in Damascus, Bashar al-­ Assad appointed Fehd Jassem al-­Freij as his successor (Dukhan, 2012). It has been overlooked that al-­Assad promoted a Sunni Muslim from the Hadidiyn tribe at such a crucial point in the conflict. Another question that comes to mind is, what made Mohammad Said Bkhetan and many other officials who come from Arab tribes so loyal to the Syrian regime for so long? Additionally, why is it that many army officers with renowned tribal backgrounds had not already defected? Over the last few decades, Fehd Jassem al-­Freij, Mohammad Said

132   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war Bkhetan and many other tribal leaders across the country helped to establish the regime’s legitimacy by showing that it was not purely an Alawite sectarian regime. They also ensured the regime’s stability in their regions by working as mediators between their tribesmen and the state. During the first few months of the uprising, these tribal leaders had managed to keep a connection between the state and their tribal youths who were protesting against the regime. In the early months of the uprising, many tribal leaders, especially in al-­Hassakeh and Raqqa, actively opposed the protests to protect their tribes and clans from the regime’s repression (Hassan, 2012a) or for fear of the Kurds. For example, while many regions of Syria like Dar’a and Deir Ezzor, where big tribes like the al-­Zoubi and Aqaydat reside, had become battlefields, other places like Raqqa and al-­Hassakeh, where tribes of the Bu Sha’ban and Tay live, had remained safe enough to absorb hundreds of thousands of people displaced from other parts of Syria (Abouzeid, 2012). Six months after the start of the Syrian uprising, Bashar al-­Assad visited Raqqa at the end of Ramadan to perform the Eid Adha prayer in one of its major mosques. On this occasion, many of the tribal leaders of Raqqa publicly pledged allegiance to the President (Legrand, 2014). These included most of the leaders of Bu Sha’ban clans including Sheikh Abdulkarim Rakkan of the Sabkha and Sheikh Bashir Faisal Hweidi of the Afadilah (Aksalser, 2013). The same Sheikhs were invited to visit the Presidential Palace at a later stage and to meet with the President to talk about the demands that the young people had regarding the ‘reform’ process (Syria-­ news, 2011). They confirmed during their meeting that they would do their best to solidify Syrian national unity by keeping their governorate peaceful and preventing any ‘chaos’. In Dar’a where the Syrian uprising started, the regime sought the assistance of Sheikh Nasser al-­Hariri to mitigate the protests (Alarabiya, 2012). Sheikh Nasser was invited to the presidential palace in Damascus and was given a promise by Bashar al-­Assad that the security forces would stop using violence against the protesters. In each of the Syrian governorates where there are large tribes, Sheikhs set up what was known as ‘a tent of the homeland’ in which they tried to meet up with the angry youths of their tribes to negotiate their demands with the regime and ask them to give up the protests in return for the regime’s amnesty for their participation in the uprising (Shamfm, 2012). The regime also arranged a visit of many tribal leaders from Aleppo to the different Syrian governorates where violence started to escalate, to meet with tribal leaders from those regions and work as mediators between their communities and the regime. Some other tribal leaders were forcibly asked to announce their loyalty to the regime and ask their tribesmen to keep quiet. For example, Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir of Baggara revealed that the Syrian authorities forced him to conduct an interview with a Syrian satellite television channel ‘with a gun to his head’, forcing him to talk about the importance of giving political reform a chance, rather than engaging in the demonstrations that were taking place in Syrian cities (Asharq al-­Awsat, 2012). In many parts of Syria, tribesmen denounced their Sheikhs’ stance towards the uprising, considering them to be traitors. For example, some tribesmen from

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   133 the Hadidiyn tribe issued a statement disowning Fehd Jassem al-­Freij and asking him to defect from the regime (al-­Dar Alkabera, 2012). Some other army officers from the same tribe announced their loyalty to the regime against the ‘conspiracy’. The uprising has shown that there is a gap between the Sheikhs and their tribesmen. It was young people who made it to the streets to protest first which forced the Sheikhs to take a stance as to whether they were with or against the uprising. In cases where the Sheikhs sided with the regime, there was a vacuum of traditional authority among the young generation who rejected those Sheikhs. This led to the emergence of new, younger leaders within certain tribes. For example, Sheikh Mohammad Fadous of the Fawa’ira tribe in Homs took a clear stance of supporting the regime (Dintist, 2011: p78), contradicting the majority of the younger generation of his tribe as they protested in large numbers in the city of Homs at the beginning of the uprising. Abdel Basset Sarout who used to be a popular player in the Syrian football national team therefore started to rise as the leader of the youth of the Fawa’ira tribe (Shaam Snn, 2014). This new generation of tribal leaders did not give up on the notion of tribal solidarity or the importance of tribal support during the Syrian uprising. Abdel Basset Sarout continued to seek support from other tribes in Homs even during the most difficult times when he and his companions were besieged in Baba Amr district (Rkhoms1, 2012). In some rare cases, traditional Sheikhs, especially those with a background of opposing the regime, ceded to the pressure of the protesters and decided to side with the uprising. For example, in 2011, many protesters in Deir Ezzor began chanting ‘where is the honour, oh Nawaf?’ (wayn al-­nakhwa, ya nawaf?), asking Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir to take a clear stance against the regime’s repression (Khaddour and Mazur, 2017). As a result, Al-­Bashir, who signed the Damascus Declaration in 2005, took a clear stance of opposing the regime by publicly asking the president to stop repressing the protesters and to start a real reform process (Kaddafy, 2011). As the repression of the regime escalated in Deir Ezzor, Sheikh Nawaf al-­Fares, the former Syrian ambassador to Iraq, defected from the regime (BBC, 2012b). The violence, to which the people of his tribe (Aqaydat) were exposed, put him in an awkward moral position (Hassan, 2012b). The news of his defection was well received by many of his tribesmen. The cases of Nawaf al-­Bashir and Nawaf al-­Fares during the uprising were very rare because the patronage networks that the Syrian regime has woven with these Sheikhs for many years prevented them joining the uprising. It was reported that the Syrian regime bribed many Sheikhs with a large amount of money and cars at the beginning of the Syrian uprising in order to make them stick to their position against the protesters (al-­Abtah, 2011). With the Syrian uprising turning into a civil war, many Sheikhs moved from the position of rhetorically supporting the regime into recruiting people from their tribe into pro regime militias in different parts of the country. For example, in Idlib, Sheikh Ahmad al-­Darwish of the Bani Ezz tribe recruited people from his tribe to fight alongside the regime against the opposition in his region. Sheikh Mhanna al-­Fayyad of the Albu Saraya recruited people from his tribe to join the national defence militias of the Syrian government in Deir Ezzor. Many Sheikhs,

134   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war such as Radwan Tahan of the Nu’im in Quneitra, have appeared on state media asking their tribesmen to give up their arms and surrender to the regime. They have been given the task of leading the negotiations with different opposition groups and in many cases working as meditators to convince their tribesmen to agree to the terms and conditions of the regime. As a result of the shortage in manpower, the Syrian regime started assigning the task of preserving peace and security in the areas it gained control of, to the tribal leaders. For example, the regime invited Nawaf al-­Bashir of the Baggara tribe to come back to Syria from his exile in Turkey. Sheikh Nawaf accepted the invitation to come back and has since then been recruiting people from the Baggara tribe to join al-­Baqqer brigade in Deir Ezzor to protect their areas and participate in the skirmishes against Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF ).

‘Gathering’ the tribes Tribal gatherings have arisen on a large scale following the uprising. Before the uprising started, tribal political activity was not public. Although the regime manipulated tribal and sectarian ties for its own interests, it did not allow any groups to act publicly based on their tribal or sectarian group membership. For example, the regime appointed many tribal leaders in the Syrian Parliament but this appointment was not seen as representative of a ‘tribal bloc’. Tribal leaders in the parliament were not allowed to organise meetings or gatherings under the descriptions of ‘tribal coalition’ or ‘tribal front’ as happened after the uprising. Part of this was because the regime wanted to keep its secular image as a regime that does not sponsor tribal or sectarian tendencies publicly. The regime tried to mobilise certain regions by invoking tribal identity on a moral level. The regime started periodically holding ‘tribal conferences’ in Homs, Tartous and Raqqa in which Sheikhs of tribes were asked to issue statements of support and pledge loyalty to Bashar al-­Assad (Syria Defender, 2011). They were asked in front of the state media to encourage their tribesmen to refuse to join the rebels and to condemn western and Arab Gulf interference in Syrian internal affairs. The loyal tribes attending these conferences announced the establishment of the Syrian and Arab Tribes and Clans Forum. Sheikh Radwan Tahan of the Nu’im tribe said that the forum sends a clear message, which rejects foreign interference and the conspiracy against Syria and voices support for national dialogue and reforms (SANA, 2014). Tribal Sheikhs were also asked to meet the Russian ambassador and present him with gifts after Russia’s veto against the Security Council resolution that tried to condemn the regime’s massacres (Syria Online, 2012). Moreover, they were also asked to meet with the UN Secretary General’s envoy Kofi Annan to denounce the ‘terrorist acts’ that target innocent people and reject the economic siege imposed on Syria (Cham Times, 2012). Syrian state media presented these tribal Sheikhs as symbols of Syrian identity and patriotism. In an unprecedented step, tribal leaders in the Syrian Parliament sought to form a ‘tribal bloc’ to support the ‘reformist’ trend of President Bashar al-­Assad, according to their statement

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   135 (Syria Steps, 2012). This could not have happened without the green light from a regime that seemed to be using the tribal gatherings to offset the youth protest movement. In other words, the regime wanted to create a bloc of co-­opted Sheikhs in the Syrian parliament to use against the tribal youth who wanted change from the regime. The role of the Syrian tribes’ forum continued to increase during the Syrian civil war with regular meetings being held to respond to the regional developments of the crisis. For example, as an indication of the larger involvement of the tribes in the Syrian crisis, the forum held a meeting in Damascus during which it rejected the call of the Jordanian King to arm the Syrian tribes to confront the Islamic State. Sheikh Mohammad al-­Fares of the Tay tribe announced during the meeting that the only power that should be equipped with arms to confront ISIS is the Syrian Army and not any tribal militias (Tishreen, 2015). The regime has continued to organise tribal gatherings in different parts of the country. There are different points that can be made about the tribal gatherings that the regime organised in Syria. Firstly, these continuous gatherings were used as a way to give legitimacy to the Syrian regime. These meetings were important to the regime to show to the international community that it was not purely an Alawite regime supported by Iran but it is a regime that still holds wide support from its Sunni rural constituency. For example, the leaders of the forum held a meeting before the ‘Geneva II’ talks with the opposition and declared that the regime is their only legitimate representative in the negotiations (SANA, 2014). They also held a meeting with the Chinese ambassador to Damascus to convey the same message to him (Albaath Media, 2014). Secondly, the regime tried to show that it has influence over the Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese tribes by inviting representatives of these tribes to attend the tribal gatherings in Syria (Syria News, 2012). Thirdly, these meetings were used as a way to bridge the sectarian gap that was growing between the Syrians. Christian and Alawite public figures were invited to the tribal gatherings to discuss what could be done to glue the fractured Syrian community together again (Alwehda, 2014). Fourthly, these meetings were used to delegitimise the Arab countries by claiming that the ‘real Arab tribes’ live in Syria and therefore no one can claim that the Syrian regime is an extension of the regime in Tehran. On the other hand, the first tribal gathering against the regime was held in the Jordanian city, al-­Mafraq in January 2012. More than 250 people from different confederations and tribes, like the Aneza, the Shammar and the Baggara, attended the meeting. During their meeting they confirmed that the uprising was supported by the tribes and asked the Syrian National Council for representation equal to their weight in the Syrian uprising (Najem News, 2012). As for the rhetoric of the leaders of the Syrian National Council, while appearing to avoid mentioning the tribal factor, they occasionally spoke of some support and loyalty offered by the Syrian tribes to the opposition, as a reaction to the tribal discourse employed by the official media (Boutaleb, 2012). Syrian tribal leaders started holding gatherings, conferences and symposiums in different countries with the aim of unifying the ranks of the tribes. They sought to establish coalitions, one

136   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war of the first being the Syrian Arab Tribes’ Council (SATC) which held its founding meeting on 16th April 2011 in Istanbul, with the agreement and legitimisation of the Syrian National Council (SNC). Therefore, SATC has been a political framework accepted internally and externally, and aims to activate the role of tribes during the uprising. When the National Council was replaced by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, the Syrian Arab Tribes’ Council (SATC) was placed under its umbrella. The Syrian opposition used the tribal council to legitimise its call for an international intervention against the Syrian regime. The Syrian tribal council called on the international community to launch an international intervention in Syria to put an end to the regime’s massacres, in a meeting held in Sanliurfa in 2012, according to their statement (Cihan, 2012). The opposition’s attempts to gather the tribes seemed to face many challenges: firstly, the Kurdish-­Arab division that came out of previous policies adopted by Hafez al-­Assad who encouraged thousands of people, mainly from the Bu Sha’ban tribe, to settle in villages built over Kurdish lands in order to challenge the status quo of a region, which traditionally had a Kurdish majority. This divide between the Arab tribes and the Kurds in al-­Hassakeh was clearly made manifest during a conference for the Syrian opposition held in Cairo in 2012, where the Kurdish parties ended up withdrawing after wrangling with the Syrian Arab Tribes’ Council (SATC) as the latter refused a Kurdish suggestion to abolish the ‘discriminatory’ Arab belt project initiated by the Syrian regime on their lands (Interviewee 4, 2014). There were challenges at the regional level, too, related to the role of the regional powers competing to control the Syrian opposition. While the Syrian Arab Tribes’ Council was set up in Istanbul and was hugely influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia did not have any leverage over it and therefore, Saudi Arabia and Jordan sponsored another tribal council in Amman in December 2012 (Mjls Alshayr Alswryt, 2013). A statement was signed by more than 15 tribal leaders to confirm their withdrawal from the tribal council of Istanbul because it had been hijacked by certain tribes according to them (Sawt Alkurd, 2012). It is clear that the council was hugely influenced by the Saudi support, based on the number of official statements issued by it that expressed thanks to the Saudi King for his support for the Syrian cause and the number of telegraphs sent to the Saudi family to congratulate them on religious and national occasions (El-­khabar, 2014). Tribal conferences continued to be held in Moscow, Tehran, Amman and Istanbul. Each one of the sponsoring countries had its own motive in arranging such a gathering. Turkey has tried to mobilise the Arab tribes against the increasing Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. Jordan wanted to use the tribes as a buffer zone in southern Syria against ISIS and other Islamist-­dominated rebel groups. Russia, in its turn, wanted to legitimise its intervention in Syria by showing that it involved societal figures such as tribal leaders in the peace process. Iran wanted to confront the Saudi project of using the tribes for its own interests by creating links with the Syrian tribes and providing them with a better deal than the Saudi arrangement.

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   137

‘Tribal Crescent’ versus ‘Shiite Crescent’ Many media outlets have discussed the Arab Gulf countries’ interest in regime change in Syria, with the aim of steering Syria away from Iran and bolstering their power there (Hassan, 2012c). Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbours had been apprehensive of the ‘Shiite Crescent’ that extended from Iran through Iraq, into Syria and to the Mediterranean shores of Lebanon. The uprising in Syria was a golden opportunity for the Gulf States to use their links with Syria to destroy Bashar al-­Assad’s regime, which had given Iran an upper hand in what was meant to be their sphere of influence. As soon as the uprising started in Syria, after the oppression exercised by the Syrian regime against the protestors in Syria, the tribes of Homs and Deir Ezzor contacted their ‘cousins’ in the Gulf asking for a firm stance on the Syrian regime (Hassan, 2012c). Social media websites were replete with videos of Syrian tribesmen asking for (Faz’a) support from their fellow tribesmen in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Muslem535, 2012). Saudi state media posted many videos of men and women from the Syrian tribes appealing for assistance from their fellow tribesmen in Saudi Arabia (Muhana9, 2013). When the Arab tribes in Syria made appeals for protection from the brutality of the al-­Assad regime, their tribal kinsmen in the Gulf States had a hard time ignoring them (Imonti, 2013). The kinship ties ignited sympathies among citizens of the Arab Gulf states who donated millions of dollars to support their fellow Syrian tribesmen (Robertson, 2012). Saudis sympathetic to what was happening in Syria report receiving regular appeals for money through relatives broadcasting messages on Facebook, Twitter or instant-­messaging services like WhatsApp (Gilbert, 2014). Large numbers of them responded by sending donations to their relatives even though they may never have met them before. Saudi Arabia also used tribal networks to provide official financial and military support to the FSA (Phillips, 2015). The Saudis have also formed tribal militias from the Aneza like King Abdul Aziz’s brigade from the Fad’an tribesmen in Raqqa. Ahmad al-­Jarba, the previous president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, is an influential tribal figure that has dual citizenship (Syrian and Saudi) and lived in Saudi Arabia for a long time (Economist, 2013). It is widely believed that Saudi Arabian support enabled him to gain this position after he played a vital role in bridging the gap between the tribes in eastern Syria and the opposition. The Saudi-­Qatari competition for influence over the Syrian opposition has tribal repercussions as well. As stated previously, Saudi Arabia sought to consolidate the position of Ahmad al-­Jarba based on tribal connections with a view to him becoming the president of the National Coalition in July 2013. Riad Hijab, who stood as the rival candidate for what is seen as the Qatari-­backed faction (Sayigh, 2014) belongs to the al-­Sukhne tribe. The election of Ahmad al-­ Jarba, as head of the major opposition umbrella organisation was a Saudi Arabian victory over Qatar and its candidate. Jarba is from the primarily Sheikhly lineage of the northern [Sunni] Shammar and a close cousin of Ghazi

138   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war al Yawar, the interim president of Iraq following the occupation in 2003 (al-­ Buluwi, 2014). According to a Syrian Sheikh I interviewed, since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Qatar and Turkey tended to support the Muslim Brotherhood wing in the Syrian opposition while Saudi Arabia tended to support the tribal forces in the Syrian opposition. This did not mean that Turkey and Qatar gave up on using the tribal card. In addition to supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey supported particular tribes in confronting the Saudi project in Syria. Saudi Arabia did not mobilise the tribes on its own. It asked its allies in Jordan and Lebanon to assist. For example, the al-­Mustaqbal bloc in Lebanon organised a tribal meeting for Sheikhs of Aneza tribes in Lebanon during which they denounced the oppression of the Syrian regime, publicly criticising Sheikh Abdel Aziz Trad Melhem of Aneza for his support and loyalty to Bashar al-­ Assad’s regime, according to their statement (Almustaqbal, 2013). Moreover, Jordan encouraged tribal Sheikhs to defect from the Syrian regime, promising to provide them with refuge and financial aid. As a result, many Sheikhs, including Sheikh Nasser al-­Hariri and Sheikh Mohammad al-­Helw, who were both members of the Syrian Parliament, announced their defection from the Syrian regime, seeking refuge in Jordan (Dama, 2012). Saudi Arabia refused to grant citizenships to Sheikhs who were believed to have cooperated with al-­Assad’s regime at the beginning of the uprising and who moved to Saudi Arabia at a later stage when the conflict escalated (al-­Hadath News, 2015). Iran and its allies did not stand silent with regards to the mobilisation that the Arab Gulf countries and their allies were encouraging among the Arab tribes of Syria. Iranian officials invited Syrian tribal leaders to visit Tehran and hold talks with them on many occasions. Syrian tribal leaders’ visits were covered by the Iranian and Syrian state media, which portrayed these Sheikhs as important national figures (Tasnim News, 2016). Iran and Hizbollah spent large amounts of money and expertise on training tribal militias of the Tay and the Sheitat to fight alongside the Syrian regime forces (al-­Qameshli, 2015). The Iraqi government organised visits to Syria for Iraqi tribal delegations to meet with pro-­regime tribal Sheikhs to coordinate support for the Syrian government and its army. Moreover, Iran started inviting some of the Sheikhs who defected from the regime in the early months of the uprising to go back to regime controlled areas, giving them guarantees that the regime would grant amnesty to them. For example, Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir from the Baggara tribe who was in Turkey for many years, went back to Syria and has since then been working on recruiting many people from his tribe to join the al-­Baqqer brigade to fight alongside Iranian Militias in Deir Ezzor as I mentioned earlier. Iran has already conducted missionary activities among members of the Baggara tribe and has successfully managed to convert some of its members to Shi’ism in the village of Hatla. Iran’s future project is to try and convert the rest of the Baggara tribesmen to Shi’ism. The potential plan is to use the Baggara tribesmen to counterbalance the Aqaydate tribe that is strongly linked to the Arab Gulf state with kinship ties. If the plan succeeds, this could lead to a long-­term sectarian tribal war in the governorate of Deir Ezzor (Interviewee 5, 2018).

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   139 The Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi (2013) described the war in Syria as the great confrontation between the Saudi and Iranian states. It seems that the war was extended when trying to gain the upper hand over the Arab tribes of Syria. So far, it seems that the Arab Gulf countries’ attempts to use their connections with the tribes in Syria to topple the regime have failed for many reasons including the Saudi-­Qatari competition over Syria which split the tribes between these two countries, the rise of Salafism among the tribal youth which pushed them to join groups like ISIS and Jabhat al-­Nusra instead of joining tribal based militias, Iran’s counter efforts to reach out to the tribes and provide them with a better deal than the Saudi one and lastly, the rivalry among many local tribes for the spoils of war after the withdrawal of the regime from their regions (Dukhan, 2018).

Tribal ties put pressure on Iraq Tribal ties extend across the Syrian–Iraqi border. Among the most prominent of the tribes that cross the Iraqi border are the Baggara, the Shammar, the Aqaydat and the al-­Jabbur. The interactions between these tribes have been hindered by the creation of the borders and the regimes that ruled both countries. The fourth chapter showed how Saddam Hussein tried and failed to mobilise the Syrian tribes and use them against Hafez al-­Assad’s regime. The previous chapter also explained how Bashar al-­Assad’s regime used tribal networks that crossed the borders to mobilise fighters against the Amer­ican occupation of Iraq. The situation became more complicated after the Syrian uprising and the involvement of the Iraqi government in Syrian domestic affairs. The Syrian uprising posed major challenges for the Iraqi government because of these cross-­border tribal ties. The first problem that the Iraqi government faced with the instigation of the Syrian uprising was the large influx of refugees. Most of the incoming refugees had relatives in Iraq, and intended to stay with them until the security situation in Syria improved (Adnan and Nordland, 2012). The Iraqi government crammed all of them into local schools and other public buildings while the army and security services imposed strict constraints on their movements. As a result, thousands of Iraqi tribesmen protested in al-­Qaim city to denounce their government’s policy in preventing their relatives from Syria from staying with them (Ruhayem, 2012). After the protests from the Iraqi tribes, the government reached a compromise with them to allow the Syrian refugees to leave the schools provided they had relatives who could ‘sponsor’ them, and if they could deliver written guarantees of this to the government (ibid.). The second problem was related to the sympathy that Iraqi tribes had towards the Syrian rebels as illustrated by their offering them a refuge and even taking part in military operations against al-­Assad’s regime. Sheikh Abdul Rahman Ali, chief of the tribal council in Falluja said: ‘When Assad goes, we will have a brother regime at our back.’ (Markey and al-­Salhy, 2012). Sheikh Abdul Rahman was hoping that the tribes in Syria would be part of the post-­Assad government and therefore support their relatives in Iraq in the future. This was escalated by the Arab Gulf support for the Iraqi tribes in order to assist the Syrian

140   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war rebels. Iraqi tribal leaders were asked by Gulf Arab officials or ‘through intermediaries such as Jordan-­based Iraqi businessmen, to support the Syrian opposition’ (Knights, 2012). As the fighting between Bashar al-­Assad’s forces and the FSA spilled over from Syria into Iraq, Iraqi tribes joined their fellow Syrians in the battles that took place there. More than 40 Syrian government soldiers who tried to seek safety in Iraq from rebel fighters along the border were killed in an attack by the Iraqi tribes (Adnan and Gladstone, 2013). Moreover, some Iraqi tribes had captured a huge amount of weapons after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and they started smuggling them to the Syrian rebels in large quantities, bribing officers on both sides of the borders (al-­Taie, 2014). One of the Iraqi Sheikhs told The Daily Telegraph that he sent hundreds of men and tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of arms to the tribes in Syria and that half of his men paid with their lives and were buried in Syria next to their cousins’ graves (Spencer, 2012). Sheikh Ali Hatem of the Dulaimi tribe in Iraq expressed outrage because the Iraqi government and Iran could support the Syrian regime while it was taboo for the Iraqi tribes to support their cousins in  Syria. Therefore, he and other Sheikhs asked their ‘tribal sons’ to support the Syrian people in whatever way they found appropriate, he told Reuters (Markey and al-­Salhy, 2012). Thirdly, the Syrian uprising started to affect Iraqi domestic politics to a large extent. Iraqi tribes in Anbar continued to hold conferences of support for the Syrian uprising, asking Nouri al-­Malki to stop interfering in Syrian affairs (Asharq Alarabi, 2013). For the first time, tribal calls emerged in support of redrawing the border to unify tribal regions currently on both sides of the border. Fears increased among the authorities of Baghdad and Damascus when the Yaarabiya-­Rabia crossing fell out of the control of the Syrian army in 2013 to tribal militias that were considered part of the Free Syrian Army. There were tribes in Iraq that sided with the government and some that opposed its policies. The Iraqi government formed a delegation of supportive tribes and asked them to visit Syria on many occasions and announce their support for Bashar al-­Assad’s regime (Sudaress, 2012). This tribal delegation accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of stirring up strife among various tribes in Iraq and Syria (Irdc, 2012). After capturing Mosul in Iraq and many other cities in Syria, the Islamic State celebrated the dissolution of the border between Syria and Iraq in 2014 (Professional Operations, 2016). ISIS interviewed many tribesmen trying to cross the border in its video and asked them to relate their opinions about the difference between life before and life after the collapse of the border. Tribes on both sides of the border had free movement for the first time in decades. This strengthened the position of Jihadists who were able to move arms, money and equipment between both countries without having to deal with border controls. The long term campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has led to the fading away of voices calling for solidarity with Syrian tribes. The future of this part of Syria and Iraq will decide the shape of the relationship between the Syrian tribes and their relatives in Iraq.

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   141

Arab tribes and the Kurds A few weeks after the beginning of the peaceful protests in Syria, some Kurdish and Arab Syrians started protesting in al-­Hassakeh governorate. The Syrian regime did not deal with the protests in al-­Hassakeh in the same way it did in Homs, Dar’a or Deir Ezzor. This might be related to the fact that the regime had a shortage of security forces to deploy in that remote part of the country. The regime also did not want to fight on two fronts with the Arabs and the Kurds so it chose to be more accommodating with the Kurds on this occasion, however, signs of tension were clear between the Kurds and the Arab tribes in the first year of the uprising. The Syrian regime started to arm its loyal tribes again, much as it did in 2004. The provision of arms was targeted towards specific tribes only, which included the al-­Walda clan that settled in the Kurdish regions in 1970s and the Tay tribe. While this behaviour was understood by some to be a defensive step to prevent the FSA from extending its activity into al-­Hassakeh, others argue that it was a warning signal from the regime to the PYD’s (Democratic Union Party) armed wing that it would not tolerate any aggressive steps from its side towards the Syrian government (Alan131210, 2012). Some tribesmen from Tay and al-­Walda explained that if the regime were to collapse, they would face retribution from the Kurds, who blamed them for siding with the regime during the 2004 Kurdish uprising (International Crisis Group, 2011). Whether Arab tribes were for or against the Syrian regime, they had the same stance towards the position of the Kurds in Syria. It has been mentioned in an earlier section that the Kurds withdrew from one of the meetings with the Syrian opposition because of the refusal of tribal Sheikhs to recognise Kurdish rights in Syria. For example, Sheikh Nawaf al-­Bashir of the Baggara tribe said, during an interview, that there was no such thing as the ‘Kurdish Region’ in Syria (Orsam, 2012). The Kurds in Syria accused al-­Bashir and many other tribal leaders of receiving thousands of dollars from the Turkish government to act against Kurdish attempts to create self-­governance in Syria (Western Kurdistan, 2013). As the uprising gradually turned into an armed conflict, many tribes in al-­ Hassakeh formed local militias to protect their territories. Two major tribes (the Tay and the Sharabyen) decided to side with the Syrian regime and serve in its national defence forces. It cannot be ignored that some young tribesmen of the aforementioned tribes left their tribal militias and joined the FSA, however, the largest number joined the national defence forces’ militias because they were paid large amounts of money and received proper training from Iranian and Hezbollah forces. For example, Sheikh Mohammad al-­Fares of the Tay tribe established a tribal militia called al-­Magawir ‘the brave’ (Holler, 2015). The only major tribe that sided with the YPG, the military wing of the PYD,1 was the Shammar confederation headed by Sheikh Hameidi Daham al-­Jarba. Some claim that the Shammar took this decision because this tribe had historically sided with the Kurds against other Arab tribes when Shammar first came to al-­Hassakeh in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Shammar tribe is considered one of the smallest tribes in al-­Hassakeh with the bulk of its numbers residing in Iraq. Its

142   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war tribesmen consider themselves as belonging to a noble tribe and thus of a higher status than the common tribes. Therefore, to counterbalance the other tribes and give itself importance and weight in the region, the tribe decided to side with the Kurds (Interviewee 3, 2014). The regime forces withdrew from most of the rural areas in al-­Hassakeh governorate in late 2012 because it needed its troops to protect Damascus and fight in Homs. This vacuum of power was filled by the Kurds who announced the autonomy of al-­Jazira Canton on the 21st January 2014 and appointed Sheikh Hameidi Daham al-­Jarba of the Shammar as the honorary governor of the new Kurdish self-­ruled areas (Dagher, 2014). The participation of Shammar tribe in al-­Jazira Canton’s government has symbolic significance for the PYD because it gives legitimacy to its future project of including Arab tribes (Khaddour and Mazur, 2017). Sheikh Daham al-­Jarba established a tribal militia that mostly includes tribesmen of the Shammar confederation named al-­Sanadid (the brave forces) (Hamou and Nelson, 2015). To fund its 10,000 fighters, al-­Sanadid seized oil wells in their region and took over the refining and sales (Dagher, 2014). The withdrawal of the regime from the majority of the rural areas in al-­ Hassakeh and the alliance between the Shammar and the Kurds has spread fear of domination by the Shammar among tribes like the Tay and the Sharabyen. Therefore, they tried to approach the YPG to coordinate with them and protect their areas. The arrival of ISIS to al-­Hassakeh and Raqqa governorates complicated the relationship between the Kurds and the Arab tribes even more. ISIS started to exploit the rivalries between the tribes and the Kurds, and between the tribes themselves to win over tribal support (Legrand, 2014). For example, before the battle of Tel Hamis in February 2014, ISIS released a video of its delegation meeting with tribal leaders and a crowd of people from the al-­Jabbur and Baggara tribes, trying to mobilise them against the YPG and Shammar militia by telling them how the Kurdish burnt their fellow tribesmen villages and raped their women in Tall Tamr (al-­Haskawi, 2014). This led to the victory of ISIS over the Kurds and the Shammar because ISIS was able to ally with local tribes in Tall Hamis. This taught the YPG that it cannot win against ISIS without support from the local tribes. Therefore, in order to win its battle to regain the Rabia border crossing with Iraq from ISIS in September 2014, the YPG not only allied with Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters but also gained support from tribesmen of the Sharabyen tribe (Coles and Hogg, 2014). After occupying the border crossing, the YPG continued its policy of courting more local tribes to join its forces, promising to give them money and protection. For example, in 2015 it struck a deal with the small tribe of Geis close to the Turkish border to fight ISIS and other Arab tribes allying with it (Merri, 2015). When the international coalition was looking for an ally on the ground to fight against ISIS, it believed that the Arab tribes were fragmented and so could not present a united front against ISIS (Dukhan, 2018). The YPG had appeared to be a much more organised, reliable force for this task. Before starting a wide scale campaign to retake the lands controlled by ISIS in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, the

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   143 YPG, which is a predominantly Kurdish group, created an alliance with Arab and Assyrian militias aiming to ‘liberate the lands that have been occupied by ISIS gangs’ (Rojava Report, 2015). This group was called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF ). SDF had to ally with many local tribes in Raqqa including the Bu Assaf and the Al-­Walda clans in order to liberate the governorate of Raqqa. Large numbers of these local tribes were fed up with ISIS’ repressive rule and saw the alliance with SDF as a potential opportunity to get rid of it. In Deir Ezzor, SDF allied with the Elite Forces, a militia that was mainly composed of members of the Sheitat clan who were massacred and displaced by ISIS in 2014. The other tribal group that allied with SDF in Deir Ezzor was the Gathering of al-­Baggara Youth, consisting mainly of members from the Baggara tribe. These two militias enabled the SDF to conquer Deir Ezzor by fighting in the villages and towns that they are familiar with in their region. Turkey, which was wary of the growing Kurdish power in Syria and the alliances that the SDF had started to weave with the Arab tribes in the region, started to play the tribal card itself. Benefiting from thousands of refugees from the tribes themselves who were displaced to Turkey as a result of the Syrian civil war (Spencer, 2016), the Turkish government sponsored what was called the ‘Eastern Tribes Army’ with the aim of resisting the Kurdish attempts to take over the ‘Arab tribal territories’ according to the statement of the meeting of the tribal leaders who announced the creation of this army (Turkpress, 2016). In a recent visit to Urfa, close to the Turkish–Syrian border, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Syrian tribal leaders who praised the Operation Olive Branch against SDF forces in Afrin (Syrianpc, 2018). Through these actions, Turkey aims to use the Arab tribes residing in Turkey to legitimise its intervention against the SDF and to have Arab fighters alongside its army in combat over Syrian territories. Turkish attempts to woo the Arab tribes might explain why tensions began to build up between members of Arab tribes and SDF in both Raqqa and Deir Ezzor (Middle East Eye, 2018). Arab tribesmen in Raqqa, most probably encouraged by Turkish offensives against SDF in Afrin and angered by a policy of obligatory military conscription of their youths, started protesting against the SDF administration as they considered SDF to be employing discriminatory practices against the majority Arab population in Raqqa. In Deir Ezzor, tribesmen of the al-­Bujamel clan arrested nine members of SDF forces after they shot an old man from the clan, suspecting that he was an ISIS sympathiser (Enabbaladi, 2017). Before the retreat of ISIS and its loss of territories in Syria, both the Syrian regime and SDF had a common objective of defeating the terrorist group. After ISIS was defeated and withdrew from the majority of the lands it once controlled, a new de facto border started to emerge between the Syrian government and SDF. SDF controlled the majority of the lands to the East of the Euphrates while the Syrian government controlled the lands to the west of the Euphrates. The Syrian government announced on many occasions its strong will to retake all Syrian lands with the purpose of restoring the sovereignty of the country. Given the wide area that the regime has captured from ISIS, the regime decided to

144   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war support tribal militias within the National Defence Forces (NDF ) militia, to enforce security and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. The regime assigned the task of protecting the western countryside of Deir Ezzor to men from the local al-­Busaraya tribe, who currently belong to the militias (Hassan, 2017). On the other hand, SDF has organised many meetings for tribal leaders in Deir Ezzor, asking them to encourage their children to join SDF. In their recent skirmishes around Deir Ezzor, both the regime and SDF have used tribal militias to achieve military advances on the ground. SDF managed to repel an attack from the Syrian regime by relying on local tribal militias (Interviewee 5, 2018). The coming months will tell who will win the tribal battle in eastern Syria.

Tribes in the civil war In general, Arab tribes do not have a unified military council to lead them and coordinate their armed activities on the ground. They are fragmented and mainly manipulated by the regime, the Islamists, the Kurds and other regional powers like Iran, Jordan and Turkey (Dukhan, 2016). Many tribal youths who took part in the protests resorted to armed self-­defence in order to take revenge for one of their relatives having been killed or tortured by the Syrian regime’s security forces. The Syrian army had large numbers of soldiers from the tribes serving in its ranks. Many of them started defecting from the army to join the FSA. Many army officers with a tribal background started to rise in the FSA, like Maher al-­ Nuimi from the Nuim tribe and Abdul Jabbar Akidid from the Aqaydat tribe (ibid.). Some army officers established tribal militias that were named after their tribe, fighting either for or against the regime. Their military activity was not managed or coordinated by their Sheikhs. In fact, the Sheikhs stood against the formation of these militias. For example, some members of the Bani Khaled tribe formed a battalion known as the Shield Brigade, which fought under the umbrella of the FSA in Baba Amr district in Homs (Mubashar, 2013). Other members from the Mawali tribe set up a tribal militia known as Mawali brigade, which fought under the banner of the FSA in Idlib (Shamee Forever, 2013). On the other hand, the regime asked its loyal Sheikhs to set up militias and mobilise their youth to join them to fight alongside the Syrian regime. For example, Sheikh Mohammad al-­Fares of the Tay tribe, a member of the Syrian Parliament, established a tribal militia in al-­Hassakeh as part of the national defence force belonging to the Syrian regime as mentioned in the previous section. Sheikh Ahmad Darwish of the Bani Ezz tribe, also a member of the Syrian Parliament, set up another pro-­regime militia of his tribesmen in Idlib. In some cases, there were two conflicting tribal militias from the same tribe: one that supported the regime and one that fought against it. Some tribal youths formed their own militias, giving it their tribe’s name while their traditional leader would set up another militia that also used the tribe’s name but fought on the side of the regime. For example, while some members of the Hadidiyn tribe fought alongside the opposition near Aleppo and Idlib (Chatty, 2013), other members of the same tribe fought on the side of the regime as part of a militia set up by Fehd

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   145 Jassem al-­Freij, the Minister of Defence who belongs to the Hadidiyn tribe. This pro-­regime Hadidiyn militia in Idlib helped to supply food and aid to the Syrian regime’s besieged forces. After capturing their areas in Idlib, Jabhat al-­Nusra managed to capture the son of Sheikh Nayef al-­Saleh of Hadidiyn and publicly beheaded him for trying to help the Syrian regime’s besieged soldiers in Abu-­ Dohor airport (al-­Mahmoud, 2015). The Syrian regime’s media mourned the Sheikh, lauding him as a patriotic hero. Some Baggara tribesmen reportedly fought alongside the Syrian regime against the opposition in Aleppo, (Baggara, 2012) while other Baggara tribesmen fought against the regime in Deir Ezzor. By the end of 2012, it was clear that the Syrian regime was not going to be defeated as a result of diplomatic and military support received from Iran and Russia. The uprising started to turn into a civil war. The FSA started to fragment into different militias. When the Syrian regime’s forces withdrew from most of the rural areas in the north-­eastern part of the country, competition among different clans arose to gain as much of the spoils of the ongoing war as possible (al-­Khafaji, 2016). The most important resources were oil and gas fields, which were taken over by different clans in the countryside of Deir Ezzor and Hassakeh. These fields were run by fighters from the clans who would distribute the benefits to their clan members and use the surplus money to buy more arms and ammunition that would enable them to protect the fields. The new focus of many tribal militias was to gain as much as possible from the oil fields and make alliances with other fighting groups (ISIS, Jabhat al-­Nusra or even the Syrian regime) in order to survive. For example, Mawali Brigade, mentioned earlier, had a bad reputation for robbing people and public buildings. At a later stage when Jabhat al-­Nusra became a prominent force in Idlib, it attacked Mawali Brigade and clashed with its members. The rise of the Islamic State and its conflict with Jabhat al-­Nusra in eastern Syria in 2014 complicated the network of alliances, which led to a devastating inter-­tribal war that lasted for many months. The clans of the Aqaydat tribe split between Jabhat al-­Nusra and ISIS. The al-­Bakir clan fought alongside ISIS while the al-­Bukamel and Sheitat clans sided with Jabhat al-­Nusra against ISIS (Etccmena, 2014). The war finished with the defeat of Jabhat al-­Nusra and its allies who were displaced from their villages and massacred by ISIS fighters (Alhayat, 2014). The Syrian regime exploited the grievances in the aftermath of what had happened to the Sheitat clan members by offering refuge and shelter to whoever managed to survive ISIS’ massacre. Member of the Sheitat clan who escaped to regime controlled areas, joined the national defence forces to fight alongside the Syrian regime in the regime’s last strongholds of Deir Ezzor (Middle East Eye, 2015). On the other hand, those who managed to escape to al-­Hassakeh joined a rebel group called Elite Forces that is funded and trained by the United Arab Emirates (Szakola, 2016). Tribal militias from the Tay and Sharabyen tribes were set up in al-­Hassakeh governorate where they received training from Iranian troops (Dukhan, 2016). They fought for the Syrian regime against ISIS in their region. In addition to fighting alongside the regime in al-­Hassakeh, the Sharabyen tribe also assisted the Kurds alongside the Shammar tribes in their

146   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war battle against ISIS as mentioned in the previous section. ISIS put a lot of effort into trying to recruit many youths from the tribes to join the organisation. The organisation released many videos of tribal leaders from Baggara, Aqaydat, al-­ Jabbur and Bu Sha’an pledging alliance to the so called Caliph. More details will be presented on the relationship between ISIS and the tribes in the next section. In Hauran region, armed groups were formed either along tribal or religious lines. For example, Jaysh al-­Yarmouk was largely formed by members of the al-­ Zoubi tribe and Hauran Pillars Brigade was formed mainly of members of the al-­Harriri tribe. Different local clans in al-­Lajat region including al-­Madalja, al-­ Ramah and al-­Oran established a military council that announced its opposition to the Syrian regime and to the Islamic State (Media Office, 2014). Jordan played a major role in coordinating the activities of the rebels on the southern front. Trying to limit the growing influence of Jabhat al-­Nusra and ISIS in the southern part of Syria, Jordan supported the establishment of the ‘Army of the Free Tribes’ composed of 3,000 fighters who belonged to different tribes (Orient News, 2015). This announcement took place after calls from the Jordanian King Abdullah to train and arm the Syrian tribes to fight against ISIS and other extremist Islamist groups (Malkawi, 2015). The United States and its allies recruited fighters from the Syrian refugees who belong to the tribes and live in Jordan and Turkey in order to create groups that could fight ISIS on the ground. This resulted in the establishment of the ‘New Syrian Army’, composed of members of tribes from eastern Syria, which live in Jordan and were used in a 2016 military operation against ISIS in the town of Al Bukamal (Al-­Majid, 2016). The second group is Jabhat Thuwar al-­Raqqa, which is composed of men from the tribes in the north Raqqa countryside. The aim of training and funding this tribal militia was to assist the Kurds in their attempt to liberate Raqqa from ISIS (al-­Tamimi, 2015).

Tribes and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Following the Amer­ican invasion of Iraq, al-­Qaeda (Dawlat Iraq al-­Islamieh), the ‘Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)’ has existed in the eastern part of Syria – where the desert and the tribes straddle the border with Iraq – for almost a decade (Abdul-­Ahad, 2012). Tribes in the eastern part of Syria played an important role in facilitating the crossing of foreign fighters into Iraq after 2003 as shown in the previous chapter. When the Syrian uprising started, ISI sent Syrian Jihadists who were in Iraq, having trained with Iraqi experts into Syria (Dukhan and Hawat, 2014). By March 2013, the fighters of ISI were able to take the city of Raqqa, one of Syria’s heavily tribal regions. The leader of ISI, Abu Bakr al-­Baghdadi, released an audio statement in 2013 in which he announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which meant bringing its Syria wing (Jabhat al-­Nusra) under the banner of the Caliphate in Iraq (MEMRI, 2013). As ISIS continued its march into Deir Ezzor and seized control of its towns and villages, tribal leaders were asked to issue statements of loyalty to the Islamic State (Jawdat, 2013). This was the beginning of the acquisition of the allegiance of

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   147 one tribe after another in most of the areas the group controlled. This section will briefly examine the relationship between ISIS and the Arab tribes in Syria from the time of its establishment in 2013 to 2016 when the group became exposed to an extensive military campaign led by the US, Russia and their allies in the region. I argue that shared economic and political interests and common foes (mainly Bashar al-­Assad’s regime and the Kurds) enabled the group to build foundations within the Arab tribes of Syria. Syrian Democratic Forces has managed to defeat ISIS and retake the majority of the lands it controlled because of the deals it struck with many local tribes in Raqqa, al-­Hassakeh in Deir Ezzor who were tired of living in fear of punishment according to the group’s extreme interpretation of Islamic law and bombardment by the Syrian regime and the coalition forces. Firstly, unlike other opposition groups that mainly focused on military action against the Syrian regime, ISIS paid great attention to enlisting the tribes in trying to fill the governance gap in eastern Syria that resulted from the collapse of the Syrian state. ISIS’s ability to gain substantial funding after controlling large reserves of oil and gas in Syria enabled it to provide services and start development projects, such as fixing bridges, providing clean water and establishing irrigation projects. It paid monthly salaries to people with disabilities and special needs and their families (Interviewee 2, 2015). It provided an alternative structure of clientelism and patronage. ISIS co-­opted traditional tribal leaders by providing them with the opportunity to be influential in return for allegiance. It gave these Sheikhs internal tasks to do within their own tribes or territories like collecting zakat (tax), solving small disputes and preparing a list of the needy who would require support from the state (Gambhir, 2014). In return, these Sheikhs were invited to meetings with the Wali (head) of each county where they were presented with money and gifts from him. In many cases, ISIS used these Sheikhs as meditators between the group and international organisations. For example, some Sheikhs sponsored the negotiations that led to the release of 19 Syrian Christians in 2015 after receiving a large ransom (Ditz, 2015). In addition to co-­opting the traditional leaders, ISIS understood that the tribal structure had changed over time and that there was a young generation that refused to accept the traditional chiefdoms. Therefore, ISIS co-­opted young tribal leaders by offering to share oil and smuggling revenues with them and promising them positions of authority in the state. For example, ISIS appointed Ali al-­Sahou, a young man of 28, as the head of its security office in Raqqa. He worked on recruiting young people from his tribe (Bu Sha’ban) and other tribes in Raqqa to join ISIS (al-­Sayed, 2015). Moreover, in return for their public support of ISIS and safe passage on the Raqqa-­ Deir Ezzor road along the Euphrates River, ISIS gave al-­Bashir’s clan of the Baggara tribe the right to exploit two oil wells in their region of al-­Kasra (Legrand, 2014). Large numbers of ISIS foreign fighters paid large dowries to the families of Syrian tribes and proposed marriage to their daughters. Many tribes saw these marriages as a political tactic to strengthen their social position and avoid ISIS’s animosity (Nahas, 2015). ISIS saw this step as a method

148   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war of strengthening its position within the Syrian community by creating what is known as a ‘marriage of alliance’ within the tribal customs. Secondly, other tribes that refused to be co-­opted by ISIS would be intimidated into doing so. This leads us to the fear argument, which attempts to explain some aspects of the relationship between ISIS and the tribes. Publishing videos of atrocities such as decapitation or the crucifixion of the members of the Sheitat clan, which tried to revolt against ISIS, aims to demonstrate the invincibility and ruthlessness of the militia and spread fear among its enemies (Sykes, 2014). It invites recruits either to choose the winning horse or die (Dukhan and Hawat, 2014). In order to tighten its control of the Syrian tribes, ISIS established a tribal affairs office headed by a Saudi man from the Shammar tribe, aided by a Syrian man named Tubad al-­Breji from the al-­Brege clan of the Bu Sha’ban tribe (Ibrahim, 2015). The tribal affairs office had the task of gathering information on the tribes and their daily activities. It works like an internal security apparatus that recruits spies from the tribes themselves who in turn report any suspicious activities of their relatives to ISIS. The group executed five Syrian media activists in Deir Ezzor, accusing them of giving information and coordinates to hostile groups (Syrian Observer, 2016). To ensure that the tribes will never be united against ISIS, the group has followed a divide-­and-rule approach with them (Weiss and Hassan, 2015). To gain full control over Jarablus in Syria, ISIS benefited from an old animosity between the Geis and Tay tribes. They supported Tay tribesmen who fought with ISIS and forced the Geis to leave the town completely and to seek refuge in Turkey (Balanche, 2016). ISIS also exploited the old hatred between the Shammar and Aqaydat tribes. When the Shammar migrated to Syria in the nineteenth century, they tried to settle in the Deir Ezzor area but the clans of Aqaydat banded together to drive the Shammar out. The name Aqaydat comes from Aqad which means ‘coalition’ in the Bedouin dialect, referring to the coalition that these clans had against the Shammar. ISIS warned Aqaydat tribes in Deir Ezzor that the Shammar, aided by the Kurds and the Amer­icans, was looking to re-­establish itself and rule them as it had done historically (Mohammad, 2016). Thirdly, ISIS fighters have grown adept at creating a common cause for the tribes who had long-­standing grievances against al-­Assad’s regime. ISIS benefited from Bashar al-­Assad’s regime’s policies towards the tribal regions of Syria, which had suffered from a decade of neglect and years of drought and poverty. When the tribes tried to revolt against the regime, they were suppressed with a brutality that led a large number of them to take up arms against the regime forces and drive them out of their regions. Many tribes preferred ISIS to Bashar al-­Assad as they hoped that the group would distribute the wealth obtained from natural resources more equally than Bashar al-­Assad, who did not acknowledge their demands and forced them to take up arms. Moreover, the indiscriminate bombing of the civilian-­populated areas in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa by the Syrian regime’s forces made the tribes willing to ally with any force, even the devil, for the sake of getting rid of a regime that killed their children and displaced them from their regions. ISIS has also manipulated stories of the crimes

Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   149 committed by the Kurds towards the Arabs in the north of Syria to scare the tribes into believing that they might suffer a similar fate if the Kurds were to take over their regions. One of the Aqaydat tribesmen commented: We are besieged between the Alawites who are supported by the Russians and bomb us and the Kurds who are supported by the Amer­icans and burn our villages. This means that if these groups win, our headbands will be stepped on and our women will be raped. We will not live to allow this to happen and therefore we will fight with ISIS until death. (Interviewee 6, 2015) After more than three years of living under ISIS’ rule, local tribes residing in the ‘caliphate’ were exhausted by oppression, random arrests, censorship and death caused by the airstrikes that were meant to target ISIS militants. These extreme conditions pushed large numbers of the tribal youths to give up on ISIS and support Syrian Democratic Forces in their military operations against ISIS in its de facto capital, Raqqa and at a later stage in Deir Ezzor. The participation of tribal youths in SDF military units and the announcement by some tribal Sheikhs that the Kurdish-­led Syrian Democratic Forces are liberating forces not occupying ones (Damon et al., 2017) helped legitimise SDF ’s image as a multi ethnic group that wants to help the local inhabitants of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor to rid themselves of an oppressive rule. This, in turn, led to the major success of SDF in defeating ISIS in the two governorates that have an Arab majority. It should be noted that after the retreat of ISIS from the major cities to the desert, it still has among its ranks some tribal youths who have been indoctrinated by its ideology and will most likely to continue to fight with the group until their last day.

Conclusion The uprising in Syria started in the periphery and not the centre. From the early days of the uprising, tribal kinship ties provided support networks for the protesters, who relied on their relatives for help and protection from the regime’s suppression. The young protesters in rural areas took pride in their tribal roots and often made appeals to their relatives for help. The uprising has shown us that there is a large gap between the Sheikhs and the younger generation of the tribes who took to the streets. Long years of clientelism between the regime and the Sheikhs helped the regime to survive but divided the tribes because the Sheikhs recruited part of their tribe to suppress the remainder that had revolted. This led to major divisions within tribes between those who supported the regime and those who opposed it. In response to the regime’s use of force against the protest movement, tribes resorted to armed self-­defence against the security forces. Many soldiers and army officers from the tribes started defecting to join the armed opposition. They received funding and support from their relatives in the Arab Gulf, Iraq and

150   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war Jordan who wanted to use the tribes for their own interests and topple al-­Assad’s regime. Iran, which is supportive of the Syrian regime, created its own tribal networks in Syria and used them to fight the Arab Gulf networks while the emergence of ISIS in Syria made the US and its allies look to the tribes for support in their campaign against the terrorist group. As the conflict in Syria escalated, tribes fragmented and became pieces in a game of chess played by international and regional powers (Dukhan, 2016).

Note 1 The Democratic Union Party or PYD is a Kurdish political party which was established on 20th September 2003 in northern Syria.

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Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war   157 Spencer, R. (2016) Syrian Kurds accused of ethnic cleansing and killing opponents. Telegraph. Available from: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/18/syrian-­kurds-accused-­ of-ethnic-­cleansing-and-­killing-opponents/ [Accessed 10th July 2016]. Sterling, J. (2012) Daraa: The spark that lit the Syrian flame. CNN. Available from: http:// edition.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-­crisis-beginnings [Accessed 3rd September 2016]. Sudaress. (2012) Delegation of the Iraqi Tribes: We will not forget Syria’s standing by the Iraqis during the Amer­ican occupation. Available from: www.sudaress.com/sudaneseonline/13253 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Sykes, P. (2014) Who are the tribesmen standing up to the Islamic State in Syria. Global Post. Available from: www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-­east/140811/ who-­are-the-­tribesmen-standing-­up-islamic-­state-syria [Accessed 11th August 2016]. Syria Defender. (2011) Syria: Tribal Leaders Together With Bashar al-­Assad. Available from: www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZEOeGXiCpI. [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). (2014) The Syrian Tribes Forum: the Syrian regime represents us during Geneva II talks. Available from: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=a1fVE4Je88E [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Syria News. (2011) President Assad meets with a delegation of tribal leaders from Raqqa and listens to their requests. Available from: http://syria-­news.com/readnews.php?sy_ seq=132048 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Syria News. (2012) The regime invited other tribes from neighbouring countries to take part in Syria tribal gatherings. Available from: http://syria-­news.com/readnews. php?sy_seq=146939 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Syrian Observer. (2016) ISIS executes five journalists in Deir-­ez-Zor. Available from: http://syrianobserver.com/EN/News/31250/ISIS_Executes_Five_Journalists_Deir_Zor. [Accessed 11th August 2016]. Syrianpc. (2018) Erdogan meets Syrian tribal leaders in Urfa. Available from: https:// syrianpc.com [Accessed 10th July 2018]. (In Arabic). Syria Online. (2012) Arab tribes in Syria honor Russian ambassador in Damascus. Available from: www.syriaonline.sy/index.php?f=Details&catid=12&pageid=1565&g=1. [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Syria Steps. (2012) Tribal representatives in the parliament move to form a united block. Available from: www.syriasteps.com/?d=127&id=89174 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Szakola, A. (2016) New rebel force battling ISIS in northeast Syria. Now Media. Available from: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567033-new-­rebel-force-­ battling-isis-­in-northeast-­syria [Accessed 10th July 2018]. Tasnim News. (2016) Khamini’s Advisor receives leaders of parties and Sheikhs of Syrian Tribes. Available from: www.tasnimnews.com/ar/media/2016/04/27 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Tishreen. (2015) Sheikhs of Syrian Tribes: We adhere to national unity and reject to be part of any project that jeopardizes our national unity. Available from: http://tishreen. news.sy/tishreen/public/read/341713. [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Turkpress. (2016) Forming ‘Army of Eastern Tribes’ to counter the federalism of Democratic Union Party. Available from: www.turkpress.co/node/19739 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Weiss, M. and Hassan, H. (2015) ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York, Simon and Schuster.

158   Tribes in the Syrian uprising and civil war Western Kurdistan. (2013) Nawaf al-­Bashir is against any agreement with the Kurdish Supreme Council. Available from: https://westernkurdistan.wordpress.com/2013/02/24/ nawaf-­al-bashir-­is-against-­any-agreement-­with-kurdish-­supreme-council/ [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic). Yasmin Syria. (2016) Hourani Dabkeh in Dar’a Protests. Available from: www.youtube. com/watch?v=SqwD9E3WMM0 [Accessed 10th July 2016]. (In Arabic).

Conclusion

Throughout history, the struggle between the tribes and the state has manifested itself in competition over land, caravan routes and water resources. This competition has run in cycles of ebb and flow where the tribes sometimes have greater control of trade routes and impose protection fees on the state or the state possesses enough power to push the tribes back to the desert and keep them at bay. This cycle of the rise and decline of tribal empires continued until the modern period when the balance of power turned against the tribes, however, as has been the case throughout history, when the state fails, tribes will fill the vacuum. The emergence of machine guns and aerial bombardment in the nineteenth century weakened the power of the tribes whose areas of control shrank from vast stretches of land to small pockets in Northern Arabia (Toth, 2006). Historically, imperial powers sought the assistance of the tribes in Northern Arabia to achieve their strategic objectives. In a similar vein, Western powers sought the assistance of the Arab tribes in their battle against the Ottoman Empire during WWI. Some of the tribes who were stricken by poverty and famine participated in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans that concluded 400 years of Ottoman authority over Arab lands. The French and the British mandate powers in the Middle East devised political and military systems to control the tribes and force them to respect the new borders they had drawn. Following a policy of ‘divide and rule’ between different segments of the Syrian population, the French authorities instrumentalised existing tribal, ethnic and religious divisions in society to rule the country (Tibi, 1991). These policies have enabled the tribes to gain some sort of autonomy and to be represented in the Syrian Parliament, counterbalancing the nationalist bloc. After independence, a succession of Syrian governments from 1947 until 1958 issued many decrees, which aimed to break tribal power and limit their influence on the politics of the country. The central government’s attempts ranged from trying to confiscate tribal lands to lowering the number of tribal seats in the Syrian Parliament and forcing tribesmen to do their military service in the national army of the country. Exhausted by continuous military coups and external threats such as the establishment of Israel, the nascent Syrian government was not strong enough to implement its decrees and therefore the level of

160   Conclusion integration did not exceed the most basic compliance with the system, and Syrian society remained separated along tribal and sectarian lines. The Nasserists in 1958, followed by the Ba’thists in 1963, adopted stringent socialist and nationalist agendas that considered the tribes a major obstacle to social and economic development (Chatty, 2013). The Nasserists and the Ba’thists abolished the traditional tribal grazing system (hima) and the customary tribal law (urf   ) and considered historically tribal land to be state owned and as a consequence weakened the tribal structure in Syria. Some of the tribes, particularly the noble tribes, responded by migrating to the Arab Gulf countries while another large group of tribes, mainly made up of common ones, embraced the state and started to join the ranks of the Ba’th Party to achieve some social mobility in their surroundings. Some tribes that had been mistreated by other tribes saw joining the Ba’th Party as a way to empower themselves with regards to those who had previously wronged them. Tribalism was waning in Syria at this stage. The country started to move slowly from a society in which tribal identification was the primary form of association to one in which affiliation with the state and its institutions was more important. This can best be described in the words of one of the Sheikhs of Fad’an who described his situation before and after the Ba’th Revolution in 1963: (Kuna bil n im wasurna bil jahim), ‘We were in paradise and now we are in hell.’ In 1970, Hafez al-­Assad took power in the country and established an authoritarian regime that he then led for 30 years. Although the mottos of nationalism and socialism were still apparent in the regime’s policy documents, the state policies were very different when it came to the tribes. The regime established patronage networks with influential tribal leaders who pledged their loyalty to the regime and were allowed to do as they pleased in their region. The state did not seek to intervene extensively in the domestic affairs of the tribes. The state’s beneficial policies at this stage were not only directed towards tribal leaders themselves. Members of the tribes joined the Ba’th Party, the Syrian army and the security apparatus in large numbers and tribal representation in the Syrian Parliament increased. Subsidising the tribes and their Sheikhs was used as a means of creating bases of social support for the regime (Kostiner, 2016) that could be used in its conflicts with other groups like the Kurds and the Islamists. Arab tribes, particularly the common ones, were the slaves of the east, while the Alawites were the slaves of the west and the two formed an alliance against the Sunni urban and rural elites (International Crisis Group, 2011). Hafez al-­ Assad also invited tribal Sheikhs who had migrated to other Arab countries to come back to Syria in order to improve his relationship with Saudi Arabia and other oil rich Gulf countries. After the death of Hafez al-­Assad and the seizure of power by Bashar in 2000, the gap between the major cities (Damascus and Aleppo) and other parts of the country started to grow dramatically. Unlike his father, Bashar al-­Assad tried to commit to neo-­liberal economic models, rolling back populist policies (King, 2009). This era witnessed the emergence of a new authoritarianism that was characterised by changes in development policies that utilised economic

Conclusion   161 l­iberalisation and reduced public subsidies. It included the emergence of a new generation of tribal leaders that, unlike their predecessors, had grown up in Damascus, had adopted the ways, views and values of the urban elite and showed scant interest in or respect for the rest of their tribe (International Crisis Group, 2011). Drought hit large parts of the tribal regions that were left without appropriate support from the government. Tribes flocked to the outskirts of the major cities, forming belts of poverty around them. The unresponsiveness of the government to the suffering of the tribes created a vacuum of power that the Salafist groups and Shiite missionary groups tried to fill. The regime had acted in ways that harmed its own social base (International Crisis Group, 2011). The collapse of the rural economy of the tribes in the east and north of Syria during Bashar al-­Assad’s reign due to drought, lack of development projects and the mismanagement of resources ignited the Syrian uprising in tribal regions (Dukhan, 2014a). Tribal codes of honour and revenge played an important role in igniting the Syrian uprising against the Syrian regime. In response to the regime’s use of force against the protest movement, tribes resorted to armed self-­defence against the security forces. The tribes have been largely, but not exclusively, supportive of the opposition. Some tribal leaders who have close links to the security services established tribal militias that have been fighting with the regime against the opposition (Dukhan, 2014b). Moreover, the Syrian uprising has proven that regional tribal bonds are still effective as shown by the Arabian Gulf and Iraqi tribal support for their fellow tribesmen in Syria. As the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war, the Syrian regime’s institutions crumbled and as a result society in the tribal regions has come to rely on the tribes. Some tribes allied with Islamist groups while others allied with the Kurds (Dukhan, 2016). These alliances are utilitarian in nature and have been constructed based on the interests of each tribe or clan in the area they reside. This might explain why a clan of a certain tribe could be fighting with the regime while another clan of the same tribe could be fighting with the Islamic State. In a similar pattern to WWII when the British and the Allies allied with the Arab tribes against the Ottoman Empire, different regional and international powers looked upon the tribes as a tool to help them achieve their strategic interests in Syria. The significant difference between 1916 and 2016 is that the conflict of major powers over Syria is much bigger this time and therefore the tribes are more fragmented in choosing who to stand with during the Syrian civil war. By studying the Syrian case of state-­tribe relations, one can make the following concluding remarks. Firstly, although modern technology made the state stronger than it had been throughout all previous periods of history, the engagements of the state at the external front could make it weak internally and allow the tribes to manoeuvre and survive. This is illustrated by the Ottoman Empire case where the state was busy with wars in Europe and the Syrian Independent state was busy with the conflict with Israel. Secondly, tribes have always been resilient and adaptive regarding the measures that have been taken by the state when it is strong. The three major shocks that the tribal structure was exposed to,

162   Conclusion the emergence of Islam, colonialism and nationalism, show that tribes survived by adapting themselves to new conditions. Thirdly, the legacy of colonialism in Syria has given rise to tribal affiliations and sentiments and opened the door wide for tribal leaders to take part in political life by appointing them as deputies in the Parliament and granting them tracts of land. This procedure has strengthened the tribe as a political unit which made it difficult for the independent state to deal with it later. Moreover, the colonial method of divide and rule has revived the urban-­tribal dichotomy which appeared in the guise of nationalism based in the city, and separatism which was centred in the tribal countryside. Fourthly, the rise of nationalism and socialism in the 1950s and 1960s led to a deep crisis of the tribal system and of the tribal leadership. Had the nation-­state that emerged after independence managed to continue its stringent measures against the tribes, tribalism could been completely eroded as a political force in Syria. The emergence of authoritarianism in Syria halted these measures. Fifthly, tribes and tribalism are ready-­made tools that can consolidate authoritarian regime formation. Hafez al-­Assad’s authoritarian regime combined aspects of personal rule based on assabiiyyah, with populist policies, co-­optation and modern party institutions that incorporated a supportive constituency. As a result, the tribes and state institutions became interwoven as the tribesmen were employed in large numbers in the army, security apparatus and civil service. In authoritarian states, there is usually a balanced relationship between the tribes and state due to the similar nature of both forms of authority (Dukhan, 2014b). Sixthly, alienation and exclusion of the tribes, from the political and the economic benefits reaped by the state, leads to the disruption of the aforementioned balance and thus de-­stabilisation of the state. When the tribal leaders disconnect from their tribesmen and join the upper class in the cities and start to care less about the interests of their tribesmen, the social contract between the state and the tribes collapses which, in turn, jeopardises the stability of the state. Seventhly, when states deform, power moves from the state authority to different local groups and sources of legitimacy fragment (Saouli, 2009). The deformation of the state could lead to the resurgence of tribalism and sectarianism as people see their tribe or sect as their shield of safety in the absence of state institutions. The uprising in Syria and the collapse of state authority in the periphery revealed that the tribes were there all along and have resurfaced as a way of organising people in the absence of the state. Finally, tribalism as an organising force in governance and social life will be eventually broken down by the modern state. This means that the cyclical pattern presented above will one day come to an end. When this will happen cannot be predicted. Industrialisation, modernisation, urbanisation, education and emigration are all factors that have led to the victory of the state over the tribes in other parts of the world. In the Middle East, these processes have proceeded unevenly and slowly. Therefore, the triumph of the state, however inevitable it may be, should not be heralded prematurely (Anderson, 1991). European history reminds us that the victory of the state over alternative structures of political authority was neither quick nor easy (ibid.). In the Syrian case, the reasons why many

Conclusion   163 people could not transform their tribal identity and pre-­national ties into a national identity and loyalty could be attributed to three main factors: colonialism, authoritarianism and lack of education in the rural areas. The hope that Syria could have been a place where a sense of national identity would grow to replace sectarian and tribal loyalties was thwarted by the current civil war. After 100 years, from 1916 to now, the relationship between the state and the tribes in Syria has come full circle. The scope of the book is not to predict the future but rather to analyse past events and try to project the cyclical patterns over them. Although this study would fill a significant gap on part of the Syrian society that is understudied, there is still more that could be done in this regard. After eight years of the Syrian conflict and the involvement of many regional and international players, it will be useful to conduct micro studies of the tribal communities in Syria to study their specific role in the uprising, the civil war, their relationship with the Islamist groups and the changes that they could have gone through. It will also be important to analyse the regional tribal bonds and their implications for the Syrian civil war, including how vital these were in terms of supporting the opposition. More could be done on Syrian tribal communities outside Syria to explore whether there have been any groups that have been collectively and forcefully displaced from their towns and villages and whether tribal dynamics are still in play in exile.

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Index

Ababsa, M. 103, 109, 114, 117 Abbasids 28–29, 44 Abd al-Jabbar, F. 74 Abdul Aziz, king of Saudi Arabia 8, 76, 77, 78 Abdulhamid II, Sultan 36 Abdullah I, king of Transjordan 39 Abdullah II, king of Jordan 146 Abdullah, king of Saudi Arabia 78 Abouzeid, R. 93 Abu Bakr 27, 43–44, 80 Abu Dali 12 Abu Ghadiya 112 Adwan 8 Afadilah 9, 83, 90, 92, 114, 132 Aflaq, Michel 57, 58 agriculture 1, 5, 6, 18, 19, 60–61, 71, 75, 107, 108; Ottoman period 35, 36; revolution in (1940s/50s) 51–53; subsidies 107, 121, 130; see also land/ land reform; state farms Agyal 37 Akidid, Abdul Jabbar 144 Al-Bukamal 146 al-Magawir 141 Al-Murtada Society 82, 116 al-Qaeda 119, 120, 146 al-Sanadid 142 Alawites 6, 42, 82, 92, 93, 103–104, 105, 108, 135, 160; conversions to Shi’ism among 116; Hafez al-Assad and 72, 81, 83, 88, 89, 95, 131; in military 72, 88, 131; in security apparatus 89, 131 Albu Saraya 12, 133 Aleppo 4, 6, 28, 29, 32, 39, 42, 81, 82, 104; development projects 106; migration to 105; Muslim Brotherhood in 82 Ali Ibn Abi Taleb 44, 117

Ali, Sheikh Abdul Rahman 139 alliances 21; marriage 35, 78, 147–148 Alon, Y. 3 al-Amer 6 Amikan 6 Amiralay, Omar 82 Ammar Bin Yasir 117 Amur 11, 88, 104, 108 Aneza confederation 7, 10, 30, 32, 33–34, 34, 35, 38, 55, 64, 76, 79, 85, 88, 95, 138 animal husbandry see pastoralism Annan, Kofi 134 Aqaydat 8–9, 9, 38, 39, 81, 88, 89, 91, 108, 110, 111, 112, 132, 138, 139, 144, 145, 146; and Shammar, hatred between 148 Arab belt project 84, 85–87, 136 Arab Gulf countries 76–79; kinship/ working migration to 79, 95, 119, 120, 160; oil 20, 70, 85; and Syrian uprising 137–140, 149–150; see also Iraq; Kuwait; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates Arab nationalism 37, 40, 42–43, 53 Arab Revolt 37–38, 159 Arab Socialist Movement 73 Arab Socialist Union 73 Arab Spring 1 Arab unity 57, 58 Arab–Israeli war (1967) 71 ‘Arabistan’ 30 al-Arif, Sheikh Faisal 118 arms: Ottoman supply of 34; see also rifles Army of the Free Tribes 146 army/armed forces 71, 72, 77, 131; tribal presence in 70, 72, 87–88, 95, 144, 160, 162; see also militias; and individual groups

166   Index As-Suwayda 4 al-Aslam 7 assabiiyyah (solidarity) 18, 43, 61, 62, 76, 162 al-Assad, Asmaa 106–107 al-Assad, Bashar 11, 21, 22, 101–121, 130, 131, 134, 139, 148, 160–161; development and ‘modernisation’ policies 105–109, 121, 160–161; economic liberalisation policies 101, 102–103, 108–109, 121, 130, 160–161; and Iraq war and insurgency 109–112; and Islamists 115–121; and narrowing down the base of alliances 102–105; tribal clashes under 112–115 al-Assad, Hafez 9, 11, 12, 21, 22, 45, 70–100, 118, 131, 139, 160, 162; and the army 87–88; and Ba’th Party 90–91; ‘Correctionist Movement’ (military coup 1970) 70, 71; and economy 74–75; and Gulf countries 77–79; and Iran relations 116; and Iraq relations 110; and Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) 81–83, 95, 160; and Kurdish problem 71, 84, 85–87, 95, 115, 136, 160; and land reform 70, 74; and parliament 91–92; and patronage networks 73, 74, 89, 95, 101, 115, 160; peasant background 87; reconciliation and national unity as feature of policies 73; and security apparatus 89–90; and tribal structures 93; tribalisation policies 73–76; widening of support base 71–73 al-assad, Jamil 81–82, 116 al-Assad lake 9, 85, 114 al-Assad, Nizzar 103 al-Assad, Rifaat 78, 82 Atabeks 29 al-Atrash, Sultan Pasha 73 al-Atrash tribe 6 authoritarianism 3, 21, 160, 162, 163; international support and maintenance of 3 Awad, M. 50 al-Awamleh, Sheik Awwad 118 al-Awda, Salman 118 al-Ayed, N. 6 Ayyubids 29, 44 Baba Amr district 11, 12, 108 al-Badia (the Steppe) 3, 4, 5, 40, 41, 60; development programs 105–106 al-Badia Festival 76

Baggara 8, 52, 93, 94, 103, 111, 117, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146 Baghdad 28, 40 al-Bakir 9, 145 Balkans 30, 31, 44 Bani Amr 29 Bani Ezz 12, 79, 133 Bani Kalb 28 Bani Khaled 12, 19, 94, 108, 129, 144 Bani Sakhr 32, 33, 37, 83, 110 Bani Tay 28 Barzani, Nechirvan 113 al-Basha, Talal 12, 94 al-Bashir, Sheikh Nawaf 8, 93, 104, 132, 133, 134, 138, 141 al-Bashir, Sheikh Raghib 8, 52 al-Basrah 28 Bates, D. 18 al-Ba’th (Ba’th Party newspaper) 57 Ba’th Party 11, 21, 52, 53, 55, 64–65, 73, 81; ideology 57–59; in Iraq 56, 84; and Kurdish problem 84–85; land reform 58, 59–61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 71; modernisation 57, 58–59, 73; nationalisation policy 55, 71; sedentarianism programmes 59, 60–61; seizing of power in 1963 56–57, 77, 160; socialism 21, 53, 55, 57, 58–59, 62, 160; tribal leaders in 70, 72, 90–91, 95, 160 Bedouin 5, 19, 20, 28, 33, 35–36, 42 Berlin, Treaty of (1875–1878) 31 Bey, Abdullah 35 Biyan 6 Bkheitan, Mohammad Said 11, 88, 103, 104, 131–132 blood money (diya) 64 Bouida 10 al-Breji, Tubad 148 bribery 35 Britain 40, 41, 159 Brykat district 108 Bu Assaf 143 Bu Bana 9–10, 82, 92 Bu Hassan 9 Bu Kamil 9 Bu Khabour 9, 90–91 Bu Sha’an 146 al-Bukamel 143, 145 bureaucracy 45; Ottoman period 36; see also civil service al-Bursan, Sheikh Shawakh Ahmad 9, 85–86 al-Busaraya 144 Bush, George W. 113

Index   167 Busha’ban 9–10, 82, 85, 132, 136 business class 102 al-Bustani, B. 37 Byzantine Empire 27, 28, 43 camels 26–27 caravan cities 27 Christians 92, 135, 93 civil service 36, 162 civil society 1, 106 civil war 144–146, 161, 163 clans 7, 18; see also names of individual clans class divisions 102 co-optation strategies 20, 21, 73; Hafez al-Assad 71, 73 coercion 20, 21 colonialism 162, 163 common tribes (shawi) 19–20, 52, 64, 65, 70, 88, 89, 92, 95 Communist Party 72, 73 confederations 7, 76 Constitution of 1950 50 Controle Bedouin 39 cooperatives 62, 71 corruption 102, 106, 131 cotton 51, 84, 86 Crusaders 29 customary law (urf) 2, 22, 49, 54, 63–64, 66, 160; and Hafez al-Assad 74 Damascus 4, 5, 11, 28, 32, 42, 104, 105, 108 Damascus Declaration (2005) 104 Dandal, Sheikh Dham 9 al-Dandal tribe 9 Dar’a 5, 6, 11, 90; arrest of school children in (2011) 128; uprising in 128–129, 130–131, 132 al-Darwish, Sheikh Ahmad 12, 133, 144 Dawod, H. 74 Declaration of Deir Ezzor (2006) 104 Deir Ezzor 4, 5, 6, 8, 12; ira 34, 36, 39, 104, 138, 143 Deir Ezzor: army officers from 88; Ba’th Party in 56, 90; drought 107; garrison 31, 33; Iraqi insurgency and youth from 109, 110–111; Muslim Brotherhood in 83; poverty 105; security agents from 89; spread of Salafism in 120; uprising in 129, 132 Democratic Union Party (PYD) 141, 142 denationalisation 55 desertification 107

development projects, Bashar al-Assad regime 105–109, 160–161 Devlin, J.F. 58 Dhiban 9 divide and rule policy 162; French mandate period 42–43, 44, 159; Ottoman period 33–34 al-Dougeim, Mahmoud 6 Draz, O. 62 drought 36, 55, 105, 106, 107, 121, 130, 161 Druzes 6, 89, 102, 104, 115; French mandate period 39, 42; and Jawabrah clash (2000) 113–114; Ottoman period 33 Dukhan, H. 17, 106 Eastern Tribes Army 143 economic liberalisation, Bashar al-Assad regime 101, 102–103, 108–109, 121, 130, 160–161 economy 74–75 education 94, 162, 163; Ottoman period 36; Shiite 117 Egypt: invasion (1831) 31; union with see United Arab Republic (UAR) al-Ekal, Hadi 120 elections 92–93; (1961) 55–56; local council 72–73 Elite Forces militia 143, 145 environment conservation 106 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 143 Evans-Pritchard, E. 18 Fad’an, Sheikh Jad’an Ibn Mheid 33 Fad’an tribe 2, 9, 10, 33, 34, 38, 39, 55, 64, 92 al-Fadl 5, 10–11, 38, 87 al-Fadous, Sheikh Mahmoud 12, 93, 94, 102, 133 Faisal, Amir 38 Faour, Sheikh Emir Mahmoud 10, 43 Faour, Sheikh Faour 10 al-Faour, Sheikh Fadl 11 al-Fares, Sheikh Mohammad 8, 109, 113, 117, 135, 141, 144 al-Fares, Sheikh Nawaf 88, 133 al-Farra, Ummar 76 Fatimids 29 Fawa’ira 11–12, 78, 79, 93, 94, 108, 129 al-Fayyad, Sheikh Mhanna 12, 133 film industry 75 First World War 37, 44 Free Syrian Army (FSA) 127, 137, 140, 141, 144, 145

168   Index al-Freij, Fehd Jassem 131–132, 133, 144–145 French mandate policies 26, 38, 39–43, 84, 89, 159; ‘law of the tribes’ (1940) 50, 54; management of tribal regions 40–41; pacification of the tribes 39–40; and tribal seats in parliament 50; using tribes to counterweight nationalist movement 42–43, 44 FSA see Free Syrian Army Fund for the Rural Development of Syria (FIRDOS) 106–107 al-Fustat 28 garrisons 28, 31, 33 gas 103, 145, 147 Gathering of al-Baggara Youth 143 Geis 120, 142, 148 Gellner, E. 18 General Commission for al-Badia Management and Development 105–106, 131 Geneva II talks 135 geography 3–5 Ghassanids 27 Golan Heights 4, 5, 77 Governorate of the Desert 36 grazing system (hima) 22, 49, 54, 61–62, 66, 160 Great Syrian Revolt (1925–1927) 42, 73 Gulf states see Arab Gulf countries Gurr, T.R. 129 Hadidiyn 12, 34, 40, 42, 60, 74, 79, 81–82, 133, 144, 145 al-Haj, A. 119 Hajr Aswad district 108 Hama 4, 6, 8, 81, 82, 106 Hamadanis 29, 44 Hanadi 34 Hannah, A. 52, 59 Hannanu 39, 42 Hardin, G. 62 al-Hariri, Rafic 116 al-Hariri, Sheikh Mohammad 11 al-Hariri, Sheikh Nasser 11, 132, 138 al-Hariri tribe 11, 19, 39, 81, 91, 146 Hasanah 10, 38, 76, 78, 79, 93 al-Hasan, L. 49 Hashemites 38 Hasoon 9 al-Hassakeh 5, 6, 8, 9, 53, 84, 85, 86; drought 107; Iraqi insurgency and youth from 109; Kurdish uprising in (2004) 8, 109, 113, 114, 141; poverty 105; protest

movement in 131, 141; tribal clashes in 8, 109, 113, 114 Hassoun, Ahmad 116 Hatem, Sheikh Ali 140 Hatoum, Colonel 65 Hauran 4, 5, 91, 104, 146 Hauran Pillars Brigade 146 headbands, symbolism of 128 Hefel, Aboud Jad’an 92 al-Hefel, Sheikh Aboud Jad’an 9 al-Hefel, Sheikh Khalil 9 al-Helew, Sheikh Mohammad 8, 138 Hezbollah 116, 138, 141 al-Hifl 9 Hijab, Ryad 104, 137 Hilal, Muhammad Talab 84–85 hima see grazing system Himyar Kingdom 27 al-Hinidi 6 Hinnebusch, R. 91 Hleissat 109 homeland 20 Homs 4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 88; migration to 105, 108; uprising in 129 honour concept 128, 161 Hourani, A. 18, 30, 49–50, 54 Hourni, A. 50 housing 108 Howeitat 37 Hussein, Saddam 109, 110, 111, 113, 139 Hussein, Sharif 37–38 Hweidi, Sheikh Bashir Faisal 132 Hweidi, Sheikh Faisal 57, 83, 92 Hweidi, Sheikh Jassem 72 Hweidi, Sheikh Mohammad 9, 56 Hweidi, Sheikh Mohammad Faisal 114 Ibn Abu Sufyan, Caliph Muawiya 44 Ibn Khaldun 18, 20; cyclical theory 43, 44 Ibn Mheid, Nuri 54, 64 Ibn Muheid, Hajim 39 Ibn Muheid, Sheikh Jad’an 36, 38 Ibn Muheid, Sheikh Mujhim 10, 39, 42, 52 Ibn Qa’ishish, Daham 34 Ibrahim Pasha 31 Ibrahim, Sheikh Trad 65 ideology 49; Ba’thist 57–59 Idlib 4, 6, 12, 81, 106 inducement policy, Ottoman period 34–35 International Crisis Group 115 International Union for the Conservation of Nature 106 Iran 77, 121, 127, 145; and spread of

Index   169 Shi’ism 115–118, 138; and Syrian uprising 138, 139, 150 Iraq 3, 7, 8, 41, 64, 77, 116, 127, 149; Ba’th Party in 56, 84; Kurds in 84; migration to 60; Syrian refugees in 139; and Syrian uprising 138, 139–140 Iraq war and insurgency 109–112, 116, 120–121, 139, 146 irrigation projects 107 ISIS (Islamic State) 10, 139, 140, 142, 143–144, 145, 150; and Arab tribes in Syria 127–128, 146–149; Jordan and 135, 136; tribal affairs office 148 Islam 26, 27, 28–29, 43–44, 80–81, 162 Islamic identity 43, 44 Islamic State see ISIS Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 146 Islamists 70, 71, 72, 79–83, 102; and Bashar al-Assad regime 115–121; and Hafez al-Assad regime 81–83, 95, 160; see also ISIS; Muslim Brotherhood; Salafism; Shi’ism; Sunnis Israel 71, 77, 159, 161 Jabbur, J. 7, 19 al-Jabbur 8, 52, 78, 84, 108, 111, 113, 114, 139, 142, 146 al-Jaberi, Khaled 108 Jabhat al-Nusra 120, 139, 145, 146 Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa 146 Jabr, Sheikh Dandal 83 al-Jarba, Ahmad 137–138 al-Jarba, Sheikh Daham 7, 74, 141, 142 al-Jarba, Sheikh Hamid 118 Jarrahids 29, 44 Jawabrah 113–114 al-Jazira (The Island) 3–4, 4–5, 30, 51, 55, 60, 142; unemployment 105 Jerusalem 29 Jihadists 120 Jordan 3, 38, 41, 64–65, 81, 138, 146, 150; Ba’th Party in 56; and ISIS 135, 136; migration to 60, 64 al-Juburi, Sheikh Mish’an 112 Jumus 6 Kalblya 6 Kalthoum, Faisal 130 Karak 29 Kashish, Khalil 10 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman 37 Keftaro, Ahmad 72 Khaddam, Abdul Halim 112, 118 Khalaf, Abu 103

Khalaf, S. 51, 52, 58, 60, 90 Khashoggi, Jamal 139 Khayyatin 6 khmsah 61 Khoury, P. 7 al-Khurfan, Sheikh Muhammad 35 al-Khursah 7 khuwa (protection fee) 30 Kilcullen, D. 107 Kinda 27 kinship ties 1, 18, 20, 58, 63, 94; and support for Iraqi insurgency 109–112 Kirkuk-Banis pipeline 110 Kostiner, J. 7 al-Kufah 28 Kuftaro, Sheikh Ahmad 110, 116 Kull, S. 80 Kurdistan 84 Kurds 5, 29, 31, 70, 83–87, 101, 104, 127–128, 131, 132, 141–144, 146, 149, 161; Democratic Union Party (PYD) 141, 142; and Hafez al-Assad regime 71, 84, 85–87, 95, 115, 136, 160; and Shammar alliance 8, 141–142, 145–146; tribes 6; uprising (2004) 8, 109, 113, 114, 141; YPG (People’s Protection Units) 141, 142–143 Kuwait 79, 119, 120, 137 al-Lajat 146 Lakhmids 27 Lancaster, W. 2, 64 land/land reform 49, 66; under Bashar al-Assad 108–109; Ba’thist 58, 59–61, 64, 65, 70, 71; French mandate period 41, 43; grazing system (hima) 22, 49, 54, 61–62; under Hafez al-Assad 70, 74; Ottoman period 35; post-independence 50; post-UAR 55; state-owned land 61; UAR period 54–55, 59, 61, 62 Lattakia 88, 90, 104, 106 law: state 63–64; see also customary law (urf) ‘law of the tribes’ 50, 53–54 Lawrence, T.E. 38 Lebanon 38, 116, 120, 138; Ba’th Party in 56 Lesch, D. 112 Levant 36–37, 76 Levitt, M. 111 Lewis, N. 2, 7, 34, 52 liberalisation policies, Bashar al-Assad regime 101, 102–103, 108–109, 121, 130, 160–161

170   Index liberty, Ba’thist goal of 57, 58 Libya 2 lineages 7, 18 local councils 72–73 Ma’at, Sheikh Abdul Karim 79 madafas (guest houses) 75 al-Madalja 146 Mahhouk, A. 19 Mamluks 29, 44 Ma’murah 41 Ma’oz, M. 30 Maronites 33 marriage, alliance 35, 78, 147–148 Marx, E. 18 al-Masalmeh 129 Mashahda 9 al-Mashi, Sheikh Dayyab 9, 72, 82, 92 Matawira 6 Mawali 12, 30, 32, 34, 40, 42, 60, 106, 144 Mawali Brigade 144, 145 Mecca 27, 31 media 75–76; see also social media; television Medina 27 Meharistes military unit 39, 41 Melheim, Sheikh Abdul Aziz 78, 79, 92, 93, 138 Melhem, Sheikh Trad 10, 49–50 al-Melhem, Sheikh Mohammed Meslet 109 al-Mershid, Sheikh Rakan 74 al-Mershid, Sheikh Trad 10 al-Meslet, Sheikh Abdul Aziz 8, 52, 53, 59, 78 al-Meslet, Sheikh Ahmad 111 Meslet, Sufian 111 Mesopotamia 27, 76 Mhemidieh 8 middle class 102, 105 migration: external 55, 60, 64, 75, 85, 95, 119, 120, 160; internal 105, 108, 121 Milhem, Sheikh 43 militias 141, 142, 143, 144–146, 161 Ministry of Defence 72 Ministry of Interior Affairs 49 modernisation 21, 22, 162; Bashar al-Assad regime 105–109, 121; Ba’thist ideology of 57, 58–59, 73; Ottoman period 31–32 Mohammad, Prophet 27, 42, 80, 117 Mongols 29 Mu-Hassan 90

Muhammad Qubrusi Pasha 33–34 Muller, V. 7 Musil, Alois 80 Muslim Brotherhood 10, 12, 34, 79–80, 81–83, 95, 112, 119, 136, 138 al-Mutawakel, Caliph 29 Najeeb, Atef 128–129, 130 Namik Pasha 33 Nasser, Abdul 21, 53–55, 61, 62, 63, 64 Nasserists 61, 64–65, 70, 160 Nassif, Mohammad Sfouk 11 nation-state 49 National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces 136, 137 National Council of Damascus Declaration 104 National Defence Forces (NDF) militia 144 National Progressive Front 73, 92 national unity 57, 58, 73 nationalisation 55, 71 nationalism 21, 44, 57, 160, 162; Arab 37, 40, 42–43, 53 Nazzal, Ahmad 94 neo-liberal policies see economic liberalisation New Syrian Army 146 Nijris, Sheikh Faisal 9 Nijris tribe 9 noble tribes 19–20, 52, 64, 70, 92, 95, 160 nomadism 5–6, 18, 19, 36, 50; Ba’thist rejection of 57–58 al-Nuimi, Maher 144 Nu’im 5, 11, 49–50, 94, 108, 144 al-Nusra, Jabhat 12, 145 oil 5, 85, 101, 103, 106, 145; AngloFrench pipeline 40; Arab Gulf countries 20, 70, 85; ISIS control of 147; KirkukBanis pipeline 110 Omar 27 Operation Olive Branch 143 Oppenheim, M.V. 7 al-Oran 146 Organisation of Socialist Unionists 73 orientalism 20 Ottoman period 26, 44, 159, 161; and Arab Revolt 37–38, 159; bureaucratic penetration 36; divide and rule policy 33–34; early (1516–1841) 29–31; inducement policy 34–35; late (1840– 1917) 31–36; modernisation 31–32;

Index   171 schools 36; settlement policy 35–36; subjugation of tribes 32–33; Tanzimat reforms 31–32, 36, 45 Palestine 28, 29, 34 Palmyra 4, 11, 27, 33, 106, 108 parliament, tribal representatives in 50, 56, 75, 91–93, 134–135, 159, 160, 162 pastoralism 6, 18–19, 35, 52 patronage networks 21, 22, 80; Hafez al-Assad regime 73, 74, 89, 95, 101, 115, 160 peasantry 18, 19, 72 People’s Council 72 People’s Party 52, 53 Persian Empire 27, 28, 43 Peshmerga 142 Petra 27 Petro Canada Company 106 pilgrimage route, protection of 31, 34–35, 38 poetry, tribal 75–76, 129 policing: desert, tribes involvement in 34, 35; post-independence 49–50 political authority 20 population 5–7 poverty 104, 105, 106, 108, 119 privatisation 101, 108–109 Qamishli 8, 113 Qasim, Abd al-Karim 84 Qatar 79, 127, 137–138, 139, 140 Qaysi 28 Quneitra 4, 5, 6, 11, 106 Quran 80 Quraysh 27 al-Radi, Sheikh Fawzi 110–111 Rae, J. 81 raiding 40, 63 railways 33 Rajiha, dawoud 131 Rakan, Sheikh Anwar 9 al-Rakan, Abdul Mohsen 114 Rakkan, Sheikh Abdulkarim 132 al-Ramah 146 Raqqa 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 39, 60, 85, 143, 146; Ba’th Party in 90; drought 107; Muslim Brotherhood in 83; poverty 105; spread of Salafism in 120; tribal clashes in 114–115; uprising in 131 Ras al-Ayn 8 al-Rasheed, M. 19 Rassam, A. 18

revenge (intiqaam) concept 128, 129–130, 161 revenge killing (thar) 63 rifles 26, 30, 33 Rogan, E. 38 Rosenblatt, N. 107 Rubin, B. 83 Russia 134, 136, 145, 147 Rwalla 2, 10, 37, 38, 55, 64, 75, 78, 92 Sabkha 9, 114, 132 al-Saddyid, Jallal 56, 66 al-Sahou, Ali 147 Said, E. 20 Saidi Arabia 3 Salafism 115, 119–121, 139, 161 Saleh, Yassin Haj 120, 127 al-Saleh, Sheikh Nayef 145 al-Saleh, Sheikh Nuri al-Nawaf 12 Sardiyah 33 Sarout, Abdel Basset 133 Saudi Arabia 8, 50, 64–65, 76–118, 120, 127, 136, 140; royal family 78; and Syrian uprising 137–139; tribal migration to 55, 60, 64, 85, 119 Sba’ah 10, 55, 64 Schoel, T. 26, 78, 79 schools: Ottoman period 36; postindependence 50, 56; Shiite 117; UAR period 54 SDF see Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Seale, P. 77, 82 security apparatus 89–90, 131, 160, 162 sedentarianism programmes see settlement policy sedentarism 6 Seljuks 29, 44 settlement policy 2, 49; Ba’th Party 59, 60–61; Ottoman period 35–36; postindependence 50 al-Sfuk, Sheikh Faisal 74 al-Shaalan, Sheikh Hussein Ali 112 Sha’lan, Emir 43 Sha’lan, Sheikh Nuri 38 Shammar confederation 7–8, 30, 33, 34, 42, 76, 84–85, 92, 114, 139; and Aqaydat, hatred between 148; and Kurds alliance 8, 141–142, 145–146 Sharabyen 141, 142, 145 Sharha (grants) 76–77 shawi tribes see common tribes al-Shaysh, Sheikh Jamal 12 Sheikan 6 al-Sheikh, Ahmad Nazal 12

172   Index Sheikhdom: system of 93–94; see also tribal leaders Sheitat 9, 143, 145 Shibly, Hamid 94 Shield Brigade 144 Shihabi, General Hikmat 102 Shi’ism 115–118, 138, 161 Shlash, Sheikh Ramadan 38 Shoup, J. 62 Slouk 120 Smith, A. 27 Smith, W.R. 18 smuggling 64, 93 social media networks 14–16, 17, 137 socialism 21, 53, 55, 57, 58–59, 62, 160, 162 solidarity (assabiiyyah) 18, 43, 61, 62, 76, 162 Soviet Union, collapse of 101 Starr, S. 105 state farms 61, 71, 86; dismantling of 103 state formation 2, 21 subjugation of tribes, Ottoman period 32–33 submission tactics of tribes 20–21 subsidies, agricultural 107, 121, 130 Sufis 116 Sukhnah 4 Sukhni 104 Sulayman, Sultan 31 Sunnis 42, 72, 80, 81, 87, 88, 89, 92, 95, 102, 104, 116, 160 surra payments 31, 35 Sweet, L. 63–64 Sweida 5, 73, 90, 113–114 Sweidan al-Shammiyya 9 Sykes-Picot Agreement 8, 76 Syria Trust for Development 106 Syrian and Arab Tribes and Clans Forum 134 Syrian Arab Tribes’ Council (SATC) 136 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 134, 143, 144, 147, 149 Syrian National Council (SNC) 135 Syrian Steppe 4 Syrian uprising 21, 127–144, 149–150, 161; collective violence and 129–130; Gulf countries and 137–140, 149–150; rural areas and 127; Sheikhs’ stance towards 131–134; and tribal gatherings 134–136; underlying reasons for among tribes 130–131 Tabler, A. 115–116

Tahan, Sheikh Radwan 11, 134 Tal Alw 8 Talabani, Jalal 113 Tanzimat reforms 31–32, 36, 45 Tartus 104 taxes, Ottoman period 35 Tay 8, 84, 108, 111, 113, 132, 141, 142, 148 Tel Hamis 142 television 75, 76, 119 Terkwai, Sheikh Mohammad Mzeid 10 Thompson, E.F. 54 Tigris River 107 al-Tikriti, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan 111 tragedy of the commons 62 Transjordan 28, 29, 32, 38 tribal clashes, Bashar al-Assad regime 112–115 tribal gatherings, and Syrian uprising 134–136 tribal leaders (Sheikhs) 93–94; in parliament 50, 56, 75, 91–93, 134–135, 159, 160, 162; and Syrian uprising 131–134; wealth 52 tribal mapping 7–12 tribal regions 3–4; management of, French mandate period 40–41 tribal structures, changes by end of twentieth century 93–95 tribalisation policies, Hafez al-Assad 73–76 tribalism 2–3, 162; Ba’thist rejection of 57 tribe(s): debates over structure and function of 17–20; definition of 17–18; see also names of individual tribes Tripoli 29 Turgot, A.R.J. 20 al-Turk, Sheikh Ismail 39 Turkey 127, 136, 138, 143; Kurdish nationalism in 84 Turki 10, 60–61, 64, 76, 79 Turkmens 6, 29, 30, 32 Turks 29, 39, 42 Umayyads 28, 44 Umma 27, 44 unemployment 105, 106, 130 United Arab Emirates 145 United Arab Republic (UAR) 53–55, 64; land reform under 54–55, 59, 61, 62; separation from 55 United States (US) 146, 147, 150 unity, national 57, 58, 73 uprising see Syrian uprising

Index   173 urbanisation 94, 162 urf see customary law Uthman 27 Uwais al-Qarni 117 Van Dam, N. 72 Vico, G. 20 Wahabbi 30 Wahhabism 41 al-Walda 9, 85, 86, 87, 91, 114, 141, 143 water resources 107, 130; see also drought wealth, tribal leaders 52

wheat 51, 84, 86 al-Yarmouk, Jaysh 146 al-Yawar, Ghazi 137–138 al-Yawir, Sheikh Ajil 7 Yemen 2, 80–81; Ba’th Party in 56 YouTube 16 YPG (People’s Protection Units) 141, 142–143 Zakaria, W. 7, 31 al-Zoubi, Mahmoud 11, 102, 130 al-Zoubi tribe 11, 39, 81, 91, 129, 132, 146