Stalin's Italian Prisoners of War 9789633863565

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

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STALIN’S

ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

M aria T eresa Giusti Translated by

R iccardo James Vargiu

press Central European University Press Budapest–New York

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©2021 by Maria Teresa Giusti English translation ©2021 by Riccardo James Vargiu Published in 2021 by Central European University Press Nádor utca 9, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.ceupress.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the permission of the Publisher. This volume was published with the financial support of the Università degli Studi “G. d’Annunzio” Chieti-Pescara and of the Consorzio per lo sviluppo culturale delle Rocche. ISBN 978-963-386-355-8 (hardback) ISBN 978-963-386-356-5 (ebook) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Giusti, Maria Teresa, author. | Vargiu, Riccardo James, translator. Title: Stalin’s Italian prisoners of war / Maria Teresa Giusti ; translated by Riccardo James Vargiu. Other titles: I prigionieri italiani in Russia. English Description: Budapest ; New York : Central European University Press, 2021. | “This volume is the English translation of the extended second edition of I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), originally in Italian. For the purposes of this translation, the material has been revised and edited for an English readership.” | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020036424 (print) | LCCN 2020036425 (ebook) | ISBN 9789633863558 (hardback) | ISBN 9789633863565 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1939-1945—Prisoners and prisons, Soviet. | Prisoners of war—Soviet Union. | Prisoners of war—Italy. | Italy. Regio Esercito. Armata, VIII—History. | Italy. Regio Esercito. Corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia—History. | World War, 1939-1945—Campaigns—Soviet Union. Classification: LCC D805.S65 G4913 2020 (print) | LCC D805.S65 (ebook) | DDC 940.54/724708951—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020036424 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020036425

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Table of Contents

Preface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  vii Introduction: The Tragedy of the ARMIR  Chapter 1: Capture and Internment 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1

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Chapter 2: Russia and Prisoners of War  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53 Chapter 3: In the Prison Camps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65 Chapter 4: Antifascist Propaganda  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  125 Chapter 5: Repatriation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  179 Chapter 6: The Final Negotiations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  221 Conclusion 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 261

Appendix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  269 I. Problems and Gaps in Data Collection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  269 II. The ARMIR’s Fallen, and the Men Who Went Missing  . . . . . . . . . .  272 Notes 

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Photographs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  349 Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  367

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Preface

The Axis armies’ attack on the USSR was unexpected and overwhelm-

ingly violent. Official German sources put the number of Soviet servicemen captured after June 1941 at 5,754,000. More than half, at least 3,220,000 men, died.1 These figures attest to the enormous tragedy of imprisonment in the Second World War. Assessing the number of the prisoners in Russian hands has always been a tall order. What we can say is that, according to Russian data, over 5.5 million foreign prisoners of war and internees were held in the Soviet Union as of October 1945.2 Italian prisoners first made their appearance in Soviet camps in the second half of 1941. These were the men of the Sforzesca Division, captured that summer in the so-called First Defensive Battle of the Don. There were relatively few of them, as the overall contribution of the Italian troops sent by Mussolini to Russia as part of the CSIR had been fairly modest. The Italian war effort increased when the ARMIR (the Italian Army in Russia) set off for the USSR—290,000 units strong—in the summer of 1942. After the war, when only about 10,000 of the 95,000 missing men had been repatriated, the Italian public began to question whether the remaining men were still in captivity or had died in Russia. Those concerns grew as the Soviet government invariably refused to send prisoner lists, and to employ the Red Cross. Not only was the lack of information on the missing men during and after the war a source of pain and sorrow for many, it also soured the overall atmosphere, as it opened the door to the suspicion that the Soviets did have the prisoners, but did not want to release them. The following years were rife with controversy, fueled by an abundance of memoirs published by survivors. Yet historiography paid little attention to

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the matter until the 1980s, when a few studies started coming out on the subject prompted by individual scholars and associations, and, largely, by institutions devoted to the Italian resistance movement.3 Meanwhile, organizations such as the National Union of Former Prisoners of War in Russia (UNIRR), the Alliance of Families of Missing Servicemen and Prisoners in Russia, and the National Association of Returnees from Captivity (ANRP) made solid contributions to the cause by collecting data and information on the ARMIR’s missing servicemen, and by putting their family members in contact with the relevant offices of the Italian Ministry of Defense.4 Yet these organizations’ efforts only started to bear fruit in the early 1990s when the archives of the former Soviet Union were opened. In 1991, the Italian government, through the Commissariat Honoring the Fallen of War (a department of the Ministry of Defense), signed an agreement with Russian authorities for the acquisition of documents and prisoner lists in the NKVD archives.5 The lists detailing the names of the prisoners who had died in the Soviet camps (including information even on which individual camp prisoners were held in) and the names of the men who had been repatriated from Russia finally arrived in Italy. The abundance of material sent by the Russian government debunks the idea—widespread since the war—that a  lack of organization in the Soviet Union had caused an inability to manage the prisoners. Despite the obvious difficulties involved in keeping track of so many prisoners at the time of capture, the numerous documents sent by the Russian government attest to the Soviets’ bureaucratic efficiency and capillary police organization. In most cases, Soviet authorities were able to record deaths even while the men were being transferred to the camps by freight train. In addition to this material made available by the UNIRR, my research for the first edition of this book focused on four Russian archives: the GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation); the RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), which holds the documents of the former archive of the Communist Party of the USSR; the RGVA (Russian State Military Archive); and, finally, the TsAMORF (Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense). The GARF contains all the documents, copies or originals, pertaining to NKVD decrees and orders on prisoners of war. I accessed the special GARF fond No. 9401, particularly Stalin and Molotov’s “special folder” (Osobaya papka Stalina i Molotova), and Stalin’s “special folder” (Osobaya papka Stalina), as documents of the highest degree of secrecy were called. I read, analyzed, and carefully compared the documents. They revealed completely new, sometimes shocking

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aspects of how the prisoners were treated, detailing both how they were exploited for their labor and how they were trained for purposes of communist propaganda and espionage. The antifascist propaganda carried out by Soviet political commissars and communist émigrés took on the form of actual Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, and had a significant impact on the prisoners’ behavior, choices, and life in general. Documents from the RGVA and the RGASPI were very interesting in this regard. A section of the latter archive contains the Comintern’s records (for the purposes of this book I consulted fonds Nos. 495 and 17), whose many documents reveal the organizational efficiency of the political work that was carried out, but also the difficulties faced in the coordination of the various facilities involved. The Russian sources aid in understanding the methods used to persuade Italian prisoners to take part in political work, what political instructors focused on the most, prisoners’ reactions to attempts to indoctrinate them and the results. The reports drafted by the commissioners sent to assess the political work carried out in the camps illuminate the short-term results of the propaganda, whereas Italian documentary sources on the men’s repatriation help determine whether there were long-term effects. Part of this book is dedicated to how the men were repatriated and tries to shed light on the complex relationship between the Italian and Soviet governments concerning prisoners of war, including the ways in which the USSR organized the repatriation; the Italian nationals that were still held; and the clashes between returnees, which often resulted from long-repressed friction during captivity that was left unchecked once the men came home. For the first edition of this book in Italian, I consulted documents pertaining to this from the Archive of the Historical Office of the Army General Staff (AUSSME), including reserved documents.6 Particularly useful were the statements returnees made in their respective military districts at the time of their repatriation, forwarded to the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates. Though these accounts are invaluable, it is worth keeping in mind that they were given in the heat of the moment, when the men’s anger toward their captors was fresh—made stronger by finding how many of their fellow servicemen had died in captivity. Other Italian sources consulted include the Gramsci Institute Foundation’s Archive “M” (recently acquired from Moscow), most notably D’Onofrio’s and Robotti’s records, and Togliatti’s correspondence. This source was extremely useful, particularly for understanding the role Italian

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Communist Party (PCI) leaders played in the matter of Italian prisoners of war. Assessed in the light of official Russian and Italian sources, I also took into account survivors’ memoirs and recollections. Key Russian figures were also interviewed, like Major Nikolai Tereshchenko, a former political instructor, and Alim Morozov, who at the time was a youth in Rossosh where the Alpine command had its seat. The period addressed in greater detail spans from 1941 to 1946, when captivity ended for most Italian prisoners as superior officers were repatriated. However, with regard to the repatriation process specifically, my investigation extends to 1950 and 1954, when prisoners still held in the USSR on war crime charges finally returned to Italy. Regarding the latter’s fate, long the subject of heated controversy, additional material was consulted, and as a result the second edition of this book—as well as the present translation—provides relevant new information.7 The introduction to the book takes into account recent studies dedicated to the Second World War, particularly German and Italian historiography on the Eastern front. These studies have tried either to cast Italians as sharing responsibility with Germans for the crimes and violence committed in Russia, or to absolve them of blame entirely, reverting to the old cliché of Italians as kind, generous occupiers, and fueling a controversy that does little to aid historical understanding.8 The picture painted in the introduction gives the reader a  sense of the circumstances faced by the Italian occupation troops in Russia, as well as of the latter’s problematic relationship with their German allies. It summarizes the objectives of the war, and raises issues that are helpful to understand the Soviet leadership’s attitude toward the prisoners. Thanks to the Russian documents now available, it has become possible to shed light on many aspects of the Italian occupation troops’ behavior, which was not always consistent with principles of humanity—though it is fair to say that instances of cruelty and gratuitous brutality were primarily the doing of specific individuals, rather than a  generalized behavior. The Russian sources confirm what has already been documented about the especially ruthless conduct of Germans on the Eastern front, on criminal orders. Indeed, recent studies by German scholars have challenged the widespread assumption that blame for the barbarization of war on the Eastern front ought to be assigned exclusively to the special SS troops, high-ranking Wehrmacht officers and the Nazi regime,9 and shown that regular troops and subordinate officers were not immune to that same criminality.

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Records of interrogations of Italian prisoners unearthed in the records of the Central Archives of the Federal Security Services of the Russian Federation (Ca Fsb RF) illuminate the Soviets’ perception of their enemy, as well as what information they deemed relevant. Conversely, the statements given by the Italian soldiers shed light on how they understood the war, fascism, and Mussolini. What the statements reveal is their widespread habituation to the regime, indifference to politics, and unanimous condemnation of the war. To investigate the relationship between the Italians and their German allies, as well as the Italians’ behavior toward civilians and prisoners of war in occupied territories, reports to the political police by regime spies—filed away in the State Central Archive (General Direction of Public Security, Political Police Division)—were also consulted, as were the diaries of the people involved, stored in the Archive of Pieve Santo Stefano. These provide a snapshot of the war from the viewpoint of the people who fought it, and offer an indication of the difficult relationship between the men of the various occupation armies. The matter of war crimes takes on a central role in this new edition of the book. The Russian documents clarify many aspects of this subject, including what the Soviets meant by “war criminals,” a  term used very broadly in the USSR. As far as the Russian sources are concerned, information was drawn from the GARF, most prominently from Molotov’s special folder (fond 9401, b. 2), which contains the reports on the status of the investigations carried out on Italian war criminals sent to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As for the Italian sources, documents from the Mario Palermo fond—stored in the Archive of the Campanian Institute for the History of the Italian Resistance, Antifascism, and the Contemporary Age “Vera Lombardi,” headquartered in Naples—were consulted. Mario Palermo was a member of the Italian war crimes inquiry committee set up in May 1946. The Soviet Union demanded that ten servicemen, accused of having committed crimes and repatriated after the defeat of the winter of 1942– 43, be handed over. It also detained nearly thirty men who had been taken prisoner so they could stand trial in local courts. In order to identify and punish criminals from the invading armies, the Soviet government set up special commissions charged with the task of retrieving information and testimonies to be used in the trials. The Extraordinary State Commission was established in November 1942, and by March 1943 similar commissions—nineteen of them in all—were set up at the regional, territorial and republic levels. The material collected by these commissions was declas-

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sified in the 1990s. All together, it paints a dark picture of the occupation regime imposed by the Germans and their allies. The crimes committed by Italian occupants, though less frequent than those attributed to other Axis armies, fell within this context. Regarding life in the camps and the handling of prisoner labor, an interesting document, never published before, has emerged from the RGASPI (the Italian translation of which is provided in appendix to the second edition of this book in Italian). It is one of the few documents signed by Stalin himself. With this document the Soviet dictator himself intervened decisively in the organization of work in the camps. The chapter dedicated to antifascist propaganda—one of the more innovative aspects in this book’s first edition—has remained largely unchanged, with the exception of the part focusing on the systems set up to recruit prisoners to work as spies for the Soviet regime after repatriation. This issue drove a deep wedge between prisoners, which would not be overcome even after they returned to Italy. Often the men who had adhered to communist ideas in captivity, and had actively taken part in the work to spread them, suffered harsh ostracism once back in Italy at the hands of those who, conversely, had refused to be involved in any capacity. As for families’ efforts to obtain information about their loved ones who had been taken prisoner, for the first edition of this book I  availed myself extensively of the documents stored in the Gramsci Institute Foundation. Indeed, letters pleading for information on missing men were sent in large numbers to the PCI’s secretariat and to Togliatti himself. The senders hoped that once Togliatti returned from the USSR he’d be able to provide news on their relations or a preferential pathway to acquire them from the Kremlin. For the second edition of this book, I was able to access additional material relevant to this painful matter, coming both from the Vatican Secret Archives10 and from the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL). In the former, I examined the appeals and the prisoner lists broadcast by Radio Moscow, as well as the entreaties addressed to Pius XII by the men’s family members or parish priests asking for information on their whereabouts and circumstances. Given the high number of requests, the Vatican Information Office prepared a form containing the exact information the inquiring party was to give.11 As attested by the documents, many pleas were answered. As for the National CGIL Historical Archive, it holds materials regarding a labor union delegation’s trip to Moscow in the summer of 1945, led by Giuseppe Di Vittorio. The purpose of the visit was to discuss several issues, including the repatriation of prisoners. The documents filed away in the archive and never published before include letters

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and notes that many Italians gave Di Vittorio at that time in hopes that he’d be able to provide them with news of their relatives on his return. The union leader worked hard and found some success. He returned to Italy bearing the first prisoner lists ever to become available, which he had been given by the Soviet authorities and by the prisoners themselves. Further, he brought back photographs and messages from the prisoners to their families back at home. It was the first time contact was established with the ARMIR’s missing men. It was also the first time prisoner lists—albeit extremely partial ones—were produced, which showed that some 1,800 Italian military men were detained in the Soviet camps. Upon returning to Italy, Di Vittorio received more letters pressing for information. Among them was an official note, never published before, by Interior Undersecretary Giuseppe Spataro, who—on behalf of the government—asked for information that might appease the public and prisoners’ families, as well as curb demonstrations calling on the government to provide answers and explanations. After the delegation’s trip, the first repatriations started in September 1945. While these had been forcefully championed by the Italian union leader during his meetings with the Soviet authorities, they were essentially decided by Stalin. Other sources newly accessed on the matter of the repatriations were the papers found in the Historical and Diplomatic Archive of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, particularly the Political Affairs series (USSR 1931–45, 1946–50, and 1951–57; and General Secretariat 1943–47 on prisoners and internees), which feature new and different information from those known until now.12 Finally, another matter I have managed to shed some light on regards the men formerly interned by the Germans (IMIs, Italian military internees) who ended up in the Soviet Union. The soldiers belonged to the divisions stationed in the Balkans who surrendered to the Germans after the 8 September 1943 armistice and were interned in camps in the territories occupied by the Wehrmacht. As the Red Army advanced, part of these men were freed in early 1944. Instead of being repatriated, however, they were transferred to prison camps in the USSR as a result of an arbitrary decision by the Soviet command. The former IMIs, swept up by the war, found themselves sharing the ARMIR men’s fate, and had to endure a double captivity. It is impossible to determine the overall number of those who experienced this treatment. What is certain, however, is that nearly 1,300 such men lost their lives in the Soviet camps. It is hard to fathom the reasons that compelled the Red Army to deport Italian military men to the Soviet Union at a time when Italy was already co-belligerent with the USSR: perhaps they thought they were German collaborators, or wanted

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more workers and to have another bargaining chip at the negotiation table; or simply the fact that they were Italians, and thus co-responsible to some extent for the attack against the Soviet Union. This additional research allowed an ever clearer picture of the experiences of Italian military prisoners in Russia, from capture to repatriation. The time I  spent studying the period of Italian occupation particularly helped me to understand the Italian military’s overall experience in Russia, and thus the Soviet leadership’s attitude toward Italian prisoners. It is true the Italian military men belonged to an invading army, but it is also true most of them had not chosen to set off for Russia. ARMIR prisoners were thus double victims: first of the fascist regime, which propelled them in the whirlwind of war with criminal carelessness and no adequate military preparation; and then of the impenetrable and unwieldy Soviet bureaucracy, which, while not necessarily evil, was certainly untrusting, uninterested and inconsistent—and thus hostile and ruinous.

NOTE ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS Images 1–10 in the photo insert, come from the Russian State Documentary Film and Photo Archive in Krasnogorsk-Moscow; images 11–17 are published here courtesy of the National CGIL Historical Archive. 18–22 and 26–31 come from the Russian State Documentary Film and Photo Archive in Krasnogorsk-Moscow; images 23-25 come from the National CGIL Historical Archive. Electoral posters 32 and 33 have been reproduced courtesy of Antonio Niero, Bologna.

NOTE ON THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION This volume is the English translation of the extended second edition of I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), originally in Italian. For the purposes of this translation, the material has been revised and edited for an English readership. Excerpts from original Russian sources, previously translated into Italian by the author, have been rendered into English by the translator of this book and verified by the author. Russian names, with the exception of those that have become established in their anglicized version, have been transliterated. Instead of the terms “commissar” and “commissariat of the people,” in use until 1946, the corresponding terms “minister” and “ministry” are often employed throughout this book for the sake of increased readability.

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INTRODUCTION

The Tragedy of the ARMIR

They were driven; they had no control, or at least none of them seemed to have the vigour and imagination to attempt a control. [...] They had to arm preposterously. They had to threaten. They had to go through with the business. [...] Now the last reasons for patience had disappeared. The tension had risen to a point at which disaster seemed like relief and Europe was free to tear itself to fragments. (H.G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come, London: Hutchinson, 1933).

1. The inevitable war The Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939 had established an unpredictable alliance between Germany and the USSR, disrupting the line of antifascist unity sanctioned in 1935 by the VII Congress of the Communist International. In keeping with the traditionally pro-German leanings of Soviet foreign policy, ratified by the Treaty of Rapallo and embodied by the close economic and military collaboration between the Soviets and the Germans, Stalin backed Germany when it reintroduced compulsory military service in 1935 in violation of the orders contained in the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1920s, this “friendship” had taken the form of economic aid offered to the USSR by German industrialists.1 Speaking with British Minister Anthony Eden at the end of March 1935, Stalin had stated:

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2

Introduction Sooner or later, the German people was bound to free itself from the chains of Versailles. […] I repeat: a people as great as the German one had to break free from the chains of Versailles. […] Germans constitute a great and brave people. We never lose sight of that.2

The Soviet leader thus did not conceal some degree of admiration for the Germans, and perhaps even hoped that a victorious revolution in Germany would lead to the end of capitalism in Europe. The Soviet leadership and the Comintern, in certain regards and at certain conditions, considered Germany a natural ally against the powers that had won the First World War. Further, both Hitler and Stalin had a  deep aversion for capitalist countries. For Stalin, though, the pact with Germany was a  short-term maneuver aimed at protecting the USSR from German aggression. This suggests that at first Stalin pursued a defensive foreign policy. Indeed, he signed the pact only after all attempts made to find an agreement with the French and the British had been rejected.3 On their part, both France and Great Britain doubted that the Red Army, whose leadership had been decimated by the purges in 1937 and 1938, was ready for an alliance, the thought of which Chamberlain found deeply troubling. The contrary theory—that Stalin actually wanted to exploit Hitler as an “icebreaker of revolution” to pave the way to communism’s rule over Europe—seems plausible as well, and is confirmed by the fact that Moscow was preparing a plan for westward aggression to be launched in 1942. The pact constituted a  short-term strategic move for Hitler, too. It would allow him to neutralize the only power in a  position to support Poland directly; to avoid a  war on two fronts; to ensure Germany had the necessary supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials; and to give birth to a  constellation of powers able to discourage French and British aggression.4 Therefore, when Hitler started working on a rapprochement between Germany and the USSR in August 1939 at Poland’s expense, Stalin was ready to seal the deal.5 The pact contained secret clauses to partition Poland between Germany and the USSR, and to assign vast western territories to the latter power. According to the commercial agreements included in the pact, the USSR would supply Germany with the raw materials it needed for the war effort. Suffice it to say that in the seventeen months that followed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact concluded in August 1939 (and before Germany attacked the USSR), the Soviet Union supplied Germany with tons of oil, manganese, copper, nickel, raw cotton, wood, linen, chromium, asbestos,

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The Tragedy of the ARMIR

3

phosphates, and cereals, as well as with about three thousand kilograms of platinum. The Soviet government made its icebreakers available to assist German warships disguised as merchant ships in the North Sea. Further, in violation of neutrality provisions, it instructed ships at sea to provide the Germans with the weather reports the Luftwaffe needed in order to bomb cities in Great Britain. In turn, Germany limited ship traffic in the Baltic Sea and in the Black Sea during the Winter War, and was supposed to supply the Soviet Union with armaments for its navy. The Soviet government was scrupulous and punctual in carrying out its commitments. As a matter of fact, the last freight train bound for Germany crossed the Soviet borders on the night of 21 June 1941, just hours before Germany launched its attack. Hence, in the early months of war, Germany received vital help from the USSR—in the form of direct aid, as well as of strategic raw materials and foodstuffs from the Far East, which necessarily had to pass on Soviet soil—in the absence of which it most likely would not have been able to attack its own ally.6 At the time, the USSR was completely unprepared for war. That is why it so diligently abided by the pacts it had stipulated with Germany, keeping at bay anything that might serve as a pretext to break them.7 However, as Germany proved increasingly successful in the war, Stalin was gradually persuaded to change his tune, both with his ally and with Great Britain and the United States. As a result, contacts with the latter were resumed: in August 1940, the Soviet-American commercial agreement was renewed, and several signs of an easing of tensions followed, not least the suspension of a press campaign hostile to the American intervention. Speaking during the session of the Supreme Soviet on 1 August 1940, Foreign Minister Molotov nevertheless said that “not only [had] the course of events in Europe not weakened the German-Soviet nonaggression pact, but, rather, it [had] drawn attention to its importance.”8 “Good, neighborly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union,” Molotov claimed, “[did] not depend on casual, contingent circumstances, but on interests of state fundamental for the USSR and for Germany alike.” The temporary alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany, from which both powers reaped great advantages, was destined to come to an end when it came time to negotiate control of the Balkans and the Black Sea. The USSR’s and Germany’s interests in the area were at odds. Stalin’s expansionist aims in the region showed Hitler that the Soviet leader had by no means settled for the concessions it had received in the Baltic. Molotov’s meetings with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Hitler—held in Berlin on 12 and 13 November 1940 respectively—constituted an attempt

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4

Introduction

to solve this delicate matter through diplomacy. During the 13 November meeting, Hitler proposed that the USSR enter the Tripartite Pact, an agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan signed on 27 September 1940. According to Molotov, while Hitler spoke in the plural, he failed to clarify whether the proposition came from the Germans alone, or from the other two powers as well. Regarding the Balkans, Hitler claimed that Germany’s interests lay in shielding the area from Great Britain’s control. To this he added that Germany understood the USSR’s interest in the Balkans and the Black Sea, but that the latter did not ensure free access to the sea, for it flowed into the Mediterranean, where Italy would always stake a claim.9 Relations between the two powers had changed since 1939. Germany was no longer interested in extending its alliance with the USSR, whereas the latter was living in the past, and viewed differences of opinion on the Balkans as strictly regional. Despite rumors to the effect that an armed conflict with Germany in the Balkans was looming large—particularly with regard to the issue of control over the Black Sea straits—the Kremlin continued obstinately to follow the course previously laid out.10 The German leadership’s position, as we know, was completely different. In fact, by the end of June 1940 (that is, immediately after defeating France), the German General Staff devised a military plan of action against the USSR. Some seven months later, during a meeting in Berchtesgaden on 20 January 1941, Hitler said: We should start by saying that a serious Russian threat would be most undesirable. It’s true that it would be possible to withdraw many of the German forces currently deployed in the North [so as to move them east], but keeping a large army on the Eastern front would be most difficult, given the lack of communications. […] Stalin is intelligent and prudent, but the danger lies in the fact that Russians view treaties unilaterally. Therefore, extreme caution is needed, and this explains why we invest so many resources there. If Russia weren’t a factor, all problems could easily be solved in Europe.11

Friendly relations between the USSR and Germany had effectively ended on 31 July 1940, at the Berghof. During a meeting “in the presence of the German armed forces commanders, Hitler communicated the purposes of the war (after Russia’s defeat, Germany would establish its absolute rule over Europe and in the Balkans); the armed forces’ task (Russia was to be liquidated and dismembered); and the time of the attack (spring 1941).”12

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In March 1941, Germany went to war in the Balkans, taking action in Greece to save Italy—which had launched its campaign there in October 1940—from certain military disaster, and occupying Yugoslavia alongside its Italian ally. Meanwhile, in the Soviet region, large units were reportedly being relocated from the Far East toward Europe, and news came from Bucharest that Soviet and German military line-ups were being intensified on either side of the USSR’s western border, both of them in support of ongoing road construction and fortification work.13

2. Russia is put to the test While Stalin knew that conflict with Germany was possible, he tried to avoid it, as the country was not yet fully prepared from a military point of view. In 1940, Red Army ranks were very limited and most divisions were made up of 8,000 men or fewer.14 At the end of May 1941, the Soviet government sought to remedy this by summoning an additional 800,000 reservists, whose training in the military schools was sped up. At the time of the attack, these new soldiers were still in the process of being assimilated into their units.15 Despite such difficulties, the Soviets could count on T-34 tanks—heavier, faster, and better armored than German panzers—and on 47.5-ton Kv-1 tanks, invulnerable to all German anti-tank guns, except 88 millimeter guns.16 Few tanks were equipped with a radio, though, a serious problem that complicated their use in combat. Meanwhile, the Soviet air force did not pose an immediate threat to the Germans: its estimated 9,576 fighter planes was the world’s biggest fleet, but many were obsolete and poorly maintained. The most serious problems the Red Army faced, however, had to do with the commanders. To be sure, there were many causes of the USSR’s shortcomings in responding to Germany’s attack, but the purges of military commanders under Stalin in 1937 was one of the most dire. The reasons for Stalin’s decision to purge his military commands can only be touched on cursorily here, but it is worth pointing out that the Soviet leader harbored a  deep mistrust of his military officers—many of whom came from a Tsarist background—and was generally averse to independent thought. Rather, much like Hitler, he appreciated intellectual subservience. In the four years after 1937, right up to the German invasion, thousands of Soviet officers went missing—between 75,000 and 80,000—and at least 30,000 were imprisoned or executed.17

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Introduction

Further, Stalin concealed the alarming information from his spies in Europe of the imminent German attack. He even failed to take heed of a letter Churchill had sent him late in April 1941, containing news from a  reliable source that Hitler, after annexing Yugoslavia, had mobilized three of the five armored divisions previously deployed in Romania toward southern Poland—an event, Churchill presumed, that Stalin would be able to assess for himself.18 Generals Semyon K. Timoshenko and Zhukov likewise received disquieting reports from their men on the border.19 According to an NKVD report dated 20 June 1941, German aircraft had violated Soviet airspace as many as sixty-three times between the 10th and the 19th of that month.20 The Germans used these incursions to examine the territory and identify the best route for the Wehrmacht’s troops. On 13 June, Zhukov and Timoshenko started putting pressure on Stalin to authorize placing troops in a state of alert, but he ignored their requests.21 The Soviet leader continued to hope the USSR would be attacked only after Great Britain had been defeated (hence, no sooner than spring 1942). Stalin believed Hitler would be mindful of the events of the First World War, and would not want Germany to be bogged down again in a war on two fronts. Feeling rather safe as a result, he had his officers prepare a plan of attack against Germany that would allow the USSR to annex other regions in eastern Europe. This sense of security prevented Stalin from seeing the other side of the coin, namely, that Hitler might attack first. As others have observed, while Stalin had acquired territories through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, he had also lost time—the time needed to organize a defensive war.22 Following the acquisition of half of Poland, the Baltic republics, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, preexisting fortifications on the western border had been dismantled, while new ones had yet to be completed. Annexing territories was one thing, but governing them was something else entirely. The Soviet leader knew this. Anti-Soviet forces were also present in the conquered areas. With the USSR weakened on its western border Hitler found an opportune moment to strike. Stalin decided to take action only on 21 June, just hours before the German offensive, when he summoned the General Staff in a secret meeting to perfect a plan for a preventive attack, according to which an offensive was to be launched within two weeks—a telling example of just how set in his ways he actually was. When Zhukov arrived at the Kremlin at 9 a.m. that day, though he’d already spoken with Stalin on the phone and told him that a  deserting German officer claimed Germany intended to wage its attack on the 22nd, he found that Stalin was still unwilling to believe that Hitler would go to war against the USSR.

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Without any defensive plan, the Red Army was unable to react promptly to the invasion of Axis forces. The Germans immediately cut off telegraphic communications between the General Staff and troops deployed to the west, completely isolating them. Ironically, life carried on much as usual in Moscow while Soviet positions were being crushed and troops routed in the west.23 The Red Army’s inability to react resulted in the fact that—during the first twenty days following the attack—the Soviets lost one fifth of the troop soldiers deployed near the front (about 600,000 men out of roughly three million) and as many as twenty-eight infantry divisions, while even those that weren’t wiped out entirely lost at least half of their regular staff.24 The attack waged by Axis armies on 22 June 1941 was purposeful and overwhelming. Operation Barbarossa had been devised in such a way as to leave the Soviet Union no chance of pulling itself back up: the area the Germans attacked was exceptionally vulnerable and devoid of natural defenses. Also, by quickly occupying the Ukraine, the Wehrmacht deprived the Soviets of all food provisions, particularly grain. What the Soviets found themselves up against was a genuine war machine: the Reich’s population, including the annexed regions, counted 117 million people, almost eleven million of whom were busy in the war industry. In the face of foreign aggression, the Soviet population reacted with courage and resolve, unlike its leader who—most likely realizing his grave lapse in judgment—for ten days failed to govern the country, even going to great lengths to avoid meeting his generals, who appealed to him for orders. In areas under German threat, militias and work squads were established to set up defense lines. Though the lack of weapons and the inadequacy of available resources was deplored, everyone was ready to fight. In a short span of time, the population was forced to evacuate the areas the enemy was gradually occupying, transfer productive facilities to the east, and carry out fast and effective industrial conversion in order to increase war production. The construction of industrial sites took place during the fall of 1941 and the winter of 1941–1942, which was very severe. The factories were reconstructed with great speed: four months after being dismantled, many were already producing at full capacity. The workday was from twelve to fourteen hours long. Workers lived under the most unimaginable conditions, often in mud huts or tents. Food was in short supply.25

To be fair, in many parts of the western Ukraine and even in Leningrad, there were instances in which German soldiers were hailed as liberators

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Introduction

by the local population. Reality would soon disappoint the expectations of many intellectuals convicted as anticommunists, when the “liberators” were revealed to be ruthless forces of occupation, the agents of another equally horrible, inhuman regime.26 Initially, the Germans sought to earn the locals’ trust, for example by distributing propaganda leaflets that described them as “liberators from the Bolshevik yoke.” They accused the Soviet regime of having made false promises, and urged everyone to commit to a  new life devoid of Jews, communists, the NKVD, or kolkhozes.27 In practice though, the war against the USSR proved from its beginning to be exceptionally violent and brutal, a war devoid of any kind of ethics, instead pervaded with overt criminal intent.

3. The parallel war: the Italian strategy In spite of the “axis” stipulated with Germany in October–November 1936, when Hitler attacked Poland in September 1939 Mussolini opted for neutrality. According to one theory, which enjoyed great currency in the past and engendered numerous lively debates, Mussolini did everything he could to avoid the war.28 The theory is only partly credible, for Mussolini took a  rather dim view of the weakness Italy was forced to display by not taking active part in the conflict.29 Not only was non-belligerence contrary to the value fascism ascribed to strength and martyrdom, but the analogy some might draw between the government’s present stance and the neutrality previously espoused by liberal Italy, much loathed by the regime, was even harder to endure. Indeed, it was inconceivable for a  regime that had long preached expansionism—and saw war as one of its fundamental features—to keep out of the conflict. 30 Rather, the reasons that compelled Mussolini temporarily to remain neutral in 1939 were his indecisiveness as to which side to take, and the country’s lack of military preparation.31 Regarding the former, in 1935 Mussolini had joined the Stresa Front, which upheld the validity of the Locarno Treaties, and reaffirmed the need for a common policy between France, Italy and Great Britain to prevent Germany’s rearmament. The Stresa Front would become strained as a  result of the war in Ethiopia, which would provoke an angry reaction from the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and lead to his suggestion that sanctions be imposed on Italy. Only in 1939 would British Prime Minister Chamberlain manage to secure a rapprochement between Mussolini and Great Britain, ensuring Italy’s non-intervention, at least for a time.

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Before signing the Pact of Steel, Mussolini followed a  “pendulum policy,” as Dino Grandi, minister of justice, dubbed it at the time (and as the historian De Felice would later call it as well). To be sure, Mussolini initially swung back and forth between democratic France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other. His decision to ally himself with Hitler ultimately depended on the nature of fascist ideology, and on his interest in revising the European order, particularly with regard to the Mediterranean. The Duce’s “social Darwinian” view of international politics also contributed to his decision to turn his back on the Stresa Front. Regarding old powers as declining, Mussolini sided with “virile” Germany. Fascism revered strength, and fascist politics, as Mussolini understood it, dictated siding with the strongest power.32 The Italian government had observed the Germans’ steps toward war with a  mixture of admiration and apprehension. Determined to expand Italy’s role on the international stage—by seizing control over the Mediterranean and, to the greatest extent possible, south-eastern Europe, northern Africa and the Middle East—Mussolini was impressed by Germany’s threat to the positions taken by Great Britain and France, the two powers that were clearly blocking its path. Yet he also had cause for apprehension, namely, that Germany would make its move before Italy was ready to do the same. This concern weighed on Italy’s last-minute maneuvers. What is more, Mussolini could not be certain that Germany’s territorial claims would stop where Hitler said they would, and thus the risk existed that such claims might impinge on Italy’s own interests.33 Therefore, following Germany’s successes on the French front, Mussolini decided to hasten Italy’s participation in the war. Several elements pushed him in that direction. Back at home, Mussolini needed to strengthen his image in the eyes of the Italian public, which coincided with his desire to obtain territory that had not been secured in 1918. In foreign politics, there were multiple reasons prompting Mussolini to take action, including general concern for Europe’s future order, and, more specifically, his aspiration to keep Germans away from the Mediterranean by means of a “parallel war.” Convinced, as many others were, that Germany would win, Mussolini wanted to position himself alongside Hitler as the first among his allies. Finally, aware of his country’s military weakness (which takes us back to the second reason for Italy’s delayed intervention in the war), Mussolini wished to take advantage of the Wehrmacht to reach his goals.34 Until now, it has often been assumed that Italy’s presence alongside Germany in Operation Barbarossa was a matter of form, stemming from the need to uphold the

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Introduction

alliance between the two countries. It was assumed that Italy had no real interest in acquiring territories in eastern Europe. In fact, Mussolini did not rule out that Italy would benefit from the occupation of the Soviet Union. Mussolini believed Italy had to make a  convincing contribution to the war in order to lend credibility to his proposal that raw materials be shared. In a meeting on 9 June 1941 with German experts, Admiral Arturo Riccardi clarified this point.35 Mussolini aimed to ensure Italy’s access to the sizable oil reserves of Maykop (the capital of the Republic of Adygea, north-east of the Black Sea), which would solve its energy problem. Russia’s eternal aspirations toward the straits was another factor that led Mussolini to send his troops east.36 Italian participation in the war would contribute to preventing the USSR from accessing the Mediterranean (by way of the Black Sea), and from robbing Italy of control over areas to its east. Not to mention that Soviet penetration in the Balkans, which had increased in the wake of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, jeopardized Italy’s “vital space.”37 Mussolini was also obsessed by the idea that Germany might arrive at a separate peace with Great Britain. This even led him to hope that Hitler might be solemnly defeated in the Soviet Union, and to foster the “eternal illusion” that the war might last long enough to give Italy time to regain its strength.38 The other option was that the war might be swift, and that the resulting compromise peace might restore balance in Europe. At the same time, the “anti-Bolshevik crusade” derived from a distorted understanding of Realpolitik, and revolved around the Duce’s determination to show Berlin that Italy was Germany’s indispensable ally in the war he really cared about, the one to end British colonial power in Africa and in the Middle East. No matter Hitler’s decision, Mussolini was always going to stand beside him, both for reasons of ideological affinity and because he intended to reach his own goals thanks to the Wehrmacht: this was the crucial point of the Italian-German alliance. Finally, the difficulties encountered during the Winter War and the weakness with which the Soviets reacted to the attack in 1941 led both leaders to underestimate their enemy.

4. The war plans Despite declarations of the regime’s strength and aggression, Italy was not ready for large-scale war; nor were attempts made to offset the objective deficiencies of the Italian war machine through investments in defense.39 The war in Ethiopia in 1935 and the participation with Hitler in the

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Spanish Civil War (1936–39) had weakened the country. Engaging in yet another conflict was a huge risk for Italy. The ventures Italy embarked on and the war plan Mussolini presented before the Grand Council in 1939 cast light on the intentions of Italian politics. As stated by the Duce, the aim was to get access to the ocean for Italy, forcing the Strait of Gibraltar to the west and the Suez Canal to the east (from which it would be possible to reach the Indian Ocean). In time these expansionist aims, as already remarked, would probably have pitted Italy against its German ally. In fact, however, Italy’s methods of attack and the actions it undertook in its parallel war exposed the utter lack of a well-ordered and systematic plan. Making matters worse were the Italian army’s serious organizational and logistical shortcomings, proved soon thereafter by its disastrous attack against Greece (28 October 1940). Italy was plunged into the maelstrom of the Second World War with criminal carelessness and no adequate preparation.40 The lesson of the war in Greece would regrettably go unheeded. Italy’s war potential in the 1930s was 2.5 percent, a figure lower than that of the other countries. The dearth of raw materials and the limitations affecting the country’s industrial development placed Italy among the less competitive powers. The Italian Royal Navy had modern ships, but the latter lacked technological capability. Furthermore, it did not possess aircraft carriers. Many airplanes, while first-rate in the 1930s, were approaching obsolescence by the time Mussolini decided to take part in the war.41 The army was old-fashioned. When war broke out, only three divisions were armored, and an equal number motorized, out of seventy-three. Radios, radars, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns were in short supply, while armored tanks were invariably weak and underpowered.42 After all, no country was ready for war in 1939; the combined war potential of France and Great Britain more or less equaled Germany’s.43 Despite that, war seemed inevitable, and no country truly endeavored to secure peace, not even Poland.44 Thus, ignoring Italy’s military deficiencies, Mussolini took part in the war effort alongside Hitler: he did not want to miss the opportunity to sit at the peace table as a victor, in front of the representatives of democracies that would finally be weakened. Yet responsibility for this, and for the resulting military disaster and the loss of a huge number of human lives, was shared by the country’s military and industrial leaders, who consented to Italy’s intervention and later to its campaign on the Eastern front. It is true that, given the type of relationship Mussolini had with his collabo-

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Introduction

rators,45 it was unlikely someone would dare oppose his decision. Still, in June 1941, no one appeared to be interested in alerting the Duce to the dangers of the step he was about to take. This cannot be accounted for exclusively by people’s fear of contradicting the powerful dictator. No matter how fantastic or absurd, Mussolini’s expansionist ambitions fundamentally resonated with the Italian leadership’s own aims.46 Of course, Mussolini would never heed warnings coming from Palmiro Togliatti. On 29 June 1941, in his Speeches to the Italian People on Radio Moscow, the latter cautioned: In 1812, there were Italians in Napoleon’s army as well. They too were sent off to be butchered like a herd of slaves, and were symbols of Italy’s vassalage to a  foreign despot. They made up a  corps of 27,390 men, supplemented by 10,000 Neapolitans. Do you know how many returned to Italy after the campaign? THREE HUNDRED THIRTY in all, including a  certain number of men who were either sick or wounded. Everyone else perished on the fields of Borodino, the hill of Maloyaroslavets, and the banks of the Moskva and Berezina rivers.47

Sadly, the Italian army’s fate in Russia would be no different now. On 30 May 1941, Mussolini charged his chief of staff, General Ugo Cavallero, with the task of forming the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia, CSIR) to be deployed on the Eastern front. When Hitler’s Germany launched Operation Barbarossa some twenty days later, on 22 June, Mussolini’s Italy was by its side, as were Finland, Hungary, and Romania. Overall, Germany deployed no fewer than 145 divisions (nineteen armored, fifteen motorized, six safety, and two mountain divisions), with over three million German soldiers, and 690,000 men belonging to allied armies. The Wehrmacht could count on 3,400 armored tanks, 250 self-propelled guns, 7,150 cannons, 600,000 motor vehicles, and 3,900 airplanes.48 A telegram informed Mussolini that the Germans accepted the CSIR’s involvement in the Russian-German war on Italy’s behalf, while also announcing that the Duce would be receiving a personal letter from the Führer. This was given to Ciano by the German embassy counselor in Rome at dawn on 22 June, and immediately delivered to Mussolini. Ciano apprised the Soviet ambassador of the declaration of war, but was only able to do so around half past noon, for the latter, oblivious to it all, had gone to Fregene beach for a dip.49 The Soviet ambassador finally received the information with “almost idiotic indifference, but that [was] his nature.”

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Ciano quickly reported what he had to say, without beating around the bush. “The conversation lasted two minutes, and, for all its gravity, was insignificant.”50 The Italian delegation in Moscow appears to have been completely in the dark about what was happening, as Ambassador Rosso’s notes indicate.51

5. The setting up and operations of the CSIR On 10 July 1941, less than a month after war was declared, 216 railroad cars departed from Italy and headed east. Led by General Giovanni Messe,52 the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia was made up of 62,000 men, organized in the Turin and Pasubio infantry divisions, and in the Celere Division, which in its turn was formed by a Bersaglieri regiment, two cavalry regiments, and four Blackshirt battalions. The CSIR also included eighty-three aircrafts—divided into two units, and staffed by 17,000 men (officers, noncommissioned officers, and airmen) led by Colonel Carlo Drago53—and the 30th Artillery Group of the Army Corps. The artillery could count on 220 (47 caliber) anti-tank pieces and 65 support guns, mortars, anti-aircraft machine guns, and 148 cannons (including sixteen 75/46 caliber and barrel anti-aircraft pieces). The CSIR was equipped with 5,500 motor vehicles, some of which were service vehicles, while the others were used for the conveyance of one of the corps’ two infantry divisions. Armored vehicles were organized into four groups, comprising 60 3.5-ton L-tanks in all, absolutely inadequate in the face of Soviet T-34s and Kv-1s, or the tanks used by the German army. As July gave way to August, the CSIR was deployed in the areas to the east and to the west of the Carpathian Mountains, in Romania and in eastern Hungary respectively, and was incorporated into the German 11th Army. In mid-August, the Pasubio Division was the first to take action in the war alongside the Germans, annihilating the Soviet forces remaining between the Dnieper and Bug rivers. After being assigned the task of holding one sector along the Dnieper—together with the Pasubio and 3rd Celere divisions—the troops of the Turin Division, which had arrived essentially on foot from Romania, joined the rest of the CSIR and took part in the encirclement of the Soviets culminating in Petrikowka (present-day Petrykivka, Ukraine). Thus, the CSIR assumed the defense of a  150-kilometer front, an undertaking that would not last long, however. By October, circumstances had turned in the German troops’ favor, and, after Kiev fell, the Red Army had to yield ground in the southern

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Introduction

Ukraine. Despite the scarcity of means at their disposal, Italian troops were commendable: by the end of October, they had seized the Donbass, and occupied the area of Stalino, an important center for coal mining and the steel industry. After the Christmas Battle (25–30 December 1941)—during which the CSIR had to respond to an attack on Stalino by six Soviet divisions—a defensive phase started. The Germans resumed operations in this sector only in July 1942, joined by the CSIR. Following a  decisive 500-kilometer advance, the invading army reached the Don. The successes of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia in these early stages very likely contributed to Mussolini’s belief that the campaign would end in the Axis’s favor, and prevented him from taking the Italian army’s serious deficiencies into due consideration. In the context of the blitzkrieg called for by Operation Barbarossa, as well as for logistical reasons in light of the vast expanse on which the forces were to operate, using armored and completely motorized units was an absolute necessity. Conversely, the Italian infantry’s qualification as “auto-transportable” was purely fictitious. Indeed, despite the Italian infantry’s training, their vehicles were insufficient.54 The variety of motor vehicles, made up of seven different brands (Fiat, Alfa, Lancia, Isotta Fraschini, Bianchi, Om, and Spa), complicated the distribution of spare parts, often stored in warehouses some 400 kilometers from the battle lines. Lack of antifreeze meant that before a vehicle could set out the oil had to be heated, which was a fire hazard. It is easy to imagine how inconvenient this must have been when engines needed to be started quickly to respond to a sudden attack. The available means of transportation were wholly inadequate in the harsh cold of the Russian steppe: Fiat technicians had to be summoned to repair the cylinders heads on the 626 and 666 trucks, cracked by the extremely low temperatures. Fuel shortage was a  huge problem as well, compounded by the lack of effective communication between Germans and Italians. Indeed, while arrangements had been made for the Germans to supply fuel, the Italian commanders had understood their allies to have greater stores of diesel than gasoline, and therefore determined that they should send diesel vehicles to Russia. In fact, the opposite was true, and the Italians were soon left without fuel as a result. It was unlikely, if not impossible, that the Italian anti-tank armaments could ever break through the Soviet armored tanks. Nor could the old Model 91 rifles used by the Italian forces—or their machine-guns, which

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often jammed in the cold and were as such ill-suited to the Russian climate—compete with the Soviets’ automatic weapons. Clothing was another sore spot for the CSIR. The men’s winter equipment was essentially the same as what was used in 1915–1918, appropriate to a  sedentary trench war totally unlike the long marches across the endless Russian plains that the soldiers were now experiencing. Sentries were equipped with a pair of padded canvas boots with studded wood soles, which greatly hampered their mobility. The same was true of the fur coat they were given, which was so cumbersome they often preferred not to keep it on. The calfskin shoes worn by infantrymen were of remarkable quality—sad proof of this lies in the fact they were found mostly intact in the common graves near the Russian prison camps—but entirely unfit for walking in snow. They were the shoes soldiers used to march in Italy! One officer of the Bersaglieri put it thus: We feel tragically lacking in means. As young, daring, and imaginative as we are, we sometimes laugh at our own poverty. Our circumstances do not lower our morale. We don’t have white clothing like the Germans, and because at night we have to cross the great Don, which is entirely covered with snow, in order not to be seen and found out by the enemy, we have to make do by covering our helmets with white towels and turning our gray-green jackets inside out, so the white lambswool lining is exposed.55

Conversely, Soviet soldiers were equipped with valenki,56 heavy felt boots still in use today, which provided good insulation, and a telogreika, a quilted jacket, or coat, with a fur cap. As for headgear, Italian soldiers were given a garrison cap, and, in winter, a balaclava, which invariably became iced over when the steam from the men’s breath froze. Camouflaged combat clothing was only provided to the higher-ranking commanders and to the ski troops of the Monte Cervino Battalion. The list of the clothes and materials the Italian troops were equipped with in the winter of 1942-43 indicates just how lacking and poorly thought-out the Italian soldiers’ equipment was. It also proves that the apparel provided to the men was better suited to Italian winters than to Russian ones. In June 1942, the CSIR command sent the General Staff in Rome instructions on how to improve the men’s winter equipment.57 Following the memorandum by the Supreme Command of the CSIR, the commis-

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Introduction

sariat of the 8th Italian Army (the ARMIR, which would set out in July 1942) established the Provisions of clothes and materials for the 1942 winter season. By the end of August, while half of the military blankets, more than half of the fur coats, and a little over one-fifth of the boots required were still yet to be provided, the number of winter kits in the warehouses of the ARMIR commissariat was nevertheless deemed satisfactory.58 Contrary to its promises to Mussolini, however, the General Administration of the Military Commissariat Service was unable to fulfill all deliveries (most importantly of fur coats) by September. Wool clothing was only delivered to ARMIR troops in mid-November, over a month into the Russian winter, when temperatures had already dropped to -23 degrees Celsius. On 15 November, only 30 percent of the troops at the front had fur coats: “As of 30 November 1942, commissariat magazines in advanced positions had distributed only 110,000 fur coats or sentry coats, whereas those in the rear had distributed 6,500 as of 18 November 1942. Tens of thousands of coats and other fur-lined items remained unused in the warehouses, while troops on the front had to endure temperatures between minus 20 and minus 30 degrees [Celsius].”59 Responsibility for these shortcomings and deficiencies lay primarily with the higher-ranking operative commanders on the front, the ARMIR commander General Gariboldi, and the man in charge of the 8th-Army commissariat, who distributed the winter kits stocked in the magazines with excessive, even criminal, frugality.60 The storekeepers carried out their duty with diligence, taking pleasure and comfort in seeing everything—items of clothing, rolls of barbed wire, shovels, shoes, coats, and all manner of other materials—stacked up in piles, classified, and catalogued. Their behavior was not the result of sabotage or treason. Rather, it stemmed from an illconceived notion of thrift, typical of the Italian army’s logistical services, as well as from the conscious decision to conserve perishable materials. After all, many believed the war was bound to last longer than anticipated, and that operations would come to a standstill in the course of the winter.

6. The ARMIR The rapid advance of the Axis forces and the weak response by the Red Army, which had been caught off guard, led Mussolini to underestimate the Soviet troops’ potential, and to believe an easy victory would be possible despite the Italian army’s limitations. With an eye to strengthening Italy’s presence in a land of conquest, Mussolini decided to dispatch an

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entire army corps to Russia. On 9 July 1942, the CSIR was incorporated into the 8th Italian Army, the Italian Army in Russia (Armata italiana in Russia, ARMIR), as the XXXV Army Corps. The only one to voice dissent against this decision was General Messe, the CSIR commander, who would be repatriated on 1 November 1942. Cognizant of both the situation on the Eastern front and the Italian army’s conditions, and not underestimating the Red Army’s capabilities, Messe advised against sending other men to the Eastern front. In his report to the Supreme Command, dated 4 May 1942, the general clearly expressed his reservations on the plan to increase the Italian war effort in Russia, which he had got wind of. While the features the upcoming campaign would assume in the Russian sector remained entirely unknown to him, and while he awaited to be made privy to all the pertinent elements, the general felt compelled to alert the Supreme Command to the “current situation” of CSIR troops, “for whatever [that information] might be worth.”61 The picture painted by his report is utterly negative: Messe spoke of “extreme effort on the part of the troops, [which were] deeply exhausted,” equipped with a winter kit that could not handle the long Russian winter. Regarding the Russian winter—Messe explained—I do not know whether the full scope of its wearing influence can truly be appreciated by those who were not present there. In the absence of events of great import, one might be tempted to view [winter] as a colorless entity. That is not the case. One might think it was something like hibernation, when it fact it was a long, terrible, and harsh trial, which drained men of physical strength and upset their spirit, and was overcome solely by virtue of incessant, quiet self-denial.62

Particularly alarming was the severe delay with which new men arrived. Indeed, CSIR troop members had little or no chance to regain their strength and courage. While some armaments and technicians were replenished, not all of them could be. The situation of transportation was also critical.63 After ten months of deployment (which had started in July 1941), CSIR troop members were utterly exhausted, and giving them time to recuperate was an absolute necessity. Furthermore, Messe underscored, the Italians’ war effort could not be compared with the Germans’. While the latter had been “equally tested by ten months of extremely harsh, uninterrupted struggle,” they possessed means the Italians did not.64

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Introduction

In May 1942, therefore, Messe’s assessment of the CSIR’s operations in Russia was extremely critical. Only two months earlier, though, on 5 March and again on 24 March, the general had displayed greater optimism concerning the results achieved by the troops and the CSIR’s conditions.65 This change of heart probably stemmed from having gained knowledge that Mussolini intended to increase the Italian involvement on the Eastern front. The text Messe addressed to the Supreme Command—which Mussolini would read and ignore—constituted a clear warning, and an indirect suggestion to give up the initiative. Despite Messe’s note of caution, an army—229,000 men strong—was set up and placed under General Italo Gariboldi’s command. The new units arrived in Russia between July and August 1942, and were comprised of the CSIR, incorporated with its divisions as the XXXV Army Corps, and the 3 January Blackshirt Group; the Cuneense, Tridentina and Julia alpine army corps divisions; the Cosseria, Ravenna, Sforzesca and Vicenza infantry divisions, and the 23 March Blackshirt Group (which made up the II Army Corps); and other units directly under the corps command: the Monte Cervino Ski Battalion, and the cavalry group made up of the Lancieri di Novara and the Savoy Cavalry. Most soldiers set out without any personal conviction or motivation, as many of them had just made it home from the Balkans. In fact, in several stations throughout Italy, large numbers of servicemen about to be sent to the Eastern front demonstrated against the country’s involvement in Russia.66 As Sergeant Oviedo Bandini, captured by the Soviets in September 1942, would put it during an interrogation: The officers told us we would be staying in Russia for two or three months to help the Germans bring the war to a  prompt end. The soldiers, however, were disinclined to believe the war would end quickly. Passing through Stalino and Millerovo we reached the bank of the Don in August 1942, and for a certain time everything was calm, until artillery fire began on 22 September.67

Even a CSIR officer commented thus: After all, had officers not been instructed to pack their best uniform (the “Prince of Piedmont”), pale blue sash, and saber? Thus, it wasn’t war, but a military parade they were going to take part in. The regiment did know how to parade, that’s for sure! Not by chance did it provide the Quirinal Palace and the Altar of the Fatherland with guards.68

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Many shared the belief that winning the war would be easy. Father Franzoni wrote the following words in his memoirs: Moscow was about to fall; we were being sent off with simple summer equipment because our purpose was to take part in the triumphal parade in Moscow. We had to sit at the winners’ table to claim a piece of the pie. We were almost embarrassed to set out on a mission with such little glory. Who among you heard Medical Captain Peli when, upon reaching the Brenner, he said, “Who knows when we’ll return”? I  did, and was scandalized: he doubted an already certain victory!69

The same problems that had afflicted the CSIR presented themselves in the ARMIR’s case, too. Motor vehicles continued to be in short supply, and as a result, the II Army Corps’ and the Alpine Army Corps’ infantry units were forced to proceed on foot; only one of the XXXV Army Corps’ divisions lacked motor vehicles. The increase in artillery pieces complicated the matter of their transportation. Finally, the weapons provided for each man had remained unchanged from those given to CSIR members. When General Roberto Lerici, commander of the Turin Division, penned his report on the retreat, he extolled the conduct of the division in his charge for sacrificing itself and “falling with honor.” He then made some comments on the progress of the campaign in Russia in general. As far as the campaign’s purely logistical aspects were concerned, first and foremost, Lerici called attention to the absence of horses, which the Germans had, and could have been used to transport wounded soldiers in the retreat. Also, the lack of horse-drawn mobile kitchens had prevented Italian soldiers, unlike the German ones, from drinking warm beverages, or at least warm water, when doing so was needed. What’s more, their clothing and equipment had proven defective compared to the ones in use by the Germans. These rightly resembled the locals’ and were much better suited to the requirements of the region.70 Another, no less troubling aspect had to do with the soldiers’ poor training: In my capacity as general, I must be completely frank and say that what I’ve seen these past days has supplied me with evidence of our soldiers’ insufficient preparation for war. Even the majority of our cadres […] have shown their incompetence, a  lack of the moral and technical training needed to face events in hard times. Thus, there have been instances of individual valor—that is true. And there have likewise been times when

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Introduction the masses have surged. But such occurrences have always been chaotic, akin to a  revolutionary uprising, with a  great deal of screaming, and rather modest results when compared to the tremendous losses.71

Compounding the troops’ insufficient preparation were the mistakes made by the commanders. On the issue of troop rotation, which had played out to negative effect in the case of the Turin and Pasubio divisions, the general pointed out the following: The primary cause for the haste with which the men fell into a state of disarray in this circumstance must be sought in their rotation. That we had to rotate men rather than units (as would have been preferable, for obvious reasons) was bad enough, but the fact that the men’s rotation within the units had to take place while they were engaged on the line was even worse.72

Finally, the problem was aggravated by the need to cover an extremely long front. Following orders by the German commanders, each ARMIR division was assigned to a front roughly 30 kilometers wide—the Celere Division was deployed along a  40-kilometer line—though it was known that, if fighting to the bitter end became necessary, a front 6–8 kilometers wide was all that could be endured. The Germans’ tactics imposed a rigid defense line along the river, and forbade occupying high ground, which would have been more defendable. Deployment along such a broad front dangerously diluted the troops, all of which found themselves on the front line with no reserves behind them. In these conditions, recourse to the Alpine Corps, with its mules and howitzers, was often incomprehensible to the soldiers themselves. As the commanders pointed out, it did not allow for their capabilities to be put to good use, and would drive them to inevitable slaughter. In a letter to his superiors, Colonel Garri of the Julia Division complained about the use of the alpine division on the Don, when it had been meant for operations in the Caucasus. According to the commander, war on the plains called for a different kind of training from the one imparted to alpine soldiers. Their weapons, mountain howitzers and small mortars, significantly limited alpine soldiers’ offensive power in the face of their enemies’ field pieces, whose range was much greater. As for their defensive power, in the absence of armored tanks and anti-tank armaments, they were likewise doomed to complete inferiority.73 Indeed, early on in the war, plans had been made for the Alpine Army Corps to be used in the Caucasus, the

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natural choice for a  mountain warfare infantry corps, and the course of action requested by the German allies. Then General Gariboldi demanded that three army corps, not two, be sent to the Don region, and on 18 August 1942 Mussolini arranged for the dispatch of the alpine divisions to the Don: the Tridentina Division, which was already marching toward the Caucasus, received orders to deviate its course. According to these orders, the three alpine divisions were to cross the Ukraine on foot and reach the Don, forming a line along the river’s bank. The Soviet offensive in August 1942 proved just how ill-advised deploying forces along such a broad front had actually been: the Sforzesca Division found itself having to hold back an onslaught led by the Soviet infantry alone, whose purpose was to create a bridgehead on the bank of the Don that was under Italian control. If the Russians had attacked using their armored vehicles—unavailable at that time, for they had been moved to the east—their offensive would have been over that very summer. The two opposing forces were completely unequal. Suffice it to say that the Soviet divisions were triangular, made up of three infantry regiments comprising 3,000 fighters each, while the Italian divisions were made up of two regiments comprising 1,200 fighters each. The other men present belonged to the service teams. With the First Defensive Battle of the Don, the Soviet army worked its way between the 8th Italian Army and the 6th German Army, which besieged Stalingrad under the command of General Friedrich Paulus. This strategic move was intended to release the German forces’ pressure on Stalingrad. Even though it managed to repel the Soviet offensive, the Sforzesca Division nevertheless failed to prevent the Soviets from establishing a wide bridgehead behind enemy lines. As many scholars of the subject have pointed out, the First Defensive Battle of the Don did not teach the Italian commanders anything, and, come December, during the Second Defensive Battle of the Don, the same script played out to catastrophic effect.

7. The Soviet attack and the Italian retreat In October 1942, the Italian army occupied a permanent position between the Hungarian army to the left and the Romanian army to the right; east of the Romanian army, the 6th German Army continued to lay siege to Stalingrad.

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Introduction

The Red Army’s great winter offensive determined the fate of the war on the Eastern front, and was carried out in three phases, starting in mid-November. At the end of the month, the Soviets overcame the Romanian army, encircling General Paulus’s army at Stalingrad after that. The Italian army was utterly annihilated with an attack known as Operation Little Saturn, launched on 11 December. On 14 December, the Soviet army broke through the Italian lines in the sector between the Cosseria and the Ravenna divisions to the west, and in the sector held by the Celere Division to the east. The offensive was carried out by the Soviets who had a crushing superiority of men and weaponry: men and artillery were outnumbered six-to-one, and the ARMIR could count on just forty-seven German tanks in the face of 750 Soviet armored tanks.74 The Soviet attack was launched quickly and with overwhelming force. A mere three days after crossing the Don, the Red Army was able to occupy the area of Millerovo, 100 kilometers south of the front. During the third phase in mid-January 1943, the Soviets stormed north, breaking through the Hungarian army, as well as through the weak defensive line set up by the Germans south of the alpine divisions, which thus came to be completely encircled. This third wave had started on 14 January. By 19 January, the Red Army’s troops had occupied Valuyki, 140 kilometers behind the Alpine Army Corps. After routing the front lines, the Red Army stormed into the rear and annihilated supply lines, disrupting communication with the superior command and between units, preventing new supplies from coming in, and wreaking havoc among the troops. Units spared by the attack were left without food, ammunition, or orders. Scattered and without their bearings, many men fell into Soviet pockets and were captured. The encirclement maneuver carried out by the Red Army immediately pushed the Julia Division back from the fortified line it had set up at such high cost on the banks of the Don and forced it farther south, past the Cuneense Division to join the German units set up in the emergency and create a defensive cordon able to delay the encirclement of the other alpine divisions. The new line was precarious, for the dry frozen ground made it impossible to dig trenches and build fortifications. Also, by attacking day and night, the Soviets did not leave their enemies time to do so. With the third phase of their offensive, the Soviets managed to creep up behind the Alpine Army Corps, without striking against it directly. The troops of the Julia, Tridentina, Cuneense and Vicenza divisions had to open a westward path for themselves, fighting for fifteen kilometers, trying

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to escape the encirclement before the forays by the Soviets’ armored troops were integrated and supported by their infantry divisions. The tactic adopted by the Red Army’s commands—unconcerned about saving lives—was perhaps the most terrifying aspect of the Soviet attack. There is ample evidence of this in the veterans’ memoirs: Russian soldiers were literally sent to slaughter; assaults were carried out without sparing men, who threw themselves on the trenches, died, and were immediately replaced by their comrades in arms behind them.75 With anti-tank pieces virtually non-existent, Italian troops could do little to fend off the attacks by the Soviet armored vehicles. As the grating sound of the tanks’ belts drew closer, panic-stricken troops desperately tried to save their lives, or fought back to the best of their abilities with their rifles. The Alpine Army Corps’ retreat, in some ways, was tougher than the infantry’s because, during the early stages, alpine units were stronger and resisted with greater obstinacy. The Russian troops consolidated their position around the Alpine Army Corps with the clear intent of trapping it into a  vice with no way out. The Vicenza Infantry Division, which arrived in Russia for defense purposes and was later made to side with the alpine formation, has very limited offensive capability. Of the three Alpine Army Corps divisions, the Tridentina and the Cuneense are still fairly effective, for until yesterday they did not move from their shelters along the Don, and, though the Russians have attacked them these past few days, they still have about 16,000 men in arms each. The Julia Division, conversely, has been worn out in the trenches of Novo Kalitva: unfortunately, our men and mules are exhausted or wounded, there are few weapons and even fewer ammunitions, and limited numbers of sledges; there are only 12,000 of us. […] We are not the only ones to have ended up in the pocket, however […] Seven thousand Germans are also present, equipped with very many sledges, a few armored tanks, several tracked motor vehicles and a few self-propelled anti-tank guns, but very few ammunitions; there are an additional 7,000 men between Romanians and disbanded elements of various provenance. […] Thus, overall, there are more than 110,000 of us trapped in the pocket, including about 70,000 Italians. Unfortunately, though, the only forces still able to endure combat are the Alpine Army Corps, a few other small Italian units, and about half of the German contingent.76

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Introduction

The Italian troops, therefore, had one less reason to feel humiliated; even the army believed to be the world’s mightiest had been encircled in Stalingrad and cornered into the same pocket as the Italian alpine servicemen. German historiography itself has reassessed the long-established opinion according to which the German troops were superior by far to all others, and had only given way in the face of the Soviets’ formidable counteroffensives. In fact, as has been observed, the huge losses suffered by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front, and the problems stemming from the troops’ morale and discipline—broken by the objective difficulties of the operations—show that the Wehrmacht too, despite being a well organized army well-prepared to wage an attack against the USSR, faced the same difficulties and limitations as its Axis allies.77 The two phases of the Soviet winter offensive that affected the Italians were catastrophic for the ARMIR. In just forty-five days, the latter endured a bloodletting of about 95,000 men, left dead or alive in Russian hands, and was only able to bring home to safety 30,000 wounded or frostbitten men. When the Soviets broke into the rear, it was easy for them to immobilize troop members appointed to logistical services—bakers, quartermasters, drivers, storekeepers, and so forth. Soldiers who had never fired a  rifle now found themselves confronted with Russians storming into their camps. Many were taken prisoner, whereas others managed to flee using the means at their disposal. Stocks of food, fuel, weapons and ammunitions ended up in Russian hands. In short, men could count only on their own two legs, presuming they functioned properly, and the tremendous courage needed to venture back.78

The ARMIR further lost all its artillery (about 1,000 cannons), 13,000 motor vehicles, 20,000 mules, and all other materials to the enemy.79 Using pickaxes, the vehicles’ engines, tires, windows, sides, and tarpaulins were wrecked. The Hungarians set their sledges on fire. One car near the command building caught fire. […] We no longer had time to think. Action took over our bodies and minds. The mules plodded along the hillsides toward Postojali, and roads were obstructed by disbanded men and sledges, which the command officers tried to organize in a  certain order. Hungarian troops had stopped along the ridge of a balka.80

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The retreat was terrible. The events described in the dozens of memoirs and diaries written by those who survived attest to desperate, even inhuman acts done just to survive. The intense cold, the lack of food, and the utter exhaustion resulting from the long march changed the men. Under these most trying of circumstances, it did not seem inhuman to them to fight to the bitter end for a potato peel. It was not infrequent for a shiny blade to emerge from beneath someone’s soiled and frozen clothes. As the marches plunged the retreating men further and further into the surreal, it became increasingly hard for them to keep their ferocious, primordial instincts in check.81 Broken by the long march, many surrendered to the cold, and fell to the ground in a state of torpidity that was a prelude to death. From Novaharkovka to Limarevka, the march puts an enormous strain on our bodies. It’s Thursday, 21 January. The blizzard whips the column, and wraps the soldiers in gusts of frozen snow. Eyes burn. We are forced to walk hunched down like old men. The first to experience hypothermia gasp for air at the side of the track, before dying. I draw close to one who is sitting, head held up with both hands. Hey!—I say—Walk. He doesn’t move. I  try to shake him, but it’s impossible. He’s already frozen, a statue of flesh turned to stone by the cold.82

For those strong enough to keep going, offering aid would have meant succumbing to the same fate. And so they carried on, trying not to fall behind the advancing column, or to pay attention to the calls of those who stopped and, with the last bit of strength, pleaded for help or struggled to get up.83 Instances of soldiers and officers committing suicide during the march, or losing their minds and opening fire on their comrades out of desperation, were not infrequent. Father Carlo Chiavazza—the chaplain to the Tridentina Division, which fared better in the retreat than many of the other groups—describes the situation in the following terms: The [division’s] trucks, loaded with the wounded, had to be left behind for lack of fuel. The drivers received the order to destroy the engines, shoot the tires out, and set the vehicles on fire. The wounded aboard screamed: “Take us away, we want to go home.” They stretched out their hands, offered rewards. An officer sorted them out one by one, placing them in the sledges. An alpine serviceman draped a  fellow fighter whose feet were frostbitten on his shoulder and set off behind the column, which was growing ever more distant on the track. […]

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Introduction From beneath one truck’s tarpaulin, a  plaintive voice repeated: “I’m never going to see my girlfriend again. My girlfriend wrote me a  letter today. Take me to my girlfriend.” He was the last of the wounded; all the other men had been unloaded. I was about to get near the vehicle, but the officer stopped me: “Leave him alone. He’s lost his mind. He doesn’t understand what’s happening. For the past hour he’s been babbling the same sentence and doing the oddest things. He’s completely naked, and his feet are gangrenous. He won’t last long. It’s tragic, but true.”84

This is how another chaplain, Father Carlo Gnocchi—among the few to get out of the pocket with General Reverberi, the commander of the Tridentina Division—recalls those difficult times: During those fateful days, I can say I finally saw man—laid bare, completely stripped of any restraint and convention by the violence of events far greater than himself, entirely at the mercy of the most basic of instincts, which had frightfully reemerged from the depths of being. I  saw men vying for a  piece of bread or meat with blows of bayonets. I saw men beat with the butts of their rifles the hands of wounded and exhausted comrades, who held on to the sides of a sledge the way a shipwrecked man would cling for dear life to a  plank. I  saw someone who had come in the possession of a  piece of bread go devour it in some remote corner, glancing around himself the way a dog would for fear of having to share it with the others. I saw officers take their belongings to safety on their sledges—and even their hunting dogs, or their Russian women, hidden beneath thick covers of blankets—leaving wounded and frostbitten fighters on the ground. I saw a man shoot a comrade in the head for not making room for him to lie down and sleep on the floor inside an izba. Yet, in this desert of exposed humanity, I  was able to pick a  few rare flowers of kindness and love, particularly from the humblest of people. It is their sweet and miraculous recollection that has the power to make the memory of that inhuman experience less menacing and frightful.85

The Italian divisions gradually dwindled in the course of the retreat, also owing to the numerous battles they had to fight against the Soviet troops. Indeed, the latter often awaited in villages where making a stop would be necessary for the routing units.86

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Up until now, the theory that the ARMIR units’ high mortality rate was due to the long retreat, the battles against the Soviet troops, the harsh Russian climate and the inadequate clothing worn by the Italian fighters has enjoyed currency in the literature on the Eastern front. This explanation has some truth to it, but it is only part of the story. As may be gleaned from the report by the Historical Office of the Army General Staff,87 the second offensive on the Don saw few battles. The Tridentina Division was among the few to be engaged in long battles. The Julia and the Cuneense divisions were forced to cover the retreat, and were ultimately encircled. The same fate befell the Torino Division, funneled into a hollow and left at the mercy of the Russian troops on the surrounding high ground. But the majority of ARMIR forces, disbanded and lacking ammunitions, fought in the desperate attempt to break through the enemy lines, and fell in the hands of the Soviet army.

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Introduction

Appendix: SOVIET PRISONERS IN ITALIAN HANDS […] Invaders—it wasn’t just the Germans, those terrible experts in aggression, destruction and genocide, but us Italians too, kindhearted if boisterous young men who, no matter what the fascist propaganda said, hated the war, and believed it to be an evil necessary only to defend one’s country, home, family, and honor, which is exactly what the Russians were doing (L. Vigo, Non prendere freddo. Il racconto di un reduce del corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia [Don’t get cold: The account of a CSIR veteran], Pavia: Iuculano, 2000).

The CSIR and the Soviet prisoners of war According to official German sources, 5,754,000 Soviet soldiers were captured starting in June 1941. At least 3,220,000 of them—more than half— died thereafter.88 Part of the survivors were put to work in the German industry. The high mortality rate depended not only on the USSR’s decision not to sign the international conventions on the safeguarding of prisoners, but also on the fact that the prisoners, now unarmed military men, were their enemy’s preferred target, commodities to be exploited as labor in the best of cases, or to be eliminated. The situation of the Soviet prisoners in German hands was indeed tragic. On 13 May 1941, Hitler had issued a  decree exempting German soldiers who committed atrocities in Russia from disciplinary measures. Days later, directives concerning war efforts against the USSR were issued urging the Germans to fight the Bolsheviks forcefully, disregarding rules, and to be vigilant toward all Red Army elements, including prisoners.89 On 6 June, the Wehrmacht issued “Directives on the treatment of commissars,” authorizing the immediate execution by firing squad of captured political commissars, as well as of the other prisoners, “with no formalities.” “In light of the importance of political commissars in the Soviet army and of their influence on the actions carried out by partisans,” the German liaison command advised its allies to isolate them from the other prisoners and hand them over to the German concentration camps.90 The Wehrmacht’s conduct toward the Soviet military men it took prisoner was no gentler, and amounted to extermination. Perhaps the most shameful example of these homicides was the “testing” of gas on 600 prisoners of war in Auschwitz in September 1941, a  trial run for the killing

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method later used to exterminate millions of Jews in the German concentration camps set up in occupied Poland and Russia.91 According to Messe, at least until they were organized into an army and set up their own camps, the Italian troops had handed their Russian prisoners over to the Germans. Still, just because they had not been the ones to execute the Russian prisoners, Italians could not expect the Soviet government to view them as blameless. In the report he sent the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 February 1945, General Messe explained that Soviet prisoners captured in the first year of the CSIR’s campaign (July 1941–July 1942) were held for thirty-six to forty-eight hours in the bigger units’ intelligence sections for questioning. After that time, they were sent, “in accordance with previously established agreements between the Italian and German governments, to the concentration camps placed under the surveillance of the German units. In these camps there was no involvement on the part of Italian commands or units.”92 After all, according to Messe, these were “the only available camps in the occupied territories […] in conformity with the rules laid out in our Instructions concerning enemy prisoners of war, which called for camps to be set up exclusively in the presence of armies.”93 Only well into winter did the German command authorize the Italian one to keep a few hundred prisoners in its custody. These were occasionally used in road work and to remove snow from tracks in the rear, alongside Italian sappers. A special, well-organized camp was set up for these prisoners—who, like our own soldiers, regularly received food and cigarettes—in which the Russian servicemen found a good accommodation. No violence [was used] on the prisoners, many of whom were put to work without surveillance.94

In fact, Messe clarified in his report that “the treatment of the Russian prisoners, from the time of their capture to the time of their delivery to the German concentration camps, [had] always been characterized by a high sense of humanity.” The general attributed this not only to the preventive action carried out by Italian officers and commanders, but also to “the very nature of Italian soldiers, incapable of committing atrocities.”95 Supporting General Messe’s account, in October 1942, Russian prisoners in the camp of Karinskaya, on the Don front, sent a note of gratitude and thanks to the Italian army, and to Lieutenant Colonel Ugo Bianchi of the CSIR in particular, “for the fair and humane treatment” they had received.96

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Introduction

Conversely, some Russian sources, as we will see, contradict Messe’s claims and the long-established idea that Italians’ behavior was always beyond reproach. In fact, in his report to Molotov on the Italian war criminals still detained in the USSR, Colonel Sergei Kruglov relayed the information gathered by the Ukraine’s interior minister concerning how Italians—CSIR service members specifically—had behaved toward Soviet prisoners: The witnesses Ragozin, Maltseva, and Berezin, as well as five other people, claim that, in September 1942, they routinely saw the hanging corpses of Soviet prisoners of war upon passing next to the camp as they were being transported from their village to work in the Rossosh station (of the south-eastern railroad). During their deposition, the witnesses Selegenenko, and Maltseva, and four other people, reported that, in the camp used for Soviet prisoners of war, Italians had created conditions for a great number of said prisoners to die each day. In front of the prisoners, their comrades were executed for disobedience or on suspicion of colluding with the partisans or Soviet activists.97

Reprisals and crimes against prisoners were thus recorded among CSIR soldiers and officers as well, though these instances appear to have been sporadic and carried out by isolated individuals, which in turn indicates that they were neither a habit nor a widespread behavior. Rather, in his Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia, Messe called attention to the Germans’ inhuman treatment of Russian prisoners. This had led him to keep the latter in the Italian units’ custody as long as possible, and to report to the German commands fewer prisoners than they had actually taken.98 There were even instances of Italian officers initially refusing to hand prisoners over to their German allies, until forced to comply with the rules in place. The following excerpt is from one alpine serviceman’s diary: The commander was supposed to hand [the Soviet prisoners] over to the Germans, but held a dozen back to help us with the heaviest work. They were given the same food as us, a few cigarettes, and occasionally a small flask of cognac—but the day we showed them toothpaste, which had a  strong taste back then, they ate it, licking the tube clean. They were good-natured young men, and none of them ever tried to escape.99

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In his own diary, a carabiniere reported that he had refused to deliver ten Soviet prisoners to the Germans, claiming they were under his direct responsibility. The two Germans got angry, threatened us with their weapons, and told us they demanded the prisoners in the Führer’s name. Encouraged by the prisoners themselves (who whispered in my ear, “Don’t be frightened. Send the Germans away”), I  answered: “In the Duce’s name, these workers will not be moved from this location.” Grumbling, the Germans walked away, and said: “Putrid, shitty Italians!” No one reacted. I  hadn’t understood their words; a  prisoner had, but he said: “Never mind, the Germans aren’t good.” These prisoners seem to like us a lot. Every morning I share some national ground tobacco with them. They are really good at what they do, and they work hard.100

A bersagliere recounts: The town we’d settled in had a school, where twenty Russian prisoners, captured by the Germans and placed in our custody, were detained. We’d been ordered to stand watch all around the building, but as cold as it was we couldn’t stay outdoors for more than fifteen minutes, and so—disobeying orders—we slipped into the school as well, for shelter. I’d never smoked, but I did have cigarettes with me. The Russians were avid smokers, and would constantly ask for something to smoke, tobacco or cigarettes, and so we would end up giving them ours. This always happened at night though, for, if our superiors had seen us, we would have gotten ourselves into trouble (giving prisoners cigarettes was forbidden). This went on for some time, and a friendship of sorts developed between us and the Russians, who even ate the same food as us.101

As for the treatment of the Soviet prisoners on the part of the Germans, the same bersagliere wrote this in his diary: One evening, a  fire broke out in one of the houses around our camp. The Germans forced the Russian prisoners held in the school to put out the fire, but some of them, taking advantage of all the commotion, tried to make a  run for it through the fields. The German soldiers immediately pursued them, and seized most of them.

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Introduction There was no escape for them: they were hanged from the school gate, near our kitchen, and left hanging there until 11 a.m. the next day, as a warning to the other prisoners.102

Particularly telling is a report on the actions carried out by the German and Hungarian occupants in the village of Novo Melnitsa, in the Ostrogozhsk district. Here, on the land of the local kolkhoz, a series of factories had been converted into camps for about 3,000 Soviet prisoners of war. Eyewitnesses, kolkhoz members and village dwellers, reported that a very harsh regime was enforced inside the camps; the hanging of prisoners was the order of the day; food was provided only intermittently, and often consisted of boiled wheat and cabbage cores. […] Each day, we witnessed just how many Russian prisoners extended their arms out to the locals begging for a  piece of bread, and the brutality with which the guards beat both the prisoners and anyone offering them bread. As a  result of malnourishment and the brutal conditions of their captivity, between twenty and thirty Russian military internees died in the camps daily.103

The witnesses also spoke of a fire that had broken out in the camp in midOctober 1942. The Hungarian guards had prevented the prisoners from evacuating their quarters, and forbidden the locals from helping them. Four hundred seventy prisoners, most of them young men born in 1922– 23, had died of asphyxiation and burn injuries.104 On the matter of prisoners, according to a  recent study, Messe had ignored the agreements in place between the German and Italian commands, based on which the Soviets captured by the CSIR were to be regarded as “prisoners of war in Italian custody.”105 In keeping with these agreements, it fell to the Italians to take care of the prisoners’ food, shelter, and transfer to Romania, from where the Germans would then take them to Germany and put them to work. In fact, however, it was impossible for the CSIR—which, as we’ve seen, lacked concentration camp facilities—to take in and provide for the Soviet prisoners until it was time for them to be transferred; only a few of them could be held back and used in support of the troops. Thus, Messe was not ignoring the directives, so much as acknowledging the logistical limitations of the CSIR. The latter handed the Soviet prisoners over to the Germans as a  result. As for the numbers, all that is known is that as of 1 March 1942 the CSIR had taken 14,267 Russian pris-

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oners, 10,927 of whom, a little over 75 percent, it placed in German custody. The vast majority of the remaining 3,340 prisoners—precisely 3,031— were handed over to the Wehrmacht in April.106 The CSIR sent to Italy only the highest-ranking officers, giving up a significant number of prisoners to the Germans, whom it otherwise might have used as labor.107 The ARMIR’s behavior When the CSIR was incorporated into the ARMIR as the XXXV Army Corps on 9 July 1942, the German commands assigned the Italian ones greater leeway and “broader occupation competencies. The Royal Army on the Russian front officially assumed independent responsibilities for civilian administration, prisoners of war, and control over the rear in the territories of deployment.”108 This, however, took place amid an emblematic set of circumstances, in which the Italian commands were clearly subordinated to the German ones, as informers working for the political police confirmed in their accounts. For example, regarding the changes made at the highest levels of the ARMIR’s command and the weight German officers carried in it, the following was noted: In a short time, General Gariboldi has shown constant and excessive submission to German orders—even when these orders result in the shameful exploitation of Italian soldiers, which they regularly do (suffice it to say that the Turin and Pasubio divisions have not had a single day off in seventeen months). But there’s more: General Gariboldi has admitted into his command—allegedly to serve as a liaison officer—the German Army Corps general (no less) Von Tippelskirch, along with a large staff of eighty German officers, that is to say, a  whole other army command.109 The above-mentioned general has become the true Rommel of Russia, effectively divesting of power General Gariboldi and Chief of Staff General Malaguti (who, in everyone’s estimation, is not up to the job). […] I think it is my duty to call your attention particularly on the way the Germans are increasingly behaving toward our troops. Ever since they’ve lost the prestige associated with winning, which they enjoyed a  year ago, more and more they’ve proven to be boorish, overbearing, barbaric, and, above all, not men of their word. The one who knows them well, and knows how to deal with them, is General Messe.110

The instructions the German liaison command sent the ARMIR on 16 July 1942 were essentially based on Hitlerian parameters. Despite allowing for

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Introduction

the Allies’ independence in penal matters, they called for very harsh punishments, even the death penalty, when crimes such as raids, thefts, robberies and rapes were carried out by allied soldiers, while giving German fighters free rein. Even though the ARMIR had been given a specific role both in the deployment of forces along the front and in the management of territory control, it was actually the Wehrmacht that established which assignments could be entrusted to the Italian security forces, and very clearly divided control tasks from extermination tasks. The ARMIR’s command set up two prisoner-of-war camps, one in Stalino and one in Dnepropetrovsk with 835 prisoners. In time, the number of camps soared to ten, housing a total of 5,000 prisoners who mostly came from the German camps—and were in “frightful conditions” when they arrived, according to Messe.111 The sick, whom the Germans disregarded completely, received care in the Italian camps, and were admitted into a convalescence unit in Rykovo (today Yenakiieve in Ukraine).112 As late as 1945, responding to Moscow’s requests that Soviet citizens and prisoners who had been relocated to Italy be turned over to Soviet authorities—an issue addressed in some length later in this book—Messe claimed that, according to the information provided by General Biglino, 8th Army quartermaster, the roughly 5,000 Soviet prisoners of war put to work in the commissariat’s warehouses, had never been transferred to Italy, but rather freed as the Red Army advanced and the front retreated from Voronezh to the Caucasus.113 In a  note intended to shed light on the number of Soviet prisoners of war held back in Italy, in relation to the one requested by Moscow, Pietro Gazzera explained that “the Russian prisoners of war captured by the CSIR and 8th Army units [had] been transferred to the German concentration camps, as transporting them to Italy [had] proven difficult.” According to Gazzera, thirteen prisoners of war were interned in the camp of Avezzano as of 8 September 1943; additionally, sixteen workers were held in Tarvisio, and seventy-eight civilians were interned elsewhere, following instructions by the Interior Ministry.114 With the arrival of the ARMIR, which settled in the territories of the upper and mid Don, the camps set up by the Germans kept running under their care. Thus, management remained in the Gestapo’s hands in the Rossosh and Kantemirovka camps, for example, whereas Italians were charged with surveillance.115 In Rossosh, the camp was located in the territory of the Put Lenina (Lenin’s path) kolkhoz. Prisoners of war, but also very many civilian refugees, were detained in livestock barns, in a vast area

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surrounded by barbed wire. Regarding this camp, the Extraordinary State Commission’s Report on Atrocities by Fascist Troops in the Territory of the Soviet Union, sent to Molotov, reads as follows: In the Rossosh countryside, in the estate of the Put Lenina kolkhoz, German and Italian occupation authorities set up a concentration camp for Soviet prisoners of war. The camp’s regime distinguished itself for its exceptional brutality. The fascists thrashed the prisoners, starved them to death, forced them to remove explosives from minefields; each day executions by firing squad occurred. First they killed the commanders of the Red Army. In groups, prisoners were led to the silo pits, not far from the camp, forced remove to their clothes, and, one at a time, made to lie down in the pit with their faces to the ground, at which point they were killed with a bullet in the back of their head. The camp invariably featured gallows from which prisoners hanged. After the liberation of Rossosh, 1,500 corpses—belonging to prisoners of war, defenseless civilians, women, and children, all of them shot dead—were found in five common graves in the territory of the Put Lenina kolkhoz.116

According to this report, the man responsible for these atrocities, along with other Italian and German officers, had been Colonel Marconi, who was in charge of the area under Italian command in Rossosh.117 The commander of the Alpine Army Corps, General Gabriele Nasci, had appointed Marconi to oversee the area assigned to the army corps. While he may not have been directly involved in those crimes, he was still responsible for them as a result of his post.118 Further, the document does not resort to the generic term “fascists,” routinely used by the Soviets to refer to the Germans and to their allies alike (a circumstance that often complicates the matter of identifying the men responsible of a given crime). Rather, it unequivocally speaks of Italians and Germans, acknowledging an overlap in roles between those who ran the camps and those who carried out surveillance tasks there, as in the case of the Italians. When they weren’t brutally killed, Soviet prisoners were a great asset. As both Russian and Italian sources attest, they were used in disparate tasks in the rear, though according to the commissariat’s orders they were to be employed only in the upkeep of roads, and in the cutting of wood for the production of railroad ties. Regarding the use of Soviet prisoners in combat

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Introduction

areas, different attitudes existed within the Italian commands: while the II Army Corps’s command had forbidden their employment in areas near the front, let alone on the front line itself, the Pasubio Division’s command favored their employment in the construction of fortifications—thus, precisely on the front line. The occupants did not hesitate to put civilians to work on the front line too, including women displaced from their villages. The Extraordinary State Commission’s Report mentioned above reads: “Following orders by the commander of the city of Yenakiieve, Italian Army Captain Grappelli, 615 peaceful inhabitants were shot dead [there], while 2,683 people were deported into slavery.”119 The matter of the crimes committed against the Soviet population— the core of the report—will be further addressed later in the book, in relation to the charges leveled against some Italian officers and soldiers who were tried. What I am interested in here is the ARMIR troops’ treatment of Soviet prisoners. The report also states: In the region of Stalino, Italian and German military troops killed and tortured 174,416 defenseless local residents, and 149,367 Red Army officer and soldier prisoners; 252,239 people were taken prisoner and led into slavery.120

The documentation testifies to the involvement of Italian military men in the violence and atrocities committed against prisoners and civilians. In the central prisoner-of-war camp in Stalino, located in the Lenin club, the occupants tortured 25,000 people, whose corpses were found buried in the camp. Tens of thousands of prisoners of war were tortured in the city of Stalino, in the camp located in factory No. 144. In the area of Khartsyzk in the Stalino region, occupants set up seven prisoner-of-war camps. More than 10,000 prisoners of war died as a result of starvation and cruel torture. Where the former prisoner-ofwar camp once stood in the city of Artyomovsk, 3,000 corpses have been found that belonged to tortured Red Army soldiers and officers.121

Violence toward Soviet prisoners often stemmed from the state of tension the occupants themselves were in, or were the result of the outcome of a  battle or rumors heard about tortures inflicted on Italian prisoners.122 Sometimes the violence was retaliatory, as in the following instance described in one alpine serviceman’s diary:

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Lieutenant Prada subsequently told me that once in Nikolayevka he’d had a hard time finding a place for the wounded and frostbitten men. He’d decided to find shelter for them in an izba occupied by some wounded Russians. But as they were making their way in, one of the wounded Russians hurled a grenade against them. Our men’s response was prompt: Second Lieutenant Tallucci of the Tirano Battalion fired a  few shots of his Parabellum pistol and killed the Russian prisoners, thus punishing them for their cowardly behavior.123

For a  similar reason, twenty-two Russian prisoners were killed for reopening fire on the Italians after surrendering.124 While it cannot be ruled out that unarmed Soviet servicemen were sometimes killed by Italian soldiers, in many cases these killings came in response to attacks or provocations. On the contrary, according to Schlemmer, these were not isolated instances, given that General Zanghieri, commander of the II Army Corps, had had to remind his men that the order to take no prisoners was only to be followed on “exceptional, very specific and limited occasions.”125 On the other hand, the clear and imperative order to kill only under specific circumstances proves that, at least on paper, Soviet prisoners were normally protected by the Italian command. While Schlemmer implies that Italians too killed prisoners during the retreat, he admits he has no proof or firsthand accounts on which to base his argument, and claims the Germans certainly did commit those actions.126 The attitude toward prisoners of war fell within the scope of “belligerent complicity,” as Snyder, by way of Furet, has called it. The disregard for human life displayed by both regimes involved in the epoch-making war strengthened the principle of total elimination. Like civilians, defenseless prisoners were more exposed and more likely to fall victim to this complicity in bringing about annihilation. The Political Administration for Prisoners of War used the matter of how Soviet prisoners in German hands were being treated to good effect in its own propaganda work. A statement issued by German prisoners lambasting the German authorities’ savageness toward Soviet prisoners was published in Pravda on 5 February 1942. Signed by sixty-three antifascist Germans of the Oranki camp, this protest was sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Another protest, signed by 115 German prisoners of the same camp, followed on 4 June, this time addressing the atrocities and violence the German authorities had inflicted on the Russian population in the occupied areas: “We, 115 soldiers, raise a voice of protest against the atrocities to which Soviet prisoners of war and the peace-

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Introduction

ful population of occupied regions are being subjected. We ask the International Committee of the Red Cross to make our protest known to the world.”127 It was a way, albeit an oblique one, for the Soviet authorities to communicate with the International Committee of the Red Cross. By the war’s end, more than five million Soviet citizens had been relocated to Germany and other European countries, including prisoners of war and civilians deported to the Reich as workers. When hostilities were over, the Soviet government set in motion a pressing political and diplomatic machine for the forced repatriation of all Soviet citizens, without exceptions.128 According to Soviet army sources, during and after the war 2,775,700 Soviet prisoners were repatriated from Germany,129 over 126,000 of whom were officers and generals. From a legal point of view, many of them were regarded as criminals in the USSR. Indeed, on 16 August 1941, Stalin had issued decree No. 270, providing that soldiers fallen into enemy hands should be considered traitors of the fatherland.130 On their way back, all former Soviet prisoners of war were gathered in assessment and sorting camps—about a hundred of them located in East Germany—and then transferred to the Soviet Union from there. About half of them ended up in the forced labor camps of the Gulag; 660,000 of these, former prisoner-of-war soldiers and noncommissioned officers the right age to be conscripted into national service, were grouped together into Soviet labor battalions for the Defense Ministry and put to work in “dangerous productions.”131 Older soldiers and sergeants—who had not militated in the Wehrmacht’s armed groups—were allowed to return home. With very few exceptions, a  tragic fate befell officers. After months of detention in sorting camps and a “scrupulous” assessment, a part of them was executed by firing squad. Others ended up in the camps of the Gulag, or in Siberia’s “special villages.”132 Out of all the repatriated Soviet prisoners, almost one million survived captivity and the sorting camps, ultimately rejoining the army.133 Soviet military men who had been captured by the Germans and joined the troops of General Andrey Vlasov, the so-called vlasovtsy, certainly fared no better. Some of their battalions, deployed by the German commands in the struggle against Yugoslav partisans, were finally seized by Tito’s men.134 With an order dated 11 September 1943, Dimitrov declared his agreement with Tito and authorized their execution by firing squad.135

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CHAPTER 1

Capture and Internment

[…] I wish you much health and military success against the hated enemy of humanity. O Pavlushka, the day will soon come when we can hold each other tight. That day is near, although victory eludes us still and will cost many lives. Yet Hitler’s scum will not drink water from the Volga, nor be corralled in the lands of the Don, full of beauty and immensity [letter for Second Lieutenant Pavel Mamchenko, Ca Fsb RF, f. 40, op. 22, d. 101, l. 50].

1. Capture Surrendering to the enemy was the only option in the face of the Soviet troops’ devastating attacks and clear superiority. We remained isolated from the rest of the battalion and there were but few of us left, as the enemy waged its attack. This did not escape the Russians’ notice; on the contrary, […] those ferocious Siberians charged toward the high ground on which we were located, and opened fire on us with their rifles and machine guns. Terrified and stunned, we stayed behind our posts. We quite simply did not know what to do. Our indecisiveness, however, enabled our enemies to intensify their fire. Indeed, they overwhelmed us with a deluge of hand grenades. One of these hit my comrade Perna right in the face. I barely had the time to see him get torn to pieces, when two more explosions occurred.1

The unit had no choice but to surrender. This moment, which might have brought release from tension and the constant fear of being a  target for

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

enemy fire, was in fact the beginning of an unmitigated tragedy for the defeated. The latter certainly could not imagine what awaited them. For Soviets, the capture of enemies was a  time for accumulated hatred and resentment to find an outlet, particularly following great losses on the field. The attack by the Nazi-Fascist troops had aroused in the Soviets intense feelings of loathing toward their enemy, stoked by two factors. First, at the time of the aggression, Stalin had made ample use of his rhetoric, and set in motion a powerful and pressing propaganda machine among civilians to incite the peoples of the USSR against their aggressors. To this end, the Soviet leader had evoked past invasions of Russia from the West, at the hands of the Germans, the Poles, the French, and the Swedes, thus prompting deep aversion to the so-called fascist predators.2 Second, Germans had committed atrocities against civilians in occupied lands. They had looted izbas, often beating or killing their inhabitants. They had executed partisans and imprisoned soldiers, particularly tank soldiers.3 This explains why, even in the absence of orders from above, the Soviets reacted in the extreme, by immediately executing many of the Germans, and in some cases the Italian officers, upon capture.4 In Messe’s own words: During the first months of activity of the CSIR, there was no news of atrocities committed by the Russians against the very small number of Italian prisoners captured at that time. Indeed, trusting in the humane treatment we had always accorded Russian prisoners, we deluded ourselves into thinking we were not a part of that ferocious race, which we could not conceive of given our sensitivity. However, it was not long before the first reasons for disappointment presented themselves, on the occasion of the “Christmas Battle” (25–31 December 1941).5

As it progressed, the war had become increasingly ideological and aimed at enemy extermination. Nor could invading Italians feel they were not a part of the “ferocious race.” Certain types of conduct thus derived from the embittering of the conflict and from the hatred aroused by the propaganda, a hatred so strong it “will not forgive the enemy even when he surrenders.” An episode General Messe describes is indicative. On 25 December 1941, the 3rd Bersaglieri Battalion was forced to leave the severely wounded in the infirmary of Orlovo Ivanovka. On returning to their post, the Italians found the wounded had all been killed with a bullet to the back of the head.6 Officially, there had been no order from above authorizing Soviet soldiers or partisans to carry out summary executions. On the contrary, the

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Council of People’s Commissars (SNK, the Council of Ministers) had issued a decree regarding prisoner treatment, on 1 July 1941. Titled “Condition of the prisoners of war,” the document forbade: a) offending prisoners and engaging in violent behavior toward them; b) taking coercive measures against prisoners of war or threatening them in order to obtain information on the state of their country in military matters or in other fields; c) confiscating uniforms, linen, shoes and other personal effects, as well as personal documents and means of identification, from prisoners of war. Money and valuables may be taken from prisoners for safekeeping upon issuance of a receipt by the competent functionaries.7

On the one hand, the decree proves the Soviet Union’s official intent to impose respect for prisoners of war. On the other, it suggests that the forbidden behaviors occurred regularly. The prohibition of seizing “personal effects” or “means of identification” was never observed. Upon capture, prisoners were subjected to a  thorough search. Similar inspections would follow at the hands of security guards during subsequent marches. When guards no longer found anything on the prisoners, they became enraged and abused them. Anything of any value—including pocketknives, watches, and fountain pens—was taken away. “After valuables were seized, the same fate awaited anything that might be viewed as a curiosity and, what is worse considering the climate, items of clothing and footwear. Boots and any combination of leg covers and shoes were taken first. Those deprived of such belongings remained barefoot, and made do as best they could.”8 Yet it is plain to see that to be deprived of boots and a coat in the harsh cold of December or January was tantamount to being sentenced to death from frostbite and exposure.9 According to a procedure that was not always standardized, soldiers were separated from officers. Most people assumed this order resulted from a plan to execute officers at once. Instead, in all but a few cases, Russian soldiers—who normally viewed military officers from Western countries as authentic representatives of the capitalist world, that is to say, as owners of production means and therefore as wealthy—thought they would find a bigger loot on them. […] Believing they were about to be shot dead, officers were generally not as bothered by the process as they would have been in

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR other circumstances. It must be noted, however, that soldiers suffered the same fate, as the watch many of them wore on their wrists quickly aroused great interest.10

The hundreds of accounts documenting what happened when prisoners were taken fill the reader with dismay. The first man to lay his hands on us was a Mongol NCO, who immediately searched us with violent hands and accompanying screams […] When it was Dante Muzi’s turn, the Mongol officer found the service pistol he was bearing. Without hesitation or the slightest explanation, he grabbed him forcefully, and jabbed the barrel beneath my poor comrade’s throat. He tried pulling the trigger two or three times, but in vain. Luckily, that damned possessed Mongol did not realize the safety catch was on. And so, as his irritation grew, he grasped the pistol by the barrel, and violently struck Dante on the face with the butt, again and again.11 There are two Mongols, who are going through the pockets of two servicemen at a  time; I  sense a  certain frenzied animosity toward the people they are searching, I hear a shot and see the prisoner subjected to the search fall. Who knows why they killed him? […] I  feel annihilated with terror. Another shot goes off, and I  see another man fall to the ground. […] as the line draws closer to the checkpoint, I realize the Mongols are drunk.12

An imprisoned bersagliere recounted his encounter with a number of tank soldiers: The tanks stop […] Some drunken tank soldiers demand a prisoner all to themselves. They want to use him as a target in a shooting contest. The commander passes us in review to choose an unlucky one among us. And here he is. He stumbles out of the ranks, thrust forward by soldiers kicking him. They put a field spade in his hands. They have him dig a grave in the snow. They strip him naked. They place him standing on the edge of the pit. Fifty meters back, the soldiers start firing at him with the guards’ rifles, one shot each. All the while, we are made to stand at attention, spectators to the scene. The prisoner is as white as snow, skeletal, and motionless. The only thing missing is the cross: it feels as if we are standing before Christ. His body is now streaked with blood. A  painful intermittent whine comes out of his mouth, hissed between clenched teeth. At once he raises his arms as if to protect his

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face, makes a  half turn, and, letting out a  choked scream, collapses into his grave of snow. Shivers of horror run down our spines. But the Russians loudly cheer the soldier who has hit the man in the heart, proud and boastful for having given us a taste of their savage skill.13

According to the survivors, the worst behavior toward prisoners came from partisans, both men and women, and from members of the cavalry: On 19 January 1943, of the forty-five men comprising the command of the 61st Motorized Unit in Valuyki, only ten or so managed to free themselves and retreat to Kharkiv when the Cossack hordes arrived in town.14 Thirty or so of them, including the group’s major commander, were captured by the Cossacks, undressed, and executed near their motor vehicles. The remaining five of us witnessed the massacre from the window; toward evening we were captured by the tank soldiers.15 In Valuyki, they captured us. Two snotty fourteen-year olds in plain clothes, armed with Parabellum pistols. Their voices assured and confident, fit for men of resolve. Onward, toward a house. There are about fifty of us now. Young women approach; they must have been between seventeen and twenty years old, partisans, armed to the teeth. They search us one at a time. They remove our watches, rings, and sweaters. At dawn, they take us into a large building, a convent perhaps, and here another inspection takes place. In the late afternoon they round us up in the yard. There are roughly two thousand of us: Italians, Germans, Hungarians; the Russians are all of them boys and girls. The snotty kids beat us, and the girls are awful—they spit on us. They turn us over to the regular army and the soldiers search us once more, taking away the few items of any worth we still had.16 [On] the evening [of 19 January], during a  break, we were captured by infantry and armored units. Immediately, the wounded and the severely sick, 150 men in all, were made to get off the trucks, rounded up near a hut and slaughtered (first they were shot with machine guns, and then they were crushed with the tanks). Subsequently the Russian soldiers entered an izba where twenty or so badly wounded or frostbitten soldiers and officers were being held, butchered them, and finally set the izba itself on fire.17

This treatment, the lot of many wounded, was utterly ruthless on the face of it. But in fact, even when the wounded were boarded on trains headed for the hospital-camps, their chances of survival were extremely slim.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR With a small number of survivors, we were taken prisoner out of exhaustion and lack of means. As soon as we were captured, we were asked to sit in the snow, in a line, between men armed with Parabellum pistols. The tanks crushed thirty-five or so surviving Alpine soldiers, who were unarmed and had already been taken prisoner.18 Approximate size of the column of prisoners at eight o’clock on 24 December 1942: about ten thousand men, mostly Italian, belonging to the different divisions. Execution by firing squad of German officers and of some Italians. The winners beat the defeated and spit on them, whether they were officers or soldiers. Looting of personal items […] Our wounded unfit to leave the battlefield were crushed by the Russian tanks or shot dead.19

To be fair, it should be noted that instances of kindness on the part of Russian civilians toward prisoners also occurred. Upon stopping in villages for a short rest, prisoners could often only count on the generosity of civilians for food. Civilians would sometimes give prisoners potatoes or some other such source of nourishment, all the while hoping the escorting soldier would not notice or mind. One survivor offers a telling example: During a  stop in a  village […] a  woman holding a  pail emerged from a  house, looked around furtively, and threw the pail’s content in our direction. It was boiled potatoes, which rolled to our feet on the pounded snow.20

Another survivor recounts as follows: I knock at three or four izbas. No one comes out. There is no one to be seen. I slip into a bunker looking for potatoes—nothing. I exit, and meet an old woman holding a  bottle of milk. She has come to me precisely to offer me the milk. I drink, and feel alive again. I hug the woman, kiss her, and she gestures for me to leave. She’s afraid of the guards.21

Finally, there were times when soldier escorts and camp guards showed sympathy too. While rarer, these instances deserved special gratitude, for they were unexpected in those difficult circumstances. These recollections are by Enelio Franzoni, lieutenant chaplain with the Pasubio Division: They line us up in a  column to take us to the other side of the Don. I’m with Zilli, Mangone and Damiani, captured like me in the pocket.

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They have us walk with our hands up. We come across a Russian artillery unit, and a captain stops us. “Why are you holding your hands up? Put them in your pockets!” That man saved our hands—I wasn’t even wearing gloves. […] A member of the escort comes up to me and tells me “if you give me your chasy [watch] and fountain pen, I’ll give you some bread”; he then lets me catch a  glimpse of a  loaf under his coat. As I  stretch out my arms disconsolately, this occurs to me: yesterday they took my watch, pen, wallet, and even my handkerchief without so much as a  peep; today this naive man would give me bread. Moscatelli says to me: “Chaplain, yesterday I saved my wedding band; have him give you that bread.22

2. The “davai” marches and the transfers by train In December 1942–January 1943, after the Second Defensive Battle of the Don, an entirely unprepared Red Army suddenly found itself forced to manage thousands of prisoners. In such high numbers, these were a real burden, a cumbersome weight requiring the use of escorts, means of transportation, and food. According to NKVD directives, captured troops were to be transferred from where the operations had taken place to locations farther inland as quickly as possible. To this end, prisoners were forced to march to railheads and stations. Greatly weakened, some wounded and already suffering from the early stages of hypothermia, the prisoners found themselves traveling on the same road of their retreat, but this time in a north-eastern direction. These marches, famously called the davai marches (from the word for “forward!” soldier escorts shouted to prisoners), dragged on for seven, ten, twenty and even twenty-five days, and took place in storms and blizzards, amid all manner of suffering. Along the way, those who fell out of exhaustion were finished off in a deluge of machine-gun shots. Captured in Valuyki on 28 January 1943 in the Don region and taken to the Krinovaya camp following an over twenty-day march in the most desperate of conditions, without sufficient food, in minus 40 degree [Celsius] weather, seeking shelter at night in ramshackle warehouses. During the transfer marches, about 70 percent of the prisoners in my column died as a result of the hardships and cold, or were killed by the Russian partisans who were accompanying us.23

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Captured in the mid Don area on 22 August 1942; after a roughly 600-km march on foot, [during which I  endured] very poor treatment and a meager daily allowance of about 250 grams of bread, [I] arrived at the Oranki concentration camp on 24 October 1942.24 The Italian and Croatian prisoners from the column captured with me were sent off on foot. […] The transfer march to the train station in Mikhaylovka lasted from 22 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 exactly; the soldiers received nourishment twice in all (potato peel soup and wheat soup, not bread); at night they were sometimes quartered in schools or hay barns, but mostly they were made to sleep out in the open.25

Thus, in the morning, columns would set off leaving behind dozens of men killed by the cold. Even among those who survived a night out in the open, there were newly frostbitten soldiers, who would not be able to keep up with the column’s pace. These men would lag behind, and end up in front of the escorting partisans, who, if they stopped, would immediately kill them with a Parabellum shot. The marches proved fatal for anyone unaccustomed to covering great distances on foot, particularly in such extreme conditions, including medical doctors and command officers. We’d been walking for over three hours, sloshing in glue-like snow, when the captain who had been beside me during the trek started feeling sick and staggering. Two of us helped him, but soon enough we’d ended up at the rear of the column, in front of the escorting partisans. He could no longer take a single step. We tried to lift him up and called out to the ones before us, but no one heard or wanted to hear us. […] One of the guards started shouting, pointing to the column that was growing farther away, then unlimbered the machine gun from his shoulder. The captain, who was propping himself up with one hand in the snow, used the other to make a farewell gesture, which seemed to me like a blessing. Then the sharp sound of a shot, unmistakable.26

Incidents of cruelty by some Soviet soldiers—not unlike the ones that took place when prisoners were taken—occurred during the marches too. According to Second Lieutenant Vicentini, the marching men would sometimes come across motorized vehicles or tanks headed for the front, and each time the column would be disarrayed, with prisoners swarming down the escarpments as the drivers—either to scare or in a  genuine

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attempt to kill their hated enemies, whom they found effortlessly on their path—came full speed at the rows of captives. The first attack, sudden and unexpected, cost the lives of many of the prisoners who had the misfortune of marching at the head of the column.27

A particularly chilling event was recounted by a Russian witness. In February 1992, a citizen of Voronezh—a city near the front—sent the Italian embassy in Moscow his description of the circumstances he had witnessed as a boy. In E.I. Karneev’s words: I will now describe how the remains of a  large number of Italian prisoners of war ended up in this ravine. It was the winter of 1942 or 1943, I can’t remember precisely. The day was almost over. The soldiers of the escort led a column of hundreds of prisoners of war near the edge of the ravine. Then they shoved the Italians, tightly tied to one another, to the bottom. After completing this operation, the soldiers of the escort emerged from the ravine, and started throwing grenades at the prisoners of war. There were many such soldiers, and they all hurled grenades. This went on for quite some time. In the intervals between the explosions, you could hear the screams of the doomed. When they were done throwing grenades, the soldiers of the escort descended to the bottom of the ravine. Shots were fired. Even though we were only boys, we understood full well what was happening there. The soldiers of the escort were finishing off anyone still alive with shots and bayonet blows. Afterwards, the soldiers mounted their horse-drawn carts and left. […] It was a cold night, and the cold finished what the soldiers of the escort had not. The Italian prisoners were out of sight. It had snowed during the night, and by morning the place of the massacre was covered with a thick layer of snow.28

Horrors of this kind seemed to fall within the bounds of normality, and those who committed them remained unpunished. That Soviet authorities were informed of such incidents, however, is evidenced by the many decrees issued by the NKVD, whose aim it was to prohibit atrocities while avoiding to mention them explicitly. In order to remedy this grave situation, and discipline soldiers’ attitude toward prisoners, on 2 January 1943 Deputy Minister of Defense General A.V. Khrulev, signed decree No. 001. The latter highlighted some very serious flaws in the way prisoner transfers

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had been conducted.29 It further indicated the general criteria to be followed in order to improve the work of the relevant organs. For that purpose, it addressed the commanders of the units deployed on the Don, the men in charge of the railroad system in the Ukraine expected to manage train transfers, and reception camp supervisors. It called for an adequate count of the prisoners of war present on the front, and urged that prisoners receive the medical care they needed, as well as food supplies prior to their dispatch.30 On 12 January, an NKVD decree followed suit, establishing a control over the organs of the Interior Ministry for the effective carrying out of the instructions contained in decree No. 001.31 In compliance with the decree, functionaries from the Administration for Prisoners of War and Internees were sent to the front line to supervise the prisoners’ registration and transfer. However, as we have already seen, the directives contained in decree No. 001 were applied only partially, and in some cases. After enduring long marches, prisoners arrived in gathering points (priyomnye punkty), from which they were led to train stations and transferred to sorting camps. These train transfers, which occurred between December 1942 and January–February 1943, were inhuman, as pointed out by the accounts of those who survived them, and as may be gleaned from official documents. The prisoners were loaded on cars lacking equipment and facilities. Eighty prisoners—sometimes even a  hundred of them—were confined in a space fit for half that number. They divided us in groups of fifty, and brutally shoved us on. The livestock wagons were very high off the ground, so we had to help one another. After the first thirty prisoners got on, there was no more space; a  barrage of blows started that only ended when the sliding door was shut with a  creaking sound, and we were plunged into complete darkness. There was no way anyone could turn around in the car. The windows along the ceiling were barred and sealed. They put the bolts in place on the outside, and some voices resounded. Then nothing.32

This was contrary to what was stated in the Temporary instruction on prisoner-of-war transfer. Issued by the NKVD on 4 July 1941, the document stated that security bars were not to be placed on car windows, except for one or two cars used for “prisoners who had attempted to escape.”33 It further highlighted that each car was to “hold forty–forty-five men. In each convoy, one or two wagons were to be reserved for the escort.”34

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When the hundredth prisoner was loaded, the sliding door was closed with great difficulty, and the latch was fastened. We were in the dark, stunned and in a state of shock, still uncertain whether what was happening was real or a figment of our imagination. Then all of a sudden, as if in unison, a wave of screams and cries swelled [inside the car] […]; the compact mass of bodies was subjected to swerves, and sudden commotion. […] Silence fell at once, when it was heard that the door was being reopened. Spurred on by blows of the rifle butt, a  dozen more prisoners were being shoved inside. Predictably, they could not get in. In fact, the pressure was propelling some of the previous occupants out. The Russian fired a few shots inside the car, piercing holes in the roof, and started screaming that he would aim lower if the prisoners didn’t make room for the newcomers. And so room for them was made, on the shoulders of the unlucky men closest to the opening. […] Exhausted, weakened by two weeks of marching, and hungry, none of us was able to remain standing for many hours. Deprived of all strength, some men—a few at first, many in time—slipped between the legs of fellow prisoners. Drooping like empty sacks, they sometimes didn’t even touch the floor, so densely packed with bodies was the car.35

The distances to be covered were not very great. Yet the trains were often parked in stations for days at a time and prisoners were not allowed to get off. Extremely scarce, the food was doled out only occasionally, when it was thrown into the cars through open windows. Desperate to eat something, prisoners fought among themselves. As a  result, almost all the food—black bread, for the most part—ended up getting filthy on the car floor, effectively a cesspool. When we were loaded on the train at the station, eighty of us were crammed into each car, and given a piece of black bread weighing about 200 grams, but no hot rations or water. The bread was thrown to us through an open window in the car, whose doors were opened only to extract dead bodies.36

The utter lack of hygiene brought on the first epidemics of typhus and dysentery among the prisoners. Untended wounds, frostbite so severe it led to septicemia, and pneumonia further resulted in the death of hundreds of men miraculously spared during the marches.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR I can declare that of the roughly 2,400 men present on the troop train headed for the hospital in February 1943, only about half of us reached our destination, and that only 500 were still alive after two months in the hospital.37

Further attesting to the inhumanity of the train transfers was the fact that prisoners were completely left to themselves. Corpses were disregarded, with the living often forced to travel with the dead until escorts decided to dump them out along the way, or to pile them up in the last cars.38 At unpredictable intervals the train made stops in the open countryside; the car doors would be opened and a tovarish would bark out: “Skolko kaput, sivodnya? Davai bistra” (How many dead today? Hurry up). In each car the corpses, as stiff as logs, were gathered by the prisoners and thrown out on the railroad escarpment. What an odd sound those bodies made when they hit the frozen soil and gravel. It was like sheets of glass being dropped to the ground and shattering into fragments on hitting a rock. And what Dantean shapes those skeletal bodies had assumed: some were lying supine while others were crouched down, some with their heads in their hands, their eyes or mouths wide open. Anyway, even after reaching the roadbed, they all kept the shape they were in when death seized them.39

Making the train transfers so tragic were also the bombings by the German Stukas, which wreaked havoc on the cars—an easy target in the vast, snowcovered Russian plains. When the marches had to be resumed as a result of the damage to the trains, the wounded would be abandoned, for speed was of the essence to avoid death by exposure.40 In this phase, guards did not always record deaths. Establishing the exact number of those who died at this time is therefore impossible. To secure a little extra food for themselves and make up for their scant provisions, prisoners sometimes found it expedient not to tell guards how many dead were present in their car. This way, they could count on their unlucky comrades’ bread for at least a day longer.41 According to the Instruction, when convoys made stops, prisoners were forbidden from interacting with the local population in any way. They were further prohibited from “conversing or exchanging correspondence with prisoners in adjacent cars,” from “soiling the floor and walls of the car, or writing on them; [from] breaking the silence with screams, singing or whistling; [from] sending letters or telegrams.”42 These directives were obvi-

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ously misguided, given that prisoners were not even allowed to detrain to relieve themselves—nor were the cars they were forced to stay in equipped with adequate facilities. The Instruction was clear with regard to medical care, too. The more severely injured, “together with an accompanying document,” were to be handed over to the railroad police, which would transfer them to the closest military hospital. In the event of death, corpses and their accompanying documents still had to be consigned to the railroad police. Indeed, bodies still needed to be taken to a hospital and buried. Directives were also categorical with regard to food supply: The provision of food to prisoners of war can be organized thus: a)  each prisoner will be given a  package containing dry food for the whole trip under the responsibility of the NKVD reception point; b)  hot meals will be provided in the facilities equipped for supply to the Red Army.43

As attested to by the survivors’ accounts, and as evidenced by scrutiny of the lists sent by the Russian government, none of this ever occurred. While the official documents reveal that the authorities intended for prisoners of war to be treated well, the facts prove that those called on to implement the provisions set forth by such official documents were generally negligent. Two main reasons may be found for this. On the one hand, there was little will to make enemies’ lives easier. On the other, the system was ineffective, and made worse by the lack of coordination between NKVD organs and the Red Army’s political administration. It is worth noting that as of 4 July 1941, when the Instruction was issued, prisoner management was still under control. This was because the number of captured soldiers was still small—only 9,147 men had fallen into the hands of the Red Army by 31 December 1941.44 After the Second Defensive Battle of the Don and the defeat at Stalingrad (February 1943), the number of prisoners soared to hundreds of thousands, and neither the Red Army nor the NKVD was able to manage the situation any longer. Proof that the system set up for the transfer of the prisoners was deeply flawed may be found in the decree issued on 5 February 1943, in which Apollonov, the deputy minister of the interior, openly stated that the number of convoys used to transport prisoners was insufficient; the number of escorts and men in charge of food and water supply was also deemed too small. It was further noted that “the convoy commanders had not ensured that the supplies for the convoys themselves were adequate,

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nor organized and distributed the work among their subordinates and helpers, the consequences of which had been entirely negative.”45 To remedy the situation, the NKVD decided to entrust responsibility for transport only to mid- and high-level cadres of the escort troops. Throughout the journey, the latter were to ensure “hot food once every twenty-four hours; hot water no less than once a day, and cold water in adequate amounts; the daily distribution of bread and other products; heat in the cars; in the absence of sanitation facilities on board, at least two stops every twenty-four hours for the carrying out of bodily functions.”46 If convoys were unheated or otherwise unequipped for human transport, then it was ordered that “prisoners not be allowed into the cars for their transfer,” a provision conflicting with the insufficient number of convoys. Finally, the NKVD called attention to the fact that “railroad convoy commanders and their assistants bore full responsibility for deaths among the prisoners of war, and would be brought before the military court.”47 At the beginning of 1943, many troop trains loaded with wounded and frostbitten prisoners set off for hospitals located to the rear, beyond the Volga, toward the Urals. Prisoners were conveyed from one camp to another at frequent intervals, and train transfers thus became common practice.48 The intended destination for Italian officers changed three times, until finally, in October, it was settled to be Suzdal camp No. 160, which, from that month on, was used exclusively for officers of every nationality.49 Soldiers were made to move between five or six camps before arriving in Kazakhstan. During these trips, the conditions in which prisoners were held improved slightly. Still, distances were long, and the number of those who died was very high.

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CHAPTER 2

Russia and Prisoners of War

In this chaos of blinding light and blinding darkness, of shots, explosions and machine-gun fire, in this chaos that tore into shreds any sense of the passing of time, Krymov could see with absolute clarity that the German storming-party had been routed (Vasily Grossman, Life and Fate, London: Vintage Books, 2006, 33).

1. The Soviet organization structure As the many NKVD decrees indicate,1 jurisdiction over prisoners of war fell to a  number of administrative, military and political offices. Among these, the NKVD handled their registration, distribution in the camps and sustenance, as well as their assignment to the labor camps. Within the NKVD, the body in charge of prisoner management was the Main Administration for Prisoners of War and Internees (GUPVI). Prisoners were considered “enemies of the Soviet people,” on a par with domestic class enemies. Indeed, by attacking the peasant and working people, they had committed a crime against their own social class, as troop members were predominantly of proletarian stock. This explains why their management was entrusted to the Interior Ministry, rather than to the Defense Ministry. Stalin’s view of the war against the USSR followed this perspective. The Second World War, a war of conquest up until June 1941, changed after that time, when war on the Eastern front took on the character of an ideological “clash of the titans” that would give the victor control of the world and the ability to impose his order. On 7 November 1941, during celebrations on the Red Square for the twenty-fourth anniversary of the

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revolution, in his speech to the troops headed for the front, Stalin himself would clearly state the true meaning of the war: Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, men and women guerrillas, the whole world is looking to you as the force capable of destroying the plundering hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of the German invaders look to you as their liberators. A great liberating mission has fallen to your lot. Be worthy of this mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war.2

In order of the day No. 55, dated 23 February 1942, Stalin highlighted the Red Army’s ability to react in a crisis, and the success it enjoyed after it overcame the transitory difficulties of Germany’s surprise attack. He also relieved the German people of responsibility for Hitler’s war, equating it with all freedom-loving peoples that had become friends of the Soviet Union.3 Summoning principles of international communism, Stalin spurred his soldiers to fight for the liberation of Russia, as well as for the liberation of all nations, for independence and for democratic freedoms. Finally, he called for the establishment of a united popular front against fascism. To this end, the USSR was busy, on the one hand, pushing back Nazi-Fascist attacks on the front, and, on the other, reeducating fascist invaders to believe in the “democratic freedoms” evoked by Stalin through a formidable propaganda system. In this complex and ambitious work of political propaganda, the NKVD was sustained by the Party’s Central Committee through its Department for Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop), and by communist party exiles in the USSR. Also significant was the role of the Main Political Administration of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (GlavPURRKA),4 which, together with the NKVD, handled propaganda among fighters on the front. The task of coordinating political work, and of exercising final control over it, fell to the offices of the Central Committee and GlavPURRKA, and to the Political Administration for Prisoners of War, within the Comintern (Communist International). The men in charge of the departments that worked with prisoners of war were: Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov, director of the Political Administration of the Red Army and of the Central Committee’s Agitprop section5; the Central Committee members Dmitry Z. Manuilsky, L.Z. Mekhlis, and Y.M. Yaroslavsky, and the Navy’s Political Administration director I.V. Rogov. The Executive Committee of the Comintern (IKKI) carried out the propaganda work on

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the front and in prisoner-of-war camps; it also collaborated on the elaboration of fliers, messages, and propaganda over the radio.6 Georgi Dimitrov, the head of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Comintern’s first secretary, contributed decisively to the dissemination of propaganda among prisoners. At his behest, on 22 June 1941, the Comintern Secretariat approved a  resolution calling for close collaboration with the Red Army’s Political Administration on the matter of drawing up antifascist manifestoes.7 A few days later, on his advice, propagandists, writers, poets, and journalists were chosen among the political émigrés to carry out ideological work on the front among enemy troops.8 For the Italian prisoners of war, the man charged with this task was Vincenzo Bianco, the Communist Party of Italy9 representative with the Executive Committee of the Comintern, whose direct superiors were Dimitrov and Togliatti (at the time, the Comintern’s second secretary). After the Comintern’s disbandment (15 May 1943, ratified on 10 June), coordination of political work among prisoners was entrusted to the Central Committee’s Institute 99.10 Headquartered in Moscow and made up of communist émigrés, the latter was expected to “solve organizational matters with the Soviets, publish papers for the prisoners of war, manage radio broadcasts, direct the missions of agitators sent to the front and in camps, and so forth.”11 The institute was also responsible for organizing the work of the civilian teachers in the two antifascist schools (more will be said on this later). Several organs were thus involved in prisoner-of-war management. The NKVD handled organizational and police aspects, including questionings and the identification of war criminals. The Red Army’s Political Administration, the party and the Comintern dealt with the planning of propaganda.

2. Prisoner registration The number of prisoners of war in Soviet hands has always been reason for debate, among both Western scholars and Russian historians. According to recently emerged Russian data, in October 1945, over 5.5 million foreign prisoners of war and internees were held in the USSR.12 A proper census of prisoners was only conducted after they arrived in the sorting camps, that is to say, after the transfers had already taken their high death toll. Very rarely did security guards make a note of the names of those who died during the marches or on the trains.13

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In the registration phase, the organization was aimed at the collection of the prisoners’ data, but—as the types of questions that were asked makes clear—what mattered most was their nationality, and even more so their social status. Indeed, in order to make political use of the prisoners, it was deemed necessary to paint their “class” portrait. The carrying out of this task was entrusted to a well-ordered and apparently infallible system, managed by special organs, among which the NKVD ultimately prevailed. Following tradition and in keeping with Lenin’s teachings, order No. 25/11805 dated 9 September 1940, Clarifications on the socio-political role of prisoners of war, urged competent authorities to draft detailed descriptions of prisoners, to better identify “socially close” detainees—potential partners in the fight against fascism, who, in the not too distant future, might serve as allies and leading figures of the “world revolution.” Fundamentally, the order prioritized prisoner identification from a social point of view. Each prisoner’s social position became a discriminating element in the distribution of jobs within the camps and in the assignment of “special” roles. It further constituted the basis for the adoption of concrete measures toward the prisoner, such as the recommendation of food “norms.” A new, more detailed registration system was set forth in the directive called Treatment and count of prisoners of war in NKVD camps dated 7 August 1941, issued shortly after the German attack.14 Among other things, this directive compelled camp directors to inform authorities of prisoner deaths “immediately” (paragraph IV). It also introduced the use of an “information form” (anketa), on which all relevant prisoner data were to be recorded. The form was made up of twenty-five questions. These were aimed at collecting the prisoner’s personal data, as well as information regarding his rank and unit, and at tracing his social profile. Thus, the prisoner was asked detailed questions regarding his parents and urged to provide a list of all family properties (real estate and movable assets). If the prisoner belonged to the farmer class, his estate was investigated in detail, in order to establish how much land, machinery and livestock he owned, and how many people he had in his employ. The prisoner’s profession (item 11), his affiliation to a political party (item 12) and his level of formal education (item 13) were other points of interest.15 Registration forms were filled out in two copies. One was filed in the camp archives, while the other was sent to section No. 2 of the NKVD’s Administration for Prisoners of War. Both on the information form and on the registration form, all of the prisoner’s movements were noted down, including his conveyance to a  different camp, or from the camp to the infirmary, his arrest, any attempts to escape, his release, and his death.16

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Between 1941 and 1945, the registration process was perfected. The form, by now the standard means of registering prisoners of war and internees, included as many as forty questions.17 For the NKVD commissars, the essential traits that defined the prisoner were his role in the enemy army (item 23) and his willingness or not to take part in the conflict (item 17). An important aspect had to do with the way the capture had played out. Voluntary submission to the Red Army was viewed as a sign of the prisoner’s unreliability and regarded with disapproval. An exception was made if there had been underlying political reasons for the submission. In that case, the attitude of the NKVD men changed. Indeed, the prisoner might even be seen as a collaborator, though not without reservations, and used for purposes of propaganda and espionage.18 In filling out the form, or during the questionings, many prisoners provided false information concerning their social background, in an attempt to pass off as proletarians if they were bourgeois, and as peasants if they were landowners. Suspicious on principle, NKVD functionaries asked prisoners the same questions again months later, in an attempt to ascertain the veracity of the information previously given them. Obviously, both because of the different circumstances in which the questionings took place and because of the time that had elapsed between them, the prisoners did not recall what they had stated before, and were therefore forced to come up with new lies or to tell the truth.19 The men hailing from the peasant or working classes were selected as “natural” candidates for the antifascist courses set up immediately after their arrival in the camps. It is interesting to note that the forms used both with prisoners of war and with civilian internees in the Gulag remained in force even after the war ended. They were unified, and employed as a model for the registration of all individuals fallen under NKVD control, namely, foreigners charged with espionage, former Soviet prisoners of war, political detainees, and common criminals.20 Despite the law’s good intentions, the distribution of the forms and the actual data collection only started taking place at a much later time. In the early stages, for obvious practical difficulties, not least the high number of prisoners, the soldiers responsible for these tasks applied NKVD directives with a high degree of approximation. According to the survivors’ accounts, attempts to record the names of the fellow soldiers who died at capture or during the marches were made by the prisoners themselves. However, in the course of the systematic searches prisoners were subjected to, these lists, written amid great difficul-

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ties on improvised sheets of paper, ended up being confiscated.21 Indeed, seizing these lists of deceased prisoners was the main reason for the continual searches, which subsequently continued taking place in the prison camps. Guards rummaged through the shacks and “sequestered anything they deemed suspicious, down to the smallest piece of written paper.”22 “It was precisely during these thorough searches that the Russians managed to find those pitiful lists of the dead and the locations of their burial, which our chaplains drafted and kept scrupulously hidden in hopes of being able to give news to the prisoners’ families once back in Italy.”23 The Soviets “were obsessed by these lists, which, in a sense, might serve in our hands as eloquent proof of their responsibilities and the oppression we suffered.”24 Some did succeed in taking the lists of the deceased prisoners out of the camps. Among them was the chaplain Corrado Bertoldi, who had “copied the names of over 300 German prisoners detained in Russia in a Karl Marx book.” The latter, however, “[had] been taken away from him by the Russian police at the border.”25

3. Stalin and the prisoners of war Early on in the conflict with Germany, the Soviet government committed to respecting the 1929 Geneva Convention, even though it had not been among the document’s signatories, provided its adversaries did the same.26 In essence, that was the content of the telegram Molotov sent Max Huber, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, on 27 June 1941, in response to the latter’s request that the USSR make clear its position on the Geneva Convention.27 The treaty famously recognized a warring nation’s right to take and hold prisoners, but also bound it to safeguarding their health and life, so that, at the war’s end, they might be repatriated in the best possible conditions. Article 8 of the Convention further stipulates the following: “Belligerents are required to notify each other of all captures of prisoners as soon as possible, through the intermediary of the Information Bureau organized in accordance with Article 77. They are likewise required to inform each other of the official addresses to which letters from the prisoners’ families may be addressed to the prisoners of war.”28 On 1 July 1941, in an already cited decree, the SNK set forth a number of key points fundamentally ratifying the 1929 Geneva Convention, and, on paper anyway, aiming to safeguard prisoners’ lives. In the document, matters were settled pertaining to the prisoners’ status and

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legal standing, detainment conditions, work placement, and penal and disciplinary responsibilities, as well as to the organization of certificates and aid to the prisoners.29 On 22 July, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross sent Molotov a cable informing him of Italy’s and Slovakia’s willingness to share their lists of prisoners and wounded. Thus, as underscored by Huber, Italy was committing to adhering to the Geneva Convention. The telegram ended with the following words: “We would be happy to hear the Soviet government’s position on the matter.”30 Moscow, which was not expecting Italy to move so fast (Italy had not recognized the Hague Convention or the Geneva Convention right up until the last day), found itself compelled to make an official statement. The Soviet reply—a telegram prepared on 8 August by Andrey J. Vyshinsky, deputy president of the Sovnarkom—was brilliant in that it rejected Italy’s offer, while at the same time leaving the door open for diplomatic action. Vyshinsky stressed that the Soviet Union would accept both the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention as regarded Article 4, which addressed the issue of improving the conditions of wounded and sick prisoners of war. As for all other points, Vyshinsky clarified, it might be agreeable to resort to Article 14 of the Hague Convention, which called on belligerent countries to draft prisoner lists, and to compile a “military file” with each prisoner’s personal information; the latter, however, would only be “handed over to the other belligerent side’s government after peace was concluded.” On 21 August, the German government announced that, following the atrocities the Russians had perpetrated against German prisoners, it no longer felt bound by the directives set forth in Geneva.31 At the same time, the German command sent Wehrmacht troops and armies allied with the latter a circular listing a series of horrific acts allegedly committed by the Soviets, thereby justifying its decision.32 The Italian government did not subscribe to the German declaration at first. Only later, on 12 March 1942, did it tell the International Committee of the Red Cross that it would be “forced, in the future, to refrain from relaying any news it might come to have regarding imprisoned, transferred or deceased Soviet soldiers.” Despite the “promptness” and “care” with which the Italian government had provided Moscow with information on Russian prisoners, “the absolute lack of reciprocity on the part of the Soviet authorities [had] become painfully clear.”33 The Soviet government’s indifference, callousness and negligence when it came to recording prisoners, as well as its rejection of the moral and diplomatic duty to communicate prisoner data to enemy countries,

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were the fundamental reasons behind the USSR’s failure to adhere to the Geneva Convention. The “formal” reason, however, stemmed from its categorical refusal to accept the principle of “prisoner distribution in the camps based on racial or national affiliation.”34 When Vatican Substitute for General Affairs to the Secretary of State Giovanni Battista Montini asked for information on Medical Second Lieutenant Antonino Buffa, who had gone missing on the Russian front, the US apostolic delegate answered thus: “every step taken to establish his whereabouts has proven useless, because the Soviet government has repeatedly answered the United States Department of State that it does not wish to provide information regarding its prisoners, for the reason that it has not signed the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners.”35 As well as resulting from difficulties of a diplomatic nature, however, the poor treatment of prisoners of war also had political-ideological reasons. To Stalin’s way of thinking, soldiers who had fallen prisoner, even in spite of their best efforts not to, were contemptible. This applied to Soviet prisoners too, toward whom the government and military commands showed no interest whatsoever. To be taken prisoner was tantamount to losing citizenship rights; through exposure to foreign “contamination,” prisoners became potential traitors and threats to the Soviet State.

4. Italian communists in the USSR and the question of prisoners Members of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in Moscow, especially Palmiro Togliatti and Vincenzo Bianco, must have known about the events on the front and the ordeal their fellow countrymen had been enduring since capture. Bianco, in particular, at the beginning of 1943, immediately after the Italian army’s defeat on the Don front, was entrusted with organizing political work among Italian prisoners of war, setting up political schools and a paper for the prisoners. Because of his role, he often visited the camps, and must have had a clear understanding of the physical and psychological state the Italian internees were in. This is also evidenced by the well-known letter Bianco sent Togliatti on 31 January 1943, addressing, among other things, the question of prisoners: I submit to you a very delicate matter of great political import. I think a way must be found, with the right manners and the requisite political tact, to raise the issue, so that prisoners of war may not die en masse

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again, as they have. I shall not go on at length, you understand, but leave it to you to find the way.36

Bianco asked Togliatti to intervene, and, by calling for “political tact,” proved to be aware of how Stalin might react to such interference by the Comintern’s secretary. The Stalinist view of politics did not allow for independence, nor did it authorize political intrusions, not even by other communist leaders, particularly in such a critical phase of the war. Togliatti’s reply to Bianco, dated 15 February–3 March 1943,37 attests to the prevailing climate of tension in the USSR at the time, and is suggestive of the fact that there was little freedom of action,38 or leeway for any kind of proposition in the face of Stalinist power. Additionally, it points to his own complete adherence to the canons of international communism. Bianco’s request was essentially a deviation, called “abstract humanism” in Stalinist parlance, and viewed as an attempt to place “national interests over class interests.”39 According to Togliatti, who had learned his lesson during the many years spent in the USSR, Bianco was exceedingly “sentimental” and, with his philanthropic thinking, deviated from the position assumed by the Stalinist leadership. Togliatti therefore answered as follows: The other matter on which I disagree with you is the treatment of prisoners. I  am not at all ferocious, as you know. I  am a  humanitarian as much as you are. Or as much as a dame of the Red Cross could ever be. Our position of principle on the armies that invaded the Soviet Union has been established by Stalin, and there is nothing more to say. In practice, though, if prisoners die in large numbers as a result of the dire conditions of war, I  have absolutely nothing more to say. Quite the opposite. And let me tell you why. The Italian people have without doubt been poisoned by the imperialist and criminal ideology of fascism. Not as much as the German people, but to a considerable extent. The poison has spread among peasants and workers, not to mention the petite bourgeoisie and intellectuals—in brief, it has spread among the people. The fact that Mussolini’s war, and particularly the expedition against Russia, will end in tragedy, in personal grief for thousands and thousands of families, will be the best and most effective antidote. The more widely the conviction is felt among people that aggression against other countries means ruin and death for one’s own—means ruin and death for each citizen taken individually—the better it will be for Italy’s future. The massacres of Dogali and Adua were one of the most powerful brakes on Italian imperialism, and one of the most powerful spurs for the

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR development of the socialist movement. The destruction of the Italian army in Russia must achieve the same result today. After all, those who tell the prisoners, “No one asked you to come here, so you have nothing to complain about,” as you reported, say something profoundly just, even though it is also true that many of the prisoners came here only because they were dispatched. It is difficult, or indeed impossible, to distinguish within a  people those who are responsible for a  policy from those who are not, particularly when an open struggle against the ruling classes does not emerge within the population for others to see. I’ve already told you: I am not at all saying that prisoners must be eliminated, all the more so given that we could put them to good use to achieve certain results in another way; yet in the objective hardship that may be the end of many of them, I see nothing but the tangible expression of the justice the old Hegel claimed to be immanent in all history. And now, on to practical work matters.40

Togliatti’s refusal to take any initiative to save Italian prisoners of war and his attempt to cast the death of thousands of men as the rightful justice for their participation in the war against the USSR prove the PCI leadership’s utter subordination to Stalinist politics. The death of thousands of prisoners was—Togliatti seemed to believe—the “most effective antidote” against fascist politics, something of a “high-impact rehabilitation.” While doing nothing to stop them from being killed, the PCI leader claimed the prisoners, if kept alive, could equally serve the cause of communism. This would be pursued through the establishment of antifascist schools and programs, meant to “reeducate” the very prisoners who had escaped death. Bianco replied rather bluntly in his letter dated 20 March: I have no intention of starting a  discussion, with you or with anyone else. I  do not share your point of view, and I  have therefore turned to Giorgio [Dimitrov]. I understand perfectly what Stalin has said; if that could be applied to this situation, I would not have said a word, to you or to others. Adua and Dogali are in Africa, while we are in the Soviet Union, and that is entirely different. Do not mistake me for a daughter of charity. I  am perfectly aware that, by fighting against the Soviet Union, they have committed a serious political crime against the Soviet people, who had shown them a way out of a war counter to their own interests, and counter to the interests of the social class most of them belonged to. But to put a cross on the mass of the workers of the fascist

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bloc—you know as well as I what that means. And furthermore, I know full well you do not agree with that. But, unfortunately, I see the opinion is widely held.41

This is not the place to analyze the relationship between the PCI leader and the other senior party members. However, it would be hard not to take notice of the surprisingly assertive tone Bianco used with Togliatti in this letter. That Bianco had reached out to Dimitrov setting forth his doubts and concerns despite the PCI leader’s response is in itself rather amazing. In Dimitrov’s journal, the meeting with Bianco is marked as having occurred on 16 March: Bianco: he informed me of his trip to the prisoner-of-war camp in Tiomnikov [No. 58, Mordovia] (4,500 Italians, 10,000 Romanians, 1,000 Germans and others). Enormous mortality. Deficiencies in the camp. Wrong set up by the camp commander, etc. I asked him to hand in a written report on the matter so that it might be brought to the attention of the relevant authorities.42

Following Dimitrov’s advice, on 24 March, Bianco wrote to Major General Ivan A. Petrov, in charge of the Main Administration for Prisoners of War. Several very interesting passages in Bianco’s letter43 not only clarify the difference in outlook between him and Togliatti on the matter of prisoners, but also expose the dire state of the prisoners. They had no shoes, nor could they wash themselves. In an attempt to delouse prisoners, rather than carry out proper disinfestation procedures, the camp administration had deprived them of padded jackets. According to Bianco, this situation was the result of both the camp administration’s negative attitude toward the prisoners, and the lack of coordination between “the military administration and the political section.” Bianco’s understanding of the situation was that the former saw prisoners merely as “conscious enemies of the socialist motherland.” As a result, the men in charge of the camp tended not to apply the measures necessary to improve prisoners’ conditions. Conversely, the political section viewed prisoners as a long-term investment. “Deceived” and “bamboozled” by the fascist ideology, they could still be turned into “active allies” of the communist movement and “excellent propagandists” at the service of the “socialist motherland” through the regenerating and reeducating force of political action. According to Bianco, the dreadful living conditions in the camp and the hostility of the Soviet camp

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managers toward prisoners made “the reeducation work impossible,” and complicated “significantly the action of comrades charged with carrying out the functions of political instructors.” But anyone who drew attention to the shortcomings in the camp’s management, Bianco wrote, was generally accused of “philanthropy,” or worse viewed as taking on the role of “advocate for the prisoners of war.”44 Bianco’s accusations were at odds with a  mentality intolerant of humanitarian attitudes. The insistence with which Bianco addressed both Togliatti and the Soviets in charge of prisoners of war, as well as Dimitrov himself, proves that he was sincerely interested in the fate of his fellow countrymen. After all, unlike Togliatti, Bianco had visited the prison camps. However, the answer to the questions Bianco raised was implicit in Togliatti’s words. The latter had spoken of a “position of principle” regarding the armies that had invaded the Soviet Union, established by Stalin. While Bianco had attempted to stretch it, Dimitrov, military higher-ups like Petrov, and Togliatti himself had adapted to it perfectly, even going so far as to justify it. The indifference Togliatti had displayed in his letter to Bianco was later somewhat counterbalanced by the proposal he presented to the Political Administration in 1944, promoting the collection of small presents for Italian soldiers and officers for Christmas, a gesture he claimed would be an “important political event.” When he was denied permission to carry out the plan, Togliatti commented that this kind of attitude would compromise the antifascist work in the camps.45 The aims of the NKVD and the interests of the USSR took precedence over philanthropic matters yet again. This seems to have been the only initiative favoring prisoners of war on the part of Togliatti. His attitude—unrelenting if not downright merciless on the one hand, timidly attentive on the other—indicates that he tried to find a balance between the responsibilities and obligations of his position, which placed him at once among the leading figures of both Italian politics and international communism.

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CHAPTER 3

In the Prison Camps

Only in prison is it easy to understand that life without any expectation of the future becomes meaningless and flooded with despair. We feared solitude while waiting for it. It was our only substitute for freedom, and in moments of complete relaxation it gave us the relief and the almost physical pain of tears (G. Herling-Grudziński, A World Apart: The Shocking Personal Experience of a Man Who Spent Two Years in Soviet Prisons and Labor Camps, New York: Roy Publisher, 1951, 47).

1. Organization within the camps In the wake of the defeat on the Don and the fall of Stalingrad, Red Army command sought to organize prisoner distribution. To this end, prisoners were funneled to gathering points along the front. It was only a temporary solution, as reception and gathering points were not adequately equipped. Also, the presence of a  large number of detainees near the front made the Red Army vulnerable, and exposed it to the danger that the prisoners might be freed as a result of subsequent counteroffensives. Camps varied based on function. Those termed reception points (PPV, priyomnye punkty voyennoplennyk), or gathering points (SPV, sbornye punkty voyennoplennykh), were employed to take in prisoners during the earliest stages of detention. Later, prisoners were sorted out and dispatched to various internment camps, usually according to criteria taking military rank into account. During the first few months of 1943, the NKVD issued numerous decrees aimed at offering a solution for prisoner accommodation. Among

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such orders, one dated 9–11 April called for an “increase in the existing prison network and the setting up of new camps for prisoners of war.”1 Lavrentiy Beria, the Interior Minister, ordered that “the capacity of prisoner-of-war camps be raised to 500,000 units.” As for how this plan should be implemented, point 6 explained that “construction [was] to be carried out according to model plans, with no need for an advance budget approval, utilizing the prisoners of war and the men of the special contingent as workforce.”2 Basically, all camps were to double their capacity. For example, Tambov camp No. 188 needed to expand its capacity from 8,000 to 15,000 prisoners; Oranki camp No. 74 from 3,000 to 5,000; and Krasnogorsk camp No. 27 from 1,700 to 3,500.3 These expansions were supposed to be completed by June or July, but the Tambov camp, for instance, had already taken in the greater part of Italian prisoners by February. German, Austrian, Romanian and Hungarian prisoners were crammed there too, as the camp came to hold 16,000 men. Even before the work to expand the camps was over, the overpopulation problem was solved by the decimation of prisoners resulting from their terrible living conditions. According to the available data, between 1939 and the beginning of 1943, twenty-four prisoner-of-war camps were present on Soviet soil.4 Between 1943 and 1951, following directives on the expansion of the concentration camp network, the number soared to 533, with facilities distributed throughout the land.5 At least nine additional special camps, called obekt (objective) camps, located mostly in the Moscow region, in Latvia, in the Ivanovo region and in the territory of Khabarovsk, were also present. Italian prisoners were detained in approximately 428 camps and hospitals.6 The exact location of only 130 or so of these facilities has been identified so far. Two-digit numbers indicated prison camps. Four-digit numbers were used for hospitals. These could stand alongside the camps or be located elsewhere. The number of hospital-camps in the concentration camp network was not lower than 214.7 In general, the identification of the camps is made difficult by the Soviet custom of frequently changing the numbers associated with them. A given camp might be identified by different numbers at different times.8 Or perhaps one number might be assigned to two camps located in different regions, and sometimes the number of a closed camp was attributed to a new camp in a completely different area.9 The decision to shut down or transfer a  camp sometimes resulted from its being in a  “poor state,” making it unfit to take in prisoners, as in the case of Khrenovoe (No. 81), which we will address at length later, where very many Italians died. The closing of camps could also stem from defensive or strategic reasons: Nekrilovo (designated first as No. 62, and

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later as No. 169) and Michurinsk (No. 56), for example, were closed because of their proximity to the front.10 Once it was decided that a  camp should be closed, the prisoners detained there were forced to set off on new trips, by train and on foot. As a result, the hardship and suffering endured during the initial marches and transfers from the front had to be faced again. Transfers from one camp to another occurred for several reasons. While troop members and officers were initially detained together, for example, the latter were ultimately conveyed first to Oranki, and then to Suzdal camp No. 160. Troops were transferred based on the need for manpower in the various regions of the USSR, and put to use in seasonal or factory work. The transfer of individual prisoners depended on various factors, such as the intent to isolate special prisoners, like pilots and generals, or particularly recalcitrant ones—the intractable and untamable, or those who complained most often about how they were treated.11 Sometimes medical officers, or prisoners specialized in certain jobs, were transferred so they could be employed in military camps. Prisoners who had attended the antifascist schools were also sometimes transferred to disseminate propaganda among their fellow countrymen. The constant relocation of prisoners was one of the decisive causes of the spread of diseases—typhus and dysentery passed from one camp to another along with the prisoners. Further, it hampered the organization of political work. Indeed, antifascist propagandists and communist party members, who worked for the Political Section of the Red Army, were forced to move frequently throughout the Soviet Union to reach prisoners of their respective nationalities. As we will see, these moves were often opposed even by the NKVD, in charge of the country’s security. More than once the NKVD urged instructors to restrict the number of trips. Vincenzo Bianco, too, addressed this problem. In a report to Togliatti and Manuilsky dated 18 June 1942 on the work carried out among Italian prisoners of war in Karaganda camp No. 99, in Kazakhstan, he offered several suggestions to improve propaganda. These included “asking the general administration for prisoner-of-war camps to concentrate all Italians in a single camp.”12 The proposal produced no effect, of course. Prisoners of war were routinely subjected to psychological tortures, such as threats, and the agony of fake executions and fake releases. During the questioning of so-called special prisoners of war—generals, pilots, highranking carabinieri—the Soviets regularly resorted to the same techniques used with their own civilian internees. For example, prisoners were given

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large amounts of exceedingly salty food, but no water; they were beaten, or forced to stand for hours on end.13 The extreme living conditions led to a high number of suicides. These were especially common among prisoners sick with typhus, who during the acute phases of the illness rejected food with varying degrees of awareness, prisoners placed in confinement following attempts to escape, and prisoners charged with war crimes.14 Beria deplored the lack of control on suicidal subjects. By killing themselves, prisoners condemned for war crimes “escaped responsibility for their offenses, and diminished the chances that their accomplices—as well as the espionage network existing among Soviet citizens, known to them—might be exposed.”15 The incarceration system in place for prisoners of war fell within the framework of the Gulag. The onset of the war brought with it a change in the features of Soviet camps, as the latter had to take in prisoners coming from the front’s western regions. From Khlevniuk’s precious and massive reconstruction of the Stalinist concentration camp system, we learn the following: As of 1 January 1941, there were 1,500,000 prisoners in NKVD corrective labor camps, almost 429,000 prisoners in labor colonies, and about 488,000 in prisons. In June, on the eve of the German invasion, there were about 1,500,000 people in labor and special settlements. Considering the growth in the number of prisoners in early 1941, it is possible to state that when the war started, there were about 4,000,000 people in all Gulag divisions.16

Prisoners’ arrival in camps and colonies caused serious overpopulation problems. Hygiene standards dropped. General living conditions, which had already significantly deteriorated after 1941, got even worse.17 As early as 1939, the NKVD had issued a number of decrees aimed at making life for internees a little better. Yet these measures had never been applied for lack of resources.18 In September, for example, the NKVD requested from A.I. Mikoyan, president of the Red Army supply commission, that any remaining funds and resources be allocated to the Gulag in the form of materials and food, for the wellbeing of the prisoners of war.19 Mikoyan answered promptly, detailing the food provisions for the prisoners of war. Included in his list were, among other things, tomato sauce, vinegar, and bay leaves.20 Prisoners of war were treated with the same negligence as civilian detainees, whose permanence in the Gulag was justified solely by their productivity. On entering into the camps, the prisoners of war found a system

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fully operational since the collectivization period and perfected during the Great Terror.21 In the majority of cases, particularly where officers were concerned, prisoners were held in special camps so that they would not come in contact with civilian detainees, whom they nevertheless came across when they were taken out for work reasons.22 In other cases, sections of huge camps— like Karaganda camp No. 99—might be destined for both prisoners of war and Soviet civilian internees. Like their Tsarist forerunners, Soviet corrective camps housed a  mixed bag of regular criminals and political dissidents. To undermine solidarity among them and thwart alliances (hotbeds of rebellion in civilian camps) the Gulag administration systematically encouraged conflicts, for example by appointing as squad leaders detainees at odds with the men assigned to them.23 Thus, a common prisoner might be placed at the head of a  group of political detainees, or someone imprisoned for murdering Jews might be assigned a team of Jews. The same criteria were followed for prisoners of war. Command and management tasks were entrusted to prisoners based not on rank, but on their response to propaganda and advancement on the path to ideological maturity. As a result, noncommissioned troop officers might be charged with leading and punishing officers, and subordinates might find themselves issuing orders to superiors. This overturning of hierarchies not only subverted relations and undermined officers’ authority, but also increased prisoners’ alienation toward the military training they’d received and toward their own values. In general, the GUPVI tended to avoid grouping prisoners by nationality. Rather, prisoners of a given nationality were split up and scattered in different camps. In the Gulag, the aspect that most clearly put prisoners of war on an equal footing with internees was work. The Gulag certainly aimed to isolate and reeducate anti-Soviet elements, but it also served as a way to create an immense reservoir of servile manpower to be used primarily in the most dangerous jobs and in inhospitable regions. Prisoners of war were likewise placed within this system with the double goal of converting them to socialism and exploiting their work. The management of work and the assignment of tasks were based on the fulfillment of predetermined production quotas, called “norms.” Respecting those norms came with certain privileges, like an increase in the meager food rations; “a prize, or better yet the promise of a prize [could also ensue if the norm] was fulfilled or even exceeded.”24 Generally speaking, forced labor requirements imposed on civilian prisoners were much stricter.

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The production norms associated with an increase in the ration of bread, for example, were much higher for civilians than for prisoners of war.25 In the same vein, punishments for non-fulfillment were harsher: torture and physical violence were used more readily and frequently in corrective and forced labor camps than in prisoner-of-war camps.26 In Solovki, the first Soviet camp, punishments for Soviet prisoners of either sex were extremely harsh: “Prisoners sometimes got away with non-fulfillment of the norm, but more often they were held outside in the cold in the woods for hours, sometimes for the whole night. Many suffered from hypothermia. […] In the summer, for the same crime, prisoners were exposed ‘to the mosquitoes’: stripped naked, they were tied up in the woods at night, where dense swarms of mosquitoes bit them till they bled.”27

2. Sorting camps Sorting camps were not located far from the front. Tambov, Michurinsk, Nekrilovo and Khrenovoe lay in the province of Voronezh. Tambov (No. 188) was one of the largest. Members of the Alpine divisions captured in the second half of January 1943 were particularly numerous among the Italians detained there. Mortality was extremely high in this camp, where 8,268 Italians lost their lives. Michurinsk (No. 56) remained open only for three months, in the course of which 4,234 Italians died, all of them members of the Alpine Army Corps. Temnikov camp No. 58, in the Republic of Mordovia (500 km south-east of Moscow), comprised a number of smaller camps located along the railroad directly managed by the NKVD: 4,239 Italians of the infantry divisions were held there, the greater part of them dying as a result. Nekrilovo (Nos. 62 and 169), located 150 km north of the Alpine Army Corps front, had Novo Khopiersk as its reference station. This camp claimed the lives of 2,191 Italians. When it was closed in October 1943, the survivors were transferred to the other side of the Urals, in hospital-camp No. 6715. Khrenovoe (No. 81), 90 km west of Nekrilovo, lay on the railroad line between Valuyki and Ostrogorsk. It was a large camp for the initial sorting of prisoners, where most of the captured men from the Cuneense Division ended up. The camp stayed open only for a little over a month—from 1 March to 6 April 1943—but during that time 1,566 Italians died there, according to Russian sources. Innumerable others whose personal data were not collected died there as well, particularly because of the camp command’s poor management.28

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Unlike Khrenovoe, where prisoners were huddled together in Tsarist-era horse stables,29 the Michurinsk and Tambov camps included no buildings, and were located in the woods. In Michurinsk, prisoners had to sleep on the ground, whereas in Tambov they were lodged in underground hovels, sustained on the inside by frameworks made of branches. There were forty or so such bunkers. Seven housed the officers, while the remaining ones were used for the soldiers, who were mostly Romanian and Hungarian. At first, these quarters were tight for the prisoners, but as the days went by the high death rate would take care of making more room for them. A Tambov survivor recalls: The bunkers—that’s what we called them—were the result of an underground dig. The tunnels’ sizes varied: some, like the one I’d ended up in, were about four meters long and three meters wide; others were larger, fifteen meters or more in length and five meters in width. The latter would hold as many as a hundred prisoners. All the bunkers were covered with a  meter of dirt, and had a  single opening (not a  door, mind you). They were accessed by a ramp so steep it required balance on the way down, and strength on the way up. There were no actual walls inside; left and right of a  corridor spanning the whole length of the bunker were two rather inclined embankments; on each was spread some straw, our bed for the night. We could do nothing but stay in (underground!) the whole time, given our conditions, and the fact that it was even colder outside than inside. We were thus condemned to darkness, as each bunker lacked even the smallest of openings, other than the one used as an entrance.30

This is what another survivor had to say: My group was assigned bunker 21. I was one of the first to climb down the three or four steps of frozen snow, and, bowing down, to go through the low, doorless opening. […] Inside, there was literally nothing; the frozen ground was what the new camp offered us for a bed. We found out there was no kitchen, there were no toilets, there was no water, there was no fencing. On the steppe side, only a string of sentinels stood guard at a distance of fifty meters, deep in snow and wearing a heavy fur coat. On the wood side, there was nothing, or so it seemed; we’d gone in a short distance, but soon enough we were thigh-deep in powdery snow.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Our inspections dampened even our most modest expectations. The camp offered nothing that might encourage hope in a less animallike existence than the one experienced up until then.31

In the Tambov and Michurinsk camps, prisoners enjoyed relative freedom. There were no fences, unnecessary as the harshness of the Russian winter and the prisoners’ severe debilitation made escapes impossible or futile.32 Hygiene was all but absent. There was no water, and there were no latrines. Not even lighting.33 Prisoners were forced to quench their thirst with snow. They wore foul, lousy clothes. No medical assistance existed, so even first-degree frostbites or relatively minor wounds could prove fatal. These conditions led to the outbreak of dysentery and typhus epidemics, which decimated the prisoners. Indeed, typhus had been endemic in the Soviet Union since before the war. Suffice it to say that in the first three months of 1933 alone, as many as 142,000 infirm people—hunger-stricken and even sick with typhus—had flooded the Gulag camps.34 But the most serious issue was food. In Tambov, even when rations were available for distribution, they were extremely scarce. Prisoners received a piece of black bread, which was supposed to last them the whole day; tea in the morning; kasha (semolina porridge) for lunch; and a thin, innutritious soup for dinner.35 Teams charged with going to the distribution point and bringing the rations back to their comrades were set up daily in each bunker. On these occasions, aggressions and the stealing of food (real or feigned) often occurred: Around midnight the barracks chief and his trusted men return from collecting the bread, with six fewer loaves than expected. They report being attacked by a gang of Romanians armed with persuasive sticks. As luck would have it, mine is one of the last teams on the roster completed for the occasion, and as such one of the teams forced to do without half a ration. Suspicions about the barracks chief and his stooges strengthen, especially in those personally stung by the incident. The Romanians would not have settled for six loaves.36

Complete chaos reigned in Tambov, Khrenovoe, and Temnikov: “the doling out of soup was reason enough for quarrels, disorders, and fist fights, which the Russians would not intervene to stop.”37 Distributing food fell to the Romanians and Hungarians, who felt fortified by the role appointed to them, and treated the newly-arrived Italians and Germans with contempt.

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On this subject, Major Massa Gallucci recalls an episode that occurred during the first days of his imprisonment in Tambov: A wagon appeared bearing a barrel propped up by bearded, ragged men, surely prisoners themselves appointed to kitchen duty. A cloud of smoke rose from the barrel—it was our soup, something warm. Then a pitiful scene I’d rather not remember played out before me. I never did find out what kind of soup the barrel contained. A ravenous crowd threw itself at the container, screaming in hunger. The barrel came undone and the thin soup spilled on the snow, forming a large yellowish stain.38

These accounts portray a  camp entirely lacking in organization, where prisoners were effectively left to themselves. Indeed, Soviet personnel was in short supply in all prison camps. Often, thousands of prisoners were supervised by a single NKVD colonel or major, a political commissar, two noncommissioned officers and a  dozen guards. Servicemen were helped by sestry (nurses), who in addition to handling health care, made lists and divided prisoners into work teams, exonerating the sick. In Tambov, the enforcement of discipline and the carrying out of a  number of duties fell to the Romanians: “alongside them [are placed] some Jews of Magyar, Czech, and Ukrainian South-Carpathian descent, mobilized in Nazi and Hungarian labor battalions, and freed by the Russian army. Mostly [they are] professionals or university students. The Romanian hierarchy and the Jews alike are in absolutely normal physical conditions, and wear very elegant uniforms. Members of both categories speak Russian perfectly.”39 Exploiting their role, the Romanians established a regime of tyranny at the expense of all other nationalities. They had even set up a police corps, “[bearing] a special badge and band, and armed with gnarled sticks,” whose main aim was to protect the Romanians who at night attacked the teams of prisoners sent out to collect bread supplies.40 Further, according to some accounts, the Russians did not usually beat the prisoners themselves, deeming such methods “fascist.” Instead, the thrashings were normally carried out by the Romanians in charge of discipline.41 According to the testimony of Medical Lieutenant Temistocle Pallavicini, however, violence and abuse in Tambov were commonly practiced by the Russians, too, “suitably helped by the barracks chiefs and the men in charge of duties in the camp: Romanians, Hungarians, Yugoslavs.”42 Fundamentally, the various accounts reveal that arrival in the camps did not improve the living conditions of the prisoners. On the contrary, the lack of organization reigning in all camps produced a further increase in

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their death rate. In March 1943, in the Tambov, Temnikov, Michurinsk and Khrenovoe camps alone mortality soared to 90 percent as a result of the spread of epidemic typhus. In Tambov […] epidemic typhus strikes; between five and seven hundred die each day. Naked, completely naked, the deceased are taken into the woods on sleds. Once you are dead, they undress you, and you lose your nationality; the dead—whether German, Italian, Hungarian or Romanian—get mixed, all together. That’s why there’s no way of knowing who died in Russia.43

A table published by a  Russian-German committee set up to create a memorial dedicated to the victims of the Tambov camp provides an analytical breakdown of the deaths by nationality: It is calculated that, between 1 December 1942 and 10 June 1943, NKVD camp No. 188 in Rada admitted 24,036 prisoners, 10,639 of whom died. Mortality was especially high in January, with 1,854 deaths; in February, with 2,582; in March, with 2,932; and in April, with 1,811. Typhus was the main cause of death. Only 267 men died in May. As for the nationalities [of those affected], these are the numbers: out of 851 German prisoners, 648 died 76.1% out of 11,199 Romanian prisoners, 2,856 died 21.0% out of 10,118 Italian prisoners, 6,909 died 68.2% out of 1,832 Hungarian prisoners, 726 died 39.6%44

The high mortality of Germans and Italians, more than twice that of Romanians, is striking. As we have seen, Romanians held “prestigious” positions in Tambov, a circumstance only reinforced when the Germans and the Italians arrived in the camp. This ensured that Romanians could enjoy better living conditions. The Germans, who had escaped summary executions by firing squad upon capture and during the marches, were generally subjected to the worst treatment. The Italians, on the other hand, were ill-adjusted to the climate, and, initially, to life in the camp, finding it hard to make sense of the situation and to understand how best to achieve positions of prestige for themselves. This would happen later, and be one of the contributing factors to the significant decrease in the mortality of Italian prisoners. Living conditions in Khrenovoe camp No. 81 were no better than in Tambov. Chaplain Carlo Caneva’s account makes up one the harshest pages extracted from any of the memoirs written by those who experienced

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life in this camp, which, for lack of documents and hard data, did not officially supersede Tambov as the one with the highest mortality. Over twenty years later, just thinking about Khrenovoe, I am overcome with horror and fear, like someone waking up from a terrible nightmare. To tell of Khrenovoe is dreadful. It hurts those who lived in the camp and do the telling, and it can hurt the mothers of the many who went missing there—mothers who suffered and wept as they waited uselessly, and still weep today. Yet it would be unfair for fear of memories and compassion for the pain [these memories might provoke in others] to condemn to oblivion one of the most tragic and monstrous pages in the history of the Italian campaign in Russia. Twenty-seven thousand soldiers perished in Khrenovoe; of these, as many as twenty thousand were Italian.45

The Khrenovoe camp was a square-shaped expanse surrounded by walls and barbed wire, containing depots separated by large yards. In the camp, [it was] a  Dantean hell! […] we were lodged in facilities intended for the barracks’ quadrupeds; twenty-seven or so of us occupied a  horse stall. It was physically impossible to lie down for lack of space. Food for the officers: 100 grams of black rye bread… two mess-tins of so-called hot soup, in which all that floated around was potato peel… Water was drawn from a well holding the corpses of four Hungarian soldiers. High rate of cannibalism…46

Enrico Reginato, a physician detained in the USSR until 1954, gives a similar testimony in his memoirs: At the center of the [camp’s] yard was a deep well. A rope, made with belts and rags tied together, was used to lower some cans into the well and draw water. Thirsty men crowded around the well, and, in the commotion, some would fall in and drown. The corpses were moved with a pole, and water continued to be drawn.47 Inside the stables, the prisoners could barely see. In the deep of the night, we awoke with a  start. Some men had entered holding lit torches. There were several of them, and they screamed like demons. […] We could not make out what they wanted, but that proved unnecessary. The first [prisoners] they could put their

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR hands on, they counted, twice, and shoved outside. […] [Our comrades] returned the next day; some said they had moved corpses for what was left of the night. No one came [for us] on the following day and night: it was as if we had been forgotten. […] It was the third day after our arrival, and still we hadn’t been assigned a  place to sleep, nor had they given us a  single gram of food. Absolutely nothing. We would have settled for a  morsel of bread, a  fistful of straw, a  bandage. Dumbfounded, I  looked at the others—wounded, frostbitten, dying of hunger and fatigue.48

Prisoners were abandoned and neglected by Soviet personnel to an extremely high extent in camp No. 81: “it seemed as if humanity had suddenly taken a backward leap to its earliest stages. Civilization, moral and religious principles, feelings of charity and brotherhood—they all had disappeared, it seemed, supplanted by the brutal violence of a reemerging primordial spirit of conservation.”49 Khrenovoe’s appalling conditions even motivated prisoners to contemplate an extreme solution. “When they all came to feel that they were being condemned to cruel agony by the Soviets, […] Alpine Colonel Scrimin was charged with asking the Russian command for mercy in the form of execution by firing squad for all. The Soviets found the request inappropriate, and advised [prisoners] to wait.”50 Russian sources also attest to the inhuman conditions of Khrenovoe. A  document dated 30 March 1943 features the results of an inspection conducted by physicians and an NKVD functionary, aimed at ascertaining the conditions of the prisoners and the causes for the very high mortality in the camp.51 The inspectors’ report denounced a state of serious neglect and squalor: Prisoners are housed in the dark buildings of the former stables. […] For the past two months, straw has been used for bedding. The stables were heated with iron stoves, but the quarters were not warm enough. Following the camp commander’s orders, the temperature was kept at 6–7 degrees [Celsius]. The camp grounds are seriously polluted with fecal masses.52

Yet, in anticipation of an inspection, the administration had “taken forceful measures to clean and sanitize the camp’s indoor and outdoor facilities.”53

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As the report shows, the prisoners were already severely debilitated on arrival in the camp. According to the available data, 26,805 prisoners got to Khrenovoe between 24 January and 23 March; 9,273 of these were Italian. Only 29 percent of the total number of prisoners were healthy—that is to say, able to walk independently. The sick and the very weak made up 71 percent of this population. To reach the camp, the inspectors wrote, the prisoners had had to endure heavy marches in low temperatures, on an inadequate diet, and with “insufficient medical assistance.” In essence, “the prisoners who arrived [in the camp] were in very poor health, suffered from vermin, had frostbite on their upper and lower limbs, and were ill equipped (some of them lacked shoes, hats, and coats).”54 The very poor state of the prisoners on arrival was only made worse by the dramatic conditions of the camp, where disinterest in and neglect of the detainees were clearly the norm. The most eloquent piece of information is that of the 26,805 prisoners who arrived at the camp on 24 January 1943, only 298 remained two months later; 48 of these were in need of medical attention, while the remaining 250 were “relatively healthy.” All around, it had been a hecatomb. This piece of information explains why the GUPVI itself had decided to send a commission to Khrenovoe in order to shed light on the situation. “After careful inspection of the camps in Khobotovo and Khrenovoe,” on 6 April, Deputy Interior Minister Kruglov forced their shut-down, and ordered that material goods be transported to other camps, and that “the credits acquired” through the work of prisoners of war be “transferred to the financial section of the NKVD.”55 Before the decree was issued, on 3 March, the commander of the Khrenovoe camp, Captain of State Security Vasily G. Kuznetsov, had been arrested “for having a negligent and criminal attitude toward his service obligations, for failing to execute instructions by the NKVD of the USSR on the modes of detention of the prisoners of war, for not ensuring that their living conditions meet the necessary requirements, and for not keeping discipline among prisoners.”56 It was a widespread rumor among the latter that Kuznetsov had been shot dead. In fact, following his arrest, he was appointed to several posts, and in October 1947 he finally ended up in the cadres office of the GUPVI.57 Recollections of what transpired in Michurinsk are no less appalling. Roughly 5,350 of us arrived in that camp, counting soldiers and officers (124). At the end of March, [the camp] was closed for military reasons (the German offensive). The healthy were transferred to locations beyond the Urals, whereas the sick were moved to a nearby camp. What

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR are the figures? About 400 people [were sent] to the Urals. Of these, fewer than 200 are living today. The nearby camp took in 420 men, of whom 60 or 70 at the most are still living. Thus, a  total of roughly 4,500 units died in Michurinsk, and only 250–260 Michurinsk survivors remained in the other two camps.58

On 31 December 1945, in relaying the content of the reports made by repatriated soldiers to the Ministry of Post-War Assistance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on the Russians’ treatment of Italian prisoners: I have not heard of any episodes of premeditated cruelty or intentional abuse on the part of the Russians. While our soldiers’ memories of the time spent in captivity are horrendous, and while they deeply resent their incarcerators, they recognize that they were not the victims of inhuman treatment, but only, or primarily, of almost inconceivable negligence. They claim 90 percent of the Italian expeditionary corps taken prisoner in Russia has died in the concentration camps. […] Their recollection of the large camp in Tambov is especially sad […]. Food was very scarce and, as a result of the deficient organization, unequally distributed. The daily mortality exceeded 500 men. A  soldier who spent six months there says that of the 14,000 Italians [originally detained in the camp] there remain no more than 400.59

3. Internment camps On 1 March 1943, Beria issued a  decree spelling out the criteria to be adopted for the distribution of prisoners captured in the Don area, and of the 78,500 Germans seized in Stalingrad. According to the minister of the interior, officers were to be transferred thus: most German officers should be sent to the camps of Oranki and Elabuga (No. 97), whereas those coming from Italy, Romania, Hungary and other countries should be sent to Suzdal. Soldiers already detained in Oranki and in Suzdal—764 and 1,004 respectively—were to be transferred immediately.60 The application of the decree issued on 1 March was not prompt, however. As Russian records show, Italian officers were still dying in high numbers in the Tambov camp in late March and in April. The special attention devoted to officers was intended to offer the latter better living conditions in captivity—as we will see, the Suzdal camp was indeed more organized than others—and to create an environment conducive to the setting up of propaganda activities.

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The separation of soldiers and officers had started in the sorting camps. For instance, in Khrenovoe, officers were lodged in different barracks from those assigned to troop members. Both at the sorting camp stage and subsequently, discrimination would take place even with regard to food, to the clear benefit of officers.61 While prisoner distribution in the camps based on nationality had always been rejected and opposed by the NKVD, rank became the fundamental criterion for distribution, both because soldiers could thus be used in forced labor and because propaganda activities could be molded on the prisoners’ different cultural and political backgrounds. At first, the distribution of prisoners in the camps had followed no particular standard: in January–February 1943, the Soviet commands had been faced with managing about half a million prisoners, who were sorted and sent to the camps in a largely haphazard way. Based on the available accounts, it has been ascertained that, from the prisoner gathering points, some of the luckier officers were dispatched to the Suzdal camp directly62; others spent only a few days in Tambov, before being transferred to Oranki or to Suzdal63; and still others remained in Tambov or in Khrenovoe for longer periods of time, dying there. The influx of Italian soldiers was especially large in the internment camps of Mordovia, 600 km south-east of Moscow; in the Tatar and Mari ASSRs on the other side of the Volga (1,000 km east of Moscow); in the Urals, in the regions of Perm and Sverdlovsk (1,800 km east of Moscow); in the region of Tashkent in southern Kazakhstan, on the border with China and Afghanistan. Despite being relatively better equipped (with framed shelters, straw mattresses, blankets, kitchen facilities, latrines, bathrooms, and sanitation rooms), these camps experienced extremely high mortality rates as well.64 Out of about 1,500 Italians transferred to camp No. 241/4 (Gubakha, Perm region), only 600 were still alive by April 1943; on 20 June 1943, when the camp was evacuated, the number had dropped to exactly half that.65 In the internment camp of Oranki, 661 Italians died, including 327 officers.66 In the camp hospital, mostly housing prisoners sick with typhus, two patients lay on each straw mattress, under the same blanket; there were neither sheets nor pillows; every evening, the nurse would find three or four dead (out of a hundred or so). Drugs were unavailable, and hygiene very poor. Some camp personnel members and civilians living outside were also infected by typhus, and died.67 The epidemic took a  heavy toll in Oranki. Privations, poor nutrition, the climate, the lack of hygiene, promiscuity, and the shortage of medication, all favored the onset of wasting diseases. Tuberculosis did not

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR spare anyone who was the least bit predisposed to such illness. Men on the verge of death dozed off in a state of insensitivity, and serenely succumbed, as if their spirit had already been delivered from their suffering limbs.68

In a report submitted to the Vatican Information Office, the chaplain Corrado Bertoldi, just back from imprisonment, spoke thus of Oranki: Later when transferred to the camp of Oranghi [Oranki] (Gorky), he got sick, like everyone else, with epidemic typhus and dysentery. Those who couldn’t walk were left to die in the forest. Out of 6,000, there remained alive […] just over 200 men. Here, they lived in wooden barracks, and obtained food in almost sufficient quantities. In this camp, called a hospital camp, the death rate was high for the lack of medicines and treatments, and because physicians were in short supply.69

In general, living conditions in interment camps were initially no better than in sorting camps. Even in Suzdal, the convent-fortress located between Moscow and Gorky, where conditions were more acceptable for prisoners, 821 Italians lost their lives. It is hard to paint an overall picture of living conditions in the camps: they varied from one to another, and also from time to time, based on a number of factors, such as the camp’s command, its location, and the kind of labor the prisoners were compelled to carry out. The management of internment camps was under the strict supervision of the NKVD, whose functionaries, through regular inspections, were supposed to verify that everything was in working order and well organized. As in the case of Khrenovoe, serious shortcomings in the way a camp functioned could lead to its commander’s transfer. By a decree dated 2 June 1943, Deputy Minister for State Security Kruglov ordered that the commander of internment camp No. 35, M.M. Karelin, be removed from his post. An inspection of conditions in the camp had brought to light the “grave violation of the decrees and orders issued by the NKVD.” According to Kruglov, “the criteria used for the defense and recording of the prisoners were unsatisfactory; the required isolation of prisoners who had attempted to flee was disregarded, nor was anything done to prevent their flight. Instances of prisoner maltreatment had taken place, in the form of beatings and the stealing of their belongings on the part of those charged with keeping watch on them.” Kruglov also pointed out that food provisions did not follow the established norms. There had been an “increase

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in spending for food rations, and theft of foodstuff” intended for prisoners. Orders were defied in the camp even when it came to hygiene: “without regard for the prevalence of lice, sick prisoners were kept alongside healthy ones; the complete absence of satisfactory sanitation facilities led to an increase in infectious diseases. As a result of all this, the health of prisoners deteriorated, and mortality among them rose.”70 Once the complex initial phase involving the transfer of thousands of prisoners from the front to the interior was completed, the Soviet leadership’s attitude toward survivors gradually changed because of the high mortality recorded during the marches and in the sorting camps. On 15 May 1943 a decree calling for the safeguarding of prisoners of war, and detailing measures to be taken to reduce their mortality, was issued. It was the important NKVD order No. 248, signed by Beria, sent to all camps with the objective of imposing common criteria with which to “improve the living conditions of prisoners” and “bring camp lodgings and grounds to exemplary sanitary standards.” The order further aimed to “improve the health care provided to each prisoner,” and to establish “a different diet for sick and weak prisoners.” The latter were to receive “750 grams of bread per day, and a  food ration increased by 25 percent until their ability to work was fully restored.”71 While acknowledging the severe neglect suffered by prisoners, as well as the need to reduce their high death rate, the order claimed their extreme physical weakness and the diseases they developed should be ascribed to their conditions prior to capture, not to the treatment endured during imprisonment.72 Partially as a  result of this order, in subsequent years living conditions gradually improved in the camps, though food scarcity and difficulty in medicine procurement were chronic.

4. Relationships among prisoners Initially, when prisoners were still huddled in camps with little or no organization, the management of camp life was up to the more enterprising officers. Survivor Fidia Gambetti recalls that in Tambov he found fellow soldiers whom he had believed dead. The latter had become camp veterans, and started to organize life in the bunkers. They elected or ratified “the self-election of a barracks chief and two helpers, chosen among the NCOs or among soldiers who [spoke] a  bit of Russian. The men [were] divided into teams of ten, with a commander who answer[ed] for them before the barracks chief, the only person responsible to the camp’s authorities.”73

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Subsequently, when the situation had normalized, it was the Russians who appointed team leaders, chosen within national groupings. Prisoners, split into brigades, were commanded by their team leaders both within the camp and outside the camp during work expeditions. According to the prisoners’ own accounts, the chosen leaders were often stricter at enforcing orders than the Russians themselves. It also frequently occurred that team leaders vexed and abused their fellow countrymen. Conflicts among prisoners stemmed from material reasons at first, particularly from the need to secure food, drink, or shelter from the cold. As conditions improved and prisoners’ most basic needs came to be satisfied, however, new reasons for strife emerged. Hitherto completely disregarded or viewed as secondary, these reasons were political in nature. In particular, a stark contrast emerged between those who—whether out of deep conviction or opportunism—had adhered to antifascism, and those who continued to profess their faith in fascism, sometimes provocatively boasting this (extending their arms in the Roman salute or singing Faccetta nera in the middle of the camp). These conflicts led to actual clashes and aggressions between the Italian officers detained in Suzdal. On 5 October 1945, jotting down information acquired on an “anti-Soviet” officer in his notepad, the camp political instructor Giuseppe Ossola wrote: “He is a fascist provocateur, an agent of the camp’s reactionary gang. He constantly threatens the progressive elements of the antifascist movement, particularly Major B., saying: ‘We’ll settle the score with you and yours once in Italy,’ or ‘We will get you hanged.’”74 Months earlier, he had written: “Two second lieutenants have accused the group of men most active [in antifascist activities] of having been bought off by the Russians. They threatened to kill Major B. if they found him 500 meters out of the camp.”75 According to Ossola, an “organized fascist terrorist group, which would stop at nothing,” had become established in the camp. This “band” was made up of eleven officers, duly listed “in order of dangerousness.” Indeed, the men had “prepared a  list with the names of forty antifascists to be killed upon exiting Frankfort,”76 that is, on Allied soil, before entering Italy. Lieutenant C.A. is the organizer of the terrorist squad mentioned above. He is shrewd. He takes the names of antifascists in order to report them to terrorist squads in Italy. He has a close bond with Major C.G. Together they make notes and share thoughts on the men they plan to report in Italy. These last few days, Major C. has started resorting to open provocations. Second Lieutenant A.F., who lives in the same room, is aware of everything. He can provide precious information.

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They are two of the most dangerous individuals. They are doubtless members of fascist squads. 12 February 1946. On 4 March 1946, in room 15, Lieutenant I. condemned the provocation by V. in Italy on the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union. Lieutenant C. answered: “anything said against the Soviet Union is good; as for you, I., when we return to Italy you will surely find someone who will tear your eyes out. You won’t escape us, and others of your ilk present in this camp will not get away from us either.” 7 March 1946.77

Tensions and conflicts were exacerbated by the well-known fact that certain officers acted as informers, relaying information on their fellow soldiers to camp commanders and antifascist instructors. Informers reported on anything the most hostile individuals might say about the Soviet Union, the war, and fascism. In perfect compliance with the Soviet police system, something of a spy network had formed to unmask the “enemies of socialism.” In the Suzdal camp, officers most critical of communism and the USSR were concentrated in barracks No. 13, alongside prisoners whose task it was to report their opinions. The reasons behind some prisoners’ willingness to collaborate with the system and act as informers are complex. Some collaborated believing the promises of early repatriation made to them, or in hopes of receiving preferential treatment. But certainly there were also those who did so because they were won over by antifascism and the communist cause. A further source of conflict was the fact that subordinates were put in charge of work brigades. While hierarchy had almost entirely become irrelevant, particularly during the first phase of imprisonment, the Soviets’ decision to assign the command of units “without regard for rank” was cause not only for complaints on the part of the higher-ups, but also for the frequent refusal by lower-ranking men to collaborate. Many officers declined command positions with “the pretext that their group comprised captains that were their seniors in rank,” or because they did not wish to be the “agents of the maltreatments and humiliations to which the Russians, directly or indirectly, subjected Italian officers.”78 The decline of military hierarchy was certainly the effect of the circumstances of their captivity, but also, and perhaps primarily, of the decisions made by the Soviet command, which distinguished prisoners based on exclusively political criteria. In the Stalinist way of thinking, it was inconceivable that soldiers and officers of a  warring army might not be politicized. The Red Army displayed an ideological bent in its very name, and it defended the people of the soviets. By the same token, the invading

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army could be nothing but “fascist.” Therefore, those who did not take part in political activities in the camps were viewed as fascist too, while those who did were assigned tasks and treated favorably (for instance, they were given better food, and more of it). Camps were organized in such a way as to promote conflicts and divisions between groups of different nationalities. Camp commands aimed to avoid alliances between prisoners that might lead to disorders and revolts. To this end, the GUPVI concentrated different nationals in each camp, making communication difficult. Reporting on the situation of the Karaganda camp to the Political Section of the Red Army, Bianco drew attention to the fact that in the central sector Italians had been placed alongside former Cossacks of the Soviet army. These had joined the Wehrmacht and been taken prisoner. Justification for this state of affairs was therefore the need to “keep order among [the Cossacks], who had been captured with the Germans”: The Cossacks have beaten the Italian prisoners half to death, to the point that camp administrators have decided to move them so as to avoid instances of summary justice at the hands of the Italians. On this issue, I  must point out that those who ought to see too often “do not see” that some prisoners abuse those placed in their charge as subordinates.79

Another reason for division was the practice of assigning tasks in such a way as to favor certain national groups, whereby creating discriminations and privileges. Being in charge of food distribution offered the opportunity of accessing rations directly. Survival itself could depend on equitable food allocation—namely, on receiving the right amount of soup.80 Even the management of sanitation and hygiene facilities, when present, had its advantages. Before they could wash themselves, prisoners had to remove their clothes for disinfestation purposes.81 Those who oversaw the sauna facilities were presented with a  chance to steal sweaters and trousers in good state, which they could use as a bargaining chip. The stealing of garments was yet another cause of conflict among prisoners.

5. Hunger In the Soviet Union, hunger had been a  constant since the 1930s, when the process of forced industrialization and the collectivization of

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agriculture, and the ensuing famines, caused tremendous difficulty for food supplies. In the emergency of wartime, the problem took on catastrophic proportions. Taking “one meager meal a  day” in the Hotel Lux was a  treat even for those who, in 1942 Moscow, worked for the Comintern.82 Many communist émigrés insisted with the Comintern’s senior officials that their families be transferred to Moscow, so that they could benefit from the Lux’s coveted meal vouchers.83 In the country’s periphery, the situation was far worse. People died of starvation and there were instances of cannibalism 17 April 1945, for example, local party organs reported to Stalin, Molotov and Malenkov on “cases of mortality from malnutrition and severe foodstuff shortage” in certain Asian republics, including the Republic of Uzbekistan. These had resulted from the “failed harvest of 1944 and the insufficient procurement of cereal products.”84 On that same day, the local soviet informed Stalin, Molotov and Beria that two youths—a twelve year old in the region of Andizhan (Uzbekistan), and another young man in Samarkand—had been arrested for selling human flesh.85 It is known that anthropophagy was widely practiced by the population of Leningrad in the course of the long siege the city had had to withstand.86 In such a difficult situation for the Russian population and the warring army itself, it should come as no surprise that the treatment of prisoners of war was entirely inadequate. Hunger is the most tragic memory shared by all survivors. It accompanied prisoners from the davai marches to the camps. It would be inaccurate to say rations were insufficient only during the earliest stages of captivity, for even subsequently there never was a regular distribution of food, and, although conditions did improve in the course of the years, procurements remained consistently inadequate. Survivors’ accounts speak of terrible suffering in the camps due to hunger. Prisoners spent days with a pitiful hope of receiving a sufficient ration, or in the desperate search for something edible. Hunger was torture for these men, forced to live and work in an extremely harsh climate on a  diet comprising just a  small amount of bread per day, and soup every three or four days. In the course of detention, many lost up to forty kilograms. I used to weigh 85–90 kilograms, and now I  am down to 49… The great death rate among prisoners (92–95 percent) is due exclusively to the lack of nutrition, on account of which disease easily triumphed over bodies thus weakened.87

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Bread had become a currency of exchange. In sorting camps, the Romanians or Hungarians who managed the kitchens carried out an actual traffic, bartering bread for clothes, tobacco, and other products. The possession of material goods—a watch, a fountain pen, or some such item—could be a real boon to prisoners. Often, to obtain a  small amount of extra food, prisoners failed to report deaths in their barracks or bunkers, and kept taking rations intended for those who had died until hiding the corpses became impossible. In Tambov, Khrenovoe, Temnikov, and Michurinsk the lack of food led to anthropophagy. Instances of cannibalism—which in winter involved the consumption of flesh from prisoners who had just died, before their corpses could freeze—were more prevalent among soldiers, whose food rations were significantly smaller than officers’. Accounts of cannibalism may be found both in the memoirs of those who experienced life in the camps and in official sources. A  document from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 31 December 1945, claims the following with regard to Tambov: Cannibalism was commonly practiced there. One of the internees has told me that the Romanians detained in the same camp trafficked in human flesh cut off from corpses, which they exchanged for bread, and that he had eaten it more than once himself.88

In Khrenovoe, “the almost complete lack of food resulted in several cases of cannibalism involving the many who died daily of epidemic typhus, hunger and cold.”89 The following account is by Father Maurilio Turla, chaplain of the “Saluzzo” Battalion: Hunger has wrested control from reason, and made beasts of men. Cannibalism—the literal manhunt—is the weapon brandished by the crazed, hungry prisoners to ward off death. The first incidents of anthropophagy occurred among the Hungarian Jews, soon emulated by Italians and Romanians. […] Sadly, I  witnessed these inhuman tragedies. As priests, our words were sometimes able to take hold of those minds, ravaged by monstrous aberrations, but abstention from such atrocities was shortlived. Hunger pushed men beyond all morals. Only [the wielding of] sticks and iron bars had the power to repress anthropophagy, or at least to limit its spread.90

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To fight the phenomenon, officers set up “anticannibalism teams.” These were comprised of “volunteer officers who, at night, made the rounds with maces, and in the morning reported horrors.” But, despite these measures, the practice of cannibalism continued.91 Former IMIs (Italian Military Internees) detained by the Germans also reported cases of anthropophagy in Tambov. “Freed” by the Red Army and removed from the camps of the Reich, the IMIs were deported to the USSR, where they would share the fate of ARMIR soldiers. Among the IMIs was a  soldier of the Acqui Division, Salvatore Porelli, who described the situation in the following terms: [Tambov] housed forty-thousand men. The roofs of the barracks emerged from the soil, and windows were flush with the ground; they lacked water, latrines, and heating. We were forced to sleep on loose planks, arranged so as to make up two tiers. They thought of us as moles bearing a resemblance to humans. […] It also occurred that flesh went missing from corpses, and it was said that the Romanians exchanged it for bread. Flesh did indeed go missing, but beyond the rumors I am not able to assert whether the trade actually took place or not. One thing’s for sure, though—the grapevine has never been wrong.92

Beria had urged the men in charge of the camps to abide by food regulations (normy pitaniya), particularly when it came to sick and wounded prisoners, since February 1943.93 A decree dated 16 March established the amount of food prisoners were to be given each day—that is, their daily food norms. Stated in grams, quantities differed based on the intended recipients, of which there were three categories. Norm No. 1 applied to soldiers and noncommissioned officers; norm No. 2 applied to officers; and, finally, norm No. 3 applied to prisoners who were being punished in the gatehouses, and did not go out to carry out work.94 Rations intended for officers were nearly twice as big as those for soldiers: that was the consequence of a new attitude toward officers, which marked the end of the deep-rooted equalitarianism that had characterized the Red Army, and had been projected onto the enemy army. The daily ration of meat was 30 grams for soldiers, and 50 grams for officers; the same was true of butter and fish.

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Table 3.1. Average food norms for the requirements of internees in corrective and labor camps, and in the colonies of the NKVD of the USSR Daily quantities per person (grams) Products

Quantities

Notes

1

Bread

700

For men performing heavy labor

2

Bread

600

For men performing other work

3

Flour

10

4

Meal – pasta

80

5

Meat – meat derivatives

20

6

Fish – fish derivatives

60

7

Fats (vegetable or animal)

13

8

Sugar

10

9

Tea substitute

2

10

Natural tea

0.05

11

Potatoes and vegetables

12

Tomato purée/sauce

13

Dried fruit

0.2

(Only for the sick)

14

Potato starch

0.2

(Only for the sick)

15

Black pepper

0.1

16

Bay leaf

0.1

17

Salt

(Only for the sick)

400 10

10

Source: Decree No. 0463 dated 3 December 1942, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 119, l. 58. Original. Confidential.

The norms dictated that prisoners be allotted vinegar, a bay leaf, and even 0.1 grams of pepper. They further called for the monthly distribution of soap, an item not always readily available. There were special norms for the sick, who were prescribed larger quantities of food and, more importantly, a greater variety of food. They were given twenty-five different food items, as opposed to the usual seventeen (which included fresh milk, rice, and vegetables). Their rations were generally twice the amount given to soldiers.

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The administration, however, rarely managed to ensure the regular distribution of food. Prisoners failed to receive even the minimum quantities provided for in the orders issued by the NKVD. One survivor recalls: To look at the charts, there was reason to rejoice. They listed meat, fresh vegetables, butter, cereal, and fish. Not even vinegar and bay leaves were forgotten. But in practice, we were starving to death. There is no meat, the camp commanders would announce, we will give you cereal: millet, oats, barley. In proportion to meat, the amount of cereal should have been far greater. Yet supplies of cereal were defective too—either the “transports” were still unmarked, or the snow was thawing and roads were impassable. And so it would be potatoes. These too should have been more plentiful. Half of them were good, half of them were rotten. If they had stopped at this, so be it, we would have made do. But beneath it all was a subtle Machiavellian plot—substitution after substitution they would end up doling out air, of which there was plenty. Eat this, and let’s be done with it.95

Table 3.2. Food norms for the daily requirements of prisoners of war Daily norm per person (grams) Products

Norm No. 1 for soldiers and NCOs

Norm No. 2 for officers

Norm No. 3 for prisoners being punished in gatehouses

1

Second-quality wheat flour

10

10

5

2

Semolina

70

80

50

3

Pasta (macaroni, vermicelli)

10

20

—

4

Meat

30

50

—

5

Fish

50

50

30

6

Mixed fat

3

10

—

7

Vegetable oil

10

10

5

8

Tomato purée/sauce

10

10

5

9

Sugar

10

20

—

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Daily norm per person (grams) Products

Norm No. 1 for soldiers and NCOs

Norm No. 2 for officers

Norm No. 3 for prisoners being punished in gatehouses

—

.1

—

10

Natural tea

11

Tea substitute

2

—

2

12

Salt

10

12

8

13

Bay leaf

.1

.1

—

14

Black pepper

.1

.1

.1

15

Vinegar

.7

1

—

16

Vegetables (potatoes, fresh cabbage, sauerkraut, carrots, turnips, onion, cucumbers, other vegetables)

300–100 30–50–10 10

360–150 30–40–10 10

180–80 turnips: 40 —

17

Soap for all needs (monthly)

200

200

—

Source: GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 133, l. 145–151, l. 149 verso. Original. Secret.

In April 1943, the State Defense Committee (GKO) decided medical supplies to the camps would be entrusted to the Main Military Medical Administration of the Red Army.96 This made it possible for camps to receive medicine, medical equipment, and disinfectants. However, on 10 May, in light of the unacceptable living conditions in the camps, Kruglov ordered that all prisoners be diverted for a period of ten days from productive activities to lighter labor, such as the maintenance of the heating system, or vegetable farming.97 Things improved somewhat in the course of 1944. But then, between the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, disorganization caused a noticeable worsening in the food, and prisoner treatment deteriorated in general: it was as if there had been a reversion to the conditions of the sorting camps. This led to the hunger strike announced by the officers of camp No. 160, on 15 and 16 January 1946.98 Over the previous months troops had begun to be repatriated. Officers, whose return home was delayed, were going through a time of exasperation, dejection and discouragement. According to the instructor Ossola’s journal, the strike had been organized by a dozen officers for “antidemocratic” ends, “exploiting the contingent material difficulties of the camp.”99 Even two chaplains, Father

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Caneva and Father Bonadeo, had joined the strike, according to Ossola, for “antigovernmental and antidemocratic purposes,” and to “take hold on young officers.”100 The report on the conditions of Italian prisoners of war in camp No. 160 that Kruglov sent Molotov and Malenkov also addressed the strike: Last 15 January, a  group of reactionary officers, headed by colonel Longo, tried to refuse food; 180 Italian prisoner-of-war officers [out of the 494 detained in the Suzdal camp] when it was time for lunch did not go to eat, and inquired with the camp administration as to why they had not been repatriated and were not receiving letters from home.101

The camp command, Kruglov said in conclusion, had “taken the necessary measures to handle the matter,” and “no more hunger strikes had occurred” in Suzdal.102 The initiative had therefore borne some fruits; according to the survivors’ accounts, the food improved somewhat. The fact that fewer than half of the officers were willing to take part in the strike is a testament to the political divisions coursing through the internee community. According to Ossola’s diary, most of the strikers were the same men who opposed antifascist activities and professed themselves fascists or nationalists. In two 1949 reports to Molotov, Kruglov himself included among the charges against the Italian officers held in the Soviet Union for their crimes not only the setting up of a small fascist group in the camp, but also the participation in two hunger strikes in Suzdal, construed as a form of sabotage and fascist display.103 Conversely, officers who took part in antifascist propaganda activities also did not join the strike because they clearly enjoyed preferential treatment. Indeed, antifascists active in the camps—and most prominently students enrolled in antifascist schools—were awarded special treatment. Decree No. 0488 established a fixed amount of 700 grams of bread per day for “courseattending prisoners of war”104 regardless of rank and, if they were soldiers entrusted with a certain task, regardless of their work quotas. The appeal of this treatment undoubtedly weighed on some prisoners’ decision to attend antifascist schools. Many internees, in order to be admitted to the courses, claimed they were members of the communist party back in Italy.105 However, not even attending antifascist courses and schools could guarantee adequate amounts of food. It was not rare that, as a result of the abysmal procurement system, poor management, and appropriation by the

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men in charge of the orders, even course-attending prisoners had to settle for the meager rations established for ordinary prisoners. In a letter dated 3 June 1942, the Russian instructor Nikolai Yantsen pointed out to Dimitrov that the problem of hunger greatly hindered the carrying out of the lessons: The students pay attention and are interested in the work; most of them study assiduously. Seminars are usually lively affairs, with most students actively participating, and heated debates take place in small groups after classes. […] Sadly, though, this doesn’t happen often, for most [prisoners] are occupied from morning to night with problems related to food and tobacco. […] This situation is also one of the reasons it falls to us to oppose theft strictly. During the last twenty days, I have had to expel from school two Romanians for stealing a potato and two Germans for stealing bread. We are still investigating these two thefts. This is a clear obstacle to our work, despite the educational measures we have set forth in school as regards these facts.106

Similar remarks appear in a letter written by Walter Ulbricht, the German communist leader who coordinated political work among internees from his country, and addressed to Kondakov, responsible for Agitprop among prisoners of war: 1. Auditors receive the old norms, as they did before. If these norms are not increased, serious consequences for their health might ensue. A few days ago, one of them died (as a result of vitamin deficiency). 2. All auditors are in rags. There are no better clothes in the camp.107

Sustenance—Ulbricht wrote—was insufficient even for the teachers, among whom “the dearth of food had become cause for discussions.” The situation had become difficult for them too: “Between classes and seminars, they taught for six hours a  day, not counting the work carried out with individual prisoners. […] They [could] not buy any products, except for the ones included in the norm.”108

6. Labor The use of prisoners of war as a source of labor for the Soviet Union’s state economy dates back to the decree Beria issued on 25 September 1939.109 According to this decree, 25,000 Polish prisoners of war, soldiers

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and subordinate officers, were sent to the labor camp of the GUSHOSDOR (General Administration for the Construction of the Road Network) to work on the construction of the road connecting Novograd and Lviv. In the early months of the conflict with Germany, few prisoners were taken. At the end of 1941, there were 8,427 and only a part of these were put to work in the nickel mines of Aktyubinsk, in the coal industry (camp of Spasozavodsk, Karaganda) and in forestry.110 But starting in January 1942, the NKVD started planning to exploit the manpower offered by the prisoners of war. On 8 January, Beria issued circular No. 5 On the use of the labor of all prisoners of war fit for work.111 From that time, the number of labor camps increased sensibly. These camps were set up in a  hurry, using the work of the prisoners themselves, and started operating in a state of complete disorganization. In addition to malnutrition, the labor—often strenuous work, carried out for twelve hours a day112 in a harsh climate—caused an increase in disease and mortality among the internees. For example, 600 prisoners died out of the 2,500 detained in Unzhensk (in the Gorky region) during the three months of the camp’s existence; over 1,500 got sick with malnutrition.113 To solve the situation, the NKVD decided to establish control on the camps’ productive activity. Starting on 19 May, labor camp commanders were to provide daily reports on the progress of the prisoners’ work, detailing such issues as the quantities of product yielded, the causes for the failure to fulfill plans, the number of prisoners exempted from service, the reasons for their exoneration, and so forth.114 Prisoner labor was used primarily for logging and transportation, the clearing of ice from roads, agricultural work in kolkhozes, the construction of buildings and power plants, cotton harvesting, and mine work. One member of the Alpine Corps gives the following account: We set up teams of workers, [made up of] fifteen Italians and fifteen Germans, and head for the woods to fell trees. Then for six months I work in a nearby factory where heating radiators are manufactured. Our work consists in collecting the turnings from the machine departments, taking them to the tracks, and loading them into the cars. Six months in, and I am transferred to the Volga. I am the only Italian in a  group of Germans and Romanians. During the summer, boats loaded with tree trunks make it down the river, and we make stacks of trunks as high as houses. During the winter, we take the trunks to the sawmills.115

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Work duties did not exist for officers, who were generally in charge of services within the camps. It did happen, however, that camp commanders would request “voluntary” work from officers in times of need—when harvest loss was feared, or if firewood was needed to heat the barracks, for instance. But often it was the officers themselves who offered to work in order to obtain additional food or, no less important, to have the chance to leave the camp for a time and break their dreadful routine.116 Harvesting potatoes or cabbage further made it possible to scrape together a little extra food, whereas work in the kolchozes gave prisoners a chance to come in contact with the civilian population. Prisoners performed work for civilians as well. For example, they might paint buildings on behalf of the city soviet, repair equipment, or carry out small artisanal jobs. Cobblers enjoyed particular success. The lack of men meant that, in villages and towns neighboring the camps, prisoners’ work was in high demand, and greatly appreciated. On 17 July 1942, the GUPVI approved a directive according to which camp commands, assisted by medical commissions set up for that purpose, had to conduct monthly examinations to assess the prisoners’ productive capacity. Based on the results of these exams, prisoners were divided into four categories: the healthy (zdorovye), suited for heavy labor; those only partially fit (ogranichenno godnye) for physical labor as a result of their being affected by congenital disease or physical defects; the weak (slabye), suffering from serious chronic disease or physical defects, and therefore only suitable for employment in light labor; and finally the invalid, who could not be assigned to any kind of work, except for light activity in support of camp services.117 Assignment to one group or another was a decisive factor for a prisoner’s life: being charged with more or less demanding work—and thus being awarded larger or smaller rations of food—depended on it. The production norms to be fulfilled differed between categories. Prisoners assigned to the first and second categories were expected to reach 100 percent and 80 percent of the daily norm respectively, and received their additional food only if they met those requirements; the third category, also termed slabaya komanda (the weak team) was expected to reach 60 percent of the norm, and received a  fixed supplement of 150 grams of bread, regardless of the work completed.118 Target production levels— the number of trees to be felled, the amount of cotton to be harvested, or the number of plants to be planted, for example—were high, though, and hitting the mark was difficult for malnourished and debilitated prisoners. Only about half of them managed to reach between 15 and 25 percent of the norm.

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We’re working in the woods, logging. There’s the “norm”: cut pine trees at their foot; four cubic meters a day each, [to be] cleaned, thoroughly stripped of leaves, cut into pieces 1.5 meters long and stacked. Measurements [follow] in the evening: no one reaches one-third of the norm. […] During the winter we break the ice on the river. Come summer, we go out to the countryside, in teams. Russian civilians— political internees, men and women—work with us as well; they are subjected to the same discipline and receive the same rations as us.119 Work on cotton commences in the new camp. The first harvest is in September. We must collect 50–60 kilograms of cotton per day. Almost no one fulfills the “norm,” and we’re back to starving again. The second harvest is in November. The cotton is sticky now, harder to pick, [and] the norm is reduced to 25–30 kilograms. There’s snow and the cold is intense.120 On 20 September [1943] we went cotton picking for the first time. The Russians warned us we would have to pick at least 25 kilograms of cotton each, on average. I picked over 10 kilograms, and the others fared no better. In subsequent days, work continued, and between 15 and 20 kilograms of cotton were harvested on average. But the Russians demanded more, much more—about 28 kilograms of cotton per day—or else bye-bye ration!121

Physical exertion ended up weakening the prisoners, who were often placed in a lower work category in their medical examinations. In a matter of weeks, prisoners lost all productive capacity.122 Obviously, prisoners had neither the right clothes nor the right tools for the jobs they were to carry out. What is more, work sites were often quite far from the camps, with the result that the transfers entailed a loss of time and energy. The prisoners’ fates also depended in no small measure on team leaders and foremen, who were given extra bread if their team was able to fulfill the daily norms. Furthermore, it was team leaders that decided whether those who claimed to be sick should be sent to the infirmary: in many cases, only feverish or seriously wounded men were exonerated from work. In 1942, prisoner-of-war labor amounted to 538,500 days of work, for which the GUPVI deposited 2,218,000 rubles into the state coffers.123 By the end of 1943, the work performed by the prisoners of war had earned the state 12,011,000 rubles.124 Given these results, it was in the camp administration’s interest to keep prisoners alive, at least long enough to offset the costs sustained for

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their maintenance and to reach the expected productivity levels. As well as determining labor norms, the NKVD had therefore established “mortality norms” for the prisoners in the Gulag system—that is, the length of time within which a prisoner’s death was viewed as a loss. After this period set at three months elapsed, the inmate was no longer considered necessary for the system.125 Since the treatment of prisoners of war fell within the scope of the Gulag, it may be inferred that these management criteria and mortality parameters applied to them, too. The NKVD issued numerous directives aimed at safeguarding the weakest among the prisoners of war. Starting in the final months of 1943, for example, only prisoners belonging to the category of the “healthy” were sent off to work, while those belonging to the second category were assigned only to tasks inside the camps.126 By the end of February 1944, however, even prisoners from the second category were once again diverted to productive activities, except in very rare and justified cases.127 Starting in early 1945, the number of prisoners of war employed for labor increased noticeably as new contingents of prisoners arrived from the front. The GUPVI again addressed how to improve productive efficiency and maximize labor exploitation. The directive issued on 28 April urged labor camp commanders to identify prisoners who were professionally qualified and specialized in certain jobs.128 The selection of specialists—engineers, physicists, technicians, or other such professionals—had already started when the ankety were completed. Now it was a matter of identifying those who had not been selected before, and of assigning new tasks to them in concert with the managers of the businesses set up alongside the camps. In 1944, the need to improve productivity and ensure discipline among prisoners engaged in the coal industry persuaded the NKVD to introduce a monetary incentive for those who fulfilled the monthly production norm. Stalin himself spoke of monthly wages in addressing the issue of job regulations on 4 June 1945, as attested to by an exceptional document sent by the Kremlin directly, voiding all other orders related to prison labor. In addition to highlighting the importance the Soviet leader attributed to the question, the GKO directive serves as evidence of the fact that Stalin himself stepped in to distribute prisoners among the various Soviet businesses in order to improve productivity. Meanwhile, Stalin reaffirmed the principle that those who did not abide by the norms ought to be punished, and those who fulfilled them, or indeed exceeded them, should be rewarded:

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The monthly wages of prisoners who carry out and exceed the state norms of productivity must be increased from 100 to 200 rubles, depending on the percentage by which the norm is exceeded. As for specialized workers, team leaders, unit leaders, and platoon and company commanders, [monthly wages must be increased] from 125 to 500 rubles, depending on the percentage by which the units they head exceed the norms.129

The pay was not given to the prisoners directly, but deposited—every ten days—in the camp shops, where staple goods and necessities could be purchased. The following account is by Fidia Gambetti: Twenty-one rubles for three months, like Soviet soldiers. The only commodity one can buy is machorka [a potent, coarse tobacco], sold for five rubles a cup. This expense absorbs all the earnings of smokers, also because the distribution of dues isn’t always regular, and for most it does not suffice. Five rubles, which are equivalent to the price of an egg or of half a liter of milk.130

Officers too received a  stipend. Strangely enough, this varied based on rank: “ten rubles a month to lieutenants, fifteen to captains, and twenty to higher-level officers.” The purchasing power was very low: “a pencil cost forty rubles, a comb eighty.”131 Alongside such rewards were punishments inflicted if production quotas were not met. The most common sanction was the public reprimanding of the team. Back in the camp: Sometimes, we would immediately go get our supper, and had the time to gulp it down; other times, while we were standing there holding our mess tins, they would call the proverka—that is, they would assemble us for a roll call—and we would have to eat remaining in line, making sure we weren’t seen. This was an inconvenience we never did manage to avoid. The muster was furthermore a favorable occasions for recriminations to be made for failed harvests. The same scenes took place each evening. You work little, the Russians would say; “plochaja rabota” was their insistent and insufferable motto.132

Another very common sanction was to given additional work, or even heavier labor. More serious sanctions were detainment for fifteen days in

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the gatehouse outside of work hours, or the transfer to hard regime sections of the camp.133 Not all war prisoners resigned themselves to the living conditions in the camps, particularly after Germany capitulated and the war ended. Many refused to work, damaged their tools, or, in order to be sent home sooner, deliberately injured or maimed themselves. The Interior Ministry issued directives to “oppose instances of sabotage in the camps.”134 Therefore, it was decided that judicial action would be taken against “saboteurs.” However, measures used against troop members were not applied to officers. In the mentioned directive dated 4 June, Stalin himself ordered that drastic measures be taken to deal with saboteurs. In establishing a series of rules aimed at persuading prisoners to lend their labor, he claimed that “those prisoners who intentionally avoid work, and obstructionists, must be referred to the military court.”135 This explains why some Italian prisoners were held in the USSR on war crime charges after the conflict had ended, as we will see in Chapter 6. To be sure, the USSR’s interpretation of the term “war criminal” was very broad, and stemmed in large part from its notion of the security of the state and of prisoners’ moral obligation to indemnify the country they had attacked. Stalin’s statements on the “disorganizers” were not casual. One of the most serious sabotage actions to affect Russian camps—namely, the strike announced by the officers in charge of internal services in Suzdal—had taken place in June 1945. As they would reiterate a few months later by way of their hunger strike, prisoners asked for improved living conditions in the camps, particularly with regard to the food they were given. This effort was the first instance of organized rebellion against a prisoner-of-war camp command and against the camp administration. The vast majority (but not the totality) of the officers present in the camp, roughly 650 in all, joined the strike. On that occasion, the Italian officers tried to involve the German officers “to induce them not to go to work in the absence of a bonus.”136 The instructor Ossola took the following note: On 8 July 1945, near the general’s dwelling, Lieutenants P. and B., together with Colonel L., discussed the results of the Italians’ collective refusal to go out and work for the Russians. Colonel L. drew attention to the need for unity in the fight against the Russians, in order for the effort to be effective. Lieutenant P. claimed that what Colonel L. said was right: we must sway the Germans, persuade them to refuse to work as well, and at the same time fight against those Italians who might be willing to set out to work.137

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And, speaking of Lieutenant E.B., he wrote: Active anti-Soviet reactionary element. With Colonel L., Lieutenant P. and Sargent P., on 5 June 1945, he organized the campaign aimed at the Germans to force them to refuse to work. On that occasion he said: “We must fight against the men belonging to the two Italian brigades led by Captains R. and B. They are scabs—they want to go work for the Russians.”138

Lieutenant Colonel G.V., a  senior officer of the militia, was one of the organizers, but, according to Ossola, avoided sticking his neck out. The Suzdal strike, however, was not managed only by officers belonging to the Bersaglieri Corps or the militia, more hostile to the Soviet system, but also by officers who were not politically motivated. The attempt, carried out by officers with a fascist background, to involve the former German allies did not bear fruit; the Germans were subjected to a very harsh treatment, and any act of rebellion was far riskier for them. The strike was nevertheless somewhat successful, and brought an improvement in the food. As for the results of the work carried out by the prisoners of war, there exists an important document, never published before, in which Kruglov reported on production data as of 24 May 1950 to Stalin and Molotov: In 1946, more than 1,800,000 prisoners of war were employed for labor in the most important sectors of the national economy, of which: 645,532 (35.2%) in construction (including road and railway construction); 410,793 (22.4%) in the power industry; 319,098 (17.4%) in the defense industry and in the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR; 247,576 (13.5%) in the production of building material (including the forestry industry); 143,044 (7.8%) in the metallurgical industry and heavy industry; 67,822 (3.7%) in other sectors of industry and in agriculture. In the period from 1945 to 1 January 1950, prisoners worked for 1,077,564,200 hours, yielding a production equal to 50 billion rubles. In this period, prisoners earned 16,723,528 rubles, used to cover the cost of their maintenance. A significant number of unskilled prisoners of war acquired specializations in the fields of construction and industry during the time spent in the camps of the Interior Ministry. Informed of the best practices of socialist work, the prisoners of war gradually improved their production indicators, and increased productivity.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR In 1949, 90 percent of all prisoners of war paid by the piece reached and exceeded established work norms, and the average execution was 131 percent of the norm; average earnings for one day of work were 21 rubles and 78 kopeks.139

Thus, prisoners of war contributed to impressive works, replacing the men on the front with their labor. In fact, as Kruglov himself claimed, prisoners made a significant contribution to the building and rebuilding of the roads destroyed during the war, and railways, like the one connecting Lake Baikal and Amur River. Indeed, they amounted to “between 40 and 90 percent of all the workers employed” in the construction of the country’s most important hydroelectric plants.140

7. Medical care and mortality Unlike military men captured by the British and Americans, prisoners in the USSR never received proper medical assistance because of the chronic lack of relevant infrastructure and resources in the country.141 Measures taken were minimal, and mostly haphazard. Surgical care was almost absent, particularly early on, and the sick were tended to only intermittently. The state of prisoners on arrival to the camps, together with the organizational difficulties described so far, caused extremely high morbidity and mortality indexes, the likes of which were not experienced in other cases of captivity. Regarding prisoner mortality, the first phase of captivity must be broken down into two periods. The first one started at capture and ended after the first month of the case of Italian prisoners at the end of February 1943. The second one, no less trying, spanned from March to June of the same year. By weakening the soldiers’ bodies, the first period lay the foundations for the more deadly subsequent period, in which epidemics (typhus, diphtheria, tuberculosis), dystrophy, gangrene, and scurvy killed almost all the prisoners who had arrived in the camps. During these early months, medical care was practically non-existent. The sick were simply transferred to rooms identical to the ones they had occupied before, laid down on the ground or on plank bunks, and left to die. After this initial period, when mortality reached 90 percent, a rudimentary healthcare system was set up in the camps, involving the administration of vaccines (camp survivors recall passing one at a time in front of three doctors: the first one inserted the needle, the same one for all

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patients, the second one gave the shot, and the third one removed the needle).142 Yet the chronic lack of drugs in the country prevented the regular provision of health services, and epidemics could not always be stopped from spreading. To face the emergency, on 16 March 1943, Kruglov sent NKVD functionaries in affected republics and regions, and camp commanders, the directive No. 120. This called for a series of measures aimed at improving hygiene and establishing more healthful conditions in the prison camps.143 Following the decision of the GKO, in April medical supplies for prisoners were entrusted to the Main Military Medical Administration of the Red Army.144 This was supposed to ensure the provision of drugs, medical equipment, and disinfectants. The complex Soviet concentration camp machinery, however, failed to adapt to the GKO’s orders efficiently and on time. Figure 3.1. Monthly mortality of Italian prisoners of war in Soviet camps 10.000 9.000 8.000 7.000 6.000 5.000 4.000 3.000 2.000 1.000 1942

1943

1944

1945

Source: Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni [CSIR-ARMIR, prison camps and common graves], (Gaeta-LT: Stabilimento grafico militare, 1996), 25.

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Even the Comintern was informed of the difficult situation faced by the prisoners of war. On 10 April, Dimitrov wrote down in his journal that he’d called a meeting attended by General Petrov, who had reported “on the causes of the very high mortality index, on the measures adopted to cure the prisoners, [and] on the sick wards.”145 In May, having ascertained that “unsatisfactory conditions persisted” in the camps, Kruglov ordered that all prisoners of war be exonerated from work for ten days. During this time, they could be employed for activities within the camps, like refueling, foraging for vitamin-rich plants, gathering hay and straw to be used as mattress stuffing, and so forth.146 Despite the measures taken, results were slow to come. It was only in the second half of 1943 that they became apparent. Conversely in the spring, while decreasing somewhat, the mortality index remained high. By 15 April, 99,946 men had died in the camps and gathering points in the course of just two months and a half.147 In total, out of the 291,856 prisoners counted by the GUPVI of the NKVD, 171,774 (59%) had died between the beginning of the war and 15 April 1943. Of these, 75,600 perished in the camps, 29,006 while being transported, 31,648 in the reception points, 33,275 in the hospitals, 5,849 at the hands of Red Army units before being conveyed to the gathering points, and 2,245 on arrival in the camps.148 It’s worth pointing out that mortality among prisoners remained high even later, when the winter months had passed. In the second half of April, 25,174 more prisoners died, despite only 800 new detainees being registered in that time frame.149 In addition to bearing witness to the tragedy of captivity by way of the numbers it sets forth, the document reveals that the Soviets somehow managed to carry out a census of the deceased even during the transfers. In October, the NKVD issued further directives to improve hygiene and health conditions in the camps.150 The year after, with a  decree dated 5 October 1944, it even instituted special regime healthcare and prophylaxis facilities (spetsgospitali), called “cure camps” and “cure units” for prisoners of war, converting fifteen labor camps to this end.151 In all other labor camps, special medical districts were established. Each one could house 10 percent of the camp’s prisoners. The existence of these special facilities is corroborated by the recollections of the camp survivors. In the report submitted to the Territorial Military Command of Milan, Medical Lieutenant Temistocle Pallavicini described his experience in Tambov, where “experimental barracks” were set up. While the meals served in these facilities were improved to the point of being

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decent, the barracks nevertheless proved ineffective in curbing the high number of deaths.152 In an attempt to cope with the lack of physicians, captive foreign medical officers were recruited as well. Starting in 1944, the latter were sent to the hospital-camps to provide care to their fellow countrymen. The directive dated 2 March 1946 reiterated the need to “employ as much as possible” all physicians and healthcare specialists present among prisoners of war in the camps and special hospitals. It also detailed the tasks and limitations of this collaboration with medically trained prisoners. These “could not exonerate other prisoners from work; could not authorize the hospitalization of prisoners, or their release from hospitals and healthcare centers; could not participate in the medical commissions set up to assign prisoners to the various work categories.”153 Pressed by the increasing mortality in the camps, as well as by the onslaught of directives dedicated to the sanitary conditions of these facilities, camp commanders went so far as to threaten prisoners who were physicians, forcing them to “experiment” with all systems suited to contain the spread of typhus and dysentery. Lieutenant Pallavicini gave the following account: We were facing complete and utter lack of drugs. Like all physicians in general, I was constantly threatened with prison or death on the charge of “not wanting to cure the Italians” if the daily death rate exceeded a certain percentage.154

The “norm” logic was applied to healthcare as well. No more than a set number of sick could die per day. Given the dearth of means and medicines, it was to be expected that very little could be done to provide care. Yet if the number of deaths exceeded the limit established by the camp command, medical prisoners were blamed. They would be threatened and accused of “defeatism.” In an attempt to cure the sick, those entrusted with this task had to make do with improvised tools, like razors, scissors, and carpentry saws. Ice was used as an anesthetic. In sorting camps, traditional remedies were used. Tannic acid was produced by boiling bark, and charcoal with which to stop dysentery was made by carbonizing animal bones.155 However, starting in May 1943, administrative procedures for managing the sick started to be perfected in some hospital-camps. For example, medical records were completed for the patients. Let us take a look at one such record. Soldier Pietro Davide di Bartolomeo was admitted

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into hospital-camp No. 5882 (city of Glazov, Udmurt Republic), where forty-seven Italians died. His chart includes the following information: the “anamnesis of sick person No. 553”; the daily progress of his body temperature; the course of his illness and the results of the observations carried out on him; the diagnostic and therapeutic recommendations he was given, and the diet he followed; the baths administered to him, and the changing of his linen. Finally, the chart accounts for his death, which occurred on 12 April 1945 as a  result of tuberculosis. The document, signed by three inspectors, even details where the soldier was buried in the cemetery (plot No. 1, tomb No. 54).156 Attached to the medical record is a personal file containing the patient’s vital statistics, and the socio-political information gleaned from his interrogation. The prisoner was a private soldier originally from Goriano Valli (in the province of L’Aquila). He had been interned by the Germans. Under the section titled “Time and place of imprisonment,” it says he was captured on 27 April 1944, in Serbia.157 He had been admitted into the hospital on 11 January 1945, with the following diagnosis: “Type II dystrophy. Rheumatism. Previous diagnosis: Pulmonary tuberculosis?” Table 3.3158 provides an overview, based on Soviet sources, of data concerning the death rates in only thirteen of the most significant camps, the decree number, and the dates on which the camp was opened and closed. Nekrilovo and Khrenovoe, two of the worst camps in terms of the living conditions they offered, were soon closed for the reasons discussed above. With regard to Khrenovoe, the data shows that a mere one month and five days was enough for 1,566 Italian prisoners to die, averaging over fifty-two deaths per day. And the data is incomplete because of the disorganization that prevailed in that camp. Conversely, very accurate lists were made in the Taliza camp. As a result, it is possible to identify a very high percentage of the prisoners who died there (782 out of 930).159 The Italian prisoners who perished in these thirteen camps alone were 27,488; the remaining 11,000 died in the 467 other camps. Examining the general records of the prisoners who died in the USSR, UNIRR experts were able to trace mortality among the Italians in different months of imprisonment (table 3.4). The data indicates that 85 percent of Italian prisoners died between January and June 1943 (31,230 deaths), whereas the figure dropped to 9 percent between July and December (3,308).160 Mortality peaked in March, when over 9,000 men died overall as a result of the uncontrollable spread of typhus. Only in June and July did the number of deaths start subsiding. Between 1944 and 1950, 2,226 died.

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Table 3.3. Some data on the camps Name and region

Decree No. and opening date

Decree No. 
and closing date

No. of Italian prisoners deceased

188

Tambov (Tambov)

00161 23.01.1942

00966 15.09.1947

8,268

56

Michurinsk (Tambov)

00816 13.07.1944

00934 07.10.1949

4,234

58

Temnikov (Mordovia)

00982 12.06.1943

00593 05.06.1947

3,824

62

Nekrilovo (Voronezh)

002597 23.11.1942

001645 October 1943

2,191

81

Khrenovoe (Voronezh)

00398 01.03.1943

00673 06.04.1943

1,566

137 1691 (hospital)

Vols (Saratov)

00451 08.03.1943

00401 19.04.1948

1,229

2989

Kameskovo (Vladimir)

 


May 1948

1,211

67/5

Bosyanovka (Sverdlovsk)

00928 08.05.1942

 

1,185

Pinyug (Kirov)

 


May 1948

939

165

Taliza (Ivanovo)

001735 28.12.1941

00914 12.10.1946

930

160

Suzdal (Vladimir)

001735 28.12.1941

00914 12.10.1946

821

74

Oranki (Gorky)

0308 19.09.1939

074 03.02.1950

661

38

Reni (Odessa)

001575 26.09.1943

00257 07.03.1945

429

Camp No.

2074 (hospital)

Source: Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni [CSIR-ARMIR, prison camps and common graves], (Gaeta-LT: Stabilimento grafico militare, 1996), 25.

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Table 3.4. Progress of mortality among Italian prisoners of war in Russia 1941

 

 

10

 

1942

January–November

76

467

1%

 

December

391

 

 

1943

January

3,352

31,230

85%

 

February

6,205

 

 

 

March

9,943

 

 

 

April

6,328

 

 

 

May

3,985

 

 

 

June

1,417

 

 

1943

July

1,102

3,308

9%

 

August

510

 

 

 

September

462

 

 

 

October

424

 

 

 

November

259

 

 

 

December

551

 

 

1944

 

 

777

2%

1945

 

 

1,398

3%

1946

 

 

39

 

1947

 

 

6

 

1948

 

 

3

 

1949

 

 

–

 

1950

 

 

3

 

Total

 

 

37,241

100%

No date of death

 

 

2,786

 

 

 

 

40,027

 

Source: Ministry of Defense, UNIRR (ed.), “Elenco ufficiale dei prigionieri italiani deceduti nei lager russi” [Official list of Italian prisoners of war deceased in Russian camps], supplement to the Notiziario UNIRR, fascicle II, 1993, 6.

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Four hundred and sixty-seven deaths (1%) recorded among the men captured between January and December 1942 before the great winter offensive, and 2,786 deaths for which no date is available must also be added to the figures above. It follows that 40,027 Italian military men died in the Soviet camps in total. In the post-war years, the repatriation of just 10,032 ARMIR survivors posed a diplomatic issue between the Italian and Soviet governments. The report by the Italian delegate in the United Nations Commission for Prisoners of War (1958) displayed a huge discrepancy between the percentage of Italians repatriated from the USSR (14.4%) and from other belligerent countries, such as the United States (99%) and even Germany (94.4%). It’s worth noting, however, that the stated percentage for the USSR did not take into account the 11,059 repatriated men who didn’t come from the ARMIR, but from previous internment in Germany. Finally, according to the NKVD’s data, the percentage of the Italians who died in captivity was 56.5. In other words, 27,683 Italian prisoners died out of the 48,957 registered in the camps. Mortality was thus higher among Italians than among prisoners of other nationalities, including Germans, whose death rate was 14.9.161 Table 3.5. Italian prisoners in the Second World War according to the report to the UN’s Commission on Prisoners of War Nation

Captured

Repatriated

Percentage repatriated

England

420,322

414,71

98

United States

125,533

125,373

99

68,267

67,194

99

Germany

641,954

606,306

98

Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Switzerland

142,072

128,833

91

Soviet Union (ARMIR soldiers)

70,000

10,087

14

?

11,059

?

France

Soviet Union (prisoners taken from German camps)

Source: report by the Italian delegate in the United Nations Commission for Prisoners of War, Rome, AUSSME, 1958

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Table 3.6. Prisoners of war from Germany and from countries allied with Germany according to NKVD data Nationality

Prisonerof-war total

Repatriated

Deaths during imprisonment

Mortality (percentage)

1. Wehrmacht servicemen German

2,388,443

2,031,743

356,687

14.0

Austrian

156,681

145,79

10,891

6.9

Chechoslovak

69,977

65,954

4,023

5.7

French

23,136

21,811

1,325

5.7

Yugoslav

21,83

20,354

1,468

6.7

Polish

60,277

57,149

3,127

5.1

Dutch

4,73

4,53

199

4.2

Belgian

2,014

1,833

177

8.7

Luxembourger

1,653

1,56

92

5.5

Spanish

452

382

70

15.4

Danish

456

421

35

7.6

Norwegian

101

83

18

17.8

Others

3 989

1 062

2 927

73.37

2,733,739

2,352,672

381,067

13.9

Total (Wehrmacht servicemen)

2. Servicemen from countries allied with Germany Hungarian

513,766

459,011

54,753

10.6

Romanian

187,367

132,755

54,602

29.0

Italian

48,957

21,274

27,683

56.5

Finnish

2,377

1,974

403

16.9

752,467

615,014

137,453

18.2

3,486,206*

2,967,686

518,52

14.8

Total (servicemen from countries allied with Germany) Total of prisoners

* Not taking into account data on prisoners of war who were citizens of the USSR, and war criminals sent to special camps. Source: Information on the number of prisoners of war belonging to German armed forces and to German allies calculated in NKVD camps as of 22 April 1956, RGVA, f. 1 p, op. 32.b, d. 2, l. 8–9.

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It is striking that fewer deaths occurred among the Germans than among the Italians in percentage. It is known that the Germans were often subjected to summary executions upon capture, and to much harsher treatment by the Soviets during captivity. Yet it is worth noting that the Soviets took many German prisoners even after the 1942–43 winter offensive, and by then the Soviet organizational structures were better equipped. This obviously affected the prisoners’ mortality rate. Further, many of the Germans who were immediately executed by firing squad when captured were not recorded, and therefore were never even counted among the prisoners. Conversely, most Italians who took part in the campaign on the Eastern front were captured in the winter of 1943, when conditions in the sorting camps were extremely difficult and mortality was very high among all prisoners. Fundamentally, the great mortality recorded among all prisoners of war in the winter of 1942–43 is attributable to the organizational difficulties faced by the Soviet commands. It would be unfair to say that there was a will on the part of the Soviets to get rid of their prisoners. After all, the latter were bargaining chips, as well as a useful source of manpower. There appears to have been no intent to kill the incarcerated either through starvation or through hardship. The Gulag machine continued to operate as it would. Where food could be stolen, some commanders did. And likewise, where something could have been done in order to save human lives (albeit the lives of enemies), if the circumstances and means did not permit, nature was allowed to take its course.162

8. Prisoners and religion An aspect of captivity worth considering is the matter of religion. This issue reflects more general dynamics not without interest. As the conflict progressed, Stalin’s attitude toward religion changed, gradually but significantly shifting to a  more conciliatory position. He understood that the Russian Orthodox Church could be a great ally, and that religion was a  powerful tool to bring people together. Both patriotism and religion could therefore be used as tools for popular mobilization. The war was portrayed as a struggle to save historical Russia from a monstrous, almost mythological enemy.163 The terms Soviet Union and communism were used less and less in official publications, superseded by Russia and Motherland. A new national anthem replaced The Interna-

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tionale.164 The word God (with an uppercase initial) started appearing in articles in Pravda. In 1942, the autocephalous Russian Orthodox Church was entirely rehabilitated after years of persecution. The metropolitan of Moscow Sergei was given some freedom of action, and almost all the bishops detained in the camps were released. On 4 September 1943, Sergei and two other metropolitans—Aleksy of Leningrad and Nikolai of Kiev—were received by Stalin, who authorized them to organize the appointment of the patriarch, whose seat had been vacant since 1926.165 Stalin further allowed churches and a certain number of seminaries to be reopened, and decreed allocations for religious practice to be resumed. For their part, ecclesiastical authorities responded by raising money among worshipers to fund a  Soviet armored column. And inside the churches, which attracted more people than they could hold, priests urged their congregations to observe the faith, God, and Stalin. On 22 June 1941, the day of the German invasion, Sergei had addressed the Russian people exhorting the faithful to be united against the enemy, in support of the Soviet army. In the following two years, Sergei issued no less than twentythree pastoral epistles, calling on his flock to fight for the godless state in which they lived. With regard to the war in general and to the war on the Eastern front specifically, the Holy See avoided taking a stand for one side or the other, despite Roosevelt’s pressing requests.166 In truth, the invasion of the Soviet Union, even by racist and atheist Nazis, did have something of a  silver lining for the Vatican. It meant potentially getting rid of the communist threat. Also, it seemed to offer the opportunity of “reorganizing Catholic religious life in occupied areas, as Monsignor Tardini had stated as early as 29 June.” This was to be pursued, however, through the agency of the Italian or Hungarian troops, rather than the German troops, which might even have been willing “to support Orthodox religious propaganda in an anti-Bolshevik capacity, over Catholicism.”167 At least some of the military chaplains who had left with the CSIR first and the ARMIR later were probably not expected solely to provide religious assistance to the troops. According to an account by Monsignor Enelio Franzoni, the Russicum—the Pontifical Institute of Eastern Studies—had trained a  group of chaplains who, in the event of victory, would stay in Russia after the war with the task of evangelizing the Soviet people.168 The immediate choice of the Roman Catholic Church had been to side with the fascist regime against its historical enemy, atheist Marxism. It soon became apparent, however, that the Holy See could not cast aside its principle of

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universality, nor could the pope give up his role as the spiritual guide of millions of Catholics. News that the United States was about to enter the war proved decisive: the Vatican could not afford to side with the losing Axis.169 In occupied territories, a good rapport between the chaplains and the local populations was often established spontaneously. At the war’s outset, in occupied Ukraine, masses held in celebration of the Italian troops had wide participation among local civilians; the chaplains received many requests for children’s baptisms.170 In his diary, an Alpine serviceman reported giving a child in Yenakiieve food from the canteen over the course of several days, and finally being asked by the child’s mother to take part in his confirmation. The soldier accepted, serving as the child’s sponsor, and attending the simple party that followed.171 He was stunned to see that locals were not at all the godless communists described by fascist propaganda, but people willing to defy the authorities to uphold their faith. Particularly in areas farther removed from Soviet power, many women and elderly peasants still cherished icons and prayed in secret. More than a few Italians who in the course of their retreat or during the davai marches found shelter in the izbas scattered along the way were amazed to find that, in the country of communism and atheism, such dwellings had small altars and icons lit up with candles.172 In general, chaplains carried out disparate tasks. Depending on the stage of the conflict and what was needed at a particular time, these ranged from the duties as religious ministers to assisting suffering soldiers, from distributing food packages to acting as intermediaries with the soldiers’ families through the Vatican Relief, from taking testamentary dispositions to handling burials.173 During captivity, the position of the military clergy was regulated by the 1929 Geneva Convention. Chaplains were considered “neutral persons” assimilated into the medical staff who enjoyed the right to practice their religious function even during imprisonment. Article 16 of the Geneva Convention established the right to spiritual assistance for detainees, who were to be permitted “complete freedom in the performance of their religious duties, including attendance at the services of their faith.” In Russia, though, particularly in the earliest stage of detention, religious assistance was not allowed at all. Chaplains were not permitted to exercise their religious function, and requests for access to religious rites by troops and officers fell on deaf ears.174 In truth, the conditions of captivity were initially so harsh that simply surviving was the most pressing concern. Chaplains’ role in that phase was limited to the comforting of dying and wounded men, and to collaborating with medical prisoners.175 Many tried

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to share the fate of their fellow captives. Enelio Franzoni, for example, asked to be allowed to stay with the senior officers who were held in Russia in July 1946, and sent home the following August.176 “After all, both the Holy See and the Military Ordinariate [had] pointed to the moral duty of the religious to remain behind barbed wire until the prisoners were repatriated, so as not to deprive soldiers and officers of priestly assistance.”177 The fact that chaplains were frequently transferred from one camp to another—and therefore only had scope for brief and occasional presence in any given camp—was one negative aspect thwarting action on their part. Another obstacle was their appointment to camps reserved to officers, with whom they were equated. As all surviving chaplains were sent to Suzdal, only officers could benefit from religious services, when these were finally authorized. By their very nature, chaplains’ functions clashed with the communist ideology and the work of political instructors, whose duties included fighting against any belief system the prisoners might stand for. In his memoirs, Nikolai Tereshchenko tells that—in his capacity as a teacher in an antifascist school—he was accused of inflicting “moral tortures” on prisoners, mainly resulting from his intense anti-religious propaganda.178 Particularly for Italians, religion was a very sensitive matter. Tereshchenko recalls how his Italian colleague Paolo Robotti would advise caution: We always tried to appear of one mind before the prisoners, even though heated debates often took place among us. For instance, there existed a  program of study that we were supposed to follow. Well, I  said we should conform to the program, and therefore teach atheism. According to Robotti, however, the program ought to be adapted for Italians— teaching atheism was not necessary, and Italians would react badly, for they were all Catholic. Conversely, it was my opinion we should take advantage of the opportunity to reveal the truth behind the Church. When confronted with the anti-religious arguments I  set forth, Italians reacted in different ways: some accepted the criticism leveled against the Church; others, you could tell, disagreed entirely, but remained silent; others still rejected it openly. For example, Lieutenant Ricciardi, one of my students, openly affirmed God’s existence despite my lessons in atheism. However, if I could go back in time, I would heed Robotti’s advice. I would take into consideration the strong attachment Italians have for the Catholic Church; I would avoid taking an overtly critical tone against religion, and, more generally, broaching anti-religious subjects.179

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Even those who had attended the antifascist school were reluctant to detach themselves from religious faith. Speaking about two Italian captains Giovanni Chiara and Giuseppe Guzzetti, the instructor Ossola had to admit that, despite completing the program and “actively participating in antifascist work,” they had not been able to “overcome residues of religion.” The same assessment was made for Lieutenant Mario Riva: “He carries out a good antifascist activity, but he cannot break with religion.”180 It is therefore natural that the work of political propaganda among prisoners was opposed most forcefully by chaplains. Their attitude must also be viewed within the context of the changes in the conditions experienced by Italian prisoners during the war. After the 8 September 1943 armistice, Italian prisoners in the hands of the Allied powers found themselves detained in countries that were no longer Italy’s enemies, but rather co-belligerent with Italy. By the winter of 1943–44, the British started asking Italian prisoners whether they wanted to collaborate in the struggle against Germany. The option was laid before chaplains as well, though this was in violation of the conditions set by the Geneva Convention. In Allied camps, “it was rather frequent for the religious to become propagandists of cooperation, or conversely champions of intransigence. The chaplain’s decision took on great importance, and many confused and hesitant soldiers looked to it [for guidance].”181 In the USSR, the issue of collaboration was far more complex, because it meant accepting Marxist ideology. A program of sorts was set up in Allied camps as well, to re-educate Italian prisoners with fascist leanings to democracy.182 Yet these programs never reached the levels of the propaganda organized and carried out in the Soviet Union. The most unyielding of all the chaplains detained in the USSR was certainly Giovanni Brevi, who repeatedly refused to sign appeals to the Italian government established after the armistice, ultimately persuading many undecided prisoners to follow suit. According to the Italian officers of the antifascist group active in camp No. 160, Father Brevi “strongly opposed the antifascist movement in the course of public meetings.”183 Even Ossola’s diary draws attention to chaplains’ anti-Soviet attitude. Speaking of Agostino Bonadeo, chaplain to the Celere Division, Ossola wrote that he was a “reactionary and anti-Soviet element. A bitter enemy of any democratic or progressive renewal whatsoever.” Both he and Father Franzoni refused to sign a message addressed to the Ferruccio Parri government (June–December 1945) citing as justification that “chaplains did not engage in politics on principle.” Yet, Ossola commented, “when it is time to slander the democratic movement and the Soviet Union, or when

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an antidemocratic effort of any kind is being organized, chaplains are front and center.”184 According to Ossola, the chaplains conducted “a venomous anti-Soviet campaign.” They were opposed to the progressive democratic movement, and did not miss a chance to cast aspersions on Italian left-wing parties. As for Giuseppe Fiora, Ossola wrote that, while speaking with the Hungarian chaplain, the former had said: “Protestantism is a trifle when compared to the huge heresy that threatens us today, Bolshevism. All good Christians must unite in this crusade against Bolshevism.”185 Like all prisoners, chaplains too were frequently subjected to questioning on their political allegiances. The following was written by Father Franzoni: At the beginning of the summer of 1943, Mr. D’Onofrio arrived in our camp [Oranki]. We hadn’t finished making our first comments and assessments on the new commissar’s arrival when I  was summoned to the room of the Italian commissar [Ettore] Fiammenghi. Before me were D’Onofrio, Fiammenghi and the Russian Major Orlov [Tereshchenko]. I was interrogated about my political views; it was D’Onofrio who posed the questions. I tried to be evasive, saying that as a chaplain I could not follow any given political current. I mentioned that even in fascist Italy priests could not hold a  party membership card. D’Onofrio did not relent; he deemed it impossible that, as a  citizen, I  should not at least have a political liking, and he wanted me to be forthcoming. […] In the face of my restraint, D’Onofrio and the other two men started explaining the damages fascism had caused in Italy. At that point, I was asked what, in my estimation, would prove most effective in hastening a revolt in Italy. I answered it was not my place to say, for I was a  priest, and as such I  would be called upon to carry out my mission in Italy whether it be under the rule of fascism, communism, or any other political current. “But fascism is ruining Italy,” my three inquisitors pressed on. “You too must do something to bring down fascism.” I added, “I can see for myself that fascism is ruining Italy, but I fail to understand what I, a prisoner, can do about it.”186

Thus, questionings primarily served the purpose of sounding out chaplains’ attitude toward fascism. In some cases, though, questionings were also occasions for attempts to recruit chaplains as spies. Some chaplains were promised immediate release, provided they were willing, once back in Italy, to collaborate with men of the Soviet embassy, to whom they would be introduced.187

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A unique account of the chaplains’ work surfaced from the former Soviet archives in the form of a letter, never published before, Father Franzoni addressed to Pope Pius XII on 27 January 1943. The initiative was probably taken by the chaplain himself, with support from the political commissars at Oranki. Only on 19 March did Bianco submit the letter to Dimitrov, asking for permission to forward it. It is unknown whether it was ultimately sent or not.188 This is what Franzoni had to say: Holy Father! It is with the utmost devotion that I  write you this letter in captivity, and you will surely understand me. I  am a  military chaplain detained in Russia. When I  was taken prisoner on 16 December 1942 I  never would have thought that I  would be allowed to communicate with you on this day, 27 January 1943. Our propaganda, as you know, features many negative prejudices regarding the Russians’ attitude toward religion and priests. The truth, confirmed by my letter, is quite different from what is believed to be the case in Italy. It is true that they treat us as prisoners, but our condition improves with each passing day. There are commissars among us who take an interest in us and worry about our wellbeing. The camp is equipped with saunas, a  cinema, a  hospital for prisoners, and soon we are going to publish a  paper of our own. As a chaplain, I have been questioned, and they’ve treated me respectfully. They had assured me that in Russia the customary approach toward religion was to oppose it through propaganda, whereas here even religious propaganda is allowed. In Moscow, there are churches [that are] opened for believers, and the Muscovite government organs have convened a  commission of priests to take part in the work carried out to unmask the atrocities perpetrated on the front during war operations. [...] Thank God, I  am well, and therefore I  can perform my priestly functions for the wounded, the sick, and more generally all the Italian soldiers present here. I have been allowed to visit the soldiers’ barracks. I  can easily visit the patients, which, for obvious reasons, is strictly forbidden to everyone else. Together with the soldiers and the sick, I  address impassioned prayers to God that He may bring peace, and relieve humanity of such unbearable suffering. Perhaps, chaplains like myself will be allowed to have a field altar. Here where I am, they have promised me that they would take up the matter. In any case, I ask His Holiness to send us at least a field altar, and for the benefit of the Italian prisoners of war I  plead with you to

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR offer us some material aid. […] You know very well how important religious comfort is for Italians. Best wishes on behalf of the Italian and Romanian soldiers.

Clearly, this is an extremely diplomatic letter, fit for Soviet eyes. Careful wording was necessary if the document was to reach its intended recipient. Nonetheless, it contains several pieces of information the Soviets might not have wanted to be known, like the names of two chaplains admitted into the infirmary, the way the camp functioned, and the conditions it was in: “even though there are thousands of us in this camp…” An eloquent example of the letter’s prudent style is the brief reference to the questioning that took place in the camp, and to the presence of commissars. Perhaps Father Franzoni intended merely to establish contact and let authorities know he was alive, but surely his plea for “some material aid” must be viewed as an allusion, however cautious, to the dire conditions of the captivity, then in its hardest phase. What he says about “religious propaganda” being allowed in the camp is particularly implausible. Father Franzoni himself told us: It was known that Father Alagiani had already been reciting Mass in secret in Oranki. Yet in Suzdal we only started celebrating services in October 1943. This was brought about gradually. The meetings were clandestine at first, and increasingly open as time passed, until we were given official permission to celebrate Mass each Sunday. A Russian officer brought us the wine from Moscow, which we managed to pay for with the money we’d received as payment for our work, rubles we wouldn’t have otherwise known how to spend. That officer disappeared: perhaps someone had reported him.189

In Oranki, in August, prisoners expressed the desire to practice religious rites, and two chaplains turned to Tereshchenko for permission to celebrate Mass. The political commissar proved to be open to the idea, but deferred his final decision on the matter because the sacred objects needed for the rite could not be acquired.190 Not all camp directors or political commissars authorized religious rites, however. For instance, Father Brevi’s request to recite Mass made to the commander of Suslonger camp No. 171 (in the Mari ASSR)—to which he had temporarily been transferred in May 1943—was rejected. The prisoners did not give up though. After work, they built a small altar and made a chalice “of carved wood” with which they could celebrate Mass in secret.191 In

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such cases, as well as being a source of spiritual comfort, Masses were acts of defiance toward camp commanders and political instructors. Of course, the secret Masses were often discovered, as in Suslonger: Sadly, there were those who snitched. The “red guards” flew into a rage. They rummaged through the whole bunker, found the sacred objects in the sand, and took everything away, including Father Brevi’s precious missal, which he’d managed to salvage through endless vicissitudes. The chaplain was greatly pained as a  result. With clenched jaws, his eyes staring at nothing, he lay on the plank-bed, and started praying. Without a word, he began his hunger strike.192

The Russians officially authorized religious rites only at the end of 1943, and Christmas Mass was even allowed in the Suzdal camp. On that occasion, officer prisoners who arrived in Oranki could attend the service celebrated by Father Brevi and four other chaplains.193 News of the Christmas Mass also appears in a clichéd article Paolo Robotti published in Avanti! on 14 February 1945. In this document, the Italian political instructor describes his visit to a camp, which he characterizes as “the continuation of the neighboring company town: identical twostory houses with big yards, everything white and very tidy, with a large pine forest surrounding it.”194 Based on his description, it would almost seem as if it had not been a prison camp at all: It’s Christmas! […] I walk into the large hall where the Italians have set up a nice Christmas tree, felled in the nearby woods. Almost everyone is there: a few men have gone to Mass, and will be back in a moment. They talk merrily, in groups, and laugh.195

In this communist nativity, there is room for believers too, but only “a few” of them.

9. Correspondence Articles 8, and 36–41 of the Geneva Convention sanctioned POWs’ right to communicate with their families. Nevertheless, even the Allies failed to ensure regular correspondence between the prisoners and their families. In fact, communications with the homeland remained difficult in Europe right up until the war’s end.196

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In the first, dramatically harsh period following capture, prisoners in Russia were more than a little surprised to find that days went by without the thought of home entering their minds. Later, once the problem of survival had been solved, the thought of their families would indeed enter their minds, and turn into a torment. Thus, it is plain to see that being able to correspond with their relatives had crucial psychological significance for prisoners. While the Soviet Union had not ratified the Geneva Convention, a system of correspondence—however intermittent for the lack of a military postal service, and camp commanders’ sluggishness and negligence—was set up for Italian internees in Russia. The commission in charge of political work among prisoners of war had actually found that correspondence was an opportunity for propaganda. According to a document dated 6 March 1942, “newcomers, even in the future, [were] to write short letters for their relatives at home.”197 Fidia Gambetti describes an émigré’s arrival in Tambov, and the comfort she brought prisoners: But what’s most important, and awakens even the most unresponsive men from their lethargy, is this—she assures us we will be able to write home, and makes us hope we may even receive news [from home]. She asks of the barracks chief, inquires with him about our number, and hands him a packet of post cards for the correspondence of the prisoners of war. They are pink, standard-size cards with the customary printed instructions on how to address them, in Russian and in French, above which are the emblems, placed side by side, of the International Red Cross and the Turkish [Red] Crescent.198

Often, though, the cards were not supplied in adequate numbers, and lots had to be drawn to decide who should get them, with the understanding that the lucky prisoners would send greetings on behalf of the others.199 A foot soldier provides a far less enthusiastic account: I had no news from home. I wrote two postcards, as they provided one card every four prisoners, and so we took turns writing them. After some time, I found my cards in the trash—they had never been sent.200

Thus, not all postcards reached their intended recipients, and some took months or years to arrive.

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Germans were given permission to write home only in July 1945, following a decree issued by Beria. Among other things, the decree set the censorship criteria to be used on the documents. Cards with an anti-Soviet or pro-fascist content, those offering information on the location of industrial objectives, and those bearing news of other prisoners and soldiers who had died in captivity were to be confiscated and sent to the Operative Office of the GUPVI. Furthermore, letters “addressed to countries other than the prisoner’s homeland” were to be seized as well, “regardless of content.”201 According to one survivor: After many months, prepaid postcards were distributed among us. We could write only news about ourselves, not the names of our deceased colleagues, or information on our location. Perhaps this time they were actually going to send them. They seemed serious about it. They placed a  mail box in the camp, and displayed the rules for the correspondence.202

The letters and postcards that reached their destination were all reassuring in tone, and featured phrases like “don’t worry about me, I’m fine,” “they treat us well here,” and “I can’t wait to hug you again.” After all, where the message approached unauthorized topics, the censor would intervene obscuring the illicit text with black ink.203 The material fact of writing has become a big problem for many of us here. None of the prisoners has a fountain pen anymore; very few have but a  pencil stub. I  am told almost everyone intends to write: “we are fine, and they treat us very well.” A necessary lie. We hope the Soviets decide to use the postcards as a  means for propaganda, and really get them delivered to Italy.204

The censored letters of the Italian prisoners ended up in Moscow, on Togliatti’s desk. According to Nina Bochenina: [Togliatti] reads fragments of the letters from Italy and to Italy that have been confiscated—the soldiers’ mail. “When we were dispatched to Russia, they told us: Don’t shoot, the Germans will do that. You’ll only have to collect the cartridge cases. You’ll be home by Christmas 1941.” I noticed that Ercoli underlined a phrase recurring in several letters: “The Soviet Union has done us no harm.”205

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For Italian prisoners held in the Soviet Union and repatriated only in 1950 or in 1954, writing home became increasingly hard as the years went by. The postal service continued to operate, as a result of the presence of Austrian and German prisoners, but the letters that were sent were few and far between. As most prisoners were repatriated between 1945 and 1946, by the late 1940s Red Cross postcards were hard to come by in Italy. The relatives of those still being detained in Russia thus had to “turn to the families of prisoners from Germany and Austria, who copied the text from the postcards, and passed it along.”206 Starting in 1945, the possibility of forwarding correspondence to prisoners lay at the heart of a complex and exhausting negotiation. The latter involved the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, the Italian Red Cross, the Allied Postal Service Sub-Commission, the Soviet government, and the Soviet Red Cross.207 The Soviet government authorized correspondence between prisoners and their families,208 but organizational and diplomatic obstacles made the exchanges highly episodic. In fact, the matter of letters sent to the prisoners crossed paths with another extremely delicate question, the one revolving around the lists of prisoners fallen into Soviet hands, which the Italian government continued to request in vain. In the absence of these lists, mail could be an indirect source of information. Thus wrote the High Commissariat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The list of the prisoners taken in Russia, and of those still present there, is truly indispensable. It is not appropriate to rely, as a means to acquire an exact understanding of the prisoners taken by the Russians, solely on the mail sent back because the recipients are deceased. Certain prisoners (whether dead or alive) may not be sent mail by their relatives, as is often the case for a number of reasons. Indeed, this indirect mode would fail to provide any information whatsoever on such prisoners.209

Similarly—in cabling the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 30 June 1945 with information on the arrival of a  first batch of letters the Italian Red Cross had sent its Soviet counterpart for the prisoners—Italian Ambassador in Moscow Pietro Quaroni had every reason to be skeptical about the promptness with which the letters had been forwarded: The Soviet government’s well-known attitude in the matter of our prisoners of war […] compounds the objective difficulties that tracking

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down the prisoners, scattered throughout the Union’s various republics, and the slowness of the Soviet postal service pose in themselves.210

He was not wrong. For example, in Suzdal mail was distributed to the prisoners only once, on 31 December 1945.211

10. News from Radio Moscow, and the Holy See The only way prisoners could let their loved ones know they were alive was through Radio Moscow. In the Vatican Secret Archives, recently made accessible, the Vatican Information Office set up by Pius XII stores thousands of messages sent by prisoners from all fronts, prisoner lists (classified as E), and information inquiries on prepared forms. Furthermore, in the case of Russia, envelopes (buste, b.) No. 377 and 378 hold the messages sent to families through Radio Moscow between 1943 and 1945 (classified as RM).212 In addition to relaying lists of prisoners sending greetings to their relatives, Radio Moscow allowed the broadcasting of short messages.213 For example, on 24 November 1942, prisoner Carlo Novelli was able to reach out to his family in Rome: My loved ones, at every moment my thoughts turn to you. I am a prisoner of the USSR and am very well. Surely at the end of this war I will return safe and sound to your arms. Dear Mom, your prayers have assisted me. I am intact, completely unscathed. Stay cheerful, as the war will soon be over, and there will be rightful peace for all nations. Kisses to all, Carlo.214

Captain Guido Musitelli (held in Russia after the war’s end, and repatriated only in 1954) managed to communicate with his wife on 18 December 1943: “I assure you my health is excellent, greetings to you, Giorgino, Mom, and all my loved ones.”215 To satisfy the needs of prisoners and accede to the pressing requests of their relatives back at home, the Holy See laid out a plan for the conveyance of special messages by families in Italy to prisoners detained in the USSR. To this end, a form was prepared detailing the recipient’s personal data, including the unit to which he belonged, as well as the personal data and address of the requesting family member. Often, rather than a relative, a parish priest or some other authority was charged with the task of writing

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the telegram. The latter had to be very concise, spanning a maximum of twenty-five words. Each form had a given reference number and, finally, bore the address any relevant information and paperwork should be sent to: “Secretary of State—Information Service—Vatican City.” The following are but a few examples. On 11 June 1943, Maria Cristina Guadagni of Rome sought to establish communication with her husband Giuseppe Guadagni, who had enrolled as a  volunteer in the militia. This was her laconic text to him: “I long for news from you. We are all well, and I hope you are too. Greetings, and kisses.”216 Like thousands of others, she never received an answer. Guadagni never came back from Russia. Other appeals were successful, and in those instances the Vatican Information Office provided the party making the inquiry with all the news it had been able to gather. General Emilio Battisti—commander of the Cuneense Division, repatriated in May 1950—was addressed the following text from his relatives: “Aware [of] your captivity, [we] pray for your health [and] hope [to] receive firsthand news from you soon. Yours, Gigina and Claudia. We [are] all well, [and we are] thinking of you. Kisses.”217 In addition to completing the prepared forms, family members tormented by the lack of information on their relations sometimes turned to the pope himself, with heartbreaking pleas. In broken Italian, the wife of the bersagliere Giacomo Sardisco of Palermo wrote something along the following lines: The Secretary of State of His Holiness, Rome I, the undersigned, Indagati Serafina—having received no word for the past five months about my husband, under arms on the Russian front—implore you to take up the matter, and give me news of my husband. […] Greetings from your most devoted, Indagati Serafina218

In 1946, when many prisoners were being repatriated from the USSR, Sardisco’s wife reiterated her plea: The Secretary of State of His Holiness I beg Your Holiness to give me news of the bersagliere Sardisco Giacomo, who is on the Russian front. I have not heard from him in three years. The [other] prisoners have all come back from Russia. I have inquired, and he is safe and sound. The Italian commissar has not let him repatriate. He has left him in camp No. 29 [unreadable] 3 [Tashkent?].

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I beg Your Holiness to grant me the favor of taking up the matter. I have not seen [my husband] in six years, and we have a child together who does not know [his own father]. Please, do me this kindness, and give me news promptly.

The letter ended with a desperate and devout “Bless Jesus Christ.”219 The soldier Giacomo Sardisco was ultimately repatriated, but only on 11 July 1950. He had been included among the Italian prisoners held back in Russia on charges of war crimes.

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CHAPTER 4

Antifascist Propaganda

I vow to be ruthless with those who break this oath. If I break this oath, and become a  traitor of the people, of my homeland and of my family, I will lose the right to live. My comrades in the common cause will be authorized to eliminate me as a traitor and an enemy of the people (Oath taken by the prisoners of the antifascist schools, RGASPI, f. 495, cart. 77, fasc. 20, 126. Secret).

1. The organization of the political work From the start, propaganda was a central feature of the Soviet system. At the time of the civil war, political work proved to be a  necessity for the spreading of official ideology among common citizens and army members. As the years passed, propaganda activities grew. The craft was honed until it culminated under Stalin, particularly in the course of the Second World War, when political work among troops was used to support the war effort. In the Soviet army, political work was entrusted to the politruki or politrabotniki—the political commissars—who had dominated the military system since the civil war, expanding their responsibilities to the point of effectively becoming consultants to the military commands. Political commissars even went to the trenches to offer soldiers moral support and encourage them to resist the enemy for the sake of the socialist state. They organized conferences among the Soviet military to strengthen their political education. Their tasks, however, often exceeded their role as propagandists. During the battles of Stalingrad, it became clear how political commissars’ incompetent interference in the direction of war operations often

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led to gross mistakes, and compromised the military commands’ effectiveness. On 9 October 1942, the very institution of commissars was abolished and the unitary command of the army was established instead. Propaganda among the prisoners of war was experimented on the 25,000 Polish military men (mostly officers) captured in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the invasion of Poland, and interned in the camps at Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostaskov. Classes specifically devoted to Marxist culture were organized there. The topics ranged in scope, and included the October Revolution, the causes of the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union, and the “material and cultural wellbeing of USSR workers.” Topics like the “beginning of the new imperialist war” and the Soviet Union’s foreign policy were also broached. Other activities included the reading of Soviet papers, followed by debates on the issues raised therein, the screening of documentaries on the history of the USSR, and discussions on general activities to be carried out in the camps.1 After June 1941, propaganda followed two directions. There was propaganda among enemy troops, and there was antifascist propaganda among prisoners of war. The latter took the form of mass political work with the prisoners of each nationality and programs set up by the antifascist schools centering on typical topics of Marxism-Leninism. The Executive Committee of the Comintern (IKKI) managed political work, with help from special sections, units and instructors belonging to the PURRKA, the Political Administration of the Red Army. Other ideological institutions collaborated as well, including the Political-Military Propaganda Council, the Soviet Information Office, the Pan-Soviet Radio Committee, clandestine party organizations, and partisan groups. In support of the Political Administration of the Red Army, the IKKI set up a special commission charged with organizing and managing political work among the prisoners. Presided over by Dimitrov, the commission included Dmitry Manuilsky, Ercole Ercoli (the pseudoname used by Palmiro Togliatti), Mátyás Rákosi, Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Johann Köplenig (a member of the Austrian communist party), and Bedřich (originally Friedrich) Geminder. In the meeting held on 24 January 1942, the commission appointed a subcommission of sorts, whose task was to ensure “constant collaboration with the IKKI on political matters pertaining to the work among the prisoners.” The subcommission was comprised of Ulbricht, who was in charge of it, as well as Köplenig, Vincenzo Bianco, and Zoltán Szántó, a member of the Hungarian communist party. The contents of the political propaganda were established by party and Soviet government resolutions, State Defense Committee (GKO) and

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Red Army Political Administration directives, Defense Ministry orders, and IKKI decrees. Propaganda was carried out in a variety of forms and through different methods: individual and group conversations with the prisoners, held by Soviet political commissars or by foreign communist émigrés; lessons; meetings; conferences, in the course of which decisions were made with the prisoners’ approval. Political work with the prisoners was set in motion quickly upon their arrival in the camps early in 1942, and appeared to be structured and deliberate. In the case of the Italians, prisoners from the CSIR were involved at first. Later, by the end of 1942, ARMIR survivors were also engaged. The nature of the war on the Eastern front has already been commented on, but Second Lieutenant Valdo Zilli’s remarks further clarify the matter: The fact that the victor immediately set about conducting political reeducation work among the captured prisoners lays bare the ideological nature of the war fought on the Eastern front. That the conflict between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union was akin to a war of religion has been observed by many.2

2. The aims of propaganda In organizing antifascist propaganda, the Administration for Political Work Among Prisoners intended primarily to create “a mass antifascist movement.” By this means, it pursued both short-term and long-term goals. The former included bringing about the end of the Italian-German alliance, prompting desertions in enemy troops, and overthrowing the fascist regime. In the Program of Initiatives by the Team of Tereshchenko and Edo’s Comrades, the paragraph devoted to the “Criteria for a correct political approach” states: The movement’s duty […] is to create a political platform that may direct the greater part of the prisoners against Italy’s participation in the war and in favor of the democratic coalition. To this end, the propaganda’s main political slogans will be: 1)  Italy’s exit from the war against the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. 2) The breaking of the alliance between Italy and Germany, which compels Italy to continue the war against England, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR The overthrowing of Mussolini’s government must be the third objective, […] based on the consideration that the war—which seems not to come to an end—started because of Mussolini, and that any truly national, non-fascist Italian government that might presently come to be in Italy would end this war waged against democratic countries and immediately detach itself from the alliance with Germany, fatal for the Italian people.3

Clearly, prior to the armistice, the propaganda machine pursued purely military goals, associated with the Soviet Union’s pressing need to reduce its engagements on the front. Thus, until 8 September, it aimed to persuade Italian prisoners to sign the pleas made among the fighting troops or broadcast over the radio for the Italian people to hear. The prisoners—duly trained and placed in special mobile units under the Soviet army’s various divisions—participated directly in the propaganda on the front,4 using megaphones and the radio.5 Another very common and effective means of propaganda that hinged on prisoner involvement was the distribution of fliers along the front line signed by individual military men or by groups of them. In the first year of war alone, Red Army specialists produced no less than 3,500 different fliers. Overall, in the course of the war, as many as 25,000 were drafted and distributed.6 For example, one flier on 13 September bore the signatures of two Italian soldiers who had recently been taken prisoner. The text argued for solidarity among fellow workers: “We are setting out to work, and we will toil in the company of men who are workers and peasants like us; […] in whose name are we fighting against the Russians, against Russian workers and peasants?” The falsehood of fascist propaganda was another fundamental issue raised in the flier: “They told us Russians tortured and shot [their prisoners], but that was a lie. And through similar lies they deceived us and herded us here as they would with livestock.”7 A different flier provided other arguments: “Fighting in Rostov and later near Moscow, we became completely persuaded that the propaganda spewed by our higher-ups was a miserable lie, and that we were fated to annihilation, not victory and peace.”8 Fliers directed at fighting troops, as well as appeals to the Italian people broadcast over Radio Moscow, contended that the Italian people rejected the war of aggression against the USSR, a thesis the Communist Party of Italy too had held since 1941.9 Thus, the mass of fighting workers was absolved of responsibility for the conflict, laid exclusively on the regime. At the same time, the fliers called for solidarity and brotherhood with the very people fascism had cast as enemies, namely, “Russian workers and peasants.”

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A flier distributed in February 1943 signed by the soldier Antonio Astediano—an Alpine servicemen from the 10th Company, Mondovì Battalion, 10th Regiment, Cuneense Division—stated: War has broken out in our homeland. Meanwhile, you suffer the cold and spill your blood for the Germans—those damned treasonous Germans, who turned themselves in to the Russians as prisoners at Stalingrad. The Romanian prisoners told us that when the Germans recognized the danger of being massacred they pushed the Romanians in front of the tanks to take the bullets, whereas they, the Germans, preferred to turn themselves in as prisoners.10

The absurdity of the alliance with Germany and the lack of affinity between the Italian and German peoples were recurring themes as well. Why are we writing you this letter? Because we cannot allow that you, our fellow countrymen, continue to fight against the Russians, who are invincible (a fact known to all), to safeguard the interests and to the advantage of Hitler’s bandits, who are entirely foreign to us. Has the Italian people not suffered enough for this endless war of occupation? Has it not already lost its best sons for this senseless war on the fields of France, Yugoslavia, and Africa? O comrades, enough! This sacrifice devoid of any justifiable reason must be brought to an end.11

The radio was an extraordinarily effective means of communication and propaganda in war. The Soviet leadership exploited it fully to communicate both with its own troops and resistance movements, and with enemy troops and the peoples of warring countries. For the latter purpose, on the initiative of communist émigrés, with collaboration from the Soviet government and the Comintern’s secretariat, radio stations were set up for Germany, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Austria, and Bulgaria. In addition, there were the Polish radios that had been broadcasting from locations in Russia and the Ukraine since the outset of the war, and four Czechoslovak radios.12 On 26 May 1943, Major Polikarpov, president of the Radio Broadcasting and Information Committee within the Council of the People’s Commissars, wrote to Shcherbakov addressing the importance of using prisoners of war “to increase the effectiveness of propaganda in foreign languages”:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Reliable news from Berlin, relayed from the Soviet mission in Stockholm, confirms that announcements on prisoners of war produce a significant effect on radio listeners. Currently, the Radio Broadcasting Committee has no material regarding the prisoners of war. Comrades working with Italian detainees have said that it would be possible to create radio broadcasts, even with participation from Italian generals. I ask you, therefore, for authorization to send a team to record the pieces in the prisoner-of-war camps on a regular basis, and to inform our comrades the camp directors of this decision.13

Following Polikarpov’s proposal, in June, activists in the Tambov camp produced an appeal for a  “free, happy, and independent Italy.” Radio Moscow broadcast the message that same month: Italian men and women, listen to the cry of faith, enthusiasm and revolt that we prisoners in Russia send to you from afar. We who have fought against a strong, disciplined and well-led people urge you to answer this question, which you yourselves […] asked on 10 June: “What have we gained from three years of war?” […] War is the worst punishment fascism has meted out to Italy. Men in arms, workers and peasants, do you not feel how crushing the weight of complete defeat is, how useless your sacrifice is, how short-lived your resistance is […], how many difficulties the future has in store for our children and wives if we persist in this war? […] Rebel en masse against your fascist leaders; bring factories’ military production to a halt, as factories are all under Germany’s thumb […]. Fight against fascism, bring about its fall to stop the imminent Anglo-American invasion.14

The appeal, in which the reference to the “Anglo-American invasion” is noteworthy, continued with slogans against fascism and Mussolini, and with praises for the Red Army’s successes. When the fascist regime fell on 25 July, thirty-eight officers detained in Suzdal—including three colonels and lieutenant colonels—sent the Italian people a message. Opening the message was an invitation to desist from the “absurd and disastrous” conflict. What advantages could the Italian people gain from this war, fought “only for a small circle of plutocrats who increase their wealth through the war industry while the people languish, struck by rationing and all manner of limitations, and Italy’s best sons die in vain in far away lands”?15

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Signed by 460 officers, the message dated 18 January 1944 was what Suzdal activists believed to be “camp No. 160’s biggest political success.” The message expressed gratitude toward those—regular units and partisan groups alike—who were fighting for the liberation of Italy from “the NaziFascist tyranny.” It affirmed the prisoners’ desire to join them in the resistance. It praised the “effective action” of and the part played until then by “antifascist political parties, the true expression of Italians’ sentiments and maturity, despite twenty years of fascist obscurantism.” Finally, it called for the establishment of a  democratic government that might lead to Italy’s material and moral reconstruction.16 Broadcast over the radio, these messages were a  way for Italians in Russia to participate in Italian politics from a distance by commenting on its crucial phases: the fall of fascism; the armistice signed on 8 September; the declaration of war by the Italian Kingdom of the South against Germany; the congress held in Bari by the parties of the National Liberation Committee (the recipient of a  message, though only ninety officers detained in camp No. 160 signed it);17 and the fall of the government presided by Ferruccio Parri (8 December 1945), to whom a message of solidarity was addressed on 25 January 1946. As the situation on the front evolved and the war’s end neared, propaganda among prisoners of war gradually changed. Before the men were repatriated, propaganda’s political aspect became dominant. Indeed, its long-term aim, as stated by the Secretariat of the Comintern’s Executive Committee, was to “forge conscious and active antifascists, and prepare new national military units and even new cadres for their respective communist movements.”18 In addition to supporting the struggle against fascism, offering a positive image of the Soviet system now became important. On 27 April 1943, Bianco wrote political instructors the following words: As well as revealing fascism’s false and reactionary nature, you must explain “what the Soviet Union is,” for example, [by illustrating its history] from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the Second World War. […] To explain what the Soviet Union is, cite as an example the fact that the working masses can and should fight to rebuild a  regime that may not only destroy the causes of war, but also allow workers to lead the state and forge their own lives, as [they do] in the Soviet Union, without capitalists or blackshirts.19

At this point, propaganda was not to target only subjects who were already somewhat receptive, but the largest possible number of people. In a report

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to Togliatti regarding the camp in Temnikov, Edoardo D’Onofrio was critical of instructor Buzzi’s recruiting only “elements who were never members of the National Fascist Party back in Italy” for the antifascist group. D’Onofrio believed it was necessary to increase “the number of antifascist activists in the camps,” as well as to prompt “the mass of the prisoners, not just active ones, to express their views publicly on the current political issues (the war with the Germans, etc.).”20 The need for mass work engendered a certain degree of caution in the “indoctrination” strategies. This is clearly visible in the dispute between Tereshchenko and Robotti in the Krasnogorsk School, for example. During a lesson, Tereshchenko expressed his hope that a communist society featuring “authentic social justice” might be established for all humanity. Robotti rebuked Tereshchenko in front of the prisoners, saying the school should focus on antifascism: “Fighting against fascism, guilty of all the tragedies that befell our peoples—this is the school’s primary task.” Based on a 1946 document concerning the results of the work carried out by the GUPVI, propaganda in the camps had the following goals: — to ensure the loyal attitude of the mass of the prisoners toward the USSR; — to ensure that the prisoners of war understand their armies’ responsibility for the destruction carried out in the lands of the USSR and, thus, that they are conscientious in their work in the camps; — to educate, drawing them from the prisoners of war, tenacious antifascists, who, once back in their homelands, might be able to carry out the struggle to reorganize their countries on democratic principles and to root out the residues of fascism; — to unmask people responsible for atrocities, and any pro-fascist elements.21

To fulfill these goals, in 1946 the GUPVI organized the following activities in the camps holding prisoners of war: 4,924 prisoner assemblies, 985 meetings, 13,952 conferences and reports, 51,626 group newspaper readings, 37,997 individual conversations, 14,338 communications on the international political situation, 15,848 concerts and other amateur activities, and 3,298 movie screenings. In the course of that year, the antifascist groups numbered 92,771 members, including 25,670 activists.22 The size of the Soviet commitment to propaganda serves as proof of communism’s fundamentally educational calling. The Soviet Union was cast as an enormous school, where everyone was to receive the teachings

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that would eradicate the spirit of capitalism and mold the “new man” of socialism. At least formally, the entire Gulag system had an educational purpose.23 Even in the case of prisoners of war, it was this broader project—as well as the goal of training a  select core of communist activists—that justified the substantial work involved in the carrying out of propaganda.

3. “Mass” political work As previously mentioned, there were two distinct levels of political work. One was for the mass of prisoners of each nationality, and one, not accessible to all, took the form of education in antifascist schools. For both types of activities, instructors were expected to abide by the directives, suggestions and programs established by the Administration for Political Work Among Prisoners of War. In a meeting held on 24 January 1942, the IKKI’s Commission for Political Work Among the Prisoners presided by Dimitrov spelled out the undertakings deemed effective for the purpose of propaganda. These included calling conferences with prisoners of the various nationalities, and establishing “a school camp for antifascist prisoners, with three-monthlong classes,” at the end of which the prisoners were to be used “for work in the camps,” and, in the case of those who had especially distinguished themselves as antifascists and communists, “for other activities as well, having to do with the political work.”24 Item 4 of the minutes provided a brief summary of the plan to set up antifascist schools. The project would be fully developed over the course of the next few months, until finally, in April, the first such school would be opened in the Oranki camp, as we will see further on. Item 5 of the minutes introduced another crucial component of the political work, namely, the distribution of an information bulletin among prisoners. The following year, this would lead to the setting up of papers for the prisoners of war. Thus, within days of taking thousands of prisoners, the Comintern set in motion the organization of mass political work. In addition to spreading the principles of antifascism on a large scale, this helped identify subjects who—having shown interest in the preliminary work—were likely to benefit from further study in the schools. A year later, through its directive dated 5 February 1943, the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern perfected the organization, calling for the following measures:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR 1. Expand the prisoner-of-war school to 300 persons with a three-month program for the training of instructors and men in charge of the work among the prisoners of war. 2. Organize short courses (four–five weeks long), involving up to 1,000– 1,500 prisoners of war, for the training of the activists. 3. Organize special seminars for prisoner-of-war officers. 4. Work on the training of prisoners of war, forming battalions with the view to turn them into national military units at a later time. 5. Ensure that popular antifascist radio broadcasts in the prisoners’ languages are heard in the camps. 6. Publish as soon as possible pamphlets (with mass appeal) on matters pertaining to the POWs’ countries, and on the Soviet Union’s political system, economy, and culture, on the life of the Soviet peoples, and, particularly, on the Soviet Union’s patriotic war against the fascist invaders.25

The directive also urged that the papers for the prisoners be turned into papers “by the prisoners.” This could be achieved by letting prisoners collaborate to the work of the paper and contribute pieces. A document titled Project for a Work Plan Among Italian Prisoners, filed away in the Comintern archives, suggested methods and contents for the political work among the prisoners. It claimed conversations should not seem forced, should involve four or five prisoners at a  time, and should hinge on questions regarding “matters of primary concern.” It also advised that prisoners purporting to be antifascist or communist be scrutinized more closely, for “fascist agents” could sometimes be concealed among them. Certain prisoners, after their authentic antifascism had been ascertained, could be entrusted with “intelligence tasks” within the camp. It might also prove useful—the author of the document added—to study the correspondence belonging to the prisoners, both dead and alive, in order to identify and exploit any reasons for discontent about the war, particularly in relation to Italy’s alliance with Germany.26 The importance of carrying out political work with individual prisoners, reiterated by the Comintern,27 is reminiscent of the systems the NKVD routinely adopted with civilian detainees. The gathered data was regularly sent to the Administration for Political Work Among Prisoners of War. The latter drafted files in which prisoners’ political views were noted down in great detail. The following is one survivor’s account:

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Every so often mysterious men visit the camp. They arrive from Moscow and summon some of the prisoners to a small room in the command headquarters to talk. Each prisoner is filled with anxiety in anticipation of the meeting. Invariably, he returns astonished and uneasy.—Of the thousand questions I was asked, all of them seemingly insignificant, which one has been treacherous [for me], and of interest [to them]?28

In the course of the questioning, prisoners were asked not only to offer details about themselves, their family, and their work, but also to provide information and assessments of a political and military nature—on their unit, on the corps structure, and on the battles carried out.29 The words below are from one survivor’s diary: In my case, in addition to addressing my particulars and my family’s, the conversation focused on questions pertaining to: unit and military rank; level of education; schools attended and subjects studied; knowledge of foreign languages; profession; party membership, and circumstances of capture; possession of material goods; books read; friendships and sports. For each question, I had to provide an adequate answer. And they wouldn’t accept to be told only about myself—they wanted the same information with regard to my family members, my in-laws, and even my friends.30

The commissar further investigated prisoners’ reasons for discontent. These ranged from exhaustion accumulated as a result of the war in Albania to lack of confidence in victory, from the absence of motivation for war against the USSR to general disapproval of the alliance with Germany. When asked about their views of fascism, many prisoners claimed they no longer supported Mussolini’s stance on the war, but “agreed with everything else.”31 The interrogations were also opportunities for the prisoners to adhere to communism, and, paradoxically, to free themselves of the bonds imposed by fascism. During his first interview with the NKVD, Bruno Cecchini was imparted the following piece of wisdom from the officer: “You are now in the motherland of socialism; you are free, and no longer dominated by fascist propaganda.”32 Captivity itself was not to be viewed as a waste of time, therefore, but rather as a time for personal maturation. The second phase of the mass political work hinged on conferences. Organized by nationality, they were usually managed by Soviet commissars

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or political instructors, and had the double purpose of providing information on the progress of the conflict, and of raising the issues of antifascism and communist indoctrination.33 The political exiles held meetings daily, their propaganda was onesided—in favor of communism—and the most frequently used slogans were “death to capitalism,” and “lands and factories to the workers.” They made very convenient comparisons: “What’s the difference between a capitalist factory and a communist factory?” We did not know what to answer. Thus, they would intervene and say that the former, when it had produced a  lot of material and filled its warehouses to capacity, fired workers and drove them to hunger, whereas [the latter], when it produced more than required, reduced work hours and left wages unchanged.34

The debates were used to seek out prisoners particularly inclined to antifascist ideas, but also to expose the most recalcitrant and quarrelsome— that is, the fascists. Instructors and political commissars often devoted great energy to this second category of prisoners because of the weight their “conversion” would carry in the eyes of both the Comintern’s higherups and the mass of undecided prisoners. Reading wall newspapers, or camp papers, and books enhanced the conferences’ work. Many camps were equipped with a  library, supplied through requests sent to the Political Administration.35 The organization of the First Italian Prisoner-of-War Conference proved particularly effective for mass political work. Dimitrov entrusted Bianco with selecting delegates among prisoners already “appointed by their fellow detainees, representing all units and divisions of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia.”36 The conference was held in Karaganda camp No. 99 on 27 April 1942, and its contents were published in Pravda on 25 June. In the course of the conference, some prisoners spoke out against the fascist regime. While it “had promised to make Italy great and free, to secure freedom to work for laborers and to seize excess profits from the war,” it had instead brought Italy to ruin.37 At the end of the conference, a document was approved unanimously for distribution in all USSR prison camps. The document reiterated the regime’s demagogic nature and condemned Italy’s subservience to Germany. The proceedings from the meeting show that Finnish, Romanian, and Hungarian delegates were present, as well as one German delegate. The First Italian Prisoner-of-War Conference was brought to an end by chanting Bandiera rossa.38

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Finally, a significant part was played by the camp club set up for the recreation and diversion of the prisoners, who could practice many different types of activities, such as reading, playing chess, watching propaganda films, taking part in small musical ensembles or theater productions. In one survivor’s words: I spend my days at the club, where I’ve found books in French, and even in Italian. I read Marx’s selected works voraciously, and some of Lenin’s oeuvre in French too, turning the pages as if they belonged to a novel. A company of “artists” is present as well. It comprises a small musical ensemble, singers, and character actors. Every Sunday they perform in the club’s small meeting room. Even the Russian commanders, woman doctors and sestry flock in to listen—they don’t want to miss a single note. On weekdays, the musicians (a violinist, three guitarists, and a drummer) and the singers take turns in the infirmaries to cheer up the sick. On Saturday evening, the artists exit the camp and perform in the Russians’ stolovaya [mess hall].39

The mass political work also involved sports, as recalled by Bruno Cecchini, second lieutenant of the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment: The cultural-recreational and social-proletarian program features physical exercises and mass sports too. The landscape of physical activities is varied: volleyball, soccer games played with balls made from rags held together by improvised and rather flimsy ties, boxing matches, and gym displays. The cultural landscape is its equal, and indeed keeps growing, increasing in intensity and volume while remaining the same: library, conferences, appeals, revues and a  variety of shows, debates, talks, round tables, updates, and mandatory indoctrination classes. According to another baseless evil rumor, Robotti was appointed—by the man with the blue flashes, that is to say, by the NKVD, the absolute ruler of our lives—to the education and re-education of the Italian officers detained in Suzdal, in compliance with a specific methodology. Rizzoli was appointed to active teaching for the educational purposes set for the workers and peasants. The appeals we are required to sign are too many to count; among them, the first one, a  fabrication petitioning to give Trieste to Yugoslavia and to Tito’s comrades, stands out. Anyone refusing to sign the appeals is a reactionary, a fascist, and a revanchist; those who stall and try to buy time fare a little better, but an eye is kept on them too; those who sign are democratic and progressive.40

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4. The structure of the “antifascist group” In every camp, political commissars or communist émigrés had the task of organizing “antifascist groups” among prisoners of each nationality. These groups were made up of prisoners “from across the political spectrum, clearly aligned against fascism, and determined to establish a new democratic regime” in their countries of origin. Elements recruited into the antifascist groups were “intent on fighting to eradicate any residue of fascism, and on shedding light on the problems of democracy.”41 Prior membership in the communist party or having been sympathizers were not strict requirements, though these circumstances were looked on favorably. The selection took place among those who, during questioning, had openly criticized Mussolini’s regime, or otherwise proven their hostility to it. Each antifascist group included “general activists” and a  smaller subset of “select activists.” Most prisoners adhering to antifascist propaganda qualified as general activists of a given antifascist group, and participated in assemblies and all pertinent activities organized in the camp. Chosen elements who had attended the antifascist programs at the schools became select activists. The latter spoke at meetings and were asked to write reports on the progress of the propaganda.42 They organized recreational activities for the prisoners and were expected to “steer the great majority of intellectuals to the need to return home fully informed about Italy’s new situation, including its most recent developments, and the social function of each [of them].”43 In his report to Ercoli on camp No. 58, D’Onofrio wrote: The instructors’ work depends on 300 activists (in all). There are about 150 select activists, chosen among the 300. Both kinds of members are distributed in the camp’s various sections, barracks, and companies. They are in charge of reading Soviet war bulletins and L’Alba to all prisoners.44

Additionally, it fell to activists to inform Italian political instructors and Soviet commissars about prisoners’ behavior and ideas. It is worth pointing out that instructors’ political work could also be covert. For instance, the instructor Roncato wrote: I need some advice on whether the antifascist groups I have so far put to work illegally—in agitation and propaganda, as well as in intelligence tasks—should continue in this way, or instead perform their role overtly.

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I  think the illegal system is best, because some officers are known to express their thoughts openly [in the presence of “undercover” activists]. And so in this way I  can keep the development of good ideas and of opposing ones under control. That is, I am able to keep a check on all discussions occurring in the rooms, and, through the agency of antifascist elements, to perform agitation and propaganda work.45

Within a  given antifascist group a  so-called antifascist committee was sometimes established, entrusted with specific tasks, like the distribution of prisoner papers. Progress on the front and political events in Italy carried considerable weight among the prisoners. They influenced prisoners’ attitude toward propaganda and toward antifascist groups, determining, alternately, group enrollments and resignations. The fall of fascism, the signing of the armistice, the declaration of war against Germany, and the Germans’ occupation of Italy naturally facilitated propaganda, mass political work, and activities by antifascist groups generally. The fall of fascism was the subject of assemblies and rallies held by the antifascist groups: “After the initial surprise at the sudden turn of events, an awakening of political activity became apparent both in camp No. 74 and in camp No. 160.”46 In Oranki, 217 out of 270 officers approved the order of the day drafted on the antifascist group’s initiative on 3 August 1943. It was a huge success, as shortly before 25 July only forty or so officers had spoken out against the war and for the struggle against fascism.47 Regarding camp No. 58, D’Onofrio wrote to Ercoli that the camp instructor Buzzi had to stall “the admission into the general activists’ group of numerous elements whose views [had] shifted following Mussolini’s fall, telling them to wait a while longer. This was done so they wouldn’t believe enrolling into the antifascist group [had] become easy.”48 When the Badoglio government was established, D’Onofrio met with the prisoners of Oranki. According to Tereshchenko, prisoners attended in high numbers and listened very carefully. On that occasion, it was decided to adopt a resolution acknowledging the new government.49 Among Italian officers in camp No. 160, the announcement of the armistice on 8 September 1943 was generally met “with enthusiasm, because the armistice meant the end of a useless massacre for Italians in a war against their own interests alongside Germans, and because it strengthened everyone’s hope that captivity was coming to an end.”50

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The following account is by Fidia Gambetti: We’d been there [in camp No. 93] for a  few days when the Soviet authorities told us Italy had signed an unconditional armistice with England, the United States, and the USSR. It was merely the official ratification of an entirely expected defeat, yet, despite knowing Badoglio, none of us would have thought all that time had been wasted so foolishly. The news aroused the envy of Romanians and Magyars, and opened our hearts to many hopes. The Soviet authorities said they no longer regarded us as their enemies, and confirmed we would soon be dispatched south, until we could be repatriated via the Mediterranean, which was likewise expected to happen without delay.51

News of the armistice aroused different reactions. In the Suzdal camp there were even those who, in protest or out of disappointment, refused to take their food rations.52 In Suzdal, the select activists of the antifascist group found that, while “the most glorious phase of resistance” was starting in Italy, this “regrettably did not resound with and gain the appreciation of many officers in camp No. 160.”53 After the Italian Kingdom of the South declared war against Germany (13 October 1943), a rally was held in camp No. 165 on 17 October. At the end of the rally, the officers and soldier gathered in assembly discussed the situation in Italy, the reasons that had pushed Mussolini to ally himself with Germany, the country’s economic circumstances, and freedom of thought. Finally, they prepared a  motion, which they would give the editorial staff of L’Alba, calling for a “national committee fighting for the liberation of the Italian people” to be set up. These words are by Second Lieutenant Valdo Zilli: “Is the freedom we enjoy in the Soviet Union’s concentration camps not greater than the one fascism purported to give us, which was actually the enslavement of many millions of men?”54 Still, some antifascist groups, most notably Suzdal’s, witnessed acts of resistance and even the resignation of members. When the line of the Italian parties convened at the congress in Bari was endorsed, this caused rifts among the select activists of the antifascist groups. Those who opposed antifascism were emboldened, and their desire to retaliate even led to the fascist salute’s making a comeback in some camps.55 Ossola recorded resignations by at least thirty-four men, out of the 140 enrolled in the antifascist group in Suzdal. These stemmed from disparate causes. Some men objected to the group’s exceedingly anti-monar-

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chical stance. Others resigned because “the democratic movement hadn’t restricted itself to expelling Mussolini, but rather had taken on an increasingly economic, political, and social nature.” Still others jumped ship because they disagreed with how the group’s representatives were elected. Finally, two antifascist activists resigned in opposition to the compromise calling for the “formal unity” of all democratic forces in the struggle against fascism.56 Yet the question of Trieste was the main reason many resigned. On 1 May 1945, Tito’s troops had entered the city, and the following September the Molotov-Kardelj plan to transfer the whole of Julian Venetia to Yugoslavia was set forth again at the London Conference. The PCI maintained an ambiguous position with regard to Istria. In camp No. 160, the question of Trieste caused a  particularly severe reaction. Activists deemed it appropriate to convene the antifascist group in two assemblies to discuss the matter publicly. The speaker’s presentation led to a heated debate and to strong opposition: “the speaker’s point of view was held to be the antifascist group’s [at large], and as such resulted in very many resignations.”57 The prisoners were often threatened with not being sent home if they refused to sign the appeals to transfer Trieste to Yugoslavia.58 After all, it bears noting that activists’ undertakings was often met with strong opposition, particularly in camp No. 160, even though the organization of mass political work was intense and very extensive there. Opposers—varyingly described as “antidemocratic,” “antinational,” or “fascist”—included both stalwart fascists, whether or not they had been actual blackshirts, and those who wanted to uphold their oath to the king. In February 1944, a  group of senior officers had signed a  message averse to antifascist propaganda. The message called attention to the fact that a soldier’s duty was to fight, not deal in politics, and condemned the actions of those who had sided “against the king and the government that had provided their livelihood for years.” According to activist officers, such statements led the mass of prisoners “astray” and “obfuscated” their ideas: “Undeniably, the Italian community still bears the brunt of that depravity, which results in failure to understand the events that take place in Italy and threatens to turn young forces away from the number of those that will determine the country’s future wellbeing.”59 Activists saw Catholics and “social-democrats” as hindering political work in the camps, too. The Commission for Political Work Among Prisoners of War in camp No. 95 (Kyshtym, in the Chelyabinsk region),60 for example, acknowledged as much:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Political work in the camps must embrace the broadest strata of prisoners. Work among social-democrats and Catholics, as well as among peasants and members of the middle classes, has so far been neglected, and must be improved. The very fact that in camp No. 95 there is a  group of social-democrats, made up of fifteen people who have said they do not wish to receive instructions from Moscow, proves that tactical mistakes have been made in the political work.61

5. The political training of prisoners and their enrollment in the antifascist schools Soviet political commissars were surprised to find that most Italians were not interested in political matters. The instructor Goldmacher observed that “the prisoners [were] complete political virgins,” with “no idea of what Italy was like before fascism.”62 The instructor started his work in the camp hospital and reported trying to engage the men by bringing up topics potentially of interest to them. As prisoners were mostly peasants and farmers, he had raised the issue of land in Italy. Prisoners’ only concern, however, was kasha (semolina porridge).63 Manuilsky and Tereshchenko had advised that political work focus mainly on officers, that is, on middle-class men, but not to the detriment of soldiers belonging to the proletariat. Thus, a report issued in October 1944 on camp No. 165 criticized the fact that in the Italian section out of 118 students there were only “three peasants and thirty-four workers in all.” Indeed, “the remainder—thus the majority—was made up of elements from the petite-bourgeoisie.”64 The role of instructors and communist functionaries, who visited the camps regularly, was crucial for the selection of the students. The selection criteria were regulated by a  very detailed directive, urging that attention be paid to: a) Deserters and prisoners of war who willingly turned themselves in […]. b) Former members of the communist party or communist youth organizations, or former functionaries of reliable mass revolutionary organizations. c) Some former social-democratic partisans, members of Catholic organizations, […].

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d) Prisoners of war who, at reception points and sorting camps, professed to be active opponents of the fascist regime. e) Able prisoners of war formerly in the employ of large companies who can provide precious information of a  political nature […] on facts that may be used in our propaganda work in the countries fighting against us. f) Able peasants, [and] representatives of the intelligentsia. g) Work must be carried out in a  similar vein among officers, some of whom may be [ideologically] close to us.65

Additionally, antifascism, proven reliability and active participation in the movement were indispensable requisites. As attested to by the report issued in May 1943 on propaganda activities carried out in camp No. 188, selection was strict: among the antifascist prisoners of war of the Italian army [143], seventyfour men have been selected for individual assessment interviews; the men were then sent to the antifascist school. Those for whom we had even the slightest doubt were held back, and not sent to the antifascist school.66

But of course there was broad discretionary leeway: there were instances when the administrators of individual camps, in an excess of zeal, sent off to the Krasnogorsk School even self-professed antifascists, who in fact had no inclination for studying in such a peculiar institution, or whose antifascism was very superficial, casual, or indeed fictitious.67

In Suzdal, between 31 January 1945 and the closing of the school, political commissars turned down the applications of as many as nineteen prisoners, for various reasons. One prisoner was rejected because his father was a fascist functionary. Another was rejected because he had been a militia officer. Some had proven politically weak, or, despite their declarations, had seemed hostile or suspicious of Marxism. Only two were not admitted because their health was poor.68 In general, out of the 159 men enrolled in the antifascist group of Suzdal, twenty-nine had attended the school. Of these, five had shown meager results, and three had attended irregularly between April 1945 and April 1946. Eight camp prisoners had refused to

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attend the Krasnogorsk School after being selected by the instructor and the political commissar. A chaplain had asked to be admitted to the program too. According to Robotti, he had been rejected because, “given his intellectual background,” it was expected “a lot of time would be wasted in idle talk, whereas the courses followed a regular program spanning three–four months.”69 Father Corrado Bertoldi corroborates this piece of information. In his memoirs, he recalls asking Robotti to be admitted to the school because he was “very interested, as a priest.” However, [Robotti] immediately made clear to me that, precisely because of my status, I could not be admitted: did he realize [by taking me in] they would be providing me with a  two-edged sword? If they hadn’t been able to sway me to their side—and I believe they had several reasons to think that would be the outcome—they would have offered an adversary excellent grounds on which to attack them.70

6. Instructors and control over political work Instructors were recruited among communist émigrés attending the party school in Moscow.71 Their references were checked and subjected to the NKVD. A resolution by the Secretariat of the IKKI called for them to be “equated to State Security lieutenants and senior lieutenants.”72 Their role was not limited to teaching and propagating antifascist ideas. It also involved acting as intermediaries between the prisoners and the camp commands. In the carrying out of mass political work as well as in schools, Soviet political commissars and other personnel—made up of communist émigrés performing translation and secretarial tasks—assisted instructors. When it came to where the latter should be sent, and to requests for translators and typists, the path followed was strictly hierarchical, but recommendations by party functionaries were taken into account.73 The work of instructors and personnel was generally subjected to control by the Administration for Political Work Among Prisoners of War and by the Comintern. Indeed, mass political work in the camps was under the close control of the party functionaries, who reported their findings to Comintern directors and to the Administration for Political Work Among Prisoners of War. Conversely, according to what Tereshchenko wrote, there was no one appointed to directing “the study process in practice,” or to

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“checking on the teachers’ work.” The reason for this was that “the superior organs of state, party and army” were busy with more serious matters.74 Still, there could be indirect forms of control: for example, the number of enrollments in the antifascist movement and the number of prisoners signing appeals cast a positive light on the instructors, and increased the importance and weight they carried with the Political Administration. Instructors’ work required terrific sacrifice and dedication, and was not without risk. In one of his reports, Bianco claimed that several instructors had contracted typhus in the camps and that some had died from it.75 In his account on the work carried out in camp No. 160, the instructor Roncato said he too had fallen victim to the typhus epidemic and been admitted to the hospital; “even while there, anytime [he] could think rationally,” he had tried to “keep up the work in the camp,” with help from his Russian comrades who would go pay him a visit. Yet, “between those who had died and those who had been evacuated to other hospitals, the disease had destroyed all of [his] work, and [he] had been left with only two officers.”76 Life for instructors was not easy. They suffered from hunger in the camps. In Moscow, they had to plead with Comintern directors in order to reunite their family or to benefit from the Lux Hotel meal vouchers. They were often unable to repatriate. The case of Armando Cocchi is emblematic. He repeatedly asked to be sent back to Italy, but in vain. He died in Moscow in August 1946.77 Robotti himself had a hard time repatriating. When delegates from the CGIL traveled to the Soviet Union in August 1945, Robotti handed their leader Giuseppe Di Vittorio—of whom more will be said later—a card enjoining him to take action for his repatriation: Let me tell you, I am still waiting for your promised “urgent recall” […] for I continue to believe, as I did when we spoke before, that I could be of greater use in Italy, in any field, than here. Anyway, I trust in the will of the […] saints, who, as everyone knows, reside in Rome. My affectionate regards to you and to our comrades, Robotti.78

The PCI activist thus relied on Di Vittorio to convince the “saints” that were supposed to call him back to Italy, including Togliatti, to do so at once. The following year Robotti was still in the Soviet Union. At that point, he addressed the PCI leader directly, pressing for his repatriation application—seemingly bogged down—to be processed.79 Despite all this, official communications by the communists engaged in the political work often attest to their strong motivation. The instructor

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Matilde “Torre,” for example, addressed the following words to Bianco on 28 January 1943: I am here in camp No. 188, where 9,000 Italians are held! Of these, more than 3,000 are officers of different ranks. The work is enormous, and I  am alone amid this sea in storm. I  assure you that for the sake of our party it is indispensable, urgent, extremely necessary that [we] be present. Therefore, dear Bianco, take immediate action and if you can’t come personally, though this would be desirable, then send at least two or three political elements to our aid. To help us. Our literature in Italian and in French, Italian papers, and Italian-Russian dictionaries are indispensable. Dear Bianco, your presence is more than necessary, I  believe, and [should be established] as soon as possible.80

7. The antifascist schools In April 1942, the first political antifascist school was set up in Oranki. Right from the start, the school was conceived of as an institution that should have instructors and follow a  program made up of well-defined classes. In January 1943, it was decided to transfer the school to a better equipped camp, not far from Moscow. Camp No. 27/b in Krasnogorsk, a  small village ten kilometers from the capital, was chosen for this purpose.81 On 24 January, the instructors Szántó and Jancen went to camp No. 27. Colonel Voronov, the camp’s director, stated his willingness to accomodate the antifascist school in the houses of the nearby abandoned workers’ village. This solution would allow to isolate the students from both the camp and the outside world. Szántó presented a report to Dimitrov, asking that the secretary of the Krasnogorsk VKP(b) City Committee receive the necessary instructions on how to organize the complex. In his report, Szántó further drew attention to the fact that Voronov had truly committed to this cause and worked very hard to see it through, “aware [as he was] of the importance of such a school.”82 Dimitrov asked that the required authorizations be produced and the men in charge of the Krasnogorsk camp be mobilized in a timely manner, “so that work in the school might commence by 15 February.”83 In fact, actual classes did not start in Krasnogorsk until the fall. Between April and May 1943, antifascist courses were also instituted in camp No. 165 (Taliza), near the town of Yuzha.84 By focusing on differ-

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ent tasks, the activities carried out in this second school, which we will call the Yuzha School, complemented the ones carried out in the Krasnogorsk School. The NKVD decree established as follows: 1. Antifascist political courses for prisoners of war to be organized in Yuzha camp No. 165. Classes to be set up for 1,000 prisoners. 2. Candidate selection for attendance in the courses to be carried out in the camps and submitted to Major General Petrov, in charge of the Administration for Prisoners of War. 3. Lessons to start on 30 May 1943. 4. Command staff in camp No. 165 to be increased by up to nineteen elements. 5. Food rations for attendees in the antifascist courses to be determined according to the norms in place for officers.85

The Yuzha School started being operational in August. It offered basic courses lasting as little as a month. Lessons focused on “simple and essential information on the history of the Country of the Soviets, as well as on the history of Italy and of fascism.”86 In addition to the two schools mentioned so far, a third school existed. Veterans called it “the villa.” Only some of the prisoners selected in Suzdal or in other prison camps were interrogated in the villa, or Spanish House, located in camp No. 20 not far from Moscow. Prisoners who, after attending the programs of the other two schools, claimed to be willing to become agents for the Soviet Union were housed in this building, where rooms were rigged with microphones.87 In Krasnogorsk, subjects such as Marxist political economics, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism were studied in greater depth.88 The program lasted at least four months and dealt with the same issues addressed in the country’s high schools. In essence, the Krasnogorsk School was precisely something of a secondary school for the best and worthiest students coming from the other school. The decision to set up more advanced courses had arisen from the need to recruit “qualified propagandists,” in short supply according to the NKVD. These might become educators, and would be “the best disseminators of antifascist truth among the masses” of prisoners.89 For Tereshchenko, the school’s goal was to “sow feelings of friendship toward the USSR among prisoners.”90 The Krasnogorsk School was divided into four sections, with German, Hungarian, Austrian, and Italian students respectively. In Yuzha, a  fifth section for Romanian students was also present.91 A specific hierarchy was followed in both. The director, who was also in charge of the camp, was an

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NKVD colonel. It fell to him to ensure that the school functioned properly overall, and to oversee the work of the section managers. The latter, one per nationality, handled teaching in its more general parts. The Italian section in Krasnogorsk was managed by Tereshchenko, whereas the one in Yuzha was managed by Dmitry Shchevliagin. Paolo Robotti, who headed the program, and Matteo Giovanni (alias Ivan Regent) worked in Krasnogorsk. Luigi Amadesi (Lovera), Giovanni Germanetto, Giulio Cerreti and other communist émigrés occasionally visited the school and gave reports (usually on the progress of the war effort). The two schools employed not only teachers, but also secretaries and translators, as well as non-permanent staff in charge of producing booklets and other published material. Taking teachers and collaborators into account, twenty-one people worked in Krasnogorsk: eight in the German section, seven in the Italian, four in the Hungarian, and two in the Romanian. Table 4.1. Antifascist schools: men employed in the Italian section, and their wages  Antifascist School (Krasnogorsk) […] No. 106

Matteo Giovanni

teacher

1,300 rubles

107

Tereshchenko Nikolai Ivanovich

teacher

1,200 rubles

108

Robotti Pavel Petrovich

teacher

1,200 rubles

109

Curato Andrey Andreevich

teacher

1,100 rubles

110

Grets Eva

librarian

900 rubles

111

Rudash Eva

translator

700 rubles

112

Parfënova Marija Filippovna

secretary

500 rubles

Antifascist Courses (Yuzha) No. 131

Shchevliagin Dmitry Petrovich

teacher

1,400 rubles

132

Vera (Moschelli) Paolo

teacher

1,400 rubles

133

Foschi Yulii Antonovich

teacher

1,200 rubles

Source: RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 39, l. 4–5

Twenty-eight people worked in Yuzha, fifteen of whom in the German section alone, and three in the Italian section. Monthly wages for Italian

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teachers did not exceed 1,400 rubles, as shown in table 4.1, which only concerns the Italian sections in the two schools. Based on the requests for material and money for wages submitted by school directors, total expenditures over seven months were as follows: Money for the payment of teachers and school personnel: 40 teachers, average of 1,500 rubles a month for seven months 14 typist-translators, 800 rubles a month for seven months 2 directors of teaching, 1,500 rubles a month for seven months. Total: 519,400 rubles.92

These costs were budgeted for by the GUPVI and later, after it was established, by the Institute 99.93 In Krasnogorsk, each class was made up of about twenty-five students—the number was never lower than twenty, or higher than thirty. Instructors chose their assistants from among the best students. Food in Krasnogorsk, Danilo Ferretti wrote, was of the standard variety given to prisoner-of-war soldiers. Thus, [the school] was neither a  retirement home nor a  place of leisure, as some in Suzdal would say out of malice. Further, the school was tough, not only because the program was organized in such a  way that students were compelled to apply themselves in their studies, but also because— despite not receiving any additions to their food rations, unlike what happened in the other camps—men had hard [physical] work to do.94

Students in Krasnogorsk had to work at the railroad freight yard, located four or five kilometers from the camp. They had to carry wood used for cooking and heating on their backs from the railroad to the school. Finally, the members of each national community had to shovel snow and clean their own rooms. These tasks also served the purpose of testing aspiring students. Before they could start the actual program, students had to undergo a “quarantine, or rather, a trial [period]; forty days or so during which the prisoners, divided into teams, had to work daily from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m., and then from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m., receiving very little food—extremely hard labor in the woods. […] Those who complained during this time were immediately sent away, and readmitted into their camps of origin.”95 Having thus selected the students, the program could start. The latter was divided into three parts, each of which was one month long:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR 1st part: recent political events, causes [and] progress of the war, its consequences; 2nd part: history of the Bolshevik Communist Party; 3rd part: communist system and doctrine; Karl Marx.96

Students were divided into three study groups. One was made up exclusively of soldiers, whereas the other two were mixed, including both soldiers and officers. Actual classes, when the three groups merged together, were held in the morning. Usually, they lasted two hours, with a  short break in between. At the end of the class, the teacher answered any questions the students might have. A mandatory study session and a seminar followed in the afternoon. The seminar provided an opportunity for a discussion to take place among the students, under a teacher’s guidance, on the issues addressed in class.97 At the end of the school day, teachers evaluated the written work students had carried out in the afternoon, as well as their participation in the discussion. The work was officially assessed, and deemed excellent, good, adequate, or mediocre. At the end of each part of the program, the teacher evaluated the students overall. Regulations called for anyone judged “mediocre” to be dismissed from the program. No one was ever actually given that rating, so everyone was admitted to the following part. At the end of the program, upon passing their written and oral exams, students were dispatched to the various camps, where they were integrated into teams and work brigades with the purpose of disseminating the doctrines they had learned in school. Owing to this task, their daily rations were increased by 25 percent. In truth, propaganda activities were carried out only when a political commissar was keeping watch. In his absence, propagandists did nothing, and the benefit of having attended the school came down to not working and still receiving better treatment. Once repatriated, students were supposed to continue carrying out propaganda wherever they might be, leaning on the local sections of the Communist Party for support of any kind.98

In both schools, teachers’ work was monitored by political commissars or exponents of the communist parties—in the Italians’ case, Bianco and D’Onofrio—during their frequent inspection visits. In particular, NKVD functionaries exercised direct control over the Krasnogorsk School, where students were often asked questions in an attempt both to assess their level of knowledge and to acquire their opinions of other students and instruc-

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tors’ competence. In general, the two schools received periodic inspections by special commissions, which, at the end of their visit, wrote a report. As for the number of students present in Krasnogorsk and in Yuzha, on 7 March 1944 Beria informed Molotov that out of the 10,624 prisoners of war taken from the Italian army (of whom three were generals, 693 were officers, and 9,928 were soldiers), “150 [had] finished the antifascist school program (including twenty-nine officers) and 259 the antifascist courses. Overall, 2,700 antifascists [had] been counted among the Italian prisoners of war.”99 This figure included men who had not actually attended the schools, but had nevertheless taken part in political work. This data is similar to those regarding course attendance by prisoners of all nationalities, between December 1943 and early November 1944. In this span of time, three groups of students graduated from the courses and four from the school. The total number of attendees was 2,660. Graduates may be broken down as shown in table 4.2.100 Overall, between 1942 and September 1945, 395 Italian prisoners attended one of the two antifascist schools.101 The antifascist courses, held in Yuzha starting in July 1943, were attended by 548 Italians, divided into six sessions; of these, 195 attended the courses offered in 1945.102 Table 4.2. Yuzha and Krasnogorsk graduates, October 1944  

Courses

School

Total

Germans

827

429

1,26

Italians

245

150

395

Romanians

226

233

459

Hungarians

143

96

239

Austrians

120

70

190

Czechs and Slovaks

—

68

68

Poles

27

26

53

Total

1,588

1,072

2,66

Upon completing the school program, those adhering to the antifascist activities had to ratify their choice by taking an oath, pledging to pursue the goals of the antifascist cause. The oath’s text was similar to the one concerning German prisoners found in the Comintern’s archives:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR I, a  son of Germany, vow—for the love I  feel toward my people, my homeland and my family—to fight until my country is once again free and happy, the infamy of fascist barbarism washed away, and Hitlerian fascism destroyed. I vow not to spare myself in this struggle, and to be faithful to my people to the last drop of blood. With this oath, I  am bound to all antifascists in ties of fraternal loyalty and dedication to the fight, until the holy cause is won. I vow to be ruthless with those who break this oath. If I break this oath, and become a  traitor of the people, of my homeland and of my family, I will lose the right to live. My comrades in the common cause will be authorized to eliminate me as a traitor and an enemy of the people.103

Not all school graduates were willing to take the pledge. On 14 May 1945, one prisoner from camp No. 27 wrote to Robotti telling him as much. He had understood the materialistic theories studied in school to be useful, as clear new gateways to knowledge and to actions for the good of humanity. Yet he claimed he could not take the oath, for he still felt bound by the vow made as an officer of the Italian army. Taking a new oath would make him a  perjurer, he went on to say. As a  result, he feared any new commitments on his part would not be credible in anyone’s eyes. To reassure Robotti, the prisoner finally said: “This point of view is exclusively my own, and I will do nothing to propagate it, not last because I believe those who deem it right to act differently are entirely in good faith.”104

8. L’Alba Another important component of the propaganda machine was “L’Alba, the paper of Italian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union,” bearing the slogan “for a free and independent Italy.”105 The first issue of the paper, dated 10 February 1943, was printed in Moscow under the direction of Rita Montagnana, Togliatti’s wife. Starting from the fifth issue and until August 1944, the paper was managed by Edoardo D’Onofrio. Subsequently, the task fell to Luigi Amadesi and Paolo Robotti. The editorial committee included Vincenzo Bianco (editor-in-chief), Ruggiero Grieco (deputy editor-in-chief, who went by the pseudonym Garlandi), Anselmo and Andrea Marabini, and Nikolai Tereshchenko.106 The first few issues were made up of four pages and, owing to paper shortage, their size was small. Starting with the fifth issue, dated 4 April

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1943, the periodical’s format was increased, but the five-column layout was maintained.107 Page one was normally devoted to news from the front.108 Page two featured articles on the accomplishments of Soviet industry, and on people’s mobilization. The following two pages presented articles lambasting the fascist regime and listing the hardships Italians were forced to endure back at home. Sometimes, political and social news was complemented, on the last page, by literary articles devoted to the bestknown socialist realist writers; for example, page four of issue No. 5 was almost entirely devoted to Maxim Gorky. Despite chronic paper shortage, L’Alba was printed in 5,000 or even 7,000 copies, an exceedingly high number when taking into account the number of intended recipients. In Tambov, political commissars lamented the excessive number of copies they received, four to five times greater than required (300 copies at most), while paper for wall newspapers was insufficient.109 At first, editorial work was carried out exclusively by communist émigrés. In time, prisoners’ limited interest in the paper spurred authorities to seek their collaboration, as a way to turn L’Alba into a paper “by the prisoners,” rather than for the prisoners. This was attempted starting with issue No. 7, dated 8 May 1943, where page three featured a short section called “We collaborate gladly,” showcasing a list of prisoners who collaborated with the paper. Contributions were also taken in the form of articles, comments, assembly reports, and even jokes on fascism and Mussolini. Staff members would then edit the material so as to make it suitable for publishing. L’Alba arrives in a timely enough manner, and is regularly distributed. In addition to news on the progress of the war on the various fronts, it now publishes articles by the prisoners and correspondence from the camps, from which we are often pleased to find that comrades we had lost sight of since the days of the retreat or the earliest stages of captivity are still alive.110

Collaboration on the part of prisoners was also made necessary in order to get out of the impasse in which L’Alba found itself immediately after its first two issues came out. An impasse, Tereshchenko explained, due to the shortage of material […] from the prison camps. The paper had no authors among the prisoners of war, much as it had no Soviet authors who could regularly provide material on Soviet issues, and particularly on the main topic, “the truth on the country of the Soviets.”111

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What is more, the Military Administration had warned Tereshchenko that the paper was to come out “no matter what, regardless of all circumstances.”112 Collaboration with the prisoners—the result of an unrelenting campaign in the camps—and Togliatti were crucial for the paper’s success. Prisoner participation increased in the spring of 1943, stabilizing in the second half of the year, with articles by 595 different prisoners featured in the paper. Participation peaked the following year, when 2,039 contributors were counted among the prisoners. In 1945, as prisoners started being repatriated, the number of contributors dropped to 592. Finally, prisoner contributions to the paper were very few during the five months it was published in 1946.113 Manuilsky requested Togliatti’s involvement. He told the PCI leader that the Soviet Army Command itself was “appealing to the Italian Communist Party for help in carrying out educational work among Italian prisoners of war. For help, particularly, in organizing the work of the paper L’Alba.”114 Togliatti accepted to take on the editor’s post, and nominated D’Onofrio as his executive secretary. He did not change the appearance of the paper, but did introduce the use of italics for the most important pieces. In a short time, he was able to give the paper the “right tone,” turning it into the “original bridge connecting the life of prisoners with the life of the Italian people.”115 On 12 October 1943, a day before the Badoglio government declared war against Germany, thirty-nine officers held in the Suzdal camp signed a document, which stated that, “after Italy left the war, the fascist coalition experienced a profound crisis, and was confronted with catastrophe as it attempted to plunge the Italian people still deeper in a sea of blood.” “United by sincere love for our homeland,” the document went on to say, “we Italian officers detained in camp No. 160 have decided to form a group called Friends of L’Alba,” the better to echo the cry issued by the paper “that Italy may truly be free and independent.” Friends of L’Alba— similar groups were established in the other camps as well—set forth its aims in a detailed program. These included active collaboration with the paper, heeding its educational and fighting spirit. The paper, the document said, was meant to “unmask the [demagogy] of fascism and its supporters, root out fascist mentality from Italians, avoid past mistakes, [and] re-establish Italian freedom and independence.”116 Most of all, the group committed to attracting the greatest number of readers to the paper and to increasing the number of its own members through “persuasion and propaganda.” Prisoners followed political developments with interest and anxiety. They felt like indirect representatives of Moscow’s political options

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with regard to Italy’s decisions in international politics and in relation to the conflict. The topics broached by the paper were largely in keeping with those addressed by the propaganda. Gloomy descriptions of the situation in Italy and the war were contrasted with praise for the USSR, cast as a social paradise, and the Red Army’s triumphs. The goal was to “de-fascisticize” prisoners by “unmasking” the mistakes the fascist regime and the Duce had made. This is from one of the articles featured on the first issue of L’Alba: Today, for the first time in their lives, tens of thousands of workers, peasants, artisans, employees, professionals, [and] career officers, who find themselves prisoners of the Soviet Union, are provided with means to think freely, know the truth about a  country presented to them in the bleakest terms for twenty years, judge the fascist regime based on the results reaped by its politics in all fields. Thus, Italian citizens […] find, in their state as prisoners of war, the freedom to think with their own heads and speak out.117

As was the case with all other forms of indoctrination, articles featured in L’Alba, signed by communist émigrés, as well as by prisoners, turned certainties on their heads, to alienating effect. The paper, together with the propaganda machine at large, helped prisoners detach themselves from fascist ideology, from the regime’s mistakes, and from its role in the country’s ills. The alienation this produced naturally engendered a  crisis of values, to respond to which new values were suggested—communism’s. Further, in contrast to the “basic democratic freedoms” present in countries like Great Britain or the United States, the “higher and more complete form of Soviet democracy” was extolled.118 It must be noted, however, that pieces on this topic were not given great prominence. Indeed, criticism of fascism was mostly prudent. Perhaps it was deemed “counterproductive to push the debate too far, lest suspicion be aroused in the myriad small owners and employees—the ‘middle class,’ that is.” The latter might have seen attacks on capitalism as hiding “the specter of a forced march to communism.”119 We have already commented on the fact that, even in conducting mass political work, instructors were advised caution in arguing against fascism, so as not to grate on prisoners’ sensitivities.120 Still, despite everyone’s best intentions, the paper undoubtedly ended up carrying out heavy propaganda. One of the issues most prominently featured in the paper was the need for unity of action on the part of democratic forces in order to defeat fascism. After all, this was the political line—suggested by Stalin— Togliatti

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himself would announce with the so-called turning point of Salerno.121 On 27 July 1943, the prisoner Molinari wrote the following in his editorial, equal parts ideological rhetoric and political project: In the two years we have spent in Russia, the greatness of its people has become apparent to us. We have understood that the roots of such greatness reside in freedom and equality, palpable in the air, and in the fact that everyone here is united, for there are no privileged few, profiteers, plutocrats or imperialists placing their own will above that of the nation.122

The issue published on 3 August 1943 featured a message, similar in tone and content, by some of the officers held in camp No. 160 on the events of 25 July. The message urged readers to set aside their political differences and unite so as to help Italy break the Pact of Steel and withdraw from the war. “In Italy there are already many who oppose fascism as a result of the evil it has produced, and want the war to end. Let’s support them. Let’s all of us unite in a national front and do away with the oppressors.”123 Purging fascists was another recurring theme. The arrest of National Fascist Party members started being announced as early as 3 August 1943, on issue No. 17.124 Issue No. 20, dated 24 August, even presented the order of the day voted on 3 August in camp No. 74 on the initiative of the antifascist group, calling for the need to purge the country from “obstinate fascists, party leaders and henchmen, who, still loose and armed, against all laws,” attacked those who demonstrated in favor of the new government.125 One topic that gained traction among readers was the historical incompatibility of Italy’s alliance with Germany and Austria. These two countries had been Italy’s enemies during the previous war and cost the lives of thousands of its men. The denunciation of the atrocities Germans committed in occupied territories of the USSR was expedient to emphasize the difference between Germans and Italians—a difference ultimately ratified by the signing of the armistice, the declaration of war against Germany, acceptance of Italy’s status as co-belligerent on the part of the Allies, and the partisan struggle. Once Italy was absolved, Germany was left alone at the head of the imperialist effort, which was challenged by Soviet pacifism, according to L’Alba. In general, the paper looked at all the important topics of Italian domestic and foreign politics, but from a distorted perspective, particularly with regard to the country’s political parties. For example, while at the end of August 1943 the paper reported that the Socialist Party had sided

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against the king and called for a republican constitution, Christian Democracy was never mentioned until April 1944, and the Action Party was presented as an aggregate of intellectuals disconnected from the problems of interest to the masses and intent on restoring ancient regimes. Of course, Togliatti was made to stand out as the bearer of innovation in the midst of forces that were either old or far removed from the masses. At first, the Badoglio government was harshly criticized. Indeed, it was characterized as authoritarian and as taking up fascism’s legacy. Starting with the issue published on 19 October 1943, however, as Togliatti shifted on the matter, it was legitimized. In the wake of the Salerno Turn, the institutional question too was addressed very articulately. Rather than dwelling on the alternative between monarchy and republic—a matter complicated by the Allies’ different standpoints (the English were pro-monarchical, the Americans pro-republican)—L’Alba championed full collaboration with the king for the sake of liberating Italy and rebuilding the nation. These last two aspects recurred frequently alongside the matter of Anglo-American presence and Allied army successes on the Western front. L’Alba tended to play down the contribution of the Allies, of the United States particularly, in the struggle against Germans and supporters of the Italian Social Republic (so-called repubblichini), praising the results of the partisan forces. Suffice it to say that, in the issue dated 10 June 1944, the paper devoted three lines spread over two columns to the Normandy landings, while even the smallest feats by the Red Army were celebrated at length. L’Alba continued to conduct its political campaigns after the war ended. Late in 1945 and early in 1946, its pages were peppered with appeals to the Italian government to indemnify the Soviet Union for the war damages Italy had caused there. Repeated accusations of a return to fascism, carried out by “crisis provokers,” were also featured on the paper (and clearly referred to De Gasperi’s policy). It is beyond doubt that the stance taken by L’Alba ended up exacerbating the contrast between prisoners adhering to antifascism and those steering clear of it. Finally, a topic L’Alba did not deal with was the terrible hardships prisoners—its readers—had experienced from capture to internment in the camps. Instead, camps were hypocritically described as idyllic places, and the time prisoners spent there was entirely misrepresented. Aimed at readers who could personally gauge the magnitude of the reticence and lies, the dezinformatsiya generated in many prisoners feelings of hostility or indifference toward L’Alba, often considered useful only as wrapping paper for tobacco.

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9. The question of participation in the war against Germany by Italian prisoners More than once, the Allies contemplated the idea of employing prisoners in connection with the war, even though Article 31 of the Geneva Convention forbade it. The message Badoglio sent prisoners in Allied hands on 11 October 1943, calling for collaboration, ultimately changed the Anglo-Americans’ minds. Still, when the Allies ratified Italy’s status as co-belligerent, after 13 October, the Badoglio government became further convinced that fighting units would be set up recruiting men among the prisoners of war. As early as 1941, at a  time when Axis forces were prevailing, England had elaborated a plan for prisoners to be placed in fighting units and deployed against the Germans. In the United States, Pietro Gazzera, the ranking prisoner officer there, met with senior officials to weigh the idea of employing Italian prisoners as fighters assigned to an army corps.126 The American generals approved the plan. The proposition they ended up making the Italian government was completely different, though. According to the plan ultimately set forth, while keeping their status, Italian prisoners could be used toward the common goal by any of the Allied nations in any part of the world. Badoglio refused to sign the agreement.127 Up until 8 September 1943, detained Italians were used in work unrelated to the war effort, much like the Germans. After the armistice was signed and war against Germany declared, collaboration on a  voluntary basis was instituted. In May, ISUs (Italian Service Units) were set up in the United States. On a  voluntary basis, prisoners—whose status remained unchanged—were organized into service units under the command of US officers. This went against international conventions, as the Italian government had not been consulted. What is more, many prisoners who had declared themselves collaborators or joined the ISUs soon backtracked.128 On the whole, Italian prisoners were used primarily in agricultural work, or in other manual tasks unrelated to the war. The Soviets likewise considered employing Italian prisoners against Germans. Prisoners themselves had expressed their will to fight. Many signed appeals addressed to the Soviet government, asking to be allowed to take arms against their former allies. The matter had been raised in assemblies long before 8 September, and before the Badoglio government declared war against Germany—that is to say, at a time when fighting alongside the Soviets would have meant fighting against the Italian army. In May 1943,

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during a conference held in Tambov, some prisoners professed their belief that the time had come to take action to “help the Italian people, […] subjugated to fascism [and] Italian-German imperialists.” A soldier of the Alpine Army Corps claimed: “It is our sincerest desire to intervene, arms in hand, against the Italian-German fascist army, for the immediate destruction of our ferocious enemy.”129 As another prisoner put it: Fascism is nearing its demise, but, without a  strong push from within and from without, waiting for the end is useless. However modest their means, all Italian prisoners of war have a duty to contribute to strengthening and hastening the blow. We must help the Red Army and the Allies, as well as our own people, destroy fascism as quickly as possible.130

Help to the Red Army was supposed to take the form of an Italian contingent set up for deployment alongside the Soviets. We must organize an Italian unit made up of prisoners of war and fight on the Soviet-German front, or in Italy itself, against the ferocious enemy that is oppressing a large part of Europe, as well as its own people.131

Admittedly, these statements reveal the imprint of Soviet propaganda. Gauging their sincerity and establishing the extent to which they reflected truly widespread sentiments is no easy task. After 8 September, actual petitions were sent to the Red Army Commands. In September 1943, the officers held in camp No. 74 signed a request to form a “Garibaldian legion.”132 Encouraged by news that “a Romanian division, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav legions, and Polish units” had been set up, prisoners of camp No. 160 submitted a similar appeal.133 In his report to Togliatti on camp No. 58 dated 20 September, D’Onofrio claimed the following: News of the German occupation of Italian cities and regions has been cause for surprise and great pain. Everyone thinks about the Germans’ barbarity and their ferocious ways. Politically, reactions are good. According to Buzzi, 80 percent of the prisoners could be mobilized to return to Italy and fight the Germans. Fifty percent could be mobilized to fight the Germans alongside the Red Army on the Russian-German front.134

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Further incentive to request to take arms came when the Badoglio government declared war against Germany. During a rally held on 17 October 1943 in camp No. 165, Robotti said: You have all asked to be enlisted. This request to the Soviet government will be repeated today. A Garibaldian unit will thus be established for the purpose of fighting against the Germans, wherever they may be. When Italians back at home learn that their far-away sons are all fighting toward their same goal, they will be further encouraged to carry out their struggle.135

On 7 March 1944, reporting to Molotov on the number of Italian prisoners present in the USSR at that time, Beria claimed he had “132 individual or collective appeals signed by over 1,000 men asking to be allowed to fight against the German army.”136 The idea of setting up fighting units for deployment with the Soviets came up again on 20 March 1944 in Suzdal, during a meeting called by Paolo Robotti. According to the veterans Bassi and Martelli, forming an Italian legion to be assigned to the Red Army—much like the Croatian, Romanian and Hungarian ones—was suggested in the course of the meeting. Italian officers claimed to be willing to accept the proposal on the condition that they be allowed to fight wearing their country’s uniform—that is, as Italian soldiers abroad, at the Italian king’s service. At that point, according to witnesses, the meeting degenerated. Men started shouting “Long live Italy!” and “Long live the king!” They chanted the Hymn to Rome. Robotti let them carry on. Finally, upon leaving the room, he warned they would never return to Italy if they continued to engage in such behavior.137 Two telegrams were written after the meeting, one for Stalin and one for Badoglio. The former, signed by General Battisti and senior officers, read: To Marshal Stalin, Italian officer prisoners of war in the USSR are grateful to you for deciding to accept the Badoglio government’s request to establish direct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. They hope this marks the beginning of a new era of mutual understanding and fruitful collaboration between the two nations, as well as grounds for active participation by the [Italian] prisoners of war in the struggle to free their country, and to bring about complete victory of all peoples engaged in the war against Hitlerism for freedom and independence.138

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Similar in tone, the telegram for Badoglio was signed by all officers, 490 prisoners in all.139 In truth, the two cables spoke of “active participation” in the conflict, but did not specify under whose command or on what conditions this was to take place. The officers of camp No. 160 proved intransigent, however, declaring their unwillingness to fight under Soviet command. The attitude of lower-ranking officers was different in this regard: It was very distressing for us, because our circumstances didn’t allow us to take sides immediately and in effect to stand by our people against the German invader. That was our state of mind, when the project was launched among Italian prisoners in the USSR to set up a “Garibalidian legion.” Adherence by junior officers was almost unanimous. Why couldn’t the project be carried out in practice? It’s impossible for me to establish exactly. What I can say with certainty is that it was not for lack of desire by Italian junior officers, the majority of whom always aspired to throw their force behind partisans and the reconstituted Italian army.140

In soldier camps, no formal objections were ever raised. Troops stated their willingness to fight under the Red Army’s direct command, in units D’Onofrio characterized as “Garibaldian legion.” Robotti’s version of events is available to us: Plans devised by Italian officers and soldiers in prison camps included setting up a  Garibaldi brigade made up of officer and soldier POWs in the USSR to go fight against the Germans. The plan, it must be admitted, was immediately met with favor by most prisoners, officers included. Small reasons for friction soon emerged among senior officers, however, as competition for command posts started. Later, for reasons depending on the general political situation, and, particularly, on relations between the three great Allies conducting the war against Germany, the plan could not get backing from Soviet authorities, though the latter did nothing to thwart it.141

In fact, the decision on whether or not to involve Italian prisoners in the war depended entirely on Stalin. At first, it was Soviet authorities that considered the option of availing themselves of Italian prisoners against the Germans. The Administration

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for Political Work Among Prisoners of War ordered that instructors and commissars encourage detainees of all nationalities to promote the plan. By spring or summer 1943, during meetings held at the Kremlin, Togliatti and Stalin discussed about setting up “an Italian contingent, which would be made up of communists and antifascists recruited among the prisoners of war.”142 This contingent—Nina Bochenina wrote—was to fight alongside the Red Army against the Germans and in the future might have given rise to a  revolutionary and antifascist army in Italy. I  don’t know for what reasons, but this proposal by Ercoli was not accepted.143

The plan discussed at the Kremlin entailed recruiting “trusted” prisoners—that is, prisoners who professed their communism or antifascism openly. These were fewer than the 50 percent suggested by the instructor Buzzi, according to D’Onofrio’s report. After receiving the report, on 23 September 1943, Togliatti wrote to Shcherbakov: We’ve received news from several camps where Italian prisoners of war are detained that a  movement is arising among POWs calling for Italian fighting units to be set up in the USSR and deployed against the Germans. For example, in officer camp No. 74, officers have unanimously signed a petition addressed to the Soviet government requesting permission to fight against the Germans. Similar appeals have arrived from soldier camps No. 58 and No. 188. We know (based on the documents in comrade Melnikov’s possession) that even the three generals (Battisti, Ricagno and Pascolini) have asked for permission to take part in the war against Germany. I ask that you provide us with instructions on the matter, and that you ask comrade Beria to authorize me to meet with the three Italian generals to discuss what I  have illustrated above with them, based on whatever decision is made on the issue. On the instruction of c[omrade] Manuilsky and c[omrade] Dimitrov the letter is held back, of which c[omrade] Ercoli is informed 26.IX.43 [signature unreadable]144

Calls to set up prisoner-of-war fighting units came from Italy as well. On 21 July 1944, Prime Minister Bonomi cabled the ambassador in Moscow Pietro Quaroni authorizing him, on behalf of the Italian royal government,

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to suggest that Italian troops interned in Russia be assembled in “homogeneous military units with Italian uniforms, badges and flag, suitably armed and equipped,” and that they be placed “under the command of Italian officers at the Soviet Supreme Command’s disposal for use in the common war.” Bonomi went on to clarify that the proposal stemmed from the Italian government’s desire “to ripudiate the fascist aggression of Russia in deed as well as in word; to show Russia [Italy’s] tangible solidarity in war.” In voicing his government’s faith “in the future of Italian-Soviet relations,” Bonomi also asked that, once established, the units be deployed in the Balkans. In particular, he called for their use in Romania and in Hungary, whose peoples, Bonomi explained, despite their governments’ actions, were bound by “strong ties” and the “deepest of relations,” which could be used to “galvanize the anti-German spirit present there.” The Italian proposal was to be viewed as a token of friendship toward the Soviets, and as an indication of Italy’s willingness to participate in the common war.145 As this document shows, the Italian leadership’s grasp of reality was flawed at best. The Italian government believed it could dictate the conditions under which the Soviets could use Italian prisoners (who were to receive Italian uniforms and badges, and allowed to fight waving the Italian flag), and even suggest how the collaboration might play out, and where—the Balkans. In his turn, Quaroni addressed the matter in far more practical terms in a cable dated 17 August. He answered that the setting up of battalions made up of prisoners of war was under the control of Soviet authorities, whose attitude toward Italian prisoners varied depending on the category to which they belonged, that is, on their relationship and collaboration with the Germans, as well as on their behavior during the occupation.146 Despite Italy’s willingness, and the Soviet leadership’s initial support, the final decision was Stalin’s to make. And the fact that Togliatti’s letter was never sent on to Shcherbakov proves Stalin was already set on the idea of not deploying Italian prisoners of war in fighting units. Conversely, prisoners of other nationalities were mobilized against the Germans. In a  message sent to General A.V. Khrulev—in charge of the Red Army’s rear—on 13 May 1944, Manuilsky requested uniforms and supplies for 300 prisoners of war, who were to be deployed on the front in the Ukraine as soon as possible.147 Between March and April 1945, Romanian prisoners held in several camps asked Stalin to be allowed to participate in the war against the Germans.148 Their requests were accepted. A document dated 4 May informed Stalin that two infantry divisions, made up of 10,321 Romanian prisoners of war in total, had been established.149

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In the same two months, Austrian prisoners also asked Stalin to be given permission to fight against the Nazi regime, and called for fighting units to be set up with “Austrian prisoners of war with antifascist leanings.”150 At that point in the war, the Austrians’ offer amounted to little more than a symbol of support for the Soviet Union, much like the Italians’ proposition had been. Stalin rejected the request set forth by the Austrians, as well as the one made by the Germans through the Free Germany National Committee. Documents addressing the reasons behind the Soviet leadership’s decision to reject Italian, German and Austrian prisoners as allies are currently unavailable. Surely, however, an important part must have been played by the Soviets’ reluctance to put their trust in men who had been their enemies until very recently and now professed remorse. There could be no guarantee that, once on the front, the units made up of former prisoners would not desert or even turn against the Red Army. Another explanation is that in 1945, as Europe’s division loomed on the horizon, Stalin decided to arm only those who would enter into the Soviet sphere of influence.

10. Operational work among prisoners of war In addition to administering antifascist training, the NKVD availed itself of its dense network of collaborators in the camps and territorial department officials to recruit agents among prisoners of all nationalities. Once back in their countries, these agents could work on behalf of the USSR in state, sociopolitical, scientific, religious, military and even sports institutions. The collaboration of prisoners selected to serve as agents started in the camps. Here they were asked to inform on their fellow soldiers. This may be gleaned from a secret NKVD document by the People’s Deputy Commissar Kruglov, dated October 1943. After criticizing recruitment as it had been carried out until then, Kruglov advised identifying and engaging, among the prisoners, subjects of “operational interest” who in the future would take on important roles in their countries of origin; prisoners whose support for the USSR was most unsuspected, and, perhaps more importantly, who could be easily blackmailed (namely, those with close relatives in Soviet custody); prisoners facing financial troubles, or who were very interested in money.151 At the time of the directive, recruitment work among the Italians had still borne little fruit. Yet a report presented by a major after his repatriation from Russia in 1946 indicates that some Italian prisoners did allow themselves to be recruited. Identified as No. 1785, the officer belonged to

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the mobile squad. Described as “intelligent, learned, serious and reliable” by Italian military authorities, he reported confidential information gathered by the Troop Information Service (SIT, servizio informazioni truppa) on activities carried out by certain officer prisoners, communist émigrés and elements of the Soviet Intelligence Service. In December 1943, the officer was sounded out by command officers in Suzdal, and then sent to the Krasnogorsk camp to be “engaged” by the Soviet Intelligence Service. As reported by the subject himself, the recruitment was unsuccessful, for he was not deemed pliable enough, and was viewed as having monarchical and nationalistic tendencies. In June 1944, he returned to Suzdal, camp No. 160, where, following directives from the Soviet Command, he assumed an attitude that was not “exceedingly antifascist,” and broke off all relations with Italian exiles serving as “political commissars” in the camp (Rizzoli, Ossola). From April 1945 to June 1946 he headed the camp kitchen. This post, in his opinion, caused serious strife with the camp’s Russian command, which ultimately charged him with “boycotting” and “antiSoviet propaganda.” At the time of repatriation, he had no any contact with elements of the Soviet Intelligence Service.152

The returnee also reported on the part Italian officers had played in spreading propaganda, and on their relations with the Soviet Intelligence Service. He further divided prisoners and others involved in antifascist activities into the following nine groups:

I) Elements who attended the antifascist school in camp No. 27/b or No. 165, and subsequently worked with “political instructors” in the activities of the antifascist groups. II) Elements directing antifascist activities in camp No. 160 (Suzdal). III) Elements believed by the source to have been engaged by the Soviet Intelligence Service. IV) Elements repatriated individually before all other officers, whose engagement by the Soviet Intelligence Service the source believes to be certain. V)  Elements who initiated contact [with the Soviet Intelligence Service] for the purpose of acquiring information they could later relay to the Italian authorities.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR VI) Elements “sounded out” but not “engaged” by the Soviet Service. VII) Elements still in the USSR displaying features of interest. VIII) Soviet Intelligence Service agents. IX)  […] Italian officers held hostage by Soviet authorities in Maramures-Sighet (Romania) for possible excesses the would-be repatriates might have committed, whose fate is unknown. [The names of fifty officers were provided for this group.]153

According to the report, the first group numbered twenty-seven officers. Fifteen of them were PCI members, and they were among the most constant and effective supporters of so-called antifascist activities. After joining the “active group” early in 1943—most spurred by hunger, few out of conviction—they later found themselves increasingly caught up in the situation as a result of the hostility arising between them and the mass of their colleagues, toward whom they started showing open animosity since that time (2).

After attending the antifascist school, they “received cyclostyled booklets and lecture notes, some of them truly fascinating for their paradoxical point of view and incredible distortions of facts and events” (2). During the discussions that took place after the classes—the so-called seminars, which sometimes lasted up to six consecutive hours—[prisoners] were trained for public speaking. Before the end of the course, they took an oath—which they also signed, and the text of which has been found in Suzdal, in the room of Major B.—pledging to be faithful and “consistent” with the cause of the people. All of them contributed to the paper L’Alba, published in Moscow, and to wall newspapers in the various camps, with articles characterized by defeatism at first, when Italy was still at war, and by communist propaganda after that. On graduating from the school, many of them joined the PCI (3).

The notes in Ossola’s diary corroborate this information. The data is congruous even with the names of the Italian officers most involved in the propaganda. As for the aims of the political work, the former serviceman continued: “Sent to the camps in June 1944, with orders from Robotti himself to agitate and spread propaganda, almost all of them became select

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activists of the AF [antifascist] group.” Concerning relations with fellow soldiers, according to the report, antifascist officers spied and informed on their colleagues, many of whom were sent off to punitive camps as a result of their denunciations. What’s more, during a  meeting held in 1945, Second Lieutenant M.L. proposed that socalled reactionary fascists—that is, men who had openly voiced their disapproval of the methods of propaganda—be separated from the others and not repatriated.

On the possible recruitment of elements from this first group as Soviet informers, the returnee claimed the following: It is unlikely they were engaged by the Soviet Intelligence Service, for their communist stance was too overt and caused mistrust in their colleagues, who knew them well (3).

This conclusion strengthens the theory that the Soviet Intelligence Service drew its recruits from among subjects who, both during imprisonment and after repatriation, had proven most critical of the PCI and the USSR. Their conduct made them the least susceptible to their comrades’ suspicion. In the returnee’s report, the second group comprised “elements directing antifascist activities in camp No. 160.” All but one of the fourteen officers forming this group were PCI members. Of these men, the veteran said: They attended the “antifascist school” mentioned above. In the school, Major B. even publicly stated he was ashamed to have worn an Italian officer’s uniform. They were the most active and extreme members of the antifascist group, on which they cast a  decidedly sinister light. In their activities, they never drew attention to themselves, pushing the people addressed in the previous paragraph to the forefront instead. Through writings and conferences, V. and Z. supported the legitimacy of ceding Trieste to Yugoslavia, until finally, in the face of widespread indignation, the AF group itself had to repudiate them, even though the directives calling for the campaign had come from Moscow. […] Those identified by the symbol (o) are PCI members, and were probably chosen to serve as a  base for future cells in the army and in

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR other branches of activity. Very many of them were commissioned officers. They all took part in directive action in the propaganda and repression carried out in camp No. 160, except for S. and G., who were elsewhere (4).

The report went on to list the names of the prisoners making up the third group, subjects the source believed to have been recruited by the Soviet Intelligence Service. The names belonged to eleven officers, some of whom featured in the first and second groups as well. One of them had belonged to the Italian Information Service. “Engaged” prisoners were frequently subjected to questioning, following which, according to the source, they often assumed a blatantly fascist attitude, even going so far as to sing the official hymn of the Italian National Fascist Party, Giovinezza (Youth). “Many of them,” the returnee under questioning claimed, “had been invited to the Villa 20/b near Moscow, where they underwent further questioning and even more pressure was put on them.” According to the report, “all the men committed in writing to providing political and other kinds of information after returning home” (6). The fourth group, made up of “elements repatriated individually before all other officers, whose engagement by the Soviet Intelligence Service the source believe[d] to be certain,” included eight prisoners: two lieutenants, a medical lieutenant, four second lieutenants and a  sergeant. Some of these men had been repatriated in 1944. According to the returnee, in 1945, two of the four second lieutenants—armed and equipped with a red band on their arm, donned in their capacity as auxiliary service members—had escorted a group of Italian officers from the camp in Vladimir to Suzdal. Subsequently, they had vanished without a  trace. This piece of information was confirmed by other veterans, who were also interrogated and whose answers were noted in reports No. 251/C, No. 249/C, and No. 268/C (7). Unlike some of the officers listed in the first three groups, no prisoners belonging to the fourth group were subjected to formal or informal investigation by Italian military authorities after their repatriation. Three prisoners—a lieutenant, a  second lieutenant, and a  sergeant major—who had “initiated contact” with the Soviets in order to acquire information they could later relay to the Italian authorities made up the fifth group. The three men were believed to be able to provide a great deal of useful information. The returnee claimed there were witnesses who could confirm their double-crossing.

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Three additional prisoners were listed in the sixth group (two captains and a  second lieutenant), who had been “sounded out,” but whom the Soviet Intelligence Service had been unable to “engage.” In their memoirs, other war veterans speak of the NKVD’s attempts to recruit spies among prisoners. And after all, many had declared themselves antifascists during questioning, whether out of disappointment in the regime—which had misled them by promising an easy victory and proven to be superficial in its preparation of war against the USSR—or as a result of Italy’s change of front after 8 September 1943. The armistice allowed prisoners to feel free to choose, particularly at a time when Italy was no longer at war with the USSR. In this phase, NKVD agents started asking for active collaboration, or even demanding it. Archive documents show that some prisoners led the Soviets to believe they wanted to collaborate, and then relayed the information they gathered to the Italian authorities once home. This was the case of a major in the Ivrea Alpine Artillery, C.S., who on 25 December 1943 was questioned by an NKVD official and urged to “secretly exchange letters” with the Soviets after returning to Italy, assuming all risks for this future collaboration, which he was to carry out under the alias “Barolo.”154 In a subsequent meeting it was clarified that “he would have to work in the industrial and commercial field.” Repatriated on 26 August 1946, C.S. showed up at the Army’s Information Office of his own accord to denounce what had happened, and detailed the tasks the NKVD expected him to perform. Upon being questioned in late November 1944, Engineer Sergeant Luigi Venturini was also offered to be repatriated to Bari, provided he accept to take a  transceiver with him and to relay “news on American, German and fascist forces,” using specific codes and contact information supplied to him. In exchange, he would receive a good pay, and protection. Despite his strong desire to return home, the noncommissioned officer stalled for time, and ultimately answered: “I am a soldier of the Italian army, I took an oath, and I do not feel like returning to my country to be a spy!” Thus turned down, the NKVD official accused Venturini of still being fascist and forced him to sign a statement promising never to divulge the things that had been said during the questioning.155 The chaplain Carlo Caneva was likewise asked to collaborate with the Soviet Intelligence Service. “After attending a short course in Moscow, which I was told was nothing like the customary communist programs,” Caneva wrote, “I would have had the opportunity to return to Italy even if the war had not ended by then. This was in December 1944.”156 The chaplain refused squarely, and was forced to sign a statement committing him to silence,

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under penalty of death in case of transgression. As we will see further on, the NKVD considered recruiting chaplains as spies an important objective. Indeed, as members of the clergy, they were deemed to be the least likely to be suspected. In May 1950, in a document addressed to Stalin and to the party’s highest authorities, Deputy Minister Kruglov reported on the number of repatriated prisoners, on their use as labor, on propaganda activities and on espionage activities.157 Regarding the operational work carried out by the organs of the MVD among prisoners of war and internees, Kruglov explained that it was aimed at preventing hostile behavior by fascist elements in the camps, at repressing attempts at diversions and dangerous acts in the course of operations, at exposing men responsible of atrocities and war crimes in the territories of the Soviet Union and of people’s democracies, and even at identifying subjects who, by virtue of their past activities, [had] important military, political and economic information, with the purpose of using them in the USSR’s interest.158

For the recruitment of USSR collaborators and spies to be repatriated, the organs of the MVD [had] selected—from the group of agents enlisted among prisoners and internees—986 subjects who showed promise because of their relations and potential in Germany and in other countries. These agents [had] been assigned to the Intelligence Committee, to the Main Administration for Counterintelligence of the Army Staff, to the Navy Staff, and to the Ministry for State Security.159

The investigations and intelligence work conducted among the prisoners of war and internees allowed the organs of state security to identify anti-Soviet spies among the very citizens of the USSR, as well as foreign agents active on Soviet soil. According to Kruglov, 6,136 enemy agents and informers had been exposed among Soviet citizens, and 1,554 of them had been found guilty. The pertinent documents had been sent to the organs of the Ministry of Security of the USSR. Additionally, 983 Soviet citizens were identified and condemned for being traitors of the homeland, who had served in Hitler’s army and tried to pass off as German citizens at the time of capture.160 The questioning of foreign prisoners and agents had also made it possible for information on German agents active in several European countries and in the United States to be acquired.161

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The matter of whether ARMIR prisoners had been recruited to carry out espionage activities or otherwise collaborate with the Soviets was immediately the focus of much speculation in the 1940s. It made headlines again in the early 1990s, following a trip by Italian President Cossiga to Suzdal. On that occasion, Cossiga was asked about the recruitment of over one hundred Italian prisoners as spies for Moscow. The Italian president answered that while he could not assess the authenticity of the source, he understood the choice of those who, during imprisonment, had felt compelled to find a way to ensure their survival. If these activities had continued after their repatriation, then that was altogether different.162 In the former case, the decision to collaborate would have been made by poor devils; in the latter, by actual spies. The recruitment of agents on the part of the NKVD should come as no surprise. Russian documents reveal the extent to which the Stalinist leadership was determined to enlist prisoners—particularly those above suspicion—as agents entrusted with intelligence and espionage tasks to be carried out in their countries of origin after repatriation. It would be premature to comment on the results reaped by Moscow. The classified nature of the data suggests caution, as does the fact that the bulk of the documents regarding the personnel that took part in the campaign on the Eastern front is still covered by secrecy.

11. The results of the political work It is notoriously difficult to measure the effects of propaganda. The difficulty is even greater, perhaps, when the aim is to assess propaganda’s long-term effects not on public opinion at large, but on a limited group of individuals, whose tasks might have involved acting clandestinely over a length of time. When it comes to evaluating the effects of propaganda among prisoners, short- and long-term results must be viewed separately. On the one hand is the outcome of the mass political work and courses some prisoners were made to attend, while on the other is the effect of the political experience prisoners acquired during imprisonment on their behavior after repatriation. To assess short-term results, we can avail ourselves of the reports on the propaganda work carried out in camps and schools. Admittedly, however, these sources are somewhat biased. Indeed, while instructors generally cast a positive light on prisoners’ progress in hopes of gaining special recognition from the NKVD, select activists were more prone to focus on

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the shortcomings of the political work, and Soviet political commissars were usually even harsher. A report dated May 1943, prepared by the instructors, spoke favorably of the mass political work carried out among the Italians of camp No. 188. The document highlighted that prisoners’ morale had been heightened by the extensive interpretive political work and the improvement of life conditions in the camp. Prisoners’ interest in political matters and the progress of the war increased, as did questions on the Soviet Union.163

The report also called attention to the fact that prisoner participation in meetings had both increased and improved.164 Reports written on the antifascist courses held in Andijan camp No. 26 between January and September 1944 were likewise positive, extolling the progress of prisoners’ adherence to antifascism as evidenced by the content of their conversations with instructors and their speeches during rallies.165 A very important result of the political work was the teaching of reading and writing to prisoners, particularly soldiers. At the time, illiteracy was widespread in the Italian army, most prominently among soldiers from southern Italy, or from peasant backgrounds. “At first,” the report on the political work in camp No. 26 noted, “many were almost entirely illiterate, but now they can manage to read L’Alba, to write their own address, and to solve simple arithmetic problems.”166 For many, imprisonment thus turned into an opportunity for education and emancipation. Learning to read and write, as well as participating in meetings where they could speak in public, certainly contributed to their cultural growth and to the development of critical skills.167 Counterpointing this positive picture was the activists’ report pertaining to the propaganda work carried out in camp No. 160. The document drew attention to the issue of political absenteeism, described as rampant among officers, and viewed as “extremely dangerous,” for as soon as the men were distanced from the current circumstances it was “liable to turn automatically into opposition.”168 In the activists’ estimation, the results of propaganda in Suzdal, as well as in Oranki, were not entirely consistent with expectations. It was noted that, “despite efforts invested in political work,” three groups with different attitudes toward the antifascist movement continued to exist among officers. The first group was made up of antifascists of different political persuasions “intent on fighting to eradicate any residue of fascism, and on shedding light on the problems of democracy.” Opposite this group was a “small, but active group,

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made up of elements who were openly and effectively antidemocratic, and thus antinational.” In dealing with this group, which opposed propaganda work in the camp, the movement had failed to reach its intended results. Finally, between the two camps was a third group comprising “a significant number of officers whose policy it [was] to sit on the fence, and for the most part act as spectators of the daily struggle between the two groups.”169 Within the last group—the biggest one numerically—antifascist activists identified several subsets. There were elements who would acknowledge that the antifascist movement was right in private, but could not bring themselves to do so in public. Others who were “completely disoriented,” and could not free themselves “from the roar of fascist rhetoric.” Others still who were lagging behind and had not yet come to the “correct” interpretation of events. There were elements skeptical of the effectiveness of the antifascist struggle. Finally, there were elements “who, because of their military position, might have done something for democracy, but preferred to do nothing or very little, thus indirectly contributing to the bewilderment of younger prisoners particularly, who looked to them for direction.”170 Antifascist propaganda among officer prisoners had thus achieved only partial success. Select activists from camp No. 160 were actually very harsh in their assessment. They failed to take into account the many genuine conversions that took place among fascist servicemen and members of the militia. In all fairness, many prisoners turned into sincere, committed antifascists. Danilo Ferretti’s case is emblematic in this regard. Ferretti had participated in the Spanish Civil War, and had even led a small group of soldiers belonging to the 6th Blackshirts Battalion of the Montebello. Yet during his captivity, in the material he was advised to read by instructors, in the conversations he engaged in with the latter, and in his innate aspiration to “social justice,” Ferretti found “the fundamental reason for detaching himself from fascism.” His conversion to antifascism was a  step-by-step process. It was mindful and heartfelt: “And it mattered that the victory of communism came for me not as an instance of love at first sight, but as the culmination of a gradual crumbling down, resulting from critical thought, of all the elements that constituted fascism.”171 Many prisoners discovered a world unknown to them, laid bare by the work of communist émigrés, who “were the living opposition to fascism.” Regarding communist exiles, Ferretti wrote that h had crossed their path at the precise moment he had started doubting fascism:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Fiammenghi, D’Onofrio, Gottardi, Robotti, Di Giovanni, Curato, Germanetto: an unknown Italy approached me with a  language that perhaps hurt me, but that I felt was based on the truth, a language that differed from anything I’d heard until then, but seemed to me full of the greatest substance, humanity and Italian character. They were the first antifascist fighters I met.172

Adherence to antifascism was difficult for him because it called into question the entire political past he had believed in until then. Late in October 1944, Ferretti set off for the antifascist school together with fifteen or so officers from camp No. 160.173 The political work carried out in the two antifascist schools was expected to produce results that would reward the efforts of the Administration for Political Work Among Prisoners. During an inspection in the Yuzha School, in October 1944, delegates judged the results of the courses to be positive, particularly among peasants and workers. Shortcomings, however, included a certain disconnect between theory and reality (delegates believed the role played by party and unions in the democratization process was not clear enough to students), and an insufficient number of hours devoted to the economic and political problems of the prisoners’ countries. Attention was also drawn to the teachers’ lack of training in theoretical-political matters, and to their overall incompetence on political-military issues. In order to improve instructors’ abilities, it was recommended that informative material be provided to them, and that refresher courses be organized.174 Still, despite these areas for improvement, the work performed in the Yuzha School was deemed positive overall. By contrast, the assessment of the results reaped in Krasnogorsk as of May 1944 was far more critical. According to the commission, most prisoners remained fascist. Indeed, “they only found fault with some of the regime’s choices, but considered the fascist system to be positive as a whole.” Many students, officers especially, “openly stated that they had never envisaged becoming materialists, and continued not to, and that antifascist teaching, not materialist teaching, had been proposed to them in the camps.” Thus, many students were unwilling to be educated in Marxism-Leninism.175 There was also a significant group of more reactionary elements who intended to “adapt to the situation,” or rather, to “accept it outwardly.” They would spend a  few months in the school, where conditions were better than in the camps. At the war’s end, they would return home where the time spent in the school would be but a happy memory.

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On the whole, the situation was difficult. Some officers were decidedly critical, while others were either sitting on the fence or engaging in opportunism, and had little to no motivation. This produced clear skepticism toward the classes. Many of the officers and soldiers merely touched on the contents of the lessons, feeling no desire to mull over them, or to analyze any of the issues they raised.176 In fact, “during lessons and class activities, questions were frequently asked that revealed overtly fascist attitudes.” “Reactionary elements were even more cavalier in barracks, where they were openly sarcastic about the school, its teachers, and Marxist terminology, even poking fun at those who studied Marxism with interest.” In an attempt to foster a  climate conducive to study, at the end of December 1943, certain prisoners “who demoralized students,” including four Italian officers, were expelled. As discipline was restored, a radical “political-moral shift in students’ state of mind and thought process” occurred late in January 1944. According to the inspection commission, other decisive factors in this shift were, first and foremost, the contents of Marxist doctrine; the favorable progress of the war effort on the SovietGerman front; and, last but not least, teachers’ “patient and methodical” work. In essence, the commission observed that, at the end of their studies, a vast majority of students have achieved huge personal growth and made great progress from an ideological, political and moral point of view. It may be claimed, without exaggeration, that all students have improved as antifascists. […] Once home, a significant group of them will doubtless join the communist movement. Many have assimilated the combative aspect of Marxism and are determined to fight, weapons in hand, on its behalf.177

Students were evaluated based on how they performed on written tests, as well as on self-assessment sessions. In the course of the latter, in the presence of fellow prisoners, students spoke of their political and military past, and of the political and moral transformation they had experienced by way of studying in the antifascist schools. According to the inspectors, however, there were still those who—despite professing opposition to fascism—were “uncertain companions for the antifascist movement.” These men continued to display “strong signs of the fascist ideology,” and were thus unlikely to join “a radical democratic transformation in their countries.” Inspectors blamed the candidates’ selection, which had been superficial, and the fact that, within the NKVD system, the school had probably not received all

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the attention it deserved. Overall, though, the training of the antifascists had yielded results deemed “more than satisfactory.”178 Requests to join the PCI made by some of the Italian prisoners was one of the most significant successes of the Krasnogorsk School. At least five officers, out of the twenty-nine Ossola identified as having attended the program after 31 January 1945, asked to become members of the party. After assessing the abilities acquired by the students and the quality of their training, instructors and political commissars decided how best to employ them. A report on the prisoners who had completed the program offered in the first antifascist school advised using them to carry out mass political work among prisoners from their respective countries and to monitor their activities at all times.179 Attention was to be paid particularly to those who were not able to work independently, and therefore required help—peasants and hired hands whose activity, once they were back home, in their own social environment, might have held special meaning. The report also called for workers to be taken into due consideration. Once back home, these men could be assigned tasks of an executive kind aimed at obtaining information and at establishing contacts. In other words, they could serve as spies.180 As we have seen, many prisoners were asked to collaborate with the USSR after repatriation. At present, existing documents on army personnel are still protected by secrecy. It is therefore difficult to determine who accepted these propositions, and—in the case of those who did accept— who then actually worked as a Soviet agent, or otherwise collaborated with the Soviet Union. With regard to the Krasnogorsk School, Tereshchenko wrote, somewhat complacently, that he had found that many of his former students held “important positions in [Italy’s] sundry social organizations, democratic institutions, and institutes of education.”181 In the reports he continued to send Soviet commissars after being repatriated, Robotti painted a rosy picture of propaganda’s effects among prisoners. In a letter to D. Shchevliagin, dated 7 May 1947, he wrote: Everywhere I’ve been in my travels around Italy, I  have found former students of ours. They are all where they should be, on the front line. Many hold a  seat on the directive committees of large cells, sections and even federations (as in the case of G.). S. led the insurance agents’ national strike, and is one of the chairmen of their national trade association. D., a  student of yours, serves as secretary to a  section 1,200 members strong. Before going to Russia, he was a sacristan in his town!

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Only M. and P. have defected—they are doing nothing. The work carried out has thus been very useful, and it will be even more so in the future.182

Many former prisoners who had adhered to propaganda activities in the USSR joined Communist Party federations once back in Italy, sometimes even holding important posts; Luigi Sandirocco of the Avezzano (L’Aquila) Chamber of Labor became a party deputy (parliamentary representative). One of the most interesting documents on the results of the political work conducted in the camps, never published before and held in the NKVD archives, is Kruglov’s already mentioned report to Molotov dated 24 May 1950. In this document, the deputy minister of the Interior claimed: Through the agitation and propaganda work carried out among prisoners of war, political events occurring in the prisoners’ countries of origin were accurately explained to them, and their attitude toward those events gained clarity. In the letters they sent home, in an overwhelming majority of cases they correctly assessed the situation in their countries, where they hoped democratic reforms would spread and strengthen; furthermore, they spoke positively of the conditions of their detainment in the Soviet Union.183

What is more, once repatriated, many former prisoners took “active part in the democratic transformation of their countries, lending a  hand in exposing the calumnies of bourgeois reaction against the Soviet Union, and explaining the need for stronger relations with the Soviet Union to the population.”184 Many former prisoners had run for election and performed well in their capacities as managers, union leaders, and propagandists, in party schools, education institutions, mass organizations, the police, and mass cultural work generally. Many former prisoners, who graduated from the schools and completed the antifascist courses, are members of the Association for German-Soviet Friendship, and take active part in the work of the clubs dedicated to the study of the Short Course in the History of the VKP(b); they disseminate among workers—and introduce in factories—new forms and methods of labor; they promote competition and are in charge of production themselves (6).

Further extolling the results of the political work performed in the camps, Kruglov finally pointed out rather smugly that,

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR during the repatriation phase, prisoners of war—particularly German, Japanese, Hungarian, Romanian and Austrian ones—wrote over 4,000 letters of thanks, and signed 834,562 positive evaluations of the Soviet Union, and of life in the camps. In these letters, prisoners express their benevolent opinions of the Soviet Union, as well as their gratitude to Comrade Stalin and the Soviet government for their humane attitude toward them (7).

When considering propaganda’s effects on prisoners, it is worth bearing in mind that propaganda was only one element among many contributing to determine individuals’ political evolution. There were those who were antifascist before attending the courses or schools, and those who embraced communism only after they got back to Italy. As Robotti pointed out to Shchevliagin, even among those who had been most active during captivity there were some who “defected” once home. Others still espoused the PCI, but covertly, working for the party while officially remaining in the anticommunist camp. After all, voluntary and even eager adherence to antifascism did not at all imply passive acceptance of Soviet propaganda. Sometimes taking on the form of brainwashing, propaganda ended up bumping against a wall of obstinacy and opposition, put up most prominently by officers. Also hindering propaganda was the contrast between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the reality of life in the USSR, which prisoners had witnessed firsthand. The memory of the first months of imprisonment left an indelible mark on those who survived. Additionally, there were staunch fascists on which propaganda took no hold whatsoever, even though the Soviet authorities adopted every possible measure to convert them. More often than not, fascists continued to believe that the regime had been a good thing for Italy. Very rarely did they turn their backs on the ideas they had had before setting off for Russia. In their case, propaganda only caused them to become more set in their ways.

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CHAPTER 5

Repatriation

We, the only survivors (the title of C. Vicentini’s memoirs, Milan: Mursia, 1997).

1. Diplomatic negotiations on the repatriation of prisoners Given that diplomatic communications between Italy and the Soviet Union were interrupted, for the whole duration of the conflict the Italian government was left in the dark as to the number of its men who had gone missing on the Eastern front. When the armistice was signed and Italy acquired its co-belligerent status, the Badoglio and Bonomi governments, in turn, lodged official requests with the Soviet government for the repatriation of Italians under Soviet custody. It was the first time such requests were made. The USSR’s political recognition of the Badoglio government (14 March 1944) changed the Soviets’ attitude toward Italy, at least at first. On Moscow’s initiative diplomatic relations were resumed at the end of October 1944. Mikhail Kostylev was appointed as the Soviet ambassador in Rome and Pietro Quaroni as his Italian counterpart in Moscow. The Kremlin’s decision was interpreted as a sign of goodwill on the part of the USSR. Italian authorities, including the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, hoped their countrymen’s state of imprisonment in the Soviet Union might be over.1 In fact, the status of Italian prisoners was not to change as a result of the signing of the armistice for either the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. According to the Allies, Italy continued to be

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR a defeated country, which could put forward no demands, on the grounds of its unconditional surrender. The armistice’s provisions called for the turning in of Allied prisoners in Italian hands, and held the Italian government responsible in the event of their transfer to Germany, but made no mention whatsoever of a  possible future release of the Italian prisoners.2

Under these circumstances, Italian authorities decided to face the delicate matter of repatriation with a degree of caution. At the same time, however, they needed to address the issue taking the great pressure exerted by public opinion and concerned families duly into account. In the early months of 1944, in his capacity as chief of staff, General Giovanni Messe tried to obtain information on the prisoners from a Soviet delegation, then visiting Italy. His attempts were to no avail.3 Additionally, in 1944 and 1945, the Bonomi governments presented several official requests to the Soviet government as well, in hopes of acquiring intelligence on the prisoners. Spurred by an onslaught of “letters, pleas and petitions,” they asked for name lists, permission to correspond with prisoners and to see them, and the release of those who were unwell or more senior in age. Finally, they sent a list with the names of the men they believed to be missing.4 The Soviet legation in Stockholm had also taken to passing on individual requests and to relaying information on Italian prisoners in Russia. Based on data transmitted by Soviet functionaries, these tidbits of information were not factual in any full sense of the word. They reported that Italian prisoners had been “provided with proper winter clothes, and that food [was] plentiful. Soldiers work[ed] in the woods, felling trees, but officers [were] not forced to carry out any kind of labor.”5 Clearly, this did not paint an accurate picture of what prisoners detained in the USSR were enduring. On 27 June 1944, Renato Prunas—the secretary general to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—complained with Quaroni that news on the Italian servicemen detained in the Soviet Union had up to that point been “very fragmentary and almost non-existent, or limited for the most part to the information a very small number of them [had] managed to communicate through Radio Moscow.”6 Thus, the fate of almost all the men who had set off to war in the ranks of the ARMIR remained unknown in Italy. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to receive letters and appeals from families lacking information about their loved ones, Prunas urged the Italian ambassador to take an interest in the matter, and obtain from the

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relevant Soviet authorities “a list—preferably a name list—of [Italian] prisoners of war, the camps’ locations, news on the men’s material and moral conditions, and on whether or not they [could] correspond with their relatives in Italy.”7 On 9 October 1944, General Pietro Gazzera—the high commissar for prisoners of war—reported to the government and to the army chief of staff on the outcome of his encounter, the day before, with Colonel N.D. Yakovlev, the head of the Russian military mission charged by the USSR’s Council of Ministers with the repatriation of Soviet citizens. Yakovlev had asked for information on “a hundred or so Russian prisoners (including a  few women who [had] followed [Italian] units at the time of repatriation) present in Italy as of 8 September 1943.”8 After supplying Yakovlev with all the data in his possession, Gazzera had likewise asked for news of the Italian prisoners detained in the Soviet Union. He had been told they were treated well: “in some cases, when procuring supplies was difficult, their treatment [had] supposedly been better than the Russian population’s.”9 According to Yakovlev, it could not be ruled out that some prisoners were still being housed by Russian families in the area of the Italian troops’ retreat. Further, since the Italian ambassador Quaroni’s arrival in Moscow, lists were allegedly being drawn up in the Soviet capital to be relayed to the Italian government. The most comforting piece of information was prisoners of war in the USSR would soon be repatriated via Persia, and via Egypt.10 The enthusiasm provoked by this communication was short-lived. The following month, reliable Italian sources informed their government there was little hope prisoners might be repatriated en masse from the USSR, “given the magnitude of the disaster.”11 A document dated 9 November, signed by Giuseppe Micheli, the vice-president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, informed Gazzera of the outcome of the meeting that had taken place, in the Chamber of Labor, between Italian representatives and Soviet delegates of the workers unions. One of the critical issues addressed during the meeting had been the need, felt by the Italian government, to accelerate repatriations from the USSR: The government’s hesitation in arranging the repatriation of the extremely high number of prisoners detained in India, in Africa and elsewhere—and thus that dealing with the latter might require more time—is understandable. In the case of prisoners held in Russia, it seems to me that it should be possible to act more swiftly, and that they should be given absolute precedence. Indeed, their number will be far lower, sadly. The difficul-

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR ties entailed in their transportation and the great distance at which they are situated call for the whole process to be advanced. Further, prisoners detained in Russia have been isolated from their homeland and all forms of communication, without the comfort of a paternal word, for two years, and in some cases for even longer. It is only fair that their captivity be ended before that of other prisoners, who have been luckier.12

Therefore, in November 1944, the government knew that the number of military men awaiting repatriation from the USSR was lower than initially expected. Likewise, it was aware of the harsh conditions endured during imprisonment in Russia (it had probably been informed of this by the embassy in Moscow). To the Soviet authorities’ way of thinking, though, the matter of the lists of Italian prisoners detained in the Soviet Union and of their return to Italy was closely connected with two factors: the Italian government’s failure to supply lists of Russian prisoners held in Italy, and the alleged atrocities committed by Italian units on Soviet soil.13 During the first months of 1945, in order to satisfy requests from the USSR, the Italian government zealously tried to ascertain the number of Soviet prisoners and citizens confined or interned in Italy. On 22 January, the Italian Foreign Affairs minister cabled the Italian embassy in Moscow. First, Prunas reported that twenty-nine Soviet citizens—counting prisoners of war and internees in the camps of Avezzano and Treviso—were known to be in Italy as of that date.14 Second, he clarified that, even taking into account Soviet military men sent to Italy for work purposes, the number of Soviet citizens on Italian soil would continue to be small compared to the thousands of Italian prisoners held in Russia, including those constantly conveyed there from European territories under the Soviet army’s rule.15 As for the accusations of atrocities at the hands of Italian units, he stated he was unaware of any evidence to that effect. Quite the contrary, Italians had “abstained from excesses of any kind in Russia,” and their behavior had in fact been “particularly humane toward the Russian population,” which they had shielded from German atrocities. Still, he conceded that sporadic instances of bad behavior could not be ruled out entirely. Receiving documentation on these instances was desirable, he said, so the matter might be addressed.16 On 25 January, the high commissar informed the government and the army chief of staff that he’d appointed Colonel Pallotta to “research and gather all data […] concerning Russian prisoners of war already interned in concentration camps in Italy.”17 However, the Soviet government’s requests, submitted through Ambassador Kostylev in Rome, extended to all Soviet

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citizens present in Italy at the time—that is, to those who had moved voluntarily following the Axis troops and whom the USSR now aimed to see repatriated forcibly. The Italian government’s aspirations continued to be frustrated. As effectively illustrated by Quaroni in a report dated 11 May, the Soviet attitude originated from a “completely different understanding of human relations,” devoid of “sentimentality,” as observed elsewhere. As for the mystery surrounding [Italian] prisoners, it is but a manifestation of the general mystery surrounding everything in this country. The British and the Americans were precisely denied permission to send officers to take care of their men freed by the Russians: some British officers who had arrived in Lublin were sent back rudely. The Russians turn prisoners over in Odessa, but until then only the Russians can tend to them, without exception. These people have a completely different understanding of human relations. Here, they don’t concern themselves with their own men who have been taken prisoner—they don’t ask for name lists, nor do they try to make sure that their men can receive mail, care packages, and such. To this day, the Anglo-Americans are not asked to provide lists, but merely to hand the men over. Unless the deceased serviceman was a  general, people are not informed when someone in their family who served in the Soviet army dies—let people figure it out for themselves. Fighters who stop writing are probably dead; if they aren’t, then at some point they’ll resume writing. Or they’ll show up at the war’s end. This is the atmosphere people in this country have been living in for twenty-five years now, and, whether they like it or not, they’ve grown accustomed to it. If this is their mindset, how can we expect them to understand our sentimental aspirations to receive and to give news, to be informed of the circumstances of someone’s demise, to be provided with death certificates, and so forth? Even if they were willing to trouble themselves with such requests, the state of confusion is so great the work required would be enormous—and here anything not immediately needed for the war effort must be cast aside at once. Given this tough and ruthless mentality, devoid of sentimentality, which they view as useless, our anxiety for news is not understood. They are unwilling to see what this uncertainty means for families back at home.18

Beyond these differences in mentality, the Soviet refusal to provide lists with the names of the Italian men in their custody was also to be inter-

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preted, Quaroni said, as “punishment for the fact that the Italian government, during the war, had first taken the initiative” of not supplying its own lists of Soviet prisoners. Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that the matter of repatriation was a bargaining chip the Soviets could use at the negotiating table. On 28 June, in a  telegram to the embassies in Washington and London, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the issue of prisoners to be addressed during the coming conference of the Big Three. Indeed, the Italian government would have appreciated it if the repatriation of all Italian prisoners in Allied hands was discussed on that occasion. Italian authorities could envisage no difficulties, for the Anglo-Americans “had already made known in private […] their decision to repatriate the Italian servicemen.” The Allies’ joint statement would have had “the great advantage of binding Russia,” and thus would have “unburdened the government and the Italian people of a serious cause of concern.”19 It was even suggested that an Italian Red Cross delegate should be dispatched to the Soviet Union. Quaroni discarded the idea. The British and the Americans had already asked for permission to send an International Red Cross representative, who was to travel throughout the country in order to provide prisoners with care. Their request had been denied. That a  similar concession might be made for the Italians was unthinkable.20 Until the war ended, attempts by the Italian government to obtain information on Italian prisoners in Russia fell on deaf ears. The Soviet government replied curtly that Italy was not to insist, but to wait calmly. Hostilities were ongoing, the Soviet government said, and the USSR would need to reorganize after the conflict came to an end. It was obvious the issue of prisoners transcended negotiations underway on the supplying of name lists and on repatriation. Prisoners were becoming an extraordinary resource the Soviet Union could exploit in a  cynical quid pro quo grounded on the Soviet’s peculiar view of prisoners, which Quaroni had so effectively explained to the minister of Foreign Affairs on 11 May. Moscow’s reticence—both on the lists and on the freeing of prisoners—was therefore deliberate. However, in order to deflect the suspicions and conjectures that had started appearing on the Italian press since the summer of 1944, in July 1945 the Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Y. Vyshinsky, tried to justify himself with the Italian ambassador, claiming material conditions in the Soviet Union were very different from those present in Great Britain or the United States. “I am hopeful,” the Soviet deputy minister said, “that the matter of prisoners will

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be solved soon: they will return to Italy, they will tell how we treated them, and this whole fabrication will be laid to rest.”21 Even while the issue of repatriation remained a mystery for the Italian government and public opinion, the Soviet leadership set to work to free the prisoners, whose presence—particularly in the case of ill and weak men—was a burden for the camps’ administration and a hindrance to the country’s reconstruction efforts. Further, the USSR wanted all the Soviet citizens who had ended up in Italy, whether as refugees or because they had followed the retreating Italian troops, to be sent back to the USSR. In fact, it was precisely the repatriation of people who did not wish to return to the Soviet Union that it demanded most.

2. The USSR organizes prisoners’ repatriation The repatriation of prisoners and internees from the Soviet Union started right after the end of the conflict in Europe, and dragged on until the spring of 1950; for some Italians, found guilty of war crimes, it lasted until 1954.22 The first antifascist prisoners—in some cases even of Austrian or German nationality—were repatriated as early as 1945, long before their fellow countrymen; the repatriation of Germans officially started in 1950. The same happened in the case of many antifascist Italian prisoners, who, as we will see, were repatriated with the invalids. The first group of prisoners, made up of soldiers and noncommissioned officers, was repatriated following an already mentioned GKO directive signed by Stalin, which authorized the NKVD of the USSR to release from the camps and special hospitals and to repatriate prisoners of war who cannot be used as labor because of their physical condition: invalids, the chronically ill, the debilitated and the long-term disabled, 225,000 men in all.23

Following this order, the NKVD issued an implementing decree on 15 June 1945, which made an estimate of the prisoners to be repatriated. These were selected by special commissions, coordinated by the health directors of the regions the camps were located in.24 The NKVD’s primary short-term concern was to repatriate the sick. Yet the sending home of this first contingent did not solve the camps’ problems connected with the presence of men unfit for labor, whose number was constantly increasing.

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On 10 August, Beria sent Stalin a resolution plan developed by the State Defense Committee, involving the evacuation from camps located on the front and in the rear of 418,000 and 290,000 prisoners respectively—708,000 men in total.25 A decree dividing the prisoners to be freed into three groups followed the plan. The first group comprised the Slavs: Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosniaks, for a total of over 62,000 men. The second group was made up of Italians, Belgians, Dutch, Luxembourgers, Danes, Swiss, Norwegians, Americans, Swedes, Greeks, and the British, for a  total of over 24,000 men, whose repatriation was entrusted to the man in charge of such operations in the Council of Ministers, Golikov. The decree established that prisoners in this group should be “dressed in appropriate military clothing, seized from the enemy.” The third and biggest group comprised 622,000 men: 412,000 Germans unfit for labor (whereas no such distinction had been made in the case of the first and second groups), 150,000 Hungarians, 30,000 Austrians and an equal number of Romanians. Regardless of their health, prisoners who had committed atrocities in occupied Soviet territories, as well as prisoners belonging to the SS, SD, SA and Gestapo, were excluded from these groups. To this end, the NKVD prescribed strict control of the units the prisoners belonged to and reiterated the order in subsequent decrees.26 Throughout 1945, prisoners’ repatriation was carried out in a rather chaotic fashion. Angelo Lopiano recalls the following: By the 12th [of October 1945], the Russians had drawn up the list of those who were to depart. On the 19th, the imminent arrival of trucks in the nearby station of Salderia was discussed; just the same, we set out to go to work. […] While we were eating our rations, I  saw Raimondi and Quintavalle approach and give the Russian soldier on guard a note with the order to return to the camp immediately. No words can describe such moments. […] Only twenty or so comrades remained in the camp (it was rumored by some they were held back as punishment). Among them was a  fellow who came from the same part of the country as me, one Assennato Giuseppe, repatriated with the others in January 1946. […] After thirty-four months, freedom at last. When we reached the railway station, though, the trucks weren’t there, though the remaining men from the four closest camps were about to arrive. Shortly afterwards, the Russians arrived. They distributed cards among us, on which

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were written these and other words in Russian: first name, last name, paternity, class, and nationality. Also, they informed us of the fact that the trucks were not going to arrive that night, and suggested we make do as best we could.27

Repeatedly, prisoners were summoned for roll call, counted for the purpose of being repatriated and then sent back to their barracks. When the announced repatriation became effective, prisoners—who by this time had often become disillusioned—were loaded onto cargo trains. Their journeys could last for weeks, as a  result of the long stops that were made, or because of route changes. In his memoirs, an Acqui Division returnee recalls his feelings on hearing the news of his repatriation, as well as his long journey home: What each of us poor wretches went through in those moments I cannot describe—our joy was so great it grabbed us by the throat and plunged us into a  state of near insanity. Truthfully, we didn’t know whether to laugh or cry. And thus started the interminable journey that, by way of several Soviet republics (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the steppes of the Kyrgyz people, the Moscow region, White Russia), led us to the RussianEuropean terminal: Brest-Litoŭsk, the Russian-Polish border crossing.28

Problems had to do primarily with the evacuation of the camps located on the front. Here, “because of the appointed GUPVI officials’ negligence,” or for other reasons, it often happened that “documents regarding the freeing of seized men belonging to enemy armies could not be found.”29 In general, the repatriation of the sick took place in a haphazard way. Not all prisoners arrived in the designated area, and those who did faced very difficult circumstances. On this issue, Mátyás Rákosi sent the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) a cable on 29 December, lamenting Hungarian POWs’ poor physical condition at the time of repatriation.30 In total, in 1945 the Soviet Union freed 1,015,749 prisoners belonging to European armies.31 Still, despite the measures taken, repatriating all European nationals (with the exception of Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and Romanians) proved impossible. Indeed, when the repatriation decree was issued, many of them had not even been recorded yet, while others were in the process of being transferred between camps, or were convalescing. On 8 January 1946, the NKVD reiterated its order to liber-

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ate and transfer prisoners who were not German nationals into camp No. 186, near Odessa, excluding members of the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo, and all officers.32 The NKVD took account of the bitter experience of the repatriations carried out in 1945 and advised that, “prior to departure, all prisoners slated for liberation be subjected to a full health treatment, so as to avoid that prisoners infested with lice, feverish, contagious or otherwise unfit for transportation be loaded in the cars.”33 To ensure assistance during the journey, the use of health personnel and special cars equipped with the required amount of medicine and supplies was arranged.34 Meanwhile, in the camps, the number of prisoners fit for work was decreasing noticeably.35 As the presence of prisoners of war in the USSR was justified solely by their productivity, on 26 May 1946 Kruglov asked Stalin, Molotov and Beria for permission to repatriate the contingent of prisoners unfit for work, totaling 150,000 men.36 Kruglov’s request was followed first by an order from the Council of Ministers (18 June) and then by a decree (27 June) establishing that prisoners admitted into hospitals and camp hospitals should be repatriated before the others. The first large groups of antifascists were also sent home in 1946: based on a decree by the Interior Minister dated 5 November, out of the 10,000 repatriated Romanian soldiers and noncommissioned officers, 1,700 were antifascists, including 700 who had attended the antifascist schools.37 Subsequently, the repatriation of prisoners belonging to the group of antifascist activists usually took place by decision of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), which prepared the name lists. The prisoners to be sent home individually were gathered in camps No. 27, No. 275 (Lviv) and No. 284 (Brest), where stocks of new uniforms were concentrated.38

3. The CGIL delegation in the USSR To reciprocate a Soviet delegation’s visit to Italy in June,39 an Italian labor union delegation headed by Giuseppe Di Vittorio (the CGIL secretary, as well as a  member of the PCI leadership) spent about a  month in the USSR in the summer of 1945.40 It arrived in Moscow at the beginning of August. From the 7th to the 11th, it toured factories, firms and exhibitions in Leningrad. Then, after doubling back to Moscow, it moved to Stalingrad, where post-war reconstruction was already underway.41 The activities of the delegation revolved around three aspects: assessing the USSR’s

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results in reconstruction; meeting with local unions at all levels; visiting some prison camps in which Italians were detained. Available documents show these were Temnikov camps No. 58/4 and No. 58/6, and Krasnogorsk camp No. 27/b, the seat of the antifascist school. The delegation further paid a visit to Yuzha camp No. 165. Thus, for the first time, a delegation from Italy had access to Soviet prison camps and, for the first time, lists were acquired, which Di Vittorio was to take back to Italy. One thousand eight hundred names appeared on these lists, the collation of several others—some supplied by the Soviets during the visits to the camps, others made out by Di Vittorio on the grounds of letters and notes written by the prisoners, and others still penned by the prisoners themselves. With an eye to the delegation’s upcoming trip, many relatives of the men who had gone missing on the Eastern front had given Di Vittorio notes and letters in hopes of receiving news from their loved ones. The distraught mother of one serviceman—who had not heard from her son since 11 December 1942, despite seeking the intercession of the Red Cross, the Vatican, the Red Crescent and other authorities—had finally appealed to the CGIL. Her only hope was placed in Di Vittorio, to whom she wrote: “I am one of many who ask, I know. Yet a desperate mother will be allowed and forgiven much. Many thanks for any action taken so that we may have word of our loved one and be delivered from this terrible anguish.”42 The dossier includes other letters and cards from the fathers, mothers and wives of men held captive in Russia, calling for news and information on their relations, sometimes tentatively and sometimes in overtly exasperated tones toward the powers that be.43 Di Vittorio set off for the USSR bearing the weight of these entreaties and petitions, with which the CGIL delegation and the PCI were charged both morally and politically. On 3 August, the Italian leader met with Dimitrov. On Togliatti’s instruction, the two men addressed a number of matters, including the issue of prisoners.44 In the camps, prisoners gave Di Vittorio messages for their families, and expressed their hopes that they would be sent home soon. On 4 August, the prisoners of Yuzha camp No. 165 saluted the union delegates with a statement characterizing the “representatives of the Italian working classes” as having arrived in the USSR “to confirm the gratitude of the Italian nation toward the Soviet peoples.” The latter had proven “most valiant, most determined and most able in the struggle to free humanity from the Hitlerian and fascist plague.” The prisoners described the USSR as “a grand world, feverishly and tenaciously at work toward progress, wellbeing and peace,” and declared their pride in having made its acquaintance.

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Regarding the united labor union, prisoners claimed they had followed the “tireless and intelligent efforts of [their] union leaders in grouping the labor masses into a single organism,” through which the groundwork had been laid for unity, “an essential condition for the establishment of a strong popular democratic regime.”45 Of course, such an official message would be expected to display this sort of tone and content. And after all, the prisoners who authored it belonged to the Yuzha School. Even the notes and letters the prisoners wrote for their families and put in the care of Di Vittorio extolled the Soviet Union to a disproportionate extent. Second Lieutenant Mario Gonnelli, for example, wrote that—excepting a short period of disorganization early on during his imprisonment, which he attributed to “the selfishness of the very prisoners Soviet authorities had entrusted with the camps’ management”—he had “always found perfect order, good food, the highest degree of cleanliness and hygiene, excellent healthcare, thoughtfulness and disinterested moral assistance on the part of others.”46 To be sure, if Second Lieutenant Gonnelli had described the situation otherwise, he would not have been allowed to stay in the antifascist school (in his case, the obekt 40 school, in camp No. 27/b) for very much longer, nor would his letter ever have left the USSR to be delivered to his family. The sapper Fiorenzo Lancelotti, who hailed from the ranks of the 103rd Company of the Celere Division, spoke of the generous heart of the Soviets who had taken him and his comrades in, of the attentive care he had received in the hospital, and of well prepared food, provided in adequate quantities. “Italian mothers should know,” he wrote, “that many of their sons were rescued from death by Soviet mothers and nurses who paid with their own lives.”47 In his message to his family in Milan, Sergeant Andrea Lusardi too wrote that the Soviet authorities had done “everything possible to make [their] stay as comfortable as possible,” and listed the sporting and cultural activities organized in the camp.48 These messages are important because they prove that the delegation was only allowed to visit the most organized camps and to receive letters only from the “best prisoners,” that is, from the students of the antifascist schools, who enjoyed preferential treatment. The prisoners gave the delegation a message for Togliatti (at the time minister of justice in the Parri government) as well: To Radio Moscow—please broadcast the following in Italy To Minister of Justice Palmiro Togliatti, Rome We antifascist prisoners of war in the USSR send warm greetings to Minister Togliatti, who, in the most difficult of circumstances, fought

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against fascism and now, back home after his time abroad, leads the Communist Party with a  firm hand in the further struggle to root out fascism and democratize the country.49

On 5 August, Di Vittorio wrote Molotov a letter on this issue.50 Prisoners were likewise the only important subject of a conversation he had, on 22 August, with the Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Solomon Lozovsky. In this instance, it was precisely on the “painful matter” of prisoners that Di Vittorio seemed to attain his mission’s “only partial success.” He showed “remarkable determination in pointing out the difference between the situation of Italian prisoners of war detained in the USSR—of whom there was no news whatsoever—and that of prisoners detained in England or in the United States.”51 He said he could not see why “this should be a secret.” By insisting that the matter had “great political significance,” Di Vittorio wrested from Lozovsky the promise that he would raise the issue with Stalin and Molotov once they returned from Berlin. Di Vittorio even wrote a letter to Stalin himself. Lozovsky kept his promise and, on 25 August, officially announced to Di Vittorio the repatriation of all Italian prisoners of war, with the exception of those charged with war crimes.52 Of course, Di Vittorio’s doings had had no bearing on the Kremlin’s decision to repatriate the prisoners. As the orders issued by the NKVD prior to August 1945 show, that decision had already been made. After Lozovsky’s announcement, the Italian delegation sent Stalin a  message. “Speaking on behalf of Italian workers,” the delegation addressed “its most heartfelt thanks” to “Generalissimus Stalin, the precursor of the union of free peoples, for his firm resistance against the fascist aggressors,” and to “the Soviet government and all the peoples of the great and victorious Soviet Union.”53 The Italian people, the message said, was “very much interested in the fate of its prisoner-of-war sons, most of whom were innocent victims of the heinous regime that [had] oppressed […] and dishonored Italy for over twenty years, plunging the country into the worst catastrophe in all its history.” The delegation expressed “deepest gratitude” on behalf of the Italian people “for the Soviet government’s generous decision toward Italian prisoners of war. This gratitude [was] all the more profound,” the message concluded, “as the Soviet government [was] first among the Allied governments to liberate all Italian prisoners of war.”54 Once back home, Di Vittorio continued to receive letters and petitions from the family members of the men whose traces had been lost on the Eastern front. For example, comrade Nicodemo Pipita di Cirò asked for information about his son Antonio, a bersagliere with the Pasubio Division,

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whom he had not heard from in some time. Incredulous at the reported small number of prisoners about the return from Russia, he suggested that the figure referred to Italians detained in regular camps, and that “a much more significant number of men” must be located “in rural villages,” where perhaps they tended to work in the fields in liberty.55 Even Interior Undersecretary Giuseppe Spataro wrote Di Vittorio in hopes of acquiring information with which he could appease public opinion: The families of the men imprisoned in Russia are deeply concerned about the fate of their loved ones. Public demonstrations have even taken place on several occasions, in which—among other things—it has been asked that a survivors’ list be made known. The matter has become particularly urgent as a result of the contradictory news coming from the press. Entreaties have further been made to arrange for the prisoners to be sent home before the winter sets in, and to provide them with effective assistance, ensuring they return on board motor vehicles. That said, for the purpose of enabling the government to release a communiqué able to placate the anxiety understandably felt by many families, I  would be most grateful if you would provide this Ministry with any news you have been able to collect on the issue during your recent travels in Russia. Many thanks. For the minister, Spataro [authentic signature]56

The following is the most significant excerpt from Di Vittorio’s answer to Spataro, and confirms what the former had already publicly stated, namely, that our prisoners are treated extremely well—as all the members of the union delegation and I  were able to ascertain in the Krasnogorsk camp we visited— with regard to both the money they receive and their hygiene and morale; that the relationship between our prisoners—all of whom are in good health, and most of whom are occupied in work of some kind—and the Soviet authorities is based on mutual respect and may be described as friendly. Indeed, more than a few Italian prisoners are armed with military weapons and entrusted with surveillance of German prisoners; messages [I’ve] received from prisoners detained in various camps and reports given to me by the Italian medical officers in charge of [their] healthcare very clearly show that our prisoners’ conditions are truly excellent.57

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Further, Di Vittorio claimed he had become persuaded that “the great majority of Italian prisoners [had] assumed a  decidedly antifascist and democratic attitude.” Members of the first and only Italian delegation to visit Soviet prison camps saw what the authorities wanted them to see. Their perception and reports were significantly distorted as a result.

4. The repatriation The decision to repatriate the Italian prisoners took everyone by surprise. As late as 7 July, Vyshinsky had told Quaroni that the “liberation of prisoners was a  matter the three Allies would handle with one accord, and prisoners in British and American hands hadn’t been freed yet either.”58 In an attempt to leverage the case’s emotional aspects, which his interlocutor failed to understand, Quaroni had observed that in his opinion [Vyshinsky] was underestimating the sentimental reactions of the Italian people. There are impressions, both good and bad, that unfortunately are not easily forgotten. In any case, I would have felt as though I was falling short on my duties as a person who should care about the good relations between Italy and the Soviet Union if I had not called his serious attention to this side of the problem—though it wasn’t the first time I did so.59

As we have seen, and as the ambassador himself understood all too well, Soviet functionaries were impervious to this line of reasoning. Once again, Quaroni would have to acknowledge that Vyshinsky had indulged him on a single matter, the issue of correspondence. Indeed, communications had not been ensured despite promises to the contrary, and even though prepaid postcards had been handed out for that purpose. As for the other points he had raised with Vyshinsky, Quaroni had done so merely by virtue of the role he played, with little hope of actually attaining anything. The Soviet government’s unexpected initiative, however, served to discredit the alarmist rumors on the fate of Italian prisoners that were circulating in Italy at the time. It was also typical of the Kremlin’s inscrutable ways that, after opposing the bureaucratic work underlying prisoners’ repatriation (specifically the drawing up of name lists), and with no prior warning, the Kremlin would now arrange for Italian servicemen detained in the USSR to be sent home. In a similar vein, it provided no explanation for the number of the prisoners it repatriated, far lower than 95,000—the number of missing ARMIR servicemen.

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After all, Quaroni would later write, the Soviet attitude had been no different toward prisoners from other former enemy countries, or toward Allied internees and prisoners liberated by the Red Army. The French, the Dutch, Belgians, and even the British were never allowed to visit the camps housing their “liberated” countrymen, nor were they provided with prisoner lists, etc. Sometimes, as in the case of the Dutch, prisoners were handed over out of the blue, without warning, after diplomatic authorities had insisted for months and months to be given at least some news about them. Even recently, as far as I  know, former English and French prisoners coming from concentration camps located in the country’s interior passed through Moscow—a small number of them at a time, under adequate guard—on their way to Odessa or some other boarding port; their respective diplomatic authorities had not been forewarned of their passage, and, after learning about it by chance, were unable to get authorization to make contact with them during the short time they spent in one of the capital’s stations.60

On 11 September, the Soviet embassy in Rome made it known that, following a decision by the Interior Ministry of the USSR, 19,648 Italian prisoners of war—soldiers and noncommissioned officers—would be freed and repatriated.61 As the announcement did not mention officers, Quaroni was sent forth to ask for explanations. Meeting with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir G. Dekanozov on 13 September, Quaroni tried to shed light on whether the stated number of roughly 20,000 men was to be taken as comprising all Italian internees detained in the Soviet Union, including Germany’s former prisoners. This clarification would essentially make it possible to establish how many CSIR and ARMIR members had died in the USSR.62 Dekanozov, however, took great offense. He saw this line of questioning as suggestive of speculations on the part of the Italians. He pointed out that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Italy, and that therefore the USSR was under no obligation to free prisoners “captured with arms in hand.” The prisoners’ release was “a generous and friendly gesture” by the Soviet Union and should have been viewed as such, particularly in light of the fact that the Anglo-Americans had not liberated their own Italian prisoners, except for certain individuals or members of specific categories.63 Dekanozov further censured the injurious and anti-Soviet tone with which the Italian press was handling the matter. Instead of expressing gratitude, news outlets were often making insulting insinuations on the

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fate of the additional 60,000 prisoners. As Quaroni had once again turned to the issue of the prisoner lists Moscow had failed to submit and to the matter of the 80,000 men who had gone missing in action—the (actually underestimated) figure set forth in the wake of Commander Gariboldi’s retreat—Dekanozov answered thus: The Italian command knew very well that, given the local conditions, most of the men who had gone missing were either dead or wounded: it described them as prisoners so as not to show the Italian public what Mussolini’s Russian adventure had cost Italy. It is odd the Italian government would presently allow the Italian press to avail itself of this maneuver of fascist propaganda to wage an offensive campaign against the USSR.64

To this he added, not without irony, that if the Italian government preferred to be provided with lists rather than with men, it needed only say so.65 Reverting to the topic of what Italian papers were publishing, Dekanozov pointed out that the Soviet decision to repatriate the prisoners had “found little echo in the ‘progressive’ press,” and none elsewhere; yet when the Soviet embassy had protested with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the circulation of anti-Soviet press and literature, the government had effectively stepped in to remedy the situation, he said. Despite his formal refusal to specify whether the number set forth by Lozovsky—roughly 20,000 men—included all surviving Italian prisoners, Dekanozov admitted that the prisoners “responsible for atrocities in war and for fascist crimes” would not be returned. As Quaroni said to De Gasperi, they most likely had not all been killed by firing squad, but he doubted any of them would ever see Italy again; he therefore suggested not raising the issue, in hopes that some of them might one day make it home. This was a risky strategy, for it could have produced the opposite effect. In any case, Quaroni’s impression was that Dekanozov had been instructed specifically to play up Moscow’s resentment at Italy’s lack of appreciation, for the purpose of creating something of a “myth about Italian ingratitude” that could be exploited in the event of future requests by Rome. All in all, the ambassador felt that Italy was in no position to make a display of its resentment. While the British, the Americans and the Russians could tolerate all manner of insolence from one another, Italy—a small, no longer independent country—needed to exert greater caution. He concluded:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR We are dealing with a  country that is particularly sensitive to criticism of any kind in foreign papers, and expects defeated countries and allies alike to say everything it does is perfect. I understand this might seem boring, and even ridiculous at times, but whether we like it or not we mustn’t forget Russia is a  big country, strong and powerful, whose friendship could benefit us, and whose hostility could damage us.66

Quaroni’s report to De Gasperi was realistic and sound. Yet, while making the Soviets understand the weight public opinion carried in a democratic country was difficult, appeasing that very public on the complex matter of prisoners of war in Russia was an even taller order. Meanwhile, as one returnee put it, prisoners in the camps were living in uncertainty: It was an obsession by then. L’Alba published the news that, at a specific point in time, all Italian prisoners would be repatriated—it was a matter of months, but it might happen as soon as tomorrow; in Russia, you never find anything out until the very last second. […] It was a  day of sun and clouds. Italians were starting to be sent home. When would it be the turn of us officers? Disparate voices—the ambassador’s, our government’s, Moscow’s, the Allies’—crossed in the camp. It was a jumble of conjectures, a morbid heap of conflicting news. The air throbbed with the excitement of men held behind gates, in anticipation of their being flung open. The Russians remained ever silent. A sudden alarm broke out one October night. We were to descent [from our quarters] taking everything with us, and assume our assigned positions; lists upon lists were made, and there were motor vehicles present. But it was only a drill, and we were sent back.67

Even before diplomacy was resumed, following the decree issued on 15 June, the Soviets had handed over to Italy about a  hundred prisoners— most of them maimed or sick, but some of them servicemen and officers in good physical conditions. According to the UNIRR report: the criteria used to select the latter were not explained, but they became clear when, almost a  year later, all the remaining officers returned as well. At that time, it was disclosed that the prisoners who had enjoyed early repatriation had all attended the school in Moscow and proven their absolute dedication to the communist cause with articles featured on L’Alba.68

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As the authors of the report acknowledged, though, all other “sovietized” officers were repatriated with the mass of prisoners. They even complained with the Soviets that they had been equated with men who had not adhered to the antifascist movement. According to another account: the five men who returned before us were not antifascists. For example, among them was Antonio Ferrante, marquis of Ruffano, who—in the course of his interrogations—claimed his mother was American and his father a diplomat, a relative of Ambassador W.A. Harriman. He’d never been an antifascist. In any case, we were surprised these men were repatriated ahead of time, with the soldiers. Perhaps it was a test to see how people would react.69

In truth, anyone familiar with the Russian documents cannot help but think that in this case, as in many others, a large part was played by the arbitrary, mistaken and chaotic application of existing decrees and orders. The artilleryman Angelo Lesizza was one of the prisoners able to benefit from the decree issued in June 1945. Forced to work, between December 1944 and May 1945 he reached the lowest level of work ability and was thus admitted into the military hospital of Kokant, in Uzbekistan. This is his account from 4 October, given one month after his repatriation: Fortunately, on 26 July, a  medical and military commission that had arrived in the hospital arranged for the repatriation of the less seriously ill. There were 160 of us in all, between Italians and Germans. About eighty stayed behind because they were too sick (sixty of these were Italians); the other eighty (including sixty Italians, half of whom were affected by tuberculosis), loaded into livestock cars, started the journey back to their homeland. […] The 1,000 prisoners (500 Italians, collected from other camps during the month-long journey) got off at the Frankfurt station. The local Russian command arranged for the ill to reach a gathering camp (3 km away). Russian personnel provided each prisoners with a pass, and with food provisions sufficient for three days: 1.5 kg of bread, some dried potatoes and a small quantity of barley. Divided into groups of fifty, each was pointed to the direction it should go to reach Berlin. And thus each one of us placed himself in the hands of fate. Sadly, we were not all fit to venture out, and I have no knowledge of what might have befallen the other men. […]

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR From Berlin, resorting to makeshift means and troop trains set up for the repatriation of internees from Germany, I  reached Bolzano. There were only six returnees from Russia, including myself. We were taken to Merano on board Allied vehicles (30 August). […] Had I stayed a little longer, I never would have made it back, as was the case for many… I can still hear my comrades’ sobs as they saw me leave, and the cries with which they entreated me to ask that Italy take an interest in their liberation, and soon.70

As for the number of prisoners awaiting repatriation, the artilleryman said: Rumor has it there are 20,000 prisoners in need of being repatriated from Russia. But this isn’t the opinion held by anyone who has experienced Russian captivity. The men will be far fewer. That figure will not be reached even if the thousands of prisoners deported to Russia from the Balkans in the last few months are taken into account.71

In fact, the 20,000 mark was exceeded, precisely owing to the presence of internees. One of the latter had this to say about the repatriation process: The Russians accompanied us to a  temporary camp located about 2 km from the train station. Here, after the usual head count, which was repeated several times, we were finally placed in the charge of others. Our new guardians asked each of us for our personal data, gave us a pass, and told us we were free. Our protests to make them understand that unless someone took care of us it would not be possible for us to reach Italy, over 1,000 km away, were to no avail. They refused to understand…72

Indeed, many returned home using makeshift means, and often walking long stretches. On arriving in Berlin with a group of fellow countrymen, Porelli asked for information on how to get to Austria: First, those who had only one leg, those whose limbs were gangrenous (for having suffered from frostbite and not having undergone surgery) and those affected with tuberculosis no longer had the strength to carry on walking. All the passersby looked at us with a  standoffish air, and understandably so. Barefoot, clothed with rags, and our faces full of boils, we

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looked like a group of skeletons arrived from who-knows-where, perhaps another planet.73

Other accounts also attest to the difficulties endured by men as they tried to make their way home, particularly the return of hunger: In Brest we had more or less stocked up on supplies; despite that, some men in my car had come into the possession of a  dead horse’s leg, and so each one of us ate a small amount of cooked meat, which gave everyone indigestion.74 And the journey soon proves to be very uncomfortable. The train is extremely slow, and lacks a kitchen. Each day they give us a few slices of dry bread, potatoes and raw peas. […] I hadn’t eaten anything warm for days, and I could feel my strength dissipating. The journey was starting to be reminiscent of the frightening one at the beginning of captivity. And indeed there were those who died. Every morning they would unload someone who had passed away.75

Even while they rekindled hope in the hearts of the Italian population, the repatriations—because of how they were being carried out—could not change the atmosphere of uncertainty and exasperation surrounding the fate of the prisoners. On 9 November, the man in charge of the detached office of Northern Italy’s Ministry of Post-War Assistance76 informed Minister Emilio Lussu of the fact that “a committee of women, whose behavior was rowdy,” had arrived in his office that morning, calling for the repatriation—or, at the very least, for news—of their relations detained in Russia (ARMIR prisoners). Of course, our office could not accede to their demands. This increased their discontent and led to the threat of a  violent demonstration being held in front of the AMG [Allied Military Government] building. The demonstration was ultimately avoided, when the protesting women were persuaded to send one delegation to the AMG and another one to the Soviet Mission in Milan.77

The personnel responsible for repatriation procedures could not satisfy the requests set forth by the prisoners’ families for the simple reason that it had received no clear information from Moscow. Minister Lussu was

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informed of the women’s threat to carry out “an equal or more violent demonstration” if they failed to receive news within fifteen days. Further, he was asked to take a stand and spur the Italian government to acquire survivor lists from the Russian embassy and, “if possible, a statement akin to the ones other powers had issued regarding the alleged time frame for the repatriation of these fellow countrymen.”78 If nothing tangible could be done, then the Italian government should at least find a way to show that it was truly interested in the matter: So as to avoid unruly reactions by these poor people by any means— reactions that it is feared might damage the prisoners rather than benefit them—it would be desirable for the Italian government to make an announcement, however anodyne, able to persuade the interested parties that this very serious problem is not being underestimated.79

The mass repatriation of the soldiers was carried out in groups. It started in September 1945 and continued through March 1946. In the month of September, for example, thirty-three soldiers and a  few officers were repatriated; in October, twenty-seven prisoners of war.80 On 15 November, a dispatch by the Ministry of Post-War Assistance informed the Ministry of War that in addition “to the roughly 400 previously repatriated sick prisoners […] two other groups of men” had been released between 9 and 11 November; these had been sent to Pescantina, and comprised “1,874 and 3,235 men respectively.”81 A subsequent dispatch, on 17 November, raised the issue of the actual number of ARMIR and CSIR survivors among the repatriated. Based “on restricted information, and also, primarily, on the impressions prisoners of war back from Russia voiced during their interrogations,” it had been ascertained that, out of roughly 20,000 repatriates, ARMIR survivors were fewer than 11,000. Also, it was established that the number provided by Soviet authorities included “Italian servicemen formerly imprisoned by the Germans and subsequently liberated by the Soviet troops.”82 In essence, between 1945 and 1946, the USSR repatriated 21,065 men in all. Of these, only 10,032 hailed from the ranks of the CSIR or the ARMIR; as already noted, the remaining 11,033 came from the indefinite (and to this day unknown) number of prisoners formerly interned by the Germans. As late as April 1946, most officers had yet to be sent home. On 20 April, a note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that “a reliable confidential source” had revealed that “about 700 Italian officers were [still] detained

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in Russia.” Their “accommodations were adequate, and well heated,” but their spirits were low “for they were all eager to return to their own country.” Only four or five of them, “believed to be of interest politically,” would have to wait until the peace treaty was signed to be repatriated.83 As had been the case with the troop members, the repatriation of the 600 officers started without warning. As of 20 April, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received no official statement on the matter, as the document quoted above attests. Meanwhile, though, the transferring of the men for the purpose of repatriation had already commenced on Soviet soil. The officers came from Suzdal camp No. 160, with the exception of medical officers—detached to the soldiers’ camps to provide healthcare—and of the men who had attended the antifascist courses and had been sent to carry out propaganda in other camps. Finally, one day in April, all exits were blocked in our korpus. They carried out a search the likes of which we had never seen, and kept us locked in our rooms for a few days. They called and called, continually, moving us around and isolating some of us. We were familiar with their systems—we knew we wouldn’t all leave. When they let us out of our rooms and arranged us in front of the main door, we realized some of us were missing […] We managed to glean our destination. We were certain we were going to leave now; we were headed for Odessa.84 Not all of us left camp No. 160. The general, senior officers and some lieutenants and captains—fifty men in all—stayed behind. We had anticipated this would be the case where the former were concerned. The Russians had shown us in every possible way they were keen on overturning rank. We were surprised, however, to see the latter were affected by this as well. On the morning of 6 April, all of a sudden—after they’d summoned us to where they usually carried out the roll call—they started calling out, in alphabetical order, the names of militia men, carabinieri and others to whom the Soviet Union attributed criminal activities, and they were placed in a separate korpus; we, who were slated to leave, were segregated far away from them. […] Seeing them like that—so few in number, going round and round in the yard—we pitied them. As far as the senior officers were concerned, so be it. We knew this could happen, and they would surely

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR be allowed to leave in time. They would only have to wait a month or so. But as for as the others, we didn’t know what to think.85

Fifty-four senior officers were detained in the camp until they were finally repatriated that year on 22 August.86 Among them, it must be noted, were also prisoners known to have actively participated in the camp’s antifascist activities. Prior to leaving Suzdal, a group of officers signed a farewell message for the Soviet government: Farewell from the departing To the command of camp No. 160—For the Soviet government In the imminence of our repatriation, we Italian antifascist officers bid farewell, through you, to the courageous Soviet people, the decisive factor for victory in the struggle against fascism and presently the secure bulwark of democracy and peace in the world. As Italians and as democrats, we are grateful to the Soviet government: For having helped us during our imprisonment to understand the real essence of fascism and to adhere to the cause of the struggle against all forces opposing collaboration among peoples; For the help given our country toward defeating fascism and conquering independence and true progressive democracy. Despite being prisoners, we have been able to see up close the sacrifices the Soviet people have had to endure in order to obtain victory; in light of these sacrifices, the Soviet government’s efforts to ensure good living conditions for us are all the more meaningful. All Italian democratic forces will join us in being grateful for this. Our wish for the Soviet people is that under the leadership of Generalissimus Stalin and the glorious Bolshevik Party it may attain the wellbeing and happiness to which it is entitled because of the sacrifices it has sustained. On leaving the Soviet Union, we state our certainty that a solid and unending friendship will be established between your country and the Italy of tomorrow, republican and democratic.87

The message was signed by eighty-four officers (one colonel, five majors, eleven captains, twenty-four lieutenants, and forty-three second lieutenants) and was published—together with the signatures of the men who supported it—on issue No. 11 of L’Alba, dated 15 June 1946. Most of the men had been part of the group of antifascist activists in camp No. 160.

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On 25 May, Kruglov sent Molotov an updated report on the number of Italian prisoners in Russia. As of 1 August 1945, there were 19,810 of them (including former internees from German camps).88 This number would later be increased by 1,400 units, with the addition of former IMI men. Overall, Italian prisoners in Russia were 21,210. Of these, 20,145 were turned over to the organizations responsible for repatriation between the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, and 160 died in the camps or hospitals. At this point, only officers and men enrolled in the Italian SS—a total of 905 prisoners—remained in the camps. Officers included Emilio Battisti, Etvoldo Pascolini and Umberto Ricagno, thirty-four senior officers, 649 junior officers (ranking captain or lower), and 219 noncommissioned officers and soldiers. Seven hundred and forty men, 600 of whom officers, were ready to be transferred to Odessa, in keeping with the instructions contained in the NKVD decree issued on 8 January 1946.89 The remaining 165 men (three generals, thirty-four officers, 113 men enrolled in the Italian SS, and fifteen sick), excepting of the ones who were ill, could be turned over to the organizations in charge of repatriation the following June. The generals were repatriated only in 1950. The journey to transfer the officers was a veritable odyssey. As Kruglov indicated to Molotov, they were first transferred to camp No. 186 in Odessa, then to a camp in the interior, and finally to a resort on the Black Sea, where they remained until 6 June. They had us stop in front of a large building, and told us we were free— not entirely, as we would continue to be watched, but we could go where we wanted. The first thing we did was take a few steps so as to break the line, and then, giving in to instinct, all together like a pack of animals, we ran toward the sea. Panting, we reached the sand and got in the water with our clothes still on, and stayed there in silent contemplation of the horizon.90

According to the veterans’ accounts, by letting them spend time in the resort area of Odessa, the Soviets wanted to give them a chance to recover, at least in part, after imprisonment. It cannot be ruled out, however, that they were planning on repatriating them by sea. There are also those who believe the delay in the officers’ repatriation originated in political concerns having to do with the 2 June 1946 elections for the Constituent Assembly and concurrent referendum. With tales of

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imprisonment and accounts of the role communist émigrés had played in propaganda activities, the officers might have harmed the PCI.91 That same day, L’Eco del Popolo published a communiqué by Soviet Ambassador Kostylev describing the situation of repatriates and those still in the USSR: The number of Italian prisoners of war to be repatriated from the USSR was 21,193, including 681 officers. Of these 21,193 persons, 160 died as a  result of severe wounds and various diseases. Assenting to the request set forth by the Italian government as early as August 1945, the Soviet government decided to free from imprisonment and repatriate all Italian soldiers and noncommissioned officer prisoners. In conforming with this decision, between September and December 1945, 14,192 persons were repatriated; 5,904 more persons [were repatriated] between 1 January and 30 April 1946. Thus, by May 1946 as many as 20,096 Italian soldier and noncommissioned officer prisoners of war had already been repatriated. Operations for the repatriation of the remaining 937 soldiers and officers are in progress and soon they too will be sent to Italy.92

The ambassador basically relayed the data Kruglov had already officially sent Molotov on 24 May, from which it could be gleaned that the USSR had repatriated the greater part of its Italian prisoners and that the remaining 937 men would be returning home soon as well. Thus, 21,033 repatriations in all. Missing from these accounts were thirty or so men, whom the diplomats did not mention. These were the prisoners held back with various charges until the 1950s. By November 1945, given the negative effect of the first returnee’s accounts, Togliatti—on meeting with Kostylev—had suggested that officers be repatriated before soldiers. It was the majority of the latter who had attended the antifascist propaganda courses and adhered to democratic ideas, whereby displaying a “more responsible attitude toward Italy’s fate.”93 On that occasion, the communist leader had actually failed to consider that precisely among the officers were the fiercest anticommunists, a fact that would even call the attention of the Ministry of War. Indeed, with a note dated 28 January 1946 addressed to the military commands of certain cities, the Ministry of War indicated that it was advisable that, “until repatriations were completed, veteran officers abstain from making any comments or exhibiting any kind of behavior that might jeopardize the fate of the men who were yet to be repatriated.”94

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The officers left Odessa on 6 June. Much to their surprise and distress, they were conveyed north again, to a  location near Lviv, 600 km from the Black Sea. Then, through Galicia and the Carpathian region, they reached Maramures-Sighet, in Romania, where they remained for a week. Here, fifty officers were made to stay without explanation. During a meeting previously carried out in Odessa they had been named “by Paolo Robotti and other members of the antifascist group from camp No. 160.”95 Unable to get clarifications on their fate, the officers started a hunger strike. It appeared at first as though the hunger strike would produce no effect. The Russians replied to our protests with little more than half smiles; their rare answers were inane, or ridiculous. They had excuses aplenty: one time, our documents hadn’t been filled out; another time, there was a lack of convoys; finally, there was no room in the troop train the others had left on.96

To this day, the reasons for the officers’ detention are unclear. On 16 July, General Zauli, in charge of Udine’s military command, wrote the following to the Ministry of War: The reasons for this measure are unknown. According to some returnees, they must have to do with reports made to the Russians by the prisoners themselves, and the accusations they must have made against their fascist comrades. This circumstance could not be verified. What is certain is that, as soon as the convoy was out of the Russiancontrolled area, some returnees were attacked and struck by their comrades, who in this way intended to punish them for the hostility to their own and subservience to the Russians displayed during captivity.97

At Sighet, some of them wrote a  letter addressed to the Italian legation in Bucharest, with which they made known that groups of Italian prisoners were still present in Russia: five officers and ten soldiers were being held back in the camp in Odessa even after their fellow servicemen had departed; roughly ten officers, including three generals, were sent to other concentration camps; seven officers were prevented from leaving in Maramarosz-Sighet on 8 August, after the last group slated for repatriation had departed, and set up in a camp alongside 200 Roma.98 Meanwhile, the largest group of officers continued its journey to Austria, reaching Sankt Valentin, near Linz. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been informed by Colonel Jakovlev—and, on 11 June, had in its turn

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informed the Returnees’ Office—that “800 Italian former prisoners in Russia, including 600 officers,” would arrive in Sankt Valentin shortly, and were to be repatriated from there. Thus, the collaboration of Italian officers was requested to “ensure proper repatriation methods.”99 The officers spent a week in Sankt Valentin. Subsequently, they were handed over to the British occupation authorities in order to be transferred to Tarvisio on 7 July. The repatriation journey had been nearly three months long. In Austria, in the Russian occupation zone, some officers had drafted a document, which 525 former prisoners out of 552 then signed. Captain Melchiorre Piazza, Lieutenant Guido Martelli, Lieutenant Aldo Sandulli and Second Lieutenant Manlio Francesconi were the appeal’s promoters. According to General Messe’s account, the government did not authorize its circulation. Only two years later, in April 1948, was the document finally published by the UNIRR in a single-issue newspaper titled Russia. To the Italian people Having survived horrendous captivity in Russia, free at last from moral or material coercion, as we cross the sacred borders of our homeland, we officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers: Remind our countrymen of the tens of thousands of our comrades in arms who died from hunger, cold and epidemics during their imprisonment in Russia. Appeal to the Italian government to request, and obtain, the prompt return of our fellow nationals, arbitrarily detained in captivity with the complicity of certain elements, whom we hold up to public contempt as unworthy of being called Italians. Salute the republic and the Italian government, and declare our solidarity with them in their effort to rebuild and renew Italy, both morally and materially. Salute our families, with whom, for a long time, we were denied the sacred right to correspond. Witness to what we saw and suffered, whatever our political leanings may be, we repeat to every Italian: Bolshevism, stripped of its demagogic rhetoric, means a  police regime and a  regime of terror, it means a  dictatorship worse than the one Italians fought to take down; it is synonymous with external national enslavement and with internal tyranny by one party on the nation, on families, and on individuals. Long-live democratic, free and independent Italy!100

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Political opportunity clearly influenced the decision to withhold the document from publication in 1946, as well as the later decision to publish it in 1948. In the former case, the government was trying to avoid friction with the USSR, much as it had done six months before, when, as we have seen, it had advised military commands to supress the outcries of repatriated officers. Conversely, in the latter case, the publication of the appeal was exploited as a source of anticommunist propaganda at a time when the election campaign was in full swing. The very day after the officers’ return, at 10:30 p.m. on 8 July, Radio Moscow informed the Italian Red Cross that all the Italian prisoners had been repatriated, and that the last ones would be arriving in Italy shortly. Indeed, on 21 August 1946, a group of fifty-four officers and sixtyfour noncommissioned officers arrived in Udine. At the time of the party’s departure, the group included the officers and servicemen the Soviet authorities had held in the Vienna area as well.101 On 30 September, the Italian embassy in Moscow reassured the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would ascertain whether or not Italian prisoners could still be found in Russia. In particular, it would survey locations where Italians—either hailing from the ARMIR or transferred to the USSR from Nazi concentration camps at the time of the Soviet forces’ advance— were said to be present in large numbers. Excepting a  small number of military men that were not being repatriated for political reasons, about whom Soviet authorities were keeping quiet, these were men scattered in small groups as a  result of the disorganization of the services set up for the surveillance and labor of the prisoners of war.102 Prunas replied to this communication, asking the Italian embassy in Moscow to acquire a list of the Italian servicemen who had died during imprisonment.103 On 3 October, nine more prisoners—four captains, three lieutenants, a soldier and a civilian from South Tyrol—were repatriated from Russia. The small number of returnees, as well as their coming home in fits and starts, satisfied neither the public opinion nor the government, whose weapons against Moscow, however, were blunted—a fact not lost on the government itself. At least for Italian public opinion, the matter was far from resolved. The gap between the number of repatriates and that of the men gone missing was too large. On 4 December, Quaroni wrote this note: Rather than expressing enthusiasm for this “act of benevolence,” as the Soviet leaders had anticipated, the Italian public opinion was deeply troubled by the number of prisoners reported by Moscow, small when compared with the 80,000–100,000 men our command had reported as

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR missing in action on the Eastern front. A terrible doubt arose in several Italian circles—that, in addition to the officially reported number of men, thousands and thousands of prisoners might be present in the USSR, whom the Soviet government did not intend to send home.104

With an eye to possible upcoming elections, greatly spurred by public opinion, the Italian government continued to ask for news and clarifications. What appeared like Italian “ingratitude” was met with Soviet discontent. The Soviets, Quaroni commented, “cannot grasp such sentimentalities, foreign to their system.” In December, the representative of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zaikin, once again told Quaroni that as far as the Soviets were concerned the repatriation of Italian prisoners had been “fully completed.” At the time, he said, there remained in the USSR but a small number of servicemen, who had not “been repatriated on the grounds that they [were] considered criminals of war,” and whose names he would not divulge.105 A note summarizing the repatriations, transmitted to General Messe on 8 January 1947, explained the following: The numerous accounts of the last men to be repatriated are unanimous in saying that, with the exception of the thirty-four servicemen addressed in attachment No. 2, there are no other Italian prisoners in Russia. Only vague and unverified news speaks of a higher number of prisoners detained in far-away territories.106

5. The return to Italy For many, repatriation was a time when scores could be settled with the men who had adhered to propaganda activities during imprisonment. In the report issued by the commission appointed for the repatriation of prisoners from the USSR,107 Colonel Ettore Musco stated that in Arnoldstein, Austria, on 7 July 1946, he had taken into custody “551 junior officers, all former members of the ARMIR,” and “176 noncommissioned officers and troop soldiers, only about forty of whom were ARMIR returnees”; “during the transfer operations, in Arnoldstein, incidents [had] occurred between the majority of the officers and about twenty of them who had attended the communist propaganda course (alongside another twenty or so men, who [had] nevertheless been left undisturbed).” The attacked officers

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were charged with:—conniving with Soviet authorities during captivity and informing on their comrades;—having fifty of their comrades detained in Sighet (Romanian Transylvania) […];—carrying communist propaganda material back to Italy, while their comrades had been searched and stripped of everything.108

Thanks to “immediate, forceful action by Lieutenant Colonel Traina and the six public security agents on guard,” the clash had not had serious consequences. “A dozen officers” had been beaten, and two of them—who had sustained more visible bruises—had been admitted, “on their request, to the hospital in Udine.”109 The eleven officers who had been the “object of their comrades’ anger and resentment” had been gathered in a car and escorted by officers Musco and Traina themselves. In Tarvisio, in order to avoid further skirmishes, Colonel Musco had ordered that five carabinieri board the car as well. Once in Udine, the attacked officers had been quartered in the rooms of the military command. Indeed, they had asked “to be spared contact even with troop elements, who had reasons for resentment against them as well.”110 A few days later, a note issued by the Returnees’ Office and addressed to the commission in charge of questioning officers repatriated after being imprisoned in Russia, headquartered in Lecce,111 clarified the following: It appears that [these officers] are the strongest suspects, but there are others (about forty men in all) who, while they haven’t incurred their comrades’ wrath, will be reported by them during questioning owing to a similar conduct on their part during captivity. The territorial commands of Milan, Florence, Naples and Rome have been warned the officers in question must undergo special interrogation and, in any case, may receive only conditional authorization.112 We call the commission’s attention to the facts described above so that it might examine in greater depth, with additional questioning if necessary, the conduct of the suspects, among whom are commissioned officers, during both their captivity and [homeward] journey.113

At the time of repatriation, returnee soldiers and officers alike were subjected to interrogations centered on their captivity. In particular, officers were obliged to report to the military commands on the actions and behavior of their fellow nationals during imprisonment, engaging in a so-called discrimination process. These interrogations too provided a  chance for score-settling with those who had collaborated with the Soviets in cap-

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tivity, attended the antifascist courses, or behaved unfairly toward their comrades. For example, in the report he presented to the command of the military district of Lodi on 10 August 1946, Second Lieutenant V.G. said that in prison camp No. 160, “from 20 October 1943 to the date of his return [home], incidents occurred caused by certain Italian officers who damaged and offended the honor of the majority of the Italian officers [present there].”114 “Despite suffering hunger and the tragic days of imprisonment like the others,” these officers had sided “with the Russian political commissars and the Italian political exiles, and attempted to inculcate soldiers and officers with pro-communist and anti-Italian sentiments. […] The articles and texts written by these men, as well as the conferences held by them, revealed not love of country or emotional attachment to Italy, […] but rather complete and utter servitude to the Russian communist party.”115 The aggressions suffered by these officers at the hands of fellow returnees were the outcome of the anguish and exasperation accumulated by the latter during imprisonment. The exhausting interrogations, the threats, the fear of setting off for unknown destinations, the punishment camps, the declaration [the accused officers] made on leaving the camp [for Italy], in which [they] praised and thanked the Soviet government for its humane treatment of Italian prisoners of war […] and, in the course of the repatriation journey, the detention of fifty officers believed to be anticommunist, all brought about a  state of mind that broke loose at the Austrian border crossing, in Arnoldstein, and led to the punishment of informers and other guilty parties.116

Attached to the report was a list detailing the names of the eighteen officers deemed responsible “for the abuse” suffered by the other prisoners back in the camp and attacked in Arnoldstein. During the interrogation carried out on 29 July 1946, Second Lieutenant E.C. (one of the fifty men detained in Sighet) stated that the beaten officers carried out communist propaganda in the concentration camps; they spared no efforts (publishing articles on the prisoners’ paper L’Alba, as well as on the camp’s wall newspapers) to make the mass of Italian officers and soldiers who did not approve such propaganda appear fascist, antidemocratic.117

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L’Unità addressed the matters of the questioning of the repatriates and of the hostility and suspicion surrounding the antifascist officers. An article featured on the edition issued in Genova on 28 August reads as follows: An officer was carrying along some books, which encompassed literature, economics and philosophy. For the mere fact they included some Marxist texts, he was asked to leave his baggage behind and to proceed on his journey without them. When he refused, he was accompanied to Udine under an agent’s guard and here he was detained for inexplicable reasons by the military authorities while all others were allowed to keep going. However, while other officers did not have to submit to any particular formalities, those who declared themselves antifascist or communist (and lists of these men, by a strange coincidence, were already in the military authorities’ possession) were subjected to a fire of questions and inquiries, and it almost seemed as if they might be charged with treason against the “fascist faith.” Facts of this kind are occurring with a frequency that gives pause: on 8 July, too, when another group of men arrived from Russia, the antifascist officers fell victim to mistreatments, and the Marxist texts they had were even burned. What are the military authorities in Tarvisio and Udine thinking? Would they rather welcome returnees bearing booklets of fascist mysticism in their luggage?118

The accusations leveled by L’Unità were firmly rejected by the officer in charge of the Territorial Military Command of Udine, General Armellini. In a note dated 9 September, he answered that “each and every returning serviceman is closely interrogated on the circumstances of his capture, on his conduct in those circumstances as well as in captivity, and on specific disciplinary or criminal facts he might be aware of so as to determine liability, whether his own or someone else’s.”119 As for the reported baggage inspections, the military authorities professed they had nothing to do with them, for such actions fell within “the competence of Customs and Public Security authorities. As most officers returned with nothing but the rags on their backs, the sight of others bearing luggage must have seemed odd to the Customs and Public Security functionaries, and it only makes sense that the latter should want to inspect them.”120 Armellini conceded that, “following a tip by certain fellow returnees,” for unknown reasons,

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“two books containing Soviet propaganda (one of them written in Russian, the other in Romanian) were seized from an officer.” However, “after the commander of the lodging center of Udine personally intervened, the two volumes were given back to the officer, who was allowed to proceed on his journey undisturbed.”121 A report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms that some returnees had baggage, and that this exposed them as collaborators with the USSR. Among other things, the report states as follows: Collaborators were easy to spot among the Italian prisoners returning from Russia; early on they even had red trimmings on their caps, but it was mainly their health and gear (they had baggage) that set them apart from the others, who were hungry, dirty, and dressed in tattered clothes and wooden shoes when they arrived in Italy. Some of these collaborators were denounced by their comrades as camp tormentors. Yet, unlike what happened to those who arrived from the German camps, who were seized by the police shortly after, the ones mentioned above were not subjected to this at all.122

6. Contemporary press on the matter of repatriation Italian papers covered the issue of prisoners in Russia extensively and at length. The tone and slant of the pieces varied based not only on political perspective, but also on the specific moment in time. The matter proved a  formidable topic of political controversy anytime campaigns were in progress, particularly the one leading to the elections on 18 April 1948. In the months following the first repatriations, L’Unità featured several articles by communist émigrés, many of whom contributed to L’Alba as well. These articles relayed accounts by officers who were still being detained in the Soviet Union, and emphasized the fascist regime’s responsibility in the ARMIR’s defeat. The issue published on 2 October 1945 introduced the column Survivors Say, dedicated to the campaign on the Eastern front, with an article titled “The terrible winter of 1943.” The opening paragraph cited pieces featured on other Italian newspapers expressing wonder “at the fact that only 20,600 Italian prisoners of war were present in the Soviet Union.” According to the author, such pieces aimed to exploit the issue so as to “mount the usual anti-Soviet speculations.” Conversely, the column featured on L’Unità would “reestablish the truth simply by giving voice to […] the soldiers and officers who [had] sur-

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vived the ARMIR’s terrible defeat.”123 On 4 October, the author published some interviews with the veterans. On the matter of how the military campaign against the USSR had been conducted, the returnees called attention to the “crisis ensuing from the rotation of units during operations.” This had compromised the mission’s outcome, further complicated by the “irrational setup of the logistics services.”124 On 6 October, the article titled “The end of the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment” was based on accounts by several soldiers and officers the Soviet Union took prisoner.125 Signed by Fidia Gambetti and published in the column History of the ARMIR and Its Men, the article titled “Who led our soldiers to death in the USSR?” featured the account given by “one man who [had] made it back from the terrible trial”—that is, from the campaign on the Eastern front—and denounced the “tragedy of a generation betrayed and lost by fascism.”126 In the spring of 1946, the weekly Oggi covered the campaign on the Eastern front at length over the course of nine issues. Among the causes of the disaster, the periodical pointed to the difficult climate and the Italian army’s poor organization. The Soviets were depicted merely as fighters called upon to defend their country under attack.127 Prior to the 1946 administrative and constituent elections (held in March and in June respectively), Il Popolo and other Catholic-leaning newspapers such as Il Quotidiano, the official organ of the Italian Catholic Action organization, poured a lot of ink on the vicissitudes of Italian soldiers in Russia as well. L’Avvenire d’Italia vividly described the pitiful state of the men returning from the USSR, albeit without assigning the blame for it to the Soviets.128 Once the repatriations were completed, however, the dispute quickly became very heated. On 18 March 1947, General F.I. Golikov released a bitter statement against Italian Minister of Defense Luigi Gasparotto to the Russian news agency TASS, later published by Izvestia on 25 March. In a  letter published in Risorgimento liberale on 27 February, Gasparotto had spoken of 12,513 repatriates. This figure, Golikov said, misled the Italian public opinion and caused pieces hostile to the Soviet Union to surface in the Italian press. Between November 1945 and June 1946, the competent Soviet authorities had repatriated 21,065 men seized by Red Army units. The Italian embassy in Moscow had been informed of this. Later, in December 1946, thirty-two more Italian prisoners—previously admitted to military hospitals—were sent home. Further—Golikov continued—I think it necessary to point out that the Soviet authorities have carried out the repatriation of 145,756 Italians, freed by the Red Army troops and previously the prisoners of the

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Germans in Poland, Germany and Austria. Among the liberated Italians were 146 generals.

Attached to the article was a chart detailing the number of prisoners placed in the custody of the Soviet organs responsible for their repatriation, the dates on which this happened, and the locations where it happened. “It’s worth noting,” Golikov went on to say, “that the Italian government has lodged no complaints or objections concerning the Soviet government’s statements” on the number of repatriates. Gasparotto’s words could only be viewed as “an unfriendly act on his part toward the USSR.”129 It was a fair observation. Yet that behavior derived from Italy’s weak standing as one of the attacking states that had lost the war, and from its need not to lose the Soviet Union’s support on the peace treaty as a result of exceedingly pressing demands. As documents from American sources show, the Italian government had actually not been idle on this issue, and had in fact availed itself of the Americans, as representatives of a winning power on an equal footing with the USSR, to obtain information on its missing military men from Moscow.130 On 26 March, Il Messaggero passed on, without further comment, the information published by Izvestija.131 The next day, the newspaper reported that—in light of the information published by the TASS—the member of parliament Cortese had officially submitted a question to the Ministry of Defense. He wished to know whether the ministry confirmed what the Soviet agency had said “about the fate of the Italian prisoners in Russia,” as well as what steps the Italian government had taken “to determine, at the very least, why there exist[ed] so big a discrepancy between the number of Italian prisoners reported by the Soviet government and the number of prisoners actually repatriated.”132 On 28 March, Il Messaggero published Minister Gasparotto’s answer to the questions raised by the member of parliament Cortese (National Democratic Union, UDN), Gortani (Christian Democracy, DC), Covelli (Monarchist Party) and Riccio (DC) on the real situation of prisoners in Russia. In his answer, the minister reiterated the information he had already laid out before the National Council on 5 March 1946—when he served as minister of Post-War Assistance in De Gasperi’s first cabinet—namely, that 12,312 men had been repatriated from Russia, “455 officers and 11,857 noncommissioned officers and troop soldiers.” The minister explained the discrepancy between this number and the one reported by the Soviets (21,065) by suggesting the latter must have included “a certain percentage of Italian prisoners seized by the Germans and later fallen under the control of the Soviet troops.”133

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The increasing controversy over the number of repatriates forced the PCI to take action. In a letter dated 1 April to Shchevliagin regarding his party’s progress in Southern Italy, Robotti touched on the “many means” in the hands of “reaction.” Among the arguments used by the latter was the matter of returnees from Russia. Through a series of scandals, they’ve attempted to attack the party and partisan movement, but this has amounted to nothing. Now they are back at it with the matter of prisoners in the USSR, which they’re trying to exploit to the fullest. But in this case as well they will not gain any significant benefit. To this end, it would be desirable for one of your papers to counter with a few thrusts of its own. Avail yourselves of the papers I’m sending you to see how the matter is being presented.134

In 1948, the debate on returnees became increasingly bitter. On the same day a series of questions raised by Gasparotto, Braschi and Bubbio on the fate of ARMIR prisoners was addressed in the senate (8 June), a  piece by General Messe appeared on Il Tempo. In this article, General Messe reflected on the terrible phases of the campaign on the Eastern front and joined the others in calling for clarifications, particularly on the number of Italians still detained in the Soviet Union.135 The next day, the paper chronicled the parliamentary session. The answers given by Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Brusasca apparently had not appeased the assembly, and accusations—as well as punches—had been hurled from the right and the left.136 More than just a  colorful story in the papers, the incident was emblematic of the extent to which the problem continued to be heartfelt and of how readily it lent itself to being an instrument of political conflict. In the jumble of controversies, inaccurate and contradictory news, and figures given and then retracted that characterized the matter of returnees from Russia and missing servicemen, an aspect worth considering is the so-called myth of Italians held back in Russia—a myth nourished by many families’ hope that their loved ones might still be alive. Quaroni had made comments strengthening this hypothesis as early as May 1945: All the indirect news I’ve been able to acquire confirms that for the most part our prisoners are treated as well as the circumstances allow. By chance, I’ve had news, reliable news, that some of them are married and have children.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR On this point too I had no doubt: most of our prisoners are busy at work, and the average Russian is incapable of not being hospitable toward foreigners. And after all, considering the prisoners will one day have to return home, it is only logical that people here would try to send them back with the best possible impression of the USSR.137

Once the repatriations were over, the rumor gained traction. Even the report the Returnees’ Office gave the Civil Affairs Section of the Italian Prisoners of War Division was consistent with the idea: Based on the information we have gathered, while it seems highly unlikely that substantial groups of ARMIR prisoners are still present in Russia, it cannot be ruled out entirely that servicemen taken prisoner by the Germans and then transferred east by the Russians, or seized in Yugoslavia, have in fact remained in Russia.138

On 28 April 1947, Il Messaggero published the following statement made by Minister of Defense Gasparotto: News from various sources seems to attest that a few thousand prisoners are still present in the country, but, as much as the government has looked for it, tranquilizing confirmation of this has never been found.139

On 25 May, the same newspaper published an account by soldier Mario Guidi, a twenty-sever year old from Pescara, who claimed he had escaped from a  prison camp in Odessa. Up until the time of his escape, about 2,500 Italian prisoners had reportedly been detained there, performing hard labor for ten hours a day. A few days later, however, a retraction article revealed that the self-professed veteran—actually a native of Volterra— had never experienced captivity in Russia. Instead, he had been tried for desertion.140 The PCI had been denying these rumors since 1946. In particular, in an interview on Radio Moscow broadcast on 2 July, Paolo Robotti had said: Too many families are harboring illusions about their relations who haven’t returned. This must be said, also because certain men—who are accountable for the ARMIR’s defeat, and share responsibility for fascism’s and the monarchy’s war policy—are hiding behind these rumors.141

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On 8 July, Radio Moscow reiterated that all assumptions that missing servicemen might be present on Soviet soil are baseless. Radio Moscow has stopped broadcasting information and messages, after doing so for three years, because Italian prisoners’ stay here has ended.142

The communist leadership was not entirely at ease on this issue, though. The persistence of these assumptions had the potential to affect the party’s credibility very negatively. Writing to Shchevliagin on 7 May 1947 on the “thorny matter,” Robotti asked the Soviet authorities to intervene somehow. It needs to […] be said that none of the Italians who have gone missing are living in peasant houses in the Ukraine or elsewhere. In any case, the female delegation will fill you in on the questions that the men’s mothers and widows have been raising on this issue.143

In addition to the myth whereby Italians were being held in the USSR against their will, other rumors had thus spread to the effect that some men had chosen of their own accord to settle down and even establish new families for themselves in the peasant villages of that land. These rumors were reiterated more than once in those years, in the press and in parliamentary debates. The testimony of a  Voronezh citizen, who in 1992 wrote to the UNIRR through the intermediation of the Italian embassy, shows how implausible such events were. In his letter, this witness recounted the story of an Italian man who, after falling behind one of the many prisoner columns, had managed to survive with help from peasants. He had remained in a  village for two years carrying out disparate tasks, for which his services had often been required and much appreciated. Once the war had been over, the local authorities had told the police about his presence, and the NKVD had immediately asked for explanations. The head of the rural soviet and the head of kolkhoz had each answered trying to lay the blame on the other, until finally, to avoid retaliations on the part of the NKVD, they had decided to get rid of the prisoner by shooting him.144 It was objectively difficult for a  foreigner—particularly a  serviceman—to remain in the USSR without the feared and omnipresent police system finding out. Still, some cases did prove that the opposite could also happen. To deal with the matter once and for all, come up with a shared

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method with which to find missing Italian servicemen on Soviet soil and solve the many cases of Italian men married with Soviet women who wished to return to Italy, two delegations of the Italian and Soviet Red Cross met in Moscow between 27 and 30 April 1960.145 Soviet authorities supplied a  list of ten Italians and their families— thirty people in all—who were asking to return to Italy. Among them were two servicemen, Enrico Ponti and Pietro Canesi, residents of Kharkiv, in the Ukraine. One of them had been in the ARMIR, whereas the other was a former internee of the Germans. Both had lived in the Soviet Union with their respective families for fifteen years. The news was reported, in different ways, by L’Unità and Il Paese. The latter of the two newspapers in particular magnified the data, and claimed that according to the calculations made by Italian authorities the number of missing Italians was about 60,000. In reporting on the joint statement by the delegations, L’Unità underscored the “spirit of close and sincere collaboration” between the two sides in their meetings, and made no reference to specific numbers.146 Indeed, as even Il Paese was willing to concede, the meetings had been different compared to past efforts, in that for the first time they had set aside the clash between the two countries’ governments.147 In point of fact, as we now know, the Soviet Union was not actually harboring all of these missing men: over 60,000 of them, as was discovered only in the 1990s, had died in the camps. As mentioned before, the matter of Italian prisoners in Russia became one of the main points of contention in the 1948 election campaign carried out by the Christian Democracy. One of the party’s campaign signs bore the image of a  prison camp, eloquently surrounded by red barbed wire, beyond which were visible the gaunt silhouettes of the prisoners, donning their iconic caps. The sign read: “Sent to Russia by the fascists, held there by the communists.” Another sign drew attention to the fact that the Italian prisoners of war seized by the United States, Great Britain and France had all been repatriated, and added this piece of information: “80,000 [the number of missing men] in Russia. Only 12,540 return. Why don’t the others come back?” Finally, a third sign said: “What is communism? Have the veterans from Russia explain it to you.” As late as the 1950s and beyond, accounts of Italians who had stayed in Russia—generally unfounded and soon debunked—continued circulating broadly in the press. In October 1957, for example, Il Tempo reported extensively on a hunter who had allegedly downed a migratory bird bearing a message in which it was stated that 300 Italians were still being held captive in the “wastelands of Siberia,” where they toiled “like slaves in the

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mines.” The message further said it could not make names and urged whoever found it to tell “the whole world about the barbarities committed by the Reds.”148 Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made several attempts to obtain lists of prisoners who had died in the USSR from the Soviet government, as well as indications of where the Italians were buried.149 These requests fell on deaf ears. The Soviets claimed there were no cemeteries, and that in any case entire neighborhoods had been built on the site of possible common graves. Films were made about the matter of Italian prisoners in Russia as well. Steno’s Letto a tre piazze (1960), starring Totò and Peppino De Filippo, follows a  repatriate who, upon returning from Russia ten years after the war’s end, finds that his wife has remarried. Vittorio De Sica’s I girasoli (1969), starring Marcello Mastroianni and Sophia Loren, focuses on an ARMIR soldier who loses his memory during retreat, becomes involved with a Russian woman and even has a child with her.

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The Final Negotiations

[…] in Udine, the mothers, sisters, wives, fathers and brothers of the soldiers gone missing in Russia—concern visible on their faces— besiege us. Trembling lips whisper a  name: “Did you meet him? Did you see him? Where did he die? How did he die?” Amid irrepressible bursts of weeping, I  see hands flailing before me—hands holding faded photographs of thriving, vigorous young men who never returned home (E. Reginato, 12 anni di prigionia nell’Urss [Twelve years of captivity in the USSR], Treviso: Canova, n.d.).

1. Pleas to the PCI and the Holy See After the war’s end, the PCI leadership received many letters from the relatives of the missing servicemen, pleading for news of their loved ones with whom they trusted PCI representatives in exile in the Soviet Union had come in contact. These requests were forwarded to the PCI office for Northern Italy or to provincial delegations. As well as to Togliatti, letters were most frequently addressed to Longo and D’Onofrio. These intended recipients, Togliatti in particular, often forwarded the requests to Robotti, who had spent the most time in Russia and had worked in the camps alongside the prisoners. The correspondence from 1945 stored in the PCI Archive is made up of fulfilled requests, and attests to the communist leadership’s attentiveness in answering. For example, on 17 June, the father of one prisoner wrote the following from Bassano del Grappa:

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Dear Mr. Longo, I have received your kind letter dated the 28th of last month, and I thank you wholeheartedly for providing me with the news I  so longed for regarding my son […] who is captive in Russia. Please extend my thanks, and my family’s, to your friend Edoardo D’Onofrio for his kind interest in the matter. Reading about the good treatment enjoyed by prisoners in Russia, and about the life they live there, has brought great peace to my family.1

On 7 June, a woman from San Benedetto Po spoke of her “immense joy” on receiving Longo’s “kind” letter concerning her husband.2 On 2 June, a socialist from Pavia thanked Longo for giving him news of his son, who had gone missing in Russia. To this he added: “I am proud my son is antifascist: may he forever harbor these noble feelings, shared by my whole family.”3 Indeed, the prisoner’s name was featured in the list of officers who had signed the message saluting the Soviet government before leaving Suzdal. In subsequent years, the tone of the letters changed drastically. As the repatriation process unfolded, the Italian population must have realized how tragically small the number of survivors was. After the first repatriations, calls for news of the prisoners increased, and were often tinged with accusations of complicity against the PCI: Italian communists had done nothing to help their fellow nationals or to prevent the disaster, and had in fact promoted a system that had let prisoners die of hunger and cold. In May 1947, the PCI’s Committee for the Assistance of Returnees and Invalids (CARS) redirected one of the many letters it had received to the party’s national secretariat, suggesting the text be read by Togliatti himself. It was a  letter by a  doctor from Naples, Corrado P., who claimed to have asked for news of his father, an ARMIR major. Five months later, he had received a typewritten template text wherein the party declined to take an interest in the issue, and provided generic suggestions on the routes to follow to further his inquiry (with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), “knowing full well those official routes would lead nowhere.” While professing to be a  PCI sympathizer, he was forced to admit the following: The ill-treatment of Italian ARMIR prisoners has been, on top of everything else, a  serious political mistake on the part of the Soviets. I  have spoken to hundreds of returnees, officers and soldiers, and I  have witnessed their meetings with family members and the popula-

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tion at large—I can assure you no amount of opposing propaganda has damaged the politics of communists more than this fact, which is now common knowledge.4

Robotti replied to the letter on 16 May. The doctor’s claims, he wrote, proved just how influential certain segments of the press were when they speculated about the ARMIR. Too many people set off with dreams of glory and easy victory. Back in their country after being defeated and imprisoned, these same people naturally exaggerated the accounts of their “hardships,” even making up stories of tortures that never happened. This replaced the imagined glory of victory with the… made-up glory of martyrdom.5

Regarding the argument that the matter of the returnees could be detrimental to the PCI, Robotti wrote: “people know very well it was not the PCI that sent the ARMIR off to sacrifice itself uselessly on Soviet soil, and it also knows the Soviet Union had to think, first of all, about defending itself by every means, and thus could not foresee that large masses of enemy troops would surrender” (1743). As for the request that the matter be taken up with the Soviet government directly, Robotti answered: It is true there are communists in the USSR, and perhaps we could have advanced our cause through them, but this proved impossible because of the shady campaign continuously made against us, based on allegations regarding our “dependance” on “a foreign government.” Can you imagine the commotion that would ensue if we did take steps in their direction, as you suggest? Unfortunately the situation is still thus in our country (1743).

On 14 November 1947, having “heard on the radio” that Togliatti would be going to Russia “on an important mission,” the deputy president of the National League of MIA Families reached out to him asking that he try to seek out information on the prisoners still detained in the USSR. Togliatti’s answer disregarded the question altogether: Dear Madam, The news that I have plans to go to Moscow is false. It is one of the usual lies used to deceive good people. The news that there are still missing Italian servicemen in Russia waiting to come home is likewise false. This is all part of the campaigns conducted to disorient the population and

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR once again lead it to a catastrophe like the one in which our poor brothers were sent to die in Russia. If your organization wants to do something good, it ought to help us expose the people behind these campaigns. It is the only way to spare other mothers the pain you have suffered. Kind regards (1137).

Professor Lucio Casati wrote a  letter on 19 November to champion the cause of the National League of MIA Families: Dear comrade, I would like to hear word from you to be certain you are planning on going to Russia soon, as I’ve been told. I don’t know whether you would be going in a private or official capacity. Either way, the deputy president of the league of mothers of servicemen gone missing in Russia, comrade Calcaterra, entreats you, through me, to do everything you can if you do go—first as an Italian citizen, second as a  communist—to see whether former Italian prisoners of war are still present in Russia. Those poor devils were dragged there by those who wanted the war but didn’t fight it, those who returned from Russia and tried to discredit it for covert reasons (all too clear to me) saying they’d suffered terribly there, and so forth and so on, even though their mere presence in Italy and good physical shape disproved their lies and the hardship and ill-treatment they claimed to have experienced. Therefore, please do me the kindness of answering promptly, if you can, and of letting me know whether you are going to Russia and can address the matter I’ve just laid out. In the event that you are not going to Russia, please get in touch with the competent authorities there. As well as my thanks, please accept my fraternal greetings, Prof. Lucio Casati (1213)

Togliatti replied much in the same terms he had used before, denying his upcoming trip to Moscow and insisting that trust not be placed “in such petty news,” and that every effort be made “to expose the people behind these campaigns” (28 November, 1214). Thus, doubtless also on account of the harsh political climate of the time, the PCI aimed to detach itself from the matter of the prisoners. It pinned the blame not only for the accusations of involvement leveled against the party, but also for the dragging out the controversy, on “campaigns conducted to disorient the population.” What is more, starting in June 1947 the PCI was no longer in government—yet another reason

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the party might want to distance itself from the matter. On 22 November, replying to a letter that inquired about a missing serviceman (1395), Togliatti’s private secretary Massimo Caprara wrote that “competence on the question of prisoners’ return is strictly the government’s, and today there exists in Moscow an ambassador of the Italian Republic. If the minister of Foreign Affairs does not instruct him on how to solve the issue, it is either out of negligence or, worse, to stoke a perennial campaign of anticommunist speculation.” The PCI, Caprara continued, would have been happy to help, but it held no sway: “of course, [its] relationship with Soviet representatives in Italy [was] no different from the one routinely established with the representatives of any foreign country” (1399). It is true PCI leaders could do very little about the matter, as may be inferred from the fact that Togliatti had not been forewarned of the critical decision to repatriate Italian prisoners, and that the announcement of this on 25 August 1945 had caught everyone in the party by surprise. As briefly mentioned elsewhere, Togliatti was worried about the effect the returnees’ stories might have. Their accounts of the hunger experienced in Russia, local peasants’ living conditions and the poverty they had witnessed there were at odds with the propaganda being spread on the country. On the very day the repatriation was announced, during a  discussion with Ambassador Kostylev, Togliatti urged the latter to brace himself for “the anti-Soviet campaign [that would be waged] from the right and from pro-fascist elements.”6 Indeed, the first groups of repatriates—their tales amplified by the press—caused the negative effect Togliatti had feared. Their ragged appearance in itself caused an uproar, and was the subject of heated political debate. In an interview aired on Radio Moscow on 2 July 1946, Robotti said some Italian newspapers had given in to “dishonest speculation by claiming former Italian prisoners back from the Soviet Union [were] dressed in rags and barefoot.”7 In fact, Robotti said, the officers’ break in Sighet depended precisely on the need “to sort out their clothing”: the “750 men, counting officers and soldiers, had each received two new shirts; 93 percent of them had been given a coat, new Italian-style caps and military trousers, which the Soviet Union had had to supply as the prisoners lacked them.”8 In truth, some prisoners did receive a change of clothes before they left the USSR, as recalled by one veteran: In addition to the mail given to us, what made us hold fast to hope was the fact that some of our clothes were replaced. The items we had were disgracefully tattered.9

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In general, clothing was taken care of. Other prisoners, in the course of their return journey, were assisted by Catholic organizations. Beraudi, repatriated in the fall of 1945, provided the following account: We’re in Tyrol. We get off in Mittenwald. We reach some barracks. They disinfect us. A pontifical commission is in service here. My shoes—soles now gone—are replaced with a pair of white canvas ones three sizes too big. Still, I am given chocolate and some bread.10

For a change of clothes, he would have to wait until he arrived in Italy. In Bologna, Beraudi found himself in a barracks: I refuse to stand in line for hours for new clothes. I  leave with my rags on. One of my comrades offers me a loan. I accept 200 lire. […] I realize there are still stars on my collar, which I’ve held on to for years. I step into a doorway and—with difficulty, that’s how rusty they are—remove them. Indeed, I should blush to be seen with those on, dressed as I am in a Finnish infantry coat and Russian padded trousers, wide white canvas shoes on my feet. The only Italian military clothes I am wearing are my gray-green socks, which are riddled with holes.11

Togliatti, on the other hand, claimed many returnees sold Soviet-supplied uniforms in order to show up in Italy dressed in rags. This presumably occurred as a result of the influence exerted by “reactionary Catholic circles,” at work among the prisoners to discredit the communist party.12 A note by the command of the military district of Bolzano reported: On the 13th [of November 1945], at 1:10 p.m., Milan’s radio broadcast news—announced by Oreste Foresti, a propagandist—that returnees from Russia, prior to arriving in Italy, sell their clothes in order to appear to be in a  pitiful state, whereby indirectly carrying out anticommunist propaganda.13

“I can assure everyone,” General Giacomo Negroni commented, “that returnees have nothing to sell, as what they are wearing is usually foul to see and touch.”14 Adding to the confusion and controversy was the fact that destitute men often showed up at military districts claiming to be veterans from Russia as a ploy to get help.15 The question of the veterans’ clothing involved Allied authorities as well. On 30 November 1945, the Civil Affairs Section of the Italian Pris-

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oners of War Division informed the Returnees’ Office that about 3,000 servicemen back from Russia were on German soil, and had been for days, for American authorities denied them access to territories under their own jurisdiction for lack of clothes. The Americans had previously sent sufficient clothing supplies, which apparently had never made it to their destination. The note concluded that, until light was shed on the fate of this apparel, American authorities would not allow the Italian veterans’ transit.16 The Returnees’ Office replied on 4 December, offering reassurance that the men would all be adequately dressed when they arrived in Italy.17 Similar requests were addressed to the Vatican. As had been the case between 1943 and 1944, when desperate wives and mothers had turned to the pope for information on their loved ones, even after the repatriation of ARMIR returnees, the Vatican Information Office received many pleas and letters written by the relatives of missing servicemen, discouraged and downhearted for their relations’ failure to return. These believers trusted that the Holy See would take an interest, and placed their last hopes in the pope. Thus, in 1947, Mrs. Rosetta Fabio, disappointed by the actions taken by the government, which had ripped her only brother Paolo “from the affection of his loved ones,” entreated the pope to intervene, and asked for his help and comfort. Even though the Peace Treaty had been signed, Rome could obtain neither that all Italians be repatriated from the USSR, nor that information be given on the servicemen gone missing. Believing the pope might hold sway over De Gasperi, she pleaded with him to press the government at least to acquire some news.18 On 3 October 1947, it was the wife of Major Zigiotti—one of the prisoners held back in the Soviet Union on criminal charges—who wrote the pope. The woman turned to Pius XII begging him to do everything in his power to hasten the repatriation “of the group still detained in Russia on false charges.” She further lamented the exasperating wait resulting from the “silence of the Soviet authorities,” and the “moral and material conditions” the poor wretches must be in “after five years of captivity.”19 The letter written in November 1948 by Mrs. Ernestina Nardi was similar in tone. On behalf of the mothers of servicemen gone missing in Russia, she implored Pius XII to call the government to order. She complained that neither De Gasperi nor other politicians had answered their inquiries about their sons in Russia. “If the Italians of yesterday made mistakes” and caused much pain, the Italians of today should make every effort to right those wrongs. “Why is there no end to this war for us? … Is there not a way, and a duty, to release our sons from the evil claws of that wretched, inhuman and uncivilized people?”20

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Other letters too showcased many people’s deep distrust of the Italian government—viewed as weak, indifferent and incapable of action—as well as their complete misunderstanding of the tragedy that had befallen the ARMIR. The actual scope of the military disaster and its fallout was altered also by the propagandist speculations ensuing from the beginning of the Cold War, and from the campaign for the April 1948 elections. The matter of prisoners was thus propelled to the forefront of Italian domestic politics. Even Father Giovanni Brevi, one of the prisoners still detained in the Soviet Union, addressed Pius XII from Kiev camp No. 7062/4. His letter, unlike Father Franzoni’s, made it to its intended recipient.21 As it was now known in Italy that certain prisoners had been held on criminal charges, Brevi turned to the pope “from the bottom of the grave” he was in, to make it known that any charge, any written document or spoken account, that might be produced against them, even if it was signed by one or more of the prisoners, was to be “rejected as fake,” and as having been “extorted by illegal means and methods.” In his letter, Brevi listed the servicemen detained with him. He further assured the pope that no serious accusation could be made against them—nothing genuine, anyway—for they were “honorable soldiers,” “Christians enlightened by their strong faith,” and supremely devoted “to their homeland and families.”22 Father Brevi could not be certain the letter would reach its destination (“If this letter of mine overcomes all the obstacles placed on its path and reaches you, accept it as you would a miracle performed by the Holy Virgin”). If it did, though, he would have managed to convey the list of the prisoners still detained with him in the Kiev camp and to urge the pope to champion their cause. As we will see, the diplomatic authorities and public opinion rallied to solve the question of the Italian servicemen held in the USSR.

2. The matter of war crimes Ever since the signing of the armistice, the Allies had raised the issue of war crimes perpetrated by Italians, much as it had for those carried out by the nationals of other Axis countries. Art. 29 of the Long Armistice established that Italy would hand over to the Allied powers all persons accused of crimes. In the final years of the conflict and immediately after that time, the handing over and punishing of war criminals were hot topics that kept the diplomats of interested countries busy. According to international agreements, warring armies had to comply with the 1899 Hague Convention, which, among other things,

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called for the protection of civilians in war, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which, as well as reiterating some of the convention’s principles, prohibited the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons.23 The 1899 Hague Convention defined occupied territories as those effectively under the authority of a  hostile army (Art. 42). The latter was nonetheless bound to respect “family honors and rights, the individual lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty” (Art. 46). In this territory, the occupant was to take every possible measure to “reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country” (Art. 43). Requisitions in kind or services could be demanded, on the authority of the commander in the occupied territory, only for the needs of the occupying army; they were to be “in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their country” (Art. 52).24 The Italian army, much like the other armies involved in the Second World War, did not always abide by these principles. In a climate of general barbarization and regression of humankind, the treatment of subjects the conventions termed illegitimate fighters, a category that included partisans, was particularly off the mark. In the specific case of the Soviet Union, some prisoners, alleged war criminals, were detained to be tried before local courts. With the aim to identify and punish criminals of the invading armies, the Soviet government set up special commissions, whose job it was to gather material and witness statements that could be used in court. As early as November 1942, the Extraordinary State Commission was set up to investigate crimes committed by the occupants and assess the damages inflicted on local communities, the kolkhoz, state organizations and Soviet firms.25 In March 1943, similar commissions—nineteen of them in total—were established at the regional, territorial and republic levels, which operated under the direction of the state commission. Declassified in the 1990s, the material put together by these commissions paints a bleak and tragic picture of the occupation regime imposed by Germany and its allies. The misdeeds committed by Italian occupants, though less frequent than those attributed to other Axis armies, are to be viewed within this context. The small number of Italians charged with war crimes perpetrated in Russia should not be seen as exceptional, as has been claimed.26 The number of Italian servicemen active on the Eastern front was considerably lower than that of other Axis armies. Additionally, Italian troops’ behavior was generally better and more humane. Indeed, in the assessment of

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the crimes committed, based on the witnesses’ accounts and investigators’ reports, there emerges a hierarchy of evils. The worst were attributed to White Russians, who were followed, in this order, by Germans, Romanians, Finns, Hungarians and, finally, Italians. It would be inaccurate to say no Italian officers in the Second World War were tried.27 Greece, for example, presented the Allied Commission with a list of 111 Italians charged with crimes, and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with seventy-four additional names. In 1945, trials were started in Athens, some of which resulted in convictions in absentia. Yugoslavia asked for the extradition of 750 alleged Italian war criminals so they could be tried, but not all of them were in fact brought to trial, and even those who were condemned did not serve their sentence.

3. The USSR’s requests Between 1943, when the war was still in progress, and 1952, the USSR started legal proceedings against alleged war criminals. During that span of time, 81,780 people were tried for war crimes, including 25,209 foreign servicemen charged with crimes against prisoners. Overall, about 40,000 foreign servicemen—mostly German and Austrian nationals—were tried for crimes committed against either members of the military or civilians. Collaborationists, Soviet servicemen and civilians who had given their support to the Axis troops, made up the greater part of convicts.28 As for Italy, the USSR’s requests were limited. On the grounds of the reports produced by state and local commissions, in 1944 the Soviet Union—like Yugoslavia—started asking the Italian government for the extradition of ten alleged criminals, who had been repatriated after the defeat in the winter of 1942–43. The list Mikhail Kostylev supplied the high commissar for sanctions against fascism, Count Carlo Sforza, included twelve men. One of them, however, was the lieutenant of the Carabinieri Dante Iovino, a Soviet prisoner, and another was Major Romolo Romagnoli, who had died on the battlefield in Russia.29 The defendants for whom Soviet military authorities sought extradition were the following officers: General Roberto Lerici, commander of the Turin Division; Brigadier General Paolo Tarnassi; Lieutenant Colonel Raffaele Marconi; one Piliz Franzi, possibly Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Pinzi; Major Luigi Giovanni Biasotti; Captain of Engineers Luigi Grappelli; Captain of the Carabinieri Mariano Piazza; Medical Lieutenant Bernardo Giannetti; and Lieutenant Renato Basile.30 According to the “Report by

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the Extraordinary State Commission on the atrocities committed by fascist troops in the territory of the Soviet Union,” and to the accusations by the local commission in Yenakiieve (Rykovo), General Lerici, in his capacity as commander of the Turin Division, had been responsible for the destruction of industrial plants in the area under his jurisdiction. In Yenakiieve, Capitain Grappelli—head of the Civil Affairs Office of the Turin Division command—had also perpetrated several crimes: he had had 615 locals shot, and deported into slavery 2,683 people. Under his command, industrial plants, factories, hospitals, treatment centers, dispensaries and schools had been destroyed.31 Together with the commander of the Carabinieri of the Cosseria Division, Captain Mariano Piazza, Grappelli had distinguished himself for cruelty “in the extermination of the Soviet population.” Indeed, “following their orders, Italian soldiers [had] committed horrifying atrocities.”32 Medical Lieutenant Bernardo Giannetti was likewise accused of having collaborated in the destruction of civil and industrial facilities in Yenakiieve.33 An Italian inquiry committee—set up by De Gasperi, and of which more will be said later—responded to these accusations and came to the officers’ defense. The committee pointed out that not all the plants mentioned in the charges had been found in Yenakiieve. What’s more, the units that had first entered the city, and supposedly committed the crimes, had not been the ones the defendants belonged to. Rather, according to the committee, the plants had been “destroyed by the Russians, with scientific meticulousness, during their retreat.”34 Finally, the committee emphasized that Commander Lerici, far from destroying “what was already there,” had made every effort to fix “what was damaged.” Not only had the incriminated officers not committed the crimes they were charged with, they had actively strived to meet the locals’ needs, “particularly as regarded their health and welfare.”35 In challenging the Soviets’ accusations, the Italian inquiry committee deliberately failed to consider that while some of the charges were summary, others were circumstantiated, even detailing the names of the victims and eyewitnesses to the crimes. For example, it was reported that Brigadier General Paolo Tarnassi36 and Colonel Piliz (Pinzi) were being charged with the shooting of many innocent civilians in the Kantemirovka area.37 Following orders by Colonel Pinzi, hundreds of people had been deported to Germany.38 The Italian committee could not rule out that Tarnassi, “in his capacity as general in charge of overseeing security and the [local] police” might have ordered the shooting of an undefined number of citizens, but the indictments against the victims also needed to be assessed.39

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According to the Boguchar commission, in December 1942, Captain Piazza shot twenty-three Soviet citizens, whereas Romagnoli ordered the search of civilian E.S. Bekhalova’s house. On 13 December, the latter was arrested along with her fifteen year old daughter. Both were tortured, and their house was set on fire.40 In August 1942, the local commander in Boguchar, Major Luigi G. Biasotti of the 38th Infantry Regiment of the Ravenna Division, reportedly arrested and tortured one citizen, and sent others off to the concentration camps.41 Heavy charges were leveled against Colonel Marconi, who served under Colonel Attilio Binda. Marconi was the chief of the area of Italian command in Rossosh and, on 15 January, allegedly had thirty-one Soviet citizens shot in the prison yard.42 The Italian inquiry committee responded to these charges claiming that on that day twenty or so Russian tanks had attacked the city, leading to a terrible battle between the Italian-Germans and the Russians. Many civilians had perished as a result as well. The Italian forces had retreated, leaving Colonel Binda’s troops on the ground. Two days later, these troops had also retreated, whereas the colonel himself had fallen on the battlefield. According to the committee, the civilians found dead in the prison yard had likely been killed by the Ukrainian guards who watched over them. Further to the officer’s defense, the committee claimed no news of so violent a  crime had been reported to the corps command. Also, it called attention to the fact that some Soviet prisoners, temporarily under Italian custody, had been sent away from Rossosh. Thus, it could not see why the men detained in the prison would have been shot by the Italians. The committee concluded that the men found dead had either been killed on site by their Ukrainian guards, or had been dragged there at a later time, and were actually Russian civilians killed in the military operations. The arguments used in Colonel Marconi’s defense seem a bit weak. Regardless of whether responsibility fell to one officer or the other, Soviet authorities had raised cases of suspected war crimes, which the Italians played down. Colonel Binda, the local commander in Rossosh, while absent from the list of criminals whose extradition was sought by the USSR (on account of his being dead by then), was identified as one of the toughest commanders in the Bogoyavlensky Report. Probably to combat partisan actions, Binda had issued an order limiting residents’ right to move and punishing with death anyone harboring unauthorized strangers or nonresident relatives.43

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4. The Italian government’s reaction The government in power at that time, led by De Gasperi, made every attempt to spare the Italians charged with war crimes from being tried in the countries in which they had supposedly committed those crimes. To this end, a twofold defensive strategy was prepared, aimed at eluding requests from the formerly occupied countries. First, it was decided to prepare counter-documentation with evidence of the Italian officers’ innocence and elements turning the accusations against the local resistance. Second, the government claimed the right to judge the supposed crimes in Italy. As a result of the pressing requests made by the interested countries and the United Nations, in February 1946, Manlio Brosio, then at the helm of the Ministry of War, advised De Gasperi—who in addition to being the head of the government also served as interim minister of Foreign Affairs—to institute a committee of inquiry, comprising a “certain number of high generals and former ministers of War.” The latter would have the aim of “carrying out every possible examination” in order to establish “whether the events took place; whether they were legitimate or in violation of criminal laws; the circumstances in which they occurred; and their relation to the conduct of war.”44 If this was too difficult, another solution, Brosio believed, would be to call for “mixed courts, which would have to include among their judges a representative of the defendant’s nation, to the exclusion of the offended party’s representative.”45 The trial would have to take place in Italy and be open to the public and the press. If this proved impossible as well, then every effort should be made at least to “obtain that the court include no representatives of the opposing nations,” and that the hearing “not take place in the country of the allegedly wronged party.”46 Clearly, Brosio wished to institute proceedings in such a way as to afford the defendants the greatest degree of protection. De Gasperi approved the suggestion, and took the necessary steps to set up the committee. On 9 April, he wrote Admiral Ellery W. Stone, chief of the Allied Commission, and justified Italy’s will to judge the alleged crimes independently with “arguments of a legal nature.” These originated from the Moscow Declarations, and the different treatment accorded to Italy as opposed to Germany. De Gasperi informed Stone that the minister of War was eager to establish the responsibilities possibly falling on “the Italian commanders or privates for their conduct in foreign territories occupied by the Italian armed forces,” and to “punish anyone

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guilty of so-called war crimes.” To this end, he was “carrying out a strict investigation,” on the outcome of which the Allied Commission would be informed.47 The inquiry committee, led first by Alessandro Casati and then by Luigi Gasparotto, was established in May 1946 with the stated purpose of proving Italy’s will to carry out the necessary investigations on the men guilty of crimes, but also with an eye to avoiding the defendants’ extradition.48 The handing over of alleged Italian war criminals to the USSR depended, among other things, on the requests that the Italian public, in its turn, was making to be handed over alleged German war criminals. On this point, in January 1946, Ambassador Quaroni had written De Gasperi from Moscow voicing his concerns about the appropriateness of Italy’s taking active part in the punishment of German war criminals: I understand very well the Italian public’s desire to see those Germans most responsible for war crimes committed in Italy brought to justice: I also understand that, for obvious reasons of prestige and for the sake of our legal and moral standing generally, the Italian government wishes to be granted the right to take active part in the punishment of German criminals. Unfortunately, though, we are in a position where other countries are asking us—or might ask us—to hand over [our own] men guilty of real or alleged atrocities. Indeed, the terms of our armistice could not be any clearer on this.49

Based on what he read on the Italian press, the ambassador inferred that the Anglo-Americans did not take an exceedingly broad view of what constituted a war crime, when it came to Italy. Yet the same could not be said of other injured parties, including the Soviets. The USSR, on the other hand, has presented us with a  list of war criminals, which we haven’t followed up in any way so far. Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Ethiopia are moving heaven and earth against our atrocities, and calling for us to hand over our criminals: all four display an undeniable tendency to give a rather extensive interpretation of the concept of war criminal. […] Even presuming they could do without, on the day a German criminal is first handed over to us, a chorus of complaints will arise from all those countries that lay claim to the extradition of Italian criminals.50

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After initially being intransigent with regard to the small number of alleged Italian criminals it demanded be brought to justice, the USSR started changing its tune in 1945. Finally, as we will see, Moscow proved more conciliatory in its accusations in a letter Kruglov sent Molotov in 1949. Indeed, it was primarily the Soviet Union’s changed attitude that thwarted Yugoslavia’s own attempts to obtain the extradition of defendants from Italy. Negotiations on the handing over of Soviet citizens who had stayed in Italy after the end of the war—whose immediate repatriation the USSR had requested—had been successful. This was most likely a contributing factor in persuading the Soviets to ease up their demands on the matter of alleged Italian war criminals. As an additional result, however, Yugoslavia lost the support of an important ally.51

5. War crime charges against prisoners held in the USSR In addition to the ten alleged criminals whose extradition was sought, between 1948 and 1950 the USSR tried twenty-three Italian prisoners held in the country on war crime charges. As indicated in the documents exchanged between Soviet and Italian diplomats, most prisoners held in the USSR were claimed to have committed violent acts against the civilian population and prisoners of war, as well as abuse of power and theft, espionage and anti-Soviet activities. The trials hinged exclusively on Russian witnesses, lacked the procedural protections to which the defendants were entitled, and took place in the military tribunal of Kiev. Sentences ranged between ten and twenty-five years of forced labor for “anti-Soviet activity.” On these events, the news and information that reached the public at large and the defendants’ families were confused and not always reliable. Even before the repatriations started, in May 1945, according to a note Kruglov sent Molotov, “among the Italian prisoners of war cited for atrocities committed against peaceful civilians there were seventeen men: a general, four officers, twelve noncommissioned officers and soldiers.”52 On 24 July 1946, the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list comprising twentynine Italians who had been dispatched in groups from camp No. 160 to other unknown camps. A note from the Italian embassy in Moscow dated 4 December reads: “a group of war criminals has been held in the USSR. The Soviet authorities will provide us with a  list at the end of the legal

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proceedings against them. The group is presumably made up of thirty or so people.”53 On 30 December, the minister of War sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note with a “List of servicemen apparently held in the USSR”: The information provided by most repatriates confirms what was published in the papers. Indeed, returnees agree that—excepting the thirtyfour servicemen listed in the attached document—there are no other prisoners in Russia. While we have again asked that the Allied Sub-Commission be involved in any action the Allied authorities may be able to take to acquire knowledge of the missing servicemen’s fate, we appeal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take every possible step to obtain, at least, accurate information on the thirty-four servicemen mentioned above, who are surely still in Soviet hands.54

The same number comes up in Colonel Ettore Musco’s communication dated 2 May 1947. As a  result of their own comrades’ tip-offs, Musco wrote, “very many are reported to have suffered persecutions and about a hundred men appear to have stayed in the concentration camps (following some repatriations, the number has gone down to the known thirtyfour). Some, including the centurion Dell’Aglio Giovanni, were held precisely in Odessa.”55 Several articles appeared on the issue that year. For example, on 1 January 1947, a piece in L’Avvenire d’Italia titled “I prigionieri rimasti in Russia” [The prisoners still in Russia] addressed the minister for PostWar Assistance, the communist Emilio Sereni, and decried that at least thirty Italians were still being detained in the Soviet Union. The day before, basing his assumptions on the communications he’d received from Moscow, Sereni had claimed that, “with the exception of a few men gone missing in some of the camps, there [were] presumably no more Italian prisoners of war in Russia.” In its turn, L’Avvenire claimed the number of Italians still in Russia was perfectly known to the Soviets, who had held them there for political reasons. Italians had the right to know as well, and it was imperative that the families of the missing servicemen—informed that their loved ones were still alive by some repatriated veterans—be put at ease. On 13 January, even the Gazzetta Veneta published two articles on the issue, in which Sereni was urged to ask his “comrades” Paolo Robotti, Dino Gottardi and Giuseppe Ossola—all of them émigrés, though the

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latter two had repatriated from the USSR—for news on those who had stayed behind in the Soviet Union.56 The following was the list provided by the Ministry of War. We have added, when it is known, each prisoner’s repatriation date: Divisional General Emilio Battisti, former commander of the Cuneense Division, repatriated on 6 May 1950; Brigadier General Etvoldo Pascolini, former commander of the Vicenza Division, repatriated on 6 May 1950; Brigadier General Umberto Ricagno, former commander of the Julia Division, repatriated on 6 May 1950; Lieutenant Colonel Nicola Russo, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Major Alberto Massa, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Major Giuseppe Zigiotti, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Captain Giovanni Dell’Aglio, Odessa camp No. 36/15; repatriated in 1947; Captain Giuseppe Fasano; Captain Franco Magnani, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Captain Guido Musitelli, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Lieutenant Ivo Emett, repatriated in May 1947; Lieutenant Gotto Raffaele; Lieutenant Giuseppe Ivo Joli, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Lieutenant Dante Iovino, carabiniere, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Lieutenant Salvatore Pennisi, carabiniere, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Medical Lieutenant Enrico Reginato, repatriated on 12 February 1954; Lieutenant Italo Stagno, died in the camp hospital of Kiev in September 1947 (following a hunger strike); Lieutenant Domenico Suppa, Blackshirt, Tagliamento Division, repatriated on 11 July 1950; Lieutenant Chaplain Pietro Alagiani, repatriated on 14 January 1954; Lieutenant Chaplain Giovanni Brevi, repatriated on 14 January 1954; Second Lieutenant Leo Barbettani, 81st Infantry, Turin Division, repatriated on 10 April 1947; Second Lieutenant Giuseppe Cangiano, camp No. 36/15; Second Lieutenant Giulio Leone, Julia Division, admitted into the Suzdal camp hospital, unfit to be moved; Sergeant Major Spartaco Spolveroni, repatriated on 11 July 1950; Sergeant Antonio Mottola, repatriated on 11 July 1950; Corporal Major Felice Bolella [Boello], repatriated on 11 July 1950;

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Corporal Gino Canevari, repatriated on 11 July 1950; Soldier Mario [Edoardo] Della Rocca [Bosca], repatriated on 6 June 1950; Soldier Giovanni Osella, camp No. 36/15, repatriated on 11 July 1950; Soldier Giacomo [Giovanni] Passafianco [Passafiume], repatriated on 11 July 1950; Soldier Antonio Santaniello, repatriated on 6 June 1950; Soldier Giuseppe [Giacomo] Sardisco, repatriated on 11 July 1950; Soldier Ludovico Scagliotti, repatriated on 14 January 1954; Soldier Lelio Zoccai, repatriated on 11 July 1950.

Missing from this list are Sergeant Guerrino Bacchi, repatriated on 11 July 1950, Sergeant Cesare Schellenbrind, from South Tyrol, enlisted with the Germans, who asked to be repatriated with the Italians on 11 July 1950, and Lieutenant Enzo Boletti, formerly interned by the Germans. While there were no charges agains Boletti, Schellenbrind’s case was different. In his report to Molotov dated 5 January 1949, Kruglov provided the list of the Italian prisoners that were still being held in the USSR at the time. Regarding Schellenbrind, the report said he had enrolled in the fascist party and Blackshirts, and was suspected of having committed crimes. As in other cases, however, no evidence or testimonies had been found corroborating the allegations against him. The only actual charge that could be leveled against him was that he had “participated in the sabotage of production and in the Italian prisoners’ provocative hunger strike.” Further, the report called attention to his reticence during questioning.57 After the last repatriations of 1946, thirty-seven prisoners of war were still known to be present in the USSR. One of them died in 1947. Sixteen were repatriated in 1950, and twelve more (thirteen with Boletti) were repatriated in 1954. Information is missing on seven prisoners. Two Russian documents presently provide different data. These notes signed by General Petrov, dated 6 and 8 March 1947 respectively, offer updated information on the number of Italians present in Soviet prison camps. According to the first note, as of 1 March forty-seven Italian nationals—prisoners of war and internees—were detained in Soviet camps. Writing to Molotov on 8 March about the number of German army prisoners, Kruglov attached a note summarizing the situation as of 1 February 1947, which he’d received from Petrov. The latter confirmed the previous information: Italian prisoners in Soviet camps were forty-seven.58 As I have said, one of them died in September that year, and sixteen were repatriated in 1950. Thus, thirty Italian prisoners still had to be pres-

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ent in the Soviet Union at that time. Yet, according to two documents of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior, only twenty-five Italian prisoners—ten officers and fifteen between soldiers and noncommissioned officers—plus one internee, probably Enzo Boletti, were recorded as being present as of 1 March 1952. All twenty-six of these men were referred to as “convicts.”59 Hence, it must be assumed that four Italian prisoners had died between 1950 and 1952. If twenty-six Italians were detained in Soviet camps in 1952, and thirteen were repatriated in 1954, we know nothing of the remaining thirteen men’s identities and fates. The reasons these prisoners were held in the USSR constitute a whole other matter. We know some men, including Medical Lieutenant Reginato, had been transferred in 1945 to Suslonger punishment camp No. 171, in the Mari ASSR, on charges of being “reactionaries” and of having carried out “anti-Soviet activities.”60 Father Bertoldi recounts one such instance of anti-Soviet activity in the Suzdal camp. The main figures of this “appalling fact” were Father Brevi, Captain Franco Magnani and Doctor Quarti. [The three] along with some other prisoners, found a  full-page photograph of Mussolini in one of the books in the library. Magnani had great sway over a significant number of officers; they held him in high esteem because of the conduct he’d displayed on the front line in Kalitva. […] Having torn the photo from the book, he and his following were struck by the strange idea of parading it through the camp like a religious icon, after they’d gathered other sympathizers. As if in procession, they even chanted the fascist hymn as they marched. A casus belli was made of this. The Russian command immediately took drastic measures against the ringleaders, who were sent to a camp in central Asia, where they remained until their repatriation took place seven years after our own.61

According to the Russian documents, prisoners like Father Brevi, Medical Lieutenant Reginato and Major Russo were primarily guilty of participating in the hunger strike organized in Suzdal, hindering work activities in the camp through a strike, and inciting other officers to get involved in the protest. One of the Soviet prosecution’s strongest arguments was the men’s membership in the fascist party and the oath of loyalty to Mussolini taken during imprisonment. Also, on that occasion, the prisoners had stated that, once they were repatriated, they would carry out “terrorist acts against the communist party leadership.”62

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Indeed, the 20 June 1946 directive by the Soviet Ministry of the Interior —on intelligence work aimed at exposing and disbanding secret fascist organizations set up among prisoners and internees—confirms that, when the Italian Communist Party took part in the Badoglio government, camp No. 171 officers Joli, Reginato, Russo and Zigiotti, along with ten others, signed a sworn declaration of loyalty to fascism, even promising to retaliate with terrorist acts against exponents of the PCI.63 On 28 April 1948, one of the defendants, Lieutenant Colonel Russo, sent the Italian government a letter to report on the fate of the men held in the USSR. The alleged Italian criminals had first been split up among several concentration camps in Kiev, and then, in December 1947, gathered in Darnitsa camp No. 7062/13, on the outskirts of Kiev. The group was made up of ten officers and eighteen soldiers, including five men from South Tyrol, previously incorporated in the German army; Lieutenant Dante Iovino had been held back in camp No. 7062/4, in a  special isolation unit. These prisoners found it difficult to write to Italy directly, nor did they manage to get news from their families.64 In the month of April, when the trials started, interrogations were resumed as well and the charges against the men became clear: the killing of and violence against Soviet civilians and partisans; looting of towns during the war; fascist propaganda in captivity, instigation of hunger and work strikes. Russo wrote that the accusations were based on documents that were never shown to them, some of which consisted of statements given by Italian prisoners. All the charges had been squarely rejected by the defendants.65 Russo was referring to Sergeant Antonio Mottola who, as we will see further on, once in Italy, was accused of betrayal by his comrades in arms and tried. In a  letter to the Italian government, Lieutenant Domenico Suppa decried not being able to write his family at home and that prisoners were subjected to surveillance, questioning and inquiries without being made aware of the charges against them. Suppa asked for measures to be taken to improve their circumstances, and attached a list detailing his fellow prisoners.66 It is worth noting that—in addition to the names of the men held in the USSR encountered thus far—the list included names not present in other official documents. These were Francesco Rainer, Rodolfo De Franceschi, Giacomo De Cassian, Paolo Croati, Enrico Robacer: possibly some of the prisoners missing from our previous calculations whose traces we had lost. Investigations on fifteen criminals, whose guilt had “been proven by the victims’ accounts and through the proceedings of the Extraordinary

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State Commission,” were brought to an end on 15 January 1948. The defendants were taken back to the places where, according to the Soviet military authorities, they had perpetrated their crimes and abuses. Judicial documents, mainly depositions taken in the occupation areas, corroborated the charges. Even presuming the statements given by the witnesses magnified the events, they still warrant consideration. The following are a few examples of what came up during the trials. Salvatore Pennisi, lieutenant of the Carabinieri, was subjected to legal proceedings on 27 July 1948, on charges of having carried out mass arrests of Soviet civilians in the occupied areas. According to the prosecution, Lieutenant Pennisi and his subordinates had set up “a harsh, fascist regime of repression against the Soviet prisoners of war” seized by the Italian army. He was sentenced to twenty-five years of forced labor in the country’s corrective camps.67 Lieutenant Giuseppe Joli was charged with having shot, in July 1942, Soviet civilians who had resisted the appropriation of their belongings, which, according to what was stated in the verdict, Lieutenant Joli and his soldiers had subsequently sent back to Italy. On the grounds of the Russian civilians’ accounts, the prosecution claimed the defendant’s guilt and the court sentenced him to death, a punishment later commuted to twenty-five years of forced labor.68 According to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in Kiev, Medical Lieutenant Enrico Reginato had assaulted a  Soviet woman, ordered children’s evacuation from the Yenakiieve preschool, accompanied Russian civilians sentenced to death to their execution, seized surgical tools and equipment from the Yenakiieve hospital, and defamed some Soviet women. He was sentenced to twenty years “of forced labor,” in the country’s “corrective camps.” Lieutenant Reginato prepared an appeal, but was ultimately unable to present it, as it was taken from him before the new trial and used by his own attorney to perfect and make more plausible the depositions of the prosecution’s witnesses.69 Indeed, as attested by other trials (Lieutenant Colonel Russo’s and Father Brevi’s, for example), appeal trials always resulted in sentences being upheld.70 Accused of violence against civilians in the occupied areas, Captain Franco Magnani was sentenced to fifteen years of forced labor in the country’s “corrective camps,” on 28 February 1950.71 Major Massa Gallucci had been charged with espionage; on 19 March 1950, proceedings against him and other Italian prisoners were reopened: There were charges against me that were not strictly personal. They summarized the report drafted by the commission investigating the

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR damages and violence inflicted on the population of the Don during the war. The report spoke of instances of arson and destruction amounting to billions of rubles, and of children and women massacred by the thousands—a frightful list. The judge was kind enough to say he did not hold me alone to be responsible for all those crimes, but said running through the list was necessary for the court to form an idea of all the offenses. After this, the proceedings were deemed closed.72

Like the others had done as well, Massa Gallucci asked for permission to choose a defense lawyer of his liking and to warn the Italian embassy in Moscow, so that Italian officers able to testify in his favor might be summoned. When the proceedings were sent to the military prosecutor for further examination, Massa Gallucci wrote to him saying that, through 1949, no charges had been pressed against him, and that the records of the proceedings misrepresented the facts.73 I was informed, finally, that my trial would take place on 14 February. The documents pertaining to the case were given to me so I could read them, and I saw that, as expected, all the interrogations had been distorted against me. The night before the trial I could not sleep and in the morning, on waking up, I even turned down food.74

Massa Gallucci was sentenced to the death penalty, a  punishment later commuted to twenty years of forced labor. In light of the examined documents, it may be claimed that some prisoners were indicted because they really had committed atrocities and abuses of power during the occupation. Others, however, were tried and sentenced not for having committed war crimes, but rather for their passive resistance to propaganda and for having been “fascist provocateurs.” For the apparatus in charge of political work, these prisoners, with their declarations in favor of fascism and Mussolini, were living proof that anti-fascist propaganda had failed. Kruglov’s report to Molotov dated 5 January 1949 is telling. The deputy minister stated: Documents are being put together on the criminal activities of six Italian prisoners, concerning their involvement in atrocities. If investigations should fail to produce sufficient material on the crimes committed in temporarily occupied USSR territories, the defendants will stand trial for violating camp regulations.75

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In essence, the prisoners were going to be charged with anti-Soviet activities, sabotage (for having organized strikes) and terrorism (for their claimed intention to retaliate against communist exponents in Italy).

6. The diplomatic case of Salò In addition to ARMIR prisoners and former IMIs, there was another category of men held in the USSR—the one comprising diplomats and staff members from the embassies of some of the countries freed by the Red Army. In 1944, as the Red Army advanced westward, state functionaries were arrested in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Finland, including officials who had remained loyal to Mussolini and joined the Italian Social Republic. The Soviets arrested and transferred to the USSR all personnel from the legation in Bucharest, including the consul of the Republic of Salò Armando Odenigo and his wife, accused of hostile acts against the Soviet armed forces. These people and their families had arrived in Zhmerynka using regular passenger trains, paying their own fare, on the promise that they would be transferred to Odessa for repatriation. Instead, they were forced to board cargo trains headed for northern Russia with former IMIs.76 On 28 April 1944, the Italian legation in Sofia provided the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a name list of employees who, following the Red Army’s advance into Bulgaria, had been captured and interned in the Soviet Union. After joining the members of the German legation in an attempt to flee to Turkey, Ronchi—the officer in charge of the Italian consulate in Bulgaria—had been arrested together with his collaborators in September 1944 and later interned in the USSR.77 Dealing with the matter on 8 March 1947, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the Italian embassy in Moscow to find a way to repatriate the staff of the fascist republican legations in Bucharest and Sofia deported by the Soviet troops. These people—with the exception of Moschetti, who had served in the general consulate in Odessa—had never set foot on Soviet soil, nor had they ever committed any war crimes against the USSR. On 26 August, in a telegram to the Main Administration for Political Affairs, Brosio—who had taken Quaroni’s place in Moscow— offered assurances that the Italian embassy was following the fate of the members of the republican legations of Bucharest and Sofia. To this end, it had sent several verbal notes and queries to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to obtain information on those Italians, but to no avail.78 On Brosio’s advice, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sforza sent Kostylev

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a letter on 12 September, encouraging him to take an interest in the fate of the republican diplomats and consulate staff members detained in the USSR. They were not criminals, but merely “people who, for lack of discernment, failed to understand their duties as men and as citizens.”79 The liberation of the diplomats of Salò and of prisoners sentenced for crimes would lie at the heart of negotiations between the Soviet and Italian diplomacies into the 1950s.

7. The exchange: Soviet refugees for Italian detainees The matter of the men held in the USSR was strictly connected with the Peace Treaty. In 1946, during consultations, in partial compensation for war damages suffered, the Soviets requested that Italy hand over its fleet.80 Yielding to this very harsh demand, and in light of the pressure of public opinion, in 1947, the De Gasperi government requested that the men still held in the USSR be repatriated. Indeed, even though many years had passed since Italy’s retreat and since its co-belligerency with the Allies had been declared, its prisoners had not been tried yet. In fact, an important game was being played revolving around prisoners and the diplomats of Salò still in the USSR. Moscow wanted to draw the greatest possible advantage from the situation, also in consideration of the fact that the April 1948 elections in Italy had sanctioned the latter’s placement in the American bloc. On one side of the scale were the Italian prisoners charged with crimes, and the diplomats of Salò; on the other were all the Soviet citizens who were residing in Italy, including a certain number of alleged criminals, and the USSR’s demand that they be all turned over.81 In essence, Moscow continued to exploit the Italian nationals who had moved to the USSR arbitrarily, as well as the men it had detained in the country, as a bargaining chip to reclaim its citizens, some of whom were refugees, enforced by both the Yalta Agreements and Article 45 of the Peace Treaty. With the Yalta Agreements signed in February 1945, the British and US delegations committed to handing over to Soviet authorities only people who wished to be. Additionally, forced repatriation applied to those who, on capture, had been found in German uniform, had been at the service of the Red Army as of 22 June 1941, or had collaborated with the enemy according to reliable sources. Between May and June 1945, the agreement was followed by Operation Keelhaul, whereby the Allies were

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to hand over to the USSR and Yugoslavia thousands of refugees in flight from Eastern Europe. In July 1945, the Allies concentrated 750 Soviet citizens in Forlì, later transferring them to Austria and then into the Soviet Union. For the most part they were prisoners of war and Ostarbeiter, citizens deported by the Germans into the Reich to carry out forced labor, but also collaborationists, stragglers and drifters.82 By virtue of Operation Keelhaul, between 1943 and the beginning of 1947, Western countries handed over about two and a half million prisoners of war and refugees to the Soviet Union, regardless of their individual preferences. Thousands of old émigrés (people who had left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution and the civil war) were also forced to return to the USSR, along with people of Russian descent who had never actually lived within Russian borders. By 1 March 1946, 53,240 Soviet citizens were made to leave Italy for the USSR, including 44,205 prisoners of war and 9,035 civilians (483 women and 80 children).83 It is unknown how many of these truly wished to return to the Soviet Union. The Italian government engaged in difficult negotiations only with regard to the alleged criminals demanded by Moscow. Otherwise, it agreed to let Soviet delegates visit its refugee camps and take back their occupants. It should be noted that the Soviet mission was most interested in the refugees who did not wish to return to the Soviet Union. While it had acted in compliance with international agreements in place on the matter, which safeguarded Moscow’s requests that Soviet citizens be handed over, the Italian government nevertheless shared the responsibility for the tragedy that ensued. Most refugees were considered traitors and ended up in control camps and sorting camps with the repatriated Soviet prisoners of war, or were killed soon after being brought back into the USSR.84 Conversely, as late as 1948 and 1949, Minister Sforza lamented with the Soviet embassy that several Italian citizens were still present in the USSR. These were neither prisoners nor diplomats having to do with Salò, and yet they were unable to get an exit visa, in spite of the fact that Italian authorities had “always taken every interest in repatriating Soviet citizens residing in Italy.”85 On 22 May 1948, during a meeting with Vyshinsky, Brosio invoked Article 71 of the Peace Treaty and pressed for information on the prisoners who had not been handed over.86 Vyshinsky observed that the loss of men was a foreseeable “risk” when invading a country and professed to consider the matter closed. Still, he referenced “the group of war criminals gathered in Kiev,” prompting Brosio to remind him of the diplomats of Salò as well. At this point, by Brosio’s account, Vyshinsky felt compelled to launch

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a tirade against Italy’s “gross violation” of the Peace Treaty, “for having adopted rules to assess the war crimes not provided for by the treaty.”87 In other words, the Italian government was being lambasted for using its own criteria to judge alleged criminals and for applying an extradition process in contravention of the Peace Treaty. At the end of May, the Soviet government made a  proposition: Moscow would send the diplomats of Salò back home in exchange for thirty Soviet war criminals present in Italy. On this point, Brosio jotted down the following in his diary: Yesterday I  was received by Kosyrev, the head of the first European office. […] He gave a  partial answer to our note on the prisoners. Fundamentally, the Soviets are asking for thirty of their war criminals, and will turn our former diplomats over to us [in exchange]. As for us, we have issued […] a  decree that would subject this handing over to [our] extradition procedure. Thus, the Soviets, who do not recognize this procedure, will refuse to repatriate our diplomats until we give them their traitors.88

As pointed out by Brosio, the exchange was morally very lopsided. On the one hand were diplomats who wanted to return to Italy; on the other Soviet citizens who did not want to return to Russia. He concluded: The Soviets are negotiating a  liberation in exchange for a  persecution. From a moral point of view it is unacceptable; from a political point of view, what interest and what right have we to sacrifice our fellow citizens in order to protect the Soviets from the laws of their country, when we are legally bound, according to the peace treaty, not to protect them, but rather to hand them over?89

The ambassador justified the exchange with the need to comply with the Peace Treaty, all the while knowing that once repatriated the Soviet citizens would be doomed. Brosio confirmed this news on 27 May 1948 with a telegram to the Main Administration for Political Affairs, to which he attached a  list of alleged Soviet war criminals containing the specific indictments against them. As for the circumstances of the former diplomats of Salò, the Soviets claimed they were still alive and counted on being repatriated.90 On the matter, Minister Sforza pointed out that the proposed exchange of these prisoners for Soviet citizens, supposed war criminals,

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was illegitimate, for the former diplomats of the Italian Social Republic were “neither war criminals nor prisoners, but simply Italian citizens eager to repatriate.” Objecting that no evidence had been produced against them, he decried that the Italian embassy had not been allowed to meet with them.91 Italy had already paid the price for their restitution, he claimed, with the high number of Soviets already present in the country’s gathering camps, whom the Soviet embassy had been allowed to visit, catechize and even take back to Russia, so long as they agreed.92 Rather, the restitution of alleged Soviet criminals could rightly be linked with the handing over of the Italian servicemen still detained in the USSR and awaiting trial. Sforza assured the the Soviet government that they had started examining the lists of the thirty Soviets requested, and had verified that none of them was in police custody. The police could only account for twenty-five alleged war criminals, already put at the disposal of the Soviet embassy in Italy.93 Moscow was actually prepared to drop all charges against the men still detained in the USSR so long as Italy returned the twenty-five Soviet citizens in the hands of the Italian police or, at least, handed over some of the thirty men it sought.94 A procedure was therefore set up in Italy to verify the indictments against the alleged Soviet criminals. Despite difficulties resulting from the lack of evidence on the part of the Russians, the Italian ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice would come up with strategies for the latter’s extradition, in exchange for the restitution of Italian nationals.95 Meanwhile, pressed by questions raised in parliament, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs never stopped concerning itself with the fate of the diplomats of Salò. On 23 September, the members of parliament Guido Russo Perez, Giorgio Almirante and Roberto Mieville, during the session of the Chamber of Deputies, inquired as to what steps the Italian government had taken or intended to take with the competent Soviet authorities in order to obtain the repatriation of the former Italian legation in Bucharest.96 The Italian government replied that its Soviet counterpart had never detailed the location of the men’s internment; only at a  later time had the Soviet government made known that the men were being held for (unspecified) hostile acts against the Soviet armed forces.97 On 4 October 1948, Brosio spoke his mind about the fate of the Kiev prisoners and diplomats of Salò. In his opinion, the Italian government’s reference to the Soviet citizens it had already handed over to the USSR carried little weight in Moscow. Conversely, the attempt to strike a quid pro quo deal by releasing other Soviet citizens who wished to return to their country, but were presently being held in Italy, might produce some

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positive effects. It was worth bearing in mind, however, that Italy’s new stance would most likely lead to a dead end. The USSR was interested in war criminals, rather than willing citizens. It could not be ruled out that, in the face of Italy’s stiff resistance, the Soviets would respond by carrying out even more summary trials of the Kiev prisoners, which would result in some or all of them being condemned. Among other things, Brosio recalled that the request to visit the Italians still in the USSR had been turned down with the explanation that Rome had impeded contacts between the Soviet Repatriation Commission and Russian citizens.98 Indeed, the Italian government had cut the number of authorizations issued to Soviet embassy delegates to visit refugee camps and make contact with their citizens in need of repatriation.99 Starting in October, the repatriations of Soviets from Italy were halted, in a form of retaliation, so as to press Moscow to release the prisoners and diplomats of Salò.100 On 20 December, Brosio commented on Sforza’s request that the diplomats of Salò and the Kiev prisoners be handed over at once: Sforza telegraphs as if this were possible as a  matter of goodwill or some kind of sentimentality deriving from our good conduct in the economic negotiations. These are illusions: I  sent Zamboni to sound out Sergeev101; after speaking with him for an hour and forty-five minutes, he came back to me none the wiser. I will now call for a meeting with Kosyrev […] and reserve the right to speak with Zorin or Vyshinsky after that. But the Soviets proceed unhurried, and all the more so to the extent that they realize we are in a rush. Anyway, I do not intend to give up on the matter now, and I will insist, but I fear that if I am too tough there will be reprisals against the Kiev prisoners.102

The Italians’ hurry was determined by the pressure exerted by the press and the public. On 24 December, Brosio had a long conversation with Kosyrev, who once again proposed the exchange of the diplomats of Salò for the Soviet war criminals, rejecting the idea of handing over the other prisoners in Soviet custody. Regarding the latter, the ambassador invoked “the moral and political necessity not to insist on a trial, whose significance, all this time later, would be merely political,” a line of reasoning completely lost on Kosyrev. After all, while the Kremlin had given up on seeing ten alleged Italian criminals—already repatriated—turned over, it had no intention of holding back from trying the prisoners it still had in its custody. The situation had come to a grinding halt as a result of intransigence on both sides. On 30 April 1949, Brosio met with Valerian A. Zorin, the

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Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, on the matter of the Kiev prisoners and the diplomats of Salò. In the course of the meeting, he declared that Italy would not let any more Russian citizens leave until the diplomats of Salò were back in Italy. Zorin insisted on the Soviet war criminals, implying that the Italian ones would be tried, and leading Brosio to conclude that “no political or human consideration [would] change their minds.”103 In fact, many prisoners accused of crimes had already been tried and sentenced, without the defense they were entitled to, of which Vyshinsky had presumably informed Brosio in a meeting held on 1 August.104 A turning point was reached in September. On the 13th, Brosio told Vinogradov, head of the European Department, the Kiev prisoners and diplomats of Salò could perhaps be repatriated with the crew operating the last ship delivered to the USSR in compensation for war damages, the Fuciliere. According to Brosio, Vinogradov pretended not to understand and stalled for time. The proposition was reiterated on 25 October. This time Vinogradov answered that the Soviet government had taken up the matter.105 An agreement was finally reached on 30 December. The Soviets offered to hand over 135 men from South Tyrol, ten diplomats of Salò and the sixteen Kiev prisoners, including the three generals, keeping the other men charged with “serious crimes” in detention.106 The offer rested on two conditions, namely, the repatriation of Soviet citizens who wanted to return, and free access to the Italian concentration camps by the Soviet delegates. Starting in the early months of 1950, the two governments tried to settle how the repatriations were to be carried out. Zamboni proposed that the Italian prisoners and Soviet citizens be exchanged simultaneously, but Vinogradov objected to this forcefully. The agreement with Brosio was that the Italians would hand over the people in their custody first, and then the Soviets would follow suit.107 In the wake of the agreement, the Soviet Repatriation Mission visited the camps housing Soviet citizens in order to identify and repatriate the greatest possible number of refugees, regardless of their will.108 Between January and February 1950, the population in Rome feverishly anticipated the imminent return of the prisoners whose fate had caused such a stir in the Italian public. On 7 February, Zorin let Brosio know that the first prisoners from South Tyrol were going to be sent to Vienna and that he would supply a list with their names shortly.109 The inspections by the Soviet Repatriation Mission must have hit a rough patch, though, judging from the note the Soviet embassy sent the

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Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former protested, rather vigorously, that the Italian authorities in charge of the Fraschette refugee camp—contrary to their commitments—had prevented the delegates from entering. Meanwhile, “anti-Soviet organizations” had enjoyed the support of the camp’s administration and carried out “hostile propaganda” forcing the citizens, by way of “threats and violence,” to refuse repatriation.110 A note by Brosio clarified, among other things, that the anti-Soviet elements in question had been identified as being thirty-one citizens of the USSR. The latter had already been flagged as “elements decidedly hostile to the Soviet Union and responsible for activities in opposition to the efforts of the Soviet Repatriation Mission.”111 In one of his last meetings with Brosio, Zorin—to be replaced by Lavrentev—assured him there was “no cause for concern. The repatriates’ return [was] following its normal course and [was] being delayed exclusively for technical reasons. It [was] a  matter not only of concentrating the repatriates, but also of clothing them, getting them in shape, returning them in conditions adequate to prevent their families from protesting.”112 Lavrentyev proved intransigent from the start, backtracking on the Soviet government’s word. Indeed, in addition to willing Soviet citizens, he demanded war criminals, though these were not the pact’s terms.113 On 13 May, Brosio made the acquaintance of Aleksandr Bogomolov, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, who proposed the exchange of five Soviet citizens—held in Italy illegally, according to Moscow—for twentyfive Italian prisoners. On 17 May, a telegram arrived from Rome with news of the repatriation of three generals, one noncommissioned officer, two soldiers and twenty-nine men from South Tyrol in exchange for the five Soviet citizens requested by the USSR.114 Negotiations were becoming increasingly delicate, and on Moscow’s part continued to revolve around the matter of the alleged Soviet criminals. On 16 July, speaking with Brosio, Bogomolov announced that the USSR would repatriate eleven additional prisoners out of the remaining twentyone, and would throw in ten more if the Italian government, in a gesture of goodwill, returned the requested Soviet citizens. On 28 July 1950, the first sixteen prisoners held back in the USSR made their return, in exchange for ten Soviet citizens, but then, in order for the remaining prisoners to be repatriated, Bogomolov demanded thirteen more Soviets still in Italy.115 Early in September, international pressure was exerted on the USSR. The first secretary of the Australian legation informed the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that its government intended to offer energetic support in the matter of the Italians detained in the Soviet Union, in the UN Assembly.116

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On 13 September, Brosio once again pleaded with Bogomolov for the ten diplomats of Salò to be handed over. Much to the ambassador’s surprise, Bogomolov acquiesced, but in turn presented a list of Soviets he wished to see repatriated: sixteen adults and five children. Brosio said he needed to confer with the authorities in Rome, for many names on the list were new to him, but did not object, so long as they were citizens who would submit voluntarily.117 On 16 September, the Italian government accepted to hand over “a large group”—with the exclusion of four who were standing trial.118 After the Australian legation stepped in to help, the United States Department of State followed suit in October, offering its own support with the UN, as well as the United Kingdom’s, to see the Italians still detained in the Soviet Union back to safety. With an eye to obtaining the strongest possible backing from the world public opinion, the department asked for testimonies documenting the Soviet government’s bad faith.119 In brief, the matter of the Italian prisoners held in the USSR against their will and Moscow’s pressures to have Soviet refugees present in Italy handed over turned into a formidable tool of anti-Soviet propaganda, which the United States were quick to seize on at a very delicate juncture in the Cold War. On 19 April 1951, Brosio had a bitter meeting with Bogomolov: [He demands] thirty-three Soviet repatriates at all costs, and refuses to carry out an equal exchange with a number of prisoners from South Tyrol acceptable to us (twenty-one of ours for twenty-one of theirs). He’s never been this tough; I  stayed calm, and tried to prove to him that by accepting to take back twenty-one men from South Tyrol we are being understanding. […] Above all, he was unwilling to commit to returning war criminals, despite all my invocations of Soviet gene osity.120

Jotting down his impressions of that meeting—during which the issue of reparations was also addressed—in his diary, Brosio wrote of a “black day,” a defining moment in his relations with Soviet diplomacy, from which he had nevertheless garnered great results. Very bitterly, he acknowledged: Of course, we are in a  difficult position here—diplomats in a  world viewed as the enemy, forced to broker deals in an atmosphere of suspicion, in the face of mentalities far removed from and incompatible with our own. It is clear that the Soviets see those who do not bend [to their wishes] as hostile, I  realize this now. I  feel their trust in me is shaken,

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR increasingly so as they become aware that I have understood them, and that I am holding out using their very weapons.121

For the matter of the Kiev prisoners and the diplomats of Salò to be solved entirely, Italy would have to wait until 1954.

8. The last prisoners return home In 1950, all the so-called reactionary officers had been once again reunited in the prisons of Kiev. The three generals had arrived in camp No. 7062/11 for the purpose of repatriation as well. Many of the men continued to manifest their dissatisfaction and dissent with letters sent to the Soviet authorities. For example, Major Massa Gallucci, as the eldest of the prisoners, on 10 November 1948, addressed the USSR minister of the Interior and entreated him to solve the issue of correspondence. Fourteen prisoners had received no news from home in six to seven years. Ten had only received a few postcards.122 Although the trials had been concluded and the sentences confirmed, the detainees were still often subjected to questioning by camp authorities. In July 1950, Massa Gallucci again complained about the harshness of the interrogations, particularly of the insults hurled at the chaplain, Father Brevi, who had even been beaten. The officer reported that their “moral and material circumstances [had] radically deteriorated,” both because of the unsolved issue of correspondence and because of the prisoners’ continued uncertainty after questioning was reintroduced.123 Frequent interrogations were used not only to understand what the detainees intended to do once home, but also to single out Soviet collaborators. In November, the men sentenced to forced labor were transferred to the camp in Providanka, near Stalino. After Stalin’s death, on 5 March 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued an administrative decree authorizing the liberation of 2,219 foreign nationals, sentenced by the military tribunals of the USSR and abroad (in Germany, Austria and Hungary). The Soviet leadership “realized perfectly well that the sentences against many prisoners of war were based on insufficient reasons, on formal evidence.” This, in a nutshell, was the content of the note Beria and Molotov sent the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 14 April—a little over one month after Stalin’s death—with which a special inter-ministerial commission was set up, comprising functionaries from the Soviet ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Justice, and charged with the task of reviewing, within

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a month, the sentences of the men “for whom further detention was no longer deemed necessary.”124 The note stressed that many of the convicts had been judged in the course of the Second World War, in some cases for “minor crimes,” and that at present they no longer posed “a serious threat” to the Soviet State. The commission authorized the prompt liberation, as “a matter of urgency,” of 16,547 foreign convicts, including 6,162 prisoners of war and internees (thirteen generals, 3,037 officers, 2,673 noncommissioned officers and soldiers). In prisoner-of-war camps there remained 12,231 men. In the camps of the Ministry of the Interior there were 7,804. In detention sites in East Germany and in Austria there were 5,045. The repatriation of the freed prisoners was set in motion in October 1953. The ARMIR prisoners, convicted of war crimes under Stalin’s regime by Soviet courts, were allowed to return to Italy only in 1954, after twelve years of imprisonment.

9. Trials in Italy against former prisoners of war Following the repatriations, as a  result of the denunciations made by some of the veterans, Italian military authorities had to carry out inquiries into some of the repatriates from the USSR. On 6 September 1946, the Returnees’ Office drafted a list of seventy-seven officers and noncommissioned officers who had adhered to the anti-fascist movement and attended the Marxist-Leninist courses, based on information provided by their fellow prisoners.125 On 8 November, the office sent the Ministry of Defense records of the interrogations of four majors—one of them a reserve officer, and the remaining commissioned officers—against whom “serious charges [had been alleged] by numerous other veterans of all ranks.”126 On 6 December, the central commission set up for the interrogation of officers back from captivity in Russia, headquartered in Lecce, sent the Discipline Division of the General Administration for Officer Personnel the records of the interrogations of some veterans, along with a proposal to launch a  formal inquiry into officers who attended courses of Marxist culture and, at the time of repatriation, signed a  document expressing regard for the power that held them [captive], against whom criticisms and denunciations have been leveled by other returnees for the propaganda they carried out and the attitude they displayed toward their fellow prisoners.127

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“After looking into the matter from all angles,” the Ministry of Defense ruled that the veterans’ political behavior in captivity did not warrant disciplinary action. Rather, it called for evidence, if available, of “objective and certifiable disciplinary or criminal misconduct.”128 The issue of antifascists’ role in Soviet prison camps was taken up by Italian newspapers as well. For example, on 30 July 1946, Italia Nuova published an article titled “Prisoner in Russia,” signed by eighty-seven veteran officers, who accused a number of former fellow prisoners (mockingly referred to as “the enlightened”) of “complicity” with the Soviets and of having prompted the continued detention in the USSR of certain fellow nationals, for whom the Italian government’s intervention was presently requested. On 1 September, Il Popolo di Mantova came out with a  piece titled “The Renegade Enlightened,” in which the former prisoners who had attended the antifascist courses or taken part in propaganda activities in the camps were accused of turning their backs on their motherland. On 28 September, an appeal signed by 526 returnees, published in L’Ora, deemed “the enlightened” responsible for the continued detention in the USSR of a certain number of Italian soldiers, held them up “to the contempt of the country,” and claimed they were “unworthy of being called Italians.” Between 1947 and 1955, formal investigations in several military districts were launched into thirteen officers and one soldier accused of reporting on their comrades in arms and harassing their subordinates. Indeed, one of the officers was accused of denigrating the Italian army, while another was charged with violence against two subordinates.129 When the officers were presented with summons to appear before the military court, they could not help but involve the PCI. On 25 March 1947, Colonel M.B. addressed Togliatti and asked him to provide support in the situation. The officer had been requested to appear in the Territorial Military Command of Milan, and, “for the third time, to set forth the particulars” of his role in Suzdal as commander of the camp’s international section.130 My impression was confirmed that the anonymous slanderers who claim my conduct was antimilitary, and I made life difficult for them because their ideas were at odds with mine, are having a field day. Thus my brave antifascist conferences, held until the very end of my captivity, are being turned into a display of antimilitary sentiments, and put on trial. This takes place seven months after my repatriation, and with a communist army undersecretary.131

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As a result, Colonel M.B. called on Togliatti to “inform” Defense Undersecretary Francesco Moranino, a  communist, so that the latter might “ask to review the disciplinary files pending with the Ministry of Defense (Army) on the officers back from the Soviet Union.”132 Prompted thus, Moranino opened an inquiry to shed light on the position of the antifascist officers charged with anti-Italian activities. In his turn, Robotti wrote the secretariat of the communist parliamentary group on 27 March, urging that the group issue a public statement “calling on the member of parliament Gasparotto to put an end to the persecutions against the Italian antifascist officers back from the USSR.”133 Let me take this chance—Robotti went on to say—to mention that there exists a circular by the Ministry of War prescribing that a diploma of merit […] be bestowed on those who collaborated with the AngloAmerican authorities in the camps. At the same time, let me point out that Colonel M.B. and Major G.F. are under investigation, have not received the checks they are entitled to, and are not being called back into service for having accepted to direct camps with Italian prisoners in the USSR following the request of the Soviet military authorities. Communist greetings.134

Robotti further attached a memo for Moranino, wherein he suggested arguments in defense of the indicted officers. For example, the charge against them of having caused the transfer of their fellow prisoners to other camps had to be dismissed on the grounds that “prisoner mobility” depended solely on the camp’s administration. Accusations to the effect that the officers had imported Marxist literature were baseless, as the books seized from them upon their repatriation were readily available in Italy, and following the fall of fascism the possession of such books could not be censored.135 Robotti drew attention to the clear disparity of treatment between antifascists and fascists: Whereas payment of the checks owed to antifascist officers was withheld in the amount of 50 percent, officers who conducted themselves as fascists or as fascist sympathizers during captivity suffered no such deduction or any other inconvenience. Major W.B., though cleared to resume service,136 has yet to be called back. This has certainly to do with the fact that immediately after 25 July 1943 he proved a staunch antifascist, and kept this stance with rectitude throughout captivity.

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR Why is he not called back to serve in the army, still infested with fascists and monarchists?137

Robotti mentioned the cases of other officers who had stopped receiving their checks, and concluded: The families of some of these officers were frequently harassed by the Germans and by supporters of the Italian Social Republic following appeals the officers addressed to Italian partisans via Radio Moscow to incite them to fight. It is confounding, to say the least, that they themselves are now treated in this way by the republican authorities, which [conversely] do not bother those officers who insulted Italian partisans during captivity.138

On 18 April, once again commenting on his circumstance as the subject of an investigation, Colonel M.B. wrote to Robotti informing him of the fact that, according to D’Onofrio, Moranino would present the findings of his inquiry by mid-April. However, as may be inferred from his letter, he already felt doomed: After my questioning in Milan on 20 March, I  have doubts that can happen; or else, the resolution will be voluntarily delayed in my case only, as I am the main scapegoat in this affair. I plead with you to gain information on this and to let me know what you find, as I need to be prepared for whatever may come. I look forward to hearing from you. Please accept my fraternal regards.139

On 7 February 1948, Second Lieutenant D.M. had received a  notice from the military district of Naples informing him that a formal investigation had been initiated against him on the charge of “having acted as an informer on numerous officers,” many of whom he had allegedly “had punished,” and whose life he had “made difficult during his time as a prisoner of war.” The officer issued a report defending his behavior. He stated he had adjusted and adapted to the Italian government’s choices, and ended his letter lamenting the absurdity of the situation, in which “communists, rather than fascists, [were] put on trial.”140 However, the report did not placate the investigators, and the second lieutenant was later asked to provide further explanations, particularly with regard to the accusations

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of having acted as an informer and collaborated with the political commissar of camp No. 160.141 Three months later, on 18 May, Second Lieutenant D.M. wrote Robotti telling him about the investigation. In this letter, the officer appeared fully prepared to face whatever consequences were in store for him: If I have to spend a few years behind bars, so be it, if this is in the party’s best interest. This […] has been one of many insinuations […] by our preachers of death. In my opinion, we are better off ignoring them. Meanwhile, the struggle continues. Insinuations dissipate, but unemployment—to mention but one issue—keeps increasing. If humankind could draw nourishment from calumnies, brilliant solutions would already have been found for the problem that has been obsessing the minds of men for billions of days.142

Another officer under investigation, Major B., wrote Robotti on 19 May 1947 expressing concern that the PCI’s exit from government would have repercussions on the inquiries into the antifascists: The present crisis may lead to changes in the leadership. As a result, it may be that little can be done to ensure that the truth comes to light in the matter of our captivity, for the time being. But no matter what, we will do everything we can so it does.143

Set up to clarify the part antifascist prisoners had played in the camps, the commission presided by Moranino had made the mistake of glossing over prisoners’ most serious shortcomings, only to call undue attention on their less important ones: Two circumstances call for prosecution: failure to uphold the enlistment oath by those who, after 25 July, sided against their legal government […], and failure to take on the responsibility of commanding units made up of officer prisoners by those higher in rank. It was precisely the latter who determined the disciplinary situation in which the “illegal” command of camp No. 160 arose in May 1945.144

It was the men who, after 25 July 1943, had refused to accept the fall of fascism, and thus to comply with the reversed alliances established by the Badoglio government, that should be viewed as traitors. In this perspective,

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some higher-ranking officers’ refusal to command units of officer prisoners—a hotly debated and contested matter in Suzdal—amounted to a failure on their part to comply with the duty to cooperate. On the other hand, those who accused the antifascist officers responded that many of them had sided with the Soviets and turned to communism before 25 July or 8 September. The matter was actually very complex and multifaceted. Accusations against antifascist returnees thus dragged on until the 1950s.145 Indeed, documents attesting to the continuation of formal proceedings against the aforementioned Major B. and another prisoner, L.S., are dated 1955. In a communication from 31 March, the investigating officer informed L.S. that the Territorial Military Command of Rome had charged him with the task of further advancing the inquiry in regard to the following accusation: “As a prisoner of war in Russia, he carried out activities to the detriment of his colleagues, fifty of whom were excluded from the repatriation list. He took part in the meeting presided by a political exile in which the exclusion from repatriation of the fifty officers mentioned above was decided.”146 Participation in the meeting of Odessa, during which the fate of the fifty men ultimately held back in Sighet was decided, is one of the most frequent charges found in the inquiries initiated against the returnees; however, based on the accounts given by the prosecution’s main witnesses, it has never been clear whether the men under investigation really took part in that meeting. According to the investigation records of the military tribunal of Padua, Major B. was accused of continued insults to the Italian nation in times of war, with more than one aggravating circumstance, because, on unspecified days starting in the month of June 1944 and in the year 1945, in the Suzdal (Russia) camp he was confined in as a  prisoner of war, by means of repeated actions executing the same criminal plan, he publicly vilified the Italian nation, which he systematically disparaged—verbally and in writing through a  wall newspaper—claiming that the Italian people is made of up of thieves, marauders, and looters, and that Italy is a  backward, uncivilized, and wretched country.147

On 9 April 1947, following some returnees’ accounts, the Territorial Military Command of Udine had arranged for the repatriate to be subjected to disciplinary assessment. However, only in 1957 was Major B. committed for trial by the prosecutor of the military tribunal of Padua for “continued insults to the Italian nation in times of war, with more than one aggravat-

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ing circumstance.” The legal proceedings, during which the major was suspended from his functions, came to an end on 26 January 1959, when the military tribunal of Padua formally absolved him because his conduct did not constitute a crime.148 The other inquiries likewise came to nothing. Some of the men under investigation continued to serve in the army ranks unchanged, whereas others were demoted. In essence, though, they were viewed as having been “antifascists abroad.” There was only one case in which the indicted officer was convicted. Immediately after being repatriated in 1950, Sergeant Antonio Mottola (of the 120th Artillery Regiment) was seized and brought to trial based on the accusations set forth by his fellow returnees. Upon returning to Italy, Mottola had been “taken into custody by the railroad police in Tarvisio,” while the other returnees had been allowed to continue their journey to Udine. “This safety measure had been suggested in order to protect Mottola from the wrath of his fellow prisoners, who, when their convoy had crossed the Italian-Austrian border, had beaten him.” By the other returnees’ accounts, “Antonio Mottola had repeatedly asked for Soviet citizenship, which the authorities had denied him, even though he’d married a Soviet citizen, by whom he’d even had a child.”149 As attested by a  report Kruglov sent Molotov, Mottola had indeed informed on his fellow prisoners and collaborated with the Soviets: Based on the testimony given by the prisoner of war Mottola Antonio on 15 February 1949, Brevi and Reginato were active members of the fascist group made up of officer prisoners in camp No. 171, [all of whom had] undersigned a  sworn declaration of loyalty to Mussolini in 1945, and committed, once back in Italy, to carry out a terrorist act against the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti.150

According to Kruglov, no compromising material had been acquired that would justify Mottola’s detention. On the contrary, Mottola has actively collaborated with us to expose any war criminals present among the Italian prisoners. He has even stated he does not wish to return to Italy, and would like to gain Soviet citizenship.151

Thus, it was suggested that the prisoner should be freed and sent off to work in the Crimea, in the Massandra sovkhoz, where Spanish republicans

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had also been gathered. Mottola’s request for Soviet citizenship was never granted, though, and the prisoner was repatriated on 11 July 1950. The military tribunal of Milan accused Mottola of having provided the enemy with intelligence and betrayed his fellow countrymen, determining painful persecutions to the detriment of the latter. Indeed, harsh sentences had led to innocent victims continuing to be held in the USSR’s tough jails. Mottola had probably made his reports exposing the other prisoners in hopes of securing the Soviets’ trust and support. For example, Major Massa Gallucci recalled that in the course of the trial he had had to stand in Russia, Mottola had accused him of a  having a  suitcase with a  false bottom, containing secret documents, and thus of being a spy. They read out to me yet another one of Mottola’s usual denunciations. It concerned the whole group of prisoners, and claimed we’d taken an oath of loyalty to Mussolini in camp No. 171. Indeed, the camp had been dubbed the Dux camp. It further contained many details about a plot we’d hatched and were expected to execute once back in Italy.152

Although it was proved that Mottola—who passed himself off as an officer—enjoyed “the esteem of the Russian police, whose confidant he’d become,” the final verdict issued against him only found him guilty of “the crime of insubordination through violence, insults and threats against superiors.” For this crime he was sentenced to serve an eighteen year term, later reduced to ten, in the military prison of Gaeta. Conversely, the charges against him for his information activity were dropped on the grounds that such conduct did not constitute a crime.153

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he research conducted on Russian sources has broadened our knowledge on a wide range of issues. In particular, it has shown what the Stalinist regime’s real intentions were with regard to its prisoners of war. While seemingly characterized by an ambiguity toward prisoners and a  lack of organization in their management, the regime in fact arranged for the exploitation of their labor down to the smallest detail. Prisoners were to replace the men dispatched to the front, thus constituting an early form of compensation for war damages. I have reported on an interesting directive on this matter, signed by Stalin himself, in which rules were laid out to manage prisoner labor, increase productivity, and punish prisoners who failed to meet their requirements. Finally, the directive also included the criteria to be followed for the repatriation of men unfit for work. The directive attests to the fact that, while the Gulag was managed by the NKVD, and was therefore under Beria’s authority, it was still Stalin who determined how it should function, including in its most practical aspects. Data on mortality lay bare the tragedy of captivity in the Soviet Union. As we have seen, 1943 was a horrible year. At least until the month of April, conditions in the camps were brutal. Almost 100,000 men died there in only two and a  half months.1 Indeed, between the beginning of the war and mid-April 1943, 59 percent of the prisoners taken by the Soviet Union died, not because they were deliberately killed, but as a result of the conditions of capture, of transport, of the camps, and—to no small degree—of the climate. The high death toll was primarily the result of negligence and dereliction. Of course, prisoners of war were not Stalin’s most pressing concern in 1943, when he was calling on the Allies to open a second front in Europe to reduce the Axis’s pressure on the Soviet Union.

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Extremely high mortality affected prisoners of all nationalities at that time, but Italians most prominently. It has emerged that the 56.5-percent death rate recorded among them was the absolute highest. Sources show that the NKVD stepped in with a  large number of orders and decrees aimed at improving the conditions of prisoners of war. The most telling example is the decree Beria issued in May 1943, when— also because of a  typhus epidemic—mortality was peaking. The measures called for by the authorities often remained on paper, though, both because of the camp commanders’ sluggishness and as a result of the fact that the means provided for their implementation were insufficient. Faced with a lack of adequate medical tools and with food shortage, made worse by misappropriation on the part of the guards and the men in charge of distribution, commanders sometimes ended up settling for purely formal solutions to the problems at hand. Documents prove that failure to fulfill orders on prisoner management was punished with the removal from command. In the Khrenovoe camp—where, according to an inspectors’ report conditions were hellish in March 1943, to the point that mortality (not always recorded by those in charge) was extremely high among detainees—the commander was replaced, albeit without facing serious consequences.2 Contrary to rumors circulating among the prisoners, according to which the commander, Kuznetsov, had been sentenced to death, his military career continued unimpeded. Documents further show that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and the Comintern invested great energy and resources in antifascist work with the prisoners. The methods and tools of this work were generally the same for all prisoners, following in the footsteps of what had been carried out within the Gulag and, after 1939, among Polish prisoners. Its contents, conversely, differed significantly, based on the prisoners’ ideological background. Propaganda was very effective among national groups allied with Germany, particularly in the early stages, when it was anti-Nazi in intent. When addressing Romanians, Croats and Slovenes, their affinity to the Slavs was played up. In the case of the Italians, attention was drawn to the fact that the Germans and Austrians had historically been their enemies. Instructors were careful to pin the blame for the crimes and destruction perpetrated in the occupied Soviet territories on the Germans, relieving the Italian population and prisoners themselves from any responsibility. Blame for the fact Italy had followed Germany in the aggression of the USSR was placed squarely on Mussolini.

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One of the aspects of this propaganda the Soviet documents shed light on is the relationship between camp prisoners and communist émigrés. The latter made appearances in the world of the camps as the only link the prisoners could enjoy with their homeland. At the same time, they were completely different from their countrymen detained in the camps, in terms both of the language they used and of their behavior, almost invariably standardized. Some proved fanatical propagandists, even prepared to torment their most reluctant compatriots. Others were rational and mindful of the need to reeducate the prisoners to antifascism and democracy. Others still proved generous or even indulgent, eager only to survive and to help prisoners do the same. However, excepting Vincenzo Bianco, Italian communist leaders are not known to have pleaded with Soviet authorities to improve the conditions of their fellow nationals (unlike Walter Ulbricht and even the Russian instructor Nikolai Yantsen). In the short term, propaganda was only partially successful, for a  number of reasons. First, interrogation records indicate that faith in Mussolini was persistent among Italian prisoners—soldiers and officers alike. Second, the time factor played a part in hampering the success of propaganda. Fully understanding that time was not on its side, the Political Administration tried to push through the work as quickly as possible, steering the classes in the two antifascist schools toward Marxist issues. In most cases, attempts to brainwash prisoners actually caused them to put up a wall and reject the teachings. Similarly, even though the Political Administration had expressly called for moderation, the language of propaganda used in assemblies and in class ended up having an irritating effect on the prisoners, with its clichés and its programatic optimism about the USSR’s glorious future. This aspect helps us evaluate the long-term effects of the propaganda. Admittedly, such an evaluation is extremely difficult, not least because many documents, from both Soviet and Italian sources, are still classified. To be sure, in terms of sheer numbers, the success rate of propaganda was not great, though individual men exposed to it did embrace communism, whether out of conviction or calculation. Propaganda did not significantly change the attitude of the mass of prisoners. In my opinion, political work carried out among the prisoners—future returnees from the USSR—did not have large-scale repercussions. Rather, it was followed by the adherence to communism by individual men, who were either intimately antifascist to begin with, or saw collaboration with the USSR and the PCI as expedient to building a career for themselves, or to finding a job once back home. It should be noted, however, that life for many returnees was not

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easy in postwar Italy—or in West Germany—as the Allies believed them to be suspect for the mere fact of having been taken prisoner in Russia and kept a close watch on them. Propaganda was part of the Stalinist plan to turn prisoners into “new” citizens. Antifascist and, perhaps more importantly, inducted into communism, these were to be sent back to their countries of origin as faithful allies of the USSR. To this end, some prisoners were recruited—not necessarily the ones who had attended the antifascist courses—to work at the service of the USSR as informers or agents. Initially, as attested by the fact it was the first state to recognize the Badoglio government, the Soviet Union was open toward Italy. This was due, at least in part, to the USSR’s intention to expand its foreign policy in the Mediterranean—which it would do using Yugoslavia as its bridgehead, at least until 1948. Stalin’s decision to repatriate Italian prisoners before the other Allies, starting in September 1945, also fit within this plan. With this move, the Soviet leader signaled his openness toward a government he thought would be friendly to his, in a country liberated from fascism that had been allied with the Axis. Later, when the spheres of influence were determined and Italy joined the Marshall Plan, the USSR became more intransigent. Indeed, Italy now belonged to the capitalist bloc, and a clash between the capitalist system and the communist one was inevitable. As a  result, negotiations for the liberation of the few prisoners still detained in the USSR on criminal charges turned into an ordeal for Italian diplomacy. As we’ve seen, the USSR’s interpretation of what constituted a “war criminal” was very broad, originating in large part from its notion of state safety and the idea that each prisoner had a moral obligation to repay the country he’d attacked. Some prisoners paid for alleged crimes committed during the occupation by being put on trial and serving sentences that in some cases would keep them in the Soviet Union until 1954. I am not entirely persuaded all of these men were guilty, but in some cases the Russian archive documents do detail the accusations in depth, even providing the victims’ and eyewitnesses’ names. Even so, some of the men held back in the USSR by the Soviet authorities were only guilty of being fascists who had openly—sometimes brazenly—manifested their loyalty to the regime and to Mussolini. In other words, they were living proof that the effectiveness of the antifascist indoctrination carried out by the sundry Soviet institutions had been limited. Between 1943 and 1952, based on the 19 April 1943 decree by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—“Punishment measures for criminals guilty of crimes and atrocities against the Soviet population and Red Army prisoners”—the Soviet military tribunals tried 81,780

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people, including Soviet civilians and servicemen accused of collaborating with the Axis powers. Out of all these people, 25,209 were foreign servicemen, accused of crimes against prisoners of war. In total, the number of foreign servicemen—mostly Germans and Austrians—put on trial for crimes against Soviet civilians and prisoners reached 40,000.3 The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist system led Russia to reconsider the intransigence and extremism of what had happened under Stalin, including the trials carried out against alleged war criminals. Alongside the Memorial Society’s work aimed at restoring the good name of former Soviet Union citizens unfairly detained in the Gulag, victims of repression, a process to rehabilitate foreign nationals, particularly Germans, sentenced for war crimes in the Soviet Union during and after the conflict was launched in Russia in the early 1990s. The law “On the rehabilitation of the victims of political repression” was approved on 18 October 1991. As a result, more than 12,000 rehabilitation requests by former German servicemen were filed with the Russian military prosecutor’s office. By January 2000, 8,000 of these requests had been accepted, and their petitioners rehabilitated, while the remaining 3,000 had been denied.4 The documents produced in order for the trials against the alleged war criminals to be reexamined indicate that a  significant number of charges were unfounded. Thus, in the 1990s, it was admitted that, for a number of reasons, many people who had not committed the acts ascribed to them ended up being suspected of and charged with crimes. Often, false denunciations, or confessions from the defendants themselves extorted through physical and psychological violence, lay at the heart of their convictions.5

Corroborating the fact that some of the people convicted for war crimes were actually blameless is the Report by Kruglov to Molotov on Italian War Criminals dated 2 March 1949. In the report, the deputy minister of the Interior acknowledged that no damning material had been found against the Italian prisoners Father Brevi and Medical Lieutenant Reginato that might testify to “their involvement in atrocities and war crimes.”6 The only reasons for their convictions were an alleged oath of loyalty to Mussolini, believed to have been taken in the prison camp (an ideological pretext), and their alleged determination to make attempts on the lives of PCI functionaries once they were back in Italy (an intent, not an executed act). This had been enough for the USSR’s military tribunal to view them both as war criminals.

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The negotiations on the repatriation of the remaining prisoners and of the diplomats of the fascist republican legations of Bucharest and Sofia captured by the Red Army make up one of the most interesting points to emerge from the documents. Both the prisoners who were tried and convicted for crimes and the republican diplomats held back in the USSR were exploited by the Kremlin as bargaining chips to reclaim the Soviet refugees that were in Italy. In the course of these negotiations, for all the skills and training of the ambassadors Quaroni and Brosio, Italy’s weakness as an attacking state defeated in war was in full view. Rome was also hampered by its need both not to lose the Soviet Union’s support on the peace treaty as a result of exceedingly pressing demands, and to convince Moscow to remove its veto on Italy’s admission to the UN. Italy failed to find a way to bring back to safety the prisoners who continued to be detained in the USSR and the diplomats of Salò that didn’t involve handing over the Soviet citizens that had sought refuge in Italy, despite knowing their fate would be sealed as a  result. The agreement signed by Brosio and Zorin in December 1949 is suggestive not only of Italy’s lack of authority, but also of the Soviet Union’s diplomatic and political strength. In those circumstances, the Italian government hid behind the need to get its citizens back, but also behind a precedent: the Allies’ handing over—in 1945, following the Yalta Agreements—of Soviet and Yugoslav citizens, who were fleeing or had fled communist regimes, back to Moscow and to Belgrade respectively. In the aftermath of war, a paradox occurred: the USSR made every effort to regain custody of its own citizens who had sought refuge in European countries, all the while arbitrarily and forcibly detaining foreign nationals who wished to flee. Indeed, in addition to convicted prisoners and to the diplomats of Salò, all manner of foreigners attempting to return to their countries of origin were present in the postwar Soviet Union. Even the staunchest communists—including Robotti, Cocchi, and Togliatti himself—had to negotiate long and hard to leave the USSR. Moscow tended to hold everyone back, because of Stalin’s suspiciousness and deep mistrust, for reasons of state security, and because of a perceived vulnerability in Europe, where the presence of the United States was increasingly pervasive. Another issue that completes the analysis of Italians’ captivity in the USSR pertains to the servicemen formerly interned by the Germans, the IMIs, who fell victim to Hitler first, and then to Stalin. The reasons that in 1944 led the Kremlin to deport and detain on Soviet soil Germany’s former internees who had fought in the Balkans were ideological and polit-

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ical in nature. First, the Stalinist notion that war prisoners were essentially traitors, and the prejudice that the Italians detained in the Reich’s camps must be collaborators. Second, the Soviet leadership’s intention to exploit former IMIs as an additional bargaining chip, the better to set forth political requests and to demand compensation for war damages. The matter of the IMIs has been addressed extensively by historians, but the specific point concerning those who, instead of being freed by the Red Army, were deported to the USSR has been completely overlooked. The reason for this silence lies in the oblivion into which the fate of Italian prisoners in Russia had fallen in general. I have attempted to describe this matter in its entirety and complexity, in order to restore it to its rightful place in history.

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Appendix

I. Problems and gaps in data collection The recording and counting of prisoners was a problem the Soviet administration never managed to solve properly. The simultaneous arrival of a huge number of prisoners in the camps, their physical and psychological state, the poor training of the staff called on to deal with them, the plethora of orders and instructions issued by the authorities, the discrepancy between the forms used in the camps, the failure to observe directives on the part of camp personnel, the confusion deliberately generated by the prisoners, all contributed to frustrating any attempts made to put together a reliable and complete census of prisoners fallen into Soviet hands. The recording of prisoners’ identities was often entrusted to common soldiers. When an interpreter was absent, the latter merely transcribed into Cyrillic what they were able—or believed they were able—to make out of what was said to them. Many cities and last names were written down incorrectly as a result. Confusion also stemmed from the Russians’ habit of assigning patronymics. These muddled the prisoners’ identities by altering their last (or first) names. What is more, Italian swear words, transcribed into Cyrillic, also occasionally appear in Russian lists where a prisoner’s last name or city of origin ought to be.1 The German prisoners’ behavior further invalidates the records’ reliability. Terrorized by what they heard about the atrocities the Russians committed against the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, German prisoners sometimes tried to pass off as Czechs, as Hungarians, as Poles, as Frenchmen, and even as Italians (from South Tyrol). The NKVD issued several decrees regarding the criteria to be followed for prisoner registration in the various stages of detention. The Instruction dated 16 November 1944, for example, called for the counting of prisoners of war to be revised. This decision was probably made neces-

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sary by the chaos that had been ongoing in the camps and the extremely high mortality among the prisoners, whose deaths were not always being recorded. The instruction stated that prisoners present in all camps and hospitals needed to be surveyed indicating the exact date on which each of them was found to be in a  given camp or hospital (to avoid that the same person be counted more than once). Between five and thirty days were allotted for this recount. Single-copy information sheets and triplecopy registration forms were to be completed for each prisoner. Given the sheer bulk of this work and the short time available to carry it out, the instruction even suggested how many people should be employed. It was estimated that taking a  census of 1,000 prisoners of war would require employing 120 people for one day; thus, twenty-four people would be needed for five days, and so forth.2 Despite the NKVD’s efforts, adequate prisoner registration never came to be for the whole duration of the war. As late as 1 January 1945, the man in charge of the prisoner registration section in camp No. 168 (Minsk, Belarus) wrote General Petrov of the GUPVI, addressing the matter as follows: In all camps, the required number of people are allotted to surveying the prisoners, yet the work is poorly set up. The section in charge of this task is unable to provide accurate information on how many prisoners of war are present in the camp. The process is not carried out in compliance with the instructions; the figures are not drawn from the documents, but in a haphazard fashion. The directives issued by the GUPVI of the NKVD are disregarded. This is the case of directive No. 28/2/4 dated 23 August 1944, which clearly indicates the documents to be sent to the GUPVI in the event of a POW’s death. So far, none of the dossiers have been filled out or sent. The documents on the deceased prisoners lie in complete disarray. Establishing how many prisoners have died is impossible. Forty-nine prisoners died during the second ten-day period of December 1944, but only forty-four were recorded. It would appear that the remaining dead were going to be recorded in the following ten-day period, so as to make it seem as though the mortality rate was lower. The deceased prisoners’ lists are not completed according to instructions. In the rare event that they are drafted, no one’s willing to sign them.3

Clearly, the sections in charge of recording prisoners and filing their data away in an orderly fashion were far from perfect in carrying out their duties.

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This particular section manager’s candor in confessing to such shortcomings to General Petrov is surprising, and disconcerting. When all is said and done, prisoner-of-war data contained in official NKVD documents must be taken with caution. The NKVD took it upon itself to draft information charts on the number of prisoners in Soviet hands, which were periodically sent to Stalin and Molotov. One such chart provided the alleged number of prisoners detained in the USSR between 22 June 1941 and 1 March 1944. The number of Italian prisoners of war amounted to 43,674. Of these, 10,624 were still alive as of 1 March 1944, whereas those who had died in the time interval were 33,050. The Italians’ mortality rate—a staggering 75.7 percent—was the highest recorded among all nationalities.4 A subsequent chart further clarified that the figure above comprised “three generals, 693 officers, and 9,928 soldiers.” Of the latter group, 393 and 163 were members of the fascist party and the fascist youth organization respectively. Also, “8,367 men were located in the camps, while 2,257 were in NKO and NKZ hospitals.”5 Considering that 10,031 ARMIR prisoners were repatriated, it must be concluded 600 more prisoners died after March 1944, even though general conditions had improved. On 12 May 1945, Beria submitted the following information to Stalin: Secret 12 May 1945,

The State Committee No. 546/b to I.V. Stalin

The NKVD reports on the POWs as of 11 May of this year: 1.  In gathering points, in NKVD camps and in hospitals, there are 1,464,803 prisoners of war as of 11 May 1945. They may be broken down thus, by rank: generals93 officers36,268 noncommissioned officers and soldiers 1,428,442 By nationality: German747,733 Hungarian275,448 Romanian116,214 Other266,207

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Polish 26,636 Italian19,889 French12,6766

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An additional 605,197 men had been captured during the previous days, but the commands of the Red Army had yet to hand them over to the organs of the NKVD. The number of prisoners thus soared to 2,070,000.7 On 6 June 1945, Beria issued another note, informing Molotov that the number of prisoners amounted to 2,641,246, 1,366,298 of whom had been captured after Germany’s surrender. Among these, 20,501 were Italians.8 The number cited by Beria actually included internees, as well as prisoners.

II. The ARMIR’s fallen, and the men who went missing Publications by the Historical Office of the Army Staff have tried to establish the number of men who died or went missing on the Eastern front as precisely as possible. However, contingent difficulties and the lack of data from the Soviets placed tremendous obstacles before anyone trying to provide a definitive answer to this question. The Historical Office’s report set the number of ARMIR soldiers around 230,000 units.9 It is unclear whether this figure included replacements, men dispatched to stand in for those who returned to Italy on leave for health or other reasons. Regiments in Italy often provided mobilization centers neither with the number of the men who were dispatched, nor with the names of those who died, were injured, or went missing. Conversely, battalion replacements were recorded in their respective military districts, which were then expected to relay the information to the Ministry of War. However, in addition to the lack of coordination between armed forces and the inaccurate recording of data on the men sent to the front, the chaos that followed 8 September and two years of war in Italy also put a considerable strain on military district archives, and led to the misplacement and loss of a great deal of material.10 Compounding contingent problems was the political and military authorities’ complete disinterest in reordering the data, immediately after the war as well as in subsequent years. Until the Russian government finally made its lists of prisoners deceased in the USSR available, the most reliable document on this matter had been the report by the Historical Office of the Army Staff, which speaks of 79,789 dead (including 4,989 men who had lost their lives prior to 10 December 1942). This report is based on information General Gariboldi provided after the retreat. Indeed, the difficult work of assessing losses was carried out as soon as the command of the 8th Army was able to regroup and reorganize. On 20 March 1943, Gariboldi let Rome know that 84,830 men had gone missing, out of an alleged 230,000.

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The Historical Office’s calculation warrants several observations. Prior to 10 December 1942, 13,592 frostbitten and wounded men had been counted; their fate is unknown. Further, it is uncertain whether an additional 29,690 frostbitten and wounded men were able to avoid Soviet encirclements between December 1942 and January 1943. Deaths resulting from disease, as well as air force losses, were not taken into account. Finally, it is unknown whether some reserve units that were traveling toward the Don in January 1943 were captured, or managed to escape the Soviets.11 As for the second kind of difficulties of a contingent nature, the confusion that ensued among the military divisions at the time of the retreat is easy to imagine. Commanders, junior officers and quartermasters found themselves tasked with counting the missing men, without actually knowing what had become of them: whether they had died in combat or been taken prisoner; it was possible some had stayed behind and then joined other units. Often, after a battle against enemy troops or a break to rest, the men scattered. When it was time to regroup and resume the journey, many soldiers could no longer find their units. When quartermasters or officers were killed or captured, the data in their possession were forever lost. Finally, the rout had caused regiments, battalions and artillery groups to lose contact with their magazines, baggage trains and ammunition stores in the rear. Information on their fate was lost as a result too.12 The greatest number of losses occurred when the Italian commands were no longer in control. Therefore, it is not currently possible—and it probably never will be—to determine the number of prisoners executed by firing squad at the time of capture, or who died on board the trains and during the marches leading to the camps. In calculating the Italian losses, we must take into account the men who went missing or who died before the Battle of the Don. Indeed, the Soviets had taken Italian prisoners even prior to that decisive clash. A letter Army General Carlo Geloso sent General Messe in December 1948, included by the latter in his report, reads as follows: As confirmation for something I  mentioned when we spoke, let me clarify that, on 25 July 1945, in the Liubotin camp […], we were paid a  visit by Mr. Paolo Robotti and Red Army Captain Shchevliagin. […] In my conversations with the two, during which Brigade General Lorenzo Richieri was always present, of course we also addressed the Italian prisoners seized by the Bolsheviks during the campaign; we broached the subject when I  inquired about General Ricagno and the alpine prisoners of the Julia Division. In the course of these conversa-

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STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR tions, I  found out, from Captain Shchevliagin to be exact, that the overall number of Italian prisoners captured during the campaign ranged between about 60,000 and 80,000. In a  previous meeting, one of the two—but I  can’t say which—had stated that about 20,000 prisoners were present in the Russian camps at that time.13

The official Soviet sources that provided information on the prisoners captured by the Red Army in the offensive launched between December 1942 and January 1943 were L’Alba, the press, and Radio Moscow.14 On 10 February 1943, Togliatti wrote the following in L’Alba: The Italian Army [that was] operating in Russia no longer exists. The Red Army’s offensive has crushed the 8th Italian Army, too. Between 16 and 30 December, the Ravenna, Cosseria, Pasubio, Turin, Sforzesca, and Celere divisions were defeated, along with Blackshirt battalions in the mid Don area. More than 50,000 Italian soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. In January, the Julia, Tridentina and Cuneense alpine divisions, and the 156th Infantry Division [the Vicenza Division] were defeated as well on the Voronezh front and 33,000 more soldiers and officers (including three division generals [...]) were taken prisoner […].15

Thus, the reported number of prisoners was 83,000. The issue dated 20 February spoke of 80,000 prisoners.16 The issue dated 3 April assessed that Italian losses amounted to “150,000 men, between those who had died, been wounded, or been taken prisoner.”17 During the 5 March broadcast on Radio Moscow, Togliatti said: “Italian prisoners seized by the Red Army in this period are in excess of 40,000 units, according to the data I  gleaned from official Soviet communications.”18 During the 19 March broadcast, he boasted that “the Red Army was able to have absolutely accurate data on the initial strength of the ARMIR, the reinforcements it received, and its losses.”19 It is therefore clear and logical that the Soviet authorities—not Mussolini—have had the opportunity to count the deceased left on the battlefield by the routing Italian units, to count the wounded the Italian and German transports abandoned in the open country, on the snow, and even to calculate the number of Italian nationals left behind by Hitler’s troops who have died and been buried in the cemeteries.20

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According to such “irrefutable” data, in 1941, CSIR divisions had had to “receive reinforcements equivalent to 60–70 percent of their strength.” The Soviet press, Togliatti reported, estimated that 60,000 of Mussolini’s men had died on the Eastern front, 69,000 had been wounded, and 46,000 had been taken prisoner. “One hundred and seventy five-thousand men in all.”21 A classified memorandum the Prisoner-of-War Service sent the Ministry of Post-War Assistance on 2 March 1946 reads as follows: About 100,000 men from our Expeditionary Corps in Russia are missing. It has been estimated that about 20,000 of them died in battle. An equal number of them have gone missing in action. In all likelihood, the latter perished in the area of operations at the time of retreat (December 1942–January 1943). About 60,000 men are assumed to have been seized by the Soviet troops.22

The Roll of Honor, in the Ministry of Defense, holds documentation on roughly 90,000 military men who never returned from the Russian front. Considering about 5,000 of these names belonged to men killed or gone missing before the definitive battle—that is, before 10 December 1942—we are left with approximately 85,000 names. The names of 10,000 returnees, whose files are no longer held in the Roll of Honor’s archive but were nevertheless absent as of 20 March 1943, must be added to this list. Thus, the missing ARMIR men amounted to about 95,000.23 This means the 8th Italian Army had lost more than one-third of its strength. Records sent by the Russian government starting in 1992 have finally provided some insight into what befell thousands of Italians who set off to war with the ARMIR. These records feature the names of 64,500 Italian prisoners of war, including 38,000 men who died in the camps, and 22,000 men who were repatriated (this number is comprehensive of 12,000 former German internees). For other names—2,000—no information is provided on the fate of the men they belonged to. Finally, there are roughly 2,500 instances of repeated names (307 counting officers only), foreign names, civilian names and names belonging to South Tyroleans.24 Of course, this does not include the men who died during the marches or on the trains—presumably, about 22,000 men.25 Out of the 38,000 prisoners who died in the camps, only 20,650 have been identified.26 Only once the repatriated soldiers started being questioned was it possible to establish that just 10,032 of the 21,800 men who made it home were ARMIR survivors.27

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Notes

PREFACE 1 

C. Streit, “Sowjetische Kriegsgefangenen in deutscher Hand: Ein Forschungsüberblick,” in K.-D. Müller et al., Die Tragödie der Gefangenschaft in Deutschland und in der Sowjetunion. 1941-1956 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 281–90. Data from the Soviet General Staff also speak of about 5.8 million prisoners captured by the Germans. Cf. C. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 9. 2  Cf. V.P. Galitsky, “Repatryatsionnaya politika Sovetskogo pravitelstva vo vtoroj mirovoj vojne i posle neyo” [The Soviet government’s repatriation policy during and after the Second World War], in VV.AA., Tragediya plena. Materialy nauchnoprakticheskoj konferentsii [The tragedy of imprisonment: Proceedings from the practical-scientific conference] (Krasnogorsk, 1996). 3  On the issue of captivity in Russia, see Istituto storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e Provincia ed., Gli italiani sul fronte russo [The Italians on the Russian front] (Bari: De Donato, 1982); P.L. Bertinaria, La tragedia italiana sul fronte russo, 1941-1943. Immagini di un sofferto sacrificio con documenti e testimonianze [The Italian tragedy on the Russian front, 1941–1943: Snapshots of a painful sacrifice through documents and accounts] (Rimini: Ghigi, 1993); G. Rochat, “Otto cartoline di prigionieri in Russia” [Eight postcards of prisoners in Russia], in Studi piacentini, no. 14, 1993, 191–96, and S. Fontana, “Il diario di prigionia di un ufficiale del Borgo” [Diary of captivity of an officer from the Borgo], ibid., 197–225. On the subject of antifascist propaganda, see M. Rossi, “Quel giorno più lungo dell’anno. La propaganda in Urss 1941-45” [That longest day of the year: Propaganda in the USSR, 1941–45], in Propaganda politica e mezzi di comunicazione di massa tra fascismo e democrazia [Political propaganda and mass media between fascism and democracy], ed. A. Mignemi (Turin: Gruppo Abele, 1995), 261–72. On captivity in the Second World War more generally, see Rainero ed., I prigionieri militari italiani durante la seconda guerra mondiale, aspetti e problemi storici [Italian military prisoners during the Second World War: Historical aspects and problems] (Milan: Marzorati, 1985); F.G. Conti, I prigionieri di guerra italiani. 1940-1945 [The Italian prisoners of war, 1940–1945] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986); G. Rochat, “I prigionieri di guerra, un problema rimosso” [Prisoners

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of war, a repressed problem], in Una storia di tutti. Prigionieri, internati, deportati [A history that belongs to everyone: Prisoners, internees, deportees], ed. Istituto storico della Resistenza in Piemonte (Milan: Angeli, 1989), 1–12; Id., “Una ricerca impossibile. Le perdite italiane nella seconda guerra mondiale” [An impossible research: Italian losses during the Second World War], Italia contemporanea, no. 201, (December 1995), 688–89; and A. Bendotti and E. Valtulina eds., Internati, Prigionieri, Reduci. La deportazione militare italiana durante la seconda guerra mondiale [Internees, prisoners, and returnees: The Italian military deportation during the Second World War] (Bergamo: Istituto bergamasco per la storia della Resistenza e dell’età contemporanea, 1999); A.M. Isastia ed., I prigionieri di guerra nella storia d’Italia [Prisoners of war in the history of Italy] (Rome: Edizioni ANRP, 2003). 4  The volume issued by the UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia [Report on the Italian prisoners of war in Russia], eds. P. Resta and C. Vicentini (Cassano Magnago, VA: Crespi, 1995), proved useful to me in the early stages of my research. 5  Along with the agreement dated 23 April 1991, the Italian government signed a convention with the Russian Federation authorities to retrieve Italian soldiers’ corpses buried in field cemeteries, and to search for common graves. 6  AUSSME sources on all WWII prisoners amount to 15,800 sheets, roughly 850 of which have to do specifically with their captivity in the Soviet Union. Regarding the prisoners’ repatriation and their treatment in captivity, the following have been consulted: Diari Storici (DS) [Historical Diaries] 2271/C and 2241; fond I 3/163 and some documents from the Servizio informazioni militare (SIM) [Military Information Service]. 7  The first study on this topic—imprecise with regard to the figures it provides, and partial in relation to the sources it cites—was authored by F. Bigazzi and E. Zhirnov, Gli ultimi 28. La storia incredibile dei prigionieri di guerra italiani dimenticati in Russia [The incredible story of Italian prisoners of war forgotten in Russia] (Milan: Mondadori, 2002). 8  For an example of the former, see T. Schlemmer, Invasori, non vittime. La campagna italiana di Russia. 1941-1943 [Invaders, not victims: The Italian campaign in Russia, 1941–1943] (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009); for examples of the latter, see G. Scotoni, L’Armata Rossa e la disfatta italiana (1942-43). L’annientamento dell’Armir sul Medio e l’Alto Don negli inediti dei comandi sovietici [The Red Army and the Italian defeat (1942–43): The ARMIR’s annihilation on the mid and upper Don in never before published documents issued by the Soviet command] (Trento: Panorama, 2007), and G. Scotoni and S. Filonenko eds., “Retroscena della disfatta italiana in Russia nei documenti inediti dell’8a armata” [A behind-thescenes look at the Italian defeat in Russia in never published before documents issued by the 8th Army], vol. I, L’occupazione [The occupation], and vol. II, La disfatta [The defeat] (Trento: Panorama, 2008). In a recent volume, Scotoni has tried to balance out the assessments of Italians’ behavior, by including a series of documents on the Royal Army’s counter-guerrilla and “pacification” measures in the appendix (cf. G. Scotoni, Il nemico fidato. La guerra di sterminio in Urss e l’occupazione alpina sull’Alto Don [The trusted enemy: The war of extermination in the USSR, and the alpine occupation on the upper Don] (Trento: Panorama, 2013). For a more evenhanded assessment, see H.J. Burgwyn, “The Legacy of Italy’s Participation in the German War,” Mondo contemporaneo, no. 2, 2011, 161–81.

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9 

See O. Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (London: Macmillan, 2001), and H.F. Meyer, Blutiges Edelweiß. Die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Links, 2008). The part of this book dedicated to the slaughter of the men of the Acqui Division by the German 1st Mountain Division has been translated into Italian with the title Il massacro di Cefalonia [The massacre of Cephalonia], ed. M.H. Teupen, with a preface by G. Rochat (Udine: Gaspari, 2013). 10  Prisoner-of-War Archive of the Vatican Information Office (1939–47), set up by Pius XII and made available by Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI. 11  A model form is provided in the documents section of the Italian second edition to this book. The Vatican Information Office also prepared a very long list— which may be accessed in its archives—of WWII Italian prisoners. Further, Inter Arma Caritas. L’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano per i Prigionieri di guerra istituito da Pio XII (1939-1947) [Inter Arma Caritas: Vatican Information Office for prisoners of war established by Pius XII (1939–1947)], 2 volumes, vol. II, Documenti [Documents] (Vatican City, Vatican Secret Archives, 2004), may be consulted online, on the archive’s website. 12  As well as in the official letters written by the Italian ambassadors in Moscow, Pietro Quaroni and Manlio Brosio, the diplomatic negotiations carried out for the repatriation of Italian nationals held in the USSR feature prominently in M. Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 1947-1951 [Moscow Diaries, 1947–51] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986).

INTRODUCTION 1

 Cf. M. Geller and A. Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the USSR from 1917 to the Present (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 354. 2  Record of the meeting I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov had with British Minister, Lord Eden, in Vneshnyaya politika SSSR [The USSR’s foreign policy], vol. XVIII, No. 148 (Moscow: 1973), 249f. 3  Cf. J. Bourke, The Second World War: A People’s History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13. 4  Cf. G. Schreiber, La seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004), 23. For more, see G. Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol. III, The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa, 19391941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 5  Cf. S.P. MacKenzie, The Second World War in Europe, 2nd ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2009), 7. 6  Cf. G.L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 205; and by the same author, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941 (Leiden: Brill, 1954), 74. 7  In his book 1941 god. 22 iyunya, Moscow: 1965, Italian translation Stalin aprì le porte a Hitler [Stalin opened the doors for Hitler] (Rome: Tindalo, 1968), Nekrich draws attention to Stalin’s responsibility for the Soviet deficiencies in the face of the Nazi invasion. The book could only be published in the final stage of post-Stalinist liberalization, but even so it was subsequently confiscated, and its author was forced to move abroad. V. Volkov also addresses the issue of

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the USSR’s strict observance of the pacts it had entered into with Germany in his essay “Balkanskie problemy v otnosheniyakh Sovetskogo Soyuza i Germanii v 1940 g.” [Balkan matters in the relationships between the Soviet Union and Germany], contained in his book, Uzlovye problemy noveishei istorii stran Tsentralnoi i Iugo-Vostochnoi Evropy [Key problems of contemporary history in central and south-eastern European countries] (Moscow: Indryk, 2000). 8  Ibid., 10. 9  “Perepiska V.M. Molotova s I.V. Stalinym, Noyabr 1940 goda” [Correspondence between Molotov and Stalin, November 1940], in Voyenno-istoricheskij zhurnal, No. 9, 1992, 18–21, 19. On the same issue, see also, V. Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side: His Interpreter’s Memoirs from the October Revolution to the Fall of the Dictator’s Empire (New York: Birch Lane, 1994). 10  Cf. Volkov, Uzlovye problemy novejshej istorii stran Tsentralnoj i Iugo-Vostochnoj Evropy, 29. 11  G. Messe, La guerra al fronte russo. Il corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Csir) [War on the Russian front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR)] (Milan: Mursia, 2005), 25–26. After all, expansionism was the hinge on which German foreign policy turned in the 1930s; Germany’s eastward aspirations, summarized in the motto Drang nach Osten (Push to the East), determined Hitler’s decisions (cf. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, Munich, Franz Eher Nachfolger, 1933, vol. I, 152f). 12  Volkov, Uzlovye Uzlovye problemy novejshej istorii stran Tsentralnoj i Iugo-Vostochnoj Evropy, 29ff. Among the very many texts written on this subject, let me suggest the following two collective works by Soviet and German historians: A.A. Grechko et al., ed., Istoriya Vtoroj mirovoj vojny, 1939-1945 v 12 tomakh [History of the Second World War: 1939–1945, in 12 volumes] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973–82); and Horst Boog et al., Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1991), 38–42. 13  Cf. Le operazioni del Csir e dell’Armir dal luglio 1941 all’ottobre 1942 [Operations by the CSIR and the ARMIR from July 1941 to October 1942] (AUSSME, 1947), 34f. 14  In June 1941, Germany could count on 8,500,000 men (an increase of 3,550,000 since 1940), for 208 divisions in total. In that same period, the USSR could rely on 5,000,000 men Cf. G.K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), 217. After being appointed commander in chief of the Soviet troops in Mongolia, a vassal state, Georgy K. Zhukov, back in Moscow, was saluted as a military genius, also owing to a favorable press campaign, which had cast skirmishes as epic battles. In 1940, Stalin entrusted him with the command of the Kiev military district on the western border; later, he appointed him as Chief of the General Staff. For more, cf. C. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 35, 53. 15  Cf. D.M. Glantz and J. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 27. 16  Between January 1939 and 22 June 1941, the Soviet war industry provided the Red Army with over 7,000 tanks; in 1941, the industry was able to supply about 5,500 units of various kinds. By the beginning of the war, the industry had been able to put out 1,861 Kv and T-34 tanks. Still, it was not enough, Zhukov wrote (Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, 109).

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17

 Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, 11. According to another theory, the purges actually allowed Stalin to lay the groundwork for the Soviet regime’s power: “Without that seemingly irrational terror, which had killed people virtually at random, a military coup d’état or a popular revolt against Stalin would almost certainly have occurred in the first days or weeks after the German invasion” (cf. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 16). Pleshakov estimates that the purges produced 35,000 victims (ibid.). Among the arrested generals was Konstantin Rokossovsky, one of the men who led the Red Army to victory, and who was freed after fifteen months of captivity. 18  Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, 226. 19  Timoshenko, who had successfully led the Soviet troops in the war against Finland, was appointed as People’s Commissar for Defense in May 1940. 20  Cf. “Iz soobshcheniya Nkvd Sssr v Ck Vkp(b) i Snk Sssr o narushenii sovetskoy granitsy inostrannymi samoletami s 10 po 19 iyunya 1941g.” [From the report by the NKVD of the USSR to the CC of the VKP(b) and to the SNK of the USSR on the violation of the Soviet airspace on the part of foreign aircrafts between 10 and 19 June 1941], in 1941 god, vol. II, 396–97, doc. 586, No. 581. According to the report, there had also been nine incursions by Finnish aircrafts, two by Hungarian aircrafts, and twelve by Romanian aircrafts (ibid.). 21  According to Zhukov’s memoirs, Stalin told Timoshenko over the phone that he would think about it (Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, 232). Baker, however, claims that both Stalin and his generals disregarded the well-founded and detailed warnings on the German troops’ movement. Cf. L. Baker, The Second WorldWar on Eastern Front (Harlow: Pearson, 2009), 6). 22  Cf. M. Narinsky, “Drama 1939 goda—novye dokumenty,” in Svobodnaya mysl, No. 6, 1993, 119; the theory is set forth by V. Zaslavsky as well, in Storia del sistema sovietico (Roma: Carocci, 2001). 23  According to recent studies, the Red Army was not prepared to fight defensive battles; in other words, it was not prepared to face an attack (Baker, The Second World War on Eastern Front, 7). 24  Cf. ibid., 3. Even the Soviet General Staff’s less catastrophic estimates speak of between 8.6 and 11.4 million soldiers lost; Hitler lost 3.25 million in all, between the Eastern and Western fronts (cf. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 9). Of these, 1,637,280 died or were injured between 22 June 1941 and 15 September 1942. Cf. Vojna i obshchestvo. 1941-1945 (War and society), vol. I (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 99. 25  M. Geller and A. Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the USSR from 1917 to the Present, 376–77. 26  On this topic, see L. Osipova, “Dnevnik” [Diary], in O.V. Budnitskij, ed. “Svershilos. Prishli nemtsy!” Idejnyj kollaboratsionizm v SSSR v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny [“It’s over! The Germans have arrived!” Ideological collaborationism in the USSR in the period of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow: Rosspen, 2012. On the population’s mood between 1940 and 1941, see also, N.A. Lomagin, Neizvestnaya blokada [The unknown siege] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2002). 27  For example, see the leaflet contained in G. Scotoni, Il nemico fidato. La guerra di sterminio in Urss e l’occupazione alpina sull’alto Don [The trusted enemy: The war of extermination in the USSR, and the alpine occupation on the upper Don] (Trento: Panorama, 2013), 420. 28  A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin, 1963), 103.

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29

 On this issue, cf. A. Cassels, “Switching Partners: Italy in A.J.P. Taylor’s Origins of the Second World War,” in G. Martel, ed., The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate after Twenty-five Years (London: Unwin Hyman, 1986), 73–96, 87. 30  Regarding Mussolini’s decision to send troops east, may I suggest my own book, La campagna di Russia. 1941-1943 [The campaign in Russia, 1941–1943] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016). On the topic of the fascist regime’s initial “non belligerence,” see S. Colarizi, Storia del Novecento italiano [History of the Italian twentieth century] (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000), 250ff, and, by the same author, L’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime (1929-1943) [The Italians’ opinion under the regime (1929–1943)] (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009) 302ff. 31  Regarding Mussolini’s indecisiveness as to whether or not Italy should ally itself with an aggressive Germany, or with Great Britain and France—which on their part had condemned Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and imposed sanctions on the country—see R. De Felice, Intervista sul fascismo [Interview on fascism], edited by M.A. Ledeen, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1975, 79. 32  Cf. Cassels, Switching Partners, 82. 33  On this issue, see Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 26ff. On the matter of Mussolini’s plans for a “new order” in the Mediterranean, see D. Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 34  Cf. H.J. Burgwyn, “The Legacy of Italy’s Participation in the German War,” in Mondo contemporaneo, no. 2, 2011, 161–81, 181. 35  “Undatierte Aufzeichnung ohne Unterschrift,” HaPol. Ivb 6548/42, in Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, Series E, III, 1941–1945, Band I-VIII, No. 97, 15 July 1942, unsigned and undated memorandum, 171–73, 172. 36  In this case, however, his aspirations butted heads with the Reich’s. Indeed, Germany too had aims on the Black Sea straits, the subject of negotiations between Stalin and Hitler between 1939 and the end of 1940, about which Mussolini had been kept in the dark (see Volkov, Uzlovye problemy novejshej istorii stran Tsentralnoj i Iugo-Vostochnoj Evropy. 37  On this matter, see M. Toscano, L’Italia e gli accordi tedesco-sovietici del 1939 [Italy and the German-Soviet agreements of 1939], Florence: Sansoni, 1955. 38  Mussolini allegedly stated: “I would not at all mind if Germany lost many of its men in the clash against Russia”. G. Ciano, Diario. 1937-1943 [Diary, 1937–1943], Milan: Rizzoli, 2000, entry from 6 June 1941, 522. On the length of the war, cf. ibid., 529, entry from 29 June 1941. 39  Cf. G. Rochat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943. Dall’impero d’Etiopia alla disfatta [The Italian wars of 1935–1943: From the Empire of Ethiopia to defeat] (Turin: Einaudi, 2005), 305, and M.T. Giusti, La campagna di Russia. 40  V. Zilli, “Gli italiani prigionieri di guerra in Urss: vicende, esperienze, testimonianze” [Italian prisoners of war in the USSR: Events, experiences, accounts], in Istituto storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e Provincia, ed., Gli italiani sul fronte russo [The Italians on the Russian front] (Bari: De Donato, 1982), 295–321, 296. 41  Regarding the production of war aircrafts by the leading powers between 1939 and 1945, see the chart featured in MacKenzie, The Second World War in Europe, 32.

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42

 Ibid., 11.  Ibid., 10. In the same period of time, the relative war potential of the United States was 41.7 percent (the highest among all countries) out of a national income equal to 68 billion dollars, and a population of 129 million; the income percentage spent for defense of the United States was 1.5, as opposed to 26.4 spent by the USSR, whose potential was nevertheless smaller: 14 percent, out of a national income of 19 billion dollars and a population of 167 million. 44  Cf. R. Overy, 1939: Countdown to War (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 11. In 1939, both France and Great Britain sped up their rearmament. The British Chief of Staff had claimed that war against Hitler was inevitable: B. Bond, ed., Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, vol. I, 1933–1940 (London: Cooper, 1972), 161. 45  Mussolini tended to establish personal relationships with his men, awarding his trust and assigning posts based on the devotion and support they showed him: “He was in the habit of choosing collaborators not because of their ideas and abilities, but because of their aptitude for inserting themselves in his politics based on personal power,” G. Rochat, “Mussolini e le forze armate” [Mussolini and the armed forces], in A. Aquarone and M. Vernassa, eds., Il regime fascista [The fascist regime] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974), 113–32, 123. 46  G.S. Filatov, La campagna orientale di Mussolini [Mussolini’s eastern campaign] (Milan: Mursia, 1979), 8. 47  M. Correnti [P. Togliatti], Discorsi agli italiani [Speeches to the Italian people] (Rome: Società Editrice L’Unità, 1945), 9. Mario Correnti was the pseudonym Togliatti used on Radio Moscow (whereas within the Comintern he went by the name of Ercole Ercoli). 48  L e operazioni delle unità italiane al fronte russo (1941-1943) [Operations by the Italian units on the Russian front (1941–1943)] (Rome: Stato maggiore dell’esercito, 2000), 22ff. 49  Ciano, Diario, 526. 50  Ibid., 526f. 51  Cf. M. Toscano, “L’intervento dell’Italia contro l’Unione Sovietica nel 1941 visto dalla nostra Ambasciata a Mosca” [Italy’s intervention against the Soviet Union in 1941 as seen from our embassy in Moscow], in A. Valori, La campagna di Russia, Csir-Armir. 1941-1943 [The Russian campaign: CSIR-ARMIR, 1941–1943] (Rome: Grafica nazionale editrice, 1950–1951). 52  General Messe led the CSIR from July 1941 to 31 October 1942, when he was replaced by General Francesco Zingales. On the matter of the prisoners, see Messe’s “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia” [Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia], in the appendix to his own book La guerra al fronte russo, 301–69. 53  Cf. A. Natalini, I rapporti tra Aeronautica italiana e tedesca durante la seconda guerra mondiale [Relationships between the Italian and German air forces during the second world war] (Cosenza: Giordano, 2004), 45. Later, at General Messe’s request, a number of SM.81s were added. These were supposed to compensate for logistical shortcomings, made worse by the vastness of the front. 54  It is worth bearing in mind that, as a result of inconsistent track gauges, many divisions were forced to cover hundreds of kilometers on foot before reaching the Don, where the front had established itself. For example, between July and November 1941, the Turin Division and part of the Pasubio Division marched 43

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for 1,300 kilometers from Hungary to Rykovo; and between July and August 1942, they marched for an additional 500 kilometers from Rykovo to the Don. The Ravenna and Sforzesca divisions covered on foot 850 and 900 kilometers respectively, from Kharkiv to the Don. The Cuneense Division marched for 560 kilometers, from Gorlovka to the Don; the Julia Division covered 300 kilometers, from Izium to the Don; and the Cosseria Division marched for 500 kilometers from Gorlovka to the Don. For more on this topic, see Dotazione indumenti e materiali per la stagione invernale 1942 [Provisions of clothes and materials for the 1942 winter season], attachment No. 1 to paper 3811/Comm. V.E., in I servizi logistici delle unità italiane al fronte russo. 1941-1943 [Logistical services of the Italian units on the Russian front, 1941–1943], AUSSME, 1975. 55   G. Angelucci, Uomini di vetro. Uomini di ghiaccio [Men of glass, men of ice], (Chieti: Solfanelli, 1991), 27. 56  The main problem afflicting the Italian troops’ kits in Russia had to do with footwear. In June 1942, the CSIR command suggested that the men’s short boots be replaced with typical Russian boots called burki, made up of several layers of quilted fabric, which would have to be produced on site. Manufacturing valenki, made of felt, appeared to be more difficult. Cf. F. Cappellano, “Scarpe di cartone e divise di tela…” [Carton shoes and canvas uniforms], in Storia militare, X, no. 101 (February 2002), 29. 57  Memorandum of the CSIR special commissariat dated 26 June 1942, Oggetti mimetici per neve ed indumenti per il Csir [Camouflage for use in snow and clothing for the CSIR], cited in Cappellano, “Scarpe di cartone e divise di tela…”, 23, 25. 58  See the chart summarizing the situation of clothing and winter equipment for the ARMIR issued in August 1942 in Dotazione indumenti e materiali per la stagione invernale 1942, in Cappellano, “Scarpe di cartone e divise di tela…”, 24. 59  Ibid., 29. 60  Cf. ibid. In November 1944, General Carlo Biglino, in his capacity as ARMIR quartermaster, was accused by the Military Personnel Purge Commission “of ineptitude at logistical organization in anticipation of winter needs” (ibid., note 11). 61  Report by the command of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia, Operations Office, to the Supreme Command, reference No. 3713, in attachment No. 51 to DS 680, AUSSME, 1. 62  Ibid., 2. 63  Ibid., 5. 64  Ibid., 6. 65  See the reports dated 5 and 24 March, reference No. 1740 and No. 2391 respectively, sent by the Command of the CSIR, Operations Office, to the Supreme Command (and to the General Staff of the Royal Army), both of which were signed by the Army Corps’ commander Giovanni Messe, DS 600, attachment to the March folder, AUSSME. 66  Upon hearing about Italy’s declaration of war against the Soviet Union, many men, particularly troop members, showed their discontent: following their time home on furlough, granted to them after they had served in Albania, many soldiers returned to their units four or five days late, and gave vent to their frustration by throwing everything upside down in the barracks, or demonstrating

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against the war in the stations. Cf. the record of the interrogation of the prisoner Antonio Astediano, sent to Dimitrov on 6 December 1942, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 18, l. 18–26. Confidential. 67  Record of the interrogation held on 23 September 1942 of the Italian Army POW Sargeant Oviedo Bandini, born in 1916, captured on 22 September 1942, in Ca Fsb RF, f. 14, op. 4, d. 912, l. 182–89. Original. The interrogation was carried out by Tarabrin. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 2016), document II. 68  L. Vigo, Non prendere freddo. Il racconto di un reduce del corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia [Don’t get cold: The account of a CSIR veteran] (Pavia: Iuculano, 2000), 10. Born in 1920, Vigo was a second lieutenant assigned to the 81st Infantry Regiment of the Turin Division. He volunteered in the war and asked to be included among the very small number of men who, on their first appointment, would take service with the mobilized regiment set to leave for Russia (ibid., 19). 69  E. Franzoni, Memorie di prigionia. Russia, un sacerdote dal fronte alla deportazione 1941-1946 [Memoirs of captivity: Russia, a priest from the front to deportation, 1941–1946] (Brescia: Nordpress, 2008), 23. Father Enelio Franzoni, the chaplain of the Pasubio Division, returned from captivity on 22 August 1946. He died at the age of ninety-five in 2007, in Bologna. 70  R. Lerici, Relazione sul ripiegamento effettuato dalla divisione “Torino” dal 19 dicembre ’42 al 16 gennaio 1943. Alcune considerazioni [Report on the retreat of the Turin Division from 19 December 1942 to 16 January 1943: Some observations], attachment No. 3 to DS 603, AUSSME, 2. Regarding logistical and tactical matters, see also the reports by General G. Nasci, commander of the Alpine Army Corps, Relazione sui fatti d’arme dal 14 al 31 gennaio 1943 [Report on feats of arms between 14 and 31 January 1943], AUSSME, and by General E. Battisti, La divisione alpina “Cuneense” al fronte russo. 1942-43 [The Cuneense Alpine Division on the Russian front, 1942–43], AUSSME. 71  Ibid., item 5. 72  Ibid., item 8. 73  Cf. Bedeschi, Centomila gavette di ghiaccio [One hundred thousand ice mess tins] (Milan: Mursia, 1994), 145ff. On the use of alpine servicemen, see Scotoni and Filonenko, eds., L’occupazione [The occupation], 78, 80. Further, see H. Hamilton, Sacrifice on the Steppe: The Italian Alpine Corps in the Stalingrad Campaign, 1942–1943 (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishing, 2011). 74  Cf. UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia [Report on the Italian prisoners of war in Russia], eds. C. Vicentini and P. Resta (Cassano Magnago (VA): Crespi, 1995), 10. 75  Cf. Bedeschi, Centomila gavette di ghiaccio, 230, 244f and G. Beraudi, Vainà kaputt. Guerra e prigionia in Russia (1942-1945) [Vainà kaputt: War and imprisonment in Russia (1942–1945)] (Rovereto, TN: Museo storico italiano della guerra, 1996), 36. 76  Bedeschi, Centomila gavette di ghiaccio, 289f. Regarding the retreat, see E. Corradi, La ritirata di Russia [The retreat in Russia] (Milan: Longanesi, 1965). See also, A. Caruso, Tutti i vivi all’assalto. L’epopea degli alpini in Russia [All survivors charge: The feats of the Italian alpine servicemen in Russia] (Milan: Longanesi, 2003).

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77

 Cf. O. Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (London: Macmillan, 2001). Regarding the relationship between Germans and Italians during the retreat, see A. Massignani, Alpini e tedeschi sul Don. Documenti e testimonianze sulla ritirata del corpo d’armata alpino e del XXIV Panzerkorps germanico in Russia nel gennaio 1943—con diario di guerra del “generale tedesco presso l’8a Armata” [Italian alpine servicemen and the Germans on the Don: Documents and accounts on the retreat of the Italian Alpine Army Corps and the German XXIV Panzerkorps in Russia in January 1943, with the war diary of the “German general taken by the 8th Army”] (Valdagno, VI: Rossato, 1991). 78  L. Zazzero, La mia odissea [My odyssey], typewritten diary, 38, Pieve S. Stefano (AR): Fondazione Archivio diaristico nazionale, coll. MG/99, 1. Zazzero was born in Cassano Magnago (VA) on 6 September 1922 and died in 2000; he was an alpine serviceman in the Monte Cervino Skiers Battalion. 79  Cf. UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia, 15. 80  C. Chiavazza, Scritto sulla neve. Diario di un cappellano militare in Russia [Written on the snow: The diary of a military chaplain in Russia] (Chiari, BS: Nordpress, 2008), 41. Father Carlo Chiavazza served as chaplain to the Tridentina Alpine Division, headquartered in Podgornoe. 81  Bedeschi, Centomila gavette di ghiaccio, 336. 82  Chiavazza, Scritto sulla neve, 44. 83  Bedeschi, Centomila gavette di ghiaccio, 366ff. 84  Chiavazza, Scritto sulla neve, 46–47. 85  C. Gnocchi, Cristo con gli Alpini [Christ with the alpines] (Milan: Mursia, 2008), 15–16. 86  The penetration of Soviet armored troops was extremely fast: by 19 January they had occupied Nikolayevka, which the Tridentina Division would reach on the 26th. Also on 19 January, the Red Army had taken Valuyki, which the Cuneense Division would reach on the 28th, only to be completely annihilated. 87  Le operazioni delle unità italiane al fronte russo. 88  C. Streit, Sowjetische Kriegsgefangenen in deutscher Hand: ein Forschungsüberblick, in Klaus-Dieter Müller et al., Die Tragödie der Gefangenschaft in Deutschland und in der Sowjetunion. 1941-1956 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 281–90. The information provided by the Soviet General Staff also speaks of about 5.8 million prisoners captured by the Germans. Cf. Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 9. 89  G. Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad (London: Longman, 2002), 25. 90  German liaison command, No. 27/42, special orders by the Supreme Army Command, issued following the increased use of allied forces, 16 July 1942, TsAMORF, f. 500, op. 6, d. 130, l. 5. 91  Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad, 27. Soviet prisoners were killed without mercy, as recalled by H. Gerlach Gerlach, L’Armata tradita [The betrayed army] (Milan: Garzanti, 1959), 214: “In the gathering center of Berestechko, at night, they’d killed sixty Soviet officers for pure fun, opening fire from their guard towers.” To address the matter in greater depth, see Streit, Sowjetische Kriegsgefangenen in deutscher Hand: ein Forschungsüberblick; V. Naumov and L. Reshin, “Sovetskie voyennoplennye: takoj tragedii istoriya eshche ne znala” [Soviet prisoners of war: History had not yet experienced such a tragedy], in Rossiiskie vesti, 27 January 1995; VV.AA., Tragediya i geroizm. Sovetskie voyennoplennye. 1941-1945 [Tragedy

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and heroism: Soviet prisoners of war, 1941–1945] (Moscow, 1999); K.C. Berkhoff, “The ‘Russia’ Prisoners of War in Nazi-Ruled Ukraine as Victims of Genocidal Massacre,” in Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 15, no. 1 (2001), 1–32. Regarding the diplomatic negotiations on the Soviet prisoners, see S. Picciaredda, Diplomazia umanitaria. La Croce Rossa nella Seconda guerra mondiale [Humanitarian diplomacy: The Red Cross in the Second World War] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), 111–19. 92  General Staff, Operations Office, reference No. 10241/Op., to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Presidency of the Council, to the Ministry of War, to the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, re: Russian prisoners of war, in ASMAE, series Affari politici [Political affairs series]. 1931–1945, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3, 1; see also, Messe, La guerra al fronte russo, 92. 93  Ibid., 303f. 94  Prigionieri di guerra russi, 1–2. 95  Ibid., 2. 96  Note of gratitude by the Russian prisoners interned in the camp of Karinskaya, on the Don front, October 1942, AUSSME, Fondo Messe, b. 7, photographic documentation. 97  Excerpt from the UMVD report on the Voronezh region dated 22 February 1949. Secret. Copy No. 1, attached to Relazione di Kruglov a Molotov sui criminali di guerra italiani [Kruglov’s report to Molotov on Italian war crimes], Secret. Tovarishchu Molotovu [To comrade Molotov], 2 March 1949, in Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 74. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XXI. 98  Messe, La guerra al fronte russo, 92. 99  Zazzero, La mia odissea, 8. 100  Carabiniere Rinaldo Di Filippo’s diary, Daghela lu la carne grassa, typewritten (13), Pieve S. Stefano (AR): Fondazione Archivio diaristico nazionale, coll. MG/90, 5. 101  Diary of Bruno Doni (6th Bersaglieri Regiment from Bologna, 5th Company, fanfare unit, p.m. 40), Sulle rive del Don, typewritten, ibid., MG/07, 19. 102  Ibid., 7. 103  Rapporto sul villaggio di Novo Melniza, soviet rurale di Glinoe, distretto di Ostrogozhsk, regione di Voronezh [Report on the village of Novo Melnitsa, rural soviet of Glinoe, Ostrogozhsk district, Voronezh region], 30 January 1943, in TsAMORF, f. 203, op. 2847, d. 61, l. 146, provided in full in G. Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 408–9. 104  Ibid., 409. 105  Cf. T. Schlemmer, Invasori, non vittime. La campagna italiana di Russia. 19411943 [Invaders, not victims: The Italian campaign in Russia, 1941–1943] (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005), 94. Schlemmer features the order Prigionieri di guerra. Norme per la segnalazione dei prigionieri di guerra catturati in Russia [Prisoners of war: Rules for the reporting of prisoners of war captured in Russia], Pasubio Division, September–October 1941, attachment No. 96, CSIR Command, Services Office, 11 September 1941, AUSSME, DS II 628. 106  Cf. Schlemmer, Invasori, non vittime, 96. 107  Y et, as men were needed in Italy for labor, particularly in the mines, the Supreme Command asked the OKW for up to 20,000 Soviet prisoners to be transferred there directly from Germany. In December, the command changed

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its mind when epidemic typhus broke out in the camps, which might have spread to Italy if the prisoners had in fact been transferred (cf. ibid., 94). 108  Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 184. 109  In charge of the German liaison unit, General Kurt Von Tippelskirch was an extremely self-confident man, fully convinced of the German troops’ superiority. He lost no opportunity to explain to his Italian allies the errors of their ways and their omissions, often offending their sensitivities as a result. Overstepping the bounds of his post, he took charge of the ARMIR alongside Gariboldi. 110  Verona, 10 December 1942, Situazione attuale dell’Armir in Russia [Current situation of the ARMIR in Russia], ACS, Interior Ministry, DGPS—Political Police Division, Cat. P 65, Confidential, b. 215, fasc. 2—Italian Military Expeditionary Corps in Russia, 1939. 111  Prigionieri di guerra russi, 3. 112  Ibid. Messe recalls that the man in charge of the camp in Rykovo was looked down on by the local German command because he had prisoners take baths (ibid.). 113  Cf. Messe, Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia, 304. 114  Ministry of War—Former Enemy Prisoners Office, Prigionieri di guerra russi, reference No. 188, Rome, 12 February 1945, sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Chief of Staff, among others, ASMAE, serie Affari politici. 1931–1945, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3. General Gazzera, a prisoner in the United States repatriated in December 1943, had been appointed High Commissar for Prisoners of War and Repatriates by Badoglio in April 1944. The Commissariat had been established to carry out a census of military men located all over the world, and of the prisoners in the hands of allied powers. Before it was set up, there was only the Central Office for Assistance and News on Prisoners, with gathering centers in Naples, Foggia, Lecce and Aversa, which only concerned itself with military men seized on Italian soil before the armistice was signed. 115  Cf. Scotoni and Filonenko, L’occupazione, 185. The camp of Kantemirovka had been set up in July 1942 in the Krasnyj Partizan kolkhoz. As many as 70,000 prisoners were interned there. The camp of Rossosh, opened by the Germans on 7 July 1942, came to hold 10,000–14,000 Soviet prisoners and refugee families (ibid., 184–85). 116  Spravka chrezvychainoi Gosudarstvennoi Komissii. O zlodeyaniyakh fashistskikh voysk na territorii Sovetskogo Soyuza [Extraordinary State Commission’s Report on Atrocities by Fascist Troops in the Territory of the Soviet Union], signed by secretary Bogoyavlenskij, undated, 21–33, 30–31. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder]. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XIX. 117  Ibid. Other documents corroborate this account. On this topic, cf. S. Abroskin, V. Nejno and M. Sergeenko, Zemlya, zalitaya krovyu [Earth, blood-soaked], Voronezh, Oblastnoe knigoizdatelstvo, 1944, 35. On the killing of large numbers of Soviet prisoners, even by way of starvation, see also, T. Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 118  R egarding the extremely harsh directives Marconi issued, see “Istruzioni del comandante del distretto di Rossosh’, ten. col. Marconi (19.10.1942)” [Instructions by Rossosh district commander, Lieutenant Colonel Marconi (19 October 1942)], in Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 349–51.

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119

 Spravka chrezvychaynoy Gosudarstvennoy Komissii, 22. Captain Luigi Grappelli was in charge of the engineering command of the Turin Division until 1941, when he was appointed to the civil affairs office of the same command. 120  Ibid. 121  Ibid., 22–23. 122  C f. Unnamed author, Diario di un autiere dell’Armir [Diary of an ARMIR driver], AUSSME, L-3, 58/46, entry from 1 September 1942. 123  Diario personale di un militare degli alpini che è andato in Russia con l’Armir [Personal diary of an alpine serviceman who went to Russia with the ARMIR], AUSSME, L-3, 58/45, entry from 27 January 1943. 124  Radio message from the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment dated 27 December 1941, AUSSME, DS II 648, 3rd Celere Division. 125  Order from the command of the II Army Corps, reference No. 2949/02, AUSSME, DS II 885, DS Cosseria Division, September–October 1942 attachment No. 186. 126  Cf. Schlemmer, Invasori, non vittime, 106. 127  Pravda, 4 June 1942. 128  Cf. E. Bacon, The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light of Archives (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 92. These, as Soviet officials in charge of the repatriation would tell their British colleagues, were detained to the corrective camps. Cf. Geller and Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the USSR from 1917 to the Present, 451. 129  Bacon, The Gulag at War, 93. At the end of the war, many refused to be repatriated—the so-called nevozvrashchentsy (“non-returners”). 130  Ibid., 92. 131  Cf. T.G. Ibatullin, Vojna i plen [War and captivity] (Saint Petersburg, 1999), 18, which features the decree dated 18 August 1945 by the State Committee for Defense: “all prisoners and civilian deportees the right age to be conscripted into national service are placed in ‘labor battalions’ and sent to the corrective labor camps of the Siberian and northernmost regions as punishment.” 132  Ibid. 133  Bacon, The Gulag at War, 93. 134  In July 1942, the Germans captured Soviet General A.A. Vlasov, commander of the 2nd Assault Army, who declared himself willing to collaborate with them. In 1943, he established the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), primarily made up of Soviet prisoners and used for operations alongside the Germans. Together with eleven high officers from his army, Vlasov surrendered to the Allies, but neither the Americans nor the British had any interest in granting him asylum, a decision that would have compromised relations with the Soviet Union. Taken back to Moscow, the vlasovtsy underwent a summary trial for high treason. Vlasov and his men were hanged on 2 August 1946. 135  “We agree with your decision regarding the Russian prisoners, General Vlasov’s men—they are to be shot dead.” Ukazanie G. Dimitrova I. Tito o rasstrele plennykh vlasovtsev [G. Dimitrov’s recommendation to I. Tito on the execution by firing squad of the vlasovtsy prisoners], RGASPI, f. 495, collected materials.

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  V. Di Michele, Io, prigioniero in Russia. Dal diario di Alfonso Di Michele [I, a  prisoner in Russia: from the diary of Alfonso Di Michele] (Florence: Maremmi, 2008), 81. 2  On this issue, see the volume by V.A. Nevezhin, Sindrom nastupatelnoj vojny. Sovetskaya propaganda v preddverii “sviashchennikh boev” [War of attack syndrome: Soviet propaganda verging on “Holy War”] (Moscow: Airo-XX, 1997). By 1938 an anti-German current existed in Soviet cinema, despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Eisenstein’s famous movie Alexander Nevsky evoked the invasion of Russia by German soldiers, who, like forbearers of the Nazis, intended to subjugate the Slavs and other nationalities with the same slogans and the same fanaticism (cf. R. Taylor, Film propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, London: Croom Helm, 1979, 116ff.). As for the use of propaganda among the Russian and Ukrainian populations, as well as among soldiers, see also, A.I. Efimov, O yazyke propagandista [The propagandist’s language] (Moscow: Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1951), which illustrates the best techniques one must use for the purpose of effective propaganda, according to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin. 3  Cf. G. Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia” [Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia], in appendix to the book by the same author, La guerra al fronte russo. Il corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Csir) [War on the Russian front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR)] (Milan: Mursia, 2005), 347. 4  In his diary, Severino Martini recounts of an Italian officer killed by Soviet guards, who believed him to be German because of the greatcoat he was wearing (S. Martini, Memoriale di un reduce dai lagher sovietici [Memoirs of a Soviet camp survivor], Pieve S. Stefano (AR): Fondazione Archivio diaristico nazionale, coll. MG/94, 16). 5  Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia,” 339. 6  Ibid. The massacre had taken place by order of the political commissar. As we shall see, the politruk accompanied troops, carrying out activities of propaganda and providing moral support. 7  Postanovleniye Snk Sssr N. 1798-800 “Polozheniye o voyennoplennykh” [Decree by the SNK of the USSR No. 1798–800 “Condition of the prisoners of war”], 1 July 1941, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 619, l. 297–299. Confidential. 8  G. Alfieri, “Aspetti sociologici della comunità dei prigionieri di guerra nei campi di concentramento dell Urss, con particolare riguardo ai primi mesi di prigionia” [Sociological aspects of the POW community in USSR concentration camps, particularly during the first months of captivity], in Atti del XIV Congresso internazionale di Sociologia [Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of Sociology], ed. C. Gini (Rome: Società italiana di Sociologia, 1950), vol. II, 11. 9  Lieutenant Beraudi recounts that some prisoners had come up with the idea of trading one shoe with a comrade, for no one would ever think of “taking a pair of mismatched shoes away from us” ”. Cf. G. Beraudi, Vainà kaputt. Guerra e prigionia in Russia 1942-1945 [Vainà kaputt: War and imprisonment in Russia 1942–1945] (Rovereto, TN: Museo storico italiano della guerra, 1996), 83. 10  Alfieri, “Aspetti sociologici della comunità dei prigionieri di guerra nei campi di concentramento dell’Urss,” 11.

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 Di Michele, Io, prigioniero in Russia, 82. In this account, as in others, soldiers hailing from Asian republics and displaying certain features are incorrectly referred to as “Mongols.” 12  Account by Luigi Venturini, the radio telegraphist of the Alpine Army Corps command, provided in G. Bedeschi, Fronte russo: c’ero anch’io [Russian front: I was there too] (Milan: Mursia, 1983, vol. II), 405. A very similar account is given in Venturini’s own memoir, La fame dei vinti. Diario di prigionia in Russia di un sergente della Julia [The defeated’s hunger: Russian captivity diary of a sergeant of the Julia], (Udine: Gaspari, 2003), 24. 13  V. Bozzini, Neve rossa. Dall’Ucraina alla Siberia: il dopo Nikolajewka [Red snow: From the Ukraine to Siberia, post-Nikolayevka] (Chiari, BS: Nordpress, 2008), 21. 14  It was likely the cavalry; the Cossack military unit sided with the Axis army. 15  Account by Medical Lieutenant of the 10th Motorized Unit Giannetto Palmas, in Russia, edited by the UNIRR, 1948, single issue. 16  Account by the Alpine soldier Battista Candela, of the 2nd Regiment, in N. Revelli, La strada del davai [The davai road] (Turin: Einaudi, 1967), 70. 17  Account by Second Lieutenant of the 81st Infantry Regiment Mario Pedroni, ibid. 18  Account by Second Lieutenant of the Alpine Troops Giuseppe Cumina, ibid., 30. 19  Account by Second Lieutenant Giuseppe Oleandri, ibid. 20  Vicentini, Noi soli vivi [We, the only survivors] (Milan: Mursia, 1997), 51. On the relationship prisoners had with Russian civilians, see, among others, G. Gherardini, La vita si ferma [Life stops] (Milan: Baldini e Castoldi, 1948), 190, and M. Rigoni Stern, Il sergente nella neve [The sergeant in snow] (Turin: Einaudi, 1982). 21  Giovanni Bosio, Alpine soldier, in Revelli, La strada del davai, 200. 22  Account cited in UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia [Report on the Italian prisoners of war in Russia], eds. C. Vicentini e P. Resta (Cassano Magnago, VA: Crespi, 1995), 119. 23  Report by the Reserve Lieutenant Silvio Sala, dated 18 July 1946, in Stralcio delle relazioni riassuntive sulle notizie raccolte negli interrogatori dei reduci dalla prigionia in Russia [Extract from the summarizing reports on the news collected during the interrogations of Russian imprisonment survivors], AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 3. Khrenovoe camp No. 81 was a sorting camp in the Voronezh region (cf. Italian Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen [Commissariato di Onorcaduti], Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni [CSIR-ARMIR, prison camps and common graves] (Gaeta, LT: Stabilimento grafico militare, 1996), 11). On this camp’s mortality, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 2016), document III. 24  From the report issued by Reserve Lieutenant Valentino Spada, of the 5th Infantry Regiment, Military District of Monza, Information Office, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1. Oranki camp No. 74 was in the Gorky region (Nizhny Novgorod), 400 km east of Moscow, on the Volga. 25  From the report issued by Medical Lieutenant Temistocle Pallavicini, of the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment, 3rd Celere Division, repatriated on 9 July 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 4.

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 G. Gherardini, Morire giorno per giorno [Dying day by day] (Milan: Baldini e Castoldi, 1948), 180. 27  Vicentini, Noi soli vivi, 57. 28  Notiziario Unirr [UNIRR news bulletin], October–December 2000, No. 68, 22. The account, transmitted from Moscow to the Italian Commissariat Honoring the Fallen (Commissariato di Onorcaduti), was published only in 2000. The first two parts were issued on Nos. 66 and 67 of the Notiziario. 29  Prikaz Nko N. 001 ot 2 yanvarya 1943 g., GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 655, l. 115–116. Original. Secret. 30  Ibid. 31  Prikaz Nkvd Sssr n. 0049 ob okazanii organami Nkvd sodejstviya Nko v evakuatsii voyennoplennykh s fronta [NKVD decree No. 0049 on the provision by the bodies of the NKVD of assistance to the NKO in the evacuation of prisoners of war from the front], GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 655, l. 115–116. Original. Secret. 32  C f. Gherardini, La vita si ferma, 176. In some cases, so many men were crammed into the cars the guards found it difficult to close the sliding doors behind them (cf. Venturini, La fame dei vinti, 32). 33  Vremennaia instruktsiya o konvoirovanii voennoplennykh iz priemnych punktov v lageriy-raspredeliteli chastiami konvoynykh voysk Nkvd [Temporary instruction on the transfer of prisoners of war by NKVD escort troops from gathering points to sorting camps], GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 619, l. 195–209. Original. Confidential. 34  Ibid., l. 196. 35  Vicentini, Noi soli vivi, 84. 36  Account by Giuseppe Zirone, a blackshirt “centurion,” in Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia,” 37. 37  Account by the Alpine soldier Bruno Bernardoni, of the 2nd Regiment, ibid. 38  General Renato Saggese, former director of the foreign office of the Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, confirmed as much: “In the town of Rada, east of Tambov, in the wood in front of the train station, there are common graves holding 2,000 Italian prisoners who died on the trains” (R. Saggese, Rapporto riguardante la ricognizione delle aree di sepoltura dei prigionieri italiani in alcuni lager della ex Unione Sovietica [Report on the reconnaissance of areas used for the burial of Italian prisoners in some former–Soviet Union camps], Rome, June 1993). 39  B. Cecchini, Memorie di un celoviek bersagliere. La prigionia in Russia di un ufficiale del 3o reggimento: 1942-1946 [Memoirs of a chelovek-bersagliere: A 3rd-Regiment officer’s captivity in Russia, 1942–1946], ed. A. Ferioli (Castel Maggiore, BO: Il Mascellaro, 2007), 60. 40  Cf. Venturini, La fame dei vinti, 32. 41  This is what Second Lieutenant Guido Martelli—enlisted in the 120th Artillery Regiment of the Celere Division, and a survivor of imprisonment—said to me during an interview on 8 February 2001. He is also the one who recounted the last time he saw his cousin Vittorio, also a prisoner, in the camp of Oranki: Ultimo incontro a Oranki. Ricordo di Dodo (Vittorio Rondelli, 1918-1943) [Last encounter in Oranki: Recollections of Dodo (Vittorio Rondelli, 1918–1943)] (Bologna: Pendragon, 2005). His letters, sent to his family before he was captured, were published jointly in L. Marisaldi, Un uomo, un soldato. Memoria di Guido Martelli [A man, a soldier: In memory of Guido Martelli] (Rome: Cromografica Roma per L’Espresso, 2013).

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42

 Vremennaya instruktsiya o konvojrovanii voyennoplennykh iz priyemnykh punktov v lagerya-raspredeliteli chastyami konvojnykh vojsk Nkvd. 43  Ibid. 44  Cf. the table in V.P. Galitsky, “Vrazheskiye voennoplennye v Sssr. (1941-1945 gg)” [Prisoners of war, enemies of the USSR 1941–1945], in Voyenno-istoricheskij zhurnal, no. 9 (1990), 40. 45  Prikaz No 00242 O meropriyatiyakh po uporyadochneniyu konvojrovaniya voyennoplennykh [Decree No. 00242 on measures for the reorganization of the transfer of prisoners of war], GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 132, l. 165–165 verso–166, l. 166 verso. Secret. 46  Ibid., l. 165 verso. 47  Ibid., l. 166. 48  Comparing the ways prisoners of war were transported under Stalin with those prevalent under the Tsar during the First World War, it becomes apparent that the Soviet government was much indebted to Tsarist policies. The train routes adopted by the NKVD, for instance, were those used at the time of the Tsar. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that some of the prison camps were the ones employed under the Tsar, as in the case of camp No. 7062 in Darniza, Kiev. Cf. M. Rossi, I prigionieri dello zar [The Tsar’s prisoners] (Milan: Mursia, 1996), 87–98). 49  Camp No. 160 in Suzdal lay in one of Russia’s holy cities, in the Vladimir region, between Moscow and Gorky. It was located in a seventeenth-century convent-fortress. In the early months of 1943 a large number of Italian prisoners captured between Christmas and the end of 1942 were locked up in there.

CHAPTER 2 1

 The volume Voennoplennye v Sssr. 1939-1956. Dokumenty i materialy [Prisoners of War in the USSR, 1939–1956: Documents and materials] (Moscow: Logos, 2000), presents numerous POW-related decrees stored in the GARF. 2  J. Stalin, On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: Speeches, Orders of the Day and Answers to Foreign Press Correspondents (London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d.), 23. 3  Ibid., 30. 4  During the Second World War, a new organ was established within this institution, the Council for Military-Political Propaganda, “which was to have a very important role in developing and strengthening ideological work in Soviet armed forces”. V. Sablin, “O deyatelnosti Soveta voyenno-politicheskoj propagandy. 1942-1944 gg” [Activity of the Military-Political Propaganda Council, 1942–44], in Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 4 (1978), 90ff. The council was set up on 12 June 1942 following a decision by the Party’s Central Committee, in a critical phase of the war for the Soviet Union, when boosting ideological education among the country’s fighting forces had become necessary. 5  After 1945 he was succeeded by Andrey Zhdanov, director of the Agitprop section and of the Central Committee’s foreign policies section; starting in 1948 that role was taken on by Mikhail Suslov. 6  After the Comintern dissolved, the relevant structures in the IKKI were transferred within the party apparatus.

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  On this matter, see RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 10.   In meetings with the Red Army’s political instructors, Dimitrov spoke of the experience of Bolshevik propaganda and agitation among men seduced by fascism. “To fight against fascism successfully, he said, you must understand it ‘perfectly and from all angles,’ study it concretely and without interruption, consider all its distinctive traits, and expose the propaganda maneuvers of Hitler’s men without hesitation.” M. Burcev, “G. Dimitrov v gody borby s germanskim fashizmom” [G. Dimitrov in the years of struggle against German fascism], in Voyenno-istoricheskij zhurnal, no. 6 (1972), 69. The author had been able to listen to Dimitrov’s speeches in person. 9   Starting in June 1943, the Communist Party of Italy took the name of Italian Communist Party (PCI, Partito comunista italiano). 10 Resheniye o raspuske Ikki [Directive on the dissolution of the IKKI], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 73, d. 174, l. 77–82. 11  See ibid. and H. von Einsiedel, Tagebuch der Versuchung, (Frankfurt a.M.-BerlinVienna: Ullstein, 1985), 76. 12  Cf. V.P. Galitsky, “Repatriatsionnaya politika Sovetskogo pravitelstva vo vtoroj mirovoj vojne i posle neye” [The Soviet government’s repatriation policy during and after the Second World War], in VV.AA., Tragediya plena. Materialy nauchnoprakticheskoj konferencii [The tragedy of imprisonment: Proceedings from the practical-scientific conference] (Krasnogorsk, 1996); see also, Vengerskie voyennoplennye v Sssr. Dokumenty, 1941-1953 [Hungarian prisoners of war in the USSR: Documents, 1941–1953], eds. D.I. Borisov, E.M. Varga et al. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2005). 13  The notes were not systematic. Also, more often than not, the recorded information was inaccurate. The Russian soldiers wrote down in Cyrillic what they were told by the dead prisoner’s comrades. In many cases, the survivors did not know all of their partner’s personal data. Concerning the registration of such data, Carlo Vicentini, Second Lieutenant of the “Monte Cervino” Skiers Battalion, recalls that upon capture the Soviet soldiers asked for neither his rank nor his name (interview dated 28 April 2000, Monte Porzio Catone). Doctor Veniero Ajmone Marsan, former Second Lieutenant of the Alpine Corps, also recalls arriving in Tambov on 27 January and being asked for his name and rank only on 15 May (interview dated 10 March 2000, Rome). 14  GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 606, l. 351–384. Original. Confidential. 15  GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 205, vol. 12, l. 313–316. 16  Ibid. 17  See RGVA, D. 03-1859853. 18  On this matter, I will reference only the account of a former prisoner, interviewed in November 1999, and subsequently in March 2000 and in September 2001, who told me how he handed himself over as a prisoner on the RussianGerman front. The advice to surrender and allow the Russians to take him prisoner had been given to him in Italy by PCI members active in his city. Ordered to stand sentry just meters from an enemy station, he had asked a Soviet soldier, in Russian, to light his cigarette. Identified by the local politruk, he had been taken prisoner during an operation together with other of fellow soldiers, whom he had convinced to desert with him. Once imprisoned, in the Tambov camp, he had been chosen to attend the antifascist school of Krasnogorsk. He’d thus been 8

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able to visit the camps where Italian prisoners of war were detained, in order to carry out propaganda activities; further, even after his repatriation, he had been asked to carry out some operations for the Russians. 19  Guido Martelli, interview dated 8 February 2001, San Lazzaro di Savena (BO). 20  The question “Have you or your relatives ever been prisoners, or have you ever lived in the territories occupied by the Germans during the war?” was removed from the form only in 1992. Cf. V. Vsevolodov, “Arifmetika” i “algebra” ucheta voyennoplennykh i internirovannykh v sisteme Upvi Nkvd-Mvd Sssr v period 1939-1956 [“Arithmetic” and “algebra” in the counting of prisoners of war and internees in the system of the GUPVI of the USSR’s NKVD-MVD, 1939–1956], in Tragediya vojny—tragediya plena [The tragedy of war: The tragedy of imprisonment] (Moscow: Memorial Museum of German Antifascists in Krasnogorsk, 1999), 31. 21  Account by Monsignor Enelio Franzoni, former chaplain of the Pasubio Division, Bologna, 2 December 1999. See also, G. Gherardini, La vita si ferma [Life stops] (Milan: Baldini e Castoldi, 1948), 165. 22  L. Nannini, Prigioniero in Urss [Prisoner in the USSR] (Pistoia: Nannini, 1993), 178. Loris Nannini, former lieutenant of the 371st Squadron of the 22nd Autonomous Fighter Unit deployed alongside the CSIR, was the first Italian prisoner of war, and the only aircraft pilot to be repatriated. After his plane was brought down on 2 September 1941, he was held captive by the Russians for five years, and finally repatriated with the other officers in July 1946. The story of his imprisonment is rather unique: he was held in the Lubyanka and the Butyrskaya prisons, Moscow’s two worst jails, as well as in several camps, including the prison camps on the Volga, with Soviet political detainees and common criminals. His text offers a dramatic repertoire of the suffering endured by Gulag prisoners of war and detainees. The author also recalls the questioning he was subjected to by Nikita Khrushchev. 23  Ibid. 24  Ibid., 212. 25  “Resoconto del sacerdote Corrado Bertoldi rimpatriato dalla Russia (Vaticano, 21 dicembre 1946)” [Report by the priest Corrado Bertoldi, repatriated from Russia (Vatican, 21 December 1946)], in Inter Arma Caritas. L’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano per i Prigionieri di guerra istituito da Pio XII (1939-1947) [Inter Arma Caritas: Vatican Information Office for prisoners of war established by Pius XII (1939–1947)], 2 volumes, vol. II, Documenti [Documents] (Vatican City: Vatican Secret Archives, 2004), 1138–40, 1138. 26  For more on this point, see S. Picciaredda, Diplomazia umanitaria. La Croce Rossa nella Seconda guerra mondiale [Humanitarian diplomacy: The Red Cross during the Second World War] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), 102ff. 27  “The Soviet Union is prepared to accept the proposal by the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the transmission of information on prisoners of war, if such information is transmitted by the countries warring against the Soviet Union as well. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov,” 27 June 1941 (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 054, op. 22, l. 22, d. 73, l. 36. Copy). 28  Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929.

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 Postanovleniye Snk Sssr N. 1798-800 “Polozheniye o voyennoplennykh” [Decree by the SNK of the USSR No. 1798–1800 “Condition of prisoners of war”], 1 July 1941, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 619, l. 297–299. Confidential. See also, Vasily S. Khristoforov, “I materiali degli archivi russi relativi alla sorte dei prigionieri di guerra italiani” [Russian archive material on the fate of Italian prisoners of war], in La campagna di Russia [The campaign in Russia], eds. Biagini and Zarcone (Rome: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercitio, 2013), 37–48. 30  K. Böhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in sowjetischer Hand. Ein Bilanz (Munich: Gieseking, 1996), 165. 31  Cf. G. Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia” [Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia], in appendix to the book by the same author, La guerra al fronte russo. Il corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Csir) [War on the Russian front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR)] (Milan: Mursia, 2005), 305. 32  Ibid. 33  Communication by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the International Committee of the Red Cross, signed by Cassinis, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 34  Cf. V.B. Konasov, Sudby nemetskikh voyennoplennykh v Sssr [The fate of German prisoners of war in the USSR] (Vologda, 1996), 17–23. 35  “Il delegato apostolico negli Usa Amleto Giovanni Cicognani al Sostituto della Segreteria di Stato Giovanni Battista Montini (Washington, 19 giugno 1943)” [Apostolic Delegate in the USA Giovanni Cicognani to Substitute for General Affairs to the Secretary of State Giovanni Battista Montini (Washington, 19 June 1943)], in Inter Arma Caritas, vol. II, Documenti, 817. 36  RGASPI, f. 527, op. 1, d. 1, 14. “Lettera di Bianco a Togliatti” [Bianco’s letter to Togliatti] was published in Italy on the magazine Panorama on 9 February 1992. When the letter was written, many Italian prisoners had not yet started their terrible train trips. 37  The text of the letter, containing some translation errors, first appeared on La Stampa on 15 February 1992, on page 4. The exact text may be found in R. Risaliti, Togliatti fra Gramsci e Neciaev [Togliatti between Gramsci and Neciaev] (Prato, FI: Omnia Minima, 1995), 58. 38  Even the Italian communist leader’s every move was well monitored by the NKVD. On 16 or 17 October 1941, Togliatti had been collected from the Lux Hotel, where he resided together with other international communist émigrés, to be questioned by the secret police. At the time, the situation in Moscow was very tense and the PCI leader was suspected of having relations with the Germans and of wanting to leave the USSR. Cf. N.D. Bočenina, La segretaria di Togliatti. Memorie di Nina Bočenina [Togliatti’s secretary: Nina Bochenina’s Memoirs] (Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1993), 23. 39  Cf. E. Aga Rossi and V. Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 207. 40  “Otechestvennye Arkhivy,” No. 3, 1992, 91 and 93. The original text of the letter is in RGASPI, f. 527, op. 1, d. 1, l. 18–25. 41  Ibid., 90. The original text is in RGASPI, f. 527, op. 1, d. 1, 26, 26 bis. 42  G. Dimitrov, Diario. Gli anni di Mosca (1934-1945) [Diary: The Moscow years (1934–1945)] ed. S. Pons (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 586. 43  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 256, l. 24. 44  Ibid. 45  Cf. Bočenina, La segretaria di Togliatti, 41.

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 GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 2. Top secret.  Ibid. 3  Compare with the attachment No. 1 to decree No. 00689, ibid. 4  Data drawn from RGVA, f. 1p, op. 3a, d. 1, l. 1–3. The twenty-four camps were spread in the republics of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in the Mari, Tatar and Mordovian autonomous republics, and in the regions of Vladimir, Vologod, Gorky, Ivanov, Irkutsk, Kalinin, Novosibirsk, and Smolensk. 5  Cf. “Lagerya Nkvd-Mvd Sssr dlya voyennoplennykh i internirovannykh. 19431951 gg” [Interior Ministry of the USSR NKVD camps for prisoners of war and internees, 1943–1951], in Voyennoplennye v Sssr. 1939-1956. Dokumenty i materialy [Prisoners of War in the USSR, 1939–1956: Documents and materials], ed. M.M. Zagorulko (Moscow: Logos, 2000), 1029–1037. See also, Vengerskiye voyennoplennye v Sssr. Dokumenty, 1941-1953 [Hungarian prisoners of war in the USSR: Documents, 1941–1953], eds. D.I. Borisov, E.M. Varga et al. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2005). 6  This includes camps where even a single Italian was detained, according to Doctor Vicentini, who bases his opinion on an analysis of the records sent by the Russian government (interview dated 28 April 2000, Monte Porzio Catone, Rome). 7  To delve deeper into the data provided, refer to the list Dislokatsiya frontovykh lagerej (Fppl), priyomnykh punkotv (Ppv), sbornykh punktov voyennoplennykh (Spb) po obsluzhivaniyu frontov. Po sostoyaniyu na 1 yanvarya 1945 [Distribution of frontline camps (FPPL), reception points (PPB), and prisoner-of-war gathering points (SPB), active on the front: Situation as of 1 January 1945]. The document, developed by the NKVD, was transmitted by the Russian government to the Italian Commissariat Honoring the Fallen. 8  For example, at one point camp No. 62 was located alongside Tambov camp No. 188; subsequently, that number was assigned to the Nekrilovo camp in the region of Voronezh; finally, in 1945, it was attributed to the Kiev camp, which comprised thirteen different sections. Cf. Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni [CSIR-ARMIR, prison camps and common graves] (Gaeta, LT: Stabilimento grafico militare, 1996), 1. 9  Here are a few examples of the complex system in place to number the camps, taken from the NKVD list. The number 100 was assigned to Susslonger and Zaparozhsk, located in the Mari Republic and in the Ukraine respectively, whereas the number 188 was used both for Rada-Tambov, in the region of the same name, and for Didililovsk, in Georgia. Two other camps in the Republic of Georgia were identified by a same number (No. 146). The number 15 was assigned to Imansk and Semenovsk, both of which were located in the territory of Primorye; the number 26 went to the camps of Farkhadsk and Andizhan, in Uzbekistan; the number 47 was attributed to Lesozavodsk, in the territory of Khabarovsk, and to Vaninsk, in the territory of Primorye. In some cases, the administration went so far as to use the same number three times: the number 211 was assigned both to Solombal and Arkhangel, in the Arkhangelsk region, and to Vytegra, in the Vologa region. Cf. “Lagerya Nkvd-Mvd Sssr dlya voyennoplennykh i internirovannykh. 1943-1951 gg”. 2

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 Nekrilovo lay in the region of Voronezh, on the Don, 150 km north of the Alpine Army Corps’ front. The Michurinsk camp was located in the Tambov region, south-east of Moscow, 100 km west of Tambov. Survivors also referred to it as Uchostoe. 11  In his memoirs, Alberto Massa Gallucci recalls the complaints he would frequently lodge with the camp administrations, which cost him punitive detention on more than a few occasions. Often, his complaints concerned the need for better food, cots for sick prisoners, razors and soap; occasionally, these requests were granted. Cf. A. Massa Gallucci, No! 12 anni prigioniero in Russia [No! Twelve years a prisoner in Russia] (Milan: Rizzoli, 1958), 64ff. Massa Gallucci was among the ARMIR prisoners detained in Russia until 1954 on war crime charges. 12  Doklad Bianko o rabote sredi italyanskikh voyennoplennykh v lagere 99 [Bianco’s report on the work carried out among the Italian prisoners of war in camp No. 99], 18 June 1942, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 26, l. 3. Confidential. 13  L. Nannini, Prigioniero in Urss [Prisoner in the USSR] (Pistoia: Nannini, 1993), 68. 14  “Suicides, particularly in the days immediately following capture, were very frequent, most prominently among officers. As no one had weapons, they hanged themselves at night, so that they might rest—and did they ever! It never occurred to me to end it all of my own accord; but I did often long to die. C. Bertoldi, La mia prigionia nei lager di Stalin [My captivity in Stalin’s camps] (Maniago, PN: Università della terza età delle valli del Cellina e del Colvera, 2001), 34. 15  Wired MVD order No. 216, Moscow, 10 April 1948, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 913, l. 231–232. Secret. See also, directive No. 371 dated 10 June 1949, which referred to the Italian and German prisoners still in the USSR, accused of war crimes, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 986, l. 12. Secret. Regarding suicides in the Gulag, cf. G.M. Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: The Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian System (New York-London: Sharpe, 2000), 103. 16  Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 328. While absent from the camps at the beginning of 1940, many million citizens of the Soviet Union had experienced the Gulag during previous years. According to Khlevniuk, approximately twenty-million people were condemned between 1930 and 1941 (ibid.). 17  Cf. E. Bacon, The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light of the Archives (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 62, 146. 18  Beria’s directive No. 23 dated 24 January 1942 urged labor camp and colony commanders to reduce overpopulation, and to improve medical care by having recourse to local resources. Cf. ibid., 147. 19  The letter dated 20 September 1939 is signed by Chernyshov. GARF, f. 5446, d. 2136, l. 15–16. Original. Secret. 20  Vypiska iz protokola n. 37 zasedaniya Ekonomsoveta pri Snk Sssr o normakh prodovolstvennogo snabzheniya voyennoplennykh [Extract of minutes No. 37 from the meeting of the Economic Council before the USSR’s SNK regarding the norms for the provisioning of food to the prisoners of war], 20 September 1939, signed by Mikoyan. GARF, f. 5446, op. 23 a, d. 2136, l. 19–20. Secret. According to the list, prisoners were even supposed to receive five match boxes and five packets of tobacco per month!

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21

 O n the eve of the war and during the years of the conflict, the USSR was a country divided in two: on the one hand, there were families whose closest members had been spared the regime’s violence, and, on the other, there were families who counted victims of repression and persecution among their members (cf. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag, 329). 22  It bears remembering that some prisoners of war shared the same fate as civilian internees and common prisoners of the USSR. This was the case, for instance, of the generals who, for a short time, were detained at the Lubyanka, and of the prisoners held in the USSR after the conflict on war crime charges. After 1946, such prisoners were transferred to several camps, until they were finally interned in camp No. 7062, in Kiev. After the war ended, and the last repatriations had occurred, there was no reason for prisoner-of-war camps to be kept open. Hence, the few remaining prisoners were interned in the Gulag camps. 23  Squad leaders didn’t always behave badly toward the detainees placed in their charge. In One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, the narrator, Shukhov, speaks of his team leader, who had already served nineteen years of detention by then, as an understanding man. He did not force prisoners to rise a moment too soon for a muster, and, when necessary, he knew how to bribe higher-ups with rations of pork fat in order to spare his team exceedingly hard work (cf. A. Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963), 26–27). 24  Cf. A. Kaminski, I campi di concentramento dal 1896 a oggi [Concentration camps from 1896 to the present] (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1997), 81. 25  Cf. decree No. 0463 dated 3 December 1942, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 119. According to this decree, a civilian internee was entitled to 300 grams of bread if he reached 50 percent of his production quota, 400 grams if he reached between 50 and 80 percent, 500 grams if he reached between 80 and 100 percent, and 600 grams if he reached 125 percent. Regarding the norms in place for civilian detainees, see also, Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag, 71. 26  Tortures and violence against politicians started in the halls of the NKVD, in the summer of 1937, following specific instructions by Stalin and Yezhov, who had deprecated the use of exceedingly delicate investigations (cf. Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism, 35). “To extort confessions, torture was very frequently used. One of the most common methods consisted in so-called chain questioning, during which investigators took turns, questioning the detainee without pause for days on end, depriving him of sleep and forcing him to remain standing or to sit in uncomfortable positions” (Khlevniuk, “I nuovi dati,” in Storica, no. 18 (2002), 18, and, by the same author, The History of the Gulag, 149ff.). 27  J. Brodskij, Solovki. Le isole del martirio. Da monastero a primo lager sovietico [Solovetsky, the islands of martyrdom: From monastery to first Soviet camp] (Milan: La Casa di Matriona, 1998), 61. 28  For data on the camps, refer to the Italian Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni, 6–18. 29  Founded by Count Orlov in 1776, and designed by the Italian architect Domenico Giraldi, the facility comprised stables and a racetrack extended over five square kilometers. 30  Bertoldi, La mia prigionia nei lager di Stalin, 35f. 31  C. Vicentini, Noi soli vivi [We, the only survivors] (Milan: Cavallotti, 1986), 94.

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 Cf. F. Gambetti, Né vivi né morti. Guerra e prigionia dell’Armir in Russia, 19421945 [Neither alive nor dead: ARMIR’s war and captivity in Russia, 1942–1945] (Milan: Mursia, 1972), 143. 33  A. Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa. Ricordi di prigionia [Those long days on the steppe: Recollections of imprisonment] (Pasian di Prato, UD: Campanotto, 1996), 94. 34  Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag, 69. 35  Account dated 10 February 2001 by Giuseppe Bassi of Padua, former Second Lieutenant of the 120th Artillery, Celere Division. The small loaves could weigh as much as 400 grams, but Russian bread (usually black bread) was very moist and heavy. 36  Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 149. 37  Vicentini, Noi soli vivi, 94. 38  Massa Gallucci, No! 12 anni prigioniero in Russia, 61. 39  Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 154f. 40  Ibid. 41  Ibid., 90. The original text is in RGASPI, f. 527, op. 1, d. 1, 26, 26 verso. 42  Testimony, AUSSME, DS2271/C, 4. 43  N. Revelli, La strada del davai [The davaj road] (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 210. 44  The document appears in the UNIRR’s Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia [Report on the Italian prisoners of war in Russia], eds. C. Vicentini and P. Resta (Cassano Magnago, VA: Crespi, 1995), 78. 45  C. Caneva, Calvario bianco [White Calvary] (Vittorio Veneto, TV: Friulian section of the UNIRR of Udine, 1972), 93. 46  Account by Lieutenant Aldo Sandulli, in G. Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia” [Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia], in appendix to the book by the same author, La guerra al fronte russo. Il corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Csir) [War on the Russian front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR)] (Milan: Mursia, 2005), 356. 47  E. Reginato, 12 anni di prigionia nell’Urss [Twelve years of captivity in the USSR] (Treviso: Canova, n.d.), 61. Reference to the corpses of two Hungarian soldiers inside the well may also be found in Caneva, Calvario bianco, 94. 48  Ibid., 89. 49  Ibid. 50  Ibid. Manlio Francesconi corroborates the episode in his memoirs: “We had been abandoned to starvation first and to epidemics later. The consequences of the hatred that such a state of affairs had generated could no longer be stopped. Our superior officers asked the camp command to be executed by firing squad, along with their subordinates and the soldiers”. M. Francesconi, Siamo tornati insieme, [We returned together] (Rome: Volpe, 1968), 99. 51  The commission was made up by the head of the Health Office of the NKVD’s GUPV, who presided; the deputy head of the Main Military Medical Administration; two physicians representing the Health Ministry; and the representative of the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 52  Rapporto sulle condizioni fisiche dei prigionieri di guerra e sulle cause del loro alto tasso di mortalità nel lager n. 81 di Khrenovoe [Report on the physical conditions of prisoners of war and on the causes for their high death rate in Khrenovoe camp No.

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81], RGVA, f. 1p, op. 4z, d. 6, l. 1–5. Original. The document is also featured in Vengerskiye voyennoplennye v Sssr. Dokumenty 1941-1953 gg, 141–44. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 2016), document III. 53  Ibid. 54  Ibid. 55  Prikaz Nkvd n. 00673 o likvidatsii Khobotovskogo i Khrenovskogo lagerej Nkvd dlya voyennoplennykh [NKVD decree No. 00673 on the closing of the Khobotovo and Khrenovoe prisoner-of-war camps], 6 April 1943, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 658, l. 249–251. Secret. 56  Kuznetsov had been replaced by the GUPVI’s deputy commander, Major-General of State Security Petr K. Soprunenko (cf. Vengerskiye voyennoplennye v Sssr. Dokumenty 1941-1953 gg, 466n). 57  News of the execution by firing squad appears in Francesconi, Siamo tornati insieme, 99; and in Caneva, Calvario bianco, 110. The latter recalls that it was a Hungarian commissar who, on arriving in Skit to hold some conferences before his fellow countrymen, had spoken with the Italians, in French, “and said that the Russian colonel at the helm of the Kkrinovaya camp had been deemed responsible by the Soviet authorities for the death of so many thousand prisoners, and executed by firing squad.” On Kuznetsov’s career, cf. Voyennoplennye v Sssr. 1939-1956. Dokumenty i materialy, 1074. 58  Account by Captain Melchiorre Piazza, in Messe, Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia, 355. 59  AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 2. In addition to the Ministry of Post-War Assistance, the text was sent to the Ministry of War’s Returnees’ Office, and, so they would be informed of the facts, to the Italian embassy in Moscow. 60  Cf. O vyzove voyennoplennykh iz lagerej i priëmnych punktov pri frontovoj polosy [Transfer of the prisoners of war from the camps to the gathering points in the area of the front], GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 133, l. 73. Secret. 61  Cf. Caneva, Calvario bianco, 70f, 76, 94, 132. 62  Carlo Romoli, of the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment of the Celere Division, was captured on 28 December 1942, while the remainder of his regiment had been seized on the 21. He had attempted to escape capture with a small group of fellow servicemen. Carried out in the steppe and in a completely encircled area, the flight proved futile, and lasted one week. From there he was taken directly to Suzdal. Account given on 19 February 2001, in Pisa. 63  This was the case of Second Lieutenant Giuseppe Bassi, who remained in Tambov for a few days, and was transferred to Oranki on 24 January 1943. 64  Monsignor Franzoni recalls how sanitation procedures, carried out in a room that was essentially a sauna, were something of a nightmare for many of the prisoners. Severely weakened by hunger and disease, prisoners often did not survive the high temperatures involved (interview given on 2 December 1999, in Bologna). 65  Cf. Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa, 87f. 66  Cf. Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni, 14. 67  Cf. Vicentini, Noi soli vivi, 116f. 68  Reginato, 12 anni di prigionia nell’Urss, 43.

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 Resoconto del sacerdote Corrado Bertoldi rimpatriato dalla Russia [Account by the priest Corrado Bertoldi, repatriated from Russia], in Inter Arma Caritas. L’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano per i Prigionieri di guerra istituito da Pio XII (1939-1947) [Inter Arma Caritas: Vatican Information Office for prisoners of war established by Pius XII (1939–1947)], 2 volumes, vol. II, Documenti [Documents] (Vatican City, Vatican Secret Archives, 2004), 1139. 70  O snyatii s raboty nachalnika lagerya voyennoplennykh n. 35 Karelina M.M. i o naznachenii na etu dolzhnost polkovnika Krastina N.M., decree No. 00926, 2 June 1943, in GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 135, l. 144. Secret. 71  Direktiva Nkvd Sssr N. 248. O neobkhodimosti prinyatiya mer po uluchsheniyu sanitarno-bytovykh uslovij soderzhaniya voyennoplennykh, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 684, l. 396–397. Original. Secret. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document IV. 72  Ibid. 73  Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 47f. 74  G. Ossola, Bloc notes, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [Gramsci Institute Foundation], Archive “M” (Moscow) MF (microfilm) 312, doc. 312. The notepad contains six attachments, and lists the names of 323 Italian officers imprisoned in Suzdal camp No. 160, as well as assessments on their behavior in the camp and their political inclinations; the instructor probably made these notes after the meetings/questionings with the prisoners, and wrote down what the latter said about their fellow servicemen too. 75  Ibid., 5 June 1945. 76  Ibid., 23 November 1945. 77  Ibid. 78  This is Second Lieutenant Angelo Bartolozzi’s answer to another Italian prisoner who had joined the antifascist group, and called on him to assume command of a group of officers (ibid.). 79  V. Bianco’s letter to Petrov, 24 March 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 256, l. 24. 80  Italians would be assigned this task as well at a later time and in certain camps, including Suzdal. 81  In Khrenovoe, for example, this task was assigned to the Croatians; Hungarians enjoyed preferential treatment and ran the camp, second only to the Russians. Their leader, “doctor” Gottesmann, was known as the “hyena of Khrenovoe” and “more than one Italian had sworn to kill him” (Francesconi, Siamo tornati insieme, 92). 82  Cf. M. Venturi, Via Gorkij 8. Interno 106 [8 Gorky St: Apartment 106] (Turin: Sei, 1996), 90ff. 83  For example, Vincenzo Bianco had put in a good word with Dimitrov for the wife of the instructor Matteo Regent, who was convalescing at the time, so that she might be transferred to Moscow from Alma Ata and receive a better diet in the Hotel Lux (cf. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 133). In the same vein is Bianco’s letter to Dimitrov dated 23 June 1943, in which he relayed the request by the instructor Maltagliati to be transferred to the Usman camp in Moscow and to benefit from the canteen of the Hotel Lux (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 149).

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84

 Osobaya papka Stalina i Molotova, vol. I, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 95, l. 58–62. Secret. 85  Ibid., l. 50–56. Secret. 86  Cf. R. Overy, Russia’s War (London: Penguin, 1999), 107. See also, H. Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969), 474ff. 87  Account by Medical Lieutenant Egidio Finocchiaro, in Messe, Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia, 355. 88  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. See also, Trattamento fatto ai prigionieri italiani in Russia [Treatment of the Italian prisoners in Russia], Rome, 1946, Ufficio informazioni Stato maggiore esercito [Army Staff Information Office], in ASMAE, serie Affari politici [Political affairs series]. 1946–1950. USSR, b. 6, Prigionieri ed internati [Prisoners and internees]. In his interview with me on 27 November 1999, Giulio Brancadoro—former corporal major of the ski unit of the L’Aquila Battalion, Julia Division—confirmed he had seen Romanian prisoners trafficking in human flesh in the Tambov camp. 89  Report given by Lieutenant Colonel Cesare Cocuzza in the 73rd District of Varese, Returnees’ Office, on 4 September 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1. 90  M. Turla, La nostra e la loro prigionia. Russia, quattro anni di prigionia in mezzo ad un popolo di prigionieri [Our captivity and theirs: Russia, four years of captivity among a people of prisoners] (Esine: S. Marco, [1948] 1982). 91   Cf. G. Gherardini, La vita si ferma [Life stops] (Milan: Baldini e Castoldi, 1948), 223. The anticannibalism teams were made up of officers; even in captivity, officers were a point of reference for order and discipline. Furthermore, they were sustained by the fact that they received more generous food rations. Soldiers, among whom anthropophagy was more rampant, had to survive on less and lower quality food. 92  S. Porelli, Il lungo ritorno da Cefalonia [The long return from Cephalonia] (Rende, CS: Istituto bellunese di ricerche sociali e culturali, 2012), 72–73. The soldier of the Acqui Division Angelo Zanoni, 1912 contingent, number 26138, also ended up in Tambov on 5 July. Following this terrible experience, he was repatriated on 26 November 1945. 93  Decree No. 00367 dated 24 February 1943, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 133, l. 44 verso. Original. Secret. 94  GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 133, l. 145–151, l. 149 verso. Original. Secret. Cf. infra, table 3.2. 95  Gherardini, La vita si ferma, 295f. 96  GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 205, l. 271. The GKO (State Defense Committee) was the USSR’s supreme organ, which assumed all power of the state in the course of the Second World War. Created on 30 June 1941, it included among its members: Stalin, president, Molotov, vice president, K.E. Voroshilov and G.M. Malenkov. N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesensky, L.M. Kaganovich and A.I. Mikoyan subsequently joined the GKO as well. After the war ended, the GKO was disbanded by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 4 September 1945. 97  Ibid., l. 265. 98  Bassi and Martelli, cited interview. 99  Ossola, Bloc notes, 19 January 1946. 100  Ibid.

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 Dokladnaya zapiska S.N. Kruglova V.M. Molotovu i sekretaryu Ck Vkp(b) G.M. Malenkovu o polozhenii i nastroenii voyennoplennykh italyantsev, 5 April 1946, Moscow. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 142, l. 109–110, l. 109. Authenticated copy. Secret. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XV. 102  Ibid. 103  Tovarishu Molotovu [To comrade Molotov], Kruglov’s report dated 5 January 1949. Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 34–37, l. 36. Secret. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XX; and Tovarishu Molotovu, O predanii sudu Voyennogo tribunala 23 italyanskikh prestupnikov [To comrade Molotov, on the handing over of 23 Italian criminals for judgment before the military court], 12 January 1949, signed by Kruglov, ibid., l. 16–20, l. 18. Copy No. 4. Secret. 104  GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 133, l. 150. 105  These statements were promptly verified by the Commission for Political Work Among Prisoners of War. On this issue, see Bianco’s letter to Dimitrov dated 19 Aprile 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 31. 106  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21, l. 8–9. 107  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 51, l. 41. 108  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 51, l. 50. 109  GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 532, l. 465–466. Original. Confidential. 110  RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 23a, d. 13, l. 73. Confidential. 111  GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 647, l. 47–49. Original. Secret. 112  The work regime of prisoners of war had been established by an order issued on 24 March 1942. The twelve hours included “the time necessary for the transportation of prisoners to and from the work site” (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 645, l. 191. Original. Confidential). 113  Cf. RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 23a, d. 13, l. 73. 114  Cf. RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 01e, d. 1, l. 160. In compliance with a subsequent order, starting in October camp commanders had to send in their reports every five days (ibid., l. 200). 115  Giovanni Galaverna, in Revelli, La strada del davai, 101. 116  Account by the camp survivor Romoli. 117  Directive No. 28/7309, in GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 205, t. 14, 129 verso, l. 141. Copy. Secret. Memoirs written by those who experienced life in the camps speak of this division as well. Among others, cf. H.M. Fehling, Russia: prigione senza ritorno [Russia: Prison without return] (Florence: Salani, 1953), 107f.; Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa, 101; Caneva, Calvario bianco, 137; Malisardi, Presente alle bandiere, 170. This division based on physical fitness was obviously modeled on the treatment of civilian internees (Bacon, The Gulag at War, 130). 118  Cf. Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa, 101. 119  Account by the infantryman Giuseppe Viale, in Revelli, La strada del davai, 26. One of the most taxing works, for which some prisoners volunteered, consisted in the cutting and conveyance of trunks in the snow, using sleds pulled by hand. Thanks to the sacrifice of some prisoners, including many officers, in the winter

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of 1945–46 prison camps were equipped with firewood, which could be burned for heat. 120  Account by the Alpine Corps member Romano Beltrame, ibid., 253. 121  Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa, 107. 122  As evidenced by the NKVD data, as of 1 September 1942, 5,158 prisoners out of 17,459 captured by the Red Army since the beginning of the war (that is, 29.5%) had died in the labor camps. These figures are derived from RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 01e, d. 5, l. 23–25. 123  Data derived from RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 23a, d. 2, l. 45. 124  RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 11a, d. 5, l. 39. 125  From the program Lager internatsional, broadcast on 30 October 2000 by the TV of Moscow. This piece of information is also confirmed by Ivanova, who, based on the documents she examined, claims that prisoners’ physical resistance in labor camps—those close to Moscow, it must be noted—averaged only three months (Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism, 100). 126  By April, decree No. 00675 had established a work schedule not in excess of eight hours a day in order to preserve the prisoners’ health (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 658, l. 252–268. Original. Secret). However, the order was not always applied: where the work day of Soviet detainees was longer, so was, in equal measure, the work day of prisoners of war. 127  This, according to NKVD order No. 80 on the use of labor by prisoners of war belonging to the second category, 28 February 1944, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 714, l. 292f. Original. Secret. 128  GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 205, t. 13, l. 43, 43 verso, 44. Confidential. 129  Postanovleniye Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony n. 8921 “O raspredelenii voyennoplennykh v meropriyatiyakh po uluchsheniyu ikh trudovogo ispolzovaniya” [Directive No. 8921 of the State Defense Committee “On the distribution of prisoners of war among businesses for the improvement of labor”], RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 502, l. 7–16. Typewritten copy. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XIV. 130  Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 224. 131  Caneva, Calvario bianco, 186. 132  Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa, 108. 133  Decree No. 00311, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 722, l. 308. Original. Secret. 134  The large number of directives issued to this effect suggests that the instances objected to were in fact rampant. Cf., in particular, directives No. 242 dated 15–16 October 1946, on the simulation of damages among prisoners (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 779, l. 139–140. Original. Confidential), and No. 50 dated 11 March 1947, on episodes of simulated injuries among German prisoners of war and internees (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 834, l. 203f. Original. Secret). 135  Directive No. 8921 by the State Defense Committee “On the distribution of prisoners of war among businesses for the improvement of labor.” 136  Ossola, Bloc notes. 137  Ibid. 138  Ibid. 139  Doklad S.N. Kruglova ot 24.05.1950 [Report by S.N. Kruglov dated 24 May 1950], Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op.

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2, d. 269, l. 2–3. Secret. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XXII. 140  I bid., 3. Construction on the grand hydroelectric plant in Farkhadskaya, Uzbekistan, on the Syrdaria, started precisely in 1942. 141  For example, the United States provided prisoners with an excellent level of care, the same one given to American servicemen. Medical and surgical care were administered in special clinics and hospitals; a liaison unit was even set up between the military authority in charge of prisoners and the healthcare authority. Cf. F.G. Conti, I prigionieri italiani negli Stati Uniti [Italian prisoners in the United States] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), 94ff. 142  Cf. Ministry of Defense, Commissariat Honoring the Fallen, Csir-Armir. Campi di prigionia e fosse comuni, 25. 143  Direktiva Nkvd Sssr N. 120 o meropriyatiyakh po uluchsheniyu fizicheskogo sostoyaniya voyennoplennykh [Directive of the NKVD No. 120 on the measures to be adopted for the improvement of the physical conditions of prisoners of war], GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 684, l. 195–198. Original. Confidential. 144  GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 205, t. 12, l. 271. 145  G. Dimitrov, Diario. Gli anni di Mosca (1934-1945) [Diary: The Moscow years (1934–1945)], ed. S. Pons (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 599. As well as by Dimitrov and Petrov, the meeting was attended by Colonel M.A. Yakovets (deputy director of the political section of the GUPVI), Ulbricht, Bianco, Rákosi, Köplenig, Pauker, Försterling, Belov and Yantsen, director of the antifascist school (ibid., 676). 146  Ibid., p. 265. 147  RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 01e, d. 15a, l. 32–33. Out of the total, 24,346 had died in the Beketovsk camp; 13,796 in Khrenovoe; 12,289 in Khobotovo; 7,222 in RadaTambov; 5,031 in Temnikov, and 4,129 in Morshansk. 148  Ibid. 149  Ibid., 61. 150  With the directive issued on 6 October, Kruglov intended to improve the care provided to prisoners in the reception and gathering camps, and during the transfers (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 678, l. 248–261. Original. Confidential). On 11 October, Kruglov and the head of the GUPVI’s healthcare section, the medical serviceman Yezhov, sent a letter to the healthcare directors of the most disorganized camps, requesting that “all shortcomings in the care provided to prisoners be overcome.” Cf. Russkii Arkhiv:Velikaya Otechestvennaja. Inostrannye voennoplennye vtoroj mirovoj vojny v Sssr [Russian Archive: The great patriotic war. Foreign WWII POWs in the USSR], Moscow: Terra, t. 24 (13), 121f. On 12 October, the NKVD and the Health Ministry (Narkomzdrav—Nkz) issued a joint directive to improve the care of hospitalized prisoners (directive No. 508c/324/110c. GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 686, l. 159–159 verso. Authentic copy. Secret). On 22 October, Health Minister G.A. Miterev and Kruglov approved the order that destined some Narkomzdrav hospitals to the medical care of prisoners of war (GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 205, t. 14, l. 175–175 verso). 151  GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 707, l. 295–296. Original. Confidential. 152  Certified letter from the Territorial Military Command of Milan to the Ministry of War, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1f. 153  Directive No. 52 dated 2 March 1946, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 777, l. 12–12 verso. Original.

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154

 Certified letter from the Territorial Military Command of Milan to the Ministry of War, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1f. Lieutenant Pallavicini later addresses how unpredictable and fickle the Soviets’ attitude was toward medical prisoners. Transferred to hospital-camp No. 1074 in Kurart Baranoe, Kazakhstan, after just two months of work (“very limited” by his own estimation, possibly as a result of the perennial drug shortage), he and the other Italian medical officers were deprived of their white coats and employed as simple construction workers in the same hospital. This was greeted with “the sympathy of Italians, the derision of foreigners, and the indifference of Russian civilians. Any explanation requested was always given in vague terms” (ibid.). 155  Reginato, 12 anni di prigionia nell’Urss, 19. 156  A directive issued on 24 August 1944 stated the criteria to be followed for the burial of prisoners of war. (RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 5e, d. 2, l. 116 verso–117. Secret.) 157  Pietro Davide, of the 343rd Infantry Regiment of the Forlì Division stationed in the Balkans, had fallen prisoner to the Germans. “Freed” by the Soviets, he was described as a “prisoner of war” in his death certificate, and had been treated as such by the Red Army commanders, despite having been captured in 1944, during the Red Army’s advance, when Italy was no longer the USSR’s enemy. A copy of his medical record is stored in the Resta archive. 158  The table is based on the data from the Dislokatsiya frontovykh lagerej (Fppl), priëmnykh punkotv (Ppv), sbornykh punktov voyennoplennykh (Spv) po obsluzhivaniyu frontov. Po sostoyaniyu na 1 yanvarya 1945. The missing information derives from the original Russian documents. 159  Such success in identifying the deceased, unparalleled in other camps, was made possible by the fact that the lists produced there included almost all of the prisoners’ personal information (place of birth, unit, and, in one list, even paternity). This accuracy is probably owed to the collaboration of communist émigrés present in that camp, where one of the two antifascist schools was located. Vicentini, interview dated 28 April 2000. See also, by the same author, “I prigionieri italiani in Urss negli archivi russi” [The Italian prisoners in the USSR in the Russian archives], in Internati, prigionieri, reduci [Internees, prisoners, and returnees], eds. A. Bendotti and E. Valtulina (Bergamo: Rassegna dell’Istituto per la storia della Resistenza e dell’età contemporanea, 1999), 153–66. 160  For a general overview of mortality in the camps, based on the data hitherto identified, see the table provided in the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XII. 161  In an interview with me (November 2000, Krasnogorsk, near Moscow), the former director of the Memorial Museum of German Antifascists, Arkadii Krupennikov, claimed that while mortality had been higher in Tambov among Germans than among Italians by nearly 10 percent (76.1% for Germans, in contrast to 68.2% for Italians), between March and June 1943, “fundamentally, and in general, the absolute highest mortality index recorded among all prisoners in the hands of the Army Army [had been] the one of the Italians.” 162  Even Valdo Zilli, a veteran of the Italian Russian campaign, puts the blame for the death of thousands of prisoners exclusively on the Soviets’ negligence: cf. V. Zilli, “Gli italiani prigionieri di guerra in Urss: vicende, esperienze, testimonianze” [Italian prisoners of war in the USSR: Events, experiences, accounts], in Gli italiani sul fronte russo [The Italians on the Russian front], ed. Istituto

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storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e Provincia (Bari: De Donato, 1982), 295– 321, 309. 163  Cf. P.M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era (Manchester-New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 234 and 237. 164  Cf. Overy, Russia’s War, 161–62. 165  Cf. J. Meyendorff, La Chiesa ortodossa ieri e oggi [The Orthodox Church past and present] (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1962), 140. The support of the Orthodox Church in the struggle against the German invasion was such that in those years the autocephalous Church of Russia was truly resuscitated as a result. “The council, however, could assemble only eighteen bishops (for many were still in jail) and Sergei was appointed patriarch” (ibid.). 166  In order to gain support from American catholics for his aid policy to the USSR, Roosevelt put pressure on the Holy See to take a stand against the Nazi war. Only on 14 November 1941, one month before Pearl Harbor and the German and Italian declaration of war against the United States, did the National Catholic Welfare Conference endorse Roosevelt’s politics. Cf. G. Verucci, La Chiesa nella società contemporanea. Dal primo dopoguerra al Concilio Vaticano II [The Church in contemporary society: From the post-WWI years to the Second Vatican Council] (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1988). On the relationship between the Vatican and the United States during this time, see also, E. Aga Rossi, “La politica estera americana e l’Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale” [American foreign policy and Italy during the Second World War], in VV.AA., Italia e America dalla grande guerra ad oggi [Italy and America from the Great War to the present] (Venice: Marsilio, 1976); E. Aga Rossi, L’Italia nella sconfitta [Italy in defeat] (Naples: Esi, 1985); E. Aga Rossi, Una nazione allo sbando. L’armistizio italiano del settembre 1943 e le sue conseguenze [A nation adrift: The September 1943 Italian armistice and its consequences] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003); E. Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti 1939-1952. Dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor [The Vatican and the United States: From Myron C. Taylor’s papers] (Milan: Angeli, 1978). 167  Verucci, La Chiesa nella società contemporanea, 170. In the Ukraine there were communities of Uniate Christians. The latter were closely related to Catholics, and had always been watched over by the Vatican, for in the “European” area of the Soviet Union, they were a minority surrounded by Orthodox Christians. 168  Interview given on 18 May 2001, in Bologna. No official document corroborates Father Franzoni’s statement, and this is not the place to address the issue at length, though the subject clearly warrants further investigation. 169  O n the Church’s stance with regard to the war in Russia, based on what may also be gleaned from the reports given by regime spies, see S. Colarizi, L’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime. 1929-1943 [The Italians’ opinion under the regime, 1929–1943] (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009), 357ff. 170   In an article in Gente in 1962, General Messe published a photograph of a  chaplain who, in July 1942, administered baptism to some children in a Ukrainian village. According to Messe, the photograph attested to the “very humane treatment our soldiers had shown in Russia, whereas the Soviet government had always leveled the most ridiculous and outrageous accusations against our soldiers and officers.” Cf. Caneva, Calvario bianco, 13, and G.

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Messe, “Accuso i sovietici di aver assassinato i miei soldati” [I accuse the Soviets of having killed my soldiers], in Gente, no. 1–2 (1962). 171  Giuseppe Melchiorre’s diary, Racconto di una vita [The tale of a life], typewritten (33), Pieve S. Stefano (Arezzo): Fondazione Archivio diaristico nazionale, coll. MP/06, 11. Hailing from Bussi sul Tirino (Pescara), Melchiorre had enrolled in the Sforzesca Division. 172  On the relationship Ukrainians, particularly older ones, had with religion, refer to the report provided by another chaplain: Father Carlo Chiavazza, Scritto sulla neve. Diario di un cappellano militare in Russia. Gennaio 1943 [Written on the snow: The diary of a military chaplain in Russia, January 1943] (Brescia: Nordpress, 2008), 18; cf. also, Father Carlo Gnocchi, Cristo con gli Alpini [Christ with the Alpines] (Milan: Mursia, 2008). 173  Concerning chaplains’ role as intermediaries with the Vatican, see R. Sani, “La Santa Sede e i prigionieri di guerra italiani” [The Holy See and Italian prisoners of war], in I prigionieri militari italiani durante la seconda guerra mondiale [Italian military prisoners during the Second World War], ed. R.H. Rainero, Atti del Convegno di Mantova [Proceedings from the conference in Mantua] (Milan: Marzorati, 1985), 210–15. For a thorough treatise on military clergy during the Second Ward War, see, by M. Franzinelli, Il riarmo dello spirito [The rearming of the soul] (Treviso: Pagus, 1991); “I cappellani militari nella resistenza all’estero” [Military chaplains in the resistance abroad] (Rome: Rivista militare, 1993); Con la croce dietro il filo spinato. Aspetti della prigionia dei cappellani militari nei campi alleati (1940-1946) [With the cross behind barbed wire: Aspects of captivity for military chaplains in Allied camps [1940–1946)], in Internati, prigionieri, reduci, eds. Bendotti and Valtulina, 169–206. 174  Veniero Ajmone Marsan, Guido Martelli, Giuseppe Bassi and Enelio Franzoni have said as much in the cited interviews. 175  Cf. G. Brevi, Russia 1942-1953 (Milan: Garzanti, 1964). Father Brevi, chaplain to the Julia Division, was held in Russia until 1954. 176  The incident recounted by Franzoni appears in Francesconi, Siamo tornati insieme, 169f.: “The military chaplain asked that he might stay with those who were not repatriated, and his request was granted.” 177  Franzinelli, Con la croce dietro il filo spinato, 170. 178  Cf. N. Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani [The man who “tortured” Italian prisoners of war] (Milan: Vangelista, 1994), 162, and 172. A Soviet major and political commissar, Nikolai Tereshchenko worked both on the editorial staff of L’Alba, the paper for Italian prisoners, and as an instructor in the school set up in Krasnogorsk. As the man in charge of the paper alongside Togliatti, D’Onofrio and Manuilsky, starting in March 1943 Nikolai Tereshchenko was to gather material for the paper that might interest its readers and gain their trust. As a result, the paper did not deal with religious subjects, which might have upset a large part of the Italian prisoners. 179  Nikolai Tereshchenko, interview dated 4 novembre 2000, Moscow. Paolo Robotti was a friend of Gramsci’s and Togliatti’s, and even became related to the latter by marriage to Elena Montagnana. A communist émigré in the USSR, starting in 1934 he had worked as a technician in the “Kalibr” factory. He was arrested by the NKVD early in 1938, and released in 1939. During the war, he worked as an instructor with the Italian prisoners.

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180

 Ossola, Bloc notes.  Franzinelli, Con la croce dietro il filo spinato, 193f. As recalled by Franzinelli, “in England, the vast majority [of prisoners] decided to adhere, and non-collaborators were brought together in ‘punitive’ camps, where life conditions were very harsh” (ibid.). 182  For example, see G. Tumiati, Prigionieri nel Texas [Prisoners in Texas] (Milan: Mursia, 1985). Regarding the general position of Italian prisoners after the armistice and their legal status, see F. Conti, I prigionieri di guerra italiani. 1940-1945 [Italian prisoners of war, 1940–1945] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986), 67ff. Regarding the Allies’ attitude toward Italian prisoners, see B. Moore and K. Fedorowich, The British Empire and its Italian Prisoners of War, 1940–1947 (London-New York: Palgrave, 2002). As the authors point out, the work of “de-fascistization” of Italian prisoners preceded the schemes the Allies later used with their German prisoners (ibid., 93); I. Insolvibile, Wops: i prigionieri italiani in Gran Bretagna (1941-1946) [Wops: Italian prisoners of war in Great Britain (1941–1946)] (Naples-Rome: Esi, 2012), 67ff. As for the educational activities carried out in camps in the United States, see Conti, I prigionieri italiani negli Stati Uniti, 102. 183  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss [Chronicle of the antifascist movement of the Italian officers in the USSR], Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [Gramsci Institute Foundation], Archive “M” (Moscow). The document, drafted by the antifascist activists of Suzdal camp No. 160, is the final report on the “ideological and political situation of the Italian officers’ community,” and an assessment of the antifascist propaganda carried out among the officers. 184  Ossola, Bloc notes, 30 March 1946. 185  Ibid. The hostility toward Soviet propaganda shown by all Catholic chaplains belonging to the ARMIR is in stark contrast with the stance taken by the Protestant chaplains of the Wehrmacht. Many Protestant chaplains gladly joined the antifascist “Free Germany” movement, also because the latter, unlike Hitler’s regime, allowed the free expression of religious ideas. 186  E. Franzoni, “Lettera al Direttore” [Letter to the editor-in-chief], in Risorgimento liberale [Liberal resurgence], no. 73, 28 March 1948. According to Father Franzoni, D’Onofrio must have been disappointed by his answers and, after questioning him for roughly an hour and a half, sent him back to his bunker. An exile in the USSR since 1939, Edoardo D’Onofrio managed Italia libera’s daily radio broadcasts from Moscow, and was later one of the principal editors of L’Alba, the paper published for Italian prisoners of war. He usually signed official documents as Edo. 187  Cf. ibid., 63. 188  I personally showed Father Franzoni the letter on 18 May 2001, translating it from Russian for him (the text was Bianco’s translation for Dimitrov). Bianco asked Dimitrov for instructions on what to do with the letter. The document is in RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 25, l. 147–148. The letter was written in camp No. 188. 189  Interview conducted on 18 May 2001, in Bologna. “On being repatriated, I had to hand in all the accoutrements needed for Mass, which Lieutenant Usatienko routinely confiscated and Colonel Krastin returned to us. I had a heavy heart, for those were not my own belongings, but a legacy shared by all the camp prisoners. The Russian sergeant […] looked at me and understood. He glanced 181

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around. Luckily there were no indiscreet eyes, and so he let me keep everything: surplice, chasuble, chalice” (Father Enelio Franzoni, in UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia, 120). 190  Cf. Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 124. 191  Cf. E.S., “Perché a don Brevi fu tolto il messale” [Why the missal was taken away from Father Brevi], in Il Tempo, 10 August 1949. 192  Ibid. Father Brevi did not hesitate to talk back to the Soviet guards and camp directors. In secret, he had written several lists of deceased prisoners, which was strictly prohibited. “I remain a priest, an official, a Catholic, and an Italian— Father Brevi had said—and every trial is a point of pride for me. Each insult and calumny mortifies me. I am prepared to die here” (ibid.). A few days into the hunger strike, Father Brevi managed to have his missal back. 193  Cf. Vicentini, Noi soli vivi, 173. 194  P. Robotti, “Quel giorno in Russia…” [That day in Russia], in Avanti!, 14 February 1945. 195  Ibid. The article continues with the prisoners’ accounts, and reporting the impressions of one prisoner in particular who, a few days before, had been to Moscow on a prize holiday, an unusual treatment for a prisoner of war. This suggests that the group was not formed by ordinary soldiers. Most likely, the camp Robotti is describing is zone B of Krasnogorsk camp No. 27, where the antifascist school was headquartered. 196  Regarding the case of the Allies, cf. Conti, I prigionieri italiani negli Stati Uniti, 96f. 197  Protokol zasedaniya komissii po politrabote sredi voyennoplennykh ot 6.3.1942 [Minutes from the meeting of the Commission for Political Work Among Prisoners of War on 6 March 1942], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 49, l. 17. The meeting had been attended by “Ulbricht, Köplenig, Szántó, and the comrades Burger and Evers from the camps Nos. 58 and 95.” 198  Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 152f. 199  Ibid., 176. 200  Account by the foot soldier Luigi Bodini, in G. Bedeschi, Prigionia: c’ero anch’io [Captivity: I was there too] (Milan: Mursia, 1990), vol. I, 552. 201  Cf. Osobaya papka Molotova, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 103, l. 255. The document displays Beria’s authentic signature. Original. Secret. The censorship criteria were reiterated in a decree dated 5 September 1945. 202  Gherardini, La vita si ferma, 307. 203  During our meeting on 18 May 2001 in Bologna, Franzoni showed me some postcards delivered to his relatives while he was in captivity, parts of which were redacted with black ink covering several lines of text. 204  Reginato, 12 anni di prigionia nell’Urss, 82. 205  N.D. Bočenina, La segretaria di Togliatti. Memorie di Nina Bočenina [Togliatti’s secretary: Nina Bochenina’s Memoirs] (Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1993), 25. 206  Massa Gallucci, No! 12 anni prigioniero in Russia, 122. 207  Cf. AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 208  Verbal note attached to the telegram sent on 17 January 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 209  Telegram sent by the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 April 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C.

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210

 Telegram sent by the Italian embassy in Moscow on 30 June 1945, relayed in the telegram dated 1 August 1945, sent by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian Red Cross and to the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 211  Cf. Vicentini, Noi soli vivi, 283. 212  See Inter Arma Caritas. L’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano per i Prigionieri di guerra istituito da Pio XII (1939-1947), 2 volumes, vol. I, Inventario [Inventory], Vatican City, Vatican Secret Archives, 2004. 213  The radio reported daily: “The Italian prisoners of war listed below assure their families they enjoy good health, and send greetings and affectionate kisses.” A list with ten–twelve names ensued; some of the names were further accompanied by a brief personal message (Vatican Secret Archives, Information Office, Prisoners of War (1939–1947), b. 377, from RM 1 (March 1943) to RM 22 (December 1944), b. 378, from RM 23 (January 1945) to RM 34 (December 1945). 214  Ibid., b. 377, RM 10. 215  Ibid., 18 December 1943, message addressed to the prisoner’s wife Ada Musitelli, via Benvenuto Cellini 1, Trieste. Another similar message was broadcast two days later: “To Mrs. Ada Musitelli […] My dearest, I am well, have faith in the future. We will again be united and happy. Kisses to you, to Giorgino, to Mom, and to the whole family” (ibid., message dated 20 December 1943). 216  Vatican Secret Archives, Information Office, b. 1775, reference No. 00691391, form completed by M.C. Guadagni, the sought-after prisoner’s wife. Giuseppe Guadagni’s name is featured also among the Pratiche in sospeso con richieste di rimpatrio per i prig. italiani, civili e militari, internati in campi di prigionia, inviate alla Sezione rimpatri dell’Uff. Informazioni [Pending applications with repatriation requests for Italian detainees, civilian and military, interned in prison camps, sent to the Repatriation Section of the Information Office], for the years between 1944 and 1945, fascicules 1–4 (cf. Inter Arma Caritas, vol. I, Inventario, 351). Lieutenant Guadagni, whom a fellow soldier (Giovanni Dell’Aglio, also hailing from Rome) last saw in Odessa in 1946, never came home. His name doesn’t even appear with those of the prisoners detained in the USSR for a number of reasons after the repatriations of 1945–46, of which more will be said later. The form completed by Mrs. Guadagni is featured in the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document V. 217  Vatican Secret Archives, Information Office, b. 1678, reference No. 00577360, 29 May 1943. Form filled out by the prisoner’s sister. 218  Ibid., reference No. 00577881, the date is given on the back of the form: 26 May 1943. Sardisco, class 1915, belonged to the 171st Infantry Gun Company, Turin Division, military post 152. 219  Ibid., reference No. 00577881, 4 July 1946 [pencil] inventory folder 275.

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 For more on this, see “Politdonoseniye rukovodstva Starobelskogo lagerya S.V. Nekhoroshevu ‘O politiko-moralnom sostoyanii Starobelskogo lagerya Nkvd za noyabr mesyats’” [Report by the command of the Starobelsk camp to S.V. Nekhoroshev “On the political-moral state of the NKVD camp in Starobelsk in the month of November”], in Rossiya XX vek, Moscow, 1997, 238–43. See also, the report by the same command dated 31 December 1939, ibid., 280–85. Among the studies on Katyn, see N.S. Lebedeva, “O tragedii v Katyni,” in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 5, (1990); R. Pikhoya and A. Gieysztor eds., Katyn. Plenniki neobyavlyennoj vojny (Moscow, 1997); V. Zaslavsky, Il massacro di Katyn. Il crimine e la menzogna [The Katyn massacre: The crime and the lie] (Rome: Ideazione, 1998), and by the same author, Pulizia di classe. Il massacro di Katyn [Class cleansing: The Katyn massacre] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006); in the latter book, on propaganda, cf. 30–31; on the political profiling of each prisoner, cf. 31ff. 2  V. Zilli, “Gli italiani prigionieri di guerra in Urss: vicende, esperienze, testimonianze” [Italian prisoners of war in the USSR: Events, experiences, accounts], in Gli italiani sul fronte russo [The Italians on the Russian front], ed. Istituto storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e Provincia (Bari: De Donato, 1982), 295–321, 311. 3  Plan meroprijatij brigady tt. Tereshchenko i Edo, July 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 154. Confidential. 4  The Political Administration gave special importance to the use of prisoners of war beyond enemy lines, in both espionage and propaganda. In a letter dated 26 February 1944, written by GUPVI Deputy Director Nikolai D. Melnikov and addressed to Manuilsky, the following was requested for operative reasons: “the overall numerical data on the use of prisoners of war in oral and printed propaganda, and in work aimed at disbanding enemy troops.” Essentially, Melnikov was asking for the number of prisoner officers and soldiers used on the front, including those who “operated in enemy units,” divided by army (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 43, l. 4. Confidential). 5  In the Museum of German Antifascists in Krasnogorsk, housed where the fascist school once was, mobile-unit posts set up on the front have been recreated using authentic materials. In addition to the life-size dummies portraying political commissars and prisoner collaborators, clothed with original uniforms, the most important tools for effective propaganda among enemy troops feature prominently in the reconstruction: megaphones, two-way radio equipment, notepads, and discs. On Soviet propaganda on the front, see M. Rossi, “Primi documenti di propaganda sovietica verso i militari italiani” [The earliest documents of Soviet propaganda toward Italian servicemen], in Le diverse prigionie dei militari italiani nella seconda guerra mondiale [The different captivities of Italian servicemen during the Second World War], ed. L. Tomassini (Florence: Regione Toscana, 1995), 83–113. 6  Cf. M. Rossi, “Quel giorno più lungo dell’anno. La propaganda in Urss 194145” [That longest day of the year: Propaganda in the USSR, 1941–45], in Propaganda politica e mezzi di comunicazione di massa tra fascismo e democrazia [Political propaganda and mass communication media between fascism and democracy], ed. A. Mignemi (Turin: Gruppo Abele, 1995), 261–72, 263. 7  Messaggio dei soldati prigionieri Severino e Marlini all’esercito italiano [Message from the captured soldiers Severino and Marlini to the Italian army], RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 55, l. 28.

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8

 Agli ufficiali e soldati dell’Armata Italiana in Russia! [To the officers and soldiers of the Italian army in Russia!], a flier signed by the lieutenants Vittorio Tonolini, commander of the exploration platoon of the 79th Battalion of the CSIR, and Leandro Codeluppi of the same unit, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 6 verso. 9  Even before the Communist Party of Italy did, Stalin understood that propaganda offered the unique opportunity to separate the Italian and German peoples from their respective leaderships: cf. P.M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era (ManchesterNew York: Manchester University Press, 20033), 235. 10  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21 a, l. 16. 11  Agli ufficiali e soldati dell’Armata Italiana in Russia! Another flier dated 21 November 1942 urged Italians yet again to break free from their alliance with the Germans: “SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS! The German troops are suffering defeats in Africa, in Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. The time will come when the Germans will betray you, as they did in Egypt, when they abandoned the Italian divisions in the rout. Why do you accept to be slaughtered for the sake of the Germans? End the war! Break your alliance with the Germans! Hand yourselves over as prisoners to the Russians! You will have your lives spared, and at the war’s end you will return home safely” (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 8–8 verso). Or: “If you want to save your lives, and to return safe and sound to your country, follow your comrades’ example. Turn yourselves in as prisoners before it is too late!” (flier No. 2 dated November 1942, in RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 9 verso). 12  Cf. N.N. Rudenko, Slovo pravdy v borbe s fashizmom [The word of truth in the struggle against fascism] (Kiev, Nauk. Dumka, 1980), 110. 13  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 30, l. 30. Confidential. 14  Appello agli italiani per un’“Italia libera, felice ed indipendente” [Appeal to Italians for a “free, happy, and independent Italy”], 10 June 1943, camp No. 188, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 4. 15  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77. d 21a, l. 10, 10 verso, 11. 16  Cf. Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss [Chronicle of the antifascist movement of the Italian officers in the USSR], Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [Gramsci Institute Foundation], Archive “M” (Moscow), 41ff. The lieutenants Italo Stagno and Federico Imbriani, and the medical second lieutenant Enrico Reginato were among those who did not sign the message. 17  A copy of the message is in the Fondo D’Onofrio, together with the list of the ninety officers who signed it. In the message, titled Alla giunta esecutiva permanente del Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale—Bari [To the permanent executive junta of the National Liberation Committee—Bari], the officers underlined the importance and effectiveness of unity on the part of the democratic forces involved in the antifascist struggle; stated “their complete adherence to all of the congress’s decisions, the prompt implementation of which constitute[d] a decisive contribution to the liberation of the homeland from the German-fascist enemy”; and hoped they could “actively participate in the struggle waged by the whole Italian people very soon” (Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3637, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci).

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18

 Postanovleniye Sekretariata Ikki ot 5-ogo fevralya 1943 [Resolution by the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern dated 5 February 1943], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 26, l. 24. Confidential. 19  Pismo Bianko italyanskim kommunistam instruktoram lagerej [Bianco’s letter to the Italian communist instructors in the camps], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 50. Confidential. 20  E. D’Onofrio, La situazione al campo 58. Relazione di Edo a Ercoli [The situation in camp No. 58: Edo’s report to Ercoli], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 179. 21  RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 9a, d. 9, l. 17. 22  Ibid., 18. 23  On the Gulag’s educational purpose, cf. in particular E. Bacon, The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light of the Archives (New York: New York University Press, 1994). As for the fact that the educational spirit only reached the threshold of the camps, cf. A. Besançon, A Century of Horrors: Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007). See also, A. Kaminski, I campi di concentramento dal 1896 a oggi [Concentration camps from 1896 to the present] (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1997), 66, and G.M. Ivanova, Labor Camp Socialism: The Gulag in the Soviet Totalitarian System (New York-London: Sharpe, 2000), 19. 24  Protokol zasedaniya komissii ot 24.1.42g. po dokladu o rabote v Karagandiskom lagere voyennoplennykh [Minutes from the meeting of the Commission held on 24 January 1942 on the political work carried out in the Karaganda prisoner-of-war camp], RGASPI, f. 77, op. l. 60. Confidential. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), document I. 25  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 26, l. 24–25. As for the publication of booklets, during the meeting held on 24 January 1942, the IKKI’s Commission for Political Work Among Prisoners of War had appointed a specific subcommission, comprising Manuilsky, Ercoli, Ulbricht, Rákosi, Pauker, Köplenig, Gottwald, Pieck, Gerö, M. Wolf, Friedrich, and Wieden (cf. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 10, l. 15. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document I). 26  Neither author nor date is provided for the document, written in Italian (its original title being Progetto di un piano di lavoro tra i prigionieri italiani). A political instructor or D’Onofrio probably drafted it. The text is in RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 130–133 verso. Confidential. 27  See, for example, the Protokol zasedaniya komissii po politrabote sredi voyennoplennykh ot 6.3.1942 [Minutes from the meeting of the Commission for Political Work Among Prisoners of War on 6 March 1942], where, on page 17, it says: “Instructors must pay great attention to individual political work among prisoners.” 28  G. Beraudi, Vainà kaput. Guerra e prigionia in Russia (1942-1945) [Vainà kaputt: War and imprisonment in Russia 1942–1945] (Rovereto, TN: Museo storico italiano della guerra, 1996), 126. 29  Cf. the report on the interrogation of the soldier Antonio Astediano, sent to Dimitrov on 6 December 1942, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 18, l. 18–26. Confidential.

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30

 V. Di Michele, Io prigioniero in Russia. Dal diario di Alfonso Di Michele [I, a prisoner in Russia: From the diary of Alfonso Di Michele] (Florence: Maremmi, 2008), 118–19. 31  Report on the interrogation of the soldier Umberto Picini, 4 December 1942, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 18, l. 27. Confidential. 32  B. Cecchini, Memorie di un celoviek bersagliere. La prigionia in Russia di un ufficiale del 3o Reggimento: 1942-1946 [Memoirs of a chelovek-bersagliere: A 3rd-Regiment officer’s captivity in Russia, 1942–1946], ed. A. Ferioli (Castel Maggiore, BO: Il Mascellaro, 2007), 92. 33  On this issue, the conference V. Bianco held in camp No. 99, titled La situazione politica in Italia [The political situation in Italy], can serve as paradigmatic example (cf. Doklad Bianko o rabote sredi italyanskikh voyennoplennykh v lagere 99 [Bianco’s report on the work carried out among the Italian prisoners of war in camp No. 99], 18 June 1942, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 26, l. 7. Confidential). 34  F. Stefanile, Davai bistré. Diario di un fante in Russia. 1942-1945 [Davai bistrè: Diary of an infantryman in Russia, 1942–1945] (Milan: Mursia, 1999), 176. 35  The most sought-after political texts were Stalin’s Questioni di leninismo [Questions of Leninism] and Storia del Vkp(b) [History of the VKP(b)]. Cf. Otchet o politrabote sredi voyennoplennykh italyanskoj armii v lagere 188 Nkvd. [Assessment of the political work among the prisoners of the Italian army in NKVD camp No. 188], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 151f. 36  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77. d. 21a, l. 29–34. 37  Ibid. 38  Cf. ibid. 39  F. Gambetti, Né vivi né morti. Guerra e prigionia dell’Armir in Russia. 1942-1945 [Neither alive nor dead: ARMIR’s war and captivity in Russia, 1942–1945] (Milan: Mursia, 1972), 220f. 40  Cecchini, Memorie di un celoviek bersagliere, 3–4. 41  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 7. 42  By June 1945, the antifascist group in Suzdal had at least 140 members, nineteen of them qualifying as activists (cf. G. Ossola, Bloc notes, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [Gramsci Institute Foundation], Archive “M” (Moscow) MF (microfilm) 312, doc. 312). The following year, on 8 April 1946, the antifascist group counted 133 members, nineteen of whom were activists (cf. Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss). Activists were sarcastically called “the enlightened” by prisoners not taking part in propaganda activities. 43  Ibid., 16. 44  D’Onofrio, La situazione al campo 58. Relazione di Edo a Ercoli. 45  Rapporto del lavoro compiuto al campo 160 dal 15 febbraio a questo giorno dal compagno Roncato [Report on the work carried out in camp No. 160 from 15 February to the present by comrade Roncato], 5 March 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 84. 46  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 25. 47  Ibid., 27. 48  D’Onofrio, La situazione al campo 58. Relazione di Edo ad Ercoli, 179. 49  N. Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani [The man who “tortured” Italian prisoners of war] (Milan: Vangelista, 1994), 123. 50  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 35.

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 Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 204.  This was the case of Second Lieutenant Italo Galeota, an artilleryman with the Pasubio Division, from L’Aquila. Galeota refused to eat, and retired to one side manifesting his dejection at the news of the armistice (account by veteran Giuseppe Bassi, who on 9 September 1943 was in charge of doling out the food). 53  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 80. The document listed the officers who had not viewed the armistice as an important event for Italian history: for example, it noted that “Lieutenant Joli Giuseppe, Second Lieutenant Chini Luigi, and Lieutenant Chaplain Brevi […] had expressed their stark opposition to the antifascist movement in the course of public meetings.” The same men feature in the list of prisoners held in the USSR until 1954 (ibid., 35). 54  Report on the rally held on 17 October 1943 in concentration camp No. 165, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 114. 55  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 67f. 56  Ossola, Bloc notes. 57  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 89. 58  Speaking of Italy’s war against Yugoslavia, propagandists justified their requests thus: “The Italians, together with the Germans, invaded our socialist sister, democratic Yugoslavia; killed millions of our communist brothers; destroyed cities and towns. You have to make up for all this, you invading fascist bandit! Sign the appeal, get it?” (Cecchini, Memorie di un celoviek bersagliere, 93). 59  Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 64. 60  The camp, where eleven Italians died, was located on the Siberian side of the Urals, 100 km north of Chelyabinsk. 61  Protokol zasedaniya Komissii ot 6.3.1943 po politrabote sredi voyennoplennykh [Minutes from the meeting of the Commission for Political Work Among Prisoners of War on 6 March 1943], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 49, l. 17. 62  Resoconto su conversazione con istruttore avendo lavorato con prigionieri italiani [Account of a conversation with an instructor who worked with Italian prisoners], undated, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 44. Written in pencil in the upper right corner of the report (in Italian) is the name of its intended receiver, Ercoli. The text was sent by Longo, as the signature at the bottom of the document attests. 63  Cf. ibid. 64  Cf. Doklad o poezdke delegatsii v lager n. 165 [Report on the inspection carried out by a delegation in camp No. 165], 6 October 1944, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 40, l. 23. Confidential. 65  Proekt. Nachalnikam priëmnykh punktov i lagerej raspredelitelej voyennoplennykh [Project: To those in charge of prisoner-of-war reception points and sorting camps], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 26, l. 37. The original document is undated. Confidential. 66  Assessment of the Political Work Among the Prisoners of the Italian Army in NKVD Camp No. 188, 147. 67  Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 138f. 68  Ossola, Bloc notes. Cf. Dokladnaya zapiska. Ob osnovnykh politicheskikh itogakh obucheniya 4-ogo nabora slushatelej antifashistskoj politshkoly pri lagere N. 27/b Nkvd Sssr [Report on the most important political results of the IV student contingent 52

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in the camp No. 27/b antifascist school]. 22 May 1944. Secret. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 40, l. 4–9. The document attests to the fact that, as of 22 May 1944, thirty-nine students had been expelled from the school in all, for political or other reasons. Twenty of them were officers (ibid., 1). 69  Ibid., 4. 70  C. Bertoldi, La mia prigionia nei lager di Stalin [My captivity in Stalin’s camps], Maniago (PN): Università della terza età delle valli del Cellina e del Colvera, 2001, 70. 71  Founded in 1926, the international school (MLK) for communist émigrés held its own courses alongside the ones offered by the KUNMZ, the university in Moscow titled to Zapata. Soviet teachers taught there in addition to Italian ones. The latter included Amoretti, Berti, Gennari and Pastore, as well as Togliatti, Longo and Greco. The Italians were seventy or so. 72  Postanovleniye Sekretaryata Ikki ot 5 fevr. 1943, l. 3. 73  Correspondence between Soviet party leaders and PCI representatives on the subject of hiring translators for the work among the Italian prisoners of war helps to grasp the procedure that was followed. Cf. Richiesta personale di Bianco a Dimitrov [Bianco’s personal request to Dimitrov], 30 July 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 177. Restricted; Richiesta di Ercoli a Manuil’skij [Ercoli’s request to Manuilsky], 16 October 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 29, l. 7. Restricted; Richiesta di Manuilsky a Melnikov [Manuilsky’s request to Melnikov], 16 October 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 29, l. 6. Confidential; Comunicazione di Belov a Manuil’skij [Belov’s communication with Manuilsky], 19 October 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 29, l. 8. Confidential. 74  Cf. Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 142. 75  Pis’mo Bianko ital’janskim instruktoram, l. 52. 76  Rapporto del lavoro compiuto al campo 160 dal 15 febbraio a questo giorno dal compagno Roncato, 84 verso. 77  M.T. Giusti, “La propaganda antifascista tra i prigionieri di guerra italiani nell’Urss” [Antifascist propaganda among Italian prisoners of war in the USSR], in Ricerche di storia politica, No. 3, 2000, 358. 78  The short letter with Robotti’s authentic signature attests that even a staunch communist such as he would go to great lengths to leave the Soviet Union. Robotti included drawings by the prisoners on the ARMIR’s defeat, deemed useful for publishing. The yet unpublished document is stored in the Archivio storico CGIL nazionale [National CGIL historical archive], Atti e corrispondenza 1945 [Acts and correspondence, 1945], b. 3, fasc. 5, Delegazione sindacale in Urss, 1945 [Union delegation in the USSR, 1945]. 79  Cf. Robotti’s letter dated 20 September 1946 to Togliatti, requesting that he take steps with the authorities in Moscow for his “liberation.” PCI Archive, Singoli [Loose Documents], Palmiro Togliatti’s Correspondence, MF 115, 2185, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci. Robotti makes no mention of these difficulties in his Scelto dalla vita [Chosen by life], Rome: Napoleone, 1980, 315. 80  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, l. 123. The letter was written before the instructor fell ill with typhus. 81  In 1945, school camp No. 27/b was called school No. 40, better known as obekt No. 40 (Ministry of War, “I” Office, 2nd Section, Turin, interrogation of veteran Veniero Ajmone Marsan, AUSSME, H8 83. Confidential).

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82

 Dokladnaya zapiska Szántó Dimitrovu [Report by Szántó to Dimitrov], 24 October 1943, RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 25, l. 33. Confidential. Bureaucratic custom dictated that the local party secretary waited for orders from above before taking any kind of initiative. G. Dimitrov, Diario. Gli anni di Mosca (1934-1945) [Diary: The Moscow Years (1934–1945)], edited by S. Pons (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 567. 83  Ibid. 84  The town of Yuzha (Shuya) is located in the Ivanovo region, 300 km north-east of Moscow. 85  Prikaz Nkvd Sssr n. 00805 ob organizatsii antifashistskikh politicheskikh kursov voyennoplennykh [Decree of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00805 on the organization of political antifascist courses for prisoners], 28 April–7 May 1943. Moscow. Top secret. 86  Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 133. 87  The villa is mentioned in some notes on former prisoners in Russia, in AUSSME, H8 83. Confidential. 88  According to the account Mr. Giulio Brancadoro gave on 27 November 1999 in L’Aquila, the history of political parties and the fundamentals of atheism were also studied in depth in Krasnogorsk. 89  Cf. Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 134. 90  Interview with Nikolai Tereshchenko, 4 November 2000, Moscow. 91  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 39, l. 2. 92  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 26, l. 59. 93  Other major costs for the institute in addition to antifascist schools were: the National Committee for a Free Germany (NKSG); the editorial staff of POW papers; executives like the institute’s leader (Kozlov at the time) and administrators; secretaries; librarians; and finally the institute’s services and mess hall. On this matter, see “L’elenco dei collaboratori dell’Istituto 99 (al 1 o settembre 1944)” [The list of Institute 99 collaborators (as of 1 September 1944)], in RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 39, l. 1–5. Confidential. 94  D. Ferretti, La lunga strada di un prigioniero di guerra nell’Urss [The long road of a prisoner of war in the USSR], 97, unpublished typewritten diary, kindly provided by his widow, Mrs. Maria Chiara Bosi Ferretti. These memoirs are of great interest, for they attests to the complex political path followed by Danilo Ferretti, who started out as a fascist militant and ended up staunchly adhering to communism. 95  Interrogation No. 1287 of Captain Diego Cadeddu, who had attended the Krasnogorsk School, 7 November 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 2. Confi­ dential. 96  Ibid. 97  Cf. Ferretti, La lunga strada di un prigioniero di guerra nell’Urss, 97f. 98  Interrogation No. 1287 of Captain Diego Cadeddu, 3. 99  Osobaia papka Stalina, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 69, l. 142. Secret. For the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document VIII. 100  Spravka o rabote antifashistskoj shkoly i kursov [File on work in the antifascist school and courses], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 39, l. 13. Confidential. 101  RGVA, f. 88, op. 4, d. 2, l. 85f.

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 Ibid., l. 82 s. Tereshchenko (L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 142) speaks of 500–550 Italian students who attended the Krasnogorsk School between 1943 and 1945. Other sources attesto to seventy-seven officers, ranging in rank from majors to second lieutenants (document 15800/223, minutes, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 42). 103  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 20, l. 126. Secret. 104  Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3637, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci. 105  Anastatic copies of the paper are in L’Alba: per una Italia libera ed indipendente: giornale dei prigionieri di guerra italiani nell’Unione Sovietica [L’Alba: For a free and independent Italy: The paper of Italian prisoners of war in the Soviet Union], reprint edited by Istituto storico della Resistenza di Cuneo, Cuneo, 1975. Other papers published for prisoners of war and coordinated by the Institute 99 were: Svobodnaya Germaniya (Free Germany), for German prisoners; Slovo pravdy (The word of truth), for Hungarian prisoners; Svobodnyj golos (Free voice), for Romanians (cf. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 39, l. 1). 106  Tereshchenko claimed that editors received no payment for their work, “not even tiny sandwiches during the meetings held by the editorial committee, whose members were, without exception, no less hungry than I was at the time” (Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 102). According to documents on the Institute 99’s budget, however, the four regular collaborators of the paper for Italian prisoners of war received a stipend: Giovanni Germanetto 1,500 rubles, Luigi Longo 900 rubles, Elena K. Lebedeva 800 rubles, and Maria Rossi 500 rubles, for an overall monthly cost of 3,700 rubles. Cf. “L’elenco dei collaboratori dell’Istituto 99 (al 1o settembre 1944),” l. 2. 107  The fifth issue’s editorial, Ai lettori [To the readers], announced that the new, bigger format would give “prisoners of war more chances for collaboration.” The government of the Soviets, it said, was the only one that provided prisoners of war with a paper they could use as a means to discuss their problems: “Thus, the paper is yours. It is for you to write it.” L’Alba, no. 5, 4 April 1943, 3. 108  For example, the first issue dated 10 February stated as follows: “L’offensiva sovietica si è estesa su tutto il fronte” [The Soviet offensive has extended to the whole front]. And further down: “L’Armata italiana operante in Russia non esiste più” [The Italian army operating in Russia no longer exists]. No. 1, 10 February 1943, 1. 109  Cf. Valutazione del lavoro svolto tra i prigionieri di guerra dell’esercito italiano nel campo 188 Nkvd, 152. 110  Gambetti, Né vivi né morti, 218. 111  Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 101. 112  Ibid. The responsibility Tereshchenko was taking on in his capacity as editor of the paper—prior to being sent to the camps, and then to the Krasnogorsk School—made him very demanding toward his collaborators, so much so that he often had words with Germanetto, Grieco and Bianco. 113  Cf. M. Calandri, “Quali scelte dei prigionieri italiani in Russia” [What choices by the Italian prisoners in Russia], in Le diverse prigionie dei militari italiani nella seconda guerra mondiale, ed. Tomassini, 124. 114  Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 109. 115  Ibid., 109f.

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116

 Gruppo “Amici dell’Alba” [“Friends of L’Alba” group], Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3638, manuscript identified as attachment 3, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci. 117  “Libertà di parola” [Freedom of speech], in L’Alba, no. 1, 10 February 1943, 3. 118  Second Lieutenant A. Mastropasqua, “Il processo del fascismo” [Fascism on trial], in L’Alba, no. 40, 15 January 1944, 2. 119  A. Mola, “I prigionieri italiani nell’Urss attraverso L’Alba: evoluzione dalla ‘guerra del duce’ alla nuova Italia” [Italian prisoners in the USSR as seen through L’Alba: Evolution from the “Duce’s war” to the new Italy], in I prigionieri militari italiani durante la seconda guerra mondiale. Atti del Convegno di Mantova [Italian military prisoners during the Second World War: Proceedings of the conference of Mantua], ed. R.H. Rainero (Milan: Marzorati, 1985), 59. See also, A. Mola, “Attraverso L’Alba. Temi e limiti della evoluzione dalla ‘guerra del duce’ alla nuova Italia” [Through L’Alba: Themes and limitations of the evolution from the “Duce’s war” to the new Italy], in La campagna di Russia. Nel 70o anniversario dell’inizio dell’intervento dello CSIR— Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia [The campaign in Russia: On the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the involvement by the CSIR, the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia], eds. A. Biagini and A. Zarcone (Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2012), 65–80. Regarding the paper, see also, L. Vaglica, I prigionieri di guerra italiani in Urss. Tra propaganda e rieducazione politica. “L’Alba” 1943-1946 [Italian prisoners of war in the USSR: Between propaganda and political re-education: L’Alba, 1943–1946] (Civitavecchia, Rome: Prospettiva, 2006). 120  Cf. Lettera di Bianco al compagno Fiammenghi [Bianco’s letter to comrade Fiammenghi], 30 December 1942. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 27, 122. 121  On this issue, cf. E. Aga Rossi and V. Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 57ff, 63 (note 40). 122  A. Molinari, “L’unità del popolo italiano contro i nemici d’Italia” [Unity of the Italian people against Italy’s enemies], in L’Alba, no. 16, 27 July 1943, 1. 123  L’Alba, no. 17, 3. Twelve officers signed the appeal. 124  Ibid., 3. The short piece bears the following title: “Arresto di gerarchi. Alcuni castighi esemplari” [Arrest of National Fascist Party members: Some exemplary punishments]. 125  L’Alba, no. 20, 24 August 1943, 3. 126  The plan was to employ about 50,000 prisoners, assigned to an army corps made up of three or four divisions, only one of which to be used in combat (F.G. Conti, I prigionieri italiani negli Stati Uniti [Italian prisoners in the United States], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), 43). 127  Ibid. Once back in Italy, Gazzera requested that all prisoners over sixty and prisoners over fifty who had already been detained for two years be repatriated. 128  Ibid., 61, 63, 141–42. Many collaborators decided to withdraw from the ISUs because American authorities did not uphold their promises. Many were called “fomenters” or “rotten eggs,” and sent back to the normal camps. Those who did not collaborate were constantly threatened and often transferred as a way to discourage relations and friendships. There were 125,000 Italian prisoners of war in American hands. Over 51,000 were sent to the United States. Well over half of these, 35,000, joined the ISUs.

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129

 Valutazione del lavoro politico svolto tra i prigionieri di guerra dell’esercito italiano nel campo 188 Nkvd, 148. 130  Ibid., 149. 131  Ibid., 150. 132  Cf. Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 36. 133  Ibid., 36ff. 134  D’Onofrio, La situazione al campo 58. Relazione di Edo a Ercoli, 180. 135  RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 21a, l. 106. 136  Osobaia papka Stalina, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 69, l. 142. Secret. 137  Interview with Giuseppe Bassi and Guido Martelli, officers of the 120th Artillery, Celere Division, 12 April 2001, San Lazzaro di Savena (BO). 138  Osobaia papka Stalina, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, l. 236. Secret. The text of the telegram is in Russian. 139  Ibid., l. 238. 140  Ferretti, La lunga strada di un prigioniero di guerra nell’Urss, 93. 141  Robotti, Appunti per il compagno Fidia Gambetti, 5. 142  N.D. Bočenina, La segretaria di Togliatti. Memorie di Nina Bočenina [Togliatti’s secretary: Nina Bochenina’s Memoirs] (Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1993), 37. In order to evaluate the idea of forming battalions made up of Italian prisoners under Soviet command, Stalin had met with Togliatti at the Kremlin to get information “on the situation in general and on the political leanings of Italian soldiers and officers who had surrendered after the Battle of Stalingrad” (ibid.). 143  Ibid. 144  Pismo Erkoli Shcherbakovu, Rgaspi, f. 495, op. 77, d. 30, l. 29. Original. Confidential. After all, Italian units had arisen in Yugoslavia after 8 September 1943. These collaborated with the partisans of Tito’s National Liberation Army. They were under Italian command, but entirely dependent on the Yugoslavs (cf. E. Aga Rossi and M.T. Giusti, Una guerra a parte. I militari italiani nei Balcani. 1940-1945 [A war apart: The Italian military in the Balkans, 1940–1945] (Bologna, Il Mulino: 2011), 190ff. 145  Telegram 22/14 I.R., from Bonomi to the Royal Italian representatives in Moscow, 21 July 1944, in ASMAE, serie Affari politici [Political affairs series], 1931–1945. USSR, b. 49, fasc. 6, Ristabilimento relazioni diplomatiche Italia-Urss [Re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Italy and the USSR], 1–4. 146  Telegram dated 17 August 1944, from the Royal Italian representatives in Moscow to the General Direction of Political Affairs IX, regarding: Prigionieri italiani in Russia [Italian prisoners in Russia], ibid., 1–2. For example, Soviet military authorities reserved the right to make all decisions concerning voluntary squads, members of the fascist militia and “people whose conduct in Russia [had been] unsatisfactory” (ibidem). 147  Pismo Manuil’skogo generalu armii Chrulevu A.V. [Letter from Manuilsky to Army General A.V. Khrulev], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 39, l. 39. Confidential. 148  Cf. Osobaya papka Stalina i Molotova, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 94, l. 127–131, 225–233, 260–262; d. 95, l. 76–79. 149  Ibid., d. 95, l. 346, 389–391. 150  Communication with Stalin dated 28 March and 12 April 1945, ibid., l. 10–14.

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151

 Cf. Direktiva Nkvd Sssr N. 489 ob agenturnoj rabote sredi voyennoplennykh, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 686, l. 56–64, l. 62, Original. Secret. The Italian translation, Direttiva dell’Nkvd dell’Urss n. 489 sul reclutamento di agenti tra i prigionieri di guerra. 7 ottobre 1943 [Directive of the NKVD of the USSR No. 489 on the recruitment of agents among prisoners of war, 7 October 1943], previously edited by M.T. Giusti and published in Ventunesimo secolo, No. 3, 2003, 114, is also featured in the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document VI. 152  As explained in the report’s introduction, the officer “had shown up willingly to give an account”; he had arrived in Tarvisio on 7 July 1946, and in Rome the following 10 July. Attached to report No. 426/2a, section SIT/c, 25 July 1946, Russia, giugno-luglio 1946. Notizie sull’attività svolta nei campi di prigionia da ufficiali italiani prigionieri, da fuoriusciti ed elementi del Servizio informazioni sovietico [Russia, June–July 1946: News on the activities carried out in prison camps by Italian officer prisoners, exiles and elements of the Soviet Intelligence Service], AUSSME, DS 2271/C. Confidential. Distribution of the document was “limited to security forces.” 153  Ibid., 1f. The following quotes come from the same source, for which the page number is provided in parentheses. For reasons of privacy, officers mentioned by the veteran under questioning are referred to with their initials only. 154  AUSSME, H-8, folder 83, 19 June 1948. 155  L. Venturini, La fame dei vinti. Diario di prigionia in Russia di un sergente della Julia [The defeated’s hunger: Russian captivity diary of a sergeant of the Julia] (Udine: Gaspari, 2003), 128–29. 156  C. Caneva, Calvario bianco [White Calvary] (Vittorio Veneto, TV: Friulian section of the UNIRR of Udine, 1972), 172. 157  To comrades I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.I. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Doklad S.N. Kruglova ot 24ogo maja 1950g., N. 227ss/k, Soveršenno sekretno [Report by S.N. Kruglov dated 24 May 1950, file No. 227ss/k, Secret], Sui risultati del lavoro svolto con i prigionieri di guerra e gli internati relativamente alla loro detenzione, all’utilizzo come manodopera, al lavoro politico e operativo e sui rimpatri [On the results of the work carried out among prisoners of war and internees regarding their detention, their use as labor, political and operational work, and repatriations], in Osobaia papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 269, 1–11 (henceforth, Kruglov’s report dated 24 May 1950; for the full text, cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XXII). 158  Ibid., 8. 159  Ibid., 9. 160  Ibid., 8. 161  According to Kruglov, some 553 German agents worked abroad: eighteen of them in the United States, twenty in England, twenty-seven in France, twenty-one in Yugoslavia, forty-one in Turkey, twenty-seven in Spain, ten in Belgium, eighty-four in other capitalist countries, 186 in popular-democratic countries, seventy-eight in White Russian, Armenian, Georgian, and Russian circles, forty-one among religious in various countries (ibid.). 162  M. Scafi, “Cossiga accusa i comunisti italiani in Urss” [Cossiga accuses Italian communists in the USSR], in Il Giornale, 1 April 1992. The day before, in the

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same newspaper, Montanelli had branded news of the Russians’ recruiting spies among prisoners as the last in a long line of untruths (I. Montanelli, “L’ennesima patacca da Mosca” [The umpteenth nonsense from Moscow], in Il Giornale, 31 March 1992). 163  Valutazione del lavoro politico svolto tra i prigionieri di guerra dell’esercito italiano nel campo 188, 151. 164  Ibid. 165  RGVA, f. 4/4, op. 4, d. 4. The Italians’ effort in camp No. 26 is confirmed by the high number of Italian men asking to join the antifascist courses: out of a total of 2,000 antifascists, as many as 1,730 were Italian; out of 307 activists, 230 were Italian. Overall, sixty-two Italian prisoners completed the courses; out of 1,705 prisoners of various nationalities who collaborated on drafting the appeals, 1,625 were Italian, including five officers (ibid.). 166  Ibid. 167  Danilo Ferretti speaks of a young man from the Aosta Valley who, nearly illiterate on arriving in Russia, had become so proficient a writer that he’d started contributing articles for the camp’s wall newspaper (Ferretti, La lunga strada di un prigioniero di guerra nell’Urss, 99). In almost all camps, depending on the number of prisoners, there existed schools for the illiterate complementing the political work. On this issue, see also, Ossola, Bloc notes. 168  Cf. Cronistoria del movimento antifascista degli ufficiali italiani prigionieri nell’Urss, 60. 169  Cf. ibid., 3f. 170  Ibid. 171  Ferretti, La lunga strada di un prigioniero di guerra nell’Urss, 85. On Ferretti’s life, see M.T. Giusti, “From Fascism to Communism: The History of a Conversion,” in Totalitarian Societies and Democratic Transition, eds. T. Piffer and V. Zubok (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2017), 251– 76. Fidia Gambetti followed a similar path: a blackshirt in 1941, he set off as a volunteer for the war in Russia, until finally, during captivity, he converted to communism; once back in Italy, he joined the PCI. 172  Ibid. 173  Ibid., 266. In Krasnogorsk, Ferretti served as an assistant. Once repatriated, he worked in Bologna as a teacher in the PCI educational institution bearing the name of Anselmo Marabini. (Account by Ezio Antonioni, vice-president of the Provincial Institute for the Study of the Italian Resistance in Bologna, and a friend of Ferretti’s, 13 June 2001, Bologna). 174  Doklad o poyezdke delegatsii v lager n. 165, l. 23. 175  Cf. Dokladnaya zapiska. Ob osnovnykh politicheskikh itogakh obucheniya 4-ogo nabora slushatelej antifashistskoj politshkoly pri lagere N. 27/b Nkvd Sssr, l. 2 s. Ajmone Marsan Veniero was of this opinion. He attended the school for a month out of intellectual and personal curiosity, but then resigned. He was Catholic, and as such could not abide by the lessons’ materialist contents (account dated 10 March 2000, Rome, confirmed by Nikolai Tereshchenko’s testimony). 176  Ibid., l. 4. 177  Ibid., ll. 5, 6, 8. 178  Ibid., l. 9

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179

 Cf. Doklad Vorobyova, Ulbrichta, Szántó o rabote vypusknoj i priyomochnoj komissii i ispolzovanii okonchivshikh 1-uyu shkolu antifashistkikh voyennoplennykh [Report by Vorobëv, Ulbricht and Szántó on the work of the Graduation and Admissions Commission and on the use of graduates from the first school for antifascist prisoners], RGASPI, f. 495, op. 77, d. 49, l. 24. Confidential. 180  Ibid., l. 25. 181  Tereshchenko, L’uomo che “torturò” i prigionieri di guerra italiani, 178. 182  Letter in Italian by Robotti to Shchevliagin, 7 May 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 373, l. 43. See also, Robotti, Scelto dalla vita, 314. 183  This quote and the following ones are taken from Kruglov’s report dated 24 May 1950, 6–7. In subsequent passages, the page number is provided in parentheses at the end of the quoted text. 184  According to Kruglov, positive results were reaped among German former prisoners, especially those who had completed the antifascist schools. Once in the Soviet zone, they had enrolled in the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the unified German socialist party). The SED was a political party of the German Democratic Republic from 1946 to 1990.

CHAPTER 5 1

 Cf. note dated 9 November 1944, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. See also, the communication by the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, sent to the government and army chief of staff on 17 November 1944, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 2  E. Aga Rossi, “Il problema dei prigionieri italiani nei rapporti tra l’Italia e gli anglo-americani” [The problem of the Italian prisoners in the relationship between Italy and the Anglo-Americans], in I prigionieri militari italiani durante la seconda guerra mondiale [Italian military prisoners during the Second World War], ed. R.H. Rainero (Milan: Marzorati, 1985), 19–33, 21. 3  Cf. G. Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia” [Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia], in appendix to the book by the same author, La guerra al fronte russo. Il corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Csir) [War on the Russian front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR)] (Milan: Mursia, 2005), 34. 4  R oughly two weeks before the soldiers’ repatriation from the USSR was announced on 25 August 1945, the Italian embassy in Moscow had reiterated the request that unwell prisoners and those older than sixty be repatriated at once. Cf. telegram from the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, to the Ministry of War, and to the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, 9 August 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 5  Telegram No. 47/17 from the Soviet legation in Stockholm to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trattamento fatto ai prigionieri italiani in Russia [Treatment of the Italian prisoners in Russia], 22 January 1944, ASMAE, serie Affari politici [Political affairs series], 1931–1945, USSR, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3, Prigionieri di guerra [Prisoners of war]. 6  Telegram from Prunas to Royal Minister P. Quaroni, representative of the Italian government with the government of the USSR, re: Prigionieri di guerra in Russia [Prisoners of war in Russia], Salerno, 27 June 1944, ibid. 7  Ibid.

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8

 Restricted document, 9 October 1944, AUSSME, DS 2271/C.  Ibid. 10  Ibid. 11  Cf. R. Morozzo della Rocca, “I prigionieri in Urss. Consistenza, problemi ed utilizzazioni politiche” [Prisoners in the USSR: Size, problems, and political uses], in I prigionieri militari italiani durante la seconda guerra mondiale, ed. Rainero, 40. 12  Communication from the Italian Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies to the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, 9 November 1944, AUSSME, f. I 3/163. 13  See telegram No. 00703 dated 22 January 1945, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of War, the chief of staff, and the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War, as well as to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Italian embassy in Mosca, for their information, re: Prigionieri di guerra in Russia [Prisoners of war in Russia], signed by Prunas, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1931–1945, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3, Prigionieri di guerra; see also, Messe, Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia, 305. 14  Telegram No. 00703 dated 22 January 1945, 2–3. These lists did not include the names of those who had followed the Italian troops of their own accord and for reasons unrelated to the war, or, as in the women’s case, for sentimental reasons. 15  Ibid., 5. 16  Ibid., 6. 17  AUSSME, f. I 3/163. 18  Telegram No. 930/26 from the Italian embassy in Moscow to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, re: Prigionieri italiani nell’Urss [Italian prisoners in the USSR], Moscow, 11 May 1945, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1931–1945, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3, 3. The report is also found in AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 19  The telegram was sent also to the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War and to the Italian embassy in Moscow; 28 June 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. The Italian prisoners in the hands of the Anglo-Americans, a little over half a million men, were distributed in several countries, as far-flung as Australia. Excluding the servicemen seized in northern Africa and in Sicily between the end of 1942 and the armistice, the others remained captive for several years. The Foreign Office tended to prioritize the repatriation of those who declared themselves antifascists. 20  Telegram from Quaroni dated 9 July 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 21  Dispatch from Quaroni to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 July 1945, ibid. 22  The last Germans to be condemned for war crimes were freed in 1956. 23  Postanovleniye Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony n. 8921 “O raspredelenii voyennoplennykh v meroprijatijach po uluchsheniyu ikh trudovogo ispolzovaniya” [State Defense Committee directive No. 8921 “On the distribution of prisoners of war among businesses for the improvement of labor”], RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 502, l. 7–16. Typewritten copy. 24  Cf. GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 726, l. 21 s. Secret. 25  Soprovoditelnaya zapiska L.P. Berija I.V. Stalinu k proektu postanovleniya Gko ob osvobozhdenii iz lagerej Nkvd 708 tys. voyennoplennykh [Accompanying note from L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin on the resolution plan proposed by the GKO on the liberation from the NKVD camps of 708,000 prisoners of war], 10 August 1945, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 98, l. s. Authentic copy. Secret. 9

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26

 Prikaz Nkvd Sssr N. 00955 ob osvobozhdenii chasti voyennoplennykh iz lagerej Nkvd i spetsgospitalej [NKVD decree No. 00955 on the liberation of a part of the prisoners of war from the NKVD camps and hospital-camps], 10–14 August 1945, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 728, l. 121–125. Original. Secret. 27  A. Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa. Ricordi di prigionia [Those long days on the steppe: Recollections of imprisonment] (Udine: Campanotto, 1996), 145ff. 28  G. Caleffi, Da Cefalonia alla Siberia. Un superstite, due volte prigioniero, racconta [From Cephalonia to Siberia: A survivor and two-time prisoner’s account] (Verona: Balan & Ferrari, 1991), 44. 29  Some camps on the front only put together name lists of released prisoners; others had a general prisoner list, on which the names of those who had been liberated were transcribed; others still only kept a record of the number of freed prisoners, divided by nationality. Cf. RGVA, f. i/p, op. 23a, d. 14, l. 1. 30  GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 140, l. 3. 31  That same year, Japanese prisoners of war who were wounded or sick—65,245 men in all—were repatriated as well, before they were even transferred to camps in the USSR. Cf. “Voyenno-istoricheskij zhurnal,” no. 4, 1991, 71. 32  Decree No. 0015, in GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 195, l. 25–26. 33  Ibid. 34  Ibid., l. 26. 35  By May 1946, out of 1,579,729 prisoners, 193,257 had been admitted into the camp hospitals or actual hospitals; the prisoners classified as weak were 154,911, whereas those classified as invalid were 11,902 (ibid.). 36  Cf. Dokladnaya zapiska S.N. Kruglova I.V. Stalinu,V.M. Molotovu, L.P. Berii o fizicheskom sostoyanii voyennoplennykh v Sssr i neobkhodimosti otpravki bolnykh i netrudosposobnykh iz nikh na rodinu [Report by S.N. Kruglov to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria on the physical state of the prisoners of war in the USSR and on the need to repatriate those among them who are sick and unfit for work], 26 May 1946, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 136, l. 310f. Authentic copy. Secret. 37  Cf. Prikaz Mvd Sssr N. 0374 ob otpravke na rodinu voyennoplennykh rumynskoj natsionalnosti [MVD decree No. 0374 on the sending home of prisoners of war who are Romanian nationals], GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 740, l. 175–179. Original. Confidential. The repatriation of about 3,000 antifascists chosen among Austrian prisoners fit for work started that same year in December. On this issue, cf. Dokladnaya zapiska Kruglova Stalinu, Molotovu, Zhdanovu o poryadke vozvrashcheniya na rodinu voyennoplennykh avstrijtsev [Note from Kruglov to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov on the methods for the repatriation of Austrian prisoners of war], 27 November 1946, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 139, l. 427–433. Authentic copy. Secret. On the same issue, cf. the decree dated 28 November, in GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 764, l. 151–155. Secret. 38  Cf. Direktiva Mvd Sssr n. 119 o poryadke otpravki na rodinu voyennoplennykh iz chisla antifashistkogo aktiva, osvobozhdaemykh individualno po resheniyam rukovodyashchikh instantsij [Directive of the Interior Ministry of the USSR No. 119 on the methods for the repatriation of prisoners of war belonging to the group of antifascist activists, to be released individually based on the decisions of the directive bodies], 13 June 1947, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 835, l. 85. Original. Secret.

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39

 The delegation, whose aim it was to strengthen Italian-Soviet relations, was led by Nikolai Krasavchenko and included Dmitry Shchevliagin, Anatolii Rizhikov, Zlata Potapoka, Sofia Demisheva, Ekaterina Riaboka e Aleksandr Marinov (cf. M. Clementi, L’alleato Stalin [The ally Stalin], Milan: Rizzoli, 2001, 253, and P. Iuso, “La dimensione internazionale” [The international dimension], in La Cgil e la costruzione della democrazia [The CGIL and the building of democracy], volume III of Storia del sindacato in Italia nel ’900 [History of the Italian union in twentiethcentury Italy], eds. A. Pepe, P. Iuso, and S. Misiani (Rome: Eds, 2001), 151. 40  The delegation comprised Roberto Cuzzaniti, secretary to the chemical workers’ federation (Christian Democracy, DC); Giovanni Borghesi, member of the central committee of the Italian railroad workers’ union (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity, PSIUP); Luigi Morelli (DC) and Ferdinando Santi (PSIUP), representatives of Milan’s Chamber of Labor; Erminio Pizzorno, representative of Genoa’s Chamber of Labor, a metalworker and commander of a partisan unit in Northern Italy (PCI), and Adele Bei, representative of women workers in the managing body of the CGIL (cf. Archivio storico Cgil nazionale [National CGIL historical archive], Atti e corrispondenza 1945 [Proceedings and correspondence, 1945], b. 3, fasc. 5, Delegazione sindacale in Urss, 1945 [Union delegation in the USSR, 1945]). 41  Cf. Di Vittorio’s report on the trip, ibid., b. 3, fasc. 4: “The Germans,” Di Vittorio wrote, “destroyed 52,000 km of railroads and 2,500 train stations, a large part of which have been rebuilt. […] There remain to be reconstructed 16,000 bridges and 12,000 km of railroads. […] Twenty-five billion rubles are required over the next two or three years.” Dossier No. 4 (fasc. 4) includes reports by other delegation members on the visits and the meetings conducted with workers and authorities. 42  Letter from Mrs. G. Mezzar, via Bellocchio 10, Voghera, 26 July 1945. Her son was a bersagliere in the 6th Regiment, 13th Battalion, 6th Company, 3rd Celere Division (Archivio storico Cgil nazionale, Atti e corrispondenza 1945, b. 3, fasc. 5, Delegazione sindacale in Urss, 1945). 43  Pasqualina Pizzichini asked for news of her husband, whom she had not heard from in three years; Nunziata Cincotta asked for news of her son, Second Lieutenant Antonio Cincotta, interned by the Germans and freed by the Russians who now held him prisoner (ibid.). 44  Cf. G. Dimitrov, Diario. Gli anni di Mosca (1934-1945) [Diary: The Moscow years (1934–1945)], ed. S. Pons (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 862. 45  Alla delegazione sindacale [To the union delegation], camp No. 165, 4 August 1945, 2, Archivio storico Cgil nazionale, Atti e corrispondenza 1945, b. 3, fasc. 5, Delegazione sindacale in Urss, 1945. 46  Alla delegazione sindacale italiana [To the Italian union delegation], comrade Di Vittorio, ibid. The Second Lieutenant Gonnelli of Montepulciano (SI) belonged to the 79th Infantry Regiment of the Pasubio Division. 47  To comrade Di Vittorio, ibid. The sapper wrote his family in Gardone Val Trompia, Inzino (BS). 48  Ibid. Sergeant Lusardi belonged to the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment of the Celere Division. 49  Ibid. Fifty-three soldiers, officers and noncommissioned officers signed the message. This also served the purpose of letting their families know they were alive.

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50

 Cf. F. Gori and S. Pons eds., Dagli archivi di Mosca. L’Urss, il Cominform e il Pci. 1934-1951 [From the Moscow archives: The USSR, the Cominform and the PCI, 1934–1951] (Rome: Carocci, 1998), doc. 13, 245–47. 51  Ibid., 60. 52  Cf. ibid. In this instance, Lozovsky spoke of 19,500 Italian prisoners. 53  Message Al generalissimo Stalin presidente del Consiglio dei Commissari del Popolo dell’Urss [To Generalissimus Stalin, president of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR], Moscow, August 1945, in Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3637. 54  Ibid. 55  Letter dated 30 August 1945, Archivio storico Cgil nazionale, Atti e corrispondenza 1945, b. 3, fasc. 5, Delegazione sindacale in Urss, 1945. 56  Cf. Interior Ministry, Cabinet Department. Most urgent, reference No. 34795, Rome, 8 September 1945, To the Honorable Giuseppe Di Vittorio, secretary to the Italian General Confederation of Labor, re: Militari italiani in Russia [Italian servicemen in Russia], ibid. 57  To Interior Undersecretary Spataro, Rome, Secretariat, 273/dv, reference f. 34795 dated 8 September 1945, 16 September 1945, re: Militari prigionieri in Russia, ibid. 58  Dispatch from Quaroni, cited in the telegram by the minister of Foreign Affairs dated 14 August 1945, Prigionieri di guerra italiani nell’Urss, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1931–1945, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3; also found in AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 59  Ibid., 2. 60  Announcement by the Italian embassy in Moscow dated 4 December 1946, 2–3, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 61  Dispatch by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 September 1945, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1931–1945, b. 49, fasc. 1, s.fasc. 3; also found in AUSSME, DS 22717/C. 62  Telegram No. 760/333, from the Italian Embassy in Moscow to His Excellence the Honorable Alcide De Gasperi, minister of Foreign Affairs, re: Liberazione prigionieri italiani in Russia [Liberation of Italian prisoners in Russia], Moscow, 13 September 1945, 1, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1931–1945, USSR, b. 49, fasc. 1, Prigionieri di guerra. 63  Ibid., 2. On the matter, see also, Conti, I prigionieri italiani negli Stati Uniti, 375ff. 64  Telegram No. 760/333 from Quaroni to De Gasperi, 13 September 1945, 3–4. 65  Ibid., 4. 66  Ibid., 5–6. 67  G. Gherardini, La vita si ferma [Life stops] (Milan: Baldini e Castoldi, 1948), 307. 68  Cf. UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia [Report on the Italian prisoners of war in Russia], eds. P. Resta and C. Vicentini (Cassano Magnago, VA: Crespi, 1995), 161. 69  Interview with Second Lieutenant Giuseppe Bassi, dated 10 February 2001. 70  Account by the artilleryman Angelo Lesizza, active officer in the 1st Regiment, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, and attached officer in the 30th Regiment, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Udine, 4 October 1945, 9f, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. Confidential. 71  Ibid., 11.

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 S. Porelli, Il lungo ritorno da Cefalonia [The long return from Cephalonia] (Rende, CS: Istituto bellunese di Ricerche sociali e culturali, 2012), 84. 73  Ibid., 85. 74  Lopiano, Quei lunghi giorni nella steppa, 150. 75  G. Beraudi, Vainà kaputt. Guerra e prigionia in Russia (1942-1945) [Vainà kaputt: War and imprisonment in Russia 1942–1945] (Rovereto, TN: Museo storico italiano della guerra, 1996), 178f. 76  Established by lieutenancy decree No. 380, on 21 June 1945, the Ministry of Post-War Assistance absorbed the functions of the High Commissariat for Prisoners of War. Its competences were set by decree No. 645, on 28 September 1945. By the same decree, in order to facilitate aid to repatriated servicemen, Provincial Post-War Assistance Offices were established within each province. Individual towns’ assistance committees depended on the latter. Indeed, Provincial Offices were the competent organizations repatriates could turn to when dealing with red-tape, or if they required advice, help and information. 77  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 78  Ibid. 79  Ibid. 80  Nota per il signor maresciallo d’Italia Messe, 8 gennaio 1947 [Note for the Italian Marshall Messe, 8 January 1947], with an attached list of “Repatriations from Russia (ARMIR),” AUSSME, DS 2271/C. Strictly confidential. 81  Ibid. 82  Communication by the Ministry of Post-War Assistance, 17 November 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 83  Ibid. 84  M. Francesconi, Siamo tornati insieme [We returned together] (Rome: Volpe, 1968), 169f. 85  Gherardini, La vita si ferma, 313. 86  Note from the head of the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates, General Mannerini, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 24 July 1946, reference No. 113929/223. Attachment No. 1: “List of officers detained in Suzdal camp No. 160 on 25 April 1946 (fifty in all)”; attachment No. 2: “List of officers who left Suzdal camp No. 160 at different times, in groups, headed for other camps the name of which is unknown (twenty-nine in all).” AUSSME, DS 2271/C. The lists, it was clarified, had “been drafted on the grounds of the survivors’ accounts; it cannot be ruled out, therefore, that a few names have been omitted” (ibid.). 87  The original text, bearing authentic signatures, is stored among the papers of Giuseppe Ossola, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [Gramsci Institute Foundation], Archive “M” (Moscow), MF (microfilm) 312, doc. 312. 88  Cf. Dokladnaya zapiska S.N. Kruglova V.M. Molotovu o kolichestve italyanskikh voyennoplennykh v lageryakh Mvd Sssr i repatrirovannykh na rodinu [Note from S.N. Kruglov to V.M. Molotov on the number of Italian prisoners present in the camps of the Interior Ministry of the USSR and of repatriates], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 142, l. 294–294 verso. Authenticated copy. Secret. See the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 2016), document XVI. 89  Ibid.

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90

 Francesconi, Siamo tornati insieme, 172.  Gherardini, La vita si ferma, 326. 92  L’Eco del Popolo, No. 9, Sunday, 2 June 1946, in ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 6, Prigionieri ed internati [Prisoners and internees]. 93  E. Aga Rossi and V. Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 176. 94  Communication to the military commands of Milan, Bolzano, Udine, Bologna, Florence, and Rome, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 95  Memorandum for the Defense-Army Cabinet, regarding the Contegno di ex prigionieri italiani nell’Urss durante la sosta ad Odessa [Conduct of former Italian prisoners in the USSR during their stop in Odessa], drafted by Colonel Ettore Musco (in charge of repatriation procedures), head of the Ufficio stralcio reduci prigionia di guerra e rimpatriati [Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates], 2 May 1947, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1. 96  Gherardini, La vita si ferma, 334. See also, UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia, 177; C. Vicentini, Noi soli vivi [We, the only survivors] (Milan: Cavallotti, 1986), 316. Even Father Bertoldi was held in Sighet; cf. his La mia prigionia nei lager di Stalin [My captivity in Stalin’s camps] (Maniago, PN: Università della terza età delle valli del Cellina e del Colvera, 2001), 86. 97  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 98  For the names of the men who were detained, cf. note 107 below. Telegram No. 2215 from the Ministry of Post-War Assistance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 17 September 1946, re: Prigionieri reduci dalla Russia [Returnee prisoners from Russia], in ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 6, Prigionieri ed internati. 99  Phonogram by the minister of Foreign Affairs to the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates, and to the minister’s cabinet, 11 June 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 100  Message “Al popolo italiano” [To the Italian people], in Russia, ed. UNIRR, single issue, April 1948, 2. 101  Telegram No. 16940/223 from the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates, signed by its president, General A. Mannerini, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 7 October 1946, re: Rimpatri prigionieri Armir [Repatriations of ARMIR prisoners], ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 6, Prigionieri ed internati. 102  Telegram from Moscow addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 September 1946, re: Prigionieri italiani nell’Urss [Italian prisoners in the USSR], ibid. 103  Telegram No. 381 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian embassy in Moscow, Rome, 30 September 1946, re: Prigionieri italiani nell’Urss, ibid. 104  Communication from the Italian embassy in Moscow, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 2. 105  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 106  Nota per il signor maresciallo d’Italia Messe, 8 gennaio 1947. 107  The commission was made up of the colonel of the Military Information Service (SIM), Ettore Musco, the lieutenant colonel of the Bersaglieri, Aurelio Traina, and a junior officer who was to serve in plain clothes on behalf of the Alliance of Families of Missing Servicemen and Prisoners in Russia (Alleanza familiare per i dispersi e i prigionieri in Russia), established in Parma in 1942. 91

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 Colonel E. Musco, Relazione sul rimpatrio dello scaglione prigionieri italiani reduci dalla Russia presi in consegna il 7 luglio u.s. ad Arnoldstein (Austria) [Report on the repatriation of the group of Italian prisoners returning from Russia taken into custody on 7 July in Arnoldstein (Austria)], 14 July 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 109  Ibid. 110  Communication by the Territorial Military Command of Udine dated 16 July 1946 to the Ministry of War, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1. 111  The city of Lecce housed a returnee reception center. Regarding the organization that went into the repatriating of servicemen and the other reception centers, see the appendix “Estratti dalla ‘Relazione sull’attività svolta per il rimpatrio dei prigionieri di guerra ed internati, 1944-1947’” [Excerpts from the “report on the action carried out for the repatriation of prisoners of war and internees, 1944–1947”], in R.H. Rainero, “I prigionieri italiani nel mondo,” in the book edited by the same author I prigionieri militari italiani durante la seconda guerra mondiale, 2–12. 112  Concurrently with this communication, Colonel Traina sent the military districts of Milan, Florence and Naples three telegrams in which he provided the names of the returnee officers to be subjected to “in-depth questioning,” AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 113  AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1f. As well as to the minister’s cabinet, the document was sent to the General Administration for Officer Personnel—Discipline Division. 114  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 115  Ibid. 116  Ibid. 117  Interrogation carried out on 29 July 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 118  “ I reduci dall’Urss. Ingiustificati maltrattamenti agli ufficiali antifascisti” [Returnees from the USSR: Unjustified mistreatments of antifascist officers], in L’Unità, 28 August 1946. 119  Reduci dall’Urss [Returnees from the USSR], reference No. 819/“I”, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 120  Ibid. 121  Ibid. 122  Notizie relative ai prigionieri italiani in Russia [News concerning the Italian prisoners in Russia], AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 2. 123  G. Amadesi, “Il terribile inverno del ’43,” in L’Unità, 2 October 1945. 124  Id., “L’odissea della ‘Pasubio’” [The odyssey of the “Pasubio”], in L’Unità, 4 October 1945. In a previous article, Amadesi had identified the causes of the catastrophe in the “recklessness” displayed by the “criminal” selection criterion of the reserves to be sent on the Russian front, in “corruption” and “servility toward the Germans” (“Le cause della catastrofe,” in L’Unità, 3 October 1945). 125  G. Amadesi, “La fine del 3o Bersaglieri,” in L’Unità, 6 October 1945. 126  In L’Unità, 6 August 1946. On the same topic, see also, F. Gambetti, “Dieci divisioni sul Don pronte ad andare al massacro” [Ten divisions on the Don ready to go to slaughter], in L’Unità, 7 August 1946. 127  Cf. “Italiani in Russia” [Italians in Russia], in Oggi, 16, 23, 30 April, 7, 14, 21, 28 May, and 4, 11 June 1946.

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128

 R. Manzini, “I reduci dalla Russia” [Returnees from Russia], in L’Avvenire d’Italia, 16 November 1945. 129  “O vozvrashchenii voyennoplennykh iz Sovetskogo Soyuza v Italiyu” [POWs’ return to Italy from the Soviet Union], in Izvestia, No. 71, 25 March 1947. 130  On this issue, see the Memorandum of Conversation dated 24 October 1950 documenting the meeting between Dr. Bounous, first secretary to the Italian embassy in Washington, and Mr. Hilton, representative of the United States Department of State. A copy of the memorandum was sent to the representatives of the US embassies in Rome and Moscow (Confidential USA Department Central Files, Italy Internal Affairs, 1950–1954, 0551–0555. Confidential). 131  “Per Mosca i prigionieri sono tutti rimpatriati” [As far as Moscow is concerned, all the prisoners have been repatriated], in Il Messaggero, 26 March 1947, 1. 132  “I nostri prigionieri in Russia” [Our prisoners in Russia], in Il Messaggero, 27 March 1947, 1. 133  “All’Assemblea costituente” [To the constituent assembly], in Il Messaggero, 28 March 1947, 1. Minister Gasparotto concluded his answer saying he hoped the news that there were no other Italians in Russia would make it possible for a page that had “caused much damage and much pain to the Italian people” (ibid.) to be turned at last. 134  Pismo Robotti Shchevliaginu [Robotti’s letter to Shchevliagin], 1 April 1947. Shchevliagin passed the letter on to M.A. Suslov on 15 April, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 373, l. 37. 135  G. Messe, “Prigionieri in Russia” [Prisoners in Russia], in Il Tempo, 8 June 1948. 136  “La discussione sui prigionieri in Russia provoca tumulti nell’aula del Senato” [The debate on prisoners in Russia causes tumults in the senate chamber], in Il Tempo, 9 June 1948. 137  Quaroni’s report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prigionieri di guerra italiani nell’Urss, cit. 138  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 139  “Dichiarazione di Gasparotto” [Gaparotto’s statement], in Il Messaggero, 28 April 1947, 1. 140  Cf. “Quattordici evasi dalla prigionia giungono a Padova da Odessa” [Fourteen fugitives arrive in Padua from Odessa], in Il Messaggero, 25 May 1947, 1. 141  D’Amico, Intervista a Paolo Robotti [Interview with Paolo Robotti], Radio Moscow, Moscow, 2 July 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 142  Communication broadcast by Radio Moscow to the Italian Red Cross, 8 July 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 143  Pismo Robotti Shchevliaginu [Robotti’s letter to Shchevliagin], l. 43. 144  The Commissariat Honoring the Fallen received a similar communication from a Russian citizen. In his letter to the Ministry of Defense division, the latter denied the possibility that there might be, or might ever have been, former Italian prisoners who willingly settled in Russia after the war ended. 145  A. Livi, “Concluse a Mosca le trattative per i dispersi italiani in Urss” [Negotiations on missing Italians in the USSR end in Moscow], in Il Paese, 1 May 1960, 6; M. Ferrara, “Raggiunto a Mosca un accordo sui dispersi italiani nell’Urss” [Agreement reached in Moscow on missing Italians in the USSR], in L’Unità, 1 May 1960.

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 Livi, “Concluse a Mosca le trattative per i dispersi italiani in Urss,” and Ferrara, “Raggiunto a Mosca un accordo sui dispersi italiani nell’Urss,” cit. 147  Forms in the two relevant languages were prepared detailing all of the missing men’s data. Interested families were to fill them out and convey them to the Soviet Red Cross. 148  Cf. Il Tempo, 22 and 25 October 1957. 149  Luigi Vittorio Ferraris also tackled this issue when he led the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s Office for Eastern Europe between 1969 and 1970. Account given to me by Ferraris on 16 October 2008.

CHAPTER 6 1

 Fondazione Istituto Gramsci [Gramsci Institute Foundation], Archive “M” (Moscow), MF (microfilm) 254, fasc. “Notizie prigionieri” [News on prisoners]. 2  Ibid. 3  Ibid. 4  Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, PCI Archive, Togliatti’s Correspondence, MF (microfilm) 144, 1739–1741. The letter is dated 7 May 1947, CARS reference No. 6764, 1739. 5  Ibid., 1742. The following quotes come from the same source, for which the page number is provided in parentheses. 6  E. Aga Rossi and V. Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 175. 7  D’Amico, Intervista a Paolo Robotti [Interview with Paolo Robotti], Radio Moscow, Moscow, 2 July 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 8  Ibid. 9  G. Gherardini, La vita si ferma [Life stops] (Milan: Baldini e Castoldi, 1948), 312. 10  G. Beraudi, Vainà kaputt. Guerra e prigionia in Russia (1942-1945) [Vainà kaputt: War and imprisonment in Russia 1942–1945] (Rovereto, TN: Museo storico italiano della guerra, 1996), 184. 11  Ibid., 186. 12  Cf. Kostylev-Togliatti, 23 November 1945, in the President of the Russian Federation’s Archive, cit. in Aga Rossi and Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti, 176. 13  AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 14  Ibid. 15  Ambassador Kostylev in Moscow also reported on instances of this kind: cf. Aga Rossi and Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti, 175, and AUSSME, DS 2271/C, f. I 3/163. 16  Note by General Anfosso in AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 17  Phonogram from the Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates to the Civil Affairs Section of the Italian Prisoners of War Division, 4 December 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 18  Lettera di Rosetta Fabio a Pio XII [Rosetta Fabio’s letter to Pius XII], Nicosia (EN) [1947], Vatican Secret Archives, Information Office, Prisoners of War, 1598, reference No. 00500236; also found in Inter Arma Caritas. L’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano per i Prigionieri di guerra istituito da Pio XII [Inter Arma Caritas: Vatican Information Office for prisoners of war established by Pius XII

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(1939–1947)], 2 volumes, vol. II, Documenti [Documents] Vatican City, Vatican Secret Archives, 2004), 1249. The letter is also provided in the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 2016), document XVII. 19  Lettera di Elba Zigiotti Corvetta a Pio XII [Elba Zigiotti Corvetta’s letter to Pius XII], Cordovado (PN), 3 October 1947, ibid. 20  Lettera di Ernestina Nardi all’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano [Ernestina Nardi’s letter to the Vatican Information Office], Genoa, 17 November 1948, Appello di Madri di dispersi in Russia [Appeal by the mothers of servicemen gone missing in Russia], Vatican Secret Archives, Information office, Prisoners of War, 2106, reference No. 00187118, also found in Inter Arma Caritas, vol. II, Documenti, 1251. The appeal is also provided in the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XVIII. 21  Cf. supra, chapter 3. 22  Lettera di Padre Giovanni Brevi a Pio XII [Letter from Father Giovanni Brevi to Pius XII], Kiev, camp No. 7062/4, September 1947, Vatican Secret Archives, Information office, Prisoners of War (1939–1947), 2104, reference No. 00185735; also found in Inter Arma Caritas, vol. II, Documenti, 1248–1249. 23  The text of the 1899 Hague Convention was broken down into three parts (Convention III, IV and V) during the Second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907. As regarded land warfare, Convention IV—which followed the relevant part of the 1899 text—was particularly important. Held in 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention is the current international law regulating troops’ behavior toward civilians. 24  Hague Peace Conference (1899), Oxford Public International Law, about Armed Conflict, Disarmament, Armed Forces, Arbitration, Good Offices, http://opil. ouplaw.com, Oxford University Press, 2015. 25  At the head of the Extraordinary State Committee was N.M. Shvernik, president of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who could count on help from important exponents of culture and politics, including the writer A.N. Tolstoy and the aviation hero Valentina Grizodubova. Cf. G. Scotoni, Il nemico fidato. La guerra di sterminio in Urss e l’occupazione alpina sull’alto Don [The trusted enemy: The war of extermination in the USSR and the Alpine occupation on the upper Don] (Trento: Panorama, 2013), 260. 26  Cf. M. Clementi, L’alleato Stalin [The ally Stalin] (Milan: Rizzoli, 2011), 168. 27  Cf. J. Foot, Fratture d’Italia. Da Caporetto al G8 di Genova. La memoria divisa del paese [Fractures of Italy: From Caporetto to the G8 in Genoa: The country’s divided memory] (Milan: Rizzoli, 2009), 250–51. The alleged innocence of Italian servicemen during the war, much like the myth of the “good Italian,” is a prejudice, and has long been an obstacle to an accurate understanding of historical facts. 28  Cf. L.P. Kopalin, “Rassledovaniye prestuplenij, sovershennykh v otnoshenii sovetskikh voyennoplennykh” [Inquiry into the crimes perpetrated against Soviet prisoners of war], cit. in Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 286; and A. Epifanov, “Reabilitatsiya inostrancev, osuždennych za voennye prestuplenija” [The rehabilitation of foreigners condemned for war crimes], in Rossijskaya Yustitsiya, no. 1, 2001. 29  Romagnoli, commander of the 3rd Mortar Battalion of the Ravenna Division and local commander in Filonovo, had died on 16 December 1942, near elevation-landmark 217, to the east of Krasno Orekhovo.

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 Cf. Elenco nominativo dei criminali di guerra italiani secondo i russi, Promemoria russo e Accusa mossa dalla Commissione della città di Enakievo [Name list of Italian war criminals according to the Russians: Russian memo and accusation leveled from the commission of the city of Yenakiieve], Fondo Palermo, b. 54, fasc. 256, AICSR. 31  Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 22. Secret. 32  Ibid., l. 32. “Led by their commanders Messe, Gariboldi, Attilio Banda, Iovino Dante, Grappelli, Della Robbia, Battisti, Ricagno, Tarnassi, Bonsembiante, Lerici, Pinzi and others,” the report further stated, “Italian troops established a brutal regime against civilians, forced to turn over agricultural produce, coerced into working and forbidden from leaving” (ibid., 28). 33  Accusa mossa dalla Commissione della città di Enakievo, 2. 34  Ibid., 10. 35  Ibid., 11. 36  On 18 August 1942, General Giovanni Zanghieri, the commander of the 2nd Army Corps, entrusted General of Brigade Paolo Tarnassi with the command of the military district that included the city of Kantemirovka. Tarnassi was also in charge of maintaining security in the rear and organizing 2nd Army Corps police forces (cf. Comando del II Corpo d’armata—Ufficio operazioni, reference No. 2301/02, attachment No. 25 to the DS [Historical Diary] dated 18 August 1942 XX, re: Incarico generale Tarnassi [General Tarnassi’s duties], Fondo Palermo, b. 54, fasc. 258, AICSR). 37  “Relazione della Commissione di Stato straordinaria sulle atrocità compiute dalle truppe fasciste nel territorio dell’Unione Sovietica” [Report by the Extraordinary State Commission on the atrocities committed by fascist troops in the territory of the Soviet Union], signed by Bogoyavlensky, in Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], Secret. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 21–33. Henceforth, Bogoyavlensky Report. See also, Accusa mossa dalla Commissione della regione di Kantemirovka [Charges leveled from the commission of the Kantemirovka region], b. 54, fasc. 256, II, 13–14, AICSR. 38  Ibid. To read about the other heavy charges, see the Bogoyavlensky Report, the Italian translation of which is provided in full in the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XIX. 39  Accusa mossa dalla Commissione della regione di Kantemirovka, 13–14. 40  Proceeding of the commission of the Boguchar region dated 11 November 1943, ibid., III, 17. The same accusations against Piazza are found in the Bogoyavlenskij Report. 41  The commission also provided the names of Biasotti’s victims (cf. Accuse mosse dalle Commissioni di inchiesta della regione di Bogučar e Pisarevo, Promemoria russo [Charges leveled from the inquiry commissions of the Boguchar and Pisarevo regions: Russian memorandum], b. 54, fasc. 256, 17, AICSR). Regarding Biasotti, the Bogoiavlensky Report (31) stated: “In the city of Boguchar, the commander of the Italian army, Major Luigi Giovanni Biasotti, distinguished himself for his exceptional harshness. Completely unfounded mass arrests, maltreatments, tortures and executions by firing squad of Soviet civilians were carried out under his direction.”

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42

 Proceeding No. 3 of the commission of the Rossosh region dated 19 November 1943, in Accusa mossa dalla Commissione di inchiesta della regione di Rossosh, Promemoria russo [Charges leveled from the inquiry commission of the Rossosh region: Russian memorandum], b. 54, fasc. 256, 26, AICSR. The names of some of the victims were also given in Proceeding No. 3. In the Bogoyavlensky Report mass killings of unarmed civilians were attributed to the colonel (cf. supra, Introduction, and Bogoyavlensky Report, 31). 43  Cf. Bogoyavlensky Report, 28–29. 44  Commissione d’inchiesta per i crimini di guerra italiani in Jugoslavia, Carte varie [Inquiry commission for Italian war crimes in Yugoslavia: Miscellaneous papers], M. Brosio to the president of the Council of Ministers and to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Criminali di guerra italiani secondo alcuni Stati esteri [Italian war criminals according to some foreign states], 3–4, 6 February 1946, Fondo Palermo, b. 53, fasc. 239, 8, AICSR. For De Gasperi’s correspondence with Brosio on this issue, see Focardi, “I mancati processi di criminali di guerra italiani” [Trials against Italian war criminals that never took place], in Giudicare e punire [To judge and to punish], eds. L. Baldissara and P. Pezzino (Naples: L’ancora del Mediterraneo, 2005), 194f. 45  Criminali di guerra italiani secondo alcuni Stati esteri, 4. 46  Ibid., 5. 47  Commissione d’inchiesta per i crimini di guerra italiani in Jugoslavia, Carte varie, Seg. Pol. No. 440, De Gasperi’s letter to Admiral Stone, 9 April 1946, Fondo Palermo, b. 53, fasc. 239, AICSR. 48  The committee comprised a former minister of War (Senator Casati), three former undersecretaries of state, including Mario Palermo; two high magistrates; an international law professor; three high-ranking military officers and a secretary (cf. Commissione d’inchiesta per i crimini di guerra italiani in Jugoslavia, Carte varie, to Mario Palermo, Criminali di guerra italiani secondo alcuni Stati esteriCommissione d’inchiesta, 18 April 1946, ibid.). 49  Telespresso No. 12/6, Moscow, 7 January 1946, from the Italian embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome (www.criminidiguerra.it). 50  Ibid. 51  In 1948, once the preliminary investigations were over, the Italian inquiry committee referred twenty-six of the forty-five most prominent defendants to the military tribunal of Rome. The legal process came to a halt, however, when appointing the presiding and panel judges proved difficult. The small number of tried defendants would never serve any real sentence or suffer any kind of punishment. On Yugoslavia, see AUSSME, f. H-8, racc. 21; cf. also, Aga Rossi and Giusti, Una guerra a parte. I militari italiani nei Balcani. 1940-1945 [A war apart: The Italian military in the Balkans, 1940–1945] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 427ff. 52  Dokladnaya zapiska S.N. Kruglova V.M. Molotovu o kolichestve italyanskikh voyennoplennykh v lageryakh Mvd Sssr i repatrirovannykh na rodinu [Note from S.N. Kruglov to V.M. Molotov on the number of Italian prisoners present in the camps of the USSR Ministry of the Interior and of repatriates], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 142, l. 294 verso. Authenticated copy. Secret. See the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XVI. 53  Communication, reference No. 13929/223, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 5. F. Bigazzi and E. Zhirnov, Gli ultimi 28. La storia incredibile dei prigionieri di guerra italiani

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dimenticati in Russia [The last twenty-eight: The unbelievable story of Italian prisoners of war forgotten in Russia] (Milan: Mondadori, 2002), often quoted by other authors, speak of a lower number of men detained in the USSR. 54  Note Prigionieri italiani non restituiti dall’Urss, reference No. 2300707/II, all. 1, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 55  Memorandum for the Defense-Army Cabinet, regarding the Contegno di ex prigionieri italiani nell’Urss durante la sosta ad Odessa [Conduct of former Italian prisoners in the USSR during their stop in Odessa], drafted by Colonel Ettore Musco (in charge of repatriation operations), head of the Ufficio stralcio reduci prigionia di guerra e rimpatriati [Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates], 2 May 1947, AUSSME, DS 2271/C, 1. Gone to Russia on a voluntary basis as a Blackshirt, Giovanni Dell’Aglio was a centurion (captain) commander of the Montebello. He returned from the USSR in 1947. 56  “I prigionieri italiani ancora in Russia” [The Italian prisoners still in Russia], in Gazzetta Veneta, 13 January 1947. 57  Kruglov’s report dated 5 January 1949. Secret, Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 34–37. See the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XX. 58  S pravka Gupvi Mvd Sssr o voyennoplennykh i internirovannykh italyantsev v lageryakh Mvd po sostoyaniyu na 1 marta 1947 g. [Note by the GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR on Italian prisoners of war and internees in the camps of the MVD as of 1 March 1947], 6 March 1947, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 2665, l 263 s. Original. Secret. Soprovoditelnoe pismo S.N. Kruglova na imya V.M. Molotova k spravkam o kolichestve voyennoplennykh byvshej nemetskoj armii, soderzhashchikhsya v lageryakh Mvd spetsgospitalyakh i batalyonkch Mvs Sssr, po sostoyaniyu na 1 fevralya 1947 g. i o kolichestve osvobozhdyonnykh iz nikh v techeniye 1941-1947 gg [Letter from S.N. Kruglov to V.M. Molotov accompanying the note on the number of former German army POWs detained in the camps of the MVD, in special hospitals and in the battalions of the Ministry of the Armed Forces as of 1 February 1947 and on the number of freed prisoners in 1941–1947], 8 March 1947, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 172, l. 133–136. Copy. Secret. 59  The documents in question are two information notes dated 30 March and 7 April 1952, penned by the second-in-command of the GUPVI, Colonel I.S. Denisov, on the “presence of prisoners of war and internees, sentenced or not, detained in the camps of the USSR as of 1 March 1952,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 338, l. 131–132 and 134–135. Secret. 60  Based on an NKVD decree, sections No. 3 and No. 7 of the Karaganda and Suslonger camps were identified as confinement camps for “special categories of prisoners.” On this matter, see: Prikaz Nkvd Sssr n. 001130 o soderzhanii osobykh kategorij voyennoplennykh v lageryakh Nkvd n. 99 i 171 [NKVD decree No. 001130 on the confinement of special categories of prisoners in camps No. 99 and No. 171], 9 September 1944, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 701, l. 153–165. Original. Secret. 61  C. Bertoldi, La mia prigionia nei lager di Stalin [My captivity in Stalin’s camps] (Maniago, PN: Università della terza età delle valli del Cellina e del Colvera, 2001), 64. 62  Kruglov’s report dated 5 January 1949.

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63

 Direktiva Mvd Sssr n. 163 ob usilenii agenturno-operativnoj raboty po vyjavleniju i likvidatsii fashistskikh organizatsij i grupp sredi voyennoplennykh i internirovannykh, 20 June 1946. Secret, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 778, l. 205–211. Original. The members of this fascist group had even circulated anti-Soviet leaflets in the camp and involved German, Hungarian and Romanian officers in their sabotage and work and hunger strikes. 64  Major Giorgio Sommer, head of the Italian Senior Liaison Office, had reported on the tough conditions of the prisons to Colonel Paolo Zecca, head of the Office Seeking MIAs, in a telegram dated 18 August 1948, re: Informazioni sul nucleo di Italiani prigionieri in Russia nel K.L. 7062/4 [Information on the nucleus of Italian prisoners in Russia in K.L. 7062/4], Essling, ASMAE, serie Affari politici [Political affairs series], 1946–1950, USSR, b. 16, fasc. 4, Prigionieri ed internati [Prisoners and internees]. 65  Lettera del tenente colonnello Nicola Russo al governo italiano [Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Nicola Russo to the Italian government], camp No. 7062/13, 28 April 1948, ibid. 66  Lettera del tenente Suppa Domenico al governo italiano [Letter from Lieutenant Suppa Domenico to the Italian government], camp No. 7062/13, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 16, fasc. 4, Prigionieri ed internati. 67  Cf. Prigovor imeni Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik [Sentence by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], Military tribunal of the Kiev region, sentence dated 27 July 1948. Secret, AUSSME, “Resta Archive.” The source is the same for all sentences cited henceforth. Soviet authorities supplied the dossiers on the Italian officers repatriated in 1954 to the secretary to the Italian embassy in Vienna, Giovanni Ludovico Borromeo, on 12 February 1954. 68  Cf. Prigovor imeni Sssr [Sentence by the USSR], 2 February 1950. Secret. 69  Indictments against Medical Lieutenant Enrico Reginato, Assotsiatsiya Mezhdunarodnogo voenno-memoryalnogo sotrudnichestva «Voennye Memorialy» [“Military memorials” international military-memorial association]. 70  Verkhovnyj Sud Soyuza Ssr. Opredeleniye n. 2-0755.Voyennaya Kollegiya Verkhovnogo Suda Sssr [Supreme Court of the USSR, proceeding No. 2-0755, Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR], 2 March 1950. Confidential. Verkhovnyj Sud Soyuza Ssr. Opredeleniye n. 2-02261.Voennaya Kollegiya Verkhovnogo Suda Sssr [Supreme Court of the USSR, proceeding No. 2-02261, Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR], 23 March 1950. Confidential. 71  Cf. Prigovor imeni Sssr [Sentence by the USSR], 28 February 1950. Secret. 72  A. Massa Gallucci, No! 12 anni prigioniero in Russia [No! Twelve years a prisoner in Russia] (Milan: Rizzoli, 1958), 160. 73  Cf. Lettera del prigioniero di guerra magg. Alberto Massa Gallucci al ministro degli Interni della R.U. Ufficio prigionieri di guerra [Letter from POW Major Alberto Massa Gallucci to the minister of the Interior, R.U., Prisoners of War Office], AUSSME, 2241. 74  Massa Gallucci, No! 12 anni prigioniero in Russia, 171. 75  Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 34–37. Secret. The six prisoners in question were Brevi, Mottola, Reginato, Russo, Schellenbrind, Spolveroni. See the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XX.

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76

 Primo Levi speaks of 600 Italian civilians he’d crossed paths with who came from Romania and belonged to the Italian legation in Bucharest: “men and women, well dressed, with suitcases and trunks, some with cameras slung round their necks, almost tourists” who believed they were about to return to Italy. The Reawakening (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 117. 77  See the telespresso No. 16390/68 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Post-War Assistance, Rome, 29 October 1946, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 10, Prigionieri ed internati, and the telespresso No. 18513/28 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian embassy in Moscow, Rome, 6 December 1946, re: Maggiore Giovanni Ronchi ricerche [Major Giovanni Ronchi, researches], ibid. 78  R eceived telegram No. 12065 from the Italian embassy in Moscow to the Main Administration for Political Affairs, Moscow, 26 August 1947, re: Console Odenigo ed altri [Consul Odenigo and others], ibid. 79  Letter from the minister of Foreign Affairs Carlo Sforza to Kostylev, ambassador of the Soviet Union, Rome, 12 September 1947, ibid. 80  According to Article 57 of the Peace Treaty, Italy was bound to hand over a part of its fleet to the Allied governments within three months of when the treaty came into force. According to Article 74, Italy had to pay the USSR 100 million dollars in reparations within seven years of when the treaty was signed; this amount was to be paid, in part, with assets Italy had in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The evaluation of these assets was the foundation on which the entire negotiation process relating to compensation for war damages had been conducted. 81  According to Article 45 of the Peace Treaty, Italy was bound to hand over, so they could stand trial, all persons accused of having committed or ordered war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity, or of being complicit in those crimes, as well as the subjects of the Allied powers accused of having violated the laws in effect in their countries, traitors and collaborators. 82  For their repatriation to Moscow, a specific office had been set up since 1944 (Upravleniye Upolnomochennogo Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov) directed by F. Golikov (cf. Clementi, L’alleato Stalin, 152). 83  Cf. ibid., 155, 157. From March 1946 to 1952, 616 Soviet citizens were repatriated to the USSR from Italy. 84  British officers who released prisoners in Soviet port towns, like Murmansk or Odessa, saw with their own eyes execution squads kill Soviet citizens as they disembarked. Called upon to show pity for those who did not wish to return to the Soviet Union, Eden claimed that the stipulations of the Yalta Agreement, signed in the Crimea, had to be upheld and that there was no time for sentimentality. On this issue, see P. Huxley-Blythe, The East Came West (Caldwell, Ida.: The Caxton Printers, 1964); N. Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977); Id., The Secret Betrayal (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978); N. Bethell, The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944–7 (London: Basic Books, 1974). More recently, the topic has been broached in the volume by Clementi, L’alleato Stalin, 152ff. As for Russian historiography, cf. V.N. Zemskov, “Repatriatsiya sovetskikh grazhdan i ikh dalnejshaya sudba. 1944- 1956 gg” [The repatriation of Soviet citizens and their fate], in Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, no. 5, 1995. By the same author, see also Vozvrashcheniye sovetskikh peremeshchennykh lits v SSSR. 1944-1952 gg. [The return of Soviet

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refugees to the USSR, 1944–1952] (Moscow-Saint Petersburg: Tsentr Gumanitarnykh initsiativ, 2016). 85  Verbal note of the minister of Foreign Affairs, reference No. 15/03728/11, dated 4 February 1948, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 27, fasc. 3, Rimpatrio di cittadini italiani [Repatriation of Italian citizens]; and verbal note dated 16 June 1949, ibid. 86  Article 71 of the Peace Treaty between Italy and the Allies reads: “Italian prisoners of war shall be repatriated as soon as possible in accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the individual Powers detaining them and Italy.” 87  M. Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 1947-1951 [Moscow Diaries, 1947–1951] (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986), 301. 88  Ibid., 304. 89  Ibid. 90  Received telegram No. 6929 from Brosio to the Main Administration for Political Affairs, re: Questione prigionieri [The matter of prisoners], Moscow, 27 May 1948, in ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, b. 16, fasc. 4, Prigionieri ed internati. 91  Nota verbale del ministero degli Affari esteri all’ambasciata dell’Urss [Verbal note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassy of the USSR], Rome, 17 August 1948, ibid. 92  Outgoing telespresso No. 1043, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Main Administration for Political Affairs VIII and the Italian embassy in Moscow, re: Prigionieri italiani in Urss [Italian prisoners in the USSR], Rome, 23 June 1948, ibid. 93  Telespresso No. 1043 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian embassy in Moscow, re: Prigionieri italiani in Urss, Rome, 23 June 1948, ibid. It was possible the many others who were requested had never set foot in Italy, or had already left thanks to the Allied Commission or the International Refugees Organization (IRO). On 25 June, Brosio informed Kosyrev of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ reservations on Moscow’s suggested quid pro quo. The Soviet diplomat tried to buy time claiming steps would be taken on the alleged criminals of Kiev based on the inquiry’s outcome (cf. Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 319). 94  Telegram from Brosio to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, re: Questione prigionieri, colloqui con Kosyrev [The matter of prisoners, meetings with Kosyrev], Moscow, 9 July 1948, in ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 16, fasc. 4, Prigionieri ed internati. 95  Telespresso No. 25325/173 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian embassy in Moscow, Prigionieri di guerra italiani, Rome, 4 September 1948, ibid. 96  Appunto per la Direzione generale affari politici [Note for the Main Administration for Political Affairs], Rome, 23 September 1948, ibid. 97  Progetto di risposta della Direzione generale degli affari politici all’interrogazione rivolta al ministero degli Affari esteri nella seduta della camera dei deputati del 22 settembre da parte degli onorevoli Russo Perez, Almirante e Mieville [Planned answer from the Main Administration for Political Affairs to the questions addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the session of the Chamber of Deputies held on 22 September by the members of parliament Russo Perez, Almirante and Mieville], Rome, 23 November 1948, ibid.

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98

 Telespresso by Brosio to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, re: Prigionieri italiani in Urss, Moscow, 4 October 1948, ibid. 99  Since the fascist period, Soviet citizens had been concentrated in the camps of Fraschette, near Alatri (Frosinone), Fara Sabina (Rieti), Fossoli (Modena), Alberobello (Bari) and Lipari (Messina). 100  When Colonel Yakovlev asked for an explanation, he was told the Soviet citizens were being further detained because of Moscow’s unyielding stance on the matter of the Kiev prisoners and diplomats of Salò. 101  Guelfo Zamboni, advisor to the Italian embassy in Moscow. Lev A. Sergeev, a Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) official. 102  Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 404. 103  Ibid., 460. On that occasion, Zorin also complained “good-naturedly” about the announced delay in the reparations and in the delivery of two destroyers. 104  Ibid., 476–77. 105  Ibid., 488, 510. 106  Ibid., note dated 30 December 1949, 536. Brosio wrote that the Soviets held back seven men; in fact, at least twelve prisoners were sentenced and repatriated only in 1954. 107  Ibid., 540. Brosio clarified that the exchange was to take place “in quick succession.” 108  Ibid., 550, note dated 28 January 1950. Consequently, fifteen Soviets were embarked on the steamboat Michurin on the embassy’s request. See Appunto per il direttore generale degli Affari politici [Note for the Director General of Political Affairs], Gastone Guidotti, dated 14 March 1950, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, 1946–1950, USSR, b. 33, fasc. 3, Prigionieri ed internati. 109  Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 553. On 11 February, Moscow sent the list pertaining to the diplomats of Salò and Kiev prisoners (ibid., 554). 110  Verbal note from the Soviet embassy to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 1950, ibid. During the Soviet Repatriation Mission’s visit, there had been instances of violence: some elements, whom the embassy described as criminals, had beaten a repatriate who had asked for Soviet citizenship; one of the refugees had lashed out against a Soviet colonel (cf. Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 553, entry from 7 February 1950). 111  Appunto per il direttore generale degli Affari politici, 2. Conversely, less than a week before, the Soviet embassy had voiced its satisfaction with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter had offered assurances to the effect that it would do everything possible to expedite the repatriation of the Soviet war criminals and collaborators requested by Moscow (Memorandum dated 8 March 1950, ibid.). 112  Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 561, entry from 5 March 1950. 113  Ibid., 571–72. Brosio described Lavrentev as a young blond man who “during meetings [came] off as a friendly youth,” but was in fact “shrewd, tough and cynical” (ibid.). On 26 April, despite these first difficulties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that thirty men from South Tyrol had arrived in Vienna (ibid., 575). 114  Ibid., 582. 115  Cf. ibid., 604, 608.

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116

 Appunto per il direttore generale degli Affari politici, Rome, 5 September 1950, ASMAE, serie Affari politici, b. 33, fasc. 3, Prigionieri ed internati. Italy’s diplomatic abilities were particularly commended. Indeed, the Italian diplomacy had brought to safety a certain number of prisoners—including three generals and about a hundred men from South Tyrol—without turning in the alleged Soviet criminals as requested. 117  Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 621–22. 118  Ibid., 622. 119  Telegram No. 19698/C dated 13 October 1950, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGAP) to the Ministry of Defense and Army, re: Azione dell’Onu per rimpatrio prigionieri dall’Urss [Actions by the UN for the repatriation of prisoners from the USSR], ASMAE, serie Affari politici, b. 33, fasc. 3, Prigionieri ed internati. 120  Brosio, Diari di Mosca, 658. 121  Ibid., 659, entry from 19 April 1951. 122  Cf. Lettera del prigioniero di guerra magg. Alberto Massa Gallucci al ministro degli Interni. 123  Letter to Colonel Wyckman, head of the POW Office of the Ministry of the Interior, 20 July 1950, ibid. 124  Dokladnaya zapiska L.P. Berii i V.M. Molotova v CK Kpss o peresmotre sudebnykh prigovorov na osuzhdyonnykh k lisheniyu svobody inostrantsev [Note from Beria and Molotov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the retrial of foreigners sentenced to imprisonment], Moscow, 14 April 1953, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 464. Secret. 125  Reference No. 1580/223, signed by the head of the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates, General A. Mannerini, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 126  Communication No. 18303/223 dated 8 November 1946, signed by General Mannerini. Classified. A copy of the same note was sent to the Discipline Division of the General Administration for Officer Personnel, so further decisions could be made. 127  Note by the Ministry of War dated 6 December 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 128  Ibid. 129  Reduci dalla prigionia in Russia, accusati di delazione nei confronti dei propri compagni [Returnees from captivity in Russia, accused of informing on their fellow prisoners], attached to the Elenco dei reduci che hanno frequentato il corso antifascista [List of returnees who attended the antifascist course], reference No. 1580/223, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. Classified. The list is not comprehensive: based on the documents examined so far, charges were leveled against at least twenty officers, not counting Sergeant Mottola. 130  Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3640, fasc. 27, reference No. 3345. 131  Ibid. 132  Ibid. 133  Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3637. 134  Ibid.. 135  Cf. P. Robotti, Promemoria per il compagno Moranino [Memorandum for comrade Moranino], 1, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3640, fasc. 27.

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 Authorizations were issued by the commission questioning prisoners upon their repatriation. If suspicions or serious accusations surrounded a former prisoner, this “pass” was not issued. It followed that the military district to which the former prisoner belonged could not give him permission to go home on leave of absence, resolve his administrative position, or provide him with discharge papers. Only after a repatriate received discharge papers did he gain the status of “returnee” from captivity, and attendant rights. (Al prigioniero che torna, 30). 137  Robotti, Promemoria per il compagno Moranino, 3. 138  Ibid. 139  Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3640, fasc. 27. 140  Undated memorandum sent to the investigators, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Robotti, b. 3603. 141  In the communication, the indicted officer was urged to set aside all considerations of a political nature, and respond to the accusations leveled against him, to the effect that he had acted as an informer during captivity to the detriment of his fellow prisoners, that he’d had many of them punished, and otherwise made their life difficult (communication dated 25 February 1948, reference No. 1403/I.RI/DU, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3637). 142  Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Robotti, b. 3603. 143  Letter dated 19 May 1947, Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo D’Onofrio, b. 3640, fasc. 27. 144  Ibid. 145  Antifascist prisoners’ activities after their repatriation were limited and supervised by Allied occupation forces, through surveillance and questioning. Something similar to what happened in Italy also occurred in West Germany. Until 1955, over a hundred trials were initiated against former German prisoners of war who had espoused antifascism. The main charge against them was their alleged mistreatment of fellow prisoners. In reality, these proceedings were invariably aimed at putting former antifascists and members of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship on the dock, whereby limiting the scope of their action. 146  Military District of Sulmona, Command Office, Discipline Section, reference No. 68 Disc. R., Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Robotti, b. 3596. 147  Territorial military tribunal of Padua, Sentenza nella causa contro B.W. [Sentence in the cause against B.W.], sentence No. 134/58, AUSSME, “Archivio P. Resta.” 148  Ibid. 149  “Accusato di tradimento dai compagni di prigionia” [Accused of treason by his fellow prisoners], in Momento, 26 April 1951. 150  Tovarishu Molotovu. Otchet Kruglova Molotovu ob italyanskikh prestupnikov [To comrade Molotov: Report by Kruglov to Molotov on Italian war criminals], 2 March 1949, Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 70–72. Secret. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XXI. 151  Ibid. 152  Massa Gallucci, No! 12 anni prigioniero in Russia, 155, 159. 153  Sentence by the territorial military tribunal of Milan against Antonio Mottola, May 1951, AUSSME, “Archivio P. Resta.”

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CONCLUSION 1

 RGVA, f. 1/p, op, 01e, d. 15a, l. 32–33.  The most eloquent piece of data is perhaps that of the 26,805 prisoners who arrived in the camp on 24 January 1943, there remained only 298 two months later, 48 of whom in need of medical treatment, and the remaining 250 “relatively healthy.” It had been an unmitigated disaster. 3   Cf. A. Epifanov, “Reabilitatsiya inostrantsev, osuzhdennykh za voennye prestupleniya” [The rehabilitation of foreigners convicted of war crimes], in Rossiiskaya yustitsiya, no. 1, 2001. 4   Cases were examined individually. When a request was accepted, the petitioner was rehabilitated and the proceedings against him were closed; when they were denied, the interested party could appeal to the superior court. On this issue, see ibid. The matter of the rehabilitation of Germans was discussed at the highest levels on 16 December 1992 during a meeting between the Russian president Boris Yeltsin and the German chancellor Helmut Kohl, both of whom agreed on speeding up the rehabilitation process of Germans unfairly accused of crimes during occupation. 5   Ibid. 6   Osobaya papka Molotova [Molotov’s special folder], GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 240, l. 70–72. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia, document XXI. 2 

APPENDIX 1

 C. Vicentini, interviews dated 28 April 2000 and 6 June 2013.  Instruktsiya po personalnomu pereuchetu voyennoplennykh, soderzhashchikhsya v lageryakh Nkvd i v spetsgospitalyakh Nko e Nkzdrava [Instruction for a new individual count of prisoners of war, detained in the camps and in the special hospitals of the NKO and NKZDRAV], 16 November 1944, GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 716, l. 326–34. Original. Secret. 3  RGVA, f. 47/p, op. 22, d. 4, l. 13. 4  Skorrektirovannye svedeniya Nkvd Sssr o dvizhenii voyennoplennykh v Sssr za period s 22 iyunya 1941 po 1 marta 1944 g. [News corrected by the NKVD on the movement of prisoners of war in the USSR in the period between 22 June 1941 and 1 March 1944]. A chart, prepared based on documentation gathered in RGVA, f. 1/p, op. 23a, d. 2, l. 32–34, 75–76, is featured in M.M. Zagorulko (ed.), Voyennoplennye v Sssr. 1939-1956. Dokumenty i materialy [Prisoners of war in the USSR, 1939–1956: Documents and materials], Moscow: Logos, 2000, 1040. 5  GARF, Osobaya papka Stalina i Molotova, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 69, 142. 7 March 1944. Copy. Secret. Cf. the Italian 2nd edition of this book: M.T. Giusti, I prigionieri italiani in Russia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014, 2016) document VIII. 6  In German-occupied areas, the French had been conscripted into the Axis army. Among others, P. Rigoulot has dealt with the topic of the “malgré nous” (unwilling) soldiers: La tragédie des Malgré-nous, Paris: Denoël, 1990. Regarding the repatriation of the French, see C. Gousseff, Rétour d’Urss. Les prisonniers de guerre et les internés français dans les archives soviétiques. 1941-1951, Paris: CNRS, 2001. 2

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346

Notes to Appendix

7

 Dokladnaya zapiska L.P. Beria predsedatelyu Gko I.V. Stalinu o kolichestve, natsionalnom i kadrovom sostave voyennoplennykh po sostoyaniyu na 11 maya 1945 g. [Record from L.P. Beria to the president of the GKO I.V. Stalin on the number, national breakdown and ranking of the prisoners of war as of 11 May 1945], GARF, Osobaya papka Stalina i Molotova, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 96, 10. 12 May 1945. Secret. 8  GARF, Osobaya papka Stalina i Molotova, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 103, 189. 6 June 1945. Secret. 9  Le operazioni delle unità italiane sul fronte russo 1941-1943 [The operations of the Italian units on the Russian front, 1941–1943], (Rome: AUSSME, 2000), 473. 10  For more on this issue, see E. Aga Rossi, Una nazione allo sbando. L’armistizio italiano del settembre 1943 e le sue conseguenze [A nation adrift: The September 1943 Italian armistice and its consequences], Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003, 111ff. 11  Cf. G. Rochat, “Una ricerca impossibile. Le perdite italiane nella seconda guerra mondiale” [An impossible research: Italian losses during the Second World War], in Italia contemporanea, No. 201, December 1995, 688–89. 12  Cf. UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia [Report on Italian prisoners of war in Russia], edited by P. Resta and C. Vicentini, (Cassano Magnago- VA: Crespi, 1995): Crespi, 1995, 17f. See also, Rochat, Una ricerca impossibile, 687–700. 13  In G. Messe, “Inchiesta sui dispersi in Russia” [Inquiry into the missing soldiers in Russia], in appendix to the book by the same author, La guerra al fronte russo. Il corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia (Csir) [War on the Russian front: The Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia (CSIR)], Milan: Mursia, 2005, 15ff. 14  In the course of 1942, Radio Moscow was transferred to Ufa, the capital of Bashkiria. Broadcasts, to which Palmiro Togliatti and Georgi Dimitrov contributed greatly, shed the indistinct revolutionary slogans typical of communist propaganda in 1939–41, in favor of new watchwords having to do with the need to defend national unity and the homeland against Nazism, as well as the extolling of common ideals, like freedom and democracy—elements entirely new to the communist ideology. Cf. P. Spriano, Storia del Partito comunista italiano [History of the Italian Communist Party], (Turin; Einaudi, 1973, vol. IV), 197–211. 15  L’Alba, No. 1, 10 February 1943, 2. Togliatti was referring to the generals Battisti, Pascolini and Ricagno, captured at the end of January 1943. 16  L’Alba, No. 2, 20 February 1943, 2. 17  L’Alba, No. 5, 30 April 1943, 1. 18  Mario Correnti (P. Togliatti), Discorsi agli italiani [Speeches to the Italian people], (Rome: Società Editrice L’Unità, 1945), 234. 19  Ibid., 338. 20  Ibid. 21  Ibid., 339. 22  Promemoria. Situazione prigionieri italiani in Russia [Memorandum: The situation of Italian prisoners in Russia], 2 March 1946, AUSSME, DS 2271/C. 23  Cf. UNIRR, Rapporto sui prigionieri di guerra italiani in Russia, 20. 24  Cf. C. Vicentini, “Situazione esame elenchi russi” [Status of the examination of the Russian lists], in Ministry of Defense, UNIRR, ed., Elenco ufficiale dei prigionieri italiani deceduti nei lager russi [Official list of Italian prisoners who died in Russian camps], fasc. 2, 3. The Italian Ministry of Defense and the UNIRR have published all records sent by the Russian authorities in five fascicules; these

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347

were supplemented by further documents with the names of the deceased prisoners the UNIRR researchers were gradually able to identify. We are presently referring to the updated data present in the essay by the same author, “I prigionieri italiani in Urss negli archivi russi” [The Italian prisoners in the USSR in the Russian archives], in A. Bendotti and E. Valtulina, eds., Internati, prigionieri, reduci. La deportazione militare italiana durante la seconda guerra mondiale [Internees, prisoners, and returnees: The Italian military deportation during the Second World War], (Bergamo: Rassegna dell’Istituto bergamasco per la storia della Resistenza e dell’età contemporanea, 1999), 154. 25  Ibid., 157. 26  This implies that, when a deceased man’s name was transliterated, the latter was found to correspond with the data present in the Roll of Honor’s lists, and, from that moment on, removed from the missing men list. Unidentified names— that is, names for which no match was found in the Roll of Honor’s lists—are affected by serious problems in the transliteration from the Cyrillic alphabet. 27  Cf. Comunicazione del ministero per l’Assistenza postbellica all’Ufficio autonomo reduci e rimpatriati [Communication from the Ministry of Post-War Assistance to the Autonomous Office of Returnees from Captivity and Repatriates], 15 November 1945, AUSSME, DS 2271/C.

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Photographs

1. Don front, summer 1942.

2. Servicemen of the Sforzesca Division captured on the Don front, late August 1942.

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350

Photographs

3. A column of Italian prisoners being escorted to the rear, Don front, September 1942.

4. Don front, December 1942.

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Photographs

351

5. Servicemen of the Ravenna and Pasubio divisions captured in the Boguchar pocket.

6. Boguchar pocket, December 1942.

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352

Photographs

7. Hungarian soldiers with some Alpine troops.

8. Don front, December 1942.

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Photographs

353

9. Don front, December 1942.

10. Don front.

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354

Photographs

11. Marching to captivity.

12. Prisoners listening to the orders, Kalachi, 20 December 1942.

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Photographs

355

13. The reading of orders to the prisoners.

14. Megaphone announcements made to the newly captured prisoners.

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356

Photographs

15. Megaphone announcements made to the newly captured prisoners.

16. Italian prisoners writing postcards. Propaganda photo.

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Photographs

357

17. Prisoners writing home. Propaganda photo.

18. A camp for prisoners of war in 1941.

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358

Photographs

19. Prisoners in the reception point of the Krasnogorsk camp preparing wood for the sauna, 1942.

20. A group of German and Italian prisoners at work in a kolkhoz in the Stalingrad region, 1942.

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Photographs

359

21. Work in the vegetable garden of the Suzdal camp, 19 May 1943.

22. Lieutenant Andrioni weighing bread, Suzdal camp, 19 May 1943.

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360

Photographs

23. The delivering of mail. Propaganda photo.

24. Posing for a propaganda photo.

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Photographs

361

25. Meeting of the antifascist activists of L’Alba, Suzdal camp. Standing in the center is the editor-in-chief, Lieutenant Visentin.

26. Prisoners’ choir in camp No. 27.

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362

Photographs

27. The reading of the newspaper in camp No. 27.

28. Mass in camp No. 165, 1943.

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Photographs

363

29. German and Italian generals in the Suzdal camp. In the center, General Paulus and Captain Rabinovich, a camp administration collaborator; to the left, generals Battisti and Ricagno; last on the right, General Pascolini.

30. A group of Italians, most likely IMIs, that surrendered to the Red Army, 1944.

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364

Photographs

31. Italian IMIs in a Soviet camp, 1944.

32. Christian Democracy (DC) propaganda poster for the 1948 elections.

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Photographs

365

33. Christian Democracy (DC) propaganda poster for the 1948 elections.

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Index

Abroskin, Sergei V., 288 Aga Rossi, Elena, 296, 308, 321, 322, 325, 331, 334, 337, 346 Alagiani (Alagianian), Father Pietro, 116, 237 Aleksy, Metropolitan, 110 Alfieri, Gabriele, 290 Almirante, Giorgio, 247, 341 Amadesi, Gino, 332 Amadesi, Luigi (alias Romolo Lovera), 148, 152 Amoretti, Giuseppe (alias Aldo Neri), 318 Anfosso, Maggiorino, 334 Angelucci, Gianni, 284 Apollonov, Arkadij N., 51 Aquarone, Alberto, 283 Armellini, Quirino, 211 Assennato, Giuseppe, 186 Astediano, Antonio, 285, 315 Bacchi, Guerrino, 238 Bacon, Edwin, 289, 298, 304, 315 Badoglio, Pietro, 158, 160, 161, 179, 240, 257, 264, 288 Baker, Lee, 281 Baldissara, Luca, 337 Banda, Attilio, 336 Bandini, Oviedo, 18, 285 Barbettani, Leo, 237 Bartolozzi, Angelo, 302 Bartov, Omer, 279, 286 Basile, Renato, 230 Bassi, Giuseppe, 160, 300, 301, 303, 309, 317, 322, 329

Giusti 01 könyv.indb 367

Battisti, Emilio, 122, 160, 162, 203, 237, 336, 363 Bedeschi, Giulio, 285, 286, 291, 311 Bekhalova, E.S., 232 Bei, Adele, 328 Belov, Andrian M., 306, 318 Beltrame, Romano, 305 Bendotti, Angelo, 278, 307, 309, 347 Benedict XVI, 279 Beraudi, Gino, 226, 285, 290, 315, 330, 334 Berezhkov, Valentin M., 280 Berezin, 12, 30 Beria, Lavrentiy P., 66, 68, 78, 81, 85, 87, 92, 93, 119, 151, 160, 162, 186, 188, 252, 261, 262, 271, 272, 298, 311, 323, 326, 343, 346 Berkhoff, Karel C., 287 Bernardoni, Bruno, 292 Berti, Giuseppe (alias Jacopo), 318 Bertinaria, Pier Luigi, 277 Bertoldi, Father Corrado, 58, 80, 144, 239, 295, 298, 299, 302, 318, 331, 338 Besançon, Alain, 315 Bethell, Nicholas, 340 Biagini, Antonello, 296, 321 Bianchi, Ugo, 29 Bianco, Vincenzo (alias Ricca; Krieger), 55, 60-64, 67, 84, 115, 126, 131, 136, 145, 146, 150, 152, 263, 296, 298, 302, 304, 306, 310, 315, 316, 318, 320, 321 Biasotti, Luigi Giovanni, 230, 232, 336 Bigazzi, Francesco, 278, 337

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368

STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Biglino, Carlo, 34, 284 Binda, Attilio, 232 Bochenina, Nina, 119, 162, 296, 311, 322 Boello, Felice, 237 Bogomolov, Aleksander E., 250, 251 Bogoyavlensky, P.I., 232 Boletti, Enzo, 238, 239 Bonadeo, Father Agostino, 91, 113 Bond, Brian, 283 Bonomi, Ivanoe, 162, 163, 179, 180, 322 Bonsembiante, Francesco, 336 Borghesi, Giovanni, 328 Borisov, Dmitry I., 294, 297 Borromeo, Giovanni Ludovico, 339 Bosi Ferretti, Maria Chiara, 319 Bosio, Giovanni, 291 Bounous, Mr., 333 Bourke, Joanna, 279 Bozzini, Vittorio, 291 Brancadoro, Giulio, 303, 319 Braschi, Giovanni, 215 Brevi, Father Giovanni, 252, 259, 265, 309, 311, 317, 335, 339 Brodskij, Jurij, 229 Brosio, Manlio, 233, 243, 245-251, 266, 279, 337, 341-343 Brusasca, Giuseppe, 215 Bubbio, Teodoro, 215 Budnitskij, Oleg V., 281 Buffa, Antonino, 60 Bulganin, Nikolai A., 303, 323 Burgwyn, James H., 278, 282 Buzzi, Mario, 132, 139, 159, 162 Cadeddu, Diego, 319 Calandri, Michele, 320 Calcaterra, Giacomina Baldi, 224 Candela, Battista, 291 Canesi, Pietro, 218 Caneva, Father Carlo, 74, 91, 169, 300, 301, 304, 305, 308 Canevari, Gino, 238 Cangiano, Giuseppe, 237 Cappellano, Filippo, 284 Caprara, Massimo, 225 Caruso, Alfio, 285 Casati, Alessandro, 234, 337 Casati, Lucio, 224

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Cassels, Alan, 282 Cassinis, Angelo, 296 Cavallero, Ugo, 12 Cecchini, Bruno, 135, 292, 316, 317 Cerreti, Giulio, 148 Chiara, Giovanni, 113 Chiavazza, Father Carlo, 25, 286, 309 Chini, Luigi, 317 Churchill, Winston, 6 Ciano, Galeazzo, 12, 13, 282, 283 Cicognani, Amleto Giovanni, 296 Cincotta, Antonio, 328 Cincotta, Nunziata, 328 Clementi, Marco, 328, 335, 340 Cocchi, Armando, 145, 266 Cocuzza, Cesare, 303 Codeluppi, Leandro, 314 Colarizi, Simona, 282, 308 Comollo Gorelli, Matilde (alias Torre), 146 Conti, Flavio Giovanni, 277, 306, 310, 321, 329 Cortese, Guido, 214 Covelli, Alfredo, 214 Croati, Paolo, 240 Cumina, Giuseppe, 291 Curato, Andrea (alias Andrey Andreevich), 148, 174 Cuzzaniti, Roberto, 328 D’Amico, Riccardo, 333, 334 Davide, Pietro, 103, 307 De Cassian, Giacomo, 240 De Franceschi, Rodolfo, 240 De Gasperi, Alcide, 157, 195, 196, 214, 227, 231, 233, 234, 244, 329, 337 Dekanozov, Vladimir G. (pseud. of Dekanozishvili), 194, 195 Della Bosca, Edoardo, 238 Dell’Aglio, Giovanni, 236, 237, 312, 338 Della Robbia, 336 Demisheva, Sofia, 328 De Felice, Renzo, 9, 282, De Filippo, Peppino, 219 Denisov, Ivan S., 338 De Sica, Vittorio, 219 Di Filippo, Rinaldo, 287 Di Giovanni, 174

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Index Di Michele, Alfonso, 290, 316 Di Michele, Vincenzo, 290, 291, 316 Dimitrov, Georgi, 38, 55, 62-64, 92, 102, 115, 126, 133, 136, 146, 162, 285, 289, 294, 296, 302, 304, 306, 310, 315, 318, 319, 328, 346, Di Nolfo, Ennio, 308 Di Vittorio, Giuseppe, xii, xiii, 145, 188-193, 328, 329 Doni, Bruno, 287 D’Onofrio, Edoardo (alias Edo Fimen), ix, 114, 132, 138, 139, 150, 152, 154, 159, 161, 162, 174, 221, 222, 256, 309, 310, 314-316, 320322, 329, 343, 344 Drago, Carlo, 13 Eden, Anthony, 1, 8, 279, 340, Efimov, Aleksandr I., 290, Einsiedel, Heinrich von, 294 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 290 Emett, Ivo, 237 Epifanov, Aleksandr E., 335, 345 Fabio, Paolo, 227 Fabio, Rosetta, 227, 334 Fasano, Giuseppe, 237 Fedorowich, Kent, 310 Fehling, Helmut M., 304 Ferrante, Antonio, 197 Ferrara, Maurizio. 333, 334 Ferraris, Luigi Vittorio, 334 Ferretti, Danilo, 149, 173, 174, 319, 322, 324 Fiammenghi, Ettore, 114, 171, 321 Filatov, Georgy S., 283 Filonenko, Sergei, 278, 285, 288 Finocchiaro, Egidio, 303 Fiora, Giuseppe, 114 Focardi, Filippo, 337 Foot, John, 335 Foresti, Oreste, 226 Försterling, Paul, 306 Foschi, Yulii A., 148 Francesconi, Manlio, 206, 300-302, 309, 330, 331 Franzinelli, Mimmo, 309, 310 Franzoni, Father Enelio, 44, 110, 112116, 228, 285, 295, 301, 308-311 Friedrich (Bedřich Geminder) Furet, François, 37

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369

Galaverna, Giovanni, 304 Galeota, Italo, 317 Galitsky, Vladimir, 277, 293, 294 Gambetti, Fidia, 81, 97, 118, 140, 213, 300, 302, 305, 311, 316, 317, 320, 322, 324, 332 Gariboldi, Italo, 16, 18, 21, 33, 195, 272, 288, 336 Garri, Colonel, 20 Gasparotto, Luigi, 213-216, 234, 255, 333 Gazzera, Pietro, 34, 158, 181, 288, 321 Geller, Mikhail J., 279, 281, 289 Geloso, Carlo, 273 Geminder, Bedřich (alias Friedrich, Otto Kramer), 126 Gennari, Emilio (alias André Charlot Piro), 318 Germanetto, Giovanni, 148, 174, 320 Gerö, Ernö, 315, Gherardini, Gabriele, 292, 295, 303, 311, 329-331, 334, Giannetti, Bernardo, 230, 231 Gieysztor, Aleksander, 313 Gini, Corrado, 290 Giovanni, Matteo (alias Ivan Regent), 148, 302 Giraldi, Domenico, 299 Giusti, Maria Teresa, 318, 319, 322324, 335-339, 344, 345, Glantz, David M., 280, 281 Gnocchi, Father Carlo, 26, 286, 309 Goldmacher, 142 Golikov, Filipp I., 186, 213, 214, 340 Gonnelli, Mario, 190, 328 Gori, Francesca, 329 Gorky, Maxim, 153, Gortani, Michele, 214 Gottardi, Dino (alias Rizzoli), 137, 165, 174, 236 Gottesmann, 302 Gotto, Raffaele, 237 Gottwald, Klement, 315 Gousseff, Catherine, 345 Grappelli, Luigi, 36, 230, 231, 289, 336 Grets, Eva, 148 Grechko, Andrey A., 280 Greco, Lila, 380 Grieco, Ruggiero (alias Rossi; Garlandi), 152, 320

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370

STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Grizodubova, Valentina S., 335 Grossman, Vasily, 53 Guadagni, Giuseppe, 122, 312 Guadagni, Maria Cristina, 122, 312 Guidi, Mario, 216 Guidotti, Gastone, 342 Guzzetti, Giuseppe, 113

338, 344 Khrulev, Andrey V., 47, 163, 322 Krupennikov, Arkadii, 307 Kuznetsov, Vasily G., 77, 262, 301

John Paul II, 279 Joli, Giuseppe Ivo, 237, 240, 241, 317

Lancelotti, Fiorenzo, 190 Lavrentev, Anatolii, 250, 342 Lebedeva, Elena K., 320 Lebedeva, N.S., 313 Ledeen, Michael A., 282 Lenin (pseud. of Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov), 34-36, 56, 137, 290 Leone, Giulio, 237 Lerici, Roberto, 19, 230, 231, 285 Lesizza, Angelo, 197, 329 Levi, Primo, 340 Livi, Augusto, 333, 334 Lomagin, Nikita A., 281 Lombardi, Vera, xi Longo, Colonel, 91 Longo, Luigi, 221, 222, 317, 318, 320 Lusardi, Andrea, 190, 328 Lopiano, Angelo, 186, 300, 301, 304, 305, 327, 330 Loren, Sophia, 219 Lozovsky, Solomon A. (alias Dridzo), 191, 195, 329 Lusardi, Andrea, 190, 328 Lussu, Emilio, 199

Kaganovich, Lazar M., 303, 323 Kaminski, Andrei J., 299, 315 Karneev, Emelyan I., 47 Khlevniuk, Oleg V., 68, 298-300 Khrulev, Andrey V., 47, 163, 322 Khrushchev, Nikita, 295 Kohl, Helmut, 345 Konasov, Viktor B., 296 Kondakov, 92 Kopalin, Leonid P., 335 Köplenig, Johann (alias Ludwig), 126, 306, 311, 315 Kosyrev, Semën P., 246, 248, 341 Kostylev, Mikhail A., 179, 182, 204, 225, 230, 243, 334, 340 Krasavchenko, Nikolai, 328 Krastin, Nikolai M., 302, 310 Kruglov, Sergei N., 30, 77, 80, 90, 91, 99-102, 164, 170, 177, 188, 203, 204, 235, 238, 242, 259, 265, 287, 304-306, 323, 325, 327, 330, 337,

MacKenzie, Simon P., 279, 282 Magnani, Franco, 237, 239, 241 Malenkov, Georgy M., 85, 91, 303, 304, 323 Malisardi, Settimo, 304 Maltseva, 30 Mamchenko, Pavel, 39 Mannerini, Alberto, 330, 331, 343 Manuilsky, Dmitry Z., 54, 67, 126, 142, 154, 162, 163, 309, 313, 315, 318, 322 Manzini, Renato, 333 Marabini, Andrea, 152 Marabini, Anselmo, 324 Marconi, Raffaele, 35, 230, 232, 288 Marinov, Aleksandr, 328 Marisaldi, Luciano, 292 Marsan, Veniero Ajmone, 294, 309, 318, 324 Martelli, Guido, 160, 206, 292, 295, 303, 309, 322

Harriman, William A., 197 Herling-Grudziński, Gustaw, 65 Hilton, Mr., 333 Hitler, Adolf (also Führer), 2-6, 9-12, 28, 31, 39, 54, 129, 266, 274, 279283, 288, 294, 310 House, Jonathan, 280, 281 Huber, Max, 58, 59 Huxley-Blythe, Peter, 340 Ibatullin, Talgat G., 289 Indagati, Serafina, 122 Insolvibile, Isabella, 310 Iovino, Dante, 230, 237, 240, 336 Isastia, Anna Maria, 278 Iuso, Pasquale, 328 Ivanova, Galina M., 298, 299, 305, 315

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Index Martini, Severino, 290 Marx, Karl, 58, 137, 150 Massa Gallucci, Alberto, 73, 241, 242, 252, 260, 298, 300, 311, 339, 343, 344 Mastroianni, Marcello, 219 Mastropasqua, Antonio, 321 Mekhlis, Lev Z., 54 Melchiorre, Giuseppe, 309 Melnikov, Nikolai D., 162, 313 Messe, Giovanni, 13, 17, 18, 29, 30, 32-34, 40, 180, 206, 208, 215, 273, 280, 283, 284, 287, 288, 290, 292, 296, 300, 301, 308, 309, 325, 326, 330, 331, 336, 346 Meyendorff, Jean, 308 Meyer, Hermann Frank, 279 Mezzar, G., 328 Micheli, Giuseppe, 181 Mieville, Roberto, 247, 341 Mignemi, Adolfo, 277, 313 Mikoyan, Anastas I., 68, 298, 303, 323 Misiani, Simone, 328 Mola, Aldo, 32 Molinari, A., 321 Molinari, Domenico, 156 Molotov, Vjačeslav M. (pseud. of Vjačeslav M. Skrjabin), viii, xi, 1-4, 6, 10, 30, 35, 58, 59, 85, 91, 99, 126, 141, 151, 160, 177, 188, 191, 203, 204, 235, 238, 242, 252, 259, 265, 271, 272, 279, 280, 287, 288, 290, 295, 303-305, 311, 322, 323, 327, 330, 336-339, 343-346 Montagnana, Elena, 309 Montagnana, Rita, 152 Montini, Giovanni Battista (pope as Paul VI), 60, 296 Moore, Bob, 310 Moranino, Francesco, 255-257, 343, 344 Morelli, Luigi, 328 Morozov, Alim, x Moschelli, Paolo (alias Vera), 148 Mottola, Antonio, 237, 240, 259, 260, 339, 343, 344 Müller, Klaus-Dieter Musco, Ettore, 208, 209, 236, 331, 332, 338 Musitelli, Ada, 312 Musitelli, Guido, 121, 237

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371

Mussolini, Benito (also Duce), vii, ix, 8-12, 14, 16, 18, 21, 31, 61, 128, 130, 135, 138-141, 153, 155, 195, 239, 242, 243, 259, 260, 262-265, 274, 275, 282, 283, 321, Muzi, Dante, 42 Nannini, Loris, 295, 298 Nardi, Ernestina, 227, 335 Narinsky, Mikhail M., 281 Nasci, Gabriele, 35, 285 Natalini, Andrea, 283 Naumov, Vladimir P., 286 Negroni, Giacomo, 226 Nejno, Vladimir, 288 Nekhoroshev, Semën V., 313 Nekrich, Aleksandr, 279, 281, 289 Nevezhin, Vladimir A., 290 Nikolai, Metropolitan, 110 Novelli, Carlo, 121 Odenigo, Armando, 243, 340 Oleandri, Giuseppe, 291 Osella, Giovanni, 238 Osipova, Lidya, 281 Ossola, Giuseppe (alias Rizzoli), 82, 90, 91, 98, 99, 113, 114, 140, 165, 166, 176, 236, 302, 303, 305, 310, 316, 317, 324, 330 Overy, Richard, 283, 303, 308 Palermo, Mario, xi, 122, 336, 337 Pallavicini, Temistocle, 73, 102, 103, 291, 307 Pallotta, Michele, 182 Palmas, Giannetto, 291 Parfënova, Marija F., 148 Parri, Ferruccio, 113, 131, 190 Pascolini, Etvoldo, 162, 203, 237, 346, 363 Passafiume, Giovanni, 238 Pastore, Ottavio, 318 Pauker, Ana, 315 Paul VI, 279 Paulus, Friedrich, 21, 22, 363 Pedroni, Mario, 291 Peli, Captain, 19 Pennisi, Salvatore, 237, 241 Pepe, Adolfo, 328 Petrov, Ivan A., 63, 64, 102, 147, 238, 270, 271, 302, 306

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372

STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Pezzino, Paolo, 337 Piazza, Mariano, 230-232, 336 Piazza, Melchiorre, 206, 301 Picciaredda, Stefano, 287, 295 Picini, Umberto, 316 Pieck, Wilhelm (alias Gustav; Wilhelm; Witte), 126, 315 Pikhoya, Rudolf, 313 Pinzi, Andrea, 230, 231, 336 Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli) Pipita, Antonio, 191 Pipita, Nicodemo, 191 Pizzichini, Pasqualina, 328 Pizzorno, Erminio, 328 Pleshakov, Constantine, 277, 280, 281, 286 Polikarpov, D.I., 129, 130 Pons, Silvo, 296, 306, 319, 328, 329 Ponti, Enrico, 218 Porelli, Salvatore, 87, 198, 303, 330 Potapoka, Zlata, 328 Prada, Lieutenant, 37 Prunas, Renato, 180, 182, 207, 325, 326 Quaroni, Pietro, 120, 162, 163, 179181, 183, 184, 193-196, 207, 208, 215, 234, 243, 266, 279, 325, 326, 329, 333 Quarti, Martino, 239 Quintavalle, 186 Raimondi, 186 Rainer, Francesco, 240 Rainero, Romain H., 277, 309, 321, 325, 326, 332 Rákosi, Mátyás, 126, 187, 306, 315 Reginato, Enrico, 75, 221, 237, 239241, 259, 265, 300, 301, 307, 311, 314, 339 Reshin, Leonid, 286 Resta, Paolo, 278, 285, 291, 300, 307, 329, 339, 344, 346 Revelli, Nuto, 291, 300, 304 Reverberi, Luigi, 26 Riaboka, Ekaterina, 328 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 1-3, 6, 10, 126, 290 Ricagno, Umberto, 162, 203, 237, 273, 336, 346, 363

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Riccardi, Arturo, 10 Ricciardi, Lieutenant, 112 Riccio, Stefano, 214 Richieri, Lorenzo, 273, Rigoni Stern, Mario, 291 Rigoulot, Pierre, 345 Riva, Mario, 113, Rizhikov, Anatolii, 328 Robacer, Enrico, 254 Roberts, Geoffrey, 286 Robotti, Paolo, ix, 112, 117, 132, 137, 144, 145, 148, 152, 160, 161, 165, 174, 176, 178, 205, 215-217, 221, 223, 225, 236, 255-257, 266, 273, 309, 311, 318, 322, 325, 333, 334, 343, 344 Rochat, Giorgio, 277, 279, 282, 283, 346 Rodogno, Davide, 282 Rogov, Ivan V., 54 Rokossovsky, Konstantin, 281 Romagnoli, Romolo, 230, 232, 335 Rommel, Erwin, 33 Romoli, Carlo, 301, 304 Roncato, Gaetano, 138, 145, 316, 318 Ronchi, Giovanni, 243, 340 Rondelli, Vittorio, 292 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 110, 308 Rossi, Maria, 320 Rossi, Marina 277, 293 Rosso, Augusto, 13 Rudash, Eva, 148 Rudenko, Nina N., 314 Russo, Nicola, 237, 239-241, 339, Russo Perez, Guido, 247, 341 Saggese, Renato, 292 Sala, Silvio, 291 Salisbury, Harrison, 303 Sandulli, Aldo, 206, 300 Sani, Roberto, 309 Santaniello, Antonio, 238 Santi, Ferdinando, 328 Sardisco, Giacomo, 122, 123, 238, 312 Scagliotti, Ludovico, 238 Schellenbrind, Cesare, 238, 339 Schlemmer, Thomas, 37, 278, 287, 289 Schreiber, Gerhard, 279 Scotoni, Giorgio, 278, 281, 285, 287, 288, 335

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Index Scrimin, Luigi, 76 Sereni, Emilio, 236 Sergeenko, M., 288 Sergeev, Lev A., 248, 342 Sergei, Patriarch, 110, 308 Shcherbakov, Aleksandr S., 54, 129, 162, 163, 322 Shchevliagin, Dmitry P., 148, 176, 178, 215, 217, 273, 274, 325, 328, 333 Sforza, Carlo, 230, 243, 245-248, 340 Shvernik, Nikolai M., 335 Snyder, Timothy, 37, 288 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., 299 Sommer, Giorgio, 339 Soprunenko, Pyotr K., 301 Spada, Valentino, 291 Spataro, Giuseppe, xiii, 192, 329 Spolveroni, Spartaco, 237, 339 Spriano, Paolo, 346 Stagno, Italo, 237, 314 Stalin (pseud. of Josif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), viii, xii, xiii, 1-6, 38, 40, 53, 54, 58, 60-62, 64, 85, 96, 98, 99, 109, 110, 125, 155, 160164, 170, 171, 178, 185, 186, 188, 191, 202, 252, 253, 261, 264-266, 271, 277, 279, 280-282, 286, 288290, 293, 296, 298, 299, 303, 314316, 318, 319, 321-323, 326-329, 331, 334, 335, 338, 340, 345, 346, Stefanile, Francesco, 316 Stegemann, Bernd, 279 Stone, Ellery W., 233, 337, Streit, Christian, 277, 286 Suppa, Domenico, 237, 240, 339 Suslov, Mikhail, 293, 333 Szántó, Zoltán, 126, 146, 311, 319, 325 Tallucci, Lieutenant, 37 Tardini, Monsignor Domenico, 110 Tarnassi, Paolo, 230, 231, 336 Taylor, Alan John P., 281, 282, Taylor, Myron C., 308 Taylor, Philip M., 308, 314 Taylor, Richard, 290 Tereshchenko, Nikolai I. (alias Orlov), x, 112, 114, 116, 127, 132, 138, 139, 142, 144, 147, 148, 152-154, 176, 309, 311, 313, 316-320, 324, 325

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Teupen, Manfred H., 279 Timoshenko, Semyon K., 6, 281 Tippelskirch, Kurt Von, 33, 288 Tito (pseud. of Josip Broz), 38, 137, 141, 289, 322 Togliatti, Palmiro (alias Ercole Ercoli, Mario Correnti), ix, xii, 12, 55, 60-64, 67, 119, 126, 132, 145, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 162, 163, 189, 190, 204, 221, 223-226, 254, 255, 259, 266, 274, 275, 283, 296, 309, 311, 315-318, 321, 322, 331, 334, 346 Tolstoy, Aleksey N., 335 Tolstoy, Nikolai, 340 Tomassini, Luigi, 313, 320 Tonolini, Vittorio, 314 Toscano, Mario, 282, 283 Totò (Antonio De Curtis), 219 Traina, Aurelio, 209, 331, 332 Tumiati, Gaetano, 310 Turla, Father Maurilio, 86, 303 Ulbricht, Walter, 92, 126, 263, 306, 311, 315, 325 Usatienko, Lieutenant, 310 Vaglica, Luca, 321 Valori, Aldo, 283 Valtulina, Eugenia, 278, 307, 309, 347 Varga, Eva Maria, 294, 297 Venturi, Marcello, 302 Venturini, Luigi, 169, 291, 292, 323 Vernassa, Maurizio, 283 Verucci, Guido, 308 Viale, Giuseppe, 304 Vicentini, Carlo, 46, 179, 278, 285, 291, 292, 294, 297, 299-301, 307, 311, 312, 329, 331, 345, 346 Vigo, Luciano, 28, 285 Vinogradov, Sergei A., 249 Vlasov, Andrey A., 38, 289 Vogel, Detlef, 279 Volkov, Vladimir A., 279, 280, 282 Voronov, Ivan P., 146 Voroshilov, Kliment E., 303 Voznesensky, Nikolai A., 303 Vsevolodov, Vladimir A., 295 Vyshinsky, Andrey J., 59, 184, 193, 245, 248

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374

STALIN’S ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Weinberg, Gerhard L., 279, 282 Wells, H. G. (pseud. of Herbert George Wells), 1 Wieden, Peter (Ernst Fisher), 315 Wolf, Mikhail (Mihály Farkas), 315 Wyckman, Colonel, 343 Yakovets, Mikhail A., 306 Yakovlev, Nikolai D., 181, 342 Yantsen, Nikolai, 92, 263, 306 Yaroslavsky, Yemelyan M. (alias Minei Izrailevich Gubelman), 54 Yezhov, Mikhail K., 299, 306 Zagorulko, Maksim M., 297, 345 Zaikin, 208 Zamboni, Guelfo, 248, 249, 342 Zanghieri, Giovanni, 37, 336

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Zanoni, Angelo, 303 Zarcone, Antonino, 296, 321 Zaslavsky, Victor, 281, 296, 313, 321, 331, 334 Zauli, Adolfo, 205 Zazzero, Lorenzo, 286, 287 Zecca, Paolo, 339 Zemskov, Viktor N., 340 Zhdanov, Andrey, 293, 327 Zhirnov, Evgeny, 278, 337 Zhukov, Georgii K., 6, 280, 281 Zigiotti, Giuseppe, 227, 237, 240 Zigiotti Corvetta, Elba, 335 Zilli, Valdo, 44, 127, 140, 282, 307, 313 Zingales, Francesco, 283 Zirone, Giuseppe, 292 Zoccai, Lelio, 238 Zorin, Valerian A. 248-250, 266, 342

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