Stalin and Stalinism (Seminar Studies) [4 ed.] 1138316229, 9781138316225

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Stalin and Stalinism

One of the most successful dictators of the twentieth century, Stalin transformed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union into one of the world’s leading political parties. Stalin and Stalinism explores how he amassed, retained and deployed power to dominate, not only his close associates, but the population of the Soviet Union and Soviet Empire. Moving from leader to autocrat and finally despot, Stalin played a key role in shaping the first half of the twentieth century with, at one time, around one-third of the planet adopting his system. His influence lives on – despite turning their backs on Stalin’s anti-capitalism in the later twentieth century, countries such as China and Vietnam retain his political model – the unbridled power of the Communist Party. First published in 1983, Stalin and Stalinism has established itself as one of the most popular textbooks for those who want to understand the Stalin phenomenon. This updated fourth edition draws on a wealth of new publications, and includes increased discussion on culture, religion and the new society that Stalin fashioned as well as more on spying, Stalin’s legacy, and his character as well as his actions. Supported by a Chronology of key events, Who’s Who and Guide to Further Reading, this concise assessment of one of the major figures of the twentieth-century world history remains an essential read for students of the subject. Martin McCauley is a prolific author and broadcaster who has a wealth of experience in Soviet, Russian and international affairs. He taught at the University of London for thirty years and at other universities. His recent publications include The Cold War 1949–2016 (2017), The Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949 (fourth edition, 2015), and The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union (2008).

Introduction to the series

History is the narrative constructed by historians from traces left by the past. Historical enquiry is often driven by contemporary issues and, in consequence, historical narratives are constantly reconsidered, reconstructed and reshaped. The fact that different historians have different perspectives on issues means that there is often controversy and no universally agreed version of past events. Seminar Studies was designed to bridge the gap between current research and debate, and the broad, popular general surveys that often date rapidly. The volumes in the series are written by historians who are not only familiar with the latest research and current debates concerning their topic, but who have themselves contributed to our understanding of the subject. The books are intended to provide the reader with a clear introduction to a major topic in history. They provide both a narrative of events and a critical analysis of contemporary interpretations. They include the kinds of tools generally omitted from specialist monographs: a chronology of events, a glossary of terms and brief biographies of ‘who’s who’. They also include bibliographical essays in order to guide students to the literature on various aspects of the subject. Students and teachers alike will find that the selection of documents will stimulate the discussion and offer insight into the raw materials used by historians in their attempt to understand the past. Clive Emsley and Gordon Martel Series Editors

Stalin and Stalinism Fourth edition Martin McCauley

This edition published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Martin McCauley The right of Martin McCauley to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Pearson Education Limited 1983 Revised second edition published by Pearson Education Limited 2008 Revised third edition published by Routledge 2013 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-31622-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-31624-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-45578-0 (ebk) Every effort has been made to contact copyright-holders. Please advise the publisher of any errors or omissions, and these will be corrected in subsequent editions. Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Foreword to the fourth editionix Map and list of figuresxi Chronologyxii Who’s whoxxii PART 1

The context1   1 Introduction: the problem

3

PART 2

Analysis9   2 Early years

11

  3 The October revolution, state capitalism, war communism and the civil war, 1917–21 War communism  20

14

  4 The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28 Exit Trotsky and Zinoviev  27 The Urals-Siberian method  28

22

  5 The thirties The first FYP  33 Collectivisation 33 Famine 38 The second FYP  42 The murder of Kirov  44 Stalinism emerges  44 The Great Terror  47

33

vi  Contents The third FYP  51 Foreign policy  51 Culture 56 Society 58   6 The Great Fatherland War, 1941–45 The economy  67 Culture 67 The party  68 The grand alliance  69

63

  7 High Stalinism, 1945–53 Eastern Europe  76 The Leningrad affair  76 Economic policy  78 Currency reform  79 Meeting Mao  80 The Korean war  81 Eastern Europe  83 The Cold war emerges  84 Science 85 Culture 89 Spies 93 The Doctors’ plot and the Mingrelian affair  94

72

PART 3

Assessment99   8 Stalin: Personality and power Conclusion 111

101

  9 The judgement

116

10 The legacy Foreign and security policy  124 Empire 125 Putin 126

120

PART 4

Documents133

Part 4. Documents Document 1: The party  135

135

Contents vii Document 2: The right deviation  137 Document 3: Dizzy with success  137 Document 4: Harsh realities  138 Document 5: The breakneck speed of industrialisation 139 Document 6: Famine and the nouveaux riches  140 Document 7: Fulfilment of the principal goals of the Stalinist Five-Year Plans, 1928–50  142 Document 8: Mandelstam’s poem about Stalin (November 1933)  143 Document 9: (A) Interrogation techniques  144 Document 10: Bukharin  145 Document 11: Operational order No. 00447: 30 July 1937  148 Document 12: Molotov  150 Document 13: Stepan Podlubny’s diary  150 Document 14: Stalin the miracle-worker  151 Document 15: The Stalin cult blossoms  152 Document 16: (A) A call to arms  153 Document 16: (B) Real burden of defence outlays, 1940–44 (Billion roubles at 1937 factor cost)  154 Document 16: (C) Military losses in the Great Patriotic War (millions)  155 Document 17: (A) GDP per head of the USSR in international comparison, 1913–40 ($ and 1980 prices) 156 Document 17: (B) Real GDP by sector of origin, 1937–44 (Billion roubles and 1937 factor cost)  156 Document 18: (A) Prikaz (decree) of the USSR people’s commissariat of internal affairs issued in 1941 157 Document 18: (B) The USSR NKVD section for combatting banditry  159 Document 19: The cost of hostilities: A balance sheet  160 Document 20: Stalin the omniscient  161 Document 21: Stalin on red army discipline  162 Document 22: Stalin in 1948  163 Document 23: Soviet attitudes towards Yugoslav culture 164 Document 24: The importance of the cow  164 Document 25: A Jewish success story  165 Document 26: Youth, culture and health  166 Document 27: The reality of Soviet planning  168

viii  Contents Document 28: What is Stalinism?  169 Document 29: Khrushchev’s secret speech at the XXth Party Congress, 24–25 February 1956  171 Glossary175 Further reading181 Bibliography190 Index193

Foreword to the fourth edition

The demise of the Soviet Union, in 1991, revealed one truth about Stalinism: it was fatally flawed and its internal contradictions led to its own destruction. However, this only applies to its economic model which Soviet leaders tried in vain to reform to raise living standards and compete with the West. The political model still has relevance in the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, Cuba, Laos and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. President Vladimir Putin wishes to provide Russian school children with a version of history to make them proud of their motherland. This had led to airbrushing out the more brutal aspects of Stalinism and concentrating on the great achievements – first and foremost – victory over Germany, in 1945. The annual Victory Day parade, on 9 May, demonstrates the military might of present day Russia and is a warning to any potential aggressor that an attack on the country would be foolhardy. Magnificent achievements, during Stalin’s reign, were also recorded in science, especially military science. There are striking similarities in the way Stalin was and Putin is portrayed: they are the indispensable leader and without them the country would fall into disarray. Russians admire strong leaders but Putin has nothing like the awesome power of Stalin to dictate everyday politics. Since the third edition of this study there has been an explosion of published materials and it is now possible to gain greater insights into the day to day workings of the Stalinist system. Much is still unclear, especially as regards the Great Fatherland War and foreign policy. One archive is still shut: the Presidential Administration, and, it is assumed, that it contains much valuable information. This edition draws on recent Russian studies which permit a greater understanding of Stalin’s personality but, in many aspects, he remains a man of mystery, as he was a masterly actor and could play various roles. Kaganovich, a member of his inner circle, once remarked there were six Stalins and one’s first task, when meeting him, was to decide which one one was meeting. At times, he was a utopian – during the first Five Year Plan – and, at others, a hard-headed realist. Reality forced him to retreat from utopianism but he never abandoned the belief that the Soviet Union could march forward to communism, when everyone’s needs would be met, irrespective of their contribution to society. Culturally, he was a

x  Foreword to the fourth edition Russian nationalist (although born a Georgian and speaking Russian with a Georgian accent) and believed that all non-Russians should become more like Russians. This one nation concept was greatly resented by many nonRussians and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like many great dictators, he was a psychopath, and could be cold and ruthless but warm and charming to some of his entourage. As such, he is an endless source of inspiration to those writing fact and fiction. In short, a fascinating politician about whom the world thirsts to learn more about his achievements and foibles. This was underlined, in June 2017, when an opinion poll by the Levada Centre, in Moscow, reported that 38 per cent of Russians regard Stalin as the most outstanding person in world history. President Putin came second with 34 per cent and Lenin fourth with 32 per cent. Martin McCauley

Map and list of figures

The expansion of Soviet industry under Stalin USSR Supreme Soviet (1936 constitution) CPSU party organisation A Mexican policeman shows the ice-pick which killed Trotsky, August 1940 Figure 6.1 Leningrad. USSR. Three men burying victims of the siege of Leningrad at the Volkovo cemetery Figure 7.1 Stalin’s Funeral 1953 USSR

Map 0.1 Figure 0.1 Figure 0.2 Figure 5.1

xxviii xxix xxix 49 64 96

Chronology

1917 25 February

26–27 February 12 March

3 April 4 April 10 October

12 October

25–26 October

26–27 October

A strike in Petrograd becomes a general strike. The Tsar orders the demonstrations to be dispersed by any means necessary. The troops fire on the demonstrators, causing many casualties The Petrograd garrison mutinies and joins the demonstrators. This results in the victory of the February revolution Stalin, Kamenev and other Bolsheviks, in exile in various parts of Russia, return to Petrograd. They immediately support the policy of the Petrograd soviet and Provisional government Lenin, his wife Krupskaya and other Bolsheviks return to Petrograd from Zürich Lenin addresses Bolsheviks and members of the soviet on the tasks of the proletariat, known as the April Theses Bolsheviks achieve an absolute majority in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets. A secret meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDRP (Bolsheviks) resolves to launch an armed uprising. Only Kamenev and Zinoviev oppose this The Petrograd soviet sets up a Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) to combat counter-revolution. This then permits the Bolsheviks to organise an uprising through the MRC During the night Bolshevik units take the Winter Palace, arrest 13 Provisional government ministers but Kerensky escapes dressed as a female nurse. The IInd All-Russian Congress of Soviets convenes in Petrograd and confirms the seizure of power as Bolsheviks and left SRs are in the majority. Right SRs and Mensheviks leave the Congress in protest. The Congress then declares that power has passed to the soviets During an all-night sitting the Congress passes the decree on peace and the decree on land. A provisional Council (Soviet) of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) is confirmed, headed by Lenin, consisting only of Bolsheviks

Chronology xiii 1918 3 March 6–8 March

1919 2–6 March 1921 2–18 March

8–16 March

1922 3 April 1923 4 January 15 December

1924 21 January 26 January–2 February 23–31 May

1925 10 April 27–29 April

Brest-Litovsk Peace is signed between Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey At the VIIth Bolshevik Congress the name of the party is changed from Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) to Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks) RCP(B) The Communist International, the Comintern or IIIrd International, is founded in Moscow, Zinoviev is elected President The Kronstadt uprising against Bolshevik rule. The island base, in the Gulf of Finland, was of great strategic importance and the Bolsheviks suppress the uprising of the sailors with huge losses on both sides The Xth Congress of the RCP(B) is shocked by the uprising and under Lenin’s leadership introduces the New Economic Policy (NEP) and bans factionalism (organised opposition) in the party Stalin is elected Secretary-General (Gensek) of the RCP(B) Lenin, very ill, adds a postscript to his Testament, advising that Stalin be removed from positions of power at the centre because of character defects Stalin opens a campaign against ‘Trotskyism’ in Pravda in response to Trotsky’s attacks against bureaucratisation (too much bureaucracy) in the party and the lack of inner party democracy Lenin dies in Gorky, near Moscow, and is succeeded by three men, the triumvirate, Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev At the IInd All-Union Congress of Soviets Stalin swears to uphold Lenin’s legacy and presents himself as the leading follower of the dead leader At the XIIIth Congress of the RCP(B) Zinoviev and Kamenev attack Trotsky with Stalin keeping his counsel. Lenin’s Letter to the Congress, in which he comments on the qualities of the leading Bolsheviks, and his postscript, in which he speaks of Stalin’s character defects, are read to the Congress Tsaritsyn is renamed Stalingrad At the XVth Conference of the RCP(B) Stalin’s concept of socialism in one country is adopted against the opposition of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev

xiv  Chronology 18–31 December

1926 14–23 July

1927 2–19 December

1929 18 January

23–29 April

1930 2 March

1934 1 January 12 January 26 January–10 February

1 December

The XIVth Party Congress in Moscow adopts Stalin’s views on industrialisation and a new party statute, renaming the party the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) At a joint plenum of the CC and the Central Control Commission (CCC) Trotsky presents the ‘Declaration of the 13’, opposing the Stalin group in the leadership. The argument for more rapid industrialisation is rejected and Zinoviev is removed from the Politburo The XVth Party Congress confirms the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the party and Kamenev and another 74 opposition figures lose their party membership. The Congress decides on the collectivisation of agriculture and the drafting of a Five-Year Plan for the Soviet economy. The main victor is Stalin Stalin succeeds in the Politburo in forcing through the banishment of Trotsky from the Soviet Union, against the opposition of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky The XVIth Party Congress adopts the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) for the development of the economy and condemns the right deviation (Bukharin and Rykov) as a great danger to the party In an article in Pravda, ‘Dizzy with Success’, Stalin chastises those who have forced peasants into collectives and permits them to leave if they so desire. They rush out of the kolkhozes but Stalin’s move is only tactical in order to ensure that the spring sowing would not be interrupted. Later the peasants are recollectivised The second FYP (1933–37) is published which foresees the completion of socialist reconstruction The party purge reveals that about 300,000 members in Siberia and the Soviet Far East (15.6 per cent of the total membership) have been expelled The XVIIth Party Congress (the Congress of the Victors) meets in Moscow; Stalin delivers the main speech and states that the Soviet Union has been transformed from an agrarian country into an industrial state Sergei Kirov, party leader in Leningrad, is murdered, and Stalin uses this act to begin a period of mass terror

Chronology xv 1935 15–17 January

21 March 29 March

25 July–20 August 1936 27 June 19–24 August

26 September 5 November

5 December

1937 23–30 January

11 June

Kamenev, Zinoviev and others are accused of treason but Kamenev gets only five years’ imprisonment and Zinoviev 10 years; 76 supporters of Zinoviev are exiled to Siberia The NKVD states that 1,074 persons from Leningrad have been exiled for life to Siberia British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (later Lord Avon) arrives in Moscow to see Stalin who attempts to convince him and the western powers to enter a collective security system against Hitler The VIIth Comintern Congress meets in Moscow, attended by 510 delegates. The dangerous international situation leads to the adoption of a popular front strategy Decree banning abortion and promoting the family. The family becomes again the basis of society First Moscow Show Trial (the Trial of the 16) against the terrorist Trotsky–Zinoviev centre. The main accused are Kamenev and Zinoviev and are sentenced to death and executed, Tomsky commits suicide on 23 August Genrikh Yagoda is replaced by Nikolai Ezhov as People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Germany and Japan sign the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin which includes the agreement not to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union without the permission of the other country A new Soviet constitution is adopted at the VIIIth Congress of Soviets which abolishes the three-class elector system (workers, peasants, intelligentsia) and introduces the general and equal right to vote and direct elections to all soviets. The USSR Supreme Soviet is to consist of two houses, Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities. The number of Soviet republics increases from seven to 11 with the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federal Socialist Republic and the appearance of Azerbaidzan, Armenia and Georgia as Soviet republics. Kazakhstan and Kirgizia are upgraded from Autonomous Republics to Union Republics Second Moscow Show Trial against 17 members of the ‘anti-Soviet Trotskyist parallel centre’; 13 are sentenced to death (and shot, 1 February) and the others to 10 years’ imprisonment The arrest of leading military officers (Marshal Tukhachevsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Defence, and six generals) is announced. In a secret trial they are sentenced to death and executed. This begins a mass purge of the military

xvi  Chronology 16 December 1938 2–13 March

8 December 29 December

1939 17–26 June 10–21 March

11 May 23 August

1 September 17 September 28 September–10 October

26–28 October

Eight Soviet officials, mainly leaders of national minorities (Jews, Armenians), are accused of spying and treason, sentenced to death and executed Third Moscow Show Trial against the ‘anti-Soviet bloc of the right and the Trotskyists’ involving 21 accused, including Rykov and Bukharin. On 13 March 18 are sentenced to death and executed on 15 March Nikolai Ezhov, notorious for his role in the Moscow Show Trials, resigns as People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs and is succeeded by Lavrenty Beria A decree on raising labour discipline withdraws many of the social gains of the previous years (reduction of wages and holidays, including maternity leave, and the removal of benefits from those who change jobs twice). All workers and employees are to be given labour books (a record of their work performance) Second Soviet census reveals a population of 190,687,000 on 17 June The XVIIIth Party Congress (the Party Congress of the Completion of the Victory of Socialism) adopts the guidelines for the third FYP and a new party statute. Stalin states that the goal is to catch up and surpass the developed capitalist countries and the construction of a classless socialist society Beginning of battle of Khalkin-Gol, on the Soviet– Mongolian border, with Japan; Moscow emerges the winner on 15 September Molotov and von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, sign in Moscow the German–Soviet NonAggression Pact, having already signed a trade and credit agreement (19 August). In a secret protocol the two sides divide up east central Europe Germany attacks Poland and penetrates up to the line agreed in the secret protocol and the Second World War begins Soviet troops begin their march into eastern Poland (as agreed by the secret protocol) The Soviet Union signs agreements with Estonia (28 September), Latvia (5 October) and Lithuania (10 October) which permit Soviet bases on their territories. A similar agreement with Finland is not reached (11–12 October) The Soviet-occupied west Ukraine, formerly in east Poland, votes to introduce Soviet power and to join the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Belorussian population of former east Poland do the same and become part of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic on 28–30 October

Chronology xvii 27 November

30 November–12 March 1940 1940 12–17 June

22 June 1940

26 June

21 July

21 August 12–13 November 18 December 1941 22 June

30 June 3 July 8 September–20 January 1944 26 September

After the failure of Finnish–Soviet negotiations to establish a mutual assistance pact (Finland refused to permit Soviet bases on its territory), Moscow declares the non-aggression of 21 January 1932 null and void and breaks off diplomatic relations on 28 November The Soviet–Finnish (or Winter) war begins with an air raid over Helsinki and the march of Soviet troops into Karelia Soviet demands to Lithuania (12 June), Estonia and Latvia (16 June) to permit more Soviet bases and to elect governments according to Soviet wishes lead to the transformation of the Baltic States into Soviet republics (21–22 July) and then as part of the Soviet Union (3–6 August) France agrees an armistice with Germany, after failing to stem German advances since May: Britain is now alone against Germany; Italy is allied to Germany The Soviet government demands that Romania secede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to it. When Romania does not concur, Red Army units occupy both regions on 28 June Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the army, is ordered by Hitler to begin preparing for war against the Soviet Union. Hitler envisages a five-month campaign in the spring of 1941 Trotsky dies in Mexico after an attempt on his life (20 August) Molotov arrives in Berlin for negotiations concerning the division of the world. Moscow wants Finland, Romania and Bulgaria Hitler signs instruction no. 21, Operation Barbarossa, which envisages all preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union to be finished by 15 May 1941 German units attack the Soviet Union across a broad front without a declaration of war. Churchill offers Stalin help, as does Roosevelt (23 June); Molotov, not Stalin, announces to the Soviet people that Germany has invaded The State Committee for Defence (GKO) is set up and Stalin becomes its head (1 July) Stalin, in a radio broadcast, proclaims the Great Patriotic (Fatherland) War and orders that no territory shall be conceded to the enemy 900-day siege of Leningrad The battle of Kiev ends with 665,000 Red Army prisoners

xviii  Chronology 30 September–20 April 1942

16 October 7 December 1942 26 May 29 May–1 June 17 July–2 February 1943 25 July–9 October 1943 1943 31 January–2 February 22 February–21 March 14 April 15 May

12 July 28 November–1 December 1944 4 March–10 April 26 March 6 June

Battle for Moscow; Hitler calls it Operation Typhoon and it is codenamed Moscow Cannae (the battle in 216 BC in south-eastern Italy where the Roman legions were destroyed by Hannibal). The German offensive comes to a stop in December and on 5 December a Soviet counter-offensive forces the Germans back The Soviet government and diplomatic corps moves from Moscow to Kuibyshev (now Samara) but Stalin stays in Moscow Japanese forces attack Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, thus bringing the US into the war In London, Molotov signs an Anglo-Soviet alliance and friendship treaty for 20 years Molotov holds talks in Washington on a second front in west Europe (Britain had already agreed to this on 26 May) and economic aid The battle of Stalingrad The battle for the Caucasus

The southern part of the German army at Stalingrad surrenders on 31 January (General Paulus) and the northern part on 2 February (General Strecker) German offensive recovers much lost ground; recapture of Kharkov on 16 March and Belgorod on 21 March Stalin’s son, Yakov, a prisoner of war in the German concentration camp Sachsenhausen, deliberately seeks death by entering a prohibited zone and is shot dead Stalin dissolves the Cominform to demonstrate that the Soviet Union has no expansionary aims; the functions of the Cominform are taken over by the Central Committee Secretariat and a department of international affairs is set up Greatest tank battle of the Second World War at the Kursk salient involving over 1,200 tanks. The Germans later break off the battle and retreat Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt agree, in principle, on the partition of Germany at Tehran Spring offensive of the Red Army in the southern Ukraine along a 1,100 km front. Kherson is liberated on 13 March, Vinnitsa on 20 March and Nikolaev on 28 March Soviet troops reach the Romanian border on the river Pruth D-Day landing of allied troops in Normandy, codenamed Operation Overlord

Chronology xix 19–20 June 22 June–1 August 24 August–2 September 12 September

19 September 7 October

9–18 October

1945 4–11 February 12 April 16 April 2 May 8 May

24 May

17 July–2 August

6 August 9 August 21 August 2 September

Soviet partisans interrupt railway communications of the German army group centre at 9,600 places in the greatest act of sabotage of the war Soviet summer offensive against the German army group centre The German 6th army is encircled and annihilated near Kishenev London protocol, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, on future occupation zones in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin A ceasefire is agreed by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and Finland in Moscow. Finland is to withdraw to the 1940 frontiers At Dumbarton Oaks, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China agree to establish the United Nations (and a draft UN charter) as the successor organisation to the League of Nations Stalin and Churchill meet in Moscow and negotiate on a post-war settlement, especially on eastern and south-eastern Europe. Stalin agrees in principle to Churchill’s ‘percentages’ deal, apportioning zones of influence in the Balkans Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt discuss future military operations and the post-war world at Yalta President Roosevelt dies and Vice-President Harry Truman becomes President Great offensive of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts towards Berlin, which is encircled on 25 April Berlin capitulates to the Red Army General Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral von Friedeburg and Colonel General Stumpff sign the unconditional surrender of German forces at the Soviet headquarters at Berlin Karlshorst. The document is dated 8 May but it is signed at 00.16 on 9 May At a victory reception in the Georgevsky Hall, in the Kremlin, for over a thousand officers, Stalin lauds the Russian nation and places it above all other nations in the Soviet Union The United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain agree on the political and economic goals of their occupation policy in Germany at the Potsdam Conference US drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan US drops atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Japanese troops capitulate to the Red Army, including over 600,000 prisoners Japan surrenders to the Allies on board USS Missouri (V-J Day)

xx  Chronology 11 September–2 October

24 October 1946 9 February 25 February 5 March

25 April–15 May; 15 June–12 July 1947 12 March 5 June 22–27 September

1948 20 March 24 June–12 May 1949 28 June 1949 25 January

4 April

London conference of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, France and China finds agreement difficult. Discussions on peace treaties for defeated states and reparations for the Soviet Union The Soviet Union, Belorussia and Ukraine join the UN as founding members Stalin launches a new Five-Year Plan and celebrates the Great Patriotic War as a victory of ‘our Soviet social system’ and of ‘our Soviet state’ The Red Army is renamed the Soviet Army Churchill’s speech at Fulton, Missouri, speaks of an ‘iron curtain’ descending in Europe from Stettin (Szczecin) in the north to Trieste in the south. He calls for an Anglo-American alliance. Stalin sharply criticises the speech on 13 March The 2nd conference of the four powers (the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France) discusses European security and Germany, the Trieste problem and a peace treaty with Austria President Harry Truman proclaims the Truman Doctrine which promises US help to countries threatened by communism General George Marshall, US Secretary of State, announces the Marshall Plan, the European recovery programme An information bureau of communist and workers’ parties (Cominform) is set up in Szklarska Poreba, Poland, by communist and workers’ parties from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and Yugoslavia (until 1948). Its headquarters are in Belgrade, and in Bucharest from 1948 The Allied Control Commission in Berlin is paralysed by the withdrawal of Marshal Sokolovsky Berlin Blockade: all land and waterways to west Berlin and east Germany are blocked. Berlin is supplied by air lift from 26 June 1948 to 29 June 1949 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia is expelled from the Cominform at a conference in Bucharest and Cominform’s headquarters are moved to Bucharest The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) is set up by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia NATO is set up in Washington

Chronology xxi 4 May 25 September 7 October 1950 13 January 31 January 14 February 25 June 1952 10 March

September 16 September 3 October 5–14 October

1 November 1953 9 January

5 March

Four-power agreement in New York ending the Berlin Blockade, to be effective on 12 May TASS reports the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb The German Democratic Republic (DDR) is established The Soviet Union ceases to participate in the UN Security Council and UN agencies (until 1 August 1950) President Truman announces that the US is to build a hydrogen bomb The Soviet Union and China conclude a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance for 30 years The Korean war begins Stalin proposes, in a note to the US, Britain and France, a peace treaty which would result in a unified, neutral Germany; the west sends a non-committal reply on 25 March Stalin’s Economic Problems of Socialism is published The Soviet Union agrees to restore Port Arthur and their rights over railways to China Britain explodes successfully its first atomic bomb in the Montebello islands The XIXth Congress of the CPSU(B) adopts a new statute. The Politburo is replaced by a Presidium of the CC. The CC secretariat, headed by Malenkov, is expanded to 10 members. The term Bolsheviks in the name of the Party is dropped. In future the Party will be called the CPSU The US explodes its first hydrogen bomb successfully in the Marshall Islands Nine Kremlin doctors are arrested and held responsible for the deaths of leading Soviet politicians. An anti-Semitic campaign begins with the announcement of the Doctors’ Plot on 13 January Stalin dies from a heart attack suffered on 1 March

Who’s who

Alliluyeva, Nadezhda Sergeevna (1902–32): She married Stalin as his second wife at the age of 17 and was a student at the Industrial Academy where she met Nikita Khrushchev. She committed suicide, mainly because she could not cope with the harsh political reality of the time. Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899–1953): A political gangster who was kind to his family. A fellow Georgian, he was Stalin’s butcher in the Caucasus and succeeded Ezhov in 1939. He headed the Soviet atomic programme. He lost out to Khrushchev and others after Stalin’s death and was executed. Budenny, Marshal Semen Mikhailovich (1883–1973): He became one of Stalin’s favourite military men. A cavalry man, mechanised warfare in 1941 totally bewildered him. Stalin shunted him sideways. His intellect may have saved him during the purges. Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938): In Lenin’s phrase, the ‘darling of the party’, Bukharin was a sophisticated, urban intellectual who was a major economic theorist but, politically, was no match for Stalin. He was associated with the right and a slow transition to socialism. Victim of a Show Trial. Bulganin, Marshal Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1895–1975): A political marshal who occupied many high-ranking posts connected with defence and security. His task at the beginning of the Second World War was to ensure that the military obeyed Stalin and implemented his orders. He was Minister for the Armed Forces 1947–49. Then he became Deputy Prime Minister until Stalin’s death. The fact that Stalin never became suspicious of his motives reveals his high political skill. Ezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1895–1940): A ‘bloody dwarf’ and ‘iron people’s commissar’, Ezhov gave his name to the bloodiest period of the purges, the Ezhovshchina. He succeeded Yagoda in September 1936 and, in turn, gave way to Beria in April 1939. In his desk, Ezhov kept the bullets, wrapped in paper, with the victim’s name on each, which had terminated the lives of Bukharin, Zinoviev and other top leaders.

Who’s who xxiii Gorky, Maxim (1868–1936): Seen by many as the father of Soviet literature, he became the most famous communist writer in the world, while living, of all places, in fascist Italy. He returned to Moscow in 1931 and his death may have been due to natural causes or Stalin may have helped him into the next world. Kaganovich, Lev Moiseevich (1893–1991): True to Stalin to the end; he even denied he was a Jew. He was party leader in Moscow in 1930 and helped Khrushchev’s career. He did not intercede on behalf of his brother, Minister for Aviation, who committed suicide on hearing that he was going to be arrested by Beria and shot. Jews complained of his antiSemitism. Stalin told him to shave off his beard because he did not want a rabbi near him. Kamenev (né Rozenfeld), Lev Borisovich (1883–1936): An intellectual who was unwilling to fight for his convictions; instead tried to persuade others by the force of his arguments. His character was soft and he did not seek power. An Old Bolshevik, he was manager of Pravda before 1917. He opposed Lenin’s vision of a proletarian revolution, proclaiming that Lenin wanted to leap into socialism on an aeroplane. Zinoviev and he penned an article in Gorky’s Novaya Zhizn opposing the seizure of power, whereupon Lenin demanded his expulsion from the Party but he was outvoted. To Kamenev, Lenin was engaged in conspiracy but he believed in the Russian Revolution. Ideologically, Kamenev’s territory was between Bolshevism and Menshevism. As a member of the Petrograd soviet, he debated politely and maintained normal human relations with his opponents – a rarity among Bolsheviks whereas Lenin cursed his opponents with his supporters following suit. Stalin and he, as editors of Pravda, toned down Lenin’s rhetoric in ‘Letter from Afar’ but after Lenin returned to Petrograd, Stalin changed sides and supported Lenin but Kamenev did not. The latter opposed the October seizure of power but became head of the Moscow soviet (1918–26) and from 1922, deputy chair of Sovnarkom and other offices. His fall came in 1926 when he was subjected to a campaign of personal vilification and was sent to Italy as ambassador (1926–27). He was expelled from the party in 1927, readmitted in 1928, expelled again in 1932, readmitted in 1933 and finally expelled in 1934 and then put in prison. At the Party Congress in 1925, he declared: ‘Comrade Stalin is unable to fulfil the role of unifier of the Bolshevik party. We are against the theory of one man rule; we are against the notion of creating a leader’. He sided with Stalin against Trotsky, even though his wife was Trotsky’s sister and later with Zinoviev, head of the Petrograd soviet, against Stalin. Zinoviev was always seeking allies for a fight against Stalin but Kamenev but would only fight with words. Zinoviev and he were sentenced to death, in 1936, as members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev centre. On his way to execution, he told a depressed Zinoviev: ‘Stop it, Grigory, let us die like men’. He did not know how to fight but knew how to die bravely.

xxiv  Who’s who Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971): A rumbustious, intelligent but uneducated party official who was entranced by Stalin. The spell was only broken after Stalin’s death and he demolished Stalin’s reputation in 1956. Khrushchev was party leader in Ukraine and Moscow and enthusiastically participated in the purges. Kirov, Sergei Mironovich (1886–1934): His assassination in December 1934 was seized upon by Stalin to begin what later became known as the purges. He had been approached by some delegates at the party congress in 1934 to stand against Stalin as party leader. This may have sealed his fate. Konev, Marshal Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973): One of the most successful Red Army commanders during the Great Fatherland War. Commander of the Kalinin Front, October 1941–December 1942. He commanded the Steppe Front, 1943–44 and became a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1944. His front advanced to the Vistula and then Berlin. He continued to Torgau where he linked up with US forces. His forces then moved south and entered Prague in May 1945. He was First Deputy People’s Minister of Defence and commander of Soviet ground forces, 1946–50. Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna (1869–1939): Lenin’s wife but not his great love. She was a faithful wife who worked for the cause but her memoirs are disappointingly shallow. She was advised to pay more attention to Lenin to save him from seeking satisfaction with his secretaries. She was browbeaten by Stalin who warned her that if she were not careful the party would appoint someone else as Lenin’s widow. Lenin (né Ulyanov), Vladimir Ilich (1870–1924): One of the great political actors of the twentieth century in world politics. Inspired by the Enlightenment vision of a just, harmonious society, he brooked no opposition in his quest for revolution. Stalin was a key aide in 1917 and afterwards Lenin tried to smooth the acrimonious relationship between Stalin and Trotsky. In his Testament he warned the party against Stalin’s inclination to abuse power. Stalin’s associates rallied to his cause after Lenin’s death and Trotsky fluffed his lines. Stalin never looked back and repaid his opponents with death. Malenkov, Georgy Maksimilianovich (1902–88): A skilled administrator, he played a key role during the war as a member of GKO. He was elected to the Politburo in 1946 and was also Deputy Prime Minister. Stalin poked fun at his excess flab. Molotov (né Skryabin), Vyacheslav Mikhailovich (1890–1986): Ever faithful to Stalin, ‘bootface’ Molotov played a major role in foreign affairs and was greatly disliked in the West. His memoirs are disappointing and reveal little of Stalin’s real thinking. He found the Khrushchev era soft because it was not Bolshevik enough, meaning not enough coercion was being used to mould the new society.

Who’s who xxv Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (Sergo) (1886–1937): A prominent Georgian revolutionary who was influential in the 1930s during industrialisation. He was a supporter of Stalin and moved to Moscow in 1926 to become chair of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin. In 1930 he became chair of VSNKh and in 1932 Commissar for Heavy Industry. He became a full member of the Politburo in 1930. He fell out with Stalin over the purges, in which his brother was tortured and shot. He committed suicide. Pyatakov, Georgy Leonidovich (1890–1937): He was always on the left of the party (his father was a sugar merchant) and he supported Trotsky against Stalin. He was Deputy Commissar for Heavy Industry (under Ordzhonikidze) 1932–36. He was the chief accused at the second great Moscow Show Trial in 1937. He was found guilty and shot. Rykov, Aleksei Ivanovich (1881–1938): Stalin’s ally in the battle against Trotsky after Lenin’s death, Rykov reaped the whirlwind later. He became a leading member of the right opposition, with Bukharin, against Stalin’s policies, especially forced collectivisation. In 1930 he was sacked from all his posts and from the Politburo. He was tried for treason in the third great Show Trial in 1938 and executed. Stalin (né Dzhugashvili) Iosif Vissarionovich (1878–1953): A brilliant but flawed politician who was one of the most important leaders of the twentieth century. He revealed matchless skill at political tactics and had a superb memory. He never forgot a slight. He relentlessly pursued the goal of making Soviet society socialist and the Soviet Union the leading country in the world. Although a Georgian he became an assimilated Great Russian and remorselessly suppressed non-Russian nationalism. He was willing to sacrifice anyone in the pursuit of moral–political unity (a harmonious society). Timoshenko, Marshal Semen Konstantinovich (1895–1970): He occupied many top military posts during the Great Fatherland War but it was his friendship with Stalin, going back to the Civil War, which saved him from retribution for failure. He was a cavalry man and replaced Voroshilov as Commissar for Defence, in May 1940, with special responsibility to reorganise the Red Army after defeat in the Winter War with Finland. He became commander of the western front when the Germans invaded and could do little to stem the tide. He was defeated by the Germans at Kharkov, May 1942. This cost him his command and he was transferred to the northwestern front, his last operational command. He then moved to Stavka for the rest of the war. Trotsky (né Bronstein), Lev Davidovich (1879–1940): The most brilliant speaker and writer of the revolution, he failed as a politician. He thought that intrigue was beneath him and this cost him dear against Stalin. He was in Lenin’s mind as his successor and this meant that Stalin and the

xxvi  Who’s who others ganged up against him. On the left, he played a major role in the Civil War as Commissar for Defence. Trotsky ridiculed Stalin’s socialism in one country and typically failed to see its nationalist appeal. He was driven to open opposition in 1927 and exiled in 1928. Stalin’s hitman finished him off in Mexico, in 1940. Tukhachevsky, Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937): One of the architects of the Red Army, his brilliant career was cut short because of suspicions about his loyalty to Stalin. Autocratic by nature, he was of aristocratic Polish origin, his hauteur made many enemies. He became a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935. In 1936 he was First Deputy Commissar for Defence. Tortured and executed, he was exonerated and rehabilitated under Gorbachev. Voroshilov, Marshal Klimenty Efremovich (1881–1969): Close to Stalin from the Civil War, he proved himself a great survivor. He was Commissar for Defence, 1934–40. He gave way to the more able Timoshenko, in May 1940, as part of the reorganisation of the Red Army. He then became a deputy chair of Sovnarkom and the chair of the defence committee. He was appointed to the GKO, responsible for the overall running of the war. He was put in command of the armies of the north-western front, but could do little to stem the German advance. He was a member of Stavka. He signed the armistice for the Allies with Hungary and headed the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Hungary, 1946–47. He was USSR Deputy Prime Minister, 1946–53. Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarevich (1883–1954): A venomous, merciless state prosecutor who gained worldwide notoriety for his courtroom behaviour during the great Show Trials. A former Menshevik, he always had to prove his loyalty to Stalin. He came out with the famous line, in closing for the prosecution, during the first great Show Trial: ‘I demand that these mad dogs be shot, every last one of them!’ He was Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1940, and deputy chair of Sovnarkom, 1939–44. In 1949, he replaced Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs (he was reputed to have reported to Stalin over Molotov’s head) and was permanent Soviet representative at the United Nations. He turned his venom on the United States, especially during the Korean War, 1950–53. In a memorable phrase, Leonard Schapiro described him as the nearest thing to a human rat he had ever seen! Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich (1891–1938): One of Stalin’s bloodiest police chiefs, he himself fell victim to the executioner’s bullet. Some referred to him as the Mephistopheles from the (Jewish) Pale. Stalin made him head of the NKVD, 1934–July 1936. Just to keep him dangling, Stalin appointed him Commissar for Posts and Telegraph, 1936–37, and then had him arrested. He commented: ‘I have long been expecting you’.

Who’s who xxvii Zhdanov, Andrei Aleksandrovich (1896–1948): The guardian of Stalinist cultural orthodoxy, from socialist realism to the xenophobia of the late 1940s, known as the Zhdanovshchina, he became a member of the Politburo in 1939. In 1934, he laid down the rules for writers – socialist realism: all published work was to be didactic and optimistic. He led the defence of Leningrad, 1941–44. He died suddenly in 1948, probably naturally – he was a heavy drinker. Malenkov and Beria seized the opportunity to settle scores with the Leningrad leadership in what became known as the Leningrad Affair. This resulted in many officials being executed and many hundreds being dismissed. Zhukov, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich (1896–1974): The most prominent and successful Red Army commander during the Great Fatherland War. He defeated the Japanese at Khakin-Gol, Mongolia, 1939. He was made chief of the General Staff and Deputy Commissar for Defence, January–July 1941. In October 1941, he replaced Voroshilov as commander of the northern sector and was personally responsible for the defence of Leningrad. He then moved to Moscow and became commander-in-chief of the entire western front. He was responsible for the defence of Stalingrad. He participated in the battle of Kursk and became commander of the 1st Belorussian front, November 1944. His troops reached Berlin in April 1945. He then became commander of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. Stalin was wary of his popularity and in April 1946 demoted him to commander of the Odessa military district. After Stalin’s death, he returned to Moscow as Deputy USSR Minister of Defence. A brilliant but rude and abrasive man, he was undoubtedly the leading military man of his generation. Zinoviev (né Radomyslsky), Grigory Evseevich (1883–1936): In Trotsky’s memorable phrase, Zinoviev was either in seventh heaven or in the depths of despair. His Jewish family owned a dairy farm. A passionate orator and volatile politician, Stalin made mincemeat of him. Stalin drew him into a tactical alliance against Trotsky after Lenin’s death but after Trotsky’s defeat Stalin turned on Zinoviev. In 1926, he lost his place on the Politburo and his Comintern post, and was expelled from the party, in November 1927, after going on to the streets with Trotsky to protest, in vain, against Stalin’s policies. He was readmitted to the party in 1928, after praising Stalin to the skies. He was expelled again in 1932. He (and Kamenev) were tried in secret in January 1935, and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. In April 1936, he was the main accused in the first great Show Trial. He was a pathetic figure before execution. He was rehabilitated under Gorbachev.

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Map 0.1  The expansion of Soviet industry under Stalin

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Figure 0.1  USSR Supreme Soviet (1936 constitution)

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Figure 0.2  CPSU party organisation

Part 1

The context

1 Introduction: the problem

When the Soviet Union became the dominant power in Europe and second only to the United States in 1945 there was an urgent need in the West to analyse its rise to power and to prevent it expanding its influence throughout the world. How was the USSR ruled? Why had it become so powerful in such a short time? After all, no one gave the country much hope against the German Wehrmacht, in 1941. Then less than four years later the Red Army was raising the Soviet Flag over the Reichstag in Berlin. Even more disconcerting, the Soviet model of government and economy rejected the market, private ownership of land and assets, the rule of law: in other words, the capitalism which had led to the development of the western world in previous centuries. The western concept of democracy, based on a pluralism of opinions, was also ignored. Had a new model of development appeared in the Soviet Union which could challenge the hegemony of capitalism and perhaps replace it in the future? Russia, in western imagination, is often conceived of as a bear, an animal which is strong enough to devour any man or woman. How was western Europe and the United States to protect themselves against this bear that claimed it would one day take over the world? Out of fear of the Soviet Union emerged the concept of totalitarianism which prevailed among historians from 1945 to the 1960s. The Soviet Union was a dictatorship over which the leader held total sway: in politics, economics, society, culture, indeed in every aspect of daily life. This was enforced by limitless coercion that resulted in fear of the secret police (NKVD) coursing through everyone’s veins. The Communist Party enjoyed a monopoly and no opposition was permitted. Religion was to be eliminated and a secular, socialist culture was to be instilled by a media which was omnipresent. Propaganda (regarded as a positive) was all-pervasive. It was everyone’s duty to inform on other citizens (including wives, husbands and children) who were suspected of harbouring anti-Soviet views. Failure to do so was a crime. Totalitarianism viewed communism as frozen in time and incapable of reform. Control from the top was so pervasive that only war could topple the regime. It was impossible to carry out academic research in the Soviet Union. Could one believe what was written in the newspapers and journals? A joke

4  The context circulated that there was no Izvestiya (news – the government newspaper) in Pravda (truth – the party newspaper) and no Pravda in Izvestiya. How could one glean information? One source was a group of Soviet émigrés who had managed to escape the net which had ensnared so many of their colleagues and remain in the West after 1945. The Harvard project [findings summarised in Bauer et al. (1956) and Inkeles and Bauer (1959)] questioned them in depth to discern the hidden mechanisms of the Soviet power structure. The basic approach was totalitarian but there were studies by Barrington Moore Jr (1954) and Black et al. (1975) that adopted a modernisation approach. Once debriefed the Harvard set ran into the question of bias. Were they so hostile to the Soviet Union that their evidence was too subjective? The Smolensk archives, captured by the Germans and in turn by the Americans, were a major boon. They provided detailed information about the course of Soviet policy in Smolensk oblast. Merle Fainsod produced a classic account entitled How Russia is Ruled (1953). Jerry F. Hough brought out a revised edition How Russia is Governed (1979). The Soviet Union was compared to national socialist Germany and Kurt Schumacher, leader of the west German social democratic (SPD) party after 1945 referred to communists as ‘red painted Nazis’. The party led by Hitler was the NSDAP, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party. Referred to as the Nazi (from the German nationalsozialistisch or national socialist) party, many comparisons were drawn. It exercised a monopoly of political power; it regarded world dominance as its goal; the chosen people were ethnic Germans (under communism it was the working class); the Jews were the enemy and were to be exterminated (under communism it was the bourgeoisie); religion was to disappear and be replaced by worship of the leader; the secret police, the Gestapo, ruthlessly combated dissent and opposition (the NKVD played this role in the USSR); both had charismatic leaders who were worshipped as demi-gods. Since Nazism was held to be evil, so too was communism. They were two of a kind. America’s unease about communism became almost hysterical during the years 1950–57, when Senator Joseph McCarthy accused the State Department, CIA, military and other institutions of harbouring communists within their ranks. The fear of communism went hand in hand with the fear of World War III breaking out. President Eisenhower revealed that he dreaded that it would start every day of his presidency (1953–61). The Vietnam War set in train a reassessment of the totalitarian model. The ‘class of 68’ no longer had faith in the US government and the reaction led to the revisionism of the 1970s. Social historians looked again at 1917 and concluded that the Bolsheviks had support, even among workers, and this challenged the prevailing view that the Bolsheviks were led by returning activists from abroad (Lenin and Trotsky) who enjoyed little local support and were able to effect a coup. This cohort of Marxists and left leaning socialists included Ronald Grigor Suny (1972); Alexander Rabinowitch

Introduction 5 (1976); Diane Koenker (1981) and Steve Smith (1983). They produced solidly researched studies, which even their critics had to admire. The next step was to adopt a revisionist stance to the 1920s or the period of the New Economic Policy (1921–28). This was a much more complex task as NEP introduced a mixed economy and the return of the market while the commanding heights of the economy (energy, large scale industry, banking, etc.) remained in state hands. It was much more difficult to source research in this period in Soviet archives. The leading light of the revisionists turned out to be Stephen Cohen, a political scientist, who produced a biography of Nikolai Bukharin (1973), the main figure on the right against Stalin. Cohen sought to show that there was a feasible alternative to Stalin’s enforced rapid industrialisation and collectivisation. Bukharin’s gradualist approach offered hope of a successful alliance of workers and peasants which would benefit all. Cohen saw Stalin as veering away from the Bolshevik revolution set in train by Lenin. Hence Stalin highjacked the revolution in his desire for personal power and so Stalinism cannot be viewed as legitimate. Cohen accepted the totalitarian model when applied to Stalinism but rejected it when applied to the October Revolution and NEP. The revisionists were regarded as soft on communism or, even worse, ignoring the brutality and excesses of the Stalinist period. There were referred to as communists or proto-communists who were apologists for an evil regime. The bitterness and acrimony of the debate between the totalitarians and the revisions can only be understood in a Cold War context. The 1930s were even more difficult to study from Soviet sources but this did not deter a group of social historians who were interested in researching the level of support from below for the Stalinist regime. The leading light was Sheila Fitzpatrick, who started out studying the violin in Moscow, bur then abandoned her musical studies to delve into the lives of ordinary Soviet people. She was fascinated by the new cultural elite, the commissariat for enlightenment under Anatoly Lunacharsky, and produced ground breaking studies on education and social mobility (1979) and (1992). Lynne Viola studied workers and collectivisation (1987); Hiroaki Kuromiya examined workers and politics (1988); and William J. Chase published on work and life in Moscow (1987). It became clear that mobilisation of workers to achieve government policies had achieved considerable success. Out of this milieu came future leaders of the party and industry. Trotsky’s view that the revolution had been betrayed (1937) found resonance among some scholars who concluded that the Soviet Union was a bureaucratic, deformed state which exploited workers. Prominent representatives of this attitude were Moshe Lewin and Donald Filtzer. Moshe Lewin, who had worked on a kolkhoz (collective farm) in Kazakhstan, brought hands on expertise to the study of Stalin’s new creation (1975). He roundly condemned the new order as a move away from socialism. The new creation, called the Stalinist system, resulted from the ‘degeneration’

6  The context of the Communist Party into a hierarchical, administrative body which felt it could apply unlimited coercion to achieve its goals. However, the more force it used the more confused the situation became. The consequence of forced collectivisation was that the peasants were driven into the cities but once there ‘ruralised’ them. They retained their social values (patriarchal, family networks, a rural attitude) to work (short bursts followed by periods of inactivity) and time (regular timekeeping was alien to them) and thereby overwhelmed the state. Lewin writes of the ‘quicksand society’ and the ‘demonisation’ of the authoritarian political system. The state bureaucratised society but the values of the village predominated and the village exacted its revenge by turning the Soviet Union backwards in its quest for modernisation. The attempt to destroy village values, so prevalent in collectivisation, produced confusion and alienation and led to a sense of permanent crisis. The nervousness of the leadership and its fear of instability led to the cruel, elemental violence of the Great Terror. Lewin was in no doubt about whether the Soviet system was socialist or not. He passionately rejected the new order, from a socialist (anti-capitalist) point of view, and saw it as a bastard who had wreaked havoc in the Soviet Union. Fitzpatrick and Lewin never entered into debate and, indeed, ignored one another’s work in public and print. However, their work does reveal some similar tendencies. Both see the 1930s as a reversal of the revolution. For Lewin, NEP was a false path which then led to forced industrialisation and collectivisation. For Fitzpatrick, the end of the Cultural Revolution, in 1932, called a halt to the revolutionary impulse of socialism. A revolutionary mentality gave way to a Soviet mentality. The Great Purges (1937–38) produced a remarkable book by Robert Conquest (1968; followed by reassessments in 1991, 2002 and 2007). Great ingenuity had to be displayed by the author as he did not have access to Soviet archives in his original study. He amended some of his calculations in the light of archival evidence in later assessments. A fierce debate ensued between totalitarians and revisionists with the former accusing the latter of trying to whitewash Stalin’s crimes. Denying Stalin’s crimes was tantamount to denying the Holocaust in the eyes of some critics. The numbers game was played with the totalitarians suggesting large numbers and the revisionists cutting these numbers down considerably. One of the historians who was quoted was E.H. Carr, who penned a seven-volume history of Soviet Russia over the years 1950–61. Revisionists were favourably disposed towards his work but he was subjected to criticism because of his methodology and his left leaning politics and regarded as only writing about the winners which meant that he paid little attention to the losers in the conflict with Stalin. After the fall of communism, he was asked what approach he would now adopt if writing his history of Soviet Russia. He replied that he would pay much less attention to official documents and statistics. His work can be read as the official Soviet version of the period which archives have revealed to be quite misleading.

Introduction 7 Gradually the views of social historians became accepted wisdom in the field of Soviet history. This was especially so as studies revealed that there was considerable resistance to collectivisation (Fitzpatrick 1994; Viola 1996). Sarah Davies examined popular opinion, propaganda and dissent (1997) and Jeffrey Rossman assessed worker resistance (2005). The opening of the archives after 1991 did not mellow Richard Pipes, who maintained that he had been right all along. He does not even include the works of revisionists in his bibliographies. He holds to his view that Russian political culture is authoritarian and favours the emergence of strong leaders. Hence the way to study Russia is to analyse politics from above.

Post-revisionism Just when revisionism had become the norm it was undermined in the 1990s by a new wave: the return of ideology and theories about cultural and intellectual history. The subjectivity of the Soviet experience took precedence. Inspiration was derived from the social theories of the French Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida and the German Jürgen Habermas. Ideology was understood, not as a set of texts but as something which emerged from collective experience. The classic study was by Stephen Kotkin of the evolution of Magnitogorsk (1995), building a new city in the Urals, when he presented Stalinism as a new civilisation. Kotkin follows the twists and turns of changing events and how workers and managers adjusted their behaviour to give the impression they were following the plan. They learnt to speak Bolshevik and exploited the system for their own ends. Management returned to bourgeois values and lived in fine villas while many workers were obliged to live in squalid shacks. Kotkin does not concern himself with the question about whether this new phenomenon was socialist: it was simply everyday Stalinist reality. The regime ensured that no one, even at the top, could feel secure with the threat that their cherished life style could be snatched away at a moment’s notice. Worker anger at poor living conditions could be turned against the bosses. People thought they were building socialism and a better tomorrow, so all the sacrifices were justified. Cultural studies are imbued with the approach that Stalinist civilisation was not the product of something imposed from above but the emergence of a collective experience and the adoption of new values. Hence everyday discourse, ritual and practices are very relevant. Diaries and oral testimony provide valuable insights. Jochen Hellbek’s discovery of a diary written during the Stalin years (2009) produced a fine book. Alexei Kojevnikov (2004) follows the battles of Soviet physicists and how these conflicts affected the discipline. Some of the most influential works of the post-Soviet period do not belong to the post-revisionist school. A prime example is Terry Martin’s publication (2001) on Soviet nations and nationalities in the 1920s and 1930s which follows efforts at affirmative action by the authorities. It is

8  The context worth mentioning that the goal was to produce a new cohort of officials and leaders who would transcend their own ethnic origins and cultures and identify with the new Soviet norms. As experience was to prove, this often had the opposite effect and some of the elites in the non-Slav areas became leaders of a nationalist revival which surfaced under Gorbachev. Political history has again emerged as the brilliant studies by Oleg Khlevniuk on repression during the 1930s, based on archives, reveal. He believes that the archives, so far closed, when open will reveal many hitherto unsuspected secrets of the Stalin era.

Part 2

Analysis

2 Early years

Ioseb Dzhugashvili, the son of Besarion, was born in Gori, a small town in Georgia, in the south of the Russian Empire, on 6 December 1878. In Russian, he was known as Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili but to the world he was Joseph Stalin. The Georgian Orthodox Church used the Julian calendar which means that, according to the Gregorian calendar, he was born on 18 December 1878. His birth certificate, his christening certificate, his seminary school records and his graduation certificate all bear the same date. The documents of the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, give 6 December 1878, as his date of birth. In December 1920, Stalin filled in a long questionnaire for the Swedish newspaper, Folkets Dagblad, and, again, gave as his date of birth 6 (18) December 1878. However, in late 1921, the date of his birth was changed to 21 December 1879 (9 December 1879 old style). Subsequently, this latter date was always given as his date of birth. No one has yet explained why Stalin changed his date of birth to render himself one year and three days younger. He once remarked that he had done nothing outstanding, compared to others, before the revolution. Perhaps changing his date of birth was a symbolic way of distancing himself from the years before 1917. He never allowed anyone to write a biography of his activities before October. Indeed, his private secretary, Tovstukha, the keeper of his personal archive until 1935, withdrew as many documents about his activities before 1917 from archives as he could find and they were then passed on to the Stalin, most of them never to be seen again. His father was a cobbler who sometimes earned enough to sustain his wife and son. He took to drink, became violent at times, and eventually abandoned his family. Ioseb or “Soso”’s mother was devoted to him and he did not need to work, a common fate of local boys. He contracted smallpox which left his face pockmarked for life and damaged his left arm in an accident but poor medical treatment left it disabled. Two toes on his left foot were joined. One can assume that Soso came in for a lot of ribbing because of his physical defects. Despite this, he did not display the cruelty which so marked his character later. His mother’s dream was that he should become a priest in the Georgian Orthodox Church and she managed to enrol him in the Gori Theological

12  Analysis School. Local children taught him Russian, the language of instruction and he proved an able student. He remained there from 1888 to 1894. He did well (except in Greek and arithmetic) and had a fine tenor voice. Soso then entered the Tbilisi Theological Seminary and remained there until May 1899. He devoted less and less time to his studies and more and more time to radical writers, first and foremost, Karl Marx. He embraced Marxism and it became his new religion. He possessed restless energy and longed for action. He was expelled from the seminary and Georgian social democracy offered him the opportunity to spread his wings. Caucasian culture was often violent, with blood feuds based on traditions of honour. Infighting was vicious and any route to the top was acceptable. Only the strong could survive in such an environment and Soso had few equals. Then followed a life of underground political activity which led to imprisonment and exile on several occasions. So was forged the personality of a professional revolutionary whose dedication to Marxism never wavered. Hand in hand went hatred of the Tsarist regime. Soso was an outsider in a land dominated by ethnic Russians. The only way for him to rise to the top was to overthrow the existing order. Stalin – he adopted this Russian pseudonym (derived from the Russian word for steel) in 1913 – went underground in 1899 and threw himself into the activities of the Transcaucasian Social Democratic Party, which embraced Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. He proved an excellent agitator and several strikes broke out. This led to his having to leave Tbilisi for Batumi where more strikes occurred. The Okhrana, or Tsarist secret police, arrested him in March 1902 and he was sent into exile to Siberia. He managed to escape the following year and returned to Georgia but this led to persistent rumours that he had become a double agent. In 1903, the Russian Social Democratic Party had split into Mensheviks, who favoured a gradualist and non-violent policy, and Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, who wanted the party to be restricted to activists and to promote strikes, violent protests and demonstrations. Stalin immediately sided with Lenin. The 1905 revolution forced the tsarist authorities to concede a parliament, the Duma, to legalise trade unions and political parties and to introduce significant agrarian reforms. Stalin, in the meanwhile, had been climbing to the top of the Transcaucasian party and was chosen as the sole Bolshevik delegate at the Russian ‘Unity’ Congress, in Stockholm, in April 1906, and again as the only Bolshevik delegate at the May 1907 Congress, in London. Reports circulated that Stalin met Lenin in Berlin en route to London and he travelled to Paris afterwards to meet other Bolsheviks, returning to Russia on a false passport. Meanwhile, he had married Ekaterina Svanidze, in July 1906, and their son, Yakov, was born in March 1907. She was arrested soon after her marriage but escaped with a light sentence. Stalin moved his wife and son to Baku, Azerbaijan, but Ekaterina soon fell seriously ill and died in November 1907.

Early years 13 Part and parcel of political activities in Transcaucasia involved robbing banks and any other institution which possessed liquid funds. One spectacular heist netted 250,000 roubles, a huge sum at that time. In this way, the revolutionaries financed and expanded their activities. It was inevitable, that, sooner or later, Stalin would be arrested by the Okhrana and in the spring of 1910 he was sent to Vologda province where he remained until July 1911. He immediately returned to revolutionary activities, criss-crossing Russia, penning articles and becoming one of Lenin’s trusted lieutenants. He was elected to the Central Committee of the party, in 1912, and went to Vienna to draft an article on nationalities policy, at the behest of Lenin. It was a hot topic among Austrian social democrats as they wrestled with the problems thrown up by the multi-ethnic AustroHungarian Empire. As Stalin knew little or no German, he must have been aided by a local Bolshevik. His luck ran out in February 1913, in St Petersburg, when he was betrayed by Roman Malinovsky, one of Lenin’s favourites. The latter was unmasked as a double agent, in 1914, and this threw the Bolshevik leadership into disarray. Stalin was sentenced to four years’ exile in Turukhansky krai, in Siberia, but managed to arrange a rather comfortable lifestyle, receiving books and articles from other Bolsheviks but chafed at the inaction he was forced to endure. The only thorn in his flesh was Yakov Sverdlov, another leading Bolshevik. The two fell out and Stalin found another place to stay and rumours circulated that he fathered a child there.

3 The October revolution, state capitalism, war communism and the civil war, 1917–21

The Minister of Finance, Count Vladimir Kokovtsov, in February 1917, sensed that ‘something extraordinary was about to happen but no one had the slightest idea what it could be’. The premonition became reality on the morning of 23 February when textile workers went on strike. It was International Women’s Day and the cry was ‘bread’. By 25 February, over 2,000 factories were on strike, students joined in and trams stopped running. The Tsar and his family were at Tsarskoe Selo, just outside Petrograd, but a key guards’ regiment mutinied and was joined the following day by another. Machine guns mowed down civilians in Nevsky prospekt, the city’s main boulevard. On 27 February, a large part of the Petrograd garrison mutinied and the Duma, in the Tauride Palace, was invaded by students, workers and soldiers. A Provisional Executive Committee of Soviet Workers’ Deputies was set up and called on workers, soldiers and citizens to attend a Duma meeting that evening. About midnight, a bedraggled figure, wandered in and declared: ‘I am the ex-Minister of the Interior, Protopopov, and, as I desire the welfare of our country, I surrender myself voluntarily’. The Tsar’s power, thereby, was also meekly surrendered. On 2 March, Nicholas II abdicated in favour of his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail, but the following day, he abdicated, on the advice of members of the government, and then implored people to obey the Provisional Government, which had been set up on 2 March, ‘until, within as short a time as possible, the Constituent Assembly, elected on a basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage, shall express the will of the nation regarding the form of government to be adopted’ (Miles 2017: 356, 357). The news that the Tsar had abdicated took some time to reach the exiles in Siberia, partly because the local authorities banned local newspapers from reporting it. The hope was that it was all a storm in a teacup but it turned out to be one of the defining moments of the twentieth century. The crown passed to Aleksei, the Tsar’s haemophiliac son, but on hearing he would never see him again, declined it in his name. The Romanov dynasty, in power since 1613, expired without a whimper. Russia became a republic so who would act decisively in this power vacuum?

The October revolution and socialism  15 Lenin, in Switzerland, learned the news from Western newspapers. He was as stunned as anyone else and began frantically planning his return to the motherland. Who had provoked the February Revolution? It appeared it was a spontaneous protest against a lack of bread and other shortages. The turning point was when soldiers and the police went over to the side of the demonstrators and that sealed the fate of the royal dynasty. When the news finally reached Achinsk where Stalin was domiciled, a hastily arranged meeting, at which Lev Kamenev played a leading role, jubilantly welcomed the news and sent a telegram to Grand Duke Mikhail praising him for declining the throne. Stalin, for some reason, was not among the exiles at the meeting. When Stalin, Kamenev and the others eventually reached Petrograd they found that the Duma had appointed a Provisional Government consisting mainly of Kadets (the main liberal party) and other liberals. There was a solitary Socialist Revolutionary, Alexander Kerensky. Their goal was a parliamentary republic along Western lines. A Constituent Assembly would in due course be elected and it would draft a constitution, hold elections and a government would then be appointed. Even more significantly, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies had come into being dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), the main agrarian party but not Marxist. It immediately passed Order no. 1, which stated that ‘orders of the Military commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed, with the exception of those which contradict the orders and decrees of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies’ (McCauley 1975: 23). It would support the bourgeois government as long as it continued the revolution. So, there was dual power from the very beginning of the republic. The Mensheviks held that Russia had entered the bourgeois democratic phase of its development which entailed a bourgeois government being formed. The SRs went along with this and, as the main agrarian party, concentrated on land reform. What about the Bolsheviks? They broadly accepted the Menshevik line and expected the bourgeois democratic stage to last a long time as Russia was industrially underdeveloped. Kamenev and Stalin agreed with this moderate line and, in control of Pravda, the party’s newspaper, pushed this agenda, suppressing left radicalism. They were also members of the Petrograd soviet so were in the vanguard of socialist policy making. Lenin, still in Switzerland, was furious with the moderate line and sent an article which was heavily edited when it appeared in Pravda. This revealed that the editors did not grasp Lenin’s political line which was based on studying previous revolutions. Lenin, a keen student of Marx, was aware that the sage of Trier had warned against premature revolutions, based on the experience of France, in 1851, when Louis Napoleon had swept the Legislative Assembly aside and ended the Second Republic, eventually proclaiming himself Emperor

16  Analysis Napoleon III. How had this been possible? Marx concluded that the Second Republic was a premature revolution. Moreover, engaging in it, in a country where the social substructure had not developed – meaning a mature, organised and politically aware proletariat – was a dangerous counter-productive phenomenon. The risk is that that it naturally leads to a regime with all the energies released by revolution and the end result is that the instincts of the autocratic past are likely to reassert themselves. Lenin, ignoring Marx, was bent on seizing power and then developing a socialist revolution from above, guided by the vanguard of the proletariat, the Bolshevik leaders. Lenin accepted that workers on their own could not achieve socialism so needed guidance from those who understood the laws of history. The October Revolution was not a Marxist revolution and without Lenin, it would almost certainly not have occurred. Thus it can be called a Leninist revolution and the phrase Marxist-Leninist was coined to describe this phenomenon. Lenin was aware that revolutions go through various phases. They start off as being quite moderate but moderates are soon swept aside as they cannot effect rapid progress This, in turn, radicalises the masses and extreme solutions become attractive. Russia would surely follow this paradigm. Lenin did not want to enter any coalitions as this would risk being held in check at the vital moment when the seizure of power was possible. Lenin always believed that he was right and without him the party would fail so he had to dominate and be obeyed. Lenin struck a deal with the German authorities to allow him and his comrades to return to Russia. Berlin believed that, given Lenin’s opposition to the war, this would weaken Russia and make it easier to defeat it. Money was also provided and this permitted the Bolsheviks to purchase, among other things, a 250,000 rouble (about £10 million in today’s money) printing press and publish an almost unlimited amount of propaganda. When he arrived at the Finland Station, in Petrograd, on 4 April 1917, he shocked his audience with his oratory which became known as the April Theses. The war was not to be supported as it continued to be an imperialist war. Russia, at present, was ‘in transition from the first stage of the revolution…to the second stage which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and poor strata of the peasantry…no support must be given to the Provisional Government…it must be explained to the masses that the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies is the only possible form of revolutionary government’ (McCauley 1975: 52, 53). Lenin admitted that the Bolsheviks were in a small minority in the Soviet. A parliamentary republic would be a retrograde step. The police, army and bureaucracy were to be abolished and all landed estates were to be confiscated and all land was to be nationalised and handed over to the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. Out of this came the brilliant slogan: All Power to the Soviets. Other slogans were an immediate peace and land to the peasants. The party was to change its name to the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The October revolution and socialism  17 There was fierce opposition to these theses from without and within the party and it appeared Lenin was planning a coup and some party members thought he had gone off his head. Kamenev went so far as to pen a letter in Pravda stating that comrade Lenin’s general line was unacceptable as it assumed that the bourgeois democratic revolution had been completed. Where did this leave Stalin? He immediately changed course, dropped his moderate Bolshevism and endorsed Lenin’s position. As a result, he was elected to the party Central Committee at the April 1917 conference when Lenin warmly endorsed him as comrade Koba, a Georgian pseudonym. Stalin added some icing to Lenin’s cake. He declared that it was ‘entirely possible that Russia will prove to be the country that paves the way towards socialism…We must reject the obsolete notion that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the ground of the latter’ (Khlevniuk 2015: 47). He was now wholly committed to Lenin’s tactic of seizing power: soldiers to return home; workers to take over the factories; and peasants the land, were heady aspirations which attracted more and more adherents. Meanwhile, the Provisional Governments were most concerned about avoiding civil war but were quite incapable of improving the daily life of the citizens. They eschewed violence which handed the initiative to their opponents. They continued in the war and the failed June offensive put paid to any hope of keeping control of the army. In a revolutionary situation, the Bolsheviks had to demonstrate to workers and soldiers that they were capable of action and were obliged to promote rallies and demonstrations and deploy violence when necessary. In July 1917, workers, soldiers and sailors marched to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government. It is unclear what role the Bolshevik leadership played but they were involved. Was this a dry run for the seizure of power? The demonstration was suppressed by the government and rumours spread that Lenin was a German agent being paid to promote revolution. The Bolshevik printing presses were smashed and some activists, such as Lev Kamenev, were arrested, and Lenin and Zinoviev went underground. Stalin was not deemed important enough to arrest and was staying with the Alliluevs, long standing friends. He married daughter Nadezhda in 1919. Stalin even thought that Lenin could hide there as well but wiser counsels prevailed (the risk of assassination was too high). In August, he accompanied Lenin and Zinoviev to Razliv, on the Gulf of Finland, where they hid in a hayloft owned by a worker. In August, Lenin entered Finland in disguise, feigning dumbness as he did not speak Finnish. With Lenin in Finland, Stalin and other leaders convened the VIth Party Congress, in which Stalin played a prominent role. Luck was on the side of the Bolsheviks. In August, the Prime Minister, Alexander Kerensky, agreed with General Lavr Kornilov, the army commander in chief, to send units to Petrograd to gain control after the July Days. Kerensky began to doubt his loyalty and declared him a rebel. The Bolsheviks sided with Kerensky and he released several of their members from prison. Even more significant, the

18  Analysis Petrograd Soviet set up a military wing, the Military Revolutionary Committee, and weapons were handed out which were never returned. An armed uprising was now feasible. Lenin, still in Finland, forwarded a letter to the party Central Committee, dated 12–14 September, calling for an uprising but was opposed by moderates, such as Kamenev and Zinoviev who even went as far as publishing an article, dated 11 October, opposing an armed uprising. Stalin sided with Lenin. This was a golden opportunity for the Provisional Government to clamp down on the Bolsheviks but their response was feeble. Lenin demanded that Kamenev and Zinoviev be expelled from the party but Stalin demurred. He acted as conciliator and this is one of the few occasions he opposed Lenin but he may have harboured many of the doubts expressed by Kamenev and Zinoviev. But then, another prime actor had entered the fray – Lev Trotsky. Marooned in the United States when the Romanov dynasty collapsed, he managed to return to Russia in May 1917. The most brilliant orator of his day, he was brimming in self-confidence and could move an audience to ecstasy or tears. Stalin was pedestrian in comparison. Before the revolution, Trotsky had clashed with Lenin on numerous occasions. Which faction should he join? He set up his own party but quickly sided with Lenin. His ascendancy put Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev in the shade. The seeds of the conflict which germinated after Lenin’s death were thus sown at this time. Lenin sneaked, disguised, back into Petrograd and the Bolsheviks seized power at the IInd Congress of Soviets, on 25 October 1917, having previously arrested members of the Provisional Government. Kerensky escaped dressed as a nurse. Moderate socialists left the Congress in disgust but this proved a foolish gesture as the Bolsheviks now had a clear majority and could pass decrees on peace and land and appoint a government: the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom). Who played the decisive role in the October Revolution? Lenin was the intellectual driving force and his insistence that the Bolsheviks seize power alone carried the day. Stalin and Trotsky were the main organisers as Lenin was in Finland. Stalin drew important lessons from studying Lenin’s tactics in 1917. First and foremost, was selfbelief and decisiveness which rode rough shod over all opponents. Another lesson was the need to camouflage motives and engage in tactical alliances. In other words, every comrade was disposable. Lenin was head of Sovnarkom and tried to avoid civil war. Industry was to continue functioning but the commanding heights would be nationalised and the hope was that managers would remain. Workers were not to take over factories as they lacked the skills to run them successfully. This phase was called state capitalism but it only lasted until the summer of 1918. Workers engaged in wild cat nationalisation and, once in control, acted as monopolists. Experienced managers fled. In January 1918, the Constituent Assembly, in which the Bolsheviks found themselves in a minority, was disbanded and in March 1918, a peace treaty

The October revolution and socialism  19 was signed with Germany which surrendered vast swathes of the country to Berlin. Civil War broke out and the Bolsheviks had to fashion a Red Army as quickly as possible. Trotsky turned out to be the organising, ruthless genius who eventually masterminded the defeat of the Whites, consisting of landowners, socialists who opposed the Bolsheviks and disgruntled peasants. Bloodletting on a vast scale overtook the land and of the 16 million people who died of wounds, hunger or disease between 1914 and 1922, at least eight million perished during the Civil War (1918–20). Another two million emigrated and the famine of 1921–22, the result of the Civil War, cost another five million lives. In contrast, the First World War ‘only’ cost two million lives (Khlevniuk 2015: 54). The savagery and desperate struggles of the Civil War shaped the Soviet state. Born in rivers of blood and victorious against all odds, the Bolshevik leaders came to believe they were destined to forge a new society. Stalin was a member of the victorious elite and, as before, followed Lenin closely and communed with him almost on a daily basis. A member of the government (commissar for nationalities) and the top party leadership, he was often absent from Moscow on various fronts during the Civil War. As hunger gripped the centre, Lenin sent him to Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad, now Volgograd) to collect grain. The city almost fell to White forces but Stalin’s ruthlessness saved the day and he developed successful tactics based on an unwillingness to accept defeat. The Red Army, set up in February 1918, had to recruit former Tsarist officers, placed under the control of political commissars. Mutual distrust was the result. Stalin linked up with Kliment Voroshilov and together they unleashed a reign of terror on the city. Counterrevolutionary plots were discovered and large numbers of former Tsarist officers, bourgeois and others executed on trumped up charges. Local newspapers carried lurid accounts of the activities of the Cheka, the secret police and long lists of those executed. Red Terror, organised by Stalin, saved the day and the grain was collected and forwarded to Moscow. Stalin then requested Lenin, on 31 August 1918, to permit him to purge Voronezh of ‘counter-revolutionary elements’: he was given the go ahead. The day before, Lenin was shot and wounded by Fanny Kaplan, an SR. The Red Terror became official policy and Stalin used it to demand a free hand to suppress ‘counter-revolution’ and refused to subordinate himself to the local military command. Trotsky, as head of the Red Army, categorically opposed Stalin’s Tsaritsyn tactics and the indiscriminate use of force. On 4 October 1918, he telegrammed Lenin demanding Stalin’s recall and also criticised Voroshilov’s military expertise. Stalin and Voroshilov counter-attacked and accused Trotsky of military incompetence. Stalin even travelled to Moscow to press his point but Lenin supported Trotsky and Stalin and Voroshilov had to leave Tsaritsyn together with many of their appointees. From then on, Stalin grasped every opportunity to denigrate Trotsky. During the spring and summer of 1920, Stalin was on the south western front fighting General Petr Wrangel, the commander of the remnants of

20  Analysis the White Army and the Poles who had invaded Ukraine. The Red Army reached Warsaw and it appeared that if Poland fell, the road to Berlin was open. On 13 July 1920, he informed Lenin that victory over the Polish forces was a foregone conclusion and on 24 July he proposed organising insurrections in Italy, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Despite Stalin’s optimism, the Red Army could not capture Lviv and Wrangel counter-attacked in Crimea. The Poles declared a national emergency and called for recruits to save the motherland. The ‘miracle of the Vistula’ was the result and the Red Army was routed. Soviet Russia had to sign a peace treaty with Poland which included ceding parts of Belarus and Ukraine. Stalin was recalled from the front and never returned to military action. Stalin insisted that the front commanders were guilty for the debacle of the Red Army but Trotsky and Lenin saw it differently. Stalin was dispatched to the Caucasus but soon returned to Moscow. Stalin began building up his clan of supporters (called khvost or tail in Russian) and they included Tsaritsyn veterans and Transcaucasians. The Bolshevik leadership was riven with dissent and Lenin had to manage the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky as best he could.

War communism The Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) was set up, in December 1917, to manage the economy. Worker self-management was Bolshevik policy and workers simply took over factories and requested the party Central Committee to nationalise them. Nikolai Bukharin and Evgeny Preobrazhensky, leading Left communists, wanted the march to socialism to begin immediately On 28 June 1918, wholesale nationalisation of industry was decreed, partly out of fear that enterprises could fall under foreign, mainly German ownership. Factory committees implemented workers’ control. Above them were the trade unions, which by early 1918, were in Bolshevik hands. Aleksandr Shlyapnikov, the first commissar for labour, held the view that the trade unions should run industry but Sovnarkom regarded itself as in control. A major problem for the Bolsheviks was that they did not control the production of a vital product – food. The land decree led to peasants dividing up the landed estates among themselves (they obtained, on average, about a hectare each) whereas Lenin had envisaged model farms being set up on them, run by peasant soviets. The food situation became so desperate that, on 11 June 1918, kombedy or committees of poor peasants were set up to extract grain from kulaks and rich peasants. It did not work and workers’ detachments were formed to extract grain and they were successful because they had guns. Sovnarkom quickly established itself as the key decision making body after the Revolution but by 1921–22, the party Politburo was dominant. This came about because Lenin permitted government commissars to appeal to the Politburo if their wishes were thwarted. Competent staff were in such

The October revolution and socialism  21 short supply that appeals were sent to the centre to send reliable comrades. The person in charge of the party Secretariat responsible for supplying them was Stalin. He gradually built up an extensive file and was referred to as comrade Filing Clerk. War communism was an attempt to leap over capitalism to communism. Money was to be phased out but the net result was a catastrophic drop in production and living standards. To overcome this, Trotsky proposed subjecting labour to military discipline but Lenin shied away from such a draconian policy. Lenin, ever tactical and, aware that power was slipping away from the Bolsheviks, adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP). Krontstadt sailors, regarded as the reddest of the red, revolted during the Xth Party Congress, in March 1921, and the uprising had to be suppressed in rivers of blood. NEP was decreed and factionalism in the party banned. This was the only way to enforce a decision which saw a reversion to capitalism in the countryside.

4 The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28

The adoption of NEP was a humiliating reversal for the Bolsheviks and it underlined the utopianism of the early revolutionary years. The party had espoused various economic policies which had all failed. Abolishing the market, capitalism, had proved impossible. The new policy was the first which did not contain a political word in its title. Lenin, chastened by experience, expected NEP to be a long drawn out affair. Building socialism was going to take much longer than first expected. Added to this was the realisation that world revolution was turning out to be a chimera. Money came back and peasants could market their produce and then pay tax. Small businesses and services flourished. Stalin’s pragmatism allowed him to accept Lenin’s detour to NEP and he was head of two government agencies; the commissariat of nationalities and the workers’ and peasants’ inspectorate, as well as being a member of the Politburo. Neither task was high profile and so he searched for a more influential position. He found it, in 1922, when he was appointed to the new post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); in effect, its manager. This accorded him a top spot in the Politburo. He ceased to be head of the other two institutions and could now concentrate wholly on building up the party apparat. His major opponent was Trotsky who had obtained quite a following in the Central Committee. This alarmed Lenin and, at the Xth Party Congress, in March 1921, intense lobbying ensured that Lenin’s followers outnumbered Trotsky’s and the latter’s supporters were ejected from many top positions. Lenin’s key ally in this struggle was Stalin and his importance to Lenin grew from mid-1921 onwards as the latter began to suffer symptoms of severe cerebral arteriosclerosis, slight paralysis and impaired speech and this forced him to take more and more holidays (Khlevniuk 2015: 65). As the comrade who arranged Politburo meetings and provided materials for the agenda, Stalin gradually shaped the working of the whole apparat. He was strict and robustly defended his own interests but also had a human side and gave subordinates the impression he cared for them and understood their frailties. In this way, he engendered loyalty. Given the fractious relations in the Politburo, Stalin often played the role of conciliator and

The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28  23 came across as a moderate. Trotsky was a pain and he manoeuvred against him at every turn. Top comrades often addressed one another as ty, the second personal singular, but Stalin always used vy, the polite second person plural, when talking to Trotsky. Lenin spent much time at Gorky, a large villa just outside Moscow. When I visited it, in 1957, we were shown Lenin’s death bed and the calendar on the wall, showing 21 January, the day he died. In the garage, was a Rolls Royce and other cars as well as his bath chair. Stalin was his link to the Moscow elite. In May 1922, he asked Stalin for poison so that he could end his life when he so desired. Stalin agreed but told him that the doctors were sure he would recover. This was completely false but was good psychology as it cheered Lenin up. Lenin’s illness upset the balance in the leadership and the influence of Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev grew and that of Trotsky waned. Soviet Russia became the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 30 December 1922. Should the new entity be a unity state or a federation? Stalin proposed that the other republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) and all the other ethnic regions become part of the Russian Federation but with certain rights of autonomy. Lenin countered by suggesting independent republics – they would enjoy the right to secede from the Union. In this way, non-Russians could avoid the domination of Moscow. Lenin had his way and the federal USSR came into being. Lenin’s proposal was not as it seemed. Whereas a federal Union came into being with separate republics, the Communist Party was unified and the leading political entity. It would certainly not tolerate a republic leaving the Union. Lenin and Stalin disagreed on another point – foreign trade. The former favoured a state monopoly but the latter a much looser arrangement. To outflank Stalin, Lenin brought Trotsky in from the cold and asked him to work closely with him. A note was dictated, in December 1922, and sent to Trotsky by Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife, to the effect that Trotsky was to attack Stalin’s plan for the liberalisation of foreign trade at the Congress of Soviets and the XIIth Party Congress, in April 1923. When Stalin discovered this, he berated Krupskaya in intemperate language, claiming she had no right to take down Lenin’s words and forward them to Trotsky. She immediately complained to her husband. This was one of the few occasions when Stalin lost control of himself and reveals the extreme anxiety which fuelled his behaviour. Worse was to follow for Stalin: on 24–25 December 1922, Lenin dictated what became known as his Testament, that ‘Comrade Stalin, having become general secretary, has concentrated unlimited authority in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution’. He added on 4 January 1923: ‘Stalin is too rude and this defect, quite tolerable in our midst and in relations among us communists, becomes intolerable in the post of general secretary. This is why I suggest comrades think of a way of removing Stalin from the post’. Even more

24  Analysis damaging from Stalin’s point of view was Lenin’s assessment of Trotsky: ‘He is probably the most capable man on the CC at present’ (McCauley 1975: 295, 96). Another issue which Lenin seized on to attempt to reassert his authority was the Georgian affair. Infighting in the Transcaucasian party (of which Georgia was a part) was endemic and Sergo Ordzhonikidze, its head, in a fit of anger, struck an opponent. Feliks Dzerzhinsky, head of the Cheka, was sent to investigate and absolved Ordzhonikidze but Lenin suspected a cover up with Dzerzhinsky and Stalin behind it. Why should Lenin make such a fuss about a slap in the face? It appears that he was gathering material to use against Stalin at the XIIth Party Congress, in March 1923. He wrote to Trotsky and asked him to take up the affair as he did not trust Dzerzhinsky and Stalin. He also wrote a note to Stalin saying that his rude behaviour towards his wife was intolerable. Either Stalin apologise or he would sever relations with him. Kamenev was sent to Georgia with a note from Lenin supporting the locals against Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. It appeared that Lenin was manoeuvring to remove Stalin as general secretary but he would not have been cast into outer darkness. Another less important post would have been found for him. Lenin’s attempts to reassert his authority came to nought as another stroke felled him – again Stalin’s luck held – and he did not speak at the Party Congress, the Georgian Affair was passed over and even Trotsky did not bring up the dismissal of the general secretary at the Congress. Why not? Probably to promote unity at a dangerous time. Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin referred to themselves as the troika but Zinoviev, in a letter to Kamenev, in July 1923, complained bitterly about Stalin’s behaviour. There was no troika, only Stalin’s dictatorship. In essence, he was manipulating the Politburo and decisions to suit his ends. Zinoviev also discussed this with Bukharin. What was the solution? Add Trotsky and Zinoviev to the Secretariat. Stalin was furious and wrote about his hurt feelings and, even more important, that they were undermining the unity of the leadership (Khlevniuk 2015: 75). The other oligarchs were telling Stalin that he was not observing the rules of collective leadership and would have to have his wings clipped. Stalin adopted a smart tactic. He found an issue that would deflect attention away from himself: the revolutionary situation in Germany. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin were keen to help the German comrades as they believed that socialism in the USSR could not be built without help from outside. Stalin, on the other hand, was much more cautious. The matter was put on the agenda of a Politburo meeting, on 21 August 1923. Stalin concurred that the impending revolution in Germany would be of vital importance for the Soviet Union. War was imminent but Stalin refused to set a date for the country to become involved, much to the chagrin of Trotsky and Zinoviev. Bukharin and Aleksei Rykov thought the Soviet Union should back off. As a result, no action was taken and this was fortunate as

The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28  25 the German uprising was smashed. Trotsky and Zinoviev joined the Central Committee Organisational Bureau (Orgburo) instead of the Secretariat. It is unclear why they agreed to this as it did not solve the problem of Stalin’s control of the Politburo. An even more significant event took place at a CC plenum, in September 1923, when Stalin and Voroshilov were added to the presidium of the commissariat of defence. Trotsky was the commissar and, furious, stormed out of the session. It was a clever move to reduce his standing because, as head of the Red Army, he could wield enormous power in a crisis. It is unclear how this demarche was organised. The following month, Trotsky counter-attacked and accused the majority of Politburo members of following misguided policies and aggrieved party members rallied to his cause. In the fierce struggle which followed, Zinoviev and other oligarchs, shortly before opposed to Stalin, had to side with him as Trotsky presented the greater danger. Lenin died on 21 January 1924 and on the eve of his funeral, Stalin delivered a remarkable speech: ‘We communists are people of a special mould. We are made of special stuff’ and added that there was nothing higher than the calling of a member of a party, whose founder and leader was comrade Lenin. Stalin then set out their duties in a litany: Departing from us, Comrade Lenin enjoined us to hold high and guard the purity of the great title of member of the party. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we shall fulfil your behest with honour!…Departing from us, Comrade Lenin enjoined us to guard and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we shall spare no effort to fulfil this behest with honour! There were another four of these. Stalin is presenting himself as the pontifex maximus, the only legitimate interpreter of the revolutionary gnosis. It is quasi-religious and reflects his training in an Orthodox seminary and is developed into Marxism-Leninism which can be regarded as a secular religion. Lenin was not buried in a grave but placed in a mausoleum where the faithful could gaze on his embalmed body. The phrase: ‘Lenin is always with us’ was born. The next move was to define Leninism in terms that every comrade could understand. Stalin delivered six lectures at Sverdlov University, in Moscow, and they were published in Pravda as ‘The Foundations of Leninism’. According to him, the essence of Leninism consisted of stressing revolutionary will and political activism and rejecting the views of those Marxists who emphasised the dependence of political change on the development of economic and social forces. Leninism also meant displaying extreme relativism when assessing social forces and values: if they served the revolution, they were good; if not, they were bad. The same relativism was also to be applied to social reforms, culture, democracy, foreign affairs, etc.

26  Analysis The party was declared to be the main motive force of the revolution (Doc. 1, p. 135). The inchoate, spontaneous desires of workers had to be subordinated to the grinding will of a rigidly disciplined and centralised party, otherwise the revolution could not be saved or socialism built. Stalin was not the only one who sought to define Leninism. Zinoviev provided his version and Trotsky missed the boat again (he failed to turn up at the funeral because he was recuperating in the North Caucasus and offered the lame excuse that Stalin had misinformed him) by opposing the whole venture, arguing that Lenin’s utterances could not be dissected in such a way. Another opponent was Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin’s widow, and she claimed she could show how contrary it was to his wishes. Zinoviev and Stalin approached the task of defining Lenin’s legacy differently. Whereas the former placed himself on a par with Lenin, Stalin projected himself as the humble apostle and devoted follower. The question of Stalin’s removal as general secretary came up at the XIIIth Party Congress, in May. Lenin’s strictures about the general secretary were not read out at a full session of the Congress but rather at separate meetings of delegations. Trotsky did not mention the matter and Stalin was re-elected general secretary. Instead of feeling gratitude towards his fellow oligarchs, Stalin, in June 1924, criticised Kamenev and Zinoviev, thus undermining the antiTrotsky front. Stalin, in turn, was attacked and, it appears, found himself in a minority. This led to a letter, dated 19 August 1924, in which he maintained that it was impossible to work closely with his colleagues and, as a result, wished to resign from the Politburo and as general secretary. He requested to be posted to Turukhansky krai or abroad in some minor post (Khlevniuk 2015: 79, 80). What led Stalin to engage in such an extraordinary demarche? He was risking everything, or was he? He was aware that lots of careers depended on him and if he went down so would his tail as well. A group of his supporters in the Central Committee got together and elected a seven member group which took over the running of the CC. It included all the members of the Politburo except Trotsky. The troika was dead and the Seven took over. This indicated that he was moving away from Kamenev and Zinoviev, on the left, and towards Bukharin and Rykov, on the right. The political temperate was raised by Trotsky, in October 1924, when he published Lessons of October, a vitriolic attack on Zinoviev and Kamenev and other ‘old’ (members who had joined the party before 1917) for their criticism of Lenin in 1917. Since Trotsky had only become a Bolshevik, in June 1917, and had himself a long history of disagreements with Lenin, he was stirring up a hornet’s nest. Kamenev riposted by writing Lenin or Trotsky, in which he accused Trotsky of Menshevism. He found it easy to lay bare Trotsky’s record of past altercations with Lenin. A veritable flood of abuse descended on the hapless Trotsky as no communist wished his own Leninist probity to be placed in doubt.

The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28  27 The controversy over Lessons of October gave birth to another dispute, that of socialism in one country. Stalin seized on an article by Bukharin attacking Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution and developed the argument that Trotsky’s beliefs contradicted Lenin’s doctrine of proletarian revolution. Lenin, according to Stalin, had held the view that the Soviet Union alone could build socialism, but that the final victory of socialism in the USSR depended on socialist revolution triumphing abroad. Stalin maintained now that the Soviet Union could become the pace setter and did not have to wait on world events. It was a great psychological shot in the arm for the party and the nation. Collective oligarchic leadership functioned well as long as moderate economic policies were pursued. Recent research has revealed that this consensus only broke down when the government began to adopt more radical economic goals. The seeds of discord were sown deliberately by Stalin (Khlevniuk 2015: 81).

Exit Trotsky and Zinoviev The top three oligarchs were Stalin, Zinoviev and Trotsky and their personal ambitions began to destabilise the Politburo. Stalin and Zinoviev wanted to side-line Trotsky and they removed him from his last great government office, as commissar for military and naval affairs, in January 1925. Zinoviev wanted him expelled from the Politburo but Stalin was against and argued for the preservation of unity and other members of the Politburo and CC agreed. Anyway, Trotsky had already been excluded from the Seven so did not have any significant impact on policy. He was a great polemicist and came up with ‘gravedigger of the revolution’ and ‘Genghis Khan with a telegraph’ (originally coined by Alexander Herzen) to denigrate Stalin. Zinoviev and Trotsky needed a policy which they could use against Stalin and it was the rather obvious one of NEP economic policy. It was strengthening capitalism in the countryside and thereby undermining socialism. At the XIVth Party Congress, in December 1925, Zinoviev launched a broadside against the Politburo majority, the main target being, of course, Stalin, but suffered a humiliating defeat as only his own Leningrad delegation supported him. Stalin had handpicked Congress delegates to ensure his own crushing victory, 559 votes to 65. A delegation, headed by Vyacheslav Molotov, went to Leningrad to clear out Zinoviev and his tail with Sergei Kirov and his tail replacing them. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were now the united or left opposition but they found it more and more difficult to organise legally. The term ‘enemy’ was now applied to them, an innovation as this appellation had previously only applied to the bourgeois, Mensheviks and SRs. After a secret meeting was uncovered, they were accused of forming an ‘illegal organisation’. This contravened the ban on factionalism imposed at the Xth Party Congress. The united or left opposition did not give up and continued their activities underground. Fake documents appeared which were used to label them

28  Analysis members of a ‘counter-revolutionary organisation’, which allegedly was preparing a military coup. In July 1926, they penned the ‘Declaration of the 13’, a condemnation of ‘rightist’ (meaning pro-peasant) economic policy and the elimination of free debate which, to the signatories, foreshadowed the degeneration of the revolution. As a result, Zinoviev was removed from the Politburo. Foreign affairs provided a stick with which to continue beating the leadership. In China, disaster overtook the Communist International (formed in 1919) policy of entering into a tactical alliance with Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang, for, in April 1927, Chiang had turned his forces against the communists, in Shanghai, and massacred them. Then the Soviet Embassy was raided and diplomatic relations broken off. Across the world in London, Arcos, the All-Russian Co-operative Society, was raided by British police, and this too led to diplomatic relations being severed (McCauley 1993: 68). In June, the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, Petr Voikov, was assassinated. Rumours of war began to circulate and Stalin used the death of Voikov to launch a murderous campaign against former monarchists and Whites. Trotsky and others published the ‘Declaration of the 83’, a withering attack on the leadership’s foreign policy mistakes. The tables were turned on Trotsky after he was manoeuvred into stating that he would only defend the country after certain changes were made. On 7 November 1927, they held their own commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution but were quickly dispersed. Reprisals followed and many oppositionists were exiled. The XVth Party Congress, in December 1927, sealed the fate of the united opposition but Trotsky and some others would not concede defeat. Trotsky was dispatched to Almaty, Kazakhstan, and, in 1929, had to move to Turkey, with Stalin making the mistake of allowing him to take his archive with him. An ice pick through his skull, in Mexico, in 1940, silenced him. Almost all the other oppositionists were liquidated in the 1930s. The Seven now contained only one member who aspired to become leader: Stalin. Members argued and fell out and formed factions but this did not bother Stalin. He even offered his resignation as general secretary to fulfil Lenin’s wish in his Testament. Needless to say, it was rejected and cemented his reputation as the first disciple of Lenin and gave the impression that he was modest and placed the party above his own personal ambitions.

The Urals-Siberian method The 1927 harvest was satisfactory but the grain did not flow into the cities as expected with the better off peasants preferring to stock pile. The main reasons were the low government procurement price and the shortage of consumer goods. The simple solution would have been to increase prices but the government needed to invest in industry which, after all, was the bedrock of socialism and would also expand the working class, its support base. What to do? Stalin then took a tremendous risk and decided to

The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28  29 squeeze the grain out of the peasants by force. If the gamble misfired, his career could nosedive. Why did Stalin suddenly move to the left of Trotsky and Zinoviev and, in doing so, end NEP? He was reverting to the methods of War Communism which were certain to provoke strong peasant opposition. It became clear that NEP was not developing socialism but, instead, was creating an urban and peasant bourgeoisie. Stalin’s solution was to declare war on the peasants with grain surpluses. He set out for Siberia, in January 1928, and spent 3 weeks cajoling local aktivs to collect grain by force. They were to ‘press, beat, squeeze’. The Urals-Siberian method, as it became known, was very successful as peasants who had grain were labelled ‘speculators’ and ‘enemies’ and handed over to the courts for sentencing for refusing to handover grain. No payment was offered and seed grain was also confiscated. Some timorous officials pointed out that this left many peasants destitute and incapable of sowing the following spring but Stalin dismissed their concerns with contempt. In January, 52,400 tonnes were collected, or a third of the annual grain quota (Khlevniuk 2015: 103). Stalin returned to Moscow in triumph. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky came together to form a new opposition group, the right opposition. They wanted an end to the use of force, a better deal for the peasants and a less headlong rush into industrialisation. The government began paying more for grain but the private market price was higher, and the winter of 1928–29 saw frequent bread shortages in Moscow and Leningrad. Many former oppositionists were impressed, for Stalin was doing what they had previously advocated. The rapid industrialisers had the wind in their sails and the annual wrangle over grain requisitions strengthened their resolve to deal with the kulaks once and for all. Stalin deliberately exaggerated the danger from the right (Doc. 2, p. 137) and went so far as to claim that Bukharin and his supporters were betraying the working class and the revolution. If anyone refused to fight the right then he too, declared Stalin, was a traitor. In May–July 1928, Stalin organised (the secret police were now under his control) the Shakhty show trial accusing 50 Russian and three foreign engineers of counter-revolutionary sabotage and espionage. The prosecution alleged that sabotage was being used as a weapon in the class struggle. In realty, much machinery broke down due to the incompetence of the work force and management. Five engineers were sentenced to death and 44 others imprisoned. In a later show trial, ‘wrecking’ (if machinery broke down or the plan was not met) became a criminal offence. Stalin introduced the concept that as the Soviet Union progressed towards socialism, so the enemies of socialism would intensify their opposition. Bukharin tried desperately to link up with Kamenev, a gross mistake as he was a defeated oppositionist. He expressed his thoughts in Notes of an Economist, in September 1928, but the Stalinists demolished his arguments. Bukharin was expelled from the CC and Politburo, in November 1929 and Rykov, in December 1930 who also ceased to be Soviet head of government.

30  Analysis He was succeeded by Vyacheslav Molotov, a close ally of Stalin and Tomsky was dismissed as head of the trade unions, in May 1929, and was not reelected to the Politburo at the XVIth Party Congress, in July 1930. Valerian Kuibyshev, a Stalin ally, became head of Gosplan in November 1930. The party machine was Stalin’s power base as most middle and lower rank officials were Stalin nominees. Areas outside his control were incorporated one by one: the youth organisation (Komsomol), the party machine in Moscow, then Leningrad. As the state became stronger, it was the prerogative of the centre to fill more and more posts. A nomenklatura system developed which gave the party the final say in every important appointment. Lacking skill and experience the Stalinist appointees became more and more abrasive and bluster and abuse were their only answer to criticism. The rough and often violent treatment of the peasants during the grain acquisitioning of 1928 and 1929 paved the way for what was to come later. The campaigns against Trotsky, the united opposition and the right opposition allowed full scope for ambitious men to demonstrate their loyalty to the party leadership. Another spur was that if the oppositionists were defeated there would be more plum jobs to fill. Since life was often hard, the privileges and perquisites of office were eagerly sought. This form of behaviour was not restricted to party and state affairs, but extended to other facets of life, including culture. To gain greater control, Stalin set up a private secretariat, called the general department or personal chancellery. Its deliberations were kept secret from the CC Secretariat and headed by the very discreet Aleksandr Poskrebyshev. Stalin was a short man and he preferred short men around him. Poskrebyshev was so small that only his head was visible at table. The chancellery had a secret line of communication and Stalin used this to link up with Molotov. The latter would forward proposals, and the master would agree, amend or veto them and if he agreed, they had the force of law. In this manner, he circumvented Sovnarkom and other institutions. Stalin was often accused of having no ideas of his own, of being a parasite which needed a host on whom to live. At Politburo meetings, in the early 1920s, he often spoke last and then it was to chart a via media between the extremes of his more eloquent colleagues. He was instinctively on the left but could not adopt this position until Trotsky and the united opposition had been rendered impotent. A very skilful politician, he had a superb grasp of tactics, could predict behaviour extremely well and had an unerring eye for personal weaknesses. He listened in to the vertushka, the Kremlin’s internal telephone system, to learn what his colleagues were up to. He was good at blackmail but was capable of fostering friendships which produced devoted followers, such as Molotov, Voroshilov and Mikoyan, and these lasted a lifetime. This did not preclude dropping them from time to time if he judged it opportune. On the other hand, he ruthlessly destroyed his enemies. His attitude to ideas was utilitarian. If they served to make the Soviet Union stronger, they were welcome. His incursions into ideology after

The new economic policy (NEP), 1921–28  31 Lenin’s death served two purposes: to provide a simple, accessible exegesis of Marxism-Leninism, and to outmanoeuvre his opponents. Industrialisation and collectivisation, said Stalin, amounted to the revolution from above. It did not concern him that orthodox Marxism required the working class to be the agent of revolution, and that it therefore should have come from below. He was greatly assisted by the inept tactics of his opponents. Trotsky’s attacks on the party and state bureaucracy merely served to weld these groups together more closely around Stalin in defence of their own positions at a time when alternative employment was hard to find. Trotsky expected to be recognised as leader without building up a tail to support him. He was the comrade of grand ideas and, as a Marxist theorist, without peer. He disliked bureaucracy and was not mindful of his supporters. After a speech, he would leave and avoid contact with his supporters. Pressing the flesh was alien to him but it was second nature to Stalin. Trotsky was off hand, arrogant, distant and sarcastic. At Politburo meetings, he sometimes read French novels, every now and then interjecting a withering comment and had a gift for making enemies. Stalin played on his sense of insecurity and always tried to get under his skin and he would arrive home after altercations with Stalin soaked in perspiration From Stalin’s point of view, he was the stoat and Trotsky, the rabbit. This led to bouts of ill health and he had to go south on several occasions. There was only one area where he got the better of Stalin. He loved riding and posing on horseback as he knew that neither Lenin nor Stalin liked horses. A sort of one uphorsemanship! The gulf between the left and the right was never very wide: it was only Stalin’s skilful manoeuvrings which made it appear so as all Bolsheviks agreed that socialism entailed industrialisation. The argument between left and right was about the pace at which it should go ahead (Nove 1992: 38). The left wanted rapid growth – by which they simply meant growth rates above those being achieved at the time – while the right would have been satisfied with moderate growth. The left was ready to subordinate everything to the achievement of a predetermined target, say 10 per cent annual industrial growth. The money for this would have been found by squeezing the peasants through heavy taxation, and anything which aided the fulfilment of the plan was legitimate. The right, on the other hand, thought the economy should grow organically, with industry and agriculture in tandem. Both factions regarded socialist or co-operative agriculture as the goal, but whereas the left was unwilling to allow the peasant to dictate the speed of economic growth (four out of five persons lived in the countryside) the right thought the peasants would be forced to resist and this would be economically disastrous. Bukharin, the main economic theorist on the right, hoped that the peasants would gradually come to see that co-operative agriculture was in their best interests. In prospering, they would buy more consumer goods, thus stimulating industrial growth. Neither Trotsky nor Evgeny Preobrazhensky, the main economic thinker on the left, envisaged

32  Analysis forced collectivisation. Stalin’s recourse to this was closely linked to his drive for rapid industrialisation and his supporters adopted growth rates which far surpassed the demands of the left. This meant extra labour for industry and guaranteed food supplies for the cities and building sites. Living standards in the countryside were so miserable that peasants abandoned the land in droves and became industrial workers. The state simply requisitioned the food produced on farms to feed them. Some of the blame for the debacle of the right must be pinned on Bukharin. Although an able economist, he never produced a convincing plan to counter the dreams of the super-industrialisers. The weakness of the party required the Politburo to show a united face to the public. The leadership could not afford to be seen to be engaging in infighting and factionalism. Controversies did burst into print, but Stalin’s creeping control of the media dictated how the debate was conducted. The press gradually became a vehicle of the ruling faction, in which defeated opponents were pilloried without any right of reply. By 1929, all non-party journals had been closed down and there were no private publishing houses left. Stalin also enjoyed his fair share of luck: had Yakov Sverdlov not died in 1919 he would have been the natural candidate for the post of general secretary. He had a phenomenal memory and was reputed to carry details of all members in his head! Lenin’s death saved Stalin from certain demotion and the death of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, head of the Cheka, renamed the OGPU (United State Political Administration) in 1922 – and on the left, died in July 1926. Stalin had a say in who succeeded him and he, in turn, became a close ally in fabricating evidence for him. Stalin was not an original thinker as all the ideas about collectivisation and industrialisation were present in the 1920s. The twist he added was coercion and wildly ambitious goals. He was brilliant at identifying weaknesses in his opponents thinking and, giving them a new slant, using them against the left and the right at various times. His intellectual patron was Lenin and he repaired to his works when seeking inspiration or a solution to a problem. His mind was intensely practical and he was skilled at penetrating to the core of a problem. He never asked for advice but asked questions and, in this way, gathered information but also could assess the speaker. His rise to power was not inevitable but he had his fair share of luck which every great leader needs. He never trusted anyone – except Hitler – and also imposed checks and balances on his subordinates. He would tell one lies about another to gauge his interlocuter’s reaction and when speaking to him, one had to look him straight in the eye. Someone who avoided his gaze was regarded as guilty.

5 The thirties

The cult of Stalin’s personality dates from 21 December 1929 when his 50th birthday was celebrated amid mountains of effusive praise. The leader had at last emerged on to the national stage and can be called the vozhdor Boss.

The first FYP The first Five-Year Plan (FYP), or Great Leap Forward, was adopted at a party conference, in April 1929. It had been drafted in two variants: the basic and the optimal. The latter was approved, even though it was wildly optimistic and reflected the prevailing euphoria that the sky was the limit as far as industry was concerned. One of those who strongly opposed centralised state planning was Grigory Sokolnikov, the brilliant commissar for finance who had stabilised the rouble after 1921. He had called for Stalin’s removal as general secretary, in December 1925, but was then appointed vice-chair of Gosplan. He regarded the onset of the first FYP as a mistake, favouring market incentives to increase production. He was then sent to London as ambassador. Stalin had little economic expertise and approached everything politically and was now a maximalist who would not accept any criticism from economists. In December 1929, it was decided that the plan could be achieved in four years and, in the end, it ran from 1 October 1928 to 31 December 1932. Human will overruled mathematical calculations and one planner claimed: ‘There are no fortresses which we Bolsheviks cannot storm’. The Great Depression, which began in 1929 and engulfed advanced industrial states, added fuel to the conviction that the Bolsheviks were on the highway to success. The FYP set the relatively modest target of bringing 20 per cent of the sown area under the control of collectives within five years. Entry to these collective farms or kolkhozes, would be voluntary. At the same time, state farms, or sovkhozes, were to be expanded, especially in areas of virgin land, where they were to be very large.

Collectivisation A socialist (anti-capitalist) economy implied socialist industry and socialist agriculture. Hence capitalism in the rural sector had to be eliminated. This was a political and not an economic decision.

34  Analysis In November 1929, Stalin stated that collectivisation would obtain everywhere and be immediate and the following month, he declared war on the kulaks. They were to be obliterated as a class. A war against kulaks saw the seizure of their property to provide the necessary implements for the kolkhozes. The peasants would provide an agrarian labour force reminiscent of the pre-emancipation era. The output would be taken by the state and the country would gradually move to a moneyless economy with the peasants being rewarded with goods and the same would apply to workers. Party commissions ordered officials to force peasants into kolkhozes but kulaks who were willing to join would be accepted, with only those who resisted being arrested and exiled. Peasants would not have all their property confiscated but could retain private plots. Stalin disagreed and favoured turning villages into kolkhozes but kulaks were to be excluded. All peasant property was to be confiscated and market relations eliminated. Collectivisation was to be speeded up and, in the most important regions, completed by the autumn of 1930. All kulaks were to be arrested, deported to Siberia and other remote regions or shot. There were to be no private plots for kolkhozniks. Stalin appeared to be aiming at forming communes, in which there was no private property or possessions. Mao Zedong forced Chinese peasants into communes in the 1960s – a move which resulted in widespread famine. A call by the party for 25,000 worker volunteers to help peasants enter kolkhozes was launched (my supervisor at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, in Moscow, in 1969, was one of them and related stirring tales of his involvement) and they achieved stunning success. On 1 October 1929, 7.5 per cent of peasant households were in kolkhozes, but this had risen to 52.7 per cent on 20 February 1930. Those who resisted were beaten and often the women raped. What was to become of the kulaks? Stalin was brutally frank: ‘It is ridiculous and foolish to talk at length about dekulakisation… When the head is off, one does not grieve for the hair. There is another question no less ridiculous: whether kulaks should be allowed to join the collective farms? Of course, not, for they are the sworn enemies of the collective farm movement’. The kulaks were divided into three classes: the first consisted of about 63,000 ‘counter-revolutionary’ families who were either to be executed or exiled and have their property confiscated. Group two was made up of 150,000 households labelled ‘exploiters’ or ‘active opponents’ of collectivisation. These were to be deported to remote regions in the east and north, but permitted to retain some possessions. Another group was composed of between 396,000 and 852,000 households who were to be permitted to remain in their home region but on land outside the collectives. (This meant, in effect, land which was not arable.) If one assumes a modest five persons per household, the first and second groups amounted to over one million persons. No one in the Politburo cared whether they survived or not. Others abandoned their home villages, desperately trying to beg enough to survive. Kulak children were often left to die, since their deported fathers belonged to the ‘wrong class’. Peasants did not take the erosion of their way of life lying down. In 1926–27, only 1,300 disturbances, involving 244,000, were recorded but in

The thirties 35 January–February 1930, there were 1,500 disturbances involving 324,000. Reports reached Moscow of peasants demanding the dissolution of the kolkhozes, the reopening of churches and the beating of party officials in various parts of the country. The situation escalated and forced Stalin to retreat. The result was the famous article Dizzy with Success, which appeared in Pravda and other papers on 2 March 1930 (Doc. 3, p. 137) Pravda became a best seller in the countryside and desperate officials attempted to restrict circulation. The policy of forcing peasants into kolkhozes was an aberration and due to the over-enthusiasm of local officials. The spread of communes amounted to no less than an ‘anti-Leninist inclination’. The Central Committee issued a decree returning some confiscated property (livestock, etc.) to peasants. Collective farms were dismantled, their property returned to former owners and peasants returned to their former plots. Only 23 per cent of peasants were left in kolkhozes by 1 June 1930. In total, about 3.4 million peasants took part in disturbances in 1930. Armed rebellions in border regions were put down by cannon and machine guns. The regime responded by arresting ringleaders, kulak and educated rural dwellers and handing down harsh sentences. Revolts petered out as peasants had to devote their energies to spring sowing (Khlevniuk 2015: 113–15). Once the harvest began to appear, collectivisation was again enforced as Dizzy with Success was merely a tactic to ensure that the spring sowing went ahead. The beaten peasants took to slaughtering their livestock and breaking their implements rather than see them collectivised. Mikhail Sholokhov, the Nobel Prize winning novelist, catches the atmosphere in Virgin Soil Upturned: ‘Slaughter! You won’t get meat in the kolkhoz’, crept the insidious rumours. And they slaughtered. They ate until they could eat no more. Young and old suffered from indigestion. At dinner time, tables groaned under boiled or roasted meat. Everyone had a greasy mouth, everyone hiccoughed as if at a wake. Everyone blinked like an owl, as if inebriated from eating. (McCauley 1993: 162) Livestock numbers, in 1932, were less than half those of 1928. To the government, the tractor was the symbol of mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture and the trump card of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. It penetrated the countryside more rapidly than expected. Tractors were grouped in Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) and serviced surrounding farms. Since so many draught animals had been slaughtered, scarce resources had to be diverted to the production of even more tractors. The shortage of cattle and sheep meant less leather and wool for consumer goods. Kotkin (2017: 52) sees Stalin’s thinking as being based on MarxistLeninist logic: criticism of collectivisation ipso facto meant support for capitalism; support for capitalism meant colluding with the imperialists; furthering

36  Analysis the cause of imperialism meant effectively plotting to overthrow the Soviet regime; plotting an overthrow perforce entailed assassinating Stalin, since he embodied the building of socialism. Timid voices were raised about the breakneck speed of industrialisation. Could the pace not be slowed down a little? Stalin firmly rejected such thinking (Doc. 5, p. 139). He even wanted the economy to grow more rapidly because imperialist vultures were circling overhead and the Soviet Union had to become strong enough to keep them at bay. ‘Specialist baiting’ was a popular sport during the early years of the FYP. After the Shakhty trial, in 1928, came the ‘industrial party’ trial of November–December 1930, when industrial experts confessed to wrecking and other heinous crimes. The Shakhty trial was followed by the arrest of thousands of ‘bourgeois’ or non-party engineers and, by 1931, half of the engineers and technical workers in the Donbass, a key industrial region, had been arrested. It may seem paradoxical that, at a time when their skills, were desperately needed, ‘bourgeois’ and foreign engineers were being held behind bars. However, there was a rationale behind the arrests: the leadership was in its utopian phase and would not tolerate any resistance to central directives. The ‘bourgeois’ engineer could judge the orders were not feasible and said so. Moscow wanted engineers who were willing to attempt the impossible. A declared opponent of the campaign against ‘bourgeois’ engineers was Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who became head of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), at the end of 1930 and, therefore, the de facto leader of the drive for industrialisation. He appears to have influenced Stalin’s decision to call a halt to the campaign. On 23 June 1931, the general secretary declared that the policy of considering every specialist an ‘undetected criminal and wrecker’ should be dropped. Show trials of engineers did not completely cease as the case against the Metro-Vickers engineers, in 1933, demonstrated. The change of heart towards the experts – reality was imposing itself on the utopian goals – was accompanied by a dramatic change in the fortunes of labour. The years, 1928–31, saw workers exercise an influence over production never again to be equalled. Shock workers and shock brigades showed the workers the way, and there was a great deal of worker initiative as hierarchy was played down. This happened at a time when planners could not accurately plot the way ahead. Some members of the leadership, working on the assumption that socialism meant a moneyless economy, believed that goods exchange would replace money as NEP was phased out. Indeed, many of them, in 1930, thought that this stage was fast approaching and it was also assumed that society could be transformed very rapidly and that workers could be motivated by enthusiasm, so that an end could be made to payment by result. But, in July 1931, Stalin changed tack and attacked the prevalent egalitarianism and proposed wage differentials which reflected skill and responsibility. The ideas of the American time and motion expert,

The thirties 37 F.W Taylor, found favour and engineers were given the task of setting scientifically based norms. Authority returned to specialists and engineers. The first FYP was a period of genuine enthusiasm, and prodigious achievements were recorded in production. The ‘impossible’ targets galvanised people into action, and more was achieved that would have been the case had orthodox advice been followed. New cities, such as Magnitogorsk in the Urals, rose from the ground. According to official statistics, the FYP plan in industry was fulfilled (Doc. 7, no. 5 p. 142.). With the plan for producers’ goods – the production of the means of production (heavy industry) – being overfulfilled (Doc. 7, no. 9, p. 142.). Consumption goods (light industry), on the other hand, fell short of the target (Doc. 7, no. 10, p. 142.). These figures cannot be taken at face value and various Western economists have recomputed the results and their estimates range from 59.7 to 69.9 per cent fulfilment (Doc. 7, nos. 6–8, p. 142.). Whatever the figures, a great engineering industry was in the making and the rise in the output of machinery, machine tools, turbines and tractors was very impressive. Ukraine, the Volga, the Urals and the Kuzbass (south west Siberia) saw most expansion. Engineering enterprises in the Leningrad and Moscow regions were modernised and expanded. Industry also penetrated the less developed republics, such as Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Power for expanding Ukrainian industry flowed from the huge Dnieper dam which was completed during these years. The plan for railway expansion was less than half achieved but canals increased rapidly, often using forced labour, as in the case of the Volga-White Sea canal. The latter proved of little value. Not surprisingly, agricultural performance was abysmal (Doc. 7, no. 11, p. 142.). The rush from the countryside led to the over-fulfilment of the labour plan (Doc. 7, no. 16, p. 142.), and unemployment in the cities had disappeared by 1932. Industry took on many more workers than planned (Doc. 7, no. 17, p. 142.), all this meant that money wages were far in excess of the plan (Doc. 7, no. 18, p. 142). Thus, there was even more money chasing the few consumer goods on offer. Living standards were miserably low, and if they were low in the towns, they were even worse in the countryside. Despite the over-fulfilment of the labour plan, industrial production was officially only a fraction over the plan (Doc. 7, no. 5, p. 142.). This meant that labour productivity was very low, and this came as a great disappointment to the planners. Determined efforts were made to improve labour discipline during the FYP. The first legislation imposing prison sentences on those who violated labour discipline was passed in January 1931. Work books were introduced for all industrial and transport workers, in February 1931, and the death sentence could be imposed for the theft of state or collective farm property, as from August 1932. Missing a day’s work could mean instant dismissal after November 1932, and the internal passport (not issued to kolkhozniks) was introduced on 27 December 1932 to restrict movement and increase control. Such draconian measures bear eloquent testimony to the difficulty of transforming the peasant into a worker.

38  Analysis The industrial achievements of Stalin’s Great Leap Forward were mainly the result of utilising what was available more fully, including the extra plant which came on stream, as a consequence of the pre-1928 investment. Plants started during the first FYP were completed, in the main, in 1934–36, and the investment plan was only half fulfilled (Doc. 7, no. 26, p. 143.). Vast sums were invested in construction projects which were never completed and equipment produced for which there was no use and many goods were so shoddy as to be of little value. This was inevitable given the haste and pressure to meet plan targets. In a market economy, the consumer determines what is produced but in the Soviet economy, the planners decided. Production was the key, not end use. The Great Depression, which began in 1929, was an enormous stroke of luck for Stalin. Until then it had been very difficult for the Soviet Union to get loans abroad but now industry in the West desperately needed orders. Over a thousand state of the art factories were built by foreign companies during the first FYP. Foremost among these were US companies. Henry Ford built the largest tractor plant in the world in Stalingrad and again in Chelyabinsk, in the Urals. There were more rolled steel mills in the USSR than in the rest of Europe combined. Stalin gleaned from Ford that the secret was huge investment and superior organisation. It was one thing to build the factories but another to run them. For instance, tractor output only reached 48,900 in 1932, instead of the planned 170,000. Stalin’s goal of eliminating capitalism in industry was not successful. During the first FYP, enterprises set up exchanges to barter inputs which they could not obtain from the state and hoarded as much as possible to trade later. Providing they fulfilled the plan, the vozhd permitted them to sell privately goods to the value of 5 per cent of the plan. Thus the shadow economy – the capitalist economy – was born. There was also the black or illegal economy which met demand for products which state stores did not provide.

Famine The countryside could not feed the towns adequately – a situation which continued to the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 – so rations were meagre and often people went hungry. The huge losses of horses, cattle and pigs took years to recoup. The kolkhozes were a poor substitute for the kulak farms which had produced so much of the agricultural surplus before 1928. Ambitious girls left and the boys followed, leaving the land to the less motivated and older people. Kolkhozniks knew that their output would be taken by the state so productivity was low. The only people who ate well were the bosses. Stalin was aware that the peasants resented being herded into kolkhozes and accused them of declaring war on the Soviet government. What incentive could the peasant be given to increase production? Replace confiscation

The thirties 39 with set amounts to be delivered with the locals keeping any surplus. Stalin would not hear of it as he wanted to squeeze as much as possible out of the countryside. Grain had to be exported to service and run down foreign debt. Some limited purchases of grain abroad were made, in early 1932, but Stalin closed this channel down as well. Another problem facing the Soviet Union was that grain prices on the world market plummeted during the Great Depression, so more exports were needed to compensate but the country had repaid its foreign loans by the mid-1930s. The 1932 harvest was even lower than the previous year. Groups of officials and city activists seized not only grain but vegetables, meat and dairy products, Traditionally, peasants buried grain and food in holes in the ground to keep them going during winter. They were beaten and tortured to reveal where these holes were and, when discovered, everything was confiscated, leaving the family to starve. Desperate peasants tried to move to cities but were forced to return to their dying villages. By mid1933, there were 2.5 million in labour camps, prisons and exile. Ironically, the survival rate there was often higher than in the countryside. The famine reached its apogee, in late 1932 and early 1933, and affected about 70 million people in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan and some Russian Federation regions. The remaining 160 million existed on minimal rations. Typhus, inevitably, spread as did other infectious diseases and some were so weakened they succumbed to an early death. Ukraine and North Caucasus produced about half of the country’s grain but, in 1932, they delivered over 40 per cent less than the previous year. Stalin was furious and told Mikhail Sholokhov, in May 1933, that the ‘esteemed grain growers are in fact waging a quiet war against Soviet power. A war by starvation’. The famine could now be blamed on peasant enemies and therefore war could be waged against them. Sholokhov sent another letter to Stalin, in April 1933, and described how grain was coerced out of peasants: mass beatings; mock executions; hot irons applied to their flesh; hanging to induce partial asphyxiation during interrogations and other methods (Khlevniuk 2015: 116–22). The number of deaths from starvation and disease has been put at 7.2– 8.1 million (Ellman 1991: 379) of which 3.9 million occurred in Ukraine. Kotkin (2017: 127) estimates that between five and seven million died from hunger and another 10 million almost died. There were also subsequently premature deaths due to the famine. Was the outside world aware of the famine? Malcolm Muggeridge, the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Moscow, sent searing accounts to his editor but they were not published or heavily edited. The Daily Worker correspondent was aware of what was happening and passed information to other journalists but wrote articles which followed the official Soviet line. Ukrainians now refer to the famine as Holodomor (literally, to kill by starvation) and Ukraine now treats it as genocide perpetrated by the Soviet government.

40  Analysis The leading specialist on Soviet peasants, Sheila Fitzpatrick (1994), concludes that Stalin’s main objective was to seize as much of the harvest as possible irrespective of the cost in human life. Anne Applebaum (2017) regards Stalin’s primary aim to be the crushing of opposition to collectivisation in Ukraine by depriving the republic of food. Genocide is defined as the deliberate annihilation of a whole nation or ethnic group. The famine was halted in mid-1933 and only part of the Ukrainian nation succumbed. Hence, technically, the Holodomor was not genocide. Kotkin points out that the greatest losses per head of the population occurred in Kazakhstan and refers to it as a Soviet famine. He does not regard the famine as intentional but ‘it resulted from Stalin’s policies of forced collectivisation-dekulakisation, as well as the pitiless and incompetent management of the sowing and procurement campaigns, all of which put the country on a knife-edge, highly susceptible to drought and sudden torrential rains’ (Kotkin 2017: 128). Luck was again on Stalin’s side as the 1933 harvest was a record. Giles Udy (2017), in a penetrating study, carefully analyses the reaction of the British left to Stalin’s policies during the 1930s. George Bernard Shaw, the celebrated Irish playwright, was a leading member of the Fabian Society, along with Beatrice and Sidney Webb and Virginia Woolf, to name only a few. Fabians were socialists but not Marxists. He visited the Soviet Union, in 1931, and afterwards. Asked once if he thought revolution attracted degenerate types, he commented: ‘On the contrary it has attracted superior types all the world over to an extraordinary extent wherever it has been understood. But the top of the ladder is a very trying place for old revolutionists who have had no administrative experience, who have had no financial experience, who have been trained as penniless hunted fugitives with Karl Marx on the brain and not as statesmen. They often have to be pushed off the ladder with a rope around their necks’, On another occasion, he wrote: ‘What we are confronted with now is a growing perception that if we desire a certain type of civilisation and culture we must exterminate the sort of people who do not fit into it’. For him, mass executions were justified as merely ‘weeding the garden’. In 1933, he commented: ‘The power to exterminate is too grave to be left in any hands but those of a thoroughly Communist government’. Shaw had once commented that Russia was an ‘autocracy tempered by assassination’. Thousands of politicians and officials had been assassinated before 1914, so it appeared this was the Russian way of forcing change. The Webbs deliberately distorted information about the purges and saw it as an understandable cost to pay for a ‘new civilisation’. They penned Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?, in 1935, a glowing portrait of Stalin, whitewashing the deportation and murder of kulaks and denied the reality of the mass famine in Ukraine and elsewhere. Pro-Soviet sympathisers in Westminster and the Foreign Office deliberately obfuscated the abundant evidence of repression and murder. Ramsey MacDonald, the British Labour Prime Minister, was a fan and, in 1930, wrote a lengthy rebuke to

The thirties 41 the Archbishop of Canterbury for organising a day of prayer when a million Christians interceded for persecuted Soviet believers. This horrified, not only MacDonald but the whole Labour government. G.D.H. Cole, a leading economist and Fabian, and Stafford Cripps, who later became British ambassador in Moscow and a member of the Labour government after 1945, advocated the replacement of parliament with the dictatorship of the proletariat. In 1942, Cole wrote: ‘Much better to be ruled by Stalin than a pack of half-hearted and half-witted Social Democrats’. He was aware of Soviet repression but thought it a price worth paying. The part of the left, in the 1930s, who saw Stalin in a negative light, were the Trotskyites but there were others, such as George Orwell, who commented: ‘All people who are morally sound have known that since about 1931 that the Russian regime stinks’. The post-war Labour government of Clement Attlee (pro-communist in the 1930s but became anti-communist during the war when he was deputy Prime Minister to Winston Churchill) and Ernest Bevin was under no such illusions about Stalin and Bevin, a former trade unionist who had spent years fighting communists, was one of the architects of NATO. The US was no different. Writers and dramatists such as Lillian Hellman, Dashiell Hammett and Dorothy Parker were either members of the Communist Party of the USA or pro-Soviet and brushed aside criticisms of the Great Terror. The second FYP (1933–37) got off to an inauspicious start and the XIVth Party Congress, in January–February 1934, redrafted it. The new version revealed that Soviet planning had become more realistic, for this time the targets set did not belong to cloud cuckoo land. Agriculture was in a parlous state, in 1933, but improved rapidly afterwards. Although there were about 9 million peasants outside the collective farm sector, in 1934, by 1937 they had practically all been collectivised. High taxes and compulsory deliveries were levied on the peasant, and when he could not meet all his obligations all his goods and belongings were sold to meet the deficit. One can assume they were sold at knock down prices to those in the know. Livestock numbers recovered rapidly after the depredations of the early 1930s. This was due, in large part, to the state’s willingness to permit farmers to own their own animals – within strict limits, of course and each household was allowed a private plot. After state procurements, surpluses could be sold in towns at local kolkhoz markets at regulated prices. The producers themselves had to do the trading, no middlemen were permitted to reappear. The militia sometimes barred access until they were paid a tax in kind – all illegal, of course. In February 1933, Stalin promised he would help every peasant household to acquire a cow over the next two years. The private plots were very productive and, in 1937, produced 38 per cent of national vegetables and 68 per cent of the meat and dairy products. Another famine hit the Soviet Union, in 1936, and it was the private plot that saved the country from starvation. The success of the private plot revealed that

42  Analysis the frantic rush into collectivisation, with the peasant forbidden to cultivate food privately, had been an horrendous mistake. A Congress was convened, in 1935, to draft a model charter for the kolkhozes, which was to stay on the statute book until the early 1970s. The kolkhoz was defined as a voluntary cooperative, working land provided by the state rent free in perpetuity. The chair was to be elected by the members (in reality, by the local party secretary) and the kolkhoz enjoyed little autonomy as its goals were set by the government and party. The mechanical work was performed, under contract, by machine tractor stations and paid for in kind. The date for the spring ploughing, sowing and harvesting was dictated by the party secretary. Unlike state farms or sovkhozes, kolkhozes did not offer their members a guaranteed wage before 1966. Money was distributed at the end of year if the kolkhoz made a profit, otherwise there was nothing to disburse. This did little to motivate farm labour and they came to rely on their private plot as their staff of life with Anastasia, the cow, being especially valuable. She produced milk and butter and meat and a hide when the time came to slaughter her. Some Russians told me she saved their lives.

The second FYP The second FYP (1933–37) was overfulfilled by 3 per cent (Doc. 7, no. 5 p. 142.). and the engineering industry again expanded rapidly. The output of steel almost trebled, the main reason for this being the great plants, begun under the first FYP, came on stream. Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk and Zaporozhe, for example, became great industrial centres. Karaganda (Kazakhstan), the Kuzbass and the Urals saw a great expansion of coal mining: the generation of electricity grew but oil production was disappointing as Baku and the Urals-Volga fields failed to cope with their technical problems. Industry was spread around the country, even in the non-Slav republics where the return on investment was lower than in the ‘older’ industrial areas. The Bolsheviks followed a Marxist pattern, believing that the whole country had to be industrialised. The by-product of this policy was that inputs often came from far away and this helped to make the country inter-dependent. The moneyless economy was consigned to the rubbish bin as the need to reduce inflation and strengthen the rouble became important. Personal interest and material incentives were now the driving force of progress. The pious hopes about according consumer goods greater emphasis bore no fruit (Doc. 7, no. 10, p. 142.). One of the reasons for this was the increasing share of production devoted to defence – officially only 3.4 per cent of total budget expenditure, in 1933, but 16.5 per cent in 1937. (Real defence expenditure, in 1933, appears to have been about 12 per cent.) Agriculture flopped again (Doc. 7, no. 11, p. 142.). Indeed no FYP ever achieved its targets in the Soviet Union. One target could not be fulfilled: by 1933 about two million had been sentenced to be sent into exile and camps but the system could not cope with

The thirties 43 such numbers and only about 270,000 ended up in exile. More and more camps in remote areas had to be found with the expected surge in numbers in the future. The number of workers in the economy, and especially in industry, fell below the level projected by the FYP (Doc. 7, no. 11, p. 142.), but as output had exceeded the targets set, labour productivity was rising faster than expected. One of the contributory factors to this was the Stakhanovite movement, named after Aleksei Stakhanov, who on 30, 31 August 1935, had shown what could be done by mining 102 tonnes of coal in five hours and 45 minutes (the equivalent of 14 norms). Needless to say, Stakhanov did not achieve the feat on his own, he had all the help he needed and all the machinery was in working order. The next day, 119 tonnes were recorded. The world of make believe ended with a superman mining 536 tonnes! Stalin, everyone claimed, was the inspiration behind these feats. The heroes of labour were showered with material rewards. This bred resentment and many comrades would cheerfully have pushed the Stakhanovites down a mine shaft had they thought they could get away with it! After the fall of communism, it was revealed that all the records were make believe but they had served a purpose: to force up labour norms. What became of Stakhanov? He joined the party, was awarded the Order of Lenin, acquired a large apartment but took to drinking, went berserk and smashed mirrors in the Metropole restaurant, in Moscow, and wed a 14-year-old girl. He lost his Order of Lenin and party card. Real wages increased greatly during the second FYP but were still lower, in 1937, than in 1928 and, in that year, were little better than in 1913. In 1935, Stalin came up with a new slogan: ‘Life has improved, life has become more joyful’. He added that those who disputed this were the enemies of Soviet power. Rationing was gradually phased out in 1935, but even with a ration card (only issued to workers and state employees or about 20 per cent of the population – the other 80 per cent had to fend for themselves) there was no guarantee that the desired goods would be available. Free market prices were very high, reflecting especially the shortage of bread, a staple food. There was a special provisioning system for all those deemed of importance for the building of socialism. They obtained special norms (managers were awarded 9 kg of meat and workers 6 kg monthly, in 1932) and they paid lower prices for consumer goods. The Politburo, in 1931, invited 10,000 foreign specialists to work in the Soviet Union and they lived very well. One of their perks was that they could import goods duty free whereas a Soviet citizen had to pay prohibitive duties (3 weeks’ wages to bring in a bar of soap!). Academics lobbied to be afforded privileges. A complicated system came into being in which benefits multiplied as the academic climbed the ladder. The quickest route to success was to obtain a party card. Professors received housing, transport, food, travel and so on and they were often better off than in the West. They did not retire at 65 years of age and kept

44  Analysis their salaries and perks until they died. Stalin, when it came to sex, was a puritan. He did not trust a comrade who divorced his wife. All this changed under Khrushchev when a professor could change his wife annually for a new model. After all, he could afford it! The OGPU was abolished, in February 1934, and replaced by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Stalin talked about socialist legality and some sentences were annulled on the basis that OGPU had fabricated evidence. In September 1934, a Politburo commission was set up to investigate cases brought against ‘wreckers’ and ‘spies’. OGPU was to be purged and those guilty of certain techniques punished. Then came the murder of Sergei Kirov, in Leningrad, on 1 December 1934, and the commission stopped its work. There were still hundreds of thousands convicted, in 1934. In September, some employees at a metallurgical factory, in Siberia, were executed for spying for Japan. Stalin made clear that anyone spying for Japan would be shot (Khlevniuk 2015: 125, 126).

The murder of Kirov During the XVIIth Party Congress some prominent party officials discussed the removal of Stalin as general secretary and replacing him with Sergei Kirov, the Leningrad party leader but Kirov informed Stalin of this putative move. During the elections to the new Central Committee at the end of the Congress, several delegates voted against Stalin but all their names became known to him. Newspapers reported, on 2 December, that Kirov had been assassinated by a ‘treacherous hand of an enemy of the working class’. The killer, Leonid Nikolaev, was a loner, but a case was fabricated that he was a member of a group of former oppositionists and followers of Zinoviev. There was no evidence that Nikolaev was a member of an opposition group. Stalin used this case to charge former oppositionists with complicity in the murder of Kirov and many were shot or imprisoned. Zinoviev and Kamenev were also implicated and convicted and thousands of former members of the nobility, clergy, former Tsarist officers and others were exiled or sent to the gulag.

Stalinism emerges Stalinism flowered in a responsive soil. Without his army of willing cohorts, Stalin could not have propelled the country into breakneck industrialisation and collectivisation, which slowed slightly after the initial enthusiasm had ebbed. A corps of state and party officials came into being who were welded to the Stalin chariot. The bloodletting and brutality of collectivisation found many wanting and they passed from the scene and were replaced by those who were not so squeamish. Battle-scarred, ruthless and dedicated, the new men really were people of a special mould. Since their goal was socialism, any measure which advanced the USSR towards that glorious culmination

The thirties 45 was justified. If mistakes were made they paled into insignificance when placed alongside the triumphs of the period. Since capitalism had been left behind, what the Soviet Union was constructing had to be socialism. The typical Stalinist official was of peasant origin. He was patriarchal by instinct and eagerly followed the party leadership and quickly accepted the view that all opinions which differed from those of the leadership were treasonous. The XVIIth Party Congress can be seen as a watershed. Eighty per cent of the delegates had joined the party before 1920 and hence belonged to the Leninist elite. At the Congress, Stalin secured the abolition of Rabkrin, the workers’ and peasants’ inspectorate, which was responsible for policing government officials, and the Central Control Commission, which did the same for party officials. Stalin liked military metaphors. He referred to the party as the General Staff of the proletariat [Doc. 1, p.]. At a CC plenum, in March 1937, he divided the party into leaders and the led. There were 3,000–4,000 senior leaders; who were the generals; the 30,000–40,000 middle-rank officials made up the officer corps, and the 100,000–150,000 lower level officials were the NCOs. This neatly illustrates Stalin’s hierarchical way of thinking. No one had the right to an opinion unless his seniority entitled him to one. The way Stalin projected himself is instructive. During the 1920s, he claimed to be the only true apostle of Lenin; others, such as Trotsky and Zinoviev, were anti-Leninists. Gradually, Stalin became the equal of Lenin, and the phrase ‘Lenin-Stalin’ made its appearance. The slogan ‘Stalin is the Lenin of today’ marked the next stage, in which Stalin is ahead of Lenin and was projected as the father of the nation and the epithet ‘Stalinist’ guaranteed success. He could work miracles and his intervention produced exaltation and joy (Doc. 7, no. 14, p. 143.). So successful was the projection of this image (Doc 15 p. 152.). That many people accepted it and believed that all the injustices of the 1930s were the fault of incompetent officials. Some went to their deaths convinced that, if only comrade Stalin had known what was really going on, he would have stepped in to correct the injustice. Stalin’s rise meant that that the role of the party changed. It was no longer true that the party knew best as Stalin’s thoughts became the fount of true wisdom. Hence Stalinism meant modernisation; it meant technology; it meant a bright future; it meant victory. The tide of Russian nationalism also rose as national self-adulation increased. This spelled doom for the nonRussian elites. How did Stain’s state function? The twin towers of power were the party and the government. The party acted as a parallel government and checked the implementation of plans. The flow of information was restricted and the more important the official, the more he was told. The party watched the government but the political police watched both. Key decision making was centred in Stalin’s chancellery, all the information was pieced together there, the jigsaw was complete. Stalin was the only person in the entire country who saw the complete picture and he skilfully used the information available

46  Analysis to him but his power was not based on control of the party or government or the secret police but on manipulating all three. It was vital to Stalin that he maintain several independent sources of information; in that way, he hoped to be able to judge which one was misleading. After 1936, he successfully prevented anybody, be it the Politburo or the CC of the party or the government, meeting as a group and taking counsel together, independent of him. He preferred to consult individuals or small groups. This explains why there were only two Party Congresses between 1934 and 1952 – they were frankly unnecessary. Stalin disliked mass meetings and was conscious of his Georgian accent, restricting the number of people who had direct access to him and, in so doing, created a mystique around his person. The destruction of the old ruling strata, the more able farmers, the kulaks, and the old intelligentsia left a void. It was inevitable that the authoritarian political culture, which was just being challenged by civil society (autonomous institutions outside the control of the government) and the new elites (industrialists, lawyers and so on) before 1914 should reassert itself. Lenin changed his view of the state, moving from a weak to a strong state. This fitted the pre-1917 Russian tradition. Autonomous labour organisations, such as factory committees and trade unions were emasculated because they wished to share in decision making. No independent institutions were permitted to emerge. Hence all the new institutions were instrumental, to serve Bolshevik, later Stalinist goals. The 1918 Soviet constitution afforded soviets legislative and executive functions but this was at variance with the newly emerging Soviet state. The failure of world revolution isolated Soviet Russia and it had to survive on its own. Outside ideas, ‘bourgeois’ ideas, were, by definition, counter-revolutionary. The violent internecine strife, which illuminated the 1920s, encouraged authoritarianism. Utopianism was given its head during War Communism and the first FYP and led to untold misery for millions of peasants and others. Bukharin, perceptively, warned of the ‘Leviathan state’ which would emerge from the ‘military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry’. The Bolsheviks were determined to eliminate the peasant mir or community. The muzhik had to depart the stage. The type of economic planning adopted shaped the regime. Bolshevik rejection of the market was total and was, in part, due to the fact that the market was only just emerging in Russia, in 1914. Communist planners declined to base their plans on value and price and concentrated on material balances instead. The former could have afforded enterprises the opportunity, in their own interests, to achieve the plan more effectively by cutting costs. Costs, in fact, were ignored in the early years of the first FYP. Material balances meant that an increasing number of quantitative goals, which could not encapsulate quality and innovation, had to be set, thereby requiring more and more bureaucrats. Stalin, significantly, complained of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information about enterprise potential during the 1930s. Planners were reduced to increasing annual targets by a certain amount (the ratchet principle). Stalin was forced to legalise the market, but

The thirties 47 only the kolkhoz market. A shadow economy, based on barter, emerged to make up for the lacunae which the planners could not or would not cope with. This produced a system in which it was impossible to meet the plan by legal means: it was just too inefficient. Tolkachi, or fixers, were sent out by enterprises to secure vital inputs and, in return, provide inputs the other enterprise needed. Everyone stockpiled inputs and hid these reserves from the planners. Since every company director broke the law, he could be accused of criminal activity and arrested.

The Great Terror Comrade Stalin, should power be based on loyalty or fear? ‘Fear’, replied Stalin, ‘because loyalty can change’. Why did Stalin launch the Great Terror? This remains unknown but what is known is the methodical way it was implemented. Stalinism also meant a permanent state of emergency. There were enemies both inside and outside the country. Insecurity was everyone’s constant companion and Stalin was no exception. Genrikh Yagoda, People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, had acquitted himself well in fabricating evidence against Leningraders after the murder of Kirov. He was then given another task: do the same with staff working in the Kremlin. Lev Kamenev was arrested and charged with organising a plot against Stalin, who kept a close eye on proceedings, and this included giving the NKVD specific instructions. Abel Yenukidze, an old friend of the vozhd, had overall responsibility for the Kremlin and was added to the accused. He was shot and became the highest profile Bolshevik, although not a member of the Politburo, to be liquidated. The first Moscow Show Trial, involving a group of defendants, including Kamenev and Zinoviev, took place in August 1936. Trotsky was introduced as the arch villain and, it was claimed, he had ordered numerous assassinations and wreckings. Andrei Vyshinsky, who became notorious as a brutal prosecutor, demanded, in his closing speech, that these mad dogs be shot, every last one of them! They were all shot, but it was Stalin who was the real judge. Vyshinsky epitomised a certain type of official who slavishly served Stalin. As an ex-Menshevik, he felt that he had repeatedly to reaffirm his credentials of loyalty to the regime. Leonard Schapiro, a noted specialist on the Soviet Union, once described him as the closest thing to a human rat he had ever encountered! The second Moscow Show Trial should have involved Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, in September 1936, but it was cancelled. Tomsky cheated the executioner by taking his own life and it was possible neither Bukharin nor Rykov would make the obligatory confession. Nikolai Ezhov took over from Yagoda, the same month, and Stalin ominously commented that the country was ‘four years behind’ in the struggle with Trotsky and other political foes. Ezhov got down to collecting evidence against Bukharin and the right, which

48  Analysis Yagoda had begun. In line with the fear of war at the time, Yagoda and his top NKVD aides were branded German spies, among other things. Ezhov recommended the arrest of 2,273 NKVD officers between October 1936 and August 1938. They were all replaced by Ezhov appointees. Everyone who knew Ezhov, before he became head of the NKVD, commented on how nice a man he was but there was nothing nice about his two years in office (he was replaced by Lavrenty Beria, in December 1938, and shot as head of an NKVD counter-revolutionary organisation – again an utter fabrication). They were the most dreadful peacetime years in the history of the Soviet Union and are known as the Ezhovshchina, the Ezhov times, when blood flowed in rivers, and the guilt or innocence of the accused was completely immaterial. The NKVD had their plan targets like everyone and were certainly not going to underfulfil them. According to a report, dated 11 December 1953, sent to Khrushchev and Malenkov, the total number condemned by the political police (Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, etc.), between 1921 and 1953 was 4,060,306. Those shot amounted to 799,455 of which no fewer than 681,692 were executed during 1937 and 1938, the Ezhovshchina. Lesser peaks of repression were 1930–33, 1942 and 1945–46. Another remarkable statistic was that, over the period 1923–53, over 42 million Soviet citizens were imprisoned (39.1 million in the RSFSR alone). The vast majority of these were sentenced for non-political offences. If one excludes those under 14 and over 60 years of age, then, during the course of one generation, 1923–53, every third citizen was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In comparison, the highest number in prison, in the immediate pre-war period, was 111,800 in 1912. There were 884,000 children in internal exile (not permitted to live in their home towns but obliged to reside hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometres away), in 1954.The bloodiest year for the Russian Orthodox Church was 1937 when 85,000 priests were shot. Five and a half million families (one can assume five members per family) were deported or exiled. In all, over the years 1918–53, about 3.5 million people from ethnic groups (the repressed people) were driven from their home, with, perhaps, a third dying en route. The second Moscow Show Trial, in January 1937, turned out to involve Pyatakov, mentioned by Lenin in his Testament; Sokolnikov, a signatory of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and later Commissar for Finance, who had rescued the rouble after 1921, and resisted the wild targets of the first FYP; and various former oppositionists who had held key positions managing the economy and industrial enterprises. The latter were accused of wrecking and espionage. Ordzhonikidze fought hard to defend them and, distraught, committed suicide. The vozhd took this as a personal affront and the defendants were all lumped together as an ‘Anti-Soviet Trotskyist centre’. Pyatakov debased himself but was shot and Sokolnikov died in a labour camp, in 1939. The turn of the military came in due course. Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a deputy Commissar for Defence, and a leading strategic thinker, and many other top military figures were branded traitors and shot, in

The thirties 49 June 1937.Tukhachevsky was tortured to extract a confession and signed it in his own blood. Then followed a veritable slaughter of the top brass. All 11 deputy Commissars for Defence and 75 of the 80 members of the Supreme Military Council were executed. All eight admirals suffered the same fate. In total, 35,000, half of the officer corps, were either executed or imprisoned. Kotkin estimates that about 20 per cent of top NKVD officials were executed and over 90 per cent of the top military (Kotkin 2017: 378). As Khrushchev was to admit later, it was all a ghastly mistake since the charges against the officers were baseless (Khrushchev 1971: 75). The fabricated evidence had been put together under the direct supervision of Stalin. The last Moscow Show Trial opened on 2 March 1938 and involved the pair who previously had slipped the net: Bukharin and Rykov. Others thrown in included Yagoda, getting a taste of his own medicine. Vyshinsky branded them a ‘Bloc of right wingers and Trotskyites’, and the inevitable death sentences followed. Bukharin wrote a plaintive mea culpa to Stalin, begging for his life, but the vozhd ignored it. All the Show Trials were followed by waves of arrests throughout the country, linking the accused to the events in Moscow. Foreign communists, in exile in the Soviet Union, were mown down like ripe corn, the NKVD being especially severe on Germans and Poles. The greatest prize of all, however, eluded them until 20 August 1940, when an agent put an ice pick through Trotsky’s skull, in Mexico.

Figure 5.1 A Mexican policeman shows the ice-pick which killed Trotsky, August 1940 © ASSOCIATED PRESS

50  Analysis After such a catalogue of methodical madness, the question must arise: was Stalin himself a victim of the frenzy of the period? Did he lose his sanity for a time? Svetlana Alliluyeva, his daughter, believed that officials, such as Beria, poisoned his mind and convinced him that the mad accusations were true. This is not correct. Stalin himself edited the indictments against Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and others for the second Moscow Show Trial. All lists of the condemned were forwarded to him and, during 1938, at least 383 lists, containing 44,000 names, of whom 39,000 were executed, were passed on to him. Stalin signed 362 lists; Molotov 373; Voroshilov 195; Kaganovich 191 and Zhdanov 177. Stalin’s Politburo colleagues were enthusiastic in their support of repression and they often wrote comments in the margin encouraging the NKVD to step up the torture: for example, against certain names: ‘beat again and again!’. The NKVD did not have to go and look for suspects: they were inundated with denunciations. Such was the spirit of the times that, to avoid being denounced, one had to denounce everyone else first. There were even targets for the number of people one had to denounce in a given period. The speeches and comments by Stalin, during 1937–38, provide clues to his state of mind. They are tortuous and, at times, incoherent, containing endless references to conspiracies and being surrounded by enemies. When addressing leading workers in the metallurgical and coal industries, in October 1937, he told them that he was not sure he could trust them: I’m not even sure that everyone present, I truly apologise to you, is for the people. I’m not sure whether even among you, I again apologise, there might be those who are working for the Soviet government but at the same time have set themselves up with some intelligence agency in the West – Japanese, German, Polish – for insurance. The official report of the speech does not include the above comments which must have sown consternation among his guests. Arkady Rozengolts, Commissar for Foreign Trade, who knew Stalin well, commented that the vozhd was ‘suspicious to the point of insanity’. Previously, he was calm and signed any papers which were necessary but, now, he fell victim to a ‘fit, a mad fit of rage’ (Khlevniuk 2015: 152). Just why was he so furious and at whom or what? Khlevniuk points to the international situation and the increasing threat of war as contributing to Stalin’s excessive anxiety which exploded into fits of rage. The Japanese were in Manchuria and Stalin was aware that France was egging on Japan to attack Siberia. Poland seemed to favour an agreement with Germany rather than the Soviet Union and there was a risk that the Trotskyites might come out on top in the civil war in Spain. The latter had to be prevented at any cost and this contributed to the eventual victory of General Francisco Franco. In China, Stalin prevented Mao Zedong from killing Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, because he wanted both to oppose the occupying Japanese. Had Mao murdered

The thirties 51 Chiang, it is possible that a pro-Japanese faction would have taken over China and together with Japan would have attacked Siberia.

The third FYP The third FYP (1938–41) was adopted at the XVIIIth party Congress, in 1939, but was cut short after three and a half years by the German invasion. It reaffirmed the emphasis on heavy industry, but it also increased defence spending to 18 per cent of GDP, in 1940. As a consequence, the living standards of workers and employees stagnated and may even have fallen by 1941. Forced labour, supervised by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), made a significant contribution to the fulfilment of the plan. Western estimates of the number of prisoners, in 1941, range from 3.5 million to 15 million. Recent Soviet research has produced a figure of 1.9 million, in 1941, rising to 2.5 million, in 1952. It would appear that the Soviet figures only include part of those engaged in compulsory labour. Government attitudes towards workers became noticeably harsher in 1939 and 1940. Hitherto, workers had been able to choose their place of work, and this led to a high turnover as they sought to improve their lot. In 1940, however, the state decreed that the free labour market was to end. No worker or office employee could change his or her job without permission, and skilled workers and specialists could be directed anywhere. Absenteeism, which could mean being 20 minutes late for work, became a criminal offence and one woman was convicted of the crime while she was in a maternity ward giving birth. Over three million people were charged under this law, in a single year, and 480,000 sentenced to prison for up to four months. The others had to perform compulsory labour for up to six months. The legislation stayed on the statute book until 1956 and, if judges were soft on offenders they were put in the dock themselves. Theft was severely dealt with. One man who worked in a flour mill brought home a handful of grain for his hungry family and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Social benefits for most workers were cut.

Foreign policy Japan invaded Manchuria, in 1931, and this, understandably alarmed Moscow. In June 1932, Stalin wrote to Ordzhonikidze: ‘the Japanese are certainly (certainly!) preparing for war against the USSR, and we have to be ready (we must!) for anything’. Military forces were immediately beefed up in the Far East. The rise of fascism was completely misinterpreted in Moscow, where it was assumed to be the most predatory face of finance capital, with only a limited capacity to endure, if it ever came to power. The Comintern, the Russian Communist Party wearing its foreign suit, came to the conclusion that the German National Socialists (NSDAP) were claiming to do the impossible. They promised to put German industry back on its feet,

52  Analysis which implied that big business would do very well, while at the same time they canvassed the votes of small businessmen, shopkeepers and farmers. They promised to protect the latter from unfair competition, yet, in order to do this, the Nazis would have to restrict the activities of the industrial giants. Unemployment would end and workers would live better. From a communist point of view, the Nazis were promising the impossible. A fatal weakness was that communists did not understand nationalism, regarding it as a ploy by the ruling class to fool workers. Italian fascism was not deemed a threat to the Soviet Union, so why should German fascism be any different? The social democrats (SPD) were regarded as the main enemy and labelled ‘social fascists’. In Germany, the SPD was the main supporter of the Weimar Republic and it was assumed, in Moscow, that the destruction of the SPD would topple the republic. Communist animus against the social democrats was based on the fact that the latter accepted capitalism and sought to redistribute income within it. The breath-taking ease with which Hitler and the NSDAP swept the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) off the political stage, the pusillanimity of the other political parties and the Führer’s ruthlessness in disposing of Ernst Röhm and the SA (Sturmabteilung or storm troops), as part of a deal with the German army, the Reichswehr, rudely awakened Moscow. In December 1933, the Politburo adopted a secret resolution about the Soviet Union’s possible entry into the League of Nations and a mutual defence pact with European powers, including France and Poland, against Germany. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, in 1934, and concluded a treaty with France, in 1935, which was extended to embrace Czechoslovakia. The Comintern, at its VIIth and final Congress, in August 1935, appealed for the formation of a popular front. Western governments were slow to respond as previous Comintern policy had been to appeal to rank and file social democrats, over the heads of their leaders, to overthrow their governments. The 1936 constitution, partly for Western consumption, was an attempt to make the Soviet Union appear a ‘normal’ country. Groups previously excluded from voting were now enfranchised and elections were to be direct and secret. The previous constitution was a ‘revolutionary’ one which had excluded groups regarded as hostile to Soviet power. Hundreds of thousands of those convicted for non-political offences were released or rehabilitated. Never the less, 1936 was a bad year for Moscow. The German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by Germany, Italy and Japan, and the onset of the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), with the Soviet Union the main ally of the Spanish Republic, boded ill for Soviet hopes. Stalin believed that Spanish defeats were due to the activities of saboteurs in the ranks. The General Staff had to be cleared of old specialists and replaced by, young, competent officers. If this did not happen, the Republicans would lose the war. The concept of the fifth column (enemy sympathisers would subvert the Republic from within) originated during this conflict and was taken up by

The thirties 53 Stalin. Molotov, for one, also believed there was an active fifth column in the Soviet Union so fifth columnists had to be ruthlessly hunted down and purged. In 1936, Hitler launched a four year plan to prepare for war. The main target was the Soviet Union and Stalin was aware of this. To buy time to prepare the country for the forthcoming titanic struggle, Stalin hoped to forge a new German-Soviet Pact along the lines of the one which had existed until 1933. Negotiations began, in early 1937, to revive Soviet-German trade but they failed because Hitler would not countenance a political dimension. When the Soviet delegation returned to Moscow, in March 1937, they were either imprisoned or shot. In July 1937, Japan invaded China and, in August, the USSR and China signed a non-aggression pact. At the same time, it was decided to transfer Koreans from the Far East to Central Asia and elsewhere: a total of 170,000 were expelled. They were regarded as a security risk and susceptible to being recruited by Japanese intelligence. Stalin had two alternatives as far as policy towards Germany was concerned. He could enter into an alliance with France and Great Britain and thereby effectively checkmate the Third Reich, which could not face a war on two fronts. But the Soviet leader could not be absolutely sure that France and Great Britain would remain committed if war with Germany did break out. The British and French leaders, at Munich, on 30 September 1938, – the Soviet Union was not invited to participate – handed over the Sudetenland, a predominantly German populated region of Czechoslovakia, to Hitler, Stalin cannot be blamed for concluding that the Western powers were not willing to countenance war with Germany. The Soviet Union stated on numerous occasions that it would fight in support of Czechoslovakia, even if other powers did not but here was a problem. The Soviet Union had no border with Czechoslovakia and would have had to cross Romanian territory to reach that country. Were Great Britain and France trying to turn Germany’s face towards the east? In March 1939, Germany occupied all of Czechoslovakia, turning Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech lands, into a protectorate and setting up a separate Slovak State, which was to join the Wehrmacht in the attack on the Soviet Union. In so doing, the Munich Agreement, instead of staving off war, had made a general European war inevitable. Stalin’s other option was to sign a pact with Hitler and unleash the dogs of war westwards. When he concluded that war was inevitable, his main objective was to keep the USSR out of the conflict. After what he had done to the Red Army, Air Force and Navy this was the most prudent approach. The Soviet Union began negotiating seriously, in May 1939, when Maksim Litvinov, a Jew, was replaced as Commissar for Foreign Affairs by Molotov. Litvinov was spared imprisonment or death and sent off to Washington as ambassador. His subordinates were not so lucky as they were demoted, imprisoned or shot. They paid a heavy price for failing to fashion

54  Analysis a collective security system to keep the Soviet Union out of the coming war (Overy 1997: 136). Stalin strove to reach agreement with Great Britain and France but to no avail. When the British Prime Minister was informed that Moscow and Berlin had reached agreement on a pact he stated that he could not believe such a thing. London’s source was a German general. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed by von Ribbentrop and Molotov, in Moscow, on 23 August 1939 (Stalin and Hitler never met) and it was only a matter of time before Hitler attacked in the west as he had secured his eastern flank. The Pact consigned the eastern part of Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland to the Soviet Union with Lithuania being added later – thus reversing some of the losses of Brest-Litovsk. Moscow was alarmed by the rapid success of the German Blitzkrieg in Poland and by the fact that neither Great Britain nor France made any move to attack Germany. Stalin began even to fear that the Wehrmacht would not stop at the agreed demarcation line in eastern Poland and invade the Soviet Union. He, therefore, ordered the Red Army to attack Poland, on 17 September 1939, to secure the Soviet Union’s slice of Poland. Great Britain and France, obligingly, did not treat this as an act of war against them. With Finland part of its zone of influence, Moscow pressed the Finns to concede a frontier away from Leningrad. The Soviets also wanted naval bases on Finnish soil but Finland would not countenance this. The Red Army, therefore, launched an assault against Finland, on 30 November 1939, but the Winter War highlighted its deficiencies, and of the million troops deployed, losses reached 400,000. To forestall intervention by Great Britain and France, a lenient peace was signed, in March 1940. The Finnish debacle ended the ‘cult of the Civil War’, Stalin’s words, in military thinking. Kliment Voroshilov was sacked as Commissar for Defence and replaced by Marshal Timoshenko. He concentrated on building up huge numbers of tanks and aircraft and training many more officers. Over 80 per cent of officers arrested in the purges were reinstated. Timoshenko brought back the old uniforms, promoted over a thousand to the rank of general or admiral and junior officers could no longer criticise their superiors. The political commissar slipped into the background. Work began on fortify the new border with Germany. Hitler regarded war with the Soviet Union as inevitable but Stalin considered a conflict could be avoided and believed that Hitler could be bought off with concessions and thought that Germany had to defeat Great Britain and France first. This would provide the USSR with the breathing space to build up its armed might to such a pitch that the Wehrmacht would not invade. Stalin handled his relations with Hitler very badly. Since the USSR was the weaker power, he had to appease the German dictator. When Molotov visited Berlin, in November 1940, Hitler proposed that the Soviet Union join the Tripartite Pact, which linked Germany, Italy and Japan with Berlin’s east European satellites. The bait was Soviet gains in the Black Sea area. Molotov astonishingly then produced his shopping list: Finland and southern

The thirties 55 Bukovina (Romania) were to fall under Soviet sway, Bulgaria was to form part of a Soviet security zone, as was Sweden; and notice was served that the Soviets had future designs on Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece and even part of German occupied Poland. Moscow also wanted military bases in the Dardanelles and a Soviet-Danish condominium over the Baltic. Shortly afterwards, Stalin accepted the invitation to join the Tripartite Pact and demanded that the Soviet Union be permitted to expand through Iran to the Persian Gulf. New documents reveal that Stalin’s main aim was to agree a new pact defining spheres of influence in eastern Europe. Everything else would be a bonus. Stalin’s demands revealed the weakness of the Soviet Union and, instead of pacifying Hitler, they provoked him. Just why did Stalin act so clumsily? Perhaps he thought that if he did not make any demands, Hitler would have regarded the Soviet Union as weak and afraid to assert its interests. Stalin remained unaware of this blunder, however, and the German invasion of 22 June 1941, took him completely by surprise, even though he had been forewarned by his own intelligence services, Churchill and Soviet spies in Tokyo and Berlin. The Wehrmacht had intended to invade earlier, in May 1941, but had been detained in Greece and Yugoslavia. Stalin thought he would be safe in June, as it was too late for a summer offensive. If the prime goal of Soviet foreign policy during the 1930s was to keep the country out of a European war, then it was a dismal failure. The rise of fascism was looked on with equanimity; indeed, the NSDAP and the KPD cooperated from time to time and were even known to share the same offices in some places. Stalin took it that the Second World war would be a re-run of the First, with the European powers becoming bogged down. When they had exhausted themselves, the USSR would be free to intervene and act as it pleased. Again, this was a disastrous miscalculation. All the Soviet Union succeeded in doing was to make Germany even stronger. A Machiavelli might argue that, in the end, it turned out right for the Soviet Union, a case of serendipity. Not only was Germany defeated, but Moscow ended up occupying part of Germany, thereby making the USSR a great power. This, however, is no justification for a policy that unleashed a whirlwind, which killed over 50 million and maimed millions of others in mind and body. Also, this argument assumes that the Soviet occupation was a net benefit for Moscow. All the European powers must assume some responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. Had Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union acted decisively together, in 1939, Germany could not have launched a European and eventually a world war. In June 1938, NKVD General Lyushkov, overseeing the Far East, defected to the Japanese, in Manchuria. He was aware of military deployments and had much other intelligence of value to the Japanese. In July and August 1938, the Red Army, 15,000 strong, became embroiled in a conflict with the Japanese, at Lake Khasan, near the borders with China and Korea. Despite victory, the military were held to have conducted themselves poorly and Marshal Vasily Blyukher, was arrested, tortured and died soon

56  Analysis afterwards in prison. Stalin, as usual, assumed that a military reverse was due to treachery. An even more important battle took place at Khalkhin Gol or Nomonhan, on the Mongolian-Soviet border, between May and September 1939. Stalin replaced the commander with General (later Marshal) Georgy Zhukov and he launched an offensive, using tanks for the first time in Soviet mechanised warfare. He had over 112,000 troops under his command and the Red Army believed it came off better. A truce was agreed, in September 1939, and, fortunately, the Japanese turned their attention away from the Soviet Union and towards South East Asia and the United States. Ironically, Zhukov deployed tactics elaborated by the executed Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and these became the core of Zhukov’s method of warfare. Had the Japanese attacked in the east when Germany attacked in the west, the Red Army could not have coped. It would have meant defeat for the country and, with it, the end of the communist experiment. Had Japan chosen to march west, it would not have attacked the United States and that country might have been reluctant to go to war. Who would have challenged the German-Japanese occupation of the Soviet Union? The Great Terror changed the balance of power in the Politburo. Hitherto, there had been some collective leadership but Stalin became totally dominant, in 1937. Five members of the Politburo were shot and another excluded and Ordzhonikidze had already taken his own life. In March 1939, at the XVIIIth Party Congress, Andrei Zhdanov and Nikita Khrushchev joined the Politburo and Lavrenty Beria became a candidate member. In February 1941, Nikolai Voznesensky, Georgy Malenkov and Aleksandr Shcherbakov became candidate members. The Politburo was being rejuvenated. The Politburo declined in importance during the Great Terror and, in early 1938, the ‘Secret Five’ was formed, consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Kaganovich, and took precedence. Stalin also decided policy with individual members of the Politburo in his office, dacha or after watching films in the Kremlin cinema. In March 1941, the Bureau of Sovnarkom, consisting of Molotov and his deputies, was set up to concentrate government decision making at the top. Then, on 4 May 1941, Stalin pushed Molotov aside and made himself head of government, with Molotov as deputy (but Nikolai Voznesensky was made the vozhd’s first deputy – this was to register his displeasure at Molotov’s record) and Molotov was to continue as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Stalin, retained the position of party first secretary, but would have insufficient time for party work and therefore Zhdanov was made his deputy to fill this lacuna (Khlevniuk 2015: 180, 181).

Culture Education changed dramatically as the entire pedagogical system was transformed. Schools were handed over to collective farms or enterprises, pupils and teachers abandoned formal learning and sought to learn through

The thirties 57 ‘productive labour’ or were mobilised to fulfil the plan. There was even talk of the ‘withering away of the school’ altogether. Universities were transferred to the VSNKh or the major economic commissariats. The majority were restructured along functional lines, involving narrow specialisms. ‘Bourgeois’ academics were, like school teachers, hounded out. However, by 1932, literacy was back in fashion. The socialist substitute, the rabfak, had produced high dropout rates and little technical expertise (one of those who dropped out as Nikita Khrushchev). Selection reappeared and, by the end of 1936, non-proletarians could again enter higher education. Russian nationalism was promoted and all other nations were referred to as ‘younger brothers’. Tuition fees had to be paid for the final three years of secondary education and compulsory uniforms were introduced (including a pinafore and pig tails for girls) and these remained until the end of the Soviet era. Out of experimentation emerged a fine education system, with a particularly good record in the hard sciences. Literacy rates were among the highest in the world. The party did not attempt to control all aspects of culture during the 1920s, and a 1925 decree made this clear. The defeat of the right, however, had serious repercussions, since several key writers were linked to Bukharin. The All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) was in the ascendancy, in 1928, and propagated the hegemony of working class values in fiction. There was only one fly in the ointment as far as RAPP was concerned, namely the All-Russian Union of Writers (AUW). The latter tried to keep politics out of their fiction but, though RAPP disapproved strongly of this attitude, most of the leading Russian writers were members of AUW. Undeterred, RAPP launched a campaign against Evgeny Zamyatin, the AUW chair, and Boris Pilnyak, head of the Leningrad branch, accusing them of publishing anti-Soviet works abroad. They were found guilty, and the AUW was dissolved and replaced by the All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers (AUSW). About half of the former AUW members were denied membership of the new organisation and, since they could not legally publish unless they were members, they were faced with a stark choice: recant and seek admission, or give up hope of publishing in the Soviet Union. RAPP was jubilant. However, in 1930, Stalin wrote an article in the party journal Bolshevik, in which he argued that nothing should be published which was contrary to the official line. This should have warned RAPP (which believed that literature should tell the truth, warts and all) that party goals might not always be identical to their own. In fact, the party disbanded both RAPP and the AUSW, in 1932, and set up a single organisation, the Union of Soviet Writers. The end of RAPP was the end of an era in Russian literature. Writing during the years 1928–31 saw the glorification of the little man, as everyone pulled together to build the new USSR. Plots displayed an absence of hierarchy and experts and managers faded into the background. The machine was worshipped; indeed, only a country as backwards as the Soviet Union

58  Analysis could have placed so much faith in technology as the answer to humankind’s problems. The rest of Europe had had the myth of the good machine exploded during the First World War, but for the post-war Soviet Union, noise was still a sign of progress, and the smoke belching out of factory chimneys a symbol of a brighter future. After 1928, learning was demystified, and anyone with the right attitude, a Stalinist attitude, could become a specialist. Folk heroes appeared in many fields: Makarenko in education; Vilyams in grassland management; Lysenko in agrobiology; Marr in linguistics and Michurin in fruit farming. The fact that almost everything they preached was denigrated in the West only strengthened their position. What else could one expect from bourgeois scientists jealous of the success of socialism? In 1931, the literary hero changes: the manager, the expert, the party official, in other words, the decision makers, take over. The writer had also to be a skilled craftsman; the ‘engineer of the soul’, as Stalin graphically put it. His frame of reference was handed down by Andrei Zhdanov, in April 1934, at the 1st Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers. Socialist realism was to be the guiding light. In essence, it meant building the brave new world with the bricks of the present. Literature was to uplift readers so that they would be inspired to be better workers during the construction of socialism. It was to be deliberately didactic; and optimism was compulsory. Every novel, like a Hollywood movie of the period, had to have a happy ending as the hero or heroine battled against impossible odds to final victory. The main hero, of course, was the vozhd and another was the Russian nation and its great figures: Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible walked again. The tide of nationalism boded ill for non-ethnic-Russians. Stalin formulated the slogan: ‘National in form, Socialist in content’ to describe what was permissible. This amounted to saying in Uzbek, what was being said about Stalin and Russia in Russian. The national heroes who had fought against imperial Russian domination were banished; the local bards were swept aside and replaced by Russian luminaries. The purges, which wiped out non-Russian elites, completed the process.

Society The term capitalism was coined by the French political and economic theorist, Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) to describe any economy in which privately owned firms compete in a market, with the owners taking the profits and the workers taking a wage. Marx, in Das Kapital (1867), depicts ruthless capitalists driving down wages to the lowest level while competing for the largest possible market share. He divided society into classes. Under capitalism the two main classes were the capitalist class and the working class (actually Marx used the term Arbeiterklasse or worker class). The former were the oppressors and the latter the oppressed. Come the socialist revolution the roles would be reversed. Class was linked to the means of

The thirties 59 production. If one owned a factory and employed labour one was a capitalist. The working class or proletariat sold its labour. Everyone who worked for a wage was a member of the working class. What about a doctor who was employed by the state? Marx never defined precisely what he meant by class. This caused huge problems for the Bolsheviks when they came to divide the new society into classes. The winners were the industrial workers and landless peasants, but they only made up a fraction of the population. Defining class was of crucial importance to the Bolsheviks as they needed to decide who were their allies and who were their enemies. The new ruling class was the proletariat but many of the Bolshevik leaders were not of working class origin (Lenin was a member of the service nobility). The problem was solved by declaring the latter ‘proletarians by conviction’. The 1918 Russian Federation constitution conferred full citizenship and the right to vote only on workers and poor or landless peasants. During the 1920s almost all institutions practised class discrimination. They deliberately excluded the sons and daughters of non-proletarians from secondary and further education. They were deemed ‘class aliens’ and, of course, used subterfuge, bribery and deceit to penetrate the bureaucracy, party and higher education. Vigilant communists ‘unmasked’ them and they were periodically purged. The 1926 Soviet census (the population was estimated to be 147 million) divided society into two categories: wage earners or the proletariat and proprietors or those who employed labour. Naturally many of the latter dissimulated in an attempt to be classified as members of the proletariat. Everyone spied on everyone else and hoped to benefit from ‘unmasking’ a ‘class alien’. Trust was a commodity in short supply in Soviet society. Unmasking aliens reached a fever pitch by the end of the 1920s with the kulaks being liquidated as a class as well as all private traders. A cultural revolution began which resulted in many ‘bourgeois specialists’ losing their posts in commissariats, research institutes and enterprises. All ‘outsiders’ risked losing their jobs, being evicted from their homes and losing their ration cards. Their children were thrown out of universities, the Komsomol and Young Pioneers (10–14 year olds). Hence rural schoolteachers who were the sons of priests were sacked. Gradually economic rationality reasserted itself. The contribution of outsiders was recognised and all the laws discrimination against nonproletarians were repealed. The 1936 constitution conferred the vote on everyone. There were now two classes: the working class and the collective farm peasantry (kolkhozniks) with the educated becoming the intelligentsia but described as a stratum. Internal passports, with one’s class and ethnicity recorded, were introduced in 1932 but peasants were excluded and were only allowed to move if granted permission by their farms. Hence the 1920s was period when the majority of the population pretended to be someone else and to move into the coveted working class. The party had a rule that seven years of service qualified one for promotion to the working class.

60  Analysis Party membership surged and being a worker and party member meant that one had joined the new society’s elite. This underlined the instinctive desire of people to join groups, favouring those who look and behave as themselves and hold prejudices against those who do not. Stalin brilliantly exploited this insight by praising those who shared his vision of the new society and vilifying those who did not. Mass mobilisation was set in train and ordinary citizens became guardians of the new society and were encouraged to denounce those who harboured doubts. As a Lamarckian believing in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, Stalin set out to create the new man and woman (homo sovieticus). The victory of socialism was proclaimed in 1933 and altered the perception of criminality and social deviance. Hitherto these phenomena were regarded as remnants of capitalism but were now categorised as class hostility to the new Soviet order. Criminals were no longer perceived as social deviants but as counter-revolutionaries acting against the Soviet state and the building of socialism. As such, they had to be extirpated. Progressive schooling, where pupils were encouraged to develop their creativity, was abandoned in 1931. Traditional norms were reimposed and the ‘stern collective’ became the model. In 1935, the old grading system (1–5 with 5 the top grade) reappeared and so did school uniforms. When I first saw the girls’ black dresses and white pinnies, I was remined of pre-1914 English ladies’ maids. Mikhail Pokrovsky dominated history writing until his death in 1932 and he regarded almost everything the Tsars undertook to be bad. Stain then intervened and labelled Pokrovsky an anti-Leninist. The task was now to forge a new Soviet patriotism and identity and as such new heroes had to appear. Soviet history no longer began in 1917 but in 882 with the founding of Kievan Rus. A new history of the Soviet Union appeared in 1935, closely edited by Stalin, and remained the set text for the next 20 years. It lauded the successes of the Tsars in their campaigns to expand the Russian Empire. Hitherto non-Russian national histories had praised local resistance to Tsarist expansion. The latter was now regarded as a modernising force and local resistance as trying to hold back the wheel of history. The Stalin cult began in earnest on his official fiftieth birthday, in December 1929. In 1934, he was addressed as Dear Leader and children were taught to regard him as a kindly father figure. In 1934, an old peasant woman wrote to him and said she had a spare cow. Would he like to have her? The Dear Leader replied: ‘Thank you very much, but I spend all my time in towns in the service of the Soviet people and I don’t have a farm; just keep your cow and carry on’. Stalin knew how to cultivate the common touch, but one observer warned: ‘He catches everything on the radio station of his brain, which operates on all wave lengths… Be on your guard if he is being charming as he has an enormous range of anaesthetics at his disposal’.

The thirties 61 One of the goals of the cult was to give citizens a focus in a period of enormous social upheaval. With Stalin at the helm, the Soviet ship of state was in safe hands. Another way of restoring some normalcy to life was the plethora of festivals, carnivals and celebrations and there was almost one every month. Militant atheism was the norm but the persecution of religion had relented by the early 1930s. This permitted the reappearance of the New Year’s Tree (banned in 1928) and Father Frost (a Russian version of Father Christmas). It became again possible to buy the ingredients to make the traditional Easter cake. In 1943, the Russian Orthodox Church was enrolled to help with the war effort and priests could again be trained in seminaries. Some of them were secret policemen and others were obliged to become informers. Four main faiths were recognised: Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism and there was a special state department which oversaw religious affairs. Great stress was placed on physical fitness and there were endless parades of gymnasts, athletes and other sportsmen and women. There were competitions galore and the winners received generous prizes as the Soviet Union aspired to attain world records in everything. For instance, a Soviet pilot flew higher than anyone else. All record feats were attributed to the inspiration of the Dear Leader. Rapid industrialisation required a plethora of specialists, mainly engineers who had completed higher technical or specialist secondary education. There were 521,000 in 1928 but on 1 January 1941 their numbers had swollen to 2.4 million or one in four employees. In order to arrive at a figure for the intelligentsia, one needs to add scientists, artists and writers – this added up to 2.5 million. In January 1941, there were 110 engineers and technicians for every 1,000 workers. Anyone with elementary literacy skills enjoyed an advantage and, in 1940, the average wage of a worker was 31 roubles a month and an employee 54 roubles. Heads of party and state institutions at Union, republican, krai and oblast levels were the top bosses and there were 73,000 of them in 1939. Below them were managers of state firms, construction sites and in administrative agencies – they totalled 445,000; another 757,000 held posts at lower levels. In the countryside there were 280,000 chairs and deputy chairs of kolkhozes. This amounted to a grand total of 1.55 million and these men and some women ran the Soviet Union. They formed powerful interest groups. There was a strict hierarchy with only those at the same level mixing and socialising together. Partying with plentiful supplies of booze and girls was quite common. The new society was to be predominantly urban and 23 million peasants moved to towns between 1928 and 1939 of which two million made for Moscow. In 1939, one in three citizens was living in an urban area. The population of Moscow and Leningrad doubled during the decade to 1939; in Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) it tripled. Millions of peasants, after sampling life in one city, moved to another or back to their village. Housing

62  Analysis conditions were often appalling. Many new workers had to live in barracks or holes in the ground. The lucky ones found a corner of a room, or four or five families had to share a communal kitchen. The less said about sanitary conditions the better. The huge flow of people in and out of cities imposed an enormous strain on human relationships. Women had to work during the day and then begin again at home in the evening. This led to higher death rates and lower birth rates.

6 The Great Fatherland War, 1941–45

Operation Barbarossa (Red Beard) was launched at 3.30 a.m. (Moscow time) on the morning of Sunday 22 June 1941. There were three main groups: Army Group North headed for the Baltic States and Leningrad; Army Group Centre struck towards Belarus and Moscow and Army Group South thrust towards Ukraine and Kiev. The Wehrmacht had 3.6 million men at its disposal and Finnish, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Italian and Spanish troop joined in later. Hitler envisaged a four-month campaign. The Red Army, which numbered 2.9 million men, and the Red Air Force were quite unprepared for the onslaught. Stalin was stunned by the attack and thought it had been begun by rogue German officers without Hitler’s permission. Molotov was sent to see the German ambassador, who confirmed that Hitler had issued the order. Soviet troops were not to fire back and it was only, almost four hours after the assault, that the order was given to defend positions. However, no attempt was to be made to cross German lines. This order was not signed by Stalin, but by Timoshenko, Molotov and Zhukov. Molotov was given the task of telling the Soviet people that the country was at war. The first day’s fighting was a disaster: 1,200 planes lost, most of them on the ground; the Wehrmacht advanced 60–80 km into the Baltic States; 40–60 km in Belarus and 20–40 km in Ukraine. Stalin was confused and even wanted to know what territories Berlin would accept to end the attack and commented to Molotov: ‘Lenin left us a great legacy but we, his heirs, have fucked it all up’. On 23 June, he approved the setting up of Stavka, the General Staff responsible for all land, air and sea operations. He holed himself up in his dacha, read a play about Ivan the Terrible, and left the Politburo to its own devices. On 30 June, in desperation, Molotov and others went to see him and proposed the formation of a State Defence Committee (GKO), to be headed by him and with Molotov as first deputy which was to supervise the military, political and economic life of the country. Stalin returned, on 1 July, to the Kremlin and by 3 July 1941, he had sufficiently composed himself to address the nation and to tell the awful truth about the war (Doc. 16, p. 153.). He did not attempt to conceal the seriousness of the situation: ‘it is a matter of life and death for the Soviet state, life and death for the peoples of the USSR’. A scapegoat had to be

64  Analysis found and he turned out to be General Dmitry Pavlov, commander of the Western Front. He was asked why he had not reported to comrade Stalin that German forces were massing on the border. He replied that he reported what Stalin wanted to hear. He and many of his subordinates were executed. On 19 July, the Politburo adopted a resolution naming Stalin as Commissar for Defence and, on, 8 August, supreme commander. The old order had been restored as the vozhd was again in charge. Over the period October 1941 to May 1942, 5.7 million Red Army soldiers were captured, of whom 3.4 million died in captivity (Doc. 16, p. 155.). (59 per cent). In comparison, only 3.5 per cent of British, US and other Allied prisoners of war, died in German camps. Of the 2.39 million Germans prisoners of war in the Soviet Union, 356,000 died. Another 1.1 million were also captured, mainly Hungarians, Romanians, Austrians, Slovaks, Italians and Spanish and, of these, 162,000 died. Why was the fatality rate of Soviet prisoners so high? The German military stated that if a soldier could not work, he would be left to die. Besides this, the huge number of prisoners overwhelmed the Wehrmacht. During the war, 2.8 million Soviet prisoners of war were sent to Germany to do forced labour. Some of them were killed in Allied air raids (e.g., in Siegen, Westphalia). The siege of Leningrad lasted 872 days (8 September 1941–27 January 1944) but there never was any intention of capturing the city. Why not? The Germans were in no position

Figure 6.1 Leningrad. USSR. Three men burying victims of the siege of Leningrad at the Volkovo cemetery. [© ITAR-TASS News Agency/Alamy Stock Photo]

The Great Fatherland War, 1941–45 65 to feed the 3.2 million inhabitants, so they were to be starved to death. Then the city would be reduced to rubble. The same applied to Moscow: starve the population to death and then level the city. The Red Army mobilised about 30 million soldiers and total Soviet losses are estimated at 26.6 million: of these, 11.4 million were military losses; another estimate is 7.8 million dead, of whom 5.5 million died at the front, 1.1 million from wounds in hospital and 1.2 million in German captivity (Ellman and Maksudov 1994: 674). The Germans lost 2.7 million men and about 80 per cent of these casualties were on the Eastern Front. Berlin referred to the war as a Vernichtungskrieg, a war of extermination, and that was quite apposite. Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, was brutally frank: ‘I am totally indifferent to the fate of the Russians and Czechs… Whether they live well or are wracked by hunger, only interests me in so far as we need them as slaves for our culture’. The Generalplan Ost stipulated that about 75 per cent of the Slav population was to be moved to Siberia; Germans, Norwegians, Swedes, Danes and Dutch were to colonise the land vacated by the Slavs. The military commissar was brought back and commanded secret police departments within the army; in rank, he was the equal of the military commander but, in October 1942, they were appointed deputy commanders – now subordinate to the military commander. By 10 October 1941, 10,201 Red Army soldiers had been shot, 3,321 in front of their units (Khlevniuk 2015: 210). It became a crime to be taken prisoner and families of POWs were deprived of their pensions. Every city was to be defended to the last man. The Wehrmacht took Kyiv and almost half a million prisoners, in September. Stalin was to blame as he would not permit a withdrawal of troops to a more defensive position. By October, the Red Army had lost three million dead or wounded and the same number captured. On 15 October, Stalin envisaged abandoning Moscow the following day but changed his mind. Foreign diplomats and many government offices were evacuated to Kuibyshev (now Samara). To boost morale, the 7 November anniversary parade was marked with a military march past. The event was filmed and shown throughout the country. Moscow was saved by the incisive leadership of Zhukov, who had fresh troops from the Far East as well as a thousand tanks and aircraft. Vital information from Richard Sorge, a German communist spy, in Tokyo, that Japan was not going to strike against Siberia but against the US in the east and the British, French and Dutch, in south east Asia, permitted the withdrawal of many troops and equipment. There was also the fact that the Wehrmacht did not realise that panic reigned in the city as the Metro halted, bakeries stopped baking bread and communists tore up their party cards. The clinging mud meant that tracked vehicles were necessary but most German vehicles had wheels. German carts fell apart and their horses died in thousands. The Germans had no winter clothing and a quarter of a million soldiers succumbed to frostbite. An offensive to take Kharkiv, ordered by Stalin against military advice, failed amid huge losses. Repeated counter-attacks, instead of retreating to

66  Analysis form defensive lines, were ordered throughout 1942 and explains the huge losses suffered by the Red Army. There were several turning points during the war: the first was the successful defence of Moscow which revealed that the German Blitzkrieg had failed; the second was the great victory at Stalingrad (November 1942–February 1943) and the third was the giant tank battle at Kursk (July 1943–August 1943). Stalingrad resulted in the destruction of a Wehrmacht force of 300,000 and the capture of 91,000 troops (only 6,000 returned home), Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, the first of this rank ever to be captured in battle, and 24 generals. Over 200,000 German and allied troops perished but Soviet losses will never be known. In March 1943, Stalin promoted himself marshal. At Kursk, which involved four million soldiers, the Soviets had twice as many tanks as the Germans. The Germans successfully retreated but the defeat ended all hopes of a Wehrmacht victory over the Red Army. Zhukov became the leading general but he was also a hard taskmaster. On one occasion, a Ukrainian officer was explaining, on maps on a table, why his unit had failed. Zhukov became so enraged that he took a knife and sliced off the tips of some of his fingers. The tide turned decisively from early 1944 onwards. Leningrad was relieved and rapid advances were made in Ukraine and into Romania. On 17 July 1944, over 57,000 captured Wehrmacht troops, led by generals and officers, were paraded through Moscow. A similar parade was held in Kyiv on 16 August. The Red Army could now field 6.6 million troops and outnumbered German matériel resources. Stalin promoted Russian nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church came in from the cold and a Patriarch could now be elected. Portraits of the great nineteenth century generals, Aleksandr Suvorov (who never lost a battle against Napoleon) and Mikhail Kutuzov, were placed side by side with photographs of Lenin on the wall of Stalin’s office. Those who had been awarded Tsarist medals in combat could now display them side by side with Soviet medals, to which were added the order of Suvorov, the order of Kutuzov and so on. In early 1945, the Red Army advanced rapidly to the river Oder and prepared for the final assault on Berlin. Stalin was determined to get to Berlin ahead of the British and Americans. The vozhd regarded the German capital as a military-political prize whereas General Eisenhower, the Allied commander in chief, only saw it as a military one and agreed that the Red Army should have primacy. Stalin launched a two-pronged attack and set Marshals Zhukov and Konev against one another to get there first. One of the prizes was the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, from which the Soviet troops seized 250 tonnes of metallic uranium and three tonnes of uranium oxide. The institute was the centre of German nuclear research. Lend-Lease aid was important and Khrushchev revealed how significant American Dodge trucks and gun mountings had been to the Soviet war

The Great Fatherland War, 1941–45 67 effort (Khrushchev 1971: 199). They helped to keep the Red Army mobile, in 1943, and speeded up its advance but the main contribution was made by Soviet industry. Prodigious achievements were achieved as the whole nation was girded for war. Soviet industry outproduced the German war economy and the longer the war lasted the greater the difference became. The Red Army had 25,000 tanks at the beginning of the war but only about 10 per cent were battle ready. ‘Ivan’ was underestimated in 1941 but later Germans began to regard him with dread. If a German soldier misbehaved elsewhere, he was sent to the eastern front as punishment.

The economy By November 1941, about half the population and one third of productive capacity had been lost or was threatened. Enormous efforts were undertaken to dismantle factories and, by November 1941, over 1,500 had been moved eastwards. Women and the unskilled had to be used to fill the gaps left by the fighting men, but they succeeded in raising production, in 1942, to 59 per cent and, by 1944, to 79 per cent of the 1940 GDP. Food production suffered as much of the arable land fell under German control. Grain output, in 1942, was 36 per cent and, in 1944, 64 per cent of that of 1940. Horses, where available, were sent to the front, so that women were left to farm under the most primitive conditions and where there were no animals, women were yoked to the plough. The cow population was only half of that of 1940. The Soviet Union simply went hungry during the war years (Doc. 16, p. 155.).

Culture The 2 years which followed the invasion were an Indian summer for Soviet letters and a torrent of writing engulfed the reader. Deeply patriotic and virulently ant-German, it painted a picture of fortitude, heroism, self-sacrifice and suffering. The Leningrad siege produced particularly moving literature. The common soldier was not forgotten and his qualities of wit, humour and perseverance were celebrated in print and on stage. Someone had to be held responsible for the dreadfully poor leadership of the Red Army and, in his novel, The Front, published by Pravda, in August 1942, Aleksandr Korneichuk put the blame fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the older generation of war leaders. The younger generation, more technically able, would, he asserted, turn the tide. Russia’s national history was glorified and the heroes of the past who had served Russia at vital moments – Aleksandr Nevsky, Kutuzov, Peter the Great and the like – rallied the forces again from the grave. The glorification of the past continued a trend which had become noticeable in the 1930s. Writers seized the opportunity offered them by the war of depicting real people in real situations. Heroes and heroines came to life on the page and

68  Analysis were a far cry from the nebulous beings of the 1930s but, in late 1943, the party began again to reassert its authority. The person who felt the full force of the party’s ire was Mikhail Zoshchenko, a noted satirist. His Before Sunrise was held to be too pessimistic, too subjective and short on patriotism. Konstantin Fedin also came in for some harsh treatment. The offending work was volume two of his Gorky anthology, and such was the furore, that volume three was never published.

The party The war changed the composition of the party. During the war, over 5 million candidate members and 3.6 million new members joined; of these, 3.9 million candidate members and 2.5 million members were serving in the armed forces. By 1945, one quarter of the men and women in the military were communists and a further 20 per cent were members of the Komsomol. This meant that just over half of party members, at the end of the war, were servicemen and women: a new phenomenon, for, in June 1941, only 15 per cent of the military had been enrolled in the party. It is fair to say that a clear majority of new members only had a nodding acquaintance with Marxism-Leninism.

Nationalities The multinational composition of the Soviet Union was a profound weakness on the eve of the German invasion. The decimation of the national elites during the purges and the travails of collectivisation had left a deep reservoir of resentment among many non-Russians. Over a million Soviet citizens, including 250,000 Cossacks, fought on the German side against the Red Army. Stalin did not afford Soviet Germans the luxury of choice. He dissolved the Volga German autonomous republic, in August 1941, and packed off all the Germans, communists and serving officers and soldiers in the Red Army, to the east (Doc. 18, p. 157.). Since some nationalities had welcomed the Germans, they were all accused of collaboration and deported. This involved Karachai, in October–November 1943, Kalmyks, in December 1943, Chechens and Ingushi, in February 1944, Crimean Tatars, in June 1944, Greeks also in 1944, as well as Meskhetians and Balkars. In all, about 3.3 million people were deported or resettled between 1941 and 1948. A German prisoner of war, in Chechnya, told me that the Chechens, on occasion, would warn the Germans to stay indoors that evening as they were going to raid the camp and kill Russians. An Ingush informed me that when the train stopped in Kazakhstan, everyone was turfed out into the steppe and had to dig holes in the ground to protect themselves against the night cold. He referred to Kazakhs as a ‘hostile people’. All these nations were rehabilitated after 1956, demonstrating that their suffering had been in vain. They were permitted to return

The Great Fatherland War, 1941–45 69 to their ancestral homes with two exceptions, the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars. Some Germans left the Soviet Union to settle in East or West Germany.

The grand alliance No formal alliance between Great Britain, the USA and the USSR was ever concluded. When Winston Churchill heard of the German attack, he proposed, in the House of Commons, immediate aid to the Soviet Union. There was no immediate response but with Stalin back in the saddle everything changed. An Anglo-Soviet diplomatic agreement was reached on 12 July 1941 and, on 18 July, Stalin wrote to Churchill proposing a second front, in France, and another in the Arctic. When the Soviet leader met Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s envoy, at the end of July, he had already drawn up a long list of necessary equipment. On 3 September 1941, Stalin asked Churchill for 30,000 tonnes of aluminium by the beginning of October and a minimum monthly supply of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks. He also wanted a second front in the Balkans and France, in 1941. On 13 September 1941, he proposed Great Britain land 25–30 divisions at Archangel or ship them to the southern part of the USSR via Iran to cooperate militarily on Soviet soil with the Red Army. Asking for foreign troops on Soviet soil underlines how desperately pessimistic Stalin was about the situation. The US extended a $1 billion credit in November 1941 and included the USSR in the Lend-Lease Act. Hitler committed a major error of judgment when he declared war on the US, on 11 December 1941. Had he not done so, it is more than possible that the US would have restricted itself to fighting Japan before committing combat troops to the European theatre. An Anglo-Soviet treaty was signed, in London, on 26 May 1942, but it had taken 6 months to negotiate. One sticking point was that the Soviets wanted the frontiers of 22 June 1941 recognised. This would have meant Poland ceding territory, but the Polish government in exile, in London, would not countenance such a thing. The Americans were also against making binding agreements about post-war frontiers. This highlighted the problem of Poland, which was to become one of the most bitter during the war. Even when the USSR was waging a life and death struggle against the Wehrmacht, Stalin was still thinking about future territorial gains. One of the few occasions when Stalin lost his temper in the presence of a Western statesman occurred in August 1942, in Moscow, when Churchill informed him that Anglo-American forces would not invade northern France but North Africa, in November 1942. Stalin’s reaction was to taunt Churchill with the suggestion that British troops were afraid of fighting Germans. The British Prime Minister swallowed the insult. Indeed, on the Anglo-American side, there were some feelings of guilt that the Red Army was bearing the brunt of the Wehrmacht’s onslaught. Stalingrad was a

70  Analysis turning point in relations. Until then, the Soviet Union had been begging for aid and was very fearful about the future. Afterwards, the tide of war began to turn and Stalin became very self-confident in his dealings with Allied statesmen. He was aware that time was on his side and that if the Red Army overran eastern Europe, it would be Moscow which would decide where the western frontiers of the Soviet Union would be. The first time the Big Three – the UK, the US and the USSR – came together, was at Tehran, in November 1943, and it was a striking success for Soviet diplomatic skill as Churchill and Roosevelt competed with one another to praise Stalin. In reality, it was the Big Two, with the UK clinging to the coattails of the US. No firm line was taken on Poland, and it was Churchill who suggested that perhaps Poland could be compensated for loss of land in the east by the acquisition of some German territory in the west. The second front, in France, was firmly set for May 1944. By the time the Big Three met again at Yalta, in Crimea, in February 1945, the military situation had so changed that the Soviet Union was preparing the final assault on Berlin. Eastern and south-eastern Europe had been almost completely overrun. Finland had left the war, in September 1944. A Polish provisional government had been recognised by Moscow, on 5 January 1945. In May 1944, Churchill had conceded the USSR a key role in Romania and Bulgaria, and when he visited Moscow, in October 1944, he widened the agreement to include Hungary and Yugoslavia, in which countries the Soviet Union and the West were to have equal influence. Greece was to fall within the British sphere. Stalin merely put a large tick against the percentages proposed by the British Prime Minister. Since both parties were aware that there were no Anglo-Americans troops in the countries involved, Churchill was tacitly conceding that the Soviets would play the leading role in them. In Greece, British troops were present, and this tipped the scales against the Greek communists. Although Stalin did not get everything he wanted at Yalta, the Polish frontier was to be moved westwards, with Poland being compensated at Germany’s expense. This was guaranteed to make post-war Polish-German relations very tense and this implied that Warsaw would need Soviet support. Another bonus was that the USSR was to gain southern Sakhalin (lost in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05) and the Kurile islands, as a reward to going to war with Japan when European hostilities had ended. Neither side completely trusted the other to fight Germany to a finish. The Western Allies were not certain, as late as summer 1944, whether, once the Red Army reached the German frontier, it would stop. Stalin, in his turn, suspected that the Western Allies might conclude a separate peace with Berlin, thus permitting the Wehrmacht to pit all its strength against the Red Army. One of the reasons that Churchill was willing to concede so much, in 1944–45, was that, if no agreement were reached, the victorious Red Army might sweep forward so fast that Moscow would become the arbiter of the

The Great Fatherland War, 1941–45 71 fate of Europe. His concessions to Stalin were an attempt to salvage as much as possible for the West. The Soviet flag flying over the Reichstag, on 2 May 1945, symbolised the situation. The Soviet Union had become the leading power in Europe and was only number two to the US in the world. On VE Day, 8 May 1945 (9 May 1945 in Moscow, because of the time difference), the USSR was unsure of itself and uncertain how long it would be staying in Germany. Washington expected the Soviet Union to be economically weak and to need up to 20 years to recover fully. Britain was expected to be the leading power in Europe but was, economically, in no position to sustain such a role. There was a grand victory parade, in Moscow, on 24 June. Stalin was to mount an imposing white horse and lead the celebration but, on examining the animal, thought it better to ask Marshal Zhukov to take over. This was a wise decision as Stalin’s left arm was damaged and it would have been difficult to control the horse, if it shied. Zhukov, a fine horseman, rode the steed in style and Stalin could only look on with envy.

7 High Stalinism, 1945–53

The war elevated Stalin to new heights and he became a demi-god, according to the propagandists. He was worshipped but to many he was a man of mystery. Not given to much internal travel, and in the pre-television era, he appeared mainly through newspaper photos. The films in which he starred painted him in heroic colours with no sign of the pock marks on his face. Like many short men, he was acutely conscious of the fact – he was only about 1.6 metres – and portraits and films gave the impression of a taller man. One fact stood out: Stalin’s power and influence had now reached its apogee. He would decide which direction the country would take and those who disagreed would be remorselessly crushed. This occurred at a time when his mental faculties began to decline and, consequently, the final years of his dictatorship are strewn with campaigns, conspiracies, fabricated court evidence and a general fear of the morrow. Stalin deliberately set out to turn the gaze of the population away from the outside world and concentrate on life and culture at home. If he was worshipped by many, there were others who were not so enamoured. Millions had seen what life was like outside the Soviet Union and were struck by the higher standard of living there. Soviet propaganda had presented life under capitalism as penury and there were many now who could correct this narrative. Prisoners of war returning from Germany were dispatched to the east for interrogation to find if they had internalised any dangerous ideas. The country was in ruins – the Germans had destroyed everything they could when retreating – and a colossal effort would be needed to rebuild the shattered homeland. Peasant soldiers hoped that they would enjoy more economic freedom in the kolkhozes; party members looked forward to contributing to the debate about how the country was to be rebuilt; nonRussians hoped that their cultures would flourish again. Could the relationship with the West continue and remove the permanent threat of war? Stalin moved quickly after victory to break up the key institutions which had fought the war and hence wielded great power. The State Defence Committee (GKO) was dissolved, on 4 September 1945, and its functions were distributed among many commissariats (renamed ministries, in

High Stalinism, 1945–53 73 March 1946). Demobilisation of the 11 million service men and women began and the party launched a campaign to raise the ideological level of its members (McCauley 1993: 178). Stalin conceded to Red Army (renamed the Soviet Army, in March 1946) commanders, at a reception, on 24 May 1945, that: our government made more than a few mistakes; there were moments of desperation in 1941–42, when our army was on the retreat, abandoning our native villages and cities…Another people might have told its government: you have not met our expectations; go away; we will put another government in your place that will sign a truce with Germany and ensure us peace. But the Russian people chose not to do that since they believed in the correctness of their government’s policies and chose to make sacrifices to ensure the destruction of Germany. And this trust the Russian people placed in the Soviet government proved to be the decisive force that secured a historic victory against an enemy of humanity – against fascism. Thanks to the Russian people for this trust! (Khlevniuk 2015: 262) A remarkable speech and one of the few times Stalin ever conceded he made mistakes. What were the mistakes the government had made? This question was posed to Stalin on several occasions but he never provided an answer because it could open a Pandora’s box of accusations against the authorities. The other striking aspect of the peroration is that he thanked only the Russian, not the Soviet, people for their trust and endeavours. This was a recurring theme and he often referred to the country as Russia to foreigners, whereas Molotov always said the Soviet Union. Stalin talked about the country’s losses and gave a gross underestimate of the sacrifices the country had made. It made it easier to bear if the numbers were low. He also tried to present the appalling record of the Red Army in the early stages of the war as a measured retreat, even citing Kutuzov’s retreat and sacrifice of Moscow to, eventually, destroy Napoleon’s Grande Armée, in 1812. The vozhd was concerned about the ‘contamination’ of society by Western ideas and mores which could lead to the Soviet population developing an inferiority complex. Campaigns to eradicate ‘kowtowing to the West’ were launched. A CC resolution, in August 1946, pilloried the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad, with the latter being accused of publishing material ‘permeated with the spirit of servility towards everything foreign’ and closed down. The satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko’s writings were suffused by the ‘venom of a brutish hostility to the Soviet system and the scum of the literary world’. Akhmatova was called a ‘concoction of nun and harlot…a mad gentlewoman dashing back and forth from her boudoir to her chapel’. Andrei Zhdanov, speaking for Stalin, was the author of these attacks and the cultural establishment was chastised until his death, in August 1948. G. E. Aleksandrov, a protégé of Zhdanov, had published an acclaimed tome

74  Analysis on The History of Western Philosophy and had even won a Stalin Prize. A conference was organised, in January 1947, to tear the book to shreds but Stalin was not satisfied with the results and a further conference was held, in June, when the wolves set upon Aleksandrov for underestimating Russian influence on Western philosophy. Aleksandrov was removed from the CC agitation and propaganda department and replaced by Mikhail Suslov, who later became the guardian of party orthodoxy. After culture and philosophy came science. Two scientists had apparently come up with a miraculous cure for cancer and had submitted their article for publication in an American journal. In June 1947, they were arraigned before a court of honour – a tsarist body for naming and shaming officers and officials who had transgressed – and 800 spectators. Publishing abroad was ‘anti-patriotic and anti-state’. It was all very embarrassing for Zhdanov, who had helped the scientists in their research. All things Russian was glorified and anything of value had been discovered by a Russian, including the first person to fly. Relativity theory, quantum mechanics and genetics, not fathered by Russians, were mere pseudoscience. Soviet science was socialist and Western science bourgeois and, by definition, erroneous. There were exceptions such as mathematics and astrophysicists. Why? They contributed to the production of an atomic bomb. The first Soviet test of an atomic bomb occurred on 29 August 1949 in northern Kazakhstan. However, it was only deliverable or capable of being dropped in 1954. Then began the race between the US and USSR to build a hydrogen bomb (also known as a thermonuclear weapon) which would be vastly more destructive than an atomic bomb. The American team was led by Edward Teller, a theoretical physicist, and Stanisław Ulam, a mathematician. It was transported to the Marshall Islands, in the Pacific, and detonated there on 1 November 1952. It was about 700 times as lethal as the Hiroshima bomb. On 1 March 1954, the Americans tested another which was about 1,000 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb. The father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb was Andrei Sakharov and the first prototype was tested in August 1953 but was less powerful than the American one. Beria was the driving force behind the Soviet bombs – aided by reams of calculations supplied by those working on the American bombs – and he made clear to the scientists that failure was not an option as it could end their lives. Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Mikoyan – the Five – had ruled the country during the war. Stalin’s health was failing and the went off to the south. This gave rise to much speculation in the foreign press that the vozhd was on the way out and perhaps Molotov would take over. Time to take ‘iron arse’ down a peg. At the Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting, in London, in September 1945, Molotov made concessions which Stalin forced him to withdraw. Even worse, he stated that he was doing this on Stalin’s orders. The vozhd demanded that Libya, Italy’s colony in north Africa, become a Soviet trustee territory but this was turned down. In December, he accused Molotov of scheming against him, which led the latter to abase

High Stalinism, 1945–53 75 himself and claim that the vozhd had been misinformed. Beria, Malenkov and Mikoyan also came in for some harsh treatment but assured Stalin that they had given Molotov a dressing down. When Stalin returned to Moscow, in December, Andrei Zhdanov, was added to the Five and it became the Six. In October 1946, Nikolai Voznesensky came on board and now it was the Seven who ruled the country. Marshal Zhukov, the country’s greatest war leader, became a target and several generals close to him were arrested. Zhukov was demoted to the Odesa military district. The CC convened, in March 1946, and elected a new Politburo, Secretariat and Orgburo. The latter was to supervise all party affairs and to meet at least once a week. The Politburo was to meet fortnightly but over time met less frequently. Many party members looked forward to a flowering of ideology but the vozhd held back as there was no guarantee it could be kept fully under control. Interpreting Stalin’s thought was particularly difficult as he was never a man to waste words. There are only three items for 1947 and two for 1949 in his collected works. Pravda editorials called for everything to be done in a Stalinist spirit and declared a Stalinist attitude to work was needed but what exactly did that mean? He pointed the way ahead in a major speech, on 9 February 1946. If citizens were expecting a more relaxed life, they were to be bitterly disappointed. Economic targets were set, not only for 1950, but also 1960. Life was going to be hard. Party membership grew slowly and it was only about 20 per cent higher, in 1953, than it had been in 1945. The new recruits were the decision makers: engineers, technicians, members of the intelligentsia, skilled industrial workers and leading cadres in agriculture. Hand in hand with careful selection of new recruits, went purges; about 100,000 members were expelled annually in the late Stalin era. In 1946, Stalin chose Aleksei Kuznetsov, second in command to Zhdanov, to remodel the party apparat but his brief did not include ideology. He was to concentrate on producing competent technical cadres. His report painted a disturbing picture of drunkenness, debauchery (too much sex) and careless handling of confidential documents by leading officials. The party apparat – called the holy of holies by Kuznetsov – had become compromised by its close relationship with government agencies. Stalin was informed that many local party bosses spent their time acquiring scarce goods and organising events at which huge amounts of alcohol were consumed. State agencies paid for the booze and the girls. Lower level apparatchiks had to make do with ordinary girls; middle level comrades had more attractive girls; the bosses had sensational girls. CC department heads formed cliques with no fraternising with those below or above. Important ministers were like feudal lords who simply ignored the CC and went directly to the Council of Ministers. The secrecy was absolutely stifling. Kuznetsov concluded that if this continued, it would mean the end of the party. Attempts made to extricate the party apparat from the economy proved futile.

76  Analysis Famine again ravaged the country in 1946–47 with over 1.5 million dying of hunger or disease and countless others having their health permanently undermined. Cannibalism again reared its head. A Ukrainian party member told me his family survived by illegally acquiring and secreting away black beans.

Eastern Europe A Soviet backed coup in Czechoslovakia, in February 1948, brought the last country in the region under communist control. In 1945, the first stage of sovietisation was the formation of coalitions with bourgeois politicians and with all major industries nationalised. Then the communists took over. Opposition to the communist takeover was widespread and this led to harsh measures against opponents. The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was set up, in Szklarska Poreba, in Poland, in September 1947, and embraced all the new satellites except east Germany. Zhdanov was the main speaker at the founding congress and divided the world into two camps: the socialist and the imperialist, with countries such as India and Indonesia outside both. Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav leader, had come to power without the help of the Red Army – which, fortuitously, had left Yugoslavia – and was acting too independently for Stalin. He was unceremoniously drummed out of the Comintern, in June 1948, despite his pledges of loyalty to the vozhd, who expected the Yugoslav leadership to split and depose Tito. The opposite happened as Tito eliminated the pro-Moscow faction within the leadership and emerged stronger. Agents were sent from Moscow to liquidate Tito but they were liquidated instead. There were rumours that Tito sent a note to Moscow telling Stalin to desist otherwise he would send a man to Moscow and he would not fail. This was quite a blow to Stalin as he was confronted with a major leader for the first time since Trotsky. Yugoslavia would have collapsed financially had the US not stepped in and shored up the communist state. Stalin set out to purge eastern Europe of Titoists and there were show trials of communist politicians and others, in Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, which resulted in death sentences. The Soviet secret police supervised the falsification of evidence, at which they were past masters. A show trial was scheduled in east Germany but, for some unknown reason, was cancelled.

The Leningrad affair In August 1948, Andrei Zhdanov died and his duties, as the vozhd’s deputy, were taken over by Georgy Malenkov. Zhdanov had been head of the Leningrad group or clan and, under his patronage, many leading positions were filled. The Gosplan chair, Nikolai Voznesensky, was another member. As intrigue and back stabbing were part of the political culture, Malenkov and

High Stalinism, 1945–53 77 Beria set about doing down the Leningrad group, now almost defenceless, with the death of its patron. They exaggerated their many misdemeanours and the whole affair snowballed, with the vozhd accusing Leningraders of copying Zinoviev who had tried to transform the Leningrad party organisation into a power base for his ‘anti-Leninist faction’. This was lethal language and reminiscent of the 1930s and usually proved fatal for the accused. Death sentences duly followed, in September 1950, involving Voznesensky and other leaders. Several hundred others were sentenced to death, imprisoned or exiled. The purge extended to other regions of the country where Leningraders had been promoted. Stalin took aim at Molotov through his Jewish wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, accusing her of being involved in various anti-Soviet Jewish organisations. The vozhd told Molotov to divorce her, which he duly did. In December 1948, she was expelled from the party and Molotov could not bring himself to vote in favour. Soon afterwards, he repented and sent Stalin a humble apology. In March 1949, Molotov was dismissed as foreign minister and replaced by Andrei Vyshinsky, and Mikoyan was dropped as Minister of Trade. The prevailing atmosphere of the period is nicely illustrated by a comment that Nikolai Bulganin made to Khrushchev: ‘It has happened that a man goes to Stalin at his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin he does not know where he will be sent next, home or to gaol’. Aleksei Kosygin, on leaving for the office in the morning, always instructed his wife what to do if he did not return in the evening. At the same time, the cult of Stalin’s personality reached new heights (Doc. 20, p. 161.). If Stalin was hard to men, he was equally hard to women. Milovan Djilas, a prominent Yugoslav communist, records a conversation about the misbehaviour of Soviet troops (Doc. 21, p. 162.), which reveals that the vozhd did not spare a thought for the victims of the assaults. This was typical of the attitude towards females during Stalin’s last years – their highest calling was to bear children. With millions of men dead, there were simply not enough males to go round so the law was changed and the paternity suit disappeared. Henceforth, a man was not to be held legally responsible for offspring born out of wedlock. The literature of the period portrays the problems which arose as soldiers returned from active service. Women who had filled men’s shoes during the war had simply to step down. The woman who devoted herself completely to the party and neglected her husband and children now became an object of censure. The male was king, and never had the law and the state been so openly on his side. Djilas perceived a rapid decline in Stalin’s mental facilities by 1948 (Doc. 22, p. 162.). The targeting of Jews began in early 1948, when the prominent Jewish theatre director, Solomon Mikhoels, was run over by a lorry, on Stalin’s orders. He then ordered the dissolution of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which had drummed up support for the Soviet Union during the war. Its members and others were arrested and almost all executed. Jews

78  Analysis became victims of a campaign against ‘cosmopolitans’ with many losing their jobs and others being discriminated against. When Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, fell in love with a Jew, he was labelled a British agent and shipped off to the Arctic. This has led to the question: was Stalin an anti-Semite? It is worth mentioning that the campaign against ‘cosmopolitans’ embraced other nationalities as well. That said, many of his opponents who were liquidated, were Jews: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Sokolnikov, for example, but Lazar Kaganovich, a Jew, was a close associate. Khrushchev relates that Stalin once accosted him and claimed that he was a Jew. Embarrassed, he assured the vozhd that there was no Jewish blood in his family. One of the reasons for the rise of anti-Semitism was the disappointment that Israel, established in June 1948, had turned west instead of east, given the number of east European and Soviet Jews in the leadership. In late 1952, Stalin informed the party leadership: ‘any Jew-nationalist is an agent of American intelligence. Jew-nationalists believe that their nation was saved by the U.S.A. (there you can become rich, a bourgeois, etc.). They feel they have an obligation to the Americans’ (Khlevniuk 2015: 286). It seems that in his final years, Stalin regarded Jews as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ nationality.

Economic policy Material wartime losses were immense: 70,000 villages and 98,000 kolkhozes were wholly or partly wiped out; 1,876 sovkhozes laid waste; 17 million head of cattle and seven million horses were confiscated; 65,000 km of railway track were destroyed and well as half of the railway bridges in occupied territory. In the towns, 1.2 million homes had been demolished, and 3.5 million in the country and a third of the capital stock had been destroyed (Doc. 19, p. 160.). The fourth FYP (1946–50) was to put the country back on its feet. Achievements were exaggerated with the claim that national income (roughly GDP) was fulfilled (Doc. 7, p. 142.). Nothing could disguise the poor performance of agriculture, given the appalling famine of 1946–47 (Doc. no. 11, p. 142.). The kolkhoz labour force dropped from 18.2 million, in 1940, to 11.5 million, in 1945. Widespread theft of grain was common and, in 1945, over 5,700 kolkhoz chairs were sentenced and, in 1946, 9,500. Desperate times give rise to desperate measures. Nikita Khrushchev, then Party boss in Ukraine, in June 1948, promoted a decree, which permitted the exiling of the work-shy and it was then extended to cover the whole country. The legislation, ordered Stalin, was not to be published. Over the years 1948–53, 33,000 kolkhozniks and 13,600 members of their families were exiled to Siberia. The private plots of kolkhozniks and workers were taxed: in money and kind. The average plot had to deliver annually 40 kg of meat; up to 100 eggs and 320 litres of milk. The average money tax rose from 112 roubles in 1940, to 528 roubles, in 1952. There was no way a kolkhoznik could pay this tax from his wages: he had to take as much produce as possible to

High Stalinism, 1945–53 79 the kolkhoz market and raise the money. This forced prices down and the result was that villages were reduced to penury. In 1950, the average annual income of a kolkhoznik was 1,133 roubles (workers earned, on average 7,000 roubles) with only 221 roubles being earned from working on the kolkhoz. A simple explanation why labour productivity on kolkhozes was so low. In 1950, private plots of kolkhozniks accounted for 38 per cent (and workers, 13 per cent) of the global agricultural production of the country (this included 46 per cent of animal products). The poor state of the agrarian sector meant that more young men and women made for the cities, in search of employment, and hence this was greater than envisaged (Doc. 7, p. nos. 16 and 17, p. 142.). As a result, total money wages were far in excess of the plan (Doc. 7, no. 18, p. 142.). and real wages (inflation deducted) did not rise as quickly as intended (Doc. 7, no. 19, p. 142.). Agricultural incomes were miserably low, but large numbers of farmers were saved from starvation by the possession of a cow (Doc. 7, no. 24, p. 164.).

Currency reform All governments print money during wartime and the Soviet Union was no exception. Rising inflation was the result so a currency reform was needed to balance the money in circulation with what it could buy. In 1943, it was decided to increase prices, introduce new roubles and end rationing after the war. The 1946–47 famine held up these reforms and it was only, in December 1947, that the currency reform was announced. Ten old roubles could be exchanged for one new rouble. Bank deposits were treated differently: depositors who had of up to 3,000 roubles were not affected; those who had between 3,000 and 10,000 would receive two new roubles for 30 old roubles; and those with over 10,000 roubles, one new rouble for 20 old ones. The government was trying to erase much of the black market gains during the war but failed to do so. Salaries for November were paid ahead of schedule and many took this as a signal that a reform was coming. People rushed to savings banks to take out their savings and bought furs, watches, jewellery, furniture and anything else which would retain its value. Before the reform those in the know had split their savings into smaller accounts. After the reform, the amount of money in circulation dropped from 59 billion roubles to 4 billion. On the face of it, the reform had been a resounding success. The end of rationing saw the prices of some food items drop while clothing, for instance, rose. Customers could only buy a certain amount of food and other essential items. Many discovered they could not buy what they needed and would have preferred rationing to continue. The reform was presented as a way of wiping out the ill-gotten gain of black marketeers but, instead, produced a new group who enriched themselves: officials and those working the shadow economy, who had bought up large quantities of goods before devaluation, now sold them on at a handsome profit. Store managers were in prime position to benefit but several

80  Analysis thousand, of whom most were party members, were arrested for speculation. Many senior party, government and police officials escaped punishment by forming a mutual protection society. Stalin was aware of these criminal activities but appears to have taken no action and had to accept that the profit motive was alive and kicking in the Soviet Union. The currency reform was a success and permitted the government to engage in a much-needed reform of industrial prices. Now is an opportune moment to take a closer look at Stalinist economic planning (Doc. 27, p. 168.). A unique system evolved in which the impression was given that a master FYP was being implemented. In reality, there was no master plan, merely a mass of lower level plans which the centre tried to coordinate. How could there be an overall plan if the FYP was adopted only after the beginning of the plan period? The targets for the output of each factory, steel mill, each power station always demanded more than the economy could sustain. This forced a multitude of adjustments, usually in favour of heavy industry. It was quite normal for a factory to receive emendations daily. All economic units throughout the country formed part of one vast company, Soviet Union PLC. Information was therefore of key importance if the centre – Gosplan and the economic ministries – were to take rational economic decisions. Many of the failures were due to decisions based on faulty information. Human nature being what it is, enterprises had no intention of revealing their true resources and potential. They wanted easy to fulfil plans and colluded with one another to achieve this. It is more apt to describe the Stalinist centrally planned economy as a centrally managed economy. The key economic official in any oblast was the party first secretary. Where there was industry, they were normally engineers and formerly successful enterprise directors, but, in oil producing oblasts, they were geologists. He (very rarely she – when I asked why there were so few female party officials, I was told that women were not hard enough) was responsible for all activities in his bailiwick, including meeting the plan; finding resources in short supply; settling disputes between enterprises and attracting more investment. In practice, some first secretaries were more important than ministers and when they moved upwards, they took their team or tail with them.

Meeting Mao The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed by Mao Zedong, on 1 October 1949, and he declared that the PRC was no longer ‘on its knees’ and would stop kowtowing to foreigners. The ‘century of humiliation’ had come to an end and henceforth the country would develop in a way which corresponded to Chinese characteristics. China needed to industrialise and there was really only one source of aid: the Soviet Union. Mao played the obsequious apostle to Stalin but the vozhd had no intention of turning

High Stalinism, 1945–53 81 China into a formidable communist competitor. Mao requested a meeting with Stalin many times before he came to power but was always rebuffed. Liu Shaoqi led the first Communist Party of China (CPC) delegation to the Soviet Union, from June to August 1949. This laid the groundwork for Mao’s visit, in December 1949, and he was welcomed at the station (Mao disliked flying) by Molotov and Bulganin, resplendent in his marshal’s uniform and Stalin received him in his Kremlin office that evening. He was ensconced in a dacha about 30 kilometres from Moscow and all he could do was to fume and look out at the snow. On 21 December, he sat on Stalin’s right at the latter’s birthday celebrations. Then back to the dacha. He became so frustrated that he shouted – to ensure he was overheard – that he was ready to do business with the US, Britain and Japan. Diplomatic relations were established with London, on 6 January 1950, and a rumour was leaked to the British press that the vozhd was holding Mao under house arrest. Stalin changed tack, with talks beginning on 22 January 1950, and a SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was agreed, on 14 February with various other agreements being signed. The Soviet Union lost almost all the gains it had achieved at Yalta and the Changchun Railway and Port Arthur, instead of passing to the USSR for 30 years, were to be returned by 1952. Property leased in Dalian was to be returned immediately and thereby the Soviet Union lost its only ice-free port on the Pacific. A $300 million loan was extended, at 1 per cent interest, and to be invested in defence plants. Manchuria and Xinjiang were to remain Soviet spheres of interest. Throughout the proceedings, Stalin addressed Mao as Gospodin (Mr.) and declined to address him as comrade which the Great Helmsman found deeply insulting. Why did he make so many concessions to Mao? He was wary of China going its own way and Mao turning into another Tito, and Sino-American relations might develop in a way inimical to Soviet interests (McCauley 2017: 14–21).

The Korean war In 1945, Korea was divided along the 38th parallel. Japanese forces surrendered to the Red Army in the north and to the Americans in the south. In the north, the Soviets installed a 33 year old Red Army officer, Kim Il-sung (literally ‘Become the Sun Kim’), and in the south, the Americans installed a 70 year old professor, Syngman Rhee, who had spent 33 years in exile in the US. Skirmishes between north and south were the order of the day, and both sides concluded that the only way to reunite Korea was by military force. Stalin was cautious and his instructions to Soviet representatives in the north, in May 1947, were: ‘We should not meddle too deeply in Korean affairs’. Kim Il-sung visited Moscow, in March 1949, to ask for help in taking over South Korea but Stalin demurred. He kept Kim in check until he had

82  Analysis the atomic bomb, the communists had taken over China, and Korean units fighting with the Japanese Army – amounting to about 50,000 troops with their weapons – had returned to North Korea. Soviet forces began to leave North Korea, in late 1948, and US forces left South Korea, in June 1949. In September 1949, the Soviet Politburo prohibited the North Koreans from engaging in any military activities near the 38th parallel but, in January 1950, Stalin changed his mind and said he would talk to Kim who, then, reported to Mao that the Soviet leader had approved his plan to attack the south. On 25 June 1950, the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel and, initially, were unstoppable. President Truman’s comment was: ‘If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East. There’s no telling what they’ll do if we don’t put up a fight now’. The Americans managed to get a UN mandate from the Security Council because the Soviet delegate had been boycotting it. A UN coalition, including US, Britain, Turkey and 12 other nations, turned the tide. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the UN forces, landed at Inchon and crossed into North Korea, took Pyongyang and most of the north, and it appeared Kim would be swept into the sea. On 18 October 1950, 180,000 Chinese troops crossed into Korea and took the UN forces completely by surprise, obliging them to retreat. The Soviet air force joined in. Kim asked Mao for a cease fire, in June 1951, but the Chinese wanted the war to wear down the Americans and their allies. The longer the war lasted the more arms factories he could ask for from Moscow. In February 1953, the new US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, warned the China he might use the atomic bomb; this was great news for Mao and he requested an atomic bomb from the vozhd. On 28 February 1953, Stalin decided the war had to end, and an armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. China sent three million men into Korea and lost about 400,000 and the UN coalition counted 142,000 fatalities. The Soviet air force won the air war and 12 Soviet air divisions were deployed with 72,000 airmen involved in combat. The Soviets claimed they shot down 1,097 enemy planes and anti-aircraft guns accounted for another 212, with the Soviets losing 335 planes and 120 pilots. Among the dead was Mao’s eldest son and Moscow provided China with hundreds of MiG warplanes. It was a great victory for China and, for the first time in a century, China had emerged from a war on the victorious side. Between 1950 and 1953, China imported technical equipment worth 470 billion roubles and this permitted the construction of 47 industrial projects. Over the same period, 1,093 Soviet technical experts worked in China. The Soviets designed about 80 per cent of all projects, provided 80 per cent of the equipment and provided technical materials, free of charge. Moscow also sent 120,000 books and reference materials and 3,000 scientific documents, free of charge. Thousands of Chinese students and specialists

High Stalinism, 1945–53 83 went to the Soviet Union to study. The Soviet Union, therefore, provided the science and technology base which permitted the Middle Kingdom to industrialise rapidly. The war poisoned Sino-American relations for almost two decades and ensured that Beijing had to look to Moscow for support. Before the war, Washington did not regard Taiwan as worth defending, but, afterwards, it prevented Beijing from taking it over. On the other hand, when China invaded Tibet, it remained inactive. The Korean war led many Americans to believe that a war against the Soviet Union was inevitable (McCauley 2017: 21–25).

Eastern Europe In January 1951, a meeting took place between the Soviet leadership and top officials from the eastern bloc. Stalin and several members of the Politburo and military made up the Soviet delegation. Eastern European countries sent their party leaders and defence ministers (only the Polish party leader was absent). General Sergei Shtemenko, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, spoke of the growing NATO threat and the need to counterbalance it by increasing the military capabilities of the socialist countries. The Soviet satellites were instructed to increase rapidly their military might during the following three years and to create a military-industrial complex to support this. Shtemenko laid down specific targets for each country. The Polish defence minister, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, pointed out that such an expansion was planned for 1956 and, therefore, could not be realised by 1953. Stalin said that was fine providing Rokossovsky could guarantee that war would not break out before 1956. Because he could not, the original plan was to be implemented. The Soviet military, reduced to 2.3 million, in 1949, had grown to 5.8 million, by 1953. Military expenditure grew by 60 per cent, in 1951, and 40 per cent, in 1952, but these are estimates and the actual outlay may have been higher. Highest priority was afforded nuclear weapons, rocket technology, jet bombers and fighters and an air defence system for Moscow. In February 1953, major programmes in aviation and naval ship construction were launched: there were to be 106 bomber divisions by the end of 1955 – instead of the 32, in 1953. This involved building 10,300 new planes and increasing naval and air force personnel by 290,000. Soviet military bases were established in Kamchatka and Chukotka, near the maritime boundary with the US. Was the vozhd planning a pre-emptive strike against the West? In early 1951, Stalin proposed the holding of another Cominform conference and to nominate Palmiro Togliatti, the general secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), as general secretary of the Cominform but Togliatti declined the offer and no conference was held. What was behind this move? To encourage western Europeans communist parties to seize power? (McCauley 2017: 25, 26).

84  Analysis

The Cold war emerges The key country for the Soviet Union in Europe was Germany. Soviet thinking about post-war Germany began in 1943 and, by 1944, commissions comprising members of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), then in exile in the Soviet Union, were busily working out plans for German development. It was only at Yalta that Stalin knew that it would acquire a zone in Germany. The behaviour of the Soviet reparations and dismantling squads in the Soviet zone angered many Germans as it hurt the prospects of communists, led by Walter Ulbricht, and boosted support for the social democrats (SPD). The latter wanted the factories being dismantled – on the basis they had belonged to Nazi criminals – nationalised to form the basis of a socialist economy. At the Potsdam conference, in July–August 1945, it was agreed that Germany should be denazified, demilitarised and democratised, and that the USSR should get reparations, though the exact sum was not stated. Germany was divided into three zones (increased to four when France became an occupying power) and Berlin was given its own control council under three (later four) power control and divided into sectors. Relations between the USSR and the Western Allies, in 1945, were good. In 1946, they became strained and during and after 1947 they were bad. From early 1946, the Western Allies became concerned about the expansion of Soviet power. The event which marked a watershed took place in the Soviet zone, in April 1946, when two political parties, the KPD and SPD, were compelled to unite and form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). This was mainly due to Soviet concern about the popularity of the SPD. The other occupying powers would not legalise it in their zones. Many social democrats in east Germany and the vast majority in west Germany opposed the fusion. This meant that Marxist socialism or even Christian socialism suddenly became less attractive in west Germany, and this pushed parties to the right, establishing a gulf which had not existed in 1945. The Soviets pushed through many reforms in their zone without consulting their allies, such as being the first to license political parties. In eastern and south eastern Europe there were small indigenous communist parties, led, in the main, by Moscow émigrés and they favoured a socialist revolution, in 1944–45, but were restrained by Moscow, until 1947. The initial Soviet goal were democratic revolutions involving parliaments and multi-party coalitions. Tactically, this was an astute move, since the countries involved were very weak economically, and would find it difficult to satisfy Soviet demands for reparations; had they gone communist all the resentment of the population would have been directed against local communists and their Soviet protectors. Stalin knew local communist parties had to be cleansed of ‘sectarians’ and ‘adventurists’; in short, all those who would not accept the tactics Moscow proposed. It was not only in the east that the Soviets held back fraternal parties from attempting to seize power. Western parties were also affected. It was considered prudent, at a

High Stalinism, 1945–53 85 time when there were American troops in France and Italy, not to be seen to be fomenting revolution. This circumspection lasted until 1947, but, by then, the most propitious moment for revolution had passed. There seems to have been a general directive for communist parties in Europe to work within the parliamentary system and not to attempt a revolution in 1945 and 1946. For instance, the archives of the Communist Party of Norway, contain such instructions. After 1947, people’s democracies gradually took over and adopted Soviet political institutions. The Western powers had assumed the main task was to contain Germany, now the perception was that the Soviet Union posed the greater threat and containing the USSR became the new policy. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine (promising help to any country threatened by communism), the fusing of the US and British zones to form Bizonia, and the currency reform which split Germany economically, in June 1948, were some of the measures adopted. They, in turn, led Moscow to seek ways of welding their satellites more closely to it. The Berlin Blockade was the Soviet Union’s desperate gambit to force the Western Allies to cancel the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in their zones and their sector of Berlin. The blockade increased hostility to Moscow and by the time the blockade was lifted, in May 1949, the western zones were on their way to becoming the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO followed. The currency reform was the key event which divided Germany, until 1990. On reflexion, the West underestimated the Soviet Union, in 1945, but overestimated its power, after 1947. Isaac Deutscher was one of those who pointed this out but, as a Trotskyite, was ignored.

Science Soviet scientists can lay claim be the founders of gerontology, ecology, cybernetics, the lie detector, population genetics, molecular biology and modern neuroscience. Given this astonishing array of talent, why did Soviet science not dominate the world? The simple conclusion is that science was held back by Marxism or rather Stalin’s understanding of the sage of Trier (Ings 2016). German and Russian have only one word for science, Wissenschaft, which makes no distinction between science and the humanities. Hence Marx, for one, held that science was a single whole and laws from one discipline could inform others. He believed in scientific government with science informing politics to the point where there was no distinction between knowledge and policy. An early synthesiser of all disciplines was Aleksandr Bogdanov who worked closely with Lenin until they fell out. He dreamt of a universal science which would put all previous knowledge in the shade. Capitalism had fragmented scientific progress; socialism would reunify it. Real science benefited humankind and pure research was an indulgence and hence a waste of resources. In other words, all science had to be applied science and had to

86  Analysis demonstrate tangible results. Given the Soviet Union’s desperate economic situation, these results had to be produced double quick. Marx was a follower of Jean Baptiste Lamarck, a talented Belgian scientist who came up with the term ‘biology’. He developed what became known as the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Train an animal or a person to do something and the offspring would inherit the skill. This was a hugely attractive idea which could make it possible for a person, within a generation under socialism, to be transformed into a rational thinking and acting individual. Heady stuff, and the Bolsheviks swallowed it hook, line and sinker. If humans could be transformed so could nature and that was needed was the desire to achieve this. Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, Stalin’s pet Lamarckian, put it nicely: ‘To achieve a certain result, you must want to obtain precisely that result; if you want to achieve a certain result, you will obtain it…I need only such people as will obtain the results I need’ (Ings 2016: 289, 290). The barefoot scientist was telling everyone that will superseded reality. This was music to Stalin’s ears and led to many crackpot proposals to achieve astonishing results if funding were forthcoming. One smart fellow managed to obtain 200,000 roubles but as little was heard of him, a search party was sent to find him. He was located enjoying himself in Leningrad’s cabarets and night clubs! Another proposal was that soda baths rejuvenated one. Baking powder sold out overnight. Stalin had a penchant for lemons and wondered if it would be possible to breed trees to produce them in the Arctic. He was an avid experimenter in his greenhouse in Moscow and at Sochi. Nikolai Koltsov was an early proponent of eugenics. He imagined that people could be domesticated just as dogs had emerged from wolves. ‘Rebellious types could be eradicated; docile breeders would give rise to an obedient workforce; those with fine motor control would be bred to create craftsmen; the most beautiful bred for show, and so on. In as little as a century, endless individual races of domesticated people as sharply distinct from one another as a pug or a lapdog is from a Great Dane or St Bernard’ would appear (Ings 2016: 146, 47). There was also the suggestion that the most beautiful women could be impregnated with the sperm of a handsome he-man who was capable of siring 1,000 offspring. Eugenics took a nosedive after the Nazis gave the discipline a bad name. Ings gives some hilarious examples of crazy science. There was the ergonomist who invented a machine with pulleys and belts to churn out new types of human being. A scientist tried to cross a chimpanzee with a human but the chimpanzee won and the human ended up in hospital. When Lenin died, in January 1924, it was decided to preserve his brain. This practice had begun in the German states, in the mid-1850s, and spread to France and other countries. A German specialist and his wife began examining the brain, in 1925, and concluded, in 1929: ‘In layer three of the brain cortex, in many areas, especially in the deeper regions of this layer,

High Stalinism, 1945–53 87 I found pyramidal cells of a size I have never before observed and, in a number, that I have never before observed’. What did this all mean? ‘Our brain anatomical results show Lenin to have been a mental athlete’. Freud attracted much interest and his chief apologist among the Bolsheviks was Trotsky but there was a major problem: Freud’s view of human nature was pessimistic and this ran counter to the Bolshevik demand that everyone be an optimist. Despite this Trotsky, in January 1927, penned ‘Culture and Socialism’ which enthusiastically appealed for an understanding of Freud’s opus. The timing could not have been worse. Stalin was demolishing Trotsky’s reputation so his support of Freud was the kiss of death for psychoanalysis. As a postgraduate at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, in Moscow, I asked my supervisor to arrange a meeting with Lysenko but was fobbed off with the answer that he was too ill to receive visitors. The battle, or rather war, between two schools of thought about genetics lasted from the 1920s to 1966. On the one side were the Lamarckians, who regarded themselves as materialists and, on the other, the followers of Gregor Mendel who were labelled idealists. As Stalin was a Lamarckian (not even the brilliant botanist Nikolai Vavilov, in an hour-long discussion, could convince him he was mistaken) it was a foregone conclusion that Lamarck would triumph over Mendel. Lysenko was from a poor background and did not concern himself with theory or mathematics. He was a practical comrade – but also an egomaniac with a huge inferiority complex towards orthodox scientists – who would open the way to agricultural plenty in the Soviet Union. He promised the earth and delivered practically nothing. He did not publish scientific papers but mainly newspaper articles and denied the existence of genes, the existence of competition within species and opposed hybrid grains. One of his pet projects was vernalisation. Winter wheat, for instance, yields more than spring wheat so the grain should be treated in such a way as to ensure, when sown in spring, it would produce the superior harvest. This was an old idea that had been tried out in the US in the nineteenth century and rejected because the economic gain was minimal. The main problem was that it was labour intensive and yielded meagre results. Lysenko was a brilliant salesman and could spout Bolshevik speak – an irresistible combination. He told Stalin what he wanted to hear and was ready with a new panacea when a problem arose. The Russian steppe was short of animals so Lysenko hit on the idea of populating it with exotic creatures: Sika deer, European bison, racoon dogs from Manchuria and grey mullet and Black Sea invertebrates were added to the Caspian Sea as food. Wolves, as predators, had to be exterminated. The outcome was disastrous. ‘With no wolves to pick off the weaklings, the health of deer, moose and other ungulates collapsed, even as their populations skyrocketed. Their diseases passed to domestic cattle, causing a huge death toll. And feral dogs quickly filled the niche the wolves had left behind’ (Ings 2016: 195, 196).

88  Analysis In the 1930s, many top geneticists were executed and Mendelian genetics almost died. The terrible famine of 1946–47 led to a blame game. Despite the huge investment in agricultural research, the country could still not feed itself. Someone had to pay and Lysenko targeted the Mendelians. Genetics was banned in 1948. What could be done to stave off famine? A massive tree planting operation to hold back scorching winds – its modest title was The Stalin Plan for the Great Transformation of Nature. The result? By 1952, half of the forests had died and the first two forest belts were in a sorry state. There was a plan to turn Siberian rivers, which flow to the Arctic, southwards. Irrigation canals were built but not lined so at least a third of the water seeped away. Some Soviet scientists continued to work in Berlin during the war. One of them, Nikolai Timofeev-Ressovsky, was carrying out valuable research on genetics. He was shielded from denunciations by the local SS Gruppenführer who had taken a great interest in his work. Timofeev-Ressovsky’s institute received a regular supply of rabbits which were irradiated for study. Towards the end of the war, food became very scarce so the rabbits, instead of being irradiated, were eaten and the SS Gruppenführer was rewarded by being a regular guest at experimental rabbit dinners. When I visited plant physiology and animal husbandry research stations, in the 1970s, I always enquired about genetics. On one occasion, I was asked: ‘What is genetics?’ At a meeting with the director and a few colleagues that evening, I mentioned that I was surprised that a scientist could ask such a question. ‘Oh’, replied the director, ‘that was our party secretary. We always elect our most stupid scientist party secretary’. He confirmed that the institute had ignored the ban on Mendelian genetics. This was the case at other institutes and a professor at the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy risked his life by teaching genetics to a few select students. Ings makes the point that the Soviets were much given to aspiration and much less to implementation. This was brought home to me when I attended a session of a local soviet in Moscow, in 1969. A female deputy waxed eloquent on the need to increase milk production. Irritated, another deputy intervened and asked: ‘And how would you achieve this?’. There was no answer. So why did Lysenko get away with it for so long? Stalin was lauded as the coryphaeus of science, a scientific genius. What he pronounced upon could not be questioned. Lysenko was the most brilliant of the manipulators of his scientific ideas as the vozhd had no way of judging who was right because he had never studied science. There was no retirement age in the Soviet Union, so the only way to gain promotion was to unseat those in higher positions. A violent struggle developed between and among colleagues to move upwards and the most ruthless and ambitious won. Under Stalin to lose meant often the loss of one’s own life as well. Stalin only intervened directly in genetics and linguistics, leaving scientists in other disciplines to fight among themselves to climb up the greasy pole.

High Stalinism, 1945–53 89 Soviet psychiatrists had no understanding of human psychology. Soviet psychiatrists were taught that psychological terms and expressions were subjective, idealistic and non-scientific – and they were forbidden to use them… It was Soviet psychiatry that made waves of fresh incarcerations possible, by promulgating models of human mental functioning that were savagely reductive, doctrinaire, rigid and plain wrong…The number of hospital beds almost tripled and the number of psychiatrists almost quadrupled between 1950 and 1970 (Ings 2016: 426–28). Those with contrary views were viewed as schizophrenics such as, for example, those who criticised MarxismLeninism by quoting Marx. They were viewed as suffering from ‘philosophical intoxication’. Zhores Medvedev was incarcerated because he published in two fields – biology and political science – and was thus regarded as suffering from a split personality. A man who called the Komsomol leaders a bunch of paper pushers suffered from ‘reformist delusions’ and had insulin pumped into him to bring him to his senses. Religious believers, hippies, draft dodgers and the like all ended up being treated for psychiatric disorders. During the Soviet era, there was a colossal waste of natural resources and nature was raped and desecrated at will. Why was this? The Bolsheviks set out to bend nature to their will and there was also the Marxist point that nothing has any value until a human hand is placed on it. Hence virgin forests, for example, have no value. The massive hydroelectrical projects during the Stalin era never took into consideration the damage to the environment, the cost of drowning so many towns and villages and the transfer of thousands of people. Belomorstroi, the White Sea Canal which linked the Baltic and White Seas, was trumpeted as a great success even though it turned out to be economically useless.

Culture Stalin loved watching films in the Kremlin cinema and one visitor, the director of the film the vozhd was watching, was searched 15 times before he could sit down. Then a secretary brought Stalin a message. ‘What’s this rubbish?’, he commented but the director thought he was commenting on his film, fainted and was carried out. And ‘they didn’t even give him a new pair of pants for the ones he had soiled’, commented the vozhd. Among Stalin’s favourites were The Great Waltz about Johann Strauss and he saw it dozens of times. He loved the Tarzan films as the Red Army had seized many American films in Berlin, including those starring Johnny Weissmuller, and they were gradually released to the public. Boys would wear Tarzan haircuts and utter war cries which were said to be so piercing that they disturbed cattle on the collective farms and kept cows from giving milk! Some Russians believed Tarzan was a real person. So pervasive was the Tarzan cult that the party stepped in and started a campaign against it. Mikhail Chiaureli’s The Fall of Berlin was a 70th birthday gift for Stalin, in 1949. The hero and heroine are summoned to meet Stalin in his white

90  Analysis tunic in a beautiful garden and Stalin is carrying a hoe and listening to the birds singing. The Germans then attack and Stalin and his generals confer during the defence of Moscow. Hitler, the corpulent Göring, the limping Goebbels (he had a club foot) are chatting with diplomats from Japan and the Vatican. The Führer rants and raves in Russian and Göring is chatting to an American who toasts the imminent fall of Stalingrad. Shostakovich’s music accompanies the Soviet victory. At Yalta, the cunning, double chinned Churchill puffs on a cigar and Roosevelt nods as Stalin unfolds some maps. The battle of Berlin is dramatic with everyone looking up as Stalin’s plane lands in Berlin which is followed by quasi-religious scenes of adoration. The only problem is that Stalin did not go to Berlin. The film was widely distributed in Western Europe but it was only in 1952 that it hit America. The New York Times dismissed it as a ‘deafening blend of historical pageantry and wishful thinking’. Stalin alighting in Berlin was like a ‘Gilbert and Sullivan frolic’. However, there were American critics who regarded it as a ‘masterpiece of cinema art’ (Caute 2003: 143–47). I saw the film in the 1950s and it made a great impression on me especially the scene where Stalin descends from his plane like God from Heaven. After Stalin’s death, it was lambasted by the critics and Shostakovich took his revenge on Chiaureli by claiming he could not tell a piano from a toilet bowl. The vozhd took a great interest in film scripts, poetry, plays and books and regularly edited them before they could be performed or published. His musical tastes were pre-modern and this made life difficult for composers such as Shostakovich. The Conspiracy of the Doomed (1950) was widely distributed. An American ambassador, MacHill – villains in Soviet Cold war films were usually call Mac something – arrives to arrange a crop failure to overthrown the communist government (apparently Czech). The suave diplomat is also plotting the assassination of the deputy Prime Minister. A devious cardinal – probably modelled on Cardinal Minszenty, Primate of Hungary – tells everyone the drought is God’s punishment for forsaking Him. It turns out that there is no grain shortage – it was being hidden by kulaks all along and workers take over and chant: ‘Stalin, Stalin’. The ambassador curses everyone and flies away. The film never reached the US but this did not stop some American critics rubbishing it – based on Soviet reviews. Nevertheless, it is regarded as one of the two best Cold War films produced in the Soviet Union. They Have a Native Land (1949) tells the story of Soviet children captured in Germany by the British and Americans and some are put on a ship for New York. They ‘want to send them to be cannon fodder in a new war’, the voiceover explains. Frau Wurst (Mrs. Sausage) asks a British officer for a slave girl with blue eyes and the officer obliges but all ends happily as the children are returned to the Motherland. The British and Americans all speak impeccable Russian – they were in counter-intelligence, of course. What message came through Soviet Cold War films? The Soviet Union defeated Germany and Japan without any help from the US and Britain; it

High Stalinism, 1945–53 91 did so despite an Anglo-American conspiracy to help Germany and Japan; victory was due entirely to the leadership of Stalin. The Anglo-American conspiracy appeared time and again but Roosevelt was always held to be innocent. The Secret Mission (1950) drew protests from London and Washington. Americans are shown running away from a German offensive, in January 1945. Field Marshal Montgomery shouts into the telephone: ‘I won’t help the Americans. They can go to the devil’. Churchill appeals to Stalin for help and complains the Americans are ready to negotiate a separate peace with Germany. Heywood, an American senator, says: ‘We held up the second front for two years to cheat the Russians’. Himmler replies: ‘We have left the Western front deserted’. German troops are shown surrendering to the Americans in ceremonial order. How this fits with the beginning of the film which showed Americans fleeing in panic is not explained. Roosevelt’s Vice-President Truman is presented as the person who sent Heywood to inform Hitler about the forthcoming Soviet offensive and the German industrialist Krupp promises Heywood that he will preserve his military factories in West Germany but destroy those in East Germany before the Soviets arrive. Krupp thanks Heywood for all the raw materials he received to continue his war production. Heywood goes to the Balkans to meet Hitler supporters and is told that if things get too hot to go to Yugoslavia where he will be safe. This was the film’s swipe at Tito. In the last scene, Churchill promises a new world war and expects it to cost the lives of half of the world’s population before it ends. No wonder the British and American governments were outraged at the total falsification of history. The film was a runaway success in the Soviet Union. Silvery Dust (1953) deals with the African-American question and is set in the American South. White racists are willing to sacrifice blacks in pursuit of a ‘death ray’. Blacks are sentenced to the electric chair but the Ku Klux Klan moves in to execute them. A general intervenes and the blacks are put in a laboratory cage and expected to die from ‘silvery dust’ but peace partisans raid the laboratory and rescue the African-Americans and warn the white racists that they will face a people’s court one day. The American delegate even complained in the UN Security Council about the ‘extravagant fictions in which all the villains are Americans. For many years the Soviet Union has been busy at just this sort of thing’. The Soviet representative commented that he had encountered dozens of American films which contained outrageous slanders against the Soviet Union. Cold War films, he admitted, presented superficial ‘psychological portraits’ but overall reflected the reality of the ‘imperialist conspiracy’. In the US, The Woman on Pier 13, was one of the first ‘Red Menace’ films to be favourably reviewed. It concerned communist manipulation of labour on the San Francisco waterfront. The party ruthlessly disciplines its members. I Was a Communist for the FBI (1951), has a leading communist committing a fictitious murder. To ‘bring communism to America we must incite riots’, is a comment. Communists are portrayed as the sworn enemies

92  Analysis of African-Americans, workers and Jews. In My Son John (1952) a wholesome American mother has two sons fighting in Korea ‘on God’s side’ but the third one, John, is a red and she hands him over to the FBI. Informing on family members as a civic duty appears in many American Cold War movies. John decides to confess but his party comrades murder him before he can but he had taped his confession beforehand and confesses he is a traitor and a communist spy. Walk East on Beacon (1952) praises the FBI for protecting Americans from communism. They uncover a vast network of spies trying to steal the secrets of a path breaking new computer. Big Jim McLain (1952), starred John Wayne as an agent, who deals with communists on the Honolulu waterfront. Big Jim’s assistant is murdered and the communist plan is to paralyse communications and halt the flow of war material to Korea. Big Jim has a punch up with the bad guys before they are arrested. An arts festival held in West Berlin, in 1951–52, revealed how seriously the US State Department took cultural competition with the Soviet Union. Porgy and Bess was a hit with Berlin audiences and the Boston Symphony Orchestra gave concerts as did others and the Americans enthused that US prestige had risen more during a month than in the previous seven years. A Soviet cultural festival took place in Paris, in April 1952. Works by Prokofiev, Ravel, Copland, Rachmaninov and Richard Strauss were played and Stravinsky, who had fled to Paris in 1939, returned to conduct his own work. Works by composers banned under Hitler were performed and, in December 1952, six Soviet musicians ventured as far as Edinburgh to give a concert in a half empty Usher Hall with listeners very impressed by their technical skill. Jazz was all the rage in the Soviet Union after 1945. The Red Army even had a jazz band and the Communist Party set up its own. That changed during the Zhdanov clampdown and jazz was banned not only in the Soviet Union but also in Eastern Europe. It was derided as ‘black music’ and, in 1949, all saxophones were confiscated and many jazz musicians ended up in the gulag. Many American jazz bands toured Europe and Japan. Louis Armstrong took France by storm and the Pope thanked him. Voice of America and the US army in Germany and Austria broadcast jazz to an adoring audience. Jazz in Moscow was seen as a narcotic, a way to dope workers and hypnotise the will by machine rhythm. Paul Robeson maintained that the ‘real’ Negro music was spirituals and the blues. Soviet art concentrated on three genres: the portrait, mainly of political and military leaders (there was a famous one of Marshal Zhukov on a white horse backed by Berlin burning); historical themes: displaying the evolution of the new socialist state; and genre painting (workers, collective farmers bring in the harvest, parades for peace; joyous folk festivals in which everyone is depicted as smiling, healthy and moving forward). The leading figure portrayed was Stalin always receiving the thanks of a grateful people. Artists in the satellite countries had to follow suit. East German art copied

High Stalinism, 1945–53 93 Soviet art and the only thing that was different were the costumes (Caute 2003: 152–77, 394–96, 444–46, 516, 517).

Spies During the 1930s, the Cambridge spies (Guy Burgess, Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross – dubbed the Fabulous Five) provided Stalin with reams of material. Burgess, for instance, forwarded 4,604 documents, over twice as many as Blunt before 1939 but Stalin judged them a plant, so voluminous and detailed were they. Wartime intelligence was invaluable to Stalin as it provided him with British and American negotiating positions at all the Big Three meetings; and US spies sent analyses and goals as well. It was not all one way traffic. Wilfred Mann, a brilliant British physicist involved in the Manhattan project to build an atomic bomb, spied for the Soviet Union but was turned and worked for the CIA. The Fab Five caused enormous damage to western intelligence – and the death of many agents. The British establishment was deeply shocked, often unwilling to believe that men born to privilege, educated at public schools and Cambridge, could possibly be communist spies. The best symbol of the transformation wrought by the Cambridge spies is James Bond himself. Ian Fleming was a clubman but 007 is not. While ‘M’ takes Bond to lunch at the fictional Blades Club, Bond is not a member. He is classless and independent, and this stands out in Spectre, the 2015 film. He defends the establishment but is outside it and becomes the perfect post-war spy. The Briton who became possibly the most successful Soviet spy was Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. Born in Newcastle-on-Tyne, in 1903, his family moved to Soviet Russia in 1921. He joined the secret police and was posted to Oslo and London during the 1930s and became involved in radio deception. He entered the US in 1948 and ran a spy network in New York. He was betrayed by a colleague but escaped the electric chair and was eventually exchanged for Gary Powers, captured when he was shot down over Ekaterinburg on a spying mission. He died in 1971 and appeared on a Soviet stamp and is the subject of the 2016 Steven Spielberg film Bridge of Spies, in which he is brilliantly played by Mark Rylance who was rewarded with an Oscar. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was set up on 13 June 1942 to provide mainly intelligence about Germany and it was wound up on 20 September 1945. The CIA appeared on 18 September 1947. Towards the end of the war, the Americans sought to acquire the Wehrmacht’s intelligence on the eastern front. Lieutenant Colonel Reinhard Gehlen, headed the operation and, and after the war, offered the Americans his services, personnel and files. The Americans welcomed him with open arms but Gehlen was

94  Analysis unaware that Soviet intelligence controlled most of his sources and were aware of most of the others. In 1940, Soviet scientists concluded that an atomic bomb from enriched uranium was feasible. On 16 September 1940, Donald Maclean – one of the Fab Five – forwarded a report to Moscow on a project codenamed Tube Alloys. In March 1942, Beria forwarded a report on British atomic research to Stalin, mainly supplied by John Cairncross. In January 1943, Bruno Pontecorvo, an Italian born British subject, working on the Manhattan project, reported to the NKVD about the first nuclear chain reaction, and by July 1943, Moscow had received 286 classified US documents. The Soviet embassy in Washington received 211 rolls of classified documents in 1943, 600 in 1944 and 1,896 in 1945. These provided valuable material on radar, wireless technology, jet propulsion and synthetic rubber which permitted Soviet industry to advance. When the first atomic bomb was detonated, in August 1949, it was very similar to the ‘Fat Man’ bomb dropped on Nagasaki. In January 1950, the confessions of Klaus Fuchs, a German born British scientist who had worked on the British bomb and the Manhattan project, led to an intensive hunt by the British and US authorities to unearth other spies. Fuchs revealed he had passed 570 top secret documents to the Soviets by November 1943. Another key scientist, never identified, had passed on about 5,000 pages. In February 1950, the revelations about spying were seized upon by the junior senator for Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, to declare dramatically that he had evidence that there were no less than 206 communists in the State Department. There were communists among the military as well. He argued that President Truman was soft on communism and had ‘lost’ China to the communists in 1949. A witch hunt ensued and reached hysterical heights, underlining the dep insecurity of the American establishment (McCauley 2017: 26–31).

The Doctors’ plot and the Mingrelian affair Stalin was always suspicious of his security services and, in July 1951, ordered the arrest of Viktor Abakumov, Minister of State Security, and many of his subordinates, and the new minister, Semen Ignatiev, from the party apparat, was given the task of fabricating the necessary incriminating evidence. This resulted in a sweeping purge of the ministry. Stalin then departed for a four-month vacation in the south but continued to monitor the ministry closely. In October, he told Ignatiev to ‘kick all the Jews out of the ministry’ and the diligent minister began fabricating a Zionist plot within the ministry. The purges then embraced high level Jewish functionaries in the party and state apparat. The next target turned out to be Georgia, the bailiwick of Lavrenty Beria. The local Minister of State Security reported that Beria, a Mingrelian, was

High Stalinism, 1945–53 95 placing his own people in important positions. Many republican leaders were arrested and 11,000 people were deported to remote parts of the Soviet Union. After Stalin’s death, Beria arranged for the dismissed officials to return to their former posts. At the XIXth Party Congress, in October 1952, the Politburo was replaced by the Presidium with almost three times as many members as before. Was Stalin preparing a purge of the old guard to make way for a new, younger Stalin cohort? Dmitry Shepilov, a member of the party Central Committee, and later editor of Pravda, attended the Congress which he found awe inspiring, but Stalin’s behaviour troubled him. He was condescending towards his closest colleagues and hurled accusations at them. Marshal Kliment Voroshilov was guilty of ‘espionage’; Vyacheslav Molotov and Anastas Mikoyan had ‘capitulated to American imperialism’. ‘Could all this be a product of Stalin’s schizophrenic paranoia?…To question Stalin or try to object – these outlandish ideas did not occur to anyone. The pronouncements and views of the genius Stalin could only be reverently and rapturously acclaimed’ (Shepilov 2007: 235). When Mikoyan began to defend himself, he was shouted down and told not to try to fool the Central Committee. As Shepilov mentions, no one would now dare make a move as the vozhd had made it clear he was going to cling on to power until his dying breath. In January 1953, Pravda had announced the discovery of a Doctors’ Plot. Since 1945, several leading politicians had allegedly been murdered by a group of doctors, most of whom were linked to a Jewish organisation run by the Americans. One of those accused confessed that he had been ordered to ‘eliminate the leading cadres of the Soviet Union’ and this included comrade Stalin. The newspaper assured readers that documentary evidence to prove these heinous crimes was available. Ministries were accused of slackness and the Komsomol of lacking vigilance and Stalin devoted a lot of time to the fabrication of evidence against the ‘wrecker doctors’. Their patrons were to be found in the Ministry of State Security. The Minister, Semen Ignatiev, suffered the full force of Stalin’s foulmouthed insinuations which included calling officers ‘hippopotamuses’ and he was going to ‘drive them like sheep and hit them in the mug’. Several leading doctors, who treated the Kremlin elite, were arrested, in October and November 1952, and Stalin told investigators to use torture. The minister informed Stalin that two of his most skilled torturers had been assigned to the case but there was resistance to the brutal methods being deployed. A party Presidium meeting, on 4 December 1952, passed a resolution on the work of the Ministry of State Security: Many Chekists [Ministry of State Security officials] hide behind…rotten and harmful reasoning that the use of diversion and terror against class enemies is supposedly incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. These good for nothing Chekists have descended from positions of

96  Analysis revolutionary Marxism-Leninism to positions of bourgeois liberalism and pacifism. In a closed session, Stalin made clear what he wanted done: ‘Communists who take a dim view of intelligence and the work of the Cheka, who are afraid of getting their hands dirty, should be thrown down a well head first’. The wrecker doctors were allegedly in collusion with ministry officials and the orders to assassinate leading Soviet personnel came from a US based bourgeois Jewish organisation and British intelligence services (Khlevniuk 2015: 308). Rumours swirled around Moscow about possible pogroms and the expulsion of Jews from Moscow and other cities. Then suddenly, on 23 February 1953, the whole campaign was dropped. Shortly after Stalin’s death, the so-called plot was acknowledged as a fabrication and the deputy Minister of State Security indicted and executed. On Saturday 28 February 1953, the vozhd summoned Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev and Bulganin – together with Stalin, the Five – to his dacha for the last dinner he would ever give. Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov, long term members of the inner circle, were in disgrace. That night he suffered a stroke and was found the next day paralysed and lying in a pool of his own urine. Doctors were only called on 2 March and they confirmed that he was at death’s door. Molotov and Mikoyan joined the other oligarchs, in direct

Figure 7.1  Stalin’s Funeral 1953 USSR [© Photo 12/Alamy Stock Photo]

High Stalinism, 1945–53 97 defiance of Stalin’s orders at the recent Congress and they asked the doctors to prolong Stalin’s life to give them time to prepare for the post-Stalin era. Pravda, on 4 March, gave the public the grave news about their leader’s imminent demise. The expanded Presidium appointed at the last Congress was dissolved and a new Presidium elected to restore the status quo ante. At 9.50 pm, on 5 March, the vozhd died an agonizing death.

Part 3

Assessment

8 Stalin: Personality and power

Stalin’s character and behaviour changed over time. One can examine him playing three separate roles: • • •

In 1929 he became the leader In the early 1930s he became a dictator In 1937 he became a despot

As a leader he had to build coalitions to push through his policies. This involved compromise and skilful political manoeuvring, and giving the impression that he respected the views of his close colleagues. As a dictator, he rode roughshod over the views of some of his colleagues and eventually excluded them from influencing key decisions. Rapid industrialisation and collectivisation were enormous risks, but he managed to keep his closest colleagues on side. Ordzhonikidze, a close colleague, tried to protect his officials from accusations of spying and wrecking but to no avail. After a furious row with Stalin, in 1937, he committed suicide. With Ordzhonikidze gone, no one dared oppose the vozhd but only discuss policies – with him having the final word. He is then the despot who can decide all major policies and liquidate anyone who is seen as a challenge to his supreme power. Stalin destroyed many documents and materials at the height of his power. Presumably his reasoning was that they shed too much light on his thinking and personality. As an inveterate collector of information, he may have surmised that someone else, ill disposed towards him, could use the papers as evidence against him. This neatly sums up Stalin’s personality and modus operandi: reveal as little as possible and confuse the opposition. Critical decisions and orders should not be written down, they should be delivered orally. If the order concerns one person or a small group of persons, it can be given orally. If it involves a large group, for instance, party officials or NKVD officers, it must be put down on paper. The historian is thankful for this since it provides invaluable insights into the decisionmaking process during Stalin’s time. As someone who was conscious of his place in history, Stalin wanted to be painted a hero and to leave an indelible

102  Assessment mark on Soviet society. He saw himself as a revolutionary force who would elevate the USSR from being a run of the mill European power to become its leading force. The world would then follow Europe. More important than this would be the transformation of Soviet society from an underdeveloped bourgeois to a socialist and then to a communist society. The wheel of history had to turn quickly. Since there was no time to waste, change had to be accelerated and the most appropriate implement was force. Those who resisted were rejecting a brilliant tomorrow, a paradise on earth and the most effective way of dealing with them was to exterminate them as they were parasites, vermin and a disease on the body politic. It was a service to humankind to dispose of them. Maxim Gorky once remarked perspicaciously that Lenin treated workers and indeed people as a miner treats ore. Stalin was of the same mould. Anything was justified which pushed the revolution forward and if some innocents were killed in the process this was a small price to pay for progress. After all, the masses were important, the individual not. On the one hand, Stalin, at the pinnacle of the Soviet Union, is not difficult to understand. He saw himself as an agent of history, acting rationally, not only in the interests of the Soviet working class, but also of the world proletariat. A heady mix which can lead to vanity, if not megalomania. On the other hand, he was an intensely private person, hiding his emotions, a superb actor who could read the weaknesses and frailties of others and play on them to his own advantage. He never kept a diary but then neither did Lenin nor any leading Bolshevik. Private thoughts were not important in the struggle to build a new world. Some decisions of the Politburo were deemed too important to be recorded in the minutes. The work of members of the party Secretariat was deemed secret and not put down on paper. Stalin normally controlled his emotions but, at times, they exploded. He lost his temper once with Lenin’s wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, and had to apologise humbly. He controlled his drinking but liked to force his companions to drink to excess and he did not need to know any Latin to realise that ‘in vino veritas’, drink loosens the tongue. The British politician, Rab Butler, related how he coped with the problem of drink. Winston Churchill, a great bibber, plied him with the best brandy and insisted that he kept drinking with him. When Churchill was not looking or lighting up a cigar, Butler poured the spirits down his shoe. No comrade dared to do the same when Stalin replenished his glass for the umpteenth time. Stalin liked Georgian wine but usually ate traditional Russian food. He had a penchant for bananas and when he was served unripe bananas, in 1949, he had the Minister of the Food Industry sacked! He was a night owl, like many of the world’s most powerful leaders, and obliged his colleagues to remain at their desks until 3 or 4 a.m., just in case he needed to phone them for information. This took a heavy toll on their health and cardio-vascular diseases were common. His inner circle often watched films into the wee hours and then had to repair to his dacha for a repast.

Stalin: Personality and power 103 He loved films and a special 20 seat cinema was built in the Kremlin, in 1934. Viewings began in late evening and went on into the small hours. Stalin sat in the front row with other top colleagues. He and others engaged in a running commentary and afterwards Stalin would issue instructions about the contents of films and the film industry. Questions about ideology and cultural policy were also debated and decided. There were also discussions about policy before and after the viewings. As time passed, fewer and fewer colleagues were invited to the Kremlin cinema. After the viewing, everyone repaired to Stalin’s dacha which was nearby. He liked to work in a large room on the first floor and often slept there and there was an open fire and sometimes meat was roasted there. The dacha was surrounded by a large park which cows, horses, hens, ducks and bee hives. He gave detailed instructions – almost every day – to the manager of the park and followed the progress of the plants sown. He was a keen student of aviation and received daily reports about production and also devoted much time to studying military hardware. An inveterate pipe smoker, he had to give up in 1952. He dealt with 100 or 200 documents daily, wrote a lot and his prose in clear and almost always grammatically correct, even though Russian was not his first language and made attempts to learn German and English but never attempted to practise what he had learnt. Stalin’s library contained over 20,000 volumes and was replete with books by Marx and Lenin and he was very well read in modern Soviet literature. He believed that extensive reading made it easier to find solutions to difficult problems. At times, he wrote comments in the margin, sometimes offensive. Writers, playwrights and cinematographers were to depict the glorious tomorrow and not the mundane today. He had a limited knowledge of Russian and foreign classics. The vozhd devoted an enormous amount of time to editorial work and read books, film scripts and plays before publication and made changes. In fact, he was a superb editor and publisher. The same applied to party publications where every CC and Politburo resolution was corrected by him. The speeches of his colleagues were submitted to him and he made many suggestions and improvements. Indeed, he was very concerned with style and a change of language heralded a change of policy. He did not like vague expressions such as ‘proletariat’ and replaced it with ‘workers or labourers’. He excised references to ‘Bolsheviks, Bolshevism and revolutionary Bolshevism’. Another expression which he found obsolete was the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. He comes across as a strict schoolmaster, deriding sloppy language and fuzzy thinking. He was a keen student of Lenin’s writings and often quoted him. When something new came up he would often repair to his library and pick out a volume and say: ‘Let’s see what Vladimir Ilyich has to say on this’. It is of interest that there was no statue of Karl Marx in Moscow during the Stalin era. The foundation stone was laid on 1 May 1920 and Lenin and other leading politicians, including Stalin, inscribed their names on a metal plate.

104  Assessment The statue was only unveiled in 1961. Stalin, it appears, placed Lenin and his writings ahead of the sage of Trier. He may have done so but could not forget that Lenin, dying, had advised that Stalin be removed from the position of party general secretary. It rankled and he had to endure this being flung in his face on many occasions. This led to his offering to resign as general secretary on at least six occasions. The putdown appears to have penetrated his psyche. The vozhd loved history, especially pre-revolutionary Russian history. His heroes were Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great and he oversaw the production of history books for schools and universities but intellectual history was of little interest to him. He devoted much time to studying military strategy and Carl von Clausewitz was a favourite. In music, he was a traditionalist and could not tolerate twentieth century music which he dismissed as formalist. Essentially, he was an autodidact and could not tolerate being contradicted or revealed to be ignorant. On one occasion, he stated that Benelux was a country, but his listeners deemed it wise not to point out that Benelux stands for Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. His analysis of the world was based on class and he simplified problems with socialists always being right and capitalists wrong and the latter’s motives were always base and materialistic. He had a fine tenor voice but spoke softly because of a defect in his vocal cords. I saw him in the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum in Red Square, Moscow, in 1957, laying to the right of Lenin, with his pock-marked face painted to present a clear skin. It was hard to believe that this short man had murdered perhaps 20 million people and could terrify generals and top officials merely by turning his gaze on them. Stalin was attracted to women and, they to him, was married twice and had several offspring. He forced himself on some women but some, such as Lavrenty Beria’s wife, was capable of keeping him at a safe distance. Nikita Khrushchev’s thought he espied dolly birds in the Kremlin. As a Georgian, the vozhd preferred dark eyed, dark haired beauties but he did not share Fidel Castro’s view that sex is alright for a revolutionary but love is not with the Cuban dictator thinking that love weakens the drive of a revolutionary. Stalin expected his cohorts to stay with their wives and be good husbands and, unlike some members of his Politburo, there are no reports of any homosexual acts. The same applied to military officers and, if divorced, had to appear before his unit’s party committee for a dressing down and inevitably received a party penalty which excluded him from promotion for a long time. After 1945, the vozhd gradually withdrew from his family and towards the end of his life hardly saw his grandchildren. Many top leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev springs to mind, had wives or consorts who played an important part in their success but there was no strong woman behind Stalin. However, his second wife, Nadya, committed suicide, in 1932, aged 31, and this affected him deeply and he accepted the common view that she had taken her own life to punish him.

Stalin: Personality and power 105 According to one account (Beria 1999: 20) Stalin did not love his mother. She was given to affairs and it was rumoured that Stalin was not her husband’s son. He did not introduce his children to her until they were in their teens, even though they spent summers in Georgia and did not attend her funeral in 1937. Stalin’s left arm was slightly withered because of an infected ulcer and this exempted him from service in the Tsarist army in 1916. Understandably, he was very sensitive about this physical defect and the pock marks which smallpox left on his face; they were airbrushed out on his portraits. Faith in God was replaced by faith in Marx and his chief Russian disciple, Lenin, and his quasi-religious worship of him, after 1924, owes much to his Orthodox education, as does his prose. In exile, he was confronted several times by fellow Bolsheviks who accused him of being an Okhrana agent. To them, it could not just be coincidence that he escaped arrest so many times. How could he have travelled to Petrograd and then abroad several times without being arrested? Stalin’s usual answer was to make counter-accusations. The lessons and skills he learnt as an illegal in Russia served him well in future conflicts within the party. Stalin spoke and wrote Georgian fluently and crafted some poems as well. Never the less, he began to identify more and more with Russia and, during the purges, he did not spare the Georgians. He chose traditional Russian names for his children and they did not learn Georgian. The writer Aleksei Tolstoy, researching a biography of Peter the Great, informed Stalin that he had unearthed some documents which suggested Peter’s father was a Georgian king. He thought he would ingratiate himself with Stalin by telling him this but instead, Stalin was appalled and forbade Tolstoy to mention the matter ever again. The cult of personality (a term popularised by Nikita Khrushchev) begins with the adulation of the vozhd on his official fiftieth birthday, in 1929. Gradually he emerges as a demi-god, omniscient, omnipresent and, as such, indispensable to the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. From 1936, he is referred to as father of nations; the coryphaeus of science; brilliant genius of humanity; gardener of human happiness and so on. Poetry and prose are vehicles to express adulation: ‘Everything belongs to you, chief of our great country and when the woman I love gives birth to our child, the first word it will utter, will be: “Stalin” ’. The bubble burst at the XXth Party Congress, in February 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev vilified the cult of personality and engaged in character assassination: ‘It is impermissible and contrary to the spirit of MarxismLeninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman, possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god’ (Doc. 29, p. 171.). Stalin was much taken by uniforms and loved, after 1945, to try out new ones, always attempting to conceal the fact that he was getting older but kept his weight in check. He did this by regular visits to the sauna since he was no lover of physical exercise and liked to mount the steps at the Lenin

106  Assessment Mausoleum at the double, causing his heavier colleagues some embarrassment. He was quite vain and expected every household to have a portrait of him in a prominent place. He once visited Beria’s dacha and immediately went around looking for a portrait and was not pleased when he did not find one. The Soviet leader was very condescending towards his colleagues about the way they looked and dressed. Malenkov, who looked like a pastry cook who had eaten too many of his own pastries, was a constant butt. He was to lose some of his flabby fat by going to the sauna and taking exercise but he did take up horse riding though it did not help. Khrushchev was shaped like a barrel so Stalin regarded him as a hopeless case. He kept on telling Mikoyan he did not know how to knot his tie. Kaganovich was to shave off his beard. ‘I don’t want a rabbi near me’, was Stalin’s comment. Bulganin was also to remove his facial hair but managed to make do with a goatee. Lavrenty Beria had to wear a hat and a tie, which displeased him greatly. Add the pince-nez and he looked like a caricature of a New York hood! Needless to say, Stalin thought the pince-nez inappropriate. ‘It makes you look like a Menshevik’, was his wry comment. He was long on humiliation and short on compassion. Voroshilov was told on occasions: ‘Shut up, you idiot!’. Budenny was treated a little better but he was even dimmer than Voroshilov. Stalin never forgot a slight and could wait years before exacting revenge and loved humiliating his cohorts and see them sweating. As he got older he became more capricious and had a great fear of death and one can speculate about his growing moroseness. Fear of judgement by a higher power? Near the end, he appears like a ruler sacrificing victims to assuage the wrath of the gods. Stalin, a short man himself, liked to surround himself with dwarfs. Ezhov was only about five feet tall and Poskrebyshev, his secretary, was so short than when he sat at table the only part visible was his head. He was very ugly but a good and faithful servant. The vozhd could deploy great personal charm when required and had a great ability to find topics of conversation which put people at their ease and was interested in their problems and once told Beria’s son that the best way to know someone was to ask him what he read. He always went to a person’s library to check which books were there and leafed through them to discover whether they had actually been read (Beria 1999: 143). The leader’s skill at chess was put to good use and could always plan two moves ahead and was very resourceful in promoting friction among his subordinates. He often told one comrade a lie about another to sow discord and made it his business to get to know all leading party and state officials, inviting them for private chats. There were many overlapping party and state agencies and this permitted him to balance one against the other. The vozhd was a brilliant organiser and immediately penetrated to the core of a problem and could formulate tasks very swiftly and issue precise orders about how to implement them. The exception to this was the war when it

Stalin: Personality and power 107 took him, until 1943, to learn mechanised warfare but, afterwards, proved to be a brilliant war leader. The vozhd had no equal as a politician and was a master of intrigue, outfoxing Trotsky, who regarded intrigue as being beneath him. Stalin had a superb mind and was methodical to a fault, not rushing into decisions, and often appeared cold and impersonal. Vladimir Semenov, who first served in the Soviet embassy in Berlin in 1940 and went on to become Soviet ambassador in East Berlin and Bonn, related, in private conversation, how Stalin operated. He was called into Stalin’s presence after the war and addressed him as comrade Stalin as the vozhd did not like to be called Iosif Vissarionovich. Semenov was asked to sit while Stalin circled him keeping his slightly yellow eyes fixed on him all the time. He had information that there were defence plants in Berlin Zehlendorf, then part of the British sector. Semenov told him that Berlin-Zehlendorf was a residential area and that there were no plants there (I can confirm this was correct as I have stayed in Zehlendorf). Stalin began to swear which made Semenov anxious but the latter was put at ease when he was told that the information was clearly false. He then asked Semenov’s opinion about something else. Stalin listened attentively and when he had finished commented: ‘But comrade Semenov you told me, on such and such a date, something completely different’. Semenov replied that the situation had changed and Stalin accepted his new analysis. This reveals that Stalin was extremely well versed in German affairs and had an encyclopaedic memory. Semenov added that it was important to look the vozhd straight in the eye because he assumed that someone who avoided his gaze was hiding something. By the way, the vozhd never asked for advice, just information. Foreign observers also gave him high marks. President Harry Truman liked the way Stalin looked him straight in the eye when he was speaking to him. Averell Harriman, Roosevelt’s envoy in Moscow, was struck by his high intelligence, shrewdness and fantastic grasp of detail. ‘Better informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than Churchill… the most effective of the war leaders’, was his verdict. (Harriman was not naïve. He knew that Stalin was a ‘murderous tyrant’ who was capable of ‘ghastly cruelty’.) General Sir Alan Brooke (Lord Alanbrooke), Chief of the Imperial General Staff and a man of high intelligence, concluded that Stalin’s grasp of strategy was due to a ‘brain of the highest calibre’. General Charles de Gaulle, the wartime French resistance leader, saw Stalin in a different light. He ‘was consumed by a desire for power. Trained by a life of plots to conceal his faculties and nature, to do without illusions, pity or sincerity, to see in every man an obstacle or a danger, to him everything was manoeuvre, mistrust and obstinacy’. Stalin did not rate the French leader very highly either. He had an instinctive grasp of mass psychology and the fact that, in 1929, almost half the population was under the age of 29 made it possible to appeal to the idealism of youth. They were susceptible to a vision which placed them at the centre of the struggle to build a new society. Mass

108  Assessment mobilisation was needed to carry out the plans which were launched in 1928. The mayhem of the 1930s could have led to the collapse of the state. Why did it not collapse? Stalin was capable of forging new elites who, despite the murderous purges, held on to the vision of a better world. Molotov was astonished that the peasants put up with the famine of 1932–33 and brought in a record harvest in 1934. Part of the secret was that the state controlled the narrative which the people heard and most of the population believed it. Everyone was surrounded by enemies and this ensured that a coherent opposition could not emerge. Kotkin regards Stalin as possessing a demonic disposition in the late 1930s. To him, only such a mind could have unleashed the violence of 1937–38. Stalin was socialism and without Stalin there was no socialism. The apogee of human endeavour was the state and Stalin personified the state and gave it expression. Everything which people had was a gift from the state (‘Thank you, comrade Stalin!’). People could achieve fulfilment by submitting to the state. The writer Konstantin Simonov commented: ‘With people – this we sometimes saw in the newsreels – he conducted himself simply. He dressed simply, identically. There was nothing showy about him, no external pretensions to greatness or a sense of being chosen. This corresponded to our impressions of how a person standing at the head of the party should be. Altogether this was Stalin: all these feelings, all these positive traits, real and drawn by us, of the leader of the party and the state’ (Kotkin 2017: 303, 304). Stalin possessed a certain magnetism, personifying socialist modernity and the state and huge numbers found this inspiring. The writer Konstantin Paustovsky attended the Komsomol Congress, in April 1936, and on the final day wrote: We want comrade Stalin, Stalin, Stalin’, the delegates shouted, stamping their feet. And then it happened! Stalin emerged suddenly… Everyone jumped. There was frenzied applause… Unhurriedly, Stalin came up to the table, stopped, and, with hands linked on his stomach, gazed at the hall… The first thing that struck me was that he did not resemble the thousands of portraits and official photographs, which set out to flatter him. The man who stood before me was stumpy and stocky, with a heavy face, reddish hair, low forehead and a thick moustache… The hall rocked with all the shouting. People applauded holding their hands high over their heads, one felt, the ceiling would come crashing down. Stalin shouted abruptly and in a rather hoarse voice, with a strong Georgian accent: ‘Long live Soviet youth! Kornei Chukovsky, the children’s writer, also attended and was struck by the rapturous adulation of the young people. ‘What took place in the hall! HE stood, fatigued, engrossed in thought, titanic. One sensed the immense habituation to power; the force and at the same time something female, soft. I looked around: everyone had loving faces, kind, inspirational and smiling

Stalin: Personality and power 109 faces. Just to see – simply see – was happiness for us all’. Chukovsky sensed the power and concluded: ‘Never did I think I was capable of such feelings’ (Kotkin 2017: 289, 90). The Soviet leader did not promote men (there were no women) of high intelligence to leading positions but neither could he fill his innermost circle with idiots. He had to sow uncertainty and fear among them to maintain the upper hand. Play one group off against another to his mutual advantage. This requires great skill, patience and endless hours of work and he checked up on those closest to him and often arrived unannounced at their homes and set about working out the family hierarchy. Close contact among Politburo families was discouraged for fear that it could lead to coalition building and he was always checking on the whereabouts of Politburo members. Friendships among top officials were not allowed to develop. Hence, he frowned on the Russian love of parties which started late and ended in the early hours as they could produce loose talk. Not that Stalin was short of gossip as everything was bugged and the transcripts landed on his desk. If Beria made a derogatory remark about Stalin, which was part of his style, Malenkov would trot round and blab. Character assassination was a fine art in Kremlin politics and there was precious little cooperation as each official was competing for the leader’s favour. Suspicious of everyone’s motives, he assumed everyone else acted in the same manner. Since it could be suicidal to report failure to Stalin, how did he decipher the truth? Can one say that he was misled? He had several sources of information on the same matter: his own personal chancellery; the NKVD; the government apparatus; his own personal envoys; and so on. He then studied the reports and drew his own conclusions. This was a very important problem when he was dealing with the purges. Yagoda, and even more so Ezhov, presented more and more evidence of plots, conspiracies and opposition. A case can be made that he was misled into believing that there was more opposition than really existed. The trouble is that he was often the instigator himself, demanding that large numbers be arrested and found guilty. Some scholars used to think that the terror had got out of control and that he was also a victim. This is not a sustainable point of view given the evidence in the archives. The NKVD was never out of control and it never subordinated the party to its power. Caught up in the frenzy of the purges, the Soviet leader gradually realised that he could wipe out all opposition, including those former colleagues, who had parted company with him, such as Bukharin. There was often a policy reason behind the killing. Rykov and the right opposed the militarisation of the economy and fought for balanced budgets (income and expenditure on a par). Their demise meant that no one could reiterate these arguments. The fear of war and the need to prevent a fifth column emerging explains, to some extent, the murder of the national contingents. The NKVD complained to the vozhd that the 1936 constitution permitted former oppositionists to vote in upcoming elections and it was concerned about their impact. The NKVD was then let loose against former

110  Assessment Mensheviks, SRs and anarchists and the problem was solved by exterminating them before they could exercise their newly granted right to vote. All the ‘superfluous’ people such as former kulaks, criminals, recidivists and so on, of no use in the building of a socialist society, could be disposed of like vermin. The problem was that, in 1940, Moscow was against full of thieves and criminals and the solution adopted was simple: shoot the lot. He paid great attention to the British Labour Party, editing the minutes of meetings with Labour leaders, in July 1946 and October 1947. To make the text lighter he inserted, in parentheses, ‘smiling’ or ‘laughter’ but his recorded comments are sharper than in the original discussions. Harry Pollitt, the leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain, was instructed to draft a new party programme and then he edited it and insisted on it stating that Labour was nothing more than the ‘left wing of the Conservative Party’. The title was changed from ‘For a People’s Parliament and a People’s Britain’ to ‘For a Progressive Workers’ Government and People’s Democratic England’. Pollitt was informed, in January 1951, that so much time had been devoted on the draft because it was to serve as a model for the Canadian and Australian parties as well. In Malenkov’s draft report to the XIXth Party Congress, in 1952, the adjective ‘socialist’ was repeatedly replaced with ‘democratic’ and the ‘socialist’ camp becomes the camp of ‘peace and democracy’. The responsibility of the US for the woes of the world had to be emphasised and a reference to the ‘aggressive policy of the Anglo-American bloc’ was crossed out and replaced with the ‘aggressive policy of the leading circles of the USA’ (Naimark 2002: 13). In other drafts, references to the Soviet Union being willing to fight and to its nuclear weapons were excised. Vyacheslav Molotov, appointed foreign minister in 1939, was regarded as competent by the vozhd but, when Molotov flew to London, in 1942, to negotiate the Anglo-Soviet treaty, the Soviet leader demanded to know every detail and introduced changes in policy and instructed his foreign minister how to conduct himself. Stalin addressed Molotov with the second person singular, ty, a mark of intimacy, and signed himself Instantsiya (the boss) but was also sharply critical of Molotov at times. After the war, the vozhd sometimes provided Molotov with instructions twice a day, told him what negotiating position to take, what opposition he could expect to encounter and how to deal with it and did not want him to become a popular foreign minister in the West. Molotov’s acceptance of membership of the USSR Academy of Sciences was overruled as Molotov had been too enthusiastic in his acceptance letter. In 1948, a case was fabricated to implicate Polina Zhemchuzhina, Molotov’s Jewish wife, in an anti-Soviet Jewish organisation. Molotov was told to divorce her which he did. [They remarried after the vozhd’s death.]. The same happened to the Jewish wives of Poskrebyshev and Voroshilov. One of the few passions, apart from politics, which Stalin and Trotsky shared, was cartoons. The vozhd was a great doodler and, at a Politburo meeting, in 1930, he drew a cartoon of the commissar of finance, who was

Stalin: Personality and power 111 depicted naked and suspended from a rope by his genitals. A note was attached: ‘To all members of the Politburo, for all his present and future sins, Bryukhanov is to be hung by his balls. If they hold up he should be considered not guilty, but if they give way he should be drowned in a river’. The famous cartoonist, Boris Efimov, relates how, in 1947, he was hauled out of a meeting by his elbows and taken to see Andrei Zhdanov as the Soviet leader wanted a cartoon ridiculing the American military build-up in the Arctic. The next day, Stalin phoned him but the vozhd did not bother to say ‘hello, how are you?’ but got down to essentials straight away. Eisenhower was to be depicted arriving at the North Pole with a large army. Asked why they are there, given that everything is peaceful, he retorts: ‘Can’t you see we are being threatened?’. Efimov came up with the idea of drawing a poor Eskimo family and a bedraggled penguin but Stalin corrected it by adding Alaska and the North Pole and entitled it ‘Eisenhower to the Defence’. After it was published, Efimov got phone calls poking fun at the penguin. People delighted in pointing out that penguins were only found at the South Pole but when Efimov informed them that Stalin had approved the drawing, they clammed up.

Conclusion Fedor Raskolnikov, a Soviet diplomat who defected, in his diary, drew an incisive psychological portrait of Stalin judging him as someone with a ‘superhuman strength of will’ that ‘suffocates, destroys the individuality of people who come under his influence’ Stalin had broken the ‘wilful’ Kaganovich and ‘he demands from his closest aides complete submission, obedience, subjection’ (Kotkin 2017: 709). How does one sum up the vozhd? Does all the above qualify him as a psychopath? Some of the traits of a psychopath are: narcissism, revealing an exaggerated opinion of one’s self-worth; a lack of empathy for others; cold blooded ruthlessness; no feelings of remorse about his actions; brilliant insights into the personalities of his opponents, especially their weaknesses; manipulative; unwillingness to accept responsibility for failures; long term desire to seek revenge for past defeats or slights; satisfaction derived from killing opponents. Based on this list, he was a psychopath. Why were so many people killed on his watch? Was it bloodlust or was there another reason which permitted him to justify it to himself? One can argue that the killings owe something to Marxist or Leninist ideas. The French Revolution provided a secular justification for killing opponents who stood in the way of building a brilliant tomorrow. Marx expected the bourgeoisie to be exterminated but there is not the revelling in spilling blood that one encounters in Lenin and Stalin. The vozhd took the first Soviet leader as his model and repaired to his library to seek counsel from him when confronted with a thorny problem. Commentators have often pointed to Lenin’s bloodlust, the desire to wipe

112  Assessment out the remnants of the monarchy, the bourgeoisie (if one wore a tie or a hat it could be a death sentence) and any opponent who stood in the way of progress. Stalin, in this respect, was following in the first leader’s footsteps. The bloodletting of the Civil War was replicated during the 1930s, but at a higher count level. The leader’s brutality was shaped by his experiences during the Civil War. The solution to the dire situation in Tsaritsyn was to label his opponents counter-revolutionaries, saboteurs and anti-Soviet. The road to victory was paved with the corpses of the bourgeois and it was immaterial if they had been active or passive. Even Trotsky was appalled by the vozhd’s brutality seeing it as counter-productive but Lenin turned a blind eye and let Stalin loose on Voronezh. If brutality succeeded in Tsaritsyn and Voronezh, it could succeed anywhere. Stalin had found a model for later and, with the secret police in his pocket, he could label anyone a counter-revolutionary, anti-Leninist or foreign spy. Stalin, following Lenin, was both a utopian and a realist. The vozhd shared the first Soviet leader’s vision that it would be possible to implement Marxist socialism from above after the October Revolution. The agency to achieve this would be the vanguard of the proletariat, the communist party. In short, the leaders of the party would decide what was best for the working class because, it was held, the proletariat, on its own, was not capable of building socialism in Russia. During War Communism (1918–21) the country attempted to jump over capitalism into socialism and this involved, among other things, a moneyless economy and the expropriation of all assets. This utopian phase ended in 1921, when Lenin engaged in a U turn and reintroduced capitalism – money and the market. Realism was back in fashion. The first FYP was another utopian phase but entirely of Stalin’s making. The goal was to eliminate capitalism, private property and money. Communes were to take over the countryside and there would be no private plots or personal property. This utopian phase began to erode soon afterwards when private plots were again permitted – Stalin had to recognise that without them the country would starve. This utopian phase ends when the FYP plan is declared over in 1932. The vozhd declared that socialism had been achieved, in 1933, and the next phase was communism (one’s needs would be met irrespective of one’s contribution to society). Paradoxically, he warned that as the country progressed towards communism, opposition from domestic and foreign enemies would grow. This was counter-intuitive because the achievement of socialism meant that all the enemies of socialism had been vanquished. The mid-1930s saw the Soviet leader almost in despair: Rozengolts related that he flew into almost uncontrolled rages at times; he told award winning metallurgical and mining workers that he did not trust some of them; his speeches were almost incoherent and replete with accusations of plots, conspiracies, sabotage and imminent danger of war. So distraught was Ordzhonikidze at the leader’s policies that that he committed suicide and Kaganovich’s brother did the same.

Stalin: Personality and power 113 Stalin did not even trust his own counsel but he had to cling to selfbelief in the path he had chosen for the country. In this, he was following in Lenin’s footsteps who had infallible self-belief that he was right and his opponents were wrong. The first Soviet leader held to his belief, even in the darkest hours and the vozhd did the same. It is striking how often Stalin’s explanation for economic failure, is to label it sabotage or wrecking. Why? Given that the social and economic base of the country was socialist, any lack of success had to down to personal, deliberate sabotage and wrecking. Under socialism, the means of production were in the state’s hands, so there was no reason why goals should not be achieved because the prerequisites for a rapid expansion of the economy, were all present. The 1930s was a decade of multiple dangers in China, Germany and Spain and thigs were going badly for the socialist camp. This, presumably, contributed to provoke Stalin’s rage at underachievement or lack of diplomatic success. He came to believe there was a fifth column in the military and the country: otherwise the slaughter of the military top brass is incomprehensible. Molotov thought there was a fifth column. The case of Mikhail Tukhachevsky is instructive and was probably the leading strategic thinker in the Red Army. The German Abwehr (intelligence) fabricated evidence that Tukhachevsky had links to the Wehrmacht and ensured that a copy ended up on the desk of President Beneš of Czechoslovakia, who, in turn, passed it on to Stalin but it was not brought up as evidence at Tukhachevsky’s trial. The Soviet leader assured the population, on numerous occasions, that no enemy would invade as the Red Army was too strong. His numerous faux pas, before and during the first two years of the epic struggle, were always explained by accusing commanders and troops of treachery. Technically, they were down to the leader’s incompetent military policies but this could not be admitted. The leader’s utopianism again surfaces in his search for an economic policy under socialism and its transition to a communist economy in The Political Economy of Socialism in the USSR. Work on the book began in 1941, then had to be abandoned, until 1945, and continued until 1952. The main problems which exercised the vozhd were: did the law of value continue under socialism; what was the role of commodities and products under socialism; and would money be phased out. His conclusion was that commodities could continue to exist but only in foreign trade. The law of value (demand and supply expressed in money prices) could only exist in the kolkhoz sector as it was cooperative and not wholly socialist – in contrast to the sovkhozes which were state owned and their output became state products – the same applied to industry. The goal was for industry to exchange products for food from the kolkhozes which, eventually, would become state owned, thus overcoming the anomaly of a two tiered agrarian system. In the 1954 edition of the book, the law of value was declared to apply to agriculture and industry and the passages on industry exchanging products for kolkhoz food were excised. All the output of industry and

114  Assessment agriculture became commodities, and could be bought and sold for money, and hence the law of value applied to them. The leader had made clear that the law of value did not apply to the planning process but this changed, in 1955, when centralised directive planning was replaced by Gosplan and the All-Union and Republican ministries coordinating plans. In 1957, the allocation of products by the centre ended and was replaced by setting up, under Gosplan, centralised sales organisations to sell the products of Soviet industry. In 1958, the agricultural machinery of Machine Tractor Stations was sold to kolkhozes and thereby kolkhoz output became commodities. The beginnings of a socialist market economy were now laid, something which the vozhd had strongly fought against, reflecting his strong, anticapitalist conviction. The goal of product exchange (no money involved), outlined by Stalin, when reached, would have signalled the arrival of a communist economy. This utopian vision was scotched by his successors who conceded that this dream was holding back the development of the economy but not for long. Khrushchev, in 1961, proclaimed that the country would reach the foothills of communism, by 1980. His utopian dream faded away into oblivion when he was unceremoniously ousted as leader in 1964. No subsequent leader ever openly expressed this dream. Then there is the question of revenge. A psychopath never forgets a slight and waits patiently for a chance to pay back a slight with interest. It is striking that his victims, in the Show Trials and elsewhere, had all been political opponents but had repented and sought his forgiveness. There was no need to kill the inoffensive Bukharin but the leader delighted in so doing, even though Bukharin had forwarded a mea culpa and swore not to oppose the vozhd. Tukhachevsky had once criticised Stalin for his lack of military expertise and the two had clashed during the Soviet-Polish war, from which the vozhd came off decidedly second best. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the leader experienced a large dose of Schadenfreude when framing and executing Tukhachevsky. Why was it necessary to torture Marshal Vasily Blyukher, who came out of the battle of Lake Khasan with the Japanese with some credit, to the point where he died soon afterwards? Was it as a warning to commanders if they failed, they would suffer the same fate? The vozhd’s personal physician, Dr Myasnikov, concluded that the Soviet Union was ruled by a sick man in the years before his death and underlines his obstinacy and suspiciousness – the latter when taken to extremes is paranoia. When did this mental decline begin? Arkady Rozengolts thought he was paranoid, in the 1930s, – suspiciousness bordering on insanity – and subject to fits of rage. Milovan Djilas, in 1948, saw a marked deterioration in the leader’s mental abilities. Dmitry Shepilov thought that schizophrenia and paranoia had overtaken him. The vozhd would have been superhuman to have survived the war years unscathed and it is no surprise that he left for a four month vacation after the war. Unfortunately, it only increased his

Stalin: Personality and power 115 suspiciousness of his colleagues’ motives, in Moscow. Frank Roberts, a British diplomat during the Berlin Blockade, commented that he found Stalin, usually extremely well briefed, quite unprepared for many of their meetings. The verdict is that Stalin was a political genius, and a politician who played a major role in shaping the twentieth century, but also a psychopath, schizophrenic and paranoid.

9 The judgement

Stalinist socialism was a child of the Enlightenment and was an attempt to fashion a new, just and prosperous society on earth. It was inspired by European secular thinkers such as Hegel and Kant and their work can be seen as secular versions of Judeo-Christian thinking. For instance, in Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, [Critique of Pure Reason], Vernunft is a secular word for God. It is no accident that Kant’s main discipline was mathematics as he, like many others, was inspired by Sir Isaac Newton’s mathematics. Hegel’s convoluted prose can be summed up quite simply: paradise on earth is inevitable, sooner or later. The guarantee for this was the ability of a person to reason. The Enlightenment toyed with the idea of a science of society and the race was on to discover the laws of mathematics which would reveal the evolution of the human race. Higher mathematics, which, after all, is philosophy with numbers, was held to be the key but it is beyond the comprehension of most of us so this implied there were special people, imbued with great insight, who could plot the route to the Promised Land. Their disciples, like Old Testament prophets, could claim special knowledge which afforded them the right to lead the people forward. The Jews considered themselves the people of God, a chosen people. Karl Marx, although he would turn in his grave if one claimed that he was influenced by the prophets, also conceived of a chosen people: the working class who were the saviours of humankind simply because they produced the wealth of the world. Marxism is an eclectic mix of morality and materialism with the oppressors being punished and the oppressed inheriting the earth. The religious and secular versions of the kingdom of heaven on earth have intoxicated generations throughout the ages. The wonderful thing about these visions is that not only are they desirable, they are inevitable. The first time the secular vision was tested was the French revolution. It produced two opposites: great humanitarian thinking but also savage violence. The latter arose from the fact that there were those who did not share the vision of the men who held power in the state. They were seen as yesterday’s men and women holding up the progress of humankind to a better tomorrow. If they stood in the way, they could be annihilated. The greater good came before any feeling of morality which led to a new morality being

The judgement 117 born. Whatever served to push the revolution forward was held to be good. Crimes could be committed in the name of revolution. Of course, they were not held to be crimes, merely necessary acts. Why should a revolution, imbued with such noble aspirations as the French revolution, have descended into such base violence? The justification of violence comes from the religious visions of a perfect society. The Middle East has given birth to three great world religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. All of them preach peace but contain justifications for violence. In the Old Testament it is written that God ordered the extermination of peoples. There is the philosophy of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. This carried over into Christianity where some of Christ’s followers believed they had the right to kill in his name. During the Spanish Inquisition, some held that, if the heathen refused to convert to Catholicism, the body could be killed to save the soul. Then there is St Augustine’s concept of the just war. In Islam, the jihad is a holy war against the infidel who has insulted Allah. Hence all three religions are, at the same time, potentially profoundly pacific and potentially profoundly violent. This dichotomy was carried over into Enlightenment thought. Marx did not preach violence but he regarded it as inevitable. The dictatorship of the proletariat would be imposed violently with the bourgeoisie being put to the sword. His followers reveal the same dualism as the great religions: a pacific wing and a violent wing. The German social democrats, by 1914, had come to regard the arrival of socialism as inevitable and there might even be a coalition of the bourgeoisie and the working class to usher it in. This is the evolutionary thinking which so enraged Lenin. Coming from an underdeveloped state, and without any experience of modern industry, he regarded the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie as inevitable since the Russian ruling class would never see reason. The vozhd was caught up in the heady vision of transforming Russian society. Marx’s antagonistic contradictions (groups which opposed the greater good of society) would be overcome in order to produce a conflictfree, harmonious society. To do this, purification was necessary and everything which slowed down the march of progress had to be eliminated. Those who could not, or would not, contribute to the building of the new were classified as ‘yesterday’s people’ and, as such, had to be exterminated. Lenin spoke of vermin – he meant humans – and Stalin continued the trend. A healthy society had to exterminate vermin and this was an historical necessity. After the Great Fatherland War, Stalin wrote that there were ‘weeds’ sprouting in the stone walls of the socialist edifice. As every gardener knows, weeds must be extirpated. Institutions to catalogue, list, regulate, map the progress of and supervise each person were needed. Enormous effort was put into monitoring and controlling the population; all deemed necessary to measure the progress achieved in creating the moral-political unity of society. It is instructive that terror intensified after the victory of socialism was proclaimed in 1933. This

118  Assessment was because Stalin wanted to purify society quickly and reach the Promised Land, if possible, in his lifetime. The vozhd’s ruthless pursuit of the new millennium went through various stages. Private property could not exist in the new socialist (anti-capitalist) world and peasants had to work for the common good, not their own good. The most successful farmers, the kulaks, as a class, had to be eliminated as they were the class enemy, as were the remnants of other groups, such as the sons of priests. Individualism had to be rubbed out as each person had to work harmoniously with others for the common benefit of society. Each new Soviet campaign created a new enemy and, before the 1936 constitution, the vilest term was class enemy; afterwards it became enemy of the people. The advantage of the latter phrase was that it included members of the Communist Party. All Old Bolsheviks, who did not convert to Stalinism, were to be mown down, as were Trotsky and his followers. They were hunted down with ruthless zeal as they were perceived to be the greatest intellectual threat to the vozhd’s hegemony. Another target which exercised the Soviet leader greatly, was nationalism. To create the new conflict-free, harmonious society, everyone had to come to think of themselves as forming part of a socialist nation. That nation would be based on the Great Russian nation and Russian would be the language of the new world. A major problem was that the borderlands of the Soviet Union were populated mainly by non-ethnic Russians. Deportation was one solution but 50 million Ukrainians could not be deported. When the Baltic States were incorporated thousands of the educated were exiled to remove the leading lights of each nation. The Cossacks, ethnic Russian in origin but living mainly outside the Russian Federation, were fiercely independent and refused to give up their distinctive traditions. The Soviet leader repressed them savagely and it is no wonder 250,000 fought with the Germans against the Red Army and were ferociously efficient in killing Soviet soldiers. There were other nationalities which exasperated Stalin: the Chechens, Ingush and the Crimean Tatars, to name only three. In deporting them to Central Asia, he hoped to wipe out their culture and the Chechens, for example, were not permitted Chechenlanguage schools or to honour their traditions. Another special target were the Jews and their claim to be a chosen people riled the vozhd and other Russian communists. For them, Russians were the chosen people. There was a ruthless logic to the vozhd’s policies. If someone’s class, nationality, culture or religion prevented them from full commitment to the building of the new society, they had to be set apart and if they were perceived to be unreformable, they had sentenced themselves to death. Enormous efforts were devoted to propaganda under Stalin to teach everyone the new way and a favourite term was moral-political unity, meaning a harmonious society. The Soviet leader, in using this term, also issued a stern warning: there were those who were mouthing the new thinking but harboured the seeds of the old thinking in their minds. If they did not do away with the vestiges of the old thinking, they would be done away with.

The judgement 119 Many of Stalin’s closest associates were intoxicated by the vision of the new society and some like Molotov, revelled in the violence which was part and parcel of it. To him, Bolshevism meant struggle: without struggle, there was no need for Bolsheviks. This could lead to innocents being killed but he showed no mercy. ‘Let innocent heads roll’. What were a few lives, if the moral-political unity of society was promoted? Understandably, he was disgusted by Khrushchev who wanted a quieter life. Part of the brilliance of the Stalinist model was that everyone was expected to participate in it. There were to be no passive by-standers as each person was to be engaged in purifying himself or herself and checking that others were doing the same. Each new wave of cleansing instituted by the leadership was to be executed by the people themselves, through denunciations. They were to choose, from among their midst, who was to be executed, imprisoned or deported. They were empowered but at the same time were powerless. One can regard this aspect as an indication of the vozhd’s political genius. He was able to remove all those he perceived to be a brake on his massive social-engineering project and enlisted the whole population to help him do it!

10 The legacy

Stalin regarded his associates as weaklings who would be incapable of carrying on his work after his death. This may appear strange as one would have expected the vozhd to train a cohort who could implement successfully his vision of a country marching towards a communist society. The key reason why this did not happen was that Stalin was concerned that he could be shunted aside and others would choose a different path forward. Personal security took precedence over everything else. Vyacheslav Molotov and Anastas Mikoyan were side-lined after the XIXth Party Congress, in October 1952, because they were suspected of harbouring higher ambitions. Greater defence expenditure was demanded by the leader, so raising living standards dropped down the list of priorities. Given the medical evidence and comments of senior politicians after Stalin’s demise, it is fair to assume that medically he was not in complete control of his faculties. Top of the list was his suspiciousness about everyone else’s intentions. This had surfaced in the mid-1930s and grew stronger over time. He held the power of life and death over his colleagues and they could never be sure that after meeting him they would return home or go to prison. Were there any conspiracies to remove him? No evidence has emerged of such a démarche as failure would have resulted in instant death. Better to see the old man out than risk one’s life. Immediately after the vozhd’s death, the reforms of the Politburo at the XIXth Party Congress were undone and this included Molotov and Mikoyan coming in from the cold. The huge defence budget was cut back as were other pet projects, such as the transformation of nature, were cancelled. The new oligarchs feared popular unrest but little materialised. It was judged opportune to improve living standards and especially lighten the burden imposed on the agrarian sector. What were the strengths of the political model that Stalin bequeathed his successors? The Sistema which had been fashioned over the years remained impregnable. The Communist Party held sway or rather it was based on a strong leader who could impose his will. Democratic centralism ensured that decisions at the top were transmitted downwards to be implemented by lower

The legacy 121 level officials. It followed a military pattern. The political police (now called the MGB) were responsible for keeping the party in power. The military might of the country was subordinated to the party with its leader the commander in chief. Stalin had treated these institutions harshly during his final years. How would they react to the new oligarchs? Was there a danger of a military coup? Very unlikely, since the previous one had occurred in 1825 and had been a miserable failure. The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic state in which Slavs made up about two thirds of the population. Stalin had used a mailed fist to supress nationalism (including ethnic Russian nationalism) so there were a lot of festering sores which could become inflamed. There were millions in the gulag and in exile who claimed that they were innocent of the charges levied against them. They sought justice, especially party members, and rejoiced at the death of the vozhd. The oligarchs agreed that collective leadership was the immediate solution to the leadership problem. But how to ensure that a new Stalin did not emerge? Eventually Nikita Khrushchev emerged as primus inter pares. The Stalinist model favoured the emergence of a single leader who could become a dictator. When Khrushchev began to act capriciously, just like Stalin, he had to be removed. He was followed by the consensus seeking, cautious Leonid Brezhnev. Then came Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko whose main battle was to stay alive. Up popped Mikhail Gorbachev – the in joke was: ‘How much support does Gorbachev have in the Politburo? None. He can walk by himself!’ He quickly discovered that he could not make personnel changes at will and eventually sought to exercise power through a presidency. What does all this tell us about the Sistema inherited from Stalin? It was almost impossible to reform. There was no age of retirement and this meant that a party leader, once in office, could only be removed by death or a coup. The lack of a mechanism for rotating leaders was a serious defect. As Gorbachev once wryly observed: the ‘oblast first secretary regards himself as a prince; the republican first secretary as a Tsar and the general secretary is almost the equal of God himself’. The weakness of this hierarchy was obvious: reforming it could only be achieved by using Stalinist methods and that was out of the question. So deep were traditions of rule established that office holders could only normally be removed if guilty of egregious corruption. Things were different in the Soviet Empire in eastern Europe: Moscow could remove party leaders they had lost confidence in. China still retains the same structures but with the important proviso: the general secretary of the party may only remain in office for two 5 year terms and he should not be in power after he reaches the age of 70 and the party secretary of a city, county or province is the economic manager of his bailiwick. The most successful managers are promoted. In the Soviet Union party secretaries resisted innovation but in the Middle Kingdom the

122  Assessment opposite is true. Vietnam follows the same pattern and reintroduced a capitalist economy in the mid-1980s. What about the economic model which the oligarchs inherited? It was based on central planning (Gosplan) with planners setting goals which worked on a ratchet principle: produce more than the year before. Prices were set by planners. Inputs were distributed by Gossnab or the state supply agency. Due to the vast number of inputs, Gossnab only allocated inputs to ministries which, in turn, distributed them to the enterprises under their jurisdiction. There was a perpetual shortage of inputs to achieve the outputs of the plan so enterprises horded inputs. One was discovered to have four years’ supplies of inputs. So a shadow economy developed where enterprises could barter their surpluses with other enterprises. Money was of secondary importance because the Soviet economy was not a market economy and there were not a lot of consumer goods to buy. An example was when the British embassy needed to do some repairs, the cement and materials had to be flown to Moscow since they were impossible to acquire locally. This system promoted an enormous amount of false reporting and corruption. Phantom enterprises appeared which received inputs (diverted to real factories) but produced nothing for the state economy as all output went into the shadow economy. One can imagine the number of officials who had to be bribed to ensure the smooth functioning of a fictitious enterprise. The Uzbeks carried this to a higher level by exporting millions of roubles of fictitious cotton to Moscow. Party officials and enterprises developed elaborate scams. One such involved exporting caviar in tins marked sardines. The whole thing came to light one morning when a KGB officer opened his tin of fish to discover he had caviar. The deputy Minister of the Fish Industry was reportedly shot but the party secretary was merely moved elsewhere. No one could calculate how much foreign currency the scam had accumulated over the years. A Georgian official confided to me that it was a national duty to cheat Russians and then proceeded to relate some of the scams they operated. Besides the shadow economy, which was semi-legal, there was also the black market which was, of course, illegal. Dentists were among the most affluent by providing clients with gold teeth. Gold, needless to say, could not be bought legally. There was also a vigorous trade in gold coins, mostly from the Tsarist era. The Stalinist industrial model functioned well when heavy industry predominated but was found wanting when the information and technological revolution arrived on the scene. It had a built-in aversion to innovation since if an enterprise manager did innovate and output declined, he was in dire trouble. Various attempts were made to reform industry, especially during the tenure of Aleksei Kosygin as Prime Minister (1964–80). As an excellent engineer, he could identify the problems but all his various reforms ran into

The legacy 123 the sand. One of the problems was that released workers had to be found another job as everyone had to be employed. Enterprises were able to resist change because they had accommodated themselves successfully to the existing system. Stalin would have enforced change by brutal methods but that was no longer possible. Gorbachev attempted to weld market incentives to the planned economy but only made matters worse. Hence the Stalinist industrial model was fatally flawed. The part of the Soviet economy which competed successfully with the West was the defence sector. Competition between bureaux to obtain contracts led to rapid innovation. The best scientific and technical brains were channelled into this sector and it was granted all the resources it needed. The problem was that, from the mid-1970s, the Soviet industrial economy began to decline and this imposed a limit on what could be afforded. By 1991, the Soviet defence sector could no longer compete with the US simply because the resources to do so were not available. A top general conceded this and said that economic and political reform was necessary to rectify the situation but was not sure the Soviet Union could survive political reform. How prescient he was. The situation in agriculture was more critical because of enforced collectivisation. The best farmers, the kulaks, were eliminated and collective farmers were only paid at the end of the year if the farm had made a profit during the Stalin era. They survived on their private plots and had little motivation to work for the state. Stalin’s decision to collectivise was political not economic and the country went hungry during his time in charge. This continued to the end of the Soviet era and leaders were forced to spend billions of dollars on imported food, foodstuffs and fodder. In the late Gorbachev era, 25 per cent of the state budget went on agriculture but with meagre results. I visited many farms and scientific institutes over the years and was even asked once, by the USSR Minister of Agriculture, to suggest how agricultural output could be increased. The answer was to go over to capitalism but, needless to say, I deemed it unwise to suggest this! Gorbachev, for one, would not countenance reintroducing capitalism to agriculture. An agricultural economist was of the same mind and informed me if farmers were permitted to decide what to grow they would only produce enough to satisfy their needs and, as a consequence, the country would starve. Just how wrong he was is revealed by the fact that Russia, in 2016, became the leading world exporter of wheat and other grains. Was Gorbachev not impressed by China’s agricultural reforms when he visited the country, in 1988? No. He misread them and concluded they would fail. Mao was appalled by Khrushchev’s political assassination of Stalin in 1956 and by his claim that the Soviet Union could reach the foothills of communism by 1980. Peasants were herded into communes and over the years 1958–61 over 36 million died from starvation and disease. Mao was as determined as Stalin to wipe out capitalist agriculture. He also concluded

124  Assessment that serious drawbacks of the Stalinist model were that it produced a ruling bureaucracy and powerful industrial groups. He set out to smash both during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Mao died in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping became the leading politician two years later and concluded that the Stalinist economic model was fatally flawed. He then set in train a fundamental agrarian reform to ensure that China could feed itself. This eventually, in 1992, resulted in a reversion to capitalist agriculture. The same applied to industry and socialism with Chinse characteristics took over. This was a euphemism for capitalism. Mao clung to many of Stalin’s prescriptions but Deng Xiaoping dumped them. The Stalinist economic model was consigned to the rubbish bin of history. Vietnam followed a similar course in the mid-1980s. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea, is slowly moving away from its rigid adherence to the Stalinist economic model. Limited private agriculture is permitted and a bourgeoisie has emerged in Pyongyang. Fidel Castro, in Cuba, had to admit, in 2009, that the planned economy had failed and then permitted a limited amount of capitalism to reappear. The Stalinist political and economic model also found favour in many countries in the Third World but failed everywhere. It was not inevitable that the Stalinist political and economic reform would collapse. A more skilful politician than Gorbachev might have steered the country through the shark infested waters of reform and promoted the reemergence of a capitalist economy. Surveying the other leaders at the time, it is difficult to identify one could have done what Deng Xiaoping did in China.

Foreign and security policy The heaviest burden Stalin bequeathed to his successors was his foreign and security policy. He had failed to reach a modus vivendi with the West after 1945 and this had led to the Cold War. The result was an arms race which was a terrible burden for a country recovering from the devastating effects of war. He allowed Kim Il Sung to launch the Korean war but his failure to secure a swift victory led to China becoming involved to prevent Kim’s defeat. The tense international situation provoked the vozhd to demand greater defence expenditure at home and in eastern Europe. Stalin’s stubbornness during the Berlin Blockade eventually led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the permanent stationing of US troops in western Europe. It also produced the creation of a separate West German state and, in response, the emergence of the German Democratic Republic. This combination of events was probably the worse outcome for the Soviet Union and the blame can be laid at Stalin’s door. The way was open for a rapprochement after Stalin’s death but the suppression by Soviet tanks of the east German uprising, in June 1953, convinced President Eisenhower to reject Winston Churchill’s suggestion of a

The legacy 125 summit meeting. A great opportunity was lost and such was the level of mistrust on both sides that no coming together proved possible. The removal of Lavrenty Beria from the Soviet leadership was another nail in the coffin of hope. He had floated proposals about a neutral united Germany and the ending of the occupation. The uprising led to Khrushchev concluding that if the Soviet Union lost east Germany it would lose the rest of eastern Europe as well. This was its cordon sanitaire in case of another attack from the West. It battened down the hatches and the Cold War continued as before. Khrushchev, to disguise Soviet military weakness, claimed that the USSR had missiles which could hit a fly over Omaha, Nebraska. This was total fiction but due to the lack of information about the Soviet Union, it might have a grain of truth. In this way, Khrushchev was his own worst enemy. He wanted an arms deal but all he got was increased US defence spending. Stalin left the oligarchs with a poisoned chalice in 1953 but more skilful leadership, perhaps by Beria or Malenkov, might have produced a calmer international environment.

Empire Eastern Europe and east Germany were regarded as war booty after 1945. The Soviet Union took out more resources under Stalin than it put in. This changed dramatically after 1953 when it became clear that east European communist regimes enjoyed little legitimacy. Poland was always a pain and Moscow had to provide aid on more than one occasion. It had to intervene in 1956 in Hungary and again had to provide money and resources to patch up what it had destroyed. Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the last military intervention as Moscow realised that force was not a solution to the region’s problems. Economically, the region became a greater and greater economic burden. Stalin had brutally imposed communist rule because Soviet security was of paramount importance. The Soviet inspired coup in Czechoslovakia, in February 1948, convinced many in the West that the Soviet Union was a predatory, imperialist power bent on expansion. In reality, it was a defensive move to prevent Western interests prevailing there which could have led to the demonstration effect: neighbouring states desiring the same. Had he had a choice, Stalin might have settled for the Finlandisation of eastern Europe. This would have involved the region staying out of foreign military and economic organisations and agreeing not to engage in policies which the Soviet Union deemed a threat to its security. As the German proverb goes: if the word if did not exist, my father would be a millionaire! One can point to many events in the immediate post war period and surmise if they had turned out differently, how much better off the world would have been. Stalin’s involvement in the Third World consisted of trying to acquire influence in Libya and Iran and some Turkish territory. Again, security was

126  Assessment uppermost in his mind but the net result was to oblige Turkey and Iran to seek US protection. Another cack handed piece of diplomacy. Mao Zedong resented the way Stalin treated him when he came to Moscow to negotiate a friendship treaty, in December 1949. As he expected to be humiliated, he did not permit his interpreter to accompany him when meeting Stalin. The Soviet leader wanted to demonstrate that he was in charge of the communist world and Mao had better not behave like Tito, who had been drummed out of the Communist Information Bureau, in June 1948. The treaty contained clauses which were painful for Mao and China. The Great Helmsman was a very proud Chinese and had to accept being treated as a poor relative. He took his revenge on Khrushchev and set out to humiliate him as he had been humiliated in Moscow. Stalin sowed the seeds of this behaviour.

Putin President Boris Yeltsin chose as his successor Vladimir Putin and he became Russian President in 2000. The free wheeling 1990s had seen the rise of several oligarchs who had essentially captured the state. Putin set about recentralising power and clipping the wings of the oligarchs. His first assault was on the media empires since he wanted to control television and print news. Vladimir Gusinsky left for Israel and Boris Berezovsky made for London, both in 2000. The state sector of the economy was only 10 per cent and the new President began increasing the state’s share in the hydrocarbon industries and utilities. In 2018, the state sector had risen to 71 per cent. All important industries and utilities are now in the state sector. Putin understood that the Americans were offering Russia an Atlantic Partnership and there was even talk of Russia joining the European Union and NATO and believed that there was an agreement that NATO would not expand into the former communist east European states and the successor republics of the Soviet Union. It was a shock when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became NATO members in March 1999 and an even greater shock when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in March 2004. Putin gradually concluded that the US had no intention of developing Russia into a formidable economic competitor and that Washington was bent on restricting Russian influence. The break came in 2007 when he declared that Russia would no longer follow a Western political and economic model but would do everything to protect its security and sovereignty. The seeds of a new Cold War were sown then and the Western media became increasing anti-Russian. In Ukraine, in 2014, the ousting of President Yanukovich alarmed President Putin and he feared that the Russian naval base at Sevastopol was no longer secure. A swift coup led to Crimea being incorporated again in Russia (Khrushchev had transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 1954) and most Russians rejoiced. This exacerbated relations with the West and the European

The legacy 127 Union, the US and other countries imposed sanctions and Russia responded with counter-sanctions. Russia supported separatist movements in eastern Ukraine and the selfproclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics declared independence from Ukraine in 2014. This led to more Western sanctions and talks in Minsk, Belarus, have so far failed to halt the conflict. Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war, in September 2015, at the request of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad and has since played a major role in ensuring that the Syrian President is not defeated militarily. The US and NATO support Al Assad’s opponents and this has led to even more tension between Russia and the West. Putin has surprised many in the West by cementing his authority in Russia and expanding Russia’s influence in the Middle East and even as far as Sudan. He has emerged as an authoritarian leader and is sometimes referred to as Stalin Mark II. Is this accurate? No. Putin has nothing like the power of Stalin and even if he had would most likely not engage in the brutal repression of the Georgian despot. What role does the media play? The three big Moscow based TV networks dominate and most Russians get their news from these channels and they present the Putin version of reality – strongly nationalistic and antiAmerican. There is a liberal newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, and a radio station Ekho Moskvy (Moscow Echo). There is a plethora of newspapers to cater for local interests but there are rules of the game. Certain subjects are off limits: rejection of the annexation of Crimea; criticism of Russia’s role in eastern Ukraine; Russian intervention in Syria; the revival of ‘Christian values’ now under way; and the Putin concept of ‘national sovereignty’ that separates Russian foreign policy from that of the West. Journalists can criticise the authorities and say almost anything but attack the ‘consensual values’ which underlie the present system of power in Russia and your journalistic career may be over. There are many internet news sites and some of them proclaim themselves to be part of the opposition. The most strident critic of the regime at present is Aleksei Navalny who concentrates on exposing corruption, even claiming that the Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, is a very rich man with property in Russia and abroad. Demonstrations need permission from the authorities and Navalny is often arrested for demonstrating illegally. He is used to going to prison and then being released and was banned from running in the 18 March 2018 presidential election and called for a boycott of the election which won by Vladimir Putin, thus securing another six year term in power. Russian elections do not produce any surprises. If Putin survives until 2024 he will be the longest serving ruler since Stalin. Will he stand for re-election in 2024 and rule longer than Stalin? This would involve changing the constitution as a President can only serve two consecutive terms but he has the votes in the Duma to do that.

128  Assessment The basis of Putin’s legitimacy was a rising standard of living but the economy has been performing poorly over the past few years and the emphasis has switched to Putin as the Father of the Nation who is defending it against a hostile West. Vyacheslav Volodin, then deputy head of the presidential administration coined the slogan: ‘If there is Putin, there is Russia, if there is no Putin – there is no Russia’. In St Petersburg, his home city, he has been portrayed as an angel spreading out his hand to bless the city’s inhabitants, and the same city has unveiled a statue of him as a Roman emperor. Vladislav Surkov, a close aide, has revealed that Putin is a ‘man whom fate and the Lord sent to Russia’ The election of Kirill, as Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, in January 2009, strengthened the bonds between the church and the state. He and Putin share a common vision of Russian national identity and exceptionalism. According to this vision, Russia is neither European nor Asian but rather a unique society representing a special set of values which are believed to be divinely inspired. The church partners the state, and this is the ideological justification for Putin’s crackdown on dissent and the repression of civil society and other religious groups. When Putin was elected President, in February 2012, Patriarch Kirill acclaimed him with the words: ‘He is a miracle of God’. When there were demonstrations against Putin because of the atrocities in Chechnya, the Patriarch’s spokesman commented: ‘Organised forces with foreign support are behind this’. Kirill maintains that ‘in Russia, a strong, centralised form of rule is typical: without this nothing gets done’. A cult surrounds Putin and he cultivates a macho image: riding a horse bare chested; fishing in a stream; flying in an aircraft; experiencing life in a submarine; hunting in Siberia; and so on. The Russian mode of rule is referred to as Sistema, the system, and is defined as a network-based form of governance. Characteristics are the limited nature of property rights (all land in Russia is leasehold – the state is the landlord); the legal system can be manipulated by the authorities to remove anyone they dislike; the double standards of the Russian Orthodox Church, which is immensely rich and is involved in politics, and which justifies the actions of corrupt officials; the all-embracing corruption which pervades power institutions; and the powerlessness of the individual vis-a-vis Sistema. Politics is virtual, in other words, merely a façade. There are democratic elections, but the results are always rigged. Proximity to Putin opens up huge opportunities, and no other centre of power is permitted to emerge. Since 71 per cent of the economy is in the state sector, the President can decide who is awarded lucrative state contracts and even the wealthiest is ready to hand over his assets to the state without a whimper. In Russia Sistema has been remarkably successful and has ensured stability and if the country collapsed, new power holders would emerge who would most likely develop their own form of Sistema (McCauley 2016: 306, 07). Several of the aspects of Sistema are to be found in the Stalin era. Did Stalin invent them? No. They are age old Russian traits.

The legacy 129 So what is Putin’s view of Russia’s history? His heroes are Peter the Great and Catherine the Great but the ‘greatest criminals in our history were those weaklings who threw power to the ground – Nicholas II and Gorbachev – and allowed power to be picked up by hysterics and madmen’. On the October Revolution: ‘Letting your rule be guided by an idea is right but only when it leads to the right results, not like it did with Lenin. In the end, that idea led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. We did not need a global revolution. The Bolsheviks placed an atomic bomb under the building that is Russia and the bomb exploded’. He claims that the fall of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century. It is clear that Putin, once a member of the Communist Party, is no longer a communist. ‘I am convinced that the idea of communism was nothing more than a beautiful story but…a dangerous one…leading to an impasse that was both ideological and economic’. Marx is given short shrift as well. Responding to a journalist who quoted Marx and Engels at him, he said: ‘It’s the Germans who are guilty, it was they who forced them on us, by exporting their Marxism here’ (Eltchaninoff 2018: 12, 13). Thus, he has no intention of attempting to recreate the Soviet Union. Does Russian history stop in 1917 and begin again in 1991? The President wants to fashion an historical narrative which will make Russians proud to be Russian and to belong to the Russian nation. He took offence at President Obama’s remark that Russia was merely a regional power. ‘No’, he proclaimed, ‘given our geography, we are a world power’. So Soviet history has to be sifted to reveal its positive aspects and these must overwhelm the dark pages of the recent past. During the 1990s, almost everything published by historians about Stalin was negative and shameful. To Putin, the nation had to be reborn and Great Russia had to rise again, and to achieve this, the great victories of the past had to be celebrated. There were no great political victories since the communist world dissolved after 1991 and the less said about the economy the better. That left the military and the victory over Germany in 1945. Not surprisingly, military glory is highlighted and the celebration of victory in 1945 becomes more elaborate every year. Stalin is acknowledged as a great war leader and during his rule the Soviet Union became a superpower. What about the Great Terror? No institute of higher learning teaches a course on the terrible events of the 1930s. There is not a single book by a contemporary Russian historian which tackles the broad themes of purges and gulags. ‘The guidelines are set by the Kremlin’, commented one historian. ‘Putin has gone further than any Soviet or Russian leader, in acknowledging the massive tragedy that befell millions of people, and admitting it was wrong. On the other hand, President Putin is striving to knit together a narrative of Russian history that promotes national unity, and Stalin needs to be integrated into that story as an effective leader who oversaw industrialisation and victory over Nazi Germany and left the Soviet Union a superpower on the world stage when he died. Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union and many of its institutions trace their

130  Assessment roots back to the Soviet era. One of the institutions is the Federal Security Service (FSB), which recently celebrated the centenary of its founding as the Cheka, the Soviet secret police organisation. The current FSB director, to mark the occasion, gave an interview and argued that many of the accusations against Stalin’s secret police were greatly exaggerated. The country faced many external enemies, as Russia does today, and the Motherland had to be protected even if the methods deployed were sometimes harsh. The enemy tried to defeat us in open combat and by using traitors inside the country to sow discord, divide the nation, and paralyse the ability of the government to effectively respond to threats. The destruction of Russia is still an obsession for many’. Russians are increasingly inclined to see Stalin as an effective leader and play down the mass crimes which occurred under his rule. Was the Great Terror a matter of necessity which history will absolve? In 2007, 9 per cent of respondents thought so but this had grown to 25 per cent in 2017. Those who viewed the purges as a political crime which cannot be justified, dropped from 72 per cent to 39 per cent over the same period. Many of those who suffered greatly in the purges are still unsure what to think of Stalin and somehow find it possible to justify his policies (Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 2018). Memories of the past must come flooding back when the Russian national anthem is played. One of the first things the President did, on assuming office, in 2000, was to reintroduce the music of the Soviet national anthem to accompany the words of the new Russian national anthem. The Soviet red banner was also restored but without the hammer and sickle as the official flag of the armed forces. Michel Eltchaninoff (2018) attempts to understand what Putin believes. In his autobiography, the President dwells on his upbringing in the back streets of St Petersburg and concedes he was a thug because there was no other way to survive. He is also proud of his days as a spy but there is very little about what he learnt at school or university – he has a law degree. On becoming President, he debunked any idea of an official ideology (the Russian Constitution bans official ideologies) but a great nation like Russia needs an inspiring idea and that became patriotism. Eltchaninoff identifies three defining influences: judo; the Russian Orthodox Church; and the military. Putin highlights the philosophical revelations of judo, his favourite sport. He attends Orthodox services and the military successes of the Soviet era are deeply imprinted on his mind despite the fact that he never served in the armed services or experienced war. He praises the former KGB for its professionalism and patriotism and blames the mistakes it made on bad decision making by the Communist Party. As a New Year gift in 2014, leading officials received a package of books and Eltchaninoff highlights three of them: Nashi Zadachi (Our Mission) by Ivan Ilyin; The Philosophy of Inequality by Nikolai Berdayev; and The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy by Vladimir Solovyov. Ilyin (1883–1954), a Russian conservative in the Slavophile tradition was

The legacy 131 the main ideologue of the Russian White diaspora. He died in Switzerland but his remains were returned to Russia and his grave re-consecrated in 2009. He strove to strengthen Russian self-consciousness and the emergence of a leading national stratum to implement the creative potential of the people. Fundamental to his thinking was the belief that Russians should not attempt to imitate Western traditions and mores. Nikolai Berdyaev (1874– 1948) was a prominent religious philosopher who stressed the spiritual significance of human freedom. Vladimir Solovyov (1853–1900) regarded good as a person’s highest goal and it comes from God. ‘However convincing or authoritative a moral teaching may be, it will remain devoid of power unless it finds a secure foundation in the moral nature of man’. Eltchaninoff concludes that Putin uses the ‘pseudo-scientific elements of Russian philosophy’ to restore Russia’s ‘international ideological vocation’. On 25 December 2015, a 400-page tome of pronouncements by the President, Words that Change the World, was sent to about a thousand politicians and officials. It consists of 19 speeches, articles and campaign pledges dating back to Putin’s appearance at the UN General Assembly in 2003. A letter accompanying the present explains that the speeches would allow readers to understand the ‘moral and reference points which led to extremely important domestic and foreign policy decisions’. The President underlines repeatedly that the UN should be paramount in global decision making. The anthology includes the speech at the Munich security conference when he railed against US dominance, claiming it had ‘overstepped its national borders in every way’, and it also contains his speech, in 2014, confirming Russia’s annexation of Crimea which, he claimed, ‘had been handed like a sack of potatoes to Ukraine’, in 1954. Another striking comment, in 2012, was that ‘any person living in our country should not forget his faith and ethnicity but before everything else, must be a citizen of Russia and be proud’.

Xi Jinping The National People’s Congress – the parliament – in March 2018, amended the Chinese Constitution by removing the words the ‘President and VicePresident … shall serve no more than two consecutive terms’ and thereby made it possible for Xi Jinping (born 1953) to remain President for life. Xi is also the general secretary of the Communist Party of China and its Constitution sets no time limit to the office holder’s tenure. The same applies to the Chair of the Central Military Commission, in effect, the commander in chief of the armed forces. Xi was elected to all three offices in 2012 and launched an anti-corruption drive which saw thousands of party and government officials arrested and imprisoned and replaced by Xi appointees. At The 19th Party Congress, in October 2017, many members of Xi’s faction were elevated to leading positions in the Party, government and armed services. Xi was declared to

132  Assessment be the ‘core of the Party leadership’ and ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ was inserted in the Party’s Constitution as the guiding principle of the Party and nation. ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ was also added to the Chinese Constitution. He has also fostered a cult of the personality. In so doing, Xi has ignored Deng Xiaoping’s instructions that no leader should promote a cult of personality and China should be ruled by a collective leadership, namely the Politburo Standing Committee. Xi promotes the total dominance of the Party and the goal is to ‘improve and uphold the Party’s comprehensive leadership…and strengthen the Party’s leadership of every sector of the state and society and ensure that Party leadership becomes stronger and more forceful…and the leadership of the Party is the most fundamental characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (People’s Daily, 28 October 2017). The Party is to exercise control over enterprises, social organisations, foreign companies, including all those which used to be under the jurisdiction of the market economy. Party cadres are exhorted to be at one with Xi Jinping. In other words, they must declare and demonstrate loyalty to their leader. It is worth noting that the Party refers to itself as a Marxist, not a Marxist-Leninist, Party Some Chinese commentators see the above as transforming Xi into Mao Zedong Mark II. The Great Helmsman, however, rode roughshod over the Party and criticised it sharply during the Cultural Revolution. Others liken his belief that only he can transform the ‘Chinese Dream’ into reality to Stalin’s desire to lead the Soviet Union to full communism. The ‘Chinese Dream’s is a euphemism for full communism when the Middle Kingdom will be the leading state on the planet. Stalin also began his rise to power through the Party apparat which eventually permitted him to promote those loyal to him and demote Party and state officials who criticised him. Xi does not yet possess the power of Stalin but his goal is certainly to emulate him. He will try to avoid the mistakes made by the vozhd and Stalin is a more instructive role model than Mao Zedong who, as a great revolutionary leader, was the unchallenged leader in 1949, when the People’s Republic was founded. Stalin, on the other hand, had to climb up the greasy pole of power. It is interesting, that couples, after the wedding ceremony are now encouraged to lay flowers at the graves of revolutionary heroes (a Soviet practice but there the graves were of war heroes).

Part 4

Documents

Part 4. Documents

Document 1: The party Stalin here spells out systematically his understanding of the role of the Communist Party. This document was originally published in 1924 and is one of the foundation stones of Leninism which Stalin, more than anyone else, developed. What are the specific features of this new party? 1. The Party as the vanguard of the working class. The Party must be, first of all, the vanguard of the working class. The Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order that it may really be the vanguard, the Party must be armed with revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of the movement, with a knowledge of the laws of revolution. Without this it will be incapable of directing the struggle of the proletariat, of leading the proletariat. The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertness and the political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to elevate the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat. The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class; it must lead the proletariat, and not follow in the tail of the spontaneous movement… No army at war can dispense with an experienced General Staff if it does not want to court certain defeat. Is it not clear that the proletariat can still less dispense with such a General Staff if it does not want to give itself up to be devoured by its mortal enemies? But where is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of the proletariat can serve as this General Staff. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff. The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat…

136  Documents 2. The Party as the organised detachment of the working class. The Party is not only the vanguard detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the organised detachment of its class. 3. The Party as the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat. The Party is the organised detachment of the working class. This organisation is the Party of the proletariat…the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organisation capable of centralising the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organisation of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class. The Party is the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat… 4. The Party as the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat…The Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians; it is at the same time an instrument in the hands of the proletariat for achieving the dictatorship where that has not yet been achieved and for consolidating and expanding the dictatorship where it has already been achieved… The proletariat needs the Party for the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 5. The Party as the embodiment of unity of will, incompatible with the existence of factions. The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline…Iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a contest of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable… But from this it follows that the existence of factions is incompatible either with the Party’s unity or with its iron discipline. 6. The Party is strengthened by purging itself of opportunist elements. The source of factionalism in the Party is its opportunist elements…Our Party succeeded in creating internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution, because it was able to rid its ranks of the Liquidators, the Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become

Documents 137 strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, socialimperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots, and social-pacifists. The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements. Source: J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1945), pp. 97–109.

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Document 2: The right deviation Published in April 1929, this condemnation of Bukharin and his supporters is a good example of Stalin’s political style. Note how he blackens the Right by asserting that support for them means betrayal of the revolution. By 1929 he was in a position to decide what was in the best interests of the revolution. The fight against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive duties of our party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat forward – if we in this General Staff tolerated the free existence and the free functioning of the Right deviationists, who are trying to demobilise the party, to demoralise the working class, to adapt our policy to the tastes of the ‘Soviet’ bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties of our construction – if we tolerated all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we want to send the revolution down hill, demoralise our socialist construction, flee from difficulties, surrender our positions to the capitalist elements? Does Bukharin’s group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to betray the working class, to betray the revolution? Source: Ibid., pp. 371–72.

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Document 3: Dizzy with success This is part of an article which appeared in Pravda on 2 March 1930. Collectivisation was supposed to be voluntary but officials herded peasants into collectives against their will. To reduce the mayhem in the countryside and to ensure that the spring sowing was done, Stalin called a temporary halt. It was only tactical, as collectivisation was stepped up later in the year. But what really happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of allowing for local peculiarities are not violated in a number of districts? No, unfortunately, that cannot be said. We know, for example, that in a number of the Northern districts of the grainimporting belt, where there are comparatively fewer favourable conditions

138  Documents for the immediate organisation of collective farms than in the graingrowing districts, not infrequently efforts are made to substitute for preparatory work in organising collective farms the bureaucratic decreeing of a collective farm movement from above, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms, the formulation of collective farms on paper – of farms which do not yet exist, but regarding the ‘existence’ of which there is a pile of boastful resolutions. Or, take certain districts in Turkestan, where there are even fewer favourable conditions for the immediate organisation of collective farms than in the Northern regions of the grain-importing belt. We know that in a number of districts in Turkestan attempts have already been made to ‘overtake and outstrip’ the advanced districts of the U.S.S.R. by the method of threatening to resort to military force, by the method of threatening to deprive the peasants who do not as yet want to join the collective farms of irrigation water and of manufactured goods. What is there in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev ‘policy’ and the party’s policy which rests on the voluntary principle and allows for local peculiarities in collective farm construction? Obviously, they have not, nor can they have, anything in common. Source: Ibid., pp. 421, 22.

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Document 4: Harsh realities This (a) is from a letter by Stalin, in August 1930. He is ordering more exports at a time when the world market is depressed. In 1929, the Soviet Union exported 200,000 tonnes of grain but, in 1930, 4.8 million. The impact it had is graphically illustrated (b) by a worker’s letter to Pravda, in September 1930 (not published, of course). (a) Mikoyan reports that grain collections grow and every day we export 1–1.5 million poods [16.38 poods = 1 kg] of grain. I think this is too little. We need to raise (NOW) daily exports to a minimum of 3–4 million poods. If not, we risk not finishing our new metallurgical and machinebuilding (Avtozavod, Chelyabzavod, and others) plants…In short, we need furiously to force the export of grain. Source: Reprinted in Elena Osokina, Our Daily Bread (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 44.

(b) The building of socialism is not done by Bolsheviks alone. It should not be forgotten that many millions of workers are participating in the building of socialism. A horse with its own strength can drag 75 poods, but its owner has loaded it with a hundred poods, and in addition he’s fed it poorly. No matter how much he uses the whip, it still won’t be able to move the cart.

Documents 139 This is also true for the working class. They’ve loaded it with socialist competition, shock work, overfulfilling the industrial and financial plan, and so forth. A worker toils 7 hours, not even leaving his post, and this is not all he does. Afterwards he sits in meetings or else attends classes for an hour and a half or two in order to increase his skill level, and if he doesn’t do these things, then he’s doing things at home. And what does he live on? 150 grams of salted mutton; he will make soup without any of the usual additives, neither carrots, beets, flour nor salt pork. What kind of soup do you get from this? Mere ‘dishwater’. Source: Reprinted in Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism as a Way of Life (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 39–40.

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Document 5: The breakneck speed of industrialisation Those who favoured a slowdown in industrialisation were answered by Stalin in 1931. He had a long memory for past Russian defeats, something one would not have expected of a Soviet leader. Note that past German defeats have been omitted. It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo a bit, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world. To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her – for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. Do you remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: ‘You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia’. These words of the old poet were well learned by those gentlemen. They beat her, saying: ‘You are abundant’, so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: ‘You are poor and impotent’, so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters – to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak – therefore you are wrong; hence, you can be

140  Documents beaten and enslaved. You are mighty – therefore you are right; hence, we must be wary of you. That is why we must no longer lag behind. In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in the hands of the working class, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said during the October Revolution: ‘Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries’. We are 50 or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in 10 years. Either we do it, or they crush us. Source: J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1945), pp. 455–56.

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Document 6: Famine and the nouveaux riches (a) This NKVD report highlights the desperate food situation in Voronezh oblast. Leningrad raion, Azov-Black Sea krai, has been plagued by disorganised peasant migrations from Voronezh oblast. In December and November 1937, 150 people arrived…Most of them have no [internal] passports or documents, nor do they have permission to leave the collective farm. The local organisations need more workers on their kolkhozes and have allowed the new peasants to stay. Those which cannot find work live in railway stations or in migrant camps in the fields. They are begging. The migrants explained that Voronezh oblast has suffered a very bad harvest and that the peasants are starving, since they are forced to live on 200 grams of bread per workday. The influx of peasants is continuing. Source: Reprinted in Elena Osokina, Our Daily Bread (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 158.

(b) This NKVD report about the village of Donshino, Volga-River oblast, in January–February 1937, lists 60 people dead, 27 of them from hunger. The Kinyakin family of non-kolkhoz peasants: Kinyakin himself died in December 1936. In January 1937, his 36 year old wife died, followed by his 15 year old daughter and 13 year old son. The Potemkin family of non-kolkhoz peasants: Potemkin himself left the village in search of work while his wife and six children remained in

Documents 141 the village. Four of them died in January, the rest of them are bloated with hunger. The Lyubaev family of non-kolkhoz peasants: Lyubaev and his 17 year old daughter died; his wife and the other two children are bloated. The Vedyasov family of non-kolkhoz peasants: Vedyasov, his 37 year old wife, 15 year old daughter, and 8 year old son all died. Source: Ibid., p. 159.

(c) A person could not become a millionaire in Soviet Russia by producing and selling goods but he could through theft and speculation. Great ingenuity was displayed in stealing goods. Assistants reclassified poor goods as high quality; wrote off goods as damaged and sold them privately; they put in loss claims and wrote off large quantities of goods. Those employed in warehouses did not need to steal; they simply bought goods at state prices and sold them on the black market. All this activity required many hands to be greased to continue. The NKVD had hundreds of informers in the trade system. Below is one report, dated 1937. Many state trade employees in the city of Moscow regularly engage in organised theft – they are not punished but are respected people. Their example influences many other people, and gradually it has become a tradition, an inalienable right for a trade employee to be a thief – that’s normal. They must have valuable things and get them regularly: they must build dachas; they must go on sprees; they must have lovers; etc. Unfortunately, many people look at the big-time tradeworker-thieves with the same lack of concern as people used to view the quartermasters who embezzled state funds. Source: Ibid., p. 184.

(d) Famine returned in 1946–47 and below is an extract from a report by party Central Committee inspectors about the situation in Mariupol, Ukraine. Industry was a privileged sector and this highlights the plight of other sectors. In the municipal industries of Mariupol, the number of workers ill of dystrophy has recently increased significantly. City doctors concluded on 1 March [1947] that there are 3,789 cases of dystrophy in five factories in Mariupol…Their examination has established that the increase in illness is related to a significant degree to the fact that the Ministry of Trade has, in the course of the last 5 months, systematically reduced the supply of grain and food products to the factories. Source: Reprinted in Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 48.

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142  Documents

Document 7: Fulfilment of the principal goals of the Stalinist Five-Year Plans, 1928–50 The following table estimates to what extent the principal goals of the FiveYear Plans were achieved. Jasny, Bergson, Nutter, Kaplan, Moorsteen, Johnson and Kahan are western economists. Figures are given in percentages. First FiveYear Plan (1928–32) (1) National Income   1. Official Soviet estimate (1926/27 prices)   2. Jasny estimate (1926/27 ‘real’ prices)  3. Bergson estimate  4. Nutter estimate Industrial Production   5. Official Soviet estimate (1926/27 prices)  6. Jasny estimate  7. Nutter estimate   8. Kaplan and Moorsteen estimate   9. Official Soviet estimate, producer goods (1926/27 prices) 10. Official Soviet estimate, consumer goods (1926/27 prices) Agricultural Production 11. Official Soviet estimates (1926/27 prices) 12. Jasny estimate 13. Nutter estimate 14. Johnson and Kahan estimates Transport 15. Railway freight traffic (ton–km) Employment 16. National economy, workers and employees 17. Industry, workers and employees

Second FiveYear Plan (1933–37) (2)

91.5

96.1

70.2

66.5

Fourth FiveYear Plan (1946–50) (3) 118.9

89.9 84.1 100.7

103.0

116.9

69.9 59.7 65.3

81.2 93.1 75.7

83.8 94.9

127.6

121.3

127.5

80.5

85.4

95.7

57.8

62.6–76.9

89.9

49.6 50.7 52.4

76.7 69.0 66.1–69.0

76.4 79.4

104.0 144.9

113.2 93.4

173.9

Wages (workers and employees, nat. economy) 18. Average money wage 143.9 19. Average real wage, official 31.9 Soviet estimate 20. Average real wage, Zaleski 26.0 estimate

116.1 118.9

173.6 102.6 65.8

127.8 89.1

Documents 143 First FiveYear Plan (1928–32) (1) Labour Productivity, Industry 21. Official Soviet estimate 22. Jasny estimate 23. Nutter estimate 24. Kaplan and Moorsteen estimate Cost of Production 25. Industry (current prices) Investment 26. In constant prices

Second FiveYear Plan (1933–37) (2)

65.1 41.8 36.3

146.1

Fourth FiveYear Plan (1946–50) (3) 100.7 80.0

121.2

54.0

134.2 122.0

Source: E. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth 1933–1952 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1980), p. 503, copyright © 1980 by the University of North Carolina Press, used by permission of the publisher. Note: Khanin (in Harrison, 1993) estimates industrial growth over the years 1928–41 at 10.9 per cent annually (officially 17 per cent) and national income growth at 3.2 per cent (officially 13.9 per cent).

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Document 8: Mandelstam’s poem about Stalin (November 1933) Osip Mandelstam was arrested in May 1934 for composing this poem, which he had recited at a gathering. Stalin got to know about it and was offended by the unflattering reference to him. This was enough to lead to Mandelstam’s arrest and eventual death in a labour camp. We live, deaf to the land beneath us, Ten steps away no one hears our speeches, But where there’s so much as half a conversation The Kremlin’s mountaineer will get his mention.1 His fingers are fat as grubs And the words, final as lead weights, fall from his lips, His cockroach whiskers leer And his boot tops gleam. Around him a rabble of thin-necked leaders– Fawning half-men for him to play with. They whinny, purr or whine As he prates and points a finger, One by one forging his laws, to be flung Like horseshoes at the head, the eye or the groin.

144  Documents And every killing is a treat For the broad-chested Ossete.2 Source: N. Mandelstam, Hope Abandoned (London, Collins Harvill, 1971), p. 13. 1 In the first version, which came into the hands of the secret police, these two lines read: All we hear is the Kremlin mountaineer, The murderer and peasant-slayer. 2 ‘Ossete’. There were persistent stories that Stalin had Ossetian blood. Ossetia is to the north of Georgia in the Caucasus. The people, of Iranian stock, are quite different from the Georgians.

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Document 9: (A) Interrogation techniques Osip Mandelstam (M. in the text) was subjected to various types of treatment, here described by Nadezhda Mandelstam, his wife. The police could always rely on a steady flow of denunciations. It was one way of exacting revenge for past wrongs. Informers were everywhere as well. At the very first interrogation M. had admitted to being the author of the poem on Stalin, so the stool pigeon’s task could not have been merely to find out something that M. was hiding. Part of the function of these people was to unnerve and wear down prisoners under interrogation, to make their lives a misery. Until 1937 our secret police made much of their psychological methods, but afterward these gave way to physical torture, with beatings of the most primitive kind. After 1937 I never again heard of anyone being held in solitary confinement cells, with or without stool pigeons. Perhaps people picked out for such treatment after 1937 did not leave the Lubianka alive. M. was put through the physical ordeal which had always been applied. It consisted mainly of not being allowed to sleep. He was called out every night and kept for hours on end. Most of the time was spent not in actual questioning, but in waiting under guard outside the interrogator’s door. Once, when there was no interrogation, he was wakened all the same and taken to see a woman who kept him waiting at the door of her office for many hours, only to ask him at the end of it whether he had any complaints. Everybody knew how meaningless it was to make complaints to the prosecutor, and M. did not avail himself of this right. He had probably been called to her office simply as a formality, and also to keep him awake even on a night when the interrogator was catching up on his own sleep. These night birds lived a preposterous life, but all the same they managed to get some sleep, although not at the times when ordinary mortals did. The ordeal by deprivation of sleep and a bright light shining right in the eyes are known to everybody who has gone through such interrogations. The work of undermining a person’s sanity was carried on quite systematically in the Lubianka, and since our secret police is a bureaucratic

Documents 145 institution like any other, all the procedures involved were probably governed by precise instructions. Even though the personnel were specifically selected for the job, one cannot ascribe what went on to their wicked nature, since the same people could overnight have become kindness itself – if so instructed. There were rumours among us that Yagoda had set up secret laboratories and staffed them with specialists who were carrying out all kinds of experiments with drugs, hypnosis, phonograph records and so forth. It was impossible to check such stories, and they may have been a product of our morbid imaginations, or tales deliberately put about to keep us all on tenterhooks. The interrogator’s arrogance was reflected not only in his manner, but also in occasional very superior remarks that smacked of the literary drawing room. The first generation of young Chekists, later to be removed and destroyed in 1937, was distinguished by its sophisticated tastes and weakness for literature – only the most fashionable, of course. In my presence Christophorovich said to M. that it was useful for a poet to experience fear (‘you yourself told me so’) because it can inspire verse, and that he would ‘experience fear in full measure’. Both M. and I noted the use of the future tense. In what Moscow drawing rooms had Christophorovich heard this kind of talk? Apart from people who were forced into cooperating, there were hosts of volunteers. Denunciations poured into every institution on a quite unmanageable scale. Before the Twentieth Congress [1956] I heard an inspector of the Ministry of Education address a meeting at the Chuvash Teachers’ Training College, where I was then working, and ask the staff to stop writing denunciations, warning them that anonymous ones would no longer be read at all. Can it be true that they no longer read anonymous denunciations? I find it hard to believe. Because of this system of ‘interviews’, people developed two kinds of phobia – some suspected that everybody they met was an informer, others that they might be taken for one. One final question: was it my fault for not getting rid of all our friends and acquaintances, as did most good wives and mothers at that time? My guilt is lessened only by the fact that M. would in any case have given me the slip and found a way of reading his outrageous poem – and in this country all real poetry is outrageous – to the first person he met. He was not one to put a gag on himself and lead a life of voluntary seclusion. Source: Ibid., pp. 75, 6.

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Document 10: Bukharin Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda were the most prominent defendants during the third great Show Trial. While in prison, Bukharin wrote several letters to Stalin. On 10 December 1937, he wrote the following letter, explaining why he had

146  Documents decided to plead guilty to the charges laid against him. He, and other senior communists, could not bring themselves to reject the party even though they knew that the charges, to which they were pleading guilty, were completely baseless. They did this for the good of the party. Bukharin was not a Jew. Iosif Vissarionovich, This is perhaps the last letter I shall write to you before my death. That’s why, although I am a prisoner, I ask you to permit me to write this letter without resorting to officialese, all the more since I am writing this letter to you alone: the very fact of its existence or non-existence will remain entirely in your hands. I’ve come to the last page of my drama and perhaps of my very life, I agonised over whether I should pick up pen and paper – as I write this, I am shuddering all over from disquiet and from a thousand emotions stirring within me, and I can hardly control myself. But precisely because I have so little time left, I want to take my leave of you in advance, before it’s too late, before my hand ceases to write, before my eyes close, while my brain somehow still functions. In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I will say to you from the outset that, as far as the world at large is concerned (a) I have no intention of recanting anything I’ve written down; (b) In this sense (or in connection with this) I have no intention of asking you or pleading with you for anything that might derail my case from the direction in which it is heading. But I am writing to you for your personal information. I cannot leave this life without writing to you these last lines because I am in the grip of torments which you should know about. 1. Standing on the edge of the precipice, from which there is no return, I tell you on my word of honour, as I await my death, that I am innocent of those crimes which I admitted to at the investigation… 2. I had no ‘way out’ other than that of confirming the accusations and testimonies of others and of elaborating on them. Otherwise it would have turned out that I had not ‘disarmed’. 3. Apart from extraneous factors and apart from argument 2 above, I have formed, more or less, the following conception of what is going on in our country: 4. There is something great and bold about the political idea of a general purge. It is (a) connected with the pre-war situation and (b) connected with the transition to democracy. This purge encompasses (1) the guilty; (2) persons under suspicion; and (3) persons potentially under suspicion. This business could not have been managed without me. Some are neutralised one way, others in another way, and a third group in yet another way. What serves as a guarantee for all this is the fact that people inescapably talk about each other and in doing so arouse an everlasting distrust in each other. (I’m judging from my own experience. How I raged against Radek, who had smeared me, and then I myself

Documents 147 followed in his wake…) In this way, the leadership is bringing about a full guarantee for itself. 5. For God’s sake, don’t think that I am engaging here in reproaches, even in my inner thoughts. I wasn’t born yesterday. I know all too well that great plans, great ideas, and great interests take precedence over everything, and I know that it would be petty for me to place the question of my own person on a par with the universal-historical tasks resting, first and foremost, on your shoulders. But it is here that I feel my deepest agony and find myself facing my chief, agonising paradox… 6. …Once, most likely during the summer of 1928, I was at your place, and you said to me: ‘Do you know why I consider you my friend? After all, you are not capable of intrigues, are you?’ And I said: ‘No, I am not’. At that time, I was hanging around with Kamenev…Believe it or not, but it is this fact that stands out in my mind as original sin does for a Jew. Oh, God, what a child I was! What a fool! And now I am paying for this with my honour and my life. For this, forgive me Koba. I weep as I write…I ask you for forgiveness, though I have already been punished to such an extent that everything has grown dim around me and darkness has descended upon me. 7. When I was hallucinating, I saw you several times and once I saw Nadezhda Sergeevna [Stalin’s late wife]. She approached me and said: ‘What have they done with you, Nikolai Ivanovich? I’ll tell Iosif to bail you out’. This was so real that I was about to jump and write a letter to you and ask you…bail me out!…Oh, Lord, if only there were some device which would make it possible for you to see my soul flayed and ripped open! If only you could see how attached I am to you, body and soul, quite unlike certain people…No angel will appear now to snatch Abraham’s sword from his hand. My fatal destiny shall be fulfilled… (a) It would be a thousand times easier for me to die than go through the coming trial. I simply don’t know how I’ll be able to control myself… (b) If I’m to receive the death sentence, then I implore you beforehand, I entreat you, by all that you hold dear, not to have me shot. Let me drink poison in my cell instead. (Let me have morphine that I can fall asleep and never wake up.) For me, this point is extremely important. I don’t know what words I should summon up in order to entreat you to grant me this as an act of charity…Have pity on me!…So if the verdict is death, let me have a cup of morphine. I implore you… Source: Reprinted in J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 556–59.

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148  Documents

Document 11: Operational order No. 00447: 30 July 1937 This is the decree, signed by Ezhov, but penned by Stalin, which aimed at liquidating all ‘anti-Soviet elements’ still alive. It has been established…that a significant number of former kulaks who had earlier been subjected to punitive measures and who had evaded them, who had escaped from camps, exile, and labour settlements, have settled in the countryside. This also includes many church officials and sectarians who had formerly been put down, former active participants of anti-Soviet armed campaigns. Significant cadres of anti-Soviet political parties (SRs, Georgian Mensheviks…) as well as cadres of former active members of bandit uprisings, Whites, members of punitive expeditions, repatriates, and so on remain nearly untouched in the countryside. Some of the above-mentioned elements, leaving the countryside for the cities, have infiltrated enterprises of industry, transport and construction. Besides, significant cadres of criminals are still entrenched in both countryside and city. These include horse and cattle thieves, recidivist thieves, robbers, and others who have been serving their sentences and who had escaped and are now in hiding…The organs of state security are faced with the task of mercilessly crushing this entire gang of anti-Soviet elements… I therefore ORDER THAT AS OF 5 AUGUST 1937, ALL REPUBLICS AND REGIONS LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN OF PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST FORMER KULAKS, ACTIVE ANTISOVIET ELEMENTS, AND CRIMINALS… I  Groups subject to punitive measures 1. Former kulaks who have returned home after having served their sentences and who continue to carry out active, anti-Soviet sabotage. 2. Former kulaks who have escaped from camps or from labour settlements, as well as kulaks who have been in hiding from dekulakization, who carry out anti-Soviet activities. 3. Former kulaks and socially dangerous elements who were members of insurrectionary, fascist, terroristic, and bandit formations, who have served their sentences, who have been in hiding from punishment, or who have escaped from their places of confinement and renewed their criminal, anti-Soviet activities. 4. Members of anti-Soviet parties (SRs…) 5. Persons unmasked by investigators…and who are the most hostile and most active members of White Guard–Cossack insurrectionary organisations… 6. …bandits, Whites, sectarian activists, church officials and others, who are presently held in prisons, camps, labour settlements and colonies… 7. Criminals (bandits, robbers, recidivist thieves, professional contraband smugglers…)

Documents 149 8. Criminal elements in camps and labour settlements who are carrying out criminal activities in them… 1. All kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements subject to punitive measures are broken down into two categories: (a) To the first category belong all the most active of the abovementioned elements. They are subject to immediate arrest and, after consideration of their case by the troikas, to be shot. (b) To the second category belong all the remaining less active but nonetheless hostile elements. They are subject to arrest and to confinement in concentration camps for a term ranging from 8 to 10 years, while the most vicious and socially dangerous among them are subject to confinement for similar terms in prisons as determined by the troikas. 2. In accordance with the registration data presented by the people’s commissariat of the republic NKVD and by the heads of krai and oblast [regional] boards of the NKVD, the following number of persons subject to punitive measures is hereby established: First category Azerbaidzhan SSR Armenian SSR Belorussian SSR Georgian SSR Kirghiz SSR Tadzhik SSR Turkmen SSR Uzbek SSR Bashkir ASSR Buryat-Mongolian ASSR Dagestan ASSR Karelian ASSR Crimean ASSR Tatar ASSR Azov-Black Sea krai Far Eastern krai West Siberian krai Leningrad oblast Moscow oblast Sverdlovsk oblast Chelyabinsk oblast …

1,500 500 2,000 2,000 250 500 500 750 500 350 500 300 300 500 5,000 2,000 5,000 4,000 5,000 4,000 1,500

Source: Ibid., pp. 473–76.

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Second category 3,750 1,000 10,000 3,000 500 1,300 1,500 4,000 1,500 1,500 2,500 700 1,200 1,500 8,000 4,000 12,000 10,000 30,000 6,000 4,500

Total 5,250 1,500 12,000 5,000 750 1,800 2,000 4,750 2,000 1,850 3,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 13,000 6,000 17,000 14,000 35,000 10,000 6,000

150  Documents

Document 12: Molotov Molotov argues that the elimination of the military élite was necessary, not because they were spies, but because they were a potential ‘fifth column’ during a war. They might have challenged Stalin’s authority. Let us assume [Stalin] made mistakes. But name someone who made fewer mistakes. Of all the people involved in historic events, who held the most correct position? Given all the shortcomings of the leadership of that time, [Stalin] alone coped with the tasks then confronting the country… Stalin was, of course, distinguished by his rudeness. He was a very blunt person. But if not for his harshness I don’t know how much good would have been accomplished. I think harshness was necessary otherwise there would have been even greater vacillation and irresolution… 1937 was necessary. Bear in mind that after the revolution we slashed right and left; we scored victories but tattered enemies of various stripes survived, and as we were faced by the growing danger of fascist aggression, they might have united. Thanks to 1937 there was no fifth column in our country during the war…It’s unlikely those people were spies, but they were definitely linked with foreign intelligence services. The main thing, however, is that at the decisive moment they could not be depended on… Stalin, in my opinion, pursued a correct line: let innocent heads roll, but there will be no wavering during and after the war. Yes, mistakes were made, but look Rokossovsky and Meretskov were freed…The terror was necessary, and it couldn’t have been completed without mistakes. The alternative was to carry the internal political debates into the war years…Many people were wavering politically. Source: Reprinted in Philip Boobbyer, The Stalin Era (London, Routledge, 2000), pp. 76–7.

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Document 13: Stepan Podlubny’s diary Stepan Podlubny, a young worker of peasant origin, in Moscow, kept a diary between 1931 and 1939. It is an extraordinarily revealing source for understanding the tensions in the lives of those of non-proletarian origin, especially before 1936. He always lived in fear of being ‘unmasked’ and being rejected by the new society. 8 December 1932 My daily secretiveness, the secret of my inside – they don’t allow me to become a person with an independent character. I can’t come out openly or sharply, with any free thoughts. Instead I have to say only what everyone [else] says. I have to walk on a bent surface, along the line of least resistance. This is very bad. Unwittingly, I’m acquiring the character of a lickspittle, of a cunning dog: soft, cowardly and always giving in. How trite and how disgusting! It makes me sick to mention this, but that’s the way it is.

Documents 151 23 December 1933 Youth, in other words the way in which youth views the world, can be divided into two groups. One group that enjoys great respect in the current order is a group of state parrots. They never have their own opinion. They do everything the way they are ordered to, without any thought. These people have a shallow understanding of science and they resemble each other like a flock of sheep. There is another category of people, which I would call more or less liberal. Liberal in the sense that they occupy a different place and have evolved differently, perhaps due to their upbringing. Well, these are unconventional people with progressive views or so. It is very noticeable that the character of these people is deeper, more developed and more gifted than the first one. They do everything silently and have a critical opinion on everything…They would never say anything without reason. In terms of their knowledge one can feel that they don’t know things in general, like the first category, but they know the depths. They are profound people. Profound, because they look at life with clear, not dull, eyes, and aren’t afraid to face the truth. 12 February 1935 This is the onset of a time of such reaction and persecution…I can’t describe it in a few words. It only reminds me of studying the history of the party in 1907: a raging black reaction, going on right now. A raging reaction, and the persecution of free thought. You have to fear not only your comrades, you must also be afraid of yourself. They just don’t persecute you for conversations, but they even persecute you for hinting at unfavourable speech. Source: Reprinted in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Directions (London, Routledge, 2000), pp. 87, 96, 97, 105, 109.

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Document 14: Stalin the miracle-worker Bukharin acted as the protector of the literary élite as long as he was at liberty. His intervention on Mandelstam’s behalf reveals that Stalin’s word was absolute. In his letter to Stalin, Bukharin added a postscript saying he had been visited by [Boris] Pasternak, who was upset by the arrest of Mandelstam. The purpose of this postscript was clear: it was Bukharin’s way of indicating to Stalin what the effect of M.’s arrest had been on public opinion. It was always necessary to personify ‘public opinion’ in this way. You were allowed to talk of one particular individual being upset, but it was unthinkable to mention the existence of dissatisfaction among a whole section of the community – say, the intelligentsia, or ‘literary circles’. No group has the right to its own opinion about some event or other. In matters of this kind there are fine points of etiquette which nobody can appreciate unless he has been in our shoes. Bukharin knew how to present things in the right way,

152  Documents and it was the postscript at the end of his letter that explained why Stalin chose to telephone Pasternak and not someone else… Stalin began by telling Pasternak that Mandelstam’s case had been reviewed, and that everything would be all right. This was followed by a strange reproach: why hadn’t Pasternak approached the writers’ organisations, or him (Stalin), and why hadn’t he tried to do something for Mandelstam: ‘If I were a poet and a poet friend of mine were in trouble, I would do anything to help him’. Pasternak’s reply to this was: ‘The writers’ organisations haven’t bothered with cases like this since 1927, and if I hadn’t tried to do something, you probably would never have heard about it’. Pasternak went on to say something about the word ‘friend’, trying to define more precisely the nature of his relations with M., which were not, of course, covered by the term ‘friendship’. This digression was very much in Pasternak’s style and had no relevance to the matter in hand. Stalin interrupted him: ‘But he’s a genius, he’s a genius, isn’t he?’ To this Pasternak replied: ‘But that’s not the point’. ‘What is it, then?’ Stalin asked. Pasternak then said that he would like to meet him and have a talk. ‘About what?’ ‘About life and death’, Pasternak replied. Stalin hung up. Pasternak tried to get him back, but could only reach a secretary. Stalin did not come to the phone again. Pasternak asked the secretary whether he could talk about this conversation or whether he should keep quiet about it. To his surprise, he was told he could talk about it as much as he liked – there was no need at all to make a secret of it. Stalin clearly wanted it to have the widest possible repercussions. A miracle is only a miracle, after all, if people stand in wonder before it. Everybody could now clearly see what miracles Stalin was capable of, and it was to Pasternak that the honour had fallen not only of spreading the good tidings all over Moscow, but also of hearing a sermon in connection with it. The aim of the miracle was thus achieved: attention was diverted from the victim to the miracle-worker. It was extraordinarily symptomatic of the period that, in discussing the miracle, nobody thought to ask why Stalin should have rebuked Pasternak for not trying to save a friend and fellow poet while at the same time he was calmly sending his own friends and comrades to their death. Even Pasternak [who] had not thought about [his] contemporaries took Stalin’s sermon on friendship between poets completely at its face value and was ecstatic about a ruler who had shown such warmth of spirit. Source: N. Mandelstam, Hope Abandoned (London, Collins Harvill, 1971), pp. 145–47.

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Document 15: The Stalin cult blossoms This extract is taken from a speech by A.O. Avdienko, a writer, to the VIIth Congress of Soviets in February 1935; the poem appeared in Pravda in August 1936.

Documents 153 Thank you, Stalin. Thank you because I am joyful. Thank you because I am well. No matter how old I become, I shall never forget how we received Stalin 2 days ago. Centuries will pass, and the generations still to come will regard us as the happiest of mortals, as the most fortunate of men, because we lived in the century of centuries, because we were privileged to see Stalin, our inspired leader. Yes, and we regard ourselves as the happiest of mortals because we are the contemporaries of a man who never had an equal in world history. The men of all ages will call on thy name, which is strong, beautiful, wise and marvellous. Thy name is engraven on every factory, every machine, every place on the earth, and in the hearts of all men. Every time I have found myself in his presence I have been subjugated by his strength, his charm, his grandeur. I have experienced a great desire to sing, to cry out, to shout with joy and happiness. And now see me – me! – on the same platform where the Great Stalin stood a year ago. In what country, in what part of the world could such a thing happen? I write books. I am an author. All thanks to thee, O great educator, Stalin. I love a young woman with a renewed love and shall perpetuate myself in my children – all thanks to thee, great educator, Stalin. I shall be eternally happy and joyous, all thanks to thee, great educator, Stalin. Everything belongs to thee, chief of our great country. And when the woman I love presents me with a child the first word it shall utter will be: Stalin. O great Stalin, O leader of the peoples, Thou who broughtest man to birth. Thou who fructifiest the earth, Thou who restorest the centuries, Thou who makest bloom the spring, Thou who makest vibrate the musical chords… Thou, splendour of my spring, O Thou, Sun reflected by millions of hearts… Source: Pravda, 28 August 1936, reprinted in T.H. Rigby, Stalin (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 111, 12.

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Document 16: (A) A call to arms The situation was desperate when Stalin delivered this radio speech on 3 July 1941. Right up to the moment of invasion the Soviet people had been assured that there would be no attack. Added to German destruction was the demand that if the Red Army had to retreat, a scorched earth policy was to be adopted. Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men of our Army and Navy! It is to you I am speaking dear friends!

154  Documents The perfidious military attack by Hitlerite Germany on our Motherland, begun on 22 June, is continuing. In spite of the heroic resistance of the Red Army, and although the enemy’s finest divisions and finest air force units have already been smashed and have found their graves on the field of battle, the enemy continues to push forward, hurling fresh forces to the front. Hitler’s troops have succeeded in capturing Lithuania, a considerable part of Latvia, the western part of Byelorussia and part of Western Ukraine. The Fascist aircraft are extending the range of their operations… The Red Army, Red Navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for our towns and villages, must display the daring, initiative and mental alertness characteristic of our people… We must strengthen the Red Army’s rear, subordinating all our work to this end; all our industries must be got to work with greater intensity, to produce more rifles, machine-guns, cartridges, shells, planes; we must organise the guarding of factories, power stations, telephonic and telegraphic communications, and arrange local air-raid protection. We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganisers of the rear, deserters, panicmongers and rumour-mongers; we must exterminate spies, sabotage agents and enemy parachutists, rendering rapid aid in all this to our extermination battalions. We must bear in mind that the enemy is treacherous, cunning, experienced in deception and the dissemination of false rumours. We must reckon with all this, and not fall victims to provocation. All who by their panic-mongering and cowardice hinder the work of defence, no matter who they may be, must be immediately hauled before a military tribunal. In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling-stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway truck, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. Collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe keeping of the State authorities, for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn, must be destroyed without fail. In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated. Source: Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials, vol. 1, 22 June 1941–31 December 1943 (New York, Hutchinson, 1946).

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Document 16: (B) Real burden of defence outlays, 1940–44 (Billion roubles at 1937 factor cost) The Soviet Union paid a heavier price in human and material resources during the war than any other belligerent country.

Documents 155

GDP Net imports Defence outlays:  Munitions  Pay  Food   Clothing, etc.  Fuel  Transport  Construction   Other, including repairs Defence outlays, less net imports Defence outlays, % of GDP:   Domestic supply   Foreign supply

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

247.6 0.0 45.3 16.6 6.8 9.9 4.4 1.5 0.9 2.4 2.7 45.3

206.3 0.0 66.9 28.3 9.8 14.1 5.1 2.1 1.1 2.6 3.8 66.9

144.1 9.0 110.1 61.6 15.8 16.1 6.4 2.4 1.4 2.0 4.5 101.1

160.9 30.9 133.8 82.3 16.6 19.0 5.3 2.7 2.6 1.1 4.2 102.9

192.2 35.6 145.3 90.2 17.2 19.1 6.3 3.1 3.0 1.5 4.8 109.7

18.0 0.0

32.0 0.0

70.0 6.0

64.0 19.0

57.0 19.0

Source: M. Harrison, ‘Soviet economic growth since 1928: The alternative statistics of G.I. Khanin’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 45, no. 1, 1993, Table 4 and D-1, reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.informaworld.com).

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Document 16: (C) Military losses in the Great Patriotic War (millions) 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. Less 7. 8. 9. 10.

Killed in action and died of injuries before reaching a hospital Died from injuries in hospitals Died from disease, accident or shot as punishment (of whom died from diseases died from accidents and shootings Missing and imprisoned (according to military reports and the data of the repatriation organs) Unaccounted for losses in the first months of war Total losses (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5) Previously surrounded and missing soldiers subsequently called up on liberated territory Returned prisoners of war Total (7 + 8) Net loss (6–9) of whom not returned from imprisonment (died, killed, emigrated)

5.227 1.103 0.556 0.267 0.289) 3.396 1.163 11.444 0.940 1.836 2.776 8.668 1.783

156  Documents armed forces frontier troops internal troops

8.509 0.061 0.098

Source: M. Ellman and S. Maksudov, ‘Soviet deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A note’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 4, 1994, p. 674, reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.informaworld.com).

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Document 17: (A) GDP per head of the USSR in international comparison, 1913–40 ($ and 1980 prices) The Soviet Union was ahead of Japan in GDP per head in 1913 but behind in 1940. Apart from Japan, however, the USSR was growing faster than the other economies. This was partly due to the fact that mature economies grow more slowly than those which begin from a low base. Real GDP by sector of origin reveals that industry by 1944 contributed almost as much as in 1937 – a formidable achievement given the war and dislocation.

Japan Russia (USSR) Italy Germany France UK USA

1913

1928

1932

1937

1940

800 900 1550 1960 2000 2970 3790

1150 900 1780 2280 2550 3110 4690

1130 930 1740 1880 2280 2990 3450

1330 1440 1960 2740 2590 3610 4570

1660 1440 2070 3190 2330 3980 4970

Source: R.W. Davies, M. Harrison and S.G. Wheatcroft, eds., The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union 1913–1945 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 270.

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Document 17: (B) Real GDP by sector of origin, 1937–44 (Billion roubles and 1937 factor cost) 1937 Agriculture Industry:   defence industry   civilian industry Construction Transport, communications Trade, catering

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

63.0 65.4 3.4 62.0 10.5 16.8

69.9 73.8 8.3 65.5 10.6 19.3

42.3 70.3 14.2 56.2 6.9 17.8

25.3 51.1 28.1 22.9 3.2 10.2

30.4 59.2 35.0 24.2 3.4 11.8

45.0 66.5 38.7 27.8 4.4 13.7

10.4

11.1

9.3

3.8

3.5

4.1

Documents 157 1937 Civilian services Military services:   army, navy  NKVD NDP Depreciation GDP

33.1 3.7 3.4 0.3 202.9 9.4 212.3

1940 42.0 7.3 6.8 0.5 234.0 13.6 247.6

1941 35.3 10.4 9.8 0.6 192.3 14.0 206.3

1942 22.1 16.6 15.8 0.8 132.4 11.7 144.1

1943 23.4 17.3 16.6 0.7 149.1 11.8 160.9

1944 28.8 17.9 17.2 0.7 180.5 11.7 192.2

Source: M. Harrison, ‘Soviet economic growth since 1928: The alternative statistics of G.I. Khanin’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 45, no. 1, 1993, Table 1, reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.informaworld.com).

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Document 18: (A) Prikaz (decree) of the USSR people’s commissariat of internal affairs issued in 1941 This is the decree (prikaz) deporting ethnic Germans from the Volga German Republic, Saratov and Stalingrad oblasts mainly to Siberia and Kazakhstan. They were accused of conspiring with the advancing Wehrmacht troops. Ethnic Germans in the Red Army, the party and other institutions were also affected. The Germans were absolved of all blame by Khrushchev but their republic was never returned to them. They, together with the Crimean Tatars, are the only two deported nationalities which did not receive their old territory back. In all, about 52 nationalities were deported in the 1940s. Recent Russian estimates put the number exiled or resettled between 1941 and 1948 at about 3.3 million with another 215,000 being despatched later. Besides storing up hatred of Russians and the Soviet regime, these deportations had an unexpected consequence. They forced disparate nationalities from the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia to cooperate to survive. Some of the mafia gangs of the 1980s and 1990s in Russia began in embryo in exile. 001158. Contents: Measures on the Deportation of Germans from the Volga German Republic and Saratov and Stalingrad Oblasts No.001158 August 27, 1941 Moscow. In order to execute the Decree of USSR Sovnarkom and CC RCP(B) on the deportation of Germans from the Volga German Republic, Saratov and Stalingrad oblasts, the following measures are to be carried out:  1. Send a USSR NKVD operational group headed by Comrade Serov, USSR Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, to the area…   2. Entrust the following troikas [group of three] with the task of preparing and carrying out the operation in the oblasts…

158  Documents  3. On arrival at the designated place, the three responsible officials are to organise the operation. Carry out the operation according to the appended instructions.   4. The operation is to begin on September 3 and is to be completed on September 20, 1941.   5. Send special USSR NKVD officers to each settlement area for German deportees and make them responsible for preparing the timely acceptance of columns with the deportees at the transfer points and in the settlement areas….   6. To carry out the deportation operation, Comrade Obruchnikov, Deputy People’s Commissar, is to send 1200 NKVD officers and 2000 militia officials to the Volga German Republic; 250 special NKVD officials and 1000 militia officials to Saratov Oblast; 100 NKVD officers and 250 militia officials to Stalingrad Oblast.   7. To carry out the deportation operation by the NKVD troops, MajorGeneral Apollonov is to send Brigade Commissar Krivenko and 7350 Red Army soldiers, under his command, to the Volga German Republic; Colonel Vorobeikov and 2300 Red Army soldiers, under his command, to Saratov Oblast; Brigade Commissar Sladkevich and 2500 Red Army soldiers, under his command, to Stalingrad Oblast. Deputy People’s Commissar Obruchnikov and Major-General Apollonov are to ensure that those sent officially arrive at the place designated for them not later than September 1, 1941.  8. To ensure the embarquement of German deportees on steamers in Astrakhan, Comrade Voronin, Head of the Stalingrad NKVD Administration is to provide an operational group to help the Astrakhan Section for Operatives.   9. On the basis of the information received by local NKVD organs from agents and operatives, identify anti-Soviet elements and arrest them before the operation and deport their families in the conventional manner. 10. Prior to the operation, explain the situation to Soviet and Party activists and warn the deportees that if they assume an illegal status, some members will be prosecuted and other family members will be subjected to repression [execution or imprisonment]. 11. If some family members to be deported refuse to go to the settlement area, arrest such persons and transfer them forcibly to the settlement area. 12. Warn all NKVD personnel involved in the operation that the operation is not to be accompanied by noise or panic. If any delays, anti-Soviet actions or armed clashes occur, take decisive measures to eliminate them. 13. To coordinate the whole deportation, transfer and settling procedure, Comrade Chernyshov, USSR Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade Fedotov, head of the Red Army Administration and

Documents 159 Comrade Sinegubov, Head of the Transport Administration are to be seconded to the USSR NKVD. 14. Comrade Serov, Deputy People’s Commissar, is to inform the USSR NKVD* on the preparation and the progress of the operation beginning from September 1, 1941. L. Beria, USSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, General Commissar of State Security [*According to the data of the USSR NKVD Section of Special Deportation Areas, 446,480 persons were deported from the regions mentioned in the prikaz; in addition to the Germans from the Volga German Republic, more than 800,000 citizens of German nationality who were living scattered throughout the country had been deported.] Source: TsGAOR, f. 8331, op. 22, d. 542, l. 234.

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Document 18: (B) The USSR NKVD section for combatting banditry An extract from an Explanatory Note by Lavrenty Beria to Comrade J.V. Stalin, Comrade V.M. Molotov (USSR Sovnarkom) and Comrade G.M. Malenkov [CC, RCP (b)]. July 1944 In order to implement the decree of the State Committee of Defence, 602,193 inhabitants of the North Caucasus, of whom 496,460 were Chechens and Ingushi, 68,327 were Karachai and 37,406 were Balkars, were deported by the NKVD for permanent residence in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, in February–March 1944. Most of the special deportees (477,809 persons) were sent to Kazakhstan. However, the republican agencies of Kazakhstan did not devote due attention to the problem of providing special deportees from the North Caucasus with gardens and household plots. As a result, the living standards of special deportees in Kazakhstan and their engagement in socially useful labour have been unsatisfactory. Special deportees’ families settled in kolkhozes were not allowed to join agricultural artels [cooperatives]. The provision of special deportees with household plots and gardens and also living quarters was inadequate. Special deportees settled in sovkhozes and assigned to industrial enterprises were unsatisfactorily employed in industrial enterprises. Cases of typhus, shortcomings in the provision of household plots and in living conditions, thefts and criminal offences were recorded. In order to introduce proper order, Kruglov, USSR Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, and a group of officers were sent on an official visit in May 1944 to Kazakhstan. In July 1944 2,196 special deportees were arrested

160  Documents for various offences. All the cases were heard by special courts. 429 NKVD special komendaturas were established to supervise the residence conditions of the special deportees, combat escapes, provide NKVD operatives and provide as quickly as possible special deportees’ families with household plots. Special deportees were provided with better and larger household plots. Of 70,296 families settled in kolkhozes, 56,800 or 81 per cent became members of agricultural artels; 83,303 families (74.3 per cent) received household plots and gardens; 12,683 families lived in their own houses. The work of children’s labour colonies was organised. In June 1944 1,268 children were placed there. More special deportees were employed. For example, of a total of 16,927 persons found capable of work, 16,396 were actually employed in Dzhambul oblast. In Akmolinsk oblast of 19,345 persons, 17,667 were actually working and of these 2,746 were old people and children. Source: TsGAOR, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 228, l. 259–67.

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Document 19: The cost of hostilities: A balance sheet The euphoria [of victory] however, concealed an appalling bill of costs. Outstanding among these were the 27–28 million premature deaths incurred by the Soviet population, which accounted for no fewer than one in seven of the prewar population, and up to half of global demographic losses attributable to World War II. The bleeding wounds of victory were everywhere. The Soviet Army had lost nearly 9 million dead. No other army in history had achieved so much at such great cost. The civilian cost was still greater. Some 19 million civilians had perished before their time. One-third of the prewar capital stock had been destroyed, and twice that amount used up by wartime defence, economic conversion, and lost national income… In the years just after the war, the reinforced legitimacy of Stalin and Stalinist institutions ran strongly against other, weaker currents welling up from below. The war experience would also supply a smothered impulse to reform. There was a widespread desire for liberalisation and relaxation, in politics as in culture and economic affairs. Veterans of military service and war work, whose loyalty to the Soviet system had passed the severest test, may have expected the system to reward them with greater trust and increased rights of participation, not just free bus passes. Some also believed that the war had revealed the weaknesses of Stalinist dictatorship, above all in 1941–42, and the necessity of limiting the arbitrary powers of individual leaders. The war had given many the opportunity to exercise their own personal initiative and responsibility on a wider scale than in peacetime, as military commanders, factory managers, farmers, war administrators, war writers and reporters, and had taught them that mere unthinking obedience to superior orders was not enough.

Documents 161 For the time being, however, such beliefs and values would remain implicit or, if voiced en clair, dangerous to the individuals who held them. Among the political leadership there were only confused ideological shadings, without sharp distinctions between overall political alternatives or coherent programmes. In the absence of any clear challenge, Stalin would seek to restore everything as it was before the war to the rigid mould of personal dictatorship and rule from above by decree. And while he lived he would very largely succeed. Other nations – the two Germanies and Japan under Allied occupation, Britain under the Attlee government, France and Italy under new postwar constitutions – went through different postwar reforms. In the Soviet Union, in contrast, the prewar order of forced industrial accumulation, political dictatorship, and social mobilisation, would be restored… If not Stalin, then who can be credited with the great victory on the eastern front? Millions of ordinary people, infantrymen, officers, workers at the bench and in the field, managers, writers – even war administrators and Party secretaries: these shouldered the main burdens, whether they did it well or badly. For the most part they were not born great heroes, and they were not innately brave or noble, although many of them did very brave things. They were marked out not by special personal qualities but by special circumstances, and an extraordinary history. What enabled them to wage such a terrible war and emerge victorious? The answer to these questions is the same – everything in their history, their revolutionary and national traditions, their cultural ties and family roles, the social, economic and administrative webs which defined their place in Soviet life, the organs of state, the Party and its leaders, and Stalin too. All these are indispensable elements of the explanation of what made them fight, and why victory cost them so much. Source: J.D. Barber and M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945 (Harlow, Longman, 1991), pp. 206–11.

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Document 20: Stalin the omniscient Stalin is the brilliant leader and teacher of the Party, the great strategist of the Socialist Revolution, military commander, the guide of the Soviet state. An implacable attitude towards the enemies of Socialism, profound fidelity to principle, a combination of clear revolutionary perspective and clarity of purpose with extraordinary firmness and persistence in the pursuit of aims, wise and practical leadership, and intimate contact with the masses – such are the characteristic features of Stalin’s style. After Lenin, no other leader in the world had been called upon to direct such vast masses of workers and peasants. He has a unique faculty for generalising the constructive revolutionary experience of the masses, for seizing upon and developing their

162  Documents initiative, for learning from the masses as well as teaching them, and for leading them forward to victory. Stalin’s whole career is an example of profound theoretical power combined with an unusual breadth and versatility of practical experience in the revolutionary struggle. In conjunction with the tried and tested Leninists who are his immediate associates, and at the head of the great Bolshevik Party, Stalin guides the destinies of a multi-national Socialist state, a state of workers and peasants of which there is no precedent in history… Everybody is familiar with the cogent and invincible force of Stalin’s logic, the crystal clarity of his mind, his iron will, his devotion to the party, his ardent faith in the people, and love for the people. Everybody is familiar with his modesty, his simplicity of manner, his consideration for people, and his merciless severity towards enemies of the people. Everybody is familiar with his intolerance of ostentation, of phrasemongers and windbags, of whiners and alarmists. Stalin is wise and deliberate in solving complex political questions where a thorough weighing of pros and cons is required. At the same time, he is a supreme master of bold revolutionary decisions and of swift adaptations to changed conditions. Stalin is the worthy continuer of the cause of Lenin, or, as it is said in the Party: Stalin is the Lenin of today. Source: G.F. Alexandrov et al., Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947), pp. 198–201.

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Document 21: Stalin on red army discipline ‘Do you see what a complicated thing is man’s soul, his psyche? Well then, imagine a man who has fought from Stalingrad to Belgrade – over thousands of kilometres of his own devastated land, across the dead bodies of his comrades and dearest ones! How can such a man react normally? And what is so awful in his amusing himself with a woman, after such horrors? You have imagined the Red Army to be ideal. And it is not ideal, or can it be, even if it did not contain a certain percentage of criminals – we opened up our prisons and stuck everybody into the army. There was an interesting case. An Air Force major wanted to have a woman, and a chivalrous engineer appeared to protect her. The major drew a gun: ‘Ech, you mole from the rear!’ – and he killed the chivalrous engineer. They sentenced the major to death. But somehow the matter was brought before me, and I made inquiries – I have the right as commander in chief in time of war – and I released the major and sent him to the front. Now he is one of our heroes. One has to understand the soldier. The Red Army is not ideal. The important thing is that it fights Germans – and it is fighting them well; the rest doesn’t matter’. Soon afterwards when I returned from Moscow, I heard, to my horror, of a far more significant example of Stalin’s ‘understanding’ attitude towards

Documents 163 the sins of Red Army personnel. While crossing East Prussia, Soviet soldiers, especially the tank units, had regularly shelled and killed all the German civilian refugees – women and children. Stalin was informed of this and asked what should be done. He replied: ‘We lecture our soldiers too much; let them have some initiative!’ Source: M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (London, Hart-Davis, 1962), pp. 101, 02.

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Document 22: Stalin in 1948 I could hardly believe how much he had changed in 2 or 3 years. When I had last seen him, in 1945, he was still lively, quick-witted, and had a pointed sense of humour. But that was during the war and it had been, it would seem, Stalin’s last effort and had taken him to his limit. Now he laughed at inanities and shallow jokes. On one occasion he not only failed to get the political point of an anecdote I told him about how he had got the better of Churchill and Roosevelt, but he even seemed to be offended, as old men sometimes are. I perceived an embarrassed astonishment on the faces of the rest of the party. In one thing, though, he was still the Stalin of old: stubborn, sharp, suspicious whenever anyone disagreed with him. He even cut Molotov, and one could feel the tension between them. Everyone paid court to him, avoiding any expression of opinion before he expressed his, and then hastening to agree with him… Towards the end of the dinner Stalin unexpectedly asked me why there were not many Jews in the Yugoslav Party and why these few played no important role in it. I tried to explain to him that there were not many Jews in Yugoslavia to begin with, and most belonged to the middle class. I added, ‘The only prominent Communist Jew is Pijade, and he regards himself as being more of a Serb than a Jew’. Stalin began to recall: ‘Pijade, short, with glasses? Yes, I remember, he visited me. And what is his position?’ ‘He is a member of the Central Committee, a veteran Communist, the translator of Das Kapital’, I explained. ‘In our Central Committee there are no Jews!’ he broke in, and began to laugh tauntingly. ‘You are an anti-Semite, you, too, Djilas, you, too, are an anti-Semite!’ I took his words and laughter to mean the opposite, as I should have – as the expression of his own anti-Semitism and as a provocation to get me to declare my stand concerning the Jews, particularly Jews in the Communist movement. Source: Ibid., pp. 138–40.

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164  Documents

Document 23: Soviet attitudes towards Yugoslav culture How little the views of the Yugoslavs were respected can be seen from an incident which happened to Tito while he was in Moscow. He says: ‘The representatives of the Soviet press asked me to write an article for their papers. I did so, and when I got the text, I noticed that eight-tenths of my views had been completely altered according to the wishes of the editors. I was already familiar with such methods in the Soviet Union, but I never imagined that Soviet journalists could alter to their own formula the text of an article written by the Prime Minister of a friendly allied country. The same thing happened to Djilas, Mora Pijade, and Rato Dugonjis, the Secretary of the People’s Youth of Yugoslavia. The latter had written an article about the Brtko–Banovisi railway which the youth of Yugoslavia had built by voluntary work. The editor of Komsomolskaya Pravda changed the article considerably, even shortening the railway from 50 miles to 37. Strange logic!’ In contacts with the most responsible Soviet representatives a tone of disparagement towards the Yugoslavs as a people was noticeable, disparagement of our culture, complete ignorance of our history and our way of life. For instance, Zhdanov once asked Djilas whether opera existed in Yugoslavia. There were 12 opera houses in Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav composers, Lisinski for instance, had been writing operas more than a century ago… Various Soviet representatives especially pounced on our press as one of the most powerful instruments of propaganda. Almost every week a representative of the Soviet Information Bureau would come round with several hundred articles written in Moscow on various topics, mostly about life in the Soviet Union, birthdays of Russian writers, composers, and scientists, or life in the collectives; there were also many articles about other countries, and he persistently asked for all this material to be published in our dailies and weeklies. Had we printed them all, we should have had almost no space left for our own journalists, who would soon have been out of work, leaving the people to be informed of world events only through the eyes of writers in Moscow. On the other hand, we asked the Soviet government to publish at least something about Yugoslavia in the Soviet press, on a reciprocal basis. This was always avoided. Some articles waited a year for publication, then were returned without having seen daylight. The same thing happened with books. We published 1,850 Soviet books; they published two of ours. Source: V. Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), pp. 274, 275.

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Document 24: The importance of the cow This was why I dreamed of a cow. Thanks to the vagaries of our economic system, a family could support itself for many years by keeping a cow. Millions lived in wretched huts, feeding themselves from the products of their

Documents 165 tiny plots of land (on which they grew potatoes, cabbage, cucumbers, beets, turnips and onions) and their cow. Some of the milk had to be sold to buy hay, but there was always enough left over to add a little richness to the cabbage soup. A cow gives people some independence and, without overexerting themselves, they can earn a little extra to buy bread. The State is still in a quandary about this relic of the old world: if people are allowed to buy hay to feed their cow, then they do only the very minimum of work on the kolkhoz; if, on the other hand, you take their cows away, they will die of hunger. The result is that the cow is alternately forbidden and then permitted again. Source: N. Mandelstam, Hope Abandoned (London, Collins Harvill, 1971), p. 301.

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Document 25: A Jewish success story It was Lezhnev who had asked M. to write The Noise of Time forRossia, but then turned it down after reading it – he had expected a totally different kind of childhood story, such as he himself was later to write. His was the story of a Jewish boy from the shtetl who discovers Marxism. He was lucky with his book. At first nobody wanted to publish it – though it was probably no worse than others of its kind – but then it was read and approved by Stalin. Stalin even tried to phone Lezhnev to tell him, but Lezhnev was not at home at the moment Stalin called. When he learned what had happened, Lezhnev sat by his phone for a whole week, hoping that Stalin might ring back. But miracles, as we know, are not repeated. A week later he was informed that there would be no further telephone call, but that orders had been given for his book to be published (it was already being printed), that he had been made a member of the Party on Stalin’s personal recommendation and appointed editor of Pravda’s literary section. In this way Lezhnev, hitherto a nobody who could always be trampled underfoot as a former private publisher, was suddenly raised to the greatest heights and almost went crazy from joy and emotion. Of all the Haroun al Rashid miracles, this, incidentally, turned out to be the most enduring: Lezhnev kept his Pravda post, or an equivalent one, right up to his death. On hearing all this, Lezhnev at last left his telephone and rushed off to the barber – his beard had grown considerably during the week of waiting. Next he called on us to present us with The Dialectic of Nature and to tell us about the great change that Marxism had brought into his life. None of this had ever entered his head in the days when he was editor of Rossia. From what he said, it appeared that he had read some newly discovered works by Engels, notably The Dialectic of Nature, and seen the light. He had even gone into a bookshop just now and bought a copy for us, because he hoped it would help M. to see the light as well. Lezhnev was an exceptionally sincere and well-meaning person. I was even a little envious of him at that

166  Documents moment – a genuine conversion to the true faith, which suddenly puts an end to all your troubles and at the same time starts bringing in a regular income, must be a remarkably agreeable thing. Source: Ibid., pp. 241, 242.

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Document 26: Youth, culture and health (a) Some young people were not satisfied with official culture. They continued the Russian tradition of self-education and developed their own private culture which they referred to as a ‘catacomb’ culture. Ernst Neizvestny, who became a famous sculptor and had a furious row with Khrushchev over art, describes his experience. Khrushchev’s son commissioned Neizvestny to do a headstone which would serve as a memorial to this father. It can now be seen in Novodevichy cemetery, Moscow. We did not pose any political questions; we did not in any event have political conceptions. I was not even in the Komsomol, although one of our friends was a member of the party. We all intended, however, to educate ourselves well, and the reading of, say, Trotsky, or Saint Augustine, or Orwell, or Berdiaev was punishable. Therefore we needed a conspiracy… Before samizdat [underground self-publishing which began in the 1960s], we procured and copied privately the whole circle of the Verhkovtsy [liberal thinkers of the Landmarks movement, 1909]…Besides this we listened to reports on theosophy, genetics, on subjects forbidden in the USSR. If the authorities had asked us whether we studied politics, we would have had to answer honestly: no. Source: Reprinted in Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 113.

(b) Neizvestny and his friends were at one end of the cultural spectrum; the other end was made up of party officials and rank-and-file members. These are extracts from a party Central Committee report, prepared by officials sent out to various parts of the country to assess the impact of propaganda, in 1947. The experience was rather chastening. The first two interviews are with local party officials. The third is with a rankand-file party member.

First interview Q. What political literature do you read? A. Comrade Stalin’s first volume. Q. What in particular have you read in it?

Documents 167 A. Q. A. Q. A.

I forget. I can’t remember. I can’t say. What else do you read? I read Comrade Aleksandrov on bourgeois theories. What kind of fiction do you read? I read Ivan the Terrible, a book by one of our writers. I don’t like the book. It speaks well of the people but among the bourgeoisie and the capitalists there isn’t one good person. That is all I have read this year.

Second interview Q. Have you read the report of Comrade Zhdanov on the journals Zvezda and Leningrad? A. No, I haven’t read it. Q. Which of the recent decisions of the Central Committee guide you in your work? A. I cannot now name any. Q. What English political parties do you know? A. I don’t remember. Q. Who is the head of the government in Yugoslavia? A. I don’t remember. Tito is in the government either in Yugoslavia or Bulgaria.

Third interview Q. Name the highest organ of government in the USSR. A. The working class. The Central Committee? The All-Union Communist Party? Q. What is Comrade Stalin’s position in government? A. He has many offices, I can’t say. Q. Who is the head of the Soviet government? A. I don’t know. Q. What is Comrade Molotov’s position in government? A. He travels abroad. Q. What is currently going on in Greece? A. A gang is making war on the working class. Source: Ibid., pp. 124, 25.

(c) The Doctors’ Plot, in January 1953, had some unexpected side-effects, as this extract reveals. It is by Ya. I. Rapoport, the well-known pathologist, who was one of the plot’s victims. The unlikeliest rumours spread among the public, including ‘reliable’ reports that in many maternity wards newborn infants were being killed or that some sick person died immediately after the visit of a doctor, who was then, naturally, arrested and shot. Visits to clinics declined sharply, and

168  Documents the pharmacies were suddenly forsaken. At the institute where I worked, a young woman came and demanded an analysis of an empty vial of penicillin. Her child had pneumonia, and immediately after she was given the penicillin, according to the mother, he grew worse. Allergic reactions to antibiotics are common enough, but she attributed the reaction to the work of poison allegedly contained in the penicillin, declaring that she would not give him any more medicine. When I told her that she would thus condemn him to death, she replied: ‘Let him die from illness but not from poison that I give him with my own hands’. Source: Ibid., pp. 137, 38.

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Document 27: The reality of Soviet planning Zaleski here argues that the central national plan, from which all other plans are derived, was a myth. In describing the Soviet economy – a centrally planned economy – the tendency is to give planning priority over management. This would be correct if the central plan, broken down among economic units in an authoritarian fashion, were actually carried out. However, this study shows that the existence of such a central national plan, coherent and perfect, to be subdivided and implemented at all levels, is only a myth. What actually exists, as in any centrally administered economy, is an endless number of plans, constantly evolving, that are coordinated ex post after they have been put into operation. The unification of these innumerable plans into a single national plan, supposedly coherent, takes place rarely (once or twice during a 5-year period and once for an annual or quarterly plan); furthermore, the attempt at unification is only a projection of observed tendencies resulting from extrapolating trends based on natural forces. In view of the changing and often ephemeral nature of the plans, management emerges as the only constant in the system. The economic administration is built on a strict hierarchy descending from the ministry (or people’s commissariat) to the enterprise, subject to strict discipline, obeying orders transmitted continuously. Under each management agency, from the Council of Ministers down to the enterprises, there is a planning commission with a consulting role…Of course, higher-level ‘consultants’ (Gosplan) tend to take over certain management functions (material and equipment supply) or to intervene more or less directly in management, but then they become administrators just like the others and their ‘planning’ becomes management. The priority of management over planning has been the dominant feature of the Soviet economy since Stalin’s time. Since management is highly centralised, this feature is characteristic of the entire model. Therefore, it seems more nearly correct to call the economy ‘centrally managed’ rather than centrally planned.

Documents 169 Source: E. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1952 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1980), p. 484, copyright © 1980 by the University of North Carolina Press, used by permission of the publisher.

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Document 28: What is Stalinism? There are many different approaches to a study of the Stalinist system. There is the totalitarian or intentionalist approach which concentrates on politics and ideology, the strong state and strong leader; the Stalinist Marxist approach which views Stalinism as the dictatorship of the proletariat; the Trotskyist approach which emphasises the trend to Thermidorian bureaucracy and the emergence of a Leviathan state; the state capitalist approach which sees a nominally socialist state but run along capitalist lines (workers as wage labour); the new class approach of Djilas; the oriental despotism interpretation of Karl Wittfogel, who argues that traditions of deference to authority may have had their origins in the high levels of socio-political organisation required by a ‘hydraulic society’ in which the office of watermaster (controller of irrigation water) in arid lands was sovereign; the pluralist approach, which includes institutional pluralism; the corporatist interpretation; and finally the industrial society approach which concentrates on the primacy of industrialisation. (a) 1. Commitment to a violent anti-capitalist revolution which does not develop beyond the replacement of the political power of the bourgeoisie by the power of political bureaucracy and of private property by state ownership of the means of production. 2. The leading force of the revolution and the backbone of the postrevolutionary society is a monolithic, strongly disciplined, strictly hierarchical party which has a monopoly of all economic and political power and reduces all other social organisations to its mere transmissions. 3. The state tends to exist even after the complete liquidation of a capitalist class. Its primary new function is a rigid administrative planning of all production and complete control of all political life. The state is officially a dictatorship of the working class; in reality it is dictatorship of the party leadership or of one single leader. 4. The new society is continued as a collectivist welfare society in which most forms of economic and political alienation would survive. 5. As a consequence of the centralist political and economic structure, smaller nations in a multi-national country are denied selfdetermination and continue to be dominated by the biggest nation.

170  Documents 6. All culture is subordinated to the sphere of politics and is strictly controlled and censored by the ruling party. Source: Mihailo Marković, ‘Stalinism and Marxism’ in R. Tucker, ed., Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York, W.W. Norton, 1977), p. 300.

(b) Stalinism was not simply nationalism, bureaucratisation, absence of democracy, censorship, police repression and the rest in any precedented sense. These phenomena have appeared in many societies and are rather easily explained. Instead Stalinism was excess, extraordinary extremism, in each. It was not, for example, merely coercive peasant policies, but a virtual civil war against the peasantry; not merely police repression, or even civil war style terror, but a holocaust by terror that victimised tens of millions of people for 25 years; not merely a Thermidorian revival of nationalist tradition, but an almost fascist-like chauvinism; not merely a leader cult, but deification of a despot…Excesses were the essence of historical Stalinism, and they are what really require explanation. Source: Stephen F. Cohen, ‘Bolshevism and Stalinism’ in ibid., pp. 12, 13.

(c) The cult of the state and worship of rank, the irresponsibility of those who hold power and the population’s lack of rights, the hierarchy of privileges and the canonisation of hypocrisy, the barrack system of social and intellectual life, the suppression of the individual and the destruction of independent thought, the environment of terror and suspicion, the atomisation of people and the notorious ‘vigilance’, the uncontrolled violence and the legalised cruelty. Source: R.A. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1975), p. 553.

(d) (i)

A formally highly centralised, directive economic system characterised by mass mobilisation and an overriding priority on the development of heavy industry; (ii) A social structure initially characterised by significant fluidity, most particularly in the form of high levels of social mobility which brings the former lower classes into positions of power and privilege; subsequent consolidation of the social structure results in the dominance of rank, status and hierarchy; (iii) A cultural and intellectual sphere in which all elements are meant to serve the political aims laid down by the leadership and where all areas of culture and intellectual production are politically monitored;

Documents 171 (iv) A personal dictatorship resting upon the use of terror as an instrument of rule and in which the political institutions are little more than the instrument of the dictator; (v) All spheres of life are politicised, hence, within the scope of state concerns; (vi) The centralisation of authority is paralleled by a significant measure of weakness of continuing central control, resulting in a system which, in practice, is in its daily operations loosely controlled and structured; (vii) The initial revolutionary ethos is superseded by a profoundly conservative, status quo, orientation. Source: G. Gill, Stalinism (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990), pp. 57, 58.

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Document 29: Khrushchev’s secret speech at the XXth Party Congress, 24–25 February 1956 Khrushchev denounces Stalin’s crimes and the cult of personality surrounding the vozhd. This devastating attack concentrated mainly on the damage done to the party and its cadres and eventually led to a split in the world communist movement. This is the case for the prosecution. Khrushchev put his survival during the Stalin era down to sheer luck. Comrades! After Stalin’s death, the Central Committee began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and contrary to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman, possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour. Such belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years… At present, we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the Party now and for the future – how the cult of the personality of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which developed at a certain specific stage and became the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality. Because not all realise fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of personality, or the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of collective Party direction and by the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person, the Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to make materials on this matter available to the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union… While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organisers of the masses, Lenin mercilessly stigmatised every manifestation of the cult

172  Documents of personality, inexorably combated any foreign-to-Marxism views about a hero and a crowd, and countered all efforts to offer a hero to the masses and to the people… In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of Party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership and his wilfulness vis a vis the Party and its Central Committee became fully evident after the XVIIth Party Congress, in 1934. Having at its disposal numerous data showing the brutal wilfulness towards Party cadres, the Central Committee created a Party commission and it has been charged with investigating what made possible mass repressions against the majority of Central Committee members and candidates elected at the XVIIth Congress. The commission has examined a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and other documents. It has established many facts relating to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusations, and to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the deaths of innocent people. It became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic activists who in 1937–38 were branded enemies were never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest communists. They were merely stigmatised as enemies. Often, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they confessed (at the order of the investigative judges/falsifiers) to all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes… Of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee who were elected at the XVIIth Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 per cent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937–38). What was the composition of the delegates to the Congress? 80 per cent of the voting participants of the Congress joined the Party before the Revolution and during the Civil War, i.e., meaning before 1921. By social origin the majority of Congress delegates were workers (60 per cent of voting members). For this reason, it is inconceivable that a Congress so composed could have elected a Central Committee of which a majority would prove to be enemies of the Party. The only reason why 70 per cent of Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Congress were branded as enemies of the Party and people was because honest communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated and revolutionary legality was gravely undermined. The same fate befell not only Central Committee members but also the majority of Congress delegates: of 1,966 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary crimes, i.e. decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were the charges of counterrevolutionary crimes made, as we now see, against a majority of participants at the Congress… Why did that mass repressions against activists increase more and more after the Congress? It was because Stalin had so elevated himself above the Party and above the nation that he ceased to take into consideration the

Documents 173 Central Committee and the Party. Using his formulation…that the closer we are to socialism the more enemies we will have…the provocateurs who had infiltrated the state-security organs together with unprincipled careerists began…the mass terror against Party cadres, cadres of the Soviet state, and ordinary Soviet citizens… When the cases of some of these so-called spies and saboteurs were examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. The confessions of guilt of many of those arrested and charged with enemy activity were obtained by cruel and inhuman tortures… When we look at many of our novels, films and historical-scientific studies, the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War [1941–45] appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything…During the war and after the war, Stalin advanced the thesis that the tragedy our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of an unexpected attack by the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue… Documents which have now been published show that on 3 April, 1941 Churchill, through his ambassador to the USSR, [Sir Stafford] Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union…We must state that information of this sort concerning the threat of a German armed invasion was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources. However, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was assessed with reservations… After the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet nation proudly stressed the magnificent victories gained through the great sacrifices and tremendous efforts…and it was precisely at this time that the so-called Leningrad affair occurred. As we have now proven, this case was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included: comrades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others…How did it happen that these persons were branded as enemies of the people and liquidated? Facts prove that the Leningrad affair was also the result of wilfulness which Stalin exercised against Party cadres…We must state that, after the war, the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal. In particular, his suspiciousness grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable levels. Many workers became enemies before his very eyes. After the war, Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or anything. The wilfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union. The July 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of the conflict with Yugoslavia. Stalin played a shameful role. The Yugoslav affair contained no problems which could not have been solved through Party discussions among comrades…

174  Documents You see what Stalin’s mania for greatness led to. He completely lost contact with reality. He demonstrated his suspiciousness and haughtiness not only to individuals in the USSR, but also to whole parties and nations. Let us also recall the Doctors’ Plot. Actually, there was no Plot. Stalin issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists and called the investigating judge, gave him instructions, and advised him on which methods to be used. These methods were simple – beat, beat and, beat again…When we examined this case after Stalin’s death, we found it to have been fabricated from beginning to end… Comrades! The cult of personality led to faulty principles in Party work and economic activity. It brought about rude violations of internal Party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, cover-ups of shortcomings, and varnishings of reality. Our nation produced many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit. We should also not forget that, due to the numerous arrests of Party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared all that was new, feared their own shadows, and began to show less initiative in their work…Those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noticed it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never travelled anywhere, did not meet city and kolkhozniks. He did not know the actual situation in the provinces. He knew the country and agriculture only from films and these films dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture. Many films portrayed kolkhoz life with tables groaning under the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently, Stalin thought that it was so… Let us consider the first Central Committee Plenum after the XIXth Party Congress. Stalin, suggested that comrades Molotov and Mikoyan were guilty of some baseless charges. He evidently had plans to finish off the older members of the Politburo… Comrades! We must abolish the cult of personality decisively, once and for all… We are absolutely certain that our Party, armed with the historical resolutions of the XXth Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories. Long live the victorious banner of our Party – Leninism! (Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.) Source: Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive, Soviet Government, Moscow.

Glossary

ASSR:  Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; an administrative unit of a republic which is populated by a nationality other than the titular nationality: e.g. the Tatars made up the Tatar ASSR in the RSFSR. Although they had their own government, they were ruled from the titular nationality’s capital; in the Tatars’ case, Moscow. Hence ‘autonomous’ here does not mean independent. AUSW:  All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers; see also AUW and RAPP. AUW:  All-Russian Union of Writers; see also AUSW and RAPP. Bolsheviks:  When the All-Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP), founded in 1898, split in 1903, those in the majority became known as Bolsheviks; in October 1917 the Bolshevik or Communist Party seized power. Brest-Litovsk:  Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany, March 1918, recognised Soviet Russia in international law; fulfilled the Bolshevik pledge to bring peace; revealed how split the Bolshevik leadership could be on a major issue. Candidate member:  (a) Before a person could become a full member of the Communist Party, he or she had to serve a probationary period during which he or she was called a candidate member; (b) candidate members of the Central Committee and Politburo might attend meetings, speak but not vote. CC:  Central Committee of the Communist Party; this organisation acted in the name of the Party Congress when the latter was not in session; it contained all the important party officials, government ministers, leading army and naval personnel, key ambassadors, etc. CEC:  All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; the body which acted in the name of the Congress of Soviets when that body was not in session; theoretically, it was the supreme organ in the state but it rapidly lost power to Sovnarkom after December 1917. The Bolsheviks had a majority in the CEC but in the Presidium or inner council of the CEC there were only Bolsheviks; the chairman of the CEC was, in practice, the president of the country; in 1922 it changed its name to the CEC of the USSR; the 1936 constitution replaced it with the USSR

176  Glossary Supreme Soviet. It was headed by L.B. Kamenev, October 1917–January 1918; Ya.M. Sverdlov, January 1918–March 1919; M.I. Kalinin, March 1919–36. Cheka:  All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counter Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation; established December 1917; renamed OGPU in 1922; later KGB. Collectivisation:  Establishment of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, which meant the end of private farming. Collectivisation began in 1917 but had made little impact by 1929 when it really got under way; was completed by 1937. In practice several villages were lumped together and declared a kolkhoz; peasant opposition was dealt with brutally, by using military force, deportation or expulsion; initially almost everything was collectivised, but in March 1930 the private plot around the peasant’s cottage was legalised; as of May 1932 he could legally sell any surplus (after paying taxes) in an urban kolkhoz market where demand and supply determined prices. Cominform:  Communist Information Bureau; established in 1947 and disbanded in 1955. Comintern:  Communist International; international communist organisation established in 1919 and disbanded in 1943. Commissar:  (a) Government minister; (b) official representing party, government or soviet. Conference:  Differed from a Party Congress in that not all organisations were represented (an exception was the XIXth Party Conference in 1988). In the early years the problems of logistics were such as to make it difficult to call a Congress at short notice. A Conference did not have the right to elect members to the Central Committee and Politburo. Congress:  Most important meeting of party, Soviet, trade union or other organisation; at a congress the Communist Party reviewed its past record and laid down goals for the future; a new Central Committee was elected and it, in turn, elected a new Politburo and Secretariat. FYP:  Five-Year Plan; first FYP ran from October 1928 to December 1932; second from January 1933 to December 1937; third from January 1938 to June 1941; fourth from January 1946 to December 1950; fifth from January 1951 to December 1955. GKO:  State Committee of Defence during the Great Fatherland War (1941–45). Gosplan:  State Planning Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers; responsible for drafting economic plans and checking on their implementation; founded February 1921; headed by G.M. Krzhizhanovsky, 1921–23, 1925–30; A.D. Tsyurupa, 1923–25; V.V. Kuibyshev, 1930– 34; V.I. Mezhlauk, 1934–37; N.A. Voznesensky, 1938–49. Kolkhoz:  Collective farm; members farmed the land as a cooperative but in reality had little say in what was to be produced; this was laid down in the annual state plan. Under Stalin payment was based on the number

Glossary 177 of labour days worked (it was possible to acquire several labour days during a day’s work) and rewards came at the end of the harvest. If the farm recorded a loss no wages were paid. A basic guaranteed wage was only introduced in 1966. Kolkhoznik:  Collective farm peasant; between 1929 and 1966 there was no guaranteed basic wage; wages were paid out at end of harvest according to the profitability of the farm; the private plot kept the kolkhoznik and his family alive until the 1950s. Kombedy:  Committees of poor peasants; established by the Soviet government in June 1918 to seize grain from richer peasants who held surpluses; the state was to get most of grain (to feed cities) but in fact received little. In November 1918 there were 122,000 kombedy but in the same month all were disbanded. Komsomol:  Communist youth movement for those between ages 14 and 28. KPD:  Communist Party of Germany; founded in December 1919; refounded in Soviet Zone of Germany June 1945; fused with Soviet Zone SPD in April 1946 to form Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). Kulak:  Peasants were divided into poor, middle and rich by the Bolsheviks; the poor peasant did not have enough land to live off, the middle peasant did, and the rich peasant had enough to produce a surplus; in west-European terms the kulak would have been classified as a modestly well-off farmer. Left communists:  Bukharin was the leader of this group on the Central Committee (October 1917–18); they favoured the immediate introduction of socialism and a revolutionary war against imperial Germany. Lenin wanted a slow march to socialism and peace with Berlin; he eventually won over a majority of the Central Committee. Lend-Lease:  US military and food aid to Allies during the Second World War; authorised by Congress in March 1941 to aid Great Britain, it was extended to include China in April and the USSR in September 1941; about 22 per cent of aid or US$10,000 million went to the Soviet Union. Mensheviks:  When the All-Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP), founded in 1898, split in 1903, those in the minority became known as Mensheviks; in October 1917 the Mensheviks opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power since they believed that Russia was not ready for socialism; they thought that the country had to become strong economically and a large working class come into being before a socialist revolution became a possibility. Mir:  Peasant commune. Moderate socialists:  Mensheviks and right Social Revolutionaries; they were called moderate to contrast them with the radical Bolsheviks. Muzhik:  Russian peasant. NEP:  New Economic Policy, introduced in March 1921; it brought back the market economy with money again being backed by gold; during NEP peasants could dispose of their produce as they liked; light

178  Glossary industry also passed into private hands but heavy engineering, energy and transport stayed in state hands; in practice ended in 1929. NKVD:  People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, renamed Ministry of Internal Affairs, in March 1946. NSDAP:  National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party. Oblast:  The principal territorial subdivision of a republic. Orgburo:  Organisational Bureau of the CC; handled all matters of an organisational and administrative nature, domestic and foreign, except those deemed important enough to be passed over to the Politburo; abolished in 1952. Politburo:  Political Bureau of the CC; key decision-making body of the Communist Party; established in 1919; prior to that the Central Committee was the most significant body; called the Presidium between 1952 and 1966. Presidium:  Inner council or cabinet, hence supreme body; the Politburo of the Communist Party was also known as the Presidium between 1952 and 1966. Rabkrin:  People’s Commissariat of Workers and Peasants Inspection; founded in 1920 to supervise all government organs; dissolved in 1934 when functions were transferred to Commission of Soviet Control; in 1940 became People’s Commissariat of State Control and from 1946 Ministry of State Control. Headed by I.V. Stalin, 1920–22; A.D. Tsyurupa, 1922–23; V.V. Kuibyshev, 1923–26; S. Ordzhonikidze, 1926–30; A.A. Andreev, 1930–34. RAPP:  All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers; founded 1928 and dissolved in 1932; see also AUSW and AUW. RCP:  All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 1918–25; formerly All-Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP) 1898–1918; renamed All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) 1925–52; renamed Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 1952–91. Right Opposition:  Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky and their supporters came together in the summer of 1928 to oppose the headlong rush towards industrialisation which was then beginning to gain momentum; they favoured voluntary collectivisation which meant in practice very slow collectivisation; by early 1929 they had been defeated by Stalin. RSFSR:  Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic; constitution adopted July 1918; between October 1917 and July 1918 the state was referred to as Soviet Russia or the Russian republic – in essence it amounted to the RSFSR; when the USSR was formed in December 1922 the RSFSR became the largest republic; between June 1918 and December 1922 the RSFSR concluded treaties with Belorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia – together they formed the Soviet state. Secretariat:  The administrative centre of the Communist Party; its key officials were called secretaries and the leading one Secretary-General

Glossary 179 (1922–53, 1966–) or First Secretary (1953–66); only from 1929 was the Secretary-General the leader of the Soviet Union. SED:  Socialist Unity Party; ruling communist party in the German Democratic Republic; founded in April 1946. Sovkhoz:  State farm; run like a factory with guaranteed minimum wages higher than those of kolkhozniks; operatives were classified as workers and enjoyed their social benefits. Soviet:  Name of state – Soviet Union; also elected council. Sovnarkom:  The Council of People’s Commissars; the government of Soviet Russia and later of the USSR; it was appointed by the IInd Congress of Soviets in October 1917 and was to be subordinate to it but soon proved stronger; all the members of the first Sovnarkom were Bolsheviks and picked by Lenin himself; there was a brief coalition government between December 1917 and March 1918 when some left SRs joined; since March 1918 only Bolsheviks or communists have been commissars or ministers; was renamed USSR Council of Ministers in March 1946; according to the 1936 and 1977 constitutions the government should resign at the end of each legislative period, but this was a mere formality. These constitutions also laid down that each republic and autonomous republic (ASSR) was to elect its own government or Council of Ministers to underline the federal nature of the Soviet state, but in reality the USSR Council of Ministers dominated; Sovnarkom was the dominant body in the state while Lenin was well, but it was superseded by the Politburo in 1922. Headed by V.I. Lenin, October 1917–January 1924; A.I. Rykov, February 1924–December 1930; V.M. Molotov, December 1930–May 1941; I.V. Stalin, May 1941–March 1953. SPD:  Social Democratic Party of Germany; refounded in 1945 and fused with KPD in Soviet Zone of Germany in April 1946 to form SED; see also KPD. SRs:  Socialist Revolutionaries; the SRs constituted an agrarian socialist party; they had great support among the peasants since they advocated the handing over of the land to the peasants; as agrarian socialists they were not Marxists – they sought to influence and represent the urban working class; the party split in 1917 into right and left SRs, the latter supporting the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917; the left SRs joined Sovnarkom in December 1917 to form the first coalition government but left after refusing to be associated with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed in March 1918; they then joined the anti-Bolshevik opposition, some even resorting to armed violence; the SR parties were banned in the early 1920s. State capitalism:  The economic order in existence between October 1917 and June 1918. Stavka:  General Staff of the Red Army and Navy during the Great Patriotic War (1941–45).

180  Glossary Supreme Soviet:  Set up by the 1936 constitution; the USSR Supreme Soviet was bicameral: Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities; the number of deputies of the former was based on population, while the number of the latter was fixed; the houses were of equal status and often met in joint session; a parliament only in name, the key decisions were taken by the government and the party; the chairman of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was the president of the country; each republic and autonomous republic had its own Supreme Soviet but they were unicameral. United Opposition:  Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and their supporters combined in the summer of 1926 to form the United Opposition – to oppose socialism in one country and the policy of allowing kulaks free rein; they favoured a more rapid growth of industry and more weight to be accorded the world socialist revolution; this opposition was directed essentially against Bukharin and Stalin. USSR:  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. VSNKh:  (Vesenkha) Supreme Council of the National Economy; founded December 1917 and responsible for the whole economy and state finances; as of June 1918 it became in effect the commissariat of nationalised industry; there were local VSNKh to run industry; during the Civil War the main function of VSNKh was to provide the Red Army with war material and clothing; under NEP, factories producing similar products were grouped together in trusts but still managed by VSNKh; in 1924 a VSNKh was created in each republic and made responsible for industry there; VSNKh was headed by N. Osinsky, 1917–18; A.I. Rykov, 1918–20, 1923–24; P.A. Bogdanov, 1921–23; F.E. Dzerzhinsky, 1924–26; V.V. Kuibyshev, 1926–30; S. Ordzhonikidze, 1930–32; then it was divided into the Commissariats of Heavy Industry, Light Industry and the Timber Industry. War communism:  The economic order in existence between June 1918 and March 1921. Workers’ or food requisition detachments:  Established in August 1918; they were highly successful in requisitioning grain since they were composed of workers who desperately needed the food for their urban families and the army and because they had machine guns. Forced requisitioning lasted until March 1921.

Further reading

There has been an explosion of published material on Stalin and Stalinism since 1991. Many archives became accessible for the first time to western researchers (some have already closed again but the key archive, in the Presidential Administration, has never been opened) and this has permitted the publication of valuable collections of documents. Often, they are the result of collaboration of western and Russian scholars. Notable among these are J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (New Haven, CT and London, Yale University Press, 1999). This is invaluable for a study of the terror. Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents (New Haven CT and London, Yale University Press, 2000). The documents offer penetrating insights into the lives of the average person during the hurricane which was Stalinism. Another volume which has resulted from the collaboration of Yale and Russian archives is Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov and Oleg V. Khlevniuk (eds.), Stalin’s Letters to Molotov 1925–1936 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1995). The letters before 1930 are more revealing than those afterwards. See also: R.W. Davies et al., (eds.), The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931–1936 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2003). Other fine collections of documents are Philip Boobbyer, The Stalin Era (London and New York, Routledge, 2000); Christopher Read, The Stalin Years: A Reader (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002). Eastern Europe is covered in a fine collection of documents: Gale Stokes, 2nd ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996). On the Russian Revolutions of 1917 see China Miéville, The Story of the Russian Revolution (London, Verso, 2017); Mark D. Steinberg, The Russian Revolution 1905–1921 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017); S.A. Smith, Russia in Revolution: An Empire in Crisis, 1890 to 1928 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017); Sean McMeekin, The Russian Revolution: A New History (London, Basic, 2017); Alexander Rabinowitch, The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1968) and The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of

182  Further reading 1917 in Petrograd (New York, W. W. Norton, 1976); Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1990; and Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2003); Robert M. Slusser, Stalin in October: The Man Who Missed the Revolution (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972); William G. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974); Diane Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981); Steve Smith, Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917–1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983). Biographies of Stalin are legion but the best single volume study is Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2015) and a major source for this study; Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (London, Penguin, 2015) and Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 (London, Penguin, 2017) to be followed by volume 3 covering the years 1941–53 will become the standard work; Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), is still worth reading. His sympathies lie with Trotsky. Trotsky’s own The Revolution Betrayed (New York, Pathfinder Press, 1972) tells us more about Trotsky than Stalin. This said, anything by Trotsky is worth reading because, although one may disagree with him, he puts his arguments brilliantly. More recent studies which provide stimulating reading include Robert Tucker, Stalin in Power (New York, W. W. Norton and Co, 1990); Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2004); Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin: Profiles in Power (London, Routledge, 2013); Sarah Davies and James Harris (eds.), Stalin: A New History (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005); Miklos Kun, Stalin: An Unknown Portrait (Budapest and New York, Central European University Press, 2003); Edward Radzinsky, Stalin (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1996), is not an academic study but is very entertaining and Stalin: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia’s Secret Archives (New York, Anchor Books, 1997); Dmitry Volkogonov, Stalin (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), is full and revealing. Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003); and Young Stalin (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007); Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2008). See also: Erik van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth Century Revolutionary Patriotism (London and New York, Routledge, 2002). On Stalin and his relations with other Bolshevik leaders see Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Stalin and His Inner Circle (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2008); Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004); Oleg

Further reading 183 V. Khlevniuk, In Stalin’s Shadow: The Career of ‘Sergo’ Ordzhonikidze (New York, Routledge, 1995); E.A. Rees, Iron Lazar: A Political Biography of Lazar Kaganovich (London and New York, Anthem Press, 2012); Matthew E. Lenoe, The Kirov Murder and Soviet History (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2010); Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen: An Authoritative Portrait of a The Tyrant and Those Who Served Him (London, Viking, 2004); Jonathan Brent and Vladimir Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948–1953 (New York, Harper Perennial, 2003); Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, (eds.), Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Post-war Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2001); Jörg Baberowski, Verbannte Erde: Stalins Herrschaft der Gewalt (Munich, C. H. Beck, 2012). See also Sergei Khrushchev, (ed.), Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev Vol 2 Reformer (University Park, PA, Penn State University Press, 2006); Dmitrii Shepilov, The Kremlin’s Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics Under Stalin and Khrushchev (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2007). Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) is a sympathetic study of the ‘darling of the party’; and Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1985); Paul R. Gregory, Politics, Murder and Love in Stalin’s Kremlin: The Story of Nikolai Bukharin and Anna Larina (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 2010); Derek Watson, Molotov and Soviet Government (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996) provides many insights into the relationship between Molotov and his master. Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov, Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov 1895–1940 (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 2002), based on archives, is very revealing; see also J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, Yezhov: The Rise of Stalin’s ‘Iron Fist’ (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2008) and J. Arch Getty, The Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered 1933–1938 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985); J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, (eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994); Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993) is a leading study. On Stalin’s personality Sergo Beria – Lavrenty Beria’s son, Beria, My Father Inside Stalin’s Kremlin (London, Duckworth, 1999) provides fascinating insights and is the most revealing source available; Roman Brackman, The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life (London, Frank Cass, 2001) is an extraordinary book and the fruit of a life’s labours to understand what motivated Stalin. Brackman sees the terror as flowing from Stalin’s obsession to eliminate all archival evidence and human testimony about his collaboration with the Okhrana, the Tsarist secret police. A very detailed but not very flattering picture of Stalin emerges. Brackman does not take into account Stalin’s ideological desire to found a new society.

184  Further reading On Stalinism see Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origin and Consequence of Stalinism (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1971) and was very influential; See also Chris Ward, Stalin’s Russia (London, Edward Arnold, 1999). See also John Channon, (ed.), Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997); J. Cooper, M. Perrie and E. A. Rees (eds.), Soviet History 1917–1953 (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Graeme Gill, Stalinism (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998). On particular aspects of the Stalin period see: M. Brown, Socialist Realist Painting (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1998); David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003); Susan Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997); Vera Dunham, In Stalin’s Time (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976) – provides a fascinating insight into the adoption of bourgeois values by Soviet families, based on published novels; J. von Geldern and R. Stites (eds.), Mass Culture in Soviet Russia (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1995); A. Kemp-Welch, Stalin and the Literary Intelligentsia, 1928–39 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1991); P. Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society 1917–1953 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992) looks at an important propaganda source; A. Luukkanen, The Religious Policy of the Stalinist State, 1929–1938 (Helsinki, SHS, 1997); Vladimir Papernyi, Architecture in the Age of Stalin (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002); K. Smith, Remembering Stalin’s Victims (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996); P.H. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996); R. Taylor and D. Spring, (eds.), Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (London, Routledge, 1993); R. Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934–1941 (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1996); Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957 (Armonk, NY and London, M.E. Sharpe, 1998) catches the period very well and is highly informative. On the atomic bomb see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 1996). On science see N. Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997); Simon Ings, Stalin and the Scientists: A History of Triumph and Tragedy 1905–1953 (London, Faber & Faber, 2016); Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone Death and Memory in Russia (London, Granta Books, 2000) is a haunting study of suffering. It is a prize winning book which has been called an ‘epic and moving history’. On opposition see Judy Kutulas, The Long War: The Intellectual People’s Front and Anti-Stalinism 1930–1940 (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1995). On the economy, see Paul R. Gregory, (ed.), Behind the Façade of Stalin’s Command Economy: Evidence from the Soviet State and Party Archives (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 2001) provides a mass of material

Further reading 185 but no startling revelations; James Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province: A Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization in Siberia (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996); R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2004); R. W. Davies, Mark Harrison and S. G. Wheatcroft, (eds.), The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994); Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 1946–1991 (London, Routledge, 2014); Andrea Graziosi, The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933 (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996); and Stalinism, Collectivization and the Great Famine (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009); J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, (eds.), The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2010); Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag from Collectivization to the Great Terror (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2004); Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps (London, Penguin, 2017); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1985); Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special Settlements (New York, 2007); and Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996); Lewis Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity 1935–1941 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988); Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization, 1928–1941 (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1986); and Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002); Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices and Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004); David R. Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2009); Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–41 (Washington, DC and Baltimore, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009). Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1995) is a magnificent study of the founding and development of Magnitogorsk; Elena Osokina, Our Daily Bread Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalin’s Russia, 1927– 1941 (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2001) is a fine study of Stalin’s attempt to replace the market with state-controlled supply which never really worked; William J. Chase, Workers, Society and the Soviet State: Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918–1929 (Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1987); Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988); Matthew J. Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism (Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); E. A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport

186  Further reading 1928–1941 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995); D. Shearer, Industry, State and Society in Stalin’s Russia 1926–1934 (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996); Lynne Viola, Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization (New York, Oxford University Press, 1987); and Peasant Rebels under Stalin (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) and (ed.), Contending With Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2002); Golfo Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens and the Soviet State, 1926–1936 (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2003); Jeffrey J Rossman, Worker Resistance under Stalin: Class and Revolution on the Shop Floor (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2005). On women see Wendy Z. Goldman, Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002); Melanie Ilic, Women in the Stalin Era (New York, Palgrave, 2001). On the coming of war see John Erickson and David Dilks, (eds.), Barbarossa: the Axis and the Allies (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1994); Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War: Origins of the Total Security State in the USSR and the Outbreak of World War II in Europe (London, Frank Cass, 2002); Lennart Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000); David R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926–1933 (Lawrence, KA, University of Kansas Press, 2000); James R. Harris, The Great Urals: Regionalism and the Evolution of the Soviet System (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999). On the military and war, the leading scholar is John Erickson: The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History 1918–1941, 3rd ed. (Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 2001) is the standard work; The Road to Stalingrad (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983); and The Road to Berlin (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983); Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (London, Penguin, 1999) and Berlin the Downfall 1945 (London Viking, 2002) are outstanding and prize winning military history. See also David E. Murphy, What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2005); see also Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2000); Golfo Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens and the Soviet State, 1926–1936 (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2003). The best account of the Great Fatherland War is Richard Overy, Russia’s War (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997). Albert Axell, Zhukov (London, Longman, 2002) is authoritative and includes new material; see also his Stalin’s War Through the Eyes of His Commanders (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1997). On Churchill’s relations with Stalin see David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), who strives manfully to cope with Churchill’s mercurial temperament. He concludes that President Harry Truman was a more effective anti-communist than the brilliant British Prime Minister. On the mass

Further reading 187 killings on the borderlands between the Soviet Union and Germany see Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (London, Vintage, 2010). See also Susan Butler, (ed.), My Dear Mr Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2005). Excellent sources on the Stalin cult are Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001), richly illustrated and penetrating; see also Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2000) and Jan Plamper, The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2012). A fine comparative study of Stalinism and National Socialism is I. Kershaw and M. Lewin, (eds.), Stalinism and Nazism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). On the republics see David R. Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1992); is a superb study of Vinnytsia, part of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine during the war; Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001). On Russian nationalism and the nationalities see David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956 (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002); Maureen Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001); Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, (eds.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Building in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) also The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923– 1939 (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001). On espionage, Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London, John Murray, 2001) reads like a James Bond thriller; Max Hastings, The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939–1945 (London, William Collins, 2015); Glenn Frankel, High Noon: The Hollywood Blacklist and the Making of an American Classic (London, Bloomsbury, 2017) contains much information about American communists and their support of Stalin; Giles Udy, Labour and the Gulag: Russia and the Seduction of the British Left (London, Biteback, 2017) is a revealing account of reaction in Britain to Stalin’s policies. On eastern Europe see: N.M. Naimark, Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995); Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956 (London, Allen Lane, 2012). On the totalitarian approach see Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow (London, Hutchinson, 1986); Stalin and the Kirov Murder (London, Hutchinson, 1989); The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purges of the 1930s (London,

188  Further reading Pimlico, 1992); Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1972); The Origin of the Communist Autocracy (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1977); Abbott Gleeson, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995). A fine study of the reaction of the British left to Stalin’s rule is Giles Udy, Labour and the Gulag: Russia and the Seduction of the British left (London, Biteback, 2017). On revisionism in Soviet history the main source for this study is Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Revisionism in Soviet History’, History and Theory, vol. 46, no. 4 (December 2007) pp. 77–91. On the social history approach the outstanding scholar is Sheila Fitzpatrick. Of note among her many writings are: (ed.), Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931 (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978); Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1992); Stalin’s Peasants (New York, Oxford University Press, 1994); Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York, Oxford University Press, 1999); and Stalinism: New Directions (London, Routledge, 2000) – this volume contains many seminal articles published during the 1990s, edited by Fitzpatrick; and Tear off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century Russia (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005); Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine (London, Penguin, 2017), based on primary sources, is a haunting study of what she terms genocide; and Elena Osokina, Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalin’s Russia, 1927–1941 (New York and London, Routledge, 2001); Donald Filtzer, The Hazards of Urban Life in Late Stalinist Russia: Health, Hygiene and Living Standards, 1943–1953 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010); Moshe lewin, The Making of the Soviet System (New York, Pantheon, 1985); Moshe Lewin also addresses social problems but relates them to the political, unlike Fitzpatrick and her school of authors, sometimes called the ‘new cohort’. Lewin sees the 1930s as a disaster of epic proportions as the Stalinist state set up bureaucratic institutions to stabilise the quicksand society it had created by its own destructive campaigns. He sees Stalin as an historical demon with roots in the peasant culture. The new cohort regards the demonologising of Stalin as totally erroneous. See Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power (Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1968); The Making of the Soviet System (London, Methuen, 1985); ‘Bureaucracy and the Stalinist State’, in I. Kershaw and M. Lewin, (eds.), Stalinism and Nazism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997). On the Cold War see Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold War 1941– 49, 4th ed. (London, Routledge, 2016) and The Cold War 1949–2016 (London, Routledge, 2017).

Further reading 189 More detailed biographies of the leading figures of the Stalin era are to be found in Martin McCauley, Who’s Who in Russia since 1900 (London, Routledge, 1997). A more detailed chronology is in Martin McCauley, Russia since 1914 (Harlow, Longman, 1998). On Putin, see Michel Eltchaninoff, Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin (London, Hurst, 2018); Vladimir Yakunin, An Insider’s Account of Modern Russia (London, Biteback, 2018).

Bibliography

Aldrich, R.J. (2001) The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray. Alexandrov, G.F. et al. (1947) Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House. Barber, J.D. and Harrison, M. (1991) The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II. Harlow: Longman. Bauer, R., Inkeles, A. and Kluckhohn, C. (1956) How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological and Social Themes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Beria, S. (1999) Beria: My Father Inside Stalin’s Kemlin. London: Duckworth. Black, C.E. et al. (1975) The Modernization of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study. New York: The Free Press. Boobbyer, P. (2000) The Stalin Era. London: Routledge. Brooks, J. (2001) Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Carr, E.H. (1979) The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Caute, D. (2003) The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. (1977) ‘Bolshevism and Stalinism’ in Tucker, R. (ed.), Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation. New York: W.W. Norton. Davies, R.W., Harrison, M. and Wheatcroft, S.G. (eds.) (1994) The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union 1913–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dedijer, V. (1953) Tito Speaks. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Djilas, M. (1962) Conversations with Stalin. London: Hart-Davis. Ellman, M. (1991) ‘A note on the number of 1933 famine victims’, Soviet Studies, vol. 43, no. 2. Ellman, M. and Maksudov, S. (1994) ‘Soviet deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A note’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 4. Eltchaninoff, M. (2018) Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin. London: Hurst. Fainsod, M. (1954) How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fitzpatrick, S. (1994) Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bibliography 191 Fitzpatrick, S. (ed.) (2000) Stalinism: New Directions. London: Routledge. Getty, J.A. and Naumov, O.V. (1999) The Road to Terror: Stalin and the SelfDestruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gill, G. (1990) Stalinism. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Harrison, M. (1993) ‘Soviet economic growth since 1928: The alternative statistics of G.I. Khanin’, Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 45, no. 1. Ings, S. (2016) Stalin and the Scientists: A History of Triumph and Tragedy 1905– 1953. London: Faber & Faber. Inkeles, A. and Bauer, R.A. (1959) Year 99–1959: The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jansen, M. and Petrov, N. (2002) Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov 1895–1940. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Khlevniuk, O.V. (2015) Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Khrushchev, N. (1971) Khrushchev Remembers, in Talbott S. (ed.). Boston, MA: Little Brown. Kojevnikov, A.B. (2004) Stalin’s Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists. London: Imperial College Press. Kotkin, S. (1995) Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kotkin, S. (2017) Stalin: Volume II: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941. London: Penguin. McCauley, M. (1975) The Russian Revolution and the Soviet State, 1917–1921: Documents. London: Barnes & Noble. McCauley, M. (1993) The Soviet Union 1917–1991 (2nd ed.). London: Longman. McCauley, M. (2016) Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949. London: Routledge. McCauley, M. (2017) The Cold War 1949–2016. London: Routledge. Mandelstam, N. (1971) Hope Abandoned. London: Collins Harvill. Marković, M. (1977) ‘Stalinism and Marxism’, in Tucker, R. (ed.), Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation. New York: W.W. Norton. Martin, T. (2001) The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Medvedev, R.A. (1975) On Socialist Democracy. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Moore Jr, B. (1954) Terror and Progress, USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Naimark, N. (2002) ‘Cold War studies and new archival materials on Stalin’, The Russian Review, vol. 61, no. 1. Nove, A. (1992) An Economic History of the USSR. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Osokina, E. (2001) Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalin’s Russia, 1927–1941. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Overy, R. (1997) Russia’s War. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Rigby, T.H. (1966) Stalin. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Shepilov, D. (2007) The Kremlin’s Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics Under Stalin and Khrushchev. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Siegelbaum, L. and Sokolov, A. (2000) Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Stalin, J. (1945) Problems of Leninism. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House.

192  Bibliography Tucker, R. (1977) Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation. New York: W.W. Norton. Udy, G. (2017) Labour and the Gulag: Russia and the Seduction of the British Left. London: Biteback. Wade, R. (2000) The Russian Revolution, 1917. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Webb, S. (1935) Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? London: Longmans. Zaleski, E. (1980) Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1952. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Zubkova, E. (1998) Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945–1957. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Index

Entries in italics denote figures. Abakumov, Viktor 94 Abel, Rudolf 93 affirmative action 7 African-Americans 91 agriculture: after Stalin 123; collectivisation of see collectivisation; cooperative see kolkhozes; films on 174; in FYPs 37, 41, 78 – 9; in Great Fatherland War 67; modernisation of 35; see also private plots Akhmatova, Anna 73 alcohol 43, 75, 102 Aleksandrov, E. 73 – 4 Alliluyeva, Nadezhda xxii, 17, 104, 147 Alliluyeva, Svetlana 50, 78 Andropov, Yuri 121 Anglo-Soviet treaty 69, 110 anti-Semitism 78, 163 ‘anti-Soviet elements’ 148, 158 Applebaum, Anne 40 April Theses 16 art, under high Stalinism 92 – 3 atomic bombs 74, 82 – 3, 93 – 4, 129, 184 Attlee, Clement 41 AUSW (All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers) 57, 175 authors, in Soviet Union 57 AUW (All-Russian Union of Writers) 57 Avdienko, A.O. 152 – 3 Balkars 68, 159 bank robberies 13 Belarus 20, 23, 63, 127 Beneš, Eduard 113 Berdyaev, Nikolai 130 – 1, 166 Berezovsky, Boris 126

Beria, Lavrenty xxii; appearance criticised by Stalin 106; and atomic weapons 74, 94; and deportations 159 – 60; and Great Terror 48, 50; and Leningrad Affair 77; and Mingrelian affair 94 – 5; in Politburo 56; removal from leadership 125; and Stalin’s death 96 Berlin: in Cold War 84 – 5; Soviet conquest of 70 – 1 Berlin Blockade 85, 115, 124 Bevin, Ernest 41 Big Jim McLain 92 black market 122, 141 Blunt, Anthony 93 Blyukher, Vasily 55 – 6, 114 Bogdanov, Alexandr 85 Bolsheviks: and class 59; and economic policy 20 – 1; and October Revolution 15 – 17; Old 118; origins of 12; Western analyses of 4; see also CPSU Brezhnev, Leonid 121 British left 39 – 41, 110, 188 Brooke, Alan 107 Buddhism 61 Budenny, Semen xxii, 106 Bukharin, Nikolai xxii, 20; attacks on Trotsky 27; Cohen’s biography of 5; and culture 57; and industrialisation 29, 31 – 2; letters to Stalin 145 – 7, 151 – 2; purge of 47, 49, 109, 114; Stalin’s condemnation of 137; and the state 46 Bulganin, Nikolai xxii, 77, 81, 96, 106 Bulgaria 55, 70, 76, 126 Burgess, Guy 93 Butler, Rab 102 Cairncross, John 93 – 4 Cambridge spies 93

194 Index capitalism, use of term 58 – 9 Carr, E. H. 6 cartoons 110 – 11 Castro, Fidel 104, 124 CCC (Central Control Commission) 45 Central Committee of Bolsheviks/ CPSU 175; Bukharin expelled from 29; purges of 172; relationship with apparat 75; resistance to Stalin in 44; Stalin and 13, 22, 25 – 6 character assassination 105, 109 Chechens 68, 118, 128, 159 Cheka 19, 24, 176; FSB as successor of 130; renaming of 32 Chernenko, Konstantin 121 Chiang Kai-shek 28, 50 – 1 Chiaureli, Mikhail 89 China: collectivisation of agriculture in 34; in Korean War 82 – 3; legacy of Stalinism in 121, 131 – 2; People’s Republic of 80 – 1, 126; Stalin’s policy in 28, 50 Christianity, justifications for violence 117 Chukovsky, Kornei 108 – 9 Churchill, Winston 41, 55, 69 – 70, 90 – 1, 102, 124 – 5, 173 CIA 4, 93 civil society 46, 128 Civil War 18 – 19, 112 class: Stalin on 104; in USSR 59, 61 Clausewitz, Carl von 104 Cohen, Stephen 5 Cold War 5, 84, 91, 124 – 5, 188 Cole, G.D.H. 41 collectivisation 176; forced 31 – 4, 40, 123; resistance to 5 – 7, 34 – 5; and Stalinism 44 Cominform 76, 83, 176 Comintern (Communist International) 28, 51 – 2, 76, 176 Communist Party of Great Britain 110 Communist Party of the USA 41 Conquest, Robert 6 The Conspiracy of the Doomed 90 consumer goods 28, 31; and FYPs 35, 37, 42 Cossacks 68, 118, 148 cows see livestock CPC (Communist Party of China) 81, 131 – 2 CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union): apparat of 22, 75, 94, 132; and formation of USSR 23; in Great

Fatherland War 68; Lewin on 6; membership of 43, 60, 75; oblast first secretaries of 80, 121; political monopoly of 3; Stalin’s vision of 135, 137; under Stalin 30, 45 – 6; see also Central Committee; Politburo; Secretariat Crimea 20, 70, 126 – 7, 131 Crimean Tatars 68 – 9, 118, 157 criminals 60, 110, 129, 148 – 9, 162 Cripps, Stafford 41, 173 Cuba 124 cultural festivals 92 Cultural Revolution: Chinese 124, 132; Russian 6, 59 cultural studies 7 culture: in 1930s 56 – 8; in Great Fatherland War 67 – 8; political 7, 46, 76; power struggles in 30; under high Stalinism 89 – 93; young people’s 166 currency reforms: in Germany 85; in USSR 79 – 80 Czechoslovakia 20, 52 – 3, 76, 113, 125 Davies, Sarah 7 de Gaulle, Charles 107 Declaration of the 13 28 Declaration of the 83 28 Deng Xiaoping 124, 132 denunciations 50, 88, 119, 144 – 5 deportations 34, 40, 118, 157 – 8, 176 Derrida, Jacques 7 Deutscher, Isaac 85 ‘Dizzy with Success’ (Stalin) 35, 137 – 8 Djilas, Milovan 77, 114, 163 – 4, 169 Doctors’ Plot 95 – 6, 167 – 8, 174 Doctrine, Truman 85 Dugonjis, Rato 164 Dzerzhinsky, Feliks 24, 32 Eastern Europe: Stalin and Western allies negotiating on 55, 70; under Soviet domination 76, 83 – 5, 92, 125, 187 education, under Stalin 56 – 60 Efimov, Boris 111 Eisenhower, Dwight 82, 111, 124 Eltchaninoff, Michel 129 – 31 Enlightenment 5, 116 – 17 Estonia 54, 126 eugenics 86 exile, internal 48 Ezhov, Nikolai xxii, 47 – 8, 106, 109, 148

Index  195 Fabian Society 40 – 1 factions, banned in CPSU 21, 27 The Fall of Berlin (Chiaureli) 89 – 90 famine: of 1921 – 22 19; of 1932 – 33 108 (see also Holodomor); of 1936 – 37 41, 140 – 1; of 1946 – 47 76, 78 – 9, 88, 141 fascism 51 – 2, 55, 73 February Revolution 14 – 15 Fedin, Konstantin 68 fifth column 52 – 3, 109, 113, 150 films: of Cold War era 89 – 92; Stalin’s depiction in 72; Stalin’s interest in 56, 89, 103, 174 Finland 54, 70 Finlandisation 125 Fitzpatrick, Sheila 5 – 6, 40 Fleming, Ian 93 forced labour 37, 51, 64 Ford, Henry 38 foreign trade 23, 50, 113 Foucault, Michel 7 ‘The Foundations of Leninism’ (Stalin) 25 French Revolution 111, 116 – 17 Freud, Sigmund 87 The Front (Korneichuk) 67 FSB (Federal Security Service) 130 Fuchs, Karl 94 FYP (Five-Year Plans) 176; adjustments to 80; first 33, 36 – 8, 46, 48, 112; fourth 78; fulfilment of 142 – 3; second 41 – 3; third 51 Gehlen, Reinhard 93 – 4 Generalplan Ost 65 genetics 74, 87 – 8, 166 genocide 39 – 40 Georgian Affair 24 Georgians, Stalin’s attitude to 105 Germany: Cold War division of 124 – 5; invasion of Russia 63 – 7 (see also Great Fatherland War); in Nazi era 50 – 6 (see also NSDAP); revolutionary situation in 24 – 5; Russian occupation of 71, 84; in World War I 16, 19; see also Wehrmacht GKO (State Defence Committee) 63, 72 – 3, 176 Gorbachev, Mikhail 8, 121, 123 – 4, 129 Gorky, Maxim xxii – xxiii, 102 Gosplan 30, 33, 76, 80, 114, 122, 176 Gossnab 122

grain: during Civil War 19 – 20; during Great Fatherland War 67; exports of 39, 138; forced requisition of 28 – 9 Great Depression 33, 38 – 9 Great Fatherland War 63 – 71, 117, 153 – 4; further reading on 186 – 7; Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin in 173; material costs of 78, 154 – 6, 160 – 1 Great Purges 6 Great Terror 47 – 9, 56, 129 – 30, 148 – 9; Lewin on 6; Western reactions to 41 Greece 55, 70 Greeks, in USSR 68 Gusinsky, Vladimir 126 Habermas, Jürgen 7 Hammett, Dashiell 41 Harriman, Averell 107 Harvard project 4 Hegel, G. W. F. 116 Hellman, Lillian 41 Himmler, Heinrich 65, 91 history, in USSR 60 Hitler, Adolf: in film 90; rise to power 52; and Stalin 32, 53 – 5; and US 69 Holodomor 38 – 40 homo sovieticus 60 Hopkins, Harry 69 Hungary 20, 55, 70, 76, 125 – 6 I Was a Communist for the FBI 91 ideology, and Soviet studies 7 Ignatiev, Semen 94 – 5 Ilyin, Ivan 130 – 1 industrialisation 29; Bukharin’s opposition to 5; forced 6, 44; and FYPs 37, 42; and intelligentsia 61; Stalin on 31 – 2, 36, 139 – 40 Ingushi 68, 118, 159 intelligentsia 46, 59, 61, 75, 151 internal passports 37, 59 interrogations 39, 72, 144 – 5 Iran 55, 69, 125 – 6 Islam 61, 117 Israel 78 Ivan the Terrible 58, 63, 104 Japan, USSR threatened by 44, 50 – 3, 55, 65 jazz 92 Jews: and Nazi Germany 4; Stalin’s attacks on 77 – 8, 94 – 6, 163 Judaism 61, 117

196 Index Kaganovich, Lazar ix, xxiii, 50, 56, 78, 106, 111 Kaganovich, Mikhail 112 Kalmyks 68 Kamenev, Lev xxiii, 15, 47; alliance with Stalin 23 – 4; and Bukharin 29; criticised by Stalin 26; imprisonment of 44; as Jewish 78; and October Revolution 17 – 18 Kant, Immanuel 116 Kaplan, Fanny 19 Kerensky, Alexander 15, 17 – 18 Khalkhin Gol 56 Khlevniuk, Oleg 8 Khrushchev, Nikita xxii – xxiii; anecdotes from Stalin era 49, 77 – 8, 104; education of 57; emergence as leader 121; foreign policy of 125; headstone 166; Mao’s split with 126; ousting of 114; in Politburo 56; secret speech 105, 123, 171 – 4; sexual mores under 44; Stalin’s criticism of 106; and Stalin’s death 96; as Ukraine party boss 78 khvost 20 Kim Il-sung 81 – 2, 124 Kirill, Patriarch 128 Kirov, Sergei xxiv, 27, 44, 47 Koenker, Diane 5 Kojevnikov, Alexei 7 Kokovtsov, Vladimir 14 kolkhozes 176 – 7; after Stalin 114; establishment of 33 – 4; model charter for 42; productivity of 38; resistance to 35 kolkhozniks 34, 37 – 8, 59, 78 – 9, 177 Koltsov, Nikolai 86 Komsomol 177; class aliens’ children expelled from 59; and Doctors’ Plot 95; members in military 68; Stalin’s control of 30 Konev, Ivan xxiv, 66 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic ix, 82, 124 Korean War 81 – 3 Koreans, in USSR 53 Korneichuk, Aleksandr 67 Kornilov, Lavr 17 Kosygin, Aleksei 77, 122 Kotkin, Stephen 7 KPD (Communist Party of Germany) 52, 55, 84, 177, 179 Kronstadt uprising 21 Krupskaya, Nadezhda xxiv, 23, 26, 102 Kuibyshev, Valerian 30

kulaks 29, 177; Stalin’s war on 34, 40, 118, 123, 148 Kuromiya, Hiroaki 5 Kursk 66 Kutuzov, Mikhail 66 – 7, 73 Kuznetsov, Aleskei 75, 173 labour camps 39, 42 – 3, 48, 143 labour discipline 37 Lake Khasan 55, 114 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste 60, 86 – 7 Latvia 54, 126 law of value 113 – 14 League of Nations 52 lemons 86 Lend-Lease aid 66, 69, 177 Lenin, Vladimir xxiv; death of 25, 31 – 2; and economic policy 20 – 2; Gorky on 102; as head of Sovnarkom 18 – 20; illness of 22 – 3; and October revolution 4 – 5, 15 – 18; preserved brain of 86 – 7; and Stalin 12 – 13, 45, 103 – 5, 111 – 12; and the state 46; Testament of 23 – 4, 28 Leningrad, siege of 64, 65, 67 Leningrad Affair 76 – 8, 173 Leninism, Stalin’s development of 25 – 6 Lessons of October (Trotsky) 26 – 7 Lewin, Moshe 5, 188 literature: in 1930s 57 – 8; during Great Fatherland War 67 – 8; Stalin’s tastes in 103 – 4; under High Stalinism 73 – 4 Lithuania 54, 126 Litvinov, Maksim 53 Liu Shaoqi 81 livestock: in Great Fatherland War 67; of peasants 35, 41 – 2, 164 – 5 Lunacharsky, Anatoly 5 Lysenko, T. D. 58, 86 – 8 Lyushkov, Genrikh 55 MacArthur, Douglas 82 MacDonald, Ramsey 40 – 1 Maclean, Donald 93 – 4 Magnitogorsk 7, 37, 42 Malenkov, Georgy xxiv, 56, 76 – 7, 96, 106, 110 Manchuria 50 – 1, 55, 81, 87 Mandelstam, Osip 143 – 4, 151 – 2 Mann, Wilfred 93 Mao Zedong 34, 50 – 1, 80 – 2, 123 – 4, 126, 132

Index  197 market economy: and FYP era 34, 46 – 7; under NEP 5, 22, 112 Marshall Plan 85 Martin, Terry 7 – 8 Marx, Karl: on class 58 – 9; and Napoleon 15 – 16; Putin on 129; on science 85; Stalin and 12; and violence 111, 116 – 17 McCarthy, Joseph 4, 94 media: Stalin’s control of 32; under Putin 127 Medvedev, Dmitry 127 Medvedev, Zhores 89 Mensheviks 12, 177; and February Revolution 15; suppression of 27 Meskhetians 68 Mikhoels, Solomon 77 Mikoyan, Anastas 30; appearance criticised by Stalin 106; conflict with Stalin 75, 77, 95 – 6, 120, 174; in Secret Five 56, 74 Mingrelian affair 94 – 5 Molotov, Vyacheslav xxiv; becoming head of government 30; conflict with Stalin 74 – 5, 77, 95 – 6, 110, 120, 163, 174; and fifth column 53; and Great Terror 50; and Mao 81; and military purges 150; and name of USSR 73; and Nazi Germany 53 – 5, 63; and NEP 27; public knowledge about 167; in Secret Five 56; and violence 119 Moscow: defence of 65 – 6; victory parade in 71 Moscow Show Trials see show trials MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) 35, 42, 114 Muggeridge, Malcolm 39 music, under high Stalinism 92 My Son John 92 Napoleon III 15 – 16 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 41, 83, 85, 124, 126 – 7 Navalny, Alexei 127 Nazi Party see NSDAP Neizvestny, Ernst 166 NEP (New Economic Policy) 21 – 2, 177 – 8; end of 29; united opposition to 27 – 8; Western analysis of 5 – 6 Nicholas II, Tsar 14, 129 Nikolaev, Leonid 44 NKVD 44, 178; and deportations 157 – 60; executions of 49; and forced labour 51; and Great Terror 47 – 50,

109 – 10; reports on famine 140 – 1; Western attitudes to 3 – 4 nomenklatura 30 North Caucasus 26, 39, 157, 159 NSDAP (National Socialists) 4, 51 – 2, 55, 178 October Revolution 5, 16 – 18, 28, 112, 129, 140 OGPU 32, 44 Okhrana 11 – 13, 105, 183 Operation Barbarossa 63; see also Great Fatherland War Ordzhonikidze, Sergo xxiv, 24, 36, 48, 51, 56, 101, 112 Orwell, George 41 OSS (Office of Strategic Services) 93 Ossetia 144 Parker, Dorothy 41 party cards see CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), membership of Pasternak, Boris 151 – 2 Paulus, Freidrich 66 Paustovsky, Konstantin 108 Pavlov, Dmitry 64 PCI (Italian Communist Party) 83 peasantry: becoming workers 32, 37, 61 – 2; collectivised see kolkhozniks; influence on Stalinism 6, 45; resistance to collectivisation 34 – 5; restrictions on movement 59 permanent revolution 27 Peter the Great 58, 67, 104 – 5, 129 Petrograd Soviet 15, 17 – 18 phantom enterprises 122 Philby, Kim 93 philosophical intoxication 89 Pijade, Mora 163 – 4 Pilnyak, Boris 57 Podlubny, Stepan 150 – 1 poetry 90, 105, 143 – 5, 152 – 3 Poland: 1920 invasion of 20; 1939 partition of 54 – 5; after Stalin 125 – 6; post-war borders of 69 – 70; and Soviet foreign policy 50, 52 Politburo: 1952 reforms of 95, 120, 174; Bukharin removed from 29; dominance over government 20; in Great Fatherland War 63 – 4; and Great Terror 50, 56; Stalin in 22, 24 – 6, 30; Stalin’s management of 109; Trotsky in 31; unity of 32; Zinoviev in 27 – 8

198 Index The Political Economy of Socialism in the USSR 113 Pollitt, Harry 110 Pontecorvo, Bruno 94 Poskrebyshev, Aleksandr 30, 106, 110 post-revisionists 7 Potsdam Conference 84 Pravda 4, 15, 17, 35, 75, 95, 97, 165 Preobrazhensky, Evgeny 20, 31 – 2 Presidential Administration archive ix, 181 prisoners of war 64 – 5, 72 private plots 34, 41 – 2, 78 – 9, 112, 123, 176 – 7 Problems of Leninism (Stalin) 135 – 40 propaganda, impact of 166 – 7 Provisional Government xii, 14 – 18, 70 psychiatry 89 psychopathy x, 111, 114 – 15 purges: in late Stalin era 75; of military members 54; of non-Russian elites 58, 68; Stalin’s control over 109 – 10; Western reactions to 40; see also Great Terror Putin, Vladimir ix – x, 126 – 31, 189 Pyatakov, Georgy xxv, 48, 50 rabfak 57 Rabinowitch, Alexander 4 Rabkrin (workers’ and peasants’ inspectorate) 22, 45, 178 Radek, Karl 50, 78 RAPP (All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) 57 Raskolnikov, Fedor 111 ratchet principle 46, 122 Red Army: against Japan 55 – 6; in Civil War 19 – 20; formation of 19; in Great Fatherland War 63 – 70, 73; in Korea 81 – 2; in Poland and Finland 54; renaming of 73; Stalin’s purges of 53; violence towards women 77, 162 – 3 Red Terror 19 religion 3 – 4, 12, 25, 61, 117 – 18; see also Russian Orthodox Church revenge, Stalin’s interest in 106, 111, 114 revisionism 4 – 7, 188 Right Opposition 29 – 30, 178 Robeson, Paul 92 Rokossovsky, Konstantin 83, 150 Romania 55, 66, 70, 126 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 69 – 70, 90 – 1

Rozengolts, Arkady 50, 112, 114 Russia, post-Soviet 126 – 31 Russian nationalism x, 45, 57 – 8, 66, 118, 128 – 9, 187 Russian Orthodox Church 48, 61, 66, 128, 130 Russian Revolutions: further reading on 181 – 2; see also February Revolution; October Revolution Russian Social Democratic Party, Menshevik-Bolshevik split in 12 Rykov, Aleksei xxv, 24, 29, 47, 109 sabotage, Stalin’s accusations of 29 Saint-Simon, Henri de 58 Sakhalin 70 Sakharov, Andrei 74 Schapiro, Leonard 47 Schumacher, Kurt 4 science: further reading on 184; under high Stalinism 74, 85 – 9 scorched earth policy 153 Secret Five 56, 74 – 5 The Secret Mission 91 Secretariat of Bolsheviks/CPSU 21, 24 – 5, 75, 178 – 9 SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) 84, 179 Semenov, Vladimir 107 shadow economy 38, 47, 79, 122 Shakhty show trial 29, 36 Shaw, George Bernard 40 Shcherbakov, Aleksandr 56 Shepilov, Dmitry 95, 114 Shlyapnikov, Aleksandr 20 shock workers 36, 139 Sholokhov, Mikhail 35, 39 Shostakovich, Dmitri 90 show trials 47 – 50, 76, 114, 145 Shtemenko, Sergei 83 Silvery Dust 91 Simonov, Konstantin 108 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship 81 Sistema 120 – 1, 128 Slovakia 126 Slovenia 126 Smith, Steve 5 Smolensk archives 4 social historians 4 – 5, 7 socialism in one country 27 socialist legality 44, 172 socialist realism 58 Sokolnikov, Grigory 33, 48, 50, 78 Solovyov, Vladimir 130 – 1

Index  199 Sorge, Richard 65 Soviet Army 73, 83, 160; see also Red Army sovkhozes 33, 35, 42, 78, 113, 159, 176, 179 Sovnarkom 18, 20, 30, 56, 179 Spanish Civil War 50, 52 SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 4, 52, 84, 179 specialists, denigration of 36, 58 – 9 spying 44, 93 – 4, 101, 187 SRs (Socialist Revolutionaries) 15, 19, 27, 110, 148, 179 Stakhanovism 43 Stalin, Josef xxv; agricultural policy 28 – 9, 33 – 5, 38 – 41; appearance of 105 – 6; biographies of 182; British attitudes to 39 – 41; Bukharin’s opposition to 5; in Civil War 19 – 20; and contemporary political leaders 129 – 32; cult of personality 33, 43, 60 – 1, 72, 77, 105, 152 – 3, 161 – 2, 171 – 4, 187; and culture 57, 60; death of 96 – 7; declining health 74, 77, 114 – 15, 120, 163; early political activism 12 – 13; economic legacy of 122, 124; as editor 103, 110, 165 – 6; elimination of oppositionists 29 – 30; family of 11 – 12, 105; in films 89 – 91; and Five Year Plans 36 – 7; foreign policy of 51 – 4, 124 – 6; funeral 96; as general secretary 22 – 4, 26, 28; and Great Terror 47, 50; and Hitler 54 – 5; ideas of 30 – 1; and Korea 81 – 2; late purges of 94 – 6; leadership style of 30, 46, 56, 106 – 9, 111 – 13; and Mao 81; as military leader 56, 63 – 6, 113, 153 – 4, 162 – 3, 173; and October Revolution 15, 17 – 18; and other Bolshevik leaders 182 – 3; personality of ix – x, 101 – 3, 111, 150, 183; political legacy of 120 – 2; public knowledge about 167; rise to leadership 21, 25, 31 – 2; Russian nationalism of 73, 105; and science 86 – 8; self-projection of 45; sexual morality of 44, 104; and socialism in one country 27; sources of information 109; totalitarian and revisionist schools on 6; vision of 117 – 19; and Western Allies 69 – 71 Stalingrad: Battle of 66, 69 – 70; tractor plant in 38

Stalinism: continuing relevance of ix; emergence of 44 – 5; further reading on 184; and terror 47; use of term 169 – 71; Western debates about 5 – 7 state capitalism 14, 18, 169, 179 Stavka 63, 179 Suny, Ronald Gigor 4 Surkov, Vladislav 128 Suslov, Mikhail 74 Suvorov, Aleksandr 66 Svanidze, Ekaterina 12 Sweden 55 Syria 127 Tehran conference 70 Teller, Edward 74 theft 37, 51, 78, 141, 159 They Have a Native Land 90 Third World 124 – 5 Timiryazev Agricultural Academy 34, 87 – 8 Timoshenko, Semen xxv, 54, 63 Tito, Josip 76, 81, 91, 126, 164, 167 Togliatti, Palmiro 83 tolkachi 47 Tolstoy, Alexei 105 Tomsky, Mikhail 29 – 30, 47 totalitarianism 3 – 6, 169, 187 – 8 Tovstukha, Ivan 11 trade unions 12, 20, 30, 46, 176 Transcaucasian Social Democratic Party 12, 24 troika 24, 26, 149, 157 Trotsky, Lev: campaign against 30; and Civil War 19; and Freud 87; and industrialisation 31; as Jewish 78; and militarisation of labour 21; murder of 28, 49; and October Revolution 4 – 5, 18; struggle against Stalin 22 – 8, 31 Trotskyites 41, 49 – 50, 85, 118, 169 Truman, Harry 82, 91, 107 Tsaritsyn 19 – 20, 112; see also Stalingrad Tukhachevsky, Mikhail xxvi, 48 – 9, 56, 113 – 14 Turkey 28, 82, 125 – 6 Udy, Giles 40 Ukraine: in Civil War 20; famine in see Holodomor; industrialisation of 37; Putin’s intervention in 126 – 7, 131; in USSR 23 Ulam, Stanislaw 74

200 Index Ulbricht, Walter 84 United States: attitudes to USSR in 41; Cold War films in 91 – 2; Trotsky in 18; wartime aid to USSR 66 – 7, 69; in World War II 56 United/Left Opposition 27 – 8, 30, 180 universities, under Stalin 57, 59 Urals-Siberian method 28 – 9 urbanisation 61 – 2 USSR: after Stalin 121; and British Left 39 – 41; collective oligarchic leadership of 27; economic model of ix, 46 – 7, 80, 113 – 14, 122 – 4, 126, 168, 184 – 6; foreign policy of 51 – 2, 55, 127; foundation of 23; GDP per capita 156 – 7; name of country 73; non-Russian nationalities of 45, 58, 68 – 9, 118, 121; Putin’s attitude to 129 – 30; secret police in 4, 48 (see also Cheka; NKVD; OGPU); and Western Allies 69, 84; Western analyses of 3 – 8 utopianism 22, 36, 46, 112 – 14, 116 – 19 Uzbeks 58, 122 Vavilov, Nikolai 87 Verhkovtsy 166 Vietnam 122, 124 Vietnam War 4 violence, utopian justifications for 108, 116 – 17, 119 Voikov, Petr 28 Volga Germans 68 – 9, 157 – 9 Volodin, Vyacheslav 128 von Ribbentrop, Joachim 54 Voronezh 112, 140 Voroshilov, Kliment: as Defence Commissar 25, 54; during Civil War 19; in Great Terror 50; in Secret Five 56; as Stalin’s ally 25, 30; Stalin turning against 95 – 6, 106 Voznesensky, Nikolai 56, 75 – 7, 173, 176 VSNKh (Supreme Council of the National Economy) 20, 36, 57, 180 Vyshinsky, Andrei xxvi, 47, 77 Walk East on Beacon 92 war communism 20 – 1, 29, 46, 112, 180

Webb, Beatrice and Sidney 40 Wehrmacht 53 – 5, 63 – 6, 69 – 70, 93, 113 Western Allies 70, 84 – 5; in Cold War films 90 – 1 Western ideas, Stalin’s campaign against 73 White Sea Canal 37, 89 Winter War 54 Wittfogel, Karl 169 The Woman on Pier 13 91 women: in Great Fatherland War 67; as party officials 80; resistance to collectivisation 34; in Soviet society 61 – 2, 186; Stalin and 77, 104 Woolf, Virginia 40 workers: Bolshevik support among 4, 17; in February Revolution 14; Lenin on 16, 26; in October Revolution 18, 20; and peasants 5; in Soviet society 59 – 61; under Five-Year Plans 7, 34, 36 – 7, 43, 51 World War II, Russia in see Great Fatherland War Wrangel, Petr 19 – 20 wreckers 29, 36, 44, 47 – 8, 101, 113, 172 Xi Jinping 131 – 2 Yagoda, Genrikh xxvi, 47 – 8, 109, 145 Yalta conference 70, 81, 84, 90 Yeltsin, Boris 126 Yenukidze, Abel 47 Yugoslavia 55, 70, 76, 91, 163 – 4, 173 Zamyatin, Evgeny 57 Zhdanov, Andrei xxvi, 50, 56, 58, 73 – 6, 92, 111, 164, 167 Zhemchuzhina, Polina 77, 110 Zhukov, Georgy xxvi – xxvii, 56, 63, 65 – 6, 71, 75, 92 Zinoviev, Grigory xxvii; alliance with Stalin 23 – 5; imprisonment of 44; as Jewish 78; and Leningrad Affair 77; and Leninism 26; and October Revolution 17 – 18; opposition to NEP 27 Zoshchenko, Mikhail 68, 73