Sport: Law and Practice 9781526509260, 9781526509291, 9781526509284

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Sport: Law and Practice Fourth Edition

Sport: Law and Practice Fourth Edition

Adam Lewis QC and

Jonathan Taylor QC

BLOOMSBURY PROFESSIONAL Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc © Bloomsbury Professional Ltd 2021 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-governmentlicence/version/3) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2021. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN:

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Foreword to Fourth Edition It is with pleasure that I have agreed to write a short foreword for this fourth edition of Sport: Law & Practice, edited by Adam Lewis QC and Jonathan Taylor QC. As a former athlete, then politician, and now sports administrator, I am well aware of the importance of rules and law to sport. •

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I was the first athlete invited to address an IOC Congress back in 1981. My task was to synthesise the views of the 40 Olympians that Juan Antonio Samaranch had invited to the Congress. Of the four minutes that I was allocated, I spoke about the dangers to the health of the athletes, the damage to the fabric of sport and the integrity of competition for about two and three-quarter minutes. This little group, which included the current IOC  President, Thomas Bach, then formed the membership of the first IOC Athletes Commission. I’ve also always had an interest in the governance of sport. In advance of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, I  went head-to-head on the BBC with the Chairman of the British Amateur Athletics Board. I  disputed the selection policy for the Games that year. In response to my position, the Chairman observed that this was all about who ran the sport. I replied that I welcomed that approach and when he did find out who ran the sport, would he please let me and the athletes know as it would be extremely helpful! Sadly, he had the last laugh and, more importantly, the casting vote that vetoed my selection a couple of months later for the Seoul Games, denying me the opportunity of winning a third 1500m title. As chair of the London 2012 Bidding Committee and then the Organising Committee for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, I  was involved in securing the necessary statutory protection of the Olympic symbols from ambush marketing, in the form of the Olympic Symbol etc (Protection) Act 1995, subsequently amended by the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006. With my team at LOCOG, we also worked hard on developing the strong governance structures that enabled the Organising Committee, which I  chaired, the Olympic Delivery Authority, the British Olympic Association, the Mayor of London, the UK  Government, and the plethora of regional and national bodies and departments to be instrumental in delivering an exceptional Olympic and Paralympic Games. When I  became president of the IAAF (now World Athletics) in 2015, I  spearheaded the reform of the sport’s constitution and the creation of the Athletics Integrity Unit (a ground-breaker) in response to the Russian doping crisis, and I have personally been to CAS when the Russian Olympic Committee challenged our exclusion of Russian athletes from the 2016 Olympic Games (ROC & Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684) and when Caster Semenya challenged our rules governing the eligibility of athletes with differences in sex development to compete in the female competition category (Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798). When it came to rebalancing the powers of the IAAF president in our governance reforms in 2016, I was slightly taken aback when one key figure in the sport could not understand why I would want to give away so much power after having worked so hard to win the election. That was when I knew the full enormity of the reform process that lay ahead and the need for a much greater understanding of empowerment in the governance process.

vi  Foreword to Fourth Edition

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As a politician in the early to mid-1990s and now a Member of the House of Lords and Chancellor of Loughborough University, I continue to believe that sport is fundamental to the fabric of our society and continue to speak out on sport governance, sport integrity, the power of partnerships and the need for sport to be available to all.

Given how high the stakes are in modern professional sport, and given the intensity of the public gaze, sports governing bodies and all others active in the sports sector clearly need highly competent and expert legal advice. I therefore welcome the latest edition of this comprehensive practitioners’ guide. No sports organisation should leave home without one! Sebastian Coe World Athletics President January 2021

Preface to Fourth Edition This book continues to seek to provide an accessible guide, for both participants in sport and for legal practitioners, to the interaction of sport with the law, an interaction that has intensified and developed greatly since the first edition was published in 2003. To that end, this fourth edition retains and updates the core content of the third edition, while reorganising the structure followed and adding new chapters, in particular in relation to data protection, best practice in sports governance, effective sports regulation, misconduct, exploitation of sports data, and eSports. Where relevant, the effect of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union is addressed, as is the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The law stated in this edition is as of 1 June 2020, although where possible later developments have been incorporated. Part A (Governance of the Sports Sector) examines how, and the extent to which, sports governing bodies self-govern (Chapter A1); their forms of organisation (Chapter A2); government intervention in the sector (Chapter A3); the application of data protection law to sports organisations (Chapter A4); and lastly best practice in sports governance (Chapter A5). The last two chapters are new as stand-alone topics, reflecting their growing importance in law and practice. Part B  (Regulating Sport) addresses the approach to, and the principal areas of, the regulation of sport by sports governing bodies. The first chapter (Chapter B1) analyses the basic legal principles relevant to and constraining sports governing bodies’ regulatory efforts. While some of the content of this chapter has been addressed elsewhere in previous editions, we have sought to examine these principles in more detail here in order to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for what follows in the rest of the section and elsewhere in the book. The remaining chapters of Part B address a number of specific areas of regulation: selection (Chapter B2); misconduct (Chapter B3); match-fixing and related corruption (Chapter B4); financial fair play (Chapter B5); and safeguarding (Chapter B6). Other areas of regulation are addressed where they arise in the context of disciplinary and other internal proceedings brought by sports governing bodies (Chapter D1) and in the context of challenges to the actions of sports governing bodies (Part E). The major area of doping is deal with separately in Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement) in the light of the extensive developments in this area, including the introduction of the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code with effect from 1 January 2021. Each of the critical elements of anti-doping law and practice is now dealt with in a separate chapter in the interests of accessibility for readers, even where that results in chapters of (at times significantly) differing lengths. After an initial introduction (Chapter C1), the anti-doping regulatory framework is described (Chapter C2), setting out how the regime is operated and by whom. The next three chapters deal with the practicalities of anti-doping procedures: the parties to the procedure (Chapter C3); preliminary considerations in bringing and defending a charge (Chapter C4); and the burden and standard of proof at a hearing on the merits (Chapter C5). There then follow ten chapters (Chapters C6 to C15) on the individual anti-doping rule violations contained in Article 2 of the World Anti-Doping Code 2021, which are carried over into the anti-doping rules of all Code-compliant sports. The remaining chapters deal with the consequences of a proven violation: an introductory overview of how periods of ineligibility are determined (Chapter C16); the starting point of basic periods of ineligibility determined by application of Code Articles 10.2 and 10.3 (Chapter C17); reduction of the starting point basic period where the athlete establishes they bear

viii  Preface to Fourth Edition

no fault or negligence or no significant fault or negligence for the violation (Chapter C18); increase of the period in the light of aggravating factors (Chapter C19); the methodology of fixing the period of ineligibility within an available range (Chapter C20); reductions in the period for other reasons not connected to the degree of fault (Chapter C21); the start date for the period of ineligibility (Chapter C22); and the disqualification of results and financial consequences (Chapter C23). Part D (Disciplinary and Arbitral Proceedings) explains the role in sports disputes of proceedings other than in court. Disputes in the sector are resolved increasingly resolved in such proceedings. Disciplinary and other internal proceedings (Chapter D1) are the proceedings brought by or against sports governing bodies before internal decision makers, which range from administrative arms of the sports governing body to domestic tribunals that are or verge on the arbitral. The next chapter (Chapter D2) analyses the dual roles of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, on occasion as the last appeal instance in relation to a decision made by the governing body’s internal panel, and on occasion as an ordinary arbitration in respect of a range of disputes submitted to it. Lastly Chapter D3 addresses arbitration in sport more widely and generally. Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies) analyses the judicial limits on self-governance by sports governing bodies, ie the bases on which courts and arbitral panels are prepared to intervene in relation to various actions of sports governing bodies, and the procedural elements involved. In order to make this area more accessible both to those contemplating challenging a sports governing body, and to sports governing bodies defending such a challenge, each of the critical elements is now dealt with in a separate chapter, as with doping, even where again that results in chapters of differing lengths. After an initial introduction (Chapter E1), the types of governing body actions susceptible to challenge are addressed (Chapter E2). Then the initial steps preparatory to bringing or defending a challenge are examined: identification of the cause of action and the respondent (Chapter E3); and choice of forum (Chapter E4). That is followed by analysis of the nature of a sports governing body’s actions and the consequences: the extent to which the governing body’s actions are private or quasi-public (Chapter E5); and the varying degree of review as a result (Chapter E6). There then follow eight chapters (Chapters E7 to E14) on the principal causes of action relevant to challenge to governing body action: the grounds for review arising out of control of the sport (or ‘Bradley grounds’); contract; tort; restraint of trade; competition law; free movement to the extent applicable; human rights law; and discrimination law. The remaining chapters deal with remedies (Chapter E15) and procedural aspects of such challenges (Chapter E16). Part F (Relationships between Clubs and Players) turns to the relationships between the principal participants in sport other than governing bodies: clubs, players, training staff, and agents. First, player and manager contracts are dealt with (Chapter F1); then players’ agents (Chapter F2); and lastly the complex rules and practice in relation to player transfers (Chapter F3). Part G (Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport) describes the circumstances in which one participant in a sporting contest may become liable to another, or to a member of the public, as a consequence of the way in which the sport is played: first civil liability (Chapter G1), and then criminal liability (Chapter G2). Part H (Commercialising Sport Properties) covers the application of the law to the activities of commercial partners that contract with governing bodies or participants in order to make a financial gain from the sport: proprietary rights in sports events, and the corollary ambush marketing (Chapter H1); broadcasting and new media (Chapter H2); sponsorship (Chapter H3); image rights (Chapter H4); merchandising and licensing (Chapter H5); hospitality (Chapter H6); and exploiting sports data

Preface to Fourth Edition  ix

(Chapter H7). The last chapter is new as a stand-alone topic, again reflecting its growing importance. Part I  (Tax Issues in the Sports Sector) addresses taxation of sports organisations (Chapter I1) and taxation of individual athletes (Chapter I2). Part J  (Esports) is new and sets out the application of the law to the most recent development in the ambit of sport, esports. We are very grateful to all of those who have made this fourth edition possible, including each of the author-contributors, who are individually identified in the table of contents following this preface and whose biographies are then set out, Kiran Goss, Paul Crick and Jenny Lank for Bloomsbury, Joanna Hawkins and Catherine Smith at Bird & Bird, and Mat Swallow and the clerks at Blackstone Chambers. We also thank Lord Coe very much for providing a short foreword that shows how frequently he has encountered sports law issues during his illustrious career as an athlete, politician, and sports administrator. Finally, as in the case of previous editions, Adam again thanks Beate, Magnus and Marianne, and Jon again thanks Kate, Sophie and Emily for putting up with us (and our absences) while we have been working on this edition. Adam Lewis QC Blackstone Chambers January 2021

Jonathan Taylor QC Bird & Bird LLP

Contents Foreword v Preface vii Author Biographies xxiii Table of Statutes xli Table of Statutory Instruments li Table of Cases lv

PART A  GOVERNANCE OF THE SPORTS SECTOR

1

CHAPTER A1

THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT, AND ITS LIMITS (Lauren Pagé and Jonathan Taylor QC) 3 1 INTRODUCTION 3 2 THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT 4 3 THE PYRAMID MODEL OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE 17 4 THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF AN SGB 24 5 EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER MEMBERS 32 6 ADDRESSING UNSANCTIONED EVENTS 52 CHAPTER A2

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES AND COMPETITIONS (James Maloney,Tom Bruce and Jon Walters) 72 1 INTRODUCTION 72 2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCHEME 73 3 THE NATIONAL SCHEME 76 4 TYPICAL CONSITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL GOVERNING BODIES AND OTHER SPORTS ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK 78 5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNING BODIES AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS 91 6 THE DEGREE OF RETENTION OF RIGHTS BY SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES 92 7 AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS 97 CHAPTER A3

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE SPORTS SECTOR (Lewis Calder and Jonathan Taylor QC) 104 1 INTRODUCTION 104 2 THE POWER OF SPORT, AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY 105 3 GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY 108 4 IMPLEMENTING MODERN GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 122 CHAPTER A4 DATA PROTECTION AND SPORT (Emma Drake) 171 1 INTRODUCTION 171 2 DATA PROTECTION LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE 172 3 DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND SPORT 183 4 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS 220 5 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS 231 6 DIRECT MARKETING, EPRIVACY AND SPORT 237 7 LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT 247 CHAPTER A5

BEST PRACTICE IN SPORTS GOVERNANCE (Maria Clarke, Edwina Haddon, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 255 1 INTRODUCTION 255 2 BROAD PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 260

xii  Contents 3 4

PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE MONITORING COMPLIANCE

PART B  REGULATING SPORT

270 288

291

CHAPTER B1

DRAFTING EFFECTIVE REGULATIONS – THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (Jonathan Taylor QC, Charles Flint QC, and Adam Lewis QC) 293 1 INTRODUCTION 293 2 THE AUTONOMY AFFORDED TO AN SGB TO REGULATE ITS SPORT 294 3 THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON AN SGB’S EXERCISE OF ITS REGULATORY POWERS 304 4 RESOLVING DISPUTES AS TO THE PROPER MEANING OF AN SGB’S REGULATIONS 359 CHAPTER B2 SELECTION (Elizabeth Riley and Christopher Stoner QC) 391 1 INTRODUCTION 391 2 THE SELECTION PROCESS 392 3 ELIGIBILITY 402 4 APPEALS 404 5 THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES 419 6 CONCLUSIONS 421 CHAPTER B3

MISCONDUCT (Kendrah Potts, Stuart Tennant, and James Eighteen) 423 1 INTRODUCTION 424 2 ON-FIELD DECISION MAKING 424 3 POST-MATCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ON-FIELD INCIDENTS 429 4 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 433 5 TYPES OF ON-FIELD OFFENCES 438 6 REGULATING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT 447 7 DRAFTING AND ENFORCING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT PROVISIONS 449 8 TYPES OF OFF-FIELD OFFENCES 454 9 CODES OF ETHICS 469 CHAPTER B4

MATCH-FIXING AND RELATED CORRUPTION IN SPORT (Iain Higgins, Jonathan Taylor QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Tom Mountford) 487 1 INTRODUCTION 487 2 THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM 490 3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN SPORT 508 4 PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN CORRUPTION CASES 530 5 SANCTIONS IN CORRUPTION CASES 546 6 PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION RULES 555 7 THE FUTURE: A WORLD ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY? 574 CHAPTER B5

REGULATING FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY (Nick Craig, Jonathan Taylor QC, and Sam Beer) 577 1 INTRODUCTION 577 2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 581 3 CLUB LICENSING 597 4 COST CONTROLS 607 5 WHEN IT ALL GOES WRONG – INSOLVENCY 630 CHAPTER B6 SAFEGUARDING (Kate Gallafent QC and Richard Bush) 642 1 INTRODUCTION 642 2 KEY TECHNOLOGY 643 3 THE CHILD PROTECTION/CARE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND 648 4 SAFEGUARDING IN SPORT 652

Contents  xiii

PART C ANTI-DOPING REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 673 CHAPTER C1

INTRODUCTION (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 675

CHAPTER C2 1 2 3

THE ANTI-DOPING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 676 A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION 676 THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: AN OVERVIEW 681 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE IN THE UK 685

CHAPTER C3 PARTIES (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 687 1 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS? 687 2 WHO IS SUBJECT TO ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS? 689 CHAPTER C4 1 2

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS IN BRINGING and DEFENDING A CHARGE (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 697 GIVING NOTICE OF THE CHARGE 697 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATHLETE OR OTHER PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AN ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATION 702

CHAPTER C5 1 2 3 4 5

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF AT THE HEARING ON THE MERITS (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 739 INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION 739 STANDARD OF PROOF THAT THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION MUST MEET 739 THE ATHLETE’S BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 743 ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 743 REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 747

CHAPTER C6

1 2 3

ARTICLE 2.1 ADRV – THE PRESENCE OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR ITS METABOLITES OR MARKERS IN AN ATHLETE’S SAMPLE (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 749 ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAMPLE 754 ESTABLISHING THE RELIABILITY OF THE LABORATORY’S ADVERSE ANALYTICAL FINDING 774 ESTABLISHING THAT THE SUBSTANCE FOUND IN THE SAMPLE IS IN FACT PROHIBITED 799

CHAPTER C7

ARTICLE 2.2 ADRV –AN ATHLETE’S USE OR ATTEMPTED USE OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR A PROHIBITED METHOD (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 822 1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.2 VIOLATION 822 2 PROVING ‘USE’ 824 3 PROVING ‘USE’ BY REFERENCE TO ANALYTICAL DATA 825 4 PROVING ‘USE’ BY MEANS OF THE ATHLETE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT 827 5 PROVING ‘USE’ BY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL DATA 846 6 ‘ATTEMPTED USE’ OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR METHOD 850 7 DEFENCES 852 CHAPTER C8

ARTICLE 2.3 CHARGE – REFUSING OR FAILING TO SUBMIT TO OR OTHERWISE EVADING SAMPLE COLLECTION (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 854

xiv  Contents CHAPTER C9

ARTICLE 2.4 ADRV – THREE WHEREABOUTS FAILURES IN TWELVE MONTHS (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 868

CHAPTER C10 ARTICLE 2.5 ADRV – TAMPERING OR ATTEMPTED TAMPERING WITH ANY PART OF DOPING CONTROL (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 876 CHAPTER C11 ARTICLE 2.6 ADRV – POSSESSION OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR A PROHIBITED METHOD (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 886 1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.6 (POSSESSION) VIOLATION 886 2 DEFENCES TO AN ART 2.6 CHARGE 891 CHAPTER C12 ARTICLE 2.7 ADRV – TRAFFICKING OR ATTEMPTED TRAFFICKING IN ANY PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR PROHIBITED METHOD (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 893 CHAPTER C13 ARTICLE 2.8 ADRV – ADMINISTRATION OR ATTEMPTED ADMINISTRATION OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE TO AN ATHLETE (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 897 CHAPTER C14 ARTICLE 2.9 ADRV – COMPLICITY OR ATTEMPTED COMPLICITY BY AN ATHLETE OR OTHER PERSON (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 901 CHAPTER C15 ARTICLE 2.10 ADRV – PROHIBITED ASSOCIATION – and ARTICLE 2.11 ADRV – RETALIATION (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 905 1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.10 VIOLATION 905 2 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.11 VIOLATION 906 CHAPTER C16 CODE SANCTIONS: OVERVIEW OF APPROACH TO PERIODS OF INELIGIBILITY (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 908 CHAPTER C17 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (1): APPLYING CODE ARTICLES 10.2 AND 10.3 (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 915 1 OVERVIEW 915 2 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.1 VIOLATION 916 3 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.2 VIOLATION 937 4 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.3 VIOLATION 939 5 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.4 VIOLATION 940 6 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.5 VIOLATION 942 7 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.6 VIOLATION 943 8 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.7 VIOLATION 944 9 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.8 VIOLATION 944 10 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.9 VIOLATION 944 11 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.10 VIOLATION 945 12 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.11 VIOLATION 945 CHAPTER C18 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (2): ESTABLISHING NO (OR NO SIGNIFICANT) FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 946 1 IS A PLEA OF NO (OR NO SIGNIFICANT) FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN PRINCIPLE? 946

Contents  xv 2 3

4 5

THE FIRST THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR BOTH NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE AND NO SIGNIFICANT FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE: PROVING HOW THE SUBSTANCE ENTERED THE ATHLETE’S SYSTEM 951 THE SECOND THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE: PROVING THAT THE ATHLETE USED ‘UTMOST CAUTION’ TO KEEP THEIR SYSTEM CLEAR OF PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES 968 THE SECOND THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR NO SIGNIFICANT FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE: PROVING THAT ANY FAULT THAT THE ATHLETE BEARS FOR THEIR VIOLATION IS ‘NOT SIGNIFICANT’ 984 DETERMINING THE REDUCTION FOR NO SIGNIFICANT FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE ONCE THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS ARE MET 1009

CHAPTER C19 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (3): AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 1010 1 THE CASES WHERE A PLEA OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE AVAILABLE 1010 2 ESTABLISHING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 1011 CHAPTER C20 DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF THE INELIGIBILITY PERIOD WITHIN A PERMITTED RANGE (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 1021 1 ASSESSING FAULT WHERE THE RANGE IS 0–24 MONTHS OR 12–24 MONTHS 1022 2 ASSESSING FAULT WHERE THE RANGE IS 24 OR 48 MONTHS UP TO A LIFETIME BAN 1058 3 ASSESSING FAULT WHERE AGGRAVATING FACTORS ARE FOUND TO EXIST 1063 CHAPTER C21 SUSPENDING OR REDUCING SANCTIONS FOR REASON UNRELATED TO FAULT (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 1064 1 SUSPENDING THE PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY AND/OR OTHER CONSEQUENCES DUE TO ‘SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE’ 1064 2 REDUCING THE PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY BASED ON AN ADMISSION MADE BEFORE THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION WAS AWARE OF THE ADRV 1071 3 REDUCING A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY BASED ON A PROMPT ADMISSION AFTER BEING CONFRONTED WITH THE ADRV 1075 CHAPTER C22 DETERMINING THE START DATE OF THE INELIGIBILITY PERIOD (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 1080 1 GENERAL RULE: BAN STARTS FROM THE DAY IT IS ACCEPTED OR IMPOSED 1080 2 FIRST EXCEPTION: DELAYS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ATHLETE OR OTHER PERSON 1080 3 SECOND EXCEPTION: CREDIT FOR PROVISIONAL SUSPENSION 1082 4 THIRD EXCEPTION: NEW BANS RUN CONSECUTIVELY, NOT CONCURRENTLY 1083 5 NO OTHER EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE 2021 CODE 1084 CHAPTER C23 DISQUALIFICATION OF RESULTS AND FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 1086 1 DISQUALIFICATION OF RESULTS 1086 2 FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES 1098

xvi  Contents

PART D DISCIPLINARY AND ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS 1101 CHAPTER D1

DISCIPLINARY AND OTHER INTERNAL PROCEEDINGS (Kate Gallafent QC and Christopher Quinlan QC) 1103 1 INTRODUCTION 1103 2 JURISDICTION: ESTABLISHING RULES BINDING ON PARTICIPANTS 1107 3 JURISDICTION: ESTABLISHING RULES COVERING DIFFERENT TYPES OF DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES AND OTHER INTERNAL DISPUTES 1116 4 ENFORCEMENT: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 1125 5 CHECKLISTS 1145 6 CONCLUSION 1148 CHAPTER D2 THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR COURT (Michael Beloff QC, Dr Stephan Netzle and Prof Dr Ulrich Haas, With Björn Hessert and Dr Mirjam Koller Trunz) 1150 1 HISTORY 1151 2 ORGANISATION OF CAS 1156 3 JURISDICTION OF CAS 1166 4 HOW TO PROCEED BEFORE CAS 1176 5 GOVERNING LAW ON THE MERITS 1199 6 SPECIFIC SPORTS LAW PRINCIPLES 1206 7 THE AWARD 1215 8 CAS MEDIATION 1227 9 LEGAL OPINIONS 1228 CHAPTER D3 ARBITRATION IN SPORT (Ian Mill QC and andrew Hunter QC) 1229 1 INTRODUCTION 1229 2 WHEN ARE SPORTS DISPUTES REFERRED TO ARBITRATION? 1232 3 VALIDITY OF SPORTS ARBITRATION CLAUSES 1237 4 THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 1244 5 OUSTER OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, STAYS AND ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS 1250 6 CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC SPORTS ARBITRATIONS; SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE BY THE COURT 1253 7 CHALLENGES TO DECISIONS OF ARBITRAL BODIES 1256 8 ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC ARBITRATION AWARDS 1259 9 IMMUNITY OF DOMESTIC SPORTS ARBITRATORS FROM SUIT 1260 10 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1260

PART E CHALLENGES TO THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES CHAPTER E1

1263

INTRODUCTION TO CHALLENGES (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1265

CHAPTER E2 THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1268 1 ACTIONS AFFECTING A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANT 1269 2 ACTIONS AFFECTING A CLASS OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS 1274 3 FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS 1277 4 ACTIONS AFFECTING SPECIFIC CLUBS 1277 5 ACTIONS AFFECTING ALL CLUBS 1280 6 ACTIONS AFFECTING OTHER SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES 1282

Contents  xvii 7 8 9

ACTIONS AFFECTING COMMERCIAL PARTNERS ACTIONS AFFECTING THE PUBLIC ACTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS AFFECTING OTHER PARTICIPANTS

1284 1289 1289

CHAPTER E3

IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND RESPONDENT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1291 1 CAUSE OF ACTION 1291 2 RESPONDENT 1294 CHAPTER E4

CHOICE OF FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGE (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1298 1 INTERNAL PROCEEDINGS AND INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1298 2 ATTEMPTS TO OUST THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 1301 3 EXTERNAL ARBITRATION 1301 4 COURT 1306 5 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOUTION OR MEDIATION 1306 6 ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 1307 CHAPTER E5 1 2 3

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1309 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE CHOICE OF PROCEDURE 1310 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 IN THIS CONTEXT 1312 THE EXTENSION TO SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES OF EU FREE MOVEMENT LAW 1314

CHAPTER E6 1 2 3 4 5 6

THE VARYING DEGREES OF REVIEW (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1316 JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE 1316 THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN APPLIED 1317 LIMITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE 1318 DOES THE PRINCIPLE APPLY IN THE CONTEXTOF RESTRAINT OF TRADE? 1319 SHOULD SPECIALIST ARBITRAL BODIES BE SO RELUCTANT? 1319 RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE UNDER COMPETITION LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW 1320

CHAPTER E7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ARISING OUT OF CONTROL OF THE SPORT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1322 THE EXTENT OF AND BASIS FOR THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 1323 THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT LAWFULY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPORTS GOVERNING BODY’S RULES 1348 THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT FAIRLY IN A PROCEDURAL SENSE, OR ‘NATURAL JUSTICE’ 1351 THE REQUIREMENT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONLY RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS 1359 THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE BODY INSTRUCT ITSELF PROPERLY AS TO THE FACTS 1360 THE REQUIREMENT NOT TO ACT CONTRARY TO A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 1360 THE REQUIREMENT NOT TO ACT IRRATIONALLY, ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY 1360

xviii  Contents CHAPTER E8 1 2 3 4

CONTRACT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1363 THE SOURCES OF CONTRACTS TO WHICH SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES ARE PARTY 1364 EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 1371 IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 1371 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 1372

CHAPTER E9 1 2 3

TORT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1373 ACTIONS IN NEGLIGENCE AGAINST SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES 1373 INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THE ECONOMIC TORTS 1375 ACTIONS AGAINST SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES BASED ON OTHER TORTS 1376

CHAPTER E10 COMMON LAW RESTRAINT OF TRADE (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1377 1 THE BASIS FOR AND EXTENT OF THE DOCTRINE 1378 2 APPLICATION TO THE RULES AND ACTIONS OF SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES 1381 3 DOES THE DOCTRINE REMAIN A DISTINCT BASIS FOR CHALLENGE? 1390 CHAPTER E11 EU AND UK COMPETITION LAW RULES AND SPORT (Brian Kennelly QC,Tom Richards, and Adam Lewis QC) 1392 1 INTRODUCTION 1392 2 THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU AND UK COMPETITION RULES 1393 3 APPLYING THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE SPORTS SECTOR 1405 4 COMPETITION LAW JURISPRUDENCE IN THE SPORTS SECTOR 1415 CHAPTER E12 EU FREE MOVEMENT RULES and SPORT (Thomas De La Mare QC and Ravi S Mehta) 1492 1 APPLICATION OF EU FREE MOVEMENT RULES TO SPORT 1492 2 STATUS OF SPORT UNDER THE EU TREATIES 1496 3 FREE MOVEMENT RULES ESTABLISHED BY THE EU TREATIES 1498 4 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT RULES 1500 5 SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT RULES 1530 6 ENFORCEMENT 1540 CHAPTER E13 THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND SPORT (Lord Pannick QC, Paul Luckhurst, and Celia Rooney) 1542 1 INTRODUCTION 1542 2 THE PROVISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 1545 3 THE CONVENTION ARTICLES RELEVANT TO SPORT 1554 4 THE HRA 1998 IN PRACTICE 1571 CHAPTER E14 DISCRIMINATION IN SPORT (Emily Neill and Hollie Higgins) 1575 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1575 2 WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION? THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGISLATION 1580 3 WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL? THE SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATION 1593 4 STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS RELEVANT TO SPORT 1598 5 REMEDIES 1608

Contents  xix CHAPTER E15 REMEDIES (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1610 1 INTERIM INJUNCTIONS 1610 2 FINAL INJUNCTIONS 1615 3 INTERIM DECLARATIONS 1617 4 FINAL DECLARATIONS 1618 5 REMISSION FOR A FRESH DECISION 1619 6 DAMAGES 1620 7 REMEDIES UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 1623 8 UNFAIR PREJUDICE PETITIONS UNDER SECTION 994 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 1623 CHAPTER E16 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1625 1 PARTIES 1625 2 OBTAINING A QUICKER RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE 1626 3 SECURITY FOR COSTS 1629 4 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR INTERNAL PROCEEDINGS 1629 5 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF PENDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1631 6 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF PENDING CHALLENGE 1631 7 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF PARALLEL REGULATORY COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 1631 8 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 1632 9 JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 1633

PART F RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLUBS AND PLAYERS 1637 CHAPTER F1

PLAYING CONTRACTS (Paul Goulding QC, Jane Mulcahy QC, and Diya Sen Gupta QC) 1639 1 INTRODUCTION 1639 2 WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? 1641 3 FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT 1644 4 PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 1656 5 TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT 1657 6 REMEDIES 1669 7 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 1674 8 MINORS’ CONTRACTS 1676 CHAPTER F2 1 2 3 4

PLAYERS’ AGENTS (Ian Lynam, Jonathan Ellis, and Nick De Marco QC) 1678 THE ROLE OF PLAYERS’ AGENTS IN SPORT 1678 THE REGULATION OF PLAYERS’ AGENTS 1681 THE CONTENT OF A REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT 1717 ISSUES ARISING BETWEEN AGENT AND PRINCIPAL AND THIRD PARTIES 1724

CHAPTER F3 1 2 3 4 5 6

PLAYER TRANSFERS (Stephen Sampson, Peter Limbert, and Adam Lewis QC) 1741 THE MEANING OF THE TERM ‘PLAYER TRANSFER’ 1742 CONTRAST WITH POSITION OUTSIDE THE SPORTS SECTOR 1746 TRANSFER RULES THAT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED, AND WHY 1747 THE LEGALITY OF TRANSFER RULES 1759 NEGOTIATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL PLAYER TRANSFER 1787 DISPUTES IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL PLAYER TRANSFERS 1812

xx  Contents

PART G LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF PARTICIPATION IN SPORT CHAPTER G1

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF PARTICIPATION IN SPORT (Prof Mark James) 1 INTRODUCTION 2 LIABILITY OF CONTESTANTS TO EACH OTHER 3 LIABILITY OF NON-ATHLETES FOR CAUSING INJURY TO SPORTS PARTICIPANTS 4 LIABILITY OF GOVERNING BODIES 5 LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES CAUSED ON OR NEAR SPORTING PREMISES 6 DEFENCES 7 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS CHAPTER G2

1847 1849 1849 1853 1864 1872 1877 1894 1897

CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF PARTICIPATION IN SPORT (Prof Mark James) SPORTS PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW PARTICIPATOR VIOLENCE COMBAT SPORTS PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES AND RACIST ABUSE INITIATION CEREMONIES AND INFORMAL PUNISHMENTS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

1900 1900 1901 1922 1923 1927 1927

PART H  COMMERCIALISING SPORTS PROPERTIES

1929

1 2 3 4 5 6

CHAPTER H1 PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN SPORTS EVENTS (Clive Lawrence, Phil Sherell, and Tristan Sherliker) 1 INTRODUCTION 2 NO PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN A SPORTS EVENT PER SE 3 FIGHTING AMBUSH MARKETING: THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIAL PROGRAMME FOR A SPORTS EVENT 4 ACCESS RIGHTS 5 CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS ON PARTICIPANTS AND COMMERCIAL PARTNERS 6 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 USING OTHER LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL REMEDIES CHAPTER H2 MEDIA RIGHTS AND SPORT (Morris Bentata and Craig Giles) 1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SPORTS MEDIA RIGHTS 2 WHAT ARE SPORTS MEDIA RIGHTS? 3 FROM THE PITCH TO THE SCREEN: THE PRODUCTION AND BROADCAST OF SPORTS EVENTS 4 SPORTS MEDIA RIGHTS CONTRACTS 5 REGULATION OF SPORTS BROADCASTING CHAPTER H3 SPONSORSHIP (Craig Giles, Robert Turner, and Georgie Twigg MBE) 1 INTRODUCTION 2 TYPES OF SPONSORSHIP 3 RIGHTS INVENTORY 4 KEY ISSUES ARISING IN SPONSORSHIP DEALS 5 SPONSORS IN REGULATED MARKETS

1931 1931 1932 1942 1945 1953 1959 1993 1996 1996 2002 2009 2016 2039 2045 2045 2050 2056 2061 2069

CHAPTER H4 IMAGE RIGHTS (Stephen Boyd and Felicity Reeve) 2080 1 INTRODUCTION 2080 2 THE USE OF IMAGE RIGHTS IN MODERN MARKETING PRACTICE 2081 3 THE LEGAL STATUS OF AN ATHLETE’S IMAGE RIGHTS 2083 4 IMAGE RIGHTS CONTRACTS 2111

Contents  xxi CHAPTER H5 MERCHANDISING AND LICENSING (Clive Lawrence) 2127 1 INTRODUCTION 2127 2 THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF A MERCHANDISING/LICENSING AGREEMENT 2134 3 SUMMARY 2149 CHAPTER H6 HOSPITALITY (Warren Phelops) 2150 1 INTRODUCTION 2150 2 COMMERCIAL RATIONALE FOR OFFICIAL HOSPITALITY ARRANGEMENTS 2151 3 HOSPITALITY AGREEMENTS – KEY PROVISIONS 2152 4 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 2167 5 THE RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS OF HOSPITALITY PACKAGES 2174 CHAPTER H7 EXPLOITING SPORTS DATA (andy Danson and Elizabeth Dunn) 2174 1 INTRODUCTION 2174 2 CREATION, COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION OF SPORTS DATA 2180 3 PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN SPORTS DATA 2183 4 KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPORTS DATA 2184

PART I  TAX ISSUES IN THE SPORTS SECTOR

2197

CHAPTER I1

TAXATION OF SPORTS ORGANISATIONS (Ben Elliott) 2199 1 WHY TAX IS IMPORTANT 2200 2 THE TYPES OF ENTITY AND THE TAXES THEY FACE 2201 3 CORPORATION TAX 2202 4 VALUE ADDED TAX 2209 5 PAYE AND NIC 2220 6 SPECIAL TYPES OF SPORTS ORGANISATIONS 2226 APPENDIX: VAT TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF INCOME 2230 CHAPTER I2

TAX AND FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR INDIVIDUAL ATHLETES (Ben Elliott) 2233 1 INTRODUCTION 2234 2 IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL PLANNING 2235 3 LIABILITY FOR INCOME TAX 2238 4 TAXATION OF INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT 2244 5 TAXATION OF INCOME FROM A TRADE, PROFESSION OR VOCATION 2248 6 SPECIAL TYPES OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 2250 7 INVESTMENT INCOME AND GAINS 2253 8 RETIREMENT PLANNING 2253 9 OTHER TAXES 2255 10 NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTION OBLIGATIONS AND PLANNING 2256 11 VALUE ADDED TAX 2256 12 ENQUIRIES, INVESTIGATIONS, LITIGATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE 2257

PART J  ESPORTS

2265

CHAPTER J1 ESPORTS (William Deller and Richard Bush) 2267 1 INTRODUCTION 2267 2 THE ESPORTS ‘ECOSYSTEM’ 2269 3 COMMERCIAL RIGHTS IN ESPORTS 2273 4 ESPORTS AND GAMBLING 2282 5 ESPORTS REGULATION 2284 6 THE FUTURE OF ESPORTS 2289 INDEX

2291

Author Biographies Adam Lewis QC

Adam Lewis is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, London. He regularly advises national and international governing bodies, clubs and players from a wide range of sports, and commercial partners involved with those sports. He regularly appears on their behalf before the English courts, the Court of Arbitration for Sport and other arbitral bodies, and the domestic and European regulatory authorities. He lectures on the British Association for Sport and the Law and de Montfort University postgraduate sports law course and regularly speaks at sports law conferences and is a co-author of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional, 2016). His background is as an EU and public law specialist. Between 1991 and 1994 he worked in Brussels in the cabinet of the European Commissioner responsible for competition and for White & Case (Brussels). His practice covers a wide range of contentious sports-related issues, including challenges to the actions and decisions of sports governing bodies, competition and free movement issues, doping and disciplinary , and disputes between clubs and players. He is a Sport Resolutions Arbitrator, an FA Rule K Arbitrator, an RFU Appeal Board Chairman, and a UKA Tribunal Chairman. Chambers UK 2021 puts him in a class of his own as the only Star Individual at the Bar in the area of sport and states that ‘he is widely regarded as the leading sports barrister in the UK, whose dedicated focus has led to him having an unrivalled knowledge and experience in the sector’, that ‘he is a market leader’ and that ‘he is first rate and his sport knowledge is second to none’. The Legal 500 2021 describes him as ‘the foremost leader in the field. He is a leading light in the sports sector. Works extremely hard and gets to grips with the detail. He is the complete package and a go to silk’.

Jonathan Taylor QC

Jonathan Taylor QC is a partner and co-head of the International Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP (twobirds.com). With law degrees from Oxford (BA) and Virginia (LLM), he initially practised as a commercial litigator in New York (1990–97) before returning to England in 1997, where he has practised sports law exclusively ever since, advising blue chip international and national sports governing bodies, public agencies, broadcasters, sponsors and other commercial partners of sport on the full range of commercial, regulatory and contentious issues that arise in the sports sector. Jonathan is an experienced advocate, appearing regularly before the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland, as well as a range of other sports tribunals, in particular in doping and match-fixing cases, and was made Queen’s Counsel in 2017 in recognition of his advocacy skills. He was the chair of WADA’s independent Compliance Review Committee from 2016 to 2020, and of the IBU External Review Commission from 2018 to 2021. In 2019 he led reviews of the English Football League’s governance and of its handling of the Bury FC matter. He is co-author of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional, 2016). He has also sat as an arbitrator/expert in sports cases for Sports Resolutions (UK), the International Baseball Federation, and the International Chamber of Commerce. He has been ranked as a leading sports law practitioner for many years by both Chambers UK  2020 (‘Star Individual’; ‘a massive name and a superb sports lawyer’) and The Legal 500 2021 (‘Hall of Fame’; ‘Jonathan Taylor has an enormous breadth of knowledge and experience on which to rely, and uses it to great effect. Understands the whole picture – from the minutiae to the broader context – better than anyone’).

xxiv  Author Biographies

Michael Beloff QC

Michael Beloff QC of Blackstone Chambers is former President of the British Association of Sport and the Law, co-author of Sports Law, 2nd edn (Hart Publishing, 2012), Editor of Sweet & Maxwell’s International Sports Law Review, Halsburys Laws of England, 5th ed, Vol 96 on Sport, and Atkins Court Forms, Vol 36(2) (Sports Law). He has been a member of CAS since 1996 and has served on four CAS Summer Olympic Ad Hoc Panels. His other offices include President of Trinity College Oxford (1996–2006), Treasurer of Gray’s Inn (2008), Senior Ordinary Appeal Judge of the Channel Islands (2005–2014), Chairman of the International Cricket Council’s Code of Conduct Commission (2003–) and Dispute Resolution Committee (2015–), Chairman of the Emirates Cricket Board Appeal Tribunal (2018–), First Chairman of the International Association of Athletic Federations Ethics Board (2014–2018) and Disciplinary Tribunal (2017-2019), Steward of the RAC  (1999–2018), Ethics Commissioner for London 2012, member of the FIA  International Appeal Panel (2010–), Member of the European Tour Golf Appeal Panel (2013), and member of the Mixed Martial Arts and Ironman Anti-doping Appeal Tribunals (2016–).

Morris Bentata

Morris Bentata is a founding partner of media, entertainment, sports and technology ‘new-law’ firm, Level. His practice comprises a comprehensive range of commercial work within the sports sector, focusing principally on the acquisition, protection and exploitation of media and marketing rights for rights-holders, agencies, broadcasters and sponsors. Morris read law at Cambridge and obtained the Postgraduate Certificate in Sports Law at Kings College London. Morris is a director of the British Association for Sport and Law.

Stephen Boyd

Stephen Boyd is a barrister practising from Selborne Chambers, London. Following a degree in Linguistic and International Studies (Russian, Swedish and law), Stephen worked for international trading companies in Hong Kong and South Africa. His practice comprises a broad range of commercial and property litigation. In 2001 he was awarded the Postgraduate Certificate in Sports Law by King’s College London (for which his dissertation was on image rights). He is a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and is on CEDR’s panel of mediators and arbitrators. He has been a supporter of Tottenham Hotspur FC since going to watch the likes of Greaves and Mackay as a lad in the sixties.

Tom Bruce

Tom is a Partner at Farrer & Co LLP and Deputy Head of its Sports Group. He is embedded in the sports sector and works closely with high-profile sports clients on a wide range of corporate, commercial and governance matters. He advises national governing bodies and international federations, commercial sports organisations and clubs and is a ‘go-to’ adviser for his clients on governance matters (including the Code for Sports Governance), joint ventures and structuring international sporting events. The Legal 500 2021 describes Tom as ‘the most knowledgeable lawyer in regards to corporate governance issues in the sports sector. He has advised so many organisations, and his detailed knowledge of the sector, coupled with his legal skill, means he is now the go-to person for any governance related issues’. Tom lectures on the British Association for Sport and the Law and de Montfort University postgraduate sports law course and provides training sessions for the Sports Governance Academy (a partnership between the Governance Institute and Sport England).

Author Biographies  xxv

Richard Bush

Richard Bush is a senior associate in the Sports Group at international law firm Bird & Bird LLP. He advises on a range of regulatory and contentious sportsrelated issues, including challenges to regulatory decisions, rules and regulations, disciplinary matters, child protection/safeguarding, and commercial dispute resolution. He represents clients, and has acted as advocate, before a range of national and international dispute resolution forums, including CAS, anti-doping tribunals, anti-corruption tribunals, and various other institutional arbitrations in sport. He is a member of The FA County Disciplinary (Anti-Discrimination) FA Chairman’s Panel and was among the first members of the Esports Integrity Coalition Disciplinary Panel.

Lewis Calder

Lewis is an associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP in London. Lewis’s focus is primarily on commercial and corporate matters, such as advising on sponsorship, media rights, licensing, merchandising, image rights, and gambling-related issues and agreements. Lewis represents clients across all major sports, including football, rugby, tennis, motor sport, and cricket, as well as a range of broadcasters, event organisers and sponsors. Lewis also has experience advising on the drafting and interpretation of rules and on wider regulatory matters, including financial regulation and best practice sports governance. In particular, Lewis advised on the drafting and implementation of the FIA Formula One 2021 Financial Regulations, a groundbreaking set of regulations that introduced a cap on the amount that each team may spend each season in order to promote the competitive balance and sporting fairness of the championship while seeking to ensure the long-term financial stability and sustainability of the teams. He also has experience client-side through several virtual secondments including with a global sports and media agency and a national football governing body. Prior to his career in law, Lewis was a professional rugby player, having represented Scotland Sevens on the World Rugby Sevens Series.

Nick Craig

Nick Craig is the Governance & Legal Director at the English Football League, the world’s original league football competition. He is responsible for providing advice on all aspects of the Football League’s operational and commercial activities and, since his appointment in 2001, has helped implement a variety of measures aimed at improving the governance of the League and its member clubs. They include the introduction of English football’s first ever Fit and Proper Persons’ Test (now the Owners’ and Directors’ Test), Sporting Sanctions (points deductions for clubs subject to insolvency proceedings) and wide-ranging financial regulations including controls on club expenditure. He led the EFL’s successful defence of the so-called football creditors’ rule and of Queens Park Rangers’ competition law challenge to the Financial Fair Play regulations.

Andy Danson

Andy is a partner in Bird & Bird’s industry-leading Sports Group and heads up the firm’s international gambling practice. He has spent the last 15 years advising clients in the sports and gambling sectors and has a particular interest in the interface between the two. He has advised on some of the biggest developments in the sports data rights market over the last few years, including on the establishment of The Racing Partnership, and his clients include major national and international governing bodies and rights-holders, teams, broadcasters, agencies, global brands, and major international betting operators. He has longstanding expertise in sports media rights exploitation (for both betting and primary broadcast markets) and in sports sponsorship

xxvi  Author Biographies

and marketing matters and has been invited by the European Commission and the Asser Institute to participate in expert workshops on the advertising of gambling, and the commercial relationship between the sports and gambling industries. He is also a member of the International Masters of Gaming Law. Andy was seconded to LOCOG, the organising committee for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and is a former first-class cricketer and Cambridge Blue.

Tom de la Mare QC

Tom de la Mare QC is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, where he specialises in sports, EU, competition, media/entertainment, and human rights/ public law. He has advised and acted for clubs (eg London Welsh, Scarlets), for governing bodies (eg ECB, RFU, Premier League) and individuals (eg Aljaz Bedene) and companies (eg  Betgenius) in a wide range of sports, with particular emphasis on regulatory matters raising individual and systemic questions of competition and EU law. Tom appeared for London Welsh in its successful competition law challenge to the requirements of the RFU’s minimum stadium criteria, for a variety of football agents in various disputes over The FA’s version of the FIFA Players Agents Regulations, for the BDO in their successful campaign to have darts recognised as a sport, for the UK in the CJEU challenge over the UK’s designation of the World Cup and European Championships as ‘crown jewels’ to be broadcast free to air, and has regularly acted for F1 motor racing teams, most recently Racing Point. Brexit, Bosman and grandfathered free movement rights have been a particular focus of Tom’s practice since 2018. Tom is a contributing editor to Lester and Pannick’ s Human Rights Law and Practice and a former Chair of the Bar European Group.

Will Deller

Will Deller is a senior associate based in Bird & Bird’s Sports Group, having qualified at the firm in 2014. Will’s practice is mainly focused on commercial/ contractual matters, though he also has experience in advising on league structuring, rule drafting/interpretation, and other sports and esports regulatory issues. On the commercial side, he routinely advises on sponsorship, media rights, event staging and other commercial contracts, but he also advises sports and gaming clients on consumer law and advertising and gambling regulation. Will leads Bird & Bird’s esports practice, advising stakeholders from across the industry on issues ranging from sponsorship and player contracts through to rule drafting and brand protection. His clients are major AAA-game publishers, esports teams, agents, tournament platform operators and service providers, giving him a rare insight into the spectrum of issues facing those involved in this idiosyncratic and fast-growing industry. Will was awarded the ‘Rising Star’ Award at the 2019 Legal Week Innovation Awards for his role in developing Bird & Bird’s esports practice, and was shortlisted by the Financial Times in their 2019 Innovative Lawyers awards for his work with esports platform Intergalactic Gaming.

Nick De Marco QC

Nick is one of only two barristers in England with a practice exclusively in sportsrelated disputes. His practice ranges from commercial and contractual claims to regulatory and disciplinary disputes, dealing with issues relating to sponsorship, intellectual property and competition law in sport. He is active in disputes across all sports, but widely recognised for his special expertise in football where he has been involved in most of the high-profile disputes in England, as well as many internationally. Chambers UK  2020 described him as ‘an outstanding practitioner with a widely held reputation at the Bar for being the foremost expert on football

Author Biographies  xxvii

regulatory matters,’ adding he ‘has formed a fantastic reputation for successfully challenging governing bodies’. Nick sits as an arbitrator across a number of sports, and he is a member of the World Athletics Disciplinary Commission, the Sports Resolutions’ independent Panel of Arbitrators and Mediators, and the specialist sports list of arbitrators at the Asian International Arbitration Centre. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Law In Sport and writes and lectures regularly on sports law issues. He is co-author of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional, 2016) and is the author and General Editor of Football and the Law (Bloomsbury Professional, 2018). He is a director of the British Association for Sport and the Law.

Emma Drake

Emma is a senior associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP. Emma is a privacy specialist and was described during parliamentary debates as a ‘lead lawyer for sport on data protection’ for her work alongside governing bodies in securing sport-related provisions in the Data Protection Act 2018. She advises a large number of clubs, competitions and national and international sports governing bodies on privacy matters. This has included specific advice on topics such as safeguarding, antidoping, integrity investigations, Covid-19 protocols and engagement with grassroots athletes and fans. Her work covers all aspects of data protection law, including advice on privacy notices, policies and procedures, data protection impact assessments, data subject rights, cookie compliance and data breach reporting. Emma is also the data protection officer for a major UK governing body and is CIPP/E  certified by the International Association of Privacy Professionals.

Elizabeth Dunn

Elizabeth is a senior associate in Bird & Bird LLP’s Media, Entertainment & Sport Group, based in London. Her practice focuses on primarily on commercial and regulatory matters in the sport and gambling sectors. She advises major national and international governing bodies and rights-holders, teams, broadcasters, agencies and global sports brands on major international sports media rights tenders and licensing, sponsorship, licensing, event staging and supply agreements, and has particular expertise in the production, exploitation and protection of sports data. She also regularly advises major international gambling operators on commercial and regulatory issues, often co-ordinating multi-jurisdictional projects, and is a member of the International Masters of Gaming Law. She was seconded twice to the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), first in the legal team and then in an operational role during London 2012 itself.

James Eighteen

James is a founding partner of Northridge Law LLP. He is a commercial litigator who specialises in dispute resolution, governance and regulation, and regularly acts for sports governing bodies, individuals and teams in all dispute resolution forums, particularly before disciplinary panels, the High Court, and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. His recent experience includes acting for Premiership Rugby in the landmark salary cap investigation and prosecution of Saracens Rugby Club, and leading on the re-drafting of all of the British Horseracing Authority Rules and Regulations. James is ranked as a Next Generation Lawyer in The Legal 500 and recognised in Chambers, who describe him as ‘impressive’, ‘an expert in his field’ and someone who provides ‘quick, reasoned and sensible advice’. He lectures on the BASL/DMU postgraduate certificate in sports law and is a contributing author to the textbook Football and the Law.

xxviii  Author Biographies

Ben Elliott

Ben Elliott is a barrister at Pump Court Tax Chambers specialising in all areas of tax law, including corporate, employment, VAT, property, private client and international tax, as well as tax-related insolvency and public law. He acts for a broad range of clients and is experienced in handling tax investigations, negotiating settlements with HMRC, and litigating disputes before the Tax Tribunal and High Court. He has particular expertise advising on tax issues relating to sporting organisations and individuals.

Jonathan Ellis

Jonathan is a founding partner of Northridge Law LLP. He is a trusted adviser to some of the biggest names in sport, with clients describing him as ‘the absolute go-to person on regulatory matters’ and as being ‘an exceptional litigator, who is superb when the stakes are at their highest’. Jonathan has acted for The FA for more than 15 years, undertaking a wide range of work from advising on the regulation of intermediaries through to representing The FA at the Hillsborough inquests. Other highlights have included representing leading Premier League and European football clubs before CAS, successfully defending the WRU in High Court litigation, and acting as the Solicitor and Secretary to the Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis. Jonathan is ranked as a leading individual by Chambers (Band 1), The Legal 500, and in the International Who’s Who of Sports & Entertainment Lawyers.

Charles Flint QC

Charles Flint QC has extensive experience in sports law, both as counsel and arbitrator. He is President of the UK National Anti-Doping Panel, chairman of the independent tribunal of the International Tennis Federation and a member of the adjudicatory chamber of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body. Charles practises from Blackstone Chambers (blackstonechambers.com) as an arbitrator and mediator in sports cases.

Kate Gallafent QC

Kate Gallafent QC is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers where she specialises in sports, professional discipline, public and employment law. She regularly acts for and advises national governing bodies, clubs and individuals in a wide range of sports including football, tennis, rugby and horse-racing, with a particular emphasis on discipline and safeguarding. Examples of recent work include acting for The FA in relation to disciplinary matters such as FA  v Peter Beardsley and FA  v Kieran Trippier, and appearing before CAS in FIFA  v The FA in relation to breaches of transfer regulations by Chelsea FC. She represented the Football Association of Wales in the challenge by a club to its decision to terminate the 2019/20 season prematurely due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and acted as prosecutor for the RFU in disciplinary proceedings brought against members of the Barbarians rugby team for breaches of the Covid-19 Code of Conduct. At the international level she has acted as prosecutor for the IAAF Ethics Board including appearing before CAS in proceedings against Athletics Kenya officials, and regularly sat on the disciplinary committee of the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique. She is a member of the UK Anti-Doping Panel and is on the Sport Resolutions’ lists of mediators and arbitrators. She is recognised as a leading silk in sports law by The Legal 500 and Chambers UK.

Craig Giles

Craig is a partner in Bird & Bird LLP’s Media, Entertainment and Sport Group, based in London. He advises on a range of commercial issues connected with sport,

Author Biographies  xxix

including media rights, sponsorship, image rights, staging agreements, agency agreements, merchandising, licensing, funding agreements, brand protection, and ticketing measures. He acts for a number of major national and international governing bodies, competition organisers and broadcasters, including The Football Association, Six Nations Rugby, the RFU, the All England Lawn Tennis Club, the British & Irish Lions, ATP Media, Celtic Rugby (the organisers of the PRO14), the IPC, and Perform/DAZN. He has particular expertise in the field of media rights, having advised numerous national and international sports organisations and broadcasters on some of the most high profile and cutting-edge media rights deals in the industry, both in the UK and in other jurisdictions across the world. He also advises clients on the highly regulated world of marketing, including advertising campaigns across all digital and non-digital media, prize competitions and sweepstakes, website terms and conditions, e-commerce, and the ever-changing consumer law landscape. Craig is ranked as a leading practitioner for sports law in the Chambers UK and The Legal 500 directories. In Chambers UK 2020 clients noted that Craig ‘knows the business and understands the angle of the advice that we need, and if we need it quickly he is very good at giving succinct, clear, commercial advice’.

Paul Goulding QC

Paul Goulding QC is a member of Blackstone Chambers. He practises in sport, employment, and commercial law. He is a Specialist Member of the Football Association Judicial Panel, and a member of the Chairmen’s Panel of Arbitrators of Sports Resolutions. He has appeared in many sports cases, including: in football Sheffield United FC  v The Football Association Premier League (the Tevez case); Fulham FC  v Tigana; Jones v Southampton FC; in athletics Modahl v British Athletics Federation; in snooker Hendry v World Snooker; in tennis Korda v ITF. He has also represented sports governing bodies, Formula One constructors and drivers, and individual sportsmen. He is recognised as a leading silk in both sports law and employment law by The Legal 500 and Chambers UK. He is the Editor of Employee Competition: Covenants, Confidentiality, and Garden Leave, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2016) and a contributor to De Marco, Football and the Law (Bloomsbury Professional, 2018) and Tolley’s Discrimination in Employment Handbook, 2nd edn (2011).

Ulrich Haas

Ulrich Haas is a professor of private law and civil procedure at the University of Zurich. He is also of counsel at the law firm TIMES Attorneys. One of his fields of research is sports law. He has been an arbitrator with the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne (CAS) since 2002. He also acts as arbitrator for other sports arbitral institutions, such as the Deutsche Sportschiedsgericht of the Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit eV in Cologne, the FIBA  Arbitral Tribunal (BAT) in Geneva and Sport Resolution in the UK. Ulrich has acted as a chairman or party-appointed arbitrator in more than 250 sports-related arbitration proceedings. He chaired the advisory group on legal issues of the monitoring group of the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention from 2002–04 and the Independent Observer Group at the Summer Olympic Games in Athens 2004. He has also participated in various revision processes for the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code (2009, 2015 and 2021). In 2014–15 he was a member of the independent investigation team that investigated the doping allegations in international cycling. He also chaired the Governance Working Group tasked with reforming the governance structure of the World Anti-Doping Agency (2018). Furthermore, he was a member of the CAS Ad Hoc Panel for the Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver (2010) and for the Olympic Summer Games in Rio de Janeiro (2016).

xxx  Author Biographies

Edwina Haddon

Edwina is an associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP, helping a range of international sports clients deal with regulatory issues and disputes. Edwina specialises in disciplinary matters including anti-doping, challenges to regulatory decisions, selection disputes, rules and regulations, constitutions and governance and contractual disputes, as well as investigations. She has advised international and national governing bodies, clubs, competition organisers, and individual athletes, and in some cases has represented them before internal sports tribunals. Edwina recently completed a secondment with the Premier League.

Björn Hessert

Björn Hessert is a research assistant and Ph D candidate at the University of Zurich, specialising in the field of sports law. He holds a Master’s degree from the University of Melbourne (LL M) and was admitted to the bar in Germany in 2019.

Hollie Higgins

Hollie Higgins is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers. She practices in EU, public, commercial and employment law. Her sports practice intersects with all of these areas and has recently included commercial litigation in the High Court regarding the sale of a club, an internal investigation into misconduct allegations, and an arbitration between an athlete and their promoter. Hollie has a particular specialism in discrimination and equality issues and recently appeared in the Supreme Court equal pay case of Asda Stores Limited v Brierley.

Iain Higgins

Iain is a law graduate of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Iain played professional rugby league for London Broncos RLFC in the Super League whilst successfully completing a Postgraduate Certificate in Sports Law at King’s College, London. He held senior legal, operational and strategic roles with the International Cricket Council for eleven years, most recently as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, prior to which he worked as a senior solicitor within the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP, advising on a range of legal issues connected with sport. His expertise lies primarily in respect of matters of discipline, doping, corruption and other regulatory fields, as well as in commercial disputes and all aspects of sporting governance. Whilst at the ICC, he advised on many challenging issues faced by international cricket, including on the management of ethical issues, governance and corruption, most notably in the successful prosecution of numerous international cricketers for offences committed under the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code, Anti-Doping Code, and Code of Conduct. As part of a global strategic initiative, he led a process by which USA Cricket was established in 2018 as the recognised governing body for the sport in the United States and he recently moved to California to become USA Cricket’s first-ever CEO.

Andrew Hunter QC

Andrew Hunter QC is a leading commercial advocate with many years of experience in the sports sector. He has acted in a wide variety of high-profile sports disputes such as ‘Spygate’ in Formula One, ‘Bloodgate’ in rugby, and Bin Hammam v FIFA concerning alleged corruption at FIFA.

Professor Mark James

Mark James is Professor of Sports Law and Head of Research at Manchester Law School, where his research and teaching expertise focuses on sports law, the law of tort, and criminal law. Mark is the author of Palgrave Macmillan’s Sports Law

Author Biographies  xxxi

and has published widely on issues relating to player violence and sports injuries, football-related disorder, ambush marketing and Olympic law. His current research focuses on the legal frameworks within which sporting mega-events operate, and in particular the operation of Rules 40 and 50 of the Olympic Charter, and ticket touting at sport and entertainment events. Mark is an editor of the Entertainment and Sports Law Journal and a member of the Editorial Boards of the International Sports Law Journal, International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics, and LawInSport.

Brian Kennelly QC SC

Brian specialises in competition and EU, commercial, public and regulatory law, sanctions law and telecommunications law. He is recognised by the legal directories as a leading barrister in these areas. He is also a Senior Counsel at the Bar of Ireland. He appears regularly in the Court of Justice of the EU and the General Court, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and the Commercial Court, the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. He has appeared in competition, regulatory and commercial cases in Ireland, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Brian has acted in over 70 cases before the CJEU and General Court in a broad range of competition, regulatory and sanctions matters. He is a leading advocate in private competition damages actions and has also appeared in many of the leading regulatory public law cases of recent years in the Admin Court and the Competition Appeal Tribunal.

Dr Mirjam Koller Trunz

Mirjam Koller Trunz is a Swiss attorney practising law with TIMES Attorneys in Zurich. Her current work includes the support of clients before sports arbitration tribunals as well as the advice of clients on commercial, organisational, disciplinary, doping and compliance issues. Before she joined TIMES Attorneys, Mirjam worked as an attorney and trainee at Bär & Karrer and as an assistant at the chair of Prof Ulrich Haas. She wrote her PhD thesis on the topic ‘A  global solution to combat manipulations of sports competitions’, which was awarded the Walther Hug Prize, and acted as an ad hoc clerk in several CAS proceedings. Since 2015, she has been a lecturer on various topics related to sports law at the University of Zurich and its international postgraduate programme.

Clive Lawrence

Clive Lawrence is a partner at Lupton Fawcett LLP where he is head of the Intellectual Property and Commercial department. A graduate of Downing College, Cambridge, he qualified as a solicitor in 1993. He has advised clubs, individual participants and governing bodies in a wide range of sports on intellectual property and rights matters, as well as a broad sweep of allied issues ranging from constitutional and regulatory matters to broadcasting, sponsorship, licensing and merchandising. He is the coauthor of Sports Business: Law, Practice and Precedents (Jordans (1st edn), 1999; (2nd edn) 2005), author of Brands: Law, Practice and Precedents (Jordans, 2008), and a Visiting Lecturer at Leeds Beckett University.

Peter Limbert

Peter is General Counsel at Fulham Football Club, where he has worked since 2014. He is in charge of all legal affairs at Fulham and also has management responsibility for the club’s safeguarding, equality and HR functions. Prior to his career at Fulham, Peter worked in private practice as part of the Sports Law team at the international law firm, Squire Patton Boggs. He has a broad range of experience in contentious and non-contentious matters and has been recognised as one of the UK’s leading sports law practitioners. He was noted in legal directories as a ‘future star’, a lawyer

xxxii  Author Biographies

who ‘knows everything about how football works’ and was named as one of the ‘Hot 100’ in the 2019 Edition of The Lawyer magazine’s list of the most prominent UK lawyers. Aside from his work for Fulham, Peter has been a member of working groups at football governing bodies and holds directorships at organisations including the British Association for Sports Law.

Paul Luckhurst

Paul Luckhurst is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers. He specialises in commercial, public, international, EU, and human rights law. His sports practice includes advising and representing football players, managers, agents and clubs, particularly in the context of FA Rule K arbitrations. Paul has also acted for rugby clubs, boxers, and the organisers of a round-the-world yacht race in a variety of sporting and commercial disputes.

Ian Lynam

Ian Lynam is a partner at Northridge Law LLP. Ian’s practice spans a wide range of transactional and regulatory areas of sports law. His expertise includes the financial regulation of sport (including salary caps and financial fair play), mergers and acquisitions in sport, financing, governance, integrity, rules and regulations, sponsorship agreements, transfers, player contracts, and image rights. He is recognised by the legal directories as a leading ‘commercial dealmaker’ ‘who has become a clear leader in the UK’ and ‘an excellent lawyer, whose knowledge of the sports industry is unparalleled’. He has a particular expertise in the use of data in the sports industry, has spoken widely on the subject, advises a number of companies in the area and sits on the board of STATSports as a non-executive director. Ian is a contributing author to a number of other leading textbooks including Football and the Law, The Sports Law Review, and The Negotiator’s Desk Reference. He regularly speaks at conferences (including the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference 2017 & 2019) and lectures on a number of undergraduate and postgraduate university sports law programmes. Ian is ranked as a ‘Leading Individual’ in UK Sport by The Legal 500 and in Band 1 for UK Sport by Chambers UK. Ian is also recommended in Who’s Who Legal in the Sports & Entertainment category. He is admitted to practise in England & Wales, Ireland, and New York.

James Maloney

James Maloney is a partner at Farrer & Co LLP and a member of its Sports Group. James regularly advises a range of national governing bodies on structuring their charitable activities, including advice on the formation and registration of new charities, and compliance with charity law. He also advises other sports-related charities on charity law matters, including constitutional matters, governance, charity mergers, fundraising and trading. He is a member of the Charity Law Association and the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (for which he currently acts as deputy chair of their Philanthropy Advisors Global Special Interest Group) and was a member of the CLA working party that responded to the Charity Commission’s consultation on the advancement of amateur sport. He lectures on charity law and charity tax law at City, University of London’s business school (formerly Cass Business School). He speaks regularly at conferences on issues affecting the charity and sport sectors and is also a charity trustee.

Ravi Mehta

Ravi Mehta is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, where he specialises in sports, public, EU and competition and employment law. He has a busy and varied sports law practice in domestic and international tribunals, FA K arbitration proceedings,

Author Biographies  xxxiii

the High Court and CAS. He regularly advises and acts for players, player representatives, clubs, commercial intermediaries and governing bodies in relation to a range of issues including anti-doping, disciplinary procedures, competition law, broadcasting and sponsorship, eligibility for national and international competitions, and the organisation of or access to rival competitions.

Ian Mill QC

Ian Mill QC is a member of, and for over seven years (2004–2012) was joint head of Blackstone Chambers. He practises in commercial, media and entertainment and sports law. He is highly rated by the independent legal directories as a leading silk for sports-related disputes. He has specialist knowledge of a wide range of sporting issues, having acted for numerous individuals, teams, organisers, managers, governing bodies and sports broadcasters, and has appeared before many international and domestic sports-related arbitral and regulatory bodies. He has particular knowledge in the fields of athletics, rugby, tennis, football, cricket, boxing, motor sport, golf, and horse racing. As well as acting for parties, Ian is a highly experienced decision-maker in sporting disputes. UK Athletics appointed him as Chairman of its Disciplinary Committees to hear the so-called ‘nandrolone’ doping cases, and The FA has appointed him to chair a number of appeals from FA Disciplinary Commissions. He has also been appointed an FA Premier League Panel Member. Ian is a Chairman of the Sport Resolutions Panel of Arbitrators and has acted as Chairman of International Cricket Council and International Tennis Federation Anti-Doping Tribunals. He has recently been appointed as an Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer for the Tennis AntiCorruption Program and Chair of the European Tour’s Disciplinary Panel. He is also an Appeal Steward of the British Boxing Board of Control. He is a consulting editor of International Sports Law Review.

Tom Mountford

Tom Mountford is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers. He advises organisations and individuals in respect of all contentious and non-contentious aspects of sports law, from commercial sports litigation to regulatory, disciplinary and safeguarding work across numerous different sports. He regularly appears before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, arbitral bodies, disciplinary and regulatory tribunals and in the English courts in sports cases. He also advises upon and undertakes investigations. He has served as Legal Secretary to the Ethics Board of World Athletics (formerly the IAAF) since 2015. He acts both for owners, sponsors, clubs and other commercial actors in the world of sport as well as for national and international governing bodies and for individual sportspeople. Recent highlights include successfully acting for HRH Prince Abdullah bin Mosaad bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in his boardroom battle for control of the English Premier League football club Sheffield United in the English High Court in 2019.He is ranked as a leading junior in the field of sports law in both Chambers UK and The Legal 500, where he has been described as ‘technically excellent … extremely bright and very hard working’ and ‘an expert in sports ethics and corruption matters, who is accessible, practical and has a good eye for the finer detail’.

Jane Mulcahy QC

Jane Mulcahy QC acts in the civil courts and in arbitration and sports tribunals, including the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Areas covered include breach of contract, employment, disciplinary and regulatory matters, doping, corruption, player transfers, competition/restraint of trade, agency , and child protection. Jane sits on the English Cricket Board’s Appeals Panel in child protection cases. She also sits as an Appeal Steward for the BBBC and as an Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer

xxxiv  Author Biographies

for the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program. She advises sport governing bodies on a range of issues and is on Sport Resolutions’ panel list of mediators and arbitrators. In respect of the latter roles, she has experience of arbitrating disputes between players, agents and clubs, both alone and as one of a panel of arbitrators and has mediated sports cases.

Emily Neill

Emily is a barrister practising at Blackstone Chambers, London, and at the Bars of Northern Ireland and Ireland. She practises in EU, public and commercial law. Her sports law practice builds on her particular specialisms in EU and competition law. Emily worked on the case of FIFA and UEFA v European Commission (with Tom de la Mare QC and Brian Kennelly), acting for the United Kingdom intervening in actions brought by FIFA and UEFA in relation to the Commission’s approval of the UK notification of listed events mandatorily broadcast on free television. She regularly advises on EU and competition law issues in the sporting context, particularly the compatibility of the rules of sporting associations with those requirements and on issues of State aid in the context of support for sport.

Dr Stephan Netzle, LLM

Stephan Netzle is a Swiss attorney practising law with TIMES Attorneys in Zurich. He holds law degrees from the University of Zurich and the University of Virginia School of Law. Stephan is a renowned expert on sports law and served as an arbitrator with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) from 1991 until 2010. At the Sydney 2000 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games he was a member of the Ad Hoc Division of the CAS. He has been an arbitrator with the independent Basketball Arbitration Tribunal (BAT) since 2006. He advises and represents international sports federations, National Olympic Committees, event organisers, athletes, teams, agents, corporate sponsors and host cities on commercial, organisational, disciplinary, doping and compliance issues. He is a co-editor of the German bi-monthly Sport und Recht. Since 2009, he has been a lecturer on International Arbitration at the University of Zurich. Stephan rowed in the Olympic finals 1980 (Moscow) and 1984 (Los Angeles), won the Stewards’ Challenge Cup at Henley twice, and became world champion in the coxless four in 1982.

Lauren Pagé

Lauren Pagé is a senior associate in the Media, Entertainment, & Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP (twobirds.com). She works in the regulatory/contentious sports team and advises on a variety of issues including (among others) anti-doping and other disciplinary matters, investigations and governance reviews, integrity issues, membership disputes, challenges to regulatory decisions, rules and regulations, and contractual disputes. Over the years she has acted for national and international federations, event organisers, clubs, rights-holders, and individuals across numerous sports including (among others) tennis, motor sport, equestrianism, rugby union, cricket, ice hockey, and field hockey. In the anti-doping field, she regularly acts for international federations in anti-doping proceedings before first instance panels such as Sport Resolutions in London, and on appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne. Lauren is an arbitrator for the Euroleague Basketball Dispute Resolution Chamber, and also sat as a member of a three-person panel appointed ad hoc to hear a first instance International Handball Federation anti-doping case. She is also an independent director of the British Orienteering Federation. With a dual civil and common law degree from McGill University (Montreal, Canada), Lauren is qualified in three jurisdictions: England & Wales, Quebec, and New York. The Legal

Author Biographies  xxxv

500 2020 ranked Lauren as a ‘rising star’, stating that ‘she is developing along the same lines as Jonathan Taylor; she has the ability to distil complex issues into clearly understandable advice’.

Lord Pannick QC

Lord Pannick QC specialises in constitutional and administrative law, human rights law, and sports law. His leading sports law cases include acting for Greg Rusedski (in refuting unfounded doping allegations), Wimbledon FC (in securing permission to move to Milton Keynes), Ashley Cole (on tapping-up charges), the RFU (against Viagogo), and Manchester City FC. He appeared in 100 cases before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and has argued over 30 cases in the Supreme Court since its creation in 2009. He is a crossbench peer in the House of Lords, a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, a member of Blackstone Chambers, and a season ticket holder at Arsenal FC.

Warren Phelops

Warren has recently joined as a partner at Squire Patton Boggs, to spearhead the Global Sports & Entertainment Practice with fellow author Stephen Sampson. He previously led the Global Sports Practice at K&L Gates, having joined there from Slaughter & May, where he also trained. The majority of his work focuses on rights/ content tendering, ownership, and exploitation, event staging, governing body regulation, structuring, strategy, and broadcast/ digital media His client list and work over his 27 years working in the global sports industry reads like a who’s who at the very top end of the sector and his work has involved some of the biggest global sports events (including the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup, Rugby World Cups, Cricket World Cups, Formula 1, Ryder Cups, and America’s Cups). The clients he has advised include financiers, media/broadcast/ digital technology companies, domestic and international governing bodies, sponsors, clubs, players, merchandisers/kit manufacturers, gambling operators, event owners, promoters, hospitality and travel companies, and insurers. Warren has been described in Sports Business International as ‘one of the world’s most influential lawyers in the sports industry’. He is a Director of Sports Resolutions (UK) and sits on the editorial board of the International Sports Law Review.

Kendrah Potts

Kendrah Potts is a barrister at 4 New Square Chambers specialising in commercial, civil fraud and sports law. She is recognised as a leading junior in the directories. Kendrah acts for athletes, clubs, governing bodies and agents across a range of sports. She is regularly instructed on high profile cases, most recently including acting for Daniel Sturridge in respect of charges brought under The FA’s betting regulations, Alex Hales in relation to charges of bringing cricket into disrepute and Birmingham City FC in financial fair play-related charges. Kendrah represented the Rugby Football Union in bringing charges against Nathan Hughes and Sale Sharks, and regularly acts for the governing bodies of tennis in match-fixing cases. She is on the Sport Resolution panel of arbitrators and mediators, the Union Cycliste Internationale arbitral and disciplinary board, the World Association of Kickboxing Organizations arbitration committee, and sits as a panel member for the British Equestrian Federation. Before moving to the Bar, Kendrah was a solicitor, during which time she was also Legal Counsel to the Cycling Independent Reform Commission set up by the UCI to investigate doping in cycling, the lead lawyer for sport integrity and anti-doping for LOCOG and was appointed to the Challenge Panel that advised the UK Government on its review of UK Anti-Doping.

xxxvi  Author Biographies

Christopher Quinlan QC

Christopher Quinlan QC is a member of Guildhall Chambers, Bristol and Farrar’s Building, London, Recorder of the Crown Court, and Bencher of Inner Temple. He is a sports and criminal law silk, with extensive experience in both fields as an advocate, judge and tribunal chair. Christopher is the Independent Judicial Panel Chairman for both World Rugby and The Football Association. He is a member of the World Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal and Deputy Chair of the Appeal Board, Table Tennis England. He is a member of the Sport Resolutions Panel of Arbitrators, and a legal member (since its inception) of the UK National Anti-Doping Panel and National Child Safeguarding in Sport Panel. He is the author of the Quinlan Review of the structure, composition and operation of the British Horseracing Authority (BHA) Disciplinary Panel, Appeal Board and Licensing Committee, which was published in September 2016. In January 2019 his independent review into events at Wrexham Tennis Centre was published. The Lawn Tennis Association commissioned that review following the conviction and subsequent imprisonment for sexual offences of their former Head Coach in July 2017. In 2019 he led a review of the safeguarding policies and procedures of UK Athletics. As happened with his BHA review, all of his recommendations will be implemented. He is a contributor to Cowe and Cavender (Eds), Practical Advocacy in the Crown Court (Bloomsbury Professional, 2018). Described in Chambers UK (Sport) thus: ‘He is extraordinarily thorough, extraordinarily hard-working and his understanding of the issues is without parallel’.

Felicity Reeve

Felicity Reeve is a partner in Bird & Bird’s Sports Group in London. She is recognised in the elite band of commercial sports lawyers, having advised clients in the sports sector for over 20 years. Felicity has worked on a number of high profile and cuttingedge corporate and commercial projects in football, tennis, rugby, and motor racing. Her experience includes the sale and purchase of sports-related rights and businesses, event staging, venue build, finance and hire arrangements, media and marketing rights work, licensing and supply agreements, and advising on gaming and betting.

Tom Richards

Tom Richards is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, practising in commercial, competition and public law as well as sports law. He has acted for clients including Joe Calzaghe, The Football Association, the Welsh Rugby Union, Derby County FC, and London Welsh RFC and is ranked for his sports law practice in the leading legal directories.

Elizabeth Riley

Liz Riley is the General Counsel at the International Paralympic Committee. Prior to that she spent over ten years as a barrister in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP, where she advised a wide range of sports clients (including international and national governing bodies and organisations, public bodies, event organisers, sporting venues, clubs, sponsors, agents and athletes) on a variety of sports-related issues, including governance and constitutional matters, anti-doping, discipline and corruption, rules and regulations, Para sport classification, selection, player contracts, commercial sponsorship and supply agreements, ticketing, and contractual and regulatory disputes. Liz is an experienced advocate and has appeared frequently before CAS and other sporting tribunals. She sat as a member of the RFU’s Disciplinary Panel for several years and has been a non-executive director for the British Wrestling Association since 2016. Liz was a member of WADA’s 2021 Code Drafting Team and is also the lead drafter for the 2021 International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions. Liz played rugby for London Wasps and has also represented

Author Biographies  xxxvii

England A and the England touch rugby team. Liz studied at St Catharine’s College, Cambridge where she gained a first class BA (Hons) degree in law.

Celia Rooney

Celia is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, practising in commercial law, public law, and employment law. She has a particular specialism in sport, and acts for governing bodies, clubs and athletes alike. Her clients to date have included The Football Association, the FA of Wales, the Premier League, the Lawn Tennis Association, Arsenal FC, Middlesbrough FC, Racing Point and British Boxing, as well as a number of individual athletes. Recent cases include South Shields v The FA and The New Saints v The FA Wales, two of the first challenges arising out of the coronavirus pandemic, in each of which she successfully represented the relevant governing body (led by James Segan QC and Kate Gallafent QC, respectively). Celia is also currently part of a team of lawyers (led by Nick De Marco QC) representing gymnasts who claim to have suffered abuse at the hands of British Gymnastics.

Stephen Sampson

Stephen is a partner and the Head of the Sports & Entertainment Practice at Squire Patton Boggs, qualifying in 1998 at its predecessor firm. He has been ranked as a leading sports law practitioner for over a decade by both UK legal directories and is noted in the ‘Hall of Fame’ by The Legal 500. He has over 20 years’ experience of undertaking contentious, regulatory, investigatory, governance, commercial and transactional work within the sports sector with particular expertise in all aspects of dispute resolution, including regularly appearing before the CAS. Clients include national and international governing bodies, broadcasters and rights owners, clubs and teams, sponsors, agencies and leading players. In this publication, Stephen writes on player transfers, in which he is considered a specialist due to the volume of transactions handled and his involvement in many of the transfers and leading cases that have helped shape the application of the regulations of the football governing bodies.

James Segan QC

James practises at Blackstone Chambers, specialising in regulatory, commercial and public law. He is recommended as a leading barrister in the field of sports law by all of the independent legal directories. He acted for The FA in successfully defending its decision to void the 2019/20 season in lower leagues on account of Covid-19; he has acted for the EFL in successful prosecutions of Birmingham City, Sheffield Wednesday and Queen’s Park Rangers under the ‘financial fair play’ rules; he has acted for the RFU in many commercial and disciplinary cases over the last 14 years including in its Supreme Court win against the ticket agent Viagogo; he acted for the Force India Formula One Team in successfully defending a multi-million pound Commercial Court claim against it by a sponsorship agent; and he advised the British Olympic Association in relation to all London 2012 selection disputes. He is a coauthor of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional, 2016) and writes and blogs regularly on sports law issues.

Diya Sen Gupta QC

Diya Sen Gupta QC is a member of Blackstone Chambers. She specialises in complex and significant employment litigation including in the areas of employee competition, business protection, whistleblowing and discrimination. Diya is instructed in cases which typically involve difficult issues of law, and are commercially and reputationally significant. Her recent sports law experience includes acting for Premier League football clubs in employment disputes. Diya is a contributor to

xxxviii  Author Biographies

Employee Competition: Covenants, Confidentiality, and Garden Leave, and co-wrote the employment chapter of Football and the Law. Diya is Chair of the Employment Law Bar Association.

Tristan Sherliker

Tristan Sherliker, solicitor-advocate at Bird & Bird, is a specialist in resolving intellectual property disputes. With a focus on bringing and defending complex cases in the High Court, Tristan represents clients in a wide range of IP rights from the use of trade marks, passing off and confidential data, to technical electronic patent disputes.

Phil Sherrell

Phil heads Bird & Bird LLP’s international Media, Entertainment and Sport sector, a 130-strong team of sector-focused lawyers spread across our offices and practice areas. His day job is as a litigator, handling complex intellectual property and media law disputes, often with a digital aspect. Phil sits on the Copyright and Technology Working Group of the British Copyright Council and is the Editor of the International Comparative Legal Guide to Copyright. The Legal 500 ranks Phil as a Leading Individual for Media & Entertainment.

Christopher Stoner QC

Christopher Stoner QC is a member of Serle Court in Lincoln’s Inn and Guildhall Chambers in Bristol. His practice encompasses sports disciplinary and regulatory work. Chris appears in sports matters before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the High Court and international and domestic tribunals and he has been recognised as a leading specialist for sports law in both The Legal 500 and Chambers for many years. Chris regularly provides advice for numerous governing bodies as well as for individuals and often drafts rules and regulations in the disciplinary and regulatory context. Chris has also acted on numerous occasions and developed a particular expertise in classification issues in Paralympic sport as well as in selection issues across a wide range of sports.

Stuart Tennant

Stuart is a sports regulatory and disputes lawyer based in the Legal Services team at the Premier League. He manages a wide range of regulatory and disciplinary cases and provides legal advice on issues such as transfers and registrations, intermediaries, safeguarding, medical matters and financial regulation. He is a Non-Executive Director (Legal) to the board of Scottish Squash Limited and sits as a Disciplinary Panel Member for the Lawn Tennis Association.

Robert Turner

Robert Turner is a partner in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP. Robert advises on a variety of commercial transactions in the sports sector, such as sponsorship, licensing, wagering rights, broadcasting and media rights and event staging. He is also head of the firm’s International Consumer Law Group, advising businesses that sell to (or otherwise interact with) consumers, including advising sports entities on their ticketing terms, hospitality and membership terms, merchandising programmes and other fan initiatives.

Georgie Twigg MBE

Georgie is an associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP in London. She is experienced in advising on sports-related commercial issues and has acted for

Author Biographies  xxxix

governing bodies, event organisers, clubs and commercial sponsors across a range of sports including football, rugby union, motorsport and athletics. Georgie is also experienced in consumer law matters, including advertising, marketing, prize promotions and competitions, and complaints before the Advertising Standards Authority.

Jon Walters

Jon is a founding partner at Northridge Law LLP, providing commercial and corporate advice to clients. In the sports sector, he acts for governing bodies, teams, agencies and brands, specialising in governance, M&A and investment work, and commercial rights deals. His clients include The FA, the Welsh Rugby Union, the Rugby Football League, AEG  Worldwide and institutional investors active in sport. Highlights in sports governance include acting for The FA and World Rugby on landmark governance reforms, the Welsh Rugby Union on its regional rugby structure, and the Rugby Football League on the reform of its relationship with Super League. Jon maintains a broad practice outside sport, notably for technology and media clients. He leads Northridge TRACK, a club supporting and connecting growth businesses and industry participants with a focus on the application of technology in the sports and entertainment market. He is recognised as a ‘Next Generation Partner’ by The Legal 500 and as an ‘Up and Coming Partner’ by Chambers UK.

Table of Statutes

para

para

Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 s 8.................................................. G2.36 Administration of Justice Act 1985... F2.78 Arbitration Act 1996.............. C4.20, C4.45; C5.8; D1.5, D1.8, D1.63; D3.1, D3.3, D3.7, D3.75, D3.77, D3.78, D3.81, D3.84, D3.98, D3.110, D3.112; E3.4, E3.12; E4.2, E4.7, E4.8, E4.9, E4.11; E7.26; E13.36, E13.50; E16.18, E16.20; F2.166; F3.39 s 1.................................................. D3.75 2.................................................. C4.20 (2)............................................. D3.108 3.................................................. D3.7 5.................................................. D3.8 6.................................................. D3.8 (1).................................. D3.11, D3.12 7.................................................. D3.23 8(1)(a)......................................... D3.51 9........................... D3.28, D3.69, D3.70, D3.73; E4.9; E15.43; F3.196 (4)......................... D3.12; F2.37, F2.39 15, 16.......................................... D3.76 18................................................ D3.76 (3)........................................... D3.76 24.......................... D3.81, D3.82, D3.83 (2)........................................... D3.82 (3)........................................... D3.82 30...................................... D3.26, D3.91 31................................................ D3.26 (1)........................................... D3.92 32................................................ D3.26 33........................... D3.79, D3.83, D3.94 34................................................ D3.77 35................................................ D3.60 37................................................ D3.77 38................................................ D3.77 40................................................ D3.80 41................................................ D3.80 42...................................... D3.77, D3.85 43....................... B4.47; D3.86, D3.108; E4.8 44......................... D3.73, D3.87, D3.88, D3.108; E15.13; F3.196 45................................................ D3.89

Arbitration Act 1996 – contd s 46................................................ D3.19 66................................................ D3.109 (1)........................................... D3.99 (2)........................................... D3.100 (4)........................................... D3.101 67......................... C4.20; D3.26, D3.91, D3.91, D3.94, D3.97 (1)(a), (b)................................ D3.92 68......................... C4.20; D3.93, D3.94, D3.97 (2)(g)....................................... E16.27 (4)........................................... D3.95 69......................... D3.93, D3.96, D3.97; E4.2 (2)........................................... D3.96 (8)........................................... D3.96 70(2), (3)..................................... D3.97 72...................................... D3.26, D3.97 (1)........................................... D3.91 73....................................... D3.26, D3.92 74................................................ D3.102 (3)........................................... D3.102 77................................................ D3.90 79................................................ D3.90 82(2)........................................... D3.61 Pt II (ss 85–98).............................. D3.109 s 101.............................................. D3.109 102.............................................. D3.110 103.............................................. D3.110 (3)......................................... D3.110 Betting and Gaming Act 1960........... A3.77 Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963.......................................... A3.77 Birmingham Commonwealth Games Act 2020 s 10...................................... A3.69; H6.95 11–25.......................................... A3.69 Bribery Act 2010................... B3.168; B4.2, B4.48, B4.49; F2.22, F2.23, F2.26; H3.4, H3.76; H6.112, H6.114, H6.115, H6.122, H6.124 s 1, 2.............................................. F2.23 7.................................................. F2.25 Broadcasting Act 1981...................... A3.84 Broadcasting Act 1990............ A3.84; H4.27 s 3(3)............................................. B5.15 13................................................ H2.137

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para

Broadcasting Act 1996...................... A3.84 Pt IV (ss 97–105).......................... A3.99 Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984..... A3.84 Care Act 2014........................ B6.16, B6.31 s 9.................................................. B6.31 42......................................... B6.7, B6.31 (1)........................................... A4.69 43................................................ B6.31 Sch 2.............................................. B6.31 Charities Act 2006................. A2.60, A2.61, A2.62, A2.64, A2.65, A2.66 Charities Act 2011................... A2.60, A2.64, A2.66, A2.74; I1.116 Children Act 1989............................. B6.25 s 17................................................ B6.26 31(9)........................................... B6.10 31A, 33....................................... B6.30 44................................................ B6.29 44A............................................. B6.29 46................................................ B6.29 47................................................ B6.27 105(1)......................................... B6.5 Children Act 2004............................. B6.25 s 16E.............................................. B6.28 Children and Social Work Act 2017.... B6.25, B6.28 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 s 25................................................ E16.30 Civil Partnership Act 2004................ E14.34 Communications Act 2003...... A3.95; H4.23 s 211.............................................. H2.137 233(3)......................................... H2.137 299.............................................. A3.84 (1B)....................................... A3.86 300.............................................. A3.86 368A........................................... H2.139 Companies Act 1985 s 459.................................. D3.52; E15.41 Companies Act 2006............. A2.35, A2.37, A2.39, A2.43, A2.59; H3.3 s 28................................................ A2.37 33................................................ B5.37 (1)........................................... E8.3 170.............................................. A2.38 (4)......................................... A2.38 171.............................................. A2.38 172............................. A2.38; B5.4; H3.3 173–177...................................... A2.38 251(1), (2)................................... B5.12 994................................. D3.52; E15.41, E15.42, E15.43 Competition Act 1998.............. E3.6; E5.13; E11.4, E11.28, E11.42, E11.45, E11.47, E11.205, E11.251; F3.54

Competition Act 1998 – contd Pt I Ch I (ss 1–16).............. A1.67; D3.34; E11.7, E11.8; F3.55, F3.83; H6.60, H6.61, H5.65 s 2......................... E11.8; E15.7, E15.25; F3.86 (4)............................................. E11.46 4................................................ E11.251 9.................................................. E11.10 10................................................ E11.12 Pt I Ch II (ss 17–24).......... D3.34; E11.15, E11.17; H6.60 s 18..................... E11.14, E11.46; E15.25 25................................... E11.40, E11.41 25A............................................. E11.41 26, 27.......................................... E11.40 28................................... E11.35, E11.40 29................................................ E11.40 31(1), (2)..................................... E11.41 31A............................................. E11.41 39, 40.......................................... E11.41 46, 47.......................................... E11.44 47A............................................. E11.45 50(1), (5)..................................... E11.40 58................................................ E16.25 (1)........................................... E11.43 62, 64.......................................... E11.35 Sch 8 para 3......................................... E11.44 9, 13, 36............................. E11.47 Sch 8A........................................... E11.47 Consumer Rights Act 2015.... A3.69; H1.33; H6.101, H6.102, H6.106, H6.107, H6.130, H6.134, H6.136, H6.141, H6.143 s 2(3)............................................. H6.130 49, 50............................. H6.131, H6.142 51, 52.......................................... H6.142 54................................................ H6.134 (7)........................................... H6.134 55................................................ H6.132 56................................................ H6.133 57................................................ H6.141 (6)........................................... H6.143 Pt 2 (ss 61–76).............................. H1.36 s 62(4)........................................... H6.135 68................................................ H1.36 Pt 3 Ch 5 (ss 90–95)...................... H1.33 s 90(3)(c)....................................... H6.103 91................................................ H6.109 (8)........................................... H6.103 92(3)........................................... H6.103 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.......... H6.146, H6.147; H7.50 Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014........ A2.48, A2.51, A2.57, A2.58; B5.139

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Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988................... E2.50; H1.69, H1.70, H1.78, H1.84, H1.85, H1.89, H1.92; H2.31, H2.88; H3.26; H5.22 s 1.................................................. H1.65 (1)....................................... J1.8, J1.27 (a)......................................... H4.30 2(1).................................... H1.65, H1.85 3.................................................. H1.75 (1)............................................. H1.69 (b)......................................... J1.8 (2)................................... H1.65; H2.31 3A............................................... H1.77 4................................. H5.22; J1.8, J1.27 (1)(a)............................... H1.81; H2.31; H4.30 (b), (c).................................. H2.31 5A............................................... J1.8 (1)(a)...................................... H2.31 5B(1)................................. H1.83; H2.31 6.................................................. H1.83 (1)............................................. H2.31 9........................................ H1.66, H1.84 (2)(aa), (ab), (b)........................ H2.31 11(1)........................................... H2.31 (2)........................................... H2.32 12................................................ H1.67 (2)........................................... H2.31 13A............................................. H1.67 (2)(a)–(c).............................. H2.31 13B............................................. H2.31 14................................................ H1.67 (2)........................................... H2.31 16...................................... H1.65, H1.88 (1)........................................... H1.85 (3)(a)....................................... H1.85 17................................................ H1.65 (3)........................................... H5.22 18, 19.......................................... H1.65 20.......................... H1.65, H1.83; H2.97 21................................................ H1.65 22–26................................ H1.65, H1.86 29................................................ H1.87 30...................................... H1.87; H2.88 (2)................................. H1.88; H2.89 31...................................... H1.72, H1.87 51................................................ H5.22 52................................................ H5.22 62................................................ H1.81 72................................................ H2.97 77, 78.......................................... H1.65 80................................................ H1.65 84, 85.......................................... H1.65 87................................................ H1.65 90(2)........................................... H1.68 91...................................... H1.84; H2.33 92................................................ H1.68 94................................................ H1.65

Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 – contd s 96, 97.......................................... H1.89 97A............................................. H1.147 98–100........................................ H1.89 101, 101A................................... H2.110 107(1), (2)................................... H1.90 153.............................................. H2.31 178.............................................. H2.32 180(2)............................... H1.69, H1.70 183.............................................. H1.65 198.............................................. H1.90 213.............................................. H5.19 296, 296ZA–296ZG................... H1.90 297, 298.................................... E11.234 Corporation Tax Act 2009 s 46................................................ I1.7 Pt 8 Ch 7 (ss 754–763).................. I1.36 Corporation Tax Act 2010 Pt 5 (ss 97–188)..................... I1.29, I1.37 s 217B........................................... I1.39 Pt 13 Ch 9 (ss 658–671)...... A2.63; I1.123 s 996A........................................... I1.32 1121............................................ I1.10 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990... F2.78 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s 28................................................ B3.143 (1)........................................... G2.87 (4)........................................... G2.88 (5)........................................... G2.88  31................................................ G2.87 (1)(c)........................... B3.143; G2.91 (5)............................... B3.143; G2.91 Criminal Justice Act 1967 s 8.................................................. B3.46 Criminal Justice Act 2003................. A3.70 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s 57................................................ G1.156 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.......................................... E11.40 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.................................... H6.94 s 166................................... A3.69; H1.33; H6.91, H6.94 (1)......................................... H1.33 166A................................. A3.69; H1.33 Criminal Law Act 1977 s 1.................................................. B4.48 Data Protection Act 1998...... A4.26, A4.77, A4.156, A4.157, A4.239, A4.247, A4.250; H4.57, H4.70 Data Protection Act 2018....... A3.124; A4.2, A4.4, A4.12, A4.15, A4.59, A4.65, A4.67, A4.68, A4.71, A4.74, A4.132, A4.154, A4.158, A4.163, A4.164, A4.167, A4.174, A4.199, A4.205,

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Data Protection Act 2018 – contd A4.239, A4.241, A4.243, A4.254, A4.255; B4.45; B6.52; H4.70, H4.71, H4.72, H4.73, H4.76, H4.77, H4.78, H4.80 s 3(2), (3)....................................... H4.71 (3)............................................. H4.71 (5)............................................. H4.71 (10)........................................... A4.209 9.................................................. A4.45 10...................................... B6.53; H4.76 11(2)........................................... A4.12 13................................................ H4.76 (2)........................................... H4.76 17A, 17B.................................... A4.199 17C............................................. A4.201 18................................................ A4.202 21................................................ A4.26 115(2)......................................... A4.242 122(5)......................................... A4.205 123.............................................. A4.87 127.............................................. A4.151 142–145...................................... A4.241 146.............................................. A4.241 (9)......................................... A4.241 147.............................................. A4.241 148.............................................. A4.241 149–153, 155–159...................... A4.243 167–169...................................... A4.249 170.............................................. A4.255 171.............................................. A4.255 (3), (4)................................... A4.255 172.............................................. A4.255 173................................ A4.158, A4.255 184.............................................. A4.255 187–189...................................... A4.254 198.............................................. A4.256 199A........................................... A4.201 205.............................................. A4.167 Sch 1........................ A4.59, A4.69, A4.72 Pt 1 (paras 1–4) para 18......................... A4.69; B6.53 (4).............................. B6.7 27................................... A4.63 (1), (2)....................... A4.63 28................................... A4.65 (1)(b), (c)................... A4.65 (2).............................. A4.65 Pt 3 (paras 29–37)..................... A4.58 para 36................................... A4.68 Pt 4 (paras 38–41)..................... A4.72 para 39–41............................. A4.72 Sch 2................................ A4.172, A4.174 para 2, 5..................................... A4.91 7......................................... A4.92 16(3).................................. A4.163 19, 22................................. A4.91 23, 24................................. A4.163

Data Protection Act 2018 – contd Sch 2 – contd para 26....................................... A4.91 Sch 3................................ A4.172, A4.174 Sch 4................................ A4.172, A4.174 Sch 15.............................. A4.241, A4.256 para 15....................................... A4.255 Sch 21................. A4.198, A4.200, A4.201 para 4, 5..................................... A4.199 6–8..................................... A4.201 Defamation Act 2013........................ H4.20 Digital Economy Act 2017...... A3.69, A3.84; A4.132; H6.101, H6.110 s 106................................ H6.110, H6.111 Disability Discrimination Act 1995.... E14.5, E14.17 s 21F.............................................. E14.60 Education Act 1944........................... A3.11 Education Act 2002 s 84(3)........................................... A3.44 Education Reform Act 1988 Sch 13 Pt I.................................... A3.12, A3.47 Employment Agencies Act 1973....... F2.20, F2.21 s 13(2), (3)..................................... F2.20 Employment Rights Act 1996........... E14.54; F1.36, F1.38, F1.58 s 95(1)........................................... F1.59 98................................................ F1.64 (1)(b).............................. F1.48, F1.59 (2)........................................... F1.59 (4)(a)....................................... F1.59 114.............................................. F1.86 115.............................................. F1.86 119.............................................. F1.85 (2)(a)..................................... F1.85 (3)......................................... F1.85 123(1)......................................... F1.85 124(1), (1ZA).................... F1.60, F1.85 203.............................................. D3.52 220–229...................................... F1.85 Enterprise Act 2002........................... E11.4 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.................................... E11.21 Equality Act 2006.................. E14.5, E14.17 Equality Act 2010..... E7.56; E14.5, E14.10, E14.11, E14.16, E14.17, E14.18, E14.21, E14.22, E14.23, E14.25, E14.27, E14.28, E14.29, E14.30, E14.36, E14.40, E14.47, E14.48, E14.50, E14.51, E14.52, E14.54, E14.58, E14.61, E14.62, E14.63, E14.64, E14.65, E14.66, E14.67, E14.68, E14.76; F1.6 Pt 2 Ch 1 (ss 4–12)........................ E14.19

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Equality Act 2010 – contd s 4.................................... E14.31, E14.35 5.................................................. E14.32 6.................................................. E14.48 7(1)............................................. E14.33 8.................................................. E14.34 9.................................................. E14.36 10................................................ E14.37 11................................................ E14.38 12................................................ E14.39 Pt 2 Ch 2 (ss 13–27)...................... E14.19 s 13................................................ E14.41 (1)........................................... E14.23 (2)........................................... E14.24 (5)........................................... E14.23 (8)........................................... E14.35 15.................................. E14.41, E14.42 (1)(b)....................................... E14.49 17................................... E14.23, E14.35 (6)........................................... E14.35 18.................................... E14.23, E14.35 (6)........................................... E14.35 19................................................ E14.25 (2)(d)....................................... E14.49 20................................... E14.40, E14.44 21................................................ E14.40 23................................................ E14.23 26...................... E14.27, E14.28, E14.29 (1)–(3)..................................... E14.27 27................................................ E14.30 Pt 3 (ss 28–31)................ E14.20, E14.21, E14.58 s 28(1)........................................... E14.58 29................................................ E14.58 (3)........................................... E14.27 (7)........................................... E14.59 31(2)........................................... E14.58 Pt 4 (ss 32–38).............................. E14.20 Pt 5 (ss 39–83)................ E14.20, E14.21 s 39................................................ E14.53 40(2)–(4)..................................... E14.29 41................................................ E14.53 53, 54.......................................... E14.55 55, 56.......................................... E14.57 65................................................ E14.52 66................................................ E14.52 69................................................ E14.52 79................................................ E14.52 83................................... E14.53, E14.54 (2)........................................... E14.52 (a)....................................... F1.6 Pt 7 (ss 100–107)............ E14.20, E14.21, E14.60 s 101.............................................. E14.61 102.............................................. E14.61 107.............................................. E14.61 109.............................................. E14.51 (4)......................................... E14.51 111.............................................. E14.51

112(1)......................................... E14.51 118................................. E14.78, E14.83 119, 120......................... E14.78, E14.83 123................................. E14.78, E14.83 127(9)............................ E14.52, E14.83 128................................. E14.52, E14.83 131.............................................. E14.52 144(1)......................................... D3.52 158................................. E14.79, E14.80 159................................ E14.79, E14.81, E14.82 (4)(b)..................................... E14.83 (5)......................................... E14.82 193(7)......................................... E14.76 195.................... E14.58, E14.68, E14.69 (1)......................................... E14.67 (2)............... E14.67, E14.73, E14.74 (3)......................................... E14.67 (4)............................ E14.67, E14.68 (5), (6).................... E12.103; E14.75 (7), (8)................................... E14.78 Sch 1.............................................. E14.48 Pt 1 (paras 1–9)......................... E14.40 para 6, 9................................. E14.48 Sch 2 para 2(2).................................... E14.59 (7)...................... E14.50, E14.66 (8).................................... E14.50 Sch 3 para 27....................................... E14.77 Sch 9 Pt 1 (paras 1–6)......................... E14.74 Sch 16 para 1......................................... E14.62 Equal Pay Act 1970.............. E14.5, E14.10, E14.17 European Communities Act 1972..... E11.3, E11.28 s 1A, 1B........................................ E14.16 2.................................................. E11.2 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.................... A4.4; E14.16, E14.52 s 1..................................... E11.3; E14.16 1A...................... E11.3, E11.28, E11.45 2, 3.............................................. E14.16 4........................... E11.3, E11.5, E11.29; E14.16 5(4)............................................. E14.16 6(2)–(7)....................................... E14.16 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020.... E11.3; E14.16; H5.19 Sch 5 para 1......................................... A4.4 Fair Trading Act 1973..................... E11.205 Family Law Reform Act 1969 s 1.................................................. F2.142 Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 s 5B............................................... B6.22

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Finance Act 1998 Sch 18............................................ I1.24 Finance Act 2004 Pt 7 (ss 306–319).......................... I2.108 Finance Act 2010.............................. B5.15 s 30................................................ B5.15 Sch 6 Pt 1 (paras 1–7) para 1, 4................................. B5.15 Finance Act 2013.................... A3.43; I2.110 Sch 45............................................ I2.21 Finance Act 2014 Pt 4 (ss 199–233).......................... I2.111 Sch 17............................................ I1.8 Finance Act 2016 Sch 2.................................... I1.101; I2.69 Finance (No 2) Act 2017................... I2.28 s 5.................................................. I1.95 22................................................ A2.60 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.......................................... H3.75 s 21................................................ H3.75 60A............................................. B5.15 Fire Safety and Safety at Places of Sport Act 1987.......................... A3.63 Football (Disorder) Act 2000............ A3.70, A3.72 Sch 1.............................................. A3.70 Football (Offences) Act 1991............ A3.67 s 2–4.............................................. A3.67 Football Spectators Act 1989............ A3.64, A3.66, A3.72, A3.73 s 10................................................ A3.64 14A................................... A3.70, A3.72 14B....................... A3.71, A3.72, A3.73; E12.69 14J.............................................. A3.74 Fraud Act 2006............. B4.48; F2.29, F2.30 s 1.................................................. F2.29 2.......................................... B4.48; F2.29 3, 4.............................................. F2.29 Freedom of Information Act 2000.... A4.26; I2.58 Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.................................... A4.26 Gambling Act 2005................ A3.77, A3.82; B4.15, B4.51, B4.52; H3.79, H3.80, H3.81, H3.82; I1.31; J1.58, J1.60 s 1.................................................. B4.51  6(2), (5)....................................... J1.60 9.................................................. J1.62 14................................................ J1.58 30................................................ B4.47 42.......................... B4.47, B4.48, B4.49, B4.52 (1)(b)....................................... B4.48 (3A)(a).................................... B4.48 88(1)........................................... B4.47

Gambling Act 2005 – contd s 327.............................................. H3.79 330.................................... H3.79, H3.80 (2)......................................... H3.79 336.............................................. B4.51 Sch 6 Pt 3............................................ B4.47 Gaming Act 1845 s 18................................................ D3.25 Gaming Act 1968.............................. A3.77 Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act 2008.......... A3.69, A3.101; H1.144 s 2, 10, 17, 42................................ A3.101 Horserace Betting and Olympic Lottery Act 2004............ A3.78, A3.79, A3.80 Human Rights Act 1998.......... B1.25, B1.26, B1.61; D1.39, D1.100; D3.64, D3.67; E3.5, E3.6; E5.2, E5.5, E5.7; E7.10, E7.59; E11.35; E13.1, E13.2, E13.3, E13.4, E13.6, E13.7, E13.8, E13.9, E13.15, E13.16, E13.17, E13.20, E13.25, E13.26, E13.28, E13.33, E13.34, E13.50, E13.53, E13.74, E13.75, E13.80; E14.3, E14.6, E14.7, E14.24; E15.3, E15.29, E15.40; F1.64; F2.60; H4.50, H4.53 s 1....................................... E13.9, E13.32 2.................................................. E13.10 3.......................... B1.61; E13.3, E13.11, E13.12 (2)(c)......................................... E13.3 4............................ E13.1, E13.3, E13.13 (5), (6)....................................... E13.13 6............................... E5.8; E13.1, E13.3, E13.7, E13.14, E13.26, E13.28 (1)............................................. E13.7 (3)............................................. E14.7 (a)............. E13.14, E13.17, E13.28, E13.29, E13.30, E13.31 (b)........................... E13.14, E13.29 (5)............................................. E13.29 7.................................................. E13.1 (1)............................................. E13.1 (a)............................ E13.74, E13.76 (b)......................................... E13.74 (2)............................................. E13.76 (3)............................................. E13.75 (5)............................................. E13.77 (a), (b).................................. E13.77 (7)............................................. E13.75 8.......................... E15.40; H4.63, H4.64, H4.68

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Human Rights Act 1998 – contd s 8(1).................................. E13.78; H4.54 (2)–(4)....................................... E13.78 9(3), (5)....................................... E13.80 10................................................ E13.13 11................................................ H1.88 21(1)........................................... E13.28 Sch 1.................................. E13.8, E13.32 Protocol 1 Art 1................... H4.66, H4.67, H4.68, H4.69 Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU  Withdrawal) Act 2020.................................... F1.12 Income Tax Act 2007 Pt 13 Ch 2 (ss 714–751)................ I1.104 s 966.............................................. I2.32 Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003.................................... I2.52 s 22–26A....................................... I2.29 44................................................ I2.58 48................................................ I2.57 61................................................ I2.57 61A............................................. I2.56 Pt 3 Chs 2–11 (ss 63–220)............ I2.72 s 203(2)......................................... H6.81 204.............................................. H6.81 265.............................................. H6.81 Pt 7A (ss 554A–554Z21).............. I2.54 s 554A........................................... I2.54 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 13, 14.......................................... I2.32 850C–850E................................. I1.8 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965........................ A2.48; B5.139 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1967.................................... A2.48 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1975.................................... A2.48 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1978.................................... A2.48 Industrial and Provident Societies Act 2002.................................... A2.48 Insolvency Act 1986............ B5.131, B5.132, B5.133 s 123(1)(e)..................................... B5.131 (2)......................................... B5.132 127.............................................. B5.133 129(2)......................................... B5.133 213, 214...................................... B5.132 Sch B1 para 3(1).................................... B5.133 (4)(b)............................... B5.133 26....................................... B5.139 40(1)(a), (b)....................... B5.133 43(6).................................. B5.153 Sch 6 para 1–7..................................... B5.135

Justices of the Peace Act 1361 s 1.................................................. G2.84 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 s 1(1)............................................. G1.140 Legal Services Act 2007........ E13.52; F2.78 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s 19...................................... A3.12, A3.47 Local Government, Planning and Land 1980................................. A3.47 Localism Act 2011............................ A3.47 London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006..... A3.100; H1.143 s 4(1)............................................. A3.39 31................................................ A3.69 Sch 4.............................................. H1.143 Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976.. A3.77 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s 44................................................ G2.36  115.............................................. G2.84 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 34–36.......................................... D3.52 National Insurance Contributions (Termination Awards and Sporting Testimonials) Act 2019................................ I1.101; I2.69 National Lottery etc Act 1993........... A3.13, A3.77 s 26................................................ A3.13 National Lottery Act 1998................ A3.13 National Lottery Act 2006................ A3.13 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957........... G1.81, G1.84, G1.85, G1.88, G1.89, G1.90, G1.92, G1.94, G1.103, G1.120, G1.123, G1.124, G1.138 s 1(2)............................................. G1.84 (3)(a)......................................... G1.86  2.................................................. G1.69 (2).................... G1.89, G1.93, G1.119, G1.123 (3)............................................. G1.94 (4)(a)......................................... G1.98 (6)............................................. G1.84 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984........... G1.81, G1.84, G1.85, G1.88, G1.89, G1.90, G1.91, G1.103, G1.114, G1.120, G1.138 s 1(3)............................................. G1.115 (b)......................................... G1.117 (4)............................... G1.115, G1.119 Offences Against the Person Act 1861................................ G2.14, G2.16 s 18........................... G2.2, G2.27, G2.29, G2.35, G2.65

xlviii  Table of Statutes

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para

Offences Against the Person Act 1861 – contd s 20......................... G2.14, G2.23, G2.24, G2.25, G2.30, G2.46, G2.54, G2.55, G2.58, G2.65, G2.66, G2.69  47......................... G2.14, G2.18, G2.19, G2.22, G2.23, G2.66, G2.96 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012.................. A3.68 s 1, 6.............................................. A3.68 Office of Communications Act 2002.. H2.136 Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937.................................... A3.11 Police Act 1997 Pt V (ss 112–127).......................... B6.58 s 112.............................................. B6.59 113A(1), (2)................................ B6.60 113B(4)....................................... B6.61 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 75................................................ B4.38 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s 130.............................................. G2.73 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906... F2.23 s 1.......................................... B4.48, B4.49 2.................................................. B4.48 Private International Law (Mis­cella­ neous Provisions) Act 1995........ E11.29 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002............. B4.53 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012..... B6.64, B6.67, B6.72 s 80................................................ B6.58 Public Order Act 1986 s 4.................................................. G2.58  4A......................... G2.14, G2.85, G2.87  5........................... B3.143; G2.14, G2.85, G2.86, G2.87, G2.91, G2.95  17–22.......................................... G2.89 Race Relations Act 1976....... E14.5, E14.17, E14.36 s 25................................................ E14.60 Recreational Charities Act 1958....... A2.60 Registered Designs Act 1949............ H5.17 s 1(2)............................................. H5.17 (3)............................................. H5.18 1B............................................... H5.17 (1)........................................... H5.17 7.................................................. H5.17 7A(1).......................................... H5.17 8(1), (2)....................................... H5.17 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.................................... B4.53 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974................................ B6.59; D1.50

Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976.......................... E11.251; E13.26 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 123.............................................. B5.15 125(3)......................................... B5.15 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 s 9.................................................. B6.65 35................................................ B6.65 Sch 4.............................................. B6.64 Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975.... A3.63, A3.64, A3.65 s 1.................................................. A3.63 2.................................................. A3.63 12................................................ A3.63 School Standards and Framework Act 1998 s 77................................................ A3.47 Senior Courts Act 1981 s 31(2A)........................................ E7.62 Sex Discrimination Act 1975............ E14.5, E14.10, E14.17, E14.29, E14.68 s 13................................................ E14.56 44................................................ E14.68 Sexual Offences Act 2003...... A3.75; B6.91; D1.39 s 2, 3.............................................. G2.96 16...................................... A3.75; B6.45 17–19.......................................... B6.45 Solicitors Act 1974............................ F2.78 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 s 1, 2.............................................. A3.69 Sports Grounds Safety Authority Act 2011.......................................... A3.65 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 s 139.............................................. A2.56 152....................................... I1.20; I2.86 Theft Act 1968.............. F2.29, F2.31; H1.33 s 17................................................ F2.31 Theft Act 1978.................................. F2.29 Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002.......................... A3.81; H3.97 s 10................................................ A3.81 (2)........................................... A3.81 Trade Marks Act 1938....................... H1.102 Trade Marks Act 1994........ H1.102, H1.104, H1.115, H1.116, H1.126, H1.129 s 1.................................................. H1.102 (1)............................................. H4.31 2(2)............................................. H1.129 3(1)(b), (c).................................. H1.104 4.................................................. H1.104 (5)............................................. H1.142 5(3), (4)....................................... H1.107 7(3)............................................. H1.107

Table of Statutes  xlix

para

para

Trade Marks Act 1994 – contd s 10................................................ H1.113 (1)............................ H1.113, H1.115, H1.116, H1.117 (2)............................. H1.113, H1.116, H1.122, H1.123 (3)............................. H1.113, H1.124 (4)............................. H1.114, H1.120 14–16............................ H1.125, H1.126 46(1)(a)–(c)................................ H1.110 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 s 207A(2)...................................... F1.49 Transport Act 1968............................ H1.33 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.................................... I2.105 UEFA  European Championship (Scotland) Act 2020........ A3.69; H1.26 s 2.................................................. H6.95 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977....... F2.9; H6.139, H6.140, H6.141 s 3.................................................. H6.139 Sch 2.............................................. H6.140 Value Added Tax Act 1994................ I1.45 Sch 1 para 1......................................... I1.46 Sch 4A para 9A...................................... H6.83 Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006... H1.33; H6.93 s 52................................................ A3.72

Code du Sport (10 December 2020) – contd art L222-16, L222-17, L222-18.... F2.90 L222-19.................................... F2.90 L222-19-1................................ F2.90 L222-20, L222-21.................... F2.90 R222-1..................................... F2.89 Law No  71-1130 (31  December 1971) art 6............................................... F2.90 Law of 16 July 1984 art 18-1....................................... E11.244

AUSTRALIA COMMONWEALTH Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 s 40................................................ D2.15 NEW SOUTH WALES Homebush Bay Operations Act 1999.......................................... H2.27 SOUTH AUSTRALIA Equal Opportunity Act 1984 s 66................................................ E14.68 CANADA Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents 2000... A4.187 FRANCE Code of Public Health art L 3323-2................................... H3.86 Code du Sport (10 December 2020) art L111-1...................................... A1.6 L132-2...................................... F2.90 L 222-5............................. F2.89, F2.90 L222-6...................................... F2.90 L 222-7..................................... F2.90 L222-8 – L222-11.................... F2.90 L222-12– L222-15................... F2.90 L222-15-1................................ F2.90

GERMANY Competition Act (Gesetzgegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB)) s 31.............................................. E11.243 GREECE Sports Law 2725/1999 art 90............................................. F3.222 GUERNSEY Image Rights (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Ordinance 2012....... H4.86, H4.87 Pt I (ss 1–64) s 1.................................................. H4.87 2(3)............................................. H4.88 5(1)............................................. H4.87 18................................................ H4.88 27–29.......................................... H4.89 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND Equal Status Act 2000....................... E14.62 Public Health (Alcohol) Act 2018..... H3.86 Sport Ireland Act 2015...................... A4.64 SOUTH AFRICA Promotion of Administration Justice Act 2000.................................... E5.5 SWITZERLAND Cartel Act 1995 art 7(2a)......................................... A1.44 12............................................. A1.44 Civil Code (Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB))............ B1.4 art 2............................................... A1.44 (2)........................................... A1.44 27............................................. D2.127 (2)......................................... D2.194 28................................. A1.44; D2.127 60................................. A1.23; D2.127 64............................................. A1.29 75..................... D2.64, D2.65, D2.101 Civil Procedure Code 2008.... D2.45, D2.48, D2.52

l  Table of Statutes

para

para

Civil Procedure Code 2008 – contd art 353(2)....................................... D2.47 354........................................... D2.46 381........................................... B1.16 390........................................... D2.46 393........................................... D2.46 Code of Obligations (Obligation­ enrecht)..................................... D2.127 art 41............................................. D2.127 75............................................. B1.12 163........................................... D2.127 336........................................... D2.127 337........................................... D2.127 (c)(1).................................. F3.275 Code on Private International Law (LDIP) art 25............................................. D2.67 116(1)....................................... B1.16 190(2)(e).................................. B1.16 Federal Act on Employment Services and the Hiring of Services (AVG)........................................ D2.188 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation art 23.................................... A1.9; D2.100 Federal Tribunal Act 2005 art 40, 72, 74, 77, 90, 92,   103, 105................................... D2.174 Private International Law Statute (18 December 1987)...... D2.45, D2.47, D2.48, D2.49, D2.50, D2.52, D2.109, D2.111, D2.113 Ch 12................................... D2.43, D2.47 art 13............................................. D2.124 16............................................. D2.125 (1), (2).................................. D2.125 17............................................. D2.124 116........................................... D2.122 176(1), (2)................................ D2.47 177........................................... D2.46 (1)....................................... D2.59

Private International Law Statute (18 December 1987) – contd art 178(1)....................................... D2.52 (2)............................. D2.53, D2.55 181........................................... D2.66 182........................................... D2.68 (1)....................................... D2.49 (2)............................. D2.69, D2.70 (3)............................. D2.43, D2.70 183........................................... D2.107 (1)......................... D2.103, D2.106 (2)............................ D2.44, D2.109 184........................................... D2.113 186........................................... D2.57 (1)....................................... D2.57 (2)............................. D2.57, D2.66 187................. B1.16; D2.122, D2.124 (1)....................................... B1.16 (2)....................................... D2.122 190.................. D2.85, D2.86, D2.108, D2.192 (2)........................... D2.46, D2.176 (a).................................. D2.177 (b).................... D2.178, D2.180 (c).................................. D2.185 (d).................................. D2.186 (e).................... D2.191, D2.193 192............................... D2.74, D2.169 (2)....................................... D2.173 194........................................... D2.49 UNITED STATES Americans with Disabilities Act 1990............................ E14.63, E14.64 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 1992........... B4.4; H7.15 Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (15  USC § 78017807)......................................... F2.83 Sports Broadcasting Act 2000 s 1291–1294................................ E11.243 Uniform Athlete Agents Act 2000..... F2.84

Table of Statutory Instruments

para

para

Breaching of Limits on Ticket Sales Regulations 2018, SI 2018/735. H6.101, H6.110 reg 3.............................................. H6.111 Business Protection from Mislead­ ing Marketing (Amendment) Regulations 2013, SI  2013/ 2701.......................................... H6.96 Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1276................ H1.145; H4.23, H4.25, H6.137 reg 3(2).......................................... H5.76 Child Safeguarding Practice Review and Relevant Agency (England) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/789 reg 18............................................ B6.28 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132............... E13.76; E16.14; I2.105 r 3.4............................................... E16.8 Pt 7.11........................................... E13.76 Pt 8 (rr 8.1–8.9)........ E5.3; E7.23; E13.15, E13.21; E16.10, E16.13 r 19.6............................................. E16.3 (1)......................................... A4.253 19.11........................................... A4.253 Pt 24 (rr 24.1–24.6)....................... E16.8 Pt 25 (rr 25.1–25.15)..................... E16.15 r 25.1(1)(b).................................... E15.20 34.4............................................. B4.47 40.20........................................... E7.23 Pt 54 (rr 54.1–54.36).............. E3.4, E3.5, E3.12; E5.2, E5.3, E5.8; E7.10, E7.16, E7.23, E7.42, E7.45; E13.7, E13.15, E13.19, E13.20, E13.21, E13.26, E13.42; E15.2; E16.13 Claims in respect of Loss of Damage arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/385..................... E11.47 Community Amateur Sports Club Regulations 2015, SI  2015/ 725............................................ A2.63

Competition Act 1998 (Competition and Markets Authority’s Rules) Order 2013, SI 2014/458 Sch 1 para 5......................................... E11.41 Competition (Amendment etc) EU Exit Regulations 2019, SI 2019/93 reg 3.............................................. E11.12 62............................................ E11.3 Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003, SI 2003/3319............................. F2.21 reg 13A, 14, 16, 18–22, 25............ F2.20 26............................................ F2.20 (1)–(3)..................................... F2.20 27A.......................................... F2.20 29............................................ F2.20 30............................................ F2.20 Sch 3.............................................. F2.20 Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3134............................. H1.36 reg 14(4)........................................ H1.35  28(h)........................................ H1.35 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277.................. H4.23, H4.25; H6.137 reg 3.............................................. H4.24 (2).......................................... H4.23  4, 5.......................................... H4.24  9, 10, 12.................................. H6.96  15(2)........................................ H4.24  18(4), (7)................................. H4.24 Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032.................. H1.77, H1.93 reg 13............................................ H1.93  16(1), (2)................................. H1.93  17(1)........................................ H1.93 Copyright (Free Public Showing or Playing) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, SI  2016/ 565............................................ H2.97 Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/480............................... A4.132

lii  Table of Statutory Instruments

para

para

Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU  Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/419.. A4.4, A4.27, A4.184, A4.198, A4.209, A4.203, A4.244 reg 8.............................................. A4.209 Sch 1 para 62....................................... A4.245 Designs and International Trade Marks (Amendment etc) (EU  Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/638............................... H5.19 Sch 1.............................................. H5.19 Sch 2.............................................. H5.19 Employment Equality (Age) Regula­ tions 2006, SI 2006/1031.......... E14.5, E14.17 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1660................ E14.5, E14.17 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1661................. E14.5, E14.17 Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2020, SI 2020/205. F1.60 Sch 1 para 1......................................... F1.85 Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No  9) Order 2012, SI  2012/ 1569............................ E14.20, E14.58 Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010, SI  2010/ 2128.......................................... E14.48 Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, SI  2007/ 1263................ E14.5, E14.17, E14.60 Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2034 reg 8.............................................. F1.20 Freedom of Establishment and Free Movement of Services (EU  Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/1401............................. E12.4 Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act 2008 (Games Association Right) Order 2009, SI 2009/1969 art 4............................................... H6.95 Human Rights Act 1998 (Remedial) Order 2019 (draft)..................... E13.80 Income Tax (Entertainers and Sportsmen) Regulations 1987, SI 1987/530............................... I2.32 Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2682 reg 72............................................ I1.96  81............................................ I1.96

Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) Regulations 2016, SI 2016/771............................... A3.43 Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018, SI 2018/634.......... H6.97, H6.98 reg 15(2)........................................ H6.99 Payments into the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2007 (draft)............................... A3.15 Payments into the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2008, SI 2008/255..................... A3.15 Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/233.. B6.58, B6.61 reg 2.............................................. B6.77 Privacy and Electronic Communi­ cations (EC Directive) Regula­ tions 2003, SI 2003/2426........... A4.203, A4.204, A4.205, A4.207, A4.208, A4.209, A4.211, A4.214, A4.216, A4.220, A4.224, A4.226, A4.229, A4.240, A4.248, A4.256 reg 2(1).......................................... A4.208 3A............................................ A4.235 6.............................................. A4.226 (1), (2)................................... A4.226 (4).......................................... A4.237 19–21, 21A.............................. A4.214 22(2)........................................ A4.208 (3)........................................ A4.212 Sch 1 para 8AA................................... A4.256 Provision of Services Regulations 2009, SI 2009/2999................... E12.3 Registered Designs Regulations 2001, SI 2001/3949 reg 2.................................... H5.17, H5.18  2.1B......................................... H5.17 (1).................................... H5.17  5.............................................. H5.17 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975, SI 1975/1023................... B6.60, B6.61 Safety of Places of Sport Regulations 1988, SI 1988/1807................... A3.63 Safety of Sports Grounds (Accommodation of Spectators) Order 1996, SI 1996/499........... A3.63 School Premises (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1943 reg 10............................................ A3.45 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/656..................... E14.29 State Aid (EU  Exit) Regulations 2019 (draft)............................... E11.5

Data

Table of Statutory Instruments  liii

para

para

Television Broadcasting Regulations 2000, SI 2000/54....................... A3.95 Ticket Touting (Designation of Football Matches) Order 2007, SI 2007/790 art 2............................................... H6.92 Tobacco and Related Products Regulations 2016, SI 2016/507.. H3.98 reg 44............................................ H3.98 (1)(a), (b)............................. H3.98 Trade Secrets (Enforcement etc) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/597.. H1.20 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/246...... B5.137, B5.148; F1.67 reg 8(4).......................................... B5.148

Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, SI 2009/273..................... I2.105 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083............... E11.223; H1.33 Value Added Tax (Sport, Sports Competitions and Physical Education) Order 1999, SI 1999/1994............................. A2.34 AUSTRALIA Homebush Bay Operations Regulation 1999 reg 3(d).......................................... H2.27

Table of cases [All references are to paragraph number]

para 1998 Football World Cup, Re (Case IV/36.888) [2000] 4 CMLR 963........................... H6.67 77m Ltd v Ordnance Survey Ltd [2019] EWHC 3007 (Ch)........................................... H1.100 A A v Association B (SFT Decision, 5A.805/2014)........................................................... C3.7 A  v B  Plc [2002]  EWCA  Civ 337, [2003]  QB  195, [2002] 3  WLR  542, [2002] 2  All ER  545, [2002]  EMLR  21, [2002] 1  FLR  1021, [2002] 2  FCR  158, [2002] HRLR 25, [2002] UKHRR 457, 12 BHRC 466, [2002] Fam Law 415, (2002) 99(17) LSG 36, (2002) 152 NLJ 434, (2002) 146 SJLB 77, CA................ E13.31, E13.59, E13.65 A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2016)............................................................ D2.187 A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 12 September 2018)..................................................... D2.79 A v Club Atletico de Madrid SAD v Real Federacion Espanola de Futbol (RFEF) & FIFA (CAS 2013/A/3140).............................................................................. B1.4; D2.63 A v FIA (CAS 2014/A/3773).......................................................................................... C20.8 A v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2426)........................................................................................ B1.25 A v FINA (CAS 2005/A/925)......................................................................................... C20.17 A v ITF & B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 29 January 2019)............................................... D2.70 A v Queen’s Park Rangers FC (Faurlin), FA Disciplinary Hearing, February & May 2011............................................................................................................. E2.40; F3.209 A v S (24 October 2011)................................................................................................. F3.176 A  v Tayside Fire Board, 2000  SC  232, 2000  SLT  1307, 2000  GWD  5-174, Ct of Sess.............................................................................................................. B4.40; D1.95 A v UEFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 21 March 2013)........................................ C4.17; D2.192 A  v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 6  November 2009)....................................................................................................................... D2.179 A  v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & FINA (Federal Tribunal, 28  October 2019)....................................................................................................................... D2.27 A & B v AMA & VTV 4A_428/2011 (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 13 February 2012)...... D2.12 A AG v B NV (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 21 November 2003)......................................... D2.55 AAA  v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012]  EWHC  2103 (QB), [2013]  EMLR  2, [2012] HRLR 31, QBD........................................................................................... H4.63 AC Milan v UEFA (CAS/2018/A/5808, 1 October 2018)............................... D1.100; E12.39 AC Muthiah v Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr [2011] INSC 436, Supreme Court of India.......................................................................................................... E5.5 AC Venezia v Club Atlético Mineiro & AS Roma (CAS 2004/A/560)............ F3.179, F3.248 ADO Den Haag v Newcastle United FC (CAS 2006/A/1152)............................. B1.56, B1.59 AEK Athens BC v Malik Hairston (CAS 2018/A/5971)................................................ D2.122 AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA (CAS 98/2000; 20 August 1998)..... A1.20, A1.27, A1.56; A5.27; B1.4, B1.6, B1.16, B1.21, B1.27, B1.29, B1.35, B1.36, B1.37, B1.38, B1.39, B1.45, B1.47; B4.41; C4.19; D2.107, D2.132, D2.133, D2.134, D2.148; D3.3, D3.59; E2.30; E4.11; E11.60, E11.123, E11.124; E12.37, E12.108; E16.32 AEK PAE & SK Slavia Praha v UEFA (CAS 98/2000)................................................. B5.17 A-G  for Jersey v Edmond O’Brien [2006]  UKPC  14, [2006] 1 WLR  1485, [2006] 3 WLUK 571.................................................................................................. B4.38; C5.6

lvi  Table of Cases

para A-G  v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC  109, [1988] 3 WLR  776, [1988] 3 All ER  545, [1989] 2  FSR  181, (1988) 85(42)  LSG  45, (1988) 138  NLJ  Rep 296, (1988) 132 SJ 1496 HL...................................................................................................... H4.63 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975), Re [1975] QB 773, [1975] 3 WLR 11, [1975] 2 All ER 684, (1975) 61 Cr App R 118, [1975] RTR 473, [1975] Crim LR 449, (1975) 119 SJ 373, CA....................................................................................................... G2.36 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992), Re [1994] QB 91, [1993] 3 WLR 982, [1993] 4 All ER 683, (1993) 97 Cr App R 429, (1994) 158 JP 741, [1993] RTR 337, (1994) 158 JPN 552, (1993) 90(27) LSG 36, (1993) 143 NLJ 919, (1993) 137 SJLB 152, CA........................................................................................................................... G2.63 A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980), Re [1981] QB 715, [1981] 3 WLR 125, [1981] 2 All ER 1057, (1981) 73 Cr App R 63, [1981] Crim LR 553, (1981) 125 SJ 426, CA.... A3.76; G2.82 AMA v ASBL & Keisse (CAS 2009/A/2014)................................................................ C23.6 AMI  Sport & Entertainment Pty Ltd v Rugby Union Players Association Inc [2005] NSWSC 950 21........................................................................................... F2.71 AMP Advisory & Management Partners AG v Force India Formula One Team Ltd [2019] EWHC 2426 (Comm), [2019] 9 WLUK 333........................................ E8.1; F1.5 AOC v FIBT (CAS OG 2010/01)............................................... B1.54, B1.55, B1.56, B1.57; B2.14, B2.16, B2.65, B2.89 AOC v IOC & ICF (OG Athens 2004/006).................................................................... D2.152 AOC & AWU v FILA (CAS 2008/A/1502).......................................................... B1.53, B1.59 AR Cycling AG v UCI (CAS 2004/4/777)..................................................................... D2.149 ARU v Bourke (ASADA press release, 30 May 2012)................................................... C12.4 ARU v Sailor (ARU Judicial Committee Decision, 20 July 2006)............. B1.56; C6.1, C6.39; C20.18 A SA v B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J & L Association (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 15 July 2015)... D2.187 ASA Adjudication on Fuller Smith & Turner plc (Decision, 1 July 2009)..................... H1.132 ASADA v Allen (Athletics Australia Doping Control Tribunal, 13 October 2008)....... C7.20, C7.22; C11.2, C11.7 ASADA v Bannister (CAS A1/2013)....................................................................... C9.2, C9.3 ASADA v Marinov (CAS (Oceania/2007/ 9 June 2007)............................ C5.1; C11.2; C12.4 ASADA v O’Neill (CAS 2008/A/1591)................................ C5.11; C18.14, C18.24, C18.26 ASADA v Wyper (CAS A4/2007)................................................ C4.23; C7.20; C11.2; C22.9 ASADA (on behalf of AC & ASC) v Smith (CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2015).......... C18.12 AS Livorno Calcio v Chelsea Football Club Ltd (CAS 2013/A/3366)............. F3.278, F3.279 ATP v Braga (Anti-Doping Tribunal, May 2004)........................................................... C6.6 ATP v Köllerer (Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, 31 May 2011)................................. B4.38 ATP v Luzzi (Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, ATP press release 28 February 2008). B4.25 ATP v Newport (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 7 December 2005).......................................... C23.6 ATP v Perry (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 30 November 2005)............ B1.15, B1.39; C4.40; C6.2; C18.19; C20.16 ATP v Rodriguez (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 18 September 2003)................. B1.44; C6.2, C6.41 ATP v Rusedski (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 10 March 2004).............................................. C6.2 ATP v Ulihrach (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 7 July 2003)................................ B1.39; C6.2; E7.68 ATP v Vargas-Aboy (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 12 July 2005)........................................... C22.6 Aanes v FILA (CAS 2001/A/317)............................................... C6.1; C16.2; C18.29; C23.2 Abakumova v IOC (CAS 2016/A/4804)......................................................................... C6.34 Abdelrahman v Egyptian NADO (CAS OG 16/23).............................................. C4.26; C6.23 Abdelrahman v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & EADA (CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036).................................................... A1.19; B1.53, B1.56; C3.7; C6.14; C17.4, C17.6; C18.3; C23.6 Abdevali v United World Wrestling (CAS AG 14/04).................................................... B1.56 Aberavon & Port Talbot Rugby Football Club v Welsh Rugby Union Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 584, CA.................................................................................... E7.55 Aberdeen Journals Ltd v Director General of Fair Trading [2002]  CAT  4, [2002] 3 WLUK 524, [2002] Comp AR 167...................................................................... E11.16 Abrahams v Performing Right Society Ltd [1995] 5 WLUK 301, [1995] ICR 1028, [1995] IRLR 486..................................................................................................... F1.78

Table of Cases  lvii

para Abramova v International Biathlon Union (CAS 2016/A/4889).................................... C18.19 Ace Paper Ltd v Fry; Capital Print & Display Ltd, Re [2015]  EWHC  1647 (Ch), [2015] 6 WLUK 606............................................................................................... B1.61 Achilles Paper Group Ltd v OFT [2006] CAT 24........................................................... E11.41 Adam Opel AG v Autec AG (48/05) 25 January 2007.................................................... H1.120 Adams v CCES (CAS 2007/A/1312)............................. C6.1, C6.39; C18.18, C18.19; C20.11 Adams v IAAF (CAS 2016/A/4703).............................................................................. B1.28 Adamson v NSW  Rugby League (1991) 100  ALR  479, 27  FCR  535, on appeal, 103 ALR 319.................................................................................. E10.5; E11.168; F3.53 Adamu v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2426)....................................... A1.20; A5.45; B3.175, B3.182, B3.186; B4.38 Ademi v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4676).............................. C17.4, C17.5; C18.5, C18.26; C20.6 Adidas v The Lawn Tennis Association [2006] EWHC 1318 (Ch), [2006] 6 WLUK 67 [2006] UKCLR 823, [2006] ECC 29, [2006] Eu LR 1057, [2006] ETMR 64....... B1.28 Adidas-Salomon AG  v Draper [2006]  EWHC  1318 (Ch), [2006]  UKCLR  823, [2006] ECC 29, [2006] Eu LR 1057, [2006] ETMR 64 Ch D..................... E2.47; E7.26; E11.68, E11.77, E11.293; E12.58; E15.9; E16.8 Adidas-Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd (C-408/01) [2004] Ch 120, [2004] 2  WLR  1095, [2003]  ECR  I-12537, [2004] 1  CMLR  14, [2004]  CEC  3, [2004] ETMR 10, [2004] FSR 21, ECJ.................................................................. H1.120 Ad Vitam (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 9 October 2015)........................................... B4.32, B4.38 Aerenson v Arenson [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 179.............................................................. D3.103 Affutu-Nartoy v Clarke (The Times, 9 February 1984).................................................. G1.53 Agar v Canning (1965) 54 WWR 302............................................................................ G1.17 Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41, [2000] 201 CLR 552.................................. E2.28; E9.3; G1.78 Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) [2006]  UKHL  23, [2006] 1  WLR  1380, [2006] 3 All ER 97, [2006] STC 1056, 77 TC 686, [2006] BTC 372, 8 ITL Rep 1106, [2006] STI 1542, (2006) 103(22) LSG 27, (2006) 156 NLJ 880, (2006) 150 SJLB 671, HL.................................................................................................. I2.32 Agen v ERC (ERC Appeal Committee, March 2002).................................................... B4.21 Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, CA................................................................................................ D3.69 Agreement between the FA Premier League & BskyB see Televising Premier League Football Matches, Re Agreement between the FA Premier League, Re [2000] EMLR 78, [1999] UKCLR 258.............................................................................................................. E2.51; E11.49 Air Canada v United Kingdom (18465/91) (1995) 20 EHRR 150, ECtHR................... E13.36 Aitken v DPP [2015] EWHC 1079 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 297, [2016] 3 All ER 45, [2015] 4 WUK 419, [2015] 2 Cr App R 18, (2015) 179 JP 223, [2015] EMLR 23, [2015] Crim LR 719, [2015] AC 77........................................................................ B1.61 Akyuz (Nectmettin Erbakan) v International Wushu Federation (IWUF) (CAS 2017/A/5155)................................................................................................ D2.133 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (T235/03) [2008] All ER (EC) 1, [2008] Bus LR 348, [2007] ECR II-3523, [2008] 4 CMLR 3, [2007] CILL 2513, CFI....................................................................... E11.36 Alabbar v FEI (CAS 2013/A/3124)........................ B1.27, B1.30; C5.4, C5.6; C18.5, C18.12, C18.16, C18.20, C18.21, C18.32; C20.12, C20.13 Al Eid v FEI (CAS 2012/A/2807).......................................................... B4.41; C18.6; C20.10 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (C-67/96) [1999] ECR I-5751, [2000] 4 CMLR 446, ECJ..................................... E11.144, E11.169 Albert v Belgium (A/58) (1983) 5 EHRR 533, ECtHR...................... E13.39, E13.40, E13.42 Albertville, Barcelona (unreported, 16 July 1992)............................................ E2.53; E11.202 Albion Water Ltd v Ofwat [2006] CAT 23..................................................................... E11.44 Albion Water Ltd v Water Services Regulation Authority (formerly Director General of Water Services) [2008]  EWCA  Civ 536, [2009] 2 All ER  279, [2008] Bus LR 1655, [2008] UKCLR 457, CA......................................................................... E11.19 Albon (t/a NA  Carriage Co) v Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd [2007]  EWHC  1879 (Ch), [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 420, [2007] 7 WLUK 895................................ D3.70, D3.72

lviii  Table of Cases

para Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310, [1991] 3 WLR 1057, [1991] 4 All ER 907, [1992] PIQR P1, (1992) 89(3) LSG 34, (1991) 141 NLJ 166, (1992) 136 SJLB 9, HL........................................................................................... G1.124 Alejandro Valverde Belmonte v Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 29 October 2010)........................ D2.32, D2.33, D2.69, D2.70, D2.177 Al Hussein (HRH Prince Ali) v FIFA (CAS 2016A/4459)............................................. A5.34 Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8, [2010] 2 AC 39, [2010] 2 WLR 471, [2010] 2 All ER 175, [2010] PTSR 524, [2010] HRLR 18, [2010] UKHRR 417, [2010] HLR 22, [2010] BLGR 401, (2010) 154(7) SJLB 37, SC.......................... E13.50 Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2018]  EWHC  298 (Ch), [2018] 2  WLUK  532, [2018] EMLR 17..................................................................................................... H4.63 Ali v United Kingdom (Application 40378/10) [2015] 10  WLUK  500, (2016) 63 EHRR 20, [2015] HLR 46................................................................................. E13.50 Alisic v Bosnia & Herzegovina (Application 60642/08)................................................ E13.73 Al Jazira FSC v FIFA (CAS 2018/A/5900).................................................................... D2.133 Allan (Robert C) v Scottish Auto Cycle Union [1985] Outer House Cases 32.............. E7.55 Allenet de Ribemont v France (A/308) (1995) 20 EHRR 557, ECtHR.......................... E13.55 Allport v Wilbraham [2004] EWCA Civ 1668, CA.............................................. G1.56, G1.57 Alovan v IOC (CAS 2017/A/4927)...................................................................... C4.17; C23.2 Aloyan v IOC (CAS 2017/A/4927)...................................................................... B1.54, B1.60 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien (Case C-384/93) [1995] ECR I-1141, [1995] 5 WLUK 142, [1995] 2 BCLC 214, [1995] 2 CMLR 209, [1995] All ER (EC) 543.................................................................................................................. E12.86 Al Rumaithi (Mohammed) v FEI (CAS 2015/A/4190).................. B1.56, B1.61; C6.2, C6.55; C21.12; C22.3 Al Shaab FC v Guirie (CAS 2015/A/4122; 26 August 2016)......................................... F1.73 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (55721/07) (2011) 53 EHRR 18, 30 BHRC 561, [2011] Inquest LR 73, ECtHR............................................................................................ E13.75 Al-Suweidi v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)...................................................... C21.5 Alstom Transport v Tilson [2010] EWCA Civ 1308, [2011] IRLR 169, CA................. F1.8 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84, [1981] 3 WLR 565, [1981] 3 All ER 577, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 27, [1981] 7 WLUK  280, [1981] Com LR  236, (1981) 125 SJ 623............................................................................................................... B1.57 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No  1) [1975] AC  396, [1975] 2 WLR  316, [1975] 1 All ER 504, [1975] FSR 101, [1975] RPC 513, (1975) 119 SJ 136, HL.... C4.26 Anderlecht v UEFA (CAS 98/185)........................................................................ E2.29; E7.55 Andersen & Anti-Doping Denmark v IPC (CAS 2015/A/435)...................................... C18.27 Anderson v IOC (CAS 2008/A/1545)....................................................... B1.22, B1.40, B1.60 Anderson v Lyotier (t/a Snowbizz) [2008] EWHC 2790.................................. G1.45, G1.143 Anderson Luis de Souza v CBG & FIFA (CAS 2013/A/3395)...................................... C6.21 Andrade v Cape Verde NOC (CAS Atlanta 96/002 & 005).................... D2.150; E2.13; E7.65 Andreea Raducan v IOC (5P.427/2000).......................................................................... D2.37 Andrianova v ARAF (CAS 2015/A/4304)........................ B1.44, B1.56, B1.61; C4.22; D2.70 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA (CAS OG 12/06)........................................... B2.14, B2.65 Angelic Grace see Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA  v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar Narodni Podnik (C-245/02) [2004] ECR I-10989, [2005] ETMR 27, ECJ......................................................... H1.120 Annus v IOC (CAS 2004/A/718).................................................................................... C8.2 Antonelli v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [1998] QB 948, [1998] 2 WLR 826, [1998] 1 All ER  997, [1997] 7 WLUK  704, (1998) 10 Admin LR  75, [1998] 1 EGLR 9, [1998] 14 EG 133, [1998] COD 178, (1997) 94 (35) LSG 35, (1997) 141 SJLB 198, [1997] NPC 123............................................................................. B1.43 Appleton v Medhat Mohammed El-Safty [2007] EWHC 631, QBD.................. G1.32, G1.60 Appollon Kalamaria v Davidson Oliveria (CAS 2004/A/678).......................... F3.160, F3.222 Araci v Fallon [2011] EWCA Civ 668, (2011) 155(23) SJLB 39, CA........................... F1.80 Arashov v ITF (CAS 2017/A/5112).......................... C6.1, C6.8, C6.10, C6.14, C6.16, C6.18; C17.4, C17.7; C18.2; C20.19

Table of Cases  lix

para Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Offentlich Rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) v Commission of the European Communities (T-158/00) [2003] ECR II-3825, [2004] 5 CMLR 14 CFI..................................................... E11.228 Archer v South West Thames Area Health Authority (The Times, 10  August 10 1985) QBD....................................................................................... B4.38, B4.40; D1.95 Arestova v IPC (13 September 2016)............................................................................. A1.59 Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, [2006] UKCLR 1135, (2006) 103(42) LSG 32, (2006) 150 SJLB 1391, CA............................................. E11.41 Armstrong v World Curling Federation (CAS 2012/A/2756)......................................... C20.6 Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619, [2015] 2 WLR 1593, [2016] 1 All ER 1, [2015] 6 WLUK 320, [2015] HLR 31, [2015] 2 P & CR 14, [2015] L & TR 25, [2015] CILL 3689............................... B1.54, B1.56, B1.58, B1.59; B2.16; E8.15 Arnolt v Football Association (2 February 1998)........................................................... E2.56 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (Application 7050/75) 19 DR 5 (1980)....................... E13.64 Arsenal Football Club Plc v Elite Sports Distribution Ltd (No 1) [2002] EWHC 3057 (Ch), [2003] FSR 26, (2003) 26(3) IPD 26017, (2003) 100(7) LSG 36, Ch D...... H1.39, H1.45, H1.121 Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (C-206/01) [2003] Ch  454, [2003] 3 WLR  450, [2003] All ER (EC) 1, [2002] ECR I-10273, [2003] 1 CMLR 12, [2003] CEC 3, [2003] ETMR 19, [2003] RPC 9, (2002) 152 NLJ 1808, ECJ.. H1.109, H1.116, H1.117, H1.118, H1.135; H4.37 Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (No  2) [2002]  EWHC  2695 (Ch), [2003] 1 All ER  137, [2003] 1  CMLR  13, [2002] Eu LR  806, [2003]  ETMR  36, (2003) 26(2) IPD 26008, (2003) 100(3) LSG 32, (2002) 152 NLJ 1923, Ch D................ H1.119 Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 696, [2003] 3 All ER 865, [2003] 2 CMLR 25, [2003] Eu LR 641, [2003] ETMR 73, [2003] RPC 39, (2003) 26(7) IPD 26045, (2003) 147 SJLB 663, CA......................................................... H1.120 Arzhanova v CMAS (CAS 2010/A/2284)............................................................ B1.23, B1.26 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008]  UKHL  25, [2008] 1  AC  962, [2008] 2 WLR  975, [2008] 3 All ER  573, [2008] 4 WLUK  587, [2008] Po LR  203, (2003) 158 NLJ 632, (2008) 152 (17) SJLB 29...................................................... G1.150 Asian Handball Federation v International Handball Federation (CAS 2008/O/1483).... D2.101, D2.145 Asif v ICC (CAS 2011/A/2362)...................................... B3.192; B4.21, B4.22, B4.40, B4.41, B4.45; E7.66, E7.67; E16.22 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authorities [2012] USKC 22, [2012] 2 AC 471, [2012] 2 WLR 1275, [2012] 4 All ER 1249, [2012] 5 WLUK 909, [2013] 1 CMLR 4, (2012) 109 (24) LSG 22.......................................................................................... B1.56 Associated British Ports v Transport & General Workers Union [1989] 1 WLR 939, [1989] 3 All ER 822, [1989] 7 WLUK 356, [1989] ICR 557, [1989] IRLR 399, (1989) 133 SJ 1200................................................................................................. E15.9 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223.............. D1.69 Association Nouvelle des Boulogne Boys v France (Application 6468/09)................... E13.69 Associazione ‘Giùlemanidallajuve’ v European Commission (T-273/09) (19  March 2012)....................................................................................................................... E11.78 Aston Cantlow & Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546, [2003] 3 WLR 283, [2003] 3 All ER 1213, [2003] HRLR 28, [2003] UKHRR 919, [2003] 27 EG 137 (CS), (2003) 100(33) LSG 28, (2003) 153 NLJ 1030, (2003) 147 SJLB 812, [2003] NPC 80, HL.............. E13.16; H4.67 Aston Villa Football Club v B.93 Copenhagen (CAS 2006/A/1177).... F3.157, F3.250, F3.255 Aston Villa v FA (29 January 2016)................................................................................ F1.14 Athletic Association of Ireland v Turnbull (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Tribunal, October 2006)................................................................... C6.42, C6.44, C6.45 Athletic Club v Commission (Case T-678/19)............................................................ E11.316 Athletics Ireland v Colvert (Irish Sports Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 16  July 2015)....................................................................................................................... C6.30 Athletics South Africa v IAAF (CAS 2018/O/5798).......................................... D2.90, D2.133 Attheraces Ltd v British Horseracing Board Ltd [2007]  EWCA  Civ 38, [2007] UKCLR 309, [2007] ECC 7, [2007] Info TLR 41, [2007] Bus LR D77, CA.... E11.307

lx  Table of Cases

para Auckland Boxing Association v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001] NZLR 847.... A1.56; E7.51 Ausiello v Italy (1996) 24 EHRR 568, ECtHR............................................................... E13.48 Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club [1998] 2 VR 546, Australia.......... D3.65 Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2000/C/267).................... A1.19, A1.29; B1.16, B1.46, B1.49, B1.51, B1.53 Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT (CAS OG 10/01)............................................. B2.89 Australian Rugby League v Cross (1996) 135 ALR 33, (1997) 39 IPR 111........ E8.17; F3.53 Australian Rugby League v Law, Leagues (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 23 May 2013)....... C7.20 Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] 4 All ER 745, [2011] ICR 1157, [2011] IRLR 820, (2011) 161 NLJ 1099, (2011) 155(30) SJLB 31, SC................ F1.8 Aylesbury Football Club (1997) Ltd v Watford Association Football Club Ltd (unreported, 12 June 2000).................................................... F1.40, F1.89, F1.95; F3.253 Azevedo v CBDA (CAS 2003/A/510)..................................... C6.16, C6.18; C8.1, C8.5, C8.6 Azevado v FINA (CAS 2005/A/925).............................................................................. C18.3 Azharuddin v BCCI (CCCA No 408 of 2003), 8 November 2012................................. B4.5 Azzimuri v CNOC (CAS OG 06/03).............................................................................. D2.151 B B (Children) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11, [2008] 3 WLR  1, [2008] 4 All ER  1, [2008] 2  FLR  141, [2008] 2  FCR  339, [2008] Fam Law 619, [2008] Fam Law 837, HL............................ B4.37; D1.103; E7.66 B v FEI (CAS 2007/A/1415)...................................................................... C8.2, C8.5; C17.13 B v FIBA (CAS 92/80)................................................................. B1.4, B1.16, B1.32; D2.157 B v FINA (CAS 2001/A/337)....................................................... C6.23, C6.25, C6.41, C6.52 B v FINA (CAS 2002/A/430)......................................................................................... C6.10 B v FINA (CAS 98/211)................................................................................................. D2.88 B v ITU (CAS 98/222).................................................................................................... D2.133 BAF v Jason Livingston (BAF Appeal Panel, 1993)...................................................... C6.62 BBC v British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd [1992] Ch 141, [1991] 3 WLR 174, [1991] 3 All ER 833, Ch D........................................................................... E2.50; H1.87; H2.88 BBC  v Talksport Ltd (No  1) [2001]  FSR  6, (2000) 23(10)  IPD  23084 (2000) 97(27) LSG 39, Ch D...................................................................... H1.15; H2.18, H2.26 BBC v Talksport [2001] FSR 53............................................................ E2.50; H1.130; H2.35 BBC  Worldwide Ltd v Pally Screen Printing Ltd [1998]  FSR  665, (1998) 21(5) IPD 21053, Ch D..................................................................................... H1.122, H1.132 BBSA v Howe (NADP Tribunal, 4 May 2009).............................. B1.44; C4.16; C8.5; C19.9 BCCI v Pandya (Hardik) (19 April 2019)........................................................... B3.94, B3.120 BHA v Ahern (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 22 May 2013)............... B4.32, B4.37, B4.38, B4.43 BHA v Best (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 14 December 2016).......................................... B4.22 BHA v Burke & Rodgers (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 20 July 2009)..................... B4.19, B4.26 BHA  v Egan (Darren) & Langford (Philip) (BHA  Disciplinary Panel, 23  October 2014)....................................................................................................................... B4.45 BHA v Heffernan (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 23 January 2013).............. B4.19, B4.21, B4.26, B4.45, B4.47 BHA v O’Mahoney (Gerrard) (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 23 October 2014)................. B4.45 BHA v Sines (Disciplinary Panel, 28 April 2012).......................................................... B4.43 BHA v Sines (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 14 December 2011)...... B4.23, B4.25, B4.26, B4.38, B4.45, B4.47 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 227, [2011] 1  WLR  2524, [2011] 3  All ER  470, [2011] Bus LR  1359, [2011] BCC 399, [2011] 2 BCLC 1, CA................................................................ B5.131 BPP Holdings Ltd v R & Comrs [2017] UKSC 55, [2017] 1 WLR 2945, [2017] 4 All ER 756, [2017] STC 1655, [2017] 7 WLUK 609, [2018] RVR 8, [2017] BVC 36, [2017] STI 1742...................................................................................................... I2.105 BRV v FIA (Case Comp/39732, 4 August 2011)........................................................ E11.182 BTTC v ITTF (CAS 2005/A/996).................................................................................. A5.34 BWF v IPC (CAS 2016/A/4745).................................................................................... B1.22 BWF v IWF (CAS 2015/A/4319)............................................................ A1.55, A1.58, A1.59

Table of Cases  lxi

para BWF v Perssons (BWF Ethics Hearing Panel, 18 March 2019).................................... B4.29 BWLA v T (Disciplinary Panel, 20 August 2007).......................................................... C6.46 Babbs & Cleaschi v BHA (BHA Appeal Board, 3 June 2013)....................................... B4.26 Bacardi & Cellier des Dauphins v Newcastle United Football Club [2001] Eu LR 45..... E2.47; E5.14; E12.57; E16.26 Bacardi-Martini SAS & Cellier des Dauphins v Newcastle United FC  [2001] Eu LR 45...................................................................................................................... E15.23 Bacon v White & Chartfield Associates Ltd (21 May 1998).......................................... G1.49 Badrick v British Judo Association [2004] EWHC 1891 (Ch)................ B2.12, B2.13; E7.51 Bagnall v Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd [2001]  UKPC  57, [2001] All ER (D) 162 (Dec)....................................................................................................................... F1.5 Bain Budgen Sports Ltd v Hollioake (unreported, 8 December 1997)........................... F1.5 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737, [2001] 2 WLUK 803, [2001] CLC 999............................. E8.10 Baker v British Boxing Board of Control [2015]  EWHC  2469 (Ch), [2015] 8 WLUK 235.......................................................... D3.17; E3.12; E4.8; E10.30; E11.102 Baker v Jones (for British Amateur Weightlifters’ Association) [1954] 1 WLR 1005, [1954] 2 All ER 553, (1954) 98 SJ 473 QBD.......................... D3.66; E2.29; E4.6; E7.56 Balciunaite v LAF & IAAF (CAS 2011/A/2414).................................... C6.6, C6.46; C18.12 Balmoral Tanks Ltd v Competition & Markets Authority [2017]  CAT  23, [2017] 10 WLUK 135, [2018] Comp AR 61...................................................................... E11.41 Bank Mellat v HM  Treasury (No  2) [2013]  UKSC  39, [2014]  AC  700, [2013] 3  WLR  179, [2013] 4 All ER  533, [2013] 6  WLUK  527, [2013]  HRLR  30, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 580............................................................................ E3.9; E7.82 Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2020] EWCA Civ 408, [2020] 4 WLR 55, [2020] 2  All ER (Comm) 756, [2020] 3  WLUK  249, [2020] Lloyd’s Rep FC 211..................................................................................................................... C5.2 Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants [2020]  UKSC  13, [2020] AC  973, [2020] 2  WLR  960, [2020] 4  All ER  19, [2020] 3  WLUK  464, [2020]  ICR  893, [2020] IRLR 481, [2020] PIQR P11, [2020] Med LR 155, (2020) 175 BMLR 1, [2020] PNLR 22, 2020 Rep LR 74................................................... G1.35, G1.36, G1.42 Barcelona v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3793).......................................................................... B1.16, B1.28, B1.56; E2.21 Barlow v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 6 September 2016)...... C17.16 Barmi v Board of Control for Cricket in India (Case No 61/2010, 8 February 2013).... E11.103 Barnard v Australian Soccer Federation & FIFA (1988) 81 ALR 51................. E15.12; F3.53 Barnard v Jockey Club of South Africa (1984) 2 SALR 35........................................... E7.71 Barrieau v US Trotting Association (1986) 78 NBR (2d) 128, 198 APR 128........ E5.5; E7.74 Barry Silkman v Colchester United Football Club Ltd (15 June 2001)......................... E2.57 Barry Silkman Soccer Consultancy Ltd v Colchester United Football Club Ltd [2001] WL 825218.................................................................. E8.9; F2.7; F3.160, F3.202 Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials [2015] 8 WLUK 301...... G1.56 Barton v FA (FA Appeal Board, 24 July 2017)..................................................... B4.23, B4.25 Bassani-Antivari v IOC (CAS OG 2002/003)...................................................... B1.57, B1.60 Bassong (Zohran Ludovic); Anderlecht v FIFA (CAS 2015/A/4178)............................ F3.254 Bates v Post Office (No 3) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB), [2019] 3 WLUK 260.................. B1.46 Bauer v AOC & ASF (CAS OG 14/001).................................................. B2.11, B2.15, B2.83 Baumann CAS Sydney 00/006 (Digest of CAS Awards II 1998–2000)......................... E16.29 Baumann v IOC, NOC German & IAAD (CAS OG 2000/006)..................................... D2.58 Baxter v IOC (CAS 2002/376)........................................................................... C6.37; C23.2 Beal v South Devon Railway 159 ER 560, (1864) 3 Hurl & C 337, Ct of Exch............ F2.13 Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation (CAS 2000/A/260)............................. B2.59, B2.69 Beaton & Scholes v Equestrian Federation of Australia (CAS 2003/A/477)................. C6.23 Beaton v Devon County Council (2003) LS Gaz........................................................... H1.94 Bedene (Aljaz) v Lawn Tennis Association & International Tennis Federation (2 March 2017)................................................ B1.4, B1.6, B1.35, B1.36, B1.40; E12.48 Begaj v IWF (CAS 2015/A/4049).................................................................................. C6.40 Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry Group v Golden Ocean Group Ltd [2013] EWHC 1063 (Comm), [2013] 2 All ER (Comm) 436, [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61, QBD.... D3.24, D3.25

lxii  Table of Cases

para Belane Nagy v Hungary (Application 53080/13)........................................................... E13.73 Belarus Canoe Association v International Canoe Federation (CAS 2016/A/4708)...... A1.55, A1.58; C11.5 Belcher v British Canoe Union (Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012)................ B2.6, B2.9, B2.14, B2.47, B2.50, B2.51 Belgian Linguistic Case (A/6) (1968) 1 EHRR 252, ECtHR......................................... E13.41 Belgium v Royer (48/75) [1976] ECR 497, [1976] 2 CMLR 619, [1977] ICR 314, ECJ.... E12.85 Belize Basketball Federation v FIBA (CAS 2009/A/1988)................................... B1.4, B1.49 Bellman v Northampton Recuirtment Ltd [2018]  EWCA  Civ 2214, [2019] 1  All ER 1133, [2018] 10 WLUK 202, [2019] ICR 459, [2019] IRLR 66...................... G1.42 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY  Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2012] 1 AC 383................................................................................................... B5.131, B5.141 Berchtold v Skiing Australia (CAS 2002/A/361)....................... B2.60, B2.74, B2.88; D2.157 Beresford v Equestrian Australia (CAS 2012/A/2837)......................................... B2.56, B2.89 Berg v Blackburn Rovers Football Club & Athletic Plc [2013]  EWHC  1070 (Ch), [2013] IRLR 537, Ch D.......................................................................................... F1.18 Berger v Mallya (unreported, 19 March 1998)............................................................... F1.5 Berger v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2009/A/1948)...... B1.51, B1.55, B1.56, B1.57, B1.59, B1.60; C18.27 Berkele Degfa v TAF & IAAF (CAS 2013/A/3080)................................ C10.1; C19.7; C19.8 Berkely Community Villages Ltd v Pullen [2007]  EWHC  1330 (Ch), [2007] 6 WLUK 93, [2007] 3 EGLR 101, [2007] 24 EG 169 (CS), [2007] NPC 71......... B5.7 Bernhard v ITU (CAS 98/222)............................................................................ C6.42, C6.49 Beşiktaş JK v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2824)...................................................................... B5.66 Besitkas JK v UEFA (CAS 2013/A/3258)......................... B1.4, B1.23, B1.54, B1.57, B3.187 Bility v FIFA (CAS 2015/A/4311).................................................................................. A5.45 Billington v FIBT CAS Salt Lake City (2002/005, 18 February 2002)................ B1.56, B1.60; D2.157 Birkner (Maria Belen Simari) v Comite Olimpico Argentino (COA) & Federacion Argentina de Ski y Andinismo (FASA) (CAS OG 14/003)........................ B2.15, B2.51, B2.99; D2.40 Birmingham City Football Club plc v R & C Comrs (2007) UK VAT 20151....... F2.128; I1.65 Bitar v Nuffield Health [2017] UKET 2206631/2016.................................................... F1.7 Blackler v New Zealand Rugby Football League [1968] NZLR 547...... E2.14; E10.4, E10.11; F3.53 Blackpool FC v Club Topp Osslbid (CAS 2006/A/1027)............................................... F3.255 Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 1 WLR 1195...... E8.2 Blain v Splain [1994] FSR 497....................................................................................... H4.7 Blair v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 30 July 2018)....... C16.2; C17.6; C18.5, C18.12 Blanco v USADA (CAS 2010/A/2185).......................... C4.16, C4.33, C4.45; C6.21, C6.22, C6.23, C6.46; C7.3 Bland v Sparkes (for the Amateur Swimming Association) (The Times, 17 December 1999), Cal B1.23; E2.9; E4.5 Blass v Cycling New Zealand (NZST 06/19)................................................................. B2.47 Blatter v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4501)................................ A5.3; B1.40, B1.44; B3.164, B3.174 Bloomsbury International Ltd v Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs [2011]  UKSC  25, [2011] 1  WLR  1546, [2011] 4 All ER  721, [2011] 6 WLUK 297, [2011] 3 CMLR 32, (2011) 161 NLJ 883....................................... B1.57 Boevski v IWF (CAS 2004/A/607)......................................... B4.38; C4.34; C5.5; C6.6, C6.7, C6.18; C7.1; C10.1 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, [1957] 2 All ER 118, [1955-95] PNLR 7, (1957) 101 SJ 357, QBD............................... G1.26, G1.59 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC  232, [1997] 3 WLR  1151, [1997] 4 All ER 771, [1997] 11 WLUK 222, [1998] PIQR P10, [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 26, (1998) 39  BMLR  1, [1998]  PNLR  1, (1997) 94 (47)  LSG  30, (1997) 141 SJLB 238.................................................................................. G1.26, G1.59 Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, [1994] 2 All ER 486, [1994] COD 295, CA...................................................................................... A1.68; B4.41; C16.1; C20.10

Table of Cases  lxiii

para Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078, [1951] 1 TLR 977, 50 LGR 32, (1951) 95 SJ 333, HL..................................................... G1.86, G1.121, G1.122, G1.138 Bony v Kacou [2017] EWHC 2146 (Ch), [2017] 9 WLUK 19........ C3.3; D3.8, D3.29, D3.31; E8.1, E8.9; E16.17; F2.170, F2.171; F3.202 Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Amalgamated Racing Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 (Ch), [2009] UKCLR 547, Ch D........................... E11.53, E11.254 Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Wilf Gilbert (Staffordshire) Ltd [1994] FSR 723 Ch D............................................................................................. H1.76 Bosman case see Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman (C-415/93) Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch. D. 339, CA.............. F1.38, F1.57 Botta v Italy (21439/93) (1998) 26 EHRR 241, 4 BHRC 81, (1999) 2 CCL Rep 53, [1998] HRCD 302, ECtHR..................................................................................... H4.54 Bouras v International Judo Federation (CAS 99/A/230)............. B1.22, B1.56, B1.61; C4.15 Bournemouth & Boscombe AFC  v Manchester United Football Club (The Times, 22 May 1980), CA............................................................................ F1.28, F1.42; F3.237 Boxing Australia v AIBA (CAS 2008/O/1455)............................. B1.6, B1.21, B1.27, B1.29, B1.37, B1.47; B2.80 Boyle v SCA Packaging Ltd [2009] UKHL 37, [2009] 4 All ER 1181, [2009] NI 317, [2009] 7 WLUK 2, [2009] ICR 1056, [2009] IRLR 746, (2009) 109 BMLR 53, (2009) 153 (26) SJLB 27........................................................................................ E16.9 Boyo v Lambeth London BC  [1994] 3  WLUK  115, [1994]  ICR  727, [1995] IRLR 50.................................................................................................................. F1.77 Bradley v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, [2005] 7 WLUK 253, [2006] LLR 1; aff’d [2004] EWHC 2164, [2004] 10 WLUK 1, [2007] LLR 543................. A1.9, A1.68; B1.4, B1.6, B1.31, B1.36; B2.11; B4.41; B5.96; D1.8, D1.34; D3.2; E3.4, E3.5, E3.9, E3.12; E4.2, E4.3; E5.4; E6.1, E6.2, E6.8; E7.1, E7.6, E7.8, E7.15, E7.16, E7.17, E7.18, E7.20, E7.21, E7.22, E7.23, E7.24, E7.25, E7.26, E7.27, E7.28, E7.29, E7.30, E7.31, E7.32, E7.33, E7.35, E7.36, E7.40, E7.49, E7.56, E7.57, E7.60, E7.82, E7.83, E7.84; E8.14, E8.15; E10.2, E10.24, E10.25, E10.27, E10.32; E11.127; E13.1, E13.42; E15.23, E15.32, E15.33, E15.34; E16.2 Brady (Kieron) v Sunderland Football Club (unreported, 17 November 1998)............. F1.33 Brady v PKF (UK) LLP [2011] EWHC 3178, QBD...................................................... E15.15 Braganza v BP  Shipping Ltd [2015]  UKSC  17, [2015] 1 WLR  1661, [2015] 4 All ER  639, [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 240, [2015] 3  WLUK  513, [2015]  ICR  449, [2015] IRLR 487, [2015] Pens LR 431.............................................. B1.36; E7.40; E8.2 Bratty v A-G of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 WLR 965, [1961] 3 All ER 523, (1962) 46 Cr App R 1, (1961) 105 SJ 865, HL......................................... G2.63 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, HL....................................................................................... F2.14 Bray v New Zealand Sports Drug Agency [2001] 2 NZLR 160, 166, NZCA................ C4.10 Brennan v ERC (ERC Appeal Tribunal, 1 June 2007).................................................... B3.81 Brennan v Health Professions Council [2011]  EWHC  41 (Admin), (2011) 119 BMLR 1, QBD................................................................................................ B4.41; E2.7 Brescia Calcio SpA v West Ham United FC Plc (ICAS, 26 June 2012)(2012) 3 Int SLR 40.............................................................................................. D2.32, D2.85; E7.70 Breuer, Derr, Krabbe case (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 20 November 1993)............. C6.57; C7.1 Brewer v Delo [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 488....................................................................... G1.101 Breyer (Patrick) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland) (Case C-582/14) [2017] 1 WLR 1569, [2016] 10 WLUK 420, [2017] 2 CMLR 3, [2017] CEC 691, 42 BHRC 700......... A4.10, A4.50 Bridport & West Dorset Golf Club Ltd (Case C-495/12) [2014]  STC  663, [2013] 12 WLUK 671, [2014] BVC 1, [2014] STI 257..................................................... I1.57 Briggs v Professional Combat Sports Commission [2012]  WASAT  57, 27  March 2012, [2011] WASAT 30......................................................................................... E2.7

lxiv  Table of Cases

para Brimsmeade & Sons Ltd v Brimsmeade & Waddington & Sons Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 706, CA........................................................................................................................... H1.131 Bristol Conservatories Ltd v Conservatories Custom Built Ltd [1989] RPC 455 CA... H1.132 British Aircraft Corp v Austin [1978] IRLR 332, EAT................................................... F1.33 British Airline Pilots Association v British Airways Citiflyer Ltd [2018] EWHC 1889 (QB), [2018] 5 WLUK 93....................................................................................... E15.20 British Airways Plc v Commission of the European Communities (T-219/99) [2004] All ER (EC) 1115, [2003] ECR II-5917, [2004] 4 CMLR 19, CFI............ E11.18 British Airways Plc v Sindicato Espanol de Pilotes de Lineas Areas [2013] EWHC 1657.............................................................................................. E12.122 British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell [1980]  ICR  303, [1978]  IRLR  379, (1978) 13 ITR 560, EAT..................................................................................................... F1.59 British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd [2005] EWCA (Civ) 863, [2005] 7 WLUK 318, [2006] ECC 16, [2005] ECDR 28, [2005] RPC 35, (2005) 155 NLJ 1183.............................................................................................. H1.98 British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Ltd [2001]  EWCA  Civ 1268, [2002] ECC 24, [2002] ECDR 4, [2002] Masons CLR 1, (2001) 24(9) IPD 24059, CA........................................................................................................................... H1.96 British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Ltd [2001] RPC 612.............................. H1.95 British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill (C-203/02) [2009] Bus LR  932, [2004] ECR I-10415, [2004] 11 WLUK 206, [2005] 1 CMLR 15, [2005] CEC 68, [2005] ECDR 1, [2005] Info TLR 157, [2005] RPC 13............... H1.94, H1.97, H1.100 British Judo Association v Petty [1981] ICR 660, [1981] IRLR 484, EAT.................... E2.14 British Olympic Association v World Anti-Doping Agency (CAS 2011/A/2658)......... B1.11, B1.35; B2.18; C4.13; E2.2, E2.14, E2.43; E7.55, E8.8 British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, Virgin Media, The Football Association Premier League Ltd, British Telecommunications Plc v Office of Communications Competition Appeal Tribunal, 8 August 2012 [2012] CAT 20.................................................... E2.51 British Sky Broadcasting Ltd v Office of Communications Competition Appeal Tribunal 9 November 2010 [2010] CAT 29, [2011] Comp AR 3........................... E2.51 British Telcommunications plc v Office of Communications [2014] EWCA Civ 133, [2014] 4 All ER 673, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 973, [2014] Bus LR 713, [2014] 2 WLUK 510........................................................................................... E2.51; E11.224 British Triathlon Association v Tim Don (Tribunal, 29 September 2006).............. C9.1, C9.3 British Westinghouse Eletcric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Rlys Co of London Ltd (No 2) [1912] AC 673, [1912] 7 WLUK 88.............................. F1.78 Brothers v FINA (CAS 2016/A/4631).............................................. C8.2, C8.5; C18.3; C20.6 Brown v Gould [1972] Ch  53, [1971] 3 WLR  334, [1971] 2 All ER  1505, (1971) 22 P & CR 871, (1971) 115 SJ 406 Ch D............................................................... F3.226 Browing v Odyssey Trust Co Ltd, Belfast Giants 2008 Ltd [2014] NIQB 39................ G1.105 Bruin v FINA, (CAS 98/211)............................................................................... C6.25; D2.98 Bruno Heiderscheid v Franck Ribéry (CAS 2007/0/1310)............................................. F2.139 Bruyneel v USADA; Marti v USADA; World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Bruyneel (CAS 2014/A/3598).......................................... C3.8; C17.20; C20.22, C20.24 Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353......................................... E10.4, E10.9, E10.11; F3.53 Bulgarian Chess Federation v Fédération Internationale des Echechs (FIDE) (CAS 2012/A/2943).................................... B1.27, B1.57; D2.59, D2.73, D2.74, D2.130 Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU) (CAS 2014/A/3863)....... A1.29, A1.43, A1.56, A1.60 Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd v Williams [2008] NSWSC 822, SC (NSW)........... F1.80 Bunn v FEI (CAS 2000/A/313)...................................................................................... C6.10 Burgess v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Decision SR/062/2020, 29 April 2020).... C17.5; C18.21 Burghartz v Switzerland (A/280-B) [1994] 2 FCR 235, (1994) 18 EHRR 101, [1995] Fam Law 71, ECtHR............................................................................................... E13.59 Burke v Cycling Canada & UCI (SDRCC, 2 October 2013).......................................... C18.19 Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2821)........... B5.56, B5.57, B5.59, B5.65

Table of Cases  lxv

para Buscarini v San Marino (Application 24645/94) [1999] 2  WLUK  314, (2000) 30 EHRR 208, 6 BHRC 638................................................................................... E13.62 Butcher (Terry Ian) v Jessop, 1989 JC 55, 1989 SLT 593, 1989 SCCR 119, HC of Justiciary................................................................................................................ G2.84 Butt v ICC (CAS 2011/A/2364).......................................... A1.9; B1.6; B4.22, B4.26, B4.41, B4.42; E7.66, E7.67; E16.22 C C v D [2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 557, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 367, [2007] 6 WLUK 670, [2007] 1 CLC 1038...................................... D3.7, D3.69 C v FINA (CAS 2002/A/430; 6 June 2003).................................................................... C5.9 C v M (FIFA DRC, 6 August 2009)................................................................................ F3.257 CBDG v FIBT (CAS OG 10/02).................................................................................... B2.89 CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11, [2007] 2 FLR 301, [2008] 2 FCR 505, [2007] Fam Law 591, QBD................................................................. H4.63 CCES v Adams (CAS 2007/A/1312).............................................................................. C18.6 CCES v Adams (SDRCC DT-06-0039).......................................................................... C18.6 CCES v Aubut (SDRCC, 2 March 2009)........................................................................ C20.21 CCES v Bains (SDRCC DT Decision 20-0323)............................................................. C17.8 CCES v Barber (SDRCC, 11 August 2016).................................................................... C18.19 CCES v Boyle (SDRCC DT 07-0058).................................................................... C8.5; C18.3 CCES v Brown (SRDCC Doping Appeal Tribunal, 20 April 2015)............................... C18.5 CCES v Earle (DT 15-0230, 28 July 2015).................................................................... C21.12 CCES v Galle (SDRCC Doping Tribunal, 23 April 2009)............. C3.7; C7.3; C18.24; C20.6; C22.12 CCES v Garieny (SDRCC Doping Tribunal 19 January 2012)...................................... C20.20 CCES v Gerhart (SDRCC No DT 13-0192)................................................................... C8.5 CCES v Haack (SDRCC Decision, 22 May 2012)............................................. C12.4; C20.20 CCES v Jamnicky (SDRCC Decision, 16 August 2019)...................... C17.5; C18.19; C20.19 CCES v Lee (SDRCC Decision, 21 December 2019).................................................... C17.8 CCES v Lelievre (SDRCC Decision, 7 February 2005)......................... C6.16; C18.6, C18.20 CCES v Moscariello (SDRCC DT 09-0097, 14 December 2009).................................. C20.22 CCES v Novia (DT 15-0234, 16 September 2015)........................................................ C21.12 CCES v Picard (DT 15-0235, 13 October 2015)............................................................ C21.12 CCES v Sheppard (SDRCC Decision12 September 2005)............ C4.38; C6.30; C7.3; C17.2 CCES v Thomassin (SDRCCC Decision 15 April 2018)............................................... C18.19 CCES v Thompson (SDRCC DT Decision 19-0316, 3 October 2019).......................... C4.28 CCES v Valiquette (SDRCC, 9 December 2014)........................................................... C18.6 CCES v Welsh (DT 15-0228, 8 July 2015)..................................................................... C21.12 CCES v Zardo (SDRCC DT-05-0023)........................................................ C8.2, C8.5; C20.10 CCGS v Shulga (SDRCC, 20 September 2013)................................................ C6.60; C18.32 CH  Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1  WLR  307, [1972] 1  All ER  960, (1971) 116 SJ 176, Ch D.................................................................................................... F1.80 CJ Motorsport Consulting v Bird [2019] EWHC 2330 (QB), [2020] 1 All ER (Comm) 279, [2019] 9 WLUK 5, [2019] IRLR 1080................................... E10.1; F1.22; F2.165 CNOSF, BOA, USOC v FEI & NOCG (CAS OG 04/007)............................................ D2.63 CNOSF, BOA, USOC v FEI & NOCG (CAS OG 04/008)............................................ D2.152 COA v FIS (CAS OG 02/002)........................................................................................ B2.51 COC & Scott v IOC (CAS 2002/0/273)......................................................................... D2.133 CONI & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Petacchi (CAS 2007/A/1362)........... B1.44; C6.32; C22.4 CONI (CAS 2000/C/255)........................................................... A1.29, A1.30; A5.27; B1.10, B1.12, B1.21 CONI (CAS 2005/C/841)...................................................... A1.9; B1.6, B1.15, B1.22, B1.39 CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch).... B5.7 Caballero (Carlos Javier Acuna) v FIFA & Associacion Paraguaya de Futbol (CAS 2005/A/956).................................................................................................. F3.147 Cadiz CFSAD v FIFA & Associacion Paraguaya de Futbol (CAS 2005/A/955)........... F3.147, F3.254

lxvi  Table of Cases

para Calder & Jarvis v FISA (CAS OG 04/005).................................................................... D2.152 Caldwell v Maguire & Fitzerald [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [2001] 3 ISLR 224...... G1.8, G1.9, G1.14, G1.17, G1.18, G1.20, G1.21, G1.23, G1.28, G1.29, G1.55, G1.110, G1.111 Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228, HL.................. E9.5 Calvin v Carr [1980]  AC  574, [1979] 2  WLR  755, [1979] 2  All ER  440, (1979) 123 SJ 112, PC (Aust)....................................................................... D1.121; E6.1; E7.72 Cameron v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (CAS 2019/A/6110)..................... B1.6; C17.8; C18.6 Campagnolo v Benalla & District Football League Inc [2009] VSC 228, 11 June 2009, SC (Victoria)........................................................................................................... E2.14 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004]  UKHL  22, [2004] 2  AC  457, [2004] 2 WLR 1232, [2004] 2 All ER 995, [2004] EMLR 15, [2004] HRLR 24, [2004]  UKHRR  648, 16  BHRC  500, (2004) 101(21)  LSG  36, (2004) 154 NLJ 733, (2004) 148 SJLB 572, HL.......................... E13.31, E13.59; H4.63, H4.72 Campbell v United Kingdom (13590/88) (1993) 15 EHRR 137, ECtHR...................... E13.60 Campbell v United Kingdom (A/80) (1985) 7 EHRR 165, ECtHR............................... E13.49 Campbell-Brown v JAAA v IAAF (CAS 2014/A/3487).................. B1.7; C6.5, C6.13, C6.14, C6.15, C6.22, C6.24 Canadian Olympic Committee & Beckie Scott v IOC (CAS 2002/O/373)......... B1.16, B1.57; D2.62, D2.148, D2.152 Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch), [2019] 2 WLUK 275, 183 Con LR 167, [2019] L & TR 14................................... E11.4 Canas v ATP Tour (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2007, ATF 133 III 235)... C4.17; D2.54, D2.70, D2.74, D2.171, D2.186 Cañas v ATP Tour1 (CAS 2005/A/951).................................. C6.7; C18.16, C18.19; C20.12; C23.6, D2.187 Cañas v Commission (T-508/09), General Court (Order of 26 March 2012)................. E5.13 Canoe Kayak Canada v Austin Denman (CCES Decision, 7 May 2014)....................... C18.27 Cantanae v Shoshana (1987) 10 IPR 289 (Federal Court).............................................. H4.49 Caparo Industries v Dickman [2001] QB 1134, [2001] 2 WLR 1256, [2001] PIQR P16, (2001) 98(12) LSG 44, (2001) 145 SJLB 31, CA................................... G1.5, G1.6 Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire CC  [1997]  QB  1004, [1997] 3  WLR  331, [1997] 2 All ER 865, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161, (1997) 147 NLJ 599, (1997) 141 SJLB 92, CA.................................................................................................... G1.74 Carabba v Anacorted School District No 103 435 P 2d 936 (1967)............................... G1.57 Cartier International AG  v British Telecommunciations plc [2018]  UKSC  28, [2018] 1  WLR  3259, [2018] 4 All ER  373, [2018] 2 All ER (Comm) 1057, [2018] Bus LR 1417, [2018] 6 WLUK 226, [2018] ECC 29, [2018] ETMR 32, [2018] ECDR 16, [2018] EMLR 22, [2018] RPC 11............................................. H1.148 Carlton Communications Plc v Football League [2002] EWHC 1650, [2002] All ER (D) 1, QBD......................................................................................... E2.48, E2.51; H2.63 Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204, [1975] 3 All ER 158, [1975] 7 WLUK 83, (1975) 61 Cr App R 275, [1975] Crim LR 714, (1975) 119 SJ 560............. B1.57, B1.60 Casas Vaque v FEI (CAS 2019/A/6202)............... B1.22, B1.54; B3.59, B3.59, B3.61, B3.137 Case 32150 Eurovision [2000] OJ L151/18................................... E11.225, E11.232, E11.271 Case 32524 Screensport/EBU [991] OJ L63/32......................................................... E11.224 Case 33384 & 33378 Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup [1992] OJ L326/31.................................................................................. E11.68, E11.207 Case 36237 TPS+7 [1999] OJOJ 1999 L 90/6............................................................. E11.227 Case 36539 British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, 1999 OJ L312/1......................... E11.224 Case 36888 1998 Football World Cup [2000] OJ L5/55..................... E2.53, E2.56; E11.198, E11.202, E11.203 Case 37.576 (UEFA’s broadcasting rules) [2000] OJ C121/14.................... E11.279, E11.280 Case 37214 Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga [2005]  OJ L134/46.................................................................................. E11.228, E11.245, E11.263 Case 37398 Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League [2003] OJ L291/25................................................... E11.68, E11.227, E11.228, E11.230, E11.231, E11.242, E11.243, E11.244, E11.245, E11.246, E11.263

Table of Cases  lxvii

para Case 37576  UEFA  Broadcasting Regulations [2001]  OJ L171/12 [2001] 5 CMLR 654.............................................................................................. E11.59, E11.77 Case 37932 Cupido v UEFA, Euro 2000 & ISL Marketing AG................................... E11.198 Case 38287 Telenor/Canal+/Canal Digital, para 28...................................................... E11.228 Case JV.37 BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV................................................................................. E11.228 Case M.2876 Newscorp/Telepiu, OJ 2004 L 110/73................... E11.227, E11.228, E11.260, E11.268, E11.270, E11.274 Case M.469 MSG Media Service, [1994] OJ L 364/1.................................................. E11.228 Case M.779 Bertelsmann/CLT [1996] OJ C364/3........................................................ E11.227 Case M.993 Bertelsmnann/Kirch/Premiere, [1999] OJ L53/1....................... E11.228, E11.231 Case M.4066, 19 January 2006 [2006] OJ L134/46...................... E11.224, E11.227, E11.331 Case M.5659 Daimler AG, IPIC, Brawn Grand Prix (13 Hanuary 2010).................... E11.331 Case M.6380 Bridgepont, Infront Sports & Media (19 January 2012)........................ E11.331 Case M.7000 Liberty Global /Ziggo (30 May 2018).................................................... E11.331 Case No COMP/JV.37 BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV Case...................................................... E11.331 Case No COMP/M.2483–Group Canal+/RTL/GJCD/JV............................................. E11.331 Case Nos IV/F-1/33.055 & 35.759 [1996] 4 CMLR 885............................ E11.189, E11.290 Case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu v Romania (Application 47848/08)........................................................................................... E13.75 Casini v FC Vestel Manisaspor....................................................................................... F2.137 Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 615.................................................. G1.136 Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants see Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools Catley v St John’s Ambulance Brigade (unreported, 25 November 1988)..................... G1.61 Caucchioli v CONI & UCI (CAS 2010/A/2178)............................ B1.44; C4.16; C7.8, C7.11 Cavanagh v The FA (FA Appeal Board, 23 October 2009)............................................ B4.37 Cavendish Square Holding BV  v Makdessi [2015]  UKSC  67, [2016]  AC  1172, [2015] 3 WLR  1373, [2016] 2 All ER  519, [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 55, [2015] 11 WLUK 78, [2015] 2 CLC 686, [2016] BLR 1, 162 Con LR 1, [2016] RTR 8, [2016] CILL 3769................................................................................................... F1.79 Cellino v Football League (5 April 2014)................................................ B1.51, B1.56, B1.57 Celtic v UEFA (CAS 98/201)...................................................... A1.32; B1.14, B1.53, B1.56, B1.57; D2.133; F3.239 Centro Europa 7 SrL v Italy (Application 38433/09) [2012] 6 WLUK 105...... E13.43, E13.44 Chagnaud v FINA (CAS 1995/A/141)............................................................................ C23.2 Chalmers Brown [2003] NICA 7.................................................................................... E13.72 Chambers v British Olympic Association [2008] EWHC 2028 QBD........ A1.9; B1.6, B1.34; E2.2, E2.43; E7.1, E7.6, E7.31, E7.32, E7.56; E10.4, E10.27; E11.127; E15.4, E15.7, E15.9 Chand v IAAF & AFI (CAS 2014/A/3759)....................... A1.30; B1.4, B1.10, B1.11, B1.13, B1.28, B1.34, B1.35; B2.38 Chandimal v ICC (25 June 2018)................................................................................... B1.61 Chanpanich v FA of Thailand (FAT (CAS 2013/A/3389).............................................. A5.34 Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786, CA........................................................................... G1.32 Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch  71, [1966] 2 WLR  40, [1965] 3 All ER 764, (1965) 109 SJ 871, CA..................................................................... F2.144 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009]  UKHL  38, [2009] 1  AC  1101, [2009] 3 WLR 267, [2009] 4 All ER 677, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 365, [2009] Bus LR  1200, [2009]  BLR  551, 125 Con LR  1, [2010] 1  P  & CR  9, [2009] 3 EGLR 119, [2009] CILL 2729, [2009] 27 EG 91 (CS), (2009) 153(26) SJLB 27, [2009] NPC 87, [2009] NPC 86, HL.................................... B1.54, B1.57, B1.59; B2.16 Chelsea FC v RC Lens & FIFA (re Kakuta) (CAS 2009/A/1976)................................. E16.23 Chelsea v Adrian Mutu (CAS 2006/A/1192).................................................................. B1.49 Chelsea FC v FIFA (CAS 2019/A/6301)....................... B5.24; E2.21; F3.137, F3.147, F3.254 Chelsea v Mutu (CAS 2005/A/876, CAS 2006/A/1192)............ D2.65, D2.167; F1.48, F1.49, F1.79; F3.261 Cheltenham BC v Laird [2009] EWHC 1253 (QB), [2009] IRLR 621, QBD............... F1.36 Chemidus Wavin v TERI [1978] 3 CMLR 614, CA....................................................... E11.46 Cheney Bros v Doris Silk Corpn (1929) 35 F 2d 279..................................................... H1.13

lxviii  Table of Cases

para Chep & SSAF v SSNOC (CAS OG 16/005)....................................................... B2.53, B2.84 Chepalova v FIS (CAS 2010/A/2041)................................. C6.6, C6.23, C6.30, C6.40; C22.4 Cheruvier (t/a Fleur Estelle Belly Dance School) v R & C Comrs [2014] UKFTT 7 (TC), [2013] 12 WLUK 547................................................................................... I1.128 Chiapas Football Club v Cricuma Esporte Clube & Reinaldo de Souza (CAS 2006/A/1189, CAS 2007A/1329-1330)........................................................ D2.65 Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation (CAS 2000/A/278)................... B2.15, B2.50, B2.51, B2.81 Chicago Professional Sports LP v NBA 95 F 3d 593, 598–99 (7th Cir 1996)............... E11.49 Chicherova v IOC (CAS 2016/A/4839).......................................... C3.7; C6.23, C6.25; C23.2 Chief Adjudication Officer v Maguire [1999] 1 WLR 1178........................................... B1.36 Chittock v Woodbridge School [2002] EWCA Civ 915, [2002] ELR 735, [2003] PIQR P6, (2002) 99(32) LSG 33, (2002) 146 SJLB 176, CA............................... G1.31, G1.52 Chiyangwa v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5098)............................................................. A5.34, A5.45 Chorherr v Austria (A/266-B) (1993) 17 EHRR 358, ECtHR........................................ E13.66 Christianuyi Ltd v R  & C  Comrs [2018]  UKUT  10 (TCC), [2018]  STC  1863, [2018] 1 WLUK  258, [2018]  BTC  504, aff’d [2019]  EWCA  Civ 474, [2019] 1  WLR  5272, [2019] 3 All ER  178, [2019]  STC  681, [2019] 3  WLUK  310, [2019] BTC 10, [2019] STI 853............................................................................. I2.56 Chung (Mong Joon) v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5086)............ A5.46; B1.22, B1.23, B1.39, B1.44; B4.32; C4.16; D2.161, D2.162 Church of X v United Kingdom (Application 3798/68) 12 YB 306 (1969)................... E13.63 Cielo v FINA (CAS 2011/A/2495-2498) see FINA v Cielo Cilic v ITF (CAS 2013/A/3327).......................................... C17.15; C18.22, C18.24, C18.25, C18.26, C18.32; C20.2, C20.6, C20.7, C20.8, C20.9 Cityhook Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 18.............................................................................. E11.41 Clansman Sporting Club Ltd v Robinson (unreported, 5 May 1995)..................... F1.21, F1.39 Clarke v Earl of Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 HL................................... E8.1, E8.9 Clarke v Lloyd [2011] EWHC 4079 (QB)...................................................................... F2.107 Clarke v Price (1819) 2 Wils Ch 157, 37 ER 270, [1819] 7 WLUK 43......................... F1.80 Clark (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Oceanic Contractors Incorporated [1983] 2 AC 130, [1983] 2 WLR 94, [1983] 1 All ER 133, [1983] STC 35, [1982] 12 WLUK 161, 56 TC 183, (1982) 13 ATR 901, (1983) 133 NLJ 62, (1983) 127 SJ 54........ I1.93; I2.53 Claymore Dairies Ltd & Arla Foods UK plc v OFT [2005] CAT 30.............................. E11.18 Cleghorn v Oldham (1927) 43 TLR 465......................................................................... G1.7 Club A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 2 July 2015).......................................... D2.185, D2.190 Club A v Club B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 28 August 2014)................ D2.65, D2.178, D2.183 Club Atletico de Madrid SAD v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4805; 1 June 2017)......... E2.21; F3.137, F3.147 Club Atlético de Madrid SAD  v Sport Lisboa E  Benfica – Futebol SAD & FIFA (Federal Tribunal, 13 April 2010 (4A_490/2009).......................... D2.65, D2.67, D2.193 Club Atletico Penarol v Carlos Heber Bueno Suarez & Christian Gabriel Rodriquez Barotti & Paris Saint Germain (CAS 2005/A/983 &984)........................ D2.160; F3.160 Club Atletico Velez Sarsfifeld v Football Association Ltd, Manchester City FC & FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4903, 16 April 2018).............................................................. E12.84 Club Guarani v G & Club FC St Gallen AG (CAS 2005/A/878)................................... F3.255 Club Samsunspor v Umar & Fédération Internationale de Football Association (CAS 2015/A/4220; 12 July 2016)......................................................................... F1.73 Club Sekondi Hasaacas FC v Club Borussia Monchengladbach (CAS 2007/A/1219)..... F3.160, F3.222 Club X v D & FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3765).............................................................. B1.22, B1.57 Club X v Club Y; Club X v FIFA (32/2016)................................................................... F3.276 Clubol Sportiv Municipal Ramnicu Valcea v RFF & RPFL (CAS 2014/A/3855)......... B1.36 Clyde & Co LLP v Bates van Winkelhof [2011] EWHC 668 (QB), [2011] CP Rep 31, [2012] ICR 928, [2011] IRLR 467, [2011] Arb LR 7, (2011) 155(12) SJLB 30, QBD........................................................................................................................ D3.52 Coal Authority v HJ Banks & Co Ltd [1997] Eu LR 610 QBD..................................... E16.25 Coditel SA v Cine Vog Films SA (Coditel I) (62/79) [1980] ECR 881.......................... H2.96

Table of Cases  lxix

para Coditel SA  v Cine Vog Films SA (Coditel II) (262/81) [1982]  ECR  3381, [1983] 1 CMLR 49, (1983) FSR 148, ECJ........................... E11.232, E11.237, E11.266; H2.96 Coetzee v Comitis [2001] 4 BCLR 323.......................................................................... F3.53 Cofemel v G-Star Raw (Judgment, 12 September 2019).................................... H1.65; H5.22 Colgan v the Kennel Club [2010] 10 WLUK 709, QBD........................ D1.14, D1.50; D3.68; E2.10; E7.18, E7.57, E7.67 Collett v Smith [2009]  EWCA  Civ 583, (2009) 106(26)  LSG  18, (2009) 153(24) SJLB 34 CA............................................................................................................ G1.153 Collier v Sunday Referee Publishing Co Ltd [1940] 2 KB 647, [1940] 4 All ER 234, KBD........................................................................................................................ F1.30 Collins v Lane (unreported, 22 June 1999), CA........ E4.5; E7.7, E7.50, E7.64, E7.72; E15.39 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, [1984] 3 All ER 374, [1984] 4 WLUK 145, (1984) 79 Cr App R  229, (1984) 148  JP  692, [1984] Crim LR  481, (1984) 81 LSG 2140, (1984) 128 SJ 660............................................................................ G1.11 Collins v NBPA & Grantham, United States DC, District of Colorado, 850 F Supp 1468 (1991), affirmed per curiam, 976 F 2d 740 (10th Cir 1992).......................... F2.87 Commission Decision 1990 World Cup, para 47 [1994] 5 CMLR 253........... E11.69, E11.70 Commission of the European Communities v France (167/73) 1974] ECR 359, [1974] 2 CMLR 216, ECJ.............................................................................................. E12.122 Commission of the European Communities v France (C-334/94) [1996] ECR I-1307, ECJ.......................................................................................................................... E12.25 Commission of the European Communities v France (C-262/02) [2005] All ER (EC) 157, [2004] ECR I-6569, [2004] 3 CMLR 1, ECJ..................................... E2.47; E12.57 Commission of the European Communities v France (C-200/08).................................. E12.56 Commission v France (Case C-429/02).......................................................................... E12.57 Commission v France (Case C-94/09) [2012] STC 573, [2010] ECR I-4261, [2010] 5 WLUK 79............................................................................................................. I1.51 Commission v France; Bacardi France SAS  v Television Francaise 1  SA (TF1) [2004] ECR I-6569, [2004] 3 CMLR 1, [2005] All ER (EC) 157.......................... E5.14 Commission of the European Communities v Infront WM AG (C-125/06  P) 2008] ECR I-1451, [2008] 2 CMLR 28, ECJ............................................. E2.49; E12.62 Commission of the European Communities v Italy (C-118/85) [1987]  ECR  2599, [1988] 3 CMLR 255, ECJ....................................................................................... E11.65 Commission of the European Communities v Spain (C-153/08) [2009] ECR I-9735, [2010] 1 CMLR 30, ECJ......................................................................................... E12.68 Commission of the European Communities v Tetra Laval BV (C-12/03 P) [2005] All ER (EC) 1059, [2005] ECR I-987, [2005] 4 CMLR 8, ECJ................................... E11.18 Comr of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11, [2019] AC 196, [2018] 2 WLR 895, [2018] 3 All ER 469, [2018] 2 WLUK 453, [2018] 1 Cr App R 31, [2018] HRLR 11..................................................................................................... E13.10 Comr of Police of the Metropolis v Thorpe [2015]  EWHC  3339 (Admin), [2016] 4 WLR 7, [2015] 11 WLUK 426, [2016] 1 Cr App R (S) 46, (2016) 180 JP 16, [2016] ACD 12............................................................................................ A3.72; E13.68 Common Wealth Games / CGC & Triathlon Canada (CAS CG 02/001)....................... B1.56 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA  v Commission of the European Communities (C-395/96 P) [2000] All ER (EC) 385, [2000] ECR I-1365, [2000] 4 CMLR 1076, ECJ................................................................................................ E11.17 Company X v Switzerland (Application 7865/77) 16 DR 85 (1981)............................. E13.63 Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866, [1985] 2 All ER 453, (1985) 135 NLJ 485, (1985) 129 SJ 382, CA........................................................................ G1.1, G1.7, G1.15, G1.22 Confederaçao Brasiliera de Desporto no Gelo & Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing v Fabiana Santos (CAS 10/02, 12 February 2010)..................... D2.40 Conrad v Inner London Education Authority (1967) 65 LGR 543................................. G1.53 Conteh v Onslow- Fane (for the British Board of Boxing Control) (The Times, 26 June 1975)....................................................................................................................... G2.70 Conway v Irish Tug of War Association, Tug of War International Federation [2011] IEHC 245 7 June 2011................................................................................ E2.16 Cook v Thomas Linnell & Sons [1977] ICR 770, [1977] IRLR 132, (1977) 12 ITR 330, EAT......................................................................................................................... F1.36

lxx  Table of Cases

para Cooke v Football Association [1972] CLY 516.............................................................. E16.29 Cooper & Grant v BWLA (CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418)................ B1.12; C6.4, C6.10, C6.17 Corbett v Cumbria Kart Racing Club [2013] EWHC 1362, QBD....... G1.89, G1.101, G1.143 Cosentino (Pablo Gustavo) v Ezequiel Matias Schelotto (CAS 2016/A/4554).............. D2.182 Costain Ltd v Tarmac Holdings Ltd [2017]  EWHC  319 (TCC), [2017] 2  All ER (Comm) 645, [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331, [2017] 2 WLUK 725, [2017] 1 CLC 491, [2017] BLR 239, 171 Con LR 183......................................................................... B1.57 Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (13134/87) [1994] 1  FCR  65, (1995) 19 EHRR 112, ECtHR............................................................................................ E13.23 Couch v British Boxing Board of Control (unreported, 31 March 1988 (2304321/97) March 31, 1998, EAT............................................................... B2.6, B2.47, B2.57, B2.94 Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee [2012]  ISLR  3, SLR37-39........................................................................................................ D1.56; E6.2 Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v Saluja [2006] EWHC 2784 (Admin), [2007] 1 WLR 3094, [2007] 2 All ER 905, [2007] LS Law Medical 237, (2006) 92 BMLR 153, [2007] ACD 29, (2006) 156 NLJ 1767, QBD............ B4.38 Coulter v Independent Press Standards Organisation CIC [2018] EWHC 919 (QB)..... E7.6, E7.41 Council of Civil Service Unions v United Kingdom (Application 11603/85) 50 DR 228 (1987)...................................................................................................................... E13.69 Coventry (t/a RDC  Promotions) v Lawrence [2012]  EWCA  Civ 26, [2012] 1 WLR 2127, [2012] 3 All ER 168, [2012] PTSR 1505, 141 Con LR 79, [2012] Env LR 28, [2012] 1 EGLR 165, [2012] 10 EG 88 (CS), (2012) 109(11) LSG 21, (2012) 156(9) SJLB 31, CA............................ G1.127, G1.129, G1.130, G1.131, G1.133 Cowley v Heatley (The Times, 24 July 1986), CA...................... B1.15, B1.35, B1.51; E2.13; E6.1, E6.2; E7.8, E7.52, E7.54, E7.56; E15.16; E16.29 Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] 4  WLUK  370, [1997] EMLR 444, (1997) 16 Tr LR 544, (1997) 20 (7) IPD 20070, (1997) 94 (21) LSG 32, (1997) 141 SJLB 107........................................................................ H4.63 Cresswell v IRC  [1984] 2 All ER  713, [1984]  ICR  508, [1984]  IRLR  190, (1984) 81 LSG 1843, (1984) 134 NLJ 549, (1984) 128 SJ 431, Ch D.............................. F1.36 Crews v AIBA (CAS 2009/A/1985)............................................................................... C4.23 Cricket South Africa v Kleinveldt (SAIDS Disciplinary Panel, 3 April 2012).... C20.6, C20.10 Criminal proceedings against A Case E-1/07 [2007] EFTA Court Report 246.............. E12.73 Criminal Proceedings against Dickinger (C-347/09) 15 September 2011, ECJ............. E12.68 Criminal Proceedings against Gilli & Andres (C788/79) [1981]  ECR  2071, [1980] ECR 2071, [1981] 1 CMLR 146, ECJ..................................................... E12.104 Criminal proceedings against Ibiyinka Awoyemi (C-230/97) [1998]  ECR  I-6781, ECJ.......................................................................................................................... E12.70 Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association (CAS 2010/A/2275)................ A1.43, A1.56, A1.60 Cronin v Greyhound Board of Great Britain Ltd [2013]  EWCA  Civ 668, [2013] 6 WLUK 438................................................................................................. E7.37, E7.60 Crown & Cushion (Chipping Norton) Ltd v R & C Comrs [2016] UKFTT 765 (TC), [2016] 11 WLUK 387............................................................................................. I1.33 Cruzeiro EC v CA Atenas (CAS 2017/A/4994)............................................................. D2.133 Crystal Palace FC (2000) Ltd v Dowie [2007] EWHC 1392 (QB), [2007] IRLR 682, QBD........................................................................................................................ F1.43 Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd, Re [2004] EWHC 2113............................................ E2.29 Crystal Palace v Steve Bruce [2002] 2 ISLR SLR-81.............................. F1.27, F1.81, F1.83; F3.16, F3.218 Culley v Whitehawk Football Club [2017] UKET 2300793/2017................................. F1.29 Cullwick v FINA (CAS 96/149)................................................. B1.19, B1.44, B1.57; D2.133 Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd (1991) 157 LG Rev 481.............................. G1.99 Curaçao Sport & Olympic Federation v International Olympic Committee (CAS 2011/A/2576)..................................................................................... D2.40, D2.55 Currie v Barton (The Times, 12 February 1988)............................. E2.9; E7.6, E7.31, E7.65; E9.6; E10.13, E10.27

Table of Cases  lxxi

para Curry v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Panel, 22 May 2018)........... C17.3, C17.4, C17.8 Cycling Ireland v Kelly (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 27 July 2015).... C19.8; C22.8 Czarnikow Ltd v Roth Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478, (1922) 12 Ll L Rep 195, CA... D3.64 Czech Olympic Committee & Czech Cycling Federation v Union Cycliste Inetrnationale (CAS OG 16/022) ........................................................................... B2.99 Czech Olympic Committee & Swedish Olympic Committee v IIHF (CAS OG 98/004005)................................................................................................................ B1.28, B1.57 D D v FINA (CAS 2002/A/432)......................................................................................... C18.26 D, Re (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland intervening) [2008] UKHL 33.............. D1.103 DFB v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5063)...................................... B1.37, B1.53, B1.54, B1.56, B1.57 DFSNZ v Brightwater-Wharf (STNZ, 29 November 2010)................................. C4.16; C20.5 DFSNZ v Gemmell (CAS 2014/A/2)............................................. B1.44, B1.56; C4.16; C9.1, C9.3; C17.15 DFSNZ v Murray (CAS 2017/A/4937)................................. C5.2, C5.6; C10.1, C10.2; C16.1 DFSNZ v Newman, (STNZ, 31 January 2012)............................ C4.13; C11.2; C16.1; C19.8 DFSNZ v Prestney (New Zealand Sports Tribunal ST 09/11, 15 December 2011)....... C18.24 DFSNZ v Seay (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 28 July 2011)....................................... C18.19 DFNSZ v Stewart (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 6 December 2010)........................... C23.6 DFSNZ v Stewart (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 16 February 2011)................. C7.20; C23.6 DFSNZ v Takerei (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 8 June 2012).................................... C20.13 DH v Czech Republic (57325/00) (2008) 47 EHRR 3, 23 BHRC 526, [2008] ELR 17, ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.71 DPP  v Newbury (Neil) [1977] AC  500, [1976] 2 WLR  918, [1976] 2 All ER  365, (1976) 62 Cr App R 291, [1977] Crim LR 359, (1976) 120 SJ 402, HL................ G2.30 DSN v Blackpool Football Club Ltd [2020] EWHC 595 (QB), [2020] 3 WLUK 208..... G1.36, G1.41 Dacas v Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 217, [2004] ICR 1437, [2004] IRLR 358, CA............................................................................................. F1.8 Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI (CAS OG 06/008)............................. B2.13, B2.15, B2.78, B2.89; D2.133, D2.151 Daniels v WP Rugby (15468/11) [2011] ZAWCHC 481............................................... E5.5 Danilova v IOC (CAS 2002/A/371)................................................................................ C6.30 Danish Tennis Federation Commission, Re (Case Nos IV/F-1/33.955, 35/759) [1996] 4 CMLR 885...................................................................................... E2.45, E2.46; H6.22 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2008/A/1539).......................... B2.64, B2.88 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2008/A/1574)............. B1.23; B2.13, B2.48, B2.49, B2.64, B2.89 Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang & Chino (DRA Disciplinary Committee, 15 June 2018)................................................................................................. B4.22, B4.37, B4.38 Darwin Zamir Andrade Marmolejo Club Deportivo La Equidad Seguros SA & FIFA (Award 24 November 2016).................................................................................... F3.100 Data Protection Comr v Facebook Ireland Ltd & Schrems (Maximillian) (Schrems II) (Case C-311/18) [2020] 7 WLUK 245..................................................... A4.187, A4.196 David Wilson Homes Ltd v Survey Services Ltd (In Liquidation) [2001] EWCA Civ 34, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 449, [2001] BLR 267, (2001) 3 TCLR 13, 80 Con LR 8, CA................................................................................................................. D3.17 Davies v Barnes Webster & Sons Ltd (29 June 2011).................................................... E16.17 Davies v Nottingham Forest FC [2017] EWHC 2095................................. E8.1, E8.9; F2.170 Davis v Carew Pole [1956] 1 WLR 833, [1956] 2 All ER 524, (1956) 100 SJ 510, QBD................................................................................................. D1.20; E2.11; E7.53 Davis v Feasey (unreported, 14 May 1998), CA............................................................ G1.107 Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] EWCA Civ 74, [2017] 1 WLR 3255, [2017] 2 WLUK 461, [2018] WTLR 57.............................................................. A4.157, A4.160 Day v High Performance Sports Ltd [2003] EWHC 197, QBD..................................... G1.50

lxxii  Table of Cases

para Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44 (Comm), [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 991, [2004] 2 CLC 489, [2004] UKCLR 384, [2004] ECC 21, [2004] Eu LR 477, QBD................................... E10.3, E10.31; E11.107 De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Ltd [2019] FCA 688...................... B6.1 De Bonis v CONI & UCI (CAS 2010/A/2174)............................ B1.44; C4.16, C4.31; C6.22; C7.5, C7.8, C7.9, C7.11 Debreceni Vasitas Sport Club (DVSC) v Nenad Novakovic (CAS 2017/A/5111)......... D2.125 De Cubber v Belgium (A/86) (1985) 7 EHRR 236, ECtHR........................................... E13.52 De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430, Ch D...................................................... F1.80 de Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee v IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727........................... D2.140 Del Pino v UIM (CAS 2015/A/3892)..................................................................... C4.31; C6.6 De Moor v Belgium (A/292-A) (1994) 18 EHRR 372, ECtHR..................................... E13.39 Dean Ashton v Wright-Phillips............................................................................... E4.13; E9.2 Deer v University of Oxford; Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM  Co Ltd [2017]  EWCA  Civ 121, [2018]  QB  256, [2017] 3  WLR  811, [2017] 3 WLUK 119............................................................................................ A4.156, A4.160 Delcourt v Belgium (A/11) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 355, ECtHR......................................... E13.36 Deliege v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL (C-51/96 & C-191/97) [2000] ECR I-2549, [2002] 2 CMLR 65 ECJ................. B2.41; E5.13; E6.10; E11.51, E11.66, E11.74, E11.94, E11.152, E11.154, E11.155, E11.156; E12.22, E12.29, E12.30, E12.46, E12.95, E12.98, E12.99, E12.103, E12.119 Demicoli v Malta (A/210) (1992) 14 EHRR 47, ECtHR................................................ E13.52 Demir v Turkey (34503/97) [2009] IRLR 766, (2009) 48 EHRR 54, ECtHR............... E13.68 Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund (12/86) (12/86) 1987]  ECR  3719, [1989] 1 CMLR 421, ECJ.................................................................................................. E12.76 Denisov v Ukraine (Application 76639/11)....................................................... E13.38, E13.50 Denmark Productions v Boscobel Productions (1967) 111 SJ 715, HC......................... F2.144 de Ridder (Dirk) v International Sailing Federation (CAS 2014/A/3620)..................... B3.74 Deripaska v Cherney [2012] EWCA 1235..................................................................... B4.38 Derrick v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4579).............................................................................. A5.45 Despres v CCES (CAS 2008/A/1489 & 1510).................................... C6.51; C18.31, C18.32; C22.9; C23.8 Detroit Lions & Billy Sims v Jerry Argovitz, 580  F  Supp 542, United States DC, Eastern District of Michigan, (1984)...................................................................... F2.88 Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 1  WLR  1580, [1995] 4  All ER 717, [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 113, [1996] 5 Bank LR 109, [1996] BCC 180, (1995) 145 NLJ 1719, (1996) 140 SJLB 21, HL.................................................... B2.16 Deutscher Handballbund eV  v Kolpak (C-438/00) [2003]  ECR  I-4135, [2004] 2 CMLR 38, ECJ................................................... E5.13; E12.4, E12.7, E12.22, E12.45, E12.76, E12.77, E12.81, E12.89, E12.112; E16.26; F3.44, F3.67, F3.70, F3.71, F3.72, F3.74, F3.75 De Vere Golf & Leisure Ltd (Lond/01/055 & 058)........................................................ I1.58 Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC (CAS 2009/A/1752, CAS 2009/A/1753)....... B1.20, B1.61; B2.16; C4.45; C6.5, C6.21, C6.22, C6.45 Deweer v Belgium (A/35) [1980] ECC 169, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 439, ECtHR.............. E13.41 Dextra Accessories Ltd v Macdonald (Inspector of Taxes) [2002] 9  WLUK  18, [2002] STC (SCD) 413, [2003] WTLR 349, [2002] STI 1335............................... I2.54 Diack v IAAF & Ethics Commission of the IAAF (CAS 2016/A/4420)....................... B1.23 Diana Trade Mark, Re [2000] 7 WLUK 939, [2001] ETMR 25.................................... H4.34 Di Mauro v ATP (CAS 2007/A/1427)............................................................................ B4.25 Diethart v IOC (CAS 2007/A/1290)................................................................... C11.2; C20.18 Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain; sub nom Medicaments & Related Classes of Goods (No 2), Re [2001] 1 WLR 700, [2001] UKCLR 550, [2001] ICR 564, [2001] HRLR 17, [2001] UKHRR 429, (2001) 3  LGLR  32, (2001) 98(7)  LSG  40, (2001) 151  NLJ  17, (2001) 145 SJLB 29, CA................................................................. B2.71; E7.22, E7.71; E13.53

Table of Cases  lxxiii

para Dobud v FINA (CAS 2015/A/4163)............................................................................... C8.2 Dogru v France (Application 27058/05) [2008] 12 WLUK 119, (2009) 49 EHRR 8, [2009] ELR 77........................................................................................................ E13.62 Dollingstown Football Club v Irish Football Association [2011]  NIQB  66, [2012] NI 109, [2011] Arb LR 42, QBD................................................................ D3.96 Dominguez v FIA (CAS 2016/A/4772).............................. A1.19; B1.6, B1.16, B1.35, B1.39, B1.53; C3.7; C4.19, C4.21; C20.6 Don King Productions Inc v Warren (No 1) [1998] 2 All ER 608, [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 176, [1998] 3 WLUK 572, [1998] 2 BCLC 132, [1998] RPC 817, (1998) 95 (21) LSG 24, (1998) 142 SJLB 162........................................................................ F1.5 Donà v Mantero (C-13/76) [1976] ECR 1333; [1976] 2 CMLR 578, ECJ......... E5.13; E6.10; E11.51; E12.22, E12.23, E12.28, E12.44, E12.88 Donoghue v Folkestone Properties Ltd [2003]  EWCA  Civ 231, [2003]  QB  1008, [2003] 2 WLR 1138, [2003] 3 All ER 1101, [2003] 2 WLUK 914, (2003) 100 (17) LSG 29, (2003) 147 SJLB 265, [2003] NPC 28............................................. G1.117 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]  AC  562, 1932  SC (HL) 31, 1932  SLT  317, [1932] WN 139, HL................................................................................................ G1.4 Doping Authority Netherlands v Zuijkerbuijk (CAS 2009/A/2012)............... C18.14, C18.20, C18.24; C20.6, C20.11; C21.7 Doping v Wallader see Wallader v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) Dorofeva v ITF (CAS 2016/A/4697)............................................... C3.7, C3.8; C4.23; C12.2, C13.2; D1.20 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [2001] QB 967, [2001] 2 WLR 992, [2001] 2 All ER 289, [2001]  EMLR  9, [2001] 1  FLR  982, [2002] 1  FCR  289, [2001]  HRLR  26, [2001] UKHRR 223, 9 BHRC 543, [2001] FSR 40, CA................. H4.54, H4.55, H4.56, H4.57, H4.72 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No  6) [2005]  EWCA  Civ 595, [2006]  QB  125, [2005] 3  WLR  881, [2005] 4  All ER  128, [2005]  EMLR  28, [2005] 2  FCR  487, [2005] HRLR 27, (2005) 28(8) IPD 28057, (2005) 155 NLJ 828, CA...... H4.21, H4.59, H4.60, H4.62 Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [2007] 2 WLR 920, [2007] 4 All ER 545, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2007] Bus LR 1600, [2007] 5 WLUK 21, [2007] IRLR 608, [2007] EMLR 12, [2007]  BPIR  746, (2007) 30 (6)  IPD  30037, [2007] 19  EG  165 (CS), (2007) 161 SJLB 674, [2007] NPC 54.......................................... F2.151; H2.20, H2.21, H2.22 Doyle v White City Stadium Ltd [1935] 1 KB 110, CA.......................... B1.36, B1.38; D1.26; E8.4; F1.94 Drug Free Sport New Zealand v Blair Jacobs (ST 24/10, 22 June 2011)....................... C20.13 Drug Free Sport New Zealand v O’Grady (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 21 March 2011)...................................................................... C18.4, C18.6, C18.14, C18.19; C23.2 Dry v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 25 February 2020)............ C9.1; C10.1; C17.16 Duckworth v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 10 January 2011)... C18.32; C20.13 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (A/45) (1982) 4 EHRR 149, ECtHR................................ E13.59 Duncan Ferguson, Re (Ferguson v Scottish Football Association) (unreported, 1 February 1996)............................................................................................ E7.55, E7.68 Dundee United Football Co Ltd v Scottish Football Association, 1998  SLT  1244, 1998 GWD 9-420, Ct of Sess..................................................................... E7.75; F3.199 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, [1914] 7 WLUK 5............................................................................................................... F1.79 Dunlop-Slazenger v European Commission (T-43/92) [1994] ECR II-441, CFI....... E11.296 Du Plessis v ICC (21 December 2016)................................................................. B1.56, B1.61 Durant v Financial Services Authority (Disclosure) [2003]  EWCA  Civ 1746, [2004] FSR 28, CA..................................................................................... A4.157; H4.71 Dzhumadzuk (Maria) & Equestrian Federation of Ukraine v FEI (CAS 2016/A/4921 & 4922)................................................................................................................... D2.133

lxxiv  Table of Cases

para E E v Diyarbakirspor (CAS 2008/A/1447; 29 August 2008)............................................. F1.72 E v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2354)........................................................................................ E2.21 E v FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club (CAS 2009/A/1881).............................................. D2.66 E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, [2004] QB 1044, [2004] 2 WLR 1351, [2004] 2 WLUK 12, [2004] INLR 268, [2004] BLGR 463, (2004) 101 (7) LSG 35, (2004) 148 SJLB 180....................................................... E7.80 E & A v IBU (CAS 2009/A/1931)............................................... B1.44, B1.59; C4.16; C6.22, C6.23, C6.30 EFDR Complaint to the European Commission against the Rugby Football Union & the International Rugby Board, Case No IV/36.994 (March 1998).......... E2.41; E11.101 EFL v Birmingham City Football Club (No 2) (29 June 2020)...................................... E8.17 EFL v Sheffield Wednesday (EFL Disciplinary Commission, 16 July 2020)................. E7.66 EPCR v Chris Ashton (EPCR Independent Judicial, 20 January 2016)......................... B3.57 EPCR v Mourad Boudiellal & RC Toulon (17 July 2018).............................. B3.106, B3.120 ERC v Gavin Henson 10 January 2006.......................................................................... B2.87 ERC v Harlequins (ERC Appeal Tribunal, 17 August 2009).......................................... B3.67 ERC v Williams (Appeal Committee, 1 September 2009)............................................. C3.8 Earl of Ellesmere v Wallace [1929] 2 Ch 1, CA............................................................. E8.9 East Dorset District Council v Eaglebeam Ltd `[2006]  EWHC  2378 (QB), [2006] 7 WLUK 764, [2007] LLR 154, [2007] Env LR D9.............................................. G1.137 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413, [1963] 3 WLR 574, [1963] 3 All ER 139, (1963) 107 SJ 574, Ch D.............................. E2.19; E10.3, E10.9, E10.11, E10.21; E15.23, E15.35; F1.26; F3.29, F3.49, F3.50, F3.51, F3.52, F3.53 Eastman Photographic Materials Co Ltd v John Griffiths Cycle Corpn Ltd (1898) 15 RPC 105............................................................................................................. H4.43 Eckle v Germany (A/51) (1983) 5 EHRR 1, ECtHR...................................................... E13.48 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV (C-126/97) [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 44, [1999]  ECR  I-3055, [1999]  UKCLR  183, [2000] 5  CMLR  816, ECJ.................................................................. D3.3, D3.53, D3.54, D3.59; E4.9; E16.27 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09); Martinez v MGN Ltd (C-161/10) [2012] QB 654, [2012] 3 WLR 227, [2012] CEC 837, [2012] ILPr 8, [2012] EMLR 12, ECtHR..................................................................................................................... H4.82 Eder v IOC (CAS 2007/A/1286).......................................... B1.56, B1.57; C6.7; C7.1; C11.2, C11.3, C11.5; C13.1; C14.1, C14.2, C14.4; C16.2 Eder v Ski Austria (CAS 2006/A/1102)................................................... C4.17; C7.22; C20.6 Edwards v British Athletic Federation [1998] 2 CMLR 363, [1997] Eu LR 721, (1997) 94(30) LSG 29, (1997) 141 SJLB 154, Ch D........................ C4.20; E2.3; E5.13; E12.65 Edwards v IAAF (CAS/OG/04/003).................................................. C18.16, C18.26, C18.32; C20.16, C20.17; D2.99 Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, [1955] 3 WLR 410, [1955] 3 All ER 48, [1955] 7 WLUK 81, 48 R & IT 534, 36 TC 207, (1955) 34 ATC 198, [1955] TR 209, (1955) 99 SJ 558........................................................................... I2.106 Egon Zehnder Ltd v Tillman [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154, [2019] 3 WLR 245, [2020] 1 All ER 477, [2019] 7 WLUK 10, [2019] 2 BCLC 143, [2019] ICR 1223, [2019] IRLR 838, [2019] FSR 39.................................................................. E10.3; F1.25 Egyptian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation (CAS 2019/A/6498)................................................................................................ A1.59 Ehrman v Bartholomew [1898] 1 Ch 671, Ch D............................................................ F1.80 Eiffrage SA v Switzerland (Application 1742/5)............................................................ E13.41 Ekaterina Bychkova (Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, 8 January 2010)...................... B4.30 Ekeberg v Norway (Judgment, 31 October 2007).......................................................... E13.52 Elche Club de Futbol v Commission (Case T-901/16)............................................... E11.318 El Nasharty v J Sainsbury Plc [2007] EWHC 2618 (Comm), [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 360, QBD....................................................................................................... D3.6, D3.31 Elias Karigiannis v Football Federation Australia Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1454................ E7.61 Elliot v Lloyds TSB Bank plc (Case OLS51907)........................................................... A4.157

Table of Cases  lxxv

para Elliot v Saunders (unreported, 10 June 1994)....................................................... G1.13, G1.21 ELVIS PRESLEY Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543, (1997) 20(5) IPD 20044, Ch D....... H1.21; H4.17 ELVIS PRESLEY Trade Marks [1999] RPC 567, (1999) 22(5) IPD 22050, CA.......... H4.16, H4.34, H4.60 Emirates Football Club Co v Hassan Tir Raja Club & FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3707)........ D2.62 Emms v R & C Comrs [2008] STC (SCD) 618, [2008] STI 374, Sp Comm................. I2.73 Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association [1971] Ch  591, [1970] 3 WLR 1021, [1971] 1 All ER 215, (1970) 114 SJ 827, CA.............. D3.65; E2.29; E4.5, E4.6; E7.7, E7.51, E7.63, E7.65; E8.11; E15.1 Enfield v Football League (unreported, 1995)................................................................ E10.18 England & Wales Cricket Board v Gale (Andrew) (October 2014)............................... B3.58 England & Wales Cricket Board v Hales (Alex) (7 December 2018)............. B3.118, B3.119, B3.120, B3.127, B3.146 England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074, QBD...... B4.47; C4.20; C5.8; D1.5; D3.17, D3.18, D3.22; E4.9 England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Kaneria & Westfield (Disciplinary Panel, 22 June 2012).................................................... B1.4; B4.1, B4.22, B4.28, B4.37, B4.38, B4.41, B4.42, B4.43, B4.45; D3.31, D3.86; E3.12; E4.3, E4.8; E13.41 England & Wales Cricket Board v Stokes (Ben) (7 December 2018).............. B3.120, B3.143, B3.146 England & Wales Cricket Board v Thakor (Shiv) (16 March 2018)................. B3.106, B3.142 England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Tixdaq Ltd [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch), [2016] Bus LR  641, [2016] 3  WLUK  529, [2017]  ECDR  2, [2016] Info TLR  285, [2016] RPC 21................................................................................. E2.50; H1.88; H2.89 English Bridge Union Ltd v R  & C  Comrs (Case C-90/16) [2017]  STC  2317, [2017] 10  WLUK  622, [2018]  CEC  844, [2017]  BVC  53, [2018]  LLR  23, [2017] STI 2241...................................................................................................... I1.59 English Bridge Union v English Sports Council [2017]  EWCA  Civ 116, [2017] 1 WLUK 649........................................................................................................... E7.10 English Bridge v English Sports Council [2015]  EWHC  2875 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 957, [2015] 10 WLUK 407, [2016] LLR 127, [2016] ACD 2.......... A3.56; E5.3; E7.10; E13.21 English Chess Federation & Georgian Chess Federation v FIDE (CAS 2011/A/2360 & 2392)................................................................................................................... E2.57 English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd v E.ON UK Plc [2007] EWHC 599 (Comm), [2007] UKCLR 1653, [2008] ECC 7, [2007] Eu LR 633, QBD............................ E11.46 Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2009  CAR  36’ aff’d [2011]  EWCA  Civ 2, [2011]  UKCLR  303, (2011) 108(5) LSG 18, CA................................................................................................. E11.47 Eremenko v UEFA (CAS 2017/A/5078)........................................................................ C6.40 Errani (Sara) v International Tennis Federation (CAS 2017/A/530).... C17.6; C18.12, C18.12, C18.12, C18.16; C20.8 Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 1) [1979] AC 731, [1979] 3  WLR  68, [1979] 2  All ER  927, [1979]  FSR  397, [1980]  RPC  31, (1979) 123 SJ 47, HL......................................................................................................... H1.130 Essel Sports Pvt Ltd (Indian Cricket League) v Board of Control for Cricket in India, England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd & International Cricket Council [2011] INDLHC 1834, 31 March 2011, on appeal [2010] INDLHC 642.............. E16.31 Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v Plowman (Minister of Energy & Minerals) [1995] 128 ALR 391........................................................................................................... E2.30 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC  269, [1967] 2 WLR 871, [1967] 1 All ER 699, (1967) 111 SJ 174, HL............... E10.3, E10.4, E10.5; F3.228 Ethnikos Asteras FC v Hellenic Football Federation (CAS 2009)................................. E12.77 Et Plus SA v Welter [2005] EWHC 2115 (Comm)........................................................ D3.58

lxxvi  Table of Cases

para Ettl v Austria (A/117) (1988) 10 EHRR 255, ECtHR.................................................... E13.49 European Federation of American Football (EFAF) v International American Football Association (IFAF) (CAS 2012/A/2873)................................................................ A1.60 European Football League notification [1999] OJ C70/07, Case IV D3/3700............. E11.114 European Professional Club Rugby v Armitage (Delon) (Appeal Committee, 22 January 2015)..................................................................................................... B3.82 European Rugby Cup v Richards, Brennan, Chapman & Harlequins (2010) 1 ISLR SLR9-43.............................................................................................. E2.7, E2.29; E7.68 European Rugby Cup v Williams (2009) 4 ISLR 122.................................................... E2.7 Evans v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Tribunal, 5 July 2016)................ C17.12, C17.19; C20.6; C21.11 Evans v Waitermata District Pony Club [1972] NZLR 773............................................ G1.102 Excelsior Mouscron IP/99/965 (9 December 1999)........................................... E2.31; E12.50 Exeter City AFC  Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004]  EWHC  2304 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR  2910, [2004] 4 All ER  1179, [2004]  BCC  498, [2005] 1  BCLC  238, (2004) 101(9) LSG 31, Ch D........................................................................ D3.52; E2.34 Exxon Corp v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] Ch 119, [1981] 3 WLR 541, [1981] 3 All ER 241, [1982] RPC 69, (1981) 125 SJ 527, CA.......... H1.79; H4.30 Ezsias v Welsh Ministers [2007] 11 WLUK 611, [2007] All ER (D) 65 (Dec).............. A4.157 F F  da Silva Matuzalem v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 27 March 2012)............................................................... D2.194 F v Switzerland (A/128) (1988) 10 EHRR 411, ECtHR................................................ E13.75 F, Re [1990] 2 AC 1, [1989] 2 WLR 1025, [1989] 2 All ER 545, [1989] 5 WLUK 284, [1989] 2 FLR 376, (19889) 139 NLJ 789, (1989) 133 SJ 785................................ G1.149 FA v Anelka (Nicolas) (Regulatory Commission, 3 March 2014)................................. B3.33 FA v Armstrong & Kendall (FA Regulatory Commission, 3 October 2017)......... C6.7; C17.6, C17.8; C18.3 FA v Arsenal (Regulatory Commission, 10 June 2019).................................................. B3.84 FA v Aston Villa (Regulatory Commission, 18 May 2015)............................................ B3.84 FA v Barton (FA Regulatory Commission, 26 April 2017)................................... B4.23, B4.25 FA v Beardsley (Peter) (Regulatory Commission, 18 September 2018)........ B3.185; D1.104; G2.94, G2.95 FA v Becchetti (Regulatory Commission, 15 January 2015).......................................... B3.59 FA v Benitez (Rafel) (Regulatory Commission, 8 October 2018).................................. B3.140 FA v Birmingham City FC (Regulatory Commission, 16 September 2019).................. B3.84 FA v Blackstock (Dexter) (FA Regulatory Commission, 2 May 2014).......................... B4.45 FA v Bowyer (Lee) (Regulatory Commission, 15 October 2019).................................. B3.137 FA v Bradbury (Kieran) (FA Regulatory Commission, 21 November 2017)................. F2.149 FA v Cellino (Edoardo) (Regulatory Commission, 18 April 2016)................. B3.111, B3.112 FA v Choudhury (Hamza) (Regulatory Commission, 10 May 2019).............. B3.111, B3.119 FA v Codner (Robert) (FA Regulatory Commission, 19 October 2017)........................ F2.149 FA v Dembele (Moussa) (FA Regulatory Commission, 6 May 2016)........................... B3.57 FA v Evra & Chelsea Football Club (2009) 1, SLR1-9.......................................... E2.6, E2.29 FA v Forestieri (FA Regulatory Commission, 24 July 2019).............................. B3.58, B3.143 FA v Ferdinand (Rio) (FA Regulatory Commission, 13 August 2012)............... D1.48; G2.93 FA v Fredericks (Ryan) (Regulatory Commission, 24 March 2017)................ B3.111, B3.112 FA v Gray (Andre) (Regulatory Commission, 22 September 2016)............... B3.106, B3.110, B3.111, B3.112, B3.118, B3.119 FA v Guardiola (Pep) (Regulatory Commission, 12 March 2018)................................. B3.77 FA v Harris (FA Regulatory Commission, 23 July 2009)............... B4.19, B4.21, B4.23, B4.25 FA v Hennessey (Regulatory Commission, 12 April 2019)................ B3.113, B3.122, B3.124, B3.128 FA v Henry (Tony) (Regulatory Commission, 9 July 2018)............................. B3.120, B3.125 FA v Jehwo (Daniel) (FA Regulatory Commission, 12 July 2019)................................ F2.149 FA v Johnson (FA Regulatory Commission, 20 January 2020)........... C10.1; C21.10, C21.11, C21.12

Table of Cases  lxxvii

para FA v Johnson (Marvin) (Regulatory Commission, 26 September 2018)....................... B3.111 FA v Jones (Sophie) (Regulatory Commission, 19 March 2019)................................... B3.58 FA v Kenny (FA Regulatory Commission, 9 September 2009)...................................... C20.6 FA v Klopp (Jurgen) (February 2019)............................................................................ B3.137 FA v Livermore (Jake) (8 September 2015)............................................. C20.6, C20.19; E2.3 FA v Lowe (Ryan) (Regulatory Commission, 21 August 2018)..................................... B3.120 FA v Manasseh (David) (FA Regulatory Commission, 28 September 2018)................. F2.149 FA v Marshall (FA Regulatory Commission, 8 May 2012).................. B1.30; C18.32; C20.13 FA v Mourinho (Jose) (FA Regulatory Commission, 9 June 2014)................ B3.115, B3.129, B3.137, B3.138, B3.139 FA v Mourinho (Jose) (FA Regulatory Commission, 13 December 2018)......... B1.29, B1.39; B3.99, B3.102, B3.103, B3.121, B3.129, B3.130, B3.132, B3.133, B3.134, B3.135, B3.136, B3.141; E7.81 FA v Moyes (Regulatory Commission, 12 June 2017)......................... B1.29; B3.120, B3.128, B3.131 FA v Niasse (Oumar) (Regulatory Commission, 22 November 2017)................. B3.30, B3.66 FA v Pardew (Alan) (Regulatory Commission, 11 March 2014)................................... B3.59 FA v Pochettino (Mauricio) (Regulatory Commission, 4 March 2019)......................... B3.64 FA v Poyet (Gus) (Regulatory Commission, 3 March 2015)......................................... B3.59 FA v Puncheon (Jason) (Regulatory Commission, 6 March 2014)................................ B3.111 FA  v Queens Park Rangers/Gianni Palladini (FA  Regulatory Commission, 20  May 2011)................................................................................. B5.27; E12.41; F3.207, F3.208 FA v Queens Park Rangers FC (Faurlin) (FA Disciplinary Hearing, February & May 2011)....................................................................................................................... F3.39 FA v Reading (Regulatory Commission, 5 August 2015).............................................. B3.84 FA v Rodriguez (Jay) (Regulatory Commission, 11 April 2018)................................... B3.60 FA v Sagna (Bacary) (Appeal Board, 1 February 2017).................................. B3.106, B3.138 FA v Sexton (Niel) (FA Regulatory Commission, 18 May 2017).................................. F2.149 FA v Shaw (Regulatory Commission, 6 September 2017)............................................. B4.26 FA v Silva (Bernardo) (FA Regulatory Commission, 11 November 2019)....... B3.112; D1.48 FA v Smith & Wycombe Wanderers (Phillips (FA Regulatory Commission, April 2014)... F3.39 FA v Snodgrass (Robert) (Regulatory Commission, 25 April 2019).............................. B3.120 FA v Stretford (Disciplinary Proceedings) (FA Appeal Board, 22 December 2008)...... E2.10; E4.5 FA  v Stretford (Disciplinary Proceedings Preliminary Issue) (FA  Regulatory Commission, 31 March 2008)......................................... E13.7, E13.15, E13.26, E13.28, E13.41, E13.52 FA v Sturridge (Appeal Board, 27 February 2020)................................. B4.26, B4.38, B4.41 FA v Sturridge (Regulator Commission, 15 July 2019).................................................. B4.26 FA v Suarez (Luis) (FA Regulatory Commission, 30 December 2011)............. B3.33, B3.60; G2.92, G2.95 FA v Timms (David) (FA Regulatory Commission, 12 July 2019)................................ F2.149 FA v Terry (FA Regulatory Commission, 27 September 2012)............. B3.60, B3.143; D1.50; E7.67; E16.22 FA v Tunnicliffe (Ryan) (Regulatory Commission, 17 June 2015)................. B3.111, B3.112 FA v Tweneboah (Glen) (FA Regulatory Commission, 21 November 2016)................. F2.149 FA v Vernazza (Paolo) (FA Regulatory Commission, 12 December 2016).................... F2.148 FA v Warnock (Neil) (Regulatory Commission, 20 May 2019)..................................... B3.137 FA v Webber (Danny) (FA Regulatory Commission, 13 December 2016).................... F2.149 FA v Wenger (Arsene) (Regulatory Commission, 10 January 2018)............................. B3.137 FA v West Ham (Regulatory Commission, 18 January 2019)........................................ B3.84 FA v Wilshere (Jack) (Regulatory Commission, 15 June 2015)..................................... B3.120 FA v Wood (FA Regulatory Commission, 18 April 2018)........................ B4.22, B4.37, B4.38, B4.39, B4.43 FA v Wyness (Keith) (Regulatory Commission, 5 June 2017).......................... B3.116, B3.137 FA of Wales v UEFA (CAS 2004/A/593)................................................. B1.56, B1.57, B1.61 FAPL v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), [2013] 7 WLUK 490, [2013] ECDR 14....................................................................................... E2.50; H1.147

lxxviii  Table of Cases

para FAPL v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch), [2017] 3 WLUK 305, [2017] ECC 17, [2017] ECDR 17, [2018] LLR 738............................................... H1.147 FAPL  v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2019]  EWHC  1828 (Ch), [2019] 5 WLUK 661........................................................................................................... H1.147 FAPL v LCD Publishing Ltd [2008] EWHC 3171, Ch D.............................................. H1.45 FAPL v Luxton [2016] EWCA Civ 1097, [2016] 11 WLUK 263, [2017] ECDR 7, [2017] FSR 21, [2017] LLR 102............................................................. E11.237; E12.61 FAPL  v Panini UK  Ltd [2003]  EWCA  Civ 995, [2004] 1  WLR  1147, [2003] 4  All ER  1290, [2004]  ECC  17, [2003]  ECDR  36, [2004]  FSR  1, (2003) 100(35) LSG 35, (2003) 147 SJLB 874, CA................................................ H1.87; H6.35 FAPL v Panini [2002] EWHC 2779 (Ch), [2002] 12 WLUK 415, [2003] ECDR 21, [2003] FSR 38, (2003) 26 (4) IPD 26022............................................................... E2.52 FAPL v Premier League Tickets Ltd (Case No D-RS 04232)........................................ H1.25 FAPL v QC Leisure & Murphy v Media Protection Services (2012) 34(4) EIPR 277– 279.......................................................................................................................... E16.26 FAPL  v QC  Leisure [2008]  EWHC  44 (Ch), [2008]  UKCLR  65, [2008]  ECC  16, [2008] Info TLR 1, [2008] FSR 22, Ch D.............................................................. E12.61 FAPL  v QC  Leisure; Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (Case C-403/08 & C-429/08) [2012] Bus LR  1321, [2011]  ECR  I-9083, [2011] 10  WLUK  38, [2012] 1 CMLR 29, [2012] All ER (EC) 629, [2012] CEC 242, [2012] ECDR 8, [2012] FSR 1, (2011) 108 (40) LSG 22, (2011) 161 NLJ 1415................. E2.50, E12.61; E11.233, E11.234, E11.235, E11.236, E11.237, E11.267; H1.70, H1.80, H1.90, H1.91; H2.95, H2.97; J1.27 FAPL v QC Leisure [2012] EWCA Civ 1708, [2013] Bus LR 866, [2013] FSR 20, CA........................................................................................................................... H2.97 FAPL v QC Leisure; Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) [2012] All ER (EC) 629, [2012] Bus LR  1321, [2012] 1  CMLR  29, [2012]  CEC  242, [2012] ECDR 8, [2012] FSR 1, (2011) 108(40) LSG 22, (2011) 161 NLJ 1415, ECJ................................................................................................................. H2.95; J1.27 FAPL  v QC  Leisure [2012]  EWHC  108 (Ch), [2012] 2  WLUK  133, [2012] 2 CMLR 16, [2012] FSR 12, [2012] LLR 375....................................................... E12.61 FA v (1) Queens Park Rangers FC & (2) Gianni Paladini (FA Regulatory Commission, 20th May 2011............................................................................................. F3.39, F3.207 FAPL v Trademark (Case No D-2005-0014).................................................................. H1.25 FAPL v West Ham United (FAPL Disciplinary Panel, 27 April 2007)............... B5.22; E2.40; E12.40; F3.39, F3.207 FAPL Joint Selling of Media Rights (Case COMP/C-2/38.173, 22 March 2006)........ E11.237 FC A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 18 April 2018)......................................................... D2.59 FC Dinamo Minsk v Obodo (CAS 2015/A/4327).......................................................... F1.73 FC Girondins de Bordeaux v FIFA (CAS 2012/A/2862, 11 January 2013)....... B1.54; E12.84 FC Girondins de Bordeaux (CAS 2011/A/2494)............................................................ E2.21 FC Metalist v FFU (CAS 2010/A/2267).......................................................... B3.187, B3.193 FC Midtjylland A/S v FIFA (CAS 2008/A/1485; 6 March 2009).............. B1.4, B1.16, B1.25, B1.26, B1.29, B1.31, B1.57; F1.99; F3.139 FC  Mretebi v Georgia (Application 38736/04) [2007] 7  WLUK  885, (2010) 50 EHRR 31............................................................................................................ E13.41 FC Nantes v Féderation Internationale de Football Association & Al Nasr Sports Club (CAS 2013/A/3091)................................................................................................ F1.72 FC Pyunik Terevan v L, AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA (CAS 2007/A/1358)................ B1.57 FC Schalke v FIFA (CAS 2008/A/1622-1624)...................................... B1.57, B1.61; E12.53 FC Shakhtar Donetsk v da Silva (CAS 2008/A/1519).................................................... F1.74 FC Sion v Federation Internationale de Football Association (Al Ahly & Al Hadary) (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 12 January 2011)................................................... D2.76, D2.77 FC Sion v FIFA & AL-Ahly Sporting Club (CAS 2009/A/1880-1881; 1 June 2010)... F1.74 FEI Belgian Competition Authority (Brussels Ct of Appeal, 28 April 2016)................. A1.76 FEI v Camiro (FEI Tribunal, 22 December 2008).......................................................... C18.6 FEI v Filho (FEI Tribunal, 25 April 2019)...................................... C6.2; C17.2, C17.3, C17.6

Table of Cases  lxxix

para FEI v Koyshov (Aleksandr) (FEI Tribunal, 27 November 2012)................................... C18.6 FEI v Millar (FEI Tribunal, 28 March 2013)........................................... C20.6, C20.18; C21.7 FEI v Stroman (CAS 2013/A/3318)............................................... B1.56, B1.57, B1.61; C3.7; C18.16; C20.6; C20.10, C20.11, C20.12; C21.1; C21.5 FFG v SOCOG (CAS OG 2000/014)................................................................. B1.56, B1.57 FFSA v FISA (CAS 97/168)........................................................................................... B1.10 FIA Formula One Championship [2001] OJ C-169/5................... A1.71, A1.72; E2.25, E2.53 FIFA v CBF & Lopes (CAS 2017/A/5022)............................................. C17.3, C17.8; C18.3 FIFA v CONMEBOL & Fernandez (CAS 2016/A/4416)....................... B1.57; C18.21; C20.8 FIFA v European Commission (C-204/11 P, C-205/11 P).............................................. A3.97 FIFA v European Commission (T-385/07) (Belgian listing) [2011] ECR II-205........... E2.49; E12.62 FIFA v European Commission (T-68/08) [2011] ECR II-349................ A3.97; E2.49; E12.62 FIFA v KFA & Kang Soo (CAS 2015/A/4215).......................... C17.8; C18.26; C20.2, C20.6, C20.11, C20.12; C21.10 FIFA v Nike Inc (Civ Action No 03-2003, Dist Columbia)............................................ H1.106 FIFA v SOAC (CAS 2016/A/4596).......................................................... C4.33; C6.40; C17.8 FIFA v STJD & CBF & Mr Ricarda Lucas Dodo (CAS 2007/A/1370)............... C6.7; C18.6, C18.12, C18.16 FIFA Ethics Committee v Hammam (Bin) (CAS 2011/A/2625).................................... B3.164 FIFA Ethics Committee v Karim (Keramuudin) (Adj ref no 12/2019)........... B3.154, B3.175 FIFA Ethics Committee v Marin (Jose Maria) (Adj ref no 23/2018)............................. B3.193 FIFA Ethics Committee v Mbaga (Oden Charles) (Adj ref no 13/2018)....................... B3.190 FIFA Ethics Committee v Ngaissona (Patrice-Edouard) (Adj ref no 10/2019).............. B3.175, B3.193 FIFA Ethics Committee v Nicholas (Tai) (Adj ref no 6/2019)....................................... B3.174 FIFA Ethics Committee v Shprygin (Adj ref no 5/2019)............................................... B3.172 FIFA Ethics Committee v Siasia (Samson) (Adj ref no 3/2019).................................... B3.190 FIG v SOCOG (CAS OG 2004/014).................................................................. B1.29; D2.133 FIN v FINA (CAS 96/157)............................................................................................. B1.16 FINA & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Tagliaferri (CAS  2008/A/1471 & CAS 2008/A/1486)............................................................. B1.44; C18.5, C18.6; C20.6; C22.4, C22.6; C23.8 FINA v Aleshin (FINA Doping Panel Decision No. 09/10)............................. C4.13; C17.15 FINA v Cielo (CAS 2011/A/2495-2498)..................................... B1.15, B1.30, B1.58, B1.60; C18.31; C20.5, C20.13, C20.18; C22.12 FINA v Cox (Madisyn) (FINA Doping Panel Decision 07/18)...................................... C17.5 FINA v D (FINA Doping Panel 04/01)............................................................. C20.17; E12.73 FINA v Donath ( FINA Doping Panel, October 2012)............................. C9.1, C9.3; C17.15 FINA v G (DINA Doping Panel, 04/17)......................................................................... C9.3 FINA v J (FINA Doping Panel Decision 06/01)............................................................. C5.1 FINA v Kreuzmann & German Swimming Federation (CAS 2005/A/921).......... C6.1, C6.35 FINA v Mellouli & FTN (CAS 2007/A/1252)...................................... C17.2; C18.8, C18.24; C20.18, C20.19; E7.84 FINA v Molina & CBDA (CAS 2011/A/2515).............................................................. C20.7 FINA v Oliva (FINA Doping Panel, 18 January 2007)......................................... C6.23, C6.25 FINA v Ortiz (FINA Doping Panel, 20 August 2010).................................................... C17.15 FINA v Palmer (FINA Doping Panel Decision 03/15)................................................... C4.23 FINA v Schoeman (FINA Doping Panel Decision 01/20).................................... C4.23; C17.5 FINA v Tagliaferri (CAS 2008/A/1471, CAS 2008/A/1486)......................................... C4.13 FIS v Johaug & Norweigan Olympic & Paralympic Committee & Confederation of Sports (CAS 2017/A/5015 & 5110).......................................... C18.14, C18.16, C18.26; C20.8, C20.10, C20.18 FIS v Veerpalu (FIS Doping Panel, 21 August 2011).......................................... C6.10; C19.8 FISA v Gomez (Arriaga) (FISA Anti-Doping Panel, 22 June 2015).............................. C18.19 FISA v Gryhchenko (FISA Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, 9 February 2005).................. C13.2 FISA v Olefirenko (FISA Commission, 9 February 2005)............................................. C18.19

lxxx  Table of Cases

para FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec & Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA (CAS 2009/A/1290)..... B3.181, B3.187; B4.20, B4.22, B4.23, B4.37, B4.38, B4.43, B4.47 FK Siad Most v Clube Esportivo Bento Gonçalves (CAS 2009/A/1781)...................... F3.255 FLCP v IWF (CAS 99/A/252)........................................................................................ C6.51 FWS Joint Sports Claimants v The Copyright Board (1991) 22 IPR 429, 432-3........... H1.72 F91 Diddeleng v Commission (T-341/10), General Court 16 April 2012.......... E5.13; E12.45, E12.54 Fabiano in Rio Football Services v Sevilla [2010] EWHC 2446.................................... E13.34 Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724, [1984] ICR 589, [1984] IRLR 61, [1985] FSR 105, (1984) 134 NorieLJ 255, Ch D................................................... F1.38 Fagan v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [1969] 1 QB 439, [1968] 3 WLR 1120, [1968] 3  All ER  442, (1968) 52 Cr App R  700, (1969) 133  JP  16, (1968) 112 SJ 800, DC....................................................................................................... G2.16 Fallon v Chesfield Downs Golf Club Ltd [2012] 7 WLUK 910..................................... G1.98 Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 1898 (QB), 28 July 2006, [2006] All ER (D) 427............................................ B4.39, B4.50; C4.27, C4.29; D1.96, D1.98; E2.10; E7.1, E7.33, E7.67, E7.78, E7.82, E7.84; E16.22 Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006]  EWHC  2030 (QB), [2006] 7 WLUK 806, [2006] LLR 735, (2006) 103 (37) LSG 33........................... B4.41; E7.33 Faramus v Film Artistes Association [1964] AC 925, [1964] 2 WLR 126, [1964] 1 All ER 25, (1964) 108 SJ 13, HL.................................................................................. E7.9 Farnan v Sunderland Association Football Club Ltd [2015] EWHC 3759 (QB), [2015] 12 WLUK 693, [2016] IRLR 185........................................................................... F1.35 Farnasova v IAAF & ARAF (CAS 2017/A/5045).......................................................... C7.8 Fashion ID GmbH & Co KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV (Case C-40/17) [2020] 1 WLR 969, [2019] 7 WLUK 445, [2020] 1 CMLR 16......................................... A4.23 Fauconnet v ISU (CAS 2011/A/2615).................................... C18.25; C20.6, C20.10, C20.12, C20.13; C22.4, C22.12; C23.8 Fazekas v IOC (CAS 2004/A/714)..................................................... C8.2, C8.4, C8.5; C23.2 Fearn v Board of Trustee of the Tate Gallery [2020] EWCA Civ 104, [2020] Ch 621, [2020] 2 WLR 1081, [2020] 2 WLR 108, [2020] JPL 985..................................... G1.134 Federacio Catalana de Patinage v International Roller Sports Federation (CAS 2004/A/776)....................................................................................... A1.44, A1.47 Federation Francaise des Echecs v Federation Internationale des Echecs (CAS 2010/O/2166)............................................................. A1.29; B1.56, B1.57, B1.59 Federation Internationale de Motorcyclisme v Kuwait Motor Sports Club (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 28 May 2018)................................................................... A1.44, A1.48 Fédération Luxembourgeoise de Boxe v British Board of Boxing Control................... E2.43 Fédération Nationale des Syndicates Sportifs v France (Application 48151/11 & 77769/13)....................................................................... C4.17; D2.133; E13.22, E13.33, E13.57, E13.62 Federation Suisse de Lutte Amateur v Grossen SFT 121 III 350................................... B2.44 Federation X v Federation A, B, C, D, & E & F Inc (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2016)....................................................................................................................... D2.188 Federitalia / Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (FISE) (Decision no 18285, 28 July 2008)....................................................................................................................... A1.80 Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü v Stephen Appiah (CAS 2009/A/1856-1857; 7 June 2010)... F1.74; F3.268, F3.269 Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) [2013] EWHC 2310, Ch D...... H4.52; H6.33 Fercometal v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA (The Simona) [1989] AC 788, [1988] 3 WLR 200, [198] 2 All ER 742, [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 199, [1988] 6 WLUK 151, (1988) 138 NLJ Rep 178, (1988) 132 SJ 966......................................................... H6.127 Ferguson (Duncan) v Normand 1995 SCCR 770, [1995] 10 WLUK 105...................... G2.60 Ferreira v IWF (CAS 2016/A/4758).................................................................. C6.14; C20.18 Feyenoord Rotterdam v Clube de Ragatas do Flamengo (CAS 2007/A/1320-1321)..... F3.244 Fiji Association of Sports & National Olympic Committee v Commonwealth Games Federation (CAS 2010/O/2039).............................................................................. A1.58

Table of Cases  lxxxi

para Financial Services Authority v Sinaloa Gold plc [2013] UKSC 11, [2013] 2 AC 28, [2013] 2 WLR 678, [2013] 2 All ER 339, [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1089, [2013] Bus LR  302, [2013] 2 WLUK  718, [2013] 1  BCLC  353, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 305, (2013) 163 NLJ 267, (2013) 157 (9) SJLB 31.......................................... E15.12 Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (Nos 1, 2 & 3) [1985] 2 NZLR 159... E2.56; E5.5 Finnish FA v Tampere United in (2011) 9(6) World Sports Law Report........................ B5.21 Finnish Ski Association & A-K. Saarinen v FIS (CAS 2010/A/2090)........... D2.144, D2.146, D2.147 Finucane’s Application for Judicial Review, Re [2019] UKSC 7, [2019] 3 All ER 191, [2019] NI 292, [2019] 2 WLUK 382, [2019] HRLR 7........................................... E7.81 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov; sub nom Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co [2007] UKHL 40, [2007] 4 All ER 951, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 1053, [2007] Bus.LR 1719, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254, [2007] 2 CLC 553, 114 Con LR  69, [2007]  CILL  2528, (2007) 104(42)  LSG  34, (2007) 151  SJLB. 1364 HL.......................................................................................... D3.24, D3.43, D3.44 Fisher v National Greyhound Racing Club (unreported, 31 July 1985) CA........... E7.6, E7.9, E7.75; E9.6 Fitzgerald v British Disabled Fencing Association Sport Resolutions, 27 April 2012... B2.75 Fixtures Marketing v OPA (9 November 2004).............................................................. H1.97 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB (C-46/02) 2004]  ECR  I-10365, [2005] ECDR 2 ECJ................................................................................................ H1.97 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB, Vantaa District Court & Helsinki Court of Appeals, 1999 MMR 93.......................................................................................... H1.96 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB (C-338/02) [2004]  ECR  I-10497, [2005] ECDR 4, ECJ............................................................................................... H1.98 Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB, Gotlands Tingsrätt, Case No T  99-99 (Gotland District Court, 11 April 2000).................................................................. H1.96 Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2005]  EWCA  Civ 1117, (2005) 102(37) LSG 31, CA.......................................... A1.55; D1.81; E2.3; E6.1, E6.2; E13.52 Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2004] EWHC 2838 (Ch), [2004] 12 WLUK 184, [2005] LLR 70...................................... E6.1, E6.3; E7.1, E7.22, E7.25, E7.33, E7.72, E7.73 Flannery (Jerry) v Six Nations Ltd (Six Nations Appeal Committee, 3 March 2010)... B3.48, B3.49 Fleetwood Wanderers Ltd (t/a Fleetwood Town Football Club) v AFC Fylde Ltd [2018] EWHC 3318 (Comm), [2019] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 247, [2018] 11 WLUK 540...... D3.94; E4.11 Fletcher v Bradford City Association Football Club (1983) Ltd, Health & Safety Executive & West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (unreported, 23 February 1987).... G1.123 Focsa Services (UK) Ltd v Birkett [1996] IRLR 325 EAT............................................ F1.77 Foggo v National Rugby League (CAS 2011)............................. B1.30, B1.44, B1.56; C18.32 Foley v Post Office; HSBC Bank plc (formerly Midland Bank plc) v Madden [2001] 1 AlL ER 550, [2000] 7 WLUK 954, [2000] ICR 1283, [2000] IRLR 827............ F1.59 Football Assocation of Serbia v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4602).................. A1.47; B1.36, B1.53, B1.60; D2.60, D2.130 Football Dataco Ltd v Brittens Pools Ltd; Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK  Ltd; Football Dataco Ltd v Stan James (Abingdon) Ltd [2010]  EWCA  Civ 1380, [2011] ECDR 9, [2011] RPC 9, CA.................................. E2.52; E12.63; H1.76, H1.77, H1.78, H1.99 Football Dataco Ltd v Livescore Ltd [2011] EWHC 2264, Ch D...................... E2.52; E12.53 Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises [2011] EWHC 973 (Ch), [2011] 1 WLR 1978, [2011] FSR 25, Ch D.............................................................................................. E2.52 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2011]  EWCA  Civ 330, [2011] 1 WLR 3044............................................................................................................ E12.63 Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] EWCA Civ 27, [2013] Bus LR 837, [2013] 2 CMLR 36, [2013] ECC 12, [2013] FSR 30, CA......................... H1.99, H1.100 Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd (Case C-604/10) [2012] Bus LR 1753, [2012] 3 WLUK  1, [2012] 2  CMLR  24, [2013] All ER (EC) 257, [2012]  ECDR  10, [2013] FSR 1................................................................................................ E2.52; H1.78

lxxxii  Table of Cases

para Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd see Football Dataco Ltd v Brittens Pools Ltd Football Federation of Australia v Hearfield (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 4 June 2013)....... C6.19; C18.6, C18.20, C18.22 Football Federation of Kazakhstan v Pelzer (CAS 2014/A/3527).................................. B1.16 Football League Ltd v Edge Ellison [2006] EWHC 1462, [2006] All ER (D) 263........ E2.48 Football League Ltd v Littlewoods Pools Ltd [1959] Ch  637, [1959] 3  WLR  42, [1959] 2 All ER 546, (1959) 103 SJ 490, Ch D...................................................... H1.76 Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242.............................. E5.5 Forestieri (Fernando) v FA (FA Appeal Board, 12 September 2019)............................. B3.185 Foschi v FINA (CAS 96/156)...................................................... B1.15, B1.19, B1.27, B1.56; C6.22; C10.1; C16.2; D2.161 Foschini v Victoria Football League (unreported, 15 April 1983).................................. F3.53 Fossdal v IPF (CAS 2015/A/3945)................................................................................. C20.10 Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v UEFA (CAS 2011/A/2476)............................................... B5.55 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251.............................. B1.19, B1.51, B1.53, B1.57, B1.60; C4.19 Fowles v Bedfordshire CC [1996] ELR 51, [1995] PIQR P380 CA.............................. G1.53 Fox v Riverside Health Trust [1994] 1 FLR 614, [1994] 2 FCR 577, (1994) 6 Admin LR 250, [1995] 6 Med LR 181, [1994] Fam Law 321, CA.................................... E15.20 Foxley v United Kingdom (33274/96) (2001) 31  EHRR  25, 8  BHRC  571, [2000] BPIR 1009, ECHR...................................................................................... E13.60 France Telecom SA  v Commission of the European Communities (T-339/04) [2007] ECR II-521, [2008] 5 CMLR 6, CFI........................................................... E11.24 Frank Industries Pty Ltd v Nike Retail BV  [2018]  EWCA  Civ 497, [2018] 3 WLUK 287, [2018] FSR 24................................................................................. E15.4 Fraser v Major League Soccer 97 F Supp 3d 130 (D Mass, 2000)................................. A1.26 Fraser v Professional Golfers’ Association Ltd [2008]  CSIH  53, 2009  SCLR  324, 2008 GWD 33-492, Court of Session, OH............................................................. E2.12 Freedman v Petty & Greyhound Racing Control Board [1981] VR 1001...................... E7.72 Freeport Plc v Arnoldsson (C-98/06) [2008]  QB  634, [2008] 2  WLR  853, [2007] ECR I-8319, [2008] CEC 21, [2007] ILPr 58, ECJ.................................... E11.26 Freibergs v IOC (CAS 2014/A/3604)...................................................... C6.21, C6.25, C6.34 French v Australian Sports Commission & Cycling Australia (CAS 2004/A/651)........ C5.3; C7.15; C12.4 Friend v United Kingdom (Application 16072/06) [2009] 11  WLUK  569, (2010) 50 EHRR SE6......................................................................................................... E13.59 Fulham FC v FC Metz (CAS 2006/A/896)..................................................................... B1.57 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855, [2012] Ch 333, [2012] 2 WLR 1008, [2012] 1 All ER 414, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1148, [2012] Bus LR 606, [2011] BCC 910, [2012] 1 BCLC 335, [2012] 1 CLC 850, [2011] Arb LR 22, CA........................................................... D3.12, D3.52; E2.34; E4.9; E15.43 Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Tigana [2004]  EWHC  2585 (QB), [2004] 11 WLUK 392; aff;d [2005] EWCA Civ 895, [2005] 7 WLUK 564.......... F1.36, F1.48, F1.52, F1.79 Fulham Football Club v West Ham United Football Club FA Rule Arbitration [2011] International Sports Law Review 1, SLR1-7.................................... E2.40; E4.11; F3.39 Funke v France (A/256-A) [1993] 1 CMLR 897, (1993) 16 EHRR 297, ECtHR.......... E13.46 Fusimalohi v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2425)......................................................................... B4.41 Fussballclub Zürich v Swiss Football League (Swiss Federal Tribunal, January 1982, ATF 108 II 15, 18).................................................................................................. D2.65 Fútbol Club Barcelona v Commission (Case T-865/16).............................................. E11.316 Fútbol Club Barcelona v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3793)............... B1.57; F3.137, F3.147, F3.254 Futebol Clube do Porto v Jacobus Adriaanse / Jacobus Adriaanse v Futebol Clube do Porto (CAS 2008/A/1464, CAS 2008/A/1467........................................................ F3.219 Future Investments SA  v Fédération Internationale de Football Association [2010] EWHC 1019................................................................................................ E2.51 G G (J) (Guardian & Trustees of) v Strathcona (County) (2004) 38 Alta LR (4th) 261.... G1.52

Table of Cases  lxxxiii

para G v A (FIFA DRC, 1 March 2012)................................................................................. F3.257 G v International Equestrian Federation (CAS 91/53)................................................... E7.64 G v K & E (FIFA DRC, 20 May 2011)........................................................................... F3.257 GB  v Stoke City Football Club Ltd [2015]  EWHC  2862 (QB), [2015] 10 WLUK 831............................................................................................... G1.39; G2.96 GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association (5 March 2012).............................................................. B1.54, B1.56, B1.57; B2.12, B2.13, B2.14, B2.15, B2.16, B2.17, B2.57, B2.104 GNK Dinamo v UEFA (CAS 2013/A/3324 & 3369)............................. B1.57, B1.61; D2.133 Gaber v UWW (CAS 2015/A/4210)........................................................... C9.2, C9.3; C17.15 Galatasaray SK v Ribbery (CAS 2006/A/1180).................................................. A1.24; B1.16 Galatasaray v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4492; 3 October 2016)........... B1.4, B1.15, B1.16; B5.89; E2.39; E11.172; E12.39; F3.45 Gallagher v Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1994] Ch  107, [1994] 2  WLR  160, [1993] STC 537, [1993] 6 WLUK 307, 66 TC 77, (1993) 90 (32) LSG 40, (1993) 137 SJLB 174.......................................................................................................... I1.17 Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League (CAS 2008/A/1452)........ B1.49; C4.13, C4.15; C7.22; C18.19 Gannon v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council (unreported, 6 February 1991)... G1.1, G1.51 Garcia v FECNA (CAS 2013/A/3170)........................................................................... C6.6 Garcia (Albert), in the matter of (FIBA Commission, 7 July 2006)............................... C18.19 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984]  AC  130, [1983] 3 WLR  143, [1983] 2 All ER  770, [1983] Com LR  198, [1983] 3  CMLR  43, [1984] FSR 23, (1983) 127 SJ 460, HL.................................................................. E11.48 Gargano Corse / ACI (Decision no 19946, 30 June 2009).............................................. A1.80 Garrett v Canadian Weightlifting Federation (Case No. 9003-01227) (unreported, 18 January 1990), Alta QB (Edmonton)................................................................. B2.73 Garycki v Poland (Judgment, 6 May 2007), ECtHR...................................................... E13.55 Gasser & SLV v IAAF (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 18 January 1988).............................. C6.16 Gasser v Stinson (unreported, 15 June 1998), QBD............. C4.2, C4.17, C4.20, C4.33; C6.1, C6.22; E2.3, E2.4; E6.2; E7.6, E7.31, E7.53; E8.11; E10.4, E10.5, E10.13, E10.17, E10.27; E16.11, E16.29, E16.32 Gautrin v France (1999) 28 EHRR 196, [1998] HRCD 555, ECtHR............................. E13.52 Gaygusuz v Austria (17371/90) (1997) 23 EHRR 364, ECtHR..................................... E13.71 Geerings v Netherlands (30810/03) (2008) 46 EHRR 49, 24 BHRC 365, ECtHR........ E13.55 Geldof Metaalconstructie NV  v Simon Carves Ltd [2010]  EWCA  Civ 667, [2010] 4 All ER 847, [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 517, [2010] 1 CLC 895, [2010] BLR 401, [2010] TCLR 6, 130 Con LR 37, [2010] CILL 2880, [2011] Bus LR D61, CA.... B5.37 Gemeente Almelo v Energiebedrijf Ijssellmij NV (C-393/92) [1994]  ECR  I-1477, [1994] 2 CEC 281, ECJ.......................................................................................... D3.53 Gemeente Nijmegen v European Commission (Case T-251/13)................................ E11.315 Genoa Cricket & Football Club SpA v NK Lokomotiva Zagreb (CAS 2015/A/4335)..... F3.255 Genzyme v OFT [2004] CAT 4...................................................................................... E11.16 Germany v European Parliament (C-376/98) [2000]  All ER (EC) 769, [2000] ECR I-8419, [2000] 3 CMLR 1175, ECJ..................................................... A3.81; H3.95 Germany v European Parliament (C-380/03) [2007]  All ER (EC) 1016, [2006] ECR I-11573, [2007] 2 CMLR 1, ECJ........................................................ H3.95 Getty v FIS (CAS OG 14/002)........................................................................... B2.86; D2.151 Geys v Société Générale London Branch [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] 1 AC 523, [2013] 2  WLR  50, [2013] 1 All ER  1061, [2012] 12  WLUK  668, [2013]  ICR  117, [2013] IRLR 122..................................................................................................... F1.47 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557, [2004] 3 WLR 113, [2004] 3 All ER 411, [2004] 6 WLUK 427, [2004] 2 FLR 600, [2004] 2 FCR 481, [2004] HRLR 31, [2004] UKHRR 827, [16 BHRC 671, [2004] HLR 46, [2005] 1  P  & CR  18, [2005]  L  & TR  3, [2004] 2  EGLR  132, [2004] Fam Law 641, [2004] 27 EG 128 (CS), (2004) 101 (27) LSG 30, (2004) 154 NLJ 1013, (2004) 148 SJLB 792, [2004] NPC 100, [2004] 2 P & CR DG17..................................... E13.12

lxxxiv  Table of Cases

para Gibbs v Leeds United Football Club Ltd [2016]  EWHC  960 (QB), [2016] 4 WLUK 627, [2016] IRLR 493............................................................................. F1.55 Gibbs v Barking Corp [1936] 1 All ER 115, CA............................................................ G1.53 Gibilisco v CONI (CAS 2007/A/1426)...................................................... B1.15; C7.20, C7.21 Gibraltar Badminton Association v International Badminton Federation (CAS 2001 2001/A/329)................................................................................................ B1.28; D2.107 Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3776)................... A1.47; B1.36, B1.37, B1.42, B1.44, B1.45, B1.46; D3.3 Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA (CAS 2002/O/410)........ A1.44; B1.16, B1.36, B1.37, B1.42, B1.44, B1.45; D3.3 Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA (CAS 2007/O/1237).............................. A1.44, A1.47 Gillingham Football Club v McCammon UKEAT/0626/11/RN EAT, 8  December 2011........................................................................................................................ G1.63 Gillmore v LCC [1938] 4 All ER 331.................................................................... G1.1, G1.94 Ginikanwa v United Kingdom, Application 12502/86, 55 DR 251................................ E13.40 Glacier Bay see West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association (Luxembourg) v Cristal Ltd (The Glacier Bay) Glasner v FINA (CAS 2013/A/3274)............................... B1.16, B1.26, B1.57, B1.60, B1.61; C4.15; C23.3, C23.5, C23.6 Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd’s Application for Revocation [1996] ETMR 56, TM........................................................................................................................... H1.110 Global Champions League SPRL & Tops Trading Belgium SPRL v L’Autorite Belge de la Concurrence (Brussels Ct of Appeal, 27 June 2018)..................................... A1.76 Globe Motors Inc v TRW  Lucas Variety Electric Steering Ltd [2016]  EWCA  Civ 396.......................................................................................................................... B1.46 Globespan Airways Ltd (in liquidation), Re [2012]  EWCA  Civ 1159, [2013] 1 WLR 1122, [2012] 4 All ER 1124, [2012] 8 WLUK 296, [2014] BCC 252, [2013] 1 BCLC 339, (2012) 109 (33) LSG 18, (2012) 162 NLG 1124........ B1.54, B1.56 Gnidenko v IOC & UCI (CAS 2016/A/4803)..................................................... B1.44; C6.34 Goals Soccer Centres plc v R  & C  Comrs [2012]  UKFTT  576 (TC), [2012] 9 WLUK 131, [2012] STI 2936.................................................................... I1.53, I1.128 Goc v Turkey (36590/97) (2002) 35 EHRR 6, ECtHR................................................... E13.44 Golden Gate Yacht Club v Société Nautique De Genève, New York.............................. E7.55 Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW  Trading Co (formerly Barratt Homes Ltd) [2010] EWHC 1632 (TCC), [2010] 7 WLUK 5..................................................... B5.7 Golder v United Kingdom (A/18) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, ECtHR.............................. E13.41 Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC  645, [1966] 3 WLR  513, [1966] 2 All ER  989, [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65, (1966) 110 SJ 527, PC (Aust)........................................ G1.127 Goncalves v IWF (CAS 2016/A/4761)............................................................... C4.17; C20.18 Goode v Owen [2001] EWCA Civ 2101, (2002) 99(2) LSG 29, CA............................. G1.133 Goodwood Racecourse Ltd v Satellite Information Services Ltd [2004] EWHC 2364, [2004] All ER (D) 112, Ch D....................................................................... H1.30, H1.33 Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003, [2015] 3 WLR 409, [2016] 2 All ER 337, [2015] 3 WLUK 852, [2015] CP Rep 28, [2015] 1 CLC 526, [2015] 3 CMLR 2, [2015] EMLR 15, [2015] Info TLR 373, [2015] FSR 25........ A4.250 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v AEPD, Mario Costela González (Case C-131/12) [2014]  QB  1022, [2014] 3  WLR  659, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 301, [2014] 5 WLUK 394, [2014] 3 CMLR 50, [2014] All ER (EC) 717, [2014] ECDR 16, [2014] EMLR 27, 36 BHRC 589, (2014) 164 (7607) NLJ 20................................ A4.28 Gorel v Ozalan (10 February 2003)................................................................................ F2.138 Gorgodze v IPC (CAS 2015/A/3915)................................. C6.8, C6.14, C6.16; C19.8; C23.9 Gorraiz Lizarraga v Spain (2004) 45 EHRR 1031.......................................................... E13.75 Gosiewski v British Judo Association, (unreported, 2012)...................... B2.13, B2.56, B2.87 Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landsbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA (C250/92) [1994] ECR I-5641, [1996] 4 CMLR 191, ECJ...................... E11.101, E11.253 Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351, [2002] QB 1213, [2002] 3 WLR 289, [2002] 2 All ER 985, [2002] 2 CMLR 11, [2002] Eu LR 359, [2002]  HRLR  29, [2002] Po LR  68, [2002] ACD  75, (2002) 99(18)  LSG  36, (2002) 152 NLJ 552, (2002) 146 SJLB 94, CA.......................................... A3.73; E12.69

Table of Cases  lxxxv

para Gough v United Kingdom (Application 49327/11) 2015  SCCR  1, [2014] 10 WLUK 813, (2015) 61 EHRR 8, 38 BHRC 281............................................... E13.59 Gouldbourn v Balkan Holidays Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 372, (2010) 154(11) SJLB 30, CA........................................................................................................................... G1.26 Graham v Equestrian Australia (CAS 2012/A/2828)..................... B2.13, B2.26, B2.51, B2.89 Graham v Horse Racing Ireland (29 October 2019)....................................................... E8.9 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima (CAS 2008/A/1705)..................... B1.10, B1.16; F3.179, F3.247 Gravil v Carroll [2008] EWCA Civ 689, [2008] ICR 1222, [2008] IRLR 829, (2008) 105(26) LSG 26, (2008) 158 NLJ 933, CA.......................... E9.2; G1.12, G1.38, G1.149 Great Britain Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, [2012] ISLR 2, SLR 23-30................................. D1.33, D1.56; E2.43 Greek Swimming Federation v Xynadas (Board of Hellenic Swimming Federation, 5 June 2009)............................................................................................................ C8.5 Green v Perry (1955) 94 CLR 606.................................................................................. G1.102 Greig v Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302, [1978] 3 All ER 449, (1978) 122 SJ 162, Ch D...... A1.20, A1.28, A1.62, A1.68, A1.70, A1.73; E2.25; E9.6; E10.3, E10.9, E10.12, E10.19; E11.108; E15.23 Gresham Life Assurance Society ex p Penney (1872) LR Ch A 446.............................. B5.145 Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001]  EWCA  Civ 33, [2001] 2  All ER 437, [2001] EMLR 18, (2001) 151 NLJ 102, CA................................... B4.21, B4.49 Grondin (Christophe) v Al-Faisaly Football Club (CAS 2014/A/3706)......................... F3.100 Group Lotus Plc v 1Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2011]  EWHC  1366 (Ch), [2011] ETMR 62, Ch D.......................................................................................... H1.123 Guerrero v FIFA (CAS 2018/A/5546)......................... C17.6; C18.12, C18.16; C20.8, C20.18 Guest v Commonwealth Games Federation & Triathlon Canada (CAS CG02/001)...... B4.39; C4.26, C4.28; D2.38, D2.149 Guincho v Portugal (A/81) (1985) 7 EHRR 223, ECtHR.............................................. E13.48 Guinez v UCI (CAS 2016/A/4828).......................................................... C6.23; C17.2, C17.4 Guirao v Besiktas Jimnastik Kilubu (CAS 2007/A/1407)............. B1.54, B1.56, B1.59, B1.61 Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2015] 5 WLUK 637............................. A4.251 Gulf Oil (Great Britain) Ltd v Page [1987] Ch 327, [1987] 3 WLR 166, [1987] 3 All ER 14, (1987) 84 LSG 1968, (1987) 137 NLJ 408, (1987) 131 SJ 695 CA........... H1.49 Gunawan v FINA (CAS 2014/A/3549)........................................................................... C17.8 Gundel v FEI (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 15 March 1993, ATF 119 11 271)........... C4.20; D2.8, D2.9, D2.12, D2.25, D2.32, D2.175, D2.177 Gundel v FEI; G v FEI (CAS 92/63)............................................... D2.8, D2.9, D2.12, D2.25 Gunter Harz Sports v USTA (1981) 511 F Supp 1103......................................... A5.27; B1.21 Gusev v Olympus SARL (CAS 2008/O/1643)............................................................... C7.8 Gustafsson v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR 409, ECtHR..................................................... H4.66 Guzzardi v Italy (A/39) (1981) 3 EHRR 333, ECtHR.................................................... E13.79 Győri ETO v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2702).............................................................. B5.65, B5.66 Gyrre (Andreas) v Norweigan Government [2020] OJ C90/2........................................ E12.23 H H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re [1996] AC 563, [1996] 2 WLR 8, [1996] 1 All ER 1, [1996] 1 FLR 80, [1996] 1 FCR 509, [1996] Fam Law 74, (1995) 145 NLJ 1887, (1996) 140 SJLB 24, HL.................................................... B4.37 H v Belgium (A/127) (1988) 10 EHRR 339, ECtHR.......................... E13.24, E13.39, E13.40 H v FINA (CAS 98/128)................................................................................................. B1.56 HMV Ltd v Propinvest Friar LP [2011] EWCA Civ 1708, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 416, [2013] Bus LR, CA................................................................................................. D3.96 HRA v Fallon (HRA Appeal Board, July 2006)............................................................. B4.39 HRA v Kelly (HRA Disciplinary Panel, 19 April 2007)...................................... B4.8, B4.19 HRA v Winston (Disciplinary Panel, 16 February 2007)..................................... B4.26, B4.38 Hachette Filipacchi Presse Automobile & Dupuy v France (Application 71111/01) [2007] 7 WLUK 323, (2009) 49 EHRR 23............................................................. E13.66 Haga v FIM (CAS 2000/A/281)..................................................................................... E4.11

lxxxvi  Table of Cases

para Halford v United Kingdom (20605/92) [1997]  IRLR  471, (1997) 24  EHRR  523, 3 BHRC 31, [1998] Crim LR 753, (1997) 94(27) LSG 24, ECtHR....................... E13.79 Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205, CA.......................................... G1.103 Hall v Holker Estate Co Ltd [2008]  EWCA  Civ 1422, [2008] 12  WLUK  490, [2008] NPC 143............................................................................................ G1.87, G1.90 Hall v Thomas, Hardwick & The Everton Football Club Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 1625 (QB), [2014] 5 WLUK 683..................................................................................... G1.64 Hall v Victoria Football League [1982] VicRp 6, [1982] VR 64, 58 FLR 180............... E2.14; F3.44, F3.53 Hall v Victorian Amateur Football Association [1999]  VCAT AD  30, [1999] 7(2) SATLJ 66................................................................................................................ E2.12 Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013]  EWCA  Civ 333, [2013] 3 WLUK 427, [2013] 3 WMLR 4, [2013] Info TLR 351....................................... A4.250 Halliwell v Panini (unreported, 6 June 1997)...................................................... H4.36, H4.49 Hallman Holding Ltd v Webster [2016] UKPC 3, [2016] 1 WLUK 435....................... F1.28 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS  Trust [2004]  EWCA  Civ 576, [2004] 1 WLR 3002, [2004] 4 All ER 920, [2004] CP Rep 34, [2004] 3 Costs LR 393, (2005) 81  BMLR  108, (2004) 101(22)  LSG  31, (2004) 154  NLJ  769, (2004) 148 SJLB 629, CA.................................................................................................. D3.72 Halsted v British Fencing Association Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012............ B2.31, B2.47, B2.66 Hamburger Sport-Verein cV v Odense Boldklub (CAS/2003/O/527)............. F3.176, F3.246, F3.247 Hamed v Mills & Tottenham Hotspur Football Club & Athletic Ltd [2015] EWHC 298 (QB), [2015] 2 WLUK 530......................................................................... E15.37; G1.62 Hamilton v USADA & UCI (CAS 2005/A/884).................... C4.33; C5.2, C5.5; C6.31; C7.2 Hammersley-Gonsalves v Redcar & Cleveland BC  [2012]  EWCA  Civ 1135, [2012] ELR 431, CA............................................................................................... G1.53 Hammerton v United Kingdom (Application 6287/10) [2016] 3 WLUK 514, [2017] 1 FLR 835, (2016) 63 EHRR 23............................................................................. E13.80 Hamr Sportas v European Commission (Case T-693/14)........................................... E11.325 Handsworth FC v FA, FA Rule K arbitration, 6 & 11 July 2012.................................... E10.28 Handyside v United Kingdom (A/24) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, ECtHR........... E13.61, E13.65 Hansen v Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) (CAS 2009/A/1768)............ B1.6, B1.56, B1.61; C6.1, C6.10, C6.17, C6.55; C23.2; D2.40 Hapoel Beer Sheva FC v Ravak (CAS 2015/A/4206).......................................... F1.72, F1.73 Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1993] QB 701, [1993] 3 WLR 42, [1993] 3 All ER 897, [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455, CA........................................................................................... D3.24, D3.25, D3.49 Harding (Tonya) v United States Figure Skating Association [1994] 851  F  Supp 1476........................................................................................................................ C4.28 Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808, [2010] 7 WLUK 439, [2011] RTR 1.................................................................................. B5.15 Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club & RAC  Motor Sport Association Ltd [2008] CSOH 33 (OH)............................................................................................ E3.14 Harrods Ltd v Harrodian School [1996] RPC 697, (1996) 19(10) IPD 19090, CA....... H1.132; H4.43 Hasan v General Medical Council [2003] PC 52............................................................ B4.38 Hauschildt v Denmark (A/154) (1990) 12 EHRR 266, ECtHR...................................... E13.52 Hawkes Hill Publishing, Re [2007] BCC 172................................................................ B5.132 Headcorn Parachute Club v Pond (unreported, 11 January 1995).................................. G1.107 Health & Case Management Ltd v Physiotherapy Network Ltd [2018] EWHC 869 (QB)........................................................................................................................ B5.7 Hearn v Rugby Football Union [2003] EWHC 2690 (Ch), (2003) 100(40) LSG 31, Ch D.. D1.69 Heart of Midlothian plc v Andrew Webster & Wigan Athletic AFC  Ltd (CAS 2007/A/1298).................................................... B1.28; F3.76, F3.77, F3.80, F3.81, F3.99, F3.257, F3.263, F3.264, F3.266, F3.267, F3.268, F3.271

Table of Cases  lxxxvii

para Hedley v Cuthbertson (unreported, 20 June 1997)......................................................... G1.50 Hellenic NOC & Kaklamanakis v ISAF (CAS OG/04/009)................. B1.45, B1.47; D2.133 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, [1995] 4 All ER 473, (1995) 92(7) LSG 35, (1995) 139 SJLB 49, QBD.................................................. H4.60 Henderson v Radio Corp Pty [1969] RPC 218............................................................... H4.43 Hendry v World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 71, [2002] UKCLR 5, [2002] ECC 8, [2001] Eu LR 770, Ch D................ A1.68, A1.72, A1.73, A1.74, A1.75; E2.26, E2.36; E10.20, E10.23, E10.30; E11.102, E11.110; E15.23, E15.25, E15.38; F1.9; F3.92 Henneberry v Law Society (unreported, 2000)............................................................... B1.23 Henning v SAIDS (CAS 2016/A/4716)....................................... C17.2, C17.3, C17.8, C17.9 Henriques v IOC & IAAF (CAS 2019/A/6225).................................................. B1.53, B1.54 Herbert Clayton & Jack Waller Ltd v Oliver [1930] AC 209, [1930] All ER Rep 414, HL........................................................................................................................... F1.30 Hercules Club v Futbol v Commission (Case T-766/16) (22 March 2018)................ E11.318 Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 2 All ER 65, [1992] PIQR P433, HL........................................................................................................................... G1.124 Hill v Cycling Australia & ASADA (CAS 2013/A/3388).............................................. C18.32 Hill v NCAA 1994 7 Cal 4th 1 (SC California)............................................................... C3.7 Hilton (Elliot) v National Ice Skating Association of the United Kingdom Ltd [2009] ISLR 75..................................................................... B2.13, B2.15, B2.62; E2.15 Hilton v United Kingdom (1988) 57 DR 108................................................................. E13.60 Hinchcliffe v British Schoolboys Motorcycle Association (unreported, April 2000)..... G1.107 Hipperdinger v ATP (CAS 2004/A/690)............................. B1.15, B1.60; C4.19; C6.1; C18.8, C18.12, C18.14, C18.16, C18.24; C20.16, C20.17, C20.18; C22.6 Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch  169, [1946] 1  All ER 350, CA............................................................................................................. F1.38 Hoch v FIS & IOC (CAS 2008/A/1513)...................... C7.22; C14.2, C14.4; C20.21, C20.22 Hoenig v Isaacs [1952] 2 All ER 176, [1952] 1 TLR 1360, CA..................................... B5.40 Hoffmann La Roche & Co AG v Commission of the European Communities (85/76) [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, [1980] FSR 13, ECJ................................. E11.17 Hofner v Macrotron GmbH (C-41/90) [1991]  ECR  I-1979, [1993] 4  CMLR  306, (1991) 135 SJLB 54, ECJ....................................................................................... E11.65 Hogan (Niall) v London Irish Rugby Football Club Trading Ltd (unreported, 20 December 1999)................................................................................................. F1.56 Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA (C-412/10) 2012] ILPr 2, ECJ................................. E11.29 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, [1970] 2 WLfzR 1140, [1970] 2 All ER 294, [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 453, (1970) 114 SJ 375, HL......................... G1.99 Hondo v UCI, Swiss Olympic & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2005/A/922, 923, 926).................................................................... C20.16, C20.18 Hondo v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), UCI (Swiss Federal Tribunal of 10 January 2007, 4P.148/2006)............................................................................... D2.192 Hønefoss Baliklubb v Mora Mora & Bélen FC (CAS 2015/A/4082)............................ F1.72 Honey v Australian Airlines (1990)18 IPR 185.............................................................. H4.49 Hong Kong Rifle Association v Hong Kong Shooting Association [2012] HKCU 1504, CFI.................................................................................................................. D1.8; E5.5 Horne & Marlow v RAC Motor Sports Association (unreported, 24 May 1989), CA... E9.2; G1.103 Horse Sport Ireland (HSI) & Cian O’Connor v Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) (CAS 2015/A/4208)........................................................... B3.35; D2.138, D2.143 Hospitality Group v Australian Rugby Union [1999] FCA 1136, [2001] FCS 1040..... E2.54; E11.206, E11.219 Hospitality Group v Football Association (unreported, 24 January 1996)....... E2.54; E11.206 Hosseinpoor v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Tribunal, 13 January 2017)............. C16.1 Howells v Dominion Insurance Co Ltd [2005] EWHC 552, QBD................................ A2.30 Howey v British Judo Association.................................................................................. B2.93

lxxxviii  Table of Cases

para Hubert Watson v Irish Football Association see Dollingstown Football Club v Irish Football Association Hudson v Gambling Commission [2010] EWHC 1229................................................. B5.153 Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) 19  FCR  10, (1986) 69 ALR 660, Federal Ct of Australia...................................................................... F3.53 Hull City FC  v Football Association (FA  Rule K  Arbitration Panel, 23  February 2015)....................................................................................................................... E2.32 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC  655, [1997] 2  WLR  684, [1998] 1  WLR  434, [1997] 2 All ER 426, [1997] CLC 1045, 84 BLR 1, 54 Con LR 12, [1997] Env LR 488, [1997] 2 FLR 342, (1998) 30 HLR 409, [1997] Fam Law 601, [1997] EGCS 59, (1997) 94 (19) LSG 25, (1997) 147 NLJ 634, (1997) 141 SJLB 108, [1997] NPC 64........................................................................................ G1.127, G1.128 Hunter-Galvan (Liza) v Athletics New Zealand Incorporated (NZST 07/08, 20 June 2008)....................................................................................................................... B2.51 Hutchison v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012....... B2.13, B2.30, B2.47, B2.50, B2.53, B2.71, B2.73 Hyland v Dundalk Racing Ltd [2017] 6 WLUK 15, [2017] LLR 481........................... E8.9 I I v FIA (CAS 2010/A/2268)................................................ B1.4; C3.7; C18.5, C18.6; C20.6, C20.19; E7.84 IAAF v ADAK & Ndegwa (CAS 2017/A/5175)................................................. C17.6; C22.8 IAAF v AFI & Asisini (CAS 2012/A/2763)................................................................... C18.16 IAAF v AFS & Javornik (CAS 2008/A/1608)................................ C5.4; C6.16, C6.21, C6.30 IAAF v ANI, Aswini el al (CAS 2012/A/2763)................................... C18.5, C18.29, C18.32 IAAF v ARAF & Chernova (CAS 2016/A/4469)........................................................... C23.6 IAAF v ARAF & Dyldin (CAS 2016/O/4702)........................................ C8.2; C17.13; C22.8 IAAF v ARAF & Kazarin (CAS 2016/A/4480)................................................... C5.7; C20.20 IAAF v ARAF & Kirdyapkin (Sergey) & RUSADA (CAS 2015/A/4005).................... B1.44 IAAF v ARAF & Mokhney (CAS 2016/O/4504).................................... C5.7; C10.1; C17.20; C20.20; C22.8 IAAF v ARAF & Rutto (Disciplinary Tribunal, 7 November 2019).............................. C7.8 IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina (CAS 2016/O/4464)....................... B1.12, B1.40, B1.61; C4.13, C4.16; C7.6, C7.7, C7.8, C7.9; C17.12; C19.8; C23.7 IAAF v ARAF & Yegorova (CAS 2008/A/1718-24).................... B1.40; C4.15; C10.1; C23.6 IAAF v ARAF, Zaripova & RUSADA (CAS 2015/A/4006)............................... C16.3; C23.6 IAAF v Adekoya (Disciplinary Tribunal, 18 July 2019)...................................... C17.2, C17.6 IAAF v Ahye (Disciplinary Tribunal, 7 January 2020).................................................. C9.3 IAAF v Bett (Disciplinary Panel, 19 November 2018)..................... C8.2, C8.5; C17.6; C23.6 IAAF v Balakhnichev, Melinikov, Dolle & Diack (IAAF Ethics Commission, February 2016)....................................................................................................................... A5.3 IAAF v Boulami (CAS 2002/A/452)................................................................... C6.30, C6.31 IAAF  v Bulgarian Athletics Federation & Slambolova & Veneva (CAS 2007/A/1348)...................................................................................... C6.45, C6.46 IAAF v CBA & Dos Santos (CAS 2002/A/383)............................................................ C4.33 IAAF v Cakir-Alpetkin (CAS/2014/A/3498)................................................................. C7.12 IAAF v CBat v Da Silva (CAS 2012/A/2779)..................... C6.6, C6.8, C6.16, C6.17; C20.18 IAAF v Chepchirchir (Disciplinary Tribunal, 28 November 2019).......... C7.8; C17.12; C23.6 IAAF v Czech Athletic Federation & Z, CAS 2002/A/362............................................ C6.53 IAAF v FFA & Fadil Bellaabouss (CAS 2011/A/2340)................................................. D2.130 IAAF v Griggs (Virjilio) (SR/278/2019)........................................................................ B3.154 IAAF v HAA & Kovago (CAS 2012/A/2843)......................................................... C6.7; C8.2 IAAF v Hellebuyck (CAS 2005/A/831)........................................ B1.12; C4.13, C4.22; C6.30 IAAF v Jeptoo (NADP Tribunal, 22 February 2016)............................... C10.1; C19.4, C19.8 IAAF v Jeptoo (CAS 2015/O/4128)......................................................... B1.40, B1.60, B1.61 IAAF v Kendagor (Disciplinary Tribunal, 22 October 2019)......................................... C8.2 IAAF v Kintum (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/94/2019)..................................................... C7.6

Table of Cases  lxxxix

para IAAF v Kokkariniou (CAS 2012/A/2773)................................. C7.5, C7.7, C7.8, C7.9, C7.12; C19.7, C19.8 IAAF v Nathaniel (Disciplinary Tribunal, 5 May 2019)................................................ C17.6 IAAF v Ottey (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 3 July 2000).......................................... B1.59; C6.51 IAAF v QAF & Balla (CAS 2018/A/5989).......................................................... B1.44; C11.2 IAAF v RFEA & Fernandez-Palaez (CAS 2011/A/2678).......... C16.3; C21.2, C21.2, C21.5 IAAF v RFEA & Onyia (CAS 2009/A/1805)....................................................... C6.40, C6.60 IAAF v RusAF & Bespalova (CAS 2018/O.5676)........................................ C5.2, C5.5; C7.19 IAAF v RusAF & Firova (CAS 2018/O/5666)............................ C6.34; C7.19; C19.8; C22.4; C23.6, C23.7 IAAF v RUSAF & Ganeeva (CAS 2018/O/5704).......................................................... D2.133 IAAF v RusAF & Guschina (CAS 2019/O/6153).................................... C19.8; C23.6, C23.7 IAAF v RusAF & Khanafeeva (CAS 2018/O/5673)........................ C5.2; C7.2, C7.19; C17.6; C23.7 IAAF v RusAF & Kirdyapkina (CAS 2017/O/5398)............................................. C7.8; C19.8 IAAF v RusAF & Pyatykh (CAS 2017/O/5039)......................... B1.44; C4.22; C7.19; C19.8; C23.2, C23.6, C23.7 IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva (CAS 2018/O/5822)................................. C7.6, C7.8; C17.12; C23.6, C23.7 IAAF v RusAF & Shkolina (CAS 2018/O/5667)................................ C5.2, C5.5, C5.6; C7.2, C7.19; C19.8; C23.6, C23.7 IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov (CAS 2018/A/5675)............................ B1.44; C4.22; C5.2; C7.19; C19.8; C23.7 IAAF v Ryzhova (Disciplinary Tribunal, 29 August 2019).................................. C7.8; C17.12 IAAF v SAAF & Alhamdah (CAS 2014/A/3469).......................................................... C19.8 IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkarinou (CAS 2012/A/2773) see IAAF v Kokkariniriou IAAF v Savinova-Farnosova (CAS 2016/O/4481)......................................................... C23.7 IAAF v Shobukhova....................................................................................................... C7.12 IAAF v Sumgong (Disciplinary Tribunal, 17 January 2019).......................................... C10.1 IAAF v TAF & Yanit (CAS 2013/A/3373).................................... C7.8, C7.12, C7.13; C19.8 IAAF v USATF (CAS 2002/O/401)............................................ A1.29; B1.10, B1.11, B1.39, B1.47, B1.56, B1.57, B1.61; C4.23 IAAF v UKA & Walker [2001] 4 ISLR 264..................... E2.42; E4.2, E4.3, E4.7; E6.9; E8.6 IAAF v Ugarova (CAS 2016/O/4463)....................................................... C7.8; C19.9; C23.6 IAAF v Vasilyeva (CAS 2017/O/4980).......................................................................... C23.7 IAAF & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v RFEA & Dominguez Azpeleta (CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3651)........................................... B1.4; C6.15, C6.22; C7.5, C7.8, C7.12; C23.7 IAAF v Walker (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 20 August 2000).......... B1.24, B1.56; C6.60, C6.63 IAAF Ethics Board v Spinola (Vanessa) (05/2016).......................................... B3.171, B3.173 IBAF v Lopez (IBAF Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, 12 February 2010).......................... C18.6 IBAF v Luque (IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal, 13 December 2010).......... C6.21; C16.2; C18.6, C18.14, C18.19, C18.20, C18.25, C18.28; C23.5; IBAF v Maestales (IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal, 15 June 201)...................................... C19.8 IBAF v Ponson (IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal, 8 June 2009)............... C18.26; C20.12; C21.7; C23.6 IBU v Glazyrina (IBU Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, 24 April 2018).............................. C7.19 IBU v Loginov (ADHP, 30 June 2015)........................................................................... C23.7 IBU v Sleptsova (ADHP, 11 February 2020)..................................... C5.2, C5.8; C6.21; C7.1, C7.2, C7.19; C19.9 IBU v Ussanova (ADHP, 9 September 2019).......................................... B1.44; C11.4; C14.3 IBU v Ustyugov (ADHP, 11 February 2020).................................................................. C7.19 IBU v Yaroshenko (IBU Doping Hearing Panel, 11 August 2009)..................... C4.13; C6.22, C6.25; C19.9 ICC v Anderson & Jadeja (3 August 2014).......................................................... B3.44, B3.60 ICC v Ansari (Disciplinary Panel, 19 February 2019).................................................... B4.32 ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir (10 November 2010).......................................... B4.39, B4.41; C5.5; D1.95, D1.98

xc  Table of Cases

para ICC v Butt (23 December 2010)......................................................................... B3.193; B4.40 ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir (Anti-Corruption Tribunal, 5 February 2011)............... B4.4, B4.21, B4.22, B4.30, B4.37, B4.38, B4.41, B4.42, B4.45, B4.47; E7.66, E7.67 ICC v Ikope (Disciplinary Panel, 5 March 2019)........................................................... B4.32 ICC v Salman Butt, Mohammad Amir, & Mohammad Asif ICC Disciplinary Tribunal (Michael Beloff QC), 5 February 2011................................................................... E16.22 ICC v Smartt (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 14 December 2011)............................................ C20.5 ICC v Tharanga (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 15 July 2011).................................................. C20.10 ICC v USACA (ICC Dispute Resolution, 16 June 2017)............... A1.9, A1.44, A1.45, A1.53, A1.54, A1.55, A1.56, A1.57; B1.6, B1.56 IFFB v IWGA (CAS 2010/A/2119)......................................................... A1.52, A1.55, A1.59; B1.22, B1.23, B1.33 IOC v Lysenko (IOC Disciplinary Commission, 6 October 2016)................................. C17.2 IOC & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Pinter & FIS (CAS 2007/A/1434)....... C11.2, C11.3; C14.2; C22.6 IOC & World Curling Federation v Aleksandr Krushelnitckii (CAS ADD 18/03)........ D2.167 IOC Ethics Commission v Diack (Lamine) (D/01/2011)............................................... B3.157 IOC Ethics Commission v Drut (Guy) (D/06/05)........................................................... B3.194 IOC Ethics Commission v Kim (Un Yong) (D/01/05).................................................... B3.194 IOC Ethics Commission v Moon (Dae-sung) (01-2016)................................................ B3.175 IPC v Brockman & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2004/A/717)............. C18.27 IPC v Issa (IPC Anti-Doping Committee, 13 August 2018)........................................... C20.6 IPC v Polukhih (IPC Hearing panel, 20 June 2016)....................................................... C18.19 IRB v Evile Telea (Board Judicial Committee, 18 August 2010).............. C12.1; C21.5, C21.7 IRB v Gould (Board Judicial Committee, 27 October 2013)......................................... C19.9 IRB v Gurusinghe (IRB Judicial Committee, 16 September 2011)................................ C20.6 IRB v Hitch (Board Judicial Committee, 10 August 2012)............................................ C6.7 IRB v Keyter (CAS 2006/A/1067).............................................. C5.4; C18.6, C18.7, C18.19, C18.24; C20.10 IRB v Kulakivisky (Board Judicial Committee, 21 June 2013).......................... C19.8; C21.10 IRB v Lytvynenko (Board Judicial Committee, 29 May 2013).......................... C10.1; C19.8 IRB v Murray (IRB Post-Hearing Review Body, 27 January 2012)................... C20.6, C20.12 IRB v Nelo Liu (Board Judicial Committee, 24 April 2007)...................... B1.56; C8.2, C8.5; C18.3 IRB v Slimani (Board Judicial Committee, 14 October 2008)....................................... C18.26 IRB v Thompson (Board Judicial Committee, 7 June 2007)................ C18.26; C20.6, C20.18 IRB v Troy (CAS 2008/S/1664)......................................................... A1.19; C3.6; C5.1, C5.2; C7.20, C7.22; C11.2, C11.3; C12.3 IRB v Van Standen (Post-Hearing Review Body, 11 February 2011)................. C16.3; C21.5 IRB v Viklani (16 January 2013).................................................................................... C18.5 IRB v Zhivatov et a ( Board Judicial Committee, 21 January 2013).............................. C18.6 IRC v Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217, HL................................... H4.39, H4.68 IRC v Willoughby [1997] STC 995, [1997] 7 WLUK 218, 70 TC 57, [1997] BTC 393, (1997) 94 (29) LSG 28, (1997) 147 NLJ 1062, (1997) 141 SJLB 176................... I2.108 IRC v Wimbledon FC Ltd [2004] EWHC 1020 (Ch), [2004] 5 WLUK 216...... B5.147; E2.34 IRIFF v FIFA (CAS 2008/A/1708)...................................................................... A1.30; B1.10 ISI v International Rugby Board.......................................................................... E2.55; E3.14 ISL Marketing & FIFA v JY Chung (Case D-200-0034) (unreported, 3 April 2000).... E2.52 ISU v Commission (Case C-93/18) [2018] OJ C142/72................................................ A1.80 ISU v Malkova RSU & RUSADA (CAS 2016/A/4840).................................... B1.30; C20.13 ISU v Park (ISU Disciplinary Commission, 20 March 2017)........................................ C18.19 ISU v Sin (ISU Disciplinary Commission, 28 April 2018)............................................ C17.15 ITF & Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP & OÜ Viking Line Eesti (C438/05) [2007] ECR 1-10779............................................................................. E12.122 ITF v Abel (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 29 April 2008)........................................................ C18.6 ITF v Aleshchev (Independent Tribunal, 1 August 2019)................................ C20.18; C21.11

Table of Cases  xci

para ITF v Antoniychuk (ITF, 12 May 2010)......................................................................... C22.12 ITF v Beck (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 13 February 2006)........................... B1.16; C4.19; C18.6 ITF v Belluci (4 January 2018)....................................................................................... C17.8 ITF v Bogomolov (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 26 September 2005)............ C18.16; C20.5; C23.6 ITF v Burdekin (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 4 April 2005)............................... C4.3, C4.23; C18.6, C18.24; C20.16; E7.68 ITF v Dorofeyeya (Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal, 9 June 2016)................ C4.23; C12.2; C13.2; C20.21 ITF v Farah (ITF Decision, 10 February 2020).............................................................. C18.19 ITF v Fridman (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 2 March 2006)...................................... C18.27; C20.6 ITF v Gasquet (CAS 2009/A/1296)............................................... B1.56; C4.42; C5.4; C6.38; C18.6, C18.7, C18.8, C18.12, C18.19; C20.5, C20.19 ITF v Hingis (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 3 January 2008)............. C4.45; C5.8; C6.6, C6.7, C6.8, C6.10, C6.17; C16.1; C18.6 ITF v Hood (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 8 February 2006)................................................... C18.26 ITF v Karatantcheva (CAS/2006/A/1032)................................... C4.23; C6.10, C6.17, C6.52; C18.6, C18.16; C20.6 ITF v Karic (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 21 December 2006)............................................... C18.26 ITF v Korda (CAS 99/223/A)..................................................... B1.59; C6.48; D2.56, D2.133 ITF v Kozlova (ITF, 27 May 2015)................................................................................. C20.8 ITF v Koubek (CAS 2005/A/823)...................................................... C18.14, C18.16, C18.26; C20.5, C20.15; C23.2, C23.6 ITF v Kramperova (4 January 2018).................................................................... C17.8; C22.9 ITF v Kratzer (Independent Tribunal, SR/085/2020)..................................................... C17.8 ITF v Lepchenko (ITF Decision, 20 September 2016)................................................... C18.19 ITF v Mak (Independent Tribunal, 7 November 2017)................... C6.2; C8.2, C8.5; C17.13; C18.3 ITF v Nastase (SR/913/2017).............................................................. B3.59, B3.120, B3.121, B3.125, B3.128 ITF v Neilsen (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 5 June 2006).......................... C18.20, C18.25, C18.27 ITF v Sharapova (Independent Tribunal, 6 June 2016)............................. B1.39; C4.45; C6.2; C17.7, C17.8; C18.16, C18.21, C18.24; C20.18 ITF v Valle (Zacarias) (ITF Decision, 8 February 2019)................................................ C18.19 ITF v X (ITF Decision, December 2019)....................................................................... C18.19 IWBF v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) & Gibbs (CAS 2010/A/2230)......... B1.30, B1.32, B1.57, B1.61; C4.17; C17.6; C18.5, C18.6, C18.9 Iannone v FIM (CAS 2020/A/6978).................................................................... C17.5; C18.6 Iao Hui v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2612)............................................ A1.30; B1.12, B1.16, B1.19; C4.13, C4.15; C6.6 Ibrahim v United Kingdom (Applications 50541/08, 50573/08 & 40351/09)............... E13.46 Ide v ATB Sales Ltd / Lexus Financial Services v Russell [2008] EWCA Civ 424, [2008] 4 WLUK 710, [2009] RTR 8, [2008] PIQR P13, (2008) 152 (18) SJLB 32.......... C18.12 Iles v Shooting Australia (CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2016)........................................ B2.61 Imageview Management Ltd v Jack [2009]  EWCA  Civ 63, [2009] 2 All ER  666, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 921, [2009] Bus LR 1034, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 436, [2009] 1 BCLC 724, CA......................................................... F1.4, F1.38; F2.15, F2.18, F2.41, F2.166 Imberechts v Belgium (Application 15561/89) 69 DR 312 (1991)................................ E13.47 Ime Akpan (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 10 April 1995)..................................................... C6.62 Iñaki Urquijo v Liedson Da Silva Muñiz (CAS 2007/A/1371)...................................... F2.140 Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [1999] 1  WLR  270, [1999] 1  All ER 820, [1999] CLC 165, (1999) 1 TCLR 169, (1998) 95(41) LSG 45, (1998) 142 SJLB 269, CA....................................................................................... D3.70, D3.91 Independent Schools Council v The Charity Commission for England & Wales . See R (on the application of Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for England & Wales

xcii  Table of Cases

para Indian Hockey Federation v International Hockey Federation, FIH  Judicial Commission (CAS/2014/A/3828).............................. A1.9, A1.43, A1.44, A1.45, A1.48; B1.6, B1.8, B1.44, B1.56 Infront WM v European Commission (T-33/01) [2005] ECR II-5897........................... A3.96 Interfish Ltd v R  & C  Comrs [2014]  EWCA  Civ 876, [2015]  STC  55, [2014] 6 WLUK 859, [2014] BTC 34, [2014] STI 2286.................................................... I1.33 International Canoe Federation v ICF (CAS 2015/A/4222)........................................... B1.58 International Canoe Federation v Sterba (CAS OG 12/07)................... C6.55, C6.58; C18.24; C20.12 International Cycling Union & Italian National Olympic Committee, Re (CAS 94/128)... D2.133 International Federation of American Football (IFAF) v Wiking (CAS 2017/O/5025). A1.29 International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) v SCB  Eishockey AG (Swiss Federal Tribunal of 8 March 2012, 4A_627/2011).............................................................. D2.181 International News Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 63 L Ed 211, 39 S Ct 68 (1918).................................................................................... H1.10, H1.11, H1.13, H1.14 Inverclyde Property Renovation LLP v R & C Comrs [2019] UKFT 408 (TC)............ I1.8 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (No  1), [1998] 1 WLR 896, [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 BCLC 531, [1997] CLC 1243, [1997] PNLR 541, (1997) 147 NLJ 989, HL........................ B1.54, B1.57, B1.59; B2.16 Ionikos FC v Juan Pajuelo Chavez (CAS 2008/A/1517)................................................ D2.65 Irish Football Association v Football Association of Ireland (CAS 2010/A/2071)........ B1.54, B1.57; D2.107, D2.130 Irish Football Association v Football Association of Ireland CAS, 27 September 2010, (2011) ISLR 2, SLR151–162.................................................................................. E2.43 Irish Hockey Association / Lithuanian Hockey / International Hockey Federation (CAS 2001/A/354).................................................................................................. B1.57 Irish Sugar Plc v Commission of the European Communities (T-228/97) [2000] All ER (EC) 198, [1999] ECR II-2969, [1999] 5 CMLR 1300, CFI............................ E11.18 Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355, [2002] 2 All ER  414, [2002]  EMLR  32, [2002]  FSR  60, (2002) 25(6)  IPD  25039, (2002) 99(18) LSG 38, (2002) 152 NLJ 553, (2002) 146 SJLB 85, Ch D.......... H1.138; H4.14, H4.39, H4.42, H4.44, H4.46, H4.47, H4.48, H4.49, H4.52, H4.60, H4.68, H4.84; H6.32 Italia 90 (Distribution of Package Tours) [1992] OJ L 326/31................. E2.53, E2.54, E2.56; E11.38, E11.202, E11.203, E11.208, E11.209, E11.210 Italian Canoe Federation v ICF (CAS 2015/A/4222).............................. B1.48, B1.57; B2.16 Italy v Sacchi (155/73) [1974] ECR 409, [1974] 2 CMLR 177, ECJ......................... E11.225 J J Bollinger SA v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd (No 4) [1961] 1 WLR 277, [1961] 1 All ER 561, [1961] RPC 116, (1961) 105 SJ 180, Ch D.............................................. H1.134 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade & Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, [1989] 3 WLR 969, [1989] 3 All ER 523, (1989) 5 BCC 872, [1990] BCLC 102, (1990) 87(4) LSG 68, (1989) 139 NLJ 1559, (1989) 133 SJ 1485, HL................. E13.6 JJ Burgess & Sons v OFT [2005] CAT 25...................................................................... E11.44 JJB Sports Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, [2005] Comp AR 29, CAT... E11.297 Jack v Swimming Australia & ASADA (CAS A1/2020).................................... C17.5; C18.6 Jacob v Irish Amateur Rowing Union [2008]  IEHC  196, 10  June 2008, [2008] 4 IR 731............................................................................................... D1.33; E2.15; E6.2 Jaguar v McLaren [2001] 9(2) SATLJ 88....................................................................... F3.16 Jalloh v Germany (Application 54810/00) [2006] 7 WLUK 277, (2007) 44 EHRR 32, 20 BHRC 575, [2007] Crim LR 717....................................................................... E13.59 James v United Kingdom (A/98) 1986) 8 EHRR 123, [1986] RVR 139, ECtHR.......... H4.66 James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] AC 141, [1977] 3 WLR 907, [1977] 3 All ER 1048, [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 119, [1977] 11 WLUK 64, [1978] RTR 59, [1978] 1 CMLR 156, (1977) 121 SJ 811.............. B1.51

Table of Cases  xciii

para James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC 583, [1970] 2 WLR 728, [1970] 1 All ER 796, [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 269, [1970] 3 WLUK 6, (1970) 114 SJ 225............................................................ B1.57 Japan Paralympic Committee (JPC) v International Paralympic Committee (IPC) & International Blind Sport Federation (IBSA) (CAS 2012/A/2831)........................ B2.4 Jarrold v Boustead [1964] 1  WLR  1357, [1964] 3 All ER  76, 41  TC  701, (1964) 43 ATC 209, [1964] TR 217, (1964) 108 SJ 500, CA............................................ I2.66 Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 1 WLR 898, [1979] 2 All ER 1108, (1979) 123 SJ 389, CA..................................................................................................... D1.95; B4.38, B4.40 Jersey Football Association v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4787)...................... A1.33, A1.43, A1.44; B1.36, B1.53, B1.54, B1.56, B1.57, B1.59, B1.60 Jobcentre Krefeld Widerspruchsteel v JD (Case C-181/19)........................................... E12.25 Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4184).................................. B1.4 Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes (1993) 1 SA 649................................................ E5.5 Jockey Club v Bradley (Appeal Board [2003] ISLR-SLR 71)............. E5.10; E13.24, E13.31, E13.33 Jockey Club v Bradley (Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel, 13 December 2002).............. B4.34 Jockey Club v Bradley see Bradley v Jockey Club (Application for New Ground of Appeal) Jockey Club v Buffham [2002] EWHC 1866 (QB), [2003] QB 462, [2003] 2 WLR 178, [2003] CP Rep 22, [2003] EMLR 5, (2002) 99(40) LSG 32, QBD....................... E13.65 Jockey Club v Carphone Warehouse [2005] EWHC 1151............................................. B4.47 Jockey Club v Carter (Gary) (Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel, 28 September 2005).... B4.8, B4.19, B4.47 Jockey Club v Coleman (Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel, 22 January 2003)................ B4.11 Johnson v Athletic Canada & IAAF [1997] OJ 3201, (1997) 41 OTC 95.............. B1.6; E10.5; F3.53 Johnson v Cliftonville Football & Athletic Club [1984] 1 NI 9, 21, Ch D................ E11.168 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518, [2001] 2 WLR 1076, [2001] 2 All ER 801, [2001] ICR 480, [2001] IRLR 279, [2001] Emp LR 469, HL... F1.34, F1.77 Jones v Northampton Borough Council (The Times, 2 May 1990)................................ G1.98 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270, [2006] 2 WLR 1424, [2007] 1 All ER  113, [2006]  HRLR  32, [2007]  UKHRR  24, 20  BHRC  621, (2006) 156 NLJ 1025, (2006) 150 SJLB 811, HL.............................................................. E13.10 Jones v Sherwood Computer Services plc 1992] 1 WLR 277, [1992] 2 All ER 170, [1989] EG 172 (CS), CA............................................................................. D3.48, D3.66 Jones v USADA (CAS 2019/A/6376)............................................................................ C17.6 Jones v USADA (UFC Arbitration Tribunal, 6 November 2016)........ C18.6, C18.16, C18.22; C20.2; C22.12 Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (The Times, 6 March 1997)....................................... C4.28; E6.6 Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (27 February 1997).......................... E7.11; E7.58, E7.62, E7.65, E7.76; E15.5, E15.14 Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (NADP Tribunal, 9 June 2010)......................................... C8.5 Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2008/A/1605).................... B1.23; B2.51 Jonsson v IPF (CAS 2007/A/1332)................................................................................ C6.16 Joseph Barton of Queens Park Rangers FC before the Football Association Regulatory Commission, 23 May 2012..................................................................................... G2.70 Jovanovic v USADA (CAS 2002/A/360)................................................ C6.51; C7.1; C18.29 Jules Rimet Cup Ltd v Football Association Ltd [2007]  EWHC  2376 (Ch), [2008] ECDR 4, [2008] FSR 10, (2008) 31(1) IPD 31002, Ch D............. H1.81, H1.85, H1.139 Juliano v FEI (CAS 2017/A/5114).............................................................. B1.6, B1.35, B1.57 Justice v South Australian Trotting Control Board (1989) 50 FAR 613......................... E5.5 Juventus Football Club SpA v Chelsea Football Club Ltd (CAS 2013/A/3365).... B1.4, B1.53, B1.61; F3.278, F3.279 K K v E (FIFA DRC, 26 April 2012).................................................................................. F3.257

xciv  Table of Cases

para Kambala & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIBA, (FIBA Appeals Tribunal, 23 August 2007)............................................................... B1.44; C4.16; C18.21, C18.22, C18.26; C20.2, C20.6, C20.18 Kaneria v ECB (Appeal Panel, May 2013)............................................... B4.37, B4.38, B4.45 Karabil Kaiya Hai (FEI Tribunal, 21 March 2012)......................................................... C18.6 Karatantcheva v ITF (CAS 2006/A/1032).......................... C3.7; C6.51, C6.52; C18.5, C18.6 Karatancheva v ITF (CAS 2007/A/1399)....................................................................... C18.7 Karwalski v Squash Australia (CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014).......... B2.49, B2.87, B2.88 Kason Kek-Gardner Ltd v Process Components Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 2132, [2018] 2 All ER (Comm) 381, [2017] 12 WLUK 373....................................................... B2.16 Katusha Management SA  v Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) (CAS 2012/A/3031)............................................................... B1.7, B1.26; D2.73, D2.74 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, CA................................................................ H4.21, H4.60 Keefe v McInnes [1991] 2 VR 235................................................................................. E2.12 Keegan v Newcastle United Football Co Ltd [2010] IRLR 94, (2010) International Sports Law Review 1, SLR1-8....................................................................... F1.18, F1.54 Kemp v New Zealand Rugby Football League [1989] 3 NZLR 463..................... F3.44, F3.53 Kendrick v ITF (CAS 2011/A/2518)......................................... B1.30, B1.56, B1.60; C18.14, C18.24, C18.26, C18.32; C20.5, C20.6, C20.13; D2.100 Kennaway v Thompson [1981]  QB  88, [1980] 3 WLR  361, [1980] 3 All ER  329, [1980] JPL 515, (1980) 124 SJ 378, CA................................................................. G1.132 Kennedy v Charity Commission; Kennedy v Information Comr [2014]  UKSC  20, [2015] AC 455, [2014] 2 WLR 808, [2014] 2 All ER 847, [2014] 3 WLUK 755, [2014] EMLR 19, [2014] HRLR 14, (2014) 158 (13) SJLB 37................. E7.82; E10.17 Kennedy v United Kingdom (26839/05) (2011) 52 EHRR 4, 29 BHRC 341, [2010] Crim LR 868, ECtHR............................................................................................. E13.60 Kennemer Golf & Country Club v Staatssecretaris van Financien (Case C-174/00) [2002] QB 1252, [2002] 3 WLR 829, [2002] STC 502, [2002] ECR I-3293, [2002] 3 WLUK 629, [2002] 2 CMLR 12, [2002] All ER (EC) 480, [2002] CEC 330, [2002] BTC 5205, [2002] BVC 395, [2002] STI 354............................................. I1.58 Kenny v Football Association (FA Appeal Board, 20 October 2009)............... C20.10, C20.13 Kenya Football Federation v FIFA (CAS 2008/O/1808)................................................ A1.17 Kenya v Kenya Cricket Association (unreported, 2006) (HC Kenya)..................... D1.8; E5.5 Keramuddin v FIFA (CAS 2019/A/6388)....................................................................... B4.38 Kerr v Willis [2009] EWCA Civ 1248, (2009) 106(44) LSG 20, CA............................ G1.29 Kerry v Ice Skating Australia (CAS 2013/A/3415)........................................................ B2.56 Kervanici v France (Application 31645/04)................................................................... E13.62 Key2Law (Surrey) LLP  v De’Antiquis [2011]  EWCA  Civ 1567, [2012]  BCC  375, [2012] 2 BCLC 195, [2012] 2 CMLR 8, [2012] ICR 881, [2012] IRLR 212, CA. B5.148 Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 59, [2016] AC 155, [2015] 3 WLR 1665, [2016] 4 All ER 794, [2015] 11 WLUK 613, [2016] HRLR 2, 40 BHRC 228...................................................... E7.82, E7.83; E10.24 Kibunde v IOC (CAS Sydney 2000/004)......................................................... B1.16; D2.131 Kieron Brady v Sunderland Football Club see Brady (Kieron) v Sunderland Football Club Kim v FILA (CAS 2013/A/3272)................................................................................... A1.33 Kindle v Federation Motorcycliste Suisse (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 25 March 1992)... D2.101 King v AIBA (CAS 2011/A/2452).............................................. B1.26, B1.58, B1.61; D2.133 Klass v Germany (A/28) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214, ECtHR............................................. E13.60 Klein v ASADA & Athletics Australia (CAS A/4/2016)..................................... C8.4; C20.19 Klemenic v UCI (CAS 2016/A/4648).......................................... B1.44, B1.56; C4.16; C6.24, C6.30; C22.5; C23.7, C23.9 Kline v OID Association Inc 609 NE 2d 564 (1992)...................................................... G1.57 Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)................................... B4.38; D2.167 Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2018/A/5734)............................................... D2.167 Knauss v FIS (CAS 2005/A/847)............................... B1.56; C16.3; C18.12, C18.14, C18.20, C18.21, C18.31, C18.32; C20.2, C20.5, C20.11, C20.18; C21.2, C21.5; D2.101

Table of Cases  xcv

para Koji Murofushi & Japanese Olympic Committee v International Olympic Committee (CAS 2012/A/2912)................................................................................................ D2.100 Kokkinakis v Greece (A/260-A) (1994) 17 EHRR 397, ECtHR..................... E13.62, E13.63, E13.64 Kolasa v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 22 May 2014)....... C5.5; C8.2; C21.6, C21.7 Köllerer v ATP (CAS 2011/A/2490).................................................... B3.181, B3.186; B4.22, B4.37, B4.43 Kolobnev (CAS 2011/A/2645)............................................................... C18.6, C18.14; C20.6 Konig v Germany (No.1) (A/27) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 170, ECtHR................................ E13.39 Koninklijke Racing Culb Genk v Manchester United Football Club (CAS 2018/A/5733)................................................................................................ F3.250 Kontakt-Information-Therapie & Hagen v Austria (Application 11921/86) 57 DR 81 (1988)...................................................................................................................... E13.63 Kop v IAAF & TAF (CAS 2008/A/1586)....................................................................... C4.16 Korda v ITF (CAS 99/A/223)............................................................................... B1.53, B1.54 Korda v ITF [1999] All ER (D) 337............................................ D2.56; D3.13, D3.45, D3.49, D3.50; E4.2, E4.7 Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation) [1999] All ER (D) 84....... B1.56; C3.7; C4.10; D1.16; D3.29; E2.4; E7.53, E7.55 Korean Olympic Committee v International Skating Union OWG (Salt Lake City 02/007, 23 February 2002)............................................................ B3.36; D2.140, D2.145 Korneev & Gouliev v IOC, CAS (Atlanta) No 003-4L............... B3.187; C5.2; C6.56, C6.57; E7.66 Koubek v ITF, CAS 2005/A/823 see ITF v Koubek (CAS 2005/A/823) Kowalczyk v FIS (CAS 2005/A/918)............................................................................. C18.27 Krabbe v IAAF (High Regional Court of Munich, 28 March 1996).............................. B1.15 Kreuziger v Czech Cycling Federation (COC Arbitration Committee, 22 September 2014)................................................................................................................ C7.6, C7.8 Kristoffersen v Norweigan Ski Federation (E-8/17) [2018] 11 WLUK  814, [2019] 2 CMLR 6..................................................................................... E12.23, E12.29, E12.42 Krunic (Branislav) v Bosnia & Herzegovina Football Federation (BIHFF) (CAS 2014/A/3850)................................................................................................ D2.65 Kulesza v Canadian Amateur Synchronized Swimming Association Inc (Case No 27763-0001) (unreported, 27 June 1996), Ont Ct Gen Div (Ottawa)............... B2.71 Kulubu (Sivasspoor) v UEFA (CAS 2014/A/3625)............................... B3.187; B4.12, B4.37 Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The Queen [1955] AC 197, [1955] 2 WLR 223, [1955] 1 All ER 236, (1955) 119 JP 157, [1955] Crim LR 339, (1955) 99 SJ 73, PC........ B4.38; C5.7 Kutrovsky v ITF (CAS 2012/A/2804)................................... C18.8, C18.20, C18.24, C18.32; C20.2, C20.6; D2.100 Kuwait Motor Sports Club (KMSC) v Federation Internationale de Motorcyclisme (FIM) (CAS 2015/O/4316)..................................................................................... A1.48 Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation (CAS 2016/A/4727)............................................................... A1.55, A1.56, A1.57; B1.22 Kuwait Sporting Club v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association CAS 2015/A/4241....... A1.4, A1.17, A1.44, A1.53, A1.58 Kyprianou v Cyprus (73797/01) (2007) 44 EHRR 27, ECtHR.......................... E7.73; E13.52 L L v IOC (CAS 2000/A/310)............................................................................................ C6.61 La Barbera v IWAS (CAS 2010/A/2277).......................... C6.7, C6.10, C6.16; C18.6, C18.7 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR  273, [1964] 1 All ER 465, (1964) 108 SJ 135, HL......................................................... H1.65, H1.85 Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming Ltd v Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator (C-258/08) [2013] All ER (EC) 62, [2010] 3 CMLR 40, [2011] CEC 212, ECJ...................... E12.68 Lagat v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & IAAF (13 September 2006)............... C3.7 Lamond v Glasgow Corp, 1968 SLT 291, Ct of Sess..................................................... G1.122 Lamptey v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5173)........................................... B4.33, B4.38, B4.43, B4.47

xcvi  Table of Cases

para Landis v USADA (CAS 2007/A/1394)................................. C4.34, C4.45; C6.1, C6.5, C6.7, C6.21, C6.22, C6.23, C6.25, C6.42, C6.45, C6.46 Langborger v Sweden (A/155) (1990) 12 EHRR 416, ECtHR...................................... E13.52 Langston v Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (No 1) [1974] 1 WLR 185, [1974] 1 All ER  980, [1974]  ICR  180, [1974]  IRLR  15, (1973) 16  KIR  139, (1973) 118 SJ 97, CA.............................................................................................. F1.31 Lapikov v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2677).................................................... C13.2; C18.32; C20.12 Lassana Diarra v FC Lokomotiv Moscow (CAS 2014/A/4094)..................................... F3.279 Latsutina v IOC & FIS (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 27 May 2003)........... D2.25, D2.34, D2.177 Lauri v Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402, [1892] 6 WLUK 12..................................................... B1.40 Lauritzencool AB v Lady Navigation Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 579, [2005] 1 WLR 3686, [2006] 1 All ER 866, [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 183, [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 63, [2005] 5 WLUK 363, [2005] 1 CLC 758................................................................ E7.50 Lau Tak Wah Andy v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [2000] 1 HKC 280..................................... H4.49 Law Society of Ireland v Competition Authority [2005] IEHC 455.............................. E11.36 Law v National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 3 All ER 300, [1983] 1 WLR 1302, CA.......................................................................................................... E5.2, E5.6; E7.22 Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2003] UKHL 35, [2004] 1 All ER 187, [2003] ICR 856, [2003]  IRLR  538, [2003]  HRLR  29, [2003]  UKHRR  1024, (2003) 100(28) LSG 30, (2003) 153 NLJ 1005, (2003) 147 SJLB 783, HL...................... B2.71 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 26, [2012] 1 WLR 2127, [2012] 3 All ER 168, CA............................................................................................................. E9.7 Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 1 WLR  698, [1959] 2 All ER 285, 93 ILT 213, (1959) 103 SJ 470, (1959) 103 SJ 462, CA....... F1.37, F1.50 Lawson v IAAF (CAS 2019/A/6313)................................................................. C17.5; C18.19 Lazar & Brazeur & FN Belgium & Hungary v Freun & FEI (CAS 2006/A/1046)........ D2.185 Lazutina v IOC (CAS 2002/A/370).................................................. C4.17; C5.9; C6.7, C6.30, C6.47, C6.51; D2.12 Lea v USADA (CAS 2016/A/4371)........................................... C6.60; C18.24; C20.5, C20.7, C20.8, C20.9 Lebara Mobile Ltd v Lycamobile UK  Ltd [2015]  EWHC  3318 (Ch), [2015] 11 WLUK 393......................................................................................................... E15.9 Levedeva v IOC & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2017/A/4983)............ C6.34 Le Compte v Belgium (A/43), Van Leuven v Belgium (A/43), De Meyere v Belgium (A/43) [1982] ECC 240, (1982) 4 EHRR 1, ECtHR...... E13.24, E13.39, E13.40, E13.68 Le Roux v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (unreported, 14  March 1995), NZHC...................................................................................................................... E7.78 Leatherland v Edwards (28 October 1998)..................................................................... G1.25 Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329, [1952] 1 All ER 1175, [1952] 1 TLR 1115, (1952) 96 SJ 296, CA........................ B1.49; B5.144; D3.66; E7.7, E7.9; E15.19; F1.28 Leeds Rugby Ltd v Harris [2005] EWHC 1591, QBD......................................... F1.22; F3.224 Leeds United 2007 Ltd v Football League Ltd [2008] BCC 701................................... E2.34 Leeds United Football Club & Rotherham FC v Football League, award of FA Arbitral Panel (1 May 2008)................................................................................................. E2.30 Leeds United Football Club v The Football League (unreported, 2007)........................ B5.144 Leeper v IAAF (CAS 2020/A/6807)............................................... B1.4, B1.6, B1.25, B1.32; B2.39; C17.9; C20.10 Legkov v FIS (CAS 2017/A/4968)..................................... A1.58; C4.26, C4.28, C4.29; C5.1, C5.2, C5.5, C5.6; C7.1, C7.2; C10.1; C13.1; C14.1, C14.3 Lehtinen v FINA (CAS 95/A/142).................................................................................. C6.7 Lehtonen v Federation Royale Belge des Societes de Basket-Ball ASBL (FRBSB) (C-176/96) [2001] All ER (EC) 97, [2000] ECR I-2681, [2000] 3 CMLR 409, [2000] CEC 498, ECJ................................................. B1.4; B5.31; E2.19; E5.13; E6.10; E11.51, E11.148, E11.149, E11.150; E12.22, E12.36, E12.98, E12.106; F3.34, F3.57, F3.62, F3.63, F3.88, F3.151

Table of Cases  xcvii

para Lei Cao v IOC (CAS 2017/A/4974)................................. C4.23; C6.21, C6.22, C6.55; C23.2 Les Authentiks & Supras Auteuil 91 v France (Application 4696/11)........................... E13.69 Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232, [1964] 3 WLR 573, [1964] 2 All ER 929, [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339, (1964) 108 SJ 519, CA............................................................ G1.11 Lewis v Brookshaw (1970) NLJ 413.............................................................................. G1.12 Lewis v Buckpool Golf Club 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 43........................................................ G1.16 Lewis (Lennox) v World Boxing Council & Frank Bruno (unreported, 3 November 1995)................................................................................................... E8.2, E8.9; E16.30 Lewis v Heffer [1978] 1 WLR 1061, [1978] 3 All ER 354, (1978) 122 SJ 112, CA...... C4.28 Leyton Orient v FAPL (FA Rule K arbitration, still pending).............................. E2.32; E4.11 Liao Hui v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2612)............................................. B1.8, B1.10, B1.61; C4.34; C6.3, C6.4, C6.6, C6.22, C6.53; C19.4, C19.9 Licensed Players’ Agent Vincent Cusumano, Belgium v Player David Mounard, France, 15 February 2006....................................................................................... F2.20 Lichtenstein v Clube Atletico Mineiro [2005] EWHC 1300, QBD......... F2.7, F2.134; F3.240 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa (C-42/07) [2009]  ECR  I-7633, [2010] 1  CMLR  1, [2010] CEC 399, ECJ............................................................................... E12.68; E13.41 Lilia Malaja v Fédération Française de Basketball (Case No VC 99 NC 00282)........... E12.78; F3.66 Lim (Jo-Ann) v Synchronised Swimming Australia Inc (CAS (Oceania Registry) A2/2016)....................................................................................................... B2.48, B2.87 Lincolnshire CC v Hopper [2002] 5 WLUK 705, [2002] ICR 1301.............................. F1.10 Lindemann v American Horse Shows Association, 851 F Supp 1476 (1994)................ C4.28 Lindon v France (21279/02) (2008) 46 EHRR 35, ECtHR............................................ E13.52 Lindqvist (Bodil), criminal proceedings against (Case C-101/01) [2004]  QB  1014, [2004] 2  WLR  1385, [2003]  ECR  I-12971, [2003] 11  WLUK  159, [2004] 1 CMLR 20, [2004] All ER (EC) 561, [2004] CEC 117........................................ A4.160 Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v Union of European Football Associations & FC Porto Futebol SAD (CAS 2008/A/1583)............................ B1.25, B1.26, B1.28, B1.54, B1.57 Lissarague v FEI (CAS 2005/A/895).............................................................................. D2.63 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 AC 215, [2001] 2 WLR 1311, [2001] 2 All ER 769, [2001] ICR 665, [2001] IRLR 472, [2001] Emp LR 819, [2001] 2  FLR  307, [2001] 2  FCR  97, (2001) 3  LGLR  49, [2001]  ELR  422, [2001] Fam Law 595, (2001) 98(24)  LSG  45, (2001) 151  NLJ  728, (2001) 145 SJLB 126, [2001] NPC 89, HL........................................................................ G1.35 Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, [1957] 2 WLR 158, [1957] 1  All ER  125, [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 505, (1957) 121  JP  98, (1957) 101 SJ 106, HL....................................................................................................... F1.36 Lithuanian Hockey / International Hockey Federation (CAS 2001/A/355)................... B1.57 Lloyd (Richard) v Google LLC  [2019]  EWCA  Civ 1599, [2020]  QB  747, [2020] 2  WLR  484, [2020] 2  All ER  676, [2020] 2  All ER (Comm) 128, [2019] 10 WLUK 6, [2020] 1 CMLR 34, [2020 EMLR 2.................................. A4.251, A4.253 Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, [1987] 2 WLR 821, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, HL..... E7.14 Lobello v ISU (CAS 2007/A/1318)................................................................................ C9.1 Lobo Machado v Portugal (1997) 23 EHRR 79, ECtHR................................................ E13.52 Lombard North Central plc v GATX  Corpn [2012]  EWHC  1067 (Comm), [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 1119, [2013] Bus LR 68, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 662, [2012] 4 WLUK 531, [2012] 1 CLC 884................................................................. D3.70, D3.71 London Borough of Ealing v R  & C  Comrs (Case C-633/15) [2017] 4 WLR  174, [2017] STC 1598, [2017] 7 WLUK 256, [2017] BVC 35, [2017] STI 1721......... I1.60 London Welsh v RFU, Newcastle Falcons intervening (RFU  Arbitration 29  June 2012)........................................................................ B5.42; D1.57; E2.27, E2.33; E6.11; E7.56; E11.68, E11.72, E11.77, E11.117, E11.119; E15.7; E16.12 Longridge on Thames v R & C Comrs [2016] EWCA Civ 930, [2017] 1 WLR 1497, [2016] STC 2362, [2016] 9 WLUK 9, [2016] BVC 33, [2016] STI 2541............. I1.118 Lopez Ostra v Spain (A/303-C) (1995) 20 EHRR 277, ECtHR..................................... E13.23

xcviii  Table of Cases

para L’Oréal SA v Bellure NV (C-487/07) [2010] All ER (EC) 28, [2010] Bus LR 303, [2009] ECR I-5185, [2010] CEC 453, [2009] ETMR 55, [2010] RPC 1, ECJ...... H1.124 Louisvale Pirates v South African Football Association [2012] ZAGPJHC 78.............. E5.5 Lovchev v IWF (CAS 2016/A/4632).............................................................................. C6.34 Lovell v Pembroke County Cricket Club [2003] ISLR 2 SLR 38................ E7.6, E7.7, E7.64, E7.65 Lowe v British Judo Association.................................................................................... B2.93 Lozovye v Russia (Application 4587/09)....................................................................... E13.58 Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208, [2011] 3 WLR 487, [2011] 4 All ER  817, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1011, [2011] Bus LR  1211, [2011]  ECDR  21, [2012]  EMLR  3, [2011]  FSR  41, 7 ALR  Int’l 711, (2011) 161 NLJ 1098, SC................................................................................................... H5.22 L’Union Nationale des Footballeurs Professionnels (Conseil d’Etat, 24  February 2011)....................................................................................................................... C4.17 Lumley v Wagner, 42 ER 687, (1852) 1 De GM & G 604............................................. F1.80 Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2019]  UKSC  20, [2020]  AC  1045, [2019] 2 WLR 1051, [2019] 3 All ER 1013, [2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 559, [2019] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 399, [2019] 4 WLUK 148, [2019] BCC 520, [2019] 1 CLC 619, [2019] BLR 327, [2019] Env LR 32....................................................................... E11.26 Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish v Romania (Application 76943/11)................................ E13.48 Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom (31417/96) (2000) 29  EHRR  548, 7  BHRC  65, ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.79 Lynch v Horse Sport Ireland (CAS OG 12/03).................................................... B2.13, B2.15 Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62 Ch D......................... H1.137; H4.49, H4.52 Lyon v Maidment [2002] EWHC 1227 (QB), [2002] 6 WLUK 471................... G1.26, G1.28 M M v AIBA (CAS OG 96/006)......................................................................................... D2.145 MA (children) (care: thresholds), Re [2009] EWCA Civ 853, [2009] 7 WLUK 849, [2010] 1 FLR 431, [2010] 1 FCR 456, [2009] Fam Law 1026............................... B6.11 MFK Dubnica v FC Parma (CAS 2014/A/3486)............................................................ D2.99 MONOC v IOC (CAS OG 08/006)................................................................................ D2.159 MSC  Mediterranean Shipping Co SA  v Cottonex Anstalt [2016]  EWCA  Civ 789, [2017] 1 All ER (Comm) 483, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 494, [2016] 7 WLUK 720, [2016] 2 CLC 272................................................................................................... B1.46 MTK Budapest v FC Internazionale Milano SpA (CAS 2009/A/1757)............ F3.176, F3.186 MTV v Formula One Management (unreported, 6 March 1998)................................... E2.51 McBride v Falkirk Football & Athletic Club (UKEATS/0058/10/BI)................. F1.16, F1.18, F1.34, F1.61, F1.64 McCaig v Canadian Yachting Association, (Case No CI96-01-96624) (unreported, 24 April 1996), Man QB (Winnipeg)...................................................................... B2.47 McCarrick v Park Resorts Ltd & Chiltern Health & Safety Service & Johnson [2012] 10 WLUK 851........................................................................................... G1.98, G1.100 McComiskey v McDermott [1974] IR 75....................................................................... G1.18 McCracken v Melbourne Storm RLFC [2005] NSWSC 107......................................... G1.16 McCulloch v Lewis A May (Produce Distributors) Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 845, (1948) 65 RPC 58, [1947] WN 318, (1948) 92 SJ 54 Ch D..................... H1.136; H4.16, H4.40, H4.43, H4.44 McCutcheon v David MacBrayne [1964] 1 WLR 125, [1964] 1 All ER 430, [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 16, 1964 SC (HL) 28, 1964 SLT 66, (1964) 108 SJ 93, HL.............. H1.34 McDaid v Walsall MBC [2018] 5 WLUK 171............................................................... G1.156 McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1986]  QB  965, [1986] 3 WLR  45, [1986] 2 All ER  676, [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 24, [1986]  ICR  525, [1986] IRLR 308, (1986) 83 LSG 1559, (1986) 130 SJ 372, CA........................... F1.33 MacDonald v FIFA & SFA [1999] SCLR 59, [1999] 7(1) SATLJ 33............................ E2.56 McGill (Anthony) v Sports & Entertainment Media Group (SEM) [2016] EWCA Civ 1063, [2017] 1 WLR 989........................................................................................ F2.152 McGinley v United Kingdom (21825/93) (1999) 27 EHRR 1, 4 BHRC 421, (1998) 42 BMLR 123, [1998] HRCD 624, ECtHR............................................................ E13.59

Table of Cases  xcix

para McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (No 13) [2012] FCA 1441................. E2.46; E11.175, E11.178 McInnes v Onslow Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520, [1978] 3 All ER 211, (1978) 122 SJ 844, Ch D........................................................................ E2.12; E6.1, E6.2; E7.8, E7.9, E7.11, E7.35, E7.45, E7.58, E7.65, E7.75, E7.81; E10.13, E10.19; E15.8, E15.19 McKennitt v Ash [2006]  EWCA  Civ 1714, [2008]  QB  73, [2007] 3  WLR  194, [2007] EMLR 4, (2007) 151 SJLB 27, CA............................................................. H4.63 McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508, QBD.............. B4.21, B4.26, B4.38, B4.45, B4.47; D1.8, D1.91, D1.123; E2.7; E3.4, E3.13; E6.1; E7.1, E7.33, E7.65, E7.80; E15.27 McKeown, Decision on Penalty Reconsideration, 25  May 2010, ISLR  2010 3/4 SLR 157–158............................................................................ D1.123; E7.34, E7.35 McKerr v UK (Application 28883/95) [2001] 5 WLUK  157, (2002) 34  EHRR  20, [2001] Inquest LR 170............................................................................................ E13.75 McLaren Racing Ltd v R & C Comrs [2012] UKFTT 601 (TC), [2013] SFTD 18, TC........................................................................................................................... E8.9 McMahon v Dear [2014]  CSOH  100, 2014  SLT  823, 2014  SCLR  616, [2014] 6 WLUK 431, 2014 Rep LR 71, 2014 GWD 22-421............................................. G1.113 McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 ALR 584...................................................................... G1.12 McTier v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWHC 212 (Admin)....................... B1.43 McVety v Mahoney (1980) 25 AR 173........................................................................... G1.27 Maatschaap Toeters & MC Verberk v Productschap Vee en Vlees (Case C-171/03)..... A4.154 Macari v Celtic Football & Athletic Co Ltd, 1999  SC  628, 2000  SLT  80, 2000 SCLR 209, [1999] IRLR 787, 1999 GWD 25-1208, Ct of Sess.......... F1.19, F1.34, F1.37, F1.50 Makuda v FIFA (CAS 2018/A/5769)............................................................................. B3.195 Málaga Club de Futbol SAD v UEFA (CAS 4 June 2013)............................................. B5.66 Malboum v Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa (CAS 2017/A/5163)................................................................................................ B3.167 Malhous v Czech Republic (Application 33071/96) (12 July 2001).............................. E13.47 Malik v Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) [1998] AC 20, [1997] 3 WLR 95, [1997] 3 All ER 1, [1997] ICR 606, [1997] IRLR 462, (1997) 94(25) LSG 33, (1997) 147 NLJ 917, HL.............................................................. F1.34 Malik v United Kingdom (23780/08) [2012] Med LR 270, ECtHR.............................. E13.72 Malisse (Flemish Doping Tribunal Case 2009-03, 5 November 2009)............... C9.1; C17.15 Malone v United Kingdom (A/82) (1985) 7 EHRR 14, ECtHR..................................... E13.60 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011]  UKSC  45, [2011] 2  AC  104, [2010] 3  WLR  1441, [2011] 1 All ER  285, [2011]  PTSR  61, [2010] 11  WLUK  96, [2011]  HRLR  3, [2010]  UKHRR  1213, 31  BHRC  670, [2011]  HLR  7, [2010] BLGR 909, [2011] L & TR 2, [2010] 3 EGLR 113, [2010] 45 EG 93 (CS), (2010) 107 (44) LSG 16, (2011) 108 (8) LSG 20, (2010) 154 (42) SJLB 30......... E13.10 Manchester City Football Club Plc v Royle [2005] EWCA Civ 195, CA...................... F1.48 Manchester City v UEFA (CAS 2019/A/6298).............................................................. B5.75 Manchester City Football Club v UEFA (CAS 2020/A/6785)......... B1.4; B5.3, B5.73; E7.60, E7.66, B5.76 Manchester United v Gabriel Heinze (unreported, 21 August 2007)............................. F3.44 Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] WLR 749....... B1.56, B1.57 Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG  v Commission of the European Communities (T112/98) [2001] ECR II-729, [2001] 5 CMLR 1, CFI.......................................... E11.36 Marbe v George Edwardes (Daly’s Theatre) Ltd [1928] 1 K.B. 269; 56 A.L.R. 888, CA........................................................................................................................... F1.30 Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG (C-425/98) [2000] All ER (EC) 694, [2000] ECR I-4861, [2000] 2 CMLR 1061, [2000] CEC 395, [2000] ETMR 723 ECJ.......................... H1.122 Marcello Costa (Case C-72/10) (16 February 2012)...................................................... E12.68 Marckx v Belgium (A/31) (1979) 2 EHRR 330, ECtHR.................................. E13.72, E13.75; H4.68

c  Table of Cases

para Marcus Webb Golf Professional v R  & C  Comrs [2012]  UKUT  378 (TCC), [2013] STC 574, [2012] 10 WLUK 710, [2012] BVC 1944, [2012] STI 3232..... I1.128 Marks & Spencer plc v BNP  Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742, [2015] 3 WLR 1843, [2016] 4 All ER 441, [2015] 12 WLUK 67, 163 Con LR 1, [2016] 1 P & CR 13, [2016] L & TR 8, [2016] CILL 3779................................................................................................... F1.28 Marlon v Durban Turf Club 1942 AD 112...................................................................... E5.5 Martin v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd, 13 April 2010, EAT......................... E2.14 Martinez & Martinez v MGN Ltd (Case C-161/10) [2012] QB 654, [2012] 3 WLR 227, [2011] ECR I-10269, [2011] 10 WLUK 688, [2012] CEC 837, [2012] IL Pr 8, [2012] EMLR 12..................................................................................................... H4.82 Martinez v Ellesse International SpA [1999] CLY 861, CA................................... E8.15; F1.5 MasterCard International Incorporated v FIFA  239 Fed Appx. 625, 2007  US App LEXIS 12309 (2nd Cir, 25 May 2007)................................................................... H3.65 Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream (C-344/98) [2000] ECR I-11369......... E11.30; E16.24, E16.25 Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC  98, [1998] 3 WLR  18, (1998) 142  SJLB  100, PC (Mauritius).................................................................................................... B1.29; E7.82 Matchroom Boxing v BT [2018] EWHC 2443 (Ch), [2018] 9 WLUK 247................... H1.147 Matt Lindland v US Wrestling Association & USOC.................................................... B2.93 Mayer v IOC (CAS 2002/A/389-393).................................................................. B1.44; C7.22 Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust (t/a XC Sportspace) [2017] EWHC 378 (QB), [2017] 3 WLUK 226........................................................................................................... G1.148 Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1390, [2007] QB 462, [2007] 2 WLR  286, [2007] 1 All ER  1, [2007]  ICR  701, [2007] 1  FLR  1398, [2006] 3 FCR 447, [2007] LS Law Medical 1, (2006) 92 BMLR 51, [2007] Fam Law 214, [2006] 44 EG 196 (CS), (2006) 103(43) LSG 28, (2006) 156 NLJ 1686, CA.......... F2.61 Meca-Medina & Majcan v FINA (CAS 99/A/234 & CAS 99/A/235)............... B1.44; C4.34; C6.1, C6.10, C6.41, C6.48, C6.51, C6.52; C17.6; C18.6 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities (C-519/04 P) [2006] All ER (EC) 1057, [2006] ECR I-6991, [2006] 5 CMLR 18, ECJ................... A1.44, A1.79; B1.4; B5.31; C4.17, C4.20; D3.34, D3.35, D3.39; E7.31; E11.1, E11.50, E11.51, E11.52, E11.64, E11.71, E11.74, E11.75, E11.76, E11.77, E11.80, E11.87, E11.89, E11.93, E11.94, E11.101, E11.102, E11.105, E11.107, E11.115, E11.126, E11.127, E11.151, E11.168, E11.182, E11.198; E12.107, E12.64, E12.99, E12.116, E12.121; E15.8; F3.84, F3.88 Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities (T313/02) [2004] ECR II-3291, [2004] 3 CMLR 60, [2005] CEC 176, CtFI.............. E2.4; E6.10, E6.11; E7.84 Mechaai v IAAF & Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de la Salud-en el Deporte (AEPSAD) (CAS 2017/A/4967)............................................................................. C9.3 Media Protection Services Ltd v Crawford [2012]  EWHC  2373 (Admin) [2013] 1 WLR 1068, [2012] CP Rep 48, (2013) 177 JP 54, [2012] CTLC 82, [2013] Crim LR 155, DC.................................................................................................... E12.61 Media Protection Services Ltd v Gowland [2010] Eu LR 283....................................... E12.61 Medicaments & Related Classes of Goods (No 2), Re see Director of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain Meier v Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/345...................................................................... C6.30 Melinte v IAAF (CAS OG 00/015).............................................. C4.28, C4.28; C6.47, C6.61 Melnikov (Balakhnichev) v IAAD (CAS 2016/A/4417).................... B3.154, B3.157, B3.188 Mendy v Association Internationale de Boxe (AIBA) (CAS Atlanta 96/006)................ B3.36; E2.16; E6.2 Mercato Sports (UK) Ltd & McKay v Everton FC [2018] EWHC 1567 (Ch), [2018] 7 WLUK 274....................................................... C3.3; D3.8, D3.29, D3.31; E8.1, E8.9; E16.17; F2.171, F2.173; F3.202 Merchandising Corp of America Inc v Harpbond [1983] FSR 32, CA.......................... H4.30

Table of Cases  ci

para Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc v San Diego Yacht Club & Royal Perth Yacht Club of Western Australia 76 NY 2d 256............................................................................ E2.57 Mersan Idman Yurdu SK v Milan Stepanov & Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (CAS 2017/A/5274)................................................................ D2.100 Messenger Leisure Developments Ltd v R  & C  Comrs [2005]  EWCA  Civ 648, [2005] STC 1078, [2006] 5 WLUK 633, [2005] BTC 5332, [2005] BVC 363, [2005] STI 1022...................................................................................................... I1.58 Messi Cuccitini v EUIPO; JM-EV e hijos (MESSI) (Case T-554/13) (26 April 2016).. H4.32 Metropole Television SA (M6) v Commission of the European Communities (T185/00) [2002] ECR II-3805, [2003] 4 CMLR 14, [2003] ECDR 25, CFI..... E11.271 Metropole Television SA  v Commission of the European Communities (T528/93) [1996] ECR II-649, [1996] 5 CMLR 386, [1996] CEC 794, [1998] EMLR 99, CFI......................................................................................... E11.115, E11.271, E11.275 Mewing v Swimming Australia (CAS 2008/A/1540).................... B2.2, B2.30, B2.47, B2.50, B2.54, B2.68 Mexes & AS Roma v AJ Auxerre (TAS 2005/A/902)............. F3.260, F3.263, F3.264, F3.271 Mexès v AS Roma (CAS 2004/A/708)........................................................................... D2.107 Mica v PFC Naftex AC Bourgas (CAS, 24 December 2008) Micallef v Malta (Application 17056/06) [2009] 10 WLUK 386, (2010) 50 EHRR 37, 29 BHRC 31............................................................................................................ E13.51 Michael v Australian Canoeing (CAS 2008/A/1549).................... B2.51, B2.74, B2.88, B2.89 Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports (NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011)............. B2.34, B2.47, B2.50, B2.63, B2.69, B2.88, B2.89 Michelin NV v Commission of the European Communities (322/81) [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1 CMLR 282, [1985] FSR 250, ECJ........................................................... E11.18 Middlesbrough Football & Athletic Co (1986) Ltd v Liverpool Football & Athletic Grounds plc (FA Arbitration) [2002] All ER (D) 311 (May, [2002] All ER (D) 353 (Nov), [2002] EWCA 1929.................................................................. F1.89; F3.215 Milanese v Leyton Orient Football Club Ltd [2016] EWHC 1161, [2016] 5 WLUK 580, [2016] IRLR 601..................................................................................................... F1.35 Millar v BCF (CAS 2004/A/707)......................................................................... B1.44; C4.16 Millar v FEI (CAS 2013/A/3151)................................................................................... C21.7 Miller v Australian Cycling Federation Inc [2012] WASC 74, SC Western Australia.... E8.3 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966, [1977] 3 WLR 20, [1977] 3 All ER 338 CA............. E15.18; G1.127, G1.128, G1.133 Minelli v Switzerland (A/62) (1983) 5 EHRR 554, ECtHR........................................... E13.55 Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145 Ch D......... H1.132, H1.138; H4.52 Miranda CAS Sydney 00/008, Digest of CAS Awards II 1998–2000............................ B1.35 Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd (No 1) (The Times, 23 July 1999), HL......... C6.21 Modal v BAF [1997] 7 WLUK 561............................................... B1.11, B1.49, B1.51, B1.56 Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd (No  2) [2001]  EWCA  Civ 1447, [2002] 1 WLR 1192, (2001) 98(43) LSG 34, (2001) 145 SJLB 238, CA................. B1.53; C3.7; C4.1, C4.20, C4.26; C5.3; C6.46; D1.12, D1.13, D1.16, D1.17, D1.34;D3.8, D3.29; E2.2; E3.12; E4.5; E5.4; E7.13, E7.14, E7.17, E7.18, E7.22, E7.38, E7.44, E7.51, E7.52, E7.54, E7.57, E7.72, E7.83; E8.3, E8.9, E8.11, E8.13, E8.18; E9.5; E10.17, E10.24; E13.52; E15.1, E15.31, E15.32, E15.39; E16.21; F1.3, F1.19, F1.28 Modahl v British Athletic Federation [1999] All ER (D) 848........................................ B4.39 Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd 1997 QL 1105493......................................... B1.57 Mohamed Bin Hammam v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2625)........................................ A5.3; D1.104 Mohammed v Football Association [2002] EWHC 287, QBD.............................. E9.6; F2.64 Mohammed v Rougier & FA & FIFA [2002] EWHC 287............................................. E9.6 Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016]  UKSC  11, [2016]  AC  677, [2016] 2 WLR 821, [2017] 1 All ER 15, [2016] 3 WLUK 90, [2016] ICR 485, [2016] IRLR 362, [2016] PIQR P11....................................................................... G1.35 Moloughney v Wellington Racing Club [1935] NZLR 800........................................... G1.102

cii  Table of Cases

para Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd (In Liquidation) v London Stock Exchange Ltd [2002] 1  WLR  1150, [2001] 4  All ER  223, [2001] 2  All ER (Comm) 344, [2001] 2 BCLC 347, [2001] BPIR 1044, Ch D................................ B5.141 Montcourt v ATP (CAS 2008/A/1630)........................................... B1.4; B4.24, B4.25, B4.41 Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001]  EWCA  Civ 318, [2001]  ICR  819, [2001] IRLR 269, [2001] Emp LR 405, (2001) 98(20) LSG 40 CA...................... F1.8 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430, [2015] 2  WLR  768, [2015] 2  All ER  1031, 2015  SC (UKSC) 63, 2015  SLT  189, 2015 SCLR 315, [2015] 3 WLUK 306, [2015] PIQR P13, [2015] Med LR 149, (2015) 143 BMLR 47, 2015 GWD 10-179............................................................. G1.59 Moore v Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 1 WLR  1024, [1972] 3 All ER  399, 48 TC 338, [1972] TR 61, (1972) 116 SJ 276 Ch D............................................... I2.67 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [1985] RPC 219................................... H1.13 Morales v Guatemalan National Anti-Doping Association (CAS 2016/A/4694)........... C6.15 Moreira de Azevedo v Portugal (A/189) (1991) 13 EHRR 721, ECtHR........................ E13.36 Morgan v Jamaican Athletic Administration Association (CAS OG 16/008)................ B2.99 Moriarty v Brooks, 172 ER 1419, (1834) 6 Car & P 684, Assizes................................. G2.23 Morocanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Stores Ltd [2014]  EWHC  1686 (IPEC), [2014] 5 WLUK 957, [2015] ECC 6, [2014] ETMR 55, [2015] FSR 4............................. H1.134 Morrell v Owen (The Times, 14 December 1993).................................................. E9.2; G1.95 Morris (Herbert) v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688...................................................... E10.3, E10.4 Morrow v Safeway Stores plc [2001] 9  WLUK  313, [2002]  IRLR  9, [2001] Emp LR 1303.......................................................................................................... F1.34, F1.35 Mortimer v Becket [1920] 1 Ch 571, Ch D.................................................................... F1.80 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20, (2008) 158 NLJ 1112, QBD.................................................................................... H4.63 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] All ER (D) 02 (Jul), (2009) 46(4) CMLR 1327–1341.................. A1.24, A1.76; E11.61, E11.69, E11.102, E11.103 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Greece (C-49/07) [2009] All ER (EC) 150, [2008] ECR I-4863, [2008] 5 CMLR 11, [2008] CEC 1068, ECJ... E11.101 Mountford v Newlands School [2007]  EWCA  Civ 21, [2007]  ELR  256, (2007) 151 SJLB 164, CA....................................................................................... G1.26, G1.49 Mountstar v Chairty Commission (CA/2013/0001)....................................................... I1.122 Mouscron (Commission Press Release, 9 December 1999, IP/99/965)........... E11.86, E11.87 Mubic (Elmir) v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2354)................................................................... F3.254 Muehlegg v FIS (CAS 2002/A/400).................................................................... C6.30; C17.2 Muehlegg v IOC (CAS 2002/A/374).............................................................................. C6.31 Muller v Switzerland (A/133) (1991) 13 EHRR 212, ECtHR........................................ E13.66 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 80 AJLR 43.......................... G1.100, G1.148 Mullins v Jockey Club see R (on the application of Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal Board (No 1) Mullins v McFarlane [2006] EWHC 986, QBD..................... D1.23; E3.4, E3.13; E5.3; E6.2, E6.3; E7.1, E7.6, E7.23; E10.26; E13.1, E13.7, E13.15, E13.20, E13.21 Mulvaine v Joseph, 118 NLJ 1078, (1968) 112 SJ 927.................................................. G1.32 Muralidharan v NADA (CAS 2014/A/3639).............................. C4.23; C6.10, C6.13, C6.14, C6.15, C6.17, C6.25 Murdoch v Yachting New Zealand.................................................................................. B2.47 Murgatroyd (Inspector of Taxes) v Evans-Jackson [1967] 1 WLR 423, [1967] 1 All ER 881, [1966] 11 WLUK 130, 43 TC 581, (1966) 45 ATC 419, [1966] TR 341, (1966) 110 SJ 926................................................................................................... I2.73 Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2007]  EWHC  3091 (Admin), [2008] 1 WLR 1869, [2008] Bus LR 1454, [2008] ECD 9, [2008] FSR 15, [2008] ACD 30 & [2008] EWHC 1666 (Admin); [2008] UKCLR 427; [2008] FSR 33, DC......... E12.61; E16.26 Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2012]  EWHC  466 (Admin), [2012] 2 WLUK 696, [2012] 3 CMLR 2, [2012] ECC 16, [2012] LLR 672....... E2.50; E11.235; E12.61

Table of Cases  ciii

para Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd v QC  Leisure (C-403/08) [2012] All ER (EC) 629, [2012] Bus LR 1321, [2012] 1 CMLR 29, ECJ..................................... H2.97 Murphy v Southend United Football Club Ltd (unreported, 18 March 1999)................ F1.45, F1.79 Murray v Express Newspapers Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481, [2008] 3 WLR 1360, [2008] ECDR 12, [2008] EMLR 12, [2008] 2 FLR 599, [2008] 3 FCR 661, [2008] HRLR 33, [2008] UKHRR 736, [2008] Fam Law 732, (2008) 105(20) LSG 23, (2008) 158 NLJ 706, (2008) 152(19) SJLB 31, CA................... H4.63 Murray v Harringay Arena 1951] 2 KB 529, [1951] 2 All ER 320n, (1951) 95 SJ 529, CA............................................................................................................ G1.104, G1.105 Mutko v IOC (CAS 2017/A/5498)................................................................................. B1.22 Mutu v Chelsea (CAS 2008/A/1644)..................................................... D2.167; F1.48; F3.257 Mutu v Chelsea Football Club Ltd ( Swiss Federal Tribunal 10 June 2010).................. D2.32, D2.177 Mutu & Pechstein v Switzerland (Application 40575/10 & 67474/10)............. D1.63; D2.10, D2.16, D2.25, D2.54, D2.88, D2.133, D2.167, D2.177; D3.6, D3.10, D3.15, D3.21, D3.32, D3.33, D3.37, D3.38, D3.67; E2.4; E4.6, E4.8, E4.10; E5.10, E5.11; E13.22, E13.26, E13.33, E13.36, E13.39, E13.41, E13.44, E13.47, E13.50, E13.51, E13.52, E13.54; E16.17 Muyldermans v Belgium (A/214B) (1993) 15 EHRR 204, ECtHR............................... E13.44 N N v FEI (CAS 92/63)...................................................................................................... C6.25 N v FINA (CAS 98/202)................................................................................................. C7.1 N, J, Y, W v FINA (CAS 98/208)........................................................................... C5.2; D2.98 N, J, Y, W v FINA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 31 March 1999)........................... B1.18; D2.192 NAAAT v Baptiste (Disciplinary Committee, 10 August 2014).... C21.1, C21.2, C21.4, C21.5 NADA v Sinkewitz (CAS 2012/A/2857)..................................... C6.22, C6.34; C21.5; C23.9 NISA v ISU (CAS 2003/O/466)....................................................... A1.29; B1.6, B1.8, B1.16 NRL v Wicks (23 May 2011)............................................................................... C12.1, C12.4 NZ Rugby League v Erihe (New Zealand Sport Tribunal, 4 April 2005)....................... C18.16 NZO & CGA Inc v Telecom New Zealand Ltd [1996] 7 TCLR 167............................. H1.132 NZRL v Tawera (SDTNZ, 5 May 2005)................................................................ C8.1; C18.3 Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian Ice Hockey Federation v International Ice Hockey Federation (CAS 2001/A/357).................. B1.28, B1.29, B1.57 Nadarajah v Secretary of State for the Home Department see R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Nagle v Fielden [1966] 2 QB 633, [1966] 2 WLR 1027, [1966] 1 All ER 689, (1966) 110 SJ 286, CA........................................................ B5.145; D1.51; E2.12; E3.12; E7.6, E7.7, E7.8, E7.9, E7.16, E7.50, E7.82; E8.11; E10.3, E10.13, E10.19, E10.25; E15.11, E15.23, E15.30 Naraki v Shelbourne [2011] EWHC 3298 (QB), [2011] 12 WLUK 526....................... G1.63 Nasri v UEFA (CAS 2017/A/5061)................................................................................ C18.27 National Basketball Association v Motorola Inc 105 F 3d 841 (1997) (2d Cir (US)..... H1.13, H1.73 National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corpn Ltd [2009] UKPC 16, [2009] 1 WLR 1405, [2009] Bus LR 1110, [2009] 4 WLUK 476, [2009] 1 CLC 637...... E15.4 National Crime Agency v N & Royal Bank of Scotland [2017] EWCA Civ 253, [2017] 1 WLR 3938, [2017] 4 WLUK 201, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 232.......................... E15.20 National Cycling Federation v Wilson (NADP Tribunal, 8 July 2008).......................... C23.6 National Football League/Adidas, Court of Appeal of Paris, 29 February 2000, [2000] 10 ECLR, p N.118/9............................................................................. E11.288, E11.290 National Football League Players’ Concussion Injurity Litigation (No 2), Re (12-md02323 (ED Pa)......................................................................................................... E2.28 National Grid Plc v Gas & Electricity Markets Authority 2010]  EWCA  Civ 114, [2010] UKCLR 386, CA......................................................................................... E11.18

civ  Table of Cases

para National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Naidoo (AR254/08) [2009] ZAKZHC 6; 2010 (3) SA 182 (N).............................................................. E5.5 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1975) 1 EHRR 578................................ E13.68 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785, [1972] 2 WLR 455, [1972] 1 All ER 641, [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 101, (1972) 116 SJ 138, HL.................................................................................... B5.37 National Wheelchair Basketball Federation v UK  Anti-Doping (UKAD) & Gibbs (CAS 2010/A/2230).................................................................................... C16.2; E13.21 Nemec v CITA & IAAF (CAS 2016/A/4458)........................................................ C6.8, C6.17 Netball New Zealand v IFNA (CAS 2010/A/2315)........................................................ B2.13 Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) v International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) & United States Olympic Committee (USOC) (CAS 2008/A/1641) B3.36;.................................................................................... D2.40 Neumeister v Austria (A/8) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 91, ECtHR.......................................... E13.48 New Balance Athletics Inc v Liverpool Football Club & Athletic Grounds Ltd [2019] EWHC 2837 (Comm), [2019] 10 WLUK 385...................... F1.5; F3.230; H3.67 New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee (CAS OG 02/006)..................................................................................... B1.37; B2.85; D2.152 New Zealand Trotting Conference v Ryan [1990] 1 NZLR 143.................................... E5.5 Newcastle United Plc v R & C Comrs [2006] UKVAT 19718....................................... F2.124 Newcastle United Plc v R & C Comrs [2007] EWHC 612 (Ch), [2007] STC 1330, [2007] BTC 5481, [2007] BVC 449, [2007] STI 1050, Ch D..................... F2.125; I1.65 Newport Association Football Club Ltd v Football Association of Wales Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 87, (1994) 144 NLJ 1351, Ch D................................ E2.31; E7.6; E8.6, E8.17; E10.1, E10.4, E10.7, E10.10, E10.15, E10.16, E10.17, E10.18, E10.19, E10.21, E10.24; E12.49; E15.5, E15.7, E15.11, E15.20, E15.21, E15.35; F3.50 New Saints v Football Association for Wales Ltd [2020] EWHC 1838 (Ch), [2020] 7 WLUK 165................................................................ A1.30; B5.152; E2.38; E6.1; E7.1, E7.41, E7.51; E8.3, E8.15 News Ltd v Australian Rugby League (1996) 135 ALR 33.......................... E8.5, E8.17; E9.6 News Ltd v Australian Rugby League (No 2) (1997) 139 ALR 193...................... E8.17; E9.6 News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [2003] HCA 45.. B5.42 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV [2011] EWCA Civ 890, [2012] Bus LR 53, [2012] RPC 1, CA......................................................... H1.65, H1.79 Newsweek Inc v BBC [1979] RPC 441 CA................................................................... H1.134 Newton-John v Scholl-Plough (1986) 11 FCR 233........................................................ H4.49 NeXovation Inc v European Commission (Case T-353/15) (16 October 2017).......... E11.323 NeXovation Inc v European Commission (Case C-665/19P)...................................... E11.323 Neykova v FISA & IOC (CAS Sydney 00/012)............................................................. B3.37 Nicholas v Borg [1987] AIPC 90 (SC Australia)............................................................ H1.133 Nichols Advanced Vehicle Systems v De Angelis (unreported , 21 December 1979).... F1.2, F1.9, F1.66, F1.81, F1.82; F3.16 Nigerian Football Federation v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3744 & 3766)............................... A1.17 Nike European Operations Netherlands BV v Rosicky [2007] EWHC 1967, Ch D...... F1.84 Nintentdo Co Ltd v Sky UK Ltd [2019] EWHC 2376 (Ch), [2020] 3 All ER 83, [2020] 2 All ER (Comm) 238, [2019] Bus LR 2773, [2019] 9 WLUK 74, [2020] ECC 7, [2019] ETMR 60..................................................................................................... H1.148 No 1 West India Quay (Residential) Ltd v East Tower Apartments Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 250, [2018] 1 WLR 5682, [2018] 2 WLUK 457, [2018] HLR 20, [2018] L & TR 18............................................................................................................ B1.36; E7.40 Nobes v Australian Cricket Board (unreported, 16 December 1991)............................. F3.53 Nolan v Aldwinians RUFC (unreported, 10 July 2001).................................................. F1.28 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535, HL...... E10.4, E10.5, E10.6, E10.7, E10.11, E10.12, E10.16, E10.18, E10.19, E10.21, E10.23, E10.29; F1.22; F3.50, F3.53, F3.228 Norman v Golder (1942-45) 26 TC 203......................................................................... I2.73

Table of Cases  cv

para Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] ECDR 205, [2000] EMLR 67, [2000] FSR 363, (2000) 23(3) IPD 23026, (1999) 96(45) LSG 31, (1999) 143 SJLB 279, CA........ H1.38, H1.69 North Range Shipping Ltd v Seatrans Shipping Corp (The Western Triumph) [2002]  EWCA  Civ 405, [2002] 1  WLR  2397, [2002] 4  All ER  390, [2002] 2  All ER (Comm) 193, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1, [2002]  CLC  992, (2002) 99(20) LSG 31, CA................................................................................................. D3.95 Norwegian Olympic Committee, Alsgaard v IOC (CAS 2002/O/372).......................... D2.62 Norwich Pharmacal v R  & C  Comrs [1974] AC  133, [1973] 3  WLR  164, [1973] 2 All ER 943, [1973] 6 WLUK 112, [1973] FSR 365, [1974] RPC 101, (1973) 117 SJ 567.................................................................................... B4.47; E15.15; H1.148 Nose v Slovenian Cycling Federation (CAS 2007/A/1356)................... C4.40; C6.45; C7.16; C18.19; C20.12 Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch), [2006] EMLR 14, [2006] RPC 14, (2006) 29(3) IPD 29023, (2006) 103(8) LSG 24 Ch D....... H1.70; J1.27 Nowak (Peter) v Data Protection Comr (Case C-434/16) [2018] 1 WLR 3505, [2017] 12 WLUK 540, [2018] 2 CMLR 21, [2018] CEC 1001......................................... A4.7 N’Sima v FIBA (Appeal Commission, 16 January 2006).............................................. C6.16 O O v RFEC (CAS 2002/A/358)........................................................................................ C6.30 OBG Ltd v Allan; Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young; Douglas v Hello!Ltd; sub nom OBG Ltd v Allen [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [2007] 2 WLR 920, [2007] 4 All ER 545, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2007] Bus LR 1600, [2007] IRLR 608, [2007] EMLR 12, [2007] BPIR 746, (2007) 30(6) IPD 30037, [2007] 19 EG 165 (CS), (2007) 151 SJLB 674, [2007] NPC 54, HL............... E9.6; F1.88; F2.151; G1.155; H1.16, H1.17, H1.18, H1.19, H1.39 OGC Nice Cote d’Azur & Yannick dos Santos Dialo v FIFA (TAS 2011/A/2578)....... F3.280 Oberschlick v Austria (A/204) (1991) (1995) 19 EHRR 389, ECtHR........................... E13.54 Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (1998) 25 EHRR 357, ECtHR......................................... E13.66 O’Brien v Associated Fire Alarms [1968] 1 WLR 1916, [1969] 1 All ER 93, 3 KIR 223, (1968) 112 SJ 232, CA............................................................................................ F1.37 O’Callaghan v Coral Racing Ltd (unreported, 19 November 1998), CA.......... D3.17, D3.19, D3.25, D3.103 O’Connell (Edward) & Lambe (James) v Turf Club & A-G [2017] IESC 57, [2017] 2 IR 43..................................................................................................................... E7.41 Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009]  UKHL  25, [2009] 1 WLR 1230, [2009] 3 All ER 1061, [2009] 5 WLUK 466, [2010] Imm AR 59, [2009] INLR 401..................................................................................................... B1.36 Odeon Associated Theatres Ltd v Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1971] 1  WLR  442, [1971] 2 All ER 407, [1970] 11 WLUK 63, (1970) 49 ATC 315, [1970] TR 299, (1971) 115 SJ 224................................................................................................... I1.17 O’Dwyer v Council of Ministers of the European Communities (T466/93) [1995] ECR II-2071, [1996] 2 CMLR 148, CFI.................................................................... E12.110 Office of Fair Trading v X [2003] EWHC 1042 (Comm), [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 183, [2003] UKCLR 765, [2004] ICR 105, QBD................................................... E11.35 O’Hara v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & UEFA (CAS 2008/A/1511)........... C4.21; C18.27 Ohlsson v WRU (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 6 January 2009)............ C3.7; C4.3, C4.23, C4.26; C6.6, C6.7, C6.16, C6.22 Ohuruogu v UK Athletics (CAS 2006/A/1165)............................ A1.19; B1.53, B1.56, B1.59; C3.6, C3.7; C4.17; C9.1; C17.15; F1.3, F1.19 Olafsson v Iceland (2013) 56 EHRR 633....................................................................... E13.68 Olasu de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit (CAS 2014/A/3467)................. B4.21, B4.35, B4.38 Oliveira v USADA (CAS 2010/A/2107)............................................................. C18.33; C20.6 Olubi v British Bobsleigh (Sport Resolutions, 21 January 2014)........................ B2.47, B2.57 Olympique des Alpes SA v Genoa Cricket & Football Club (CAS 2017/A/5090)........ D2.99

cvi  Table of Cases

para Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Bernard [2010] ECR I-2177................. F1.26; F3.156, F3.181, F3.183, F3.247 Olympique Lyonnais SASP  v Bernard (Case C-325/08) [2010] 3  WLUK  457, [2010] All ER (EC) 615, [2010] 3 CMLR 14, [2011] CEC 60.................. B5.31; E12.22, E12.28, E12.34, E12.42, E12.100, E12.101, E12.102, E12.103, E12.105, E12.115, E12.121 Olympique des Alpes SA (FC  Sion) v Genoa Cricket & Football Club (CAS 2017/A/5090)................................................................................................ F3.252 Olympiques des Alpes v Schweizerisher Fussball-Verband (Higher Court, Canton of Bern (Obergericht des Kantons Bern), 19 April 2012)........................................... D2.104 Olympiques Lyonnais v UEFA (CAS 2017/A/5299)...................................................... B3.85 Omeragik (Masar) v Macedonian Football Federation (FFM) (CAS 2011/A/2670)..... B1.22, B1.61; D2.133 Omonigho Temile v FC Krylia Sovetov Samara (CAS 2007/A/1369)............... F1.69, F1.70; F3.100, F3.256 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of Ministers of the European Communities (T-115/94) [1997] All ER (EC) 97, [1997] ECR II-39, [1997] 1 CMLR 733, CFI.................. E12.73 Oriekhov v UEFA (CAS 2010/A/2172)................................... B3.181, B3.187; B4.11, B4.30, B4.35, B4.37, B4.38, B4.41, B4.43 Orkem SA (formerly CdF Chimie SA) v Commission of the European Communities (374/87) [1989] ECR 3283, [1991] 4 CMLR 502 ECJ........................................... E11.36 Ortega (Ariel) v Fenerbahce & FIFA (CAS 2003/O/482)................................ F3.259, F3.268 Osmanoglu v Turkey (Application 48804/99) [2008] 1  WLUK  371, (2011) 53 EHRR 17............................................................................................................ E13.62 Osborne v Parole Board; Reilly’s Application for Judicial Review, Re [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC  1115, [2013] 3 WLR  1020, [2014] 1 All ER  369, [2014]  NI  154, [2013] 10 WLUK 277, [2014] HRLR 1, (2013) 157 (39) SJLB 37............. E7.57, E7.64 O’Sullivan McCarthy Mussel Development Ltd v Ireland (Application 44460/16) [2018] 6 WLUK 712, (2019) 68 EHRR 6............................................................... E13.72 Otakuku Rovers Rugby League Club v Auckland Rugby League (unreported, 12 November 1993)............................................................................................ E11.289 Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17............................................................................ B5.7 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound No  1) [1961]  AC  388, [1961] 2  WLR  126, [1961] 1  All ER  404, [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, [1961] 1 WLUK 865, 100 ALR 2d 928, 1961 AMC 962, (1961) 105 SJ 85................................................................................................................. G1.31 Overvliet v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2675)............................................. A1.19; B1.53; C3.7; C4.13, C4.17; C20.15 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Siskina v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210, [1977] 3 WLR 818, [1977] 3 All ER 803, [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, [1978] 1 CMLR 190 HL.............................................................................. E15.11 Oxley (Graham) Tool Steels v Firth [1980] IRLR 135, EAT.......................................... F1.33 Oyston v Reed [2016] EWHC 1067 (QB), [2016] 5 WLUK 147................................... E9.7 P P (A Barrister) v General Council of the Bar [2005] 1 WLR 3019, [2005] PNLR 32... E13.52 P v FINA (CAS 97/180).................................................................................................. C18.6 P v International Federation (13 April 2016).................................................................. B5.31 PGA Ltd v Evans (unreported, 25 January 1989)...................... E2.44, E2.54; H1.33, H1.130; H6.8, H6.24, H6.57 PRABF v USAB (CAS 94/132)...................................................................................... D2.157 PSV Eindhoven (Case SA/41613; 4 July 2016)........................................................... E11.315 PSV NV v FIFA & Federacao Portuguesa de Futebol (CAS 2005/A/835&942)........... D2.65; F3.100 PTIOS v Gaviri (Hearing Officer, 30 April 2018)........................................................... B4.32 PTIOS v Guzman (Anti-corruption Hearing, 14 March 2019)....................................... B4.22 PTIOS v Klec (Anti-corruption Hearing, 21 August 2015)............................................ B4.32 PTIOS v Kryvonos (AHO, 18 May 2017)...................................................................... B4.41 PTIOS v Liindahl (CAS 2017/A/4956).......................................................................... B4.41

Table of Cases  cvii

para PTIOS v Navarrete (Ribeiro) (Anti-corruption Hearing, 3 October 2017)..................... B4.25 Page One Records, Ltd v Britton [1968] 1 WLR 157, [1967] 3 All ER 822, (1967) 111 SJ 944, Ch D.................................................................................................... F1.80 Pakistan Cricket Board v BCCI (ICC Dispute Resolution Committee, 20 November 2018)....................................................................................................................... B1.57 Palmer (Sigismund) v R [1971] AC 814, [1971] 2 WLR 831, [1971] 1 All ER 1077, (1971) 55 Cr App R 223, (1971) 115 SJ 264, PC................................................... B3.52 Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation (CAS  2009/A/1823, 11 December 2009)....................................... A1.30, A1.54, A1.55, A1.56, A1.60; B1.22 Panathanaikos v Kyrgiakos (CAS 2005/A/973).............................................................. F3.223 Panathanaikos v UEFA & Olynpiakos (CAS 2015/A/4151).......................................... B5.7 Pantano & Pantano v Super Nova Racing [2003] EWHC 255, QBD.................. F1.81; F3.16 Papathanasiou (Emilios) v International Sailing Federation (ISAF) (CAS 2006/A/1142)... B3.35 Paragon Finance plc (formerly National Home Loans Corpn) v Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1466 [2002] 1 WLR 685, [2002] 2 All ER 248, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 1025, [2001] 10 WLUK  408, [2002] 2  P  & CR  20, (2001) 98 (44)  LSG  36, (2001) 145 SJLB 244, [2002] 1 P & CR DG13........................................................ B1.36; E7.40 Parish v World Series Cricket Pty Ltd (1977) 6 ALR 172.............................................. E2.52 Paris St Germain Football SASP v UEFA (CAS 2018/A/5937, 19 March 2019).......... B5.83; E12.39 Paris St Germain & Neymar Da Silva Santos Junior v Union des Associations Europeenes de Football (UEFA) (CAS 2019/A/6367)............................. B3.137, B3.138 Park Promotion Ltd (t/a Pontypool Rugby Football Club) v Welsh Rugby Union Ltd [2012] EWHC 1919, QBD....................................... B5.42; D1.57; E2.27, E2.29; E2.33; E6.2; E7.1, E7.36, E7.50, E7.55; E8.3; E10.27; E16.12, E16.16 Parkasho v Singh [1968] P 233....................................................................................... D2.124 Parma FC v Portsmouth City FC (CAS 2012/A/2943)................................................... D2.71 Parma FC  SpA  v Federazione Italiana Giuco Calcio & Torino FC  SpA (CAS 2014/A/3629)................................................................................................ B1.12 Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow v Wallbank see Aston Cantlow & Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank Parsons v R  & C  Comrs [2010]  UKFTT  110 (TC), [2010] 3  WLUK  256, [2010] STI 2124...................................................................................................... I2.73 Patrugan v Romanian Anti-Doping Agency (CAS 2017/A/5209)....................... C3.8; C13.2 Pavicic (Karen) v Federation Equestre Internationale (OG 16/014, 2016).......... B2.99; D1.31 Pawlak v Doucette & Reinks (1985) 2 WWR 588.............................................. G1.22, G1.44 Pechstein, DESG v ISU (CAS 2009/A/1912-1913)....................... B1.44; C3.7; C4.16; C5.2; C6.6, C6.10, C6.16; C7.3, C7.5, C7.8, C7.9, C7.10; D2.13; E16.17 Pechstein v ISU (4A_612/2009)........................................................................... C7.10; D2.13 Pechstein v ISU (15 January 2015)............................................ C7.10; D2.13; E4.8; E11.102, E11.103 Pechstein v ISU (German Federal Ct of Justice, 7 June 2016)............... A1.24; B1.15; C4.17; C7.10; D2.13 Pechstein v ISU, (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 10 February 2010)............... C4.17, C4.45; D2.192 Pellizotti v UCI (CAS 2010/A/2308 & CAS 2011/A/2335)................................... C7.8, C7.11 Penarol v Beuno Rodriguez & Paris Saint Germain (CAS 2005/A/983/4)........ B1.15; F3.222, F3.257 Perez v IOC (CAS OG Sydney 2000/005)............................ B1.57; D2.133, D2.156, D2.157 Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255.................................................................... G1.70 Peternell v SASCOC & SAEF (CAS 2012/A/2845).......... B2.33, B2.48, B2.49, B2.77, B2.89 Peters v Netherlands, 77-A DR 75 (1994)...................................................................... E13.59 Pett v Greyhound Racing Association (No 1) [1969] 1 QB 125, [1968] 2 WLR 1471, [1968] 2 All ER 545, (1968) 112 SJ 463, CA......................................................... E7.6 Pfeifer v Austria (A/227) (1992) 14 EHRR 692, ECtHR............................................... E13.54 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015]  UKSC  19, [2015] 1 WLR 1591, [2015] 3 All ER 1015, [2015] 3 WLUK 744, [2015] 2 CMLR 49, [2015] Imm AR 950, [2015] INLR 593........................................................ E7.82, E7.84

cviii  Table of Cases

para Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1970] AC 403, [1968] 3 WLR 286, [1968] 2 All ER 686, (1968) 112 SJ 601, HL......................................................... E10.9 Phee v Gordon [2014] CSIH 50, 2015 SCLR 343, [2014] 6 WLUK 40, 2014 GWD 20383.............................................................................................................. G1.98, G1.142 Philis v Greece (No 2) (1998) 25 EHRR 417, ECtHR...................................... E13.24, E13.39 Phillip v Panam Sports Organisation (CAS 2019/A/6637)............ C6.14; C23.2, C23.5, C23.6 Phillip Darrell Jones v Commonwealth Games Federation (CAS CG 2010/01)............ B2.42 Phoenix Finance Ltd v Federation International de l’Automobile [2002] EWHC 1028, Ch D................................................................ D3.10, D3.61, D3.88; E2.12; E4.9, E4.11; E7.55; E15.5, E15.7, E15.8, E15.10; E16.19 Photo Productions v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC  827, [1980] 2 WLR  283, [1980] 1 All ER 556, [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 545, [1980] 2 WLUK 146, (1980) 124 SJ 147............................................................................................................... H6.127 Piau (Laurent) v Commission of the European Communities (T-193/02) [2005] ECR II-209, [2005] 5 CMLR 2, CFI.......................... E2.27; E11.67, E11.68, E11.70, E11.71, E11.72, E11.79, E11.80, E11.102, E11.162, E11.163; E12.66; F2.1, F2.59, F2.69, F3.92 Piau v Commission of the European Communities (C-171/05) [2006] ECR I-37......... D3.34; F2.59 Piersack v Belgium (1982) 5 EHRR 169........................................................................ E13.52 Pighini v Atletico de Madrid........................................................................................... F2.137 Pilkadaris v Asian Tour (Tournament Division) Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 236, HC Sing...... E2.26; E10.5, E10.29; E11.108 Pillay v Hockey India (Case 73/2011 Competition Commission, India, 31 May 2013).... A1.77 Pinchbeck v Craggy Island Ltd [2012] EWHC 2745 (QB), [2012] 3 WLUK 447......... G1.88 Pine Valley Developments v Ireland (A/246-B) (1993) 16 EHRR 379, ECtHR............ E13.79 Pistorius v IAAF (CAS, 16 May 2008).......................................................................... E2.14 Pistorius v IAAF (CAS 2008/A/1480)............................................................................ B2.39 Pitcher v Huddersfield Town Football Club [2001] All ER (D) 223.................. G1.21, G1.37 Pittsburgh Athletic Co v KQV Broadcasting Co, 24 F Supp 490 (WD Pa 1938)........... H1.11, H1.12 Platini v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 29 June 2017)....................................... B1.53; D2.47 Platini v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4474)................................................................................ A5.3 Player H  v Club O  & Club D  (23  March 2006); Player P  v Club L  (21  February 2006)........................................................................................................... F3.160, F3.221 Plotniy v ITF (CAS 2010/A/2245)................................................................................. C16.1 Pobyedonostsev v IIHF (CAS/2005/A/990)........................................... C7.1; C18.19, C18.28 Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1988] AC 344, [1987] 3 WLR 1153, [1987] 3 All ER  974, [1988]  ICR  142, [1987]  IRLR  503, (1987) 137  NLJ  1109, (1988) 138 NLJ Rep 33, (1987) 131 SJ 1624, HL............................................................. F1.85 Poll v FINA (CAS 2002/A/399)..................................................................................... C6.41 Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth Activities Committee [2007] EWHC 1567, QBD.................................................... G1.6, G1.88, G1.92, G1.148 Porter v Magill [2001]  UKHL  67, [2002] 2  AC  357, [2002] 2  WLR  37, [2002] 1  All ER  465, [2002]  HRLR  16, [2002]  HLR  16, [2002]  BLGR  51, (2001) 151 NLJ 1886, [2001] NPC 184, HL.................................. B2.71; D1.76; E7.22, E7.73 Porter v National Union of Journalists [1980] 1 WLUK 274, [1980] IRLR 404........... B1.54 Portuguese Athletic Federation v Ornelas, Case 4/2011 (Disciplinary Council of Portuguese Athletic Federation, 13 January 2012)...................................... C7.12; C19.8 Post Office v Liddiard [2001] EWCA Civ 940, [2001] Emp LR 784, CA..................... F1.64 Pous Tio v ITF, CAS 2008/A/1488....................................................... C16.2; C18.26, C18.27 Powell v JADCO (CAS 2014/A/3571)........................................................................... C20.10 Premier Family Martial Arts LLP  v R  & C  Comrs [2020]  UKFTT  1 (TC), [2020] 1 WLUK 13, [2020] STI 231.................................................................................. I1.128 Premier Rugby v RFU [2006] EWHC 2068................................................ E2.37; E7.55; E8.5 Premier Rugby Ltd v Saracens (5 November 2019)................... B1.4; B5.114, B5.115; D3.34; E2.24, E2.39; E6.1, E6.2, E6.11; E7.1, E7.39, E7.51, E7.84; E8.4; E11.53, E11.73, E11.165, E11.167, E11.172, E11.173; F3.22, F3.25, F3.45

Table of Cases  cix

para Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fiji Shipping Company Ltd see Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov Prestatyn Urban DC  v Prestatyn Raceway Ltd [1970] 1  WLR  33, [1969] 3  All ER 1573, 68 LGR 609, (1969) 113 SJ 899, Ch D.................................................. G1.132 Print v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1999] All ER (D) 1197, QBD.................... D3.66 Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 815, [2012] IRLR 241, [2012] FSR 16, CA................ E10.3; F1.19, F1.25; F2.142, F2.161, F2.162, F2.163, F2.166; H4.91 Proceedings Brought by Wahlergruppe Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative und Grune GewerkschafterInnen/UG (C-171/01) [2003]  ECR  I-4301, [2003] 2 CMLR 29, ECJ.................................................................................................... E12.76 Procola v Luxembourg (A/326) (1996) 22 EHRR 193, ECtHR..................................... E13.52 Produce Brokers Co Ltd v Olympia Oil & Cake Co Ltd (Reasonableness of Trade Custom) [1917] 1 KB 320, CA............................................................................... B2.17 Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd [2006] EWHC 2903 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 542, [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 356, [2007] Bus LR 93, (2006) 156 NLJ 1723, Ch D.................. F1.89, F1.96; F2.7, F2.142, F2.147, F2.150; F3.251 Provident Financial Group v Hayward [1989] 3  All ER  298, [1989]  ICR  160, [1989] IRLR 84, CA............................................................................................... F1.30 Provimi Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA  [2003]  EWHC  961 (Comm), [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 683, [2003] UKCLR 493, [2003] ECC 29, [2003] Eu LR 517, QBD........................................................................................................................ E11.26 Puerta v ITF (CAS 2006/A/1025)..................................... B1.15, B1.32, B1.33, B1.43, B1.61; C4.42; C16.3; C18.5, C18.6, C18.7, C18.8, C18.17; C20.10, C20.17, C20.18, C20.19; C23.2; E7.84 Pulis v Cystal Palace Football Club Ltd [2016]  EWHC  2999 (Comm), [2016] 11 WLUK 529............................................................................................... D3.94; F1.42 Purevdori v United World Wrestling (CAS 2019/A/6190)........... C4.17; C6.40; C17.5, C17.6 Q QPR v EFL (EFL Arbitration, 19 October 2017)............. B1.4; B5.96, B5.114; D3.34; E7.56 Qatar FA v FIFA (CAS 2012/A/2742).................................................................. B1.55, B1.56 Qerimaj v International Weightlifting Federation (CAS 2012/A/2822).............. C13.2; C17.8; C18.20, C18.32; C20.6, C20.12, C20.13, C20.15; C21.11 Queens Club Ltd v R & C Comrs [2017] UKFTT 700 (TC), [2017] 9 WLUK 362, [2017] STI 2074...................................................................................................... I1.68 Queen’s Park Rangers v Football League (FDC Arbitral Panel, 2017)................ E6.11; E7.84 R R  v A  (Complainant’s Sexual History) [2001]  UKHL  25, [2002] 1 AC  45, [2001] 2 WLR  1546, [2001] 3 All ER  1, [2001] 2 Cr App R  21, (2001) 165  JP  609, [2001]  HRLR  48, [2001]  UKHRR  825, 11  BHRC  225, [2001] Crim LR  908, (2001) 165 JPN 750, HL......................................................................................... E13.12 R  v Abu Hamza [2006]  EWCA  Crim 2918, [2007]  QB  659, [2007] 2  WLR  226, [2007] 3 All ER 451, [2007] 11 WLUK 637, [2007] 1 Cr App R 27, [2007] Crim LR 320.................................................................................................................... B1.39 R v Adomako (John Asare) [1995] 1 AC 171, [1994] 3 WLR 288, [1994] 3 All ER 79, (1994) 99 Cr App R 362, (1994) 158 JP 653, [1994] 5 Med LR 277, [1994] Crim LR 757, (1994) 158 JPN 507, (1994) 144 NLJ 936, HL........................................ G2.34 R v Amir (Mohammad); R v Butt (Salman) [2011] EWCA Crim 2914, [2012] 2 Cr App R (S) 17, CA.................................................................................................... B4.41, B4.49; E7.67; E16.22 R  v Anderson (William Ronald) [1986] AC  27, [1985] 3  WLR  268, [1985] 2 All ER 961, (1985) 81 Cr App R 253, [1985] Crim LR 651, HL................................. B4.48

cx  Table of Cases

para R  v BBC, ex p Lavelle [1983] 1  WLR  23, [1983] 1 All ER  241, [1983]  ICR  99, [1982] IRLR 404, (1983) 133 NLJ 133, (1982) 126 SJLB 836, QBD....... B4.38, B4.40; D1.95 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560, [2019] QB 1, [2018] 3 WLR 883, [2018] 3 WLUK 554, [2018] 2 Cr App R 1, [2018] LLR 514, [2018] Crim LR 847....................... G2.42, G2.78 R  v Barnes (Mark) [2004]  EWCA  Crim 3246, [2005] 1  WLR  910, [2005] 2  All ER 113, [2005] 1 Cr App R 30, [2005] Crim LR 381, (2005) 102(4) LSG 30, CA...................................................................... D1.7, D1.95; G2.8, G2.9, G2.26, G2.33, G2.46, G2.47, G2.48, G2.55, G2.60 R v Barnsley MBC, ex p Hook [1976] 1 WLR 1052, [1976] 3 All ER 452, 74 LGR 493, (1976) 120 SJ 182, CA............................................................................................ E7.84 R v Billinghurst [1978] Crim LR 553, CC.............................................. G2.24, G2.54, G2.55 R v Birkin (Paul Abbey) (1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 303, [1988] Crim LR 854, CA......... G2.65 R v Blissett (The Independent, 4 December 1992).............................................. G2.29, G2.55 R v Boateng (Michael); R v Ganeshan (Krishna Sanjay); R v Sankaran (Chann) (Case Nos T20139135, T20139053 & T20139135) (unreported, Birmingham Crown Court)...................................................................................................................... B4.49 R v Boggild (Phillip) [2011] EWCA Crim 1928, [2012] 1 WLR 1298, [2011] 4 All ER 1285, [2011] 5 Costs LR 879, [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 81, (2012) 176 JP 85, [2012] Crim LR 48, CA............................................................................... A3.70, A3.72 R v Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83......................................................... G2.1, G2.26, G2.31 R v British Basketball Association, ex p Mickan (unreported, 17 March 1981), CA..... B1.57; E7.6, E7.52; F3.44 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, [1993] 2 WLR 556, [1993] 2 All ER 75, (1993) 97 Cr App.R 44, (1993) 157 JP 337, (1993) 157 JPN 233, (1993) 143 NLJ 399, HL..... G2.8, G2.13, G2.40, G2.42, G2.43, G2.78 R v Brownbill (unreported).................................................................................. G2.13, G2.18 R v CC 2009 ONCJ 249...................................................................................... G2.33, G2.51 R v Calton [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 64, CA.............................................................. G2.2, G2.28 R v Cantona (The Times, 25 March 1995).......................................................... B3.80; G2.59 R v Cey (1989) 48 CCC 3d 480 (Sask CA)......................................................... G2.33, G2.48 R v Chance, ex p Smith [1995] BCC 1095, (1995) 7 Admin LR 821, DC..................... B4.40 R v Chapman (unreported 3 March 2010) CC (Warwick).............................................. G2.55 R v Church (Cyril David) [1966] 1 QB 59, [1965] 2 WLR 1220, [1965] 2 All ER 72, (1965) 49 Cr App R 206, (1965) 129 JP 366, (1965) 109 SJ 371,Ct of CA........... G2.30 R v Ciccarelli (1989) 54 CCC (3d) 121.......................................................................... G2.48 R  v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1982] AC  779, [1982] 3 WLR  159, [1982] 6 WLUK  104, [1982]  IRLR  424, 80 LGR 737, (1982) 126 SJ 449............................................................................. B1.47 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, QBD.......................................... A3.76; G2.13, G2.37, G2.43, G2.78, G2.81, G2.82 R v Cotterill [2007] EWCA Crim 526, [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 64, CA................. G2.5, G2.66 R v Davies (Robert Paul) (1990-91) 12 Cr App R (S) 308, [1991] Crim LR 70, CA.... G2.21, G2.22 R v Derby Magistrates Court, ex p B [1996] AC 487, [1995] 3 WLR 681, [1995] 4 All ER 526, [1996] 1 Cr App R 385, (1995) 159 JP 785, [1996] 1 FLR 513, [1996] Fam Law 210, (1995) 159 JPN 778, (1995) 145 NLJ 1575, (1995) 139 SJLB 219, HL........................................................................................................................... E11.36 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909, [1993] 2 All ER 853, [1993] COD 234, (1993) 143 NLJ 163, CA........ E2.4; E5.3, E5.5; E7.7; E13.15; E15.11 R  v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 207, (1990) 2 Admin LR 609, [1990] COD 260, DC.............................. E5.3 R v Donovan (John George) [1934] 2 KB 498, (1936) 25 Cr App R 1, CA................... G2.43 R v DPP, ex p Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326, [1999] 3 WLR 972, [1999] 4 All ER 801, [2000] 1 Cr App R 275, [2000] HRLR 93, [2000] UKHRR 176, (2000) 2 LGLR 697, (1999) 11 Admin LR 1026, [2000] Crim LR 486, (1999) 96(43) LSG 32, HL...... E13.55 R  v Eastern Counties Rugby Union, ex p Basildon Rugby Club (unreported, 10 September 1987)................................................................................................ E2.33

Table of Cases  cxi

para R v Evans (unreported, 14 June 2006) (Newcastle Crown Court).................................. G2.17 R v Executive Council for the Joint Disciplinary Scheme, ex p Hipps [1996] CLY 5, QBD........................................................................................................................ B4.40 R  v Football Association Ltd, ex p Football League Ltd [1993] 2  All ER  833, [1992] COD 52...................................................................................... E2.43; E5.3, E5.4 R  v Football Association of Wales, ex p Flint Town United Football Club [1991] COD 44, DC...................................................................................... E5.3; E12.49 R  v G  [2003]  UKHL  50, [2004] 1  AC  1034, [2003] 3  WLR  1060, [2003] 4  All ER 765, [2004] 1 Cr App R 21, (2003) 167 JP 621, [2004] Crim LR 369, (2003) 167 JPN 955, (2003) 100(43) LSG 31, HL............................................................. B3.47 R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, [1981] 2 All ER 1060, (1981) 73 Cr App R 124, [1981] Crim LR 648, (1981) 125 SJ 442, CA......................................................... C4.1 R v Garfield (unreported, 15 November 2007), Crown Court (Swansea)...................... G2.24 R v Goodwin (Reginald Barry) (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 885, CA...................... G2.69, G2.70 R v Gough (Robert) [1993] AC 646, [1993] 2 WLR 883, [1993] 2 All ER 724, (1993) 97 Cr App R 188, (1993) 157 JP 612, [1993] Crim LR 886, (1993) 157 JPN 394, (1993) 143 NLJ 775, (1993) 137 SJLB 168, HL.................................................... E13.53 R v Hardy (The Guardian, 27 July 1994)....................................................................... G2.61 R v Hertfordshire County Council, ex p Cheung (The Times, 4 April 1986)................. B1.27 R  v Howell [1982]  QB  416, [1981] 3  WLR  501, [1981] 3  All ER  383, [1981] 4  WLUK  132, (1981) 73 Cr App Rep 31, [1981] Crim LR  697, (1981) 125 SJ 462............................................................................................................... G2.84 R  v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, ex p Brindle [1994] BCC 297, CA.............................................................................................. B4.40 R v Institute of Chartered Accountants, ex p Nawaz [1997] 16 PNLR 43, CA.............. B4.38 R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225, (1991) 5 Admin LR 265, [1990] COD 346, QBD............................................. E2.55; E5.4, E5.5; E7.81; E10.14; E13.21 R v Johnson (1986) 8 Cr App Rep (S) 343..................................................................... G2.28 R  v Johnstone (Robert Alexander) [2003]  UKHL  28, [2003] 1 WLR  1736, [2003] 3  All ER  884, [2003] 2 Cr App R  33, (2003) 167  JP.281, [2004]  ETMR  2, [2003] HRLR 25, [2003] UKHRR 1239, [2003] FSR 42, [2004] Crim LR 244, (2003) 167 JPN 453, (2003) 100(26) LSG 36, (2003) 147 SJLB 625, HL............ H1.120 R v Kamara (The Times, 15 April 1988)........................................................................ G2.58 R  v Keogh (David) [2007]  EWCA  Crim 528, [2007] 1  WLR  1500, [2007] 3  All ER 789, [2007] 2 Cr App R 9, [2007] HRLR 21, (2007) 104(12) LSG 35, (2007) 151 SJLB 397, CA.................................................................................................. E13.55 R  v Life Assurance Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation, ex p Ross [1993]  QB  17, [1992] 3 WLR 549, [1993] 1 All ER 545, [1993] BCLC 509, (1993) 5 Admin LR 573 [1992] COD 455, CA................................................................................. B2.94 R v Lincoln (1990) 12 Cr App Rep (S) 250......................................................... G2.65, G2.69 R v Lloyd (1989) 11 Cr App Rep (S) 36.............................................................. G2.3, G2.65 R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Hibbit & Saunders (The Times, 12 March 1993)................. E6.5 R  v Luttrell (Gerrard Francis) [2004]  EWCA  Crim 1344, [2004] 2 Cr App R  31, (2004) 148 SJLB 698, CA...................................................................................... B3.60 R v Majeed, Butt, Amir & Asif (3 November 2011).......................... B4.1, B4.4, B4.35, B4.40 R v Majeed (Mazhar); Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186, [2013] 1 WLR 1041, [2012] 3 All ER 737, [2012] 2 Cr App R 18, [2012] Lloyd’s Rep FC 593, [2012] Crim LR 965, CA............................................................................. B4.41, B4.48, B4.49 R v Marshall (Adrian John) [1998] 2 Cr App R 282, (1998) 162 JP 489, [1999] Crim LR  317, (1998) 162  JPN  504, (1998) 95(16)  LSG  24, (1998) 142  SJLB  111, CA........................................................................................................................... H1.33 R v Miller (Peter) [1954] 2 QB 282, [1954] 2 WLR 138, [1954] 2 All ER 529, (1954) 38 Cr App R 1, (1954) 118 JP 340, (1954) 98 SJ 62, Assizes................................ G2.23 R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex p Federation Europeene de la Sante Animale (FEDESA) (C-331/88) [1990]  ECR  I-4023, [1991] 1  CMLR  507, ECJ........................................................................................................................ E12.110 R v Moloney (Alistair Baden) [1985] AC 905, [1985] 2 WLR 648, [1985] 1 All ER 1025, (1985) 81 Cr App R 93, (1985) 149 JP 369, [1985] Crim LR 378, HL.................... G2.35

cxii  Table of Cases

para R v Moore (1898) 15 TLR 229....................................................................................... G2.31 R v Noble (Kalem Connor) [2015] EWCA Crim 1454, [2015] 7 WLUK 1008............. G2.66, G2.69 R v Olliver (Richard George) (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 10, (1989) 153 JP 369, [1989] Crim LR 387; (1989) 153 J.P.N. 390, CA............................................................... G2.73 R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex p Al-Fayed [1992] BCC 524, [1992] BCLC 938, (1993) 5 Admin LR 337, CA.................................................................................. B4.40 R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex p Datafin [1987] QB 815........................ E5.4; E13.21 R v Piff (Jason Mark); su nom A-G’s Reference (No.27 of 1993), Re (1994) 15 Cr App Rep (S) 737, CA........................................................................................... G2.28, G2.65 R v Rodgers..................................................................................................................... B4.49 R  v Sang (Leonard Anthony) [1980]  AC  402, [1979] 3  WLR  263, [1979] 2  All ER 1222, (1979) 69 Cr App R 282, [1979] Crim LR 655, HL............................... B4.38 R v Savage (Susan); R v Parmenter (Philip Mark) (No.1), sub nom DPP v Parmenter (Philip Mark) [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 3 WLR 914, [1991] 4 All ER 698, (1992) 94 Cr App R 193, (1991) 155 JP 935, [1992] Crim LR 288, (1991) 155 JPN 770, (1991) 141 NLJ 1553, HL........................................................................... G2.20, G2.23 R v Scottish Football Association, ex p Rangers Football Club Plc [2012] CSOH 95, 2012 SLT 1156, 2012 GWD 20-402................................................... B5.144; D1.8; E4.9; E5.5; E16.17 R v Secretary of State for Education & Employment, ex p Portsmouth Football Club [1998] COD 142..................................................................................................... F1.13 R  v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Eastside Cheese Co [1999] 3  CMLR  123, [1999] Eu LR 968, [2000] EHLR 52, (2000) 2 LGLR 41, (2000) 55 BMLR 38, [1999] COD 321, CA.......................................................................................... E12.110 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, [1991] 2 WLR 588, [1991] 1 All ER 720, (1991) 3 Admin LR 486, (1991) 141 NLJ 199, (1991) 135 SJ 250, HL............................................................................................ E13.2 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Naughton [1997] 1 WLR 118 (QB)........................................................................................................................ B1.57 R v Shervill (David Anthony) (1989) 11 Cr App Rep (S) 284, CA................................ G2.65 R v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, ex p Gallagher, CA............................................... B4.40 R v Soneji (Kamlesh Kumar) [2005] UKHL 49, [2006] 1 AC 340, [2005] 3 WLR 303, [2005] 4 All ER 321, [2005] 7 WLUK 669, [2006] 2 Cr App R 20, [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 79, [2006] Crim LR 167, (2005) 102 (31) LSG 26, (2005) 155 NLJ 1315, (2005) 149 SJLB 924.............................................................................................. C4.23 R v Stapylton (Ben) [2012] EWCA Crim 728, [2013] 1 Cr App R (S) 12, [2012] Crim LR 631, CA............................................................................................................. G2.73 R v T [1990] Crim LR 256, CC...................................................................................... G2.63 R v Terry (John) (unreported, 13 July 2012)................................. B3.143; E2.6; E7.67; G2.91 R v Thomas (unreported, 13 February 2006), Bexley Magistrates’ Court...................... G2.86 R v Venna (Henson George) [1976] QB 421, [1975] 3 WLR 737, [1975] 3 All ER 788, (1975) 61 Cr App R 310, [1975] Crim LR 701, (1975) 119 SJ 679, CA................ G2.20 R v Westfield, 17 February 2012........................................................................ B4.41, B4.49 R v Weston (unreported, 5 March 2012), Bristol Crown Court...................................... G2.66 R v Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411, (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, [1984] Crim LR 163, (1984) 81 LSG 278, CA............................................................................ G2.61 R (Robert) v Ski Llandudno Ltd [2000] 7 WLUK 921, [2001] PIQR P5.......... G1.90, G1.144 R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions see R (on the application of Holding & Barnes Plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions R  (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312, [2008] 2 WLR 781, [2008] 3 All ER 193, [2008] EMLR 8, [2008] HRLR 25, [2008] UKHRR 477, 24 BHRC 217, (2008) 152(12) SJLB 30, HL......................................................... E13.66 R (on the application of RBNB) v Crown Court at Warrington [2002] UKHL 24, [2002] 1  WLR  1954, [2002] 4 All ER  131, [2002] 6  WLUK  333, [2002]  BCC  697, (2003) 167 JP 6, [2002] LLR 515, (2003) 167 JPN 31, (2002) 99 (30) LSG 39, (2002) 152 NLJ 999, (2002) 146 SJLB 174, [2002] NPC 85................................. B5.15

Table of Cases  cxiii

para R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453, [2008] 3 WLR 955, [2008] 4 All ER 1055, [2008] 10 WLUK 552, (2008) 105 (42) LSG 20, (2008) 158 NLJ 1530, (2008) 152 (41) SJLB 29........................................................................................ B3.134 R (on the application of Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100, [2006] 2 WLR 719, [2006] 2 All ER 487, [2006] 1 FCR 613, [2006] HRLR 21, [2006] UKHRR 708, 23 BHRC 276, [2006] ELR 273, (2006) 103(14) LSG 29, (2006) 156 NLJ 552, HL............................................................ E13.62 R  (on the application of Bulger) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 119, [2001] 3 All ER 449, DC............................................ E13.75 R  (on the application of Bus & Coach Association Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2019] EWHC 3319 (Admin), [2019] 12 WLUK 71............................. E15.24 R  (on the application of Carson) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2005] UKHL 37, [2006] 1 AC 173, [2005] 2 WLR 1369, [2005] 4 All ER 545, [2005] HRLR 23, [2005] UKHRR 1185, 18 BHRC 677, HL................................ E13.71 R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63, [2014] AC 271, [2013] 3 WLR 1076, [2014] 1 All ER 683, 2014 SC (UKSC) 25, 2014 SLT 143, [2013] 10 WLUK 509, [2014] 1 CMLR 45, [2014] HRLR 3, 2013 GWD 34-676.................................................................................................. E13.10 R  (on the application of Countryside Alliance) v A-G  [2007]  UKHL  52, [2008] 1  AC  719, [2007] 3  WLR  922, [2008] 2  All ER  95, [2008] Eu LR  359, [2008]  HRLR  10, [2008]  UKHRR  1, (2007) 104(48)  LSG  23, (2007) 157 NLJ 1730, (2007) 151 SJLB 1564, [2007] NPC 127, HL................. E13.68, E13.70 R  (on the application of DSD) v Parole Board [2018]  EWHC  694 (Admin), [2019] QB 285, [2018] 3 WLR 829, [2018] 3 All ER 417, [2018] 3 WLUK 689, [2018] HRLR 12, [2018] ACD 57.......................................................................... E7.78 R (on the application of Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]  EWCA  Civ 606, [2002]  QB  1391, [2002] 3  WLR  481, [2002] 4  All ER  289, [2002]  UKHRR  734, 12  BHRC  497, [2002] Imm AR  447, [2002] INLR 257, [2002] ACD 76, (2002) 99(22) LSG 33, (2002) 152 NLJ 708, (2002) 146 SJLB 124, CA...................................................................................... E13.75 R  (on the application of Gallaher Group Ltd) v Competition & Markets Authority [2018]  UKSC  25, [2019] AC  96, [2018] 2 WLR  1583, [2018] 4 All ER  183, [2018] Bus LR 1313, [2018] 5 WLUK 293, [2018] 5 CMLR 2............................. E7.82 R (on the application of Gloszczuk) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-63/99) [2002] All ER (EC) 353, [2001]  ECR  I-6369, [2001] 3  CMLR  46, [2001] CEC 358, [2002] INLR 357, ECJ............................................................... E12.76 R  (on the application of Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs [2016]  EWHC  55 (Admin), [2016]  PTSR  851, [2016] 1 WLUK 230, [2016] 2 CMLR 19, [2016] ACD 73............................................... E7.78 R  (on the application of Haworth) v R  & C  Comrs [2019]  EWCA  Civ 74, [2019] 2 WLUK 1, [2019] 1 FLR 1175, [2019] 2 FCR 153.............................................. I2.111 R (on the application of Holub) v Secretary of State for the Home [2001] 1 WLR 1359, [2001]  HRLR  24, [2001] Imm AR  282, [2001]  INLR  219, [2001]  ELR  401, [2001] ACD 31, CA................................................................................................ E13.75 R  (on the application of Hutchinson 3G UK  Ltd) v Teleconica UK  Ltd [2017] EWHC 3376 (Admin), [2017] 12 WLUK 572............................................ B1.21 R  (on the application of Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for England & Wales; A-G v Charity Commission for England & Wales, sub nom Independent Schools Council v Charity Commission for England & Wales [2011]  UKUT  421 (TCC), [2012] Ch  214, [2012] 2  WLR  100, [2012] 1 All ER 127, [2012] PTSR 99, [2011] ELR 529, [2012] WTLR 41, 14 ITELR 396, TC........................................................................................................................... A2.71 R (on the application of Jayes) v Flintshire County Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1089, [2018] 5 WLUK 246, [2018] ELR 416................................................................... E7.80 R  (on the application of Kaur) v Institute of Legal Executives Appeal Tribunal [2011]  EWCA  Civ 1168, [2012] 1  All ER  1435, [2012] 1 Costs LO  23, [2011]  ELR  614, (2011) 108(45)  LSG  20, (2011) 155(40)  SJLB  31, [2011] NPC 106, [2012] PTSR, CA...................... D1.52, D1.78, D1.121; E7.72; E13.52

cxiv  Table of Cases

para R (on the application of Khatun) v London Borough of Newham [2004] EWCA Civ 55, [2005] QB 37, [2004] 3 WLR 417, [2004] 2 WLUK 611, [2004] Eu LR 628, [2004] HLR 29, [2004] BLGR 696, [2004] L & TR 18, (2004) 148 SJLB 268, [2004] NPC 28........................................................................................................ E7.78 R  (on the application of King) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015]  UKSC  54, [2016]  AC  384, [2015] 3  WLR  457, [2016] 1  All ER  1033, [2015] 7 WLUK 909................................................................................................. E7.60, E7.72 R  (on the application of Locke) v R  & C  Comrs [2019]  EWCA  Civ 1909, [2020] 1  All ER  459, [2019]  STC  2543, [2019] 11  WLUK  52, [2019]  BTC  30, [2019] STI 1805...................................................................................................... I2.111 R  (on the application of Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2073 (Admin), [2003] 9 WLUK 7, [2004] Prison LR 65............... A4.162 R  (on the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015]  UKSC  41, [2016] AC 697, [2015] 3 WLR 121, [2016] 1 All ER 391, [2015] 6 WLUK 762, [2015] 3 CMLR 42, [2015] HRLR 12, [2015] Crim LR 894................................. E3.9 R  (on the application of McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2002]  UKHL  39, [2003] 1 AC 787, [2002] 3 WLR 1313, [2002] 4 All ER 593, [2003] 1 Cr App R 27, (2002) 166 JP 657, [2002] UKHRR 1286, 13 BHRC 482, [2003] HLR 17, [2003]  BLGR  57, [2003] Crim LR  269, (2002) 166  JPN  850, (2002) 146 SJLB 239, HL.................................................................................................. B4.37 R (on the application of McMorn) v Natural England [2015] EWHC 3297 (Admin), [2016] PTSR 750, [2015] 11 WLUK 312, [2016] Env LR 14, [2016] LLR 151... B1.27 R (on the application of McVey) v Secretary of State for [2010] EWHC 437 (Admin); [2010] Med LR 204, QBD...................................................................................... E7.32 R  (on the application of Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Comrs of Income Tax [2002]  UKHL  21, [2003] 1 AC  563, [2002] 2  WLR  1299, [2002] 3 All ER  1, [2002]  STC  786, [2002] 5 WLUK  481, [2002]  HRLR  42, 74  TC  511, [2002] BTC 223, 4 ITL Rep 809, [2002] STI 806, (2002) 99 (25) LSG 35, (2002) 146 SJLB 126, [2002] NPC 70............................................................................... B1.61 R (on the application of Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] UKSC 56, [2014] 1  WLR  3947, [2015] 1  All ER  495, [2014]  PTSR  1317, [2014] 10 WLUK 872, [2014] BLGR 823, [2015] RVR 93............................................... B1.21 R (on the application of Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal Board (No 1) [2005] EWHC 2197 (Admin), [2005] 10 WLUK 434, [2006] LLR 151, [2006] ACD 2............. D1.8; E3.13; E5.3, E5.5, E5.8; E7.1, E7.6, E7.10, E7.23; E13.21, E13.26 R  (on the application of N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) [2005]  EWCA  Civ 1605, [2006]  QB  468, [2006] 2  WLR  850, [2006] 4  All ER 194, [2005] 12 WLUK 723, (2006) 88 BMLR 59, [2007] MHLR 59.............. B3.185 R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363, [2005] 11 WLUK 580.................................................... B1.39 R  (on the application of Newcastle United Football Club Ltd) v R  & C  Comrs [2017]  EWHC  2402 (Admin), [2017] 4  WLR  187, [2018]  STC  103, [2017] 10 WLUK 63, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 604, [2017] BVC 44, [2017] ACD 129, [2017] STI 2181.................................................................................................. F2.7; I1.1 R (on the application of Ngole) v University of Sheffield [2019] EWCA Civ 1127, [2019] 7 WLUK 20, [2019] ELR 443..................................................................... B3.115 R  (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary fo State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755, [2008] 7 WLUK 256, (2008) 152 (29) SJLB 29.............. B3.132 R  (on the application of Oliver) v DPP  [2016]  EWHC  1771 (Admin), [2016] 7 WLUK 371........................................................................................................... G2.34 R (on the application of Reprotech) (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8, [2003] 1 WLR 348, [2002] 4 All ER 58, [2002] 2 WLUK 761, [2003] 1 P & CR 5, [2002] 2 PLR 60, [2002] JPL 821, [2002] 10 EG 158 (CS), [2002] NPC 32.... B1.36, B1.39 R (on the application of S) v Swindon BC [2001] EWHC Admin 334, [2001] 2 FLR 776, [2001] 3 FCR 702, [2001] BLGR 318, [2001] Fam Law 659, QBD........................ B6.87 R (on the application of ST (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12, [2012] 2 AC 135, [2012] 2 WLR 735, [2012] 3 All ER 1037, [2012] 3 WLUK 674, 34 BHRC 23, [2012] Imm AR 734, [2012] INLR 440........ B1.46

Table of Cases  cxv

para R (on the application of Save Britain’s Heritage) v Secretary of State for Commnunities & Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 2137, [2019] 1 WLR 929, [2019] 1 All ER 1117, [2018] 10 WLUK 88, [2019] JPL 237.................................................... E7.75 R (on the application of Simms) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 2 AC  115, [1999] 3  WLR  328, [1999] 3 All ER  400, [1999] 7  WLUK  189, [1999]  EMLR  689, 7  BHRC  411, (1999) 11 Admin LR  961, [1999] Prison LR 82, [1999] COD 520, (1999) 96 (30) LSG 28, (1999) 149 NLJ 1073, (1999) 143 SJLB 212.......................................................................................................... B1.61 R  (on the application of Sky Blue Sports & Leisure Ltd) v Coventry City Council (No 2) [2018] EWCA Civ 2252, [2018] 10 WLUK 220.................................... E11.322 R (on the application of Stott) v Justice Secretary [2018] UKSC 59, [2020] AC 51, [2018] 3 WLR 1831, [2019] 2 All ER 351, [2018] 11 WLUK 455, [2019] 1 Cr App R (S) 47, [2019] Crim LR 251........................................................................ E13.71 R (on the application of TVDanmark 1 Ltd) v Independent Television Commission [2001] UKHL 42, [2001] 1 WLR 1604, [2001] 3 CMLR 26, [2001] Eu LR 741, [2001] EMLR 42, (2001) 98(34) LSG 43, HL................................. A3.98, A3.99; E15.22 R  (on the application of Turkish Businesspeople Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019]  EWHC  603 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR  4273, [2019] 3 WLUK 276, [2019] ACD 51................................................................................ E7.81 R  (on the application of United Cabbies Group (London) Ltd) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2019] EWHC 409 (Admin), [2019] 2 WLUK 359, [2019] LLR 374....................................................................................................... B2.71; E7.72 R (Westech College) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 1484 (Admin), [2011] 6 WLUK 205............................................................................... E7.32 R  (on the application of Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL 38........................................................................................ B1.57 R  (on the application of White) v Blackfriars Crown Court [[2008]  EWHC  510 (Admin), [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 97, (2008) 172 JP 321, [2008] Crim LR 575, DC........................................................................................................................... E12.69 R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education & Employment [2005]  UKHL  15, [2005] 2 AC  246, [2005] 2 WLR  590, [2005] 2 All ER  1, [2005] 2 FLR 374, [2005] 1 FCR 498, [2005] HRLR 14, [2005] UKHRR 339, 19 BHRC 99, [2005] ELR 291, [2005] Fam Law 456, (2005) 102(16) LSG 27, (2005) 155 NLJ 324, (2005) 149 SJLB. 266, HL................................................... E13.62 R  & C  Comrs v Bridport & West Dorset Golf Club Ltd (Case C-495/12) [2014] STC 663, [2013] 12 WLUK 671, [2014] BVC 1, [2014] STI 257............. I1.128 R & C Comrs v Football League Ltd v The Football League & FA Premier League [2012]  EWHC  1372 (Ch), [2012] Bus LR  1539, [2013]  BCC  60, [2013] 1 BCLC 285, [2012] BPIR 686, (2012) 109(24) LSG 20, Ch D................ B5.39, B5.134, B5.140, B5.141, B5.144, B5.146, B5.153; E2.34; E12.38 R & C Comrs v Rochdale Drinks [2011] EWCA Civ 1116, [2012] STC 186, [2011] 10  WLUK  298, [2013]  BCC  419, [2012] 1  BCLC  748, [2011]  BPIR  1604, [2011] STI 2776...................................................................................................... E15.4 R & C Comrs v McLaren Racing Ltd [2014] UKUT 269 (TCC), [2014] STC 2417, [2014] 6 WLUK 462, 82TC 345, [2014] BTC 518, [2014] STI 2288.................... I1.32 R  & C  Comrs v Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd [2010]  EWHC  2013 (Ch), [2011] BCC 149, [2010] BPIR 1123, (2010) 107(33) LSG 14, Ch D..... B5.133, B5.146; E2.34 R & C Comrs v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd [2020] UKUT 147 (TCC), [2020] 5 WLUK 118............................................................................................... I2.51 R & C Comrs v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd UT/2018/0161....................... F1.10 R & C Comrs v Tottenham Hotspur Ltd [2017] UKUT 453 (TCC), [2018] 4 WLR 17, [2018] STC 81, [2017] 11 WLUK 602, [2017] BTC 535, [2018] STI 90...... I1.95; I2.68 RC v UK, Application 37664/94....................................................................... E13.33, E13.72 RCA  Corpn v Pollard [1983] Ch  135, [1982] 3 WLR  1007, [1982] 3 All ER  771, [1983] FSR 9, CA................................................................................................... H1.18 RCD  Espanyol De Barcelona Sad v Club Athletico Velez Sarsfield (CAS 2004/A/635).................................................................................................. B5.18

cxvi  Table of Cases

para RCD Mallorca v Club Atletico Lanus (CAS 2004/A/781)............................................. B5.18 RCD Mallorca v FA & Newcastle United (CAS 2008/A/1639)............. D2.65, D2.66, D2.116 RFC 2012 plc (in liquidation) (formerly The Rangers Football Club) plc v A-G for Scotland [2017]  UKSC  45, [2017] 1  WLR  2767, [2017] 4  All ER  654, [2017]  STC  1556, 2018  SC (UKSC) 15, 2017  SLT  799, 2017  SCLR  517, [2017] 7  WLUK  77, [2017]  BTC  22, [2017]  WTLR  1093, [2017]  STI  1610, 2017 GWD 21-357.......................................................................................... I1.95; I2.54 RFC Seraing v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4490).......................... B1.4, B1.14; B5.25, B5.31, B5.34; D3.23, D3.38; E2.40; E12.40, E12.41; F3.42, F3.209 RFEC v Alberdi (Spanish National Competition & Sporting Discipline Committee, 13 April 2009)......................................................................................................... C18.19 RFL v Leaf (RFL Disciplinary Panel, 11 August 2011).......................... B4.23, B4.25, B4.26, B4.34, B4.38 RFL v Long & Gleeson (RFL Advisory Panel, 17 June 2004)....................................... B4.25 RFL v Price (RFL Anti-Doping Tribunal, 25 October 2008)......................................... C18.26 RFL v Tomkins (Joel) (Independent Operational Rules Tribunal, 5 March 2019)......... B3.61 RFU v Armitage (RFU Disciplinary Tribunal, 20 January 2011)................................... C10.1 RFU v Ashton (Chris) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 22 September 2016).......................... B3.57 RFU v Blake (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 24 May 2015)........................................ B4.23, B4.25 RFU v Cipriani (RFU Disciplinary Tribunal, 28 August 2018)................. B1.29; B3.3, B3.93, B3.98, B3.107, B3.131, B3.142, B3.145 RFU v Comben (RFU Tribunal, 9 April 2013)................................................ C18.24; C20.15 RFU v Cotton Traders Ltd [2002] EWHC 467 (Ch), [2002] ETMR 76, Ch D.............. H1.105, H1.121, H1.135; H5.32 RFU v Diamond (Steve) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 19 November 2017)............. B3.3, B3.91, B3.136, B3.137 RFU v Goodfellow (NADP Hearing Panel SR/NADP/112/2019, 11 February 2020)... C17.8 RFU v Hadfield (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 25 October 2019)........................................... C20.6 RFU v Hart (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 12 April 2018).............................. B4.25, B4.32, B4.41 RFU v Hughes (Nathan) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 23 October 2018)................ B3.3, B3.107, B3.111 RFU v Johnson (Martin) (Internal Appeal, Disciplinary Panel, 5 March 2002)............. D1.42 RFU v Jose (Independent Panel, 23 September 2014)................................................... C21.7 RFU v Kvecic (Matt) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 28 January 2020)................................ B3.44 RFU v Lockwood (Barry) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 29 September 2014).................... B3.62 RFU v Lovobalavu (Gaby) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 21 February 2018)..................... B3.44 RFU v McCarthy (28 February 2017)............................................................................ B3.137 RFU v McIntosh (NADP, 13 April 2017)....................................................................... C10.1 RFU v Parker (RFU Tribunal, 8 May 2012)................................................................... C21.9 RFU v Peters (Disciplinary Tribunal, 3 March 2014)........................................... C11.3; C12.4 RFU v Price (Independent Panel, 10 March 2016)............................................... C6.16; C8.5 RFU v Ridler (Chance) (2 October 2012)............................................................. D1.48; D2.13 RFU v Scowby (John) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, February 2017)................................. B3.51 RFU v Solomona (Denny) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 5 April 2018).............................. B3.60 RFU v Southend & Colchester (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 11 January 2017)................. B3.87 RFU v Spellman (RFU Tribunal, 3 April 2012)................................................... C21.7, C21.8 RFU v Steenkamp (RFU Judicial Committee, 22 March 2011)..................................... C18.32 RFU Stokes (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 3 November 2017)................................................ C21.11 RFU v Van Rensburg (Rohan Janse) (RFU Appeal Panel, 7 February 2020)................. B3.40 RFU v Viagogo Ltd [2012] UKSC 55, [2012] 1 WLR 3333, [2013] 1 All ER 928, [2013] 1  CMLR  56, [2013]  HRLR  8, [2013]  FSR  23, (2012) 162  NLJ  1504, (2012) 156(45) SJLB 31, SC.......................................................... E15.15; H1.33; H6.58 RFU v Willmott (Anti-Doping Panel, 13 April 2015 & 2 June 2015)................. C12.1, C12.3; C20.20; C21.7 RPC v IPC (CAS 2016/A/4745)................................................... A1.52, A1.55, A1.58, A1.59 RS  Components v Irwin [1974] 1 All ER  41, [1973]  ICR  535, [1973]  IRLR  239, (1973) 15 KIR 191, [1973] ITR 569....................................................................... F1.48

Table of Cases  cxvii

para RWF v IWF (CAS OG 16/009)...................................................................................... A1.59 RYA v Johnston (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 30 May 2007)........................... C7.20; C8.5; C20.18 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS  Foundation Trust [2012]  UKSC  2, [2012] 2 AC  72, [2012] 2 WLR 381, [2012] 2 All ER 381, [2012] PTSR 497, [2012] HRLR 10, 33  BHRC  208, (2012) 15  CCL  Rep 13, [2012] Med LR  221, (2012) 124 BMLR 148, [2012] MHLR 66, (2012) 162 NLJ 261, (2012) 156(6) SJLB 31, SC............................................................................................................................ E13.75 Race Tires America Inc v Hoosier Racing Tire Corp , No 09-3989 (Court of Appeal, 3rd Circuit, 23 July 2010)................................................................................... E11.193 Racecourse Association v OFT; BHB v OFT [2005] CAT 29........................... E2.51; E11.253 Racing Partnership Ltd & Arena Leisure Ltd v Done Bros (Cash Betting) Ltd [2019]  EWHC  1156 (Ch), [2020] Ch  289, [2019] 3  WLR  779, [2019] 5 WLUK 112, [2019] ECDR 17, [2019] FSR 33; aff’d in part [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2020] 10 WLUK 86, [2021] FSR 2..................................... H1.19, H1.30, H1.37, H1.41, H1.43, H1.100; H2.21 Radford v Campbell [1809] 6 TLR 488.......................................................................... F3.2 Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 1262; [1978] 1 All ER 33, 7 BLR 35, (1978) 35 P & CR 316, (1977) 121 SJ 319, Ch D.............................................................. F1.77 Radien v FINA (CAS 2015/A/4200)................................................................... C17.3; C20.6 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities (C241/91  P) [1995] All ER (EC) 416, [1995]  ECR  I-743, [1995] 4  CMLR  718, [1995] EMLR 337, [1995] FSR 530, [1998] Masons CLR Rep 58, ECJ........... E11.304, E11.305 Raducan (Andrea) v IOC (5P.427/2000)......................................................................... D2.192 Raducan v IOC (CAS OG 00/011)................................................................................. C23.2 Raducan v IOC (Swiss Federal Tribunal 4 December 2000, 5P427/2000).................... C23.2 Raguz (Angela) v Rebecca Sullivan [2000] NSWCA 290.................................. D2.15, D2.37 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, [2012] 1 All ER 1137, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2012] Bus LR 313, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 34, [2011] 2  CLC  923., [2012]  BLR  132, 138 Con LR  1, [2011]  CILL  3105, SC................................................................................................................. B1.57; B2.16 Ralepelle v World Rugby..................................................................................... C6.14, C6.24 Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sa v Portugal (Applications 55391/13, 57728/13 & 74041/13)........................................................ E13.42, E13.47, E13.49, E13.50, E13.51 Rangers Football Club Plc, Petitioner [2012]  CSOH  95; 2012  SLT  1156; 2012 GWD 20-402, Ct of Sess, OH........................................................................ E7.55 Ratcliffe v Evans 1892] 2 QB 524, CA........................................................................... H4.21 Ratcliff v McConnell [1999] 1 WLR 670, [1998] 11 WLUK 535, (1999) 1 LGLR 276, [1999] Ed CR  523, [1999]  PIQR P170, (1999) 96 (3)  LSG  32, (1999) 143 SJLB 53............................................................................................................ G1.118 Raula v RADA (CAS 2014/A/3668)........................................................... C6.6; C8.2; C19.8 Ready Mixed Concrete (Pistorius East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions & National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, [1968] 2 WLR 775, [1968] 1 All ER 433, 4 KIR 132, [2010] BTC 49, (1967) 112 SJ 14, QBD................................................................ F1.8 Real Federación Española du Fútbol v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3813)........... A1.24; B1.4, B1.16, B1.40, B1.56, B1.58; E2.21; F3.137, F3.147, F3.254 Real Madrid v Commission (Case T-791/16) (22 May 2019)..................................... E11.317 Real Madrid v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4785).......................................................... E2.21; F3.137 Real Sociedad de Fútbol SAD & Nihat Kahveci v Consejo Superior de Deportes & Real Federación Española de Fútbol (C-152/08) [2008] ECR I-6291........ E12.89; F3.72 Rebagliati v IOC (CAS OG/98/001)................................................................... B1.22; D2.154 Rebagliati v IOC (CAS OG/98/002)............................................................................... C4.15 Reebok France v Adidas & Uhlsport [1998] ECLR 5................................................ E11.288 Reel v Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226, [1981] 3 All ER 321, (1981) 125 SJ 585, CA (Civ Div)........................................................................ A1.47, A1.55; B1.36, B1.56; D2.133; E2.42; E8.6; E16.29 Regner v Czech Republic (Application 35289/11) [2017] 9  WLUK  277, (2018) 66 EHRR 9.............................................................................................................. E13.45

cxviii  Table of Cases

para Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008]  EWCA  Civ 361, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 586, CA.................................................................................................... H6.128 Reinholds v FISA (CAS 2001/A/330)................................................................. B1.33, B1.34 Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012.............. B2.5, B2.13, B2.14, B2.30, B2.47, B2.88, B2.91 Resch’s Will Trusts, Re [1969] 1 AC 514, [1968] 3 WLR 1153, [1967] 3 All ER 915, 41 ALJR 213, PC (Aust)......................................................................................... A2.70 Response Clothing Ltd v Edinburgh Woollen Mill Ltd [2020]  EWHC  148 (IPEC), [2020] 1 WLUK 291, [2020] ECC 16, [2020] ECDR 11, [2020] FSR 25............. H5.22 Ressiot v France (Application 15054/07) (28 June 2012).............................................. E13.65 Revie v Football Association (The Times, 14 December 1979)..................................... E7.72 Rewe-Zentrale AG  v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (120/78) [1979] [1979] ECR 649, [1979] 3 CMLR 494, ECJ....................................................... E12.104 Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 1 WLR 948, [1985] 2 All ER 712, [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1, (1985) 82 LSG 2995, (1985) 129 SJ 503, HL... C18.6, C18.12 Rhind v Astbury Water Park [2004] EWCA Civ 756, [2004] 6 WLUK 266, (2004) 148 SJLB 759, [2004] NPC 95............................................................................... G1.116 Ribeiro v UEFA (CAS 2005/A/958).................................................................... C4.26; C6.40 Ricco v CONI (CAS 2008/A/1698)................................................................................ C21.5 Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482, [1880] 2 WLUK 53............................................ F3.9 Riis Cycling A/S v the Licence Commission of the UCI (UCI) (CAS 2012/A/3055).... B1.11, B1.12, B1.26, B1.40, B1.41; D2.82 Rio Football Services v Sevilla [2010] EWHC 2446, QBD...................... B5.25; E2.40; F3.39 Roach v Football Association [2001] 9(3) SATLJ 26............................................ D1.20; E2.11 Roberge v Judo Canada (Arbitration, 21 June 1996)...................................................... B2.14 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012.............. B2.12, B2.16, B2.31, B2.33, B2.34, B2.47, B2.50, B2.67, B2.88 Roberts v FIBA (SFT Decision 4P 230/2000)................................................................ C3.7 Roberts v Gray [1913] 1 KB 520, CA................................................................ F1.94; F2.144 Robertson v Australian Professional Cycling Council (unreported, 10  December 1992)....................................................................................................................... F3.53 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018]  UKSC  4, [2018]  AC  736, [2018] 2 WLR 595, [2018] 2 All ER 1041, [2018] 2 WLUK 189, [2018] PIQR P9..................................................................................................................... G1.5, G1.6 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850, 154 ER 363, [1848] 1 WLUK 171..................... F1.77 Robyn Rihanna Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a TopShop) [2013] EWHC 2310 (Ch), [2013] 7 WLUK 1050, [2014] ECDR 3, [2014] FSR 5.................... H1.138; H4.16 Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013]  EWHC  24 (Ch), [2013] 1 WLUK 209........................................................................................................... H4.63 Rodgers v Bugden & Canterbury Bankstown (1993) ATR 81–246................................ G2.38 Rodriguez v ITF (CAS 2019/A/6245)................................................... C17.6; C18.3; C21.12 Rodriguez v RFEA (CAS OG 12/06)................................................................. B2.92; D2.151 Rofa Sport Management v DHL Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 902............................................... E2.55 Rogers v Bugden & Canterbury-Bankstown (1993) ATR 81-246.................................. G1.12 Romania & Spain v World Rugby (World Rugby Appeal Committee, 6 June 2018)..... B3.36 Romanova v IOC (CAS 2017/A/5435)............................................... C5.2, C5.5, C5.6; C10.1 Romero v IAAF (CAS 2019/A/6319).................................................................. C6.10; C18.6 Root 2 Tax Ltd v R & C Comrs [2019] UKFTT 744 (TC), [2019] 12 WLUK 477, [2020] STI 169........................................................................................................ I2.54 Rootes v Sheldon [1968] ALR 33................................................................................... G1.22 Roquette Freres SA v Directeur General de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression des Fraudes (C94/00) [2003] All ER (EC) 920, [2002] ECR I-9011, [2003] 4 CMLR 1, [2004] ICR 66, ECJ.................................................................. E11.35 Rotherham & English Second Division Rugby Ltd v English First Division Rugby Ltd, English Rugby Partnership Ltd & the RFU [2000] 1 ISLR 33.............. E2.33; E7.55 Rubython v FIA [2003] EWHC 1355 (QB) [2003] All ER (D) 182........ E2.15, E2.56; E13.7, E13.15, E13.26, E13.33, E13.65

Table of Cases  cxix

para Ruffoni v UCI (CAS 2018/A/5518)...................................................................... C17.5, C17.6 Rugby Australia v Folau (Israel) (2019)......................................................................... B3.111 Rugby Australia v Latu (Tolu) (2019)............................................................................. B3.142 Rugby Union Players’ Association Inc v Commerce Commission (No  2) [1997] 3 NZLR 301............................................................................................................ F3.53 Rugby World Cup Ltd v Scottish Rugby Union (The Times, 17 December 1999)........ E2.9 Ruiz-Mateos v United Kingdom Application 13021/87................................................. H4.66 Russell v CCES (SDRCC DT 12-0177)............................................................. C16.1; C20.20 Russian Badminton Federation v International Badminton Federation (CAS 2005/A/971).................................................................................................. A1.43 Russian Olympic Committee & Ekimov v IOC (CAS 2004/A/748).............................. D2.62 Russian Olympic Committee v FEI (CAS OG 04/001)............................ B1.49, B1.57; B2.65, B2.89; D2.153 Russian Olympic Committee v IAAF (CAS 2016/O/4684).......... A1.9, A1.24, A1.53, A1.58; B1.4, B1.6, B1.8, B1.28, B1.32, B1.35, B1.36, B1.38, B1.40, B1.58 Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) (CAS OG 16/09).................................................................... B1.23, B1.29, B1.39 Rybka v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2759)......................................... C18.5, C18.6, C18.12, C18.16 S S (Children) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan), Re 2002] UKHL 10, [2002] 2 AC 291, [2002] 2 WLR 720, [2002] 2 All ER 192, [2002] 1 FLR 815, [2002] 1 FCR 577, [2002] HRLR 26, [2002] UKHRR 652, [2002] BLGR 251, [2002] Fam Law 413, (2002) 99(17) LSG 34, (2002) 146 SJLB 85, HL........................... E13.11 S v FIG (CAS 2001/A/340)............................................................................................ B1.44 S v FINA (CAS 2000/A/274)................................................................................ B1.44, B1.46 S v International Equestrian Federation (CAS 91/A/56)...................................... C4.34; C6.16 S v UCI & FCI (CAS 2002/A/378)................................................................................ C4.26 SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi v FIFA (C-243/06) [2006] OJ C212/11......... E4.9; E11.96; E12.51, E12.126 SARL Liberation v France (Judgment, 14 May 2008)................................................... E13.66 SARU v Ralepelle & Basson (SARU Judicial Committee, 25 January 2011)..... B1.44; C4.16 SASP  Le Havre Athletic Club & the Association Le Havre Athletic Club v FIFA, Newcastle United FC & N’Zogbia (CAS 2004/A/791).......................................... F3.262 SC  Fotbal Club Timisoara SA  v FIFA & Romanian Football Federation (RFF) (CAS 2008/A/1658)................................................................................................ D2.63 SC Steaua Bucuresti SA v Christiano Bergodi & FIFA (CAS 2013/A/3364)................ D2.66 SCB Eishockey AG v International Hockey Federation (IIHF) (CAS 2012/A/2250).... D2.181 SCS Fotbal Club CFR 1907 Cluh SA & Manuel Fereira de Sousa Ricardo & Mario Jorge Quintas Felgueiras v FRF (CAS 2012/A/2852, 28 June 2013)..................... E12.54 SDI Retail Services Ltd v Rangers Football Club Ltd [2018] EWHC 2772 (Comm), [2018] 10 WLUK 383............................................................................................. H3.66 SETCA – FCTB/FIFA (Case IV/36.583) (28 May 2012)............................................... B1.4 SLV & Gasser v IAAF (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 18 January 1988)................... C6.22, C6.25 SNBC Holding v UBS AG [2012] EWHC 2044 (Comm), [2012] 7 WLUK 685.......... F3.230 SPI v National Football Museum & FIFA (unreported, 9 January 1998)....................... E16.30 SRU v MacLeod (Judicial Committee, 22 February 2008)................................ C6.45; C18.19 SRU v MacLeod (24 November 2008)........................................................................... C4.33 SV Willhelmshaven v Altletico Excursionistas & River Plate (CAS 2009/A/1810)...... B1.56; F3.179, F3.247, F3.250 SV  Willhelmshaven v Norddeutscher Fußall-Verband (German Federal Tribunal, 20 September 2016)................................................................................................ D2.173 St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping [1865] 11 ER 642..................................................... G1.128 St Johnstone Football Club v Scottish Football Association Ltd,1965 SLT 171, Ct of Sess..................................................................................................... D3.65; E2.29; E6.4 Sachenbacher-Stehle v IBU (CAS 2014/A/3685)................................................ C20.8; C21.5 Safronov v IPC (20 O 323/16)........................................................................................ A1.59 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497, KBD................................................................................ H1.30

cxx  Table of Cases

para Salabiaku v France (A/141-A) (1988) 13 EHRR 379, ECtHR....................................... E13.55 Salford Red Devils & Dr Marwen Koukash v Rugby Football League Ltd (Off Field Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal, 14 July 2016)................................................. B5.107 Salmond v IIHF (CAS 2018/A/5885)..................................... B1.56, B1.59; C5.2; C6.2, C6.8; C8.2, C8.6; C10.1; C14.3, C14.4; C18.3; C20.18 Salomon SA v EC Commission [1999] ECR II-2925, ECJ......................................... E11.311 Samoa NOC v IWF (CAS OG 00/002)........................................................................... B2.65 Sammut v UEFA (CAS 2013/A/3062)................................................................. B4.38, B4.43 Sanchez v Barnet Football Club Ltd, Case No 3302270/2012, Watford Employment Tribunal (unreported, November 2012)........................................................... F1.8, F1.61 SanDisk Corp v Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch), [2007] Bus LR  705, [2007]  UKCLR  1539, [2007] ILPr 22, [2007]  FSR  22, (2007) 30(5) IPD 30033, Ch D........................................................................................... E11.26 Sanghi Polyesters Ltd (India) v International Investor (KCFC) (Kuwait) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 480, [2001] CLC 748, QBD............................................................... D3.96 Sankofa v Football Association Ltd [2007] EWHC 78, QBD...................... D3.88; E2.1, E2.6; E4.2, E4.11; E7.26, E7.58, E7.75; E16.19 Santos v FINA (CAS 2019/A/6482).................................................................. C4.17; C18.19 Saunders v United Kingdom (19187/91) [1997]  BCC  872, [1998] 1  BCLC  362, (1997) 23 EHRR 313, 2 BHRC 358, ECtHR........................................... E13.46, E13.79 Savic v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, (CAS 2011/A/2621)....... B4.22, B4.37, B4.38, B4.43, B4.45 Schafflützel & Zöllig v Fédération Suisse de courses de chevaux (Swiss Fereal Tribunal, 23 August 2007).......................................................................... C4.17; D2.192 Schelotto (Ezequiel Matias) v Pablo Gustavo Cosentino (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 January 2018)..................................................................................................... D2.182 Schlittler v IJF & BJC (CAS 2011/A/2784)............................................. C17.2; C18.5, C18.6 Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay (formerly Instone) [1974] 1 WLR 1308, [1974] 3 All ER 616, (1974) 118 SJ 734, HL.................................. F1.24 Schuettler v ITF (CAS OG 08/003)..................................................................... B2.65, B2.89 Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association (CAS OG 06/002)....................... B2.13, B2.51, B2.94; D1.31; D2.40, D2.151 Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland (A/263) [1994] 1 FCR 453, (1993) 16 EHRR 405, [1995] Pens LR 159, ECtHR.................................................................................. E13.47 Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2016/A/4707)................................................................ C6.6, C6.8, C6.14, C6.16, C6.45; C17.2; C18.5; C23.6 Score Draw Ltd v Finch [2007] EWHC 462 (Ch), [2007] Bus LR 864, [2007] ETMR 54, [2007] FSR 20, (2007) 30(7) IPD 30045, Ch D........................... E2.52; H1.105, H1.121 Scott v Avery, 10 ER 1121, (1856) 5 HL Cas 811, HL................................................... D3.64 Scott v ITF (CAS 2018/A/5768)............................................ B1.24; C4.3; C5.8; C6.59,C6.60, C6.62; C17.2, C17.5, C17.6 Scott v Ricketts [1967] 1  WLR  828, [1967] 2  All ER  1009, [1967] 4  WLUK  9, 44 TC 303, (1967) 46 ATC 133, [1967] TR 123, (1967) 111 SJ 297..................... I2.64 Scottish Football League v Smith, 1998 SLT 608.......................................................... E8.5 Scottish Premier League Ltd v Lisini Pub Management Co Ltd [2013] CSOH 48........ E11.53 Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Athena) [2006]  EWHC  2530 (Comm), [2007] 1  All ER (Comm) 183, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 280, [2006] 2 CLC 710, [2007] Bus LR, QBD................... D3.8 Secretary of State for Defence v Spencer [2003] EWCA Civ 784, [2003] 1 WLR 2701, [2003] 5 WLUK 678, (2003) 100 (28) LSG 31...................................................... B1.56 Secretary of State for Defence v Turner Estate Solutions Ltd [2015]  EWHC  1150 (TCC), [2015] 4 WLUK 645, [2015] BLR 448, 161 Con LR 138......................... B1.56 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon [2014]  EWHC  4375, [2015] EWHC 311.................................................................................................. D3.94 Segura v IOC (CAS OG 00/013)............................................................ B1.45, B1.57, B1.59; D2.140, D2.145

Table of Cases  cxxi

para Semenya v IAAF (CAS 2018/O/5794).................................. B1.4, B1.6, B1.13, B1.28, B1.31, B1.34; B2.38; D2.90, D2.133 Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v IRC  [2007]  UKHL  34, [2008] 1 AC 561, [2007] 3 WLR 354, [2007] 4 All ER 657, [2008] Bus LR 49, [2007] STC 1559, [2008] Eu LR 1, [2007] BTC 509, [2007] STI 1865, (2007) 104(31) LSG 25, (2007) 157 NLJ 1082, (2007) 151 SJLB 985, HL...................... I2.54 Sepia Logistics Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 13..................................................................... E11.41 Sepoong Engineering Construction Co v Formula One Management (formerly Formula One Administration Ltd) [2000] 1 Lloyds Rep 602, [2000] All ER (D) 345.......................................................................................................................... E2.55 Seraing v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 20 February 2018)......................................... D2.14 Sevilla FC v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5463).......................................................................... F3.42 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (C-192/89) [1990]  ECR  I-3461, [1992] 2 CMLR 57, ECJ...................................................................................... E12.80, E12.81 Shakhtar Donetsk v Matuzalem (CAS 2008/A/1519-1520)................... B4.43; F3.81, F3.264, F3.265, F3.266, F3.267, F3.272, F3.273 Sharapova v ITF (CAS 2016/A/4643).............................. B1.39, B1.60; C6.2; C17.7, C17.8; C18.16, C18.21, C18.24; C20.6, C20.7, C20.18 Shears v Mendeloff (1914) 30 TLR 342......................................................................... F2.144 Sheffield United Football Club Ltd v West Ham United Football Club Plc [2008]  EWHC  2855 (Comm), [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 167, [2008] 2  CLC  741, QBD........................................................................... D3.74, D3.88; E4.9, E4.11; E16.18 Sheffield United v FAPL [2007] ISLR, SLR-77................. B5.22; D3.63, D3.98; E2.1, E2.29, E2.33; E6.9; E7.27, E7.79, E7.82; E8.3 Sheffield United v FAPL, 13 July 2007............................. B1.34; B5.22; D1.8, D1.57, D1.69; D3.96; E2.40; E3.13; E4.2, E4.11; E7.30; F3.39 Sheffield United v West Ham [2011] ISLR SLR1–7.............................................. E6.1; E7.53 Sheffield United v West Ham FA Rule K arbitration.......................... E2.57; E3.6; E8.1; F3.39 Sheik Al Nahyan v FEI (CAS 2014/A/3591)...................................... B1.4, B1.6, B1.7, B1.25; C5.4; C18.14, C18.16 Sheldon v Daybrook House Promotions Ltd [2013] EWPCC 26, PCC......................... H4.45 Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134 Ch D.................................... H4.60 Sheppard v CCES, SDRCC DT-05-0028 (12 September 2005)..................................... C4.2 Shone v British Bobsleigh Ltd [2018] 5 WLUK 226............................................. E9.2; G1.47 Shooting Federation of Canada v Canadian Olympic Committee, ADRsportRED 04-0029, 3 May 2004.............................................................................................. B2.14 Sidiropoulos v Greece (1999) 27  EHRR  633, 4  BHRC  500, [1998]  HRCD  707, ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.68 Sigma Finance Corpn, Re [2009] UKSC 2..................................................................... B1.54 Sigurjonsson v Iceland (A/264) (1993) 16 EHRR 462, ECtHR..................................... E13.68 Silvey v Pendragon Plc [2001]  EWCA  Civ 784, [2001]  IRLR  685, [2001] Emp LR 882, [2002] Pens LR 277, CA........................................................................... F1.77 Sim v Heinz [1959] 1  WLR  313, [1959] 1  All ER  547, [1959] 2  WLUK  25, [1959] RPC 75, (1959) 103 SJ 238......................................................................... H4.52 Simms v FINA (CAS OG 08/002)...................................................................... B2.85; D2.159 Simms v Leigh Rugby Football Club Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 923......................... G1.69, G1.94 Simpson (East Berkshire Sports Foundation Trustee) v R  & C  Comrs [2009]  STC (SCD) 226, [2009] WTLR 499, [2009] STI 514, Sp Comm.................................. I1.117 Simunic v Croatia (Application 20373/17) (22 January 2019)....................................... E13.67 Simutenkov (Igor) v Spanish Football Federation, 12  April 2005 (C-265/03) [2005] ECR I-2579; [2006] All ER (EC) 42, [2005] All ER (D) 98........ E12.22, E12.45, E12.77, E12.81, E12.89, E12.112; E16.26; F3.44, F3.68, F3.71, F3.72, F3.74, F3.75 Sines v BHA (BHA Appeal Board, 10 April 2012).................................. B4.37, B4.38, B4.41 Singer v Jockey Club (unreported, 28 June 1990).......................................................... E7.18

cxxii  Table of Cases

para Singh v Football Association (2001) ET Case No 5203593/99...................................... F1.6 Singh v Football Association, Football League [2002] 1 SLJ........................................ E2.14 Sinkewitz v UCI (CAS 2011/A/2479)...................................................... C4.28, C4.33; C6.40 Six Nations v Hartley (Dylan) (Six Nations Disciplinary Committee, 27  March 2012)....................................................................................................................... B3.52 Six Nations v Marler (Joe) (England) (Six Nations Disciplinary Committee, 12 March 2020)....................................................................................................................... B3.57 Sky Italia srl v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (C-234/12)..................... E12.59 Sky Osterreich GmbH v Osterreichischer Rundfunk (C-283/11) [2013] All ER (EC) 633, [2013] 2 CMLR 25, [2013] ECDR 6, ECJ...................................... E12.60; H2.135 Slack v Glennie (unreported, 19 April 2000), CA.......................................................... G1.107 Slaney v IAAF, 244 F 3d 580, 593 (7th Cir 2001)................................................ C4.17; C6.45 Slaney (IAFF Arbitration Panel, 25 April 1999)............................................................. C6.45 Slovenia v Commission (Case T-507/12)..................................................................... E11.312 Smikle v JADC (CAS 2015/A/3925)................................................................... C6.14, C6.15 Smith (Linsay) v Nairn Golf Club [2007] CSOH 136, 2007 SLT 909, 2007 GWD 25420................................................................................................................ D1.105; E2.7 Smith De Bruin v FINA (CAS 1998/A/211)........................... B4.38; C5.5; C6.6; C7.1; C10.1 Smith v British Boxing Board of Control [2015] 4 WLUK 112......................... D3.21, D3.83 Smith v United Kingdom (33985/96) [1999] IRLR 734, (2000) 29 EHRR 493, (1999) 11 Admin LR 879, ECtHR...................................................................................... E13.59 Smoldon v Whitworth [1997] ELR 249, [1997] PIQR P133, CA........ G1.26, G1.54, G1.146, G1.147 Smouha SC  v Ismaily SC & Aziz Abdul & Club Asante Kotoko FC & FIFA (CAS 2017/A/4977).................................................................................. F3.277, F3.279 Soares v Beazer Investments Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 482, [2004] 3 WLUK 718.......... F1.47 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (56/65) [1966]  ECR  235, [1966] CMLR 357, ECJ...................................................................................... E11.265 Soderman v Sweden (Application 5786/08) (12 November 2013)................................. E13.59 Sodie v Macclesfield Town Football Club Ltd [2017] UKET 2401718/2016................ F1.61 Softball New Zealand v Potae (Sports Tribunal New Zealand, 27 February 2008)........ C18.19 Solicitor, Re [1993]  QB  69, [1992] 2  WLR  552, [1992] 2  All ER  335, (1991) 141 NLJ 1447, QBD............................................................................................... B3.53 Sonatrach Petroleum Corp (BVI) v Ferrell International Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 627, QBD................................................................................................................ D3.7 Sonatrach v Statoil [2014] EWHC 875 (Comm), [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 857, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 252, [2014] 4 WLUK 108, [2014] 1 CLC 473................................ D3.94 South African Institue for Drug-Free Sport v Leballo (Independent Doping Hearing Panel, 19 July 2017)...................................................................... C10.1; C17.6, C17.18 South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953, [2004] 4 All ER 775, [2005] 1 P & CR 6, [2004] 4 PLR 50, [2004] 28 EG 177 (CS), (2004) 101(31) LSG 25, (2004) 148 SJLB 825, [2004] NPC 108 HL.......... B2.34 South Shields v Football Association (9 June 2020).............................. B1.21, B1.36, B1.38; E2.38; E6.1; E7.1, E7.40, E7.51, E7.52, E7.55, E7.58; E8.3, E8.4 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club v News Ltd [2000] FCA 1541, [2001] FCA 862, [2001] 2 ISLR N-20.................................................................... E10.5 Southport Corpn v Esso [1954] 2 QB 182, [1954] 3 WLR 200, [1954] 2 All ER 561, [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 446, [1954[ 6 WLUK 20, (1954) 118 JP 411, 52 LGR 404, (1954) 98 SJ 472..................................................................................................... G1.127 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine (48553/99) (2004) 38 EHRR 44, ECtHR....... E13.73; H4.69 Spanish Bowling Federation v International Bowling Federation & Catalan Bowling Federation (CAS 2007/A/1424).............................................................................. A1.44 Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 239, QBD.................................... E2.4; H4.63 Sport in International Wheelchair Basketball Federation v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) & Gibbs (CAS 2010/A/2230, Court of Arbitration)............................................... B1.4 Sport Ireland v Miele (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 13  December 2019)...................................................................................................... C8.2, C8.4, C8.5

Table of Cases  cxxiii

para Sport Ireland v O’Reilly (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 26  February 2018)............................................................................................ C17.8; C21.11, C22.12 Sportive / French Football Deferation (French Competition Authority, 30 September 2009)....................................................................................................................... E11.39 Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD  v UEFA,& FC  Porto Futebol SAD (CAS 2009/A/1583 & 1584)..................................... B1.54; B5.7; D2.60, D2.64, D2.97 Sporting Clube de Portugal SAD  v SASP OGC  Nice Cote d’Azur (CAS 2014/A/3647)................................................................................... F3.235, F3.280 Sporting Club Olbanense v Gonzaio Mathias Bordes Mastriani & Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (CAS 2016/A/4675)...................... D2.71 Sporting Exchange Ltd (t/a Betfair) v Minister van Justitie (C-203/08) [2013] All ER (EC) 62, [2010] 3 CMLR 41, [2011] CEC 313, ECJ.............................................. E12.68 Sports & General Press Agency Ltd v Our Dogs Publishing Co Ltd [1917] 2 KB 125, CA....................................................................... H1.7, H1.8, H1.8, H1.30; H2.19, H2.20 Sports Club v Inspector of Taxes [2000]  STC (SCD) 443, [2000]  STI  1364, Sp Comm.............................................................................................. F3.194; I1.104; I2.76 Sports Club, Evelyn & Jocelyn v Inspector of Taxes [2000]  STC (SCD) 443, [2000] STI 1364, Sp Comm................................................................. F3.160; H4.4, H4.5 Sports Network Ltd v Calzaghe [2009] EWHC 480, QBD............................................ F1.4 Sports Network, Frank Warren v Ricky Hatton (January 2006)..................................... F1.80 Spycatcher see A-G v Observer Ltd Squizzato v FINA (CAS 2005/A/830)............................. B1.32, B1.34; C3.6; C17.2; C18.21, C18.26; C20.12, C20.15, C20.16, C20.18; E7.84 Stanley v National Ice Skating Association of GB & Northern Ireland (Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013)...................................................... B2.57, B2.62, B2.88 Starlight Shipping Co v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (Hubei Branch) [2007] EWHC 1893 (Comm), [2008] 1  All ER (Comm) 593, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 230, [2007] 2 CLC 440, QBD.................................................................................................... D3.69 State v Forbes (unreported, 12 September 1975) (Case 63280) Minn Dist Ct............... G2.62 Stec v United Kingdom (Application 65731/01) [2006] 4  WLUK  341, (2006) 43 EHRR 47, 20 BHRC 348................................................................................... E13.71 Steel v United Kingdom (Application 24838/94) [1998] 9  WLUK  214, (1998) 28 EHRR 603, 5 BHRC 339, [1998] Crim LR 893, [1998] HRCD 872................ B1.19 Sterjna v Finland (1994) 24 EHRR 195, ECtHR............................................................ E13.59 Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v Football League Ltd (The Times, 1 August 1996)....................................................................... B1.34; B5.144; E7.11, E7.36, E7.51; E10.5, E10.7, E10.13, E10.17, E10.18, E10.23, E10.24, E10.25 Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v Football League Ltd (1997) 9 Admin LR 109, CA....................................................................................... E4.5; E5.5, E5.6; E6.8; E7.6; E15.1, E15.5, E15.7, E15.17, E15.18, E15.19; F3.50 Stevens v United Kingdom (Application 11674/85) 46 DR 245 (1986)........................ E13.65 Stewart v FIM (CAS 2015/A/3876)......................................... C4.21; C18.27; C20.8, C20.20 Stewart v Judicial Committee of the Auckland Racing Club [1992] 3 NZLR 693........ E7.76 Stinnato v Auckland Boxing Association [1978] 1 NZLR 1........... E6.3; E7.6; E10.10; F3.53 Stitchting Anti-Doping Autoriteir Nederland (NADO0 & the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Scaatsenrijders Bond (KNSB) v W (CAS 2010/A/2311, 2312).... E13.40 Stillitano v USSF & FIFA (CAS 2006/A/1192).................................................. A1.24; B1.49 Strabya v FINA (CAS 2003/A).................................................... B1.44; C4.16; C6.29, C6.54 Stran Greek Refineries v Greece (A/301-B) (1995) 19 EHRR 293, ECtHR.................. E13.24 Stransky v Bristol Rugby Ltd 2002] All ER (D) 144, QBD.................................. F1.16, F1.44 Stratton v Hughes, Cumberland Sporting Car Club Ltd & RAC  Motor Sports Association Ltd (unreported, 17 March 1998), CA........................ E9.2; G1.31, G1.107 Streetmap.EU  Ltd v Google Inc [2016]  EWHC  253 (Ch), [2016] 2  WLUK  347, [2016] Info TLR 146............................................................................................... E11.19 Stretch v Romford Football Club (1971) 115 SJ 741..................................................... G1.132 Stretford v Football Association (FA Rule K Arbitration)........................................ E4.5; E7.1

cxxiv  Table of Cases

para Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2006] EWHC 479, Ch D............... C4.20; D2.54; D3.6, D3.28, D3.31, D3.33, D3.40, D3.67; E7.1; E8.9; E13.1, E13.31; F1.21; F2.34, F2.61, F2.142 Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 238, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, [2007] Bus LR  1052, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 31, [2007] 1  CLC  256, (2007) 151 SJLB 437, CA.......................................................... A1.41; D3.21; E4.5, E4.6, E4.9, E4.11; E5.1, E5.10, E5.11; E7.26, E7.56; E13.24, E13.26, E13.36, E13.39, E13.41, E13.50; E16.17; F2.34 Striani v UEFA (11 April 2019)........................................................................... B5.88; E2.39 Striani v UEFA (Case C-299/15) (16 July 2015)................................. B5.87; E11.171; E12.39 Suarez (Luis), FC Barcelona & AUF v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3665, 3666 & 3667)......... B3.57; D2.127 Subaru Tecnica International Inc v Burns [2001] 12 WLUK 265, [2001] All ER (D) 195 (Dec)....................................................................... F1.9, F1.24, F1.66, F1.81; F3.16 Subirats v FINA (CAS 2011/A/2499)...................................................................... C9.2, C9.4 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia (CAS 2000/A/284).......... B2.15, B2.61, B2.79, B2.89 Sumukan Ltd v Commonwealth Secretariat 2007]  EWCA  Civ 243, [2007] 3  All ER 342, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 23, [2007] Bus LR 1075, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 87, [2007] 1 CLC 282, (2007) 157 NLJ 482, (2007) 151 SJLB 430, CA....... D3.31, D3.33, D3.96; E13.41 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (A/30) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, (1979) 76 LSG 328, ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.61 Sunderland Association Football Club v Uruguay Montevideo FC [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 828, QBD........................................................................... B5.18; F1.43; F3.196 Sunrise Brokers LLP  v Rodgers [2014]  EWCA  Civ 1373, [2014] 10 WLUK  681, [2015] ICR 272, [2015] IRLR 57........................................................................... E15.19 Supporters Juventus Turin v FIGC-CONI-UEFA-FIFA (12 May 2009)........................ E11.78 Surikov v Ukraine (Application 42788/06) [2017] 1 WLUK 497, [2017] IRLR 377.... E13.60 Susin v FINA (CAS 2000/A/274)........................................................................ C6.45, C6.46 Sutton v Syston Rugby Football Club Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1182, CA......... G1.97, G1.101 Svenska Blisportforbundet v Konjurrensverket (Swedish Market Court, Decision no 2012:16).................................................................................................................. A1.80 Swedish NOC & Swedish Triathlon Federation v ITU (CAS OG 12/10)...................... D2.142 Swiss Ski v FIS (CAS 2006/A/1053)............................................................................. D2.63 Synstar Computer Services (UK) Ltd v ICL (Sorbus) Ltd [2001]  CP  Rep 98, [2001]  UKCLR  585, [2002]  ICR  112, (2001) 98(23)  LSG  40, (2001) 145 SJLB 119, Ch D............................................................................................... E16.24 T TLT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217..................... A4.250 TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v ETTU (CAS 2007/A/1363)..................... B1.56, B1.57, B1.61 TV10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media (Case C-23/93) [1994] ECR I-4795........... E12.60 TWR v RAC (unreported, 9 October 1985).................................................................... E7.55 Tabbane v Switzerland (Application 41079/12) (1 March 2016)........ E13.41, E13.44, E13.51 Taflan-Met v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank (C-277/94) [1996] ECR I-4085, [1997] 3 CMLR 40, ECJ......................................................................................... E12.76 Talacre Beach Caravan Sales Ltd (Case C-251/05) [2006]  STC  1671, [2006] ECR I-6269, [2006] 7 WLUK 154, [2006] 3 CMLR 31, [2006] CEC 1000, [2007] BTC 5455, [2007] BVC 366, [2006] STI 1855, [2006] NPC 80................ I1.52 Tavener Rutledge Ltd v Trexapalm Ltd [1975]  FSR  479, [1977]  RPC  275, (1975) 119 SJ 792, Ch D....................................................................................... H1.132; H4.52 Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90, [2003] QB 528, [2002] 3 WLR 640, [2002] 2 All ER 353, [2002] 2 WLUK 67, [2002] CP Rep 29, (2002) 99 (12) LSG 35, (2002) 152 NLJ 221, (2002) 146 SJLB 50............................................................. E7.72 Taylor v World Rugby (CAS 2018/A/5583)................................ C6.2; C18.6, C18.12; C20.6; C21.11; C22.6 Tchachina v FIG (CAS 2002/A/385).......................................... C4.31; C5.10; C6.22, C6.23

Table of Cases  cxxv

para Televising Premier League Football Matches, Re [1999]  UKCLR  258, [2000] EMLR 78, (1999) 96(32) LSG 33, Ch D....................... E2.36; E11.109, E11.251 Terna Bahrain Holding Co WLL v Al Shamsi [2012] EWHC 3283 (Comm), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 580, [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 86, 145 Con LR 114, QBD............ D3.94 Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663, [1985] 7 WLUK 305, (1985) 135 NLJ 1009....... G1.127 Tevez v Mancini’ by (2011) 9(11) World Sports Law Report 15–16);........................... F3.208 Thai Airways International Public Co Ltd v KI Holdings Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 1250 (Comm), [2015] 1 CLC 765.................................................................................... F1.78 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22, QBD................... E13.31, E13.59; H4.60 Thellusson v Viscount Valentia....................................................................................... B1.36 Thomas v St Jonhstone Football Club (unreported, 30 August 2003)............................ F1.62 Thompson v Charnock, 101 ER 1310, (1799) 8 Term Rep 139..................................... D3.64 Thornton v School District No 57, Board of School Trustees (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 35..... G1.52, G1.53 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163, [1971] 2 WLR 585, [1971] 1 All ER 686, [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 289, [1971] RTR 79, (1970) 115 SJ 75, CA.......... H1.34 Tibor Balog v Royal Charleroi (C–264/98).................................... E11.135, E12.33; E16.26; F3.89, F3.93 Tierce Ladbroke SA  v Commission of the European Communities (C-353/95  P) [1997] ECR I-7007, [1998] CEC 338, ECJ......................................................... E11.305 Tietosuojavaltuutettu, proceedings brought by (Case C-25/17) [2019] 4  WLR  1, [2018] 7 WUK 169, [2019] 1 CMLR 5, [2019] CEC 1061.......................... A4.23, A4.26 Tifu Raiders Rugby Club v South African Rugby Union [2006] (2) ALLSA 549......... E5.5 Tilling v Whiteman [1980] AC 1, [1979] 2 WLR 401, [1979] 1 All ER 737, [1979] 3 WLUK 61, (1979) 38 P & CR 341, (1979) 250 EG 51, [1979] JPL 834, (1979) 123 SJ 202............................................................................................................... E16.9 Tilpekapora Herunga v Namibian National Olympic Committee (NNOC) (CAS OG 16/015).................................................................................................. B2.99; D2.40 Tiscali UK Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc [2008] EWHC 3129, QBD............. H1.145 Tod v Swim Wales [2018] EWHC 665 (QB), [2018] 3 WLUK 745.......... E5.4; E7.14, E7.38; E8.3, E8.9, E8.10; F1.3 Tolley v JS Fry & Sons Ltd [1930] 1 KB 467, CA............................................. H4.15, H4.19 Tomjanovich v California Sports Inc, No H-78-243 (SD Tx 1979)................................ G2.63 Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46, [2003] 3 WLR 705, [2003] 3  All ER  1122, [2004]  PIQR P8, [2003] 32  EG  68 (CS), (2003) 100(34) LSG 33, (2003) 153 NLJ 1238, (2003) 147 SJLB 937, [2003] NPC 102, HL........................................................ G1.19, G1.91, G1.100, G1.101, G1.118, G1.148 Tonga National Rugby League v Rugby League International Federation [2008] NSWSC 1173, 27 October 2008.................................. B1.4, B1.35; E2.42; E10.4 Topfit eV & Biffi v Deutscher Leictathletikverband eV (Case C-22/18) [2019] 6 WLUK 171, [2020] 1 CMLR 3, [2020] CEC 264.................. E12.10, E12.14, E12.22, E12.24, E12.26, E12.27, E12.31, E12.50, E12.101, E12.121 Topps Europe Ltd v European Commission (Case C-699/14) [2017] 1 WLUK  65, [2017] 4 CMLR 13............................................................................................... E11.295 Towcester Racecourse v Racecourse Association Ltd 2002] EWHC 2141 (Ch), [2003] 1 BCLC 260, (2002) 99(45) LSG 34, Ch D...................................................... E7.2, E7.7 Townsend v Google Inc & Google Ltd [2017] NIQB 81............................................... A4.77 Transado-Transportes Fluvais do Sado v Portugal (Application 35943/03)................... E13.41 Tre Traktorer AB v Sweden (A/159) (1991) 13 EHRR 309, ECtHR............................. H4.68 Trebor Bassett Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1997]  FSR  211, (1996) 19(12) IPD 19116, Ch D............................................................................. E2.52; H1.115; H6.35 Treganowan v Robert Knee & Co Ltd [1975]  ICR  405, [1975]  IRLR  247, [1975] ITR 121, (1975) 119 SJ 490, DC................................................................ F1.48 Treherne (Alwyn) (for the Welsh Amateur Boxing Federation) v Amateur Boxing Association of England [2001] 3  ISLR  231, [2001] Al ER (D) 342, [2002] EWCA Civ 381, [2002] All ER (D) 144 (Mar)....................... E2.43; E7.50; E8.6 Tretorn Commission (Decision 94/987/EEC [1994] OJ L378/45)............................. E11.296

cxxvi  Table of Cases

para Troicki v ITF (CAS 2013/A/3279)........................................ C8.2, C8.5, C8.6; C18.3, C18.20 Tsagaev v IWF (OG Sydney 2000/010, 25 September 2000)................ A1.55; B1.22, B1.23; D2.152, D2.155 Tsfayo v United Kingdom (60860/00) (2009) 48  EHRR  18, [2007]  HLR  19, [2007] BLGR 1, ECtHR............................................................................. E7.72; E13.50 Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA (CAS 2009/A/1827)........................ A1.29; B1.10, B1.57 Turner v BEF (NADP Tribunal, 1 August 2014)............................................................ C8.2 Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974(3) SA 633 (A)........................................... E5.5 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpn v British Telecommunciations plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2012] 1 All ER 806, [2012] Bus LR 1461, [2011] 7 WLUK 872, [2011] RPC 28, (2011) 155 (31) SJLB 31...................................... H1.147 Tyrrell Racing Organisation v RAC  Motor Sports Association & the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (unreported, 20 July 1984)............ E7.51, E7.55, E7.64; E15.8 Tyrrell v FA (unreported, 28 April 1997)........................................................................ E2.56 Tysall v Snowdome Ltd [2007] CLY 4196..................................................................... G1.148 Tysse v Norwegian Athletics Federation & IAAF (CAS 2011/A/2353)........................ C6.30 U UBS AG & DB Services UK Ltd v R & C Comrs [2016] UKSC 13, [2016] 1 WLR 1005, [2016] 3 All ER  1, [2016]  STC  934, [2016] 3  WLUK  249, [2016]  BTC  11, [2016] STI 513........................................................................................................ I2.54 UCI & Coni (CAS 94/128)................................................................................. B1.44; D2.133 UCI v A (CAS 97/175, 15 April 1998)........................................................................... E4.5 UCI v Bascio & USADA (CAS 2012/A/2924).............................................................. C20.7 UCI v Burke & CCA (CAS 2013/A/3370)..................................................................... C18.19 UCI v Contador & RFEC; World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Contador & RFEC (CAS 2011/A/2384, 2386)........................................... B4.38, B4.46; C4.24; C5.2; C7.8; C17.4, C17.5; C18.6, C18.10, C18.11, C18.12, C18.13; C23.8; D1.102; D2.70 UCI v Diniz (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 13 September 2017).............. C6.15, C6.16, C6.21; C7.8, C7.9; C23.7 UCI v Fernandes (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 20 December 2019).............................. C10.1 UCI v Forde (CAS 2006/A/1057)................................................................................... C6.22 UCI v Gonzalez (CAS 2009/A/1797)............................................................................. C21.7 UCI v Hamberger (CAS 2001/A/343).................................................................. C4.33; C6.30 UCI v Israel & FCC (CAS 2004/A/613)......................................................................... C18.26 UCI v Kocjan (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 28 June 2017)...................... C6.22, C6.24; C10.1; C22.5; C23.7, C23.9 UCI v Kolobnev (CAS 2011/A/2645).............................................................. C18.26; C20.13 UCI v Landaluce & RFBC (CAS 2006/A/119)............................. B1.6, B1.15; C6.23, C6.25, C6.46; C16.3 UCI v M & FCI (CAS 2007/A/1368)............................................................................. C21.3 UCI v Mason (CAS 98/212)........................................................................................... C6.49 UCI v Munoz Fernandez (CAS 2005/A/872)................................................................. C18.26 UCI v Negri (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 28 January 2020).......................................... C6.52 UCI v Paolini (UCI Anti-Doping Trubunal, 13 April 2016)........................................... C18.21 UCI v Rasmussen & DIF (CAS 2011/A/2671)........................................ C9.4; C17.15; C22.4; C23.6, C23.8 UCI v Sohrabi (UCI Anti-Doping Panel, 17 January 2020)........................................... C6.10 UCI v Ullrich (CAS 2010/A/2083)............................................................ C4.3, C4.13, C4.23; C7.17; C16.4; E7.68 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia (CAS 2010/A/2235)........... C4.17; C6.22, C6.33; C7.4, C7.6, C7.7, C7.8, C7.11; C19.9; C23.4, C23.6, C23.7 UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v BAC Travel Management (Order of Richards J, 8 June 2004)....................................................................................................................... E2.53 UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v Domino’s Pizza (Order of Lewison J, 8 April 2004)......... E2.53

Table of Cases  cxxvii

para UEFA & EURO  2004  SA  v eBay International AG (Order of Buckley J, 19  May 2004)....................................................................................................................... E2.53 UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v Select Promotions (Order of Patten J, 25 February 2004). E2.53 UEFA v Alliance International Media 25 April 2000, Case D2000-0153...................... E2.52 UEFA v European Commission (T-55/08) [2011] ECR II-271.............. A3.97; E2.49; E12.62 UEFA v European Commission (C-201/11 P).................................................... A3.97; E12.52 UEFA v European Commission (9C-204/11 P).............................................................. ................................................................................................................................ E12.52 UEFA v European Commission (C-205/11 P)........................................ A3.97; E2.49; E12.52 UEFA v Sakho (UEFA Control, Ethics & Disciplinary Body, 7 July 2016)......... B1.24; C6.60 UEFA v Z Association (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 December 2008)...... B1.53, B1.54, B1.57 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Anderson (NADP Tribunal, 15 May 2013)............. C18.5, C18.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Awad (NADP Tribunal, 11 May 2015)................. C18.6, C18.24 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bailey (NADP Tribunal, 8 December 2017).......... C6.10, C6.14; C8.2, C8.5; C20.18 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Barlow (NADP Tribunal, 27 June 2016)..... C10.1, C10.2; C17.16 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Barlow (NADP Tribunal, 6 September 2016)........... C6.7; C10.1, C10.2 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Barrett (NADP Tribunal, 9 October 2012)....................... C20.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Belarus Athletic Federation (CAS 2015/A/3977)............. C6.23 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bevan (16 December 2016).............................................. C21.12 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bird (NADP Tribunal, 9 January 2019)...................... C8.2, C8.4 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Blair (NADP Tribunal, 23 February 2018)....................... C18.5 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bridge (26 September 2016)............................................. C12.4 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Burns (NADP Tribunal, 10 December 2012)......... C11.2; C19.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Burrell (NADP Tribunal, 7 February 2018)...................... C8.2 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Buttifant (NADP Tribunal, 14 December 2015)............... C21.11 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Buttifant (NADP Appeal Panel, 7 March 2016).... C17.4; C21.11 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v C (NADP Tribunal, 15 May 2018)............................ C9.1, C9.3 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Canaveral (NADP Tribunal, 7 October 2019).......... C4.13; C8.2, C8.5 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Catana (NADP Tribunal, 14 December 2010).................. C18.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Clabby (NADP Tribunal, 20 December 2016)........ C8.2; C18.3 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Cleary (NADP Tribunal, 5 January 2016)........................ C18.24 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Colclough (NADP Tribunal, 30 January 2014)................ C4.13; C12.4; C20.20 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Cooper (NADP Tribunal, 22 November 2011)................. C10.1 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Croall (NADP Tribunal, 24 April 2014)........................... C20.7 UK  Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Danso & UK  Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Offiah (NADP Tribunal, 20 July 2012)....................................................... C10.1; C19.9; C21.7 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Davies (NADP Tribunal, 16 September 2014)................. C20.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Dry (NADP Appeal Panel, 25 February 2020)...... C10.1, C10.2; C17.16; C20.15, C20.18 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Edwards (NADP, 7 June 2011)...................... C4.13; C6.6, C6.7, C6.10, C6.16; C7.3; C19.7, C19.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Edwards (NADP Tribunal, 10 June 2014)........................ C22.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Evans (NADP Tribunal, 29 January 2015).......... C18.32; C20.5, C20.7 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Fletcher (29 November 2011)............................... C2.23; C12.4 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Gibbs (NADP Tribunal, 4 June 2010).............................. C18.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Gleeson (NADP Consent Order, December 2011)........... C18.16, C18.21; C19.8; C20.5 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Graham (NADP Tribunal, 27 August 2015)......... C17.2, C17.4, C17.12 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Grant (NADP Tribunal, 29 October 2015)............. C17.8; C20.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Hardaker (NADP Tribunal, 6 April 2018)........................ C18.21 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Hastings (NADP Tribunal, 18 November 2015)............... C17.8

cxxviii  Table of Cases

para UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Insall (NADP Tribunal, 3 October 2017)............. C17.12; C18.6, C18.24 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Kendall (NADP Tribunal, 9 January 2015)............ C7.20; C19.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Kruk (11 July 2012).......................................................... C7.3 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Lancaster (RFU Appeal Panel, 9 February 2016)............. C21.11 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Llewellyn (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 14 February 2013).... B1.56; C3.7; C20.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v McMillan (NADP Tribunal, 21 April 2015)......... C18.6, C18.24 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Normandale (NADP Tribunal, 27 June 2019)....... C17.3, C17.7, C17.8; C18.24 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Olubamiwo (NADP Consent Order, 13 June 2012)......... C2.23; C19.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Patton (NADP Hearing SR/004/2020, 11 June 2020)...... C17.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Phelps (NADP Tribunal, 19 October 2015)...................... C17.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Priestley (NADP Tribunal, 16 June 2010).............. C18.5, C18.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Rule (Consent Order, December 2011)............................ C10.1 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Six (NADP Tribunal, 26 September 2012)............... C8.5; C18.3 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Skafidas (NADP Tribunal, 22 February 2016)........ C3.8; C10.1; C13.1; C20.21, C20.23; C21.7 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Staite (NADP Tribunal, 6 July 2010)................................ C19.9 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Slowey (NADP Tribunal, 9 September 2016)...... C17.12; C20.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Tiernan-Locke (NADP Tribunal, 15 July 2014)........ C7.5, C7.6, C7.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Tinklin (Philip) (NADP Trubunal, 28 May 2014).... C3.8; C11.2, C12.1, C12.2; C20.20 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Townsend (NADP Tribunal, 22 December 2015)............. C17.4, C17.6; C18.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Turley (NADP Tribunal, 29 January 2018).......... C17.8; C18.21; C20.6 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Walsh (NADP Tribunal, 18 May 2010)............... C18.6, C18.32; C22.12 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Warburton (Gareth) & Williams (Rhys) (NADP Tribunal, 12 January 2015)............................................................... C4.16; C18.5; C18.22, C18.31; C20.5, C20.7 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Watt (NADP Tribunal, 6 November 2014).............. B1.44, B1.56 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Webster (7 November 2017)............................................. C22.12 UK  Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Wilson (National Anti-Doping Panel, 28  September 2011)......................................................................................... C6.6, C6.7, C6.16; C19.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Windsor (NADP Tribunal, 30 April 2013)............. C7.16; C19.8 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X (CAS 2016/O/4712)...................................................... C9.3 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X (NADP Panel, 8 October 2019).................................... C4.28 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X (NADP Tribunal, 3 August 2017)........................ C6.2, C6.14 UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X & Y (NADP Trubunal, 3 August 2016)............... C4.28; C20.6 UK Athletics v Chambers (Disciplinary Committee, 24 February 2004)............ B1.16, B1.24, B1.51; C4.19, C4.20; C6.57, C6.60 UK Athletics v Ohuruogu (UKA Disciplinary Committee, 15 September 2006).......... C9.3; C17.15; C20.15, C20.18 UKA v Walker (unreported, 25 January 2000).................................................... C6.56, C6.57 US Swimming v FINA (CAS OG 1996/001).......................................... D2.158; E2.13; E7.69 USA Shooting & Quigley v International Shooting Union (CAS 94/A/129)....... B1.19, B1.20, B1.21, B1.22, B1.61; B3.99; C4.15; C6.1, C6.5; D2.130, D2.133 USA Triathlon v Smith (CAS 99/A/241)........................................................................ C6.25 USADA v Arias (AAA Panel, 27 March 2012).............................................................. C9.2 USADA v Asfaw (AAA Tribunal, 9 March 2015)................................ C18.25, C18.26; C20.9 USADA  v Armstrong (Decision of USADA on disqualification & ineligibility, 10 October 2012)........................................................ B1.15; C3.3; C4.22; C7.18, C7.17; C12.4; C15.2; C20.20; C21.5

Table of Cases  cxxix

para USADA v Barnwell (AAA Panel, 26 February 2010).................................................... C19.9 USADA v Bergman (CAS 2004/A/679)......................................................................... C6.30 USADA v Block (AAA Panel, 17 March 2011)............................. C4.23; C5.2; C12.1; C14.1; C20.21, C20.22 USADA v Brown (AAA Panel, 30 September 2019).................... C3.8; C10.1; C12.1; C14.2, C14.3, C14.4; C18.3 USADA v Brunemann (AAA Panel, 26 January 2009)............................ B1.44; C4.16; C20.6 USADA v Bruyneel (AAA Panel, 7 June 2013)...................................................... C3.3, C3.8 USADA v Cabada (USADA, 2 February 2017)............................................................. C18.19 USADA v Collins (AAA Panel, 9 December 2004)................................. C6.44; C7.14; C21.5 USADA v Cosby (AAA Panel, 5 May 2010)................................................................. C20.6 USADA v Crawford (USADA Press Release, 18 April 2013)....................................... C17.15 USADA v Davis (AAA Panel, 15 April 2014)............................................................... C4.13 USADA v Dooler (NADP Tribunal, 24 November 2010).............................................. C18.32 USADA v Drummond (AAA Panel, 17 December 2014)..................... C11.3; C14.2; C20.22 USADA v Duckworth (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 10 January 2011)............................... C4.16 USADA v Downing (USADA press release, 31 May 2013).......................................... C18.3 USADA v Dwyer (AAA, 11 October 2019)........................................... C17.8; C18.16; C20.8 USADA v Gaines (CAS 2004/O/649)......................................................... B4.38; C5.2, C5.5; C7.2, C7.14 USADA v Gatlin (AAA Panel, 1 January 2008, appeal rejected CAS 2008/A/1461)...... C4.13, C4.15; C16.2; C18.5, C18.6; C21.5 USADA v Gicquel (AAA, 11 August 2020)................................................................... C23.6 USADA v Gilbert (USADA press release, 17 July 2012).............................................. C19.8 USADA v Grammer (NADP Tribunal, 4 January 2012)...................... C18.26; C20.6, C20.18 USADA v Grove (USADA, 4 January 2019)................................................................. C18.19 USADA v Hainline (AAA Panel, 29 December 2005)................................................... C18.3 USADA v Hardy (CAS 2009/A/1870).................................................. B1.30; C18.32; C20.2, C20.10, C20.16, C20.18 USADA v Hellebuyck (AAA Panel, 30 January 2012).......................................... C4.2; C5.10 USADA v ICC (ICC Dispute Committee, 16 June 2017)....................... A1.30, A1.52; B1.10, B1.22, B1.53, B1.57 USADA v Jelks (AAA Panel, 23 May 2012).......................................... C9.1; C17.15; C20.6 USADA v Jenkins (AAA Case No 30 190 00199 07)............................... C4.2, C4.45; C6.22, C6.23, C6.25 USADA v Klineman (AAA Panel, 12 December 2013).................................. C18.21; C20.13 USADA v Korchemny (AAA Panel, 12 March 2007).................................................... C20.22 USADA v Landis (AAA Panel, 20 September 2007)..................... C4.2, C4.34, C4.45; C6.1, C6.5, C6.7, C6.21, C6.22, C6.23, C6.25, C6.42, C6.45, C6.46 USADA v Leeper (AAA Panel, 6 November 2015)....................................................... C17.5 USADA v Leinders......................................................................................................... C20.22 USADA v Leogrande (AAA Panel, 1 December 2008).............. C4.33; C6.30; C7.16; C10.1 USADA v Lock (USADA press release, 20 April 2012)................................................ C17.15 USADA v McCall (9 June 2017).................................................................................... C4.21 USADA v Meeker (AAA Panel, 18 November 2013)............................ C18.12; C19.4, C19.9 USADA v Merritt (AAA No 77 190 00293).................................................................. B2.18 USADA v Montgomery (CAS 2004/O/645)...................................... B4.38; C5.2, C5.5; C7.2, C7.14; C22.4 USADA v Mortenson (AAA Panel, 25 September 2006)..................................... C4.13; C9.1 USADA v O’Bee (AAA Panel, 1 October 2010)........................... C4.7, C4.38; C7.16; C19.8 USADA v O’Neill (AAA Panel, 9 December 2009).......................... C18.20, C18.24; C20.10, C20.18; C22.12 USADA v Page (AAA Panel, 4 February 2009)....................................................... C8.2, C8.5 USADA v Piasecki (AAA Panel, 24 September 2007).................................... C18.32; C20.10 USADA v Reed (CAS 2008/A/1577)......................................... C3.7; C6.39; C18.24; C20.11 USADA v Rollins (AAA, 14 April 2017)............................................... B1.51; C9.3; C17.15; C20.8; C22.5

cxxx  Table of Cases

para USADA v Sahin (AAA Panel, 23 March 2005)................................. C18.19, C18.21, C18.26 USADA v Salazar (30 September 2019)............................. C3.8; C4.3; C10.1; C11.1; C12.1, C12.2; C13.1, C13.2, C13.3; C14.1, C14.3, C14.4; C17.20 USADA v Sbeih, (AAA Panel, March 2004)................................................................. C6.30 USADA v Stewart (AAA Panel, 24 June 2010)................................................. C12.4; C20.22 USADA v Trafeh (AAA Panel, 2 December 2014)................................... C7.14; C8.2; C19.8 USADA v Wade (AAA Panel, 9 November 2005)..................................... C4.34; C6.6, C6.7, C6.22, C6.52 USADA v Williams (USADA, 5 August 2010).............................................................. C16.1 USADA v Youngquist (AAA Panel, 28 February 2005).......................... C4.38; C17.2; C22.4; C23.6 USADA v Zalicek (USADA Press Release, 10 June 2011)........................................... C10.1 USOC v IOC (CAS OG 2000/001)..................................................................... B1.26, B1.48 USOC v IOC & IAAF (CAS 2004/A/725)......................................................... B1.22; C4.15 USOC v IOC (CAS 2011/O/2422)........................................ A1.9, A1.19, A1.44; B1.6, B1.8, B1.10, B1.11, B1.12; B2.18, B2.22, B2.23; C4.13; D2.197 Udinese Calcio SpA v De Sanctis & Sevilla FC SAD (CAS/A/2145, 2146&2147)...... F3.81, F3.271, F3.273 Ugo Cifone (C-77/10)..................................................................................................... E12.68 Unabhangiges Landeszentrum fur Datenschutz Schlewsig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbG (Case C-210/16) [2019] 1 WLR 119, [2018] 6 WLUK 11, [2018] 3 CMLR 32, [2019] CEC 799............... A4.23 Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA) v Briscomb (Application for Summary Judgment) Chancery [2006] EWHC 1268 (Ch), (2006) 150 SJLB 670, Ch D........................................................................................................... H1.91; H2.110 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) v Euroview Sport Ltd [2010] EWHC 1066 (Ch), [2010] Eu LR 583, Ch D.............................................. E12.61 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman (C415/93) [1996]  All ER (EC) 97, [1995]  ECR  I-4921, [1996] 1  CMLR  645, [1996] CEC 38, ECJ....................................... B1.4, B1.32; B5.31; E2.19, E2.22; E5.13; E6.10; E11.49, E11.51, E11.66, E11.72, E11.90, E11.91, E11.93, E11.130, E11.131, E11.132, E11.133, E11.134, E11.138, E11.142, E11.240, E11.276, E11.326; E12.2, E12.3, E12.21, E12.22, E12.23, E12.28, E12.33, E12.34, E12.45, E12.88, E12.92, E12.93, E12.97, E12.100, E12.101, E12.105, E12.112, E12.115, E12.118, E12.119, E12.120, E12.124; F1.26; F2.1; F3.25, F3.29, F3.44, F3.50, F3.54, F3.55, F3.56, F3.58, F3.60, F3.61, F3.76, F3.82, F3.84, F3.87, F3.88, F3.89, F3.91, F3.93, F3.94, F3.95, F3.102, F3.103, F3.116, F3.117, F3.128, F3.239 United Brands Co v Commission of the European Communities (27/76) [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, ECJ............................ E11.16, E11.19, E11.223 United Policyholders Group v A-G of Trinidad & Tobago [2016] UKPC 17, [2016] 1 WLR 3383, [2016] 6 WLUK 683.................................................. B1.36, B1.38, B1.39 United States v International Olympic Committee (CAS, 4 October 2011)................... E8.8 United States v National Football League 116 F Supp 319, 323–24 (ED Pa 1953)....... E11.49 United States v Panhandle Eastern Corp , 118 FRD 346 (D Del 1988)......................... D2.30 United States Cricket Association v International Cricket Council (16 June 2017)....... E15.42 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch  601, Ch D........................................................................................................................ H4.83 Unnamed tennis player & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), ATP & ICAS (European Commission Decision, 12 October 2009)................................. C4.17; C20.15 Upjohn Co v US 499 US 383 (1981).............................................................................. E11.36

Table of Cases  cxxxi

para V V v FINA (CAS 2003/A/459)..................................................................... C8.5; C16.3; C20.6 V v FINA (CAS 2003/A/493)............................................ B1.44; C4.16; C6.6, C6.10; C18.29 V v Swiss Cycling, (CAS 2001/A/318).......................................................................... B1.44 VB  Football Assets v Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta Ltd) [2017] EWHC 2767 (Ch), [2017] 11 WLUK 88............................................ E15.43 VfB Admira Wacker Modling v AC Pistoiese spA (CAS 2008/A/1521)............ F3.176, F3.250 Vairy v Wyang Shire Council (2005) 80 ALJR 1............................................. G1.100, G1.148 Valcke v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 7 May 2019)....................................... D2.47, D2.135 Valcke v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5003)................................................. A5.3; B1.4, B1.15, B1.16, B1.22, B1.57; B4.32; D2.161 Valencia Club de Futbol v Commission (Case T-732/16) (18 November 2016)......... E11.318 Valsts policihas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalda v Rigas pašvaldibas SIA (Case C-13/16)........................................... A4.47, A4.48, A4.49, A4.50 Vanakorn v Federation Internationale de Ski (FIS) (CAS 2014/A/3832)....................... B1.23 Van de Hurk v Netherlands (A/288) (1994) 18 EHRR 481, ECJ................................... E13.49 Vanderlei De Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) v International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) (CAS 2005/A/727).............................................. B3.36 Van der Mussele v Belgium (A/101) (8919/80) (1984) 6 EHRR 163, ECtHR............... E13.35 Van Hannover v Germany [2004] 6 WLUK 538, [2004] EMLR 21, (2005) 40 EHRR 1, 16 NHRC 545......................................................................................................... H4.54 Van Huyssteen v International Rugby Board (CAS 2014/A/3772)................................ C18.24 Van Marle v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 483, ECtHR................................................. H4.68 Van Oppen v Bedford Charity Trustees [1990] 1 WLR  235, [1989] 3 All ER  389, (1989) 139 NLJ 900, CA........................................................................................ G1.51 Van Snick v Federation Internationale de Judo (CAS 2014/A/3475).......... C5.4; C6.1; C16.2; C18.19; C23.2 Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools; sub nom Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants [2012]  UKSC  56, [2013] 2 AC  1, [2012] 3 WLR  1319, [2013] 1 All ER  670, [2013]  IRLR  219, [2013]  ELR  1, [2013] PIQR P6, (2012) 162 NLJ 1505, (2012) 156(45) SJLB 31, SC........ G1.35, G1.36 Varis v IBU, (CAS 2008/A/1607)................................................................................... C6.23 Varnish v British Cycling Federation (t/a British Cycling) [2018] UKET 2404219/2017......................................................................................................... F1.8 Varnish v British Cycling Federation (t/a British Cycling) [2020] 5  WLUK  539, [2020] IRLR 822..................................................................................................... F1.8 Vassilev v FIBT & BBTF (CAS 2006/A/1041)............................................... C18.19, C18.28 Veerpalu v FIS (CAS 2011/A/2566)............................................. C6.21, C6.22, C6.34; C7.11 Veerpalu v FIS (CAS 2020/A/6781)............................................................................... C4.26 Vencill v USADA (CAS 2003/A/484)................................... C18.14, C18.15, C18.20, C18.32 Vereniging Rechtswinkels Utrecht v Netherlands (Application 11308/84) 46 DR 200 (1986)........................................................................................................ E13.63, E13.65 Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, HC (Australia).................................................................. E2.51; G1.134; H1.8, H1.9, H1.10, H1.12, H1.15, H1.18, H1.30, H1.39; H2.18, H2.19, H2.22; H3.26 Villanueva v FINA (CAS 2016/A/4534)............................. B1.56, B1.61; B4.4; C4.17;C17.4, C17.5, C17.6; C20.18; C21.10, C21.11 Vincenzo Morabito v Ittihad Club (CAS 2007/A/1274)................................................. F2.138 Vinus v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, [2000] 6 WLUK 152, [2001] CP Rep 12, [2000] CPLR 570.............................................................................................. B1.61 Virgin Islands Olympic Committee v IOC (CAS OG 10/003)....................................... B1.55 Virgin Net Ltd v Harper [2004] EWCA Civ 271, [2005] ICR 921, [2004] IRLR 390, (2004) 101(14) LSG 25, (2004) 148 SJLB 353, CA............................................... F1.77 Vistins & Perepolkins v Latvia (Application 71243/01) [2012] 10 WLUK 793, (2014) 58 EHRR 4.............................................................................................................. E13.73 Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (The Santa Clara) [1996] AC 800, [1996] 3 WLR 105, [1996] 3 All ER 193, [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 225, [1996] CLC 1159, (1996) 15 Tr LR 347, (1996) 93(26) LSG 19, (1996) 146 NLJ 957, (1996) 140 SJLB 147, HL.............. B5.139

cxxxii  Table of Cases

para Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v Union of European Football Associations & FC Porto Futebol SAD (CAS 2008/A/1584)........................ B1.25, B1.26, B1.28, B1.57 Vivendi/BskyB (April 2000; DTI Press release P/2000/277)...................................... E11.229 Vlasov v ATP (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 24 March 2005)..................................... C18.26; C20.6 Volandri v ITF (CAS 2008/A/1782)............................................ B1.26, B1.44; C4.23; D2.74 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379................................................................ H4.61 Von Hannover v Germany (40660/08 & 60641/08) [2012]  EMLR  16, (2012) 55 EHRR 15, 32 BHRC 527, ECtHR..................................................................... E13.59 Vowles v Evans [2003]  EWCA  Civ 318, [2003] 1  WLR  1607, [2003]  ECC  24, [2003] PIQR P29, (2003) 100(20) LSG 28, CA..................... E9.2; G1.26, G1.54, G1.56 Vroeman v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autoreit Nederland (CAS 2010/A/2296)................................................... B1.56; C4.33; C6.8, C6.10, C6.16, C6.21, C6.22, C6.23, C6.28 W W v B (22 July 2010)...................................................................................................... F3.176 W v UK Athletics (CAS 2002/A/455)............................... B1.16, B1.28, B1.30, B1.45, B1.61 W  Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC  931, [1977] 3  WLR  214, [1977] 3 All ER 40, 8 BLR 57, [1977] ICR 662, [1977] IRLR 314, (1978) 13 ITR 71, (1977) 121 SJ 512, HL....................................................................................................... F1.57 WBPSA v Lee (Disciplinary Panel, 16 September 2013).......................... B4.4, B4.21, B4.37, B4.38, B4.41, B4.42 WCM-GP Ltd v FIM, CAS 2003/A/4612.............................................. B1.56, B1.61; D2.147 WCVB-TV v Boston Athletic Association, 926 F 2d 42 (1st Cir 1991).............. H1.13; H2.26 WICB v Samuels (Disciplinary Committee, 16 May 2008).......... B4.26, B4.28, B4.38, B4.41 WPBSA v Higgins & Mooney (WPBSA statement, 8 September 2010).............. B4.30, B4.45 WPBSA v Jogia (WPBSA statement, 25 July 2012)...................................................... B4.34 WRU v Laing (NADP Tribunal, 28 June 2011).............................................................. C18.32 WTC v Moats (AAA Panel, 10 October 2012)................... B1.20, B1.22; C4.4, C4.15; C20.6 Waddington v Miah [1974] 1 WLR 683, HL...................................................... B1.43; D2.133 Wagon Mound, The see Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound) Walker v Australian Biathlon Association (CAS 2011/A/2590)..................................... B2.51 Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd [1910] 1 KB 87, CA................................... F1.8 Walker v UKA & IAFF (unreported, 3 July 2000).................... B1.40; C4.20, C4.26; D2.133; D3.112; E2.42; E4.11; E8.6, E8.7, E8.12; E9.6; E16.29 Walkinshaw v Diniz [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 237, [1999] 5 WLUK 257........ D3.17, D3.18, D3.19, D3.22, D3.50; E3.12; E4.8; E13.41 Walkinshaw v Diniz [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 632, QBD............................................ F1.2, F1.66 Wall v British Canoe Union [2015] 7 WLUK 983......................................................... G1.73 Wallader v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 29 October 2010)...... C18.31, C18.32 Walrave v Association Union Cycliste Internationale (36/74) [1974]  ECR  1405, [1975] 1 CMLR 320, ECJ........................................ A1.32; B1.14; B2.41; E5.13; E6.10; E11.51, E11.93; E12.21, E12.22, E12.23, E12.43, E12.90, E12.122 Walter v Ashton [1902] 2 Ch 282, Ch D......................................................................... H4.43 Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102... B1.60 Waltons & Morse v Dorrington [1997] IRLR 488, EAT................................................ F1.29 Wang Lu Na v FINA (CAS 98/A/208............................................................................. C6.23 Ward v (1) International Olympic Committee (2) International Boxing Association (3) Association of National Olympic Committees [2012] CAS OG 12/02.................. B1.53, B1.57; D1.31 Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209, [1936] 3 All ER 160, KBD........ F1.80 Warnock v Scarborough Football Club [1989] ICR 489, EAT....................................... F1.79 Warren v Burns [2014] EWHC 3671 (QB), [2014] 11 WLUK 351........................ F1.5, F1.65

Table of Cases  cxxxiii

para Warren v Mendy [1989] 1  WLR  853, [1989] 3  All ER  103, [1989]  ICR  525, [1989] IRLR 210, (1989) 133 SJ 1261, CA.......................... E7.50; E15.19; F1.9, F1.80, F1.81, F1.82, F1.90; F3.16 Warren v USADA (CAS 2008/A/1473).................................................. C18.6; C20.6, C20.18 Watson & Bradford AFC v Gray & Huddersfield Town AFC (The Times, 26 November 1998)..................................................................................... G1.2, G1.12, G1.21, G1.37, G1.154, G1.155 Watson (Michael) v British Board of Boxing Control (1999) 143 Sol Jo LB  235, [2000] EWCA Civ 2116, CA; [2001] QB 1134, [2001] 2 WLR 1256, [2000] All ER (D) 2352, [2001] PIQR P213.................................. E2.28; E3.8; E6.5; E9.4; E15.37; F1.33; G1.61, G1.68, G1.69, G1.71, G1.73, G1.78, G1.79 Watson v British Boxing Board of Control Ltd [2001] QB 1134, [2001] 2 WLR 1256, [2001] PIQR P16, (2001) 98(12) LSG 44, (2001) 145 SJLB 31, CA..................... G1.31 Watson v Gray (The Times, 26 November 1998)........................................................... F1.91 Watson v Prager [1991] 1  WLR  726, [1991] 3  All ER  487, [1991]  ICR  603, [1993] EMLR 275, Ch D............................................... E2.57; E7.6; E10.13; F1.9, F1.24 Watson’s Application for Leave to Appeal for Judicial Review [2011] NIQB 66.......... E5.5 Watt v Australian Cycling Federation (CAS 96/153)................... B2.47, B2.50, B2.82, B2.89, B2.94; D1.56; D2.133; E6.9 Watt v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal, 10 March 2015).................... C3.7; C4.13; C6.1, C6.39; C20.18 Wattleworth v Goodwood Road Racing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 140 (QB), [2004] PIQR P25, QBD........................................................... E9.2; G1.3, G1.68, G1.75, G1.78, G1.79 Watts v Australian Cycling Federation (CAS 96/153).................................................... E7.69 Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 61 ALR 225.............................. E15.42 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541, [2016] 3 All ER 357, [2015] 11 WLUK 554, [2016] EMLR 7............................... H4.63 Wells v Full Moon Events Ltd (t/a Dave Thorpe Honda Off-Road Centre) [2020] EWHC 1265 (QB), [2020] 5 WLUK 255................................................... G1.101 Welsh Rugby Union Ltd v Cardiff Blues [2008] EWHC 3399, QBD.................. E2.41; E7.55; E11.95; E12.53 Weltimmo sro v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és információszabadság Hatóság (Case C-230/14) [2016] 1 WLR 863, [2015] 10 WLUK 12............................................. A4.28 Wemhoff v Germany (A/7) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 55, ECtHR........................................... E13.48 Wen Tong v IJF (CAS 2010/A/2161)........................................................ C4.31, C4.33; C6.23 West Bromwich Albion Football Club Ltd v El-Safty [2006]  EWCA  Civ 1299, [2007]  PIQR P7, [2007]  LS  Law Medical 50, (2006) 92  BMLR  179, (2006) 103(41) LSG 34, (2006) 150 SJLB 1428. CA..................................... G1.6, G1.60, G1.65 West Ham v FA (Rule K Arbitration Tribunal, 7 Feburary 2014).................................. E2.16 West Indies Cricket Board of Control & the West Indies Players’ Association, in the matter of (unreported, 16 December 2004)............................................................. H4.94 Westfield v ECB (ECB Appeal Panel, July 2013).......................................................... B4.45 Westland Helicopters Ltd v Arab British Helicopter Co (ABH) (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 19 April 1994)......................................................................................... D2.185 Westminster Property Management Ltd (No 1), Re; sub nom Official Receiver v Stern (No  1) [2000] 1  WLR  2230, [2001] 1 All ER  633, [2001]  BCC  121, [2000] 2 BCLC 396, [2000] UKHRR 332, CA..................................................... E13.40, E13.46 West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA (formelry Ruinione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) (Case C-185/07) [2009] 1 AC  1138, [2009] 3  WLR  696, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 435, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413, [2009]  ECR  I-663, [2009] 2  WLUK  197, [2009] 1 CLC 96, [2009] All ER (EC) 491, [2009] CEC 619, [2009] IL Pr 20, 2009 AMC 2847...................................................................................................... E11.26 Westzucker GmbH  v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker (Case 57/72) [1973] ECR 321, [1973] 3 WLUK 69..................................................................... B1.40 Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552, [1966] 2 WLR 581, [1966] 1 All ER 582, [1966] RA 193, [1966] RVR 223, (1966) 110 SJ 149, HL.......................... G1.84, G1.89 Whitbread Plc (t/a Whitbread Medway Inns) v Hall [2001] EWCA Civ 268, [2001] ICR 699, [2001] IRLR 275, [2001] Emp LR 394, (2001) 145 SJLB 77, CA......... F1.59

cxxxiv  Table of Cases

para White v Bristol Rugby Ltd [2002] IRLR 204, QBD...................... F1.16, F1.44, F1.49, F1.68 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455, [1998] 3 WLR 1509, [1999] 1 All ER  1, [1999]  ICR  216, [1999]  IRLR  110, (1999) 45  BMLR  1, (1999) 96(2) LSG 28, (1998) 148 NLJ 1844, (1999) 143 SJLB 51, HL................ G1.124 Whiteside v United Kingdom (20357/92) (1994) 18 EHRR.......................................... H4.66 Whitmore v International Skating Union (CAS 2016/A/4558)...................................... B3.146 Whyte v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 27 March 2013)............ C18.20, C18.21, C18.32 Wickmayer (Flemish Doping Tribunal Case 2009-04, 5 November 2009)............ C9.1, C9.2; C17.15 Widnes RFC v Rugby Football League (unreported, 26 May 1995).............................. E7.55 Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police see Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd Wigan Athletic FC v EFL (League Arbitration Panel, 4 August 2020).............. B5.72, B5.150 Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd v Heart of Midlothian Plc (Webster) ( CAS 2007/A/1298; 30 January 2008)................................................................................ B1.15, B1.22; F1.74 Wigan RLFC v Rugby Football League (Off Field Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal, March 2019)............................................................................................................ B5.106 Wilander & Novacek v Tobin & Jude [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 293, [1997] 2 CMLR 346, [1997] Eu LR.265, CA.................................................... B1.4; C4.17; C5.3; C6.1, C6.6; E2.3, E2.4; E5.13, E5.14; E7.12, E7.78, E7.80, E7.83; E10.13, E10.17, E10.18, E10.24; E12.65; F3.54 Wilcox v Jeffery [1951] 1  All ER  464, [1951] 1  TLR  706, (1951) 115  JP  151, 49 LGR 363, [1951] WN 77, (1951) 95 SJ 157, DC.............................................. G2.37 Wiles v Bothwell Castle Golf Club, 2005 SLT 785, 2006 SCLR 108, 2005 GWD 25460, Ct of Session......................................................................................... E5.5; E13.19 Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard Motor Cycle & Light Car Club [1971] 1 WLR 668, [1971] 2 All ER 369, (1971) 115 SJ 309, CA......................................................... G1.82 Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43, [2018] AC 779, [2016] 3 WLUK 477, [2017] 2 All ER 327, [2016] 7 WLUK 510................................................................................. E9.5 Willes v IBSF (CAS 2016/A/4776)............................................. C6.10, C6.16, C6.35; C18.32 William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker [1999] ICR 291, [1998] IRLR 313, (1998) 95(20) LSG 33, (1998) 142 SJLB 140, CA................................................... F1.27, F1.31 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014]  UKSC  10, [2014]  AC  1189, [2014] 2 WLR  355, [2014] 2 All ER  489, [2014] 2 WLUK  621, [2014] WTLR  873, 16 ITELR 740, (2014) 164 (7596) NLJ 16............................................................. B1.59 Williams v Eady (1893) 10 TLR 41, CA........................................................................ G1.52 Williams v Leeds United Football Club [2015] EWHC 376 (QB), [2015] 2 WLUK 644, [2015] IRLR 383................................................................................. F1.34, F1.35, F1.57 Williams v Welsh Rugby Union [1999] Eu LR  195, QBD see Williams & Cardiff RFC v Pugh (IRB intervening) Williams & Cardiff RFC v Pugh (IRB intervening) (unreported, 23 July 1997), CA.... E2.36, E2.37, E2.41; E3.11; E5.14; E6.4; E8.5, E8.7; E10.5, E10.20, E10.22; E12.54; E15.5 Williams (Calle) v IOC (CAS 2005/A/726).................................... C5.2; C6.34, C6.55, C6.56, C6.58, C6.59, C6.61 Willmott v RFU (Appeal Panel, 11 January 2016).................................. C7.20, C7.22; C12.3 Wilson v British Darts Organisation Ltd 95/NJ/1687..................................................... E2.25 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 633, [2002] QB 74, [2001] 3 WLR 42, [2001] 3 All ER 229, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 134, [2001] ECC 37, [2001]  HRLR  44, [2001]  UKHRR  1175, (2001) 98(24)  LSG  44, (2001) 145 SJLB 125; aff’d [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, [2003] 3 WLR 568, [2003] 4  All ER  97, [2003] 2  All ER (Comm) 491, [2003] 7  WLUK  303, [2003]  HRLR  33, [2003]  UKHRR  1085, (2003) 100 (35)  LSG  39, (2003) 147 SJLB 872................................................. B1.36, B1.38, B1.40, B1.43, B1.57; H4.66 Wilson v Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Primary School, Carlton, Governors [1998] 1 FLR 663, [1998] ELR 637, [1998] PIQR P145, [1998] Fam Law 249, CA........ G1.107

Table of Cases  cxxxv

para Wilson v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 19 January 2012)......... C6.7, C6.10, C6.10, C6.16; C19.8 Wilson v United Counties Bank Ltd [1920] AC 102, [1919] 6 WLUK 1....................... F1.78 Wilson (Ajee) (USADA Press Release, 19 June 2017).................................................. C18.19 Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57, [1937] 3 All ER 628, 1937 SC (HL) 46, 1937 SLT 523, HL................................................................................... F1.33 Wimbledon case (OFT press release no 20/93, 23 March 1993)......... E2.54; E11.60, E11.205, E11.219 Wimbledon Football Club v Football League (FA Arbitration, 29 January 2002)......... D1.33; E7.69; E10.5, E10.20, E10.24 Wingrove v United Kingdom (17419/90) (1997) 24 EHRR 1, 1 BHRC 509, ECtHR... E13.66 Wise (Dennis) v Filbert Realisations (formerly Leicester City Football Club) (in administration) (unreported, 9 February 2004)................................... F1.48, F1.58, F1.62 Wiszniewski v Central Manchester HA [1998] PIQR P324, [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 223, CA................................................................................................................... B4.38 Withers v Flackwell Heath Football Supporters’ Club [1981] IRLR 307 EAT.............. F1.9 Wium v IPC, IPC Management Committee (Decision, 7 October 2005)............... C6.10; C8.5 Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989, [2020] 2 WLR 941, [2020] 4 All ER 1, [2020] 3 WLUK 454, [2020] ICR 874, [2020] IRLR 472, [2020] EMLR 19, 2020 Rep LR 80.................... G1.35, G1.36, G1.40 Wombles Ltd v Wombles Skips Ltd [1975] FSR 488, [1977] RPC 99 Ch D................. H4.52 Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017]  UKSC  24, [2017] AC  1173, [2017] 2  WLR  1095, [2017] 4  All ER  615, [2018] 1  All ER (Comm) 51, [2017] 3 WLUK 724, 171 Con LR 1, [2017] CILL 3971................. B1.54; B2.16; E8.15; F1.21 Wood v Mussleburgh Joint Racing Committee [2016] 10 WLUK 343, [2017] LLR 216, 2016 GWD 34-621.................................................................................................. E8.9 Wood Group Engineering v Robertson (unreported, 6 July 2007)................................. F1.8 Woods v Multi-Sports Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 76 ALJR 483............ G1.80, G1.100, G1.148 Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1982] Com LR 208, [1982] ICR 693, [1982] IRLR 413, CA............................................................................................. F1.34 Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2  QB  43, [1962] 3 WLR  616, [1962] 2 All ER  978, (1962) 106 SJ 489 CA............................................................ G1.1, G1.7, G1.30, G1.108, G1.109, G1.110, G1.112 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ADAK & Athletics Kenya & Kipyego (CAS 2017/A/5295)................................................................................................ C17.4 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ADAK & Jepchoge Marn (CAS 2019/A/6157)................................................................................................ C17.8 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ASADA (CAS 2007/A/1383)................. C6.60; C7.3; C23.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ASSIS & FPC (CAS 2006/A/1153)..... C4.17; C6.16, C6.17, C6.52 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Arman-Marshall Silla (CAS 2017/A/4954).... B4.46 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Ayiro (CAS 2017/A/5248).............................. C17.5 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Batan & IPF (CAS 2013/A/3316)........ B1.57; C4.15, B1.61 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Bellchambers (CAS 2015/A/4059)....... B1.36, B1.61; C5.2, C5.6, C5.8; C7.1; C18.26; C20.8; C22.3, C22.4 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Bhupender Singh & NASA (CAS 2014/A/3868)......................................................................... C8.3; C18.16; C20.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Buitrago & GCD (CAS 2013/A/3077)............ C8.5 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CADO & Greaves (CAS 2016/A/4662).......... C17.4, C17.6; C18.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CBC & Denise Consuelo Oliveira (CAS 2014/A/3786)................................................................................................ C20.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CBJ & Penalbar (CAS 2009/A/1954)............. C4.16 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CFA, Eranosian (CAS  2009/A/1817 & CAS 2009/A/1844....................................................................................... B1.39; C21.2 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI & Fiorio (CAS 2013/A/3241)............... C18.3

cxxxvi  Table of Cases

para World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI (FIGC & Cherubin (CAS 2008/A/1551)......................................................................................... C8.2, C8.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini (CAS 2008/A/1557)...................................................... B1.56, B1.57; C8.2, C8.3, C8.5; C20.6; C22.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, FITET & Piacentini (CAS 2008/A/1516)................................................................................................ C20.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, FPI & Comastri (CAS 2008/A/1479)... C18.6, C18.20, C18.24 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, Slay & Diaz (CAS 2009/A/1892)........ C8.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Chernova & RUSADA (CAS 2013/A/3112)... C6.8, C6.15, C6.21, C6.22; C7.8; C19.8 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Comitato Permanente Antidoping San Marino NADO & Karim Gharbi (CAS 2017/A/4962)........................................................ C4.17 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Contreras & COC (CAS 2013/A/3341).......... C8.5; C10.1, C10.2 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Covert & FEI (CAS 2012/A/2960)..... B1.57, B1.58; C4.23; C18.6; C23.8 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Daiders, Daiders & FIM (CAS 2014/A/3615)... C16.2; C17.2; C18.5, C18.6, C18.9, C18.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v EADA & Abd Elsalam (CAS 2016/A/4563)... C6.55; C18.5, C18.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FAW & James (CAS 2007/A/1364)................ C20.6, C20.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FCF & Garcia (CAS 2017/A/5315)...... C6.8, C6.16, C6.22, C6.23, C6.53; C20.18 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FCL & Villareal (CAS 2011/A/2376)...... C6.10, C6.16; C18.5; C20.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FECNA & Lina Maria Prieto (CAS 2007/A/1284 & 1308)............................................................................................. C3.7; C18.6, C18.32 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIBA & Morgan (FIBA AC 2005-1, 22 June 2005)................................................................................................... B4.38; C5.5; C16.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIG & Melnychenko (CAS 2011/A/2403)...... C20.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIG & Vysotskaya (CAS 2007/A/1413)......... C6.1; C18.6; C20.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FILA & Abdelfattah (CAS 2008/A/1470)....... C3.3; C5.5; C6.7; C8.2 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Abdelrahman (CAS 2017/A/5036)...... C17.6; C18.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FILA & Stadnyik (CAS 2007/A/1399)........... C18.6; C22.4 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIM & Iannone (CAS 2020/A/7068).............. C17.5; C18.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIVB & Berrios (CAS 2010/A/2229)............. B1.30; C5.4; C18.32; C20.10, C20.12, C20.13 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FMF & Cermona (CAS 2006/A/1149)........... C4.31; C6.21, C6.22 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FPC & Cabreira (CAS 2009/A/1873)............. C10.1 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FPF & Costa Fernandes (CAS 2012/A/2922)... C4.23; C6.21 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Fedrovia (CAS 2016/A/4700)................. C6.7; C10.1 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Galuilina & FIG (CAS 2012/A/3037)............. C20.6, C20.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Goltsova & IWF (CAS 2014/A/3485)............ C18.24 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Hardy & USADA (CAS 2009/A/1870).......... B1.30, B1.40, B1.44; C4.16; C18.29; C20.10, C20.13; D2.100

Table of Cases  cxxxvii

para World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v IIHF & Busch (CAS 2008/A/1564)......... C8.2, C8.3; C18.3; D2.179 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v IWF & Calcedo (CAS 2016/A/4377)..... C5.4; C17.4, C17.6; C18.3, C18.6, C18.12, C18.16; C23.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v IWWF & Rathy (CAS 2012/A/2701)............. C18.32; C20.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Indian NADA & Pereira (CAS 2016/A/4609)... C17.3, C17.8; C18.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v International Hockey Federation (IIHF) & Lestan (CAS 2017/A/5282)......................................................... C17.8; C21.11, C21.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v JBN, de Goede & Dopingautoreit (CAS 2012/A/2747).......................................................................... B1.61; C17.8; C22.9 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Jamaludin (CAS 2012/A/2791)................ C8.2, C8.5; C14.1; C19.8; C20.22; C21.5 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Jobson (CAS 2010/A/2307)................ B1.15, B1.34, B1.60; C4.17, C4.19; C6.1; C20.6, C20.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Karpinska & PWF (CAS 2014/A/3472)......... C23.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Kurtoglu v FIBA (FIBA AC 2005-6).............. B1.31; C4.17; C18.20, C18.21, C18.22, C18.24; C20.2, C20.16 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Lallukka (CAS 2014/A/3488)............ B1.44; C4.16; C6.34; C19.9; C23.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Lund & USADA (CAS OG 06/001)...... C6.7; C17.2, C18.4, C18.24; C23.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v McHale (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Panel, 29 July 2010)............................................................................................... C18.3; C20.18 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Nilforushan & FEI (CAS 2012/A/2959)......... C18.24, C18.26, C18.27; C20.6, C20.10, C20.12; C22.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v NADA & Meghali (CAS 2016/A/4626).......... C17.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v NSAM & Cheah (CAS 2007/A/1395)............ C16.2; C18.12, C18.16, C18.24 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ONADE & Illescas (CAS 2016/A/4834)........ B1.16 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Pakistan Cricket Board (CAS 2006/A/1190).. B1.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Portuguese Football Federation & Nuno Asis Lopes de Almeida (CAS 2006/A/1153)...................................................... C4.34; C6.51 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Qatar FA & Alanezi (CAS 2007/A/1446)....... C4.21; C18.26 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Qatar FA & Ali Juma Al-Mohadanni (CAS 2007/A/1445)..................................................................................... C18.5; C22.9 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v RADO & ADAK & AK & Ndinda Muli (CAS 2017/A/5157)................................................................................................ C21.11 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Roberts (CAS 2017/A/5296)............... C18.6, C18.19 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Robinson & JADCO (CAS 2014/A/3820)...... C17.6; C18.6, C18.16; C21.5; C22.8; C23.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v SANEF & Gertenbach (CAS 2008/A/1558)... C6.10; C8.2; C16.3; C20.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Salmon & FIVB (CAS 2012/A/296)............... C18.20; C20.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Stanic & Swiss Olympic Association (CAS 2006/A/1140)................................................................................................ C18.7 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Stanic & Swiss Olympic Association (CAS 2006/A/1130)..................................................................................... C18.5, C18.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Stauber & Swiss Olympic Committee (CAS 2006/A/1133)..................................................................... C16.2; C18.14, C18.19, C18.25, C18.26, C18.27

cxxxviii  Table of Cases

para World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Sundby & FIS (CAS 2015/A/4233)...... B1.56, B1.57, B1.61; C18.27; C20.8; C23.2 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Sun Yang & FINA (CAS 2019/A/6148).......... B1.27; C6.8; C8.2, C8.5, C8.6; C10.1, C10.2; C18.3; C23.6; D2.10 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Swiss Olympic & Daubney (CAS 2008/A/1515)...................................................... C18.6, C18.19, C18.20, C18.24 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v TFF & Kuru (CAS 2016/A/4512)................... C17.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Troy & IRB (CAS 2008/A/1652).......... B1.54, B1.57 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Turkish Football Federation & Ahmet Kuru (CAS 2016/A/4512)................................................................................................ C17.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Turrini & CISM (CAS 2008/A/1565)............. C18.25, C18.26 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v USADA & Ryan (CAS 2019/A/6180)............ C6.39 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v USADA & Scherf (CAS 2007/A/1416).......... C18.3 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v USADA & Thompson (CAS 2008/A/1490)...... C18.20; C20.6, C20.12 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Wium (CAS 2005/A/908)........... C6.6, C6.17, C6.18, C6.25, C6.46 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v WSF & Iqbal (CAS 2016/A/4919)....... C17.4, C17.6; C21.11 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v WTC & Marr (CAS 2011/A/2398)................. C18.24 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v West (Anthony) & FIM (CAS 2012/A/3029).... C6.60; C20.6, C20.7 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Yadav & NADA (CAS OG 16/25).................. C17.6 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian (CAS 2009/A/1817, CAS 2009/A/1844)................................................... B1.40, B1.44; C4.13, C4.16; C5.4; C7.15, C7.16; C13.2; C18.24; C21.5 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & FIFA (CAS 2005/C/976 & 986).......... A1.50, A1.58; B1.6, B1.8, B1.16, B1.22, B1.27, B1.30, B1.32, B1.34; C2.9; C18.14, C18.15, C18.18, C18.20, C18.26; C20.6, C20.13; D2.100, D2.198 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & UCI v Alberto Contador Velasco & RFEC (CAS 2011/A/2384)................................................................................................ E7.66 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & UCI  v Valverde (CAS  2007/A/1396 & 1402)................................................................... B4.38; C5.2, C5.7; C6.6; C7.17; C23.6 World Archery v Ticas (Anti-Doping Panel, 5 July 2016)................................... C17.8; C20.2 World Athletics v Chani (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/078/2020)............................... C7.8, C7.9 World Athletics v Kibarus (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/069/2020)................................... C6.10 World Athletics v Kipkemoi (Disciplinary Trubunal SR/051/2020)................. C18.25, C18.26 World Athletics v Marimuthu (Disciplinary Tribunal, SR/287/2019)........ C4.23; C6.22, C6.51 World Athletics v Wilson Kipsang Kiprovich (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/009/2020, 24 June 2020).............................................................................. C9.2, C9.4, C9.5; C10.1 World Cup 1990 Package Tours: Pauwels Travel Bvba v FIFA  Local Organising Committee Italia ‘90¸ [1994] 5 CMLR 253......................................................... E11.202 World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry v FIFA & ISL (Case No IV/F1/35.266).................................................................................... E2.45; E11.186, E11.187 World Motor Sport Council v Renault, Briatore & Symonds (21 September 2009)...... E2.7, E2.29 World Rugby v Hettiarachchi (Board Judicial Committee, 20 February 2017)............. C17.9 World Rugby v Marler (Joe) (Independent Judicial Committee, 5 April 2016)............. B3.56, B3.58 World Rugby v Mikhaltsov (Board Judicial Committee, 2 June 2016).............. C17.3, C17.8; C18.19 World Rugby v Perinchief (Board Judicial Committee, 29 June 2015)............... C4.24; C18.5, C18.12, C18.19, C18.31 World Rugby v Ricco (World Rugby Independent Judicial Committee, 30  March 2017)............................................................................................................ C17.8; C18.6

Table of Cases  cxxxix

para World Rugby v Taylor (Judicial Committee, 16 July 2017)................. C18.12; C21.11; C22.6 World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2001] All ER (D) 50; on appeal [2002] EWCA Civ 196, [2002] All ER (D) 370; resumed [2006] EWHC 184, [2006] All ER (D) 212, [2007] All ER (D) 13......... E2.52 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (C-309/99) [2002] All ER (EC) 193, [2002] ECR I-1577, [2002] 4 CMLR 27, [2002] CEC 250, ECJ................................................................................ A1.67; E11.50, E11.51, E11.102, E11.126, E11.253 Wright v Cheshire CC [1952] 2 All ER 789, [1952] 2 TLR 641, (1952) 116 JP 555, 51 LGR 14, [1952] WN 466, (1952) 96 SJ 747, CA.................................. G1.25, G1.53 Wright v Jockey Club (The Times, 16 June 1995)............... E2.12; E7.64, E7.69, E7.80; E9.5 Wycherley v Queens Park Rangers Football & Athletic Club Ltd [2017] UKET 3347602/2016.................................................................................. F1.48 X X AG v Y ( Federal Tribunal, 20 December 2005, ATF 132 III 389)..... B1.16, B1.53; D2.128, D2.191, D2.192 X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, ECtHR........................................................ H4.54 X v ATP (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2007)........................................................ D2.171 X v Austria 18 DR 155 (1980)........................................................................................ E13.57 X v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal 20 February 2018)....................................... B5.32; D2.192 X v Germany (Application 4653/70) 17 Yearbook 148 (1974)....................................... E13.34 X v IWF (SFT Judgment, 28 February 2018)................................................................. C6.16 X v Netherlands (Application 9322/81) 32 DR 180 (1983)............................................ E13.34 X v Netherlands 16 DR 184 (1979)................................................................................ E13.57 X v Netherlands 32 DR 180 (1983)................................................................................ E13.21 X v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2014/A/3751).................................... C18.27 X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 4 August 2006)............................................. D2.177, D2.192 X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 3 May 2010, 4A_456/2009)......................... D2.178, D2.180 X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 9 February 2009, 4A_400/2008).................................. D2.188 X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 13 April 2010).............................................................. D2.108 X & Church of Scientology v Sweden (Application 7805/77) 16 DR 68 (1979)........... E13.63 X Co v Z Ltd (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 18 February 2016)............................................ D2.52 X SpA v Y Srl (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 8 March 2006)................................................ D2.191 Xuen v OCA (CAS AG/14/03......................................................................................... C6.10 Y YL v Birmingham City Council; L v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95, [2007] 3 WLR 112, [2007] 3 All ER 957, [2007] HRLR 32, [2008] UKHRR 346, [2007] HLR 44, [2008] BLGR 273, (2007) 10 CCL Rep 505, [2007] LS Law Medical 472, (2007) 96 BMLR 1, (2007) 104(27) LSG 29, (2007) 157 NLJ 938, (2007) 151 SJLB 860, [2007] NPC 75, HL.......................... E13.26 YS v Minister voor Immigratie (Case C-141/12)............................................ A4.156, A4.162 YS v Minister voor Immigratie (Case C-371/12)............................................ A4.156, A4.162 Yang v Hamm (CAS 2004/A/704).................................................... D2.139, D2.140, D2.142 Yarrow v United Kingdom (Application 9266/81) 30 DR 155 (1983)........................... E13.73 Yashin v NHL [2000] OTC 681...................................................................................... F3.53 Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation (CAS 2014/A/3516)........ B1.22, B1.23, B1.45, B1.61 Ynysybwl RFC v WRU................................................................................................... D1.44 Young & Woods v West [1980] IRLR 201, CA.............................................................. F1.10 Young (Yang Tae) & Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) v International Gymnastics Federation (CAS 2004/A/704)................................................................................ B3.35 Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3, [2016]  AC  1457, [2016] 2  WLR  509, [2016] 3  All ER  261, [2016] 1 WLUK 488........................................................................................................... E7.82 Z Zakharov v Russia (Application 4743/06) [2015] 12 WLUK 174, (2016) 63 EHRR 17, 39 BHRC 435.......................................................................................................... E13.60

cxl  Table of Cases

para Zahavi v FC Besiktas...................................................................................................... F2.138 Zaripov v IIHF (CAS 2017/A/5280)..................................................................... B1.33; C17.8 Zemliak v Ukranian Athletic Federation & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2018/A/5654)..................................................................................... C6.34; C7.13 Zeturf Ltd v Premier Ministre (C-212/08) [2012] Bus LR 1715, [2011] 3 CMLR 30, ECJ.......................................................................................................................... E12.68 Zielinksi v IWF (CAS 2017/A/5178)............................... C4.17; C17.4, C17.6, C17.8; C20.2 Zina v LOC (CAS OG 18/06)............................................................................... B2.84, B2.96 Zubac v Croatia (Application 40160/12) [2018] 4 WLUK 36, (2018) 67 EHRR 28..... E13.41 Zubkov v Federation Internationale de Natation (CAS 2007/A/1291)........................... B3.98 Zubkov v IOC (CAS 2017/A/5422)................................... B1.12, B1.23, B1.56; C4.13; C5.1, C5.2, C5.5; C7.1, C7.2; C10.1; C13.1; C14.1, C14.2, C14.3 Zulkiffi v BWF; Seang v BWF (CAS 2018/A/5846)............................... B4.22, B4.37, B4.38, B4.41, B4.43, B4.45

PART A

Governance of the Sports Sector

CHAPTER A1

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits Lauren Pagé and Jonathan Taylor QC (both Bird & Bird LLP) Contents para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A1.1 2

THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT........................................ A1.2 A The sports movement’s assertion of independence and autonomy.............. A1.2 B Governmental attitudes to self-regulation by the sports movement............. A1.5 C When does government intervention become improper?............................ A1.11

3

THE PYRAMID MODEL OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE................................. A1.19 A Deriving governance authority from consent............................................... A1.19 B The ‘European model of sport’.................................................................... A1.22 C The North American model of sport............................................................ A1.26

4

THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF AN SGB............................................................................................................... A1.27 A The legislative branch.................................................................................. A1.28 B The executive branch................................................................................... A1.33 C The judicial branch...................................................................................... A1.36

5

EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER MEMBERS.............................................. A1.42 A Admission as a member of an international federation............................... A1.43 B Defining the rights and obligations of members.......................................... A1.49 C Enforcing membership obligations.............................................................. A1.52

6

ADDRESSING UNSANCTIONED EVENTS.................................................... A1.61

1 INTRODUCTION A1.1 An understanding of the sports sector begins with an understanding of who governs that sector. As the rest of this book will explain, it is a very heavily regulated sector, and therefore it is vital for anyone working in that sector to understand where the power to govern and regulate a sport lies, where that power comes from, how it is maintained and exercised, and what are the main constraints on that power. In this opening chapter, therefore, we first explain how national governments generally recognise and support the autonomy of the sports sector, leaving it to private associations (not public agencies) to govern and regulate each sport, subject only to compliance with the general law (Section 2); we then describe the pyramid model of sports governance and regulation, with one international governing body at the top of the pyramid for each sport, responsible for the sport worldwide, and with one national governing body in each country where that sport is played, responsible for the sport in that country (Section 3); we provide a brief overview of how such sports governing bodies (SGBs) exercise legislative, executive, and judicial authority over the sport and its internal affairs (Section 4); we explain how international federations depend on their member national federations to apply and enforce their rules and regulations throughout the sport, which requires discussion of the legal principles governing admission of new members, the enforcement of membership obligations, and the suspension or even expulsion of members who do not comply with those

4  Governance of the Sports Sector

obligations (Section 5); and finally we survey the growing number of cases dealing with efforts by SGBs to address the issues arising from unsanctioned events that fall beyond their regulatory remit (Section 6).

2 THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT A The sports movement’s assertion of independence and autonomy A1.2 The sports movement has always maintained as an article of faith that it best understands the unique characteristics (or ‘specificities’) of sport,1 and therefore knows best how to govern and regulate sport for the benefit of all its stakeholders and the public good, so that it should be allowed to get on with that job without interference from external bodies (in particular governments), and where disputes arise among its stakeholders, they should be left to be resolved internally, by the sport itself.2 For example, when speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in 2013, the IOC president stated: ‘Regardless of where in the world we practise sport, the rules are the same. They are recognised worldwide. They are based on a common “global ethic” of fair play, tolerance and friendship. But to apply this “universal law” worldwide and spread our values globally, sport has to enjoy responsible autonomy. Politics must respect this sporting autonomy. For only then can sport organisations implement these universal values amidst all the differing laws, customs and traditions. Responsible autonomy does not mean that sport should operate in a law-free environment. It does mean that we respect national laws which are not targeted against sport and its organisations alone, sometimes for chiefly political reasons’.3 1 See European Commission White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 final, 11 July 2007. The Commission recognised that ‘sport has certain specific characteristics, which are often referred to as the ‘specificity of sport.’ According to the Commission, the specificity of European sport can be approached through two prisms: (1) the specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules, such as separate competitions for men and women, limitations on the number of participants in competitions, or the need to ensure uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance between clubs taking part in the same competitions; and (2) the specificity of the sport structure, including notably the autonomy and diversity of sport organisations, a pyramid structure of competitions from grassroots to elite level and organised solidarity mechanisms between the different levels and operators, the organisation of sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single federation per sport. Similarly, in 2011 the Commission told the European Parliament: ‘The specificity of sport includes ‘all the characteristics that make sport special, such as for instance the interdependence between competing adversaries or the pyramid structure of open competitions’. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Developing the European Dimension in Sport’, Brussels, 18 January 2011, COM (2011) 12 final, pp 10–11. 2 This tenet is set out as one of the ‘Fundamental Principles of Olympism’ at the beginning of the Olympic Charter: ‘Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality. They have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied’. See also IOC Press Release, ‘Historic Milestone: United Nations Recognises Autonomy of Sport’ (3 November 2014). 3 Quoted in Transparency International, ‘Autonomy and governance: necessary bedfellows in the fight against corruption in sport’ (undated).

A1.3 Accordingly, the Olympic Charter proclaims the IOC’s mission ‘to protect [the Olympic Movement’s] independence, to maintain and promote its political neutrality and to preserve the autonomy of sport’.1 The Charter emphasises the ‘independence and autonomy [of each international federation] in the governance of its sport’,2 and requires National Olympic Committees to ‘preserve their autonomy

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  5

and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter’.3 1 Rule 2.5 of the Olympic Charter. 2 Ibid, Rule 25. 3 Ibid, Rule 27.6.

A1.4 Following this lead, international federations usually include broad statements in their constitutions that assert their independence and autonomy, and mandate that they and their members must manage their affairs independently, without improper influence by third parties, in particular in relation to the election of its officeholders.1 And the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has accepted the importance and legitimacy of that principle.2 1 See eg  International Biathlon Union (IBU) Constitution (October 2019) Art 2.1.10 (one of the fundamental purposes of the IBU is to ‘protect the right of the IBU (internationally) and its NF Members (nationally) to govern, regulate and administer the sport independently and autonomously, including by conducting democratic elections that are free from any outside influence to elect office-holders’) and Art 7.1.7 (requiring each member national federation ‘to manage its affairs autonomously and without interference from bodies outside the Olympic Movement’); International Cricket Council (ICC) Memorandum of Association (June 2017), Art 5(D) (one of the ICC’s objectives is ‘to protect the independence and autonomy of the ICC and its Members to govern and regulate Cricket’), and ICC Articles of Association (June 2017), Art 2.4(D) (requiring each member federation to ‘manage its affairs autonomously and ensure that there is no government (or other public or quasi-public body) interference in its governance, regulation and/or administration of Cricket in its Cricket Playing Country (including in operational matters, in the selection and management of teams, and in the appointment of coaches or support personnel)’); FIFA Statutes (June 2019), Arts 14.1(i) (requiring member federations ‘to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties in accordance with art 19 of these Statutes’) and Art 19 (‘1. Each member association shall manage its affairs independently and without undue influence from third parties. 2. A member association’s bodies shall be either elected or appointed in that association. A member association’s statutes shall provide for a democratic procedure that guarantees the complete independence of the election or appointment. 3. Any member association’s bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with the provisions of par. 2, even on an interim basis, shall not be recognised by FIFA. 4. Decisions passed by bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with par. 2 shall not be recognised by FIFA’); and Union Cycliste International (UCI) Constitution (July 2019), Art 7.6 (‘The national federations must manage their internal affairs with total independence and ensure that no third party interferes in their operations. They must remain autonomous and resist all political, religious and financial pressure which may infringe their commitment to abide by the Constitution of the UCI. Any external form of interference or attempt to interfere must be reported to the UCI’). 2 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.60 (‘the undue interference by governments into the governance of national federations is a serious concern which contravenes a fundamental FIFA principle. The protection of independence and autonomy is a cornerstone of FIFA’s Statutes and values as an organisation which aims to promote the sport of football without political influences’).

B Governmental attitudes to self-regulation by the sports movement A1.5 The governments of some countries (for example, many southern and eastern European states) adopt an interventionist approach to the regulation of the sports sector, based on the premise that sporting activity is a public good and therefore a public service responsibility of the state, with sports organisations being licensed and funded by the government in order to fulfil that responsibility as agents of the state: ‘The state has a central role [in sport] in such countries. It endows sports federations with their right to exercise regulatory and disciplinary functions. These are thus public powers which are only delegated to federations as long as they comply with criteria of independence, legality and democracy. The powers can be withdrawn if these criteria are not met or the powers are abused. It is argued that interventionist

6  Governance of the Sports Sector sports policies produce uniform regulation, better governance, greater public accountability and prevent alternative governing bodies proliferating’.1 1 Foster, ‘Can Sport Be Regulated By Europe? An Analysis of Alternative Models’ in Caigner & Gardiner (Eds), Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-Regulation (TMC Asser Press, 2000) at p 62.

A1.6 In France, for example, in accordance with the Code du Sport, the French Ministry of Sport recognises one national governing body for each sport, and confers on that body the exclusive right to organise events, license participants in its sport in France, and set the technical rules of the relevant sport, under delegated authority from the Ministry.1 In other words, the recognised SGB effectively functions by licence from (and as an organ of) the state, and is accountable to the Ministry of Sport. 1 See Art L111-1. The Ministry is also responsible for (among other things) the promotion of sport to all age groups, and for the management and supervision of government grants to sports.

A1.7 This has significant ‘constitutional’ consequences for those active in the sports sector. For example, as a quasi-public body exercising delegated sovereign powers, a French SGB may not recognise and give effect in France to disciplinary sanctions handed down by the international federation of that sport if the disciplinary procedures followed by the sanctioning body are deemed to fall short of the standards required of French sports bodies under the Code du Sport. Any French body that proposes to recognise such sanction can be challenged for acting ultra vires, ie beyond the scope of its delegated public powers, and ultimately risks being ‘de-recognised’, ie stripped of its constitutional authority to govern its sport in France. This can lead to very difficult practical issues, as the rulebooks of most international federations will require automatic recognition and enforcement by all of its members of disciplinary sanctions imposed by any other members or authority.1 It also means the government has very significant influence over the sports sector, as the SGB depends on it not only for funding but also for its very authority to govern its sport.2 1 See paras D2.12–D2.16 and D3.6. For example, in 2010 French rugby union player David Attoub was banned by a European Rugby Cup Disciplinary Committee for 70 weeks for eye-gouging an opponent in a Heineken Cup match, but challenged that sanction before the French authorities, arguing that it did not comply with French law, and saw his domestic ban reduced to 52 weeks. See, ‘David Attoub’s reduced ban leaves him free to play in December’, Guardian 11 June 2010 (theguardian.com/ sport/2010/jun/11/david-attoub-reduced-ban [accessed 23 September 2020]). 2 Foster, ‘Can Sport Be Regulated By Europe? An Analysis of Alternative Models’ in Caigner & Gardiner (Eds), Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-Regulation (TMC Asser Press, 2000) at p 62 (‘Where state intervention is reinforced with state funding, the threat of de-recognition is a powerful tool for the state’).

A1.8 In most countries, however, including the UK and many other northern and western European states, governments have traditionally taken a non-interventionist approach to sport, regarding the provision of sport not as a public service responsibility of the government, but rather a matter for the private, voluntary sector to address, with general encouragement from government.1 As a result, in such countries typically no general ‘law of sport’ is enacted to regulate activity in the sector. Rather, the sport sector has historically been left entirely alone not only to organise and manage itself, but also to regulate the entire conduct and administration of the sport, including in areas of important public interest such as safeguarding,2 anti-corruption,3 and anti-doping.4 Legislation or other intervention is generally countenanced only as a measure of last resort, in response to a pressing public interest requirement that a sport cannot or will not meet by its own regulatory measures.5 1 See generally Chapter A3 (Government Intervention in the Sports Sector) and Foster, ‘How Can Sport Be Regulated?’ in Greenfield & Osborn (Eds) Law & Sport in Contemporary Society (Frank Cass, 2000), pp 267–282.

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  7

2 3 4 5

For example, the historical attitude of respective UK governments has been that sport ‘generally presented a complex of problems out of which government was not wholly free to opt’: Lord Hailsham, The Door Wherein I Went, p 207. In his foreword to the Labour administration’s 2001 sports strategy paper, ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’ (DCMS PP374, March 2001), Prime Minister Tony Blair was emphatic: ‘The Government does not and should not run sport’. One member of the Parliamentary Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, when faced with the suggestion that the Minister for Sport should exercise more executive authority, said: ‘I think the only thing which would be worse than hordes of old buffers [running sport] would be government ministers’: Minutes of Evidence before the Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, 1998. Additionally, in a speech in May 2007, David Cameron (then opposition leader) said: ‘I believe that football shouldn’t need government intervention. National governing bodies should be empowered to deliver in their areas with the government there to help and advise with intervention only required in extreme situations. You shouldn’t nationalise the running of sport through government. You provide funding and trust it to run itself. Government is about devolving power and responsibility, not controlling everything from its centre’. Sport Industry Lecture, 23 May 2007. See further para A3.37 et seq. See eg Joint UK Government/Sports Councils’ Response to Commission Consultation Paper, The European Model of Sport (DCMS May 1999) (‘In the UK at least the governing bodies are autonomous bodies set up and run by their members and it is not for the Government, or [European] community institutions, to decide whether they should be retained, combined with others, or abolished’); and the ‘Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies’ annexed (as Annex IV) to the Nice European Council Presidency Conclusions (December 2000), at paras 7-9 (Role of sports federations), available on the Commission’s website: europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm [accessed 23  September 2020] (‘The European Council stresses its support for the independence of sports organisations and their right to organise themselves through appropriate associative structures. It recognises that, with due regard for national and Community legislation and on the basis of a democratic and transparent method of operation, it is the task of sporting organisations to organise and promote their particular sports […]. It notes that sports federations have a central role in ensuring the essential solidarity between the various levels of sporting practice, from recreational to top-level sport, which co-exist there; they provide the possibility of access to sports for the public at large, human and financial support for amateur sports, promotion of equal access to every level of sporting activity for men and women alike, youth training, health protection and measures to combat doping, acts of violence and racist or xenophobic occurrences. These social functions entail special responsibilities for federations and provide the basis for the recognition of their competence in organising competitions’). See Chapter B6 (Safeguarding) See Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption). See Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement). See further para A3.62 et seq.

A1.9 This laissez-faire approach is reflected in the national laws of such countries. While SGBs have to respect the law, just like everybody else, courts are generally loathe to interfere and second-guess an SGB’s actions, and therefore afford the SGB a ‘wide margin of appreciation’ in governing its affairs,1 including in making rules for the sport,2 resolving membership issues,3 and determining to what extent it is necessary and proportionate for its rules to restrict the rights and freedoms that participants in the sport otherwise enjoy under national law.4 1 See generally Chapter B1 (Drafting Effective Regulations: The Legal Framework), Section 2 (‘The Autonomy Afforded to an SGB to Regulate Its Sport’). 2 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 73 (‘The starting point is that sports governing bodies know what is best for their sport. The law’s intervention therefore is consciously restrained’); Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 149 (‘[…] the FEI as a sporting association is afforded a wide margin of appreciation in making rules to regulate the conduct of its members. While this principle does not prevent a judicial or arbitral tribunal charged with examining the rules to determine whether they constitute an infringement of fundamental rights, it serves to emphasise that a sporting association will generally be in the best position to assess the rules which are required to address issues arising in the sport which it runs’); Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 117 (‘this Panel’s duty is not that of rewriting a federation’s rules. The rule-making power, and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking into account also the overall legislative framework. The duty of this Panel is to ensure that such an exercise does not conflict with the rules that govern it and not to alter the content (whether by way of interpretation or other form of ‘manipulation’) of existing rules transforming them into something different’); Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para  143 (‘One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue

8  Governance of the Sports Sector their own rules relating to their governance, their membership and their own competitions’); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 55 (‘Recognized by the Swiss federal constitution and anchored in the Swiss law of private associations is the principle of autonomy, which provides an association with a very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The right to regulate and to determine its own affairs is considered essential for an association and is at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue rules relating to their own governance, their membership and their own competitions’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17 (‘Like any other human or social activity, there cannot be any sports activity outside the framework of State law. Depending on the various political and legal systems in the world, States grant to sports organizations and governing bodies a certain degree of autonomy and allow them to establish, within the framework of State law, their own sports laws and rules’). 3 For example, Art 23 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation states: ‘Freedom of association is guaranteed. Every person has the right to form, join or belong to an association and to participate in the activities of an association. No person may be compelled to join or to belong to an association’. According to the CAS panel in Indian Hockey Federation v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 139, ‘[t]he contents of this constitutional right are designed to protect the association – within certain boundaries – from all kinds of state interference (including interference by state courts with the association life (CAS 2010/A/2083, at 61; CAS 2010/A/386, at 5.3.4)’. The broad autonomy of SGBs when it comes to admitting new members is discussed further at para A1.44. 4 Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 55 (‘[…] significant deference should be afforded to a sporting body’s expertise and authority to determine the minimum level of sanction required to achieve its strategic imperatives’); FIFA & WADA, CAS  2005/C/976 & 986, para  142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’) and para 125 (‘In a different context, this wide discretion is referred to as ‘the margin of appreciation’’); Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216, Richards J, para 43 (‘The test of proportionality requires the striking of a balance between competing considerations. The application of the test in the context of penalty will not necessarily produce just one right answer: there is no single “correct” decision. Different decisionmakers may come up with different answers, all of them reached in an entirely proper application of the test. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised that, in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular, whether it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of discretion. The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of judgment. Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range of reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests. The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate. The court’s role, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, is to determine whether the decision reached falls within the limits of the decision-maker’s discretionary area of judgment. If it does, the penalty is lawful; if it does not, the penalty is unlawful. It is not the role of the court to stand in the shoes of the primary decision-maker, strike the balance for itself and determine on that basis what it considers the right penalty to be’), affirmed on appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056; Chambers v BOA [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB) (‘[…] though the court must not shrink from exercising a supervisory power which it has if it affects the claimant’s right to work […], the BOA, if acting honestly and not capriciously and within its powers, is and must be a body better fitted to judge what was needed than me, or any court’).

A1.10 In recent years, however, this traditional non-interventionist model has come under more and more pressure. This is partly because: (a)

sport has such enormous social, cultural, and economic importance in modern society;1 (b) politicians have come to understand the power of sport as an instrument for achieving public policy imperatives;2 and (c) SGBs have had to turn to government for assistance in addressing issues that are beyond their jurisdiction and/or competence to control (from public order issues like hooliganism and ticket touting, to integrity issues such as doping and match-fixing).3 These factors have led to increasing levels of cooperation and partnership between the UK government and SGBs and increasing levels of public funding and other support for the SGBs’ activities. But that in turn has led to a demand that if SGBs are to be publicly funded partners in the delivery of public policy goals, they must stand up to scrutiny in their standards of governance, transparency, and accountability, a demand

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  9

that has only been heightened in the wake of the string of high profile scandals that have exposed incompetence and corruption in many (mainly international) SGBs.4 This demand is satisfied by placing strict conditions on the receipt of public funding and other benefits. For example, to be eligible for recognition and public funding, SGBs in the UK have to comply with the Code of Sports Governance issued by UK  Sport and the home country Sports Councils (which are government-funded agencies),5 and they also have to comply with the National Anti-Doping Policy.6 1 See para A3.5. For example, like many other countries, the UK has ‘listed events’ legislation that operates to protect free-to-view access to the coverage of sports events that have ‘a special national resonance […]; […] an event which serves to unite the nation; a shared point on the national calendar’ (see para A3.83 et seq). 2 See para A3.16. 3 In relation to public order issues, see para A3.66 et seq. In relation to ticket touting, see para A3.69. In relation to doping, see para A3.117. 4 Examples include IOC members selling their votes for the hosting of the 2002 Olympic Games in Salt Lake City (nytimes.com/2000/07/21/sports/olympics-leaders-of-salt-lake-olympic-bid-are-indictedin-bribery-scandal.html, 21  July 2000 [accessed 23  September 2020]); FIFA  Executive Committee members and CONMEBOL executives selling their votes for hosting of events and acceptance of commercial contracts (justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeeringconspiracy-and-corruption, 3  December 2015 [accessed 23  September 2020]); the IAAF  President accepting bribes to bury Russian doping cases before the 2012 Olympic Games (wada-ama.org/en/ resources/world-anti-doping-program/independent-commission-report-2, 14 January 2016 [accessed 23 September 2020]); and the IWF President running the sport of weight-lifting corruptly for several decades (mclarenweightliftingenquiry.com/wp-content/themes/mclarenweightlifitingenquiry/assets/ CORRECTED-300720-FULL-REPORT-MASTER-FINAL-FOR-PUBLICATION-v2.pdf, 4  June 2020 [accessed 23 September 2020]). See also para A5.3. 5 See para A3.37. 6 See para A3.121.

C When does government intervention become improper? A1.11 Against this background, it is not an easy task to determine what should be accepted as appropriate intervention by a government in the practice of sport within its territory, and what is ‘improper’ interference or ‘undue’ influence. Where is the line to be drawn? A1.12 The sports movement recognises that it needs government support in certain areas, because there are certain threats that it cannot protect sport from on its own. For example, in 2006 the IOC acknowledged that ‘Governments are needed to fight doping issues (WADA), corruption, illegal betting, money laundering, trafficking of young athletes, racism and other forms of discrimination’.1 And SGBs are always willing recipients of public funding. But once the help of governments is requested in this way, it becomes very hard to resist governmental demands that as a quid pro quo SGBs observe minimum standards of governance and integrity themselves. For example, no one has ever seriously run an argument that the UK Government’s conditioning of public funding and support on SGB compliance with the governmentsponsored Code of Sports Governance, equality standards, or the National Anti-Doping Policy, constitutes improper government interference in the autonomy of the sports movement. On the contrary, the IOC itself has recognised that ‘governments invest in sport and have a natural and justified position wanting to control their investments and the use of funds from the national lottery, for which in turn they are accountable to electors and parliaments’.2 And while Article 7.6 of the UCI Constitution states emphatically that ‘the national federations must manage their internal affairs with total independence and ensure that no third party interferes in their operations’, the comment to that Article states: ‘This provision does not prevent, for instance, the government from controlling the appropriate use of allowances granted to a national federation […]’.3

10  Governance of the Sports Sector 1 Resolutions of the First Seminar on the Autonomy of the Olympic and Sports Movement, IOC, 2006. 2 Ibid. 3 UCI Constitution (July 2019) Art 7.6. The comment continues: ‘but under no circumstances should the government interfere with the strategy or the operations of the national federation’.

A1.13 It is telling, in this respect, that principle number 7 of the IOC’s Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement1 asserts that the sports movement and governments have ‘complementary missions’, and therefore emphasises the importance of ‘cooperation, coordination, and consultation’: 7.1 Cooperation, coordination and consultation (‘Sporting organisations should coordinate their actions with governments; Cooperation with governments is an essential element in the framework of sporting activities; Cooperation, coordination and consultation are the best way for sporting organisations to preserve their autonomy’); 7.2 Complementary missions (‘Governments, constituents of the Olympic Movement, other sports organisations and stakeholders have a complementary mission and should work together towards the same goals’); 7.3 Maintain and preserve the autonomy of sport (‘The right balance between governments, the Olympic Movement and sporting organisations should be ensured’). 1 Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement, Seminar on Autonomy of Olympic and Sport Movement, February 2008.

A1.14 In fact, external authorities have made clear,1 and the sports movement well understands that there will be further encroachment on the autonomy of sport if it fails to improve governance standards. As the IOC noted during the Olympic Congress in October 2009, ‘the legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement depends on upholding the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. All members of the Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard, the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement, as proposed by the IOC[…]’.2 The issue of good sports governance has therefore assumed great importance, and as a result this edition of the book includes a whole chapter of this book is dedicated to the subject.3 1 See eg European Commission, White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 final (11 July 2007), p.13 (‘The Commission acknowledges the autonomy of sporting organisations and representative structures (such as leagues). Furthermore, it recognises that governance is mainly the responsibility of sports governing bodies and, to some extent, the Member States and social partners. Nonetheless, dialogue with sports organisations has brought a number of areas to the Commission’s attention. […] The Commission considers that most challenges can be addressed through self-regulation respectful of good governance principles, provided that EU law is respected, and is ready to play a facilitating role or take action if necessary’). It followed this up in September 2013, stating: ‘The autonomy of sports bodies is now more susceptible than ever before. Interventions from the courts, national governments or regulators, commercial interests or European institutions are more likely. Indeed, in its 2011 Communication “Developing the European Dimension in Sport” the European Commission developed its position beyond that of previous comments confirming good governance is a condition for the autonomy and self-regulation of sport organisations’ (ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/policy_documents/xg-gg201307-dlvrbl2-sept2013.pdf [accessed 17 November 2020]). Similarly, in its September 2013 report the expert group on good governance established by the European Council as part of its European Union Work Plan for Sport for 2014–2017 said that ‘sports bodies that do not have in place good governance procedures and practices can expect their autonomy and self-regulatory practice to be curtailed’. However, it later added that ‘autonomous self-regulation by the sport movement remains the best option and is consistent with the structure of the international sport movement’ (European Commission, Expert Group “Good Governance” Deliverable 2 report (September 2013), pp. 3. 15). 2 Recommendation 41, Olympic Congress, Copenhagen, 2009. 3 Chapter A5 (Best Practice in Sports Governance).

A1.15 Where the sports movement appears to draw the line is when the government inserts its officials into the leadership of a national federation,1 or interferes with the

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  11

federation’s strategy or operations. The IOC has noted the following examples with disapproval:2 ‘Interventions have been witnessed through national legislation processes or in electoral proceedings, appointment of officials, appointment of referees, recognition of sporting results, (selective) financing mechanisms, splitting of National Federations or the creation of parallel structures aimed at positioning friendly voices and/or influencing voting in National Olympic Committees, the creation of separate (controlled) appeal bodies, (forced) bankruptcies, denigration campaigns, imprisonment and visa refusals for athletes or officials’. 1 There is obvious cause for concern on this front. A 2017 survey of National Olympic Committees (NOCs) showed that at least one in seven NOCs have leaders with formal ties to their governments. See Play the Game survey ‘Autonomy in National Olympic Committees 2017 – an autonomy index’, by Mads A Wickstrom and Sine Alvad (June 2017) (‘Of the 205 NOCs surveyed, 30 are led by a president and/or secretary general (26 presidents and 8 secretary generals) with formal ties to government institutions. […] Of the five regional confederations, the Asian OCA [Olympic Council of Asia] holds the largest relative proportion (36.4%) of government-connected NOC leaders followed by Oceania (11.8%) and Europe (10%). A great number of NOC leaders hold a position as minister of either tourism and/or sport. Furthermore, especially in Asia, a considerable number of NOC leaders belong to the ruling or highly politically influential royal family’). 2 Resolutions of the First Seminar on the Autonomy of the Olympic and Sports Movement, IOC, 2006.

A1.16 Rule 27.9 of the Olympic Charter provides that: ‘the IOC  Executive Board may take any appropriate decisions for the protection of the Olympic Movement in the country of an NOC, including suspension of or withdrawal of recognition from such NOC if the constitution, law or other regulations in force in the country concerned, or any act by any governmental or other body causes the activity of the NOC or the making or expression of its will to be hampered.’

The cases where the IOC has exercised that power reflect what it considers to be improper interference with the autonomy of the sport movement: (a) In January 2010, the IOC suspended the Kuwait Olympic Committee (KOC) after the Kuwaiti legislature adopted a law that permitted the state to interfere in the elections of officers of sport federations. The KOC was barred from receiving IOC funding and its athletes and officials were banned from participating in Olympic Games and Olympic meetings until the interference was removed. The IOC lifted the suspension in December 2012 after guarantees were received from the Kuwaiti government that the KOC and its national federations would be permitted to operate in full compliance with the Olympic Charter and the rules of the international federations.1 (b) In 2011 the IOC objected to the Indian Sports Ministry’s attempts to require national sports federations in India to incorporate specific age and tenure requirements for officials into their constitutions, stating: ‘The [Indian] government authorities may make suggestions and recommendations to assist sports organizations in their internal matters and internal governance, if need be, however, [they] cannot force them (by law) to adopt standard mandatory provisions. […] All internal operations and procedures in force within the NOC (and the NSFs) including in particular the membership, eligibility conditions for members, decision-making mechanisms, election procedures, eligibility conditions for officers and office-bearers, etc. must be determined exclusively by these sports organisations’.

When the Indian Sports Ministry pressed ahead with its demands, in December 2012 the IOC Executive Board suspended the Indian Olympic Association’s membership of the Olympic Movement, meaning that it was barred from receiving IOC funding and its athletes and officials were banned from participating in Olympic Games and Olympic meetings. The IOC lifted the

12  Governance of the Sports Sector

(c)

(d)

suspension on 7 February 2014 following confirmation by an IOC representative that the elections for a new board of the Indian Olympic Association had been held properly and without government interference.2 In 2015, legislation was passed in Kuwait that gave the Kuwaiti Sports Ministry the power to take control of national sporting bodies and the ability to control financial matters. Using that power, the Kuwaiti Sports Ministry disbanded the Kuwait NOC and nine national sporting bodies based on supposed financial irregularities, and set up interim committees to run those sports. In response in October 2015 the IOC again suspended the Kuwait Olympic Committee. It provisionally lifted the suspension only in August 2018, based on revisions to the law and an agreement to establish a process for free elections of the officers of all sports organisations in Kuwait, and lifted the suspension completely in July 2019 after the successful implementation of a roadmap established under the supervision of an IOC supervisory committee.3 In 2019, the IOC issued a warning to the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) after the Italian Parliament approved a law that would set up a separate governmentcontrolled organisation (Sport e Salute) to distribute funds to the country’s national federations, reducing CONI’s role to only handling preparation for the Olympic Games (reducing its budget by around £353 million). In its warning letter, the IOC emphasised CONI’s autonomous responsibility in the determination and control of the rules of sport, the definition of the structure of and the governance of their organisations.4

1 See IOC press releases dated 4 January 2010 (olympic.org/news/the-ioc-suspends-the-noc-of-kuwait [accessed 23  September 2020]) and 4  December 2012 (olympic.org/news/final-executive-boardmeeting-of-2012-gets-under-way-in-lausanne). 2 See ‘Govt can’t infringe IOA autonomy through legislation: IOC’, Times of India, 11  June 2011 (timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/more-sports/others/Govt-cant-infringe-IOA-autonomy-throughlegislation-IOC/articleshow/8814994.cms [accessed 23  September 2020]); and IOC press releases dated 4  December 2012 (olympic.org/news/final-executive-board-meeting-of-2012-gets-under-wayin-lausanne/184870 [accessed 23  September 2020] and 11  February 2014 (olympic.org/news/iocexecutive-board-lifts-suspension-of-noc-of-india [accessed 23 September 2020]). 3 See IOC press releases dated 27 October 2015 (olympic.org/news/suspension-of-the-kuwait-olympiccommittee [accessed 23 September 2020]), 2 June 2016 (olympic.org/news/executive-board-wrapsup-day-2-of-meetings-with-reports-from-organising-committees [accessed 23  September 2020]), and 5  July 2019 (olympic.org/news/ioc-lifts-suspension-of-kuwait-olympic-committee [accessed 23  September 2020]). The IOC  Executive Board did permit certain athletes from Kuwait to take part in the 2016 Olympic Games as independent Olympic athletes under the IOC flag. However, the Kuwaiti athletes did not have any right to participate; rather, this was an act of mercy by the IOC. See also ‘Governmental interference in global sport – Why Kuwait is still in the Olympic wilderness’ LawInSport (15  June 2018) (lawinsport.com/topics/item/governmental-interference-in-global-sportwhy-kuwait-is-still-in-the-olympic-wilderness#sdfootnote6sym [accessed 23 September 2020]). 4 See Inside the Games article dated 7 August 2019,’IOC issues stern warning to CONI over potential Olympic Charter breaches’ (insidethegames.biz/articles/1083142/ioc-warning-for-coni [accessed 23 September 2020]).

A1.17 The Fédération Internationale de Football (FIFA), the international governing body for football, has also not hesitated to suspend its member national federations when it considers that their independence has been compromised by government interference. Since that suspension means that neither the national federation’s clubs nor its national representative teams may play in international competitions, compliance with FIFA’s demands tends to be swift. For example: (a)

In July 2006, FIFA suspended the Greek Football Federation when (despite of repeated warnings from both FIFA and UEFA) the Greek government failed to amend a national law on sport to recognise that football matters could be decided only by the Greek Football Federation and its subordinated football structures (a requirement for the federation to comply with the FIFA Statutes and relevant UEFA regulations). The suspension was lifted a week later, after the legislation was amended to recognise the independence of the federation.1

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  13

(b) In October 2006, FIFA suspended the Kenyan Football Federation (KFF) for ‘repeated government interference in local football affairs’, after the Kenyan government intervened to address alleged malfeasance within the KFF by appointing a committee to take over the running of the game. The suspension was lifted in March 2007 after the KFF resolved in general meeting to dissolve itself and transfer its powers to a new governing body, Football Kenya Limited, which had the support (but not the involvement) of the Kenyan Government.2 (c) In May 2008, FIFA suspended the Iraqi Football Association (IFA) after the Iraqi government dissolved the Iraqi Olympic Committee and all national sports federations. FIFA lifted the ban after the Iraqi government excluded the IFA from dissolution. However, less than a year later, in November 2009, the IFA was suspended again after the Iraqi Olympic Committee moved to disband it. FIFA lifted the suspension a few months later on the basis that the ‘National Olympic Committee of Iraq had withdrawn the dissolution of the IFA and that the latter had its full authority restored’.3 (d) In November 2008, FIFA suspended the Peruvian FA following the Peruvian Government’s refusal to recognise its national election results. Peru had earlier been stripped of the right to host the South American U20 championship due to the dispute.4 (e) In June 2011, FIFA suspended the Belize Football Federation following the announcement by the Ministry of Sports that the federation was not authorised to represent Belize as it had failed to meet the requirements for registration with the national sports council. FIFA provisionally lifted the suspension less than a month later based on ‘some positive developments’ in the matter, but said that the suspension would be reinstated in August that year if the federation was not able to ‘definitively settle the issues at stake with the authorities’. It appears the issues were resolved, as the suspension was not reinstated.5 (f) In July 2013, FIFA suspended the Cameroonian Football Association (FECAFOOT), following government interference with the elections of its officers, and set up a FIFA normalisation committee to oversee new elections. FIFA lifted the suspension less than three weeks later, after the Cameroonian authorities allowed the new committee to enter the FECAFOOT headquarters and to carry out its activities unhindered.6 (g) In July 2014, FIFA suspended the Nigeria Football Association in response to a court order preventing its officers from running Nigerian football and requiring the Minister of Sports to appoint a member of the civil service to manage the association pending a hearing. FIFA lifted the suspension just over a week later after the court proceedings and order were withdrawn.7 (h) In June 2015, FIFA suspended the Indonesian Football Association and disqualified it from the 2018 World Cup and 2019 Asian Cup qualifiers following the takeover of its activities by the Indonesian Sports and Youth Ministry, which had attempted to prevent certain teams from participating in the domestic league, and had set up another body to replace it. FIFA lifted the suspension almost a year later after the Indonesian Government agreed to lift the decree in question.8 (i) In October 2015, FIFA suspended the Kuwait Football Association (KFA) after the Kuwait Government failed to withdraw new legislation that gave the Kuwaiti Sports Ministry the power to interfere with the independence national sporting bodies, including the KFA. The suspension meant that the Kuwait team could no longer compete in the FIFA World Cup qualifying tournament. In a detailed and instructive award, CAS rejected a challenge to that suspension, finding that the Kuwaiti law did interfere with the independence of the KFA, in breach of the requirements of the FIFA  Statutes, and that the suspension of the KFA was a necessary and proportionate sanction for that breach.9 The

14  Governance of the Sports Sector

suspension was lifted in December 2017 after the Kuwait Parliament adopted a law that excluded government interference in the sport.10 (j) In March 2017, FIFA suspended the Malian Football Association (FEMAFOOT) after the Mali Sports Minister dissolved the executive committee of FEMAFOOT and appointed a provisional committee to run the federation and to set up elections within 12 months. FIFA lifted the suspension the next month after FEMAFOOT provided a copy of the decision of the Malian Sports Minister annulling the initial decision to dissolve the executive committee.11 (k) In July 2017, FIFA suspended the Sudan Football Federation (SFF) when the SFF  President and board of directors were removed from post by decree of the Sudanese Government. FIFA lifted the suspension a week later following confirmation that the Prime Minister of Sudan had issued a resolution suspending the offending decree.12 (l) In October 2017, FIFA suspended the Pakistan Football Federation (PFF) when the PFF’s offices in Karachi were put under the control of a court-appointed administrator. FIFA lifted the suspension in March 2018 after the PFF regained control of its offices and accounts.13 (m) In October 2018, FIFA suspended the Sierra Leone Football Association (SLFA) after the SLFA President and General Secretary were removed from post during a criminal investigation into corruption charges. FIFA demanded that the SLFA and its recognised leadership confirm to FIFA that the SLFA administration, premises, accounts and communication channels were under their control once again. FIFA lifted the suspension in June 2019 after the SLFA  President and General Secretary returned to their posts after being acquitted of all corruption charges.14 FIFA has also issued a number of warnings to member federations in relation to government interference.15  1 See FIFA press releases dated 3  July 2006 (fifa.com/news/fifa-suspends-the-hellenic-footballfederation-104401 [accessed 23  September 2020]) and 12  July 2006 (fifa.com/news/fifa-liftssuspension-hellenic-football-federation-104439 [accessed 23 September 2020]).   2 See FIFA press releases dated 25 October 2006 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-the-kenyafootball-federation-106935 [accessed 23  September 2020]) and 9  March 2007 (fifa.com/who-weare/news/fifa-lifts-suspension-kenya-football-federation-112991 [accessed 23  September 2020]). In Kenya Football Federation v FIFA, CAS 2008/O/1808, dissident officials of the KFF appealed to the CAS, seeking an order that FIFA had not validly expelled the KFF, and that there had been no legal succession from FFF to FKL. The CAS ruled that FIFA had been right not to apply the expulsion provisions in its statutes, as it had not been necessary for it to do so. It was sufficient for FIFA to accept the binding decisions taken by the bodies governing football in Kenya to change the legal vehicle of the national federation, particularly since the dissidents now before the CAS had not challenged the decision of the KFF General Assembly to form a new governing body.  3 See CNN, ‘Iraq banned from international football’, 21  November 2009 (edition.cnn.com/2009/ SPORT/football/11/21/iraq.fifa/index.html [accessed 23  September 2020]) and FIFA press release dated 19  March 2010 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-executive-committee-approves-specialfunding-for-chile-and-haiti-1183198 [accessed 23 September 2020])  4 See FIFA press release dated 25  November 2008 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-theperuvian-959151 [accessed 23 September 2020]).  5 See FIFA press releases dated 17  June 2011 (fifa.com/worldcup/news/suspension-the-footballfederation-belize-1454212 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 7 July 2011 (fifa.com/worldcup/news/ suspension-the-football-federation-belize-provisionally-lifted-1470955 [accessed 23 September 2020]).   6 See FIFA press releases dated 4 July 2013 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-the-cameroonianfootball-association-2132047 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 22 July 2013 (fifa.com/who-we-are/ news/cameroonian-football-association-suspension-lifted-2139105 [accessed 23 September 2020]).   7 See FIFA press releases dated 9  July 2014 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/keep-pending-fifa-emergencycommittee-suspends-nigeria-football-federa-2402265 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 18 July 2014 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-of-the-nigeria-football-federation-lifted-2406572 [accessed 23 September 2020]). See also Nigerian Football Federation v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3744 & 3766, where the CAS panel held that FIFA legitimately declined to recognise the results of the elections of officers of the Nigeria FA.   8 See FIFA press release dated 3  June 2015 (fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=6/news=indonesiadisqualified-from-2018-fifa-world-cup-russia-and-afc-asian-c-2617809.html [accessed 23 September

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  15 2020]) and BBC article ‘Fifa ends Indonesia’s suspension from football after almost a year’ dated 14 May 2016 (bbc.co.uk/sport/football/36292992 [accessed 23 September 2020]).  9 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241. The CAS panel found that ‘FIFA, as an association under Swiss law, enjoys substantial autonomy under Article 63(1) of the SCC [Swiss Civil Code]. It is empowered to require its members to manage their affairs independently and without third party interference’ (para 8.13); and that ‘the FIFA Statutes provide clear requirements which its members must comply with. Such requirements include respecting the principles of independence and autonomy […]. Certain legal provisions found in the new Kuwaiti sports laws 117/2014 and 25/2015 contravene the FIFA  Statutes. Specifically, the KFA, which is obliged to implement the laws of Kuwait, finds itself in breach of its obligations as a member of FIFA. This is sufficient to justify the suspension of KFA’ (paras 8.48–8.50). The legal provisions that were held to cross the line included provisions that the Public Authority for Youth and Sport (PAYS) could form a neutral committee to attend the meetings of the general assembly of the sports body ‘to investigate the validity of its meeting and voting measures’ (because this compromised the independence of the sports body and could lead to interference with the actions of those participating in the meeting) (para 8.17); that the PAYS could require the sports body to call a general meeting or face interruption of government support (para 8.32); and that a member of the sports body that paid its membership fee had a right to attend the general assembly (para 8.46: ‘This subsection substantively alters the rights which a member of a sporting body enjoys nor was such a condition imposed previously. Undue interference occurs when a third party can influence or interfere in the internal affairs of a sporting organisation. As previously explained, such interference does not occur when laying out a timeframe for when an election should occur. However, interference does occur when a government can set out the rights which a member does or does not have within a sporting body. The rights of members must remain within the ambit of the sporting body itself in order to preserve its autonomy and independence’). On the other hand, other provisions were held not to cross the line, including a provision mandating a four-year term limit for directors of the sports body, because such provision ‘does not interfere with the substance of the election, nor does it provide a third party with the ability to influence the outcome of the board’s election’ (para 8.39). 10 See FIFA press releases dated 16 October 2015 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-of-the-kuwaitfootball-association-2717726 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 6 December 2017 (fifa.com/whowe-are/news/suspension-of-the-kuwait-football-association-lifted-2922929 [accessed 23  September 2020]). 11 See FIFA press releases dated 17  March 2017 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-malianfootball-association-femafoot-2876348 [accessed 23  September 2020]) and 2  May 2017 (fifa.com/ who-we-are/news/suspension-of-the-malian-fa-lifted-2881964 [accessed 23 September 2020]). 12 See FIFA press releases dated 7 July 2017 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-sudan-footballassociation-2900598 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 13 July 2017 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/ fifa-lifts-suspension-of-sudan-football-association-sfa-2901219 [accessed 23 September 2020]). 13 See FIFA press releases dated 11  October 2017 (fr.fifa.com/who-we-are/news/la-fifa-suspend-lafederation-pakistanaise-de-football-2913302# [accessed 23  September 2020]) (available in French only) and 14  March 2018 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-lifts-suspension-of-pakistan-footballfederation [accessed 23 September 2020]). 14 See FIFA press releases dated 5  October 2018 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-the-sierraleone-football-association [accessed 23  September 2020]) and 3  June 2019 (fifa.com/who-we-are/ news/fifa-council-appoints-qatar-as-host-of-the-fifa-club-world-cup-in-2019-and-2020 [accessed 23 September 2020]). For further examples of FIFA suspensions, see Henk Erik Meier and Borja Garcia, ‘Protecting private transnational authority against public intervention: FIFA’s power over national governments’, (2015) Public Administration 93(4) 890–906, doi: 10.1111/padm.12208, pp 896 et seq. 15 For example, in March 2012, when the Gambian Government dissolved the Gambian Football Association and replaced it with a government-appointed interim committee, FIFA threatened ‘severe sanctions’, stating: ‘no governmental instituted “interim committee” would be recognised and/or dealt with by FIFA. FIFA underlines that any action taken against the GFA’s executive committee would constitute a clear governmental interference and therefore infringe the FIFA Statutes’: see BBC article ‘Fifa warns The Gambia that it faces ‘severe sanctions’ dated 6 March 2012 (bbc.co.uk/sport/ football/17273349, [accessed 23 September 2020]). Further, in 2018, FIFA threatened to suspend the Nigeria Football Federation (NFF) due to undue government interference after a faction (supported by the Nigerian Sports Minister), led by a person who was serving a five-year ban from the game, took over the NFF headquarters after winning a court ruling following a protest of the elections that kept the incumbent in power. Nigeria narrowly escaped the international ban as FIFA received prompt confirmation that the legitimate leadership had been given back effective control of the federation (see fifa.com/who-we-are/news/nigeria-and-ghana-given-final-deadline-or-face-suspension and in.reuters. com/article/soccer-africa-nigeria/soccer-nigeria-escape-fifa-ban-as-officials-return-to-poweridUKL3N0RA3A620140909 [accessed 23  September 2020]). See also, eg  ‘FIFA warns Venezuela against controversial sports law’, insideworldfootball.biz (2  August 2011) (insideworldfootball. com/2011/08/02/fifa-warns-venezuela-against-controversial-sports-law/ [accessed 23  September 2020]); and ‘FIFA warn S  Africa government against interference’, Thomson Reuters (31  March

16  Governance of the Sports Sector 2013) (uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-africa-safrica/fifa-warn-south-africa-government-againstinterference-idUKBRE92U01F20130331 [accessed 23 September 2020]). As a further example, also in 2018, US President Donald Trump wrote on Twitter (‘The US has put together a STRONG bid w/ Canada & Mexico for the 2026 World Cup. It would be a shame if countries that we always support were to lobby against the US bid. Why should we be supporting these countries when they don’t support us (including at the United Nations)?’), suggesting that he was willing to withdraw political and financial support to nations that did not back the three-way North American bid to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup. In response, FIFA brought the FIFA ethics guidelines to the President’s attention and noted the rules prohibiting undue influence by government. Reuters article ‘FIFA points to ethics rules after Trump tweets threat to World Cup bid opponents’ dated 27  April 2018 (reuters.com/article/us-soccer-worldcup-trump/fifa-points-to-ethics-rules-aftertrump-tweets-threat-to-world-cup-bid-opponents-idUSKBN1HY03C [accessed 23 September 2020]).

A1.18 One particular area where the sports movement draws the line is where a government mandates discrimination either against some of its own citizens or against athletes from other countries: (a)

The IOC did not permit the South African Olympic Committee to enter a team in the Olympic Games from 1964 until 1988 because of the South African government’s policy of apartheid, which prevented South African SGBs from allowing participation in sport without discrimination on racial grounds.1 (b) The European Weightlifting Federation (EWF) withdrew Spain’s right to host the 2018 Junior and Under-23 Championships because of its political stance over Kosovo. Kosovo is a member of the EWF, but Spain does not recognise Kosovo (which declared its independence in 2008) as a sovereign state because it thought this might provide arguments for the recognition of the Catalan independence movement. The EWF rules provide that the hosts of EWF events must allow all member nations to participate. The EWF  Executive Board sought guarantees from Spain that Kosovo’s team would be given visas, but Spain refused them, prompting the withdrawal of the hosting rights.2 (c) In January 2019, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) stripped Malaysia of the right to host the 2019 World Para Swimming Championships after the Malaysian government banned Israeli athletes from taking part in events in its country, and the Home Ministry of Malaysia failed to provide the necessary guarantees that Israeli para swimmers would be able to participate safely and free from discrimination in the championships.3 (d) In October 2019, the International Judo Federation (IJF) suspended the Iran Judo Federation ‘from all competitions, administrative and social activities organised or authorised by the IJF and its Unions, until the Iran Judo Federation gives strong guarantees and prove that they will respect the IJF Statutes and accept that their athletes fight against Israeli athletes’, following an incident at the 2019 World Championships where Iranian authorities and the Iran Judo Federation instructed an athlete to withdraw from a potential contest against an Israeli athlete, in contravention of the IJF Statutes, the Olympic Charter, and the IOC Code of Ethics.4 1 See BBC article ‘1964: South Africa banned from Olympics’ (news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ stories/august/18/newsid_3547000/3547872.stm [accessed 23  September 2020]); NY  Times article ‘Olympics Committee Ends Its Ban On Participation by South Africa’ dated 10 July 1991 (nytimes. com/1991/07/10/sports/olympics-olympics-committee-ends-its-ban-on-participation-by-south-africa. html [accessed 23 September 2020]); and Capobianco, ‘Voices of Discontent: Avery Brundage and the IOC’s Dilemma of South Africa’s Olympic Participation, 1956–1968’, (PhD thesis, June 2015). See further para A1.59(c). 2 See Inside the Games article dated 23 April 2018, ‘Exclusive: Spain loses weightlifting championships because of political stance over Kosovo’ (insidethegames.biz/articles/1064262/spain-losesweightlifting-championships-because-of-political-stance-over-kosovo [accessed 23  September 2020]). 3 See IPC press release dated 27  January 2019 (paralympic.org/news/ipc-strip-malaysia-2019-worldpara-swimming-championships [accessed 23 September 2020]). 4 See International Judo Federation Disciplinary Commission decision no 2019-3 dated 22 October 2019.

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  17

3 THE PYRAMID MODEL OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION A Deriving governance authority from consent A1.19 As noted above,1 in most countries SGBs are not state agencies, licensed by the state to implement its policy objectives; instead they are wholly private bodies. As a result, the authority of SGBs is not derived from statute or other government mandate. Instead, an SGB’s legitimacy and authority as the governing body of its sport is entirely consensual, derived from the agreement of its members to be bound by its rules and regulations.2 1 See para A1.8. 2 Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 49 (‘The constitution of FINA is established by contract and FINA derives its powers by contract. FINA, as the world-wide body for swimming has promulgated rules and regulations for the sport. These rules and regulations also constitute a contract between the body and its members’); Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036 (‘92. The Panel agrees that the authority of international or national federations and/or national anti-doping organizations to impose sanctions on athletes is normally based on a contractual relationship. Such relationship may be grounded on the athlete obtaining a licence to participate in competitions organized under the rules of a federation, or on an agreement – either explicit or implicit – on participation in a specific sport event. 93. The terms of this contractual relationship consist inter alia of the relevant anti-doping rules. While obtaining a licence to compete from a federation or when participating in a sport event, an athlete accepts that the anti-doping rules of that federation or event organizer bind him/her’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, paras 86, 88 (same); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 8.21 (‘[…] the WADA Code is neither a law nor an international treaty. It is rather a contract instrument binding its signatories in accordance with private international law’); Ohuruogu v UK  Athletics and IAAF, CAS  2006/A/1165, para  7.16 (‘It is clear as a matter of English law that the relationship between UKA and Ohuruogu is contractual in nature. Ohuruogu agreed to be subject to the UKA’s new regime when she signed the form that contained those procedures on 25  July 2005 […]’); International Rugby Board v Troy & ARU, CAS  2008/A/1664, para  38 (‘[…] the [ARU Anti-Doping] By-Law is only enforceable by reason of contract. Thus there must be some evidence that the Respondent undertook contractually to be bound by the By-Law’); Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.26 (‘[…] the Appellant, when she entered the IWF European Championships, accepted the IWF Regulations and the sanctions provided in the IWF ADP. As Respondent correctly submitted, by participating in an IWF competition, the Appellant entered into a contractual relationship with the Respondent, and, consequently, subjected herself to the IWF ADP with respect to doping matters’).

A1.20 This has important ‘constitutional’ consequences. For example, because this regulatory structure is a private arrangement between the SGB and its members, under English law at least those aggrieved by the actions and decisions of an SGB may not invoke the judicial review mechanisms that are used to challenge the actions and decisions of public bodies. Rather, a private law cause of action must be identified, and private law remedies apply.1 On the other hand, as a result of the social, cultural and economic importance attributed to sport, and the enormous public interest in its conduct,2 SGBs are often seen as custodians of public assets.3 Combined with their monopoly authority and control over access to the sport, which carries with it enormous power over people’s livelihoods, hopes, and expectations, this creates a tension between an SGB’s ‘private’ status and its public interest role that is reflected in (for example) the application to SGBs of EU free movement rules that are supposedly confined in application to ‘state’ measures,4 in the debate as to whether SGBs are considered ‘public authorities’ within the scope of human rights legislation,5 and in the public law standards that have crept into courts’ ‘private law’ analysis of the actions of governing bodies.6 1 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies), and in particular Chapter E5 (Public or Private?). See eg Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/1/2426, para 65 (‘With specific regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), which was invoked by the Appellant, the Panel remarks that international treaties on human rights are meant to protect the individuals’ fundamental rights vis-à-vis governmental authorities and, in principle, they are inapplicable per se in disciplinary

18  Governance of the Sports Sector

2 3

4 5 6

matters carried out by sports governing bodies, which are legally characterized as purely private entities’). See para A3.5 et seq. See eg Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347–48 (‘The two bodies were in a sense custodians of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game should be properly organised and administered’); Sport and the European Union (Federation Internationale de l’Automobile, May 1999) (‘Sports authorities fulfil functions which are manifestly public interest responsibilities. They maintain rules to ensure integrity of competition. They establish rules to protect the safety of participants and spectators. […] If sporting authorities did not carry out these responsibilities, public authorities would be forced either to ban all dangerous sport or to step in and run it at significant cost to the taxpayer’). See para E12.21. See para E13.14. See Chapter E5 (Public or Private?) and Chapter E7 (Grounds for Review Arising Out of Control of the Sport). See also AEK Athens v UEFA, CAS 98/200, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002) p 38, para 58 (‘there is an evident analogy between sports-governing bodies and governmental bodies with respect to their role and functions as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities, and similar principles should govern their actions’).

A1.21 Another important consequence of the fact that an SGB’s authority is derived from the consent of its members is that it makes a ‘pyramid’ model of governance and regulation inevitable and essential, because it is impossible for one SGB to contract with all of the millions of bodies and individuals who participate in the sport around the world, let alone to police and enforce those contracts. Instead, it has to contract with a few members, and require them to contract with and enforce its rules against the participants in the sport in their respective jurisdictions.

B The ‘European model of sport’ A1.22 In its November 1998 consultation paper,1 the European Commission adopted the term ‘The European Model of Sport’ to describe the pyramid system of governance and regulation typically seen in the sports sector:2 ‘In the Member States sport is traditionally organised in a system of national federations. Only the top federations (usually one per country) are linked together in European and international federations. Basically the structure resembles a pyramid with a hierarchy … The clubs form the foundation of this pyramid. They offer everyone the possibility of engaging in sport locally, thereby promoting the idea of “sport for all”. They also foster the development of new generations of sportsmen/women. At this level unpaid participation is particularly important and beneficial to the development of European sport […] Regional federations form the next level; the clubs are usually members of these organisations. Their area of interest is limited to a region in which they are responsible for organising regional championships or co-ordinating sport on a regional level […] The national federations, one for each discipline, represent the next level. Usually all the regional federations are members of the respective national federation. These federations regulate all general matters within their discipline and at the same time represent their branch in the European or International federations. They also organise national championships and act as regulatory bodies. The top of the pyramid is formed by the European Federations, which are organised along the same lines as the national federations. Every European federation allows only one national federation from each country to be a member. By means of rules, usually involving sanctions for those taking part in championships which have not been recognised or authorised by the international federation, these organisations try to maintain their position’.

However, the continental federations are not at the apex of the pyramid. Instead, each of them will be a member of an international federation that has ultimate authority for

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  19

the governance of their sport. Thus, the Olympic Charter recognises one international federation for each sport, with exclusive authority and responsibility to govern that sport,3 and buttresses that authority by requiring National Olympic Committees to recognise only one national federation for each sport, which must be the national federation that is affiliated to the international federation recognised by the IOC.4 1 ‘The European Model of Sport’, Consultation Document of DG X, November 1998. See also para E11.81. 2 Typically, but not uniformly. The European Commission has noted that ‘[t]here are differences in the scope and importance of the sporting pyramid depending on the sport. In particular, the system of open competitions is generally limited to team sports, and even in that case “the system of open competitions is somewhat mitigated by a licensing system that introduces financial criteria for participation in competitions”. In other disciplines, such as motor sports and cycling, professional competitions are totally or partially closed, and in disciplines such as golf and tennis “the organisation of competitions also largely diverges from the pyramid structure”’. European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 29, citing ‘Commission staff working document – The EU and Sport: Background and context’, SEC (2007) 935, p 41. See also Commission staff working paper at para 4 ( ‘in view of the diversity and complexities of European sport structures […] it is unrealistic to try to define a unified model of organisation of sport in Europe. […] ‘[t]he emergence of new stakeholders (participants outside the organised disciplines, professional sports clubs, etc) is posing new questions as regards governance, democracy and representation of interests within the sport movement’). 3 See Rules 25 and 26 of the Olympic Charter. 4 See para 1.2 of the Bye-Law to Olympic Charter Rules 27 and 28 (‘An NOC shall not recognise more than one national federation for each sport governed by an IF’) and Rule 29 (‘To be recognised by an NOC and accepted as a member of such NOC, a national federation must exercise a specific, real and on-going sports activity, be affiliated to an IF recognised by the IOC and be governed by and comply in all aspects with both the Olympic Charter and the rules of its IF’). See also para 2.1 of the ByeLaw to Rules 27 and 28 (NOC must select athletes for Games from those proposed by recognised national federation) and Rule 44.4 (‘An NOC shall only enter competitors upon the recommendations for entries given by national federations’).

A1.23 International federations come in various guises. Many have followed the IOC in basing their headquarters in Switzerland,1 and they are usually organised as non-governmental not-for-profit associations founded under and governed by Art 60 et seq of the Swiss Civil Code. However, this is not a requirement of the Olympic Charter. For example, the International Tennis Federation, World Sailing, and the International Netball Federation are all based in the UK, while the International Cricket Council is based in Dubai, and each of them is organised as a private limited company, under the laws of either the UK or another common law jurisdiction.2 1 For a discussion of some of the perceived benefits of doing so, see Dudognon, ‘The Standard International Sports Federation: An Association under Swiss Law, with its Headquarters in Lausanne’ [2014] ISLR 50. 2 See generally Chapter A2 (Forms of Organisation of Sports Governing Bodies).

A1.24 Wherever the international federation is based, however, it must have international reach and authority, because sport ‘is a global phenomenon which demands globally uniform standards. Only if the same terms and conditions apply to everyone who participates in organised sport, are the integrity and equal opportunity of sporting competition guaranteed’.1 The international federation establishes those terms and conditions in its rules and regulations, and then ensures their uniform application throughout the world by adopting the aforementioned pyramid structure of governance and regulation.2 More specifically: (a) The international federation’s constitution will recognise the exclusive authority of its member national federations to govern the sport in their respective national territories.3 (b) Each national federation will in turn be required as a condition of membership (i) to recognise the exclusive authority of the international federation to regulate the sport,4 and (ii) to adopt the rules of the international federation within its

20  Governance of the Sports Sector

territory, and enforce them against its members, including athletes under its jurisdiction.5 (c) The international federation’s rules will make it clear that no athlete may participate in international competitions unless they are a member of or otherwise affiliated to a member national federation and have agreed to be bound by and to comply with its rules.6 (d) The international federation’s rules will usually require the reciprocal recognition throughout the sport of disciplinary decisions and sanctions handed down by the international federation or by its member federations.7 (e) The international federation and its member federations will require participants to commit to compete only in competitions that have been sanctioned by the international federation or one of its member federations, and so are organised subject to their rules (and not to participate in any competition to which those rules do not apply and to which their authority does not extend).8 1 Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 12. The courts have recognised the importance of the uniform application of the rules of sport by upholding provisions requiring the submission of all disputes to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in order to avoid inconsistent application and enforcement of those rules by national courts. See eg  Pechstein v International Skating Union, German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15. In addition, the Court of Arbitration for Sport has developed different ways of ensuring that an international federation’s rules may be applied uniformly throughout the sport, notwithstanding differences in national laws. See para B1.16. 2 See Rule 26.1 of the Olympic Charter (‘The mission and role of the IFs within the Olympic Movement are: (1) to establish and enforce, in accordance with the Olympic spirit, the rules concerning the practice of their respective sports and to ensure their application’); opinion of Advocate-General Kokott dated 6  March 2008 in C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] All ER (D) 02 (Jul) (‘The pyramid structure that has developed in most sports helps to ensure that the special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for competitions, are taken into account’). 3 See eg Art 4.2 of the Statutes of the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) (‘The FIA shall recognise in each country and for all branches of motoring only one holder of the Sporting Power which under all circumstances shall remain responsible to the FIA pursuant to the FIA Statutes and regulations. The holder of the Sporting Power is the direct motor sport representative and exclusive authority for its country within the FIA. It is the sole entity entitled to govern motor sport and enforce in its country the International Sporting Code of the FIA and all other FIA and ASN/ACN regulations required for the development and organisation of motor sport competitions and for the implementation of the applicable judicial and disciplinary proceedings’); FIH  Constitution at Art 2.2(a)(i) (‘full Members shall enjoy all of the rights and benefits conferred on Members by the Statutes and Regulations, including (without limitation) recognition as the sole governing body for Hockey in that Member’s Country’). See also Stillitano v USSF & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2241, para 10.21 (‘the Panel finds persuasive FIFA’s assertion that “one of the basic tenets of FIFA and its member organizations is that its national association members control association football within their respective territory”’). 4 See eg  FIA  Statutes Art 6 (‘6.1 The Clubs, Associations or Federations which are members of the FIA shall, by the very fact of their admission into the FIA, agree to abide without reservation by the Statutes. They shall undertake to do this when they file their application for membership. 6.2 Likewise, they shall undertake to enforce in their respective countries the general regulations established by the FIA and the appendices thereto. 6.3 They shall also undertake to accept, observe, and enforce all decisions taken by the bodies of the FIA, including the International Tribunal, the Cost Cap Adjudication Panel, the International Court of Appeal, the Senate, the World Council for Automobile Mobility and Tourism, the World Motor Sport Council and the General Assembly’); FIH Constitution, Art 4.1(a) (‘All Members […] shall be deemed to have agreed and acknowledged that (a) the FIH has sole ultimate authority over the governance, regulation and playing of Hockey; (b) they shall not become a member of or recognise or otherwise support any organisation with similar objects to the FIH unless that organisation is recognised by the FIH’) and Art 4.1(c) (‘All Continental Federations and Members […] shall be deemed to have agreed and acknowledged that: […] they are bound by and must comply with the Statutes and Regulations, and with the decisions taken by the FIH and its constituent bodies (including Congress, the Executive Board, and other duly appointed officials and bodies of the FIH) pursuant to and in application and enforcement of the Statutes and Regulations […]’). 5 For example, in Real Federacion Espanola de Futbol (RFEF) v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, the CAS panel noted that ‘the structure has it that the national football associations are the primary guardians of FIFA’s regulations on the protection of minors with power to take action on any member who breaches the said regulations’ (para 204). See further para 259 (‘The RFEF had an ancillary duty to play in

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  21 ensuring full compliance of Article 5.1 of the FIFA RSTP [FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players]. This role entailed undertaking both preventive and curative measures in monitoring clubs’ compliance thereof’), and para 291 (‘The national federations play an important role in the protection of minors. They must assume an oversight and supervisory role in respect of the relevant FIFA rules, a duty stipulated in general and abstract terms in the FIFA regulations. Therefore, a violation of these FIFA rules on the protection of minors should be taken (particularly) seriously’). The CAS panel held that the RFEF had failed to enforce the relevant regulations properly by overseeing the international transfer of foreign under-aged players to Spanish football. The CAS upheld the sanction imposed by the FIFA Appeal Committee, but reduced the fine amount. The RFEF was fined CHF 280,000 (reduced from CHF 500,000), reprimanded, and given a period of one year to rectify its regulatory system to comply with the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (paras 15, 32, 297, and CAS conclusions on final page). Similarly, Art 20.3 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code requires international federations not only to adopt Code-compliant anti-doping rules, but also ‘[t]o require as a condition of membership that the policies, rules and programs of their National Federations and other members are in compliance with the Code’, and ‘[t]o withhold some or all funding to its member National Federations that are not in compliance with the Code’. The 2021 World Anti-Doping Code will significantly strengthen Art 20.3, in particular by obliging international federations who sign the Code ‘to require, as a condition of membership, that the policies, rules and programs of their National Federations and other members are in compliance with the Code and the International Standards, and to take appropriate action to enforce such compliance; areas of compliance shall include but not be limited to: (i) requiring that their National Federations conduct Testing only under the documented authority of their International Federation and use their National Anti-Doping Organization or other Sample collection authority to collect Samples in compliance with the International Standard for Testing and Investigations; (ii) requiring that their National Federations recognize the authority of the National Anti-Doping Organization in their country in accordance with Article  5.2.1 and assist as appropriate with the National Anti-Doping Organization’s implementation of the national Testing program for their sport; (iii) requiring that their National Federations analyze all Samples collected using a WADA-accredited or WADA-approved laboratory in accordance with Article  6.1; and (iv) requiring that any national level anti-doping rule violation cases discovered by their National Federations are adjudicated by an operationally independent hearing panel in accordance with Article 8.1 and the International Standard for Results Management’. 6 See eg Art 1 of World Athletics’ rules on ‘Requirements to compete in International Competitions’: ‘No athlete may take part in an International Competition unless they: 1.1.1 are a member of a Club affiliated to a Member; or 1.1.2 are themselves affiliated to a Member; or 1.1.3 have otherwise agreed to abide by the rules of a Member; […]’. Where a national federation is suspended from membership of the international federation for failure to comply with its membership obligations, such as the duty to run an effective anti-doping programme, the default position is that its athletes may not participate in official competitions until the national federation is reinstated. See eg International Volleyball Association (FIVB) Disciplinary Regulations (May 2019) Art 25.1.2 (‘Unless the FIVB Board of Administration or Executive Committee decides otherwise (eg authorising participation in competitions under the FIVB flag), a suspended NF loses the rights as member of FIVB (except for Art. 2.3.1.4 of the FIVB  Constitution [may attend Congress as observers]) so long as it remains suspended and its teams and officials may not organise and/or participate in official competitions or activities’); UCI Discipline and Procedure Regulations (February 2020) Art 12.3.017 (‘In the event of the suspension of a team, association or any other organisation, all licence holders who are members or otherwise linked shall also be suspended, unless authorised by the UCI Management Committee to exercise their activities in an individual capacity under appropriate conditions to be set by the Management Committee’); and FEI General Regulations (January 2020) Art 117.5 (‘Athletes whose NF has been suspended or expelled may not be accepted as entries for any International Event, or national Event outside the country of their NF, during the period of the Suspension or expulsion, unless otherwise approved by the Board’). The rationale is that the athletes were admitted to international competition based on their federation’s firm legal commitment, as a condition of membership, to institute effective anti-doping measures. The athletes’ exclusion from international competition is then an inevitable result of their federation’s failure to meet that commitment. The exclusion is not a punishment for the athletes’ own doping conduct; it is a necessary consequence of the fact that their federation has failed to subject them to an anti-doping system that meets the mandatory requirements of the Code. The pyramid system of governance and regulation of sport requires that they share the fate of their federation, and bear the consequences of the actions and omissions, achievements and failures of that federation’s management. So, for example, when the IAAF (now World Athletics) suspended the Russian Athletics Federation (RusAF) from membership in November 2015 on the basis that it had failed to comply with its obligation to operate an adequate anti-doping system, by operation of the IAAF’s Competition Rule 22.1(a) all Russian track athletes were automatically ineligible to compete in any international competitions (including the Olympic Games) pending RusAF’s reinstatement. The Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) and a number of Russian athletes challenged the validity of that rule in ROC & Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, but the CAS rejected the challenge and upheld the validity of the rule, stating: ‘It is a rule which

22  Governance of the Sports Sector affects the eligibility of athletes to enter into International Competitions and is a consequence of the organizational structure of international sport; national federations are members of international federations, and have the duty to respect the obligations deriving from such membership; athletes participate in organized sport, as controlled by an international federation, only on the basis of their registration with a national federation, which is a member of the international federation in question. […] [T]he consequence contemplated by Rule 22.1(a) is in fact suitable to apply irrespective of the reason triggering the suspension of the national federation. In other words, Rule 22.1(a) is a rule of general application, not specific to doping cases, and would apply equally to athletes who are members of federations that fail to pay their membership dues as to athletes who are members of federations that engage in other breaches of federation obligations to the IAAF as a member thereof’ (para 119). 7 For example, if one national federation were to ban a player for a period for misconduct (eg on-field violence, or doping), it would undermine the integrity of the sport if that player could circumvent the ban by simply going to play elsewhere. To avoid this, the international federation’s rules may provide that disciplinary sanctions imposed by a national federation apply automatically throughout the sport. See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 7.1.8 (requiring member federations to ‘recognise and enforce within its Country: all decisions of the IBU’s constituent bodies, officials, the Biathlon Integrity Unit, Disciplinary Tribunals, and the CAS; periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed under the [IBU] Rules, including the IBU Integrity Code; and periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed by other NF Members’); FIH Statutes (November 2018) Art 2.2(b)(vii) (‘Each full Member and provisional Member […] must recognise and enforce within its Country: (A) all decisions of the FIH’s constituent bodies and/or officials made under the Statutes and Regulations; (B) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed by the FIH, the Disciplinary Commissioner or the Judicial Commission; and (C) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed by CFs or by other Members …’); and, similarly, ICC Anti-Corruption Code for Participants Art 9.2 (‘Decisions made and Provisional Suspensions and sanctions imposed under the anti-corruption rules of National Cricket Federations shall be recognised, enforced, extended and given effect to within their respective jurisdictions by the ICC and other National Cricket Federations (including in respect of any Matches, tournaments or other events sanctioned by such National Cricket Federations), automatically upon receipt of notice of the same, without the need for further formality’. Similarly, Article  15 of the World Anti-Doping Code provides for the automatic recognition and enforcement by all Code signatories of doping bans issued pursuant to rules complying with the Code. Alternatively, the international federation’s rules may give the international federation the right, in ‘serious’ cases, to extend the sanction so that it applies worldwide. See eg FIFA Disciplinary Code (2019 edition) Art 136.1 (‘If the infringement is serious, in particular but not limited to discrimination, the manipulation of football matches and competitions, misconduct against match officials or forgery and falsification, the associations, confederations, and other organising sports bodies shall request the Disciplinary Committee to extend the sanctions they have imposed so as to have worldwide effect’) (which is further discussed at para B3.55). This principle may lead to difficulties where the sanctions handed down by one governing body are deemed to fall short of the requirements of national law binding another governing body: see para A1.7, n 1. 8 See further Section 6.

A1.25 For example, FIFA governs association football at the global level. It is responsible for maintaining the ‘Laws of the Game’ (ie the ‘rules of football’), and also issues regulations on issues of global application and importance, such as the scheduling of international matches, the registration and transfer of players, and player release for international matches. On the other hand, issues relevant only to one continent or nation are addressed by (respectively) the continental federation or the national federation in question. For example, UEFA governs football in Europe, regulating issues specific to European football associations, and organising pan-European competitions at national representative level (eg  the quadrennial UEFA  European Championships) and at club level (the annual UEFA  Champions League and Europa League).1 And The Football Association is the governing body for football in England, issuing regulations on matters such as the use of agents2 and the maintenance of proper discipline and conduct on and off the field,3 as well as organising or sanctioning the organisation of national-level competitions.4 The FA may in turn delegate certain functions to regional federations (or county associations) to administer at a lower level. 1 There are six continental associations in football sitting under FIFA, namely UEFA in Europe, the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Confederation of African Football (CAF), the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC), and the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL).

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  23 2 See Chapter F2 (Players’ Agents). 3 See para B3.56 et seq. 4 The FA organises the FA Cup and enters national representative teams in international tournaments organised by UEFA and FIFA and in ‘friendly’ matches that it organises directly with other FIFA member national associations. In addition, The FA sanctions the Premier League to organise its own annual league competition, it sanctions the Football League to organise its own annual league competitions as well as the annual League Cup, and it sanctions the National League to organise annual league competitions below the Football League. See further the discussion at para A2.78 .

C The North American model of sport A1.26 In contrast to the so-called ‘European model of sport’, North American sports are mainly split into: (a) amateur sport, mainly high school and university athletes, with all intercollegiate sports governed by the NCAA;1 and (b) professional leagues, with the ‘big four’ Major League sports being Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and National Hockey League (NHL) (although some call for Major Soccer League (MLS) to make it the ‘big five’).2 Notably: (a) In contrast to the pyramid structure of the European model of sport (which involves interdependence between the organisations at different levels of the pyramid), the North American model is more ‘horizontal’.3 In particular, the professional leagues are generally not linked to (or responsible for developing) the lower levels of the sport. (b) A single league dominates the competition and organisation of each professional sport, and it operates independently of the international sporting system.4 Teams in the leagues are privately owned ‘franchises’, and the owners of those franchises are also the owners of the league,5 which has a private ownership structure.6 The owners appoint a ‘commissioner’ who runs the league on their behalf (effectively as a CEO). (c) In contrast to the ‘open system’ seen in most European league sports, the North American professional leagues are ‘closed leagues’, which do not have a system of promotion and relegation. Changes in teams in the league therefore come only from adding, removing, or relocating franchises (with the owners of the league having the exclusive right to decide on market entry).7 (d) To maintain competitive balance in the absence of promotion and relegation, the professional leagues typically recruit new talent through a reverse-order draft system (in its simplest form, the lowest ranked team in a season will get the first choice of high school or college graduates that are eligible to play in the league the next season) and also impose salary caps to limit the amount of money that clubs can spend on wages.8 (e) A further significant differentiating characteristic of the North American model is that collective bargaining agreements govern the relationship between the league/owners and the unions (which represent all of the players in the league and negotiate collectively on their behalf). Disputes in the bargaining process have led to numerous strikes and lockouts.9 1 See NCAA website (ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [accessed 24 September 2020]); and Van Bottenburg, ‘Why are the European and American sports worlds so different? Path-dependence in the European and American sports history’, Utrecht University (March 2019), p 14. 2 See eg Cassidy, ‘How far can soccer go in the U.S.A?’, The New Yorker (2 July 2014) (newyorker.com/ news/john-cassidy/how-far-can-soccer-go-in-the-u-s-a [accessed 24 September 2020]). 3 Nafziger, ‘A comparison of the European and North American models of sports organisation’, The International Sports Law Journal (1 July 2008), p 8.

24  Governance of the Sports Sector 4 For example, the NHL is not a member of the International Ice Hockey Federation (which is the IOCrecognised international federation for ice hockey), and refused to release its players to participate in the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympic Games. See NHL press release dated 4 April 2017 (nhl.com/news/ nhl-will-not-participate-in-2018-winter-olympics/c-288385598 [accessed 24 September 2020]). 5 See eg  Mitten, ‘Baseball: An Illustration Of How Professional Sports Are Structured, Internally Governed, And Legally Regulated In The USA’, Marquette University Law School (January 2009), p 3. 6 The MLS is an exception. See Fraser v Major League Soccer, 97  F  Supp 2d 130 (D  Mass 2000), p 132 (‘The structure and mode of operation of MLS is governed by its Limited Liability Company Agreement (“MLS Agreement” or “Agreement”). The MLS Agreement establishes a Management Committee consisting of representatives of each of the investors. The Management Committee has authority to manage the business and affairs of MLS. Several of the investors have signed Operating Agreements with MLS which, subject to certain conditions and obligations, give them the right to operate specific MLS teams. There are also passive investors in MLS who do not operate teams’). 7 See eg Buzzacchi et al, ‘Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome: Open Leagues, Closed Leagues and Competitive Balance’, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (2003), p 170. 8 Salary caps in various guises are slowly being introduced into European sports. See para B5.100 et seq. 9 See eg CNN Editorial Research article, ‘Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts’ dated 17 March 2020 (edition.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/index.html [accessed 24 September 2020]).

4 THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF AN SGB A1.27 The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has noted that ‘there is an evident analogy between sports-governing bodies and governmental bodies with respect to their role and functions as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities, and similar principles should govern their actions’.1 In particular, like governments, SGBs have legislative, executive, and judicial functions. For example, the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), the world governing body for four-wheel motor sport, has noted: ‘The FIA is structured in line with the principles of good governance and its organisation follows a classic governmental style similar to that of a nation state. Specifically in relation to sport, there is a clear separation between: making and amending of sporting rules as the primary legislative function; making and reviewing executive decisions regarding the management of financial resources and organisation of sporting competitions; and resolving disputes between members, sporting participants and other relevant parties’.2 1 AEK  Athens v UEFA, CAS  98/200, p  38, para  58. See also Max Mosley, Former President of the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile, speech at The Rules of the Game, conference on the Governance of Sport (Brussels, February 2001) (‘the whole structure of a sports federation is that of a small government which, within the limits of what it is trying to do, mainly makes rules and becomes, for that particular area of activity, almost like a sovereign country’). 2 See fia.com/governance [accessed 24 September 2020].

A The legislative branch A1.28 The SGB has a clear legislative function, issuing rules to regulate an activity of broad interest and importance, in the public interest.1 Not only is it the guardian of the ‘laws of the game’. It is also called upon to issue regulations addressing a host of issues of obvious public interest,2 such as the integrity of the sport (including doping,3 match-fixing,4 and financial fair play5) and the safety of its participants (including on-field discipline6 and safeguarding7). It also has to maintain the constitution of the SGB, determining how and by whom the powers of the SGB are to be exercised, and regulating the relationship between the SGB and other SGBs at other levels of the pyramid in the sport in question.

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  25 1 See eg Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347-48 (‘[T]he two bodies were in a sense custodians of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game should be properly organised and administered’). 2 See generally Chapter B1 (Drafting Effective Regulations: The Legal Framework). 3 See Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement). 4 See Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption). 5 See Chapter B5 (Regulating Financial Fair Play). 6 See Chapter B3 (Misconduct). 7 See Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).

A1.29 The legislative authority of the SGB – its power to amend its constitution and/or to issue rules and regulations setting out the playing conditions of the sport – is ultimately vested in the members of the SGB, meeting together as a ‘Congress’ or ‘General Assembly’.1 For example, the supreme legislative body of the FIA is the General Assembly, which is composed of representatives of the national automobile associations or clubs representing the different countries in membership of the FIA.2 However, such bodies generally meet only every two or four years, or (at most) annually. Many SGB constitutions therefore confirm that only the members in general meeting may change the constitution, but delegate the power to issue sporting regulations (which may need to be changed more urgently and/or more frequently) to the Executive Committee or other organ of the SGB.3 Where rule-making power is dispersed between different bodies in this way, disputes may arise as to whether a particular body did actually have the requisite power to issue particular regulations.4 1 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 12.2 (‘Congress holds ultimate and supreme authority in relation to the affairs of the IBU’); and World Athletics Constitution (November 2019) Art 24.1 (‘Congress is the highest authority of World Athletics and the sport of Athletics worldwide’). See also, eg Art 64 of the Swiss Civil Code (‘The general meeting of members is the supreme governing body of the association’); Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, para 84 (‘Under German law, the meeting of the members is the highest organ of an association’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para  12 (‘Chapter IV of the Constitution is entitled “Congress”. By Article  27 the Congress is the general meeting of members and the highest authority of UCI’); International Federation of American Football (IFAF) et al v Wiking, CAS 2017/O/5025, para 205 (‘The Congress is the supreme authority of IFAF (Article 1 of the IFAF Statutes) […]’). 2 Further to Article 4.1 of the FIA Statutes, the FIA General Assembly has the exclusive right to take all decisions concerning the organisation, direction, and management of international motor sport, including the right to amend the FIA Statutes and the International Sporting Code. 3 NISA  v ISU, CAS  2003/0/466, para  7.8 (‘The Panel observes, in general, that in any international federation the legislative power is hierarchically apportioned between the general assembly and the executive body, whatever their names. General assemblies of international federations are convened only once or twice every four-year Olympic period. It would be highly impractical for the administration of a sport if the executive body, whose meetings are frequent, could not enact rules at all in order to implement or supplement the resolutions adopted by the general assembly, provided that it does not violate them’); Federation Française des Echecs et al v Federation Internationale des Echecs, CAS 2010/O/2166, para 9.6.5 (‘It is customary in practically all sports federations to transfer the powers of the general assembly to a body which manages the affairs of the federation between the sessions of the general assembly (which sits every two or four years’); Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 34, discussing the governance structure of FINA (‘the General Congress and the Technical Congress have the power to issue rules. The Bureau interprets and applies them. In between congresses, the Bureau has further wide authority over all matters to be decided by FINA and, in particular, may issue decisions which will have authority in between congresses. Bureau decisions once made are effective until they are either confirmed or the Congress acts in a different fashion. The effect of the Bureau decision is binding and determinative of the issue until changed by the Congress’). For example, the FIA  General Assembly delegates the right to identify potential changes to the Statutes and the International Sporting Code, and to approve the regulations for different FIA competitions, to a body called the World Motor Sports Council, but retains the right to approve or reject changes to the Statutes and/or the International Sporting Code at its next meeting. See FIA Statutes Art 9.10-9.13 and Art 16. 4 See eg IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 13 (‘[…] insofar as the promulgation, interpretation, or amendment of the IAAF  Rules are concerned, such powers are reserved exclusively to the appropriate organs of the IAAF’); CONI, CAS  2000/C/255, para  43 (finding that a new UCI rule did not, as contended, create a new category of membership, and therefore it was not ultra vires the UCI management committee to issue that rule); FFSA et al v FISA, CAS 97/168 (rejecting claim by

26  Governance of the Sports Sector member federations that the FISA Council did not have authority, under the FISA Statutes, to adopt bye-laws limiting the placing of advertising on athletes’ uniforms); Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA, CAS  2009/A/1827, paras 7.1.6 and 7.19 (Executive Committee bye-laws that would have had the effect of amending the Statutes declared invalid, because AIBA’s Statutes provided that they could only be amended by Congress).

A1.30 The SGB’s different legal instruments and rules form a ‘hierarchy of norms’ that must be respected.1 The SGB’s constitution (which may be referred to by different names, eg Statutes, or Charter, or Memorandum and Articles of Association) is the supreme document that governs the affairs of the SGB. Any regulations issued by any duly authorised body of the SGB must fall within the object clause of the constitution,2 and must not contradict the constitution.3 In particular, they must respect any fundamental rights and principles set out in the constitution.4 1 See para B1.10. 2 New Saints v Football Association of Wales [2020]  EWHC  1838 (Ch), para  76(3) (‘the objectives of FA Wales, as set out in the FA Wales Rules, constitute a hard limit on the powers that FA Wales has’); ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 50 (‘It is axiomatic that ICC cannot act outwith its objects. […]’) (discussed further at para A1.44, n 1). 3 IRIFF v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1708, para 24 (‘In principle, FIFA has the freedom to establish its own provisions, but there are limits to this autonomy. When creating new rules and regulations, the relevant organs are bound by the limits imposed on them by the higher ranking provisions, in particular the association’s statutes. This follows from the principle of legality which means that a lower level provision may complement and concretize a higher ranking provision, but not amend, override, contradict or change the higher one. This principle is also well-established in CAS jurisprudence’); Hui v IWF, CAS  2011/A/2612, para  102 (‘It follows from this principle [of hierarchy of norms] that – subject to well-defined exceptions – rules and regulations enacted by an association must be in compliance with the highest regulatory framework, ie the statutes of the associations. In case of contradiction between lower ranking norms and the statutes it is the latter – subject to well-defined exceptions – that take precedence’); and USOC  v IOC, CAS  2011/O/2422, paras 57-58 (‘By Rule 44 of the OC [Olympic Charter], the IOC has incorporated the WADA  Code into the IOC’s own Statutes. The IOC further provides in Rule 41 of the OC that a competitor must respect and comply with all aspects with the WADA Code. Accordingly, the IOC has by virtue of its own statutes and in particular, Rule 44, accepted the binding nature of the WADA Code. Because the Panel has found that the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been incorporated into the OC, the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, ie the OC, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable’). 4 For example, in Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449, ‘[t]he Athlete contended, and the IAAF did not submit to the contrary, that the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco all provide that there shall not be discrimination and that these provisions are higher-ranking rules that prevail. Accordingly, unless the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary, reasonable and proportionate, they will be invalid as inconsistent with the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco’. See also CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (finding that new UCI rule ‘does not interfere in the internal affairs of national federations, and so does not infringe UCI’s Constitution in that regard’).

A1.31 There may even be sporting norms or rules that are hierarchically superior even to the SGB’s own constitution.1 For example, if the SGB is a national federation, its rules will have to comply with the statutes and rules of the international federation of which it is a member;2 whereas if the SGB is the international federation of a sport that is part of the Olympic Movement, Rule 25 of the Olympic Charter states that its ‘statutes, practices and activities must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter’. So, for example, the international federation is required to implement the World AntiDoping Code (including adopting anti-doping rules that incorporate the mandatory requirements of that Code and make them applicable to all athletes and athlete support personnel under its jurisdiction) and also the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions.3 However, rules that are adopted in defiance of these obligations are still enforceable against the participants in the sport, even if they put the international federation in breach of its obligations under the Olympic Charter.4 And beyond enforcing these obligations under the Olympic Charter, the IOC may not constrain the autonomy of the international federation.5

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  27 1 See para B1.11. 2 See para A1.24 and A1.45. 3 See Olympic Charter, Fundamental Principles of Olympism, no 7 (‘Belonging to the Olympic Movement requires compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition by the IOC’), Rule 1.4 (‘Any person or organisation belonging in any capacity whatsoever to the Olympic Movement is bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and shall abide by the decisions of the IOC’); and Rule 43 (‘Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement’). See also para B1.11, n 3. 4 Unless those obligations have been validly incorporated into the international federation’s own constitution: see para B1.12. 5 Prusis & Latvian Olympic Committee, CAS Ad Hoc Division, OG 02/001, para 10 (‘unless the IOC proves that an International Federation has violated the Olympic Charter (in which case the IOC may impose sanctions on the International Federation), the IOC cannot take any action with regard to a specific sport which could be regarded as prejudicial to the independence and autonomy of the International Federation administering that sport’).

A1.32 In addition, the legislative authority and powers of the SGB’s members in general meeting may be supreme within the sport, but they are constrained by the obligation that every SGB has to comply with applicable national and transnational laws.1 The SGB’s constitution is likely to specify a governing law, usually the law of the country where the SGB is headquartered or incorporated. If the SGB is a national federation, and its regulations only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of that nation, the legality of its regulations can generally be assessed solely by reference to the applicable national law.2 If the SGB is an international federation, however, the position will be more complicated, because its rules apply globally, and therefore they will potentially be subject not only to any national law specified in the constitution as the governing law, but also to the mandatory requirements of the laws of every country in which the rules will apply, and (if the rules apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the EU) the laws of the EU.3 This poses obviously challenges to the creation of a global level playing-field,4 which CAS panels have worked hard to overcome by various different methods.5 1 The sports sector has stopped short of claiming that the autonomy of sport requires exemption from national or European laws: McCutcheon, ‘The Rule of Law in Sport’ (2002) 9(3) Sports Law Administration & Practice 1; Foster, ‘Is There a Global Sports Law?’, (2003) Entertainment Law 1–18. Rather, it has acknowledged that ‘[s]port is part of society and cannot establish its own political and legal framework’: The Rules of the Game, conference on the Governance of Sport (Brussels, February 2001), Advance Conference Paper, p 5. The sports movement always hopes that the law will be flexible enough to accommodate the ‘specificities’ of the sports sector, but it accepts that ultimately sport must defer to the law, and not the other way around. 2 See further para B1.51, n.1. 3 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, para 28 (‘By reason of the fact that it is imperative, the [EU] rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or of the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the Community’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201, para 4 (EU provisions on free movement and on free competition fall within the special category of mandatory rules that must be applied irrespective of the national law applicable to the merits of the case). See also Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 547–49 (discussing the need for sports rules to comply with an ‘ordre public “international and universal”’, including EU rules). 4 See para B1.14-B1.15. 5 See para B1.16 et seq.

B The executive branch A1.33 In the periods between the annual or biennial or quadrennial general meetings of the SGB’s member federations in Congress or General Assembly, the powers of the SGB are exercised by an ‘Executive Committee’ or ‘Executive Board’ or ‘Council’ made up of individuals elected by the member federations at a previous general meeting.1 Equivalent to a board of directors in a public or private limited

28  Governance of the Sports Sector

company,2 the Executive Board or Council is responsible for overseeing a staff of employees headed by a CEO (or, in sport movement speak, a ‘Director General’ or ‘Secretary General’) who administer the rules and regulations of the SGB. The Executive Board or Council is also responsible for making decisions and exercising powers entrusted to it under the constitution and/or those rules and regulations, which may include promulgating further rules and regulations setting out the conditions for the playing of the sport,3 and/or ruling on requests arising under those rules and regulations on a range of diverse matters, such as: (a)

whether or not a particular event should be sanctioned by the SGB for inclusion in the official calendar; (b) whether or not a particular performance should be ratified as a world record; (c) which country or city should be awarded the right to host one of the SGB’s events; or (d) whether or not to permit a particular athlete to transfer allegiance from one member federation to another. Some of these tasks may be delegated to other committees, or to individual officers such as the CEO.4 1 Once again, care must be taken only to exercise powers that have been delegated, and not to purport to exercise powers that have been reserved to Congress (see eg Jersey Football Association (JFA) v UEFA, CAS  2016/A/4787 (CAS panel set aside the UEFA  Executive Committee decision to reject JFA’s application for membership because only the UEFA Congress had that power)) or to assert powers that have not been delegated to it under the rules, properly construed. For example, in Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation (IJF), CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.8, the CAS panel rejected the IJF’s attempt to rely on a provision in its statutes that purported to grant the IJF’s Executive Council a wide-ranging power to decide any issues that had not been placed under the authority of another IJF body. The CAS panel held: ‘Such residual-powers clauses are common in statutes and by-laws. Officials of the relevant entities are on occasion tempted to make sweeping claims of authority by reference to them. But such claims are absolutely constrained by the overall powers of the body as a whole. They do not give the vast power of arbitrary exclusion; if such a thing were possible, there would be no reason at all to define lesser powers and to allocate them carefully among internal organs along with a requirement of compliance with procedural safeguards. Otherwise residual-power clauses could degenerate into the proposition that “for matters not expressly defined herein, the President may do whatever he wants whenever he wants”. The proper purpose of a residual-powers clause is to make clear that when a general authority has been explicitly granted, incidental and subsidiary decisions may be made by the authorised organ, even if they are not specifically defined’. Care must also be taken to exercise the power in accordance with the requirements in the applicable rules, eg  voting in person and not by correspondence where required by the rules. Kim v FILA, CAS 2013/A/3272, para 84 (‘The Panel finds that the Decision is illegal because it was voted on by correspondence’). 2 Where the SGB is a public or private limited company, the ‘Executive Board’ or ‘Council’ will actually be the board of directors of the company. 3 As to which, see generally Chapter B1 (Effective Sports Regulation; The Basic Principles). 4 For example, the ITF constitution gives the Rules of Tennis Committee the power to recommend changes to the Rules of Tennis to the ITF board of directors; while World Athletics’ Competition Rule 31.9 gives the President and CEO power to determine requests for ratification of performances as world records (with reference to be made to the Council only in cases of doubt).

A1.34 The powers of the Executive Board or Council may also include deciding whether to bring action against a member federation or an individual official or athlete for breach of the SGB’s rules and regulations, although a trend has started to put that important power in the hands of an operationally independent ‘integrity unit’ of the SGB that reports to a separate board made up of individuals who are independent of the SGB.1 1 See para A5.48.

A1.35 Election to the Executive Board/Council can be a sought-after role, because its substantial powers and/or authority give office-holders a special status in the sport, and/or because it is often a gateway to appointment to higher office (including

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  29

membership of the IOC). However, the members of the Executive Board/Council are subject to extensive legal1 and ethical duties2 in the exercise of their powers, breach of which may lead to significant sanctions3 or even individual legal liability. In addition, the stakes are generally high, and therefore their collective decisions are often subject to legal challenge, most often on the grounds that they followed an unfair procedure, or that they failed to comply with their own rules or with applicable law, or that they exercised their discretion irrationally.4 1 2 3 4

See eg para A5.27 et seq. See para A5.46. See eg para B3.104 et seq. See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies).

C The judicial branch A1.36 It is vital that challenges to the actions of the SGB are heard by one tribunal, applying the same laws and standards to each case. If instead such challenges could be heard by any national court anywhere, applying its own laws, the uniformity of approach that is required to ensure a level playing-field wherever the sport is played would be destroyed.1 Furthermore the judges of a national court may be less likely to appreciate and therefore take account of the ‘specificities’ of the sport than a more specialised tribunal. Therefore, most SGBs’ constitutions provide that all disputes between the SGB and its members, including any challenges to the actions or decisions of the SGB, must be referred exclusively to a specialist tribunal for hearing and determination. To limit the possibility of challenges in the courts to the decisions of that tribunal, it should have the features necessary to qualify as an independent arbitral tribunal.2 The usual choice (at least in the case of international federations) is the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland,3 although national federations may choose a domestic counterpart, such as (in the UK) Sport Resolutions.4 1 See further para B1.15 et seq. 2 See generally Chapter D3 (Arbitration in Sport). 3 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport). One exception is the FIA, which has its own International Court of Appeal: see fia.com/international-court-appeal#:~:text=Established%20 under%20the%20FIA%20Statutes,organizations%20affiliated%20to%20the%20FIA [accessed 24 September 2020]. 4 See sportresolutions.co.uk/ [accessed 24 September 2020].

A1.37 Disputes may also arise under an SGB’s constitution and/or rules and regulations on a wide range of other matters. For example, the SGB may have a claim against one of its members for breach of its duties under the constitution or the rules,1 or against an official or individual athlete for breach of disciplinary rules; member federations may protest against decisions taken by competition officials; or one member federation may assert a claim against another member federation. Again, to achieve efficient and consistent resolution of such disputes, and to avoid the sport being dragged constantly before national courts, the SGB’s constitution needs to create internal bodies and/or identify appropriate external tribunals to hear and determine each kind of dispute. Depending on the circumstances, these may not need to be independent arbitral tribunals. For example, protests about breaches of competition rules are usually heard by a competition referee and/or a jury of appeal (made up of officials of the sport) sitting in situ at the competition venue. Alleged rule breaches by member federations may be decided by the Executive Board and/or Congress, and alleged breaches by individual officials or athletes generally go to an internal or external disciplinary tribunal, in each case with a right to appeal that first decision to an independent appeal body;2 while claims between members are often assigned to an internal tribunal or arbitral panel.

30  Governance of the Sports Sector 1 See para A1.52 et seq. 2 For example, the International Equestrian Federation (FEI) sends such cases to its own FEI Tribunal, with a right of appeal to the CAS: FEI Statutes Arts 38.1 and 39.1.

A1.38 For example, part nine of the International Biathlon Union’s constitution (‘Dispute Resolution’) states: 30. Alleged violations of the Rules 30A Protests 30.1 Mechanisms will be established in the IBU  Event and Competition Rules to resolve any protest concerning the fair and proper conduct of a competition, including protests about alleged infringements by an Athlete or Athlete Support Personnel of the IBU  Event and Competition Rules, protests about alleged errors by officials, protests about competition conditions, and protests about announced results. 30B Alleged violations of the IBU Integrity Code 30.2 Alleged violations of the IBU  Integrity Code will be prosecuted by the BIU before a Disciplinary Tribunal, as follows: 30.2.1 where the alleged violation is of the anti-doping chapter of the IBU  Integrity Code, the matter will be referred to the CAS  AntiDoping Division, which will appoint one or more CAS arbitrators to sit as the Disciplinary Tribunal that will hear and determine the case in accordance with the anti-doping chapter of the IBU Integrity Code, the CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration, and the Arbitration Rules for the CAS Anti-Doping Division; and 30.2.2 where the alleged violation is of a different part of the IBU  Integrity Code, the matter will be referred to the CAS Ordinary Division, which will appoint one or more CAS arbitrators to sit as the Disciplinary Tribunal that will hear and determine the case in accordance with the relevant provisions of the IBU  Integrity Code and the CAS  Code of Sports–related Arbitration, provided always that the BIU may choose instead to refer to the Secretary General any alleged violations of the IBU Integrity Code that it considers to be minor or otherwise suitable for referral. The Secretary General will follow a process for hearing and determining such cases that is efficient and effective while respecting the due process rights of the party that is the subject of the allegations. 31. Appeals against IBU decisions 31.1 All ‘field of play’ decisions, including decisions resolving protests in accordance with the IBU Event and Competition Rules, will be final and binding on all parties concerned, and may not be appealed or otherwise challenged in any forum, save where the aggrieved party claims to have direct evidence that such decision is tainted by fraud or corruption or other bad faith/prejudice. Any such claim will be resolved exclusively by one or more arbitrators appointed by the CAS Ordinary Division, in accordance with the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration and the ‘field of play’ doctrine set out in CAS jurisprudence. 31.2 To the extent that this Constitution or the Rules (including the IBU Integrity Code) give a party a right of appeal against any decision, that appeal is to be made (unless otherwise specified in this Constitution or in those Rules) exclusively to the CAS Appeals Division, which will appoint one or three CAS arbitrators to resolve the appeal definitively in accordance with the CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration. Pending resolution of the appeal, the decision being appealed will remain in full force and effect unless the CAS orders otherwise. The decision of the CAS resolving the appeal may not be challenged in any forum or on any ground except as set out in Chapter 12 of the Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law. 32. Other claims and disputes 32.1 Subject to Article 32.3, any claim or dispute of any kind whatsoever: 32.2.1 between the IBU and one or more IBU  Members and/or IBU Officials;

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  31



32.3

32.4

32.2.2 between two or more IBU Members and/or IBU Officials; or 32.2.3 between the IBU and any other Person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the IBU or of an IBU Member; that arises out of or is related in any way to the activities of the IBU as an association or their activities as members or officials of or stakeholders in the IBU, and whether such claim or dispute arises under this Constitution or the Rules, or pursuant to a decision of the IBU, or in connection with a contract between the parties, or otherwise, will be referred to the CAS Ordinary Division, which will have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim or dispute definitively in accordance with the CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration. The decision of the CAS  Ordinary Division determining such claim or dispute may not be challenged in any forum or on any ground except as set out in Chapter 12 of the Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law. This Article 32 does not apply to the following claims and disputes: protests (which are governed exclusively by Article 30.1), alleged violations of the IBU Integrity Code or other Rules (which are governed exclusively by Article 30.2), appeals against decisions (which are governed exclusively by Article 31), and claims or disputes involving IBU Staff or BIU Staff in relation to their terms of employment or engagement by the IBU (which are governed by the dispute resolution terms agreed in their contracts of employment or engagement by the IBU).

A1.39 Decisions of an SGB’s internal dispute resolution bodies may be challenged before the courts on the same grounds as decisions of its executive bodies.1 Bodies exercising disciplinary jurisdiction and with the power to impose significant sanctions on participants must therefore be particularly careful to exercise their powers with due regard for the legal rights of those participants.2 1 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies). 2 See generally Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and Arbitral Proceedings), as well as paras B1.28-B1.30 (requirement of equal treatment) and para B1.33 (requirement that any punishment be proportionate to the offence).

A1.40 For such sports-specific dispute resolution mechanisms to work, all of the sport’s participants must be obliged to respect them. As a result, many international federations require their members not only to agree to submit disputes to bespoke judicial organs, but also to require their own members at national level to do the same. For example, Art 59 of the FIFA Statutes (June 2019) provides: 1. The confederations, member associations and leagues shall agree to recognise CAS as an independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members, affiliated players and officials comply with the decisions passed by CAS. The same obligation shall apply to intermediaries and licensed match agents. 2. Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of provisional measures is also prohibited. 3. The associations shall insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating that it is prohibited to take disputes in the association or disputes affecting leagues, members of leagues, clubs, members of clubs, players, officials and other association officials to ordinary courts of law, unless the FIFA regulations or binding legal provisions specifically provide for or stipulate recourse to ordinary courts of law. Instead of recourse to ordinary courts of law, provision shall be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognised under the rules of the association or confederation or to CAS. The associations shall also ensure that this stipulation is implemented in the association, if necessary by imposing a binding obligation on its members. The

32  Governance of the Sports Sector associations shall impose sanctions on any party that fails to respect this obligation and ensure that any appeal against such sanctions shall likewise be strictly submitted to arbitration, and not to ordinary courts of law.

A1.41 In 2007, the European Parliament expressed its disquiet at these provisions, which it considered to be an attempt to deny citizens the right of recourse to national courts.1 Similarly, the European Commission has on occasion suggested that denying participants an ability to have their competition law claims heard by a national court might itself be anti-competitive.2 However, in 2012, the European Parliament passed another resolution stating that it: ‘[…] recognises the legitimacy of sports courts for resolving disputes in sport, as long as they respect people’s fundamental rights to a fair trial; [and] calls for the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to take into account EU law provisions when it comes to settlement of sport disputes within the EU disputes arising within the EU’.3

This accords with the position under English law: the English courts have robustly defended the right of sports bodies to require their stakeholders to submit sports disputes to arbitration by bespoke sporting tribunals.4 1 Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 29  March 2007 on the future of professional football in Europe, paras 13-16 (The European Parliament ‘13. Believes that improved governance leading to more concerted self-regulation at national and European level will reduce the tendency to have recourse to the Commission and the Court of Justice; 14. Recognises the expertise and legitimacy of sporting tribunals insofar as they address the citizens’ right to a fair hearing, as laid down in Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 15. Takes the view that applying to the civil courts, even when not justified in sports terms, cannot be penalised by disciplinary regulations; and condemns the arbitrary decisions by the FIFA in this respect; 16. Asks UEFA and FIFA to accept in their statutes the right of recourse to ordinary courts, but recognises however that the principle of self-regulation implies and justifies the structures of the European sports model and the fundamental principles governing the organisation of sporting competitions, including anti-doping regulations and disciplinary sanctions’.) 2 See para D3.39. See also European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 269 (the rules requiring participants to submit all disputes to arbitration before the CAS ‘reinforce the restrictions of competition that are caused by the Eligibility rules’). 3 See European Parliament resolution of 2  February 2012 on the European dimension in sport, at para 89. 4 See eg Stretford v The Football Association, [2007] EWCA Civ 238, discussed at para D3.28 et seq and para 13.31.

5 EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER MEMBERS A1.42 Under the pyramid model of sports governance, an international federation relies heavily on its member continental and national federations to help it govern the sport wherever it is played, giving them the right and the responsibility to govern, regulate, promote, and develop the sport in their respective continental or national jurisdictions, and often providing them with significant financial and other support to help them in those efforts. The quid pro quo is that the member federations must exercise their powers and discharge their responsibilities effectively. In this section, we examine how international federations manage this vital relationship with their members, covering the process of accepting applications for membership, identifying the rights and responsibilities of members, and when action has to be taken to enforce members’ obligations, including (in extreme cases) suspending or even expelling a federation from membership.

A Admission as a member of an international federation A1.43 The international federation alone has the right to decide who to admit as a member to represent a particular country (or territory1), not the government2 or

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  33

National Olympic Committee3 of the country or territory in question. And within the international federation it is generally the members in general meeting who have the exclusive right to decide who may join their ranks.4 1 See paras A1.46-A1.47. 2 For a government to insist that it has the right to determine which body should be recognised as the national governing body for a sport would be considered by the sports movement to be improper government interference. See para A1.11 et seq; International Hockey Federation v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 159 (‘it would be contrary to the FIH’s right to autonomy to oblige it to wait until the Indian government had decided which body was to be the National Sports Federation, before making any decision’). 3 See eg  Russian Badminton Federation v International Badminton Federation, CAS  2005/A/971, para 7.2.5. The International Badminton Federation sought to justify its decision to recognise one Russian national body instead of another on the basis that the Russian Olympic Committee had recommended that action. The CAS panel rejected that argument, stating: ‘The ROC has no right to ‘pick and choose’ the national associations which […] compose its membership. The recognition of the national federations lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the international federation. This principle conforms with and remains consistent with the Rule 26 of the Olympic Charter which states that each international federation “maintains its independence and autonomy in the administration of its sport”’. See also Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 27 (‘With respect to the Appellant’s expulsion from the COC, it is doubtful whether this fact could in itself justify the Resolution. It has been held by CAS in the case CAS 2005/A/971 that “Unless relating to the participation of the national association’s athletes in the Olympic Games, the provisions of [Rules 26 and 28 of the Olympic Charter] do not vest any authority whatsoever in the NOCs which permit them to determine or co-determine the […] expulsion of a national association by its IF. This does not prohibit the NOC from making a recommendation to the IF […], but the IF is not required to follow such recommendation”’). This does not stop the international federation taking into account the views of the country’s National Olympic Committee as to which body should be admitted to membership as the national federation of the sport in that country. In fact, some international federations make recognition by the NOC a condition of membership. See eg Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, paras 8081 and 87 (‘it is in the interest of the sport of shooting and the athletes practicing this sport that the national federations are “recognized and affiliated with their National Olympic Committees”, as article 1.3.1 of the ISSF Constitution explicitly states. […] The Panel concludes that the recognition of the national shooting and rifle organization by and its affiliation to the National Olympic Committee and to the Olympic Movement is a sine qua non-condition for membership with the ISSF. […] According to the ISSF Constitution and German law, a national shooting and rifle organization which has lost its recognition by and its affiliation with the National Olympic Committee may be expelled for valid reasons, provided that the proceedings leading to the expulsion meet the requirements of due process’). However, given that the Olympic Charter requires the NOC to recognise only a national federation that is admitted to membership of the international federation (see para A1.22, n 3), making NOC recognition a condition of membership creates a circularity that is unhelpful at best and at worst can contribute to intractable membership disputes (as happened, for example, in International Hockey Federation v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828). 4 See eg  FIH  Constitution (November 2018) Art 2.4(a) (‘Only Congress may admit an NA as a full Member’); Jersey Football Association (JFA) v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787 (CAS panel set aside the UEFA Executive Committee decision to reject JFA’s application for membership, because only the UEFA Congress had that power).

A1.44 As a general principle, SGBs (or, more specifically, their members in general meeting) have a very broad discretion as to who to admit (or not admit) as a member.1 Any court or arbitral panel exercising supervisory jurisdiction will generally be assiduous not to second-guess such decisions on the merits.2 However, the SGB’s discretion is not absolute.3 In particular: (a) The SGB must not make a membership decision that is contrary to the legitimate expectations that the applicant derived from the SGB’s rules and/or conduct.4 (b) The SGB must not make an arbitrary decision5 or one that treats the applicant differently from other federations.6 (c) The SGB must not act anti-competitively.7 The CAS has held that the impact of competition law is that an SGB that has exclusive control over access to the sport might ‘have in fact a duty to accept new members if they fulfil all statutory conditions to that effect’.8

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If an SGB’s denial of a membership application crosses one of these lines, the reviewing court or arbitral panel may order it to admit the applicant to membership.9 1 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 57 (under English law, ‘sports governing bodies are afforded a wide margin of appreciation in governing their affairs, in particular in respect of membership matters’). This is also the clear position under Swiss law. See eg IHF v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 142 (‘The autonomy of Swiss associations is particularly evident with regard to determining the composition of their membership. With respect to the exclusion of members, for example, the Swiss Civil Code has granted associations “a freedom that almost reaches arbitrariness”’); Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS  2002/O/410, para  29 (‘Generally, freedom of association includes the freedom of an association to accept or to refuse any applicant for membership, even if the applicant fulfils all statutory conditions’); Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 103 (‘the principle of the autonomy of the association […] means, inter alia, that the association is free to accept or refuse members. The association thus has a discretionary right in this respect. This right is usually exercised by an association by setting forth in its articles of association criteria and conditions for the admission of members’). See also Spanish Bowling Federation v International Bowling Federation & Catalan Bowling federation, CAS  2007/A/1424, para  29, where the CAS upheld the decision by the International Bowling Federation (now World Bowling) to admit the Catalan federation as a new member, despite objections by the Spanish federation (‘The Panel wishes to add that it intends to give priority in the political debate to the principle of the independence and autonomy of international federations, particularly in organisational matters. In this respect, the Panel refers to the case law of the CAS, which has repeatedly affirmed the importance of safeguarding the independence and autonomy of international federations in relation to the administration of their sport (see in particular CAS OG 02/001, paragraph 29). In particular, the CAS case law recognises that the general assemblies of the international federations have “final jurisdiction over any question relating to the affiliation of a new member”, which is described in that case law as “(…) a discretionary power which leaves a very wide margin of appreciation” (CAS 2004/A/776, paragraph 71)’) (unofficial English translation of French original). 2 See eg  Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme v Kuwait Motor Sports Club, Swiss Federal Tribunal decision number 4A_314/2017 dated 28 May 2018, para 3.2.2 (English translation available at: swissarbitrationdecisions.com) (‘According to the case law, in view of the autonomy of sports federations, it is not for the CAS to substitute itself for the competent organ of an international federation to decide on the merits of a federation’s application for membership’, citing Federacio Catalana de Patinatge v International Roller Sports Federation, CAS  2004/A/776, para  49); Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Union, CAS 2009/A/1823, paras 9.1-9.2 (‘The CAS has neither the authority nor the ambition to make policy for sports federations. In particular, it is not for the CAS to say whether one entity or another is a more suitable member of a federation. […] The CAS’s authority is rather to verify the legal bases of federal actions, irrespective of their wisdom or otherwise, in the interest of parties who have a stake in the proper functioning of the federations […]’); Jersey Football Association (JFA) v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 137 (CAS panel declined the JFA’s request to order the UEFA Congress to ‘take all necessary measures to admit the JFA as a full member of UEFA without delay’, because the UEFA Congress has discretion as to whether to admit new members, and it was the panel’s understanding that some of the membership requirements were not met: ‘The Panel is therefore bound to respect such power of discretion. It is not the role of the CAS to replace the due discretion of a body of a sports association by the discretionary views of the respective Panel. In order to reach the conclusion that the UEFA Congress should be ordered to admit the JFA as a UEFA member, the Panel holds that it would have to reach the conclusion that, even after the consideration of all due discretion, such order would be the only legitimate outcome of the evaluation of the Appellant’s application’). 3 IHF v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 143, citing USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para at 55 (same). See also Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 29-31 (‘However, this principle [of an SGB’s freedom to decide who to accept as a member] is now generally considered to be limited, such limits being derived in particular from: (i) the contractual nature of the membership to an association and the related obligation to act in good faith in the context of contractual or pre-contractual discussions (Article  2 Swiss Civil Code [other references omitted]); (ii) the general prohibition of arbitrary decisions and the need of a control of the association’s decision to refuse a new member (Article 2 paragraph 2 Swiss Civil Code); (iii) in professional matters, the provisions of competition law and the related need to protect personality rights (see, JdT 1957 I 202-212; Article 7 of the Swiss Federal Law on Cartels)’); Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 105. 4 Where an SGB through its conduct creates a legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant member federation that it will be granted membership if it meets the relevant membership conditions, the SGB will be precluded from denying it such membership if the conditions are met: Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 118 (‘When reviewing the application of the GFA and recommending accepting the GFA as a member of UEFA, the Expert Panel created “legitimate expectation” for the GFA to achieve its goal to become affiliated with UEFA. Although this does not by itself create a claim to membership, it lifts the threshold for UEFA to reject GFA’s application. In other words, after having created legitimate expectations, there must be material reasons (and not only

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  35 the exercise of an uncontrolled voting power) to reject the membership application of the GFA. This Panel finds the reasons given by UEFA why it rejected the GFA’s application not convincing enough to outweigh the legitimate expectations created by its own Expert Panel’). For further discussion of the doctrine of legitimate expectations, see para B1.36 et seq. 5 See eg Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 32-33 (‘The Panel holds, in that respect, that the exclusion of athletes, or of a sports association to which athletes are affiliated, from an international sports organisation which occupies a dominant or monopolistic position in the organisation of the sports competitions at issue may have the effect of a boycott. It is the Panel’s opinion that such an exclusion should therefore be held invalid, at least to the extent that it is not grounded on objective and justified reasons. The Respondent itself admitted that a refusal by UEFA to grant the GFA provisional membership could be considered as illegal if it were arbitrary or based on “unjustified reasons”’); Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 115 (‘The discretion which UEFA is entitled to exercise when accepting members, cannot be exercised arbitrarily. It must be exercised in good faith which means that there must be justified and objective reasons for denying membership to an applicant who fulfils all the requirements for membership’) and para 117 (‘In the view of this Panel there are no objective and justified reasons to reject the GFA’s application, nor has UEFA been able to identify any such reasons. Consequently, this Panel finds that a bona fide exercise of UEFA’s discretionary right should have lead [sic] to acceptance of the GFA’s application for membership’). 6 Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS  2007/O/1237, para107 (‘The rejection of an application for membership for discriminatory reasons may constitute an unlawful breach of personality rights. This is recognised not only for professional and trade associations but also for sports associations with monopolistic powers’) and para  109 (‘A  violation of Art. 28  CC [Swiss Civil Code], especially if this consists of discriminatory behaviour, may lead to an obligation of the discriminatory to enter into a contract with the discriminated person’. On the facts of the case, the CAS found (at para 110) that ‘[i]n the past, UEFA has repeatedly accepted as members the governing bodies of football of certain territories which are comparable to Gibraltar, at least with respect to their degree of independence and the fact that they are not independent members of the United Nations, such as the Faroe Islands, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. This Panel finds it difficult to draw a distinction between those members and Gibraltar, and concludes that non-admission of the GFA as a member of UEFA would constitute a discrimination which violates Art. 28 CC [Swiss Civil Code, protecting personality rights]’. 7 Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 30; Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS  2007/O/1237, paras 122-127 (‘this Panel regards UEFA as an association of the kind that it is intended to be covered by the Cartel Act and also by EU law provisions relating to restrictions on competition […] . By refusing membership to the GFA, UEFA has denied the GFA access to all of these programmes which have not only a sporting, but also an economic impact on the participating federations. Such refusal must be regarded as a refusal to do business which violates Article  7 para. 2a of the Cartel Act and may lead to the sanctions addressed by Article  12 of the Cartel Act. […] [T]he unlawful restraint of competition may be cured by elimination of the barrier to becoming a member of UEFA […] . Based on Article 13(b) of the Cartel Act, a person may therefore be obliged to contract with another person or, more specifically, to accept a person as a member in an association […] . It is for these reasons that this Panel will declare in the operative part of this award that the GFA is entitled to full membership in UEFA, and that it will order the UEFA to take all the necessary measures to achieve this’). In contrast, in Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.74, the CAS panel rejected the argument that suspending the membership of the KFA was in breach of competition law, because ‘in accordance with well-established principles of EU competition law, which the Swiss competition authorities apply readily in Switzerland, restrictions that are proportionate to achieve a legitimate objective do not violate competition law’, citing case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492. For more information on competition law and its application to the sport sector, see generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport). 8 Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS  2002/O/410, para  31 (‘Furthermore, in the context of sports associations, it is now often considered that associations in a monopolistic position […] have in fact a duty to accept new members if they fulfil all statutory conditions to that effect. This opinion is derived both from the legislation on cartels and from the provisions on the protection of the personality’). 9 See Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, where the CAS held that UEFA ‘shall take all necessary measures to admit the Gibraltar Football Association to full membership of the Union des Associations Européenes de Football without delay’; and Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3776, where the CAS ordered the FIFA Executive Committee to send the GFA’s application for FIFA membership to the FIFA Congress, which ‘shall take all necessary measures to admit the Gibraltar Football Association as a full member of FIFA without delay’.

A1.45 In order to be admitted to membership of an international federation, a national federation must satisfy the criteria for admission to membership set out in

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the international federation’s constitution, and continue to satisfy them thereafter. Those criteria will vary from sport to sport, but the key requirements typically include1 that the national federation must: (a) be a legal entity properly constituted in accordance with the law of its country; (b) be solvent; (c) be concerned with the administration, organisation, and practising of the sport in issue (either that sport solely and exclusively, or else in conjunction with other sports2); (d) claim the exclusive right to govern its sport (both the men’s and women’s game3) in its country;4 (e) have a constitution that: (i) complies with the Olympic Charter, the World Anti-Doping Code, and the international federation’s constitution and rules; (ii) declares the federation’s opposition to any unlawful discrimination on the grounds of race, skin colour, national or social origin, gender, sex, sexual orientation, language, political or other opinion, religion or other beliefs, circumstances of birth, or other improper grounds; and (iii) includes a formal undertaking to be bound by the membership obligations applicable to national federations; and (f) stage competitions and carry out developmental and other activities in its country at least to the minimum level prescribed by the international federation. 1 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 5.1; World Athletics Constitution (November 2019) Art 7; FIH Statutes (November 2018) Art 2.3; and ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Arts 2.4 and 2.7 and definition of ‘Eligibility Criteria’. 2 For example, many national associations govern both skiing and biathlon, and Article  5.1.2 of the IBU Constitution specifically permits this. 3 This was introduced by the IOC as a means of addressing inequalities between men’s and women’s sport. 4 See eg IHF v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, paras 5–6, in which the International Hockey Federation (FIH) changed its membership requirements to say that there could no longer be two members from one country, one representing men’s hockey and the other representing women’s hockey; instead there could only be one member for each country, representing both men’s and women’s hockey. The India Hockey Federation (IHF), which governed men’s field hockey, and the Indian Women’s Hockey Federation (IWHF), which governed women’s field hockey, created a new entity called the Indian Hockey Confederation (IHC), which purported to govern men’s and women’s field hockey. However, in 2008, the FIH discovered ‘that the IHC did not govern either men’s or women’s hockey, but was merely a facade behind which the IHF continued to govern men’s hockey and the IWHF continued to govern women’s hockey’. While the IWHF was merged into the IHF, and the IHF claimed to be the FIH member as a successor to the IHC, the FIH recognised a new body, Hockey India, set up in 2009 with the support of the Indian Olympic Association. After several years of legal challenge, in 2014 the FIH Congress unanimously approved Hockey India as the FIH member for India, which decision was upheld by the CAS. As a further example, the ICC suspended the USA Cricket Association (USACA) in 2015 because (inter alia) it no longer seemed to be the de facto governing body of cricket in the US, since the majority of the US cricket community were not members of USACA. Following USACA’s failure to comply with reinstatement conditions geared at uniting the US cricket community behind USACA, the ICC expelled USACA from membership, and USACA’s challenge to its right to do so was rejected in ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017. See para 77 (‘The Reinstatement Conditions, certainly the first three [ie obtaining ICC approval of a new Constitution, adoption of that new Constitution, and election of a new Board under the new Constitution], were designed to ensure that that USACA satisfied an indispensable element of membership, set out both in the membership criteria (see para 3.1) and in Article 2.7(D), that USACA was a national body in control of cricket within its country (a position which, at the time of the suspension, ICC considered USACA did not enjoy)’); para 81 (‘I consider that it was Reinstatement Conditions 1-3 which were key; and their satisfaction the most important precondition of USACA’s reinstatement from suspension. My reasons are these. First they enjoyed pride of place at the head of the list of reinstatement conditions. Second the form of any legal person’s constitution is critical to its governance; it is the source from which all else flows. Third on several occasions […] ICC indicated that USACA’s adoption of the ICCapproved constitution might cause the ICC to overlook USACA’s failure to satisfy other Reinstatement Conditions (which were therefore necessarily perceived by the ICC to be of lesser significance). Fourth, the record shows that ICC spent much time and effort in identifying what provisions in any

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  37 USACA constitution to replace the 2008 version (which both parties agreed before me was no longer fit for purpose) were necessary in its view to achieve what each party asserted to be a key objective of unifying the USA cricketing community (that the parties disagreed on which provisions would achieve that objective is irrelevant to this particular point). Fifth, in so far as ICC’s concern was that USACA under its present regime bore responsibility for the division in that community, the disputed provisions […] were designed to ensure that the dominant figures in that regime could not simply continue seamlessly in post’); and para 100 (‘This therefore inexcusable (as I find) failure to comply with this mandatory constitutional reinstatement condition would in my view per se justify ICC conference’s consideration of whether or not to expel USACA’).

A1.46 It is obviously important for an international federation to define clearly the meaning of ‘country’ under its rules. It is not bound by international norms on this point, and so may recognise for sporting purposes a member federation that represents a ‘country’ that is not recognised as a sovereign state in international law.1 For example, many sports have different members for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland; while the IOC only allows Team GB to enter the Olympic Games. 1 For example, World Athletics defines a ‘Member Federation’ as ‘the national governing body for the sport of Athletics in a Country or Territory which has been admitted to membership to World Athletics’, where ‘Country’ is defined as ‘a self-governing geographical area of the world recognised as an independent state by international law and international governmental bodies’, and ‘Territory’ is defined as ‘a geographical area of the world which is not a Country, but which has aspects of self-government, at least to the extent of being autonomous in the control of its sport, and which is recognised as such by the World Athletics’. See World Athletics’ Generally Applicable Definitions. See also FIFA Statutes (June 2019) Art 11.6 (‘An association in a region which has not yet gained independence may, with the authorisation of the member association in the country on which it is dependent, also apply for admission to FIFA’).

A1.47 Sometimes an SGB may find itself dragged into political disputes about the sovereignty of particular ‘countries’. For example, in Reel v Holder (for IAAF),1 the English Court of Appeal found that an IAAF resolution to make its member federation from China the sole representative within the IAAF for both mainland China and Taiwan amounted to a decision to expel the Taiwanese federation (which had been a member since 1956), which was beyond any power conferred in the IAAF’s rules. The Court of Appeal noted that the word ‘country’ in the rules delineated the area over which one governing amateur athletic association exercised authority; that membership of the federation was thus not confined to associations representing sovereign or national states.2 It ruled:3 ‘Those who formed the federation [IAAF] were not concerned with international politics; they were concerned to set standards for athletics throughout the world. They were concerned to collect together people who would be in a position to exercise control over athletics in various parts of the world. Unless a governing body of some kind applies for membership, the federation is not concerned to determine if a given place or area is a country. It is only in connection with an application for membership by an applicant who puts himself forward as a governing body for a particular place, district or region that it becomes necessary to consider the meaning of “country” in the rules. One thing that is clear is that there may only be one member for each country. Therefore, in entertaining an application, it has to be seen whether or not there is an existing member who has control, or a measure of control, over the same area as that for which the applicant contends. There must be no doubt who is to speak with authority as the governing body for a particular group of athletes. The word “country” has been used in the rules in order to delineate the area of authority. They do not use the word in the sense of sovereign state’.4 1 2 3 4

[1979] 1 WLR 1252, aff’d [1981] 1 WLR 1226 [CA]. Ibid at p 1226. Ibid at p 1232. For examples of similar disputes, see Football Association of Serbia v UEFA, CAS  2016/A/4602, paras 126–130 (The Serbian federation sought to have UEFA’s decision to admit the Football Federation of Kosovo to membership set aside on the basis that the Kosovo federation was not ‘based in a country which is recognised by the United Nations as an independent state’, as required under

38  Governance of the Sports Sector then Art 5(1) of the FIFA Statutes. The CAS panel noted that the UN does not ‘recognise’ countries, and so it was required to interpret Art 5(1) to determine the meaning of ‘country’. It referred to the definition of ‘country’ in another provision of the FIFA Statutes (‘an independent state recognised by the international community’), which accorded with the Olympic Charter definition. The CAS panel also noted that Kosovo had already been recognised by the IOC and a number of other international federations (FIBA, FINA, UCI, IAAF, FIS, etc). The CAS panel stated that ‘if the UEFA Statutes are interpreted in line with the common understanding in the sporting community, it becomes evident that FFK fulfils the membership criteria’. On that basis, the CAS held that Kosovo’s admission to membership was valid); Federació Catalana de Patinatge v International Roller Sports Federation, CAS 2004/A/776 (CAS panel ordered the International Roller Sports Federation to have its Congress reconsider the membership application of the Catalan Roller Skating Federation); and the cases of Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237 and Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3776 (CAS panels ordered each of UEFA and FIFA to ‘take all necessary measures to admit the Gibraltar Football Association to full membership’).

A1.48 The rules of an international federation should also set out a clear procedure for resolving competing claims for membership by bodies from the same country, based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria.1 Simply failing to deal with the issue is not acceptable.2 1 For example, Art 2.4(d) of the FIH Constitution provides: ‘If membership for a particular Country is vacant, and more than one body applies to be admitted as a Member for that Country, or in other circumstances where there are competing claims to be entitled to membership for a particular Country and the Executive Board deems it appropriate to apply this clause, the competing claims shall be resolved as follows: (i) The Executive Board will specify the criteria by which the competing claims are to be assessed. (ii) The Executive Board will appoint appropriate persons to a committee to consider the respective claims of the competing bodies, in accordance with a fair and impartial process, and then to make a written recommendation as to which of those bodies, in the committee’s view, best meets the criteria and so should be the FIH’s Member for that Country. (iii) The Executive Board will submit that recommendation to the next meeting of Congress for decision. However, if it sees fit the Executive Board may admit/treat the recommended body as a provisional Member pending that meeting, strictly without prejudice to the powers of Congress pursuant to sub-clause (iv), below. (iv) At its next meeting, Congress will consider the competing claims, together with the committee’s recommendation, and will give each claimant an equal opportunity to be heard by Congress, before deciding which claim to accept. (v) The decision of Congress shall be final. The rejected claimant may challenge that decision exclusively by appeal to the CAS in accordance with Article 14.3(b)(i) of these Statutes’. This process was scrutinised and passed muster in Indian Hockey Federation v International Hockey Federation & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828. 2 Reel v Holder (for IAAF) [1979] 1 WLR  1252, aff’d [1981] 1 WLR  1226  CA, p  1232 (‘One thing that is clear is that there may only be one member for each country. Therefore, in entertaining an application, it has to be seen whether or not there is an existing member who has control, or a measure of control, over the same area as that for which the applicant contends. There must be no doubt who is to speak with authority as the governing body for a particular group of athletes’). In Kuwait Motor Sports Club (KMSC) v Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme (FIM), CAS  2015/O/4316, the Kuwait International Automobile Club (KIAC) was recognised by FIM as an Affiliate Member for Kuwait. However KMSC was recognised by the Kuwait Public Authority for Youth and Sports. In September 2009, the KMSC informed FIM of its wish to become a member of FIM. KIAC opposed it, and when FIM failed to act on the KMSC’s application for more than two and a half years, the KCMS filed an appeal at CAS. The CAS panel found the delay by FIM amounted to a formal denial of justice, and ordered FIM to rule on KMSC’s application for membership within nine months. FIM challenged the CAS award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction (PILA Art 190(2)(b)) and for ruling ultra petita, ie rendering a decision that goes beyond the claims submitted to the tribunal (PILA Art 190(2)(c)), but the challenge was dismissed (Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme v Kuwait Motor Sports Club, Swiss Federal Tribunal decision number 4A_314/2017 dated 28 May 2018).

B Defining the rights and obligations of members A1.49 The rights of members of SGBs will depend on the type of membership held (full or associate/provisional), and will vary across sports. However, national federations that are full members in good standing of an international federation will typically have the right to: (a) recognition by the international federation and its members as the body with the ‘sole and exclusive right’ to govern the sport in its country;

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  39

(b) appoint delegates to attend and speak on its behalf at meetings of the international federation’s Congress; (c) submit proposed motions to the Executive Board and Congress, eg on changes to the rules and regulations for participation in the sport; (d) vote on motions put before Congress; (e) nominate individuals who meet the eligibility criteria for election or appointment to the Executive Board or committees; (f) receive copies of reports required to be made to Congress, and other official information distributed about the federation; (g) enter athletes in international competitions (in accordance with the relevant eligibility and qualification rules); (h) participate in development programmes and activities organised by the international federation; and (i) bid to host international competitions sanctioned by the international federation.1 1 See eg  IBU  Constitution (October 2019) Art 6; FIH  Constitution (November 2018) Art 2.2(a); ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Art 2.3.

A1.50 The obligations imposed on members of international federations will also vary across sports.1 However, there are certain obligations that are common to most sports because they embody the vital role that the national federation plays in the pyramid system of governance and control of the sport.2 In addition to requiring continued satisfaction of the criteria for admission as a member in the first place,3 and also requiring payment of an annual membership fee,4 typically an international federation’s constitution will require a member national federation to: (a) (b) (c) (d)

respect, support, and promote the purposes of the international federation; administer, promote, and develop the sport in the national federation’s country; develop, stage, and sanction competitions in its country; participate in other competitions only if they been duly sanctioned by the international federation (for international competitions) or by other national federations that are members of the international federation (for other competitions);5 (e) determine its officeholders by democratic elections; (f) manage its affairs autonomously and without interference from bodies outside the Olympic Movement;6 (g) comply in all respects with the international federation’s constitution and rules, and the decisions of its Congress, Executive Board, disciplinary tribunals, and the CAS; (h) adopt, implement, and enforce within its country a constitution and regulations that comply with, and are not inconsistent with, the constitution and other rules and regulations of the international federation, including anti-doping regulations that are compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code; (i) recognise and enforce within its country: (i) all decisions of the international federation’s constituent bodies, officials, disciplinary tribunals, and the CAS; (ii) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed under the rules and regulations of the international federation; and (iii) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed on participants in the sport by other national federations that are members of the international federation; (j) require any participants in its competitions and activities to submit to its rules and regulations, and the rules and regulations of the international federation, as a condition of such participation; (k) adopt and enforce rules prohibiting persons under its jurisdiction from participating in competitions in its sport that have not been properly sanctioned

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by the international federation (in the case of international competitions) or the national federation (in the case of other competitions);7 (l) not do anything (by act or omission) that risks bringing the sport or the international federation into disrepute or that is contrary to the integrity and best interests of the sport or the international federation;8 (m) agree to the resolution of disputes through the disputes resolution procedure provided for by the international federation (usually by way of arbitration, including before CAS);9 and (n) provide reports on its activities to the international federation upon request.10  1 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’).   2 See para A1.42.   3 See para A1.45.  4 For example, Article  10.2 of World Athletics’ Constitution (November 2019) provides that ‘[a] Member may be suspended or expelled from Membership in accordance with this Constitution if any Membership Fees or other fees or payments to World Athletics are due and outstanding for more than thirty (30) days after the Due Date, or any later date, approved by Council upon application by the Member Federation’.   5 See para A1.61.   6 See para A1.2. See also paras A1.11 et seq.   7 See para A1.61.   8 See para B1.23.   9 See para A1.36. 10 For a typical list of such membership obligations, see eg  IBU  Constitution (October 2019) Art 7; FIH Constitution (November 2018) Arts 2.2(b) and 2.3; ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Arts 2.4 and 2.7(A).

A1.51 To comply with the principle of legal certainty,1 the international federation should clearly identify in its constitution what consequences may apply in the event that a member federation breaches its membership obligations. It will not be permitted to impose any consequences not provided for in the constitution, however much the member federation may deserve them.2 The range of sanctions should include (for serious cases) the right to suspend the member for a set period or until the member has satisfied certain conditions (during which suspension the member federation may not exercise any membership rights, including in particular the right to enter its athletes in international events), as well as (for the most serious cases) the right to expel the member. In addition, there will generally be a range of less severe sanctions for less serious cases, which might be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions, such as a warning or reprimand, a fine, withholding of grants or subsidies, suspension of particular membership rights, together with a catch-all power to impose ‘such other reasonable sanctions’ as the appropriate body within the SGB may consider appropriate.3 1 For a discussion of which, see para B1.19 et seq. 2 See para A1.55 and para B1.22. 3 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 10.1 and Appendix 4; FIH Constitution (November 2018) Arts 2.6 and 2.7; World Athletics Constitution (November 2019) Arts 13 and 14; ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Arts 2.10 and 2.11.

C Enforcing membership obligations A1.52 To maintain the integrity of the pyramid structure of governance and regulation of the sport, the international federation has to be ready, willing, and able to enforce the obligations that its national federations have assumed as members, including (if necessary) by suspending or even withdrawing membership from a national federation that fails to comply with its obligations. This is particularly true of the obligation on member federations to adopt and enforce effectively in their

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  41

respective national jurisdictions the rules and regulations issued by the international federation to set the playing conditions for the sport, in particular the rules that protect the integrity of competition, such as the anti-doping rules. If the international federation fails to enforce this obligation strictly, the standards it has set will not be applied uniformly throughout the sport across the world. Instead, the defaulting national federation, and its athletes, will be playing by a different set of rules, and the playing field will not be level.1 1 RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 82 (the IPC is ‘dependent on its (national) members to implement its policies on a national level […]. [As the IPC pointed out] this federal system with complementary international and national obligations is the core back-bone of the fight against doping’); IFBB  v IWGA, CAS  2010/A/2119, headnotes and paras 27-34 (‘the decision to suspend the IFBB from participation in the World Games was based on the IFBB’s failure to take serious measures to address doping within its system and not on vicarious imputation to the IFBB of the actions of its athletes. In other words, the IFBB was held responsible for its own omissions, and not for the acts of third parties. […] An international federation which wishes to take part in the World Games must respect the rules of the IWGA and apply proper anti-doping policies. If it is not in a position to ensure the fair conduct of its sport – for whatever reason – such federation cannot claim to have its sport, tainted by doping, included in the World Games programme – so involving indirectly the IWGA in its failures’). In ICC  v USACA, ICC  Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16  June 2017, paras 50-56, USACA argued that Art 3(A) of the 2016  ICC  Memorandum of Association (which provided that ‘The objects for which the Council is established are: (A) To administer, develop, co-ordinate, regulate and promote the game of cricket worldwide in co-operation with its Members […]’) meant that it was beyond the competence of the ICC to require amendments to USACA’s constitution as a condition of reinstatement from suspension due to breach of its membership obligations. The sole arbitrator (Michael Beloff QC) rejected that argument as follows: ‘It is axiomatic that ICC cannot act outwith its objects. … In my view the natural and ordinary meaning of paragraph 3(A) of the MOA is that ICC’s object is to work together with its members where such cooperation is necessary in order to achieve the effective administration, development, co-ordination, regulation and promotion of the sport worldwide in accordance with the characteristic pyramid system of governance and regulation of international sports. […] it would be destructive of the harmonisation of global standards, eg in the fields of anti-doping or sex discrimination, if a member could simply pick and choose what principles or rules to adopt in defiance of ICC (cf IFBB v IWGA CAS 2010/A/2119 at paras 27-28). In my view, on the contrary, its duty to collaborate involves necessary subordination to the requirements of ICC (as long as they are in the broad sense intra vires) as the quid pro quo of its membership. The words “in cooperation with its Members” cannot sensibly be construed as giving a member a right of veto over a valid proposal of ICC. I conclude that […] [the] submission that it is beyond the constitutional competence of the ICC to require of USACA amendments to the latter’s constitution is wrong. The power to do anything conducive to achieving ICC’s developmental, regulatory and other objectives in cooperation with its members clearly includes the power to require a member to do that which is necessary for the achievement of those objectives and to sanction a member for its refusal (or failure) to do so’.

A1.53 Membership obligations are enforceable in the same way as any other contractual obligations, including (in extreme cases) by termination of the membership contract. As the CAS has stated: ‘it is a fundamental principle of the law of associations in all applicable jurisdictions that members of associations have an obligation to satisfy the requirements for membership in the association and if they fail to do so those members may have their association membership adversely affected. In many ways, this is the contract for being part of an association and the rules upon which all association members are expected to conduct themselves’.1 1 Russian Olympic Committee & Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 124. In ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 39, sole arbitrator Michael Beloff QC cited that passage with approval, and noted that it also reflects the position under English law. See also Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.14 (‘The broad discretion and autonomy which FIFA enjoys under Swiss law means that it can require its members to abide by its Statutes. A failure to do so may result in sanctions’).

A1.54 Similar to the limited review conducted of an international federation’s decision not to admit an applicant as a member,1 if an international federation’s suspension or expulsion or other sanctioning of a member national federation is

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challenged, the supervising court or arbitral panel will not second-guess the merits of that decision, but rather should simply ensure that it respects the following legal constraints on SGB decisions and actions.2 1 See para A1.44. 2 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017 (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator), para 73 (‘whether the issue of the propriety of the proposed expulsion is approached through the lens of company law, the law of associations, or the principles of public law which have migrated into the private sector, especially where powerful sports governing bodies are concerned, […] the approach will be essentially the same. The starting point is that sports governing bodies know what is best for their sport. The law’s intervention therefore is consciously restrained’) and para 40 (‘the role of an arbitral panel reviewing a decision to expel a member of an international federation is not to “make policy for sports federations’’, ie by evaluating whether it thinks that the entity is a suitable member, but ‘is rather to verify the legal bases of federal actions, irrespective of their wisdom or otherwise, in the interest of parties who have a stake in the proper functioning of the federations, including persons or entities who at a particular moment may find themselves in the minority’’), quoting Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS  2009/A/1823, paras 9.19.2 (‘The CAS has neither the authority nor the ambition to make policy for sports federations. In particular, it is not for the CAS to say whether one entity or another is a more suitable member of a federation. […] The CAS’s authority is rather to verify the legal bases of federal actions, irrespective of their wisdom or otherwise, in the interest of parties who have a stake in the proper functioning of the federations, including persons or entities who at a particular moment may find themselves in the minority’).

A1.55 First, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, the international federation must be able to show that the obligation that the member federation is said to have breached, and the sanction that has been imposed for that breach, are set out clearly in the applicable rules.1 For example, in Tsagaev v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), the IWF purported to suspend a member national federation due to repeated doping infractions by some of its athletes, with the consequence that all of the member’s athletes were excluded from the 2000 Olympic Games. On appeal, a CAS panel overturned the federation’s suspension on the basis that the specific provision in the IWF statutes that the IWF invoked to justify the suspension stated that the sanction for repeated doping infractions by a member’s athletes was a fine, and that the federation would only be suspended if it did not pay the fine. The IWF’s alternative argument was that it had ‘an inherent power to take appropriate action, including the suspension of a member federation, if the behaviour of a member federation is harmful to that particular sport’. That was also rejected by the CAS panel: ‘Although an international federation may have certain general discretionary powers to govern its sport even in the absence of specific provisions in the statutes or regulations, the Panel is of the clear view that a suspension of an entire federation from participation in the Olympic Games, including innocent athletes who have not committed a doping offence or any other violation of the applicable rules, at least requires an explicit, and unambiguous legal basis’.2

The CAS panel applauded the IWF for its desire to signal its commitment to stamp out doping in its sport, but noted: ‘Laudable policy objectives, and alacrity in pursuing them, do not, however, obviate the fundamental and no less legitimate requirement of having a legal basis for disciplinary action’.3 1 See para B1.19 et seq. 2 Tsagaev v IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, para 22 (emphasis in original). 3 Ibid, para 25. See also Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Union, CAS 2009/1823, para 9.4 (‘Whether one is talking of a nation-State or an international sports federation, the exclusion of a constituent entity cannot be the result of an arbitrary executive action or by the extra-constitutional vote of a majority of the community – no matter how large the majority, no matter how unpopular the excluded member’) and para 9.6 (‘PJU’s eviction as Continental Union was no small matter; it entailed the extinction of its raison d’être. It naturally cannot be legitimised in the absence of a clear legal foundation. For reasons to be explained immediately below, the Panel has no doubt in concluding that the decision lacked legal basis’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  43 Federation, CAS  2016/A/4727, para  208 (‘Finally, the Panel notes the arguments of the ISSF that Article 1.13.5.1 [of the ISSF Constitution] gives it a wide discretion to suspend its members, citing CAS 2011/A/2525. The Panel maintains that there has to be a clear purpose to better serve and some evidence of behaviour by the Member that is putting this purpose in danger. A disciplinary sanction such as suspension should not be at the whim of the association’) and para 213 (‘The Panel does not seek to condone the actions of the Kuwaiti Government in any way at all, however, the suspension or expulsion of a member by an International Federation is a serious matter and must be done in accordance with its own constitution and in accordance with the applicable law. Without calling into question the right of the General Assembly of an IF to take disciplinary measures against its national members, it appears in the present case that the reasons retained by the ISSF to suspend the KSF are not justified by any applicable rule’); Belarus Canoe Association & Belarusian Senior Men’s Canoe and Kayak team members v ICF, CAS  2016/A/4708, paras 72-80 (‘In the Panel’s view, issuing a decision first and thereafter searching for a possible legal basis does not confirm to the principle of legality. […] Article 12.3 read together with Sub-Article 12.3.1 provides that in case of four or more anti-doping rule violations within a twelve month period, the ICF (Executive Committee) has two options: a) to ban all officials from the BCA for participation in any ICF activities for a period of up to two years and/or to fine the BCA in an amount up to 15.000 Euros. The Appealed Decision deviates from the above legal basis in three ways: it includes athletes, it does not ban all officials of the BCA and it does not ban all officials for participation in any ICF activities, but from participation at “all international competitions”. […] The Panel, thus, holds that by applying Article 12.3 read together with Sub-Article 12.3.1 ICF ADR on other persons than officials on the one hand, and by not addressing all BCA officials on the other hand, and finally by banning them, but not from any ICF activities, the Appealed Decision violated its legal basis’); IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, para 12(A) (the first question to ask when reviewing the legality of the IWGA’s decision to suspend the IFBB from the World Games is whether it has a ‘proper legal basis in the IWGA rules and regulations’) and paras 14-41 (analysis concluding that there was a proper legal basis in the IWGA rules for suspension); BWF v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319, para 57 (finding that the IWF rules clearly provided for the sanction imposed, namely banning the BWF from entering athletes in the next edition of the Olympic Games); RPC  v IPC, CAS  2016/A/4745, para  83 (IPC  Constitution provided the IPC with the explicit and unambiguous right to suspend the rights of a member National Paralympic Committee that fails to comply with its membership obligations) The position is the same under English law: ICC  v USACA, ICC  Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16  June 2017, para  44 (The ICC’s ‘relationship with its members is governed by contract, ie its Memorandum (‘MOA’) and Articles of Association (‘Articles’), and the source of any power on the part of the ICC to expel or suspend a member must be found in those instruments by which both parties are bound’) and paras 57-58 (‘These principles articulated in CAS cases [citing RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745 and IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119] are not discrepant, but rather dovetail with domestic jurisprudence. See generally Flaherty v NGRC [2005] EWCA Civ 1117 CA (‘it is the courts’ function to control illegality and make sure that a body does not act outside its powers. But it is not in the interest of sport or anybody else for the courts to seek to double guess regulating bodies in charge of domestic arrangements. Sports regulating bodies ordinarily have unrivalled and practical knowledge of the particular sport that they are required to regulate. They cannot be expected to act in every detail as if they are a court of law. Provided they act lawfully and within the ambit of their powers, the courts should allow them to get on with the job they are required to do’ (para 20ff)). Similarly, in Reel v Holder (for IAAF) [1979] 1 WLR 1252, aff’d [1981] 1 WLR 1226 CA, p.1231, the English Court of Appeal found that the IAAF (now World Athletics) had no power under its rules to expel a member, and therefore the IAAF’s expulsion of the Taiwanese athletic federation was invalid.

A1.56 Secondly, the process by which it is determined whether the alleged breach(es) of the member’s obligations have taken place and (if so) what consequences should be imposed must be fair, ie  it must respect the member’s right to natural justice (in civil law terms, the ‘right to be heard’).1 This generally means that, at a minimum: (a) The member must be given fair and proper notice of the provisions in the rulebook that it is alleged to have breached, and the facts on which those allegations are based.2 (b) The member must be told what consequences will be sought and may be imposed if the alleged breach(es) are found to have been established.3 (c) The member must be given a full and fair opportunity to answer the case against it, both on the facts and on the law.4 This may include the right to be heard orally, or (depending on the circumstances) the right to make written submissions may be sufficient.

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(d) The decision-maker must act impartially, ie  it must not have pre-judged the matter and it must decide the case on the facts alone, and not based on any extraneous matters.5 If the decision-maker is not independent of the international federation, the member should have the right to appeal an adverse decision on a de novo basis to an independent body.6 1 Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 30 (‘There is no doubt that the right to be heard is a legal principle which has to be respected by federations when making their decisions and within their internal proceedings […] such as the Appellant’s expulsion from the EGA’); Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.9 (‘Expulsion from the IJF is permitted only on the grounds of ‘serious breach or gross negligence […] . A finding to that effect requires the opportunity to be heard. This is a matter of international public policy which should be apparent to an international body like the IJF’). 2 Auckland Boxing Association Inc v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001]  NZLR  847 [2001] NZHC 445, 8 May 2001, paras 53–54 (‘The most fundamental natural justice ground advanced by ABA is that the Council, in deciding that it would suspend the Applicant, failed to allow a proper hearing. The duty to hear all sides before deciding is a fundamental aspect of natural justice. Basic to that duty is the requirement of notice. This may, in the circumstances, include notice of the potential outcomes of the decision-making process’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 200 (‘The use of this provision in the ISSF Constitution to suspend the KSF should invoke a disciplinary process. The Panel would have expected some form of investigation by the ISSF into whether there was some actual conduct by the KSF that was affecting the purposes of the ISSF. The Panel would have expected the ISSF to have put the findings of such investigation to the KSF and to have given it the opportunity to comment, before any decision was taken, as in a normal disciplinary process’); Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS  2010/A/2275, paras 31–37 (waiting until the eve of an AGM to inform a member federation that a resolution proposing its expulsion would be put to a vote the following day, even though the information had been available weeks before, and refusing to provide the member with relevant documents, constituted a severe violation of the right to be heard). 3 See Auckland Boxing Association Inc v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001]  NZLR  847 [2001] NZHC 445, 8 May 2001, para 64 (‘The ABA was not properly notified of the scope of the [New Zealand Boxing Association) Council’s concerns, or of the potential consequences of the decision. In the absence of such notice, they were unable fully to put their own case to the Council. This is a serious breach of natural justice’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 197 (‘[…] the starting point is the ISSF Constitution. Each Member should be able to identify with certainty what disciplinary sanctions it could face which could threaten its membership of the ISSF […]. If a temporary sanction is handed out, such as suspension, then the conditions to remedy the behaviour should be clear in the Constitution too, so the Member can regain membership’). 4 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017 (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator), para 74 (‘USACA does not allege any procedural unfairness. ICC has followed the procedure set out in its constitution to the letter, and at all times has given USACA clear notice of the reasons for its actions and the requirements for USACA’s reinstatement. In the 30 April letter it was also expressly stated that USACA will be given a full and fair opportunity to be heard before the membership votes on the resolution to expel’); AEK  Athens & SK  Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘With regard to the right to be heard, the Panel wishes to stress that the CAS has always protected the principle audiatur et altera pars in connection with any proceedings, measures or disciplinary actions taken by an international federation vis-à-vis a national federation, a club or an athlete. However, there is a very important difference between the adoption by a federation of an ad hoc administrative or disciplinary decision directly and individually addressed to designated associations, teams or athletes and the adoption of a general regulation directed at laying down rules of conduct generally applicable to all current or future situations of the kind described in the regulation. […] Only in the event of administrative measures or penalties adopted by a sports-governing body with regard to a limited and identified number of designees could there be a right to a legal hearing’); Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, paras 31-37 (one day’s notice of an AGM  vote on potential expulsion was clearly insufficient, and refusing to provide the member with relevant documents was also a breach of the member’s right to be heard). 5 See para D1.52. 6 Such a de novo appeal may be held to cure any procedural defects in the first instance proceedings. See eg RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 69 (‘possible deficiencies – such as denial of justice, or procedural irregularities – are unfortunate but without any effect in light of the de novo decision of the CAS’); Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, para 92 (‘Even if the Appellant’s rights had been violated by the General Assembly of the ISSF, the proceedings at the CAS would have a curing effect’) and para 101 (‘Even if one would assume that procedural rules have been violated in rendering the appealed decisions, quod non, such defects could have been cured by the Panel pursuant to article

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  45 R57 of the Code’). But cf Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, paras 38 and 40, where the CAS panel set aside the European Golf Association’s decision to expel the Croatian Golf Federation because the procedure leading to the resolution adopted at its AGM violated the Croatian Golf Federation’s fundamental right to be heard. The CAS panel held that the de novo proceedings before it could not cure that violation because the vote on the AGM resolution ‘is not a decision which was largely determined by legal standards and which the Panel could therefore take in lieu of the delegates’ because ‘it is still very much a “political” decision within the discretion of the delegates whether or not to expel a member’.

A1.57 Thirdly, the decision reached must not be arbitrary or irrational; it must be grounded in objective facts.1 1 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, paras 57 and 58 (‘it is elementary that sports governing bodies are afforded a wide margin of appreciation in governing their affairs, in particular in respect of membership matters. A court or arbitral body seized of a complaint of abuse or misuse of power would not ordinarily intervene unless the complainant (here USACA) was able to show that the actions of the governing body (here ICC), to which objection was taken, were irrational, perverse, or evidently or grossly disproportionate’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS  2016/A/4727, para  208 (‘the Panel notes the arguments of the ISSF that Article 1.13.5.1 gives it a wide discretion to suspend its Members, citing CAS 2011/A/2525. The Panel maintains that there has to be a clear purpose to better serve and some evidence of behaviour by the Member that is putting this purpose in danger. A disciplinary sanction such as suspension should not be at the whim of the association’).

A1.58 Fourthly, if the member federation is found to have breached its obligations, the sanction imposed must be proportionate to the member’s offence, ie it must serve a legitimate purpose, it must be effective to achieve that purpose, and it must go no further than is necessary to achieve that purpose.1 The international federation will be given a margin of appreciation in determining what is a proportionate sanction in a particular case,2 but if challenged it will need to be able to show that it considered and gave appropriate weight to all relevant factors, including the degree of fault of the member (ie  did it act deliberately, recklessly, or negligently);3 the importance of the obligation breached4 and the damage caused by the member’s breach of that obligation;5 the impact of the sanction on the member;6 and whether there were any alternative sanctions that would have been just as effective in achieving the international federation’s purposes.7 1 RPC  v IPC, CAS  2016/A/4745, paras 73-74 (‘The more difficult question for consideration is whether the decision to suspend the RPC […] was proportionate […] The question is whether the Decision served a legitimate purpose and was suitable, necessary and appropriate for the objective which it aims to achieve’) and paras 88–89 (‘The IPC took the view, which was not unreasonable in the circumstances of the scale and the nature of the doping and cover-up, that the purpose of a suspension of membership was threefold. On the one hand, the measure was designed to provoke behavioural change (for the future) within the sphere of responsibility of the RPC. On the other hand, the suspension took into account that the failures in the past had resulted in a distorted playing field on an international level, because the IPC anti-doping policy was not being adequately enacted and enforced vis-à-vis para-athletes affiliated to RPC. Finally, the IPC submitted that in view of the fact that Paralympic sports had been specifically mentioned in the IP Report, a strong message had to be issued to restore public confidence, since the Paralympic movement depends – much more than other sports – on the identification with moral values. The Panel notes that all three goals pursued by the IPC are legitimate and that the measure taken is suited to achieve the goals pursued’). ROC et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, paras 130–131 (‘The principle of proportionality implies that there must be a reasonable balance between the nature of the misconduct and the sanction. In order to be respected, the principle of proportionality requires that (i) the measure taken by the governing body is capable of achieving the envisaged goal, (ii) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, and (iii) the constraints which the affected person will suffer as a consequence of the measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal. In other words, to be proportionate a measure must not exceed what is reasonably required in the search of the justifiable aim [references omitted]. […] In the Panel’s opinion, eradication of doping in sport, protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity are undeniably legitimate objectives of extreme importance for the viability of sport at any level, and i. the measure taken by IAAF, and the effect it produces, is capable of achieving those objectives, as it prevents athletes under the jurisdiction of the suspended national federation (for having failed to promote a doping-free environment) from competing with athletes registered with federations that have not been the subject of an exclusion;

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2

3

4

5

6

ii. the measure taken by IAAF is necessary to reach the envisaged goal: if the IAAF could not take a step having the mentioned effect, the suspension of the Russian federation would have no meaningful impact; and iii. the constraints which the affected athletes, including the Claimant Athletes, will suffer as a consequence of the measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal, which outweighs them, and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it’). On the requirement of proportionality more generally, see para B1.31 et seq. FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’) and para 125 (‘In a different context, this wide discretion is referred to as ‘the margin of appreciation’’); IFBB  v IWGA, CAS  2010/A/2119, para 36 (IWGA had a wide margin of appreciation in determining whether to lift its suspension of the IFBB for governance failings); RPC  v IPC, CAS  2016/A/4745, para  83 (‘The decision of the IPC to suspend the RPC was within its power, has a proper legislative basis and was not irrational, or perverse, or outside the margin of discretion open to it. The Decision was not evidently or grossly disproportionate’). Kuwait Sporting Club et al. v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association (KFA), CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.65 (‘in principle, FIFA’s decision to suspend the KFA with immediate effect without a reasonable time limit to address FIFA’s concerns would be a violation of the principle of proportionality. However, as stated concerning the principle of equal treatment, FIFA’s measures have not been taken in a contextual vacuum. FIFA has had to intervene on numerous occasions in Kuwait over the past several years, each of which has related to interference by the Kuwaiti government in the affairs of sports organisations. The regular and repeated attempts by a national government to unduly interfere with the independence of FIFA’s members would justify the manner in which the Decision was imposed’). RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 82 (in finding that the IPC’s decision to suspend the RPC was not disproportionate, the CAS panel took into account that the IPC is ‘dependent on its (national) members to implement its policies on a national level … . [As the IPC pointed out] this federal system with complementary international and national obligations is the core back-bone of the fight against doping’) and para 84 (‘The concern that clean athletes, inside and outside of Russia, have confidence in the ability to compete on a level playing field, and the integrity and credibility of the sporting contest, represent powerful countervailing factors to the collateral or reflexive effect on Russian athletes as a result of the suspension. This represents an overriding public interest that the IPC was entitled to take into account in coming to the Decision’). Ibid, para 86 (‘The testing of Russian Paralympic athletes had not complied with the WADA Code. The damage caused by the systemic non-compliance is substantial. […] This was not a case of a single or simple failure by an anti-doping authority. It was not a case of failing temporarily or occasionally to fulfil an obligation, or of inconsequential inadvertence on the part of the RPC’) and para 81 (suspension not disproportionate given the magnitude of the RPC’s failure, leading to what the IPC described as the ‘biggest doping scandal in sports history’). Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & KFA, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.69 (‘Importantly, the Decision under appeal does not impose a permanent exclusion of the KFA. Rather, it is a temporary suspension, which may be lifted immediately. Under such circumstances, whereby the sanction of an association may not only be removed entirely in a very short amount of time, but is also not permanent in nature, the Panel finds that it would be disproportionate to consider that it violates Swiss social, moral and economic values. Moreover, the KFA, as a member of FIFA and the addressee of the Decision, has accepted to be bound by its statutes which include the possibility of sanctions’). Importantly, the fact that the athletes affiliated to the suspended member federation will not be able to participate in international competitions is simply a natural consequence of the member’s suspension, and does not change the proportionality analysis. ROC and Lyukman et al, CAS 2016/O/4684, paras 119, 121, and 130; RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 79 (‘The fact that the suspension of the RPC reflexively affects the Russian para-athletes insofar as they derive a legal position from the RPC is a logical and natural consequence of the simple fact that the IPC Constitution allows for legal persons (representing the sport in a specific geographical area) to obtain membership. This by itself cannot change the accountability of such a (collective) member to comply with the obligations imposed by the IPC Constitution. In particular, the collective member cannot hide behind those individuals that it represents’) and para 91 (‘The RPC points to the consequences for the athletes but considering the matter in dispute in, and the parties to, this arbitration, such consequences follow from the suspension, as has happened in the case of other suspensions of NFs’); BWF v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319, paras 73–74 (‘no additional sanction is imposed on BWF athletes as the ban is not a direct consequence of the fact that they individually committed anti-doping rule violations. […] The BWF athletes are prevented from taking part in the Olympics because they are affiliated to a national federation that has been banned from entering athletes for the Olympic Games because it has not been able to fight doping within its organisation effectively. […] The fact that individual BWF athletes are prevented from participating in the Olympic Games as a mere ”collateral damage” that is justified by the overarching objectives to protect the values of sport and to ensure that general education is provided by national federations to its affiliated members. […] [P]art C.1 of the Qualification System determines that a national federation is only not allowed to enter athletes if 9 or more violations of the IWF ADP are committed within a calendar year period “in testing conducted by the IWF or Anti-Doping

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  47 Organizations other than the National [sic] or its National Anti-Doping Organization”. As such, antidoping rule violations committed based on tests conducted by the national federation itself and the national anti-doping organisation are not counted. […] It derives from such rule that the intention is for the national federations to actively combat doping within their organisations. The reason for the ban on the national federation is not so much that its affiliated members have been sanctioned for anti-doping rule violations, but rather that the national federation has been unsuccessful in finding anti-doping rule violations among its affiliated members while others could […]’); Fiji Association of Sports and National Olympic Committee v Commonwealth Games Federation, CAS 2010/O/2039, paras 7.1-7.2 (‘The Panel accepts the Claimant’s submission that the athletes of Fiji are being punished for no fault of their own. But […] we are clearly of the view that the effect of Fiji’s full suspension is to deprive it of the rights and privileges of membership of a Commonwealth Country. […] While it is a principle of CAS jurisprudence that where possible rules of sports governing bodies should be construed so as to enable athletes to compete, the Panel does not consider that the CGF rules allow a benevolent construction. […] A  suspension means, absent any particular qualification, denial of rights pro tem’); Legkov et al v International Olympic Committee, CAS OG 18/03, para 7.18 (where Russian athletes and coaches appealed the IOC’s decision not to invite them to participate at the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympic Games, the CAS panel ruled that ‘it may be that non-sanctioned individual athletes, including the Applicants, are prevented from participating in the Olympic Games simply because they are citizens of a country that has been found to have engaged in a systemic manipulation of the anti-doping rules. However, in light of the IOC’s overall objective to balance the interests of clean athletes and the fight against doping against the interests of individual Russian athletes, the Panel concludes that any unfairness was a consequential effect of the suspension of the ROC and that the process was neither discriminatory nor unfair (see also [BWF v IWF], CAS 2015/A/4319)’). See also Ahn et al v IOC, CAS OG 18/02 (same); BCA & Belarusian Senior Men’s Canoe and Kayak team members v ICF, CAS 2016/A/4708, para 79. 7 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & KFA, CAS 2015/A/4241, paras 8.61 et seq (‘FIFA cannot take any direct measures against the State of Kuwait [for government interference in Kuwait football], and as a result, is only left with the choice of imposing sanctions on its members’).

A1.59 Examples of cases where a member federation has been suspended from membership on account of a failure to comply with its membership obligations include the following: Failure to comply with rules for the protection of the welfare of participants in the sport: In March 2015 the FEI suspended the UAE national federation from membership for failure to protect horse welfare issues and non-compliance with FEI rules and regulations in the discipline of endurance. Under the terms of the suspension, the UAE national federation was precluded from attending or being represented at any session or meeting of any body of the FEI and from organising any international events, and its members were precluded from participating in any international events (although UAE athletes in disciplines other than endurance were allowed to compete in international competitions under the FEI flag), unless and until the UAE federation took the actions deemed necessary by the FEI to provide assurance that moving forward it would protect horse welfare and comply fully with the FEI rules and regulations.1 (b) Failure to comply with anti-doping obligations: The International Paralympic Committee (IPC) suspended the Russian Paralympic Committee (RPC) from membership in August 2016 (just before the Rio Paralympic Games) on the basis that the cheating at the 2014 Sochi Paralympic Games that had been exposed in Richard McLaren’s report2 was caused by its failure to take the necessary steps (including insisting on appropriate support from the Russian Ministry of Sport and the Russian national anti-doping organization, RUSADA) to run an effective anti-doping programme in Russian Paralympic sport. The RPC’s appeal was rejected by the CAS, which ruled that: (i) The IPC had established that the RPC had failed to comply with its obligations as a member of the IPC. It had failed to rebut Professor McLaren’s evidence of a state-sponsored doping scheme, and while there was no evidence that the RPC was complicit in that scheme, it had a positive obligation to vigorously pursue all potential anti-doping (a)

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rule violations within its jurisdiction and to investigate cases of doping. Furthermore: ‘the RPC had a non-delegable responsibility with respect to implementing an anti-doping policy in conformity with the WADA  Code in Russia. As an athlete cannot escape the consequences of an anti-doping rule violation by delegating his or her responsibility in relation to the personal duty to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his or her system (Art. 2.1.1 WADA Code), the RPC cannot delegate the consequences where other bodies within Russia acting as its agent implement a systemic system of doping and cover-up’.

As a result: ‘the existence of the system as described in the IP [McLaren] Report and in the McLaren affidavit means that the RPC breached its obligations and conditions of membership of the IPC’.

(c)

(ii) The IPC had a clear legal basis under its constitution to suspend the RPC on account of such breaches. Art 9.2.2 of the IPC Constitution provided that ‘a member may be suspended for not fulfilling the conditions for membership and not complying with the obligations of members, as defined in the bylaws’. (iii) The RPC had failed to establish that the IPC had not respected due process in imposing the suspension. The RPC complained that it was not given due warning of the suspension, as required under the IPC’s suspension policy. However, the CAS found that the IPC did not dictate the timeline (it had no control over when the McLaren report was issued, and it sent the RPC notice of the opening of suspension proceedings four days after receiving the McLaren report, so it ‘could not have reacted more quickly’). It was also ‘obvious that the RPC could not correct a situation of the magnitude described in the IP [McLaren] Report in time for the Rio Paralympic Games’, through no fault of the IPC. In any event, the RPC had a de novo appeal before CAS, which cured any procedural defects raised by the RPC. (iv) Taking into account the magnitude of the RPC’s failure, the serious damage caused (given that the IPC is dependent on its national members to implement its policies on a national level), and the fact that there were no obvious alternatives to complete suspension, the decision of the IPC to suspend the RPC ‘without reservation, or alleviation of the consequences to Russian Paralympic athletes’ was ‘within its power, has a proper legislative basis and was not irrational, or perverse, or outside the margin of discretion open to it. The Decision was not evidently or grossly disproportionate’. The consequences to Russian athletes did not change the proportionality analysis, because those ‘consequences follow from the suspension, as has happened in the case of other suspensions of NFs’. (v) Finally, the fact that the IOC had taken a different decision (not suspending the Russian Olympic Committee but instead requiring all Russian athletes seeking to compete in Rio to prove they were innocent of doping) did not render the IPC’s decision disproportionate or unlawful. The IPC is not bound by decisions of the IOC, in particular as they operate under different charters and rules and have different structures. Further, in any event, properly analysed the decisions of the IOC and IPC were not in contradiction.3 Government interference: As noted above, a number of national federations have been suspended from membership of the international federation as a result of governance interference in their affairs.4 In addition, in 1963 the IOC

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  49

passed a resolution requiring the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC): ‘to make a firm declaration of its acceptance of the spirit of the Olympic Code and in particular of Principle 1 and Rule 24 read together, and [to] get from its Government by December 31st 1963 a change in policy regarding racial discrimination in sports and competitions in its country, failing which the South African National Olympic Committee will be debarred from entering its teams in the Olympic Games’.

The IOC subsequently withdrew SANOC’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, and refused subsequent pleas from SANOC to be reinstated while its government’s apartheid policy endured, notwithstanding that this meant its (blameless) athletes were prevented from taking part in the Olympic Games from 1964 to 1988.5 (d) Failure to follow proper election procedure: World Archery suspended the Archery Association of India (AAI) in August 2019 after two groups conducted parallel elections resulting in the election of two different presidents of the AAI. Due to concerns that Indian archers might not be able to participate in the Tokyo Olympic Games, the dispute was referred to the Delhi High Court, which ordered new elections to be held in January 2019. Following those elections, World Archery conditionally lifted the suspension.6 (e) Poor governance of the sport: In May 2019, the IOC suspended the International Boxing Association (AIBA) due to issues with its finances, refereeing standards, and governance issues (including the fact that the AIBA  President was on a US  Treasury Department sanctions list as ‘one of Uzbekistan’s leading criminals’). The IOC set up a special taskforce to oversee the delivery of the boxing competition at the Tokyo Olympics in place of AIBA.7 Similarly, FIBA suspended the Brazil Basketball Confederation (CCB) in November 2016 on the basis that it was ‘not fully complying with its obligations’, in particular in relation to its ‘overall financial situation’, ‘lack of full control of basketball in the country’ and failure to organise the national youth championships and a 3x3 World Tour event. That suspension was conditionally lifted eight months after the ban was imposed, subject to CCB delivering on a number of actions.8 1 See FEI press release dated 12  March 2015, at fei.org/news/fei-suspends-uae-national-federation [accessed 25  September 2020]; and FEI press release dated 27  July 2015, at inside.fei.org/news/ uae-national-federation-suspension-lifted-fei-bureau-following-signature-agreement [accessed 25 September 2020]. 2 McLaren independent investigation report, part 1, 18 July 2016 (wada-ama.org/en/resources/dopingcontrol-process/mclaren-independent-investigation-report-part-i [accessed 25 September 2020]). 3 RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, paras 56-60, 61-72, 81, 83, 91, 98, and 99. See RPC v IPC, Swiss Federal Tribunal decision number 4 A_470/2016 dated 30 August 2016 (RPC appealed CAS award and sought provisional measures to have the CAS award stayed and to allow Russian para athletes to participate at the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games. The Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the request for provisional measures, finding in particular that (i) to succeed in obtaining a stay, the RPC would have to establish that it did (and will) fulfil its obligation to comply with the IPC Anti-Doping Code and World Anti-Doping Code, and that its interest in the immediate stay of its suspension outweighs the interest of the IPC in its fight against doping to protect the integrity of the sport, which it was unable to do, and (ii) the request to admit individual Russian athletes to the Paralympic Games was beyond the scope of the subject matter in dispute, because the individual athletes were not party to the CAS or Swiss Federal Tribunal proceedings). Separately, a number of Russian athletes also tried to obtain provisional measures from the German courts (as the IPC’s headquarters are in Bonn, Germany) to participate in the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games. They started at the Landgericht Bonn (first instance court), appealed to the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court), and even ended up in front of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany’s constitutional court). In essence, the athletes alleged a violation of personal rights, freedom of action, and equal treatment. All of the arguments were rejected, and the courts made it clear that the balancing of interests favoured the IPC. See Safronov et al v IPC, 20  O  323/16, Landgericht Bonn decision dated 5  September 2016, and Arestova et al v IPC, 20 O 325/16, Landgericht Bonn decision dated 6 September 2016; Arestova et al v IPC, Safronov et al v IPC, Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf decisions dated 13 September 2016; and Bundesverfassungsgericht decision 1 BvQ 38/16 dated 15 September 2016.

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4 5

6

7 8

See also RWF v IWF, CAS OG 16/009 (upholding the IWF’s exclusion of the Russian weightlifting federation and its athletes from the Rio Olympic Games based on Art 12.4 of the IWF anti-doping rules, which provided that ‘if any Member federation or members or officials thereof, by reason of conduct connected with or associated with doping or anti-doping rule violations, brings the sport of weightlifting into disrepute, the IWF  Executive Board may, in its discretion, take such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation and integrity of the sport’; this provided a sufficient legal basis to exclude the Russian federation (and its athletes), the IWF’s decision was based on reliable information (ie the McLaren report), and the RWF failed to show that the IWF’s conclusion that weightlifting had been brought into disrepute was unreasonable); BWF v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319 (rejecting BWF’s challenge of IWF’s decision to ban the Bulgaria national federation from entering any athletes (or nominating any of its athletes for entry by its NOC) into the 2016 Rio Olympics due to its failure to put adequate anti-doping systems into place, ruling that it was entirely consistent with the World Anti-Doping Code, and clearly necessary and proportionate to the defence of clean sport, and so was justified notwithstanding the consequence that Bulgarian weight-lifters were denied participation in the Rio Games through no fault of their own); IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, headnotes and paras 27-34 (‘the Panel underlines that the failure of the IFBB to implement proper anti-doping policies, as indicated by the anti-doping tests showing positive results during the past editions of the World Games, as well as by the anti-doping tests performed by IFBB in 2009, affects in itself the image of the World Games, as it establishes that the member federation is not in a position to ensure compliance of its athletes with the relevant anti-doping regulations. Proof of damage to the IWGA image, arising out of such circumstances, in fact, does not need, in the Panel’s view, confirmation by specific evidence, as it is inherent in the exposure to the public of the “bad doping record” of one of its member federations at the World Games – organized by the IWGA. In any case, the Panel notes that the existence of such damage can be inferred, on the basis of a general presumption that the conduct of illicit practices (such as doping) adversely affects the image of those appearing to be involved. […] the Panel observes that the decision to suspend the IFBB from participation in the World Games was based on the IFBB’s failure to take serious measures to address doping within its system and not on vicarious imputation to the IFBB of the actions of its athletes. In other words, the IFBB was held responsible for its own omissions, and not for the acts of third parties. […] An international federation which wishes to take part in the World Games must respect the rules of the IWGA and apply proper anti-doping policies. If it is not in a position to ensure the fair conduct of its sport – for whatever reason – such federation cannot claim to have its sport, tainted by doping, included in the World Games programme – so involving indirectly the IWGA in its failures’). In October 2017 the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) suspended nine of its members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) for 12 months as a result of anti-doping rule violations discovered upon the re-testing of samples collected at the 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games. (See BarBend article ‘Suspension Starts for Nine IWF Member Federations’ dated 23 October 2017 (barbend.com/iwf-member-federations-suspension/ [accessed 24 September 2020]). The IWF set a number of conditions that each federation had to meet to ensure a shift in culture regarding anti-doping. The suspensions were lifted in June 2018 for three countries (Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), but the rest served the full suspension. Further, in September 2019, the IWF suspended the Egyptian Weightlifting Federation after seven Egyptian weightlifters, including five minors, were sanctioned with four-year periods of ineligibility for positive out-ofcompetition tests for methandienone at a training camp in the lead-up to the African Junior and Youth Championships in Cairo. The Egyptian federation appealed to CAS: Egyptian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation, CAS 2019/A/6498, which upheld the decision of the IWF to suspend any current EWF ‘team official’ who was an EWF team official at the Junior Championships or training camp from participation in any IWF activities for a period of two years, suspend the EWF from participation in any IWF activities for a period of two years, and impose a fine of USD 200,000. See para A1.15 et seq. See BBC article ‘1964: South Africa banned from Olympics’ (news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ stories/august/18/newsid_3547000/3547872.stm [accessed 25 September 2020]) and NY Times article ‘Olympics Committee Ends Its Ban On Participation by South Africa’ dated 10 July 1991 (nytimes. com/1991/07/10/sports/olympics-olympics-committee-ends-its-ban-on-participation-by-south-africa. html [accessed 25  September 2020]); Capobianco, Voices of Discontent: Avery Brundage and the IOC’s Dilemma of South Africa’s Olympic Participation, 1956–1968 (PhD thesis, 2015), pp 153–154. See World Archery press release dated 23  January 2020 (worldarchery.org/news/177315/worldarchery-conditionally-lifts-suspension-indian-federation [accessed 24  September 2020]); and Sport Business article ‘World Archery lifts India suspension’ dated 24  January 2020 (sportbusiness.com/ news/world-archery-lifts-india-suspension/ [accessed 24 September 2020]). See Inside the Games article ‘IOC taskforce to oversee organisation of boxing at Tokyo 2020 after AIBA suspended’ dated 22 May 2019 (insidethegames.biz/articles/1079552/ioc-taskforce-to-overseeorganisation-of-boxing-at-tokyo-2020-after-aiba-suspended [accessed 24 September 2020]). See FIBA press release dated 14  November 2016 at fiba.basketball/news/fiba-suspends-brazilianfederation [accessed 24 September 2020].

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  51

A1.60 There have also been cases, though fewer in number, where the ultimate sanction of expulsion from membership has been imposed: (a) In Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, the CAS upheld an appeal against the decision of the International Judo Federation (IJF) to disaffiliate one of its regional associations, the Panamerican Judo Union (PJU) in favour of a new body, the Panamerican Judo Confederation. The CAS was very clear that the IJF had to demonstrate a clear basis in its statutes for such action.1 The IJF’s statutes allowed it to admit both continental unions and national federations as members, but only granted it an explicit right to expel national federations from membership. The IJF argued that as both continental unions and national federations were defined as members, by analogy the expulsion right should also apply to the continental unions. The CAS panel ruled that the analogy did not work because as federative constitutive bodies of the IJF the continental unions had a distinct status from the national federations. The CAS also rejected the IJF’s attempt to rely on Art 11.4 of the IJF Statutes, which purported to grant the Executive Council of the IJF wide-ranging power to decide any issues that had not been placed under the authority of another IJF body.2 (b) In Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, the CAS set aside the European Golf Association’s decision to expel the Croatian Golf Federation because the procedure leading to the resolution adopted at its AGM clearly violated the Croatian Golf Federation’s fundamental right to be heard.3 The de novo proceedings before the CAS could not cure the violation of the right to be heard because the vote on the AGM resolution ‘is not a decision which was largely determined by legal standards and which the Panel could therefore take in lieu of the delegates’, because ‘it is still very much a “political” decision within the discretion of the delegates whether or not to expel a member’.4 (c) In Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, the ISSF expelled the BSSF (its Bulgarian member federation) and accepted the BSU in its place, based on the fact that the Bulgarian Olympic Committee had expelled the BSSF from its membership, because the ISSF Constitution required member federations to be ‘recognised and affiliated’ with its National Olympic Committee. The ISSF relied on a provision in its constitution providing that a member could be expelled ‘for an action contrary to the Constitution or the General Regulations’. The CAS held that this was not a suitable legal basis, because ‘the absence of the conditions for membership according to article 1.3.1 of the ISSF Constitution cannot be considered ‘an action contrary to the Constitution or the Regulations’’. However, the CAS panel noted that ‘[a]ccording to German law, a member of an association can be expelled for valid reasons, even if the statutes of the association do not provide so, subject to judicial review’.5 On that basis, the CAS panel found that NOC-recognition of a member federation was ‘a sine qua non-condition for membership with the ISSF’, and that a member federation could be expelled for valid reasons on that basis, provided that the expulsion procedure respected due process.6 While the BSSF argued that its right to be heard had been violated, the CAS found that any procedural defects were cured by the de novo appeal before CAS. The CAS therefore upheld BSSF’s expulsion of the BSSF (and also separately confirmed the BSU’s admission to membership).7 (d) In ICC  v USACA, the ICC initially suspended the USA  Cricket Association (USACA) because it was in fundamental breach of key membership requirements. In particular, it no longer seemed to be the de facto governing body of cricket in the US, since the majority of the US cricket community were not members of USACA, and various of its actions were contrary to the interests

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of the ICC and the sport. As one of a number of reinstatement conditions, the ICC required that USACA adopt a new constitution approved by the ICC, incorporating and implementing the new governance framework that would unite that community behind it. When USACA adopted an amended version of the constitution that did not include certain requirements that the ICC regarded as key to the unification process, the ICC board put a motion to the members in general meeting to expel USACA from membership. USACA challenged the motion as contrary to the ICC’s own rules and/or applicable law. The sole arbitrator (Michael Beloff QC) found in favour of the ICC, ruling that ‘as long as the grounds advanced by ICC for USACA’s expulsion are vouched for by the ICC’s objects and are rational, they can be relied on’, and that ‘[a] member who does not accept the changes reasonably required of it by ICC to rectify the […] defects relied on for its suspension must […] be liable to expulsion. If the ICC could not expel such member when it continued to resist those changes, the member would have to remain in a state of perpetual suspension, which would be counter-intuitive’.8 1 Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.4. Cf European Federation of American Football (EFAF) et al v International American Football Association (IFAF), CAS  2012/A/2873, where the continental governing body of American football in Europe, EFAF, sought to nullify a resolution adopted by the IFAF Congress, amending the IFAF statutes to replace continental federations with continental executive committees (effectively removing EFAF as an ‘affiliate member’ of IFAF). The CAS panel ruled (see paras 6.18-6.30) that the de facto exclusion did not violate the IFAF Statutes, because under the IFAF statutes only a national federation could be a ‘Member’, and so EFAF could not claim the same rights as were afforded to members. Federations are free to distinguish between different types of members, and even though the amendment in issue was ‘tantamount to a de facto revocation’ of EFAF’s membership, it was the result of an organisational change that affected all of the continental federations as affiliated members. 2 Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS  2009/A/1823, para  9.8 (‘Such residual-powers clauses are common in statutes and by-laws. Officials of the relevant entities are on occasion tempted to make sweeping claims of authority by reference to them. But such claims are absolutely constrained by the overall powers of the body as a whole. They do not give the vast power of arbitrary exclusion; if such a thing were possible, there would be no reason at all to define lesser powers and to allocate them carefully among internal organs along with a requirement of compliance with procedural safeguards. Otherwise residual-power clauses could degenerate into the proposition that ‘for matters not expressly defined herein, the President may do whatever he wants whenever he wants’. The proper purpose of a residual-powers clause is to make clear that when a general authority has been explicitly granted, incidental and subsidiary decisions may be made by the authorised organ, even if they are not specifically defined’). 3 Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 30. 4 Ibid, paras 38 and 40. 5 Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, para 85. 6 Ibid, paras 81, 87, and 95. 7 Ibid, paras 92 and 101. 8 ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 59.

6 ADDRESSING UNSANCTIONED EVENTS A1.61 As explained above, the integrity of the pyramid model of sports governance and regulation depends on there being only one international governing body for each sport and one national governing body in each country for that sport. The function of governing and administering a sport is a natural monopoly; there can be only one ultimate source of the rules and regulations that determine the playing conditions of the sport, one set of administrators issuing decisions, and one unitary judicial system resolving disputes, or else confusion will reign, and the important sporting imperatives that the rules and regulations are designed to advance1 will be undermined. But that also means that the participants in the sport must only compete in events that are sanctioned by the international federation and its members and to which the rules (and enforcement mechanisms) of the international federation and

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  53

its members therefore apply. As a result, it is a central feature of the pyramid model of sports governance that international federations require their member national federations only to participate in sanctioned events,2 and their member national federations require the same of their member clubs and the athletes affiliated to them.3 1 See para B1.4. 2 See eg  ICC  Regulations on the Sanctioning of Events (May 2018) Art 2.8 (‘Participation in Disapproved Cricket is prohibited for all persons under the jurisdiction of the ICC or any of its National Cricket Federations. It is the responsibility of each such person to establish that a particular match or event constitutes Approved Cricket and not Disapproved Cricket before participating in it’); World Rugby Regulation 16.2.1 (‘A Rugby Body or Club shall not play a Match or Matches against any Rugby Body or Club or other team(s) that are not affiliated (temporarily or otherwise) to a Union or against teams that contain Players that are not members of a Union without the prior written consent of the CEO […]’) and 16.2.8 (‘Any Match, Series of Matches, tour or tournament which does not fully comply with the requirements of the Bye-Laws, Regulations and Laws of the Game shall be deemed unofficial. The Union within whose territory such an unofficial event takes place (and the visiting Union or Unions) and/or the Union or Unions of participating Provincial, County, District, Clubs or Rugby Bodies will be held responsible and will be liable to sanction in accordance with the Regulations and/or Bye-Laws’); FIFA  Statutes (June 2019) Art 70 (‘The Council shall compile an international match calendar that shall be binding upon the confederations, member associations and leagues, after conferring with the confederations’) and Art 71 (‘No such match or competition shall take place without the prior permission of FIFA, the confederations and/or the member associations in accordance with the Regulations Governing International Matches’). International federations will require their national members to include such provisions in their rulebooks. See eg  IBU  Constitution (October 2019) Art 7.1.9.2, which requires its members (ie NF Members) to ‘adopt and implement rules […] prohibiting Persons under its jurisdiction from participating in Biathlon events that have not been properly sanctioned by the IBU (in the case of International Competitions) or an NF Member (in the case of other competitions)’. 3 Examples of such rules in the national federation’s rulebook include Rule b.1 of the Football Association Rules (2019/20) (‘Associations, Competitions or other combinations of Clubs, Players or Officials, shall not be formed without the written consent of The Association, or of the Affiliated Association or Affiliated Associations concerned. […] All Affiliated Associations, Competitions or other combinations of Clubs, Players or Club Officials, Officials or Match Officials shall observe the Rules. Associations or Clubs in membership of or affiliated to The Association and/or an Affiliated Association shall not play against any association or club belonging to any association, competition or combination of clubs to which such consent has not been given’); and Supplement to the UK Athletics Rules for Competition 2020, Rule G3 (23) S 1 (‘The following are ineligible to take part in Competition under UKA Rules: Any person who: […] (iii) takes part in any athletics meeting which requires to be sanctioned but has not been permitted / licensed by UKA or other appropriate Association’).

A1.62 Apart from simply avoiding fixture clashes, and ensuring uniform application of the sports rules and regulations, control over the calendar also enables the SGB to give scheduling priority to one form of competition over others, where it considers it necessary to do so to achieve broader regulatory imperatives for the good of the sport as a whole. For example, an Olympic international federation may want its member associations to prioritise the forms of competition that it has chosen to feature at the Olympic Games, so that the programme at the Games is of the highest possible quality, thereby contributing to the success of the Games (and so guaranteeing the sport’s continued inclusion in the Olympic programme, and therefore its all-important share of Olympic revenues), and also providing an excellent advertisement for the sport to the watching millions. As another example, the football clubs playing in certain domestic leagues (especially in Europe) earn significant income from broadcasting and other revenues, and can afford to sign players from other continents on wages that dwarf what the players get from playing for their nations. At the salaries the clubs pay, they could require the player to commit to play for them alone and never leave to play for his or her country in international competition. But FIFA’s objective is to develop the game in every country around the world, which is best done by having a competitive national representative team whose achievements on the international stage inspire young players to emulate them (while at the same time making the international competitions a better and therefore

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more attractive product for broadcasters and sponsors). FIFA therefore identifies dates in the calendar that will be taken up with international matches, including the qualifying matches for the FIFA World Cup and the continental championships, as well as the dates of non-competitive (‘friendly’) matches, and then requires member associations not to schedule domestic fixtures on those dates, and requires clubs to release their players for international duty on those dates (and forbids players who do not report for international duty playing in any other matches on those dates).1 Without control over the calendar, SGBs would simply not be able to protect and advance their regulatory imperatives in this way. 1 See Art 70 of the FIFA Statutes, June 2019 (‘The Council shall compile an international match calendar that shall be binding upon the confederations, member associations and leagues, after conferring with the confederations’) and Annexe 1 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (June 2020 Edn) (‘Release of players to association teams’). As to the legal issues arising from such ‘player release’ rules, see paras E11.95 to E11.99. There are similar rules in other sports, including cricket (see ICC Regulations on Sanctioning of Events (May 2018), where domestic leagues generate limited income (except for the Indian Premier League), and instead it is the revenues from international cricket that underwrite the sport. See Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302, 309 (‘there is no very substantial spectator attendance except at Test Matches and correspondingly that these are generally the only matches likely to produce any substantial profit. In all the Test-playing countries, the county sides or state associations or the equivalent necessarily constitute the breeding ground in which players are trained and the source on which Test selectors largely, if not exclusively, rely in choosing their Test teams. In the situation just described, however, country clubs and state associations are themselves very dependent for their solvency on subventions from Test Match receipts. The structure and finances of cricket in the Test-playing countries are thus vulnerable, in the sense that they are dependent to a considerable degree on the continued popular attraction and profitability of Test Matches. Anything which is likely to prejudice such attraction or profitability must be of concern to those organising cricket in those countries’).

A1.63 However, another consequence of the fact that the authority of SGBs derives not from sovereign power but from the consent of their members1 is that those members can always choose to walk away if they are not happy with the way the sport is being run. The rash of breakaway threats over recent decades is a testament to the difficulty that an SGB faces in trying to reconcile the long-term interests of all of its constituents, from the mass amateur ranks of the sport to the professional elite at the top of the pile. But the pressure has increased in the modern entertainment world, where content is king and therefore the commercial rights to sports event can be of such enormous value, leading to a string of entrepreneurs being ready to pay large sums to the stars of the sport to join their new sports events. In particular, the enormous success of Twenty20 cricket, in particular in the form of the Indian Premier League, has inspired many imitators in other sports. 1 See para A1.19.

A1.64 There is therefore an enormous tension between the regulatory imperative to retain control over the organisation and sanctioning of competitions as part of the official sporting calendar, and the commercial imperative of the stars of the sport to maximise their career earnings, and of third party investors to bring new products to the market. To SGBs, restrictions on participation in unsanctioned events are essential to protect the integrity of the pyramid model of sports governance and regulation, on which the long-term health and well-being of their sports depend. To the sports stars and the entrepreneurs, however, they are blatantly anti-competitive, frustrating their own legitimate commercial desires and thwarting consumer demand for new and innovative products. A1.65 Conflicts in this area tend to follow a certain natural cycle. First, the sport starts to gain in popularity and so in commercial appeal. More broadcasters and sponsors start bidding for the commercial rights to the elite events. The SGB rightsholder is happy, but the losing bidders are not, and the elite professional players or

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  55

clubs may not be either, if they feel they are not getting a big enough share of the value they consider they have helped to create. Frequently the SGB is not willing or able to meet all of their demands, because of the competing need to use some of the revenues to support the sport at its grass roots (from where the professional elite once came). Private entrepreneurs (often disappointed bidders for the commercial rights to the official events) see an opportunity to grab value by creating their own content, luring over the elite participants with promises of a bigger share of the pot (which is easier for the private promoter to do, as it will have no wider responsibilities to the sport as a whole). The SGB therefore invokes the rule against participating in ‘unsanctioned’ events. The elite participants cry foul, alleging restraint of trade/breach of competition law, on the basis that their right to ‘ply their trade’ is being infringed. The private promoters also cry foul, also alleging unlawful anti-competitive conduct, on the basis that the SGB is simply trying to prevent the emergence of a rival that would compete with it for the services of the players/clubs and for the rights fees on offer from broadcasters and sponsors. A1.66 The competition law arguments for those challenging the status quo1 generally run as follows: (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f) (g)

(h)

There is a market for the organisation of sports events, with connected markets for the acquisition of the essential ingredients for such events – the clubs, the players, the venues – and for the sale of the commercial rights to the events to broadcasters and sponsors.2 The prohibitions on participating in unsanctioned events that are issued by an international federation and its member federations, and imposed on all clubs/ players participating in the sport, constitute an agreement or arrangement that restricts competition on those markets and/or gives the SGBs a dominant position on that market.3 Where SGBs not only regulate the sport but also organise and sell commercial rights to events, their regulatory authority, as well as their ‘first mover’ advantage, and their control over elements such as national representative competition, give them an enormous share of and a dominant position in the market for the organisation of sports events. Under UK and EU competition law,4 they have a ‘special responsibility’ not to abuse that dominant position in a way that prevents or restricts competition on that market.5 In particular, they must not leverage their regulatory powers to their own commercial and financial advantage. They are also required in any event not to enter into arrangements that have an anti-competitive effect, and (because they are generally associations of undertakings) they are required not to make any decisions that have such an effect.6 It is an abuse of that dominant position for an SGB to use its regulatory control to require clubs/players to participate exclusively in ‘sanctioned’ events, and not to participate in ‘unsanctioned’ events At least, it is an abuse where the SGB is using that rule to prevent the emergence of competitors in the market for rights fees from broadcasters and sponsors. The rule against playing in unsanctioned events is an insuperable barrier to entry for new competition organisers, because it means there are no clubs/players (‘essential inputs’) for it to sign. The players they want to sign would be exiling themselves from ‘official’ competitions, including (in the case of players) national representative competition. It is also an unreasonable restriction on the players/clubs’ freedom to ‘ply their trade’ as they see fit. Finally (say the players/clubs), this is all completely out of proportion to any legitimate aim pursued, and therefore incapable of justification under the competition rules. Declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief should be

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granted to prevent this unlawful conduct and to compensate for the losses it has caused. 1 As to which, see generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport). There may be attempts to use other causes of action as well, such as EU free movement law (see Chapter E12), or the guarantee of a right to property under Art 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR (see para E13.72), but ultimately they add little to the competition law claims. 2 See para E11.49. 3 See para E11.100. 4 On 31 January 2020, the UK ceased to be a member of the European Union (aka ‘Brexit’). However, EU law continues to apply in the UK during the Brexit transition period (scheduled to end on 31 December 2020). The impact of Brexit on UK competition law following the transition period is not yet clear, and will depend on the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU. 5 See para E11.13. 6 See para E11.7.

A1.67 In response, the SGB is likely to point out that competition law does not prohibit sporting rules that are necessary for the ‘organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport’, and are proportionate to the achievement of that objective.1 It will argue that the rules against participating in unsanctioned events are necessary to create fair sporting competition in the first place, are therefore in the interests of the sport and so in the public interest, and are proportionate to the achievement of that objective and so justified.2 1 ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context’, accompanying paper to the EC’s White Paper on Sport, SEC (2007) 935, Annex I, para 2.1.5. See further paras B1.4 and E11.75. 2 In competition law terms, there are two stages at which arguments broadly based on justification for a measure or rule may arise. First, a measure or rule may not fall to be regarded as anti-competitive at all under TFEU, Arts 101(1) or 102 where, although it may have some anti-competitive elements, those restrictions are necessary in order to create the very activity/product itself. See especially C-309/99 Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Order van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577. Secondly, some restrictions that do not meet the above standard and so involve a prima facie infringement of TFEU, Art 101(1) may still be justifiable, and so may be exempted under TFEU Art 101(3), and do not fall to be regarded as an abuse under TFEU Art 102, where they are justified. See EC Competition Policy Newsletter (June 1998) at 26: analysis of criteria for exemption under Article  85(3)  EC (now Article 101(3) TFEU) ‘should not be based on purely commercial considerations. The special characteristics of sport have to be taken into account. These could include, for example, the need to ensure ‘solidarity’ between weaker and stronger participants or the training of young players, which could only be achieved through redistribution of revenue from the sale of broadcasting rights’). Chapter I of the UK Competition Act 1998 (Competition Act) provides for a similar prohibition on anti-competitive agreements that have an actual or potential effect on trade within the UK (or any part of it) and similar exemption criteria. See further para E11.8. The distinction between the two lines of argument is often unclear. (The Commission has suggested that justification under Art 101(3) is most likely to apply where a rule or conduct is not inherent in the organisation or proper conduct of sport but its pro-competitive benefits outweigh its restrictive effects. See ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context’, accompanying paper to the EC’s White Paper on Sport, SEC (2007) 935, Annex I, para 2.1.6). Broadly, however, in each context, the central question is whether the rule or measure in question pursues a legitimate objective whose effects are inherent and proportionate to that objective.

A1.68 How so? The SGB may argue as follows: (a)

Sports governing bodies are not standard private trading companies, maximising profit in order to generate a healthy return on their shareholders’ investment. Rather, they are the custodians of the sport, dedicated solely to growing participation in the sport, and maximising its health, social, cultural, and other benefits, all of which is in the public interest.1 In all of their efforts, whether regulatory (issuing rules and regulations to govern the playing of the sport) or commercial (organising and promoting events that will improve playing standards and generate commercial revenues that can be invested in projects for the further development of the sport), they are acting only for the common good. (b) Requiring participants to play only in sanctioned competitions is the only way to be sure that rules and regulations of the sport will be applied and observed

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  57

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

consistently, transparently, and with accountability,2 and therefore it is the only way to maintain public confidence in the ability of the SGB to protect and preserve the integrity of the sport.3 The public is unable to distinguish between sanctioned and unsanctioned sport, and therefore if a lack of integrity controls in the latter leads to scandal, the public will lose confidence in the integrity of the whole of the sport, not just unsanctioned sport. Similarly, requiring participants to play solely in sanctioned competitions is the only way to retain control over the competition calendar, and so to ensure that competitions are developed in a structured and coherent way that properly balances the competing interests of the various stakeholders, for the benefit of participants and spectators alike.4 More broadly, it means that to the extent the sport is lucky enough to attract significant commercial interest, that demand must be exploited for the benefit of the whole of the game, and not for the benefit of the few. Innovation must be encouraged, entrepreneurial risk-taking must be rewarded, and high playing standards must be incentivised, but in addition the grass roots must be nourished in order to continue growing the playing base, both as an end in itself and also to ensure that new talent emerges and contributes to the spectacle at the elite end of the sport, thereby generating further revenues and permitting further investment. In contrast, ‘breakaways’ undermine all of the above and therefore are not in the public interest. Over the long term, they do not promote competition but instead harm the ability of the sport to create the ‘product’ that the consumer wants to see. First and foremost, the creation of competing products means the consumer is denied what he or she wants to see most, which is who is the best in the sport.5 Secondly, as noted above the integrity risks raised by unsanctioned competitions threaten public confidence in the whole of the sport. Thirdly, existing competitions can be badly distorted.6 More fundamentally, however, the entrepreneur is free-riding on the development efforts of the SGB. It is able to pay more prize money to the professional elite because the revenues it generates by staging its events do not need to be shared with the grass roots. Similarly, the professional elite have benefited from the SGB’s previous efforts, having been identified and developed by the performance pathways that the SGB has created and financed. They therefore owe at least a limited duty of solidarity to the sport. In other words, the need to control the official event calendar, and to prevent the emergence of unsanctioned competitions, is not just to ensure regulatory integrity and a proper balance between different types of event. It is also about ensuring that the commercial revenues that the sport generates are applied to benefit the sport as a whole, and not just the elite at the top of the pyramid, because without such solidarity the competitive playing base of the pyramid will shrink, and so too will the long-term prospects of all levels of the sport.7 At the very least, the collective should surely at least be able to require those who benefit from it to support the collective and not to harm it. In other words, while there is no God-given exclusive right to run a sport,8 while competition by private promoters is obviously lawful, and while clubs/players cannot be stopped (subject to honouring any contractual commitments to ‘official’ events) from going off to play in ‘unofficial’ events (even if this is blatant freeriding), surely they cannot have it both ways? In other words, they cannot insist in playing in both, they have to choose one or the other.

1 See eg Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347-48 (‘[T]he two bodies [the international and national cricket federations] were in a sense custodians of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game should be properly organised and administered’). 2 See paras A1.61 et seq. See also Commissioner van Miert, [1996]  OJ C217/87, 12 April 1996 (‘It is generally acknowledged that the most effective institutional structure for promoting sport is the

58  Governance of the Sports Sector

3

4 5 6

7

8

creation of a single federation in each Member State and a single international federation for each sport’). The courts have consistently recognised how important it is for a professional regulatory body such as an SGB to maintain that public confidence in the profession that is regulated, and have therefore considered rules that impose serious restrictions on the freedom of participants in the sport to be justifiable where they are necessary to achieve that objective. See eg Bolton v Law Society, [1994] 2 All ER 486 [CA]; Bradley v Jockey Club, [2005] EWCA 1056, para 24. See paras A1.61 et seq. ‘Only a single league can produce that most useful of joint products, the World Champion’. Neale, ‘The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports’ (1994) 1(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 9; Hendry v WPBSA [2001] All ER (D) 71, at para 95 (a ‘split sport’ is not in the public interest). For example, if Premier League football clubs were not required to compete only in ‘official’ competitions, but could pick and choose when to play in ‘official’ competitions and when to play in ‘unofficial’ competitions, clubs would no longer be competing with the same incentives and so the playing-field would no longer be level. For example, a club that was out of the running for the Premier League title might decide to play a series of midseason friendlies in the Middle East, so sapping its resources for its Premier League fixtures (and so giving an advantage to those who play it now over those who played it earlier in the season, when it was still in the race). Or a club might not fight so hard to qualify for the UEFA Champions League if it knew it was guaranteed a place in a rival super-league. See European Commission, draft Preliminary Guidelines on the Application of the Competition Rules to Sport, 15 February 1999 (‘The IRB [now World Rugby] clearly sees such control [over the official event calendar] as necessary for the good of the game, highlighting the importance of ensuring solidarity between clubs and the continued development of the sport at grass roots level (matters which individual clubs, if allowed to act in their own self interest, are unlikely to take into account)’). See para A1.63.

A1.69 The courts and the competition regulators have now had to grapple with these arguments on several occasions, and they have struggled to develop a coherent doctrine that addresses adequately both sides of the argument. A1.70 A key early case was Greig v Insole in the High Court in England in 1978. Kerry Packer’s Nine Network had bid unsuccessfully for the broadcasting rights to Australia’s home Test matches. It therefore set up its own ‘World Series Cricket’ and signed 34 leading players to play in it. The ICC responded by introducing a rule that anyone who played in a match that was not approved by the ICC was ineligible to play Test cricket indefinitely, and declaring that World Series Cricket was disapproved cricket for purposes of this rule. It asked its member federations to introduce the same rule at the domestic level, and the Test and County Cricket Board (TCCB) proposed to do so by banning anyone who played World Series Cricket from approved events for a period of two years. The players and Packer alleged these rules were an unlawful restraint of trade and asked the High Court to restrain the ICC and TCCB from applying them. The High Court held that: ‘both the ICC and the TCCB have legitimate interests, which are entitled to be protected by appropriate restraints. […] The two bodies were in a sense custodians of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game should be properly organised and administered. [.].. It is now necessary to consider whether, on the facts, their changes or rule are no more than is reasonably necessary for the organisation and administration of the game’.1

The High Court accepted that steps had to be taken to protect Test match cricket, because it financed the rest of the game, including the grass roots from which the next generation of Test match players would come.2 It also accepted the defendants’ complaints of free-riding by Packer: ‘Under present circumstances, there is much force in Mr Kempster’s description of the World Series Cricket organisation as being “parasitic”. For it is creaming off from conventional first class cricket the star players whom it has itself incurred no expense in training and preparing for stardom, with a view to exploiting their talents for commercial profit.’3

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  59

However, the High Court decided that the threat to Test match finances from the original (limited) plans for World Series Cricket was a limited one, and that a retrospective ban was not a reasonable response to that threat. The players who signed for Packer before the rules came into effect had broken no rules then in effect, and so did not deserve punishment. Meanwhile the effect of the ban would be to deny the public the pleasure of seeing those players in future Test matches (and so would also hurt Test match revenues).4 On the other hand, the longer-term threat to the game was greater, as Packer might expand his plans, and/or other promoters might join the market. But this: ‘[…] could have been adequately met by merely imposing prospective disqualification from Test cricket on all players who should thereafter contract with or play for World Series Cricket or other unapproved private promoters. I  do not say that a merely prospective ban of this nature would necessarily have been valid. However, being narrower than the ban, both prospective and retrospective, which was in fact imposed, it would clearly have been more easy to justify. In general terms I see the force of the proposition that official Test-players should not for the future be permitted to make themselves available to official Test cricket and to privately promoted international cricket in turn and from time to time, as and when they please. There would, I think, have been much to be said for the reasonableness and thus for the validity of a resolution […] of which the effect had been merely to inform cricketers in clear terms that any of them who thereafter contracted with and elected to play cricket for a private promoter, such as World Series Cricket, could not subsequently expect to be engaged to play in official Test Matches by any of the cricketing authorities of the Test-playing countries’.5

This judgment helps to identify the objectives that are legitimate for an SGB to pursue, and it seeks to explain why some actions are proportionate, and so a justifiable means of achieving those objectives, while others are not. It thereby establishes a framework for analysis that allows those active in the sports sector to come to informed judgments about what can and cannot be done moving forward. Unfortunately, the same compliment cannot be paid to some of the subsequent jurisprudence in this area. 1 Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347-48. 2 Ibid, at 309. 3 Ibid, at 349. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid, at 352. See also ibid at p  464 (‘If cricketing authorities employ a player to go on a tour or indeed perhaps even if they employ him to play in one or more test matches at home, it may be open to them, as a matter of fair negotiation, to demand from him, as a price for the privileges which he himself will derive from participating in the match, a limited covenant precluding him from playing for competitors. If such covenant represents no more than is reasonably required for the authorities’ protection, in terms of duration, place and otherwise and is reasonable in the interest of the public, it may perhaps be enforceable according to its terms’).

A1.71 In the FIA Formula One World Championship case,1 a complaint was made to the European Commission that the FIA had refused to sanction a promoter’s event simply in order to avoid competition for sanctioned Formula One events. In June 1999 the Commission issued a Statement of Objections, expressing the preliminary conclusion that rules and contractual provisions requiring drivers and circuits to participate only in events sanctioned by the FIA, and penalising licensed broadcasters who also broadcast unsanctioned events, gave the FIA the power to prevent competition emerging, in breach of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now Arts 101 and 102 of the TFEU). The Commission ended its investigation when the FIA announced that it was transferring all of its interest in the commercial rights to the Formula One Championship for 100 years to ‘a commercial rights holder’. In the eyes of the Commission, this addressed the potential conflict between the FIA’s role in regulating the sport and its role in staging events, taking away the risk that it might

60  Governance of the Sports Sector

misuse its regulatory powers to gain an improper commercial benefit/advantage over competing events. The Commission said that the FIA ‘will have neither the commercial incentive nor the regulatory power to limit the type and number of events it authorises, other than on the basis of objective criteria relating to the secure, equitable and orderly conduct of the sport’.2 1 Commission press release IP/99/434 of 30 June 1999; Article 19(3) Notice, OJ C169/5, 13 June 2001; 2001 Report on Competition Policy, para 221; Commission press releases IP/01/1523 of 30 October 2001, and IP/03/1491 of 31 October 2003. 2 See Art 19(3) Notice, OJ C169/5, 13 June 2001.

A1.72 Does the Formula One case mean that it is unlawful per se for the body that regulates a sport also to be involved in the commercial exploitation of the sport? The then-European Commissioner for Competition suggested otherwise, expressing the point as a starting point for enquiry rather than an end point: ‘Where regulation and organisation being vested in a single body leads to significant commercial conflicts of interest, the Commission will look carefully at whether another scenario should be required’.1

And the courts and regulators have subsequently rejected any suggestion of a per se rule, starting with the English High Court in the Hendry case.2 1 Commissioner Monti, DN Speech/01/84, 26 February 2001. 2 In Hendry v WPBSA, [2001] All ER (D) 71, Mr Justice Lloyd did not accept that the Formula One case established a per se rule, noting: ‘it seems to me to be of more value as an illustration of the points that can arise under these Articles [then 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, now 101 and 102 of the TFEU] than it is as a direct analogy. This is because of notable differences in the circumstances of the two sports [Formula One and snooker] and therefore of the facts of the two cases, and also because the statement of objections, though of course fully considered and issued after years of investigation, is not a decision on the case but rather a statement of the Commission’s position, to which the parties had and exercised the right to respond, and which, if the process had not been cut short by the new proposals, would have been followed by further steps before any decision was reached’ (para 31). He therefore did not accept that the WPBSA had to choose between being a regulator and being a promoter of snooker events (par 163). The ECJ’s subsequent decision in MOTOE confirms that he was right, and there is no such absolute rule prohibiting one body having both a regulatory role and a commercial one (see para A1.76). See also European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 173 (reproduced at para A1.79(e)).

A1.73 The Hendry case followed a very similar fact pattern to Greig v Insole before it. TSN sought to acquire certain commercial rights to the WPBSA’s ‘Main Tour’ events. When negotiations broke down, TSN announced it was setting up ‘a new and truly global World Snooker Tour’ for the top 64 players on the tour, with three events (the Grand Prix, UK  Championship, and World Championship) scheduled for the same dates as the WPBSA events of the same name. TSN argued that the WPBSA was legally obliged to stop being a promoter, confine itself to being a regulator, and it would be paid five per cent of the TSN prize money to sanction the TSN tour. The WPBSA responded by saying it would sanction TSN events as a supplement to the Main Tour provided that they met the usual conditions for sanction, ie if they did not clash with Main Tour events (so that players continued to give priority to Main Tour events), and if television coverage of them was not broadcast at a time that clashed with the BBC’s live coverage of the Main Tour events (to protect WPBSA’s television revenues). If not, WPBSA Rule A5 would apply, which provided that players could not play in events not organised or sanctioned by WPBSA without WPBSA’s consent. TSN sued on the basis that the object and/or effect of this and other WPBSA rules was to prevent a competitor to WPBSA entering the market for the organisation of snooker events, in breach of UK and EU competition law, in breach of the EU guarantee of free movement of services, and in unreasonable restraint of trade. The WPBSA defended its rules on the basis that they were required in order to ensure that the sport developed in a manner that benefited all, and that they were therefore pro-

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  61

competitive, and/or their pro-competitive benefits outweighed their anti-competitive effects, and were a proportionate way of achieving clearly legitimate interests. Mr Justice Lloyd held that the relevant market was the market for the provision of playing services by snooker players to the organisers/promoters of snooker event1 and that the WPBSA, as promoter of the largest and most commercially developed events, had a substantial share of and so was dominant on that market.2 He found that the imposition of Rule A5 was an abuse of that dominant position, since the effect of the rule (if not its object) was to prevent competition ‘by limiting the sources to which players can have recourse in order to earn their livelihood […]’.3 This ruling was not explained further, but appeared to have been based on the fact that the Main Tour events occupied all of the dates in the calendar that would be of interest to broadcasters, and so for the WPBSA to reserve those dates to itself was a significant barrier to entry for promoters of rival competitions. Mr Justice Lloyd did not address, in this context, the justifications offered by the WPBSA for its sanctioning stance. Instead he simply ruled Rule A5 void and unenforceable for breach of the EU and UK competition rules without further discussion.4 In contrast, in the context of the restraint of trade claim, Mr Justice Lloyd gave apparently favourable consideration to the justifications proffered by the WPBSA for the restrictions in its rules: ‘The analogy with Greig v Insole shows that WPBSA has a legitimate interest, as the governing body of the sport of snooker, which it is entitled to protect, so the question would then be whether the provision is no more than is reasonably required to protect that interest. […] WPBSA does not have a major investment in the training of players to protect, such as did the cricket authorities. It does have its broadcasting contracts to protect, and with them also its sponsorship contracts. Those exist for the collective benefit of the sport of snooker and its players, and they have over the years been of immense value to snooker, in making it a much better-known and more popular sport, and one which has attracted much better funding. It also has a legitimate interest in supporting a wider group of players than those in whom 110 Sport is interested. As a general proposition, WBSA must be concerned about the sport as a whole, including its future players, which might well lead to a course of conduct inconsistent with the view taken by some current players of what would be in their best interest. […] Of course the particular distribution of the funds available for prizes in a given season is something on which different views can always be taken, but it seems to me that WPBSA does have a legitimate interest, on behalf of its members, in spreading the prize money more widely than it would be in TSN’s interest to do, which is motivated solely by commercial profit’.5 1 2 3 4 5

Hendry v WPBSA [2001] All ER (D) 71 (Lloyd J), para 89. Ibid, at para 84. Ibid, at para 98. Ibid, at para 112. Ibid, at para 114 et seq.

A1.74 This seems to be clear authority for the proposition that it is legitimate for an SGB to impose (reasonable) restraints on players and others plying their trade in the sport where necessary to protect an investment in the training of players, to protect broadcast and sponsorship revenues that are needed for re-investment in the sport, and/or to ensure that commercial revenues of the sport are applied not just to the benefit of the elite but also to the development of a broader playing base. However, Mr Justice Lloyd then abruptly decided that refusing to sanction events that clashed (or whose broadcast coverage clashed) with Main Tour events went further than was necessary to protect these legitimate objectives. The only explanation he offered was that: ‘I am not convinced that this interest can only sensibly be protected by a rule such as A5. I can readily accept that in earlier years such a rule may have been justifiable.

62  Governance of the Sports Sector But at present, it seems to me that, even absent the constraints of competition law as such, WPBSA cannot justify this restriction as being no more than is reasonably required for the protection of its own legitimate interests’.1 1 Hendry v WPBSA, [2001] All ER (D) 71 at para 115 et seq.

A1.75 This raises a number of questions. In particular: (a)

Why would such a policy have been justifiable in earlier times, but not now? It appears that Mr Justice Lloyd was swayed by evidence that the BBC remained loyal to the WPBSA even after the WPBSA suspended application of Rule A5 in light of TSN’s legal challenge (which suggested to him that Rule A5 was not required). But by that point the rule had done its job (most players had signed for the Main Tour), and that is why the BBC remained loyal. (b) On the other hand, Mr Justice Lloyd rejected a challenge to the WPBSA rule limiting the amount of patches that players could wear at televised events, because of evidence that the BBC would have walked away if that condition had not been accepted. So if the SGB’s broadcast revenues are conditional on the top players playing in the event, and there is evidence that the broadcaster would walk away if that condition were not met, presumably that would mean a ban on playing in events that clashed with the SGB’s events would be justified? (c) More fundamentally, if it is legitimate for an SGB to take steps (i) to protect the commercial revenues that its events generate, in order to re-invest those revenues in all levels of the sport, and (ii) to prevent outside organisers freeriding on its developmental efforts, how is it supposed to do that other than by requiring players to commit themselves only to participate in sanctioned events? (d) Mr Justice Lloyd noted that TSN had met with the BBC because: ‘they suspected that the BBC’s contract with WPBSA contained some sort of clause under which the BBC could escape from the contract if not enough of the top players took part in WPBSA’s tournaments, and they hoped that they could persuade the BBC to broadcast their own tour if they were able to attract enough players for the clause to apply. If the BBC had withdrawn from the contract with WPBSA, as TSN knew, the WPBSA tour would not have been viable, since sponsorship would also have been withdrawn’.1

But if this sort of behaviour is allowed on the part of the third-party promoter, why is the SGB not allowed to defend itself against such behaviour by requiring players to commit to events so as to secure the revenues that pay their prize money? (e) Interestingly, Mr Justice Lloyd rejected TSN’s claim that the WPBSA had abused its regulatory powers by refusing to sanction an event if the broadcasting rights to that event were granted to TSN. He reasoned that the WPBSA ‘had a legitimate reason for objecting, in that WPBSA was supporting the event in material respects [providing cloths, balls, a scoring kit, and officials], and would not have agreed to do so if it had been known to be an event also supported (through the webcast) by TSN. On a different scale, one would not normally expect Shell to support an event which is also supported by BP’.2 But if this is correct, why would the same reasoning not apply equally to any event where the promoter wants to use players who have been identified and developed through performance pathways financed by the SGN? 1 Hendry v WPBSA, [2001] All ER (D) 71 (Lloyd J), para 35. 2 Ibid, at para 65.

A1.76 The next key case on this issue was Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio,1 in which the ECJ held that a non-profitmaking body that sanctions the staging of sporting events but also organises its

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  63

own events and sells the commercial rights thereto is acting as an undertaking for purposes of the competition rules, and as a result its sanctioning power has to be subject to ‘restrictions, obligations and review’ to ensure that it is not used ‘to distort competition by favouring events which it organises’. While this makes it clear that such dual functionality is not illegal per se, the judgment provides no indication of what ‘restrictions, obligations and review’ of the sanctioning power are required. The opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in the case (dated 6 March 2008) is a little more enlightening (although it was not incorporated into the ECJ’s judgment and therefore its status is limited): ‘89. Certainly, not every exercise of the right of co-decision conferred on ELPA by Article 49 of the Road Traffic Code can automatically be regarded as abuse. If the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position can be objectively justified, it is not abuse. In fact, in a case such as this, there may be objective reasons why an association such as ELPA refuses to give its consent to the authorisation of a motorcycling event. 90. The existence of such an objective reason is particularly evident where, at a planned motorcycling event, the safety of the racers and spectators would not be guaranteed because the organiser did not take the appropriate precautions. 91. However, in addition to the purely technical safety requirements, there may be other objective reasons for refusing consent which relate to the particular characteristics of the sport. In a case such as this, it is worth bearing in mind the following considerations. 92. Firstly, it is in the interests of the sportspersons concerned, but also of the spectators and the public in general, that, for each sport, rules that are as uniform as possible apply and are observed so as to ensure that competitions are conducted in a regulated and fair manner. This applies not only to the frequently discussed antidoping rules, but also to the ordinary rules of sport. If rules varied greatly from one organiser to another, it would be more difficult for sportspersons to participate in competitions and to compare their respective performances; the public’s interest in and recognition of the sport in question might also suffer. 93. Consequently, the fact that an organisation such as ELPA makes the grant of its consent to the authorisation of a motorcycling event subject to compliance with certain internationally recognised rules cannot automatically be regarded as abuse. This is without prejudice, of course, to the substantive examination of each of those rules from the point of view of their compatibility with Community law, in particular its rules on competition. 94. Secondly, it is in the interests of the sportspersons participating in the event, but also of the spectators and the public in general, that the individual competitions in a particular sport are incorporated into an overarching framework so that, for example, a specific timetable can be followed. It may make sense to prevent clashes between competitions so that both sportspersons and spectators can participate in as many such events as possible. 95. Consequently, the fact that an organisation such as ELPA makes the grant of consent to the authorisation of a motorcycling event subject to the requirement that the event must not clash with other events that have already been planned and authorised cannot automatically be regarded as an abuse. However, it goes without saying in this regard that, when establishing a national Greek annual programme for motorcycling events, ELPA must not give preference to the events (co-)organised or marketed by it over those of other, independent organisers. 96. The pyramid structure that has developed in most sports helps to ensure that the special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for competitions, are taken into account. An organisation such as ELPA, which is the official representative of the FIM in Greece, is part of that pyramid structure. Under its right of co-decision in the authorisation by a public body of motorcycling events, it may legitimately assert the interests of sport and, if necessary, refuse to give its

64  Governance of the Sports Sector consent. However, a refusal to grant consent becomes an abuse where it has no objective justification in the interests of sport, but is used arbitrarily to promote the organisation’s own economic interests, to the detriment of other service providers that would like to organise, and above all market, motorcycling events on their own responsibility.

The Advocate-General’s opinion therefore accepts the public interest in having events being played subject to the regulatory oversight and control of the SGB and its members, and in the SGB also having control of the calendar, to ensure that competitions are organised and staged in an orderly way that ensures a timetable that works for participants and spectators alike. What is not clear is what else an SGB may use its control over the calendar and sanctioning of events to achieve. In particular, if the SGB exercises its sanctioning power to protect the commercial value of its events, not so that it can pay out dividends to shareholders but rather so that it can reinvest the proceeds in the sport, so protecting the ‘virtuous circle’ of investment, development, profit, investment, etc that is so vital to the long-term future of the sport, is that ‘arbitrary use to promote the organisation’s own economic interests’? Or is it ‘objectively justified in the interests of the sport’? Neither the ECJ’s judgment nor the Advocate-General’s opinion helps to answer that question.2 1 C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] All ER (D) 02 (Jul). 2 The Belgian Competition Authority thought that the FEI had crossed the line when it declined to sanction the ‘Global Champions League’ series, meaning that those who competed in that series faced a six month ban from the FEI’s sanctioned events under Article 113 of the FEI General Regulations. It issued an interim injunction restraining the FEI from applying Article 113 in respect of the Global Champions League (FEI/Global Champions League, Belgian Competition Authority decision number ABC-2015-V/M-23 dated 27 July 2015 (case number CONC-V/M-15/0016)), and the Belgian Court of Appeal rejected the FEI’s appeal against the injunction, citing MOTOE for the proposition that ‘when drawing up the annual calendar, it shall not be permissible for the regulatory authority which also organises competitions to give preference to the competitions that it co-organises and commercialises over those of other independent organisers’. FEI  v Belgian Competition Authority, Brussels Court of Appeal decision dated 28 April 2016, case number 2015/MR/1, para  56. The Belgian Court of Appeal also held that ‘the pyramid structure that has emerged in most disciplines ensures that the special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a single competition calendar, are taken into account. The College does not dispute this analysis but it criticises the FEI for having broadened its objectives to the point of not pursuing “clearly defined” objectives’. Ibid, paras 57–58. The complaint was withdrawn when the parties entered into an MOU pursuant to which the FEI approved the Global Champions League rules and confirmed it as an FEI-approved series. See FEI press release dated 26  January 2017 (inside.fei.org/news/fei-and-global-champions-league-reach-agreement [accessed 25 September 2020]). There was however a postscript. A Belgian rider and stable challenged the MOU on the basis that it reserved most of the places for riders who were members of a team that paid to compete and limited the number of invitations issued to riders based solely on their ranking and not on payment of a fee. The Belgian Competition Authority ‘considered prima facie that it is not unreasonable to think that this decrease might constitute an infringement on competition law’ and so imposed interim measures requiring the parties to the MOU to ensure that ‘at least 60% of the invitations for GCT events are sent to riders on the basis of their ranking in the official ranking of the FEI, and should not depend on the question whether riders are members of a paying team of the GCL’ (see Belgian Competition Authority press release no. 22/2017 dated 21 December 2017). In April 2018, the Belgian Competition Authority followed up by imposing daily penalty payments on each of the parties to the MOU ‘for lack of implementation of the provisional measures imposed by the College in its decision of 20 December 2017’. (See Belgian Competition Authority press release no 6/2018 dated 16 April 2018). However, in June 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal set aside the Belgium Competition Authority’s decision on interim measures due to contradictory and insufficient reasons (the Competition College had decided in its decision to disregard the MOU, which decision was confirmed by the fact that the MOU was not included in the case file. However, the College nevertheless referred to the MOU in its decision on a number of occasions and made an order to suspend part of the MOU. The Court of Appeal found that there was a contradiction in the reasons and decisions of the College, and that as a result it could not be considered a reasoned decision as required by Art IV.64 para 6 of Book IV of the Belgian Code of Economic Law, ie The Competition Act). Following that decision, the applicants (Global Champions League and Tops Trading) requested the recusal of the members on the Competition College that rendered the annulled decision. The Belgian Court of Appeal granted that request in August 2018. See Global Champions League SPRL

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  65 and Tops Trading Belgium SPRL  v L’Autorité Belge de la Concurrence, Brussels Court of Appeal decision dated 27 June 2018, case number 2018/MR/1 and decision dated 7 August 2018, case number 2018/AR/1293 (originals in French) with summary (in French) at: belgiancompetition.be/sites/ default/files/content/download/files/2018_rapport_annuel_abc.pdf [accessed 25  September 2020] and English article at: mondaq.com/antitrust-eu-competition-/797176/belgian-competition-authoritycloses-investigation-into-international-horse-jumping-governance-body [accessed 25  September 2020]. After the newly constituted Competition College reconsidered the matter, in October 2018, the Belgium Competition Authority said that there was insufficient evidence to impose interim measures, and closed the case in December 2018 on the basis that the FEI had agreed to make ‘procedural and substantive changes’ to address its concerns. (See Belgian Competition Authority press releases no 35/2018 dated 5 October 2018 and no 44/2018 dated 20 December 2018).

A1.77 Some insight comes from a decision of the Competition Commission of India relating to field hockey, which is a very popular and therefore commercially valuable sport in India. In December 2010, the Indian Hockey Federation (IHF), which was not a member of the International Hockey Federation (FIH), announced that it had signed a 15-year agreement with Indian pay TV broadcaster Nimbus to stage a new annual hockey event in India, called ‘World Series Hockey’, featuring international players from different hockey countries. This caused great concern to the FIH and its member national associations, because the event cut across the existing calendar of official events, and was not subject to the regulatory oversight of the FIH and its members. The FIH therefore introduced new regulations making participation in an event not sanctioned by it or its members a disciplinary offence that could lead to a ban from participation in sanctioned events. The regulations were said to be aimed at protecting and furthering ‘fundamental sporting imperatives’ within the sport, namely, the avoidance of unsanctioned events compromising the regulatory integrity of the sport, the proper organisation and conduct of the sporting calendar, and the primacy of international competition in that calendar. Six individuals connected to the IHF and World Series Hockey filed a complaint with the Competition Commission of India, alleging that the regulations had been applied anti-competitively in an attempt to stamp out World Series Hockey. The Competition Commission of India rejected that complaint in May 2013,1 ruling that: (a) ‘The Commission took note of the most important merits of the pyramid structure, which are (i) It helps to ensure that the special requirements of sports, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for competitions, are taken into account. (ii) Pyramid structure is essential for organization of national championships and the selection of national athletes and national teams for international competition. (iii) Enforcement of rules that ensure proper organization and prioritisation of international competition as the international competition is recognized to be an essential and valuable feature of sport. (iv) Enforcement of rules that protect the integrity of the sport and maintain public confidence’ (decision, para 10.5.2). As such, ‘there are strong efficiency arguments in favour of a pyramid structure, as also there are tendencies and scope for potential anti-competitive practices’ (ibid, para 10.6.2). (b) ‘Sanctioning an event is a regulatory function of sports bodies and cannot be found foul, per se, for violation of competition laws. It is necessary to prove that the application of the system was not in accordance with sporting objectives’ (ibid, para 10.13.5(a)). (b) ‘the intent/rationale behind introduction of the guidelines as submitted by FIH relating to sanctioned and unsanctioned events needs to be appreciated before arriving at any conclusions. Factors such as ensuring primacy of national representative competition, deter[ring] free riding on the investments by national associations, maintaining the calendar of activities in a cohesive manner not cutting across the interests of participating members, preserving the integrity of the sport, etc. are inherent to the orderly development of the sport, which is the prime objective of the sports association’ (para 10.12.1);

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(c) the regulations are inherent in and proportionate to those objectives, and cannot be ruled illegal unless and until ‘there is any instance where they are applied in a disproportionate manner, for which there is no evidence at present’ (para 10.13.6); (d) the evidence adduced by the complainants did not support their claim that the regulations were introduced specifically to deter players from participating in World Series Hockey. To the contrary, the regulations were not applied retrospectively (‘FIH was not advocating disciplinary action on those players/ officials who entered into binding agreements with [World Series Hockey] before the regulations of FIH were notified’), and the IHF and Nimbus were given a window to sign additional players to World Series Hockey before the regulations came into force (paras 10.12.1–10.12.7). 1 Pillay v Hockey India, Competition Commission of India decision dated 31 May 2013, Case No 73 of 2011. See also Barmi v Board of Control for Cricket in India (Case No 61/2010, 8 February 2013), paras 8.55, 8.58 and 8.59, where the Competition Commission found that the BCCI, by binding itself in a commercial agreement with the Indian Premier League (IPL) not to sanction any competing league, had thereby ‘used its regulatory powers in arriving at a commercial agreement’ in a manner contrary to the prohibition on abuse of dominance (paras 8.55, 8.58, and 8.59). The Competition Commission also suggested that the intent behind section 32 of the ICC’s regulations, which required ICC members ‘not to put themselves or the ICC in breach of their respective commitments to those commercial partners, as this would threaten the generation of commercial income for distribution throughout the sport’, was ‘not so much in preserving the specificities of sport, rather of assuring revenue for Cricket Sports Federations under the guise of pyramid structure’ (para 8.57).

A1.78 The next case comes from the sport of basketball. In 2000, unimpressed with the competitions organised for them by the international federation (FIBA) and its affiliate company FIBA  Europe, some leading European basketball clubs launched their own competitions, the Euroleague and Eurocup, organised by Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA), owned by 11 of the 16 competing clubs. In 2016, FIBA Europe launched the Basketball Champions League, to be contested by the winners of its member federations’ respective domestic leagues, and told those members that if they did not discipline the clubs in their countries that continued to participate in the Euroleague and Eurocup, they would not be permitted to enter national representative teams in international competitions, including the 2016 Olympic Games. ECA promptly filed a complaint with the European Commission, alleging this constituted an abuse of FIBA’s dominant position, in breach of EU competition law.1 In response, FIBA filed its own complaint with the Commission, alleging that ‘in essence, ECA wishes to reap the benefits of the basketball ecosystem developed by national federations (players, coaches, referees, thousands of other clubs) without contributing to the foundations of the sport’s pyramid and holding the national teams hostage to serve the interests of six commercially powerful clubs’.2 In June 2016, the Munich Regional Court granted an ex parte application by Euroleague Basketball, some Euroleague and Eurocup clubs and some domestic leagues for interim measures prohibiting FIBA and FIBA Europe from sanctioning or threatening to sanction its member federations (by excluding them from the 2016 Olympic Games) for deciding to cooperate with ECA and its subsidiaries, stating: ‘Excluding or threatening to exclude the national teams by reference to the exclusivity clause under Article 9.1 of the Statutes, constitutes the abuse of a dominant position. It is “asymmetric” warfare. The National Federations with their national teams are prevented from taking part in the Olympic Games or European Championships – which is elementary for them – in order to pressurise them into persuading the clubs and players organised in the National Federations to forgo taking part in the competition of a competing event, irrespective of the binding clarification of the legal issue of whether the ECA, for its part, abuses its market power by organising the club championships Eurocup and Euroleague. Even if the exclusivity clauses under Articles 9.1 and 12 of the Statutes and the associated sanctions mechanism

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  67 do not in themselves constitute an anticompetitive measure within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, in this specific case there would be no justification for excluding a National Federation from Olympic Games or European championships in order to eliminate de facto one competitor (the only one) for club championships (Eurocup versus FIBA Europe Cup), where such competitor is unable to organise an economically viable competition on account of clubs compelled to refuse. No compulsory need of FIBA is in evidence as to why it should not await the outcome of the complaint proceedings before the European Commission that have just been initiated, where the question will be reviewed as to whether the ECA/Euroleague are abusing their market power pursuant to Article 102 TFEU. The entitlement to take part in Olympic Games should be decided for sports reasons. The decision of certain clubs to take part in a certain club competition has, in terms of sport, nothing whatsoever to do with a national team’s participation in international competitions. Such association, namely the imposing of sanctions on third parties to enforce own interests in a different area, is a classic case of antitrust abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU’.2

However, the court lifted the injunction shortly afterwards on the grounds that the applicants had waited too long before applying for relief, after FIBA Europe pointed out that the applicants had known about its stance for longer than they had let on in their ex parte application. The court also ruled that the applicants were bound by an agreement in the FIBA rules to submit their claims to arbitration before the CAS.3 In 2017, FIBA supplemented its complaint to the Commission after ECA organised its competitions to clash with qualifying matches for the 2019 Basketball World Cup and clubs participating in ECA competitions refused to release their players to play in those qualifying matches.4 In November 2017, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager answered a parliamentary question on the topic by underlining the importance of national teams and the athletes’ right to decide whether or not they want to play with their national team, and suggesting that FIBA and ECA should find a solution for the good of the athletes and the entire sport.5 However, peace did not break out. Instead, in January 2020 the Union of Leagues of European Basketball announced that it had joined FIBA  Europe’s complaint to the Commission against ECA.6 As of August 2020, however, there had been no public indication that the European Commission had issued any statement of objections or taken any other step on either complaint, instead apparently still hoping by its inaction to force the two sides to settle their differences consensually. 1 See Euroleague press release ‘Euroleague Basketball presents a complaint before the European Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe’ dated 22 February 2016. 2 FIBA press release, fiba.basketball/news/fiba-files-complaint-against-euroleague [accessed 25 September 2020], 5 April 2016. 3 Landgericht München I  Az.: 1  HK  0 8126/16. English translation available at: euroleague.net/ rs/6xk9sj4v9aybwosi/84bd1f8d-134d-42a0-a8ee-cd688d29aaa2/dbc/filename/munich-courtdecision-english.pdf [accessed 25  September 2020]. See also FIBA press release ‘FIBA  Europe welcomes Munich court decision to cancel temporary injunction’ dated 23 June 2016. 4 See FIBA statement: The worldwide calendar will not change for 2 Euroleague game-days’, fiba. basketball, 22 September 2017. 5 europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2017-005288&language=EN [accessed 25 September 2020]. 6 sportbusiness.com/news/uleb-joins-fibas-european-commission-complaint-over-eca/ [accessed 25 September 2020], 22 January 2020.

A1.79 In the meantime, however, on 8 December 2017 the European Commission issued an important decision that drew together the key strands of the previous caselaw and set out clear guidance on what is and is not acceptable conduct on the part of SGBs in relation to unsanctioned events. Two professional speed-skaters had filed a complaint with the Commission in June 2014, alleging that the eligibility rules of the International Skating Union (ISU) that made a skater ineligible for a period up to a lifetime to participate in in ISU events, the Olympic Winter Games, the Winter Youth Olympic Games and all international competitions, exhibitions and tours

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authorised by the ISU if they participated in any speed skating events not authorised by the ISU or one of its member federations infringed Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, because they stopped the skaters from participating in an event organised by a private promoter that offered them much better prize money and other revenues. The Commission opened proceedings in October 2015. In 2016, the ISU adopted amended rules that restated the objectives behind its eligibility rules and introduced a new sanctions regime, ranging from a warning to periods of ineligibility from an unspecified minimum to a maximum of a lifetime ban. In September 2016 the Commission issued a statement of objections, and in December 2017 the Commission issued a decision finding that the ISU rules did indeed breach Article 101 TFEU,1 on the following basis: The relevant market for competition law purposes2 is the worldwide market for the organisation and commercial exploitation of international speed-skating events (as opposed to national speed-skating events or events in other sports disciplines) (Commission decision dated 8 December 2017, para 115). (b) As the international governing body of the sport, controlling the calendar and the rules of the sport, the ISU has a strong position on that market because athletes have to submit to its jurisdiction if they want to participate in the important international competitions, and that means they cannot compete in other competitions without the ISU’s agreement (ibid, para 130). (c) The ISU conducts not only regulatory activities but also commercial activities, including marketing the commercial rights to events that it organizes, and so is an ‘undertaking’ for purposes of the competition rules,3 it and its members are an association of undertakings for purposes of those rules (ibid, paras 147– 48), and the ISU’s rules amount to a decision of undertakings for purposes of Article 81 of the TFEU (ibid, para 153). (d) The ISU’s eligibility rules have an anti-competitive object: ‘By imposing severe sanctions, including a lifetime ban, on athletes who participate in unauthorised speed skating events, the Eligibility rules inherently aim at preventing athletes from participating in events not authorised by the ISU, resulting in the foreclosure of competing event organisers. As set out in Rule 102(1) a) (ii), one of the explicit objectives of the Eligibility rules is the protection of the ISU’s economic interest. This confirms that the objectives of the Eligibility rules are not – or at least not purely – of a sports nature, but rather of an economic one. The rules aim to exclude competing event organisers which could potentially harm the economic interests of the ISU’ (ibid, paras 168-69). Therefore ‘the Eligibility rules restrict competition by object in the worldwide market for the organisation and commercial exploitation of international speed skating events within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty, even though the Eligibility rules may at the same time also pursue other objectives such as protecting the integrity of the sport’ (ibid, para 188). (e) ‘The Commission takes into consideration the fact that international sports federations have regulatory functions and are entitled to conduct economic activities besides their regulatory functions. However, where an association of undertakings is active in the organisation and commercial exploitation of speed skating events, but at the same time, through its regulatory function, has the power to authorise sports events organised and commercially exploited by other, independent service providers, this may lead to a conflict of interest. The exercise of the ISU’s regulatory power should therefore be subject to restrictions, obligations and review to avoid a distortion of competition by favouring its own events and/or those of its Members above those of third party organisers’ (ibid, para 173). (f) The ISU eligibility rules also have an appreciable restrictive effect on competition: ‘in the absence of the Eligibility rules, athletes would be able (a)

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  69

to offer their services freely to speed skating event organisers other than the ISU or its Members or organisers whose events were specifically authorised by the ISU. Moreover, there would have been real concrete possibilities for a potential competitor to enter the market for the organisation and commercial exploitation of international speed skating events without the need for the ISU’s authorisation’ (ibid, para 202). (g) Such rules may nevertheless be justified if they are necessary and proportionate to the achievement of legitimate objectives, and ‘the Commission considers that the protection of the integrity of sport, the protection of the health and safety of skaters and the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport can be regarded as legitimate objectives in the general interest’ (ibid, para 212, citing Meca-Medina4), but ‘the ISU  Eligibility rules are not inherent in the pursuit of the objective of protecting the integrity of skating from bettingrelated match-fixing nor proportionate to that objective because the betting policy applied by the ISU does not protect skating against the risks associated to betting-related match-fixing but was rather used to prevent Icederby from organising its planned Dubai Grand Prix’ (ibid, para 235), and nor is it clear how health and safety and anti-doping standards are applied to third party events (ibid, paras 239–240). (h) ‘[T]he organization and proper conduct of competitive sport and in particular to protect the good functioning of the calendar and the rules of the games’ are also legitimate objectives (ibid, para  242), but the ISU rules do not say the ISU will only ban an athlete if the third party event interferes with the athlete’s responsibilities under the ISU’s calendar (ibid, para 243), and ‘the ISU also does not apply any pre-established objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria in order to protect the good functioning of the calendar. Sanctioning athletes merely for participating in unauthorized events, without applying an authorization system that is based on such criteria, is not inherent in the pursuit of the organisation and proper conduct of the sport and proportionate to that objective’ (ibid, para 244). Furthermore, ‘in the absence of clear authorisation criteria that do not go beyond what is necessary to protect legitimate aims, the Eligibility rules impede the creation of any new, potentially innovative competitive events without bringing any improvement to the production or distribution of goods’ (ibid, para 294). (i) ‘[T]he Commission recognises that some forms of horizontal solidarity (for instance, equal distribution of revenues to all the clubs participating in the same competition) or vertical solidarity (for instance, redistribution of revenues from the elite/professional level of a sport to the low/grassroots level) may justify limited restrictions to the economic freedom of undertakings involved in sport, in particular within a sport pyramid’ (ibid, para 222). But ‘the protection of economic and/or financial interests does not, however, constitute a legitimate objective that can justify a restriction of competition. Such interests have also not been recognised by the Court of Justice as a legitimate objective capable of restricting the economic freedoms granted to undertakings operating in the EEA under Internal Market or competition rules. In particular, the Court has held that imperative requirements that can be invoked to justify limited restrictions to such rules can only be of a non-economic nature. Concerning the ISU’s argument that it uses part of the revenues it generates through commercial activities for the development of the sport, the Commission notes that these funds are, however, also redistributed to the ISU’s own Members for the organisation of international competitions […], thus putting third party event organisers at competitive disadvantage’ (ibid, para 220). ‘The ISU does not convincingly substantiate how preventing skaters from participating in speed skating events organised by third party organisers would be necessary to preserve the ISU’s solidarity model. If the purpose is to foster and develop the

70  Governance of the Sports Sector

sport of speed skating, a solidarity contribution to be requested from third party organisers of skating events may under certain circumstances be accepted but such a contribution should be fair and reasonable, be used to finance grassroots sports activities and not have exclusionary effects (a solidarity contribution should for instance not be used to cross-subsidise the events organised by the governing body collecting the contribution – or its Members – to the detriment of events organised by third party organisers)’ (ibid, para  247); and it must be set by objective criteria, not left to the wide discretion of the ISU (ibid, para 248). (j) ‘As to the protection of the ISU’s jurisdiction, the Commission notes that, without prejudice to the question whether the principle of having one regulator per sport can be considered as legitimate objective capable of justifying restrictions of competition law, the measures established by the ISU (that is, the pre-authorisation system embodied by the ISU’s Eligibility rules and by Communication No  1974 on Open International Competitions) are neither inherent in the pursuit of those objectives nor proportionate to them’ (ibid, para 221). They are not inherent because other international federations do not have a pre-authorisation system and seem to function well enough without it (ibid, paras 252–53), and they are disproportionate because they require the third party organiser to disclose financial information and business plans, they give the ISU broad discretion to ask for more information and to accept or reject applications for authorisation, and they do not set clear deadlines for decisions on such applications (ibid, paras 254–258). (k) The ISU’s complaint that the third party organisers were free-riding on the investment of the ISU and its members was addressed by the fact that the ISU’s rules permitted it to require a solidarity contribution to be made as a condition of receipt of authorization to hold an event (ibid, para 224). (l) Finally, the sanctions prescribed for participating in unauthorized events ‘are manifestly disproportionate’, extending up to a lifetime ban, and ‘there are no pre-established, clear and transparent criteria as to how the sanctions are to be applied’, instead conferring a broad discretion on the ISU Council, ‘resulting in an unpredictable, unclear and non-transparent sanctioning system’ (ibid, paras 260–65). 1 European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017. 2 For an explanation of this concept and its relevance to the competition law analysis, see para E11.54 et seq. 3 For an explanation of this concept and its relevance to the competition law analysis, see para E11.65 et seq. 4 Discussed at para E11.50–E11.52.

A1.80 The Commission ordered the following relief: ‘338 The ISU is required to bring the infringement established in this Decision effectively to an end and henceforth refrain from any measure that has the same or an equivalent object or effect. 339. As there is more than one way of bringing that infringement effectively to an end in conformity with the Treaty, it is for the ISU to choose between these various ways, including for instance the abolishment of its pre-authorisation system and of the sanctions imposed on athletes for participation in unauthorised events. If the ISU were to choose to maintain a pre-authorisation system, it would appear that the ISU can only effectively bring the infringement to an end by substantially changing its Eligibility rules, the Appeals Arbitration rules and the authorisation criteria as currently laid down in Communication No 1974, in the following way. 340. First, the ISU should only provide for sanctions and authorisation criteria that are inherent in the pursuit of legitimate objectives. The ISU’s financial and economic interests are not considered as legitimate objectives.

The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits  71 341. Second, the ISU should provide for objective, transparent and nondiscriminatory sanctions and authorisation criteria that do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve legitimate objectives. 342. Third, the ISU should provide for an objective, transparent and nondiscriminatory procedure for the adoption and effective review of decisions regarding the ineligibility of skaters and for the authorisation of speed skating events’.

The ISU filed an application to the EU  Court of Justice (General Court) on 19 February 2018 to have the Commission’s decision set aside, but no decision had been issued at the time of writing.1 Subject to whatever the CJEU may say, however, the Commission has given clear warning of the minefield that faces SGBs who wish to restrain participation in unsanctioned events, but has also given them a roadmap by which they may safely traverse that minefield, if they tread very, very carefully. 1 T-93/18 ISU v Commission [2018] OJ C142/72. Updates are available at: curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.js f?lgrec=fr&td=%3BALL&language=en&num=T-93/18&jur=T [accessed 25 September 2020]. See also: (1) The Italian Competition Authority investigated the unsanctioned event rules of the national motor sports federation (ACI) and equestrian sports federation (FISE) in 2008. Those investigations were closed after the ACI and FISE committed to allow its respective members to participate in events not organised by the federation. See Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Federitalia/Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (FISE), Decision n°18285 of 28  July 2008, Bolletino n° 19/2008; Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Gargano Corse/ACI, Decision n° 19946 of 30 June 2009, Bolletino n° 23/2009. (2) The Swedish Market Court (upholding the decision of the Swedish Competition Authority of 13 May 2011 Case 709/2009) found that sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the Swedish Automobile Sports Federation (SBF) Common Rules, which prohibited its members from participating as drivers and event staff in races not sanctioned by the SBF and provided that they could be fined or lose their licence in the event of breach, were anti-competitive and ordered the SBF to amend its rules. While the Swedish Market Court accepted the social, educational, and cultural objectives of sport and the need to ensure fair and safe competition, it considered that the restrictions under the SBF rules were a disproportionate means of attaining those objectives. See Svenska Bilsportförbundet v Konkurrensverket, Swedish Market Court, decision number 2012:16 in case A 5/11, 20 December 2012 (SBF v KKV). (3) In another Swedish case, BMR Sport Nutrition AB relied on SBF v KKV when bringing a complaint before the Swedish Competition Authority against the Swedish Bodybuilding Association (SKKF) regarding the ‘loyalty clause’ in its by-laws which provided for fines and suspensions against members for participating in competitions not sanctioned by SKKF. The Competition Authority closed the investigation after SKFF committed no longer to suspend or fine its members for participating in unsanctioned events. Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority), case 590/2013, SKKF, 28  May 2014. (4) Following a 2011 investigation, the Competition Authority in Ireland determined that Article  299N of the Show Jumping Ireland (SJI) Rulebook, which prevented its members from competing at unaffiliated show jumping events where the prize fund exceeded €50/£50, amounted to a decision of an association of undertakings which was likely to restrict the participation of SJI members at unaffiliated show jumping events and the organisation of such unaffiliated events in Ireland. The Competition Authority was of the view that the SJI rule was disproportionate to the stated purpose and likely to infringe Irish and European law. The case was closed in May 2012, as SJI agreed to amend the alleged anti-competitive rule as follows: ‘Members of SJI who enter unaffiliated shows with a prize fund above €50/£50 will be penalised if the show: (i) has not signed up to the specified Health and Safety Standards, and (ii) has not provided SJI with evidence of adequate insurance’. See ‘Show Jumping Ireland amend allegedly restrictive rule’ dated 1  May 2012 (ccpc.ie/business/enforcement/civil-competition-enforcement/ closed-investigations/show-jumping-ireland-restrictive-rule/ [accessed 25 September 2020]).

CHAPTER A2

Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions James Maloney and Tom Bruce (Farrer & Co) and Jon Walters (Northridge) Contents para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A2.1 2

THE INTERNATIONAL SCHEME.................................................................... A2.5

3

THE NATIONAL SCHEME................................................................................ A2.14 A Regulation of sport....................................................................................... A2.15 B Competitions – professional sport and amateur sport.................................. A2.21 C The role of representative bodies................................................................. A2.25

4

TYPICAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL GOVERNING BODIES AND OTHER SPORTS ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK.......................................................................................................... A2.27 A Unincorporated associations........................................................................ A2.29 B Companies or other corporate bodies.......................................................... A2.35 C Changing legal structure.............................................................................. A2.53 D Charitable status........................................................................................... A2.60

5

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNING BODIES AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS................................................... A2.76

6

THE DEGREE OF RETENTION OF RIGHTS BY SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES............................................................................................................... A2.81 A International competitions for national teams.............................................. A2.81 B Individual sports competitions..................................................................... A2.85 C Club competitions........................................................................................ A2.88 D Structures adopted for governing body owned competitions....................... A2.92

7

AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS...................... A2.95 A Common features......................................................................................... A2.95 B Disputed relationships between governing body and competitions............. A2.99 C Models of governing body and sports competition relationship.................. A2.101

1 INTRODUCTION A2.1 Sports governing bodies are essentially private undertakings, even though they may undertake many public or quasi-public functions.1 Under the socalled ‘European Model of Sport’,2 they operate within a pyramid structure. The international federations sit at the top. The national federations are members of the international federations. There may be continental or area associations that are also members of the international federations and that also have the national federations in their respective continents or areas as members. Beneath the national federations are regional associations, and beneath those are district associations or counties. Then come clubs or community associations, and beneath them the individual participants in the sport. 1 See para A1.11. 2 See para A1.22.

Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions  73

A2.2 At a national level, there can be a plethora of organisations involved in any sport, ranging from those regulating the sport (the national governing bodies), those organising competitions, those participating in the sport, and representative organisations for the different interest groups. For example in English football, The Football Association is the governing body that imposes the Laws of the Game (as mandated by the international federation, FIFA) and sanctions competitions; the Premier League, the Football League and the National League are competition organisers that run the professional leagues; The FA itself runs the FA Cup and the Community Shield; the Professional Footballers’ Association represents players’ interests; the county football associations administer the game at county level; and the Football Foundation is a football charity promoting grassroots participation. A2.3 There is no common form of organisation for these different bodies. Some may be unincorporated associations, and so not even legal entities in their own right; whereas others will be private companies, public companies, or perhaps registered societies1 or Royal Charter bodies. A small number now have charitable status.2 1 See para A2.48. 2 See para A2.60.

A2.4 This chapter explains the pyramid structure and the interrelationship between sports bodies at an international and national level. It sets out the constitutional structures that are typically used for UK sports organisations operating within the different elements of the pyramid framework. It describes how these traditional structures are having to change to reflect the increasing need for efficiency in administrative operation as well as the move to greater professionalism in sport and observance of the principles of corporate governance.1 It deals with the potential for charitable status for sports bodies. It also discusses how different models have emerged in different sports for the development and commercial exploitation of new competitions owned not by the governing body but rather by a separate entity in which the governing body may have a stake but ownership or control is either given to or shared with the participants in the competition and even potentially third party investors. 1 See Chapter A5 (Best Practice in Sports Governance).

2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCHEME A2.5 There is no one standard organisational structure for sport in the UK; rather, each sport is organised according to its own characteristics and idiosyncrasies. However, there are some common features. In particular, each sport usually has an international (or worldwide) federation. These international federations – for example, FIFA (football), World Athletics (athletics), FIBA (basketball), FINA (swimming), ICC (cricket), and World Rugby (rugby union) – are responsible for promoting the sport, establishing the ‘laws of the game’, regulating the sport at an international level, and imposing certain requirements to be fulfilled by their member associations at national level. International federations will make rules regulating the staging of international competitions. They will be responsible for, and make rules governing the relationship between, the international federation and the national federations, as well as the relationship between national and other affiliated federations. To some degree, they will regulate the relationship between a national federation and its own constituent members (for example, by requiring the national federation to impose certain anti-doping obligations on athletes and athlete support personnel under its jurisdiction at national level).1 1 See para A1.50(h) et seq.

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A2.6 It can sometimes be difficult to see exactly how all the elements of the pyramid work together. The relationships can be fairly loose. There will be a series of rights and obligations on different sides. Although the relationship between the different elements will usually be contractual,1 the exact contours of the relationship will all depend on the facts of the individual case. 1 See para A1.52 and the discussion of the Modahl case at para E8.11 et seq.

A2.7 The international federation is the association of all the national federations. It exists to provide a set of uniform rules for the sport and to ensure these are enforced.1 It provides the means of regulation of international competition, and may use the revenues generated by such competition to underwrite distribution schemes to help grow the game in new areas, in order to broaden the playing base for the sport. 1 The rules of the game for golf and cricket are set not by the relevant international federation but rather by the Royal & Ancient Club and the Marylebone Cricket Club respectively.

A2.8 International federations come in a variety of guises. Some will be legal entities in their own right, recognised in the country where they were established. Others will not be legal entities, and they will be governed by the laws of the country where their headquarters are based from time to time. It will be necessary to examine the laws of the country having jurisdiction over the international federation to see how it is recognised.1 1 Many international federations have followed the International Olympic Committee in making Lausanne, Switzerland their home. They are usually organised as non-governmental not-for-profit associations founded under and governed by Art 60 et seq of the Swiss Civil Code. See eg Art 1.1 of the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation (November 2018). However, the position in each case must be checked carefully. A comprehensive survey of the different forms of organisation of an international sports federation is beyond the scope of this chapter.

A2.9 The national governing body is usually a member of the international federation, and is bound by virtue of that membership to abide by the constitution and rules and regulations of the international federation.1 In certain cases the national governing body will not be a member of the international federation but will be ‘recognised’ by it, in which case a condition of recognition will be that the national governing body must abide by the international body’s rules. Whether the relationship is one of membership or recognition, there is normally a contractual relationship between the two bodies. World Athletics, for example, is a membership organisation and each national governing body for athletics is a member of World Athletics and thereby bound by its rules. By contrast, the members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are individuals from each country, as opposed to the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and international federations, which are ‘recognised by the IOC’. The NOCs and international federations are however bound by the Olympic Charter. 1 See eg Art 4.1 of the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation: ‘All Continental Federations and Members […] shall be deemed to have agreed and acknowledged that: […] they are bound by and must comply with the Statutes and Regulations, and with the decisions taken by the FIH and its constituent bodies (including Congress, the Executive Board, and other duly appointed officials and bodies of the FIH) pursuant to and in application and enforcement of the Statutes and Regulations […]’. See further para A1.43 et seq.

A2.10 In well-developed sports, there will be a layer of continental or area associations sitting under the international federation.1 The national federations within a particular geographic area will also be members of the continental/area association for that particular continent/area. The continental/area associations will be responsible for representing their member national federations and for organising competitions within a particular geographic area for their sport.2 There are often one

Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions  75

or two area associations within a particular sport that are more powerful than the other area associations, often because the most important commercial markets for the sport are located within their areas. 1 For example, there are six continental associations in football, sitting under FIFA, namely the Asian Football Confederation, the Confederation of African Football, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football, the Oceania Football Confederation, and the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol/ Confederação Sul-americana de Futebol (South American Football Confederation). 2 For example, UEFA and the European Athletics Association are continental governing bodies for football and athletics respectively at a European level and are responsible for pan-European competitions in those sports.

A2.11 Throughout the different sports, therefore, there will be a chain of interlocking associations/organisations responsible for the sport’s governance at each level. This can lead to tensions between national, continental/area and international federations, particularly where the international federation’s rules are in conflict with regional or national laws. For example, the European Commission has several times taken the position that football’s rules on the transfer of players from club to club breach EC guarantees of free movement and/or fair competition.1 In response, for some time the sports movement sought to argue that it should be exempt from EC law,2 but that argument has been soundly rejected by the European Court of Justice.3 Meanwhile the German courts ruled that the four-year doping ban imposed on athlete Katrine Krabbe under the anti-doping rules of the IAAF (as World Athletics was then named) was an unreasonable restraint of trade under German law, forcing the IAAF to reinstate Krabbe’s eligibility for competition and to reduce the ban it imposed for serious doping offences from four to two years.4 1 2 3 4

See further para E11.127 et seq. See eg ‘Sports unite to lobby EU’, Sport Business, No 21 (May 1998). Meca-Medina and Macjen v Commission (519/04 P) [2006] ECR I-6991. See paras E11.50 to E11.52. See para C6.57.

A2.12 Within different sports, there may be players’ associations, which are usually outside the pyramid structure but nevertheless can play an important role within the sport. The negotiations between the European Commission, FIFA, UEFA and FIFpro in respect of FIFA’s transfer rules1 demonstrated the importance of international players’ organisations and the increased voice that such organisations may have. 1 See para E11.136 et seq.

A2.13 As well as the international federations for each sport, there are various other sporting bodies of an international nature. The International Olympic Committee is the ultimate governing body for the sports that participate in the Olympic Games, requiring as a condition of membership of the Olympic Movement that the constitutions, rules and regulations of such sports comply with the requirements of the Olympic Charter.1 The Commonwealth Games Federation is responsible for the Commonwealth Games, and each Commonwealth country has its own Commonwealth Games Council. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (a Swiss foundation under the Swiss Civil Code) are other important international sporting organisations; they are dealt with elsewhere in this book.2 1 See Art 25 of the Olympic Charter (Lausanne, 26 June 2019): ‘In order to develop and promote the Olympic Movement, the IOC may recognise as IFs international non-governmental organisations governing one or several sports at world level, which extends by reference to those organisations recognised by the IFs as governing such sports at the national level. The statutes, practice and activities of the IFs within the Olympic Movement must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter, including the adoption and implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code as well as the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions. Subject to the foregoing, each IF maintains its independence and autonomy in the governance of its sport’.

76  Governance of the Sports Sector 2 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport) and Chapter C2 (The Anti-doping Regulatory Framework).

3 THE NATIONAL SCHEME A2.14 This section describes the legal structures commonly used by sports organisations in the UK. In order to understand why different structures are used, it is necessary to understand the different roles that the various types of organisation play within the UK and how the national governing body sits within the modern-day sporting framework.

A Regulation of sport A2.15 Within the UK, each sport generally has its own national governing body responsible for governance and regulation of the sport at the national level (ie  England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). This includes rulemaking,1 rule enforcement,2 regulating relations between clubs and between competitors, and regulating competitions. Some sports also have joint governing bodies across the various ‘home nations’, such as UK Athletics, GB Snowsport, and British Swimming. Some governing bodies may govern a number of sports, such as the Royal Yachting Association (which governs all forms of boating, including dinghy and yacht racing, motor and sail cruising, RBIs and sport boats, powerboat racing, windsurfing, inland cruising and narrowboats, and personal watercraft), and the British Equestrian Federation (which governs equestrian sports, including jumping, eventing, dressage, vaulting and endurance). 1 See Chapter B1 (Drafting Effective Regulations – The Legal Framework). 2 See generally Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and Other Internal Proceedings).

A2.16 Typically, the national governing body will have responsibility for all regulatory matters at national level,1 with functions delegated to area or county associations to administer at a lower level (such as management of the sport generally and discipline, other than for doping offences2). Many governing bodies will be responsible for organising national championships and other national competitions, although these responsibilities may be delegated to organising committees. 1 See para A1.19 et seq. 2 As a condition of receipt of public funding, UK national governing bodies of sport are required to delegate the enforcement of their anti-doping rules to UK Anti-Doping, the UK’s national anti-doping organization. See para C2.21 et seq.

A2.17 Each sport will have its own competition structure. Team sports are likely to have a very different competition structure to individual sports. Individual sports are more likely to have global tours with a centralised ranking system (eg tennis, golf), whereas team sports will usually compete on a league basis. The national governing body will usually want to ensure that competitions where a GB or England team is competing have precedence in the calendar over domestic competitions or international competitions where the competitor or team competes as an individual. This can lead to tensions between individual and country and between club and country. Some of the different models of ownership and control of different competitions are discussed below, at Section 5 et seq. A2.18 The national federation will not necessarily be responsible for all competitions in the sport within the UK. Indeed there is no rule of English law that prevents individuals setting up a competition outside the auspices of the national federation,1 and any attempt by a national federation to limit or forbid participation

Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions  77

in unsanctioned events is likely to be closely scrutinised on competition law grounds to guard against the use of regulatory powers for improper reasons.2 1 See para A1.63. 2 See further paras A1.17 et seq and E11.97 et seq.

A2.19 The national federation is part of the international pyramid, but it is also the top of the national pyramid for the sport. It is important to ensure that each level of the pyramid is bound by, and operating according to, the same rules and procedures (which ultimately emanate from the international federation). Some national governing bodies (such as the Lawn Tennis Association) have the county and other affiliated associations as their members, which in turn have the clubs as their members, which in turn have the individual athletes as their members. Other governing bodies (such as British Cycling) have the individual athletes as members. A2.20 It is important to remember that the national governing body governs both amateur and professional sport within the country and there may be conflicts between those two arms of the sport. In some sports, particularly football, the professional sports clubs may have greater commercial appeal than the national team run by the governing body. The result is that many of the individual clubs have far greater resources than the governing body. However, for many other sports, and in particular rugby and cricket, where the national team is the most valuable commercial asset of the sport, the national governing body is more likely to be on a firmer financial footing than the clubs.

B Competitions – professional sport and amateur sport A2.21 The tension between the amateur and the professional (elite) game is an increasingly difficult issue for sports. The governing bodies are required to invest in the ‘grass roots’ development of the sport and yet the success of the sport is judged by the success of the elite competitors and clubs. Lottery funding under the World Class Programme has done little to ease this tension, as governing bodies enjoy greatly increased funds, but they must be spent on specific elite activities.1 1 See further para A3.60.

A2.22 Rugby union became ‘open’ to professional players in 1995. It is fair to say that it has taken some time for the sport to adapt to the change. The latest agreement between the RFU (governing body) and Premier Rugby Limited (a private company existing to promote the Premiership and represent the clubs in the Premiership) was signed in 2016 and governs the professional game in England until 2024. It covers all aspects of professional rugby in England, including the season structure, the creation of elite playing squads and a player management programme, academies, a compensation scheme for clubs releasing players to play for England, player welfare, a standard player agreement, governance and commercial matters, and the terms of participation in the European Rugby Champions Cup. A Professional Game Board (made up of representatives from the RFU, PRL, and the Rugby Players’ Association) has been created to oversee the operation of the agreement. The provisions around player release are crucial to the resolution of the club versus country debate, which has been a recurring theme in rugby since the game turned professional.1 1 See further para E11.95.

A2.23 In football, the professional competitions are managed by companies set up for that purpose. The creation of the FA Premier League Limited and the Football League Limited as separate companies demonstrated the need for the professional football leagues to be administered separately from the amateur game. As discussed

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in further detail below, The Football Association, as the national governing body, has been able to retain particular rights in relation to the Premier League by means of a preference share (with voting rights only in relation to particular matters). A2.24 Some of the member clubs within the Premier League have floated on the stock exchange and became public companies (such as Manchester United, which listed on the New York Stock Exchange on 10 August 2012). However, Tottenham Hotspur de-listed from AIM on 13  January 2012 and re-registered as a private company to enable it to raise funds for a new stadium.

C The role of representative bodies A2.25 The different interests in a particular sport may well be served by a collective voice. During the late 1990s the popularity of supporters’ organisations was demonstrated in football. The purposes of these organisations (which are usually registered societies1) are to forge closer links between the supporters and the club, to acquire shares in the particular club (which are then held by the registered society for the benefit of its members) and to involve supporters in the club’s administration by securing election of supporters to the board of directors of the club. 1 See paras A2.48 to A2.52.

A2.26 There are representative bodies not only for supporters but also for sportsmen and women. In the UK the Professional Footballers’ Association is well known. Other organisations representing the interests of players include the British Athletes Commission, the UK  Athletics Athletes’ Commission, the Professional Golfers’ Association, and the Rugby Players’ Association. Most of these organisations are private companies limited by guarantee.1 1 See paras A2.39 to A2.40.

4 TYPICAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL GOVERNING BODIES AND OTHER SPORTS ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK A2.27 This section sets out various general principles relating to the types of legal structure that are used by national governing bodies and other sports bodies in the UK. It is not intended to be exhaustive, and when dealing with any particular type of legal structure the reader should refer to a specialist work on that type of organisation (for example, Gore-Brown on Companies, or Palmer’s Company Law). A2.28 It appears that the form of structure taken by a national governing body often has a great deal more to do with the history of the sport’s development than with what is necessarily the most sensible option from a corporate governance and administration point of view. However, the increased commercialisation of sport, and the recognition of the advancement of amateur sport as charitable, means that sports bodies at all levels are well advised to review, from time to time, whether their constitutional structure adequately protects them from liability and affords them all the available tax benefits.

A Unincorporated associations A2.29 Traditionally, an unincorporated association was the most common form of structure for sports bodies, as it is the simplest way to establish a membership

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organisation. Increasingly, as governing bodies become professional entities handling large sums of money, employing people, and owning or leasing their own premises, the problems associated with this type of organisation outweigh the benefits, and most governing bodies have changed their legal status to become limited companies.1 In fact, the government agencies involved in sport in the UK2 are keen to ensure that governing bodies are corporate entities, largely to protect the individuals running them from personal liability. 1 World Rugby, based in Dublin, is an unincorporated association. 2 See para A3.51 et seq.

A2.30 Unincorporated associations are essentially groups of individuals or entities coming together to carry out a mutual purpose other than to distribute profit. They are members’ organisations and have no legal personality distinct from the individuals/entities that comprise their membership.1 This structure can therefore be suitable for grassroots clubs, county associations or other sports bodies that do not hold property or employ staff, and whose liabilities can be easily covered by having in place appropriate insurance policies. However, it is less suitable for governing bodies with significant staff, commercial assets, and turnover. The lack of separate legal identity means that the association cannot hold assets or contract in its own name, which can cause difficulties when it tries to enter into commercial contracts exploiting the commercial value of its events.2 Furthermore, it means that the members of the association are not shielded from liability for the debts and other liabilities of the association. The power to run and the responsibility for running the association will usually be delegated to a committee. However, the committee members will be personally liable for any liability of the club beyond its assets, and the other individual members may also be liable, depending on the particular facts of the case at hand.3 1 See generally Warburton, Unincorporated Associations: Law and Practice, 2nd Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 1992). This can raise some complicated procedural issues when court proceedings are brought, challenging the actions of a sports governing body that is an unincorporated association of its members: see para E3.14. 2 This was one of the main reasons why the Six Nations Committee formed Six Nations Rugby Limited and why the Four Home Unions Tours Committee formed British Lions Limited. 3 In Howells v Dominion Insurance (2005)  EWHC  552 (QB), two individual members of an unincorporated football club (the chairman and secretary) sued the defendant insurance company as representatives of all of the members of the club, seeking a declaration that the company was liable to pay a claim made under an insurance policy issued by the company for the benefit of the members of the club. The insurance company counterclaimed for return of money paid under the policy, which it alleged was void for non-disclosure, and the counterclaim was upheld and a money judgment issued against the claimants. The High Court held that as a matter of law the judgment could be enforced against those individuals who were members of the club when the proceedings were brought and when judgment was issued, subject only to any of them establishing special reasons (eg fraud) why the judgment should not be enforced against him or her personally. Ibid, para 29. It also found that the contract of insurance was made (through the agency of the club secretary) for the benefit of all of the members of the club for the time being and therefore the claim was against all of the members of the club for their personal liability under that contract, and so the rule that members of an unincorporated association cannot be individually liable for the club’s debts did not apply. Ibid, para 31.

A2.31 One of the last remaining sports governing bodies that was organised as an unincorporated association was the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC). However, in 2012 it applied for and was granted a Royal Charter, coming into effect on 1 July 2013, which changes the MCC’s status from a private, unincorporated members’ club to a body incorporated by Royal Charter. The MCC sought this change to enable it to hold assets (such as Lord’s Cricket Ground) in its own name, rather than through a custodian trustee, and to remove any potential liability of individual MCC members for debts and other liabilities incurred by the club.1 1 ‘MCC granted Royal Charter’, 12  December 2012, lords.org/news/2012/december/mcc-grantedroyal-charter/.

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A2.32 The relationship between the members of an unincorporated association is a contractual one, regulated by the rules of the association. Those rules must be carefully drafted to ensure that the practicalities of how the association is run are set out, as there is little general law to be relied upon where the rules are silent. The relative informality of the rules may not be adequate to cover what the organisation is doing. The more sophisticated the organisation, the more sophisticated the rules will need to be concerning the members’ liabilities as between themselves. A2.33 The rules must deal with the following matters: name, objects, membership, fees and subscriptions, resignation and expulsion, composition of management committee and management committee responsibilities, appointment of trustees (or other mechanism for the holding of property), general meetings, alteration of rules, power to make and alter regulations, bye-laws and standing orders, finance and accounting, borrowing, property, indemnity, application of surplus funds, and dissolution. Usually the rules of the unincorporated association can only be amended by a specified majority of the members of the association at a general meeting. Therefore, to provide flexibility, the rules may also give a committee of the association the power to make bye-laws that deal with the technical and practical aspects of the sport, and to avoid cluttering the constitution with administrative matters such as expenses policies and the rules for the club cup competition. A2.34 The rules will need to take account of any particular requirements of the association. For example, the VAT exemption on sports supplies can only be claimed if an organisation’s constitution is compliant with the Value Added Tax (Sport, Sports Competitions and Physical Education) Order 1999, meaning (broadly) that any profits cannot be distributed to members but instead must be spent on club facilities.1 The association’s status in respect of corporation tax will also need to be considered. If it is trading and wants to claim mutual trading status, the association’s rules must provide that any surplus on a winding-up reverts to the members.2 1 SI 1999/1994. See para I1.58. 2 See para I1.13.

B Companies and other corporate bodies A2.35 Increased commercialisation and the onus on sport to become more accountable has led many sports bodies to incorporate as limited companies. There are various types of company that can be used, and the most appropriate for different types of sports bodies are set out below. Again, the reader should refer to a specialist publication in relation to the detail of company law, particularly in light of the enactment of the Companies Act 2006. A2.36 The main benefit of incorporation as a limited company is that the liability of the members is limited either to the price paid for the share in the company (in the case of a company limited by shares) or to a nominal figure in the event of the company being dissolved (in the case of a company limited by guarantee). However, there are also other benefits, such as the ability to hold property in the company’s own right, and the ability to sue and be sued in its own name rather than in the name of certain individuals as representatives. A2.37 A company’s constitutional documents used to consist of its memorandum of association (Memorandum) and its articles of association (Articles). Since October 2009, however, when the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2006 came into force, new companies have simply filed a Memorandum in the prescribed form (containing a list of the company’s subscribers and a statement

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that the subscribers wish to form a company under the Companies Act 2006 and have agreed to become members) at Companies House. The Articles are now the primary constitutional document setting out the rights and duties of the company and its members. The objects of the company (historically set out in a company’s Memorandum) and any other provisions in the existing Memorandum that are not within the new style Memorandum are now automatically incorporated within the Articles.1 The Memorandum and Articles are public documents on file at Companies House and can be viewed by anyone by obtaining them from Companies House. There are annual filing requirements in respect of the annual return and the directors’ report and accounts, which means increased administration costs compared to an unincorporated association (whose rules and accounts are private documents). 1 Companies Act 2006, s 28.

A2.38 The directors of the company have to abide by company law and must have regard to their responsibilities to the company. The general duties upon directors have been partially codified in the Companies Act 2006,1 although the codification is explicitly stated to be non-exhaustive, and existing common law on directors’ duties remains applicable.2 The general duties of directors are as follows: (a) to act within their powers; (b) to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and having regard to (amongst other matters) the long-term effect of their decisions, the interests of employees, and the impact on the community and environment; (c) to exercise independent judgment; (d) to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; (e) to avoid conflicts of interest; (f) not to accept benefits from third parties; and (g) to declare interests in proposed transactions or arrangements. The second of these duties can be considered new, as it replaces the duty to act in the best interests of the company. The new duty is wider and reflects enlightened shareholder values, i.e., that companies should act responsibly in the interests of their stakeholders. For the directors of sports governing bodies, who have in any event had to consider the effect of their decisions on a wider audience (the participants within the sport at large), this new duty should not be unduly problematic. However, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest can cause issues for directors of a governing body who have been nominated to the board by particular stakeholders in the sport, to act as their ‘representatives’ on the board.3 1 Companies Act 2006, ss 170–177. 2 Companies Act 2006, s 170(4). 3 See eg the discussion in the EFL Governance Review (Feb 2020) (copy available at efl.com/siteassets/ image/201920/governance-reviews/governance-review.pdf) of the difficulties arising from the EFL rules providing for directors of member clubs to be appointed as directors of the EFL to represent the interests of all of the clubs in their division.

(a) Private companies limited by guarantee A2.39 A company limited by guarantee can only be a private company, as opposed to a publicly-held company, ie  a company whose shares are publicly traded.1 However, a sports governing body will have a defined membership, so that trading of shares will not be necessary or appropriate. And otherwise a company limited by guarantee is very flexible. Its Articles of Association2 can be tailored to the purposes and practicalities of operation of the particular sports organisation. It is likely to be non-profit-distributing, and the guarantee that the members are liable to pay in the event of the company being wound up is limited to a nominal sum (usually £1 or

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£10). Furthermore, only guarantee companies can benefit from mutual trading status for the purposes of corporation tax and the VAT exemption,3 which makes them particularly suitable for sports bodies with members to whom they supply services. 1 See para A2.41. 2 Sports bodies constituted as companies limited by guarantee are likely to retain bespoke objects clauses rather than adopting the Companies Act 2006 template for companies limited by guarantee, because it will remain important to distinguish the purposes of the different governing bodies within the pyramid structure of sports governance. 3 See paras I1.13 and I1.57.

A2.40 Guarantee companies are usually used for non-profit-distributing organisations, membership organisations,1 and smaller clubs and governing bodies. Non-profit-distributing does not mean non-profit-generating. Sports organisations should aim to make a profit but they will want to re-invest it in the sport rather than distribute it to their members. Examples of sporting organisations incorporated as companies limited by guarantee include the British Olympic Association, the British Paralympic Association, UK Athletics Limited, the British Canoe Union, the English Golf Union Limited, the All England Netball Association Limited, the Ski Club of Great Britain Limited, the Amateur Boxing Association of England Limited, and the Amateur Rowing Association Limited. 1 For an interesting discussion of the organisation of golf’s Asian Tour, as arranged between the owner of the tour, Asian Tour Limited, a company limited by guarantee whose members are the individual golfers competing on the tour, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Asian Tour (Tournament Players Division) Pte Ltd, a company limited by shares, that organises and administers aspects of the tour, see Pilkadaris v Asian Tour (Tournament Division) Pte Ltd, [2012] SGHC 236.

(b) Private or public companies limited by shares A2.41 Many sports governing bodies and other sports bodies are constituted not as companies limited by guarantee but rather as public or private limited companies limited by shares.1 In the normal commercial context, such a structure would be used to enable investment in the company, including (in the case of a public company, such as Manchester United plc) by the listing and trading of its shares on a public exchange. However, sports governing bodies that are organised as companies limited by shares will include tight restrictions in the articles of association on the transfer of shares, since ownership of a share carries with it the right to participate in the governance of the sport (in the case of, for example, a county association that is a shareholder in The Football Association) or in a particular competition (as in the case of a football club that is a shareholder in the FA Premier League Limited or the Football League Limited).2 1 The Scottish Rugby Union used (until 2017) to be a public limited company, due (the authors understand) to the way in which it financed the building of its stadium at Murrayfield. Other national governing bodies are private limited companies, ie  companies limited by shares rather than by guarantee, such as The Football Association Limited, which was incorporated on 23 June 1903, and the English Football League. 2 For example, the English Football League rules requiring the consent of the English Football League board to the transfer of a share from one company to another are the mechanism used to impose sports sanctions on clubs that file for and then seek to emerge from bankruptcy: see paras B5.140 and B5.141.

A2.42 There may also be other specific articles that will need to be inserted. For example, the articles of the FA Premier League Limited contain provision for one preference share held by The Football Association that entitles The Football Association to vote on certain matters and to repayment of capital on a winding up in preference to the other classes of share. The other shareholders in the FA Premier League Limited are the football clubs in the Premier League from time to time. A club that is relegated from the Premier League is required to give up its share and receives instead a share in the Football League Limited.

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A2.43 Since October 2009, new limited companies (and companies amending their articles to reflect the updated provisions of the Companies Act 2006) have to set out their objects in their articles of association. If a newly established company does not do so, it will have entirely unrestricted objects. And if it does not register bespoke articles of association, then the Companies Act 2006 model articles for companies limited by shares will apply by default. Those model articles are intended for use by small businesses, however, and do not lend themselves easily to use by sports governing bodies. In particular, they do not anticipate the sometimes complicated provisions that can be required for the appointment or election of the office holders of a governing body, and/or of the additional committees or councils that may exist within such a body. A2.44 Matters that might be expected to be seen in articles of association of sports bodies organised as limited companies after October 2009 include the following: (a) definitions and interpretation; (b) objects; (c) decision-making powers of directors, including the power to make rules and regulations binding on all members; (d) members and general meetings; (e) additional structures/committees within the organisation; (f) administrative arrangements; (g) directors’ indemnity and insurance; and (h) application of surplus funds on winding up of the company. A2.45 Where the members (shareholders) have particular agreements amongst themselves (perhaps as to voting or profit share) that extend beyond the matters dealt with in the articles of association, they may set them out in a shareholders’ agreement, which is private and so does not have to be filed at Companies House. And matters such as rules of the game, disciplinary procedures for enforcement of the rules, and the like, should not be set out in the Articles of Association, because that restricts the ability to amend them easily, and also means they have to be filed each time with Companies House. Instead, such topics should be dealt with in byelaws or regulations issued pursuant to powers conferred in the Articles.

(c) Royal charter body A2.46 Royal charter bodies are corporations for legal purposes. They are created either by grant of royal charter of incorporation from the Crown or by a statute making provision for the creation of a corporation by grant of royal charter. Generally, a royal charter is granted for an organisation that works in the public interest and that can demonstrate pre-eminence in its field, stability (including financial stability) and permanence, and that has the support of a government organisation to petition the Privy Council. Examples of sports bodies existing by Royal Charter include the Sports Councils,1 the MCC,2 the National Rifle Association, and the Jockey Club. 1 See para A3.58 et seq. 2 See para A2.31.

A2.47 When a practitioner is advising in relation to a charter body, it will be important to check the terms of the charter carefully to make sure that all of the powers that the organisation is likely to need are included within the charter (particularly the ability to make subordinate rules). The charter is the ‘governing document’ or constitution for the particular organisation, and seeking amendments to the charter is not as easy as amending a company’s articles.

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(d) Registered societies A2.48 A  registered society is an organisation conducting an industry, business or trade either as a co-operative (a ‘co-operative society’) or for the benefit of the community (‘a community benefit society’). The term also covers societies incorporated under the old Industrial and Provident Society Acts,1 which formerly fulfilled the same roles. Co-operative societies are mutual organisations in which profits are only distributed to members in line with the rules of the society. For community benefit societies, any profits are ploughed back into the organisation for the benefit of the community the society is designed to benefit. Democracy is paramount and different classes of member are not permitted. For this reason, many trade unions are established as registered societies. 1 There were several Industrial and Provident Society Acts, namely 1965, 1967, 1975, 1978 and 2002. Registered societies are now governed by the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 (CCBA 2014).

A2.49 Establishment of a sports organisation as a registered society is usually on the basis that it is a co-operative organisation. The Rugby Football Union is organised as a registered society, as are certain rugby, cricket and golf clubs and many of the football club supporters’ organisations. A2.50 Like a company, a registered society is a legal entity in its own right and can therefore hold property and sue and be sued in its own name. The structure also affords limited liability to its members. A2.51 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is responsible for the maintenance of the public registers for registered societies. An application to register an organisation as a registered society needs to be made to the FCA,1 which will scrutinise the proposed rules (and also any changes subsequently proposed to the rules) to ensure compliance with the requirements of the CCBA 2014. Annual returns and annual accounts are also required to be lodged with the FCA. 1 Mutual Societies, Financial Conduct Authority, 12 Endeavour Square, London E20 1JN (email: [email protected]).

A2.52 Most sports organisations will choose to incorporate as companies rather than registered societies, because companies are cheaper1 and simpler to administer, and (perhaps more importantly) because most practitioners are more familiar with companies than registered societies. However, if a sports organisation owns substantial real property, the transfer of which to a new incorporated body would attract a substantial tax liability,2 then incorporation as a registered society may be preferable, because (in simple terms) the association ‘becomes’ the registered society rather than having to transfer its assets to a new entity. Specialist advice should be sought. 1 The fees currently payable in respect of registration, rule changes and annual returns are significantly greater in respect of registered societies compared to limited companies. 2 See para A2.56.

C Changing legal structure A2.53 From time to time and for a variety of reasons, sports organisations may want to change their legal structure. For example, an unincorporated association may wish to incorporate as a company limited by guarantee or by shares or as a registered society; while a registered society may wish to convert into a company; and a private company may wish to become a public company and float on the stock market. In

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such cases, professional advice should be obtained to ensure compliance with the organisation’s existing constitution and with all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements and procedures. A2.54 The incorporation of an unincorporated association as a company is complicated. Below is set out a brief summary of the steps that will need to be taken: (a)

(b)

(c) (d)

(e) (f) (g)

It will be necessary to ensure that the unincorporated association has power to dissolve and is also able to pass its assets by way of a scheme of reconstruction to a separate entity before a resolution to transfer the assets and undertaking to that entity is proposed. This may necessitate a change in the existing rules at the same time. A company will need to be established with an appropriate constitution to which the unincorporated association’s assets and undertakings can be transferred. The constitutional documents are likely to need a considerable amount of work before they reflect the association’s current structure and to include any changes to its structure for the future. In particular, incorporation can provide the opportunity to streamline the way the unincorporated association is governed and administered. The company will need to be incorporated and all the necessary Companies House forms completed in readiness. The transfer resolution will need to be prepared. This must identify all the assets to be transferred and set out the date on which the transfer will take place (which should be some time after the date of the meeting at which the transfer resolution is proposed, to allow for administrative matters to be dealt with). It will usually also provide that the unincorporated association will be dissolved after the transfer. The relevant tax clearances will need to be obtained from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. Re-registration for PAYE may be required. The transfer resolution will need to be put to a general meeting of the members and passed by the appropriate majority. All the pre-completion matters will need to be addressed. The members of the unincorporated association will have to apply to be members of the new company before the effective date of the transfer. The various Companies House forms will need to be filed. The employees (having been consulted beforehand about the change) will need to be informed of their new employer, as the TUPE regulations will apply. All the unincorporated association’s contracts will need to be novated in favour of the new company. The documents to transfer any property, or assign any lease, or transfer any investments, will need to be completed. The association’s bank will need to be informed and a new mandate completed. The association will need to re-register at the Information Commission. New stationery and other documents for the new company will have to be ordered.

A2.55 After completion, the unincorporated association will usually be dissolved. However, that should be avoided if legacies are expected. In addition, there may be certain assets of the unincorporated association that are particularly valuable and that will need protecting either by being retained in the unincorporated association (eg an historic insurance policy left for the benefit of the unincorporated association’s officers relating to a liability that arose before incorporation) or by being kept in a separate company to the newly incorporated company (eg  property assets or a portfolio of stocks and shares ring-fenced from the newly incorporated operating company in order to protect those assets from a future claim brought by a member of the operating company).

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A2.56 Incorporation as a company limited by guarantee can be structured so that it is tax neutral for capital gains tax if it is a ‘scheme of reconstruction’ under s 139 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992. Any mutual status of the association for corporation tax purposes should be preserved if a guarantee company is used. If the association owns property, the transfer of that property to the new company will fall within the scope of stamp duty land tax, but (depending upon the circumstances of the particular unincorporated association) there may be an applicable exception such that there is no tax to pay. Specialist advice should be sought on such a transfer. A2.57 Where an unincorporated sports organisation wants to become a registered society rather than a company (eg to avoid stamp duty land tax: see para A2.52), it will be necessary to ensure that new rules are adopted or the existing rules changed by a resolution of the members so that they comply with the requirements of the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. This should enable the organisation to be registered with the FCA. Before putting the resolution to the members, it is advisable to consult with the FCA to ensure that it will register the organisation if the new rules are adopted. A2.58 If a registered society wishes to convert into a company, it will be necessary to follow the procedure set out in the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. There will need to be liaison with both the FCA and Companies House relating to the logistics of conversion because, unlike an incorporation of an unincorporated association, the company will not be established in advance of the conversion. A2.59 Where a private company limited by shares converts to a public company, there will need to be compliance with the Companies Act 2006 requirements and any applicable Stock Exchange regulations. A  summary of that process is beyond the scope of this book and reference should be made to a specialist work.

D Charitable status A2.60 There can be substantial financial benefits from being registered as a charity, including both tax and business rates relief, as well as eligibility to receive grants.1 Prior to implementation of the Charities Act 2006, the promotion of sport was not in itself a charitable purpose, meaning that an organisation set up to promote sport would not generally be considered a charity.2 Under the 2006 Act (later consolidated in the Charities Act 2011), however, the ‘advancement of amateur sport’ is a charitable purpose in its own right. This means that: (a) established sports charities may be able to extend their remit (if their objects allow pursuit of other charitable activities); (b) not-for-profit organisations that already advance amateur sport (but were previously not charities) may now be charities and obliged to register with the Charity Commission; and (c) funders of charities may be able to fund a body that ‘advances amateur sport’ even if that body is not a charity, which means that a national governing body may be able to seek funds for grassroots activities from grant-making charities. At the time of the 2006 Act it had been thought that this could lead to a major expansion in the use of charities to run grassroots sports activities. While this has happened, at least to some extent, two countervailing factors have been a lack of clarity as to the full legal impact of the change in the law, and the scope (since 1 April 2017) for governing bodies to claim a corporate tax deduction for funding grassroots sport.3

Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions  87 1 See para I1.116 et seq. 2 That said, sport could be a means of achieving another charitable purpose, for example, where it was part of the education of young people or people with a disability. Organisations providing certain multisports facilities could also be charities under the Recreational Charities Act 1958 (now consolidated with other charity legislation in the Charities Act 2011). 3 Introduced by s 22 of the Finance (No 2) Act 2017.

A2.61 Notwithstanding the passage of time since the 2006 Act received Royal Assent, the Charity Commission has not yet issued guidance on what it considers the ‘advancement of amateur sport’ to mean. A consultation document posing a number of questions was published on 28  February 2011,1 but this did not result in draft guidance and no further information from the Commission has yet been forthcoming. Consequently, a number of unanswered questions remain in relation to the scope and meaning of the ‘advancement of amateur sport’. That said, decisions made by the Commission in the intervening period provide an idea of the Commission’s thinking on at least some of these points. A small number of governing bodies have successfully registered as charities during this period,2 although this is still unusual for non-para sport governing bodies. 1 Charity Commission, ‘Consultation on the Advancement of Amateur Sport’ (February 2011), webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140506132343/http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/ media/94901/pbaas.pdf [accessed 29 June 2020]. 2 By way of example, British Dressage was registered as a charity in 2014 and The Amateur Swimming Association (Swim England) Limited was registered in 2017.

A2.62 The first issue is that where a charitable purpose had a particular meaning under charity law as at the date the 2006 Act came into force, it is prescribed to continue to bear that meaning. There is therefore an argument that the purpose ‘advancement of amateur sport’ has the meaning set out in the 2003 Charity Commission Guidance document, ‘RR11 – Charitable Status and Sport’,1 which recognised as charitable the promotion of community participation in healthy recreation by providing facilities for playing particular sports. The authors’ view, however, is that RR11 represents guidance on the previous decision to recognise as charitable ‘community participation in healthy recreation’, rather than existing charity law on ‘the advancement of amateur sport’, which is different from and potentially much wider than community participation in healthy recreation. Until RR11 is revisited in the long-awaited guidance on ‘the advancement of amateur sport’, however, this question will unfortunately remain open.2 1 gov.uk/government/publications/charitable-status-and-sport-rr11 [accessed 29 June 2020]. 2 It is very much to be hoped that the Charity Commission will amalgamate RR11 with any new guidance it issues. With the law having been broadened in this area, leaving RR11 as it is would be confusing and potentially misleading for sports organisations.

A2.63 The second issue is again a question of interpretation: there is no definition of either ‘amateur’ or ‘amateur sport’. The Commission’s 2011 consultation asked what criteria it ought to use when deciding whether what is being advanced is an ‘amateur’ sport. Until it issues guidance, however, the position remains unclear. It had previously been suggested that the definition of ‘amateur’ used for community amateur sports clubs in Chapter 9 of Part 13 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 (as amended by the Community Amateur Sports Club Regulations 2015) should be used in this context – which would mean that the organisation would have to be nonprofit-making, could not provide benefits other than those prescribed by HMRC as suitable for an amateur sports club, could not exceed prescribed limits on the number of paid players (and on the amount paid to such players), and would have to pass its assets to another charity on dissolution.1 However, while there would certainly be merit in such consistency, unless there is a specific provision (either by enactment or

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in Charity Commission guidance) for ‘amateur’ to bear that meaning, as a matter of legal interpretation it will bear its ordinary meaning, ie ‘non-professional’. 1 See para I1.126.

A2.64 The 2006 Act (now 2011 Act) defines ‘sport’ as ‘sports or games which promote health by involving physical or mental skill or exertion’. The health promoted does not have to be physical health, however, meaning that ‘mind sports’ such as chess or bridge can fall within the ambit of the new law, on the basis that they promote mental well-being.1 Not every activity that involves some level of physical or mental activity will be admissible. The physical or mental activity must involve more than ‘effort’; it must amount to ‘skill or exertion’ and that skill or exertion must be shown to promote health. Moreover, a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) (which is empowered to consider appeals against decisions of the Charity Commission) found that neither the Charity Commission nor the Tribunal ‘should lightly reach findings, which result in the advantages of charitable status being conferred in respect of activities for which the science base is less than robust’.2 1 By way of example, in February 2011 the Charity Commission registered Hitchin Bridge Club as a charity: see gov.uk/government/publications/hitchin-bridge-club [accessed 29 June 2020]. 2 Cambridgeshire Target Shooting Association v The Charity Commission for England and Wales (CA\2015\0002), para 61.

A2.65 The Charity Commission’s February 2011 consultation document suggested that the effect of the 2006 Act is that organisations concerned with advancing sports or games may apply to register as a charity if they satisfy the following characteristics: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

the organisation advances a sport or game; that sport or game promotes health; that sport or game involves physical or mental skill or exertion; that sport or game is an ‘amateur’ sport or game; the organisation has aims that are exclusively charitable; and the sport or game is advanced ‘for the public benefit’.

A2.66 In order to obtain charitable status, therefore, as well as having a ‘charitable purpose’ an organisation must demonstrate that it is established for the ‘public benefit’. In September 2013, the Charity Commission published final guidance on the public benefit requirement under the 2006 Act (by then consolidated in the 2011 Act). This followed earlier guidance which was published in January 2008 and subsequently withdrawn following a decision of the Upper Tribunal in October 2011 about the Commission’s guidance on public benefit and fee-charging in relation to educational charities. It is clear from the guidance that the position of the Charity Commission is that the 2006 and 2011 Acts did not substantively change the existing law on public benefit, and therefore the following aspects must be considered: (a)

The ‘benefit’ aspect – to satisfy this aspect: (i) the purpose must be beneficial; and (ii) any detriment or harm that results from the purpose must not outweigh the benefit. (b) The ‘public’ aspect – to satisfy this aspect: (i) the purpose must benefit the public in general, or a sufficient section of the public; and (ii) the purpose not give rise to more than incidental personal benefit. A2.67 Questions remain as to the application of these aspects of public benefit to the new charitable purpose of ‘advancement of amateur sport’. It is to be hoped that the long-awaited guidance from the Charity Commission provides clarity on this point.

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A2.68 The first principle is likely to be satisfied by an organisation (typically a club or county association) enabling people to engage in a particular sport. However, the second aspect raises difficult questions when considered in the context of the sports sector. The majority of clubs, county leagues and county associations are operating (at one level or another) within a competition structure and not in isolation. The competitive nature of most sports requires there to be a number of participant clubs, and as a result the aim of each club is likely to be to improve its standing within that competition as well as enabling their members to participate in sport. The authors do not consider that such an aim conflicts with charitable status. On the contrary, it is needed to promote success of the sport and make it attractive to participants. A2.69 The authors’ view is that the second aspect needs to be set within the context of providing access to the sport. This may be on a defined geographical basis. A county association that exists to advance a particular sport in a particular county should be capable of satisfying the public benefit requirement even though it runs county competitions in which only the best players from the county compete. Correspondingly at club level, there needs to be some recognition that as a club develops it may promote higher standards (excellence), which will mean that a new member may not be able to play in the first team. However, provided that membership is open to all (subject to restrictions for safety reasons), the authors consider that such an arrangement ought not to fall foul of the public benefit requirement. A2.70 The second aspect has been hotly debated in the context of fee-charging charities (particularly independent schools). It is likely that many sports clubs will fall within this category, since many of them charge membership fees. The reality is that the majority of grassroots sports clubs are run on a shoestring and seek only to break even. In these circumstances, and as long as people on low incomes are not entirely excluded,1 payment of a fee to join should not be a bar to charitable status. 1 Re Resch’s Will Trusts (1969) 1 AC 514.

A2.71 The Charity Commission’s general public benefit guidance was followed by sector guidance on fee-charging charities (of particular relevance to sports clubs that charge membership fees) and assessments of the public benefit provided by four sports and leisure charities.1 While three of the charities assessed by the Commission were adjudged to have met the public benefit criteria, Radlett Lawn Tennis and Squash Club was not. The Commission determined that its membership fees were set at a level that many people could not afford, and that there were limited opportunities for those who could not afford membership fees to benefit from the club’s activities. The Commission confirmed that Radlett Lawn Tennis and Squash Club was a charity, but asserted that it did not, at the time of the assessment, deliver sufficient public benefit. The authors understand that the club then began a dialogue with a view to aligning its activities more closely with the Commission’s expectations on public benefit. The Commission’s approach appeared to have implications for other sports clubs or bodies that are or that wish to be registered as charities. However, following a decision of the Upper Tribunal in October 2011 about the Commission’s guidance on public benefit and fee-charging in relation to educational charities,2 parts of the guidance were withdrawn and eventually replaced by new guidance on the ways that trustees of fee-charging educational charities can ensure they run their charities for the public benefit.3 1 Tintagel Memorial Playing Fields Association, Wigan Leisure and Culture Trust, Birmingham City Football Club Community Trust, and The Radlett Lawn Tennis and Squash Club. 2 The Independent Schools Council v The Charity Commission for England and Wales and others [2011] UKUT 421 (TCC). 3 gov.uk/government/publications/charging-for-services/charging-for-services-illustrative-examplesof-benefits-for-the-poor [accessed 29 June 2020].

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A2.72 The fee-charging point aside, the second aspect does raise an important issue relating to the affordability of participation in certain sports. Ocean yachting, polo, motor racing and equestrianism, for instance, are generally perceived as expensive sports. An organisation established to advance amateur sport through these sports may have difficulty satisfying this public benefit aspect where the costs of participation require the participant to purchase the necessary equipment (yachts, horses, motor cars). This will therefore need to be looked at on a case-by-case basis. A2.73 In relation to the requirement that any personal benefit should not exceed what is incidental, the frequent practice of a sport is likely to lead to individuals or teams improving their sporting prowess. At some point an individual or team may excel so that they are able to earn a living by practising their sport and thereby gain personally as a result. The question then arises as to whether the organisation of which that individual or team is a member is no longer established for the public benefit. It seems to the authors that the answer is likely to vary from sport to sport. In football, for example, it may be fair for charitable status to be lost when a club with a single team is promoted to a professional league. But what about the club with a professional team and ten other amateur/junior teams? In an individual sport (such as athletics), the penalty of private benefit may seem more acute. If an athlete who is a role model for other club members turns professional, should he/she be forced to leave the club because his/her professionalism jeopardises the club’s status? These questions show that it is difficult to impose hard and fast rules about the incidental nature of personal benefit, and it is to be hoped that at some stage the Charity Commission issues guidance on ‘the advancement of amateur sport’ that addresses this issue too. It should also be noted that some of these concerns can be addressed simply through the structuring of a group that includes both charitable and non-charitable entities. A2.74 Even if they might advance amateur sport and so qualify for charitable status, many clubs may well not want to go through the constitutional change required to become a charity and adhere to the increased reporting standards required. Annual reports and accounts have to be provided to the Charity Commission. Those persons running the club may not want to become charity trustees and therefore bound by the standards imposed on charity trustees by the Charities Act 2011 and the general law. Any sports club with a social element (such as the running of a bar) would need to establish a trading company subsidiary to run that activity, as it will not normally be charitable. Any property owned by the sports club would become charitable property. These ‘burdens’ of charitable status will have to be weighed against the financial advantages of charitable status. The benefits from the charity tax regime would need to be substantial to justify the burdens. Certain clubs, which have significant legacies in sight, may be justified in making the change, but others may decide otherwise, particularly since clubs that are not charitable are often still afforded favourable tax status as a result of either not trading or (where they do trade) being mutual organisations and getting some rate relief.1 1 See para I1.13. If an association has exclusively charitable objects, it will be a charity and must (if it has an income over £5,000 a year) register with the Charity Commission. If the association does not want the burden of being a charity, it must ensure that its objects are not exclusively charitable or that it does not operate for the public benefit.

A2.75 Charities are usually constituted as charitable incorporated organisations (CIOs), companies limited by guarantee, trusts or unincorporated associations (although other structures, such as bodies incorporated by royal charter, may be available in some cases).1 The CIO is a bespoke legal structure specifically designed for (and solely for) use by charities. It provides an alternative to the company limited by guarantee (which was not created with charitable status in mind). CIOs are

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registered with and regulated by the Charity Commission but not Companies House, thereby avoiding the dual regulation imposed on charitable companies. CIOs need only file information (such as the annual return) with the Charity Commission. CIOs are subject to the accounting and reporting requirements set out in the Charities Act 2011, which are less onerous than the Companies Acts accounting regime. Unlike Companies House, the Charity Commission does not currently charge for registration or the filing of information; nor does it levy late filing fees. The legal framework for CIOs is still relatively new. As such, it has taken a little time for clubs and other parties (such as funders and lenders) to understand the various requirements. There are no plans to maintain a searchable register of charges over CIO assets comparable to that maintained for companies by Companies House. This may discourage some lenders from lending to CIOs where there is no land that can be offered as security for the borrowing. The Charity Commission has produced model constitutions for CIOs, and any organisation wishing to register as a CIO must adopt a constitution as close as possible in form to one of the models. The Charity Commission has also produced basic template constitutions for charitable trusts, unincorporated associations and companies limited by guarantee that may be appropriate for use by sports charities that do not require complex structures.2 1 See further paras A2.29 to A2.47. 2 gov.uk/government/publications/setting-up-a-charity-model-governing-documents [accessed 29 June 2020].

5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNING BODIES AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS A2.76 The pyramidical structure of sports governance consisting of international federation, regional federation and national federation is a helpful way of understanding the traditional approach to sports governance in European and (largely) international sport.1 Indeed, the ‘principle of a single federation per sport’2 is recognised by the European Commission. It undeniably remains a straightforward and accurate prism through which to explain and understand the prevailing mode of top-down regulation of sport. Yet it remains a blunt tool for capturing the systems of organisation, ownership and control that have evolved in sports with multi-faceted stakeholder relationships, particularly those with strong, autonomous professional club competitions or individual athlete participants. 1 See paras A2.1 to A2.13. Of course, this structure does not have universal application. In particular, US sports have their own structures and history, which require separate consideration (outside the scope of this chapter). 2 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’, COM (2007) 391 final, 11 July 2007 at para 4.1.

A2.77 The economic development of sport, in particular the emergence of professional sports leagues, has created an uneven, and at times complicated, rights ownership system. Whereas amateur sport can typically be said to have allowed for a singularly controlled elite competition structure, the increased commercial power of club-owned or privately-owned competitions in professional sport has placed stresses on the authority of governing bodies accustomed to control over the regulation and organisation of the entire sport. A2.78 English football is a case in point. While a club-controlled competition (The Football League) has existed since the nineteenth century due to the early professionalisation of the sport, the hegemony of The Football Association (The FA) as domestic governing body can arguably be said to have been relatively unthreatened, notwithstanding an at times uneasy relationship with The Football League, until the formation of the Premier League in 1992.1 That The FA continues to

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enjoy its consensual status as national governing body with authority over domestic professional football competition is due to the clubs and The FA and the Premier League having been able to agree a means of co-existence, enshrined through The FA’s ‘golden share’ in the Premier League.2 1 In turn, The FA sits within the classical pyramid structure for football headed by FIFA. First formed in 1904 of seven members, by the first FIFA World Cup (in 1930) there were 41 members, and today FIFA oversees six confederations, who themselves direct the 211 affiliated associations. Each has its own geographical or functional sphere of competence for the regulation of the sport but remains beholden to the organisations above them. 2 See paras A2.96 and A2.108.

A2.79 Other sports have fared less well in finding an accommodation between the interests of governing bodies and professional sports competitions. Individual sports, in particular, have suffered from the fragmentation of governance and control.1 It is obvious that for the accommodation of interests to operate successfully, there needs to be either a commercial or legal imperative for such accommodation. Where neither exist, instability will invariably follow.2 1 Boxing is the classic example of this fragmentation. See further para A2.90. 2 Darts has suffered more than most sports from schism, most notably in the 1990s during the legal battle between the incumbent British Darts Organisation and a breakaway player-led organisation, the World Darts Council (now the Professional Darts Corporation).

A2.80 The following sections of this chapter consider how the legal basis for the relationship between governing bodies, professional sports competitions and their participants is commonly structured, both in the case of governing body-controlled competitions and in the case of autonomous events run by teams or private entities. The focus is on the systemic framework in which these relationships exist, thrive and wither, with particular emphasis on ownership of rights. For a more detailed explanation of the governance and regulatory framework applying between governing bodies and competitions, readers are urged also to consider Chapter A1.1 1 See paras A1.11 to A1.41.

6 THE DEGREE OF RETENTION OF RIGHTS BY GOVERNING BODIES IN NATIONAL TEAM, INDIVIDUAL, AND CLUB COMPETITION A International competitions for national teams A2.81 The development of professional sports competitions has not led in every case to governing bodies losing rights holding and organisational control to those competitions. Indeed, at the level of international sport involving national representative teams, it remains typical that competition is organised and managed under the auspices of the sport’s international governing body. A2.82 The quadrennial World Cups in rugby union and football are examples of this. The Rugby World Cup is rugby union’s most recognised and profitable event, the rights in which are vested in Rugby World Cup Limited, a ‘subsidiary’ of World Rugby.1 In turn, the host nation for each tournament, selected by a vote of the World Rugby Council (consisting of national member unions), will set up a local organising entity to deliver on the operational aspects of the tournament pursuant to a host nation agreement between the local entity and Rugby World Cup Limited. All commercial rights in the competition, save for ticketing and agreed local rights, remain vested in Rugby World Cup Limited, and the devolution of operational control to the host union is strictly by reference to the agreed parameters of the host union agreement.

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Accordingly, there is a clear reservation of ultimate authority and commercial benefit by the international governing body. Teams participate in the competition on a contractual basis under a participation agreement and subject to a universal set of competition rules. Similarly, the 32 nations who qualify for the FIFA World Cup2 will compete in an event which has been run by FIFA since the event’s inauguration in 1930.3  1 World Rugby (formerly the International Rugby Board) is the recognised international governing body for rugby union. As already noted, constitutionally it exists as an association of its member unions, rather than as a corporate entity. For this reason, Rugby World Cup Limited is not a ‘subsidiary’, in its strict legal sense, of World Rugby. 2 The number of qualifying nations will increase to 48 for 2026. 3 This structure continues to be followed as the favoured model by governing bodies for new international competitions. For example, the International Hockey Federation (the FIH) launched the FIH  ProLeague, a round-robin style international field hockey tournament, as a centrally owned and controlled competition to which competing national federations were enjoined by a participation agreement.

A2.83 This structure carries with it substantial benefits for a governing body, such as a coherent set of entry and participation rules; central retention of commercial rights (and the revenues derived therefrom); the ability to delegate local matters of organisation and planning; and the transfer of commercial risk for hosting the event and ticket sales to the host federation (often in return for a minimum revenue guarantee). A2.84 Another tangible benefit is that it allows, in theory, for the direct flow of event revenue to all levels of the sport. The Olympic Charter, for example, stipulates this as a fundamental principle of the Olympic Movement to be strictly adhered to by the IOC.1 The so-called 2013–16 Games2 generated revenue of $ 5.7 billion. Whilst 10% is earmarked for the operational and administrative costs of governing the Olympic Movement, the remaining 90% is used for the holding of the Games and for the development of athletes.3 Other competitions may provide for more substantial distributions to member federations according to sporting performance, historical status, and financial need. However, a common feature of competitions controlled by international governing bodies is that their members can ultimately control how, and in what proportions, distributions of revenue are made. 1 Olympic Charter (2019), Rule 5 and Rule 24.2. 2 Being comprised of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics. 3 See the Olympic Games website: olympic.org/funding.

B Club competition A2.85 If international competitions featuring national teams tend towards a model of ownership and control by the governing body, club competitions might generally be said to be owned and controlled by their participants. This is largely a consequence of commercially powerful and well organised participating teams having prised control from a governing body that may previously have controlled competitions while the sport was amateur or less commercially attractive. For obvious reasons, a model of club ownership delivers economic opportunity to clubs, usually at the price of the governing body, and has been considered desirable by participating teams. Further consideration of the operation of autonomous club leagues and competitions is found in paragraphs A2.95 to A2.113. A2.86 Nonetheless, there are significant club competitions that continue to fall under governing body ownership and control. In football, these include The FA  Cup, the FIFA  Club World Cup, and the UEFA  Champions League. Indeed, UEFA have confirmed their intention to introduce a third club competition

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alongside the Champions League and Europa League. However, it is notable that notwithstanding UEFA’s control of the Champions League, economic ownership is heavily concentrated in the participating teams. The gross commercial revenue from the 2018/19  UEFA  Champions League (combined with the Europa League and UEFA  Super Cup) was estimated at around €3.25bn, of which €522.5m was set aside to cover solidarity payments and organisational costs, leaving a resulting net revenue of €2.73bn, 6.5% to remain with UEFA, and 93.5% to be distributed amongst participating clubs.1 Were UEFA not willing to distribute this proportion to teams, its ownership and control of the Champions League would come under challenge.2 1 As an indication of the economic importance of the revenue share from the Champions League, Celtic FC received six times as much from participating in the Champions League group stage as they did from Scotland’s domestic TV deal. 2 The periodical traction that the notion of a European Super League for top teams garners indicates the potential challenge.

A2.87 Less commercially developed sports properties may also feature a model of central governing body control. Where possible, governing bodies will typically seek to retain ownership of club competitions, if commercial and political realties allow, in order to receive the benefits identified above. The FA, for instance, relaunched The FA Women’s Super League (the top-flight women’s club football competition in England) for the 2018/19 season as a centrally owned and controlled competition to which teams adhere under the terms of the Women’s Super League licence. It is informative to contrast this with the model adopted for the men’s equivalent in England, where commercial power has dictated a club-owned competition, the Premier League.1 1 Another example of a governing body-owned club competition in European sport is PRO14 rugby. In contrast to its English counterpart, the Premiership, which is owned by the participating clubs, the PRO14 (the domestic rugby competition for Welsh, Scottish, Irish, Italian and certain South African teams) is owned by the three Celtic Unions, each of which holds a share in the private company operating the competition (while the Italian and the South African Rugby Unions, participate by contract).

C Individual sports competitions A2.88 Individual sports are less consistently associated with singular governing body control. The four major tournaments representing the apex of professional tennis and golf, for example, are outside the direct ownership and control of any overarching international governing body. The tennis Grand Slams are owned by the relevant national association (or in the case of Wimbledon, by the All England Lawn Tennis Club) and operate with the sanction of the International Tennis Federation (ITF). Those four owners work together collectively as the Grand Slam Board, which coordinates the general management, direction, financial control and governance of the majors. Below Grand Slam level, men’s  tennis is overseen by the ATP, which sanctions 64 tournaments, and women’s tennis by the WTA, with individual tournaments typically owned and run by independent organisations receiving funding through private sponsorship, broadcasting deals and ticketing. The ITF runs professional circuits below the ATP and WTA circuits, as well as the Davis Cup and Fed Cup. A2.89 In a similar fashion, golf’s most noteworthy individual contests (the US Open, US Masters, Open Championship, and PGA Championship) are owned and controlled by national governing bodies rather than an international entity with overarching responsibility.1 If we also count the Ryder Cup, the top level US golf tour (the PGA Tour), and the top level European golf tour (the European Tour) as

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the pinnacles of elite competition in the sport, the number of competing ownership and governance groups include the PGA Tour (US), the PGA  European Tour, the Professional Golf Association (UK), the Professional Golf Associations of Europe, and the R&A. It is no wonder that golf is seen by potential new entrants to the market as a sport ripe for disruption.2 1 The USPGA owns and controls the US Open, US Masters, and the PGA Championship. The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St Andrews (R&A) plays this role for the British Open. 2 At the time of writing, the latest entrant circling is the proposed Premier Golf League, a multitournament series for the top 48 players in the world that both the PGA Tour and the European Tour have been vocal in rejecting as a competition in which its players can participate: ‘Tiger Woods considering approach from PGA rival Premier Golf League’, Guardian, 11  February 2020 (theguardian.com/ sport/2020/feb/11/tiger-woods-premier-golf-league-approach-pga [accessed 17 November 2020]).

A2.90 At the extreme is boxing, where the highest level of professional competition operates almost entirely outwith the jurisdiction of the IOC’s recognised international governing body, the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur. Four major sanctioning bodies vie for position: the World Boxing Council, the World Boxing Association, the International Boxing Federation, and the World Boxing Organization. Each of them sanctions matches, ranks fighters and holds its own world championship, leading to the often confusing situation whereby four different fighters could each call themselves world champions within their weight category.1 Commercial rights to bouts and the responsibility for organising them are privately held, either directly or indirectly by the fighters, their promoters, the broadcasters, or other private individuals or entities. While the licence from the relevant sanctioning body provides a contractual route to impose certain minimum standards, these can be widely divergent and do not deliver a clear governance system. Recent doping scandals in the sport have illustrated the issues presented by this lack of convergence.2 1 Rafael Tenorio, ‘On the competitive structure in professional boxing, or why the best boxers very seldom fight each other’, in Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymanski (ed), Handbook on the Economics of Sport (2006, Edward Elgar Publishing). 2 The case of British heavyweight Dillian Whyte is salient. As with many boxing fights, Whyte and his opponent, Oscar Rivas, had agreed to voluntary testing under the auspices of the Voluntary AntiDoping Association (VADA) ahead of their match, with each fighter passing all tests. In addition, UK  Anti-Doping (UKAD) conducted tests, one of which produced a positive sample for Whyte. This led to a conflict between the contractual position between the fighters, which dictated the bout should continue in the absence of any failed VADA test, and the sanctioning regulator, the British Boxing Board of Control, which is bound by the National Anti-Doping Policy (see para C2.22). An independent panel on the day of the bout cleared the fight to proceed without Rivas having any awareness of the failed test. Similar controversies have arisen with other prominent fighters, not least Saul ‘Canelo’ Alvarez, widely considered one of the pre-eminent pound-for-pound fighters in world boxing, who tested positive for the banned drug, clenbuterol, during voluntary testing ahead of his rematch with Gennady Golovkin in 2018. With the Nevada Athletic Commission in charge of sanction, few were surprised at the eventual outcome of a reduced ban, allowing one of boxing’s most valuable bouts to take place on Mexican Independence Day to a lucrative pay-tv audience of Mexican and Mexican origin Canelo fans.

A2.91 While the lack of central ownership and governance in a sport can create confusion, it must also be conceded that the model of athlete- or promoter-owned competition, in theory, allows for the participating athletes to maximise their commercial potential. Whereas, to revert to the example of tennis, the Grand Slam tournament owners benefit significantly from a share of the revenues generated before delivering prize monies to athletes, boxing is the ultimate example of an individualistic approach to competition ownership where the purse is, in principle, split between fighters in agreed proportions. In practice, this may not deliver a greater proportion of revenues to boxers over other athletes once the large commissions taken by managers and promoters are taken into account, but it does effectively remove governing bodies from having any meaningful economic participation, perpetuating the fragmented regulatory market in the sport. Contrast this position

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with another combat sport, mixed martial arts, where a dominant organising body exists in the form of the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), which operates as owner and regulator of its sport. The UFC retains the substantial majority of revenues it generates, leaving an average fighter wage share of 20% of event revenue.1 1 For an excellent analysis of the finances of UFC, see ‘What we now know about the UFC finances’, Bloody Elbow, 9 September 2019 (.bloodyelbow.com/2019/9/9/20851990/what-we-now-know-aboutthe-ufc-finances [accessed 17 November 2020]).

D Structures adopted by governing bodies for owned and controlled competitions A2.92 How then do governing bodies structure the ownership and control of their own competitions? A common option is to set up a quasi-autonomous competition board or subsidiary, either to make decisions on, or to own and exercise rights in, the competition. Depending on the extent of legal distinction between the competition body and the federation as a whole, this may allow for liability to be contained in the competition entity. It should also afford the competition body greater flexibility and efficiency in decision making, whilst also ensuring that the competition is run according to the core rules and values of its parent company under delegated or devolved authority. A2.93 The organisational structure of the UEFA  Champions League is a good illustration of this.1 UEFA is comprised of 19 standing committees and six expert panels, sitting under the control of the UEFA Executive Committee. One of these committees is the Club Competitions Committee (the CCC), which oversees the UEFA Champions League and other UEFA-run club competitions. The CCC is itself formed of a chairman and deputy chairman selected from the Executive Committee, as well as vice-chairmen and ordinary members (as considered necessary for the proper functioning of the CCC). 1 See UEFA website: uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/committees-panels/ [accessed 17  November 2020].

A2.94 Another example is the Rugby World Cup. Rugby World Cup Limited (RWCL) is a private limited company established as a ‘subsidiary’1 of World Rugby and responsible for the management of the Rugby World Cup, Women’s Rugby World Cup, and Rugby World Cup Sevens. The RWCL  Board is comprised of seven directors who are accountable to and report to the World Rugby Executive Committee, but the Executive Committee has no power to overrule a decision of the RWCL Board.2 RWCL will (amongst other things) audit the host nation’s accounts and oversee their arrangements, consider match venues, hold the commercial rights to the events, and select event sponsors and broadcasting partners to whom rights will be granted.3 1 See para A2.82, n 1. 2 This autonomy is enshrined in World Rugby bye-law 10.4(e). See also bye-law 10.4(l)(iv), which excludes RWCL from the procedures and protocols of World Rugby. 3 The model for the organisation of the Six Nations Championship is similar. In this case, the Unions of each of the six participating nations (England, France, Ireland, Italy, Scotland and Wales) pool the broadcasting and title sponsorship rights over their home international ties under the auspices of the Six Nations Committee, while retaining ticketing rights and advertising and lesser sponsorship rights to their respective home matches for individual exploitation, The Championship itself is organised under the auspices of the Six Nations Committee, which is comprised of the individual Unions but functions according to its elected 12-member Council, its own constitution, and the bye-laws of World Rugby. The Six Nations Committee then further divests the everyday running of the competition to its registered services company, Six Nations Rugby Limited, which carries out certain designated services and organises the central exploitation of the broadcasting rights and title sponsorship rights to the Championship.

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7 AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS A Common features A2.95 A feature of sports competitions that exist outside the ownership and control of a governing body is the formation of a new entity, distinct from the governing body in terms of legal identity, ownership and management, to own and operate the competition.1 1 For different types of constitutional structure deployed by those entities, see paras A2.27 to A2.52.

A2.96 Returning to the example of English football, within the established hierarchy of The FA (at national level), UEFA (at regional level), and FIFA (at global level), there has been a long-standing separation of the professional game from amateur football – first, through the establishment of a private company owned by the clubs, the Football League (now the English Football League), and secondly, through the formation of the Premier League to protect the interests of the most commercially attractive clubs in the top flight league.1 These private companies retain control over the economic rights and administrative running of the competitions in which their respective member clubs participate, while submitting to the overall jurisdiction and regulation of The FA in respect of on-field discipline, anti-doping and anti-corruption regulation.2 Another notable feature of the Premier League is the ‘special share’ held by The FA in the Premier League, giving it a right to veto any proposed changes to certain fundamental aspects, such as promotion and relegation.3 1 The Premier League’s 2016–19 broadcasting deals demonstrate the commercial weight of the league. Domestic rights elicited £5.136 billion and the overseas market brought in a further £3 billion. 2 See para A2.108 regarding The FA’s retention of some of these rights. 3 See para A2.108.

A2.97 Club rugby, both league and union, further illustrates the preponderance of participant-owned club competitions. The Premiership, the top tier of domestic rugby union in England, takes the legal form of a private company owned by the clubs, although this structure has recently been adjusted to allow for external investment by the private equity firm, CVC  Capital Partners. The Rugby Football Union as governing body is not one of the shareholders. Instead, its relationship with the Premiership is dictated by contract.1 Rugby league’s equivalent, the Super League, is similarly owned by the clubs, with the rights vested in a private company formed for the purpose. In that case, the Rugby Football League holds a ‘special share’ akin to The FA’s in the Premier League, and also enjoys a contractual relationship with the Super League governing areas of operational cooperation and control and the distribution of revenues.2 1 See para A2.22. 2 See A2.109.

A2.98 In each of the examples above, the devolution of ownership and control to an autonomous entity can be described as consensual. That is to say that the governing body has acceded to the emergence of a club-controlled competition, not necessarily without a significant degree of negotiation or, at times, tension in the relationship, but at least without recourse to the courts.

B Disputed relationships between governing body and competition owner A2.99 In other cases, the path towards autonomy has been less smooth. In rugby union, European club rugby competition remains in the hands of the national unions

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whose teams participate in the tournament, but only after threats of litigation and ultimately mediation to ensure a change to the revenue distribution and format of the competition to suit the participating clubs.1 1 The European Rugby Cup Limited (ERC) set up the European Cup with a Board responsible for the implementation of ERC’s strategy for European club rugby. The ERC  Board was made up of representatives of the six shareholder unions (who take part in the Six Nations), as well as league bodies and club representatives. However, owing to concerns over the running of the competition and distribution of the revenue generated, PRL and its French counterpart, the LNR, served notice on the ERC Board in June 2012, citing an intention to establish an independent club competition. This disunity sparked mediation meetings between ERC Board members and led to a change to revenue distribution and the reformatting of the competition as the European Rugby Champions Cup.

A2.100 Where it is not possible to reach an accommodation between the governing body and the operator of a sports competition, a governing body may seek to exert its authority by enforcing restrictions under its rules. In general, those restrictions can be said to manifest themselves in two ways: (i) the imposition of rules against new entrants, and/or (ii) the sanction of athletes who participate in unapproved events. Cricket, swimming, and speed skating have all been subject to high profile disputes between competitions and governing body related to the exercise of sanctioning control by the governing body, considered elsewhere in this book.1 1 See paras A1.70 et seq.

C Models of governing body and professional sports competition relationship A2.101 Where an autonomous professional league or competition has emerged that operates with the tacit or explicit sanction of the governing body, the level of formality and choice of structure for the relationship between governing body and competition organiser can vary dramatically. There is no such thing as a common approach, but some or all of the following features are likely to exist: (a) consensual co-existence by adherence to regulations and overall sporting governance of the governing body; (b) a contractual model pursuant to which the governing body and competition organiser agree the terms of their cooperation and co-existence in a stand-alone contract; and (c) a shareholder model in which the governing body holds a ‘special share’ in the entity operating the competition.

(a) Consensual co-existence A2.102 Consensual co-existence underpins all autonomous sports competitions that operate with governing body sanction. In its simplest form, this requires the tacit acceptance by the federation of the event taking place, and the tacit acceptance by the event owner of the rules and regulations of the federation applying to its competition. The rulebook of the governing body will invariably give it the power to regulate any competition in its sport taking place within its area of geographical authority.1 It is also likely that the rulebook will submit teams or athletes participating in the competition to its jurisdiction. Assuming the event owner accepts that authority, consensual co-existence can therefore occur without further formality.2 1 See para A1.46. 2 For the reasons set out in para A2.103, it is likely that the governing body will wish to formalise the relationship with a negotiated agreement. However, whether this is achievable will depend on the respective bargaining power of the parties involved. In some cases, as much as a federation may wish to agree further terms with the event owner, it may be forced into a position of begrudging acceptance of undocumented, consensual co-existence. The Indian Premier League (IPL) is a case in point. The

Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions  99 T20 tournament is one of the most valuable brands in cricket, with a 2018 brand value of $6.3 billion. The competition was introduced in 2008 by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), which owns and runs the IPL. Therefore, on a national level, the BCCI as the Indian governing body enjoys a strong position. The IPL is set up as a sub-committee of the BCCI. It is governed by a General Council comprised of BCCI representatives and ‘directly accountable’ to the BCCI under its Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations. The eight teams participating in the IPL have no ownership or involvement in the running of the competition; instead, they are the successful bidders for an IPL franchise and bound by a Franchise Agreement with the BCCI-IPL. These Agreements grant the BCCI-IPL a right to a minimum percentage share of the central licensing income of the franchisees and an exclusive right to the exploitation of the competition’s central rights. Cricket players are also tied to the BCCI-IPL through centralised contracts and an implied acceptance of the Players’ Code of Conduct submits them to the rules and regulations of the BCCI rather than the International Cricket Council (ICC). Indeed, despite the BCCI having been a full member of the ICC since 1926, the separation of the IPL from the ICC has been staunchly reiterated since establishment. So, whilst the ICC recognises the IPL and assures no international matches are scheduled during its fixture window, it remains without locus standi over the tournament and receives no revenue or rights from it.

A2.103 In practice, this is an over-simplification. It is usual that the governing body would have reserved power in its rulebook to give express sanction to the competition; and also to approve the calendar for the competition.1 Depending on the constitution of the governing body, this may require a Board, Council or shareholder vote to grant the necessary consent.2 It also creates a precarious position for the parties, particularly the federation, in the absence of a binding legal relationship. All of the matters that would be covered by a long-form agreement are undocumented, creating a perpetual pressure for the parties to maintain an alignment of interests and vision for the competition and its place within the sport as a whole. 1 See para A1.62. 2 For example, World Rugby Regulations require the regulation, co-ordination and approval of the Council for any international match or competition (Reg 16). Regulation 9 also provides a specific window for player release.

(b) Contractual agreement A2.104 For this reason, governing bodies and competition owners will commonly enter into a negotiated agreement documenting their relationship and terms of coexistence. What areas might this cover? (a) The respective areas of responsibility for governance and regulation of the competition. An acknowledgement of acceptance of the federation’s rulebook is a given, but it will be necessary to agree any devolved areas of responsibility (for example, the implementation of competition-specific integrity rules). It can be expected that areas of regulation on commercial matters will sit with the competition owner, whereas matters of sport-wide regulatory concern will continue to be the preserve of the governing body.1 (b) The process for setting the calendar and scheduling of the competition. This may be supplemented by provisions of the governing body’s rulebook requiring approval over these matters.2 A particular pressure will be agreeing sufficient flexibility for the event owner to maximise its commercial appeal, while affording sufficient protection to international competitions and other domestic cup competitions. (c) Provisions as to the required player release for participation in international competition. There may be a basic position provided for under a global federation’s rulebook, which a national governing body may seek to enhance by agreement with the event owner, often in return for a compensatory payment.3 (d) Player management and welfare generally, including data sharing on the medical condition and training load of players. (e) The share (if any) of the commercial revenues generated by the competition that will be delivered to the governing body.

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(f) The creation of a governance structure affording the federation direct representation on a competition board or specific competition sub-committee. Depending on the balance of power between federation and event owner, this representation may be limited to a regulatory committee, rather than the full competition board. (g) The ownership of intellectual property rights in the competition. An event organiser may own all intellectual property rights in a competition; or the rights may ultimately be owned by the governing body with an exclusive licence granted to the event organiser to exploit them. In the latter example, provisions on the share of commercial revenues will need to account for the governing body’s ultimate ownership. (h) The period of time over which the negotiated agreement will apply; and termination rights. 1 An example of this would be The FA’s continuing authority to regulate and prosecute disciplinary issues relating to participants in the Premier League. Rule B1(b) of The FA  Rules provides for competitions (such as the Premier League) to put in place any regulations they deem necessary. As such, the Premier League has its own set of rules that govern the conduct of the competition and the clubs within it. However, these regulations are expressly subject to The FA’s own rules, and where matters impact on the sport as a whole (for example in cases of betting or racial abuse), The FA will take its own disciplinary action and issue its own sanctions, independent of the Premier League. In contrast are the commercial regulations, for example the requirements as to the display of commercial partner advertising in stadia, control over enforcement of which resides with the Premier League as the rights owner in the competition. 2 See para A1.62 and para A2.103. 3 Rugby union is a good example of a sport where governing bodies have sought to negotiate enhanced player release provisions over and above those provided for under World Rugby rules to allow the national team the greatest possible access to players. Both the RFU (see para A2.22) and the Welsh Rugby Union through its professional rugby agreement with the four professional regional rugby teams in Wales have negotiated enhanced player release.

A2.105 The Concorde Agreement (Concorde) in Formula One is one of the most well-known and complicated negotiated agreements between an international federation and a sports rights owner. Concorde has existed in various iterations since 1981 as the commercial agreement between the sport’s global governing body (the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile), the commercial rights holder in Formula One (the Formula One Group), and the participating teams. Its negotiation has been made significantly more complicated by the fact that teams are individual signatories to the agreement and by the private ownership of the Formula One Group. It covers all of the aspects described in para A2.104 above, save for player release for international duty, which is not applicable in the sport.1 Consistent areas of dispute between signatories are the share of distributions from the sport and the overall programme and technical direction of the sport. This has led to significant periods of disagreement and brinkmanship around the time of Concorde renewal. A comparison could be drawn with the collective bargaining process in US sports between the major leagues and player associations concerning the terms of the players’ participation in those leagues, which has frequently led to extended disputes and lock-outs where agreement cannot be reached.2 Therein lies the fundamental weakness with a process of contractual agreement between event owner and federation and teams, being the contract renewal risk arising around the expiry of the agreed term of the negotiated agreement. 1 For a brief background of the Concorde Agreement and the protracted negotiations over its renewal, see Norman Howell, ‘F1 owner and teams race to rewrite revenue split’, Financial Times, 25 May 2019 (ft.com/content/42c14d54-6a87-11e9-9ff9-8c855179f1c4 [accessed 17 November 2020]) 2 Both the MLB and NHL have suffered from failed negotiations over collective bargaining agreements (CBA). Over the course of its history, the MLB has experienced eight work stoppages (five strikes and three lockouts), with the most recent causing the cancellation of the entire 1994/95 post-season, including the World Series. Similarly, CBA disputes saw the cancellation of the 2004/05 NHL season. The 2013 lockout led to a new CBA being signed between the NHL and NHLPA, and their mutual refusal to trigger the opt-out provisions and re-open the CBA (2019) is surely a relief for hockey fans, at least until its expiry after the 2021/22 season.

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(c) Shareholder model A2.106 A  possible answer to this renewal risk is to adopt a shareholder model that gives the governing body a share or membership interest in the entity owning and operating the competition, typically as a separate class of share to ordinary shareholders (the participants in the competition), with distinct rights attached. A2.107 The rights attached to the governing body share are likely to be noneconomic.1 General voting rights may also be limited. The principal rights attaching to the share are instead typically specific weighted voting or veto rights over noncommercial matters of a sporting and regulatory nature relating to the competition.2 In order to protect the integrity of regulation of a sport as a whole and the place of an autonomous competition in that framework, these rights may allow the governing body through its own class of share an effective veto over certain decisions, while leaving the other shareholders free to determine the commercialisation of the sport. The veto will likely fall short of positive control, save over a handful of specific regulatory matters that may be preserved as exclusive matters for the governing body to determine. The share may also carry the right to appoint a director to the board. The type of rights that may be enjoyed through governing body shareholding are best illustrated by example. 1 It is more common for any revenue share between competition owner and governing body to be addressed in a separate contract concerning areas of cooperation, although this is not always the case and a special share may provide for economic rights. 2 These shares are often described as ‘golden shares’ in the same fashion as weighted voting right shares held by governments in previously nationalised businesses that have since been privatised.

A2.108 Shares in The Football Association Premier League Limited (FAPL) are held by the competition’s constituent member clubs through ordinary shares. In addition to this and by virtue of its role as the sport’s national governing body, The FA is afforded a ‘special share’ (also known as the ‘golden share’) in the FAPL. This special shareholder status does not give The FA any involvement in the dayto-day running of the FAPL or to full economic participation. For example, The FA does not have a right to vote at general meetings and (other than in the very limited circumstance of the FAPL’s dissolution) it does not have any right to receive the capital or income of the FAPL. However, the special share does grant The FA rights held only by it as the special shareholder. These rights are set out in full at Articles 7.2 to 7.4 of the FAPL Articles of Association and include the right to: (a) (b)

veto the appointment of the FAPL Chairman or Chief Executive; effect or prevent change of certain FAPL Articles through giving or withholding written consent. This includes changes to the Articles governing the issue of ordinary shares, adherence to The FA Rules, the conditions over winding up of the FAPL, change of name, and the rules against multiple club ownership; (c) be notified of, attend and participate in FAPL General Meetings; and (d) priority of payment in the event of the FAPL winding up. A2.109 The share held by the Rugby Football League (the RFL) in Super League (Europe) Limited (the owner of the Super League rugby league competition) (SLE) is another good example of this model. In the RFL’s case, its share enjoys economic rights alongside the other club member shareholders. It also gives the RFL the right to appoint a non-executive director to the SLE board. Its share ranks as a separate class of share and provides the RFL with veto rights or, in some cases, exclusive voting rights over certain non-commercial matters, including: (a) changes to core provisions of the Articles, such as to share capital and class rights or which otherwise materially adversely affect the RFL;

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(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

changes to the name of the Super League; changes to the number of competing teams beyond agreed parameters; changes to promotion and relegation mechanisms outside agreed parameters; the commitment by the member clubs of SLE to abide by the RFL’s fixture list; and the adoption or amendment of certain key rules or regulations, such as Salary Cap Regulations, Operational Rules, and rules on common ownership.

(d) The involvement of private investors A2.110 An increasingly prevalent feature of professional sports competitions is the involvement of a third party private investor. Formula One has a long history of private ownership, first through CVC Capital Partners and latterly through Liberty.1 Newer competitions will also frequently be backed by third party monies – UFC being a prime example.2 Established sports have also demonstrated a recent appetite for private investment, notably tennis and rugby union.3 1 Liberty purchased Formula One’s parent company, Delta Topco, from CVC in a two-stage acquisition from 2016 to 2017 for a total enterprise and equity value of $12.4 bilion. Whilst the consortium of sellers led by CVC retains shares and board representation in Formula One, the voting rights passed to Liberty. 2 UFC’s parent company is owned 50.1% by sports and entertainment company Endeavor (itself private equity backed) and 22.9% apiece by investment groups Silver Lake Partners and KKR: Chris Smith, ‘The Endeavor IPO is actually a risky bet on the future growth of UFC’, 19 September 2019 (forbes. com/sites/chrissmith/2019/09/19/endeavor-ipo-ufc/#3fb00fa75839 [accessed 17 November 2020]). 3 Each of the UK’s top-level club rugby competitions, PRO14 and the Premiership has sold a minority stake to CVC Capital Partners.

A2.111 Third party investment in sports commonly comes in the form of asset or equity sales, but an alternative option is the contractual relationship of a partnership. The Davis Cup has been reformatted for 2019 on the basis of such a partnership between tennis’s governing body, the ITF, and the sport investment group, Kosmos. Whilst this partnership has faced mixed reactions, with concerns over a congested competition calendar and the required change in the competition format, the sale to Kosmos of a 25-year licence to operate the Davis Cup will provide $3 billion to the ITF for the worldwide development of tennis. For Kosmos, the partnership has the potential to return high revenues through increasingly lucrative sponsorship and broadcasting deals attracted by the funder’s running of the new one-week World Cup style tournament as a marquee event. In the meantime, the sport will see around $125 million per annum entering all stages of the game, with $80 million being earmarked for the Davis Cup and the remainder being used to fund future collaborative events, tennis development programmes and grassroots projects throughout the member nations. A2.112 The balance to be struck between the interests of the investor and the sporting participants or governing body will be a core area of negotiation. The same issues that apply to the relationship between autonomous sports competitions and governing bodies will apply in relation to any private investment or disposal of commercial assets. While there has been a longstanding history of rights holders selling or licensing exclusively commercial rights in sports properties to agencies for onward exploitation, the emergence of private equity suitors has driven more complicated structures requiring the grant of an equity interest in the sports competition (or the commercial rights to it) to the investor, frequently combined with a significant element of debt. This has created more difficult questions of governance, given the inevitable tension between the economic interests of the investor and the overall well-being, history and integrity of the sporting competition.

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A2.113 One approach is to divest the commercial rights in the competition into a new entity in which the investor holds shares, while leaving the governance and regulation of the competition in club / governing body hands via a separate entity in which the investor holds no equity interest. Nonetheless, there will remain considerable areas of cross-governance to determine. Plainly, the commercial success of a competition cannot operate in a vacuum from its governance and regulation. Therein lies the challenge of distinguishing between matters that are purely commercial in nature, matters that are purely questions of governance, and matters that are a hybrid category, each of which may require their own decision-making framework. It may be easy to identify the choice of title sponsor as a commercial matter, and anti-doping and anti-corruption as governance issues, but what of matters such as setting the calendar for the competition, which affects its appeal to broadcasters as much as it affects player welfare and responsibilities to fans? With private investment in sport only set to continue to gather pace, these issues will be rehearsed with increasing frequency.

CHAPTER A3

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector Lewis Calder and Jonathan Taylor QC (both Bird & Bird LLP)* Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A3.1 2

THE POWER OF SPORT, AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY................................ A3.5

3

GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY................................................................... A3.9 A Early government sports policy................................................................... A3.11 B The National Lottery.................................................................................... A3.13 C A Sporting Future for All............................................................................. A3.16 D The Cunningham Review............................................................................. A3.18 E Game Plan.................................................................................................... A3.20 F The Carter Report........................................................................................ A3.22 G London 2012 and the Olympic Legacy........................................................ A3.23 G Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation............................... A3.32 I School Sport and Activity Action Plan........................................................ A3.35

4

IMPLEMENTING MODERN GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP............................................................... A3.36 A Government departments and agencies that impact on the sports sector..... A3.37 B The three main methods of government intervention in sport..................... A3.60

The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Tim Payton of Park Street Partners to an earlier edition of this chapter.

*

1 INTRODUCTION A3.1 The aim of this chapter of the book is to consider the extent to which the UK Government intervenes in the governance and regulation of the UK sport sector, and the extent to which it leaves that task to the private, voluntary sector, ie  the national governing bodies of sport (SGBs). It explains how the approach has shifted from a strictly non-interventionist stance to a more nuanced approach involving a (sometimes uneasy) partnership with the SGBs to achieve public policy goals. A3.2 The discussion starts with a brief narrative of the development of government sports policy from the late 19th century through to the Labour administration in power from 1996 to 2010, which recognised more than most of its predecessors that the enormous public interest in sport makes it not just a populist tool, but also a potent instrument to be harnessed in support of public policy goals,1 a recognition undoubtedly encouraged by the successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games in London.2 The story then looks at the approach taken by successive UK Governments, firstly the Coalition Government in power between 2010 and 2015, which vowed to deliver a ‘genuine and lasting legacy’ following London 2012,3 and then the recent Conservative Governments, which have championed ‘Sporting Future: A  New Strategy for an Active Nation’ – the UK Government’s first new sporting strategy for over a decade.4 1 See paras A3.6 to A3.28.

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  105 2 See para A3.23. 3 See para A3.29 et seq. 4 See para A3.32.

A3.3 The chapter then continues with a description of the various central government departments and non-departmental public bodies that are responsible for implementation of the UK Government’s sports policy and/or whose activities otherwise impact upon the sports sector.1 That description then leads into a discussion of the three different methods the government uses to pursue its public policy goals in this area. At one extreme, there is direct legislative intervention in areas of clear and pressing public interest.2 At the other extreme, there is mere exhortation/ persuasion of SGBs to comply with government wishes.3 And in between there is the development of a formal public-private partnership, with the government regulating the sector indirectly by conditioning SGBs’ access to public funding on compliance with public policy objectives.4 That public-private partnership, fuelled by the flow of significant Exchequer and Lottery funds to sporting causes, has prompted the government to seek reform and modernisation of some of the practices of the private sports movement, amounting to a degree of intervention in the administration of sport, as well as in its regulatory imperatives, that at times departs significantly from the traditional non-interventionist model. 1 2 3 4

See paras A3.36 to A3.59. See paras A3.62 to A3.101. See paras A3.102 to A3.110. See paras A3.112 to A3.124.

A3.4 While the reaction of SGBs to each type of government intervention is often to fall back to a jealous defence of its autonomous role (interpreting intervention as interference), the sports movement increasingly realises that it requires government support to respond effectively to its greatest regulatory challenges. The changes to the regulatory landscape in the field of anti-doping illustrate the point.1 1 See para A3.117 et seq.

2 THE POWER OF SPORT, AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY A3.5 Sport forms an integral part of popular culture in the UK, capturing the hearts and minds of millions of people from every section of UK society.1 Indeed, certain of the elite sports events are said to ‘unite the nation; [to be] a shared point on the national calendar’, part of our common heritage and an expression of our national identity.2 Millions of people are involved in amateur sport as a healthy and sociable pastime, some as participants,3 others as volunteers4 and/or employees, while millions more ‘consume’ elite sport as an entertainment ‘product’.5 1 When he became Prime Minister in July 2007, Gordon Brown noted: ‘Watching sport is a national pastime. Talking about sport is a national obsession’: Department for Children, Schools and Family (2007), ‘Five hours a week of sport for every child’. Research conducted by sportsthinktank.com in 2006 indicated that national newspapers devote four times as much coverage to sports stories as to political stories. 2 Quote taken from appendix to a letter sent by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in November 1997 to various sports bodies, identifying the criteria for designating events to which public access should be protected under the UK’s ‘listed events’ legislation: see para A3.83 et seq. 3 The Active Lives Adult Survey published by Sport England in October 2018 indicated that 63.2 per cent of adults (28.6 million) had taken part in 150 minutes or more per week of sporting activity from May 2018 to May 2019 (sportengland.org/media/14239/active-lives-adult-may-18-19-report.pdf [accessed 25 September 2020]). 4 Ibid. The Active Lives Adult Survey indicated that 14 per cent of adults (6.2 million) have taken part in a volunteering role to support sport. 5 According to a 2013 report published by Sport England, sport contributed over £20bn to the British economy in 2010 (1.9 per cent of the total UK ‘gross value added’); consumer spending on sport in

106  Governance of the Sports Sector England stood at £8.5bn, with nearly half of that amount coming from television/satellite broadcasting revenues (£4.4bn); and sport-related employment in England stood at over 440,000 jobs in 2010, representing 2.3 per cent of England’s total employment that year: ‘The Economic Value of Sport in England’ (Sport England (2013) (available at sportengland.org/media/3174/economic-value-of-sportsummary.pdf [accessed 25 September 2020]).

A3.6 The United Kingdom became the epicentre of world sport in the summer of 2012, when for four weeks the nation was consumed by the twin sporting spectacles of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. London welcomed 16,500 sportsmen and women, 4,000 technical officials, 4,000 officials from the Olympic and Paralympic movements, and 21,000 members of the media. Over 240,000 individuals applied to volunteer as ‘Games Makers’, with 70,000 making the final cut. Television audiences on the BBC reached 27.3 million during the opening ceremony. Nearly eleven million tickets were sold to attend events at the Games.1 In July 2013, UK Trade & Investment and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills announced that the 2012 Games had already given the UK economy a boost worth £9.9 billion, including: (a) £5.9bn of additional sales from Olympic-related activity; (b) £2.5bn of additional inward investment into the UK since the Games, generating more than 31,000 new jobs, with 58 per cent of the value invested outside London; and (c) £1.5bn of Olympic-related high value opportunities won overseas, including £120m of contracts already won by UK companies for the Brazil 2014 World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, plus more than 60 contracts won by UK companies for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics and 2018 Russia World Cup. They cited projections made in an independent report that the total benefit to the UK from hosting the London 2012 Olympics could reach up to £41 billion by 2020.2 In addition, since successfully staging the 2012 Olympics and Paralympic Games, London has staged more than 25 major sporting events using Olympic venues, further boosting the UK economy. For example, the 2017  IAAF  World Athletics Championship and 2017 World Para Athletics Championships, both held in the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, generated over £79 million and £28 million respectively.3 UK Sport Head of Major Events Esther Britten noted that ‘the significant economic impact comes on top of the benefits athletes receive when competing on home soil, in addition to the phenomenal opportunities spectators and volunteers enjoy when experiencing live sport’.4 1 London 2012 Report and Accounts. 2 See UKTI press release P/036-2013, ‘Turning the Games into Gold: Government announces almost £10 billion economic boost from London 2012’, 19 July 2013. At the time of writing, no quantitative study has been published to assess whether this prediction was accurate. 3 ‘London 2012 legacy continues to provide a positive economic impact six years on’ UK Sport press release, 27 July 2018. 4 Ibid.

A3.7 This enormous public interest in sport gives it ‘vast potential […] as a policy tool to achieve wider social and political objectives’.1 As Nelson Mandela once famously said:2 ‘Sport has the power to change the world, the power to inspire, the power to unite people in a way that little else can. It speaks to people in a language they can understand. Sport can create hope where there was once only despair. It is an instrument for peace, even more powerful than governments. It breaks down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of all kinds of discrimination. The heroes sport creates are examples of this power. They are valiant, not only on the playing field but also in the community, spreading hope and inspiration to the world’.

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  107 1 Godfrey and Holtham, Sporting Lives: A Vision for Sport in the UK (IPPR, 1999), pp 5, 8. See also (2002) the Guardian, 18 March: ‘The case for taking sport more seriously rests on its vast untapped possibilities as a source of social cohesion and improved public health’. 2 Quoted by then-Sports Minister Richard Caborn in a speech given on 5  February 2007. See also ‘Sport as a Tool for Development and Peace: Towards Achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (Report from the UN  Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace) (United Nations, 2005) (available at unicef.org/sports/reportE.pdf [accessed 25  September 2020]): ‘By its very nature sport is about participation. It is about inclusion and citizenship. Sport brings individuals and communities together, highlighting commonalities and bridging cultural and ethnic divides. Sport provides a forum to learn skills such as discipline, confidence and leadership and it teaches core principles such as tolerance co-operation and respect. Sport teaches the value of effort and how to manage victory, as well as defeat’.

A3.8 The European Commission has identified that sport fulfils an education function, a public health function, a social inclusion function, a cultural function and a recreational function, making it ‘a particularly effective weapon in the fight against intolerance, racism, violence, alcohol and narcotics abuse’.1 Similarly, in a 2001 paper, the Central Council for Physical Recreation (now the Sport and Recreation Alliance) asserted:2 ‘Sport and recreation makes a real contribution to Government policies: improving education both at schools and through lifelong learning; encouraging a healthy lifestyle for all; promoting social inclusion by providing links to employment, reducing crime and promoting social integration; and bringing everyone together to celebrate national success’.

In 2000, then Prime Minister Tony Blair put it most succinctly, asserting that his government’s sports policy ‘is not just a sports policy, it is a health policy and education policy, an anti-crime policy and an anti-drugs policy’.3 The notion of sport as a tool for social change has held strong over the ensuing years, with successive governments recognising its value. For example, following its 2019 inquiry into the social impact of participation in culture and sport, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee stated:4 ‘Government should see sports and culture as a mainstream way of delivering their social policy goals’. 1 European Commission, ‘The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the Field of Sport’ (Brussels 1998). See also European Commission, ‘Developing the European Dimension in Sport’ (Brussels 2011): ‘Sport has a strong potential to contribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and new jobs through its positive effects on social inclusion, education and training, and public health. It helps limit the rise in social security and health expenditure by improving the health and productivity of the population and ensuring a higher quality of life through old age. It contributes to social cohesion by breaking down social barriers and it improves the employability of the population through its impact on education and training. Voluntary activity in sport can contribute to employability, social inclusion as well as higher civic participation, especially among young people’. In his sports keynote speech at the City of London Academy, Southwark, on 28 June 2010, Jeremy Hunt, then Secretary of State for Culture, Media, Olympics and Sport, stated: ‘The cost [of nonparticipation in sport] is enormous. Not just in terms of health, where 1 in 4 adults in this country are now classed as obese – the highest level in Europe. Not just in terms of social breakdown, where there is clear evidence that participation in sport reduces the propensity for at-risk teenagers to commit crime. But also in terms of educational attainment, where teachers know that physical activity boosts concentration and feeds through directly into improved academic performance. The schools showing fastest improvement in GCSE results over the past three years were schools with a sport speciality. So the question is not whether to focus on sport or on academic achievement. The question is whether we can afford to go on ignoring the fact that sport can help power academic performance’: Hunt, Sports Keynote Speech, Southwark, 28 June 2010 (available at gov.uk/government/speeches/sports-keynotespeech [accessed 25 September 2020]). 2 ‘Active Britain: A  Manifesto for Sport and Recreation’ (CCPR, May 2001). On its website, the Sport and Recreation Alliance states: ‘The myriad benefits of physical activity for health are well documented. Greater levels of activity lead to significant benefits in tackling a wide range of common diseases, for people of all ages. Sport and physical recreation have a broad appeal and are inexpensive to deliver, and can bring about lasting improvement for individuals of every age and background. It is clear that there can be no effective strategy for public health which does not promote and facilitate sport and physical recreation’.

108  Governance of the Sports Sector 3 Taken from Tony Blair’s speech at the Labour Party’s 2000 Conference in Brighton, quoted in ‘The Road to 2012: The Impact of 2012 and Our New Responsibilities for High Performance Sport’ (UK Sport). 4 See ‘Changing Lives: the social impact of participation in culture and sport’, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, published 14 May 2019 HC 734. Similarly, as part of its 2019 Action Plan (see further A3.34), the Department for Education hailed the value of sport as a vital tool for social change: ‘sport has been identified by the Department for Education as one of the five foundations for building character, helping young people develop resilience, determination and self-belief, and instilling values and virtues such as friendship and fair play. It can help children and young people to connect with their peers, tackling loneliness and social isolation and building stronger communities’.

3 GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY A3.9 Because there are ‘valid and legitimate reasons to justify government involvement in and funding of sport’,1 some countries take a centralised approach to the regulation of the sports sector, based on the premise that sport is a public function that the state has the right and the responsibility to deliver.2 Historically UK governments, in common with many other northern and western European states, have taken a different view, considering the provision of sport to be not a public service responsibility of the government, but rather a matter for the private, voluntary sector to run, with general encouragement from government.3 1 Mr Justice Charles Dubin, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (Ottawa 1990) at pp  517, 525. It is always important to remember, however, that ‘sport matters in itself […] Too often sport is justified on the basis of its spill-over benefits. There is, of course, a good argument that sport is important because it enhances analytical ability, leadership and teamwork; or that literacy and numeracy can all be taught with examples drawn from sport. The justification for sport is the Education Department. There is a good argument that sport is important because it helps us deal with crime by diverting young people at risk away from trouble. The justification for sport is with the Ministry of Justice. We hear too that sport keeps the voluntary sector buoyant. Nearly 2 million people give at least an hour a week to sport. They sustain over 100,000 affiliated clubs in England, serving over 8 million members. The justification for sport is in the Communities Department. And yes, sport does have all these other benefits and I’m delighted about that. But they are not the reason we love it. They are not the reason government is committed to it. Sport is a joy and a passion, not because we can learn about Newton’s laws through the movement of a snooker ball, but because of the beauty of sport itself […] It does improve our health, it does help us to learn, it does help to bind a community. But its greatest virtue is none of these things. Its greatest virtue is to be found in the joy of playing’: DCMS Secretary of State James Purnell, ‘World Class Community Sport’, 28 November 2007. This theme was continued by Purnell’s Conservative colleague, Jeremy Hunt, then Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport, in a speech in June 2010: ‘I want to be clear that, for this government, competitive sport really matters. Not just because it’s great entertainment, not just because we have the Olympics in two years. But in its own right. As something that should be a vital part of growing up for every child in the country’. Hunt, Sports Keynote Speech, Southwark, 28 June 2010 (available at gov.uk/government/speeches/ sports-keynote-speech [accessed 25 September 2020]). 2 See para A1.5. 3 See para A1.8.

A3.10 In recent years, however, this orthodox understanding that ‘the government does not and should not run sport’ has come under more and more pressure, partly because of the social, cultural and economic importance attributed to sport in modern society,1 partly because politicians have come to understand the power of sport as an instrument for achieving public policy imperatives,2 partly because SGBs have had to turn to government for assistance in addressing issues that are beyond their jurisdiction and/or competence to control (from public order issues like hooliganism and ticket touting, to integrity issues such as doping and match-fixing),3 and partly because the public and the media expect the government to stay on top of a sector that is of such enormous public interest.4 On the back of such reasons, during the first two decades of the 21st century, taxpayer and Lottery funding of sport reached unprecedented levels,5 bringing with it calls for government to have a greater say

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in how that money is spent. The result has been the emergence of more of a publicprivate partnership in the governance and regulation of sport. 1 See para A3.16. 2 See para A3.16. 3 In relation to public order issues, see para A3.66 et seq. In relation to ticket touting, see para A3.69. In relation to doping, see para A3.117 et seq and generally Chapter C2 (The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework). In relation to match-fixing, see para B4.50, n.2 (discussion of need for state intervention to protect integrity of sport in face of match-fixing scandals, because otherwise its use as a tool for social good will be undermined).See generally Rogge, ‘Governments should protect and promote sports’ (2001) Sportcal.com, 18 October. 4 Football, for example, is seen as ‘the national game’. Furthermore, the ‘listed events’ legislation (see para A3.88 et seq.) recognises that certain core events in the UK sports calendar – the ‘sporting crown jewels’ – are ‘public’ assets, free access to which must be protected from the vagaries of the sports rights market-place. In response to questioning by the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, during its 2011 inquiry into the governance of football in the UK (see para A3.106), then Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson said: ‘I think as the Minister, you should probably have two reasonable areas of responsibility. The first is that any Minister for Sport should have at the centre of his brief the performance of the national team. So I  think if our national team is under-performing, then it is perfectly reasonable for the Minister to ask the question why. I think secondly, we invest quite a considerable amount of public money in football, and so I think it is my responsibility as the Minister to make sure that the corporate governance arrangements surrounding the spending of that money are as they ought to be. Thirdly, of course football is the national game. It is way ahead of any other game in this country in terms of the number of people who play it and follow it, so it would have to be a concern for the Minister for Sport if he didn’t feel that the game was correctly governed’. 5 See paras A3.54 and A3.56.

A Early government sports policy A3.11 Government sports policy and direction covers not only immediate sporting issues such as participation, competition, and facilities, but also the wider applications of sport in society, including health, education and social exclusion.1 Emerging sports policy in the nineteenth century pursued ‘the maintenance of social stability, the defense [sic] of privilege, and paternalism’,2 followed by a desire to create a healthy workforce for the industrial revolution and a fit male population for military service.3 The Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937 was followed by the Education Act 1944, requiring local authorities to provide facilities for recreation and physical training. 1 See generally Houlihan, ‘Sport in the United Kingdom’ in Chalip, Johnson and Stachura Eds), National Sports Policies: An International Handbook (Greenwood Press, 1996). 2 Ibid, at p 379. 3 Chaker, Study on national sports legislation in Europe (Council of Europe Publishing, 1999), p 11.

A3.12 The Wolfenden Report produced by the Central Council of Physical Recreation in 1960 recommended (among other things) the creation of a GB Sports Council to assist in the achievement of governmental policy goals via sport.1 That recommendation was eventually implemented in 1965,2 but subsequent governments continued to view sport as a ‘minor matter’,3 notwithstanding the 1975 White Paper ‘Sport and Recreation’, which has been identified as ‘one of the few attempts by government to provide a comprehensive philosophy of sport and recreation’, portraying sport as part of the welfare state, contributing to the ‘physical and mental well-being of the population and to the reduction of hooliganism and delinquency among young people’, but also identifying benefits from international sporting success and therefore supporting the funding of elite athletes.4 Consistent with that view, legislation was passed in the 1970s to promote sport and recreation by encouraging local authorities to provide sports facilities.5 During the 1980s, however, politicians left the world of sport ‘principally untouched by legislation’, having acknowledged that sport and politics were ‘uncomfortable bedfellows’.6

110  Governance of the Sports Sector 1 willparry.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Wolfenden-report-1960.pdf [accessed 2 November 2020]. 2 In July 1995, the incumbent Conservative administration published a sports policy paper, ‘Sport, Raising the Game’ (Department of National Heritage, July 1995), which led to the reorganisation of the GB Sports Council into UK Sport and Sport England, and UK Sport’s eventual designation as a Lottery fund distributor in its own right. Today, UK Sport and the four Home Country Sports Councils, with the Youth Sport Trust and UK Anti-Doping, are today the primary agents for implementation of government policy on sport in the UK. See para A3.55 et seq. and para A3.116 et seq. 3 See Grayson, Sport and the Law, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 2000), p 319, quoting Lord Hailsham. 4 Houlihan, ‘Sport in the United Kingdom’ in Chalip, Johnson and Stachura (eds), National Sports Policies: An International Handbook (Greenwood Press, 1996).at p 380. 5 See in particular s 19 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, as amended by Pt I of Sch 13 to the Educational Reform Act 1988, which authorised a local authority to ‘provide […] such recreational facilities as it thinks fit’. 6 See Lord Moynihan’s comments during the House of Lords debate on his Sports Governance Bill [HL] 2014–15 on 4  December 2014 (see publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/1412040002.htm#14120454000495 [accessed 28 September 2020]).

B The National Lottery A3.13 The National Lottery, introduced in November 1994 pursuant to the National Lottery Act 1993, triggered a sea-change in the amount of public investment going to sport, heralding a new era in sports policy as distribution systems through the Home Country Sports Councils and UK Sport1 were established and the government took a far greater interest in how the additional revenues were spent.2 The 1993 Act stipulated that the National Lottery Distribution Fund would divide its funding equally between five ‘good causes’: the arts, sport, the national heritage, charitable expenditure, and projects associated with the start of the third millennium in 2000. The National Lottery Act 1998 created a sixth ‘good cause’, of health, education and the environment. The millennium cause was removed and the distribution of funding altered, with sport’s share dropping from 20 per cent to 16.66 per cent. The National Lottery Act 2006 laid down a new system of distribution and apportionment, with half of the National Lottery Distribution fund to be distributed (via the newly established Big Lottery Fund) to charitable causes or to projects connected with health, education or the environment, and the other half divided equally between sport, the arts, and heritage. 1 See paras A3.51 to A3.57. 2 Further to s 26 of the National Lottery Act 1993, as amended by the National Lottery Act 1998, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport issues financial directions that set broad parameters for the permissible application of Lottery funds by the Lottery funding agencies such as UK Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils.

A3.14 This change was severely criticised by former Prime Minister John Major in 2004.1 The original 1992 White Paper that led to the setting up of the National Lottery had stated that the Lottery would fund only projects additional to those that would otherwise be funded by the public through general taxation. Major accused the Labour administration of ‘grand larceny’ and ‘muddying the waters between Exchequer and Lottery revenues’ by diverting Lottery funding to support health, education, and the environment. He said when he established the Lottery he wanted the money to go to art, sport and heritage because they would never compete with education, defence and pensions for funding.2 In January 2008, Lord Glentoran argued in the House of Lords that ministers were continuing to use the Lottery as a ‘slush fund’ to finance public projects.3 In the May 2010 Coalition Agreement, the administration specifically committed to ‘examine the case for moving to a ‘gross profits tax4 system for the National Lottery, and reform of the National Lottery so that more money goes into sport, the arts and heritage’.5 In November 2010, following a public consultation, the Lottery Shares Order 2010 was passed, amending the percentage share of money held in the National Lottery Distribution Fund in two stages: first, from April 2011, the

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shares for arts, heritage and sport were increased from the previous 16.66 per cent each to 18 per cent each, with the Big Lottery Fund (responsibility for which moved from DCMS to the Cabinet Office) reducing from 50 per cent to 46 per cent; then, on 1 April 2012, the shares for arts, heritage and sport each increased to 20 per cent, with the Big Lottery Fund’s share reducing to 40 per cent.6 While the percentage allocation to sport is a statutory requirement, the amount of Lottery money distributed to sport depends on numbers buying Lottery tickets, and therefore has fluctuated over time. The figure peaked in 1998 at £322 million, dropped to £258 million by 2010,7 and then by 2019 climbed back up to £321 million.8 1 This point was made explicitly by the Culture, Media and Sport House of Commons Select Committee in its 2004 report on Reform of the National Lottery (publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/ cmselect/cmcumeds/196/19602.htm [accessed 28 September 2020]). 2 ‘Major charges Labour with “lottery larceny’’, Sunday Times, 24  October 2004 (thesundaytimes. co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article126581.ece [accessed 28 September 2020]). 3 See the House of Lords debate on the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2007. 4 Under the ‘gross profits tax’ proposal, the operator of the National Lottery would be taxed after it had distributed prizes for winning tickets, rather than before. In the event, no such change was made. 5 ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ (May 2010, Cabinet Office), p 14. 6 See culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/national_lottery/3397.aspx [accessed 28 September 2020]. 7 See National Lottery Distribution Fund Account 2010-11 (culture.gov.uk/images/publications/NLDFAccounts-2010-11-HC1650.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]). 8 See National Lottery Distribution Fund Account 2018-19 (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/815717/HC_2338_National_Lottery_Distribution_Fund_ Report_and_Accounts_2018-19__Web_Accessible.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).

A3.15 The London 2012 Olympics also became a major beneficiary of the National Lottery Distribution Fund. In 2007, Parliament established the independent Olympic Lottery Distributor, a body tasked with using National Lottery proceeds to fund the delivery of the infrastructure for London 2012 and its legacy, and agreed to the transfer of £1,085bn to the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund.1 Although £410m of this amount had already been agreed, an extra £675mn was required to meet the growing cost of the Games, and it was taken from money that had been due to be distributed to sport via the Home Country Sports Councils and UK Sport, to be repaid from profits arising from the sale of land in the Olympic Park after the Games. Introducing the order that sanctioned the transfer, then-Secretary of State James Purnell MP provided a guarantee to Parliament that no further diversions from Lottery funds to the Olympics would take place.2 By 2013, when the Olympic Lottery Distributor was dissolved by statutory instrument,3 it had distributed over £1.8bn in funds, the vast majority of which had been granted to the Olympic Delivery Authority to finance construction of Olympic venues (over £1.7bn, the single biggest Lottery grant ever made in the UK).4 Other grants included a £15m sum to LOCOG to fund its ‘Cultural Olympiad’ projects, and various grants to the East London Business Alliance to support community projects.5 1 2 3 4

See the House of Commons debate on the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2007. See the Payments into the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2008. The Olympic Lottery Distributor (Dissolution) Order 2013. Olympic Lottery Distributor, Annual Report and Accounts 2011/12 (official-documents.gov.uk/ document/hc1213/hc02/0222/0222.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]). 5 See Olympic Lottery Distributor report on grants to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and their legacy (nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121204113822/http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_ we_do/national_lottery/6715.aspx [accessed 28 September 2020]).

C A Sporting Future for All A3.16 In April 2000, the Labour Government published its strategy for the development of sport over the next decade, A Sporting Future for All.1 In his foreword, Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote:

112  Governance of the Sports Sector ‘The Government does not and should not run sport. Sport is for individuals, striving to succeed – either on their own, or in teams. However those individuals, together or alone, need the help of others – to provide the facilities, the equipment, the opportunities. So there is a key role to play for those who organise and manage sport – local authorities, sports clubs, governing bodies, the Sports Councils and the Government.’

This paper identified more clearly than ever before that the twin goals of government sports policy were mass participation (‘more people of all ages and all social groups taking part in sport’) and success at elite level (‘more success for our top competitors and teams in international competition’). The perceived obstacles were insufficient opportunities for children and young people, loss of interest after school age, too many obstacles to the attainment of peak performance, and fragmented and unprofessional organisation and management of sport. The document set out both a ‘Vision’ and an ‘Action Plan’ to surmount those obstacles. It made it clear (as the quote above illustrates) that it saw the delivery of government sports policy as a joint effort between the public and the private sector. 1 DCMS, ‘A Sporting Future for All’ (HMSO, 2000).

A3.17 The Sports Strategy (A  Sporting Future for All) Implementation Group, drawn from leading figures in sport education, local authorities, and SGBs, produced an initial action plan in December 2000.1 Then in March 2001 the Department of Culture, Media and Sport published the government’s action plan, ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’, adopting many of the recommendations of that group.2 The first annual report, issued in May 2002, noted that some parts of the plan had been delivered and others had not, but concluded that ‘what is clear is that sport in education, and sport as a vehicle for delivering social policy, have a higher profile across Government than they did last year’.3 1 ‘A Sporting Future for All: Action Plan, Report of the Implementation Group to the DCMS and DfEE’ (December 2000), described in the subsequent DCMS publication adopting the plan (‘A  Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’, DCMS PP374, March 2001, DCMS) as ‘the most significant sporting manifesto ever seen in the United Kingdom’. 2 DCMS PP374 (March 2001, DCMS). 3 ‘A  Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport, Annual Report 2001/02’. See also ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport, Annual Report 2002/03’.

D The Cunningham Review A3.18 A review panel chaired by Jack Cunningham MP was commissioned by the government in October 2000 to consider the future of elite sport in the UK. It issued a report in September 2001 that concluded: ‘all is not well with sport in the UK’.1 While certain concerns were raised about sport at an amateur level,2 at the elite level it was found that: ‘there are some overriding issues which the government must urgently resolve if this report is to herald a new dawn for UK sport: • • • • •

The quality of leadership and management in sport at national level must be improved; The opportunity must now be taken to change the style of leadership in Sport England to one which is much more open, inclusive, responsive and sport centred; The complex structure of sport in the UK must be simplified and better understood; Bureaucracy and territorial concerns must take second place to the development of sport itself; There must be clearer responsibility and accountability for decision-making in sport, with proper incentives for delivery;

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  113 • The national governing bodies must be supported to modernise their management systems and performance structures; • New investment in high quality club and talent development structures and systems will be required to achieve consistent success at World Class level; • There is a need for a radical step change in the way we license, train and employ sports coaches as they are the cornerstone to the development of talented performers; • Well co-ordinated, well managed UK wide funding and quality support services and facilities for our top sportsmen and women must be ensured and delivered quickly […] Decisive leadership and a strong commitment from UK Government and the devolved administrations will also be essential if we are to deliver the outcomes and sporting success that everyone wants to see. It will also be crucial for the organisations they support and fund to be given firm direction and responsibility for delivery of the required results and to be held regularly accountable for the progress made. This will be best achieved if there is one lead body – UK Sport – which is given key responsibility for overseeing all the “World Class” Programmes for Olympic/ Paralympic Sports and GB/UK [national governing bodies]. The Sports Cabinet (the collective meeting of Ministers with responsibility for sport in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport) will also have an essential role to play. This group of Ministers will provide the ideal medium for the collective direction, monitoring, reporting and accountability required to ensure delivery of a sustained programme of support for UK elite athletes’.3 1 For example, it was concluded that club sport was ‘less well-structured [than school sport] and indeed in some sports barely surviving […] We need to ensure that the National Governing Bodies of sport are encouraged to develop clear club and volunteer development strategies and that investment in club sport becomes a greater priority for funding agencies’: Elite Sports Funding Review, Report of the Review Group chaired by Dr Jack Cunningham MP (August 2001). 2 Elite Sports Funding Review, Report of the Review Group chaired by Dr Jack Cunningham MP (August 2001). 3 Ibid. See also Goodbody, ‘Report calls for cash to boost elite grants’, The Times, 12 September 2001.

A3.19 At the Sports Cabinet meeting on 31  October 2001, most of the review group’s recommendations were accepted (including a ‘one stop shop’ for national governing bodies seeking talent development funding), and the DCMS stated that it would consider the remaining recommendations (which required additional funding) in the context of the then-pending Comprehensive Spending Review.1 In December 2002, an additional £9.4 million in Exchequer funding for UK Sport was announced, to cover the costs of implementing those recommendations. 1 ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport, Annual Report 2001/02’.

E Game Plan A3.20 On 1 February 2002, the Prime Minister announced ‘the most wide-ranging review of British sport since the White Paper of 1975’,1 a collaboration between the DCMS and the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office, charged with ‘sorting out a new organisation chart for British sport’.2 The fruit of this collaboration was the joint publication by DCMS and the Strategy Unit in December 2002 of ‘Game Plan’, which sought to refine the government’s sports policy objectives and to identify ways of improving the delivery of government support for sport by making a number of proposals for the reform and simplification of the sporting infrastructure.3 In particular, Game Plan echoed the Cunningham Review in calling for rationalisation and simplification of funding streams from UK Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils to the national governing bodies of sport. It also called for the appointment of a new Director of Sport to lead within DCMS on sports-related issues and to

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coordinate with other government departments, a recommendation that DCMS swiftly adopted. 1 Trelford, ‘Watching Brief’ Daily Telegraph, 27 May 2002; Guardian leader column, 18 March 2002; ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’, Annual Report 2001/02’, at 1 (noting that the Performance and Innovation Unit review and the Quinquennial Review of Sport England ‘are likely to make recommendations about how the role of sport in delivering the Government’s wider agenda should best be organised’). 2 Goodbody, ‘Sporting bodies face top-level review’ The Times, 1 February 2002. The article contained the following quote from Tessa Jowell, Culture Secretary: ‘Our review is intended to achieve a clear strategy that will deliver sports policy and will take into account the range of different bodies, such as central government and local government, and will address the disparity between regions’. 3 ‘Game Plan’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, December 2002).

A3.21 The first ‘Game Plan’ delivery report, issued in April 2004, noted rapid progress in raising participation levels, ‘both in the provision of opportunities for schools and community participation through new and existing funding programmes’. On elite competition, the progress report was also positive; noting improvements across high performance funding, talent identification, reform of the government’s funding organisations, and the modernisation of governing bodies. On the formulation of sports policy, the report applauded the appointment of a dedicated Director of Sport within the DCMS and reforms of governing bodies as well as Sport England and UK Sport.

F The Carter Report A3.22 In July 2004, Lord Carter was asked to examine how to ‘ensure far better co-ordination of effort and resources in sport’ and to explore the ‘proposal to involve private and public sectors together in a new National Sports Foundation’ with a view to the possible extension of funding for sport. The Carter Report, issued in March 2005,1 valued public spending in sport at £1.8bn per annum, although England’s public investment per capita in sporting infrastructure was less than most other nations (for example, three times less than France, but slightly more than Germany). Carter made five key recommendations to be used to inform the priorities of the sports sector: (1)

To introduce robust measurement and monitoring systems to inform government investment at local level and ensure clear lines of accountability. (2) To promote the personal benefits of sport and physical activity and to help people identify their local delivery points. (3) To improve the local delivery of sport. The government was asked to consider how it could support the coordination of public, private and voluntary sector investment, as well as local authorities and regional bodies, in order to improve local sporting facilities. (4) To create, under strong government leadership, a single access point and brand for sport in England and to streamline duplicative ‘back office’ functions in order to release more money for front line activity. (5) To provide targeted incentives and commercial assistance – via a new National Sports Foundation – to encourage individual and corporate support and to ‘help sport help itself’. The Carter Report was welcomed by then-Chancellor Gordon Brown and DCMS  Secretary of State Tessa Jowell, who noted that they had already issued plans to put in place the National Sports Foundation and promised to consult with stakeholders in considering the report’s recommendations for the future funding of sport.2 1 Lord Carter, ‘Review of national sport effort and resources’ (March 2005) (webarchive.nationalarchives. gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/Carter_report.pdf, [accessed 28  September

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  115 2020). The Carter Report found that England’s public investment in sporting infrastructure stood at £36 per capita, with France and Finland leading the international comparisons (with £110 and £84 respectively) and Germany slightly behind with £30. England’s funding broke down into £24 (67 per cent) from local government, £8 (22 per cent) from the Lottery and £4 (11 per cent) from central government. 2 DCMS press notice 059/95.

G London 2012 and the Olympic Legacy A3.23 In July 2005, however, the Carter Report and all other initiatives as drivers of government sports policy were supplanted when the International Olympic Committee announced that the 2012 Olympic Games would be staged in London. When the government had announced in May 2003 that it would support London’s bid to host the Games, it did so on the basis that it wanted: ‘[…] to harness the power of sport to help address some of the key issues our nation faces – health, social inclusion, educational motivation and fighting crime. We want the Olympics to be the catalyst that inspires people of all ages and all talents to lead more active lives’.1

The government and its bidding partners therefore accepted a commitment to create a sporting system that would not only lead to success at the 2012 Games but would also leave a lasting legacy of sporting success into the future.2 More specifically, the government’s Olympic promise ‘to create a world-class sporting nation’ meant ‘three things: a world class school sport system, a world class community sports system, and a world class elite sport system’.3 1 See statement of Tessa Jowell, DCMS Secretary of State, to the House of Commons, 12 May 2003. The Institute of Government’s post-Games publication, ‘Making the Games, What Government can Learn from London 2012’ (Norris, Rutter and Medland, IOG, 2013) summarised the scale of the government’s ambition: ‘The scale of the Olympics was like no other project undertaken by governments. It meant organising the world’s biggest sporting event followed three weeks later by the world’s second biggest sporting event. But in the UK’s case it mean much more: converting derelict land in East London into an Olympic Park with new permanent and temporary venues and accommodation for athletes and the media – but an Olympic Park that was designed to lie at the heart of the future regeneration of the most deprived boroughs of the city. It meant mobilizing the biggest peacetime force of volunteers from around the country. It meant transporting hundreds of thousands of spectators around London and the South East, where transport systems were notoriously crowded and prone to breakdown’. 2 See eg speech of Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘A Lasting Legacy: the View from Government’, 27 April 2006: ‘in addition to our ambition to deliver the best games ever, we are determined to create and leave a sustainable legacy for Britain […] a legacy that delivers an enduring boost for British sport and young people’s physical activity and thousands and thousands of volunteers for sports clubs across the United Kingdom and beyond’. 3 Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport James Purnell, in a speech on ‘World Class Community Sport’ made on 28 November 2007.

A3.24 On 16 September 2005, the government took the first step down that path, announcing a streamlining of responsibility for sports policy designed to simplify the structure and remove the bureaucracy identified in ‘Game Plan’ and the Carter Report.1 UK Sport was made fully responsible for elite sport performance in England and the UK, with Sport England and the other Home Country Sports Councils taking responsibility for increasing and sustaining participation in community sport, and the Youth Sport Trust taking responsibility for physical education and sport in schools.2 In the March 2006 Budget, the Chancellor announced that £200m of additional Exchequer funding would be provided between 2006 and 2012, to be matched by £100m of private funding, to finance the high performance system designed to achieve medal success at the 2012 Games and a legacy of further success beyond the Games.3 1 DCMS press release, 16 November 2005 DCMS. 2 See further para A3.52, n 1.

116  Governance of the Sports Sector 3 See 2006 Budget, p149. This was on top of the £80 million per year already being spent on Olympic success. However, it was announced in March 2007 that £675m of Lottery funding earmarked for sport would instead be applied to the costs of the 2012 Olympic Games in London, so taking sport’s share of Lottery funding below 16 per cent: see para A3.15.

A3.25 Notwithstanding this restructuring, Sport England continued to come in for criticism for its alleged bureaucracy and for failing to achieve an increase in the number of people participating in sport in England1. On 28 November 2007, thenDCMS Secretary of State James Purnell announced the refocusing of Sport England on sports development and sports participation, ie ‘community sport’. To support this objective, the Government established a new Cabinet Committee focusing on health and well-being, with responsibility for delivering on the Government’s target to have two million more people active by 2012. The Secretary of State’s intention was that the physical activity work previously undertaken by Sport England would transfer to the Department of Health and Social Care, leaving Sport England to concentrate on mainstream sports activity.2 He explained: ‘[…] we need to create a world-class community sports system. And that can be one of the biggest legacies of that great day in Singapore: to create an Olympic generation, to make sure that when people of all ages get inspired to take up sport, there are clubs, facilities and coaches there to welcome them. […] We will start this process with a review of Sport England’s strategy to focus the delivery of an excellent sporting infrastructure form the grass roots up. That means creating excellent national governing bodies, clubs, coaches and volunteers, supported by the investment we’ve already made in facilities. And the sporting bodies will be critical. My offer to you is clear. We want to create whole sports plans, with a single funding pot. We will free you up from the bureaucracy and bidding that you complain about today. But, in return, you will need to commit to clear goals to improve participation, coaching and the club structure. And in particular, you will need to show how you will reach groups who do less sport today, whether women, poorer groups or some ethnic minorities. […] But sport can only play its full role in tackling social problems, if we invest more in community sport, not less. […] We are at the dawn of an incredible decade of sport. And we would not forgive ourselves if we failed to create a community sports infrastructure to capitalize on that decade: to take the enthusiasm of those who watch our sports stars and turn it into a lifetime’s commitment to sport. […] Our sports policy has a simple and powerful idea at its core: that if you have a talent we will pull down every barrier in your way to help you succeed. It is the idea that runs through all the government’s work. Competitive sport is a perfect meritocracy. The cream rises to the top. But everyone has the chance to do their best. We want everyone, at all levels of ability, to be as good as they can be’. 1 See eg Syed, The Times, 11 July 2007: ‘sporting participation has not budged since 1994 despite an extra £3 billion of investment through the lottery and millions more from the taxpayer. […] It is now clear that the great sporting experiment of recent years has failed to deliver the change in attitudes that was promised and has simply provided cheaper access to sport for those already familiar with the concept of exercise. The net result has been a super-size redistribution of wealth from the fat to the fit. […] The core problem at the heart of policy is that successive sports ministers have abrogated their primary responsibility and allowed most of the big funding decisions to be taken by unelected quangos staffed by bureaucrats who don’t know the difference between a googly and a grubber. How is the Government to be held to account for sports policy when it has very little to do with it? […] Why not abolish Sport England – and Sport Scotland, Sports Council Wales, Sport Northern Ireland – and give the cash straight to the governing bodies and other end users?’ 2 See speech by then-DCMS  Secretary of State James Purnell, ‘World Class Community Sport’, 28 November 2007. He added: ‘Of course sport has a role to play in tackling wider social problems. The rise of obesity is a big problem, which the government is taking very seriously indeed. The DCMS is playing its part in raising participating in PE and school sport. That is why I have agreed with the department for health and the chief secretary to the Treasury that we will work closely over the next few months to ensure that all relevant government departments are working together to deliver a physical activity strategy for all. This work will provide absolute clarity of the roles and responsibilities for all the different organizations to meet our aim of 2 million more people being more active by 2012’.

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A3.26 In 2008, DCMS published ‘Playing to win: A New Era for Sport’, a plan intended to set out ‘a vision for sport to 2012 and beyond’, encompassing a ‘world leading system for PE and sport’ in schools (the responsibility of the Youth Sport Trust), with all 5–16 year olds being offered five hours of PE and sport each week, a ‘world leading community sports system’ (the responsibility of Sport England), continuing to increased participation year on year, and ‘a legacy of world leading elite sport infrastructure including high quality coaching’ (the responsibility of UK Sport).1 1 ‘Playing to win: A New Era for Sport’, DCMS, 2008.

A3.27 In 2009, in its build-up to the 2010 general election, the Conservative party published ‘Extending Opportunities: A  Conservative Policy Paper on Sport’,1 in which it promised to: ‘• • • • • • • •

Return the National Lottery to its four original pillars and consider moving to a gross profits tax system releasing more money for sport. Create a new Cabinet Office cross departmental sports body to reduce bureaucracy and act as a champion for sport in government. Draw up a cross departmental compact to attract world class sports events to the UK and support World Cup bids such as 2018. Examine options to bring together UK  Sport, Sport England and the Youth Sport Trust under one roof to create a world-leading ‘one stop shop’ for sport. Deliver the 2012 Olympics on time and within budget – with a proper legacy for community sport. Support the creation of an independent anti-doping agency and put sport dispute resolution on a statutory basis. Drive increases in mass participation through the reformed Sport England and national governing bodies using the extra money released by the reform of the National Lottery. Prioritise school sport provision and competition, links between schools and clubs and opening up school sports facilities after hours’.

1 ‘Extending Opportunities: A Conservative Policy Paper on Sport’, Conservative Party, 2009. See also the 2010 Conservative Party Manifesto, ‘Invitation to Join the Government of Britain’.

A3.28 Meanwhile, the Labour Party published its own sports policy document, ‘A sporting Britain for all’,1 in which it promised to: ‘• Deliver a Golden Decade of major sporting events in Britain, driving record investment into the economy and inspiring more people to take up sport than ever before. • Stage a successful Olympics and Paralympic Games, on time and within budget, helping to secure more medals for Team GB than in Beijing, and to ensure that we come at least fourth in the 2012 Olympics Medal Table. • Transform school sport and guarantee the availability of five hours of competitive sporting opportunity every week for all under-19s in full time education, underpinned in law by a Pupil Guarantee. • Open up more school facilities to the community and establish a network of 3,000 Olympic after-school Sports Clubs for teenagers by 2011. • Work to get one million more adults playing sport by 2012 – making sure that amateurs of all ages and abilities can join one of the tens of thousands of sports clubs run by National Governing Bodies – and a further one million adults doing more physical activity. • Help to create 10,000 new Volunteer coaches by 2012. • Provide the strongest protection for playing fields. • Ensure women’s, girls’ and disability sport will not be an optional extra, but a vital part of future investment to create new opportunities in sport. • Use the power of sport to engage young people in our most deprived communities through outreach programmes such as Streetgames and Sport Action Zones.

118  Governance of the Sports Sector • • •

Increase the number of sessions of free swimming for children and the over 60s. Examine the case for the introduction of a new “fair return” to sports from the proceeds of betting on sport. Work with national governing bodies to improve the financial governance of professional sport and to ensure greater supporter involvement in professional clubs, making it easier for Supporters Trusts to buy stakes in their clubs’.

1 ‘A sporting Britain for all’, Labour Party 2010. The Liberal Democrats’ 2010 manifesto was far less detailed in respect of the policy promises it made concerning sport, but noted: ‘We are proud that Britain is hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012, and we support bids for other highprofile events such as the 2018 World Cup – but we believe that grassroots sport is just as important. We will give people from all backgrounds and generations the opportunity to participate in sports’.

A3.29 Following the May 2010 election, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government stated in its coalition agreement: ‘The Government believes that a vibrant cultural, media and sporting sector is crucial for our well-being and quality of life. We need to promote excellence in these fields, with government funding used where appropriate to encourage philanthropic and corporate investment’.

It set out its commitment to support bids for major sporting events to be hosted in Britain, to ensure a ‘safe and successful Olympic and Paralympic Games in London in 2012, and [to] urgently form plans to deliver a genuine and lasting legacy’, to ‘encourage the reform of football governance rules’, to ‘support the creation of an annual Olympic-style schools sport event’, and to ‘protect school playing fields’.1 A few weeks into his new job as Minister for Sport and Olympics, in June 2010, Hugh Robertson MP outlined his plans:2 ‘Delivering a mass participation legacy for sport from London 2012 is one of my three top priorities. I want to see a marked, and sustained, cultural shift toward greater participation in sport. So I have today informed Sport England that, going forward, it will have two clear priorities; supporting sports governing bodies through the Whole Sport Plans and delivering a mass participation sports legacy from London 2012. To deliver this Sport England will focus on improving facility provision and developing sport at a community level. […] Lottery reform – Plans to increase sports’ share of Lottery returns from 16% to 20% are progressing quickly, with an Order expected to be put before Parliament after the summer recess. It is estimated this will lead to a funding increase of £50 million a year to sport by 2012; Structural reform – Proposals are being developed for the bringing together of UK Sport, Sport England and Youth Sport Trust under one roof while maintaining their separate roles and responsibilities; School sport – The Secretary of State has made it his top priority to deliver a renewed emphasis on competition both within and between schools. Work is underway to develop an Olympic and Paralympic style school sport competition. More details to follow in the next few weeks; Elite/world class sport – Consultation is underway with those sports bidding or planning to bid for major events with a view to bringing forward, at the appropriate time, a specific Major Sports Events Bill designed to make it easier to win and host major events. These changes will boost school and community sport, increase the flow of lottery money and further improve the way our key sports bodies work together. They will also help put the UK at the top of the world league when it comes to hosting major sports events, which is critical at a time when we are bidding to win the 2018 World Cup’.

That same month, Jeremy Hunt formally launched the government’s planned ‘Olympic-style competition open to schools’.3 Led by the Youth Sport Trust, in conjunction with Sport England, the ‘School Games’ project was initially financed by National Lottery funding of £10m per annum, with a further contribution from the Department for Health.4 And in January 2012, the government announced a new £10m investment from Sainsburys to support the project.5 In November 2010, Hugh Robertson launched the ‘Places People Play’ initiative, a £135m project, funded by

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National Lottery cash and overseen by Sport England, to encourage community sports participation by upgrading a thousand local sports clubs and facilities, protecting and improving playing fields, and recruiting 40,000 ‘Sport Leaders’ to organise and lead grassroots sporting activities.6 In January 2012, DCMS issued ‘Creating a sporting habit for life – A new youth sport strategy’, committing the investment of £1bn of Lottery and Exchequer funding between 2012 and 2017 to ‘create a meaningful and lasting community sports legacy by growing sports participation at all levels’ (including plans for every one of England’s 4,000 secondary schools to be offered a community sports club on its site, with links to a national governing body; all secondary schools to be given support to keep their facilities open for local community use; and establishment of a £40m local sport fund to help local authorities improve sport provision).7 1 ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ (May 2010, Cabinet Office). 2 ‘Sport and Olympics Minister sets out Olympic sports legacy plans’, 10 June 2010, culture.gov.uk/ news/media_releases/7152.aspx [accessed 28 September 2020]. 3 Sports keynote speech, City of London Academy, Southwark, 28 June 2010. 4 ‘Plans for the Legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games’ (DCMS, December 2010). 5 ‘£10 million Sainsbury’s investment to inspire a new sporting generation’, 10  January 2012, gov. uk/government/speeches/10-million-sainsbury-s-investment-to-inspire-a-new-sporting-generation [accessed 28 September 2020. 6 ‘Plans for the legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games’ (DCMS, December 2010). 7 ‘Creating a sporting habit for life – A new youth sports strategy’ (DCMS, January 2012).

A3.30 On 18 September 2012, following the conclusion of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games, Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson set out the government’s 10 point ‘sports legacy plan’:1 (a) Elite funding – the government confirmed that, through UK  Sport, it had confirmed Lottery and Exchequer funding of £125m per year through to the Rio Olympics in 2016. (b) World class facilities – the government repeated its plans to re-locate and/or re-configure many of the Olympic venues and to turn certain of the warm-up facilities used during the Games as community sports venues. (c) Major sporting events – the government confirmed its successful bids to host 20 major sporting events between 2013 and 2019 and its pending bids for three more. (d) Places People Play. (e) Youth Sport Strategy. (f) Join In – a new initiative to ‘use the volunteering spirit which did so much to enhance of the [sic] Games’ and encourage people to give to the community. (g) School Games. (h) PE – the government committed to ‘ensure all our children have the chance to enjoy sport in school, to compete against their peers and to promote and celebrate sporting excellence at young age’. (i) Disability sport – Sport England awarded £1.5m to the English Federation of Disability Sport ‘to work with National Governing Bodies to increase sports participation by disabled people and make grassroots sport more inclusive’. (j) International development – continued funding of the International Inspiration programme, the London 2012 international legacy initiative.2 And in March 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron announced details of a new primary school sports strategy ‘capitalising on the inspiration young people took from what they saw during those summer months’ in 2012.3 The strategy promised a new £150m per year package, funded jointly by the Department for Education (£80m), the Department for Health (£60m) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (£10m), to be spent on school sport, a greater role for national governing bodies in

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providing specialist coaching at primary school level, and tougher assessment of school sport provision by the government inspectorate, Ofsted.4 1 gov.uk/government/publications/beyond-2012-the-london-2012-legacy-story [accessed 2  November 2020]. 2 On 24 January 2013, Robertson provided an update on the progress of the 10-point plan in a written ministerial statement (gov.uk/government/speeches/written-ministerial-statement-sporting-legacy [accessed 28 September 2020]). He confirmed that £347m had been committed by UK Sport to fund Olympic and Paralympic athletes prepare for the Rio 2016 Olympics, an increase of 11 per cent on the funding available for London 2012 athletes. In addition, he announced that the funding for Places People Play had increased by £15m to £150m, that the UK had successfully bid to host a further six major sporting events, and that Sport England had committed £493 million in its ‘whole sport plan funding package for national governing bodies’ to drive participation. 3 ‘Olympic legacy boost – £150 million for primary school sport in England’ (DCMS, 16 March 2013). 4 For further details of the Coalition Government’s school sports policy, see paras A3.29 to A3.32.

A3.31 Nevertheless, whether the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government delivered on its legacy promise remains controversial.1 For example, a survey conducted by the Sport and Recreation Alliance in October 2012 revealed that ‘two thirds of [sports] clubs do not feel that they have benefited [from the UK hosting the Games] and […] the majority of clubs (73 per cent) do not believe the Government has done enough to help community sport create a legacy of participation’.2 Moreover, from 2005 – when London won the bid to host the 2012 Olympics – to 2016 there was virtually no change in adult participation rates. For instance, in October 2005 the proportion of over 16s in England that played sport for at least 30 minutes each week was 34.6 per cent; by October 2016 this was 36.1 per cent.3 1 See eg  Edwin Heathcote, ‘Legacy or Lunacy?’, Financial Times, 20  January 2012: ‘This was a Games sold on its legacy and the critical question is exactly what legacy it will leave. Football clubs bickered over the unneeded stadium but it now looks like it will remain in sorely underused athletics mode at huge public expense. The aquatics centre will be the most expensive-to-maintain municipal pool in this – or perhaps any other – city. The argument for London’s taxpayers was that this was a desired development made possible by, or at least accelerated by the Olympics: such resources would never have been marshalled otherwise. But, actually, what London has got is a huge park strewn with enormous chunks of blankly impenetrable structure. It seems odd for an architecture critic to complain of too much architecture but at a moment when buildings and facilities of real community engagement – from libraries to sport fields – are being closed, the question needs to be asked whether this huge expenditure can be justified for a few brief moments of national pride’. See also Toby Helm, the Observer, 26 January 2013: ‘It is now six months since the start of the Olympics. London won the Games very largely off the back of its promise to deliver a legacy, not just by ‘inspiring a generation’ for a few weeks or months, but by putting in place actual policies to boost participation for all age groups and in all communities. So has any progress been made? On the plus side, the government has massively increased funding for elite sports to try to ensure Team GB does at least as well in 2016 in Rio as it did in London in 2012. In December it announced a record funding package of £347m for the next four years for elite sport – an 11% increase on the previous four-year cycle. UK Sport, which distributes lottery and government funding to elite athletes, rewarded those sports that hit or exceeded their medal targets. Funding for boxing rose by 40% to £13.8m, while cycling, rowing, sailing and equestrian sport also did well. To boost community sport, £493m is being spent on a range of projects over coming years. But while those involved in grassroots sport welcome both allocations, most say one gaping hole remains at the heart of policy. One senior figure close to government said: “We welcome the money for elite sport and community projects but we ask where is the strategic vision here? To be honest, policy is a hotchpotch. What we still completely lack is a policy for linking schools to clubs in the communities – that is what has gone and nothing has been put in its place.” To gauge opinions among experts, the  Observer  invited responses via guardian.co.uk from people involved in community and school sport, and emailed scores of headteachers. While all agreed that the Olympics had been worth every penny of its £9bn price tag, most respondents said sporting provision was no better or, in most cases, worse than in 2010. Some leaders of local clubs said there had been a pick-up in interest since the Olympics but as time wore on numbers had returned to levels more like those before the Games. The vast majority said they did not believe this government was committed to delivering a lasting legacy.’ 2 ‘Olympic and Paralympic Games, Legacy Survey’, Sport and Recreation Alliance (January 2013), sportandrecreation.org.uk/sites/sportandrecreation.org.uk/files/web/images/Olympic%20and%20 Paralympic%20legacy%20survey_1.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]. 3 See Sport England Active People Survey analysis from 2005-2016 (activepeople.sportengland.org/ [accessed 28 September 2020]).

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H Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation A3.32 The Conservative Party positioned sport as a key item in its manifesto for the 2015 general election, highlighting the importance of both building on the success of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and boosting funding in school sport.1 Shortly after its victory in the election, the Conservative Government published its strategy for the development of sport in the UK, ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’.2 In his foreword, then-Prime Minister David Cameron wrote:3 ‘By harnessing the power of sport for the good of our whole society, by investing in developing the talent of future stars in every sport and by standing up for the integrity of the sports we love, we can secure our sporting future and in doing so make our country stronger for generations to come’.

‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’ marked the government’s first new sporting strategy for over a decade, and set out to redefine the sporting landscape in the United Kingdom by focusing on five key outcomes: physical well-being, mental well-being, individual development, social and community development, and economic development. The policy targeted inactivity generally (with a particular focus on getting those from under-represented groups more engaged), which marked a shift in focus from historic policies that measured activity by reference to the number of people playing one sport or another at a particular moment. In conjunction with this, the Active People Survey4 was replaced with the new Active Lives Survey,5 in order to provide the government with a better indicator for measuring physical activity generally, rather than just participation in sport. In addition, the strategy paper committed to introduce a new governance code designed to protect the integrity of UK sport. The Code for Sports Governance was published on 31  October 2016 and set out the governance requirements that national sports governing bodies must comply with in order to receive public funds.6 1 Conservative Party Election Manifesto (2015) (ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/localpdf/ Conservatives.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]). 2 ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’ (DCMS, 2015). 3 Ibid, see foreword. 4 See Sport England Active People Survey analysis from 2005-2016 (activepeople.sportengland.org/ [accessed 28 September 2020]). 5 See Sport England Active Lives Survey (sportengland.org/know-your-audience/data/active-lives [accessed 28 September 2020]). The Active Lives Survey measures the nation’s activity levels through two surveys: Active Lives Adult, which is published twice a year, and Active Lives Children and Young People, which is published annually. 6 For discussion of the substance of the new Code, see para A5.12.

A3.33 In June 2018, the Conservative Government published its second annual progress report on Sporting Future: ‘A New Strategy for an Active Nation’, measured against the five key outcomes. Then-Minister for Sport Tracey Crouch remarked that ‘a huge amount has been achieved’1 at both an elite and community level. This is backed up by the data: the Active Lives Adult survey published in April 2019 reflected that during the period from November 2017–November 2018 the number of adults who were regularly ‘active’ increased by almost 500,000 whilst the number of ‘inactive’ fell by 185,000.2 1 ‘Sporting Future: Second Annual Report’, published January 2018. 2 See Adult Lives Survey, published April 2019. The survey captures data by reference to three levels of activity: ‘inactive’ (less than 30 minutes a week), ‘fairly active’ (between 30 – 149 minutes a week), and ‘active’ (at least 150 minutes a week).

I

School Sport and Activity Action Plan

A3.34 In December 2018, however, when the government published the results of the first year of Sport England’s new Active Lives Children and Young People’s

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Survey,1 the data showed that only 17.5 per cent of children had met the Chief Medical Officer’s guidance for how much activity children should be doing (at least 60 minutes per day). This prompted a substantial new focus across government on improving sport and physical activity for young people. In July 2019 the Department for Education, in collaboration with DCMS and the Department for Health and Social Care, published a new strategy designed to provide all children with the opportunity to take part in at least 60 minutes of physical activity each day, the ‘School Sport and Physical Activity Action Plan’.2 The Action Plan focuses on making sport and physical activity an integral part of both school and after-school activities. From September 2020, the government plans to launch a series of ‘innovative’ regional pilots where schools will work with sport providers and other local organisations to provide a coordinated offering of physical activity and sport in and out of school.3 1 Active Lives Children and Young People Survey: Academic Year 2017/18, published December 2018. 2 ‘School Sport and Physical Activity Action Plan’ (Department for Education, 2019). 3 Ibid.

J Summary A3.35 Current government sports policy reflects the belief in sport as a potent instrument of public policy, along with an appreciation of the ‘feel-good’ benefits of sporting success at the level of elite international competition. However, it took the massive impetus generated by the successful bid for London 2012 to trigger a sharp refocusing of the government sport infrastructure onto the triple-track pathways of school sport (via the Youth Sport Trust), community sport (via Sport England and the other Home Country Sports Councils) and elite and international sport (via UK Sport).

3  IMPLEMENTING MODERN GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP A3.36 This section describes the central government departments involved in developing the government’s sports policy, and the non-departmental public bodies involved in delivering it on an ‘arm’s length’ basis. It also describes the three main methods by which the government intervenes in the sports sector, in pursuit of its sports policy as well as broader public policy objectives.

A Government departments and agencies that impact on the sport sector A3.37 With governance of the sports sector traditionally left to the private sports movement, historically there has not been a need for a large sports expertise or presence within government. It was only in 2002 that sport was given dedicated policy recognition within Whitehall by being made a key policy objective of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. However, various government departments have got involved from time to time in the sphere of government sports policy, with varying and sometimes overlapping and conflicting responsibilities, and without any obvious clear over-arching framework of reporting and responsibility. The CCPR (now the Sport and Recreation Alliance) claimed in 2001 that 17 different government departments affected sport and recreation.1 In May 2007, David Cameron, then leader of the opposition, stated:2 ‘It sometimes seems that every government department wants to run UK sport. We’ve got the DCMS, the DfES, the DoH, the DCLG and the Home Office all

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  123 claiming a role. Sometimes even the MOD, the FCO and DFID get involved. I’m a politician and even I’m confused. I think it’s time to consider setting up a British equivalent of the Australian Sports Commission to co-ordinate sports policy across different departments and act as a champion for sport in government’.

However, the August 2012 comments of Sir Keith Mills, Deputy Chairman of LOCOG,3 suggest that little changed once David Cameron became Prime Minister under the 2010 Coalition Government: ‘The issue we have had historically is that sport has been tackled in a fragmented way. There isn’t a national sport strategy. That is something that is missing. We have got the opportunity to accomplish that off the back of a very successful [Olympic] Games. There are some great organisations that do some great work, but they are not connected. And government is not connected […] Let’s pull together the main departments in government that are responsible for it – health, education, Home Office, communities and DCMS – and agree a national strategy, And agree on how we deliver on it’. The need for joined up, cross-department collaboration has become increasingly important. This was identified by then-minister for Sport Tracey Crouch when launching ‘Sporting Future: A  New Strategy for an Active Nation’: ‘if this new strategy is to work effectively, all parts of government must work more closely together towards clear, shared outcomes’.4 This has been reinforced in recent years too. As noted by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee following its recent inquiry into the social impact of participation in culture and sport: ‘sport […] must be better integrated within the work and policy objectives of the Department for Education, the Department for Health and Social Care, and the Ministry of Justice to ensure that everyone can benefit’.5 1 CCPR, ‘Active Britain: A Manifesto for Sport and Recreation (May 2001), p 4. Grayson counted 14: see Grayson, Sport and the Law, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 2000), p 97. 2 Sport Industry Lecture, 23  May 2007. See also Hugh Robertson MP, then Shadow Sports and Olympic spokesman, Letters, Observer, 17  October 2007: ‘Currently, DCMS, DfES, DoH and the Home Office all have a say [in how sport is delivered across government], often with vastly differing objectives. A body like the Australian Sports Commission would have a dramatic effect both in terms of coordinating the delivery of sports across government and by acting as a champion for sport within government’. 3 ‘London 2012 Olympics ‘should prompt wholesale rethink of UK sport policy’’, the Guardian, 6 August 2012. 4 ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’ (DCMS, 2015), see foreword. 5 See ‘Changing Lives: the social impact of participation in culture and sport’, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, report published 14 May 2019 HC 734.

(a) The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport A3.38 The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has primary responsibility for sport in central government,1 including a coordinating role with other central government departments active in the sports sector. DCMS is responsible within the government for National Lottery policy, setting the policy and financial framework within which the bodies distributing Lottery funding operate.2 It also receives the bulk of the direct funding for sport allocated by the government in its annual budget of Exchequer funds. DCMS is also responsible for identifying those sports events that are so much part of the national heritage that public access to them via free television coverage is protected under ‘listed events’ legislation.3 And as the sponsoring department for gambling, DCMS takes direct oversight of horse racing matters.4 1 See generally the DCMS website at gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-culture-mediasport [accessed 28 September 2020]. Originally it was the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, using the same ‘DCMS’ acronym. 2 See para A3.51 to A3.57. 3 See para A3.83 et seq. 4 See para A3.77.

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A3.39 Perhaps DCMS’s most high-profile responsibility in recent years was managing the delivery of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,1 a task it managed principally through two bodies, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG). The ODA, a statutory executive non-departmental public body, was given broad powers by the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006, including the right to ‘take any action that it thinks necessary or expedient for the purposes of preparing for the London Olympics’.2 The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport had responsibility for appointing the ODA board, whose principal role throughout the delivery phase was to manage the construction of the Olympic Park and the various Olympic venues. LOCOG was a separate entity, a private limited company whose structure had been agreed during the bid phase to meet IOC requirements. It was accountable to three stakeholders: the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London, and the British Olympic Association, who were collectively responsible for appointing its board under a joint venture arrangement. After the Games were concluded, DCMS’s policy portfolio included ensuring the Olympic legacy.3 And in recent years, DCMS has played an active role in exploring modern day integrity issues facing the sports sector. In addition to the Code of Sports Governance published in December 2016,4 in October 2017  DCMS published its ‘Review of Criminalisation of Doping in Sport’,5 a wide-ranging review into whether additional legislative measures were required to criminalise the act of sports doping in the UK. Ultimately, the review concluded that there was no need to criminalise doping, but it did set out a number of recommendations for the government to consider to strengthen the fight against doping in sport, including through better use of existing powers.6 1 Interestingly, despite DCMS’s success as the lead government department during the bid phase, once the bid was won there was no guarantee that the portfolio for delivering the Games would fall within the Department. ‘Understandably, DCMS were keen for the Games to stay with them after the win. But that was not a fait accompli; DCMS was the smallest government department with little delivery experience and a small budget unable to absorb the inevitably higher budget the Games would entail. Some voices within Government whispered that this was beyond the department’s comfort zone. […] There were rumours that the Department for Communities and Local Government wanted the Olympics to sit with them as a major regeneration programme and suggestions that the Games might be best located in a specialist unit in the Cabinet Office […]. There was even a brief suggestion of a dedicated Olympics department. After negotiation, and after lobbying from Tessa Jowell, it agreed that the Olympics would stay at DCMS’. Norris, Rutter and Metland, ‘Making the Games, What government can learn from London 2012’ (Institute of Government, January 2013). 2 Section 4(1) of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006. 3 See para A3.29 et seq. The Prime Minister also established a Cabinet Committee on Olympic and Paralympic Legacy, a ‘policy advisory group’ chaired by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and attended by Lord Sebastian Coe and the Mayor of London, to provide oversight of legacy delivery. See gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/olympic-and-paralympic-legacy-cabinetcommittee [accessed 28 September 2020]. 4 See para A3.32. 5 See ‘Review of Criminalisation in Sport’, DCMS policy paper (DCMS, October 2017) 6 Ibid.

A3.40 DCMS generally takes an ‘arm’s length’ approach to sports delivery, establishing the government’s financial, administrative, legal, and overall policy framework for sport, but delegating implementation of that policy, as well as the all-important function of distributing Exchequer and Lottery funding for sport, to separate non-departmental public bodies, principally UK Sport and the four Home Country Sport Councils.1 It is those bodies (along with UK Anti-Doping) that then make operational decisions in implementation of government sports policy, albeit that they are accountable to DCMS under the terms of their formal funding agreements, and to Parliament through the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Select Committee for Culture, Media & Sport. This arm’s length approach, combined with the fact that DCMS itself by no means has exclusive responsibility for sport among the different

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Departments of State, has led different Ministers for Sport to bemoan their limited power and authority,2 which is perceived by commentators as a serious limitation on the ability to ensure sport is sufficiently prioritised in the political agenda.3 Calls therefore periodically surface to give the Minister for Sport direct executive power and responsibility, by creating a Department of State for Sport with a place for its Minister in the Cabinet, in order to increase their influence and to achieve access to the wider funding opportunities that exist in other government departments.4 1 In its response to the report of the Committee that heard the evidence of the then Minister for Sport, bemoaning his lack of powers, that is quoted at n 2, below, the government stated: ‘Ministers do not intend abolishing the arm’s length principle, but they do intend that [DCMS] should give strategic leadership, and should set a clear policy framework within which its bodies can operate’, using in particular the policy directions issued by the Secretary of State for the DCMS to Lottery-funded grant bodies under the National Lottery Act 1998 (Objectives and Performance of the DCMS: Government Response to the Fifth Report from the Culture, Media & Sport Committee, Session 1997/98). See also the comments of Hugh Robertson MP, Minister for Sport, HC Deb, 28 January 2013, 756, January 2013: ‘I can set the overall strategy for UK Sport, and indeed I do, but it is not up to me to make individual funding decisions within that, because about two thirds of the money that goes to any of these funding awards is lottery money. As anyone who has been in this House for any length of time will know, that is not for Ministers to direct’. 2 In 1998, in evidence given to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, then Minister for Sport Tony Banks said ‘it is an interesting fact that the budget of my Department for sport is small at about £50 million, and that would not be that bad of course if the £50 million was totally at my disposal, but of course about £49 million of that £50 million goes straight out to other bodies like the English Sports Council and the UK Sports Council, so in terms of money that is available, as it were, to me as a Minister and to our Department directly, it is a very, very small amount and that is why the constant stream of Members who come to me and put great projects to me and ask how we can possibly fund them should realise that, I am afraid, as a Minister, I tend to have to try to influence rather than to take executive action in terms of sports decisions. Lastly, I asked for a list because someone said, “What does the Sports Minister do?” and it is an exceedingly good question and I think really I would see my function more as an advocate for sport within government because I have been contacting my colleague Ministers who appear to have some element of responsibility for sport within their Departments and so far I have been talking to Education Ministers, Employment, Home Affairs, Defence, the Foreign Office and International Development as all of them have a sport element somewhere within their Department […] Influence rather than executive decision-making is the role of any Sports Minister’. Minutes of Evidence to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 1997. Mr Banks stated that the suggestion that the job of the Sports Minister is in some ways, to a large degree, a sham, that it is an enormously publicised post and you get a lot of attention, but actually your effect on British sport is not very great’ was ‘quite unkind, but probably reasonably accurate’. Similarly, Mr Bank’s successor, Kate Hoey, is reported to have said: ‘I can try and influence, I can try and persuade, but I have got no real power’: Independent, 15 May 2001. In contrast, in February 2007, after six-and-a-half years in office, making him the longest-serving Sports Minister in history, Richard Caborn took a more positive view of the extent to which the Sports Minister can influence the sporting agenda: ‘A sports minister can have an impact in many ways, not just through providing direction and sufficient funding, but also on how sport is perceived within Government.  Supporting sport for sport’s sake is a worthy end in itself – and one we sometimes forget – but sport can also be a powerful medium for delivering on a whole range of issues facing the country – from public health to crime prevention […]. It is sometimes said that sport should have a voice in Cabinet. It does: her name is Tessa Jowell [then Secretary of State for the DCMS]. But I do not subscribe to the view that sport needs a voice all to itself. In fact I believe sport’s bargaining hand in Cabinet is strengthened by the fact that the Secretary of State representing sport has a wider portfolio of interests behind them. Nevertheless I  believe it was encouraging sign of Tony Blair’s commitment to sport that when I was given the job it was as a Minister of State and Privy Councillor, not a Parliamentary Under Secretary as most previous Ministers had been. This helps give the post holder what you need; a Minister that has authority, commands respect and has a clear vision of what can be achieved. My personal belief is that the Sports Minister’s position could be strengthened if they were to chair a Cabinet committee for Sport. This would mean ministerial colleagues were constantly engaged in ensuring sport was actually delivering on their agendas’ (speech given on 5 February 2007 at sportsthinktank.com.event). 3 See eg Houlihan, ‘Sport in the United Kingdom’ in Chalip, Johnson and Stachura (eds) National Sports Policies: An International Handbook (Greenwood Press, 1996), at p 401: ‘The fortuitous combination of a group of senior government members with a clear agenda for sport can evaporate just as rapidly as it emerged, leaving sport at the whim of the next incumbent of number 10 Downing Street’. 4 See eg  CCPR, ‘Active Britain: A  Manifesto for Sport and Recreation’ (May 2001) (‘We propose a dedicated British Sports Department with a Cabinet Minister to drive policy across Whitehall Departments in partnership with the devolved administrations’). See also Goodbody, ‘A Journalist’s

126  Governance of the Sports Sector View’ [2001] 9(3) SATLJ 5 (suggesting that the Secretary of State and Minister for Sport should also chair UK Sport and Sport England respectively, thereby assuming executive power and responsibility). See also the comments of former Director of Communications and Strategy for Tony Blair, Alistair Campbell, ‘Dear Mr Cameron, Please create a new Department for Sport and Olympic Legacy in reshuffle’, 3 September 2012: ‘My idea […] is the creation of a new Department for Sport, with a seat at the Cabinet table, a proper budget, and ministerial representation on all key economic, health, education, crime and community policy committees, not to mention Olympics Legacy. The Secretary of State should have the same role in overseeing legacy projects that ministers had as the 2012 project came together. Obviously over time the Legacy part of the brief will start to fade. But by then hopefully the Department for Sport will be as much an accepted part of the political and cultural landscape as health, education or the economy. And meanwhile sport will be more deeply embedded in our lives’.

(b) The Home Office A3.41 The Home Office is responsible for legislation relating to public order at sports events, including specific measures to address football disorder, racist chanting, and ticket touting at football matches.1 Along with the Association of Chief Police Officers, it funds and oversees the UK Football Policing Unit, which is responsible for preventing and tackling English and Welsh football disorder domestically and abroad. In March 2011, the Home Office launched the ‘Sports Charter’, calling ‘for anyone and everyone with a sporting interest or involvement to unite and tackle homophobia and transphobia in sport’.2 The Home Office also sets immigration policy (through the UK Border Agency), influencing the terms upon which foreign sportsmen and women can enter the UK to participate in sport.3 The Home Office is also not above using sport to advance its own policy goals. In 2019, for example, it announced the launch of a partnership with Sport England to help tackle serious violence and knife crime.4 Sport England introduced a series of projects designed to provide young people with a positive activity to take part in at times when such individuals are statistically at risk of being drawn into violence, with beneficiaries of these projects receiving a copy of the Home Office’s #knifefree campaign ‘Partner Pack’.5 1 See para A3.66 et seq. 2 ‘Tackling Transphobia and Homophobia in Sport: A Charter for Action’ (Home Office, March 2011) (available at gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85484/sports-charter. pdf [accessed 28  September 2020]). The FA, RFU, RFL and ECB are founding signatories of the charter. 3 See paras F1.12 to F1.15. 4 ‘Sport used to tackle knife crime’ Sport England, press release (23  July 2019) (sportengland.org/ media/14183/20190723-sport-used-to-tackle-knife-crime.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]) 5 Ibid. The Home Office’s #knifefree campaign was announced on 23 March 2018 and aims to increase awareness about ‘positive alternatives’ to knife crime. The Home Office’s #knifefree partner pack includes information on the campaign, along with links to where individuals can download the campaign resources (gov.uk/government/news/home-office-launches-anti-knife-crime-campaign [accessed 28 September 2020]).

(c) The Department of Health and Social Care A3.42 The Department of Health and Social Care has long recognised the role that sport can play in improving the nation’s health and well-being. Under the 2010–15 Coalition Government, the Department for Health made a financial commitment to the government’s School Games programme, and in December 2011 it launched the Public Health Responsibility Deal, a scheme in which organisations can make a pledge to improve the public health of the nation. Sporting organisations that have signed up include Sport England and the Youth Sport Trust.1 In August 2013 and in direct response to the Coalition Government’s push for a more active population following the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,2 the Department of Health and Social Care pledged to invest over £5 million across three initiatives in order to encourage children and families to exercise more.3

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  127 1 See webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130104155639/http://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/ [accessed 28 September 2020]. 2 See para A3.29. 3 ‘Get active to get healthy’, Department of Health and Social Care, press release (14 August 2013).

(d) The Treasury A3.43 The Treasury is responsible for all taxation policies that affect sport, including the application of corporation tax to governing bodies and VAT rates paid by sports bodies and athletes,1 and also allocates Exchequer funding to sport as part of its periodic Comprehensive Spending Review.2 The Treasury has responded to concerns that overseas sports stars will avoid coming to the UK for fear of having to pay UK income tax on their worldwide income3 by granting exemption from income tax to overseas sportsmen, albeit only on an event-by-event basis, first in relation to the London 2012 Olympics and the 2011 and 2013  UEFA  Champions League Finals staged at Wembley, and then (as provided for in Finance Act 2013) in relation to the London Anniversary Games in July 2013 and the Commonwealth Games in 2014. The Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) Regulations 2016 extended this protection to participants in the 2016 London Anniversary Games and the 2017 IAAF World Athletics Championships in London.4 In April 2018, the Treasury announced the introduction of a levy on soft drinks containing added sugar with all proceeds used to ‘fund new sports facilities in schools as well as healthy breakfast clubs, ensuring children lead healthier lives’.5 The tax, commonly referred to as the ‘sugar tax’, generated £240 million from April 2018 to April 2019, and a further £251m from April 2019 to October 2019.6 1 See generally Chapter I1 (Taxation of Sports Organisations) and Chapter I2 (Taxation of Individual Athletes). 2 The Sport and Recreation Alliance estimated in 2011 that in 2008 the government made a net surplus of £5.7bn from sport, with £5 taken in tax for every £1 it spent on sport. ‘Red Card to Red Tape’ (2011, Sport and Recreation Alliance). In November 2001, the Rugby Football Union announced that it had estimated it would pay the government £50m in tax over the eight years from March 2001. It pointed out that such a sum could be better used to fund grassroots development of the sport and noted suggestions that governing bodies committed to the grassroots development of their sports should be tax exempt: ‘Profits up but RFU condemns government’, sportbusiness.com (16 November 2001). In 1999, UK Sport stated: ‘If the UK wants to be successful in the highly competitive events marketplace, it will need to address the issue of VAT and Corporation Tax levied on sporting bodies. A  number of countries including Australia, the Republic of Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands have illustrated the benefits of reducing the tax burden on certain defined major international events’: see ‘A UK Strategy for Sport: Major Events, A “Blueprint” for Success’ (1999, UK Sport). In June 2011, with the support of the Minister for Sport, the Sport and Recreation Alliance formulated a tax strategy for sport that it hopes will bring about legislative change to ‘promote, protect and provide for community sport’. Its proposals include: allowing Community Amateur Sports Clubs (see para I1.124) to claim Gift Aid on member subscriptions; including sports clubs in HMRC’s definition of charity, so that they are treated as charitable organisations for tax purposes (see para I1.116 et seq.); making SGBs exempt from corporation tax; and making endorsement income earned by overseas sportsmen and women exempt from UK tax. On 4 March 2013, Sajid Javid, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, announced a new public consultation, due to be issued later in 2013, calling for responses on proposals to make it easier for Community Amateur Sports Clubs to take advantage of existing tax benefits: ‘Community Amateur Sports Clubs’ (March 2013, HM Treasury). 3 See eg ‘Britain “has closed the door” to major sporting events’, Telegraph 8 May 2008; ‘Bolt snubs London over tax law’, bbc.co.uk, 13 July 2010 (‘Triple Olympic champion Usain Bolt announces he will not compete in London before the 2012 Olympics, because of Britain’s tax laws’). See generally Hedley, Hackleton and Watkins, ‘Sporting Chance’ (2013) Taxation, 16 May, p 10 (arguing that ‘the UK tax system is out of line with the rest of the world and […] exemptions are becoming increasingly necessary to encourage organisers of world events and top international talent to compete in the UK’). See further para I2.29. 4 ‘The Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) Regulations 2016’, HMRC policy paper (21 July 2016) (available online at gov.uk/government/publications/the-major-sporting-events-income-taxexemption-regulations-2016/the-major-sporting-events-income-tax-exemption-regulations-2016 [accessed 28 September 2020]). 5 ‘Soft Drinks Industry Levy comes into effect’ HM Treasury, press release (5 April 2018) (available online at gov.uk/government/news/soft-drinks-industry-levy-comes-into-effect [accessed 28 September 2020]).

128  Governance of the Sports Sector 6 ‘UK  Soft Drinks Industry Levy Statistics’, HMRC press release (October 2019) (available online at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/848936/2019_Oct_SDIL_Comm.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).

(e) The Department for Education A3.44 In 2010 the Department for Education was established to replace the Department for Children, Schools & Families (DCSF), and took on responsibility for sport in the national curriculum and for sports facilities at schools, colleges and universities. By virtue of s 84(3) of the Education Act 2002, physical education is one of the foundation subjects of the national curriculum, and a compulsory subject for pupils aged 5 to 16 in state-maintained schools in England and Wales.1 In October 2002, the incumbent Labour Government launched its physical education and school sports strategy, ‘PE, School Sport and Club Links’, accompanied by a further strategy document, ‘A Guide to the Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links Strategy’. The plan, backed by Lottery and Exchequer funding of £1.5bn from 2003 to 2008, was to be delivered through eight PE programmes, including the introduction of Specialist Sport Colleges, School Sport Coordinators and the Gifted and Talented Programme. The ultimate aim of the scheme was to increase the percentage of school children participating in two hours a week of high quality PE to 75 per cent by 2006 by creating 450 School Sport Partnerships across England.2 In 2008, the programme was extended with the ‘PE & Sport Strategy for Young People’, intended to build on the approach already in place, with further funding of £755m between 2008 and 2011. The new strategy raised the bar for youth sports participation further, making a ‘five hour offer’: a commitment to offering new opportunities for 5–16 year olds to increase the amount of hours per week playing sport, with the help of school, voluntary and community providers. 1 The National Curriculum for England states that ‘the Government believes that two hours of physical activity a week, including the National Curriculum for physical education and extra-curricular activities, should be an aspiration for all schools. This applies throughout all key stages’. 2 The Department for Education’s September 2010 ‘PE and Sport Survey’ described School Sport Partnerships in the following terms: ‘Partnerships are families of schools which typically comprise a Specialist Sports College linked to a set of secondary schools, each of which has a further group of primary and special schools clustered around it.’

A3.45 Notwithstanding the apparent success of these policies in increasing youth sports participation in schools,1 in October 2010 the new Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, announced that they would be dropped in order to give schools the freedom to concentrate on competitive sport:2 ‘Our approach differs fundamentally from that of the last Government. As part of this change of approach, I have concluded that the existing network of school sport partnerships is neither affordable nor likely to be the best way to help schools achieve their potential in improving competitive sport. While the network helped schools to increase participation rates in the areas targeted by the previous Government, the fact remains that the proportion of pupils playing competitive sport regularly has remained disappointingly low. Only around two in every five pupils play competitive sport regularly within their own school, and only one in five plays regularly against other schools. I can confirm therefore that the Department will not continue to provide ring-fenced funding for school sport partnerships. I  am also announcing that the Department is lifting, immediately, the many requirements of the previous Government’s PE and Sport Strategy, so giving schools the clarity and freedom to concentrate on competitive school sport’.

At the same time he also announced the new School Games, an Olympic-style sports competition for schools.3 Following strong criticism of the abandonment of the prior

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administration’s policies, however,4 in December 2010 Mr Gove announced that funding for School Sports Partnerships would continue until August 2011 (at a cost of £47m). He also confirmed that a further £65m of funding would be provided until 2013 to fund one day a week of secondary school PE teachers’ time to be spent out of the classroom encouraging intra- and inter-school competition in primary schools, that Lottery funding for the School Games project would increase, and that the government was committed to reviewing the PE curriculum to place greater emphasis on competitive sport.5 Nevertheless, in its February 2013 report Ofsted (the government inspector and regulator of schools in England) acknowledged the investment made in school physical education by the previous administration and the success of its school sport partnerships policy, and challenged the then-Coalition Government to build on that success:6 ‘the report confirms there is more good and outstanding PE than at the time of the last Ofsted PE survey in 2008. Sustained government investment has enabled schools to make significant improvements in PE and school sport. However, continuing these improvements will present a formidable challenge for schools against a backdrop of greater expectations. Ofsted recommends that the Department for Education considers devising a new national strategy for PE and school sport that builds on the successes of school sport partnerships and enables schools to make a major contribution to the sporting legacy left by the 2012 Olympic Games’.7 1 In its most recent ‘PE and Sport Survey’, in September 2010, the Department for Education found that during the 2009/10 academic year 84 per cent of pupils in years 1 to 11 were spending at least two hours on PE per week at school, an increase of 40 per cent on the 2003/04 figures. 2 See gov.uk/government/publications/refocusing-sport-in-schools-to-build-a-lasting-legacy-of-the2012-games [accessed 28 September 2020]. 3 See gov.uk/government/policies/getting-more-people-playing-sport/supporting-pages/the-schoolgames [accessed 28 September 2020]. 4 See eg Vaughan, ‘End of sports strategy is “devastating contradiction”’, Times Educational Supplement, 29 October 2010. See also Hart, ‘London 2012 Olympics: Government accused of ‘devastating’ legacy with school spending cuts’, Daily Telegraph, 20 October 2010. 5 See gov.uk/government/news/new-approach-for-school-sports-decentralising-power-incentivisingcompetition-trusting-teachers [accessed 28 September 2020]. 6 ‘Beyond 2012 – outstanding physical education for all’ (Ofsted, February 2013, 1203670). 7 Further controversy came in October 2012 with the enactment of the School Premises (England) Regulations 2012, which replaced a previous legal requirement on secondary schools to provide a minimum of 5,000 square metres of outdoor space with a requirement merely to provide ‘suitable’ outdoor space (reg 10 of the School Premises (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1943). This has again drawn criticism from many quarters, with concerns that the new regulations will make it easier for schools to sell off outdoor space and accusations that it contradicts the specific commitment set down in the 2010 Coalition Agreement to ‘protect school playing fields’.

A3.46 In July 2013, the House of Commons Education Committee issued a report praising the School Games programme but recommending that the Department for Education require schools to offer non-competitive as well as competitive sport, and that it should continue to focus on investment in sport at primary school level, but move away from short-term funding initiatives (such as the two-year ‘primary school premium’ funding) by committing to ‘a long-term vision for school sport which is properly supported by long-term funding’. The Committee concluded: ‘School sport is simply too important to be picked up and dropped. If school sport is to grow from the grass-roots, it needs long-term funding and time to develop. We would like to see an end to school sport being kicked around as a political football, and successive governments commit to a long-term future for school sport’.1

Since then, successive governments have continued to support and fund the ‘primary school premium’. In April 2019, the Department for Education confirmed that £320 million will be made available to primary schools in England to improve the quality of PE and sport.2 The Department of Education also played a key role in the development of ‘School Sport and Activity Action Plan’3 and on its announcement

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then-Education Secretary Damian Hinds hailed the health benefits of sport: ‘[sport] not only keeps pupils fit and healthy but helps them grow in confidence and learn vital skills. My ambition is for every pupil to have the chance to find a sport they love, setting them up to lead healthy, active lives […]’.4 The Action Plan represents cross-department collaboration, with the Department for Education working together with DCMS and the Department for Health and Social Care to ensure that sport and physical activity are an integral part of both the school day and after-school activities.5 1 HC  Education Committee, ‘School sport following London 2012: No more political football’, 3rd Report of Session 2013–2014, Vol 1, HC 164-I, 22 July 2013, pp 3–4. 2 ‘DfE confirms Primary PE and Sport Premium for 2019/20’ Youth Sport Trust, press release (30 April 2019). 3 See further A3.34. 4 ‘New plan to help children get active’ Sport England, press release (14 July 2019) (available online at sportengland.org/news-and-features/news/2019/july/14/government-launch-school-sport-andactivity-action-plan/ [accessed 28 September 2020]). 5 ‘School Sport and Physical Activity Action Plan’ (Department for Education, 2019).

(f) The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government A3.47 The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (formerly the Department for Communities and Local Government) oversees local authorities, county councils and district councils, ie the organisations that have traditionally had primary responsibility for providing facilities and opportunities for mass participation in sport in the UK.1 Section 19 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 19762 permits (but does not require) a local authority to provide sports and recreational facilities of any and all types for use by such persons as it sees fit, and/or to contribute to the expenses of any not-for-profit organisations providing recreational or sports facilities. In the late twentieth century, the pressure on local authority revenue caused by the move from domestic rates to poll tax to council tax led to widespread cuts in spending on non-statutory services such as sport, as well as to sales of capital assets such as sports facilities.3 However, local authority spending on sport and recreation facilities (admittedly heavily subsidised by Lottery funds) remains one of the most significant sources of public funding for sport in this country: local authorities own and operate the sports centres, swimming pools, playing fields and specialist facilities that facilitate mass participation in sport.4 Faced with an enormous budget deficit, the then-Coalition Government announced in December 2012 that local authority budgets would be cut by an average of 3 per cent (with the wealthiest councils facing cuts of nearly 9 per cent),5 putting serious pressure on local authority spending on sports facilities.6 On the other hand, the Coalition Government followed through on its promise to decentralise power away from Whitehall by enacting the Localism Act 2011, which gives communities a ‘Right to Buy’ and a right to challenge the decisions of local authorities when sport and recreational facilities are under threat.7 1 See ‘A Sporting Future for All’ (DCMS, March 2001) at p 52: ‘Local authorities are key providers of sport and recreation and play a central role in the delivery of sport in the community’; Joint UK Government/Sports Councils’ Response to the Commission Consultation Paper ‘The European Model of Sport’ (May 1999), para 27 (‘The promotion of public health through activity, whether sport or less formal physical activity, is essentially a matter which can be dealt with satisfactorily at a lower or national level. Local government in the UK plays a full part in promoting health through sport and leisure, as well as local sports organisations and we certainly believe they are capable of promoting sport for all initiatives’). 2 As amended by Pt I of Sch 13 to the Educational Reform Act 1988. 3 The Conservative Government introduced legislation in 1980 (the Department of Education and Science Regulations 1980 and the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980) that encouraged local authorities to sell off their playing fields to private developers in order to raise finances for investment in educational facilities. It is estimated that between 1981 and 1997 around 5,000 sports fields were sold to developers. In 1996 measures were introduced requiring local authorities to consult

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4 5 6

7

with Sport England (then the English Sports Council) on receipt of a planning application affecting a playing field. However, Sport England was given no power to prohibit the development. In 1998 new procedures were introduced pursuant to the Town and Country Planning (Playing Fields) (England) Direction 1998, empowering the Secretary of State of the Environment to examine applications where the local authority announced its intention to reject the advice of Sport England. In addition, s 77 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 required local authorities to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State for the Environment to the disposal of school playing fields. In July 2001 the Department for Education issued Guidance 0580/2001 for the Protection of School Playing Fields. Applications for the sale of school playing fields must now be considered by an independent advisory committee called the School Playing Fields Advisory Panel: see fieldsintrust.org/. In 2013, Sport England estimated that local government was responsible for more than 50 per cent of the total resources available to sport every year. See bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20784599 [accessed 28 September 2020]. See the Sport & Recreation Alliance briefing paper, Local Authorities (sportandrecreation.org.uk/ lobbying-and-campaigning/policyareas/access-facilities/local-authorities [accessed 28  September 2020]): ‘Clubs are operating in a challenging environment due to local authority spending cuts. Authorities have more incentive to sell or close facilities which are used by clubs, and funding for sport and recreation are being drastically reduced’. But see the Sport & Recreation Alliance briefing paper, Local Authorities, (sportandrecreation.org. uk/lobbying-and-campaigning/policyareas/access-facilities/local-authorities) [accessed 28 September 2020]: ‘There is little reason to be assured by the promise of a “Right to Buy”, which will do little more than provide an opportunity to bid against a developer’.

A3.48 The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government is also responsible for issuing the National Planning Policy Framework, setting out the government’s planning policies for England and how it is intended they be applied by local authorities. Planning law requires that applications for planning permission to local authorities be determined in accordance with the Policy Framework unless material considerations indicate otherwise. The most recent Policy Framework, issued in February 2019,1 made a number of specific provisions for sports facilities, including the following: ‘96. Access to high quality open spaces and opportunities for sport and physical activity is important for the health and well-being of communities. Planning policies should be based on robust and up-to-date assessments of the need for open space, sport and recreation facilities (including quantitative or qualitative deficits or surpluses) and opportunities for new provision. Information gained from the assessments should be used to determine what open space, sports and recreational facilities is needed, which plans should then seek to accommodate. 97. Existing open space, sports and recreational buildings and land, including playing fields, should not be built on unless: (a) an assessment has been undertaken which has clearly shown the open space, buildings or land to be surplus to requirements; or (b) the loss resulting from the proposed development would be replaced by equivalent or better provision in terms of quantity and quality in a suitable location; or (c) the development is for alternative sports and recreational provision, the needs for which clearly outweigh the loss of the current or former use’. 1 See assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/810197/ NPPF_Feb_2019_revised.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].

A3.49 In July 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government in partnership with Sport England announced the introduction of a new fund, the Integrated Communities Innovation Fund.1 The Innovation Fund is designed to use sport and physical education to tackle the key causes of integration problems in communities. On 20 May 2019, Communities Minister Lord Bourne announced that 16 ‘trailblazing’ projects across the country would receive £3,000,000 of new funding to support ‘innovative approaches to integration’, including a table tennis club run across three housing estates in Brighton, and a large scale sporting festival in

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Birmingham.2 Speaking on announcement of the funding initiatives, Sport England CEO Tim Hollingsworth said:3 ‘Sport England is proud to be working with the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to help integrate communities up and down the country […] Not only does taking part in sport and physical activity have powerful mental and physical health benefits, it can help people develop new skills and bring them together in a shared experience’. 1 ‘Integrated Communities Innovation Fund’. Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government press release (9  July 2018) (available at gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-communitiesinnovation-fund [accessed 28 September 2020]). 2 ‘Tens of thousands to benefit from Integrated Communities Innovation Fund’, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government press release (20 May 2019) (available at gov.uk/government/news/ tens-of-thousands-to-benefit-from-integrated-communities-innovation-fund [accessed 28  September 2020]). 3 Ibid.

(g) Devolution A3.50 Responsibility for sport in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has devolved to their respective Parliaments and Assemblies. In the Scottish Executive, the Minister for Public Health, Sport and Wellbeing is the Executive’s voice on sport, sporting events and legacy, obesity, and physical activity.1 In the National Assembly for Wales, responsibility for sport lies with the Minister for Culture, Sport and Tourism.2 In the Northern Ireland Executive, responsibility for sport lies with the Department for Communities.3 Each of those bodies has a funding and policyimplementation relationship with its own country sports council similar to the relationship that exists between DCMS and UK Sport and Sport England. 1 See gov.scot/about/who-runs-government/cabinet-and-ministers/ [accessed 28 September 2020]. 2 See gov.wales/cabinet-members-and-ministers [accessed 28 September 2020]. 3 See communities-ni.gov.uk/ [accessed 2 November 2020].

(h) UK Sport A3.51 While it sets the sports policy framework, the government delegates responsibility for implementing that policy to non-departmental public bodies. The original body was the GB Sports Council, which was set up in 1962 with responsibility for co-ordinating sports development across the whole of the UK. Following various reorganisations and re-branding exercises, today UK-wide issues are coordinated by the United Kingdom Sports Council (aka UK  Sport), save for anti-doping policy, which is implemented by UK Anti-Doping.1 The ‘Home Country Sports Councils’ – the English Sports Council (aka Sport England), the Scottish Sports Council (aka Sport Scotland), the Sports Council of Wales (aka Sport Wales), and the Sports Council of Northern Ireland (aka Sport Northern Ireland) – deal with sport in their respective countries.2 These are official, publicly funded, non-departmental public bodies, established by Royal Charter (except UK Anti-Doping, which is established as a private company limited by guarantee), operating under funding arrangements with DCMS or its equivalent in Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and accountable to Parliament, via DCMS, with their work being scrutinised by Parliamentary Select Committees.3 The function of UK  Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils, broadly, is to advise the government on sports-related issues in the UK, to distribute public funding for sport, and (by placing conditions on access to that funding) to develop sport in line with government policies on ‘sport for all’ and international success in elite sport. Meanwhile, the function of UK Anti-Doping is to implement the government’s National Anti-Doping Policy.4 1 See para A3.117 et seq and para C2.23 et seq.

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  133 2 Their respective websites are at uksport.gov.uk, sportengland.org, sportscotland.org.uk, sportni.net, sportwales.org.uk, and ukad.org.uk. 3 Such as the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, as to which see para A3.59. 4 See para A3.117 et seq.

A3.52 UK  Sport was established by Royal Charter on 19  September 1996. Its primary mission is to fund, develop, and support a sports movement system capable of producing a constant flow of world class Olympic and Paralympic performers. In particular, from 1 April 2006 UK Sport became fully responsible for the elite sport performance system in England and the UK, including taking responsibility for, and incorporating into its existing World Class Performance programme, four matters previously dealt with by Sport England and the other Home Country Sports Councils, namely the funding of World Class Potential Athletes, the strategic direction of the English Institute of Sport, the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme, and the 2012 scholarship scheme.1 Until February 2019, its World Class Performance Programme operated at two distinct levels: ‘Podium’ (ie supporting athletes with realistic medalwinning capabilities at the next Olympic/Paralympic Games); and ‘Podium Potential’ (ie supporting athletes whose performances have suggested that they have realistic medal-winning capabilities in either the next or the next-but-one Olympic Games).2 In February 2019 UK Sport announced its new strategy for the Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games cycles, introducing a third funding tier, ‘Progression’, which is designed to support athletes with medal winning potential in one of the next three Games. UK Sport Chair Dame Katherine Grainger said the new strategy will help ‘sustain medal success while enabling more communities to be inspired by the power of sport’.3 1 See para A3.24. Minister for Sport Richard Caborn explained in February 2007: ‘The aim was to streamline the way sport is organised, clarify the responsibilities of sporting bodies and greatly improve the chances of Britain’s medal hopefuls for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Despite earlier changes, Sport England was still not delivering what we expected and needed. Though the earlier reforms had reduced the size of the centre, it still loomed too large over the delivery on the ground through the Regional Sports Boards. And while the regions had been given greater autonomy, they had not been given a clear direction. So while regions focused primarily on sport others saw driving up physical activity as their main objective. Using funds earmarked for sport to do this was not acceptable and indeed in my view had to change. The decision last April gave Sport England a much sharper focus on increasing participation in community sport through its Regional Sports Boards. It also gave UK Sport a clear remit for delivering success in high performance sport and developing elite athletes from the playground to the podium. This meant responsibility for the World Class Potential Programmes for Olympic and Paralympic sports, the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme and the funding and directing of the work of the English Institute of Sport, all transferred across from Sport England to UK Sport. This may have taken longer than we had hoped, but I am confident we now have both the leadership and the locally focused structure to make a real difference’. Caborn, sportsthinktank.com event (February 2007). Speaking in UK Sport’s Annual Review of 2006, Sue Campbell, Chair of UK Sport, stated: ‘For the first time we have a sporting system that properly integrates the funding and management of high performance sport and provides the ‘one stop shop’ that sports were crying out for’. 2 See at uksport.gov.uk/our-work/world-class-programme [accessed 28 September 2020].. 3 ‘UK Sport sets out exciting blueprint for the future of elite sport’ UK Sport, press release (12 February 2019) (available online at uksport.gov.uk/news/2019/02/12/uk-sport-sets-out-exciting-blueprint-forthe-future-of-elite-sport [accessed 28 September 2020].).

A3.53 UK Sport’s funding of athletes is released in four-year cycles, to coincide with each Olympic and Paralympic Games. Athletes on the World Class Performance Programme receive funding through two channels: UK  Sport funds national governing bodies to provide a range of programme support services, and separately athletes are entitled to apply for Athlete Personal Awards to assist with living costs and costs of training and equipment. The level of award available to athletes depends on a number of criteria, not least the likelihood of the athlete winning a medal at the next Olympics or Paralympics.1 1 See uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/how-uk-sport-funding-works [accessed 28 September 2020].

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A3.54 The funding that UK Sport distributes to elite athletes and their governing bodies traditionally comes from two sources: the Exchequer (in 2017/18 UK Sport received £62m from HM Treasury); and from the National Lottery (in 2017/18 it received £74.9m from the Lottery).1 In the lead-up to London 2012, a third source of funding was established, the ‘Team 2012’ programme, which sought to raise funds through private sponsorship to support athletes bound for the London Olympics.2 In the London 2012 Olympic cycle, UK Sport distributed a total of £249m to Olympic sports in the UK, and just under £50m to Paralympic sports.3 In subsequent Olympic cycles the level of funding has increased. While certain sports have seen their funding drop or withdrawn completely (in the case of handball for Rio 2016 and badminton for Tokyo 2020), the overall funding allocated to Olympic sports was £274.4 million for Rio 2016 and £265.1 million for Tokyo 2020, and the overall funding allocated to Paralympic sports was £72.8 million for Rio 2016 and £70.8 million for Tokyo 2020.4 1 UK Sport 2017/18 Annual Report and Accounts (available at uksport.gov.uk/resources/annual-reports [accessed 28 September 2020]). 2 See ‘Team 2012 Launched’, 1  October 2009 (available at uksport.gov.uk/news/2009/10/01/team2012-launched [accessed 28 September 2020]). 3 See ‘12 Facts about 2012’, uksport.gov.uk/news/2012/05/03/uk-sports-12-facts-about-2012 [accessed 28 September 2020]. 4 ‘UK Sport Investment – Tokyo 2020 Cycle (2017–2021)’, UK Sport, press release.

(i) The Home Country Sports Councils A3.55 With UK Sport addressing common issues at a UK level, the responsibility for developing sport on a home country basis falls to the respective Home Country Sports Councils. Following the April 2006 restructuring,1 they no longer have any responsibility for elite sport. Instead, their focus is firmly on community sport: their aim is to increase participation levels, including by increasing the number of facilities at which sport can be played and the number of coaches who can teach new participants how to play. 1 See paras A3.24 and A3.52.

A3.56 The English Sports Council, operating as Sport England, was established by Royal Charter on 19 September 1996. Its mission is to transform sport and physical activity so that everyone can benefit.1 As part of its role, Sport England acts as the gatekeeper for distribution of public funding (including lottery grants and Exchequer finding) to be awarded on a competitive basis. In 2018/19 it received £199.4m of Lottery funding and £104.3m of Exchequer funding for that purpose.2 Sport England’s funding decisions are focused on achieving the five outcomes3 promoted in ‘Sporting Future: A  New Strategy for an Active Nation’, which in turn defines three Sport England organisational targets:4 (a) to increase the number of people who are regularly active by 500,000 nationally; (b) to increase the number of women who are regularly active by at least 250,000 nationally; and (c) to increase the number of people from lower socio-economic groups who are more active by 100,000 in targeted locations. In determining which sports qualify for funding, Sport England operates a recognition process based on whether such activity falls within the European Sports Charter’s definition of a ‘sport’.5 Sport England’s application of this test has not been without controversy, having previously recognised darts, model aircraft and rifle shooting as sports but not ‘mind sports’ such as bridge.6 1 Sport England Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2018–19 (available online at sportengland. org/media/14046/sport-england-2018-19-annual-report-and-accounts.pdf [accessed 28  September 2020]).

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Ibid, p 14. See para A3.33. Sport England Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2018–19, p.10. European Sports Charter, Council of Europe (16 May 2001). See Article 2: ‘”Sport” means all forms of physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition at all levels’ (available online at rm.coe.int/16804c9dbb [accessed 28 September 2020]). 6 See R(EBU) v Sports Council England [2015]  EWHC  2875, para  55. The English Bridge Union launched judicial review proceedings to challenge Sport England’s decision that bridge does not qualify as a sport. The challenge was made on the basis that the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘sport’ in the European Charter was sufficiently broad such that it did not necessarily require any ‘physical activity’. However, this was dismissed by the High Court with Mr. Justice Dove finding that Sport England’s interpretation (that a pastime had to include ‘physical activity’ to qualify as a sport) was in line with a ‘proper construction of the objects and powers contained in the Royal Charter’.

A3.57 Other investments made by Sport England to aid community sports participation include: (a)

£10m per year of Exchequer funding to bodies with specialist skills, knowledge and services in particular aspects of sport, such as women’s participation, child protection, and disability sport (including the English Federation of Disability Sport, StreetGames, Volunteering England, and the Sport + Recreation Alliance); (b) £17.6m of Exchequer and Lottery funding to the Football Foundation, a body that issues grants to local football clubs to improve facilities and/or to provide kit and equipment; (c) more than £45m to Olympic venues, such as the Velodrome and Aquatics Centre, to re-purpose them to become community sports venues following the 2012 Games; (d) £35m to the School Games project;1 (e) more than £135m to the Places People Play scheme;2 and (f) £5m towards protecting and improving community playing fields.3 1 See para A3.30. 2 Ibid. 3 As noted above (see para A3.47), Sport England is a statutory consultee on all planning proposals involving playing fields, where it seeks to ‘ensure that England’s planning system favours the retention of existing opportunities and the development of new facilities – where this is consistent with principles of sustainable development’. ‘Sport England’ (April 2000, Sport England). See generally Sport England planning policy statement, ‘A sporting future for the playing fields of England: policy on planning applications for development on playing fields’ (available at sportengland-productionfiles.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/a-sporting-future-for-the-playing-fields-of-englandplanning-policy-statement.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).

A3.58 In October 2010, Jeremy Hunt, then-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, announced that: ‘UK Sport and Sport England will be merged to create a more unified, coherent and cost-effective structure as part of the Government’s  2012 Olympic Games legacy plans. DCMS is also working with the Youth Sport Trust to explore how they could be brought into the new structure’.1

In January 2013, however, then-Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson announced a U-turn: ‘In view of […] the challenges associated with merging a UK-wide organisation with an England only body, I have concluded that we will retain UK Sport and Sport England as two separate entities with a shared reform agenda. To maintain momentum, and ensure that the two organisations deliver the economic and strategic benefits intended from the merger, we intend to conduct a joint review of both organisations in 2014– 15, as part of the Government’s rolling programme of reviews of non-departmental public bodies. They will also be asked to co-locate, share significantly more back

136  Governance of the Sports Sector office services and align their strategies. With this approach, I am confident that both organisations will be able to reduce their administrative costs over this spending review period and that we can deliver the strategic benefits of closer working between the two organisations with immediate effect. This fits logically within the context of the Government’s public bodies reform programme which will reduce the number of public bodies by a third, and it directly contributes to improvements in accountability and transparency, and will cut out waste and duplication from the system. It will also contribute to Government-wide reductions of over £2.6 billion in the administration costs of public bodies over the spending review period’.2 1 ‘Improving efficiency and transparency: DCMS cuts quangos’, DCMS press release, 15 October 2010. 2 Minister for Sport, Hugh Robertson, HC Deb 23, January 2013, 11WS-12WS.

(j) Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee A3.59 The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of DCMS and its associated public bodies. The Committee holds several inquiries a year, to which witnesses provide written and oral evidence.1 Following an inquiry, it issues a report making recommendations on how DCMS should act. Inquiries held by the Committee in recent years have covered: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games; ticket touting;2 the failed bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup;3 football governance;4 racism in football;5 homophobia in sport; 6 accessibility of sports stadia; 7 and doping in sport. 8

1 See generally parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/culture__media_and_sport.cfm [accessed 28 September 2020]. 2 See HC  Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Ticket Touting’, 2nd Report of Session 2007–08 (HC 202, 10 January 2008). 3 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘2018 World Cup Bid’, 6th Report of Session 2010-12 (HC 1031, 5 July 2011). The Committee criticised FIFA for not investigating properly the allegations of corruption in relation to the bidding process. It also recommended that The FA review its bidding strategy, and that the Government also review the manner in which it reviews and supports bids to host major events. 4 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Football Governance’, 7th Report of Session 2010–12 (HC 792, 29 July 2011). See also HC Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Football Governance FollowUp’, 4th Report of Session 2012–13 (HC 509, 29 January 2013). See further para A3.105 et seq. 5 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Racism in Football’, 2nd Report of Session 2012–13 (HC 89, 19 September 2012). 6 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Homophobia in Sport’, 7th Report of Session 2016–17 (HC 113, 12 February 2017). 7 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Accessibility of Sports Stadia’, 5th Report of Session 2016–17 (HC 62, 16 January 2017). 8 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Combatting Doping in Sport’, 4th Report of Session 2017–19 (HC 366, 5 March 2018). The Committee concluded that UK Anti-Doping does not have the investigative or testing resources to fulfil its role effectively and called for a change in the law to ‘criminalise the supply of drugs to sports people’ (para 152). Given that DCMS had conducted a review of the same issue and concluded just a few months previously that doping in sport should not be criminalised (see para A3.39), that recommendation was never likely to go very far.

B The three main methods of government intervention in sport A3.60 In recent years, as the social and economic status of sport has grown, the government’s engagement with sport has evolved and it has taken a far greater involvement in how sport is governed. There are a number of reasons for this:

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(a) Successive administrations have seen the potential to harness the power of sport to achieve important public policy goals. (b) Increased investment of public money in sport brings with it an expectation of a greater say in how taxpayers’ money is spent. (c) Many issues facing sports governing bodies are beyond their direct ability to control, ie public order issues like football hooliganism and ticket touting, and integrity issues such as doping and match-fixing. Sport itself has turned to government for support (legislative, operational, and financial) on these issues. (d) There has been significant public and media pressure for the government to take direct involvement in sporting matters, because of the huge impact that sport has on both foreign and domestic policy. In particular, there is an expectation that governments will play a direct role in (i) supporting their national teams to achieve international success, and (ii) supporting bids to bring major sporting events to this country. There is also the notion that sport can be used as a tool to apply sanctions to rogue international states. A3.61 It is possible to identify three different mechanisms that the government uses to intervene in the sports sector: (1) Direct intervention, by means of legislative and/or regulatory measures that directly impact upon sporting activities. The key examples are identified at paras A3.63 to A3.101. (2) At the other end of the spectrum, exhortation, whereby government uses its authority to exhort/persuade/pressure sports governing bodies to act in a certain way. This approach sometimes sees the government implying that it might be forced to take legislative action or adopt a specific policy direction if the sport does not bend to its will; but more often it is careful to stress only that it has an opinion as an interested and knowledgeable bystander. Examples of the use of this approach are set out at paras A3.102 to A3.111. (3) Indirect intervention, using the leverage that comes with control over access to public funding for sport to pursue an increasingly broad agenda in its burgeoning partnership with the private sports movement.1 The scope of this indirect regulation is slowly increasing because of the perception that government sports policy can only be implemented in partnership with the private sports movement, and the recognition that such a partnership, and the increased public funding that comes with it, must be on a professional basis in accordance with normal public standards of transparency, equity and accountability. Thus, recognition as the governing body of a sport, and access to public funds for that sport, now depends on compliance not only with objective standards on public interest issues such as child protection, equality, and anti-doping, but also on issues relating to corporate governance and accountability that see the government taking a far more interventionist role (albeit indirectly, through UK Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils) not only in developing the strategic policy of sport but also in overseeing the way in which sport is governed and administered on a day-to-day basis. The practicalities of this mechanism are discussed at paragraphs A3.112 to A3.124. 1 See generally Houlihan, Dying to Win, 2nd Edn (Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), pp 15–25.

(a) Direct intervention, by means of primary legislation A3.62 Consistent with the traditional non-interventionist approach taken by successive UK governments in the sports sector, there is no broad legislative programme for the UK sport sector, underpinned by a grand policy design, ie there is no UK equivalent of the French ‘Code du sport’.1 Rather, legislation or other intervention is generally countenanced only as a measure of last resort, in response to

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a pressing public interest requirement that a sport cannot or will not meet by its own regulatory measures. A summary overview of some of the key legislation follows.2 1 See para A1.7. Calls do periodically resurface for the introduction of a body of UK ‘sports law’, the main proponent in recent years being Lord Moynihan, who has pointed to the rapid growth and commercialisation of sport (and the associated challenges that this brings) as cause for the United Kingdom to follow the example of many other countries by adopting a body of law designed to ‘protect and promote well-being in this society’. Lord Moynihan in a House of Lords debate on 19 December 2018 (available at hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2018-12-19/debates/CFBD805F-55CB-4D69-B313730392F62C76/SportRecreationAndTheArts [accessed 28 September 2020]). 2 Obviously, the sports sector, like any other sector, is subject to the general law of the land, including the reams of legislation that is not in any way specific to sport. Some of the generic statutes that impact most on the sports sector are addressed elsewhere in this book. This chapter deals only with legislation specific to, or impacting mainly upon, the sports sector.

(i)  Public safety A3.63 Introduced in response to recommendations made after the stand collapse at Ibrox Stadium in 1969 that killed 66 spectators, the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (SSGA  1975) established a system of licensing and control of major sports stadia. Section 1 of the SSGA 1975 requires designated sports grounds with capacity for more than 10,000 spectators to apply for a safety certificate from the local authority.1 Section 2 of the SSGA 1975 gives the local authority a broad discretion to include any conditions in the certificate that it deems necessary to secure spectator safety, and s 10 allows it to cap the number of spectators that may be admitted into the stadium. Section 12 makes it a criminal offence to contravene safety requirements imposed under the licensing scheme. 1 The Safety of Sports Grounds (Accommodation of Spectators) Order 1996 amended the SSGA 1975 to reduce the capacity threshold from 10,000 to 5,000, but only in relation to stadia where Premier League or Football League football is played. The Fire Safety and Safety at Places of Sport Act 1987 also amended the SSGA 1975 by specifying (as a result of the Popplewell reports on the Bradford City fire and Heysel Stadium disasters of 1985) that stands with a capacity of 500 or more at sports grounds not designated under the SSGA 1975 must also obtain a safety certificate from the local authority. The application procedures are set out in the Safety of Places of Sport Regulations 1988, SI 1988/1807.

A3.64 After the Hillsborough disaster of 15  April 1989, the government commissioned Lord Justice Taylor to make further recommendations regarding crowd control and safety at sports events. The Taylor Report, published in 1990,1 found that existing safety standards were not complied with, and were in any event inadequate. It made various recommendations to improve safety standards, the principal one being that major football stadia (specifically, the grounds of Premier League and Football League Division One clubs) should become all-seater, and terracing should be improved at Division Two and Three grounds. The Football Spectators Act 1989 implemented most of the Taylor Report recommendations. Section 10 of the Football Spectators Act 1989 requires that any stadium hosting spectators for a designated football match (currently Premier League, Football League, and international matches) must be licensed by the Football Licensing Authority, a new body established by the 1989 Act. In order to receive a licence from the Football Licensing Authority, the stadium must comply with the safety criteria recommended in the Taylor Report. The Football Spectators Act 1989 also obliges local authorities to comply with directions from the Football Licensing Authority on the issue of licences for such stadia under the SSGA 1975, including imposing conditions as to capacity and seating. 1 The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster (Final Report, Cm 962), Taylor LJ.

A3.65 In 1998, with the structural improvement programme for major football grounds recommended by the Taylor Report largely completed, the government

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concluded that there was no longer a need for the Football Licensing Authority to act as a further regulator of such football grounds, over and above the regulatory role of local authorities under the SSGA 1975. A Culture and Recreation Bill was introduced on 14 December 2000 to reconstitute the Football Licensing Authority as the ‘Sports Grounds Safety Authority’ and to repeal the separate licensing function for major football stadia established by the Football Spectators Act 1989 and administered by the Football Licensing Authority. The Bill stalled initially but, following the government’s announcement in October 2010 that the Football Licensing Authority was to be one of the 192 quangos to be scrapped,1 the Bill was resurrected and passed into law on 12 July 2011 as the Sports Grounds Safety Authority Act 2011. Today, the Sports Grounds Safety Authority retains a review function with respect to safety certificates issued by local authorities in relation to such stadia (including the power, via the Secretary of State, to require the inclusion of conditions in such licences), but has also taken on an advisory role for central and local government authorities on safety issues associated with sports grounds.2 1 ‘Improving efficiency and transparency: DCMS cuts quangos’ (DCMS, 15 October 2010). 2 See generally sgsa.org.uk.

A3.66 In recent years there has been growing support for the introduction of safe standing areas at major football grounds. In response to a 2018 petition that campaigned for the introduction of safe standing at Premiership and Championship football clubs,1 then-Sports Minister Tracey Crouch announced that the DCMS was commissioning an external review into the matter.2 The review concluded that the current evidence was not ‘robust’ enough for the purposes of making a full assessment over the safety risk of persistent standing and whether any change to the current policy would ensure ‘equivalent or improved spectator safety’.3 Notably, the Conservative Party Manifesto in the lead up to the 2019 General Election included a commitment to ‘work with fans and clubs towards introducing safe standing’.4 Separately, the Sports Ground Safety Authority undertook research into the safety aspects of standing and published its initial findings on 7  February 2020, which recognised the positive safety steps that have been taken at grounds to mitigate the risk of injury.5 The final report was due to be published in the summer of 2020. 1 The Conservative Government’s petition to ‘Allow Premier League and Championship football clubs to introduce safe standing’ that was signed by over 112,000 people, available at petition.parliament.uk/ archived/petitions/207040 [accessed 28 September 2020]. 2 See at hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-06-25/debates/8A09C8B2-14D5-4E2D-8F3E1D7FF3838818/FootballSafeStanding [accessed 28 September 2020]. 3 ‘Standing at Football: A  Rapid Evidence Assessment’ report published by CFE  Research on 3 October 2019. 4 Conservative Party Election Manifesto (2019) (available online at assets-global.website-files.com/5 da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]). 5 See at sgsa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Safe-management-of-standing-at-football-emergingfindings.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].

(ii)  Public order A3.66A The Football Spectators Act 1989 envisaged that the Football Licensing Authority would also have a public order role, controlling access to designated matches via a national football membership scheme. That never materialised, but other statutes have been enacted to address the serious public order issues associated with football.1 1 See generally Pearson ‘Legislating for the Football Hooligan: A Case for Reform’ in Greenfield & Osborn (Eds) Law and Sport in Contemporary Society (Frank Cass, 2000); Greenfield & Osborn Regulating Football (Pluto Press, 2001), Ch 1.

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A3.67 On Lord Justice Taylor’s recommendation,1 the Football (Offences) Act 1991 added three football-specific crimes to the statute book specifically to address the ‘English disease’ of football hooliganism. Therefore, in addition to the generic crimes of assault, criminal damage, riot, affray and so on that apply at sporting events as they do throughout the land, under the Football Offences Act 1991 it is an offence at a designated football match to throw anything at or towards the playing area, or any area adjacent to the playing area to which spectators are not generally admitted,2 to engage in indecent or racial chanting,3 or to go onto the playing area, or any area adjacent to the playing area to which spectators are not generally admitted, without lawful excuse.4 1 2 3 4

‘The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster’ (Final Report, Cm 962), Taylor LJ. Section 2 of the Football Offences Act 1991. Ibid, s 3. Ibid, s 4.

A3.68 In Scotland, following several sectarian incidents involving the two Glasgow clubs, Rangers and Celtic, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 was passed into law on 1 March 2012, making it an offence: (a) to engage in any hateful, threatening, or otherwise offensive behaviour expressed at or around football matches that is likely to cause public disorder;1 and (b) to make threats of serious harm or that are intended to incite religious hatred, whether sent by mail or posted on the internet.2 1 Section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012. 2 Ibid, s 6. In its report on racism in football (HC Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Racism in Football’, 2nd Report of Session 2012–13 (HC  89, 19  September 2012)), the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee stated: ‘We acknowledge that the situation in Scotland is different to that in England and we commend the efforts being made there to tackle abusive behaviour. The Government should look at the legislation which has already been enacted in Scotland and, if necessary, incorporate lessons learned into any future legislation for England and Wales’.

A3.69 Section 1 of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 makes it unlawful to carry alcohol or allow alcohol to be carried or consumed on public transport whose primary purpose is to transport spectators to a regulated sporting event (which includes trains and buses running special services to regulated football matches and also any vehicle hired for the purpose of transporting spectators to regulated football matches, ie ‘football specials’). Section 2 makes it an offence to be drunk while trying to enter or while in a regulated sports ground, to drink in sight of the pitch, or to have in one’s possession an article that can be thrown and cause injury to another. In addition, in an effort to ensure segregation of opposing fans, section 166 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 makes the unauthorised offer for sale or sale in a public place of tickets for a designated football match a criminal offence.1 1 See para H7.90 et seq; Greenfield and Osborn ‘Criminalising Football Supporters: Tickets, Touts and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994’ [1995] 3 SATLJ 36. In 2006, s 166A of the CJPO Act 1994 was amended by s 53 of the Violent Crimes Reduction Act 2006 to extend the prohibition to sales or offers for sale of tickets to a regulated match over the Internet. The Scottish Parliament recently took a step further in relation to the UEFA 2020 Championships (now scheduled to take place in 2021). On 23  January 2020 the UEFA  European Championship (Scotland) Act received Royal Assent (legislation.gov.uk/asp/2020/1/contents/enacted [accessed 28 September 2020]), making it a crime for any person to tout tickets for profit, whether in person, via a secondary resale site, or privately, in connection with any Euro 2020 Championship match held in Scotland. For other sporting events, ticket touting is not in itself an offence, but individuals may be subject to existing criminal law in respect of theft, deception, obstruction or threatening behaviour. Certain

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  141 sports have called for statutory protection against resale of tickets to be extended to their events (see eg ‘UK’s Big Five Sports Demand Ticket Protection’, Sportcal.com (4 April 2007)), particularly after similar statutory protection was afforded to the 2012 Olympic Games (under s  31 of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006), the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games (under the Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act 2008), and has been proposed for the 2022 Birmingham Commonwealth Games (under ss 10–25 of the draft Birmingham Commonwealth Games Bill 2019– 20). But then-Minister for Sport, Gerry Sutcliffe, noted in a House of Commons debate on 23 June 2008: ‘The Government do not intend to introduce new regulation to tackle ticket touting. Ticket touting is banned for football matches on public disorder grounds, and for the Olympic Games in 2012 to meet International Olympic Committee bid conditions. The Government has consistently taken the view that the consumer interest comes first, and market-led measures to benefit consumers are a far better option than the burden of legislation’. Successive governments have maintained that line. See eg the provisions introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in respect of sale of tickets via online secondary platforms and the general consumer protections on unfair contract terms. See also the provisions introduced by the Digital Economy Act 2017 in respect of secondary ticketing, including criminalising the use of bots to purchase tickets in bulk and requiring re-sellers to provide unique ticket numbers to help the buyer identify the location of the seat.

A3.70 Section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989, as amended by the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, requires the court to impose a football banning order on anyone convicted of a relevant football-related offence1 if it ‘is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches’. If the court does not impose such an order, it must explain why not.2 1 A full list of relevant offences is set out in Sch 1 to the Act. 2 In R v Boggild and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1928, [2012] 1 WLR 1298, the trial judge decided not to impose football banning orders on a number of individuals who had been found guilty of a football-related offence (affray outside a public house 15 minutes after the conclusion of a Premier League match), stating: ‘I looked at the legislation but decided that a banning order is appropriate in cases where there is a future risk of football violence and it is essentially a preventative measure rather than a punitive element of the sentence’. Instead of banning orders, the judge imposed ‘prohibited activity requirements’ on the defendants pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, preventing them from attending any football match, other than home matches of their own team, Everton FC, for two years. The Crown Prosecution appealed, arguing that the intention of the legislation was that ‘those who were convicted of relevant offences would in the normal case be made the subject of a football banning order’, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, ruling that: ‘there has been ample opportunity […] to frame the [Football Spectators] Act as to make a football banning order a mandatory consequence of a football-related conviction. That opportunity has plainly deliberately not been taken. I am not surprised for myself that it was not thought necessary or desirable, but in any event that decision is not for this court but for the legislature’.

A3.71 Section 14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 allows the police to apply to a magistrates’ court to impose a banning order on any person that the police can prove, to the civil standard, ie on the balance of probabilities, ‘has at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere’. There is no requirement that the violence or disorder have been football-related. If the police can make that showing, then provided that the court ‘is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches’, it must impose a banning order on that person. Section 14B therefore authorises the banning of a person who has not been convicted of any offence, football-related or otherwise. To support applications for a banning order under s 14B, the police usually rely on previous convictions, often in combination with a ‘hooligan profile’ compiled by the UK Football Policing Unit (as in Gough1), but previous convictions are not a necessary prerequisite, ie the police may apply based on (for example) a ‘hooligan profile’ alone. 1 See para A3.73.

A3.72 A person made the subject of a football banning order under the Football Spectators Act 1989 may not attend regulated football matches in England and Wales, nor may he travel abroad when designated football matches are being played abroad;

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instead he must report to a police station (domestic match) or surrender his passport (overseas match).1 As regards matches in England and Wales, the magistrates’ court has no power to limit an order to particular matches or in relation to particular teams (as confirmed in Thorpe2). The Football Banning Orders Authority determines which matches played abroad trigger the travelling ban in particular cases. They will include any overseas match or tournament involving the England national team, any overseas match involving the team supported by the banned person, and any other high-risk match between club sides in an international competition. Where a noncustodial sentence is imposed, the banning order imposed under s 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989 must be in place for between three and five years following conviction; where a custodial sentence is imposed, the ban must be for between 6 and 10 years. A football banning order imposed under s 14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 will be for a minimum of three years and maximum of five years. As at 1 August 2019, there were 1,771 football banning orders in force, which represents a decrease of 44 per cent from the 3,174 reported on 29 November 2011.3 1 See the Football Spectators Act 1989, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, and s 52 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. See also R v Boggild and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1928 at 1304A-E. 2 In Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Thorpe [2015] EWHC 3339 (Admin), the magistrates’ court sought to impose a limited banning order as to three named clubs (Fulham, Brentford, and Chelsea) on the basis that it was necessary and proportionate to protect the subject’s ECHR Article 8 right to private and family life (see para E13.57). This was subsequently overturned by the High Court, which concluded that there was no reason to adopt anything other than a natural construct to the words used in the Football Supporters Act. 3 See assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/832431/ football-related-arrests-banning-orders-1819-hosb2219.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].

A3.73 In Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire,1 two individuals were banned for two years each pursuant to s  14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 from attending regulated football matches in the UK or from travelling overseas when designated football matches were taking place overseas. They challenged the bans as an infringement of their rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (under Art 6,2 because s  14B makes criminal sanctions applicable simply on a ‘reasonable suspicion’, proved only to the civil standard; and under Art 8,3 because s 14B stops people who had not been convicted and imprisoned from leaving the UK) and under Art 49 of the EC Treaty4 (on the basis that s 14B constitutes an unlawful and disproportionate restriction on the subject’s right to give and receive services throughout the EU). The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court’s dismissal of these arguments, primarily on the basis that, if the strict showing required by the Football Spectators Act (that the defendant had a propensity for taking part in football hooliganism) was made out, interference with that individual’s rights was necessary for the prevention of disorder. Given that there was a power to allow the subject to travel abroad if he could prove to the Football Banning Orders Authority on the balance of probabilities that the trip was for a purpose other than to attend football matches, the ban from international travel was not disproportionate to that aim. The Court of Appeal did emphasise, however, that the serious restraints that banning orders involved meant that there had to be individual consideration of each case, and in relation to each case magistrates must be satisfied that the individual has caused or contributed to violence or disorder in the UK or abroad, and that there are strong grounds for believing the individual is likely to become involved in violence or disorder if permitted to attend matches in the future. The Court of Appeal stated that the magistrate should apply an exacting standard of proof to such questions that would in practice be hard to distinguish from the criminal standard. 1 2 3 4

[2002] EWCA Civ 351, [2002] 2 All ER 985, [2002] All ER (D) 308 (Mar). In relation to the right to a fair trial, see para E13.36. In relation to the right to respect for private life, see para E13.57. See para E12.69.

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A3.74 Under s  14J of the Football Spectators Act 1989, breach of the terms of a banning order is an arrestable offence. A  person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both. This applies to the failure to report to a police station when required, failure to surrender a passport when required, and the entry into a stadium hosting a regulated football match when the subject of a banning order. (iii)  Sexual offences A3.75 Under s 16 of the Sexual Offences Act it is an offence for a person aged 18 or over to engage in any sexual activity with a person under 18 years of age if that older person holds a ‘position of trust’ (such as a teacher or social worker), such sexual activity being deemed an abuse of the position of trust. In the wake of numerous sex abuse scandals in recent years in different sports,1 there has been growing calls for the criminalisation of sex between a coach and an athlete under 18 years of age. Then-sports minister Tracey Crouch stated in 2017 that she had reached ‘ministerial agreement’ with the Ministry of Justice for the required changes to the law, which would bring the sport industry into line with other sectors.2 Anne Tiivas, the head of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’s child protection in sport unit, welcomed this move: ‘We know that some sports coaches spend years grooming young people and then, as soon as their 16th birthday comes around, they target them for sex. Ever since the football abuse scandal broke we have been strongly urging government to close this loophole that leaves children in sports and other out-of-school clubs vulnerable to adults who want to prey on them’.3

In June 2018, the Conservative Government published its second annual progress report on ‘Sporting Future’: A New Strategy for an Active Nation and confirmed that proposals were being developed to extend the definition of a ‘position of trust’ in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to capture sports coaches who hold a particular position of trust.4 At the time of writing, however, no changes to the Sexual Offences Act have been made. 1 Following revelations by Andrew Woodward in 2016 regarding the abuse he suffered as a young footballer by serial paedophile Barry Bennell, a vast number of allegations of child abuse have since come to light across a range of sports (from archery to cannoeing to bobsleigh, see telegraph.co.uk/ archery/2017/06/30/archery-latest-olympic-paralympic-sport-hit-sexual-abuse-allegations/ [accessed 28  September 2020]). In 2018, it was reported that (according to Offside Trust, a body set up for survivors of child sexual abuse in football) at least 80 sports coaches were convicted of child sexual abuse since 2016, leading then-FA Chairman Greg Clarke to refer to this as one of the biggest crises in the history of the governing body (see bbc.co.uk/sport/football/46453955 [accessed 28 September 2020]). See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding in Sport). 2 See bbc.co.uk/sport/42018265 [accessed 28 September 2020]. 3 See at theguardian.com/sport/2017/nov/16/law-change-coaches-relationships-16-17-year-olds-illegal [accessed 28 September 2020]. 4 Sporting Future: Second Annual Report, published January 2018.

(iv)  Prohibited sports: combat sports A3.76 As a matter of public policy, the criminal law generally does not recognise consent as a defence to the charge of intentionally inflicting actual or serious harm on another.1 However, boxing and other lawfully constituted combat sports2 are exempted from that general rule, so that the infliction of injuries in the normal course of such sports will not attract criminal liability. The exemption does not stand on the strongest of footings, either legally or logically,3 and periodically (usually after a high-profile fight has resulted in a particularly horrific injury) attempts are made

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to introduce legislation to repeal the exemption. However, notwithstanding its weak foundations, the standing of this exemption in English law remains solid,4 and none of the attempts at a legislative repeal has yet come close to succeeding.5 1 See para G2.22. 2 From the case law it is clear that sparring and wrestling would fall within the exemption, but there is no definitive list of what other combat sports fall within the exemption. See para G2.81. 3 See para G2.81, where it is explained that no court has specifically held that boxing is exempt from the criminal law; rather, the exemption has been implied from the reasoning of the House of Lords in R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, as to why prize fighting is not legal. 4 See A-G’s Reference (No  6 of 1980) [1981]  QB  715 per Lane LCJ: ‘nothing which we have said [about fighting outside the context of sport being unlawful] is intended to cast doubt upon the accepted legality of properly conducted sports and games’. 5 Indeed, then-Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson indicated his strong support for the sport in 2013. In response to a Parliamentary question: ‘should the Government not encourage sports that measure athleticism without inflicting brain damage?’, he stated, ‘No is the simple answer to that question. Many sports contain an element of risk—riding and cycling, both of which have much higher injury tallies than boxing, come to mind. At London 2012, the majority of injuries were not from boxing, but from other sports. Most young people like an element of risk, and boxing has a really important role to play in encouraging young people to take up sport, particularly in deprived and inner-city areas. I am keen to encourage them to do so’. HC Deb, 10 January 2013, 451. For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, including a survey of the public interest arguments for and against an exemption, see Gunn and Ormerod, ‘Despite the Law: Prize-Fighting and Professional Boxing’ in Greenfield & Osborn (Eds), Law and Sport in Contemporary Society (2000, Frank Cass), pp 21–50. See also Anderson, ‘Time for a Mandatory Count: Regulating for the Reform of the Professional Boxing Industry in the UK’ (2005) 13(1) Sport and the Law 40.

(v)  The Horseracing Levy and the Tote A3.77 Gambling activity in this country is by no means confined to betting on the outcome or other aspects of sports events, but a substantial proportion of it is based on horse racing and other sports events,1 and gambling is the source of a corruption risk for sport that many governing bodies have seen fit to introduce bespoke regulations to address.2 Government legislation on gambling3 has included various sports-specific provisions, including requiring the industry to contribute part of its turnover to the horse racing industry via the Horserace Betting Levy Board, licensing of on-course bookmakers, and restricting pool betting on horseraces to the Horserace Totaliser Board. Since the 1960s, then, the UK Government has been directly involved in the determination of funding for the sport of horse racing, with the Levy Board collecting a statutory levy on both on-course and off-course horse racing betting turnover, such amount to be determined by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport if no agreement is reached between the Levy Board and the bookmakers.4 The levy collected each year is distributed in accordance with the Horse Betting Levy Board’s business plan.5 1 According to a 1998 report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 71 per cent of the 1997 turnover of licensed betting offices was on horse racing, 20 per cent on greyhound racing, 5 per cent on other sports, and 4 per cent on numbers betting: ‘Ladbroke Group plc and the Coral betting business: a report on the merger situation’ (Cm 4030, 1998, MMC). In a 2009 report, ‘Economic Impact of British Racing’, Deloitte calculated that the betting industry had generated over £5.5bn from British racing over the preceding five years. See also para B4.3 et seq. 2 See generally Chapter B4 (Fighting Match-Fixing and Related Integrity Issues). 3 For the historical position, see the Betting and Gaming Act 1960, as amended by the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, the Gaming Act 1968, the Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976 and the National Lottery Act 1993. See generally Smith, The Law of Betting, Gaming and the Lotteries (Butterworths, 1987). In July 2001, the Gambling Review Body, headed by Sir Alan Budd, issued a report recommending a broad liberalisation of UK gambling laws, backed up by stricter regulation of various high-risk areas. Specifically, it proposed that all regulation relating to gambling be incorporated into a single Act of Parliament, with regulation and licensing undertaken by a single regulator, to be called the Gambling Commission. Its recommendations were broadly adopted, and Parliament eventually passed the Gambling Act in April 2005. The Act establishes the Gambling Commission (see para B4.51) as the regulatory body for gambling except the National Lottery and spread betting (which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority). It suggested that bookmakers at greyhound

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  145 tracks should be licensed and regulated in the same way as bookmakers at race courses, as should the privately-owned tote and pool operators. Certain aspects of the Gambling Act of particular relevance to sport are discussed at paras B4.14 and B4.47. For a number of years, a perceived major flaw in UK gambling legislation was that it covered only betting operators situated in the UK. As a result, betting operators located off-shore did not need a licence from the Gambling Commission and did not need to contribute a percentage of their revenues to the levy, even though they may be offering bets to the UK market via the internet, thus evading regulation and resulting in a substantial decline in the funds distributable to the sport through the Levy scheme each year. In 2014, the Gambling (Licensing & Advertising) Act took effect, meaning that all remote gambling operators in the United Kingdom required a licence from the UK Gambling Commission and were subject to the same reporting and other duties as onshore operations. 4 See eg ‘41st Levy Scheme Finalised’, DCMS press release 35/02 (7 March 2002). See generally the Horserace Betting Levy Board’s website, at hblb.org.uk. 5 See hblb.org.uk/page/1.

A3.78 In March 2000, having ‘identified no overriding reason why the assessment, collection and apportion of a levy on horserace betting should be a proper function of the public sector’,1 the Home Office announced the government’s intention to abolish the horserace betting levy and the Horserace Betting Levy Board and to sell the Totaliser Board to a consortium of racing interests, thereby seeking ‘to bring to an end the Government’s direct involvement in the administration and financing of racing, so enabling racing to take responsibility for its own affairs’.2 In November 2000, the government issued a consultation paper proposing that horse racing’s governing body, the British Horseracing Board,3 succeed the Levy Board as the central funding body for racing, and that a new statutory regulator be established to approve and monitor all racecourse betting operations. Implementation was delayed initially by a dispute between the British Horseracing Board and the bookmaking industry over the commercial arrangements that should replace the levy, and although the Horserace Betting and Olympic Lottery Act 2004 was passed to implement the sale of the Tote and abolition of the levy,4 in December 2006 the then-Minister for Sport, Richard Caborn, advised the House of Commons that the government had decided to retain the Levy Board and the levy on the basis that, following the ECJ’s decision on database rights in November 2004 that destroyed horse racing’s leverage over the betting industry,5 no commercially-based alternative funding mechanism was available. The provisions of the 2004 Act relating to abolition of the levy would therefore be repealed and the levy retained ‘until such time as a secure and adequate alternative commercial funding arrangement can be identified’.6 1 Home Office (2000) ‘A  Consultation Paper on the Proposed Abolition of the Horseracing Betting Levy Board and the Licensing of Racecourse Betting and Pool Betting on Horseracing’ quoted in the ‘Gambling Review Report’ (2001, HMSO), para 13.5. The initial rationale had been that with the legalisation of off-course betting, the horse racing industry would have to be compensated for falling gate receipts: Zeffman, ‘Developments in British Horse racing’, paper delivered at BASL Conference, November 2005. 2 ‘Gambling Review Report’ (2001, HMSO), para 4.24. 3 Now the British Horseracing Authority: see britishhorseracing.com. 4 The Act also enabled the National Lottery to introduce Olympic Lottery games, the proceeds of which were ring-fenced for Olympics expenditure. 5 See para H1.97. 6 ‘Future of the Horserace Betting Levy Board announced’, Parliamentary Written Statement, 14 December 2006. See Osborne, ‘Horse racing shake-up stumbles at the first hurdle’, Daily Telegraph, 1 August 2006.

A3.79 On 5  May 2011, DCMS  Minister John Penrose MP called for preconsultation views on three potential options for reform of the levy, as well as asking for any additional alternative approaches: (a) retaining the levy system but with the amount to be determined (where not agreed) not by the Secretary of State but rather by a non-political independent arbitration process;

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(b) abolishing the levy using the existing provisions in the Horserace Betting and Olympic Lotteries Act 2004, and replacing it with an independent commercial agreement between gambling and racing, enforced as a condition of the bookmaker operating licence issued by the Gambling Commission; or (c) abolishing the levy using the existing provisions in the Horserace Betting and Olympic Lotteries Act 2004 and, to ensure that horseracing and gambling come to their own commercial agreement independently of government, establishing a statutory ‘Horserace Betting Right’ comparable to copyright.1 The government received responses on this consultation in July 2011 but has taken no further action on the issue to date, and the Levy Board remains in operation. 1 See eg  DCMS  Business Plan 2011–15 (May 2011) in which it states that it is a Coalition priority to ‘resolve the future of the Tote and end government intervention in deciding the right level of the Horserace Betting Levy’.

A3.80 The Horserace Totalisator Board (‘the Tote’) was a non-departmental public body established by the Racecourse Betting Act 1928 ‘to offer on-course pool betting on horseracing as an alternative to starting price betting with bookmakers’ and to distribute its profits for ‘purposes conducive to the improvement of breeds of horses and the sport of horseracing’.1 By 2008/09 the Tote’s turnover was £2.9bn, making it the fourth largest bookmaker in the UK, with over 500 betting shops and a presence at 61 racecourses. As far back as 1999, however, a tripartite review carried out by the Home Office, the Treasury and the Tote recommended that the Tote be sold to the private sector.2 The Horserace Betting and Olympic Lottery Act 2004 changed the law to enable such sale, but a number of potential bids fell through for lack of funds and/or concerns about falling foul of EU state aid rules.3 Eventually, in June 2011 the government announced the sale of the Tote to bookmaker Betfred, with 50 per cent of the proceeds of sale to be distributed to the racing industry.4 In March 2012, the government announced that the funds would be distributed to the sport by: (a) a new charity, the Racing Foundation; and (b) a grant system operated by the national governing body for the sport, the British Horseracing Authority.5 1 From the Tote website, reproduced in the House of Commons briefing paper, The Tote, SN/HA/2746, 23 July 2010. 2 Home Office, Tote review: report of the Steering Group, 1999. 3 HC Debate 26 May 1999, vol 332 c152W. 4 DCMS press release, ‘Tote to be sold to Betfred for £265 million’, 3 June 2011. 5 DCMS press release, ‘Details of £90 million pay-out to racing after Tote sale unveiled by Minister with responsibility for horseracing John Penrose’, 28 March 2012. See generally the House of Commons briefing paper, The Tote, SN/HA/2746, 23 July 2010.

(vi)  Tobacco and gambling sponsorship A3.81 Sponsorship of sports teams and events has historically been a major promotional tool for tobacco brands and betting operators, and a significant source of income for many sports. The Labour Party made a manifesto commitment in 1997 to ban advertising and promotion of tobacco products (including promotion via sponsorship of sports events), and originally intended to do so by implementing the EC Tobacco Advertising Directive 98/43/EC. However, after that Directive was annulled by the European Court of Justice on jurisdictional grounds,1 the government adopted a private member’s bill as a government bill, which became the Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002. Section 10 of the Act specifically prohibits using a sponsorship arrangement to promote a tobacco product. Under s 10(2), both parties to such an arrangement (for example, a sports event organiser and a tobacco sponsor) would be guilty of an offence under the Act. Various sports particularly

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dependent upon income from tobacco sponsorship (such as snooker and darts) asked the government for assistance in replacing this key source of income,2 but to no avail. 1 376/98 Germany v European Parliament [2000] ECR I-2247. Now see the Directorate approximating Member State laws on advertising and sponsorship of tobacco, 2003/33/EC, discussed at para H3.94. 2 See para H3.97 et seq.

A3.82 The promotion and advertising of bookmaker brands has come under increased scrutiny in recent years, particularly in football. In 2017, The FA undertook a review of its relationships with gambling firms, following which it moved to terminate an existing long-term commercial relationship with Ladbrokes worth a reported £4,000,000.1 Following this decision, The FA has been under increased pressure to limit all association with the gambling industry, including in 2020 in the context of its existing FA Cup ‘bet to view’ streaming deal with certain betting operators. Under the arrangement, The FA granted betting operators the right to make footage of certain third-round matches available to any end-user customer that placed a bet or put a deposit in their account in the 24 hours before kick-off of such match. At the time of writing, the arrangement is being investigated by the Gambling Commission.2 As part of its manifesto in the lead up to the 2019 General Election, the Conservative Government committed to a review of the 2005 Gambling Act in order to ‘make Britain the safest place to be online’,3 which may have a significant impact on sponsorship deals in football. Then-Minister at the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Nigel Adams, stated that ‘football’s link with betting’ will form a key part of the Government’s ‘imminent review’.4 At the time of writing, however, betting operators have not been banned from sponsoring sports properties.5 1 2 3 4 5

See bbc.co.uk/sport/football/40367939 [accessed 29 September 2020]. See bbc.co.uk/sport/football/51106866 [accessed 29 September 2020]. See ‘Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential’, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2019. See bbc.co.uk/sport/football/51242829 [accessed 29 September 2020]. See further para H3.78–H3.84.

(vii)  Listing of events A3.83 The public interest dimension of broadcasting is expressly recognised in the UK and beyond.1 The broadcasting of showpiece sports events in particular is deemed to serve as a focal point for the nation, a moment of shared culture and identity.2 As a result, access to such sports events by their broadcast on free, widely available media is considered by many to be not only an important mechanism of ‘sport for all’,3 but also an important aspect of the public’s (human) right to freedom of information.4 1 For example, the European Commission’s ‘Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe’ (COM (96) 443 final) stated that ‘television and radio have a general interest dimension […] being linked to moral and democratic values, such as pluralism, information ethics and protection of the individual […] ’. 2 Witness, for example, the empty streets of the City of London at midday on Friday 7 June 2002, when England played Argentina in Group F of the FIFA World Cup Finals. See also Jason Cowley’s report after the England-Portugal quarter-final match in the 2004 UEFA European Championship Finals, in the Observer, 27 June 2004: ‘Thursday’s epic football clash between England and Portugal was far more than just a game. It created a communal experience rarely felt in our modern age’. The Minister for the Arts, Estelle Morris, called it ‘a special evening that brought the nation together’: Hansard, HC Deb 31 January 2005, Col 685. According to the BBC, the exclusive television broadcast rights holder of the Games in the UK: ‘The London 2012 Olympic Games delivered the biggest national television event since current measuring systems began, with 51.9m (90 per cent of the UK population) watching at least 15 minutes of coverage’. BBC press release, ‘London 2012 Olympics deliver record viewing figures for BBC’, 13 August 2012 (bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2012/olympic-viewingfigs.html [accessed 29 September 2020]). 3 See Estelle Morris, Minister for Arts, Commons debate, Hansard HC Deb 31 January 2005, Col 685: ‘It is important that key sporting events are made available to all television viewers, including those who cannot afford or choose not to spend their money in that way. […] The listed events are those that

148  Governance of the Sports Sector are believed to have a special national resonance. […] [T]he purpose of the list […] is to involve the nation and ensure that the unifying factor can be brought to bear’. 4 See EC Directive 2010/13/EU, Recital 5: ‘Audiovisual media services are as much cultural services as they are economic services. Their growing importance for societies, democracy – in particular by ensuring freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism – education and culture justifies the application of specific rules to these services’; European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the broadcasting of sports events’, B4-0326/96, [1996]  OJ  C166/109: ‘[The European Parliament] considers it essential for all spectators to have a right of access to major sports events, just as they have a right to freedom of information […] [and therefore] considers that exclusive broadcasting rights for certain sports events which are of general interest in one or more Member States must be granted to channels which broadcast in non-encrypted form so that these events remain accessible to the population as a whole’. See also Joint UK  Government/Sports Councils’ Response to the Commission Consultation Paper ‘The European Model of Sport’ (May 1999) at para 21: ‘The right to information […] Subscription and pay-per-view television is not in itself a threat to sport, so long as it is balanced by requirements to ensure access by a substantial proportion of the public to events of major importance to society without any additional charge being made for reception of these events (ie on free to air television)’; ‘Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events’, DCMS Consultation Document, DCMS, November 2009, para  36 (‘the Secretary of State also considers the listing regime fulfils obvious and justifiable public interests – namely the societal and cultural goals of pluralism, public debate, full and comparatively unfettered participation and positive access to information. In a society such as the United Kingdom, in which sport is so richly and fully integrated into its fabric, such goals are of considerable importance’).

A3.84 Legislation has existed in the UK since 1981 to secure ‘free’ public access to sports and other events deemed to be of national importance.1 The current statute is the Communications Act 2003, s 299 of which empowers the Secretary of State to ‘maintain a list of sporting and other events of national interest’, public access to which must be protected through coverage on free-to-air, widely available television. The Act distinguishes between category 1 broadcasters (broadcasters whose programming is available without charge to 95 per cent or more of the population,2 ie  currently BBC1, BBC2, ITV1, Channel 4, and Channel 5)3 and category 2 broadcasters (ie all other broadcasters); and bars a category 2 broadcaster from acquiring exclusive broadcasting rights to a listed event without the consent of the Office of Communications (OFCOM),4 unless those rights have already been offered to category 1 broadcasters on ‘fair and reasonable’ terms, and no category 1 broadcaster has been willing to acquire them on those terms.5 1 Prior to 1981, the same result was achieved by a voluntary agreement between the BBC and the ITV Network. The first piece of relevant legislation was the 1981 Broadcasting Act. The Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, and further Broadcasting Acts in 1990 and 1996 updated and amended the statutory protections to reflect developments in the broadcast sector, such as pay-per-view television and subscription services through satellite television. 2 The Digital Economy Act 2017 amended the legislation to give the Secretary of State the power to amend the 95 per cent threshold in light of fears that, due to changing viewing patterns, it may prove difficult for television broadcasters to reach such threshold in the near future. However, as at the time of writing, the Secretary of State has not exercised this right. 3 Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events, Ofcom, 2 September 2008, Annex 2. 4 Previously responsibility for regulating the list of events sat with the Independent Television Commission (or ‘ITC’). 5 On 4 July 2019, Ofcom published its proposed methodology for determining whether a service (assessed over a range of platforms, including IPTV) meets the ‘qualifying conditions’ set by Ofcom. See ‘Listed Events: Identifying television services that are free-to-view and widely available’, Ofcom (ofcom.org. uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/124447/consulation-listed-events.pdf [accessed 29 September 2020]). For indicative purposes only, Ofcom provided a list of services that it considered would qualify, which included BBC 1, BBC 2, Channel 3 Network (broadcast as ITV, STV, UTV), Channel 4, ITV2, ITV3, BBC 4, More 4, Film 4, ITV4, CBBC, CBeebies, BBC News, and BBC Parliament. If implemented, the change in methodology would mean that a larger number of channels would qualify as a category 1 broadcaster. At the time of writing, however, no decision has been taken on the adoption of the new methodology.

A3.85 In mid-1997, the Department of National Heritage (the predecessor to the DCMS) announced that a set of relevant factors would be developed to ensure that the list only includes events ‘which we can all, no matter what our personal loyalties,

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recognise as a quintessential part of our national life and our sense of common identity’. The criteria eventually adopted included as a primary requirement that ‘the event has a special national resonance, not simply a significance to those who ordinarily follow the sport concerned; it is an event which serves to unite the nation; a shared point on the national calendar’.1 1 Appendix to letter sent by the DCMS to various sports bodies in November 1997.

A3.86 An Advisory Group on Listed Events, chaired by Lord Gordon of Strathblane, was appointed to consider which events met these criteria and to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport. After consulting with sports rights holders, the Advisory Group issued its report on 2 March 1998, unanimously recommending that certain events (called Group A events) remain protected from exclusive live broadcast by category 2 broadcasters, but that other events (Group B events) be made available for exclusive live broadcast by category 2 broadcasters so long as category 1 broadcasters were offered an opportunity to carry secondary coverage (ie deferred ‘as live’ or highlights coverage). In June 1998, the Secretary of State announced that he had accepted ‘the general principles’ of the Advisory Group’s report, including the recommendation to distinguish between Group A and Group B events, and that distinction is now reflected in ss 299(1B) and 300 of the Communications Act 2003. A3.87 The protected Group A  events that emerged from Lord Gordon’s review were the Olympic Games; the FIFA World Cup Finals tournament; the FA Cup Final; the Scottish FA Cup Final (in Scotland only); the Grand National; the Derby; the finals of the All England Lawn Tennis Championships (Wimbledon); the UEFA European Championship Finals tournament; the Rugby World Cup Final; and the Rugby League Challenge Cup Final. Those events cannot be broadcast exclusively live in the UK by Sky plc or other non-‘public’ broadcasters within the meaning of the Act, unless authorised by Ofcom. Ofcom publishes a Code on Sports and Other Listed Events (initially issued by its predecessor, the ITC) that identifies the criteria against which Ofcom will decide whether to give such consent.1 Paragraph 1.14 states: ‘In deciding whether to give its consent it may be sufficient for Ofcom to establish that the availability of the rights was generally known and no broadcaster providing a service in the other category had expressed an interest in their acquisition to the rights holder, or had not bid for the rights. However, Ofcom will wish to be satisfied that broadcasters have had a genuine opportunity to acquire the rights on fair and reasonable terms and, in reaching a view, will take account of some or all of the following criteria: (a) any invitation to express interest, whether in the form of public advertisement or closed tender, in the acquisition of the rights must have been communicated openly and simultaneously to broadcasters providing services in both categories; (b) at the beginning of any negotiation the documentation and/or marketing literature must set out in all material respects the process for negotiating and acquiring the rights and all material terms and conditions, including what rights were available; (c) if the rights to the listed event were included in a package of rights, the package must not have been more attractive to broadcasters providing services in one of the two categories. Preferably, the rights should be capable of being purchased independently of other rights, eg  to highlights, delayed transmissions, other events; (d) the conditions or costs attached to the acquisition of the rights (for example, production costs) must have been clearly stated and must not be preferential to one category of service; (e) the price sought for the rights must have been fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory as between the two categories of programme service. What is a

150  Governance of the Sports Sector fair price will depend upon the rights being offered and the value of those rights to broadcasters. A wide range of prices is likely to be regarded as fair but when required to make its own judgement on the matter Ofcom will have regard to, inter alia: (i) previous fees for the event or similar events; (ii) time of day for live coverage of the event; (iii) the revenue or audience potential associated with the live transmission of the event (eg the opportunity to sell advertising and sponsorship; the prospects for subscription income); (iv) the period for which rights are offered; and (v) competition in the market place. (f) such other facts and matters as appear to Ofcom to be relevant, in the particular circumstances that have arisen’. 1 ‘Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events’, Ofcom, 2 September 2008.

A3.88 The Group B events are cricket test matches played in England; non-Finals play in the All England Lawn Tennis Championship; all matches in the Rugby World Cup Finals Tournament prior to the final itself; Six Nations Championship rugby matches involving the four home unions; the Commonwealth Games; the World Athletics Championship; the Cricket World Cup (final, semi-finals, and matches involving the home nations); the Ryder Cup; and the Open Golf Championship. These events can be broadcast exclusively live in the UK by a ‘non-public’ broadcaster as long as a ‘public’ broadcaster (ie currently the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, and Channel 5) has been granted the right to show delayed coverage of at least 10 per cent of the scheduled duration of the event, subject to a minimum of 30 minutes for an event lasting an hour or more.1 1 ‘Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events’, OFCOM, 2 September 2008, para 1.18.

A3.89 The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport can add events to or delete events from the list at any time, subject to a duty to consult with the BBC, the Welsh television authority, Ofcom, and the rights owners of the events in question.1 The last such review took place in the first half of 2009, after then Secretary of State Andy Burnham announced that he had appointed ex-FA director David Davies to chair an independent advisory panel to review the list.2 The terms of reference for the panel were to review: (a) the principle of listing; (b) the criteria against which events were currently, or might in the future, be listed; and (c) the events on the current list, and whether there should be any changes thereto.3 1 In 1997, in an effort to pre-empt listing of further events, the rights-holders to certain major events (The FA, Premier League, ECB, UK Athletics, LTA, RFU, RFL, Racecourse Association, R&A, and PGA European Tour) signed up to a Voluntary Code of Conduct for the Broadcasting of Sports Events, agreeing to make every reasonable effort to strike a balance between the need to make their events available to the public and the need to generate rights fees for investment back into their sports. They also agreed to reinvest not less than five per cent of fees received into the ‘grass roots’, ie at community level, of their sports. The Code was last amended in 2008 and its signatories today include all of England’s major sports governing bodies (with the exception of the RFU). 2 ‘Burnham announces Chair of free-to-air events review’, DMCS press release, 10 December 2008. 3 Review of Free-to-air Listed Events, Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 7.

A3.90 After a formal consultation that prompted input from 187 interested parties, including rights holders, broadcasters and other organisations, and after commissioning the British Market Research Bureau to undertake a survey of public views on the issue1 and commissioning Frontier Economics to undertake an analysis of viewing patterns for sport on television as well as developments in the sale of

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sports broadcasting rights,2 the Davies Panel published its report in November 2009. The report highlighted the wildly divergent views of, on the one hand, the viewing public, who expected access to key sporting events on free-to-air TV in return for their licence fees3 and, on the other hand, pay TV broadcasters and SGB rightsholders, who ‘believe [that protections for key sporting events] represent a significant financial penalty for sport and are an unwarranted commercial interference that reduces competition for their rights’.4 As the Panel stated at para 117 of its report: ‘For those who opposed listing, there was the strongest belief that the Government had no place in substituting its own view for that of the governing bodies of sport. They were best placed to make the balanced judgement between broadcast exposure of their sports, and the need to develop their grassroots as well as elite performers at whatever cost. In particular, they felt it wrong that any sport should suffer a financial loss – without compensation – from reduced competition when the rights to their biggest events were assured to a free-to-air broadcaster. Competition, the Panel was repeatedly told, was essential to keep the FTA broadcasters ‘honest’ in the bidding process. If listing was to remain nonetheless, they preferred the current arrangements to continue, with as few changes as possible’. 1 Hewitson and Clegg, ‘Free-to-Air Events, Summary Report on Qualitative Phase of work undertaken for DCMS’, June 2009. 2 The impact of listed events on the viewing and funding of sports, Frontier Economics, November 2009. 3 See Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events, Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 50 (‘82% [of the individuals surveyed] believed they had an entitlement to watch certain key events free-to-air because they had already paid a licence fee’). 4 Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events, Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 62. See also ibid at para 68: ‘Put starkly, in the present economic climate, at least three of the five channels qualified to show listed events because of their 95 per cent audience reach have struggled to table bids at a level most governing bodies would have found fair and reasonable. The Panel does not believe that situation is likely to change for some time’.

A3.91 The Panel stated that ‘in the current circumstances they supported the principle of protecting some major events for the widest possible TV audience, if necessary by means of listing them’.1 It concluded that, going forward, the criteria applied to determine whether or not an event should be listed should be as follows:2 ‘In order to be eligible to be listed, an event must have a special national resonance and not simply a significance to those who ordinarily follow the sport concerned. Such an event is likely to fall into one or both of the following categories: • it is a pre-eminent national or international event in sport; or • it involves the national team or national representatives in the sport concerned. It should also be likely to command a large television audience’.

Finally, the Panel concluded that ‘guaranteeing highlights or delayed coverage’ of the Group B events ‘was no longer a sufficient response’ and it ‘therefore decided to recommend a single list of live events protected for free-to-air television based on the criteria’ listed above.3 1 Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 124. 2 Ibid, para 138. 3 Ibid, paras 145 and 149.

A3.92 Based on these conclusions, the Panel recommended that the new, single list of events protected for free-to-air television should include the Summer Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup Finals, UEFA European Championships, Grand National, FA Cup Final (in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland), Scottish FA Cup Final (in Scotland), home and away qualification matches in the FIFA World Cup tournament

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and in the UEFA European Championships (in the home nation to which the relevant match relates), the All England Lawn Tennis Championship (in its entirety, not just the finals), Open Golf Championship, home Ashes Test matches, Rugby World Cup matches, and matches played by Wales in the Six Nations (to be listed in Wales only). Accordingly, the Panel recommended de-listing of the Winter Olympics, the Derby and the Rugby League Challenge Cup Final (all of which were in Group A), as well as England’s home cricket Test matches other than the Ashes, the Commonwealth Games, the World Athletics Championships, the finals, semi-finals and match involving home nations in the ICC Cricket World Cup, and the Ryder Cup.1 1 Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, paras 170 to 173.

A3.93 The Panel’s report drew sharp criticism from the sports sector, which claimed that the Panel had failed adequately to take into account the funding implications for sports (and the subsequent consequences on investment at grassroots level) if their events were listed.1 Shortly after receiving the Panel’s report, in December 2009 DCMS issued a public consultation seeking further evidence on the principles of retaining a list; what constitutes a major event and how this should be assessed; which sporting events pass the ‘Major Event Test’; the economic and wider impact of listing, and how this should be measured; and which events should be listed, taking all of these factors into account.2 The consultation document stated that: ‘the provisional conclusion of the present Secretary of State, Ben Bradshaw, is that he should accept the recommendations put forward by the Panel […]. However, the Panel expressed no view and took no account of the impact or consequences on the sport or sporting body of listing, stating that it considered such matters were for the Secretary of State to take into account. The Secretary of State’s provisional conclusion is that, in making any final decision as to which events should be listed, he should take account of the possible impacts such listing might have on the sport for the Candidate Event in question and on those broadcasters who would be both interested in, and capable of, broadcasting a Candidate Event if it were not listed’.3

A  list of ‘principal factors that the Secretary of State has provisionally concluded should be taken into account’ in determining whether an event should be listed were set out, including the extent of any adverse impact on a sporting body (across all of its activities) and the extent of any net financial effect on that body, the extent of any positive commercial benefit from listing as well as any adverse/beneficial effects on participation levels within the sport and the extent of direct and indirect public funding provided to the sport previously and the level of such funding to be provided in future.4 However, while the document acknowledged that the Secretary of State ‘should consider the impact of listing an event upon the finances of a sporting body’, it asserted that: ‘in order to pass a domestic or EC threshold of being an event of major importance for society it is likely (but not inevitable) that the IPR [intellectual property rights] in relation to such an event are of heightened value, precisely because of the wider appeal of such events to a potential viewing audience. The restriction of such rights is therefore inherently likely to produce a substantial diminution in the value of such rights. However, that diminution in itself cannot be sufficient reason to defeat a listing regime’.5

Further, the consultation document noted that: ‘a properly managed sporting body is likely to wish to have a diversified income source, in particular because of the recognised vagaries of broadcasting revenue streams. The Secretary of State has therefore provisionally concluded that it is unlikely to be sufficient to point simply to substantial decreases in net revenue’ as a reason not to be listed’.6

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  153 1 For example, the CCPR noted: ‘A  number of sports governing bodies and their ability to invest in grassroots sport are likely to be deeply affected if these recommendations are adopted and the Secretary of State should consider that carefully. CCPR press release, ‘Listed events review needs to kick-start longer term debate about sport on TV’, 13 November 2009. See also Keane and Savino, ‘The Davies report on listed events – a question of sport or television?’, (2010) Ent LR 69 (‘The report does not explain how the entire FIFA World Cup, UEFA European Championship, Rugby World Cup and Wimbledon tennis championship are of major importance to UK society. The Panel discounts the damaging impact listing has for competition and the value of such events for funding sport’). 2 ‘Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events’, DCMS Consultation Document (DCMS, December 2009). 3 Ibid, paras 8 to 10. 4 Ibid, para 44. 5 Ibid, paras 38 and 39. 6 Ibid, para 41.

A3.94 Fortunately for rights-holders, Mr Bradshaw and his colleagues were voted out of government in May 2010, shortly after the consultation had closed. Within 10 weeks of taking power, the new Coalition Government announced that it would be deferring any decision on listing of events until 2013. Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson stated:1 ‘I  fully support the principle of protecting major sports events for free to air coverage. But with Digital Switchover concluding in 2012, this will result in the widespread availability of a significantly increased number of television channels, many of which will be free to air. Add to this the BBC’s Strategy Review, which will cover sports rights, and the Ofcom Pay TV Review, the broadcasting context for this decision is increasingly unclear. The current economic climate also points to us not making a decision at this time which could adversely impact on sport at the grassroots. I have therefore decided to defer any review until 2013, when we will look at this again’.

In October 2012, the government announced that it had no imminent plans to review the list2 and the changes to the list proposed by the Davies Report have remained on the shelf. In July 2019 the Culture Secretary Jeremy Wright announced his intention to add the Paralympics to the list of protected events, while also holding a separate consultation on whether to protect the Women’s Football World Cup and other women’s events. Any change would mark the first change to the list in over 20 years, but at the time of writing the government has not made any further statement in relation to these proposed changes.3 1 DCMS press release, ‘Decision on Free-to-Air Listed Events deferred until 2013’. DCMS  080/10, 21 July 2010. 2 See the comments of Ed Vaizey MP, Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries, HC Deb 23 October 2012 col 819W: ‘There are no plans to review the list of free-to-air sports events at the current time. In 2010, the Government made the decision to defer the review of listed events, begun by the previous Government, until 2013 following the completion of digital switchover. The current list of events remains in force’. 3 ‘Equality and listed events: Written statement’, HCWS1751 (parliament.uk/business/publications/ written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2019-07-18/HCWS1751/ [accessed 29 September 2020]).

A3.95 UK legislation binds only broadcasters within the jurisdiction. Therefore, the listing of events in and of itself does not prevent foreign broadcasters from acquiring the exclusive rights to broadcast coverage of UK listed events into the UK on their own channels. To address that issue, in April 1997 the EC Television Without Frontiers Directive was amended to add a new Art 3A that established a system of mutual recognition and enforcement for Member States’ lists of designated events. That legislation was replaced in 2010 by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive,1 Art 14 of which: (a)

acknowledges the right of Member States to take national measures compatible with EC law to ensure public access, via ‘live coverage or deferred coverage on

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free television’, of ‘events which are regarded by that Member State as being of major importance for society’ (ie each Member State determines the content of its own list) (Art 14(1)); (b) requires that any Member State notify its list to the Commission, for publication (after the Commission has satisfied itself that the list is compatible with EC law) in the Official Journal (Art 14(2)); and (c) requires every Member State to take appropriate steps to ensure that broadcasters within its jurisdiction exercise cross-border rights that they hold to sporting events in a manner that respects the notifying Member State’s list of events (Art 14(3)). These provisions are implemented into UK law by the Television Broadcasting Regulations 2000 and the Communications Act 2003, which together confer a power on Ofcom to provide information to competent authorities in other EU and EEA states to enable them, in compliance with their obligations under the ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Directive, to prevent broadcasters under their jurisdiction circumventing the UK listed event rules. They also empower Ofcom to prevent a UK-based broadcaster exercising exclusive broadcasting rights in another Member State to an event that has been listed for protection in that Member State unless such broadcaster is authorised to do so under that State’s listed event rules. 1 Directive 2010/13/EU.

A3.96 The UK’s list of major events was first notified to the Commission under the Directive in 1998. After the Commission objected to aspects of the list, it was revised and re-submitted to the Commission in 2000, which published it in the EC Official Journal on 18 November 2000 ([2000] OJ C328/2). Kirch Media, the agency that at the time held the UK broadcasting rights for the 2002 and 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals, challenged the Commission’s decision to accept the list on the ground it was incompatible with EC law, in that (among other things) it included events that were not of major importance for the UK public, namely group matches in the FIFA World Cup Finals not involving any home nation. The Court of First Instance upheld the challenge, but only on the procedural ground that a Commission decision under Art 3A of the Television Without Frontiers Directive has binding legal effects and therefore should have been taken by the full College of Commissioners; it never reached the merits of the challenge.1 On 15 October 2007, the European Commission confirmed the adoption by the full College of the UK list of major events to be televised free to air, ruling that the list of protected events set down in 1998, and the process by which it was arrived at, was in accordance with EU law.2 1 Infront WM v European Commission (T-33/01) [2005] ECR II-5897. 2 Decision 2007/730/EC on the compatibility with Community law of measures taken by the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 3a(a) of Directive 89/552, EC IP/07/1493, Brussels, 15 October 2007. It had done the same with the lists from Italy, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Belgium, France and Finland on 10 July 2007, on the basis that they were proportionate measures aimed at ‘an overriding reason of public interest, which is to ensure wide public access to broadcasts of events of major importance for society’, and so the derogation from the guarantee of free movement of services was justified: Commission Decision 2007/475/EC of 25 June 2007 on the compatibility with Community law of measures taken by Italy pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities [2007] OJ L180/ 5 et seq.

A3.97 Within four months, FIFA and UEFA brought proceedings in the General Court of the European Union challenging the Commission’s decision to approve the UK list on both procedural and substantive grounds.1 When the General Court dismissed both cases, FIFA and UEFA appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).2 In July 2013, the CJEU rejected those appeals on the following basis:

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(a) The CJEU accepted that the designation by a Member State of certain events as being of major importance for society and the consequent prohibition of their exclusive broadcasting on pay TV constitute obstacles to the freedom to provide services, the freedom of establishment, the freedom of competition, and the right to property. It ruled, however, that such obstacles are justified by the objective of protecting the right to information and ensuring wide public access to television coverage of those events. (b) It pointed out that it is for the Member States alone to determine the events that are of major importance and that the Commission’s role in that respect is limited to determining whether the Member States have complied with EU law in exercising their discretion. Thus, if an event has validly been designated by a Member State as being of major importance, the Commission is to carry out only a limited review of that designation and is required, in particular, to examine only the effects thereof on the freedoms and rights recognised under EU law that exceed those which are intrinsically linked to such a designation. (c) The CJEU noted that not all the matches in the final stage of the World Cup and the European Championships are of equal importance for the general public, which tends to attach particular importance to decisive matches between the best teams – such as the final and semi-finals – and those involving the national team. Consequently, those tournaments must be regarded as events which are, in principle, divisible into different matches or stages, not all of which are necessarily capable of being characterised as an event of major importance. (d) The CJEU stated that, contrary to the decision of the General Court, Member States are required to communicate to the Commission the reasons justifying why they consider that the final stage of the World Cup or the European Championships constitutes, in its entirety, a single event of major importance for society in the States concerned. It ruled, however, that those errors did not have any impact in the present cases. The General Court found, on the basis of the information provided by FIFA and UEFA and in the light of the actual perception of the public in the United Kingdom, that all the matches in the final stages of those two tournaments actually attracted sufficient attention from the public to form part of an event of major importance. In particular, it held that it was apparent from the file, first, that those tournaments, in their entirety, have always been very popular among the general public and not only viewers who generally follow football matches on television. Secondly, those competitions have traditionally been broadcast on free television channels in the UK. (e) Finally, the CJEU found that, given the Commission’s limited power of review of the designation by a Member State of an event as being of major importance and the in-depth knowledge of broadcasters of the grounds underlying such a designation, it is permissible for the Commission to indicate only succinct grounds for its decision on the list of events of major importance drawn up by a Member State. Moreover, where the effects of such a designation on the freedom to provide services, the freedom of competition, and the right to property do not go beyond those which are intrinsically linked to the classification of the event concerned as being of major importance, it is not necessary to provide specific grounds for concluding that it is compatible with EU law. The CJEU concluded that FIFA and UEFA had not shown that the effects on the freedoms and rights recognised by EU law of the designation of the final stages of the World Cup and the European Championships, in their entirety, as events of major importance were excessive. 1 Joined Cases T-68/08 FIFA v Commission and T-55/08 UEFA v Commission, 17 February 2011. For example, FIFA argued that the Commission failed to provide reasons to justify the inclusion of all 64 World Cup matches on the UK list, that the UK  Government failed to construct its list using a

156  Governance of the Sports Sector ‘clear and transparent procedure’, that matches not involving UK national teams were ‘not of major importance for United Kingdom society, and that listing infringed FIFA’s ‘right to property’, as well as EC Treaty provisions on competition, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. 2 C-201/11  P  UEFA  v European Commission and C-204/11  P  and C-205/11  P  FIFA  v European Commission.

A3.98 The proper working of the UK’s listed event rules came up for scrutiny by the House of Lords in the TV Danmark case.1 TV Danmark, the UK-based claimant broadcaster, had acquired exclusive rights to broadcast in Denmark five ‘away’ qualifying matches played by Denmark in its FIFA 2002 World Cup qualifying group. It sought to exercise those rights by broadcasting coverage of the matches exclusively into Denmark from the UK. However, the matches were included on Denmark’s own list of protected events, ie they could only be broadcast by broadcasters reaching at least 90 per cent of the Danish population, and TV  Danmark was a subscriptionbased broadcaster reaching only 60 per cent of Denmark’s population. Furthermore, the Danish free-to-air broadcasters that TV Danmark had outbid to acquire the rights still wished to broadcast the same events and were prepared to pay for the right to do so, just not as much as TV  Danmark had bid. The ITC (and the Secretary of State of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, intervening in the House of Lords) argued that consent had to be denied to TV Danmark’s proposed broadcast of the matches, because otherwise the Danish public would be denied the right to watch the event on television in Denmark. TV Danmark argued that the ITC had to consent to TV Danmark’s exclusive exploitation of the rights, because the public broadcasters had had a fair opportunity (namely, the original tendering process) to acquire the rights but had failed to do so. That was all the ITC Code required for consent to be granted, and the fact that TV  Danmark was not prepared, post-acquisition of the rights, to share them with the public broadcasters (as the Danish listed events rules required) did not change the analysis. 1 R v Independent Television Commission, ex p TV Danmark 1 Ltd [2001] UKHL 42, [2001] 1 WLR 1604.

A3.99 The Court of Appeal agreed with TV  Danmark, stating that the tender auction provided a fair opportunity for public broadcasters to acquire the rights, which vindicated the public’s interest in watching the events, and post-acquisition events were irrelevant and could not be taken into consideration by the ITC. The House of Lords overturned that ruling, based on the premise that the purpose of the Directive is ‘to prevent the exercise by broadcasters of exclusive rights in such a way that a substantial proportion of the public in another Member State is deprived of the possibility of following a designated event’.1 That right was not vindicated by giving public broadcasters the opportunity to bid for the rights in an open auction. If that was all that was required, then in effect there would be no restriction on free market forces, and therefore no point to the legislation at all. As Lord Hoffmann said:2 ‘The argument that the public is given the possibility of watching the event if the public broadcasters are given the possibility of buying the rights at auction is in my opinion wrong. The Directive requires the public to have the possibility of following the event in the sense that a member of the public may watch it if he chooses to switch on his television set’.

He noted that the auction acquisition process is a relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding whether public broadcasters had an opportunity to acquire the rights on ‘fair and reasonable terms’, but it is not determinative, because: ‘the clear purpose of Part IV [of the Broadcasting Act 1996] is, if necessary, to protect the public interest in free access to important sporting events against market forces. The ITC is engaged in a delicate balance of the interests of broadcasters, sports organisers and the general public’.3

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Since the auction itself was not determinative, it was appropriate (and could be necessary) to look at subsequent events to determine whether the public broadcasters had been given sufficient opportunity to acquire the rights on fair and reasonable terms, such that consent to exclusive broadcast by non-public broadcasters should be given. Here, the refusal of TV Danmark to give the public broadcasters an opportunity to bid to share the rights with it (a requirement under the Danish law) meant that the pre-condition to consent under the Code (a fair opportunity to acquire the rights on fair and reasonable terms) was not satisfied. The ‘right of the European citizen to watch his national football team’4 was thus resoundingly vindicated. 1 2 3 4

[2001] 1 WLR 1604 at 1613. Ibid, at 1613. Ibid, at 1614. Ibid, at 1606. For comment on the case, see ‘Listed Sports Events Protected Against the TV Rights Market’ (2001) 4(4) Sports Law Bulletin 1; Harrington, ‘UK Listed Events Ruling Looks Bad for Kirch’ Sportcal.com, 6 August 2001; Santy, ‘Listed Events Legislation – Identifying a Rationale’ [2001] 8(5) SATLJ 1; Barr-Smith ‘Listed Events and Sale of World Cup TV Rights’ [2001] 9(3) SATLJ 135; Harris, ‘Transfrontier Broadcasting of World Cup Qualifying Games’ [2001] 9(2) SATLJ 100.

(viii)  Hosting major sporting events A3.100 As noted above, the government formally supported London’s successful bid to host the 2012 Olympics,1 and supported and funded the staging of what was widely seen to have been a very successful Games. The London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 provided the legislative framework necessary for London to host the Games. In particular it set up the Olympic Delivery Authority, whose primary task was to deliver the venues and infrastructure for the Games.2 It also delivered on commitments made to the IOC as part of the bid to host the Games to introduce effective mechanisms for countering ambush of the Games through unauthorised commercial activity and ticket touting.3 1 See para A3.23. 2 See para A3.39. 3 Ibid.

A3.101 Successive UK  Governments have clearly seen the benefits in attracting major sporting events to these shores: (a) In November 2007, the Commonwealth Games Federation announced that Glasgow had won the right to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The Scottish Parliament passed the Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act in June 2008, which replicated many of the specific protections given to the IOC for the 2012 Olympic Games.1 (b) In February 2007, the Treasury Department and DCMS jointly published an official study into the feasibility of England hosting the FIFA World Cup Finals in 2018. The report noted the government’s commitment to ensuring that the UK is in a position to bid for and host major sporting events, as well as its recognition that bids are strengthened if the government is able to lend active support. It further noted that the decision whether or not to bid is for The FA to make but aimed to provide The FA with a firm base from which to decide whether or not a bid should be made. It noted that hosting a World Cup Finals tournament would be likely to produce a positive economic impact, as well as other associated intangible benefits. Following the report, the government threw its weight behind a bid for the event, with then Prime Minister Gordon Brown stating: ‘By 2018, it will be more than 50 years since England first hosted the World Cup, and I believe it is time the tournament returned to the nation which gave football to the world. With the Olympics in London in 2012, hosting the World Cup in 2018

158  Governance of the Sports Sector would make the next decade the greatest in Britain’s sporting history. I want every region of the country to share in the benefits of these sporting events, I want every young person to be inspired by them to increase their own participation in sport, and – if the FA decides to launch a bid – I would make it my personal mission over the next few years to persuade countries around the world to support that bid’.2

In the event, despite vocal government support, £15m spent by the FA and £2.1m spent by local councils hoping to host matches,3 the English bid gained only 2 out of the 22 votes cast by the FIFA  Executive Committee, and the tournament was awarded to Russia.4 (c) The hosting of further major sporting events beyond the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics Games became a pillar of the then-Coalition Government’s legacy promise. In September 2012, Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson announced that ‘to maintain the momentum from London 2012’, the UK had won the right to host 20 global sporting events between 2013 and 2020.5 Notable events have included the 2015 Rugby World Cup in England, 2016  IPC Athletics Marathon World Cup in London, 2017 IAAF World Championships and World Para-Athletics Championships in London, and 2019 ICC Cricket World Cup in England and Wales. (d) The Conservative Government elected in 2015 has continued on this path. In 2018, UK Sport published a list of ‘mega’ sporting events that it planned to target over the next 15 years.6 The then-Secretary of State of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport confirmed the government’s commitment: ‘the UK has consistently shown that we are a world-leading host of major sporting events. They enhance the country’s reputation internationally, increase the profile of sport at home and bring a significant boost to the economy. UK Sport’s targets demonstrate our continued ambition to bring the best global sport events to the country and remain a trusted partner of the sporting world’.7

(e)

At the time of writing, England and Scotland are set to host parts of the Euro 2020 Football Championships (albeit postponed to 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic), the Commonwealth Games Federation has named Birmingham as the host city for the 2022 Commonwealth Games,8 and the football associations of England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are reportedly considering a joint bid to host the 2030 FIFA World Cup Finals.9

1 Among other things, the Act placed restrictions on unauthorised street trading in the vicinity of Games locations (s 2), a ban on unauthorised advertising in the vicinity of Games locations (s 10), a ban on ticket touting (s 17), the ability to take urgent traffic regulation measures during Games time (s 39) and empowers the Government to make compulsory land purchases (s 42). 2 See ‘Brown throws weight behind England’s 2018 World Cup bid’, the Guardian, 12 February 2007. 3 See the HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘2018 World Cup Bid’, HC 1031, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, para 1. 4 Following this disastrous result, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee held an inquiry into the failed bid, the two main themes of which were ‘the role played by FIFA during the bidding process, and the performance of the FA bid team’. See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘2018 World Cup Bid’, HC  1031, Sixth Report of Session 2010–12. See para A3.59, n 3. 5 Ministerial Written Statement by Hugh Robertson MP, ‘Sporting Legacy’, 18 September 2012. In a further ministerial statement on 24 January 2013, Robertson announced that the UK had subsequently won the right to host a further six major events in that period. 6 See UK Sport press release dated 4 October 2018. 7 Ibid. 8 See Commonwealth Games Federation press release dated 21 December 2017. The UK Government has proposed the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Bill [HL] 2019-20, which has drawn parallels with the legislation introduced to deliver the London Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 and the Glasgow Commonwealth Games in 2014. Among other things, the Bill (which is now scheduled for review by the Public Bill Committee) would permit the ‘provision of financial assistance to the organising committee; require the organising committee to report on its work; regulate association with the games; create offences in respect of ticket touting, advertising and trading; and permit the Government to direct the preparation of a transport plan’. See ‘Birmingham Commonwealth Games

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  159 Bill [HL] 2019-20’ House of Lords Library Briefing, 22  January 2020 (researchbriefings.files. parliament.uk/documents/LLN-2020-0022/LLN-2020-0022.pdf [accessed 29 September 2020]). 9 bbc.co.uk/sport/football/50650490 [accessed 29 September 2020].

(b) Exhortation A3.102 Public and media pressure is often brought to bear on government to intervene in the sports sector in response to specific scandals or concerns. In particular, when sports bodies get self-regulation wrong, the cry goes out for the government to ‘take a controlling influence’.1 Such calls have been most often focused on football, as the increasing commercialisation of the national game has left supporters and local communities feeling increasingly alienated.2 For instance, in 2015 then-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport John Whittingdale threatened to impose a levy on the Premier League’s broadcasting revenues for the ‘benefit of grassroots sports’.3 This idea resurfaced in the build-up to the 2019 general election, with Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn calling for at least 5 per cent of Premier League TV income to be diverted to the grassroots game so that those from working class communities were no longer ‘priced out’ from the game.4 However, the government has steadfastly resisted assuming a greater regulatory role in football, instead insisting on the right and responsibility of football’s governing bodies to run the game autonomously, while reserving the right to encourage those bodies to bring in such reforms as the government sees fit. For example, in 2011 then-Sports Minister Hugh Robertson stated:5 ‘It is not for any Government to run sport or micro-manage its future. All sport – not least football – is best run by dedicated professionals working within strong and effective independent and accountable organisations. At the same time Government, by virtue of public expectation and through the legitimate interest in the use of public funds, has a genuine role to play in ensuring that those sports organisations are working together effectively for the long term good of the game. […] I  want to be clear again that it is not for Government to run any sport. However there is an appropriate role for Government in encouraging the authorities in […] altering the landscape. Where there are challenges or recommendations that properly fall to Government then we intend to address them fully’. 1 Welch, ‘Time for real action’ Daily Telegraph, 6 February 1999. The issue raised (usually with more subtlety than in the following quote) is: ‘Who are these backward, unwieldy, misguided, greedy, secretive or just plain incompetent organisations answerable to?’ (Hughes, ‘Banks seeks feel-good factor’ Daily Telegraph, 20  February 1999). The answer given in that article by Tony Banks, then Minister for Sport, was: ‘Sport is just too important for individuals and the country as a whole to be left drifting […] There is a central role for government in sport. As enablers, as organisers, as arbitrators at certain times where there is clearly a need for action. We need to modernise our sporting structures’. 2 See eg Conn, ‘Growing support for fan ownership’ Independent, 3 May 2002. 3 See ‘Government May impose levy on Premier League’s TV  Money’ the Guardian, 9  September 2015 (theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/09/government-levy-premier-league-tv-money-minister [accessed 29 September 2020]). 4 See ‘Jeremy Corbyn attacks ‘pricing out’ of football fans in Premier League’ The Guardian, 15  November 2019 (theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/15/jeremy-corbyn-attacks-pricing-out-offootball-fans-in-premier-league [accessed 29 September 2020]) 5 In written evidence to the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee’s Inquiry into Football Governance (January 2011).

A3.103 This traditional ‘hands off’ approach was notable in March 2002, when it seemed that the loss of broadcasting rights fees caused by ITV  Digital’s collapse would make many Football League clubs insolvent. Despite public outcry,1 the government made it clear that it would not intervene in what it saw as a private contractual matter. Sports Minister Richard Caborn offered merely to act as intermediary in negotiations.2 Similarly, in September 2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown resisted calls by UEFA President Michel Platini for governments to legislate to curb the influence of money in football.3

160  Governance of the Sports Sector 1 See eg ‘Political Football’, Sports Business International (June 2002), p 54. 2 ‘Minister offers to act as intermediary in talks with Football League’ Financial Times, 26 March 2002. 3 His spokesman was quoted as follows: ‘Platini’s letter has raised some important issues that fans care about and we do too. But these are matters for national football authorities to address and they should respond directly to fans’ concerns. We will continue to encourage them to do so. The government recognises and supports the autonomy of sport and its right to self-regulation. The running of football is down to the game’s authorities and government can assist when asked’. ‘Brown unmoved by Platini’s plea for government action’, Sportcal.com, 20 September 2007. This was not the first time UEFA had appealed for government intervention in football. See eg ‘UEFA calls for investigation into foreign soccer investors’, Sportcal.com, 4 September 2006.

A3.104 Another example of this type of ‘light-touch’, non-legislative intervention is the pressure that the government applied to the England & Wales Cricket Board (ECB) not to visit Zimbabwe in 2003.1 The government put considerable pressure on the ECB not to go to Zimbabwe, but it specifically avoided going as far as the Australian Government, which announced in May 2007 that it was prepared to enact legislative and policy measures that would restrict the right of the Australian cricket team to visit Zimbabwe for ICC-scheduled cricket matches.2 1 See PM press briefing, 30 December 2002: ‘Ultimately, it was a decision for the ECB to take since they were the competent authority and an independent sporting body. We had made it clear that our advice was that the England team should not go to Zimbabwe. In the end, however, it was for the ECB to reach its own decision. We could advise, but we were unable to order or instruct. Although we were talking about a national team and an international sport, it should be remembered that this was not a nationalised sport inasmuch as it was not state-run – and nor should it be’. 2 See ‘Government blocks cricket tour of Zimbabwe’ The Australian, 13 May 2007.

A3.105 This approach was also evident during the Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee’s inquiry into the state of football governance in 2010-11. In response to a commitment set down in the Coalition Agreement to ‘encourage the reform of football governance rules to support the co-operative ownership of football clubs by supporters’,1 in December 2010 the DCMS Select Committee announced that it was launching ‘a new inquiry into the governance of professional football clubs’.2 The committee received nearly 100 written submissions (from government, football governing bodies, clubs, players, supporters groups and other interested parties) and conducted eight oral evidence sessions, hearing testimony from 39 individuals, including prominent individuals from The FA, the Premier League, and the Football League, and concluding with evidence from Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson MP. His written evidence, quoted at para A3.102 above, clearly reflected a preference to maintain the traditional line that the government should generally seek to encourage and exhort the sports sector to reform itself, with legislation to be used only as a threat of last resort.3 1 ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ (Cabinet Office, May 2010), p 14. 2 ‘Committee launches inquiry on Football Governance’, press release dated 7  December 2010. Committee chairman John Whittingdale MP announced that the ‘inquiry will look at the case for strategic Government intervention and improved self-regulation and will consider models which involve supporters more in how clubs are run’. While the Committee’s inquiry was ongoing, Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson fanned the flames by stating: ‘If you look across sport, it is very clear to me that football is the worst governed sport in this country, without a shadow of a doubt’. ‘Hugh Robertson: ‘Football is worst governed sport in UK’’, the Guardian, 20 January 2011. 3 Minutes of evidence of Hugh Robertson to Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 26 April 2011, at Q816 and 817.

A3.106 In his oral evidence to the committee, the Minister was asked ‘what can be done by a Minister for Sport for a game that is self-governing?’ He replied as follows: ‘Well, in that we could, in extremis, pass legislation, as indeed a number of other countries have done. That would, in my view, be a last resort. I think there is a fine line between where Government can go and where it cannot, and it is emphatically not for Government to run football, absolutely emphatically not. I  think it is for

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  161 Government to make sure that football is in the best possible condition to run itself. So I think I certainly have an influencing and persuading role. You certainly could not accuse me of not making my views clear on this particular subject. If indeed we judge in the end of that the situation is so bad and so immoveable that legislation is the only way – some form of sports law – as in the case in many other countries around the world – then that would be an option we would have to consider’.1

Committee chairman John Whittingdale MP then pressed him further: ‘Chair: Minister, you started in your first answer by referring to the plethora of reports, inquiries and commissions that have crawled over this ground [football governance] repeatedly and nothing has changed. Are you determined that on your watch something is going to change? Hugh Robertson: Yes, I am. […] Actually, what I want to do, I want to make sure that at the end of my time as a Minister that football is in a better position than it was when I took over. I think the most serious issue relates to governance and the way the game is run, and I do not want to see it at the time that I leave, or get sacked or whatever happens to me, that we haven’t tackled – because it is too much trouble or it is too much effort, or anything – something that needs to be done in what is our national game. […] Chair: In order to force a change it is sometime necessary to have an alternative which you don’t necessarily wish to deploy but which you could resort to if change didn’t happen. Hugh Robertson: Called legislation. Chair: Called legislation, and that is your position? Hugh Robertson: It is my position, Chair’. 1 Minutes of evidence of Hugh Robertson to Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 26 April 2011.

A3.107 Following the inquiry, the Select Committee published its first report on 29 July 2011, concluding that:1 (a) The FA needed ‘urgent reform to carry out its responsibilities effectively and meet the future challenges of the game. (b) The ‘Football Creditor Rule’2 should be abolished. (c) A  formal licensing model for professional clubs should be introduced ‘to underpin the self-regulation measures already introduced by the Premier League and the Football League’.3 (d) A new ‘strong fit and proper persons test, consistently applied throughout the professional game’, to determine who should be entitled to own and/or control a professional club, should be introduced, under the control of The FA.4 (e) Protections should be offered to supporters’ trusts wishing to purchase stakes in professional clubs, both by government and by The FA. (f) The FA should review its expenditure on grass roots. The committee stated: ‘Almost all of our recommendations for the reform of football governance can be achieved through agreement between the football authorities and without legislation. We therefore urge the football authorities to consider our Report carefully, and to respond positively with an agreed strategy and timetable for change. As a last resort, we recommend that the Government consider introducing legislation to require The FA to implement the necessary governance reforms in line with its duties as a governing body’.5 1 HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘Football Governance’, HC 792-I, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12. 2 See para B5.56.

162  Governance of the Sports Sector 3 See para B5.18. 4 See para B5.12. 5 Notably, not all of those who were questioned by the Select Committee shared its (and Hugh Robertson’s) view of legislation only as a last resort: ‘The solution favoured by most was Government intervention. However, it is also the case that the Government has little leverage on a game able to generate huge revenues of its own, and the governing body of which is vehemently opposed to some types of Government intervention. The most practical solution proposed was intervention by means of a Sports Act to consolidate the position of the FA as the governing body of the domestic game. Because such legislation exists in other European countries, this could not be constituted as undue Government interference. Lord Triesman, for example, noted that: there are a number of countries that have a basic sports law […] You can use it for all sorts of purposes but it can also, and it does in some countries, allocate the key responsibility for the regulation of sport to the sports governing bodies so that they must do it and they must be accountable for it. After that the Government stands back. He concluded that “it would be a great pity to have to consider legislation as a means of doing it but it would not be right to rule it out”. Ian Watmore similarly argued that Government intervention “whether that is an Act or a strongly worded demand” was required. Most intriguingly, perhaps, William Gaillard from UEFA appeared favourably disposed to a legislative solution. Citing the example of France, he told us “there is legislation in my country […] where it is clearly stated what is the role of the national association, the clubs, the leagues and so on, and therefore you avoid the turf wars that have been going on in this country”’. HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘Football Governance’, HC 792-I, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12, paras 257 and 258.

A3.108 In October 2011, DCMS made it absolutely clear that it supported the Select Committee’s recommendations, and its proposals that legislation be introduced if football’s governing bodies failed to act on them:1 ‘The Government notes and supports the Committee’s assessment that almost all their recommendations can be achieved through agreement between the football authorities and without the need for legislation. The Government expects that the football authorities, having considered the report carefully, will now respond positively and collectively with an agreed strategy and a timetable for change. […] The Government is fully committed to ensuring that the changes put forward by the football authorities make a lasting and substantive difference. If that does not happen the Government will introduce a legal requirement on the Football Association to implement the appropriate governance clauses by the swiftest possible means. To do that the Government will seek to secure, using all available channels, appropriate legislation as soon as Parliamentary time allows. There is a strong case for such legislative proposals to be formally considered in pre-legislative scrutiny’. 1 ‘Football Governance: Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee Inquiry (HC792-1)’, DCMS (October 2011). DCMS set a deadline of 29 February 2012 for the sport to agree proposals for implementation of the Committee’s recommendations.

A3.109 In response, a ‘core group’ comprising David Bernstein (FA  Chairman), Roger Burden (FA National Game Board Chairman and FA Board member), Richard Scudamore (Premier League Chief Executive), and Greg Clarke (Football League Chairman), responded to the Select Committee’s report, first on 29 February 2012,1 and then again on 27  June 2012,2 with a set of proposals seeking to address the Select Committee’s concerns. Secretary of State Jeremy Hunt asked the Select Committee to look at the proposals. After holding two oral evidence sessions (questioning individuals from the ‘core group’ and others within their organisations) and receiving 23 written statements (many of which were provided by supporter trusts) the Select Committee published a follow-up report on 22 January 2013.3 As well as recommending that the government pass legislation banning the use of the Football Creditors Rule ‘at the earliest opportunity’,4 the Committee stated:5 ‘We urge the authorities to be more radical and more urgent in addressing the problems faced by the game because of the weakness in its governance structure, at both FA and club level. We recommend that, unless there has been clear progress in all the areas we highlight […] within 12 months, the Government introduce legislation as soon as practicable’.

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The same day, then-Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson commented:6 ‘We welcome the report from the select committee which shows the will there is across parliament for football to modernise and change for the better. We have been clear that we want the football authorities to carry out the reforms they promised by the start of the 2013–14 season – most notably around improved governance and diverse representation at the FA, the development of a licensing system and greater financial transparency. If football does not deliver then we will look at bringing forward legislation’. 1 HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Football Governance follow up’, HC 509, Fourth Report of Session 2012–13 Vol 1, Appendix 1. 2 Ibid, Appendix 2. 3 Ibid. 4 As to which, see further paras B5.146 et seq and E2.83. 5 Ibid, para 18. 6 ‘English football ‘has a year to change’ say MPs preparing to urge legislation’, the Guardian, 29 January 2013.

A3.110 That deadline came and went without dramatic changes in the governance and regulation of football, yet the threatened legislation did not materialise. Instead, the threat changed to withholding public funding. For example, then-Sports Minister Tracey Crouch noted in 2016: ‘at the moment we are seeing nothing from the FA in terms of progress, they are likely to lose some public money or it will go elsewhere in the delivery of football’.1 Following similar comments from high profile figures within the sport,2 the Select Committee launched a new inquiry into football governance in October 2016. Former FA executives David Bernstein, David Davies, Greg Dyke, Alex Horne and David Triesman wrote to the Select Committee, stating that The FA had failed to self-reform and was incapable of doing so, highlighting the number of ‘elderly white men’ in the organisation as a stumbling block.3 In response, Select Committee Chair Damien Collins said that a draft bill was being prepared in order to deliver the necessary reforms: ‘We do not believe that The FA will comply voluntarily: it can survive easily without the Government’s contribution of money to grassroots sport, and there are powerful vested interests that refuse to accept the right of all those involved in football to play a role in the governance of the sport. We are therefore preparing a draft Bill to bring the structure of The FA, especially its Board and Council, more into line with modern company practice and the Government’s guidelines for sports bodies’.4

Once again, however, the threat of legislation came to nothing. 1 See at bbc.co.uk/sport/football/36877406 [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 Former FA chairman David Bernstein referred to the organisation as ‘outdated’ and in need of reform (see at bbc.co.uk/sport/football/36697413 [accessed 29  September 2020]) and ex-FA executive director David Davies commented that the FA is ‘screaming out for reform’ following newspaper revelations about England manager Sam Allardyce, who lost his job after 67 days in charge following misconduct (see at bbc.co.uk/sport/football/37497288 [accessed 29 September 2020]). 3 Letter to Chair, Culture, Media and Sport Committee from former FA executives, 12 December 2016 (see at data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/culture-mediaand-sport-committee/the-governance-of-football/written/44337.html [accessed 29 September 2020]). 4 ‘FA  Governance to be debated in Parliament’ Culture, Media and Sport Committee press release, 3  February 2017 (see at old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/ culture-media-and-sport-committee/news-parliament-2015/football-governance-parliamentdebate-16-17/ [accessed 29 September 2020]).

A3.111 Questions over the self-regulation of football surfaced again following the financial demise of Bury Football Club and its expulsion from the Football League in August 2019. In the wake of public criticisms of the EFL’s failure to protect the club as a ‘community asset’ from the failings of its owners, the Digital, Culture,

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Media and Sport Committee held an inquiry that concluded there were ‘systematic and structural problems’ in the EFL, and made a number of recommendations for reform, including a strengthened Owners’ and Directors’ Test and preventing clubs from borrowing against fixed assets such as stadiums.1 The message from Select Committee Chair Damien Collins was a familiar one: ‘The authorities must learn to respect, and act upon, these concerns. If the reforms we recommend are not introduced forthwith, the only alternative is for the Government to step in’.2

In response, the EFL commissioned an independent review into the circumstances leading to the withdrawal of Bury FC’s membership of the League, which concluded that, while there were weaknesses in the EFL’s regulations, the real cause of Bury’s demise was that the rules allowed clubs to spend more than their trading income on player wages, bridging the gap with owner funding, which left them exposed to collapse if the owner became unable or unwilling for whatever reason to continue to continue that funding.3 1 ‘Committee calls for regulatory reforms to English football’ Culture, Media and Sport Committee press release 5  November 2019 old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/ digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/football-administration-correspondence-19-20/ [accessed 29 September 2020]). 2 Ibid. 3 Independent review into the events leading up to the expulsion of Bury FC from membership of the EFL, 20 February 2020, efl.com/-more/governance/reviews/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. See paras B5.13 and B5.120–B5.122.

(c) Indirect intervention, by means of making compliance with government policy a condition of access to public funding and publicly-funded benefits A3.112 This chapter has already addressed how, since 1996, the Labour, Coalition and then Conservative Governments, building on the foundations laid by the Conservatives’ 1995 White Paper and in particular the introduction of the National Lottery, have pushed sport up the political agenda as a key instrument of public policy. Having done so, however, the government of the day has also therefore had to acknowledge the importance of the role of the private national governing bodies in the organisation and promotion of sport in the UK,1 and has used the leverage created by control over access to Lottery funding and increased Exchequer funding to co-opt those bodies as partners in the implementation of public policy. 1 In its landmark April 2000 policy paper for sport, the Labour Government stated: ‘Many agencies provide funding, support services and programmes for sport. However, delivery at community level is largely driven by three key networks – education, local authority and national governing bodies of sport’. See ‘A Sporting Future for All (April 2000), p 51. In its 2012 policy paper, Creating a Sporting Habit for Life’ (January 2012, DCMS), the Coalition Government stated: ‘Whole Sport Plans are the delivery contract between Sport England and each of the 46 funded National Governing Bodies for Sport (NGBs). They set out how Exchequer and Lottery funding will be spent and what outcomes the public can expect to see for this investment. As a result of the Whole Sport Plan approach, those who know sport best are taking the decisions that will affect the development of their sport at a local and national level. We want to continue and consolidate this approach in the next round of Whole Sport Plans which runs from 2013 to 2017’.

A3.113 If government policy is to be implemented by partnering with national governing bodies of sport, however, then those bodies have to conform to minimum public standards of governance and administration in the running of their sports.1 In its March 2001 policy statement, ‘A Sporting Future for All’, the government identified the ‘fragmented and too often unprofessional’ organisation and management of sport as an obstacle to its goals of mass participation and success at elite levels.2 It proposed:

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  165 ‘a modernising partnership with the governing bodies of sport. The public sector will continue to support sport at its foundations as it has in the past – and give sport greater say over how those funds are spent – but on two conditions: (1) that commercially successful sports also contribute to the same pot and invest in grassroots facilities; and (2) that all governing bodies agree to work to a number of clear and agreed targets for the development of their sport’.3

This meant UK  Sport and Sport England devolving funding powers to SGBs, ie allowing those bodies to run their own Lottery-funded programmes, but only on the basis that such bodies not only publish clear and realistic plans for broadening participation and identifying talent, but also modernise their management systems and structures so as to be able to demonstrate high standards of corporate governance.4 The policy statement continued:5 ‘We recognise that a closer partnership with the governing bodies of sport is crucial if we are to deliver our ambitious plans for English sport. We believe that governing bodies must be responsible for setting the strategic vision for their sport and that resources should be put behind these strategies to give them every chance of success. Governing bodies must also take responsibility for demonstrating a high standard of management, and clear, realistic plans for widening participation and developing talent. In return those bodies will be able to secure more control over the distribution of funding to their sport’. 1 In 1999, then-Sports Minister Tony Banks pointed out: ‘We’re discussing a list of priorities with any sports governing body that receives public money and setting them systematic objectives. We’ll continue to evaluate their progress’. See ‘Banks seeks feel-good factor’ Daily Telegraph, 20 February 1999. Similarly, in his evidence in 1998 to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Mr Banks stated: ‘In England I think we have spent the last 3½ years through the Lottery some £700m or committed £700m worth of expenditure. That is the nature of it. We are then dealing with organisations that in the past have been arguing around what is the equivalent of a few bob, though it runs into greater sums than that, and I think in many ways the structures that were in place, with the sort of fairly amateurish way that it was approached, have not moved easily into the area where there are now large amounts of money, never enough of course, as you know, but large amounts of money with sport becoming a bigger and bigger business as we go through. That is changing now in terms of the personnel. Governing bodies are realising that they have to be professional and we require them of course to make themselves very accountable for what is still public monies, because it is not government money that is going through the Lottery, but it is public money, and if anything were to go wrong, the responsibility undoubtedly would be visited back on us here in the House of Commons’. 2 ‘A Sporting Future for All’ (March 2001, DCMS) at p 5. 3 Ibid, at p 19. 4 Ibid, at p 45. See also ‘A Sporting Future for All: Action Plan’, Report of the Implementation Group to the DCMS and DfEE (December 2000), Section 9 and App B. 5 Ibid, at p 47.

A3.114 Both UK Sport and Sport England played a role in implementing this policy. For example, for its ‘Project Rio’ cycle leading up to the 2016 Olympic Games, UK Sport’s funding decisions were based on ten ‘Investment Principles’,1 the third of which was: ‘We will only invest in sports bodies which demonstrate the required standards of leadership, governance, financial management and administration. We will scrutinise the governance and leadership of all sports in which we invest to ensure that organisations are run professionally and efficiently, with a commitment to achieving the highest standards of corporate governance and financial management with systemic excellence at all levels. Sports must be able to evidence that equality, safeguarding and ethical standards are visibly integrated into their structures and operations. Implications • We will not invest in an organisation where there is evidence that the governance of that sport puts at risk the delivery of its longterm performance objectives.

166  Governance of the Sports Sector • • • •

We will seek evidence that the senior leadership has the appropriate skills to develop and guide the organisation’s strategic direction, with a commitment to drive continuous improvement by leading and managing change. We will embed the required standards in our overall funding agreements, holding sports to account for their delivery Performance reviews will focus on excellence in system development and management as well as results Consistent failure to meet the required standards will result in the withholding or withdrawal of funding’.

UK Sport has, by and large part, continued on this path. For the Tokyo 2020 Olympic cycle, UK Sport announced its nine investment principles and, at principle four, reaffirmed that ‘National Governing Bodies of sport hold the responsibility for the development, profile, organization, governance and leadership of their sport’, adding that ‘where a National Governing Body is unable to add value to this partnership, or to effectively manage the delivery of the programme, we reserve the right to direct all, or part, of our investment to a third party’.2 1 uksport.gov.uk/news/2012/10/05/road-to-rio-ramps-up-a-gear [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/investment-principles [accessed 29 September 2020].

A3.115 Similarly, any national governing body wishing to receive funding from Sport England must meet high standards of governance and financial controls. In the foreword to Sport England’s 2012 paper, ‘Sport England Governance Strategy: On board for better governance’, Sport England chairman Richard Lewis stated: ‘Well-governed NGBs are critical to the delivery of our strategic investment outcomes and a sustainable sector. We will continue to place particular importance on driving up standards of governance in core-funded NGBs. We will also encourage and support good governance in the wider sector through the standards we set as investors in sport and the help and support we provide’.1

In 2015, the Conservative Government published its ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’,2 which contained a commitment to introduce a new corporate governance code: on 31 October 2016, the Code for Sports Governance was issued, which set out minimum governance requirements with which organisations in receipt of public investment must comply.3 Then-Sports Minister Tracey Crouch said:4 ‘It is vital that our domestic sports bodies and organisations uphold the very highest standards of governance and lead the world in this area. We want to ensure that they operate efficiently and successfully while being transparent and representative of society. We have been clear that we will expect them to adhere to the new Code for Sports Governance if they are to receive public funding in the future’.

In a 2018 update, the government noted: ‘An aim of Sporting Future is to achieve global recognition of the UK’s Code for Sports Governance as the “gold standard” for sports governance around the world. UK Sport has made progress in influencing change across the international sporting landscape. The task is not straightforward and requires a different approach to that adopted in the UK. Each NGB [National Governing Body] that UK  Sport funds has a bespoke International Relations Strategy that captures key issues they seek to promote in their International Federations. Across NGBs, there are around 70 specific “international governance reform objectives” that UK Sport has identified this year and is actively pursuing. UK  Sport also continues to seek to influence change by supporting credible, high-calibre people from the UK, with a reform agenda, to attain senior leadership positions within Federations. In 2017, 12 individuals achieved those positions at European and international level. Through direct engagement with other governments, International Federations, the International Olympic Committee and international organisations, DCMS

Government Intervention in the Sports Sector  167 [Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport] and UK  Sport have continued to work closely to progress the new International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport (IPACS) which builds on the London Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016. At the most recent IPACS working group meeting in December 2017, three taskforces were established focusing on: (i) reducing the risk of corruption in procurement relating to sporting events and infrastructure; (ii) ensuring integrity in the selection of major sporting events, with an initial focus on managing conflict of interest; and (iii) optimising the processes of compliance with good governance principles to mitigate the risk of corruption. In addition to UK  Sport’s work on international sports governance, it has actively supported athlete voice, representation and welfare in international sport through bespoke seminars, including with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the International Olympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee. This year, UK  Sport launched the new version of its flagship International Leadership Programme, which equips high-calibre British sports administrators and retired athletes with the knowledge and skills required to operate effectively in international sport.’5

In December 2018, UK Sport and Sport England announced that 55 of the 58 sports under review were compliant with the new Code for Sports Governance.6 On 13 July 2020, they announced that the Code would undergo its first formal review. 1 ‘Sport England Governance Strategy: On board for good governance’ (Sport England, 2012). The strategy set out a number key criteria for effective NGB governance: it recommended an open recruitment processes for the appointment of board members, a maximum of 12 people on the board (at least 25 per cent of whom should be independent), and transparency of decision-making; and it described how funding may be suspended where those criteria are not met: ‘Over the 2009–13 funding period, Sport England investment in NGBs to deliver our sporting outcomes has been closely aligned to working with them to improve their governance, finance and control frameworks. We have placed particular importance on supporting NGBs in developing these frameworks because good governance is at the heart of delivering sporting outcomes. During the 2009–13 funding period we recognised that NGBs required time to develop their governance frameworks and we have supported and encouraged them in this through our self-assurance and on-site audit processes and our relationship management activities. Where significant concerns have arisen, funding has been suspended or moved to monthly or quarterly payments until key issues were resolved. Building on the NGB governance improvements that have already been made is important to us. In order to access 2013–17 funding we are setting a number of key criteria for effective governance which we will require core funded NGBs to have in place. Where these standards are not yet in place, applicants will be required to demonstrate a determination to meet them by October 2014. This determination must be supported by a robust action plan with milestones agreed both by your Board and by us. The key criteria for effective governance, set out below, draw together and build upon the minimum standards we already set through the self-assurance and on-site audit processes. They are requirements for the NGBs that we fund but we strongly encourage their dissemination by NGBs through their own structures where applicable eg at county board or regional board level’. ‘Sport England Governance Strategy: On board for good governance’ (Sport England, 2012). 2 See para A3.33. 3 Sporting Future – A New Strategy for an Active Nation, HM Government, 17 December 2015 4 uksport.gov.uk/resources/governance-code [accessed 29 September 2020]. 5 Sporting Future – Second Annual Report, HM Government, 30 January 2018, paras 4.9-4.11. 6 ‘55 national bodies now fully compliant with new world leading Governance Code for Sport’, UK Sport press release, 20 December 2018.

A3.116 However, it is not just good governance that is promoted by means of funding conditions. The Sports Councils also use their control over the purse-strings to require compliance with substantive government policy objectives. For example, national governing bodies signing up to Whole Sport Plans with Sport England must commit, as part of the funding agreement, to comply with the NSPCC’s sports child safeguarding policy1 and the Equality Standard for Sport. Again non-compliance can lead to suspension or even withdrawal of funding. 1 See para B6.35 et seq.

A3.117 Another good example lies in the field of anti-doping policy. Historically, responsibility for anti-doping regulation and enforcement within sport in the UK

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rested with the national governing body of each sport, working on a decentralised, sport-by-sport basis. The national governing body, not the National Anti-Doping Organization, retained responsibility for drafting appropriate anti-doping rules, for investigating possible anti-doping rule violations under those rules (uncovered by means of testing or otherwise), for determining whether an athlete has a case to answer under the rules, for establishing a hearing panel to hear that case, and for prosecuting the case before the panel. However, that landscape has changed dramatically in recent years.1 1 See further para C2.20 et seq.

A3.118 Consistent with its non-interventionist approach to the regulation of sport generally,1 the UK Government historically took a relatively hands-off approach to the regulation of drug use in sport. It endorsed the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code and was an early signatory to the Council of Europe’s  1989 Anti-Doping Convention.2 However, it never passed any specific legislation to incorporate the provisions of these international instruments into domestic law, or to require sports bodies to adopt anti-doping programmes reflecting their provisions. 1 In contrast, interventionist states such as France and Italy issued codified anti-doping regulations that sports federations had to adopt and enforce, or else face being stripped of their right to govern their respective sports. See eg French Law no 99 222 of 23 March 1999 and the Italian Law no 376 of 14 December 2000, both on ‘Discipline of health protection in sports activities and of fight against doping’. 2 The Anti-Doping Convention (Council of Europe – European Treaties – ETS No 135) was adopted in 1989. Thirty-eight Member States of the Council of Europe have signed it, including the UK. Until the introduction of the UNESCO International Anti-Doping Convention, it was the main legal instrument for the harmonisation of doping rules at government level.

A3.119 With the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999 and the adoption of the first World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 (‘the Code’), however, the anti-doping paradigm shifted fundamentally. The UK  Government ratified the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport, thereby committing to base its anti-doping policy on the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code (‘the Code’).1 In particular: (a) Article 1 defines the purpose of the Convention, ie to promote the prevention of doping in sport. (b) Article 3 outlines the means to achieve this purpose, including an obligation for State Parties to encourage all forms of international cooperation, particularly with WADA, and also underlines the importance of ensuring that any measures adopted against doping are consistent with the Code. (c) Article 4 commits State Parties to the principles of the Code as the basis for appropriate measures, to be taken at national level, including legislation, regulation, policies or administrative practices, to achieve the objectives of and to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Those obligations include the following: (i) ensuring that national laws contain appropriate measures against trafficking of prohibited substances and methods to athletes (Art 8); (ii) applying financial sanctions (ie  withdrawal of/ineligibility for public funding) with respect to individuals who commit anti-doping rule violations and organisations that do not comply with the Code (Art 11); (iii) encouraging and facilitating cooperation between public and private agencies in the fight against doping in sport (Art 13); (iv) supporting the mission of WADA in the international fight against doping (Art 14); and (d) Article  9 calls for State Parties to take measures and to encourage relevant organisations to take action against athlete support personnel who commit an anti-doping rule violation.

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In short, the Convention ‘impose[s] a legal obligation on all governments to work with sport, under the auspices of the World Anti-Doping Agency, to eradicate doping in sport’.2 1 International Convention Against Doping in Sport, ED.2005/CONVENTION ANTI-DOPING. 2 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Explanatory Memorandum on the UNESCO  International Convention Against Doping In Sport, 1 February 2006, Cm 6742. But see comments of IAAF President Lamine Diack to the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Madrid, 16 November 2007: ‘The fatal flaw in the Convention is that the World Anti-Doping Code and the International Standards are not an integral part of the Convention itself and they do not create binding obligations on the Governments as a matter of international law. The Convention commits the Governments only to the principles of the Code and the IAAF would respectfully suggest that this falls some way short of the type of legally binding commitment that was called for in Copenhagen and which is so fundamental to the principle of harmonisation that the Code is intended to achieve. As the leadership of WADA passes to the Governments for the next four year period, this is an issue of critical importance that must be addressed through amendment to the UNESCO  Convention itself’. No amendments were made to address this criticism, and therefore no sanctions could be applied under the Convention against Russia after its state-sponsored doping scheme was uncovered in 2016.

A3.120 Between the advent of the Code in 2003 and late 2009, working within the framework of achieving government policy by means of conditions placed on access to public funding and benefits, the Drug-Free Sport Directorate of UK Sport managed to introduce elements of centralisation and harmonisation to anti-doping rule-making and adjudication among the UK’s national governing bodies, including establishing an independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear all cases arising under the anti-doping rules of the UK’s national governing bodies.1 And then in 2007 the UK Sport board announced that it was recommending that the government require national governing bodies, as a further condition of eligibility for public funding, to transfer exclusive results management authority (ie  the authority to investigate matters and determine whether there is a case to answer under the doping rules) to a new independent National Anti-Doping Organization.2 1 See sportresolutions.co.uk/services/national-anti-doping/nadp [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 See UK Sport press releases dated 25 July 2007 and 16 October 2007.

A3.121 Following consultation with the sports movement, in December 2009, the government finalised and published its National Anti-Doping Policy,1 which establishes a truly unified UK approach to the fight against doping in sport under the auspices of UK Anti-Doping as the National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO) for the UK. It requires the national governing bodies of sport in the UK to adopt either the UK  Anti-Doping Rules issued by UK  Anti-Doping or other Code-compliant anti-doping rules mandated by their international federations, to delegate results management and case prosecution responsibility to UK Anti-Doping (save where UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own systems are Code-compliant), and to appoint the independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear and determine all charges that the anti-doping rules have been breached (save where UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own tribunals are Code-compliant). 1 UK National Anti-Doping Policy, version 1.0, 14 December 2009.

A3.122 This interventionist approach is a cause of disquiet for those who continue to adhere to the orthodox view that ‘government does not and should not run sport’.1 They question why the government is interfering in a sport’s ability to decide what should constitute cheating in its sport and what the penalties for breach of the rules should be, let alone taking away its right to police and enforce its rules by itself. But whether or not public health and ethical considerations provide sufficient justification for such a degree of intervention, the fact is that this government intervention has largely been welcomed by most sports bodies, many of whom lack the resources and expertise to deal with doping themselves.2 It has had a good degree of success in

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practice in developing the effectiveness of the fight against doping in sport.3 It is also a policy that enjoys broad support from the sporting media and wider general public, making it a very difficult one for SGBs to challenge, as they can be seen as conflicted when it comes to enforcement of anti-doping rules against their star athletes, making independent results management by a public agency a necessity as far as the public is concerned. 1 This came across strongly in the evidence that The FA gave to a 2004 Parliamentary Select Committee: ‘we strongly believe that sports governing bodies must take the lead in drug testing and doping policy in their own sports. […] The FA and FIFA therefore set out the policy and procedure for anti-doping in football. With regards to UK Sport, the FA retains them as our agents to collect and analyse samples, and report findings. We also support any UK Sport education initiatives. […] Although there are some 250 “public interest” tests carried out by UK Sport in football, we are very much of the view that it is football’s code, regulations and procedures that apply, and no one else’s. […] We have supported UK Sport’s anti-doping directorate, and continue to do so. It has been an important initiative. However, we see the FA as the national anti-doping directorate for football in England’. See also The FA’s and the ECB’s response to the Government’s  2009 consultation on the establishment of UK AntiDoping: ‘The FA believe that compulsory centralisation of the results management, case presentation and disciplinary functions does not represent the best approach for all UK national governing bodies (NGBs), particularly those with the resources, expertise and experience to provide an effective process within these areas consistent with its operational procedures and arrangements in other areas of sports discipline. […] It must be recognised that the decentralisation approach essentially amounts to the “nationalisation” of a sports regulatory function pursuant to which NGBs would be required to forego independence, autonomy and primacy over its participants. Such an approach could potentially place an NGB at odds with the process of its International Federation (IF), and potentially with those of other NGBs within its sport where the relevant NADO adopts a different approach.’ And ‘It is imperative to NGBs, and taxpayers, that the increased costs to implement the new UK Anti-Doping Organisation will result in clear and significant benefits to the sports sector as a whole. By introducing this new organisation there has been a significant shift in Government’s position in relation to the regulation of sport, as it is removing the responsibility of decision making in relation to the sport’s participants from within the jurisdiction of the NGB. It should not be underestimated that this will be at conflict with other aspects of Government policy in relation to sport, and further many UK based NGBs will then be operating at conflict with other NGBs within their International Federation’: ‘Summary of responses to consultation on establishing a modernised UK  Anti-Doping Organisation’ (DCMS, November 2009). 2 See eg the response of the Amateur Rowing Association to the government’s 2009 consultation on the establishment of UK Anti-Doping: ‘We would currently welcome the intention to centralise the results management and case presentation. This would help to ensure consistency across sports in the UK and assist the NGBs who do not necessarily have expertise in these areas or the funding available to manage them’. ‘Summary of responses to consultation on establishing a modernised UK Anti-Doping Organisation’ (DCMS, November 2009). 3 See further para C2.23.

A3.123 The biggest driver for government intervention in doping, however, has been the recognition that sport requires state support in order to protect its integrity in the face of determined cheating from dopers and their entourages. It is very difficult for a governing body to insist that the government should not get involved in the governance and regulation of its sport while at the same time calling on the government to step in to help because it cannot defend the integrity of its sport from outside attack alone. A3.124 Further evidence of the UK  Government’s strong support for the fight to protect the integrity of sport (in the area of anti-doping, safeguarding, and otherwise) came in 2018, when provisions were incorporated into the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that UK Anti-Doping and SGBs are able to process personal data where necessary to protect the integrity of sport.1 1 See para A4.61 to para A4.73.

CHAPTER A4

Data Protection and Sport Emma Drake (Bird & Bird LLP) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A4.1 2

DATA PROTECTION LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE....................... A4.3 A What is personal data and who are data subjects?....................................... A4.6 B What is processing and who are controllers and processors?...................... A4.14 C What is the scope of data protection law?.................................................... A4.26

3

DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND SPORT............................................ A4.34 A Lawful, fair and transparent......................................................................... A4.35 B Purpose limitation, data minimisation and accuracy................................... A4.94 C Storage limitation......................................................................................... A4.107 D Integrity and confidentiality (security)......................................................... A4.114 E Accountability.............................................................................................. A4.125

4

DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS.................................................................................. A4.153 A Articles 11 and 12 – the formalities of a request......................................... A4.154 B The rights of access and portability............................................................. A4.155 C The rights of rectification, restriction, objection and erasure...................... A4.166 D Significant automated decisions................................................................... A4.178

5

INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS...................................................................... A4.182 A What is a restricted transfer?........................................................................ A4.185 B When can organisations carry out a restricted transfer?.............................. A4.186 C What is different in the UK?........................................................................ A4.198

6

DIRECT MARKETING, EPRIVACY AND SPORT.......................................... A4.203 A Direct marketing – the GDPR and PECR.................................................... A4.205 B Cookies........................................................................................................ A4.226

7

LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT.................................................................. A4.239 A Supervisory authority powers...................................................................... A4.240 B Individual and group rights of action........................................................... A4.249 C Criminal offences and personal liability...................................................... A4.255 D Publicity and trust........................................................................................ A4.257

1 INTRODUCTION A4.1 Processing of personal data underlies much of the regulation and policy described elsewhere in this book. Personal data is processed in the registration of athletes, the assessment of their eligibility to compete, in collecting intelligence to prevent doping and match-fixing, and in safeguarding the welfare of participants. It also fuels the commercial and competitive drivers of sport: it is captured in the footage and film used to promote events and teams, it is analysed to deliver a marginal gain or to assess a rival, and it is scrutinised to help profile and target fans and sell sponsorship rights. The rights of individuals in relation to their personal data, and the wider regulation of data use, must be considered not only to comply with the law, but also to ensure the enforceability of sports rules, protect the value in sporting assets, and deliver the full commercial potential of a fan-base.

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A4.2 It is not the intention of this chapter to provide an exhaustive guide to data protection law; there are dedicated works that do that.1 This chapter instead explains the application of the principles of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)2 and the UK’s Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) to the activities of sports organisations. Despite the paucity of references to sport within the GDPR’s recitals and in the subsequent guidance issued from authoritative sources, this new legislative framework has clear and specific impacts on sports administration, regulation, and commercialisation. This chapter will address those impacts, and will also touch on the application of the EU’s ePrivacy regime, derived from amended Directive 2002/58/EC3 (‘the ePrivacy Directive’), particularly its restrictions on electronic marketing and cookie compliance. 1 For a general introduction to data protection law and its application to organisations within the UK, see the Information Commissioner’s Guide to Data Protection (ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guideto-data-protection/ [accessed 29  September 2020]). For more in-depth guides on the law and its implementation in practice, see eg Boardman and Morgan, Data Protection Strategy: Implementing Data Protection Compliance, 3rd Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2019); Jay, Data Protection Law & Practice, 5th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2020). 2 Regulation 2016/679 [2016]  OJ L119/1 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. 3 Directive 2002/58/EC  [2002]  OJ  L  201/37 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.

2 DATA PROTECTION LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE A4.3 Data protection law first saw substance in the Council of Europe’s  1981 Data Protection Convention (‘Convention 108’),1 which led to regulation on a European level within Directive 95/46/EC on the processing of personal data (‘the DP Directive’).2 In an effort to catch up with the forward-rush of technology, and ostensibly to improve harmonisation across Member States, the European Commission published a draft general data protection regulation to replace the DP Directive in January 2012. This was subject to lengthy review and negotiations between the European Council and European Parliament, and was finally passed into law as the GDPR in April 2016. The GDPR came into force in 25 May 2018. 1 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, European Treaty Series 108, (Strasbourg 1981). 2 Directive 95/46/EC [1995] OJ L281/1 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

A4.4 As an EU regulation, the GDPR has direct effect in EU Member States. The DPA 2018 exists to fill certain gaps left by the GDPR for national variation,1 and to address areas outside of its scope, such as law enforcement processing.2 Despite Brexit, the GDPR remains part of UK law until the end of any transition period,3 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 20184 (‘Withdrawal Agreement’) provides for it to be transposed into UK law after withdrawal, subject to some limited amendments made by the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU  Exit) Regulations 2019 (the Data Protection Exit Regulations). This law will then be known as the UK GDPR.5 1 Such as conditions for processing special category data under Art 9 (see para A4.55 et seq) and exemptions (see para A4.90). 2 Processing of data for law enforcement purposes, where carried out by competent authorities, is addressed by Directive (EU) 2016/680, which is implemented in Pt 3 of the DPA 2018. 3 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, Sch 5, para 1. This defers all provisions importing and amending EU legislation on exit day until ‘IP completion day’, being 11pm of the last day of the transition period (at the time of writing, this date is 31 December 2020). 4 SI 2019/419. As yet, most regulations are not yet in force, having been due to commence on exit day. 5 A schedule setting out the amendments that would be made by the Data Protection Exit Regulations can be found at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/779335/Keeling_Schedule_for_GDPR.pdf [accessed 29 September 2020].

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A4.5 While a substantial amount of the GDPR reflects concepts and definitions that existed under the DP  Directive and the Council of Europe’s Data Protection Convention before that, the GDPR is stricter, and introduces some novel obligations as well as enhanced individual rights. To understand the application of these rules to sport, it is important to understand the GDPR’s most basic concepts.

A What is personal data and who are data subjects? A4.6 Personal data is defined in Article 4(1) of GDPR as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)’. The Article goes on to explain that: ‘an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’.

A4.7

The two key questions to be answered are:

(1) whether the data – either alone or in combination with other data – causes a data subject to be either directly or indirectly identifiable; and (2) whether that data then relates to that data subject. There is a substantial body of both European and UK case law and guidance on these topics. Perhaps the most useful practical summary – emphasising the intended breadth of the definition – comes in C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner,1 where the CJEU explained: ‘The use of the expression “any information” in the definition of the concept of “personal data”, within [European data protection law], reflects the aim of the EU legislature to assign a wide scope to that concept, which is not restricted to information that is sensitive or private, but potentially encompasses all kinds of information, not only objective but also subjective, in the form of opinions and assessments, provided that it “relates” to the data subject. As regards the latter condition, it is satisfied where the information, by reason of its content, purpose or effect, is linked to a particular person’. 1 C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, pp 34–35.

A4.8 This finding effectively summarises the position taken by the Article  29 Working Party1 within its Opinion No  4/2007 on the concept of personal data (WP 136).2 That Opinion similarly explained that personal data should be considered to include both ‘objective information such as the presence of a certain substance in one’s blood’ and subjective information. The Article 29 Working Party also confirmed that information does not need to be ‘true or proven’ in order to be considered personal data; otherwise accuracy rules within data protection law would have little import.3 On the question of whether information ‘relates’ to a data subject, WP 136 says that ‘in general terms’ data may relate to a data subject ‘when it is about that individual’. The Opinion outlines three different ways4 in which a relational link between the data and data subject can be established: (1) The ‘content’ of the data is evidently about the individual: the data itself is evidently about an identifiable individual, such a medical result or an allocated identifying number. The GDPR has since clarified that such data includes not only obvious identifiers such as an individual’s name or date of birth, but also

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information that has undergone pseudonymisation,5 and online identifiers such as mobile device identifiers and IP addresses.6 (2) The ‘purpose’ of handling that data is one that will lead to a relationship of that data with a data subject, ie the data will be used ‘with the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour of an individual’, such as the review of sporting footage to analyse an athlete’s performance. (3) The ‘result’ of data processing is one that will lead to ‘an impact on a certain individual’s rights and interests’ (emphasis in the original). WP136 underlines that it is not necessary for this to be a substantial impact: ‘it is sufficient if the individual may be treated differently’ as a result of the processing. For example, the particular deterioration of sporting equipment such as racing car parts or cycling equipment is not of itself personal data, except to the extent to which this deterioration may be attributed to and used to assess or reprimand an athlete or support worker. 1 A  body that was established under the DP  Directive as a cooperative body representing the data protection authorities of all EU  Member States, and that issued non-binding guidance. It has been replaced under the GDPR by the European Data Protection Board. 2 WP136, adopted 20 June 2007. 3 Ibid, p 6. 4 Ibid, pp 10-11. 5 GDPR, Recital 26. 6 GDPR, Recital 30.

A4.9 An essential element of the definition of personal data is that it must relate to an identifiable data subject. Data can identify a data subject either directly or indirectly. Indirectly identifying information may be linked to a data subject through a connection with other information held by the controller, or that could be readily accessed by the controller (for example, data in the public domain). Nor does the individual necessarily need to be known to the controller. In the world of esports, for example, a player may be predominantly or uniquely known by a pseudonym. The fact that the ‘real life’ player is unknown to a particular controller does not stop information processed about them being considered personal data. Similarly, the choice to deliver marketing to a particular cookie holder based on their browsing history involves the processing of personal data, even if the only known identifier to the organisation is that user’s cookie ID. A4.10 The GDPR states, in Recital 26, that ‘to determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used’. The Recital elaborates that: ‘account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments’.

The equivalent Recital under the DP  Directive was considered by the CJEU in C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Breyer), with the court stating that identification would be unlikely in a case where: ‘[…] the identification of the data subject was prohibited by law or practically impossible on account of the fact that it requires a disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identification appears in reality to be insignificant’.1

This leaves, in practice, a relatively narrow scope for anonymity, which is perhaps not unsurprising given that anonymous data falls outside of data protection law and the reach of regulators.2 For more information on anonymisation, a vast and controversial topic of itself, organisations can consider lengthy guidance issued

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by the UK’s supervisory authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO),3 and information produced by the Article 29 Working Party.4 The GDPR has since introduced a new concept of ‘pseudonymous’ data, which has in practice narrowed the bounds of anonymity even further.5 1 C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para 46. 2 GDPR, Recital 26: ‘The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable’. 3 Information Commissioner, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ (November 2012). Note that this code was drafted to address the previous UK law and is no longer official guidance. It remains accessible and provides some assistance in the absence of more recent UK guidance. The ICO was understood to be working on a new draft code during 2020. 4 Article  29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (WP  216) adopted 10 April 2014. 5 Article 4(5) of the GDPR defines pseudonymisation as ‘[…]the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person’. Although pseudonymisation involves taking steps to reduce the identifiability of the affected data, the GDPR clearly applies to such information. For more details, see ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/what-is-personal-data/what-is-personal-data/#pd4 [accessed 29 September 2020].

A4.11 It is important to remember that personal data about one data subject can be simultaneously the personal data of a third person. This is particularly true of opinions, which are simultaneously the personal data of the holder and the subject. They can also concurrently form part of the intellectual property of others (such as photographs, or information forming part of a database).1 There is no inherent concept of ownership within data protection law. Rather, controllers and processors have responsibilities and individuals have rights over data. 1 See paras H1.81 (copyright in photographs) and H1.77 et seq (database rights).

A4.12 Within the definition of personal data, there are certain types of data that require additional protection under the GDPR. These types of data are identified in Article 9(1) of the GDPR as ‘special categories’ of personal data, namely: ‘personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership […], genetic data, biometric data [processed] for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation’.

This special category data, previously known as ‘sensitive’ personal data under the DP  Directive, is treated differently under the GDPR, requiring an additional legal basis to overcome a general prohibition of processing (see para A4.55) and imposing additional accountability obligations (see Section 3E, ‘Accountability’ below). Separately, data relating to criminal convictions and offences (‘criminal offence data’) are also subject to specific restrictions under Article 10 of the GDPR, which are discussed in brief later in this chapter (see Section 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent’ below). In the UK, s 11(2) of the DPA 2018 expands the definition of criminal offence data to specifically include ‘the alleged commission of offences’ and ‘proceedings’ in relation to offences, including their disposal and sentencing. The ICO, in its guidance on criminal offence data, explains that in the UK, at least, the definition should be considered to be even broader: ‘It includes not just data which is obviously about a specific criminal conviction or trial, but also any other personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences, including:

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unproven allegations; information relating to the absence of convictions; and personal data of victims and witnesses of crime.’1

1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/criminal-offence-data/ [accessed 19 November 2020]. As Art 10 imposes strict restrictions on the use of such data, this broad interpretation of the meaning of criminal offence data is less typical in other countries that lack the broader permissions for use found in the DPA 2018 (see Section 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent’ below).

A4.13 Photographs and film footage should not necessarily be considered to be special category data despite the fact that they may display an individual’s ethnicity, or health data.1 Instead, it is the processing of this data to make use of these visible characteristics that might result in the photographs or film footage being considered special category data. Whether the ability to ‘infer’ special category data (such as a choice to treat all those with the name Mohammed as Muslim) will ‘count […] depends on how certain that inference is, and whether you are deliberately drawing that inference’.2 1 ‘The processing of photographs should not systematically be considered to be processing of special categories of personal data […]’. GDPR, Recital 51; see also European Data Protection Board, ‘Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices’, Version 2.0, adopted 29 January 2020. 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/special-category-data/what-is-special-category-data/#scd1 [accessed 29  September 2020].

B What is processing and who are controllers and processors? A4.14 Data protection law applies to the controllers and processors who process that data. Processing is very broadly defined in Article 4(2) of the GDPR as: ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data, or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction’.

In effect, this broad definition means anything done with personal data will be considered processing and subject to data protection law, unless the particular use of the data expressly falls outside of the scope of the GDPR (see Section 2C, ‘Storage limitation’ below). A4.15 Responsibilities under UK and European data protection law fall on ‘controllers’ and ‘processors’. A ‘controller’ is defined as a person or body ‘which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data’.1 Controllers are predominantly responsible for data protection compliance, and bear the vast majority of obligations under the GDPR and DPA 2018. Processors, on the other hand, are bodies that ‘process personal data on behalf of the controller’.2 Processors had no statutory obligations prior to the GDPR, and now only have limited responsibilities relating primarily to data security. They cannot choose to use the data they handle for their own purposes: if they do so, they then become controllers for that processing.3 Although a processor’s statutory obligations are limited, the effect of the requirement to have detailed contracts in place between controllers and processors under Article 28 of the GDPR does increase their potential liability.4 1 GDPR, Art 4(7). 2 GDPR, Art 4(8).

Data Protection and Sport  177 3 To do so without the consent of the controller would also be a breach of contract: see Section 3E, ‘Accountability’ below. 4 A processor who bears some responsibility for damage can also be initially sued for the entirety of the damage. See Section 7B, ‘Individual and group rights of action’ below.

A4.16 It is possible for an organisation to be both a controller and a processor for different processing activities. For example, the ICO’s guidance on controller and processors states: ‘If you are a processor that provides services to other controllers, you are very likely to be a controller for some personal data and a processor for other personal data. For example, you will have your own employees so you will be a controller regarding your employees’ personal data. However, you cannot be both a controller and a processor for the same processing activity’. 1

It is also possible for there to be more than one controller involved in the same processing activity. Where two bodies jointly determine the purposes and means of processing for the activity, they will be considered ‘joint controllers’.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/controllers-and-processors/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 GDPR, Art 26.

A4.17 There are also examples of organisations who are involved or associated in the processing of personal data, but are neither controllers nor processors. Examples of this are intermediary service providers (as defined by Directive 2000/31/EC) who act as a ‘mere conduit’1 for data, such as ISPs that connect a user to the Internet. Other organisations may avoid being controllers where they can demonstrate that they process only anonymised information. However, organisations that do not have access to personal data but that take essential decisions about its processing can still be controllers, according to recent CJEU case law.2 1 Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, [2000] OJ L178/1, Art 12. 2 In C-25/17 Tietosuojavaltuutettu intervening parties – Jehovan todistajat – uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, para 75, the CJEU held that ’[…] a religious community is a controller […] without it being necessary that the community has access to those data’. In C-210/16 Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, para 38, the CJEU held: ‘In any event, [data protection law] does not, where several operators are jointly responsible for the same processing, require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned’.

A4.18 The factual analysis of whether an organisation is a controller is not straightforward. The Article  29 Working Party gave specific advice on this topic in its ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”’ (WP169), noting that the point often ‘requires […] complex analysis and is […] likely to lead to divergent interpretations’.1 This authoritative guidance is now due to be replaced by the EDPB’s new Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controllers and processor in the GDPR (‘Draft EDPB Control Guidelines’), although the final version of this guidance had not been released at the time of writing.2 As both WP169 and the Draft EDPB Control Guidelines explain, regulatory expediency has led to a broad interpretation of the role of controller (and, as set out below in most recent cases, the allocation of joint control). As explained in the Draft EDPB Control Guidelines: ‘as the underlying objective of attributing the role of controller is to ensure accountability and the effective and comprehensive protection of the personal data, the concept of ‘controller’ should be interpreted in a sufficiently broad way so as to ensure full effect of EU data protection law, to avoid lacunae and to prevent possible circumvention of the rules’.3 1 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”’, WP169 adopted 16 February 2010, p 12.

178  Governance of the Sports Sector 2 EDPB ‘Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controllers and processor in the GDPR’ Version 1.0, Adopted on 02 September 2020 for public consultation. 3 Ibid, p 9.

A4.19 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines examine, in detail, the ‘building blocks’ behind the definition of controller under the GDPR.1 Having explained that there is ‘no limitation as to the type of entity that may assume the role of a controller’, the EDPB explains how to assess whether a body ‘determines’ the means and purposes of data processing. It suggests that the circumstances ‘giving rise to control’ can be distinguished as: (a) ‘control stemming from legal provisions’ – responsibility for a certain task may be set out by law. These might be statutory obligations to maintain certain records, or obligations to carry out certain processing under legislation (such as requirements under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002);2 or (b) ‘control stemming from factual influence’ – absent specific responsibility under law, the responsibility of a controller must be established following ‘an assessment of the factual circumstances surrounding the processing.’ Control may stem from ‘established legal practice’, or from the exercise of traditional roles which imply responsibility for data protection purposes. For example, an employer is responsible for data relating to its employees, and a retail business is responsible for its customers’ data.3 A contract may also assist if it contains ‘sufficient elements to infer who exercises a decision-making role with respect to the purposes and means of processing’.4 However, the key is to determine which party – or parties – decide ‘why and how personal data are processed’.5 1 Draft EDPB Control Guidelines, pp 9–16. The EDPB sets this out as five ‘building blocks’: (a) the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body; (b) determines; (c) alone or jointly with others; (d) the purposes and means; (e) of the processing of personal data. 2 Ibid, p 11. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, p 12. 5 Ibid.

A4.20 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines explain that ‘the controller must decide on both purpose and means of the processing’.1 A processor ‘can never determine the purpose of processing’ and ‘decisions on the purpose of processing are clearly always for the controller to make’.2 However, in assessing the determination of the means of processing, the EDPB acknowledges that ‘some margin of manoeuvre may exist for the processor’ to take certain decisions.3 The EDPB explains that there is an important distinction to be made between: (a)

Determination of essential means – whoever makes this decision is a controller, as these are ‘close linked to the purpose and scope of processing and are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller’. Examples given by the EDPB of essential means are: (i) which data will be processed; (ii) the duration of data processing; (iii) who shall have access to the data; and (iv) whose data will be processed.4 (b) Determination of non-essential means – by contrast, the EDPB explains that these ‘concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures’. These decisions can be delegated to the processor. 5 1 Draft EDPB Control Guidelines, p 13. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, p 14. 5 Ibid/

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A4.21 Article 26 of the GDPR provides: ‘where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and means of processing, they shall be joint controllers’. This provision requires these controllers to document the allocation of responsibilities between themselves in writing and to explain this allocation in a transparent manner to individuals. A4.22 Although WP169 predates these specific obligations, joint control was anticipated under the DP Directive, and the Article 29 Working Party gave its views on what should be considered joint control. They noted that: ‘[…] the mere fact that different subjects cooperate in processing personal data, for example in a chain, does not entail that they are joint controllers in all cases, since an exchange of data between two parties without sharing purposes or means in a common or set of operations should be considered only as a transfer of data between separate controllers’.1

WP169 goes on to say, however: ‘[…] in some cases, various actors process the same personal data in a sequence. In these cases, it is likely that at micro-level the different processing operations of the chain appear as disconnected, as each of them may have a different purpose. However, it is necessary to double check whether at macro-level these processing operations should not be considered as a “set of operations” pursuing a joint purpose or using jointly defined means’.2 1 WP169, p 21. 2 Ibid, p 22.

A4.23 Recent CJEU cases seem to set the bar for joint control at a lower level than suggested in WP169.1 This chain of cases is explored in the Advocate General’s opinion in Case C-40/17 Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV.2 The collective impact of this jurisprudence led Advocate General Bobek to ask ‘who then is not a joint controller? Will effective protection be enhanced if everyone is made responsible for ensuring it?’3 Nonetheless, both he and the judges of the CJEU found that the bar for being considered joint controllers must be set at a low level, to ‘ensure the effective and comprehensive protection’ of data subjects.4 This is not to say that liability is considered to be a matter to be equally split between the parties regardless of involvement. The CJEU made it clear that ‘on the contrary, [joint controllers] may be involved at different stages of that processing of personal data and to different degrees, with the result that the level of liability of each of them must be assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances of the particular case’.5 1 See C-210/16 Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, and C-25/17 Tietosuojavaltuutettu intervening parties – Jehovan todistajat – uskonnollinen yhdyskunta. 2 C-40/17 Fashion ID  GmbH & Co. KG  v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV, Opinion of A-G  Bobek, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1039. 3 Ibid, pp 70-71. 4 C-40/17 Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629, para 70. 5 Ibid.

A4.24 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines also address joint control in the wake of these CJEU judgments. The EDPB explains that the ‘overarching criterion for joint controllership to exist is the joint participation of two or more entities in the determination of the purposes and means of a processing operation’.1 It will not be enough for entities to jointly determine purpose alone – joint activity must extend to the determination of essential means. In discussing the assessment of joint participation that organisations must make, the EDPB appears to adopt the low threshold set by the CJEU judgments by emphasising the importance of considering

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both ‘common decisions’ and ‘converging decisions’.2 On converging decisions, the type of joint control established through the CJEU judgments, the EDPB explains: ‘an important criteria [sic] to identify converging decisions in this context is whether the processing would not be possible without both parties’ participation in the sense that the processing by each party is inseparable, ie inextricably linked’. 3

Joint determination of purpose, the EDPB adds, need not mean that the same purpose is pursued, provided that the entities involved ‘pursue purposes which are closely linked or complementary […] for example, where there is a mutual benefit arising from the same processing operation’ and this isn’t simply a case of ‘being paid for services rendered’.4 Joint determination of means, meanwhile, requires merely that the entities have ‘exerted influence’ over the means of processing, and different controllers can be solely responsible for determining certain means. In particular, the EDPB says that if one entity provides the predominant means of processing – such as a tool or platform – and makes it available to others, a controller who chooses to make use of that tool should still be considered to be jointly determining the means of processing.5 The use of such common tools or infrastructure will not always lead to joint control, but organisations will need to show that ‘the processing they carry out is separable and could be performed by one party without intervention from the other’ or that the other party acts as a processor without a purpose of its own.6 1 Draft EDPB Control Guidelines, p 17. 2 Ibid, p 18. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, p 19. 5 Ibid, p 20. 6 Ibid.

A4.25 Sports organisations may often find themselves in joint control relationships, given this low threshold and their frequent collaboration with others. For example, a sports governing body may find itself a joint controller with a competition organiser, or a professional club may find itself a joint controller with sponsors when carrying out hosted marketing.1 A  prudent approach, in light of the case law and the Draft EDPB Control Guidelines discussed above, would be to assume that a joint control relationship exists when interacting with other controllers over the same data unless each party has clearly distinct purposes and processing activities. Sports bodies in this position should take care to allocate data responsibilities and liabilities between themselves and the other controller(s) in writing. 1 See Section 6A, ‘Direct marketing – the GDPR and PECR’, below, on hosted marketing and joint control.

C What is the scope of data protection law? A4.26 Data protection law began life not as a general privacy law, but rather as a reaction to the risks perceived in automated data handling when computers began to land on office desks. This can be seen in the fact that the GDPR excludes from its scope the use of personal data by an individual ‘in the course of purely personal or household activity’,1 and is limited in Article 2(1) to processing ‘by automated means’ and ‘other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system’. Non-automated data will usually be in the form of paper records, or handwritten notes. The definition of a filing system in the GDPR is ‘any structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis’.2  UK public authorities (caught by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002) should be

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aware that even unstructured non-automated data that they process will be considered personal data, thanks to an extension of scope under s 21 of the DPA 2018. 1 GDPR, Art 2(2)(c). 2 The CJEU, in considering the identical language contained in the DP  Directive, held in C-25/17 Tietosuojavaltuutettu intervening parties – Jehovan todistajat – uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, at para 57 that ‘it appears that the requirement that the set of personal data must be “structured according to specific criteria” is simply intended to enable personal data to be easily retrieved’. This appears to lead to a broader interpretation of what is caught by data protection law than was understood by the previous UK law concept of a ‘relevant filing system’ under the Data Protection Act 1998.

A4.27 The other limit on the scope of both the GDPR and the UK GDPR that will be created by the Data Protection Exit Regulations is territorial. This is not to say that either piece of legislation is unambitious in this respect. On the contrary, many sports organisations outside of the EU and the UK respectively will find themselves caught by these laws. Article 3 of the GDPR states that data protection law will extend to any organisation established in the EU,1 or to organisations established outside the EU where they either offer goods or services to data subjects in the EU (irrespective of whether payment is required)2 or monitor the behaviour of data subjects, so far as their behaviour takes place in the EU.3 Guidance on the extent of this territorial application has been produced by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB),4 in its Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR under Article 3 (‘Territorial Scope Guidelines’).5 1 2 3 4

GDPR, Art 3(1). GDPR, Art 3(2)(a). GDPR, Art 3(2)(b). This is a legal body set up under Art 68 of the GDPR, composed of a representative from a supervisory authority for each EU Member State, with tasks (including the drafting of guidelines) set out in Art 70 of the GDPR. 5 Version 2.0, published 19 November 2019.

A4.28 The concept of establishment, which Recital 22 of the GDPR tells us ‘implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements’, has been broadly interpreted both by the courts and regulators. The CJEU has ruled both that establishment ‘extends to any real and effective activity — even a minimal one’,1 and that the processing ‘in the context of activities’ of an establishment ‘cannot be interpreted restrictively’2 and includes the carrying out of activities in a Member State that lead to a non-EU operator’s activities being profitable, where these two activities are ‘inextricably linked’.3 This could potentially extend the scope of the GDPR to the wider processing of global sports organisations with representative offices or subsidiaries located in the EU or UK carrying out promotion or sales activities. 1 C-230/14 Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, ECLI:EU:C:2015:639, para 31. 2 C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v AEPD, Mario Costeja González ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 53. 3 In Google Spain, ibid at para 56, the provision of a search engine by Google’s US company and its associated data processing was considered to be established through Google’s Spanish entity, ‘since the activities relating to the advertising space [performed by the Spanish entity] constitute the means of rendering the search engine at issue economically profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the means enabling those activities to be performed’.

A4.29 It is worth stressing that once considered established in the EU or UK, all processing carried out in the context of that establishment will be covered by the GDPR or UK GDPR respectively. This can include the processing of data collected outside of the EU by an EU established entity. For example, a Premier League club collecting data about its fans in Asia, or a European tennis tournament processing data about entrants from all over the globe, must apply the principles of the GDPR to the entirety of their processing.

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A4.30 Beyond the broad interpretation of establishment, global sports bodies are perhaps more likely to be drawn into the scope of European data protection law by offering goods or services to data subjects located in the EU or UK, or by monitoring their behaviour. The GDPR will apply to such processing activities, although not to other unconnected processing carried out by affected bodies.1 On the offering of goods and services, Recital 23 of the GDPR explains that: ‘[…] it should be ascertained whether it is apparent that the controller or processor envisages offering services to data subjects in one or more Member States in the Union. Whereas the mere accessibility of the controller’s, processor’s or an intermediary’s website in the Union, of an email address or of other contact details, or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller is established, is insufficient to ascertain such intention, factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in one or more Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and services in that other language, or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, may make it apparent that the controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union’.

This clearly prompts a need for a case-by-case analysis of how EU data subjects may come to receive goods or services. Additional guidance on relevant factors that demonstrate the targeting of EU data subjects can be found in the Territorial Scope Guidelines, such as the payment for advertising targeted at EU users or the use of local top-level domains.2 Organisations likely to be covered by these rules include global events such as the Olympic Games, whose local organising committees may try to sell tickets to EU and UK data subjects, or seek to recruit them as volunteers. 1 Territorial Scope Guidelines, p 14: ‘The EDPB stresses that a controller or processor may be subject to the GDPR in relation to some of its processing activities but not subject to the GDPR in relation to other processing activities’. 2 Ibid, pp 17–18.

A4.31 There is limited guidance on what is meant by ‘monitoring the behaviour’ of data subjects. A plain English understanding of this provision could easily include a wide variety of activities, including those carried out in pursuit of regulatory and disciplinary policies described in this book, such as drug-testing and intelligence gathering. This does not obviously require a technological element to the monitoring. However, Recital 24 of the GDPR suggests the intention of the EU legislator was narrower: ‘In order to determine whether a processing activity can be considered to monitor the behaviour of data subjects, it should be ascertained whether natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential subsequent use of personal data processing techniques which consist of profiling a natural person, particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes’.

A4.32 The Territorial Scope Guidelines do not dwell on this aspect of extraterritorial reach to any great length. The EDPB does explain that it sees the scope of behavioural monitoring to be wider than merely internet-based activity, stating that it ‘considers that tracking through other types of network or technology involving personal data processing should also be taken into account […] for example through wearable and other smart devices’.1 This still suggests a technological focus, but among the list of examples given of monitoring activities are ‘market surveys and behavioural studies based on individual profiles’, and ‘monitoring or regular reporting on an individual’s health status’, neither of which is inherently technology-assisted. It would be risky to assume that anti-doping or other integrity-monitoring strategies involving the monitoring of individuals located in the EU or UK are excluded from the scope of the GDPR by reason of either Recital 24 or the Territorial Scope

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Guidelines. Sports bodies outside the EU should also consider how some of their commercial activities may be caught by this limb of extra-territorial scope: many websites are supported by use of cookies and targeted advertising. Both ‘behavioural advertisement’ and ‘online tracking through the use of cookies and other tracking techniques’ are listed as examples of behavioural monitoring caught by the GDPR.2 1 Territorial Scope Guidelines, p 19 2 All examples listed at Territorial Scope Guidelines, p 20.

A4.33 Where an organisation established outside of the EU is caught by the GDPR, it is required by Article 27 to appoint an EU-based representative, subject to some narrow exceptions involving occasional use or public bodies. Representatives particularly stand in for – or alongside – the controller or processor for communications purposes.1 They are also obliged to maintain a record of processing, which is discussed further in Section 3E, ‘Accountability’, below.2 Importantly, ‘the GDPR does not establish a substitutive liability of the representative in place of the controller or processor it represents in the Union’.3 This is not an obligation that will be replicated in the UK GDPR. If a body has no establishment in the UK but is otherwise caught by UK data protection law,4 there will be a requirement to appoint a ‘UK representative’. 1 2 3 4

GDPR, Art 27(4). GDPR, Art 30. Territorial Scope Guidelines, pp 27–28. Ie through the offering of goods and services to data subjects in the UK or monitoring their behaviour in the UK – see para A4.30

3 DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND SPORT A4.34 Data protection law is founded on ‘principles’, set out in the GDPR in Article 5. These ‘lie at the heart of the general data protection regime’,1 and underpin the majority of the more specific obligations of the GDPR. This Section focuses on the way these principles impact on the processing of data conducted by organisations active in the sport sector. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/ [accessed 29 September 2020].

A Lawful, fair and transparent A4.35 The first data protection principle, set out in GDPR, Article  5(a), is that personal data must be processed ‘lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject’.

(a) Lawful – the need for a lawful basis for processing A4.36 All processing carried out by and on behalf of controllers must be lawful. Clearly, if a controller carries out processing that is prohibited by law,1 it will fall foul of this principle. Additionally, however, the GDPR requires that all processing must have a lawful basis. The potential legal grounds for processing are set out in Article 6 of GDPR. Controllers must select and identify their legal basis for processing at the outset, as it must be identified within the information given to individuals.2 The ICO’s guidance cautions controllers to ‘take care to get it right first time – you should not swap to a different lawful basis at a later date without good reason’.3 Different data subject rights, set out in Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, below, may apply

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depending on the legal basis selected. Additionally, processing of special category data can only take place where it satisfies a condition under Article 9 of the GDPR.4 1 Such as certain solely automated decisions, according to Art 22 of the GDPR. 2 GDPR, Arts 13 and 14 – discussed at para A4.84. 3 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. 4 See para A4.55 et seq.

A4.37 The available legal grounds under Article 6 are: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

consent (Art 6(1)(a)); contractual necessity (Art 6(1)(b)); legal obligations (Arti 6(1)(c)); processing necessary to protect an individual’s vital interests (Art 6(1)(d)); processing necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest or in the exercise of a controller’s official authority (Art 6(1)(e) – in practice, this limb is limited to public authorities; and processing necessary ‘for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject’ (Art 6(1) (f)). This ground is not available to public authorities.

A4.38 Where processing is genuinely necessary to perform a contract (such as processing associated with ticket sales) or to comply with a legal obligation (such as processing necessary to comply with employment and tax laws), it will be clear which legal basis should be selected. Where these grounds are not available, private sports bodies will typically be left to decide whether to rely upon consent or whether it is possible to process data on the basis of legitimate interest. For this reason, it is important to understand the limits and pitfalls associated with these two limbs of Article 6.

(b) Consent and the problem of validity A4.39 Consent is perhaps the best known legal basis for processing, and perhaps the most overused. In order for consent to be valid as a ground for processing personal data, it must be freely given, specific, and informed.1 It must also be ‘an unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her’.2 Consent therefore may not be implied from silence, pre-ticked boxes, or inaction.3 It must also be capable of being withdrawn at any time, and data subjects must be told this at the moment consent is obtained.4 Although the processing carried out prior to consent being withdrawn is still lawful,5 an alternative legal basis is required for any further processing after such withdrawal. Given the ICO’s comment that organisations should not readily ‘swap’ legal basis at the moment it becomes inconvenient,6 organisations should only seek to rely on consent where they are comfortable that processing can be halted if consent is withdrawn, or where there is no reasonable alternative. This said, reliance on consent as the legal basis for processing cannot always be avoided: electronic marketing and the placement of cookies can only be done with valid consent (see Section 6, Direct marketing, ePrivacy and sport’, below) and it may be the only available legal basis for certain uses of special category personal data. 1 GDPR, Art 4(11). 2 Ibid. 3 GDPR, Recital 32. 4 GDPR, Art 7(3). 5 Ibid. 6 See para A4.36.

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A4.40 The concept of ‘freely given’ consent is considered further in both guidance from the EDPB,1 and in the Recitals of the GDPR. Consent must be truly voluntary. In the EDPB  Consent Guidelines, the Board emphasised that ‘if the data subject has no real choice, feels compelled to consent or will endure negative consequences if they do not consent, then consent will not be valid’.2 This guidance should be a reason for sports governing bodies to avoid reliance on consent where processing is necessary to administer or regulate a sport; they should rely instead on legitimate interests (discussed below from para A4.47). This is because if an individual cannot participate in the sport without agreeing to the processing taking place, consent is unlikely to be considered to be ‘freely given’ for data protection purposes.3 This was a point raised by the Article 29 Working Party in various stages of the consultation on the World Anti-Doping Agency’s International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information4 (ISPPI),5 and more recently by the EDPB in its letter to the Presidency of the European Council and its enclosed ‘Remarks and comments on the compliance of the WADA Code and its International Standards with the GDPR’ (‘Anti-Doping Remarks’): ‘Regarding consent, as mentioned in the Article 29 WP’s second Opinion 4/2009, 3.3, the requirement of such a consent to process personal data (Art 6.1  ISPPI), including sensitive data (Art 6.3 ISPPI) does not comply with article 6, 7 and 9 of GDPR. Indeed, although the ISPPI requires that such a consent “shall be informed, freely given, specific and unambiguous” the sanctions and the negative consequences attached to a possible refusal by participants to consent to the processing of their personal information as required for the purposes of the Code may prevent them to give a truly free consent (in this regard, see Article 6.2 of the ISSPI). Therefore, the validity of such consent is problematic’.6

See further para A4.60 on practicalities relating to processing of special category data in the context of sports rules, including in relation to anti-doping. 1 Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679, version 1.0 adopted 4  May 2020 (‘EDPB Consent Guidelines’). 2 Ibid, p 6. 3 This may not be true of consent obtained for other purposes in the rules of the sporting organisation (See eg  discussion of validity of consent to doping rules at para C3.7 and of consent to arbitrate disputes at para D3.27 et seq) or indeed consent obtained to comply with other privacy rules outside of the EU, where strict approach taken in the GDPR to validity of consent may not apply. To date there has not been CJEU consideration the ‘freely given’ requirement of consent, but the guidance from both the EDPB and the ICO is consistent and clear (ibid, and ico.org.uk/for-organisations/ guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/what-is-validconsent/#what2 [accessed 29 September 2020]). In the absence of judicial consideration, and given the CJEU typically considers WP29 opinions and EDPB guidelines to be authoritative, reliance on legitimate interests is less risky. 4 See para C2.19. 5 Opinion 3/2008 of the Article 29 Working Party on the World Anti-Doping Code draft International Standard for the Protection of Privacy (WP 156), Second opinion 4/2009 on the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information, on related provisions of the WADA Code and on other privacy issues in the context of the fight against doping in sport by WADA and (national) anti-doping organisations (WP162), Letter from the Article 29 Working Party addressed to World Anti-Doping Agency, regarding 3rd stage of WADA’s consultation in the context of the review of the World Anti-Doping Code and its International Standards (5 March 2013). 6 OUT2019-0035, p 5.

A4.41 The GDPR and EDPB Consent Guidelines also touch on other circumstances where consent is unlikely to be considered to be freely given. First, Recital 43 of the GDPR states that consent will not be freely given ‘where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller’. In addition to the example of public authorities given in this Recital, the employment relationship is flagged in the EDPB Consent Guidelines as one with an imbalance of power likely to affect validity of consent. As explained in the Guidelines, ‘employees can only give free consent in

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exceptional circumstances, when it will have no adverse consequences at all whether or not they give consent’.1 This could be the case where there is a genuine alternative offered without detriment, such as providing an alternative method of accessing a building if an employee refuses to provide details for a biometric access point. 1 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 8.

A4.42 A further restriction on when consent can be considered to be freely given is set out in Article 7(4) of the GDPR: ‘When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract’.

This provision restricts controllers’ ability to incentivise consent. Prior to the GDPR, it had been common practice to effectively seek an individual’s consent as the price of ‘free’ services or competitions. For example, ‘consent to our email marketing, and you could win a signed t-shirt!’ The presumption in Article 7(4) is that seeking consent for processing that is unnecessary for the performance of the contract is invalid: the EDPB Consent Guidelines suggest that the circumstances where it will be valid ‘will be highly exceptional’.1 The ICO has given is own guidance on the validity of consent, and has touched briefly on this point: ‘The ICO’s view is that it may still be possible to incentivise consent to some extent. There will usually be some benefit to consenting to processing. For example, if joining the retailer’s loyalty scheme comes with access to money-off vouchers, there is clearly some incentive to consent to marketing. The fact that this benefit is unavailable to those who don’t sign up does not amount to a detriment for refusal. However, you must be careful not to cross the line and unfairly penalise those who refuse consent’.2

The difficulty for controllers is that such guidance does not give them certainty: where is this line drawn? It is safer to either avoid incentives, or to obtain any consent separately to ensure that it is not conditional. 1 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 10. 2 ICO Guidance on Consent, 9 May 2019, v1.0.19, (‘ICO Guidance on Consent’), p 27.

A4.43 As well as being freely given, consent must be specific and informed. To meet these requirements, the following information must be given to the data subject no later than the time consent is obtained: (a) The name of the controller.1 As set out in the ICO  Guidance on Consent, ‘this means you need to identify yourself, and also identify any third party controllers who will be relying on the consent’.2 This has had a particularly detrimental impact on the ability to buy in marketing lists or obtain consent for a wide group of third party partners or sponsors (see Section 6, ‘Direct marketing, ePrivacy and sport’, below). As the ICO explains, such indirectly obtained consent is only valid ‘if you were specifically identified’ at the time consent was given as a controller who would be relying on that consent.3 (b) The purpose/purposes of processing.4 Consent may be need to be separated into multiple granular consents if there are separate processing operations, as Recital 43 of the GDPR says that ‘consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case’. (c) Information about the right to withdraw consent.5 The EDPB also states that controllers should also explain what data is being collected and used.6

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GDPR, Recital 42. ICO Guidance on Consent, p 27. ICO Guidance on Consent, p 28. GDPR, Recital 42. GDPR, Art 7(3). EDPB Consent Guidelines. p 14.

A4.44 If consent has been determined to be the most appropriate legal basis for processing, there are additional practicalities to be taken on board. First, Article 7(1) of the GDPR explains that the controller must be able to ‘demonstrate’ that consent has been obtained. While there is no rule preventing reliance on verbal consent, controllers should maintain evidence of any consent they obtain. The ICO Guidance on Consent tells us that controllers: ‘must keep good records that demonstrate the following: • • •

•

•

Who consented: the name of the individual, or other identifier (eg online user name, session ID). When they consented: a copy of a dated document, or online records that include a timestamp; or, for oral consent, a note of the time and date which was made at the time of the conversation. What they were told at the time: a master copy of the document or data capture form containing the consent statement in use at that time, along with any separate privacy policy or other privacy information, including version numbers and dates matching the date consent was given. If consent was given orally, your records should include a copy of the script used at that time. How they consented: for written consent, a copy of the relevant document or data capture form. If consent was given online, your records should include the data submitted as well as a timestamp to link it to the relevant version of the data capture form. If consent was given orally, you should keep a note of this made at the time of the conversation – it doesn’t need to be a full record of the conversation. Whether they have withdrawn consent: and if so, when’.1

1 ICO Guidance on Consent, p 40.

A4.45 Many sports organisations will process data relating to children. As well as affecting capacity to consent, this is relevant in other areas discussed in this chapter, in particular in relation to transparency (see para A4.80) and rights (Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’)). Parental consent may be required from children if consent is the appropriate legal basis and the children lack capacity to consent. The ICO Consent Guidance explains that usual UK rules apply, in that controllers ‘should consider whether the individual child has the competence to understand and consent for themselves (the “Gillick competence test”)’.1 Where consent is required for online processing, the GDPR specifically requires that parental consent be sought for children below a certain age.2 This age varies by Member State between the ages of 13 and 16 (the UK has selected 133). Organisations processing data from multiple Member States need to ensure they meet requirements relevant to each country they target.4 This may be far from straightforward to apply in practice. 1 2 3 4

ICO Guidance on Consent, p 33. GDPR, Art 8, where consent is sought for information society services. DPA 2018, s.9. EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 26.

A4.46 A further important limitation on consent is that it is not likely to be valid indefinitely. The EDPB Consent Guidelines tell us: ‘There is no specific time limit in the GDPR for how long consent will last. How long consent lasts will depend on the context, the scope of the original consent and

188  Governance of the Sports Sector the expectations of the data subject. If the processing operations change or evolve considerably then the original consent is no longer valid’.1

Recently, the ICO released a draft direct marketing code of practice (‘Draft Direct Marketing Code’).2 This broadly repeated the EDPB guidance on this point, adding only that ‘consent does not last forever’.3 1 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 22. 2 ICO, ‘Draft Direct Marketing Code of Practice’, Version 1.0 for consultation, published 8 January 2020. 3 Ibid, p 41.

(c) Legitimate interests and balancing tests A4.47 As set out in the ICO’s online guidance, ‘legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing’.1 As a result, it is perhaps the legal basis most frequently used by most private organisations. It cannot be used by public bodies in the performance of their tasks,2 but for these purposes, as in many other contexts,3 sports governing bodies would be considered private organisations, not public bodies. In C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalde v Rigas pašvaldibas SIA ‘Rigas satiksme’ (Rigas), the CJEU explained that this legal basis consists of: ‘[…] three cumulative conditions […] namely, first, the pursuit of a legitimate interest by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed; second, the need to process personal data for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued; and third, that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned by the data protection do not take precedence’.4 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 GDPR, Art 6(1)(f) para 2. 3 See para A1.19 (self-governance by sports governing bodies), Chapter E5 (Public or Private?), para E12.126 (free movement), para E13.7 (human rights). 4 C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalde v Rigas pašvaldibas SIA ‘Rigas satiksme’ ECLI:EU:C:2017:336, para 28.

A4.48 Any number of interests may be considered legitimate. The GDPR specifically cites some examples in its Recitals, including fraud prevention,1 direct marketing,2 group administration,3 and network and information security.4 In Rigas, the CJEU held that there was ‘no doubt that the interest of a third party in obtaining the personal information of a person who damaged their property in order to sue that person for damages’5 was a legitimate one. The ICO’s online guidance explains: ‘Because the term “legitimate interest” is broad, the interests do not have to be very compelling (although in some instances they may be) and it does not rule out interests that are more trivial […]. Showing that you have a legitimate interest does mean however that you (or a third party) must have some clear and specific benefit or outcome in mind. It is not enough to rely on vague or generic business interests. You must think about specifically what you are trying to achieve with the particular processing operation’.6

Determining whether an interest is legitimate is described by the ICO as the ‘purpose test’. In a sporting context, this will require an organisation to go beyond determining that they have a legitimate interest in holding (for example) athlete performance data, and be precise about its intended uses of that data: for instance, an interest in retaining a historical archive of results, in commercial exploitation of images and footage, or in analysis to seek a strategic advantage. All of these uses may be legitimate. 1 GDPR, Recital 47. 2 Ibid. 3 GDPR, Recital 48.

Data Protection and Sport  189 4 GDPR, Recital 49. 5 C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalde v Rigas pašvaldibas SIA ‘Rigas satiksme p 29. 6 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020].

A4.49 The next test, according to Rigas, is whether the use of data is necessary in order to achieve this purpose. According to the ICO’s online guidance: ‘This doesn’t mean that [the use of data] has to be absolutely essential, but it must be a targeted and proportionate way of achieving your purpose. You need to decide on the facts of each case whether the processing is proportionate and adequately targeted to meet its objectives, and whether there is any less intrusive alternative, ie can you achieve your purpose by some other reasonable means without processing the data in this way? If you could achieve your purpose in a less invasive way, then the more invasive way is not necessary’.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020].

A4.50 The most limiting of the three tests is the need to consider whether the identified legitimate interest is ‘overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child’.1 This requires controllers to demonstrate that they have considered the impact on data subjects. In Rigas and in Breyer, the CJEU emphasised that the outcome of any balancing test ‘depends in principle on the specific circumstances of the particular case’.2 Nonetheless, there is some guidance in the GDPR and in guidance. In Recital 47 of the GDPR,3 particular import is placed on whether individuals can ‘reasonably expect’ the processing. Controllers must be able to show how individuals are informed about the relevant processing activities or explain why a relevant exemption to notice applies. The ICO’s online guidance on legitimate interests explains that notice, although important, is not the only relevant factor: ‘Simply having warned the individual in advance that their data will be processed in a certain way does not necessarily mean that your legitimate interests always prevail, irrespective of harm. And in some cases you may still be able to justify unexpected processing if you have a compelling reason for it’.4 1 GDPR, Article 6(1)(f). 2 Rigas, para 31, See also Breyer, para 62. 3 In particular, the Recital states that ‘[…] at any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. The interests and fundamental rights of the data subject could in particular override the interest of the data controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect further processing’. 4 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020].

A4.51 As part of this assessment, it is important to whether the types of negative impact that may result from the intended processing override the interest the controller has identified. Recital 75 of the GDPR explains that ‘risk to rights and freedoms’ includes a wide variety of injury, including ‘physical, material and non-material damage’. Processing that deprives individuals of their rights, that is discriminatory, that causes significant social or economic disadvantage, or results in individuals being ‘prevented from exercising control’, are all listed as examples of such risks. However, it is not the case that any negative impact on data subjects will result in the legal basis being invalid. Instead, we are told by the ICO that it is necessary to consider whether any negative impact is ‘warranted’.1 The position was

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well summarised in the Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP217): ‘Legitimate interests of the controller, when minor and not very compelling may, in general, only override the interests and rights of data subjects in cases where the impact on these rights and interests are even more trivial. On the other hand, important and compelling legitimate interests may in some cases and subject to safeguards and measures justify even significant intrusion into privacy or other significant impact on the interests or rights of the data subjects’.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC’, WP217, adopted 9 April 2014, p 30.

A4.52 Both Recital 75 of the GDPR and WP217 note that, when carrying out an assessment, not all data or data subjects are equal. Recital 75 tells us that particular risk arises when processing data of ‘vulnerable natural persons, in particular of children’. WP217 confirms that ‘it is important to assess the effect of actual processing on particular individuals’.1 The Working Party also flagged that the nature of the personal data to be processed was a relevant consideration, noting that ‘in general, the more sensitive the information involved, the more consequences there may be for the data subject’.2 The previous processing of data may also be a factor in a balancing test – for example, ‘whether the data has already been made publicly available by the data subject or by third parties may be relevant’.3 1 WP217, p 41. 2 Ibid, p 39. 3 Ibid.

A4.53 The ICO has made clear that it expects controllers to carry out formal ‘Legitimate Interests Assessments’ to determine whether they have met these three tests.1 A template can be found on its website.2 This assessment should be carried out prior to the commencement of processing, and is an important part of the accountability documentation that should be maintained by controllers (see Section 3(E) below). 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. 2 ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/forms/2258435/gdpr-guidance-legitimate-interests-sample-liatemplate.docx – [accessed 29 September 2020].

A4.54 Where controllers choose to rely on legitimate interests, this impacts on other obligations, such as what must be included in a privacy notice, and on the rights of individuals. In particular, the right to object to processing is a powerful tool for individuals. This is further discussed in Section 4(B), ‘The rights of access and portability’ below.

(d) Special category data A4.55 Processing of special category data is unavoidable in certain areas of sport. Health data, in particular, is captured through anti-doping tests, through management of athletes’ injuries and performance, and in the assessment of eligibility for disabled sport. Other types of special category data may also be processed. Information on religion or ethnicity may be vital to help diversity initiatives, whilst an investigation into a safeguarding allegation may involve the collection of information about a child or alleged perpetrator’s sex life. Use of this data is however prohibited by the GDPR

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unless the relevant controller can demonstrate that it has met one of the conditions under Article 9(2). A4.56 The available Article 9(2) legal grounds are: (a) the explicit consent of the data subject (Art 9(2)(a)); (b) processing is necessary to meet employment law or social security law requirements (eg  collecting health data to provide maternity or disability rights), as set out in EU or Member State law (Art 9(2)(b)); (c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of an individual where the data subject is unable to give consent (Art 9(2)(c)); (d) certain processing by political, philosophical or religious non-profits or trade union where processing relates solely to members and is not disclosed without consent (Art 9(2)(d)); (e) processing involves personal data ‘manifestly made public’ by the data subject (Art 9(2)(e)); (f) processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity (Art 9(2)(f); (g) processing is necessary for ‘reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of EU or Member State law’ (Art 9(2)(g)); (h) processing is necessary for preventative or occupational medicine, including ‘assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of EU or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional’ (Art 9(2)(h)); (i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats on the basis of EU or Member State law (Art 9(2)(i)); or (j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes based on EU or Member State law (Art 9(2)(j)). A4.57 For processing of special category data to be legitimate, it must have an Article 6 legal basis and it must meet one of these Article 9 conditions. A key difference between the two Articles is that whilst Article 6 is self-executing, a number of the provisions in Article 9 require reference to national or EU legislation. Controllers cannot assume that they can (for example) identify for themselves whether there is a substantial public interest in processing. Where a provision requires that there be a basis in EU or Member State law, controllers must look to that law for such basis. Although the GDPR recognises that references to laws can be broadly interpreted, and do ‘not necessarily require a legislative act adopted by a parliament’,1 there is no specific EU or UK sports legislation.2 Controllers therefore need to consider laws on a country by country basis. For controllers located outside the EU, this may require reference to multiple countries’ laws. In this chapter, we focus on the UK’s approach to special category data, but now that the UK has left the EU, British controllers should be aware that where they collect special category data from EU countries they may also need to consider the laws of those countries. 1 GDPR Recital 41. 2 See para A1.8 and generally Chapter A3 (Government Intervention in the Sports Sector).

A4.58 In most countries, these additional special category data conditions are set out in subject-matter specific legislation. For example, in Ireland, a legal basis for the Irish National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO) to handle special category data is set out in s  43 of the Sport Ireland Act 2015. In the UK, special category data conditions are included within the DPA 2018 in Sch 1. Under the GDPR, criminal

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offence data is separately treated under Article  10.1 The UK legislator chose to apply similar rules to such data by extending and adapting the special category data conditions under the DPA 2018, Sch 1, Pt 3. 1 ‘Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures based on Article  6(1) shall be carried out only under the control of official authority or when the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects’.

A4.59 In addition to the five definitive conditions under Article 9 (explicit consent, vital interest, non-profits, data manifestly made public, and legal claims), Sch 1 to the DPA 2018 lists 28 potential conditions for processing special category data. While this chapter cannot review all of these possible options, we will touch specifically on the conditions that are most particularly relevant for sport: (from the GDPR) explicit consent, legal claims, and data manifestly made public, and (from the DPA 2018) safeguarding, anti-doping, and enforcement of ‘standards of behaviour’ in sport.

(e) Consent and the UK sport-specific provisions A4.60 Explicit consent is the first possible condition for processing of special category data listed in Article 9 of the GDPR. This needs to be differentiated from the Article 6 consent as a legal basis for processing data generally, even though that is already difficult to obtain in valid form.1 In the EDPB Consent Guidelines, the Board explains that ‘the term explicit refers to the way consent is expressed by the data subject. It means that the data subject must give an express statement of consent’.2 On occasion, explicit consent will be the only valid method of collecting and processing special category data. The EDPB Consent Guidelines give the example of an airline company offering an assisted travelling service to disabled passengers.3 However, in many of the circumstances in which sports bodies will process special category data there will be concerns about validity, especially whether the consent has been freely given, as discussed at para A4.40. 1 See para A4.40. 2 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 19. 3 Ibid, p 20.

A4.61 Sports governing bodies and Anti-Doping Organizations (ADOs) in particular risk any consent from participants being considered invalid due to the fact they would suffer detriment if they did not consent, or because of a perceived imbalance of power.1 Unfortunately, the GDPR itself does not include a clear legal basis for the processing that sports must carry out to ensure integrity and clean competition. A European Commission study carried out in 2017 on the impact of data protection law on anti-doping policy2 considered the existing national frameworks in place across all EU Member States prior to the introduction of the GDPR. It found that prior to the introduction of the GDPR, research showed ‘a diverse picture’ of legal grounds used to justify anti-doping, including explicit consent.3 The study’s authors also noted that representatives of NADOs interviewed for the study ‘varied in their views as to which grounds [under the GDPR] were most appropriate in the anti-doping context’.4 1 See para A4.40. 2 European Commission, ‘Anti-Doping & Data Protection: An evaluation of the anti-doping laws and practices in the EU  Member States in light of the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) (‘EU Anti-Doping Study’). 3 Ibid, p 115. 4 Ibid.

A4.62 Data processing for anti-doping purposes. The conclusion was that Member States should look to include a specific legal basis in their national

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legislation, under GDPR, Art 9(2)(i) or 9(2)(g), to permit NADOs and other ADOs to process special category data for the purposes of anti-doping.1 This was the approach that has been taken in Ireland to permit the processing of data by the Irish NADO,2 and by Switzerland in its Loi fédérale sur l’encouragement du sport (Federal Law for the Encouragement of Sport).3 Although neither the old Data Protection Act 1998 nor any other UK legislation set out any sportspecific condition for processing data prior to the introduction of the GDPR, the UK Government undertook ‘significant engagement with sports governing bodies’4 in the drafting of the DPA  2018. As a result, the UK now has a number of sports-driven conditions permitting processing of special category data, based on Article  9(2)(i) of the  GDPR. 1 EU Anti-Doping Study, pp 115-116. It should be noted that a number of the recommendations of the authors of EU Anti-Doping Study are controversial, and the legal analysis included within it has not been tested. Although this chapter cites some of their findings, it does not whole-heartedly endorse their conclusions. 2 See para A4.58. 3 Article 21 of the Loi fédérale sur l’encouragement du sport et de l’activité physique du 17 juin 2011, RO 2012 3953. This permits the processing and sharing of data, including ‘sensitive personal data’, by anti-doping organisations (defined in the same Article) that collect data as part of their activities for the purposes of analysing tests and sanctioning athletes that dope. 4 Hansard, HL (series 6) Vol 785, cols 1829 (13 November 2017).

A4.63 The processing of special category data for anti-doping purposes is addressed in Schedule 1, para 27 of the DPA 2018. It permits processing that is necessary: ‘(a) for the purposes of measures designed to eliminate doping which are undertaken by or under the responsibility of a body or association that is responsible for eliminating doping in a sport, at a sporting event or in sport generally, or (b) for the purposes of providing information about doping, or suspected doping, to such a body or association’.1

The paragraph goes on to explain that for the avoidance of doubt, ‘measures designed to eliminate doping includes measures designed to identify or prevent doping’.2 Unlike many of the conditions listed in Schedule 1, there is no need for the controller to demonstrate the particular ‘substantial public interest’ of any particular antidoping activity. 1 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 27(1). 2 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 27(2).

A4.64 This provision is helpfully broad, in a way that the Sport Ireland Act 2015 is not, in protecting the activities of a wide variety of ADOs, rather than only UK AntiDoping (UKAD) as the UK’s NADO. That reflects ‘the reality of split responsibility for anti-doping in UK sport today’.1 In fact, there is no specific reference to UKAD, to the World Anti-Doping Code, to a definitive list of measures considered valid processing, or to a definition of sport. This was an intentional decision by the government, as was discussed during the passage of the legislation, in recognition of the fact that ‘a large number of organisations, both domestic and international, work to prevent and eliminate doping in sport in this country’ and ‘have important roles to play’ in ensuring clean sport.2 The Lords discussed the position of the British Horseracing Authority at length, an organisation not subject to the World AntiDoping Code, and it is clear that the provision was intended to be able to permit the processing of special category data by such organisations as well as UK-based ADOs such as UKAD, the International Tennis Federation, and World Sailing.3 This should not be considered so broad as to permit an ad hoc group to start an antidoping programme, as the processing must still be necessary, the organisation must have clear responsibility for a sport or sporting event, and be able to demonstrate a legal basis under Article 6 (being, most likely, a legitimate interest not overridden

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by the rights and freedoms of individuals).4 Nonetheless, the clear intention of the government was to ensure that legitimate processing of special category data for anti-doping purposes could continue unencumbered by concerns about the validity of athlete consent for such processing. 1 Hansard, HL (series 6) Vol 785, col 1829 (13 November 2017). 2 Hansard, HL (series 6) Vol 787, col 1566 (13 December 2017). 3 Ibid, cols 1557–1570. 4 Compliance with this condition, or with any other paragraph in Sch 1 to the DPA 2018, only assists with meeting Art 9 of the GDPR. An Art 6 legal basis must always be met. See para A4.57.

A4.65 Data processing to protect the integrity of sport. The DPA  2018 also recognises that sports may have other valid regulatory uses of special category or criminal offence data outside of anti-doping. Schedule 1, para 28 to the Act permits ‘processing that is necessary for the purposes of measures designed to protect the integrity of a sport or sporting event’.1 Such processing must ‘be carried out without the consent of the data subject so as not to prejudice those purposes’,2 and must be ‘necessary for reasons of the substantial public interest’.3 The types of measures covered are those that protect against: ‘(a) dishonesty, malpractice or other seriously improper conduct, or (b) failure by a person participating in the sport or event in any capacity to comply with standards of behaviour set by a body or association with responsibility for the sport or event’.4 1 2 3 4

DPA 2018, Explanatory Notes, para 647. DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 28(1)(b). Ibid, para 28(1)(c). Ibid, para 28(2).

A4.66 This has a potentially broad application. Clearly it envisages processing data when investigating and enforcing rules designed to prevent or punish competition manipulation, given the first limb of the description of measures.1 The second limb opens the provision to a wider group of rules that require compliance with ‘standards of behaviour’ set by a governing body or competition organiser. The condition allows processing in relation to individuals participating ‘in any capacity’, which could feasibly include not only athletes, officials, and support staff, but also spectators where relevant standards are in place, such as The FA’s Respect Code of Conduct.2 Rules could relate to any type of behavioural matter, provided it could be shown to be in the substantial public interest to regulate such behaviour. Examples could include standards on discrimination, restrictions on gambling or social drug use by participants, or regulations relating to crowd management and the safety of supporters at sporting venues, provided that the controller could demonstrate that processing could not be carried out in reliance on the explicit consent of the data subject, and that processing meets the substantial public interest test. The types of processing this may protect includes investigations, collecting and retaining information from sources and witnesses, referring individuals to seek professional assistance, and the carrying out and publication of enforcement action. 1 See generally Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Integrity Issues). 2 The FA Handbook for Season 2019/2020, p 591.

A4.67 The term ‘substantial public interest’ is not defined in either the GDPR or the DPA 2018. The ICO, however, has given some thought as to its breadth: ‘Substantial public interest means the public interest needs to be real and of substance. Given the inherent risks of special category data, it is not enough to make a vague or generic public interest argument – you should be able to make specific arguments about the concrete wider benefits of your processing. For example, you

Data Protection and Sport  195 may wish to consider how your processing benefits the public in terms of both depth (ie the amount of benefit experienced from the processing, even if by a small number of people) and breadth (the volume of people benefiting from the processing). You should focus on showing that your overall purpose for processing has substantial public interest benefits. You do not need to make separate public interest arguments or show specific benefits each time you undertake that processing, or for each separate item of special category data, as long as your overall purpose for processing special category data is of substantial public interest’.1

It is important to note that the substantial public interest test is not required when the same condition is used to justify the processing of criminal offence data.2 1 i c o . o rg . u k / f o r- o rg a n i s a t i o n s / g u i d e - t o - d a t a - p r o t e c t i o n / g u i d e - t o - t h e - g e n e r a l - d a t a protection-regulation-gdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-substantial-public-interestconditions/#substantial3 [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 36.

A4.68 A consent ‘safeguard’ has also been included within paragraph 28. Unless this safeguard is met, controllers are unable to rely on this provision to process special category data. It sets a threshold requirement that reliance on consent from the data subject is impossible in the circumstances because it would ‘prejudice’ the purposes of processing to require such consent. The DPA 2018’s Explanatory Notes explain that this ‘would cover a situation where giving the data subject a choice or giving them the necessary information required for valid consent would prejudice the purpose, or where valid consent is not possible because a refusal to consent could cause detriment’.1 As discussed at para A4.40, this is precisely the concern that prevents controllers from relying on consent in the enforcement of sport rules under the GDPR. The threshold posed by this safeguard is therefore likely to be met by all sports rules that can satisfy the other limbs of paragraph 28. 1 DPA 2018, Explanatory Notes, para 647.

A4.69 Data processing to enable enforcement of safeguarding protections in sport. A  further condition in Schedule  1 of substantial interest to sport is the condition permitting processing of special category data that is ‘required for the protection of children or of adults at risk’ – namely, for safeguarding purposes.1 Specifically, Schedule 1, para 18 to the DPA 2018 provides a basis for processing special category data for the purposes of ‘protecting an individual from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm’ or ‘protecting the physical, mental or emotional wellbeing of an individual’. This is limited to protecting individuals under the age of 18, or adults considered ‘at risk’, repeating a definition lifted from s 42(1) of the Care Act 2014.2 Similarly, controllers must be able to demonstrate that the processing is in the substantial public interest and that reliance on consent is not possible because the data subject cannot give consent, the controller cannot be reasonably expected to obtain consent, or consent would prejudice the provision of protection. 1 See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding). 2 DPA 2018, Explanatory Notes, para 635.

A4.70 This safeguarding condition was drafted with private sector bodies such as sports governing bodies specifically in mind. In introducing the provision in the House of Commons Committee, the Minister explained: ‘The Government recognise that statutory guidance and regulator expectations place moral, if not legal, obligations on certain organisations to ensure that measures are in place to safeguard children and vulnerable adults. [This provision] covers processing that is necessary for protecting children and vulnerable adults from neglect or physical or mental harm. This addresses the gap in relation to expectations on, for example, sports governing bodies’.1

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She went on to give a specific example of where this condition may prove important: ‘An example provided by a sports governing body is that a person may make an allegation or complaint about a volunteer that prompts an investigation. Such investigations can include witness statements, which reference sensitive personal data, including ethnicity, religious or philosophical beliefs, sexual orientation and health data. […] Keeping a record allows sports bodies to monitor any escalation in conduct and to respond appropriately. Forcing an organisation to delete this data from its records could allow individuals that we would expect to be kept away from children to remain under the radar and potentially leave children at risk’.2 1 Hansard, HC (series 6) Vol 637, Public Bill Committees, col 38 (13 March 2018). 2 Ibid, col 39.

A4.71 Underlining part of the concern that prompted the inclusion of this condition, the Explanatory Notes explain that the provision ‘makes it clear that frontline practitioners and others can lawfully process personal data by retaining records and sharing information where necessary, for the purpose of safeguarding children and vulnerable adults’.1 The condition clearly assists the safeguarding activities of sports bodies in the UK, provided that tests on age, vulnerability, substantial public interest and necessary being met. This should provide comfort to those handling sensitive cases and matters in this area, which is discussed further in Chapter B6. 1 DPA 2018, Explanatory Notes, para 635.

A4.72 Where sports organisations seek to rely on any of these legal conditions, or on other ‘substantial public interest’ grounds set out in Schedule 1 to the DPA 2018, they must ensure that they comply with the two additional accountability requirements set out in Schedule 1, Part 4. This requires that organisations put in place and maintain an ‘appropriate policy document’ setting out how the organisation complies with the principles of the GDPR for the relevant processing, in particular erasure and retention,1 and that they include additional details on legal basis and the appropriate policy document in their record of processing2 (which is further discussed at para A4.132). 1 DPA 2018, Sch 1, paras 39–40. 2 Ibid, para 41.

A4.73 The ICO has now given guidance on the form of an appropriate policy document, explaining: ‘An appropriate policy document is a short document outlining your compliance measures and retention policies for special category data […]. It doesn’t have to take any particular form, as long as it briefly outlines: • the Schedule 1 condition (or conditions) you are relying on; • your procedures for complying with each of the principles; • your retention and deletion policies; and • an indication of the retention period for the specific data. If you process special category data for a number of different purposes you don’t need a separate policy document for each condition or processing activity – one document can cover them all’.1

The ICO also provides a template appropriate policy document on its website.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-substantial-public-interest-conditions/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 Ibid.

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(f) GDPR conditions to consider – ‘manifestly made public’ and legal claims A4.74 While the DPA  2018 provides some comfort to UK-based sports bodies looking to process special category data for regulatory purposes, it provides limited assistance to organisations that handle special category data for purely commercial purposes, or international governing bodies based outside of the UK, or whose responsibilities cover athletes and participants in EU countries. For these organisations, it is necessary to look at alternative legal grounds to process data. Outside of the UK, there are very limited instances where sports processing is specifically addressed, and these are usually confined to anti-doping measures (as described in para A4.62). As such, reference to the GDPR itself is necessary. A4.75 Two of the GDPR’s Article 9 conditions worthy of particular highlight in this context are Article 9(2)(e) (data has been manifestly made public by the data subject) and Article 9(2)(f) (data processed ‘for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims’). A4.76 Some of the natural consequences of high-profile sport may lead to special category data being manifestly made public by the individual. An athlete competing in the Paralympics must make public some evidence of their disability. A  player giving an interview to the press may discuss details of their religion. Participants of all kinds may tweet information about their trade union membership, politics, or sex lives. It must be the actions of the data subject that cause the information to become public. As the ICO explains: ‘It’s not enough that it’s already in the public domain – it must be the person concerned who took the steps that made it public’.1 The ICO guidance also suggests that controllers exercise caution when considering information obtained from social media if information is only made public through ‘default audience settings’.2 It also cautions against assuming any public domain release could be considered sufficient. The question is instead ‘whether any hypothetical interested member of the public could access this information’.3 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-conditions-for-processing/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

A4.77 Prior to the GDPR, the English High Court had considered the question of what information could be considered as validly processed under the equivalent condition in the Data Protection Act 1998 and the DP Directive. In two cases, the judge was asked to consider whether Google was required to delist details of the claimants’ criminal convictions and whether Google had a legal basis on which to justify this processing in the first place. In Townsend v Google Inc and Google UK Limited,1 Stephens J held that: ‘ordinarily an offender wishes to hide his criminal activity rather than deliberately taking steps to make it public. However, legally as a consequence of the open justice principle by committing an offence he is deliberately taking steps to make the information public’.2

The wording of the condition under the Data Protection Act 1998 slightly differed to that under the GDPR, which replicates the wording from the DP Directive. In NT1 and NT2 v Google LLC and the Information Commissioner (intervenor),3 Warby J held that this difference in wording did not provide ‘sufficient reason’ to depart from an identical conclusion to that in Townsend.4 There is clearly no guarantee that either a court considering the GDPR condition or the ICO would necessarily agree with the principle, namely that actions that naturally result in information ending in the public domain should considered to be manifestly made public by the data subject.

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If correct, however, this may offer a potential legal basis in areas of processing that may otherwise be difficult to justify, such as the processing of injury data as part of talent identification profiling. 1 [2017] NIQB 81. 2 Ibid, para 62. 3 [2018] EWHC 799 QB. 4 Ibid, para 113.

A4.78 There is no direct guidance within the GDPR on how to interpret Article 9(2) (f). The same wording is re-used in an exemption to data transfer rules (as to which see Section 5, ‘International transfers’, below). Discussing this exemption, Recital 111 states that processing for such claims is exempt ‘regardless of whether in a judicial procedure or whether in an administrative or any out-of-court procedure, including procedures before regulatory bodies’. This is helpfully broad, but the necessity test is more limiting. As explained by the Article 29 Working Party in its Guidelines on Article 49 of Regulation 2016/679: ‘[…] The abstract applicability of a certain type of procedure would not be sufficient…A data transfer in question may only take place when it is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of the legal claim in question. This “necessity test” requires a close and substantial connection between the data in question and the specific establishment, exercise or defense of the legal position’.1 1 Guidelines on Article 49 of Regulation 2016/679, WP262, p 12.

A4.79 Clearly some processing in relation to sports rules can result in the establishment, exercise or defence of a legal claim or position. It is more difficult to demonstrate that all special category data relating to the investigation and enforcement of sporting misdemeanours could be justified on this ground. The EU Anti-Doping Study’s authors were dubious, asserting that ‘very few data in the anti-doping context are processed in relation to legal claims’.1 Nevertheless, in countries where there is no alternative local legal basis specifically permitting the processing of data for a regulatory purpose such as anti-doping or competition manipulation, this may be the best available option under Article 9, given the difficulty in relying on consent in this context. 1 EU Anti-Doping Study, p 116.

(g) Fairness and transparency A4.80 As well as requiring that processing be lawful, Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR requires controllers to process data ‘fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to individuals’. The GDPR does not expand on what is meant by ‘fairly’ in this context, but it is discussed in the ICO’s online guidance on the GDPR: ‘In general, fairness means that you should only handle personal data in ways that people would reasonably expect and not use it in ways that have unjustified adverse effects on them. You need to stop and think not just about how you can use personal data, but also about whether you should’.1

This is much like the reflection that controllers must carry out as part of a legitimate interests assessment. Even where legitimate interests is not the Article 6 legal basis contemplated to be used, a controller would be well advised to consider carefully if the processing it intends to carry out has the potential to cause any unwarranted prejudice to individuals. If a new processing activity fails this ‘sniff test’, controllers should consider what steps could be taken to ensure that the processing is fair. This is closely tied with the principles of data minimisation and accuracy, and we return

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to this point in Section 3(B), ‘Purpose limitation, data minimisation and accuracy’, below. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/lawfulness-fairness-and-transparency/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.81 One way in which fairness can be addressed is through transparency, ie  ensuring individuals are informed about how their data will be processed. Transparency is discussed in the GDPR in Article  5, as part of the first principle, and is more precisely treated under Articles  12, 13 and 14. In its Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 (WP260), the EDPB explained: ‘Transparency is an overarching obligation under the GDPR applying to three central areas: (1) the provision of information to data subjects related to fair processing; (2) how data controllers communicate with data subjects in relation to their rights under the GDPR; and (3) how data controllers facilitate the exercise by data subjects of their rights’.1

In this section we will discuss the first of these elements, which is the obligation to provide notice of data processing to the data subject. We will discuss the rest of data subject rights and the relationship with transparency under Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, below. 1 WP260. rev 01, adopted on 11 April 2018, p 4.

A4.82 Controllers are required to tell individuals how they will process their data. The content and form of this information is important. As explained in Recital 39 of the GDPR: ‘The principle of transparency requires that any information and communication relating to the processing of those personal data be easily accessible and easy to understand, and that clear and plain language be used. That principle concerns, in particular, information to the data subjects on the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing […]’.

A4.83 Specific obligations on the form of communication are set out in Article 12(1) of the GDPR, while the rules on the contents of notices are set out in Articles 13 and 14. The former requires that communications to individuals: (a) Be ‘concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible’; and (b) Use ‘clear and plain language’, especially where directed at a child. Article  12(1) states that the notice ‘shall be provided in writing, or by other means, including, where appropriate, electronic means’. It also acknowledges that information can be provided orally ‘when requested by the data subject […] provided that the identity of the data subject is proven by other means’. A4.84 Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR explain what must be in a data protection notice and when it must be communicated. Article  13 addresses personal data collected directly by the controller, whereas Article  14 addresses personal data collected indirectly. They require that data subjects be told: (a) the identity of the controller and their contact details (and, if applicable, the details of their representative);1 (b) the purposes of processing; (c) the legal basis for processing, including details of any legitimate interest; (d) a description of the categories of data obtained from third parties and the sources of that data, including whether these are publicly accessible; (e) details of recipients or categories of recipients of personal data;

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(f)

details of any international transfer outside of the EU/UK, and details of the safeguards in place (see Section 5, ‘International transfers’, for more details on international transfers); (g) how long data will be retained or, if a precise period cannot be stated, the criteria that will be used to determine this period; (h) information on applicable data subject rights, including the right to withdraw consent if relevant, and the right to complain to a supervisory authority; (i) where relevant, because of processing required by law or by contract, details of what information the data subject is obliged to provide and the possible consequences of failure; and (j) the existence of any automated decision-making that might significantly affect the data subject (as described in Article 22 of the GDPR) and details of the logic (ie  the parameters being used to direct the automation) and potential consequences of such processing. 1 See para A4.33 on the obligation to appoint a representative. This should not be confused with a requirement to name a contact person unless a data protection officer has been appointed. As a result, this obligation does not apply to controllers established in the EU.

A4.85 Where data is collected directly from the individual, Article 13 requires that this information is presented at the time the data is collected. Where it is collected indirectly, Article 14 requires that the information is provided ‘within a reasonable period’ and no later than the earliest of: (a) One month after the data are obtained; (b) The time of the first communication with the data subject; or (c) The first disclosure of the data to a third party.1 1 GDPR, Art 14(3).

A4.86 WP260 expands on these requirements in some detail. Controllers are expected to take particular care in drafting their notices. In discussing what is ‘intelligible’ and ‘clear and plain language’, the Article 29 Working Party said that it is necessary that a notice ‘be understood by an average member of the intended audience’.1 To achieve this, WP260 highlights a need to avoid ‘language qualifiers’ such as ‘may’, ‘often’ and ‘some’ to the extent possible, as well as ‘excess nouns’.2 Similarly, controllers are expected to use an active rather than a passive voice and to reject ‘overly legalistic, technical or specialist language or terminology’.3 Examples of poor practice given in the guidance include the use of broad generic or ‘abstract’ statements about how data will be used, such as ‘We may use your personal data to develop new services’. Instead, specific and ‘definitive’ statements should be used.4 1 WP260, para 9. 2 Ibid, para 13. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, para 12.

A4.87 In order to convey this type of information with sufficient precision and clarity, many sports organisations may find that it is necessary to have multiple privacy notices in place. This will be especially necessary where an organisation needs to address different types of data subjects with whom it interacts (such as professional athletes and fans, whose data will be used in completely different ways). In particular, children will need special consideration. WP260 tells us that controllers must ‘ensure that the vocabulary, tone and style of the language used is appropriate to and resonates with children so that the child addressee of the information recognises that the message/information is being directed at them’.1 Processing of children’s data online and providing notices has also been considered by the ICO in its AgeAppropriate Design Code.2 It recommends the use of ‘just in time’ notices, prompts

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to discuss the notice with an adult, and use of ‘child friendly’ methods such as ‘diagrams, cartoons, graphics, video and audio content, and gamified or interactive content that will attract and interest children’.3 Importantly, this Code applies to any ‘information society services likely to be accessed by children’.4 As children are defined as anyone under the age of 18, the Code will apply to most general audience sites and services. For most sports organisations offering any type of online service, including news or entertainment content, e-commerce, online games or on-demand video, full compliance with this Code poses a substantial regulatory burden. 1 WP260, para 14. 2 Age Appropriate Design Code, 2  September 2020. Organisations are required to comply with the code by 2 September 2021. In addition to transparency, the Code sets out guidance on a number of topics, including data protection impact assessments, default settings, data minimisation, geolocation data, and profiling. A full review of the Code goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but it should be reviewed in full by any UK controller offering information society services to children or to a general audience. 3 Age Appropriate Design Code, pp 37–42. 4 DPA 2018, s 123.

A4.88 In giving the required notice to both children and adults, there is a tension between the obligation to be clear and concise, and the lengthy details that need to be provided to data subjects under Articles 13 and 14. WP260 recommends that ‘layered’ notices are used, with more complete information displayed at different stages, noting that this can ‘help resolve the tension between completeness and understanding, notably by allowing users to navigate directly to the section of the statement/notice that they wish to read’.1 In any event, certain core information must be included in the first statement to individuals. In particular, the guidance suggests this top layer must include, as a minimum, ‘the details of the purposes of processing, the identity of controller and a description of the data subject’s rights’, and ‘information on the processing which has the most impact on the data subject and processing which could surprise them’.2 1 WP260, para 35. 2 Ibid, para 36.

A4.89 There will come a time in almost all data processing where information given in a notice will need to be updated. If this is because a controller wishes to use the data for a different purpose, Articles 13(3) and 14(4) require that data subjects be told of the new purpose and also given all the relevant information otherwise set out in para A4.84 above, prior to the commencement of the new processing. WP260 sets out the expectation of the EDPB that any ‘substantial or material change’ should be communicated to data subjects, which includes any changes in purpose, to the identity of the controller. or to the methods individuals can use to exercise their rights.1 1 WP260, para 30.

A4.90 There are limited exemptions to the obligation to provide a notice. Within the GDPR itself, the only exemption to providing a notice where information is collected directly from the data subjects is where the individual already has all of the relevant information required under Article 13.1 Although WP260 emphasised that these should be interpreted and applied ‘narrowly’,2 more exemptions are set out in Article 14(5) for indirectly collected data: (a)

The information has already been provided (this is unlikely, given the indirect collection, unless the source has done this on the controller’s instruction); (b) The information would be impossible to provide or would involve a disproportionate effort, especially for archiving or research purposes, or where it would make the achievement of the objectives of the processing impossible or seriously impair them (discussed in more detail below);

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(c)

The controller is subject to a legal requirement to obtain the data and this law appropriately prevents notice and provides appropriate safeguards; or (d) A legally regulated obligation of secrecy prevents the provision of a notice. 1 GDPR, Art 13(4) and WP260, para 56. 2 WP260, para 57.

A4.91 There are also a number of exemptions under UK law that may allow information to be processed without the provision of a notice. These are even more specific, applying to particular types of processing purposes or activities. Most have no relevance to sports bodies, but potentially pertinent exemptions include those for data processing that is: (a) necessary for the prevention or detection of crime, if providing notice would prejudice this purpose (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 2); (b) necessary for the purposes of, or in connection with, legal proceedings, establishing, exercising or defending legal rights, or for obtaining legal advice, if providing notice would prevent this purpose (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 5); (c) covered by legal professional privilege, or in respect of which a legal advisor has a duty of confidentiality (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 19); (d) for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes (‘special purposes’) carried out with a view to publication, where compliance would be incompatible with these special purposes and the publication would be in the public interest (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 26); and (e) for management forecasting or planning, such as re-organisations, if providing notice would prejudice this activity (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 22). A4.92 Given the narrow nature of these exemptions, the vast majority of processing by sports organisations will be subject to a notice requirement. Areas where sport bodies carry out regulatory activity fall between the gaps of available UK exemptions, and therefore the notice requirement will apply. While the UK has an exemption for organisations processing data in pursuit of functions designed to protect the public, these must either be functions conferred under law or functions ‘of a public nature […] exercised in the public interest’.1 Most sports bodies in the UK are private bodies and therefore cannot take advantage of this exemption,2 the exceptions being public bodies such as UKAD and Sport England. 1 DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 7. 2 See para A4.47.

A4.93 Where sports organisations have obtained data indirectly, it may be possible in some circumstances to argue that notice is not required because informing the data subject would involve disproportionate effort, or impede or seriously impair a regulatory task. This would not exempt notice for any data collected directly from the individual, where no equivalent exemption exists. There would also be a need to inform relevant individuals of the general type of processing taking place, even if a specific notice is not possible. This is because Article  14(5)(b) requires that controllers relying on this exemption ‘take appropriate measures to protect the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, including making the information publicly available’. The ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code supplies the following comments on disproportionate effort: ‘If the processing has a minor effect on the individual then your assessment might find that it’s not proportionate to put significant resources into informing individuals. However the more significant the effect the processing has on the individual then, the less likely you are to be able to rely on this exception.

Data Protection and Sport  203 You are unlikely to be able to rely on disproportionate effort in situations where you are collecting personal data from various sources to build an extensive profile of an individual’s interests and characteristics for direct marketing purposes. Individuals will not reasonably expect organisations to collect and use large volumes of data in this way, especially if they do not have any direct relationship with them. If individuals do not know about such extensive processing of their data they are unable to exercise their rights over it’.1 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 50.

B Purpose limitation, data minimisation, and accuracy A4.94 Purpose limitation. Article  5(1)(b) of the GDPR requires that ‘personal data […] be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’. This is known as the ‘purpose limitation’ principle. It is in some ways an extension of transparency, in that it requires controllers to state their intended purpose ‘at the outset’.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/purpose-limitation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.95 Over time, controllers may wish to process data for new purposes. Prior to carrying out this new processing, the purpose limitation principle requires that controllers consider whether their new processing activity is ‘compatible’ with what was described in their original notice to data subjects. If compatible, a new notice must be sent. 1 If the activity is not considered compatible with that original notice, it can only be carried out with the data subject’s consent2 or where required by law.3 1 See para A4.89. 2 This consent must meet the standards set out in the GDPR. See para A4.39 et seq. 3 GDPR, Art 6(4).

A4.96 The GDPR provides some detail on what will be considered compatible processing. It tells us, in Article 6(4), that controllers should take into account: (a) any link between the original and new purposes; (b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and the controller; (c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of personal data or criminal offence data are processed; (d) the possible consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; and (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or pseudonymisation. A4.97 The ICO’s online guidance discusses the principles in more detail. In particular, it explains ‘as a general rule, if the new purpose is either very different from the original purpose, would be unexpected, or would have an unjustified impact on the individual, it is likely to be incompatible with your original purpose’.1 Examples of compatible processing could include the sharing of data with a new provider of similar services (such as a new cloud storage provider), or the retention of new statistics to improve an existing record of sports performances. If individuals have been told that certain processing will not happen, such as sharing their data with third parties, that processing will necessarily not be compatible with the original notice. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/purpose-limitation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

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A4.98 The fact that processing is compatible with the original notice does not mean that new notice requirements are avoided, but no new separate legal basis is required.1 The GDPR also tells us that certain processing – namely, processing for ‘archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes’ – should automatically be considered compatible.2 1 GDPR, Recital 50: ‘In any case, the application of the principles set out in this Regulation and in particular the information of the data subject on those other purposes […] should be ensured.’ 2 Ibid.

A4.99 Data minimisation. The data minimisation principle requires that ‘personal data […] be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed’.1 The GDPR does not define what is meant by ‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary’, but the ICO online guidance provides suggestions: ‘adequate – sufficient to properly fulfil your stated purpose; relevant – has a rational link to that purpose; and limited to what is necessary – you do not hold more than you need for that purpose’.2 1 GDPR, Art 5(1)(c) 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/data-minimisation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.100 The natural instinct of many organisations will be to amass large quantities of data in the hope that it might have some hypothetical use in the future. This may certainly be the case in sports organisations, where data analysis plays a large part in the preparation, performance, and portrayal of elite sport. The data minimisation principle prevents this type of approach. As explained by the ICO, controllers ‘must not collect personal data on the off-chance that it might be useful in the future’.1 On the other hand, the ICO recognises that it is necessary to collect enough personal data to carry out processing activities properly. The guidance accepts that ‘data may also be inadequate if you are making decisions about someone based on an incomplete understanding of the facts’.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/data-minimisation/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 Ibid.

A4.101 Data minimisation is closely related to the principle of fairness, and what data is ‘necessary’ will often be a question of what is proportionate or reasonably foreseeable. An example of this consideration was highlighted within the ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code, which explained that: ‘An individual may want as many people as possible to read their social media post but that does not mean they are agreeing to have that data collected and analysed to profile them to target your direct marketing campaigns. Likewise just because an individual’s social media page has not been made private does not mean that you are free to use their personal data for direct marketing purposes’.1 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 52.

A4.102 Sports governing bodies and ADOs should also be aware that there has been some discussion by the EDPB (and, before it, the Article 29 Working Party) of the fairness and proportionality of automatic publication of enforcement action and disciplinary decisions. In its Anti-Doping Remarks, the EDPB said that: ‘[…] public reporting [of anti-doping rule violations on the internet] should not be automatic and mandatory but, according to the principles of necessity, proportionality and data minimisation, should depend on the facts and circumstances of the case’.1

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This is clearly at odds with the practice of many ADOs and is not a new opinion. The Article 29 Working Party expressed the same view to the World Anti-Doping Authority in 2013.2 Affected sports bodies should carefully consider the risks in automatic publication of any type of disciplinary decision, and how they could take steps to mitigate these risks (such as through limited publication duration, use of summaries, or consultation with affected participants prior to publication).3 1 Anti-Doping Remarks, p 8. 2 Letter from the Article  29 Working Party addressed to World Anti-Doping Agency, regarding 3rd stage of WADA’s consultation in the context of the review of the World Anti-Doping Code and its International Standards (5 March 2013). 3 The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code mandates publication of decisions that an athlete or other person has committed an anti-doping rule violation, but specifically states (at Art 14.3.4) that ‘publication shall be accomplished at a minimum by placing the required information on the Anti-Doping Organization’s Web site and leaving the information up for the longer of one month or the duration of any period of Ineligibility’. The 2009 Code said it should be left up for ‘at least one (1) year’.

A4.103 Accuracy. Closely tied to the data minimisation principle is that of accuracy – as well as having the appropriate amount of data, it is important that the data is right. Article 5(1)(d) of the GDPR requires that personal data be ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’. There can be negative consequences to the processing of inaccurate data – an inaccurate address could lead to sensitive post being sent to an incorrect recipient,1 or an incorrectly submitted name could prevent the correct athlete from competing at a championships.2 This is clearly not limited to poor privacy outcomes – the consequent decisions or actions taken on the basis of inaccuracies can cause substantial financial harm and distress. 1 ‘Trust receives £60,000 fine after patient’s results sent to wrong address’, Guardian, 12 July 2012, theguardian.com/government-computing-network/2012/jul/12/st-georges-healthcare-trust-fine [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 ‘European Athletics Team Championships: GB name shot putter for 4x400m relay’, BBC, 12 August 2019, bbc.co.uk/sport/athletics/49313460 [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.104 As the ICO guidance says, ‘it will usually be obvious whether personal data is accurate’.1 Two points are worth particular reflection – how often must data be updated, and how does this principle apply in respect of subjective data such as opinions? 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/accuracy [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.105 The ICO’s guidance is that the need for and frequency of any update should be driven by the context. Some data will clearly never require an update: a video recording of an event, for example, or the details of a one-off customer.1 Other data may need more frequent review. The ICO suggests: ‘In some cases it is reasonable to rely on the individual to tell you when their personal data has changed, such as when they change address or other contact details. It may be sensible to periodically ask individuals to update their own details, but you do not need to take extreme measures to ensure your records are up to date, unless there is a corresponding privacy risk which justifies this’.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/accuracy [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 Ibid.

A4.106 The position of updating subjective data such as opinions is more difficult. Individuals have a right to ‘rectification’, which is discussed in Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, below. It will not always be appropriate to ‘correct’ or erase subjective data, even if this has had a substantial effect on the data subject. Subjective data might

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include opinions used as part of a decision to select another athlete for a squad, or to impose a ban on safeguarding grounds. The ICO’s guidance in these circumstances is to record the subjective nature of the data, and ‘where appropriate, whose opinion it is’.1 The guidance similarly advises controllers that ‘if an individual challenges the accuracy of an opinion, it is good practice to add a note recording the challenge and the reasons behind it.’2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/accuracy/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 Ibid.

C Storage limitation A4.107 The principle of storage limitation is perhaps the one that poses the most significant implementation problems to most data controllers. It requires that data be ‘kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed’.1 In short – data can only be retained for as long as it is demonstrably needed. 1 GDPR, Art 5(1)(e).

A4.108 The GDPR sets no specific time limits on retention. It does not specifically exclude indefinite retention, but Recital 39 tells us that the storage limitation principle ‘requires, in particular, ensuring that the period for which the personal data are stored is limited to a strict minimum’, and ‘time limits should be established by the controller for erasure or for a periodic review’. The clear expectation is that most processing should have an end date, or at the very least a point at which the continued need for the data is assessed. A4.109 Retention limits are dictated by the purposes of processing. Certain processing will have a clear natural retention limit, be that set in statute (such as a relevant limitation period) or caused by changes in a relationship, such as the end of an employment relationship. In other cases, it will be necessary for a caseby-case assessment of the processing activity and what data is needed to be able to fulfil the controller’s purposes. If identifying details are not required for these purposes, the information should be anonymised, which is often a complex process. Individual categories of data are also likely to be used for different processes by a single organisation. For example, a sports governing body may hold details of an athlete simultaneously for the purposes of maintaining a record of sporting results, within the records of a disciplinary investigation, and as part of an annually renewed registration database. In such circumstances, retention must be managed ‘purpose by purpose’, with appropriate steps taken to ensure that there are appropriate access controls, system segregation, and other measures in place to prevent data being used by teams who no longer require the data in question. A4.110 Determining an appropriate retention period is not always straightforward. The ICO says that controllers ‘are in the best position to judge’ their appropriate retention periods.1 However, if left entirely to the wishes of those who manage data day to day, there will be a natural inclination to retain information ‘just in case’ for very lengthy periods. Organisations must be prepared to demonstrate clearly why they have selected a particular retention period and why this is appropriate to their identified purposes. There may be certain circumstances in sport where indefinite retention can be justified, such as the retention of sporting results to maintain a history of the sport. The GDPR also recognises certain types of processing where lengthy retention is permitted. Article  5(1)(e) tells us that ‘personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for

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archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes’, provided that there are safeguards in place and there will be no other use of the data. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/storage-limitation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.111 Sports governing bodies and ADOs will need to make difficult decisions on retention in the area of disciplinary investigations and the publication of disciplinary decisions. There is some guidance here in the anti-doping context. WADA has, since 2009, included a mandatory International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information (ISPPPI) in support of the World Anti-Doping Code. This sets standards similar, although not identical, to GDPR obligations. As the January 2021 edition of the ISPPPI makes clear,1 the intention of the ISPPPI is to set a ‘minimum’ standard of information protection.2 In the area of retention, Article 10 of the ISPPPI contains a similar restriction to the GDPR (permitting only ‘relevant’ processing) and Annex A  to the ISPPPI sets some specific retention limits. These vary from a maximum of 12 months for whereabouts information to indefinite retention for disciplinary decisions. The ISPPPI requires a 10-year retention period for the vast majority of anti-doping purposes, such as testing documentation and results, granted therapeutic use exemptions and biological passports. 1 This version of the ISPPPI, which supports the 2021 version of the World Anti-Doping Code, was adopted in November 2019 and will be effective from 1 January 2021. All references in this chapter to the ISPPPI are to this 2021 version. 2 Article 4.1 of the ISPPPI.

A4.112 Although these are described as mandatory requirements, the ISPPPI also requires that ADOs comply with local laws such as the GDPR where these exceed or contradict the ISPPPI.1 In this context, it is important to be aware that the EDPB has flagged its disagreement with the ISPPPI retention periods in its Anti-Doping Remarks, stating that ‘the possibility to retain such sensitive data for an indefinite time is not compliant’ with the GDPR.2 Governing bodies should therefore consider the indefinite retention of information such as disciplinary decisions in identifiable form to be inherently risky. However, there are clearly instances where disciplinary data will need to be retained for lengthy periods. Decisions may have important precedential value but as a practical matter they cannot be anonymised, while details of safeguarding investigations can have ongoing relevance many years after concerns are first raised. In these circumstances, where a single maximum retention period would fail to address the fact that some data used for a particular purpose is more important to retain than others, controllers should consider implementing a retention policy based on regular periods of review rather than maximum periods of use. This could involve committing to re-assess either individual records or entire sets of data periodically, with information no longer deemed necessary being anonymised or deleted. This could not be an arbitrary review – decisions to continue retention for a lengthy period would need to be justified and documented. An example of factors to consider is set out in the Anti-Doping Remarks, where the EDPB asked: ‘[…] for example: Is the retention of a sample for an indefinite period still relevant once an athlete retired or after expiration of the limitation period for proceedings?’3 1 Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the ISPPPI. 2 Anti-Doping Remarks, p 7. 3 Ibid.

A4.113 Once a retention approach has been determined, controllers must ensure that this policy is documented and then implemented. Implementation is often more difficult than determining a period in the first place. Controllers need to consider how

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to integrate retention periods into live and back-up systems or – where technological solutions cannot entirely meet the task – ensure that appropriate policies and processes are in place to make sure that staff can carry out deletion and anonymisation effectively. There is no value in setting retention periods without ensuring that they are observed in practice.

D Integrity and confidentiality (security) A4.114 Article 5(1)(f) requires that personal data be: ‘processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction, or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (“integrity and confidentiality”).’

A4.115 Security requirements are set out in more detail in Articles  32–34 of the GDPR. The GDPR does not oblige organisations to implement specific security requirements. Instead, Article  32 requires that both controllers and processors consider ‘the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons’ in determining the relevant security measures to put in place. The higher risk the processing, whether by the nature of data or the data subject, the more robust the measures selected must be. As discussed above at para A4.51, the GDPR tells us that the types of risk that need to be considered are broad and go beyond the pure security risks that are listed under Article  5(1)(f) and repeated in Article  32(2). For guidance on particular security measures, and how to implement these, controllers and processors should refer to the ICO’s guidance,1 and other sources of information security guidance such as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity2 and the National Cyber Security Centre.3 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/security/ – [accessed 30 September 2020]. The ICO has produced a variety of guidance materials on security, including information on encryption, cloud computing, and asset disposal. 2 enisa.europa.eu/topics/data-protection/security-of-personal-data [accessed 30 September 2020]. 3 ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.116 The main ways in which the GDPR changed the requirements in relation to the security principle was by extending security obligations to processors (who had no previous statutory obligations, as explained at para A4.15) and by introducing obligatory data breach reporting requirements to all controllers. It is this second change that is worthy of specific attention by sports organisations. The vast majority of UK data protection enforcement prior to the GDPR was based on breach of the security principle, and with obligatory breach reporting we can expect this trend to continue. A4.117 There are two strands of breach reporting requirements under the GDPR – reporting to the supervisory authority under Article 33 and reporting to the affected individuals under Article 34. The only breach reporting requirement that applies to processors is under Article 33(2), which obliges processors to notify controllers about data breaches ‘without undue delay’. It is important to note that it is specifically security breaches that these articles address. The definition of a ‘personal data breach’ in Article 4(12) is a ‘breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed’. There is no obligation to confess other types of infringement, such as a failure to publish a privacy notice or to respond to a rights request on time.

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A4.118 The EDPB has adopted the Article  29 Working Party’s Guidelines on Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679 (WP250).1 These guidelines provide some useful information on the interpretation of this definition of ‘personal data breach’. The EDPB treats the definition as encompassing three types of information security breach: (1) ‘Confidentiality’ breaches – where there is an unauthorised or accidental disclosure of, or access to, personal data. This is the more commonly understood type of breach, where data has been lost or taken by a third party. (2) ‘Integrity breach’ – where there is an unauthorised or accidental alteration of personal data. Examples of this type of breach include the incorrect replacement of contact details, or a malicious amendment of results. (3) ‘Availability breach’ – where there is an accidental or unauthorised loss of access to, or destruction of, personal data. This could include an HR system going down, or the corruption of data requiring use of an earlier back-up.2 1 WP250. rev 01, adopted on 6 February 2018. 2 Ibid, p 7.

A4.119 The threshold for reporting to supervisory authorities is set low. Article 33(1) of the GDPR requires controllers to report breaches ‘without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware […] unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons’. With the bar set at any likely risk to individuals, almost all breaches will arguably need to be reported. In contrast, controllers are only required to inform the affected data subjects where the personal data breach ‘is likely to result in a high risk’.1 1 Article 34(1) – there are some exemptions listed in Art 34(3) to this obligation to inform individuals, including where the data is encrypted or otherwise technologically made unintelligible, or where a controller has taken steps to remove the high risk to individuals. If reporting to individuals is disproportionate, a public notice can be made as an alternative.

A4.120 More detail on the assessment of risks is set out in WP250, which states that controllers should consider the ‘specific circumstances of a breach, including the severity of the potential impact and the likelihood of this occurring’.1 In particular, it recommends considering: (a)

‘The type of breach’ – an availability breach where data was only temporarily unavailable is unlikely to be as high risk as a confidentiality breach where the same data is in unauthorised third-party hands. (b) ‘The nature, sensitivity and volume of data’ and ‘the number of affected individuals’– the EDPB explain that ‘usually, the more sensitive the data, the higher the risk of harm will be to the people affected’ but that other factors such as the context of the breach (eg the nature of the recipient of misdirected data or the combination of data disclosed) could increase the severity of otherwise innocuous information. The example given in WP250 is the disclosure of the current name and address of an adopted child to their birth parents. High volumes of data are considered to be higher risk due to the potential impact on a large number of individuals. (c) ‘The ease of identification of individuals’ – loss of directly identifying data is likely to be higher risk than data that has been pseudonymised or from which it is otherwise difficult to identify the data subject. (d) The ‘severity of consequences’ – the disclosure of embarrassing data, or the release of data to malicious actors, is more likely to be high risk. The EDPB give the example of circumstances where an accidental disclosure is made to a ‘trusted’ third party such as a ‘commonly used supplier’. If this third party can be reasonably expected to delete or return the data, the EDPB’s view is that

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this ‘may remove the likelihood of risk to individuals, thus no longer requiring notification to the supervisory authority […]’. (e) The ‘special characteristics of the individual’ – the EDPB suggests that the involvement of data relating to ‘children or other vulnerable individuals’ is likely to increase risk. (f) The ‘special characteristics of the controller’ – the nature of the controller may have a bearing, with a NADO losing data about an athlete it is investigating being more likely to be high risk than information lost by a company holding the athlete’s details on a mailing list.2 In summing up the weighing of these factors, the EDPB suggests ‘if in doubt, the controller should err on the side of caution and notify’.3 WP250 includes, at Annex B, a list of ten breach scenarios that the EDPB would expect to be reported.4 1 2 3 4

WP250, p 24. Ibid, pp 23–26. Ibid, p 26. Ibid, pp 31–33.

A4.121 The time given to report a breach, 72 hours from ‘becoming aware’, is not generous. The EDPB tell us in WP250 that a controller is considered to become aware when it has a ‘reasonable degree of certainty’ that personal data have been compromised as a result of a security incident.1 There is an expectation that organisations will put in place measures to ensure that breaches are promptly brought to their attention.2 The first media report or complaint from an individual will not be considered to have made the controller aware; rather, the controller would be considered to have become aware at the point that its own investigation determines to the appropriate level of certainty that a breach has taken place.3 The GDPR permits partial reports to be made, and so it is not necessary to have completed a full investigation prior to making an initial report. 1 WP250, p 12. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

A4.122 Where a processor is involved in a breach, it is still the controller that must decide whether there is a risk to data subjects and whether reports to supervisory authorities or individuals are necessary. The sole statutory role for processors is the obligation to report personal data breaches to the controller ‘without undue delay’.1 As discussed below, in Section 3(E), ‘Accountability’, controllers may seek to impose more requirements by contract, particularly on the remediation of breaches that are the fault of the processor. 1 GDPR, Art 33(2).

A4.123 Reports must be made to the appropriate supervisory authority. For a UK sports organisation where the breach only affects data subjects in the UK, the report must be made to the ICO.1 For multi-jurisdictional breaches, there may be crossborder reporting requirements. This will particularly be the case where the controller is not established in an EU country. Sports bodies should also be mindful that countries outside of Europe have data breach reporting obligations, particularly in the US, Australia, and Asia. Reports must be made using the forms made available by each authority, which vary in content, and require different information to be provided, from details of staff training to the names and contact details of processors. All will require the information set out in GDPR, Article  33(3), including the nature and quantity of data lost, affected data subjects, the likely consequences of the breach, and the steps taken to address and remedy any adverse effects. To identify relevant supervisory authorities, WP250 advises that controllers should look

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to their lead authority. For those outside of the EU, the EDPB recommends ‘that notification should be made to the supervisory authority in the Member State where the controller’s representative in the EU is established’.2 This should avoid a need to report across a large number of Member States. Organisations located outside of the UK should note that as a result of Brexit the ICO will need to be informed whenever UK individuals are affected by a breach. 1 The ICO requires that reports be made through its website or through its phone line. More details can be found at ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/personal-data-breach/ [accessed 30  September 2020]. 2 WP250, p 18.

A4.124 If an organisation is comfortable that a breach does not have to be reported, because it is unlikely to pose a risk to data subjects, this does not mean that it can be entirely dismissed. Article 33(5) of the GDPR requires that ‘the controller document any personal data breaches, comprising the facts relating to the personal data breach, its effects and the remedial action taken’. This is one of many types of document or log that controllers must maintain under the GDPR, as a result of the final data protection principle, ie accountability.

E Accountability A4.125 All the principles discussed earlier in this section existed under the DP  Directive, although the precision of their associated obligations may have differed. The only entirely new principle under the GDPR is that of accountability. Set out in Article 5(2), it requires controllers to ‘be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with’ the other principles. The ICO explains that this means controllers ‘now need to be proactive about data protection, and evidence the steps [they] take to meet [their] obligations and protect people’s rights’.1 Both specific and principle-based accountability requirements are threaded through the GDPR, which we will consider in turn. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/ [accessed 30 September 2020]..

(a) Data protection by design and by default (Article 25) A4.126 Data protection by design and default are the codification of a privacy by design approach championed by data regulators prior to the GDPR. It is, in effect, a proactive rather than reactive requirement to protect data. Data protection by design is addressed in Article 25(1) of the GDPR. It requires that controllers, both at the time of setting the purposes of processing and the time of processing itself, taking into account the relevant risks: ‘implement appropriate technical and organisational measures […] which are designed to implement data protection principles […] in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects’.

In practice, this requirement embeds an obligation for controllers to consider and implement privacy protections at the outset of processing. Sports organisations must be able to demonstrate that this has been done, and that privacy protections are still in place once processing is commenced. Any new customer relationship management system or new participant research project or new collection or use of player data should go through an assessment before it is started to ensure that data protection measures and safeguards are in place.

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A4.127 Data protection by default is then addressed in Article 25(2), which requires that measures be in place ‘for ensuring that, by default, only personal data necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed’. It goes on to say that this ‘applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility’. This is closely aligned to the data minimisation principle. As the ICO explains, when this principle is embedded correctly, ‘the individual does not have to take any steps to protect their data – their privacy remains intact without them having to do anything’.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-by-design-and-default/ [accessed 30 September 2020]..

A4.128 Embedding these two principles in practice is not always straightforward, particularly for smaller or more agile organisations that operate at a low level of formal process. Inevitably it requires the imposition of, or integration with, project initiation frameworks, and robust training to make sure staff use them. Without such procedures, it can be difficult to ensure compliance with any of the previous principles discussed. For example, notices cannot be drafted or amended without lawyers being given notice of changes, access restrictions cannot be imposed without a clear understanding of who needs to see what data, and security measures cannot be assessed without knowing the nature of what needs to be protected.

(b) Processors and contracts (Article 28) A4.129 Section 2(B) above (‘What is processing and who are controllers and processors?’) discusses the differences between controllers and processors, and the obligation to enter into written arrangements with joint controllers. At Article 28, the GDPR sets out the legal framework under which controller–processor relationships must operate. These obligations do not sit solely on the controller to implement. Instead, the requirements sit mutually on both controllers and processors. A4.130 The first requirement of Article 28 is that organisations must be rigorous in their selection of a processor. Article  28(1) requires that controllers only use processors that provide ‘sufficient guarantees’ of their compliance with data protection requirements. Sports organisations should take particular care in their selection of suppliers, given the large quantities of sensitive data they typically process and the high profile nature of their processing. There is little point in implementing strong information security and robust organisational measures to protect data, only to be undermined by a reckless processor. A4.131 The most substantial obligation under Article  28 is the requirement for a written agreement between the controller and processor.1 This agreement must require the processor to assist the controller with various aspects of compliance, and must include a clear description and details of the processing with which the processor is tasked. There is relatively limited scope for negotiation, as the obligations are particularly prescriptive. Areas where disagreements do tend arise include: (a)

Cost – many of the obligations listed require the processor to agree to provide assistance to the controller on compliance activities such as data breach reporting, data protection impact assessment, and fulfilling data subject requests. There is no obligation that this assistance be offered for free. Organisations trying to assess an approach to costs should consider how often they are actually likely to need to receive/provide this assistance in practice. For example, if a sports organisation is making use of a cloud storage processor, it is relatively unlikely that substantial assistance will be needed to gain access to data or to correct or

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erase it. In contrast, a processor left with substantial delegated authority and making use of its own systems should expect to provide this type of support on a more regular basis or at least for this to be more time-intensive support to provide. (b) Sub-contracting – the GDPR does not allow processors to freely sub-contract their processing to another ‘sub-processor’.2 Instead, controllers can either individually consent to each sub-processor or generally authorise processors to sub-contract.3 A  general consent will typically be more flexible for both parties, but must be done subject to a contractual obligation to provide the controller with prior notice of any new sub-contractors and a right to object.4 Possibly the most difficult element for processors is the obligation to ensure that any contract with a sub-processor has ‘the same’ obligations as set out in the original contract.5 The Draft EDPB  Control Guidelines state that this should be understood in ‘a functional rather than in a formal way: it is not necessary for the contract to include exactly the same words […] but it should ensure that the obligations in substance are the same.’6 In a world of standard terms, this is still very hard to ensure in practice. (c) Breach assistance – processors are only obliged to inform controllers ‘without undue delay’.7 In reality, controllers require a substantial amount of assistance where processors are involved in personal data breaches. Providing the level of detail required to complete the ICO’s breach report form will often be impossible without more detailed assistance. Controllers would be well advised to seek more detailed contractual provisions, rather than accept wording that mirrors the vague GDPR obligation to ‘assist the controller in ensuring compliance with Articles 32–36’.8 (d) Audit – the GDPR requires that processors be obliged to ‘[make] available to the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits, including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated by the controller’. Many processors, particularly large IT services providers, are extremely reticent to allow on-site audits. This is understandable where there is a need to maintain client confidentiality. However, any contract failing to include provisions permitting on-site inspection in some form will be noncompliant. This is not an obligation limited to the immediate processors. The right of audit must flow down to sub-processors, which is often where there is greater difficulty. 1 GDPR, Art 28(3). Guidance on the content of such an agreement has been given in the Draft EDPB  Control Guidelines. The EU  Commission has also released, under Art 28(7), a draft Implementing Decision on standard contractual clauses (Ares(2020) 6654429) that can be used by controllers and processors to meet this requirement. Whilst these clauses are not final at the time of writing, they are likely to be available from early 2021. 2 GDPR, Art 28(2). 3 Ibid. 4 GDPR, Art 28(3)(d) and Art 28(4). 5 GDPR, Art 28(4). 6 EDPB Draft Control Guidelines, p 40. 7 GDPR, Art 33(2). 8 GDPR, Art 28(3)(f). The Draft EDPB  Control Guidelines provide specific commentary on breach provisions, at p 37.

(c) Records of processing (Article 30) A4.132 Prior to the GDPR, the vast majority of supervisory authorities throughout Europe imposed obligations on controllers to make filings listing their processing activities and the data they processed. Although the ICO has retained a separate filing requirement,1 the requirement for detailed filings under the DP Directive has been

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replaced by an obligation to create internal records of processing activities. These must be maintained by both controllers and processors – and their representatives, as applicable – although the details to be retained by processors are more limited. A controller’s record must include: (a)

the names and contact details of the controller, any joint controller, the controller’s representative (if applicable) and any appointed data protection officer; (b) the purposes of processing; (c) the categories of data subject, personal data and recipient; (d) details of transfers to third countries, and the relevant safeguards being used to protect that transfer (see Section 5, ‘International transfers’, below); (e) details of any retention limits; (f) a general description of security measures; and (g) any additional requirements under the DPA 2018 if processing special category data (namely, details of legal basis and the appropriate policy document).2 1 The Digital Economy Act 2017 safeguarded the ICO’s right to have a separate filing and charging requirement, which was seen as necessary to protect the funding raised through controller registration. This was set out in more detail in the Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018, SI  2018/480) More details can be found on the ICO’s website at ico.org.uk/for-organisations/dataprotection-fee/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 GDPR, Art 30(1). See further para A4.73.

A4.133 Processors must retain: (a) the names and contact details of the processors and their representative(s) (if applicable); (b) the names and contact details of each controller on behalf of whom data Is processed, including their representative and any appointed DPO; (c) the categories of processing carried out on behalf of each controller; (d) details of transfers to third countries, and the relevant safeguards being used to protect that transfer (see Section 5, International transfers’, below); and (e) a general description of security measures.1 1 GDPR, Art 30(2)

A4.134 For an organisation of any size or complexity, the creation of such a record – and maintaining it to ensure its ongoing accuracy – will be a substantial endeavour. Typically these are best structured purpose by purpose, but the GDPR does not describe structure or form beyond requiring the record to be ‘in writing, including in electronic form’. Examples are available on the ICO’s website, which give some idea of the expected level of detail.1 The difficult nature of this task does not detract from its importance. These records are considered fundamental to the accountability principle, and are expressly intended under Article 30(4) to be reference documents to be made available to the supervisory authority on request. In the event of a complaint or breach, the ICO would be entitled to request a copy of the record as part of any investigation. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/documentation/how-do-we-document-our-processing-activities/ [accessed 30 September 2020]..

(d) Data Protection Impact Assessments (Articles 35 and 36) A4.135 The GDPR requires specific ‘data protection impact assessments’ (DPIA) to be carried out when controllers plan to undertake processing ‘likely to result in a high risk’ to data subjects.1 As explored below, a number of processing activities carried out by sports organisations may fall into this category, particularly when handling athlete data. These assessments must contain:

Data Protection and Sport  215 ‘(a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest pursued by the controller; (b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to the purposes; (c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects […]; and (d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons concerned’.2

In carrying out this assessment, the controller must involve their data protection officer (if one has been appointed),3 and ‘where appropriate’ should ‘seek the views of data subjects or their representatives’.4 If, following the assessment, the controller cannot fully mitigate its risk, then the data controller must either abandon the intended processing or consult with the supervisory authority.5 1 2 3 4 5

GDPR, Art 35(1). GDPR, Art 35(7). GDPR, Art 35(2). GDPR, Art 35(9). GDPR, Art 36(1).

A4.136 The GDPR gives us examples of processing where DPIAs will be required. In particular, Article 35(3) explains that the following types of processing warrant a DPIA: (a) ‘systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects […] based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based’ that produce legal or similarly significant effects; (b) ‘large scale’ processing of special category or criminal offence data; and (c) ‘systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale’. A4.137 This is far from a complete list. In particular, the GDPR specifically requires supervisory authorities to name further processing that they consider requires a DPIA.1 Every supervisory authority in Europe has produced such a list, which has been reviewed and made subject to the consistency mechanism of the EDPB. The ICO’s list is available on its website, and adds amongst others: (a) any profiling of individuals on a large scale – such as carrying out profiling activities over a large customer database; (b) matching and combining datasets from different sources – for example integrating data received from a sponsor into a dataset of fans, or using such data to identify which fans to send targeted marketing; (c) any profiling of children; and (d) tracking location, processing biometric or genetic data, using innovative technology or reliance on an exemption to providing notice, ‘in combination with any of the criteria from the European guidelines’.2 1 GDPR, Art 35(4). 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-impact-assessments/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.138 The ICO’s reference to EDPB guidance is to the EDPB’s Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is ‘likely to result in a high risk’ for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (WP248).1 This sets out nine criteria that can increase the risks associated with data processing. These lift concepts from Article 35 and some of the associated Recitals, and provide some explanation of how supervisory authorities will interpret these provisions. According

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to the EDPB, processing will be considered high risk if any two of the criteria are met, although ‘in some cases, a data controller can consider that a processing meeting only one of these criteria requires a DPIA’.2 The full list of criteria is: (1) ‘Evaluation or scoring’ – the EDPB says this includes ‘profiling and predicting’, and could include activities such as assessing an athlete’s performance based on biometrics or developing a profile on a fan. (2) ‘Automated-decision making producing legal or similar significant effect’ – this could include, for example, decisions to offer reduced prices to certain customers based on profiling or recruitment software that automatically rejects certain candidates as a result of certain pre-set criteria. Note that this differs to the type of automated decisions discussed in Article  22 (against which individuals have strong rights – see Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, below) that relate to processing solely carried out by automated means. (3) ‘Systematic Monitoring’ – this would include, for example, the use of CCTV or other processing used to monitor or control data subjects, such as access turnstiles, or network monitoring. (4) ‘Sensitive data or data of a highly personal nature’ – this goes beyond special category and criminal offence data to include location data, financial data, or other ‘private’ information, where the anticipated processing could be particularly intrusive. (5) ‘Data processed on a large scale’ – the EDPB does not define ‘large scale’, as it is not defined in the GDPR, but offers guidance that controllers should consider not just the number of data subjects involved, or volume of data, but also ‘the duration or permanence’ or ‘geographical extent’ of processing. (6) ‘Matching or combining datasets’ – the EDPB emphasises this refers to matching that would be beyond the reasonable expectations of a data subject, due to the differing original purposes of the data or data coming from different data controllers. (7) ‘Data concerning vulnerable data subjects’ – the EDPB lists children, employees, and patients as examples, and emphasises that it is the ‘increased power imbalance’ that is a concern, where ‘individuals may be unable to easily consent to, or oppose, the processing of their data, or exercise their rights’. (8) ‘Innovative use or applying new technological or organisational solutions’ – this could include processing such as using new wearables with athletes to derive new biometric outputs. (9) Processing that ‘in itself prevents data subject from exercising a right or using a service or a contract’ – this could involve reference to performance metrics to determine whether an individual is entitled to enter an event, or eligible for funding.3 A list of examples of processing meeting the criteria, and requiring a DPIA, can be found on pages 11 and 12 of WP248. 1 WP 248 rev.01 revised and adopted 4 October 2017. 2 Ibid, p 11. 3 Ibid, pp 8–11.

A4.139 Having determined that a DPIA is required, the controller must carry out the formal assessment. This must be ‘started as early as is practicable in the design of the processing operation even if some of the processing operations are still unknown’.1 In addition to the minimum contents set out in Article 35(7), Annex 2 of WP248 sets out ‘Criteria for an acceptable DPIA’, elaborating on these basic principles. The ICO has also produced a template, which is available on its website.2 1 WP248, p 14. 2 ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2553993/dpia-template.docx [accessed 30  September 2020].

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(e) Data Protection Officers (Articles 37 to 39) A4.140 Organisations have nominated chief privacy officers, data protection managers, and information security leads since long before the GDPR was drafted. Some of these individuals may have been nominally or formally appointed as the ‘data protection officer’. In some countries, this had formal legal recognition, but not in the UK. The GDPR has now created a formal role of ‘data protection officer’ (a DPO) and sets out in Articles 37–39 a statutory framework of DPO responsibilities, minimum standards, and tasks. A4.141 Not all organisations are required to appoint a DPO, although DPOs can be appointed voluntarily. Article 37(1) says that organisations must appoint a DPO if: (a) the organisation is a public authority or public body; or (b) the core activities of the controller, or processor, consist of large scale: (i) regular and systematic monitoring; or (ii) processing of special category data or criminal offence data. Recital 97 of the GDPR states that core activities involve the processing that relate to ‘primary’ rather than ‘ancillary’ activities. A4.142 The EDPB has again adopted guidance on the designation and role of DPOs.1 In WP243, the EDPB states that core activities can be considered the ‘key operations necessary to achieve the controller’s or processor’s goals’.2 The EDPB stresses that core services or activities cannot, however, be separated from the data processing that underpins them – such as hospitals from the retention of patient records, or a football club from the processing of player data. The EDPB instead distinguishes ‘support functions’ such as ‘paying employees or having standard IT support functions’.3 On ‘large scale’ processing, the same guidance is given here on the factors to consider as is given in WP248 (as to which, see para A4.138). In addition, WP243 offers some examples – processing of health data by a hospital would be considered large scale, whereas by an individual doctor would not. Where a governing body or large club handling similar data will fit in that spectrum is unclear. Similarly, processing of customer data in the regular course of business by an ‘insurance company or bank’ is likely to be considered large scale. On the definition of ‘regular and systematic monitoring’, the EDPB explains that this would cover ‘all forms of tracking and profiling on the internet, including for the purposes of behavioural advertising’, but that it is not limited to online tracking. A number of examples are given on p 9 of WP243, including profiling and scoring for risk assessment, behavioural advertising, CCTV and monitoring of wellness, fitness and health devices. 1 Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (‘DPOs’), revised and adopted on 5 April 2017, WP 243 rev. 01 (WP243). 2 Ibid, p 7. 3 Ibid.

A4.143 On a wide reading, a large number of sports organisations and ADOs will find themselves obliged to appoint a DPO. In particular, a number of activities carried out by ADOs and governing bodies are likely to involve large scale processing of special category data or systematic monitoring, and certain large sports clubs may also carry out processing on this scale. Examples of relevant core sports activities likely to trigger a DPO requirement include: (a)

anti-doping processing, including administration of therapeutic use exemptions and result management; (b) safeguarding and other integrity processing, including the collection and retention of intelligence data;

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(c) CCTV, particularly of publicly accessible areas around stadia; (d) behavioural advertising and profiling of large participant or fan datasets; and (e) profiling and management of talent identification datasets; It is important to note that it is not only controllers that must appoint a DPO. If a processor provides services that facilitate these types of services on a large scale, they may be required to appoint a DPO even if their smaller customers do not. Processors offering intelligence and monitoring services are common within sport, as are providers of wearable devices and associated technology. If these technologies or services involve data processing, this DPO requirement may be triggered. A4.144 If a DPO must be appointed, or if an organisation has chosen to voluntarily appoint a DPO, this individual must meet certain minimum levels of competence. They must, according to Article 37(5), have ‘professional qualities, expert knowledge of data protection law and practices and the ability to fulfil the tasks referred to in Article  39’. The EDPB expands on this in WP243, explaining that DPOs must have expertise ‘commensurate with the sensitivity, complexity and amount of data an organisation processes’ and ‘expertise in national and European data protection laws and practices’. An understanding of the organisation and their sector is considered ‘useful’.1 The ability to perform tasks is considered to be both a reflection of expertise and the DPO’s ‘position within the organisation’.2 Article 38(3) of the GDPR provides that the DPO ‘shall directly report to the highest management level of the controller or the processor’, which requires a position of seniority (albeit that the EDPB does not require the DPO to be part of a board, but rather able to report to the board, for this obligation to be considered met).3 1 WP243, p 11. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid, p 15.

A4.145 The DPO must be included within an organisation’s day-to-day compliance activities, and must be consulted on data protection matters. The GDPR makes specific provision for the DPO to be named in privacy notices,1 consulted on DPIAs,2 monitor compliance and carry out training,3 act as the contact point for the supervisory authority,4 and inform the organisation and its employees of their duties.5 Organisations are also obliged to involve their DPO ‘properly, and in a timely manner, in all issues which relate to the protection of personal data’.6 In practice, this means involving the DPO in rights request responses and in the handling of data breaches. Organisations must also ensure the DPO has sufficient resources.7 The EDPB interprets this as including sufficient time to carry out their duties, adequate financial support and staff where appropriate, continuous training opportunities and active support from senior management.8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

GDPR, Art 13(1)(b) and Art 14(1)(b). GDPR, Art 35(2). GDPR, Art 39(1)(b). GDPR, Art 39(1)(e). GDPR, Art 39(1)(a). GDPR, Art 38(1). GDPR, Art 38(2). WP243, p 14.

A4.146 If an organisation must select a DPO, it can be difficult to determine who to appoint to this task. There is no obligation for the DPO to be internal to the controller, the EDPB recognising that DPO functions ‘can also be exercised on the basis of a service contract concluded with an individual or an organisation outside the controller’s/processor’s organisation’.1 This does not reduce the liability of the organisation. As explained by the EDPB, ‘monitoring of compliance does not mean

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that it is the DPO who is personally responsible where there is an instance of noncompliance’.2 Instead, ‘data protection compliance is a corporate responsibility of the data controller, not of the DPO’.3 Although the appointment of an external DPO could be perceived as more costly, the appointment of an existing or new employee and the provision of sufficient resources to complete the role may ultimately prove no cheaper. 1 WP243, p 12. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

A4.147 There are also potential pitfalls to the appointment of an internal DPO. First, a DPO’s position is protected by the GDPR. They may not be instructed on how to fulfil their role, and cannot be dismissed or penalised for their performance of their DPO tasks.1 Secondly, whilst they may carry out other tasks, they must be free of any conflict of interest.2 The EDPB’s guidance is that this means that an individual cannot simultaneously act as the DPO and hold a position that carries any responsibility for determining the means and purposes of processing personal data.3 As a ‘rule of thumb’, the EDPB considers this excludes senior management roles such as chief executive, CFO, COO, chief medical officer, head of marketing, and head of IT.4 WP243 is silent, however, on the position of legal and compliance staff. In Belgium, there has been enforcement action under the GDPR that has held that organisations may be in breach if they appoint a single individual as DPO and as the individual responsible for compliance, risk management, and internal audit.5 In the relevant enforcement action, the Belgian DPA held that there would be a conflict because it would be impossible for data processing as part of these compliance functions to receive appropriate oversight from the DPO. This seems to go further than WP243, but there is clearly risk attached to appointing a senior employee as the DPO. Such a restrictive interpretation makes combining a DPO role with another function (as is expressly permitted by the GDPR) very difficult. If the individual otherwise has only a junior role, free from conflict, they may simultaneously be considered to have too little influence, or too operationally involved in the processing activities to oversee them. 1 GDPR, Art 38(3). 2 GDPR, Art 38(6). 3 WP243, p 16. 4 Ibid. 5 Belgian DPA, Chambre Contentieuse, Décision quant au fond, 28  April 2020 (available only in French: autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/publications/decision-quant-au-fond-n-18-2020.pdf [accessed: 30 October 2020]).

(f) Codes of Conduct and Certification (Article 40 to 43) A4.148 Given the principle-based and all-encompassing nature of the GDPR, it can be difficult to precisely determine best practice within any given sector. Examples are given in Recitals, and in guidance from the ICO and the EDPB, but these cannot realistically give specific industry-based recommendations. However, Article 40 of the GDPR has allowed industry groups to seek approval for ‘codes of conduct’. This requires that Member States, supervisory authorities, the EDPB and Commission encourage the creation of such codes, which may be approved either on a national or multi-country basis. Given that the UK has now left the EU, bodies wishing to develop a multi-country code will need to initiate this with a regulator in a Member State. A4.149 Article 40(2) permits codes to be submitted by ‘associations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or processors’. These codes are not required to

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cover specific topics, but must be for the ‘purpose of specifying the application’ of the GDPR. Eleven examples are given of the type of precision that could be offered, such as detail on ‘the collection of personal data’,1 ‘the exercise of the rights of data subjects’,2 and ‘the information provided to, and the protection of, children, and the manner in which the consent of the holders of parental responsibility over children is to be obtained’.3 Once a code is approved, compliance with the code must be monitored by a ‘body which has an appropriate level of expertise’ that is accredited by the relevant supervisory authority, which must be independent from the code’s proposers.4 1 2 3 4

GDPR, Art 40(2)(c). GDPR, Art 40(2)(f). GDPR, Art 40(2)(g). GDPR, Art 41(1).

A4.150 In 2019, the EDPB published its Guidelines 1/2019 on Codes of Conduct and Monitoring Bodies under Regulation 2016/679.1 These guidelines set out criteria for assessment and approval of codes of conduct. Once approved, all codes of conduct must be collated by the EDPB. At the time of writing, there are no approved codes of conduct and none publicly announced as being under development in the sports sector. 1 Version 2.0, adopted 4 June 2019.

A4.151 Organisations must not confuse the GDPR’s concept of codes of conduct with the UK concept of statutory codes of practice. Part 5 of the DPA 2018 requires the ICO to prepare and maintain a number of statutory codes, notably in the area of data sharing, direct marketing, journalism, and processing of children’s data online. Section 127 of the DPA 2018 explains that whilst failure to comply with a code ‘does not of itself make a person liable’, any such code must be taken into account by the Information Commissioner or any court or tribunal where it is relevant to a question before them, subject to ensuring that codes are not given retrospective effect. A4.152 Whereas codes of conduct seek to drive more tailored compliance and best practice, certifications (discussed in Articles 42 and 43 of the GDPR) are instead a method for organisations to demonstrate that they have met best practice. Details of available certifications, once developed, must be made available by the relevant supervisory authorities and collated by the EDPB. Once again, there are no approved certification schemes at the time of writing. More information on certification can be found on the ICO’s website,1 and in the EDPB’s Guidelines 1/2018 on certification and identifying certification criteria in accordance with Articles  42 and 43 of the Regulation 2016/679.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/certification/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 Version 3.0, adopted 4 June 2019.

4 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS A4.153 Data subject rights are discussed in Chapter III of the GDPR. Individuals have the following rights: (a) the right to be informed (Arts 13 and 14, discussed in Section 3(A), ‘Lawful, fair and transparent’, above); (b) the right of access (Art 15) (c) the right to rectification (Art 16); (d) the right to erasure (Art 17); (e) the right to restrict processing (Art 18);

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(f) the right to data portability (Art 20); (g) the right to object (Art 21); and (h) rights in relation to automated decision making and profiling (Art 22).

A Articles 11 and 12 – the formalities of a request A4.154 Article 12 of Chapter III of the GDPR explores ‘transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject’. Particularly important amongst these are: (a)

Ensuring the identity of the individual – the GDPR recognises that it is important that the controller has confidence that the person making a request is the data subject they claim to be. Article 12(6) says that ‘where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity’ of the requestor, ‘the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject’. The ICO recognises that this may create a delay in responding to data subject rights, requiring only that a response is made within a month of receiving any necessary confirmation of identity, but the guidance emphasises that ‘it is important that you only request information that is necessary to confirm who they are’.1 Controllers should not have a blanket policy requiring identification. For example, if a controller has habitually corresponded with an individual using their email address, they should not require a copy of that individual’s passport to release information connected to that correspondence. The more sensitive the information or the greater the doubt, the more likely it is that requests for identifying documentation will be appropriate. The need to be certain of a data subject’s identity does not require controllers to retain additional information simply for the purpose of complying with data subject rights. Article 11(2) of the GDPR tells us that if a controller does not need to retain identifiers for its purposes of processing, ‘the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information […] for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation’. Article 11(2) provides an exemption to complying with most rights requests in these circumstances – although this can be lifted if the data subject can prove their identity by the provision of additional information (such as, for example, by providing details of a reasonable timeframe and their likeness to allow themselves to be identified in CCTV).2 (b) The time available to deal with a request – controllers must respond ‘without undue delay’ and are given ‘one month’ to deal with a request from receipt.3 According to the CJEU case law on the interpretation of Article 3 of European Regulation 1182/71,4 EU regulations containing time periods expressed as a month should be interpreted as relating to periods that will end on ‘the same day’ of the month as the day on which the relevant statutory event took place.5 As the ICO more clearly explains in guidance: ‘You should calculate the time limit from the day you receive the request (whether it is a working day or not) until the corresponding calendar date in the next month. If this is not possible because the following month is shorter (and there is no corresponding calendar date), the date for response is the last day of the following month. If the corresponding date falls on a weekend or a public holiday, you have until the next working day to respond. This means that the exact number of days you have to comply with a request varies, depending on the month in which the request was made.’6 This period is short in the life of an organisation, especially one trying to locate large quantities of data. There is a limited ability to extend this time period by a further two months, ‘where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of the requests’.7 However, this will be narrowly interpreted, and reasons for delay must be explained to the data subject.8

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(c)

The cost that can be passed on the data subjects, and the ability to refuse the request – Controllers are generally required to provide rights ‘free of charge’.9 The only exception is where a controller can show that a request is ‘manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character’. (d) The ICO tells us that the key factor to determining whether a request is manifestly unfounded is whether ‘the individual genuinely wants to exercise their rights’ and gives examples of unfounded requests such as those being ‘used to harass an organisation with no real purposes other than to cause disruption’.10 Excessiveness does not relate to requests for a ‘large amount of information’ where this may be ‘burdensome’ but instead, in the ICO’s view, relates to repetitive or overlapping requests.11 The fee imposed must be ‘reasonable […] taking into account the administrative costs of providing the information or communication or taking the action requested’. Instead of applying a charge, the controller can instead refuse to comply, in which case they must inform the individual without delay – and within one month – of the reasons for refusal, and ‘on the possibility of lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority and seeking a judicial remedy’.12 (e) The form of any request – The GDPR is silent on the form a request may take. Individuals are entitled to make a request in any form they please, be that verbally or in writing. It can also be made, as the ICO guidance explains, ‘to any part of your organisation (including by social media) and does not have to be to a specific person or contact point’.13 This means that staff must be trained to recognise and escalate requests, which do not need to specifically cite the GDPR or DPA  2018 to be valid and to start the race to respond in time. Individuals can be encouraged to use specific forms, which may help to ensure more detail is provided in the initial request, but they cannot be forced to use them.  1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020].   2 Such an example is given by the EDPB in Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices version 2.0 adopted on 29 January 2020.   3 GDPR, Art 12(3).   4 European Regulation 1182/71 [1971] OJ L124/1 on the rules applicable to time periods set out in acts of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.  5 C-171/03 Maatschap Toeters and M C Verberk v Productschap Vee en Vlees ECLI:EU:C:2004:714.  6 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020.   7 GDPR, Art 12(3).  8 Ibid.  9 Ibid. 10 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020. 11 Ibid. 12 GDPR, Art 12(4). 13 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

B The rights of access and portability A4.155 The right of access is perhaps the best known and most used data protection right. It is a right that existed in almost identical form under the DP Directive, and that has received substantial consideration by both European and UK courts. As the ICO explains, this right allows individuals ‘to obtain a copy of their personal data as well as other supplementary information’ on how it is used.1 Sport organisations are not immune to such requests, which are commonly used by employees and customers at the outset of disputes. Requests can come from athletes probing selection decisions,2 alleged victims feeling shut out of safeguarding investigations,3 or fans unhappy with

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the response a club has made to their complaint. Sports bodies need to be able to recognise and respond to requests and be familiar with the available exemptions to disclosure. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ / [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 See Chapter B2 (Selection). 3 See Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).

A4.156 An individual is entitled to obtain a copy of any personal data processed about them by a data controller, unless there is an applicable exemption. This extends to data in any media, whether contained in documents, emails, video footage, SMS messages or phone call recordings. This is not a right to the full documents containing data. As was discussed by the CJEU in C-1141/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie,1 provided data can be delivered in another form, there is no obligation to provide the original document containing wider information. The entitlement to data is usually interpreted broadly. Data in drafts, which is not repeated in final copies, remains disclosable if retained.2 Data may need to be explained – the ICO has produced drafted detailed guidance (‘Draft ICO DSAR Guidance’) that explains: ‘When providing a copy of the personal data requested, you are expected to give the individual additional information to aid understanding if the data is not in a form that they can easily understand. However, this is not meant to be onerous, and you are not expected to translate information or decipher unintelligible written notes’.3 1 C-1141/12; C-372/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M and S ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081. 2 Deer v University of Oxford [2017] EWCA (Civ) 121, para 156. 3 ICO  Right of Access – draft guidance, p  32. This, as with other guidance cited here, is expected to survive consultation, being positions held by the ICO under previous guidance issued under the DPA 1998.

A4.157 Although courts have refused to extend the right of access to wider documents, individuals are not restricted from using their subject access rights in connection with a dispute. Some earlier cases, on the equivalent right of access under the Data Protection Act 1998, questioned whether a data subject can be refused their right of access where they have a ‘collateral’ litigious motive.1 This point was more recently discussed in the Court of Appeal’s first decision in Dawson-Damer & Ors v Taylor Wessing, where Lady Justice Arden ruled: ‘Confining the scope of subject access rights by reference to purpose is an unprincipled restriction of the [subject access] right and will result in complex litigation in an attempt to determine the “true” purpose of any application. There is no reason why having a collateral purpose should disqualify a data subject from relief’. 2 1 See eg Ezsias v Welsh Ministers [2007] All ER (D) 65 (Dec), Elliot v Lloyds TSB Bank PLC & Anor (Case No: 0LS51908). These cases, and others liked them, turned on the interpretation of Auld LJ’s comments in Durant v FSA [2003] EWCA Civ 1764 at para 27. 2 Dawson-Damer & Ors v Taylor Wessing, [2017] EWCA Civ 74 para 91. At para 112, Lady Justice Arden goes on to explain that judges in cases refusing access to data on the basis of Auld LJ’s comments in Durant had misunderstood the context of his remarks.

A4.158 Information held in back-up systems or archives is still considered part of the personal data accessible to the controller, and subject to a request for access unless properly deleted.1 Similarly, if employees, directors or volunteers make permitted use of personal emails or personal devices for work they do on behalf of a controller, they should be expected to search those devices for relevant personal data if this is proportionate.2 The data considered subject to a request is the data held at the date of the request, although data can be amended or deleted if this would happen

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on a routine basis.3 To ensure data is not amended or deleted improperly, the UK has introduced a criminal offence in s 173 of the DPA 2018. This applies if a controller alters or otherwise conceals information with the intention of avoiding its disclosure to the requestor. More information on criminal offences under the DPA  2018, including personal liability for directors and managers, is set out in Section 7C, ‘Criminal offences and personal liability’, below. Data created after the date of a request is not subject to disclosure, unless a further request is made at a later date. 1 Draft ICO DSAR Guidance, p 25. 2 Ibid, pp 26–27. 3 Ibid, pp 28.

A4.159 As reviewed at Section 2A (‘What is personal data and who are data subjects?’) above, it can be difficult to determine whether certain types of information are properly considered personal data. In the context of subject access requests, some information may be requested by individuals when it is not properly due. For example, it is not uncommon for individuals who have made complaints to request to see the outcome of any investigation. This may not always be appropriate. For example, where a complaint has been made into a safeguarding or integrity matter, the outcomes of any complaint may be highly confidential. The GDPR does not entitle complainants to receive access to wider non-personal information stored in complaint files, even where these are named after the relevant individual. Instead, they are entitled only to any information that specifically relates to them as a data subject.1 Another tricky category is information associated with someone acting in their professional capacity. Controllers reviewing this information will have to determine whether the data relates to the employee. The ICO’s detailed guidance on the definition of personal data includes the following useful example: ‘Emails written by a lawyer to their client about their client’s matter all contain references to the lawyer’s name and place of work, which will be the lawyer’s personal data. However, the content of the emails are not about the individual lawyer, but about the client’s instructions. The content of the email is not, therefore, personal data where it concerns legal advice about the client’s legal query. If a complaint was then made about the lawyer’s performance or advice and the emails were then used to investigate this, the legal advice given in them would become personal data’.2 1 ICO, ‘Access to information held in complaint files’, version 3.0 published 6 June 2019. 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulationgdpr/what-is-personal-data/what-is-the-meaning-of-relates-to/#pd1 [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.160 Locating data in wide-ranging requests is a substantial and resource-heavy task, which should not be under-estimated. While controllers can ask a data subject to be more precise in their request, they cannot require that more information is provided. Individuals are entitled to request access to all personal data held about them by a sports body, and to expect the sports body to carry out a robust search. As the ICO explains: ‘If an individual refuses to provide any additional information or does not respond to you, you must still comply with their request by making reasonable searches for the information covered by the request. The time limit is not paused whilst you wait for a response, so you should begin searching for information as soon as possible. You should ensure you have appropriate records management procedures in place to handle large requests and locate information efficiently’.1

This does not mean that controllers are required to search without regard to resourcing. As EU law imposes a general principle of proportionality, which is recognised to apply to data protection obligations on controllers,2 there must be limits on the expectation to carry out complete searches. As explained by Lewison LJ in Deer v University of Oxford:

Data Protection and Sport  225 ‘[…] the result of such a search does not necessarily mean that every item of personal data relating to an individual will be retrieved as a result of such a search. There may be things lurking beneath another stone which has not been turned over. Accordingly the mere fact that a further and more extensive search reveals further personal data relating to that individual does not entail the proposition that the first search was inadequate’.3

The burden, however, of proving the search has been adequately carried out lies with the data controller. It will not be sufficient to down tools and argue that provision of data would be disproportionate without making some effort to determine what could be found and disclosed.4 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020].. 2 C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, para 88. 3 [2017] EWCA (Civ) 121, para 103. 4 See eg Dawson-Damer & Ors v Taylor Wessing, [2017] EWCA Civ 74 para 84, Lady Justice Arden.

A4.161 There will be occasions where requests for data cover information that is held by processors or joint controllers. As noted above, contracts with processors must include an obligation on the processor to provide assistance with requests. Similarly, in the case of joint controllers, a written arrangement of responsibilities as required by Article 26 of the GDPR should address the handling of data rights requests. Controllers must ensure that their searches cover data held by such entities appropriately. A4.162 Having located the appropriate data, the controller must respond to the data subject. Article  12(3) of the GDPR requires that, where a request has been made electronically, a response shall be made electronically ‘where possible, unless otherwise requested by the data subject’. In providing a copy of the information, controllers have some discretion over whether to provide the documents in which they are contained or whether to redact or extract personal data from these originals. There is also the alternative of providing a summary of the data, although this should only be done with caution. Although recognised as a valid alternative by the CJEU in YS,1 the disclosed information must accurately reflect the entirety of the personal data held by the controller. If a summary fails to properly disclose aspects of the data, by summarising at too high a level, this will not meet the requirements of Article 15.2 Responses to data subjects must also contain the information set out in Article 15(1) – which in effect requires the controller to provide much of the same information as required under Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR. 1 C-1141/12; C-372/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M and S ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, para 60. 2 See R (on the application of Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2003] EWHC 2073), where Munby J  found a ‘gisting’ approach followed by prison staff responding to requests from prisoners to be insufficient.

A4.163 There are a number of exemptions to data subject access under the DPA 2018. Some of these are the same as the exemptions to provision of a notice, discussed at para A4.91. Other exemptions particularly worth of note include: (a)

Protection of the rights of third-party data subjects (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 16) – inevitably, certain personal data subject to a request will simultaneously be the personal data of a third-party individual. This is particularly relevant to opinion data, where both the holder and the subject of an opinion have rights attached to the data. The DPA  2018 exempts the provision of third party personal data in response to subject access request unless: (i) the third party has given his/her consent; or (ii) it is reasonable to release the information without their consent.

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There is no obligation to seek a third party’s consent, nor may it always be feasible to do so if the third party can no longer be contacted or if there would be a risk that the consent would be invalid. In assessing whether disclosure is reasonable, it is necessary for the controller to take into account ‘all the relevant circumstances, including: (i) the type of information that would be disclosed; (ii) any duty of confidentiality owed to the other individual; (iii) any steps taken by the controller with a view to seeking the consent of the other individual; (iv) whether the other individual is capable of giving consent; and (v) any express refusal of consent by the other individual’.1 (b) Negotiations (DPA  2018, Sch  2, para  23) – if a request is made during an ongoing negotiation with a data subject, information that might prejudice those negotiations may be withheld from disclosure. This could include, by way of example, details from internal club discussions on a contract offer yet to be made to a player. (c) Confidential references (DPA  Sch  2, para  24) – where a reference has been given in confidence for the purposes of education, training or employment, a volunteer placement, an official appointment or provision by the individual of any service, this reference – whether given or received by the controller receiving the request – is not subject to disclosure upon an access request. This is helpful in an employment context, but may also be a relevant exemption where requests are received from match officials for access to confidential club feedback on their on-field performances. 1 DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 16(3).

A4.164 In addition to the DPA 2018 exemptions, the GDPR includes a new exemption in Article  15(4), which states that ‘the right to obtain a copy [of personal data] shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others’. Recital 63 particularly notes that this includes ‘trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the copyright protecting the software’, although references to rights and freedoms in the context of European legislation must be read to include any rights and freedoms listed within the Charter of Fundamental Rights.1 Although this exemption does not exempt controllers from confirming that they hold relevant personal data, this exemption could prove useful to broadcasters, rights holders, and even – arguably – sports governing bodies in integrity matters where disclosure might infringe on the fundamental rights of the body or its other participants. 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2016] OJ C202/389.

A4.165 An associated right, of portability, makes use of the same exemption. Introduced in Article 20 of the GDPR, this right permits individuals to request access to information that they have provided to the controller ‘in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format’ and the right to transmit these to another controller. This only applies where the processing has been carried out on the basis of consent or contractual necessity and is carried out ‘by automated means’.1 An individual can ask for the data to be transmitted directly to another controller, ‘where technically feasible’.2 In the context of sport, this type of request might arise where an athlete wishes to take biometric data to another club or coach, or where a fan wishes to port their fantasy football selections to another provider. The mirrored exemption in Article 20(4) will be important to rights holders – if porting the data would infringe intellectual property rights, the individual’s request can be denied. The EDPB considered portability in more detail in its adopted Guidelines on the right to ‘data portability’.3 In discussing the format in which data should be shared, it commented:

Data Protection and Sport  227 ‘Where no formats are in common use for a given industry or given context, data controllers should provide personal data using commonly used open formats (eg XML, JSON, CSV, […]) along with useful metadata at the best possible level of granularity […]’.4 1 2 3 4

GDPR, Art 20(1). GDPR, Art 20(2). Guidelines on the right to ‘data portability’ WP242 rev.01. Ibid, p 18.

C The rights of rectification, restriction, objection, and erasure A4.166 The right to rectify, or correct, personal data is set out in Article 16 of the GDPR, which states: ‘The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement’.

A4.167 In most cases, the correction of inaccurate data will be straightforward. Such requests may often follow access requests. This right is closely linked to the principle of accuracy discussed in Section 2B, ‘Purpose limitation, data minimisation and accuracy’, above. The GDPR does not define inaccuracy, although the DPA 2018 defines personal data as inaccurate if ‘incorrect or misleading as to any manner of fact’.1 Complexity can arise where there is a disagreement on subjective information such as opinions. Here, the ICO advises: ‘As long as the record shows clearly that the information is an opinion and, where appropriate, whose opinion it is, it may be difficult to say that it is inaccurate and needs to be rectified’.2 1 DPA 2018, s 205. 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-rectification/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.168 Although the same time limits set out in Article 12 of the GDPR apply to this right of rectification, controllers would be best advised to deal with accuracy requests swiftly. This is because Article 18(1)(a) of the GDPR allows individuals to request that data be ‘restricted’ where the accuracy of the data is contested, until the controller has determined their course of action. In these circumstances, a controller may store the contested data, but may otherwise only use it with the consent of the data subject or where necessary for establishment or defence of legal claims, the protection of another natural or legal person, or for reasons of important public interest.1 Such a request could jeopardise the swift resolution of eligibility disputes or disciplinary proceedings where evidence is challenged. 1 GDPR, Art 18(2).

A4.169 If an controller has determined that data is accurate, as in the case of all rights request rejections, the controller should inform the data subject of their decision, their reasons, and the data subject’s right to complain or seek a judicial remedy. The ICO also recommends that ‘it is also good practice to place a note on your system indicating that the individual challenges the accuracy of the data and their reasons for doing so’.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-rectification/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

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A4.170 The right to object has been much strengthened by the GDPR. This right, set out in Article 21 of the GDPR, allows individuals to object and stop the processing of data where: (a)

if the data is processed on the basis of legitimate interests or official authority, the individual objects ‘on grounds relating to his or her particular situation’, unless the controller can demonstrate that it has ‘compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the rights and freedoms of the data subject’ or that it must use the data for ‘the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims’;1 (b) the data is used for direct marketing purposes;2 or (c) the data is used for scientific or historical research or statistical purposes, unless the processing is ‘necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest’.3 1 GDPR Art 21(1). 2 GDPR, Art 21(2). 3 GDPR, Art 21(6).

A4.171 Whilst all rights must be brought to the attention of a data subject within a notice, Article 21(4) requires that the right to object ‘be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject […] clearly and separately from any other information’. This could take the form of a specific opt out, or could be set out at the top of relevant privacy notices. A4.172 The right to object to legitimate interests processing is clearly of potential detriment to sports organisations. Unlike the right to object to direct marketing processing, it is not absolute. Individuals must be able to point to their particular circumstances to justify an objection. This is not an especially high bar: any reason given by the individual will be acceptable unless the controller can point to ‘compelling interests’ overriding this concern, or the need to use the data for legal claims or another exemption applies under the DPA 2018.1 The need to point to compelling interests effectively sets a new higher threshold that applies to the legitimate interests assessment carried out by the controller at the outset of processing. The ICO tells us that controllers should consider why the data subject has objected: ‘In particular, if an individual objects on the grounds that the processing is causing them substantial damage or distress (eg  the processing is causing them financial loss), the grounds for their objection will have more weight. In making a decision on this, you need to balance the individual’s interests, rights and freedoms with your own legitimate grounds. During this process you should remember that the responsibility is for you to be able to demonstrate that your legitimate grounds override those of the individual’.2 1 None are likely to be relevant to an objection request to a sports body, and those most likely to be relevant are discussed in relation to notice and access. All possible exemptions can be found in Schedule 2, 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018 and are discussed by the ICO at ico.org.uk/for-organisations/ guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/exemptions/ [accessed 30 September 2020]. 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-object/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.173 Where a data subject successfully objects to the use of their data, they may also be entitled to have it erased. The right of erasure is set out in Article 17 of the GDPR, and is also known as the ‘right to be forgotten’. This allows individuals to request the erasure (or, alternatively, the restriction1) of their data if: (a) the data are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were processed; (b) the data subject withdraws consent, and there is no other legal ground for processing;

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(c)

the data subject successfully objects to data processing under Article 21(1) or 21(2); (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data must be erased in order to comply with law; or (f) the personal data have been collected as part of an information society service requiring parental consent under Article 8(1)2 1 GDPR, Art 18(1)(b). 2 GDPR, Art 17(1).

A4.174 Although this right appears restrictive, in practice these criteria are relatively narrow in scope and even when met, broad exemptions apply. Controllers can reject erasure requests where the data is needed by the controller: (a) to exercise the freedom of expression and information; (b) to comply with a legal obligation; (c) for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority; (d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research, or statistical purposes, where erasure is likely to seriously impair that processing or render it impossible; or (e) for the establishment, exercise, or defence of legal claims. Again, other exemptions on the DPA 2018 may apply.1 1 See Schs 2, 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018.

A4.175 Erasure may be difficult where back-up systems ensure that information is archived appropriately. This point is acknowledged by the ICO, who recognises that: ‘It may be that the erasure request can be instantly fulfilled in respect of live systems, but that the data will remain within the backup environment for a certain period of time until it is overwritten. The key is to put the backup data “beyond use”, even if it cannot be immediately overwritten. You must ensure that you do not use the data within the backup for any other purpose, ie that the backup is simply held on your systems until it is replaced in line with an established schedule’.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-erasure/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

A4.176 If a controller is obliged to erase information, it may also be required to inform others to erase the same data. This will occur where the data has been disclosed to others by the affected body. Under Article 19 of the GDPR, the controller must notify each recipient of the request it has received, unless this proves ‘impossible’ or requires ‘disproportionate’ efforts. The need to inform others will also arise where the controller has ‘made the personal data public’.1 In these circumstances, controllers must ‘take reasonable steps, including technical measures’ to inform other controllers that the data subject has requested the erasure of ‘any links to, or copy or replication of’ the relevant personal data.2 In determining what is reasonable, the controller will need to take into account ‘available technology and the cost of implementation’.3 1 GDPR, Art 17(2). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

A4.177 Sports bodies are most likely to come across complex objection and erasure requests in the context of: (a) Use of photography and footage – it may be difficult to argue that an organisation’s wish to make ongoing use of images based on legitimate interests

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overrides the rights of the individual. It is advisable to rely on contractual grounds where possible, but where this is not feasible (for example, where dealing with children or amateur participants) it is often best to offer an explicit right to object at the point data is collected, to avoid complaint at a later stage. Broadcasters and publishers may be able to rely on freedom of expression grounds to justify refusal of such requests. (b) Disciplinary and integrity data – ADOs and sports governing bodies often process details of integrity, doping, and safeguarding matters, and may publish details of enforcement action they take. Where objection requests are received, bodies are likely to defend these on the basis that this processing is necessary for the compelling interest of protecting the sport’s integrity and the rights of its participants to fair play. In relation to publication of enforcement action, this is more likely to cause obvious damage or distress to an individual, and organisations should be prepared both to robustly defend their decision making and to take a case-by-case approach in assessing what ought to be published. Where compromises can be made, such as applying more limited retention periods or tailoring publication to restrict release of identifying details that are not central to a charge or ban, this will demonstrate a proportionate approach.

D Significant automated decisions A4.178 Article 22 of the GDPR provides that ‘the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her’. Unlike the reactive rights discussed earlier in this Section 4, this is a proactive obligation on the controller much like the individual’s right to be informed. Unless the controller can meet a derogation, set out in Article 22(2), such significant automated decisions are not permitted. The derogations only allow such decision-making tools to be used if they are necessary for entering into or performing a contract with the data subject, are authorised by law, or are based on the data subject’s explicit consent.1 1 GDPR, Art 22(2).

A4.179 This provision is relatively narrow in scope. There are few obvious examples of when such decision making may be used in sport. In practice, the vast majority of decisions will be made with human input, whereas only ‘solely’ automated decisions are caught here. This is especially true where these decisions have legal or ‘similarly significant’ outcomes. Examples of decision-making that may still be caught include: (a) use of software to assess CVs and automatically reject certain candidates;1 and (b) use of automated profiles to offer different prices to certain kinds of preferentially treated customer (‘dynamic pricing’). 1 GDPR, Recital 71.

A4.180 The EDPB has examined the scope of Article  22 within its adopted Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679.1 This particularly looked at whether targeted online advertising, used by many sports organisations, is likely to trigger Article  22. It explained that: ‘in many typical cases the decision to present targeted advertising based on profiling will not have a similarly significant effect on individuals […] however, it […] may do depending upon the particular characteristics of the case, including: • the intrusiveness of the profiling process, including the tracking of individuals across different websites, devices and services;

Data Protection and Sport  231 • • •

the expectations and wishes of the individuals concerned; the way the advert is delivered; or using knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the data subjects targeted’.2

1 WP251 rev 01, revised and adopted on 6 February 2018. 2 Ibid, p 22.

A4.181 If a sports body believes it is carrying out this type of processing, the easiest solution is usually to insert a level of human review. The EDPB is clear that this cannot be done by ‘fabricating human involvement’; human oversight must be ‘meaningful, rather than just a token gesture’.1 The alternative is to examine whether the decision can be realistically based on consent, law, or contractual necessity. More detailed guidance on this right can be found in the EDPB’s guidance and in the ICO’s Guide to the GDPR.2 1 WP251 rev 01, p 21. 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-including-profiling/ [accessed 30 September 2020].

5 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS A4.182 The vast majority of sports bodies will carry out some sort of international transfer of personal data. International transfers take place when teams go on international tours, when NADOs share data in the World Anti-Doping Authority’s Anti-Doping Administration & Management System (ADAMS), and when a supplier outsources processing work to a third party abroad. In an attempt to prevent the undercutting of data protection requirements when European data leaves its borders, the GDPR requires that protections be put in place before data can be transferred to recipients outside of the European Economic Area – namely, the Member States of the European Union, plus Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. These restrictions are set out in Articles 45 to 47 of the GDPR. A4.183 Under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will be treated as part of the EU for the purposes of data transfers until the end of the transition period.1 The parties have further agreed within the political declaration that they will work towards the UK achieving an ‘adequacy decision’, which is a method of permitting otherwise prohibited transfers under the GDPR, before the end of transition.2 If this does not come to pass, EU organisations passing data to the UK will need to consider alternative safeguards to ensure data is adequately protected. 1 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, [2019] OJ C384I/01, Articles 70–73. 2 HM Government, Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, para 8.

A4.184 When it imports the UK GDPR under the Data Protection Exit Regulations, the UK will in effect gain its own data transfer regime with near-parallel provisions. Given the close relationship between these two frameworks, this Section will address first the GDPR’s requirements and tools for protection, and then the differences for transfers of UK data that will come into effect under the Data Protection Exit Regulations.

A What is a restricted transfer? A4.185 Although not a term used by the GDPR, the ICO refers to ‘restricted transfers’ to describe transfers that are caught by the GDPR.1 The ICO guidance also sets out

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the breadth of the type of processing that can be considered a transfer. It includes both the ‘sending’ of data and ‘making it accessible’ to a receiver in a country outside of the EEA, where the receiver is ‘a separate organisation or individual’. As such, an employee logging into their emails on a transatlantic holiday will not cause a transfer of data, but the sharing with a group company or supplier in another country would be caught by the law. Online publication is often likely to result in transfer. As the ICO explains: ‘If you load personal data onto a UK server which is then available through a website, and you plan or anticipate that the website may be accessed from outside the EEA, you should treat this as a restricted transfer’.2 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 2 Ibid.

B When can organisations carry out a restricted transfer? A4.186 Controllers and processors are able to carry out restricted transfers when the data is transferred on the basis of an adequacy decision,1 on the basis of appropriate safeguards,2 binding corporate rules,3 or a relevant exemption.4 1 2 3 4

GDPR, Art 45. GDPR, Art 46. GDPR, Art 47. GDPR, Art 49.

A4.187 Adequacy decisions are binding decisions taken by the European Commission, on the advice of the EDPB, to recognise certain jurisdictions or schemes as adequately protecting personal data. Transfers made to these jurisdictions or under these schemes are considered adequate and no further action is required. At the time of writing, adequate jurisdictions include Switzerland, Argentina and New Zealand: a full list can be found on the Commission’s website.1 Partial decisions have also been put in place for: (a) Japan, covering only private sector organisations;2 and (b) Canada, covering only organisations subject to its Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).3 Until July 2020, it was also possible to rely on the Commission’s decision approving use of the Privacy Shield framework (to which US organisations needed to subscribe in order to be considered adequate).4 However, in C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (Schrems II) the CJEU invalidated this decision.5 At the time of writing, the Privacy Shield framework remains in place and the Federal Trade Commission has committed to continue holding companies accountable to their commitments, but sports organisations should not rely on a Privacy Shield certification as an adequate protection in respect of a transfer of data to the United States.6 1 A complete current list can be found at ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/internationaldimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en [accessed 1 October 2020]. 2 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419, [2019] OJ L76/1. 3 Commission Decision 2002/2/EC, [2002] OJ L002/13. 4 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, [2016] OJ L207/1. 5 C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems ECLI:EU:C:2020:559. 6 ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1578975/simons_-_oral_remarks_hearing_on_ oversight_of_ftc_8-5-20.pdf [accessed 18 November 2020].

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A4.188 Where no adequacy decision exists, organisations must seek to put in place safeguards. Certain of these safeguards can be used without approval from the supervisory authority. The types of safeguard available are listed in GDPR, Article 46(2). Three types of transfer safeguard are potentially viable at the time of writing: legally enforceable transfers between public bodies, standard contractual clauses, and binding corporate rules. A4.189 The first of these safeguards is only of help to public bodies, and only where they transfer to other public bodies. More information on this safeguard can be found in Article 46(2)(a), and the ICO’s guidance.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.190 Binding corporate rules (BCRs) are group documents that permit intragroup transfers. They can be adopted either to safeguard the controller-to-controller transfers within an entire group, or to safeguard data entrusted to a group company as a processor when shared with other group companies. Importantly, BCRs provide no protection for onward transfers outside of the group and require initial approval by supervisory authorities. A number of documents addressing the preparation and approval of binding corporate rules have been adopted by the EDPB.1 BCRs are unlikely to prove useful for most sports organisations. Few have substantial intragroup transfers, and seeking authorisation for these policies requires substantial and typically lengthy engagement with supervisory authorities. The most likely circumstance in which sports bodies will come across binding corporate rules will be where they deal with processors who have adopted BCRs to assist with their onward transfer strategy. 1 These documents can be found at ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/internationaldimension-data-protection/binding-corporate-rules-bcr_en [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.191 The method of international transfer most commonly used is the third in this group, standard contractual clauses. The GDPR technically permits two types of standard contractual clauses to be used: those approved and adopted by the Commission,1 and those approved by a single supervisory authority that have then been adopted by the Commission.2 To date, there have been no clauses approved under this second heading. 1 GDPR, Art 46(2)(c). 2 GDPR, Art 46(2)(d).

A4.192 The standard contractual clauses (or SCCs) in use at the time of writing are clauses that have been in place for some years prior to the GDPR. These are: (a) (b) (c)

Controller to Controller Set I (Commission Decision 2001/497/EC [2001] OJ L181/19); Controller to Controller Set II (Commission Decision 2004/5271/EC [2004] OJ L285/14); and Controller to Processor (Commission Decision 2010/87/EU [2010] OJ L39/5).

However, in November 2020, the EU  Commission released a draft Implementing Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries under the GDPR (‘draft modernised SCCs’).1 Once finalised and implemented, the draft modernised SCCs are due to replace the existing SCCs, and organisations will be required to replace any existing transfers based on the older provisions before the end of a sunset period (set at one year, or any earlier contract amendment, in the current draft). This will be a substantial administrative exercise for all affected organisations. The draft modernised SCCs are expected to be

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implemented by early 2021. For UK organisations, it is not clear whether these will be considered adequate for use in protecting transfers made from the UK at the time of writing (see A4.201 below). 1 Ares(2020)6654686, 12  November 2020 – see in particular the Annex, which contains the draft clauses.

A4.193 Both the existing and draft modernised SCCs (both sometimes referred to as ‘model clauses’) include specific obligations on recipients (‘data importers’) that closely resemble requirements on controllers and processors, respectively, as existed under data protection law when these documents were first published. As a result, the draft modernised SCCs include substantially strengthened obligations on both controller and processor data importers. The provisions included within the draft modernised SCCs for use with processor data importers meet the obligations of Article 28(3) of the GDPR, although in practice data exporters are likely to want to address at least some of these provisions separately to ensure an enhanced contractual position.1 Both sets of SCCs also include third-party rights for data subjects, so that they can enforce certain provisions themselves. In order to use the existing SCCs, as the ICO explains (emphasis in the original): ‘[…] you must use the standard contractual clauses in their entirety and without amendment. You can include additional clauses on business related issues, provided that they do not contradict the standard contractual clauses. You can also add parties (ie  additional data importers or exporters) provided they are also bound by the standard contractual clauses’.2 The draft modernised SCCs are due to clarify this flexibility in their content, with both a clause explaining the hierarchy of the SCCs above any conflicting contractual document, and an optional ‘docking clause’ that will allow other parties to accede to the SCCs.3 1 See A4.131. In particular, controller data exporters may wish to include more specific provisions on audit and data breach notification. 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 3 Draft modernised SCCs, clause 4 and clause 6 respectively.

A4.194 All sets of the existing SCCs require completion with the details of processing, including applicable security measures for the controller-to-processor set. Once the draft modernised SCCs are implemented, there will be a substantial amount of tailoring required by organisations to implement these provisions for each transfer. This is because, as compared to the existing SCCs – which provide separate, standalone, agreements for each type of data transfer – the draft modernised SCCs address all types of transfer within one document, in modular form. Importantly, whilst the existing SCCs only allow for transfers made by EU controllers, the draft modernised SCCs include content that will allow EU processors to use this mechanism for transfers to both non-EU sub-processors and non-EU data controllers. This will remedy a major gap in the use of the existing SCCs, which had placed EU data processors at a disadvantage. A4.195 The existing Controller to Processor SCCs were subject to challenge, alongside the European Commission’s Privacy Shield decision, in the Schrems II litigation. The CJEU held that the decision underpinning these existing SCCs remained valid, but that controllers should not assume that reliance on the SCCs alone is sufficient: they must: ‘take measures to compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country by way of appropriate safeguards for the data subject’, and ‘since by their inherently contractual nature standard data protection clauses cannot bind the public authorities

Data Protection and Sport  235 of third countries […] it may prove necessary to supplement the guarantees contained in those […] clauses’.1

Controllers are told that they should assess relevant aspects of the third country’s legal system, on a case-by case-basis,2 but are not given detailed assistance in the CJEU judgment on the types of measures that should be put in place if they come to the conclusion that reliance on SCCs alone is insufficient. 1 Schrems II, paras 131 and 132. 2 Schrems II, para 134.

A4.196 The effect of Schrems II can be seen in the draft modernised SCCs, having been drafted in the wake of the CJEU’s decision and released shortly after the EDPB released draft Recommendations on measures to supplement transfer tools such as the existing SCCs.1 In particular, data exporters will be required to document the transfer impact assessments they are required to carry out, and make this available to the competent supervisory authority on request. This assessment must allow the parties to warrant that there is no reason to believe laws in the third country would prevent compliance with its obligations under the SCCs.2 Importantly, as well as the laws of the third country, this assessment may also take ‘due account’ of the ‘circumstances’ of transfer including the nature of the data, the purpose of the transfer, the duration of the contract, the number of sub-processors, the methods used to transfer data and the type of recipient.3 The completion of these assessments adds an extra level of complexity to any international transfer reliant on SCCs. Organisations seeking to rely on the draft modernised SCCs once implemented should ensure that they take account of any relevant guidance on their use. 1 EDPB ‘Recommendations 01/2020 on measures that supplement transfer tools to ensure compliance with the EU level of protection of personal data’ Version 1.0, Adopted on 10 November 2020 for public consultation. We do not address these at length, given the likelihood that the existing SCCs will be replaced early in the life of this edition, but the final version of these Recommendations may well have a bearing on the use of the draft modernised SCCs once implemented. 2 Draft modernised SCCs, clause 2. 3 Ibid.

A4.197 Exemptions to the restrictions on data transfers are limited. Article  49, where they are listed, emphasises that they should only be used ‘in the absence of an adequacy decision […] or of appropriate safeguards’, while the ICO references them as ‘true exceptions’.1 They will therefore be narrowly interpreted. The exemptions include: (a)

Transfers where the individual has given their explicit consent – as discussed at para A4.60, explicit consent is set at a higher standard of proof than the consent necessary for processing under Article 6. All the same risks to validity apply and may prevent reliance on this exemption. Consent will also only be valid here if the individual gives it ‘after having been informed of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards’.2 For these reasons, this exemption should not be used as a realistic alternative for bulk or regular transfers. (b) Transfers necessary for the performance of a contract between the controller and the data subject – this also covers ‘the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the data subject’s request’.3 This may be relevant, for example, for the transfer of ticketed tour attendees’ details to a hotel outside the EEA. It only covers data necessary for the contract, not ancillary transfers. Recital 111 also emphasises that this exemption can only be used where this transfer is ‘occasional’. (c) Transfers necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract in the data subject’s interests – again, such transfers must be occasional according

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to Recital 111. This may be of use to a controller arranging for emergency medical treatment of an athlete abroad or arranging travel for dependents. (d) Transfers necessary for important reasons of public interest – the ICO guidance tells us that ‘there must be an EU or UK law which states or implies that this type of transfer is allowed for important reasons of public interest, which may be in the spirit of reciprocity for international co-operation’.4 Recital 112 gives the specific example of transfers needed to ‘reduce and/ or eliminate doping in sport’. The ICO’s view is that this should still exempt only ad hoc transfers, stating categorically that controllers ‘should not rely on this exception for systematic transfers’.5 It is worth reiterating that the World Anti-Doping Agency receives anti-doping data from ADOs on the basis of Canada’s adequacy decision for organisations covered by PIPEDA, rather than in reliance on this exemption.6 (e) Transfers necessary to establish, exercise or defend legal claims – again this must only be used for occasional transfers. Recital 111 tells us that this exemption can apply to claims ‘regardless of whether in a judicial procedure or whether in an administrative or any out-of-court procedure, including procedures before regulatory bodies’. The ICO emphasises that ‘you cannot rely on this exception if there is only the mere possibility that a legal claim or other formal proceedings may be brought in the future’.7 (f) Transfers necessary for the vital interests of an individual unable to give consent (g) Transfers from legally established public registers (h) Non-repetitive transfers based on compelling legitimate interests – this is, as the ICO explains, a ‘truly exceptional’ exemption that can only be used when unable to rely on safeguards or an adequacy decision, where other exemptions do not apply, and where it relates to a small number of individuals. Safeguards would still need to be applied: the ICO gives the examples of ‘strict confidentiality agreements, a requirement for data to be deleted soon after transfer, technical controls to prevent the use of the data for other purposes, or sending pseudonymised or encrypted data’.8 The relevant supervisory authority would also need to be informed of the transfer. Although included here for the sake of completeness, in practice it will be very rare that any sports organisation relies on this exemption. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 2 GDPR, Art 49(1)(a). 3 GDPR, Art 49(1)(b). 4 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 5 Ibid. 6 See Anti-Doping Remarks. 7 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 8 Ibid.

C What is different in the UK? A4.198 Under the Data Protection Exit Regulations, due to enter into force at the end of transition, the UK has sought to distinguish its own data transfer regime from that of the EU’s GDPR. At the time of writing, however, there is relatively little practical difference between the existing and proposed regimes. The UK’s data transfer regime will largely be set out in a planned Schedule 21 of the DPA 2018. A  schedule showing the changes and the new wording has been published by the government.1 1 See assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779334/ Keeling_Schedule_for_Data_Protection_Act_2018.pdf [accessed 1 October 2020].

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A4.199 In relation to adequacy, the UK is due to recognise all EU and EEA states and institutions as adequate, along with countries benefiting from a current adequacy decision granted or retained under the GDPR at the end of the transition period.1 Added to this list is Gibraltar.2 This list can be amended by the Secretary of State, and new provisions will be added to the DPA 2018 granting the Secretary of State the power to make new adequacy decisions through secondary legislation, and an obligation to publish a list of adequate jurisdictions.3 1 DPA 2018, Sch 21, paras 4 and 5 (not yet in force). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid, and DPA 2018, ss17A and 17B.

A4.200 BCRs that have been approved by the Information Commissioner prior to the end of the transition period will be retained under Schedule  21. Once the UK GDPR is in place, this will allow the Information Commissioner to approve ‘UK’ BCRs. This will be a separate approval regime to that followed by the EDPB, although we can expect a similar approach to be taken by the ICO. BCRs that were authorised by another European supervisory body will need to undergo a secondary approval from the ICO to be valid following the end of the transition period, A4.201 Similarly, while existing SCCs are due to be retained both for existing transfers and for novel use under Schedule 21, the Secretary of State will be given the power to repeal these transitional arrangements.1 The Secretary of State will be able to put in place new SCCs that have been adopted by the Information Commissioner,2 in line with the procedure to be set out in a new s 199A of the DPA 2018. It is not clear, at the time of writing, whether there will be any action taken to recognise the use of the draft modernised SCCs (which may or may not be adopted prior to the end of the transition period) as an adequate method of protecting UK transfers. 1 DPA 2018, Sch 21, paras 6, 7 and 8. 2 DPA 2018, s 17C.

A4.202 The GDPR exemptions will be retained in full form as part of the UK GDPR. Under an amended Section 18 of the DPA 2018, the Secretary of State will be able to provide further definition of which transfers are – or are not – considered to be in the public interest.

6 DIRECT MARKETING, EPRIVACY AND SPORT A4.203 Although the GDPR and UK GDPR are the predominant pieces of privacy legislation that will be relevant to sports bodies, additional rules can be found in particular in the EU’s ePrivacy legislation. This is currently embodied by the ePrivacy Directive, which the UK has implemented in the (amended) Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR). Although the EU has proposed to replace the ePrivacy Directive with a Regulation, with a proposal published in 2017, this complex piece of draft legislation has become a source of sustained contention between Member States and will need to be considered by future editions of this book. A4.204 The ePrivacy Directive and PECR cover a number of topics that are relevant only to a limited group of electronic communications services or network providers, such are rules on itemised billing, use traffic data, and security breaches by these providers. We focus here on two areas of wider application – rules on electronic direct marketing, and cookies.

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A Direct marketing – the GDPR and PECR (a) What is direct marketing? A4.205 Almost all sports bodies will carry out some sort of marketing activity. This activity will be governed by the GDPR, DPA 2018 and PECR, which overlap. Direct marketing is not defined by the GDPR, but is defined at s 122(5) of the DPA 2018 as ‘the communication (by whatever means) of advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals’. This covers not only commercial messages, but also ‘all advertising or promotional material, including that promoting the aims or ideals of not-for-profit organisations’.1 Targeted marketing that encourages people to take up a sport, or to raise awareness of a linked charity, will be caught by the rules discussed below. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/ [accessed 1  October 2020].

A4.206 To be distinguished, however, are communications that are necessary for the continuity or performance of services. The ICO says that this includes ‘correspondence with customers to provide information they need about a current contract or past purchase (eg information about service interruptions, delivery arrangements, product safety, changes to terms and conditions, or tariffs)’.1 Including ‘general branding, logos or straplines’ in such messages will not trigger application of rules on direct marketing, but organisations should not include any clearly promotional messages, such as messages encouraging additional purchases or contract renewal.2 The ICO addresses the question of ‘what are “service messages”?’ in its Draft Direct Marketing Code, stating that: ‘In order to determine whether a communication is a service message or a direct marketing message, a key factor is likely to be the phrasing, tone and context […] If a message is actively promoting or encouraging an individual to make use of a particular service, special offer, or upgrade for example, then it is likely to be direct marketing. However if the message has a neutral tone and simply informs the individual for example of a benefit on their account then these are more likely to be viewed as a service message […] However, it is important to understand that you cannot avoid the direct marketing rules by simply using a neutral tone. For example a message from a supermarket chain sent to an individual saying “Your local supermarket stocks carrots” is clearly still promotional despite the use of a neutral tone’.3

The ICO takes this distinction seriously, and has fined companies that have overstepped the line, as explained in Section 7A, ‘Supervisory authority powers’,below. Alongside service messages, ‘genuine’ market research is also excluded, but again it must not stray into promotion or collecting details for marketing lists. Disguised marketing of this kind is still regulated by the law.4 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/ [accessed 1  October 2020]. 2  Ibid. 3 Draft Direct Marketing Code, pp 19–20. 4 Ibid, p 19.

(b) Direct marketing and consent A4.207 The legal basis necessary for marketing activities depends on the type of marketing being carried out. As discussed at para A4.49 above, the GDPR provides that direct marketing can be a legitimate interest. This would appear to be preferable to relying on an individual’s consent. Although individuals have an absolute right to

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object to direct marketing, reliance on legitimate interests does not require evidence to be retained and carries a lesser risk of being ruled invalid.1 The requirement to carry out and document a Legitimate Interests Assessment does still apply. However, the overlap with PECR forces controllers to rely on consent for certain types of direct marketing. 1 See Section 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent’, above.

A4.208 Regulation 22(2) of PECR requires that: ‘a person shall neither transmit, nor instigate the transmission of, unsolicited communications for the purposes of direct marketing by means of electronic mail unless the recipient of the electronic mail has previously notified the sender that he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the instigation of, the sender’.

In practice, this requires that consent is obtained for electronic marketing. This is defined as: ‘any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public electronic communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient’s terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient and includes messages sent using a short message service’.1

As such, this requirement extends beyond email to other types of electronic marketing, such as ‘texts, picture messages, video messages, voicemails, direct messages via social media or any similar message that is stored electronically’.2 The ICO’s position that direct messages via social media are caught by PECR is not universally accepted.3 PECR’s consent requirement does not extend to targeted adverts placed through social media feeds, as these are not preloaded in a network or sent to terminal equipment ahead of time. However, as discussed further below, the ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code suggests that certain use of social media marketing tools may require consent. 1 PECR, reg 2(1). 2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/electronic-mailmarketing/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 3 It is not clear whether the ICO sees these messages as being stored on terminal equipment, which would appear incorrect from a technical perspective, or stored in the network rather than simply transmitted by it. It is expected that this will be a point of pushback from industry in the ICO’s consultation on the Draft Direct Marketing Code, where this position first appeared. Readers should review the position taken in the finalised Code to confirm the ICO’s ultimate position.

A4.209 The consent required by PECR must meet the GDPR standards for validity. This is not made plain by the GDPR itself, but the Data Protection Exit Regulations have inserted a definition of consent into PECR, stating that ‘“consent” by a user or subscriber corresponds to the data subject’s consent in the GDPR (as defined in section 3(10) of the DPA 2018)’.1 This interpretation has also been adopted by the EDPB,2 so is likely to be an approach followed in EU Member States. Given there is a need to obtain consent to a GDPR standard, as the ICO explains, ‘trying to apply legitimate interests […] would be an entirely unnecessary exercise, and would cause confusion for individuals’.3 1 Data Protection Exit Regulations, reg 8. 2 Opinion 5/2019 on the interplay between the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR in particular regarding the competence, tasks and powers of data protection authorities, adopted on 12 March 2019. 3 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 30.

A4.210 There are two specific limitations to this requirement for consent for electronic mail marketing under PECR. Before discussing them in detail, it is important to emphasise that, under the ePrivacy Directive, Member States have varied

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in their interpretation and application of these rules, and EU regulators will typically argue that their local rules apply to recipients in their jurisdiction, particularly where the sender is not established in a Member State. Sports bodies should take care to check other countries’ rules where relevant. A4.211 The first limitation to the PECR requirement for consent for electronic mail marketing is to the type of marketing recipient to which they apply. In the UK, PECR rules on direct marketing only apply where the recipient is an ‘individual subscriber’. The ICO summarises the position as follows: ‘You can email or text an individual if they have specifically consented to receiving emails or texts from you… Sole traders and some partnerships are treated as individuals – so you can only email or text them if they have specifically consented’.1

PECR rules on marketing consent do not apply to ‘corporate subscribers’. This cover both generic business email addresses and the phone numbers and email addresses of named employees of such corporates. This electronic mail marketing can be based on legitimate interests, much like use of non-electronic methods such as phone and mail shots. The GDPR’s absolute right to object will still apply where a staff member is targeted, as well as rules in the CAP Non-Broadcast Code that apply to all marketing,2 and so an opt out must be offered to these staff. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/electronic-mailmarketing/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 2 Committee of Advertising Practice, Non-Broadcast Code, v12.2.49 – Rule 10.

A4.212 The second limitation applies to existing contacts. Regulation 22(3) of the PECR sets out what is known as the ‘soft-opt in’ – in practice, an opt-out approach – that permits organisations to send electronic mail marketing to individuals where: (a)

contact details were obtained in the course of a ‘negotiation or sale’ of a product or service; (b) the marketing relates to that organisation’s similar products or services; (c) the recipient was offered the ability to opt-out of marketing at the time details were initially collected; and (d) the recipient is offered the ability to opt-out in every subsequent message. A4.213 The ‘soft opt-in’ is narrowly interpreted by the ICO. It can only be relied upon where a negotiation or sale of a product or service has taken place and cannot be used for details collected by other methods such as through profile creation or registering for a specific newsletter. As the marketing must relate to similar products or services, the soft opt-in cannot allow marketing for ‘non-commercial promotions’.1 It can never be used to justify marketing of third party products or services, and for these purposes third parties includes group companies. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/electronic-mailmarketing/ [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.214 Although the PECR rules on electronic mail marketing are perhaps its most restrictive, there are also rules that apply to phone marketing. These are set out in Regulations 19, 21 and 21A of PECR (Regulation 20 contains similar rules for fax marketing, now rarely carried out). The ICO summarises these as follows: ‘In short, you must not make unsolicited live calls: • •

to anyone who has told you they don’t want your calls; to any number registered with the TPS [telephone preference service] or CTPS [corporate telephone preference service], unless the person has specifically consented to your calls – even if they are an existing customer;

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for the purpose of claims management services, unless the person has specifically consented to your calls.

You must always say who is calling, allow your number (or an alternative contact number) to be displayed to the person receiving the call, and provide a contact address or freephone number if asked […] You must not make an automated marketing call – that is, a call made by an automated dialling system that plays a recorded message – unless that person has specifically consented to receive this type of call from you. General consent for marketing, or even consent for live calls, is not enough – it must specifically cover automated calls […]’.1 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/telephone-marketing/ [accessed 1 October 2020].

(c) Third party marketing and using social media tools A4.215 Sports organisations often rely on their ability to engage their fan-base in order to increase the value of their sponsorship deals. This in turn relies on the ability to either share marketing lists or – more typically – send third-party marketing to their fans. This is made more difficult by the GDPR’s rules on consent. As explained at para A4.43, the GDPR requires that the identity of the controller be made clear to the individual at the time consent is obtained. This makes the creation and sharing of lists for a fluctuating list of sponsors incredibly difficult. The ICO’s guidance tells us that marketers ‘must be very careful before using bought-in lists for recorded calls, texts or emails. You can only use them if all the people on the list specifically consented to receive that type of message from you. Generic consent covering any third party will not be enough’.1 Even referring to a changing list of named third parties in the consent language may fail to meet the requirements, unless consent is always refreshed for newly named partners. 1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/using-marketing-lists/ [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.216 A common marketing practice in sport, and a common obligation in sports sponsorship agreements, is the sending of sponsor or partner marketing materials to a sports body’s signed-up fans.1 The ICO considered this scenario in its Draft Direct Marketing Code, alongside the use of processors for direct marketing: ‘Using third parties to send your direct marketing can take different forms, for example: • •

you provide a third party with the contact details of your customers and ask them to do it on your behalf; or you ask a third party to use their own marketing lists to send your direct marketing content to individuals (sometimes known as ‘hosted marketing’).

Although in both these forms you are not physically sending the marketing yourself, this does not mean that you stop being responsible for compliance’.2

The draft continues: ‘Both you and the third party are responsible for complying with PECR. For example if Company A is encouraged by Company B to send its marketing emails then both companies require consent from the individual under PECR – Company A because they are the sender and Company B because they are the instigator’.3

The ICO also addresses ‘dual branding promotions’, giving the following example: ‘A supermarket decides to support a particular charity at Christmas and sends out a marketing email to its customers promoting the charity’s work. Whilst the email is

242  Governance of the Sports Sector promoting the charity, it also constitutes marketing by the supermarket itself as it is promoting its values. Although the supermarket is not passing the contact details of its customers to the charity it still needs to ensure there is appropriate consent from its customers to receive direct marketing promoting the charity. Where possible it would be good practice for the supermarket to screen against the charity’s suppression list’.4 1 2 3 4

See para H3.40. Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 82. Ibid, p 83. Ibid, p 27.

A4.217 The practical result of such guidance is to render compliance for ‘hosted’ marketing activities as prescriptive and difficult as the use of shared marketing lists: sponsors will still need to be named or at the very least specifically foreseeable recipients in consent language, and will still have direct responsibility for marketing activities. The ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code also suggests that cooperation over such activities is likely to be considered ‘joint control’, with the requirement to enter into written arrangements set out in Article 26 of the GDPR.1 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p  27. See also discussion of joint control in Section 2A, ‘What is personal data and who are data subjects?’, above.

A4.218 The Commissioner has indeed already taken enforcement action on hosted marketing. In one monetary penalty notice, imposed on a controller (Grove Pension Solutions Limited) that ‘instigated’ hosted marketing through third party sites, Grove had sought legal advice, but the Commissioner commented that: ‘Consent will not be valid if individuals are asked to agree to receive marketing from “similar organisations”, “partners”, “selected third parties” or other similar generic description. Further, consent will not be valid where an individual is presented with a long, seemingly exhaustive list of general categories of organisations […] […] it is clear […] that Grove are not specifically named, or identified in such a way that would suggest they could lawfully instigate direct marketing to subscribers. Further, the privacy policies […] list a wide range of sectors […] and also fail to provide subscriber with the option to specify the types of marketing they would wish to receive’.1 1 ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/mpns/2614585/grove-pensions-mpn-20190326.pdf [accessed 1 October 2020], paras 32 and 33. Please note that the ICO removes all enforcement action from its site after two years have elapsed.

A4.219 Hosted marketing activities are likely to remain more popular than listsharing within sport in any event, given the security risks associated with sharing data with third parties and the value of these lists as an asset. Sports bodies should take particular care in ensuring that no marketing rights are granted to sponsors without reference to statutory limitations, and that their marketing language is as precise as possible about the identities or specific types of third party whose marketing may be sent, even where this marketing is likely to be limited to dual activities. It may become more common practice to refresh these types of consents on a regular basis, to account for changing groups of sponsors. Whilst this may impact on the number of individuals who consent, it would provide clearer evidence of valid consent. It would also better reflect the spirit of the ICO’s ‘good practice recommendation’, made within the Draft Direct Marketing Code, that marketing not be sent to new contacts based on third-party consents obtained more than six months previously.1 Such an approach would, however, be a step-change from current practices. 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 42.

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A4.220 Another method of third-party marketing that has become more popular in recent years is the use of social media tools to identify and send marketing to an organisation’s contacts, or to identify and target individuals who share similar characteristics with those contacts (typically known as ‘lookalike’ marketing). As explained above (see para A4.208), PECR does not require consent to be obtained to carry out this type of marketing, provided it is carried out through advertisements on an individual’s feed rather than through direct messages and does not rely on the use of cookie data to identify relevant individuals (see Section 6B, ‘Cookies’ below). However, in its Draft Direct Marketing Code, the ICO has determined that using social media tools to send advertising to an organisation’s contacts is likely to require consent under the GDPR. It says: ‘You must be upfront about this processing. Individuals are unlikely to expect that this processing takes place, therefore you should not bury information about any list-based tools you use on social media within your privacy information. It is likely that consent is the appropriate lawful basis for this processing as it is difficult to see how it would meet the three-part test of the legitimate interests basis. However you will still need to ensure you also meet transparency requirements’.1

This is typical of the approach taken in a number of other European countries,2 but it remains to be seen whether this guidance will be retained in the finalised code. In particular, since this draft was released, the EDPB has released its own draft guidance on use of social media tools, where it suggests that organisations may be able to rely on legitimate interests.3 In contrast, where the ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code does not suggest use of ‘lookalike’ marketing tools will require consent, the EDPB guidance emphasises that consent is likely required due to the substantial involvement of cookies and similar technology in identifying these audiences. Organisations will need to take care in assessing their use of these tools once these guidance documents are finalised. 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 90. 2 Such as Germany, as per a decision by its Bavarian supervisory authority (VGH München, Beschluss v. 26.09.2018 – 5  CS  18.1157) and Italy, as per the Italian supervisory authorities’ Guidelines on Marketing and against Spam, July 2013, Gazzetta Ufficiale no 174 of 26  July 2013, web doc No 2542348). 3 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 08/2020 on the targeting of social media users’, Version 1.0, adopted 7 September 2020 for public consultation. See in particular pp 17-18.

A4.221 The ICO’s view of the creation of ‘look-alike’ audiences – where customer data is shared with social media platforms to identify similar individuals on their networks to receive targeted advertisements – appears to be that these remain permissible without consent where appropriate privacy steps are taken. The ICO places emphasis on the need to inform individuals whose information is used to create the look-alike audience that their data is shared for these purposes, and the need to ensure that those who have objected to marketing-related processing are not being used for this audience creation.1 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, pp 91–92.

A4.222 A further type of marketing tool often used in sport is the ‘refer-a-friend’ or ‘viral marketing’ model. According to the Draft Direct Marketing Code, this is unlikely to meet PECR requirements even where the person sends on a generated marketing message rather than providing their friend’s contact details to the marketer.1 Again, given the popularity of these methods, if the final Direct Marketing Code maintains this position, there will be a number of sports bodies needing to review their practices. 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 83.

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(d) Opting out and withdrawing consent A4.223 As discussed in Sections 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent?’ and 4C, ‘The rights of rectification, restriction, objection and erasure’ above, whether PECR rules apply or not, individuals are entitled to withdraw any consent they have given and to object absolutely to any processing related to direct marketing. This includes both the sending of marketing itself, and any other processing associated with the marketing, such as creating profiles or sharing the data with third parties for marketing purposes (including creation of look-alike audiences and similar). A4.224 The Draft Direct Marketing Code explains: ‘Whilst you must comply with an objection to your direct marketing, this does not automatically mean that you need to erase the individual’s personal data. In most cases it is preferable to suppress their details’.1

This is because it will be necessary to retain evidence that the individual has taken steps to exercise their rights, and to ensure that this request is respected where marketing is carried out by third parties who may obtain the individual’s details, such as social media tools. Sponsors and partners may often pass suppression lists to sports organisations carrying out hosted or dual marketing on their behalf. Privacy notices should explain that data will be retained on suppression lists. Erasure requests should not affect the use of suppression lists, as this data needs to be retained to ensure that the controller can comply with the PECR and the GDPR. 1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 107.

(e) Children and marketing A4.225 A  number of sports organisations may take steps to send marketing to children. This is an activity that should be carried out with extreme caution. Electronic mail marketing and profiling, in particular, will often trigger the requirements under Article 8 to obtain verifiable parental consent. As mentioned at para A4.137, the ICO has also included marketing to children as a type of processing that requires a DPIA to be carried out. The CAP Non-Broadcast Code also contains rules on advertising to children.1 Where organisations wish to profile or send marketing to children, they should ensure they have considered both the final form of the ICO’s Direct Marketing Code and the Age-Appropriate Design Code where this involves online activity. 1 CAP Non-Broadcast Code, Rule 5.

B Cookies A4.226 Since 2012, PECR has also included consent rules on cookies and similar technologies. Regulation 6 of PECR tells us that: ‘a person shall not store or gain access to information stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user unless […] the subscriber or user of that terminal equipment— (a) is provided with clear and comprehensive information about the purposes of the storage of, or access to, that information; and (b) has given his or her consent’.1 1 PECR, reg 6(1) and 6(2).

A4.227 Cookies are text files that are downloaded and stored on an individual’s device (‘terminal equipment’). The rules clearly also apply to other similar technologies,

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such as ‘web beacons’ and ‘pixel tags’ that involve the placement of small images on websites and in emails, and use of methods such as ‘device fingerprinting’ where information already on a user’s equipment (such as their browser settings or IP address) is ‘read’ to allow them to be identified as unique individuals. A4.228 Cookies and similar technologies are used for a number of reasons. They are often fundamental in the storing of personalisation settings on websites, in storing of shopping carts between pages, in recognising a logged-in user, and in gathering site analytics. They are also extensively used in both the targeting of advertising, and in checking the advertising has been seen. It is through use of cookies that someone can be haunted by an unbought football shirt across the internet, and be sent questioning emails titled ‘Why don’t you read these any more?’ A4.229 As mentioned earlier in this section, consent under PECR must meet the requirements of GDPR consent. Website owners and others who rely on the use of cookies are obliged to meet the GDPR’s validity requirements, including the need for consent to be given specifically to named controllers and through active and unambiguous actions. A4.230 The EDPB and the ICO have both considered GDPR consent in the context of cookies. The ICO’s detailed cookie guidance tells us that applying GDPR consent rules to cookies ‘means that: (a) the user must take a clear and positive action to give their consent to nonessential cookies – continuing to use your website does not constitute valid consent; (b) you must clearly inform users about what your cookies are and what they do before they consent to them being set; (c) if you use any third-party cookies, you must clearly and specifically name who the third parties are and explain what they will do with the information; (d) you cannot use any pre-ticked boxes (or equivalents such as ‘on’ sliders) for non-essential cookies; (e) you must provide users with controls over any non-essential cookies, and still allow users access to your website if they don’t consent to these cookies; and (f) you must ensure that any non-essential cookies are not placed on your landing page (and similarly that any non-essential scripts or other technologies do not run until the user has given their consent)’.1 1 ICO, Guidance on the use of cookies and similar technologies, v. 1.0.41 published 3 July 2019, p 11 (ICO Cookie Guidance).

A4.231 The EDPB  Consent Guidelines give some specific examples of what is not acceptable. First, it will not be valid to make access to a website contingent on consent, through the use of ‘cookie walls’: ‘Example 6a: A  website provider puts into place a script that will block content from being visible except for a request to accept cookies and the information about which cookies are being set and for what purposes data will be processed. There is no possibility to access the content without clicking on the “Accept cookies” button. Since the data subject is not presented with a genuine choice, its consent is not freely given. This does not constitute valid consent, as the provision of the service relies on the data subject clicking the “Accept cookies” button. It is not presented with a genuine choice’.1 1 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 12.

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A4.232 Secondly, the EDPB Consent Guidelines address the types of actions that cannot signal ‘clear and affirmative action’ as required by Recital 32 of the GDPR, which already tells us that ‘silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not […] constitute consent’. Example 16 in the Guidelines explains that this means: ‘[…] actions such as scrolling or swiping through a webpage or similar user activity will not under any circumstances satisfy the requirement of a clear and affirmative action: such actions may be difficult to distinguish from other activity or interaction by a user and therefore determining that an unambiguous consent has been obtained will also not be possible. Furthermore, in such a case, it will be difficult to provide a way for the user to withdraw consent in a manner that is as easy as granting it’.1 1 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 21.

A4.233 As referenced in the ICO Cookie Guidance above, while sports bodies will place some of their own cookies, a number of the cookies found on any commercial site are likely to be ‘third party cookies’. These are placed in order to allow third party organisations (namely, ad-tech providers) to track a user across multiple sites, allowing for effective analytics and the placing of the unavoidable football shirt advert on page after page that the user visits. The ICO Cookie Guidance tells us: ’PECR does not define who should be responsible for complying with the requirement to provide information about cookies and obtain consent. The key point is not who obtains the consent but that you provide clear and comprehensive information and obtain valid consent’.1

In practice, ad-tech providers will almost certainly contractually oblige website owners to obtain valid consent on their behalf. Google’s EU  User Consent Policy takes exactly this approach: it requires website owners using Google’s cookies to take steps to obtain ‘end users’ legally valid consent’ and retain records of this consent.2 1 ICO Cookie Guidance, p 9. 2 google.com/about/company/user-consent-policy/ [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.234 Although not a topic confined to cookies, behavioural advertising and adtech frequently plays a part in sports bodies’ marketing strategies, and it is important to understand how this system works when assessing data protection compliance. It is beyond the ambit of this book to explain the functioning of ad-tech, but readers may find both IAB UK’s Jargon Buster1 and its collection of explanatory YouTube videos2 helpful to their understanding. 1 iabuk.com/jargon-buster [accessed 1 October 2020]. 2 youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDqxnbCr0ozqPnH18Ydg-E6gJdMUwFSsO (IAB UK YouTube Playlist: Digital Back to Basics) [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.235 Returning to the form in which consent is obtained, the ICO  Cookie Guidance dedicates multiple pages to this topic. It tells us that: (a) controllers should consider the ‘formatting’, ‘positioning’ and ‘wording’ of cookie consent mechanisms to increase their prominence;1 (b) pop-ups or ‘splash pages’ may be ‘useful’ ways of ‘highlighting the use of cookies and consent, although cookies cannot be set if users fail to engage with any of the options available’;2 (c) for now (as written in 2019) ‘relying solely on browser settings’ to ascertain consent ‘will not be sufficient’;3 (d) ‘pre-enabling’ non-essential cookies before consent is given will not be compliant;4 (e) ‘a consent mechanism that emphasises “agree” or “allow” over ”reject” or “block” represents a non-compliant approach, as the online service is

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(f)

influencing users towards the “accept” option’.5 This includes the use of larger icons or fonts; and ‘a consent mechanism that doesn’t allow a user to make a choice would also be non-compliant, even where the controls are located in a “more information” section’.6 This suggests that cookie consent mechanisms require a ‘refuse’ option, which should not be hidden behind an additional second layer.

1 ICO Cookie Guidance, p 26. 2 Ibid, p 28. 3 Ibid, p 30 – the use of browser settings to signify consent is particularly foreseen in PECR, reg 3(A). 4 Ibid, p 32. 5 Ibid, p 33. 6 Ibid.

A4.236 These rules all still apply when cookies or similar technologies are used on mobile devices, but are typically much harder to implement in this environment thanks to the use of applications and much smaller screens. Guidance on the specifics of mobile devices can be found in the ICO Cookie Guidance1 and in the Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices.2 1 ICO Cookie Guidance, p 46. 2 WP202, adopted 28 February 2013.

A4.237 There are limited exemptions to the cookies consent requirements, set out in Regulation 6(4) of PECR. This Regulation exempts cookies that are: (a) used solely for ‘carrying out the transmission of a communication’ over the network – this is of little relevance to the uses of cookies by sports organisations discussed above; or (b) ‘strictly necessary for the provision of an information society service requested by the user’. A4.238 There is substantial commentary in the ICO  Cookie Guidance on what types of cookies can be considered ‘strictly necessary’. It explains that the exemption has ‘narrow application’ and does not cover processing that is merely ‘important’.1 Examples it gives of cookies that are likely to be considered strictly necessary include cookies that ‘remember’ goods in shopping baskets as a user progresses through web pages, that ensure the security of services, or that allow pages to load promptly through ‘load balancing’.2 Examples of cookies failing to meet this exemption are analytics cookies, any type of advertising cookie, and cookies allowing personalisation.3 Although analytics cookies are not considered exempt, the ICO does indicate that at least first-party analytics cookies are unlikely to be an enforcement priority.4 More assessment on the cookie consent exemptions can be found in the Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption5 and Opinion 09/2014 on the application of Directive 2002/58/EC to device fingerprinting.6 1 ICO Cookie Guidance, p 14. 2 Ibid, p 15. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, p 36. 5 WP194, adopted 7 June 2012. 6 WP224, adopted 25 November 2014.

7 LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT A4.239 Perhaps the main reason the GDPR has received such considerable attention from organisations in all sectors is the substantial increase in risk attached to noncompliance as compared to under the predecessor regime. Under the Data Protection

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Act 1998, the ICO’s most powerful tool was the ability to impose a monetary penalty of £500,000, and it had never been imposed prior to May 2018.1 The GDPR substantially increases the maximum possible fines. To date, the ICO’s largest proposed fine under the GDPR amounts to £20 million, imposed on British Airways in October 2020.2 We discuss below the enforcement powers held by supervisory authorities like the ICO, the rights of individuals to take action alone or as a group, and criminal offences and personal liability under the DPA 2018. 1 Only sanctions in force at the time of the infringement can be applied. The ICO’s first fine of £500,000 was imposed on Facebook in October 2018, four months after the introduction of the GDPR, for its part in the Cambridge Analytica data scandal. The ICO was unable to use its GDPR powers to fine Facebook, as the related processing took place in December 2015. Facebook has since been fined $5 billion by the US’s Federal Trade Commission over the same incident. 2 ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/enforcement/british-airways [accessed 30  October 2020]. This was a substantial reduction in fine as compared to the ICO’s ‘notice of intent’, where it proposed a monetary penalty of £183.4 million. Part of the reduction in this case can be attributed to the financial impact of Covid-19 on the airline. See ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/icoannounces-intention-to-fine-british-airways/ [accessed 30 October 2020].

A Supervisory authority powers A4.240 By far the most likely source of punishment for non-compliance with either the GDPR or PECR will be the regulator. In this section, we shall examine the powers of supervisory authorities to investigate potential breaches of and to enforce data protection law. A4.241 The powers of supervisory authorities are set out in Article 58 of the GDPR. Each Member State is required to ensure these powers are granted as necessary under national law under Article  58(6). Article  58(1) lists investigative powers, whilst Article 58(2) lists enforcement powers. The UK has included these GDPR powers as appropriate in the DPA 2018. These include the investigative powers: (a) to order the controller and the processor (or their representative) to provide any information the supervisory authority requires for the performance of its tasks.1 In the UK, the ICO is granted ‘information powers’ in ss 142–145 of the DPA 2018; and (b) to carry out investigations in the form of data protection audits and to gain access to any premises, data or equipment necessary.2 In the UK, the ICO has audit and access rights that can be exercised through the issuing of ‘assessment notices’ under ss 146–147 of the DPA 2018 and additional rules in Sch 15 to the DPA 2018. These powers under the DPA  2018 include the ability to issue ‘urgent’ notices, including those which would allow (upon a warrant granted by a circuit judge) entry and inspection of premises without notice, if notice would defeat the object of entry or if the ICO needs urgent access.3 There is also an associated criminal offence for the destruction or falsification of documents, information, equipment or material with the intention of preventing the ICO from viewing or being provided with the relevant asset.4 1 2 3 4

GDPR, Art 57(1)(a). GDPR, Art 57(1)(b)(e) and (f). DPA 2018, s 146(9). DPA 2018, s 148.

A4.242 Article  57(2) of the GDPR lists the enforcement powers of supervisory authorities. These are implemented in the UK through s 115(2) of the DPA 2018. The ICO is empowered:

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(a) to issue warnings to a controller or processor that its intended processing is likely to infringe the GDPR; (b) to reprimand a controller or processor for an infringement; (c) to order a controller or processor to comply with a data subject’s rights; (d) to order a controller or processor to bring operations into compliance with the GDPR, including by implementing particular methods or in a particular timeframe; (e) to order a controller to communicate a personal data breach to a data subject; (f) to ban particular processing, either temporarily or permanently; (g) to order rectification, erasure or restriction of data, and to order notification of such actions to those to whom the personal data have been disclosed; (h) to withdraw or not issue a certification, or to order a certification body to do that; (i) to impose a fine; and (j) to order the suspension of the flow of personal data to a third country or international organisation. A4.243 Under the DPA 2018, the ICO is granted the powers to issue enforcement notices (ss  149–153) and to issue monetary penalties (ss  155–159). Historically, the ICO has made frequent use of ‘undertakings’. Although not a formal power under the Data Protection Act 1998, undertakings involved a softer commitment by organisations to make changes to achieve compliance. The Commissioner has not made use of this type of enforcement since June 2018, and appears to have replaced it with use of its formal enforcement notice powers. A4.244 Article 83 of the GDPR sets out the general conditions for imposing fines, including the level of fines that may be imposed. Two different maximum levels of fine apply: (1) ‘Up to €10 million, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher’1 – this applies to breaches of Articles 8 (parental consent), 11 (accepting additional information to identify a data subject), or any of Articles  25 to 39 (specific security and accountability obligations on the controller and processor), Article 42 or 43 (certification). (2) ‘Up to €20 million, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher’2 – this applies to breaches of Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9 (basic principles and legal basis), Articles 12 to 22 (data subject rights), Articles 44 to 49 (data transfers), failure to comply with a supervisory authority’s powers, and breaches of any specific Member State laws in relation to freedom of expression, national ID numbers, employment data, or research related processing. Once the Data Protection Exit Regulations come into force, these amounts will be translated in the UK GDPR into sums in pounds sterling (at the time of writing, subject to any future amendment, these are set at £8,700,000 to replace €10,000,000 and £17,500,000 to replace €20,000,000).3 1 GDPR, Art 83(4). 2 GDPR, Art 83(5). 3 Data Protection Exit Regulations, Sch 1, para 62.

A4.245 Supervisory authorities are generally required to ensure their imposition of fines is ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.1 In determining the level of fine to impose, supervisory authorities must give ‘due regard’ to eleven criteria set out in Article 83(2), which include:

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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, including the nature of the data, data subjects and circumstances; any mitigating action taken by the controller/processor including security measures; any previous infringements and compliance with any orders given on the same topic; the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority; any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor; whether the infringement was notified by the controller/processor or came to light through other means; adherence to any code of conduct or certification mechanism; and ‘any other aggravating or mitigating factor […] such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, from the infringement’.

1 GDPR, Art 83(1).

A4.246 The ICO has also released a Regulatory Action Policy, which sets out its objectives in taking action. These are: (a)

‘to respond swiftly and effectively to breaches of legislation which fall within the ICO’s remit, focussing on (i) those involving highly sensitive information, (ii) those adversely affecting large groups of individuals, and/or (iii) those impacting vulnerable individuals’. (b) ‘to be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and consistent […] targeting our most significant powers (i) for organisations and individuals suspected of repeated or wilful misconduct or serious failures […] and (ii) where formal regulatory action serves as an important deterrent […]’. (c) to ‘[…] promote compliance with the law through the promotion of good practice and provision of targeted advice […]’. (d) ‘to be proactive in identifying and mitigating new or emerging risks arising from technological and societal change’. (e) ‘to work with other regulators and interested parties constructively, at home and abroad’.1 1 ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2259467/regulatory-action-policy.pdf, p  6, [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.247 It is too early to assess the ICO’s enforcement activity under this Policy, as it has taken relatively limited action under the GDPR (at the time of writing, monetary penalties had only been recently imposed on British Airways and Marriott in relation to personal data breaches, whilst lengthy investigation into the activities of the activities of credit referencing agencies as data brokers has resulted in no fines).1 Indeed, much of the enforcement activity prior to May 2020 has related to breaches under the 1998 Act, which, notably, still contains the enforcement rules for PECR and limits the maximum fine that can be imposed for such breaches. Despite these being imposed under the old law, it is possible to see that the ICO has become more willing to impose larger fines, with a number of monetary penalties of the maximum £500,000 now levied, where none had been imposed prior to the GDPR coming into force. 1 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/10/ico-takes-enforcement-actionagainst-experian-after-data-broking-investigation/ [accessed 30 October 2020].

A4.248 In reviewing the activity of the ICO, it is possible to note certain trends: (a)

Breaches of security remain, unsurprisingly, at the heart of a large proportion of enforcement action – this is not likely to change given the widened breach reporting requirement. That said, organisations should not be discouraged to report personal data breaches because of the risk of enforcement, particularly

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given that the GDPR requires the ICO to consider the route of discovery and the level of controller cooperation when assessing the level of any fine to impose. (b) Transparency breaches are also of particular interest to the ICO – a number of transparency breaches have now been punished with fines, including a £400,000 penalty imposed on the ‘pregnancy club’ data broker Bounty for failure to properly inform individuals of the breadth of their data sharing,1 and a £120,000 penalty imposed on a television production company that failed to properly inform pregnant mothers of the CCTV style filming being conducted at a hospital clinic.2 The vulnerability of the affected data subjects was flagged in both of these cases. A two-year investigation into credit referencing agencies focused on their ‘invisible’ processing of personal data, with the ICO imposing an enforcement notice on Experian requiring it to improve its notices and stop processing of data collected unlawfully.3 (c) Breaches of marketing rules in PECR remain a high priority for the Commissioner – again, this is unlikely to change given the high public demand for action and the large number of complaints the ICO receives. Enforcement action can be triggered for breaches of PECR even where there is a very low level of complaint about the specific breach. The majority of this enforcement is against flagrant offenders, such as data brokers and call centre operators, acting with no regard to the rules. There is, however, a growing level of enforcement against large businesses that ignore or misapply the rules. Examples of PECR enforcement action include: (i) A fine of £12,000 on Royal Mail Group in April 20184 for sending emails to opted-out customers in relation to price reductions on stamps. Even though Royal Mail argued that this was a service message and that they had a legal obligation under the Postal Services Act 2011 to publicise their tariffs, the ICO considered that the phrasing used and the style of the message constituted marketing and not simply a service message. Royal Mail had created two versions of the message, one for opted in and one for opted out customers; however, according to the ICO it was clear that both messages were promotional and Royal Mail had failed to distinguish between service and marketing messages. The ICO stated that ‘the use of more appropriate content and phrasing could have avoided what was intended to be a service message becoming marketing’. There was only one customer complaint in relation to over 300,000 sent emails. (ii) A fine of £100,000 on EE Limited in July 20195 for sending marketing text messages to opted-out customers, informing them about their ability to check their current data usage through the EE app and the ability to get an upgrade. The ICO did not accept EE’s argument that this constituted a service message. Again, this was prompted by one complaint to the ICO in relation to 2.5 million messages sent to opted-out customers. 1 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/04/bounty-uk-fined-400-000-forsharing-personal-data-unlawfully/ [accessed 1 October 2020].. 2 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/04/ico-fines-production-company120-000-for-unlawful-filming-in-maternity-clinic/ [accessed 1 October 2020]. 3 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/10/ico-takes-enforcement-actionagainst-experian-after-data-broking-investigation/ [accessed 30 October 2020]. 4 ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/mpns/2258621/royal-mail-group-ltd-mpn.pdf [accessed 1 October 2020]. 5 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/06/ico-fines-telecoms-company-eelimited-for-sending-unlawful-text-messages/ [accessed 1 October 2020].

B Individual and group rights of action A4.249 Although the vast majority of individuals who are dissatisfied with data handling will complain to the ICO (or other supervisory authority), some will instead

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take to the courts. As seen in Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, above, individuals must be informed of their right to take judicial action when their rights requests are refused. The GDPR ensures that individuals can seek a ‘judicial remedy’ against controllers and processors under Article 79 and compensation for ‘material or nonmaterial damage as a result of an infringement’ under Article 82. These rights are implemented through ss 167–169 of the DPA 2018, which allow individuals to seek compliance orders and compensation. A4.250 Historically, compensation for data protection breaches has been raised in a number of UK cases. Many of these cited breach of the Data Protection Act 1998 alongside broader claims of breach of confidence and privacy. These almost exclusively relate to use of data by newspapers and magazines (including phone hacking cases), and whilst these are important in developing the law under that Act, they are not typical of the type of action a sports organisation is likely to face, and many of them will have little relevance to cases under the GDPR. This is particularly true of cases quantifying or discussing distress. The Data Protection Act 1998 did not include, when enacted, any potential to claim damages solely for distress. The Court of Appeal ruled in 20151 that this was an improper implementation of the DP Directive, and required that compensation for distress be ‘read in’ by UK courts. As a result, cases preceding this date must be read with this in mind. It is perhaps sufficient to note that typically damages awarded for distress alone are modest in comparison to the potential for fines under the GDPR.2 1 Google Inc v Judith Vidal-Hall and others [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 2 See eg  Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Limited [2013]  EWCA  Civ 333, where £750 was awarded for distress caused by inaccurate reporting to a credit reference agency; TLT  v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217 where the details of an asylum seeker were published on the Home Office website, resulting in payment of £12,500 in distress damages.

A4.251 It is important to stress that distress or pecuniary damage are not necessary features for a successful claim, as is clear from Recital 85 of the GDPR and the case of Lloyd v Google, where the Court of Appeal held in 2019 that a ‘person’s control over data or over their [browser-generated information] does have a value, so […] the loss of that control must also have a value’.1 Not every breach can give rise to a claim, as there is a ‘threshold of seriousness’ that would exclude breaches such as ‘an accidental one-off data breach that was quickly remedied’.2 The Court of Appeal also considered the assessment of those damages on an obiter basis, and noted that a claim for loss of control alone would be worth ‘much less’ than if distress or pecuniary damages were pleaded, but the appropriate sum would ‘not be nothing’.3 Where claims may relate to small breaches, or breaches that do not cause substantial damage or distress, the risk for all bodies will only substantially increase where there is the possibility of group litigation (discussed below). 1 Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599, para 47. 2 Ibid, para  55, citing a principle established in Gulati v MGN  Ltd ([2015]  EWHC  1482 (Ch)) and EWCA Civ 1291 (CA). 3 Ibid, para 77.

A4.252 Whilst the ICO must take care to ensure that it assesses the culpability of the controller or processor in making any decision to impose a fine, this is not the case for individuals. First, if the individual has suffered any type of damage, a controller, or processor must prove that they were ‘not in any way responsible for the event causing damage’ in order to escape liability.1 Then, ‘where more than one controller or processor, or both a controller and a processor, are involved in the same processing’ and where they are ‘responsible for any damage’, Article 82(4) of the GDPR allows individuals to make a claim for ‘the entire damage’ from a single party, ‘in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject’. If the data subject is successful,

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the unfortunate controller or processor that has footed the full bill is then entitled to ‘claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same processing that part of the compensation’ as corresponds to their respective culpability.2 It is worth noting that joint controllers are no more at risk from these provisions than two controllers who consider their activities separate, but whom the court judges to have been acting over the same processing. Identical rules will apply. 1 GDPR, Art 82(3). 2 Ibid, Art 82(5).

A4.253 Both UK law and the GDPR allow for certain types of group and representative action on data rights to take place. In Lloyd v Google, the Court of Appeal held that it is possible to bring a representative action in respect of data protection breaches in certain circumstances, provided that claimants have ‘the same interest’ required by CPR Part 19.6(1). The risk here for data subjects is that this does not necessarily mean they are put in the best position. Representative actions will naturally require a reduction to the ‘lowest common denominator’ relating to the ‘loss of control’ over data – fact-specific claims for additional damage or distress cannot be pleaded within such a group if not suffered by all.1 This does not prevent the action taking place, but data subjects wishing to seek recompense for more specific damages or distress would need to take their own legal action, although ‘represented claimants could, at least in theory, seek to be joined as parties if they wished to claim additional losses’.2 It is also possible to seek a group litigation order under CPR  19.11, allowing for opt-in rather than opt-out groups of claimants to seek collective redress. By way of example, such action has been initiated in the UK in respect of the British Airways breach discussed earlier in this section.3 1 Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599, para 75. 2 Ibid, para 76. 3 An order was granted in this matter by Warby J  on 4  October 2019, judiciary.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2019/10/Weaver-ors-v-British-Airways-PLC-sealed-order.pdf [accessed 1 October 2020].

A4.254 The GDPR includes two separate provisions that can permit representative rather than group litigation. First, Article 80(1) requires Member States to allow data subjects to proactively mandate a non-profit body or similar public interest bodies to lodge complaints or take judicial action on their behalf. Secondly, Article 80(2) allows Member States to extend this to allow such a body to take its own action in commencing complaints or judicial action (although not a right to seek compensation) if it believes the rights of a data subject have been infringed. The UK has adopted legislative provisions to incorporate the right in Article  80(1),1 but has not as yet adopted regulations that would permit such a body to combine claims of multiple data subjects. The DPA 2018 commits the government to reviewing these provisions within 30 months of commencement (ie by end November 2020).2 1 DPA 2018, ss 187–189. 2 DPA 2018, s 189.

C Criminal offences and personal liability A4.255 The GDPR establishes no criminal responsibility, but the DPA  2018 introduces offences in relation to the following activities: (a)

Destruction or disposal of documents in connection with information or assessment notices (s 148) – this was discussed at para A4.241. (b) Unlawfully obtaining or disclosing personal data (s  170) –  this makes it an offence to knowingly or recklessly obtain or disclose personal data without the consent of the controller. The offence also covers the retention of improperly obtained data and the procurement of unlawful disclosure, and the sale or

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offer to sell any such illegally obtained data. It is a defence to have obtained or disclosed the data for purposes of preventing or detecting crime, where required by law, or where necessary for public interest or journalistic or similar purposes. It will also be a defence if a person can show they had a reasonable belief that they had the legal right or controller’s consent to obtain or disclose the data. Examples of this type of offence include employees improperly accessing or siphoning data, or private investigators obtaining information through illicit means. Sports organisations making use of enquiry agents for intelligence gathering purposes should ensure that those agents do not use unlawful means to obtain this information, given the inducement limb of this offence. (c) Re-identification of anonymised data (s 171) – this provision makes it an offence to knowingly or recklessly re-identify information that has been de-identified without the consent of the controller who took steps to de-identify the data. Again, there are various defences set out in s 171(3) and (4), similar to those discussed under the s 170 offence above. There is also a defence for testing the effectiveness of de-identification in s 172, to prevent the criminalisation of ‘white hat’ probing of anonymisation techniques to ensure their robustness. (d) Alteration of data to prevent disclosure to a data subject (s  173) –  this is discussed at para A4.158. (e) Enforced subject access (s 184) – it is an offence to require an individual to make a subject access request to certain records in connection with recruitment, employment, or the provision of services. These include police, health and certain statutory records. There are certain limited defences. (f) Obstructing or failure to assist the ICO: (Sch 15, para 15) – it is an offence to intentionally obstruct the ICO’s staff whilst they are carrying out a search and seize warrant, or to fail to assist when required to do so under such a warrant. A4.256 The offences in Schedule 15 are triable only in the Magistrates Court. All the other offences could in theory be tried in a Crown Court, allowing for higher fines. Although these offences can be committed by corporate persons, s  198 of the DPA 2018 specifically allows for prosecution of directors, managers, company secretaries or similar officers or individuals ‘purporting to act in any such capacity’ where the act has been committed with their consent, connivance, or attributable neglect. This personal liability should be flagged to those in sports organisations who wish to stretch the bounds of data protection law, in particular where this relates to direct marketing. A similar personal liability Is extended to breaches of PECR, to allow the ICO to impose monetary penalties directly on such individuals.1 1 PECR, Sch 1, para 8AA.

D Publicity and trust A4.257 This Section 7 has focused on enforcement powers and liability, but it is important to add that a main reason why sports organisations should comply with data protection law is the importance of maintaining public trust. As clearly mentioned in the ICO’s Regulatory Action Policy, the ICO is committed to ensuring that its enforcement action has a deterrent effect. It will continue to take steps to make bad practice public. Media outlets are quick to publicise poor data practices, particularly where they relate to large data breaches. Individuals who do not trust a controller to handle their data correctly are far more likely to exercise their data rights – at the expense of the body having to handle these requests – and are much less likely to consent to direct marketing or other data initiatives. Given the importance of data in so many sporting activities, from the commercial to the regulatory, it is vital to maintain a clean slate with the public whose information is so valuable.

CHAPTER A5

Best Practice in Sports Governance Maria Clarke (Maria Clarke Lawyers) and Edwina Haddon and Jonathan Taylor QC (both Bird & Bird LLP) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A5.1 2

BROAD PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE......................................... A5.5 A International level........................................................................................ A5.6 B National level............................................................................................... A5.10 C Synthesising the key principles.................................................................... A5.19

3

PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE. A5.20 A Transparency................................................................................................ A5.21 B Accountability.............................................................................................. A5.27 C Stakeholder Representation......................................................................... A5.38 D Integrity Controls......................................................................................... A5.43

4

MONITORING COMPLIANCE......................................................................... A5.51

1 INTRODUCTION A5.1 We start this discussion of best practice in sports governance with a reminder of what governance is and why good governance is important: ‘What does Governance mean? Governance can be defined as: “The system by which entities are directed and controlled. It is concerned with structure and processes for decision-making, accountability, control and behaviour at the top of an entity. Governance influences how an organisation’s objectives are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and addressed and how performance is optimised”. Governance is a system and process, not a single activity and therefore successful implementation of a good governance strategy requires a systematic approach that incorporates strategic planning, risk management and performance management. Like culture, it is a core component of the unique characteristics of a successful organisation. Why is good governance important? The fundamental reasons why organisations should adopt good governance practises include: To preserve and strengthen stakeholder confidence – nothing distracts an organisation more than having to deal with a disgruntled stakeholder group caused by a lack of confidence in the governing body. And on the positive side, a supportive stakeholder base can generate benefits for the organisation though social and emotional support, intangible but very valuable attributes that all organisations should strive to achieve and sustain; To provide the foundation for a high-performing organisation – the achievement of goals and sustainable success requires input and support from all levels of an organisation. The Board, though good governance practices, provides the framework for planning, implementation and monitoring of performance and without a foundation to build high performance upon, the achievement of this goal becomes problematic. Achievement of the best performance and results possible, within

256  Governance of the Sports Sector existing capacity and capability, should be an organisation’s ongoing goal. Good governance should support management and staff to be “the best they can be”; and To ensure the organisation is well placed to respond to a changing external environment – business today operates in an environment of constant change. Technology has created an information age that has transformed our world, and for business to both survive and remain profitable to enable it to fulfil its mission and achieve its vision, a system has to be in place to assist an organisation to identify changes in both the external environment and emerging trends. This process of understanding our changing world does not happen by chance, it requires leadership, commitment and resources from the governing body to establish and maintain such a system within the organisation. Change generally does not happen “over-night”, it is there for all to see if they have in place a system for looking. Governing bodies, as the ultimate leaders of an organisation, should take prime responsibility for this activity. In summary, governance encompasses the processes by which organisations are directed, controlled and held to account. It includes the authority, accountability, leadership, direction and control exercised in an organisation. Greatness can be achieved when good governance principles and practises are applied throughout the whole organisation and that’s why governance is important.’1 1 Governance Today, ‘Governance: what is it and why is it important?’ available at: (governancetoday. com/GT/Material/Governance__what_is_it_and_why_is_it_important_.aspx?WebsiteKey=0cf4306af91b-45d7-9ced-a97b5d6f6966) [accessed 1 October 2020].

A5.2 Sport is both a public good1 and a multi-billion dollar industry, with many millions of stakeholders and consumers creating enormous public scrutiny in almost every nation around the world. National sports teams are often seen as focus of a nation’s hopes and aspirations on the world stage, and even as an expression of the nation’s values.2 For governments that see sport as a useful instrument of public policy,3 sport can also be a recipient of significant public funding and support.4 Yet at the same time the sports movement jealously guards its self-proclaimed autonomy and freedom from political interference.5 For all of these reasons and many more, the non-public international and national sports governing bodies (SGBs) that govern, regulate, and administer sport around the world have to have good governance principles embedded throughout their entire operations, so that they can retain public confidence in their work, so that they can defend their autonomy from a position of strength,6 and so that as organisations they can perform to the same high standards they expect of their athletes.7 1 2 3 4 5 6

See para A3.7. See para A3.5. See paras A3.7-A3.8. See paras A3.13-A3.15, A3.52 et seq, and A3.112 et seq. See para A1.2 et seq. See eg European Commission, White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 final (11 July 2007), p13 (‘The Commission acknowledges the autonomy of sporting organisations and representative structures (such as leagues). Furthermore, it recognises that governance is mainly the responsibility of sports governing bodies and, to some extent, the Member States and social partners. Nonetheless, dialogue with sports organisations has brought a number of areas to the Commission’s attention […]. The Commission considers that most challenges can be addressed through self-regulation respectful of good governance principles, provided that EU law is respected, and is ready to play a facilitating role or take action if necessary’); European Commission, Expert Group ‘Good Governance’ Deliverable 2 report (September 2013), p 3 (‘sports bodies that do not have in place good governance procedures and practices can expect their autonomy and self-regulatory practice to be curtailed’). In 2013 the Commission stated: ‘The autonomy of sports bodies is now more susceptible than ever before. Interventions from the courts, national governments or regulators, commercial interests or European institutions are more likely. Indeed, in its 2011 Communication “Developing the European Dimension in Sport” the European Commission developed its position beyond that of previous comments confirming good governance is a condition for the autonomy and self-regulation of sports organisations’ (ec.europa.eu/ assets/eac/sport/library/policy_documents/xg-gg-201307-dlvrbl2-sept2013.pdf [accessed 1  October 2020]).

Best Practice in Sports Governance  257 7 See eg  Sport Australia, ‘Governance – Club Development’ (sportaus.gov.au/club_development/ governance [accessed 1 October 2020]) (‘It is commonly accepted that governance structures have a significant impact on the performance of sporting organisations. Poor governance has a variety of causes including director/committee inexperience, conflicts of interest, failure to manage risk, inadequate and inappropriate financial controls and generally poor internal business systems and reporting. Ineffective governance practices not only impact on the sport where they present, but also undermine confidence in the Australian sports industry as a whole’).

A5.3 For many decades, poor governance practices in the sports movement, particularly at the international level, created a lack of transparency and accountability that allowed corruption to flourish. The resulting scandals have been deeply damaging to the SGBs and sports involved, destroying public confidence in each case in the SGB’s readiness, its willingness, and/or its ability to run the sport in the best interests of all of its stakeholders. The role of dishonour is long,1 but it suffices for present purposes to highlight three prominent recent examples: (a)

International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) (now World Athletics) – in December 2014 a German television documentary was broadcast that accused high-ranking officials within the IAAF of taking bribes to cover up doping in Russian athletics.2 In November 2015 an independent commission set up by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) to investigate those allegations found ‘a deeply rooted culture of cheating’ within Russian athletics, and ‘corruption and bribery practices at the highest levels of international athletics’.3 In a second report in January 2016, the same independent commission detailed a ‘complete breakdown of governance structures and lack of accountability within the IAAF’ that had permitted the son of the then-President (Lamine Diack), together with the head of the IAAF Anti-Doping Department, to accept bribes to delay the exposure of Russian dopers until after the 2012 Olympic Games.4 In January 2016, four of the conspirators were banned for life from the sport for their breaches of the IAAF’s Code of Ethics,5 which bans were subsequently upheld at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).6 In addition, the former President, his son, and his personal lawyer were prosecuted in France for corruption offences, with verdicts due to be announced in September 2020.7 (b) Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) – on 27 May 2015, the US Department of Justice announced that it was ‘charging 14 defendants with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with the defendants’ participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the corruption of international soccer’.8 Of those 14 individuals, nine were senior office-holders at FIFA. The US  Attorney General said that ‘the indictment alleges corruption that is rampant, systemic and deep-rooted both abroad and here in the United States. It spans at least two generations of soccer officials who, as alleged, have abused their positions of trust to acquire millions of dollars of bribes and kickbacks’, in particular in relation to the sale of broadcasting rights to international matches,9 but also (according to a subsequent superseding indictment) in relation to the sale of votes for the right to host FIFA World Cup Finals tournaments, and for the sale of votes in the 2011 FIFA President election.10 Several defendants pleaded guilty to the charges, while others were convicted at trial, and a few remain fugitives from justice as efforts continue to extradite them to the US to face trial.11 Although the then-FIFA  President, Sepp Blatter, was not indicted, he was subsequently banned from the sport for six years for paying CHF 2 million to UEFA President Michel Platini in return for his vote in the 2011 presidential election,12 while Platini ultimately received a six-year ban.13 Meanwhile FIFA General Secretary Jérôme Valcke was banned from the sport for ten years for Ethics Code breaches relating to non-disclosure of conflicts of interest, and the offering and accepting of improper gifts.14

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(c)

International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) – in January 2020, another German television documentary (involving some of the same journalists who had exposed the athletics scandal) was broadcast that accused the thenPresident of the IWF, Dr Tamas Ajan, of financial irregularities, corruption, manipulation of doping control, doping payment irregularities, and nepotism.15 In June 2020, reporting the outcome of his investigation into those allegations, Professor Richard McLaren identified further serious wrongdoing (including vote buying for the President and senior level positions of the Executive Board) and highlighted the need for significant governance reform within the IWF.16

  1 The highest profile early example was when members of the Salt Lake City bid committee bribed senior members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to vote for Salt Lake City to host the 2002 Winter Olympics, which resulted in three IOC members resigning and six being expelled: ‘IOC expels all six members in Salt Lake City scandal’, guardian.co.uk, 17 March 1999; Marquette Sports Law Review, Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 7, ‘The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal’. In further reaction to the scandal, the IOC revised its rules for future bidding processes, adopted an Ethics Code, and established an Ethics Commission to enforce it. Rule 22 of the Olympic Charter now provides: ‘The IOC Ethics Commission is charged with defining and updating a framework of ethical principles, including a Code of Ethics, based upon the values and principles enshrined in the Olympic Charter of which the said Code forms an integral part. In addition, it investigates complaints raised in relation to the non-respect of such ethical principles, including breaches of the Code of Ethics and, if necessary, proposes sanctions to the IOC Executive Board’. Other event bidding controversies include FIFA’s bidding process for the right to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, which hit the headlines when eight FIFA Executive Committee members were accused of corruption in respect of Qatar’s winning bid for 2022. The House of Commons’ Culture, Media and Sport Committee reviewed the allegations in the course of an inquiry into The FA’s failed bid to host the 2018 World Cup, and concluded: ‘The Committee was appalled by the allegations of corruption made against members of the FIFA Executive Committee during the course of its inquiry. […] They are sufficiently serious for FIFA to commission a full, urgent and independent investigation, and for the outcome to be made public. Instead, FIFA has given every impression of wishing to sweep all allegations of misconduct under the carpet and of dismissing anyone bringing allegations to them with an approach bordering on contempt’. House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2018 World Cup Bid, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12 (HC 1031, 5 July 2011). A year later, in August 2012, Michael Garcia, the newly appointed chair of the investigative chamber of the FIFA  Ethics Committee, announced that he would investigate the award of the 2018 and 2022  FIFA  World Cups to Russia and Qatar respectively. His subsequent report was not made public. Instead, HansJoachim Eckert, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee’s adjudication chamber, published a 42-page summary of the report, which cleared both Russia and Qatar of any wrongdoing. Shortly afterwards, Garcia declared that the summary was ‘materially incomplete’, with ‘erroneous representations of the facts and conclusions’ (bbc.co.uk/sport/football/30042309 [accessed 21  October 2020]), and tried to appeal to FIFA’s Appeal Committee, which ruled the appeal inadmissible (bbc.co.uk/sport/ football/30491135 [accessed 21  October 2020]). FIFA eventually published the report after it was leaked to the media, revealing that Garcia had concluded that the evidence established a prima facie case of possible breaches of the FIFA Ethics Code by certain individuals (including several current or former members of the FIFA  Executive Committee) and that formal investigative proceedings would be opened against those individuals, that various weaknesses in FIFA’s ethical and bidding rules had been identified, but no ethical breaches by any bid teams had been identified (img.fifa.com/ image/upload/wnr43dgn3yysafypuq8r.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]). In March 2020, however, a US Department of Justice indictment alleged that ‘several [FIFA] executive members were offered or received bribes in connection their votes’ in relation to who would host the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups (Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York on 18  March 2020, paras 90–95 (justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/download [accessed 21 October 2020]).  2 ARD, ‘The secrets of doping: How Russia makes its winners’, 4  December 2014 (youtube.com/ watch?v=iu9B-ty9JCY [accessed 21 October 2020]).  3 WADA, The Independent Commission Report #1 (9 November 2015), pp 10 and 12.  4 WADA, The Independent Commission Report #2 (14 January 2016), p 3.  5 IAAF v Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Dollé and Diack, decision 02/2016 of the IAAF Ethics Commission panel.  6 Balakhnichev, Melnikov and Diack v IAAF and Ethics Commission of the IAAF, CAS 2016/A/44174419-4420.  7 Ingle, ‘Trial of Lamine Diack put back after presentation of new documents’ (2020) Guardian, 13 January.  8 justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracyand (27 May 2015) [accessed 21 October 2020].

Best Practice in Sports Governance  259   9 Gayle, ‘Indictment containing 47 charges of racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering unsealed against nine officials and five sports executives’ (2015) Guardian, 27 May. This was not the first such scandal to hit FIFA. A long-running scandal over whether members of FIFA’s Executive Committee had accepted bribes from a marketing agency, ISL, in order to secure valuable marketing and television rights contracts to the FIFA  World Cup was finally resolved in April 2013, when the FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber named former FIFA  President Joao Havelange and former Executive Committee members Ricardo Teixeira and Nicolas Leoz as the recipients of the bribes: Sepp Blatter under fire for bribery culture as honorary president Joao Havelange resigns (2013) telegraph.co.uk, 30 April. 10 Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York on 18  March 2020, paragraphs 90–99 (justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/download [accessed 21 October 2020]). 11 United States Department of Justice, ‘Sixteen Additional FIFA  Official Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption’ (justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeeringconspiracy-and-corruption, 3 December 2015 [accessed 21 October 2020]); United States Department of Justice, High-Ranking Soccer Officials Convicted in Multi-Million Dollar Bribery Schemes (justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/high-ranking-soccer-officials-convicted-multi-million-dollar-briberyschemes, 26 December 2017 [accessed 21 October 2020]); Inside World Football (insideworldfootball. com/2020/01/23/warners-extradition-fate-now-lies-hands-uks-privy-council/, 23  January 2020 [accessed 21 October 2020]). 12 Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 316 (upholding ban imposed by the FIFA Appeal Committee as reasonable and fair: ‘It must be recalled that Mr Blatter as FIFA President was the top person in the world of football. There is no higher position in football, and the FIFA President must especially be aware of and conduct himself in accordance with his duties and responsibilities under the FCE [FIFA Code of Ethics]. The standard of ethical conduct required under the FCE should be and should be seen to be applied to the FIFA President as rigorously as if not more rigorously than that applied to anyone else bound by the FCE. As stated in the very first sentence of the Preamble to the FCE (2006, 2009, and 2012 editions), “FIFA bears a special responsibility to safeguard the integrity and reputation of football worldwide”. This special responsibility is borne in particular by the FIFA President as the top person in the organisation and indeed in all of football and must be taken into account when the FIFA President himself violates the FCE). See also Mohamed Bin Hammam v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625. Mr Bin Hammam was banned by FIFA’s appeal committee from participating in any football-related activity for life after he was found guilty of giving gifts and bribing voters during the 2011  FIFA presidential election campaign. Mr Bin Hammam successfully appealed FIFA’s decision at the CAS, which found that it was ‘not convinced to the standard of “comfortable satisfaction” that Mr Bin Hammam made monies available to delegates […] for the purposes of inducing them to vote for him in the election for the Presidency of FIFA’ (ibid, para 96). The panel noted that it wished to ‘make clear that this conclusion should not be taken to diminish the significance of its finding that it is more likely than not that Mr. Bin Hammam was the source of the monies that were brought into Trinidad and Tobago and eventually distributed at the meeting by Mr. Warner [previously Vice President of FIFA and President of CONCACAF], and that in this way, his conduct, in collaboration with and most likely induced by Mr. Warner, may not have complied with the highest ethical standards that should govern the world of football and other sports. This is all the more so at the elevated levels of football governance at which individuals such as Mr. Bin Hammam and Mr. Warner have operated in the past. The Panel therefore wishes to make clear that in applying the law, as it is required to do under the CAS Code, it is not making any sort of affirmative finding of innocence in relation to Mr. Bin Hammam. The Panel is doing no more than concluding that the evidence is insufficient in that it does not permit the majority of the Panel to reach the standard of comfortable satisfaction in relation to the matters on which the Appellant was charged. It is a situation of “case not proven”, coupled with concern on the part of the Panel that the FIFA investigation was not complete or comprehensive enough to fill the gaps in the record’ (ibid, para 95). 13 Platini v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4474. 14 Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003. 15 ARD, ‘The Dark Side of Sport’, 5 January 2020 (youtube.com/watch?v=FLYzWqP1UF4 [accessed 21 October 2020]). 16 Independent Investigator Report to the Oversight and Integrity Commission of International Weightlifting Federation, 4  June 2020 (iwf.net/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2020/08/ CORRECTED-300720-FULL-REPORT-MASTER-FINAL-FOR-PUBLICATION-v2.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]).

A5.4 This chapter surveys the principles of good sports governance that have been identified in reaction to these and other impetuses (Section 2), and then considers the practical implementation of those principles (Section 3), before concluding with a brief discussion of the mechanisms for monitoring compliance with good governance principles (Section 4).

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2 BROAD PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE A5.5 Since the turn of the century more than 50 sets of good governance principles and indicators have been identified by a diverse group of stakeholders, including the IOC,1 international sports federations,2 government agencies,3 umbrella sports bodies,4 intergovernmental organisations,5 external consultants/NGOs,6 academics,7 and independent reviewers.8 In this section, we highlight some of the key principles that have been identified from selected reviews. 1 IOC Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (2008); IOC  Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of good governance for national Olympic Committees (2016). See also European Olympic Committee, ’Support the Implementation of Good Governance in Sport’ (SIGGS) (2016). 2 Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Recommended Key Governance Principles and Basic Indicators and First Assessment (2016); Second Assessment (2017); Third Assessment (2019); Union Cycliste Internationale, ‘Report of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission’ (February 2015); Rowland, ‘An Independent Review of the World Squash Federation’ (19 October 2016). 3 Sport and Recreation NZ, ‘Nine Steps to Effective Governance’ (1st Edn 2004, 2nd Edn 2011, 3rd Edn 2019) and ‘Governance Lite – a concise version of Nine Steps to Effective Governance for smaller sports organisations’ (2020); Sport Canada, ‘Pursuing Effective Governance in Canada National Sport Community’ (2011); UK Sport and Deloitte & Touche, ‘“Investing in Change” – High Level Review of the Modernisation Programme for Governing Bodies of Sport’ (July 2003), and now UK  Sport, ‘A  Code for Sports Governance’ (2017); Australian Sports Commission (now Sport Australia), ‘Mandatory Sports Governance Principles’ (2015) and ‘Sports Governance Principles’ (2020); ’Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations’ (2016). 4 Sport and Recreation Alliance, United Kingdom, ‘The Voluntary Code for Sports Governance’ (1st Edn 2011, 2nd Edn 2014), and ‘Principles of Good Governance and Recreation’ (2017). 5 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2005)8 of the Committee of Ministers on the principles of good governance in sport; Recommendation CM/Rev (2011)3 of the Committee of Ministers on the principle of autonomy in sport; PACE Appendix to ‘Good governance and ethics in sport’ Resolution 1875 (2012); PACE Appendix to ‘Towards a framework for modern sports governance’ Resolution 2199 (2018); European Commission, Expert Group GG ‘Deliverables 2: Principles of good governance in sport’ (2013). 6 Sorrell, ‘Implementing Good Governance Principles in Sports Organisations: A  painful obligation or a platform for growth’, White Paper from Burson-Marsteller/TSE Consulting (April 2016); Play the Game, ‘National Sports Governance Observer’ (2018); Sport Integrity Global Alliance (SIGA), ‘Declaration of Core Principles on Sport Integrity – Sport Governance’ (2016); Good Corporation, ‘Sports Governance Framework’ (2016). 7 Chappelet and Mrkonjic, ‘Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS): An assessment tool for international sport governing bodies’ (Institut de hautes études en administration publique, January 2013); Geeraert, ‘A Sports Governance Observer’ (2015); Birkbeck Sport Business Centre, ‘Good Governance in Sport: A  Survey of UK  National Governing Bodies of Sport’ (April 2010). 8 See eg Lord Burns, ‘FA Structural Review’ (10 June 2005); McLeish, ‘Review of Scottish Football: Governance, Leadership, Structures’ (December 2010); Slaughter and May, ‘Review of Governance for the Rugby Football Union’ (November 2011); Crawford and Carter, ‘A  Good Governance Structure for Australian Cricket’ (December 2011); Lord Woolf and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, ‘An independent governance review of the International Cricket Council’ (1  February 2012); The Hon Warwick Smith AM, ‘The Independent Review of Swimming’ (19 February 2013) (Australian swimming); Christopher Quinlan QC, ‘Review of the Disciplinary Panel, Licensing Committee and Appeal Board of the British Horseracing Authority’ (September 2016); International Paralympic Committee, ‘Remaining Fit For Purpose – a summary of the proposal to reform the governance of the International Paralympic Committee’ (25 October 2019); English Football League, ‘2019 Governance Review’ (efl.com/siteassets/image/201920/governance-reviews/governance-review.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]).

A International level A5.6 The International Olympic Committee (IOC) – The fifth of the ‘Fundamental Principles of Olympism’ set out in the Olympic Charter states that: ‘sports organisations within the Olympic Movement […] have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which includes […] the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied’.

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In 2008, the IOC issued its ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement’,1 setting out basic governance principles collected under the following headings: (a)

Vision, Mission and Strategy (setting out the body’s commitment to the development and promotion of sport through non-profit organisations; the promotion of the values of sport; organisation of competitions; ensuring a fair sporting contest at all times; protection of the members and particularly the athletes; solidarity; and respect for the environment); (b) Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process (calling for regulations to be clear, transparent, disclosed, publicised and made readily available; democratic elections for offices; clear checks and balances between the different branches of the governing body; and decision-making that is independent and free of conflict); (c) Highest Level of Competence, Integrity and Ethical Standards (including the development and enforcement of ethical rules based on the IOC Code of Ethics); (d) Accountability, Transparency and Control (including the executive being accountable to the members in general meeting); (e) Solidarity and Development (fair and equitable distribution of resources and financial revenues); (f) Athletes’ Involvement, Participation and Care (including care for the safety, wellbeing and education of athletes); and (g) Harmonious Relations with Governments While Preserving Autonomy (‘Cooperation, coordination and consultation are the best way for sporting organisations to preserve their autonomy’).2 The IOC Code of Ethics states: ‘The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement, in particular transparency, responsibility and accountability, must be respected by all Olympic parties’.3  A  more detailed document, setting out ‘Consolidated Minimum Requirements for the Implementation of the Basic Principles of Good Governance for National Olympic Committees’ was published in 2016.4 1 IOC, ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement’ (1 February 2008). 2 For further discussion of the issue of government interference with the autonomy of sport, see para A1.11 et seq. 3 IOC, Code of Ethics (2020) at Article D.11, p 16 4 International Olympic Committee, ‘Consolidated Minimum Requirements for the Implementation of the Basic Principles of Good Governance for NOCs’ (2016) (stillmed.olympic.org/media/ Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/What-We-Do/Leading-the-Olympic-Movement/PGGImplementation-and-Self-Evaluation-Tools-23-12-2016.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]).

A5.7 The Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF)1 – The mission of ASOIF is: ‘to serve and represent the Summer Olympic IFs in the most competent, articulate and professional manner on issues of common interest in the Summer Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement, and on any other matter deemed necessary by the IFs’.2

In November 2015, ASOIF created a Governance Task Force, which it ‘mandated with helping [IFs] to promote and ensure a culture of good governance within their structures […]’.3 In 2016 the Governance Task Force identified five key governance principles (transparency; integrity; democracy; sports development; and solidarity and control mechanisms), each measured by ten indicators, that it recommended ‘be immediately embraced by all IFs in all their respective activities, decisions, processes and regulations’.4

262  Governance of the Sports Sector It is recommended that these five key principles should be included by IFs in their statutes, rules and regulations through simple and easily measurable indicators as appropriate to the particular circumstances of each IF. It is noted that over time and as IFs improve their governance structures and policies, more sophisticated indicators will come into play. ‘1. Transparency Make the following information public (ie  place in public domain eg  via official website): • • • • • • • • • •

Statutes, rules and regulations Organisational charts for staff, elected officials and committee structures, and other relevant decision-making groups including Remuneration Committee Vision, mission, values and strategic objectives A list of all national member federations providing basic information for each All elected officials with biographical info Annual activity report and main events reports Annual financial reports following external audit Allowances/financial benefits of elected officials and senior executives General Assembly agenda with relevant documents (before) and minutes (after) with procedure for members to add items to agenda A summary of reports/decisions taken during Board & Commission meetings and all other important decisions of IF

2. Integrity • • • • • • • • • •

Incorporate in statutes all appropriate ethical principles which align with and embrace the IOC Code of Ethics and are applicable to all members, officials and participants Have clear rules to guard against conflicts of interest Establish regulations which comply with the WADA World Anti-Doping Code and ensure that their members comply with it Establish regulations to tackle match-fixing and manipulation of competitions in accordance with the Olympic Movement Code against the Manipulation of Sport Competitions Establish confidential reporting mechanisms for “whistle blowers” together with some form of protection for individuals coming forward with information Respect principles of sustainable development and regard for the environment Put in place integrity awareness/education programmes Provide for appropriate investigation of threats to sport integrity Cooperate with relevant public authorities on integrity matters Make public all decisions of disciplinary bodies and related sanctions, as well as pending cases where and as applicable

3. Democracy • • • • • • • •

Election of the President and a majority of members of all executive bodies Clear policies to ensure election candidates can campaign on a balanced footing including opportunity for candidates to present their vision/programmes Elections process with secret ballot under a clear procedure/regulations Make public all open positions for elections and appointments including the process for candidates and full details of the roles, job descriptions, application deadlines and assessment Establishment and publication of eligibility rules for candidates for election, including due diligence assessment prior to election/appointment Term limits for elected officials Provide for the representation of key stakeholders (eg  active athletes) in governing bodies. Due regard shall also be paid to gender representation and the enactment of policies encouraging gender equality in all governing bodies Main decisions are taken on basis of written reports supported by criteria, with opportunity for a secret ballot at request of voting constituents

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Defined conflict of interest policy with exclusion of members with a manifest, declared or perceived conflict Governing bodies meet regularly: the General Assembly ideally once a year

4. Sports Development & Solidarity • • • • • • • • • •

Transparent process to determine allocation of resources in declared non-profit objectives Redistribution policy and programmes for main stakeholders Monitoring/audit process of the use of distributed funds Existence of environmental responsibility policy and measures Existence of social responsibility policy and programmes Education programmes for coaches, judges, referees and assistance to athletes during and after career Due regard is paid to gender and geographical representation through guidelines Legacy programmes to assist communities in which events are hosted Anti-discrimination policies on racial, religious or sexual orientation Cooperation with relevant public authorities on social responsibility issues

5. Control Mechanisms • •

Establish an internal ethics committee with independent representation Establish an internal audit committee that is independent from the decisionmaking body and reports directly to the members • Adopt accounting control mechanisms and external financial audit • Adopt policies and processes for internal control and risk management system • Adopt policies to prevent commercial interests from overriding sporting regulations eg conduct of draws • Observe open tenders for major commercial and procurement contracts • Decisions can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms on the basis of clear rules • Due diligence and effective risk management in bidding requirements, presentation, assessment and allocation of main events • Awarding of main events to follow an open and transparent process • Internal disciplinary procedure with appeals process and final recourse to the Court of Arbitration for Sport

In June 2020, ASOIF announced that: ‘IPACS has agreed that the ASOIF model, which has now been used by more than 100 sporting federations, will be the basis for an international recognised benchmark for sports governance, which is now under development’.5 1 The Association of Olympic Winter Sports (AIOWF) is formed of seven federations and it also produces an annual governance review, using the same evaluation system as ASOIF (ie the same five principles and 50 indicators). 2 ASOIF website (‘History’ section asoif.com/history [accessed 21 October 2020] and ‘About ASOIF’ section asoif.com/about-asoif [accessed 21 October 2020]). 3 ASOIF website (‘Governance Task Force’ section, asoif.com/governance-task-force [accessed 21 October 2020]). 4 ASOIF Governance Task Force Report, Approved by the General Assembly November 2016 (asoif.com/ sites/default/files/download/asoif_governance_task_force_report.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]). 5 ASOIF Governance Taskforce, Third Review of International Federation Governance (16 June 2020, asoif.com/sites/default/files/download/asoif_third_review_of_if_governance_fv-0616.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]), p 5.

A5.8 The Council of Europe1 – The Council of Europe has spearheaded public authority efforts to promote good governance in the sports movement, mainly through the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS): ‘EPAS provides a platform for intergovernmental sports co-operation between the public authorities of its 38 member states. It also encourages dialogue between public authorities, sports federations and NGOs. This contributes to better governance,

264  Governance of the Sports Sector with the aim of making sport healthier and fairer and ensuring that it conforms to high ethical standards. It uses Council of Europe sports standards such as the European Sports Charter and the Code of Sports Ethics as the basis for carrying out standards, monitoring them and helping with capacity building and the exchange of good practice.’2 1 See generally Council of Europe website, coe.int/en/web/portal [accessed 21 October 2020]. 2 Council of Europe (Democracy, Sport, ‘About the platform’ section, coe.int/en/web/sport-migrantintegration-directory/about-epas [accessed 21 October 2020]).

A5.9 In December 2018, the Committee of Ministers to the Council of Europe’s Member States published its recommendation on the promotion of good governance in sport and the accompanying explanatory memorandum, stressing ‘the role that governments can play in supporting the implementation of good governance in sport’.1 The recommendations issued to member states were to: ‘1. ensure that their national legislation effectively allows for investigation, prosecution and mutual legal assistance, including police and judicial cooperation, in cases of corruption offences in sport; 2. apply a zero-tolerance policy regarding corruption in sport; 3. ensure that the competent authorities use the relevant anti-money laundering and anti-corruption provisions and mechanisms to prevent and respond to cases in the field of sport; 4. monitor directly or indirectly progress towards the implementation of good governance principles by their national sport movement; 5. consider introducing compliance with good governance principles as criteria for the awarding of public grants to sports organisations and for sports events; 6. encourage the leaders of their national sport movement to comply with and actively promote good governance principles while acting within the framework of international sports organisations; 7. encourage sports organisations acting on their territory to: – apply the principles of democracy in their decision-making and operations, and further strengthen their transparency, inclusiveness and democratic ways of functioning, as well as their accountability; – develop and implement appropriate good governance measures within their own regulations and procedures; – foster a good governance culture through educational initiatives; – achieve a balanced representation in the diversity of their members – including gender equality – within their decision-making processes; – co-operate with independent experts reviewing the good governance of sports organisations, where appropriate; – publish the results of any self-assessment on good governance; – establish external evaluations and audit policies, as appropriate; – share information on corrupt practices with law-enforcement authorities; 8. Encourage co-operation with all key stakeholders to address any kind of corruption in sport; 9. Prevent conflicts of interest within bodies – public or private – which are in charge of both elite sport performance and sport integrity, particularly as regards the fight against doping and the manipulation of sports competitions; 10. Make sure that whistle-blowers benefit from effective protection, and in particular are covered by national frameworks for protection, as defined in Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7, irrespective of their contractual relation with their organisation.’

Notwithstanding the fact that the recommendations are not binding, they provide the basis for a more coordinated international approach by public authorities to encouraging good governance in the sports movement in their respective countries. 1 Council of Europe, Promotion of Goof Governance in Sport (Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)12 and explanatory memorandum (rm.coe.int/recommendation-of-the-committee-of-ministers-tomember-states-on-the-p/168093fb61 [accessed 21  October 2020]). See also Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2005)8 of the Committee of Minsters to Member States on the principles of good governance in sport, adopted on 20 April 2005.

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B National level A5.10 The Council of Europe’s recommendation that member states ‘consider introducing compliance with good governance principles as criteria for the awarding of public grants to sports organisations and for sports events’ has been in place for a while in certain countries. A5.11 The United Kingdom – In December 2015, the UK Government announced: ‘To have the strongest voice internationally when pressing for stronger governance standards, we need to hold ourselves to the highest possible standards domestically. As in international sport, there are still parts of domestic sport where governance standards fall below those required of any public limited company or charitable organisation. It is not acceptable that governance standards should still fall short in any organisation that receives public money’.1

The UK’s Code for Sports Governance was launched in October 2016, setting out the minimum standards of transparency, accountability and financial integrity that would be required as from April 2017 from those national governing bodies (NGBs) seeking public funding (via UK Sport or Sport England).2 1 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Sporting Future: A  New Strategy for an Active Nation’ (December 2015), para 8.4. 2 Tracey Crouch MP, Sports Minister at the time, said: ‘It is vital that our domestic sports bodies and organisations uphold the very highest standards of governance and lead the world in this area. We want to ensure that they operate efficiently and successfully while being transparent and representative of society. We have been clear that we will expect them to adhere to the new Code for Sports Governance if they are to receive public funding in the future’ (uksport.gov.uk/resources/governance-code, October 2016 [accessed 21 October 2020]).

A5.12 The Code for Sports Governance emphasise the importance of five governance principles: (1) a clear and appropriate governance structure, led by a properly constituted board of directors; (2) increased skills and diversity in decision making (with a target of at least 30 per cent gender diversity on boards); (3) transparency and accountability (eg publishing more information and engaging with stakeholders on the structure, strategy, and financial position of the organisation); (4) upholding high standards of integrity and conduct; and (5) compliance with applicable laws/regulations, financial strategic planning and controls, and risk management.1 The Code then sets out specific requirements in relation to each principle, which are divided into tiers, based on the type and size of the investment received by the NGB in issue. Tier 1 is the minimum level of mandatory requirements (with which any organisation seeking funding must comply) and Tier 3 is the most exacting standard (applying to investments granted over a period of years, for a continuing activity and/ or for funding over £1 million). Tier 2 falls in the middle and its requirements are to be determined on a case-by-case basis.2 1 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 14 to 15. 2 Ibid, pp 10 to 11.

A5.13 It was announced on 13 July 2020 that the Code for Sports Governance will undergo a review covering: (a) further development of the elements that support equality, diversity, and inclusion ensuring greater representation of people from black, Asian and

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minority ethnic backgrounds, disabled people or people with a long-term health condition, as well as female representation; and (b) whether any elements of the Code can be improved in light of the three years of experience of 200 bodies using the Code, whether any other elements can be improved and developments in governance best practice in other sectors.1 1 UK Sport press release, ‘UK Sport and Sport England outline future developments to Code for Sports Governance’ (13 July 2020).

A5.14 In 2017 the UK Sport and Recreation Alliance developed ‘The Principles of Good Governance for Sport and Recreation’1 for the vast majority of organisations operating in the sport and recreation sector that are not recipients of UK Sport or Sport England funding: (a)

Integrity: Acting as Guardians of the Sport, Recreation, Activity or Area. The Board must look to uphold the highest standards of integrity not only in what it does but in the wider environment of its sport, recreation, activity or area. (b) Organisation’s Vision and Mission. The Board needs to develop a strategic plan that serves the organisation in light of its vision and mission. (c) Leadership and Role of the Board. The Board should have the right balance of skills and expertise required for the long-term success of the organisation and its growth. (d) Board Structure: The Board should be balanced, inclusive and skilled as well as having representation of the diversity of the sport and the communities it serves. (e) Controls and Compliance. The Board needs to be conscious of the standards it should operate to and comply with, and its role in exercising appropriate and effective control over the organisation. (f) Accountability and Transparency. The Board needs to be open and accountable to its stakeholders and its actions should stand up to scrutiny when reasonably questioned. (g) Engaging with the Sport and Recreation Landscape. Directors need to be aware of the international and domestic sporting worlds and position the organisation appropriately, as well as maintain strategic relationships with key stakeholders and other governing bodies. 1 Available at sportandrecreation.org.uk/governance/the-principles-of-good-governance [accessed 21 October 2020].

A5.15 Australia – Following disappointing swimming results for Australia at the London 2012 Olympics, an independent review into the national swimming federation concluded that it suffered from ‘a culture of non-strategic business practices and a governance system that did not operate as well as it should’, and that ‘a lack of transparency in decision making had led to a growing disillusionment in those who held this responsibility and a general misalignment of stakeholders’.1 The Australian Sports Commission (ASC) subsequently introduced its ‘Mandatory Sports Governance Principles’.2 In 2013, only the seven sports that received the highest levels of ASC funding were required to meet these principles but from 2015 that number increased to 23 organisations, being those receiving ASC funding of more than AUD 1.5million a year.3 1 The Hon Warwick Smith AM, ‘The Independent Review of Swimming’ (19 February 2013), p 7. 2 Australian Sports Commission, now Sport Australia, ‘Mandatory Sports Governance Principles’. 3 Bang, ‘Governments tighten control of national sport organisations’ (Play the Game, 8  December 2016).

A5.16 The Mandatory Sports Governance Principles were replaced with new Sports Governance Standards in July 2020, which were introduced to help Australian

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sports leaders face the challenges of COVID-19 and to build a stronger sporting future.1 ’The Sport Governance Principles 2020 are aimed at giving sporting boards and directors clear, consistent and educational advice that improves how sport is governed, no matter the size or resources of the sporting organisation’.2 There are nine principles, each including a description of the principle, together with questions for directors to ask, examples and recommendations: ‘Principle 1: “The Spirit of the Game – Values-Driven Culture and Behaviours” – an organisation’s culture and behaviours should be underpinned by values which are demonstrated by the board and embedded in its decisions and actions Principle 2: “The Team – Aligned Sport through Collaborative Governance” – across a sport, boards should work together to govern collaboratively and create alignment to maximise efficient use of resources and implement whole of sport plans. Principle 3: “The Game Plan – A Clear Vision that Informs Strategy” – the board is responsible for overseeing the development of the organisation’s vision and strategy as well as determining what success looks like. Principle 4: “The Players – a Diverse Board to Enable Considered Decision Making” – a board should be a diverse group of people who collectively provide different perspectives and experience to facilitate more considered decision making. Principle 5: “The Rulebook – Documents that outline duties, powers, roles and responsibilities – an organisation should clearly define and document its structure and the duties, responsibilities and powers of members, directors, committees and management. Principle 6: “The Playbook – Board Processes which Ensure Accountability and Transparency” – through effective processes and continual review of its performance, the board is able to demonstrate accountability and transparency to its members and stakeholders. Principle 7: “The Defence – A  System which Protects the Organisation” – to proactively protect the organisation from harm, the board ensures the organisation has and maintains robust and systematic processes for managing risk. Principle 8: “The Best and Fairest – A  System for Ensuring Integrity” – an organisation should have measures and protocols to ensure integrity of the sport and safeguard its participants. Principle 9: “The Scorecard – Embedded Systems or Internal Review to Foster Continuous Improvement” – the board must have an appropriate system of internal controls to enable it to monitor performance, track progress against strategy and address issues of concern.’ 1 Sports Governance Principles microsite, SportAus/AIS online (sportaus.gov.au/governance [accessed 21 October 2020]). 2 Ausleisure online, New resource launched to help Australia’s sporting leaders (3  August 2020, hausleisure.com.au/news/new-resource-launched-to-help-australias-sporting-leaders/ [accessed 21 October 2020]).

A5.17 Belgium – The Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations (the ‘Flemish Code’)1 explains in its introduction that it has been produced not in reaction to a sporting crisis but rather based on ‘a profound conviction that good governance benefits the Flemish sports federations’.2 The Flemish Code ‘presents 43 general principles that are specified by way of 131 specific criteria. These principles and criteria are supplemented with 25 tips to help the federations with implementation. As of 2017, federations that implement good governance will be financially rewarded by way of indicators that are developed in accordance with the code’.3 The funding received by Flemish NGBs depends on the extent with which they meet the indicators set out in the code. One of the main authors of the Flemish Code (who is also the main author of the National Sports Governance Observer 2018) stated:4

268  Governance of the Sports Sector ‘The code and the indicators of good governance underscore the importance the Flemish government attaches to good governance in sport federations. Understanding that implementing good governance takes time, the Flemish government incentivises the indicators’ implementation incrementally. In 2018, the federations were guaranteed 75% of the total amount of good governance subsidies. The proportion of guaranteed subsidies decreases by 25% each year. By 2022, the total amount of governance subsidies is based on the federations’ implementation of indicators.’ 1 There is no national approach to sport policy in Belgium. The regional government of Flanders has responsibility for matters such as sports, culture, education and welfare in the region. 2 Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations, Sport Vlaanderen (2016) kics.sport. vlaanderen/Sportfederaties/Documents/160711_Code_of_good_governance_in_Flemish_sports_ federations.pdf, p 6 [accessed 21 October 2020]. 3 Ibid. 4 Geeraert, ‘Reports from Project Partners’ (Flanders, Belgium, National Sports Governance Observer (2018), p 107.

A5.18 The Flemish Code is divided into three sections: transparency, democracy, and social responsibility.1 The 43 general principles in the code are: Transparency Principle 1: The organisation publishes its articles of association, internal regulations, organisation chart, sports rules and multi-annual policy plan. Principle 2: The organisation publishes the agenda and minutes of its general assembly meeting. Principle 3: The organisation reports on the decisions of its board. Principle 4: The organisation publishes information about its board members. Principle 5: The organisation publishes the contact details of the board. Principle 6: The organisation publishes information about its members on its website. Principle 7: The organisation publishes an annual report, including financial statements and reports of internal committees. Principle 8: The organisation publishes regulations and reports about the compensation and bonuses of its board. Principle 9: In its annual report, the organisation reports on the implementation of the present code taking into account any changes in terms of good governance. Democracy and Social Responsibility Principle 10: Board members are democratically (re-)appointed according to rigorous and transparent procedures. Principle 11: The organisation shall establish a standardised introduction procedure for new board members. Principle 12: The organisation strives to achieve a differentiated, balanced and competent composition of its board. Principle 13: The board establishes a nomination committee. Principle 14: The organisation establishes a quorum in its articles of association or internal regulations for the board and the general assembly. Principle 15: A fixed term has been established as well as phased schedule based on which board members step down from their role. Principle 16: The general assembly represents the members and meets at least once a year. Principle 17: The board meets on a regular basis. Principle 18: The organisation is characterised by unity of administration.

Best Practice in Sports Governance  269 Principle 19: The organisation ensures that its internal stakeholders are involved in the organisation’s operations. Principle 20: The organisation provides support to its member organisations in the areas of governance and management. Principle 21: The organisation pursues a policy of social responsibility. Principle 22: The organisation implements a policy on healthy and ethical sports in accordance with the relevant regulations. Principle 23: The organisation implements a policy on the fight against doping in accordance with the relevant regulations. Principle 24: The organisation implements a policy to combat match-fixing. Principle 25: The organisation implements a policy for the promotion of equality and diversity. Internal accountability and control Principle 26: The organisation respects the relevant legislation. Principle 27: The board draws up on a multi-annual policy plan. Principle 28: The board establishes procedures in terms of the premature resignation of board members. Principle 29: The organisation defines any conflicts of interest with a membership of the board in its articles of association. Principle 30: The organisation applies a clear governance structure, taking into account the principle of separation of powers. Principle 31: The board supervises management in an appropriate manner. Principle 32: The general assembly supervises the board in an appropriate manner. Principle 33: The organisation has an appropriate risk management system. Principle 34: The organisation has a financial or audit committee. Principle 35: The board applies an internal control system. Principle 36: The board annually evaluates its own composition and performance. Principle 37: The organisation is controlled by an external, independent auditor. Principle 38: The board imposes a code of conduct on the members of the board, management and personnel. Principle 39: The board establishes conflicts of interest procedures that apply to the members of the board. Principle 40: The board establishes procedures for the processing of complaints in the bylaws. Principle 41: The board establishes an annual work plan and meeting schedules. Principle 42: The organisation encourages the inclusion of external members on the board. Principle 43: If necessary, the board establishes supporting committees. 1 Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations, Sport Vlaanderen (2016, kics.sport. vlaanderen/Sportfederaties/Documents/160711_Code_of_good_governance_in_Flemish_sports_ federations.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]), pp 9 to 40.

C Synthesising the key principles A5.19 Clearly there is significant overlap between the various principles of good governance in sport that have been identified by different stakeholders. Many have

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called for an industry-wide standard of governance to be created and monitored.1 Academics have said that: ‘[the] key challenge in improving the governance of [SGBs] is to find a common conceptual and empirical language for discussing the different aspects of governance. Doing so would help build a sense of community among the sport system’s main stakeholders and reduce the likelihood of “other” governance frameworks being put forward’.2

In December 2019, the International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport (IPACS)3 responded to calls for one agreed set of principles common to all SGBs at all levels of all sports by committing to ‘using the ASOIF indicators as a basis to develop a benchmark of sports governance at international and national level’,4 but none had been published at the time of writing. 1 See eg Parent MM & Hoye R, ‘The impact of governance principles in sport organisations’ governance practices and performances: A  systematic review’ (2018) 4(1) Cogent Social Sciences (’This systematic review has demonstrated that, despite an increase in interest in research associated with good governance principles and guidelines in sport, there is a clear need for both the international sport community and researchers to develop an agreed set of governance principles and language relevant for international, national, provincial/state and local level sport governance organisations. This may be unrealistic given the multitude of stakeholders involved, such as the International Olympic Committee, IFs and numerous national (sport) agencies, as well as the different legal and cultural contexts between national sport systems; but, this lack of coherence will limit the ability of both sport organisations to improve their governance and researchers to understand which principles and guidelines are central to improved governance performance in sport organisations’). 2 Chappelet and Mrkonjic, ‘Assessing Sport Governance Principles and Indicators’ in Winand and Anagnostopoulos (Eds), Research Handbook on Sport Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), p 23. 3 IPACS is a multi-stakeholder platform with the mission to strengthen and support efforts to eliminate corruption and promote a culture of good governance in and around sport. The founding partners are the IOC, Council of Europe, OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development); the UK Government, and the UNODC (United Nationals office on Drugs and Crime). 4 IPACS press release, ‘IPACS  General Conference Highlights Achievements, Attracts More Governments’ (17  December 2019, ipacs.sport/news/ipacs-general-conference-highlightsachievements [accessed 21 October 2020]).

3 PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE A5.20 In this section, we address how the broad principles of good sports governance that have been identified can be put into practice. We start with transparency, which many see as an effective antidote to corruption.

A Transparency (a) Publishing key documents and information on the SGB’s website A5.21 Best practice suggests that at a minimum the SGB should publish on its website: (a) its statutes and bye-laws; (b) sports rules; (c) basic information about the members of the SGB’s legislative body1 and of its executive board;2 (d) an organisation chart; (e) its vision, mission, values, and strategic objectives;3 (f) the agenda and minutes of meetings of members in Congress or General Assembly;

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(g) if not the minutes of executive board meetings, then press releases announcing key executive board decisions; and (h) an annual activity report. 1 As to which, see para A1.28 et seq. 2 As to which, see para A1.33 et seq. 3 See paras A5.24 and A5.25.

A5.22 In the governance reforms instituted in the wake of its 2015 corruption scandal,1 the IAAF (now World Athletics) committed to improving its transparency by also publishing ‘the composition of its different bodies, applications for roles, decisions, reports, remuneration of IAAF officials, and decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal’,2 as well as an organisation chart. 1 See para A5.3. 2 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF  Reform, 30  September 2016), para  3.14. The entire proposed governance reform package was approved by 95 per cent of members that voted at a special congress held in December 2016: ‘Overwhelming vote for IAAF reform delivered by membership’, (2016) World Athletics online, 3 December.

A5.23 As part of its governance reforms, World Sailing has said that ‘a number of documents will be made available on the World Sailing website including: (a) World Sailing Strategy, organisational chart; (b) calendar of the scheduled meetings including AGM, Board, Olympic Council, Committees and Sub-Committees; (c) disclosure of any financial compensation or other benefits paid or given to the President, Board members or other World Sailing Officials; (d) agenda, supporting papers and reports, and the minutes (recording the results of voting) of all General Meetings including AGMs; and (e) summary of all meetings of the Board, Olympic Council, Committees, SubCommittees and Working Groups’.1 Similarly, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) has proposed that the agenda and minutes of all General Assemblies will be published on the IPC website. A  calendar of General Assembly, IPC  Governing Board and Committee meetings will also be published. A summary of each IPC Governing Board meeting will also be published’.2 ‘The criteria and process for awards will be published on the IPC website, including the Paralympic Order’, and ‘all positions with the IPC including Governing Board, Committees and staff will be publically advertised via the IPC website and other avenues’.3 1 World Sailing, ‘the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A  Summary of the Proposal to Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 10.2(h). World Sailing cancelled its 2020 Extraordinary General Meeting at which the governance reform proposals were to be considered due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 2 International Paralympic Committee, ‘Remaining fit for purpose: a summary of the proposal to reform the governance of the International Paralympic Committee’ (25  October 2019), para  3.9.1.b.i. The IPC has cancelled its plans to hold its 2020 Extraordinary General Assembly due to the Covid-19 pandemic. A  new timeline has been devised that will mean elements of the governance reform proposals will be put before the membership to vote on at the 2021 IPC General Assembly and at the 2022 or 2023 IPC General Assembly. 3 International Paralympic Committee, ‘Remaining fit for purpose: a summary of the proposal to reform the governance of the International Paralympic Committee’ (25  October 2019), para  3.9.1.c.i and para 3.9.1.d.i.

(b) The purpose, values or strategy of the SGB A5.24 The objectives of the SGB will usually be set out in its constitution. For example, the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation (FIH) state:

272  Governance of the Sports Sector ‘1.4. The fundamental purposes of the FIH are: (a) to promote and develop Hockey at all levels throughout the world, in accordance with the rights and freedoms of the Olympic Charter, and without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status; (b) to govern and regulate the sport at the international level, and to recognise Continental Federations and National Associations to govern and regulate the sport at a continental/national level, in accordance with and subject to the FIH’s ultimate authority over the sport; (c) to protect the independence and autonomy of the FIH and its Members and Continental Federations to govern and regulate the sport, including exercising the right of democratic elections free from any outside influence; (d) to control the organisation and scheduling of competitions (including, without limitation, “world” or “international” championships and other events purporting to be “world” or “international” events or to determine “world” or “international” champions of Hockey), so as to ensure that the sporting calendar is organised and scheduled in accordance with the best long-term interests and priorities of the sport as a whole; (e) to preserve the integrity of the sport, including (without limitation) by adopting rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code and other appropriate codes of conduct and ensuring that such rules and codes are enforced at all Hockey events sanctioned by the FIH, a Continental Federation and/or a Member (as applicable); and (f) to establish and maintain an efficient administration to control, regulate and direct the affairs of the FIH and the sport of Hockey.’1 1 International Hockey Federation Statutes, fih.ch/media/13314743/fih-statutes-2018.pdf (3 November 2018) [accessed 21 October 2020], para 1.4.

A5.25 To help strengthen the ethos and values of the SGB, which are the essential foundation of any good governance model,1 the SGB should supplement those general objectives by developing and publishing a detailed strategy plan, including an implementation plan that uses key performance indicators to make the SGB accountable to its members for achieving it. A  good example comes from the Badminton World Federation, which sets out its mission, corporate values, and a strategic implementation plan for the period 2020 to 2024 on its website.2 1 Sorrell, ‘Implementing Good Governance Principles in Sports Organisations: A  painful obligation or a platform for growth’, White Paper from Burson-Marsteller/TSE  Consulting (April 2016) insidethegames.biz/media/file/28816/White%20Paper%20and%20Game%20Changer%20Model.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]). 2 Badminton World Federation (‘About’ section, corporate.bwfbadminton.com/about/ [accessed 21 October 2020]).

(c) Publishing the annual financial reports and other financial information A5.26 The financial aspects of the recent weightlifting scandal1 confirm that a lack of transparency about financial reporting can hide a multitude of sins, particularly when power at the SGB is concentrated in the hands of a few. Therefore good governance mandates independent auditing (in accordance with international accounting standards) of the SGB’s annual accounts, and publication of the audited accounts for review by stakeholders. Many also call for publication of the compensation and other benefits paid to the SGB’s President and board members, as well as senior managers, the amount of income tax paid by the SGB, and access to its archives containing historical information on the same subjects. For example, the Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) posts annual financial reports that have been externally audited, and it includes an archive of these and other reports on its website.2 Meanwhile FIFA

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publishes in its annual Governance Report the remuneration paid to its President and council members, senior executives, and committee members.3 1 See para A5.3. 2 Fédération Equestre Internationale, inside.fei.org/fei/about-fei/resource-library/fei-annual-report [accessed 21  October 2020]. Other examples include the Badminton World Federation, corporate. bwfbadminton.com/about/annualreports/ [accessed 21 October 2020]; Union Cycliste Internationale, uci.org/inside-uci/publications [accessed 21 October 2020]; and Fédération Internationale d’Escrime (the International Fencing Federation), fie.org/fie/documents/reports [accessed 21 October 2020]. 3 See fifa.com/what-we-do/governance/finances/ [accessed 21  October 2020], eg  FIFA  Governance Report 2018, pp 60 to 63. Other examples of international federations who publish payments, allowances and benefits include the Badminton World Federation, corporate.bwfbadminton.com/ statutes [accessed 21  October 2020]/, in Chapter  1 of its Statutes; and the UCI (uci.org/inside-uci/ publications [accessed 21 October 2020], see eg the 2018 Annual Report, p 122).

B Accountability A5.27 ‘Sports bodies should establish clear levels of oversight and accountability for their various decision-making bodies to ensure that powers are exercised appropriately and consistently with the objectives and functions of the relevant body. Proportionate checks and balances should be developed by the sports body concerned’.1 Furthermore, ‘for all decision making organs, sports bodies should clearly identify procedural rules and the rights of members/stakeholders to participate in consultations, debates and/or decision making processes’.2 1 European Commission, Expert Group ‘“Good Governance” Deliverable 2 report’ (September 2013), p 13. 2 Ibid at p 8. See CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 58 (‘If an International Federation proposes to make changes to its rules, those rules should, if possible, be made after discussion, consultation and explanation with the constituent bodies of that International Federation so that everyone at the National Federations understands clearly what is permitted and what is not permitted. A similar process should be undertaken if National Federations wish to change their rules so as to ensure that their constituent members of clubs have that understanding. The Panel accepts that there must in every sport be occasions on which discussion, consultation and explanation cannot take place before rule changes are made, but, hopefully, such occasions will be rare. If they do occur, great care must be taken, after the changes have been made, to explain the consequences and ramifications of the changes’); but cf AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘For a regulator or legislator, it appears to be advisable and good practice to acquire as much information as possible and to hear the views of potentially affected people before issuing general regulations – one can think of, eg, parliamentary hearings with experts or interest groups – but it is not a legal requirement. As a United States court has stated, requiring an international sports federation “to provide for hearings to any party potentially affected adversely by its rule-making authority could quite conceivably subject the [international federation] to a quagmire of administrative red tape which would effectively preclude it from acting at all to promote the game” (Gunter Harz Sports v USTA, 1981, 511 F Supp 1103, at 1122)’ [other citations omitted]).

(a) The members in general meeting (Congress or General Assembly) A5.28 The supreme decision-making body of an SGB is its membership sitting in general meeting, sometimes referred to as the Congress or General Assembly.1 Many of the key decisions of the SGB, including as to changes to its constitution, as to the formula for distribution of development funds from the SGB to its members, and as to the winding up of the SGB, are vested exclusively in the members in Congress. World Sailing’s latest reforms include proposals to give members the further right to: (a) approve the quadrennial World Sailing strategy plan; (b) remove the President and/or the Board in accordance with the laws; and (c) approve members of the Investigations Panel, Disciplinary Tribunal and the Elections Panel, on the recommendation of the Nominations Panel.2 The members in Congress also have the right to review (and ratify or reject) decisions made by other decision-making bodies of the SGB, such as decisions to issue

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new rules or amend existing rules governing the playing of the sport. In addition, meetings of the members in Congress ‘act as the conduit for the members’ views, and can therefore play an important role in ensuring healthy democracy within the organisation’.3 1 See para A1.28 et seq. 2 World Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 2.2(i). 3 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), p 32.

A5.29 Many SGBs have ‘one member one vote’, but some have weighted voting for federations in different categories of membership or who meet specified criteria.1 The ‘one member, one vote’ approach is straightforward to understand and creates democratic equality among members, however large and powerful or small and marginal they may otherwise be. However, critics argue that it increases the risk of corruption.2 Furthermore, the ‘weighted vote’ approach enables members who contribute more to the sport to get more votes, so incentivising all members to pull their weight. As a result: ‘transferring the approach of weighting of votes to international sport organisations may improve their democratic quality as well as reducing such dark sides as corruption and vote buying. While the representation of small member associations is still guaranteed their voting power will be (slightly) reduced’.3 1 For example, in 2015 World Rugby changed its constitution so that member unions can gain one or two extra votes by meeting specific governance criteria, or if they have qualified for the past two Rugby World Cups, or if they have made a major contribution to the growth and development of the game: ‘Expanded game representation and independence at the heart of World Rugby governance reform’ (World Rugby online, 10 November 2015). Meanwhile the Badminton World Federation allocates its member associations a minimum of one vote and a maximum of five votes ‘on the basis of criteria that favour those that prove able to contribute the most to the further development of badminton’, measured by objective milestones, including having more than 10,000 registered players in each of the four years of the assessment period. In addition, the allocation of votes is reviewed every four years on a retrospective basis: Pedersen, ‘Examples of evolving good governance practices in sport’ in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Sport, (Routledge, 2016), pp 63–64. 2 Mittag and Putzmann, ‘Reassessing the Democracy Debate in Sport Alternatives to the OneAssociation-One-Vote-Principle?’ in Alm, Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations, Final Report (Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies, April 2013), p 84. 3 Ibid, p 91.

A5.30 In any event, these all-important rights of membership mean that there must be a transparent, objective, and fair process set out in the constitution for the admission or expulsion of member federations.1 In addition, given the obvious corruption risks of undue influence and even vote buying,2 there should be strong ethical and procedural rules in place that minimise the risk of corruption of the voting processes.3 1 See further the discussion of these issues for international SGBS at para A1.43 et seq and para A1.60. The UK’s ‘Code for Sports Governance’ requires that membership of NFBs be inclusive and accessible: ‘membership based organisations are expected to take all reasonable steps to ensure they are accessible to all sections of the community’ and that ‘[o]rganisations should think about the information provided as part of the membership application process to ensure those to whom membership may be refused understand why’. Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 18 to 19. 2 See examples at para A5.3. 3 See para A5.34 and the discussion of sanctioning individuals for breaching such rules at para B3.154 et seq.

A5.31 The recommendation is that members meet in Congress or Generally Assembly annually,1 although the sheer number of members, and the expense of gathering them together, mean that many SGBs hold such meetings only every two or four years.

Best Practice in Sports Governance  275 ‘Ordinarily, the constitution of a sports body should include details of the entitlement of relevant members, stakeholders and participants to vote at meetings, majorities required for particular decisions, regularity of meetings, the right to receive notice of meetings, order of business under consideration, and the opportunity to make representations. Once established, there should be strict compliance with the constitution and procedural rules’.2

There should also be clearly specified quorum requirements and a clearly defined process to be followed when members are asked to make a decision, including potentially provisions for a secret ballot.3 1 See para A5.7 and A5.18. 2 European Commission, Expert Group ‘Good Governance’ Deliverable 2 report (September 2013), p 8. 3 See further para A5.7 and A5.34 fn 5.

(b) The board of directors/governing council A5.32 Between meetings of members, decision-making power has traditionally sat with a board or council (akin to a company board of directors), chaired by the SGB’s president. Traditionally the board (or the president alone) has exercised significant executive power, including approving commercial contracts, with the SGB staff providing more administrative than professional support. However, the risks of having so much power concentrated in the hands of a few have been demonstrated in many of the recent integrity scandals, leading to calls for the strict separation of governance from management.1 Therefore the role and responsibilities of the board should be made clear in the SGB’s constitution. If it has any executive function, that should be clearly delineated and its accountability in that function to the members in Congress made clear. Preferably the board should have a supervisory function only, overseeing of the strategic direction, policies, and values of the organisation, and supervising the management and standing committees in their work implementing that strategy. Under this model, the board’s role is to provide leadership, to identify values and standards, and to decide the strategy and priorities of the organisation, while establishing a system for control of risks and otherwise supervising the work of management. Management is usually led by a chief executive officer (aka ‘General Secretary’ or ‘Director General’), and their roles, powers, and responsibilities, should also be specified in the SGB’s constitution. The board is then accountable to the members in Congress, the management are accountable to the board, and the staff is accountable to management. 1 See eg IOC’s Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (para A5.6), Art 2.6 (‘A clear allocation of responsibilities between the different bodies such as general assembly, executive body, committees or disciplinary bodies, should be determined. There should be a balance of power between the bodies responsible for the management, supervision and control of the sport organisations: principle of checks and balances’) and Art 3.6 (‘Leadership is above management’).

A5.33 In addition to the transparency measures outlined above,1 there are various means of holding the board accountable in the exercise of its rights and responsibilities. In particular: (a)

Many members of the board are elected to that office by the member federations voting in Congress.2 In case of poor performance or misconduct, the constitution should give members the right to call an extraordinary meeting to remove some or all of the board.3 In any event, at the end of their term (usually four years), if they wish to stay in office the board members must be voted back on by the members at a new election congress. In this way, the members are accountable to the members as their electorate. This election process is such an important means of holding the board to account that various measures must be taken to protect its integrity.4

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(b) The constitution may provide for independent directors to be appointed to the board, to bring not only broader experience and different perspectives to bear on the board’s deliberations but also independent oversight of its activities. The value of independent directors is well-recognised in corporate governance,5 but the sports movement has been slower to recognise their value. As far back as 2005, Lord Burns recommended that two independent non-executive directors be added to the board of The Football Association (The FA): ‘there should be at least two independent directors and if the chairman was an independent director then there probably should be another two as well. […] If we are to have regulation of football, which I assume we do want, and as we implement the rules that have now been developed in UEFA, then it needs a board that is constituted differently from that which it is now. The present board is as if with the Financial Services Authority we had a controlling interest by the banks whom they are regulating. I do not think anybody would regard that as really being a satisfactory state of affairs. So a lot depends on what you think the purpose of The FA is. Is it to run the England team? Is it to be an effective governing body and regulatory body of football? The more you want it to play the second role, the more that it has to have some people on the board who do not have vested interests in the regulation that is taking place‘.6

The UK Code for Sports Governance now requires that at least 25 per cent of an NGB’s board are independent non-executive directors.7 Slowly international federations are also taking up the idea.8 (c) There must be a clear and detailed policy for dealing with board members’ conflicts of interest, whether personal or institutional (ie arising from the board member’s other position as a director or officer of a member federation or other stakeholder9), including a system for declaration of conflicting interests and a policy for when the conflict may be waived and when the conflicted member has to absent themselves from the discussion. ASOIF recommends that: ‘[a] defined conflict of interest policy is published with evidence of implementation, such as a register of interests and/or reference to the exclusion of conflicted individuals from decision-making. The policy should distinguish between types of conflict such as actual, potential and perceived with an explanation of potential remedies. The register may not be public but the declared interests should be shared among the Executive Board or corresponding group’.10

FIFA’s rules on the topic have been criticised: ‘the conflict of interest rules applicable to the board members do not establish that conflicts of interest are reported before or at the start of every board meeting, listed in the minutes, and recorded in the registry. They also do not require that every commercial transaction with a third party, with which a board member has an (in)direct familial or commercial relationship, must be submitted to the general assembly or to a body mandated by the general assembly. Finally, the rules do not establish the circumstances in which board members must abstain from voting’.11

One of World Sailing’s proposed reforms is: ‘[to] consolidate the various rules and policy on conflicts of interest into one rule/ policy and establish a programme of education for members of the Councils, Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups on how to manage them. The new independent whistleblowing mechanism, Investigations Panel and, if required, the Disciplinary Tribunal provide an avenue for reporting and enforcing any alleged breaches of conflicts of interest. The Tribunal will have the power to order a decision null and void if it was decided when a person had a conflict of interest and voted on it’.12

(d) The European Commission has stated that: ‘sporting bodies should allow for the appointment of technical or expert committees (whether standing or ad hoc) and/or working groups for specialist work and advice

Best Practice in Sports Governance  277 on relevant issues. The terms of reference, reporting lines and status of committee decisions or recommendations should be clearly identified and communicated to all members, stakeholders and participants’.13

For example, the World Athletics executive board: ‘has the power and responsibility to establish committees, taskforces or other groups to carry out any work of the Executive Board, under its delegated authority including but not limited to one or more sub-committees for finance, audit and risk’.14

Such committees can provide independent scrutiny and oversight of crucial risk areas.15 In 2016 Mr Domenico Scala resigned as an independent member of FIFA’s audit and compliance committee after FIFA passed rules giving the FIFA Council the power to appoint and dismiss members of independent committees until the congress the following year, in a move that was understood to be an attempt to undermine independent scrutiny. Michael Hershman (a cofounder of Transparency International) said that Mr Scala’s exit was ‘the worst thing that could have happened’ to FIFA, and that: ‘I remain convinced now more than ever that FIFA, if it is to survive, there must be independent oversight because they have no credibility‘.16

Further control mechanisms – in the form of eligibility checks, application of ethics code, oversight by compliance officers, and investigation and enforcement by independent integrity units – are discussed below.17   1 See para A5.21 to A5.26..   2 Some may be appointed, in which case there should be a nominations committee, with at least some independent members, to identify suitable candidates (including those proposed by the board or others) who can bring any missing competence, skills, experience, and diversity to the board. World Sailing is proposing to introduce a nominations panel composed of (a) three independent persons (‘independent’ being a person that has not been a member of or held a position in World Sailing or with any of its members in the last five years and does not have any close connection with any director or employee of World Sailing) with expertise in non-executive governance recruitment, appointed by the board following public advertisement; and (b) the president, in a non-voting capacity. The inclusion of the president is to ensure that the nominations panel is aware of gaps in expertise or skills needed on the board. World Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 4.2.   3 See eg World Triathlon’s Constitution, which provides for the removal of members of the Executive Board by Congress (triathlon.org/about/downloads/category/constitution_and_by-laws, 14  January 2020 [accessed 21 October 2020]), Art 34.12.   4 See para A5.34 et seq.   5 In 2019, independent non-executive directors made up 66 per cent of all directors of the top 150 FTSE companies, excluding chairs: 2019 UK Spencer Stuart Board Index (Spencer Stuart, 2019), p 16.   6 Lord Burns, FA  Structural Review (10  June 2005), p  2; evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Football Governance’ (8 February 2011, HC), question 27. He explained further: ‘The problem that we are trying to fix, and we have been through in some detail already, is the fact that the board is dominated by people whose main interests lie on one side of the game or the other. If the board is going to carry out a regulatory role then it needs some rebalancing, and for the reasons also that Lord Triesman has explained, independent directors do bring a different perspective on life. They are usually working elsewhere, they are seeing how other boards work, they see standards and practices and the way that things are done, and they are able to help in terms of the whole culture of the way in which a board operates. I have spent the last 13 or 14 years on a whole variety of company boards and the independent directors really do bring a very different perspective. They ask the questions that very often are not being asked by the executive team or the people who are not independent. Indeed, following my report, I notice that there has been an introduction of independent directors on to the national game board. I think there have been independent people brought on to the regulatory body that has now been established. So the principle does not seem to be lacking in The FA. It is just that when it comes to the FA board itself, the vested interests of the people who are on that board are making it very difficult to get any real breakthrough on this. Having one person who is independent—and all credit to Lord Triesman for seeking to carry out that role—it’s an enormously lonely role to be the only independent director. Frankly to be chairman and the only independent director I think is even more lonely’ (ibid, answer to question 49).   7 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 25 and 38.   8 World Rugby has two independent members on its 12-person Executive Committee. The ICC board includes one independent director. The FIA Senate (12 members) can appoint up to four independent

278  Governance of the Sports Sector members. The International Netball Federation has one board member approved (but not elected) by Congress on the board’s recommendation. Some IFs have the power to co-opt additional members for their skill and expertise. For example, the FIBA (Basketball) Central Board (of 23 members) can co-opt up to six voting members; the President of FIBV (volleyball) may co-opt up to four additional members to the Executive Committee (of 13); and the UCI  Management Committee (18 members) may co-opt up to two additional persons.   9 For example, the ITF’s Code of Ethics states that in addition to personal conflicts, ‘Officials must also disclose in the same manner any “institutional” conflicts of interest, ie, actual, apparent or potential conflicts between the interests of the ITF and the interests of a Member or Regional Associational or other body with which they are associated (whether by virtue of employment or otherwise). Such conflicts may not be waived‘: International Tennis Federation, Code of Ethics (27 September 2019), Art 2.2.3. 10 ASOIF Governance Support and Monitoring Unit, Guidance Document on Governance ‘Quick Wins’ (5 April 2019), p 8. 11 Geeraert, ‘An assessment of good governance in five international sports federations’ (Sports Governance Observer 2018, November 2018), pp 32–33. 12 World Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 10.2(f). 13 European Commission, Expert Group ‘Good Governance’ Deliverable 2 report (September 2013), pp 9 to 10. 14 World Athletics, Governance Rules (Book B – B3.1, 1 November 2019), Rule 4.29. 15 World Sailing, for example, has proposed to ‘monitor the internal controls and risk management mechanisms and assess their effectiveness’ through an Audit Sub-Committee. World Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A  Summary of the Proposal to Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 3.2(i). 16 Associated Press, ‘Domenico Scala exit damages reform at FIFA – ex-adviser Michael Hershman’ (2016) ESPN online, 2 June. 17 See para A5.43 et seq.

(c) Democratic elections of office-holders A5.34 Requiring members of the board to be elected by the members of the SGB and providing for their removal from office by members in case of misconduct is an important constitutional constraint on the power of the board. Given the clear potential for corruption of the electoral process, however,1 good governance demands that a number of measures be put in place to guarantee that all elections are free and fair, including not only: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

(h)

making sure that the SGB’s ethics code strictly prohibits undue influence over or improper interference with the election process (eg through the buying and selling of votes);2 but also ensuring there is a fair allocation of votes among members; giving members proper opportunity to nominate candidates for election; publishing an open and fair nominations process with clear deadlines;3 publishing clear eligibility criteria for electoral candidates;4 ( issuing clear campaigning rules that allow candidates for election a fair and equal opportunity to present their credentials to members; having clear rules for the voting process itself, including: (i) whether the ballot should be open or secret;5 (ii) how votes must be cast in order to be valid; (iii) whether independent scrutineers are to be appointed to distribute ballot papers (if the vote is not electronic), to count the ballot papers returned, to rule on any vote validity issues, and to count votes cast; (iv) what majority is required to win the election (v) in case of multiple candidates, how candidates are to be eliminated over different voting rounds; and (vi) how any protests will be resolved;6 and establishing an independent committee to oversee the election and ensure that the election rules are followed.7

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The Covid-19 pandemic has also demonstrated the need for rules addressing what happens when members cannot gather in person for an election congress, including whether the election should be postponed (so prolonging the term of the incumbents) or whether there should be provision to hold the election congress remotely.8 1 See para A5.3. 2 See para B3.164. 3 All deadlines must be strictly met; no warning or grace period has to be given. See Chiyangwa v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5098, para 108 (‘The Panel notes, however, that the deadline was clearly made, in bold, in the Letter, but does acknowledge that there was no warning that a failure to meet the deadline could result in the eligibility process coming to an end. The Panel notes that this is not a disciplinary process, where a warning of possible sanctions is customary so a party can defend themselves and be properly heard, rather it was an application process for a job or position with one of FIFA’s bodies. If one fails to answer questions asked of them during an interview process, the likely outcome is that one won’t get the job. This is implicit and customary’). 4 See para A5.44. 5 In the 2016 FIFA presidential election, candidate Prince Ali bin al-Hussein applied to the CAS for provisional measures requiring FIFA to use transparent voting booths during the vote, so that voters could not take photographs of their ballot papers (so allowing them to vote freely even if they were being influenced unduly, or bribed, to cast their vote for a particular candidate). His application was rejected by the CAS: HRH Prince Ali Al Hussein v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4459; ‘FIFA election: Prince Ali fails in attempt to force use of transparent voting booths’ (2016) Guardian online, 24 February. 6 In BTTC  v ITTF, CAS  2005/A/996, the Brazilian national table tennis federation challenged the elections of the executive board of the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) at the annual general assembly, alleging that there had been serious irregularities, including bribery, the counting of invalid votes, and lack of secrecy during the voting. The ITTF’s constitution and rules did not contain a dispute resolution mechanism, so the parties agreed to refer the dispute to CAS. The CAS sole arbitrator sided with the appellant and annulled the results of the election. Quoting Baddeley, L’association sportive face au droit (1994), the sole arbitrator said: ‘the principle of equality of treatment demands that the rights of those members who acted fairly and whose candidates were not elected be preserved, since […] such principle is particularly important for an association: “… [the] principle of equality of treatment between members imposes itself due to the fundamental characteristics of an association, that is the pursuit of a common non-lucrative goal, the democratic basis of the entity and the fact that the social relationship depends more on the cooperation between members than on financial contributions”’ (ibid, para 138). In Chanpanich v FA of Thailand (FAT), CAS  2013/A/3389, after he failed to be elected as FAT president in 2013, Mr Chanpanich challenged the outcome of the election, alleging the existence of a number of violations in the electoral process, including votes being cast by non-members/delegates, and interference by senior members of the FAT staff. The CAS panel noted that ‘its duty is to settle a legal dispute according to the law […] this Panel is not called upon (and in any case does not want) to address sports politics […] even though it is aware that its decision will inevitably have effects on the governance of FAT – a matter which has “political” implications, at least from a sporting point of view. In other words, this award is not, and cannot be construed to be, an endorsement of either of the Candidates who run for President of FAT: it is only about the observance of the rules applicable to, and the impact of such “irregularities and breaches”, if any, on, the electoral process’ (ibid, para 115). It rejected Mr Chanpanich’s appeal on the facts. 7 See generally ASOIF, ‘1st report of the Governance Task Force to ASOIF  Council’, EPAS  (2016) INF13, p 7; ASOIF Governance Workshop, ‘Suggested components of electoral rules and processes for international federations’ (19 October 2017), pp 6-8; SIGA Good Governance Universal Standards Implementation Guidelines (siga-sport.com/pdfs/Good_Governance_Universal_Standards.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]), pp 3-4. World Triathlon has a section in its constitution dedicated to elections, identifying (among other things) which positions are elected by the congress, which members are eligible to vote, and how voting is conducted: World Triathlon Constitution (triathlon.org/about/downloads/category/ constitution_and_by-laws [accessed 21  October 2020], 14  January 2020), Art 30. World Triathlon also publishes its voting numbers in congress minutes. See eg para 16 of the 2018 congress minutes (triathlon.org/uploads/docs/2018_Congress_Minutes.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]). 8 Morgan, ‘World Sailing Board to discuss the status of Presidential election amid coronavirus concerns’ (2020) Inside The Games, 5 April (World Sailing considering options in light of inability to hold congress in person and absence of provision in constitution or applicable law for ‘virtual’ congress). On 23  July 2020, World Sailing confirmed that its members had approved a resolution to amend the constitution to allow for an electronic election: ‘World Sailing’s Committee is now accepting nominations for the 2020 election of the World Sailing President and Vice-Presidents’, 23 July 2020 (sailing.org/news/90120.php#.X0rQ3ZrsbIV [accessed 21 October 2020]).

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A5.35 In December 2007, noting that ‘certain member associations paid too little heed to […] democratic principles in the past’, FIFA issued a Standard Electoral Code ‘in order to unify electoral procedures at FIFA’s member associations and ensure compliance with basic democratic guidelines during member association elections’.1 The Standard Electoral Code contains provisions on the electoral committee, the candidatures, the voting procedure and the count, among other things. Failure to apply the Standard Electoral Code or violation of its provisions is considered a breach of the FIFA Statutes. Further, the Standard Electoral Code gives FIFA ‘the right to intervene in the electoral processes of the association at any time to monitor its integrity and check that [the] code and the statutes and regulations of FIFA are being applied’, as well as the right to ‘suspend or invalidate the electoral processes and/or appoint a provisional administration for the association, as the case may be’,2 meaning that FIFA is able to step in to prevent breaches before they happen.3 1 FIFA Circular (28 December 2007, no 1129), p 2. 2 FIFA Standard Electoral Code, Section G. Final Provisions (29 October 2007), ss 2 and 3. 3 In March 2020, after the scheduled elections for the board of the Football Kenya Federation (FKF) were cancelled, the Kenyan Sports Disputes Tribunal ruled that the incumbents’ terms had ended and so they had to vacate their positions. In response, FIFA stated that the Sports Disputes Tribunal’s’ decision went against the FKF’s recently amended Electoral Code, and required reinstatement of the FKF Executive Committee: ‘Kenyan calls intensify for FIFA to step in as trust in FKF dissipates’, (2020) Inside World Football, 3 May.

(d) Term limits A5.36 Having term limits for elected officials is a simple but effective way to ensure no one person remains on the board or a committee for too long, entrenching their power and preventing new blood and innovation. The UK’s Code for Sports Governance requires that a director serve either: (a) four terms of two years; (b) two terms of four years; or (c) three terms of three years.1 ASOIF makes the following recommendations:2 ‘10.1 The recommended limit is three terms of four years for all elected officials. 10.2 There may be a rule to prevent any elected official who has served three terms in the same or multiple roles from serving another term without a break of at least two years. Alternatively, there may be a limit on the total number of terms which in individual can serve in multiple roles. 10.3 The terms may be counted from the congress at which they are initially adopted. 10.4 It is recommended that there should be no exemption clauses. 10.5 A specific rule is needed to deal with the case of an official taking up their position part-way through the term due to a vacancy. It may be decided that filling a vacancy for any period of less than three years does not count as a full term.’

At World Athletics, for example, elected officials can sit for a maximum of three terms (of four years each) on its Council or its executive board, while the President: ‘is subject to a maximum total number of 5 terms in office (20 years), including terms as a member of Council or the Executive Board. This means a person could be a Council Member for two terms (8 years) and then have three additional terms (12 years) as President‘.3 1 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), p 25. 2 ASOIF  Governance Workshop, ‘Suggested Components Of Electoral Rules and Processes for International Federations’ (ASOIF, 19 October 2017), p 5. 3 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), paras. 3.5.

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A5.37 Terms should be staggered so that the knowledge and experience of an entire board is not lost overnight. For example, World Sailing has proposed the introduction of staggered terms for board directors: ‘so that every two years at least 4 members on the Board will rotate off the Board (unless re-elected or re-appointed) as follows: […] Year 1 (being the year of the Olympics) – President, 2 elected directors, 1 appointed director and Chair of Athletes’ Committee; [..] Year 3 – 3 elected directors, 1 appointed director’.1 1 World Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 3.2(g).

C Stakeholder representation A5.38 SGBs should: ‘include the key stakeholder groups in decision-making structures, cooperate and coordinate activities with other relevant sport organisations and relevant sport related organisations, support and motivate member organisations to also establish good governance standards and, form strategic alliances with key stakeholder groups to further fuel the successful implementation of the organisation’s strategy’.1

For example, as part of the 2016 governance reforms in athletics, an entire ‘IAAF  Convention’ was established in order to have representation from relevant stakeholders. This ‘Convention’ is held in conjunction with each World Athletics congress, and includes ‘representatives from across the global Athletics family including Member Federations, Areas, athletes, coaches, sponsors and other stakeholders’.2 Including representatives of stakeholders on the board is an effective way of helping to develop a culture of inclusive decision-making. In her recent review of UK Athletics, Dame Sue Street noted that ‘there is a desire for more transparency and openness, particularly around decision-making. It was also suggested that the culture has not been as collaborative as is necessary for the sport to succeed‘.3 As a result, she recommended ‘that each HCAF [Home Country Athletics Federations] has the right to nominate a director to the UKA [UK Athletics] Board, whilst maintaining the requirement that all Board directors act in the best interests of UKA‘.4 1 SIGA Good Governance Universal Standards Implementation Guidelines (siga-sport.com/pdfs/Good_ Governance_Universal_Standards.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]) p 5. 2 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), para 3.2. 3 Street, UK Athletics Review – Summary of Findings (May 2020), p 1. 4 Street, UKA Change Plan 2020 (May 2020), p 2.

A5.39 There may be issues about how member federations are represented on the decision-making bodies of the SGB. Usually the constitution requires that there be at least one representative of each continent on the board,1 but if there are different categories of membership for national federations there should also usually be at least some representation of each membership category on the board.2 1 See eg  International Tennis Federation Constitution, Art 21(h)(iv) (itftennis.com/media/2431/ the-constitution-of-the-itf-2020-english.pdf [accessed 21  October 2020], 2020). Similarly, World Rugby gives all six regional associations two votes on its council: ‘Expanded game representation and independence at the heard of World Rugby governance reform’ (2015) World Rugby online, 10 November. 2 For example, the International Cricket Council (ICC) has two categories of membership: full members (‘the governing bodies for cricket of a country recognised by the ICC, or nations associated for cricket purposes, or a geographical area, from which representative teams are qualified to play official Test matches (12 members)’) and associate members (‘the governing bodies for cricket of a country recognised by the ICC, or countries associated for cricket purposes, or a geographical area, which does not qualify as a Full Member, but where cricket is firmly established and organised (92 members)’) (icc-cricket.com/about/members/about-our-members [accessed 21  October 2020]). The ICC’s articles of association provide that the ICC board of directors will consist of

282  Governance of the Sports Sector one representative of each of the twelve full members and three representatives of the 92 associate members. See ICC articles of association, Art 4.2(b) and 4.2(c) (icc-static-files.s3.amazonaws.com/ ICC/document/2017/07/10/07bf21fa-a22c-4828-a80a-f93b643d052b/ICC-new-constitution-22-Juneapproved-by-Full-Council.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020], 22 June 2017).

A5.40 There are also increasing calls to give athletes a central role in the SGB’s decision-making. Many SGBs now have athlete committees, but they often have limited influence, and so some SGBs have included the chair of the athletes’ committee on its board or council. For example, the chair (or other designee) of the Athletes’ Committee of the International Biathlon Union (IBU) is a voting member of the IBU’s 11-strong Executive Board;1 the chair of the Athletes’ Commission sits on the Executive Board of the World Squash Federation, together with a nominee from the Professional Squash Association;2 and the chair and one other member of the World Athletics Athletes’ Commission sit on the World Athletics Council3 1 IBU Constitution (October 2019), Art 16.1.2. 2 Pursuant to the recommendations of an independent review (Rowland, ‘An Independent Review of the World Squash Federation’, 19 October 2016), p 17), See World Squash Federation, Memorandum & Articles of Association (6 November 2019), Art 87. 3 World Athletics Constitution (November 2019), Art 41.1d.

A5.41 Another principle of good governance is that bodies make better decisions when their membership is diverse. The sports movement has been very slow to embrace diversity, whether of gender or anything else, but things are slowly changing. For example, World Triathlon requires a minimum of 25 per cent of each gender in the membership of its congress, executive board, and committees;1 while the IBU constitution specifies that of the nine elected members of its executive board, ‘there must be at least two representatives of the male gender and at least two representatives of the female gender among them (provided that there are at least two from each gender among the candidates for election)’, and the same applies in respect of the elected members of the IBU’s Technical Committee and Athletes’ Committee.2 Meanwhile the World Athletics Constitution specifies that in the upcoming 2023 election Congress there should be a minimum of one female Vice-President elected and in the 2027 election Congress there should be a minimum of two female Vice-Presidents elected,3 in addition to a minimum number from each gender required amongst the total number of Council members (ten of each gender for the 2023 elections and 13 of each gender for the 2027 elections and thereafter).4 At the national level, the UK’s Code for Sports Governance requires NGBs to adopt a target of, and take all appropriate actions to encourage, a minimum of 30 per cent of each gender on its board, and that they demonstrate a strong and public commitment to progressing greater diversity on the board (including in relation to black, Asian and minority ethnic diversity, as well as people with disabilities).5 1 World Triathlon Constitution (triathlon.org/about/downloads/category/constitution_and_by-laws, 14 January 2020 [accessed 21 October 2020]), Arts 18 and 30.7. 2 IBU Constitution (October 2019), Arts 16.2, 24.2, and 25.2.2. 3 World Athletics Constitution (1 November 2019), Art 36.5c. 4 Ibid, Art 36.6c. 5 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), p 42.

A5.42 At the same time, the board should not be so big as to become unwieldy. In 2019, the average board size in the top 150 FTSE companies was 10.3.1 The UK’s Code for Sports Governance requires that the board should be of appropriate size to meet the organisation’s requirements but no more than 12 people overall (unless otherwise agreed with UK Sport or Sport England).2 This is easier to achieve when the SGB also has a supervisory council sitting behind the board (because stakeholders’ desire for representation can be met by giving them seats on the supervisory council). For example, World Rugby’s executive committee has 12 members (chairman, vice-

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chairman, nine elected officials – two of which are independent members – and the chief executive),3 while World Athletics’ governance reforms created an executive board of nine members (president, four vice presidents, three appointed members from either within the athletics family or independent, and the CEO as a non-voting member).4 1 2019 UK Spencer Stuart Board Index (Spencer Stuart, 2019), p 15. 2 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 24 to 25. 3 ‘Expanded game representation and independence at the heard of World Rugby governance reform’ (World Rugby online, 10 November 2015). 4 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), para 3.4.

D Integrity controls A5.43 Best practice in sports governance includes installing a number of integrityrelated control mechanisms on top of the constraints on SGB decision-making set out above. For example, ASOIF’s Governance Taskforce has suggested1 that the SGB: ‘• • • • •

Establish an internal ethics committee with independent representation Establish internal yet independent audit committee Adopt an internal control and risk management system Adopt accounting control mechanisms and external financial audit Carry out due diligence assessments of elected and senior officials prior to election/appointment • Observe open tenders for major commercial and procurement contracts • Decisions can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms on the basis of clear rules • Due diligence and effective risk management in bidding requirements, presentation, assessment and allocation of main events • Awarding of main events to follow an open and transparent process • Internal decisions can be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport’.

We discuss certain of these suggestions below. 1 ASOIF, ‘1st report of the Governance Task Force to ASOIF Council’, EPAS (2016) INF13, p 8.

(a) Integrity checks (vetting) A5.44 Any person wishing to take up any position at an SGB (whether elected, appointed, employed, or contracted) should have to meet specified eligibility criteria. For example, the IBU’s constitution states:1 ‘26.2 Anyone who wishes to become or remain an IBU Official must be Eligible to do so. A person is not Eligible to become or to remain an IBU Official if he or she: 26.2.1 is a minor according to Austrian law (save that minors may be permitted to act as interns or apprentices within the IBU  Staff as permitted by Austrian law); 26.2.2 has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been discharged from bankruptcy or is subject to a condition not yet fulfilled or any order made under insolvency laws; 26.2.3 has been convicted in the previous ten years of an offence that involved mistreatment of people (ie, physical or sexual abuse or misconduct, hate crimes, or similar) or an offence that is punishable by a term of imprisonment of two or more years (whether or not they received such a term of imprisonment), and any appeal rights against that conviction have expired or been exhausted; 26.2.4 is prohibited from being a director or promoter of or being concerned or taking part in the management of a company due to their breach of or noncompliance with any applicable law or regulation;

284  Governance of the Sports Sector 26.2.5 is subject to an order by a relevant authority that they are lacking in competence to manage their own affairs; 26.2.6 is deprived of their civil rights by proper application of the law; 26.2.7 is serving a period of ineligibility imposed for breach of: 26.2.7.1 the IBU Integrity Code; or 26.2.7.2 any code of ethics or other rules of conduct of an NF Member or of another sports organisation; 26.2.8 has been found by a relevant authority to have committed an antidoping rule violation (whether or not they served any period of ineligibility for that violation); 26.2.9 has been removed from office by Congress or the Executive Board in accordance with this Constitution or the Rules (or previous versions thereof); 26.2.10 is otherwise prohibited from holding such position, or any similar position, under any other circumstances provided by law; 26.2.11 otherwise fails an assessment, made by the Vetting Panel in accordance with the Vetting Rules, of whether the person (a) is of good character and reputation; (b) is able to meet the high standards of conduct and integrity required of an IBU  Official; and (c) is physically and mentally fit to perform the role in question; or 26.2.12 in the case of a candidate for appointment to the BIU Board, does not have the independence or experience or expertise required for the role, as specified in the Constitution or the Rules.’ 1 International Biathlon Union Constitution (19 October 2019), Art 26.

A5.45 SGBs should have a process in place to vet candidates against these criteria.1 ‘One option is for a committee with an independent majority or at least independent representation to determine whether or not each nominated candidate is eligible for election according to agreed rules. The committee should report its decisions to the [SGB] administration or the electoral committee, if one exists‘.2

For example, World Athletics uses a vetting panel made up of three people who are independent of World Athletics and approved by the Congress on the recommendation of the Council. A decision of the vetting panel that a candidate is ineligible may be appealed to CAS.3 The Independent Governance Committee for the FIFA Governance Reform Project said in 2012 that: ‘first and foremost it is fundamental that nominees for senior FIFA positions are vetted by an independent Nominations Committee, to be put in place as soon as possible, in order to ensure that candidates for the next elections fulfil the necessary substantive criteria and ethical requirements and that the selection process is fair and transparent‘.4

Candidates who have failed the assessment by that committee have challenged the subjective nature of certain of the eligibility criteria, but the CAS has not upheld those challenges.5 1 If the body tasked with such assessment raises concerns with the candidate and no response is received, this could be grounds to terminate the eligibility process. Chiyangwa v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5098, para 115 (‘In the Panel’s determination, the FIFA ERC was justified to raise any additional concerns highlighted in the Mintz Report, to enable it to ultimately take a decision on the eligibility of the Appellant. If those concerns go unanswered, what could the Appellant reasonably expect? The process would be, and was, justifiably terminated at that point’). 2 ASOIF  Governance Workshop, ‘Suggested Components Of Electoral Rules and Processes for International Federations’ (ASOIF, 19 October 2017), p 5. 3 World Athletics Constitution (1  November 2019), Articles  65–69. The IBU has adopted similar provisions. IBU Constitution (19 October 2019), Art 27. 4 Independent Governance Committee, FIFA  Governance Reform Project, ‘First Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA’ (Basel Institute on Governance, 20 March 2012), p 3.

Best Practice in Sports Governance  285 5 In Bility v FIFA, CAS 2015/A/4311, para 57, the CAS panel noted that ‘an integrity check is rather an abstract test as to whether a person, based on the information available, is perceived to be a person of integrity for the function at stake’. The panel cited with approval the part of the decision in Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, ‘where it was stated that “officials as highly ranked as the Appellant [who was a member of the FIFA Executive Committee at the time] must under any circumstance appear as completely honest and beyond any suspicion. In the absence of such clean and transparent appearance by top football officials, there would be serious doubts in the mind of the football stakeholders and of the public at large as to the rectitude and integrity of football organizations as a whole. This public distrust would rapidly extend to the general perception of the authenticity of the sporting results and would destroy the essence of the sport”’ (CAS 2015/A/4311 at para 59). The panel concluded that ‘on the basis of all the information at its disposal, […] the FIFA Ad-hoc Electoral Committee could reasonably come to the conclusion not to admit the Appellant as a candidate in the election for the office of FIFA President in 2016. The Panel however deems it important to emphasise that the outcome of the present arbitral proceedings shall not be interpreted as a ruling that the Panel perceives the Appellant as being corrupt, dishonest or not a person of integrity, but rather that the Appellant is one of the first persons subjected to the winds of change blowing through the FIFA administration and failed to meet the very high standards of integrity that are currently demanded from the office of FIFA Presidency in order to clean the image of the worldwide governing body of football’ (ibid, para 90). The CAS panel in Derrick v FIFA, 2016/A/4579, para 87, endorsed the decision in Bility, noting that because of the recent events concerning football organisations and FIFA in particular (as to which, see para A5.3) ‘it had become necessary to increase and enhance the checks and controls of the potential high officials that operate in these organisation’. It ruled: ‘In the light of the discretionary power provided for in the FGR [FIFA Governance Rules], it is not the function of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee to decide whether a candidate has violated the FIFA Code of Ethics but to determine whether the person at stake has an impeccable integrity record and to render its opinion on the suitability of the candidate. In this respect, the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee concluded that due to his disciplinary record and the ongoing investigation against the Appellant before the FIFA  Ethics Committee, the Appellant did not meet the requirements necessary to become Vice-President of the FIFA, and the Panel agrees with its decision’ (ibid, in CAS Bulletin (2018/1), p 41, para 3.). See also the discussion of the English Football League’s similar ‘Owners’ and Directors’ Test’ at para B5.12.

(b) Code of ethics A5.46 Upon appointment, all officers, directors, employees and committee members of the SGB must agree to be bound by a comprehensive code of ethics. The IOC adopted its first Code of Ethics for members and officials in the wake of the Salt Lake City voting scandal,1 and its ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement’ require international federations and national Olympic committees to develop and enforce ethical rules based on that Code.2 ASOIF therefore expects its members to ‘incorporate in Statutes all appropriate ethical principles which align with and embrace the IOC Code of Ethics and are applicable to all members, officials and participants’.3 Details of the contents of such ethics codes and of cases dealing with alleged ethical violations are set out elsewhere in this book,4 but they should generally include commitments to respect for the human rights of all participants,5 including a prohibition of unlawful discrimination of any kind, specific provisions on avoidance of conflicts of interest, prohibitions on exerting undue influence and disclosing confidential information or exploiting it for improper purposes, a section on gifts and hospitality, setting out what is acceptable and the process that needs to be followed in order to accept such offers (paying heed to any relevant national legislation, such as the UK’s Bribery Act 2010), commitments to abide by any stand-alone integrity-related rules (eg anti-doping rules,6 rules against the prevention of manipulation of competitions,7 and safeguarding rules8), and finally a broadly-worded catch-all provision to sweep up any other unethical conduct.9 1 See para A5.3, fn 1. 2 IOC, ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement’ (1 February 2008), principle 3.6. 3 ASOIF, ‘1st report of the Governance Task Force to ASOIF Council’, EPAS (2016) INF13, p 7. See also ASOIF Governance Support and Monitoring Unit, ‘Suggested Components for Codes of Ethics for International Federations’ (20 March 2019). 4 See para B3.147 et seq.

286  Governance of the Sports Sector 5 See generally Centre for Sport and Human Rights, Championing Human Rights in the Governance of Sports Bodies (31 March 2018, sporthumanrights.org/en/resources/championing-human-rights-in-thegovernance-of-sports-bodies [accessed 21 October 2020]). 6 See generally Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement). 7 See generally Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption). 8 See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding). See also Mukurumbira KD, ‘13 characteristics of a safeguarding in sport culture’ 17 December 2019 linkedin.com/pulse/13-characteristics-safeguardingsport-culture-desmond-mukurumbira/ [accessed 21  October 2020] (‘good safeguarding in sport culture is a mark of good governance’). 9 In Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, the appellant was sanctioned for contravening Art 3 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which stated: ‘Officials shall show commitment to an ethical attitude while performing their duties. They shall pledge to behave in a dignified manner. They shall behave and act with complete credibility and integrity’. On appeal, the CAS panel rejected his argument that Art 3 contravened the requirement of legal certainty, ruling that it was ‘sufficiently clear and precise and unambiguous and provides a sufficient legal basis to sanction the Appellant’ (ibid, para 150). It ruled that the fact that the prohibition was ‘capable of catching a multitude of acts as unethical or lacking credibility and integrity does not mean that it lacks sufficient basis’, because ‘generality and ambiguity are different concepts’ (ibid, para 151). It was not necessary to list all of the acts that would be caught by the prohibition, ‘as an official, in reading the rule, could clearly make the distinction between what is an ethical attitude and what is not, what is acting with complete credibility and integrity and what is not’ (ibid, para 152). ‘The Panel is of the view that the inherent vagueness of concepts such as ethics and integrity does not preclude them to be used by sports legislators as a basis to impose disciplinary sanctions on officials that do not conform their behaviour to those standards. Indeed, in sports there are other notions, such as “unsportsmanlike conduct” or “sporting fairness”, that are inherently vague and nonetheless may serve as basis to impose disciplinary sanctions. […] civil law standards are often inherently vague and reveal their full meaning on the basis of judicial application […]. The Panel is of the view that the standards of conduct required of officials of an international federation […] must be of the highest level because the public must perceive sports organizations as being upright and trustworthy, in order for those organizations to legitimately keep governing over their sports worldwide. […] Therefore, the Panel finds that it is legitimate and even desirable that sports federation[s] include in their ethical codes a general rule residually forbidding any unethical conduct of officials in order to cover all unacceptable situations that would not be caught by more specific provisions’.

(c) Compliance officer A5.47 In its policy document ‘Olympic Agenda 2020’, the IOC said it would ‘establish a position of a compliance officer, to […] advise the IOC members, IOC staff, NOCs, IFs and all other stakeholders of the Olympic Movement with regard to compliance’,1 and ‘give advice on new developments with regard to compliance’.2 World Athletics is one of the first Olympic Movement international federations to follow suit.3 1 IOC, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020 – Context and background’ (2014)  IOC online, 9  December, Recommendation 27. 2 IOC, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020 -–Context and background’ (2014)  IOC online, 9  December, Recommendation 31. 3 World Athletics Vetting Rules, Art 5.1.

(d) Independent integrity units A5.48 Clear separation of powers is vital for good governance.1 An SGB’s board that also retains responsibility for investigating and prosecuting wrongdoing in the sport is put in an impossible position when confronted with an allegation that a star athlete or a member of the board has acted in a corrupt fashion. Even if it determines quite properly, after a rigorous investigation, that there is no wrongdoing, or only wrongdoing that requires a minimal sanction, its perceived conflict of interest means that stakeholders will have no confidence in that decision, to the ultimate detriment not only of the SGB and the sport but also of the person accused. That is why World Athletics and the IBU have both set up operationally independent integrity units, reporting to independent supervisory boards, to ensure that allegations of wrongdoing are properly investigated and pursued independently and free of any actual or

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perceived conflicts of interest. This means that if that investigation exonerates the person involved, the media and the public will have confidence in that exoneration in a way that they simply would not have if the exoneration came from the SGB’s board or management. 1 ‘The concept of separation of powers in sports governance […] usually implies separating the disciplinary bodies from the political and executive arms of a sports body. That means that active officials are usually excluded from the disciplinary body and – if present – the appeal body of the SGB, thus separating the disciplinary function from the political and executive arms of the organisation’. Geeraert, ‘The governance agenda and its relevance for sport: introducing the four dimensions of the AGGIS sports governance observer’ in Alm, Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations, Final Report (Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies, April 2013), pp 16–17. In 2011 it was recommended (among other things) that the role of FIFA’s Ethics Committee be expanded, and that its independence be assured by having members elected by the FIFA Congress rather than the Executive Committee, and that FIFA should consider appointing independent members to the Committee. It was also recommended that the Ethics Committee conduct due diligence on elected members of bodies and key personnel, even if they have been appointed by FIFA’s member associations or confederations. If there was a suggestion of impropriety, the Ethics Committee should be entitled to instigate proceedings ex officio rather than requiring authorisation from the President or Executive Committee. Independent Governance Committee, ‘Governing FIFA: Concept Paper and Report’, 19 September 2011. See also Independent Governance Committee, FIFA Governance Reform Project, ‘First Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA’ (Basel Institute on Governance, 20  March 2012), p  4 (recommending ‘the separation of an investigatory and an adjudicatory chamber as well as the right of the investigatory chamber to set procedures in motion proprio motu ie  the independent ability of the Ethics Committee to initiate investigations […]. The judicial bodies must be given adequate resources both internally and, if necessary, through contracting of outside experts in order to be able to carry out their responsibilities’). FIFA’s Independent Ethics Committee was divided into two separate chambers in 2012 – the investigatory chamber and the adjudicatory chamber, FIFA website (fifa.com/who-we-are/ committees/committee/1882034/ [accessed 21 October 2020]). FIFA’s 2020 Code of Ethics states that the chairperson of the investigatory chamber can initiate preliminary investigations themselves (Art 59.3). The FIFA Congress has the power (alone) to elect or dismiss members of the Ethics Committee (FIFA Statutes 2019, Art 28.2(r)) and candidates for the Ethics Committee must pass an eligibility check with a ‘Review Committee’ (FIFA Statutes 2019, Art 39.5). Similar sentiments drove the creation by FIG of the ‘Gymnastics Ethics Foundation’ to deal with infringements of the code of ethics, following the revelation of years of horrific sexual abuse of athletes by a doctor who worked for the US national gymnastics team. FIG president Morinari Watanabe said: ‘Beyond the set missions, the creation of the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation is aimed at establishing a veritable countervailing power in gymnastics governance. I would like to achieve a separation of powers in the sport, between the administrative power that is the FIG, the legislative power provided by the FIG Congress, and the judicial power enshrined in the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation’: ‘The Council of the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation Meets for the First Time’ (2019) Around the Rings online, 20 February. Despite an independent governance review by the International Institute for Management Development recommending to the IOC in July 2017 (olympic.org/news/ioc-executive-boardconcludes-meetings-with-governance-report-from-imd [accessed 21  October 2020]) that its Ethics Commission should be granted greater independence to investigate cases of ethical misconduct (as well as have an independent secretary and an independent budget) the IOC has failed to implement such changes. For example: (a) the Ethics Commission members are IOC members, with the exception of the chair (Art 1, Statutes of the IOC Ethics Commission); (b) the IOC Executive Board still retains the sanctioning power for breaches of the Code of Ethics (Rule 59, IOC Code of Ethics); (c) the IOC receives any ethics complaints and undertakes the relevant investigations (Rule 59, bye-law to Rule 59, para 1, IOC Code of Ethics); and (d) the IOC is the secretariat to the Ethics Commission (Art 5, Statutes of the IOC Ethics Commission).

A5.49 For example, the Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) manages all aspects of antidoping (education/prevention, testing, intelligence gathering, investigations, results management, prosecution, and appeals) as well as all other integrity topics, including bribery, corruption, betting, manipulation of competition results, age manipulation, and misconduct concerning changes of nationalities. In short, whenever there is any breach of any World Athletics rules, it is referred to the AIU for investigation and potential prosecution, taking that significant burden away from the World Athletics Council and executive staff, and also benefiting from having one procedural structure for the investigation, prosecution and adjudication in disciplinary proceedings of

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all integrity offences, leading to significant efficiencies and procedural economies.1 Crucially, while the AIU is a unit of World Athletics, it is operationally independent: (a)

Certain World Athletics employees are dedicated AIU staff members, reporting to the AIU Head of the Unit, not to the World Athletics management or Council. (b) The dedicated AIU Head of Unit does not report to the World Athletics Council either, but rather to a separate Integrity Board, made up of three entirely independent integrity experts, together with one (non-voting) Council member. This Board provides independent assurance of the AIU’s independence and freedom from improper interference. (c) The AIU staff are located in the same building as the rest of World Athletics, but their offices are secured so that no one can access them without their knowledge. The close proximity allows for easy interaction with World Athletics management and staff without compromising independence or confidentiality. 1 See generally the AIU’s website, at athleticsintegrity.org/. The Biathlon Integrity Unit follows the same model: see biathlonintegrity.com/.

(e) Mechanisms for reporting wrongdoing A5.50 Another good governance control is a ‘whistle-blowing’ mechanism and process that ensures the confidentiality of whistle-blowers and protects them against retaliation. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published a ‘Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons’ that highlights the following key points:1 (a) Review existing legal frameworks and institutional arrangements in order to strengthen existing good practice and identify gaps in relation to reporting. (b) Use new technology and traditional communication methods to facilitate reporting. (c) Encourage the view that it is socially acceptable to report wrongdoing. (d) Protect reporting persons using a combination of legal, procedural and organizational measures. (e) Consider how to provide reporting persons with access to advice. (f) Ensure that competent authorities have the appropriate mandate, capacity, resources and powers to receive reports, investigate wrongdoing and protect reporting persons. (g) Ensure that the staff of competent authorities have appropriate training and specialised skills to handle reports and protect reporting persons. Many SGBs (including the UCI, World Athletics, and the IBU) now have confidential whistle-blower mechanisms in place,2 and CAS panels in turn have protected the anonymity of testifying witnesses, provided due measures are in place to protect the rights of the opposing party.3 1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of Match-Fixing’ (United Nations, 2016) p 60. 2 See eg biathlonintegrity.com/reporting-hotline/ [accessed 21 October 2020]. 3 See para B4.38.

4 MONITORING COMPLIANCE A5.51 The Olympic Agenda 2020 calls for ‘organisations to be responsible for running self-evaluation on a regular basis. The IOC to be regularly informed of the results of the organisations’ self-evaluations. In the event of missing such information, the IOC to request such an evaluation at its discretion’.1 Play the Game’s ‘Sports

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Governance Observer’ updated its benchmarking tool in 2019 so that it now measures 309 indicators of good governance, but to date it only covers six federations.2 ASOIF has taken on the task of monitoring compliance with its governance standards by its 28 IF members.3 It uses its five key governance principles – transparency, integrity, democracy, sports development/solidarity, and control mechanisms4 – to assess its IF members (by way of questionnaire), and each principle is measured by ten separate ‘indicators’.5 Each year since 2017, ASOIF’s and AIOWF’s6 members have completed self-assessment questionnaires based on those indicators as well as new ones on safeguarding and data protection/IT security. In 2020 the results of ASOIF’s review of each international sports federation participating in the assessment were made public (in summary form) for the first time.7 1 IOC, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020 – Context and background’ (2014)  IOC online, 9  December, Recommendation 27. 2 playthegame.org/theme-pages/the-sports-governance-observer/ [accessed 21 October 2020]. The six international federations surveyed are the Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI), the International Gymnastics Federation (FIG), the International Ski Federation (FIS), the Fédération Internationale de Volleyball (FIVB), the International Biathlon Union (IBU), and the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF). 3 ‘ASOIF members start governance assessment process’ (2016) ASOIF online, 18 November. See also, for non-Olympic federations, Global Association of International Sports Federations, ‘Governance Questionnaire’ (2018). 4 ASOIF Governance Taskforce, ‘Third Review of International Federation Governance’ (16 June 2020, asoif.com/sites/default/files/download/asoif_third_review_of_if_governance_fv-0616.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]) p 8. 5 See para A5.7. 6 AIOWF’s Governance Taskforce, ‘Third Review of Governance of AIOWF International Federation Members, AIOWF online’ (September 2020) assets.fis-ski.com/image/upload/v1598943205/fis-prod/ assets/Third_Review_of_Governance_of_AIOWF_IF_Members_2020.pdf [accessed 21  October 2020]). Of all the seven winter federations reviewed, the IBU had the most-improved AIOWF review score, following its governance reforms and the overhaul of its constitutional and other regulatory documents (see press release, IBU online (1  September 2020) biathlonworld.com/news/detail/ibuwelcomes-results-of-the-aiowf-governance-review [accessed 21 October 2020]). 7 ASOIF Governance Taskforce, ‘Third Review of International Federation Governance’ (16 June 2020) asoif.com/sites/default/files/download/asoif_third_review_of_if_governance_fv-0616.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]); ‘Third Review of IF Governance reveals significant progress, challenges remain’ ((2020)  ASOIF online 16  June) asoif.com/news/third-review-if-governance-reveals-significantprogress-challenges-remain [accessed 21 October 2020]). A total of 31 IFs participated in the third governance review and the World Karate Federation (WKF) was revealed as the only governing body who declined to participate. The WKF responded to ASOIF by stating that it has ‘not rejected to participate in the study, on the contrary, as soon as [its] queries [that WKF purports to have sent in writing to ASOIF and remain unanswered] are addressed by ASOIF, [it] would be more than pleased to continue participating in the review, as [it] has done in the past’ (see Pavitt, ‘ASOIF defend governance review after World Karate Federation criticism’ (2020) Inside The Games, 18 June).

A5.52 ‘Simple compliance is not however enough to drive real change in the governance of sporting organizations. It is more than updating statutes. It is about leadership and people with the right skills and integrity, incorporating a change in culture, supported by a clear communication strategy and continuous monitoring to measure and if necessary adjust the compliance process’.1 In recognition of this fact, ASOIF announced in June 2020 that it is also planning ‘a pilot study on organisational culture’.2 1 European Commission, ‘Expert Group on Good Governance – Promotion of existing Good Governance Principles report’ (Final document, July 2016), p 5. See also Hardman, Why We Get the Wrong Politicians (Atlantic Books. 2018), p xii (‘cultures are more dangerous than individuals: they continue with each changing of the guard of bad guys, and are so pernicious that even those employed to scrutinise them can sometimes miss what’s going on or fail to recognise how bad their effects are’). 2 ‘Third Review of IF  Governance reveals significant progress, challenges remain’ (2020)  ASOIF online, 16 June.

PART B

Regulating Sport

CHAPTER B1

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC and Charles Flint QC (both Blackstone Chambers) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B1.1 2

THE AUTONOMY AFFORDED TO AN SGB TO REGULATE ITS SPORT.... B1.4

3

THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON AN SGB’S EXERCISE OF ITS REGULATORY POWERS.................................................................................. B1.10 A Superior sport rules...................................................................................... B1.10 B National and transnational laws................................................................... B1.14 C General principles of law............................................................................. B1.18

4

RESOLVING DISPUTES AS TO THE PROPER MEANING OF AN SGB’S REGULATIONS...................................................................................... B1.49 A The basic approach: what would the words mean, in their context, to a reasonable reader?................................................................................. B1.53 B Considering the words of the regulation, in their context within the specific provision and within the regulations more generally, so that the SGB’s rulebook is read as a coherent whole.......................................... B1.56 C Considering the broader factual context of the regulations, including their purpose................................................................................................. B1.57 D The role of prior precedents in determining the proper meaning of the regulation in issue.................................................................................. B1.60 E Canons of construction................................................................................ B1.61

1 INTRODUCTION B1.1 The governing body of a sport (an SGB) has a right and a responsibility to regulate the basis on which the sport is conducted in a manner that protects and promotes fair and meaningful competition, on a level playing-field, wherever the sport is played. This requires the SGB to find an effective and efficient way of incentivising conduct that will advance these basic objectives, and of disincentivising conduct that will prejudice them. B1.2 The chapters that follow in this section consider the ways in which SGBs regulate particular issues, such as eligibility, doping, match-fixing, other misconduct, and safeguarding. In this opening chapter, we set out the parameters for that discussion by considering the legal framework within which all SGB regulations are drafted, whatever the topic being regulated. Other works explain the theory and practice behind designing and implementing effective regulations,1 or give guidance on how to draft clear and precise regulations, in contexts other than sport.2 We seek in this chapter to assist SGBs to produce effective regulations in the context of their sports that will work as intended and that will withstand legal challenge, by addressing the following topics that inform and constrain the exercise of their regulatory powers:

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(a)

In Section 2 (‘The Autonomy Afforded to an SGB to Regulate Its Sport’), we identify various ‘sporting imperatives’ that the courts, arbitral panels and/or external regulators have accepted as legitimate, and therefore as justifying regulatory intervention by the SGB. We also identify the different regulatory models that an SGB may choose from to pursue those objectives. We explain how the courts and arbitral panels are generally willing to acknowledge the experience and expertise of the SGB and therefore to afford it a reasonable ‘margin of appreciation’ to craft such regulations as it deems necessary to achieve these various underlying imperatives in its sport. (b) SGBs are not immune from but instead must ensure that their regulations comply with all of the requirements of applicable law. Section 3 (‘The Legal Constraints on an SGB’s Exercise of Its Regulatory Powers’) addresses what the ‘applicable law’ is in this context. It is not always obvious, at least in relation to regulations that are intended to apply globally, across many different national legal regimes. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)3 has found different ways to prevent particular national laws undermining the uniform application of an SGB’s regulations across all of those jurisdictions, including on occasion by applying in their stead or alongside them ‘general principles of law’ that are said to be common to all jurisdictions. In Section 3 we seek to identify these ‘general principles’ and their effect, as developed and applied in the CAS jurisprudence. (c) Finally, in Section 4 (‘Resolving Disputes as to the Proper Meaning of an SGB’s Regulations’), we set out the approach that English courts and CAS arbitral panels are likely to take in resolving disputes about the meaning of an SGB’s regulations, in other words how they are to be interpreted and applied in particular cases. This is a topic of great importance not only for the people who are expected to comply with the regulations, but also for the SGB when drafting them, since it will want the regulations to be interpreted and applied as intended. 1 See eg Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch 2 (What is ‘Good’ Regulation?); Better Regulation Delivery Office, Regulators’ Code (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, April 2014). 2 See eg  Karpen and Xanthaki, Legislation in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2017); Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation: Art and Technology of Rules for Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2014); McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2009); Better Regulation Taskforce, ‘Principles of Good Regulation’ (2003); Bell & Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), pp 199–203. 3 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport).

B1.3 Some of these topics are discussed in further detail in specific contexts in other chapters. We provide cross-references to those discussions where appropriate below.

2 THE AUTONOMY AFFORDED TO AN SGB TO REGULATE ITS SPORT B1.4 An SGB’s rulebook can be seen as analogous to a classic ‘public interest’ regulatory regime, in that the SGB, acting as the guardian of the sport, intervenes by way of regulation to achieve outcomes that vindicate the public interest in the longterm health and vitality of sport as an important instrument of public policy,1 and to avoid outcomes that undermine that public interest.2 The relevant interests here extend beyond those of participants to those of the wider public, because many if not most sports have grown into activities that attract many spectators and broadcast viewers, and that generate considerable commercial revenue. In this context, the courts, the CAS and/or external regulators have accepted that the following objectives are

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legitimate and therefore justify regulatory intervention even if it restricts the rights and freedoms that participants would enjoy absent such regulation: (a) The need to organise sport in a manner that ensures fair, meaningful and structured competition, so as to encourage broad participation at the amateur level and to incentivise the best athletes to make the sacrifices required to excel at the elite level.3 (b) The need to achieve competitive balance between the contestants in a sporting contest, so as to ensure the uncertainty of outcome that makes sport such a compelling pastime and entertainment product.4 (c) The need to protect the integrity of sport from the scourges of doping5 and match-fixing,6 as well as any other conduct or practice that threatens to undermine the public’s confidence in the authenticity of the results achieved on the field of play.7 (d) The need to protect the credibility and regularity of competitions between different clubs, by preventing unilateral termination of contracts by players or clubs during the season,8 as well as transfers of players from one club to another that skew results late in the season.9 (e) The need to protect the credibility and regularity of competition between national representative teams, by ensuring that athletes have a genuine link with the nations they represent, and cannot switch quickly or frequently from one national team to another, eg  in exchange for payment (‘commerce of nationalities’).10 (f) The need to fund and promote the quality and uncertainty of outcome of competitions between clubs by distributing the revenues generated by the competitions equitably and broadly between clubs,11 and by reducing the ability of the richest clubs to buy up all the best talent.12 (g) The need to protect the financial integrity and sustainability of club competitions by increasing the transparency and credibility of club finances, encouraging the long-term viability and sustainability of club financial models, and ensuring that the financing of player and manager acquisitions and remuneration is supported by the revenue derived from football activities, and not by state subsidies or subventions from owners.13 (h) The need to incentivise national federations and clubs to invest in development programmes that identify and develop young athletic talent at grass roots without fear of others free-riding on that investment.14 (i) The need to protect minors ‘from the social dangers inherent in their international transfer’, specifically the trafficking, exploitation and abandonment of minors in foreign countries.15 (j) The need to control and supervise the ethical conduct of its organs and officials.16 (k) The need ‘to ensure the independent, impartial, specialized, and expeditious resolution of sports disputes’.17   1 As to which, see para A1.8; and see also Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity, 2016/2143(INI), Recitals B, D, E, G, K, and AJ (‘[…] sport plays a prominent role in the life of millions of EU citizens; whereas amateur and professional sport is not merely a matter of athletic abilities, sporting achievements and competitions, but also brings a significant social, educational, economic, cultural and unifying contribution to the EU’s economy and society, as well as to the EU’s strategic objectives and social values; […] sport is not only a growing economic reality, but also a social phenomenon which makes an important contribution to the European Union’s strategic objectives, and to social values such as tolerance, solidarity, prosperity, peace, respect for human rights and understanding among nations and cultures; […] practicing sports contributes to a better quality of life, prevents diseases and plays a fundamental role in strengthening personal development and health condition; […] sport also contributes to the integration of people and transcends race, religion and ethnicity; […] both professional and grassroots sports play a key role in the global promotion of peace, respect for human rights and solidarity, carry health and economic benefits for

296  Regulating Sport societies and have an essential role in highlighting fundamental educational and cultural values, as well as in promoting social inclusion; […] sport, in its broadest sense, represents a value system for a community, and whereas these values form the basis of a shared language that goes beyond all cultural and linguistic barriers; whereas it can help, and should be considered an opportunity, to strengthen dialogue and solidarity with third countries, to promote the protection of basic human rights and freedoms worldwide and to support EU external policy; […]’).   2 See generally Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), p 40. As such, they suffer from the same problems as other ‘public interest’ regulatory regimes, where the regulators may be perceived as incompetent, corrupt, or ‘captured’ by (ie  serving the private interests of) the most powerful stakeholders. (Ibid p 42).  3 C-519/04 P Meca-Medina v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, paras 43 and 45 (legitimate objectives of sporting rules include ensuring fair competitions with equal chances for all athletes, as well as protection of athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport, and ethical values in sport); European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 219 (‘In line with the case law, the Commission considers that the protection of the integrity of the sport, the protection of health and safety and the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport may constitute legitimate objectives that justify a restriction of competition’); Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 508 (‘The IAAF has introduced the Hyperandrogenism Regulations to provide for fair competition and a level playing field within the female category. The Panel accepts that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are therefore intended to pursue a legitimate objective’); Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 556 (‘ensuring fair competition in the female category of elite competitive athletes is a legitimate objective for the IAAF to pursue. […] The Panel accepts that this is an important and legitimate objective’); I v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 113 (‘In addition, the Panel remarks that anti-doping rules are aimed at protecting the vested interest of all participants in fair competition. As already noted, the principle of a level playing field is a cornerstone of sports law in general and of anti-doping law in particular’); Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, para 323 (‘It does not appear to be in dispute – nor could it sensibly be contested – that the general objective of ensuring fairness and integrity of competition in elite competitive sport is a legitimate objective for an international sports governing body to pursue’) and para 325 (‘Having regard to its margin of appreciation, the Panel considers that an international sports governing body such as the IAAF is legitimately entitled to take the view that fairness requires that the outcome of competitive athletics should be determined by natural physical talent, training and effort, and that athletes should not be able to use artificial technology during competitions in a way that provides them with an overall advantage over athletes who are not using such technology. The Panel considers that this is particularly so where (as here) the mechanical aid is one that most athletes would not, in practice, be able to utilise’) and para  333 (‘the aim of the Rule – and in particular the aspect of the Rule that places the burden on the athlete who wishes to use a mechanical aid to demonstrate the absence of a competitive advantage – is to ensure that where a disabled athlete requires a prosthetic aid in order to participate against able-bodied athletes in a particular event, the use of that aid does not enable the disabled athlete to achieve performances that are better than they would be able to achieve if they did not have the disability at all. In other words, the Rule is intended to (a) permit disabled athletes to compete against able-bodied athletes while using mechanical aids that compensate for the effect of their disability, but (b) to prevent disabled athletes from competing against able-bodied athletes that do more than compensate for the effect of their disability. The Panel considers this to be a legitimate objective for the IAAF to pursue’). This need to ensure that potential participants are not discouraged by unfair competition conditions that would deny them any real chance of success is the basis for the age, sex, and weight competition categories used in many sports.   4 European Commission, White Paper on Sport (2007), para 4.1 (acknowledging ‘the need to ensure uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance between clubs taking part in the same competitions’); Commission Staff Working Document, ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context – Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport’, COM(2007) 391 final, SEC(2007)932, SEC(2007)934, SEC(2007)936, para 3.4 (a) (‘If sport events are to be of interest to the spectator, they must involve uncertainty as to the result. There must therefore be a certain degree of equality in competitions. This sets the sport sector apart from other industry or service sectors, where competition between firms serves the purpose of eliminating inefficient firms from the market. Sport teams, clubs and athletes have a direct interest not only in there being other teams, clubs and athletes, but also in their economic viability as competitors’) and Annex A, para 2.1.5 (‘Legitimate objectives of sporting rules will normally relate to the “organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport” and may include, eg, the ensuring of fair sport competitions with equal chances for all athletes, the ensuring of uncertainty of results, the protection of the athletes’ health, the protection of the safety of spectators, the encouragement of training of young athletes, the ensuring of financial stability of sport clubs/teams or the ensuring of a uniform and consistent exercise of a given sport (the “rules of the game”). The specificity of sport, ie the distinctive features setting sport apart from other economic activities, such as the interdependence between competing adversaries, will be taken into consideration when assessing the existence of a legitimate objective’). See also Premier Rugby Limited v Saracens, Sport Resolutions Panel (Rt Hon Lord Dyson, Aidan Robertson QC, and Jeremy Summers) decision

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  297 dated 4  November 2019 (competition law challenge to Premier Rugby’s salary cap rejected inter alia because it pursued in a proportionate manner the legitimate objective of protecting competitive balance within the league).  5 Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 131 (‘[…] eradication of doping in sport, protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity are undeniably legitimate objectives of extreme importance for the viability of sport at any level’); Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira v FIFA, CAS 2015/a/4184, para 196 (‘Contrary to the Player’s argument, the Panel finds that the interests of FIFA justify an infringement in the Player’s privacy. The anti-doping policy of FIFA is a crucial part of its governance and prevails over the Player’s right to work’); Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 158 (‘[…] if there is any infringement of personal rights under the rules, then the Panel considers that it is justified by the public interest in the fight against doping in the sport […]’); IWBF v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.10 (‘It was well recognised that the continued battle to eliminate doping from competitive sport waged by lawyers and laboratories on the one hand against (some) scientist and sportsmen on the other is necessary if sport is to preserve its integrity and attraction’); CONI, CAS  2000/C/255, para  56 (‘[…] doping is the enemy of society as a whole, and of sport in particular. It is in the interests of all that doping should be removed from sport (and society), and that those who participate in sport should know that if they are caught cheating, for that is what doping is, severe punishment will be meted out to them’); C-519/04P Meca-Medina & Mejcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, para 43 (objectives of FINA’s anti-doping rules – ‘to combat doping in order for competitive sport to be conducted fairly and […] to safeguard equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport and ethical values in sport’ – are legitimate imperatives that are fundamental to the conduct of the sport); Wilander & Novacek v Tobin & Jude, [1997] 2 CMLR 346 [CA], at 354 (‘It is clear, and indeed common ground, that a provision to the effect of r.53, designed to ban cheating (and indeed danger to health) by taking drugs is free from any possible objection on grounds of discrimination and is justified by an imperative requirement in the general interest’); Johnson v Athletic Canada & IAAF, [1997] OJ 3201, para 30 (anti-doping rules justified ‘to protect the right of the athlete […] to fair competition, to know that the race involves only his own skill, his own strength, his own spirit and not his own pharmacologist’) and para 31 (‘The public has an interest in the protection of the integrity of sport. Governments around the world subsidize their elite athletes through carding systems. The public pays to attend events. The elite athlete is viewed as a hero and his influence over the young athlete cannot be underestimated’); European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 2.2 (‘Doping poses a threat to sport worldwide, including European sports. It undermines the principle of open and fair competition. It is a demotivating factor for sport in general and puts the professional under unreasonable pressure. It seriously affects the image of sport and poses a serious threat to individual health’).  6 Bradley v Jockey Club, [2004]  EWHC  2164, Richards J, para  109 (‘As to the objectives of the disciplinary procedures and the importance of those objectives, the Board was clearly entitled to view the relevant Rules as being essential to the maintenance of the integrity of racing and to attach corresponding importance to the enforcement of those Rules’); ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, ECB Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 1 (‘Self-evidently, corruption […] in cricket or any other sport for that matter, is a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game. For the general public, supporting the game and their team within it, there is no merit or motivation to expend time, money or effort to watch a match whose integrity may be in doubt. The consequences of the public’s disengagement from cricket would be catastrophic. Furthermore, the game of cricket simply cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished in the eyes of commercial sponsors. These partners could not and would not link their brand to a sport whose integrity had been so undermined. For players who have devoted their entire careers to the pursuit of hard fought and properly competitive sport, to have those genuine achievements called into question by the corrupt actions of a tiny minority, may tend to devalue their worth. Accordingly, we have no doubt that this is a cancer which must be rooted out of the game of cricket’), expressly approved on appeal, Kaneria v ECB, ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 5; Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 140 (preferring a broad interpretation of a disciplinary prohibition, because ‘this interpretation is also in line with the “zero tolerance to match-fixing” which, according to CAS jurisprudence (CAS  2010/A/2267) presents one of the most important values and principles of behaviour in football. The observance of these values and principles is indispensable for the protection and improvement of the integrity of the game’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 25 (‘[…] integrity, in football, is crucially related to the authenticity of results, and has a critical core which is that, in the public’s perception, both single matches and entire championships must be a true test of the best athletic, technical, coaching and management skills of the opposing sides. Due to the high social significance of football in Europe, it is not enough that competing athletes, coaches or managers are in fact honest; the public must perceived that they try their best to win and, in particular, that clubs make management or coaching decisions based on the single objective of their club winning against any other club. This particular requirement is inherent in the nature of sports […]’) and para 125 (‘The Panel is of the opinion that among the “myriad of rules” needed to organize a football competition, rules bound to protect the authenticity of results appear to be of the utmost importance. The need to preserve the reputation and quality of the football product may bring about restraints on individual

298  Regulating Sport club owners’ freedom’); Montcourt v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630, paras 48 and 49 (‘Competitive sports depend on the public perception that events are not fixed. The sports authorities determined several decades ago that wagering by professional athletes on events in their own sport, even by athletes not involved in the relevant event, is likely to erode the legitimacy of the sport and give opportunities for unscrupulous exploitation of athletes who embark on the slippery slope of betting. This is especially true of sports like tennis, where it is sufficient to corrupt a single player to fix the outcome. [49] The sport of professional tennis has therefore established a prohibition on wagering by its practitioners. This is a condition of participating in the sport. The Appellant has not come close to convincing the Panel that this policy and legislation is illegitimate […]’).   7 For example, regulations may be designed to address the perception of conflict when clubs in the same competition are under common ownership, as in AEK Athens & SK  Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS  98/200, para  127 (‘the intention of the Contested Rule is to prevent the conflict of interest inherent in commonly controlled clubs participating in the same UEFA competition and to preserve the genuineness of results. In this respect, the Panel is persuaded that this is a legitimate goal to pursue’) and para  129 (‘among the “myriad of rules” needed in order to organize a football competition, rules bound to protect public confidence in the authenticity of results appear to be of the utmost importance’).  8 Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para 157 (noting that restrictions on player movement in breach of contract were justified because they were necessary to protect the integrity of competitions: ‘Should players be free to leave the competition at any given moment, the sporting value of the team during the championship would be significantly impaired, affecting and compromising the clubs and the smooth running of the championship as a whole’), citing as support the stance taken by the European Commission in SETCA – FCTB/FIFA, Case IV/36.583 of 28 May 2012, para 56.  9 C-176/96 Lehtonen and Another v Federation Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basket-Ball, [2000] ECRI2681 (‘53. On this point, it must be acknowledged that the setting of deadlines for transfers of players may meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions. 54. Late transfers might be liable to change substantially the sporting strength of one or other team in the course of the championship, thus calling into question the comparability of results between the teams taking part in that championship, and consequently the proper functioning of the championship as a whole. 55. The risk of that happening is especially clear in the case of a sporting competition which follows the rules of the Belgian first division national basketball championship. The teams taking part in the play-offs for the title or for relegation could benefit from late transfers to strengthen their squads for the final stage of the championship, or even for a single decisive match’). 10 Bedene & LTA  v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2  March 2017, para  58 (ITF rule restricting changes in sports nationality has a legitimate objective in that it ‘prevents changes of nationality for economic reasons and supports the ethos of the Davis Cup which is a competition between nations’); European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 4.2 (‘The organisation of sport and of competitions on a national basis is part of the historical and cultural background of the European approach to sport, and corresponds to the wishes of European citizens. In particular, national teams play an essential role not only in terms of identity but also to secure solidarity with grassroots sport, and therefore deserve to be supported […]’); Tonga Rugby League v RLIF, [2008] NSWSC 1173, para  70 (‘Prima facie, the concern that the credibility of international competition would be hurt by players frequently changing their allegiance is legitimate’); Belize Basketball Federation v FIBA, CAS 2009/A/1988, para 22 (‘The Panel is in no way unsympathetic to the concerns of the Respondent and fully endorses the objective of preserving a link between national team competitions and national teams, and the avoidance of a situation in which national teams are substantially or wholly composed of sporting mercenaries acquiring belatedly nationalities of convenience’); International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215, para 32 (‘First, the waiting period [required before transferring allegiance from one country to another] serves the fairness and integrity of international competitions. These could be endangered if athletes could suddenly and unexpectedly change their nationalities and teams without any time limits at all’) and para 34 (‘sudden changes in athletes’ sporting nationalities would seriously endanger the fairness and integrity of sports competition’) and para  32 (‘secondly, the waiting period serves to deter unethical “commerce of nationalities” […]’); B v FIBA, CAS 92/80, para  16 (rules requiring a three year waiting period before changing sport nationality ‘answer the legitimate concern to prevent changes of basketball nationality from being dependent on the wishes or interests of the players’). 11 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 4.8 (‘Collective selling can be important for the redistribution of income and can thus be a tool for achieving greater solidarity within sports. The Commission recognises the importance of an equitable redistribution of income between clubs, including the smallest ones, and between professional and amateur sport’); European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8  December 2017, para  222 (‘the Commission recognises that some forms of horizontal solidarity (for instance, equal distribution of revenues to all the clubs participating in the same competition) or vertical solidarity (for instance, redistribution of revenues from the elite/professional level of a sport to the low/grassroots level) may justify limited restrictions to the economic freedoms of undertakings involved in sport, in particular within a sport pyramid’); Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity, 2016/2143(INI)),

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  299 para 72 (‘[The European Parliament] maintains that the selling of TV rights on a centralised, exclusive and territorial basis, with equitable sharing of revenues, is essential to the sustainable funding of sport at all levels and to ensuring a level playing field’). 12 C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para 106 (‘In view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results […] must be accepted as legitimate’). 13 Galatasaray v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, paras 75–76 (competition law challenge to UEFA’s financial fair play rules rejected because they pursue in a proportionate manner the legitimate objectives of improving the financial capability, transparency, and credibility of clubs, protect clubs’ creditors, introduce more discipline and rationality into club finances, encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues, and so protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football); Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, para 103 (the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations ‘not only serve a private interest, but also a public interest in that the overarching objectives of these regulations are […] inter alia to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues, to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finance, to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football and to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football’); Premier Rugby Limited v Saracens, Sport Resolutions Panel (Rt Hon Lord Dyson, Aidan Robertson QC, and Jeremy Summers) decision dated 4 November 2019 (competition law challenge to Premier Rugby’s salary cap rejected inter alia because it pursued in a proportionate manner the legitimate objective of protecting the financial viability of clubs in the league); QPR v English Football League, Football Disciplinary Commission decision dated 19 October 2017 (same in respect of the EFL’s Financial Fair Play rules); Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity, 2016/2143(INI)), para  33 (‘[The European Parliament] welcomes good, self-regulatory practices, such as the Financial Fair Play initiative, in that they encourage more economic rationality and better standards of financial management in professional sports, with a focus on the long-term as opposed to the short-term, thereby contributing to the healthy and sustainable development of sport in Europe; emphasises that Financial Fair Play has encouraged better financial management standards and should therefore be applied strictly’). See also the recognition in RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, paras 102, 104, of the legitimacy of the objectives underlying FIFA’s rules restricting third party ownership of and third party investment in players (preserving the stability of players’ contracts, guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of clubs and players as regards recruitment and transfers, safeguarding integrity in football and the fair and equitable nature of competitions, preventing conflicts of interest and maintaining transparency in transactions relating to players’ transfers), discussed at para B5.31. 14 C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para 106 (‘In view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate’); Bedene & LTA  v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 58 (ITF rule restricting changes in sports nationality has a legitimate objective in that it ‘protects smaller national associations who may have invested money and support in bringing on a player only to find that he defects to a wealthier national association’); ‘International Baseball Association’, CAS 98/215, para 32 (‘secondly, the waiting period serves to deter unethical “commerce of nationalities” […]. National federations can safeguard their economic interests in athletes by requiring that the athlete may not represent another federation unless three years has elapsed or the athlete has reimbursed his previous federation for all the costs which were incurred during the athlete’s training and education’); European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 2.3 (‘Rules requiring that teams include a certain quota of locally trained players could be accepted as being compatible with the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons if they do not lead to any direct discrimination based on nationality and if possible indirect discrimination effects resulting from them can be justified as being proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued, such as to enhance and protect the training and development of talented young players’). See also Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity, 2016/2143(INI)), para 38 (‘[The European Parliament] calls on governing bodies and national authorities at all levels to take measures that guarantee compensation to training clubs with a view to encouraging the recruitment and training of young players, in accordance with the Bernard ruling of the European Court of Justice of 16 March 2010’) (as to which case, see para F3.183 et seq). 15 RFEF  v FIFA, CAS  2014/A/3813, paras 189, 202, 291 (‘These rules are of great significance in that they aim at protecting the most vulnerable stakeholders in the sport of football. They have been implemented to prohibit the “commercialisation” of young players and to allow them to develop and grow within their natural environment’). See also A  v Club Athletico de Madrid & RFEF & FIFA, CAS 2013/A/3140, para 8.22 (Panel ‘wholeheartedly shares the views expressed by FIFA that Article 19 of the RSTP is a very important provision, which sets key principles designed to protect the interests of minor players. […] Considering the above mentioned, the Panel is convinced of the need

300  Regulating Sport to apply the rules on the protection of minors in strict, rigorous and consistent manner’); Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS  2008/A/1485, para  7.4.19 (‘certain rules may constitute a restriction to fundamental rights, when such rules pursue a legitimate objective and are proportionate to the objective sought. In the instant case, the Panel […] considers that FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor players do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not admissible’). 16 Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 157 (‘FIFA, as any other association incorporated under Swiss private law pursuant to Article 60 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code (“CC”), has a legitimate interest in and is entitled to control and supervise the conduct of its organs and officials by implementing inter alia specific ethical standards of conduct in its rules’). 17 IAAF & WADA v RFEA et al, CAS 2014/A/3614, para 183, holding that pursuit of such objective justifies designating the CAS as the dispute resolution forum for sports-related disputes.

B1.5 Obviously this is not an exhaustive list. It is always open to SGBs to identify and pursue other ‘sporting imperatives’ that they consider to be legitimate, so long as they do so lawfully and proportionately. Indeed, it is incumbent upon them to do so, if they are to fulfil their role as custodians of their respective sports. B1.6 Because the SGB is presumed to be best-placed to determine what is best for its sport,1 and to have the mandate of its members to do so,2 the CAS, which has ultimate jurisdiction over many if not most cases involving SGB regulations,3 has consistently ruled that it is for the SGB (not the CAS or any other court or tribunal) to determine what policies it should pursue, and therefore what regulations it should issue, to best achieve its legitimate objectives,4 so long as it acts lawfully and proportionately. This principle of deference to the SGB’s regulatory autonomy, also well-entrenched in English law,5 and derived in part from the principle of separation of powers between ‘legislature’ and ‘judiciary’,6 means that ‘an external tribunal should refrain […] from interfering with the merits of policy choices made by sports governing bodies […] The CAS cannot substitute its own judgment for that of sports bodies with regard to policy choices’,7 even if it disagrees with the approach taken.8 1 Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 149 (‘[…] the FEI as a sporting association is afforded a wide margin of appreciation in making rules to regulate the conduct of its members. While this principle does not prevent a judicial or arbitral tribunal charged with examining the rules to determine whether they constitute an infringement of fundamental rights, it serves to emphasise that a sporting association will generally be in the best position to assess the rules which are required to address issues arising in the sport which it runs’); Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 55 (‘[…] significant deference should be afforded to a sporting body’s expertise and authority to determine the minimum level of sanction required to achieve its strategic imperatives’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 101 (‘It is allowed to provide a discretion to the association and courts should not lightly exercise their power of review over the association’s decisions made in the exercise of such discretion, especially in cases in which sports governing bodies have special expertise and experience in relation to their sport’). 2 Juliano et al v FEI, CAS 2017/A/5114, paras 62, 78 (rejecting argument that policy underlying rule lacked ‘constitutional foundation’, given that the policy ‘has been presented to the GA [General Assembly] every year since the FEI started applying it in 2012; all members were and are aware of this practice and no objections have been raised or proposal made to change the current system’). Cf AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘With regard to the right to be heard, the Panel wishes to stress that the CAS has always protected the principle audiatur et altera pars in connection with any proceedings, measures or disciplinary actions taken by an international federation vis-à-vis a national federation, a club or an athlete. However, there is a very important difference between the adoption by a federation of an ad hoc administrative or disciplinary decision directly and individually addressed to designated associations, teams or athletes and the adoption of a general regulation directed at laying down rules of conduct generally applicable to all current or future situations of the kind described in the regulation. It is the same difference that one can find in every legal system between an administrative measure or a penalty decided by an executive or judicial body concerned with a limited and identified number of designees and a general act of a normative character adopted by the parliament or the government for general application to categories of persons envisaged both in the abstract and as a whole. The Panel remarks that there is an evident analogy between sports-governing bodies and governmental bodies with respect to their role and functions as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities, and that similar principles should govern their actions. Therefore, the Panel finds that, unless there are specific rules to the contrary, only in the event of administrative measures or penalties adopted by a sports-governing body with regard to a limited

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3 4

5

6

and identified number of designees could there be a right to a legal hearing. For a regulator or legislator, it appears to be advisable and good practice to acquire as much information as possible and to hear the views of potentially affected people before issuing general regulations – one can think of, eg, parliamentary hearings with experts or interest groups – but it is not a legal requirement. As a United States court has stated, requiring an international sports federation “to provide for hearings to any party potentially affected adversely by its rule-making authority could quite conceivably subject the [international federation] to a quagmire of administrative red tape which would effectively preclude it from acting at all to promote the game” (Gunter Harz Sports v USTA, 1981, 511 F. Supp. 1103, at 1122)’ [other citations omitted]). See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport). Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS  2016/O/4684, para  117 (‘The rule-making power, and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking also into account the overall legislative framework’); Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS  2014/A/3828, para  143 (‘One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue their own rules relating to their governance, their membership and their own competitions’); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 55 (‘Recognized by the Swiss federal constitution and anchored in the Swiss law of private associations is the principle of autonomy, which provides an association with a very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The right to regulate and to determine its own affairs is considered essential for an association and is at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue rules relating to their own governance, their membership and their own competitions’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17 (‘Like any other human or social activity, there cannot be any sports activity outside the framework of State law. Depending on the various political and legal systems in the world, States grant to sports organizations and governing bodies a certain degree of autonomy and allow them to establish, within the framework of State law, their own sports laws and rules’). See eg  Bradley v Jockey Club [2004]  EWHC  216, Richards J, para  43 (‘The test of proportionality requires the striking of a balance between competing considerations. The application of the test in the context of penalty will not necessarily produce just one right answer: there is no single “correct” decision. Different decision-makers may come up with different answers, all of them reached in an entirely proper application of the test. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised that, in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular, whether it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of discretion. The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of judgment. Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range of reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests. The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate. The court’s role, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, is to determine whether the decision reached falls within the limits of the decision-maker’s discretionary area of judgment. If it does, the penalty is lawful; if it does not, the penalty is unlawful. It is not the role of the court to stand in the shoes of the primary decision-maker, strike the balance for itself and determine on that basis what it considers the right penalty to be’), affirmed on appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056; Chambers v BOA [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB) (‘[…] though the court must not shrink from exercising a supervisory power which it has if it affects the claimant’s right to work […], the BOA, if acting honestly and not capriciously and within its powers, is and must be a body better fitted to judge what was needed than me, or any court’); Bedene & LTA v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 74 (‘It is well established that courts and tribunals should exercise great caution before interfering with the decision of a specialist sporting body on a matter where the expertise and experience of that body is relevant’); and ICC  v USACA, ICC  Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 73 (‘The starting point is that sports governing bodies know what is best for their sport. The law’s intervention therefore is consciously restrained’). See also Johnson v Athletic Canada & IAAF, [1997] OJ 3201, para 33 (‘This court is required to extend a measure of deference to the justifications advanced by the I.A.A.F. as the world governing body for amateur athletes when considering the reasonableness of the ban. It is not this court’s function to serve as a court of appeal on the merits of decisions reached by tribunals exercising jurisdiction over specialized fields. The I.A.A.F. has special expertise not only in regulating amateur athletics but also in regulating, detecting and preventing drug abuse’); and cases cited at paras B1.34 and E6.1 et seq. Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 21.3 (‘CAS is an adjudicative, not legislative body. It is not for CAS to write the rules of the FEI. As long as those rules are not incompatible with some relevant aspect of ordre publique, be it competition law, the law of human rights, or Swiss statute, we have to apply them as they stand. For us only the lex lata, not the lex ferenda has relevance’); FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’) and para  125 (‘In a different context, this wide discretion is referred to as “the margin of appreciation”’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 130 (‘Judges should not substitute for legislators, and the former should always allow the latter to retain a certain margin of appreciation’).

302  Regulating Sport 7 NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/O/466, paras 6.22 and 6.23, cited with approval in Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.34, where the CAS panel accepted that it was for AIBA (and not the CAS) to decide whether national federations should be permitted to enter one or two boxers into Olympic qualifying events. See also Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS  2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 469 (‘It is clear from the range of expert evidence presented in this proceeding that there are many scientific, ethical and regulatory issues on which reasonable and informed minds may legitimately differ. The Panel is mindful that, in considering these issues, it is not acting as a policy maker or regulator. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Panel to step into the shoes of the IAAF by deciding how it would have approached issues had it been charged with making policies or enacting rules itself. See eg CAS 2016/O/4684 ROC v IAAF. Instead its function is a purely judicial one. The Panel must adjudicate the disputed legal issues on the basis of the applicable legal tests and by reference to the arguments and the admissible evidence on the record in these proceedings. While this inevitably requires consideration of arguments and evidence based on an array of policy and scientific matters, the Panel must be mindful of its judicial role and the limits of that role’). 8 Cameron v UK Anti-Doping, CAS 2019/A/6110, para 110 (‘[…] the application of Article 10.2.1 of the UKADR […] appears to be harsh, particularly where the presence of the non-Specified Substance in question may not have been such as to enhance in any way the performance of the Appellant at the bout. Nevertheless, the rules enshrined in the UKADR are for the benefit of all boxers and other athletes falling within its scope, and they must be applied uniformly and without fear or favour. It will be for UKAD and WADA to reflect on the necessity or utility of the rules, which allows an adjudicator no flexibility in approach’); Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 551 (‘The Panel’s role is not to evaluate the adequacy of the IAAF’s general policy-making process or to re-write its rules’); DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, para 86 (noting proposed change to whereabouts rules to provide exception to ban on use of a phone call to locate an athlete for drug testing, the Panel stated: ‘Whether that approach is sensible or justifiable was not for the Tribunal to decide’); UCI v Landaluce & RFBC, CAS 2006/A/119, 112 (acknowledging criticism of a rule in the International Standard for Laboratories that the same analyst should not be involved in the analysis of an athlete’s A sample and his B sample: ‘This reasoning, although rational and plausible, fails before the CAS for a very simple reason: the arbitrators do not create the rules, they apply them. This is all the more true because the authors of the anti-doping regulation kept the rule which requires another analyst for the analysis of the B sample, even though they had heard the comments of the laboratory directors. The rules can certainly be modified or refined, but such is not the role of CAS. [113.] The applicable rule is clear and devoid of flexibility. The CAS arbitrators’ mission is not to modify the rules nor is their mission to appropriate discretionary power when no text allows them to do so’). Cf Leeper v IAAF, CAS  2020/A/6807, paras 323–24 (‘It does not appear to be in dispute – nor could it sensibly be contested – that the general objective of ensuring fairness and integrity of competition in elite competitive sport is a legitimate objective for an international sports governing body to pursue. The Panel recognises that the concepts of “fairness”, “competitive integrity” and a “level playing field” may sometimes be difficult to elucidate or define with precision in the context of competitive sport, and that reasonable minds may sometimes differ as to whether particular matters do or do not undermine fairness/integrity in particular sports. The use of certain technology to augment a competitor’s performance may be regarded as a threat to fairness and integrity in some sports, but not in others. Within a particular sport, different stakeholders may hold divergent views about whether, and if so to what extent, particular matters undermine or protect fair competition and the preservation of a level playing field. [324.] In this regard, the Panel is mindful that by virtue of their status, expertise and responsibility for protecting and reconciling the interests of all stakeholders in a particular sport, international governing bodies enjoy a margin of appreciation in determining what factors are relevant to ensuring the fairness and integrity of the sport in question and what regulatory measures are necessary in order to achieve this. At the same time, the Panel notes that the margin of appreciation afforded to governing bodies is not unlimited, and that careful scrutiny is called for where (as here) measures taken by a governing body are directed towards, and have a disparate impact on, individuals with disabilities or other particular protected characteristics’).

B1.7 There is a number of different regulatory approaches for an SGB to choose from, depending on which it believes will be most effective and most efficient in achieving its underlying objectives.1 For example: (a)

Many SGB regulations involve ‘prior approval’ licensing schemes, seeking to preserve minimum standards by making participation in the sport conditional on the holding of a licence that is granted upon satisfaction of specified minimum criteria.2 Examples are registration and licensing schemes for individuals or teams to enter elite-level competitions,3 financial fair play rules,4 safeguarding rules,5 and rules regulating player agents.6

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(b) Some SGB regulations are incentive-based, using a carrot rather than a stick to encourage stakeholders to behave in desirable ways.7 An example is the FIFA regulations giving clubs that identify and develop young talented players the right to compensation if the players leave before the clubs have received an adequate return on their investment. This approach serves the objective of encouraging clubs to invest in the identification and development of new young talent for the sport, but it can be complex and have significant monitoring and enforcement costs.8 (c) Most often, however, SGB regulations follow the classic ‘command and control’ model of regulation,9 setting minimum standards of behaviour, backed by appropriate sanctions, in order to deter and punish conduct that is seen as detrimental to the sport, and to incentivise conduct that protects the sport. Examples are anti-doping rules based on the World Anti-Doping Code,10 and anti-corruption rules prohibiting match-fixing and related misconduct,11 and more general rules against general ‘misconduct’.12 The strength of such regulations comes from the SGB using its legal authority over the sport to vindicate the common interest of all stakeholders in the protection of the sport’s fundamental values. The potential weaknesses, which are typical of such models, include a tendency towards legalism (producing over-inclusive and/or unnecessarily complex or inflexible rules, due to a fear of missing something important), the costs of compliance, and the costs of enforcement.13   1 See generally Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch 7.  2 Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004), Ch 10 (Prior Approval). The European Commission has acknowledged that such licensing systems created by international sports organisations can be a useful ‘tool for promoting good governance in sport’ (European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 4.11).  3 In Katusha Management SA  v UCI, CAS  2012/A/3031, para  89, the CAS noted that the licensing regulations introduced by the UCI for teams wanting to participate in its World Tour events ‘appear crucial for the safeguard[ing] of the viability, if not the survival, of the sport of cycling at national and international level. Their role can hardly be underestimated. In fact, they are designed to allow UCI to guarantee a proper competitive level, to address financial and organizational issues, and to increase the standards in terms of ethics’.   4 See generally Chapter B5 (Regulating Financial Fair Play).   5 See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).   6 See generally Chapter F2 (Players’ Agents).   7 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 111–14.   8 See Art 20 (Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, which are discussed further at para F3.100.   9 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 106–107. 10 See eg Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 181 (‘Strict liability for doping violations is an essential cornerstone of anti-doping enforcement. Although capable of operating harshly against athletes who inadvertently consume prohibited substances, strict liability is a necessary means for ensuring that athletes assume the highest degree of personal responsibility for all substances that enter their bodies. Only by cultivating a culture of responsibility, diligence and absolute intolerance of doping can fairness in professional sport be achieved and maintained, in a manner that protects all athletes’); Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS  2014/A/3591, para  152 (‘The designation of the rider as the PR for breach of the EAD Rules is, in the view of the Panel, soundly based in policy because the rider is generally in a position to take care and adopt appropriate precautions to avoid a positive test. Anti-doping rules can fairly and legitimately be formulated to encourage such conduct from ridel’s who are generally vested with control over the horse’). See generally Section C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement). 11 See generally Chapter B4 (Match Fixing and Related Integrity Issues). 12 See generally Chapter B3 (Misconduct). 13 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 107–111.

B1.8 However, even with the ‘margin of appreciation’ afforded to it by the courts and arbitral panels, the SGB does not have complete autonomy to issue whatever regulations it wants. On the contrary, its regulations must comply with the mandatory requirements of applicable law and be proportionate,1 and there is no principle of

304  Regulating Sport

deference, still less any legal immunity for SGBs, that will prevent the CAS or other tribunals or courts with appropriate jurisdiction declaring invalid and so unenforceable any regulations that fail that test either because they are unlawful or step beyond the range of measures reasonably open to the SGB. 1 Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS  2016/O/4684, para  117 (‘The rule-making power, and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking also into account the overall legislative framework. The duty of this Panel is to ensure that the exercise of such power does not conflict with the rules that govern it […]’); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 55 (‘Recognized by the Swiss federal constitution and anchored in the Swiss law of private associations is the principle of autonomy, which provides an association with a very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The right to regulate and to determine its own affairs is considered essential for an association and is at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue rules relating to their own governance, their membership and their own competitions. However, this autonomy is not absolute’), cited with approval in Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 143; Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 100 (‘The autonomy of the IWF to regulate doping matters in relation to its (affiliated) members is, however, limited by principles of Swiss association law that are applicable subsidiarily’); FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 123 (‘Swiss law grants to associations a wide discretion to regulate their own affairs. The freedom of associations to regulate their own affairs is limited only by mandatory law’); NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/O/466, para 6.23 (‘when a claim is based on policy or political questions, the CAS shall dismiss it on grounds of non-arbitrability. In contrast, when a party brings before the CAS a claim on legal grounds – eg violation of an association’s constitution or of mandatory rules of law or of general principles of law – for the protection or implementation of rights or the prevention or redress of unlawful acts, and the claim takes such a form that the CAS is capable of acting upon it, the CAS shall consider it as a justiciable issue […]’).

B1.9 While there are common themes in the principles applicable to review of SGB action across different legal systems, a pressing question at the outset is the identification of the ‘applicable law’ with which the SGB’s regulations must comply.

3 THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON AN SGB’S EXERCISE OF ITS REGULATORY POWERS A Superior sport rules B1.10 An SGB’s power to issue regulations is constrained by its constitution. Not only must the organ or body within the SGB that issues the regulations have the power to do so under the constitution;1 in addition, the regulations so issued must fall within the scope of the SGB’s objects as identified in the constitution,2 and (in accordance with the doctrine of ‘hierarchy of norms’) must respect any mandatory requirements set out in the constitution,3 including any fundamental rights conferred by the constitution on members or other participants in the sport.4 1 Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA, CAS 2009/A/1827, paras 7.1.6 and 7.19 (Executive Committee bye-laws that would have had the effect of amending the Statutes were declared invalid, because AIBA’s Statutes provided that they could only be amended by Congress); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para  13 (‘[…] insofar as the promulgation, interpretation, or amendment of the IAAF  Rules are concerned, such powers are reserved exclusively to the appropriate organs of the IAAF’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (finding that a new UCI rule did not, as contended, create a new category of membership, and therefore it was not ultra vires the UCI management committee to issue that rule); FFSA et al v FISA, CAS 97/168 (rejecting claim by member federations that the FISA Council did not have authority, under the FISA Statutes, to adopt bye-laws limiting the placing of advertising on athletes’ uniforms). 2 USACA v ICC, arbitration award of the ICC Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator) dated 16 June 2017, paras 50–51. 3 USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, paras 57–58 (‘By Rule 44 of the OC [Olympic Charter], the IOC has incorporated the WADA Code into the IOC’s own Statutes. The IOC further provides in Rule 41 of the OC that a competitor must respect and comply with all aspects of the WADA Code. Accordingly, the IOC has by virtue of its own statutes and in particular, Rule 44, accepted the binding nature of

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  305 the WADA Code. Because the Panel has found that the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been incorporated into the OC, the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, ie the OC, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable’); IRIFF v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1708, para 24 (‘In principle, FIFA has the freedom to establish its own provisions, but there are limits to this autonomy. When creating new rules and regulations, the relevant organs are bound by the limits imposed on them by the higher ranking provisions, in particular the association’s statutes. This follows from the principle of legality which means that a lower level provision may complement and concretize a higher ranking provision, but not amend, override, contradict or change the higher one. This principle is also well-established in CAS jurisprudence’ [citations omitted]); Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS 2008/A/1725, para 25 (same); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 102 (‘It follows from this principle [of hierarchy of norms] that – subject to well-defined exceptions – rules and regulations enacted by an association must be in compliance with the highest regulatory framework, ie, the statutes of the associations. In case of contradiction between lower ranking norms and the statutes it is the latter – subject to well-defined exceptions – that take precedence’ [citations omitted]). 4 See eg Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449 (‘The Athlete contended, and the IAAF did not submit to the contrary, that the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco all provide that there shall not be discrimination and that these provisions are higher-ranking rules that prevail. Accordingly, unless the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary, reasonable and proportionate, they will be invalid as inconsistent with the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (new UCI rule ‘does not interfere in the internal affairs of national federations, and so does not infringe UCI’s Constitution in that regard’).

B1.11 There may also be other norms or rules that are hierarchically superior even to the SGB’s own constitution. For example, if the SGB is a national federation, then its rules will be required to comply with the statutes and rules of the international federation of which it is a member;1 whereas if the SGB is the international governing body of a sport that is part of the Olympic Movement, then Rule 25 of the Olympic Charter states that its ‘statutes, practices and activities must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter’. So, for example, the international federation is required not to permit any government interference with its sport,2 and is also required to implement the World Anti-Doping Code, including adopting anti-doping rules that incorporate the mandatory requirements of that Code and make them applicable to all athletes and athlete support personnel under its jurisdiction.3 1 See eg Article 2.2(b)(iv) of the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation (‘Each full Member and provisional Member […] must adopt and implement and enforce within its Country Regulations that are consistent with the [FIH] Statutes and Regulations, including (without limitation): antidoping regulations that are compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code and the FIH Anti-Doping Rules; [and] regulations that are compliant with (a) the FIH’s Anti-Corruption Regulations and (b) the FIH Sanctioned and Unsanctioned Events Regulations (each as amended from time to time)’). See also IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 12 (‘[…] in accordance with the idea that the [IAAF] Rules express the collective will of the entire IAAF  Membership, it is both evident and entirely sensible that, where the rules and regulations of a Member do not conform with or are wider than those of the IAAF, it is the latter which prevail’); Modahl v BAF [1997] EWCA Civ 2209, Lord Woolf MR, para 37 (‘The BAF Rules are the rules for implementation in this country of requirements parallel to those contained in the IAAF Rules. If there is any ambiguity as to the interpretation of the BAF Rules then the IAAF Rules can be used to resolve that ambiguity’). 2 Olympic Charter, Rule 25 (‘each IF maintains its independence and autonomy in the administration of its sport’), discussed at para A1.31. 3 Olympic Charter, Rule 43 (‘The World Anti-Doping Code is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement’) and Rule 25 (requiring international federations to adopt and implement the World AntiDoping Code). See also 2015 World Anti-Doping Code Article 20.3.1, which requires international federations who sign the Code to ‘adopt and implement anti-doping policies and rules which conform with the Code’, and Article  23.2.1, which states that Code signatories ‘shall implement applicable Code provisions through policies, statutes, rules or regulations according to their authority and within their relevant spheres of responsibility’. In USOC  v IOC, CAS  2011/O/2422, a CAS panel struck down the IOC’s ‘Osaka rule’, which made anyone who had been given a doping ban of more than six months ineligible for the next Olympic Games, and in WADA  v British Olympic Association, CAS  2011/A/2658, the same CAS panel struck down a BOA byelaw that made anyone who had been given such a doping ban permanently ineligible for selection for the British Olympic team, in each case because those provisions were contrary to the requirement in the World Anti-Doping Code that signatories adopt the Code sanctioning scheme for doping offences and not any lesser or greater sanctions. See also Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.36 (ruling that a UCI provision that sought to impose an additional doping sanction to those mandated by the World Anti-Doping

306  Regulating Sport Code was non-compliant with the Code and therefore invalid and unenforceable). Cf Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS  2014/A/3759, paras 539–546 (rejecting argument that IAAF’s rule requiring female athletes to reduce their endogenous testosterone in order to compete in the female classification was a disguised doping sanction and therefore incompatible with the World Anti-Doping Code).

B1.12 What happens if the SGB adopts a regulation that contradicts or offends against a higher norm? Is that regulation still enforceable as against its members or athletes who are its target? Or is it void and unenforceable per se?1 The CAS has ruled that if the SGB has simply promised a third party that it will adopt a particular norm, but has not incorporated that norm into its own statutes, then it may be in breach of its obligations to that third party, but its regulations are still enforceable against its athletes, even though they contradict the norm in question.2 However, if the norm has been validly incorporated into the SGB’s constitution, a regulation that contradicts that norm contradicts the constitution and so is ultra vires and therefore unenforceable against anyone.3 1 As argued in CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (rejecting on the facts an argument that a UCI rule providing for teams to register not with national federations but with the UCI was incompatible with the UCI constitution) and para  37 (rejecting on the facts an argument that the same rule was incompatible with the pyramid structure of regulation of Olympic sport mandated by the Olympic Charter). 2 Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 98 (‘the legal relationships between IWF and WADA or the IOC on the one hand are distinct from the contractual relationship between Appellant and Respondent on the other hand. The latter is solely governed by the IWF regulations (including the documents referred therein) and subsidiarily by Swiss law […]. Whether or not IWF is in breach towards third parties in respect of the way it enacted its anti-doping policy is, therefore, in principle of no avail for the legal relationship between Appellant and Respondent since the legal effects arising from the different contractual relationships are, in principle confined to the parties of that legal relationship’) and para 99 (‘The autonomy of Respondent [IWF] in relation to Appellant [athlete] is, therefore, not restricted by any contractual engagements entered into by IWF  vis-à-vis third parties’); Parma FC  SpA  v Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio & Torino FC  SpA, CAS  2014/A/3629, para  32 (rejecting the argument that Article 59 of the UEFA Statutes, requiring its member federations to include a provision in their regulations giving the CAS jurisdiction over disputes arising under those regulations, should be given effect as between a member federation and one of its clubs even if not explicitly incorporated into its regulations, on the basis that ‘consistent CAS jurisprudence is clear that the UEFA (or FIFA) Statutes merely “constitute an instruction to introduce a regulation providing for CAS arbitration” (CAS 2004/A/676, paras. 2.6 and 2.7) and do not by themselves grant jurisdiction to CAS over appeals against decisions passed by national federations or leagues. Therefore, Article 59 UEFA Statutes is not directly applicable and does not form part of the rules of FIGC. FIGC remains an independent body with its own set of rules [that do not give CAS jurisdiction over the dispute in hand]. If the FIGC rules are not in compliance with the UEFA Statutes, it is for UEFA to take the necessary steps to ensure such compliance’ [citations omitted]); Zubkov v IOC, 2017/A/5422, para 872 (even if the power in the IOC’s Anti-Doping Rules for the 2014 Olympic Games to ban an athlete for life from the Olympic Games for a doping offence ‘arguably violates the IOC’s undertaking not to change the WADC’s sanctioning regime, such violation would simply constitute a breach of the IOC’s contract with WADA pursuant to which the IOC would implement the WADC’s sanctioning regime “without any substantive change”. In this context it needs to be stressed that the WADC is not a law but simply an instrument of a private organisation, the implementation of which into another body’s regulations requires a contractual agreement to this effect. As can be gleaned from Article 75 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, under Swiss law the said breach does not lead to an invalidity of the breaching rule but merely to it being voidable. Only in rare cases are decisions of a Swiss association void ab initio, ie, when they are affected by a serious formal or material flaw. This is not the case here’) (citation omitted); Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418, para 38 (‘The fact that BWLA may have agreed to incorporate the rules of another organisation into their own rules by reason of their signature to UK Sport’s National Anti-Doping Policy or otherwise would not avail the Appellants if BWLA had not done so. In principle such failure might give rise to a suit for breach of contract by W ADA against BWLA; whether it would in fact or law do so or not is outside the realm of my inquiry in disposing of the present appeal. I cannot accept as a matter of construction or otherwise Dr Davis’ ingenious submission that either the WADA Code (or the IWF Rules) confer third party rights on the athletes which are directly enforceable, (although they are undoubtedly intended to benefit athletes). Furthermore the Appellants had no legal basis on which to challenge any failure by BWLA to apply the W ADA or IWF Rules. BWLA is not a body bound by principles of public law, and in any event the Appellants have not sought to judicially review any decision of the Board’); WADA v Pakistan Cricket Board et al, CAS 2006/A/1190, paras 8.4–8.5 (The ICC Code contains no provision which obliges the PCB to allow a right of appeal of its decisions to CAS. If the PCB were subject to such a mandatory provision, no right of appeal to CAS

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  307 would exist until the PCB amended its statutes or regulations to incorporate such a right of appeal’); IAAF  v Hellebuyck, CAS  2005/A/831, para  7.3.4.3 (‘In the present case the Appellant deliberately did not adopt the exact same wording of the provision in Art 10.8 WADC in their rules. Whether the Appellant thereby breached an obligation in relation to WADA can be left unanswered in this case. Even if this were the case, the Panel cannot override the expressed will of the Appellant. Instead the Panel is bound by the content of the properly established IAAF Rules’). Cf IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 77 (where IAAF Rule 40.8 provided that all results obtained by an athlete after his anti-doping rule violation were to be disqualified, and did not permit deviation from that rule where fairness required, ‘Considering that Article  10.8 of the World Anti-Doping Code 2009 […] included a fairness exception, that this provision was part of the obligatory commitment of the IAAF as signatory to the WADC according to Article 23.2.2 WADC and that the IAAF was not allowed to include any substantial change to this provision, the Sole Arbitrator sees an obligation to understand Rule 40.8 IAAF Rules 2012-2013 harmoniously with Article 10.8 WADC. For whatever reason, the fairness exception was not mentioned explicitly in the IAAF Rules 2012-2013, but had nevertheless to be applied based on IAAF’s commitment to Article 10.8 WADC’). It is telling that in Sharmina the missing provision favoured the athlete. If it had prejudiced the athlete, query whether the CAS panel would have enforced it against her. 3 USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, paras 57-58 (‘By Rule 44 of the OC [Olympic Charter], the IOC has incorporated the WADA Code into the IOC’s own Statutes. The IOC further provides in Rule 41 of the OC that a competitor must respect and comply with all aspects of the WADA Code. Accordingly, the IOC has by virtue of its own statutes and in particular, Rule 44, accepted the binding nature of the WADA Code. Because the Panel has found that the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been incorporated into the OC, the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, ie the OC, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable’); Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.36 (a UCI regulation that sought to impose an additional doping sanction to those mandated by the World Anti-Doping Code was non-compliant with the Code and therefore invalid and unenforceable). In Zubkov v IOC, 2017/A/5422, however, a CAS panel held that even if the power in the IOC’s Anti-Doping Rules for the 2014 Olympic Games to ban an athlete for life from the Olympic Games for a doping offence ‘arguably violates the IOC’s undertaking not to change the WADC’s sanctioning regime, such violation would simply constitute a breach of the IOC’s contract with WADA pursuant to which the IOC would implement the WADC’s sanctioning regime “without any substantive change”. In this context it needs to be stressed that the WADC is not a law but simply an instrument of a private organisation, the implementation of which into another body’s regulations requires a contractual agreement to this effect. As can be gleaned from Article 75 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, under Swiss law the said breach does not lead to an invalidity of the breaching rule but merely to it being voidable. Only in rare cases are decisions of a Swiss association void ab initio, ie, when they are affected by a serious formal or material flaw. This is not the case here’ (para 872, citation omitted). The CAS panel said this conclusion did not contradict the USOC  v IOC award because in those proceedings, ‘under the arbitration agreement between the parties, the CAS was called upon to make a ruling pro or contra the validity of the respective IOC rule and thus was effectively empowered to decide on that very question’ (ibid, para 873).

B1.13 If the superior norm in the hierarchy is an absolute one (eg it mandates that the maximum ban for a doping offence is two years, with no discretion to exceed that maximum), then it will be clear whether a lower norm contradicts it (eg by imposing a four-year ban instead). But if the superior norm is not absolute, the position is not so clear. For example, if the superior norm prohibits unlawful discrimination on grounds (eg) of gender, then the question becomes whether the discriminatory effect of any inferior regulation is proportionate to a legitimate objective and therefore justified and lawful.1 1 Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449 (‘The Athlete contended, and the IAAF did not submit to the contrary, that the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco all provide that there shall not be discrimination and that these provisions are higher-ranking rules that prevail. Accordingly, unless the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary, reasonable and proportionate, they will be invalid as inconsistent with the IOC  Charter, the IAAF  Constitution and the laws of Monaco’); Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para  548 (‘The conclusion that the DSD  Regulations are prima facie discriminatory is merely the starting point, and not the end, of the Panel’s legal analysis. In particular, it is common ground that a rule that imposes differential treatment on the basis of a particular protected characteristic is valid and lawful if it is a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of attaining a legitimate objective’). The athlete in Chand also argued (CAS 2014/A/3759 at para 108): ‘In relation to the question of deference, the Athlete submits that where a regulation is inconsistent with a higher-ranking legal rule – such as a constitutional principle or the Olympic Charter – the CAS jurisprudence establishes that the regulation

308  Regulating Sport must be declared invalid. Since the critical question is whether a lower-ranking rule conflicts with a higher-ranking rule, the Athlete contends that the IAAF is not entitled to any special deference or margin of appreciation in defending the Hyperandrogenism Regulations’. That argument was not addressed by the Chand Panel in its award.

B National and transnational laws B1.14 In addition to having to comply with any superior norms set out in (or incorporated by reference into) the SGB’s own constitution, the SGB’s regulations also have to comply with any applicable national and transnational laws. The SGB’s constitution is likely to specify a governing law, usually the law of the country where the SGB is headquartered or incorporated. And if the SGB is a national federation, and its regulations only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of that nation, the legality of its regulations can safely be assessed solely by reference to the applicable national law.1 If the SGB is an international federation, however, the position will be more complicated, because its rules apply globally, and therefore they will potentially be subject not only to any national law specified in the constitution as the governing law, but also to the mandatory requirements of the laws of every country in which the rules will apply, and (if the rules apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the European Union) the laws of the European Union.2 1 See further para B1.51, n.1. 2 36-74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, para 28 (‘By reason of the fact that it is imperative, the [EU] rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or of the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the Community’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201, para 4 (EU provisions on free movement and on free competition fall within the special category of mandatory rules that must be applied irrespective of the national law applicable to the merits of the case). See also RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, para 73 (‘The Panel considers that the law of the European Union (“EU law”), including in particular the provisions of the Treaties on freedom of movement and competition law, must be taken into account by the Panel insofar as they constitute mandatory provisions of foreign law within the meaning of Article 19 of the Swiss Private International Law Act of December 18, 1987 (“PILA”)’) (unofficial translation from French); Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 547–49 (discussing the need for sports rules to comply with an ‘ordre public “international and universal”’, including EU rules).

B1.15 This poses an obvious problem. International sport ‘is a global phenomenon which demands globally uniform standards. Only if the same terms and conditions apply to everyone who participates in organised sport, are the integrity and equal opportunity of sporting competition guaranteed’.1 As the infamous Krabbe case demonstrated,2 it would be impossible to establish a level playing-field throughout the sport globally, and so to ensure equal treatment for all of its participants, if the same rules were to be given different meanings and/or different legal effect in different jurisdictions.3 Instead, the rules have to operate, insofar as is possible, outside of the constraints of any particular legal system, so that they are not impacted by doctrines or distinctions that are particular to that system, but instead are given uniform and consistent meaning and legal effect across the globe.4 1 Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 12. 2 In Krabbe v IAAF, OLG  Munich, judgment dated 28  March 1996, SpuRt 1996, p  133, a German court held that the IAAF’s anti-doping rule imposing a four-year ban for a first doping offence was disproportionate and therefore an unlawful infringement of the (German) athlete’s rights. Its view was that any ban longer than two years would be disproportionate. Therefore, to preserve a level playingfield throughout the sport, the IAAF and other international federations were forced to reduce the sanction imposed in their rules for a first doping offence to two years not just in Germany but globally. See Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’, [2003] (3) ISLR 61, 63. 3 Peñarol v Bueno, Rodriguez & PSG, CAS 2005/A/983 & 984, para 68 (‘[…] sport by its very nature is a phenomenon that transcends national frontiers. It is not only desirable, but in fact indispensable that the rules that govern sport at an international level are of a uniform character and largely coherent worldwide. In order to ensure the uniform application at an international level, such rules and

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  309 regulations must not be applied differently from one country to the other, in particular with respect to the interference of national laws with the rules and regulations of the sport’), free translation set out in Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes, [2016] (1) ISLR 9, 13. See also Wigan Athletic FC v Heart of Midlothian, CAS 2007/A/1298, para 129 (declining to apply contract law of Scotland to dispute, notwithstanding that FIFA regulations expressly permitted ‘due consideration for the law of the country concerned’, inter alia because ‘it is in the interest of football that solutions to compensation be based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary considerably from country to country’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 56 (‘International rules, against doping as well as in other areas of sport, are made for those who participate at the international level. If such rules are duly made by an international federation they should be respected within the sport as being for the benefit of all. They should not be liable to be eroded by the domestic law of any country’); Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 10.2.4 (rejecting argument that appeal from decision of national panel should be determined by reference to the law of that nation, on the basis that ‘an international federation deals with national federations and athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis. It therefore has to apply the same law to all of them. It is unacceptable that, based upon the same facts, different results might be reached depending on the law applied’); Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 551–52 (‘Given its nature, sport is an event that surpasses frontiers. It is therefore not only positive but indispensable to have uniform and coherent sports rules at international level’). See also Cowley v Heatley (1986) Times 24 July CA and the cases cited at para B1.27, n 3. 4 See eg Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 150 (‘[…] under the Appellant’s approach – where mandatory provisions of Swiss law would automatically apply to all sanctions imposed by a sport governing body under association law – a FIFA official with an employment contract (such as the FIFA Secretary General) and a FIFA official without such contract (eg a FIFA Executive Committee member) would effectively be treated differently, in that only the former – due to mandatory labour law – would be exempt from sanctions, creating an imbalance and incoherence in the application of the FCE, which would be unacceptable for the protection of ethical standards and of equality of treatment within the association. Consequently, for this additional reason the mandatory provisions of Swiss employment law are inapplicable to the present case. Instead the disciplinary authority of FIFA is solely based on the FIFA regulations supplemented by association law’); Pechstein v ISU, German Federal Court of Justice judgment dated 7 June 2016, para 59 (‘Sports federations such as the [ISU] promote sports in general and particularly their own sport by creating the prerequisites for organised sport. To achieve the relevant goals, it is of fundamental importance to ensure that the rules apply to all athletes and are implemented everywhere in accordance with uniform standards. […] Particularly in the area of doping, uniform application of the anti-doping rules of the federations and of the WADC is indispensable to ensure fair international sporting competitions for all athletes’); Foschi v FINA, TAS 96/156, para 102.4 (‘Moreover, an international federation deals with national federations and athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis. It therefore has to apply the same law to all of them. It is unacceptable that, based upon the same facts, a different result might be reached depending on the law applied’). The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, which seeks to harmonise anti-doping rules globally across all different sports, states this intent explicitly in Art 24.3, which provides that ‘the Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the Signatories or governments’. And the Introduction to the Code states: ‘These sport specific rules and procedures, aimed at enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonized way, are distinct in nature from criminal and civil proceedings. They are not intended to be subject to or limited by any national requirements and legal standards applicable to such proceedings, although they are intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights. When reviewing the facts and the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and other adjudicating bodies should be aware of and respect the distinct nature of the anti-doping rules in the Code and the fact that those rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders around the world with an interest in fair sport’. Based on these provisions, the CAS has resisted efforts to interpret and apply Code-compliant anti-doping rules by reference to laws peculiar to a particular national legal system. See eg FINA v Cielo Filho & CBDA, CAS 2011/A/2495, para 8.9 (‘[…] the preamble to the WADC makes it clear that the WADC and its derivatives are not to be subject to or limited by the laws of any particular nation’); Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS  2004/A/690, para  71 (although the ATP anti-doping rules provided for Delaware law to apply, ‘the ATP Rules have been established by the Respondent on the basis of the WADC. One of the main intentions of the WADC is the harmonisation of the worldwide fight against doping. In order to achieve that goal, it is necessary to interpret anti-doping rules that have been established on the basis of the WADC in harmony with the WADC, the respective set of rules of other international sports federations and the respective CAS case law’); WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 126 (same); Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, paras 10.6–10.8 (‘As most of the International Sports Federations have now resolved in their respective rules to refer sports related disputes to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, this appellate body is striving to achieve, despite differing governing laws of the Federations, a consistent and uniform application of the WADC throughout the world and for all sports disciplines. All of the case law developed by the CAS is based primarily on the rules issued by those federations. A large number of those federations

310  Regulating Sport are domiciled in Switzerland, thus enabling in the absence of a specific choice of law in their respective statutes the application of Swiss law. The WADA is itself a Swiss private law foundation with its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland. […] The Panel accepts that the ITF Programme provides that it is to be governed by and construed in accordance with English law, but that provision in the ITF Programme is expressly stated to be subject to the requirement to interpret the Programme “in a manner that is consistent with the applicable provisions of the Code [WADC]”. The Panel interprets those provisions […] as requiring it to construe the WADC in a manner which is consistent with Swiss law, as the law with which the WADC must comply. Construing the WADC in that way means that the WADC is not subject to the vagaries of myriad systems of law throughout the world, but is capable of a uniform and consistent construction wherever it is applied. Any other construction would negate, or, at the very least, seriously weaken, the purpose and objective of the WADC and its signatories’); Gibilisco v CONI, CAS 2007/A/1426, para 48 (insisting on applying the ‘autonomous [WADC] definition of the concept of “Attempt” that shall be applied in the assessment of any conduct eventually leading to such violation’, apparently in reaction to a ruling in earlier proceedings in the case in Italy, in which a domestic tribunal had thrown out a WADC charge of Attempted Use because the acts alleged did not amount to attempt as defined under Italian criminal law); UCI v Landaluce & RFBC, CAS 2006/A/119, para 41 (rejecting athlete argument that his agreement (as set out in the UCI antidoping rules) to submit disputes relating to those rules to CAS was trumped by Spanish national law forbidding the arbitration of doping disputes, noting that ‘to decide otherwise would lead to a veritable race for the most lenient national legislation’). See also ATP v Perry, ATP Tour Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 November 2005, para 49 (‘The principle of estoppel ought not to be brought into consideration merely to frustrate the application of a comprehensive Code of harmonized doping rules that the WADA Code represents and which are the parent derivative rules. Within that Code are rules and remedies dealing with the situation at hand that are the appropriate rules within which to work out a resolution of this dispute. The very nature and essence of a Code is to make it comprehensive and to preserve its integrity by not referring to extraneous principles that upset the intricate balancing of interests reflected in the achievement of an international agreement to harmonize sport-doping rules in the Code’); UCI decision regarding USADA v Armstrong, 22 October 2012, p 2 (‘It is UCI’s view that USADA’s reference to national law is not appropriate. First article 24.3 of the Code states that that Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the Code signatories or governments. Secondly it would be in full contradiction with the purpose of harmonisation of the Code that an action could be commenced against one athlete but not against another because of different national legislations governing the statute of limitations. Where WADA emphasises the need for harmonisation of sanctions, there should be no disharmony in the possibility to sanction an athlete at all’). Cf CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 78 (statutes of limitations ‘are private law rules’ and therefore questions as to whether the statute of limitations provided for in the World Anti-Doping Code has expired should be determined by the private law of the country where the sports federation in question is domiciled).

B1.16 CAS panels have used various different means to achieve this goal of affording regulations uniform and consistent meaning and legal effect across the globe. For example: (a) Article 187 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA) provides that ‘the arbitral tribunal shall rule according to the law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law with which the action is most closely connected’. CAS panels have on occasion taken the view that this ‘enables the parties to mandate the arbitrators to resolve the dispute in application of provisions of law that do not originate in any particular national law, such as sports regulations of an international federation […]’.1 In other words, the ‘applicable law’ is first and foremost the SGB’s own regulations, which are regarded as ‘a legal regime de private juris, having an international, or even global vocation, to be applied in the domain of sports rules governing’ the SGB’s sport.2 (b) Article  58 of the CAS  Code of Sports-related Arbitration states that the Panel ‘shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties […]’. CAS panels have on occasion interpreted this as giving priority to the SGB’s regulations over the requirements of the governing law of the regulations.3 The intent of Article 58 is said to be ‘to ensure that the rules and regulations by which all the (indirect) members are bound in equal measure are also applied to them in equal measure. This can only be ensured, however, if a uniform standard is applied in relation

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(c)

to central issues’; thus, the SGB’s regulations are prioritised over national law ‘for good reason, namely to establish the most uniform legal standard possible in appeal arbitration proceedings’.4 On this basis, where the SGB’s regulations state that a national law applies ‘subsidiarily’ or ‘additionally’ to those regulations, that national law is applied only to resolve any ‘issues that cannot be resolved solely on the basis of the rules invoked by the parties’,5 ie to fill any lacunae left by the regulations.6 If the SBG’s regulations address the point in issue, however, CAS panels have gone so far as to say that those regulations would prevail over any contrary provision of the governing national law, ‘even if the otherwise applicable provision of Swiss law were mandatory’.7 The notion that an SGB can contract out of mandatory national law is a surprising and radical one, and runs contrary to decisions from the Swiss Federal Tribunal and other CAS panels.8 This tension may be resolved by saying that, because of the overriding need for a global level playing-field, CAS panels will only apply mandatory national laws over conflicting SGB regulations where those laws are considered to be ‘justified by a sufficient interest’,9 ie where they reflect fundamental legal principles that are considered part of a ‘universal’ public order.10 In the important and much-cited AEK Athens award from 1998, CAS addressed the need for uniform and consistent meaning and legal effect of regulations across the globe through the concept of general principles of sports law. The CAS panel ruled that: ‘[…] all sporting institutions, and in particular all international federations, must abide by general principles of law. Due to the transnational nature of sporting competitions, the effects of the conduct and deeds of international federations are felt in a sporting community throughout various countries. Therefore, the substantive and procedural rules to be respected by international federations cannot be reduced only to its own statutes and regulations and to the laws of the country where the federation is incorporated or of the country where its headquarters are. Sports law has developed and consolidated along the years, particularly through the arbitral settlement of disputes, a set of unwritten legal principles – a sort of lex mercatoria for sports or, so to speak, a lex ludica [sic: lex ludorum] – to which national and international sports federations must conform, regardless of the presence of such principles within their own statutes and regulations or within any applicable national law, provided that they do not conflict with any national “public policy” (“ordre public”) provision applicable to a given case. Certainly, general principles of law drawn from a comparative or common denominator reading of various domestic legal systems and, in particular, the prohibition of arbitrary or unreasonable rules and measures can be deemed to be part of such lex ludica’.11

(d) Other CAS panels have also followed this approach, including not only panels sitting in the Ad Hoc Division, whose rules make express provision for the application of such ‘general principles of law’,12 but also in the Ordinary Division and the Appeals Division, where there is no such express provision.13 The English courts have taken a similar approach when it comes to construing the rules of an international federation,14 as have English hearing panels sitting at first instance in cases applying such rules.15  1 Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 57. See Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 6 (‘The wording of Article 187 para.1 of the Swiss PIL, which states that the parties may choose the “rules of law” to be applied, does not limit the parties’ choice to the designation of a particular national law. It is generally agreed by academics and commentators that the parties may choose to subject the contract to a system of rules which is not the law of a State and that such a choice is consistent with Article  187 of the Swiss PIL […]. The relevant statutes, rules or regulations of a sporting governing body may therefore be designated by the parties as the applicable rules of law for the purposes of Article 187 para.1 of the Swiss PIL […]’ [citations omitted]).  2 B v FIBA, CAS 92/80, para 10.  3 Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes, [2016] (1) ISLR 9, 12, citing Football Federation of Kazakhstan v Pelzer, CAS 2014/A/3527, para 57. See also Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the

312  Regulating Sport Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 541–42 (effect of CAS Code Article 58 is that ‘[t]he applicable regulations are therefore the first choice as opposed to a legal order of a specific state’).  4 Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes, [2016] (1) ISLR 9, 12–13.  5 Canadian Olympic Committee & Scott v IOC, CAS  2002/O/373, para  15. See also RFEF  v FIFA, CAS  2014/A/3813, para  153 (‘The Panel also notes the Appellant’s reference to Spanish law in addressing certain issues but is satisfied at this preliminary stage […] that the FIFA regulations to a greater extent address all the relevant issues for determination in this matter’); FC Barcelona v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, paras 8.3 and 8.4 (same); W v UK Athletics, CAS 2002/A/455, para 3 (national law only applies to issues ‘which are not governed by the relevant rules of’ the SGB).  6 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS  2008/A/1725, para  12; Galatasaray SK  v Ribery et al, CAS  2006/A/1180, para  14 (‘The application of Swiss law stipulated in Art. 60 para.2 of the FIFA  Statutes is limited. The latter only applies in the alternative and, more particularly, if there is a gap in the FIFA regulations, in particular RSTP  2001. However, where the FIFA regulations conclusively regulate a legal question there is basically no scope for having recourse to Swiss law (see CAS 2005/A/983 & 984, marg. no. 93)’).  7 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS  2008/A/1725, para  12, endorsed (albeit without attribution) in Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 541–42; Valcke v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5003, para  147 (‘According to Article 58, para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes, “[t]he provisions of the CAS Code of Sportsrelated Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.” The question, thus, is how this referral to “Swiss law” in the FIFA  Statutes must be construed. In the Panel’s view, it is obvious that Article  58 para. 2 of the FIFA  Statutes, by using the terms “primarily” and “additionally”, provides for a hierarchical relationship between the “FIFA regulations” – including of course in such category the FIFA Statutes and all other FIFA rules – and “Swiss law”. This hierarchical relationship has been understood in constant CAS jurisprudence as implying that the “additionally” applicable Swiss law is merely intended to clarify that the FIFA regulations are based on a normatively shaped basis, deriving from Swiss law, and that any matter that is not covered by FIFA regulations must be decided in accordance with Swiss law. Consequently, the purpose of the reference to Swiss law in Article  58, para. 2 of the FIFA  Statutes is to ensure the uniform interpretation of the standards of the football industry worldwide. Swiss law does govern, for example, the interpretive methods with regard to FIFA rules. Similarly, Swiss law applies when determining the question of standing to sue or standing to be sued, because of a lacuna in the FIFA regulations that must be clarified under the “additionally” applicable Swiss law (CAS 2014/A/3850, no. 62 et seq.). The same principle applies to the question of who bears the burden of proof for particular issues, since this legal question – in the absence of any explicit provision – is equally subject to Swiss law under Article 58, para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes (CAS 2014/A/3742, no. 59 et seq.; 2014/A/3527, no. 67). 148. By corollary, the referral contained in Article 58, para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes to Swiss law cannot be construed as meaning that wherever the FIFA regulations and Swiss law are in contradiction, Swiss law takes precedence. Nor can this referral be construed to mean that FIFA regulations only take precedence insofar as this is compatible with Swiss mandatory law. Instead, the wording (“primarily”, “additionally”) clearly indicates that, in principle, the FIFA regulations always take precedence over Swiss law. 149. Such interpretation is perfectly in line with Article 187, para. 1 of the PILA or Article 381, para. 1.a CPC. According thereto, the parties may agree to apply “rules of law” to the merits. The term of art “rules of law” clearly covers also rules that do not origin from a State legislator. Thus, the interpretation followed here, according to which a non-national law takes precedence over a national law, is clearly covered by the autonomy granted by Swiss statutory arbitration law […]. 150. For these reasons, the Panel finds that FIFA’s authority to impose disciplinary sanctions cannot be limited by mandatory Swiss law’). See also WADA v ONADE & Illescas, CAS 2016/A/4834, para 61 (‘The regulations of WADA and of the IAAF are thus fashioned in a way that a national authority within the system of the anti-doping regulation is bound by such rules. This means that ONADE is obliged to apply these rules even if it finds that a rule in any way can be in conflict with its national law. This is a consequence of the membership to the federation. The Athlete is similarly bound by these rules’).  8 X  AG  v Y, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 20  December 2005, ATF  132  III  285, para  1.3 (‘According to the practice of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, rules of private organisations are not equivalent to legal norms/legislation even if they are very detailed and comprehensive such as the SIA standards or the rules of conduct of the International Ski Federation. Rather, regulations drawn up by private associations are in principle subordinate to state laws and can only be considered insofar as state law leaves room for autonomous regulation. They do not constitute a “Law” within the meaning of Art. 116 (1)  IPRG [Federal Code on Private International Law] and cannot be recognised as a “lex sportiva transnationalis” as advocated by a commentator. The rules of the (international) sports federations can only be applied as a reference to substantive law and are therefore only recognised as agreements between the parties, which are governed by mandatory national law provisions’ [free translation, citations omitted]); Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 100 (‘The autonomy of the IWF to regulate doping matters in relation to its (affiliated) members is, however, limited by principles of Swiss association law that are applicable subsidiarily’); FIFA & WADA, CAS  2005/C/976 & 986,

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  313 para 123 (‘Swiss law grants to associations a wide discretion to regulate their own affairs. The freedom of associations to regulate their own affairs is limited only by mandatory law’).  9 Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, paras 7.4.2 and 7.4.3 (where FIFA Statutes provided that the FIFA regulations would govern, with Swiss law applying subsidiarily, ‘non-mandatory provisions of EC law’ were not applicable, but mandatory principles of EC law were applicable provided such application was ‘justified by a sufficient interest’); Galatasaray v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, para 43 (‘An arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland, such as the case in this arbitration pursuant to Articl R28 of the Code, must therefore take into consideration foreign mandatory rules where three conditions are met: (i) such rules belong to a special category of norms which need to be applied irrespective of the law applicable to the merits of the case; (ii) there is a close connection between the subject matter of the dispute and the territory where the mandatory rules are in force; (iii) in view of Swiss legal theory and practice, the mandatory rules must aim to protect legitimate interest and crucial values and their application must lead to a decision which is appropriate’);. 10 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS  2008/A/1725, para  13 (‘The application of the (rules of) law chosen by the parties has its confines in the ordre public. Usually, the term ordre public is thereby divested of its purely Swiss character and is understood in the sense of a universal, international or transnational sense. The ordre public proviso is meant to prevent a decision conflicting with basic legal or moral principles that apply supranationally. This, in turn, is to be assumed if the application of the rules of law agreed by the parties were to breach fundamental legal principles or were simply incompatible with the system of law and values. The mere fact that a provision is considered mandatory according to Swiss Law, thus, does not suffice to qualify it to belong to the (transnational) ordre public’ [citations omitted]) and para 23 (‘FIFA’s autonomy to deviate from (mandatory) provisions of Swiss substantive law is limited, however, by the (transnational) ordre public. The question to be raised, therefore, is whether or not the provisions in Art. 15 of the DRC Procedural Rules is in breach [of] fundamental legal principles’); Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 7 (referring to ‘an international or universal order public policy. The Swiss Federal Court specified this – for arbitral jurisdiction – more precisely in a recent decision and stated (ATF 8 March 2006, 4P.278/2005, marg. no. 2.2.2) that what was concerned were “… basic values or values, which are still recognized, which according to the understanding of the law that prevails in Switzerland, should form the basis of every legal system” [“… valeurs essentielles et largement reconnues qui, selon les conceptions juridiques prévalant en Suisse, devraient constituer le fondement de tout ordre juridique”]’). 11 AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 156 (citations omitted). 12 For example, under Article 17 of the CAS Arbitration Rules for the 2018 Commonwealth Games, the CAS was required to decide any dispute referred to it ‘pursuant to the Constitutional documents of the CGF, the applicable regulations, the general principles of law and the rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate’. See eg COC & Kibunde v IOC, CAS OG 2000/004, para 11 (‘Il est exact qu’un reglement sportif doit respecter non seulement la loi mais également les principles généraux du droit’) (free translation: ‘It is quite clear that sporting rules must observe not only the written law but also general principles of justice’). 13 See eg B v FIBA, CAS 92/80, paras 10, 19 (applying ‘general principles of law’ to test the legality of a FIBA regulation on transfers of sporting allegiance); Federazione Italiana Nuoto (FIN) v Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), CAS 96/157, para 22 (‘It is the holding of the Panel that it can intervene in the sanction imposed only if the rules adopted by the FINA Bureau are contrary to the general principles of law, if their application is arbitrary, or if the sanctions provided by the rules can be deemed excessive or unfair on their face’), cited in Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 61 (‘there could be a review of the Bureau decision if it was alleged that the decision was contrary to the general principles of law. There is no assertion that the rules SW10.7, GR 6, or any other of the FINA Handbook Rules are contrary to the general principles of law or natural justice. Therefore, there are no grounds to review the Bureau decision on the bodysuit on this basis’); Gibraltar FA  v UEFA, CAS  2002/O/410, para  4 (‘In addition [to Swiss law], to the extent it deems it appropriate, the Panel may apply general principles of law, which are applicable as a type of lex mercatoria for sports regardless of their explicit presence in the applicable UEFA or FIFA Statutes’); NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/O/466, para 6.23 (‘[…] when a party brings before the CAS a claim on legal grounds – eg violation of an association’s constitution or of mandatory rules of law or of general principles of law – for the protection or implementation of rights or the prevention or redress of unlawful acts, and the claim takes such a form that the CAS is capable of acting upon it, the CAS shall consider it as a justiciable issue […]’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS  2016/A/4772, para 59 (‘[…] to ensure a level playing-field for the sport throughout the world, an international federation’s rules have to apply equally in every national jurisdiction, which means they have to be interpreted and applied based on the “general principles of law drawn from a comparative or common denominator reading of various domestic legal systems”’, citing AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 156). Cf FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 124 (‘the Panel is not prepared to take refuge in such uncertain concepts as that of a “lex sportive”, as has been advocated by various authors. The exact content and the boundaries of the concept of a lex sportive are still far too vague and uncertain to enable it to be used to determine the specific rights and obligations of sports associations towards athletes’). 14 See para B1.51, n.5.

314  Regulating Sport 15 See UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, para 27 (‘In the CAS jurisprudence an acceptance is emerging of the general principles of sporting law governing doping offences, independent of the municipal law of the state in which the sporting body happens to be located. That approach can only be strengthened as the World Anti-Doping Code is brought into force’); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006, para 5 (same).

B1.17 In these circumstances, it is important to know: (a) what these ‘general principles of law’ are; and (b) what constraints they place on the SGBs in the exercise of their regulatory powers.

C General principles of law B1.18 As far as the authors are aware, the ‘general principles of law’ that are applicable to SGBs’ regulations have never been codified or identified definitively, either in any CAS award or otherwise. They have been described generally as ‘law which is truly international’,1 and said to ‘comprise rules commonly observed in legal systems worldwide’,2 being ‘derived not exclusively from any one national legal system, but from international sport jurisprudence’.3 Where such ‘general principles of law’ are discussed in the CAS jurisprudence, many of them bear a marked resemblance to European public law principles applied as part of EU law, which are derived from the common principles of the legal systems of the various Member States.4 However, they do not claim any such specific provenance. Instead, it has been suggested that ‘[e]ach area of doctrine arises from an almost instinctual level of legal analysis, resting on general notions of fairness shared by a panel of arbitrators who often hail from multiple countries with distinct legal systems’.5 A review of the CAS jurisprudence and related literature suggests that these ‘general principles’ include (or may include) the following principles. 1 Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p  11. ‘To identify the “appropriate” “general principles of law and rules of law”, sports law borrows from private and public law, appropriately mixing Latinisms with French phrases, civilian and common law concepts’. (Ibid, p 12). ‘Such general principles of law in the lex sportive or lex ludica consist or have affinity with, but are not identical to, well established doctrines of national law and bridge common law and civil law concepts’. (Ibid, p 308). 2 Ibid, p 13. An analogy may be drawn to some extent between such ‘general principles of law’ and the ‘essential and widely recognized values that are the foundation of any legal order’ that the Swiss Federal Tribunal uses to assess whether a CAS award violates substantive public policy (international public order), which values include ‘pacta sunt servanda, respect for the rules of good faith, the idea that a right must not be abused, the prohibition of discriminatory or confiscatory acts, and the protection of persons who are civilly incapable’. Rouiller, ‘Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law’, 25 October 2005, p 46. See also N et al v FINA, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment dated 31 March 1999, 5P.83/1999, para 3(a) (‘According to the case law, an order is contrary to public policy if it violates the fundamental legal principles to the extent where it is no longer compatible with the legal system and the system of values on which it is based: these principles include, in particular, contractual fidelity (pacta sunt servanda), respect for the rules of good faith, the prohibition of the abuse of law, the prohibition of discriminatory or spoliatory measures and the protection of persons who lack civil law capacity. Public policy, within the meaning of Section 190(2(e)) LDIP, is no more than a simple incompatibility clause lacking in any positive or regulatory effect on contentious legal relationships (negative public policy); it must be understood as a universal rather than a national concept, intended to penalize incompatibility with the fundamental legal or moral principles acknowledged in all civilized states; the contested award will be revoked only if the result to which it leads is incompatible with public policy as thus defined’ [citations omitted]). 3 Rouiller, ‘Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law’, 25 October 2005, p 12. 4 See Beloff, ‘English Public Law: Europhiliac or Eurosceptic?’, in The struggle for simplicity in the law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Butterworths); Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd Edn (Oxford European Union Law Library, 2007); Vogenauer & Weatherill (Eds), General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2017). 5 Erbsen, ‘The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva’, in Siekman & Soek (Eds), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law? (TMC Asser Press, 2012), pp 105-06.

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(a) The requirement of legal certainty (nullem crimen, nulla poena sine lege certa) B1.19 Since most SGB regulations take a ‘command and control’ approach, prohibiting and sanctioning conduct that is considered contrary to the regulatory objective,1 the starting point for the discussion is the principles of legal certainty and predictability, in other words the principles that an SGB’s regulations must be clear, understandable, and predictable in meaning and application, so that those who are subject to the regulations know (bearing in mind that they are not legally trained2) what they can and cannot do, and what the consequences will be of any transgression. These are undoubtedly fundamental principles of broad application in most if not all legal regimes,3 and the underlying rationale is obvious. As the CAS panel in the seminal Quigley case put it: ‘Any legal regime should seek to enable its subjects to assess the consequences of their actions. While it would be naïve to expect that the average athlete at all times bears in mind specific provisions of applicable regulations, the fact is that the community of persons who are subject to a body of rules gradually develops a certain understanding of it. […] When an athlete […] understands that he is subject to rules which will punish him only if it is determined that he intended to take a performance-enhancing substance, he may legitimately be expected to act in a certain way, with a certain understanding of the consequences of his actions. […] If he had been subject to a fundamentally different regime, ie, that of strict liability, his understanding would have been different and his conduct might therefore have been different. He might have summoned the fortitude to eschew medications prescribed by a stranger. In other words, his conduct may have been responsive to his perception of a greater risk of sanction. This is a matter of legitimate expectations, and it is crucial to any decent system of law’.4 1 See para B1.7. 2 Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 13.3 (‘When considering whether the rules are sufficiently clear and unambiguous the test to be applied is not whether a legally trained person would consider the rules to be crystal clear and unambiguous but rather whether an athlete subjected to the rules who has no legal education or experience understands the rules clearly and unambiguously’). 3 See eg Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603 (‘[There is a] standard of “lawfulness” set by the Convention, which requires that all law, whether written or unwritten, be sufficiently precise to allow the citizen – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail’); Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at p 267 (‘Elementary justice or, to use the concept often cited by the European court, the need for legal certainty, demands that the rules by which the citizen is to be bound should be ascertainable by him (or, more realistically, by a competent lawyer advising him) by reference to identifiable sources that are publicly accessible’). 4 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, paras 30, 31, and 33. See also Cullwick v FINA, CAS 96/149, para 31 (‘It is important that the fight against doping in sport, national and international, be waged unremittingly. […] It is equally important that athletes in any sport […] know clearly where they stand. It is unfair if they are to be found guilty of offences in circumstances where they neither knew or reasonably could have known that what they were doing was wrong […]’). For examples of CAS cases applying these principles, see para B1.22, n.2, and see also Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 103 (the principle that a federation may only impose a disciplinary sanction on a member if its rules provide a clear and ambiguous authority to do so ‘is also part of considerations of sports law that have been taken into account by CAS panels in the past irrespective of the (subsidiarily) applicable law to the merits’).

B1.20 The principle of legal certainty has both a procedural aspect (requiring a transparent and coherent process for the issuing of regulations and for their subsequent revision) and a substantive aspect (requiring that the content of the regulations is clear and precise and enables those who have to comply to know exactly what is expected of them and what will happen if they fail to comply).1 As the seminal passage from the CAS award in Quigley states: ‘The fight against doping is arduous, and it may require strict rules. But the rule-makers and the rule-appliers must begin by being strict with themselves. Regulations that may affect the careers of dedicated athletes

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must be predictable. They must emanate from duly authorised bodies. They must be adopted in constitutionally proper ways. They should not be the product of an obscure process of accretion. Athletes and officials should not be confronted with a thicket of mutually qualifying or even contradictory rules that can be understood only on the basis of the de facto practice over the course of many years of a small group of insiders’.2 1 See the IOC’s Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (February 2008) (‘All regulations of each organisation and governing body, including but not limited to, statutes/constitutions and other procedural regulations, should be clear, transparent, disclosed, publicised and made readily available. Clear regulations allow understanding, predictability and facilitate good governance. The procedure to modify or amend the regulations should also be clear and transparent’). 2 USA  Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS  94/129, para  55. This passage has been cited with approval many times since, eg by the CAS panel in Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 6.11. In WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27, a AAA hearing panel cited the passage as authority for its warning that ‘WTC should take care to provide its athletes with clear, easy to understand rules so athletes need not struggle to determine what conduct constitutes an anti-doping rule violation’.

B1.21 Looking first at the procedural requirement of a transparent and coherent process for issuing regulations: (a)

Shortly before the 1998/99 football season started, UEFA issued a rule that a club could not compete in a UEFA competition that season if it was under common ownership with another club that was entered in the competition. When that rule was challenged, the CAS panel in AEK Athens noted that ‘an adjustment to the Contested Rule should not be arranged hurriedly, and commonly controlled clubs and their owners should have some time to determine their course of action, also taking into account possible legal questions (eg  if shares are to be sold, minority shareholders may be entitled to exercise pre-emptive rights within given deadlines). There is an obvious need for a reasonable period of time before entry into force, or else the implementation of the Contested Rule may turn out to be excessively detrimental to commonly controlled clubs and their owners’.1 The panel therefore endorsed a provisional order made suspending the application of the rule while the challenge was pending, and extended that suspension for a further season even after it had upheld the legality of the rule, on the basis that ‘paramount considerations of fairness and legal certainty, needed in any legal system, militate against allowing UEFA to implement immediately the Contested Rule in the 1999/2000 football season’.2 (b) In Boxing Australia v AIBA, Boxing Australia challenged a directive issued by AIBA permitting national federations to enter only one boxer each into a continental qualifying competition for the 2008 Olympics, on the basis that that directive contradicted the rule and practice of its continental association permitting two entries per federation. The CAS panel accepted that AIBA was in principle entitled to adopt a rule reflecting its preferred approach, but only if it ‘properly and timeously exercised such discretion. Paramount considerations of legal certainty require that an international federation exercises its normative discretion by adopting resolutions or regulations in proper compliance with the formal procedures set out by its own statutes. International federations are undoubtedly subject to the rule of law. It is not permissible for an international federation bluntly to communicate by e-mail that it does not like a given rule in force at continental level and demand the national federations of that continent to simply disregard such rule even though it binds them contractually’.3 Instead, ‘in order to avoid any risk of uncertainty or arbitrariness, the policy choices of an international federation must necessarily be translated into rules and regulations, correctly adopted – as to both form and substance – and properly and timeously publicized’.4

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(c)

Similarly, in Quigley, the CAS panel noted:

‘It might be possible by a carefully drafted clause to provide for some form of ongoing adaptation of Regulations, eg by referring to a list of banned substances as may be “revised from time to time” by a defined authorised body. But to imagine that each and every Regulation, no matter how fundamental, is subject to being transformed or eradicated “upon receipt of official (sic) changes in information”, would be to deny the proper constitutional functioning of an international federation, which must be orderly, predictable and transparent’.5

1 2 3 4

AEK PAE and SK Slavia Praha v UEFA, CAS 98/2000, para 161. Ibid, para 163. This case is discussed further at para B1.36. Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, paras 6.29-6.30. Ibid, paras 6.34 and 6.35. See also CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 58 (‘If an International Federation proposes to make changes to its rules, those rules should, if possible, be made after discussion, consultation and explanation with the constituent bodies of that International Federation so that everyone at the National Federations understands clearly what is permitted and what is not permitted. A similar process should be undertaken if National Federations wish to change their rules so as to ensure that their constituent members of clubs have that understanding. The Panel accepts that there must in every sport be occasions on which discussion, consultation and explanation cannot take place before rule changes are made, but, hopefully, such occasions will be rare. If they do occur, great care must be taken, after the changes have been made, to explain the consequences and ramifications of the changes’). Cf AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘For a regulator or legislator, it appears to be advisable and good practice to acquire as much information as possible and to hear the views of potentially affected people before issuing general regulations – one can think of, eg, parliamentary hearings with experts or interest groups – but it is not a legal requirement. As a United States court has stated, requiring an international sports federation “to provide for hearings to any party potentially affected adversely by its rule-making authority could quite conceivably subject the [international federation] to a quagmire of administrative red tape which would effectively preclude it from acting at all to promote the game” (Gunter Harz Sports v USTA, 1981, 511 F. Supp. 1103, at 1122)’ [other citations omitted]). In South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020, The FA’s rules included an express duty to consult with clubs before changing rules that were applicable to them. The arbitral panel (chaired by Lord Dyson) found that the meaning of that obligation was ‘informed by well-established public law principles as to what due consultation requires’ (para  60), and that those principles (called the ‘Sedley criteria’, from the judgment of Lord Wilson in R (Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] UKSC 56) were that an ‘overall assessment […] must be made of the facts to see whether addressees of a consultation had, in a real and practical sense, been accorded a fair opportunity to express their views and opinions. […] the ultimate litmus test is simply fairness; so how the application of the criteria play out in a particular case will depend upon all of the surrounding circumstances’ (para 62, quoting with approval Green J  in R  (Hutchison EG UK  Ltd) v Teleconica UK  Ltd [2017]  EWHC  3376 (Admin) at 238). The panel considered that the surrounding circumstances ‘will include the urgency of the situation and considerations of practicability’ (para 63), and noted that in the context of determining how to address promotion and relegation issues after the Covid-19 pandemic led to early curtailment of the 2019/20 football season, the urgency of the situation justified a streamlined consultation (paras 69, 71). 5 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 28.

B1.22 Moving from process to substance, while an SGB has broad autonomy to bring disciplinary proceedings and to punish misconduct by a member,1 the principles of legal certainty and predictability mean that no finding of breach may be made in respect of, and no punishment may be imposed for, a member’s conduct unless the rules in place at the time of the conduct clearly state that such conduct is prohibited and that any transgression will attract a specified punishment,2 or at least a specific type of punishment or range of punishments.3 If there is no clear legal basis for a punishment in the rules, then it may not be imposed, even if all are agreed that it would otherwise be warranted.4 For example: (a) In Quigley, the UIT accepted that the athlete had not intended to use the drug found in his system to gain a performance advantage, but said athletes should be held strictly liable for the presence of prohibited substances in their system. The CAS panel accepted that such an approach might be appropriate in principle, but ‘[…] the fact that the Panel has sympathy for the principle of a strict liability rule obviously does not allow the Panel to create such a rule

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where it does not exist. […] The UIT had the right to punish Q. only on the basis of rules in force’.5 Furthermore, given the stringent nature of a strict liability rule, ‘if such a standard is to be applied, it must be clearly articulated’.6 The UIT rules in place at the time the athlete’s sample was collected did not satisfy that test; to the contrary, they provided that ‘Doping means the use of one or more substances mentioned in the official UIT Anti-Doping List with the aim of attaining an increase in performance’. Nor did any other provisions overrule this clear requirement of intent to gain a performance advantage. As a result, ‘[…] the UIT had no legal basis for the sanctions it pronounced against the Appellants. The sanctions must therefore be reversed’.7 (b) Similarly, in Rebagliati v IOC, a CAS panel dismissed the anti-doping charges brought by the IOC against the snowboard gold medallist at the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, notwithstanding that his urine sample had tested positive for a metabolite of marijuana, because his international federation, the FIS, had not specifically prohibited marijuana in its rules. The Panel explained: ‘We do not suggest for a moment that the use of marijuana should be condoned, nor do we suggest that sports authorities are not entitled to exclude athletes found to use cannabis. But if sports authorities wish to add their own sanctions to those that are edicted by public authorities, they must do so in an explicit fashion. That has not been done here […]. We must decide within the context of the law of sports, and cannot invent prohibitions or sanctions where none appear’.8

(c) In Tsagaev v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), the IWF purported to suspend a member national federation due to repeated doping infractions by some of its athletes, with the consequence that all of the member’s athletes were excluded from the 2000 Olympic Games. A  CAS panel upheld an athlete’s challenge to the federation’s suspension, on the basis that the specific provision in the IWF statutes that the IWF invoked to justify the suspension stated that the sanction for repeated doping infractions by a member’s athletes was a fine, and that the federation would only be suspended if it did not pay the fine. The CAS panel also rejected the IWF’s alternative argument that it had ‘an inherent power to take appropriate action, including the suspension of a member federation, if the behaviour of a member federation is harmful to that particular sport’, holding: ‘Although an international federation may have certain general discretionary powers to govern its sport even in the absence of specific provisions in the statutes or regulations, the Panel is of the clear view that a suspension of an entire federation from participation in the Olympic Games, including innocent athletes who have not committed a doping offence or any other violation of the applicable rules, at least requires an explicit, and unambiguous legal basis’.9

The Panel applauded the IWF for its desire to signal its commitment to stamp out doping in its sport, but noted: ‘Laudable policy objectives, and alacrity in pursuing them, do not, however, obviate the fundamental and no less legitimate requirement of having a legal basis for disciplinary action’.10

(d) Finally, in Mutko v IOC, the IOC decided to exclude the former Russian Minister of Sport from participation in all future Olympic Games, on the basis that he bore ‘administrative responsibility’ for the state-sponsored doping scheme uncovered by the McLaren report and confirmed by an IOC disciplinary commission. He appealed to the CAS on the ground that there was no legal basis in the Olympic Charter to impose such a sanction on him.11 The CAS panel analysed the two Charter provisions cited by the IOC and decided that neither of them provided a sufficient legal basis for the sanction imposed. Rule 59 did not assist the IOC, because it applied ‘only […] to well-defined

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categories of individuals or teams and the Appellant does not fall within any of those categories’;12 and similarly Rule 44 only permitted the IOC to ‘refuse an entry’ of a participant to a single edition of the Games, and was: ‘thus not viable as a legal basis for the sanction at hand because (i) the ROC or any other entity has not submitted any application for the Appellant’s “entry” into an edition of the Olympic Games, and (ii) the Appealed Decision bans the Appellant from any participation in “all future Olympic Games”, thereby going beyond the scope of the rule which only permits the rejection of an application to a single edition of the Olympic Games. Therefore, Rule 44 is not a proper legal basis for the Appealed Decision. In keeping with the above-cited CAS jurisprudence, the Respondent cannot “adjust” Rule 44 to enable its application when the legislator clearly did not intend for the rule to apply in situations like the present’.13   1 See para B1.6.  2 Mutko v IOC, CAS  2017/A/5498, para  60, quoting with approval Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 30 (‘In the Panel’s opinion, this provision of the Olympic Charter is to be properly read in accordance with the “principle of legality” (“principe de légalité” in French), requiring that the offences and the sanctions be clearly and previously defined by the law and precluding the “adjustment” of existing rules to apply them to situations or behaviours that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize. CAS arbitrators have drawn inspiration from this general principle of law in reference to sports disciplinary issues, and have formulated and applied what has been termed as “predictability test”. Indeed, CAS awards have consistently held that sports organizations cannot impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis and that such sanctions must be predictable. In other words, offences and sanctions must be provided by clear rules enacted beforehand’); Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 149 (‘CAS jurisprudence requires, for a sanction to be imposed, that sports regulations proscribe the misconduct with which the subject is charged, ie nulla poena sine lege (principle of legality), and that the rule be clear and precise, ie nulla poena sine lege clara (principle of predictability). As a matter of course, CAS panels have held that sports organizations cannot impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis and that such sanctions must satisfy a predictability test’) and para  152 (‘According to the principle of predictability, the offenses and sanctions of a sports organization must be predictable, to the extent that those subject to them must be able to understand their meaning and the circumstances in which they apply’) (citations omitted); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 197 (‘the starting point is the ISSF Constitution. Each Member should be able to identify with certainty what disciplinary sanctions it could face which could threaten its membership of the ISSF, in instances when the behaviour of the Member would be contrary to a stated purpose of the ISSF or if the behaviour would bring the ISSF into disrepute. It should also be clear from the Constitution what the sanction would be for the different behaviour of the Member’); Club X v D & FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3765, para 70 (‘the “principle of legality” (“principe de légalité”) requires that the offences and sanctions must be clearly and previously defined by law and must preclude the “adjustment” of existing rules to enable an application of them ot situations or conduct that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize. CAS awards have consistently held that sports organisations cannot impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis for them and that such sanctions must also be predictable (“predictability test”). This principle is further confirmed by CAS  2007/A/1363, which holds that the principle of legality and predictability of sanctions requires a clear connection between the incriminated behaviour and the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision’); Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS  2014/A/3516, paras 103–104 (‘It is well established that a sports governing body such as the WKF may impose disciplinary sanctions upon its members if they violate the applicable rules and regulations. […] It is, however, axiomatic that before a person can be found guilty of a disciplinary offence, the relevant disciplinary code must proscribe the misconduct with which he is charged. Nulla poena sine lege. It is equally axiomatic for the relevant provision with which he is charged to be in breach first in accordance with the contra proferentem rule will be strictly construed. Nulla poena sine lege clara. […] It is not sufficient to identify a duty; it is necessary as well to stipulate that breach of such duty will attract disciplinary sanctions’), cited with approval in Casas Vaque v FEI, CAS 2019/A/6202, para 193; Omeragik v FFM, CAS 2011/A/2670, para 8.13 (the principle of legality ‘requires that the offences and sanctions must be clearly and previously defined by law and must preclude the “adjustment” of existing rules to enable an application of them to situations or conduct that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize’). See also Wigan Athletic FC v Heart of Midlothian, CAS  2007/A/1298, para  99 (noting a mandatory principle of Swiss law that ‘an association must correctly apply its own regulations, another being that its regulations must be applied and its decisions made in a predictable and cognisable manner, notably to ensure equality of treatment and due process’). Cf WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27 (the twoyear ban that would otherwise have applied for the athlete’s use of testosterone without a therapeutic use exemption was reduced by 12 months on the basis that the athlete bore No Significant Fault or Negligence for his offence (see para C17.__), on the basis that the athlete’s failure to understand and

320  Regulating Sport comply with the requirements in the rules was caused in part by confusing statements on the WTC’s website).  3 Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003 (‘165. Pursuant to Article 5, para 1 FCE, the FCE may pronounce the sanctions provided in the FCE, the FIFA  Disciplinary Code (hereinafter the “FDC”) and the FIFA  Statutes. As a result, the FIFA  Ethics Committee was entitled to apply the sanctions listed in Article 6 FCE, Article 10 et seq. FDC and Article 65 of the FIFA Statutes. The aforementioned provisions do not list specific sanctions for each and every ethical offense, but rather provide a range of sanctions that may be imposed on a natural person, including the following: a warning, a reprimand, a fine, a return of awards, a match suspension, a ban from dressing rooms and/or the substitutes’ bench, a ban on entering a stadium, a ban on taking part in any football-related activity and social work. With regard to the fine, Article 15 FDC then stipulates that it “shall not be less than CHF 300, or in the case of a competition subject to an age limit not less than CHF 200, and not more than CHF  1,000,000”. 166. It is true that according to the principle of legal certainty, the offences and sanctions of a sports organization must be predictable to the extent that those subject to them must be able to understand their meaning and circumstances in which they apply (CAS 2008/A/1545, at para 30 et seq.; CAS 2004/A/725, at para 20 et seq.). In the Panel’s view, however, it is unnecessary and impractical for the FCE to list the specific sanction for each and every ethical offense, or to limit very narrowly the amount of a possible fine (CAS 2017/A/5155 at para 48). 167. A sport governing body must have a certain discretion to impose the sanction that it deems appropriate for the offense committed under the particular circumstances and context of that case. It is in this light that Article 9, para  1 of the FCE calls for the FIFA  Ethics Committee to “take into account all relevant factors in the case, including the offender’s assistance and cooperation, motive, the circumstances and the degree of the offender’s guilt”. This is not to say, however, that the sport governing body is free, in applying a sanction, to ignore the principle of proportionality; indeed, it must impose a sanction that is proportionate to the offence, aa well as taking into account the sanctions – if themselves proportionate – imposed on others for similar offences. 168. In light of the foregoing, the Panel holds that Article 6 FCE and Article 15 FDC are sufficiently “determinable” (CAS 2017/A/5272, para 64) and thus satisfy the predictability test. The Panel dismisses also the Appellant’s argument related to the fact that FIFA rules on sanctions provide no limit to the ban, as the Panel deems it legitimate that an association includes a ban for life among the possible sanctions it can impose (some offences can indeed be so serious as to warrant exclusion for life of the guilty individual from that association)’).  4 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 126 (‘In order to impose a sanction […] There must be a sufficiently clear statutory basis for a penalty in the statutes or byelaws of the association’); Tsagaev v IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, para 25 (commending the IWF for seeking to take a tough stand against doping by suspending the Bulgarian team due to three positive tests by Bulgarian weightlifters at the Games, but noting the ’fundamental and no less legitimate requirement of having a legal basis for disciplinary action’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17 (‘In sport, like all other areas of society, any disciplinary measure on sanction requires a legal basis’), para 44 (‘[…] based on the WADC, […] a sanction is possible if there is an anti-doping rule violation; absent any such anti-doping rule violation, the WADC does not provide for any possible sanction’), para  58 (‘[…] the use of pharmaceutical substances which are not expressly prohibited by sports law, and which are not similar or related substances to those expressly prohibited, cannot be considered as an anti-doping rule infringement and in that respect cannot, therefore, be the object of disciplinary sanctions’) and para  65 (‘any disciplinary sanction should rely on a clear and firm legal basis’). See also Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 111 (even if it would be sensible to prohibit the conduct at issue, ‘Common sense cannot make a disciplinary offence something which it is otherwise not’); Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 64 (‘The IOC’s argument that it would be logical to disqualify a team whose overall performance was boosted in some measure by one doped team member is not without force and is even commonsensical. However, in the view of the Panel, mere logic may not serve as a basis for a sanction because it would not satisfy the said predictability test […] and it could lend itself to arbitrary enforcement’).  5 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, paras 21, 22.   6 Ibid, para 17.   7 Ibid, para 35.  8 Rebagliati v IOC, CAS OG/98/002, para 26. See also USOC et al v IOC & IAAF, CAS 2004/A/725 (vacating disqualification of results of US relay team based on doping offence of one of its members where rules provided only for disqualification of individual results of doping offender, not of results of teams in which he played), at para  73 (‘The rationale for requiring clarity of rules extends beyond enabling athletes in given cases to determine their conduct in such cases by reference to understandable rules. As argued by the Appellants at the hearing, clarity and predictability are required so that the entire sport community are informed of the normative system in which they live, work and compete, which requires at the very least that they be able to understand the meaning of rules and the circumstances in which those rules apply. […] There was simply no express rule in force at the time of the Sydney Games which provided for the annulment of results obtained by a team, one of whose members later was found to have been ineligible to compete at the time. As became apparent in these proceedings, such a rule could only be said to have been produced by what the Panel in the Quigley case referred to as “an obscure process of accretion” – here, as the IAAF would have it, a process of

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  321 complementation and inference”’); Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10 (accepting athlete’s argument that rules only allowed disqualification of results after a positive result from an in-competition test, not from an out-of-competition test, on the basis that ‘CAS has to rule on the basis of sports law and cannot invent new sanctions. In other words, if regulatory documents define sanctions and how they should be applied to particular offences, they should be strictly interpreted by the sports authorities and the CAS. In this case, neither the IJF Anti-doping Regulations nor the IOC Medical Code provide for disqualification as the consequence of a positive out-of-competition test. Since it has no legal foundation, the respondent’s decision to disqualify the appellant and withdraw his medal should therefore be set aside’).  9 Tsagaev v IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, para 22 (emphasis in original). 10 Ibid, para  25. See also Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Union, CAS  2009/1823, para  9.6 (‘PJU’s eviction as Continental Union was no small matter; it entailed the extinction of its raison d’être. It naturally cannot be legitimised in the absence of a clear legal foundation. For reasons to be explained immediately below, the Panel has no doubt in concluding that the decision lacked legal basis’); IFBB  v IWGA, CAS  2010/A/2119, para  12(A) (stating that the first question to ask when reviewing the legality of the IWGA’s decision to suspend the IFBB from the World Games is whether it had a ‘proper legal basis in the IWGA rules and regulations’) and14-41 (analysis concluding that there was a proper legal basis in the IWGA rules for suspension); BWF  v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319, para 57 (finding that the IWF rules clearly providing for the sanction imposed, namely banning the BWF from entering athletes in the next edition of the Olympic Games); RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 83 (‘The decision of the IPC to suspend the RPC [from membership for breach of its anti-doping obligations] was within its power, has a proper legislative basis and was not irrational, or perverse, or outside the margin of discretion open to it. The Decision was not evidently or grossly disproportionate’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS  2016/A/4727, para  208 (‘Finally, the Panel notes the arguments of the ISSF that Article 1.13.5.1 [of the ISSF Constitution] gives it a wide discretion to suspend its members, citing CAS 2011/A/2525. The Panel maintains that there has to be a clear purpose to better serve and some evidence of behaviour by the Member that is putting this purpose in danger. A disciplinary sanction such as suspension should not be at the whim of the association’) and para 213 (‘This Panel does not seek to condone the actions of the Kuwaiti Government in any way at all, however, the suspension or expulsion of a member by an International Federation is a serious matter and must be done in accordance with its own constitution and in accordance with the applicable law. Without calling into question the right of the General Assembly of an IF [International Federation] to take disciplinary measures against its national members, it appears in the present case that the reasons retained by the ISSF to suspend the KSF are not justified by any applicable rule. Based on the foregoing, and after taking into due consideration all the evidence produced and all submissions made, the Panel partially allows the Appeal by the KSF and annuls the Appealed Decision’); and ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 44 (The ICC’s ‘relationship with its members is governed by contract, ie its Memorandum (“MOA”) and Articles of Association (“Articles”), and the source of any power on the part of the ICC to expel or suspend a member must be found in those instruments by which both parties are bound’) and paras 57-58 (‘These principles articulated in CAS cases [citing RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745 and IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119] are not discrepant, but rather dovetail with domestic [English law] jurisprudence. See generally Flaherty v NGRC [2005] EWCA Civ 1117 CA (“it is the courts’ function to control illegality and make sure that a body does not act outside its powers. But it is not in the interest of sport or anybody else for the courts to seek to double guess regulating bodies in charge of domestic arrangements. Sports regulating bodies ordinarily have unrivalled and practical knowledge of the particular sport that they are required to regulate. They cannot be expected to act in every detail as if they are a court of law. Provided they act lawfully and within the ambit of their powers, the courts should allow them to get on with the job they are required to do” (para 20ff)’). Similarly, in Reel v Holder (for IAAF) [1979] 1 WLR 1252, affd [1981] 1 WLR 1226 CA, p.1231, the English Court of Appeal found that the IAAF (now World Athletics) had no power under its rules to expel a member, and therefore the IAAF’s expulsion of the Taiwanese athletic federation was held to be invalid. 11 As to which, see paras XX.XX. 12 Mutko v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5498. 13 Ibid, para 64.

B1.23 Clearly, then, where an SGB wishes to prohibit and punish certain conduct, it should ensure that its regulations make it clear, by means of tailored and specific clauses, both what conduct is prohibited and what the potential sanctions are for breach of that prohibition. However, the SGB will not want to find in a subsequent case that it has drafted the prohibitions in the regulations too narrowly, so that the regulations do not cover conduct of a member that is clearly contrary to the interests of the sport. Therefore, even if the SGB should seek to include specific definitions of misconduct in its rules to the greatest extent possible, the SGB will usually also

322  Regulating Sport

include a catch-all prohibition in its disciplinary code,1 such as a prohibition of any conduct that ‘brings the SGB and/or sport into disrepute’.2 It has been argued that this approach offends against the principle of legal certainty, because a member or an athlete who is subject to such prohibition cannot predict precisely how far it extends.3 The counter-argument is that the SGB cannot predict every single action that would harm the sport, but must nevertheless be able to take action to punish such conduct when it occurs.4 The member or athlete that is charged with breach of this general prohibition is protected by the fact that the disciplinary panel would have to be satisfied by the objective evidence that their conduct has in fact brought the SGB or the sport into disrepute,5 or (if the rule prohibits conduct that ‘tends to bring the sport into disrepute’ or that ‘may bring the sport into disrepute’) that the conduct gave rise to a real risk that it would do so.6 The authors are not aware of any case where a panel has rejected such a charge for lack of legal certainty. On the contrary: (a) In Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), Article 12.4 of the IWF’s Anti-Doping Policy provided: ‘If any Member federation or members or officials thereof, by reason of conduct connected with or associated with doping or anti-doping rule violations, brings the sport of weightlifting into disrepute, the IWF Executive Board may, in its discretion, take such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation and integrity of the sport’.

The IWF relied on this provision to ban the RWF from entering any athletes in the 2016 Olympic Games, after evidence emerged from the ‘McLaren Report’ and from re-testing of samples from previous Games that the RWF had been involved in a centrally dictated program of doping of Russian weightlifters. On appeal by the RWF, the CAS panel, applying the test set down in Tsagaev, ruled that Article 12.4 of the IWF Anti-Doping Policy ‘constitutes a sufficient legal basis’ to impose the ban, and that the evidence from the McLaren Report and from the re-testing of samples was: ‘sufficient to bring the sport of weightlifting into disrepute. The Panel is unable to agree that the term “disrepute” is ambiguous. It refers to loss of reputation or dishonour. The Panel finds that the IWF’s conclusion that the above facts bring the sport of weightlifting into disrepute is neither incompatible with the applicable provisions nor arbitrary’.7

(b) Similarly, in Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation (WKF), Article  9.2 of the WKF Statutes provided that ‘Members shall undertake work in complete compliance with the rules governing the sport, maintaining a demeanour commensurate with the activity performed’. The WKF purported to sanction the WKF Secretary-General under that Article for sending letters to member federations criticising the WKF President. On appeal, the CAS panel noted that: ‘disciplinary provisions are not vulnerable to the application of that rule [nulla poena sine lege] merely because they are broadly drawn. Generality and ambiguity are different concepts. The panel has little doubt that WKF sought, incumbently with other sports governing bodies, to draft a disciplinary provision of a reach capable of embracing the multifarious forms of behaviour considered unacceptable in the sport in question’.8

The Panel found that on its proper construction Article 9.2 made it an offence either: (i) to fail to comply with the rules; or (ii) to comply with the rules but with an inappropriate demeanour. Since the conduct with which the Appellant was charged did not fall into either category, and the WKF could not identify any other rule that such conduct breached, the appeal against the sanction was upheld.9 However, if the conduct had fallen into either category, and so had amounted to a breach of Article 9.2,

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  323

there is no suggestion in the award that the CAS panel would have considered the charge to be bad for lack of legal certainty.10 (c) In Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, a FIFA official was sanctioned for contravening Article 3 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which stated: ‘Officials shall show commitment to an ethical attitude while performing their duties. They shall pledge to behave in a dignified manner. They shall behave and act with complete credibility and integrity’.

The CAS panel found that Article  3 was ‘sufficiently clear and precise and unambiguous and provides a sufficient legal basis to sanction the Appellant’. It stated that the fact that the prohibition was ‘capable of catching a multitude of acts as unethical or lacking credibility and integrity does not mean that it lacks sufficient basis’, because (quoting Yerolimpos) ‘generality and ambiguity are different concepts’. The Panel held that it was not necessary to list in the Code of Ethics all of the acts that would be caught by the prohibition, ‘as an official, in reading the rule, could clearly make the distinction between what is an ethical attitude and what is not, what is acting with complete credibility and integrity and what is not’. It said: ‘The Panel is of the view that the inherent vagueness of concepts such as ethics and integrity does not preclude them to be used by sports legislators as a basis to impose disciplinary sanctions on officials that do not conform their behaviour to those standards. Indeed, in sports there are other notions, such as “unsportsmanlike conduct” or “sporting fairness”, that are inherently vague and nonetheless may serve as basis to impose disciplinary sanctions. […] [C]ivil law standards are often inherently vague and reveal their full meaning on the basis of judicial application […]. The Panel is of the view that the standards of conduct required of officials of an international federation […] must be of the highest level because the public must perceive sports organizations as being upright and trustworthy, in order for those organizations to legitimately keep governing over their sports worldwide. […] Therefore, the Panel finds that it is legitimate and even desirable that sports federation[s] include in their ethical codes a general rule residually forbidding any unethical conduct of officials in order to cover all unacceptable situations that would not be caught by more specific provisions’.11   1 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), p 222 (‘regulated industries may apply political pressure to regulators and demand detailed rules so that the rule of law and principles of certainty are served but such types of rules may in reality be the very formulations that are most easily side-stepped by creative compliers. One response is to reinforce detailed rules with open-textured and general rules that are more difficult to circumvent’).   2 See eg Art 11 of the 2017 UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (‘1. Member associations and clubs, as well as their players, officials and members, and all persons assigned by UEFA to exercise a function, must respect the Laws of the Game, as well as UEFA’s Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions, and comply with the principles of ethical conduct, loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship. 2. For example, a breach of these principles is committed by anyone: […] d. whose conduct brings the sport of football, and UEFA in particular, into disrepute; […]’). See further paras B3.97-B3.99.  3 Bitel, ‘Disciplinary Proceedings from the Point of View of the Individual’ [1995] 3(3)  SATLJ  8 (criticising offence of ‘bringing the game into disrepute’ as nebulous and uncertain, and arguing that it would be impermissible to use it to punish conduct that has not previously been punished and that the individual athlete could not have foreseen would be considered a disciplinary offence).  4 Disciplinary and Regulatory Proceedings, 9th Edn (LexisNexis 2017), citing Henneberry v Law Society (2000) unreported CO/1858/99  DC (‘It is […] ordinarily open to professional disciplinary tribunals to apply sanctions for professional misconduct generally, regardless of whether it is conduct singled out for mention in the rules. Were it otherwise professional people might be permitted to conduct themselves in plainly deplorable ways without any disciplinary control’). See also Casas Vaque v FEI, CAS  2019/A/6202, para  194 (‘The FEI GR only stipulate that incorrect behaviour shall attract the prescribed sanction, but do not describe the prohibited behaviour as such. However, only because the relevant provision is broadly drawn does not mean that this rule does not meet the legality and predictability test’); Arzhanova v CMAS, CAS 2010/A/2284, paras 34–35 (‘The principle of legality and predictability of sanctions requires a clear connection between the behaviour in question and the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision (CAS  2007/A/1363). […] However, when a special rule does not exist, the interpretation of other provisions, in particular corresponding general clauses, may be the basis for a claim and/or a sanction (CAS 2007/A/1319; CAS 2007/A/1437)’.

324  Regulating Sport  5 Zubkov v FINA, CAS  2007/A/1291, para  19 (where rule prohibits conduct that brings the sport into disrepute, not conduct that has the potential to bring the sport into disrepute, proof of potential disrepute is not enough, proof of ‘actual disrepute is required’, ie, proof that public opinion of the sport of swimming – and not just individuals involved in the sport -- is diminished as a result of the conduct in question).  6 Bland v Sparkes (for the Amateur Swimming Association) (1999) Times 17 December (CA) (Otton LJ) (‘the test whether the conduct tended to bring ASA into disrepute or himself into serious disrepute is an objective test, namely, was there a real possibility that by virtue of what the appellant did that ASA would be brought into disrepute and himself into serious disrepute’).  7 Russian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation, CAS OG 16/09, paras 7.4 and 7.13. See also IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, paras 18-25 (rejecting argument that there was no proper legal basis in IWGA constitution to suspend a member from participation in World Games for failure to run a proper anti-doping programme, because constitution gave IWGA power to suspend wherever a member acted against the interests of the IWGA, or not in accordance with the World Games rules, or caused adverse effects to the World Games by its organisation and performance, and IFBB’s conduct met each of these tests). Similarly, the appellant in Diack v IAAF & Ethics Commission of the IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4420, argued (para  232) ‘that the IAAF  Code of Ethics was in breach of the principles set forth under Article 7 of the ECHR, as the Articles contained therein and relied upon to sanction him were “far from clear [and] do not enable a person to know which specific acts or omission would make him liable. Only general and vague concepts are invoked such as: “act in a manner likely to tarnish the reputation of the IAAF [or] to bring the sport into disrepute”, ‘’fair play”, “corrupt conduct”. Nonetheless, those conducts are never clearly and precisely defined within the Code of Ethics. Such vague articles may therefore not be the basis for sanctions of a criminal nature, as is the case of the life ban and a $25,000 fine imposed on Mr Diack and their application amounts to an infringement of Mr Diack’s fundamental rights”’. Those arguments also received short shrift from the CAS panel: ‘234. These provisions of the IAAF Code of Ethics set general norms. However, the Panel holds that such general norms are quite normal in all sorts of formal and material legislation. Whether or not there is a violation of such general norms is to be judged on the basis of facts, in a given situation. In its Appealed Decision, the IAAF Ethics Commission Panel established such facts, in the light of which it considered proven that Mr Diack, together with the other Appellants, conspired to conceal for more than three years anti-doping violations by Mrs Shobukhova. The IAAF Ethics Commission Panel then qualified these acts as dishonesty and corruption, and found that they did (unprecedented) damage to Athletics, which the Appellants have brought into disrepute by their actions. 235. In this regard, Mr Diack cannot reasonably claim that, if proven, the extortion of money, the purported aim of preventing or at least delaying and concealing doping charges against Mrs Shobukhova for a considerable period of time, cannot be regarded as likely to tarnish, and affect adversely, the reputation of the IAAF or Athletics in general, and to bring the sport into disrepute. If established, all these acts and omissions unquestionably constitute a breach of the applicable Code of Ethics and are in breach of the duty to act with (utmost) integrity, honesty and responsibility in fulfilling a role in the sport of Athletics and fair play. 236. The Panel finds that there can be no misunderstanding about the facts that the IAAF Ethics Commission Panel considered proven. Hence, it dismisses Mr Diack’s argument that their articulation was too vague. The fact that Mr Diack is of the view that the evidence on which the IAAF Ethics Commission Panel relied is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the standard of proof applicable in the present proceedings, is a different matter’.  8 Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 105.   9 Ibid at para 108. 10 See also D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, and Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1605, both involving challenges to the application of clause 2.2(6) of the AOC’s Ethical Behaviour By-Law, which stated that an athlete ‘must not by his or her acts or omissions, engage in or participate in […] conduct which, if publicly known, would be likely to bring […] themselves into disrepute or censure’. In both cases, the CAS panel proceeded on the basis that the clause was enforceable as written, and neither athlete argued otherwise. In D’Arcy, the CAS panel decided that ‘bringing a person into disrepute is to lower the reputation of the person in the eyes of ordinary members of the public to a significant extent’ (para  46), and dismissed the swimmer’s appeal on the basis that getting drunk in a bar and inflicting serious injuries on a former swimmer was ‘conduct that could form an ample basis for the exercise of discretion to terminate [D’Arcy’s] membership of the team’ (para 49). A different Panel came to the same conclusion in Jeongewaard in relation to a mountain biker who drove while intoxicated and got into an accident that seriously injured a team-mate who had been out with him. 11 Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5086, paras 150, 151, 152, 153, 154. See also Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS  2013/A/3258, para  128 (‘Pursuant to CAS case law, the different elements of the rules of a federation shall be clear and precise, in the event they are legally binding for athletes and/or clubs […]. Inconsistencies might be on the charge of the legislator (federation). However, the internal control upon the rules of the federation is manifestly relativized by the fact that the different case law, CAS and national, does not require the strict certitude of the elements provided for disciplinary sanctions of the sports federation, as required by criminal law. The different

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  325 case law rather recognizes general elements, which constitute the basis for disciplinary sanctions (CAS 2007/A/1437). In this spirit, Art 2.08 UELR [UEFA Europa League Regulations, which states ‘If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry into force of Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes, ie 27 April 2007, in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare such club ineligible to participate in the competition’,] is subject to interpretation and needs to be interpreted’), followed in Vanakorn v Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS), CAS 2014/A/3832, paras 85-88. The Beziktas/Vanakorn awards reflect the fact that ‘[i]n continental Europe, which comprises predominantly civil law jurisdictions, the traditional approach to drafting laws has been that of expressing the law in general principles, with it being up to the courts and the executive to specify the details for the application of the normative precepts to individual cases, taking into account the general intention of parliament as expressed in the preambles, discussions and other documents. Continental law tends to be expressed in shorter sentences, with less use of paragraphing but with more understandable principles, despite the fact that the relationship between several principles may be more complex. This approach leads on the one hand to simpler, clearer, and more general legislation, with the objective being for the rules to withstand the passage of time. On the other hand it is a legislation that lacks the certainty that would be afforded by a more detailed application of the principles. In contrast, in the common law tradition, legislative drafting has always been intended to be precise, unambiguous, all-inclusive and perhaps even exhaustive, with as detailed specification of legal scope as possible, even at the cost of accessibility to its audiences, both specialists and laymen. [….] The great advantage of legislation based on the general principles of civil law is that it is easier to read and its objectives are easy to understand. However the disadvantage is its higher degree of uncertainty, as it is the executive and the courts that will a posteriori provide content and sense to such general formulae. In these cases, the legislator is renouncing control of the actual facts and passing them to the judicial, that is, is abandoning (implicitly delegates) his own competence in favour of judges. This has been severely criticised from the point of view of common law, as it is hard to predict how the courts will do part of the work which the legislator has hitherto done’. Karpen and Xanthaki, Legislation in Europe (Hart Publishing 2017), p 141.

B1.24 Similarly, while the World Anti-Doping Code is clear that an athlete is strictly liable for any prohibited substance found in his sample,1 not all substances prohibited by WADA are listed by name on the WADA List of Prohibited Substances. Instead, for example, the Prohibited List identifies by name various exogenous anabolic steroids, but then states that any substance ‘with a similar chemical structure or similar biological effect(s)’ to any steroid identified by name is also prohibited.2 This approach is necessary to achieve the aim of promoting doping-free sport, because there is an almost unlimited number of steroids that may be derived from the basic testosterone compound. It is not possible to know them all or to list them all by name, and even if it were, new ones could be invented at any point, meaning that the Prohibited List would have to be constantly updated. Therefore the Prohibited List cannot be a closed list of substances; instead, catch-all language has to be used. Arguments that this approach offends unfairly against the principle of legal certainty have been rejected.3 1 See para C6.xx. 2 See para C6.xx. 3 Scott v ITF, CAS  2018/A/5768, para  118 (‘[…] The Prohibited List is not a closed list and does not provide an exhaustive enumeration of substances, but it does establish the principle that all steroids are prohibited. The list expressly identifies examples of various steroids and clearly states that substances of similar chemical structure or similar biological effects are also anabolic steroids and agents prohibited within the scope of class S1. The Panel notes that there are virtually an unlimited number of potential variances of the Testosterone compound. It would be impractical to require the identification of all forms of steroids and there is always the possibility for a nefarious scientist to synthesize a new substance before it becomes detectable the Appellant rightly concedes, and the Panel in any event finds, that there is a need, in principle, for a catch-all clause in the form of a “related substance” clause in order to establish a level playing field for all athletes’) and para  119 (‘The Panel is not prepared to follow the Appellant’s argument that once WADA is aware of a substance that is “chemically similar” in structure to another prohibited substance(s), then WADA must include the name of this “chemically similar” substance on the Prohibited List. Imposition of such an obligation would be impractical. It would have the effect that a “chemically similar” substance would in principle be covered by the Prohibited List initially and then depart from it as and when at some unidentifiable time WADA fails to name it expressly. The creation of such a mechanism would provoke endless disputes on when WADA would become “aware” of a “chemically similar” substance and what the time line would be for WADA to comply with

326  Regulating Sport its obligation to put it on the Prohibited List. This would lead to unequal treatment of the various athletes depending on the sheer coincidence when the “chemically similar” substance is detected in an athlete’s system. In addition, it would completely undermine the principle of legal certainty. When would a stakeholder know whether or not WADA was aware of the chemically similar substance within the above meaning?’); UK  Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004 (‘30. The reason for the drafting of the list in the form of example substances is derived from the complexity of the subject matter, the continuing advances in scientific understanding and the need for a rule which is comprehensive, fair and clear. It would be impracticable to identify all forms of steroids in the list of prohibited substances, and it is always possible for new substances to be synthesised. It would be unfair to some athletes, and detrimental to the health of others, to permit athletes to experiment with novel forms or derivations of steroids until such time as the rule makers detected the new compounds and moved to add them to the list of identified substances. […] 31. In this context the rule is actually clearer and fairer by being widely drafted. All athletes are warned that they should not take drugs. No athlete who intended to comply with the rules would consider taking any form of steroid on the grounds that its formulation was different from that of a named steroid on the prohibited list. The principle of legal certainty, that is that a person should know with clarity the legal consequences of his action, is thus advanced by the form in which the rule is drafted. Nor can it be argued that the principle against doubtful penalisation has any realistic application in a case where the athlete is disavowing any deliberate decision to take any form of steroid’); IAAF v Walker, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 20 August 2000, paras 18-19 (rejecting athlete’s argument that charging him with a doping offence based on the presence in his sample of a substance that was not mentioned expressly on the list of prohibited substances breached ‘the principles of legal certainty and legal clarity’, because the list stated that not only substances mentioned expressly on the list but also substances that were ‘chemically or pharmacologically related’ to substances mentioned expressly on the list were prohibited, and the substance found in his sample fell into that latter category). Cf UEFA  v Sakho, UEFA  Control, Ethics and Disciplinary Body decision dated 7 July 2016, para 21 (‘it is not enough for WADA to simply state in its prohibited list that all substances that might possibly fit a very general description (eg  all Beta-2 Agonists) are prohibited. This is not specific enough’) and para  34 (‘there must be legal certainty as to the substances on WADA’s prohibited list. Any uncertainty must be interpreted in favour of the accused and, based on the foregoing discussion of Higenamine, there is clearly considerable uncertainty in this case about the categorisation of Higenamine as a Beta-2 Agonist on WADA’s prohibited list’), para 46 (‘the CEDB must be mindful of what it could reasonably expect the Player (and his club and personal trainer) to have been able to learn about Higenamine from publicly available sources, given the fact that it does not appear by name in WADA’s prohibited list, that WADA does not appear to have made a firm determination itself, that WADA has not formally communicated any determination to its accredited laboratories and that some (if not all) WADA accredited laboratories are uncertain of Higenamine’s status on the prohibited list’), and para  49 (therefore dismissing charge that presence of Higenamine in player’s sample constituted an antidoping rule violation).

(b) The general legal principle of ‘respect for fundamental rights’ B1.25 The English legal system, like most of its counterparts, recognises and gives legal protection to certain ‘fundamental rights’ derived from national (constitutional) law and/or from international instruments,1 including the right to freedom of expression, the right to equal treatment, and the right to a fair hearing.2 It is public bodies that have to respect such rights, and the English legal system, like many others, classifies SGBs not as public bodies but as private regulators, and their decisions as subject to private law as opposed to administrative law.3 However, there are arguments even in such systems that SGBs are required as a matter of law to respect these fundamental rights, and some commentators have argued that it should be considered a general principle of law applicable to all SGBs, wherever they may be based, that their regulations should be interpreted4 and applied in a manner that respects these ‘fundamental rights’.5 Such rights may be regarded as implicit in the contractual arrangements between SGBs and participants, and in some instances the fact that state courts and tribunals must ensure the protection of these rights means that they have ‘horizontal effect’ on SGBs, because if they are breached by a decision they may be liable to review at state level. 1 For example, the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, and the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In addition, Art 6(3) of the Maastricht Treaty states: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  327

2

3

4 5

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law’. See also Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3)  ISLR  39, at 40 (contrasting the concept of ‘fundamental rights’ in this context with the narrower concept of ‘human rights’ derived solely from international legal instruments). Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245, 252 (‘Although the United Kingdom has no written constitution, the courts have recognised certain fundamental rights as constitutional. This development pre-dates the HRA [Human Rights Act] 1998 and is the common law at work in protection of fundamental rights. Thus the courts protect as constitutional the right of participation in the democratic process, equality of treatment, freedom of expression, religious freedom, and the right of unimpeded access to the courts’). See also Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, para 320 (‘In addition to relying on the anti-discrimination provisions in the IAAF  Constitution, Mr. Leeper also relies on the CRPD [UN  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities] and the ECHR. The IAAF submits that neither of those international instruments is applicable to the present case. In particular, the IAAF submits that the CRPD and ECHR only apply to State Parties and public authorities exercising State powers, and do not apply to private bodies which are not exercising such powers. The Panel accepts that the CRPD and ECHR are international treaties which are directed towards, and binding upon, State Parties and do not impose obligations on purely private bodies. The materials before the Panel do not establish that under Monegasque law the IAAF itself owes any obligations to Mr. Leeper by virtue of either the ECHR or the CRPD. In this regard, the Panel notes the observation of the CAS Panel in A v FIFA CAS 2011/A/2426 that, “international treaties on human rights are meant to protect the individuals’ fundamental rights vis-à-vis governmental authorities and, in principle, they are inapplicable per se in disciplinary matters carried out by sports governing bodies, which are legally characterized as purely private entities”. While the present appeal does not concern a “disciplinary matter”, the Panel considers that those observations are equally applicable to the Appellant’s reliance on the ECHR and CRPD in this case’). See para B1.61, n.12. Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003]  ISLR  3(3) 39, at 45-46 (‘irrespective of the academic debate over the applicability of fundamental rights guarantees in purely private sports matter[s], it would be right for sports organisations to take all appropriate action to respect fundamental rights. Thereby, they would obey the (moral) precept of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights urging “every individual and every organ of society” to play its part in securing the universal observance of human rights. Any other approach would only support the view that, in their fight against doping, the sports governing bodies are in fact acting with the same unfairness they pretend to combat’); Haas, ‘Role and Application of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in CAS Procedures’ [2012] 12(3) ISLR 43, 46 (‘at least some of the provisions of the ECHR form part of an inalienable system of values in the sense of public policy (ordre public) which state courts have to ensure observation of the various interfaces between the private and state justice systems, therefore also in relation to arbitral jurisdiction’). The introduction to the 2015 World AntiDoping Code arguably reflects the same view, stating: ‘These sport specific rules and procedures […] are intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights’. See also Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para  149 (the principle of deference to an SGB’s autonomy to run its sport ‘does not prevent a judicial or arbitral tribunal charge with examining the rules to determine whether they constitute an infringement of fundamental rights’); Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4.19 (‘[…] certain rules may constitute a restriction to fundamental rights, when such rules pursue a legitimate objective and are proportionate to the objective sought. In the instant case, the Panel […] considers that FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor players do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not admissible’). See also Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD  v UEFA & FC  Porto Futebol SAD, CAS  2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 35 (‘there is an imbalance between the association and the person affected. This is expressed by the fact that the person affected only has the choice of whether to accept performing the sport under the conditions dictated by the association or to give up performing the sport altogether. Since this imbalance carries the risk that the association abuses its position of power, certain protective standards must apply (“droits de protection”) in the interests of the person affected’) and para 45 (‘In the opinion of the Panel the club is not placed in an unprotected position by the non-application of the criminal law prohibition of retroactivity because, due to the measure’s character as a sanction, it is perfectly possible that other legal principles, which are part of the “droits de protection”, apply. In this regard one must think of the principle of legality, the principle of proportionality, the principle of equal treatment and also the principle of “nulla poena sine culpa” (on all this see CAS 2007/A/1381, no. 99)’).

B1.26 There is plenty of jurisprudence discussing and applying the rights set out in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),1 the freedoms enshrined

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in the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),2 and the rights derived from national constitutions. It appears that the function of the ‘general principle of respect for fundamental rights’ would not be to add to those laws and rights,3 but rather simply to ensure that they apply to constrain SGB regulations that transcend national and regional boundaries, notwithstanding that some SGBs may be considered under their national laws to be private bodies that do not exercise powers delegated by the state. For example, the CAS has said that provisions in an SGB’s constitution regulating the conduct of elections of officers of the SGB must respect the right to freedom of expression protected by Art 10 of the ECHR.4 It has also repeatedly emphasised that provisions purporting to restrict judicial scrutiny of the decisions of an SGB (eg by narrowing the scope of review to be undertaken by CAS on an appeal against such a decision) will be carefully scrutinised to assess whether they constitute a denial of the right to access to the courts guaranteed by Art 6(1) of the ECHR.5 1 For further discussion of the ECHR (enshrined in English law by the Human Rights Act 1998) in the context of sport, see Chapter E13 (Human Rights and Sport). 2 For further discussion of the freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU in the context of sport, see Chapters E11 (Competition Law and Sport) and E12 (Free Movement and Sport). 3 See Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4.17 (‘The Appellant also claims that Art. 19 RSTP contradicts Art. 12 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on freedom of assembly and of association. As submitted by FIFA, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not a legal document having binding effect. In consequence, one cannot rely upon Art. 12 in order to assert any legally enforceable right’); USOC et al v IOC, CAS OG 2000/001, para 26 (‘[…] the Claimants – and Mr Perez – are frustrated by a clear rule [setting out conditions for transfers of sporting allegiance from one national federation to another] which intrinsically operates in such a fashion as to cause the overall duration of an emigrating athlete’s future Olympic eligibility to depend on the particular naturalisation regime of the country in which he or she chooses to relocate. Contrary to the Claimants’ arguments, there is no rule of “fairness”, to be derived from the Olympic Charter’s acknowledgement that the practice of sport is a fundamental human right, which would under such circumstances create an outer time limit of Olympic eligibility’). 4 King v AIBA, CAS 2011/A/2452, para 6.26 (‘The Panel would only comment that in any organisation, including a sports governing body, domestic or international, there is a danger that those in control may confuse their individual interests with those of the organisation as a whole and in consequence overact and misuse their powers vis-à-vis those who oppose them. The taking of legal advice, the institution of legal proceedings, and vigorous electioneering can only exceptionally be classified as conduct violative of regulations reasonably drawn and reasonably to be applied. It is, the Panel notes, political speech that ranks foremost in the hierarchy of the rights, embraced [in] the right to freedom of expression protected by Article  10 of the European Convention on Human Rights’). See also Arzhanova v CMAS, CAS 2010/A/2284, para 42 (‘Good governance is important in sport, and thus a member of the BoD [board of directors] of a federation should be able to raise questions without the fear of being immediately sanctioned’). 5 Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 65 (declining to limit scope of CAS de novo review of first instance decisions, because under ECHR Art 6(1) ‘[…] a person affected by a decision must have, in principle, access to (at least) one instance of justice. It goes without saying that doping sanctions strongly affect the rights of an athlete and that federation instances do not provide for access to justice within the meaning of Art 6(1) ECHR, since they do not guarantee adjudication of the facts and the law by a truly independent judicial instance. Restrictions to the fundamental right of access to justice should not be accepted easily, but only where such restrictions are justified both in the interest of good administration of justice and proportionality. The Sole Arbitrator fails to see why a restriction of his mandate – contrary to the clear wording of the Art R57 of the CAS Code – would be in the interest of good administration of justice’); Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.6 (‘[…] the Panel has serious doubts whether an association could curtail a person’s right to appeal a decision by which he or she is adversely affected. Were that the case, it would leave such a party without access to any legal remedies’); Katusha Management SA v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3031, para 68 (warning against applying precedents permitting limitations on the scope of CAS review ‘[…] to the detriment of an athlete’s fundamental rights. In other words, an athlete basically cannot be precluded from obtaining in CAS arbitration at least the same level of protection of his/her substantive rights that he or she could obtain before a State court’); Volandri v ITF, CAS 2009/A/1782, para 70 (rejecting attempt in tennis anti-doping rules to limit CAS de novo review of first instance decisions: ‘The Panel is of the opinion that it must be able to review the Appealed Decision with regard to the fundamental rights of the Player. Any other interpretation would lead to possible abuse of process and of authority, which would be absolutely unacceptable and would represent a substantial and specific danger to sporting spirit. Furthermore, any agreement between the parties to restrict the powers of this Panel would have

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  329 to be viewed critically in the light of the limitations imposed by the Swiss ordre public. Agreements between athletes and international federations are – in general terms – not concluded voluntarily on the part of the athletes but rather imposed upon them unilaterally by the federation. There is, therefore, a danger that a federation acts in excess of its powers unless the content of the agreement does take sufficiently into account also the interests of the athlete. The Panel has some doubts whether a provision that restricts the Panel’s power to amend a wrong decision of a federation to the benefit of the athlete balances the interests of both parties in a proportionate manner’). See generally Haas, ‘Role and Application of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in CAS Procedures’ 2012 12(3) ISLR ISLR 43. See also Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS  2008/A/1584, para  30 (‘the Panel is of the opinion that the association’s legislator cannot make the group of persons, who have a right to appeal, smaller than the statutory model; for it is an indispensable essential part of the ordre public that an individual’s legal protection against measures by an association is guaranteed by an external instance that is independent from the association. Since it can be assumed that the association’s legislator wanted to comply with these (minimum) statutory requirements, this is also an argument for granting third parties the right to appeal if they are directly affected by the measure taken by the association’).

(c) The right to equal treatment B1.27 There is perhaps one fundamental right, however, that is interpreted and applied more broadly in the sporting context than in wider society. Although many legal systems treat equal treatment under law as a general ‘principle of good public administration’,1 discrimination is usually only unlawful when it is based on nationality in the EU context, or on ‘protected characteristics’ such as age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage and civil partnership and pregnancy and maternity.2 But in sport the paramount importance of ensuring a level playing-field wherever the sport is played means that all of an SGB’s regulations should apply equally to all participants in the sport, absent a good objective reason for different treatment.3 On this basis, any unequal treatment of participants is prima facie impermissible and requires justification in order to be enforceable, whether the unequal treatment is based on a characteristic protected by mandatory law or on some other ground. For example, the CAS has considered arguments that the principle is infringed by a policy permitting national federations in one continent to enter two boxers in Olympic qualifying competition while national federations in other continents were only allowed to enter one,4 or by rules prohibiting clubs under common ownership from competing in the same competition.5 Although in each case the CAS panel found that on the facts there was no discrimination, it proceeded on the basis that the claims could have been upheld if the facts had been different. The corollary is that there are some elements in the European Model of Sport,6 and in national international competition, in which differences based on (for example) nationality, or age, or ability, are necessary. 1 See eg R v Hertfordshire Country Council ex parte Cheung (1986) Times, 4 April, per Lord Donaldson MR (it is ‘a cardinal principle of good public administration that all persons who were in a similar position should be treated equally’); R (McMorn) v Natural England [2015] EWHC 3297 (Admin) (Ouseley J), para 200 (‘The decision-maker should decide like cases alike absent a rational justification for deciding them differently’). 2 See generally Chapter E14 (Discrimination in Sport). 3 Sun Yang v FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, para 381 (‘This is the rule of law, now of singular importance in the field of sport, and applicable to all athletes, irrespective of their background or status, their standing or success. The application of the rule of law in the domain of sport requires all to be treated equally’); FIFA & WADA, CAS  2005/C/976 & 986, para  137 (‘Sanctions imposed by associations must comply with the principle of equal treatment, eg insofar as all members or constituents of that association must be treated alike. This is especially true in sports where equal treatment is fundamental for any sports competition’); Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.37 (‘The Panel […] shares the Respondent’s preference for equal treatment and it believes that the requirement of a level playing field is a lex sportiva principle to be respected by all sports governing bodies and protected by the CAS’); Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 10.2.4 (‘[…] an international federation deals with national federations and athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis. It therefore has to apply the same law to all of them’); European Olympic Committee, CAS 95/144, para 6.1 (referring to ‘[…] two fundamental principles of Olympism: equality and universality. Doping

330  Regulating Sport rules must be the same for everyone, everywhere, applicable whatever the nationality of the person concerned and whatever the sport they practice’); Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, para 12.24 (‘[…] like cases should presumptively be treated alike’). The SGB’s rules may make this requirement of equal treatment explicit. For example, Art 4.1(j) of the 2019 IAAF Constitution requires the IAAF ‘[…] to preserve the right of every individual to participate in Athletics as a sport, without unlawful discrimination of any kind’; while Art 11.2.3 of WADA’s International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories states: ‘Signatory Consequences shall be applied without improper discrimination between different categories of Signatory. In particular, given that International Federations and National Anti-Doping Organizations have equally important roles in fighting doping in sport, they should be treated the same (mutatis mutandis) when it comes to imposing Signatory Consequences for non-compliance with their respective obligations under the Code and the International Standards’. The same principle also bars an SGB from issuing rules that treat it more favourably than its member federations in case of disputes between them, eg in relation to the ability to recover the costs of the proceedings. Bulgarian Chess Federation v FIDE, CAS  2012/A/2943, para  8.54 (‘[…] the article provides that FIDE will be subject to the same liability as the federation in part one of the article. In the vast majority of cases before the CAS it will be the member federations taking action against FIDE. Thus, in the vast majority of the cases only part one of the article will apply. Interestingly, Art 13.6 of the FIDE Statutes provides in such instances for a full recovery of costs only if the federation (initiates and) loses the appeal. If, however, the member initiates the proceedings against FIDE and succeeds with its appeal, no full recovery of costs is foreseen by the provision in favour of the member federations. This unequal treatment is disturbing and not justified by overriding interests in favour of FIDE. In particular, the goal to discourage member federations from availing themselves of their right to appeal FIDE resolutions does not justify such an unbalanced treatment of Respondent and its members. To conclude, while an equal and balanced provision could be considered as being in line with Swiss mandatory law, Art 13.6 of the FIDE Statutes is incompatible with the principle of equal treatment of the parties and, thus, the decision of the General Assembly in relation to Art 13.6 of the FIDE must be annulled’). 4 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455. 5 AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 65. 6 See para A1.__.

B1.28 The right to equal treatment means that a proposed interpretation of an SGB’s regulations that would give them a discriminatory effect is to be avoided.1 It also means that if the regulations, properly interpreted, do not treat all participants in the sport equally, the discrimination has to be justified in order to stand.2 And even if the regulations are non-discriminatory on their face, it is unlawful to apply them in a discriminatory manner.3 ‘As a matter of principle, every athlete has a right to receive equal treatment from his sports association. The right particularly means that the sports association must comply with the sports rules in relation to the athlete […]’.4

On this basis, the CAS has considered complaints based on an SGB’s allegedly selective enforcement of a rule limiting athletes’ transfers of allegiance from one country to another,5 and on an SGB’s alleged enforcement of its anti-doping rules only against athletes from a particular country.6 If the facts support the claim of discrimination and the SGB is unable to establish any objective justification for that discrimination, relief should be granted. 1 Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 47 (UEFA hearing panel, concerned about proportionality of rule that excluded a club from participation in UEFA club competitions if it had ever been involved in match-fixing activities, interpreted it as applying only to the season after the activities in question were proven, but the CAS panel criticised this, noting: ‘The Panel points out that this interpretation appears arbitrary, for there is nothing in the wording of the rule that even begins to support it. Furthermore, it gives rise to an unequal treatment of clubs, which is difficult to reconcile. For, if a club is found guilty of bribery in a sporting season, in which it does not meet the sporting criteria for qualifying for the CL, this remains without consequence for it (for ever). This is so even if the offence was only a short while back. However, a club, which qualifies for the CL in a year, in which the prohibited conduct is proven, is treated differently. That club will not be admitted, even if the offence took place perhaps many years in the past. However, it is not readily apparent why the reputation of the CL should be harmed if a club participates in the CL in the one case (according to the decision by the UEFA CDB of 4 June 2008), but not in the other’).

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  331 2 As in Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449 and Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 548: see paras B1.13, n 1 and E14.__; and Gibraltar Badminton Association v IBF, CAS 2001/A/329, p 3 (‘[…] even if we accept the English law definition stated by the Appellant “discrimination may be defined as treating someone less favourably than others without justification”, there would be no discrimination in the present situation because the IBF has good reasons to treat differently the participants in the Sudirman Cup’). 3 FC Barcelona v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, para 9.34. See also Wigan Athletic FC v Heart of Midlothian, CAS  2007/A/1298, para  99 (noting a mandatory principle of Swiss law that a sports association’s ‘regulations must be applied and its decisions made in a predictable and cognisable manner, notably to ensure equality of treatment […]’); Adidas v The Lawn Tennis Association & Ors [2006] EWHC 1318 (Ch), para 44 (dress rule in tennis may be objectively justified but manner of proposed application, to adidas’ identification but not to other manufacturers’ identifications, would amount to unlawful discrimination against adidas). 4 W v UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455, para 15. 5 Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian Ice Hockey Federation v International Ice Hockey Federation, CAS 2001/A/357. The alleged difference in treatment has to be established on the facts. In World Rugby v Perinchief, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 29 June 2015, a Mexican rugby player argued that it was unfair, and in breach of the fundamental principle of equal treatment, to charge him with an antidoping rule violation based on low levels of clenbuterol found in his sample when other SGBs had not charged athletes in similar positions on the basis that the finding was likely due to meat contamination. The hearing panel held that it had no power to dismiss the charge on this ground, and that even if it did, it would not do so as there were examples of athletes being pursued for violations based on similar adverse analytical findings for low levels of clenbuterol. Ibid, para 75 (World Rugby’s anti-doping rules do not give hearing panel ‘any power to dismiss the charge on the basis of what was asserted to be (in our word) unfairness’) and para 76 (‘We are enjoined to consider any alleged ADRV on the basis of the evidence presented to us and consider the individual charge on its merits. By that we mean the BJC is required to consider whether or not an ADRV has been proved. In so doing it may consider, for example, whether certain procedural irregularities are such that the ADRV cannot be proved. We concluded that it does not have some general and inherent “supervisory power” or jurisdiction over the bringing of proceedings. Even if we had such power, we would not have used it in this case. There are examples of athletes being pursued for alleged ADRV where the Prohibited Substance in clenbuterol. Contador is but one example’). 6 Russian Olympic Committee v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, paras 149–150 (recognising right to equal treatment, but rejecting on the facts the ROC’s argument that its athletes’ right not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality had been infringed by the IAAF, since the regulation that the IAAF was enforcing applied on its face to all national federations, without discrimination, and the IAAF had not applied it in a discriminatory manner); Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4703, para 58(iv) (‘[…] as to an alleged discrimination, such contention is unsupported by any corroborating evidence: there is no indication that the rules were (or would be) applied in a different way to athletes of different nationality’); Czech Olympic Committee and Swedish Olympic Committee v IIHF, CAS OG 98/004005, para 14 (again acknowledging right of equal treatment, but rejecting on the facts the claim that that right had been infringed; other players had been allowed to play for a second country because they were dual nationals, whereas the appellant’s player was not a dual national and so was not eligible to play for Sweden).

B1.29 On the other hand, the requirement is to treat like cases alike, but also to treat different cases differently.1 ‘As the equality principle allows unequal treatment of different situations, as long as such treatment is reasonable and justifiable, it seems to the Panel that often equal treatment is in the eye of the beholder; therefore, application of implied assumptions of equal treatment can lead to diverse answers, and is an infirm basis for bypassing unambiguous legal provisions’.2

In particular, it is not a defence to enforcement action simply to show that the rule has not been enforced in similar circumstances against other members or participants.3 The lack of action in those other cases may have been justified by objective factual differences in the other cases.4 Alternatively the difference in treatment may be because the SGB misunderstood the effect of its rules at that time,5 or it may be simply that the SGB did not know of the other cases.6 The difference in treatment would only be grounds for dismissal of the case at hand if it could be shown that the SGB had consistently and deliberately applied different standards to other parties:

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(a) without any objective justification for doing so,7 or (b) and did not have any objective justification not to do so in the case at hand.8 1 See Lord Hoffman in Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98, 109 (noting that ‘Equality before the law requires that persons should be uniformly treated, unless there is some valid reason to treat them differently’, and stating ‘their Lordships would go further and say that treating like cases alike and unlike cases differently is a general axiom of rational behaviour’); AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, paras 65–66 (‘It seems to the Panel that there is no discrimination in denying admission to a club whose owner is objectively in a conflict of interest situation; likewise, eg there is no discrimination in denying admission to a club whose stadium is objectively below the required safety standards. In both cases, if the shareholding structure or the safety conditions are modified, the club is admitted to the UEFA competition. Therefore, the Contested Rule does not target or single out specific clubs as such but simply sets forth objective requirements for all clubs willing to participate in UEFA competitions. [66] As a result, the Panel holds that the Contested Rule does not violate the principle of equal treatment’). See also Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 15 (‘Equal (or at least very similar) situations must receive equal treatment; conversely, unequal situations must receive different treatment. The general principle requires the tribunal carefully to examine the facts of the relevant cases to detect material similarities or differences and to explain the same […]’). 2 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.36. 3 See para B3.131, citing Football Association v Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 June 2017, para 3.7(i) (‘an Independent FA Regulatory Commission is required to consider the particular disciplinary charge(s) brought against the particular Participant that is/are before it. Whether other Participants could and should have been charged with misconduct in the past for similar, or even worse, comments is irrelevant to the judgment that we must make in this case’. The panel went on to comment that ‘There was nothing before us to suggest that the decision to charge Mr. Moyes was so arbitrary or capricious that it would offend principles of fairness and justice to allow The FA to pursue it’); Rugby Football Union v Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018, para  46 (the player raised the fact that in other cases players had not been subject to misconduct charges based on similar conduct; however, it was conceded that this did not prevent the panel from finding the player guilty of misconduct in that case). 4 Russian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation, CAS OG  16/09, para  7.15 (rejecting argument that a ban on the RWF from entering its athletes in the 2016 Olympic Games due to doping ‘constitutes a breach of the principle of equal treatment’, because ‘[t]he Applicant has not shown to the Panel that any other member federation has been involved in a similar doping scheme of such magnitude. Consequently, the Panel finds that there is no breach of equal treatment in the case at hand’). 5 FFG v SOCOG, CAS OG 2000/014, para 28 (where the respondent accepted that it had not enforced its bye-law restricting advertising on team uniforms in respect of other teams in the same way as it was enforcing it in respect of the applicant’s team, the CAS panel stated: ‘The Applicant has a legitimate grievance if their athletes were subject to such inconsistent treatment. However, if (as we have already concluded) the Bye-Law was correctly applied in the decision complained of it is no defence that it was incorrectly not applied to other competitors. We do, however, emphasize that as a general principle consistency of treatment in a matter such as this is of the greatest importance, and that those who enforce these rules […] should strive to attain it’). However, even if prior incorrect application does not stop the SGB correcting the practice moving forward, it might stop the SGB from enforcing the rule against those who were previously led to believe they would not be pursued: see para B1.39. 6 Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian Ice Hockey Federation v International Ice Hockey Federation, CAS  2001/A/357, paras 25–26 (‘The Respondent does concede that there have indeed been players in the past, who have represented two different countries. However, since this happened without the consent or even knowledge of the Respondent, those players cannot be taken into account when deciding the present case. They were simply able to violate the IIHF rules because no one noticed at the time, due to lack of computerization. Since those players were not “treated” by the Respondent at all, Mr. Nabokov cannot have been treated unequally. The fact that some players have, in the past, been able to violate the rules cannot mean that other players should benefit from their misconduct. The Panel is not aware that the IIHF ever allowed another player to represent a different country after turning eighteen. Therefore, this is not a case of unequal treatment’). 7 Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.5 (‘there is a general principle that no one can claim for equal treatment by referring to someone else who has adopted an illegal conduct, without sanction (Nemini dolus alienus prodesse debet). This principle is recognised by Swiss law […]. In general, one cannot claim to benefit from the same treatment as another in circumstances where the treatment granted to the other would be illegal. There is an exception to this principle where it can be evidenced that the constant practice of the authorities is to benefit third parties with treatments that are illegal’). 8 Football Association v Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13  December 2018, discussed at length at para B3.130 et seq.

B1.30 Similar caution must be applied when considering equal treatment arguments in the context of sanctions. The basic principle is clear: ‘sanctions imposed

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by associations must comply with the principle of equal treatment, eg insofar as all members or constituents of that association must be treated alike. This is especially true in sports where equal treatment is fundamental for any sports competition’.1 One CAS panel has suggested that the right to equal treatment means that ‘wherever the rules grant the sports association discretion or the scope to decide as it thinks fit, it must exercise this power in the same way in relation to every athlete’.2 Another has noted that: ‘in determining, as an international appellate body, the correct and proportionate sanction, CAS panels must also seek to preserve some coherence between the decisions of the different federations in comparable cases in order to preserve the principle of equal treatment of athletes in different sports’.3

However, while the principle that ‘like cases should be treated alike’ is simple to state, in practice the sanction imposed in a particular case will depend very much on the hearing panel’s assessment of the particular facts and circumstances of that case,4 which assessment may or may not be clear from the available reports,5 so that proper comparison to the case at hand may be impossible. Furthermore, a decision should not be followed for the sake of consistency where the hearing panel that made it misapplied the rules and set the sanction at the wrong level: ‘Although consistency of sanctions is a virtue, correctness remains a higher one: otherwise unduly lenient (or, indeed, unduly severe) sanctions may set a wrong benchmark inimical to the interests of sport’.6 1 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 137. 2 W  v UK  Athletics, CAS  2003/A/455, para  15. See also FIFA & WADA, CAS  2005/C/976 & 986, para  137 (‘Sanctions imposed by associations must comply with the principle of equal treatment, eg insofar as all members or constituents of that association must be treated alike. This is especially true in sports where equal treatment is fundamental for any sports competition’); ISU  v Malkova, RSU & RUSADA, CAS  2016/A/4840, para  45 (‘As was said in CAS  2011/A/2615 at para  92, “In determining as an international body the correct and proper sanction, CAS panels must also seek to preserve coherence between the decisions of different federations in comparable cases in order to preserve the principle of equal treatment of athletes in different sports”. Albeit equal treatment is not a circumstances envisaged in the definition of NSF as a circumstances to be taken into account in assessment of its degree and the appropriate sanction consequent upon it, the principle and rationale for it is generally […] accepted as part of the lex ludica’); WADA v Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 61 (reducing the sanction to six months in order to avoid the application of the IOC’s ‘Osaka rule’, ie to avoid the athlete being banned as well from the next Olympics, ‘means that, assuming the same degree of negligence (arguendo: the same level of negligence as Hardy’s), A-level athletes would be entitled to a lower sanction (much lower: the half of it) than all other athletes. Such result is clearly untenable: proportionality is to be measured only against the kind of conduct (or level of negligence), and not the importance or level of the athlete’). See also doping cases cited at para C17.8. 3 WADA v FIVB & Berrios, CAS 2010/A/2229, para 90. 4 ISU v Malkova, RSU & RUSADA, CAS 2016/A/4840, para 39 (‘Given that “all cases are very fact specific and no doctrine of binding precedent applies to the CAS jurisprudence” CAS 2016/A/4643 para 82, it is, in the Panel’s view, dangerous to pray in aid tariffs imposed in other cases as distinct from any principles set out in the them’); Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 55 (‘As to the period of ineligibility, the Panel is conscious of the desirability of “harmonisation of sanctions” (WADC  10.2 and Rule 149) in international sport and international sporting disputes. […] Nevertheless, each case must be decided on its own facts’); IWBF  v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS  2010/A/2230, para  11.16 (‘[…] previous awards, unless authoritatively stating principles of general application, are of no real assistance given their fact sensitive nature and the lack of detailed knowledge of their particular circumstances available to later panels or sole arbitrators’); Cielo and others v FINA, CAS  2011/A/2495-2498, paras 8.2 and 8.3 (‘Other CAS decisions based on factspecific findings are of little relevance in deciding the present appeals unless the facts in such decisions are identical, or at least extremely similar, to the facts with which the present appeals are concerned. […] While we are informed by the views expressed in those cases by different Panels on legal issues, we do not consider that the particular outcomes in those cases are particularly useful in determining the outcome of these appeals in the light of the significantly different factual situations pertaining.’); Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, para 12.23 (‘In the Panel’s view, limited assistance can be gained from any previous case in which a tribunal from which an appeal in brought to CAS, simply applies an evaluation of all the circumstances to see whether the criterion of no significant fault or negligence is met. […] Given that the exercise is multi-factorial, it would be highly unlikely that there could be an

334  Regulating Sport exact read across from earlier to later cases’). See also Football Association v Marshall, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 8 May 2012, para 73 (‘Care needs to be taken in drawing too much from authorities when it comes to assessing the degree of fault. Every case will depend on its own facts and on the evidence seen and heard’). 5 Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 10.23 (‘[…] sanctions imposed by international federations and by national anti-doping organizations without adjudicated determination by an independent tribunal are of limited or no assistance. However, the decisions of national and international doping tribunals provide helpful guidance, particularly where they contain sufficient details of the circumstances and reasoning of the tribunal’). 6 Ibid, para 10.23. See also WADA v FIVB & Berrios, CAS 2010/A/2229, para 101 (rejecting reliance on a case imposing a three month ban because ‘the panel in that case did not examine the degree of fault of the athlete, and the circumstances of that case cannot therefore be compared to the circumstances of the current case’).

(d) The general legal principle of proportionality B1.31 Most rights, even ‘fundamental’ ones such as the right to equal treatment, are not absolute. Instead, restrictions on those rights (including restrictions set out in the regulations of an SGB) are permissible so long as they have an adequate legal basis,1 they are aimed at protecting a legitimate public interest,2 and they are necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that interest.3 1 See para B1.22. 2 See eg  Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS  2008/A/1485, para  7.4.19 (‘[…] certain rules may constitute a restriction to fundamental rights, when such rules pursue a legitimate objective and are proportionate to the objective sought. In the instant case, the Panel […] considers that FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor players do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not admissible’). For examples of other objectives of sporting regulations that have been held to be legitimate, see para B1.4. 3 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, 49. See also Rouiller, ‘Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article  10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law’, 25 October 2005, p 29 (‘The restriction must also be warranted on the basis of a sufficient public interest or the protection of the fundamental rights of others. In accordance with the proportionality principle, a restriction of fundamental rights must not exceed what is necessary in order to safeguard the public interest being pursued’). See eg Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 548 (‘it is common ground that a rule that imposes differential treatment on the basis of a particular protected characteristic is valid and lawful if it is a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of attaining a legitimate objective’); WADA & Kurtoglu v FIBA, FIBA AC 2005-6 decision dated 16 February 2006 at pp 10–11 (‘[…] not every curtailment of this principle by the Respondent’s rules is incompatible with the human rights and the general legal principles of Swiss Law. Rather the principle of proportionality for the athlete’s benefit must be weighed against the legitimate interests of the sports federations. This particularly includes the legitimate aim of effectively fighting against doping and the objective of the sports federations to harmonise doping penalties. As regards the question of how the opposing principles are to be reasonably harmonised in the rules and regulations, the Respondent has a certain amount of latitude for deciding without interference by the courts’); Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216 (Richards J), para 43 (‘In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised that, in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular, whether it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of discretion. The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of judgment. Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range of reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests. The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate’), aff’d, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056.

B1.32 Accordingly, proportionality is ‘the paramount condition for the validity of restrictions on fundamental rights’.1 It ‘requires that: (a) the measure taken by the governing body is capable of achieving the envisaged goal; (b) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach the envisaged goal;2 and

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(c) the constraints which the affected person will suffer as a consequence of the measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal’.3 In other words, to be proportionate, a measure must pursue a legitimate aim, there must be a sufficient ‘nexus’ between measure and aim, and the measure must go no further than is reasonably necessary in pursuit of the aim.4 For example, in Bosman the ECJ struck out UEFA’s regulations requiring payment of a transfer fee to a player’s former club even after that player’s contract had expired, on the grounds that there were less restrictive means of protecting competitive balance between clubs, such as the clubs agreeing to share revenues from sale of match tickets and/or broadcasting rights.5 1 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] ISLR 3(3) 39, 50–51. See eg IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 185 (describing ‘the proportionality requirement under general principles of law applicable in Switzerland and Monaco’ as part of ‘Swiss public policy’); Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.8 (referring to the need for the ITF’s anti-doping rules to satisfy ‘the general legal principle of proportionality’); Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 44 (referring to proportionality as ‘a widely generally accepted principle of sports law’); B v FIBA, CAS 92/80, paras 10, 19 (applying proportionality as one of the ‘general principles of law’ to test the legality of a FIBA regulation on transfers of sporting allegiance). Similarly, the Introduction to the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code states: ‘These sport specific rules and procedures […] are intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights’. Cf Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 129 (‘Because Rule 22.1(a) is not a sanction, it does not have to pass any test of proportionality’). 2 Ibid, para 130, citing FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, paras 138–40. 3 Leeper v IAAF, CAS  2020/A/6807, para  343 et seq (it was not necessary, and therefore it was unlawfully discriminatory, to put the burden on a disabled athlete to show that the prosthetic blades he ran on did not give him an artificial performance advantage; for the rule to be lawful, that burden had to be reversed, and World Athletics had to show, if it wanted to hold him ineligible to compete, that the blades did give him an artificial advantage). 4 IWBF  v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS  2010/A/2230, para  11.9 (‘In determining whether the limitation of an ECtHR or EU or human right is proportionate, a court must conventionally ask whether: (i) the measures designed to meet the legitimate objective are rationally connected to it; (ii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective; and (iii) the measures strike an appropriate balance between the interests of society and those of individuals and groups’); and Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, 50 (the necessity condition ‘implies that no less intrusive restriction is equally suitable to achieve such aim’). 5 C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para 110, endorsing the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz on this point at para 226 et seq.

B1.33 Proportionality ‘is also a general principle of law governing the imposition of sanctions of any disciplinary body, whether it be public or private’.1 Specifically in relation to disciplinary rules, the principle requires that ‘a reasonable balance must be struck between the violation and the sanction’.2 More specifically, the sanction must be ‘effective to achieve the purpose sought’, ie it must go as far as is necessary to achieve that purpose,3 but it must ‘not exceed what is necessary for that purpose’.4 To the extent it is disproportionate, it will not be enforced.5 1 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, 50–51. See also Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.23 (‘Any sanction must be just and proportionate. If it is not, the sanction may be challenged. […] When there is a cap or lacuna in the WADC, that gap or lacuna […] is to be filled by the Panel applying the overarching principle of justice and proportionality on which all systems of law, and the WADC, is based’). For a discussion of the extent to which the principle of proportionality may be invoked to challenge the sanctions for anti-doping rule violations mandated in the World Anti-Doping Code, see para C20.14 et seq. 2 IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, para 46. 3 IAAF v Zaripova, CAS 2015/A/4006, para 103(vi) (‘as to the principle of proportionality, the Panel finds that, contrary to the Respondents’ contention, it requires the retroactive disqualification of results, rather than the opposite. The principle of proportionality implies that there must be a reasonable balance between the kind of misconduct and the sanction, and in particular that (i) the measure taken by the governing body can achieve the envisaged goal, (ii) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, and (iii) the constraints on the affected person resulting from the measure are justified by the overall interest of achieving the envisaged goal. […] In this respect, the Panel notes that: • the purpose of disqualification in the Athlete’s case is inter alia to prevent her from

336  Regulating Sport gaining the advantage sought by her intentional, continued and severe doping violations over other competitors, who competed without doping; • the measure of disqualification is certainly capable of achieving the envisaged goal, since it implies the cancellation of the results obtained; • the measure of disqualification is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, because the Athlete, who cheated in the preparation of a given competition, would otherwise keep the benefits of the results achieved to the detriment of clean competitors, and • the constraints on the Athlete are justified by the overall interest of achieving the envisaged goal’). 4 IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, paras 46-47 (rejecting IFBB’s submission that suspending it from participation in the next edition of the World Games due to its failure to implement proper anti-doping policies was disproportionate, because the sanction ‘is effective to achieve the purpose sought and does not exceed what is necessary for that purpose’). 5 Reinholds v FISA, CAS 2001/A/330, para 16 (‘FISA’s Rules are unambiguous in providing for a life ban for a first doping offence. However, that sanction could be reduced if it were impeachable under Swiss Law, or in the exercise of the Panel’s powers if, in the Panel’s opinion, the sentence imposed was disproportionate to the offence’); and see cases discussed at paras C20.17 and C20.19.

B1.34 Once a claimant shows that an SGB’s regulations restrict his rights, it will be the SGB’s burden to demonstrate that the restrictions they impose are proportionate.1 In doing so, however, the SGB will be afforded a reasonable ‘margin of appreciation’, since (again) it is considered better placed than the courts to determine what is necessary and appropriate for its sport.2 Furthermore, on occasion an SGB ‘is entitled under Swiss law to limit in its rules the circumstances to take into account when fixing the sanctions and restrict the application of the doctrine of proportionality’.3 As a result, a court or arbitral panel will not interfere with the SGB’s regulations simply because it might have taken a different view on the policy to be pursued and the method for pursuing it. While this margin of appreciation always exists (in relation to discretionary decisions as opposed to those dictated by law), the extent of it may vary with the context and circumstances: where a restriction is more onerous, a court or tribunal will be more prepared to intervene than where the restriction is less so. On occasions a court or tribunal will only interfere if the regulations are shown to be (in civil law terms) ‘evidently and grossly disproportionate’,4 or (in common law terms) ‘irrational or perverse or otherwise outside the margin of discretion open to’ the sports regulator.5 On other occasions the court or tribunal will be prepared to be more intrusive, and the standard of proportionality applied will be considerably lower than the civil law standard of gross disproportionality and the common law standard of rationality. 1 Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 540 (‘if there is discrimination, then the burden of proof shifts to the IAAF to demonstrate, on the evidence, that the DSD  Regulations are necessary, reasonable and proportionate’); Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 443 (same). Cf Stevenage Borough Football Club v The Football League Ltd. (1996) CH 1996 S No 3043 (Carnwarth J) (‘where the system of control itself can be seen as in the public interest, then in my view the onus lies on those seeking to challenge it to show that the particular rules under attack are unreasonable in that narrow sense’). 2 See para B1.6, n 1. 3 WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 120. For example, the World Anti-Doping Code expressly states that it is ‘intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights’ (2015 Code, Introduction, p 17), and it then goes on to proscribe fixed sanctions (or a fixed range of sanctions, with fixed minimums) that must be imposed for anti-doping rule violations (see generally Chapter C17), and also drastically limits the factors that may be taken into account when fixing a sanction within that range (see para C20.10 et seq). The CAS and the Swiss Federal Tribunal have repeatedly rejected claims that this approach offends against the principle of proportionality (see para C4.17 n 5). 4 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 143 (‘The right to impose a sanction is limited by the mandatory prohibition of excessive penalties, which is embodied in several provisions of Swiss law. […] However, only if the sanction is evidently and grossly disproportionate in comparison with the proved rule violation and if it is considered as a violation of fundamental justice and fairness, would the Panel regard such a sanction as abusive and, thus, contrary to mandatory Swiss law’); Squizzato v FINA, CAS  2005/A/830, para  10.26 (‘The Panel is bound to respect the freedom of associations to establish their own rules […]. Therefore, one cannot deny that the bare rule provided in DC 10.5 restricts and substantially limits respectively the CAS panels’ discretion in reducing a suspension. The Panel recognizes that a mere “uncomfortable feeling” alone that a one year penalty is not the appropriate sanction cannot itself justify a reduction. […] [T]he principle of proportionality would

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  337 apply if the award were to constitute an attack on personal rights which was serious and totally disproportionate to the behaviour penalised’). See also Reinholds v FISA, CAS 2001/A/330, para 16 (‘The Panel would require compelling evidence of invalidity under Swiss Law before it felt prepared to interfere with the decision of an International Federation, which had debated the issue of sanctions for doping offences over a long period and which had decided on a sanction which had the support of the sport as a whole. Equally, the Panel would require compelling evidence before it was prepared to exercise its powers to reduce such a sanction imposed by an International Federation as part of its well-known and widely publicised policy on the ground that the sentence was disproportionate to the offence’). 5 Sheffield United v FAPL, FAPL Arbitration Panel award dated 3 July 2007, para 38. See also Chambers v BOA [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB), para 48 (‘Next, is the byelaw proportionate? […] Does the byelaw, when subjected to the intensity of review described in Bradley, go further than is reasonable or necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of the BOA?’); Stevenage Borough Football Club v The Football League Ltd. (1996) CH 1996 S No 3043 (Carnwarth J) (‘where the system of control itself can be seen as in the public interest, then in my view the onus lies on those seeking to challenge it to show that the particular rules under attack are unreasonable in that narrow sense. I also find it difficult to see any reason in principle why the test applied to the exercise of discretion by such regulatory bodies, acting in good faith, should be materially different to those applied to bodies subject to judicial review. […] [I]f admission criteria are shown to be arbitrary or capricious in effect, whether because [of] the way in which they are formulated or in the way in which they are applied, they are in my view open to challenge. But the onus is on those who make the challenge to establish their case, and the Court will give due weight to the judgment of the responsible bodies’), affirmed (1996) 9 Admin LR 109 [CA]; and see discussion at E15.17.

B1.35 An SGB that wishes to avoid seeing its rules struck down as disproportionate should bear in mind: (a)

that it will need to be able to show that there is no less intrusive way of achieving the underlying objective;1 (b) that the more restrictive the intrusion is, the more compelling the justification will need to be;2 (c) that evidence that other sports have adopted similarly restrictive or more restrictive rules to address the same mischief should help to establish that the SGB’s rule is reasonable and proportionate;3 and (d) that it will be much easier to demonstrate proportionality if absolute prohibitions are avoided and the SGB retains discretion to grant exemptions in exceptional cases,4 where it considers that doing so will not undermine the objectives behind the restrictions.5 A decision not to grant an exemption in a particular case could still be challenged, but the courts are less likely to overturn that decision if a fair procedure has been followed, no improper factors were taken into account, and the decision is not irrational.6 1 See eg Better Regulation Taskforce, ‘Principles of Good Regulation’ (2003), p 4 (‘Policy solutions must be proportionate to the perceived problem or risk and justify the compliance costs imposed – don’t use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. All the options for achieving policy objectives must be considered – not just prescriptive regulation. Alternatives may be more effective and cheaper to apply. […]’). 2 Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 511 (endogenous testosterone ‘is not being used to determine whether an athlete should compete either as a male or as a female. Instead, it is being used to introduce a new category of ineligible female athletes within the female category. The necessity and proportionality of that restriction therefore requires particularly careful analysis’), para  513 (‘Excluding athletes from competing at all on the basis of a natural genetic advantage, or conditioning their right to compete on undergoing medical intervention which reduces their athletic performance, imposes a significant detriment on the athletes concerned, and is therefore only valid if it is clearly established to be a necessary and proportionate means of achieving fair competition’), and para 528 (‘in order to justify excluding an individual from competing in a particular category on the basis of a naturally occurring characteristic such as endogenous testosterone, it is not enough simply to establish that the characteristic has some performance enhancing effect. Instead, the IAAF needs to establish that the characteristic in question confers such a significant performance advantage over other members of the category that allowing individuals with that characteristic to compete would subvert the very basis for having the separate category and thereby prevent a level playing field. The degree or magnitude of the advantage is therefore critical’) (emphasis in original).

338  Regulating Sport 3 Juliano et al v FEI, CAS 2017/A/5114, para 69 (finding that FEI policy of provisionally suspending a doped horse for two months was proportionate given that, among other things, in similar cases the British Horseracing Authority imposed a ban of 12 months); Tonga Rugby League v RLIF, [2008]  NSWSC  1173, para  69 (accepting that restraint was lawful because, inter alia, ‘[o]f the rules of the international sports which are in evidence, the rules of the Federation allow the greatest opportunity for a player to change countries’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 126 (in support of its argument that its rule prohibiting clubs under common ownership from entering the same UEFA competition is proportionate, ‘Respondent mentions the stricter regulations which may be found in the United Kingdom, such as the rules of the Premier League, the Football League and the Scottish Football Association, or in the United States, such as the rules of the NBA, the NFL, the NHL and the MLB’). See also European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 253 (‘The ISU argues, with reference to the Wouters judgment, that every sport discipline has its own characteristics and that the fact that other sports federations operate in a different manner does not put into question the ISU’s system. However, first, the number and range of sports federations which do not have any pre-authorisation system in place and the fact that the ISU refers in its response to the Letter of Facts to alleged restrictions included in the regulations established by associations of professional players in golf or tennis, and not in the statutes of the respective international federations as recognised by the International Olympic Committee, confirm the view of the Commission that the ISU’s ex ante control system based on the pyramid structure of sport is not “the norm” for regulating sport but rather one model alongside other, alternative governance models. Second, while it may be acceptable for a governing body to adopt stricter rules for its sport than other governing bodies, this should be justified on the basis of specific facts and evidence related to the features of the sport in order to be inherent in the pursuit of legitimate objectives and proportionate to them’). 4 Bedene & LTA v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 64 (‘It is precisely because of the existence of the right to apply for a discretionary exemption that Regulation 35 [saying a player may only represent one country at senior national representative level] is unobjectionable. Cases that the ITF regard as deserving of an exemption can be dealt with under Regulation 35(d). Once that is taken into account, I can see no basis for a contention that Regulation 35 is itself in breach of Article 49’); WADA v British Olympic Association, CAS 2011/A/2658, para 8.33 (‘The fact that the Bye-Law foresees a possibility of an Appeal Procedure is certainly a good instrument to avoid totally disproportionate decisions’). See also Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para  132 (noting with approval provision allowing athletes to apply for special eligibility for international competition despite suspension of their national federation, which meant that ‘the effect produced by the suspension of a national federation […] was recently made more flexible, to take into account individual cases, in a way consistent with the sought purpose of eradication of doping, protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity’). 5 International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215, paras 51-52 (‘When considering [whether to grant] its approval to the reduction or cancellation of the waiting period [required before transferring allegiance from one country to another], the IBA should give consideration to the objectives behind the waiting period rule’, and grant its approval if doing so would not undermine those objectives); Miranda v IOC, CAS 2000/003, para 41 (decisions whether to reduce or cancel waiting period ‘should be guided by the basic principles of the [Olympic] Charter’). 6 Cowley v Heatley (1986) Times, 24  July [CA], 1986  TLR  430, p  4 (‘It is the Court’s function to control illegality and to make sure that a body does not act outside its powers. But I do not think the interests of sport or anybody else would be served by the Court seeking to double-guess regulating bodies in charge of domestic arrangements such as the organisation of the Commonwealth Games’); Miranda v IOC, CAS 2000/003, para 36 (‘NOCs were intended to and do have an absolute discretion to determine whether or not to reduce or cancel the three year period in a given case, unexaminable in the absence of clear proof of abuse or ill will’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 101 (‘It is allowed to provide a discretion to the association and courts should not lightly exercise their power of review over the association’s decisions made in the exercise of such discretion, especially in cases in which sports governing bodies have special expertise and experience in relation to their sport’) and para 102 (noting, in relation to a challenge to a decision by the FIA that fairness did not require grant of a retroactive TUE under ISTUE Art 4.3(d), ‘While the Panel accepts that CAS cannot replace its assessment of fairness with that of the TUEC, it is nevertheless of the opinion that appeals may still be permitted on the ground that the decision was arbitrary, grossly disproportionate, irrational or perverse or otherwise outside of the margin of appreciation, or taken in bad faith or without the due process rights provided to the athlete’).

(e) Protection of acquired rights and legitimate expectations B1.36 As part of its well-established regulatory autonomy,1 an SGB is entitled to amend its regulations for the future where it considers the changes are required in order to achieve its underlying (legitimate) objectives.2 However, the law gives at

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least some protection to those who have acquired rights under one set of regulations that are taken away by a new regime.3 And CAS panels have used the doctrine of venire contra factum proprium to prevent an SGB making sudden changes to rules in circumstances where its members had legitimately expected that no such changes would be made. According to the CAS panel in AEK Athens, this doctrine ‘provides that, where the conduct of one party has led to the legitimate expectations on the part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party […]’.4 Expressed in this way, the principle appears to elide two separate English law doctrines, namely the public law doctrine of legitimate expectation and the private law doctrine of estoppel.5 Its practical effect is best illustrated by the AEK Athens decision itself: (a) Having already issued rules for its 1998/99 competitions that contained no ban on common ownership of clubs participating in those competitions, in May 1998 (just three months before the beginning of the 1998/99 season) UEFA introduced a new rule prohibiting clubs under common ownership from competing in the same UEFA competition. A  challenge issued by two commonly-owned clubs to the lawfulness of the rule was eventually rejected on the merits, the CAS finding that it did not infringe EC or Swiss competition law or any other legal rights of those clubs. However, when the challenge was first filed, the President of the CAS  Ordinary Division granted the clubs an interim order restraining UEFA from applying the rule for the 1998/99 season, on the following grounds: ‘By adopting the Regulation to be effective at the start of the new season, UEFA added an extra requirement for admission to the UEFA  Cup after the conditions for participation had been finally settled and communicated to all members. It did so at a time when AEK already knew that it had met the requirements for selection of its national association. Furthermore, it chose a timing that made it materially impossible for the clubs and their owner to adjust to the new admission requirement. […] The doctrine of venire contra factum proprium […] provides that, where the conduct of one party has led to the legitimate expectations on the part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party […]. By referring to this doctrine, CAS is not implying that UEFA is barred from changing its Cup Regulations for the future (provided, of course, the change is lawful on its merits). However, it may not do so without allowing the clubs sufficient time to adapt their operations to the new rules, here specifically to change their control structure accordingly’.6

(b) In its final award, while rejecting the challenge to the legality of the new rule, the CAS panel agreed that: ‘an adjustment to the Contested Rule should not be arranged hurriedly, and commonly controlled clubs and their owners should have some time to determine their course of action, also taking into account possible legal questions (eg if shares are to be sold, minority shareholders may be entitled to exercise pre-emptive rights within given deadlines). There is an obvious need for a reasonable period of time before entry into force, or else the implementation of the Contested Rule may turn out to be excessively detrimental to commonly controlled clubs and their owners’.7

It therefore endorsed the interim order that had been made, suspending application of the rule while the challenge was pending: ‘The Panel essentially agrees with the foregoing remarks by the President of the Ordinary Division of the CAS and with the ensuing conclusion that UEFA violated its duties of procedural fairness with respect to the 1998/99 season. Indeed, a sportsgoverning organization such as an international federation must comply with certain basic principles of procedural fairness vis-à-vis the clubs or the athletes, even if clubs and athletes are not members of the international federation […]. The Panel does not find a hurried change in participation requirements shortly before the beginning of the new season, after such requirements have been publicly announced and the clubs

340  Regulating Sport entitled to compete have already been designated, admissible. Therefore, the Panel approves and ratifies the CAS Procedural Order of 16 July 1998, which has granted interim relief consisting in the suspension of the application of the Contested Rule “for the duration of this arbitration or for the duration of the 1998/99 season of the UEFA Cup, whichever is shorter”’.8

In fact, given that the CAS panel only issued its final award on the merits after the following season (the 1999/2000 season) had begun, it continued the suspension of application of the rule for the 1999/2000 season even though it had upheld the legality of the rule, on the basis that ‘paramount considerations of fairness and legal certainty, needed in any legal system, militate against allowing UEFA to implement immediately the Contested Rule in the 1999/2000 football season’.9   1 See para B1.6.   2 An athlete who agrees to be bound by the SGB’s rules ‘as amended from time to time’ is bound by any subsequent amendments to the rules even if he does not agree with them, provided they do not fundamentally alter the purpose for which the rules were originally drawn up. Doyle v White City Stadium Ltd, 1935 1 KB 110 (CA) at pp 120–21 (‘The rules in fact were altered on June 17, 1932, and no point is now taken that the new rules were not validly passed. But it is said that inasmuch as the licence was originally granted before the rules had been changed the rules as they stood after alteration and at the time of the fight were not binding upon the plaintiff. It will be observed however that the terms of the application for the licence give plain leave to alter the rules or promulgate further rules. When these rules as altered are still for the purpose of carrying out the original purpose of the society or body of persons, the altered rules are made binding on the plaintiff. If there was an attempt fundamentally to alter the purpose for which the rules had been originally drawn up, the prospective agreement to adhere to fresh rules, or any alteration in the rules, would not apply. It is quite plain from the decision in Thellusson v Viscount Valentia (1) that if and so long as the rules are akin to the purpose for which a society exists, there is no inherent objection to an alteration of those rules or to further rules being made for the same purpose. Here the alteration in the rules is for such a limited purpose. If, for example, the alterations had been to turn a society connected with British boxing into a society for conducting horse-racing, the position might have been far different’) applied in South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020, para  88 (in Doyle, ‘Lord Hamworth was saying that there was an implied restriction on the power to amend the rules, namely that it could not be exercised to alter fundamentally the purpose for which they had been originally drawn up. But, subject to that limitation, it could be exercised to make changes even if their effect was to deprive a person of a benefit which he had acquired and woudld be able to retain under the rules before they were amended’) and para 89 (‘In our judgment, the same reasoning should be applied to the proper construction of Article  147(d) and Rule J1(c)(i). These provisions are in extremely wide terms. The only express limitation on the power they confer is that the alterations should be “deemed necessary to provide for matters arising from or to implement the Rules in so far as such regulation (sic) is not in conflict with any Rule”. We accept that, despite the apparent width of this wording, it would not permit the making of an alteration which has nothing to do with football, since that could not be deemed necessary to provide for matters arising from or to implement the Rules. But the amendments to give effect to the Council Decision do not alter fundamentally the purpose for which the Rules and Regulations were originally drawn up’) and para 93 (‘That is not to say that The FA can exercise these powers within a season free from all constraints (other than that the amendments are deemed necessary to provide for matters arising from or to implement the Rules). In exercising its powers, The FA must act rationally, non-capriciously and otherwise comply with public law principles. This obligation arises both because of the supervisory jurisdiction over sport governing bodies (see e.g. Bradley v Jockey Club [2007] LLR 543 at [33] to [47] per Richards J) and because the power being exercised is a unilateral power to amend the terms of a contract (see e.g. Paragon Finance v Nash [2002] 1 WLR 685, at [30] and [32] per Dyson LJ; Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 1661 at [30] per Baroness Hale; No 1 West India Quay (Residential) Ltd v East Tower Apartments Ltd [2018] 1 WLR 5682 at [37] per Lewison LJ)’). See also WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 114 (‘The Players also contended that weight should be given to the AFL Tribunal’s decision because of the distinction of the Tribunal’s members. They contended that under the 2010 AFL Anti- Doping Code, applicable at the time of the alleged infractions, an appeal was restricted and could not be a hearing de novo. The Panel observes that the contractual undertaking of each Player encompassed changes to the AFL rules. Accordingly, the 2015 AFL Anti-Doping Code applies to the procedural aspects of this appeal’).  3 In English law, there is no ‘general presumption that legislation does not alter the existing legal situation or existing rights’, since ‘the very purpose’ of legislation is to change the existing law, often by ‘altering existing rights for the future’. Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC  816, per Lord Roger at 192. However, there is a presumption that there is no intent to disturb or interfere with ‘accrued’ rights. Ibid, per Lord Hope at 98 (referring to the ‘general

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  341 presumption that legislation is not intended to operate retrospectively. That presumption is based on concepts of fairness and legal certainty. These concepts require that accrued rights and the legal effect of past acts should not be altered by subsequent legislation’). See also s 16(1) of the Interpretation Act 1976 (‘where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears, [..] (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under that enactment; […]’). This is a weaker presumption in practice than the presumption against retroactivity (as to which, see para B1.40), because a regulation affecting vested rights does not purport to change the legal position before the regulation came into force but instead only alters the position moving forward, and ‘it is more likely that Parliament intended to alter vested rights in this way than that it intended to make a retroactive change’. Wilson, ibid, per Lord Rodger at 195. However, it was held not to assist the claimant club in South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020 (see fn 2, above, and fn 6 to para B1.38). Furthermore, the courts have struggled to come up with a straightforward test to determine when a benefit claimed under previous legislation amounts to a ‘vested’ or ‘accrued’ right that warrants such protection. See Chief Adjudication Officer v Maguire [1999] 1 WLR 1778 (CA), per Simon-Brown LJ at 1788F (‘whether or not there is an acquired right depends upon whether at the date of repeal the claimant has an entitlement (at least contingent) to money or other certain benefit receivable by him, provided only that he takes all appropriate steps by way of notices and/or claims thereafter’); Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 25, per Lord Simon-Brown at 36 (‘Maguire seems to me to point up the critical distinction between, on the one hand, legislation conferring “money or other certain benefit” and, on the other hand, a mere statement of policy as to how presently it is proposed to exercise an administrative discretion when eventually it comes to be exercised, a policy which may change at any moment’). Some commentators have suggested that ultimately it appears to come down to the court’s sense of ‘simple fairness’: Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 4.50. That is reflected in Bedene, where the ITF replaced a rule allowing transfers of allegiance from one country to another after a three-year waiting period with a rule prohibiting any transfers after playing for a country at senior level. A player who had taken several steps to transfer allegiance to a second country but had not yet completed the three year waiting period by the time the rule was changed argued that, having relied irreversibly on the transfer of allegiance provisions in the previous rule, he had a legitimate expectation that he would be permitted to play for the second country once he had met the conditions under the old rule for such transfers, and it would necessarily be unlawful for the ITF to act contrary to that legitimate expectation. The arbitrator rejected that submission on the basis that there was no general rule protecting ‘irreversible’ reliance in this way. Instead, whether protection was warranted would depend entirely on the facts, which the ITF could take into account in considering an application for exemption from the rule. Bedene & LTA  v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 75 (‘The basis for the Applicants’ contention was that Mr Bedene had relied upon the pre-2015 regulations before he became aware of its successor rule. So does that mean that any applicant for an exemption who had in any respect, however small, “irreversibly” relied upon the old rule must succeed? Why should this be the case? There is no principle of law which requires such a conclusion. Mr de la Mare criticized the lack of some sort of guidance defining or otherwise identifying relevant factors for the ITF to take into consideration in reaching a decision on an exemption. But the obvious difficulty in formulating guidance or relevant factors that are capable of distinguishing between cases of “irreversible” and “reversible” reliance, is precisely the reason why an exception must be assessed, by the ITF, on a case by case basis’). CAS panels have recognised the need to protect accrued rights in Clubul Sportiv Municipal Ramnicu Valcea v RFF & RPFL, CAS 2014/A/3855 (where a CAS sole arbitrator agreed that a club that had qualified for promotion in one season based on the rules in place for that season could not be denied promotion based on a change to the rules made after the season was completed: ‘the promotion and relegation of teams cannot be governed by a set of rules which was adopted after the end of the relevant sporting season and amended the rules which were in force during said season. This would result in disrupting the legal position acquired by the participating teams, which were entitled for promotion at the end of the relevant sporting season, in the event that the adopted amendments would not apply retroactively. [89.] In this respect, the application of such a set of rules by an association violates th expression of providing legal protection to a person who relies on the principle of good faith’), and in two international football SGB membership cases (although these can also be seen as cases of the application of the principles of non-retroactivity and procedural fairness). In Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, (paras 11 and 17) and Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA, CAS 2014/A3776, (paras 281, 284, 290), the CAS panels held that the GFA had a legitimate expectation that its membership application would be treated in accordance with the rules in place when that application was made, which were satisfied although Gibraltar was not an independent state as required under the subsequently amended rules. FIFA and UEFA could not change the criteria applicable to the GFA after the application was made, even though the decision on membership had not yet been made. In contrast in Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, the Jersey FA had made its application after the change in criteria came into effect, and so it had no basis for complaint, even though Jersey had a similar status under international law to Gibraltar. In Football Association of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602, the Serbian association was unable to defeat the Kosovo association’s application because Kosovo was held to satisfy the criteria.

342  Regulating Sport  4 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 61.   5 This is certainly how they were articulated, albeit unsuccessfully, in South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020 (see fn 2, above, and fn 6 to para B1.38). For the public law doctrine of legitimate expectation in English law, see United Policyholders Group v A-G  of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1 WLR  3383 (Privy Council), in particular per Lord Neuberger at para 37 (‘where a public body states that it will do (or not do) something, a person who has reasonably relied on the statement should, in the absence of good reasons, be entitled to rely on the statement and enforce it through the courts’) and at paras 37–38 (‘in order to found a claim based on the principle, it is clear that the statement in question must be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification” […]. Secondly, the principle cannot be involved if, or to the extent that, it would interfere with the public body’s statutory duty […]. Third, however much a person is entitled to say that a statement by a public body gave rise to a legitimate expectation on his part, circumstances may arise where it becomes inappropriate to permit that person to invoke the principle to enforce the public body to comply with the statement’’), and per Lord Carnwath JSC at para 121 (‘Where a promise or representation, which is “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”, has been given to an identifiable defined person […] by a public authority for its own purposes, either in return for action by the person […] or on the basis of which the person or group has acted to its detriment, the court will require it to be honoured, unless the authority is able to show good reasons, judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from it […]’). See also cases discussed at para E7.81. For the separate and distinct private law doctrine of estoppel by representation, see eg  Feltham et al, Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, 5th Edn (Bloomsbury Professional, 2017), p  15 (‘[…] where one person […] has made a representation of fact to another person […] by words or by conduct, or (being under a duty to the representee to speak or act) by silence or inaction, with the intention (actual or presumptive) and with the result of inducing the representee on the faith of such representation to his relative detriment, the representor […] is estopped, as against the representee, from making any averment substantially at variance with his former representation, save to the extent that that the court mitigates that result to avoid injustice, and unless that estoppel would unjustifiably subvert the policy of a rule of law’). For examples of the attempted use of this doctrine in the sports law context, see eg Reel v Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226 (CA), per Lord Denning MR at 1231 (‘[…] there is no need to go into the question of an estoppel. That would only arise if the admission of Taiwan [to membership of the IAAF] were wrong. Even if it had been wrong, nevertheless there is a strong case for saying that as everyone – except the People’s Republic of China – accepted them as a member for 22 years, it would be too late to say that their admission was not valid’) and also the selection cases discussed at para B1.37, n 2 and in Chapter B2 (Selection). However, the House of Lords noted that while there is an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power, ‘[…] it is no more than an analogy because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote’. R (Reprotech) v East Sussex CC [2003] 1 WLR 348 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at para 34. That is why it is not universally accepted that the doctrine of estoppel is a general principle of law in the AEK  Athens sense. See Russian Olympic Committe et al v IAAF, CAS  2016/O/4684, para 125 (‘The parties disagreed as to whether or not the principle of estoppel applied as a matter of the lex sportiva. The Panel did not find it necessary to decide this issue in this case, and expressly declines to do so’). 6 Quoted in the final award, AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, at para 61. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, para 62 (citations omitted). 9 Ibid, para 163.

B1.37 The AEK Athens award is therefore authority for the proposition that if an SGB’s conduct gives rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of its stakeholders that its regulations will not change for a given period, the SGB cannot then change those regulations without giving the stakeholders sufficient notice and time to adapt to the new requirements, if the absence of such notice and time would cause them significant detriment.1 Other CAS panels have applied the principle to prevent international SGBs changing Olympic qualification criteria after athletes had fixed their training and competition schedules to meet them,2 and to prevent national SGBs and national Olympic committees changing selection policies on which athletes had relied. Another applied the principle to prevent UEFA applying new membership criteria to an application for membership after it had led the applicant to believe it would apply the old membership criteria to that application.3 1 See also DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 5 (‘[…] in order to terminate a common practice [permitting an exception to a particular rule], similar principles apply as for the amendment of

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  343 rules and regulations; that therefore, for a change of rules to become binding upon the association’s members it did not suffice that the competent (legislative) body within the association adopted the amendments. In addition, for the new rules to take effect, the termination of the past practice had to be properly communicated to the relevant stakeholder and the members of the association given a chance to obtain knowledge of the contents of the new rules’) and para 6 (‘Taking into account that FIFA had intended to enact a (new) practice without a period of transition, ie, instantaneous, and furthermore amidst an ongoing – but to conclude in a few days – registration period and that FIFA required its member associations to immediately advise and communicate with its affiliated clubs on this change, the Sole Arbitrator found that the threshold for a proper communication of a change of rules or practice had not to be set too low. In the case at hand the required threshold had not been met and therefore the change of practice was not properly communicated to the Appellants who could therefore still rely on the (longstanding) FIFA practice in their interpretation and understanding of the relevant rules’). 2 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS  2008/0/1455, para  6.11 (‘[…] even if the Respondent had properly and formally enacted a resolution adopting a new qualification system, the Panel is of the opinion that an attempt to alter the Olympic qualification process with retrospective effect at such a late stage – a few months before the Olympic Games – would violate the principle of procedural fairness and the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium (the doctrine, recognized by Swiss law, providing that where the conduct of one party has induced legitimate expectations in another party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party)’) and para  6.17 (‘the Respondent might have legitimately changed the Olympic process for Oceania, if it had done so prospectively and following its proper legislative procedures. […] [C] rucial considerations of procedural fairness towards its members require international federations to announce at a reasonably early stage the Olympic qualification process and not to alter it when the national federations and their athletes have already started the sporting season leading to the Olympic Games’) and para  6.31 (‘[…] had AIBA wished to adopt a provision clearly imposing the one entry rule in all five continents, it should have enacted and publicized such provision at a reasonably early stage and, at any rate, prior to the beginning of the sporting season leading to the Olympic Games. If that had been the Respondent’s approach, the Panel would have had no hesitation in rejecting Boxing Australia’s claim. However, the failure to properly and timeously adopt and publicize the one entry rule compels the Panel to find that the Respondent is estopped from imposing the one entry rule once the sporting season leading to the Olympic Games has started, in accordance with the general principles of procedural fairness and venire contra factum proprium’); New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organising Committee, CAS OG 02/006, para 18 (‘In reaching its decision, the Panel drew an analogy to the doctrine of “estoppel by representation”, a doctrine firmly established in common law and known in other legal systems even though under a different heading (eg reliance in good faith, venire contra factum proprium). This doctrine which the Panel applies as a general principle of law (art. 17 of the CAS ad hoc Rules) is defined as: “An estoppel that arises when one makes a statement or admission that induces another person to believe something and that results in that person’s reasonable and detrimental reliance on the belief” (Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed 1999)’) and para 19 (‘By accepting the entries for the two athletes for both Slalom and Giant Slalom, SLOC induced them to prepare and train for both disciplines for which they were properly entered. To exclude them from competing in these two disciplines at this late stage would be unfair and contrary to the above doctrine of estoppel’). 3 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 11. The panel highlighted the investment by the applicant of ‘a considerable amount of time and resources in obtaining its admission as a UEFA member, relying on the legitimate expectation that UEFA would not refuse its application without any justified reason’ (ibid, para  35). See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA, CAS  2014/A3776, par 284 (‘[…] given FIFA’s special position, when a football association submits its membership application, it acquires a legitimate expectation, based on the principles of good faith and procedural fairness, that the international federation will apply, in the assessment of its candidature, the rules applicable at the moment of the application and not any unknown and future criteria implemented by the international federation at some point during the application process that would render the applicant ineligible for membership’).

B1.38 This doctrine does not, however, bar an SGB from ever making required changes to its regulations. Instead, the constraint is only temporary.1 Most SGBs review and make amendments to the rule books at least once a year, in the close season, and their stakeholders are aware of that and therefore have no legitimate expectation that the regulations will not change unless and until that period has passed and the regulations have been re-issued for the new season.2 If this process is respected, then as long as the effective date for the new regulations gives stakeholders enough time to comply with the new requirements without undue prejudice, there is no legal basis to block the change. For example, the CAS panel in AEK Athens noted that if UEFA had announced in the summer of 1998 that it would be bringing

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in its prohibition on common ownership at the beginning of the 1999/2000 football season, ‘no club could have later claimed to have legitimate expectations with respect to the treatment of multi-club ownership’.3 Similarly, having ruled in August 1999 that the contested rule was valid and enforceable, the CAS panel held that it could be implemented by UEFA starting from the 2000/01 season.4 Furthermore, given that even legitimate expectations may be disappointed where it is necessary and proportionate to do so in the public interest (ie, the interest of the sport as a whole),5 in exceptional circumstances – such as the early curtailment of a season due to a pandemic – where an SGB may be permitted to issue last-minute changes to its regulations, even to the prejudice of some of its stakeholders, if the public interest justification for those changes is particularly compelling.6 1 AEK  Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS  98/200, para  62 (‘UEFA’s procedural unfairness concerning the timing of the new rule’s entry into force is of a transitory nature and, as a result, it is not such as to render the Contested Rule unlawful on its merits with respect to all future football seasons. The Claimants’ request to annul the Contested Rule on this procedural ground is thus rejected’). 2 Cf Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 151 (no legitimate expectation that athletes of suspended federation would be permitted to compete in international competition provided they underwent certain doping tests, because that rule stated it would only apply if and when the national federation’s suspension was lifted). 3 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 162. 4 Ibid, para 163. 5 See para B1.36, n 3. 6 In South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020, after the Covid-19 pandemic led to the premature shut-down of the 201920 football season, The FA’s Council decided to expunge the results obtained in the 2019/20 season in league competitions below a certain level, and cancel promotion or relegation that season for those competitions. South Shields was at the top of the table when the season was voided in this way and brought proceedings against The FA for a declaration that the decision was invalid because it unlawfully deprived the club of its accrued right to have the system of promotion and relegation apply as per the original rules for the season 2019/20, meaning that it was entitled to be promoted to the next division for season 2020/21. The club argued that it had ‘an accrued contractual right to benefit from the NPL rules for promotion to Step 2 as at the beginning of the 2019/20 seaon on the basis of which it participated and performed in the NPL throughout that season’, and the express power given to The FA in the rulebook to amend the competition rules did not extend so far as to permit the cancellation of promotion and relegation in breach of that accrued right (para 83). The club relied on the presumption against retroactivity articulated in Wilson (see fn 3 to para B1.36), but the arbitral panel said that Wilson simply established that the key principle was one of fairness, and that amendments could be made to rules even if they took away accrued rights (eg the right in Doyle v White City Stadium to receive £3,000 for participating in a fight – see fn 2 to para B1.36) if the amendment was within the broad purposes of the rules (para 89). The FA had to amend the 2019/20 rules to address the forced end to the season before all of the fixtures had been completed. It could not do nothing; and each option open to it would to some extent have defeated the expectations of clubs at the start of the season and involve some inevitablele degree of unfairness (para 90). Therefore, while it had to exercise its amendment powers rationally, noncapriciously, and otherwise in accordance with public law principles, provided it respected those limits its decision could not be impugned on the basis that the outcome was unfair to certain clubs (para 93). Meanwhile the broad amendment power in The FA’s rulebook meant that there was no clear and express representation, and therefore no legitimate expectation, that if a club performed well enough on the field it would be promoted at the end of the season, no matter what the intervening circumstances (para 97). Rather, ‘the only legitimate expectation that any club could have had was that, if The FA exercised its power to amend the Rules or Regulations, it would do so in accordance with the Rules’ (para 97). And even if there had been such a clear and unambiguous representation (quod non), ‘the substantive legitimate expectation argument would still fail […] because the unprecedented circumstances arising out of the pandemic gave rise to a wider interest which overrode the legitimate expectation’ (para 98, citing United Policyholders Group v AG of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1 WLR 3383 at 38 and 107 to 108): ‘As the governing body of football, The FA has a responsibility to consider and balance the interests of the football community as a whole. This can involve making difficult decisions which will please some and displease others. Taking such difficult decisions is one of the reasons why governing bodies exist. The importance of such a balancing process is vividly demonstrated by the facts of this case. If The FA had adopted the suspension option or the PPG [points per game] option, there would presumably have been play offs in which some at least of the teams in Steps 3 to 7 would have been unable to compete. That is because, as Mr Ambler explains, their player contracts commonly are for a single playing season and do not extend over the summer period. If, contrary to our view, South Shields had the alleged legitimate expectation, it was outweighed and overridden by the void option, which had the merit of being workable and providing certainty and clarity’ (para 99).

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  345 The club’s estoppel argument also failed, because ‘the provisions relied on [in the rules] do not give rise to the alleged representation. All of them were subject to the possibility that they might be amended’ (para 103).

B1.39 Stopping an SGB from implementing new rules until all stakeholders have had sufficient opportunity to adapt to them is one thing. What is much more controversial is to stop an SGB from enforcing longstanding rules against one stakeholder in particular, on the basis that it gave that stakeholder reason to believe it would not enforce those rules against it. In such circumstances, issues of unfairness to the individual stakeholder need to be weighed against the interests of the sport as a whole in the uniform application and enforcement of the sport’s rules of conduct,1 and therefore the hearing panel should be slow to find that the SGB is estopped from enforcing its rules against the stakeholder in question.2 In the two most often-cited cases on this point, however, there was no obvious consideration by the hearing panel of the interests of the sport in proper enforcement of its rules, let alone an appropriate weighing of those interests against the alleged unfairness to the individual stakeholders in having the rules enforced against them in the particular circumstances of those cases: (a) In IAAF  v USATF, the IAAF asked its US member federation, USA  Track & Field, to disclose decisions it had taken exonerating its athletes of doping charges, so that the IAAF could consider whether to exercise its right of appeal against those decisions.3 But when asked to identify the rule it was relying on to require such disclosure, and when told that US law (and therefore the USATF rules) prohibited such disclosure, the IAAF failed for a period of four years to identify the provisions in its rules that required such disclosure (because it had a mistaken understanding of its own rules) and did not challenge the USATF’s assertion that US law prohibited such disclosure. When the IAAF finally realised its mistake and brought proceedings against the USATF to enforce the disclosure obligation, the CAS panel agreed that the IAAF anti-doping rules did require such disclosure (and by that time the USATF had dropped its argument that US law prohibited such disclosure), and therefore ruled that the USATF was required to disclose any decisions exonerating athletes moving forward. However, the CAS panel also held that by its previous conduct in not disputing the USATF’s assertion that it was not required to disclose such decisions to the IAAF, and in failing upon challenge to identify the IAAF rules that required such disclosure, the IAAF had led the USATF to believe that it could keep such decisions confidential, and so had induced the USATF to promise the athletes concerned that the decisions exonerating them would be kept confidential. Reneging on that commitment, the CAS panel said, would frustrate the legitimate expectations of those athletes that ‘questions which they thought were resolved should not now be re-opened’, which would lead to ‘dramatic and undoubtedly painful consequences for the athletes in question – no matter the eventual disposition of their cases – if disclosure were made obligatory so long after the events in issue, and so long after they were led to believe that their cases were closed’. Therefore, the CAS panel did not require the USATF to disclose those previous exoneration decisions to the IAAF.4 This decision can be criticised on at least two grounds. First, the CAS panel rejected the IAAF’s submission that there had to be there to be a positive, clear and unequivocal representation to found a claim of legitimate expectation,5 saying instead (relying, purportedly, on the private law doctrine of estoppel by conduct) that in appropriate circumstances silence and a failure to object may ‘speak as loudly as any words’.6 Secondly, while clearly the Panel was concerned about the prejudice that the exonerated US athletes would suffer by having to face charges they had reasonably thought were dead, it appears to have given no consideration whatsoever to the interests of the sport as a whole,

346  Regulating Sport

and in particular to the interests of the athletes who had competed against the exonerated US athletes, in ensuring that the anti-doping rules were enforced uniformly and consistently. At least in English law, even where the conduct of a party has led to the second party relying on that conduct, or has given rise to some form of legitimate expectation on the part of a second party, the first party would be permitted to resile from its previous promise or practice as long as it is not inequitable to do so,7 or (as it is put in the public law context) ‘where the authority is able to show good reason, judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from it’.8 Yet that possibility does not seem ever to have been considered by the CAS panel in IAAF v USATF. (b) In ATP v Ulihrach, the ATP charged a tennis player with an anti-doping rule violation based on the presence of metabolites of a prohibited substance (nandrolone) in his sample. He could not explain how the substance had got into his system, and therefore the charge was upheld and he was banned for two years.9 However, he applied to the hearing panel to reconsider the case after evidence emerged that thirty other players had tested positive for the same substance, the analytical evidence indicated that there may have been a common source, all of the players had consumed or may have consumed an electrolyte product that ATP trainers had handed out to players at ATP tournaments, and the ATP had suspended distribution of the product pending an investigation into its possible contamination. In such circumstances, the ATP itself submitted that it was estopped from relying on the rule that made players strictly liable for prohibited substances found in their systems. It noted its investigation was ongoing but said out of fairness to the player it did not want to delay the hearing panel’s reconsideration of the matter. The hearing panel decided that this new evidence justified re-opening the proceedings, and also justified an inference that the common source of the nandrolone found in the samples was the electrolyte tablets handed out by the ATP trainers. Citing IAAF v USATF, the hearing panel decided that: ‘the CAS lex sportif’ includes the legal principle of equitable estoppel, which ‘is to be applied as a matter of fairness and good conscience to estoppe the person whose conduct has brought the situation about from asserting their legal rights against another party who may have been misled or affected by that conduct. […] The estoppel precludes the ATP from enforcing its Rulebook and in particular Rule C 3 where it states that “the Player’s lack of intent or lack of fault (is not) a defense to a Doping Offense”. The estoppel has this effect because the ATP though its trainers is by inference the likely source of the contaminated product. Therefore, the estoppel precludes the ATP from enforcing its Anti-Doping Rule of strict liability. Upon the application of the estoppel the burden would shift to the ATP [to prove] that the apparent Doping Offense is not the result of the contaminated electrolyte supplement product supplied by it’.

Since the ATP had no evidence to discharge that burden and rebut the inference, the hearing panel decided to dismiss the charge, as the ATP itself had requested.10 The hearing panel insisted that its decision should not be taken as a qualification of, or an excuse for not complying with, the ATP’s rules,11 but if the World Anti-Doping Code had been in place, and therefore the ATP rules had given the ITF and WADA a right of appeal, those bodies would surely have considered that the collective interest of the sport in clean competition warranted exercising that right. Tellingly, when a similar estoppel argument was run (on different facts) in a subsequent case, heard after the World Anti-Doping Code had come into effect, a panel chaired by the same arbitrator who had chaired the Ulihrach panel stated that the application of the doctrine of estoppel in sports cases ‘ought to be restricted to the most extreme and egregious circumstances’, and in particular that the doctrine:

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  347 ‘ought not to be brought into consideration merely to frustrate the application of a comprehensive Code of harmonized rules that the WADA Code represents […]. Within that Code are rules and remedies dealing with the situation at hand that are appropriate rules within which to work out a resolution of this dispute. The very nature and essence of a Code is to make it comprehensive and to preserve its integrity by not referring to extraneous principles that upset the intricate balancing of interests reflected in the achievement of an international agreement to harmonise sport-doping rules in the Code. Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons the application of the doctrine of estoppel is rejected as a matter of principle […]’).12

This ruling has been strongly endorsed in subsequent cases.13  1 Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 86 (‘the legitimate expectation of other participants, fans and persons involved is that all participants will be bound by the same legal system’), and cases cited at para B1.27. By way of analogy, the House of Lords has stated that ‘remedies against public authorities [for breaching legitimate expectations] also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote’. R (Reprotech) v East Sussex CC [2003] 1 WLR 348, per Lord Hoffman at para 34.  2 See eg Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), CAS OG 16/09, para 7.7 (statement that IWF would not apply rule to ban RWF for three or more antidoping rule violations did not estop IWF from subsequently applying rule to ban RWF based on different evidence of centrally dictated and managed doping program in which RWF was implicated). Even in Football Association v Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13  December 2018, discussed at length at para B3.132 et seq., one of the very rare cases where a tribunal found that a governing body’s practice of not charging team managers for particular misconduct gave rise to a legitimate expectation that it would continue with this course, and so prevented it from charging the defendant for such conduct, the tribunal specifically noted (at para 54): ‘Any outside body, such as the Regulatory Commission or a Court, should think long and hard before deciding that a discretion has been unfairly applied’.  3 For a discussion of the vital role that such right of appeal plays in ensuring harmonisation of enforcement and sanctioning under the anti-doping rules, and in protecting against ‘home-town’ decisions, see para C16.3.   4 The USATF expressed its argument as one of estoppel, but the Panel held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was also relevant (citing AEK Athens and the selection cases referenced at para B2.76 et seq, and noting that ‘underlying all these decisions lies the notion of “fairness”’). IAAF  v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 68.   5 Which is an accurate statement, at least under English law: see para B1.36, n 3.   6 It held: ‘[…] the Panel is not persuaded that the “absolutist” approach advocated by the IAAF is necessarily correct, particularly in the circumstances of this case. Statements or actions make take a variety of forms and modes of expression, including inaction and omission. Moreover, silence or omission may be equivocal in the circumstances of one case while providing positive evidence in another’. IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 69. It noted that when explicitly asked, on several occasions, to explain where the IAAF Rules required disclosure or to respond to the USATF’s own contrary interpretation of those rules, the IAAF ‘refused to do so’, and when shown the USATF rules precluding disclosure the IAAF ‘did nothing which would suggest that those Regulations violated IAAF Rules’ (para 70). It concluded that this ‘is no mere omission […]. It is conduct which constitutes a statement and which speaks as loudly as any words. By that statement, the IAAF led the USATF to understand, in effect: we would like you to disclose the information we request; we believe it to be desirable that you do so; but the Rules do not explicitly require such disclosure and we cannot compel you to do as we ask; and we are unaware of any violation of IAAF Rule reflected in your confidentiality regulation’ (para 72). However, under English law at least, silence or inaction may only give rise to an estoppel if the silent party was under a duty to the other to speak or act: Feltham et al, Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, 5th Edn (Bloomsbury, 2017), para 1.90 et seq.   7 Feltham et al, Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, 5th Edn (Bloomsbury, 2017), para 1.85.  8 United Policyholders Group v A-G  of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1  WLR  3383 (Privy Council), para 12. See also Nadarajah v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 (Laws LJ), para 68 (public authority’s promise or practice as to future conduct ‘[…] may only be departed from, in circumstances where to do so is the public body’s legal duty, or is otherwise, to use a now familiar vocabulary, a proportionate response […] having regard to a legitimate aim pursued by the public body in the public interest’). Under English law at least, one good reason might be the coming to light of new and material facts that were not known when it was represented that a charge would not be brought. R v Abu Hamza [2006] EWCA Crim 2918 at para 54, per Lord Phillips CJ (‘[…] it is not likely to constitute an abuse of process to proceed with a prosecution unless (i) there has been an unequivocal representation by those with the conduct of the investigation or prosecution of a case that the defendant will not be prosecuted

348  Regulating Sport and (ii) that the defendant has acted on that representation to his detriment. Even then, if facts come to light which were not known when the representation was made, these may justify proceeding with the prosecution despite the representation’).  9 ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 1 May 2003. 10 ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 7 July 2003, paras 26-28. 11 Ibid, para 31 (‘This is an exceptional case dealt with in accordance with fairness and good conscience but not without regard to the responsibility of a player to know everything that is ingested’). 12 ATP  v Perry, ATP Tour Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30  November 2005, paras 49 and 46 respectively. 13 Including in ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016, para 95 (‘It is not necessary to decide whether that very wide principle is consistent with English law, which by article 1.8 applies to these rules, or whether such a principle could be applied to WADA Code provisions, save in the most exceptional circumstances. On the latter point this tribunal would agree with the comments in ATP v Perry (ATP Tour Tribunal 2015) at paragraph 49’), appeal partially upheld on other, unrelated grounds in Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643); UK Anti-Doping v X, confidential NADP Tribunal decision dated 3 August 2017, para 98.

(f) The presumption against retroactivity (tempus regit actum) B1.40 It is also important, when making changes to a regulatory regime, to be clear when the new regulations come into effect, and to what extent (if any) they are intended to apply to pending cases or to new cases that are based on facts occurring before the effective date of the new regulations.1 There is a strong general presumption,2 recognised in both common law and civil law systems, and displaced only by the clearest contrary language, that new substantive rules should not be applied retrospectively to matters occurring before they came into effect, to make acts unlawful that were lawful when done.3 The same presumption (which some view as an example of the application of the principle of legal certainty) is also wellestablished in CAS jurisprudence: ‘The Panel confirms the principle that “tempus regit actum”: in order to determine whether an act constitutes an anti-doping rule infringement, it has to be evaluated on the basis of the law in force at the time it was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that occurred prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’.4 By the same token, the presumption is that the sanctions applicable for an offence are those that were in place at the time the offence was committed, not any more stringent sanctions that were introduced after the offence occurred.5 1 In addition, the SGB should consider whether transitional provisions are required to facilitate the change from one regime to another, and in particular to cater for those who were complying with the previous requirements and would be unfairly prejudiced by now having to comply with a different set of requirements. See eg 57/72 Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker [1973] ECR. 321, paras 19–20 (not unlawful for European Commission to issue new regulations coming into immediate effect without any transitional provisions, because on the facts no harm would result to the legitimate interests of parties who had diligently protected their rights under the old regulations). In Bedene & LTA v ITF, the ITF changed its eligibility rules for international competition by withdrawing a previous provision allowing transfers of allegiance from one country to another after a three-year waiting period in favour of a rule permitting no transfers after representing one country. A  player brought a legal challenge, accepting that the ITF was entitled to change its rules and to adopt a ‘one country only’ rule, but arguing that doing so without including sufficient transitional provisions to cater for athletes who had already taken irreversible steps to transfer allegiance amounted to a disproportionate and therefore unlawful infringement of his TFEU free movement rights. The arbitrator rejected that argument on the basis that the rule permitted exemptions in deserving cases, which could include cases where an athlete was caught in the transition between the two different rules. (See para B1.35, n 4). 2 In the criminal context, it is not a mere presumption but a rule. See Art 7(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘No one shall be guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a crime under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed’). Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is to similar effect. 3 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Nicholls at 831 (‘[…] the presumption against retrospective operation and the similar but rather narrower presumption against interference with vested interests may be summed up by the dictum that Parliament is presumed not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears. […] [T]he greater the unfairness,

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  349 the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is intended’) and Lord Hope at 851 (referring to the ‘general presumption that legislation is not intended to operate retrospectively. That presumption is based on concepts of fairness and legal certainty. These concepts require that accrued rights and the legal effect of past acts should not be altered by subsequent legislation’); Lauri v Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402, per Lindley LJ at 421–22 (‘It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed as to have a retrospective operation unless its language is such as plainly to require such a construction; and the same rule involves another and subordinate rule to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary’); Walker v UKA & IAAF, (QBD) 7 July 2000 (Toulson J), 25 July 2000 (Hallett J) (IAAF not permitted to apply retrospectively a new rule providing for the provisional suspension of an athlete pending appeal by the IAAF against a decision of a domestic panel exonerating him of doping charges). See also Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 95 (‘The prohibition against retroactivity is a fundamental principle of Swiss law and forms part of international public policy (ordre public)’); Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), p 556, para 134 (‘A CAS panel may rule in equity by applying, eg, the general principle of prohibition of issuing rules with retrospective effect (a priori applicable to state courts). This rule is mutatis mutandis applicable to a sports federation such as FIFA, since such prohibition is an expression of a general legal principle not limited to the state legislator’); Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 146 (‘retroactive criteria in general are to be avoided as unfair and contrary to fundamental notions of due process and good sportsmanship’). 4 CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 51. See eg Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 119 (‘[…] according to well-established CAS jurisprudence, intertemporal issues are governed by the general principle tempus regit actum or principle of non-retroactivity, which holds that (i) any determination of what constitutes a sanctionable rule violation and what sanctions can be imposed in consequence must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the allegedly sanctionable conduct, (ii) new rules and regulations do not apply retrospectively to facts [that] occurred before their entry into force, (iii) any procedural rule applies immediately upon its entry into force and governs any subsequent procedural act, even in proceeding related to facts [that] occurred beforehand, and (iv) any new substantive rule in force at the time of the proceedings does not apply to conduct occurring prior to the issuance of that rule unless the principle of lex mitior makes it necessary’) (citations omitted); Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.38 (‘The prohibition of the retroactive application of laws to facts which occurred before the introduction of those laws is a well-established principle in Swiss law. CAS jurisprudence consistently recognises the principle that the law in force at the time the act under scrutiny was committed is the law that must be applied’); WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS 2009/A/1844, para 133 (‘[…] in order to determine whether an act constitutes an anti-doping rule infringement, the Panel applies the law in force at the time the act was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that occurred prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’); WADA v Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16 (same). See also RFEF v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, paras 151-52 (‘As to which edition of the FIFA RSTP is applicable to this matter, the Panel notes that various breaches took place at different periods between 2005 and 2012 during which periods various editions of the FIFA RSTP were in force. Therefore, when mentioning the FIFA RSTP, the Panel shall by implication be referring to the FIFA RSTP edition which was then in force vis-à-vis the specific facts or issues under consideration’). 5 Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 10 (‘[…] any determination of […] what sanctions can be imposed must be done in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the allegedly sanctionable conduct’); IAAF v ARAF and Yegorova and others, CAS 2008/A/1718, para 218 (rejecting IAAF’s request for an increased sanction on the ground that the rules in force at the relevant time did not provide for aggravated sanctions). See also IAAF  v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS  2016/O/4464, paras 76–77 (where anti-doping rule violation is committed over a long period, during which the rules were changed to increase the sanction for that violation, the lesser sanction provided for in the original rules should be applied); IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, paras 167–168 (same).

B1.41 For example, in Riis Cycling AS v UCI, the CAS held that the UCI’s 2012 ‘Neutralisation Rule’ (providing that where a cyclist has received a doping ban of two years of more, the results he obtains in the two years after he returns from the ban may not be counted for purposes of determining whether a cycling team has sufficient ‘sporting value’ to be granted a World Tour licence) operated as an additional sanction for doping and therefore was not compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code and so was void and unenforceable.1 However the CAS panel also felt compelled to note, obiter: ‘[its] very strong doubts as to the compatibility of the retroactive effect of the Neutralisation Rule with Swiss law and with general principles of sports law. The prohibition of the retroactive application of laws to facts which occurred before the introduction of those laws is a well-established principle in Swiss law. CAS

350  Regulating Sport jurisprudence consistently recognises the principle that the law in force at the time the act under scrutiny was committed is the law that must be applied. […] The fact that the Neutralisation Rule was automatically triggered by a doping violation which occurred before the rule was introduced raises serious questions concerning retroactivity’.2 1 See para B1.12, n 3. 2 Riis Cycling A/S  v UCI, CAS  2012/A/3055, paras 8.38–8.39. See also International Olympic Committee, CAS  2009/C/1824, para  7.3.6 (finding that a new IOC rule rendering anyone found to have committed an anti-doping rule violation ineligible for the next Olympic Games could only be applied to violations committed after the rule was promulgated, to avoid infringing ECHR, Art 7).

B1.42 The presumption against retroactivity applies to all of an SGB’s substantive rules, not just its disciplinary code. In Gibraltar FA v UEFA, the Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) applied for membership of UEFA. The UEFA Statutes in force at the time stated that ‘membership of UEFA is open to national football associations situated in the continent of Europe which are responsible for the organisation and implementation of football in their particular territory’. A  UEFA panel confirmed that the GFA met that requirement, but (referring to the dispute between the UK and Spain over Gibraltar’s sovereignty) recommended that UEFA’s membership criteria be amended ‘to avoid similar problems in the future’ by restricting membership of UEFA to a country that is ‘an independent state admitted to membership in the United Nations’. UEFA changed its membership rules to implement that recommendation, but also decided to apply the amended criterion to the GFA’s pre-existing application. In effect, UEFA had changed the substantive conditions that an applicant had to meet in order to become a member from a condition that the GFA could meet to one that it could not. On appeal by the GFA, the CAS ordered UEFA to determine the GFA’s application for membership in accordance with the UEFA  Statutes in force at the time the GFA had made that application, on the basis that retrospective application of substantive rules changes was impermissible.1 1 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 10, citing S v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, paras 72–73. See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA, CAS  2014/A3776, para  281 (‘FIFA cannot apply membership criteria which entered into force in 2014 retroactively to reject an application filed back in 1997 (and never abandoned since then), as doing so would violate the general principles of nonretroactivity of rules, and, especially in light of the circumstances, the general principles of procedural fairness and good faith’).

B1.43 On the other hand, it is not a breach of the presumption against retroactivity for an SGB’s regulations to provide that an act committed before the regulations came into force disqualifies someone from holding a particular position with the SGB moving forward.1 Nor is it a breach of the presumption against retroactivity to increase the sanction for a second offence where the first offence was committed prior to the rule change.2 1 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Hope at 851 (‘But the mere fact that a statute depends for its application in the future on events that have happened in the past does not offend against the presumption. For a recent example […] the marking of a disqualification order under section 28 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 against a defendant from working with children in the future did not offend against the presumption where the offending behaviour had occurred before that Act came into force’); Waddington v Miah [1974] 1 WLR 683 (HL), per Lord Reid at 695 (‘I use retrospective in the sense of authorising people being punished for what they did before the Act came into force. But there is nothing to prevent Parliament from authorising discrimination in the future between various classes of people and one ground of discrimination could be that if certain people have done a certain thing in the past or had a certain ancestry they shall be treated differently in the future from those who have not done that thing or had a different ancestry’); Antonelli v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1998] QB 948 (CA), per Beldam LJ at 958 (‘The provisions giving the Director power to disqualify are intended for the protection of the public and it would be quixotic to suppose that Parliament intended that the public should be protected from the activities of a practitioner convicted a week after the Act came into force but not from those of a practitioner convicted a week before’). For example, an SGB may adopt a regulation saying that no one may be an owner or director of a member club if they have previously

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  351 been convicted of a criminal offence of a certain gravity, as in The Football League’s ‘Owners’ and Directors’ Test’ (discussed further at para B5.12). 2 In ITF v Puerta, the athlete had committed a doping offence under a set of rules that pre-dated the World Anti-Doping Code, and those rules provided that a second offence would attract a ban of one year. But the ITF then adopted Code-compliant anti-doping rules that provided that the ban for a second doping offence would be eight years to life. When the athlete duly committed a second offence, he argued that to give him such a ban would be to give the new rule retroactive effect, by making his first offence a trigger not for a ban of one year but instead for a ban of eight years to life. The hearing panel did not accept that argument, preferring instead the ITF’s submission that there is no retroactive effect where the consequences of the first offence are not altered, only the consequences of the second offence are altered, and that alteration is made before (not after) the second offence is committed, so that the athlete is on notice before he commits his second offence of what the (new) consequences of what a second offence would be. In short, there was nothing unfair about provisions that prospectively (not retroactively) make the regime stricter than before. ITF v Puerta, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 21 December 2005, paras 79(3) and 81, affirmed in Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, section 11.6 (noting also that the first offence was an offence under both sets of rules). See also McTier v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWHC 212 (Admin) 75 (Kerr J), para 75 (noting that where the question was whether conduct that occurred before a list of disqualifying conditions was issued was covered by the list, ‘[…] the form of retroactivity contended for is not the strong form where vested or accrued rights are retrospectively taken away; but a weak form involving only the application of an adjusted sanctions regime to conduct of the type which, in a broad sense, was already the subject of a similar though narrower sanctions regime at the time of the conduct complained of’).

B1.44 The CAS jurisprudence also reveals three further instances where the presumption against retroactivity does not apply: (1) Rules relating to procedural matters ‘In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, laws and rules relating to procedural matters apply immediately upon entering into force regardless of when the facts at issue occurred’.1 This exception has been interpreted broadly, to include (for example) not only new provisions changing the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings,2 but also evidentiary matters, specifically new evidentiary methods of proving pre-existing disciplinary offences.3  CAS panels have also applied without objection Article 25.2 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, which states that the new ten-year statute of limitations introduced in Article 17 of that Code is a procedural rule that ‘should be applied retroactively’ to claims arising under the 2003 or 2009 versions of the Code, as long as the previous (eight-year) statute of limitations period applicable to such claims had not already expired when the 2015 Code came into effect.4 In Gibraltar FA  v UEFA, however, the CAS noted (albeit obiter) that even purely procedural amendments may not be applied retrospectively if doing so would be unfair or in bad faith. The CAS panel decided that the change made in that case to UEFA’s membership rules (discussed at para B1.42) was one of substance, not one of procedure. However, the CAS panel also found that even if the amendment had been one of procedure, to allow UEFA to rely on the amended membership criterion would ‘entail a violation of general principles of law which are widely recognised, particularly the principles of fairness and of good faith’, because (inter alia) ‘one of the main purposes for the amendment proposal made by the UEFA  Executive Committee was to prevent the GFA’s application from succeeding’.5 (2) Rules filling gaps In India Hockey Federation (IHF) v FIH and Hockey India, the CAS held that if there is a gap in the rules that needs to be filled to make the rules workable, then a rule change filling the gap may be applied retrospectively to cases pending before the rule change, as long as doing so entails no unfairness or bad faith or arbitrariness. The IHF and Hockey India were in dispute as to which of them should be recognised as the IHF’s member national federation for hockey in India, but the FIH Statutes contained no mechanism for deciding between such competing claims. The FIH therefore amended its Statutes to add such a mechanism, but when the IHF lost out under the new rule it went to

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CAS, asserting that the presumption against retroactive application of rules and the same ‘general principles of fairness and of good faith’ that the CAS panel had identified in Gibraltar prevented the FIH applying the new mechanism to the IHF’s previously-filed claim to membership of the FIH, because (the IHF alleged) the new mechanism had been designed to frustrate its claim and to prefer the competing claim of Hockey India. The CAS panel ruled that ‘the salient principles to be derived from Gibraltar are as follows: (i) Generally, “laws and rules relating to procedural matters apply immediately upon entering into force and regardless of when the facts occurred (paragraph  8); (ii) “On the other hand, it is a general principle that laws, regulations and rules of a substantive nature that were in force at the time when the facts occurred must be applied.” (paragraph  8); (iii) Even a procedural rule should not be applied retrospectively where “its application would entail […] a violation of general principles of fairness and good faith” (paragraph 11)’.6

The CAS panel accepted that the new FIH mechanism was substantive, not procedural, but also noted that it was needed to fill a gap in the existing rules (because there was previously no mechanism for resolving competing claims to membership), and that it was neutral as between the parties to the pending dispute, ie it did not favour one over the other. The CAS panel therefore ruled that it was not unfair or in bad faith to apply the new mechanism to pending claims.7 That must be right, because otherwise an SGB would never be able to change its membership criteria to add new requirements. (3) Rule changes that favour the subject of the regulation (lex mitior) If a member or athlete commits misconduct but the sanction set out in the rules for that misconduct is reduced before the case gets to a hearing, the member or athlete is entitled to the benefit of the new, more lenient rule. According to the CAS, this doctrine of lex mitior is: ‘a fundamental principle of law applicable and accepted by most legal regimes and which applies by analogy to anti-doping regulations in view of the quasi penal or at the very least disciplinary nature of the penalties that they allow to be imposed’.8 ‘The lex mitior […] not only entitles but obliges the Panel to apply the law as it stands at the time of determination, where more favourable to the Appellants, just as the presumption of retroactivity obliges it to apply the law as it stood at the time of the offence, where more favourable to them’.9 ‘By virtue of this principle, the body responsible for setting the punishment must enable the athlete convicted of doping to benefit from the new provisions, assumed to be less severe, even when the events in question occurred before they came into force. This must be true, in the Panel’s opinion, not only when the penalty has not yet been pronounced or appealed, but also when a penalty has become res judicata, provided that it has not yet been fully executed. The Panel considers that […] the new provisions must also apply to events which have occurred before they came into force if they lead to a more favourable result of the athlete. Except in cases where the penalty pronounced is entirely executed, the penalty imposed is, depending on the case, either expunged or replaced by the penalty provided by the new provisions’.10

For example, in Strahya v FINA, after the athlete had provided a sample that was found to have a prohibited substance present in it, but before the hearing on the resulting doping charge, FINA adopted new anti-doping rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code, including a two year ban for a first doping offence, which was shorter than the ban that would have applied under the FINA doping rules in force when the athlete provided the sample. Applying the doctrine of lex mitior, the CAS panel imposed only a two-year ban for his offence.11 In DFSNZ v Gemmell, however, a CAS panel identified two limits to the lex mitior doctrine:

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(i) ‘the principle applies to sanctions and not to the elements of [the] violation’, and therefore the athlete is not entitled to the benefit of a subsequently adopted rule that changes the elements of an offence in a way that means what he did would no longer amount to an offence (eg by saying that he must have committed three whereabouts failures in just 12 months, rather than in 18 months);12 and (ii) the new, more lenient, sanctions regime must be in force by the time of the hearing, ie, rule changes not yet in effect cannot be anticipated.13 The CAS panel in IAAF v QAF & Balla agreed that the doctrine applies only to sanctions, and therefore ruled that it does not apply to a new rule changing the deadline for appeal: ‘the principle of lex mitior enables retroactive application of provisions insofar as “penalties” or “sanctions” are concerned, if the new law is more favourable than the provisions applicable under the principle tempus regit actum. The underlying idea is that it makes little sense to sanction the party concerned according to out-dated provisions, if the unanimous view now holds that the act in question carries a milder sanction. 153. The Panel finds that the principle of lex mitior cannot be applied to deadlines for appeal. Deadlines as such cannot be qualified as “milder” or “stricter”, because the effects of such deadlines will always depend on who is the appellant and what the contents of the appealed decision is. Deadlines for appeal by their very nature are very different from “sanctions”. They apply irrespectively of whether or not the person entitled to appeal has acted with or without fault nor do they – unlike sanctions – express a disapproval of a party’s behaviour or infringe on his or her personality rights. The deadline of appeal is – at the end of the day – a procedural issue that is first and foremost dictated by considerations of appropriateness and/or practicability as well principles such as legal certainty and foreseeability that cannot be categorized as “more” or “less” favourable’.14

The CAS panel in Millar v BCF identified a further limit to the doctrine, which is that it may be displaced by expressly providing that the new rules are not intended to apply retrospectively to matters pending before they came into effect.15 Finally, in IAAF  v Kirdyapkin the IAAF argued that an athlete could not cherry-pick but had to accept that only one set of rules applied, and therefore if he wished the IAAF’s 2015 anti-doping rules to apply rather than the IAAF’s 2009 anti-doping rules (because the 2015 rules included the ‘fairness’ exception to disqualification of subsequent results16), he also had to accept that the ban for his ADRV had to be four years (as the 2015 rules provided) not two years (as the 2009 rules provided). The CAS panel said it ‘saw the force’ in that argument, but in the end decided the issue on other grounds and therefore did not have to rule on the point.17  1 S  v FINA, CAS  2000/A/274, paras 72-73. See also Blatter v FIFA, CAS  2016/A/4501, para  92 (‘pursuant to the legal principle of tempus regit actum or non-retroactivity, the Panel is satisfied that procedural matters are governed by the regulations in force at the time of the procedural act in question’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, paras 80-81; S v FIG, 2001/A/340, para 14 (‘according to a principle generally accepted in case-law and supported by legal opinion, new procedural rules apply to all cases pending when they enter into force’). This distinction also applies in English law. See Bell & Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 189; Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A  Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 4.52.  2 Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5086, para  133 (relying on ‘CAS jurisprudence to the consistent effect that, pursuant to the legal principle of tempus regit actum, procedural matters are governed by the rules in force at the time of the procedural act in question. Therefore, given that burden of proof is a procedural principle, the Panel must apply in the present proceedings the rule on burden of proof set out in Article 52 FCE (2012 edition)’) (citations omitted); Gnidenko v IOC, 2016/A/4803, para 94 (whereas the general rule is that the IOC bears the burden of proving an ADRV, ‘The 2015 WADC and, in particular, Article 3.2.1 [putting the burden on the athlete to prove a testing procedure used was not scientifically valid], were the procedural rules existing at the time each of the proceedings, giving rise to these appeals, was commenced. Accordingly, as accepted by the Appellants, the Panel is of the view that the Appellants bear the burden of proving that the testing procedures adopted by the Lausanne and Cologne laboratories were not scientifically valid’).

354  Regulating Sport  3 Petchstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 109 (‘The Panel would have no hesitation in holding that new scientifically sound evidentiary methods, even not specifically mentioned in antidoping rules, can be used at any time to investigate and discover past anti-doping rule violations that went undetected, with the only constraint deriving from the eight-year time limitation and the timely initiation of disciplinary proceedings. As long as the substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as doping is in force prior to the conduct, the resort to a new evidentiary method does not constitute a case of retrospective application of the law’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.5 (same); Caucchioli v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2178, para 33 (‘This Panel considers that the ABP has not introduced a new prohibition, but represents only a new method of screening for blood doping, which was already prohibited by other rules. New scientific methods, even if the anti-doping rules do not mention them expressly, may be used to prove past violations, with the only limitations being the term of use of the samples for anti-doping purposes (set at eight years) and the start of disciplinary proceedings within the required deadline. [34.] Therefore, the use of new methods does not constitute a case of retroactive application of rules, as long as the rules sanctioning conduct as an act of doping were in effect prior to this conduct. Otherwise, we would not be able to take advantage of technological advances to discover doping acts that went unnoticed due to the limitations of previous methods’), citing E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 8.10 (‘It simply cannot be the intent that this rule would allow an accused to afford itself of the more favourable science. Applying such an argument to a criminal case would be tantamount to requiring the court to find an accused innocent of a crime, even if the DNA proves the accused is the culprit simply because the crime was committed prior to the availability of DNA testing. This Panel finds that this simply cannot be the case’); WADA v Lallukka, CAS 2014/A/3488, paras 113-114 (research paper and guidelines that post-dated alleged ADRV were not rules but evidence relied upon by WADA to support ADRV finding, and therefore ‘the rule against retroactivity’ did not prevent such reliance); Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648, para 112 (2015 Code provision that an ADRV may be proved by analysis of B  sample split into two bottles is an evidentiary rule and therefore not a substantive rule that may not be applied retroactively).  4 IAAF  v RusAF and Pyatykh, CAS  2017/O/5039, para  76 (eight-year limitations period on claim against athlete had not expired as of 1 January 2015 and therefore it became subject to the new tenyear limitations period); IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov, CAS 2018/A/5675, para 60 (same); Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 50 (claim dismissed because eight year statute of limitations had already expired before 2015 Code came into effect).  5 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 16-17. See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA, CAS 2014/A3776. See also Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 46 (‘The 2015 ADR qualify the rule pertaining to the statute of limitation as a “procedural rule”. However, it does not necessarily follow from this qualification that there are no limits to a retroactive application of such rule. Instead, it follows from Art 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “ECHR”) that the procedure must be “fair”’).  6 Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 137.   7 Ibid, para 154 (‘If the principles of fairness and good faith (among others) are not breached, if (by way of example) no issue of legitimate expectation arises (as it did in Gibraltar), if the decision in issue does not appear to have been made arbitrarily, then there are no grounds on which to infringe upon an association’s right to autonomy. As Hockey India said, there was in this case no substantive unfairness’).  8 Volandri v ITF, CAS  2009/A/1782, para  50; UCI and CONI, CAS  94/128, para  33 (in French, English translation as quoted in CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 52) (‘The principle whereby a criminal law applies as soon as it comes into force if it is more favourable to the accused ie, lex mitior, is a fundamental principle of any democratic regime. It is established, for example by Swiss law (art 2, para 2 of the Penal Code) and by Italian law (art 2 of the Penal Code). This principle applies to antidoping proceedings in view of the penal or at the very least disciplinary nature of the penalties they allow to be imposed’). As it happens, the doctrine is ‘a creature unknown to English law’ (Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 13), but that has not prevented its application in CAS cases, even by CAS panels made up of lawyers from common law jurisdictions, and nor has it prevented its application by English domestic hearing panels, at least when applying globally applicable rules. See eg BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision dated 4 May 2009, para 41 (giving athlete benefit of change in 2009 version of World Anti-Doping Code that made the sanction for a second violation eight years to life rather than a blanket life ban).  9 Meca-Medina v FINA, CAS 99/A/234, para 3.5. 10 UCI and CONI, CAS  94/128, para  33 (in French, English translation provided in CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 52). See also WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS  2009/A/1844, para  134 (‘the new provisions must also apply to events which have occurred before they came into force if they lead to a more favourable result for the athlete’); WADA v Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16 (‘This Panel, however, has the power, according to the “lex mitior” principle, to apply those rules subsequently entered into force which are more favourable to the athlete’); FINA & WADA v Tagliaferri, CAS 2008/A/1471 & CAS 2008/A/1486, para 9.6.1 (‘[…] because of the principle of lex mitior […] the rule that is more favourable to the First Respondent can be resorted to, even if it was not in force at the time the offence was committed’); V  v Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/318, para 29, p 191 (CAS ‘always’ applies the lex mitior doctrine); V v FINA,

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  355 CAS  2003/A/493, FINA  Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), pp 17, 23 (following doctrine of lex mitior by applying two-year sanction based on new Code-compliant rules rather than four-year sanction under rules in place when case was commenced); Cullwick v FINA, CAS 96/149, para 27 (‘The doctrine of lex mitior, ie, that which permits a disciplinary tribunal to apply current sanctions to the case before it, if sanctions are less severe than those which existed at the time of the offence, is applicable in this case’). The lex mitior doctrine became particularly important in the anti-doping sphere after 1  January 2009, when a series of amendments to the original (2004) World Anti-Doping Code came into effect. Article 25.2 of the 2009 Code provided that a case ‘shall be governed by the substantive anti-doping rules in effect at the time of the alleged anti-doping rule violation occurred unless the panel hearing the case determines the principle of “lex mitior” applies under the circumstances of the case’. See eg BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision dated 4 May 2009, para 41 (giving athlete benefit of 2009 Code change that made the sanction for a second violation eight years to life rather than a blanket life ban). See also the various cases where a substance on the Prohibited List that was found in the athlete’s sample has been subsequently re-classified as a ‘Specified Substance’, thereby triggering greater discretion to mitigate sanction under the World Anti-Doping Code: Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 44 (‘[…] the power to ameliorate the sanction only came about subsequent to the time of the anti-doping rule violation when WADA relocated the drug from paragraph S6.a to S6.b [making it a ‘Specified Substance’]. Thus, the doctrine of lex mitior applies. That doctrine permits a disciplinary tribunal to apply current sanctions to the case before it if those sanctions are less severe than those which existed at the time of the offence’); USADA  v Brunemann, AAA  Panel decision dated 26 January 2009, para 10.3 (holding that substance should be considered a Specified Substance, as it had been re-classified as of 1 January 2009, even though the sample in which it was found was collected in 2008, and therefore the broader mitigation powers available under Code Art 10.4 should apply, save that the maximum ban should not be two years, as 2009 Code Article 10.4 provided, but the one year that the 2003 Code equivalent [Article 10.3] provided); SARU v Ralepelle and Basson, SARU Judicial Committee decision dated 25 January 2011, para 10 (MHA found in sample collected in November 2010 treated as Specified Substance, due to reclassification to this effect in 2011 Prohibited List); UK Anti-Doping v Duckworth, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 January 2011 (giving athlete benefit of 2011 reclassification of MHA as a Specified Substance by imposing a six-month ban under Art 10.4). 11 Strahya v FINA, CAS 2003/A/507, para 6. 12 DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, paras 103, 109 (‘The civil law basis of the principle applies to criminal sanctions only’), para 112 (‘this Panel is of the view that it [the lex mitior doctrine] applies to sanctions only and not to the elements of the violation. This view is based on the origin of the lex mitior principle, namely a rule to allow a criminal to be sentenced under a more lenient regime […] and is reinforced by the manner in which the Court of Arbitration for Sport has applied the principle’) and para 119 (‘in this Panel’s view, it is appropriate that the principle only applies to sanctions, as there is a need to protect the principles of the level playing field. It is inappropriate to apply what would in effect be a modified lex mitior principle’). Cf Mayer et al v IOC, CAS 2002/A/389-393, para 73 (where the 2002 Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code banned any administration of blood to an athlete, and the 2003 Code created an exception for administration of blood for legitimate medical treatment, the CAS panel was prepared to apply the 2003 definition to the respondents’ 2002 acts, ‘relying on the lex mitior principle as applied by analogy eg, in TAS  96/156, F. c/FINA’); IBU  v Ussanova, ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, para 148 (lex mitior is ‘a general principle of law related to sanctions of whatever kind and applies not only to sanctions, as the IBU contends, but also to the elements constitutive of an ADRV’). It appears that the Mayer and Ussanova decisions were not brought to the attention of the Gemmell panel. On the other hand, it does not appear from the Mayer award that the issue of whether lex mitior principle applied only to sanctions was put to or considered by the Mayer panel, and the precedent cited by the Mayer panel (Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156) involved use of the lex mitior principle to give the athlete the benefit of a change in sanctions provisions, not a change in the definition of an offence. Meanwhile, the Ussanova panel did not provide any authority or reasoning for its ruling. 13 DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, paras 109 (lex mitior principle ‘cannot apply if the new sanction is not in force at the date the sanction is imposed’). See also FINA v Mellouli & FTN, CAS 2007/A/1252, paras 75–76 (‘To be sure, the Panel does not ignore the debate surrounding the introduction of amphetamine into the list as part of the revision project of WADA. In any case the current list has to be applied which excludes amphetamine as a specified substance’); Kambala and WADA v FIBA, FIBA Appeals Tribunal award dated 23 August 2007, p 11, where the tribunal declined the athlete’s request that it anticipate that cocaine would be re-classified as a Specified Substance (‘according to the law at present, cocaine is not to be classified as such a substance. Whether this will change in future is uncertain and is of no relevance to the present decision; for the Single Arbitrator must – in principle – decide the case in accordance with the rules and regulation in force at the time the offence was committed. […] There is likewise no scope for applying the principle of lex mitior in the present case; for said principle requires that conflicting rules are or were in force. However, this is not the case’); UK Anti-Doping v Watt, NADP Tribunal decision dated 6 November 2014, para 38 (‘Finally, we note that under the 2015 WADA Code not yet in force Mr Watt’s case would attract a 4 year sanction: see

356  Regulating Sport Article 10.7.1(c). There is no room for some anticipatory lex mitior here’); ATP v Rodriguez, ATP Tour Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated September 2003, para  58 (‘[…] the principle [of lex mitior] can not be applied when the existence or the non-inclusion of caffeine on the restricted list of the forthcoming Prohibited List of WADA has not yet been confirmed and would in any event take effect only from January of 2004 and not at the time of writing this decision’). Cf CONI & WADA v Petacchi & FCI, CAS 2007/A/1362 & 1393, para 56 (panel took into account the 2009 WADA Code (which was not due to come into force for some nine months after the hearing) when determining the ‘just and proportionate’ sanction: ‘In the light of the specific circumstances of the case the Panel has concluded that it would be just and proportionate to reduce the period of ineligibility to one year. In doing so the Panel has taken into account that the amended [WADA Code], which the International Federations will have to implement by 1 January 2009, would qualify Salbutamol as a “specified substance” and would allow for the sanction to be reduced down to a reprimand (with no period of ineligibility). Even though the new WADC is not yet in force, the Panel takes the view that it is both equitable and fair, and in compliance with Article 255 of the ADR, to take these matters into consideration when exercising the discretion given to it by Art 275 of the ADR’). 14 IAAF v QAF & Balla, CAS 2018/A/5989, paras 152–153. 15 Millar v BCF, CAS 2004/A/707, para 39. 16 See para C23.6 et seq. 17 IAAF v ARAF, Sergey Kirdyapkin & RUSADA, CAS 2015/A/4005, para 115 (‘The Panel sees the force of the IAAF argument that specific rules cannot be picked from different systems. The lex mitior principle prevents the continued applicability of a disciplinary rule after it has been replaced by a more lenient one, and reflects, in favour of the accused, the evolution of a legislative policy, which translates into rules the opinion that the same infringement is less severe than it was previously perceived. However, this principle cannot be applied in a way that creates a law that never existed, composed of a mixture of old and new rules and upsetting the rationale of both systems’).

(f) The principle of good faith B1.45 A  regulation that was issued by an SGB in bad faith would fall foul of several different legal principles; no stand-alone doctrine of ‘good faith’ would be needed to overrule it.1 However, the CAS has been clear that an SGB is also required to interpret2 and apply its regulations in good faith: (a) As noted above, the CAS ruled in Gibraltar FA  v UEFA that even if UEFA was entitled as a matter of principle to amend its membership criteria to fix a problem exposed by an application for membership, UEFA was not entitled to apply the new criteria to deny that pre-existing application, because that would ‘entail a violation of general principles of law which are widely recognised, particularly the principles of fairness and of good faith’.3 (b) Similarly, while the rulings in IAAF v USATF and ATP v Ulihrach that the SGB could not ‘in good conscience’ enforce its anti-doping rules against a member/ athlete in circumstances where the SGB could be said to have caused the member/athlete’s breach, or at least induced it to believe the rule would not be enforced against it, were couched as applications of the doctrines of legitimate expectation and/or estoppel,4 they might just as well have been couched as applications of the principle of good faith.5 (c) A  further possible example can be seen in Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, where the CAS considered (but rejected on the facts) an argument that a disciplinary sanction imposed on the appellant for breach of the WKF’s rules should be struck out because the motive for the bringing of the disciplinary proceedings was improper, an ‘abus de droit’.6 1 See eg AEK Athens & Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 99/200, para 157 (‘The Panel, on the basis of previous remarks, finds that UEFA did not adopt the Contested Rule with the purpose of protecting its monopoly power over the organization of pan-European football competitions (see supra, paras. 110113 and 143), and finds that the Contested Rule is not arbitrary nor unreasonable (see supra, paras. 48 and 125-136). Therefore, with regard to the substantive content of the Contested Rule, the Panel holds that UEFA did not abuse its regulatory power and did not violate any general principle of law’). In Hellenic NOC and Kaklamanakis v ISAF, CAS OG/04/009, para 24, a CAS panel asserted that ‘CAS will always have jurisdiction to overrule the Rules of any sport federation if its decision making bodies conduct themselves with a lack of good faith or not in accordance with due process. In this regard both applicants have made submissions that there was a lack of due process. If such were found

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  357

2 3 4 5

6

to be the case the Rules of Sailing might well not be applied to this dispute (See CAS OG 00/013 para. 7 and 23; CAS OG 02/007 para 5; TAS 2003/A/490 para. 29; and CAS 2000/A/305 para. 5)’. On close analysis, however, this does not appear to be an assertion of a jurisdiction to ‘overrule’ an SGB’s regulations for lack of good faith, but rather a statement that if an SGB applies its regulations in bad faith in a particular case, then the CAS can rule that application of the regulations unlawful. The authorities cited in support of the proposition involve applications of the uncontroversial proposition that decisions made by match officials on the field of play will not be reviewed absent proof of bad faith or malice (as to which, see para D2.136 et seq). That is certainly true of Segura v IAAF (the first case cited), KOC v ISU (the second case cited), and CPC v IPC (the fourth case cited). The award in the third case cited does not appear to be publicly available, but it was cited (along with the other three cases) in CNOSF et al v FEI, CAS OG 04/007, in support of the proposition that ‘a number of CAS awards have made it clear that CAS does not review decisions taken or rulings made on the playing field except in cases where bad faith or malice had been demonstrated or was otherwise involved (See CAS OG 00/013 para 7 and 23; CAS OG 02/007 para 5; TAS 2003/A/490 para 29; CAS 2000/A/305 para 5)’. See para B1.54, n 2. Gibraltar FA  v UEFA, CAS  2002/O/410, paras 16-17, discussed at para B1.44. See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFAI, CAS 2014/A3776 See para B1.39. As in, for example, W v UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455, para 17 (‘the Respondent therefore rightly considered the April Sample to constitute a separate breach of the rules. Furthermore, the Respondent was not estopped from doing so by the principle of good faith. As can be seen from the extensive correspondence, contrary to the Appellant’s opinion, the Respondent at no time gave the Appellant any reason to believe that it would not treat the April sample as a separate breach of the rules’). See also Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 14 (‘Good faith: This is the universal principle according to which all persons are bound by a duty to act in a loyal, frank and open manner. For example, when one party acts or makes statements knowing that another party will act in reliance on these statements or acts, the former is precluded from reversing its position at the latter’s expense (venire contra factum proprium). In common law systems this would be characterised as estoppel’), and p 16 (‘In administrative law in civil law jurisdictions, the good faith principle applies when an administrative body gives assurances to an individual that certain future actions by that individual are legal when in truth they may not be. If such assurances are given (and provided that the body in question was empowered to decide such matters), no sanctions can be imposed upon the individual acting illegally in reliance on these assurances. Another application of the good faith principle (which flows from the principle venire contra factum proprium, “no one may set himself in contradiction to his own previous conduct”) is that a party may not create an ambiguous situation, for example by making conflicting or unclear statements, and then take advantage of the ambiguity which it has itself brought about […]’). Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 99. See Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 14 (‘Finally, the good faith principle precludes a party from availing itself of a rule in a manner which is contrary to the rationale of the rule (abus de droit)’).

B1.46 None of these examples gives rise to significant concern for SGBs that there has been too intrusive or uncertain an incursion by the CAS into their discretionary decision making. However, the CAS has on occasion stated the general principle in very broad terms, ie that an SGB must act at all times in good faith towards its members and stakeholders.1 This is inconsistent with English law, which limits contractual obligations to what is expressly stated (or necessarily implied) in the contract, and rejects a general implied contractual duty of good faith as being far too uncertain in scope and effect.2 The English courts have been clear that while the principle of good faith applies to the interpretation of treaties (by virtue of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), the principle ‘is not to be taken to be a source of obligation where none exists’.3 Instead, ‘its effect is relatively limited, being designed to ensure treaty rights are used responsibly, rather than abusively, arbitrarily or capriciously’.4 English lawyers for SGBs at least would look for the CAS to take the same approach in applying the principle of good faith to an SGB’s regulations. The proposition however finds resonance in Swiss law. 1 See eg S v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, para 34 (referring to ‘the principles of good faith which should characterise all dealings between international sports federations and the athletes within their jurisdiction’); Australian Olympic Committee, CAS  2000/C/267, para  62 (‘General principles of international contract law require that a body such as the [FINA] Bureau act in good faith. This is a universal principle according to which all persons are bound by a duty to act in a loyal, frank and open manner’ [citations omitted]); Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 30 (referring to

358  Regulating Sport ‘the contractual nature of the membership to an association and the related obligation to act in good faith in the context of contractual or pre-contractual discussions’); Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 62 (‘General principles of international contract law require that a body such as the Bureau act in good faith. This is a universal principle according to which all persons are bound by a duty to act in a loyal, frank and open manner. See Dasser, Internationale Schiedsgerichte und Lex Mercatoria (Schultess Verlag, 1989), pp 108–109 and references; Lalive, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy’, in Sanders (Ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public policy in Arbitration, (ICCA congress Series No 3, December 1987), p 308; Mayer, ‘Le principe de bonne foi devant les arbitres internationaux’, in Dominicé et al (Eds), Etudes en l’honneur de Pierre Lalive, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993), pp 543–556 and extensive references therein.’). See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA CAS 2014/A3776. 2 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789, para 45; Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Variety Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396, para 68. But see Bates v Post Office (No 3), [2019] EWHC 606 (QB) (implying duty of good faith into ‘relational’ contract). 3 See R (ST) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12, per Lord Hope at 31. 4 Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A  Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 9.46.

(g) The ‘fairness principle’? B1.47 Similarly, from time to time in the CAS jurisprudence, reference is made to an SGB’s regulatory autonomy being constrained by ‘considerations of fairness’.1 To the extent that this is just a shorthand reference to the use of doctrines such as legitimate expectation or estoppel to constrain an SGB from applying its rules in a particular situation,2 it again does not give rise to significant concern for SGBs. As the CAS panel noted in IAAF v USATF, ‘underlying all these decisions lies the notion of “fairness”’.3 Similarly, if the complaint is one of a lack of ‘procedural fairness’,4 then again it is unobjectionable: the need for an SGB to follow fair procedures in the application and enforcement of its rules is well-settled.5 1 See eg AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 163 (‘paramount considerations of fairness and legal certainty, needed in any legal system, militate against allowing UEFA to implement immediately the Contested Rule in the 1999/2000 football season’). 2 See para B1.36. 3 IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 68. 4 As in AEK  Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS  98/200, para  62; Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.11; and Hellenic NOC and Kaklamanakis v ISAF, CAS OG/04/009, para 24. 5 R v Commission for Racial Equality ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1982] AC 779 (HL), per Lord Diplock at 787F-G  (‘Where an Act of Parliament confers upon an administrative body functions which involve its making decisions that affect to their detriment the rights of other persons or curtail their liberty to do as they please, there is a presumption that Parliament intended that the administrative body should act fairly towards those persons who will be affected by their decision’).

B1.48 However, any suggestion that there is a more substantive doctrine of ‘fairness’ that constrains the rule-making powers of an SGB does give rise to significant concern for SGBs that there has been too intrusive or uncertain an incursion by the CAS into their discretionary decision making. In particular, common law lawyers acting for SGBs at least would regard with consternation statements such as the following: ‘The fairness principle would allow the Panel to disregard the strict application of a norm where it would clearly and disproportionately be contrary to a strict understanding of fairness in sport’.1 If the regulation in issue does not breach any legal rights, or frustrate any legitimate expectations, an SGB would argue that there is no residual ‘rule of fairness’ that can be used to bring it down.2 To invoke a (previously unheralded) ‘fairness principle’ to strike down a regulation that the arbitrator disagrees with would arguably be to breach the important constitutional principle of separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature, and thereby to intrude improperly on the autonomy of the SGB to determine what regulations are necessary or desirable to achieve its legitimate objectives.3 1 Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(c). No authority is cited in the decision to support this proposition. To the contrary, it appears (with great respect) to have been plucked out of thin air.

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  359 2 USOC et al v IOC, CAS OG 2000/001, para 26 (‘the Claimants – and Mr Perez – are frustrated by a clear rule [setting out conditions for transfers of sporting allegiance from one national federation to another] which intrinsically operates in such a fashion as to cause the overall duration of an emigrating athlete’s future Olympic eligibility to depend on the particular naturalisation regime of the country in which he or she chooses to relocate. Contrary to the Claimants’ arguments, there is no rule of “fairness”, to be derived from the Olympic Charter’s acknowledgement that the practice of sport is a fundamental human right, which would under such circumstances create an outer time limit of Olympic eligibility’). 3 As to which, see para B1.6.

4 RESOLVING DISPUTES AS TO THE PROPER MEANING OF AN SGB’S REGULATIONS B1.49 When an SGB’s regulations come to be applied in practice, it often turns out that there is room for debate as to what they mean and therefore as to whether or how they apply to the facts at hand.1 In such cases, the SGB’s view of what its regulations mean is not dispositive. Instead, the proper meaning of those regulations is a question of law, and in the case of dispute it will be for the court (or arbitral panel) to determine what they mean.2 1 The experienced CAS arbitrators who have contributed a chapter to this book note somewhat wearily (para D2.129) that ‘it is not uncommon […] for the regulations of sports organisations to be unclear, incomplete and ambiguous, and in need of interpretation’. 2 For English law authority on this point, see eg Modahl v British Athletics Federation [1997] EWCA Civ 2209, per Lord Woolf MR at para 38 (‘the question of the interpretation of the BAF Rules is a question for the courts. In the words of Denning LJ in the Lee case, the court “cannot permit a domestic tribunal to deprive a member of his livelihood or to injure him in it, unless the contract, on its true construction gives the tribunal the power to do so. I repeat “on its true construction”, that I desire to emphasise that the true construction of a contract is to be decided by the courts and by no one else”’); Lee v The Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329, 344 (CA) (‘Sir Frank Soskice argued that it was for the committee of the guild to construe the rules, and that, so long as they put an honest construction on them, their construction was binding on the members, even though it was a wrong construction. I cannot agree with that contention. The rules are the contract between the members. The committee cannot extend their jurisdiction by giving a wrong construction to the contract […] no matter how honest they may be. They have only such jurisdiction as the contract on its true interpretation confers on them, not what they think it confers. The scope of their jurisdiction is a matter of the courts’). See also cases cited at para E7.51. For CAS authority, see eg  Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS  2008/A/1452, para 43 (‘whatever may have been the interpretation placed on the applicable anti-doping regulations by the Respondent and others in 2007, it is a matter for the Panel to determine the proper meaning of the applicable regulation’); Russian Olympic Committee v Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI), CAS OG 04/001, para 19 (‘The FEI letter mentions “Discussions and decisions during April 2004 referring to the interpretation of Article 624.2”. The Panel must emphasise, for the avoidance of doubt, that the interpretation of the FEI Regulations, as indeed of the rules of any sporting body, is a question of law. While it is always necessary to seek a purposive and contextual construction of such rules so as to discern their true intent and effect, a body cannot impose by discussion or decision after the coming into force of the rules, a meaning which they do not otherwise bear. The Panel must add that while in practice the FEI (or any other body in similar circumstances) must form an initial view as to the meaning of its rules, it is the Panel which is vested with the function of finally determining that meaning, subject only to any recourse (if any) to the Swiss Federal Tribunal […]’); Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 50 (‘FINA can interpret its constitution as can any international sports federation. The constitution, being the very essence and foundation of an IF, can have such interpretation reviewed by the CAS. In this aspect the FINA Rules contained in the “FINA Handbook” which comprise the constating instrument are reviewable as to their proper interpretation by CAS. FINA can never be the final arbiter of its constating rules’) and para 51 (‘an IF cannot be the final arbiter of its founding document under which all else is governed and developed’). The CAS panel in Stillitano v US Soccer Federation and FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2241, para 10.18, ignored this large body of constant jurisprudence when it held that ‘[…] sporting federations are afforded broad discretion when interpreting their own statutes and regulations. Accordingly, the Panel will not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the PSC unless the PSC’s judgment was “manifestly erroneous or plainly inconsistent with the clear wording of the regulations, or was rendered in violation of a party’s fundamental rights or public policy.” (CAS  2009/A/1812 Stillitano v USSF & FIFA at 10.7 (citing CAS 2006/A/1192 Chelsea Football Club, Ltd. v Adrian Mutu)’). 

360  Regulating Sport For the same reason, nor is the CAS (or other appeal body) bound by the view taken by the first instance panel of the proper meaning of the provision in question: Belize Basketball Federation v FIBA, CAS 2009/A/1988, para 19. However, the desire for consistency creates an imperative to follow the meaning given by previous CAS panels (and even arguably first instance panels, where their reasoning is persuasive) to the same SGB regulation. See para B1.60.

B1.50 Therefore, it is obviously important both for the SGB itself and for the parties that have to comply with its regulations to understand how the court or arbitral panel will approach its interpretive task. (a)

For the SGB, it is crucial to understand how the regulations would be interpreted by the court in case of dispute, not only because it wants to be sure that the regulations have the effect that it intended, in terms of getting others to do what it wants,1 but also because the SGB has a ‘hard-edged’ obligation to act in accordance with ‘applicable law’, including its own regulations, properly interpreted. It is afforded no ‘margin of appreciation’ in this context. Therefore, if it interprets its own regulations incorrectly, and so gives them an improper meaning and effect, those adversely affected will have good grounds for legal challenge. (b) Similarly, for a member or athlete who is required to comply with the SGB’s regulations, or else face potentially serious sanction, it is crucial to understand how the regulations should be interpreted, not only in order to work out how to comply,2 but also in order to mount a defence if the SGB brings a charge of non-compliance that is not consistent with the meaning of the regulations, properly interpreted. 1 Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p  14 (‘the drafter will find it difficult to convey the Parliamentary intent to the courts unless he knows that they will attach the same meaning to his words as that in which he employs them. Hence the need for a common standard of interpretation […]’); Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation: Art and Technology of Rules for Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2014), p  331 (‘Rules of statutory interpretation form part of the legislative environment within which drafting and the drafter operate. And, although these rules are not there to absolve the drafter from the responsibility of producing a clear, precise and unambiguous legislative text, they can facilitate the drafter in the formation of a pre-legislative perception on how users will perceive the legislative expression produced. In other words, awareness of the rules of statutory interpretation offers the drafter a window into the minds of users. This can direct the drafter to fine-tune the legislative expression to the prejudices of user comprehension’) and p  328 (‘rules of statutory interpretation are a drafting tool that facilitates the unearthing and subsequent avoidance of unintended vagueness, ambiguity and incompleteness, thus contributing to effective legislation’). For example, once the drafter of an SGB’s regulations understands that the courts will favour an interpretation that promotes the objectives of the regulations over one that frustrates them (see para B1.57, n 5), he or she may decide that it is worth stating those objectives expressly in the introduction to the regulations themselves, so that there is no subsequent debate about what they are. See eg the International Cricket Council’s 2017 Anti-Corruption Code for Participants, which sets out at Art 1.1 the sporting imperatives that have led to the Code being issued, and states at Art 1.2 that it is to be interpreted in a manner that advances those imperatives. 2 See Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 1 (‘If it were not a known fact that, in the ordinary case in which the normal user of the English language would have no doubt about the meaning of the statutory words, the courts will give those words their ordinary meaning, it would be impossible for lawyers and other experts to act and advise on the statute in question with confidence’).

B1.51 Sports lawyers therefore need to know what rules of law or principles of interpretation the court or arbitral panel will apply to resolve the dispute as to the proper meaning of an SGB’s regulations. And again, the SGB’s regulations may expressly provide that they are governed by the laws of a particular jurisdiction (again, usually the one in which the SGB is domiciled). If the SGB is a national federation, and its regulations only address a topic that is confined to its national jurisdiction, the courts and arbitrators are likely to apply the rules of interpretation of that governing national law to determine the proper meaning of those regulations.1 The relevant

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part of that national law that is applicable may vary dependent upon whether the national law treats SGB regulations as akin to statutes or contracts for the purposes of interpretation. If the regulations in question are issued by an international federation and apply globally, and do not specify that they are governed by a particular national law, the same need arises as identified above for harmonisation and consistency of application of the regulations to ensure a level playing-field wherever the sport is played.2 And this all-important objective requires: ‘that general principles of interpretation are to be applied [to determine the proper meaning of the SGB’s regulations], rather than particular principles of interpretation and law derived from one particular national legal system or another. The focus in interpreting the [World Anti-Doping] Code should, accordingly, be on the principles of interpretation which are common to all legal systems because, if that approach is adopted, it is more likely that the Code will be interpreted and applied in a consistent manner”. Such an approach to interpretation of the Code, or of anti-doping rules of a sporting organisation based on the Code, is consistent with the international nature of the text as a code which is intended to function outside the constraints of a particular legal system and is analogous to the way in which common law courts have treated the interpretation of international treaties or conventions’.3

The same applies of course, by parity of reasoning, to any regulations of an international federation that are intended to apply uniformly across different national legal jurisdictions, no matter what their subject-matter.4 And it also applies to the regulations of a national federation that implement the regulations of the international federation within the national federation’s territorial jurisdiction.5 1 For example, the English Football League’s regulations setting out disqualifying conditions for football club owners and directors (discussed at para B5.12) apply only to English clubs participating in competitions staged by the English Football League in England. Therefore, they fall to be interpreted in accordance with normal English law principles, as was done, for example, in Cellino v The Football League, decision of Professional Conduct Committee (Tim Kerr QC) dated 5 April 2014. There is no need to refer to any other laws. 2 See para B1.15. 3 Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, paras 34-35, quoting David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code (CUP 2008), p 86, and citing (inter alia) Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at 281H (‘The language of an international convention […] should be interpreted, as Lord Wilberforce put it in James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 1048 at 1052, [1978] AC 141 at 152, “unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation”’). See also, by way of further analogy, Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A  Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 9.50 (‘treaties are generally intended to be given a uniform interpretation by all states parties. As international instrument intended for a “varied judicial audience”, they should not be interpreted by reference to concepts and technical rules of English law unlikely to have been in the contemplation of those framing the treaty. Rather, the court “must search, untrammelled by notions of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty”, applying “broad principles of general acceptation”’ [citations omitted]). WADA has attempted to codify this principle at Article  24.3 of the World Anti-Doping Code, which provides that ‘the Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the Signatories or governments’. The obvious intent is to ensure the uniform application of the Code across all jurisdictions and sports. In USADA v Rollins, AAA Panel decision dated 14 April 2017, para 7.4, the hearing panel relied on Art 24.3 to reject an argument that the word ‘negligence’, as used (but not defined) in Code-compliant rules, should be given the meaning given to that word in the Swiss Criminal Code. 4 Cowley v Heatley (1986) Times, 24  July [CA], 1986  TLR  430 (‘But under the constitution the headquarters [of the international federation] can be changed. For example, it could be decided some time in the future that Nairobi, or any other place, should be the headquarters of the Federation. If so, what system of law is one going to apply to a specialist word like “domicile” [appearing in the federation’s constitution]? Is one then going to give it the meaning that it has in the law of Kenya? In my judgment, the parties to this constitution cannot have meant that the rules should change in their effect and impact according to which country the headquarters for the time being were situated. In my judgment, the fact that this is a multi-national document encompassing people operating under many different systems of law is a strong indication that words used in it are not to be given technical meanings attributed to those words by the law of one particular constituent nation’); Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 49 (‘The constitution of FINA is established by contract and FINA

362  Regulating Sport derives its powers by contract. FINA, as the world-wide body for swimming has promulgated rules and regulations for the sport. These rules and regulations also constitute a contract between the body and its members. CAS, as an international arbitration body ought to interpret these contracts according to the general principles used by international arbitration panels and as it is directed to do by Swiss law. The general principles of international contract law are too numerous and too complex to be summarized comprehensively for this opinion. For a general and authoritative presentation, see GOLDMAN, “La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et L’arbitrage international: réalité et perspectives”; 106 Journal du droit International 475, (1979)’); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006, para 5 (‘Under Article S [of the Tennis Anti-Doping Programme,] the Rules are governed by English law. It is expressly provided that the programme is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the applicable provision of the WADA Code, taking into account the commentary to that code. As the Rules are based on the WADA  Code, it is clear that they must be interpreted consistently so as to accord with generally internationally accepted principles of sports law which would be applied by tribunals in other jurisdictions, and by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) to which any appeal lies under Article O’). See also cases cited at para B1.15, nn 3 and 4. 5 UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, para 27 (‘The phrase that requires to be interpreted […] is expressed in the rules of an international organization, the IAAF, which rules are in turn derived from the IOC Anti-Doping Code. The rules apply to all athletes engaged in international athletic competition and are intended to operate in a uniform manner across all jurisdictions. It is thus clear that the rules must be interpreted consistently so as to accord with generally accepted principles of law which would be applied by tribunals of other jurisdictions and by CAS, to which any appeal lies under IAAF Rule 21. In the CAS jurisprudence an acceptance is emerging of the general principles of sporting law governing doping offences, independent of the municipal law of the state in which the sporting body happens to be located. That approach can only be strengthened as the World Anti-Doping Code is brought into force’). See also Modahl v BAF [1997] EWCA Civ 2209, Lord Woolf MR, para  37 (‘The BAF  Rules are the rules for implementation in this country of requirements parallel to those contained in the IAAF  Rules. If there is any ambiguity as to the interpretation of the BAF Rules then the IAAF Rules can be used to resolve that ambiguity’).

B1.52 What, then, are the ‘principles of interpretation which are common to all legal systems’ that are relevant to determining the meaning of such ‘transnational’ SGB regulations? And to what extent are they different from the principles of interpretation that would apply under English law to determine the proper meaning of an English SGB’s regulations of purely national application?

A The basic approach: what would the words mean, in their context, to a reasonable reader? B1.53 In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, the approach taken to the interpretation of a document depends on the legal character of that document. ‘Is it an ordinary contract freely negotiated between the parties concerned? Or is it more in the nature of a statute, bye-law or legislative code imposed by one party on another?’1 The difficulty in relation to an SGB’s regulations is that they are something of a hybrid. They are contractual in that they confer rights and impose obligations on the SGB’s members, and on occasion the regulations expressly provide as much. Where they have been debated and approved by the members at an annual general meeting, they are manifestly agreed, even where individual members voted against them.2 The position is more complicated where the regulations confer rights and impose obligations on the SGB’s members’ members (for example, clubs and teams) or even participants not in such membership at all (for example, athletes and athlete support personnel, or even player agents). In that context the regulations are in some sense imposed ‘unilaterally’, usually without negotiation or even consultation. While participation in the sport may constitute a contractual acceptance to be bound by the regulations, in terms of the extent of a participant’s input and degree of choice they have distinct similarities with a statute or code.3 Lawyers from common law jurisdictions would treat an SGB’s regulations not as legislation but as a contract between the SGB, its members, and their members participating in the sport,4 to be construed in accordance with the ordinary principles applicable to the interpretation of any written contract.5 In civil law jurisdictions, the position is apparently less

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clear. For a considerable time, the position under Swiss law for example was not finally settled,6 though the position now appears to be that SGB regulations are to be interpreted in accordance with the rules applicable to statutes, at least where the SGB is a ‘large’ one,7 and that is the position taken by most CAS arbitrators.8 In many instances, however, the point may be moot because ‘in practice the principles of interpretation [of a contract and a law] overlap to a large degree’ in Swiss law.9 1 AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.5 (the issue of how a set of rules should be interpreted ‘raises the question what the legal character of such rules and regulations [is], which depends upon identification as the “Olympic Qualification System Principles”. Is it an ordinary contract freely negotiated between the parties concerned? Or is it more in the nature of a statute, bye-law or legislative code imposed by one party on another?’); Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para 121 (‘There is a need to clarify the nature of Article 14.3 as it is the indispensable prerequisite for the application of the appropriate method of interpretation’). See eg Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL) (discussing principles of interpretation applicable to international treaties, and how they differ from principles of interpretation applicable to domestic legislation). 2 See para B1.61, n 8. 3 Juventus FC  v Chelsea FC, CAS  2013/A/3365, para  141 (‘The issue is whether the articles of associations should be interpreted by using the principles applied to the interpretation of contract or to the interpretation of statutory laws. As the articles of association form the contractual basis of an association – a private law institution – it can be argued that they have much in common with contracts and should therefore be interpreted through the contractual principles of the subjective intent of the parties and good faith (Forstmoser/Meier-Hayoz/Nobel, §7 N 4; Zeller, §11 N 129-133; Valloni/ Pachmann, p  25). However, articles of association also set forth constitutive principles which may have effects to others apart from the original members of the association, and should therefore be subject to the more objective approach followed with respect to statutory laws (Forstmoser/MeierHayoz/Nobel, §7 N 3)’. 4 Modahl v British Athletic Federation (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1447, para 105 (Mance LJ), discussed at paras E7.13 and E7.14 Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 (CA) (Clarke LJ) at p 3 of the Lawtel transcript (‘both the appellants and the ITF are contractually bound by the terms of the [ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping] Programme’); and para D3.45 et seq. See also Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 49 (‘The constitution of FINA is established by contract and FINA derives its powers by contract. FINA, as the world-wide body for swimming has promulgated rules and regulations for the sport. These rules and regulations also constitute a contract between the body and its members’); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 8.21 (‘[…] the WADA Code is neither a law nor an international treaty. It is rather a contract instrument binding its signatories in accordance with private international law’). 5 Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation, Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] (Clarke LJ), at page 15 (‘The question for decision in this appeal depends on the true construction of section (V)3 [of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme], construed in the context of the contract as a whole, which in turn must be set against its surrounding circumstances or factual matrix. We must of course bear in mind in this regard the principles comparatively recently set out by Lord Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The Panel has examined the terms of these rules in accordance with the English law rules of construction to establish their proper meaning’); USACA  v ICC, arbitration award of the ICC  Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator) dated 16  June 2017, para  44 (memorandum and articles of association of the ICC, a BVI limited company, ‘are to be construed in accordance with the ordinary principles that apply to the interpretation of any written contract’). Ultimately, however, the distinction is effectively moot, because the approach taken in English law to the interpretation of statutes is very similar to the approach taken to the interpretation of contracts. See Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004]  EHRLR  245; Kirby, ‘Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes and Contracts’ [2003] 24(2) Statute Law Review 95–111; and see generally Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018). 6 The Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that such regulations are not applicable as a ‘law’ but must be considered as contractually agreed provisions like general terms of a contract. X AG v Y, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 20 December 2005, ATF 132 III 285, para 1.3; UEFA v Z. Association, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 22 December 2008, 4A_392/2008, para 4.2.1 (‘The statutes of a legal entity in private law are normally interpreted according to the principle of trust, similarly to statements of contractual intent. As is the case for the text of a law, an interpretation according to the objective meaning is also conceivable, or even better according to some legal writers’). Various CAS panels have taken the same view. See eg Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, paras 92–93 (‘92. The Panel agrees that the authority of international or national federations and/or national anti-doping organizations to impose sanctions on athletes is normally based on a contractual relationship. Such relationship may be grounded on the athlete obtaining a licence to participate in competitions organized under the rules of a federation, or on an agreement – either explicit or implicit

364  Regulating Sport – on participation in a specific sport event. 93. The terms of this contractual relationship consist inter alia of the relevant anti-doping rules. While obtaining a licence to compete from a federation or when participating in a sport event, an athlete accepts that the anti-doping rules of that federation or event organizer bind him/her’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, paras 86, 88 (same). However, other CAS panels have asserted that ‘[…] statutes and regulations of an association shall be interpreted and construed according to the principles applicable to the interpretation of the law rather than [according] to [the principles applicable to the interpretation of] contracts’. See eg Henriques v IOC & IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6225, para 85; FA of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602, para 4; DFB et al v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5063, para  3; Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS  2016/A/4787, para 126. See also Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para 134 (‘[…] the statutes of an association are not bilateral contracts between the association and its members’) and paras 143–44 (‘As regards the statutes of larger entities, it may be appropriate to have recourse to the method of interpretation applicable to the law, whereas in the presence of smaller enterprises, the statutes may more legitimately be interpreted by reference to good faith. […] FIFA’s regulations have effects which are felt worldwide, and should therefore be subject to the more objective interpretation principles’); Overliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.17 (‘The Swiss Federal Tribunal and leading commentators tend to interpret the statutes and regulations of associations in an objective way, comparable to the interpretation of statutory law’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201, paras 28-29 (same). 7 Platini v FIFA, Swiss Federal Tribunal decision A_344/2017 dated 21 December 2017, para 3.3.4.1 (‘When interpreting statutes, the interpretation methods may vary according to the type of association. For the interpretation of the statutes of large associations, we use methods of interpreting the law. For the interpretation of the statutes of small associations, reference is made instead to the methods of interpretation of contracts, namely an interpretation according to the principle of trust (judgment 4A_235/2013 of May 27, 2014, paragraph 2.3 and the case law quoted). The Federal Tribunal ruled the same when it was called to interpret the statutes of a major sports association, such as UEFA, in particular its statutory clauses relating to questions of jurisdiction (judgment 4A_392/200812 of December 22, 2008, and the references). In the present case, the interpretation concerns rules of a sports association at a lower level than the Statutes, ie, the CEF. Although they do not deal with an issue related to jurisdiction, these rules have been enacted by the organization governing football at world level, so that their scope is global. Their interpretation according to the principle of legitimate expectation is therefore not taken into consideration. The Appellant is thus right to interpret them in accordance with the methods of statutory interpretation’) (unofficial translation). The SFT went on to explain (ibid, para 3.3.4.2): ‘Any interpretation begins with the letter of the law (literal interpretation), but this is not decisive: the interpretation still has to find the true scope of the norm, which also derives from its relationship with other legal provisions and its context (systematic interpretation), the aim pursued, particularly the protected interest (teleological interpretation), as well as the will of the legislator as it may be understood from the “travaux préparatoires” (historical interpretation). The judge departs from a clear legal text only when the aforementioned other methods of interpretation show that this text does not correspond in all respects to the true meaning of the provision in question and leads to results which the legislator could not have wanted, which conflict with the sense of justice, or the principle of equal treatment. In short, the Federal Tribunal does not favor any method of interpretation and does not establish a hierarchy, based on a pragmatic pluralism in order to seek the true meaning of the norm (ATF 142 III 402 at 2.5.1 and the judgments quoted)’ (unofficial translation). 8 See para D2.130. 9 AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.9, quoting with approval the statement in Rinaldi v FINA, CAS 2007/A/1377, that ‘[…] in practice the principles of interpretation [of a statute and a contract] overlap to a large degree and both methods converge considering that the literal meaning (the wording) of the provision or clause is the starting point’. See also Ward v IOC, AIBA & ANOC, CAS 0G 12/002, para 24 (‘According to Swiss doctrine as discussed in CAS case law when interpreting a contract, “one first has to look at the text; if the text is not clear, then at what the parties intended; if that cannot be established, then how the contract should be interpreted in an objective manner. There is less unanimity, it seems, in Swiss doctrine and case law whether statutes or similar instruments should be interpreted in a like manner. But it is the Tribunal’s impression that the better and more prevalent view is that the same criteria should, so far as possible, apply”’ [citations omitted]).

B1.54 While there may be distinctions in approach, it appears that for the most part the common law and the civil law apply similar concepts and ultimately arrive at similar conclusions as to the proper meaning of an SGB’s regulations. In both systems, an objective as opposed to a subjective approach is applied. The courts do not consider what the drafters now say they intended those regulations to mean.1 Rather, they look for ‘the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were in at the time of the contract’.2 To ascertain that objective meaning is one ‘unitary exercise’, an ‘iterative process’3 in which the

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  365

court or tribunal considers the meaning of the words of the regulation in question, on the basis of how they would reasonably be understood by the members and athletes they seek to regulate,4 given their documentary, factual and historical/commercial context.5 As set out below, that means starting with the text of the particular provision in question, but also taking into account the other provisions in those regulations and in the rest of the SGB’s rulebook, and the background circumstances prevalent in that SGB’s sport generally at the time the regulations were issued, including in particular the objective purpose and object of the regulations, ie what aim objectively underlies them.6 The meaning to be preferred is the one that is most consistent with the objective meaning of the words of the provision in question, that gives all of the SGB’s regulations together a consistent and coherent meaning overall, and that applies the regulation in a pragmatic and common sense way that advances (or at least does not frustrate) the purposes underlying the regulations.7 1 For English law authority on this point, see eg  Arnold v Britton [2015] AC  1619 (SC), per Lord Neuberger at 1627H-1628A (meaning of contract to reasonable reader is to be assessed by reference to the words of the text in issue, set in their proper factual context, but ‘disregarding subjective evidence of any party’s intentions’); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions decision dated 5 March 2012, para 35 (‘[…] (a) the ultimate aim of interpreting a provision in a contract is to determine what the parties meant by the language used. […] (b) the subjective interpretations of the parties – what they thought the Policy meant – are immaterial’). For CAS authority, see eg Henriques v IOC & IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6225, para 85 (‘The interpretation of the statutes and rules of a sport association has to be rather objective and should always start with the wording of the rule which falls to be interpreted. The adjudicating body – in this instance the Panel – will have to consider the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate grammar and syntax. In its search, the adjudicating body will have further to identify the intentions (objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule, and such body may also take account of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation, as well as the entire regulatory context in which the particular rule is located’), quoting CAS 2010/A/2071, para 20; FC Girondins de Bordeaux v FIFA, CAS 2012/A/2862, para 85 (‘Under Swiss law, the articles of association must be interpreted in the sense of the text, as it can and should be understood, depending on the overall circumstances. This interpretation is described as “objective” […]. That must also be true with regard to the interpretation of regulations from an association’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 12 (‘The FIBT said that its intention and that of the IOC [in the rules they agreed for qualification for the Olympic Games] was to give athletes of NOCs whose continents were not represented in any FIBT events an opportunity to be represented. Further, according to FIBT, it was not contemplated that the Continental Representation rule could be used in order to guarantee NOCs from non-represented continents representation in all events. However, this intention is not reflected in the clear language of the text. Rather the language in the document reflects the intention to provide representation of one men’s 2-man bob or one men’s 4-man bob and one women’s bob team per continent’); Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 29 (‘[…] the wording of the provision has particular importance compared with the historical “legislative materials”; for the rules and regulations of an association must, first and foremost be interpreted according to their objective wording and purport, not according to the subjective will of the association’s organs responsible for the provision’); WADA  v Troy & IRB, CAS  2008/A/1652, preliminary award on jurisdiction dated 18 March 2009, para 83 (‘It may well be that [the] distinction we have drawn between notice of a written decision and receipt of such a decision is one which was not actually intended by the ARU but construction of the ARU By-Laws is an objective not subjective task’). In some civil law jurisdictions (eg  France), the courts apparently do place importance on the subjective intent of the parties (as noted by Lord Hoffman in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, at para 39), and consistent with that there are passing references in some CAS awards to trying to determine ‘what the parties intended’ subjectively. See eg Ward v IOC, AIBA & ANOC, CAS OG 12/002, para 24: ‘[…] one first has to look at the text; if the text is not clear, then at what the parties intended; if that cannot be established, then how the contract should be interpreted in an objective manner’; AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.10 (‘If the text of statutes, or similar instruments is not clear and unambiguous, and if the intention of the “parties” to such instruments cannot be established, the focus of interpretation must be on what the party subject to such statutes, rules or regulations (as distinct from the maker thereof) could reasonably expect the meaning thereof to be’). However, the clear weight of the CAS authorities focuses on the objective meaning of the regulations, ie what the reasonable reader would think was intended, and not what the parties that wrote them subjectively intended. 2 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896 [HL] per Lord Hoffman at 902. For further English law authority on this point, see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101, per Lord Hoffman at para 14 (‘It is agreed that the

366  Regulating Sport question is what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean’); Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] per Clarke LJ at page 15 (‘The question for decision in this appeal depends on the true construction of section (V)3 [of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme], construed in the context of the contract as a whole, which in turn must be set against its surrounding circumstances or factual matrix. We must of course bear in mind in this regard the principles comparatively recently set out by Lord Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The Panel has examined the terms of these rules in accordance with the English law rules of construction to establish their proper meaning. Under English law, it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the document by reference to what meaning would be given to it by a reasonable man having all the background knowledge that would reasonably have been available’). For CAS authority, see eg Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS 2007/A/1407, para 10 (‘The task of ascertaining the intention of the parties must be approached objectively, the question is not what one or other of the parties meant or understood by the words used but the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of concluding the Termination Agreement’) and para  11 (‘The cardinal presumption is that the Parties have intended what they have in fact said, so that their words must be construed as they stand. However this is not to say that the meaning of the words in a written document must be ascertained by reference to the words of the document alone. In the modern world of law, courts and tribunals in principle look at all circumstances surrounding the making of the contract which would assist in determining how the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.1 (‘As a legal document the Qualification System is to be understood according to general rules of interpretation. The interpretation has to start from the ordinary meaning of the words used in this context and the reasonable understanding of the addressees of such rules’). 3 Wood v Capita Insurance Services [2017]  UKSC  24, per Lord Hodge at 10 (‘The court’s task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. It has long been accepted that this is not a literalist exercise focused solely on a parsing of the wording of the particular clause but that the court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning’) and 13 (‘Textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in a battle for exclusive occupation of the field of contractual interpretation. Rather, the lawyer and the judge, when interpreting any contract, can use them as tools to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. The extent to which each tool will assist the court in its task will vary according to the circumstances of the particular agreement or agreements. Some agreements may be successfully interpreted principally by textual analysis, for example because of their sophistication and complexity and because they have been negotiated and prepared with the assistance of skilled professionals. The correct interpretation of other contracts may be achieved by a greater emphasis on the factual matrix, for example because of their informality, brevity or the absence of skilled professional assistance. But negotiators of complex formal contracts may often not achieve a logical and coherent text because of, for example, the conflicting aims of the parties, failures of communication, differing drafting practices, or deadlines which require the parties to compromise in order to reach agreement. There may often therefore be provisions in a detailed professionally drawn contract which lack clarity and the lawyer or judge in interpreting such provisions may be particularly helped by considering the factual matrix and the purpose of similar provisions in contracts of the same type. The iterative process, of which Lord Mance spoke in Sigma Finance Corpn (above), assists the lawyer or judge to ascertain the objective meaning of disputed provisions’); Re Sigma Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2, per Lord Mance at 12. 4 For English law authority on this point, see eg Porter v National Union of Journalists [1980] IRLR 404, 407 (Lord Diplock) (‘I turn then to the interpretation of the relevant rules [of the NUJ], bearing in mind that their purpose is to inform the members of the NUJ of what rights they acquire and obligations they assume vis-à-vis the union and their fellow members, by becoming and remaining members of it. The readership to which the rules are addressed consists of ordinary working journalists, not judges or lawyers versed in the semantic technicalities of statutory draftsmanship’), quoted with approval in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896, 902 (HL). For CAS authority, see eg  AOC  v FIBT, CAS OG  2010/01, para  6.1 (‘As a legal document the Qualification System is to be understood according to general rules of interpretation. The interpretation has to start from the ordinary meaning of the words used in this context and the reasonable understanding of the addressees of such rules’). 5 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 (SC), per Lord Neuberger at para 15 (‘When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to “what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean”, to quote Lord Hoffman in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101, para 14. And it does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words […] in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  367 clause; (ii) any other relevant provisions of the lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the lease, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party’s intentions’). See also Re Globespan Airways Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1159, per Arden LJ (same approach followed in the context of ascertaining proper meaning of a statute). For CAS authority, see Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 129 (‘According to CAS jurisprudence (CAS  2013/A/3047) and Swiss law, there are four coequal methods of interpretation. They are the grammatical (seeks after the semantically meaning of the word or phrase), the systematical (seeks after the systematic position of an article in the legal texture of the greater whole), the historical (seeks after the original intention of the rule) and the teleological method (seeks after the spirit and purpose of the statute) of interpretation. While interpreting a statute, the judge has to seek for an objectively right and satisfying decision, taking account of the normative context and the ratio legis. Thereby no interpretation method prevails over another. Rather, the judge has to choose those methodical arguments that allow approximating the ratio legis as close as possible’) (citations omitted); Casas Vaque v FEI, CAS 2019/A/6202, para 195 (same); Aloyan v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4927, para 74 (‘[…] under Swiss law […], the interpretation of the statutes and rules of a sport association has to be rather objective and should always start with the wording of the rule which falls to be interpreted. The adjudicating body – in this instance the Panel – will have to consider the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate grammar and syntax. In its search, the adjudicating body will have further to identify the intentions (objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule, and such body may also take account of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation, as well as the entire regulatory context in which the particular rule is located’, citing various Swiss Federal Tribunal judgments and CAS awards); DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (same); Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 126, quoting with approval IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, para 46 (same). See also UEFA v Z. Association, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 22  December 2008, 4A_392/2008, para  4.2.3 (while a purely literal interpretation of the provision in question may have suggested one result, a logical and systematic analysis of the other provisions in the same regulations, seeking a practical interpretation rather than an artificial one, justified going beyond a purely literal interpretation to read into the provision that the decisions of UEFA organs that could be appealed to CAS were ‘jurisdictional’ organs, which result was corroborated by a ‘historical’ interpretation, since the legislative history of the provision in question showed that the intent was to refer to jurisdictional organs and the omission of the word ‘jurisdictional’ was inadvertent). 6 See para D2.130; Rouiller, Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law, 25 October 2005, p 17 (‘A legal text is first interpreted according to the letter of the text (literal or grammatical method). Departure from the literal meaning of a clear text is only called for where there are objective reasons to suggest that the text does not convey the true intent of the provision in question. Such reasons may flow from the preparatory work, the aim and direction of the provision being examined, and sometimes its place within the law. Thus, the true intent and spirit of a legal text that admits of several interpretations are to be sought, inter alia, on the basis of the preparatory work that led up to its adoption (historical method), the aim that the rule seeks to achieve and the values on which it is based (teleological method), or its relationship with other legal provisions (systematic method). Contrary to what we might think, the historical method of interpretation is not fundamental and the interpreter is not bound to take the preparatory work into account. It is only to be taken into account to the extent that the ideas that were discussed during the discussions leading up to its adoption are expressed in the text. The importance of the preparatory work for the analysis is, in any case, inversely proportional to how far back in time that work was done. Lastly, it should be pointed out that all of these methods are intercoordinated and not subordinated one to the other’). 7 For a good example of such an approach, see WADA v Troy & IRB, CAS 2008/A/1652, preliminary award on jurisdiction dated 18 March 2009, para 66 (words of ARU regulation being interpreted ‘[…] must be construed objectively, in accordance with the ordinary and fair meaning of the words used and having regard to a consideration of the whole of the ARU By-law. The ARU By-law must be read as whole and the words of each clause should be interpreted so as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the ARU By-law. “The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction”’ [citations omitted]) and at paras 67–73.

B1.55 Because this approach is broadly common both to civil law systems (or at least Swiss law, the predominant law at the CAS, headquartered in Lausanne) and to common law systems, it has been accepted by the CAS as a ‘general principle of interpretation’, applicable whenever the meaning of an SGB’s regulations is disputed in CAS proceedings.1 It is therefore important to consider this ‘iterative’ process of contractual interpretation more closely, examining each of its constituent elements in turn.

368  Regulating Sport 1 Qatar FA v FIFA et al, CAS 2012/A/2742, para 197 (‘Pursuant to the general principles of construction and interpretation of laws, in order to ascertain the intention of the law maker, the deciding body should look at the ordinary and plain meaning of the law in question’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.1 (‘As a legal document the Qualification System is to be understood according to general rules of interpretation. The interpretation has to start from the ordinary meaning of the words used in this context and the reasonable understanding of the addressees of such rules’); Virgin Islands Olympic Committee v IOC, CAS OG  10/003, paras 5–6 (‘General rules of interpretation must be applied. The ordinary meaning of the words used must be considered in the context of the document under consideration, the document being considered as a whole. […] The words of the document must be given the closest scrutiny’); Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, para 38 (‘The court or arbitrator must consider what a reasonable person in the position of the parties to the contract would have understood the contract to mean at the time it was entered into’), quoting David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 84.

B Considering the words of the regulation, in their context within the specific provision and within the regulations more generally, so that the SGB’s rulebook is read as a coherent whole B1.56 The starting point is always the text of the provision in issue.1 Again, the task is to determine how the words as they appear in the text would reasonably be understood by the people they seek to regulate. This approach entails: (a) considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used;2 (b) considering also the grammar and the syntax3 and the punctuation,4 since they can also have a significant impact on meaning; (c) bearing in mind that to the audience for which the words are written (ie those participating in the sport), the words may have a special or technical meaning that they would not have for the ordinary reader;5 (d) seeking an interpretation that gives force (if possible) to each word used in the provision, and does not render any words redundant;6 (e) avoiding as far as possible an interpretation that would require the words of the provision to be altered or supplemented in a way that would change the meaning of the provision and produce a result that is not justified by the natural and ordinary meaning of the original words;7 (f) considering the words at issue not in a vacuum but in their ‘documentary’ context, ie  in the context of the rest of the specific provision in which they appear,8 because ‘English words derive colour from those which surround them’;9 and (g) also considering the words at issue in the context of the regulations as a whole,10 and in the context of the SGB’s rulebook more generally,11 so that they are read as a coherent whole:12 (i) a proposed interpretation that would ignore or contradict other provisions in the regulations should be rejected in favour of one that would be consistent with the rest of the regulations;13 and (ii) there is a presumption that a word that is used several times in a set of regulations carries the same meaning every time it is used;14 whereas a variation of language may indicate a change in meaning.15  1 For English law authority for this point, see eg  Arnold v Britton [2015] AC  1619 (SC) per Lord Neuberger at 1628C (‘[…] the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances […] should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision’); Du Plessis v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 21  December 2016, [2017] (3) ISLR SLR-67, para 4.4 (‘The starting point must be the language of the provision in question’). For CAS authority, see eg  DFB et al v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5063, para  3 (‘The interpretation of the statutes and rules of a sport association had to be rather objective and had to always start with

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  369 the wording of the rule necessitating interpretation. Any adjudicating body would have to consider the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate grammar and syntax’); Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 126, quoting with approval IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, para 46 (same); AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.9 (‘[…] the literal meaning (the wording) of the provision or clause is the starting point’); TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v ETTU, CAS  2007/A/1363, para  12 (‘By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation)’); WCM-GP Ltd v FIM, CAS 2003/A/4612 & 471 & 473, para 36 (‘The first step […] is for the Panel to construe the words used in the Regulations. Interpreting the law according to its letter requires a tribunal to construe the meaning of the words used by the legislator. […] Contrary to the submission made by the Appellant to convince the Panel that one should apply the principles of legal certainty, proportionality and the rule contra proferentem automatically, Swiss law relies on such principles only if there is ambiguity and no clear meaning can be drawn from an interpretation based on the letter and the spirit of the law’).  2 See eg  Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS  2007/A/1407, para  13 (‘The starting point in constructing a contract is that the words are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Courts assume that parties use language in the way that reasonable persons ordinarily do. Terms therefore are to be understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense, unless they have generally in respect to the subject-matter a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of the words or the context evidently points out that they must in the particular instance be understood in some other special and peculiar sense’) and para 14 (‘This conclusion is also confirmed by Swiss doctrine, particularly WINIGER, Commentaire Romand – CO I, Basel 2003, n. 18-20 ad Art. 18 CO, which establishes that the parties’ common intention must prevail on the wording of their contract. […]’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The presumption is that the words in documents should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and it is only when such an approach creates an unreasonable result that it is necessary to look to other meanings’); Zubkov v FINA, CAS 2007/A/1291, para 19 (‘The language of the relevant provision does not refer to “potential” disrepute, nor to conduct “having the potential” of bringing the sport into disrepute. When determining the proper meaning of Section 12.1.3 the starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the words used. If the meaning of the words used is clear, it is not permissible, in our view, to read other meanings, or qualified meanings, into such words’); Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 46 (‘We are of the view that the task of the Panel is to give effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of these words having regard to the context of the rules as a whole’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.5 (interpretation to be given to provision must be driven by ‘its plain meaning’). See, by way of example WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, para 80 (‘By using the qualification “compelling”, the wording of Article 2.3 underscores the strictness with which the justification needs to be examined’); WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 99 (‘This interpretation […] is fortified by the ordinary meaning of the word “dose” (eg, “a quantity of medicine prescribed to be taken at any one time”: Random House Dictionary; “a definite quantity of a medicine or drug given or prescribed to be given at one time”: Oxford English Dictionary)’); Federation Francaise des Echecs et al v Federation Internationale des Echecs, 2010/O/2166, para 9.7.8 (‘one cannot ignore that according to the text of Section 1.2 of the [Electoral Regulations] membership is a “should-requirement” as opposed to “must” or “shall”. The Panel therefore considers that the requirement of a one-year membership is not mandatory but recommendatory’); Schuettler v ITF, CAS OG 2008/003, para 7.4(ii) (‘Even where […] NOCs, when they enjoy the luxury of more than 4 players in the top 48 to choose from, are encouraged to select them in order of ranking, they are not compelled to do so. The phrase used is “should select” […] not shall or must or will select […]); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 179 (‘The Panel does not read “should” as a “must”. The word “should” implies some form of recommendation or guideline and therefore does not impose an obligation on Mr Barut’). See also to the same effect, on the difference between ‘shall’ and ‘should’, the cases cited at C6.22 n 2.  3 Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997]  WLR  749 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 775 (‘The meaning of words, as they would appear in a dictionary, and the effect of their syntactical arrangement, as it would appear in a grammar, is part of the material which we use to understand a speaker’s utterance’); DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (‘Any adjudicating body would have to consider the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate grammar and syntax’).   4 For example, Art 2.3 of the 2003 version of the World Anti-Doping Code provided that ‘refusing, or failing without compelling justification, to submit to Sample collection’ was an anti-doping rule violation. Based on the placement of the commas, some hearing panels concluded that the offence was (a) refusal; or (b) a failure without compelling justification, ie, the athlete could not seek to argue that there was compelling justification for his refusal to give a sample. See eg IRB v Nelo Lui, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 24 April 2007, para  44. In the 2009 version of the World AntiDoping Code, Article 2.3 was amended to read ‘refusing or failing without compelling justification to submit to Sample collection’, in order to make clear that an athlete could seek to offer ‘compelling justification’ not only for a failure to submit to sample collection but also for a refusal to submit to sample collection.

370  Regulating Sport See also Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 860 (panel considered that the place where the comma is situated in the phrase ‘the team may be subject to Disqualification, and/or other disciplinary action as provided in the applicable rules of the relevant International Federation’ ‘seems to indicate that the author of Article 9.1 of the IOC ADR in fact had in mind to provide for a different solution for the two different scenarios’, namely that disqualification from the Olympic Games is the exclusive prerogative of the IOC ‘whereas the imposition of “other disciplinary action” falls under the responsibility of the IFs’); Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.55 (‘[…] it is important to note that there is a comma after the phrase “administration or attempted administration of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method to any athlete.” Following this phrase and a comma, there are no further references to “athlete.” In the Panel’s view, therefore, the proper interpretation of Article 2.8 is that the first par, “administration or attempted administration of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method to any athlete” is limited to actions with respect to athletes. However, the latter part, “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or any attempted violation,” is intended to be very broad and to cover any ADR violation by any person bound by the ADR, including a coach or a support staff member, and is not limited to the ADR violations of fellow athletes’).   5 For English law authority for this point, see eg Reel v Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226 (CA), per Eveleigh J  at 1232 (where IAAF rules permitted associations to put themselves forward for membership as the national governing body of the sport in a particular ‘country’, the court noted that ‘The word “country” has been used in the rules in order to delineate the area of authority. They do not use the word in the sense of sovereign state’); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions decision dated 5 March 2012, para(f) (‘[…] where terminology is used which has a known meaning in a particular context (such as the sport of rhythmic gymnastics), the meaning of that terminology will be a question of fact to be determined by the tribunal’). For similar CAS authority, see Celtic v UEFA, CAS 98/201, para 30 (‘[…] within the framework of the rules of football, particularly concerning transfers, the concepts of “nation” and “country” have different meanings than in the usual language, it being understood that those concepts – within the context of football – do not correspond systematically and/or strictly to the existing political borders of the concerned territories. As examples thereof, it may be pointed out that the transfer of a player from Glasgow Rangers FC, a club affiliated to the SFA [Scottish Football Association], to Liverpool FC, a club affiliated to the English FA, would constitute an international transfer within the meaning of the FIFA Regulations, although both Glasgow and Liverpool are cities which are politically part of the same state (the UK)’).   6 For English law authority for this point, see eg Secretary of State for Defence v Turner Estate Solutions Ltd. [2015] EWHC 1150 (Coulson J.), para 62 (‘[…] in construing a contract, all parts of it must be given effect where possible, and no part of it should be treated as inoperative or surplus’); Secretary of State for Defence v Spencer [2003] EWCA Civ 784, [2003] 1 WLR 2701, per Peter Gibson LJ at 29 (‘It is elementary that one must seek to give meaning to every word used in a statute’). For CAS authority, see eg  ADO  Den Haag v Newcastle United FC, CAS  2006/A/1152, para  24 (‘[…] a fundamental tenet of legal interpretation is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), according to which interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a provision. An interpreter must not adopt a reading that would result in making a substantial part of a provision redundant or without legal effect’); FC Barcelona v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, para 9.8 (‘this Panel must privilege the interpretation that allows the various provisions in a statute to coexist, and cannot and should not interpret one provision so as to eliminate the scope of another one (ut regis valeat quam pereat)’); Chernova v IAAF, CAS 2017/A/4949, para 83 (‘[…] the full applicability of the jurisdictional requirements of Article R47 would lead to the impossibility of applying Rule 38.3 as a basis for CAS jurisdiction, as there would never be a previous decision to review or internal legal remedies to exhaust. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the interpretive principle ut res magis valet quam pereat (known in French as the principle of effet utile), according to which an interpretation rendering a rule effective must prevail over one which renders it superfluous’); Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 44 (‘Any interpretation of said provision must start with the plain wording of the provision. According thereto, the new statute of limitation contained in Rule 47 of the 2015 ADR “shall only be applied” to cases that have occurred prior to the entering into force of the 2015 ADR (Effective Date), if the “statute of limitation period has not already expired” by that date. It is rather obvious to the Sole Arbitrator that the latter term (“statute of limitation period”) does not refer to the “new” statute of limitation in the 2015 ADR. Instead, it refers to the (old) statute of limitation previously in force. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that no reference is made in this context to “Rule 47”. Furthermore, any different reading would make little sense, because then the second half of the sentence (“provided however that Rule 47 shall only be applied retroactively if the statute of limitations period has not already expired by the Effective Date”) would be superfluous’); Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 168 (‘The Panel prefers to find an interpretation of the Article which does not make part of it redundant’); FA of Wales v UEFA, CAS 2004/A/593, para 24 (‘The FAW had to admit at the hearing that its understanding of “implicated” as “involved” would lead to the logical result that there would be no need for art. 12.4 UEFA DR, which could thus be omitted’); Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10 (rejecting interpretation that would render part of the rule ‘superfluous’); International Baseball Association,

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  371 CAS 98/215, para 24 (same). For example, in H. v FINA, CAS 98/128, para 6, the CAS panel rejected the athlete’s argument that a provision that out-of-competition testing ‘may be conducted with respect to any banned substance or banned technique, focusing upon anabolic agents’, meant that such testing was ‘limited to’ anabolic agents, because ‘to achieve the effect desired by H., the drafters of FINA Rule DC 6.3 would not have needed the eight words “any banned substance or banned technique, focusing upon”. Legal texts are presumed not to contain superfluous words’.   7 For English law authority for this point, see Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 (SC), per Lord Neuberger at 1631, para 32 (‘I am unconvinced by this argument. It involves departing from the natural meaning of clause 3(2) in each of those leases, and it involves inserting words which are not there’); Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] (Clarke LJ) at p 15 of the Lawtel transcript (rejecting argument that a provision that ‘any dispute arising out of a decision of a domestic panel shall be submitted to CAS’ should be read, in the context of the rules as a whole, as ‘Any dispute [ie any dispute as to the enforceability and effect of the decision] arising out of any decision made by the Anti-doping Appeals Committee [which is full, final complete and binding by virtue of clause (L)8] shall be submitted [ie by way of arbitration on appeal] exclusively to the Appeals Arbitration Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport’, because ‘the words in square brackets […] introduce an impermissible gloss which is not justified by its language’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS  2006/A/1165, para  11 (‘There is no wording in rule 35.17 that suggests that a missed test cannot be declared as such until the athlete has been notified of any previous missed test(s). To interpret rule 35.17 as meaning that such prior notification is necessary would involve correcting the draftsman’s presumed mistake and adding extra words into the language of the rule. […] It is not the Panel’s role to rewrite the IAAF’s rules and anyway, in the present circumstances, such an approach is not available to the Panel under English law’); Cellino v The Football League, decision of Professional Conduct Committee dated 5 April 2014, paras 64, 73-74 (accepting submission that it would be adding an impermissible gloss to a rule making a ‘conviction’ a disqualifying condition for a football club owner or director to say that the conviction must be final, with all appeal rights exhausted: ‘Here, there are no relevant added words to qualify or expand the meaning of the word “conviction” in sub-paragraph ix). I do not think I should read in such words. […]’); UK Anti-Doping v Llewellyn, NADP decision dated 14 February 2013, para 5.19 (‘[…] the UKAD approach glosses the language of Article 10.4 unnecessarily, and appears designed to produce a result which UKAD believes is just whilst ignoring the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and failing to respect the simplicity of the language used’); ITF v Gasquet, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2009, para 65 (‘The “purposes of this Programe”, in the concluding words of Article F.4, include the purpose of giving effect to the distinction between substances banned only in competition, and substances banned at all times. The player invites us to read into the last sentence of Article F.4 the qualification that the test is only deemed to be an in competition test if the player has actually played. We are unable to accept that invitation; it would involve rewriting the rules, not construing them’), appeal upheld on other grounds, ITF v Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1926; UK Anti-Doping v Watt, NADP Tribunal decision dated 6 November 2014, para 35 (‘We agree with UKAD’s primary case that it is the presence of a prohibited substance which constitutes an anti-doping rule violation. This is what the language of Article 2.1 clearly states. It would be a violence of language to find otherwise’). For CAS authority, see eg DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, para 89 (‘Nor is it appropriate for the Panel […] to read into the express terms of the IST [International Standard for Testing] words that do not exist, such as “save in exceptional circumstances”’); Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 58 (rejecting proposed meaning where ‘the proposition could be sustained if the qualifying word “only” was inserted between the word “is” and the word “prohibited” but not otherwise’); Zubkov v FINA, CAS  2007/A/1291, para  19 (‘The language of the relevant provision does not refer to “potential” disrepute, nor to conduct “having the potential” of bringing the sport into disrepute. When determining the proper meaning of Section 12.1.3 the starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the words used. If the meaning of the words used is clear, it is not permissible, in our view, to read other meanings, or qualified meanings, into such words. This is particularly so in our view when one has regard to the possible sanctions and to the actual sanction imposed by the Disciplinary Committee here. Therefore, when Section 12.1.3 speaks of “disrepute”, it does not cover potential disrepute’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.5 (‘The use of the word “and” attracted much of the parties’ attention in their written submissions and at the hearing. The Olympic Council of Ireland argued that the word should be used conjunctively and that, as a result, the maximum that the NOC of a non-represented continent could receive would be one 2-man bob team, one 4-man bob team or one women’s bob team. However, this would require a change in the actual language of the sentence and is contrary to its plain meaning. In the Panel’s view the maximum entitlement is a representation of one man’s bob team (a 2-man bob team or a 4-man bob team) and one women’s bob team. In the context of this sentence, the use of the word “and” clearly reflects the intention of representation by one men’s bob team and one women’s bob team. In other words, “and” is used in the sense of “in addition” or “also”. In order for the Olympic Council of Ireland’s and the FIBT’s interpretation [to be correct,] the word “and” would have to be substituted by “or” (emphasis added)’); Vroemen v KNAU & ADAN, CAS  2010/A/2296, para  172 (‘The Panel is of the view that it cannot go beyond the intention of the legislating body and it must adhere to what is in the text of the regulation, drawing from the regulation’s silence the unwillingness of the legislator to require more than what is expressly stated (ubi lex voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit; see

372  Regulating Sport CAS 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haug v Newcastle United FC, at para 8.8)’); Abdevali v United World Wrestling, CAS AG 14/04, para 2.16 (‘These are the rules and regulations prescribed by the governing body of the sport and cannot be rewritten or read down’).  8 Du Plessis v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 21 December 2016, [2017] (3)  ISLR SLR-67, para  4.4 (‘The starting point must be the language of the provision in question. That language must be construed in its context’); Commonwealth Games Canada/Triathlon Canada, CAS CG 2002/001, para 24 (‘It is in our view too facile to concentrate on the vocabulary of “eligibility” and “suspension” without reference to the context in which those words are deployed’).  9 Bourne v Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 691, 696 (Stamp J), cited in McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2009), 20–21. 10 For English law authority on this point, see eg Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] (Clarke LJ) at p 18-19 of the Lawtel transcript (‘The question is how section (V)3 [of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme] should be construed in the context of the Programme as a whole […]’). For CAS authority, see eg Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 861 (‘In accordance with the rules of interpretation under Swiss law which applies to the IOC ADR, the Panel “may also take into account … the entire regulatory context in which the particular rule is located” (CAS 2017/A/4927 Aloyan v IOC, par 74 with further references’); RFEF v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, para 211 (‘An apt interpretation of the drafter’s intention behind Article 9.4 of the FIFA RSTP requires it not to be read in isolation but together with the entire texts that accompany and/or form part and parcel of Article 9 of the FIFA RSTP’); Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 46 (‘We are of the view that the task of the Panel is to give effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of these words having regard to the context of the rules as a whole’); SV Wilhelmshaven v Club A et al, CAS 2009/A/1810 & 1811, para 45 (‘Based on a systematic analysis, the Panel shall determine that the interpretation given to the rules does fit into the context of the whole regulation’); Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, para 39(d) (‘[…] words in, or a provision of, any contract are not construed in isolation from the rest of the contract. Rather, they must be construed in the context of the contract as a whole’); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 6 (‘Rule 61.1 does not, however, exist in a vacuum. It is but one provision (and its crucial first sentence is but one sentence) in a suite of rules which govern various aspects of the conduct of the IAAF and its Members. It is thus appropriate to examine Rule 61.1, as indeed any Rule, in the context in which it exists and operates’) and para 16 (‘Other provisions of the IAAF Rules, beyond those contained within what we have referred to as the “code” governing the control of drug abuse, also offer important insight into the meaning and operation of Rule 61.1’). 11 DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (interpretation of rules should be based on ‘the entire regulatory context in which the particular rule is located’); Klemencic v UCI, CAS  2016/A/4648, para 109 (World Anti-Doping Code and International Standards together form the World Anti-Doping Program and therefore ‘cannot be considered in isolation’ but instead ‘must be read in conjunction with one another’). For example, it may be necessary to consider other rules that are referred to in the regulations being interpreted. Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA], per Clarke LJ at p 17 of the Lawtel transcript (‘Although the judge said that the [CAS] code provided no guidance to the construction of section (V)3 [of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme] and although Mr Flint may be right in saying that the code is not strictly incorporated into the Programme, the code seems to be of considerable assistance in determining the correct construction of the clause. The extracts from the statutes and the regulations [of CAS] to which I have referred show that the Appeals Arbitration Division is essentially concerned with appeals from bodies such as the Appeals Committee of the ITF’). And/or it may be necessary to consider also other regulations that the regulations in question are implementing: Modahl v BAF [1997] EWCA Civ 2209, Lord Woolf MR, para 37 (‘The BAF Rules are the rules for implementation in this country of requirements parallel to those contained in the IAAF Rules. If there is any ambiguity as to the interpretation of the BAF Rules then the IAAF Rules can be used to resolve that ambiguity’). The regulations may also identify further permissible aids to construction, such as accompanying ‘Explanatory Notes’, or official commentary, such as the comments to the provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code. Article 24.3 of that Code provides that the comments ‘shall be used to interpret the Code’, and the CAS has noted that ‘[a]lthough these comments are not binding upon the Panel in formulating its decision, they form a body of information which can be taken into account when interpreting the rule and regulations in the WADC’. Knauss v FIS, CAS  2005/A/847, para  7.3.4. However, there is conflicting authority on whether other documents may be permissible aids to construction. See eg  Foschi v FINA, CAS  96/156, para  13.3.1 (‘The FINA  Rules must be read in conjunction with the FINA Guidelines. FINA has argued that it is only the FINA Rules which apply, not the FINA Guidelines. However, the Panel does not accept any submission that the FINA Guidelines have no effect. If a body issues guidelines in order to explain and clarify its doping control methods and techniques for the benefit of the federations, swimmers, coaches, managers and physicians and even states that “the guidelines should be followed as far as reasonably practicable” (as the FIA Guidelines do on page 5), the issuing body cannot be allowed to claim that its own guidelines do not apply and have no legal effect. They must have some value, at least as a source of interpretation of the rules and their application, even if they do not have the full force of the Rules upon which they are intended to guide’); IAAF v Walker, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 20 August 2000, para 13 (‘athletes

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  373 may not ignore the Rules and simply rely on the Help Notes. The Help Notes are there purely for the guidance of athletes and not for the purpose of interpreting either the Rules or the Guidelines themselves’). 12 See eg  USACA  v ICC, ICC  Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator) award dated 16 June 2017, para 52 (‘the MOA and Articles [of the ICC] must be read as a coherent whole […]’); Qatar FA v FIFA et al, CAS 2012/A/2742, para 197 (‘The cardinal rule of construction is that a law should be read as a harmonious whole, with its various parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory purposes’); H. v FINA, CAS 98/128, para 3 (‘In accordance with ordinary principles of construction, [the FINA Anti-Doping Rules] should be read as a coherent whole’). 13 For English law authority, see eg  USACA  v ICC, ICC  Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator) award dated 16 June 2017, para 52 (rejecting submission that a clause in the ICC’s memorandum of association saying that the ICC must ‘administer […] the game of cricket worldwide in cooperation with its Members’ meant that the member had a veto over any rule or action proposed by the ICC, because ‘[i]f correct it would mean that the Articles providing for suspension or expulsion – the antithesis of a cooperative exercise – would be inconsistent with the ICC’s objects’). For CAS authority, see eg Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 56 (‘The Appellant’s argument impermissibly invites the Panel to ignore the Glossary’), and para 63 (rejecting suggestion that an FEI anti-doping rule should be interpreted as only banning the specified substances in competition and not out of competition, because ‘if the Appellant’s contention were correct, there could be no reason whatsoever for the provision of out of competition testing which [is] vouched for by Article 5.1 of the EADCMR’); Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 15.5 (‘We note that the balance of Article 2 (2.1.2 and 2.1.3) with its repeated emphasis of the importance of presence (save in carefully drawn exceptions) is consistent with our construction’ of Article  2.1.1); H. v FINA, CAS  98/128, para  3 (athlete’s argument that the FINA Doping Rules did not ban cannabinoids – because Rule 2 said that banned substances ‘include’ those listed in the IOC Medical Code, but the IOC Medical Code only restricted and did not ban cannabis outright – rejected by the CAS panel on the basis that the word ‘include’ in that context ‘clearly means that the substances listed in the IOC Medical Code are banned under DC 2.1 even if they are merely “restricted” for purposes of the IOC Medical Code. It also means that the list is not exhaustive. DC 9 is entitled “Sanctions” and establishes in Article DC 9.2(d) that “cannabinoids (such as marijuana and hashish)” lead to serious sanctions – up to lifetime expulsion in the event of a third offence; up to three months in a case of first offence. In accordance with ordinary principles of construction, DC should be read as a coherent whole. The conclusion must be that cannabinoids are a banned substance for the purposes of FINA and its DC’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201, para 15 (rejecting a suggested meaning of one provision in a UEFA regulation because it contradicted the clear wording of another provision in the same regulation, and instead preferring a meaning that was consistent with that other provision). 14 For English law authority on this point, see eg  Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authorities [2012] UKSC 22, [2012] 2 AC 471, per Lord Phillips at 75 (‘When considering the meaning of a word or phrase that is used more than once in the same instrument one starts with a presumption that it bears the same meaning wherever it appears’). For CAS authority, see eg  Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 10.17 (‘Our conclusion that the analysis of fault under Article 10.4 is not different from the analysis of fault under Article 10.5 is supported and underscored by the commentary to the WADC, which uses similar language to describe the analysis under both Articles’) and para 10.18 (‘The ITF submits, and the Panel agrees, that the fact that the language is effectively identical confirms that the analysis required is the same’ under each Article). See also Australian Rugby Union v Sailor, ARU Judicial Committee decision dated 20 July 2006, para 62 (‘As a principle of statutory construction, it is well recognised that expressions within a piece of legislation will bear the same meaning throughout that legislation. It is inappropriate in construing a statute to construe an expression as meaning one thing in one part of the statute, and another in a different part of the statute’) and para 63 (‘Although this Judicial Committee is not engaged in a strict process of statutory interpretation, it seems to us, by analogy with such an exercise of statutory interpretation, the Judicial Committee would be falling into error if it did not interpret the phrase “In Competition” as carrying the defined meaning throughout the By-Law and in the Schedules to the By-Law’). 15 For English law authority on this point, see Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 115 (whereas a word used several times in the document is presumed to have the same meaning throughout, ‘different words should, prima facie, be given a different meaning. The drafter should never be presumed to have been gratuitous in his changes of wording’); Re Globespan Airways Ltd [2012]  EWCA  Civ 1159, [2013] 1  WLR  1122, per Arden LJ at 42 (‘Paragraph 83(4) uses two different concepts: receipt and registration. Since different words are used, it must be assumed that different events are referred to’). For CAS authority, see Villanueva v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4534, where the CAS panel decided that an athlete was not required to prove how the prohibited substance got into his system in order to establish lack of intent (and so trigger mitigation of sanction under Article 10.2 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code) in part because Article  10.2 did not mention any such requirement, whereas Articles  10.4

374  Regulating Sport and 10.5 of the same Code expressly stated that such proof was a pre-condition to establishing No (or No Significant) Fault or Negligence (and so qualifying for mitigation of sanction) under those Articles. The Panel explained: ‘This engages the principle inclusion unius eclusio alterius: if such establishment is expressly required in one rule, its omission in another must be treated as deliberate and significant. The omission in FINA DC modelled on WADC 2015 of the need to establish source as a precondition of proof of lack of intent must be presumed to be deliberate’ (ibid, para 35). See also Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, para 122 (same); Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 21.5 (rejecting argument that requirement of presence of minimum amount of drug should be read into the rules to exclude the possibility that the drug was produced naturally in the athlete’s body, on the basis that ‘EAMDC 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 recognise that provision may be made in the Equine prohibited list [for] quantitative thresholds in cases where the substances can be produced endogenously or ingested from the environment or as a result of contamination. [But] No such provision has been made for Capsaican; and there is no indication in the evidence before us that any is contemplated’). Cf Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS 2015/A/4190, para 52 (‘The Appellant’s submission that because the 2015 EAD rules expressly stipulate that certain factors, ie, supplement mislabelling, undisclosed third-party administration, are not available to support a case of no significant fault or negligence, [therefore under earlier versions of the EAD Rules applicable] prior thereto they must have been so available is based on no known canon of construction’). Sometimes courts and tribunals will extend this principle to say that a proposed interpretation cannot be right because if that was what the SGB had meant, then it could and would have just said it. See eg Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 (CA), per Clarke LJ at p 20 of the Lawtel transcript (rule providing that ‘any dispute arising out of any decision’ of a domestic panel may be appealed to CAS should be given its natural, broad meaning because, inter alia, ‘section V(3) could have been drafted more narrowly, but it was not’); Billington v FIBT, CAS OG 2002/005, para 30 (‘If the “draftsperson” had wanted to provide otherwise, he or she would have added a provision to the effect that athletes placed below the 8th position can move up, in order to replace athletes in the top eight who do not participate’); FFG v SOCOG, CAS OG 2000/014, para 22 (‘had those who drafted the Bye-Law intended to apply it to clothing as worn, they could have said so’). However, it has been cogently argued that this question, while often forensically attractive, is ‘seldom helpful’ in determining the proper meaning of the text, because the fact is that the dispute has arisen precisely because the particular issue that has arisen was not foreseen by the drafter. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), p 81.

C Considering the broader factual context of the regulations, including their purpose B1.57 If the above analysis yields a clear and unequivocal meaning, there is both English law and CAS authority that that is the meaning that should be adopted, without further ado, in accordance with the principle in claris non fit interpretario.1 However, English law is now clear that regard should be had to the context even when there is no apparent ambiguity in the text,2 and CAS jurisprudence concurs, in particular so far as Swiss law is concerned.3 Therefore, the proposed interpretation must be tested not only against the actual words used in the provision in question, in their documentary context, but also against their wider factual (historical and commercial) context, and against their underlying object and purpose.4 In other words, determining the proper meaning of the words used in the provision in question always means the following requirements: (a) The meaning that the words would convey to a reasonable person given the ‘factual matrix’ in which the regulations came into being must be considered,5 ie (in this context) the background circumstances prevalent in that SGB’s sport generally at the time the regulations were issued, including the problems the SGB was facing that led it to issue the regulations. (b) In particular the underlying object and purpose of the regulations, objectively assessed, must be considered and an interpretation of the meaning of the regulations that advances that purpose to one that would frustrate it be preferred.6 (i) For example, in IAAF v USATF, the CAS panel rejected the USATF’s argument that the IAAF’s rules should be interpreted as permitting national federations not to disclose domestic decisions exonerating

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  375

their athletes of doping charges to the IAAF, because that would not ‘accord with the purposes of the Rule, which quite clearly is to ensure that the domestic hearing process – from its conduct to the conclusions which result – is subject to scrutiny by the IAAF and, if necessary, an IAAF Arbitration Panel’.7 (ii) Similarly, in FIGC, Mannini, Possanzini and CONI  v WADA, a CAS panel ruled that the World Anti-Doping Code prohibition of ‘failing to provide a sample’ had to be interpreted to include an unauthorised delay in providing a sample after due notification of the requirement to do so, during which the athlete was not chaperoned, because: ‘any other interpretation of the meaning of the word “failing” to submit to sample collection under Article 2.3 would prevent achieving the purpose of the anti-doping rules with regard to In-Competition sample collection, which is to avoid giving athletes who want to cheat an opportunity to do so between the point in time of notification and their arrival at the doping control station’.8

(iii) A more extreme example of the use of the purposive approach to inform the meaning to be given to the text of the rule is Canadian Olympic Committee & Scott v IOC. Rule 25 of the Olympic Charter provided that an athlete who breached the IOC’s rules of conduct would be excluded from the Olympic Games. The appellants argued that this meant that the excluded athlete’s results from any competitions in which she had participated during the Games should be disqualified, so that any medals she had won should be taken from her and given to the nextplaced athlete. The IOC disagreed, and therefore declined to upgrade the Canadian cross-country skier’s bronze medal from the Salt Lake Games to gold after the two Russians who finished ahead of her were found guilty of anti-doping rule violations. The Panel decided that ‘the wording and grammar’ of Rule 25 ‘do not provide absolute clarity’ on the issue, and so the meaning of Rule 25 ‘must be further sought in a broader interpretation of the provisions of the OC [Olympic Charter], complementing the literal with the purposive approach to interpretation’. It then concluded that the principles of fair play and sporting ethics enshrined in the Olympic Charter: ‘are irreconcilable with an interpretation of Rule 25 § 2.2.1 of the OC which would allow an athlete excluded from Olympic Games for doping to retain any Olympic medals gained at such games. To put it another way, allowing an athlete to retain certain medals while excluding her/him from the Olympic Games on the basis of Rule 25 § 2.2.1 would amount to ignoring the Fundamental Principles upon which the OC is founded and make a mockery of the confidence placed in such principles by other athletes’.

It therefore ordered that the Russians should lose their medals and the other finishers in the race should all be bumped up two places.9 (iv) Taking the object or purpose behind the SGB’s regulations into account means that that object or purpose has to be ascertained by the court or tribunal.10 Some purposes are so obvious that they are taken as read. For example, for there to be a level playing-field throughout a sport, all of the participants in that sport must be treated equally,11 and therefore any proposed interpretation that would lead to disparate treatment should be rejected.12 Otherwise, however, if the SGB has not stated the objectives underlying the regulations in the regulations themselves, then it may be necessary to search the ‘legislative history’ in order to identify them.13 This sits somewhat uneasily with English law’s insistence that subjective declarations of intent and statements made during the negotiation of the ‘contract’ are inadmissible to ascertain its meaning.14 However, there is

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a distinction between examining contemporaneous documents as part of the factual matrix to assess what the issues were in the environment in which the regulation was adopted, and so the objective intention behind it, and hearing evidence from drafters as to what the intention was, which is subjective, and also affected by the fact of the dispute. Furthermore, such evidence may be seen as admissible, in this context at least, on the basis that SGB regulations are less of a negotiated contract and more of a unilateral pronouncement akin to a statute (for which resort to ‘external aids to construction’ such as records of parliamentary debates would be admissible15), and on the basis that other courts construing the (transnational) regulations will be considering the legislative history, and therefore harmonisation demands that English courts do the same.16 On the other hand, even CAS panels would treat with great caution subjective statements made by the SGB after the dispute has arisen, purporting to identify the original intent behind the text in dispute.17 (c) The presumption is that a common sense outcome was intended.18 Accordingly, the tribunal is entitled to prefer a proposed interpretation that is consistent with common sense, given the context in which the regulation is to apply, and its intended purpose, and to reject one that is not.19 (d) Similarly, the tribunal is also entitled to prefer a proposed interpretation that would make the rule easier to administer over a proposed interpretation ‘that would render the provision difficult (if not impossible) to apply in practice’.20 (e) According to Swiss law,21 ‘another aspect potentially relevant as a source of interpretation of the rules is the common practice and understanding of a certain provision by the relevant stakeholders’.22 One CAS panel has explained that ‘the main prerequisites for the emergence of such a “binding common practice” are that a certain understanding or application of a rule is practised over a certain period of time (long standing practice) and that such practice reflects the majority opinion of the relevant stakeholders’.23 This approach may be motivated, at least in some cases, by notions of equal treatment and/or legitimate expectation. For example, the CAS panel in Nabokov noted: ‘The Panel therefore has to acknowledge that the rule has always been interpreted as providing a possibility of representing two countries but only for players who were under the age of eighteen when they represented their first country. Since the Panel finds this to be a valid interpretation of the rule and since it has been interpreted in that way ever since it was implemented, the Panel will not interpret it differently. This is in the interest of fairness to all other players whose eligibility for playing for another country has previously been denied because of this particular interpretation of Bylaw 204 (1)c’.24

Taken to its extreme, however, this approach could obviously undermine legal certainty. For example, the CAS has relied on this doctrine to justify giving an SGB’s regulations their ‘real meaning’ (which was the opposite of their literal meaning) based on the practice of that SGB and its decision-making organs in interpreting and applying the regulations.25 Such an approach is not favoured in English law, unless (exceptionally) the practice is deemed sufficient to give rise to an ‘estoppel by convention’,26 because of concerns that it undermines legal certainty, and because it runs counter to the well-settled principles that the parties’ subjective understanding of what the rules mean is irrelevant27 and that the proper interpretation of the rules is a matter of law to be determined by the courts or arbitral panels, not by the parties.28 However, it is not just a Swiss law doctrine: it is reflected in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is part of the Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, and is also accepted in some other common law jurisdictions.29 As a result, it is perhaps hard to dispute that it is a ‘general principle’ of law that may be used to help determine the

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  377

proper meaning of an SGB’s regulations, at least to the extent those regulations are not confined in scope to England but instead have transnational effect.   1 For English law authority on this point, see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900, 2908, para  23 (‘Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it’, even if it regards the results as commercially improbable); Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Wilberforce at p 272 (‘it is usual, and indeed correct, to look first for a clear meaning of the words used’ and only resort to consideration of the purpose of the enactment if the meaning of the text is ambiguous); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions decision dated 5  March 2012, para  35(e) (‘where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it’). For CAS authority, see eg WADA v Covert, CAS 2012/A/2960, para 98 (‘A “purposive” reading of the ISL would only be appropriate if the ISL provision in question contained some ambiguity so that consideration of the underlying purpose of the text would help to clarify the meaning of the provision. However, this is not the case here. Article 5.1.2.8 is clear as to what laboratories are required to do’); Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA, CAS  2009/A/1827, para  7.5 (‘Based on the evidence and the arguments submitted, the Panel was not satisfied that the provisions of Chapter 1 of the AIBA By-laws required an interpretation that deviated from their clear wording. In the absence of any ambiguity, the Panel considered that the wording of Chapter  1 of the By-laws should be attributed its clear, literal meaning’); Anderson et al v IOC, CAS  2008/A/1545, para  43 (‘the second sentence of the OMAC Explanatory Memorandum’s paragraph cited by the IOC specifically and unambiguously states that “the rules of the International Federation concerned […] govern the question of any invalidation of the result obtained by the team” (see supra at 39). In the Panel’s view, this language, coupled with the above quoted paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the OMAC’s Chapter II makes absolutely clear the IOC legislator’s wish to leave the matter of the invalidation (or not) of team results to the discretion of the interested International Federations. In this respect, the Panel evokes the generally recognized interpretive principle “in claris non fit interpretatio”, meaning that when a rule is clearly intelligible, there is no need of looking for an alternative or imaginative interpretation’); AOC  v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.3 (‘clear language […] must be respected and given meaning’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201, para 15 (‘The Panel is of the opinion that both FIFA and UEFA Regulations are sufficiently clear in their wording that they [do] not need to be completed or clarified through construction’).  2 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] AC 1101 [HL], per Lord Hoffman at para 37 (noting his own ruling in ISC v West Bromwich that ‘it was not necessary to find an “ambiguity” before one could have any regard to background’) and at para 24 (‘in deciding whether or not there is a clear mistake, the court is not confined to reading the document without regard to its background or context. As the exercise is part of the single task of interpretation, the background and context must always be taken into consideration’); Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 913B–C (‘The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax’); Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] WLR 749 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 775 (‘The meaning of words, as they would appear in a dictionary, and the effect of their syntactical arrangement, as it would appear in a grammar, is part of the material which we use to understand a speaker’s utterance. But it is only a part; another part is our knowledge of the background against which the utterance was made. It is that background which enables us, not only to choose the intended meaning when a word has more than one dictionary meaning but also, in the ways I have explained, to understand a speaker’s meaning, often without ambiguity, when he has used the wrong words’); R (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL 38, [2002] 1 WLR 2955, per Lord Steyn at 5 (‘language in all legal texts conveys meaning according to the circumstances in which it was used. It follows that the context must always be identified and considered before the process of construction or during it. It is therefore wrong to say that the court may only resort to evidence of the contextual scene where an ambiguity has arisen’). See also (in the context of interpretation of statutes); Bloomsbury International Ltd v Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2011] UKSC 25, per Lord Mance at 10 (‘In matters of statutory construction, the statutory purpose and the general scheme by which it is to be put into effect are of central importance. They represent the context in which individuals words are to be understood’); Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204 [HL], per Lord Diplock at 1206-07 (‘If one looks back to the actual decisions of this House on questions of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions’); Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at p 280 (noting ‘an increasing willingness to give a purposive construction to the Act’). See also Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245, 248 (‘The next heresy is the assumption that one must identify a relevant ambiguity as a precondition to taking into account evidence of the settling

378  Regulating Sport of a legal text. Enormous energy and ingenuity is employed by lawyers in trying to find relevant ambiguities. This is the wrong starting point. Language can never be understood divorced from its context. The symbols of language convey meaning according to the circumstances in which they were used. The true purpose of interpretation is to find the contextual meaning of the language of the text, ie what the words wold convey to the reasonable person circumstanced as the parties were. Speaking of contracts, Lord Wilberforce said that there is invariably a setting in which the language has to be placed. The court always entitled to be informed of the contextual scene of a contract. The same principle applies to the interpretation of all legal texts’) and p 250 (‘Legislative language can only be understood against the backcloth of the world to which it relates. Sometimes judgments do not fully take into account the different levels of reasoning at which the context is relevant. As in the case of other legal texts, the setting is relevant to what different meanings the language of the text may let in. But it is also relevant when the judge comes to select among the possible interpretations the best one. It is a fundamental misconception to think that the background to the statute may only be admitted in the event of an ambiguity. Interpretation requires judges to make informed choices’); McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), pp 14–15 (‘The traditional view […] is that the process of interpretation starts with identifying the literal meaning of the enacted words. In fact, however, this approach is fundamentally defective, because it proceeds on the false assumption that a word, or group of words, will always have a single, plain meaning. The truth of the matter is that many words have a variety of meanings and their meaning on particular occasions cannot be identified without reference to the context within which they are used. […] particular importance is attached to the context within which a provision appears and […] the purpose of a provision is a very important part of its context. Both context and purpose, therefore, require closer consideration’).  3 Berger v WADA, CAS  2009/A/1948, para  39(a) (rejecting the idea ‘that modern principles of interpretation, in any jurisdiction, now require there to be any doubt or ambiguity about the meaning of a word or a phrase or a provision in a contract before consideration is given to the purpose or object of the contract or its surrounding circumstances […]’); TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, para 12 (‘By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and it has been constantly applied by CAS panels’); Russian Olympic Committee v Fédération Equestre Internationale, CAS OG 04/001, para 19 (‘it is always necessary to seek a purposive and contextual construction of such rules so as to discern their true intent and effect […]’).   4 As in, eg Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, paras 73-75. See cases cited at para B1.54, n 4. See also IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 8 (‘As submitted by the IAAF, “the starting point and the finishing point of construction is in the text”. Arguments from policy or purpose have their place in such an exercise to the extent that they enable one to consider “whether or not the construction that a literal interpretation favours is or is not compatible with the perceptible purpose of the Rule”’). See also McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), p 16 (‘The purposive approach to interpretation […] requires that regard must be had to both the purpose behind the words and the meaning of the words, with the relationship between the two being that the purpose may inform (but not supplant) the meaning’); Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 19 (‘Under the purposive approach, the judge may look beyond the four corners of the statute to find a reason for giving a particular interpretation to its words, and his role is one of active co-operation with the policy of the statute’).   5 For English law authority on this point, see Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 912H–913A (‘The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact”, but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next [ie previous negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent], it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man’). For CAS authority, see DFB et al v FIFA, CAS  2017/A/5063, para  3 (‘In its search [for the objective meaning of the rule in question], the adjudicating body will have further to identify the intentions (objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule, and such body may also take account of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation’); Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 126, quoting with approval IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, para 46 (same).  6 GNK Dinamo v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3324, para 9.11 (‘[…] the rules must be applied according to their spirit not merely according to their letter. In other words, the Panel has to interpret the rules in question in keeping with the perceived intention of the rule maker, and not in a way that frustrates it’); Ward v IOC, AIBA & ANOC, CAS OG 12/002, para 25 (same); Irish Hockey Association v/Lithuanian Hockey//International Hockey Federation, CAS 2001/A/354 and Lithuanian Hockey v/International Hockey Federation, CAS 2001/A/355, para 7 (same); Juliano et al v FEI, CAS 2017/A/5114, para 82 (same); Cullwick v FINA, CAS 96/149, para 22 (same). For English law authority on this point, see eg Modahl v The British Athletic Federation Limited,

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  379 1997 WL 1105493, 28 July 1997 (CA), per Lord Woolf at page 7 (doubting an interpretation of the rules proposed by the athlete because ‘the adoption of any implied term which does not treat the disciplinary process as a whole could be said to be inconsistent with the clear intent of the BAF and IAAF Rules which is to confine the right of appeal to issues of substance and not to allow procedural defects to interfere with disciplinary proceedings unless they would affect the integrity of the decision’); R  v British Basketball Association, ex p Mickan, 1981 WL 695917, 17 March 1981 [CA], per Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce at p 3 (‘The […] Regulations […] have to be construed in the context of the object and structure of the Association. In this context, Rule 20.3 does not have the meaning and effect for which the appellants contend. The purpose of that rule is only to provide that where valid licences have been granted, their operation shall date back to the date of receipt of documents and fees by the Association […]’); USACA v ICC, ICC Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator), para 52 (rejecting submission that clause saying object of ICC is to ‘administer […] the game of cricket worldwide in cooperation with its Members’ means the member must agree to any rule or action proposed by the ICC, because ‘If correct it would mean that the Articles providing for suspension or expulsion – the antithesis of a cooperative exercise – would be inconsistent with the ICC’s objects. […] Yet the MOA and Articles must be read […] purposively. Presumptively as an international governing body ICC must be able to govern’); Cellino v The Football League, decision of Professional Conduct Committee (Tim Kerr QC) dated 5 April 2014, para 61 (accepting ‘the uncontroversial proposition that a sport body’s rules should be interpreted in a manner that accords with the purpose of the rules and with common sense, and not in a technical way’). For CAS authority, see eg  Glasner v FINA, CAS  2013/A/3274, para  75 (preferring a proposed meaning of a rule that is ‘supported when interpreting FINA DC 10.1 in the light of its purpose’); Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS  2013/A/3258, para  140 (preferring the broader of two opposing interpretations of a disciplinary prohibition, because ‘this interpretation is also in line with the “zero tolerance to match-fixing” which, according to CAS jurisprudence (CAS  2010/A/2267) presents one of the most important values and principles of behaviour in football’); FC Barcelona v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, para 9.14 (rejecting a proposed interpretation as ‘not reasonable in light of the overall context and rationale for the rules concerning transfer of minors’, because it would mean the rule did not capture all of the mischief intended to be addressed); Fédération Française des Echecs et al v Fédération Internationale des Echecs, CAS 2010/O/2166, para 9.7.8 (requirement that a candidate for election as president of the international federation ‘should have been a member of their federation at least one year before the General Assembly’ should be interpreted as recommendatory rather than mandatory, because of the use of ‘should’ rather than ‘must’ or ‘shall’, but also because ‘if membership in the nominating federation were mandatory, a number of FIDA federations would never be able to submit candidates because in their countries individuals cannot be members of the national federation but rather only in clubs which in turn are members in (regional bodies or) the national federation’); WADA  v Troy & IRB, CAS  2008/A/1652, preliminary award on jurisdiction dated 18 March 2009, paras 70-71 (preferring an interpretation of the rules on appeals that enabled the parties with a right of appeal to make an informed decision as to whether they should exercise that right to an alternative interpretation that ‘would undermine the effectiveness of the provision for its obvious purpose of facilitating the global supervision of the handling of anti-doping rule violation allegations in the sport of rugby’); Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.2.5 (‘Any other construction would be contrary to the clearly intended objective and spirit of the regulation. The Panel accepts that to apply Art. 19 of the RSTP restrictively, to professional players only, could result in obviating protection of young amateur players from the risk of abuse and ill treatment, which was clearly not within the anticipation of the scope of the regulation’); Perez v IOC, CAS OG  2000/005, para  27 (in construing Olympic Charter rule regulating transfers of sporting allegiance between countries, ‘Having regard to the principles of the Charter, particularly those expressed in Rules 2, 3, 9 and 31 [the interests of athletes are fundamental; Olympic competition is between athletes not countries], the Panel considers that the word “nationality” in Rule 46 and its Bye-Law should be construed broadly. In so far as it is relevant to consider whether a person has lost his or her nationality, the Panel is of the view that the person may be found to have lost it both in circumstances where he or she is de jure or de facto stateless’); FFG v SOCOG, CAS OG 2000/014, para 24 (‘In our view a purposive construction of Bye-Law 1 to Rule 61 in its entirety leads to the conclusion that the measurement must be carried out on the clothing as worn’); Czech Olympic Committee and Swedish Olympic Committee v IIHF, CAS OG 98/004-005, paras 25 and 29 (declining to adopt a strict interpretation of a rule sanctioning the fielding of an ineligible player at the Olympic Games because it ‘would defeat the very purpose of the rule’ and contradict the Olympic ideal of fair play); International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215, para  35 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a rule that ‘would not correspond to the objectives which lie behind the rule’) and para 36 (assessing the merits of competing interpretations of a rule imposing a waiting period before a transfer of allegiance by ‘evaluat[ing] how these alternatives would correspond to the objectives behind the waiting period rule’).  7 IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 18. This case is discussed further at para B1.39.  8 FIGC, Mannini, Possanzini & CONI  v WADA, CAS  2008/A/1557, para  62. See also Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.43 (rejecting the suggestion that ‘possession’ in WADC Art 2.6 should be interpreted as requiring proof of possession of all of the elements required to perform a prohibited method as ‘unworkable and counter-productive to the fight against doping’).

380  Regulating Sport  9 Canadian Olympic Committee & Scott v IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, paras 46, 47, 51. 10 DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (‘The adjudicating body would further have to identify the intentions (objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule’). 11 See para B1.27. 12 Celtic v UEFA, CAS 98/A/201, para 30 (holding that a UEFA circular should be interpreted in a way that ensured equal treatment between national federations, because ‘bearing in mind the interest of the game of football which is obviously the goal that any FIFA or UEFA statutes, rules and regulations must serve, it is not conceivable in the opinion of the Panel that FIFA could deliberately have drawn up rules which could entail severe disparities between clubs competing against each other in the same football championship’); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 32 (rejecting argument rule should be interpreted to mean decisions exonerating athletes of doping did not have to be communicated to the international federation because, inter alia, ‘[a]ny other conclusion would result in international athletics being played out on an uneven field, tilted this way or that according to the rules, whims and relative weight of various IAAF Members, to the detriment of the sport and, perhaps more importantly, its athletes’); Segura v IAAF, CAS OG 2000/013, para 25 (declining to read into a rule requiring that disqualification from a race be communicated ‘immediately’ a conclusion that the disqualification is invalid if that requirement is not met, because ‘it would be intolerable to disregard the unchallenged finding that on three occasions three separate judges found the Applicant to have infringed the rules. The Panel must have regard to the interests of competitors who did not infringe the rules, and who are entitled to the benefits of their effort’); International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215, para 25 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule that would have the ‘unacceptable’ consequence that ‘Athletes with dual legal nationality would be put in a disadvantage in comparison with athletes who have only one legal nationality’) and para 27 (‘there is no reason to treat athletes unequally in sports depending on whether an athlete has one or more legal nationalities’). 13 See eg Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 135 (‘when interpreting rules establishing by international sporting bodies, the intent of the sporting body when drafting the rules (ie the sporting objectives that the rules reach for), inasmuch as it can be adequately ascertained, is a factor of important weight. When the evidence at hand helps determine the organization’s intent at the time of drafting the rules, and this intent does not blatantly contradict the text of the norm, this should be taken into consideration’); DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (panel interpreting rule ‘may also take account of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation’); Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD  v UEFA & FC  Porto Futebol SAD, CAS  2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC  Porto Futebol SAD, CAS  2008/A/1584, para  26 (‘a source for interpreting a provision can also be its historical genesis’); IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS  2010/A/2071, para  55 (‘the purpose of historical interpretation is to consider the historical conditions in, from and because of which the current legal text originated. It requires ascertainment of not only the genesis of but also the entire development underlying the text so as to ascertain how it obtained its final linguistic expression and to enable useful comparison to be made of the present with any previous rules regulating the same legal matter’). See eg  UEFA  v Z  Association, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 22 December 2008, 4A_392/2008, para 4.2.3.3 (basing interpretation of provision of UEFA Statutes in part on statements in the minute of the UEFA Congress as to the intent behind the provision); FA of Wales v UEFA, CAS 2004/A/593, para 4 (same); FIFA v CONMEBOL & Fernandez, CAS  2016/A/4416, paras 71-72 (deciding that it was permissible to adopt for one recreational drug an approach permitted by the World Anti-Doping Code for a different recreational drug, based on a detailed recounting of how and why the approach came to be included in the Code for that second recreational drug). 14 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998]  WLR  896, per Lord Hoffman at 913 (‘The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of parties and their declarations of subjective intent. […] The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life’). On the other hand, evidence of such matters may be admissible to establish the factual matrix that constitutes the background against which the meaning of the contract is to be determined. Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101, per Lord Hoffman at 42 (‘The rule excludes evidence of what was said or done during the course of negotiating the agreement for the purpose of drawing inferences about what the contract meant. It does not exclude the use of such evidence for other purposes: for example, to establish that a fact which may be relevant as background was known to the parties, or to support a claim for rectification or estoppel. These are not exceptions to the rule. They operate outside it’). 15 Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A  Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 3.44.6. See also Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No. 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Nicholls at 839-844 (discussing when courts may refer to statements made in Parliament as a means of determining the proper construction of a statute). On the other hand, where the SGB regulations in issue are more like a negotiated agreement, as in, for example, the qualification rules for the Olympic Games, the normal principle of inadmissibility should apply. See eg  AOC  v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.12 (‘In the Panel’s view the draft document submitted by the Olympic Council of Ireland [namely, a previous draft of the Qualification System discussed between the IOC

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  381 and the FIBT] is of no assistance. It is clearly a draft which was the subject of internal discussions between the IOC and the FIBT. There was no indication that the draft, or the discussion between the IOC and the FIBT, were provided or made known to the FIBT’s members or the various NOCs or athletes. Further, a review of the draft reveals that there are a number of other differences between it and the final version of the Qualification System. These were not addressed or explained by the FIBT, the IOC or the Olympic Council of Ireland and there was no explanation of the nature and content of the discussion relating to the draft and the preparation of the final document. In these circumstances, the Panel is not prepared to draw any inferences, or draw any conclusions on the basis of the different versions of the Qualification System. It must base its decision on the final, published document’). 16 See by way of analogy Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at 282B (given that foreign courts look at legislative history in interpreting meaning of international treaties, in the interests of uniformity of application English courts should do the same). 17 Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 135 (‘When the evidence at hand helps determine the organization’s intent at the time of drafting the rules, and this intent does not blatantly contradict the text of the norm, this should be taken into consideration. This, of course, does not mean that any ex post ascertainment of purpose by the international body can be considered to be an “authentic interpretation” of the rules, particularly when it is made once a dispute is filed’). 18 R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Naughton [1997] 1  WLR  118 (QB) 130GH (Popplewell J). 19 For English law authority on this point, see Rainy Sky SA  v Kookmin Bank [2011]  UKSC  50, per Lord Clarke at para  21 (‘If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other’), followed in GB  Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions decision dated 5 March 2012, para 35(d). For CAS authority, see Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 58 (rejecting proposed interpretation of FEI rule that ‘is suggested neither by language nor by logic’); Bassani-Antivari v IOC, CAS OG 2002/003, para 23 (where the words in a provision of a rule were capable of two different meanings, the one that was ‘illogical’ was rejected); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 30 (endorsing an interpretation based on the plain meaning of the words where it was also ‘logical and practical’); Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 142 (‘The Panel accepts that the texts of the above rules differ in their language, but is not persuaded by the Appellant’s contention that the new rule expands rather than merely emphasizes what is inherent in the old rule or that the latter is, on its true construction, more favourable to him than the former. In the Panel’s view, both the offering and the giving of gifts (other than of a kind specifically permitted) are proscribed under both sets of rules as being objectionable. To focus on the absence of an express use of the word “offer” or “offering” in the old rule makes no more sense than to focus on the absence of the word “give” or “giving” in the new rule. It can hardly be contemplated that the draftsman intended to outlaw only offers but not actual making of gifts in the new rule or, by parity of reasoning, intended to outlaw only making of gifts but not their offer in the old rule. Both rules embrace acts which are the mirror image of each other vis-a-vis gifts, ie giving or accepting, and the Panel considers that a purposive construction in this disciplinary (not criminal) context eliminates any material distinction between them. Moreover, the Panel finds that “giving” in the old rule must include “offering” since the vice lies in the offer. Whether or not an offer is accepted depends solely upon the reaction of the intended recipient – a matter which is not within the control of the offeror. Exculpating the offeror merely because there was a virtuous intended recipient who declined it, while condemning an offeror whose offer is accepted, would be a very odd and irrational rule that could not have been the intent of the draftsman’). 20 WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 104. See also WADA v Bataa & IPF, CAS 2013/A/3316, para 55 (rejecting an interpretation that would create a distinction that would be difficult to apply in practice). 21 Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS  2016/A/4787, paras 124-25 (accepting ‘in principle’ UEFA’s submission that ‘under Swiss law a crucial factor for interpretation is how an association itself applies a rule in question (so-called “Vereinsubung”) […] it is not even required that such application amounts to standard, long-standing practice but a one-time application may suffice to be an “important indication” (“gewichtiges Indiz”) as to how a statutory provision shall be applied’); FC  Schalke et al v FIFA, CAS  2008/A/1622-1624, paras 78–79 (‘under Swiss association law, customary law can represent a valid set of rules of an association. For this, two requirements have to be met: (i) a constantly and consistently applied practice of the respective association (inveterate consuetudo), and (ii) the conviction of the members of that association that such practice is legally binding (opinion necessitates) […]. It is undisputed under Swiss association law that such customary law may on the one hand complement the statutes of an association, ie, fill a loophole within the statutes, and may on the other hand help to interpret the statutes’). See also Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD  v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 25 (‘A source for interpreting a provision is – apart from the wording of the provision – also how it is applied in practice by the association’s organs’); Fulham FC v FC Metz, CAS 2006/A/896, para 7.2.6 (‘In determining the intent of a party or the intent which a reasonable person would have had in the same circumstances, it is necessary to look first to the words actually used or the conduct engaged in. However, the investigation is not to be limited to

382  Regulating Sport those words or the conduct even if they appear to give a clear answer to the question. In order to go beyond the apparent meaning of the words or the conduct of the parties, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case. This includes the negotiations and any subsequent conduct of the parties’); Bulgarian Chess Federation v FIDE, CAS  2012/A/2943, para  8.20 (‘Art. 14.4 of the FIDE Financial Regulations does not explicitly exclude that an event can be organised by someone that is not a “federation”. Furthermore, the provision should also be interpreted in light of FIDE practice. The Respondent has provided evidence that events in the past have also been awarded to non-federations’). 22 DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3. 23 Ibid, para 4. 24 Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian Ice Hockey Federation v International Ice Hockey Federation, CAS  2001/A/357, para  9. See also Gibraltar FA  v UEFA, CAS  2002/O/410, para  23 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of the UEFA membership criteria that would have required that the applicant be recognised politically as an independent state on the ground, among others, that such argument ‘is contradicted by the fact that UEFA already has – and had at the time when the application was made – a number of member associations from countries which do not enjoy independent statehood, such as Scotland, Wales or the Faroe Islands’). 25 In FC Pyunik Terevan v L, AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, CAS 2007/A/1358, having established that its former player had breached his playing contract with it during the ‘protected period’, the appellant club pointed out that the applicable FIFA regulation provided that in such circumstances ‘sporting sanctions shall also be imposed’ on the player, and argued that the FIFA Dispute Resolution Committee had erred in interpreting that regulation as giving it a power but not a duty to impose such a sanction. The CAS panel agreed with the club that the text of the regulation was clearly mandatory (at para 55): ‘It follows from a literal application of the said provision that it is a duty of the competent body to impose sporting sanctions on a player who has breached his contract during the protected period: “shall” is obviously different from “may”; consequently, if the intention of the FIFA Regulations was to give the competent body the power to impose a sporting sanction, it would have employed the word “may” and not “shall”. According based on the wording of art. 17 para 3 of the FIFA Regulations, a sporting sanction should have been imposed’. However, it found that the ‘real meaning’ of the regulation was different: ‘56. However this Panel considers that rules and regulations have to be interpreted in accordance with their real meaning. This is true also in relation with the statutes and the regulations of an association. Of course, if the wording of a provision is clear, one needs clear and strong arguments to deviate from it. 56. During the hearing, FIFA observed that it is stable, consistent practice of FIFA and of the DRC in particular, to decide on a case by case basis whether to sanction a player or not. Even though it is fair to say that the circumstances behind the decisions filed by FIFA to demonstrate such a practice differ from case to case, the Panel is satisfied that there is a well accepted and consistent practice of the DRC not to apply automatically a sanction as per art. 17 para 3 of the FIFA Regulations. The Panel is therefore inclined to follow such an interpretation of the rationale of art. 17 para 3 of the FIFA Regulations which may be considered contrary to the literal interpretation, but appears to be consolidated practice and represents the real meaning of the provision as it is interpreted, executed and followed within FIFA’. Similarly, in DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, the CAS panel relied on such longstanding practice not just as demonstrating how the FIFA regulations should be interpreted but as establishing an exception to a general rule set out in the FIFA regulations that was not mentioned in those regulations. Other CAS panels have taken a contrary approach, because of concerns about undermining legal certainty. See eg  Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS  2016/A/4787, paras 125 (mandatory regulations issued by SGBs ‘have priority over any deviating custom’); FC  Schalke et al v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1622-1624, para 81 (‘Part of the Swiss doctrine […] contends that in the interest of legal certainty customary law cannot be admitted contra legem; customary law may complement or help to interpret the statutes of an association, but not derogate from their clear meaning’). 26 In short, where the parties have come to a shared view of the proper construction of their contract, and have regulated their subsequent dealings on the basis of that common view, and one party would suffer detriment if the other were permitted to resile from that common view, then the other may be estopped from doing so. See eg  Amalgamated Property Co v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 at 122 (‘So here we have available to us, in point of practice if not in law, evidence of subsequent conduct to come to our aid. It is available, not so as to construe the contract, but to see how they themselves acted upon it. Under the guise of estoppel we can prevent either party from going back on the interpretation they themselves gave to it […] There is no need to inquire whether their particular interpretation is correct or not, or whether they were mistaken or not. Suffice it that they have by the course of dealing, put their own interpretation on their contract, and cannot be allowed to go back on it’); Costain Ltd v Tarmac Holdings Ltd [2017] EWHC 319, para  101. In the context of sport, see the various selection cases where the CAS panel considered that the selecting body should be estopped from interpreting its rules to exclude athletes that it had previously led to believe would be eligible for selection, thereby inducing them to commit significant time and effort to meeting the qualification criteria (discussed at para B1.37, n 2), and see Club X v D  & FIFA, CAS  2014/A/3765, para  70 (‘an association may be estopped from invoking a certain rule or exercising such rule in a certain fashion if precedent representations induce a subordinate or

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  383 member to believe something resulting in that person’s reasonable and detrimental reliance on such relief (“estoppel by representation”) (CAS OG 08/02)’); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, paras 65, 74, discussed at para B1.39. 27 See para B1.54, n 1. 28 See para B1.50, n 1; James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC  583, per Lord Reid at p  603 (‘it is now well settled that it is not legitimate to use as an aid in the construction of the contract anything which the parties said or did after it was made. Otherwise one might have the result that a contract meant one thing the day it was signed, but by reason of subsequent events meant something different a month or a year later’), cited with approval and followed in Pakistan Cricket Board v BCCI, ICC Dispute Resolution Committee decision dated 20  November 2018, para  30(vi). See generally Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), pp 179–182, 187. See also IWBF v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.17 (‘[…] some reliance was also placed on what appeared arguably to be a laxer approach to Article 10.4 by UKAD as prosecuting authority itself where cannabis use was concerned. The Sole Arbitrator is unpersuaded that UKAD’s approach in such cases, whatever it may have been, can inform construction in this way. The proper interpretation of a rule is a matter of law, not practice’); Russian Olympic Committee v Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI), CAS OG  04/001, para  19 (‘The FEI letter mentions “Discussions and decisions during April 2004 referring to the interpretation of Article 624.2”. The Panel must emphasise, for the avoidance of doubt, that the interpretation of the FEI Regulations, as indeed of the rules of any sporting body, is a question of law. While it is always necessary to seek a purposive and contextual construction of such rules so as to discern their true intent and effect, a body cannot impose by discussion or decision after the coming into force of the rules, a meaning which they do not otherwise bear. The Panel must add that while in practice the FEI (or any other body in similar circumstances) must form an initial view as to the meaning of its rules, it is the Panel which is vested with the function of finally determining that meaning, subject only to any recourse (if any) to the Swiss Federal Tribunal […]’). English law appears to be more ready to admit as a guide to the interpretation of a statute the manner in which the statute has been interpreted and applied in practice, but this is not without controversy. See Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), paras 3.58-3.60. Cf McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), pp 27–28 (discussing the difficulties under English law of putting weight on guidance issued by regulators as to the proper interpretation of their regulations). 29 Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), pp 186–87 (noting that the US and New Zealand permit reliance on parties’ subsequent conduct as evidence of proper meaning of contract).

B1.58 Generally speaking, however, and notwithstanding the ‘iterative process’ outlined above that is to be followed to determine the proper meaning of the regulation in question, the text of the regulation remains the starting point and the end point of the analysis. For reasons of legal certainty and predictability, courts and arbitrators should be slow to allow the contextual approach or the ‘purposive approach’ to be used to derive a meaning that effectively re-writes the regulation.1 Similarly the court or tribunal should not under the guise of interpretation depart from the obvious meaning of the words just because it does not like them. Its task is to interpret and apply the regulations as it finds them, not to supplant the role of the SGB by imposing its own view of what the regulations should say.2 1 WADA  v Covert, CAS  2012/A/2960, para  98 (‘The Athlete has requested that the Panel give Article  5.2.2.8 of the ISL a “purposive” interpretation, so as to find that the INRS laboratory was required to retain the sample even though the laboratory had not been given notice to do so. A “purposive” reading of the ISL would only be appropriate if the ISL provision in question contained some ambiguity so that consideration of the underlying purpose of the text would help to clarify the meaning of the provision. However, this is not the case here. Article 5.1..2.8 is clear as to what laboratories are required to do. The Athlete’s proposed “purposive” reading would in fact be an inappropriate re-writing of the article’); King v AIBA, CAS 2011/A/2452, para 6.6 (where the Appellant had been charged with associating with certain individuals but the disciplinary rule in question only prohibited associating with a suspended national federation, ‘the Respondent […] argued that there was a lacuna [in the AIBA  Disciplinary Code] which should be filled by purposive interpretation. The Panel holds that such interpretation would be no more than disguised legislation and to accept the Respondent’s invitation would violate the fundamental principle of criminal and disciplinary law “nullem crimen sine lege”’). 2 For English law authority on this point, see Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 [SC], per Lord Neuberger at 1628, para 20 (‘[…] while commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed,

384  Regulating Sport even ignoring the benefit of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have agreed, not what the courts think that they should have agreed’). For CAS authority, see Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 117 (‘[…] this Panel’s duty is not that of rewriting a federation’s rules. The rule-making power, and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking also into account the overall legislative framework. The duty of this Panel is to ensure that the exercise of such power does not conflict with the rules that govern it, and not to alter the content (whether by way of interpretation or some other form of “manipulation”) to transform them into something different’); Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(b) (‘[…] even if the Panel considered it [the approach taken by the ICF in its qualification rules for the 2016 Olympic Games] to be counterintuitive, this is a choice to be made by the ICF in what it understands is the best interest of the sport, a decision that unless taken against specific duties or norms is not under the power of review of this Panel. The Panel has full power to review the ICF’s correct application of its rules but it cannot mandate a specific interpretation on the sole basis of what it considers to be more adequate to sporting logic’); RFEF v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, para 302 (‘However strict, [Article 105.4 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code] must be construed in its ordinary literal sense to the effect that decisions regarding the amount and allocation of costs and expenses by the FIFA disciplinary bodies are final and un-appealable, at least to CAS’); FINA v Cielo Filho & CBDA, CAS 2011/A/2495, para 8.1 (‘All the parties and the Panel are bound by the FINA Rules as properly interpreted. The Panel is not at liberty to give a loose or sympathetic application to those Rules, as properly interpreted, merely because the Panel may think that, in a particular case, they produce an unduly harsh or unreasonable result. The FINA Rules and the WADC on which those Rules are modelled, are drafted in the way they are for very particular and important reasons, based in the input of all the stakeholders in the Olympic movement and in other major sports. It is not the role of this Panel to seek to do justice as it perceives it by giving the AntiDoping Rules an interpretation or application inconsistent with the language of those Rules, with the object and purpose of those Rules or with the body of CAS jurisprudence which has developed in respect of those Rules’).

B1.59 The only exception to this is where applying the natural and ordinary meaning of the text would lead to an unworkable or illogical/absurd result.1 In such cases, the approach may be that that cannot have been what was intended and there must have been a mistake in the drafting, which may mean in some civil law systems that words in the text may be ignored, or words not in the text may be added in, so as to avoid the impractical or illogical/absurd result.2 However, an English court at least would be very cautious about reaching that conclusion, for fear of crossing the line from interpreting a contract to re-writing it as one thinks it should have been written.3 1 Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS  2007/A/1407, para  15 (‘The rule that words must be construed in their ordinary sense will be departed from when the meaning would involve an absurdity or create an inconsistency with the rest of the document’); Salmond v IIHF, CAS  2018/A/5885, para 240 (‘In CAS 2007/A/1407, it was established that the “rule that words must be construed in their ordinary sense will be departed from when the meaning would involve an absurdity or create an inconsistency with the rest of the document”. In CAS  2006/A/1165, it was expressed that “the presumption is that the words in documents should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and it is only when such an approach creates an unreasonable result that it is necessary to look to other meanings”’). In Salmond, this principle was used to reject the suggestion that under the rules, properly construed, one could not be liable for complicity in an anti-doping rule violation if that complicity took the form of putting an athlete under such pressure not to provide a sample that the athlete was held to have a compelling justification for not providing the sample and so had not committed an anti-doping rule violation. 2 For CAS authority, see Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 141 (‘A literal understand[ing] of the requirement [that a federation applying for membership of UEFA must be based in a country recognised by the UN as an independent state] must therefore be rejected, as otherwise no applicant could ever meet the requirements [because the UN does not recognise countries]’) and para 142 (instead the provision ‘must be interpreted as requiring the applicant to be based in a country which is recognised as an independent state “by the majority of UN members”’); Fédération Française des Echecs et al v Federation Internationale des Echecs, 2010/O/2166, para 9.7.8 (rejecting proposed construction that an individual had to be a member of a national federation in order to be proposed for election as an officer of the international federation, because ‘if membership in the nominating federation were mandatory, a number of FIDE federations would never be able to submit candidates because in their countries individuals cannot be members of the national federation but rather only in clubs which in turn are members in (regional bodies or) the national federation’); E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 8.10 (‘It simply cannot be the intent that this rule would allow an accused to afford itself of the more favourable science. Applying such an argument to a criminal case would

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  385 be tantamount to requiring the court to find an accused innocent of a crime, even if the DNA proves the accused is the culprit simply because the crime was committed prior to the availability of DNA testing. This Panel finds that this simply cannot be the case’); Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, para  39(b) (endorsing Chartbrook on this point); AOC & AWU  v FILA, CAS  2008/A/1502, paras 6.15–6.22 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a regulation because it was not logical); ADO Den Haag v Newcastle United FC, CAS  2006/A/1152, para  15 (‘the Panel observes that the language of a provision [in a sports body’s rules] governs its interpretation, where the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an ambiguity or absurdity’); Korda v ITF, CAS 99/A/223, para 25 (‘We cannot, even applying the contra proferentem rule, or the rule against doubtful penalisation support an interpretation which results in such a paradox’). See also Segura v IAAF, CAS OG 2000/013, para 23 (where the rule says disqualification of an athlete must be notified to the athlete ‘immediately’ after the race, to make it workable ‘The word “immediate” must, without any doubt, be read as qualified by a notion of “reasonable under the circumstances” […]’). And see IAAF v Ottey, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 3 July 2000, para 15 (where rules on their literal meaning made the mere presence of nandrolone in the athlete’s sample a doping offence, but it was accepted that humans may produce nandrolone naturally at very low levels, even though there was no express requirement that the IAAF prove the nandrolone found in the athlete’s sample was exogenous in origin, to avoid unfairness to the athlete the panel found a lacuna in the rules and filled it by reading in a requirement that the IAAF must prove that the quantity of nandrolone metabolite found in the athlete’s sample so exceeds the range of values normally found in humans as to be not consistent with normal endogenous production). For English law authority on this point, see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] AC 1101 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at para 21 (‘When the language used in an instrument gives rise to difficulties of construction, the process of interpretation does not require one to formulate some alternative form of words which approximates as closely as possible to that of the parties. It is to decide what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to mean by using the language which they did. The fact that the court might have to express that meaning in language quite different from that used by the parties […] is no reason for not giving effect to what they appear to have meant’) and para 25 (‘there is not, so to speak, a limit to the amount of red ink or verbal rearrangement or correction which the court is allowed. All that is required is that it should be clear that something has gone wrong with the language and that it should be clear what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant’); Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 913D (‘[…] we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had’, ie one that flouts common sense); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The presumption is that the words in documents should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and it is only when such an approach creates an unreasonable result that it is necessary to look to other meanings’). 3 Arnold v Britton [2015]  AC  1619 [SC], per Lord Neuberger at 1628, para  17 (‘[…] the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances […] should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision’) and para 20 (‘when interpreting a contract a judge should avoid re-writing it in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party’). See also, for the same approach in the context of interpretation of a statute, Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, per Lord Neuberger at 72 (‘When interpreting a statute, the court’s function is to determine the meaning of the words used in the statute. The fact that context and mischief are factors which must be taken into account does not mean that, when performing its interpretive role, the court can take a free-wheeling view of the intention of Parliament looking at all admissible material, and treating the wording of the statute as merely one item. Context and mischief do not represent a licence to judges to ignore the plain meaning of the language that Parliament has used’).

D The role of prior precedents on the proper meaning of the regulation in issue B1.60 As noted above, the proper interpretation of a regulation is a question of law, not of fact, and therefore a court is not bound by the interpretation given by the parties, or by the interpretation given to the same clause by a previous court or tribunal.1 Again, however, the ultimate goal is consistent and harmonised application of the regulations wherever the sport is played. For that reason, therefore, and to achieve predictability and equal treatment,2 just as under English law the meaning of international conventions is to be determined by reference to international jurisprudence,3 so too a court or arbitral panel that has to decide the proper

386  Regulating Sport

interpretation of an SGB’s transnational regulations should take into account how the provision in question has been interpreted and applied by previous CAS panels.4 In fact, even though there is strictly no doctrine of precedent in arbitration,5 if previous CAS panels have interpreted a particular provision in an SGB’s regulations in a particular way, another CAS panel will not take a different view without good reason,6 and (in the authors’ opinion) a first instance tribunal should consider itself bound to follow that CAS authority, at least absent very good reason not to do so. 1 See para B1.50, n 1. 2 Nafziger, ‘Lex Sportiva’, in Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law? (TMC Asser, 2012), pp 50 and 56 (following CAS precedents, including on the proper interpretation of sports rules and regulations, ‘would help apply three values that the principle of stare decisis serves: efficiency of the legal process, predictability or stability of expectations, and equal treatment of similarly situated parties’, as well as providing ‘authoritative interpretations of the principles and rules of international sports law’). 3 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL) per Lord Scarman at 290B and 293B and D. See also Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102, at 45 (Alsop J) (‘[…] standard form contracts, including in particular standard forms [and] international terms and conditions of organisations […] using phrases that have had meanings given to them by commercial courts, should be interpreted, in the interests of international comity and international commercial certainty, in a consistent way, giving weight to those previous decisions’). 4 Berger v WADA, CAS  2009/A/1948, para  25 (‘CAS has not yet had to determine the proper construction of Article 13.4 of the 2009 WADC […]. It is, therefore, important that CAS, which is the arbitral body principally entrusted with interpretation and application of the 2009 WADC, gives a reasoned and publicly available decision on the proper construction of Article  13.4 so that in future disputes involving the 2009 WADC or its derivatives the question of jurisdiction posed by the construction of Article 13.4 of the 2009 WADC may be approached and dealt with by stakeholders in the future in a “global and harmonised way” as is the object of the 2009 Code’). See also, in the same context (doping cases decided under rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code): WADA  v Jobson, CAS  2010/A/2307, para  126 (‘the FIFA ADR has been established on the basis of the WADC, whose main intention was the harmonisation of the worldwide fight against doping. As recognised by CAS jurisprudence, in order to achieve this goal of harmonisation “it is necessary to interpret anti-doping rules that have been established on the basis of the WADC in harmony with the WADC, the respective set of rules of other international sport federations and the respective CAS case law”’), quoting Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS  2004/A/690, para  71; FINA  v Cielo Filho & CBDA, CAS 2011/A/2495, para 8.2 (‘CAS jurisprudence on the WADC, and its analogues such as the FINA Rules, is of extreme importance in respect of the interpretation of the WADC and related antidoping regimes given the purpose of “enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonised way” (see page 18 of the Preamble to the WADC)’); Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 7.2 (‘This appeal is governed by the provisions of the [Tennis Anti-Doping] Programme and the World AntiDoping Code (the “WADC”), as interpreted and applied by the CAS (with relevant decisions of lower panels of persuasive authority)’) and para 10.18 (citing as support for its interpretation of a provision of the Code the fact that other CAS panels and a first instance panel in the UK have interpreted the provision in the same way); IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 144 (‘[…] the IAAF [anti-doping] rules in question are to be interpreted in a manner harmonious with other WADC compliant rules’). See also Aloyan v IOC, 2017/A/4927, para 76 (gleaning support for its preferred interpretation from the fact that ‘[t]he interpretation advanced by the Panel, in addition, is confirmed by a consistent CAS practice, starting from the early cases’). In principle at least, persuasive decisions of first instance panels should also be taken into account. See Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 7.2 (‘This appeal is governed by the provisions of the [Tennis Anti-Doping] Programme and the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADC”), as interpreted and applied by the CAS (with relevant decisions of lower panels of persuasive authority)’); but cf Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 64 (rejecting suggestion CAS panel should defer to the expertise of the first instance panel in applying the regulations to the sport in question, because ‘the rules that are at stake here are based on the WADC, the purpose of which is to ensure the uniform application of anti-doping standards throughout the world and across all sports. The Sole Arbitrator cannot see why a federation would have more expertise in applying these rules of a truly transnational character than CAS panels […]’). 5 Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643, para 82 (‘[…] no doctrine of binding precedent applies to the CAS jurisprudence’). See para C18.16. 6 Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, paras 52-55 (‘This does not automatically entail that the Panel is bound to decide in the same way as in CAS 2004/A/725 on the basis of either the “stare decisis” or the “collateral estoppel” principles, as advocated by the Appellants. On the issue of the precedential value of CAS awards, the Panel shares the view of other CAS panels. In the case CAS 97/176, award of 15 January 1998, the panel rightly stated as follows: “in arbitration there is no stare decisis. Nevertheless, the Panel feels that CAS rulings form a valuable body of case law and can contribute to strengthen legal predictability in international sports law. Therefore, although not

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  387 binding, previous CAS decisions can, and should, be taken into attentive consideration by subsequent CAS panels, in order to help developing legitimate expectations among sports bodies and athletes” (at para. 40). Similarly, in the case CAS  2004/A/628, award of 28  June 2004, the panel stated as follows: “In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent, or stare decisis. However, a CAS panel will obviously try, if the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of law as a previous CAS panel” (at para. 73). Therefore, although a CAS panel in principle might end up deciding differently from a previous panel, it must accord to previous CAS awards a substantial precedential value and it is up to the party advocating a jurisprudential change to submit persuasive arguments and evidence to that effect. Accordingly, the CAS 2004/A/725 award is a very important precedent and the Panel will draw some significant guidance from it’); Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, paras 142–43 (although ‘fully conscious of its legal power to reach a different conclusion’, panel decided to follow the interpretation given to a UEFA provision by the CAS panel in FA of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602); Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 86 (deriving support for preferred interpretation of rule from the fact that ‘CAS panels in the past have interpreted the notion of “fairness” in this sense’); Billington v FIBT, CAS OG  2002/005, para  23 (deciding to follow decision of CAS panel in Bassani-Antivari v IOC, CAS OG 2002/003, as to the proper interpretation of a provision of the CAS ad hoc rules). The English courts would take a similar approach. See Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204 (HL), per Lord Diplock at 1206 (‘In theory, too, this House no longer regards itself as being strictly bound to follow its own previous decisions; but in fact on questions of construction of statutory provisions, at any rate if they are recent, the Appellate Committee is loth to over-rule its own previous decision even though a majority of its members think that the reasoning of the decision was fallacious’).

E Canons of construction B1.61 Finally, if after following the process set out above the meaning of the SGB’s regulations is still ambiguous or obscure, courts and tribunals may have resort to the following canons of construction to ascertain that meaning:1 (a) If the text is capable of bearing two opposing meanings, a CAS panel will prefer the meaning that provides legal certainty over one that does not.2 (b) Similarly, ‘any ambiguity in disciplinary rules must be resolved in favour of the individual who may be made liable under them’.3 In particular: (i) where it is unclear whether the conduct of the accused falls within a particular prohibition and therefore constitutes a disciplinary offence, there is a presumption in favour of a narrow construction that would result in dismissal of the charge;4 and (ii) even if an offence has been committed, a sanction may only be imposed that is clearly provided for in the rules.5 (c) A related, but broader, principle is that any remaining ambiguity in an SGB’s statutes or regulations should be construed contra proferentem, ie against the SGB that drafted and issued the regulations and in favour of the member or athlete who is subject to those regulations and had no part in drafting them.6 This canon of construction has particular force in the context of anti-doping rules, because of the harsh sanctions that can apply.7 However, it may not apply when the SGB is enforcing, against a member, rules that were adopted by all members,8 or when it is applying qualification rules for the Olympic Games that it agreed with the IOC.9 (d) Lex specialis: ‘If different (conflicting) rules are applicable to the same matter, the conflict of rules is to be solved by applying the principle lex specialis derogate generali. According thereto the (more) specific rule prevails over the more general rule, since the lex specialis is presumed to have been drafted having in mind particular purposes and taking into account particular circumstances’.10

(e)

An SGB’s regulations are to be interpreted, if possible, in a manner that does not put the SGB in breach of applicable law, since it is presumed that the SGB intended to comply with applicable law, not to break it.11 This includes preferring an interpretation that avoids infringing legally protected rights.12

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(f) ‘As a matter of principle, an exception to a general rule is to be narrowly construed’.13 (g) ‘In principle, a construction of a rule otherwise appropriate cannot be discarded on the basis that persons will not act in relation to it in good faith’.14  1 But not if it does not. See Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS  2015/A/4190, para  52 (‘The canons of construction prayed in aid by the Appellant do […] justify a strict approach to disciplinary rules; but there is no ambiguity in the EAD rules which applied at the material time […]’); Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 65 (rejecting request to construe anti-doping rule contra proferentem where the rule was not ambiguous); Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.6.12 (‘the Panel concludes that there is no ambiguity in the Programme which requires a construction “contra proferentem”’); WCMGP Ltd v FIM, CAS 2003/A/4612 & 471 & 473, para 36 (‘Contrary to the submission made by the Appellant to convince the Panel that one should apply the principles of legal certainty, proportionality and the rule contra proferentem automatically, Swiss law relies on such principles only if there is ambiguity and no clear meaning can be drawn from an interpretation based on the letter and the spirit of the law’).  2 WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 107 (‘The principle of legal certainty has an important role to play in exercise of interpretation. There is no doubt that the WADA/FIS position has the merit of certainty; those to whom the ß2A  Provision is addressed need do no more than look at a label. The Athlete’s position requires, as this appeal showed, the introduction of and reliance on detailed scientific evidence (an exercise which may be beyond the resources available to most sportsmen or sportswomen’); Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS  2014/A/3516, para  109 (rejecting proposed construction of a rule that would have made it a disciplinary offence to fail to maintain ‘an appropriate demeanour in any activity performed’, on the basis that such a construction ‘falls foul of any concept […] of legal certainty since “performed activity” has no sensible or predictable meaning’); WADA v JBN et al, CAS 2012/A/2747, para 7.14 ( ‘arguments of legal certainty speak against’ a proposed interpretation that would make it nearly impossible to determine when mitigation of sanction would be permissible under the regulation and when it would not).  3 Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 15.2. For English law authority on this point, see Aitken v DPP [2015] EWHC 1079 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 297 (67) (Warby J) (referring to the ‘rule against doubtful penalisation’).  4 McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), p  147 (‘[…] penal provisions will be construed strictly in favour of the person who is liable to be penalised’); Omeragik v FFM, CAS 2011/A/2670, para 8.14 (choosing a narrower construction that prevented the SGB disciplining the appellant based on provisions that did not clearly proscribe his conduct). One aspect of this principle is the presumption that an offence is not one of strict liability but requires proof of fault. McLeod, above, p  148); Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS  99/A/230, para  10 (‘[…] if regulatory documents define sanctions and how they should be applied to particular offences, they should be strictly interpreted by the sports authorities and the CAS. In this case, neither the IJF Anti-doping Regulations nor the IOC Medical Code provide for disqualification as the consequence of a positive out-of-competition test. Since it has no legal foundation, the respondent’s decision to disqualify the appellant and withdraw his medal should therefore be set aside’). See also USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 17 (given the stringent nature of a strict liability rule, ‘if such a standard is to be applied, it must be clearly articulated’). The most prominent example of the displacement of this presumption is Article 2.1 of the World Anti-Doping Code, which makes an athlete strictly liable for the presence of a prohibited substance found in his or her sample (for more detail of which, see para C6.5).  5 King v AIBA, CAS 2011/A/2452, para 6.6 (where the Appellant had been charged with associating with certain individuals but the disciplinary rule in question only prohibited associating with a suspended national federation, ‘the Respondent […] argued that there was a lacuna [in the AIBA Disciplinary Code] which should be filled by purposive interpretation. The Panel holds that such interpretation would be no more than disguised legislation and to accept the Respondent’s invitation would violate the fundamental principle of criminal and disciplinary law “nullem crimen sine lege”’); TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v ETTU, CAS  2007/A/1363, para  16 (protecting ‘the principle of legality and predictability of sanctions which requires a clear connection between the incriminated behaviour and the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision’).   6 For English law authority on this point, see Beale (Ed), Chitty on Contracts, 32nd Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) Vol 1, para  13-086; Ace Paper Ltd v Fry [2015]  EWHC  1647, para. 38; W  v UK  Athletics, CAS  2003/A/455, para  18 (‘The wording of the rule is clear but even if there were an ambiguity the “contra proferentem” rule of interpretation under English law would apply – that is, the interpretation to be adopted is that least favourable to the person putting forward the relevant document’); Du Plessis v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 21  December 2016, [2017] (3)  ISLR SLR-67, para  4.4 (‘Where possible, a disciplinary provision must be capable of ready application but must, in the case of any ambiguity, be interpreted contra proferentem […]’). For CAS authority, see eg  Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS  2007/A/1407, para  18 (‘It is also important to note that when seeking the real intention of the parties, in accordance with the

Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework  389 jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Court, the unclear declarations or wordings in a contract will be interpreted against the party that drafted the contract (ATF 124 III 155, 158, consid. 1b), being the responsibility of the author of the contract to choose its formulation with adequate precision (in dubio contra stipulatorem)’); Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 80 (‘As a general rule any provision with an unclear wording is to be interpreted against the author of the wording (interpretation contra proferentem). […] It follows from this that any ambiguity or doubt as to the contents or scope of application of the provisions in the FINA DC must turn against the Respondent, ie the drafter of these rules’); GNK Dinamo v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3324, para 9.11 (‘The rule maker, not the ruled, must suffer the consequences of imprecision’); Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS  2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 4.28 (‘[…] contradictions in the applicable rules must be interpreted contra proferentem, ie  to the detriment of the promulgator of the conflicting or contradictory provision’), followed in Liao Hui v IWF, CAS  2011/A/2612, para  107 (‘In light of the fact that the IWF ADP are unilaterally formulated by one of the parties and that the parties to the contractual relationship have unequal bargaining power, this Panel finds it appropriate to apply the principle of “contra proferentem” in the case at hand with the consequence that the provisions on sanctions contained in the IWF ADP must be “read down” in order to be in line with the WADC’); FC Schalke et al v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1622-1624, para 94 (‘Under Swiss law, a general principle states that any provision with an unclear wording has to be interpreted against the author of the wording (contra proferentem). This principle also applies to association law […]. This means that, in principle, if no other reasons require a different treatment, any ambiguous, or otherwise unclear, provision of the statutes has to be interpreted against the association that has drafted the statutes, and not against the members’); FA of Wales v UEFA, CAS 2004/A/593, para 6 (relying on ‘the widely recognized interpretative principle “contra proferentem” (also known as “contra stipulatorem”), according to which an unclear clause should be interpreted against the party who drafted it’).  7 See eg  WADA  v Batan & IPF, CAS  2013/A/3316, para  50 (‘[…] in such cases [of ambiguity in a rule], and particularly in doping cases, CAS decisions have consistently applied the principle of “contra proferentem” […]’) and para 51 (applying principle to prefer a restrictive interpretation of a provision on mitigation of doping sanctions that favoured athletes charged with violation of the rules in question); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 107 (ambiguities in the IWF Anti-Doping Rules should be resolved in favour of the athlete, with the four-year ban stipulated in those rules ‘read down’ to comply with the two-year ban stipulated in the World Anti-Doping Code).  8 IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 11 (‘[…] the IAAF Rules are not to be read as terms proferred by the IAAF to USATF (or to any other Member), but as resolutions adopted by and binding upon all Members, including USATF. There is thus no basis for their being read or construed contra proferentem one party or another in this arbitration’).  9 Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(c) (‘[…] although the drafting of the rules is clearly insufficient, this is not a case where the contra proferentem interpretation benefits one party against the draft of an obscure rule. Quite the opposite, in this case the unclear rule both benefits and damages national federations and their athletes and only does so after the event […]. The contra proferentem rule of interpretation may be of importance in contractual interpretation where one of the party drafts the obscure clause. It may also be of relevance in the interpretation of statutory rules predisposed by an entity, on disciplinary measures where unclear wording cannot be the basis of a conviction. However, it cannot be upheld in a case where the enacting body merely acts as a deciding authority on issues that only affect its associates, none of which effectively intervened in the drafting of the obscure rule. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to show that any party questioned the clarity of the OQS before the World Championships’). 10 Glasner v FINA, CAS  2013/A/3274, para  78. For English law authority on this point, see Vinus v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 (CA), per Peter Gibson LJ at 27. For application of the principle in the sports context, see eg  IAAF  v Jeptoo, CAS  2015/O/4128, para  159; Chandimal v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 25 June 2018, paras 4.4 and 4.7; WADA v JBN, Dennis de Goede & NADO, CAS 2012/A/2747, para 7.12 (whereas 2009 WADC Art 10.5.2 is a general provision permitting mitigation of sanction in cases of No Significant Fault or Negligence, 2009 WADC Art 10.4 is a lex specialis, providing for mitigation of sanction in cases involving ‘Specified Substances’ in cases where there is no intent to enhance performance, even if there is significant fault or negligence). 11 Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A  Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 4.17 (‘Since it is presumed that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to fundamental rights or any other “basic tenet of the common law”, it will not be taken to have done so unless it makes its intentions to this effect very clear’). See eg R (on the application of Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Comrs of Income Tax [2002] UKHL 21 (Lord Hoffman), para 8 (‘The courts will ordinarily construe general words in a statute, although literally capable of having some startling or unreasonable consequence, such as overriding fundamental human rights, as not having been intended to do so. An intention to override such rights must be expressly stated or appear by necessary implication’). 12 For English law authority on this point, see s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires courts to construe legislation in a manner compatible with the ECHR rights that the Act enshrines into English law, and (if necessary) to read down provisions that would breach ECHR rights) (see paras E13.11–

390  Regulating Sport E13.12); and Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245, 251 (‘Even outside the field covered by the Human Rights Act 1998 Parliament is presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law and fundamental rights. If Parliament wishes to do so it must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. General words cannot achieve such a result: only an unmistakeable parliamentary intent will be sufficient. This is called the principle of legality. It is a strong presumption’), citing R (Simms) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 2  AC  115, 131E–G  (Lord Hoffman) (‘In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual’). See also R (on application of Morgaan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563 at 5 (Lord Hoffman) (‘The courts will ordinarily construe general words in a statute, although literally capable of having some startling or unreasonable consequence, such as overriding fundamental human rights, as not having been intended to do so. An intention to override such rights must be expressly stated or appear by necessary implication’). For CAS authority, see Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 44 (‘[…] a federation cannot opt out from an interpretation of its rules and regulations in light of principles of “human rights” just by omitting any references in its rules and regulations to human rights’) and para 46 (‘The 2015 ADR qualify the rule pertaining to the statute of limitation as a “procedural rule”. However, it does not necessarily follow from this qualification that there are no limits to a retroactive application of such rule. Instead, it follows from Art. 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “ECHR”) that the procedure must be “fair”’); IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 185 (where IAAF Rule 40.8 provided that all results obtained by an athlete after his anti-doping rule violation were to be disqualified, and did not permit deviation from that rule where fairness required, even though the equivalent World Anti-Doping Code provision did, ‘the Sole Arbitrator finds that a fairness exception must be read in to Rule 40.8 IAAF Rules 20122013 read together with Articles  40.8 and 23.2.2  WADC. Only when reading in this manner and applying them fairly to the Athlete concerned both provisions can be understood as complying with the proportionality requirement under general principles of law applicable in Switzerland and Monaco, being the seats of WADA and the IAAF respectively’); Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para  175 (‘Chelsea’s interpretation of Article  14.3 is overly broad. It goes beyond the objective of protecting contractual stability. […] It is incompatible with the fundamental principle of freedom to exercise a professional activity and is disproportionate to the protection of the old club’s legitimate interests’). Similarly, in Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.23, where the CAS panel detected a gap in the Code, failing to provide for mitigation of the sanction for a second offence where both offences involved limited fault on the athlete’s part, it filled the gap by reference to the principle of proportionality. (See para B1.31). It has been suggested that ‘this approach, while undertaken in the context of the rules of a private association by an arbitral tribunal, might be likened to the application of the principle of statutory interpretation applicable in many jurisdictions, that a statutory provision will be interpreted, wherever possible, in a manner which complies with constitutional or fundamental rights’: David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 89. 13 WADA  v Sundby & FIS, CAS  2015/A/4233, para  94, and see para  97 (referring to ‘the principle of narrow interpretation of exceptions’). See also WADA  v Bellchambers et al, CAS  2015/A/4059, para 116 (‘[…] an exception to the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence should in principle be narrowly construed’). 14 Villanueva v FINA, CAS  2016/A/4534, para  48. See also IWBF  v UK  Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS  2010/A/2230, para  11.32 (‘IWBF’s expressed concern that construing Article  10.4 according to its ordinary and natural meaning which, the Sole Arbitrator has found, it bears, might encourage athletes who could not establish how the prohibited substance entered their body to lie and claim that they took it deliberately. The Sole Arbitrator does not consider that in principle it is appropriate to approach a question of construction on such a premise. The assumption should always be that an athlete will tell the truth; honesty is usually, if not always, the best policy. Further he has already mentioned the limited opportunity to procure reduction of sentence where the use was of a substance with the capacity to enhance performance. Moreover if an athlete started with a lie as to how the substance came in his body, he would need to lie too as to his innocence in ingestion, and his lack of culpability. Successful misleading of a panel by lies piled on lies might be a difficult, if not impossible, exercise’).

Chapter B2

Selection Elizabeth Riley (International Paralympic Committee) and Christopher Stoner QC (Serle Court and Guildhall Chambers) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B2.1 2

THE SELECTION PROCESS............................................................................. B2.4 A Selection criteria.......................................................................................... B2.4 B Structure of selection policies...................................................................... B2.12 C Compatibility with other rules..................................................................... B2.18 D Procedure..................................................................................................... B2.27

3 ELIGIBILITY...................................................................................................... B2.38 A Nationality.................................................................................................... B2.40 B Hierarchy of governing bodies..................................................................... B2.43 4 APPEALS............................................................................................................ B2.44 A Grounds of appeal........................................................................................ B2.46 B Successful grounds of appeal....................................................................... B2.55 C Limitations on the appeal panel................................................................... B2.88 D Proper parties............................................................................................... B2.93 5

THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES................................................. B2.95 A The selection framework.............................................................................. B2.96 B Selection disputes relating to the Olympic and Paralympic Games............ B2.98 C The need for a more consistent approach at national level?........................ B2.100

6 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................. B2.103

1 INTRODUCTION B2.1 Selection pervades all sports at all levels, ranging from selection from a squad of professional players for a football or rugby team to the selection of an individual to compete in a particular sport at a particular competition, from local grassroots competitions to the Olympic and Paralympic Games. It would not be possible in this chapter to provide a detailed analysis of all selection issues covering all sports, and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, this chapter focuses on the essential aspects of selection that can, and frequently do, lead to selection disputes, as well as on the mechanisms to deal with such disputes.1 1 For further reading see Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport’ (August 2000) at sportlaw.ca/the-rights-of-athletes-coaches-and-participants-in-sport/ [accessed 28 October 2020]; Findlay and Corbett, ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1(1) Entertainment Law 109; Findlay, ‘Rules of a Sport-Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of Policy Making’, 16 Marquette Sports Law Review 73 (2005); Corbishley, ‘Resolving questions of Olympic selection – and update’, Sports Law Administration and Practice, August 2008, pp 6–10; Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’ (Sport Resolutions, January 2013).

B2.2 The consequences of any particular selection decision can be euphoric for the athlete selected, whilst devastating for the athlete not selected. However, it is right to begin with the general observation that, while ultimately dependent on the circumstances, it will be extremely rare for an athlete simply to be entitled to

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selection for any given event as of right. As the CAS has stated: ‘being entitled to consideration for nomination and being eligible for nomination is not the same as having a right to nomination’.1 Ultimately, the ‘right’ to be selected will have to be earned.2 1 Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, para 7. 2 Indeed, Rule 44.3 of the Olympic Charter records that: ‘Nobody is entitled as of right to participate in the Olympic Games’. Similarly, the IPC Handbook states that: ‘Nobody is entitled to any right of any kind to participate in the Paralympic Games’.

B2.3 If there is one constant message to take away, it is not to underestimate the importance of careful advance planning and consideration of the selection process (from the initial drafting and appropriate communication of the selection policy, through to the implementation of the policy and the process for appeals) well in advance of any selection decisions actually being made. As is clear from the many examples of selection appeals discussed below, the issue is often not with the selection decision itself (which, while the athlete may disagree with it, is by and large not open to challenge if properly made) but with the process surrounding the decision and how it was reached. Moreover, as many governing bodies have found out to their detriment, the fall-out from a badly handled selection dispute can be significant and incredibly damaging to the sport and those involved. Good examples are the widespread, negative media coverage when GB Taekwondo did not select the then world number one and European champion, Aaron Cook, to participate in the 2012 Olympic Games, and the confusion surrounding whether or not the GB rhythmic gymnastics team had in fact achieved the necessary qualifying score for the 2012 Olympic Games.

2 THE SELECTION PROCESS A Selection criteria B2.4 Selection criteria will be sport-specific, but for any given selection decision the criteria will usually be formed from one of three alternative bases: objective criteria, subjective criteria, or a hybrid of the two.1 1 See eg  Japan Paralympic Committee (JPC) v International Paralympic Committee (IPC) & International Blind Sport Federation (IBSA), CAS 2012/A/2831, paras 5 and 6.

B2.5 Objective criteria include factors such as time, position, distance, weight, points or rankings gained at a particular event or over a series of events. Such criteria have a mechanical application. For example, if an athlete meets a qualification time in the relevant qualification event, they will be selected.1 1 For example, in Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 3, the relevant selection criteria under British Swimming’s Olympic Games 2012 Pool Swimming Selection Policy were ‘entirely objective’, being based solely on performances in particular events.

B2.6 On the other hand, with subjective criteria the selection of an athlete will be at the discretion of the particular selectors.1 1 For example, in Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, para 43, the selection policy governing the selection of a fifth athlete to support the four person women’s K4 crew was extremely subjective, effectively allowing the selectors to determine the relevant selection criteria. See also Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 10, where the selection policy stated that ‘diving is an extremely subjective sport and thus there will be a significant component of subjective decision making in regard to final selection of the team’, and provided for final selection to be ‘at the sole discretion of the [National Performance Director]’.

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B2.7 The third alternative is a hybrid of objective and subjective criteria, such as where selection is at the subjective discretion of the selectors, but that discretion is required to be exercised by reference to certain objective criteria (such as a list of factors that the selectors must take into account when exercising their discretion).1 1 For example, under the British Judo Association’s selection policy for the 2012 Olympic Games, the selectors were required to consider various factors, including ‘the player with the most potential to win a medal, in the Selection Panel’s opinion’, as well as a number of objective criteria such as players’ results from specified competitions.

B2.8 Some sports may also use a mixture of the above for selection for a particular event. For example, for an event where two places are available, one athlete might be selected based on objective criteria (such as winning a particular event and being ‘first past the post’, as in the US track and field trials for the Olympic Games), with the other place being filled at the selectors’ discretion. Alternatively, the selectors might have a residual subjective discretion to fill any available places in a particular event that are not filled by athletes meeting the objective selection criteria. B2.9 As a generalisation, if the selection policy is for a team sport it is likely that there will be at least an element of subjectivity so as to cater for personality traits, team chemistry, and individual strengths in those competing for a particular place on a team. Plainly, the best team will not necessarily comprise the top-ranked, fittest or fastest athletes.1 As American football player and coach, Knute Rockne, remarked, ‘the secret is to work less as individuals and more as a team. As a coach, I play not my eleven best, but my best eleven’. Selection in team sports is therefore often less straightforward (and more subjective) than in individual sports. 1 For example, in Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, in selecting a fifth athlete to support the four person women’s K4 crew, the selectors were perfectly entitled to take into account (and prefer) the potential of the selected athlete to stand in as stroke in the event of illness or injury, notwithstanding that Ms Belcher had achieved better results than that athlete in certain competitions.

B2.10 Due to their mechanical application, objective criteria must be followed when making the selection decision. Otherwise there will be a failure to follow the selection policy that will most likely lead to the selection decision being set aside.1 1 See Section 4, below.

B2.11 With subjective criteria, there will necessarily be an element of discretion exercised by those tasked with the selection decision. However, that discretion should nevertheless be exercised fairly and rationally, having regard to the objectives of the selection policy, and without bias.1 1 See Section 4, below. A  decision that has been reached pursuant to a fair procedure, lawfully, and within the limits of discretion open to the decision-maker, should be safe from interference from the courts. See the discussion of Richards J in Bradley v Jockey Club, [2004] EWHC 2164, paras 33 to 46, approved by the Court of Appeal in Bradley v Jockey Club, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, and discussed in detail at paras E7.15–E7.21. Also see Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.15.

B Structure of selection policies B2.12 A selection policy should be in writing and, insofar as possible, should use clear, intelligible language that can be understood by the athletes to whom it applies, those who assist them (such as coaches), and the selectors themselves. While this might sound obvious, a very common theme in selection disputes is the poor drafting of the policy in question,1 and getting this right upfront will go a long way towards helping to prevent future appeals. As the Appeal Committee commented in Roberts v British Swimming: ‘it will already have become obvious to all concerned that time

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and money spent on the drafting and adoption of a new, clear and coherent selection policy will be well spent’.2 1 See eg GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012, paras 39 and 40, finding against the interpretation of the selection policy put forward by the governing body (‘I would observe at the outset that the Policy is not well drafted. While it is not unusual to see terminology and abbreviations in the rules of sporting competitions (which might mean something to people knowledgeable about the particular sport but might not be readily intelligible to outsiders not involved in the sport), the document is repetitive, it uses inconsistent terminology […] and has a certain “cut and paste” appearance. Of particular note is that the two people from BG principally involved in developing the Policy cannot agree on what it means’); Badrick v British Judo Association, [2004]  EWHC  1891 (Ch), para  24 (finding the BJA’s appeal procedure to be ‘very unsatisfactorily drafted’); Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 13 (‘It may be that the objectives could be better expressed in the Selection Criteria document, but that is a matter for British Swimming’); Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 25 (‘The difficulty with this Selection Policy is that it is so badly drafted that in ascertaining the intention of British Swimming in adopting the document in this form it is unrealistic to take the approach which would be taken towards, for example, a commercial contract which had clearly been carefully and expertly drafted so that one should pause long and hard before treating particular words and phrases as redundant or, worse, meaningless’). Indeed, the same point has been made by Findlay and Corbett in relation to Canadian selection disputes in ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1(1) Entertainment Law 109, p 115 (‘a large number of disputes arise from the interpretation of the contract between sport associations and athletes. In many cases, sport administrators do not have expertise in bylaw and policy drafting […] Specifically, policies relating to team eligibility, selection and appeals are written by people not skilled in draftsmanship. As a result, adjudicators will often have to interpret selection policies and criteria that are vague, incomplete, contradictory and even silent on critical points’). 2 Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012. For the principles of interpretation to be applied, see generally para B1.49 et seq and para B2.85.

B2.13 The detail for any given selection policy will be very much dependent upon the individual sport, and quite possibly on the event to which the policy relates within that sport. However, it is suggested that as a bare minimum a selection policy should include the following: (a) (b)

(c) (d) (e)

(f) (g)

Identification of the relevant eligibility criteria, which should be clearly stated. Eligibility (discussed at Section 3, below) will determine whether a particular athlete is entitled to be considered for selection. Identification of the relevant selection criteria and, if relevant, the weight to be given to those criteria (for example, if certain matters are to be accorded more weight than others). Objective criteria are usually easily identified and should be clearly stated (for example, any minimum performance criteria, the particular time to be achieved, or, if to be determined at a later stage, the means by which the required time will be ascertained). For subjective criteria, any matters to be taken into account (and, equally, any matters not to be taken into account) should be identified. There is also some suggestion that the criteria should be drafted so as to be ‘as objective as possible’.1 If it is possible (however unlikely) for athletes to tie when seeking selection (whether on times, points or otherwise), identification of how such a tie will be resolved.2 Identification of the event(s) to which the selection policy relates, whether that be a specific trial event, a series of trial or qualifying events, or a series of events over a period of time. As a corollary of the foregoing, if applicable, the relevant authorities or bodies that have responsibility for the event(s) to which the selection policy relates should be identified, together with any particular requirements and documentation that relate to the event(s). Identification of the person(s), either by name or position (for example, the head coach), who will be making the selection decision(s). Identification of the relevant timelines for the selection policy,3 including when selection decisions will be taken, when (and how) those decisions will

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be communicated to the athletes, and the period in which an appeal should be made4 and heard. In particular, sufficient time should be allowed for the resolution of any appeals (not least because a failure to do so may result in the athlete seeking emergency relief in the courts).5 (h) Provision, if appropriate, for discretion to depart from the rules in certain circumstances (for example, in the event of injury, illness or equipment failure, due to the weather at the time of the trial event, or in other exceptional and/or extenuating circumstances).6 (i) Provision, if appropriate, for the de-selection (and replacement) of athletes following their selection (for example, due to injury, illness, or a doping or misconduct issue).7 (j) A  clear statement of all and any rights of appeal, including the permitted grounds of appeal, the process that will be adopted, and the powers of the appeal panel.8 (k) A  clear statement of all and any lines of communication, such as the name and contact details of an individual responsible for answering any questions relating to the application of the selection policy. (l) If appropriate, a suitable confidentiality clause. Such clauses may be useful in enabling disputes to be resolved away from the media spotlight. 1 See Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI, CAS OG 06/008, para 12; Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 11. Although the authority for this proposition is said to be the CAS decision in Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association, CAS OG 06/002, at para 5.16, that paragraph does not in fact exist in the award. Instead the CAS in that case simply noted that ‘unless selection rules set forth completely objective criteria […] a selection process must always rely in some fashion or other on the subjective judgment of the persons who select the athletes’. However, while the case does not appear to be authority for the proposition cited, the proposition (that even an exercise of discretion should, so far as possible, be by reference to objective criteria) is unobjectionable. 2 The importance of tie-breaking provisions is neatly illustrated by the following example from the 2012 women’s 100m US Olympic track and field trials. The top three finishers from the event were to be selected to represent the US at the 2012 Olympic Games. However, following an unusual thirdplace tie between Allyson Felix and Jeneba Tarmoh, it became clear that USA Track & Field (the national governing body) had no rules in place to break such a tie. After much delay, uncertainty and speculation, the athletes were given a choice between a coin toss, a run-off, or ceding their place to the other, with a run-off to take place in the event of disagreement. Both athletes initially agreed to a runoff, only for Tarmoh to pull out shortly before the event and decline her place in the 100m. USA Track & Field was heavily criticised in the media and there was, no doubt, much pressure on the athletes involved, not least because of the possibility of a further (unexpected) run-off, to take place at short notice and in close proximity to the Olympic Games themselves. 3 It may be of the utmost importance, depending on the sport and the relevant event(s) to which the selection policy relates, to determine the right moment for the selection decisions to be taken. If trial events are held too soon athletes may peak too early, such that the performance of those selected may be materially different by the time of the relevant event; if trial events are held too late, it may be unrealistic to expect athletes to peak twice in a short period of time. 4 The case of Netball New Zealand v IFNA, CAS 2010/A/2315 (concerning the eligibility of a netball player to represent New Zealand) is an important reminder of the need to comply with appeal timelines. In that case, as the appeal in question had not been filed within the applicable time limit, it was held to be inadmissible and was dismissed accordingly, without consideration of the merits. 5 For example, for the 2012 Olympic Games British Swimming adopted a fast track appeals procedure to allow selection disputes to be resolved in a timely manner. See also Gosiewski v British Judo Association, 2012, unreported, where arguably insufficient time was allocated to the appeals process, resulting in (among other things) the athlete being notified of the outcome of his appeal after the BJA had already submitted its nominations to the British Olympic Association, and the de-selection of another ineligible athlete in close proximity to the event. 6 For example, it was noted in Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 3, that ‘the criteria for selection […] were entirely objective, based on performances [… in certain events]. The Selection Policy does not (at least expressly) give the selectors discretion to depart from those performance requirements in exceptional or extenuating circumstances, as some selection policies do’. And in GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012, para 14, the arbitrator found that ‘If the benchmark score […] was not achieved, BG would not be making a nomination. Specifically, it was agreed that there would be no discretion with respect to the score’. See also Elliot Hilton v The National Ice Skating Association of the United Kingdom Ltd, [2009] ISLR 75 (where the court found that NISA had adopted certain ‘first past

396  Regulating Sport the post’ criteria, without any general discretion to override such criteria) and Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS  2012/A/2828, para  60 (where the CAS noted that the extenuating circumstances provision ‘could only excuse a combination from compliance with the requirements of competing in the Nomination Events, not from compliance with the requirement of attaining [the international federation’s minimum eligibility standard] by 23 April 2012. The extenuating circumstances provision could not have excused that failure’). 7 Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1605 (where the AOC’s decision not to accept the athlete’s nomination due to his involvement in a drink-related hit and run accident with a cyclist, resulting in serious criminal charges, was found to be permissible under the terms of the selection policy); Lynch v Horse Sport Ireland and others, CAS OG 12/03 (where the selection criteria effectively permitted Horse Sport Ireland to revoke its nomination of the rider based on concerns arising out of several disqualifications of the rider’s horses for hypersensitivity). See also D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574. 8 See eg Badrick v British Judo Association, [2004] EWHC 1891 (Ch), paras 19, 22 and 24, finding the BJA’s appeal procedure to be ‘very unsatisfactorily drafted’.

B2.14 The selection policy, once drafted, must provide a complete code, as the procedure to be followed will be that found in the words of the selection policy, and not simply that which may be desired, whatever the merits of a case.1 Accordingly, in circumstances where an athlete was selected for the Olympic Games and a newspaper subsequently revealed e-mails between that athlete and an unnamed trainer concerning doping practices, the de-selection of the athlete was not permissible as it was not provided for in the selection rules.2 It should also be clear as to what documents form part of the selection policy.3 1 GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012, para 36 (‘it falls to this tribunal to determine what the Policy means. In doing so, sentiment must play no part. The question is not whether the BG Group should be nominated to participate in the 2012 Summer Olympic Games. It is whether they have, in fact, met the qualifying standard that was set for them in accordance with the terms of the Policy’); Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, paras 17.3, 22.4 and 22.5 (‘Nor is it for an appeal body to rewrite a selection policy if it believes the result is unfair or not what was intended. Instead, it must give effect to the plain meaning of the words in the policy, as written, whatever the result produced […]. Reasonable people might disagree with the selection criteria or approach chosen by Mr Pursley and his colleagues (the Appeal Committee is simply not qualified to say), but it was common ground at the hearing that any such disagreement would not be sufficient to justify any intervention or re-writing of the Selection Policy on the part of the Appeal Committee. The fact that no other swimmer qualified for the second spot on Team GB for the 200m breaststroke event means this Appeal Committee does not have to be concerned that helping Molly would hurt another athlete. But that does not provide any basis for the Appeal Committee to ignore or to re-write the Selection Policy, even if it thought there were reason to do so (which it does not)’); The Shooting Federation of Canada v Canadian Olympic Committee, ADRsportRED 04-0029, 3 May 2004, paras 30 to 34 (‘As arbitrator I have no authority, absent compelling legal grounds, to amend or rewrite the agreement the parties reached in their negotiations. It is the parties who decide what is in their negotiating interests. It is the parties who select the words to express the negotiated bargain they made. It is the task of the arbitrator to apply the language of their agreement to the actions of the parties to determine whether the agreement has been lived up to or improperly applied. It is trite to say that in law, a party to a written contract must be held to the expressed terms of that contract. There are narrow exceptions to this general rule, but these occur rarely and in this case, there is no factual or legal basis for any finding of bad-faith, misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty as argued by the affected parties. As I have said, I have no doubts the parties negotiated honestly and diligently at all times and there is no basis for me to rescind the contract they made. Rather, my duty as arbitrator is to interpret and apply that contract’); Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01, para 6.8 (‘The FIBT argued that its intention and that of the IOC was to give athletes of NOCs whose continents were not represented in any FIBT events an opportunity to be represented. Further, according to the FIBT, it was not contemplated that the Continental Representation rule could be used in order to guarantee NOCs from non-represented continents representation in all events. However, this intention is not reflected in the clear language of the text’); Roberge v Judo Canada, Arbitration decision, 21 June 1996, p 7, noted in Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport’ (August 2000), pp 14 and 15 (‘What the [Appeal Panel] did, in effect, was to substitute its own decision as to who was the better athlete and accordingly manipulated the rules of the Handbook by reversing the order of the criteria to arrive at that conclusion. This is clearly inappropriate especially in a case such as this, where the tie-breaking formula contained criteria that were clear, concise, objective and nondiscretionary. It is not within the jurisdiction of the [Appeal Panel] to intervene into the affairs of Judo Canada and rewrite their selection rules based on what the [Appeal Panel] thinks is fair, or what it thinks the criteria should be in order to select the best possible athlete. The tie-breaking formula involved, in essence, the mechanical application of the criteria set out in the Handbook: adding up points, identifying the highest

Selection  397 category of tournament and counting the number of wins. There was absolutely no room for the abuse of discretion, subjective evaluation or ambiguity. In such circumstances, it is not for the [Appeal Panel] to become involved in whether the selection criteria enable Judo Canada to identify the best possible athlete. It is up to the experts in the sport organization which, in this case, was the Technical Committee […]. The tie-breaking formula was set out in the Handbook so that all athletes knew well ahead of time what the “rules of the game” were in the event of a tie. […] Decisions with respect to clear and concise criteria cannot be appealed simply because an athlete does not like the outcome and feels they are a better overall athlete than the person who won the tie-breaker. [To do this] would be grossly unfair’). 2 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others, CAS OG 12/06, paras 7.5, 7.6 and 7.9. 3 Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, paras 34 to 36 (where it was found that a crew boat strategy document was not a formal part of the selection policy but was merely guidance as to that policy).

B2.15 Once promulgated, the selection policy should be made available to all relevant parties,1 and will form a contract with all applicable athletes, to be construed in accordance with usual contractual principles.2 Indeed, even where the athletes are not party to the selection policy document, they may still have a legitimate expectation that its provisions will be followed.3 1 See Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.16 (‘[…] the Panel wishes to express in clear terms that it does not condone the lack of published qualification criteria that misled the Applicant by failing to provide clear and timely notice of the performance standards she was required to meet in order to be recommended by the ASF for nomination by the AOC to the Austrian Olympic team. To avoid any future confusion, uncertainty, qualification conflicts, and athletes’ disappointed expectations, the Panel strongly recommends that the ASF establish, identify, and publish clear criteria to enable athletes to determine in a timely manner the Olympic Games qualification standards they are required to meet to be recommended for selection by the AOC’), endorsed in Maria Birkner v COA & FASA, CAS OG 14/003, para 8.4. See also Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI CAS, OG 06/008, para 7 (noting that ‘the oral discussion of such [selection] criteria are an imperfect method of explaining to athletes what the precise criteria are in order for all athletes to know what they must do and achieve in order to be selected’); Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278, where the CAS arbitrator stated that ‘I would not hesitate to quash the decision, had the selection criteria been established before the selection, but not been communicated to the athletes. In my view, a professional athlete […] has the right to know the criteria […] which he or she must meet in order to qualify for the Olympic Games. […] the Federation and the National Olympic Committee should pursue a policy of transparency and open information’. 2 See eg Elliot Hilton v The National Ice Skating Association of the United Kingdom Ltd [2009] ISLR 75, paras 35 and 38 (‘It seems clear that there is a contract: that is hardly capable of being in dispute. […] For the reasons indicated, the effect of the promulgation of the selection criteria was to render them contractually enforceable […]’); Lynch v Horse Sport Ireland and others, CAS OG  12/03, para 1.4 (‘It is common ground, or beyond dispute, that the Agreement and the Nomination Criteria are contractually binding upon the Applicant and HSI’); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association (Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012), para 34 (‘The parties agree that in determining what the parties meant, regard must be had to the ordinary principles applied by courts when called upon to construe contracts. Although many of the cases discussed by courts relate to commercial agreements, those principles can and should be adapted to guide the interpretation of rules, regulations and other agreements which arise in the sport environment’). 3 In Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, paras 18 and 29, while the agreement in question was between the Australian Olympic Committee and the Judo Federation of Australia, the CAS held, on the facts, that ‘it is clear that the Agreement including the Annexures form a comprehensive code in relation to the nomination and selection of Athletes, as defined, in the sport of Judo for the 2000 Olympic Games. The Agreement became the terms of reference for the Athletes and the Athletes by their participation in the selection events accepted and were entitled to rely upon the Agreement. We conclude that Athletes vying for selection in the 2000 Olympic Games Team in the sport of Judo have and at all times from 27 September 1999 have had a legitimate expectation that the provisions of the Agreement would be complied with’.

B2.16 The proper approach to construing a contract under English law is addressed in detail in Chapter B1.1 The following points are of particular importance when considering the proper construction of a selection policy:2 (a)

The essential purpose of the exercise of construction will be to give the words used their natural and ordinary meaning, so as to determine what the parties actually meant.

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(b) In determining what the parties meant, evidence of the subjective intention of the parties, including those responsible for the drafting of the policy and the body whose policy is being considered, is inadmissible.3 (c) The standpoint that is properly adopted in construing the policy is that of a reasonable person who has available to him or her all the admissible background knowledge that would have reasonably been available to the parties when they made the contract. (d) If there is more than one possible construction, it is permissible to prefer the construction that accords with common sense.4 (e) If the selection policy contains unambiguous language, that language must be applied.5 (f) If the proper construction of the selection policy cannot be ascertained by the usual principles of construction, the policy should be construed contra proferentem, namely against the body that has advanced the policy.6 However, it must be stressed that such an eventuality is very much a last resort and, despite often being argued, in most cases it will be possible for the tribunal to identify a workable construction.7 1 See para B1.61 et seq. 2 See GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association (Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012), paras 35 and 69; Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras 31 and 32. 3 In addition to Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101 and the powerful statements in Lord Steyn’s dissenting speech in Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 1 WLR 1580 at 1587. See also Kason Kek-Gardner Limited v Process Components Limited [2017]  EWCA  Civ 2131 at para [16] per Lewison LJ. 4 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at 2908, para 21; Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24 at para [11]; but note Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 at paras [17] to [20]. 5 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at 2908, para 23; Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01, para 6.3. 6 See eg  Devyatovskiy v IOC, CAS  2009/A/1752, (a doping case), at paras 4.21 to 4.30, where the CAS found that, in light of the contradictory provisions in the IOC rules (and in the absence of any guidance in the rules as to how the conflict was to be resolved), the rules were to be construed contra proferentem. For further cases to the same effect, see para B1.61. 7 See the comments of the Appeal Committee in Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16  June 2012, para  33. There is also an argument that contra proferentem does not apply straightforwardly in selection disputes, where adopting the meaning of the selection rules that is proposed by the athlete will usually mean disappointing another athlete. Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(c) (‘[…] although the drafting of the rules is clearly insufficient, this is not a case where the contra proferentem interpretation benefits one party against the draft of an obscure rule. Quite the opposite, in this case the unclear rule both benefits and damages national federations and their athletes and only does so after the event […]. The contra proferentem rule of interpretation may be of importance in contractual interpretation where one of the party drafts the obscure clause. It may also be of relevance in the interpretation of statutory rules predisposed by an entity, on disciplinary measures where unclear wording cannot be the basis of a conviction. However, it cannot be upheld in a case where the enacting body merely acts as a deciding authority on issues that only affect its associates, none of which effectively intervened in the drafting of the obscure rule’).

B2.17 To give one example, in GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012, a particular issue arose as to the use of a term that was well known within the sport of gymnastics. In such circumstances, the arbitrator confirmed that the proper meaning of the phrase is a question of fact. And if it is established that the word is used in accordance with the meaning given to the word in the sport in question, the selection policy should be construed accordingly.1 1 See, by way of analogy, Produce Brokers Co Ltd v Olympia Oil and Cake Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 320, at p 330. See also Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), Ch 5, sections 7, 9 and 10; and para B1.56 n5.

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C Compatibility with other rules B2.18 When the selection policy is drafted, care must be taken to ensure that it has regard to and is compatible with any other applicable rules, regulations and agreements, whether internal or external to the governing body. The most vivid illustration of this is found in the CAS decisions of USOC v IOC CAS 2011/O/2422, and BOA v WADA CAS 2011/A/2658. B2.19 The former case concerned what was colloquially known as the ‘Osaka Rule’, a rule passed by the IOC Executive Board providing that: ‘any person who has been sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months by any anti-doping organization for any violation of any anti-doping regulations may not participate, in any capacity, in the next edition of the Games of the Olympiad and of the Olympic Winter Games following the date of expiry of such suspension’.

B2.20 The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) found itself in the invidious position whereby a AAA panel in the case of USADA v Merritt (AAA No 77 190 00293, decision dated 15  October 2010) had declared that the Osaka Rule could not be used to prevent the athlete from competing in the 2012 Olympic Games, but, under the Osaka Rule, the IOC would not accept the athlete’s nomination. B2.21 Pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the USOC and the IOC, the CAS found that the IOC was contractually committed to the World Anti-Doping Code (Code) and was therefore required not to have any rules that changed the effect of the sanctions imposed by the Code. Rejecting the IOC’s argument that the Osaka Rule was an eligibility rule, the CAS held that the rule was in fact an additional sanction, in breach of the Code and the IOC Charter, and was therefore invalid and unenforceable. B2.22 In light of the decision in USOC v IOC, WADA subsequently determined that a long-standing British Olympic Association (BOA) bye-law, which the BOA had always argued was a selection policy, was in fact an additional doping sanction and so non-compliant with the Code. The bye-law provided, in essence, that any person found guilty of a doping offence would be permanently ineligible for membership of Team GB or to hold accreditation as a member of Team GB for any Olympic Games or other Olympic event (subject to a right of appeal in certain circumstances). B2.23 The BOA appealed WADA’s determination to CAS, arguing that the byelaw was a selection policy and not a sanction, and so was not precluded by the Code. The dispute was determined by the same CAS panel as in USOC v IOC. B2.24 The CAS found that, as a signatory to the Code, the BOA had agreed to limit its autonomy accordingly. In particular, it was obliged not to have rules that added to the sanction for doping mandated by the Code. As the bye-law was found to impose an additional doping sanction, it was therefore non-compliant with the Code. While the CAS accepted the BOA’s argument that ‘generally the application of a selection function is separate and distinct from the imposition of a sanction for a doping offence’ and that ‘[i]n the normal course of events, the WADA Code and an NOC’s selection policy rarely intersect each other’, ultimately the BOA bye-law imposed a doping sanction and so was incompatible with the BOA’s obligations as a signatory to the Code. The CAS therefore made it clear that the BOA’s selection policies had to reflect those obligations. B2.25 Interestingly, the Australian Olympic Committee subsequently introduced a not dissimilar rule requiring all members of Australian Olympic teams to make a

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statutory declaration that they have not breached any applicable anti-doping rules or, if they have breached such rules, that the sanction has been eliminated, waived or already served. Any persons who do not make the declaration will be ineligible for membership of a team or to receive funding, and knowingly making a false declaration will be a criminal offence. B2.26 Another common example of the need to comply with other rules is the need for national selection policies to mesh together with the international federation’s rules (and the rules of other sporting bodies).1 It was the British Judo Association’s failure to ensure this alignment that led to at least two athletes being de-selected for the 2012 Olympic Games on the basis that they were in fact ineligible for selection under the British Judo Association’s selection policy.2 1 See eg  Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS  2012/A/2828, paras 6 and 17 (where the horse and rider combinations had to meet the international federation’s minimum eligibility standard and be nominated by their national federation in order to be selected by the Australian Olympic Committee). 2 See Section 5, below.

D Procedure B2.27 The procedure to be adopted in any given instance will be governed by the terms of the selection policy in question, which in turn should reflect the needs of the particular sport and event. However, it is possible to make some general observations as to the procedural aspects of selection policies, in particular having regard to the disputes that have arisen before domestic tribunals, the CAS, and the courts. B2.28 Even before the selection policy is issued, it is suggested that certain steps should be taken, as a matter of good practice, to ensure that the selection policy is fit for purpose and, so far as possible, to insulate it from subsequent challenge, whether via an appeals process or in the courts. These steps include: (a) ensuring that the athletes are represented in the process of developing the policy.1 This might be achieved by having an athlete representative on the body tasked with drafting the selection policy or, alternatively, by asking the athletes to provide feedback on the policy before it is issued; and (b) testing the selection policy, in so far as it is possible to do so, by applying it to previous scenarios to check that the results are as anticipated and, if not, to determine what steps (if any) need to be taken to meet those expectations. 1 One of the learning points noted in Sport Resolutions’ review of selection disputes arising out of the 2012 Olympic Games was that national governing bodies should work with athletes and their representatives in advance of the selection process to achieve an agreed selection policy. See Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’ Sport Resolutions, January 2013, p  4, para 6.

B2.29 Once issued, the athletes to whom the selection policy applies should, ideally, be required to provide their written acknowledgement and agreement to the terms of the policy. How this is achieved will depend on the circumstances, but if the selection policy relates to particular events, it is suggested that acceptance of the selection policy should ordinarily form part of the entry requirements for those events. Another option would be to invite athletes to complete an expression of interest form, acknowledging their acceptance of the selection policy and also serving as a route to capture other relevant information (such as eligibility status and preferred contact details). B2.30 The personnel who make the selection decisions will vary from sport to sport, but all should be selected for their expertise and experience, giving them the best possible understanding of the sport and event in question.

Selection  401 ‘Selectors are chosen as such because of their experience and expertise. […] They must make difficult decisions based upon judgment, experience and expertise and […], if coaches as well, must formulate strategies appropriate to ensuring the best results for a team and then make selections consistently with those strategies’.1

It is also obviously crucial that the selectors are familiar with and understand the selection policy. 1 Mewing v Swimming Australia CAS 2008/A/1540, para 21. See also Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 17.1. Cf Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 28, where the selection policy perhaps went too far in trying to ensure that the selectors were wholly independent. Only one of the selectors had any fencing experience and, as the appeal panel noted, ‘one risk inherent in the selection policy […] is that the decision is ultimately taken by selectors who are wholly independent but also removed from first hand knowledge of the technicalities of the different fencing disciplines and thus not in a good position to make any judgement as to comparative performance. The integrity of the decision making process thus depends critically on the role of the performance manager in faithfully relaying the advice of the experts on the Performance Team and the Performance Advisory Group, with all the limitations and reservations applying to that advice’.

B2.31 Again, depending on the sport and the particular circumstances, selection decisions may be made by one individual or by a panel. If made by a panel, it is sensible for the panel to comprise an odd number of members, thereby enabling majority decisions to be made where necessary. If the responsibility falls on one person, there is no objection to that person discussing their proposed selection decisions with others provided that the decision is ultimately their own.1 Equally, there can be no objection to recommendations being made to a selection panel provided the selection panel do not unthinkingly endorse the recommendations but instead actually ask themselves whether the recommendations are appropriate.2 1 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 62. 2 See eg Halsted v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012, para 32.

B2.32 The selecting body may also wish to consider appointing an expert adviser (such as an individual with relevant legal expertise) to assist it throughout the selection process, including attending selection meetings to advise on procedural and other matters. Such a person may prove to be a highly important, quasi-independent, ‘witness’ in the event of a challenge to the selection decision. B2.33 Once a selection decision is made, the selection policy should provide for how the decision is to be communicated to the relevant athletes. This will be most important in respect of those athletes who have not been selected (and in some cases individual notification may be preferable). Whilst it may not always be possible for detailed minutes to be taken in selection meetings (albeit desirable1), in the authors’ view, at the very least, minutes should be taken in respect of those decisions that might prove contentious, or, alternatively, a written reasoned communication for the non-selection should be sent to the athletes concerned based upon the discussions in the selection meeting.2 Where the selection policy contains a combination of objective and subjective selection criteria (discussed at Section 2A, above), failure to minute that each of the criteria or factors was fairly and consistently considered by the selectors will render a selection decision vulnerable to challenge. 1 In its review of selection disputes arising out of the 2012 Olympic Games, Sport Resolutions suggested that national governing bodies should take minutes of their selection meetings, in particular so that in the event of an appeal they will be better placed to demonstrate that the selection policy has been followed fairly. See Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’, Sport Resolutions, January 2013, p 4, para 5. 2 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16  June 2012, para  63(d). See also Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, para 25, where the CAS noted that ‘cogent evidence of which criteria, if any, were applied by the Respondents in reaching their decisions is lacking, thus rendering it impossible to determine if the decisions were properly taken’.

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B2.34 The reasons given for non-selection should be clear and intelligible and should enable the athlete to understand why the decision was made and what conclusions were reached on the principal issues.1 This is especially so in cases involving subjective selection criteria.2 1 Michael v NZ  Federation of Roller Sports, NZST  02/11, 19  July 2011, para  81; Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 63(e). And, by parity of reasoning with a challenge to a planning decision, see South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at 1964, paras 35 and 36. 2 See the comments of the Appeal Committee in Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras 62 and 63.

B2.35 During and after the promulgation of a selection policy, the relevant body responsible for the selection process must also be careful not to make statements outside of the policy that may give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of an athlete that they will be selected in any event.1 1 See Section 4B(e), below.

B2.36 If there is any need for the selection policy to be amended after it has been issued, this should only be done if there is time to facilitate such an amendment and on the basis that the amendment and its effect are clearly disseminated to all those who might be affected. If an amendment is made, for example, after the initial trigger for selection has passed, such as the first qualifying event having occurred, the amendment is likely to be struck down.1 1 See Section 4B(e), below.

B2.37 As noted previously, in the majority of cases the athletes simply want to feel that they have been treated fairly and consistently, in accordance with the selection policy and pursuant to a clear and transparent process, and to understand why the decision was reached (even if, ultimately, they do not agree with it). The above procedures will help to achieve that and, hopefully, to reduce thereby the need for appeals and the prospect of challenge. This is as much in the interests of the athletes as those of the regulator, in particular as it helps to prevent time-consuming and costly appeals that can be incredibly damaging to the sport and to those involved, and that can be a major distraction for the athletes and teams affected, and the sport as a whole (and often at a time when interest should be focused on the relevant event). The proper handling of selection disputes can also help to prevent those unsuccessful athletes from becoming disillusioned and, in the worst case, leaving the sport altogether. For example, following his very public selection dispute with GB Taekwondo in 2012, Aaron Cook switched to represent the Isle of Man in all major competitions outside of the Olympic Games, and later competed for Moldova in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games.

3 ELIGIBILITY B2.38 Eligibility is naturally a pre-requisite of selection, as it determines whether the athlete in question is entitled even to be considered for selection. As with selection criteria, eligibility will be sport-specific, and can include general matters such as nationality, residency, membership, sex,1 age, weight, and impairment type (for Para sports), as well as more specific matters such as having achieved minimum performance standards, having competed in certain events, not being subject to a disciplinary suspension,2 or having signed necessary agreements. There will not always be a bright line between eligibility and the selection criteria themselves. It will depend on the facts of each case and the selection policy in question.

Selection  403 1 See eg  rules governing the participation of transgender athletes and/or athletes with differences of sexual development that have been put in place by various sports. Rules of the latter kind were the subject of challenge before the CAS in Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS  2014/A/3759, and Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, which is discussed in detail at para E14.72. 2 For example, under World Rugby’s principle of ‘universality’, player suspensions (at any level of the game) are applied universally such that a player cannot play rugby union anywhere during the period of the suspension. See World Rugby Reg 17, Preamble D and Reg 17.19.11.

B2.39 As one high-profile example of an eligibility dispute, in Pistorius v IAAF, CAS  2008/A/1480,1 and in Leeper v IAAF, CAS  2020/A/6807, the CAS had to consider the validity and application of rules conditioning the eligibility of an athlete using prosthetic legs to compete in IAAF-sanctioned events against ablebodied athletes on the question of whether or not his prostheses gave him an overall competitive advantage over an athlete not using such blades. On the facts, in 2008 the CAS held that Mr Pistorius was eligible to compete as, pursuant to the IAAF rules in place at the time, it had not been established that his prosthetic legs gave him a net advantage over the other participants, whereas in 2020 the CAS held that Mr Leeper was not eligible to compete because the IAAF (now known as World Athletics) had established such advantage. 1 See discussion at para E14.42.

A Nationality B2.40 An obvious historical area of tension was that between eligibility on the grounds of nationality and European rules prohibiting discrimination based on nationality (although this is now subject to the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement). This issue is considered in more detail elsewhere in this book.1 1 See para E12.43 et seq.

B2.41 For present purposes, it suffices to note that the European courts recognised the legitimacy of selection based on nationality for international events on the basis that the decision was a matter of sporting interest and has nothing to do with economic activity. Thus, in Walrave1 the European Court of Justice upheld the legitimacy of a rule that provided that motorcycle pacemakers in certain cycle races had to be of the same nationality as the ‘stayer’. In Deliège2 the same court determined that although the selection rules had the effect of limiting the number of national participants that could advance to an international tournament, such a limitation was inherent in an international sports event and was not, of itself, a restriction on the freedom to provide services or the freedom of movement. 1 Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405. 2 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associées ASBL [2000] ECR I -2549.

B2.42 The issue of nationality is not, however, confined to European rules. Different sports have different rules on national eligibility (and changes of nationality).1 Sometimes the issue can be as simple as determining whether an athlete is a citizen of the country that he or she wishes to represent.2 1 For example, in March 2012, World Rugby’s Regulations Committee Panel determined that Steven Shingler was tied to Wales under World Rugby Reg 8 (Eligibility to play for National Representative Teams) and was therefore ineligible to play for Scotland. In 2018, World Athletics made various changes to its transfer of allegiance rules to address concerns that the previous system was open to abuse. See also Rule 41 and the accompanying bye-law of the Olympic Charter (which requires competitors in the Olympic Games to be a national of the country they are representing), and the IPC’s nationality policy governing participation in the Paralympic Games. 2 For example, see Phillip Darrell Jones v Commonwealth Games Federation, CAS CG  2010/01 (regarding the eligibility of an athlete to represent Norfolk Island in the Commonwealth Games).

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B Hierarchy of governing bodies B2.43 For any selection decision there are often rules on eligibility issued by a number of governing bodies that have to be met (for example, those of national and international federations, National Olympic and Paralympic Committees, the Commonwealth Games Federation, and/or the International Olympic Committee and International Paralympic Committee). It is therefore important that the various selection policies mesh together correctly.1 1 See eg  Rule 40 (and the accompanying bye-law) of the Olympic Charter: ‘To participate in the Olympic Games, a competitor, team official or other team personnel must respect and comply with the Olympic Charter and World Anti-Doping Code, including the conditions of participation established by the IOC, as well as with the rules of the relevant IF as approved by the IOC, and the competitor, team official or other team personnel must be entered by his NOC’. See further para B2.26.

4 APPEALS B2.44 It is essential, in the interests of natural justice, for a selection policy to include an opportunity for an athlete to challenge a selection decision. It is also essential for good governance, as in the absence of an appeals procedure the unhappy athlete may turn to the courts, which is unlikely to be in the interests of the sport.1 1 See eg the long-running legal dispute between triple jumper Charles Friedek and the German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB), in which the athlete sought damages on the basis that the DOSB had wrongly found that he had not met the applicable qualification standards and did not therefore nominate him for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games (the case was eventually settled in 2016). See also the damages awarded by a US court to mountain biker Susan Haywood in her case against USA Cycling regarding her non-selection for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games; and the Swiss Federal Tribunal case of Fédération Suisse de Lutte Amateur v Grossen, SFT  121  III  350, where the court awarded damages against the FSLA due to a breach of the athlete’s legitimate expectation (on the facts) that the qualification requirements set by the FSLA would not be changed.

B2.45 On a domestic level consideration should be given to the use of an organisation such as Sport Resolutions to appoint the panel that hears any appeal (as distinct from a wholly internal procedure), to provide an attractive degree of independence and expertise to the appeals process. At the very least, the appointment of an independent appeal panel is recommended at some stage of the process (ideally comprising at least one legally qualified member).1 Further, depending on the sport, if an additional tier of appeal is considered desirable, recourse to te CAS may be appropriate. 1 One of the learning points from Sport Resolutions’ review of selection disputes arising out of the 2012 Olympic Games was that national governing bodies should make provision for an independent appeals process. See Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’, Sport Resolutions, January 2013, p 4, para 3.

A Grounds of appeal B2.46 The general principles governing challenges to the actions of sports governing bodies are dealt with in Part E of this book. However, it is useful to give specific consideration to the possible grounds of appeal of selection decisions. B2.47 It is well established that, in the vast majority of cases, it is not the role of an appeal panel to review the merits of a selection policy or a selection decision, ie the issue is not whether the appeal panel agrees with the selection policy or selection decision in question.1 As stated in Renshaw v British Swimming, ‘the purpose of providing an athlete with a right of appeal against non-nomination is not to give athletes a second chance of selection via a second tier selection panel. Instead it is

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to provide machinery for the correction of an error’.2 Accordingly, ‘an appeal body should be very cautious about overturning a selection decision. It should only do so exceptionally, where the flaw in the decision goes well beyond a mere disagreement with the merits of the selection decision made’.3 1 This sentence was cited with approval in Team Spirit v NISA, Sport Resolutions, 25 February 2016. Also see Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 17.2 (‘the CAS is clear that it is for the experts to make those decisions [to design a selection policy and make difficult decisions in the implementation of that policy], and it is not for an appeal body to review the merits of a selection policy or of a decision made in the implementation of that policy’); Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29  June 2012, para  12(h) (‘we reiterate that the decision is made by the NPD, not this panel. Ms Couch does not agree with his view in certain respects. It is not for us to decide whether he is right. Our decision is based merely on whether […] his exercise of discretion fell within or outside the terms of the required criteria’); Halsted v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012, para 17 (‘To stray into category (ii) [matters which amount to an attack on the judgments of the selectors and their weighing of all the ingredients which go into balancing the competing claims of the candidates for selection] would be to do precisely what a British Fencing Association appeal tribunal is not entitled to do, which is to act as a second-tier selection body’); Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29  May 2012, paras 11 and 22 (‘The selection process is not a legal or adversarial process, and these proceedings are not equivalent to judicial review of public bodies. The selectors have a difficult task to balance the comparative merits of the candidates for selection and the overall interest of the association in maximising the chances of securing medals at the Olympics. These are matters of sporting or performance judgement and it is not for this panel to adjudicate on those questions’); Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 22 to 24 (‘the Appellant is really attacking the merits of the nomination or selection decision by Mr Thompson. This, in my view, is impermissible in such an appeal. In analogous circumstances courts have repeatedly warned against the impropriety of a Court or other Tribunal coming to a conclusion on the merits of the case under the guise of making a finding that the original decision-maker acted in bad faith or contrary to particular guidelines or criteria. […] CAS has, in selection disputes, adopted an identical approach. […] this appeal could only succeed if it could be shown that Mr Thompson […] did not give “proper, genuine and realistic” consideration to the “overall needs of the team”. […] The fact that someone else, similarly considering the matter, may have arrived at a different result, or even the fact that his decision is wrong, is insufficient to enable the appeal to be successful as such matters go to the merits of the decision not whether or not the decision-maker gave proper consideration to such matters’); Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, paras 49 to 50 (‘The test I have applied is to find that a decision may be open to challenge if, but only if, (i) It is not in accordance with [the] Selection Policy as published; and/or (ii) The policy has been misapplied or applied on no good evidence and/or in circumstances where the application of the policy was unfair (for example, because someone with selectoral authority had given a categorical assurance to an athlete that the policy would not be applied); and/or (iii) The decision maker has shown bias or the appearance of bias or the selection process has otherwise been demonstrably unfair; (iv) Where the conclusion is one that no reasonable decision maker could have reached. That last conclusion is one that any Judge or Arbitrator has to approach with the utmost care. As I have already indicated, it is of fundamental importance that we should not substitute our own judgment on the merits for those of the selectors – ie who would we have selected, or who is the better athlete or has the better performance figures and so forth. So long as selectors apply policy properly, and do so honestly, fairly and reasonably, and take account of relevant facts (they being best judged to decide what is relevant and what is not), then their decisions must be accorded the utmost respect’) and para 45 (‘It is absolutely no part of the role of an arbitrator to get anywhere close to substituting his or her own judgement on the merits for what is essentially a selectoral decision, assuming that that decision has been reached without bias, on the basis of all relevant evidence and has resulted in a decision which satisfies the test of being one that a panel, properly informed, could reasonably have reached’); Michael v NZ  Federation of Roller Sports, NZST  02/11, 19  July 2011, paras 87 to 89 (‘This Tribunal is reluctant to intervene in selection decisions, as they are very much for the sport. [citing Murdoch v Yachting New Zealand] “It was common ground between all parties that it was not the role of the Tribunal to substitute its views for those of the Nomination Panel on the merits of the decision as to whether the nominees will or will not achieve a top 10 placing in their class at the Olympics. The limited grounds of appeal set out in the NZOC  Nomination Criteria and Selection Criteria are constructed in such a way as to direct the Tribunal’s attention to matters of process and procedure.” […] We will not substitute our evaluation, nor second guess the selection which requires judgment. Our concern in most cases will be with the process adopted, including the way the reasons for selection or non-selection are expressed. They will usually, as here, throw light on the validity of that process’); Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS  96/153, paras 7 to 10 (‘By their agreement the parties thus want the “selection decision” scrutinized by this Tribunal, not in the sense that this Tribunal should set aside the decision simply because it thinks a better one could have been made; but rather to determine whether the decision was arrived at fairly and with due and proper regard, if any was owed, to the interests of the Appellant in

406  Regulating Sport the peculiar circumstances which existed’); Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para  10 (‘We are not a second-tier selection panel with a general power to review selection decisions. We have no jurisdiction to intervene in a selection (or non-selection) just because there is room for differing views about the fairness of the choice made by the selectors – even if (as will frequently occur with sometimes finely-balanced decisions) those views reflect sharp differences of judgment and are strongly felt by some of the involved parties to be unfair. Our task is limited to deciding whether one or other of the specified grounds of appeal has been established’); Olubi v British Bobsleigh, Sport Resolutions, 21 January 2014, para 8 (‘A court or arbitral panel will not seek to put itself into the shoes of the expert and experienced selectors, and will afford them a wide margin of discretion in the exercise of their function. The court or arbitral panel is in no position to second guess the selectors’ decision and replace it with its own. Rather on review it is appropriate to examine the way in which the decision was taken, and whether that fell short on one of the bases set out above. If the way in which the decision was taken did not so fall short, the court or arbitral panel will not assess whether the decision was in its view correct’); Bias v Cycling New Zealand, NZST 06/19, para 16 (‘The legal position is however very clear; that we can and should only intervene if there was no basis or justification for the decision reached by the selectors’). See also the Canadian case of McCaig v Canadian Yachting Association, 24 April 1996, unreported, Man QB (Winnipeg), Case No CI96-0196624, noted in Findlay and Corbett, ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1 Entertainment Law 109 at p 116, where Simonson J is reported as having said: ‘If the relief sought by the applicants were to be granted, it would, by necessary implication, require the court to write into the agreement a clause which does not exist. Apart from a claim of rectification, I know of no basis upon which a court can rewrite a contract by inserting a fresh clause in an agreement, no matter how desirable it might be.’ The authors then proceed to observe: ‘It is not the adjudicator’s role to fix drafting errors where there is no issue of interpretation – courts must give plain meaning to the words as written, even when they produce an unintended result’. See also Findlay and Corbett, The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport (August 2000), pp 19 and 20; and para B2.14, n.1. 2 Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 16. 3 Ibid, para 18.

B2.48 In two CAS decisions,1 however, the CAS panel conducted a de novo hearing of the selection decision itself: (a) In D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee,2 the CAS held that, pursuant to Art R57 of the CAS Code, it had ‘full power to review the facts and the law’ on the appeal before it, and the athlete was therefore entitled to a de novo hearing, ie a complete re-hearing on the merits of the AOC’s decision to terminate the athlete’s membership of the Australian Olympic team in light of his admitted breach of the AOC ethical behaviour rules. (b) In Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF,3 the CAS again conducted a de novo hearing based on Art R57 of the CAS Code, noting that ‘it is the duty of the CAS Panel in an appeals arbitration procedure to make its independent determination of whether the Appellant’s and the Respondents’ allegations are correct on the merits, rather than limit itself to assessing the correctness of the previous procedure and decision’. The panel accordingly went on to make the selection decision itself, applying the selection criteria and selecting the appellant in place of the athlete previously nominated. 1 Further, in the decision of Jo-Ann Lim v Synchronised Swimming Australia Inc, CAS (Oceania Registry) A2/2016, the sole arbitrator, determining the matter under the law of New South Wales, said at para 60: ‘Pursuant to Article R57 of the Code and clause 12.18 of the By-Law, this Panel has the power to review the facts and the law in determining whether there was an error on a question of law as to construction of the Nomination Criteria and as to whether the Appeals Tribunal has breached the rules of natural justice’. Having identified that there were no submissions to the contrary and that the parties agreed that the proper construction of the Nomination Criteria was a question of law, the Arbitrator continued: ‘It is therefore not necessary in this regard to consider questions of whether submissions before the Appeals Tribunal could properly amount to evidence in circumstances where the rules of evidence do not apply. In any event, there was agreement as to relevant factual matters for the purposes of the determination of this appeal’. 2 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, paras 7, 19 to 24, 38, 40 and 44. 3 Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, paras 11, 12 and 26 to 29.

B2.49 However, it is suggested that these cases are not a departure from the principles set out above but are instead a reminder of the importance of careful

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consideration of the terms of reference to an appeal panel (in particular, to the CAS1). In D’Arcy the terms of reference incorporated the CAS  Code without amendment, and it was found to be ‘significant that there [was] no requirement in the provisions applicable to the Appeal Arbitration Procedure to establish any particular grounds of appeal’.2 In any event the CAS panel also reached the same finding as the AOC and noted that, given the knowledge and experience of the AOC in such matters, its ‘unanimous view must be given great weight’.3 In Peternell the terms of reference again incorporated the CAS Code and, while the panel decided to make the selection decision itself rather than remitting it back, the selectors had failed to properly apply the selection policy and pursuant to the objective selection criteria (the highest ranked available rider) it was clear that the athlete would be selected; so it may be that on different facts (for example, with subjective selection criteria) the panel would instead have decided to remit the matter.4 A further illustration of the importance of the terms of reference is found in Karwalski v Squash Australia, a case concerning selection for the Commonwealth Games.5 The CAS panel was faced with a clear conflict between the selection policy (which stated that the Appeal Committee ‘will conduct the appeal de novo’, but also in accordance with the Guidelines to the Selection Policy) and the Guidelines (which stated that the Appeal Committee ‘will function as a committee of review and will not take on the role of an alternate [sic] Selection Committee’). The CAS panel determined that in the face of an obvious conflict the provisions of the Selection Policy itself should prevail and the Appeal Committee should therefore conduct the appeal de novo. Accordingly, as noted at Section 2B above, a selection policy should contain a clear statement of any rights of appeal, including whether there are any required grounds of appeal or whether there is to be a de novo hearing of the selection decision itself (which is likely to be rare). 1 See further Mavromati and Pellaux, ‘Article R57 of the CAS Code: A Purely Procedural Provision?’ [2013] ISLR 36. 2 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, paras 5, 22, 26 and 27. 3 Ibid, paras 48 and 50. 4 See Mavromati and Pellaux, ‘Article R57 of the CAS  Code: A  Purely Procedural Provision?’ [2013] ISLR 36, p 41 (‘In the majority of cases, the lifting of the challenged decision is followed by the issuance of a new decision. However, there might be some good reasons for the panel to refer the case back to the previous instance […] fourthly, where there may be factual reasons, eg in selection matters, where CAS often lacks the knowledge and factual basis to replace the decision of the selecting body or when additional information or investigation are needed’). As an interesting postscript, Mr Peternell had to appeal further to the CAS ad hoc division at the 2012 Olympic Games (Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS OG 12/01), as the SAEF still did not nominate him for selection (instead nominating the rider originally selected or, alternatively, suggesting the withdrawal of South Africa’s entry from the event). The CAS held that both SAEF and SASCOC were obliged to recognise the jurisdiction of CAS (and the previous CAS ruling) and therefore ordered that Mr Peternell be selected (see paras 49 to 56 of the award). While the reasoning of the CAS could perhaps have been clearer, the result was arguably justified in light of the conduct of the parties, the CAS noting that ‘[t]he course of action proposed by SAEF […] was, without doubt, against the obligation to recognise the jurisdiction of CAS […], against the applicable selection criteria […] and against the principles of Olympism expressed in the Olympic Charter. To propose, as a kind of retaliatory measure, “to withdraw the Entry of South Africa”, as SAEF did […], and to follow such a proposal, as SASCOC did […] is hardly within the Olympic spirit or the promotion of ethics and good governance in sport’. 5 Karwalski v Squash Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014, para 50.

B2.50 Whilst ultimately a matter for the drafting of any particular selection policy, appeals are usually limited to the following grounds:1 (a) the selection policy was not properly followed and/or implemented (for example, the selectors failed to apply the selection criteria, or did not give ‘proper, genuine and realistic’ consideration to the factors identified2); (b) the selectors failed to take into account relevant considerations, or took into account irrelevant considerations;3 (c) the selection process was tainted by bias;4

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(d) the selection decision was made in bad faith, dishonestly, or perversely;5 and/ or (e) the selection process was otherwise unfair6 (for example, the decision was not arrived at fairly and with due regard to the interests and legitimate expectations of the athlete;7 or the selection criteria were not fairly established or were not applied equally to all athletes8). 1 See Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5  July 2012, para  49; Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 18. 2 Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 19, 20 and 24. 3 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras 58 and 63(c) (where the selection policy did not allow any consideration to be given to the prospects of athletes at the next Olympic Games or any other event except for the 2012 Olympic Games). 4 See Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, paras 23, 36, 79 and 82, for an example of an (unsuccessful) argument based on gender bias. 5 Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 21 and 24. 6 It should, however, be noted that in the context of selection disputes the application of the rules of fairness ‘is particularly dependent on the context […]. The selection procedure is not a judicial process and the selectors are not required to give candidates an opportunity to make representations, in their own favour or, still less, against the interest of other candidates’. Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 13. 7 Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153, para 10. 8 Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278, paras 10 to 12 (where the selection criteria were finalised after the selection event and never explicitly communicated).

B2.51 Other less common grounds of appeal that have been raised include that the selection policy was contrary to general principles of law or had an arbitrary application (which might include where a policy discriminates between athletes on improper grounds),1 that the decision was irrational or was one that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached,2 and that the athlete was not given a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the selection criteria.3 1 COA  v FIS, CAS OG  02/002, paras 5, 6, 11 and 12 (where the CAS found that the international federation had not abused its discretion in determining the eligibility criteria for snowboarding events, in particular as the determination itself was not arbitrary and the failure to have written rules governing the re-allocation of unused slots and the failure to notify national federations of eligibility decisions was not contrary to general principles of law or arbitrary); Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association, CAS OG 06/002, paras 37 and 38 (where the CAS noted that arbitrariness could not be established where it was not claimed that the selection body acted in bad faith or in a discriminatory manner, or where there was no evidence that the selection process was unfair and the selection decision was unreasonable). See generally on the right to equal treatment para B1.27 et seq. 2 Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS  2008/A/1605, para  6; Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5  July 2012, paras 45, 49 and 50; Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, para 80. See also Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.15 (‘[…] a NF has a legal duty not to be arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable [in the application of both objective criteria and subjective discretion]. Based on the submitted evidence in the present case, the Panel concludes that the ASF did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner because it had a legitimate sports performance justification for not recommending that the AOC nominate the Application for an allocation quota in women’s halfpipe’), confirmed in Maria Birkner v COA & FASA, CAS OG 14/003, paras 8.2 to 8.3 (confirming that ‘a discretion based on “the evolution and projection in the future” is not arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable’); Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278. 3 Walker v Australian Biathlon Association, CAS 2011/A/2590, paras 7.40, 7.42 and 7.43, where the CAS rejected the submission that the athlete was not given a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the nomination criteria, as the changes to the race course applied equally to all participants and the athlete was therefore afforded the same opportunity as everyone else. The CAS also noted that even if the submission had been made out, the argument appeared to rely on an implied term to that effect and the parties had not addressed the requirements for such a term. See also Liza Hunter-Galvan v Athletics New Zealand Incorporated, NZST 07/08, 20 June 2008, paras 112 and 114.

B2.52 However, notwithstanding the discrete grounds of appeal identified above, there is often a degree of overlap between those grounds and it may therefore be possible to argue an appeal on more than one basis. For example, the case of Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549, was upheld on the grounds of actual bias

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but may in fact be better explained as an example of a failure to follow the selection policy. B2.53 Even if the selection policy purports to limit the grounds of appeal, it has been suggested that an appeal panel will not be bound by such limitations and will instead be entitled to consider any free-standing legal grounds for challenge to the selection policy and any decisions made thereunder.1 1 Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29  May 2012, para  9 (‘Paragraph 18 of the selection policy allows an appeal only on the basis that the process outlined in the selection policy document has not been followed. There must be implied a requirement for fairness in the application of the process. Thus paragraph 18 permits a fencer to appeal if there is a case that there has been a material deviation from the process laid down, or on the basis that the process has been affected by substantial unfairness. A challenge on the grounds of unfairness might include a challenge on the grounds that the decision making of the selectors was affected by bias. There is a requirement for fair process’.); Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 22.3 (albeit without the benefit of full argument on the point). Such an appeal may also be advanced on the basis of a breach of legitimate expectations, as in Chep & SSAF v SSNOC, CAS OG 16/005 & 16/0076.

B2.54 Care must also be taken to ensure that arguments based on proper and permissible grounds of appeal do not in reality amount to an impermissible attack on the merits of a decision.1 1 See Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, especially at paras 16, 21 and 22.

B Successful grounds of appeal B2.55 Ultimately each case will turn on its own facts, but it is possible to discern from the reported jurisprudence the principal grounds on which appeal panels have determined that a selection decision cannot stand and that an appeal should be allowed.

(a) Eligibility B2.56 Demonstrating that another (selected) athlete is ineligible is perhaps one of the most straightforward ways of succeeding in a selection appeal (albeit that such cases do not arise very often). This ground of appeal arose at the 2012 Olympic Games, where at least two selected judokas were subsequently found to be ineligible for selection under the British Judo Association’s selection policy (as they had not participated in the required events).1 This ground of appeal was also raised unsuccessfully in Kerry v Ice Skating Australia, CAS 2013/A/3415. 1 Gosiewski v British Judo Association, 2012 unreported (although in any event the BJA decided not to fill the spot vacated by one of the ineligible athletes); see Section 5, below. See also Schuettler v ITF, CAS OG 08/003 (where the CAS held that the appellant was eligible to compete and ordered the ITF to enter him for the Olympic Games). Cf Beresford v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2837 (where being on a ‘short list’ was found, on the facts, not to be an eligibility requirement).

(b) Failure to follow and/or implement the selection policy B2.57 Another relatively straightforward way to succeed with a selection appeal is to show that the selection policy was not properly followed and/or implemented. In general, this is easier to establish with objective criteria than with subjective criteria.1 1 See eg  Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29  June 2012, para  12 (where the selection criteria were largely subjective and were found to be sufficiently widely drafted to allow the selector to consider that the prospect of a medal in one event should not be jeopardised by selecting one of the athletes for a further event where he considered that to do so may affect the athlete’s performance in the first event); Olubi v British Bobsleigh, Sport Resolutions, 21 January 2014, para 14

410  Regulating Sport (where under the relevant policy it was found to be for the national federation to decide how much weight to attach to each of the listed factors); and the similar finding in Stanley v National Ice Skating Association of GB and Northern Ireland, Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013 and 12 December 2013, paras 9 and 23.

B2.58 In GB  Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5  March 2012, it was found that, on a proper construction of the selection policy, the GB rhythmic gymnastics team had met the minimum benchmark score at the specified event and should therefore be nominated by the British Amateur Gymnastics Association for the 2012 Olympic Games. B2.59 In Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation,1 the CAS found that there had been a failure to comply with the nomination criteria (which required the results of certain events to be taken into account), as the selectors were not entitled to make their own determination as to the results of an event (thereby overriding the outcome of the protest hearing at the event). As that failure caused the weight given to the performance of the athletes to be decreased, and as the selection decision itself was a ‘very close contest’ between the two crews, the CAS found that it was not possible to say that the failure made no difference to the selection decision (ie the decision ‘could have been different if the particular non-compliance had not occurred’). Accordingly, as agreed by the parties, the matter was remitted back to the AYF to make a further decision in accordance with the nomination criteria (although, ultimately, the same crew was selected). 1 Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation, CAS 2000/A/260.

B2.60 In Berchtold v Skiing Australia,1 the selection criteria were not absolute and fixed but were subject to an overarching discretion in extenuating circumstances. As the selection panel failed to recognise that it had such a discretion (and so failed to consider whether the particular circumstances were extenuating), the CAS found that it had failed to properly follow and/or implement the selection policy. The matter was therefore remitted back to the selection panel and the athlete who had brought the appeal was subsequently selected. 1 Berchtold v Skiing Australia, CAS 2002/A/361, especially paras 13 to 18.

B2.61 In Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia,1 it was held that the nomination criteria were not properly followed and/or implemented as the correct points table was not applied to the results of the athletes in the relevant events. The appellant was therefore nominated for selection. Similarly, in Iles v Shooting Australia, the sole arbitrator found that the selection committee had failed to consider a mandatory criterion (relating to an athlete’s long-term development) and the matter was therefore remitted back to Shooting Australia for reconsideration.2 1 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, para 30. 2 Iles v Shooting Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2016, paras 62 to 71 (a case determined in accordance with the law of New South Wales). In an interesting postscript, the appellant was subsequenty selected for the Rio 2016 Olympic Games as the athlete originally selected was ruled ineligible by Shooting Australia after he was charged with drink-driving and firearms offences.

B2.62 The court in Elliot Hilton v The National Ice Skating Association of the United Kingdom Ltd [2009] ISLR 75, found that NISA had adopted certain ‘first past the post’ selection criteria, without any general discretion to override such criteria, and Mr Hilton was therefore entitled to be selected in accordance with the published selection policy. In a reverse scenario, in Stanley v National Ice Skating Association of GB and Northern Ireland, Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013, para 8, it was found that NISA’s performance director had failed to exercise his judgment as required by the selection policy, and had instead incorrectly applied a single criterion.

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B2.63 Michael v NZ  Federation of Roller Sports, NZST  02/11, 19  July 2011, is another example of selectors failing to properly follow and/or implement the selection criteria, specifically, by failing to properly consider the prospect of the athlete obtaining a top ten finish, and failing to consider her development potential.1 In particular, the selectors did not properly consider the athlete’s fitness levels and gave inappropriate weight to certain factors such as previous results and injury. The case was accordingly remitted back to the federation and the athlete who had brought the appeal was subsequently selected. 1 See paras 49, 97, 98 and 100 of the judgment.

B2.64 In D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee,1 the proper procedure was not followed, as the decision to terminate the athlete’s membership of the Australian team was taken by the wrong person. The matter was accordingly remitted so that a decision could be taken by the correct body (although, in the event, the same decision was reached). 1 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS  2008/A/1539, para  12, and D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, p 3.

B2.65 Another straightforward example of a failure to follow the selection policy is Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others,1 where the athlete’s appeal against de-selection from the Olympic Games (based on a suspicion of doping) was upheld on the basis that the selection policy did not provide for such exclusion. An analogous scenario arose in the case of Samoa NOC  v IWF, where the CAS held that, under the IWF rules, the IWF’s decision to endorse a misconduct suspension imposed on an athlete by his national federation required that suspension to be valid. As the suspension had subsequently been set aside by the national courts, the IWF decision (that the athlete could not participate in the Olympic Games) was no longer supported and had to be set aside.2 1 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others, CAS OG 12/06, paras 7.5, 7.6 and 7.9. 2 Samoa NOC v IWF, CAS OG 00/002, paras 6, 9 and 10. For further examples of where a selection policy was not properly followed and/or implemented, see Russian Olympic Committee v FEI, CAS OG 04/001; Schuettler v ITF, CAS OG 08/003; Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01.

B2.66 If the relevant non-compliance with the selection policy did not, in the view of the appeal panel, ultimately affect the final outcome of the selection decision, the appeal panel can refuse to uphold the appeal notwithstanding the error.1 However, the athlete should not be required to prove that the error did affect the final decision, but instead should be given the benefit of the doubt.2 1 See eg Halsted v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012, para 12 (‘It does not follow from British Fencing Association’s failure to comply with that requirement in paragraph 13 that the selection decision must be set aside. It is clearly implicit in the Selection Policy […] that a failure to follow the process should have had, or have been realistically capable of having, a material effect on the selection decision. It would make no sense at all if any failure to follow the process gave an automatic right to have the selection decision set aside and reconsidered, even where no one could realistically say that the decision would have been different if the process had been followed correctly and to the letter’). 2 Ibid, para  13 (‘On the other hand, section 13 is an important requirement. Where on a selection decision British Fencing Association has failed to follow that part of the process, an athlete appealing against that decision will normally be entitled to have the decision set aside unless it can be confidently said that the non-compliance could not realistically have made a difference to the actual decision. The athlete is to be given the benefit of any doubt on that issue. He does not have to prove that the noncompliance did affect the decision’).

(c) Relevant and irrelevant considerations B2.67 Arguments about relevant and irrelevant considerations are clearly factspecific and can be difficult to prove in the absence of an obvious failure to have

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regard to relevant criteria or an obvious reference to irrelevant criteria. One example of a failure to take into account relevant considerations (namely, the athlete’s illness and injury, and the impact on their performance) is the case of Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16  June 2012. The Appeal Committee in that case also noted that the ground of appeal would be established where it could be shown that ‘relevant information was given obviously insufficient weight in a way that was not within the ambit of a reasonable judgment’.1 However, although the matter was remitted to British Swimming for further consideration, the athlete was not subsequently selected. 1 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras 40 and 60.

B2.68 It should also be noted that the fact that something is not specifically mentioned in the selection policy does not automatically render it irrelevant if it is otherwise consistent with that policy.1 1 See eg Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 16 and 25 (where the unlikelihood of the athlete getting a swim at the Olympic Games, if selected, was found to be a relevant factor); Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29  June 2012 (where the selector was entitled to consider that the prospect of a medal in one event should not be jeopardised by selecting one of the athletes for a further event where he did not expect her to medal and where to do so may affect the athlete’s performance in the first event).

B2.69 Relevant and irrelevant considerations are also often argued as a failure properly to follow and/or implement the selection policy, as in Michael v NZ  Federation of Roller Sports, NZST  02/11, 19  July 2011. Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation, CAS 2000/A/260, could also be explained as a case in which the selectors took into account irrelevant considerations, namely, their own view as to what the results of the nomination event should have been.

(d) Bias B2.70 Another area where successful appeals have been brought is where it is shown that the selection process was tainted by bias. B2.71 The law on bias is discussed elsewhere.1 It suffices for present purposes to note that the relevant legal test is ‘whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased’.2 However, it has been recognised that there is a danger in applying rigid rules as to apparent bias or interest derived from judicial or quasijudicial cases to selection decisions.3 In particular: ‘[no] participant in the selection decision [is] expected to come to the process without preconceived views as to which athletes are likely to stand the best chance of winning medals. It is inevitable, particularly in the case of world class athletes, that some will be very well known to those responsible for making recommendations and that they may have formed clear views as to their competitive chances compared to others. The reasonable observer would not expect […] that a national coach appointed by the association should be excluded from a role in making recommendations to be forwarded to the selectors because he happened also to be the personal coach to some of the candidates for places’.4

Accordingly, while the legal test remains relevant, it is suggested that it should not be subject to a mechanical application and the reality of the sporting context should be recognised, especially where personnel are well known to each other. 1 See paras D1.76 and E7.70. 2 These are the words of Lord Phillips in Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 (CA), as adopted by Lord Hope in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 and Lord Bingham in

Selection  413 Lawal v Northern Spirit Limited [2004] 1 All ER 187. For a recent useful discussion on the principles, see R (on the application of United Cabbies Group (London) Ltd) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2019]  EWHC  409 Admin. See also Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 12. 3 See Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 13. See also Kulesza v Canadian Amateur Synchronized Swimming Association Inc, 27 June 1996, unreported, Ont Ct Gen Div (Ottawa), Case No 27763-0001, noted in Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport’ (August 2000), p  7 (where the court took the view that it was entirely appropriate and sensible for coaches within Synchro Canada, who were familiar with the athletes, to make the selection decisions). 4 Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 13.

B2.72 The circumstances that may give rise to a real possibility of bias are many and various. Examples include where one of the selectors is a family member, coach or otherwise associated with an athlete competing for selection; where there is a history of hostility from one of the selectors towards the athlete seeking selection; or, in the case of subjective selection criteria, where one of the selectors has made a comment that suggests a pre-determination of the issue. B2.73 Thus, to build on the cited example, while in that case there had been a prior dispute between one of the athletes and the performance manager, there was no evidence of actual bias and, given the performance manager’s role in the selection process and the fact that the dispute had been disclosed, there was no basis for challenging the selectors’ decision on the grounds of apparent bias of the performance manager.1 Further, while the appeal panel noted its reservations as to the process whereby the national coach (who was also the personal coach of three of the candidates and a member of the same fencing club) made recommendations to the selectors, it found that his role did not render the process as a whole unfair (in particular as the conflict of interest had been disclosed to the selectors, and the other bodies involved in the selection process acted as a check on his recommendations such that the selection decision itself was not made by him).2 However, dependent on the facts, an allegation of apparent bias based on personal involvement may be made out.3 1 Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, paras 24 and 25. 2 Ibid, paras 27 to 31. 3 See Garrett v Canadian Weightlifting Federation, 18 January 1990, unreported, Alta QB (Edmonton), Case No. 9003-01227, noted in Findlay and Corbett, The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport, August 2000, p  9, where the athlete had been advised in writing of his selection for the Commonwealth Games but during the team’s final training camp was told by the national coach that he was being replaced by a reserve athlete (who he had bettered throughout the selection process). The CWF and a court subsequently ordered the coach to reinstate the athlete to the team on the basis that his actions were unauthorised, and the court also noted that the decision was affected by bias as the national coach was also the personal coach of the reserve athlete. However, the coach did not comply with the orders and the athlete was not subsequently able to compete at the Commonwealth Games as the team had already been constituted.

B2.74 An example of a successful appeal based on actual bias is the case of Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549. In that case the selectors were found to have shown actual bias in making the selection decision as they took into account the selected athlete’s illness when assessing their results, whilst failing to consider the known illness of the appellant, apparently due to a belief that there was a greater chance of achieving a medal if the other athlete was selected.1 1 Although this decision may be better explained as simply another example of a failure to properly apply the selection policy, insofar as the selection panel failed to consider the ‘extenuating circumstances’ of the appellant (as in Berchtold v Skiing Australia, CAS 2002/A/361). However, the case does not appear to have been argued on this basis.

B2.75 Further, if the decision of a selection panel appears to favour one athlete over another, without apparent explanation, the appeal panel may consider that there

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is an appearance of bias, if not actual bias, which justifies the matter being subject to further consideration.1 1 Fitzgerald v British Disabled Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 27 April 2012, paras 51 to 54.

(e) Amendments to the selection criteria, legitimate expectations, estoppel, and fairness B2.76 Another fertile area for appeals has been where the selection criteria have been amended after their initial promulgation. While timely and properly communicated amendments are perfectly permissible,1 the CAS has consistently held that amendments that are arbitrary or unfair will not be permitted. 1 See eg Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, para 57 (finding that the selection criteria had been properly amended in accordance with the selection policy). See generally para B1.38 et seq.

B2.77 In Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee and the South African Equestrian Federation purported to make a late amendment to the deadline for selection of the national team. In refusing to uphold the amendment, the CAS stated that the respondents had: ‘imposed new deadlines for qualification on such short notice that the Appellant could have no hope of being selected to represent his country. Until the SAEA’s 23rd May 2012 letter to the Appellant, he had no reason to believe that he would not have a chance to qualify [his horse] Asih in accordance with the FEI  Criteria. He had governed himself accordingly. In the absence of any compelling evidence presented to the Panel (a) of justification for a change, or (b) of publication of any purported change to the deadline, the Panel finds that the Appellant was dealt with in an arbitrary and manifestly unfair manner. At the very least applicable deadlines should have been notified publicly and clearly so that any potential nominee had the opportunity to make appropriate arrangements, which may have included selecting alternative qualifying events and/or seeking an extension of the time limit for qualification’.

B2.78 In Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI,1  FISI purported to amend the selection criteria as they did not provide for the situation where an athlete did not compete in a selection event due to injury or because the coach had substituted another athlete. However, the amendment was formulated only two days before the final selection event and was communicated to the athletes orally at a meeting the day before that event (at which the appellant was not present). The CAS found that the amendment was: ‘a radical alteration to the original criteria. It came too late in the selection process to be fair, particularly as it was not announced in a complete fashion and communicated to the Applicant. Therefore, the Panel finds [the amendment] to be arbitrary and it would be unfair and unreasonable in all the circumstances to apply it’.2 1 Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI CAS OG 06/008, para 16. 2 Ibid, para 16.

B2.79 In Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia,1 the purported amendment to the selection criteria did not come into effect until after the selection events had taken place. Again, the CAS held that any power to amend the criteria cannot be exercised retrospectively once points have been accrued (and subsequently confirmed) at the relevant selection events. 1 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, para 28.

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B2.80 Similarly, in Boxing Australia v AIBA,1 the CAS held that: ‘an attempt to alter the Olympic qualification process with retrospective effect at such a late stage – a few months before the Olympic Games – would violate the principle of procedural fairness and the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium (the doctrine, recognized by Swiss law, providing that where the conduct of one party has induced legitimate expectations in another party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party) […]. In view of the above, the Panel is of the opinion that the Respondent might have legitimately changed the Olympic qualification process for Oceania, if it had done so prospectively and following its proper legislative procedures. The Panel notes that the Olympic Charter requires international federations to propose to the IOC their qualification systems “three years before the Olympic Games”. Even if this term was not to be intended as a strict deadline, it is nonetheless a clear indication that crucial considerations of procedural fairness towards its members require international federations to announce at a reasonably early stage the Olympic qualification process and not to alter it when the national federations and their athletes have already started the sporting season leading to the Olympic Games’. 1 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/O/1455, paras 16 and 22. See discussion at para B1.21.

B2.81 In Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation,1 the federation had communicated its general selection policy (‘few but best’) in advance, but not the specific selection criteria (which were finalised after the selection event and never explicitly communicated). The CAS found that the criteria had been fairly established and did not breach any of the applicable rules (although noting that the federation had ‘followed a procedure which is not practiced any more in several countries’). However, as the appeal would not have been brought if the selection criteria had been announced prior to the selection event, the CAS ordered the federation to bear part of the athlete’s costs. 1 Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278, paras 11 and 16.

B2.82 The case of Watt v Australian Cycling Federation1 is an example of a successful appeal based on legitimate expectations. The ACF had provided the athlete with a written guarantee of her selection, departing from its usual selection policy and exempting the athlete from its requirements so that she could follow her own training schedule and avoid any later disruption. The CAS held that as a result the athlete had a legitimate expectation that she would be nominated in accordance with that guarantee, and the ACF was not entitled to require her attendance at a training camp or revoke her nomination (as the specified conditions in which it could revoke the guarantee had not arisen). Accordingly, in doing so the ACF had breached her legitimate expectation. 1 Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153, paras 11, 14 and 26(g).

B2.83 A number of further examples of appeals, albeit unsuccessful, have arisen based on representations and statements made to individual athletes. In Bauer v AOC & ASF,1 the CAS held that email and verbal representations made to an athlete by a staff member of a national federation may have created an expectation that the athlete would be recommended for selection if certain performance criteria were met. However, on the facts, the staff member had no authority to bind the national federation to such representations. 1 Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.12

B2.84 Furthermore, in Chep & SSAF v SSNOC, there was extensive discussion as to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The CAS panel stated:

416  Regulating Sport ‘The doctrine of legitimate expectations provides a procedural and, in some jurisdictions, a substantive right, where representations have been made to a person by someone in authority. It is designed to protect individuals from an abuse of process. A  procedural legitimate expectation is based on the presumption that a person in authority will follow a certain process in making decision, while a substantive legitimate expectation arises where a person in authority makes a lawful representation that an individual will receive a substantive benefit’.1

The CAS panel determined, with expressed difficulty, that on the facts, whilst the actions of the SSNOC President were unfair to the athlete, no substantive right arose as a consequence.2 1 Chep & SSAF v SSNOC, CAS OG 16/005 & 16/007, at paras 44 and 45. 2 See also Zina v LOC, CAS OG 18/06, especially at paras 6.18 to 6.22. The doctrine is also discussed at para B1.36 et seq.

B2.85 The terminology of an ‘estoppel’ dependent upon statements and representations has also been used. In New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee,1 two athletes whose nominations had previously been confirmed by SLOC were subsequently informed (less than three days before the relevant event) that they were not eligible to compete. On the facts, the CAS panel found that it did not need to determine which interpretation of the eligibility criteria was correct as: ‘it is the Panel’s view that SLOC and FIS are estopped from invoking their interpretation […]. By accepting the entries for the two athletes […] SLOC induced them to prepare and train for both disciplines for which they were properly entered. To exclude them from competing in these two disciplines at this late stage would be unfair and contrary to the above doctrine of estoppel’.

Further, in Simms v FINA,2 the CAS held (citing the decision in New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee) that FINA was estopped from relying on its rules regarding change of sporting nationality as it had induced the national federation to prepare and train the athlete for the particular event for which it sought to enter her, and to exclude her under those circumstances would be unfair and contrary to the rule of estoppel. 1 New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee, CAS OG 02/006. 2 Simms v FINA, CAS OG 08/002.

B2.86 Similarly, in Clyde Getty v FIS,1 the CAS was ‘ready to subscribe to the doctrine of “estoppel” set out in the CAS jurisprudence’. However, the submission failed on the facts as FIS had not made any representation that the athlete was eligible (but simply published documents listing the quota places that might be allocated to NOCs), and had not provided any individual assurance to the athlete that he was eligible. Accordingly, the CAS held (distinguishing CAS OG  02/006 and CAS OG 08/002) that ‘FIS is not estopped from denying Mr Getty a quota place to be entered into the Sochi OWG’. 1 Clyde Getty v FIS, CAS OG 14/002, paras 8.17 to 8.18.

B2.87 An interesting (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) case raising issues of procedural fairness is the case of Gosiewski v British Judo Association, 2012, unreported, which arose prior to the 2012 Olympic Games. In that case, after hearing the athlete’s appeal (but before making a decision) the BJA appeals panel met separately, in private, with some of the original selectors to discuss the case. The athlete was not permitted to be present or to know or respond to what was said. This fairly extraordinary appeals process arguably amounted to a fundamental procedural irregularity, in breach of the principles of natural justice and also leading to the

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appearance of bias (which was exacerbated by the fact that the members of the BJA appeals panel were not all independent of the governing body).1 Ultimately, however, this argument was not tested as the athlete had no further right of appeal from the decision (although the British Olympic Association did subsequently uphold the athlete’s eligibility arguments, resulting in the de-selection of the reserve judoka2).3 1 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Judicial Review, 5th Edn, Vol 61A (LexisNexis, 2020), para  35, ‘Interests which may give rise to the appearance of bias’ (‘A person ought not to participate or appear to participate in an appeal against his own decision […]; the general rule is that in such circumstances the decision will be set aside’), applied in ERC v Gavin Henson, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 10  January 2006. See also Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport’ (August 2000), p  12 (‘Where a decision-maker communicates with one of the parties in the absence of another, a reasonable apprehension of bias or preference to that party may arise. Any information discussed or exchanged with one party should be discussed or exchanged with all parties, so that all parties have the opportunity to address the decision-maker on the issues in dispute. While casual contact between a decision-maker and a party may be logistically unavoidable, the nature of the contact should not relate to the subject matter of the hearing. Operational bias may also be alleged where the decision-maker becomes involved in the proceeding to such an extent as to appear to be an advocate for one side or another’). 2 See Section 5, below. 3 For further examples of procedural unfairness, see Jo-Ann Lim v Synchronised Swimming Australia Inc, CAS (Oceania Registry) A2/2016, paras 129 to 137 (relating to legal representation and the exclusion of the appellant’s written submissions, although such unfairness was cured, on the facts, by the availability of an appeal which allowed full reconsideration of the relevant issues); and Karwalski v Squash Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014, para 51 (where denying the athlete requested documents meant there was ‘a quite serious denial of procedural fairness’, meaning that the Appeal Committee ‘denied itself the opportunity of any submissions that might have been advanced on behalf of Mr Karwalski in response to the material contained in those documents’).

C Limitations on the appeal panel (a) The outcome of a successful appeal B2.88 Ordinarily, and in line with the general principle that the purpose of an appeal is to correct an error, where an appeal is upheld the matter should be remitted back to the original selectors to make a new decision. There are many statements in the existing case law to this effect,1 and the reality is that in most cases the appeal panel will simply not have the sport-specific technical knowledge to make the selection decision itself. It is, however, common for an appeal panel to make directions when remitting a matter, for example, requiring certain factors to be taken into consideration.2 1 See eg Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 20; Berchtold v Skiing Australia, CAS  2002/A/361, paras 19 and 20; Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS  2008/A/1549, para 16; D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1539, paras 12 and 13. Furthermore, in Karwalski v Squash Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014, the CAS panel, despite having determined that the rules provided for a de novo hearing, that there had been a ‘quite serious denial of procedural fairness’ and that the relevant event was less than three weeks away, declined to substitute its own views and remitted the matter to the Appeal Committee. 2 As in Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 63; Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, paras 100 and 101; and Stanley v National Ice Skating Association of GB and Northern Ireland, Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013, para 13.

B2.89 However, the remitting back of successful appeals is not an absolute rule, and in certain circumstances there is authority to support an alternative approach: (a) Where the outcome of the appeal is such that it is obvious that the selection decision will be changed and that the appellant will be selected (this is most likely to apply in the case of eligibility and objective selection criteria).1 (b) Where time considerations dictate that it is simply impracticable for the matter to be remitted for further consideration by the selectors.2

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(c) Where ‘there is evidence of a process so flawed that there could be no confidence in its rectification’, or in ‘other exceptional cases’.3 (d) In the case of actual bias, the matter should not be remitted to the same selectors who were guilty of that bias as ‘the inference that the bias which existed could not be entirely eradicated in those circumstances is irresistible. That is why a decision is never remitted to a biased decision maker absent compelling necessity’, and to do so would necessarily infect that further process with bias.4 (e) The approach may also depend on the terms of the relevant selection policy.5 1 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, paras 5 and 31 (where the CAS ordered that the appellant be nominated); Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153 (where, in upholding the ACF’s prior nomination of the athlete, the CAS found that it would be inappropriate to remit the matter for further consideration); Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, paras 28 and 29, and Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS OG  12/01 (where, applying the objective selection criteria, the CAS found that the appellant should have been nominated as the highest ranked available rider); Russian Olympic Committee v FEI, CAS OG 04/001 (where the CAS held that, on a proper interpretation of the regulations, the applicant was entitled to a second individual dressage place); Schuettler v ITF, CAS OG 08/003 (where the CAS ordered the ITF to enter the athlete for the Olympic Games); Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01 (where the CAS ordered that the Irish two-man women’s bob team be replaced by the Australian team). 2 Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI, CAS OG  06/008, para  17 (where in light of time pressures the CAS directed selection of the athlete, although given the objective selection criteria it was arguably clear that the athlete would have been selected in any event); Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, para 15. 3 Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, para 15. 4 Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549, paras 11 to 13 (on the facts the CAS remitted the matter to a newly constituted selection panel). 5 See eg D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS  2008/A/1574, and Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS  2012/A/2845 (where the CAS  Code entitled the appeal panel to make the selection decision itself); Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549 (where the CAS was permitted to make the selection decision in certain specified circumstances); Beresford v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2837, para 12; Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, para 16. See also Russian Olympic Committee v FEI, CAS OG 04/001, Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01, paras 7 and 8, and CBDG v FIBT, CAS OG 10/02, paras 2.3 and 5.24, discussing the power of CAS, in exceptional circumstances, to recommend to the IOC (and others) that additional places be created in an event in order to achieve a just and equitable outcome (for example, to allow the originally-selected athlete to participate).

B2.90 Accordingly, if there is a desire to ensure that a successful appeal is referred back to the original selectors for re-determination, it is important that this is provided for in the selection policy.

(b) A lacuna in the selection policy B2.91 In the (likely rare) case where it is determined that there is a lacuna in the selection policy (ie an unanticipated set of facts for which provision has not been made), it has been suggested that, while an appeal panel should not attempt to fill the lacuna itself, it might remit the matter to the regulator for it to address as it sees fit.1 However, it is suggested that the better view is that an appeal panel does not have any such power. As previously discussed, it is simply a question of the proper construction of the selection policy, and it is not the role of the appeal panel to rewrite that policy (absent any legitimate grounds of appeal).2 1 Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 22. 2 See paras B2.14 and B2.46 et seq.

B2.92 As stated in Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others:1 ‘many will consider Mr. Mullera to be extremely fortunate to be the beneficiary of […] the lacuna in the RFEA’s selection criteria. However, under the current rules

Selection  419 and considering the explanation given by the RFEA, the RFEA may not exclude Mr. Mullera from the Spanish team for the London Olympic Games’. 1 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others, CAS OG 12/06, para 7.9.

D Proper parties B2.93 With any selection appeal, it is important to ensure that all parties who might be affected by the outcome (in particular, any athletes who might be replaced) are involved in the proceedings, not least so that the decision is binding and does not give rise to a never-ending cycle of appeals.1 1 For example, in the case of Matt Lindland v US Wrestling Association and USOC, noted in Findlay, ‘Rules of a Sport-Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of Policy Making’ 16 Marquette Sports Law Review 73 (2005), p 77, the rules did not allow for the selected athlete, Mr Sieracki, to be party to Mr Lindland’s appeal proceedings. Mr Sieracki accordingly issued his own arbitral proceedings and both athletes were successful, resulting in two irreconcilable judgments. While the matters were eventually consolidated, the process was unnecessarily chaotic and protracted. A  similar scenario arose in the 2002 Commonwealth Games cases of Howey v British Judo Association and Lowe v British Judo Association. There Howey appealed her non-selection to the Sports Dispute Resolution Panel (now Sport Resolutions) and was selected in place of Lowe, only for Lowe to be re-selected following her own separate appeal to the Sports Dispute Resolution Panel.

B2.94 For that reason, and in the interests of natural justice,1 even if the selection policy does not expressly provide for the participation of those potentially affected, it is suggested that the appeal panel should consider inviting such persons to be a party to the appeal or to make any representations they consider appropriate.2 1 See R v Life Assurance Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation, ex parte Ross [1993] QB 17, p 50. 2 For examples of this approach, see Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153, para 4; Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association, CAS OG 06/002, para 2; Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 5.

5 THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES B2.95 Sections 1 to 4 of this chapter apply equally to selection in the context of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (as can be seen in the cases mentioned throughout this chapter). However, there are certain additional factors that warrant further consideration of selection in this area. In particular, as noted by Findlay and Corbett, ‘selection disputes inevitably arise prior to any major games such as an Olympics’.1 Given the nature of such events, competition for places is fierce, and this is especially so in the case of a home Olympic and Paralympic Games, which may be a once-in-alifetime opportunity. With a home Games, the availability of additional qualification spots through ‘host nation’ places also lends itself to an increased number of selection disputes, particularly as such spots tend to be allocated on a more subjective basis (this was seen at both the Sydney 2000 and London 2012 Olympic Games). 1 Findlay and Corbett, ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1 Entertainment Law 109.

A The selection framework B2.96 Given some of the complexities, it is worth beginning with a high-level overview of the selection framework that applies to the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The framework is ultimately governed by the rules of the IOC and IPC, each of which has its own requirements.1 The specific qualification rules for each sport are then set by the relevant international federation, subject to approval by the IOC and IPC, as applicable. However, as is well established in the jurisprudence,

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only National Olympic Committees and National Paralympic Committees have the right to enter athletes into the Olympic and Paralympic Games, respectively.2 Such entries are typically made based on the recommendations of the relevant national federations, and there is often a written agreement in place between each national federation and the National Olympic Committee/National Paralympic Committee setting out the specific requirements that apply (for example, it is not uncommon for National Olympic Committees to set their own minimum performance/qualification/ other requirements, over and above those set by the relevant national and international federation). 1 See the Olympic Charter, rules 40, 42 and 44, and the IPC Handbook. 2 For example, see Zina v LOC, CAS OG 18/06, at paras 6.10 to 6.15.

B2.97 Beyond the general selection framework, however, the substantive requirements and rules governing selection often differ from country to country, and from sport to sport. In the event of a dispute, the applicable rules must therefore be carefully checked.

B Selection disputes relating to the Olympic and Paralympic Games B2.98 Many selection disputes arising in relation to the Olympic and Paralympic Games are dealt with at national level, in the run up to the Games. That is certainly the preferred option for all parties, as it allows the matter to be resolved on a timely basis, well in advance of the event. B2.99 In relation to each Olympic Games, there are typically also a handful of cases brought before CAS relating to selection, often concerning the correct interpretation and/or application of the applicable rules (which can be complex, as described above).1 These cases are often brought before the CAS Ad Hoc Division, which resolves disputes arising during or in the ten days prior to the Olympic Games.2 This time restriction (found in the CAS Ad Hoc Division’s procedural rules) is important, as many cases fail on this basis. Internal remedies available to an applicant should also be exhausted.3 Careful consideration should therefore be given to the correct forum for the relevant dispute: for example, might a national-level appeal body or the CAS general appeals division be more appropriate? 1 Many of these cases can be found in the online CAS case database. Recent examples include: Maria Birkner v COA & FASA, CAS OG 14/003; Herunga v Namibian National Olympic Committee, CAS OG  16/015; Morgan v Jamaican Athletic Administrative Association, CAS OG  16/008; and Czech Olympic Committee & Czech Cycling Federation v Union Cycliste Internationale, CAS OG 16/022. An important point will be to determine exactly when, on the facts, the dispute arose. 2 See para D2.34 et seq. 3 See Pavicic v Fédération Équestre Internationale, CAS OG 16/014.

C The need for a more consistent approach at national level? B2.100 In respect of selection generally, Sport Resolutions’ review of its 2012 Olympic Games selection appeals1 sets out a number of key learning points (many of which are discussed further in Sections 1 to 4, above) and is a recommended read for all national governing bodies and all persons and entities dealing with selection matters generally. However, specific consideration should be given to the overall approach to selection in the context of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. In particular, the main difficulty with the present approach is that each sport is free to

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adopt its own selection policy and, crucially, to determine its own appeals process. Accordingly, there is little consistency between sports. In particular, while some provide for appeals to an independent body such as Sport Resolutions, in other sports the only appeal is to an internal body.2 1 Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London Olympics’, Sport Resolutions, January 2013. 2 In two judo cases in 2012 the British Olympic Association determined that the nominated athletes were ineligible notwithstanding the fact that such arguments had previously been (wrongly) rejected by the BJA’s internal appeals panel. See further para B2.85.

B2.101 For the 2012 home Olympic Games, for example, the British Olympic Association selected around 550 athletes (not including reserves) to represent Team GB, based on nominations from national governing bodies. Each national governing body was responsible for putting together its own selection policy, and many chose to make use of the independent dispute service, Sport Resolutions, to handle any appeals. Sport Resolutions alone dealt with 19 selection appeals in the run up to the games, but it is estimated that, overall, there were more than 50 appeals relating to the make-up of Team GB. Furthermore, while athletes did not have any formal right of appeal to the British Olympic Association, it was ultimately responsible for reviewing and accepting athlete nominations and did in fact intervene in some cases.1 1 For example, in the Aaron Cook taekwondo selection dispute, the British Olympic Association requested further information and clarification as to the selection process before accepting the national governing body’s nomination. And in two judo cases the British Olympic Association found nominated athletes to be ineligible, resulting in their de-selection from the team. See further para B2.85.

B2.102 Accordingly, in respect of selection for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, it is suggested that while it should be for the sport to determine its own selection criteria, there are benefits to be gained from having a uniform process, particularly regarding the right of appeal to an independent appeal panel (as recommended by Sport Resolutions). One example of such an approach is the Australian Olympic Committee’s selection procedure, which (in summary) requires each national federation to establish an impartial appeals tribunal comprising a legally-qualified chair and two suitable panel members, with a further right of appeal to the CAS. It is suggested that a similar approach would assist in reducing the number of appeals as well as ensuring that, where possible, matters are properly and fairly resolved prior to any nominations being made to the National Olympic and Paralympic Committees.

6 CONCLUSIONS B2.103 In conclusion, selection disputes are here to stay, particularly in relation to major events such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games. B2.104 The vast majority of selection appeals are not ultimately successful (ie with the athlete being selected, as opposed to the appeal being dismissed or the appeal being upheld but the athlete not being selected in any event). For example, of the 19 appeals handled by Sport Resolutions in the run-up to the 2012 Olympic Games, only four were upheld and only one appellant (GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012) was ultimately successful in achieving selection. Similarly, all of the selection cases brought before the CAS Ad Hoc division in relation to the Sochi 2014 Olympic Winter Games, the Rio 2016 Olympic Games and the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games were unsuccessful.

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B2.105 However, what is clear is that the time and effort spent by the selecting body in getting its selection policy right is likely to be well worth the investment in the long term. It will not only assist in reducing the number of selection appeals but will also ensure that, where appeals do arise, they are properly, effectively and consistently managed (thus avoiding the potential fall-out from a badly handled selection dispute).

CHAPTER B3

Misconduct Kendrah Potts (4 New Square), Stuart Tennant (The Premier League), and James Eighteen (Northridge LLP) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B3.1 2

ON-FIELD DECISION MAKING...................................................................... B3.4 A The role of match officials........................................................................... B3.5 B The use of technology.................................................................................. B3.9 C Approach to on-field misconduct in individual sports................................. B3.19

3

POST-MATCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ON-FIELD INCIDENTS........................................................................................................ B3.23 A Additional punishment for on-field offences............................................... B3.24 B Retrospective action: foul play and misconduct charges............................. B3.28 C Post-match challenges to on-field decisions................................................ B3.34

4

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS...................................................................... B3.39 A The disciplinary process.............................................................................. B3.40 B Evidence....................................................................................................... B3.44 C Mens rea....................................................................................................... B3.45 D Potential criminal and civil liability............................................................. B3.51 E Interplay between criminal proceedings and misconduct charges............... B3.53 F Sanctions...................................................................................................... B3.54

5

TYPES OF ON-FIELD OFFENCES................................................................... B3.56 A Physical/verbal abuse between participants................................................. B3.56 B Abuse of Match Officials............................................................................. B3.61 C Cheating....................................................................................................... B3.65 D Mechanical doping....................................................................................... B3.69 E Political statements...................................................................................... B3.76 F Abuse of spectators...................................................................................... B3.79 G Vicarious/strict liability of clubs for conduct of their own spectators......... B3.83

6.

REGULATING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT.................................................... B3.88 A The justification for regulating off-field misconduct................................... B3.89

7.

DRAFTING AND ENFORCING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT PROVISIONS...................................................................................................... B3.96 A Drafting........................................................................................................ B3.97 B Implementation............................................................................................ B3.102 C Sanctions...................................................................................................... B3.104

8

TYPES OF OFF-FIELD OFFENCES................................................................. B3.108 A Social media offences.................................................................................. B3.108 B Other forms of abusive or insulting comments or conduct.......................... B3.120 C Criticism and abuse of officials.................................................................... B3.137 D Criminal offences......................................................................................... B3.142 E Other forms of acceptable misconduct........................................................ B3.146

9

CODES OF ETHICS........................................................................................... B3.147 A Introduction.................................................................................................. B3.147 B Who is bound by Codes of Ethics?.............................................................. B3.151 C What behaviour is caught by a Code of Ethics?.......................................... B3.154 D Issues that arise in ethics proceedings......................................................... B3.174

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1 INTRODUCTION B3.1 Sport is played according to a set of rules that governs the on-field actions of participants. On-field rules have existed since the inception of sport; however, as sport has become increasingly commercialised and media scrutiny of behaviour has grown, regulation has expanded to govern conduct beyond actions on the field of play. B3.2 This chapter looks at misconduct in sport on and off the field of play. It considers the nature of the regulations and the types of conduct that are prohibited, as well as the procedural mechanisms for dealing with misconduct. The chapter starts by looking at the regulation of on-field misconduct, before considering off-field misconduct, including breaches of codes of ethics. It does not cover doping, matchfixing, or financial misconduct, as these specific types of misconduct are addressed elsewhere in the book.1 1 See Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption), Chapter B5 (Regulating Financial Fair Play), and Section C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement).

B3.3 Participants are expected to know the rules of their sport. However, as will be seen later in the chapter, this is more straightforward in respect of certain forms of conduct than others. Regulations concerning off-field conduct are often drafted in more general terms than on-field regulations. It is easy, and necessary, to draft clear regulations in respect of on-field actions: for example, prohibiting high tackles, or eye-gouging. However, the nature and range of potential off-field misconduct has led sport governing bodies (SGBs) to draft broad provisions, for example, prohibiting any conduct that could ‘bring the game into disrepute’. In some cases, these broad provisions are supported by ‘guidelines’, for example in the social media context, to seek to ensure that participants understand what conduct will fall foul of the rules. Further, SGBs have looked to supplement their regulations by introducing ethical concepts such as core values1 and the ‘spirit of the game’.2 These concepts are designed to encourage participants to adhere to certain standards of behaviour and to ensure that a positive ethos is created and maintained. Whilst the basic forms of misconduct might be obvious, the grey areas created by generic provisions can raise issues in the fair resolution of cases, which are considered in detail below. 1 For instance, the RFU’s core values are Teamwork, Respect, Enjoyment, Discipline and Sportsmanship, which are published on the England Rugby website. The significance of these core values is reflected in a number of cases. See eg Rugby Football Union v Steve Diamond, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 November 2017, para 56 (‘those comments [towards the referee] struck at heart of the game’s core values. The game is built upon respect. There must be respect for officials’) and para 57 (‘Rugby’s Core Values are not empty words or slogans which can be signed up to and then ignored. They are not to be treated as useful bolt-ons dreamt up by a marketing team. They are integral to the game and are what make the game special’); Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 August 2018, para 45, (‘The Panel noted that the Player is expected to behave in line with the core values of the Game, core values which underpin the entire ethos of the sport. The Panel had been reminded that these core values are not empty words or slogans which can be signed up to and ignored. Indeed, these core values require rugby players to act with respect and discipline’); Rugby Football Union v Nathan Hughes, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 October 2018, para 115, (the panel commented that the player’s actions ‘publicly undermined the core values of the Game, the very values which the disciplinary process is designed to uphold’). 2 The concept of ‘Spirit of Cricket’ is enshrined in the International Cricket Council (ICC) Code of Conduct and in the ICC Standard Test Match, ODI and T20 Playing Conditions. In football, the ‘spirit of the game’ is included in Law 5 of the FIFA Laws of the Game.

2 ON-FIELD DECISION MAKING B3.4 Sections 2 to 4 of this chapter look at how conduct on the field of play is regulated. They consider, first, the processes for monitoring and sanctioning on-field misconduct and, secondly, different types of offences.

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A The role of match officials B3.5 Match officials conduct the first level of review for on-field misconduct. The laws of a sport usually provide that the match or event officials have full authority to enforce the laws of the sport during the match or event in respect of which they have been appointed to officiate, and to take action against players and other team officials who infringe the laws.1 1 For example, the Powers and Duties of the Referee under Law 5 of the FIFA  Laws of the Game include: (a) the power to take disciplinary action against players guilty of cautionable and sending off offences; and (b) the power to take action against team officials who fail to conduct themselves in a responsible manner. In rugby union, World Rugby Law 9 in the Laws of the Game stipulates that ‘a player who commits foul play must be either cautioned or temporarily suspended or sent off’.

B3.6 Depending on the sport, possible sanctions available to a match official where there has been an infringement include: (a)

giving possession to the other team or giving the other team an opportunity to score a goal/points (eg a penalty in football, or a penalty kick in rugby union); (b) awarding points to the other team (eg a penalty try in rugby union); (c) warning the player about his behaviour; (d) temporarily dismissing the player from the field of play (eg a yellow card in football or rugby union); (e) permanently dismissing the player from the field of play (eg a red card in most sports); or (f) in extreme cases, abandoning the game. B3.7 In most sports, the decisions of match officials are afforded a significant degree of immunity from challenge or review.1 This is necessary to provide certainty as to the result of the match. It also serves to limit the opportunity for legal challenges after the event. In rugby union, the referee is deemed to be the ‘sole judge of fact and law’ during a match and, except in limited circumstances (see Section 3B below), the referee’s decisions on the field of play and their sporting consequences cannot be altered retrospectively by the decision of a disciplinary panel.2 This means, for example, that the score in a match cannot subsequently be amended by a panel on the basis that a try was scored by a player who (it is subsequently found) should have been sent off earlier by the referee in the match. 1 See para B3.34 et seq and para D2.136 et seq. 2 World Rugby Reg 17.17.2.

B3.8 Notwithstanding, decisions of match officials still come in for question, both on and off the pitch. Those questioning such decisions on the pitch are destined to receive short shrift, and the act of questioning an official’s decision itself carries risks. In addition to resulting in a form of sporting advantage for the other side (such as a free kick), the act of questioning a referee may also constitute misconduct.1 1 For example, the Misconduct section in the Laws of Rugby League provides that a player is guilty of misconduct if he disputes the decision of the referee, although the notes to that Law provide that a player may ask the referee the reason why a penalty has been awarded provided he does so respectfully.

B The use of technology B3.9 For a referee trying to enforce misconduct rules during a match, the biggest challenge is ensuring that appropriate action is taken against a player who commits an act of misconduct and, equally as importantly, that action is not taken against a player who has not committed an act of misconduct. However, a referee only sees incidents live, in real time, and from one angle, and (unlike disciplinary tribunals

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that look at incidents subsequently) often does not have the opportunity to replay and slow down incidents to determine whether an offence was committed and, if so, how serious the offence was (although the position is changing, as discussed below). A referee can seek the view of any assistant referees, but they too will only have seen the incident once. B3.10 Video technology can be used during a match to review different aspects of the match, from whether a goal or try has been scored to whether there has been conduct justifying dismissal or lesser forms of misconduct. There has, in general, been greater willingness to use video technology to review the fundamental aspects of a game (such as the act of scoring1), as opposed to simple foul play. This may be due to a combination of factors, including a view that judging foul play tends to require a subjective interpretation from the match official, whereas the act of scoring can largely be assessed on an objective basis, and the fact that whether a goal is scored is so fundamental to the outcome of a match that it justifies interrupting the flow of the game. However, the decision to dismiss a player (particularly early in a match) could potentially have a greater influence on the result of the match than the award of a goal or try, and many serious misconduct incidents (such as brawls and tackles that lead to injuries) naturally lead to a break in play in any event. 1 In certain cricket matches where the Umpire Decision Review System (DRS) applies, each side has a limited number of ‘reviews’ or ‘referrals’, allowing the team to refer a decision that a wicket has (or has not) been taken to a third umpire, who will look at the television footage together with ‘Hawkeye’ and other technology to help him decide. In tennis, video technology is used for line calls. In rugby league and rugby union, where a referee is unsure whether a try has been scored, he may refer the decision to the video referee/television match official, who then has the opportunity to watch the relevant play from a number of angles and at different speeds to determine whether or not a try has been scored.

B3.11 For many years, sports other than the top American sports1 were reluctant to introduce the use of technology during matches for fear that it could ruin the rhythm and natural dynamic of games. However, following a number of controversial decisions2 and the fact that audiences can now quickly view video footage on their phones, a number of sports have started to embrace the use of technology, albeit some in more limited circumstances than others. 1 The ‘major leagues’ (baseball, American football, basketball, and ice hockey) embraced the use of inmatch video technology from as early as 1985. For a general overview, see ‘The development of Video Technology in Sport’ on the Stats Zone website (thestatszone.com/development-of-video-technologyin-sport [accessed 29 October 2020]). 2 For example, Germany’s 4–1 victory over England in the 2010 World Cup, when Frank Lampard hit a shot from outside of the penalty box that bounced off the crossbar and over the goal-line. The ball came back out and the goal was disallowed because the assistant referee did not signal for a goal. Now, goal-line technology is routinely used and a signal sent automatically to the referee indicating whether or not the ball crossed the line.

B3.12 The challenge for sport is to strike the right balance between picking up misconduct offences and allowing a game to flow naturally. The following issues should be considered when deciding whether, and if so how, to use technology: (a) Who can request the use of it – players and/or the referee? (b) Are there any negative consequences if the review is unsuccessful (ie loss of further reviews)? (c) What types of incident(s) can be referred for video review? (d) Is there a threshold for allowing a review? (e) What is the threshold for overturning the on-field referee’s decision? B3.13 The examples below indicate that sports have taken a varied approach to the use of video technology, particularly in relation to misconduct, depending on the requirements and priorities of their stakeholders and the perceived impact on the entertainment value of their sports.

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B3.14 In rugby union, if a referee is unsure whether an act of foul play has been committed, he or his fellow match officials may refer the decision to the video referee/television match official (TMO), who then has the opportunity to watch the relevant play from a number of angles and at different speeds to determine whether or not an act of foul play has been committed.1 At the time of writing, there is no right for a captain or other players to request a referral to the TMO. 1 Laws 6.15 and 6.16 of the World Rugby Laws of the Game. The remit of the TMO is restricted to clarifying situations relating to (a) whether an infringement may have occurred in the playing area leading to a try or preventing a try, and (b) ‘clear and obvious’ acts of foul play.

B3.15 The use of technology for dealing with misconduct in football is still in its infancy. In 2018, following years of trials, the International Football Association Board (IFAB) introduced Video Assistant Referees (VAR) into the FIFA Laws of the Game on a permanent basis. VAR is currently used to identify ‘clear and obvious errors’ or a ‘serious missed incident’, which can include decisions regarding a penalty where misconduct has occurred, a direct red card (not a second caution), or mistaken identity when the referee cautions or sends off the wrong player.1 The referee must always make the decision and his on-field decision should not be changed unless there is a ‘clear and obvious error’. Whilst this may appear to be a clear and, prima facie, high hurdle, as with so many thresholds, its application has been the subject of debate.2 1 Paragraph 4 of Law 5 of the FIFA Laws of the Game. 2 For example, the decision to award a penalty to France in the 2018 FIFA World Cup was arguably not a ‘clear and obvious error’ (see ‘Paul Pogba scores with the technology’s help to take France past Australia’, Guardian, 16 June 2018); the decision only to award a yellow (rather than red) card to Cristiano Ronaldo in the match between Iran and Portugal (see ‘Iran’s Carlos Queiroz berates FIFA over Cristiano Ronaldo VAR escape’, Guardian, 25 June 2018); the VAR decision to award a penalty to Brighton & Hove Albion for an alleged foul on Adam Connolly (the first VAR penalty decision in the Premier League in season 2019/2020) (see ‘Premier League admit VAR decision to award Brighton penalty against Everton was wrong’, The Daily Telegraph, 8 November 2019).

B3.16 One notable difference is that, unlike rugby union, football does not allow the replay of the incident to be broadcast on the screens in the grounds and, therefore, spectators have to wait for the decision from the referee (following his review of a television screen at the side of the pitch). In circumstances where the majority of the ground are, in any event, able to access footage on their phones, it is questionable for how long this practice will continue to operate. B3.17 In field hockey, the introduction of a video umpire has been seen as a very positive development1 for assisting referees in reviewing the award/non-award of penalty strokes (and has been recognised as highlighting good refereeing).2 There are two types of referral in field hockey:3 (1) umpire referral; and (2) team referral. The International Hockey Federation rules make clear that umpire referrals cannot be made as a result of ‘protest, queries or pressure from players’ and ‘no one other than the Match Umpires’ can stop the match to request a referral. In relation to team referrals the rules provide that: (a)

each team is only allowed one team referral during regulation time per match (which must be made through the match umpires); (b) any team player on the field of play at the time of the incident can request a team referral; and (c) provided the correct ‘T’ signal is made to the match umpire and any explanation is provided within the requisite time period, the team referral is deemed to have been lodged correctly. If the referral is upheld or the video footage is deemed to be inconclusive,4 the referring team retains its right of referral; conversely, the team loses its referral if

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there is no clear reason to change the match umpire’s original decision. A  team referral that has been adjudicated on following a referral by one team may not be the subject of a subsequent referral by the opposing team. The final decision, including any matter of interpretation, remains with the match umpire, not the video umpire. 1 See ‘“Video referrals” a good decision’, International Hockey Federation website, 9 July 2014. 2 Rules 12–14 in the FIH Rules of Hockey. 3 Appendix 8 of the tournament rules of the 2018 Hockey World Cup on the International Hockey Federation website. 4 The signal is one of ‘No Advice Possible’ if the video footage is inconclusive, including through not having the correct replays available, the ball never being in shot in the replays, the footage being of insufficient quality to permit a decision, or technical problems with the referral equipment.

B3.18 There has been concern that the use of video technology would undermine confidence in, and the authority of, the match referee. However, sport is now a huge business and vast sums of money are won and lost on the decisions of referees. There is therefore a strong argument that the predominant concern should be that the correct decision is made. Further, video technology can highlight good refereeing and prevent players from holding grudges against a referee for the remainder of the match if an incident is reviewed. It is likely that sports will continue to grapple with the challenge of balancing the use of technology to ensure that the correct decisions are made on the field of play, whilst protecting the flow of the game and audience experience.

C Approach to on-field misconduct in individual sports B3.19 In individual sports such as tennis and golf, a tiered system of misconduct is adopted, as a red card (or equivalent) would result in the player forfeiting the match. B3.20 Individual sports often deal with on-field misconduct by putting in place a Code of Conduct,1 which sets out escalating procedures and penalties for dealing with on-court misconduct at tournaments. The usual starting position is that while a match is in play, the chair umpire/referee makes the first determination as to whether the rules or code of conduct have been breached. The umpire/referee may then refer a matter to the tournament referee if he feels it necessary to do so, with the decision of the tournament referee being final. 1 Examples include the Grand Slam Code of Conduct in tennis and the ICC Code of Conduct for Players and Player Support Personnel in cricket.

B3.21 In tennis, for example, each Code of Conduct violation contains within it a point penalty system, which can be employed by the umpire at his discretion, or by the tournament referee after appeal by the player(s) concerned. A  first breach of a Code will ordinarily result in a warning from the umpire, a second breach in a deduction of one point, while each subsequent breach results in the forfeit of one game. The ultimate sanction in tennis is the ‘gross misconduct’ offence, which results in disqualification1 from the match.2 1. For example, in tennis David Nalbandian was disqualified in the 2012 final of the Queen’s tennis tournament for kicking an advertising board into a line judge’s leg, causing injury. A  more recent example is that of Nick Kyrgios, who was defaulted from the ATP Masters tournament in Rome in 2019 after slamming his racquet, kicking his water bottle, and hurling a chair on to the court. In golf, Sergio Garcia was disqualified from the Saudi International Golf Tournament in 2019 for a breach of Rule 1.2(a) of the Rules of Golf, after damaging the greens. 2 In cricket, under the ICC Code of Conduct, participants can receive a ‘red card’ for (a) threatening to assault an umpire; (b) an act of violence on the field of play; or (c) using language or gestures that seriously offend race, religion, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.

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B3.22 Additional sanctions, such as fines and forfeiture of prize money, may also be imposed after the conclusion of the match (see further Section 3A below).1 1 In the incidents referenced in para B3.21 n 1, in addition to disqualification, Kyrgios was fined $20,000 and forfeited his prize money of €33,635 (‘Nick Kyrgios defaulted from Italian Open after hurling chair across court’, Guardian, 16 May 2019); while David Nalbandian was fined £8,000 and forfeited his prize money of £36,500 (‘David Nalbandian hit with maximum fine after injuring line judge at Queens final’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 2012). Sergio Garcia did not receive further punishment as the European Tour were satisfied with his apology and disqualification (‘Sergio Garcia escapes further punishment for Saudi International disqualfication’, Sky Sports website, 5 February 2019).

3 POST-MATCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ON-FIELD INCIDENTS B3.23 In addition to action taken by officials during a match, misconduct on the field of play may also be the subject of post-match review and disciplinary proceedings. Given the desire to respect the sanctity of the decisions of the match officials, post-match proceedings related to on-field misconduct are generally limited to the following types of cases: (a) to seek additional sanctions for serious misconduct identified and sanctioned during the match; (b) retrospective action to sanction conduct that went unnoticed during a match; and (c) challenges by players to sanctions imposed during a match (although sports seek to limit such challenges for the reasons noted above).

A Additional punishment for on-field offences B3.24 Many sports provide that further sanctions may be imposed for the act of misconduct in addition to the sanction imposed during the match. In order to preserve the sanctity of the decisions of match officials, some sports limit the cases in which additional sanctions may be imposed to particularly serious on-field offences. For example, in team sports, additional sanctions are usually only applicable in cases where the conduct resulted (or would have resulted) in the player’s dismissal from the field of play during the match. The period of time served while off the field of play in the relevant match does not usually count as part of the suspension.1 1 For instance, a player may be red carded in the first minute or the 79th minute of the match, but it makes no material difference to the sanction given after the match.

B3.25 The Football Association rules provide for a ‘fast-track’ system for dealing with further punishment following a red card. This involves The FA proposing a sanction and giving a deadline for the player to accept or reject the proposed sanction.1 If the player does not accept the proposed sanction,2 the matter will be referred to a disciplinary panel to be heard in the week following the match. 1 Sections (E)8–(E)24 of the FA Disciplinary Regulations; in Scottish football, see Section 13 of the Scottish Football Association fast-track procedures. 2 See Section E  of the FA  Disciplinary Regulations, which provides that players may challenge the imposition of a red card on the grounds of (a) mistaken identity, and (b) wrongful dismissal. Section E also allows for the disciplinary consequences flowing from the red card to be increased or decreased on the grounds that the circumstances of the dismissal were ‘truly exceptional’ such that the standard punishment ‘would be clearly excessive’ (available to the player or club, see Fast Track 5) or ‘clearly insufficient’ (available to The FA, see Fast Track 6). Section D of the FA Disciplinary Regulations provides a sanction table for the various offences.

B3.26 In rugby union, the additional sanction applied after a match for on-field offences is usually a playing suspension. The sanctions are set out in sanctioning

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guidelines, which list the more common acts of foul play and the pre-determined sanction tariffs.1 If a player takes issue with the award of the red card on the basis of ‘wrongful dismissal’ or ‘mistaken identity’, a hearing will be convened to resolve the issue. 1 World Rugby Reg 17, Appendix 1.

B3.27 In individual sports, referees will usually be required to produce a match report at the end of the match, which should include any incidents of potential misconduct that might warrant further action. Players may subsequently be fined, docked prize money, or disqualified from the tournament. In tennis, for example, repeated breaches of a Code of Conduct and particularly flagrant or egregious breaches, constituting ‘Aggravated Behaviour’, are classed as ‘Player Major Offences’. If a player is alleged to have committed a Player Major Offence, the usual process is that the relevant individual within the tournament’s governing body will commence a formal investigation. The penalties for committing a Player Major Offence range from a capped fine to suspension from the events organised by the relevant governing body.1 1 For example, after calling the umpire a ‘liar’ and a ‘thief’ at the US  Open 2018, Serena Williams was fined by the United States Tennis Association (USTA) (‘US Open 2018: Serena Williams fined over outbursts during final’, BBC Sport website, 9 September 2018). See also the ATP investigation into the match-official abuse by Nick Kyrgios at the Cincinnati Open 2019 (‘ATP Concludes Kyrgios Investigation’, ATP Press Release, 26 September 2019), which resulted in a suspension of 16 ATP weeks and a fine of $25,000 (suspended for a six-month probationary period).

B Retrospective action: foul play and misconduct charges B3.28 Where the foul play or misconduct was missed during the match, the result of the match will still stand. However, in many sports footage of matches is reviewed in full to identify incidents of potential foul play or misconduct that were not dealt with during the match.1 This means that on-field offences that are not given the appropriate sanction during a match can be considered in a disciplinary context postmatch. 1 For example, in rugby league, by the Match Review Panel and, in rugby union, by citing commissioners.

B3.29 Sports have grappled with the appropriate approach to take to retrospective action, mindful of the need to balance the sanctity of decisions made by the referee with ensuring that misconduct does not go unpunished. In order to find a balance, some sports distinguish between foul play or misconduct that was detected by an official during the match, which will not therefore be the subject of further action, and foul play or misconduct that was not spotted by a referee, which may be subject to further action. B3.30 Football provides a good example of this approach. Charges may be brought against a player after the match if the incident was ‘not seen and dealt with by the Match Officials at the time’ or if there was ‘successful deception of a match official by way of a clear act of simulation which leads either to a penalty being awarded or the dismissal of an opposing Player’.1 Again, football adopts ‘fast-track’ procedures to deal with these types of offences, which ensures resolution prior to the next set of fixtures. While this is a positive step forward in many respects, it could be said that it is rather perverse that if the referee sees the dive and gives a yellow card, that player receives a lesser sanction than if the referee does not see it. On the face of it, the same sanction should be imposed for the same type of misconduct. 1 Section (E)5 of the FA Disciplinary Regulations (the charges for ‘successful deception’ are brought under FA Rule E(3)1 (improper conduct). See also Rule 201 of the SFA Regulations: ‘No player shall

Misconduct  431 cause a match official to make an incorrect decision and/or support an error of judgment on the part of a match official by an act of simulation which results in that player’s team obtaining a Substantial Advantage’. For an example of deception, see Football Association v Oumar Niasse, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 November 2017, which resulted in a two-match match suspension (for a charge under FA Rule E3) following a contested hearing.

B3.31 In rugby union, the position in relation to retrospective action is more straightforward. Foul play reviewers (known as Citing Commissioners) review matches whilst they take place, and a ‘citing’ occurs where the Citing Commissioner refers a player for an act of foul play that in the Citing Commissioner’s opinion warranted that player being sent from the field of play.1 This includes incidents seen2 and not seen by the match officials. As a result, even where one or more of the match officials has seen an incident and taken action during the game, such as giving a penalty against the offending player as well as potentially a yellow card (sin bin), further action can still be taken and an additional sanction imposed. 1 World Rugby Regs 17.6.1, 17.8.1 and 17.9.1. 2 World Rugby Reg 17.9.2 provides: ‘Citing Commissioners may cite Players for an act(s) of Foul Play where such act(s) may have been detected by the referee or assistant referee and which may have been the subject of referee action’.

B3.32 In individual sports, it is less likely that the misconduct will not be identified during the match. There is generally no restriction on a governing body taking action after the fact for an on-field incident that was detected by an umpire. B3.33 In addition to foul play offences, governing body rules also typically confer on the governing body an overarching power to bring misconduct charges for other on-field incidents.1 This includes incidents such as inappropriate goal celebrations or inappropriate language on camera.2 In such cases tribunals tend to assess whether the conduct was improper or abusive on an objective basis,3 with the context and other factors taken into account as mitigating factors. 1 See as examples, (a) The FA (Rule E3(1) and/or Rule E3(2) of the FA Regulations); (b) the RFU (Rule 5.12 of the RFU Rules; and (c) the BHA (Rule (J)19 of the BHA Rules of Racing. 2 One example of this is the case of Football Association v Nicolas Anelka, Regulatory Commission decision 3 March 2014 (the player was suspended for five matches and fined £80,000 after his use of the quenelle gesture as part of his celebration of a goal). 3 Football Association v Nicolas Anelka, Regulatory Commission decision dated 3 March 2014, paras 12–17 (‘[…] the question for us was whether NA’s use of the quenelle after scoring a goal during the match was objectively speaking abusive, indecent, insulting and/or improper’); Football Association v Luis Suarez, Regulatory Commission decision dated 30 December 2011, paras 50–73. For an example where the player’s subjective intention was considered to be relevant, see paras B3.122 and B3.124.

C Post-match challenges to on-field decisions B3.34 As set out above, sports have traditionally started from the premise that referees, umpires and any other match officials must be allowed to officiate sporting events freely, without legal interference. In other words, officials must have a field of autonomy within which a degree of human error is accepted, subject only to limited corrective mechanisms (such as video evidence) set in place under the sport’s rules. B3.35 This approach is consistently recognised by CAS through a specific sports law principle known as the field of play doctrine.1 The rationale for this approach has multiple grounds, including that sporting decisions are best taken by those with specialist expertise rather than judges; that sport should not constantly be interrupted; that there is an inherent subjectivity in in-play decision-making; that to accept jurisdiction would open the floodgates; and that off-field decisions overriding onfield decisions would lead to significant difficulties in adjudicating sporting results.2

432  Regulating Sport 1 As considered in (for example) Horse Sport Ireland (HIS) & Cian O’Connor v Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI), CAS 2015/A/4208; Emilios Papathanasiou v International Sailing Federation (ISAF) & others, CAS 2006/A/1142; and Yang Tae Young (see next footnote). See also the discussion of the doctrine at para D2.136 et seq. 2 In Yang Tae Young & Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) v International Gymnastics Federation, CAS 2004/A/704, the CAS dealt with a request made after the 2004 Olympic Games to reallocate medals on the basis that the officials had made an error when assessing the difficulty of a gymnastics routine. The CAS panel held that a judging error by an official, even one that is later admitted, will not constitute grounds for reversing the results of a competition. The panel stated: ‘to the extent that the matter is capable of analysis in conventional legal terms, it could rest on the premise that any contract that the player has made in entering into competition is that he or she should have the benefit of honest “field of play’’ decisions, not necessarily correct ones’. It also directly addressed the justiciability of decisions made by officials as a result of the use of technology: ‘Each sport may have within it a mechanism for utilising modern technology to ensure a correct decision is made in the first place (eg cricket with run-outs) or for immediately subjecting a controversial decision to a process of review (eg gymnastics) but the solution for error, either way, lies within the framework of the sport’s own rules; it does not licence judicial or arbitral interference thereafter. If this represents an extension of the field of play doctrine, we tolerate it with equanimity. Finality is in this area all-important: rough justice may be all that sport can tolerate’.

B3.36 The fact that a sporting event has already been contested and a victor determined is a strong rationale not to interfere after the event, even in respect of potential misconduct. Referees and umpires are appointed to determine the result of the sporting context and there is a presumption that their decisions are honestly taken, if not always correct given the possibility of human error. Consequently, challenges to decisions taken on the pitch (whether regarding misconduct or goals scored or seeking to have fixtures replayed) are rarely successful.1 In order to succeed in an appeal before the CAS, for example, the appellant must show that the official’s decision was tainted by corruption, fraud or arbitrariness, which is a high hurdle.2 1 One example of a successful challenge arose during the 2012 Olympic Games: the result of the bantamweight bout between Magomed Abdulhamidov of Azerbaijan and Satoshi Shimizu of Japan was overturned on appeal and the referee from Turkmenistan was expelled from the Games. The referee had allowed the fight to continue despite the fact that the boxer from Azerbaijan had fallen to the canvas six times in the third round. The AIBA overturned the result, saying that the referee should have counted at least three knockdowns and stopped the bout. See also Romania and Spain v World Rugby, World Rugby Appeal Committee decision dated 6 June 2018 (it was determined that the Panel did have the power to order the match to be replayed but that there was insufficient evidence to justify doing so). 2 See Mendy v Association Internationale de Boxe (AIBA), CAS OG 96/006; Korean Olympic Committee v International Skating Union (ISU), CAS OG  02/007; Vanderlei De Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) v International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), CAS  2004/A/727; Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) v International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) & United States Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1641. See further, Beloff, ‘The Field of Play’, in Halsbury’s Laws of England: Centenary Essays 2007 (Lexis Nexis, 2007), pp 147–151.

B3.37 It remains to be seen whether the growth in the use of video technology will encourage more challenges to decisions taken by match officials, potentially including in relation to misconduct. The improvements in video technology will mean that it may be easier for participants to demonstrate after the fact that a clear error was made.1 1 An unsuccessful attempt to challenge the result of a competition was brought in the case of Rumyana Dimitrova Neykova v International Rowing Federation (FISA) & International Olympic Committee (IOC), CAS OG 00/012. The CAS heard a challenge against race results based on the accuracy of the technical photo finish and timing equipment used during a rowing race at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. The athlete was unable to demonstrate that the equipment was inaccurate, and the panel did not therefore determine the extent to which CAS could review a field of play decision made based upon faulty equipment. However, the panel acknowledged (at para 13) that the accuracy of technical equipment is ‘somewhat different to that of a typical official’s field of play decision’. The panel did not explicitly rule out a review of a decision based on faulty equipment, thereby leaving the issue open (although it seems likely that the circumstances in which a challenge will be justified will be few and far between).

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B3.38 In addition to challenges brought under the rules of the relevant sport, onfield incidents could potentially be challenged in other forums. In respect of decisions of match-officials, there is the potential issue of legal action as a result of on-field decisions. FIFA expressly provides in its rules that match officials shall not be held liable for ‘any other loss suffered by any individual, club, company, association or other body, which is due or which may be due to any decision taken under the terms of the Laws of the Game or in respect of the normal procedures required to hold, play and control a match’.1 There have been threats of legal action in rugby union seeking to have matches replayed because of errors by match officials (ie ‘gross negligence’ of the officiating team) but, to date, none have been successful.2 1 Law 7 of the FIFA Laws of the Game. 2 See for example ‘Bath Owner Bruce Craig writes to Champions Cup organisers to demand replay of Toulouse defeat’, The Times website, 19 October 2018.

4 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS B3.39 Chapter D1 deals with the disciplinary process generally. This section focuses on issues that arise specifically in respect of disciplinary proceedings for onfield misconduct.

A The disciplinary process B3.40 One of the key differences between disciplinary processes for on-field and off-field matters is that it is generally considered that on-field matters should be resolved quickly, so that sanctions are determined before the next match. This is important not only for the participant involved but also for opposing teams. By imposing any period of ineligibility immediately, it avoids the arbitrariness of sanctions being applied later in the season, which would inevitably lead to debate as to whether the timing of an individual’s ban benefited one club over another. It is critical for the integrity of sport that the scheduling of hearings is not used tactically.1 1 See for example Rugby Football Union v Rohan Janse Van Rensburg, RFU Appeal Panel decision dated 7 February 2020 (ruling that the RFU’s appeal should be heard prior to the Premiership Cup Semi-Final as ‘it is only fair that any Player affected by such proceedings, their Club and, of course, any opposing Club, should have certainty as to the playing status of those selected to play’). Van Rensburg, found not guilty at first instance, had been selected to play in this semi-final and his club, Sale, objected to the appeal hearing taking place on the day of the match.

B3.41 The processes put in place by sports to deal with the issue of any further sanction after a match will be sport specific and will take into account the following factors: (a) the need for speed; (b) complexity; (c) nature of offence; (d) likely response from the player (ie will he or she contest the case?); and (e) availability of panels – is a hearing in person required or can it be dealt with on papers or by telephone/video conference? B3.42 Given that decisions are often taken expeditiously in the week between sporting fixtures, SGBs need to have disciplinary panels that can be put together quickly to determine any additional sanctions. However, the importance of a speedy resolution must be balanced against the rights of the individual or club that has been charged. Should a participant require further time to consider their case (or if a governing body needs additional time to investigate), there needs to be flexibility within the rules to allow this to happen.

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B3.43 As addressed above,1 football and rugby union both have procedures that provide for the speedy resolution of cases involving on-field misconduct. Horseracing also has a quick process. Each race is reviewed in real time and a rapid decision is made in relation to any misconduct, including the calling of a stewards’ enquiry. A stewards’ enquiry is held immediately after the race, at which the jockey and/or trainer are questioned by experts in relation to any potential breach of the Rules of Racing.2 A decision is then made in relation to the alleged misconduct. This allows for a quick resolution to be made in relation to disqualification. This is particularly important in horseracing given the role of betting: a quick decision on disqualification is necessary to ensure that betting markets can pay out punters accordingly. 1 See paras B3.30 and B3.31. 2 Rules (H)21–(H)24 of the Rules of Racing.

B Evidence B3.44 In expedited proceedings relating to on-field misconduct, there are generally no formal rules of evidence, and a failure to comply with directions will not usually invalidate proceedings or result in evidence being excluded. Panels are generally given wide discretion to assess the evidence and to give it the weight they consider appropriate. However, the following general principles are often applied: (a) Expert evidence: the need for expert evidence will vary from sport to sport. However, there is often a view by panels (who should have been selected because they have the relevant expertise) that they are required to reach their own view on the particular incident.1 (b) Opinion of the match referee: generally sports take the view that the referee has too much of a vested interest (eg it may go towards the score he receives from an assessor) and, as a result, his opinion may either not be admitted or may carry limited, or no, weight. (c) Video evidence: this is likely to be the primary evidence in any on-field misconduct case. For respondents, it may be worth investigating whether footage is available that shows the incident from other angles. (d) Witnesses of fact: together with video evidence, this is likely to be the primary source of evidence. Panels will, however, give some care to assessing evidence given by teammates and opposing teams.2 1 See comments in relation to expert witnesses in Rugby Football Union v Matt Kvecic, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 January 2020 (‘As an appointed Panel of experts asked to deal with this rugby hearing they determined that they were able to deal with the case and make the decision based on the evidence already before them. There was no need for any additional evidence, opinion or otherwise’); Rugby Football Union v Gaby Lovobalavu, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 21 February 2018 (‘Panels should be slow, when discharging their duty to reach reasoned findings on the evidence, to have regard to such views. Panels are required to reach an independent determination, not rely on the views of others’). See also para 3.5 of Appendix 1 to World Rugby Regulation 18: ‘Judicial Committees should not permit the introduction of opinion evidence other than expert opinion evidence. Expert opinion evidence is only likely to be permitted when the evidence falls outside the everyday knowledge of members of the Judicial Committee or of the Judicial Officer’. 2 ICC  v Anderson & Jadeja, decision of Judicial Commissioner dated 3 August 2014 (the Judicial Commissioner took into account that the witnesses in this case were ‘hopelessly biased in favour of one party or the other’).

C Mens rea B3.45 Whether or not it is expressly provided for in the relevant rules, the mental state of a participant (ie his mens rea or ‘guilty mind’) may feature in an assessment of whether or not he is guilty of an on-field offence and/or (if he is guilty) of what the sanction should be. This might involve analysis of whether the participant acted, for example, intentionally, recklessly, or accidentally.

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B3.46 By analogy, under English criminal law, proof of intent is governed by s 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, which states that: ‘[a] court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence, (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable result of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence drawing such inferences from the evidence as appears proper in the circumstances’.

B3.47 As for recklessness, it was held by the House of Lords in R  v G  [2004] 1 AC 1034 that a person acts recklessly with respect to a particular result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur, and it is (in the circumstances known to him) unreasonable for him to take the risk. It need not be an ‘obvious and significant’ risk.1 1 See Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2020 (Sweet and Maxwell, 2013), para 1750.

B3.48 Under the relevant regulations, a governing body may have to prove that the player had a particular mens rea in order to sustain the charge brought against him. The position in rugby union was discussed in an appeal decision from the 2010 Six Nations Championship involving the Irish hooker Jerry Flannery, who was found guilty at first instance of kicking an opponent and suspended for a period of six weeks. The Six Nations Appeal Committee, chaired by the RFU’s HHJ Jeff Blackett, denied the appeal and upheld the original sanction, and on the question of mental state said: ‘The Law relating to kicking an opponent (Law 10(4)(c)) does not include a requirement for mens rea. It simply prohibits a player from kicking an opponent. However, when a Disciplinary Committee considers whether to sanction a player for an act of foul play an assessment of his intent at the time of the offending is important. If the act is entirely accidental then no offence has been committed and there is no sanction. If the act was not accidental the Disciplinary Committee must decide whether it was intentional (that is deliberate) or reckless. There is no separate classification of intent under the description of carelessness – an act which is careless and mistimed (to use the description of the offence used by Mr Barriscale) may be reckless in the context of rugby. That is, by being careless in mistiming his kick, the player may have known or should have known that there was a risk of committing an act of foul play. It would be a matter for the Disciplinary Committee to decide whether a careless act amounted to recklessness or was merely accidental within the context of rugby’.1 1 Jerry Flannery v Six Nations Limited, Six Nations Appeal Committee, 3 March 2010, unpublished.

B3.49 If the reasoning of the Appeal Committee in Flannery is correct, it means (at least in rugby union) that accidental acts will not be treated as foul play, but all other acts will be treated as foul play and will fall into one of two categories (intentional or reckless), the former being more serious than the latter. Accordingly, the line between accidental and reckless is an important one as it delineates foul play (and potential sanction) and non-foul play (with no potential sanction). And yet, in a rugby union context, there is often a degree of uncertainty as to whether a particular act was committed recklessly or accidentally, and the line between those two states has sometimes been blurred (unlike the line between intention and recklessness, which is usually relatively clear). B3.50 Take, for example, a rugby union player accused of stamping on an opponent player (which is an act of foul play pursuant to Law 9.12 of World Rugby’s Laws

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of the Game). If the tribunal finds that the player’s boot did make contact with an opponent as he brought it down (in effect, the objective actus reus of the offence) but is not persuaded that the player intended to make contact with the opponent (for example, finding instead that he was intending to put his foot down onto the pitch), the difficult question becomes whether his actions were reckless or accidental. The World Rugby Regulations state that ‘reckless’ means the player ‘knew (or should have known) there was a risk of committing an act of foul play’.1 It follows that ‘accidental’ means something along the lines of: the relevant player did not know (and it was reasonable for him not to have known) there was a risk of committing an act of foul play. Applying those tests to a given set of facts (such as the player stamping) may not be straightforward. 1 World Rugby Reg 17.19.2(b).

D Potential civil and criminal liability B3.51 Criminal and/or civil action against participants could also follow from misconduct on the field of play, at least where serious harm has resulted to the victims of the misconduct.1 For example, Duncan Ferguson became the first British international footballer to be jailed for assaulting a fellow professional on the field of play when he head-butted John McStay of Raith Rovers while playing for Glasgow Rangers.2 One possible defence to a civil action is that the risk of the harm suffered was part and parcel of playing the game and therefore the victim voluntarily assumed the risk of it (ie volenti non fit injuria3). In rugby union, it is directly contemplated in the regulations that conduct on the field that leads to a criminal conviction can also trigger a sporting sanction.4 1 See generally Chapter G1 (Civil Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport) and Chapter G2 (Criminal Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport). 2 Ferguson was jailed for three months having had two previous convictions for assault (see ‘Soccer player jailed for foul play’, Independent website, 12 October 1995). 3 A common law doctrine that states that if someone willingly places themself in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict. The more flagrant the foul play, however, the more difficult it will be to argue that the victim voluntarily accepted the risk of it. See further para G1.144 et seq. 4 RFU Reg 19.4.4. A case in which this arose is Rugby Football Union v John Scowby, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated February 2017 (the player was given a sanction of 16 months for kicking an opponent in the head causing the teeth to concave in (a period of suspension that the player, having also been convicted of a criminal offence, part-served in prison)).

B3.52 Self-defence is a defence to a criminal charge.1 However, in a sporting context self-defence is not an absolute defence to an act of on-field misconduct and, instead, it will just be taken into account when determining sanction.2 And that must be correct. The critical difference between action on a rugby pitch and ‘action’ outside a pub in a city centre (where self-defence would be an absolute defence) is that in the former there are three or more match officials on hand ready to act as quasi law-enforcers, preventing foul play and administering summary justice. 1 See eg Palmer v R [1971] AC 814 [PC] (‘It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. […] It may in some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent danger he may have to avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack is all over and no sort of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any link with a necessity of defence. Of all these matters the good sense of a jury will be the arbiter. There are no prescribed words

Misconduct  437 which must be employed […] in a summingup. All that is needed is a clear exposition, in relation to the particular facts of the case, of the conception of necessary selfdefence. If there has been no attack then clearly there will have been no need for defence. If there has been attack so that defence is reasonably necessary it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action. If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonably defensive action had been taken. […] The defence of self-defence either succeeds so as to result in an acquittal or it is disproved, in which case as a defence it is rejected’). See further para G2.61 et seq. 2 See eg the case of Six Nations v Dylan Hartley, Six Nations Disciplinary Committee decision dated 27  March 2012, in which the Panel rejected an argument from Hartley that because his opponent Stephen Ferris had first put his finger into Hartley’s mouth, Hartley’s subsequent bite was an act of self-defence, and therefore not capable of being an act of foul play.

E Interplay between criminal proceedings and misconduct charges B3.53 Issues can arise where the player has been charged with a criminal offence in respect of the conduct that also forms the basis of the misconduct charge. First, there is a question as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should proceed before the criminal proceedings are concluded.1 Secondly, there is the question of how the disciplinary panel should treat the outcome and/or findings of the criminal court (considered at Section 8D below). Finally, does the fact that the conduct was tantamount to a criminal offence affect the standard of proof?2 1 Many sports proceed on the basis that disciplinary proceedings should not go ahead until the criminal proceedings have been concluded. However, the law does not mandate this (see para D1.95), and The FA Disciplinary Regulations provide, at section (A)23, that ‘the fact that a Participant is liable to face or has pending any other criminal, civil, disciplinary or regulatory proceedings (whether public or private in nature) in relation to the same matter shall not prevent or fetter the Association commencing, conducting and/or concluding proceedings under the Rules’. Furthermore, Section (D)113–(D)115 of the FA Disciplinary Regulations prescribe a power for the FA to suspend an individual on an interim basis in circumstances where that individual has been ‘charged with a criminal offence’. 2 Re A Solicitor [1993] QB 69 at p 81 is authority by analogy for the proposition that where the alleged on-field conduct is tantamount to a criminal offence (which would be the case if it amounted to, for example, assault), the criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) should be applied, particularly in cases in which the relevant regulations are silent as to the applicable standard of proof. However, it is not a decision that has been universally accepted, and in any event most sports prescribe the applicable standard of proof in their rules as balance of probabilities or comfortable satisfaction: see further paras B3.181–B3.188. The CAS has rejected the suggestion that the criminal standard of proof should apply in doping cases (see para C5.2) or in match-fixing cases (see para B4.37).

F Sanctions B3.54 Decisions of SGB disciplinary tribunals do not bind subsequent tribunals. However, previous cases can be persuasive and are often taken into account by panels if only to ensure a degree of consistency.1 1 See para B1.30 for a discussion of the extent to which the principle of equal treatment means that ‘like cases must be treated alike’ when it comes to sanctions.

B3.55 There is also the issue of enforcing sanctions. Under World Rugby’s ‘universality’ principle,1 all suspensions must be applied worldwide, at all levels of the sport, so that (for example) a player who receives a four-week suspension for conduct that got him sent off in an international match might miss a number of club matches during the period of suspension. In contrast, suspensions arising from English football automatically apply to FA-sanctioned competitions only, and so do not apply to competitions sanctioned by UEFA or FIFA (instead, if The FA wants a sanction to apply internationally, it must apply to FIFA).2 Similarly, suspensions

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imposed by UEFA or FIFA for on-field matters arising in UEFA or FIFA sanctioned competitions will not automatically apply to domestic football.3 1 World Rugby Reg 17, Preamble, section D. 2 Under section 66 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, on application from a FIFA confederation, association or other organising sporting body, the sanction for a serious infringement can be extended to have worldwide effect. 3 It is worth noting that FIFA also has the power, under section 27(6) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, to investigate, prosecute and sanction serious infringements that fall under the jurisdiction of FIFA confederations and associations if ‘deemed appropriate in a specific case’ and if the ‘confederation, association or other sports organisation fails to prosecute serious infringements within three months from the infringement becoming known to the Disciplinary Committee’.

5 TYPES OF ON-FIELD OFFENCES A Physical/verbal abuse between participants B3.56 One of the most common forms of on-field misconduct is physical and verbal abuse. In many sports players sometimes seek to gain a psychological advantage by winding each other up verbally. It is also accepted that emotions often run high in contact sports and players will let off steam towards one another, including through the use of strong or ‘industrial’ language that would be unacceptable off the pitch but which neither party feels particularly aggrieved about on the pitch. Nevertheless, abusive or insulting language on the field of play may lead to disciplinary sanction after the fact.1 1 Nick Kyrgios has been sanctioned on a number of occasions for verbal abuse. See for example ‘ATP Completes Review with Kyrgios Incident’, ATP Press Release, 24 August 2015, which involved verbal abuse towards another player, Stan Wawrinka, during a match in Montreal. See also World Rugby v Joe Marler, independent Judicial Committee decision dated 5 April 2016 (the player was sanctioned (on the basis that this was an aggravated breach) for calling Samson Lee of Wales a ‘gypsy boy’ during a Six Nations fixture between England and Wales).

B3.57 However, physical abuse is a dismissal/disqualification offence in most sports. Physical abuse cases range from the more extreme cases of eye gouging,1 biting,2 testicle-grabbing,3 or fighting4 to more minor cases of pushing fellow participants.5 1 See eg Football Association v Moussa Dembele, FA Regulatory Commission decision 6 May 2016 (Dembele was banned for six matches for a breach of FA Rule (E)3 as a result of eye gouging, which constituted violent conduct); ECPR v Chris Ashton, EPCR Independent Judicial Officer decision dated 20 January 2016 (Ashton was suspended for 10 weeks for making contact with an opponent’s eyes). 2 See eg Luis Suárez, FC Barcelona & Uruguayan Football Association v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3665, 3666 & 3667 (the Uruguayan and Barcelona player was fined and suspended from playing in official matches at any level for four months for biting an opponent); Rugby Football Union v Chris Ashton, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 September 2016 (the England international was suspended for 13 weeks for biting an opponent). 3 See eg Six Nations v Joe Marler (England), Six Nations Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 March 2020 (Marler was given a suspension of 10 weeks for grabbing the testicles of Alun Wyn Jones of Wales during a Six Nations fixture). 4 See eg the on-field fight between Lee Bowyer and Kieron Dyer (both of Newcastle) (‘Bowyer given three game ban for brawl’, Telegraph website, 23 April 2005). 5 Rangers and Celtic were both fined £7,500 for a breach of Disciplinary Rule 204 of the SFA Regulations (‘where three or more players and/or members of Team Staff from one team are involved in a confrontation with opposing players and/or members of Team Staff of the opposing team during and/or directly after a match’) (‘Celtic and Rangers fined £7,500 each for Old Firm derby brawl’, BBC Sport website, 2 May 2019).

B3.58 Where abuse strays into certain areas (eg racial abuse), higher sanctions can apply. For example, under The FA’s Rules E3(1) and E3(2):

Misconduct  439 ‘[an] Aggravated Breach of Rule E3(1) is committed where any reference to race is made in the course of abusive and insulting behaviour (or in the course of any other breach of Rule E3(1))’.1

Any reference to other specified characteristics of ethnic origin, colour, nationality, religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation or disability is also considered an aggravated breach under Rule E3(1), and is similarly likely to be considered a more serious form of breach in other sports.2 Such abuse can also amount to a criminal offence.3 Sport’s desire for inclusivity and the upholding of core values (see para B3.3) provides another justification for prohibiting such abuse. The aim of sports is to create an environment that encourages maximum participation, and so any behaviour must be dealt with strictly where it causes any group to feel they may be excluded from, or victimised within, a particular sport. 1 See eg Football Association v Sophie Jones, Regulatory Commission decision 19 March 2019 (the player received a five-match suspension, a fine of £200 and was required to attend an FA educational course after being found guilty of an ‘aggravated breach’ on the basis of having directed monkey noises towards Renee Hector). 2 See eg  England and Wales Cricket Board v Andrew Gale, decision issued in October 2014 (Gale was given a four match ban for ‘using language or gesture that is obscene or of a serious insulting nature’ as a result of using the word ‘kolpak’ towards Ashwell Prince) (see ‘Andrew Gale: Yorkshire captain given second ban for abuse’, BBC Sport website, 3 October 2014); World Rugby v Joe Marler, Independent Judicial Committee Decision dated 5 April 2016 (the player was required to make a donation of £20,000 to charity and was given a two-match ban for calling Samson Lee of Wales a ‘gypsy boy’ during a Six Nations fixture between England and Wales). 3 Criminal charges were brought for on-field racist language towards opponents in the cases of John Terry (see ‘John Terry cleared of racism against Anton Ferdinand, BBC News website, 13 July 2012) and Fernando Forestieri (see more details of the criminal case referenced in Football Association v Forestieri, FA  Regulatory Commission decision dated 24  July 2019). Both were acquitted of the criminal charges but served disciplinary sanctions handed down by FA Regulatory Commissions. See further discussion of the John Terry case at para G2.91.

B3.59 Most SGB rules prohibit misconduct by all participants, which therefore includes officials, coaches,1 managers,2 and other support staff, which is important given their influence and proximity to on-field proceedings. 1 For example in ITF v Nastase, SR/913/2017, the Romanian team coach Ilie Nastase was suspended from acting in an official capacity for three years, denied access and accreditation for competitions for one year, and fined $20,000. During a Fed Cup tennis match between Romania and Great Britain, Nastase made abusive and threatening comments to the match officials and to members of the Great Britain team, and engaged in ‘unfair conduct by intentionally interfering with the competition of British player Johanna Konta and compromising her wellbeing’). 2 See eg Football Association v Alan Pardew, Regulatory Commission decision dated 11 March 2014 (Alan Pardew, then manager of Newcastle United, was given a ban of seven matches (three for stadium ban and four as a touchline ban) and a fine of £60,000 for head-butting David Meyler of Hull City); Football Association v Gus Poyet, Regulatory Commission decision dated 3 March 2015 (Gus Poyet, then manager of Sunderland, was given a fine of £4,000 for ‘improper conduct’ as a result of kicking over of a drinks barrel following an on-field decision of the referee); Football Association v Francesco Becchetti, Regulatory Commission decision dated 15 January 2015 (Becchetti, owner and President of Leyton Orient, was given a stadium ban of six matches and a fine of £40,000 for kicking the Leyton Orient assistant manager at the end of the match). In Ignasi Casas Vaque v Federation Equestre Internationale, CAS  2019/A/6202, a veterinarian who was serving as the Spanish team’s Chef d’Equipe was sanctioned for misconduct, in particular abusing officials and calling them cheats.

B3.60 Finally, it is worth noting that while abusive language cases have elements in common with other on-field cases (incidents are likely to be brief and factually straightforward), they often differ in one significant respect: they are unlikely to be caught on video or, where they are, the crucial audio element of the incident may not have been recorded.1 This means that investigating these cases may take longer than other on-field cases, and it may not be possible to investigate them fully within time constraints that would otherwise apply. In the absence of audio evidence (or an admission of guilt), the hearing may have to rely on witness evidence to confirm what was said.2 Lip-reading (or ‘speech reading’) evidence may not provide the answer,

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depending on the facts of the case.3 Aside from the time factor of gathering this witness evidence, the only witness may be the person allegedly abused, as abuse is less likely to be said when the referee is able to hear it and crowd noise means that even participants who are nearby may not be able to hear. The evidence in such cases, based on one word against one another, can be very finely balanced.4 1 See eg Rugby Football Union v Denny Solomona, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 April 2018 (the RFU only had the evidence of the alleged victim player against that of the alleged perpetrator); ICC v Anderson & Jadeja, decision of Judicial Commissioner, 3 August 2014 (whilst there was video evidence of the players together on the field of play, the Judicial Commissioner stated that ‘without audio of the incident, I am not comfortably satisfied that the incident as described by Dhoni and Jadeja took place as they describe’, and noted that the witnesses in the case were ‘hopelessly biased in favour of one party or the other’). 2 See eg Football Association v Jay Rodriguez, Regulatory Commission decision dated 11 April 2018. 3 See R v Luttrell and others, [2004] EWCA Crim 1344, for a discussion of the issues that can arise in relation to ‘speech reading’ evidence. 4 For a detailed consideration of the issues that can arise in verbal abuse cases, including how witness evidence should be assessed, see Football Association v Luiz Suarez, Regulatory Commission decision dated 30 December 2011. See also the discussion of the John Terry case at para G2.91.

B Abuse of match officials B3.61 All sports prohibit both verbal and physical abuse of match officials. For instance, the ECB Code of Conduct provides that ‘players and team officials must at all times accept the umpire’s decision. Players must not show dissent at the umpire’s decision’ and ‘players and team officials shall not intimidate, assault or attempt to intimidate or assault an umpire’. Match official abuse ranges from the use of foul language1 to verbal abuse that questions the integrity of match officials (eg calling a match official a cheat2) up to physical abuse. Verbal abuse that questions the integrity of a match official is usually seen as being more serious than foul language alone, as it goes to the heart of a match official’s role as an independent decision-maker.3 1 See the example of Fabio Fognini who was fined $96,000 and given a suspended Grand Slam ban (to cover the next two Grand Slams) for verbally abusing a female umpire (ie committing a ‘major offence of aggravated behaviour and conduct contrary to the integrity of the game’) at the US Open in September 2017 (see ‘Fabio Fognini: Italian fined £72,806 and gets suspended ban for US Open outburst’, BBC Sport website, 11 October 2017). Similarly, Romanian tennis player Irina Spirlea was disqualified in 1996 for directing abusive language at a match official. 2 See eg RFL v Joel Tomkins, Independent Operational Rules Tribunal decision dated 5 March 2019 (the player was given a two-match ban and £500 fine after calling the official a ‘cheat’). 3 See the Serena Williams incident at the US Open 2018, where Williams called the umpire a ‘liar’ and a ‘thief’ and was subsequently fined by the USTA (as reported on the BBC Sport website, ‘US Open 2018: Serena Williams fined over outbursts during final’, 9 September 2018). See also Ignasi Casas Vaque v Federation Equestre Internationale, CAS 2019/A/6202, where a veterinarian who was serving as the Spanish team’s Chef d’Equipe was sanctioned for misconduct, in particular abusing officials and calling them cheats.

B3.62 Most sports prohibit any intentional physical contact with a referee, however minor. This reflects the vulnerable position that a referee is in while on the field of play (particularly at grass roots level).1 The significant bans given for physical or verbal abuse of referees are on occasion criticised as being unduly harsh when compared to bans given for negligent or reckless dangerous tackles that have the potential to cause significant injury. However, arguments against this view include the need to ensure that match officials do not leave the game, that others are encouraged to take up officiating, that dangerous tackles are part of the game, but abuse of officials is never necessary. 1 See Rugby Football Union v Barry Lockwood, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 29 September 2014 (the player was given a 20-year ban for punching the match official); and the Northern Ireland Combined Counties League 40-year ban for three Mullingar Town players following the attack on match official Daniel Sweeney (‘Referee attack: Three players given 40-year bans for assault on Daniel Sweeney’, BBC Sport website, 23 November 2018).

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B3.63 One common challenge in prosecuting cases of verbal abuse of referees is that often the only witness is the match official. Although referees in some sports (not football) now wear microphones so that their audio can be broadcast live, they are often not sensitive enough to pick up comments from players. As neutral decisionmakers, there is no obvious reason for officials not to tell the truth, and therefore tribunals are likely to accept their evidence. In addition, while usually it will not be possible to hear the abuse on the footage of the match, the footage will often provide evidence of the reason why a player might have abused a referee (for instance, decisions that go against the player) and/or that might demonstrate the state of mind of the player at the time (for instance, the footage might show the player getting increasingly annoyed and gesticulating towards the match official). B3.64 The FA introduced ‘Stage One Warnings’ for technical area occupants, resulting in automatic touchline bans for accumulated warnings (given during the match rather than retrospectively).1 Offences that merit a Stage One Warning include throwing or kicking objects, disrespectful gestures towards officials, provocative or inflammatory motions, gesturing for cards to be shown, and time wasting. Unlike the punishments for players accumulating yellow and red cards, there is no cut-off point in the season beyond which these warnings are wiped out. More serious touchline offences, such as violent conduct, aggressive behaviour, spitting, or entering the field of play to confront match officials can still result in the manager or coach in question being sent from the dugout and charged with misconduct.2 It will be interesting to see how this new mechanism impacts on the instances of match official abuse. 1 For example, four Stage 1 warnings equal 1 match suspension pursuant to Section 4 of Part D of the FA Disciplinary Regulations. 2 See Football Association v Mauricio Pochettino, Regulatory Commission decision dated 4  March 2019 (Pochettino was given a two-match ban and fined £10,000 for approaching the match official in an aggressive manner).

C Cheating B3.65 ‘Cheating’, or deliberately infringing the rules of the game in order to gain an advantage, covers a variety of different types of conduct, some of which are worse than others. Cheating may be dealt with by the officials during the match and/or by the SGB following the event. B3.66 At one end of the scale are intentional, but likely ‘spur of the moment’, incidents such as ‘intentional offending’ in rugby union (such as a deliberate knockon) or time-wasting, which will be penalised at the time and may result in a yellow or red card. So-called ‘simulation’ in football (where a player pretends that he has been fouled in an attempt to persuade the match officials to award him a free kick or penalty) is (when detected) usually met with a caution for ‘unsporting behaviour’.1 1 See eg Football Association v Oumar Niasse, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 November 2017, para 15 (‘To the minds of the Commission members the movements of Mr Niasse’s body, in particular the arching of the back and the collapsing of both legs, were simply not consistent with the amount of force exerted upon him by Mr Dann and in exaggerating the effect of the contact made between himself and Mr Dann, Mr Niasse deceived the referee and this led to a penalty being awarded by the referee’. Niasse received a two-match match suspension).

B3.67 Pre-meditated cheating is generally considered a more serious offence. One such incident is the infamous ‘ball-tampering’ (with sandpaper) incident, which featured three members of the Australian cricket team. When approached for an explanation at a press conference during the test match, the players said that the item used to tamper with the ball was a bit of tape to which dirt and grit had attached. Following an investigation, it transpired that the item used was sandpaper. Bancroft

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was charged by the match referee and fined 75 per cent of his match fee and Smith was charged by the ICC and fined 100 per cent of his match fee. Cricket Australia elected to take further action and, pursuant to Cricket Australia’s Code of Conduct, imposed lengthy playing bans and other restrictions on their future involvement in cricket.1 This is a good example of circumstances where there may be a twotier process for dealing with on-field offences. Another example of pre-meditated cheating is the European Rugby case against Harlequins and others in 2009, known as ‘Bloodgate’, where a player bit into a blood capsule that he had concealed in his sock, to fake a blood injury that would mean he could be substituted for a specialist kicker in the final minutes of a semi-final match.2 An area that may be at risk of exploitation in the future is the abuse of the head injury assessments for concussion.3 1 The sanctions were as follows: Warner (12-month ban and no consideration for team leadership in future), Smith (12-month ban and restrictions on leadership in future), and Bancroft (nine months and restrictions on leadership in future). 2 ERC v Harlequins & others, ERC Appeal Tribunal decision dated 17 August 2009. 3 Investigations have taken place in relation to the use of head injury assessments on a limited number of occasions to date (both of which concluded with no case to answer): France and Wales during the 2018 Six Nations (see ‘Six Nations: France will not be punished for head injury assessments against Ireland’, BBC  Sport website, 15  February 2018); Ireland and France during the 2018 Six Nations (see ‘Six Nations to review HIA protocol from France versus Ireland match’, the Guardian website, 4 February 2018). For a more general discussion in relation to HIAs see ‘Rugby’s concussion reviews are “not fit for purpose’’, says brain expert’, BBC Sport website, 21 April 2017.

B3.68 Other forms of misconduct could fall in a category of ‘cheating the audience’, rather than cheating to gain an advantage. One example of this is ‘tanking’,1 which occurs most notably in tennis2 and snooker,3 although there have also been charges in horseracing for failing to run a horse ‘on its merits’ or to ‘achieve the best possible placing’.4 The rules in tennis stipulate that: ‘[a] player shall use his best efforts during the match when competing in a tournament. Violation of this section shall subject a player to a fine up to $20,000 for each violation’.

Umpires have the authority to penalise players in breach of this rule in accordance with the Point Penalty Schedule. This type of misconduct is discussed further in the match-fixing chapter, at paras B4.9 and B4.21. 1 For example, the Badminton World Federation (BWF) disqualified eight participants at the London 2012 Olympics after charges for ‘not using their best efforts’ and ‘conducting oneself in a manner that is clearly abusive or detrimental to sport’ (see ‘Olympics badminton: Eight women disqualified from doubles’, BBC Sport website, 1 August 2012). 2 The ATP  Rulebook, VIII (The Code), section 8.04 (Player Code of Conduct), subsection h) Best Efforts. Nick Kygrios was fined €10,000 for failing to use best efforts in the 2016 Shanghai Masters tournament (‘ATP sanctions Kyrgios’, ATP  Press Release, 17  October 2016). See also an incident involving Bernard Tomic, who was fined his full Wimbledon prize money of £45,000 for not meeting the ‘required professional standard’ during a match at the 2019 Wimbledon Championships (‘Wimbledon 2019: Bernard Tomic fined for not meeting ‘professional standards’, BBC Sport website, 4 July 2019). 3 See eg  when Ronnie O’Sullivan refused to pot the black ball to complete a 147 break (‘Ronnie O’Sullivan passes up 147 break at Welsh Open as prize is ‘too cheap’, the Guardian website, 15 February 2016). 4 See Rule (F)37 and (F)38 of the Rules of Racing.

D Mechanical doping B3.69 In recent years mechanical doping has been a high-profile issue in cycling. Mechanical doping, or ‘technological fraud’ as the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) refers to it, involves the use of a motor, electromagnet, or other device to power a rider’s bicycle. At its most basic, mechanical doping involves the use of

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unauthorised equipment in a sporting contest. This clearly poses a risk to the integrity of the sport, the credibility of race results, and the ‘spirit’ of cycling.1 1 See the UCI regulations, Chapter III (Equipment), Section 2: ‘Bicycles shall comply with the spirit and principle of cycling as a sport. The spirit presupposes that cyclists will compete in competitions on an equal footing. The principle asserts the primacy of man over machine’.

B3.70 Mechanical doping has been expressly prohibited by the UCI.1 A  cyclist found to have breached the regulations could be suspended for a minimum of six months and given a fine of between CHF20,000 and 200,000 (approximately £15,000 to £150,000). A team found to have breached the regulations could also be suspended for a minimum of six months and issued a fine of between CHF100,000 and CHF1,000,000 (approximately £75,000 to £750,000). 1 Article  1.3.010 of UCI  Regulations states: ‘The bicycle shall be propelled solely, through a chain set, by the legs (inferior muscular chain) moving in a circular movement, without electric or other assistance’. Article 12.1.013 prohibits the presence or use (within the margins of a cycling competition) of a bicycle that does not comply with Art 1.3.010.

B3.71 Like anti-doping and betting monitoring, there is an element of sophistication required in order to police mechanical doping. The UCI uses a number of methods to check for motors and other prohibited devices: it has developed a specialist tablet to scan bicycles using magnetic resonance testing, and makes use of thermal cameras, visual and physical bicycle checks, and x-ray scans. B3.72 The first ‘positive’ case of mechanical doping occurred at the UCI Cyclocross World Championships in February 2016.1 The UCI detected a concealed electric motor in the seat tube of the bicycle of Femke Van den Driessche following magnetic resonance testing scans in the pit area. The rider denied knowledge of the motor but did not defend herself at a hearing. The UCI Disciplinary Commission imposed a suspension of six years, a fine of CHF20,000, and disqualification of a number of results (including her European and Belgian Under-23 titles). This sanction is significantly higher than the minimum sanction in the UCI regulations, suggesting that the breach was taken extremely seriously, and the case was considered to demonstrate culpability at the higher end of the spectrum. There have not yet been any challenges to the regulations or scrutiny of the regulations during a contested hearing. There are a number of issues that are therefore still to be considered, including the apparent strict liability nature of the offence, and the evidence required in order to prove a breach (particularly rider or team knowledge and responsibility for a non-compliant bicycle). 1 See ‘The UCI announces Disciplinary Commission decision in the case of Femke Van den Driessche’, (2016) LawinSport, 26 April. The reasoned decision is not published.

B3.73 Mechanical doping may also amount to a criminal offence. For example, Cyril Fontayne, a French amateur rider was sentenced by the Criminal Court of Périgueux  after pleading guilty to ‘technological cheating’.1 The Criminal Court sentenced the rider to 60 hours of community service and made an order for damages to be paid to the French Cycling Federation (FCF) and the race organiser. The sports disciplinary consequences were not dealt with by the UCI but rather by the FCF (given the level of cycling at which the rider participated). It imposed a five-year ban from the sport on the rider in December 2017. 1 See ’43-year-old amateur motor doper receives his punishment … including a €1 fine’, the Cycling Weekly website, 14 March 2018.

B3.74 It remains to be seen to what extent mechanical doping will grow in other sports. The most vulnerable sports are those in which athletes rely on mechanical

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and technologically advanced equipment: for example, sports such as sailing,1 motor sport, and certain Paralympic sports. One example from sailing is the case of Dirk de Ridder v International Sailing Federation,2 in which it was found that the sailor had given instructions to two shore crew in his team illegally to add weight to the forward kingpost of the AC 45 boat 4 (to improve its performance) in breach of the Racing Rules of Sailing. He was banned for 18 months. 1 See the Misconduct Guidance document issued by World Sailing, and the investigation into Iker Martinez following a report of misconduct in relation to the mechanics of the boat which resulted in no further action (‘No further action by World Sailing in Martinez misconduct protest’, Sailweb website, 27 February 2019). 2 CAS/2014/A/3620. See also ‘Sailing through sports disciplinary proceedings’, Nick De Marco QC, Blackstone Sports Law Bulletin, 20 January 2015.

B3.75 Well-drafted and properly enforced regulations are critical to managing the impact of new technologies in sports equipment. As ever, there is an ongoing battle between those seeking to develop prohibited technologies and the development of means of detection, and SGBs must ensure that detection methods keep up with such developments and remain effective. Publicity, effective testing,1 and strong sanctions help to deter cheating and indicate to fans and to honest athletes that the sport’s governing body is serious about protecting the sport from the potential risks that new technology may bring. In the case of mechanical doping, strong sanctions are likely to be viewed as proportionate due to the subversive and highly prejudicial nature of the conduct. The policing of mechanical doping needs to be properly resourced as there is always a risk that in sports where athletes are professional and, therefore, better funded and have access to equipment experts, the SGBs could be left behind. 1 In sailing, appointed individuals known as ‘measurers’ carry out pre-event equipment inspections – see the ‘Equipment Rules of Sailing’. Whether this should be done pre-event, during the event or postevent will depend on the specificity of each sport.

E Political statements B3.76 Most sports seek to operate in a politically neutral environment. The neutrality of sport is recognised in the IOC’s Olympic Charter as one of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism.1 Where participants make political statements in or around the field of play, they may be subject to a charge of misconduct.2 1 See Olympic Charter, Principle 5: ‘Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality. They have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied’. See further paras A1.2 and A1.3. 2 See ‘Politics and sport: How FIFA, UEFA and the IOC regulate political statements by athletes’, Charles Maurice, published on LawInSport. In 2018, after Colin Kaepernick and other NFL players started kneeling during the pre-match playing of the national anthem to protest against police racism and brutality, the NFL owners unanimously approved a new national anthem policy that required players to stand if they were on the field of play but gave them the option to remain in the dressing room if they so wished (‘New policy requires on-field players, personnel to stand for anthem’, ESPN website, 23 May 2018). It was anticipated that those who fell foul of this policy would be subject to misconduct charges, but the policy was suspended following legal action brought by NFL  Players Association (‘NFL anthem policy on hold under standstill agreement’, NFL website, 19 July 2018) and players continued to kneel during the national anthem (see ‘Football’s “woke” moment is over’, Vox website, 28 October 2019).

B3.77 In the case of Football Association v Pep Guardiola,1 Guardiola wore a yellow ribbon whilst in the technical area during matches. The yellow ribbon was found to be ‘undoubtedly a symbol of protest against the imprisonment of Catalonian independence figures in Spain, and also a sign of solidarity with those imprisoned’.

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Guardiola was first warned by The FA, but after displaying the ribbon in a further match was charged with a breach of Rule E1(b) in respect of a breach of Regulation A4 of the Football Association’s Kit and Advertising Regulations. The Regulatory Commission rejected an argument that Guardiola displayed it inadvertently when he unzipped his jacket. The panel imposed a fine of £20,000. 1 Football Association v Pep Guardiola, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 March 2018.

B3.78 In 2016  FIFA took disciplinary action against the Scottish and English Football Associations after both teams wore poppies (commemorating Remembrance Sunday in the UK) in a fixture on 11  November 2016. Following a fine by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, the matter was appealed to CAS. The case led to a relaxing of the FIFA rules and the appeals were withdrawn.1 1 For full details of this case, see an article from Neeraj Thomas, ‘FIFA’s evolving stance on commemorative symbols: The Poppy appeal case’, (2018) LawinSport, 21  February. The FA was charged with a breach of Law 4(4) (as it was at the time) of the FIFA  Laws of the Game which stipulated that equipment must not have any ‘political, religious or personal slogans, statements or images’.

F Abuse of spectators B3.79 The rules of all sports prohibit the abuse of spectators by players or team officials, either by way of a specific rule or by way of a more general misconduct rule. In football, for example, neither the relevant Law of the Game (Law 12, under which the referee would take action for abusive language or gestures during the game) nor Rule E3(1) (under which The FA would take action after a game) requires the abuse to have been aimed at a fellow participant for a breach to occur. Abuse aimed at a spectator is therefore caught by both provisions. B3.80 Probably the most infamous example of spectator abuse involved French international footballer Eric Cantona (whilst playing for Manchester United), when he kung-fu kicked a spectator in the crowd at Crystal Palace followed by a series of punches of the fan in question. Cantona was arrested and convicted for assault, resulting in a two-week prison sentence, which was overturned on appeal and instead he was sentenced to 120 hours of community service.1 Manchester United suspended Cantona for the remaining four months of the 1994/1995 season and fined him two weeks’ wages. The FA extended the suspension to 30 September 1995 (which FIFA then applied worldwide). In 2019 Brazilian footballer, Neymar, was banned for three matches by the French Football Federation for ‘lashing out’ at a spectator from Rennes (whilst playing for PSG).2 1 R v Cantona, (1995) The Times, 25 March, discussed further at para G2.59. 2 See ‘Neymar gets three-match ban for Coupe de France fan altercation’, ESPN website, 10 May 2019

B3.81 European Rugby dealt with an incident of physical abuse of a spectator in 2007 when Toulouse player Trevor Brennan entered the stand during a Heineken Cup match with Ulster and repeatedly punched an Ulster fan in the head. He was banned for life (reduced to five years on appeal) and fined €25,000.1 Significant sanctions are justified in such cases in order to protect spectators. 1 Brennan v ERC, ERC Appeal Tribunal decision dated 1 June 2007.

B3.82 Perhaps more common, however, are incidents of verbal exchanges between players and spectators.1 It is rare that these can be dealt with in accordance with the standard expedited procedures for on-field incidents, as they often require a full investigation, including interviewing witnesses to determine the circumstances and appropriate action. There may also be a concurrent police investigation, which could

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slow progress. In many cases, spectator abuse by players or officials occurs as a result of significant provocation by spectators.2 This is not a defence to a charge, though it may be a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate sanction. 1 See eg  European Professional Club Rugby v Delon Armitrage, Appeal Committee decision dated 22 January 2015 (Armitrage’s sanction was reduced on appeal from a 12 week to an eight week ban, after he was found to have ‘conducted himself in an unsportsmanlike manner by making a number of comments to (or within earshot of) spectators including in some cases a number of children and had used foul and abusive language by shouting and swearing in a very threatening manner at and inviting spectators, in effect, to engage with him in a physical exchange’). 2 For example, in April 2020 The FA charged Eric Dier of Tottenham Hotspur for a breach of FA Rule (E)3 for entering the stands following alleged abuse of his brother by a spectator. It was alleged that his actions were improper and/or threatening. In July 2020, the charge was upheld and Dier was banned for four matches (theguardian.com/football/2020/jul/25/eric-dier-tottenham-abuse-from-supporterstaken-more-seriously) [accessed 2 November 2020].

G Vicarious/strict liability of clubs for conduct of their own spectators B3.83 The reason that participants, primarily clubs, are made responsible for the conduct of spectators is that they are responsible for the safety of players, staff and other spectators. B3.84 In football, The FA rules provide that clubs are vicariously liable when their spectators (and crucially ‘all persons purporting to be its supporters or followers’) conduct themselves in ways proscribed by the rules.1 For example, after Jack Grealish was assaulted on the field of play by a spectator,2 Birmingham City was given a fine of £42,500 for breaching Rule (E)20(a) and (b) – the first for an assault by a spectator in a number of years. Birmingham City sought to rely on the prescribed defence that ‘all events, incidents or occurrences complained of were the result of circumstances over which it had no control, or for reasons of crowd safety, and that its responsible officers or agents had used all due diligence to ensure that its said responsibility was discharged’.3 The burden rested on the club to prove the defence on the balance of probabilities. The defence was rejected by the Regulatory Commission, which determined that had Birmingham City exercised all due diligence in respect of the risk of pitch incursion, the spectator would have been prevented from reaching the pitch. 1 See the full list of proscribed conduct in Rule (E)20 of the FA Regulations. As a comparator in Spanish football, see Josep F Vandellos Alamilla, ‘An overview of the regulations on pitch invasions in Spanish Football’ (2019) LawinSport, 12 June. 2 Football Association v Birmingham City FC, Regulatory Commission decision dated 16 September 2019. The spectator was sentenced to 14 weeks’ imprisonment, fined and banned from attending any football match in the UK for 10 years. In addition, Birmingham City imposed a lifetime ban on him attending any club fixture. 3 See also Football Association v Reading, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5 August 2015; Football Association v Aston Villa, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18  May 2015 (Aston Villa was fined £200,000); Football Association v West Ham, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 January 2019; Football Association v Arsenal, Regulatory Commission dated 10 June 2019.

B3.85 UEFA also holds clubs strictly liable for the behaviour of their supporters at matches in UEFA tournaments.1 The case of Olympique Lyonnais v UEFA2 provides useful guidance in relation to what may qualify as mitigating factors (such as previous records pertaining to crowd disturbances and security measures taken) and the required threshold that clubs seeking to advance any mitigation have to meet. UEFA also has guidelines for officials to respond to crowd trouble during matches.3 1 See Arts 6 and 11(c) of the UEFA  Disciplinary Regulations. See eg  GNK  Dinamo v UEFA CAS 2013/A/3324 & CAS 2013/A/3369, para 9.24 (the panel ‘determined that strict liability for the behaviour of a club’s supporters is neither inconsistent with Article  6 of the European Convention

Misconduct  447 on Human Rights or Swiss Procedural Public Policy (see para.103 of [Fenerbahce SK  v UEFA CAS 2013/A/3139]), nor violative of the legal principle of Nulla Poena Sine Lege. (Ditto) see further CAS 2013/A/3094 Hungarian Football Federation v FIFA paras 85-90’). Glasgow Celtic were fined €35,760 (half suspended) after being found guilty of a lack of organisation and improper conduct by supporters at the match with AC Milan (see ‘Dida banned, Celtic fined’, UEFA Disciplinary Notice, 12 October 2007). 2 CAS  2017/A/5299 (French club Olympique Lyonnais were given a fine and a suspended sentence by UEFA following crowd trouble during their home UEFA Europa League 2016/2017 Quarter-final match with Turkish club Beşiktaş JK). 3 Since 2009, UEFA has had official guidelines in place to help match officials handle incidents of racism inside stadiums. These guidelines prescribe a three-step process upon becoming aware of racist behaviour: (1) the power to stop the game and request an announcement over the public address system; (2) if the racist behaviour does not cease after the game has restarted, the power to suspend the match for a reasonable period of time; and (3) if the racist behaviour continues after a second restart, the referee can abandon the match. For an example of the UEFA three-step protocol in practice, see an article following the Bulgaria v England UEFA Euro 2020 qualifier in Bulgaria: ‘England stand tall on shameful night of racism in Bulgaria’, BBC Sport website, 15 October 2019.

B3.86 In Scottish football, the Scottish Football Association sought to introduce a regime of strict liability in respect of club liability for spectator conduct. However, it did not get support from the required majority of clubs.1 There have been moves by the devolved Scottish Parliament to step in and create strict liability legislation,2 but none has been passed to date. 1 See ‘Strict liability: Only three SPFL clubs support misbehaviour measure’, BBC  Sport website, 26 March 2019. 2 One such example was the Football (Strict Liability) (Scotland) Bill, but the consultation closed in 2017 with no progress.

B3.87 Where the rules of a sport do not contain express provisions, the SGB may rely on general provisions to bring misconduct charges.1 1 See, as an example, the case of Rugby Football Union v Southend & Colchester, RFU Disciplinary Panel, 11 January 2017 (charges were brought against Southend under RFU Rule 5.12 (the general misconduct charging power) for a failure to control the behaviour of their spectators).

6 REGULATING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT B3.88 Sections 6 to 8 of this chapter look at first, the role of and justification for provisions regulating off-field misconduct, secondly, considerations when drafting and enforcing misconduct provisions, and finally, examples of different types of off-field misconduct, including the issues that arise when bringing enforcement proceedings, and defences that might be raised.

A The justification for regulating off-field misconduct B3.89 In recent years there has been an increase in the number of cases in which charges have been brought for off-field misconduct. The range of conduct that has resulted in charges has also expanded. Before looking at how different sports approach misconduct, it is helpful to consider what the rationale is for regulating off-field misconduct. This is not merely an academic question. The purpose of provisions prohibiting off-field misconduct should be reflected in how they are drafted and enforced, in order to ensure that the rules and the way they are applied are proportionate.1 1 See paras B1.19 et seq and B1.31 et seq.

B3.90 There is no dispute that on-field conduct should be regulated. However, it could be asked why athletes’ conduct out of competition should be regulated at all. It

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might be said that once the match ends, athletes should simply be subject to the same laws of the land as any other individual. B3.91 Most sports have, however, already made significant inroads into regulating the off-field conduct of participants. The primary reason is that misconduct by participants can have negative consequences for the sport. In particular, a significant concern for SGBs is that off-field misconduct could affect the commercial value of the sport (for example by putting off sponsors,1 reducing ticket sales, or putting public funding at risk) and/or dissuade the public from participating in the sport, which in itself has financial consequences. Harm to the reputation and financial position of the sport can, of course, have repercussions for the sport more broadly. A  further consideration for SGBs might be that they wish to defend the core values that they proclaim to be at the heart of their sport, and therefore to punish participants who fail to act as the role models they are widely expected to be.2 1 For example, in 2019 Diageo ended its long-term sponsorship of London Irish following the club’s signing of Paddy Jackson, who had been found not guilty of rape the previous year (‘Guinness owners Diageo end London Irish sponsorship over Paddy Jackson signing’, Independent, 14  June 2019); in 2012 Rabobank withdrew from cycling and certain television channels in Germany refused to broadcast the Tour de France in 2007 following widespread issues of doping in the sport; and in 2019 Qantas publicly encouraged Rugby Australia to take action following comments that were widely considered to be homophobic posted by Australian rugby player, Israel Folau (‘Qantas chief Alan Joyce breaks his silence on Israel Folau posts’, News.com.au, 10 May 2019). 2 See for example the comments of the panel in Rugby Football Union v Steve Diamond, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19  November 2017, paras 16–17 (‘It could not have been clearer that there was a need for all, and in this instance, those in a position of leadership and influence, to make a concerted effort to uphold and promote those core values, which, of course, included that of Respect. As ambassadors for the sport and as role models for many others, it is essential that people such as Mr. Diamond are not only aware of those core values but demonstrate this through their actions and words. Their behaviour influences many others above and beyond those directly under their command. If they cannot uphold those standards, what hope do the thousands of volunteer mini or junior coaches have when seeking to impress these values upon youngsters and their parents?’).

B3.92 However, considerable care should be taken with the second consideration in particular. Regulating off-field conduct is a significant encroachment into the private lives of individuals. There must therefore be a strong justification for doing so and the steps taken must be proportionate. Whilst encouraging better standards of behaviour is laudable, where it does not affect the sport, there is a question as to whether such an encroachment is justified.1 1 Take the example of a low-level player who posts an abusive and insulting tweet, which attracts no media interest and is not even noticed by the SGB or the individual’s club for many years. If the tweet does not amount to criminal conduct, on what basis should SGBs be able to impose sanctions for conduct that has had no impact on the sport? In practice, these issues are often dealt with through the SGB’s approach to bringing charges, rather than in how the rules are drafted (see para B3.102).

B3.93 Given that the primary reason for regulating off-field misconduct is to protect the sport, should conduct only be sanctioned where it does in fact result in harm to the sport (for example, where there is evidence of reputational harm or loss of commercial revenue)? One issue with that approach is that a finding of misconduct then often turns not on the conduct itself, but on the consequences of the conduct, which is usually linked to the profile of the individual involved. It could be argued that part of the job of being a professional athlete is to ensure that you do not behave in a manner that harms the sport. SGBs rely on commercial and public funding and public participation and attendance to run the sport, which in turn benefits all participants, and therefore it is reasonable to require athletes not to do anything that puts that at risk. It could then also be said to follow that it is not unreasonable that higher profile athletes, who generally experience greater public scrutiny but often receive greater rewards from their sport, might be charged in circumstances where lower profile athletes might not.

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B3.94 On the other hand, it might be said that the only fair approach is to prohibit certain types of conduct and then to apply the rules equally to all participants.1 The extent to which conduct receives media coverage or otherwise causes harm may then be a factor a tribunal can take into account in determining the sanction. Albeit, even at that point, it could be argued that it is unfair to visit on the participant the way in which the media portrays certain events (which may in turn be countered by those who consider that high profile athletes must accept increased obligations, on the basis that such athletes know that there is a significant risk that their conduct will be reported).2 1 See discussion of the importance of the principle of equal treatment in the application of sporting rules at para B1.27 et seq. 2 See for example the comments in Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 August 2018, para 20 (‘The Panel was told that it was not right to say that this case would not have been brought had the incident involved someone who did not possess some level of celebrity. The RFU said very plainly that this was not a question of it targeting the Player’. However, note the comments of the panel at para 49, which show that the profile of a player was a relevant factor: ‘Ultimately, the Player is a role model and, by committing an act of common assault and by resisting arrest, acted in a way that was prejudicial to the interests of the Union and/or the Game. Putting the boot on the other foot, it is certainly not behaviour which could be said to be in the interests of the sport’). See also the comments in BCCI v Hardik Pandya, decision dated 19 April 2019, para 8 (‘In our Country, the game of Cricket is often treated as religion, revered and the Cricketers are idolised. The Cricketers wield immense influence in the Society, especially the youth, who look upon them as role models. Therefore, a player of international standing needs to bear in mind that he is shouldering a responsibility towards the society all the time, be it on or off the field, of motivating and inspiring right conduct amongst those young minds who look upon such prodigies as role models’).

B3.95 Each sport will have its own view as to what it is seeking to achieve by regulating off-field misconduct. Consideration of the purpose of the rules on misconduct is important to ensure that they are drafted and enforced proportionately, or else they may be deemed unlawful and so unenforceable.1 1 See paras B1.19 et seq and B1.31 et seq.

7 DRAFTING AND ENFORCING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT PROVISIONS B3.96 When drafting and enforcing off-field misconduct provisions, SGBs should consider: (a) what mischief the rule is designed to prevent; (b) to which participants the rule should apply; and (c) when the rule will apply (for example, are acts in the privacy of a participant’s own home caught?).

A Drafting (a) Structure of the rule and prohibited conduct B3.97 There is a wide range of off-field activity that could potentially constitute misconduct, and it would be difficult to anticipate all the situations that could arise. SGBs want the ability to deal with any form of misconduct that harms the sport. Therefore, most governing bodies choose to include in the rules a generic, catch-all provision. Examples of these provisions are set out below: (a) FA  Handbook Rule E3(1): ‘A  Participant shall at all times act in the best interests of the game and shall not act in any manner which is improper or brings the game into disrepute or use any one, or a combination of, violent conduct, serious foul play, threatening, abusive, indecent or insulting words or behaviour’.

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(b) RFU  Regulation 5.12: prohibits ‘any conduct which is prejudicial to the interests of the Union or the Game’. (c) ECB  Directives, Regulation 3.3: ‘No Participant may conduct themself in a manner or do any act or omission at any time which may be prejudicial to the interests of cricket or which may bring the ECB, the game of cricket or any Cricketer or group of Cricketers into disrepute’. B3.98 Whilst there are a number of similarities between the examples above, there are some distinctions that highlight useful factors to consider in drafting general misconduct provisions: (a) Is the aim to prohibit conduct that is generally prejudicial to the sport or specifically conduct that brings the sport into disrepute? The former is broader and would, in most cases, also encompass conduct that had brought the sport into disrepute (on the basis that this in itself is prejudicial to the sport). The structure of the regulation may take into account the culture of the sport. For example, the focus of RFU  Regulation 5.12 is on whether the conduct is ‘prejudicial to the interests of the Union or game’. This is often judged by reference to the Rugby Football Union’s core values.1 (b) The way in which the rule is formulated will affect what the governing body is required to establish to prove the offence. A charge brought on the basis that the conduct brings the game into disrepute might be found to require the SGB to prove that the conduct had in fact had that effect.2 However, where the offence is premised on ‘conduct prejudicial to the interests of the sport’, it appears that media coverage or evidence of disrepute would not be necessary.3 (c) The scope of a misconduct rule can be extended by providing that there is a breach where the conduct ‘may’ be prejudicial to the interests of the sport or ‘may’ bring the game into disrepute (see for example, ECB Regulation 3.3) or ‘risks bringing the sport into disrepute’. This would appear to remove any need to show actual prejudice; rather, it will be sufficient for the governing body to show that the conduct could be prejudicial or bring the game into disrepute. (d) Another way of extending the scope of misconduct provisions is to prohibit conduct that is simply ‘improper’, without having any regard to the effect on the game (See eg  FA  Rule E3). Such broad language could leave open the possibility of challenges on the grounds of lack of certainty.4 This is unlikely to present a difficulty in well-established categories of misconduct, such as social media offences or criticism of officials, where participants would be expected to know that such conduct is considered improper; but it could present a basis for challenging the rule if a charge is brought in respect of conduct that had not previously been the subject of a charge. (e) In order to reduce the scope for challenges to the rules and/or decisions to charge, it can be helpful to include reference to specific types of behaviour that are prohibited (See eg FA Rule E3).5 In such cases there is likely to be no difficulty establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and less scope for a challenge based on an absence of legal certainty.6 The potential for a challenge based on legitimate expectation is not, however, excluded.7 1 See cases cited at para B3.3 n 1. 2 See eg Zubkov v Federation Internationale de Natation, CAS 2007/A/1291, paras 19–20. The panel said: ‘The language of the relevant provision does not refer to “potential” disrepute, nor to conduct “having the potential” of bringing the sport into disrepute. When determining the proper meaning of Section 12.1.3 the starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the words used. If the meaning of the words used is clear, it is not permissible, in our view, to read other meanings, or qualified meanings, into such words. This is particularly so in our view when one has regard to the possible sanctions […]. Therefore, when Section 12.1.3 speaks of “disrepute”, it does not cover potential disrepute. Section 12.1.3 speaks about “bringing the sport into disrepute”. The conduct in question must thus result in the sport of swimming – as opposed to, for example, individuals involved in the sport of swimming – being brought into disrepute. In other words: public opinion of the sport of swimming

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3

4 5 6 7

must be diminished as a result of the conduct in question’. In the event, the coach was found guilty of infringing another regulation. His sanction was reduced by CAS on appeal from expulsion (with a recommendation that he not be readmitted within six years) to a ban of eight months. This issue has been considered in cases brought under RFU Regulation 5.12. See eg Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 August 2018, para 16 (‘While not essential to the question of whether the Player’s conduct was prejudicial to the interest of the Game, reference was also made to the attention that the incident had received in the media’) and para 44 (‘The question of whether the conduct had objectively brought the sport into disrepute was not something that was required by the charge. The issue was not whether the sport had been brought into disrepute but whether the conduct was prejudicial to the interests of the Union and/or the Game’). See para B1.19 et seq. Another option is the use of guidelines issued by SGBs to explain what types of conduct are likely to be caught by the rules. See para B1.23. See para B3.99 n 3 and B3.132 et seq.

B3.99 There is an obvious benefit to SGBs in having a clause prohibiting off-field misconduct that is drafted in broad terms. However, wide and generically drafted clauses can raise a number of issues and present participants with potential defences: (a) Is the governing body able to establish subject-matter jurisdiction?1 (b) Could the rule be challenged on grounds of lack of certainty?2 (c) Could the decision to charge be challenged on the basis that it was contrary to the participant’s legitimate expectation?3 (d) To the extent there is ambiguity, participants may also turn to principles of contractual and/or statutory interpretation, including, for example, contra proferentum, such that the benefit of any doubt will be construed in favour of the participant.4 1 For a discussion regarding establishing subject-matter jurisdiction see para D1.36. 2 For an example of a case in which this was successfully argued, see Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, discussed at para B3.132 et seq. 3 CAS panels have consistently held that rules must be clear and predictable. See for example: Vanakorn v FIS, CAS 2014/A/3832 & 3833, paras 84–86 (‘Since, at first, every sanction requires an express and valid rule providing that someone could be sanctioned for a specific offence, in addition and at this stage of its reasoning, the Panel describes general legal requirements for such legal basis in line with CAS jurisprudence. Pursuant to CAS jurisprudence, the different elements of the rules of a federation shall be clear and precise, in the event they are legally binding for the athletes (see CAS 2006/A/1164; CAS 2007/A/1377; CAS 2007/A/1437). Inconsistencies/ambiguities in the rules must be construed against the legislator (here: FIS), as per the principle of ‘contra proferentem’ (CAS 2013/A/3324&3369; CAS 94/129; CAS 2009/A/1752; CAS 2009/A/1753; CAS 2012/A/2747; CAS 2007/A/1437; CAS 2011/A/2612). Further, the Panel notes that when interpreting the rules of a federation, it is necessary to consider whether the spirit of the rule (in as much as it may differ from the strict letter) has been violated (see CAS 2001/A/354 & 355; CAS 2007/A/1437; CAS OG 12/02). It follows that an athlete or official, when reading the rules, must be able to clearly make the distinction between what is prohibited and what is not (CAS 2007/A/1437). In CAS 2007/A/1363 TTF, award of 5 October 2007, in line with many CAS awards, the sole arbitrator protected ‘the principle of legality and predictability of sanctions which requires a clear connection between the incriminated behaviour and the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision.’); USA Shooting v Quigley, CAS 94/129, paras 33–34 (‘If he had been subject to a fundamentally different regime […] his understanding would have been different and his conduct might therefore have been different […]. This is a matter of legitimate expectations, and it is crucial to any decent system of laws […]. The fight against doping is arduous, and it may require strict rules. But the rule-makers and rule-appliers must begin by being strict with themselves. Regulations that may affect the careers of dedicated athletes must be predictable’). As a matter of English law, see Bailey and Norbury, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 7th Edn (Lexis Nexis, 2017), Section 27.1 (Principle against Doubtful Penalisation: ‘It is a principle of legal policy that a person should not be penalised except under clear law […]. [The court] should therefore strive to avoid adopting a construction which penalises a person where the legislator’s intention to do so is doubtful, or penalises him or her in a way which was not made clear’). This topic is discussed in further detail at para B1.19 et seq, including a specific consideration at para B1.23 of the enforceability of broad clauses prohibiting conduct that ‘brings the game into disrepute’. 4 See para B1.61.

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(b) To which participants do the misconduct provisions apply? B3.100 In many sports the rules apply to all participants, regardless of their level, whether they are professional or amateur and whether they are athletes or officials.1 However, in some cases, particular groups of participants (such as professional athletes) are the subject of specific regulations. Applying prohibitions on off-field misconduct to limited categories of participants might be one way of addressing the need to be proportionate. However, in practice, the preferred approach of SGBs is to draft the provisions widely and then to limit their application by exercising discretion in deciding whether to charge. 1 See also para B3.59.

(c) When do the misconduct provisions apply? B3.101 ‘Off-field’ covers a wide range of situations, from team nights out to the privacy of a participant’s own home. Bearing in mind the need for rules to be proportionate, there is arguably no justification for sanctioning acts that take place in private. The position is different if acts carried out in private become public (for example, as a result of photographs being published). This issue is considered further at B3.126 et seq.

B Implementation B3.102 As can be seen from the preceding section, provisions prohibiting off-field misconduct tend to be drafted in very wide terms in order to ensure that governing bodies have jurisdiction to deal with any situation that arises. However, charges are not brought in every case in which a participant engages in conduct that falls within the scope of the provisions. SGBs limit the scope of off-field misconduct provisions through their decisions as to whether or not to bring a charge.1 This is necessary on a practical level given that governing bodies do not have the resources to bring charges in all cases. It can also be helpful when addressing arguments that widely drafted clauses are otherwise disproportionate. 1 See Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13  December 2018, paras 65–67 (The FA explained that ‘The FA’s approach is not to take action for swearing alone in respect of incidents that take place on or around the field of play and which might inadvertently be picked up by live broadcast cameras. Achieving absolute consistency with this approach, bearing in mind the sheer number of incidents and the myriad of circumstances in which it might be suggested the behaviour falls outside that which is tolerated, would be quite impossible for any decision-maker […]. To do otherwise would fill Commissions with literally hundreds of cases every week of the season’) and para  67 (the Regulatory Commission commented that The FA’s approach to charging seemed ‘entirely realistic’ and ‘readily justifiable’).

B3.103 However, as set out in detail in Part D of this book, SGBs are subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, and are required not to act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, or contrary to a legitimate expectation. Consequently, it is important that governing bodies give careful consideration to their approach to bringing charges under misconduct provisions in order to reduce the risk of challenges to the decision to charge.1 1 See eg Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, in which The FA’s decision to charge Mourinho was successfully challenged on the basis that it was contrary to Mourinho’s legitimate expectation. The charge was therefore dismissed (see B3.132 et seq).

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C Sanctions B3.104 The range of sanctions imposed in misconduct cases includes the usual sanctions for breaches of SGB rules, such as fines, suspensions, and warnings or reprimands. The level of sanction imposed for different types of misconduct is considered in the following section (at Section 8 below). B3.105 Given that off-field misconduct cases often involve some form of abusive or insulting behaviour, one particular feature of sanctions in off-field misconduct cases is that they often involve a requirement that the participant undertake an education course of some form. Further, whilst not a sanction that panels usually have jurisdiction to impose, off-field misconduct cases can also lead to professional players losing their contracts of employment with the SGB or their club. These contracts often contain clauses prohibiting the athlete from engaging in conduct that is contrary to the interests of the SGB or the sport. If the athlete is found guilty of misconduct, it is likely that they will also be in breach of their contract. Similarly, offfield misconduct can have significant financial repercussions as a result of sponsors terminating contracts with the athlete.1 1 For example, American Olympic swimmer Ryan Lochte lost sponsors after misconduct during the 2016 Olympic Games (‘Ryan Lochte loses all his major sponsors after Rio incident, apology’, Reuters, 22 August 2016); while Israel Folau was reported to have lost sponsors following comments about homosexuality posted in 2019 (‘Israel Folau loses Asics sponsorship deal after breaching code of conduct’, BBC website, 8 May 2019).

B3.106 Sanctions must be proportionate.1 In determining the level of sanction, panels will look at all the relevant circumstances. This may include usual factors such as any previous breaches of the rules, prompt admission, particular aggravating factors,2 and the athlete’s income from sport. In misconduct cases, tribunals might also consider the harm caused to the sport (eg the extent and nature of media coverage of the incident or actual financial loss)3 and the financial impact on the participant of losing other contracts. However, claims for mitigation based on a lack of education regarding the rules are unlikely to be given much weight.4 The extent to which precedents will be taken into account varies from sport to sport.5 Whilst there is no formal system of precedent (which would be difficult as many cases are not published), precedents should be considered in order to ensure a degree of consistency in sanctions, which is fundamental to the fairness of the process and the application of the rule.6 1 See para B1.33. 2 The Rules of the FA provide that in cases involving an aggravated breach (ie  ‘where it includes a reference, whether express or implied, to any one or more of the following:- ethnic origin, colour, race, nationality, religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation or disability’ (Rule E3(2)) mandatory minimum sanctions apply (Football Association Disciplinary Regulation, Section 2). Even if not prescribed in the rules, these factors are generally taken into account by the tribunal as aggravating features. 3 See eg England and Wales Cricket Board v Shiv Thakor, decision published 16 March 2018 (the media release notes that, ‘In reaching its sentencing decision, the panel also took into account that clear reputational damage had been done to the game due to widespread adverse publicity as well as the nature of Mr Thakor’s criminal conviction’). 4 See eg  Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22  September 2016, para 17 (‘the Commission does wonder how much education was required for a player even in 2012 to know that the comments […] were completely unacceptable and should not have been said let alone published in a format where they could have been read by anyone searching the internet’). 5 Football Association v Bacary Sagna, Appeal Board decision dated 1 February 2017, para 29 (‘caution must be exercised when considering other cases said to be comparable to the instant case. Each case turns on its own particular facts and circumstances. In respect of [another player’s] case, we do not know what form of social media was used, how many followers Mr Babel had, the extent of the public coverage of his post, or his income from football, all of which are potentially relevant considerations in the Commission’s decision in that case’); EPCR v Mourad Boudjellal & RC Toulon, decision dated 17 July 2018 (‘We have been very much alive to the desirability of maintaining consistency within rugby sanctions for similar offences but we also recognise that all cases are unique to their own facts,

454  Regulating Sport this one offence in particular. In the interests of consistency we have reviewed all of the cases, which EPCR provided in the ‘sanctions and costs’ bundle, and have assessed the sanction we pass with those cases in mind’). 6 See further discussion of this topic at para B1.30.

B3.107 In order for the ‘totality of the sanction’ to be proportionate, there is an argument that other punishments (eg  imposed by the club, or the criminal courts) should be taken into account,1 although a disciplinary panel appointed under an SGB’s rules will be aware of the risk that a club has imposed its own penalty specifically in an effort to influence the panel to lessen the sanction it would otherwise impose under the rules. 1 See eg Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 August 2018 (the player’s club imposed a fine of £2,000 and required the player to undertake 10 hours of community service and the criminal court imposed a fine of £2,000 and ordered the player to pay compensation to the police officer of £250. The panel decided not to impose a further sanction ‘taking into account the question of proportionality and totality of sanctions already handed to the Player arising out of the same incident’ (paragraph  55)); Rugby Football Union v Nathan Hughes, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 October 2018 (the player was found guilty of misconduct after posting an inappropriate tweet and given a two-week ban. He had already been fined £2,000 and ordered to undertake 20 hours community service by his club. The panel commented, ‘This takes into account the mitigating factors which are present, including the acceptance of the charge, the sanction imposed by the Club – something that the Panel commends’ (para 118)).

8 TYPES OF OFF-FIELD OFFENCES A Social media offences B3.108 In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of misconduct charges brought as a result of inappropriate social media posts. This is unsurprising. Before the introduction of social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, athletes had fewer ways of expressing their views publicly. The main method of communicating with the public was through interviews with the media, which were generally a more controlled (and edited) environment. Not only would they have afforded the athlete the opportunity to consider their views in advance, rather than blurting out what they thought in the heat of the moment, but third parties (such as agents and clubs) could edit anything that was likely to cause offence and put the athlete at risk of charges (post-match interviews being an exception). B3.109 The introduction of social media platforms that allow participants to express their views or feelings instantaneously, wherever they are, clearly increased the potential for athletes to say things that SGBs do not consider appropriate. The potential harm that can be caused is also greater given that social media reaches huge audiences worldwide instantaneously. The question for SGBs was how to deal with such conduct. B3.110 Social media offences are usually charged under general misconduct provisions of the type described above. Some sports also have guidelines for participants.1 Given the generic nature of misconduct rules, guidelines can be a useful way of informing participants about the types of conduct that are prohibited without restricting the scope of the rule. However, it could be said that today participants are sufficiently aware of the type of comment that is likely to fall foul of the rules.2 1 For example, The FA introduced social media guidelines in 2012. The RFU also publishes guidance for participants. 2 In Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016, para 17, the Commission considered that even when The FA guidelines came out, ‘the Commission does wonder how much education was required for a player even in 2012 to know that the comments […] were completely unacceptable and should not have been said let alone published in a format where they could have been read by anyone searching the internet’.

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B3.111 Social media offences can be broadly categorised into comments or images that: (a) are insulting or abusive generally;1 (b) are insulting or abusive because they are targeted at protected characteristics (such as ethnicity, race, gender or sexual orientation);2 or (c) involve criticism of officials (see section on criticism of officials at Section C below). Some SGB rules provide that the second category of misconduct constitutes an ‘aggravated breach’, which results in fixed minimum sanctions or increased sanctions.3 Other sports take a less prescriptive approach and leave this as a factor for the tribunal to take into account in determining the appropriate level of sanction. 1 See eg Rugby Football Union v Nathan Hughes, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision 23 October 2018 (Hughes tweeted ‘What a joke’ as he left a hearing for an on-field offence for which he was given a four-week ban. He was charged with and found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interests of the Union on the basis that the tweet was critical of the judicial process, which was contrary to the values of the Union (in particular ‘respect’ and ‘discipline’), and given a two-week ban. In addition, his four-week ban for the on-field offence was increased to six weeks, on the basis that the reduction for remorse was given on a false premise. See also The Football Association v Jason Puncheon, Regulatory Commission decision dated 6  March 2014 (Puncheon was charged for posting a tweet saying that Neil Warnock ‘Gives [players] extra wages n app bonus to make sure they pay him to get in the team or on the bench’. Puncheon admitted the charge, apologised and removed the tweets shortly after posting them. He was given a fine of £15,000 and a warning as to his future conduct). 2 See eg  Football Association v Hamza Choudhury, Regulatory Commission decision dated 10  May 2019 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E(3) for comments on social media made in 2013 and 2014 that included reference to ethnic origin, race and/or sexual orientation. He was fined £5,000 and ordered to attend an FA education course); Rugby Australia v Israel Folau (2019) (Folau had his contract with Rugby Australia terminated as a result of tweets that were alleged to be homophobic, having been warned a year earlier for another tweet that was alleged to be homophobic) (see para B3.114 below); Football Association v Marvin Johnson, Regulatory Commission decision dated 26  September 2018 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA  Rule E3 for tweets containing reference to gender, ethnic origin or race that were made in 2011. The panel gave particular weight to the fact the player had ‘cleansed his Twitter account over a year ago’, as well as his admission and remorse. The panel imposed a fine of £12,000 and ordered the player to attend an FA education programme); Football Association v Ryan Fredericks, Regulatory Commission decision dated 24 March 2017 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E3 for tweets containing reference to gender or sexual orientation posted in 2011. The panel imposed a fine of £10,000 and ordered the player to attend an education programme); Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016 (Gray was charged with two aggravated breaches of FA Rule E3 for comments that made reference to gender, sexual orientation, colour or race in 2012 and 2014. The panel imposed a ban of four matches, a fine of £25,000, a warning and ordered the player to attend an FA education course); Football Association v Edoardo Cellino, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2016 (Cellino was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E3(1) based on a Facebook comment that included a reference to disability. The panel imposed a three match ban, a fine of £5,000, ordered Cellino to complete an FA education programme, and gave him a warning as to his future conduct); Football Association v Ryan Tunnicliffe, Regulatory Commission decision dated 17 June 2015 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E3 after posting a comment on Twitter that was insulting and included a reference to another player’s sexual orientation. The panel imposed a two-match ban, a fine of £5,000, gave a warning as to future conduct, and required the player to complete an education programme). For examples of earlier cases of social media offences in football, see Tim Lowles, ‘Professional Footballers and Twitter: A match made in (tabloid) heaven’, LawinSport. 3 See eg The FA Handbook Rule E3(2): ‘A breach of Rule E3(1) is an ‘Aggravated Breach’ where it includes a reference, whether express or implied, to any one or more of the following:- ethnic origin, colour, race, nationality, religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation or disability. Mandatory minimum sanctions are applicable to certain Aggravated Breaches. Further provisions as to sanctions applicable to Aggravated Breaches are found in The Association’s Disciplinary Regulations’.

(a) Objective or subjective meaning? B3.112 In some cases, participants have sought to defend social media charges on the basis that they did not intend the comment to be read in an offensive manner.

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However, the prevailing approach taken by panels is to judge the relevant comments based on their objective meaning,1 regardless of what the maker of the comment intended, and regardless of whether the recipient of the comment did or did not take offence.2 1 Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22  September 2016, para 15 (the panel considered whether the relevant comments were insulting based on an ‘objective reading’); Football Association v Ryan Tunnicliffe, Regulatory Commission decision dated 17 June 2015 (the player claimed that he was shocked that his tweet could be construed in a discriminatory way and that he did not intend it to have a homophobic undertone. The Panel commented: ‘The FA Rule E3(2) simply states that ‘it includes a reference, whether express or implied […] and does not require a Participant’s intention to prove the “Aggravated Breach”’ (at paras 14–15)); Football Association v Edoardo Cellino, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2016 (Cellino argued that in the United States (where he grew up) the term ‘spastic’ was ‘largely inoffensive and a casual word for clumsiness or foolish behaviour’. The panel rejected the cultural difference argument but accepted that he did not deliberately set out to be offensive to people with disability); Football Association v Ryan Fredericks, Regulatory Commission decision dated 24 March 2017 (in respect of tweets containing a reference to gender or sexual orientation, the panel noted that, ‘the tweets were, objectively, abusive and insulting’ (para 39) and ‘whilst the tweets were limited to the small number of individuals that followed Mr Fredericks’s account at the time, they had the potential to cause offence more widely […] the tweets are not private conversation between two individuals, obscured from others, and it is entirely possible that a follower of a private account may re-tweet a comment to a wider audience’ (para 40)). 2 Football Association v Bernardo Silva, Regulatory Commission Decision dated 12 November 2019, paras 8-9 (‘The Commission accept that the Player did not himself intend the post to be insulting or in any way racist […]. It is clear that the tweet was intended to be no more than a joke between close friends. However, this was not a private jocular communication between two friends. The post was on a social media platform exposed to the 600,000 followers of a high-profile and well-respected professional footballer. It was quickly observed and reported upon by elements of the media’).

B3.113 The role of intention was considered in the context of a non-social media misconduct charge in the case of Football Association v Wayne Hennessey (see para B3.122 et seq). Whilst confirming that the appropriate approach in most cases will be to apply an objective assessment of the words of conduct, the panel identified circumstances in which the player’s intention may be relevant.

(b) Conflict with fundamental freedoms B3.114 Social media charges have highlighted the potential tension between freedom of speech and/or freedom of religion and regulation of public comments by SGBs. An example of this is the case of Australian rugby player, Israel Folau. In 2018 Folau was warned by Rugby Australia over comments he posted online that were considered to be homophobic. In 2019 Folau posted a further comment expressing what were again alleged to be homophobic views. Folau, a devout Christian, claimed that he was simply stating his views and that he was entitled to do so. Folau was charged with misconduct and the panel determined that he had committed a ‘highlevel’ breach of Rugby Australia’s code of conduct, resulting in the player’s playing contract with Rugby Australia being terminated.1 Folau did not appeal the decision, but instead brought a claim against Rugby Australia in the courts for unfair dismissal (on the basis that the tweets represented his religious views).2 1 The written decision is not publicly available, but see media releases by Rugby Australia (australia. rugby/news/2019/06/06/fair-work-folau-statement [accessed 29  October 2020]; australia.rugby/ news/2019/05/17/folau-sanction-breach [accessed 29 October 2020]). 2 A  statement by Rugby Australia on 4  December 2019 confirmed that the dispute had been settled (australia.rugby/news/2019/12/04/if-joint-statement-dec [accessed 29 October 2020]).

B3.115 The contractual relationship between participants and governing bodies provides a legal basis for regulating what athletes say in public. However, as set out above, the extent of that regulation must be proportionate, which in this sense requires a careful balance against the fundamental freedoms of free speech and religion.1 In

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order to do this, it is helpful to look back at the underlying purpose of the regulation. Most SGBs now aim to promote values such as diversity and inclusion, which are seen as values that are important in society and therefore, in turn, to sponsors and the public. Governing bodies are therefore becoming increasingly tough on conduct that is seen to undermine those values (and particularly if the conduct actively encourages intolerance or discrimination) on the basis that it could be damaging to the sport. At the same time, individuals are, of course, free to hold whatever beliefs and views they wish. The compromise would appear to be that whilst individual athletes are free to express whatever views they wish in private, they cannot express their views publicly if to do so will harm the sport.2 What then amounts to a breach in each case is to be judged by a tribunal, after due process, which will consider whether the publicly expressed view is prejudicial or brings the sport into disrepute.3 1 In R (Ngole) v University of Sheffield [2019] EWCA Civ 1127, a student social worker was dismissed for posts about homosexuality based on his religious beliefs. The Court of Appeal held: ‘The right to freedom of expression is not an unqualified right: professional bodies and organisations are entitled to place reasonable and proportionate restrictions on those subject to their professional codes; and, just because a belief is said to be a religious belief, does not give a person subject to professional regulation the right to express such beliefs in any way he or she sees fit’ (para  4); ‘Turning to the question of the legitimate aim of the professional regulations applicable here […] the maintenance of confidence in the relevant profession falls within the legitimate aim of professional regulation, and must be supported in law’ (para 104); ‘It must equally be the case that the obligation to maintain confidence cannot extend to prohibiting any statement that could be thought controversial or even to have political or moral overtones […]. The existence of a broad legitimate aim is a mere threshold to the key decision in this case, as in almost all cases it must be. Such a legitimate aim must have limits. It cannot extend too far. In our view it cannot extend to preclude legitimate expression of views simply because many might disagree with those views: that would indeed legitimise what in the United States has been described as a “heckler’s veto”’ (para 105). 2 See for example from Rugby Australia’s CEO: ‘Rugby Australia fully supports their right to their own beliefs and nothing that has happened changes that. But when we are talking about inclusiveness in our game, we’re talking about respecting differences as well’ (rugby.com.au/news/2019/05/17/folauverdict-castle-hore [accessed 29 October 2020]). 3 See eg  The Football Association v Jose Mourinho, FA Appeal Board decision dated 9  June 2014, para 6.3 (in the context of determining whether general comments about refereeing standards brought the game into disrepute, the panel noted: ‘At the same time though, one of the cornerstones of our society is the entitlement to free speech. For the purposes of football governance, any restrictions on that right should be proportionate and only imposed insofar as they may be necessary in order to serve the best interest of the game. Attempting to reconcile the two competing considerations can sometimes create difficulties, both in terms of making charging decisions and adjudicating upon misconduct charges that are brought. The question in this and every case where the issue falls to be decided is: has the line been crossed between the accepted right to express a fair and honestly held opinion, and unacceptable comments that lower the game in the estimation of right-minded members of the public?’).

(c) What amounts to expressing a view? B3.116 A further question highlighted by the Folau case is: what amounts to the expression of a view? England rugby player, Billy Vunipola, ‘liked’ the Instagram post by Folau that contained the alleged homophobic comment (and posted his own views). Vunipola was given a formal warning by the RFU and asked to ‘unlike’ Folau’s post. Given the way in which social media works, it seems likely that participants will be deemed to have expressed a view, and therefore fall foul of the rules, by ‘liking’, retweeting, or otherwise adopting a third party’s view.1 1 The Rugby Football Union guidance on social media use expressly provides that ’Re-posting or retweeting inappropriate content represents an endorsement of that content and can be actionable’ and advises participants not to ‘link’ to unsuitable content. The Football Association player guidance notes that ‘Retweeting is treated the same as posting a comment yourself’. See also Football Association v Keith Wyness, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5 June 2017 (the Chief Executive of Aston Villa FC claimed that he had not intended to retweet a caption with the video. The panel did not accept the explanation, noting that ‘the offending tweet… was clearly written in plain language above the video content and not obscured in any way. Put simply, it would have been difficult to miss’ (at para 28)).

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(d) Responsibility for re-posting B3.117 Another issue is whether participants commit a breach of the rules if their comment was made/posted privately to friends or family but then subsequently reposted or otherwise made public by another person. One view, as set out above, is that participants should be free to hold and express whatever views they wish in private and if they are not responsible for publishing the comment, there is no offence. B3.118 However, participants would be advised to take considerable care over what they say and where they say it. Certainly, it is unlikely to be a defence that at the time a message was posted, the participant had very few followers, all of whom were known to him.1 Each case will turn on its facts. However, if there is a chance that the comment could get into the public domain (for example, through re-posting), a participant risks being found to have accepted that possibility. A participant may also be held responsible even if they were not responsible for comments or images ending up in the public domain.2 1 Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22  September 2016, para  17 (‘We accept that AG had 50 followers who were friends and family when the first set of comments were tweeted and about 2000 when he tweeted the second set of comments. However AG’s twitter account was open to the public and could have been read by anyone with access to the internet. Those who publish statements on the internet must be taken to knowingly run the risk that their comments may be read by a very large number of people’). 2 Whilst not in a social media context, the case of England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales, decision dated 7 December 2018, provides an interesting example. Hales sent images to a small group of friends on Snapchat (such that the images would automatically self-delete from the recipients’ phones). The images were published several years later in the media without his prior knowledge. He received a two-match ban (suspended for 12 months) and a fine of £10,000, of which £5,500 was suspended for 12 months, and was ordered to undertake appropriate training.

(e) Permanent nature of social media B3.119 A final word of caution for athletes is that charges have been brought several years after the relevant tweet or comment was posted.1 Further, a participant will not necessarily avoid charges because they delete the post quickly.2 This may, however, be a mitigating factor when it comes to sanction. 1 See eg Football Association v Hamza Choudhury, Regulatory Commission decision dated 10 May 2019 (the player was charged for comments on social media made in 2013 and 2014); England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales, decision dated 7 December 2018 (the images were sent in 2014/2015); Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016 (the comments were made between 2012 and 2014). 2 The Rugby Football Union guidance on social media states: ‘Deleting or apologising publicly for an improper posting does not prevent disciplinary action being taken’.

B Other forms of abusive or insulting comments or conduct B3.120 Misconduct rules are drafted in sufficiently wide terms to cover abusive or insulting comments or behaviour that arise in a range of situations. Cases considered under this heading include insulting, threatening or improper comments or conduct1 in forums other than social media (see above, Section 8A) (and excluding conduct directed towards officials (see below, Section 8C)). 1 See eg  Football Association v Robert Snodgrass, Regulatory Commission decision dated 25 April 2019 (the player was found guilty of misconduct as a result of using abusive and/or insulting language towards a UK Anti-Doping official during an out-of-competition drug test. He received a one-match ban and was fined £30,000); BCCI v Hardik Pandya, decision dated 19 April 2019 (the player was suspended by the Board of Control for Cricket in India as a result of making allegedly sexist and racist remarks during a television interview. He was called home from a tour of Australia (resulting

Misconduct  459 in missing five matches and forfeiting the corresponding match fees). The tribunal ordered payment of 11,00,000 rupees to charity); Football Association v Tony Henry, Regulatory Commission decision dated 9 July 2018 (Henry was found to have written a discriminatory comment in an internal club email, which was forwarded to a journalist, and in a follow up interview Henry was found to have made further discriminatory comments. The panel imposed a ban of 12 months and ordered him to attend a Football Association education course); EPCR v Mourad Boudjellal & RC Toulon, decision dated 17  July 2018 (the owner of Toulon was found to have made insulting and discriminatory comments in an interview and press conference. The owner was already serving a ban for a previous offence and therefore he was fined €75,000 with a further €25,000 to be suspended for three years. The club was also sanctioned); International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision dated 6 February 2018 (Nastase was sanctioned for comments made during a press conference relating to Serena Williams and her unborn child and for engaging in abusive and threatening conduct directed at a member of the press (in addition to inappropriate on-field misconduct during a Fed Cup tie). The tribunal considered the off-court conduct to amount to ‘mid-range offending’ in respect of the Williams comments (for which a six-month ban from participating in events was appropriate) and ‘low-range offending’ in relation to the comments to the press (for which a three-month ban from participating in events was imposed). A fine of $20,000 was imposed (as well as a separate sanction for the on-field misconduct)); England and Wales Cricket Board v Ben Stokes, decision dated 7 December 2018 (Stokes was filmed mimicking Katie Price’s disabled son. Stokes had already served a threematch ban and was ordered to pay a fine of £15,000); England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales, decision dated 7 December 2018 (Hales sent images to a small group of friends that were found to be inappropriate and that were published several years later in the media without his prior knowledge. He received a two-match ban (suspended for 12 months) and a fine of £10,000 of which £5,500 was suspended for 12 months, and was ordered to undertake appropriate training); Football Association v Ryan Lowe, Regulatory Commission decision dated 21 August 2018 (a manager was found guilty of misconduct as a result of using abusive and/or insulting language towards a UK Anti-Doping official during an out-of-competition drug test. The Regulatory Commission imposed a two-match ground ban and a fine of £1,500); Football Association v David Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 June 2017 (Moyes was found to have made an insulting comment to a journalist after the official interviews had ended, for which he was fined £30,000); Football Association v Jack Wilshere, Regulatory Commission decision dated 15 June 2015 (the player was found guilty of misconduct as a result of making and/or inciting comments that were disparaging of Tottenham Hotspur FC during the FA Cup trophy open bus parade. As it was a non-aggravated breach, he received a fine of £40,000 and was warned as to his future conduct).

(a) Objective or subjective meaning? B3.121 As noted above in the context of social media offences, panels have tended to apply an objective test to determine whether comments are insulting or abusive.1 FA Regulatory Commissions, for example, refer to this as the ‘reasonable bystander test’. In applying this test, the circumstances in which the offending comment was made should also be taken into account.2 There may still be room for debate, as the language may, even objectively, have different possible meanings. This may also be the case where the comment was in a foreign language. In such cases, expert evidence may be necessary. 1 See para B3.112 et seq. See also International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision dated 6 February 2018, para 64 (‘Objectively, such a comment breaches the Welfare Policy, as the Tribunal considers that a reasonable person would find it inappropriate and unwelcome’). 2 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Appeal Board decision dated 18 November 2018, para 11 (‘the Commission had correctly identified the need to consider all relevant facts and circumstances relating to the utterances under scrutiny (ie to consider “context”) when applying the “reasonable bystander” test’).

B3.122 However, the decision in Football Association v Wayne Hennessey1 demonstrates that a participant’s subjective intention may still be relevant in certain circumstances. The player was charged with misconduct on the basis that a photograph posted by the player’s teammate on Instagram showed the player giving a ‘Sieg Heil’/‘Heil Hitler’ salute. The panel commented that if that had been the meaning of the gesture, it would have been offensive, even if done in jest (at para 3). However, the player claimed that he was waving to catch the waiter’s attention and cupped his hand over his mouth to make his voice carry. The panel started by noting

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that: ‘Whether or not words used or a gesture made amount to a breach of Rule E.3 because they are “abusive”, “insulting” or ‘improper” is to be decided objectively’.2 However, the panel further noted that in the previous cases on which it relied for the proposition that the test is objective, the allegedly insulting words ‘had only one meaning’, which it did not consider to be the position in that case. The panel therefore commented: ‘Transposing that analysis to the present case, if it were the case that the only possible explanation for what Mr Hennessey was doing with his hands was that he was making a Nazi salute then whatever he might have said about his motivation would not amount to a defence. Equally, if he was making a gesture which was open to more than one interpretation but which he said he meant to be taken as a Nazi salute then that would amount to good evidence that it was in fact an insulting/ abusive/improper gesture. Again, it would be no defence that he might have meant no harm by it or intended it as a joke. Those examples illustrate how in some circumstances the objective test necessarily involves taking account of a subjective element. This is not in relation to the maker’s motivation but so as to understand the meaning of a gesture made. What a player intended will be irrelevant if the words used or gesture made can only have one possible meaning or explanation. But intention may be very important if the meaning is open to any doubt […] Obviously, it would be different were there to be no other plausible explanation for the gesture Mr Hennessey made. But in circumstances in which, as we have found, there is or could be another possible explanation then the player’s evidence as to what he meant by the words spoken or gesture made is a legitimate – indeed it may be a valuable, even decisive – element of the analysis. Any other outcome would, in our view, be wholly unjust […] In the end, it comes down to this: we must interpret what the gesture was that Mr Hennessey made. The picture might speak entirely for itself and be capable of only one interpretation. If it were so, his motivation in making it would not be a defence’.3 1 Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 April 2019. 2 Ibid, para 54. 3 Ibid, paras 57–63.

B3.123 The panel considered evidence showing the player making gestures in other situations and found that the player had a ‘lamentable’ knowledge of the Nazi regime. In the circumstances, the panel found that The FA had not proven that the gesture was a Nazi salute and therefore the charge was dismissed. B3.124 The cases in which a participant’s subjective intention is relevant are likely to be limited. In Football Association v Wayne Hennessey the player’s subjective intention was relevant to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the alleged misconduct (ie whether he made a Nazi salute) took place. In most cases, however, there will be little dispute as to the meaning of the words or conduct and whether they are offensive is still to be judged on an objective basis. B3.125 The fact that the participant does not hold the belief conveyed by the offensive words or conduct is also unlikely to provide a defence.1 1 Football Association v Tony Henry, Regulatory Commission decision dated 9 July 2018, paras 24–25 (the panel found that Henry had not in fact adopted a discriminatory policy of recruitment, but that ‘the only objective interpretation [of the words] is that Mr Henry was adopting a discriminatory recruitment policy at West Ham’); International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision dated 6 February 2018, para 66 (the tribunal acknowledged evidence that Nastase was not a racist person and stated that the decision did not imply that he was; however, this did not prevent the tribunal from finding that he had made a racist comment).

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(b) Conduct or comments made in public or private? B3.126 As noted above at Section 6, SGBs have to determine where the line should be drawn in regulating off-field misconduct. One aspect of this is whether conduct that occurs, or words that are said, in private should give rise to a misconduct charge. B3.127 In general, words and conduct said or taking place in private do not give rise to disciplinary charges. However, the position is not always straightforward. First, as discussed above in the context of social media offences, the fact that a post is made on a private forum will not necessarily preclude a misconduct charge if the content is subsequently re-posted. Even where a participant sends inappropriate images only to a group of friends, he may still be responsible if one of the individuals subsequently makes the content public without his knowledge.1 In such cases, the fact that the participant did not intend the offending words to become public should, however, be a mitigating factor. 1 England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales, decision dated 7 December 2018 (see para B3.120 n 1).

B3.128 Secondly, it is not always clear what constitutes ‘in private’. Off-field covers a wide range of circumstances, from team-related events to the privacy of a participant’s own home. Even in the context of team events, is there a difference between training and team social evenings out? Further, similar to the position with re-posting, what is the position if the conduct took place in private, but is caught on camera and the photographs and/or conduct are subsequently reported in the media?1 The misconduct cases involving criminal conduct or otherwise inappropriate conduct related to drinking suggest that tribunals are unlikely to be sympathetic to arguments that conduct occurring during team events took place in private (see para B3.142 et seq).2 Given the widespread use of social media and constant access to cameras on phones, it is likely that participants will be expected to be aware of the risk that anything said or done could get into the public domain. Consequently, once the misconduct has become public, it is likely that the onus will be on the participant to establish that they believed that they were acting in a private context.2 1 For example, in Football Association v Wayne Hennessey, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 April 2019, the gesture took place during a team dinner at a restaurant, but the photograph capturing the gesture was posted by a teammate on social media. Ultimately, the panel did not need to determine the issue of whether it was a public or private event and/or how that would affect the case. However, it illustrates the difficulty that arises where participants believed that they were not in a public environment when they committed the alleged misconduct. 2 See eg the comments of the panel in Football Association v David Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 June 2017. Moyes was found to have made an insulting comment to a journalist after the official interviews had ended. Moyes claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The panel commented: ‘Although a group that consists of more than two people is capable of being private, there was no evidence before us that Mr. Moyes could reasonably have expected that the other two persons present would treat anything he might say to [the journalist] in confidence’ (at para 3.7(b). The panel also noted more generally that ‘The nature of the relationship between two people is relevant to the question whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy between them in communications’ (at para 3.7(c)). Moyes was fined £30,000. See also International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision dated 6 February 2018, para 65 (the tribunal rejected an argument that one of the offending comments was made in private on the basis that it was said in Romanian during a press conference in English, because Nastase attended in his official capacity as captain of the Romanian team and it took place in Romania, with a number of Romanian speakers present).

(c) Inadvertent and non-targeted comments B3.129 In most cases it is unlikely to be a defence that the offensive words were not directed at a particular individual.1 However, the fact that comments were inadvertently picked up by broadcast cameras may result in charges not being brought or may serve as a defence.2

462  Regulating Sport 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5  November 2018, para 24 (‘There is no specification within Rule E3 that suggests there must be at least one recipient of abusive, threatening […] indecent or insulting words […]. A requirement in every case to identify somebody who was actually insulted, abused and/or offended by words used in order to determine whether there has been a breach of Rule E3(1) would lead to absurd and illogical consequences’). In the context of criticism of officials, see also Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 2 June 2014, para 5.3 (Mourinho was found to have brought the game into disrepute as a result of ‘criticism of a general and indiscriminate nature’. The Panel noted that whether his comments brought the game into disrepute ‘involves placing oneself in the position of an ordinary, objective and fair-minded member of the public and how he, or she, is likely to have reacted to media comments in any given case’). 2 See Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13  December 2018, para 83 (‘If the FA’s practice hitherto has been “not to take action for swearing alone in respect of incidents that take place on or around the field of play and which might inadvertently be picked up by live broadcast cameras’’, then, as we have said, it is arguable that Mr Mourinho’s conduct fell within that category of behaviour in respect of which the FA says that it does not normally take action’).

(d) Legitimate expectation B3.130 Many sports have a huge number of individuals under their jurisdiction and there will be numerous incidents that could amount to misconduct. However, governing bodies do not have infinite resources and consequently many incidents may go undetected and/or may be considered too minor to be prosecuted.1 This may lead to complaints that they are not enforced consistently. 1 See eg the comments in Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, discussed at para B3.132 et seq.

B3.131 In most cases, however, arguments that a SGB has failed to bring charges in other (arguably) similar circumstances, have not been successful. Rather, panels have emphasised that their role is to judge the case on its own particular facts.1 1 Football Association v David Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 June 2017, para 3.7(i) (‘an Independent FA  Regulatory Commission is required to consider the particular disciplinary charge(s) brought against the particular Participant that is/are before it. Whether other Participants could and should have been charged with misconduct in the past for similar, or even worse, comments is irrelevant to the judgment that we must make in this case’. The panel went on to comment that ‘There was nothing before us to suggest that the decision to charge Mr. Moyes was so arbitrary or capricious that it would offend principles of fairness and justice to allow The FA to pursue it’); Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018, para 46 (the player raised the fact that in other cases players had not been subject to misconduct charges based on similar conduct; however, it was conceded that this did not prevent the panel from finding the player guilty of misconduct in that case). See further the discussion of the principle of equal treatment at para B1.27 et seq.

B3.132 However, the position is different where the participant can establish that they had a legitimate expectation that in the relevant circumstances they would not be charged. In Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Mourinho was found guilty of misconduct (at first instance and on appeal). However, a second Regulatory Commission was convened to consider the specific question of whether Mourinho had a legitimate expectation that he would not be charged. The Regulatory Commission noted that The FA is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, and went on to consider developments in the law of legitimate expectation.1 In doing so, it noted that it is no longer a requirement that the individual establish a clear and unambiguous representation as the basis of their legitimate expectation; rather, an individual may be able to rely on a policy or established practice.2 1 As to which, see generally para B1.39. 2 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, para 35 (‘In a classic case, applying it in a sporting context, a “participant” might be able to identify a clear and unambiguous representation by the sports regulator upon which he (a participant) had relied

Misconduct  463 in acting in a particular way. However, it is now clearly the law that the doctrine does not depend upon establishing either such an unequivocal representation on the one hand or actual reliance on the other’. The panel referred to the judgment of Laws LJ in R (o/a Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 and commented (paras 38–40): ‘Laws LJ, in a masterful exposition, identified the central feature of legitimate expectation as being that of fundamental fairness in public administration. That means, he explained, recognising a principle which constrains the power of public authorities, namely, that a change of policy which would otherwise be legally unexceptional may be held to be unfair by reason of that authority’s prior action, or inaction. Laws LJ’s judgment shows how far the principle had been developed from its original formulation based upon express or implied promise and/or formulated as an estoppel. He identified three categories of legitimate expectation. What he called the “paradigm case” of procedural expectation is where a public authority has distinctly promised to consult those affected and has not done so. The second category would be where, without any promise, the public authority establishes a policy distinctly and substantially affecting a person or a group, such that they might reasonably rely upon its continuance and then changes its policy without proper explanation or consultation in advance of so doing. The third category he identified is where a public authority has distinctly promised to preserve an existing policy for people who would be substantially affected by any change and, having done so, it would be held to that promise: this, as Laws LJ explained, would be a “substantive” legitimate expectation’).

B3.133 The Regulatory Commission commented: ‘The key to this whole analysis is fairness: in context, the question we must answer is whether it would be fair for the FA to proceed against Mr Mourinho if the same or similar behaviour had not previously resulted in disciplinary action?’.1 In carrying out this analysis, the Regulatory Commission considered: (a)

whether there was an existing practice as to what conduct would be the subject of the charge; (b) whether Mourinho was at least in general terms aware of the practice; and (c) whether the decision to charge Mourinho constituted a departure from the established practice.2 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, para 50. 2 Ibid, para 49.

B3.134 Whilst Regulatory Commission decisions are not binding even within the context of Football Association cases, the approach taken by the Regulatory Commission in Football Association v Mourinho provides a useful insight into how such cases may be approached: (a)

The Regulatory Commission noted that it did not consider that there was any difference between an ‘approach’, ‘policy’, and ‘practice’.1 The Regulatory Commission also noted that the absence of an unequivocal undertaking or expression of a policy is not decisive.2 (b) The Regulatory Commission considered The FA’s explanation as to its approach to charging.3 However, it also noted that it could not consider The FA’s explanation of its own policy alone. Consequently, the Regulatory Commission looked at previous cases relied on by The FA.4 (c) The Regulatory Commission rejected an argument that the fact that Mourinho’s conduct fell within the scope of the rules put him on notice that he could be charged.5 (d) As to the issue of reliance on the alleged policy, Mourinho did not seek to argue that he made a conscious decision to behave as he did based on his understanding of The FA’s policy. However, he claimed that he did not expect The FA to charge him in the circumstances. The Regulatory Commission found that:

‘it is reasonably to be inferred that at the time Mr Mourinho, at least in general terms, was aware of the fact that some forms of misbehaviour were tolerated by the FA and some were not. That explains why he was genuinely surprised – and aggrieved – to be told he faced a charge’.6

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(e) In light of its findings, the Regulatory Commission considered that charging Mourinho was a ‘material departure from previous practice for which no good justification has been provided’.7 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, para 63. 2 Ibid, para 59. 3 Ibid, paras 65 and 67. 4 The Regulatory Commission concluded: ‘It follows that we accept that throughout the period of several years from which examples were taken no participant has previously been charged for behaving in the way that it has already been established that Mr Mourinho behaved. Further, we consider that there are several examples of conduct which was more objectionable than the conduct in the instant case’ (ibid, para 82). 5 Ibid, para 87. 6 Ibid, paras 46–47, and at para 53 (‘The FA suggests that the terms of the Fast Track Procedure and of Rule E 3(1) have the effect of putting Mr Mourinho on notice that he might be in breach if he behaved as he did. We do not agree: the words may tell him what the rule says and, in general terms, that there is a particular practice as to its enforcement. But they do not go so far as to warn him that what he did on this occasion would be regarded as covered by that practice or that his conduct probably would, or could well, result in a sanction’). 7 The Regulatory Commission relied on the comments of Lord Hoffmann in R  (o/a Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 (at 60): ‘It is not essential that the Applicant should have relied upon the promise to his detriment, although this is a relevant consideration in deciding whether the adoption of a policy in conflict with the promise would be an abuse of power and such a change of policy may be justified in the public interest’.

B3.135 Whilst the Mourinho case might offer some hope to participants, it seems likely that the number of cases in which participants will succeed in a defence based on legitimate expectation will remain low. Even in the Mourinho case, the Regulatory Commission was at pains to emphasise that ‘it is of fundamental importance to recognise that a regulator such as the FA has a broad discretion as to the application of its rules’,1 and that ‘any outside body, such as the Regulatory Commission or a Court, should think long and hard before deciding that a discretion has been unfairly applied’.2 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, para 51. 2 Ibid, para 54.

B3.136 Notwithstanding the high hurdle for participants to succeed in legitimate expectation cases, there was a final word of warning for SGBs: ‘As a comment, we add only that if the FA wishes to put players, managers and all other participants on notice that in future it intends to treat words heard in such circumstances, or words that are inaudible but where the meaning is obvious, or conduct to a similar effect, as a breach of the rules, then it could easily do so’.1 Therefore, where an SGB has adopted a particular policy or approach to charging over a period of time, if it subsequently intends to change its approach, it would seem advisable to publicise this (for example by updating guidance).2 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, para 89. 2 For an example of a governing body giving such guidance, see Rugby Football Union v Steve Diamond, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 November 2017, paras 13–15 (‘the RFU and Premiership Rugby made great efforts to address the challenges of maintaining Rugby’s core values. Meetings took place with the Directors of Rugby and various relevant officials. Concerns had been expressed about the possible erosion of rugby’s core values. Match officials have been directed to stamp out incidents which challenge the authority of match officials. Further to a meeting in late July 2017, on 16th August 2017 all Directors of Rugby received an email setting out these concerns and further guidance’).

C Criticism and abuse of officials B3.137 Criticism of match officials is a common basis for misconduct charges.1 This section deals with criticism or abuse of match officials off the field of play (onfield abuse of officials is dealt with at para B3.61).

Misconduct  465 1 See eg Football Association v Jurgen Klopp, February 2019 (Klopp was charged for comments during a post-match interview that questioned the integrity of the match referee and/or implied bias. Klopp was fined £45,000); Football Association v Neil Warnock, Regulatory Commission decision dated 20 May 2019 (Warnock was found guilty of two charges of making comments that questioned the integrity of the referee or implied bias and a further charge involving comments that brought the game into disrepute. He received a fine of £20,000); Paris Saint-Germain & Neymar Da Silva Santos Junior v Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), CAS 2019/A/6367 (Neymar’s sanction was reduced to a two-match ban for comments made about officials); Football Association v Pontus Jansson, decision dated 25  October 2018 (Jansson received a one-match ban and £1,000 fine after describing a decision during a match as ‘robbery’); Football Association v Lee Bowyer, Regulatory Commission decision dated 15 October 2019 (Bowyer was charged with making comments that constituted improper conduct and/or questioned the integrity of the Match Referee (and on on-field improper conduct charge). After admitting the offence he was fined £4,000 and banned for three matches); Ignasi Casas Vague v Federation Equestre Internationale, CAS 2019/A/6202 (the appellant, the Chef d’Equipe for a team, was sanctioned for abusive language towards race officials after a race was cancelled. He was banned for three months and fined CHF2,000); Football Association v Arsène Wenger, Regulatory Commission decision dated 10 January 2018 (Wenger was found to have tried to enter the officials’ dressing room and aggressively questioned the integrity of the officials. He was given a fine of £40,000 and a threematch touchline ban after admitting misconduct); Rugby Football Union v Neil McCarthy, decision dated 28 February 2017 (McCarthy admitted a breach of Regulation 5.12 after he went to the match officials’ changing room after the match, swore at the officials and called them a disgrace, resulting in a three-week ban); Rugby Football Union v Diamond, decision dated 23 February 2017 (the Director of Rugby and coach at Sale Sharks admitted two breaches of Regulation 5.12 following derogatory comments made to the press after the match about the match referee, resulting in a six-week stadium ban, of which half was suspended); Football Association v Bacary Sagna, Appeal Board decision dated 1 February 2017 (the player posted ‘10 against 12 but still fighting and winning as a team’. After admitting the offence he was fined £40,000 and warned as to his future conduct); Football Association v Keith Wyness, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5 June 2017 (the Chief Executive of Aston Villa FC claimed that he had not intended to retweet a caption that was found to be offensive with the video. The panel did not accept the explanation. He received £10,000 fine and ban of three weeks); Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 4 November 2015 (Mourinho was found to have gone into the officials’ dressing room at half time and used abusive language. Given his previous record, the panel imposed a one-match stadium ban and a fine of £40,000); Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Appeal Board decision dated 2 June 2014 (Mourinho was found to have brought the game into disrepute as a result of ‘criticism of a general and indiscriminate nature’, for which he was fined £10,000.

B3.138 SGBs prohibit criticism of officials not only because it goes against sporting values, such as respect and discipline, but also because it has the potential to undermine the integrity of the sport by affecting how officials perform.1 At the same time, however, it could be argued that fair criticism of officials is not unreasonable. The need to strike a reasonable balance was recognised by a Football Association Appeal Board panel in Football Association v Jose Mourinho. The panel expressed the view that ‘The question in this and every case where the issue falls to be decided is: has the line been crossed between the accepted right to express a fair and honestly held opinion, and unacceptable comments that lower the game in the estimation of right-minded members of the public?’2 However, in recent years it appears that SGBs and tribunals are taking a stricter approach, which is reflected in relevant guidance.3 1 See eg the comment in Football Association v Bacary Sagna, Appeal Board decision dated 1 February 2017, para 48 (‘For a professional player publicly to question the integrity of a referee – to, in effect, suggest that he was biased in favour of one team and against another – is unacceptable. It undermines the respect for referees which is essential for the proper and fair functioning of football at all levels, professional and non-professional. Professional players, especially high-profile and senior players at leading clubs with a strong public following, bear a particular responsibility not to act in this way’). 2 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, decision dated 9 June 2014, para 6.3. See also Paris SaintGermain & Neymar Da Silva Santos Junior v Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), CAS2019/A/6367 para 70 (‘The Sole Arbitrator notes that the penalty awarded to Manchester United was a disputed decision which was taken after a lengthy review of video footage. It must be admissible for such decisions to be discussed controversially, even more so if they are match deciding. If one wants football to stir emotions, people must also have the freedom – of course within certain limits – to discuss such match-deciding decisions, even with emotions riding high. In particular, it must be possible for a player to state that he thinks the decision in question to be wrong’). 3 The Rugby Football Union guidance on social media, for example, states: ‘Do not criticise or imply bias in match officials’. The Football Association guidance to players notes: ‘Do not imply bias or attack the integrity of Match Officials’.

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B3.139 Whether a particular comment is critical of officials will be a matter for the panel, judged on an objective basis. It is likely that the fact that the words used were not critical will not be a defence if the overall intent was in fact to criticise. Similarly, the fact that criticism was not directed at a particular official is also unlikely to enable the participant to escape a charge.1 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Appeal Board decision dated 2 June 2014, para 5.3 (Mourinho was found to have brought the game into disrepute as a result of ‘criticism of a general and indiscriminate nature’. The Panel noted that whether his comments brought the game into disrepute ‘involves placing oneself in the position of an ordinary, objective and fair-minded member of the public and how he, or she, is likely to have reacted to media comments in any given case’).

B3.140 Many of the cases involve negative comments about officials made after a match. However, participants may also breach the rules (a) where comments are made before the match, and (b) even if the comments are positive.1 In The Football Association v Rafael Benitez (Regulatory Commission decision dated 8  October 2018), the panel explained: ‘The intention behind the regulation is perhaps an obvious one. Any comments, whether positive or negative, made about an appointed Match Official before a match is a risk to the integrity of that match – whether perceived or otherwise. It can also bring an additional layer of pressure onto a match referee which could have had a negative impact on the game. Thus, positive comments can be just as harmful as those that are negative’ (at para 12).

The panel further noted: ‘post-match comments are not treated in the same way. There is no rule prohibiting post-match comments about appointed Match Officials or Match Officials generally. This is because there is obviously no risk to the integrity of that match which has already been played, and Match Officials for any future games would not have been appointed at that stage’.

On this basis, it would appear that post-match comments about officials that are not critical are unlikely to constitute a breach. 1 The FA’s Essential Information for Clubs 2018/2019 (Level Professional) warns participants that the following may lead to disciplinary charges: ‘Any comment, whether positive or negative about an appointed Match Official made prior to the game’.

B3.141 One of the defences advanced in cases of this nature is that charges have not been brought in other allegedly similar cases. However, this will not normally avail a participant. Football Association panels in particular, have regularly stated that they consider each case on its own merits. This is clearly the correct approach: whether another participant escaped sanction is not a basis for not bringing charges or finding that an offence has not been committed. An exception to this position is where it can be established that the participant had a legitimate expectation, based on a pattern of charging, that the governing body would not bring charges given the particular facts of the case.1 1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, discussed at para B3.132 et seq.

D Criminal offences B3.142 Where participants commit a criminal offence, there is clearly potential for their conduct to be prejudicial to the interests of the sport and/or bring the game into disrepute. It is no surprise, therefore, that there have been a number of cases in which participants who are involved in criminal conduct have subsequently been charged with misconduct.1

Misconduct  467 1 Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018 (the player pleaded guilty to criminal offences (common assault and resisting arrest), which led the court to impose a fine of £2,000 and order payment of £250 to the police officer. The club imposed a further fine of £2,000 and required the player to undertake 10 hours of community service. The player was found guilty of misconduct and warned as to his future conduct but the panel imposed no further sanction); England and Wales Cricket Board v Shiv Thakor, decision dated March 2018 (the player was found guilty of indecent exposure, for which he was given a three-year community order, ordered to pay over £1,000 in costs, and put on the sex offenders register. He pleaded guilty to a misconduct charge for which he received a suspension of six months (of which three months were suspended)); Rugby Australia v Tolu Latu (2019) (after pleading guilty to a criminal charge of drink driving and driving while suspended, Latu was charged with a breach of the professional player code of conduct and received a four-match ban and fine of $5,000 (RugbyPass, 19 June 2019 ‘Rugby Australia heap further punishment on Tolu Latu following drink-driving conviction’)).

B3.143 An interesting issue arises where players are charged with misconduct after being acquitted of a criminal offence. Given that the standard of proof in civil cases is lower (being the balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt), this can lead to a situation in which the player is found innocent of a criminal offence but guilty of misconduct.1 In other cases the misconduct charge (for example for bringing the game into disrepute), whilst related to the conduct for which criminal charges were brought, might relate to the player’s conduct more broadly and therefore does not turn on whether the player is found guilty of a criminal offence.2 Equally, the fact that a player is not charged after being arrested does not mean that they will necessarily avoid a misconduct charge. 1 See Football Association v Forestieri, Regulatory Commission decision dated 24 July 2019, paras 43– 57, which contains a detailed analysis of The FA’s Disciplinary Regulations 23 and 24 and the interplay between criminal and civil standards of proof. Regulation 23 states that ‘the fact that a Participant is liable to face or has pending any other criminal, civil, disciplinary or regulatory proceedings (whether public or private in nature) in relation to the same matter shall not prevent or fetter The Association conducting proceedings under these Rules’. Regulation 24 states that ‘the result of those proceedings and findings upon which such result is based shall be presumed to be correct and true unless it is shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that this is not the case’. On appeal, in Football Association v Forestieri, Appeal Board decision dated 4 September 2019, the Appeal Board upheld the approach taken by the Regulatory Commission in determining that the effect of Regulation 24 is limited to meaning that ‘it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person was guilty’ (para 20) and that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ does not involve a higher standard of proof than the usual balance of probabilities (paras 29–32). Forestieri was acquitted of the criminal charge but found to have committed an aggravated breach of Rule E3(3)). In 2012, John Terry was accused of using racially abusive language towards a black player, Anton Ferdinand of Queens Park Rangers. Terry was charged with a criminal offence under s  28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, and s 31(1)(c) and (5) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. He was acquitted. R v Terry, Westminster Magistrates’ Court, 13 July 2012, available at: judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-john-terry.pdf [accessed 29 Octoer 2020]. In subsequent disciplinary proceedings relating to the same incident, Football Association v John Terry, Terry was found guilty of breaching FA Rule E3(2) and given a four-match ban and fine of £220,000. The panel noted: ‘It follows that the mere fact that a respondent has been acquitted of a criminal charge whose subject-matter is identical, is not capable of acting as a procedural bar preventing the FA from bringing disciplinary proceedings. This is because of the differing standards of proof […]. There was broad consensus between the Parties that ‘facts and matters’, in the context of criminal proceedings, can only be discerned where there is a guilty verdict. In that event, one can infer certain key facts and matters from the outcome, namely the constituent ingredients of the offence which the magistrate(s), judge, or jury found to be proved. Conversely, where the outcome is an acquittal, with a simple ‘not guilty’ verdict, what led to the ‘result’ or outcome (ie the ‘facts and matters’ upon which it was based), are not capable of discernment’ (see paras 5.3 to 5.20). 2 England and Wales Cricket Board v Ben Stokes, decision dated 7 December 2018) (the player was involved in a brawl during a night out following a one-day international match. He was found not guilty of any criminal offences. However, he pleaded guilty to a charge of misconduct based on his conduct that evening more broadly).

B3.144 There are, however, also examples of high profile cases in which participants have not been charged with misconduct despite having been found guilty of a criminal offence.1 To the extent there is inconsistency within a sport as to the circumstances

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in which criminal conduct will result in a misconduct charge, this could potentially leave open the possibility of a challenge on the basis that a charge is contrary to the participant’s legitimate expectations and/or is based on a rule that infringes the requirement of legal certainty.2 1 Cases in which no misconduct charge appears to have been brought include: England rugby player Danny Care was reported to have been arrested in 2012 for drink-driving for a second time in three weeks and to have been fined £3,100 and banned from driving for 16 months, as well as being fined by his club (‘Danny Care ‘devastated’ as he is ditched by England’, Guardian, 5 January 2012); England footballer Wayne Rooney was reported to have been arrested in 2017 for drink-driving, for which he was banned from driving for two years and ordered to undertake community service (‘Wayne Rooney pleads guilty to drink-driving’, Guardian, 18 September 2017); French footballer Hugo Lloris was reported to have pleaded guilty to drink driving and to have been fined £50,000 and banned from driving for 20 months (‘Hugo Lloris fined and banned for being ‘completely drunk’ while driving’, Guardian, 12 September 2018). 2 See para B3.130 et seq.

B3.145 The fact that a participant would be subject to separate proceedings (criminal, disciplinary and a club internal review) in respect of the same conduct is unlikely to preclude misconduct charges,1 although it may affect the sanctions imposed. 1 See eg  comments in Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, decision dated 28  August 2018, para 41 (‘For a player to face criminal charges, internal disciplinary charges and charges by the RFU is nothing out of the ordinary. The Panel was not persuaded by the submission made on behalf of the Player that this “triple jeopardy”, as it was called, went to the issue of fairness so far as the question of whether the charge was proven or not was concerned. The Panel determined that this was only relevant to the level or fairness of any sanction that was handed down, should the charge be found proven’).

E Other forms of unacceptable conduct B3.146 There have been numerous cases in which players have been sanctioned for what is considered to be unacceptable conduct involving alcohol or otherwise occurring on social occasions.1 In most of the cases the misconduct occurred whilst the participants were at a team event and/or participating in a competition, thereby bringing it squarely within the type of situation that most SGBs are seeking to regulate.2 1 See eg England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales and England and Wales Cricket Board v Ben Stokes, decisions dated 7 December 2018 (the players were charged following a night out and their involvement in a brawl following a one-day international victory); in 2017 England cricketers Jonny Bairstow and Liam Plunkett were fined £2,000 and Jake Ball was fined £1,000 and all received formal warnings for going out drinking during a series; in 2017, England cricketer, Ben Duckett was fined £1,500 after an incident whilst out drinking; in 2016, American swimmer, Ryan Lochte, was banned for 10 months and forfeited $100,000 after a drunken escapade during the 2016 Olympic Games (three other American swimmers who were involved in the incident were banned for four months); in 2011, England rugby player, Mike Tindall, was fined £15,000 (reduced on appeal from £25,000) following an incident in New Zealand that reportedly involved dwarf-throwing (two other players involved in the incident were given suspended fines of £5,000); in 2011, England rugby player, Manu Tuilagi, was fined £3,000 after jumping off a ferry whilst at the World Cup in New Zealand; in 2007, England cricketer, Andrew Flintoff, took a hotel pedalo out at night whilst drunk and capsized after an ‘eight-hour drinking spree with team-mates’. He received a one-match ban and was stripped of the vice-captaincy. 2 For a case in which the participant was not officially involved in the tournament then being staged, see Whitmore v International Skating Union, CAS  2016/A/4558 (American international speed-skater, Mitchel Whitmore, was involved in a brawl with another speed skater during which he was alleged to have hit him and knocked him to the ground. Whitmore was not participating in the tournament but was present for rehabilitation purposes. The issue between the pair was resolved the next day when Whitmore apologised. An International Skating Union Disciplinary Commission found Whitmore guilty of misconduct and imposed a 12-month ban. The sanction was reduced by the Court of Arbitration for Sport on appeal to six months).

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9 CODES OF ETHICS A Introduction B3.147 Section 9 of this chapter considers: (a) Codes of Ethics; (b) the history of their introduction and development; and (c) the issues that arise in relation to the detection, investigation and prosecution of a breach of a Code of Ethics. B3.148 The commercialisation of sport in the past few decades has seen it turn into a very valuable commodity. This has led to a series of high-profile scandals arising from serious misconduct by senior administrators. These episodes have been extremely damaging for the sports in question and have had far reaching and long lasting financial and reputational consequences. There is plainly a need to have a framework in place that regulates the behaviour of senior administrators, supported by robust sanctions if those individuals fall short of what is expected. This framework should cover not only the traditional principles of good corporate governance, which are dealt with in Chapter A5 of this book, but also extend to more basic moral and ethical values. Those participating in a sport cannot be expected to conduct themselves properly if those who regulate the sport do not do so themselves. B3.149 One of the first such high profile incidents occurred in 1998, when allegations surfaced that members of the Salt Lake City Organising Committee had bribed senior members of the IOC to ensure that Salt Lake City was awarded the right to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. The IOC appointed Dick Pound, the then IOC Vice President, to head a committee to investigate the allegations with the goal of ‘[wiping] out corruption within the IOC once and for all’.1 The investigation led to three members of the IOC resigning and sanctions being imposed on a further 14 members, including the expulsion of six IOC board members.2 This scandal prompted the IOC to develop an Ethics Commission whose first task was to produce a Code of Ethics, which it did three weeks later on 25 May 1999, becoming the first major sports governing body to introduce a Code of Ethics.3 Many SGBs have since followed the same course. As Ban Ki-Moon, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, and now the chair of the IOC’s Ethics Commission noted recently, “A culture of ethics is key to the success of any organisation”.4 1 Thomas A. Hamilton, ‘The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal’, 21 Marq Sports L Rev 219 (2010) at 223. 2 Ibid, 224. 3 Ibid, 225. 4 olympic.org/news/ban-ki-moon-delivers-ethics-commission-report-to-the-ioc-session [accessed 29 October 2020].

B3.150 It is now considered best practice to have a Code of Ethics as part of the SGB’s regulatory framework.1 These documents have as their stated aim the need to uphold the integrity and reputation of the sport in question. The provisions tend to be similar across all sports and seek to ensure that individuals who are subject to the code act in accordance with important moral values, such as dignity and honesty. 1 One or two SGBs, notably World Athletics, call their document a Code of Conduct. However, the term Code of Ethics has been used in this chapter for consistency and ease of reference.

B Who is bound by Codes of Ethics? B3.151 The misconduct provisions referred to earlier in this chapter typically apply to those who participate in the playing of the sport, such as players or managers, whereas a Code of Ethics is more often used as a tool to regulate the behaviour

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of those who administer and officiate the sport. A number of sports even expressly limit the application of their Code of Ethics in this way. The Code of Ethics of the International Tennis Federation (ITF), for example, has a stated aim of helping to ‘ensure that [tennis] is governed ethically’1 and only applies to individuals such as directors of the ITF, the President and COO and those who sit on an ITF committee. Broadly speaking, cricket, Formula One, and cycling use their ethical provisions to regulate a similar category of people. 1 ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, art 1.1.

B3.152 Other sports take a different approach. The World Athletics Code of Conduct applies to an extremely broad category of people, which includes officials, participants, ‘persons and entities bidding to host, or hosting, [international competitions]’, and anyone ‘engaged by or acting on behalf of World Athletics’.1  FIFA has taken a similar approach, and looks to bind those who play and govern the sport, including any ‘person responsible for technical, medical or administrative matters in FIFA, a confederation, a member association, a league or a club’2 (although, in practice, almost all FIFA Ethics Committee prosecutions concern officials or members of the administration). 1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, para 1. 2 FIFA  Code of Ethics 2019 edition, definition of ‘Official’ paras 2.1 and 30.1. The FIFA  Ethics Committee has been willing to give this definition a broad meaning: Mr Jose Luis Chiriboga Merino had no employment contract with the Ecuador Football Federation, did not ‘sign as an FEF official’ or send his communications from an FEF email address, but was found to be bound by the FIFA Code of Ethics because his integration ‘into FEF affairs went beyond the relationship of an external intermediary/freelancer’ and he ‘seemed to participate heavily in the FEF decision-making process’ by arranging meetings with the president and having letters signed by the general secretary (FIFA Ethics Committee Adj ref no 11/2018, paras 12–23). Conversely, Mr Guillermo Tofoni provided a service to the Argentinian Football Association whereby he organised friendly football matches for the national team of Argentina. See FIFA Ethics Committee Adj ref no 9/2018, paras 19–42 for a discussion as to why the provision of a service did not amount to being responsible for administrative matters at AFA.

B3.153 If the clause is intended to apply to a broad category of people, the sport will need to consider how to ensure that those individuals agree to be bound by the Code of Ethics, particularly as many of them would not ordinarily be licensed by or registered with the SGB. If they are not, the SGB will also have to consider how it can effectively sanction the person for a breach, as the SGB is unlikely to have an ongoing relationship with them.

C What behaviour is caught by a Code of Ethics? B3.154 Codes of Ethics generally use language that is extremely broad, such that they could catch almost any behaviour that has negative connotations. Examples of these provisions include the obligation to ‘act with utmost integrity and honesty at all times including acting in good faith towards others’,1 ‘respecting human dignity’,2 and to ‘behave in a dignified and ethical manner and act with complete credibility and integrity at all times’.3 These obligations are so broad that they could arguably cover conduct such as bad sportsmanship, although the provisions do not appear to have been stretched so far in practice. As with the general misconduct provisions described earlier in this chapter (see para B3.97), it is useful for a SGB to have the benefit of provisions that are flexible enough to cover a broad range of negative behaviours. It might be said that a SGB is correct to adopt this approach given the broad range of conduct that has been prosecuted as a breach of Codes of Ethics in recent years, which extends from dishonesty (submitting false running times)4 to serious sexual misconduct5 and even war crimes.6 As a result, it is likely that some participants will try to argue that the provisions are too broad and contravene the principle of legal certainty.7

Misconduct  471 1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, para 3.3.1. 2 ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 2.1.2.1. 3 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, para 13.3. 4 See IAAF v Mr Virjilio Griggs, SR/Adhocsport/278/2019. In breach of the IAAF Code of Conduct, Mr Griggs knowingly submitted manipulated competition results to the Panama Athletics Federation to try to gain entry to the 2017 IAAF World Championships. 5 See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Keramuudin Karim, Adj. ref. no. 12/2019: Mr Karim, the President of the Afghanistan Football Federation, was charged with a violation of the FIFA Code of Ethics based on allegations of severe mental, physical, sexual and equal rights abuse of the female players. 6 See FIFA  Ethics Committee v Mr Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Adj ref no 10/2019. Mr Ngaïssona, the president of the Central African Republic Football Association, was arrested by the International Criminal Court. He was allegedly the most senior leader and the National General Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka group and alleged to be responsible for committing crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Central African Republic. The FIFA Ethics Committee found him guilty of having violated the FIFA Code of Ethics. 7 See para B1.19 et seq. See in particular Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Diack v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4417 – 4419 – 4420, para 232 et seq, where the appellants were charged with breaching fairly broad provisions of the IAAF Code of Ethics, such as acting contrary to fair play, tarnishing the reputation of the IAAF, and not acting with the utmost integrity, honesty and responsibility. One appellant argued that this was a breach of Art 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the parts of the Code of Ethics that he was alleged to have breached were ‘far from clear [and] do not enable a person to know which specific acts or omission would make him liable […] such vague articles may therefore not be the basis for sanctions of a criminal nature’. The CAS panel ruled that these provisions were ‘quite normal in all sorts of formal and material legislation. Whether or not there is a violation of such general norms is to be judged on the basis of facts, in a given situation’. The panel was clear that the appellants would have understood that conspiring to conceal anti-doping violations over three years in return for money would be a violation of these provision.

B3.155 A Code of Ethics typically also addresses and regulates specific behaviours, such as when gifts can be accepted or conflicts of interest. Examples are set out below. It is often the case that serious misconduct contravenes many different provisions of a Code of Conduct, and the case law has been considered in the most appropriate place below. For those SGBs based in the UK, the Code for Sports Governance, which applies to all organisations in the UK that receive funding from Sport England and UK Sport, contains provisions that inform how to draft an effective Code of Ethics.

(a) Bribery B3.156 All Codes of Ethics contain a broad prohibition on bribery, being the offer, acceptance or promise of any form of benefit or incentive in order to improperly influence a particular action or decision. It is common for bribery to be one of the charges brought against a participant in corruption cases, as so many cases involve money changing hands. B3.157 There have been a material number of high-profile examples of corruption cases in recent years in which individuals looked to profit from the sport or bribe others to secure their election to a position of power. On 27 May 2015, the US Department of Justice announced that it was ‘charging 14 defendants with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with the defendants’ participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the corruption of international soccer’.1 Of those 14 individuals, 9 were senior FIFA officials. The Attorney General said that ‘the indictment alleges corruption that is rampant, systemic and deep-rooted both abroad and here in the United States. It spans at least two generations of soccer officials who, as alleged, have abused their positions of trust to acquire millions of dollars of bribes and kickbacks’, in particular in relation to the sale of broadcasting rights to international matches. Meanwhile, the 2015 WADA Independent Commission Report concluded that track & field athletes were being exploited, that an ‘open and accepted series of unethical behaviours and practices has become the norm’, and that there was ‘corruption and bribery practices

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at the highest levels of international athletics’.2 These examples serve to demonstrate that, whilst the regulatory framework in sport is undoubtedly improving and constantly evolving to tackle these problems, it remains subject to one big limitation: how to put in place effective and independent systems to police those who govern the sport and exercise its decision-making powers. 1 justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracyand [accessed 29 October 2020]. Similarly, in 1993 Lamine Diack, then Vice-President of the IAAF, was paid the sum of $60,000 in cash by a company at a time when it was in negotiations with the IAAF to sign a marketing contract. In 2011 an IOC Ethics Commission found that he had placed himself in a conflict of interest. He was only given a reprimand due to mitigating factors, such as the fact that he was not an IOC member at the time it happened. IOC  Ethics Commission v Mr Lamine Diack, D/01/2011. 2 The WADA Independent Commission Report 1, dated 9 November 2015, para 1.7.1. See Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Diack v IAAF, CAS  2016/A/4417 – 4419 – 4420. Messrs Balakhnichev and Melnikov were senior members of the Russian Athletics Federation and Mr Papa Massata Diack was a senior consultant to the IAAF. These three individuals were found guilty of conspiring together to extract money from the professional Russian marathon runner, Mrs Shobukhova. They took advantage of their positions to obtain money from her in return for suppressing evidence of her abnormal blood profile, so that she could compete in the 2012 Olympics when she should have been banned.

(b) Bidding B3.158 The bidding process for hosting a major international sporting event can be extremely competitive due to the commercial benefits that the event brings. There is therefore a motivation for those involved in the bidding process to seek to improperly influence those who decide the outcome of the process through, for example, the giving of bribes and gifts. B3.159 One of the first major bidding scandals in sport concerned Salt Lake City’s bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics.1 The bid committee was later accused of: ‘providing more than US1.2 million in cash and gifts, such as: trips to Disneyland, a Rolex watch, shopping sprees, and college scholarships to entice IOC members to support its bid’.2

As stated above, Dick Pound’s investigation led to sanctions being imposed against 14 members, including the expulsion of six IOC board members. The US  Justice Department brought criminal charges against 15 individuals involved in the scandal, although each person was eventually acquitted.3 1 Other event bidding controversies include: (1) an allegation that Jack Warner, then the CONCACAF  President and a member of the FIFA  Executive Committee, ‘accepted a bribe from the Moroccan bid committee in exchange for his vote for Morocco’ to host the 1998  FIFA World Cup (according to the Request for Restitution that FIFA lodged with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York, at p 10). This charge has not yet been decided at trial at the time of writing; and (2) allegations that the bidding process for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, awarded to Atlanta, also involved the bribing of IOC officials. None of the IOC documents made available to the public by the IOC referred to these allegations. See Thomas A. Hamilton, ‘The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal’, 21 Marq Sports L Rev 219 (2010) at 223, at 230– 231. 2 Mark Dodds, ‘Revisiting the Salt Lake City Olympic scandal: would the outcome be different today’ (2016) 12(1) Sport Management International Journal at 2. 3 Ibid, at 1.

B3.160 There were then, as there are now, rules that govern how a bid process for a major event must be conducted. A consideration of those rules is outside the scope of this chapter. However, the IOC took the view that there was a need to supplement those rules with a Code of Ethics designed to regulate a broader range of behaviour. Codes of Ethics often now address bidding directly, for example by requiring those involved to be neutral when considering bids and to conduct a bid with honesty, fairness and respect for others.1

Misconduct  473 1 See eg  ITF  Code of Ethics dated 1  January 2019, para  2.7, and World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, para 3.3.13.

B3.161 Notwithstanding the specific provisions in Codes of Ethics, there continue to be allegations relating to the bidding processes for major tournaments in sport, and football in particular. The award of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to the Gulf state of Qatar was tarnished with constant allegations of corruption. In August 2012 Michael Garcia, the Chairman of the investigative chamber of the FIFA  Ethics Committee announced that he would investigate the award of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups to Russia and Qatar respectively. His report was not made public. Instead, Hans-Joachim Eckert, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee’s adjudication chamber, published a 42-page summary of the report, which cleared both Russia and Qatar of any wrongdoing. Shortly afterwards, Garcia declared that the summary was ‘materially incomplete’, with ‘erroneous representations of the facts and conclusions’.1 Garcia unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the summary to FIFA’s Appeal Committee, which concluded that the summary was not capable of appeal.2 1 bbc.co.uk/sport/football/30042309 [accessed 29 October 2020]. 2 bbc.co.uk/sport/football/30491135 [accessed 29 October 2020].

B3.162 A US Department of Justice indictment included an allegation that bribery took place in the bidding process for the 2010  FIFA World Cup in South Africa.1 The same indictment filed with the court on 18  March 2020 alleged that ‘several [FIFA] executive members were offered or received bribes in connection their votes’ in relation to who would host the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups.2 1 A Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York dated 18 March 2020 stated that in ‘approximately 2004, high-ranking officials of FIFA and the South African government indicated to the defendant Jack Warner that they were prepared to arrange for the government of South Africa to pay $10 million to CFU purportedly to “support the African diaspora” but in fact to secure the votes of WARNER and other CONCACAF representatives on the FIFA executive committee in favour of South Africa as host of the 2010 tournament’ at para 86 (justice.gov/ usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/download [accessed 29 October 2020].). This charge has not yet been determined by the court (as the US Department of Justice has not yet managed to secure the extradition of Mr Warner from Trinidad and Tobago). FIFA has, however, made reference to the bribe on pages 9 and 10 of the Request for Restitution that FIFA lodged with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York (img.fifa.com/image/upload/amoaw7hmbus7mxnw6xot.pdf [accessed 29 October 2020].). 2 See the Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York dated 18  March 2020, paragraphs 90 – 99 (justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/ download [accessed 29 October 2020].).

B3.163 FIFA has attempted to prevent such incidents occurring in the future by making changes to the bid process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup.1 These include: (a) increasing transparency by making every step of the bidding process open to the public, including the evaluation reports for each bid (which evaluation itself will, to the extent possible, be based on objective criteria); (b) each of the 211 member associations of the FIFA Congress will be entitled to participate in the final vote on the venue for the competition, rather than just the 15 members of the FIFA Executive Committee; (c) each vote will be made public (in the past, as the voting process was confidential, it was possible for members of the FIFA Executive Committee to take bribes from multiple sources for the same vote); (d) the bidding process will be scrutinised by independent auditors; and (e) an enhanced version of the rules of conduct has been put in place, called the Bid Rules of Conduct. 1 FIFA Bid Evaluation Report 2026 FIFA World Cup.

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(c) Elections B3.164 Most sports have detailed rules that regulate the election to key posts within a SGB. These rules do not typically form part of a Code of Ethics, with notable exceptions being tennis and athletics, which both have Codes of Ethics that address the topic. However, there have been some high-profile examples of individuals being accused of having paid bribes to secure election victory, although a significant issue faced by the prosecutor is often establishing the link between the payment and the vote.1 1 See Blatter v FIFA  Ethics Committee, CAS  2016/A/4501. The 2015  US  Department of Justice investigation identified a payment in 2011 of CHF2,000,000 by FIFA to Michel Platini, who was then Vice President of FIFA, member of the FIFA Executive Committee, and President of UEFA. The FIFA Ethics Committee commenced an investigation and charged Mr Blatter with numerous violations of FIFA’s Code of Ethics. One charge was that the payment was a bribe made in order to obtain Mr Platini’s support for Mr Blatter’s candidacy in the 2011 FIFA presidential elections. Mr Blatter’s explanation for this payment was that in 1998 he made ‘an oral agreement to hire French football great Michel Platini as an advisor and ambassador for FIFA for a salary of CHF 1 million per year. Because of FIFA’s troubled finances at the time, [he] and Mr Platini agreed that some portion of the salary would be deferred until the organization could afford to pay the balance’. The balance of CHF2,000,000 was then paid on 1 February 2011 when, according to Mr Blatter, FIFA’s finances had improved. This was his position despite the fact that there was a written contract in place providing for a salary of CHF300,000 per annum for the same services (which was paid in full). FIFA’s position was that ‘the payment, 10 years after the fact, of an additional amount of CHF2 million, based on an alleged oral agreement providing for a yearly remuneration of CHF1 million (instead of CHF300,000, as indicated in the written contract signed by Mr Blatter and Mr Platini), defies any logic’. It must, therefore, be an undue benefit. However, the FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber was ‘unable to reach the conviction that the payment was made in order to obtain Mr Platini’s support of [Mr Blatter’s] candidacy’, and therefore found that it was not a bribe. On appeal, FIFA submitted that it was enough that the payment (February 2011) and Mr Platini’s support (expressed in May 2011) were a few months apart to demonstrate that the payment was a bribe. However, the FIFA Appeal Committee rejected this analysis as there was evidence that Mr Platini approached FIFA in February 2010 about the payment. CAS concluded that, even if there was a binding oral agreement between Mr Blatter and Mr Platini in 1998, this agreement was superseded by the employment contract between FIFA and Mr Platini, which provided for a payment of CHF300,000, meaning that the payment was made with no contractual basis and was therefore an undue gift. See also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Bin Hammam, CAS 2011/A/2625: In March 2011 Mohamed Bin Hamman, a senior FIFA official, ran for FIFA President. He asked Jack Warner, CONCAF’s President, to convene a special meeting for him to present his candidacy to CONCACAF’s member federations, which took place on 10 and 11 May in Trinidad and Tobago. Before the meeting, Mr Bin Hammam wired US $360,000 to the Caribbean Football Union, and later provided a further US $50,000. He attended the conference and made a 45-minute speech about his candidacy. After he left, Mr Warner announced that there were ‘gifts’ for representatives of attending associations. Later, each representative was given a sum of US $40,000 in cash in an envelope. A few days afterwards, Mr Chuck Blazer, a FIFA Executive Member, hired a lawyer to investigate the source of the money, whose report concluded that ‘At the meeting, Mr Bin Hammam and Mr Warner, caused cash payments totalling approximately US$ 1,000,000 to be paid, or attempted to be paid to “Officials”’. The report was leaked to the media and Mr Bin Hammam withdrew his candidacy. FIFA’s Ethics Committee started proceedings against Mr Warner and Mr Bin Hammam. Mr Warner resigned from all positions in international football and, in response, FIFA closed all ethics committee procedures against him, wished him well and announced that ‘the presumption of innocence is maintained’ (fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-vice-president-jack-warner-resigns-1455834 [accessed 29 October 2020]). The FIFA Ethics Committee found Mr Bin Hammam guilty of various breaches of FIFA’s Code of Ethics, including bribery, and this was upheld by the FIFA Appeal Committee. CAS, however, took a different view. It found that it was not in dispute that ‘envelopes containing US $40,000 were offered to CFU delegates’. However, CAS considered that there were two key factual questions: (1) was Mr Bin Hammam the source of the money? and (2) was the purpose of the money to buy votes for the FIFA Presidency? CAS was unable to conclude to its comfortable satisfaction either that he was the source or, even if he was, that it was used to buy votes. CAS did, however, state that the conclusion ‘should not be taken to diminish the significance of its finding that it is more likely than not that Mr Bin Hamman was the source of the monies that were brought into Trinidad and Tobago and eventually distributed at the meeting by Mr Warner and […] his conduct […] may not have complied with the highest ethical standards that should govern the world of football’, and ‘The Panel wishes to make it clear that […] it is not making any sort of affirmative finding of innocence in relation to Mr Bin Hammam’.

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(d) Political neutrality B3.165 As already noted above, it has long been a fundamental cornerstone of international sport that it should operate independently from government.1 The purpose is to ensure, so far as is possible, that the same rules apply to everyone, that sport is a politically neutral environment, and that it is free from discrimination. This principle is reflected in the writings of the founder of the IOC who, over 100 years ago, wrote that ‘the goodwill of all the members of any autonomous sport grouping begins to disintegrate as soon as the huge, blurred face of that dangerous creature known as the state makes an appearance’.2 The modern-day IOC  Code of Ethics records that two of the universal ethical principles of the Olympism are ‘respect of the principle of the universality and political neutrality of the Olympic Movement’ and ‘maintaining harmonious relations with state authorities, while respecting the principle of autonomy’.3 These principles are enshrined in most modern Codes of Ethics. 1 See para A1.2, A1.3 and para B3.76. 2 Pierre de Coubertin, Une campagne de vingt-et-un ans (1887–1908) (Paris: Éducation physique, 1909), p 152. 3 IOC Code of Ethics 2020, arts 1.2 and 1.3.

B3.166 The relationship between politics and sport is frequently in the public eye. There are numerous examples of sport having to navigate this often-difficult issue, with one famous example being John Carlos and Tommie Smith raising a blackgloved first during the 1968 Summer Olympics. More recently, examples include FIFA sanctioning the English and Scottish football associations for allowing their players to wear a poppy symbol to mark Remembrance Sunday, or NFL players ‘taking a knee’ while the national anthem was playing to highlight racial injustice and police brutality in America.1 These cases may not always be considered in the context of a Code of Ethics, but they serve as good examples of the potential for tension between sport and politics. The principles were tested during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which took place shortly after Russia had introduced a law that banned giving minors information about homosexuality.2 The Sochi Games became a platform for governments and participants from around the world to protest against these laws, such protests being prohibited by the IOC Code of Ethics and Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter. Faced with athletes making a stand against discrimination, the IOC was forced to compromise, and announced that the ‘Games cannot be used as a stage for political demonstrations however good the cause may be […] on the other hand athletes enjoy freedom of speech so if in a press conference they wanted to make a political statement they are absolutely free to do so’.3 In advance of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, the IOC Athletes’ Commission released guidelines to Rule 50 which confirmed that incidents such as these will be assessed and any necessary disciplinary action taken on a case by case basis.4 1 See para B3.78 n 1. 2 theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/russia-law-banning-gay-propaganda [accessed 29 October 2020]. 3 reuters.com/article/us-olympics-bach/protest-in-press-room-not-podium-says-iocidUSBREA0Q0VA20140127 [accessed 29 October 2020]. 4 The following passage from Transparency International, Autonomy and governance: necessary bedfellows in the fight against corruption in sport (undated), provides some further examples of the challenging relationship between politics and sport: ‘At the turn of the twenty-first century sports organisations in numerous countries, including Afghanistan, Gambia, Ghana, India, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama and Poland, denounced cases of state intervention in sport. These complaints led the IOC to temporarily suspend the NOCs of Afghanistan, Kuwait and India, preventing them taking part with their flag in the Sydney 2000, London 2012 and Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, respectively. As early as the 1970s the IOC had protested, unsuccessfully, against a law (the Amateur Sport Act) passed by the US  Congress creating the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and giving it property rights over the Olympic rings in the United States. Historically, however, it can be seen that the countries excluded from the Olympics or other world events have all been relatively minor in terms of either their size or sporting results’.

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B3.167 The IOC has recognised that there are limits to the autonomy of the Olympic Movement. When speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in 2013, the IOC president made reference to the idea of ‘responsible autonomy’, which he described as follows: ‘Regardless of where in the world we practise sport, the rules are the same. They are recognised worldwide. They are based on a common “global ethic” of fair play, tolerance and friendship. But to apply this “universal law” worldwide and spread our values globally, sport has to enjoy responsible autonomy. Politics must respect this sporting autonomy. For only then can sport organisations implement these universal values amidst all the differing laws, customs and traditions. Responsible autonomy does not mean that sport should operate in a law-free environment. It does mean that we respect national laws which are not targeted against sport and its organisations alone, sometimes for chiefly political reasons’.1

In a rare case involving the autonomy of sport, rather than political neutrality, an individual was charged with infringing the IOC principle of the autonomy of sport as a result of receiving state funding to support a campaign to be elected president of a regional association of National Olympic Committees.2 1 Quoted in Transparency International, Autonomy and governance: necessary bedfellows in the fight against corruption in sport (undated). 2 Malboum v Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa, CAS  2017/A/5163 (during a campaign for election as president of ANOCA, Malboum was charged with breaching the principle of the autonomy of sport on the basis that he received state funding to assist with the costs of the campaign. The Executive Committee of ANOCA disqualified Malboum from the election. Malboum appealed the decision to CAS. In addition to finding that there was no evidence of bribery (a charge that was also effectively withdrawn by ANOCA at the hearing), the panel noted that ‘the Respondent did not establish any convincing and sufficiently clear legal basis for the finding of any infringement based on the support received by Mr Malboum and given by his government’(para 144(iii))).

(e) Gifts B3.168 Codes of Ethics typically regulate the ability to offer and accept gifts.1 The giving or receiving of a gift is an easy way to exert improper influence over an individual or give the perception of doing so, which can be just as damaging to the integrity of a sport. It is common for gifts to be all or part of the focus of corruption cases. Most sports recognise that it is not practical, or perhaps fair, to prohibit gifts or hospitality altogether, and therefore allow modest gifts or hospitality to be accepted. This gives rise to a number of related issues. When drafting these provisions, consideration should be given to the following: (a)

It is common for an individual to be allowed to exercise a degree of judgement as to when it is appropriate to accept a gift, but within the confines of defined boundaries. Examples include a requirement to consider factors such as whether accepting the gift might (i) give the ‘impression that he has been or might be influenced’,2 (ii) create ‘an actual or apparent or potential conflict of interest’,3 or (iii) be ‘frequent, lavish or prolonged’.4 (b) Should there be a cap on the value of the gift? The IOC and FIFA, for example, permit ‘only tokens of consideration or friendship of nominal value, in accordance with prevailing local customs’,5 or those that have ‘symbolic or trivial value’6 respectively. (c) Should the test change or be stricter in certain circumstances? The perception of impropriety can be as damaging to a sport as actual impropriety. It is common for a greater duty of care to be imposed where there is a tender or bid process ongoing. (d) Should there be any objective restrictions? It is common to include safeguards such as (i) a prohibition on any cash gifts, or (ii) accepting any gifts from certain individuals, such as someone bidding for a contract.

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(e) Should there be reporting obligations? It would seem sensible to require individuals to report any gifts over a certain value. The administrative burden is low, and the requirement should deter officials from accepting gifts of a greater value and taking the risk that they will not discovered. Most SGBs have internal gifts and hospitality registers for declaring gifts. 1 For those SGBs in England and Wales, see the Bribery Act 2010, which criminalises the giving and receiving of gifts in certain circumstances. Many other countries will have similar legislation. 2 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, para 2.4.2.1. 3 ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 1.3 of Appendix 3. 4 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, para 2.4.2.2.3. 5 IOC Code of Ethics 2020 Edition, arti 4. 6 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, para 20.1.

(f) Loyalty and conflicts of interest B3.169 It is unsurprising that Codes of Ethics prohibit actual or potential conflicts of interest. It is an important tool in seeking to prevent officials from putting themselves in a position where they may be tempted to take a bribe or accept an improper gift. The prohibition is often combined with a broader positive duty of undivided loyalty to the sport, meaning the administrator is required to make decisions that are in the sport’s best interests, without regard to the interests of himself or any other party. B3.170 In some cases, the obligation is short and generic. FIFA, for example, imposes an obligation to avoid a situation where a secondary issue could influence a person’s ability to perform their duties with integrity and in an independent and purposeful manner. In other sports, a much more prescriptive approach is deployed that sets out a very detailed set of rules to follow. A person who is subject to such a code will need to take care to avoid falling foul of what are very broad obligations and often extend to relatives, family and even acquaintances.1 It would not be difficult to conceive of a situation where a potential conflict arose between the interests of a governing body and an acquaintance. In order to identify such issues, it is common for there to be a regime in place requiring people to report any conflicts of interest. 1 See FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, para 19.1 and ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 2.2.2.

(g) Discrimination B3.171 Codes of Ethics universally prohibit any form of unlawful discrimination, such as discrimination based on sex, religion, race, colour or sexual orientation. The prohibition often includes broader concepts, such as discrimination based on any ‘difference’,1 any ‘opinion [or] any other reason’2 or ‘status’.3 Athletics goes one step further and has included a positive obligation to ‘encourage and actively support equality of gender in Athletics’.4 1 2 3 4

World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, Art 3.3.9. FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, Art 22.1. IOC Code of Ethics 2019, Art 1.4. World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, Art 3.3.9.

B3.172 It is common for participants to try to defend discrimination charges on the basis that they did not intend to act in a discriminatory manner. This is typically rejected, with panels preferring to judge the act on an objective basis.1 1 See para B3.112. See IAAF Ethics Board v Vanessa Spinola, 05/2016, paras 17–19. Ms Spinola was a Brazilian heptathlete who participated in the IAAF World Championships in Beijing in August 2015. When lining up for the start of the 100m hurdles race, she was recorded on television moving her hands to the outer corners of her eyes and pulling the corners of both her eyes towards the side of her face. The panel accepted that she did not intend to cause offence. It went on to conclude at para 16 that ‘the fact that one viewer considers a gesture made by an athlete to be offensive will not, without more,

478  Regulating Sport give rise to a violation of the Code. It must be shown that the complainant’s view that the gesture was offensive was a reasonable view that may be shared by others with the result that the gesture can be said to be objectively likely to affect adversely the reputation of the IAAF’. Note that this was decided in relation to a charge of acting in a manner likely to affect adversely the reputation of the IAAF. The panel decided it was not necessary to decide the discrimination charge. However, the quote is still instructive as to how the latter would be considered. See also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Shprygin, Adj ref no 5/2019: Mr Shprygin, a member of the Executive Committee of the Football Union of Russia, posted a picture on social media of an image of SS skull and crossbones (a symbol of special SS groups during World War II and later used by neo-Nazi organisations), together with the colours and name of Dynamo Moscow. The panel found this to be offensive and discriminatory. The Panel noted ‘Mr Shyprygin’s arguments that it was merely a picture of a fan’s T-shirt, that the real intention of the T-shirt cannot be established, that he was not aware of the meaning and that he had no malicious intent, were entirely unconvincing and inexcusable. Mr Shyprygin rightfully recognizes that at least a person holding his position, should double-check and verify the content of what is posted on social media.’

B3.173 The objective test can present problems, particularly as ethics cases tend to be dealt with by international governing bodies, not domestic ones. It is possible that some conduct will be considered offensive in certain parts of the world, but not in others.1 1 See IAAF Ethics Board v Vanessa Spinola, 05/2016, paras 17–19. The Panel accepted that the gesture ‘is not everywhere construed as a racist or offensive gesture […]. However, the Panel also recognises that athletics is a global sport watched by millions of viewers, some of whom would reasonably construe the Gesture to be highly offensive […]. It is reasonable to find even well-meant gestures offensive, where they mimic racial, religious, gender or other personal characteristics and where the gestures have previously given rise to widespread controversy and criticism’.

D Issues that arise in ethics proceedings (a) Non-retroactivity B3.174 It is a common feature of the major bribery and corruption cases that the mischief is not discovered for many years. Moreover, often the individuals concerned repeat the corrupt acts numerous times over that period of time. One consequence is that there may have been regulatory changes in the interim or even entirely new regulations introduced.1 In these circumstances the legal principle of tempus regit actum, or non-retroactivity, demands that an act must be governed by the regulations that were in force at the time that the act took place. This is a fundamental principle of Swiss law (which is the applicable law in cases brought by many international federations) and is a part of international public policy.2 An exception to this principle is that if new regulations, that have come into force since the act was committed are more favourable to the accused in relation to applicable sanctions, they may be applied.3 1 See Joseph S. Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 95, Mr Blatter was accused of causing FIFA to make an unlawful payment of CHF2 million. A key issue in the dispute was whether FIFA was party to an oral agreement made in 1998 that created the obligation to pay the money. The payment was made in 2011. On FIFA’s case, there was no oral agreement in 1998, so the violation took place in 2011, whereas on Mr Blatter’s case, the obligation arose in 1998. If correct, there could be no violation of a Code of Ethics, as the first version was introduced in 2004. The Panel did not find that there was an oral agreement, so the violation took place in 2011 when a Code of Ethics was in force. 2 See para B1.40 et seq. For examples of the application of the principle in the context of claims for breach of Codes of Ethics, Makudi v FIFA, CAS 2018/A/5769, para 81; FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Tai Nicholas, 6/2019 (E18-00005), paras 4–6. 3 See para B1.44.

(b) Investigations B3.175 It is often the case that a corrupt act is only brought to a SGB’s attention because of a state investigation1 or the work of an investigative journalist. This is

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understandable to some extent as SGBs do not have the powers of investigation available to the state, although they do benefit from a greater level of flexibility when bringing charges against a participant, as they are not bound by some of the stricter rules of evidence that often restrict prosecutors on criminal proceedings.2 1 See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Adj ref no 10/2019, paras 89 and 90. Mr Ngaïssona, the president of the Central African Republic Football Association, was arrested by the International Criminal Court. He was allegedly the most senior leader and the National General Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka group and alleged to be responsible for committing crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Central African Republic. In response to complaints that the Ethics Committee did not conduct its own investigation, but instead relied on third-party investigations, the Ethics Commission stated that ‘it can decide whether the evidence provided to it is significant or insignificant depending on the particular circumstances of the case and the quality of the document itself. It is the Panel’s opinion that, principally, the reports and documents of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, a warrant arrest of the Office, a report from a Panel of Experts of the United Nations and an investigative report of the International Federation for Human Rights contain a comprehensive analysis of the armed conflict […] and the participation of Mr Ngaïssona in these events […]. It is undisputed that the entities involved in the elaboration of these reports are well known and have a world recognition without their impartiality being put in question whatsoever […]. Their impartiality and expertise in the assessment of the above-mentioned matter is undisputed and no elements contained in the case file could eventually justify a different approach’. See also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Keramuudin Karim Adj ref no 12/2019 for a further example. Mr Karim was the President of the Afghanistan Football Federation. He was accused by male Afghan Football Federation officials of subjecting the female players to severe mental, physical, sexual and equal rights abuse. FIFA representatives were unable to travel to Afghanistan due to security concerns. FIFA was able to rely on, amongst other things, a committee set up by the Attorney General of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and ‘correspondence from the Afghan public authorities, cooperation with international and local institutions’. In IOC Ethics Commission v Mr Dae-sung Moon, No 01-2016, Mr Dae-sung Moon, an IOC member, was referred to the IOC Ethics Commission as he had been accused of having plagiarised a doctoral thesis he wrote in in 2007 at Kookmin University in the Republic of Korea. The university opened an investigation but despite promising to inform the Ethics Commission of its conclusion, it never did. In 2013, the Ethics Commission noted that ‘in the absence of a decision by Kookmin University, which alone is competent to assess the validity and quality of the doctoral theses […] [the Ethics Commission] is unable to propose any recommendation to the IOC President’. On 6 March 2014, Kookmin University made a finding of plagiarism and cancelled the degree. Mr Moon appealed, but the decision was upheld by the Seoul first-instance court and the Seoul Court of Appeal. Mr Moon announced that he was filling an appeal with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea. With the 2016 Olympic Games approaching, the Ethics Commission decided to provisionally suspend Mr Moon on the basis that the ‘plagiarism has been confirmed by two judicial instances of the Republic of Korea’, and that this in itself ‘tarnishes the reputation of the Olympic Movement’, pending the Supreme Court decision. This decision was taken without any apparent consideration of the underlying evidence. It is not clear whether this suspension was ever lifted. 2 See Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, paras 62–68. In deciding that a secret audio recording that was gathered illegally in Spain was admissible in evidence before it, the panel noted that ‘the authority by which a sporting association may set its own rules and exert its disciplinary powers on its direct and indirect members does not rest on public or penal law but on civil law […]. According to established case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, only civil standards are relevant to the disciplinary sanctions imposed by sport association. In particular the Swiss Federal Tribunal noted that criminal law principles may not be applied when dealing with evidentiary issues in disciplinary cases’. See further para B4.38.

B3.176 It is becoming increasingly common for the body responsible for policing ethics provisions to appoint an independent person to investigate the issue. However, that will not always be possible due to the limited resources available to some SGBs. In those circumstances, the SGB may be forced to rely on evidence uncovered by state investigations or investigative journalists. B3.177 Some people take the view that there is a limit to what sport can do about criminal behaviour when it is taking place at the highest levels. David Howman, former head of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), noted that ‘Sport has no real power or jurisdiction: governments do. There are already several international treaties in being for corruption’.1 The calls for a unified approach to corruption in sport akin to WADA in the field of anti-doping are likely to continue while the

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scandals keep appearing on the front pages of newspapers. However, one issue is what investigative powers such a body could have beyond those that SGBs already exercise. The Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis concluded that ‘National authorities should implement more robust regulatory and enforcement approaches to betting related corruption in sport. The International Governing Bodies and national federations can use their influence with the nations in which they operate to promote this. The current shortcomings include a lack of specific criminal laws addressing match-fixing in sport, a lack of sufficient proactivity among some law enforcement authorities in investigating and criminally prosecuting such conduct, and inadequate national regulations governing betting operators. If legal safeguards cannot be assured, tennis authorities have various options, including declining to sanction events in countries that do not offer an adequate legal environment to combat integrity threats and restricting the sale of official live scoring data for events or to operators in such countries’.2 1 wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2015-10/speech-by-wada-director-general-david-howman-challengesto-the-integrity-of-sport [accessed 30 October 2020]. 2 Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis Final Report, para 503.

B3.178 One increasingly common way of improving the position is to ensure that the investigation and enforcement of ethics matters is carried out by a body independent of, or one that is otherwise at arm’s length from, the relevant sporting federation. There has been a recent trend in sport to increase this level of independence so that the body is – and is seen to be – acting without fear or favour, although these perceptions can be difficult to assuage, given that the funding for such bodies will invariably come from the sports federation. B3.179 Since 2008, responsibility for investigating and prosecuting bettingrelated corruption offences in tennis has sat with the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU), an operationally independent body originally set up by the ATP, the WTA, the ITF and the Grand Slam Board. Following an independent review,1 this level of independence was increased by creating a new supervisory board of the TIU,2 the appointment of an independent CEO3 whose remit included the appointment of TIU staff,4 and establishing the TIU as a separate legal personality.5 Since 2012, the FIFA  Ethics Committee has been split into an investigatory arm (the Investigatory Chamber) and an enforcement arm (the Adjudicatory Chamber).6 The members of each Chamber are independent of FIFA, albeit that they are appointed by the FIFA  Congress7 following recommendation from the 37 member FIFA  Council. The independent integrity unit model has also been adopted in athletics. Since 1  January 2017, integrity matters in athletics have been investigated and enforced by the Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU).8 The AIU Rules establish a number of safeguards to preserve the operational independence of the AIU from the governing body, World Athletics (previously the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)). In particular, oversight of the AIU is provided by an independent Integrity Unit Board,9 which has wide ranging powers10 including in relation to the funding of the AIU,11 approving decisions of the Head of the AIU as to whether there is a case to answer (and therefore whether a matter proceeds from the investigatory phase to the issue of a charge),12 and appointing and terminating the employment of the Head of the AIU.13 In 2019, the International Biathlon Unit established a Biathlon Integrity Unit along similar lines. See Chapter A5 for more detail about these governance reforms.  1 tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/Independent%20Reviews/Final%20Report_191218.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].   2 Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis Final Report, para 319.   3 Ibid, para 336.   4 Ibid, para 337.   5 Ibid, para 333.   6 FIFA Statutes June 2019 edition, para 28(2)(r).

Misconduct  481   7 Prior to 2017, integrity matters were enforced by an independently established body, the IAAF Ethics Board (itself formerly the Ethics Commission). Investigations were carried out by an independent investigator appointed by the Ethics Board (para C 16, Statutes of the IAAF Ethics Commission, at Appendix 6 to the IAAF Code of Ethics).   8 The Integrity Unit Board also comprises one council member of World Athletics and the Head of the Integrity Unit, but those members are non-voting (see Rule 4.2 of the Athletics Integrity Unit Rules in force from 23 November 2019).   9 Athletics Integrity Unit Rules dated 23 November 2019, rule 5.1. 10 Ibid, rule 5.1.1. 11 Ibid, rule 5.1.10. 12 Ibid, rules 9.1 and 9.3. 13 biathlonworld.com/news/detail/historic-ibu-extraordinary-congress-marks-beginning-of-new-era-foribu (19 October 2019) [accessed 30 October 2020].

B3.180 Cricket has implemented an additional safeguard, which involves an audit committee carrying out an ethical risk assessment at least every two years that looks to identify those ‘commercial arrangements and individuals that are most susceptible to inappropriate influence in the ICC’s decision making process’.1 1 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, art 3.1.

(c) Standard of proof B3.181 There is no universally applied standard of proof in ethics matters; rather, the applicable standard is set by the rules of the relevant sport and its ethics bodies.1 This means that an act that constitutes misconduct in one sport may not in another due to a higher standard of proof. 1 See Daniel Köllerer v Association of Tennis Professionals, Women’s Tennis Association, International Tennis Federation & Grand Slam Committee, CAS  2011/A/2490A, para  29, as an example of the non-universality of the approach of sport to the standard of proof in these matters. The CAS panel noted that it ‘does not agree with the Appellant that it is required to apply a different standard of proof on the basis of CAS jurisprudence. There is no universal (minimum) standard of proof for matchfixing offences. The cases to which the Appellant refers concerned match fixing under the UEFA rules, which did not provide for an applicable standard of proof, and the UEFA itself proposed to apply in these cases the standard of proof of “comfortable satisfaction”. While the Panel acknowledges that consistency across different associations may be desirable, in the absence of any overarching regulation (such as the WADA Code for doping cases), each association can decide for itself which standard of proof to apply, subject to national and/or international rules of public policy. The CAS has neither the function nor the authority to harmonize regulations by imposing a uniform standard of proof, where, as in the current case, an association decides to apply a different, specific standard in its regulations’.

B3.182 The most common approach is to impose a standard of proof of ‘comfortable satisfaction’.1 Comfortable satisfaction is commonly understood to mean a threshold that falls between the balance of probabilities and beyond reasonable doubt. Many ethics violations are of a more serious nature and can carry with them significant sanctions, such as lifetime bans. As such, it is often the case that ethics violations require evidence that satisfies tribunals towards the higher end of the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ scale. 1 This is, for example, the approach taken by the UCI: UCI Cycling Regulations, rule 12.6.011. The test applied by the FIFA Ethics Committee has recently changed from a test of ‘personal conviction’ (art 51 of the FIFA Code of Ethics 2012) to one of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ (art 48 of 2019 edition). CAS jurisprudence has confirmed that the standard of proof of ‘personal conviction’ and that of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ are the same in practice. See Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, para. 88: ‘The Panel is of the view that, in practical terms, this standard of proof of personal conviction coincides with the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard widely applied by CAS panels in disciplinary proceedings. According to this standard of proof, the sanctioning authority must establish the disciplinary violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the judging body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation. It is a standard that is higher than the civil standard of “balance of probability” but lower than the criminal standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (cf. CAS 2010/A/2172 Oriekhov v. UEFA, para. 53; CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec, Zdraveski v. UEFA, para. 85). The Panel will thus

482  Regulating Sport give such a meaning to the applicable standard of proof of personal conviction’. See also Bin Hammam v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, at paras 30 to 39; Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, at paras 117 to 122. This is relevant in practice as there are likely to continue to be cases prosecuted under the 2012 edition of the FIFA Code of Ethics.

B3.183 That sports set differing parameters as to the standard of proof required to satisfy the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ threshold can be seen when comparing the approaches taken. For example, in athletics, the rules require that the ‘standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt’.1 In that way, under its current rules, the standard of proof in athletics is never as high as the criminal standard.2 Conversely, cricket specifically provides that, for the most serious offences, the standard of proof required is the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.3 1 World Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal Rules dated 1 November 2019, rule 10.1. This is copied from the World Anti-Doping Code, as to which see para C5.2. 2 This marks a change from the position under the rules previously in force in athletics. Rule 11(7) of the Procedural Rules of the Ethics Committee (in force from 1 May 2015) provided: ‘The standard of proof in all cases shall be determined on a sliding scale from, at minimum, a mere balance of probability (for the least serious violation) up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt (for the most serious violation. The Panel shall determine the applicable standard of proof in each case’. 3 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, Appendix 4, rule A12.

B3.184 Some sports adopt a lower threshold altogether. Tennis is an example of such an approach. Breaches of the ITF Code of Ethics are determined on the balance of probabilities.1 The same is true for breaches of the IOC  Code of Ethics;2 and for ‘Corruption Offenses’ under the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (applicable to participants across the ITF, ATP, WTA and Grand Slams).3 1 Rule 5.1, Procedural Rules Governing Proceedings Before An Independent Tribunal Convened Under ITF Rules (effective 1 January 2019). 2 IOC Code of Ethics 2020, art 3.3: ‘The standard of proof in all matters under this Code shall be the balance of probabilities, a standard that implies that on the preponderance of the evidence it is more likely than not that a breach of this Code has occurred’. 3 The Tennis Anti-Corruption Program has as its governing law the laws of the State of Florida (Section K.2); the test is formulated as the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ (Section G.3(a)), which is equivalent to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities.

B3.185 In civil proceedings under English law, recent cases have emphasised that there is only one standard of proof in civil matters (the balance of probabilities). However, where courts have some flexibility is in assessing whether the evidence is sufficient for the claimant to prove its case. In this regard, it has been said that ‘the more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities’.1 This approach has been followed in sports disciplinary proceedings.2 1 R v Mental Heath Review Tribunal (Northern Region) and Ors [2006] QB 468 at para 62. 2 See eg Fernando Forestieri v The Football Association, Football Association Appeal Board decision dated 12  September 2019; The Football Association v Peter Beardsley, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 September 2019).

B3.186 Invariably, appeals from decisions made pursuant to sports ethics rules are made to CAS. The CAS  Code of Sports-related Arbitration does not address the standard of proof that will be applied in CAS arbitrations. Instead, the CAS Panel will look to whether the relevant sport has specified a standard of proof.1 1 See eg  Adamu v FIFA, CAS  2011/A/2426, paras 80 and 81; also Bin Hammam v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, para 35. Where the relevant rules do specify a standard of proof, CAS will itself apply that standard. For example, in Köllerer v Association of Tennis Professionals, Women’s Tennis Association, International Tennis Federation & Grand Slam Committee, CAS 2011/A/2490, the CAS panel upheld the standard of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ in respect of match-fixing charges

Misconduct  483 (which can be equated to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities). In doing so, the panel rejected the Appellant’s arguments that this standard of proof violated rules of national or international public policy and was void for unconscionability. However, the panel noted that, whilst the seriousness of the offences did not require a higher standard of proof to be applied, it considered ‘that it needs to have a high degree of confidence in the quality of the evidence’.

B3.187 In the absence of an express standard of proof in the applicable rules, the CAS panel will determine the standard of proof to be applied. At CAS, this is typically ‘comfortable satisfaction’. The test has its origins in CAS anti-doping jurisprudence dating back to 1996,1 but has been consistently applied in ethics matters where the standard of proof is not expressly provided for in the relevant rules. In FK Pobeda,2 the Panel noted: ‘85. Taking into account the nature of the conduct in question and the paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also considering the nature and restricted powers of the investigation authorities of the governing bodies of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities, the Panel is of the opinion that cases of match fixing should be dealt in line with the CAS constant jurisprudence on disciplinary doping cases. Therefore, the UEFA must establish the relevant facts “to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having in mind the seriousness of allegation which is made” (CAS 2005/A/908 nr 6.2)’.

This position has been endorsed in several subsequent CAS cases.3 1 Korneev v International Olympic Committee and Gouliev v International Olympic Committee, CAS OG 03-04. See further para C5.2. 2 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA CAS 2009/A/1920. 3 See eg  Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS  2010/A/2172, para  53; Football Club Metalist et al v FFU, CAS  2010/A/2267, paras 730–734; Besiktas Jimnastik Kuliibii v UEFA, CAS  2013/A/3258, paras 116–125; Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA, CAS 2014/A/3625, paras 131–133.

B3.188 Even where there is agreement as to the applicable standard of proof, there still may be argument over what, precisely, that standard of proof means and how it should be applied to the facts in question.1 1 Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Diack v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4417 – 4419 – 4420, paras 205–219. The CAS panel had to determine what was meant by proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. It stated: ‘This Panel notes that [it] is sometimes suggested that this standard can be expressed in a certain percentage. This is to be rejected. As quoted above: “a mechanical comparison of probabilities, no matter how strongly it indicates guilt is not enough to justify such a finding”. This Panel agrees to the other approach quoted above: “A charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered all of the evidence, you have in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true”. The key words in the authority quoted above are “belief” and “conviction”. Those are human criteria and not, indeed, mathematical. It entails that human beings, judges, arbitrators can come to different conclusions based on the same facts’.

(d) Competing jurisdiction B3.189 A participant’s conduct might contravene the rules of more than one SGB at different levels of the pyramid in the same sport. This is a more common occurrence where Codes of Ethics are concerned, because the wrongful act may well contravene not only the international federation’s Code of Ethics but also the equivalent rules of the national association (or confederation) to which the individual is affiliated. It would be unsatisfactory if the individual was not held to account because the national association and international governing body left it to each other to deal with. Conversely, it would be equally unsatisfactory if that individual was prosecuted twice for the same act. B3.190 There is rarely any real limitation on the ability of a SGB at any level to take action should they wish to do so. Codes of Ethics tend to be silent on the point. There are some exceptions, such as:

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(a) World Athletics’ Code of Ethics, which confirms that nothing in the rules of their member federations can usurp the jurisdiction of the international ethics body;1 and (b) FIFA, which provides that its Ethics Committee shall have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate FIFA matters, whereas if the conduct does not relate to FIFA matters, it can only take action if no ‘proper proceedings’ are taken at national or confederation level within three months of the Ethics Committee learning of the matter.2 Flexibility is required to deal with each issue on a case-by-case basis. The willingness and ability of national federations may vary considerably from one jurisdiction to another, and as a result an international federation may be forced to take action due to a particular national association failing to prosecute or conducting an inadequate investigation or, worse, looking to cover up the matter. 1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, art 4.8.2. 2 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, art 30(2). See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Oden Charles Mbaga, Adj ref no 13/2018. Mr Mbaga was a FIFA referee, affiliated to the Tanzanian Football Federation, who was found guilty in 2019 of manipulating the results of international matches in 2010 and banned for life. The FIFA Ethics Committee had determined that it was entitled to investigate the matter because of ‘the absence of a proper investigation at member association and confederation level’, at para 11. See also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Samson Siasia, Adj ref no 3/2019, paras 10–15.

(e) Relationship with criminal proceedings B3.191 Conduct that is contrary to a Code of Ethics may also constitute a potential criminal offence, which leads to criminal proceedings running concurrently with ethics proceedings. Indeed, it is often the criminal investigation that brings the conduct in question to the attention of the SGB. B3.192 If criminal proceedings are anticipated or underway, the SGB will need to balance several competing considerations in deciding how to proceed. The criminal prosecutor will often have a preference for disciplinary proceedings to be stayed so that the criminal proceedings are not prejudiced. The individual being charged may be concerned that a jury would be improperly swayed by the fact that he has been found guilty in disciplinary proceedings where a lower standard or proof applies. On the other hand, they might be keen to press on and hope either that a successful outcome has the opposite effect,1 or that they can use any sanction to their benefit in mitigation. 1 In Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, paras 39 and 44, Mr Asif argued that the publication of the first instance decision was contrary to his right to a fair trial in the subsequent criminal trial and therefore rendered the first instance disciplinary decision, not the criminal decision, unlawful, null and void. The CAS panel dismissed this point and stated: ‘Even if [this argument was] made out, it would mean that the ICC and/or the Tribunal would be in contempt of court and/or that there would be prejudice to the criminal proceedings. These factors would not necessarily have any impact on the substance of the findings, which were considered and decided upon before publication of the Determination (publication ex post cannot impugn analysis conducted ex ante and any prejudice to the subsequent criminal proceedings does not impugn the analysis contained in the Determination). In addition, the Panel notes that Mr Asif was himself eager for the Tribunal proceedings to advance and that when afforded the opportunity, he did not object to the Tribunal proceedings advancing ahead of the criminal proceedings. He cannot therefore now claim that such advancement was to his detriment’.

B3.193 Neither English nor Swiss law requires a SGB to stay disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings.1 However, it may be advantageous for the SGB to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings because, if the charge is proven, the disciplinary proceedings may be easier to conduct, particularly as more extensive evidence may have been gathered in the criminal proceedings due to the greater investigatory powers available to the state. If the conduct is sufficiently

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serious, it would be open to the governing body to suspend the individual whilst the criminal proceedings are completed.2 However, that could take a long time,3 and therefore it might be fairest to press on with the disciplinary proceedings, given that the individual will be unable to earn a living in the meantime due to the suspension. There may also be considerable public pressure on the SGB to take swift action and it may need to be seen to do so to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the sport. If the SGB does decide to wait, it should give consideration to charging the individual and then staying the proceeding, to avoid problems with any applicable limitation periods.3 1 ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, para  27.1, in relation to an application to stay disciplinary proceedings: ‘there is no automatic right to have disciplinary proceedings postponed until criminal charges arising out of the same factual matrix have been finally determined’; FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr PatriceEdouard Ngaissona, Adj ref no 10/2019, paras 72 and 74 rejecting the argument that disciplinary proceedings should be stayed because the criminal proceedings may arrive at a different decision, because ‘the mere argument that there is a possibility that the state court may come up with a different decision than that of the FIFA Ethics Committee is not a serious reason, as the possibility of conflicting decisions is present in every case of parallel proceedings involving a decision of a sporting governing body and a criminal court […] if one were to accept this argument, the FIFA adjudicatory proceedings would end up always suspended’ (para 74). The FIFA panel also noted that there may be circumstances where the protection of integrity in sport requires prompt action and the SGB cannot wait until state proceedings have concluded (para 72). See also CAS 2010/A/2267 Football Club Metalist et al v FFU, para 746 (same). 2 On 27 May 2015 14 individuals, of which nine were FIFA officials, were charged by the US Department of Justice with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering. At the time of writing, the investigation is still ongoing with a new superseding indictment being unsealed on 6 April 2020 (justice.gov/usaoedny/press-release/file/1266856/download [accessed 30 October 2020]). It is clear that these criminal proceedings will continue to run for many years. For example, the US  Department of Justice has been trying to extradite Jack Warner from Trinidad and Tobago since 2015, but he still remains there, despite having lost his final appeal in June 2019. See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Jose Maria Marin, Adj ref no 23/2018: Mr Marin was charged by the US Department of Justice in 2015 with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy. He was convicted but appealed. Whilst the FIFA Ethics Committee opened its investigation in May 2015, it did not conclude its investigation until 17 December 2018, which was three months after Mr Marin had been sentenced to four years in prison by the US criminal courts. Mr Marin argued that the FIFA investigation was ‘a mere recitation of the United States government’s case-in-chief’. He applied for a stay so he could focus on the appeal of the conviction and not prejudice the criminal proceedings. The panel dismissed the application on the basis that the disciplinary proceedings are separate, and the FIFA Ethics Committee is not obliged to follow the outcome of state proceedings. 3 Codes of Ethics do not usually include limitation periods for investigation; however, there are some exceptions. The FIFA Code of Ethics 2019 provides that as a general rule breaches cannot be prosecuted after five years, save for certain offences such as bribery, which has a 10-year limitation period. However, that limitation period shall be suspended where ‘criminal proceedings are formally opened against a person’ (see Art 12). The UCI Code of Ethics 2019 has a ten-year limitation period (see Arts 4).

B3.194 Where a Code of Ethics is international in scope, this can present Ethics Committees with a number of challenges. First, an act may be a crime in one country, but not another. Similarly, some conduct may be considered to be unethical in certain cultures, but not others. Furthermore, the conduct in question may have already been considered by one or more foreign courts. The extent to which an Ethics Commission can simply rely on investigations and prosecutions by a State is likely to vary considerably, given the variances in quality and reliability from one jurisdiction to another. On the one hand, an Ethics Commission is independent and should vigorously examine the evidence itself. On the other hand, a SGB does not have the resources of a State and cannot be expected to investigate matters as thoroughly. Historically, whilst Ethics Commission decisions stressed that they needed to consider the conduct in question independently of any findings of a criminal court, they would often simply rely on the fact that guilt was established by a State to find a breach of the Code of Ethics in question.1 As a general rule, modern national courts are better funded, benefit from more thorough investigations, and

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are more sophisticated. The result is a more robust approach and proper scrutiny of the underlying conduct. In 2018 a CAS tribunal had to resolve a technical, factually complex dispute as to whether an individual had committed forgery in relation to the amendment and adoption of changes to the statutes of the Football Association of Thailand. It described the problem as follows: ‘Although it is certainly true that the Adjudicatory Chamber, the FIFA  Appeal Committee and the Panel in the present appeal arbitration proceedings are to make their own independent investigation and that they should not simply rubberstamp the outcome of criminal law proceedings, and while acknowledging that the standard of proof to be applied is different, the majority of the Panel finds that it cannot be ignored that the Bangkok Appeal Court may be better-positioned to appreciate the intricacies of Thai law and the dealings of the [Department of Provincial Administration]’.2 1 See IOC  Ethics Commission v Mr Guy Drut, No D/06/05. Mr Drut, an IOC member, was found guilty by the Paris Criminal Court of illegally funding political parties. He said he did not appeal against his conviction in order to spare his family, and continued to serve as mayor of his town. The President of the French Republic granted him an amnesty that erased his sentence. However, the Ethics Commission noted that the ‘removal of the sentence leaves intact the acts for which [he] was sentenced. In this regard, the Ethics Commission recalls that whether or not the conduct of an Olympic party is ethical is wholly independent of its criminal nature’. The panel felt compelled to rely on the findings of the criminal court and sanction Mr Drut without independent consideration of the evidence. See also IOC Ethics Commission v Mr Un Yong Kim, No D/01/05. Mr Un Yong Kim was the IOC VicePresident and on 3 June 2004 he was found guilty by the Seoul Central District Court of embezzlement and corruption and sentenced to two and a half years in prison (a sentence upheld by the Seoul Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea). The Ethics Commission noted that ‘whether or not the conduct of an Olympic party is ethical is independent of whether such conduct may be qualified as criminal. Indeed, the same acts may not be criminally punishable depending on the law in different countries, but remain ethically reprehensible. A  fortiori, serious acts for which a judicial authority imposes a sentence must be considered as constituting conduct, which tarnishes the reputation of the Olympic Movement […] and that it is not within the IOC Ethics Commission’s jurisdiction to assess the validity of judicial decisions made by a country’s legal authorities […] it notes the fact of having been found guilty […] [which] seriously tarnishes the reputation of the Olympic Movement’. The Ethics Commission recommended that Mr Kim be expelled (Case No 1/04). This demonstrates the willingness of some panels simply to rely on a conviction of a domestic court with no consideration of the underlying evidence (although there is a tension between this position and the statement that whether the conduct is ethical is independent of whether it is qualified as criminal). Mr Kim did accept that he received a fair trial. 2 Makudi v FIFA, CAS 2018/A/5769, para 122.

B3.195 With limited exceptions,1 modern Codes of Ethics do not tend to engage with the relationship between the code and criminal behaviour.2 This is likely to be because each case needs to be examined on a case by case basis for the reasons set out above. The procedural rules that govern how a breach of a code is prosecuted typically defines how a panel should approach parallel disciplinary and other proceedings. 1 The ITF, for example, notes that its Code of Ethics applies to conduct ‘notwithstanding local criminal laws or other applicable laws or regulations’ (see para 1.6); and World Athletics’ Code of Conduct notes that conduct that violates the code may also be criminal, that the code is intended to supplement such laws with further rules of conduct, and that the code does not undermine those laws in any way (para 4.6). 2 Whilst a panel is required to consider whether the conduct in question is a breach of the relevant Code of Ethics, it may be swayed by what is commonly considered criminal. In Makudi v FIFA, CAS 2018/A/5769, paras 101–103, a CAS panel was required to consider the necessary elements of forgery as far as Art 17 of the FIFA Code of Ethics was concerned. The panel noted that it had ‘some doubts about whether there must have been an intent to cause damages or gain a benefit. Given that criminal law, English and Swiss criminal law in particular, determine that forgery is only committed if there is an intent to prejudice someone or to cause financial loss or damage or obtain an unlawful advantage, the Panel considers it questionable whether a sport governing body like FIFA can use the same terminology (ie falsification) in its regulations, while at the same time detaching such terms from the constitutive requirements commonly associated therewith’.

CHAPTER B4

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption Iain Higgins (USA Cricket), Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP), Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers) and Tom Mountford (Blackstone Chambers) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B4.1 2

THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM...................................................................... B4.3 A As the sports betting market grows ever larger, match-fixing scandals have beset sport after sport........................................................................... B4.3 B The response of the Olympic Movement..................................................... B4.13 C The response of the UK Government.......................................................... B4.14 D The response of the Council of Europe: the Macolin Convention............... B4.17

3

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN SPORT................................................................................................................. B4.18 A Who should be subject to the rules?............................................................ B4.19 B What conduct should be prohibited?............................................................ B4.20

4

PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN CORRUPTION CASES........................................ B4.36 A Standard of proof......................................................................................... B4.37 B Evidence....................................................................................................... B4.38 C Provisional suspension................................................................................. B4.39 D The impact of criminal proceedings............................................................ B4.40

5

SANCTIONS IN CORRUPTION CASES.......................................................... B4.41

6

PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION RULES......... B4.44 A Intelligence-gathering and investigations..................................................... B4.45 B Obtaining information from third parties..................................................... B4.47 C Working with the Gambling Commission and the police............................ B4.48

7

THE FUTURE: A WORLD ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY?......................... B4.55

1 INTRODUCTION B4.1 Match-fixing and related corruption is, like doping, an insidious threat to the essence of sport, taking away uncertainty of outcome and thereby compromising the integrity of the sporting contest, and therefore its attraction for participants and spectators, and so its commercial value.1 This form of corruption is clearly primarily fuelled by those who wish to cheat on the betting markets,2 but its adverse impact spreads far beyond the defrauding of bookmakers and punters. If the authenticity of the sporting spectacle is exposed just once as a façade, confidence in every sporting achievement is corroded.3 The story of the young baseball fan pleading with the 1919 World Series fixer, ‘Shoeless’ Joe Jackson – ‘Say it ain’t so, Joe!’ – may well be apochryphal,4 but it captures succinctly the faith-shattering betrayal of trust that such corruption represents. That is why match-fixing is seen as a ‘mortal danger’ to sport,5 ‘a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game’.6 And that is also why, as addressed below, the English courts and the Court of Arbitration for Sport alike have consistently upheld robust regulatory efforts to stamp out that ‘cancer’,7 and why sports have gone to great lengths to investigate the problems that they face, and to address them both at the level of prior prevention and at the level of detection

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and sanction, in a manner designed to restore confidence in the integrity of their competitions.8 1 See eg Pound, ‘Responses to Corruption in Sport’ (Play the Game Conference, 3 October 2011) (‘It is of the essence of sport that the outcome of any contest is uncertain, depending upon a combination of factors, including the skill of the players, the playing conditions, tactics, conditioning and many others. This is what makes sport interesting and exciting for player and spectator alike. Activities which put in doubt the reality of the competition destroy the essence of the competition’). See also then-IOC  President Jacques Rogge, 1  March 2011 (‘Sport is based on a hierarchy that derives its social and moral values from the concept of merit. The winner should be the one who has poured the most lawful resources into their preparation or who has worked the hardest. If in future the concept of a champion as a model of excellence becomes tarnished by the manipulation of matches or the corruption of players, then the entire credibility of sport will vanish. […] There are already countries where football competitions are no longer credible and where the public has very clearly lost interest in that sport’). For a discussion of the fight against doping in sport, see Section C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement). While there are far more reported cases of doping than of match-fixing (Gorse and Chadwick, ‘The prevalence of corruption in international sport’ (CIBS, 2011), p  2: ‘Of the 2,089 cases collated [from between 2000 and 2009], 95.64% were doping cases […] 2.73% of cases collated were examples of match-fixing (betting and non-betting related) with 1.63% of the cases being examples of the misuse of inside information for betting purposes’), many argue that match-fixing is worse than doping, because doping is at least cheating to win, whereas match-fixing is cheating to lose. See eg Scotney, ‘Establishing an effective anti-corruption strategy’, (2013) 11(4) World Sports Law Report 14. And some sports, such as football, appear to believe that match-fixing is a much bigger threat for them than doping. See eg Harris, ‘Gambling is “bigger threat to sport than doping”’, (2009) Independent, 6 March (‘One senior official explained the threat to the country’s most popular spectator events, saying: “Football, rugby and cricket don’t have a doping problem, but they know they have serious gambling problems”’). See also Gorse and Chadwick, ‘The prevalence of corruption in international sport’ (CIBS, 2011), p  3 (‘Globally, whilst athletics followed by American sports (baseball, American football, basketball) and cycling had the highest incidents of doping, football represented the principal sporting medium for incidents of betting related match-fixing’). 2 See para B4.4. 3 See eg the comments of England cricketer Paul Collingwood after the news broke of Pakistani players deliberately bowling ‘no balls’ during the England-Pakistan Test match at Lord’s in August 2010 (see para B4.22): ‘once those allegations were made it just devalued everything we had achieved in the series. You could see that in the way we celebrated taking those last wickets to win the match and the series; it was joyless. Poor Jonathan Trott and Stuart Broad, both of whom had made brilliant hundreds to get us out of the mire at 102-7, were devastated by the allegations. I have no doubt that Pakistan were trying their hardest to break their partnership and that Trott and Broad’s achievement was 100% valid, but inevitably people start to see shadows everywhere. […] I love this game because it is two teams playing honestly against each other and the best team win. If we cannot provide something the public can believe is 100% straight, then forget it, the game is gone. No player will want to play it and no spectator will want to watch it. That’s why I advocate penalties and the strongest deterrents. To me, anyone found guilty of match-fixing or spot-fixing should be banned for life’ (Mail Online, 10 October 2010). See also the remarks of Mr Justice Cooke when sentencing the three Pakistani cricketers and their agent involved in that spot-fixing, in R v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, 3 November 2011, para 1: ‘The gravamen of the offences committed by all four of you is the corruption in which you engaged in a pastime, the very name of which used to be associated with fair dealing on the sporting field. “It’s not cricket” was an adage. It is the insidious effect of your actions on professional cricket and the followers of it which make the offences so serious. The image and integrity of what was once a game, but is now a business is damaged in the eyes of all, including the many youngsters who regarded three of you as heroes and would have given their eye teeth to play at the levels and with the skill that you had. You procured the bowling of 3 no balls for money, to the detriment of your national cricket team, with the object of enabling others to cheat at gambling. Now, whenever people look back on a surprising event in a game or a surprising result or whenever in the future there are surprising events or results, followers of the game who have paid good money to watch it live or to watch it on TV, in the shape of licence money or TV subscriptions, will be led to wonder whether there has been a fix and whether what they have been watching is a genuine contest between bat and ball. What ought to be honest sporting competition may not be such at all’. 4 See Asinof and Gould, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series (Owl Books, 1963). 5 ‘Platini reiterates “mortal danger” facing football’, (2011) insidewordfootball.biz, 18  September. IOC  President Jacques Rogge said ‘together with doping, [match-fixing] is now the biggest threat facing sports’. See Braw, ‘You can cure cancer, but you can’t cure doping and illegal betting’, huffingtonpost.com, 9 January 2012. 6 ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, ECB Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 1 (‘Self evidently, corruption, specifically spot fixing, in cricket or any other sport for that matter, is a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game. For the general public, supporting the game and their

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  489 team within it, there is no merit or motivation to expend time, money or effort to watch a match whose integrity may be in doubt. The consequences of the public’s disengagement from cricket would be catastrophic. Furthermore, the game of cricket simply cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished in the eyes of commercial partners. These partners could not and would not link their brand to a sport whose integrity had been so undermined. For players who have devoted their entire careers to the pursuit of hard fought and properly competitive sport, to have those genuine achievements called into question by the corrupt actions of a tiny minority, may tend to devalue their worth. Accordingly, we have no doubt that this is a cancer which must be rooted out of the game of cricket’, expressly approved on appeal, Kaneria v Westfield, ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 5). See also Verbruggen, Foreword to ‘Sport Accord: Integrity in Sport (understanding and preventing matchfixing)’ (November 2011) (‘Fans must believe that what they see on the field of play represents a true test of the competitors’ skills. If they cannot, there is a real risk that they will ignore sport and take sponsors and broadcasters with them’). In the sentencing of the former Premiership footballer Delroy Facey upon his conviction for match-fixing under the Bribery Act 2010, Judge Mary Stacey also adopted the language of match-fixing as a cancer, telling Facey, ‘It’s about the fans of the teams involved, the families who follow the fortunes of their teams with passion, loyalty and devotion. You have betrayed all that trust, all that confidence and it’s like a cancer at the heart of football’ (bbc. co.uk/news/uk-england-32512704 [accessed 30 October 2020]). The risk of sponsors and broadcasters pulling their investments from sports that do not take rigorous action against match-fixing should not be underestimated. When the News of the World printed its exposé of spot-fixing at the Lord’s Test match between England and Pakistan in August 2010 (see para B4.22), the ICC’s commercial partner, ESPN Star Sports, wrote to the ICC within the week, noting the adverse impact that such scandals have on the commercial value of the broadcasting and sponsorship rights to cricket events, and calling on the ICC to take prompt and decisive action against corruption in the sport so as to protect the sport and the value of the rights granted to its commercial partners. See also ‘Serie A  rights-holder Sky Italia urges action on match-fixing in Italy’ (2011) Sportcal.com, 13 June. Indeed, commercial partners have pulled out of sport in the wake of match-fixing scandals. See eg ‘Renault suffers twin sponsor blow’, 24 September 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/motorsport/formula_one/8273965.stm [accessed 30  October 2020] (sponsors ING and Mutua Madrilena terminated sponsorship arrangements with Renault F1 after it was found guilty of fixing 2008 Singapore Grand Prix by ordering Nelson Piquet Jr to crash deliberately to gain an advantage for his team-mate Fernando Alonso); ‘Japan Sumo Association announces record losses after match-fixing scandal’, Sportcal.com, 23  February 2012 (losses caused by cancellation of Grand Sumo Tournament and decision of national broadcaster not to broadcast replacement event); ‘Puma drop Bafana over fixing scandal’, iol.co.za/sport/soccer, 21 October 2013 [accessed 30 October 2020] (Puma terminated supply contract for SA national team after revelations referees were bribed to fix 2010 World Cup warm-up matches). See also Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (2012) SportAccord, 13 February, pp 4 and 45 (‘sport will die if the public and sports authorities do not take action to combat fraud’, citing the example of the Chinese professional football league, which, because of corruption leading to the imprisonment of several executives of the federation, resulted in the main sponsor and television broadcaster refusing to renew their contracts with the league). 7 See paras B4.41 to B4.43. 8 As addressed in para B4.10, in 2018 an Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis commissioned by all the tennis governing bodies (ITF, ATP, WTA, and Grand Slams) reported on the nature and scale of match-fixing and related breaches of integrity faced by the sport and the adequacy of its efforts to address the problem, and made recommendations as to the future. An Interim Report was published in April 2018, supported by a Record of Evidence and Analysis, and a Final Report in December 2018. Thereafter the tennis governing bodies took extensive steps to implement the recommendations. The documents collectively provide a good overview of the phenomenon, the difficulties faced in addressing it, and some of the ways forward. The documents are available on the Tennis Integrity Unit’s website, tennisintegrityunit.com (‘Tennis Integrity Reports’).

B4.2 We provide below a brief overview of the recent history of match-fixing in sport, with crises in cricket, horseracing, tennis, and football eventually prompting not only action within those sports individually, but also concerted action both at national level in the UK, and internationally under the auspices of the International Olympic Committee and the Council of Europe (Section 2); we analyse the rules that sports governing bodies (SGBs) have put in place to try to address the problem (Section 3) and the procedural and practical issues arising in the enforcement of those rules (Sections 4 and 5); we discuss the efforts that have been made in the UK to develop productive partnerships between SGBs, the Gambling Commission and the police to facilitate the gathering of intelligence and the effective enforcement of the rules (Section 6); and we offer some thoughts about the future (Section 7). As

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with the rest of this book, our focus is on English law, and in particular on the body of jurisprudence produced by the English courts and the Court of Arbitration for Sport when ruling on challenges to decisions made by sports tribunals in cases of matchfixing and/or related corruption.1 1 We do not deal here with ‘non-competition focused’ corruption (ie ‘where the threat is related to a management decision over who gets to host events, who gets media or marketing rights to events, who gets nominated or elected for important management positions in sport’) (Oxford Research A/S, ‘Examination of threats to the integrity of sports’ (April 2010), p 7), albeit that there are some who argue that corruption on the field is facilitated, if not encouraged, by corruption in the governance of the sport. Some forms of non-competition focused corruption may have very obvious effects on the pitch, such as ‘transfer bungs’ in football to persuade a manager to bring about the signing of a particular player. These forms of corruption may have even more direct effect; for example, a manager accepting bribes relating to matters such as team selection and substitutions to ensure that appearance fees are triggered. These issues are addressed in other parts of the book, including Chapter A5 (Best Practice in Sports Governance) and Chapter B3 (Misconduct).

2 THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM A As the sports betting market grows ever larger, match-fixing scandals have beset sport after sport B4.3 Although the earliest reported example of match-fixing may have been motivated by a desire only for personal glory,1 and although there may also be other non-monetary motivations for match-fixing,2 there is little doubt that most matchfixing and related corruption is fuelled by those wishing to cheat on the sports betting markets. The link between sport and betting has existed for centuries,3 but it expanded steadily during the 20th century, as fans adopted betting as a way of demonstrating their attachment to particular sports and teams;4 and as betting on sport grew, so did match-fixing and related corruption. Taking just a few notorious examples: in 1910 four Australian Rules footballers were banned from the sport (two of them for five years, two for life) for accepting bribes from bookmakers to underperform in club matches;5 ten years later, eight members of the Chicago White Sox baseball team were banned for life for accepting $5,000 each from a gambling syndicate to throw matches against the Cincinnati Reds in the 1919 World Series;6 in 1951, the New York District Attorney arrested three stars of the CCNY college basketball team, the national champions, for fixing games for money;7 in 1964, four English footballers were jailed for bribery, corruption and defrauding bookmakers after they agreed to lose a forthcoming match and placed winning bets on that outcome;8 and in 1989 Pete Rose, the head coach of the Cincinnati Reds, was banned from baseball for life for betting on matches involving his team.9 1 It is said that in the Olympic Games in 388BC, Eupolos of Thessalia bribed three of his competitors in a fighting tournament to allow him to win a gold medal. See Maennig, ‘Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management: Forms tendencies, extent and countermeasures’, (2005) 5(2) European Sport Management Quarterly, pp 187–225. 2 See para B4.21, n 6. 3 The laws of both cricket and golf were codified for the first time in 1744 in order to facilitate betting on those sports. Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p 1. 4 The ‘football pools’ concept (in which individuals attempt to predict the outcome of top-level football matches each week) became widely popular within the UK in the first half of the 20th century, with the first ‘Littlewoods’ pools coupons being distributed to football fans outside Manchester United’s Old Trafford ground in 1923. There were also steadily increasing volumes of gambling on different sports in high street betting shops. See footballpools.com/cust?action=GoHelp&help_page=about_us [accessed 30 October 2020]. 5 Fagan, ‘How Gambling Ruined Sport’, sfaganweb.wordpress.com/2012/12/02/how-gambling-ruinedsport [accessed 30 October 2020]. 6 Asinof and Gould, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series (Owl Books, 1963).

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  491 7 Time Magazine, ‘Sport: The Big Money’, 26  February 1951, content.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,814439,00.html [accessed 29 November 2020]. 8 For several years, professional footballer Jimmy Gauld had systematically interfered with Football League matches, enticing players into fixing matches and betting on the outcome. His criminality came to light in December 1962, after he approached Sheffield Wednesday player David Layne, a former colleague at Mansfield Town, to identify a new target game. Layne suggested that Wednesday were likely to lose their imminent match against Ipswich Town, and proposed to his fellow players Peter Swan and Tony Kay that they ensure that outcome. The three all bet against their own side in the match. In 1964, Gauld sold his story to the Sunday People for £7,000, incriminating not only the three Wednesday players, but also himself. All four received jail sentences. See Simon Inglis, Soccer in the Dock (Collins, 1985). 9 Report of John Dowd to the Commissioner of Major League Baseball in the Matter of Peter Rose, manager of the Cincinnati Reds, 9  May 1989, seanlahman.com/rose/dowd/dowd_i.html [accessed 30 October 2020].

B4.4 Sports betting markets (both regulated and unregulated, and both legal and illegal1) have grown ever bigger over the end of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century, with the explosion of online betting fuelled by the globalisation of live sports broadcasting leading to a radical shift of business from high-street betting shops to online platforms that enable betting on sports events from remote locations 24 hours a day.2 At the same time, bookmakers have developed new betting products, each of which offers new opportunities for manipulation and corruption, including ‘spread’ betting,3 ‘in-play’ betting,4 ‘spot’ betting,5 betting exchanges that allow the punter to ‘lay’ (ie bet against) a particular outcome,6 and the possibility of ‘cashing out’ a bet before the end of an event.7 Such products allow betting on certain outcomes without the need for a player to throw an entire match, for example in tennis by deliberately losing a set but going on to win the match. They also allow fixing that shifts the inplay odds, however marginally, allowing for a greater return to be made. At the same time, betting algorithms have been developed that allow rapid betting on marginal odds shifts, and ‘courtsiders’ have reported scores at a match ahead of the official feed, allowing the odds to be beaten. These developments have prompted the reported infiltration of organised crime into sports betting,8 attracted by both the moneylaundering opportunities and the opportunity to guarantee substantial returns through fixing.9 This has been aided by the significantly more relaxed controls placed upon the Asian betting markets by the bookmakers in those markets: they do not restrict stakes, require registration and identification, or close down suspect markets as quickly as European-regulated bookmakers.10 At the same time, in sports such as tennis, they have also facilitated ‘self-funded’ low level and low value corruption, where, for example, players outside the tours can make small amounts of additional money by themselves betting on certain outcomes.11 As a result, in the last decade of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st, the most popular sports for betting (cricket, horseracing, tennis and football) have suffered a series of corruption scandals.   1 Sports betting may be with regulated or unregulated operators and is against the law in many countries. Until recent developments, with the repeal of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act lifting the federal ban on sports betting, it has been illegal in much of the United States. Islamic countries such as Pakistan outlaw all forms of betting. Betting is also prohibited for cultural reasons in India (except for betting on horseracing) and other Asian countries. However, betting is nevertheless rife in many of those countries. In 2012 journalist Ed Hawkins estimated that there were as many as 100,000 illegal bookmakers in India, serving millions of punters: Hawkins, ‘Bookie, gambler, fixer, spy’ (AIPS Media 2012). 2019 estimates place the size of India’s underground betting market at between $45bn and $150bn: ‘Cricket World Cup: Illegal bookmakers still thriving’, BBC News, 14 July 2019. In January 2013, Interpol told delegates at a conference that ‘illegal betting which drives match-fixing encompasses a market that is said to be in the range of hundreds of billions of Euros per year, with estimates that the large bookmakers have revenues on the same scale as the Coca-Cola company’: ‘Match-fixing proceeds “on same scale as Coca-Cola revenues”’, Sportcal.com, 18 January 2013. According to Transparency International and the Asian Racing Federation, Asia accounts for 80 percent of the estimated $500 billion in illegal betting volumes globally.: ‘Authorities across Asia battle illegal gambling surge ahead of World Cup’, Reuters, 11 June 2018.  2 See eg  IRIS  Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 49 (‘The risk of fraud that is currently threatening the integrity

492  Regulating Sport of our sporting competitions is the result of an interaction between the vulnerabilities intrinsic to the operation of the world of sport, and the formation of a worldwide betting market, one section of which is totally unregulated’); Monitor Quest, ‘Guarding the Game: preserving the integrity of sport’ (March 2011), p 9 (‘Today the lure of fame and fortune remain powerful inducements to cheat or misbehave, but the sheer amount of money at stake and the new technologies to enhance performance and facilitate cheating provide a powerful incentive multiplier. Globalisation makes contemporary integrity threats more costly and potentially more damaging to both the business and the social import of sports as well as more difficult to prevent and contain’); Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), pp 2–3 (‘The availability of e-betting has increased the liquidity of sports wagering markets, made them more competitive, promoted the growth of new modes of betting (exchanges and index (spread) betting) and facilitated the offering of new types of bet and of in-play betting. All of these changes have potential to affect incentives for athletes and officials to participate in fixing […] The rising volumes of betting in themselves make the incentive to fix greater. In a market with low liquidity, the amount of money that a syndicate could stake without driving the odds against itself is limited, reducing the payoff from an initial investment in bribery. Potentially the greatest absolute rewards to a successful fix will be found in the most liquid markets and here the risks of detection will also be lower since high bets will be commonplace’). For many reasons, not least the fact that sports betting is an illegal activity in many countries (see n 1), the value of the global sports betting market is very difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty. A January 2011 AIPS symposium was told that in 1995 there had been 200 betting companies around the world with gross revenues of €4 billion, but that had grown by 2010 to 10,000 betting companies with gross revenues of €19 billion; and that in Italy in 2010 there was approximately €9.7 billion of betting, of which approximately €5.5 billion was illegal betting: ‘Federations “must adapt to money in sport” in fight against illegal betting and corruption’, Sportcal.com, 28  January 2011. In 2011 consultants appointed by SportAccord asserted that the size of the legal sports betting market had grown exponentially during the period 2000–2010, with total sales volume reaching €100m in 2010 (SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 27). In 2013 Sportradar estimated the value of the market at ‘anywhere between $700bn and $1tn a year’: Football betting – the global gambling industry worth billions’, BBC  Sport, 3  October 2013; while an investigation by the UK data and technology publication Wired in 2019 estimated the sports betting market to be worth €1.47tn (around $1.73tn): ‘Inside the endless fight to kill the $1 trillion match-fixing industry’, Wired, 9 July 2019.   3 Rather than a simple ‘win or lose’ outcome (as in the case of ‘fixed odds’ betting), in ‘spread betting’ the bet is based on beating the ‘spread’, ie  the predicted score-line (eg  ‘Green Bay Packers to win by 14 points’) or number of goals/points/other incidents in the match, with the winnings (or losings) a multiple of the amount by which the punter beats (or fails to beat) the spread. Spread betting therefore carries a high level of risk and reward, with potential losses or gains far in excess of the original money staked. See eg SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 21. And as a result, guaranteeing the outcome by corrupting the participants in the match is all the more attractive. For example, in his 2009 autobiography, ‘Taking Le Tiss’, the former Southampton FC captain, Matthew Le Tissier, revealed that when Southampton played Wimbledon in 1995, he planned to kick the ball directly into touch from the kick-off to beat the bookmakers, who were predicting that it would take nearly a minute to go out. Le Tissier claimed that he would have made nearly £10,000 from spreadbetting by his friends, but one of his team-mates, unaware of the bet, stopped the ball from going out: ‘Le Tissier in failed betting scam’, (news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/teams/s/ southampton/8236108.stm (3 September 2009) [accessed 30 October 2020]).   4 ‘Live’ or ‘in-game’ betting, ie betting while the event is being played, provides further opportunities for participants to manipulate the action to gain an advantage for themselves or their co-conspirators. See ‘FIFA and UEFA take on in match betting’, insideworldfootball.biz, 30  March 2011 (football governing bodies assert live betting increases risks of corruption); IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), pp 39–40 and p 70 (‘firstly, it is not easy to control in real time, secondly, some types of bet are easier to manipulate, and thirdly betters can – and do – adapt their behaviour in line with variations in the market odds. Some criminals are suspected of influencing matches directly from the side of the pitch by using various codes’). See generally Gambling Commission, ‘In-running (In-play) betting: position paper’ (September 2016).   5 ‘Spot’ betting involves the offering of odds on specific incidents during the match, such as the winning margin of the first set in a tennis match, the nature of the first points scored in a rugby match (try, penalty, drop-goal), or the number of runs scored in a ten-over period (or ‘bracket’) in a cricket match. See the various examples listed by Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), pp 8–9 and Appendix C. Because of the ease with which the outcome can be controlled by an individual participant, such bets carry a significant risk of corrupt manipulation, particularly since they allow the athlete to make illicit earnings from one aspect of a match without having to lose the match itself. For example, in cricket, during England’s second innings in the Lord’s Test match between Pakistan and England in August 2010, the Pakistan fast-bowler, Mohammad Amir, bowled what is regarded as being one of the best fast-bowling spells of all time against England, taking four wickets for only eighteen runs. And yet, in the middle of that

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  493 inspired spell, he deliberately bowled a ‘no ball’ that had no bearing at all on the outcome of the game, but that had been pre-agreed (along with two others, one by him, one by fellow bowler Mohammad Asif) for corrupt purposes. See ICC v Amir, Asif and Butt, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011 (discussed at para B4.22). In 2012, former Southampton footballer Claus Lundekvam reportedly confessed: ‘We could make deals with the opposing captain about, for example, betting on the first throw, the first corner, who started with the ball, a yellow card or a penalty. Those were the sorts of things we had influence over. The match results were never on the agenda’: ‘Player arrested in Norwegian match-fixing probe’, uk.reuters.com, 11  July 2012. Tennis offers the opportunity for players to fix a particular element of a match, such as a game, or a set, without losing the match, see Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10). So too in snooker a particular frame can be fixed, see WBPSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013, aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014, and the more recent investigations and subsequent bans given to Yu Delu (10 years and 9 months) and Cao Yupeng (six years) following an investigation by the World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association: ‘Yu Delu and Cao Yupeng match-fixing: Chinese pair banned in snooker corruption scandal’, BBC Sport, 1 December 2018. Spot fixing has increased in prevalence despite the fact that it does not fit the typical idea of a liquid betting market. Ordinarily, the higher the volume of trading, the higher the stakes that can be placed without shifting the bookmakers’ odds unfavourably (see para 3.1 of B Van Rompuy, ‘The Odds of Match Fixing – Facts & Figures on the Integrity Risk of Certain Sports Bets’ (Asser Institute, January 2015).  6 On person-to-person betting exchanges (such as the one operated by Betfair, which was founded in 2000), betting odds are offered by individual punters, not by a professional bookmaker. So, for example, if an individual disagrees with the odds that the market has set for a particular bet, he can offer his own odds on an on-line betting exchange and take bets at those odds, with the exchange taking a commission. Such exchanges offer obvious opportunities for manipulation, in particular by enabling individuals to offer odds and take bets on a team or a participant to lose rather than to win. Indeed, it was betting on his own horses to lose that got Miles Rodgers banned from horseracing (see para B4.19, n.8) and it was Betfair, acting on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding it had entered into with the Jockey Club (see para B4.49) that tipped the Jockey Club off to his corrupt activities.   7 Cash out allows the individual to get money back on the bet(s) they have placed before the event being betted on is over. Such amount to be received is determined at the point at which the individual chooses to ‘cash out’ on the basis of the likelihood at that time of the bet(s) winning. Cashing out is typically offered alongside ‘in-play’ betting: Gambling Commission, ‘Understanding the cash out option’, gamblingcommission.gov.uk/for-the-public/Safer-gambling/Consumer-guides/Betting/ Understanding-the-cash-out-option.aspx [accessed 30 October 2020].  8 See eg  Europol Report into ‘The involvement of organised crime groups in sports corruption’ (5 August 2020), which estimates the global annual criminal proceeds from betting-related matchfixing to be €120 million: ‘Sports corruption is a serious crime involving organised crime groups operating transnationally. These gangs are often poly-criminal and can well serve as a platform for organised crime groups to further high-scale money laundering schemes […]. Online betting is increasingly used by organised crime groups to manipulate sports competitions and criminals usually target lower-level competitions across different sports, with football and tennis the most targeted sports by criminal networks’. An example of the specifics of such organised criminal activity that has been prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic is the institution of ‘ghost matches’, whereby organised crime groups advertise fake games on social media, blogs or fake websites, in order to make money from bets subsequently placed. The intersection between organised crime and sports betting was first articulated in 2012: IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13  February 2012), p  5 (‘The increasingly frequent presence of transnational criminal organisations in instances of corruption in sport is a major concern. […] The increase in sports betting throughout the world represents a windfall for criminal organisations […] Sports betting also represents a money-laundering opportunity for criminal organisations’); ‘Match-fixing proceeds “on same scale as Coca Cola revenues”’, Sportcal.com, 18 January 2013 (Interpol secretary-general Ron Noble: ‘Criminal organisations benefit from match-fixing in the profits it promises and in its ability to launder their ill-gotten gains from other criminal activities. Match-fixing is clearly a manyheaded dragon that we must slay with a coordinated national and international effort’).  9 Due to increasing competition among online sports betting companies, average pay-out rates have reportedly increased to over 92 per cent of the total amounts staked: SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011); ‘Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet for Modern Sport’, Sorbonne-ICSS Integrity Report, 2012–14, (Laurent Vidal, 2014), researchgate. net/publication/280112161_Protecting_the_Integrity_of_Sport_CompetitionThe_Last_Bet_for_ Modern_Sport [accessed 30  October 2020]. This explains why sportsmen and women are offered so much to fix matches. See further, eg  sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Cooke in R  v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, 3  November 2011, para  11.4 (‘There is evidence of a telephone call [with a bookmaker], conducted in the presence of the journalist, where there was discussion of $1m changing hands. You told the journalist that it would cost £50,000–£80,000 to fix a bracket, £400,000 to fix a 20/20 match result, anything between £300,000-£450,000 to fix a one day international and £1m to fix a test match’). See also ibid. para 16 (‘Notional punters stood to gain sums in excess of £150,000 from cheating when gambling on 3 no balls and more in respect of a maiden over’).

494  Regulating Sport 10 See para 5.2 of B Van Rompuy, ‘The Odds of Match Fixing – Facts & Figures on the Integrity Risk of Certain Sports Bets’ (Asser Institute, January 2015). 11 See Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10.

(a) Cricket B4.5 In the period between 1994 and 2001, numerous investigations and enquiries were undertaken into match-fixing in international cricket, involving all of the leading cricket-playing countries. Listed in the Condon Report,1 they included an inquiry into 1994 allegations by an English cricketer, Don Topley, ultimately unproven, that English country cricket teams had pre-agreed the outcome of their matches for their mutual benefit; an inquiry established by the Sri Lankan Cricket Board into suspected deliberate under-performance by the national team during a tour to India due to the influence of an Indian bookmaker; admissions by Australian star players Mark Waugh and Shane Warne that they had accepted money from an Indian bookmaker in exchange for weather and pitch information in games involving Australia during 1994 and 1995, leading to Waugh being fined AU $10,000 and Warne AU $8,000; an investigation in 1998 commissioned by the Australian Cricket Board into whether Australian players had engaged in betting, bribery, match-fixing, and/or the unauthorised receipt of money or other benefits, in particular focusing on alleged approaches made to Dean Jones, Allan Border and Ricky Ponting, and allegations that the second match of the 1992 World XI v Indian XI series was fixed (none of which was ultimately proven); the findings of the Qayyum Inquiry that members of the Pakistan national team had been involved to varying degrees in betting and match fixing, and recommending that Salim Malik and Ata-ur-Rehman be banned from cricket for life and that other Pakistan players should also be punished, including removing the captaincy of the national team from Wasim Akram; approaches made by Indian nationals in 1999 to the New Zealand captain, Stephen Fleming, and an England player, Chris Lewis, to fix a Test match between the two countries; the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation’s report in 2000 of the involvement of organised crime in betting and related corruption in Indian cricket,2 which ultimately led to the Board for the Control of Cricket in India banning former Indian captain Mohammad Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma for life, as well as imposing five-year bans on Indian players Manoj Prabhakar, Ajay Jadeja and team official Dr Ali Irani; and then (most notoriously) the South African captain, Hansie Cronje (who had also been named in the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation report) confessing that he had received payments from bookmakers in return for providing inside information and manipulating the results of particular matches, including a Test match between South Africa and England, which resulted in a life-time ban for Cronje, and a six-month ban for each of Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams for failing to report bribes offered to them by Cronje to under-perform in a one-day-international match.3 1 Sir Paul Condon, ‘Report on Corruption in International Cricket’ (April 2001), icc-cricket.com/ about/35/anti-corruption. 2 Indian Central Bureau of Investigation, ‘Report on cricket match-fixing and related malpractices’ (October 2000). Sharma’s ban was subsequently reduced to five years, and in November 2012 an Indian court quashed Azharuddin’s lifetime ban on the ground of breaches of natural justice, including that the BBCI committee that had been convened to decide on the ban included a senior policeman who had been involved in producing the CBI report that accused Azharuddin of fixing. The court did not offer any opinion on the merits of the allegations about Azharuddin’s involvement in match-fixing. Azharuddin v BCCI (CCCA No 408 of 2003), 8 November 2012. 3 See Wilde, Caught: The Full Story of Cricket’s Match-Fixing Scandal (Aurum Press Ltd, 2001).

B4.6 In April 2001, Sir (now Lord) Condon published his report on corruption in international cricket.1 The first comprehensive study of this nature carried out in any major sport, it described at least 20 years of corruption linked to betting on international cricket matches, and suggested that corrupt practices and deliberate under-performance had permeated the sport. Condon found that there was a

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prevailing culture of silence, apathy, ignorance and fear within the sport of cricket, all of which had led to a lack of understanding and information about the depth of the existing corruption problem. He recommended that the International Cricket Council (ICC) create a dedicated anti-corruption unit to deter, detect and punish such corrupt activity, as well as the development and delivery of a professional and comprehensive training and education programme. He also emphasised the need to provide a more secure environment around players on tour and to restrict players’ use of mobile phones during matches, so as to limit potential corruptors’ access to players. These recommendations were implemented with the creation of a dedicated ICC Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) and the adoption of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code for Participants2 and the Minimum Standards for Players and International Match Officials.3 This regime got thoroughly tested in 2010 in the now-infamous Pakistani cricketers’ spot-fixing case,4 and by the IPL case in 2013 when three Rajasthan Royals players and 11 bookmakers were arrested on suspicion of fixing matches in the 2013 Indian Premier League.5 All three players ended up with life bans, as did a co-owner of the Rajasthan Royals team.6 Meanwhile in 2014 a Bangladesh Cricket Board tribunal banned former Bangladesh captain Mohammed Ashraful for eight years for match-fixing in the 2013 Bangladesh Premier League (reduced to five years, with two of them suspended, on appeal), banned players Lou Vincent for three years and Kaushal Lokuarachchi for 18 months (reduced to 12 months on appeal) for failing to report corrupt approaches to fix BPL matches, and banned Salim Chowdhury and Jishan Chowdhury, respectively the chairman and the managing director of the BPL champions, the Dhaka Gladiators, for ten years each for orchestrating the fixing.7 A number of South African players were charged and found guilty of match-fixing related corruption offences by Cricket South Africa in connection with the 2015/16 RamSlam T20 competition. Gulam Bodi was banned from playing cricket for 20 years and jailed for five years; former international players Thami Tsolekile, Lonwabo Tsotsobe and Alviro Petersen were given bans of 12, 8 and 2 years respectively; and three other players received bans ranging from 7 to 10 years.8 More recently, the Bangladesh Test captain Shakib Al Hasan was given a two-year ban for failing to report corrupt approaches in relation to an ODI tri-series including Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe and a match for Sunrisers Hyderabad in the IPL.9 In a similar vein, the Pakistan Cricket Board handed Umar Akmal a three-year ban for failing to report corrupt approaches in April 2020,10 and the Afghanistan Cricket Board banned Shafiqullah for six years for trying to fix the outcome of a match in the 2018 Afghanistan Premier League in May 2020.11   1 Sir Paul Condon, ‘Report on Corruption in International Cricket’ (April 2001), scoop.co.nz/stories/ WO0105/S00039/report-on-corruption-in-international-cricket.htm [accessed 29 November 2020].   2 The current version of which can be downloaded at: icc-cricket.com/about/integrity/anti-corruption/ acu-publications [accessed 30 October 2020].  3 icc-cricket.com/about/integrity/anti-corruption/acu-publications [accessed 30 October 2020].   4 See para B4.22. In the wake of that scandal, the ICC commissioned Bertrand de Speville (former Solicitor-General of Hong Kong) to carry out a review of the operations of the ACU. He reported that since 2001 the face of international cricket had changed significantly, becoming incredibly lucrative for commercial sponsors, for the betting industry (legal and illegal), and for some (but not all) players and cricketing authorities. Against that background, he provided some commentary and recommendations on the operation of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code and on the operational practices of the ACU, and recommended increasing the resources and staffing of the ACU so as to cope with the recent increase in corruption in the sport. See de Speville, ‘A Review of the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’ (August 2011, reissued with minor amendments in January 2012), icclive.s3.amazonaws.com/cms/media/about_docs/518b7096b002c-Bertrand%20de%20Speville%20 Report%20-%20A%20Review%20of%20the%20Anti-Corruption%20Arrangements%20of%20 the%20ICC.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].   5 ‘IPL final overshadowed by off-field events as team official arrested in ongoing corruption scandal’, sportcal.com, 28 May 2013; ‘Indian Government could bring in spot-fixing law after arrests of IPL players’, sportcal.com, 20 May 2013.  6 hindustantimes.com/cricket/ipl-flashback-2013-spot-fixing-rocks-nation-as-rohit-sharma-leadsmumbai-indians-to-maiden-title/story-vPtqfvqtVeHdfxRCaa343J.html [accessed 30 October 2020].

496  Regulating Sport   7 ‘Match-fixing: Mohammad Ashraful banned for eight years’, bbc.co.uk, 18 June 2014; ‘Ashraful’s ban reduced to five years’, espncricinfo.com, 29 September 2014.   8 ‘Gulam Bodi sentenced to five years in prison’, espncricinfo.com, 18 October 2019; ‘Tsotsobe handed eight-year ban’, espncricinfo.com, 11 July 2017; ‘Tsolekile among four players sanctioned by CSA’, espncricinfo.com, 8 August 2016: (12-year ban for ‘contriving to fix’, and failing to disclose the full details of an approach; seven-year ban for Jean Symes for failing to disclose a payment ‘which he knew or ought to have known’ was given to him to breach the anti-corruption code; and 10-year bans for Ethy Mbhalati and Pumelela Matshikwe for receiving a payment/incentive to fix, making an illegal payment, and failing to disclose a payment and approach).  9 ‘Shakib Al Hasan banned after accepting three charges under ICC  Anti-Corruption Code’, icccricket.com, 29 October 2019; ‘Shakib Al Hasan banned from all cricket for failing to report bookie approaches’, espncricinfo.com, 29 October 2019. 10 ‘PCB hands Umar Akmal three-year ban from all cricket’, espncricinfo.com, 27 April 2020. 11 ‘Afghanistan’s Shafiqullah banned for six years’, espncricinfo.com, 10 May 2020.

(b) Horseracing B4.7 British horseracing’s watershed moment came in October 2002, when (following two high profile criminal cases1) the BBC’s flagship current affairs programme, Panorama, reported allegations (including by the Jockey Club’s former head of security, Roger Buffham) of race-fixing by jockeys, of links between flat jockeys and well-known Hong Kong criminals, of bookmakers offering free betting for leading trainers, and of an institutional failure by the Jockey Club to police the sport.2 In response, a ‘Security Review Group’ established jointly by the British Horseracing Board (BHB) and the Jockey Club came up with 36 recommendations, including strengthening the Rules of Racing, as well as improving the effectiveness, culture, openness and administration of the Security Department. The review emphasised that the principal activity of the Security Department should be to police the Rules of Racing (leaving criminal matters to the police), and recommended that the Security Department, the Jockey Club, and the BHB improve liaison between themselves, with the wider racing and betting communities, as well as with the police and other government agencies.3 1 In 2000 a trial of five persons accused of conspiracy to defraud by doping two racehorses collapsed at Southwark Crown Court with the trial judge directing acquittals of all five. Three of the defendants were subsequently excluded by the Jockey Club from all racecourses and other premises licensed by the regulator in Great Britain. And in 2002 allegations surfaced in one of a series of criminal trials involving an international drug smuggling gang about the corrupt activities of certain individuals in horseracing. See Report of the Joint BHB/JC Security Review Group (July 2003), Executive Summary, p 1. 2 ‘Panorama exposes “corruption of racing”’, 6 October 2002, news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/ horse_racing/2299209.stm [accessed 30 October 2020]. 3 Report of the Joint BHB/JC Security Review Group (July 2003). See BHB press release dated 1 July 2003, ‘Joint BHB/JC  Security Review Group Unveils Its Findings and Makes Recommendations’, at britishhorseracing.com/press_releases/joint-bhbjc-security-review-group-unveils-its-findings-andmakes-recommendations/ [accessed 30 October 2020].

B4.8 Even before the Panorama programme was broadcast, however, the Jockey Club was launching the first of what became a series of disciplinary cases alleging betting-related corruption. In June 2002 it had charged former champion jockey Graham Bradley with feeding inside information to gamblers for reward over a period of several years. The charges were upheld, and led to a five-year ban.1 Similar cases followed, including in 2005 against jockey Gary Carter, who was given a five-year ban for passing inside information to bettors,2 and a nine-day disciplinary hearing in February 2007 concerning Shane Kelly and three other jockeys that led to disqualifications for the jockeys and exclusion from racing for others.3 A criminal prosecution later that year of leading jockey Kieren Fallon and others for conspiracy to defraud punters was not so successful: the defendants were all acquitted when the judge upheld a submission of no case to answer.4 Some saw this as an embarrassment for the Jockey Club and its successor regulator, the British Horseracing Authority

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(BHA). However, the regulators had not conducted the prosecution, and when the BHA commissioned Dame Elizabeth Neville to review the way the recommendations of the Security Review Group had been implemented, she endorsed the improvements the BHA had made to its Integrity Services team since 2003, noting how many agencies described racing’s approach as ‘a model for the effective investigation of corruption in sport’.5 Dame Elizabeth’s recommendations included developing memoranda of understanding between the BHA and the police, to ensure a proper understanding of the relationship between the two bodies and their respective roles and responsibilities when sports cases and criminal case overlapped. Based on the lessons of the Neville Report, the activities of the Integrity Services team at the BHA now include conducting investigations into breaches of the Rules of Racing, gathering intelligence in respect of potential wrongdoing in the sport, inspections of training establishments, monitoring real-time betting markets for suspicious betting activity, and protecting the integrity of the stabling area and weighing room on racecourses on racedays. An Integrity Review carried out in 2016 concluded that the lessons of the Neville Report had led to a strengthened integrity framework within British horseracing, while a subsequent review carried out by Christopher Quinlan QC led to improvements within the BHA’s disciplinary structure.6 Several of the cases that the BHA has brought against fixing and related corruption are discussed below. 1 See Graham Bradley enquiry result, 29 November 2002. 2 See Jockey Club v Gary Carter, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 September 2005. 3 See HRA v Kelly et al, HRA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 April 2007. 4 See para B4.49. 5 Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in Horseracing – An Independent Review’, 13 May 2008 (the ‘Neville Report’), para 1.12. 6 See britishhorseracing.com/regulation/integrity/ and integrityeducation.britishhorseracing.com/ [accessed 30 October 2020]. For further details of the Quinlan Review, see paras D1.72–D1.75 and D1.79.

(c) Tennis B4.9 In August 2007, after an unusually high number of bets was taken on the Betfair exchange for fourth-ranked Nikolay Davydenko to lose a second round match in Sopot, Poland against 87th-ranked Martin Arguello (many of which bets were placed after Davydenko lost the first set), and Davydenko then retired injured in the third set, Betfair voided all of the bets on suspicion that the outcome had been fixed.1 After a lengthy investigation, both players were cleared of any wrongdoing,2 but in the meantime several other players reported that they had received approaches to fix matches,3 prompting a review of the sport that concluded that professional tennis was not institutionally or systematically corrupt, but that there was sufficient intelligence to indicate that attempts were being made to corrupt players so that they did not play to the best of their ability (‘tanking’) and/or to persuade them to provide inside information to facilitate corrupt betting practices.4 A commission of enquiry established by tennis’s governing bodies recommended in 2008 the introduction of a uniform anti-corruption code for tennis and the creation of a dedicated integrity unit focusing on deterrence, detection, and education, and the tennis authorities quickly announced that they would implement those recommendations.5 Thereafter, the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU) was created, and several cases brought under the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme led to substantial sanctions being imposed on players (including life bans) that have been upheld by the CAS.6 1 McLaren, ‘Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play’ (2008) 19(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 15, 17. 2 ‘Davydenko cleared of match-fixing’, bbc.co.uk, 12 September 2008. 3 McLaren, ‘Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play’ (2008) 19(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 15, 17. Betfair also reported suspicious gambling patterns in the match between Richard Bloomfield and higher-ranked Carlos Berlocq at Wimbledon in 2006, although again it was concluded after

498  Regulating Sport consideration that there was no prohibited activity. ‘Officials Look Into Irregular Betting on Match’, ESPN.com, June 28, 2006 (sports.espn.go.com/sports/tennis/wimbledon06/news/story?id=2502709 [accessed 30 October 2020]). 4 Gunn & Rees, ‘Environmental Review of Integrity in Professional Tennis’ (May 2008). 5 ‘Tennis Governing Bodies Appoint Jeff Rees as Director of Tennis Integrity Unit and Adopt Uniform Anti-Corruption Code’, press release dated 27 August 2008. 6 See para B4.43.

B4.10 Less than a decade later, however, a fresh scandal erupted in tennis. On the eve of the 2016 Australian Open, BuzzFeed News and the BBC claimed in ‘The Tennis Racket’ that they had obtained ‘secret files exposing evidence of widespread match-fixing by players at the upper level of world tennis’, to which it was suggested a blind eye had been turned by the tennis authorities. The piece criticised choices made by the tennis governing bodies and the TIU following the 2008 review. The governing bodies commissioned an independent review.1 This review concluded that the sport faced a serious integrity problem because the nature of the game lent itself to manipulation and to deliberate under-performance for non-betting reasons, amongst other reasons. The player incentive structure, under which few players earned enough to break even, created a fertile breeding ground for breaches of integrity, and the advent of on-line betting and the sale by the governing bodies of official live scoring data had provided the opportunity to bet on many matches (down to the lowest level of competition), where incentives were highest and security lowest. While no level was immune, the problem was most significant outside the ATP and WTA Tours and Grand Slams. The review assessed what had happened in the past and concluded that, while there was no evidence of a ‘cover-up’, there were a number of occasions where the actions taken by the sport were inappropriate or ineffective, resulting in missed opportunities. Furthermore, there were a number of ways in which the policing structure was inadequate, in particular after the commencement of live scoring data sales vastly increased the number of matches on which bets could be placed. The review made a series of recommendations aimed at: (a) removing opportunities and incentives for breaches of integrity;2 (b) establishing a newly-empowered TIU with an independent Supervisory Board;3 (c) preventing breaches of integrity through education, control of access, and disruption;4 (d) enforcing expanded integrity rules and changing the TIU’s approach to investigating and punishing offenders;5 and (e) (5) encouraging national and international cooperation and enforcement.6 The tennis governing bodies committed to the implementation of the proposals and set about doing so during 2019 and 2020. In recent years, professional players Karim Hossam, Diego Matos, and Youssef Hossam have all received lifetime bans following TIU investigations for various offences, including match-fixing, betting, providing ‘inside information’ and failing to report corrupt approaches.7 The cases brought by the TIU are identified on its website.8 1 The Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis, Lewis, Wilkinson and Henzelin. The Tennis Integrity Reports taken together (Interim Report April 2018 (at tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/ Independent%20Reviews/IRP-2018/Interim%20Report.pdf [accessed 30  October 2020]), supported by a Record of Evidence and Analysis (at tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/Independent%20 Reviews/IRP-2018/Independent_Review_of_Integrity_in_Tennis-2018.pdf [accessed 30  October 2020]) and the Final Report in December 2018 (at tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/ Independent%20Reviews/Final%20Report_191218.pdf [accessed 30  October 2020]) provide detail in relation to the nature and extent of the issues in relation to betting related corruption in tennis, the difficulties in dealing with them, and the mechanisms to be used in doing so. 2 Recommendation 1: The opportunities for breaches of integrity should be reduced through limitations on the supply of official live scoring data, in particular at the lower levels of tennis. Recommendation 2: There should be changes to the organisation of professional tennis to address the incentive problem, by restructuring the player pathway. 3 Recommendations 3 and 4: The TIU should be reorganised with independent oversight. There should

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  499 be an independent TIU with an independent Supervisory Board, more, and more diverse staff, secured funding, and external auditing. 4 Recommendation 5: Completion of enhanced integrity training should be a condition of playing, and the training should be extended to other key participants. Recommendations 6 and 7: Access to players should be controlled through, amongst other things, changes to accreditation and to the standards of facilities and security at events. Measures should be implemented to deal with rampant online abuse of players. There should be an ‘exclusion’ procedure, and consideration should be given to the use of disruption techniques and integrity testing where legal and appropriate. 5 Recommendation 8: Changes in the rules, including to broaden the prohibitions on such conduct as deliberate contrivance of a match and abuse of inside information, and to strengthen cooperation and reporting obligations. The new rules should be accompanied by a practical guidance document so that the effect of the rules can be easily understood. Recommendation 9: There should be changes to the TIU’s investigative processes, including the addition of internal betting expertise and independent tennis expertise, and improved intelligence gathering, storage and use. Recommendation 10: Changes to disciplinary processes, to permit more expeditious and cost-effective proceedings while protecting the rights of the accused, to be implemented by the new independent Supervisory Board and TIU. Amongst other things, it was recommended that the Supervisory Board and TIU consider replacing the current two-stage process – which includes a de novo appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport – with a single-stage process before an independent and impartial tribunal, or a two-stage process where the appeal is not de novo but rather reviews whether the first instance decision was flawed. Recommendation 11: Enhanced transparency of the TIU and the disciplinary process, including publication of all resolutions of proceedings. Recommendation 12: More effective engagement and cooperation with national federations and law enforcement agencies, as well as with other SGBs and third parties. 6 The review urged national authorities to make greater use of the criminal law and of the mechanisms provided by The Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (see para B4.17). 7 ‘Egypt’s Karim Hossam banned from tennis for life for multiple match-fixing offences’, BBC Sport, 3  July 2018; ‘Diego Matos: Brazilian tennis player banned for life for match fixing’, BBC  Sport, 9  September 2019; ‘Tennis match-fixing: Egyptian Youssef Hossam banned for match-fixing’, BBC Sport, 4 May 2020. 8 tennisintegrityunit.com

(d) Football B4.11 Football’s enormous popularity, and its global television coverage, mean that it accounts for a significant portion of sports betting worldwide, in both regulated and unregulated, and both legal and illegal, betting markets. Most estimates calculate that around 70 per cent of the global sports betting market’s trade comes from trading on football.1 As a result it is no surprise that the sport has been afflicted more than most with match-fixing scandals.2 Law enforcement authorities have led the way in prosecuting those involved, most prominently in Germany3 and in China,4 but also in many other countries.5 In May 2011, FIFA announced that it was entering into a 10-year agreement with Interpol to develop and implement a global training, education, and prevention programme focusing on betting-related match fixing, and that it would underwrite that programme to the tune of €20m.6 In February 2012, FIFA announced that there were up to 50 active national investigations into matchfixing in the sport.7 Also in 2012, FIFPro (the International Federation of Professional Footballers) published the results of a survey of more than 3,000 professional footballers competing in 15 different leagues in Eastern Europe. One in eight of the footballers surveyed said he had received an approach to fix a match (in Kazakhstan the figure was one in three), and almost a quarter of the footballers surveyed (in Russia, almost one half) said they were aware of match-fixing in their respective leagues.8 The sense of crisis became palpable, with Michel Platini, the then-President of UEFA, asserting that: ‘football, like most sporting disciplines, is in mortal danger.9 The very essence of our sport is based on the integrity of results, from school sport up to the World Cup. Obviously, the credibility of every competition is affected. Today, there is not a week that goes by without newspaper headlines which speak of a suspicion, an inquiry or an arrest linked to the integrity of our competitions’.10

500  Regulating Sport   1 See para B4.12, n.1 and ‘Football betting – the global gambling industry worth billions’, BBC Sport, 3 October 2013).   2 See generally Hill, The Fix: Soccer and Organised Crime (McClelland & Stewart, 2008), exposing (among other things) match-fixing at the 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals, involving corrupt members of the Ghana national team.   3 In 2005, Robert Hoyzer, a German referee, admitted fixing and betting on matches in which he had officiated, in league with organised criminal gangs in Croatia. He was banned for life from football and imprisoned for 29 months, along with two Croatian co-conspirators. Ibid, pp 166–67. In November 2009, the German police in Bochum announced that they had arrested more than 200 people suspected of bribing officials and players to fix UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League matches, as well as domestic matches in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey. ‘Match-fixing inquiry probes 200 European football games’, news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8370748.stm [accessed 30 October 2020], 20 November 2009. Eventually two of the conspirators were convicted of fraud under the German Criminal Code and were sentenced in May 2011 to 5½ years in prison each, although in December 2012 the appeal court remitted one sentence back to the district court for reconsideration as it had failed to take into account properly as a mitigating factor the defendant’s cooperation with the investigation. Mintas, ‘Hoyzer & Sapina: a criminal match-fixing law needed’, 11(2) World Sport Law Report, February 2013, p 3. UEFA used evidence handed over by the Bochum police authorities to get a referee banned for life for failing to report an approach made to him to fix a UEFA Europa League game in return for a bribe of €50,000: Oreikhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172 (discussed at para B4.38).   4 More than 50 former players, coaches, referees and other officials in the Chinese domestic football leagues have been convicted of corruption-related offences, and many of them have been imprisoned for lengthy periods. For example, in January 2012, the deputy chief of the China Football Association was sentenced to 10½ years in prison, the former referees’ director was jailed for 12 years (plus fines), and several other officials were also imprisoned for match-fixing related conduct that had helped Shenhua win the 2003 Chinese Super League title: ‘Shanghai Shenhua stripped of 2003 title as Chinese FA clamps down on match-fixing’, Sportcal.com, 19  February 2012; ‘Soccer officials sentenced in China’, nytimes.com, 13 June 2012.   5 For example, in July 2011 a criminal trial commenced in Turkey, involving 93 defendants accused of involvement in a conspiracy to fix 19 matches in the top two divisions of the Turkish domestic football competition. In August 2011, at UEFA’s urging the Turkish Football Federation refused to allow Fenerbahce to participate in the 2011–2012 Champions League due to its alleged involvement in the scandal: Arseven, ‘Turkish match-fixing: criminal law’s interaction with sport’, World Sports Law Report, September 2011, p 8. Fenerbahce later dropped a CAS appeal that it had filed against UEFA and the Turkish Football Federation, challenging its exclusion from the tournament: ‘Players banned in Turkish match-fixing probe’, dailytimes.pk, 9 May 2012. In May 2012, a football disciplinary panel cleared all of the 16 Turkish clubs linked to the investigation of involvement in match-fixing, but imposed bans of between one and three years on two players and eight officials. Ibid. However, the criminal trial continued, and in July 2012 Aziz Yildrim, the President of Fenerbahce, was convicted of match-fixing and related offences and sentenced to more than six years in jail: ‘Fenerbahce chairman sentenced to jail for match-fixing – and then bailed’, Guardian website, 3 July 2012. As noted in the text above, in June 2013 the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body ruled that Fenerbahce should be barred from participation in UEFA competitions for three seasons (including the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League) and Besiktas should be barred from participation in the UEFA Europa League as a result of their involvement in match-fixing. ‘Decisions on Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Steau Bucharest’, uefa. com/uefa/disciplinary/news/newsid=1967131.html [accessed 30 October 2020]. In Italy, in November 2011 Luciano Moggi, the former general manager of Juventus, was found guilty of sporting fraud and conspiracy and sentenced to five years and four months in jail for his role in the 2006 ‘Calciopoli’ match-fixing scandal (in which Juventus, AC  Milan, Fiorentina and Lazio were accused of rigging the outcome of games by selecting particular referees to officiate in them). The Italian FA banned Moggi for life, stripped Juventus of its 2005 and 2006 Serie A titles, relegated it to Serie B, and deducted points from AC  Milan, Lazio, Fiorentina and Roma. Some 15 other individuals were also found guilty of match-fixing. See ‘Disgraced Italian soccer official Moggi banned for life’, Sportcal.com, 16 June 2011; ‘Former Juventus chief jailed in long-running match-fixing case’, Sportcal.com, 9 November 2011. In early 2012, the Italian FA imposed a series of sanctions on 21 clubs and 52 players for match-fixing and corruption, including the former Atalanta captain, Cristiano Doni, who admitted to fixing Serie B matches and was banned for three and a half years, the former Lazio and Italy striker Giuseppe Signori, who was banned for five years, and 15 other players who were banned for between one and five years: ‘Cristiano Doni admits fixing Italian Serie B matches’, usatoday.com, 24 December 2011; Oliverio and Swing, ‘Match fixing: Italian and international measures’, (2012) Vol. 10(7) World Sports Law Report 11. And in May 2012, after an investigation that involved 280 policeman across 23 different cities, Italian police arrested 19 people (including a number of players, such as the captain of Lazio, Stefano Mauri) on suspicion of matchfixing. A  police statement indicated that eight matches from 2011 were under review and that five people had also been arrested in Hungary on suspicion of involvement in an illegal international betting ring headed by arrested Singaporean Tan Seet Eng..

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  501 Also in 2011, a Croatian bookmaker, Marijo Cvrtak, was sentenced in Germany to more than five years in prison for fixing football matches, including a 2007 World Cup qualifying group match between Norway and Malta and domestic matches in Norway: ‘Norwegian football official finally react to suspicions of match-fixing’, newsinenglish.no, 9 July 2012. In July 2012, a player for Norwegian club Follo was arrested and charged with the manipulation of results in two matches, following a report by the club to the Norwegian FA, which referred the matter to the Norwegian criminal authorities: ‘Player arrested in Norwegian match-fixing probe’. uk.reuters.com, 11 July 2012.  6 ‘FIFA’s historic contribution to INTERPOL in fight against match-fixing’, fifa.com, 9  May 2011, fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-historic-contribution-interpol-fight-against-match-fixing-1431884 [accessed 30 October 2020].   7 ‘FIFA extends worldwide sanction to 26 football participants’, fifa.com, 9 February 2012.  8 FiFPro Black Book Eastern Europe, ‘The problems professional footballers encounter: research’ (FIFPro Services BV, 2012)   9 ‘Platini reiterates “mortal danger” facing football’, (2011) insidewordfootball.biz, 18 September. 10 ‘Combating match fixing is “top priority”, says UEFA general secretary Infantino’, insideworldfootball. biz, 28 November 2011.

B4.12 UEFA responded by declaring the fight against match fixing ‘certainly the top priority for UEFA, the UEFA President and the UEFA Executive Committee in the years to come’,1 establishing a network of integrity officers across Europe, recruiting a Swiss criminal prosecutor to become its new chief legal counsel for integrity and regulatory affairs, signing a memorandum of understanding with Interpol, and scrapping all statutes of limitations in its disciplinary rules so that it could pursue match-fixing claims.2 In February 2013, Europol announced that a major investigation involving police teams from 13 European countries and running from July 2011 to January 2013 had uncovered an extensive and sophisticated criminal network involved in widespread football match-fixing. Europol stated that a total of 425 match officials, club officials, players, and serious criminals, from more than 15 countries, were suspected of being involved in attempts to fix more than 380 professional football matches, including FIFA World Cup Qualifiers, UEFA  Champions League games, and fixtures in Europe’s elite leagues, involving over €2m in corrupt payments to those involved in the matches and generating over €8m in betting profits.3  UEFA rules specify that UEFA may declare a club ineligible to participate in UEFA club competitions for one season as an ‘administrative measure’ if it is comfortably satisfied that the club been directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match.4 On its website it lists nine clubs that have been excluded in this way,5 including Besiktas and Fenerbahce, who were excluded from the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League and Europa League due to their prior involvement in match-fixing, and Albanian club KF Skenderbeu, who were banned in April 2018 for ten years from participating in UEFA club competitions for systemic match-fixing over a period of years (a decision that was subsequently upheld by the CAS).6 FIFA has produced a detailed handbook to guide member associations on how to develop an integrity programme and how to conduct investigations into matchfixing;7 while UEFA has developed a network of integrity officers in each member association to work with its own integrity officers working on a Europe-wide level.8 Recent cases include Dickson Etuhu, who was found guilty of attempted match-fixing in 2019 by the Swedish Court of Appeal in relation to a Swedish Allsvenskan match in 2017 and subsequently banned from football in Sweden for five years,9 and former Nigeria coach Samson Siasia, who was banned for life by FIFA in 2019 for agreeing to ‘receive bribes in relation to the manipulation of matches’.10 In the UK in 2015, the former Premier League footballer Delroy Facey was jailed for two and a half years after being convicted of match-fixing under the Bribery Act 2010, with the sentencing judge saying that his offences struck ‘at the very heart of football’.11   1 ‘Combatting match fixing is ‘top priority’, says UEFA general secretary Infantino’, insideworldfootball. biz, 28 November 2011.   2 ‘UEFA Approves Europe-wide Network of Integrity Officers to Counter Match-fixing’, Sportcal.com, 21 March 2011; ‘UEFA, Interpol to tackle football-related crimes’, uefa.com, 11 January 2012; ‘UEFA regulations allow club sanctions for past match-fixing’, (2013) 11(6) World Sports Law Report 1.

502  Regulating Sport   3 Europol, ‘Update – Results from the largest football match-fixing investigation in Europe’, 6 February 2013, europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/update-results-largest-football-match-fixing-investigationin-europe [accessed 30 October 2020].   4 See Art 50.3 of the UEFA Statutes (‘The admission to a UEFA competition of a member association or club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures’) and Reg 4.02 of the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League 2018–21 Cycle Regulations and Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA (CAS 2014/A/3625).  5 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/news/0243-0f8e5ded692c-b45c308f173c-1000--integrity/ [accessed 30 October 2020].  6 ‘Decisions on Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Steau Bucharest’ uefa.com/uefa/disciplinary/news/ newsid=1967131.html; ‘UEFA welcomes the CAS decision on Skënderbeu’, uefa.com, 12 July 2019 [accessed 30 October 2020].  7 FIFA, ‘Protect the Integrity of Football’, Practical Handbook for FIFA  Member Associations (resources.fifa.com/image/upload/protect-the-integrity-of-football-x4103.pdf?cloudid=rjvao05ofvgib ipajldl [accessed 30 October 2020].  8 See uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/news/0243-0f8e5ded692c-b45c308f173c-1000--integrity/ [accessed 30 October 2020].   9 ‘Dickson Etuhu handed five-year ban for match-fixing in Sweden’, Guardian, 16 April 2020. 10 ‘Former Nigeria great Samson Siasia handed life ban by Fifa’, BBC Sport, 16 August 2019. 11 See para B4.1, n 6.

B The response of the Olympic Movement B4.13 Cricket, horseracing, tennis, and football attract far more betting interest than other sports,1 which have therefore suffered far fewer match-fixing scandals.2 However, the Olympic Movement could not ignore the growing public concern with match-fixing scandals in sport. The 2009 Olympic Congress concluded that ‘Governments should recognise that close collaboration and action in the fight to put an end to illegal and irregular betting, and match-fixing is essential, both in relation to Olympic-accredited events and to the wider world of sport competition,’3 In March 2011 the IOC convened a summit on combating corruption in sport, with IOC President Jacques Rogge stating: ‘It is clear that betting, through the financial benefits it generates, provides huge opportunities to sports organisations. However, there is a significant problem when betting leads to the manipulation of competitions and therefore threatens the integrity of sport. Cheating driven by betting is undoubtedly the biggest threat to sport after doping. For the sports movement it is crucial to develop a unified strategy and to collaborate closely with public authorities and the legal gambling industry. Only then will we be able to address efficiently this complex issue’.4

Following the summit, the IOC recommended that Olympic sports adopt appropriate regulatory frameworks for fighting corruption and implement targeted anti-corruption education and communication programmes. It also announced that the IOC would establish a Working Group to analyse the best way to monitor sports betting and develop collaboration with governments and their agencies to promote legislation and develop agreements for the sharing of information about corruption in sport.5 In February 2013, the IOC announced it would tighten the prohibition on betting in the rules for the Sochi Winter Games 2013 and that it was working with the Council of Europe on an ‘International Convention against Manipulation of Sports Results’,6 which became the Macolin Convention discussed at para B4.17. In October 2013, the IOC signed an MOU with Interpol to set up a formal structure for cooperation on integrity issues;7 the following month it announced it would set up its own anti-corruption unit to work on risk prevention, information and dissemination and harmonisation of rules;8 and in 2015 it set up a whistleblower hotline on match-fixing.9 The IOC then developed the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions as a set of harmonised rules to protect all competitions falling within the Olympic family from the risk of

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  503

manipulation, and Rule 1.4 of the Olympic Charter now makes compliance with that Code mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement.10 The latest version of the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions sets out that breaches will lead to a sanction ‘which may range from a minimum of a warning to a maximum of life ban’.11 The IOC now has an internal unit dedicated to monitoring compliance through a ‘Code Implementation Support Network’,12 and has partnered with Interpol to produce a ‘capacity-building programme’.13 The IOC’s suspension of the International Boxing Association (AIBA) as the Olympic governing body for the sport of boxing in May 2019 was in part due to the refusal of the body to remove officials linked to a series of fixing allegations surrounding bouts at the 2016 Rio Olympics.14 1 The more betting there is on a sport, ie the more liquid the betting market on that sport, the greater the potential for fixing: Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p 3 and p 29 (noting that the betting markets on football and tennis are particularly liquid). See SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 6 (‘Whilst matchfixing can have other causes, there is strong correlation with betting. Sports which are most often the subject of betting are, therefore at much greater risk’). Figures from the Gambling Commission indicate that there is much more betting (at least with UK betting operators licensed by the Gambling Commission) on football and horseracing than any other sport, with those two sports accounting for more than a third of the betting integrity cases dealt with by the Sports Betting Intelligence Unit. See DCMS Impact Assessment, ‘Amendments to Schedule 6, Gambling Act 2005’, 25 November 2011, para 29. See also Gambling Commission – Industry Statistics 2009–2012 (annual betting turnover of approx £5.1m on horseracing, approx £1.4m on greyhound racing, approx £1m on football, and approx £600,000 on all other sporting (and some non-sporting) activity). See also Gorse and Chadwick, ‘The prevalence of corruption in international sport’ (CIBS 2011), p 24 (reported cases of match-fixing and use of inside information for betting purposes in Europe from 2000 to 2010 came from football, horse racing, tennis, greyhound racing, rugby and cricket). In addition to the amount of betting on a particular sport, a 2008 University of Salford research report identified the following factors as indicators of situations in which betting-related corrupt conduct is more likely to occur: where there are low salaries within the sport (and therefore a greater vulnerability to the illicit financial rewards offered for corrupt conduct); where there is a discrepancy in salaries between participants in the sport; where the sport is of an individual rather than a team nature (since outcomes are easier to fix in an individual sport than in a team sport, where the cooperation of more than one person would generally be required); where the scrutiny of the sport is less intense (for example domestic matches tend to have a lower profile, less resources and less regulatory attention than international matches); or where the outcome of a game does not affect the final placing in a tournament (for example, an end-of-season ‘dead rubber’ between two mid-table teams is much more at risk of corruption than a cup final). See Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (University of Salford, February 2008).   2 Then-IOC President Jacques Rogge asserted in January 2011 that ‘[t]here has never been a case of any suspicious betting in the Olympics’, although he continued that ‘it has to happen some day and we will have to be prepared’: ‘IOC chief Rogge declares war on illegal betting’, sportzpower.com, 29  January 2011. Prior to the London 2012 Olympic Games, the Joint Assessment Unit assessed the potential risk to the Games from betting-related corruption as low, and afterwards the Gambling Commission reported that betting on the London Games, while ten times greater than betting on the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, was still much lower than betting on professional sports such as football and tennis. See Gambling Commission, ‘Working together to protect the Integrity of Sport: the role of the Joint Assessment Unit at the London 2012 Olympic Games’ (March 2013), paras 21–23. Football accounted for 20–25 per cent of all bets on the London Games; tennis 15–20 per cent; and basketball 10–20 per cent. The men’s 100m final was reported to have the largest betting volumes on any single event at the Games: ibid, para 28.   3 Recommendations of the Olympic Congress, 2009, olympic.org/Documents/Conferences_Forums_ and_Events/2009_Olympic_Congress/Olympic_Congress_Recommendations.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].  4 ‘Sports Movement agrees on unified strategy to tackle irregular betting’ (IOC press release, 24  June 2010), olympic.org/news/sports-movement-agrees-on-unified-strategy-to-tackle-irregularbetting/92584 [accessed 30 October 2020].  5 ‘IOC sets up three sub-groups to decide objectives in fight against illegal and irregular betting’, sportcal.com, 15  June 2011. In September 2011, SportAccord published a set of Model Rules on Sports Betting for its member federations to incorporate into their own rulebooks: see SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011). In February 2012 the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) released its own set of Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption for its members (since supplemented by the ‘Model Rules for International Federations and their members to assist in implementing the Olympic Movement Code

504  Regulating Sport on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions’ (latest version published in December 2018), see further at para B4.21, n 2). In May 2013, the IOC’s Founding Working Group on the fight against irregular and illegal betting in sport ‘strongly encouraged’ international sports organisations to adopt rules based on the ASOIF model rules ‘to ensure a consistent approach’. See ‘Founding Group on fight against irregular and illegal betting calls for a universal monitoring system’, IOC press release dated 14 May 2013, olympic.org/news/founding-group-on-fight-against-irregular-and-illegal-betting-callsfor-a-universal-monitoring-system/199073 [accessed 30 October 2020].  6 ‘IOC strengthens betting prohibition’, Sportcal.com, 13  February 2013. As to the international convention, see para B4.17, n 4.   7 ‘Interpol to work with IOC in promoting integrity in sport’, sportcal.com, 22 October 2013.   8 ‘IOC to set up anti-corruption unit’, sportsresolutions.co.uk/news, 4 November 2013.  9 ioc.integrityline.org/. 10 Olympic Charter, Rule 43: ‘Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement’; Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions (2018), Art 7.1. 11 Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions, olympic.org/ prevention-competition-manipulation/regulations-legislation [accessed 30 October 2020]. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid ‘INTERPOL and IOC: shaping a global network on sports integrity’, 17  May 2019, interpol. int/en/News-and-Events/News/2019/INTERPOL-and-IOC-shaping-a-global-network-on-sportsintegrity [accessed 30 October 2020]. 14 ‘IOC EB recommends boxing keep its place on the Tokyo 2020 Sports Programme and suspension of recognition of AIBA’, Olympic.org, 22 May 2019; ‘IOC Inquiry Committee report highlights how problems with AIBA extend further than Rakhimov election’, insidethegames.biz, 23 May 2019.

C The response of the UK Government B4.14 In 2001 the Gambling Review Body endorsed Home Office proposals for a new legislative framework to deal with corruption in betting in the UK, including corruption in sports betting. That led to the passing of the Gambling Act 2005, which (among other things) makes ‘cheating at gambling’ a criminal offence.1 However, in keeping with the strongly non-interventionist approach traditionally taken by successive UK Governments to matters of sports regulation,2 the Gambling Review Body insisted that primary responsibility for dealing with corruption in sport should remain with the SGBs: ‘It is clear that corrupt actions to affect the outcome of a sporting event are wholly unfair to the innocent punter and bookmaker. However we believe that the responsibility for preventing such actions lies with the individual sports. They have a strong motive for doing so. Spectators will not attend an event where they believe that the outcome has been fixed in advance […] We would mainly expect the punter (and the non-betting spectator) to be protected by rules and disciplinary procedures imposed by the sports themselves’.3

The Gambling Review Body noted Jockey Club recommendations that more specific criminal offences be introduced directly relating to criminal behaviour in sport and related betting, such as the doping of a racehorse or greyhound, bribery of sports participants or officials, and corruption in connection with horseracing and other sports events, or in relation to betting on horseracing and other sports events. The Gambling Review Body did not endorse those recommendations, however, for two reasons: ‘We consider that measures to improve the conduct of sportsmen, sporting officials or of punters are outside our remit. We do not think it should be the role of the Gambling Commission to monitor the behaviour of sportsmen. […] Although we are not unsympathetic to the case that has been put to us, for example that there should be a specific offence of doping a horse, we do not consider that it is properly within our remit to make recommendations relating to such an issue. We have had to concern ourselves with matters that are more directly linked to the actual activity of gambling, although our proposals for the licensing of bookmakers would mean

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  505 that swift action could be taken against any licensed person who became involved in attempting to influence the outcome of a race in such a way. Secondly, we consider that sports bodies could do more to regulate the participants in their sports, and they should not always look to the criminal law to enforce their regulations. We agree that the law on corruption could be clearer and suggest that the Home Office should consider whether the law could be clarified to meet the concerns we have heard. But overall, we consider that more could be done within the current framework to ensure that betting is fairly conducted. We recommend that the Gambling Commission should work closely with the Jockey Club, and others, to ensure that betting is conducted in a fair manner and that there is not unfair access to information. Areas they may wish jointly to consider might include whether the ban on betting should be extended to more people (for example, trainers)’.4

Consistent with those sentiments, in April 2006 the Department for Culture, Media & Sport issued an ‘Integrity in Sports Betting 10 Point Plan’, setting out a code of practice designed to encourage SGBs to take action to protect the integrity of betting on sport, to safeguard participants and consumers, and to develop relationships with betting operators, statutory organisations, and Government departments.5 1 2 3 4 5

See para B4.48. See para A1.10. Gambling Review Body, ‘Gambling Review Report’ (2001, HMSO), paras 26.33, 26.38 and 26.39. Ibid, paras 16.50 and 16.51. DCMS, ‘Integrity in sports betting: a 10-point plan’ (April 2006); ‘Caborn calls on sports to tackle betting cheats’ (DCMS, 19 April 2006).

B4.15 The Gambling Commission,1 an independent non-departmental public body sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS),2 was established pursuant to the Gambling Act 2005 to regulate gambling in the UK, including by licensing UK-based betting operators on condition that they comply with the Gambling Act and with additional licence conditions and Codes of Practice issued by the Commission. When it opened its doors in 2007, it echoed the DCMS stance by stating that it was focused on its statutory objectives of ensuring that gambling is crime-free, fair and open, and that children and vulnerable people are protected, and that it intended to leave it to SGBs to protect the integrity of their sports.3 Gradually, however, in the face of persistent lobbying by the Sports Rights Owners Coalition and others, the position began to shift a little. In 2009, the Minister for Sport noted: ‘The Government is concerned that, although considerable progress has been made in recent years by SGBs, the betting industry and the Gambling Commission, the possible threat to the integrity of sport remains an ever present and complex problem requiring multi-agency solutions. If the UK is to maintain its reputation as a jurisdiction where fair play is the guiding principle for both sport and betting, it is vital that the risks of corruption arising from all sources are reduced as far as possible. The sports themselves – governing bodies, clubs and players, the betting industry and enforcement authorities – principally the Gambling Commission and the police – all play important roles. The Government is determined to ensure that everything possible is done to maintain the integrity and reputation of sport’.4

The Minister therefore convened a panel of industry experts to ‘make recommendations on how the various bodies concerned [with sports betting integrity] could work together more effectively’, including ‘the design and implementation of an integrated strategy to uphold integrity in sports and associated betting’.5 When it reported in February 2010, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel recommended that the 2006 10-Point Plan be replaced with a new Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to Sports Betting that included minimum standards for all sports to implement in their own rules;6 that sports provide regular education and communication programmes on sports betting integrity to all of their participants;7 that a ‘pan-sports integrity unit’ be established under the auspices of the Gambling Commission, ‘to ensure the efficient handling of intelligence followed by an effective investigation process

506  Regulating Sport

and, where appropriate, leading to disciplinary action under sports’ rules or criminal prosecution’;8 and that each sport: ‘[…] put in place mechanisms for recognising and capturing intelligence in relation to sports betting integrity and, as may be appropriate, communicating it to the Sports Betting Intelligence Unit […] at the Gambling Commission. At the same time, ensuring the SGB has the capacity to respond appropriately to intelligence received from the unit and from betting operators, including the capacity to handle and store sensitive information securely’.9

It also recommended the formation of a sports betting group to provide leadership for sport and to share good practice on betting integrity matters, including the development of the Code of Conduct. 1 See generally gamblingcommission.gov.uk. 2 See para A3.38. 3 See para B4.51. 4 Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Terms of Reference, p 44. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, para 1. 7 Ibid, paras 1.3 – 1.4. 8 Ibid, para 1.6. 9 Ibid, para 7 (Foreword). The Panel was careful to recommend that ‘the principal focus of the Gambling Commission in this area should continue to be the investigation of crime in relation to betting, and that sports must retain sovereignty over, and responsibility for, investigation of disciplinary matters’. Ibid, para  1.12. However, it recommended that the Gambling Commission ‘provide a facility to receive intelligence generated across all sources, not least sports, analyse it, make connections and identify patterns. Such a Unit would, as it built up intelligence across sports and betting, be able to support SGBs and betting operators’ own prevention and deterrent efforts by the provision of relevant pooled intelligence, as well as supporting the Gambling Commission’s own law enforcement efforts, subject to the capability of the SGB in question and statutory constraints on data protection and privacy’. Ibid, para 1.13.

B4.16 The Sports Betting Group was formed with a mandate to bring together sports bodies to discuss sports betting integrity issues and, where appropriate, promote co-ordinated action on integrity matters, develop and maintain the Sports Betting Group Code of Practice, communicate to sports bodies the importance of protecting their sports from the threats posed by sports betting corruption, provide help, guidance and support to sports bodies to put in place measures to protect against sports betting corruption, and engage with government and other relevant parties including the Gambling Commission and the betting industry to recommend improvements to the legislative and regulatory regime. Its terms of reference state that it brings together representatives from across sport to provide leadership and share good practice in working against sports betting corruption, with a particular focus on match fixing, spot fixing, and the misuse of inside information, to ensure that SGBs have sufficient help and guidance in relation to sports betting integrity issues.1 At the heart of its work is the development of the SBG  Code of Practice, comprising seven key actions that the Group recommends SGBs to take to put in place as industry-wide minimum standards to mitigate against any increased risk of corrupt practices caused by sports betting,2 ranging from the need for clear rules setting out what is and is not acceptable in relation to betting, through to educational frameworks, information-sharing arrangements, and regular reviews. SGBs who have published rules in accordance with the Code include The Football Association, the Premier League, the Rugby Football Union, the BHA, and the England and Wales Cricket Board. The Sports Betting Group has also encouraged innovative means of education to minimise the risks to integrity posed by corrupt betting.3 It works alongside bodies such as the Sports Betting Integrity Forum to achieve the aims of the Sports Betting Integrity Action Plan, an annually-updated plan first introduced in 2015 and published by the Sports Betting Integrity Forum that sets the overall direction of the consolidated drive to minimise the risks of betting-related integrity breaches in UK sport.4

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  507 1 Sports Betting Group – Terms of Reference (2016), sportsbettinggroup.org/downloads/SBG%20 Terms%20of%20Reference%20-%202016.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020]. 2 ‘The Code of Practice’, available at sportsbettinggroup.org/code-of-practice/ [accessed 30  October 2020].. 3 See eg the involvement of Mervyn Westfield, the former professional cricketer discussed further at para B4.49 who was banned for five years following charges of spot fixing, in a series of education resources aimed at professional cricketers in the UK. 4 2019 iteration available at sbif.uk/images/temp/SBI-Action-Plan-2019-FINAL-February-2019.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].

D The response of the Council of Europe: the Macolin Convention B4.17 In 2008 the European Parliament called for ‘the Commission and the Member States to explore with sports and betting operators the creation of a workable, equitable and sustainable framework to ensure that all sports in Europe remain free from illegal betting practices’;1 while in its November 2011 resolution on ‘Online gambling in the internal market’, it stated its view ‘that a common definition of sport fraud and cheating should be developed and that betting fraud should be penalised as a criminal offence throughout Europe’, and called for cooperation between the police, sports bodies and the betting industry in investigating match-fixing in connection with sports betting.2 Meanwhile at the 18th Informal Council of Europe Conference on 22 September 2010, the Council of Europe agreed a resolution that: (a) called upon all relevant bodies to partner together in the fight against sports corruption and to design a policy and action setting out an overall approach; (b) encouraged governments to consider whether their current legislation satisfactorily addressed issues related to the manipulation of sports results; (c) encouraged sports movements to achieve an appropriate level of self-regulation and preventative activities; (d) encouraged betting operates to achieve an appropriate level of self-regulation and preventative activities; and (e) encouraged all stakeholders to cooperate with each other.3 On 15  March 2012, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on ‘International cooperation on promotion of the integrity of sport against the manipulation of results (match-fixing)’, welcoming the work performed on the feasibility of a new international legal instrument relating to manipulation of sports results, and invited the negotiation of such a convention that could be opened for signature to non-European states, as well as exploration of the possibility of establishing an international network of national authorities in charge of betting and sports integrity issues.4 In December 2012, the head of the Council of Europe office in Brussels noted that such a convention ‘will facilitate the much-needed mobilisation against matchfixing. It will support close cooperation between sports movement, betting operators and public authorities. The convention will promote education and prevention programmes, as well as an effective detection with betting monitoring systems and an exchange of intelligence. Last but not least, it will establish clear legal provisions, defining criminal behaviours and allowing effective international co-operation for law enforcement investigations’.5 The Council of Europe’s Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (known as the Macolin Convention),6 was eventually concluded on 18 September 2014, but only came into force on 1 September 2019, after opposition from Malta (a gambling haven) led to delays in obtaining the necessary number of ratifications by state party signatories.7 The stated purpose of the Convention is to prevent, detect, punish, and discipline the manipulation of sports competitions, and to enhance the exchange of information and national and international cooperation between the public authorities concerned, and with sports organisations and sports betting operators. The Convention calls on governments to

508  Regulating Sport

adopt measures, including legislation, that create criminal sanctions for match-fixing in their jurisdictions and to promote the exchange of information among and by their betting regulators concerning illegal, irregular, or suspicious betting activities. It urges signatory countries to encourage their national sports organisations to prohibit betting or misuse of inside information by participants in sports; and its Article 13 encourages the establishment of national platforms where law enforcement agencies, local sports federations, and betting operators and regulators can exchange intelligence, and coordinate their efforts, investigations, and legal proceedings to fight the manipulation of sports competition.8 The UK Government signed the Convention in December 2018,9 but has not yet ratified it. 1 European Parliament on the White Paper in Sport (2007/2261(INI)/A6-0149/2008), para 82. 2 2011/2084(INI), paras 32–33. See also European Parliament written declaration on combating corruption in European sport, 0007/2011, 14 February 2011. 3 IM18 (2010) 7. 4 See SportAccord press release, 27 April 2012. A similar declaration was drawn up by the EU Sports Ministers in Nicosia in September 2012 (ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b1/eusf2012-nicosiadeclaration-fight-against-match-fixing.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020]), and the European Commission at the same time expressed its support for the Council’s work in promoting an international convention on match-fixing: Vassiliou, ‘The fight against match-fixing’, EU  Sport Forum, 20  September 2012 (speech/12/621) (‘Such a Convention could send a powerful signal that public authorities are committed to fighting against match fixing. It would establish common pan-European standards to preserve the integrity of sport against manipulation of results. It would also create a useful platform for pan-European cooperation by involving all the parties that need to work together: the public authorities, the sport movement and betting operators. It is an initiative that deserves to be supported’). 5 Froysnes, Seminar on sports betting and anti-money laundering (Brussels, 11 December 2012). 6 coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/215 [accessed 30 October 2020]. 7 coe.int/en/web/sport/manipulation-of-sports-competitions#:~:text=The%20Macolin%20 Convention%20is%20a,force%20on%201%20September%202019 [accessed 30 October 2020]. 8 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, CETS 215, 18 September 2014 (rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMCo ntent?documentId=09000016800d383f [accessed 30 October 2020]). 9 DCMS press release, gov.uk/government/news/uk-government-signs-macolin-convention-to-tacklematch-fixing-in-sport (6 December 2018) [accessed 30 October 2020]..

3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN SPORT B4.18 We consider in this section of this chapter the regulations that SGBs have put in place as the basis for fighting corruption in their sports, before turning in Section 4 to the practical difficulties they face in policing and enforcing those rules.

A Who should be subject to the rules? B4.19 Rules prohibiting match-fixing and related misconduct need to cover the competitors on the field of play, since they can most directly influence the course and outcome of the sporting contest. The rules also need to cover team management and coaching staff, who can direct what those competitors do on the field of play,1 as well as match officials, who can influence what happens there even without the connivance of the competitors. Depending on the sport, there may well also be others with a direct (if less obvious) influence on the contest.2 Furthermore, even if a person working within a sport has no influence at all on the field of play, they might have access to inside information about a forthcoming contest that could give someone an unfair advantage in the betting market.3 Each governing body will therefore have to think carefully how widely it should define who will be covered by its anti-corruption rules.4 Obviously, the governing body only has jurisdiction over those who have accepted (or who are deemed by their participation in the sport to have accepted) its rules,5 and many of those involved in match-fixing and related misconduct may

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  509

stand well beyond that limited reach.6 However, that does not mean the regulator has to ignore them. For example, the Rules of Racing give the BHA the power not only to ‘disqualify’ a licensed person for breach of the rules, but also to ‘exclude’ an unlicensed person when it considers ‘it is in the interests of racing to do so’. This exclusion may be for such a period of time as the BHA sees fit.7 On this basis, the BHA has brought several cases seeking exclusion of persons who are not subject to its rules for conspiring corruptly with persons who are subject to the rules, and its Disciplinary Panel has granted such exclusion orders.8 World Rugby has a similar provision in its Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting),9 and the Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis recommended the addition of such a rule to the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program.10  1 See eg FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 8 (‘to establish “influence” on a match for the purposes of rule E8 the evidence must show at least some actual influence. Such influence might well be inferred from a person’s position – the most obvious example being a team manager or coach’).   2 As just a few examples: (a) the level of influence (including financial influence) that agents have over their athlete clients in some sports may warrant making those agents subject to the anti-corruption rules; (b) in motor-racing the rules would need to apply to team mechanics, engineers, and the like; and (c) in cricket, pitch curators and groundsmen are able to prepare certain pitches that are likely to ensure particular outcomes, and so therefore need to be covered.  3 See para B4.23. For example, a player’s agent is covered by the RFU’s rules: see RFU  v Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018.   4 To take a few examples: (a) The SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011) recommend ‘a definition of “participants” in any competition that is as inclusive as possible, concerning all accredited individuals including athletes, judges, IF and National Olympic Committee employees, officials and families, the event organising committee and the entourage of all participants’; while the ASOIF Model Rules (which are intended for international federations governing the sports that take part in the summer Olympic Games) are stated to apply to ‘all Participants who participate or assist in an International Competition’, with ‘Participant’ defined as ‘any Athlete, Athlete Support Personnel, judge, referee, delegate, commissioner, jury of appeal member, competition official, National Federation team or delegation member and any other accredited person’. See ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 2.1 and Appendix 1 (since supplemented by the ‘Model Rules for International Federations and their members to assist in implementing the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions’ (latest version published in December 2018). (b) The ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code defines ‘Participants’ at Art 1.4 as including ‘Players, Player Support Personnel, ICC Official, Match Referee, Pitch Curator, Player Agent, Umpire and Umpire Support Personnel’ . (c) World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) covers ‘Connected Persons’, defined as ‘any International Player, Contract Player, International Match Official, Contract Player Support Personnel, any coach, trainer, selector, health professional, analyst, team official, administrator, owner, shareholder, director, executive, staff member and/or any other person involved with and/or engaged in relation to the Game by a Union or its National Representative Team and shall include any Union/Association/World Rugby panel of Match Officials at International Match and/or Contract Player level, Disciplinary Personnel, any Agent and/or representative of an International Player, Contract Player or Contract Player Support Personnel and/or family member and/or associate of any of the foregoing (to the extent that such family member/associate falls under the jurisdiction of a Union, Rugby Body and/or World Rugby) and/or any other individual or entity involved in the organisation, administration and/or promotion of the Game at International Match and/or Contract Player level’. (d) The Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program covers not only players but also ‘Related Persons’ (ie ‘any coach, trainer, therapist, physician, management representative, agent, family member, tournament guest, business associate or other affiliate or associate of any Player, or any other person who receives accreditation at an Event at the request of the Player or any other Related Person’) and ‘Tournament Support Personnel’ (ie  ‘any tournament director, official, owner, operator, employee, agent, contractor or any similarly situated person and ATP, ITF and WTA staff providing services at any Event and any other person who receives accreditation at an Event at the request of Tournament Support Personnel’).   5 See paras A1.10 and C3.8.   6 There may still be jurisdictional issues, however, even where all of the co-conspirators are subject to the sport’s rules. In particular, if an athlete who fixed a match is in the UK, he is likely to be subject to his national governing body’s anti-corruption rules. But what if he was persuaded to fix the match by an athlete based in another country and subject to the jurisdiction of a different national governing

510  Regulating Sport body. And/or what if the match was in the other country and/or it was an international event in the UK? Delicate questions of jurisdictional conflict can arise, which are often best addressed by national federations having discretion to delegate authority to enforce their rules to each other and/or to the international federation, and/or the international federation having the right to step in and take over investigation and prosecution of the matter where it sees fit.   7 The exclusion power was in Rule (A) 64 of the BHA Rules of Racing in effect until 2019. In the Rules of Racing applicable until May 2020 the power was contained in Rule 13 of BHA Investigations and Disciplinary Powers section of the Rules of Racing. This Rule 13 remains in effect in the latest version of the Rules of Racing, published on 15 July 2020 (‘The BHA may issue an Exclusion Order against any person, whether or not they are subject to the Rules, where it is in the interests of racing to do so. The Exclusion Order may be indefinite, or for such period as the BHA may specify’).  8 Examples are: (a) City tailor Christopher Coleman, who was the subject of an indefinite exclusion order on 22  January 2003, having been found to have bought information from jockey Barrie Wright and others over a period of years. See Jockey Club v Coleman, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 January 2003. In Jockey Club v Gary Carter, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 September 2005, it was found that Coleman had bet on eight horses ridden by Carter in August and September 2003 to lose, using information that he had bought from Carter. Coleman was therefore made the subject of a further indefinite exclusion order. A similar order was made against his son Dean, who was found to have helped in the Carter operation. (b) HRA v Kelly et al, HRA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 April 2007, where one Ajaz Khan was found to have organised the corrupt betting involved and was excluded for 10 years. Five of his associates were each excluded for a minimum of three years. (c) Miles Rodgers, punter and lead defendant in the 2007 criminal prosecution of Kieren Fallon and others (see para B4.49), was one of those targeted for disciplinary proceedings by the BHA after the criminal case collapsed. In 2009 Rodgers admitted most of the allegations against him in those proceedings. A charge he did not admit, of asking jockey Fergal Lynch to ‘stop’ a horse, was also upheld. The Disciplinary Panel ordered Rodgers’ indefinite exclusion, and recommended that the BHA not consider relaxing that sanction for 10 years. See BHA  v Burke & Rodgers, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 20 July 2009. (d) In BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 January 2013, para 29, the corrupt conspirators included two professional footballers, both of whom were made the subject of exclusion orders.   9 See Art 6.4 of World Rugby Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) (‘1. The Anti-Corruption Officer may make an application to a Judicial Officer to deem any person who is and/or is seeking to become a Connected Person [a wide-ranging definition granting similar scope to those who fall within the BHA Exclusion Orders, as set out at B4.19, n 4(c)] to be an Unsuitable Person where the Anti-Corruption Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person may be and/or may have been involved in any Unsuitable Conduct. […] 4. Following consideration of the evidence presented to him, the Judicial Officer shall either (i) impose a Provisional Suspension (where sought by the Anti-Corruption Officer) or, (ii) deem a Subject to be an Unsuitable Person where he considers that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Subject may be and/or may have been involved in any Unsuitable Conduct. 5. The Anti-Corruption Officer shall notify the Unsuitable Person and the Union(s) concerned in writing advising them of the decision of the Judicial Officer. Where a person has been deemed to be an Unsuitable Person he may not, following receipt of notification, be involved in the Game as a Connected Person and no Connected Person shall associate with an Unsuitable Person in a professional or sport-related capacity. Unions shall acknowledge and enforce any such decision and its consequences forthwith’). 10 See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10.

B What conduct should be prohibited? B4.20 A sport will want to prohibit any conduct that risks undermining the allimportant public confidence in the authenticity and integrity of its results.1 There is a temptation to create a very general requirement, for example an obligation ‘to safeguard the integrity of sport by refraining from any attempt to influence the elements of a competition in a manner contrary to sporting ethics’,2 in order to avoid anything falling between the cracks.3 However, most sports have taken the view that the better approach is to define a list of tailored offences targeted at specified acts and omissions, even if they then conclude that list with a general offence that is intended to operate as a catch-all.4 1 See para B4.1, n.1. 2 SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), para 1. This appears to be based on Art A.6 of the IOC’s Code of Ethics, which states: ‘in the context of

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  511 betting, participants in the Olympic Games must not, by any manner whatsoever, infringe the principle of fair play, show unsporting conduct, or attempt to influence the course or result of a competition, or any part thereof, in a manner contrary to sporting ethics’. Similarly, Arts 11 and 15 of the UEFA  Disciplinary Regulations (Edition 2019) provide that disciplinary measures may be imposed for ‘unsporting conduct’ and that participants ‘shall conduct themselves according to the principles of ‘ethical conduct, loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship’. Art 11 then gives examples of conduct that amount to a breach of these principles, including engaging in ‘active or passive bribery and/or corruption’ and bringing the sport into disrepute. Art 12 (introduced in the 2014 edition) specifically addresses the ‘Integrity of matches and competitions and match-fixing’, including a participant ‘acting in a manner that it likely to exert an unlawful or undue influence on the course and/or result of a match or competition with a view to gaining advantage for himself or a third party, participating in betting on competition matches, using or providing others with inside information and failing to report approaches’. In Pobeda, UEFA sanctioned a club and its president and captain for match-fixing based on general statements in the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (Edition 2008) (and therefore under an edition of the Disciplinary Regulations published prior to the addition of the specific provision now in Art 12). The defendants did not challenge the charges on grounds of legal uncertainty or otherwise, and the CAS panel was happy that the general prohibition covered match-fixing even though it did not specifically mention it: ‘the Panel is convinced that match fixing touches at the very essence of the principle of loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship because it has an unsporting impact on the result of the game by inducing players not to perform according to their real sporting capacities and because they get rewarded for their misconduct. Match-fixing is cheating and constitutes a clear violation of the basic principles under which sporting competitions shall be carried out’. FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 78. 3 Cf ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in Horseracing – An Independent Review’, Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, 13  May 2008, para  1.24 (‘The Review Team has taken into account views on how the rules for the BHA should be formulated. We are of the view that, ideally, rules should be based on a set of underlying principles. The rules themselves should not be too detailed in order to allow them to be applied more flexibly. The recommended model would be to have a set of principles supported by codes of conduct with rules which sit under them. A breach of a principle or a code of conduct can lead to a liability to disciplinary sanction, even if there is no specific rule. This gives flexibility and means that it is not necessary to try to cater for every eventuality in the rules’). 4 See para B4.33.

(a) Not playing to your merits, match-fixing, or spot-fixing B4.21 The key objective of sporting regulators is to maintain public confidence in the integrity and authenticity of the sporting contest, ie that the contest is being played on a level-playing field, that every contestant is trying their best to win, and that the contest will therefore be determined by sporting merit, and not by any illicit factor.1 Accordingly, the starting-point of any code in this area must be a clear prohibition of any deliberate under-performance for fixing purposes. In some contexts, there may need to be prohibition of deliberate under-performance even if not directly for fixing purposes, since advance knowledge of such intended underperformance facilitates corrupt betting. However, there are traps for the unwary. In particular, care must be taken not to make the prohibition too narrow2 or too broad,3 or to include any unnecessary elements. For example, some codes require proof of receipt of a bribe or reward in return for the fixing,4 but the mischief is in the fixing of the outcome or other aspect of the contest, not in the motivation for it.5 Fixing is deeply damaging to sport even in those (not unusual) occasions when it is not done for any bribe or reward.6 As a result, many anti-corruption codes treat receipt of a bribe or other reward not as a requisite element of the cornerstone offence,7 but rather as an aggravating factor when it comes to determining the appropriate sanction for that offence.8 Similarly, whether or not the fix is in fact carried out, or is successful in delivering the intended outcome, may be relevant to sanction, but it should not be a necessary element of the offence itself: simply agreeing to carry out the fix is enormously damaging in itself, obviously where it is uncovered and is splashed on the front pages of the global press, but also where it remains concealed (because it leaves the athlete vulnerable to pressure to act corruptly again in the future).9 1 See para B4.1, n.1. 2 For example, the advent of spot-betting (see para B4.4, n 5) means that the rule must prohibit not only match-fixing but also ‘spot-fixing’, ie the fixing not only of the eventual outcome but also of other,

512  Regulating Sport narrower aspects of the contest. Notwithstanding that the outcome of the match remains unaffected, such conduct is deeply damaging to the integrity and image of the sport (because it tells the public that not everything they see is real, and because it exposes the perpetrators to corrupt relationships with fixers that can easily expand into broader corruption down the line), and therefore must also be clearly prohibited and heavily sanctioned. See eg Art 2.1.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which prohibits ‘fixing or contriving in any way or otherwise influencing improperly or being a party to any effort to fix or contrive in any way or otherwise influence improperly, the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any International Match or ICC Event’ (emphasis added). This broad formulation also ‘treats indifferently fixing and being party to a fix. This allows for the inculpation of both ringmaster and performers in relation to the same incident’: ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 33. The ASOIF Model Rules include a virtually identical provision under the heading ‘Manipulation of Results’. See ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 3.2(a). This provision was supplemented by the Model Rules of the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions (2016, now updated in its latest version, published in December 2018), intended as an update to the ASOIF Model Rules 2012. Article 2.2 of the 2018 update defines ‘Manipulation of sports competitions’ as ‘an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue Benefit for oneself or for others’. Meanwhile World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) specifies two examples that are included in the definition of ‘Fix’ at Regulation 6.2; namely ‘improperly ensuring that a particular incident(s) takes place or does not take place during an Event(s) or at a particular time or juncture during an Event(s)’ and ‘improperly manipulating the scoring or any other aspect of an Event(s)’. Rule (F)37 of the BHA Rules of Racing states that a jockey must, and must be seen to: ‘ask their horse for timely, real and substantial efforts to achieve the best possible position; and take all other reasonable and permissible measures throughout the Race to ensure the horse is given a full opportunity to achieve the best possible position.’ Rule (F)38 states that ‘a Person must not prevent or try to prevent a horse from obtaining the best possible position.’ Regarding instructions, Rule (F)39 makes clear that ‘a Trainer is responsible for ensuring that a Jockey who rides a horse trained by them in a Race is given instructions that shall allow the Jockey to ensure that the horse is given a full opportunity to achieve the best possible position’; Rule (F)40 sets out that, ‘if a Jockey deliberately does not ensure that the horse runs the Race to achieve its best possible position, or if a Race is used to school or condition a horse, a Trainer shall be responsible unless the Trainer can demonstrate that the Jockey was given the necessary instructions.’ The historical equivalent of Rule (F)37 was often charged in combination with a charge that the rider has participated in a corrupt ‘conspiracy to commit a corrupt or fraudulent practice in relation to racing’ contrary to Rule (A)41.2 by providing inside information to third parties (eg that he will not, or will not try to, win the race or gain a place) so that they can bet against that outcome. See eg McKeown v British Horseracing Authority, [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 2, and BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 January 2013, para 7. 3 For example, making a participant’s ‘failure to perform to the best of his ability in any match, race or other event in which he participates’ a corruption offence (Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s proposed Code of Conduct, para 2.6) might seem overbroad, since an athlete could fail to perform to the best of their ability for many reasons, most of which are not corrupt in any way (eg ill health). On the other hand, planned deliberate under-performance, such as ‘tanking’ in tennis, has the potential to allow for corrupt betting when known of in advance. Care needs to be taken to set the prohibition at a level appropriate to the particular circumstances of the sport. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10. The Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 4.5(c) requires sports to proscribe ‘“tanking” (including, in particular, owing to an arrangement relating to betting on the outcome of any match or event) other than for legitimate tactical reasons within the rules of the respective sport)’. The approach adopted by the British Horseracing Authority is to impose a positive duty on a jockey to both ensure the horse provides all necessary efforts and ‘take all other reasonable and permissible measures throughout the Race to ensure the horse is given a full opportunity to achieve the best possible position’ (see para B4.22, n 1): Rule (F)37 of the BHA  Rules of Racing. Trainers have a corresponding duty to give instructions to ensure the best possible placing: Rule (F)39.1. These duties could be broken carelessly or recklessly, without any element of corruption, and the conduct could be sanctioned accordingly. 4 For example, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s Code of Conduct would make it an offence for a participant to ‘receive, or seek to receive, or seek a bribe in order to fix or contrive a result or the progress of a match, race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’ (para 2.3), or to ‘offer, or attempt to offer, a bribe in order to fix or contrive a result or the progress of a match, race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’ (para 2.4). The SportAccord Model Rules also link the fixing offence to receipt of a reward. See SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), para 6 (‘Ensuring the occurrence of a

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5 6

7

8

9

particular incident, which is the subject of a bet and for which he/she expects to receive or has received any reward’). However, they also require the incident to be the subject of a bet, which would not be helpful in cases where the perpetrator has fixed an aspect of a match with corrupt intent but for one reason or another (eg the fixer was testing him out, or the ‘fixer’ was really an undercover reporter) no bet has in fact been placed. See Pound, ‘Responses to Corruption in Sport’ (Play the Game Conference, 3 October 2011) (‘It is still, however, not the betting as such which is the problem, but the underlying corruption of the result or competition. Betting in those circumstances is simply a means of monetizing the corruption’). This is described in one report as ‘sporting motivated match-fixing’, as compared to ‘betting motivated match-fixing’: Oxford Research A/S, ‘Examination of threats to the integrity of sports’ (April 2010). For example, in the context of tennis, players may underperform or ‘tank’ because they wish to move on to another tournament more quickly, and injured players may play although incapable of competing in order to earn first round loser’s fees (see Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10). In 2002 French rugby club Agen were found guilty of deliberately losing their last match in the pool stages of the European Challenge Cup, not to earn illicit rewards, but rather to avoid qualifying for the knock-out stages of the Cup, because they wanted to concentrate their efforts on the domestic league. Agen v ERC, ERC Appeal Committee decision dated March 2002. Meanwhile, in the 2002 Australian Formula One Grand Prix, Rubens Barrichello allowed his team-mate Michael Schumacher to overtake him just before the finishing line, to assist Schumacher’s bid for the drivers’ championship, prompting the FIA in 2003 to ban the practice of team orders. In 2012, the Australian Football League investigated allegations that Melbourne had deliberately lost games towards the end of the season so as to improve its draft picks for the following season: see ‘Brock McLean quizzed on tank claims’, theaustralian. com.au, 2 August 2012. A Chinese badminton coach admitted in 2008 that he had advised one Chinese player to lose her semi-final match against another Chinese player whom he deemed to have a better chance to win gold in the final (‘China coach admits match fixing’, uk.eurosport.yahoo.com, 23 March 2008), and two South Korean pairs, one Chinese pair and one Indonesian pair, were expelled from the badminton tournament at the 2012 London Olympic Games for deliberately trying to lose dead rubber qualifying matches in order to secure a more favourable draw in the knock-out stages: ‘BWF kicks out eight players from London 2012 women’s doubles for deliberate poor play’, Sportcal.com, 1 August 2012. Similar allegations were made against the Japanese women’s football team, who were alleged to have deliberately played for a draw in the final group match in order to avoid having to travel to Glasgow from Cardiff (goal.com/en-us/news/1587/olympics/2012/08/02/3281424/martin-rogersjapans-womens-soccer-team-plays-to-intentional [accessed 30 October 2020]). Another possibility is that the deliberate underperformance is prompted not by the promise of reward but rather by threats and intimidation. There have sometimes been suspicions that that was the inducement (or part of the inducement) in some horseracing corruption cases. The BHA Rules of Racing steer clear of including any reference to inducement or otherwise – Rule (J)27 states that ‘a person must not: commit any corrupt or fraudulent practice in relation to horse racing in any jurisdiction; or conspire with any other person for the commission of such a practice’. By contrast, the ICC Anti-Corruption Code is one of several that makes a belief of a threat to one’s physical safety a defence to a corruption charge. See para B4.35. For example, ‘an infringement of Art 2.1.1 of the ICC Code does not require a player to gain financially. The question to be answered is whether Mr Asif fixed, contrived in any way, influenced improperly, or was a party to any effort to fix, contrive in any way, or influence improperly, the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any International Match or ICC Event. In other words, a player who is involved in a fix breaches Art 2.1.1 notwithstanding that he does not benefit financially from doing so. Accordingly, the Panel does not consider the absence of financial gain to be determinative of the fact that there is no infringement’. Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 64. See eg  Art 6.1.1.3 of the ICC  Anti-Corruption Code (‘the Anti-Corruption Tribunal must first determine the relative seriousness of the offence, including identifying all relevant factors that it deems to aggravate the nature of the offence under the Anti-Corruption Code, including […] where the amount of profits, winnings or other Reward, directly or indirectly received by the Player or Player Support Personnel as a result of the offence(s), is substantial and/or whether the sums of money otherwise involved in the offence(s) were substantial’). See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10. See eg Art 2.1.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, and Art 3.3 of the ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), each of which prohibits simply seeking or accepting a bribe to fix or improperly influence the result, progress or conduct of a match or competition, irrespective of whether or not the fix is carried out. See also FA Rule E5.2 (‘A Participant shall not, directly or indirectly, offer, agree to give, give, solicit, agree to accept or accept any bribe, gift or reward or consideration of any nature which is, or could appear to be related in any way to that Participant, or any other Participant, failing to perform to the best of their ability; or that Participant or any other person (whether a Participant or not), directly or indirectly, seeking to influence for an improper purpose, the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of, or occurrence in or in connection with, a football match or competition’); and ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.6, which makes it clear that it is not relevant to the establishing of any offence under the Code that the player’s performance and/or the conduct and outcome of the match were not affected, and/or that the bet did not pay out. See also

514  Regulating Sport Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit, CAS 2014/A/3467, para 109 (mere agreement to lose is an offence, even if player subsequently were to play to win); FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 26 (‘the point is not whether you can prove that as it turned out a particular player did or did not actually affect the outcome. It is that football matches must be free of all possible suspicion that every single player is not honestly and wholeheartedly doing his very best to help his team win, within the laws and spirit of the game’). So, for example, in February 2006 the WPBSA banned snooker player Quinten Hann for eight years for agreeing with undercover journalists that he would lose a game at the China Open in return for money, even though the journalists went public before the game and so the fix never happened: ‘Guilty Hann given eight-year ban’, bbc.co.uk, 17  February 2006. Similarly, Stephen Lee was found to be in breach of snooker’s anti-corruption rules by agreeing to play and then playing in a way designed to achieve a particular outcome without the need for proof that he deliberately lost a match that he could and should have won. WBPSA  v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013, paras 23, 82, aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014. The English appeal courts took a similar view in Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd. Following a failed criminal prosecution against him for match-fixing (see para B4.49), the Liverpool goalkeeper sued the News of the World for libel over an article accusing him of corruptly throwing matches. A jury awarded damages of £85,000 but the Court of Appeal and House of Lords both ruled that this was perverse. Both courts held that on the evidence, any reasonable jury would have found that Grobbelaar had agreed to fix matches. Although it was not proved that he ever actually did so, his conduct in agreeing to do so was, for the Court of Appeal, enough to prove that the sting of the article complained of was substantially true: [2001] EWCA Civ 33, [2001] 2 All ER 437. Although the House of Lords disagreed with that conclusion, it held that proof of the agreement was enough to mean Grobbelaar was a person with no reputation deserving of legal protection, and to reduce damages to £1: [2002] HL 40; [2002] 1 WLR 3024. In ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 141, the Tribunal rejected a charge that Mr Butt had agreed with his agent to bat out a maiden deliberately at the Oval Test between England and Pakistan, because it was ‘not convinced that he intended to implement his apparent promise to bat a maiden […] . He did not in fact do so. It would not have been something he could guarantee […] [because] a maiden depended on the performance not merely of the batsman but of the bowler and fielders of the other team. He was, it is possible, merely playing along without any intention of involving himself in a risky undertaking to act on it’. In the subsequent criminal proceedings (see para B4.49), the Court of Appeal was not so generous, finding that Butt’s not batting out a maiden over ‘was not a sudden change of mind. Butt did not suddenly repent of his involvement. It was simply that, as everybody would recognise, with a hard, new ball bowled in firstclass cricket, a batsman could not guarantee that he would provide a maiden over’: R v Amir & Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914, para 14.

B4.22 There are several examples in the case law of such fixing or attempted fixing, both of the outcome of matches (‘match-fixing’)1 and of particular aspects of matches (‘spot-fixing’).2 In particular, in April 2010 a CAS panel upheld UEFA charges that a club president had fixed his football team’s loss in the first qualifying round of the UEFA Champions League 2004/05, relying on the evidence of unusual betting patterns, but also on witness testimony that the president had told the players he would be killed if they did not lose the tie. Because of the gravity of the offence, the CAS panel also upheld the life ban that UEFA had imposed on the club president.3 In March 2012, another CAS panel upheld charges of attempted match-fixing by Austrian tennis player Daniel Köllerer, specifically, that he had offered other players approximately $10,000 per match to lose particular matches in the first round of ATP  Tour events, and also upheld the life ban imposed on him at first instance, notwithstanding that none of his offers had been accepted and so no tennis matches had in fact been fixed.4 As for spot-fixing, in February 2011 an Anti-Corruption Tribunal upheld charges that Pakistani cricketers Salman Butt, Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir had conspired to bowl three ‘no balls’ deliberately at predetermined moments during the Lord’s Test match in August 2010, and banned the players for ten, seven, and five years respectively, which bans were again upheld by the CAS;5 while in June 2012 an ECB Disciplinary Panel upheld charges that Danish Kaneria had persuaded Mervyn Westfield to concede 12 runs in his first over during Essex’s Twenty20 match against Durham in 2009, and banned Westfield for five years and Kaneria for life. Kaneria’s appeal against liability was dismissed in April 2013 and his appeal against sanction was dismissed in June 2013.6 In 2018, an Ethics

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  515

Hearing Panel of the Badminton World Federation upheld charges of match-fixing against the Malaysian badminton player Zulfadli Zulkiffli and related complicity and wagering charges against another Malaysian badminton player, Tan Chun Seang. Zulkiffli was banned from the sport for 20 years and fined US $25,000 and Tan was banned for 15 years and fined US $15,000, which sanctions were upheld by the CAS.7 1 For example, a charge of being party to an effort to fix the result of a match was upheld in Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang and Chino, DRA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 15 June 2018; while charges against a jockey of deliberately failing to ride a horse on its merits (ie riding to lose) as part of a corrupt conspiracy were upheld in Ad Vitam, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 9 October 2015, paras 18, 54–56, aff’d, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 6 January 2016; and a charge that a trainer had instructed his jockey to stop a horse was upheld in BHA v Best, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2016. 2 See eg  The Football Association v Wood, FA  Regulatory Commission decision dated 18  April 2018 (player found to have deliberately caused himself to be booked, his friends having bet on that occurrence). 3 FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920. In February 2010, it was announced that UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary Body had imposed a lifetime ban on match referee Novo Panic, based on information about match-fixing provided by the German police. ‘Bosnian referee handed life ban for match fixing’, 24 February 2010. 4 Köllerer v ATP CAS 2011/A/2490. The tennis player’s complaint to the European Commission that the Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme was unlawful was unsuccessful: Case AT.40022, Match fixing sanctions in tennis, administrative closure of the case, 28 June 2013. See also Savic v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, CAS 2011/A/2621 (life ban for attempted fixing); PTIOS v Guzman, AntiCorruption Hearing Officer’s decision dated 14 March 2019 (imposing lifetime ban for making corrupt approaches to other players, and noting other cases where a lifetime ban had been imposed for similar offences).. 5 ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011; appeals denied, Asif v ICC CAS 2011/A/2362 and Butt v ICC CAS 2011/A/2364. 6 ECB v Kaneria & Westfield Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, appeal against liability denied, 26 April 2013, appeal against sanction denied, 9 July 2013. 7 Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01, aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847.

(b) Betting on the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any match or competition B4.23 Betting by sportspersons on matches they are playing in should be prohibited, irrespective of any proof of fixing, because (as an FA Regulatory Commission noted): ‘how can the fair-minded […] fan have any solid confidence that a match is not fixed if there are players on the pitch who have thousands of pounds to gain if their own team loses? Or any confidence that any of the players in their team are playing their honest best to win the game?’1

In fact, it is not just the players who must not bet: if a club is in financial difficulties, it may be an owner or chairperson who directs the players to lose, so that losses can be covered with gambling winnings.2 Therefore, all anti-corruption codes include prohibitions on all participants (broadly defined) betting (directly or indirectly3) on their own matches.4 However, should players also be prohibited from betting on their team’s matches in which they are not playing?5 Going further, should they be prohibited from betting on matches not involving their own team but played in the same competition? Or from betting on any match at all in their sport?6 Many would argue that any sort of relationship between a participant and bookmakers is to be discouraged, for fear that it makes the participant vulnerable to corrupt influences down the line (for example, if the participant runs up large gambling debts that cannot be repaid7). Indeed, if this argument were accepted, it would speak in favour of a blanket ban on participants betting on any sport while they are in a position of influence in their own sport.8

516  Regulating Sport 1 FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 19. It therefore does not matter whether or not the result was actually influenced: ‘the point is not whether you can prove that as it turned out a particular player did or did not actually affect the outcome. It is that football matches must be free of all possible suspicion that every single player is not honestly and wholeheartedly doing his very best to help his team win, within the laws and spirit of the game’. Ibid, para 26. See also FA v Barton, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 26 April 2017, para 132 (‘The Betting Rules create strict liability. There is no need to show any evidence of an intention to influence a match. They exist to protect the integrity of the game and public confidence in football. That is why the perception of the impact on the integrity of the game is an important consideration’), and para 138 (‘The reason why they [betting on your own team] are serious aggravating factors is because of the perception such betting gives rise to. (a) Betting on team to lose – if the match or any aspect was in fact “thrown” or fixed there would be specific charges to reflect that. The gravamen of betting in this way is that it creates suspicion of wrongdoing, that something is not right with the match or an aspect of it. It is a serious aggravating factor because it strikes at the integrity of football. […] (b) Betting on own team – simply betting on a participant’s own team, even if it is to win, gives rise to the same perception that the gambler has an unfair advantage over the public generally and the organization taking the bet. That too is serious’), appeal on sanction upheld in part, Barton v FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 24 July 2017; RFU v Blake, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 May 2015, para 49 (‘we must have regard to the wider interests of the Game. It is important that those involved in the Game and the wider public understand that any breach of the anti-corruption and betting regulations will and must be treated seriously. Such behavior undermines public confidence in the integrity of the sport and strikes at the foundations of the Game. It is fundamental to the sport’s integrity that the participants and public alike believe they are watching and involved in a genuine contest between two teams competing to win’), appeal dismissed, RFU Appeal Panel decision dated 25 June 2015. 2 The authors of the IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13  February 2012), p  24, suggest that that was the motivation of the club chairman banned for life for match-fixing in FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920. 3 Without a ban on ‘indirect’ betting as well as direct betting, it would be too easy for a participant to circumvent the prohibition by placing his bets indirectly, for example, through a friend or relative. That is why the Sports Betting Integrity Panel included in its model Code of Conduct requirements not only (a) that the participant ‘not place or attempt to place a bet on a match, race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’; but also (b) that the participant ‘[n]ot solicit or facilitate, or attempt to solicit or facilitate, another person to bet on a match, race or other event of competition in which he or his club participates’. See Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to Betting, Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Chapter 2a, Arts 2.1 and 2.2. Similarly, the SportAccord model rules prohibit participants ‘participating in all forms of, or support for, betting or gambling related to their own matches and competitions in their sport’ and ‘instructing, encouraging or facilitating any other party to bet’ (SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011)); while Art 2.2.2 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code prohibits ‘soliciting, inducing, enticing, instructing, persuading, encouraging, intentionally facilitating or authorising any other party to enter into a Bet in relation to the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any International Match.’ 4 See n 3. The prohibition needs to cover not just betting to do badly but also betting to do well. This is not because a striker who bets on himself to score a goal has an incentive to play selfishly, rather than as part of the team. (A contractual bonus for scoring goals has the same effect, and that is expressly permitted under FA  Rule C1.10). Instead, it is because the arrangement puts the participant in a relationship with bookmakers that could develop into a broader (and corrupt) relationship, which is a risk that no sport can afford to take. Horse-racing is a special case, because it was created as a betting product, and owners have always been allowed to bet on their horses to win. However, the BHA Rules of Racing are clear that the owner of a horse must not ‘must not place a lay Bet on a horse in which they have any interest’. (Rule (J)9). See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011 (owner banned for laying his horse to lose, under the old Rule (A)92). 5 In such a case, the participant may still be able to affect the outcome of the match. FA  Rule E8.1 prohibits players betting on ‘the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of, or occurrence in or in connection with, a football match or competition; or any other matter concerning or related to football anywhere in the world, including, for example and without limitation, the transfer of players, employment of managers, team selection or disciplinary matters’. In FA  v Harris, FA  Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 8, the FA Regulatory Commission held that ‘to establish “influence” on a match for the purposes of rule E8 the evidence must show at least some actual influence. Such influence might well be inferred from a person’s position – the most obvious example being a team manager or coach. However, although the Player in this case was a Chester City player and was therefore actively and closely involved and in constant contact with other players in that club right up to the AFC Bournemouth v Chester City FC match itself, we cannot safely infer that he had any influence on the Match and there is no direct evidence that he had any such influence’. On the other hand, that player may well have inside information that would give him an unfair advantage over other punters. See RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 2 (‘The Tribunal

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  517 are prepared [to accept] that in the context of the other allegations against the player [including betting on games in which he played], [betting on games he was not playing in] is not the most serious of offences unless the player had some inside information such as knowing that certain players would not be playing in specific games’). 6 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s proposed Code of Conduct adopts the narrower approach, prohibiting a participant from betting (or soliciting or facilitating betting by a third party) on ‘a match, race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’. See Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to Betting, Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Chapter 2a, Arts 2.1 and 2.2. The ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code goes further, with Art 2.2.1 prohibiting those covered by the Code (ie all international players and their support personnel) from betting on all ‘International Matches’, and Art 2.6.1 says it is irrelevant whether or not they were personally involved in the match or event in question. To express the prohibition more narrowly, so allowing a cricketer to bet on international matches involving other teams, was felt to expose the sport and its participants to unnecessary risk, giving those with corrupt motives a reason to engage with the participants and try to develop inappropriate relationships with them on the basis that they might be able to influence their fellow players. The SportAccord model rules went even further, banning participants from betting on ‘their own matches and competitions in their sport’. SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), Art 6a. Similarly, the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program prohibits wagering on ‘any Event or any other tennis competition’, ie the whole of the sport. UTACP Art D.1.a. (2019). The Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para  4.5(b) required sports to ban ‘betting, gambling or entering into any other form of financial speculation on any match or on any event connected with the sport involved’. See generally Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.13 (‘A full restriction from betting on the sport does have the advantage of creating clear lines of accepted and unaccepted use of information for betting by sports participants. It also means that cases where the individual is involved in betting can be determined quickly. We recognise however that in some sports (mainly horse and greyhound racing) betting is very closely connected with the sport, and in fact horseracing as it exists in the UK is unlikely to be commercially viable without licensed owners and trainers betting. It can also be said that a full restriction from any betting on the sport is harder to enforce and less understandable to the participant – for example, a lower league player may not understand why he is not permitted to place bets on a top league final’). The Gambling Commission queried whether participants in sports where some betting is allowed should be required to disclose their betting activity and that of persons closely connected with them. Ibid, para 3.15. See further FA v Barton, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 26 April 2017, para 142 (‘Betting on all football by participants is banned for good reason. […] An individual’s sporting connections may be many and varied. The sporting public cannot know what information is or may be being deployed or relied upon when a footballer bets on a football match’), appeal on sanction upheld in part, Barton v FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 24 July 2017. 7 See IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), pp 19–20 (noting a report that German footballer Rene Schnitzler in January 2011 had admitted taking bribes to fix matches in order to pay off his gambling debts). See also Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p  18 (‘A dysfunctional gambler […] may be more tempted to fix because of an urgent need to make good his gambling losses and, if he comes into regular contact with illegal bookmakers, is more liable to be approached with inducements’). Young sportsmen with plenty of free time and disposable income appear well capable of running up such debts. For example, in April 2006 it was reported that Manchester Utd and England footballer Wayne Rooney had run up a £700,000 gambling debt: ‘Mystery bookmaker maintains low profile’, Times, 12 April 2006. 8 The authors are not aware of any SGB that has adopted such a broad rule. The closest are the ASOIF Model Rules, which reflect their Olympic-oriented provenance by prohibiting betting not only on events in one’s sport but also betting on events ‘taking place in another sport at an International Competition hosted by a Major Event Organisation in which the Participant in participating’. ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 3.1(a) (since supplemented by the ‘Model Rules for International Federations and their members to assist in implementing the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions’ (latest version published in December 2018). In that case though, the athlete has a close connection with those other sports, since they are being played at the same event in which the athlete is competing.

B4.24 In Montcourt v ATP, a CAS panel was quick to reject a player’s argument that the prohibition on him betting on matches in which he was not playing was improper because ‘online betting was private entertainment which should not warrant a decision by the sports authorities having the effect of interrupting the pursuit of his livelihood’.1 Deferring heavily to the expertise of the tennis authorities to determine what was necessary to protect their sport, the CAS panel ruled:

518  Regulating Sport ‘This is an unpersuasive and over-ambitious argument; the arbitrators are wholly disinclined to act as censors of bona fide legislation in this field. Competitive sports depend on the public perception that events are not fixed. The sports authorities determined several decades ago that wagering by professional athletes on events in their own sport, even by athletes not involved in the relevant event, is likely to erode the legitimacy of the sport and give opportunities for unscrupulous exploitation of athletes who embark on the slippery slope of betting. This is especially true of sports like tennis, where it is sufficient to corrupt a single player to fix the outcome. [49] The sport of professional tennis has therefore established a prohibition on wagering by its practitioners. This is a condition of participating in the sport. The Appellant has not come close to convincing the Panel that this policy and legislation is illegitimate […]’.2 1 Montcourt v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630, para 48. 2 Ibid, paras 48–49.

B4.25 There are many different examples from recent years of participants in different sports falling foul of betting prohibitions, including in horseracing,1 rugby league,2 rugby union,3 tennis,4 football,5 cricket,6 handball,7 boxing (at the 2016 Olympic Games),8 and snooker.9 1 See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011 (owner banned for laying his horse to lose); ‘Australian jockey Oliver banned for betting on race in 2010’ (Sportcal. com, 20 November 2012) (Australia’s leading jockey, Damien Oliver, banned for eight months after admitting that he had bet on a rival horse in a race in 2010). 2 In 2004, St Helens rugby league players Sean Long and Martin Gleeson were both banned (for three months and four months respectively) for betting on St Helens to lose a match against the Bradford Bulls when they found out that the St Helens team would be missing several players. RFL v Long & Gleeson, RFL Advisory Panel decision dated 17 June 2004. In 2010, Oldham assistant coach Mark Cass was found guilty of betting on rugby league matches, including on games involving his own club, Oldham, and was banned for one year (news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/rugby_league/8488366.stm [accessed 30 October 2020]). And in 2011 Doncaster captain Shaun Leaf admitted betting on rugby league matches (including betting against his own team in matches in which he was playing, which the RFL Disciplinary Panel found to be ‘[p]articularly worrying’ and ‘a very serious matter’), and was banned for 18 months and fined £500. RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 4. 3 In RFU v Blake, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 May 2015, appeal dismissed, RFU Appeal Panel decision dated 25  June 2015, Leicester Tigers defence coach Philip Blake accepted charges that he had bet on Leicester Tigers to win two different matches, and was banned for six months. In RFU  v Hart in 2018, RFU-registered agent Matthew Hart was found guilty of breach of World Rugby Regulation 6.3.1(c) and RFU regulations 8.3.2 and 17.3.1(c) for placing 1476 bets on rugby union worldwide over a period of three and a half years and for non-cooperation with the RFU AntiCorruption Officer. The RFU Disciplinary Panel imposed a sanction of 22 months suspension upon him, having rejected his defence that the bets he placed were all placed on behalf of his father. RFU v Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018. 4 See eg Di Mauro v ATP, CAS 2007/A/1427 (ban for betting on ATP matches in which player was not involved reduced from nine months to seven months on appeal, and fine reduced from $60,000 to $25,000, due to concerns about proportionality, particularly given that similar and even worse offences had been punished by the tennis authorities with bans of less than six months); Montcourt v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630 (ban for betting reduced from 8 weeks to just less than 6 weeks, and fine of $12,000 upheld, on the basis the player only gambled $192, on 36 matches in which he did not participate); ATP v Luzzi, decision of Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, ATP press release dated 28 February 2008 (player banned for 200 days and fined $50,000 for wagering 273 times over three years on the outcome or other aspect of a match, including placing one €3 bet on himself to win a match); PTIOs v Ribeiro Navarrete, Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer decision dated 3 October 2017 (banning player for eight months, four months suspended, and fining him $1,000, for making bets on 28 matches in which he had not been involved). Other tennis betting cases are discussed at McLaren, ‘Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play’ (2008) 19(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 15, 22. 5 See eg  FA  v Harris, FA  Regulatory Commission decision dated 23  July 2009; FA  v Barton, FA  Regulatory Commission decision dated 26 April 2017 (Commission imposed a sanction of 18 months suspension from football and a fine of £30,000 on the footballer Joey Barton for admitted misconduct in placing 1,260 bets on professional football over a 10 year period, including betting on his own team to lose, albeit in matches in which he did not play), reduced on appeal to a little over 13 months, Barton v FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 24 July 2017, because Regulatory Commission had provided no good basis to reject expert evidence that Barton was not in control of his gambling addiction even though he was able to set limits, because he was addicted to the process, not to winning.

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  519 6 In 2004, an ECB Disciplinary Panel found Surrey cricketer Ed Giddins guilty of betting on his team to lose a match against Northamptonshire, banned him for five years, and fined him £5,000 plus £1,000 costs, the maximum available sanction under the ECB rules at the time. ‘Giddins fined and banned for betting’, espncricinfo.com/england/content/story/141175.html, 24  May 2004 [accessed 30  October 2020]. 7 In February 2013, the French Handball League announced that seven members of the Montpellier handball team (including two Olympic gold medalists) had been found guilty of having ‘directly or indirectly placed bets’ on the result of a game they played in after Montpellier had already won the league. Bets were placed amounting to €88,000 (40 times the usual amount for a match of this kind), almost all of them on Montpellier to be losing at half time to a team placed well below them in the French First Division. The seven team members were each banned for the maximum ban under the applicable rules of six months. Mackay, ‘Olympic handball gold medallists given maximum ban for illegal betting’, 8 February 2013 (insidethegames). 8 ‘IOC issues severe reprimands to three boxers for betting on events at Rio 2016 Olympics’, insidethegames.biz, 28  September 2016, insidethegames.biz/articles/1042112/ioc-issue-severereprimands-to-three-boxers-for-betting-on-events-at-rio-2016-olympics [accessed 30  October 2020]; and stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-Are/ Commissions/Ethics/Decisions/IOC-Ethics-Commission-decision-MichaelConlan-Eng.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020]. 9 In each of WPBSA  v Perry, WPBSA  Disciplinary Committee decision dated 25  July 2017, and WPBSA v Maflin, WPBSA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 29 August 2017, the player was banned for three months for betting on other players’ matches.

(c) Using or disclosing ‘inside information’ for betting purposes B4.26 The rules also need to prohibit participants using or passing on inside information for betting purposes, even if doing so has no impact on what then happens on the field of play.1 This is not so much because use of inside information undermines the integrity of the betting market,2 but rather because again it is harmful to the image of the game, and in particular it puts the participant into a relationship with unscrupulous punters or bookmakers that could be a gateway to future corrupt acts that do impact on the field of play. For example, if a jockey is feeding a punter confidential information about the chances of the horse they are riding in a particular race, it may progress from there to agreeing to stop the horse in the race, so that the punter can obtain a guaranteed profit by betting on the horse to lose.3 However, two aspects in particular of the definition of this offence need careful consideration. First, what constitutes ‘inside information’ for these purposes?4 Secondly, what constitutes impermissible disclosure of that information? In particular, should there be a ‘safe harbour’ provision for disclosure of personal information to family and friends?5 Or should any disclosure be prohibited only where the participant knows (or should have known) that it might be used for betting purposes?6 Alternatively, is it only receipt of ‘reward or gain’ in exchange for the information that makes the disclosure impermissible?7 1 A lot of information may be considered helpful in a betting context, even though disclosure of it for betting purposes might have no impact on events on the field of play. Obvious examples include the details of who has been selected to play for a team in a match; whether a player is carrying an injury; the pitch conditions at a cricket match; the total number of runs at which a captain plans to declare his team’s first innings in a Test match; and so on. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10). 2 It might be said that a fair betting market is not the primary concern of an SGB (unless, of course, the sport is horseracing, which gets most of its funding from the betting industry, and therefore has a vested interest in a healthy betting market on the sport). However, SGBs rely on information from betting operators to help them police and enforce their anti-corruption codes (see paras B4.47, B4.52 and B4.53), and so they cannot afford to omit from those codes a rule required by the betting operators to help protect the integrity of those markets. 3 Indeed, in horseracing cases, those two separate offences (providing inside information, namely that you are prepared to stop the horse if necessary to keep it from placing, and actually not giving the horse a true run to prevent it from placing) are often charged together. See eg BHA v Burke & Rodgers, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 20 July 2009, where this was alleged against jockey Fergal Lynch, and McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010]  EWHC  508 (QB) at para  8 (both referring to earlier versions of the rules); BHA v Heffernan, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 January 2013, paras 6 and 7.

520  Regulating Sport 4 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel suggested that ‘[w]hat is regarded by Sports Governing Bodies to constitute “inside information” will also differ between sports. […] it would be impractical to ascribe a particular definition to what may constitute “inside information” without a full understanding of how that may in turn impact on each sport’s specific needs in seeking to preserve integrity. The Group was however very clearly of the view that every sport must have in place a sufficiently wide rule to guard against misuse of inside information’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p 19. It offered as a good example the following definition from the then BHA Rules of Racing, Rule (A) 36.1: ‘Inside Information is information about the likely participation or likely performance of a horse in a race which is known by an Owner, Trainer, Rider, stable employee or any of their service providers as a result of acting as such and is not information in the public domain’. In Babbs and Celaschi v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 3  June 2013, para  15, a BHA Appeal Board rejected an attack on the adequacy of that definition, and an argument that the information alleged to have been passed had to be particularised, on the following basis: ‘the phrase “information about the participation or likely performance of a horse in a race” in Rule (A)36.1 has inherent within it the two requirements which Mr Winter contends are missing, since, not being in the public domain, that information will in all probability both have value and be price sensitive. And we do not consider the rule necessarily requires the particularisation of the inside information allegedly communicated in contravention of it. There will be cases where it is perfectly obvious that some sort of inside information was communicated to a person without it being possible to say precisely what it was’. The Gambling Commission agrees that ‘sports should develop their own definition of inside information, specific to their sport’. Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.5. However it ‘considers a reasonable general definition of inside information to be […] information relating to the participation in, or the likely or actual outcome or development of an event which is known by an individual as a result of their role in connection with that event and which is not in the public domain. Information is considered to be in the public domain if it has been published, is on public record or is accessible by an interested member of the public’. Ibid, para 3.3. The SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011) include the following broad definition: ‘Any non-public information relating to any competition or event that a participant possesses by virtue of his/her position within the sport. Such information includes, but is not limited to, factual information regarding the competitors, the conditions, tactical considerations, injuries, or any other aspect of the competition or event but does not include such information that is already published or a matter of public record, readily acquired by an interested member of the public, or disclosed according to the rules and regulations governing the relevant competition or event’. There are similar definitions in the ICC Anti-Corruption Code and in World Rugby’s Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting). Even such a broad definition, however, will leave room for argument. In August 2011 an RFL Disciplinary Panel dismissed a charge that rugby league player Shaun Leaf had breached the rule against disclosure of inside information on the basis that the information that he was alleged to have passed on about a forthcoming match (along the lines of ‘the pack [of forwards] is shit’ and ‘there are a lot of young players out’ or ‘the team is not mentally strong’) was merely ‘the sort of information that the Tribunal believe an interested spectator would have a view about and that the information would be readily available to such spectators. The Tribunal believe that this rule was designed to deal with incidents such as when a player or club official would know what team is fielded on a specific day’. RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 3. Cf HRA v Winston et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 13 (‘In the Panel’s view, the ordinary meaning of the word “information” in Rule 243 is wide enough to include both facts about a horse and views about its chances. There are sound reasons of principle for adopting this ordinary meaning of “information”, so that the giving of opinions for reward is outlawed by Rule 243. […] It cannot be said that it is an unreasonable imposition on jockeys or other licence holders to stop them from selling privately their opinions about the chances of a horse for big reward. So in principle the Panel concludes that it is sensible to interpret the Rule as banning the sale for substantial reward of both facts and opinions […]’). This latter approach seems appropriate, so long as the opinion can still sensibly be regarded as ‘inside’ information, formed by virtue of the insider’s role as such and not simply from information that is in the public domain. 5 In principle, a sportsperson ought not to be prohibited from sharing certain news of his selection, position, injury, or intention to play in a particular game with his close friends, family, and support group (unless he knows or should know that they might use that information for betting purposes: see para B4.26 n 6). So, for example, the ICC Anti-Corruption Code contains the following guidance note: ‘nothing in this Article [2.3] is intended to prohibit any such disclosure made within a personal relationship (such as to a member of a family) where it is reasonable for the Player or Player Support Personnel to expect that such information can be disclosed in confidence and without being subsequently used for betting’. In December 2011, Gold Coast Suns defender Nathan Bock was banned for two matches and fined AU $10,000 for telling a friend and a family member that he would be playing as a forward in a forthcoming fixture, following which they duly placed a series of bets on him to score the first goal and won AU $40,000 when he did score that goal: ‘Nathan Bock banned two games, fined AU $10,000 for leaking inside information’, adelaidenow.com.au, 14 December 2011.

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  521 Similarly, if a player announces in a press conference that he is injured and will not be playing in a forthcoming match, that should not be a breach of the rules, because the news is being disclosed publicly to everyone at the same time. For example, disclosing injury or selection news through Twitter may not be a concern, because it is a recognised form of public dissemination of news, and anyone can sign up to receive the tweets in question. But what if a similar disclosure is made to an athlete’s closed or private group of followers on other social networking sites, such as Facebook or MySpace? The Gambling Commission has suggested that this could be deemed ‘misuse’ of inside information: see Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.24 (‘There is a tendency for sports participants to consider communications like these as informal – the equivalent of a chat at a party or on the phone. Where membership is strictly limited to close friends and family, this may be the case and information is likely to be released only where it would be communicated in person. However, where membership is semi-open, caution has to be taken since this may be communication of inside information either carelessly or for reward. A long established tactic for potential corrupters has been to informally establish a relationship with a participant with the intention of grooming them for a potential fix. Social media open another potential front for such activity […]’). The ICC Anti-Corruption Code seeks to retain flexibility by specifying that the key factor is not the breadth of the disclosure but whether or not it could give the recipients a betting advantage: ‘it may be an offence under this clause to disclose Inside Information: (a) to journalists or other members of the media; and/or (b) on social networking websites, where the Participant might reasonably be expected to know that disclosure of such information in such circumstances could be used in relation to Betting […]’. (See ICC Anti-Corruption Code, guidance note to Arti 2.3.2). Similarly, Art 6.3.3 of World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) states: ‘This Regulation shall not prohibit a disclosure of Inside Information to the general public at large (for example, without limitation, in a live media interview or in the news section of a Union’s website) such that the information thereby ceases to be Inside Information nor shall it prohibit a disclosure of Inside Information to a close personal associate provided that the Connected Person is aware of and complies with Regulation 6.1.3(b) and where in the circumstances it is reasonable for the Connected Person to expect that the Inside Information can be disclosed in confidence and that it will not be used in relation to Wagering. Subject to the foregoing, this Regulation shall prohibit a disclosure, for example, to journalists, members of the media, online social network contacts and/or other persons where the Connected Person knows and/or may reasonably be expected to know that disclosure of the Inside Information could be used in relation to Wagering’. 6 The usual approach is reflected in the prohibition suggested in Art 6(g) of the SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011): ‘Using any “Inside Information” for betting purposes, including disclosing “Inside Information” to any person (with or without reward) where the athlete might reasonably be expected to know that its disclosure could be used in relation to betting’. See also Art 2.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which prohibits both ‘[u]sing, any Inside Information for Betting purposes’, and ‘disclosing Inside Information to any person where the Participant knew or should have known that such disclosure might lead to the information being used in relation to Betting in relation to any International Match’. Cf FA Rule E.8(1)(b) and (2)(c): ‘a Participant shall not use any information relating to football which the Participant has obtained by virtue of his or her position within the game and which is not publicly available at that time for or in relation to betting’’, unless he can show (FA Rule E.8(1)(c)) that ‘he did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that the information provided would be used by the other person for or in relation to betting’. In The Football Association v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 163, it was found that ‘if a person assesses the odds on the Respondent moving to a particular Club (having been provided with inside information about the move by the Respondent) for the purpose of deciding whether to bet that would constitute using the information in relation to betting’). However, the defence of lack of knowledge that that was the use to which the information was to be put was ruled to be established on the facts, and therefore several different charges of provision of inside information for use for betting purposes were rejected, in The Football Association v Sturridge, Regulatory Commission decision dated 15 July 2019, para 169, aff’d in part, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 129, para 153, although the Appeal Board found the defence was not made out in respect of another charge and therefore substituted a finding that the charge was proved (para 143). In horseracing a charge of providing inside information for reward is often combined with a charge of conspiracy to commit a corrupt practice, which can be established without proof of reward (see para B4.21, n 5). Each of those charges requires intent. See BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 65 (‘in the cases of the jockeys, it was necessary to determine not merely whether any inside information might have been imparted by them, but whether they did so intending that it could be used for lay betting purposes’). However, the Gambling Commission has queried whether disclosing inside information in a careless or reckless manner should also be an offence: see Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para  3.17. The Gambling Commission was still advocating the prohibition of the release of information for reward or gain (by the participant or their associates), including careless or reckless release of information, in 2018, recommending that all SGBs include within their rules clauses relating to the misuse of such information in this way (Misuse of inside information: Policy position paper, Gambling Commission, 30 August 2018).

522  Regulating Sport 7 As suggested by the Gambling Commission: see Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.16. See eg Article 6.3.3(c) of World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting): ‘No Connected Person shall or shall Attempt directly or indirectly to […] give and/or receive Benefit for the provision of Inside Information (notwithstanding whether any Inside Information is actually provided)’ – (d) and (e) prohibit the same where attempts are made to solicit such a benefit. See further, eg the old BHA Rules of Racing, Rule (A) 36.2, discussed in McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 66 – note that this has since been updated to remove reference to any reward, with Rule J(16) now reading ‘no Person may communicate Inside Information to any other person unless permitted to do so under these Rules’. However, where disclosure of inside information is proven, the receipt of ‘any material reward, gift, favour or benefit in kind’, a reward in exchange for that information is often inferred. See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 156, under the old Rule (A)36.2 (‘The Panel was sure that [the jockey] was passing information and riding to lose if necessary in return for reward from Mr Sines and Mr Crickmore, even though it is not possible to identify exactly what that reward was’) and para 167 (‘The Panel decided that [the jockey] was also in breach of Rule 243. The inside information was her indication of willingness to take steps to hinder OBE GOLD in the race. Though there was no evidence of overt reward for this, the panel concluded that she would not have done this without payment’), appeal partially upheld, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, paras 89–125 (jockey acquitted on the facts); HRA  v Winston et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 42 (‘As for payment for this information, this is necessarily a matter of inference. The Panel concluded that there must have been substantial payments to Fitzpatrick for the material he provided. It is impossible to say how much, or how payment was made’). However, the requirement of proof of receipt of a reward for the information provided will cause the charge to fail, even if the person who discloses the information subsequently receives some benefit from the recipient of that information, if there is insufficient evidence that the benefit was given in exchange for the information. See WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16 May 2008, para 39; and Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 8.3. This would leave the regulator relying on an offence such as receiving a gift or benefit in circumstances likely to bring the game into disrepute (as to which, see para B4.28).

(d) Ensuring the occurrence of a particular incident in a match or competition for betting purposes B4.27 A bookmaker may accept a bet on aspects of a sporting event that do not impact at all on the course or outcome of the contest in question. For example, it may be possible to bet on what colour shirt a player will wear in a particular match (tennis), which fielding position a particular player will take at the start of an innings (cricket), how many players will wear long sleeves or gloves (football), how many players will wear a particular colour of boots (rugby), whether a pie will be eaten (football),1 and so on. While a participant may consider the manipulation of such occurrences to be harmless, because no underperformance is involved and the progress or the outcome of the match is not affected, such conduct nevertheless should cause the regulator serious concern, because it engages the participant in the manipulation of what happens on the field of play in order to fix a betting market, and therefore is corrupt in itself, as well as having a clear potential to develop into something even more sinister. Here the expectation that a bet will be placed has to be a part of the offence, because otherwise there would be nothing wrong with the behaviour in issue. Therefore, for example, Art 2.2.3 of the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code prohibits ‘ensuring the occurrence of a particular incident in an International Match or ICC Event, which occurrence is to the Player or Player Support Personnel’s knowledge the subject of a Bet and for which he/she expects to receive or has received a Reward’.2 1 A much-publicised example of such an incident took place during the FA Cup fifth round tie between Sutton United and Arsenal in February 2017, after which Wayne Shaw, the Sutton United reserve goalkeeper, was found to have breached FA Rule E5(a), in that he intentionally influenced a football betting market by eating a pie whilst sitting on the substitutes’ bench, in The Football Association v Shaw, Regulatory Commission decision dated 6 September 2017. 2 An identical provision can be found in the ASOIF  Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), at Art 3.2(b); and there is also a very similar provision at Art 6(e) of the SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011).

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  523 In Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, the player argued that it was irrational to ban him for five years for spot-fixing under Art 2.1.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (see para B4.22) when his alleged misconduct also constituted an offence under Art 2.2.3 of the Code, which had the additional elements of knowledge of betting and expectation of award, but carried a ban of only two to five years. The CAS panel rejected that argument on the following grounds: ‘the Panel is satisfied that Articles 2.1.1 and 2.2.3 of the Code capture distinct infringements of varying gravity. The Panel understands that the ICC considers “match fixing” and “spot fixing” to be a more serious infringement than betting on aspects of the match that are not directly relevant to the outcome of the game, but that such betting is nonetheless an activity that the ICC wishes to purge. Although the drafting of these provisions could more clearly convey the ICC’s intent (which the ICC might consider amending during the next review of its Code), the Panel is nevertheless persuaded that Mr Butt’s sanction is not irrational because the sanction for Article 2.2.3 of the Code is intended to cater for offences which might be less serious’. Ibid, para 68. It also noted: ‘the Panel does not consider it unreasonable or perverse that the ICC considers that an offence of betting should carry a lower minimum sanction than an offence of corruption. The Panel notes that [the] ICC is free to impose five year sanctions under Article 2.2.3 of the ICC Code, indicating that it has foreseen cases where betting can be as serious as certain corruption cases but considers the ICC is in principle free to decide subjectively the minimum sanctions it wishes to impose for specific conduct by reference to a number of different factors, including the long and sad history of corruption in cricket’. Ibid, para 69.

(e) Providing or receiving gifts in suspicious circumstances B4.28 The ICC Anti-Corruption Code makes the following an offence: ‘Giving or providing to any Participant any gift, payment, hospitality or other benefit […] in circumstances that could bring him/her or the sport of cricket into disrepute’.1 This is partly because gift-giving can be a precursor to a corrupt approach; and partly to address the fact that it may not be possible to link a particular payment to provision of inside information or a particular act of underperforming.2 Charges of a breach of this provision were upheld against cricketers Maurice Odumbe, Marlon Samuels, and Mervyn Westfield.3 1 ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.4.1 A similar offence is suggested in the SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), Art 6(f); whereas Rule (J)1 of the BHA Rules of Racing states that a professional rider ‘must not accept, agree to accept or solicit, any Consideration in connection with riding in a Race except a Professional Jockey may accept, agree to accept or solicit: (1) consideration stated in the Race Conditions, or the equivalent for a Race run under the rules of a Recognised Racing Authority; (2) consideration from a Sponsorship Agreement for sponsorship; and/or (3) consideration from the Owner, Owner’s Representative or Breeder of a horse for riding that horse in a Race’. Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the promotion of the integrity of sport against the manipulation of results, notable match-fixing (28 September 2011) specifically recommends that sports bodies’ rules against manipulation of results include rules ‘prohibiting provision or receipt of any gift or other benefit in circumstances that might reasonably be expected to bring them into disrepute’. 2 See WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16 May 2008, para 49 (‘The majority is of the view that the Anti-Corruption Code rightly targets not only corrupt and dishonest activity but also behaviour that objectively might be considered a precursor to corrupt and dishonest activity’). Similarly, in his 2011 review of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, Bertrand de Speville noted that ‘giftgiving is often the precursor to an improper approach’. He also explained that ‘[e]xperience in other walks of life shows that a gift offence (less serious than bribery) is an invaluable alternative offence in the numerous instances where the necessary connection between the gift or benefit and the improper conduct cannot be proved’. In this respect, he suggested that the ICC’s Art 2.4.1 was not strict enough, and that instead it should be an offence for any participant to accept a gift without the prior permission of the ICC unless such gift was listed on a pre-agreed list of permitted gifts. He also suggested that, in all cases, a specific form could be completed, which would describe the gift, the circumstances of its offering and acceptance, the identity of the donor and the applicant’s estimate of its value. See de Speville, ‘A Review of the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’, August 2011 (reissued with minor amendments January 2012). Mr de Speville also suggested that consideration be given to the inclusion of an offence of ‘unexplained wealth’ or ‘illicit enrichment’, where the offence consists in owning property or living a lifestyle in excess of official earnings unless a satisfactory explanation can be given. He suggested the following language for the offence: ‘(1) Any person […] who: (a) has a standard of living incommensurate with his present or past official emoluments; or (b) is in control of wealth disproportionate to his present or past official emoluments; is in breach of this code unless he gives to [a tribunal established by the

524  Regulating Sport ICC Code of Conduct Commission for the purpose] a satisfactory explanation of how he is able to have such a standard of living or how such wealth came under his control. […] (2) Where a tribunal is satisfied in proceedings for a breach under subsection (1)(b) that, having regard to the closeness of his relationship to the person charged with the breach and to other circumstances, there is reason to believe that any person is or was holding wealth as a gift from the person charged, such wealth shall, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be or have been in the control of the person charged. […] (3) In this section, “official emoluments” means the earnings payable under terms of engagement as a player or player support person or by the ICC and includes a pension or gratuity payable under such terms of engagement’. Ibid. The ICC in response recognised the rationale behind the recommendation, but noted that ‘to try and implement such a system in relation to international players and support personnel from different jurisdictions, whose assets may have been transferred into further jurisdictions, who are at different stages in their careers, who have many sources of income, and which is likely to require the cooperation of governments and/or financial institutions and authorities, is likely to be very difficult indeed, not to mention hugely burdensome on the players and extremely difficult to administer’. It therefore continues to rely, instead, on the more general Art 2.4.1 provision noted above. Cf Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p  30 (‘it would be a credible anti-corruption measure if referees were subject to random financial audit to establish that there was no income that could not be attributed to legitimate sources’). 3 Enquiry relating to Maurice Odumbe, report by Mr Justice Ahmed Ebrahim dated 13 August 2004 (Odumbe banned for five years for bringing game into disrepute by receiving money and other rewards from a bookmaker, and receiving money for fixing a match in Zimbabwe); WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16  May 2008, para  39; and Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 8.3 (Samuels banned for two years for allowing punter to pay his hotel bill shortly after giving that punter information about team selection); ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012 (Westfield banned for five years for commission of this offence based on his receipt of £6,000 after agreeing to concede 12 runs in the first over he bowled in a Twenty20 match against Durham). In the second case, Marlon Samuels was found to have given an associate information about who would be playing for the West Indies team in a particular match, and about two weeks thereafter to have received a benefit from the associate in the form of settlement of his hotel bill. He was not charged with misuse of inside information because there was no evidence that he had provided the information in exchange for the hotel bill payment. Ibid; see para B4.26. Instead, he was charged with breaching Art C4(ix) of the ICC Code of Conduct (as it then was) by receiving a benefit in circumstances that could bring him or the game of cricket into disrepute. The ICC  Code of Conduct Commission agreed with the Disciplinary Panel that to make out the charge it was only necessary to prove that the player knew he had received the money or other benefit; it was not necessary to prove dishonesty or corrupt intent on the part of the player. Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 7.1. It also agreed that having one’s hotel bill settled by a bookmaker shortly after providing that bookmaker with information about the team for a forthcoming match ‘could bring the game of cricket into disrepute’. Ibid, at para 7.5.

(f) Reporting obligations B4.29 Understanding that SGBs have limited investigative powers and resources, most anti-corruption codes make it an offence to fail to report any invitation given to the participant – or (to the participant’s knowledge) to another participant – to take part in conduct that would amount to a breach of the rules.1 A failure to report such an approach prejudices the sport by allowing such activity to continue unchecked.2 It also places the participant in a vulnerable position moving forward (because his failure to report the approach could be interpreted as acquiescence).3 Obviously if the person making the corrupt approach is also bound by the rules, reporting the approach will allow the authorities to take action against him; but even if he is outside the rules, reporting the approach allows the authorities to build up a more detailed intelligence picture of his activities, and so to prevent or at least restrict them in the future. 1 For example, Rule J(27) of the BHA Rules of Racing provides: ‘a Person must, as soon as reasonably practicable, provide the BHA with full details of any knowledge of: approach or invitation made to them or any other person which would amount to a breach of these Rules; and incident, fact or matter which may amount to a breach of the Rules.’. Similarly, Art 2.4.4 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code makes the following an offence: ‘Failing to disclose to the ACU (without unnecessary delay) full details of any approaches or invitations received by the Participant to engage in Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code’. Meanwhile the Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s model Code makes it an

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  525 offence to fail to ‘report any approach or other activity which contravenes, or which may contravene, the sports rules on betting’. Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to Betting, Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), chapter 2a, Article 2.5. Similarly, the Sport Accord model rules prohibit ‘failing to disclose information to the competent IF or competition authority (without undue delay) full details of any approaches, invitations to engage in conduct, or incidents that would amount to a breach of the IFs or competition rules related to betting’. SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), Art 6(h). See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10. 2 BWF v Perssons, BWF Ethics Hearing Panel decision dated 18 March 2019, para 101 (‘The failure to report an approach allows for corrupt persons to continue to conspire to manipulate badminton matches. This is the primary policy rationale for adopting a “failure to report” sanction in a sport disciplinary code. Given the limited coercive and investigatory powers of the BWF, it is crucial and fundamental that participants in badminton report approaches to manipulate matches to the BWF without undue delay in order for the BWF to continue to implement its core objective to protect the integrity of badminton competitions’). 3 ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11-13 September 2012, p 8 (‘sports organisations […] should actively promote a culture where individuals, including athletes, officials and administrators, have an obligation to report any incidents of or attempts at unethical or corrupt behavior that they encounter and can be reassured that their concerns will be investigated thoroughly and appropriately. This obligation is very important, not only to move people to report, but also because if they do not, they can be sanctioned just for not alerting the relevant bodies. A global obligation for athletes, officials and sports organisations, to report cases to law enforcement agencies, should be envisaged for the future’).

B4.30 Participants have been banned for failing to report corrupt approaches in several sports, including football,1 handball,2 tennis,3 cricket,4 snooker,5 and badminton.6 In the football case, the failure to report the corrupt approach resulted in a life ban for the offending referee that was upheld by the CAS panel on appeal, indicating the importance placed on compliance with the reporting obligation (albeit that the CAS panel seemed to be influenced by a strong suspicion that the referee had acted on the offer by fixing the match in question). 1 In Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, a CAS panel upheld a life ban imposed on a match referee for failing to report an approach made to him to fix a UEFA Europa League match in return for a bribe of €50,000. In May 2011, a CAS panel upheld a UEFA panel’s ruling that Hungarian player Vukasin Poleksic failed to report contacts made to him by a criminal gang that was planning to manipulate a UEFA Champions League match in which he participated, and therefore upheld the two-year ban that the UEFA panel had imposed on him: see CAS press release dated 5 May 2011. 2 In 2009, two referees officiating in the European Handball Champions League were caught in customs with US $50,000 hidden in their luggage. An EHF Arbitration Tribunal found that another referee had offered them that money to fix a particular match and banned them for five years for failing to report that offer. European Handball Federation Official Statement, ‘EHF Arbitration Tribunal takes final decision in prominent case’, eurohandball.com, 31 July 2009. It is not clear from the statement why they were not banned for (apparently) accepting that offer by taking the money. 3 In January 2010, tennis player Ekaterina Bychkova admitted being approached by a professional tennis gambler through her website, who asked her to provide information about when she was likely to lose and proposed that she might deliberately lose on occasions, so that he might profit by betting on her opponent, and share his winnings with her. She did not agree to participate in the scheme but did not report the approach to the authorities. She was therefore banned for 30 days and fined US $5,000. See Ekaterina Bychkova, decision of Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer dated 8 January 2010. See also, for example, the ban imposed on Venezuelan official Armando Alfonso Belardi Gonzalez for failing to report corrupt approaches regarding a scheme to enter incorrect scores: ‘Venezuelan match official Armando Alfonso Belardi Gonzalez suspended and fined for corruption offences’, Tennis Integrity Unit, 19  June 2020, tennisintegrityunit.com/media-releases/venezuelan-match-official-armandoalfonso-belardi-gonzalez-suspended-and-fined-corruption-offences. 4 In the Hansie Cronje affair (see para B4.5), Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams were both banned for six months for failing to report bribes offered to them by Cronje to under-perform in a one-dayinternational match. And in ICC  v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5  February 2011, paras 141 and 232, the Tribunal held that Mr Butt’s non-disclosure of a corrupt approach made to him by his agent to bat out a maiden deliberately at the Oval Test match between England and Pakistan was a breach of his reporting obligation under Art 2.4.2 of the ICC  AntiCorruption Code that warranted a ban of one year. See also the bans imposed on Lou Vincent and Kaushal Lokuarachchi in the Bangladesh Premier League case referenced at para B4.6, n 7, as well as that given to Shakib Al Hasan referenced at para B4.6, n 8, and Umar Akmal referenced at para B4.6, n 9.

526  Regulating Sport 5 In September 2010, snooker player John Higgins was found guilty of ‘failing to disclose promptly to the Association full details of an approach or an invitation to act in breach of the Betting Rules’ (namely to throw one or more frames). Ian Mill QC, the chair of the hearing panel, stated: ‘On the basis that [the businessmen at the Kiev meeting] intended what they said [ie  to organise fixing of snooker matches for betting purposes], it was obviously a matter of the greatest importance to the integrity of the sport of snooker that those intentions were immediately reported. Mr Higgins’ failure in this respect was extremely foolish. In mitigation, Mr Clancy SC on his behalf reminded me of his client’s exemplary record both in terms of achievement and conduct, and of his role as an ambassador for the sport. I very much bear these matters in mind. But I also consider that with such a status come particular responsibilities to other players in the game, to the Association, to its sponsors and to the viewing public to ensure that the Association’s Rules bearing on the peculiarly sensitive subject of gambling and corruption are strictly adhered to’. He therefore suspended Higgins for six months, fined him £75,000, and ordered him to pay £10,000 in costs to the WPBSA: WPBSA v Higgins and Mooney, decision of Ian Mill QC dated 8 September 2010, p 3. On the other hand, he found that Mr Higgins’ representative, Mr Pat Mooney, who had discussed fixing with the businessmen and had arranged the meeting with Mr Higgins, knowing that fixing was to be discussed, and never reported anything to the WPBSA (of which he was also a director), ‘committed the most egregious betrayals of trust – both in relation to the WPBSA, to which he owed fiduciary obligations as a director and by reason of his great influence in the world of snooker, and to Mr Higgins whose entire career and professional future he inexplicably put at serious and wholly unjustifiable risk’. Mr Mooney was therefore banned from snooker for life and ordered to pay a contribution of £25,000 in costs. Ibid. See also, more recently, the one-year ban given to Jamie Jones, after he was found to have breached the rules of the World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA) by failing to report a corrupt approach (David John and Jamie Jones: Pair banned after snooker match-fixing investigation, BBC Sport, 6 February 2019. 6 BWF  v Perssons, BWF  Ethics Hearing Panel decision dated 18  March 2019 (bans of 12 months and six months imposed for two separate offences of failure to report corrupt approaches, to run consecutively).

B4.31 Some anti-corruption codes include an even broader whistle-blowing obligation, making it an offence to fail to disclose full details of any incident, fact or matter that comes to the attention of a participant that may evidence an offence under the code by another.1 Indeed, the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program states that a participant who ‘had knowledge of a Corruption Offense and failed to report such knowledge’ is ‘responsible’ for that offence and can be sanctioned ‘to the same extent as if the Player had committed the Corruption Offense’.2 1 For example, Art 2.4.5 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code makes the following an offence: ‘Failing to disclose to the ACU (without unnecessary delay) full details of any incident, fact, or matter that comes to the attention of a Participant that may evidence Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code by another Participant, including (without limitation) approaches or invitations that have been received by another Participant to engage in Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code’; while Art D.2.a.ii of the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program states: ‘In the event any Player knows or suspects that any other Covered Person or other individual has committed a Corruption Offense, it shall be the Player’s obligation to report such knowledge or suspicion to the TIU as soon as possible’. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10). The IRIS  Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 82, specifically recommended that a sport’s anti-corruption rules include not only an ‘obligation to report any attempted approach’ but also an ‘obligation to declare any suspicions about third parties (“whistle-blowing”) with guarantees of confidentiality and protective measures if necessary’. 2 Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program, Art E.1. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10).

B4.32 Furthermore, well-drafted anti-corruption codes make it an offence not to cooperate fully with an investigation into a potential breach of the code, meaning that a participant who is suspected of wrongdoing is required to answer questions posed and providing documents and records demanded by the investigators,1 and even to hand over their communications devices so that information on them can be downloaded and searched.2 The rules of horseracing and tennis give the regulator the power to keep a non-cooperating participant out of the sport unless and until he starts cooperating.3 In Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, the CAS panel noted that it ‘recognizes the importance that sports governing bodies establish rules in their respective ethical and

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  527

disciplinary codes requiring witnesses and parties to cooperate in investigations and proceedings and subjecting them to sanctions for failing to do so. Sports governing bodies, in contrast to public authorities, have extremely limited investigative powers and must rely on such cooperation rules for fact-finding and to expose parties that are violating the ethical standards of said bodies. Such rules are essential to maintain the image, integrity and stability of sport’.4 Hearing panels in different sports have relied on the same reasoning to impose significant sanctions for failures to cooperate with an investigation into potentially corrupt conduct. For example: (a) In RFU  v Hart, a hearing panel imposed a ban of four months for failing to disclose a betting account in response to a direct question from the RFU investigator, stating: ‘We take the view that any attempt to mislead the regulator as they embark on an investigation of matters such as these is a serious matter and needs to be met with a sanction which reflects that. Such behaviour must usually be met by a period of suspension’.5

(b) In Ad Vitam, a professional gambler and horse owner who failed to submit to an interview or to provide telephone billing records demanded by the BHA was banned for two years, the panel noting that: ‘It is necessary for him and others to appreciate that interviews and records disclosure are vital parts of the regulator’s resources for policing horseracing, and that failure to co-operate will lead to heavy penalties’.6

(c) In PTIOS v Gaviri, a refusal to submit to interview and to hand over a mobile phone was met with a ban of three years. The hearing officer explained: ‘80. The idea behind TACP provisions on supplying information is based on a principle of those who are innocent have nothing to hide, and inversely by inference, that those who appear to be hiding something possibly may have reasons for doing so […] 82. The gravity of the conduct in breaching F.2.b. and c. at the level of non-cooperation as an offense goes to the very heart of the TACP. The TIU has no coercive investigative powers. It is dependent upon the contractual agreement of the Player to cooperate fully with investigations conducted by the TIU. This principle must be rigorously observed and applied when a Player fails to cooperate. The conduct here is one of the most serious categories of breaches of the TACP that could occur. Furthermore, no justification for the Player’s conduct has been proffered at all. 83. A Player who engages in the type of conduct exhibited in this case may well be engaged in a fallback position to receive a lighter charge of noncooperation to avoid the more serious charges which the TACP provides for up to ineligibility for life. The TACP would be undermined if this is the case […] 85. The gravity of the conduct in failing to make the phone available is aggravated by the failure to complete the interview process. These two matters combine to make this Player’s conduct of the most serious nature. Therefore, a penalty at the maximum level is justified in this case’.7

(d) In ICC v Ansari, the Disciplinary Panel accepted that: ‘the starting point in considering the appropriate sanction for an offence under Article 2.4.6, where a Participant has failed or refused to hand over a Mobile Device following a valid Demand, must be a period of 5 years of Ineligibility. This is the minimum sanction for offences under Article 2.1 of the Code, ie the most serious corruption offences, and it is essential that Participants are offered no incentive not to cooperate with an ACU investigation’.8 1 Art 2.4.6 of the ICC  Anti-Corruption Code makes it an offence to ‘fail […] without compelling justification, to cooperate with any reasonable investigation carried out by the ACU in relation to possible Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code’. Article 6(i) of the SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011) creates a similar offence, as does Article 6.3.5(c) of World Rugby’s Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting), while Art 6.3.4(b) makes it a standalone offence to ‘tamper with, obstruct, delay and/or destroy any evidence, potential

528  Regulating Sport

2

3

4 5 6 7 8

evidence, documentation and/or information which may be relevant to an Anti-Corruption Breach (actual or potential) and/or an investigation into anti-corruption or pursuant to these Anti-Corruption Regulations’. The old Rules of Racing also required persons subject to the rules ‘to provide any information or record which the Approved Person reasonably believes is relevant to an investigation conducted under this part’ (Rule (A) 50.1), including telephone billing accounts, records relating to sponsorship agreements, training accounts, accounts relating to the sale and purchase of horses, and betting accounts (Rule (A) 50.4), whether by supplying the information in writing or by attending for interview to supply the information (Rule (A) 50.2). In BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 12, the Disciplinary Panel banned Neil Clement for a year and fined him £3,000 for failing to cooperate with an enquiry, noting that ‘[t]he reason for this fine was that Mr Clement’s noncooperation caused serious expense to the BHA, including the costs of a Court application to procure disclosure of his telephone records’. This provision is now found at Rule (L)2.3. For example, Art 4.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code empowers the ACU General Manager to make a written demand to participants to provide information downloaded from their mobile devices. In ICC v Ansari, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 February 2019, para 6.12, the panel rejected an argument that the participant was entitled to reject a request to hand over his phone for downloading because it infringed his privacy interests and those of the persons with whom he communicated using the phone, on the basis that the right to privacy is not absolute ‘and must yield to more potential public interests such as the suppression of crime or other cognate misconduct’, that ‘A potential intrusion on a participant’s privacy is in any event the price that a participant must pay for his participation in the sport’, and that ‘A participant retains the right to refuse to permit the intrusion, albeit at the price, potentially, of further participation in the sport’. See also ICC  v Ikope, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5  March 2019, para 6.22 (‘Moreover, an international sports federation has to fight the insidious threat of match-fixing without the coercive powers of the state to assist it in investigating and uncovering corrupt conduct. That justifies imposing a positive obligation on participants to cooperate with investigations by the federation into possible wrongdoing, including an obligation to turn over a phone immediately upon demand, so that the investigators can examine it for any potential evidence. None of the participant’s rights, whether a constitutional right to privacy or otherwise, are breached thereby’); PTIOS v Klec. Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer decision dated 21 August 2015, para  5.7 (‘the Player claims that one reason for his actions was the fact that the phone contained personal information. Yet in the transcript of the interview on the 2 March 2015, he stated he did not know what information was on his phone. Such an explanation is unacceptable, particularly when the TIU investigator advised of the protections in place with respect to the privacy of the Player. Section F.2(c) of the TACP explicitly requires that a Player co-operate with the TIU and comply with demands made. The TACP provides that the TIU will keep the information confidential, except where necessary to disclose in furtherance of the prosecution of a Corruption Offense or other legitimate judicial or governmental prosecution reasons. The TIU also provided those same assurances to the Player during his interview. Additionally, as explained to the Player, there are also laws regarding data protection imposed on the TIU, the breach of which could give rise to civil lawsuits for damages. Based on all of the foregoing, I do not accept the Player’s conduct and explanation as being acceptable in determining the level of sanction’). The old Rules of Racing provided that a licensed person who fails to cooperate fully with an investigation faces being ‘summarily excluded by the Authority under Rule 64, without prejudice to the Authority’s power to take any further Disciplinary Action’ (Rule (A) 50.7), unless he has good cause for his failure (Rule (A) 50.3.1). The fact that he failed to get his telephone service provider to agree that he could obtain itemised details of his calls will not be treated as good cause for a failure to provide such details. (Rule (A) 51). This provision is now found at Rule (L)6. A tennis player who fails to comply with a demand for information from the Tennis Integrity Unit about an alleged corruption offence commits a separate corruption offense and may be subject to provisional suspension. UTACP Art F.2. and F.3. CAS 2017/A/5086, para 189. See also Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 266 (‘The cooperation of the individuals subject to the ethics or disciplinary rules of a sports association is necessary if the integrity of sport is to be protected […]’). RFU v Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018, para 80. Ad Vitam, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 9 October 2015, para 72, aff’d, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 6 January 2016. PTIOS v Gaviri, hearing officer decision dated 30 April 2018, quoted with approval by the disciplinary panel in ICC v Ansari, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 February 2019, para 7.20. ICC v Ansari, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 February 2019, paras 7.18-7.19. See also the very similar decision in ICC v Ikope, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 March 2019, para 8.16 et seq.

(g) Attempts and complicity B4.33 The rules need to cover any attempted breaches of the above provisions that did not succeed,1 any breaches that the participant commits through a third party,2

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and any efforts by a participant to persuade another participant to breach the rules.3 Match-fixing offences of their nature tend to involve more than one person (and will often involve more than one participant in the sport), and it is important to note that some complicity in the overall scheme will usually trigger liability. However, it may not be necessary to establish more than the acts of one participant. In 2017, a CAS panel clarified that the offence of ‘conspiring’ to influence a match contrary to then FIFA Disciplinary Code Art 69(1) (now Art 18(1) in the 2019 FIFA Disciplinary Code) did not require involvement of a second person: ‘“to conspire” to influence a match may be deemed to include all intentional actions, secretly planned, aimed at manipulating the result of a match, be that in combination with, or to the advantage, of others, or by the person who conspires acting alone, or to his individual benefit’.4 1 See eg ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.5.1: ‘Any attempt by a Participant, or any agreement by a Participant with any other person, to act in a manner that would culminate in the commission of an offence under the Anti-Corruption Code, shall be treated as if an offence had been committed, whether or not such attempt or agreement in fact resulted in such offence.’ The earlier exemption of liability in the case of a Participant renouncing the attempt or agreement before its discovery has now been made merely a mitigating factor.’ The same provision was copied into the ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), at Art 3.5(a), and exists in slightly updated form in the December 2018 IOC Model Rules detailed at para B4.21, n 2: ‘Any form of aid, abetment or attempt by a Participant that could culminate in a violation of this Code shall be treated as if a violation had been committed, whether or not such an act in fact resulted in a violation and/or whether that violation was committed deliberately or negligently.’ The ‘renunciation’ proviso was taken from the definition of ‘attempt’ in the World Anti-Doping Code, see para C7.22. 2 See eg ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.5.2: ‘A Participant who authorises, causes, knowingly assists, encurages, aids, abets, covers up or is otherwise complicit in [any breach of the Anti-Corruption Code] committed by his/her coach, trainer, manager, agent, family member, guest or other affiliate or associate shall be treated as having committed such acts or omissions himself and shall be liable accordingly under the Anti-Corruption Code’. 3 See eg Art 2.1.4 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which after defining each offence adds a further offence of ‘directly or indirectly soliciting, inducing, enticing, instructing, persuading, encouraging or intentionally facilitating any Participant’ to commit the offence; and Art 3 of the ASOIF Model Rules, which after each offence adds a further offence of ‘inducing, instructing, facilitating or encouraging a Participant to commit’ such offence (ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 3, passim), as well as including a separate offence of ‘knowingly assisting, covering up or otherwise being complicit in any acts or omissions of the type described in Rule 3 committed by a Participant’. Ibid, at Art 3.5(b). Cf BHA Rules of Racing, Rule (J)24.5: ‘a Person must not assist, or encourage, or cause another Person to act in contravention of a provision of these Rules’). 4 Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, para 74.

(g) Catch-all provisions B4.34 In addition, some anti-corruption codes contain catch-all offences (eg proscribing conduct that ‘is contrary to the spirit of the sport’ or that ‘brings the sport into disrepute’1) that are designed to catch any corrupt conduct that is not caught by the specific offences.2 The CAS has taken a robust approach towards arguments that such drafting contravenes the requirement of legal certainty.3 1 See eg Art 1.1.10 of Chapter C of the International Biathlon Union’s Integrity Code, which makes it an offence for a participant to ‘commit any other act that risks undermining public confidence in the integrity of a Biathlon Competition or the sport of Biathlon’. Meanwhile, the Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 4.5(f), requires sports to proscribe ‘any other form of corrupt conduct in relation to any match or event connected with the respective sport’. The same approach is taken more generally in sports codes of conduct, which usually include the catch-all offence of ‘bringing the game into disrepute’ (discussed at paras B1.23 and B3.143). 2 The RFL charged Shaun Leaf with breach of such a provision for telling someone who turned out to be an undercover journalist ‘that the game of Rugby League is being fixed by players deliberately dropping balls or players not trying, and to discuss players betting, Chief Executives betting and make allegations about entire teams such as Crusader not trying or betting to lose due to financial difficulties’. This was said to be ‘a breach of the Rules. In the Tribunal’s view this is clearly impairing the public confidence in the integrity and honesty of Rugby League. The Tribunal do not believe that Mr Leaf is fraudulent or corrupt as such but certainly has engaged in conduct which is against the interests of

530  Regulating Sport Rugby league and risks impairing confidence in our sport’. See RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, pp 3–4. See also WPBSA v Jogia, WPBSA statement dated 25 July 2012 (frequency and timing of Jogia’s contacts with punters, his lack of a consistent explanation for the contacts and the suspicions raised by the pattern of bets they placed on him to lose a particular match, created an actual or apparent conflict of interest for him as a member of the WPBSA or otherwise risked impairing public confidence in the integrity of the match). A disrepute charge does seem fitting for false allegations of corruption in sport, as in Jockey Club v Bradley. The defendant jockey claimed in his autobiography that he had tried to get the 1987 Cheltenham Gold Cup abandoned in order to help an associate win a bet. Charged with conspiracy to commit a corrupt practice, he gave evidence that the story was untrue. A charge of ‘conduct prejudicial to the integrity, proper conduct or good reputation of horseracing in Great Britain’ was added, and upheld: Jockey Club v Bradley, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel decision dated 13 December 2002. That prohibition was found in the old Rules of Racing at Rule (A) 30.1; it can now be found in the BHA Rules of Racing at Rule (J)19. 3 See para B1.19 et seq.

(h) Possible defences B4.35 Article  2.7.1 of the ICC  Anti-Corruption Code gives the participant a defence to any breach if he can show he committed the offence due to an ‘honest and reasonable belief that there was a serious threat to his/her life or safety or to the life or safety of another person’.1 This reflects the potential involvement of serious organised crime in match-fixing conspiracies in cricket, while similar concerns have been expressed in football.2 1 See eg Mr Justice Cooke’s remarks in sentencing Mohammad Amir, R v Majeed, Butt, Amir & Asif, 3 November 2011, para 37: ‘you decided not to give evidence of the pressure to which your basis of plea referred. You have referred, in material presented to the court, to threats to yourself and your family, saying that there are significant limits to what you can say in public. The reality of those threats and the strength of the underworld influences who control unlawful betting abroad is shown by the supporting evidence in the bundle of documents, including materials from the Anti-Corruption and Security Unit of the ICC’. A similar defence is created by Art 6.3.8 of World Rugby’s Reg 6 (AntiCorruption and Betting), and in the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme at Art E.4, although an attempt to rely on such defence was rejected on the facts in Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit, CAS 2014/A/3467, paras 113–117. 2 ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security [Chris Eaton] calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’, 22 August 2011, insideworldfootball.biz, (‘Intimidation is a huge problem. Players from less developed parts of the world are especially vulnerable’). Football referee Oleg Oriekhov claimed that his failure to report an approach made to him to fix a match was due to fear for the safety of his family: Oreikhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172 (discussed at para B4.43).

4 PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN CORRUPTION CASES B4.36 In many respects, the standard disciplinary procedures used to determine general misconduct charges1 will also work perfectly well in the hearing and determination of corruption charges. However, some specific thought is required in the following areas. 1 As to which, see Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and Other Internal Proceedings).

A Standard of proof B4.37 The SGB will have the burden of proving each offence charged, but what standard of proof should be required to discharge that burden? The CAS panel in Köllerer v ATP roundly rejected the player’s arguments that the seriousness of a corruption charge meant it had to be proven to the criminal standard (ie  beyond reasonable doubt), either as a matter of Florida law (the governing law of the Tennis Uniform Anti-Corruption Programme),1 or as a result of CAS jurisprudence,2 or as a matter of national or international public policy.3 Nor did the CAS panel consider that the intermediate standard of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ that is used under the World

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  531

Anti-Doping Code has to be applied in corruption cases.4 Instead, the CAS panel ruled that the tennis authorities were entitled to use the civil standard of ‘preponderance of the evidence’, aka ‘balance of probabilities’, which standard ‘is met if the proposition that the Player engaged in attempted match fixing is more likely to be true than not true’.5 Domestic disciplinary panels applying English law have also upheld the use of the civil standard of proof in corruption cases,6 and rejected arguments that a higher standard should be applied in the case of allegations of criminal or quasi-criminal conduct.7 On the other hand, the CAS panel in Köllerer stated that in assessing whether the evidence met the civil standard, it ‘has borne in mind that the Player has been charged with serious offences. While this does not require that a higher standard of proof should be applied than the one applicable according to the UTACP, the Panel nevertheless considers that it needs to have a high degree of confidence in the quality of the evidence’.8 Again, domestic hearing panels applying English law have taken the same approach.9 1 Köllerer v ATP, CAS  2011/A/2490, para  85 (‘First, while Florida law might impose a mandatory standard of proof in cases involving punitive damages, the current case relates to sanctions that follow from a breach of contract. By signing a consent form, the Player agreed to both the standard of proof and the contractual sanctions in case of breach. Therefore, neither Section 768.72 of the Florida Statutes nor the cases to which the Appellant referred are applicable’). The CAS panel also rejected the player’s argument that the standard of proof clause in the rules was ‘unconscionable’ because the player had no choice but to sign the consent forms accepting the rules, pointing out that he had had adequate opportunity to read the rules before signing, he had consented to similar rules in the past, and the ATP Player Council (which negotiated rule changes on behalf of all players) had not objected to this standard of proof. Ibid, paras 89–90. 2 Ibid, para  86 (‘the Panel does not agree with the Appellant that it is required to apply a different standard of proof on the basis of CAS jurisprudence. There is no universal (minimum) standard of proof for match-fixing offences. The cases to which the Appellant refers concerned match-fixing under the UEFA rules, which did not provide for an applicable standard of proof, and the UEFA itself proposed to apply in these cases the standard of proof of “comfortable satisfaction”. While the Panel acknowledges that consistency across different associations may be desirable, in the absence of any overarching regulation (such as the WADA Code for doping cases), each association can decide for itself which standard of proof to apply, subject to national and/or international rules of public policy. The CAS has neither the function nor the authority to harmonize regulations by imposing a uniform standard of proof, where, as in the current case, an association decides to apply a different, specific standard in its regulations’). The CAS cases referred to in that part of the Köllerer award were Pobeda and Oriekhov, as to which see para B4.43. In Pobeda, in the absence of any provision in the UEFA rules specifying a standard of proof in match-fixing cases, the CAS panel ruled: ‘Taking into account the nature of the conduct in question and the paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also considering the nature and restricted powers of the investigation authorities of the governing bodies of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities, the Panel is of the opinion that cases of match fixing should be dealt with in line with the CAS constant jurisprudence on disciplinary doping cases. Therefore, the UEFA must establish the relevant facts “to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having in mind the seriousness of allegation which is made”’. FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 85. This ruling was endorsed by a different CAS panel in Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 53, and again by a third CAS panel in Sammut v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3062, para 91. So if match-fixing charges are brought under rules that do not specify the required standard of proof, the CAS jurisprudence is clear that the default standard applied will be the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard used in the World Anti-Doping Code (as to which, see paras C5.1–C5.3). Cf Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 119 (‘CAS jurisprudence is clear that the applicable standard of proof in match fixing cases is indeed comfortable satisfaction, if not even the lower one of balance of probabilities as in CAS 2009/A/1920’). 3 Köllerer v ATP, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 87 (‘the Panel does not consider that applying the standard of proof provided for by the UTACP would violate any rules of national and/or international public policy. The Appellant argued that the standard of proof used by the Governing Bodies is inappropriate for the sanctions connected with corruption offences but has not cited any supporting authority. This Panel does not consider that the Governing Bodies have violated any principle of public policy by applying the standard of proof for corruption offences provided for by the UTACP’). See also Savic v PTIOs, CAS  2011/A/2621, para  8.32(ii) (noting this aspect of the Köllerer ruling with apparent approval, although the approval was obiter as the Savic panel decided that the higher standard of proof – ‘comfortable satisfaction’ – had been met in any event). 4 The World Anti-Doping Code provision is discussed at paras C5.1–C5.3. The ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption proposed the same standard, requiring that a charge of breach of the rules

532  Regulating Sport be proved ‘to the comfortable satisfaction of the Hearing Panel, a standard which is greater than the mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt’. ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 4.1. The IOC Model Rules in contrast provide, at Rule 3.3: ‘The standard of proof in all matters under this Code shall be the balance of probabilities, a standard that implies that on the preponderance of the evidence it is more likely than not that a breach of this Code has occurred’ (Model Rules for International Federations and their members to assist in implementing the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions (December 2018)). Article 3.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code adopts a flexible approach, stating that the panel must be ‘comfortably satisfied that the alleged offence has been committed, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation that is being made.’. This standard of proof used to be determined on a sliding scale from, at a minimum, a mere balance of probability (for the least serious offences) up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt (for the most serious offences) – this had been included at the insistence of the cricket players’ unions, and meant that in the 2010 spot-fixing case, where the Pakistani cricketers were charged with the most serious offences available under the Code, the ICC was required to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 26. Article 3.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code now imposes a lesser obligation: ‘[the] standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Both World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) (Art 6.6.1) and the BHA’s Rules of Racing Judicial Panels Code Article 11 require proof of charges only on ‘the balance of probabilities’. The Regulatory Commission noted in The Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, that ‘although the standard of proof remains that of the balance of probabilities the Regulatory Commission recognised that it needed to have a high degree of confidence in the evidence before it could find the charges had been proved’ (para 8). This was considered in light of the seriousness of the charges raised against the defendant, who was subsequently found guilty of influencing a football betting market by deliberately getting booked. 5 Köllerer v ATP, CAS  2011/A/2490, para  82. See also Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 99 (‘The BWF Rules, under which this hearing is conducted, mandate the application of the balance of probabilities to the standard of proof. Kollerer is not authority for the proposition that the CAS should impose a higher standard of comfortable satisfaction where an association has decided to apply a different, specific, standard in its regulations. Mr. bin Zulkiffli has not cited any national or international rules of public policy that require this Panel to reject, or fail to follow, the BWF Rules on this issue. The mandated standard is that of the balance of probabilities’). 6 See eg Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, para 45 (‘In our judgment the standard of proof in these proceedings before the Panel is the balance of probabilities. The Rule in paragraph 16 makes it clear that the standard of proof is the civil standard. Lord Hoffman and Baroness Hale made clear in their speeches [in In re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11] that the so-called heightened standard of proof in civil proceedings was no longer good law. We do not accept that this standard must be adopted because paragraph 16 was promulgated before In re B was decided. The House of Lords, now the Supreme Court, declares what the law is and always has been. There is, in our judgment, no room for construing paragraph 16, as importing, and bound by, the law as it was or may have been in 2001’) and para 47 (‘Although, as we accept, the charges against these appellants were serious and the consequences, particularly for the jockeys were serious, they were not criminal proceedings. They do not come into any of the cases in the first category referred to by Lord Steyn in R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 AC 787. Further, we are not helped by standards adopted by other bodies or standards applied where the penalties followed criminal proceedings. The BHA has a duty to ensure that the integrity of racing is preserved. In our judgment it is entitled to provide for a standard of proof, namely the civil standard of proof which in our opinion is appropriate and, as we find, fair’). See also Cavanagh v The FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 23 October 2009, para 32 (‘it is clear that, in relation to the disciplinary proceedings which are the subject of these appeals, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and that there is no “sliding scale” or intermediate standard of proof between the civil and the criminal standard’); WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013, para 13 (‘where criminal action is alleged in a civil context, it may appropriate to take into account as a starting point that such action is inherently improbable, but the standard remains the balance of probabilities test’, citing In re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014; Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang and Chino, DRA  Disciplinary Committee decision dated 15  June 2018, para  8 (applying balance of probabilities standard to charge of match-fixing). See para D1.103 for further discussion of In re B and other English cases. Cf Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 4 (‘Agreement was reached between the parties that, having regard to the complexities and importance of this case and the nature of the allegations made, the standard expected of the ECB was “the equivalent of the criminal standard” – the alternatives sought by the parties being “in practice indistinguishable.” The Panel accepted that agreement and has proceeded on that basis – before, therefore, either charge were proved, the Panel would have to be sure that the ECB had proved its case’).

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  533 7 Cavanagh et al v The FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 23 October 2009, para 32 (‘in relation to the disciplinary proceedings which are the subject of these appeals, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, and that there is no “sliding scale” or intermediate standard of proof as between the civil and criminal standard’, citing In re H [1996] AC 563 at 586). 8 Köllerer v ATP, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 97. Other CAS panels have taken the same line in anti-doping cases. See paras C5.1–C5.3. 9 See eg Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, para 48 (‘We accept that in making its findings the Panel should use its common sense in the way explained by Lord Hoffmann [in In Re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11]. We further accept that these were serious allegations and that cogent evidence was required to prove the allegations. However, it is clear that the standard of proof was debated before the Panel. In re B was referred to in the Panel’s reasons and we are quite satisfied that the Panel had in mind the observations made by Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale to which we have referred. In our judgment the Panel applied the correct standard of proof’); BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 12 (‘When considering the serious allegations he [Mr Ahern] faced, the Panel was particularly conscious of the need for reliable evidence to justify any findings adverse to him. That was in part because of the standard of proof that the Rules require and in part also because Ahern co-operated with the BHA Investigators. He readily provided his telephone records and attended interviews. He has had a career without any comparable problems or Rule breaches. His previously good character and cooperation with BHA Investigators emphasised to the Panel the “common sense” need for cogent evidence to prove the BHA’s case’) and 49 (rejecting on the basis of the same approach a charge of breach of the rules by another person). See also ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, para 8 (‘We are satisfied that the appropriate standard of proof is proof on the balance of probabilities but, that having regard to the grave nature of the allegations and the consequences of any finding of guilt in relation to them that we should look for very cogent proof before making any adverse finding against Danish Kaneria. The Panel concluded that in reality this meant that we should be sure of any fact before we relied on it as proving a case against Danish Kaneria’), and on appeal, Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 4 (‘Agreement was reached between the parties that, having regard to the complexities and importance of this case and the nature of the allegations made, the standard expected of the ECB was “the equivalent of the criminal standard” – the alternatives sought by the parties being “in practice indistinguishable.” The Panel accepted that agreement and has proceeded on that basis – before, therefore, either charge were proved, the Panel would have to be sure that the ECB had proved its case’).

B Evidence B4.38 The anti-corruption code should also be clear that rules restricting the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings do not apply in disciplinary proceedings to enforce the code; instead the charges may be proved by ‘any reliable means’.1 This should then be the key criterion used to resolve the various evidentiary issues that may arise in corruption cases, including the following: (a)

As the CAS panels in Oriekhov and Savic noted, ‘when assessing the evidence, the Panel has well in mind that corruption is, by nature, concealed as the parties involved will seek to use evasive means to ensure that they leave no trail of their wrongdoing’.2 As a result, while there may (exceptionally) be direct evidence of corruption,3 the law is clear that indirect (aka ‘circumstantial’) evidence may be sufficient to sustain a corruption charge,4 with the SGB proving certain ‘primary’ facts and then persuading the hearing panel that it can legitimately infer from those facts the other necessary elements of the charge(s) brought.5 ‘The strengths or weaknesses of a case based upon circumstantial evidence are, invariably, tested and resolved by reference to the explanations which are given for the circumstances said to be indicative of guilt’.6 Hearing panels have not hesitated to draw such inferences, and so to sustain such charges, where the evidence so warrants.7 For example, evidence that a betting market on a particular match has deviated from the ordinary movement of odds in accordance with the mathematical model may be a ‘decisive sign that some bettors had some information that the mathematical model did not have and expected that at least two goals be scored irrespective of the lapse of time’.8 (b) There is no right to silence in sports disciplinary cases. If a participant refuses to cooperate with an investigation, and/or to answer questions before the

534  Regulating Sport

hearing panel, an inference may be drawn that they have something to hide/ that their answers would hurt their defence.9 (c) Evidence that the SGB wants to rely on may have been obtained by covert means, such as concealed surveillance equipment used by the police or (more controversially) by undercover journalists.10 Even if some hearing panels may find such methods distasteful, arguments that the evidence should be excluded on grounds of abuse of process or illegality are highly unlikely to succeed, certainly where the SGB itself was not involved in the allegedly abusive or illegal acts.11 (d) Alternatively, evidence may be offered through witnesses who desire anonymity to avoid the risk of retaliation from criminal elements involved in the corrupt conspiracy that their evidence will uncover. Again, this is against the interests of the person charged, impinging on their right to confront their accusers. The CAS panel has balanced these conflicting considerations by permitting witnesses who can establish a concrete risk of retaliation to give evidence anonymously on condition that the CAS panel is able to check their identity, any prior statements they have made are also provided to the other party (again, in anonymised form), and the other party is given an appropriate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, with restrictions as necessary to protect their anonymity (eg by telephone, with audio scrambler, and with cross-examination questions vetted by panel to ensure they will not identify the witness).12 (e) Where the allegation is that a race or match (or some aspect thereof) was fixed, it will usually be necessary to produce evidence of what happened in the race or match.13 It may also be appropriate to introduce expert evidence to assist the hearing panel in interpreting that evidence, although in some cases (especially horseracing) the members of the hearing panel are likely to be very familiar with the sport and therefore may not require expert assistance.14 On the other hand, the fact that no one can point to a specific act of deliberate under-performance in the match in question does not mean there was no deliberate under-performance: ‘it is in the nature of match-fixing that it must be concealed. If every time a snooker match was fixed it was evident from the way the game was played, then match-fixing in snooker would soon be stopped. It is not necessary in order to establish match-fixing that the WPBSA can identify a deliberate error at the table’.15 (f) Finally, where evidence of unusual betting patterns is offered as proof of match-fixing,16 a CAS panel has warned against falling into the prosecutorial fallacy (often seen in athlete biological passport cases17) that if the probability is low of seeing such patterns when conditions are normal, then the probability of match-fixing is high. In Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA, the CAS panel noted:18 ‘85. The Panel finds that this is similar in respect of the analytical information derived from the BFDS. The BFDS analyses whether the analytical information regarding betting on football matches can be explained by “normal” circumstances. The conclusion that the statistical information cannot be explained by “normal” circumstances does not necessarily entail that it must hence be concluded that the results are to be explained by match-fixing. The reporting of an “escalated” match deriving from the BFDS is by no means conclusive evidence that such match was indeed fixed, but remains subject to review. 86. In order to come to the conclusion that a match is fixed the Panel finds that the analytical information needs to be supported by other, different and external elements pointing in the same direction, ie a differentiation must be made between the so-called quantitative information and a qualitative analysis of the quantitative information.’   1 See eg Art 3.2.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code: ‘The Anti-Corruption Tribunal shall not be bound by rules governing the admissibility of evidence in judicial or other proceedings. Instead, facts may be established by any reliable means, including admissions and circumstantial evidence’. This provision,

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  535 the origin of which was the World Anti-Doping Code (see paras C7.2 and C7.8), means that the hearing panel ‘must consider weight rather than admissibility, subject always to the overriding imperative of fairness which is necessarily to be implied into the Code. We recognise that the principles that have lain behind the exclusion of certain forms of evidence from being heard in English courts, will have resonance even where questions of weight are being considered. It is obvious, for example, that hearsay evidence of what someone said outside of the Tribunal hearing is of less weight than evidence given by witnesses in court’. ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 29. See also Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 9 (‘the Panel is required to and did consider the inherent weakened evidential value of hearsay evidence’).  2 Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 54; Savic v PTIOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.7.   3 For example, if one of the conspirators boasts to a friend about the proceeds of the conspiracy (such as Mervyn Westfield showing his team-mate, Tony Palladino, a bag filled with the £6,000 he had been paid for deliberately underperforming in a match), or (more usually) if the conspirators are recorded covertly by the police (as in Oriekhov, for example) or by undercover journalists (as in Butt, Higgins, Leaf, etc).  4 See eg  Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel decision 2018/01, at para  188: (‘Consequently, it is more likely than not that direct evidence will be the exception and indirect evidence the standard when dealing in cases involving alleged corrupt activity. In this respect, the CAS has previously held “It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation but, taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt” (CAS  2015/A/4059 Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA)’), aff’d Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS  2018/A/5846 & 5847; ICC  v Butt, Asif & Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 30 (‘Direct, eyewitness evidence is, however, not the only way of proving criminal charges. Circumstantial evidence can in certain circumstances suffice’), citing Attorney General of Jersey v O’Brien 2006 WL 690572 (PC App No 50 of 2005 (Lord Hoffman) (‘It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation, but, taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt’), and noting that ‘[t]his approach is vouched for in the specific context of sports law’ in certain doping cases (para 32), in which the CAS has held that it was enough, to sustain a charge of manipulation of a drugs test sample, to satisfy the hearing panel that the athlete was the only person who at the relevant time had the motive, opportunity and technical skill to manipulate the sample in a manner that would be undetected. Those cases were Boevski v IWF, CAS  2004/A/607, para  7.9.5, and Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/A/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), pp 255, 268, although now there are others: see para Cx.xx. In such circumstances, it is for the athlete to put forward an alternative theory identifying a plausible alternative culprit that is sufficiently supported by evidence to undermine the panel’s satisfaction on the point. See eg Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.9.6 (‘Once the probability that manipulation occurred in this phase of the chain of custody [ie when the sample was in the athlete’s control] becomes apparent then some explanation or plausible hypothesis that the athlete was not involved must be brought forward to refute the circumstantial evidence as to the probability of the manipulation either being carried out by the Appellant or with his consent and approval’). See also WADA v FIBA & Morgan, FIBA AC 2005-1, decision dated 22 June 2005, p 7 (‘both forms of determining the facts (direct evidence and circumstantial evidence) are, in principle, equal’); Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 9 (‘The Panel has reminded itself that circumstantial evidence could be powerful evidence provided that it was based on reliable facts and assisted in bolstering or undermining the ECB case’). See also the use of circumstantial evidence to prove doping charges in cases discussed at para C5.5.   5 The question is whether it is reasonable and logical to infer a fact for which there is no direct evidence from those facts that have been proved. See eg Ad Vitam, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 6 January 2016, para 105 (‘in this type of case ie where corrupt practice for financial gain is alleged, but denied, […] there will often be contested issues of fact in connection with which the tribunal has to ask itself whether the drawing of a given inference is, or is not, justifiably to be made. And, in making that decision, it will need to focus upon the facts, evidence and argument touching upon all aspects of the case, not only individually, but in so far as they may legitimately and logically be seen to interconnect’) and para 106 (‘Reward (or not) in this type of case is a cardinal example of those instances where, typically, it will be fair and appropriate for the adjudicating Panel to consider whether, direct evidence absent, an inference should or should not be drawn that a particular event has happened’), citing McKeown v British Horseracing Authority, [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 132; BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 13 (‘there was little if any dispute about primary facts. The betting activities of Mr Clement were a matter of record. […] The evidence of telephone and other contact between Mr Clement and Ahern was likewise mostly common ground. The Panel’s task was to determine whether the inference of a corrupt conspiracy between Mr Clement and Ahern was a legitimate one’); WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013 (agreement to fix inferred from evidence of communications followed by patterns of betting indicating great confidence in a particular outcome), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014; The Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, para 26 (‘We have no doubt the betting evidence demonstrates a betting syndicate. The nature, size and timing of the bets can only demonstrate coordinated action: the possibility of chance or coincidence is fanciful’).

536  Regulating Sport There is a detailed and helpful analysis of the use of circumstantial evidence, and in particular of when it is and is not proper to draw inferences from findings of fact, in McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), paras 124–133, 256–257, 264, and passim. For example, where a punter has contact with a jockey, and then places substantial bets on that jockey’s horse to lose, it may be inferred that the jockey told the punter something that made him confident of the outcome. See ibid, paras 53–59, especially para 57 (pattern of substantial and successful lay bets on horse ridden by jockey who had been in contact with punter ‘was sufficient to raise the inference that they were inspired by inside information, unless there was a good explanation to the contrary’); BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 184 (‘the size of the lay bets in this account […] – respectively the first, second, fourth and sixth largest lay bets on the account – demonstrate a confidence which indicates knowledge that Mr Crickmore had inside information’) and para 79 (‘the pattern of phone calls shows a connection between Mr Crickmore on the one hand and those who operated the various accounts which is sufficiently striking to lead to the inference that they were placing the lay bets on the basis of information derived from him. And the relative size of those bets for the accounts in question […] raises questions as to the reasons for the confidence displayed in the lay selections. The confidence was explained by inside information which was obtained in relation to these races, which in some cases went as far as indications from jockeys that they would ride to lose if necessary’); BHA v Ahern et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 19 (‘There is thus a wealth of evidence which indicates that Mr Clement’s lay bets against the five Ahern rides at issue in this enquiry were inspired by information from Ahern. His betting demonstrated a preference for laying Ahern rides. The risks which he was prepared to run on such bets was higher than was usually found in the accounts he operated. […] The betting followed contacts between Ahern and Mr Clement on or before races, as the timelines put before the Panel generally demonstrated. […] The sheer size of the bets in the case of JUDGETHEMOMENT indicated a confidence in the outcome that is seen to be justified by what happened in the race, where Ahern deliberately took steps to ensure that the gelding did not run on its merits. The Panel was left in no doubt that Mr Clement knew that the gelding would be ridden to lose’). In such circumstances, it may also be inferred that the jockey was rewarded for provision of this information, even if there is no direct evidence of such reward. See eg HRA v Winston et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 42 (‘As for payment for this information, this is necessarily a matter of inference. The Panel concluded that there must have been substantial payments to Fitzpatrick for the material he provided. It is impossible to say how much, or how payment was made. It may even have been the case that Fitzpatrick was sharing in the profits with Mr Nicholl. The sheer volume of phone contacts between Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick after suspect races is consistent with discussion about how the betting had gone, and Fitzpatrick’s evidence to the Panel that he had no idea of the extent of Mr Nicholl’s betting was a palpable lie’). See also para B4.26, n 7. Similarly, it may be inferred from efforts to conceal what one is doing that one knows that those actions are corrupt. See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para  131 (‘Fairley was the intermediary between Mr Sines and Doe. This was designed to conceal what was passing between Doe and Mr Sines, because both understood that they were engaged in corrupt behaviour’); ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 131 (rejecting Butt’s argument that text messages suggesting match-fixing were just teasing by his agent because, among other things, ‘Mr Butt’s responses to various requests for information directed to him by the ICC […] had not revealed the totality of the mobile phones that he used during the West Indies tour, nor did Mr Butt give to the ICC the explanation that he gave to us, namely that there were other mobile phones but ones whose details he could not then recollect. In response to the ICC’s formal demand for information, Mr Butt admitted what he had failed to accept in response to the ICC’s original demand for information, ie that in the period 25 April to 16 August 2010 he was the user of two SIM card phone numbers, to which Mr Majeed texted incriminating text messages in St Lucia. This suggested a certain sensitivity on Mr Butt’s part which would have been unnecessary if he had simply been the victim of a tedious tease. The episode in Spring in St Lucia then appears to have been the overture to the main performance in Summer in England’). Going further, it can be inferred from a proven lie about the nature of a phone call, or bet, that there was something improper about it. BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14  December 2011, para  196(iii) (‘If Mr Nick Gold really thought there was nothing improper about the lay betting which the BHA was seeking to investigate, there was no reason to tell that lie [ie that he based his bets on time figures]’); HRA v Winston et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 66 (‘The only sensible inference from this sustained course of lying [to the HRA investigators] is that Fletcher was trying to cover up his involvement with Mr Nicholl because he was fully involved in supplying information to support Mr Nicholl’s corrupt betting’); ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 6 (‘We utterly reject his account of the telephone calls and texts to and from Anu Bhatt during the vital days in question. Analysis of the length, sequence and timing of these phone calls simply does not permit of the innocent explanations given by Kaneria. If, as we find, he is lying about these calls and texts, there can only be one logical reason – to tell the truth would be damning’); ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5  February 2011, para  140 (‘we are compelled to reject Mr Butt’s construction of these interchanges [tape recordings of telephone calls between Butt and his agent relating to a fix at

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  537 the Oval] for these reasons. […] Mr Butt has been inconsistent in his attitude towards the Oval calls, moving from a position of denial that he was the counterparty, to a position of inability to recollect one [way] or another – to one of putting the ICC to proof – to one of acceptance. […] He must (we find) have – despite his denials – have read the NOTW article which contained extracts from his dialogue with Mr Majeed and known full well from the start that it was indeed he at the other end of the line’).  6 The FA v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 104.   7 See cases cited in note 5. On the other hand, while sometimes the inference is irresistible (ie the fact to be inferred is as certain as the proven facts from which it is to be inferred), other times it may simply be one of several possible inferences, in which case it may not be enough to sustain the regulator’s burden of proof. See eg RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 3 (‘The fourth allegation is that the player is alleged to have tried to influence a team mate to affect a result. […] This has caused the Tribunal much deliberation. Reading the evidence provided, it is possible to draw an inference that this is what Mr Leaf was trying to achieve. However, bearing in mind the burden of proof, the Tribunal are unable to say with sufficient certainty that Mr Leaf was trying to influence Mr Colton’). If the primary facts are equally consistent with guilt and innocence, they should not be considered probative of one rather than the other. Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, paras 121-22 (‘121. […] we find that the factors relied upon by the Panel were in the circumstances not sufficient to permit the inference being drawn that she [Milczarek] was part of the alleged conspiracy. 122. The telephone call at 16.45 was a single call of short duration. It is possible that it could have been a call by Mr Crickmore for Fallon even if Fallon was not in the car at the time. The text to Fallon at 17.40 could have been made on the journey back to Newmarket during a break in the journey. Milczarek was at the time a young jockey of good character with every reason not to jeopardise her career. 123. In our judgment there was insufficient evidence to support the Panel’s conclusion that Milczarek was party to the conspiracy. […]’). If there is sufficient evidence of guilt, however, it will not assist the participant to point out that the various facts relied on, taken on their own, are not inculpatory. See Attorney General of Jersey v O’Brien, 2006 WL 690572 (PC App No 50 of 2005 (Lord Hoffman) (‘It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation, but, taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt’). And still less will it assist the participant to point to an ‘exonerating’ fact that is in fact equally consistent with guilt as with innocence. For example, in Savic v PTIOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.22, the allegation was that Savic had approached X to lose the first set of his match against Y, on the basis that Y would then lose the next two sets so that X won the match, but X declined the approach. The Panel noted: ‘it was suggested by the Appellant that there was no evidence that [Y] was approached in order to fix his match [with X]. This, however, does not seem to the Panel to be of itself significant. There are a number of explanations, all as consistent with the Appellant’s guilt as with his innocence, the most obvious being that without [X’s] cooperation, no purpose would be served by approaching [Y] as well’.  8 Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, para 83. See also Sammut v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3062, para 100 (evidence that betting on the Norway-Malta UEFA qualifier favoured the outcome 4-0 supported finding that match was fixed). Cf Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang and Chino, DRA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 15 June 2018, para 45 (‘The Committee took the view that in a sporting case context suspicious betting patterns required other corroborative evidence to establish a link to the sports individual and/or entity concerned. A conclusion that any statistical information cannot be explained by usual circumstances does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the results are to be explained by match-fixing by the specific individual charged’), citing Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4650.  9 In Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit, CAS  2014/A/3467, a CAS panel rejected the player’s complaint that when interviewed he had not been advised of his right to silence, noting (para  81) that the Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme imposed ‘a duty to cooperate with investigations with investigations led by the TIU. The Respondent reminds to that respect that this obligation is essential to the success of the Governing Bodies of professional tennis’ efforts against corruption in the sport of professional tennis, because they do not have the investigatory powers of a government law enforcement authority’; and that under applicable law (Florida law), parties could waive constitutional protections, and therefore ‘the Player validly waived any right to remain silent that he may have had – issue which has not been demonstrated – in connection to this case, by signing the 2010 Player’s agreement. Consequently, the TIU did not commit any violation of the Player’s rights with respect to the interviews led by Mr. Willerton’ of the TIU (para 82). In Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01, paras 176-77, the hearing panel rejected the suggestion that the player should have been cautioned before interview that he had a right to silence, because the applicable rules provided ‘no legal basis’ for such caution, but instead obliged the player to answer ‘any reasonable question’. On appeal, the CAS panel held that it ‘is entitled to have regard to the fact that Mr. bin Zulkiffli chose not to give evidence, or explain the inconsistent statements made to the BWF Panel that led it to conclude that he lacked credibility. There was no evidence to explain or rebut the matters on which the BWF Panel relied to reach its conclusion. Accordingly, there is no reason for this Panel to call into question those conclusions’. Zulkiffli and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 74. See also ICC v Butt et al, decision of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Ethics Commission, dated 23  December 2010 on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para  27(4)

538  Regulating Sport (‘There is certainly no “right to silence” in the disciplinary proceedings’), citing Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 2 All ER 1108, R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241, and Archer v South West Thames Area Health Authority, unreported, 5 August 1985 (QBD) (Steyn J.); Harris, Disciplinary and Regulatory Proceedings, 10th Edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2019), para 12.131 (right to silence ‘would seem to have no application in disciplinary proceedings based on contract’), citing (inter alia) R v Institute of Chartered Accountants ex parte Nawaz [1997] 16 PNLR 43 (CA) (no objection in public policy to a professional conduct rule requiring self-incrimination by accountant), and Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 2 All ER 1108 (no right to refuse to swear affidavit in civil proceedings on the basis that it would disclose defence in concurrent criminal proceedings). See also BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 121 (Paul Doe ‘complained that it had been wrong to require him to disclose his telephone records. But the privilege [against self-incrimination] cannot apply to externally produced records. He also relied upon this privilege to excuse himself from attendance at the hearing. The issues for decision concern breaches of the Rules of Racing and not criminal charges. In any event, Doe had submitted to the Rules that govern racing as a condition of his licence and that required him to cooperate with the Enquiry. There was nothing in his objections’). The CAS has similarly ruled that there is no right against self-incrimination in doping cases brought under sport disciplinary rules. USADA  v Montgomery, CAS  2004/O/645, para 53, and USADA v Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, paras 57–58. Thus, for example, Art 3.2.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code provides: ‘The Anti-Corruption Tribunal may draw an inference adverse to a Participant who is asserted to have committed an offence under the Anti-Corruption Code based on his/her refusal, without compelling justification, after a request made in a reasonable time in advance of the hearing, to appear at the hearing (either in person or by video or telephone link, as directed by the Anti-Corruption Tribunal) and to answer any relevant questions’. This is copied from Art 3.2.5 of the World Anti-Doping Code. In appropriate circumstances, a similar adverse inference might be drawn from a party’s failure to call a witness who would appear to have relevant information and whose attendance is within that party’s control. See eg Wiszniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority (1998) EWCA Civ 596, (1998) Lloyd’s Rep Med 223, 240 (under English law, if a party fails without good reason to call a witness whose evidence would have been relevant to an issue in dispute, then if the other party introduces at least some evidence on the issue, no matter how weak, the court would be entitled to draw an inference that the missing witness’s evidence would have hurt the party that failed to call him or would have helped the other party). 10 As it was, for example, in Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS  2010/A/2172, para  7 (transcripts of telephone conversations recorded by the German police); WICB  v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16 May 2008, para 21 (telephone conversation recorded covertly by the Indian police); ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal determination dated 2  February 2011, para  37–40 (recordings of conversations, including telephone conversations, made covertly by an undercover journalist). 11 See eg ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir, decision dated 10 November 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application by Messrs Butt and Amir to lift their provisional suspension, paras 12–13 (‘unlike the common law of the United States of America, there is no doctrine of exclusion of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” known to English common law (R v Sang 1980 AC 402). With the exception of evidence whose admission would constitute an abuse of process (or pursuant to statute, ie Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Section 75 (where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value)), English adjectival law concentrates on weight rather than admissibility. [13]. It goes without saying that the reliability of evidence may be affected by the way in which it was gathered and presented, but sting operations are often the only way of bringing into the public domain unacceptable behaviour, whether it be (apparently) soliciting bribes as the price of voting in a particular way in the contest to stage the FIFA World Cup, or (certainly) unmasking Members of Parliament who offer to peddle their connections for reward (to give only two recent well publicised examples)’); RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, pp 1–2 (‘There is no doubt that Mr Leaf was targeted due to the tip off […] that Mr Leaf was the man to speak [to] in regards to placing bets. […] The Tribunal are not here to deal with the way in which the Sun Newspaper have acted and reported on the story; the Tribunal are dealing with Mr Leaf. As a teacher Mr Leaf is regarded by the Tribunal as being of good intelligence and should be able to weigh up such situations and is therefore responsible for his own actions the Tribunal believe even if the actions of the journalist may be reprehensible. Mr Leaf states he has been foolish, however the Tribunal believes it is more than foolish and even the conduct of Mr Sweet and the way in which Mr Leaf has been “set up” does not exculpate Mr Leaf from his own actions in this matter [betting against the team he was playing for] which as already stated is a serious breach of the operational rules’). To similar effect from the English courts, see eg Hasan v General Medical Council [2003] PC 52, para  9 (rejecting challenge to disciplinary proceedings brought against a doctor based on evidence developed by undercover journalist of the doctor’s forgery of medical reports to aid an asylum claim and a faked road traffic accident and personal injury claim; the fact that the doctor had been duped by the journalist did not ‘remove the sting’ from the charges, ie ‘that he was willing, when approached, to enter into transactions in his professional capacity which were profoundly dishonest’); Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v Saluja, [2006] EWHC 2784 (Admin), paras 124, 129 (it

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  539 was a manifest error of law to stay disciplinary proceedings as an abuse of process on basis undercover journalist had entrapped doctor into selling her a sick note so she could go on holiday from work, because of ‘[…] the substantial difference between a doctor at his professional practice being pressed to provide a false medical certificate and a drug dealer being importuned by an undercover officer. On the face of it, […] Dr Saluja could have said no when asked to provide the certificate. He could have asked the “patient” to leave. It is difficult to see how the offer of money in such circumstances, albeit with some importuning or pressure, could be said to amount to such misconduct by the journalist as to compromise the integrity of the disciplinary process’, and because ‘[s]ome disciplinary offences (particularly where the patient has an interest in keeping quiet) will only come to light through the use of techniques such as were used here’). In ATP  v Köllerer, decision of Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer dated 31  May 2011, para  143, the hearing officer stated: ‘Subject to Florida law permitting (in the context of rules which include provision that the strict rules of evidence do not apply; see Article G.3.c), I  would probably have been willing to receive and consider evidence of covert sound recordings’. Indeed, CAS jurisprudence suggests that such evidence would be admissible even if obtained in illegal fashion. See eg Adamu v FIFA, CAS  2011/A/2426, para  75 (FIFA allowed to rely on conversations covertly recorded by undercover journalists even though such recording was illegal under Swiss law, because FIFA had not performed any illegal activity to obtain the recordings; ‘the mere circumstance that some evidence has been illegally obtained do not necessarily preclude an arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland to admit it into the proceedings’); WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 10.5(c) (‘under Swiss law […] such evidence can be used, even if it was collected with violation of certain human rights, if there is an overriding public interest at stake. In the case at hand, the internationally accepted fight against doping is a public interest, which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr Valverde’s personal rights’). Similarly, under English law, evidence obtained ‘unlawfully, improperly or unfairly is admissible as a matter of law’ in both criminal proceedings (Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2020, (Oxford University Press, 2020), at para F2.1) and civil proceedings. Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The Queen, [1955] AC 197, 199 (‘In their Lordships’ opinion, the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the Court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained’). 12 Keramuddin v FIFA, CAS  2019/A/6388, para  135 (‘In light of the witnesses’ interest in keeping their identities anonymous, the Panel found that it could strike a proper balance between the Appellant’s right to be heard and to a fair trial and the necessity to protect witnesses’ interest. It did so by checking the identity, through a CAS counsel, of the witnesses, and giving the Appellant the opportunity to confront the protected witnesses as required under Article 6(1) ECHR, while placing certain limitations to protect them (see supra at para. 35). Indeed, the Panel granted the Appellant the opportunity to directly cross-examine the protected witnesses over the phone, while protecting the identities of the witnesses by (i) having them use a voice scrambler, and (ii) requiring the Appellant to provide the Panel, in advance of the hearing, the questions he intended to ask the witnesses in order for the Panel to ensure that they were not aimed at, or have even the unintentional effect of, identifying the witnesses, all the while allowing the Appellant to ask additional questions not sent in advance so long as they were not translated/posed until after the Panel had an opportunity to vet them (see supra at para.47). The Panel also sent a CAS counsel to the secret location from which the protected witnesses testified to properly identify them and ensure that they testified without any undue interference from any third party during the cross-examination (see supra at para. 35 and 48)’); FK  Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS  2009/A/1920, paras 44, 72–74, and 75 (‘The Panel made sure that the Appellants received the minutes of the interrogations of the protected witnesses and that the Appellants were able to directly cross-examine the protected witnesses over the phone during the Hearing. A counsel of the CAS assured that the witnesses were properly identified and that they were alone at the time of the examination-in-chief and the crossexamination. The Panel repeatedly denied requests of the Respondent that anonymous witness statements should be admitted without providing the Appellants with the minutes or without granting them the right to cross-examine them’). Cf UCI v Contador, CAS 2011/A/2384, para 184 (application by WADA to rely on anonymous witness refused because it was ‘disproportionate in view of all of the interests at stake. In particular the Panel found that it was insufficiently demonstrated that the interests of the witness worthy of protection were threatened to an extent that could justify a complete protection of the witness’ identity from disclosure to the Respondent, thus, curtailing the procedural rights of the Respondents to a large degree’). For the position in the English courts, see eg Deripaska v Cherney [2012] EWCA 1235, paras 12–14 (party applying for witness to remain anonymous must convince court there is a real risk of reprisal, objectively verified, if order is not granted; generalities about potential threats are not enough). See Sturman, ‘The Difficulty Detecting Corruption’, paper at Corruption in Sports Conference, 11 December 2012, endorsing approach taken by CAS panel in Pobeda (‘There is no reason whatsoever why sporting tribunals should not develop a practice where “protected” witnesses give evidence before sporting tribunals with appropriate measures, but it is sincerely to be hoped that careful procedural rules will be adopted to ensure that the interests of justice do not become subordinate to the “need” for convictions in “integrity” cases. Experience in the criminal courts has shown that if investigators are given unfettered power and discretion they may well behave inappropriately. A promise of anonymity or special measures can be used by a dishonest

540  Regulating Sport witness to evade searching cross-examination and to conceal the truth. Misconduct in a “noble cause” is still misconduct and it is very hard for the defence to test whether a statement has been obtained through improper coaching and leading if (for example) access to transcripts is withheld’). 13 See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 110 (‘There were three criticisms made by the BHA of Fizsimons’ ride of IT’S A MAN’S WORLD at Lingfield on 13 February 2009, which were said to amount to breaches of Rule 157. These were that he deliberately missed the break by restraining his mount in the stalls; that having regained contact with the field, he eased off and made no effort to progress, and that there was no real substantial effort in the last 2 furlongs of the race’). Of course, it may be that actions on the racecourse or the field of play that appear innocent in isolation take on a more sinister hue when considered in combination with off-field events. See eg ibid, at para 147 (‘the available recordings do not enable it to be said one way or the other whether there was any active restraint that was responsible for this [slow emergence from the stall]. What can be said is that there was an absence of effort by Fairley at least to correct the awkward position of the horse’s head just before the gates opened, and an absence of effort to push the horse out when they had opened. In other circumstances, there might have been innocent explanations for that, but given Fairley’s lies at a later stage about his knowledge of and contacts with Mr Sines and given the pattern of telephone contacts which show Doe acting as an intermediary to transmit information to Mr Sines who then put in motion the organisation of the lay betting (both himself and through Mr Crickmore), the Panel concluded that there was no innocent explanation and that there was a breach of Rule 157 in this case’). 14 See McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010]  EWHC  508 (QB), para  212 (‘There is in my view no general requirement flowing from the overriding requirement to conduct disciplinary proceedings fairly either for the prosecuting body to adduce and tender for cross examination or for the Disciplinary Panel to ensure the attendance of expert witnesses as a necessary condition for respectively bringing and finding [cheating on the field of play] proved against a member of a sporting body. There is in principle no reason why a tribunal including members with relevant experience and knowledge of the sport in question should not draw on their knowledge and experience of viewing and interpreting video evidence and drawing inferences from it and from the evidence relating to such things as the nature and record of the contestants. Indeed there is every reason why they should be free to do so’). 15 WPBSA  v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision date 16  September 2013, paras 46, 85, aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014. 16 See para B4.25, n3 and B4.47, n 3. 17 See para C7.6. 18 Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4650.

C Provisional suspension B4.39 The SGB’s rules should give it the power to remove those charged with corruption offences from the sport until the charges have been resolved.1 A provisional suspension operates on a precautionary principle and must weigh the potential harm to the sport of allowing the participant to continue to participate if the charges are established against the harm to the individual of being suspended from participation if the charges are not made out. There is a strong argument that the public’s confidence in the integrity of the sport, and in the ability of its regulators to protect that integrity, will be fundamentally shaken if someone is allowed to continue to participate in the sport where (for example) the Crown Prosecution Service has determined that there is enough evidence to charge him with a criminal offence,2 or where clear evidence of his apparent corruption has been splashed over the front pages of the world’s press.3 In such circumstances, and indeed in any case where there is sufficient evidence to support a charge, English courts are unlikely to uphold any challenge to a provisional suspension, notwithstanding the substantial hardship caused to the participant and the unfairness to him/her if the charges are later dismissed.4 However, the case that set that precedent involved jockey Kieren Fallon, and the criminal charges against him that led to his provisional suspension subsequently collapsed in very public fashion,5 which is a chastening reminder to SGBs to consider matters of provisional suspension carefully. A  provisional suspension is not an early indication of guilt,6 though the cogency of the evidence against a participant may be a relevant factor in balancing the potential harms. In addition, the rules should give the participant charged a meaningful opportunity to challenge that provisional suspension either before it is

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  541

imposed or soon thereafter.7 If these precautions are taken, and the participant does not challenge the provisional suspension, or else challenges it unsuccessfully, then even if the participant is subsequently exonerated at the full hearing of the charges, the SGB would have a strong defence to any claim the participant may try to bring for damage to reputation and/or lost earnings during the period of provisional suspension. 1 Paragraph 28.1(f) of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the promotion of the integrity of sport against the manipulation of results, notable matchfixing (28  September 2011) specifically recommended that sports bodies’ rules on manipulation of results include ‘mechanisms for the temporary prohibition from any participation in sports activities of athletes and sport officials under prosecution’. The SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 52, said the same thing. For an example of such a provision, see Art 4.7.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which provides that where a participant has been charged under the Anti-Corruption Code or in other circumstances, such as a participant being subject to criminal charges, the ACU General Manager ‘[…] shall have the discretion, in circumstances where he/she considers that the integrity of the sport could otherwise be seriously undermined, to Provisionally Suspend the Participant pending the Anti-Corruption Tribunal’s determination of whether he/she has committed an offence’. Cf Art 6.8 of World Rugby’s Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting), which requires World Rugby to apply to a Judicial Officer, on notice to the player, to impose a provisional suspension, with such suspension to be granted if the AntiCorruption Officer ‘has demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that there is a ‘prima facie case that the Connected Person has committed an Anti-Corruption Breach’. 2 As in Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006]  EWHC  2030 (QB), where the HRA provisionally suspended jockey Kieren Fallon after the Crown Prosecution Service charged him with several offences arising out of an alleged conspiracy to fix races in which he was competing (see para B4.49), and resisted, as an improper collateral attack on the CPS’s charging decision, a challenge by Fallon to the suspension based on an argument that there was no merit in the charges against him. 3 For example, on 28 August 2010, in the middle of the Lord’s Test match between England and Pakistan, the News of the World devoted its front page and more than 20 internal pages to a sensational account of a conspiracy it claimed to have uncovered of spot-fixing (the bowling of deliberate ‘no balls’) by three Pakistani players during that match, including photographs (and videos posted on its website) of the players’ agent accepting £150,000 in bundles of £50 notes and providing in return information about precisely when the ‘no balls’ would be bowled, followed by the bowling of those ‘no balls’ at the exact times predicted. The story was greeted with uproar, not only among the media and fans but also among the players in the match itself, with reports of scuffles between players triggered by accusations of cheating. See eg ‘Pakistan match-fixing claims: tensions boil over as Jon Trott and Wahab Riaz clash’, telegraph.co.uk, 11 October 2010. In the circumstances, the ICC had to act, which it did by charging the players on 2 September 2010 and at the same time exercising the power conferred on it under Art 4.7.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (see n 1) to suspend the players pending hearing and determination of the charges (which provisional suspension was subsequently upheld by the Chairman of the ICC  Code of Conduct Commission upon challenge by two of the players: see n 7, below). Similarly, the WPBSA provisionally suspended John Higgins in May 2010 after The News of the World published clear evidence from an undercover ‘sting’ that Higgins and his agent Pat Mooney had discussed match-fixing with undercover reporters. In each case, the period of provisional suspension served was credited against the ban subsequently imposed when the corruption charges were upheld at trial: see para B4.30, n 5. 4 In July 2006, an HRA Appeal Board affirmed the HRA Disciplinary Panel’s imposition of a provisional suspension on jockey Kieren Fallon pending determination of criminal charges that Fallon had agreed to fix races (as to which, see para B4.49). The Disciplinary Panel had said: ‘We realise the hardship that suspension and the length of time over which such hardship may last will cause, but we also recognise the damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely damaged both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such; and by the adverse reaction of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged with an offence which is so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate. In our view, the damage done would be very hard to repair and, as the Regulator, we are anxious to avoid that damage’. HRA  v Fallon, HRA Appeal Board decision, July 2006, para 11. Fallon challenged the legality of that ban in the High Court, alleging (among other things) that it was not appropriate simply to rely on the fact that criminal charges had been brought; rather the HRA had to consider the evidence and determine for itself whether it was sufficient to warrant a provisional suspension. The High Court accepted that the ban ‘will be of very significant and irremediable detriment to Mr Fallon and those connected to him, including his dependents and those otherwise wishing to use his services as a jockey’, and also agreed ‘that it is a strong thing to prevent someone from plying his trade and from earning a living, at least in Great Britain, by reason of charges which have been brought but which have not yet been proved’, such that ‘strong counteracting factors’ were required to justify it. However, the High Court

542  Regulating Sport had regard to the upholding of the perceptions of integrity of horseracing’, and in particular ‘the damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely damaged both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such; and by the adverse reaction of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged with an offence which is so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate’, given those factors it declined to disturb the HRA Disciplinary Panel’s judgment that provisional suspension was warranted in Mr Fallon’s case: Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006]  EWHC  2030 (QB), paras 58, 62. See also by way of analogy Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd [1999] All ER (D) 848 [HL], where Lord Hoffmann acknowledged without objection the IAAF’s rules providing for provisional suspension upon a positive doping test (‘I think that the IAAF adopted its system of instant suspension followed by disciplinary proceedings in the belief that although it might sometimes cause injustice in the individual case, it was necessary in the wider interests of the sport.’); Guest v Commonwealth Games Canada and Triathlon Canada, CAS CG 02/001, para 7.9 (an interim suspension even without a hearing is appropriate in a doping case because ‘the public interest of the sport trumps the private interests of the athlete’); Behan/Tyrell/Casela Park, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 October 2010 (‘There is much to be said for the view that the gelding ought not to have been allowed to run at Musselburgh after the determination by the Newcastle Stewards that this was a deliberate failure to run it on its merits. The BHA may wish to consider giving Stewards the power to suspend a horse with immediate effect when they determine that a deliberate breach has occurred, even though the matter has then to be referred to the Disciplinary Panel because the Stewards’ penalty powers are limited. There are no doubt arguments pointing against this (such as the effect on innocent owners and the fact that the betting public is at least warned about a future race when there has been an enquiry that finds deliberate breach). But this present case is one where, in the Panel’s view, the argument for an immediate suspension prevails. What if it had won at Musselburgh and the money had been down, even at cramped odds because of the publicity the Newcastle race had received? That would cause more damage to the reputation of racing than the possible injustice to the owner’); and ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir, decision dated 10 November 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application by Messrs Butt and Amir to lift their provisional suspension, para 29 (‘at one stage if not finally it appeared to be accepted that if the first criterion was established so would the second one: that is to say that if there was a seriously arguable case against the Players for breach of the various provisions of the Code with which they were charged, it would seriously damage the integrity of sport if they were permitted to continue to play until charges against them were finally resolved. I find that that is indeed so. It is the essence of sport that competition should be fair, and outcomes uncertain. The principal Code is not the only instrument governing international sport which recognises that in its governing instruments; the IOC Charter is another. There is constant jurisprudence, both of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and of the domestic courts to that effect’) and para 32 (‘It was eloquently expressed on their [the players’] behalf that not only was cricket their only livelihood, and that absence from the game would seriously damage their earning capacity and the interests of those who depend financially upon them; but that they would also suffer in terms of their physical aptitude for the game from any prolonged periods of absence. In such situations public interest has to be balanced against private interest; and I do not consider that matters alluded to were so compelling (or, in this context, unusual) [that they] can tip the scales against the suspension if otherwise justified on the basis of satisfaction of the two criteria. Such disadvantage is the inevitable concomitant of a suspension’). 5 See para B4.49. 6 The FA v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, para 6. 7 See eg Art 4.7.2 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, regarding where a Provisional Suspension has been imposed: ‘the Participant shall be given an opportunity to contest such Provisional Suspension in a Provisional Hearing taking place before the Chairman of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission (sitting alone) on a timely basis after its imposition.. At any such Provisional Hearing, it shall be the burden of the ICC to establish that in such circumstances, the integrity of the sport could be seriously undermined if he/she does not remain Provisionally Suspended pending determination of the charge(s) or such other date (as may be applicable)’. Such a hearing was held in the Pakistan spot-fixing case, where the Chairman of the ICC  Code of Conduct Commission, Michael Beloff QC, ruled that the first requirement (serious arguable case) did not mean (as Messrs Butt and Amir contended) that the case had to be proven (at that stage) beyond reasonable doubt; rather, it ‘means more than merely an arguable case. It is a case which is less than a prima facie case but more than one which establishes that [there is] a serious issue to be tried. […] It is not, however, necessary for the [ICC’s] ACSU General Manager to show that on a contested application he has much the better of the argument’. ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir, decision dated 10  November 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC  Code of Conduct Commission, on application by Messrs Butt and Amir to lift their provisional suspension, paras 9(1), 11. As to the second requirement, Mr Beloff ruled: ‘it seems to me that the phrase “in such circumstances” recognizes that there may be circumstances in which there is a strong arguable case against a Player but nonetheless the integrity of the sport would not be seriously undermined if a provisional suspension was not imposed on him, eg  if the Player’s offence was merely failure to act as a whistleblower by disclosing to the ACSU full details of any facts that have come to the

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  543 Player’s attention that may evidence an offence under the Code by another Player’. Ibid, para 9(2). He held these requirements were met in the case before him, largely because the videotapes shot by the undercover journalists appeared to show the players’ agent the night before the Lord’s Test, correctly predicting the incidence of three ‘no balls’ in England’s first innings in that Test, which was compelling prima facie evidence of fixing. He therefore did not lift the provisional suspension that had been imposed by the ICC when it charged the players.

D The impact of criminal proceedings B4.40 Conduct that breaches a sport’s anti-corruption code may also amount to a criminal offence, in the UK1 and/or overseas.2 And while it is clear that the police and the Crown Prosecution Service usually prefer to leave it to SGBs to take action in such cases,3 there are circumstances where they have to act themselves, for example because the publicity is too great to ignore (as in the Pakistani spot-fixing case), or because the corrupt actions involve serious criminality by notorious criminals who are beyond the SGB’s reach.4 Therefore, the SGB needs to be ready to decide what to do with its own disciplinary proceedings if the police start investigating the matter and the CPS starts considering criminal charges. The authors’ experience is that if the criminal authorities do get involved, they prefer that the sports bodies cede the field to them completely, staying any disciplinary investigation or proceedings until the criminal investigation and any criminal proceedings have been completed. This appears to be partly due to concerns about the competence and/or impartiality of the SGB in bringing its own charges (given that an unsuccessful outcome might undermine a subsequent criminal case), partly due to concerns that if the disciplinary proceedings are conducted first and a result adverse to the participants is published, they may argue that their right to a fair criminal trial has been prejudiced,5 but mostly due to an apparent desire to have complete control over the matter (including all witnesses and evidence) until criminal proceedings are complete. Nevertheless, there are good countervailing reasons for the SGB not to stay its own hand. For example, in some cases the initiative of SGBs can be important spurs to action by criminal authorities, and the investigation reports and reasoned decisions in sports corruption cases adjudicated by sports ethics bodies can lay the foundations for criminal authorities to open investigations/bring prosecutions. Alternatively, the police may take a long time to investigate the matter and the CPS may take a long time to decide whether to charge, and all the while the SGB may be perceived to be doing nothing to protect the sport.6 The participants in question could be provisionally suspended in the meantime,7 but out of fairness to them, and in light of its duty to maintain public confidence in its commitment to take robust action to defend its sport from corruption,8 the SGB needs to consider whether it is possible to press ahead rather than to stay its proceedings pending completion of the criminal investigation/proceedings.9 The longer that a provisional suspension is continued, the more susceptible it is likely to be to legal challenge, and in circumstances where no criminal prosecution may ensue at the end of a criminal investigation (on account, inter alia, of the requirement for a reasonable prospect of a conviction to the criminal standard of proof10), a SGB needs to consider and keep under review the appropriateness of suspending a participant and awaiting the outcome of any criminal process then afoot. There is no legal rule that sports disciplinary investigations/proceedings must be stayed while a criminal investigation is ongoing, or even if criminal charges are brought. To the contrary, English law recognises the strong public interest in disciplinary proceedings going ahead without delay, in order to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the sport and in the commitment of the regulators to take robust action to protect that integrity. Further, sports disciplinary bodies are likely to be able to impose sportsspecific sanctions if a disciplinary charge is upheld that are not available through any criminal process. Therefore, disciplinary proceedings should only be stayed if the defendant is able to show convincingly that there is a serious risk of serious

544  Regulating Sport

prejudice to them in their defence of the criminal proceedings.11 As a result, the SGB’s anti-corruption code needs to give it the power (but not the duty) to stay disciplinary proceedings pending completion of criminal investigations/proceedings where appropriate, so that it can take decisions on a case-by-case basis.12   1 See paras B4.48 and B4.49.   2 See para B4.50.   3 See para B4.53. They may argue, by analogy with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R  v Barnes [2004]  EWCA  Crim 3246 (see para G2.46), that the sport’s disciplinary rules create adequate sanctions for the player’s misconduct, and therefore it is not in the public interest to devote public funds to pursuing a criminal prosecution as well.   4 As in the case of the criminal proceedings in Germany relating to match-fixing in football: para B4.11, n 3.   5 The courts have consistently been robust on this point, insisting that the judge presiding over the criminal trial can protect against such prejudice by giving clear directions to the jury to decide the criminal case on the evidence alone. See eg A v Tayside Fire Board [2000] SC 232 (Outer House) (Lord Bonomy) (‘there is no reason to think that in this case, as distinct from other criminal cases, the jury could not be relied upon to reach a verdict on the evidence presented to them in the light of the directions given to them by the trial judge. There is in my opinion no basis for fearing that the jury in the criminal proceedings would act contrary to their directions. In any event, any trial will take place long after the conclusion of the proposed hearing’).   6 For example, after bookmakers reported suspicious betting on a snooker match between Stephen Maguire and Jamie Burnett on 14  December 2008, Strathclyde Police immediately launched a criminal investigation, but did not hand over a file to the Procurator Fiscal until April 2010, and the Procurator Fiscal then took until May 2011 to decide that there was insufficient evidence to charge the players: see ‘Maguire and Burnett not charged over snooker bet probe’, 18 May 2011 (bbc.co.uk). See also ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security [Chris Eaton] calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’, 22  August 2011 (insideworldfootball.biz) (‘Europe’s largest ever match-fixing trial, in Bochum, Germany, started in 2009 and found that over 100 games had been manipulated but it took over two years to conclude. “Who knows during that period how many matches were fixed by the same people who were eventually convicted?” asked Eaton. “We can’t wait for police in some countries to run their own long-term investigations. We want to take action against these ruthless criminals immediately”’).   7 See para B4.39.   8 See para B4.41, n 10.  9 See Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in Horseracing – An Independent Review’, 13 May 2008, para 8.18 (‘it is the widespread view of all of those the Review Team interviewed, not just that the criminal justice system is an inefficient and inadequate means by which to seek to regulate horseracing, but that the regulation of malpractice in horseracing can be better performed by the BHA than by external criminal prosecution agencies. This view is shared by the Review Team. The Review Team considers that the BHA should investigate and prosecute alleged breaches of the Rules and Orders of Racing notwithstanding that this conduct may amount to a criminal offence, subject to the exceptions set out below. The only circumstances in which disciplinary matters which are under investigation by the BHA should be remitted to the police or the Gambling Commission for consideration for criminal investigation are where the disciplinary powers of the BHA are so inadequate in an individual case that the evidence necessary to prove the charge cannot be obtained, or the penalty would be ineffective; where the conduct disclosed to the BHA concerns substantial non-racing or non-betting matters of a serious nature (eg  threats of violence, intimidation or blackmail); where the disciplinary panel, appeal board or the Board of the BHA recommends such a step at the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings’) and para 8.28 (‘The BHA has an overriding need to move more swiftly to protect the integrity of horseracing. While it fails to act or does not act, the integrity of horseracing may be subject to continuing damage. The BHA cannot allow its obligation to maintain the integrity of the sport to be compromised by the timetabling demands of a criminal investigation, as the objectives of the BHA as the regulator of horseracing, and the objectives of criminal authorities are very different. Therefore, in all but the most exceptional cases, breaches of the Rules of Racing should be investigated and prosecuted by the BHA [notwithstanding parallel criminal investigation and prosecution]’). 10 See the Code for Crown Prosecutors, 26  October 2018 (cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crownprosecutors [accessed 30 October 2020]). 11 See Neville Report, op cit, para  1.36 (‘There is no legal principle that prevents the BHA from investigating, or commencing or continuing disciplinary proceedings against a person subject to the Orders and Rules of Racing, notwithstanding that there is a risk that criminal or civil proceedings may be brought, or indeed in circumstances where they have already been commenced. In most cases there will be no impediment to the continuation of the BHA investigation and disciplinary process, but there are certain considerations in deciding whether to continue with disciplinary proceedings […]’); ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para  27(1) (‘There is no automatic right to have disciplinary proceedings postponed until criminal charges arising out of the

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  545 same factual matrix have been finally determined’), citing Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 2 All ER 1108, R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241 (QBD) (Woolf J), Archer v South West Thames Area Health Authority, unreported, 5 August 1985 (QBD) (Steyn J), and A v Tayside Fire Board [2000] SC 232 (Outer House). See also Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), para 3.25 (recognising that SGBs’ disciplinary investigations and proceedings relating to match-fixing and related corruption may proceed in parallel to criminal investigations and proceedings). Indeed, the strong public interest in effective enforcement of professional rules of conduct means that a stay of disciplinary proceedings should be refused unless the party seeking the stay can show that there is a real risk of serious prejudice leading to injustice in one or both proceedings if a stay is not granted. ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para 27(2), citing R v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, ex parte Gallagher, CA 30 September 1991, reported Law Society Gazette 15 April 1992; R v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, ex parte Brindle [1994] BCC 297, 316G-H; R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCC 524, 531. See also R v Chance, ex parte Smith, 1995 BCC 1095, 1100G; R v Executive Council for the Joint Disciplinary Scheme, ex parte Hipps, unreported, QBD, 12 June 1996 (Dyson J). If a real risk of serious prejudice is shown (eg from interference with prosecution witnesses after their ‘dry run’ in the disciplinary proceedings, or because publicity about the disciplinary proceedings might affect the jury in the criminal proceedings), there is authority that ‘a domestic tribunal ought, save exceptionally, to adjourn its proceedings’, but the strong public interest in not impeding the disciplinary process ‘requires the most penetrating analysis of whether the real risk has been established’. ICC  v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para  21(10). See also R  v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241 (QBD) (Woolf J) (‘while the court must have jurisdiction to intervene to prevent a serious injustice occurring, it will only do so in very clear cases in which the applicant can show that there is a real danger and not merely a notional danger that there would be a miscarriage of justice in the criminal proceedings if the court did not intervene’). Where the CPS has not yet decided whether to bring criminal charges, the potential criminal charges are different from the disciplinary charges (albeit that they arise out of the same facts), the standard of proof in the disciplinary proceedings is lower than the criminal standard (see para B4.37), any criminal trial will not take place for several months at least, after the disciplinary proceedings are over, and the judge presiding over the criminal trial can protect against unfairness by directing the jury to ignore anything other than the evidence before them, ‘the threshold of serious risk of serious prejudice to a criminal trial (if any) is certainly not reached’. ICC  v Butt et al, decision dated 23  December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para 32, para 33. In Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 44, the player argued that the publication of the first instance tribunal’s decision upholding the disciplinary charges against him violated his right to a fair trial on the criminal charges he subsequently faced, and so rendered those disciplinary proceedings (as opposed to the subsequent criminal proceedings) unlawful. The CAS panel quickly rejected that argument: ‘Even if [Mr Asif’s rights had been infringed], it would mean that the ICC and/or the Tribunal would be in contempt of court and/or that there would be prejudice to the criminal proceedings. These factors would not necessarily have any impact on the substance of the findings, which were considered and decided upon before publication of the Determination (publication ex post cannot impugn analysis conducted ex ante and any prejudice to the subsequent criminal proceedings does not impugn the analysis contained in the Determination). In addition, the Panel notes that Mr Asif was himself eager for the Tribunal proceedings to advance and that when afforded the opportunity, he did not object to the Tribunal proceedings advanced ahead of the criminal proceedings. He cannot therefore now claim that such advancement was to his detriment’. Why would a participant want to press ahead with the disciplinary proceedings if he also faced criminal charges based on the same conduct? He might hope that he can quickly clear his name in the disciplinary proceedings, thereby undermining the criminal case against him. But if he is unsuccessful in the disciplinary proceedings, and is banned from the sport for a long time, if he is also convicted of a criminal offence he can plead the disciplinary ban in mitigation of criminal sanction. Indeed, according to the judge who sentenced the Pakistani spot-fixers (R  v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Cooke, 3  November 2011), the disciplinary bans imposed on those players by the Anti-Corruption Tribunal meant that Salman Butt received a criminal sentence of 30 months rather than 48 months (ibid, para 28: ‘I take fully into account the ICC ban and the effect it has on you, which in itself is a considerable punishment for a man in your position. This enables me to take a more lenient course, than I otherwise might. But for that ban, the sentence would have been of the same order as that which I would have imposed on Majeed if he had not pleaded guilty’), and also triggered lenient treatment for Mohammad Asif (ibid, para 33: ‘I take account of all that is said on your behalf and in particular I bear in mind the 7 year ICC ban imposed last year, of which 2 years are suspended, and its effect on your career as a fast bowler now aged 28, which means that your cricketing career is effectively over. This in itself is a considerable punishment for a man in your position. This enables me to take a more lenient course, than I otherwise might. That is the punishment imposed by the cricket

546  Regulating Sport authorities but these crimes of which you have been convicted require that a sentence be imposed which marks them for what they are and acts as a deterrent for any future cricketers who may be tempted’) and Mohammad Amir (ibid, para 43: ‘I take account also of the 5 year ICC ban imposed last year, and its effect on your career as a fast bowler now aged 19, which will create problems for you in returning to play when the ban expires. That is the punishment imposed by the cricket authorities but these crimes of which you have been convicted require that a sentence be imposed which marks them for what they are and acts as a deterrent for any future cricketers who may be tempted, notwithstanding the mitigation which I have heard’). 12 See eg Art 10.2 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (‘[…] the ICC has the right (but no obligation) to suspend investigations under this Anti-Corruption Code to avoid prejudice to, and/or to give precedence to, investigations conducted by other relevant authorities into the same or related matters’); IBU  Integrity Code, Chapter E, Art 3.5 (‘Where it deems it appropriate, the BIU may coordinate and/or stay its own investigation pending the outcome of investigations and/or prosecutions by other competent bodies, including law enforcement and/or other regulatory or disciplinary bodies’).

5 SANCTIONS IN CORRUPTION CASES B4.41 The SGB also needs to consider what sanctions should apply in the case of proven breaches of the anti-corruption code. Few anti-corruption codes provide for disqualification of results of matches affected by corruption,1 but all of them provide for the offending party to be banned for a period from participating in the sport. How long should the ban be? Simply leaving the question to the discretion of the hearing panel is not helpful to that panel, which will expect at least some guidance as to the relative seriousness with which the regulator views the different offences in the code (or else it is likely to seek to establish comparators within or without the sport by reference to past cases).2 The regulator should therefore consider specifying either fixed bans for the different offences, reflecting what it believes to be necessary to protect the sport,3 or else a range of permissible bans, with a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating factors to guide the hearing panel as to where to fix the ban within that range in a particular case.4 As is the case with all sanctions for professional misconduct, the sanctions imposed for breach of the anti-corruption rules must be proportionate to the offence,5 and the rules should generally not paint the tribunal into a corner by denying it any discretion to address the circumstances appropriately.6 However, in considering what is proportionate, the sports body (and the hearing panel exercising any discretion given to it by that sports body) is entitled to weigh against the impact of a ban on the athlete not only the importance of the objectives underlying the rules (English courts and tribunals have repeatedly recognised that the profound threat that corruption presents to sport justifies a rigorous regulatory response7), the seriousness of the particular breach of those rules by the participant,8 the need to deter others from similar wrongdoing,9 the need to protect the image of the sport, and above all the need to maintain public confidence in the determination of the sport to stamp out corruption.10 It is also well-established that considerable deference is to be given to the experience and expertise of the SGB in weighing up those competing considerations and determining what is required to protect its sport, so much so that that judgment will not be disturbed unless it is so unreasonable that no rational person could agree with it.11   1 Disqualification of results is standard in doping cases (see para C23.1 et seq.), but there of course the corruption is designed to enhance performance, not to impede it. It is far less obvious that results tainted by match-fixing or spot-fixing or similar misconduct should be disqualified. For example, Art 6.3.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code specifies that ‘the Anti-Corruption Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to adjust, reverse or amend the results of an International Match or ICC Event’. In contrast, however, Art 6.10.2 of World Rugby Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) specifies that in all cases, in addition to bans and fines, the Judicial Officer should consider ‘appropriate further options including without limitation the cancellation of sports results/events, demotion, points reduction, return of rewards, replay of fixtures (for example in cases of Match Official corruption) where risk of fraud has been established or identified, withdrawal of accreditation, exclusion from Match venues and/or official Player environs, as appropriate’.

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  547   2 Hearing panels are unlikely to be impressed, for example, with World Rugby Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting), which for every single offence specifies a range of sanctions from a reprimand and/ or warning all the way up to a life ban (Art 6.10.2) (although it does then provide a list of potential aggravating and mitigating factors to give the Judicial Officer at least a little bit of guidance: Arts 6.10.3 and 6.10.4).   3 As an example, the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code fixes four years as the standard ban for most first offences, absent any mitigating or aggravating factors. (See Chapter C16 (Basic period of ineligibility)). Another option would be to fix a minimum sanction for an offence, and leave it to the hearing panel to decide whether (and, if so, how far) to go above the minimum. For example, Art 6 of the ICC AntiCorruption Code sets out a range of possible sanctions for each offence, between a fixed minimum and maximum, including a range of five years to life for the most serious offences, involving corruption or intended or attempted corruption of events on the field of play. In ICC  v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, paras 205–210 and para 237, the hearing panel rejected the players’ arguments that it should go lower than from the five-year minimum in the circumstances of that case, even against Mr Amir, the very inexperienced 19-year-old bowler, whom it found to be least culpable of the three: ‘Although the minimum sanction is severe, it is not so severe as in his case to take it into the realms of gross disproportion or oppression such as might enable us to disapply the Code. We have to balance private and public interest’. However, the hearing panel did add the following ‘recommendation’ at the end of its determination (at paras 241–42): ‘We appreciate that in devising the Code the ICC must have evaluated the need for the sanctions prescribed in the context of the international game, and in an endeavour to restore to the hallowed phrase “It just isn’t cricket” its previous role as a hallmark of honesty. Nonetheless, informed as we are by our diverse judicial experience, we would suggest that part of the Code relating to sanctions might usefully have injected into it a measure of flexibility. Continuity and consistency are important legal values, but minimum sanctions always pose problems for judges who wish to tailor penalties to a range of diverse facts, not all of which can have been envisaged by the legislative body: hypothetical examples where a minimum 5 year ban would be palpably unfair can be easily suggested. An ability to suspend or part suspend a ban would allow greater play to a Tribunal’s sense of what is fair and reasonable in special circumstances. Alternatively, the ICC itself might be accorded the power to refer a case to the Tribunal to consider the lifting of a ban, if, since its imposition, circumstances had changed in a material way’. A similar concern had been expressed in WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16 May 2008, paras 50–53, in relation to a fixed penalty of two years for the offence of receiving a benefit in circumstances that might bring the game into disrepute: ‘50. The Committee as a whole was extremely disappointed to note that the prescribed penalty to be imposed for commission of the offence the majority found proved is a minimum ban for a period of two years. The apparent mandatory nature of this minimum penalty does not at all sit well with the Committee. While we appreciate the need to be firm in wiping out every vestige of corruption in international cricket, we have serious reservations about the propriety of a Code that prescribes mandatory minimum punishments generally and particularly for the offence the majority found proved. 51. From the standpoint of both the offence concerned and the person who might commit the same, an enormous range in character and culpability is possible. The circumstances in which this particular offence may be committed and the personal background and motive of the offender may vary radically from one accused person to another. As indicated before, the offence does not only target the corrupt and the dishonest. It is therefore wholly unreasonable and unfair to visit upon all who are caught within its reach a uniform and very severe penalty of a mandatory two year ban. […] We consider a minimum two year ban to be entirely disproportionate in the circumstances. […] 53. If the prescribed penalty remains unaltered, it is quite likely that tribunals in the future may, in certain cases, refuse to find proven cases laid under this part of the Code only because of the unjust nature of the mandatory sentence that must be imposed. In other words, the cricketer concerned and/or cricket itself may well have been brought into disrepute but the offender would be entirely exonerated by tribunals sympathetic to the plight of the player. We do not think that such a scenario conduces to the aims of the Anti-Corruption Unit’. The ICC Code of Conduct Commission agreed, on the basis that ‘the consequences of a 2 year ban on someone found to be guilty of lack of prudence rather than lack of probity may appear to infringe the principle of proportionality’. Marlon Samuels, Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 9.5. In his 2011 review of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, Bertrand de Speville also took the view that breaches of the anti-corruption regulations may not merit the minimum period of ineligibility specified, and that minimum sanctions might therefore cause tribunals to dismiss the charge rather than impose what they perceived to be an unjust punishment. He therefore recommended that the ICC should adhere to the ‘normal principle in the administration of justice of leaving it to the tribunal to impose the appropriate sentence, subject to a maximum’. De Speville, ‘A  Review of the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’, August 2011 (reissued with minor amendments January 2012). And in its 2012 report, the MCC World Cricket Committee also recommended that there should be no minimum sanctions for specific offences, and that the hearing panel body should instead have the flexibility to determine different sanctions to fit different crimes. However, it did recommend that ‘sentences should tend toward the severe, and captains, vice captains and coaches

548  Regulating Sport should be dealt with most harshly, given their positions of power and influence’, receiving life bans. Marylebone Cricket Club, ‘Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to ICC’s Anti-Corruption and Security Unit’, 20 February 2012. On appeal in Salman Butt’s case, however, the CAS panel rejected Mr Butt’s submission that it should impose a sanction that was lower than the 5-year minimum mandated under the ICC AntiCorruption Code. Butt v ICC, CAS  2011/A/2364, para  42. It reasoned that ‘as a general rule, significant deference should be afforded to a sporting body’s expertise and authority to determine the minimum level of sanction required to achieve its strategic imperatives’ (ibid, at para 55, see also para 73), and asserted that ‘the Panel will only deviate from that minimum level of sanction where the case gives rise to exceptional circumstances (including where the sanction is disproportionate)’. Ibid, para  73; see also paras 56, 63. And it said: ‘[T]he Panel does not consider unreasonable or perverse a minimum sanction of 5 years ineligibility for engaging in corruption in breach of Article  2.1.1 of the ICC  Code. Such a sanction is significantly shorter than equivalent sanctions in other sports. […] Accordingly, in the Panel’s view, the sanction imposed on Mr Butt is rational where, as here, the conduct had the potential to, and did, impair significantly the credibility of the game’. Ibid. para  69. It was not persuaded that ‘the sanction imposed by the Tribunal was disproportionate. It is also not persuaded that any of the mitigating factors advanced by Mr Butt qualify as exceptional circumstances, which would enable the Panel to modify the minimum sanction […] ’. Ibid, para 76.   4 For example, the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme provides that the sanction for most player offences will be up to three years, but gives the hearing panel to go up as far as a life-ban for the most serious offences (those aimed at corrupting performances on the field of play, those involving provision of inside information, and those involving failures to report). See UTACP Art H.1.a. It also provides for a fine of ‘up to $250,000 plus an amount equal to the value of any winnings or other amounts received […] in connection with any Corruption Offense’. Ibid. The sanction for most offences involving non-players is loss of accreditation for at least one year. Ibid, para H.1.b. The BHA’s Guide to Procedures and Penalties specifies a range of sanctions for each offence, with an entry point. This approach, also taken in rugby union when sanctioning on-field misconduct, has some similarities with sentencing guidelines in the criminal courts. The model rules produced by the Sports Betting Integrity Panel, ASOIF, and SportAccord all carefully avoid specifying what the sanctions should be for breach of those rules. For example, the SportAccord rules simply state that the sanctions should be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), p  3. The IAAF announced in July 2012 that it was adopting the ASOIF  Model Rules for athletics and would include provision for a ban of two to four years for breach of those rules: ‘IAAF  Unveils Sanctions for Illegal Betting at London Olympics’, 5  July 2012, aroundtherings.com/articles/view. aspx?id=39941. Any breaches of Rule 3 of the World Athletics Manipulation of Sports Competition Rules (as developed from the 2018 Model Rules), covering illegal betting, are dealt with under the disciplinary proceedings set out in the World Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal Rules. The Disciplinary Tribunal therefore has discretion to impose a sanction up to and including a life ban (Rule 11 World Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal Rules). See para B4.21, n 2 regarding those Model Rules, intended to be incorporated by international federations and their members above and beyond the ASOIF Model Rules). Further, more detailed, guidelines as to sanction are set out in the Guidelines for the Sanctioning of Competition Manipulation by Sports Organisations, an internal reference document published by the Olympic Movement Unit on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions in October 2018. Section 7 of the Guidelines sets out the relevant sanctioning period for the offences of betting (0-3 years), manipulation and corrupt conduct (24 years), inside information (0–3 years), and failure to report a corrupt approach (0–2 years).   5 See generally para B1.31 et seq. In relation to doping sanctions, see paras C20.14–C20.19.  6 See eg  Bradley v Jockey Club [2004]  EWHC  2164 (QB), paras 27, 108, aff’d [2005]  EWCA  Civ 1056, discussed at paras E7.15–E7.21. CAS jurisprudence is to the same effect. See eg Al Eid v FEI, CAS 2012/A/2807, para 10.24 (‘in exercising its discretion under Article 10.2, the key consideration should be the legal principle of proportionality, ie  the sanction has to be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, taking into account the underlying objectives of the ECM Rules and the mischief they are aimed at preventing. Or, in more formal terms, (i) the objectives being pursued must be sufficiently important to justify taking away an offender’s right to pursue his or her profession, (ii) the sanction imposed must be rationally connected to the pursuit of those objectives, and (iii) it must go no further than is necessary to meet those objectives’) and para 10.25 (‘There is therefore a balancing exercise to be done. The Panel must assess (1) the culpability of the offender; and (2) the harm caused or risked by his offence, measured in each case by reference to the objectives of the rules in question and in particular the mischief that they are aimed at preventing. Against that, the Panel should weigh the impact of the sanction on the offender, and any mitigating factors’). See also WPBSA  v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 September 2013, paras 4 and 7 (‘the sanction imposed must be proportionate to the circumstances of the particular case and the particular defendant’), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014.   7 For example, in Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB), para 109, aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, in rejecting the jockey’s challenge to the proportionality of a five-year ban imposed on him

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  549 for selling inside information and other breaches, Mr Justice Richards acknowledged the importance of strong rules with strict sanctions to counter corruption in horseracing (‘As to the objectives of the disciplinary procedures and the importance of those objectives, the Board was clearly entitled to view the relevant Rules [of Racing] as being essential to the maintenance of the integrity of racing and to attach corresponding importance to the enforcement of those Rules’). Similarly, in Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006]  EWHC  2030 (QB), para  58, the High Court upheld the HRA Appeal Board’s decision to suspend the jockey pending determination of charges against him (see para B4.39) because of ‘the damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely damaged both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such; and by the adverse reaction of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged with an offence which is so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate’. See likewise the sentencing remarks of Judge Anthony Morris QC in R  v Westfield, 17  February 2012, p 3 (‘If because of corrupt payments it cannot be guaranteed that every player will play to the best of his ability, the reality is that the enjoyment of many millions of people around the world who watch cricket, whether on television or at cricket grounds, will eventually be destroyed. […] In my judgment it is necessary to impose an immediate custodial sentence in this case not only to mark the seriousness of the offence but also to deter others in your position from accepting such corrupt payments’); and of the Court of Appeal in R v Amir & Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914, para 32 (‘If for money or any other extraneous reward it cannot be guaranteed that every Test player will play on the day as best he may, the reality is that the enjoyment of many millions of people around the world who watch cricket, whether on the television or at Test Matches, will eventually be destroyed’) and para 35 (‘cricket will be poorer for the loss [of Mohammad Amir during his ban]. But in the long term the game would be utterly impoverished if the court failed to make it clear that conduct like this is not simply a matter of breaking the rules of the game and therefore subject to internal regulation and discipline by the ICC, but that it is also criminal conduct of a very serious kind which must be marked with a criminal sanction’); and in Majeed v R; Westfield v R, [2012] EWCA Crim 1186, para 1 (‘The prizes for successful gambling [on cricket] can be very great, and the scope for corruption is therefore considerable. For the health, indeed the survival of the game as a truly competitive sport, it must be eradicated’). Sports tribunals have been similarly robust. For example, the hearing panel in ECB  v Kaneria & Westfield stated: ‘Self evidently, corruption, specifically spot fixing, in cricket or any other sport for that matter, is a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game. For the general public, supporting the game and their team within it, there is no merit or motivation to expend time, money or effort to watch a match whose integrity may be in doubt. The consequences of the public’s disengagement from cricket would be catastrophic. Furthermore, the game of cricket simply cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished in the eyes of commercial partners. These partners could not and would not link their brand to a sport whose integrity had been so undermined. For players who have devoted their entire careers to the pursuit of hard fought and properly competitive sport, to have those genuine achievements called into question by the corrupt actions of a tiny minority, may tend to devalue their worth. Accordingly, we have no doubt that this is a cancer which must be rooted out of the game of cricket’. ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, para 14, appeal against liability denied, 26 April 2013, appeal against sanction denied, 9 July 2013. And the CAS itself has said the same thing on several occasions. For example, the CAS panel in AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, paras 25, 125, noted: ‘[25] […] integrity, in football, is crucially related to the authenticity of results, and has a critical core which is that, in the public’s perception, both single matches and entire championships must be a true test of the best athletic, technical, coaching and management skills of the opposing sides. Due to the high social significance of football in Europe, it is not enough that competing athletes, coaches or managers are in fact honest; the public must perceive that they try their best to win and, in particular, that clubs make management or coaching decisions based on the single objective of their club winning against any other club. This particular requirement is inherent in the nature of sports […]. [125] The Panel is of the opinion that among the “myriad of rules” needed to organize a football competition, rules bound to protect the authenticity of results appear to be of the utmost importance’. The CAS panel in Montcourt v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630, paras 48-49, held: ‘Competitive sports depend on the public perception that events are not fixed. The sports authorities determined several decades ago that wagering by professional athletes on events in their own sport, even by athletes not involved in the relevant event, is likely to erode the legitimacy of the sport and give opportunities for unscrupulous exploitation of athletes who embark on the slippery slope of betting. This is especially true of sports like tennis, where it is sufficient to corrupt a single player to fix the outcome. [49] The sport of professional tennis has therefore established a prohibition on wagering by its practitioners. This is a condition of participating in the sport. The Appellant has not come close to convincing the Panel that this policy and legislation is illegitimate […]’. The CAS panel in Fusimalohi v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 165, held: ‘Matchfixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion, bribery and the like are a growing concern in many major sports. The conduct of economic and business affairs related to sporting events requires the observance of certain “rules of the game” for the related activities to proceed in an orderly fashion. The very essence of sport is that competition must be fair. This is also true for the organization of an

550  Regulating Sport event of the importance and magnitude of the FIFA World Cup, where dishonesty has no place. In the Panel’s view, it is therefore essential for sporting regulators not to tolerate any kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted to consider adopting improper conducts for their personal gain’. The CAS panel in PTIOs v Liindahl, CAS 207/A/4956, para 67, was equally clear that ‘Match-fixing is one of the most serious types of corruption offences in sport and tennis regulators are right in demonstrating zero tolerance to match-fixing and imposing severe sanctions which both punish a corrupt player and also serve as an effective deterrent for other players’. See also ibid, para 77: ‘The Panel views match-fixing as a severe corruption offense which must be severely punished in order to both represent the disgust of the sporting community from such behaviour and deter sports people from engaging or assisting in such acts. These offenses endanger the whole premise upon which sports are built and may risk the existence of sports in future. The Panel believes that an offense of match-fixing on its own is grave enough and that one should not “count” offenses or look only into whether it was an “active” or a “passive” act in order to decide on the exact sanction in a given case’). On that basis, CAS panels have consistently upheld very substantial bans imposed on those found to have acted corruptly: see para B4.43.  8 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216, para 113 (‘Having directed itself correctly and given proper consideration to all relevant matters, the Board then carried out, as it was required to do, a careful balancing exercise, looking on the one hand at the important purpose served by the Rules and the seriousness of the breaches of those Rules, and, on the other hand, at the mitigation and at the impact of disqualification upon the claimant and his family’), aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056.   9 Ibid, para 109 (‘[The Board] was entitled to look to a penalty that reflected, as it said, the elements of punishment, deterrence and prevention. In relation to deterrence it bore properly in mind that the level of increase so as to deter others from like conduct must not be out of proportion to the size of penalty which would otherwise fall to be imposed, and it made the reasonable observation that the extent to which the passing of information had been revealed in the particular inquiry demonstrated the need for an element of deterrence’), aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. See also Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 78 (‘match-fixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion, bribery and the like are a growing concern, indeed a cancer, in many major sports, football included, and must be eradicated. The very essence of sport is that competition is fair, its attraction to spectators is the unpredictability of its outcome […] . It is therefore essential in the Panel’s view for sporting regulators to demonstrate zero tolerance against all kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted through greed or fear to consider involvement in such criminal activities. Match officials are an obvious target for those ·who wish to make illicit profit through gambling on match results (or indeed on the occurrence of incidents within matches). They must be reinforced in their resistance to such criminal approaches. CAS must, applying naturally to considerations of legality and of proportionality, respect in its awards the approaches of such regulators devoted to such virtuous ends’), endorsed in Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 120, and see para 130 (‘It is important that the period of a banning order imposed should act as an effective deterrent to those who might be tempted in the future to act in a similar way. […] It is also necessary to take into account the future consequences that a reduction in the ban would likely have for the sport of badminton’); ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 217 (‘We must take account of the greater interests of cricket which the Code itself is designed to preserve and protect. There must, we consider, be a deterrent aspect to our sanction. … Such sanctions as we impose must accordingly ensure that players are fully aware that dire consequences await them should it ever be shown that they have been parties to spot fixing or other corrupt practices’); and, on appeal from that decision, Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 72 (rejecting plea against seven-year sanction on ground that ‘given the history of corruption in cricket and the considerable adverse publicity caused by this episode, the Panel considers that strong enforcement action is necessary to send a signal of deterrence’); Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, appeals against penalties, para 8 (‘The penalties on Mr Nick Gold and Mr Peter Gold [exclusion orders of 7 and 5 years respectively] may to some seem harsh. But this conspiracy and particularly the conduct of Mr Sines and Mr Crickmore struck at the heart of the integrity of Racing. It must be made clear to all those who contemplate taking part in this sort of conspiracy, in whatever capacity, that they must expect that the penalties for doing so will be severe’). Cf WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 September 2013, para 7 (‘It is therefore essential that [the] sanction is indeed sufficient to deter others from match-fixing and spotfixing. It need not follow however that only a life-time ban will operate as such a sufficient deterrent. And in any event, the sanction imposed must be proportionate to the circumstances of the particular case and particular defendant. It is trite that a more effective deterrent is not justified if the punishment does not fit the crime’), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014. In The Football Association v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 185, the Appeal Board (following the judgment of Richards J in Bradley) rejected the player’s submission that it was disproportionate to increase a sanction purely to deter persons other than the player (‘We consider that the Commission was entitled to impose sanctions upon the Respondent that reflected elements of punishment, deterrence and prevention and that it was entitled to increase the level of sanctions imposed in order to deter (both the Respondent and others) provided that such an increase

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  551 was not out of proportion to the size of penalty which would otherwise fall to be imposed’). See also PTIOs v Kryvonos, AHO decision dated 18 May 2017, para 78 (‘I have found that the Player deliberately engaged in conduct, through double faulting, which completely demolished the integrity of the first round qualifying Match in the Tournament. I have found that this deliberate play, which coincided with betting activity, made a complete mockery of the Match. The function and purpose of the Match is to determine the best qualified player to proceed to the upcoming Tournament. That function and purpose was lost by the Player’s actions on court. Therefore, the underlying purpose and function of the Match was destroyed by the corruption that occurred. Such conduct affects the integrity of the Tournament but also the integrity of the tennis community at large. lt has a pervasive effect beyond the individual and his misconduct. The impact on the tennis community justifies a significant sanction to deter others beyond any aspect of the sanction based upon individual deterrence and punishment’). 10 Indeed, the Court of Appeal has confirmed (in the context of sanctions imposed on solicitors for professional misconduct) that this objective takes precedence over other sanctioning factors (such as the financial impact that a prospective sanction would have on the individual offender, and/or that there is little risk of re-offending), and can require and justify the imposition of the most serious sanctions available: ‘To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied readmission […] A  profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires’. Bolton v Law Society [1994] 2 All ER 486 [CA] at 519E. The Court of Appeal made the same point again in the specific context of a sport’s anti-corruption rules in Bradley v Jockey Club [2005]  EWCA  1056, para  24: ‘Where an individual takes up a profession or occupation that depends critically upon the observance of certain rules, and then deliberately breaks those rules, he cannot be heard to contend that he has a vested right to continue to earn his living in that profession or occupation. Any disciplinary tribunal, or the court when exercising a supervisory jurisdiction, must give careful consideration to whether the circumstances require a penalty that will prevent the culprit from continuing to earn his living in his chosen profession or occupation. But a penalty which deprives him of that right may well be the only appropriate response to his offending’. Many hearing panels have emphasised this point. See eg Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel decision 2018/01, para 255 (‘it is paramount, where an individual has undertaken corrupt behaviour or behaviour which directly strikes at the heart and essence of sporting competition, that a significant sanction must be issued: both as a strong deterrent to future offenders, but also and primarily to demonstrate the seriousness of the violation and the zero-tolerance to be shown to such behaviour’), aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847; The Football Association v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 199 (‘On two separate occasions on 19  January 2019 the Respondent issued unequivocal instructions to Leon to bet £1,000 on his moving to Sevilla. The fact that no bet was placed and the fact that on 20 January 2019 the Respondent directed Leon not to bet are obvious mitigating features. However, the plain fact is that it was a matter of chance so far as the Respondent was concerned that Leon did not bet as he was instructed to do. Such flagrant breaches of the Rules called for sanctions which combined punishment, deterrence and prevention. They also called for sanctions which made it clear to the public that the Regulatory Commission was intent upon protecting the integrity of the sport. Further, in our view, there needed to be some correlation between the sanctions imposed and the guideline for the offence of providing inside information for the purpose of betting. In our view a suspension of 6 weeks (with 4 of those weeks not to be served unless the Respondent re-offended) did not achieve those objectives and that is so even though such a sanction was additional to a financial penalty of £75,000. We appreciate that the list of genuine mitigating features was long in this case but, despite that, the length of the suspension should have been measured in months not weeks. Further, in our view, there was no basis for a direction that part of the suspension should not take effect unless the Respondent reoffended’); RFU v Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018, para 77 (‘In deciding what the appropriate sanction should be we have reminded ourselves that breaches of anti-corruption regulations undermines public confidence in the integrity of the sport and strikes at the foundations of the values of the game. It is fundamental to the integrity of the game that the public has confidence that those regulated within the sport are properly adhering to the anti-corruption rules. Any breaches of such rules must be treated seriously’). The ‘Bolton rule’ has also been relied on by BHA Licensing Committees to decline applications from those banned for ‘stopping’ or corrupt conspiracy for reinstatement after the expiry of their bans. Fergal Lynch, Licensing Committee decision dated 28 February 2011, at para 30 (‘30. In our decision similar considerations [to those discussed in Bolton in relation to solicitors] apply to jockeys, albeit in this different context. … Take, for example, the stopping of a horse. The consequences are not limited to the financial loss of those who gambled on the specific race in the belief that it was a genuine contest between each horse. The consequences extend to the potential for raising public doubt over the genuineness of other races. In the absence of appropriate measures not only of punishment but also of condemnation and protection from the possibility of the act itself, the obvious danger is that public confidence will be undermined and with it the reputation of British horse racing. There is potentially a very slippery slope and one which is relevant to the ambit of the test of suitability to be applied under the Rules. In our decision those factors can lead a Licensing Committee to decide not to grant a licence

552  Regulating Sport irrespective of the efforts made by the jockey concerned to re-establish him/herself and to show he/she is now a redeemed character. In our judgment the Rule requiring suitability is to be construed in the manner we have decided to maintain and protect public reputation and confidence. The public must be able to trust jockeys and the Principle is to be applied to the test of suitability in appropriate cases’). 11 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004]  EWHC  216, para  43 (‘The test of proportionality [of the penalty imposed] requires the striking of a balance between competing considerations. The application of the test in the context of penalty will not necessarily produce just one right answer: there is no single “correct” decision. Different decision-makers may come up with different answers, all of them reached in an entirely proper application of the test. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised that, in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular, whether it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of discretion. The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of judgment. Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range of reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests. The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate. The court’s role, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, is to determine whether the decision reached falls within the limits of the decision-maker’s discretionary area of judgment. If it does, the penalty is lawful; if it does not, the penalty is unlawful. It is not the role of the court to stand in the shoes of the primary decision-maker, strike the balance for itself and determine on that basis what it considers the right penalty to be’) and at para 46 (‘The importance of the court limiting itself to a supervisory role of the kind I have described is reinforced in the present case by the fact that the Appeal Board includes members who are knowledgeable about the racing industry and are better placed than the court to decide on the importance of the rules in question and the precise weight to be attached to breaches of those rules’), aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. See also Brennan v Health Professions Council [2011] EWHC 41 (Admin), para 59 (deferring to Council to determine appropriate sanction, because it is ‘better placed to understand what the physiotherapy professional needs in a case of this sort […] to deter other physiotherapists from similar behaviour and to maintain the confidence of the public, and of the sporting world in particular, in the integrity of the profession’). The Commercial Court considering the challenge to the life ban imposed on Danish Kaneria to be within the range of reasonable responses to his offence: Kaneria v ECB [2014] EWCH 1348.

B4.42 This is clearly illustrated by the CAS  panel’s award in Butt v ICC. The ICC Anti-Corruption Code specified that the sanctions for the spot-fixing the players were found to have committed1 had to include a ban of at least five years and up to life. At first instance, the hearing panel banned Butt for ten years, Asif for seven years, and Amir for five years, on the basis (inter alia) that spot-fixing was not as serious as match-fixing,2 and that overly harsh sanctions would bring the system into disrepute. Wishing to give the players an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, the hearing panel also suspended the last five years of Butt’s ban and the last two years of Asif’s ban so that, if they met specified conditions, then like Amir they would also be able to return to the sport after only five years each, ie they would also only serve the minimum ban required under the Code.3 Many perceived those sanctions to be lenient, given the damage the players had done to the sport,4 but Butt and Asif still appealed to CAS on the basis that the bans were disproportionate. The CAS panel did not hesitate in rejecting those appeals, noting that ‘significant deference should be shown to the ICC in developing sanctions to meet its strategic priorities. That deference should only be deviated from on grounds of irrationality where the decision to sanction or the length of the sanction was self-evidently unreasonable or perverse’.5 Notably, it said: ‘The Panel does not consider unreasonable or perverse a minimum sanction of 5 years ineligibility for engaging in corruption in breach of Article 2.1.1 of the ICC Code. Such a sanction is significantly shorter than equivalent sanctions in other sports. […] Accordingly, in the Panel’s view, the sanction imposed on Mr Butt is rational where, as here, the conduct had the potential to, and did, impair significantly the credibility of the game’.6 It ruled that ‘consistent with the principles established in Puerta, the Panel will only deviate from that minimum level of sanction where the case gives rise to exceptional circumstances (including where the sanction is disproportionate)’.7 And it was not persuaded that ‘the sanction imposed by the Tribunal was disproportionate. It is also not persuaded that any of the mitigating factors advanced by Mr Butt qualify as exceptional circumstances, which would enable the Panel to modify the minimum sanction […]’.8

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  553 1 See para B4.22. 2 ICC  v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5  February 2011, para  201. Cf WPBSA  v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24  September 2013, para  6 (‘The damage to the sporting integrity of a contest is clear if the end result is fixed. But there is also damage to the sporting integrity of a contest if even a part of it is not played honestly without affecting the end result. Participants, spectators and television audiences are entitled to see the entire contest played out with both sides trying their best. Furthermore, it may often not be possible to engage in such “spotfixing” without at least the potential for the end result to be affected. […] [7] It is therefore essential that sanction is indeed sufficient to deter others from match-fixing and spot-fixing’), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014 3 Ibid at para 23. 4 In Kaneria v Westfield, ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 4, Danish Kaneria cited the Butt decision as part of his challenge to the life ban imposed on him at first instance for inducing Mervyn Westfield to spot fix (para B4.49(iii)). The ECB Appeal Panel rejected his appeal, noting: ‘The Panel has taken full account of the cases drawn to its attention and, in particular, the more modest sentences imposed in the cases of Butt and others. Each case must be considered on its own merits and within the context of the problems faced in the relevant jurisdictions. It is noted that Mr Butt’s appeal to the CAS was on technical grounds and CAS was not asked by the ICC to consider whether the sentences were unduly lenient. The Panel, whilst noting the authorities which suggest that spot-fixing might be less serious than match-fixing, consider that, in the circumstances of this case, the distinction is not significant. Spot-fixing, being easier to arrange and harder to detect is an on-going evil as are recent trends further to extend corruption to less high-profile cricket’. Ibid at p 5. 5 Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 69. 6 Ibid, para 73. 7 Ibid, para 69. (As to the Puerta principles, see para C20.17). 8 Ibid, para 76.

B4.43 Because of the threat that corruption poses to sport, hearing panels have not hesitated to impose very lengthy bans for corruption offences.1 And CAS panels have repeatedly upheld the proportionality of life bans for acts of corruption in appropriate circumstances. In Pobeda, the president of a football club who was found to have attempted to fix a UEFA  Europa League football match was banned for life from the sport, even though he personally did not carry out any corrupt acts on the field of play. On appeal, the CAS panel said that it was ‘aware of the severe consequence of the sanction imposed on Mr Zabrcanec. It does, however, not find any mitigating circumstances which could lead to a reduction of the sanction. Match fixing is one of the worst possible infringements of the integrity of sports. Therefore, the Panel finds that a life ban from any football related activities against Mr Zabrcanec is an adequate sanction and not disproportionate’.2 Similarly, in Oriekhov, a football referee was banned for life for failing to report an offer of a bribe to fix a match, even though he had no prior disciplinary offences and there was no finding that he had actually fixed the match or that he had received any money to do so. In rejecting the referee’s argument that a life ban was disproportionate to his offence, the CAS panel emphasised again that the supreme importance of preserving public confidence in the integrity of the sport far outweighs the adverse impact on the livelihood of the banned offender.3 Meanwhile in Köllerer, where the appellant was banned for life for having offered three fellow tennis players bribes to lose specific matches, the CAS panel stated: ‘After careful deliberation, this Panel sees no option other than to confirm the lifetime ban imposed by the [Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer]. As explained in detail by the Governing Bodies, the sport of tennis is extremely vulnerable to corruption as a match-fixer only needs to corrupt one player (rather than a full team). It is therefore imperative that, once a Player gets caught, the Governing Bodies send out a clear signal to the entire tennis community that such actions are not tolerated. This Panel agrees that any sanction shorter than a lifetime ban would not have the deterrent effect that is required to make players aware that it is simply not worth the risk’.4

And in Savic, the CAS panel endorsed that reasoning and rejected another tennis player’s appeal against a life ban imposed for offering a fellow player a bribe to lose the first set of a match, on the basis that:

554  Regulating Sport ‘[…] the interest that the sanctioning authority is seeking to enforce is the protection of the integrity of sport against corruption, a fundamental sporting principle explicitly mentioned in the UTAP provisions. This is a compelling interest to balance against the appellant’s rights to work unlike the obviously lesser interest of contractual stability sought to be relied on by FIFA in Matuzalem to justify a life ban. There are other means to enforce a debt than a lifetime ban; but such a ban is the only truly effective means of purging a sport of corruption’.5

Similarly, in Lamptey v FIFA, a CAS panel upheld a lifetime ban imposed by FIFA on the referee Joseph Lamptey for conspiring unlawfully to influence match results in his role as referee in the FIFA World Cup qualifier match held between South Africa and Senegal on 12 November 2016, stating: ‘the very essence of sport is that competition is fair, its attraction to spectators is the unpredictability of its outcome. It is therefore essential in the Panel’s view for sporting regulators to demonstrate zero tolerance against all kinds of activities intended to influence the result of a match in a manner contrary to sporting ethics[…]’.6

On the other hand, in Sammut v UEFA, a CAS panel found the life ban imposed by the UEFA appeals panel disproportionate, and replaced it with a 10-year ban, because although it had been proven that the player was an accomplice in the agreement to lose a UEFA European Championship qualifying match 0-4, it had not been proven whether he actually took active steps to help throw the match: ‘At least in theory, Mr Sammut could have simply been a messenger between the unknown players who actually conspired to implement the fix and the persons who were willing to provide the money for it’.7 1 In Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang (Badminton World Federation, Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01) at para 254, aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, the World Badminton Ethics Panel reviewed the sanctions applied for match manipulation and spot-fixing in various CAS decisions in various sports from 2009 to 2017, and found that the most common sanction was a life ban, with other common sanctions being a 10- or 7-year ban. See eg ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 1 (life ban for Danish Kaneria for inducing Westfield’s fixing, five years for Westfield), Kaneria’s appeal against sanction denied 9 July 2013; BHA v Sines & Ors, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 April 2012, paras 215–222 (jockeys Paul Doe and Greg Fairley each disqualified for 10 years for twice ‘stopping’ their mount, with a further five-year ban for involvement in a corrupt conspiracy, partly concurrent, such that the total ban was 12 years for each jockey); BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, paras 2–3 (eight-year ban for a jockey who stopped his horse, on the basis that ‘a stopping ride, even of a horse unlikely to win, remains the cardinal sin that a jockey can commit. […] It was also submitted that an 8 year penalty was out of line with what would happen in other sports, and is too lengthy for a “moment of madness”. The stopping ride was more than a mere momentary act. It was planned and done for reward, the Panel decided. The Panel was not equipped with the detail to enable a comparison of the approach to dishonesty in other sports even if such an exercise is appropriate, so can say little about it. So far as racing is concerned, the Panel can see why the starting point is at that level. Stopping a horse is just about the worst breach a jockey can commit, and all must understand that potentially career ending penalties will follow’). 2 FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 115. The CAS panel also upheld an eight-year ban on the club taking part in UEFA competitions, because ‘[t] he episode at half time during the second game in Erevan shows that the President was not afraid to talk to the whole team about the plot and that nobody dared to oppose. Only reactions inside the clubs can prevent that games are manipulated, and only strong sanctions against the clubs will set the necessary signal to the officials and the players that the direct or indirect support of match fixing activities are not tolerated but can lead to severe consequences for the entire club and not only for the leading actors of the plot. Such sanctions should not only prevent individuals from manipulating games, but also encourage the other members of the club to take action when they become aware of such manipulations’. Ibid, para 117. 3 Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS  2010/A/2172 (‘77. The Panel accepts that, until the recent events under scrutiny in this appeal, the Appellant’s reputation was untarnished, his refereeing skills were well recognized and that he did not instigate the match manipulation. It also accepts that it should proceed on the basis that he did not actually manipulate the match or receive moneys to affect its outcome. 78. However, the Panel has to remind itself that match-fixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion, bribery and the like are a growing concern, indeed a cancer, in many major sports, football included, and must be eradicated. The very essence of sport is that competition is fair; its attraction to spectators

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  555

4

5

6 7

is the unpredictability of its outcome. 79. There are several pronouncements of CAS panels to that effect. 80. It is therefore essential in the Panel’s view for sporting regulators to demonstrate zero tolerance against all kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted through greed or fear to consider involvement in such criminal activities. Match officials are an obvious target for those who wish to make illicit profit through gambling on match results (or indeed on the occurrence of incidents within matches). They must be reinforced in their resistance to such criminal approaches. CAS must, applying naturally to considerations of legality and of proportionality, respect in its awards the approaches of such regulators devoted to such virtuous ends. […] 82. In view of the importance of the UEFA  Europa League, of the level of this competition, and of the sporting and financial interests at stake, the highest standards of behaviour must be demanded of all the people involved – players, managers, coaches, officials. It is vital that the integrity of the sport is maintained. Given his experience as a senior referee, the Appellant should have been particularly sensitive of his obligations and role in preserving and promoting such integrity. By not disclosing these improper approaches, he lamentably failed not only to obey the relevant regulations in their letter and spirit, but indeed to display any common sense. 83. The whole match fixing scandal and in particular the allegation related to the manipulation of the match in Basel caused a great and widely publicized damage to the image of UEFA and of football in general, inevitably raising doubts about whether match results are properly the product of footballers’ skills, or improperly the product [of] other illegal activities. In that context, the Appellant’s mitigation is inadequate to displace the conclusions of three footballing bodies as to the appropriate penalty for his misconduct. 84. Based on all the above, the Panel finds that a life ban from any football related activities against the Appellant is a proportionate sanction […]’). Köllerer v ATP et al, CAS  2011/A/2490, para  123. However, it did vacate as disproportionate the additional $100,000 fine imposed at first instance, on the basis that ‘it would be inappropriate to impose a financial penalty in addition to the lifetime ban, as the sanction of permanent ineligibility provides for the deterrence that corruption offences call for’. Ibid, para 127. Savic v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.34. See also ibid, para 8.33 (citing Oriekhov, noting that ‘Match fixing is the most serious corruption offence in tennis and a threat to the integrity of professional sport, as well as to the physical and moral integrity of players. It also constitutes a violation of the principle of fairness in sporting competitions’, and also agreeing with the CAS panel in Köllerer as to the need for a strong sanction to deter others). Following the CAS panel’s ruling in Köllerer, however (see n 4), the CAS panel set aside the $100,000 fine that had also been imposed at first instance, on the basis that the life ban was sufficient to provide the deterrent effect required in corruption cases. Ibid, at para 8.38. Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, paras 93–94. Sammut v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3062, para 179. See also The Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, paras 32–33 (lifetime ban would be disproportionate for deliberately getting booked in two matches for betting purposes because the outcome of neither match was affected, it was only two matches, the sums involved were relatively modest, and the player did not benefit personally; five-year ban imposed instead).

6 PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION RULES B4.44 However well-conceived and drafted a set of anti-corruption rules may be, they are of little use if they cannot be policed and enforced effectively.1 And corrupt activities do not take place, as other sporting misconduct might do, under the full glare of the floodlights on the field of play. Nor can they be uncovered, as some doping can, by analysing an athlete’s urine or blood samples in a laboratory. Instead, they are clandestine criminal (or quasi-criminal) conspiracies, undertaken by participants who know they face substantial bans if they are caught, and therefore are prepared to go to great lengths to keep their activities secret. Given that SGBs are not public bodies, and do not have state powers of coercion, they have to be very resourceful in gathering anti-corruption intelligence and in conducting investigations that produce sufficient evidence on which to bring a charge for breach of anti-corruption rules.2 1 See generally the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10. Of course, prevention is better than cure. A SGB needs to educate its participants, so that they understand the harm done by match-fixing and related misconduct, including potentially to their future earning power, and they therefore realise the need not only to avoid such misconduct themselves, but also to report any approaches they receive to participate in such misconduct, and/or any other evidence they see of such activities. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that education should be emphasised as much as detection and punishment. See eg  Oxford Research A/S, ‘Examination of threats to the integrity of sports’ (April 2010), p  30. Education was one of the BHA’s first initiatives following the 2002 Panorama

556  Regulating Sport programme (see para B4.8), and the Sports Betting Integrity Panel concluded that it is ‘imperative that sports provide regular education and communication programmes on sports betting integrity to all competitors and participants’: Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), para 1.6. SportAccord developed a Code of Conduct for players & team officials, based on five guiding principles: (i) Be Smart (know the rules); (ii) Be Safe (never bet on your sport); (iii) Be Careful (never share sensitive information); (iv) Be Clean (never fix an event); and (v) Be Open (tell someone if you are approached). Education of players was also a principal strand of the ten-year programme that Interpol agreed to deliver, with the support of substantial funding by FIFA, within the framework of a dedicated FIFA Anti-Corruption Training Wing at the Interpol offices in Singapore: see para B4.11, n 6. There are also other forms of prevention, such as paying professional athletes adequately. The SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011) suggest that federations establish ‘regulations to ensure national federations and clubs fulfill their financial obligations towards their athletes and sports officials, ie  regular pay and good conditions for their professional athletes and sports officials (including referees and judges)’. See also ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11–13 September 2012, p 4 (‘Where the economics of sport are perceived as working against the interests of the individual, the temptation to manipulate results through cheating increases, and individuals are more vulnerable to the corrupting influence of others’); Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p 30 (‘High pay for officials is essential to the minimisation of risk not only because it makes individuals think more carefully about what they stand to lose if found fixing but also because poor rewards, especially compared with players, breeds resentment and a willingness to hit back at the system’); Harman, ‘Gamble taken on “integrity unit” to defeat match-fixing’, Times, 9  October 2007 (quoting thenATP President Etienne de Villiers as saying: ‘there can be potential vulnerability lower down the scale, where [tennis] players may be less mature and can make a lot more money in these circumstances than a struggling tennis professional ever could simply by playing’). Another preventative option is to disrupt corrupt activity by limiting access for potential corruptors to dressing rooms, weighing rooms, etc, and/or requiring players to hand in their mobile phones for the duration of a match. See eg Art 6.3.5(f) of World Rugby Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) (‘World Rugby may issue a direction prohibiting and/or restricting the use of Mobile Communication Devices on the day of an International Match for certain Connected Persons involved with the conduct of the International Match […]’). Accreditation systems (including background checks) are implemented and rigorously enforced at international cricket matches by representatives of the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Unit, so as to ensure that appropriate restrictions are put in place to control access to the participants and to monitor the contacts that participants have with third parties away from the venues. The ACU has also developed a set of Players’ and Match Officials’ Area Minimum Standards, which are applied at all international cricket matches, restricting access to the dressing areas prior to, and during a cricket match, and prohibiting the use of mobile telecommunications technology and access to the internet from within the restricted areas. Members of the ACU monitor compliance with such regulations by means of a hand-held scanner device that can identify whether any mobile communications device has accessed the internet within a specific area. These regulations are intended to remove any temptation that may be presented to the participants to disclose information during the course of a match that could potentially be of significant value for betting purposes. Tennis has similar provisions: see ‘Wimbledon given watchlist of tennis corruption suspects’, telegraph.co.uk, 11 June 2011 (‘A  blacklist of “undesirables” suspected of betting corruption in tennis has been handed to Wimbledon authorities ahead of the tournament. Wimbledon is expected to ban anybody named on the list from restricted areas, including the players’ changing rooms, practice courts and even restaurants’). 2 See generally Scotney, ‘Establishing an effective anti-corruption strategy’ (2013) 11(4) World Sports Law Report 14.

A Intelligence-gathering and investigations B4.45 The steps that a SGB can take on its own include the following:1 (a) Intelligence-gathering: (i) It can provide a dedicated whistle-blowing telephone line or email address for participants in the sport and others to report any information or suspicions of corrupt behaviour, including on a confidential basis where necessary.2 (ii) It can make it a requirement under the anti-corruption code for participants to report corrupt approaches and other evidence they come across of corrupt conduct,3 with any failure to make such a report punishable by a stiff sanction.4

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  557

(iii) It can include provisions in the code for mitigation or suspension of part of a ban imposed for breach of the rules if the offender provides information that assists it in uncovering wrongdoing by others, along the lines of the ‘substantial assistance’ provision in Art 10.7.1 of the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code.5 (iv) It can even provide for a complete amnesty for participants to report past misconduct, such as the three-month amnesty announced by the ECB in January 2012 for players to report corrupt approaches they had received in the past (but had previously failed to report).6 (v) It can set up an anti-corruption unit, staffed by analysts, betting experts, intelligence officers and investigators who are trained to investigate leads and develop intelligence into evidence that can support a charge.7 It can also equip them with sophisticated databases to store, cross-refer, and match that intelligence to reveal suspicious patterns and connections.8 (b) Investigations: (i) It can give itself broad powers in its rules to investigate those who are subject to its authority, including the power to require participants who are suspected of being involved in wrongdoing or are believed to have some relevant information about such wrongdoing to answer questions and/or produce documents.9 (ii) It can require participants to consent to the production of documents by third parties, such as the production of telephone records by mobile phone service providers,10 which can be vital to establish patterns of incriminating contacts between co-conspirators.11 (iii) More controversially, it can require participants suspected of wrongdoing to hand over their laptops and phones and other devices for downloading of information, so that the SGB can see not just when a participant communicated with another, but also what they emailed or texted or messaged to each other.12   1 See generally the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10.   2 A  hotline was one of horseracing’s early 21st century initiatives and was also recommended (for example) in the Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), at para  1.9. For the London 2012 Olympic Games, the IOC established a confidential hotline and (to avoid language difficulties) an email hotline, which it publicised through the international federations and the national Olympic committees and through an ‘Integrity Corner’ in the Olympic Village. See Potts, ‘The battle for integrity in sport’, 23  February 2013 (lawinsport.com). A  similar service was established in snooker in November 2010 in response to the Higgins case (para B4.30, n 5): ‘Snooker introduces anti-corruption hotline’, 15  November 2010 (sportindustry.biz). UEFA also maintains a confidential reporting platform (integrity.uefa.org/index.php?isMobile=0 [accessed 30  October 2020]). The potential sources of anti-corruption intelligence include not only participants within the sport but also many non-participants, such as journalists, spectators, sponsors, relatives, and friends of participants. For example, part of the evidence used in the Pakistani cricketers’ spot-fixing case was provided anonymously to the ICC ACU’s confidential email address.   3 See para B4.29. For example, it was a report by a tennis player that David Savic had approached him, asking him to throw a set in a forthcoming match, that ultimately led to a life ban for Savic. See Savic v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, CAS 2011/A/2621, paras 2.6 and 2.7.   4 See para B4.30.  5 See ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11–13  September 2012, p  8 (‘effective “plea bargaining” procedures could be established in criminal proceedings as well as in disciplinary proceedings, to promote self-reporting. Clearly, in the majority of cases a sanction may still be required and it would therefore not be an “amnesty” but a proportionate penalty reduction in line with the level of cooperation of the individual. Such an approach may benefit the overall investigation and widen the parameters of those to be sanctioned’). See eg ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 6.1.2.7, which makes it a mitigating factor on sanction for the participant to provide ‘Substantial Assistance to the ICC, a criminal authority or professional disciplinary body that results in the ICC discovering or establishing an offence under the Anti-Corruption Code by another Player or Player Support Personnel or that results in a criminal or disciplinary body discovering or establishing a criminal offence or the breach of professional rules by another Player or Player Support Personnel or other third party’. To qualify as Substantial Assistance, the information provided ‘must be credible and must comprise an important

558  Regulating Sport part of any case that is initiated or, if no case is initiated, must have provided a sufficient basis on which a case could have been brought’. This provision is based on the ‘substantial assistance’ provision (Art 10.7.1) in the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code, as to which see para C21.2. In the Westfield/Kaneria spot-fixing case (see para B4.22), the ECB supported Mervyn Westfield’s appeal against his five-year ban on the basis that he had provided evidence vital to its prosecution of Danish Kaneria, that the flow of such information from cricketers was vital to the fight against match-fixing and related corruption, and that it was concerned that the five year ban imposed on Westfield might serve to discourage others from providing information in the future. On that basis, the ECB Appeal Panel (somewhat reluctantly) amended the ban imposed below to allow for Westfield to return to club cricket (not professional cricket) after two years rather than the three years specified by the first instance panel. Westfield v ECB, ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 23 (‘The panel accepts that the ECB, together with other national bodies, is deeply worried at the extent and scope of corruption currently threatening the game and that it is privy to alarming evidence worldwide. In those circumstances, the Panel noted its concerns at any sentence which it considers might inhibit the flow of information’).   6 ‘Fixing amnesty introduced by ECB’, 12 January 2012 (bbc.co.uk/sport) (quoting ECB spokesman as follows: ‘Information is critical in addressing the threat posed by corruption in sport. The decision of the board to provide a window for retrospective reporting of alleged approaches will greatly assist the ACCESS unit in compiling a more complete picture of the source and focus of approaches which may have taken place in the past. Individuals may not have thought these approaches were worthy of reporting at the time and, prior to the decision of the board, may have been concerned that the fact that they did not report such activity may have put them at risk of disciplinary action’). See also ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’, 22 August 2011 (insideworldfootball.biz) (proposing limited amnesty period, where conduct disclosed will not be subject of disciplinary proceedings, but noting that no amnesty can be given from possible criminal investigation and prosecution).   7 According to the Sports Betting Integrity Panel, ‘[t]he experience of some sports, particularly cricket and horseracing and latterly tennis, has demonstrated that the gathering, analysis and dissemination of intelligence with a view to identifying patterns of activity and a formalised targeting policy are crucial to successfully combating threat to integrity. Painstaking analysis of many suspect matches/ events, cross-referencing common elements/personnel, may be necessary before a potentially corrupt target (player, players’ support staff, related or other person) may be identified. […] Currently, sports facing these problems which do not have an effective integrity unit, either tend to pursue intelligence-gathering/investigations in an uncoordinated and somewhat haphazard fashion, usually on a case-by-case basis or seek the assistance of a sport which does have an operational intelligence unit or, in isolated cases, the problem is just ignored. Good practice adopted by those sports which do have an integrity unit, has indicated that a co-ordinated and focused process of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination by identifying patterns of suspicious activity, targeting potential offenders and ultimately providing evidence to bring disciplinary charges, is the most effective way of combating corrupt betting activity. Investigations which concentrate on individual suspect events face daunting problems of gathering sufficient probative evidence to support disciplinary offences under the rules of a sport. Targeted intelligence created from analysis of patterns of activity is most likely to enable an investigation to gather evidence to the required standard of proof (balance of probabilities) necessary to prosecute disciplinary offences’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p 34. There are numerous examples of cases brought as a result of monitoring via data analysis of the patterns of betting markets. In the UK, for example, The Football Association has had success in pursuing cases where suspicious betting patterns have been reported by the companies with whom those bets are being placed (The FA is an example of an SGB that entered into a number of Memorandums of Understanding with betting providers that those providers would report suspicious activity to the SGB). For example, in the case of The Football Association v Dexter Blackstock (FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 2 May 2014), the extent of the defendant’s betting practices was brought to The FA’s attention by a report from Betfair. Similar methods of data analysis have been used in cases brought by the British Horseracing Authority. See eg BHA v Gerrard O’Mahoney, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23  October 2014 and BHA  v Darren Egan and Philip Langford, BHA  Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 November 2015 (the latter case concerning a pattern of some 50,000 bets).  8 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel suggested that such a database should have, as a minimum, searchable features on names, nicknames, locations, vehicles, telephone numbers; storage of digital images; an integral destruction and weeding process (to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act: see generally Chapter A4 (Data Protection in Sport)); electronic grading; remote access with firewall protection; investigation database for the management of enquiries; archive facilities; a briefing facility; an interface with other databases within other sports; a database for confidential sources (with strict access controls); and facilities for evidential disclosure. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p 35.   9 See para B4.32. For example, Art 4.2 of the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code provides that the ACU ‘may at any time conduct an investigation into the activities of any Participant that it believes may have committed an offence under the Anti-Corruption Code […] and all Participants and National Cricket Federations must cooperate fully with such investigations’.

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  559 In such investigations, it is important what participants say, but it can be just as important what they do not say. For example, Mohammad Asif’s claim at the hearing in February 2010 that his ‘no ball’ had been caused by his captain Salman Butt instructing him just before the delivery in question to ‘run faster, fucker’ was rejected partly because he had made no mention of that explanation when interviewed by the police just days after the match in question. ICC  v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 155. See also BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 204(ii) (finding Mr Gold knew betting was based on inside information supplied to his son, partly because ‘[w]hen interviewed by BHA Investigators in September 2009, Mr Peter Gold was careful not to disclose the partnership which his son had recently had with Mr Sines and Mr Crickmore, though there were opportunities during that interview to do so’). And claims at interview to only a partial acquaintance with someone that are contradicted by subsequently obtained telephone records can destroy the credibility of the witness. See eg ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 154 (‘In his interview with the police when asked about the frequency of his contacts with Mr Majeed, Mr Asif suggested that they were sporadic; the upper figure he proposed was twice a day. It should be noted that at that point Mr Asif was unaware that the billing records could (and would) be obtained. His estimate was certainly vastly exceeded on the days when the ICC assert details of the conspiracy were apparently confirmed. The billing records indeed make nonsense of his estimate. This forcibly suggests that the downplaying was deliberate and designed to deflect attention from the true position’); BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 207 (‘In interview, Mr Harris said that his acquaintance with Mr Crickmore was very slight. That was untrue. The timelines for races 1 and 3 show that Mr Crickmore and Mr Harris were in frequent contact’); Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, p 26 (‘He [Danish Kaneria] claims to have been frightened of Mr Bhatt and to have attempted to keep him at arm’s length and, having been warned off by Alan Peacock, to have complied with the requirements of the anti-corruption Guidelines. The Panel finds that the telephone records overwhelmingly refute this and his evidence that there were many missed calls (some of which do not appear in the unchallenged records) to which he felt constrained to reply was wholly unconvincing. He was in regular communication with Mr Bhatt sometimes in calls lasting a significant time inconsistent with the explanations given by him’). 10 See para B4.32. For example, Art 4.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code empowers the ACU General Manager to make a written demand from a participant to furnish information, including phone records. Article 4.3 was used in the Pakistani spot-fixing case to require the players to provide their written consent to their mobile service providers supplying itemised billing records for the relevant periods to the ICC, which evidence turned out to be strongly corroborative of the ICC’s allegations of a spotfixing conspiracy. See ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para  44, para  142 (‘the very timing of other contacts recorded in the billing records is itself inculpatory. They happened exactly at the times one would expect if Mr Butt was involved in Mr Majeed’s dishonest enterprise, and had no other valid justification’), para  153 (‘The calls made to and between Mr Majeed and Mr Asif as revealed in the billing records fitted into a pattern consistent with the interchanges between Mr Majeed and MK [the undercover reporter pretending to be the representative of a betting syndicate]. There is no cogent explanation of why Mr Majeed should be in contact with Mr Asif at such hours during important test matches if the object was simply to deal with commercial or social matters; the inference must be that there was something urgent to discuss’), paras 173-74 (‘there were a number of other strong pointers towards Mr Amir’s culpable involvement. First there was a coincidence of communications with Mr Majeed at critical points in the narrative’) and para 181 (‘There is further unchallenged evidence of intense telephone and text communication between Mr Majeed and each of the three players, frequently at or near midnight or even in the early hours of the morning, in the middle of a hard-fought test match’). The same evidence was also relied upon by the CAS panel in rejecting Mr Asif’s appeal. See Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 62. 11 Telephone records have been vital to disciplinary cases brought by the BHA ever since the Gary Carter case of 2005 (discussed at para B4.19, n 8). For instance, such evidence was relied on heavily by the BHA Disciplinary Panel in BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23  January 2013, paras 32-37, para  104 (‘The telephone records show an almost frantic series of attempts by Coppinger to contact Wilson before and after the race. There were 21 calls attempted in the space of 33 minutes. This is not consistent with a casual tip’) and passim. See also McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 90 (‘The Panel found that Mr Reeder was laying Skip of Colour because he had inside information about why it was not expected to win that day. It held that the timeline was most revealing. Calls were made to Mr Reeder on the day before the race by Clive Whiting, starting immediately after the latter had spoken with Mr Blockley. On the day of the race Mr Reeder’s lay betting began within seconds of the end of a call from Clive Whiting, who had himself been speaking seconds before to Mr Blockley. In evidence Mr Reeder said that he did not know what the calls were about but the Panel found the inference to be too obvious to be doubted’). 12 See para B4.32. For example, the key evidence against the badminton players in Zulkiffi and Seang was WhatsApp messages downloaded from their mobile devices that the hearing panel concluded were conversations about fixing of badminton matches. Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01, aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 61.

560  Regulating Sport

B4.46 Other possible self-help remedies that have been mooted for SGBs include paying informants,1 using covert surveillance techniques (ranging from simply following/monitoring the activity of identified individuals to the planting of listening and recording devices, where permitted under local law), conducting undercover ‘sting’ operations,2 and even subjecting participants to lie detector tests.3 As far as the authors are aware, however, to date these techniques are not widely used. Instead, they are seen by most as a step too far, even with a threat as grave as match-fixing. 1 ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’, 22 August 2011 (insideworldfootball.biz) (proposal for reward to be paid for information provided, subject to the accuracy of the information provided and the benefit derived from it in terms of disciplinary results); ‘FIFA used organised crime gang informants to combat match-fixing’, Sportcal.com, 6 January 2012. 2 Sting operations by the media have uncovered some of the biggest match-fixing cases to date, including the News of the World’s uncovering of the corrupt actions of Higgins and Mooney in snooker (para B4.30, n 5) and of Butt, Amir and Asif in cricket (para B4.22), and the Sun covertly recording rugby league player Shaun Leaf in a public house and then in a betting shop, talking about placing bets on rugby league matches (para B4.25, n 2). However, those stings took place without the prior knowledge or consent of the sports authorities. If they had instigated the stings themselves, they would have been exposed to arguments of entrapment, at least if the participant could plausibly argue that they would not have committed the misconduct in issue but for the invitation or opportunity offered to them as part of the sting. (See para B4.38, n 9). However, in its February 2012 Report to the ICC’s Anti-Corruption and Security Unit, while it did not condone entrapment, the MCC World Committee did suggest that a ‘mystery shopper’ approach to (or ‘integrity testing’ of) a participant who is already under suspicion could prove useful. See Marylebone Cricket Club, ‘Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to ICC’s Anti-Corruption and Security Unit’ (20 February 2012). 3 In July 2011, former Australian cricket captain Steve Waugh suggested that lie detectors should be used to counter match-fixing in cricket: ‘Steve Waugh: Illegal betting approaches are not uncommon’, Guardian, 21 July 2011. In his report the following month, however, Bertrand de Seville noted that the scientific community remained unconvinced about the reliability of a polygraph or lie-detector test, and recommended that the ICC not introduce or support the use of the polygraph unless and until its validity and admissibility have been accepted by the courts. See de Speville, ‘A Review of the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’, August 2011 (reissued with minor amendments January 2012). In contrast, in February 2012 the MCC World Cricket Committee recommended that players under suspicion be allowed to undergo polygraph testing on a voluntary basis to exonerate themselves (Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to ICC’s Anti-Corruption and Security Unit, 20 February 2012), and in October 2012, the general secretary of the Singapore Football Association claimed that the introduction of polygraph testing in Singapore’s domestic league in 2001 had reduced the number of match-fixing cases in his country: ‘Singapore to use lie detectors to cut down on match-fixing’, worldfootballinsider.com, 11  October 2012. In September 2012, the owner of Bulgarian football club Lokomotiv Plovdiv ordered its players and coaches to take polygraph tests following allegations of match-fixing, telling the media that he wanted to be sure that there were no untoward factors behind an unexpected loss to a team that were bottom of the league: ‘Lokomotiv Plovdiv players to take lie detector tests’, 25 September 2012. And in UCI v Contador, CAS 2011/A/2384, paras 392-394, the CAS panel accepted the admissibility of polygraph evidence offered by the athlete as proof that he did not take a blood transfusion, although it gave it only limited weight. Other CAS panels have been even more circumspect. See WADA v BTF & Arman-Marshall Silla, CAS  2017/A/4954, para  128 (‘the polygraph test results are not admitted in evidence’; such tests must be treated as ‘mere personal statements, with no additional evidentiary value whatsoever given by the circumstance that they were rendered during a lie detector test’); Villaneuva v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4534, para 45 (‘Even in the original home of the device, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the rejection of polygraph evidence (said to support an appellant’s denial of drug taking) was not unconstitutional (See US v. Scheffer, 1998 USSC 32). Polygraph tests were notoriously passed by Lance Armstrong and Marion Jones, both of whom later admitted use of prohibited substances’) and para 46 (‘In the Panel’s view, while CAS Panels may have previously found polygraph evidence to be admissible, such evidence is of limited value. Moreover, the cost involved is disproportionate to any probative value of such test. If, in the future, it were not, as a matter of practice to be entertained by CAS panels, this would have the beneficial consequence that an athlete could not be criticized for failure to submit to such tests as a means of seeking to show lack of intent’).

B Obtaining information from third parties B4.47 An SGB’s investigative authority extends only to those who have agreed to abide by its rules and to submit to its authority to enforce those rules.1 It has no

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  561

coercive powers over anyone else. However, there are ways that a sport governing body can obtain information and evidence from third parties: (a)

In certain circumstances, it can obtain an order from the High Court, requiring the disclosure of information in the possession of a third party. In particular, in appropriate circumstances the court will grant a Norwich Pharmacal order requiring disclosure of relevant information by a third party that has become innocently mixed up in the wrongdoing of another, eg  a mobile telecommunications company whose phones and mobile services have been used in furtherance of a match-fixing conspiracy, which represents a breach of the rules of the sport and thus a breach of contract by the user of those services.2 (b) It can enter into information-sharing agreements with betting operators, giving it the ability to monitor (including on a real-time basis) betting patterns on its events,3 to be alerted to suspicious betting patterns, and after the fact to access further information about the person(s) who made the bets in question.4 (It will also need access to betting experts to analyse the betting information obtained in this way). (c) However, voluntary information-sharing agreements are not always possible, and even where they exist they can be ‘an insecure basis for information sharing in a regulated environment’.5 Therefore, in 2007 the Gambling Commission6 exercised its powers under s 88(1) of the Gambling Act 2005 to require licensed betting operators: (i) to report to a sports body that is listed in Pt 3 of Sch 6 to the Act any information that the licensed operator suspects ‘relates to a breach of a rule on betting applied by that sports governing body’;7 and (ii) to report to the Gambling Commission any information that they suspect may relate to the commission of an offence under the Act8 or may lead the Commission to consider making an order to void a bet. In addition, the Gambling Commission is empowered under s 30 of the Gambling Act to pass that information on (along with any other information ‘received by it in the exercise of its functions’) in appropriate circumstances to a sports body that is listed in Pt  3 of Sch  6 to the Act. Sports bodies have welcomed this approach, saying it ‘has made a noticeable difference in the ability of sports to secure important information’.9 (d) The Sports Betting Integrity Panel recommended that sports bodies also seek to enter into information-sharing agreements with the Gambling Commission, the police, ‘and any other relevant statutory body involved in the investigation and/or prosecution of sports betting offences’.10 However, that suggestion has been superseded to a large extent by the creation of the Sports Betting Intelligence Unit, one of the main purposes of which is to facilitate such information-sharing.11   1 See paras A1.10 and C3.8.  2 See Norwich Pharmacal v Customs & Excise [1973]  UKHL  6. This process has been used by the horseracing authorities, for example, to obtain telephone billing records, which are then used to show contacts between the alleged conspirators and how those fit with information provided and bets placed. The process was initiated in 2005 for the Gary Carter case (Jockey Club v Carphone Warehouse [2005] EWHC 1151(QB)) and is now a method of evidence-gathering in private law that is familiar to and expressly approved by the court. See also McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 60. See generally Dean, ‘Sport, Gambling & Corruption – Evidence Gathering’, paper for 5RB  Media and Entertainment Law conference, 2008, including at para  6.1 (noting that the court is likely to want proof that the regulator has exhausted all other possible options for obtaining the records, including demanding them from the participant under investigation, before coming to the court for an order against a third party) and at para 9 (‘If all the steps have been followed carefully it should be relatively simply to get the Order sought. The key question for the Judge will be whether the balancing act between the interests of the regulator in stamping out corruption and the privacy rights of the individual comes down in favour of the regulator. Experience in the context of horseracing corruption has been that the Court is willing to accept that the balance favours disclosure’), citing Treacy J in Jockey Club v Carphone Warehouse [2005] EWHC 1151 (QB) (‘It is to be observed that Article 8(2) demonstrates that Article 8 [privacy] rights are not absolute rights under

562  Regulating Sport the Convention but are qualified rights. I am satisfied that, having considered the provisions of Article 8 and in particular Article 8(2), the purposes for which the Jockey Club requires the information in this case is a matter which is encompassed in Article 8(2) and is a matter which justifies the release of the information sought for the purpose sought by the Jockey Club’). It should be noted, however, that telephone companies often only retain the billing records for 12 months, so that a prompt request may be necessary once an investigation has started. It may also be possible to get a court order requiring the police to share evidence that they have collected as part of a criminal investigation. For example, in the cricket spot-fixing case, the ICC had tape recordings from the News of the World of telephone conversations between Mazhar Majeed and (purportedly) Salman Butt, discussing proposed spot-fixing during the Oval Test between England and Pakistan. Mr Butt initially denied that he was the party on the other end of the line. The Metropolitan Police had seized Mr Butt’s phone in August 2010, when the story first broke. The ICC therefore obtained an order from the High Court further to CPR  34.4 (which gives the court the power to ‘issue a witness summons in aid of an inferior court or tribunal’), requiring the Metropolitan Police to disclose to the ICC whether or not Salman Butt’s phone had received calls (and, if so, of what duration) at the times of the Majeed phone calls on the NOTW recordings. The information provided by the Metropolitan Police pursuant to that order showed that calls had been placed from Mazhar Majeed’s phone to Salman Butt’s phone at the times and for the durations reflected on the recordings, forcing Salman Butt to withdraw his previous denial and admit that it was him on the tape. The Anti-Corruption Tribunal relied heavily on that evidence in upholding the charges brought by the ICC against Mr Butt under the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code. See ICC  v Butt, Asif and Amir, AntiCorruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, paras 133–141 (finding Butt guilty of failing to report Majeed’s approach to him to spot-fix the Oval Test) and para 142 (‘the aroma of the Oval calls impregnate[s] the approach to the Lords Test’). In England & Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm), the Commercial Court held that disciplinary proceedings to enforce the ECB’s match-fixing rules constituted arbitration proceedings to which the Arbitration Act 1996 applied, and so granted the ECB’s request for a witness summons under s 43 of the Arbitration Act requiring Mervyn Westfield to attend the hearing of Danish Kaneria’s appeal against the life ban imposed on him under those rules at first instance: see para B4.22. For discussion of the broader implications of this case for sport, see paras D3.17–D3.19 and E4.8.  3 Bookmakers obviously have an interest in a clean betting market. See eg  Mike O’Kane of Littlewoods and the European Sports Security Association (ESSA), ‘Betting Industry meets IOC and UK Government to discuss illegal betting threat to London Olympics’, Sportcal.com, 20 March 2012 (‘When sport is corrupted, and betting [is] used to profit from that corruption, it impacts sport and legitimate betting industry alike. Punters always want to know that they’re getting a fair bet on their chosen sport’); IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 52 (‘A [betting] operator’s credibility depends on their being able to ensure the genuineness of the sporting results on which they accept bets’). They also have an interest in voluntary cooperation in an attempt to avoid legal regulation. Therefore betting operators such as Betfair and the members of ESSA have entered into voluntary information-sharing memoranda with SGBs, starting with the Jockey Club-Betfair memorandum in June 2003. Betfair now provides counterparty sports bodies with software that allows them to access betting information themselves remotely and on a ‘real-time’ basis; while ESSA operates its own early-warning system to pick up and provide alerts in cases of rapid changes in odds, unusual betting volumes, and irregular betting patterns. Sophisticated mathematical models are used to project the odds that should be expected in a rational commercial market, and deviations by a certain margin are flagged for investigation. It was information that the ATP received from ESSA, for example, that triggered the investigation into Federico Luzzi that resulted in his ban for improper betting on the sport: see para B4.28, n 3. UEFA, working with its commercial and betting partners, has established the Betting Fraud Detection System (BFDS), which monitors every match played as part of a UEFA competition (in 2010, that totalled 1,800 matches) as well as 29,000 other football matches in its members’ national jurisdictions (and over 53,000 across all sports per year). The BFDS system analyses three types of data to provide information on variations in the largest operators’ pre-match odds, live odds, and the Asian handicap. The company also has a data archive that is updated instantly by a computerised matrix that captures the history of matches and the way their scores evolve. This system of aggregating data provides specific information on players and referees based on matches in which they have participated. These data – which are not available to the general public – enable a wide range of criteria to be cross-checked and help to identify leads in the event of suspicion. The system also serves to determine warning thresholds, with particularly high levels of betting being transmitted to UEFA for investigation. See ‘UEFA Approves Europe-wide Network of Integrity Officers to Counter Match-fixing’, Sportcal.com 21  March 2011. For example, it was suspicious betting on a match in the first qualifying round of the UEFA Champions League 2004/05 that led UEFA to uncover match-fixing by the president of one of the teams playing in that match: FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 6. And it was principally that betting, and expert evidence analysing that betting, that led the CAS to uphold the findings made against the club president and the life ban imposed on him. Ibid, paras 89–91. UEFA subsequently signed over the BFDS to data services company Sportradar (uefa.com/ insideuefa/protecting-the-game/integrity/#fraud [accessed 30 October 2020]).

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  563 Studying the BFDS can be used to recognise the patterns of sports betting to demonstrate the markets for betting-related match fixing, which can then be focused on by the relevant SGBs. A study carried out by the Asser Institute covering the detection system between May 2009 and September 2014 concluded that the markets which should be focused on the final score and the number of goals scored during the game. (see para 4.2 of The Odds of Match Fixing – Facts & Figures on the Integrity Risk of Certain Sports Bets, Van Rompuy B., Asser Institute, January 2015). FIFA established its own subsidiary company, Early Warning System GmbH (EWS), which monitored betting markets relating to FIFA competitions following its inception in July 2007 and also monitored betting on certain club competitions, as well as on other sports: fifa.com/who-we-are/news/ fifa-early-warning-system-ews-2261080 [accessed 30 October 2020]. FIFA, like UEFA, signed over the monitoring service to Sportradar, in doing so closing down this subsidiary in 2017. The IOC used EWS to monitor the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, before setting up its own partner, International Sport Monitoring, with similar technical monitoring capability and intelligence, to monitor activity around the Olympics Games (see ‘Rogge: IFs could risk Olympic expulsion if they don’t join fight against match-fixing’, Sportcal.com 28 February 2011), and EWS alerted FIFA to irregular betting patterns in the match corruptly refereed by Joseph Lamptey. Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, paras 8, 11, 14.   4 See IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 71 (‘Sports betting monitoring systems are effective in both surveillance and tracking, and can serve as an early warning or – when used after the event – [to] help understand a fraud’). Indeed, information about the timing, size and nature of bets placed can be very important evidence in sustaining corruption charges. Good examples are Jockey Club v Carter, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 28  September 2009, where the case was proved by mapping complex relationships between unusual betting and telephone contact; and BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 January 2013, where the Disciplinary Panel relied heavily on information about bets placed by the alleged co-conspirators through their Betfair accounts. See eg Heffernan, at paras 79, 86, 96 (noting how one person charged, who had only placed nine bets before through his Betfair account, with a largest liability risk of £54, put two separate £2,000 bets on a horse ridden by Heffernan to lose the race) and 101. See also BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, paras 66 et seq.; and cases cited at para B4.38, n.5.  5 Gambling Commission, ‘Integrity in Sports Betting – Information Sharing, Responses to the consultation’ (Gambling Commission, June 2007), para 3.14. This comment was made in response to lobbying by SGBs, who said in 2006 that ‘to continue to rely on a voluntary approach to information sharing just leaves too much to the chance. If we are to have public confidence in the new licensing regime and sports integrity, it must be seen to be applied to every betting operator and to be enforced through licensing standards set by the Gambling Commission’.   6 See para B4.51.   7 See discussion at para B4.48 of the offence of ‘cheating at gambling’ under s  42 of the Gambling Act 2005.  8 See Gambling Commission Licence Conditions and Code of Practice (29  July 2020), Licence Condition 15.1, titled ‘Information requirements – Reporting suspicion of offences’ (‘Licensees must as soon as reasonably practicable provide the Commission or ensure the Commission is provided with any information from whatever source that they […] know relates to or suspect may relate to the commission of an offence under the Act, including an offence resulting from a breach of a licence condition or a code provision having the effect of a licence condition […] Licensees who accept bets, or facilitate the making or acceptance of bets between others, on the outcome of horse races or other sporting events governed by one of the sport governing bodies for the time being included in Part 3 of Schedule 6 to the Act must also provide the relevant sport governing body with sufficient information to conduct an effective investigation if the licensee suspects that they have any information from whatever source that may: a. lead the Commission to consider making an order to void a bet; b. relate to a breach of a rule on betting applied by that sport governing body’). Schedule  6, Pt  3 of the Gambling Act originally listed the following as SGBs with whom information could/should be shared: the ECB, the FA, the FA of Wales, the Horseracing Regulatory Authority (now known as the British Horseracing Authority), the LTA, the Irish FA, the Jockey Club, the National Greyhound Racing Club (now known as the Greyhound Board of Great Britain), the PGA, the RFL, the RFU, the SRU, the Scottish FA, UK Athletics, and the Welsh Rugby Union. In 2007, the British Boxing Board of Control was added to the list by means of the Gambling Act 2005 (Amendment of Sch  6) Order 2007. In 2012, the list was amended again to add the IOC (in case threats to integrity arose during the course of the 2012 London Olympic Games), The Association of European Professional Football Leagues, Bowls England, the British Darts Organisation, British Lions Limited, Celtic Rugby Ltd, The Commonwealth Games Federation, England Hockey, England Squash, and Racketball Ltd, European Rugby Cup Ltd, FIFA, the IAAF (now World Athletics), the ICC, the International Hockey Federation, the IRB, the ITF, London Marathon, The Motorsports Association, the Rugby League International Federation, Six Nations Rugby Ltd, UEFA, the World Darts Federation, and the WPBSA. See The Gambling Act 2005 (Amendment of Schedule 6) Order 2012. This was done ‘to accurately reflect other SGBs to ensure the coverage of the main sports in the UK, and to better reflect the SGBs that the Gambling Commission deals with on a regular basis […] [as

564  Regulating Sport well as to add] international bodies […] that cover the major domestic SGBs not currently covered by the Schedule, and that have prominent profiles as well as developed information-handling procedures’. DCMS Impact Assessment, ‘Amendments to Schedule 6, Gambling Act 2005’, 25 November 2011. After a further round of consultation, in September 2017 the following bodies were added to the list: UK  Anti-Doping, the Tennis Integrity Unit, the Darts Regulation Authority, Rugby League European Federation, Irish Rugby Football Union, International Paralympic Committee, Table Tennis England, and the Ladies European Tour (gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/640229/OFFICIAL_government_response_updating_schedule_6.pdf [accessed 30  October 2020]). The 2011 DCMS Impact Assessment noted: ‘The Gambling Commission may provide information to SGBs that do not appear on the Schedule, but only where it would not breach existing statutory or legal constraints, including data protection. Where information does not relate to a criminal investigation or proceedings, and if the SGB is not listed on the Schedule, the GC has to make a decision on a case by case basis as to whether it is appropriate to share the information, which can be resource-intensive, and risks information not being shared accurately to the detriment of both the sports and gambling markets’. DCMS Impact Assessment, ‘Amendments to Schedule 6, Gambling Act 2005’, 25 November 2011, para 7. The Gambling Commission has noted that ‘betting operators can also pass other information that they consider might be of relevance to the SBIU (Sports Betting Intelligence Unit: see para B4.52), whether or not it reaches their criteria of “suspicious”. The SBIU has been working closely with operators to embed this approach’. Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), para 3.1. Licence Condition 15 does not apply to spread betting companies, who fall under the jurisdiction not of the Gambling Commission but rather of the Financial Conduct Authority. Therefore, informationsharing arrangements with spread betting companies remain voluntary. In May 2013, the BHA brought its first case, based on betting information voluntarily shared with it by a spread betting company against jockey Eddie Ahern and others (see para B4.47, n 8). See statement from Adam Brickell, Director of Integrity, Legal and Risk for the BHA, 22 May 2013.   9 Response of the BHA, BDO, ECB, FA, Football DataCo, LTA, PL, RFL, RFU and CCPR to the DCMS Remote Gambling Consultation, 18 June 2010. 10 Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to Betting, Chapter 2a, Article 6.1. The key recommendation coming out of the City of London Police review of the failed Fallon criminal prosecution (para B4.49) was that, when dealing with sports regulatory bodies as part of a criminal investigation, the police force should ensure that there is a formal framework in place to govern the relationship, set out in a written memorandum of understanding: Commander Patrick Rice, ‘City of London Police – Review of Operation Krypton’, published on 16 May 2008. 11 See para B4.52.

C Working with the Gambling Commission and the police (a) English criminal law pertaining to match-fixing B4.48 English law does not criminalise match-fixing or spot-fixing per se. However, such acts may be charged as one or more of the following criminal offences if evidence exists that would establish all of the necessary elements of the offence in question to the criminal standard of proof: (a) ‘cheating at gambling’, in breach of s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005;1 (b) the giving or accepting of corrupt payments, in breach of s 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (in relation to acts pre-dating 1 July 2011, the date that Act was repealed);2 (c) bribing or being bribed, in breach of the Bribery Act 2010 (in relation to acts from 1  July 2011 on, when the Bribery Act came into force in place of the Prevention of Corruption Act);3 (d) (possibly, although less obviously) fraud by false representation, in breach of s 2 of the Fraud Act 2006;4 or (e) (if any of the above offences is committed by two or more persons in agreement with each other) conspiracy, which may be charged either as statutory conspiracy, under s 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, or as the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud.5

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  565 1 Section 42 of the Gambling Act 2005 provides: ‘(1) A  person commits an offence if he (a) cheats at gambling, or (b) does anything for the purpose of enabling or assisting another person to cheat at gambling. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) it is immaterial whether a person who cheats (a) improves his chances of winning anything, or (b) wins anything. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) cheating at gambling may, in particular, consist of actual or attempted deception or interference in connection with (a) the process by which gambling is conducted, or (b) a real or virtual game, race or other event or process to which gambling relates. (4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine or to both […]’. In Majeed v R; Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186, paras 26–28, the Court of Appeal upheld the use of this provision to convict Mazhar Majeed for his part in the Lord’s spot-fixing conspiracy (as to which, see para B4.22), rejecting forcefully the proposition that no offence had been committed because the gambling that was affected was ‘unlawful’ gambling that took place entirely abroad, on the following grounds: ‘27. […] The offence contrary to s 42 is committed at the moment when “anything” is done “for the purpose of enabling or assisting” anyone else to cheat at gambling. It has nothing to do with the proper regulation of gambling: it simply creates an offence of cheating. In these cases, the offence was complete before any bet was placed. The “fix” was organised in England, the matches which were the target of the “fixing” took place here, and the rewards for participating were also paid here. In short the criminal conduct prohibited by s 42 occurred within the jurisdiction. 28. Interesting questions of territoriality might arise if it were ever to be the case that an individual or individuals who were living abroad and placed their bets abroad on the basis of the cheating which was organised and took place here were ever to be prosecuted in this jurisdiction. We need not address them here. We are not dealing with the criminals abroad who took advantage of the cheating organised in this jurisdiction. We are dealing with the criminals who participated in it here’. The Gambling Act wording in s 42(1)(b) in effect requires the prosecution to prove that the corrupt act was done knowingly and specifically for the purpose of assisting another to cheat at gambling. This was cited in commentaries and reports around the Gambling Commission’s decision in 2010 not to pursue a prosecution in relation to a 2009 Blue Square football match between Forest Green Rovers and Grays Athletic in circumstances where there were highly unusual betting patterns that correctly predicted an unusual match turn-around and result. The Gambling Commission reportedly felt that because it could not link a specific spot-fix in the game to a specific bet, it could not proceed with any criminal prosecution under s 42. In its 2010 report (see para B4.14), the Sports Betting Integrity Panel recommended that the definition of cheating in s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005 ‘be reviewed and, if appropriate, given greater clarity’, and that the two-year maximum sentence be reviewed. No explanation was given of the concerns driving those recommendations, but the authors understand that the desire was that ‘sporting fraud’ be established as a bespoke criminal offence. In a February 2012 debate in the House of Lords, Lord Moynihan agreed with that recommendation, stating that ‘the existing definition of cheating in the Gambling Act 2005 is not, in my view, fit for purpose. A specific sports fraud definition is necessary’. Hansard, 9 February 2012, debate on ‘Olympic Games 2012: Match Fixing and Suspicious Betting’, p 7, col 413. He did not, however, offer any such definition for consideration. In reply on behalf of the Government, Baroness Garden stated: ‘The review of cheating was not considered a priority at this time, but that is not to say that it has been forgotten. We hope to address that issue. Along with the Gambling Commission, we are looking at the range of offences related to sports-betting integrity to see that we have the suite of powers necessary to combat the threat’. Ibid, p 13, col 423. In 2014, Lord Moynihan included in his Governance of Sport Bill a provision that would have added a new section 42(a)(3A) to the Gambling Act, specifying that ‘cheating at gambling may, in particular, consist of: (a) a person engaging in conduct that corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of the event or the event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a financial advantage, or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event or the event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial disadvantage was actually caused); (b) a person offering to engage in, or encouraging another person to engage in, conduct that corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of the event or event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a financial advantage, or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event or the event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial disadvantage was actually caused); (c) a person entering into an agreement or arrangement in respect of conduct that corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct the subject of the agreement or arrangement corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of the event or event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a financial advantage, or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event or the event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial disadvantage was actually caused);

566  Regulating Sport (d) a person encouraging another person to conceal from a relevant authority conduct, or an agreement or arrangement in respect of conduct, that corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of the event or event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event or event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial disadvantage was actually caused); (e) a relevant person— (i) betting on an event or event contingency, (ii) encouraging another person to bet on an event or event contingency in a particular way (whether or not that other person actually bet on the event or event contingency concerned), or (iii) communicating the relevant information possessed by that relevant person, or causing that relevant information to be communicated, to another person who the first person knows or ought reasonably to know would, or would be likely to, bet on the event or event contingency (whether or not that other person actually bet on the event or event contingency concerned), in each case, where the relevant information possessed by that relevant person is relevant to the bet concerned’. publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0020/15020.pdf [accessed 30  October 2020]. However, the bill was never passed into law. 2 Section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 provided: ‘If any person corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gift or consideration to any agent as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having after the passing of this Act done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business’, then he shall be guilty of an offence. The use of this charge was challenged in the Majeed and Westfield cases (see para B4.44) on the basis that the manner in which a cricketer performs on the pitch is personal to the cricketer and does not involve any recourse to the ‘affairs or business’ of his employer, ie it is not aimed at his employer, and there is no intent to induce the employer to do or not do anything. This was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the basis that such construction was not supported by the case law, and ‘would be wholly inconsistent with the statutory language’. Majeed v R; Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186, para 21. The Court of Appeal ruled: ‘the way in which Butt, Amir and Asif, and Westfield performed was personal to them and clearly contrary to and far removed from the wishes of the Boards which employed them. Nevertheless, looking at the realities of the situation there could on the evidence have been nothing closer to the heart of the affairs or business of a cricket Board than the performance of the players selected by them to represent their and his country, or their and his county. In relation to the Pakistan Cricket Board, that is why, among other provisions of the central contract signed by each cricketer, he was obliged to refrain from doing anything which might damage the reputation of the team for which he was playing, or the country he represented, or the Board which employed him. He was obliged immediately to report to the manager of the team any incident which might damage the reputation of the team, or the Board which employed him, and agreed that to seek or accept any bribe or other reward to fix or contrive to influence the result, progress and conduct of an international match was prohibited. There could not be any clearer indication of the simple proposition that the Pakistan Cricket Board regarded the conduct of the players on the field as integral to its affairs and business, and indeed that their play was integral to them. Precisely the same considerations apply to Westfield and Essex County Cricket Club. That was the entire point of the agreement that he should play on behalf of the country to the best of his ability’. Ibid, para 23. ‘The actions of these cricketers fell fairly and squarely within the ambit of the 1906 Act, and the conspiracy count involving Majeed, and the count against Westfield were clearly established’. Ibid, para 25. 3 The Bribery Act 2010 contains criminal offences of bribing and being bribed in the form of six ‘cases’, two of active bribery and four of passive bribery, but each of which has the following two elements in common: (1) an advantage, financial or otherwise, must be given, promised, or requested; and (2) there must be improper performance of a function or activity of a public nature or of an activity connected with a business or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or incorporate). This second requirement means that persons who are acting purely in a personal capacity are not caught by the Act, but if they are acting as part of a team (for example) they could be covered, and the rest of the wording is potentially very broad in scope. It has been suggested that ‘the provisions of [the Bribery] Act are now likely to cater for the facts of cases’ such as the Butt and Westfield cricket spot-fixing cases in a clearer and more obvious way than the provisions of the old Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. See Milliken-Smith QC, ‘New Offences Under the Bribery Act 2010’, paper presented at Sports Corruption Seminar (December 2012). 4 Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 states: ‘(1) A person is in breach of this section if he (a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and (b) intends, by making the false representation (i) to make a gain for himself or another, or (ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. (2) A representation is false if (a) it is untrue or misleading, and (b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading. (3) “Representation” means any representation as to fact or law, including a representation as to the state of mind of (a) the person making the representation, or (b) any other person. (4) A representation may be express or implied. (5) For the purposes of this section a representation may be regarded as made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system of device designed to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention)’.

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  567 Any knowing participant in a match-fixing or spot-fixing scheme could be said to have made false representations intending to make a gain and/or expose another to a risk of loss. The false representation could be that a jockey is trying to win the race when actually he is not, or that a batsman is trying to score runs when really he is trying to get out. However, if there is no allegation of betting, and so the only persons deceived are the spectators watching the match, it is not easy to see what gain the jockey or batsman has made or what loss the spectators have suffered or risked suffering, which is why the common law conspiracy to defraud charge ran into difficulties in the Westfield case: see para B4.49. See also Potts, ‘The battle for integrity in sport’, 23 February 2013 (lawinsport.com) (discussing whether criminal law powers could be used to counter blood doping outside the Olympic Village during the London 2012 Olympics: ‘In [the UK], the police may be granted a warrant to enter and search a private residence where there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed and that there is material on premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation. The question therefore was whether blood doping could amount to an indictable offence that might justify a warrant to enter and search private properties for blood doping equipment. Under the Fraud Act 2006, where a person dishonestly makes a false representation and thereby intends to make a gain or cause loss to another he commits a potentially indictable offence. In the case of the Games, all athletes were required to sign an entry form declaring that they would comply with the WADA Code and other applicable anti-doping rules and thereby represented that they would compete “clean”. By engaging in blood doping, which is a Prohibited Method under the WADA  Code, any representation by an individual that he was clean would have been a dishonest misrepresentation made with the intention of competing with an unfair advantage and thereby gaining a personal advantage or causing loss to another. Alternatively, the fact of having in their possession blood doping equipment could amount to the separate offence of having possession of an article for use in connection with a fraud, which is also an indictable offence. However, the Fraud Act did not provide a perfect solution as this approach was arguably to shoe-horn the Act into a use for which it was never intended. It was also contrary to public policy which has tended to avoid using criminal law to regulate sport. Fortunately it was not necessary to test this approach during the Games. It is also worth noting that the Fraud Act was viewed only as a last resort, to offer a solution in the event of a high profile incident such as that in Turin, where questions would be asked if authorities could not act and police intervention could be justified as a matter of public policy’). 5 The important aspect of a conspiracy charge is that it is complete on agreement. Money need not change hands, or if it has, the match to be fixed need not have yet taken place. The agreement itself is the crime, not the performance of the agreed acts. R v Anderson [1986] AC 27, [1985] 2 All ER 961.

B4.49 There have been seven high-profile English criminal prosecutions in recent years of corrupt sporting conduct, five of which were successful: (a) In 1995 Bruce Grobelaar and Hans Segers, both professional football goalkeepers, were charged with conspiracy to accept corrupt payments, in breach of s  1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, and Grobelaar was charged individually under the same section, on the basis that they had accepted money to let in goals and thereby improperly influence the outcome of games. Both were acquitted after trial, although the evidence against Grobelaar (in the form of covert recordings of Grobelaar’s conversations with an associate) was strong enough for the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords to reject a subsequent jury’s decision to award Grobelaar £85,000 in damages for defamation, on the basis that it would have been perverse on the evidence for the jury to make any finding other than that Grobelaar had made a corrupt agreement and had corruptly accepted money.1 (b) In R  v Rodgers and others, following a lengthy investigation during which the police reportedly arrested 36 people, conducted over 500 interviews, took more than 1,300 statements, and prepared over 5,000 exhibits and nearly 40,000 pages of evidence,2 the Crown Prosecution Service charged former champion jockey Kieren Fallon, five other jockeys and trainers, and the punter Miles Rodgers, with conspiracy to defraud Betfair customers by the jockeys deliberately losing races to order so that their co-conspirators would win bets they had placed against those jockeys on the Betfair exchange. The alleged victims of the conspiracy were any users of Betfair who bet on the races with the defendants thinking that the jockeys would be riding to win.3 Despite the lengthy investigation and an also lengthy trial starting in September 2007, the prosecution collapsed when the CPS’s main witness, the Australian

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racing steward Mr Murrihy, admitted in cross-examination that he had little knowledge of the rules and culture of British racing. Mr Justice Forbes ruled that Mr Murrihy’s evidence fell ‘far, far short of establishing a prima facie breach of UK racing rules’ and, therefore, that no conspiracy to defraud could be established, so that all of the defendants had to be acquitted of all charges. Two further trials, involving the five other alleged conspirators, were also subsequently dismissed.4 (c) In late 2010, the Crown Prosecution Service charged Essex cricketer Mervyn Westfield with a single count of conspiracy to defraud members of the Essex County Cricket Club, his team-mates in the match against Durham on 5 September 2009, and spectators at that match, ‘by dishonestly agreeing to bowl his first over in a manner calculated and intended to allow the scoring of a certain number of runs, and thereby playing other than to the best of his ability as required by his contract of employment, and other than in accordance with the game of cricket’. In response to an application to dismiss the charge on the basis (inter alia) that there was no allegation that any of the alleged ‘victims’ had been induced to do anything by Westfield’s deceit, and therefore there was no offence stated that was recognised at common law, the CPS commenced new proceedings, charging Westfield with (1) accepting a bribe to act in a corrupt manner in the affairs of his employer, Essex County Cricket Club, contrary to s 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; and (2) bowling in a manner calculated and intended to allow the scoring of runs to assist others to cheat at gambling, contrary to s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005. In January 2012, when his challenge to the legal sufficiency of this new charge failed, Westfield pleaded guilty to the first charge (the second being left on the file), and in February 2012 he was sentenced to four months imprisonment.5 (d) In February 2011, following the News of the World’s exposure of ‘spot-fixing’ in the 2010 Lord’s Test match between Pakistan and England,6 the Crown Prosecution Service charged Pakistani cricketers Salman Butt, Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir, along with their agent, Mazhar Majeed, with (1) accepting a bribe to act in a corrupt manner in the affairs of their employer, the Pakistan Cricket Board, viz bowling deliberate no balls in the Lord’s Test, contrary to s 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; and (2) conspiring to bowl those no balls to enable others to cheat at gambling, contrary to s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005. Majeed and Amir pleaded guilty to the charges, but Butt and Asif denied them and went to trial, where the jury found each of them guilty on both counts. Mr Justice Cooke imposed the following sentences (each to run concurrently in each case): (1) Majeed was sent to prison for two years and eight months for the corrupt payments offence, and 16 months for the gambling offence; (2) Butt was sent to prison for two years and six months for the corrupt payments offence and two years for the gambling offence; (3) Asif was sent to prison for one year on each count; and (4) Amir was sent to prison for six months on each count.7 Butt and Amir both subsequently appealed unsuccessfully against their prison sentences,8 and Majeed appealed unsuccessfully against a ruling at first instance that the indictment properly stated criminal charges under English law.9 (e) In June 2014, two businessmen and a non-league footballer, Michael Boateng, were convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery in relation to the fixing of football matches.10  (f) In 2015, the former Premier League footballer Delroy Facey was jailed for two and a half years after being convicted of match-fixing under the Bribery Act 2010, with the sentencing judge saying that his offences struck ‘at the very heart of football’.11 (g) In 2020, Pakistan international batsman Nasir Jamshed was jailed for seventeen months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to bribe batsmen to avoid scoring

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  569

runs from certain balls in a February 2018 Pakistan Super League game in return for a share of £30,000. At his sentencing hearing, Judge Richard Mansell QC said: ‘By far the most insidious consequence of these offences is the undermining of public confidence in the integrity of the sporting contest, not simply in the individual match directly affected but in the game of cricket generally’.12  1 See Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 33, [2001] 2 All ER 437, and on appeal [2002] HL 40.   2 Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), p 3.   3 ‘Champion jockey Fallon “rigged races in £2.2 million betting fraud”’, Times, 9 October 2007.  4 See generally Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16  May 2008), the City of London Police review of the case, written by Commander Patrick Rice. Commander Rice concluded that, when dealing with regulatory bodies such as the Horseracing Regulatory Authority as part of an investigation, a formal written protocol should be put in place to govern the relationship, there should be a formal policy for funding investigations in partnership with regulatory bodies, and national guidelines on appointment of expert witnesses should be followed. The BHA commissioned Dame Neville to conduct a review of the case from the regulators’ perspective. She concluded that the collapse of criminal proceedings against Fallon and the others demonstrated that the criminal justice system was an ‘inefficient and inadequate means by which to seek to regulate horseracing and that the regulation of malpractice in horseracing could be better performed by the BHA than by external criminal prosecution agencies’. See Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in Horseracing – An Independent Review’, 13  May 2008, para  8.18 (also discussed at para B4.8). The HRA had taken interim action to prevent Fallon and other defendants from racing pending determination of the criminal charges, and on challenge the High Court had upheld the HRA’s stance: see para B4.39. After the trial, the BHA did bring disciplinary proceedings against Miles Rodgers, the jockey Fergal Lynch and others, and trainer Karl Burke, and the proceedings ended in admissions, disqualifications, and exclusions. That could be seen as vindicating Dame Elizabeth Neville’s view. Kieren Fallon gave undertakings to the BHA and was not subject to disciplinary charges.  5 R  v Westfield, sentencing remarks of Judge Anthony Morris QC, 17  February 2012. The judgment rejecting Westfield’s appeal is reported at Westfield v R  [2012]  EWCA  Crim 1186. The ECB subsequently brought disciplinary charges against Westfield (and his alleged corruptor, Danish Kaneria) under its anti-corruption code. Westfield admitted the charges and was banned for five years from first class cricket, while Kaneria (whom the CPS had not charged due to lack of evidence, Westfield not being a cooperating witness at that time) was banned for life: see para B4.22.   6 See para B4.22.  7 R v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Cooke, 3 November 2011, para 4 (‘These offences, regardless of pleas, are so serious that only a sentence of imprisonment will suffice to mark the nature of the crimes and to deter any other cricketer, agent or anyone else who considers corrupt activity of this kind, with its hugely detrimental impact on the lives of many who look to find good honest entertainment and good-hearted enjoyment from following an honest, albeit professional sport’).  8 R. v Amir & Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914. Mr Asif’s application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence was denied in June 2013: ‘Mohammad Asif loses spot-fixing appeal’, June 2012 (beta. dawn.com/news/1017770/mohammad-asif-loses-spot-fixing-appeal).  9 Majeed v R, Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186. See para B4.48, n 2. 10 R v Michael Boateng, R v Krishna Sanjay Ganeshan and R v Chann Sankaran (Birmingham Crown Court) Case Nos T20139135, T20139053, T20139135 (bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-27939919 [accessed 30 October 2020]). 11 See para B4.1, n 5. 12 ‘Cricketer Nasir Jamshed jailed over spot-fixing’, BBC Sport, 7 February 2020 (bbc.co.uk/news/ukengland-51419342 [accessed 30 October 2020]).

B4.50 There has traditionally been a reluctance on the part of the public authorities to pursue criminal action against match-fixers,1 even though many argue this area of criminality is significant and should not be neglected.2 For SGBs, the possibility that the police might investigate and the Crown Prosecution Service might prosecute match-fixing or spot-fixing as a criminal offence is a double-edged sword. The criminal authorities have significant coercive powers of investigation (including search and seizure, arrest and interview, and obtaining of evidence from abroad) that extend far beyond what a SGB can do, and also apply to persons who are outside the governing body’s jurisdiction.3 And a potential criminal conviction of a participant

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followed by a period of imprisonment can obviously act as a significant deterrent to others. On the other hand, criminal investigations follow their own pace, and the police can be very unwilling to cooperate with parallel sport investigations, which can leave the SGB in the invidious position of having to decide whether to press ahead with its own investigation and charges (when it may not have all of the evidence that the police will gather, and may be accused of prejudicing any future criminal trial) or else wait (often for months if not years) for the outcome of the criminal investigation (and any subsequent prosecution and trial).4 As already noted, under English law a governing body is generally entitled to choose either course, unless there is a clear risk of prejudice to the criminal proceedings that trumps the public interest in resolving the disciplinary matter promptly.5 In many cases, its choice may depend on whether it feels able to keep the participant provisionally suspended from the sport based solely on the criminal investigation/prosecution, and/or whether it feels it has sufficient evidence at its disposal to commence disciplinary proceedings, provisionally suspend the participant based on the disciplinary charges, and go to the disciplinary hearing without waiting to see what comes out of the criminal process. 1 See ‘Match-fixing in sport – a mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27’ (KEA European Affairs, March 2012) (ec.europa.eu/sport/news/documents/study-sports-fraud-final-version_en.pdf), p  1 (‘Case law is indeed very rare’) and p 47 (‘The major obstacles in prosecuting cases of match-fixing activities are operational rather than legal. […] the main difficulty resides in providing evidence to the prosecution – eg beyond common difficulties concerning the links among the related acts and the transfer of money, the fact that a player has deliberately underperformed or that he/she had contacts with the members of a criminal gang seem to be extremely difficult to prove. […] Lack of sufficient evidence usually leads to the abandonment of investigations or to dismissal of cases. Furthermore, the prosecution of match-fixing is extremely resource-intensive, taking both huge amounts of time and money in relation to offences that in some countries result in extremely low sanctions. The prosecutor is likely not to go ahead with a case if there are numerous uncertainties regarding the viability of proceedings; if the offence is characterised as a misdemeanour; or if match-fixing is not considered as a priority by the corresponding authorities’). In the UK, the precedent set by the failed prosecution of Kieren Fallon and others (see para B4.49) is not a happy one. See Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), passim and at para 6.1 (total cost of the investigation and prosecution was £950,000). And now see paras B4.51 and B4.52 (explaining that as a consequence of the above factors, policy of Gambling Commission and police is to leave all but the most exceptional cases to SGBs to pursue as disciplinary cases). In February 2010, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel stated: ‘Experience in GB has shown that police do not generally regard the investigation of “sporting crime” as a priority. In reality, the appetite for police involvement in such matters is more likely to occur as a result of police already having an interest in a target for other (non-sporting) criminal activity’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p 36. Meanwhile, in its July 2011 response to the DCMS Select Committee Inquiry into Gambling, the Sports Rights Owners Coalition asserted: ‘Sport also believes that too low a priority is given by the Police and Gambling Commission to the issue. The reasons are perhaps self-evident: complexities, absolute cost and police budget priorities coupled with cross border jurisdictional issues. Consequently, greater efforts need to be dedicated to the resources available to sporting bodies and the Gambling Commission and the Police should be mandated to investigate and then prosecute all those who cheat. Match-fixing is a complex crime akin to financial fraud and requires specialist and dedicated investigatory resource. We would highlight to the Committee that while the Government currently invests approximately £8m a year to anti-doping measures (in grants to the UK Anti-Doping agency) that it does not allocate any specific resources at all to the fight against betting corruption’. Sports Rights Owners Coalition, Response to Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee inquiry into Gambling (July 2011), p 4. See also Scotney, ‘Establishing an effective anticorruption strategy’, (2013) 11(4) World Sports Law Report 14, 15 (‘The Police have expertise to deal with these issues when a criminal offence is suspected, but there is a clear reluctance of the police service to become involved in “sporting offences” unless wider serious criminality is involved’). 2 See eg Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 1.4 (‘Left unchecked, this corruption will devalue the integrity of sport and diminish the acceptability and effectiveness of sport as a tool to develop and support many aspects of our society’); IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p  7 (‘sport is proving to be particularly helpless in the face of the transnational resources available to contemporary criminal organisations. The public authorities are concerned by the risk of sport being penetrated by those criminal organisations that use it to launder the fruits of their activities with virtual impunity. Concern for public order is now combined with the need to preserve the image and place of sport in society as being a force for social cohesion and education for different generations’); Froysnes, Seminar on sports betting and anti-money laundering (Brussels, 11 December

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  571 2012) (‘If we do not take the required measures, sport ethics will be challenged and the image of sport will suffer: all the benefits we expect from sport in democratic societies (education, health, integration […]) will be threatened. Moreover, sport, as well as betting economies, which are very important economic sectors, will collapse due to lack of confidence. If we do not take measures now, organised crime will expand its influence over more and more sports competitors and officials. It will mean a failure of defending the Rule of law in a very important sector of our societies’). The City of London Police decided to act in the Fallon case (see para B4.49) because ‘the gambling industry within the UK produces £9 billion profit. If the allegations made proved correct, it could have damaged not only the reputation of the horse racing industry, but the UK economy itself’. Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), para 1.9. In the Nicosia Declaration of September 2012 (ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b1/eusf2012nicosia-declaration-fight-against-match-fixing.pdf), the EU Sports Ministers declared their view that ‘pwwrosecution of serious match-fixing cases, and notably of those with cross-border implications, should be prioritised’. 3 See Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), para 5.8 (‘Whilst the Jockey Club had certain powers specifically linked to internal discipline, their powers were limited compared with the powers of the police. For example, the ability to enter premises and conduct searches, as well as the power to deploy covert measures, was beyond those of the racing authorities’) and para 5.9 (‘What soon became apparent was that although [one] individual had been dealt with under Jockey Club discipline rules, the activity was continuing on a large scale through intermediaries. The Jockey Club took the view that their powers were insufficient to tackle the problem’). 4 See para B4.40. 5 Ibid.

(b) The Gambling Commission B4.51 The Gambling Commission1 undertakes investigations into suspected breaches of the Gambling Act 2005 in its own right and in collaboration with the police, and has the power to prosecute offenders and/or (under s 336 of the Act) to order the voiding of bets where it is ‘satisfied that the bet was substantially unfair’.2 Its licensing objectives are to ensure that gambling is crime-free, fair and open, and that children and vulnerable people are protected.3 This implicates the integrity of sport only indirectly (in the need to keep the gambling market ‘fair’), and in the first years after it started operations in 2007 the Commission resisted calls from sport that it should take a proactive role in protecting the integrity of sport in the context of sports betting, on the basis that there was little evidence of serious widespread risk to the three licensing objectives arising from sports betting.4 However, that changed as a result of pressure from the sports sector, and from the Sports Betting Integrity Panel established by the Minister for Sport in 2009.5 The Commission now highlights on its website that, alongside its core statutory objectives, it ‘combat[s] illegal gambling activities and betting-related corruption in sports’.6 1 See para B4.15. 2 See Gambling Commission, ‘Licensing, Compliance and Enforcement policy statement’ (September 2009), sections 5.41 to 5.47. 3 Gambling Act 2005, s 1. 4 See para B4.14. 5 Ibid. 6 See Gambling Commission, ‘How we regulate the gambling industry’, gamblingcommission.gov. uk/about/Who-we-are-and-what-we-do/How-we-regulate-the-gambling-industry.aspx [accessed 30 October 2020].

(c) The Sports Betting Intelligence Unit (SBIU) B4.52 The Gambling Commission established the SBIU at the behest of DCMS, to implement one of the key recommendations of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel.1 The SBIU’s purpose is to collect and analyse intelligence relating to corrupt activity in respect of sports betting,2 in order to inform criminal and regulatory investigations and prosecutions, and to share with ‘other partners, both nationally and internationally’ (including SGBs), so as to ‘help bring together the intelligence efforts of partners and play its part in protecting sport from corruption’.3 The terms of reference for

572  Regulating Sport

the SBIU state that it ‘will produce intelligence products to inform investigative decision making on the prosecution or disruption of criminal offences (eg cheating at gambling, in breach of s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005) or regulatory action under the Gambling Act. Where relevant and appropriate, these intelligence products may be made available to third parties to assist disciplinary action’; that it will ‘focus upon collecting and analysing information and intelligence relating to potentially criminal activity, where that activity relates to a sporting event that occurred in Great Britain, and/or involves parties based within Great Britain, and/or occurred with a Gambling Commission licensed operator’; that it will ‘undertake targeted monitoring of betting on specific events and by specific individuals’ (but not general pre-emptive monitoring of betting markets or sports events, which ‘remains the role of betting operators and SGBs’); that it will ‘act as the Commission’s gateway for sports betting intelligence matters by establishing national and international channels of communication for the receipt and dissemination of information and intelligence with relevant partners’; and that it will ‘undertake debriefings of sports betting integrity cases conducted by the Commission and partners to develop and share knowledge, working practises and techniques’.4 The latest report regarding the work of the Gambling Commission through the Sports Betting Intelligence Unit notes that ‘there have been incidents of corruption in the UK but these seem to generally be opportunistic rather than linked to organised crime. Based on current evidence, we believe that the risks of systemic corruption of sports betting and sports activities in the UK are currently less than that experienced in other jurisdictions’.5 The SBIU has continued to develop its role as the secure intelligence and information portal between the Gambling Commission, law enforcement and other agencies. The 2019 SBIU quarterly update showed reporting engagements with over 30 non-GB countries, over 20 SGBs, and both national and international law enforcement agencies.6 1 See Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p  37: (‘Where information/ intelligence becomes available about a suspected breach of sports integrity connected with betting, or where there may be some doubt as to the specific connection with betting, the Gambling Commission will make an early assessment of the case, liaising, as necessary, with the betting industry and the relevant Sports Governing Body. If the Commission assesses that the intelligence analysis and emerging evidence indicates that a full investigation under section 42 is prudent, then it will inform the sporting authority that the Commission will be responsible for the further investigation and conduct of the case. The extent to which such notification may include details of the case will depend upon the necessary confidentiality issues […]. However, it is important to recognise that the expertise/ experience of a particular sporting body may well add value to a section 42 investigation by the Commission […] If the Commission decides that the circumstances of the case do not merit a full section 42 investigation, then it will refer the matter back to the sporting authority to be deal with […]. It is envisaged that, in such cases, the Commission will hand over its investigation to date to the sporting body to facilitate any subsequent development of that investigation by the sports body, with a view to preferring any disciplinary charge(s) for a hearing before its disciplinary tribunal. This process will ensure that the sovereignty of a sports body over its own sportsmen and women who break its rules will be maintained. In respect of its role in the investigation of section 42 offences, the Gambling Commission will also take an early view on the possible complexity of any case. If […] it concludes that the case may require additional Police powers of investigation (eg covert surveillance/interception of communications), then it will liaise with Police to discuss the way forward. […] At some stage in that process, it may become clear that the circumstances do not merit a criminal enquiry and the matter can best be dealt with by referring it back to a Sports Body to deal with its own sportsmen and women as it sees fit under its own disciplinary process. Breaking down the various elements of the operational process within a new pan-sports integrity unit, sited within the Gambling Commission, will mean that the Commission becomes the real time “playmaker” in dealing with the receipt and analysis of information/intelligence on all suspicious incidents in any way connected with betting integrity, the development of the case and gathering of evidence, to the point where a decision has to be made on how best to deal with it, (i) as a criminal investigation under section 42 (Gambling Commission or Police only) or (ii) to refer back to a sport to deal with under its own discipline rules’). The Report concluded that the unit should be housed at the Gambling Commission because it already has significant powers of enquiry and empowerment to prosecute the offence of cheating and void bets, and betting operators are obliged pursuant to their licensing conditions to report suspicious betting activity to it. In support of this proposal, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel also recommended that additional resources be established within the Gambling Commission for such purposes, including, most

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  573 notably, the appointment of an executive with specific responsibility for sports betting. Ibid, pp 37–38. 2 Sports Betting Intelligence Unit Terms of Reference, December 2018, para 2.1; ‘Protecting betting integrity’, Gambling Commission, May 2019. The main intelligence captured by the SBIU is information from licensed betting operators provided under licence condition 15.1 about suspicious betting patterns on events. (See para B4.47). However, members of the public can also provide intelligence, including by using dedicated email and phone lines (including a ‘confidential intelligence line’), and other sources of intelligence include SGBs, law enforcement, other Commission work or other regulators, and the media. See Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), para 3.1. 3 Gambling Commission, ‘Sports Betting Intelligence Unit terms of reference’ (December 2018), para 2.1. 4 Ibid. 5 ‘Protecting betting integrity’, Gambling Commission, May 2019, para 1.7. 6 Sports Betting Integrity Quarterly Snapshot October 2019’, Sports Betting Intelligence Unit.

B4.53 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel also recommended that the Gambling Commission and the police ‘provide greater clarity of expectation over when a particular incident might be treated as a criminal investigation or a sports disciplinary matter; and the circumstances under which police co-operation or, indeed, a police lead would be appropriate’.1 In December 2010, the Commission published ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ for the first time, in an attempt to provide that clarity. The latest iteration of the framework was published in August 2017.2 This document states that the SBIU first assesses the intelligence it has received to establish whether there is any potential criminal activity and also: ‘whether the activity falls within its terms of reference, in particular whether the activity relates to a sporting event that occurred in Great Britain, and/or involves parties based within Great Britain, and/or occurred with a Gambling Commission licensed operator’.3

If it does not consider that the matter should be referred for criminal investigation (for example, because it involves a breach of sporting rules but not a crime), then it cannot use its investigative powers to progress the matter, but instead will simply refer it to the SGB to investigate and proceed as it sees fit.4 If the Commission believes criminal investigation may be appropriate, its enforcement team will hold a case conference, usually in consultation with the police, to determine whether the scope and scale of criminality are sufficiently high, or other special factors exist that militate in favour of criminal prosecution (such as the need to send a deterrent message, or the need to set a precedent), or else whether the matter is better dealt with by the SGB (and/ or the betting operator).5 The document notes that criminal prosecution for cheating at gambling will often take a long time and cost a lot of money, since it would be necessary to establish the corrupt relationships and flow of money to the criminal standard of proof; it therefore suggests that the better course in most cases would be to refer the matter to the SGB to take action based on the lesser standard of proof usually found in its rules.6 It concludes: ‘a SGB applying a sanction is likely to be a quicker and less costly deterrent than the Commission or police pursuing a criminal sanction. As such there is a presumption that only more serious cases would potentially be appropriate for a criminal sanction’.7 1 Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), para 1.16. More specifically, it called for ‘development of agreed criteria/thresholds for determining whether carriage of an investigation/case management should be undertaken by Sports Governing Bodies, the Gambling Commission or the Police’. Ibid, p 13. 2 Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), revised and updated (August 2017). Unless otherwise indicated paragraph references below refer to the August 2017 version. 3 Ibid, para 3.3.

574  Regulating Sport 4 Ibid, para 3.7: ‘Our investigatory powers, such as those under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), can only be utilised when investigating (which covers intelligence work as well as enforcement work) a potential crime. As such we could not use our powers once we consider an issue unsuitable for investigation’. 5 Ibid, paras 3.14 to 3.17. 6 Ibid, paras 2. 7 Ibid, 2010 version, paras 3–14. This statement does not appear in the 2017 version. Instead ‘each case will be considered on its merits and appropriate action taken dependent on the circumstances’ (at para 2.9).

B4.54 In the same document, the Gambling Commission stated that it ‘will generally work with relevant SGBs and betting operators during the investigation process’,1 and that it may share information with them during investigations, given that they may prepare or progress disciplinary cases at the same time as a criminal investigation, although it warns that ‘[t]hese should be the subject of joint discussions to ensure neither the criminal nor the disciplinary action could negatively impact on the other’.2 1 Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), para 3.25. See further para B4.34. 2 Ibid, para 3.27 (para 3.17on the 2013 version).

7 THE FUTURE: A WORLD ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY? B4.55 Given that match-fixing is now clearly an international enterprise, encompassing both sport participants and those outside the jurisdiction of sport, with no respect for national boundaries, many stakeholders have suggested that a new international agency should be set up to coordinate the fight against match-fixing and related corruption in sport, following the model of the World Anti-Doping Agency,1 based on a uniform code of anti-corruption rules to be implemented by all sports, and using the Macolin Convention2 as the vehicle for governments to ratify to commit their support for that code, including by developing criminal law offences that support the code and by providing a framework for the sharing of information between different state authorities and by those authorities with the sports movement.3 While such an approach offers various potential benefits,4 there remains resistance to the idea to date, partly (it appears) because of a desire to preserve the ‘autonomy’ of sport,5 and partly because bailing out the sports movement is currently perhaps not the highest priority for governments. One further (and perhaps stronger) point against adopting the WADA model is that it makes no provision for any stakeholders other than sport and government, whereas in the context of match-fixing it is clear that the betting industry must be on board as a committed third stakeholder if the enterprise is to have any chance of success.6 1 As to which, see generally Chapter C2 (The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework). 2 See para B4.17. 3 For example, in January 2011 then-IOC President Jacques Rogge said that the sports movement ‘will call upon the support of governments the same way we did in 1998 to create the World Anti-Doping Agency because the sports movement cannot carry on this fight alone’ (‘Federations “must adapt to money in sport” in fight against illegal betting and corruption’, Sportcal.com, 28 January 2011), while SportAccord in its November 2011 report suggested that sport could suggest the establishment of an international policing body with responsibility for collection of intelligence and investigation of sports match fixing. ‘Sport Accord: Integrity in Sport (understanding and preventing match-fixing)’ (November 2011). See also ‘Calls increase for global body to fight corruption across sport’, Sportcal. com, 13 October 2010. Meanwhile, WADA Director-General David Howman noted: ‘What we have suggested is that governments should look at WADA as an appropriate model to address other practices that challenge the integrity of the sport. […] We have evidence from Interpol and from Major League Baseball that the people who are fixing betting are the people who are involved in illegal doping’: see ‘Drug gangs run corrupt betting’, theaustralian.com, 9  October 2010. He later added: ‘What I  was saying is don’t reinvent the wheel when you’ve got a system or a process in place which works, where government works alongside sport. The WADA model was pretty useful. I’m not saying it should be

Match-Fixing and Related Corruption  575 WADA work, but you can easily expand the WADA model to something that can encompass these issues. … It’s not different people [involved in match-fixing and involved in trafficking performanceenhancing drugs]. So if you set up different organisations to deal with the same issue, then you’ve got a problem of sharing the information’: see ‘WADA warns against criminals taking control in sport’, playthegame.org, 28 March 2011. Jacques Rogge stated repeatedly that sport and government have to work together on match-fixing: ‘As a sport federation, we can point out suspicious behaviour in matches. Then comes the second phase: the support of the government. Only the government can tap phones, issue arrest warrants and search baggage. Only the government can infiltrate crime networks. Sport needs the government and the government needs sport: only as an alliance can we fight illegal betting’. Braw, ‘You can cure cancer, but you can’t cure doping and illegal betting’, huffingtonpost.com, 9 January 2012. The UK Government and others have indicated they agree with that proposition. For example, the then Australian Sports Minister, Mark Arbib, stated in January 2011: ‘Sport is international and corruption in sport is international. The best way to fight corruption is to have an international approach that all governments and sporting bodies sign up to’: ‘UK and Australian Sports Ministers pledge support for IOC’s anti-corruption drive’, Sportcal.com, 10 January 2011. In February 2012, Baroness Garden stated: ‘The UK  Government agree that the most effective way to tackle this threat is to ensure effective collaboration between all the parties involved: sports governing bodies, betting operators, law enforcement agencies and the Gambling Commission’s Sports Betting Intelligence Unit’. Hansard, 9 February 2012, debate on ‘Olympic Games 2012: Match Fixing and Suspicious Betting’, p 12, col 422. And Interpol has also come out publicly in favour of consistent legislation worldwide on ‘sporting fraud’ and international protocols to promote information-sharing between different national police forces: ‘Interpol: information-sharing key to tackling match fixing’, 11(2) World Sport Law Report, February 2013, p 1. The IRIS  Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 83, thought that setting up a WADA-style body to fight matchfixing in sport ‘would seem premature at the moment’, but it did recommend the establishment of a pan-sport ‘monitoring centre’, at international federation level, ‘to gather together all information that might be useful to sports organisations on corruption in sport linked with betting’, which it thought might eventually develop into a fully-fledged ‘agency for the integrity of sport’. The International Centre for Sports Security (ICSS) launched an international global integrity platform for sport in 2015, as a nominally independent body (effectively akin to a pressure group), although it faced significant criticism as to its credibility in light of its stakeholders (ICSS, governments, NGOs & sport launch integrity platform, 4  November 2015, sportsintegrityinitiative. com/icss-governments-ngos-sport-launch-integrity-platform/). Other commentators have noted the potential for a global anti-corruption agency to act as a lobbying body dealing with both governments and national agencies, thereby leading to an improvement in both the content of the laws and policies being implemented (‘Corruption in sport – why a global problem requires a global solution’, LawInSport). 4 If betting operators are to be required to provide betting information to sporting bodies where they suspect sporting rules have been breached (as they are, for example, in the UK: see para B4.47), that task becomes a great deal easier (and therefore their assistance becomes a lot more effective) if they can refer to a uniform code that is applicable in every sport. The same applies to law enforcement bodies who are being asked to turn over information that they have obtained in the exercise of their state investigative powers. Meanwhile, doubts about whether a sports body will deal competently and appropriately with such information are addressed if there are uniform standards for data-processing underlying the uniform code and if the uniform code provides for transparency and accountability by giving third parties such as the international agency the right to oversee disciplinary proceedings and rights of appeal to the CAS if the outcome is inconsistent with the uniform code (as does the World Anti-Doping Code). More fundamentally, governments are going to want to know that every sport has adopted rules that are fit for purpose, and to which they can confidently provide their support. In addition, experience with the World Anti-Doping Code has shown that the adoption of one uniform code across all sports contributes greatly to legal certainty and consistency, and (by expressing the view of the entire sporting movement about what rules and sanctions are necessary to combat doping in sport) creates a regime that is highly resistant to legal challenge: see para Cx.xx. Furthermore, a similar code in the area of match-fixing would deal with the problem of recognition of sanctions across different countries and sports. 5 For example, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel strongly recommended ‘that the Government respects Sports Governing Bodies’ autonomy and independence in the formulation of their own rules and regulations in relation to sports betting, thus recognising the specificity of individual sports and the different considerations which each sport needs to take into account’. It also asserted that there were ‘major difficulties’ in seeking consistent sanctions across all sports for betting offences, ‘not least because of the fact that not all sportspersons’ careers had the same or similar longevity (contrast the length of a golfer’s career compared to that of a footballer or rugby player). The impact and financial repercussions, loss of congenial employment, etc caused by the same prescriptive ban or suspension may, as a consequence, be considerably different’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February

576  Regulating Sport 2010), pp 12, 16 and 19. See also ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11–13 September 2012, p 16 (‘Federations are also keen to retain sovereignty over their own sport, determining the exact form and application of the rules, as they believe that, while principles of integrity may be universal, the exact application will differ from sport to sport. Furthermore, they are concerned about referral to an outside body that would then interfere with the running of the organization and dictate rule changes and punishments, excluding the federation from the process and keeping information from them. It is feared that this may result in a loss of respect and authority for the federation, who may appear unable or unwilling to deal with integrity breaches. In general, federations clearly desire to maintain their position as sole contact for concerns within their sport, and develop and implement their own codes of conduct’). Cf the Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 4.6 (‘penalties should be broadly consistent across sporting codes’). 6 See also ‘Rogge: Betting operators should help finance sport and its battle against match-fixing’, Sportcal.com, 1  March 2011 (‘Creating a new body would not be creating a new WADA. WADA works with one single code, one list of forbidden drugs, one set of sanctions. With betting, we would be working much more closely with countries’ [existing] legislation. It could be an agency, but it would be a different kind of agency. It can only work with the close co-operation of the three partners. The sports movement has to educate sportsmen and their entourages and has to monitor its own competitions. Then it must send the information to public authorities. Betting operators must agree to give information whenever there is an irregular pattern of betting. Governments must agree to tap phones and search bags’). See eg Chappelet, ‘The role of governments in the fight against corruption in sport’ (18  March 2011), playthegame.org/news/comments/2011/the-role-of-governments-in-thefight-against-corruption-in-sport/ [accessed 30  October 2020]. (‘WADA’s model of parity between governments and the sports movement is probably not the best. A  third type of actors is actually fundamental here: companies that manage the legal betting market estimated at several hundred billion Euros a year. These companies should co-finance this international agency together with the sports movement because they have, as have sports organisations, a vital interest in preserving a clean sport’).

CHAPTER B5

Regulating Financial Fair Play Nick Craig (English Football League), and Jonathan Taylor QC and Sam Beer (both Bird & Bird LLP) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B5.1 2

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY................................................. B5.9 A Transparency of ownership of clubs............................................................ B5.10 B Dual association........................................................................................... B5.16 C Third party interests..................................................................................... B5.18 D Inter-game debt............................................................................................ B5.35

3

CLUB LICENSING............................................................................................. B5.41 A Licensing systems in rugby union................................................................ B5.42 B Licensing systems at national level in football............................................ B5.43 C The UEFA licensing system......................................................................... B5.45

4

COST CONTROLS............................................................................................. B5.69 A Break-even requirements............................................................................. B5.71 B Salary caps................................................................................................... B5.100 C Formula One................................................................................................ B5.124

5

WHEN IT ALL GOES WRONG – INSOLVENCY............................................ B5.131 A Some basic principles of insolvency law..................................................... B5.133 B A typical club insolvency............................................................................. B5.138

1 INTRODUCTION1 B5.1 There are many reasons why a sports governing body or competition organiser (SGB) may consider it necessary to regulate ownership of a member club and/or how the club’s finances are run. An owner who is unfit may bring not only the club but also the competitions in which the club participates into disrepute, and/or may run the club (which may be considered a ‘community asset’) into the ground. Meanwhile a club that does not live within its means, that gambles everything on huge player expenditure in pursuit of the massive rewards that come with on-field success,2 risks not only its own future but also the financial well-being of other clubs and players to whom it owes money, thereby destabilising the whole competition. Without regulation, there is a risk that other clubs will feel forced to join in the speculation in order to compete with their profligate colleagues, and the entire enterprise could spiral out of control, with multiple club failures along the way. But even if a club were to have limitless cash to spend, that raises its own issues of unfairness (‘financial doping’) for SGBs that are trying to maintain a level playingfield with some semblance of competitive balance between clubs and therefore at least some degree of uncertainty of outcome. 1 The contents of this chapter represent the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sporting bodies they represent. 2 Take, for example, the English Football League Championship Play-off Final, often described as the world’s richest club football match, because the prize for winning is promotion to the English Premier League, which leads to a guaranteed annual income of £95m or more from central broadcasting and sponsorship revenues alone. Even if the club is relegated after only one season, it is also guaranteed to receive millions in ‘parachute payments’ in each of the following three seasons (assuming it is

578  Regulating Sport not re-promoted), which themselves eclipse anything the English Football League can offer by way of distributions of commercial revenues. According to estimates by Deloitte, the guaranteed income generated by winning the 2018/19 Play Off Final would be about £170m. See deloitte.com/ uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/derby-and-villa-battle-for-biggest-prize-in-world-football.html [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.2 Various SGBs have therefore adopted regulations that are intended to ensure one or more forms of ‘financial fair play’. For example, UEFA states that the objectives behind its Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations1 are: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)

to promote and improve ‘the standard of all aspects of football in Europe and to give continued priority to the training and care of young players in every club’; ‘to ensure that clubs have an adequate level of management and organisation’; ‘to adapt clubs’ sporting infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media representatives with suitable, well-equipped and safe facilities’; ‘to protect the integrity and smooth running of the UEFA club competitions’; ‘to allow the development of benchmarking for clubs in financial, sporting, legal, personnel, administrative and infrastructure-related criteria throughout Europe’; ‘to improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their transparency and credibility’; ‘the protection of creditors and to ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually’; ‘to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances’; ‘to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues’; ‘to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football’; and ‘to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football’.

Other SGBs, in football and other sports, state that the same or similar objectives underlie their own sets of financial regulations.2 1 Article 2 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations 2018. 2 See para B5.94 (English Football League), para B5.103-B5.104 (Rugby Football League), and para B5.108 (Premier Rugby).

B5.3 Regulations that restrict a club’s ability to deal with its assets and to invest its resources as it sees fit in order to compete with its rivals appear at first glance to be a paradigm of anti-competitive interference that competition law is designed to prevent.1 However, the European Commission stated in the working paper that accompanied its White Paper on Sport that: ‘legitimate objectives of sporting rules will normally relate to the “organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport’’ and may include, eg, the ensuring of fair sport competitions with equal chances for all athletes, the ensuring of uncertainty of results, […] the protection of the safety of spectators, the encouragement of training of young athletes, the ensuring of financial stability of sport clubs/teams or the ensuring of a uniform and consistent exercise of a given sport (the ‘rules of the game’)’.2

Similarly, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)3 has recognised that the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations: ‘not only serve a private interest, but also a public interest in that the overarching objectives of these regulations are […] inter alia to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues, to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finance, to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football and to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football’.4

If the underlying objectives are legitimate, they justify regulatory intervention, provided that any restrictions that the regulations impose on the rights and freedoms

Regulating Financial Fair Play  579

of participants in the sport are limited to what is necessary and proportionate to the achievement of those objectives.5 1 See generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport). 2 Para 2.1.5 Annex 1 to the EC Staff Working Document – ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context’ – Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport. See also European Parliament Resolution 2016/2145(INI), para  33 (welcoming UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations because ‘they encourage more economic rationality and better standards of financial management in professional sports, with a focus on the long-term as opposed to the short-term, thereby contributing to the healthy and sustainable development of sport in Europe; […] Financial Fair Play has encouraged better financial management standards and should therefore be applied strictly’). 3 See Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport). 4 Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, para 103. 5 See paras B5.16 et seq (rules prohibiting multiple ownership), paras B5.21 et seq (rules prohibiting third party influence over the sale of a club’s players), paras B5.45 et seq (UEFA’s financial fair play rules), para B5.94 et seq (EFL’s financial fair play rules), and para B5.108 et seq (Premier Rugby’s salary cap rules).

B5.4 National laws often impose various controls that ought to help ensure that clubs and teams are run on a sustainable basis. For example, in the UK most professional sports clubs are run as public or private limited companies,1 and therefore have the following legal obligations: (a)

All companies must file annual financial accounts at Companies House within a prescribed period after the end of their financial year. The accounts must be audited by an independent firm of auditors, and those auditors have both statutory and common law duties to ensure that the accounts as filed fairly reflect the club’s financial position, including addressing whether there is any issue about its ability to continue as a ‘going concern’, ie has the ability to meet its debts as they become due. A failure by the company to file such audited accounts can lead to the striking off of the company (such that it ceases to exist) and even criminal prosecution for the directors who cause the default. (b) Tax legislation imposes on any employer the obligation to deduct income tax and national insurance contributions from employees’ wages at source and to account for the same to HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on a monthly basis throughout the tax year. Again, penalties will follow for companies that default.2 (c) Company law also imposes a general duty on the directors of a company to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and requires the directors to take into account: (i) the likely long-term consequences of any decision; (ii) the interests of the company’s employees; (iii) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others; (iv) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment; (v) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; (vi) the need to act fairly as between members of the company; and (vii) the interests of creditors.3 (d) Additional legal duties are imposed on directors in circumstances where it appears a company may be insolvent, whether on a cash-flow or balance sheet basis. The consequences for individual directors who breach those duties can be significant.4 1 See para A2.41 et seq (private and public limited companies). 2 See Chapter I1 (Taxation of Sports Organisations), Section 5. Most if not all professional football clubs are now required to account for PAYE and NIC on a monthly basis. 3 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. 4 See para B5.132.

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B5.5 Some SGBs have made a failure to meet certain of the statutory requirements outlined above a breach of their own competition rules, triggering a right for the SGB to intervene. For example: (a) Each of the Rugby Football League (RFL), Rugby Football Union (RFU), The Football Association (The FA), and the English Football League (EFL) requires its member clubs to file their annual audited accounts with the SGB.1 Where a failure to do so indicates potential financial instability, the SGB’s rules give it the power to take action. For example, where the RFL ‘reasonably has concerns for a club’s stability’, it can apply ‘special measures’, including requirements to submit to an audit and provide a detailed financial forecast, as well as restrictions on entering new contracts with players.2 (b) Both the RFL and the EFL require member clubs to declare to them any nonpayment of PAYE/NIC owed to HMRC, and to authorise HMRC to disclose any defaults to them direct.3 Under the EFL rules, non-payment of PAYE/NIC triggers an automatic embargo on the registration of players until the default is cleared.4 There is a clear sporting justification for adding this layer of regulation on top of what is already provided by statute. For example, a club might not be filing its annual accounts because it is having trouble persuading its independent auditors that it remains a going concern, which any SGB would want to know as soon as possible; while any club failing to pay PAYE and NIC on its player wages when due could reasonably be considered to be trading beyond its means and as such should be subject to tighter controls in terms of future player signings than those who are paying the PAYE and NIC on their player wage bill on time each month. 1 2 3 4

See RFL Operational Rule A3:9, RFU Reg 5.1, FA Rule I, and EFL Reg 16.2 respectively. See RFL Operational Rule A3:3. See RFL Rule A3:2 and EFL Reg 17. EFL Reg 17.3.

B5.6 However, history has demonstrated that these legal requirements are inadequate in and of themselves to address the mischiefs identified above, and therefore SGBs have had to enhance the protections for their own competitions through further regulation. In many cases SGBs have been put under pressure from external bodies, most notably government,1 supporters, and the press, to adopt more and tighter controls in respect of the ownership and finances of clubs participating in their respective sports. As a result, an SGB that fails to regulate ‘financial fair play’ adequately risks being accused of failing in its duty to its stakeholders to safeguard the long-term future of its competitions. 1 See in particular the Culture Media and Sport Select Committee’s consistent questioning of the adequacy of English football governing bodies’ regulation of the ownership and finances of English football clubs, discussed at para A3.102, and also at paras B5.13 and B5.145.

B5.7 Lawyers advising SGBs need to understand what different regulatory approaches are available to address these various concerns, and which of them are most likely to be effective in the sport in issue and to withstand legal challenge. Lawyers advising clubs need to understand what the regulations applicable to them require, how clubs can avoid falling foul of them, and what is to be done where there is a suggestion that the clubs they advise – or their rivals1 – may have fallen foul of the rules. 1 It might be argued that clubs owe a duty of financial fair play not only to the competition organiser but also to the other clubs in the competition, including running their businesses rationally, paying all of their debts as they become due (to other clubs, to HMRC, to trade creditors, and so on), and complying with any cost control constraints imposed on all clubs by the SGB. It would not be fair if one club was able (for example) to outspend its rivals for players because it was not paying off debts it owed, but instead was living beyond its means.

Regulating Financial Fair Play  581 Some SGBs have taken steps to impose such inter-club duties as a matter of contract in their regulations. For example, Premier League Rule B.16 provides that ‘In all matters and transactions relating to the League each Club shall behave towards each other Club and the League with the utmost good faith’. In other contexts, the courts have construed similarly phrased obligations as requiring the obligated party ‘to adhere to the spirit of the contract, […] to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, and to be faithful to the agreed common purpose, and to act consistently with the justified expectations of the parties’. CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch) at para 246; Berkeley Community Villages Ltd v Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330, para  97; Health & Case Management Ltd v Physiotherapy Network Ltd [2018]  EWHC  869 (QB). ‘The duty is not a duty to prefer the interests of the other contracting party. It is, rather, a duty to recognise and to have due regard to the legitimate interests of both the parties in the enjoyment of the fruits of the contract as delineated by its terms’. CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch) at para 240, quoting with approval the Australian case of Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17. In other words, the party that is required to act in good faith is still entitled to act in its own interests, ‘so long as pursuit of those interests does not entail unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of a benefit conferred by the express terms so that the enjoyment becomes (or could become) nugatory, worthless, or, perhaps, seriously undermined’. Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Co. [2010] EWHC 1632 (TCC). However, while there have been several high profile cases of an SGB bringing action against a club for breach of the applicable rules (See eg, paras B5.99 and B5.114), the only case to date of which the authors are aware of one club suing another club for such breach is the claim brought by Sheffield United against West Ham for damages after West Ham’s breach of the rules of third party ownership in relation to Carlos Tevez helped West Ham to avoid relegation at Sheffield United’s expense: see para B5.22 and para E7.27. This issue has now been considered by CAS, in the context of qualification for UEFA club competitions. In June 2015  UEFA had to consider whether Olympiakos, the champions of the Greek domestic league in season 2014/15, should be eligible for the UEFA  Champions League following allegations of involvement in match fixing (see, more generally, para B4.11 and B4.12). After completion of the internal appeals process, Olympiakos were admitted to the competition. Panathinaikos, the runners up in the Greek league, who also qualified for the Champions League but in an earlier qualifying round, sought to appeal that decision before CAS. Panathinaikos v UEFA and Olympiakos, CAS 2015/A/4151, and the CAS panel ruled that Panathinaikos’ appeal was admissible, because Article 62 of the UEFA Statutes provided that ‘only parties directly affected by a decision may appeal to CAS […]’, and earlier CAS cases had found that ‘the UEFA statute does not exclude the possibility that a third party can also be a party, ie a person against whom the measure taken by the Association is not directly aimed’, if the decision also disposes of the rights of the third party, because it is then directly affected by the decision (citing Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD & Victoria Sport Clube v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 & 1584). However, the CAS panel found that Panathinaikos could not establish it had sufficient standing to pursue the appeal, because the competition had already started so the ‘admissions’ phase was over and the club could not show that it would automatically take Olympiakos’ place rather than other clubs more recently eliminated from the competition in the play-offs. Panathinaikos v UEFA and Olympiakos, CAS  2015/A/4151, paras 147–149. In light of the above, SGBs should consider whether it is appropriate either (a) to regulate the manner in which third party claims are considered, or (b) to prohibit them (as, for example, the EFL prohibits third party actions in the context of enforcement of its Profitability & Sustainability Rules: see Rule 4.4 (‘Each Club shall, at all times and in all matters within the scope of these Rules behave with the utmost good faith both towards The League and the other Clubs (provided always that only The League shall have the right to bring any action whatsoever for any alleged breach of this requirement)’.

B5.8 This chapter therefore surveys some of the different regulations that SGBs have adopted to ensure ‘financial fair play’ by their member clubs and discusses how those regulations have stood up to legal challenge (Sections 2 to 4). And it also discusses the particular issues that an SGB has to address when everything goes wrong and a member club becomes insolvent (Section 5).

2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY B5.9 Transparency and accountability are at the heart of good governance.1 What is at issue, though, is the degree of transparency required. For example, is it right that supporters of a particular club have available to them details of each and every shareholder of the club, together with full access to the accounting records of the club? Alternatively, should supporters be expected to trust the SGB to gather all

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relevant information and regulate the club accordingly? Or is there a balance to be struck between the two? Various approaches have been tried to date. 1 See further para A5.21 et seq.

A Transparency of ownership of clubs B5.10 Many would argue that even the sports clubs that are not owned by supporters’ trusts but instead are privately owned (ie all Premier League clubs and the vast majority of EFL clubs) are assets of their communities, a focal point of local identity and pride. Supporters want their clubs to be successful, but a club is no good to a supporter if it has to be liquidated because it has been run recklessly in a bid for promotion, still less if it has been stripped of its assets by its owner. Requiring clubs to disclose the identity of their owners helps ensure that they are held accountable for their actions, and for the achievements (or otherwise) of the club, by the supporters and wider public.1 1 See eg Premier League Rule G5 and EFL Reg 113, requiring member clubs to publish on their websites details of any person holding a ‘Significant Interest’ in that club. A Significant Interest is set at a legal and/or beneficial holding of 10 per cent or more of the voting rights in the club. Rights of associates are taken together, as are rights of persons deemed to be ‘acting in concert’ (as that term is used in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers).

B5.11 Complete transparency of ownership is also of crucial importance to the SGB. First, it means the SGB knows who is ultimately responsible for the club’s finances, including providing any necessary support for its spending commitments.1 Secondly, it enables the SGB to ensure that the rules prohibiting common ownership of clubs in the same competition are being respected.2 Thirdly, it means the SGB can check the owners do not have any blemishes on their record that should disqualify them from owning a ‘community asset’ such as a football club. 1 For example, whenever there is a change in control of a club (defined, broadly, as acquisition, eg, by share purchase, of the ability to appoint the directors and/or to vote at least 30 per cent of the members’ voting rights), the EFL requires the club not only to file information about the new owners and directors (see para B5.12) but also ‘future financial information’ identifying projected income and expenditure over any remainder of the current season plus the next season, and requiring the new owners to demonstrate the source of funding sufficient to cover any shortfall. See EFL  Reg 16.21. Currently, however, the regulations do not mandate that this is provided before the change in control takes place, a weakness that played a part in the demise of Bury FC in 2019: see review document cited at para B5.13 fn 2. Clubs in the Championship are required to file this information each season, whether or not they have experienced a change in control: see para B5.51. If their losses are projected to exceed specified limits, they may be required to provide proof of ‘secure funding’, ie, a legally binding agreement from the owner to provide the required funds, together with a guarantee or letter of credit or other suitable security. See EFL Profitability & Sustainability Rules (EFL Regulations, Appendix 5 Part 2), section 2.8. One recommendation of the Bury Review (see para B5.122), was that the EFL consider extending the requirement to file future financial information annually to all clubs in all three divisions. 2 See paras B5.16 and B5.17.

B5.12 Each of the Premier League, the EFL, and The FA therefore requires member clubs to disclose any new owners or directors, who have to establish that they are not subject to any ‘disqualifying conditions’ (the ‘Owners’ and Directors’ Test’, formerly known as the ‘Fit and Proper Persons Test’).1 The test applies to those owning (whether individually or with associates or in concert with others) 30 per cent or more of the issued share capital in a club. The test is also intended to identify shadow directors – a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act.2 The disqualifying conditions cover not only those areas already addressed by English company law (such as disqualification as a company director), but also matters such as convictions for offences of dishonesty3 or being subject to bans imposed by other SGBs.

Regulating Financial Fair Play  583 1 See Premier League Rules Section F, EFL Reg 22 and Appendix 3, and FA Regulations on Owners and Directors. The RFL has a similar rule, which is RFL  League Operational Rules Section C3.1. In contrast, RFU Reg 3.4.3 and the accompanying Declaration at Appendix 1 to Reg 5 only applies where a new entity is being incorporated, and does not include as many disqualifying conditions as the Premier League, EFL, FA, and RFL tests. 2 Companies Act 2006, s 251(1). Under s 251(2) a person is not to be regarded as a shadow director by reason only that the directors act on advice given by them in a professional capacity, under authority of any enactment, or any direction of a minister of the Crown. 3 In March 2014, Massimo Cellino acquired ownership and control of Leeds United FC. On 18 March 2014, a court in Cagliari, Italy, issued a judgment in criminal proceedings brought by the Public Prosecutor of Cagliari, declaring Mr Cellino guilty of the crime of evasion of import tax payable in respect of a boat. The EFL determined that judgment to be a conviction by a competent court having jurisdiction outside England and Wales for a like offence to an offence involving a ‘Dishonest Act’, (ie an act that would reasonably be considered to be dishonest), and therefore disqualified him under the Owners’ and Directors’ Test. On 5 April 2014, a Professional Conduct Committee (consisting, by agreement of the parties, of Mr Tim Kerr QC, as he was then) upheld Mr Cellino’s appeal against that decision. Mr Kerr agreed with the EFL that the Italian court judgment constituted a ‘conviction’, even though under Italian law the judgment is not final and Mr Cellino was therefore presumed innocent until all appeal rights had been exhausted. However, Mr Kerr found that the judgment in its summary form did not provide ‘enough factual information to reach the conclusion that what [Mr Cellino] was convicted of was conduct which would reasonably considered to be dishonest’. When the reasoned judgment of the Italian court was subsequently issued, the EFL decided, and on Mr Cellino’s further appeal Mr Kerr agreed, that those reasons demonstrated that the court had indeed found Mr Cellino guilty of committing the offence with dishonest intent, but by the time the proceedings were resolved, the period of disqualification remaining was only a matter of weeks. Had the EFL been applying a subjective test of suitability at the point of entry, such a convoluted set of proceedings may not have ensued.

B5.13 After the financial collapse and consequent expulsion from the English Football League of Bury FC in August 2019 led to criticism from the Select Committee and supporter groups,1 the EFL announced an independent review into the circumstances leading up to Bury FC’s collapse, with a view to identifying possible rule changes that might address the concerns of the Select Committee and supporter groups. The scope of that review was not limited to the Owners’ and Directors’ Test, but the final report2 noted: ‘Under the OAD Test, no one can become (or remain) an owner or a director (in title or fact) of a Club unless he or she has disclosed all relevant facts to the EFL, and the EFL has confirmed (based on that disclosure and its own background checks) that he or she is not subject to any of the following Disqualifying Conditions: (1) ownership or involvement in the management or administration of another Club or PL club (because of the potential conflict of interest); (2) a ban by a football body or other professional body, or previous failure to comply with the OAD Test disclosure obligations or the football betting regulations; (3) an unspent conviction for one of a list of specified offences, or for any offence that results in a prison sentence of at least 12 months, or is subject to a football banning order, or he or she is a registered sex offender; (4) disqualification from acting as a company director; or (5) personal insolvency or prior involvement in two football club insolvencies (whether with two different clubs or with the same club twice). A  Club may be expelled from membership of the EFL if it fails to remove a person who fails the OAD Test.3 The OAD Test therefore applies a limited set of objective criteria. If those criteria are met, the test is passed. The OAD Test does not seek to make any further judgment as to suitability (financial or otherwise) to own or manage a Club. For example, it does not require proof of availability of funds, or experience of running a football club, or a track record of rescuing distressed companies or of running a business as a going concern. Furthermore, the objective criteria that are applied do not include various criteria that might be considered relevant to financial suitability. For example, the OAD Test does not disqualify where there is a track record of company insolvencies (other than of football clubs), of stripping assets from distressed companies, of failing to ensure payment of creditors, or of failing to file company accounts.

584  Regulating Sport […] This case has highlighted several issues with the EFL Regulations, in particular in relation to […] the OAD Test. There is no doubt that the EFL applied the OAD Test properly in relation to [Bury owners] Mr Day and Mr Dale. The question is whether the test as currently written is fit for purpose. In particular, it only looks at a narrow list of objective criteria, and does not take into account various other factors that speak to whether a new owner or director is a fit and proper person to own/run a member Club.’ 1 The Committee’s Inquiry into the Administration of English Football Clubs was launched in September 2019, with an evidence session held on 21 October 2019. Then-chair of the Committee, Damian Collins MP, said: ‘Systematic and structural problems are responsible for the tragic expulsion of Bury FC from the League this year. These failures were avoidable, and it is essential that the authorities urgently overhaul their framework if they wish to avoid the same fate befalling other clubs. We heard time and again that supporters felt powerless as they watched their beloved club suffer shocking mismanagement and financial misconduct. The authorities must learn to respect, and act upon, these concerns. If the reforms we recommend are not introduced forthwith, the only alternative is for the Government to step in’. See ‘Committee calls for regulatory reforms to English football’, 5 November 2019 (committees. parliament.uk/committee/378/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/103576/committeecalls-for-regulatory-reforms-to-english-football/ [accessed 1 November 2020]). 2 Independent review into the events leading up to the expulsion of Bury FC from membership of the EFL, 20  February 2020, efl.com/-more/governance/reviews/ (‘the Bury Review’) [accessed 1 November 2020]. 3 EFL Regulations, Appendix 3, Rule 4.4(b).

B5.14 SGBs have generally avoided expanded their ‘fit and proper person’ tests beyond narrow objective factors for fear that any subjective judgment that an owner is not ‘fit and proper’ to own a member club could be met with expensive legal challenge. However, a regulation needs to go far enough to be effective, and a decision to rule someone not ‘fit and proper’ would only be challengeable on limited grounds analogous to those available on judicial review of the decision of a public body, ie failure to apply the rules properly, procedural unfairness, or irrationality.1 1 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies), and in particular Chapter E7 (Grounds of Review Arising out of Control of the Sport).

B5.15 There are various precedents from which SGBs could draw that allow for subjective judgment. For example, the Finance Act 2010 provides that a charity will only be eligible for UK charity tax reliefs if the managers of the charity (being those person having the general control and management of the charity, including directors or trustees) are regarded as ‘fit and proper’.1 In contrast to the EFL’s bright-line approach, the legislation does not specify when someone would not be regarded as fit and proper. Instead a judgment has to be exercised in each case, based on the facts and circumstances of that case. HMRC has issued guidance as to factors it would consider to be negative indicators, including where individuals: (a) have a history of tax fraud; (b) have a history of other fraudulent behaviour including misrepresentation and/ or identity theft; (c) are barred from acting as a charity trustee by a charity regulator or court; or (d) are disqualified from acting as a company director.2 Other statutes create similarly subjective tests in the context of broadcasting,3 financial services,4 and driving instruction.5 In sport, World Athletics’ eligibility rule for its own officials has a subjective element,6 as does its counterpart in the constitution of the International Biathlon Union,7 and FIFA has a similar rule that has been enforced by the CAS.8 1 Finance Act 2010, s 30 and Sch 6, Pt 1, paras 1 and 4. 2 A copy of the full HMRC guidance can be found at gov.uk/government/publications/charities-fit-andproper-persons-test/guidance-on-the-fit-and-proper-persons-test [accessed 1 November 2020]. 3 Broadcasting Act 1996, s 3(3) and associated guidance issued by Ofcom.

Regulating Financial Fair Play  585 4 Section 60A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The FCA Sourcebook can be found at handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/FIT.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020]. 5 Road Traffic Act 1988, s 123, and in particular s 125(3). Those provisions were considered by the Court of Appeal in Harris v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors {2010] EWCA Civ 808. In the lead judgment, Richards LJ analysed existing case law to determine the meaning of ‘fit and proper’, including discussing, at para 20, the formulation adopted by Lord Bingham in R v Crown Court at Warrington ex parte RBNB [2002] 1 WLR 195: ‘Secondly, some consideration must be given to the expression “fit and proper” person. This is a portmanteau expression, widely used in many contexts. It does not lend itself to semantic exegesis or paraphrase and takes its colour from the context in which it is used. It is an expression directed to ensuring that an applicant for permission to do something has the personal qualities and professional qualifications reasonably required of a person doing whatever it is that the applicant seeks permission to do’. 6 Article 65.2 of the World Athletics Constitution (January 2019) requires that all prospective World Athletics Officials must be confirmed by the Vetting Panel to have (a) satisfied an Integrity Check and (b) not be subject to any disqualifying conditions. Article  8.2 of the World Athletics Vetting Rules states: ‘For an Applicant, Existing Official or Specified Staff Member to satisfy an Integrity Check, the Vetting Panel must decide, on the balance of probabilities, and after considering all relevant information available to it, that the person: 8.2.1 is able to meet the high standards of conduct and integrity required of an Official or Specified Staff Member; and 8.2.2 is of good character and reputation; […]’. 7 Article  26.2 of the IBU  Constitution (October 2019) lists a series of disqualifying conditions, but also includes the catch-all (at Art 26.2.11) that the individual ‘fails an assessment, made by the Vetting Panel in accordance with the Vetting Rules, of whether the person (a) is of good character and reputation; (b) is able to meet the high standards of conduct and integrity required of an IBU Official; and (c) is physically and mentally fit to perform the role in question’. 8 See para A5.45 n 5.

B Dual association B5.16 As already noted, transparency of ownership is also required to prevent breach of the various rules that exist against multiple ownership of more than one club in the same competition. For example, English football clubs are subject to UEFA’s prohibition against any person having ownership or control of two clubs participating in its competitions.1 In addition, the domestic rules effectively prohibit multiple ownership of clubs across the Premier League and the EFL, via the Owners’ and Directors’ Test, by preventing someone becoming an owner or director of a club in one of those competitions if they, either directly or indirectly, are involved in or have any power to determine or influence the management or administration of another club in the Premier League or the EFL.2 Each also prohibits an owner or director from holding or acquiring any significant interest (ie  more than 10 per cent shareholding)4 in a club while they either directly or indirectly hold any interest in any class of shares of another club (though each only applies within the Premier League and the EFL separately, rather than across both).3 Separately, the EFL Regulations restrict persons from having any interest at all an EFL club if they (or one of their associates) already have an interest (of any size) in another club in the United Kingdom or Ireland, without the prior written consent of the EFL board.5 Further, the EFL  Regulations restrict any EFL club having an association with or influence over the running of any club in the United Kingdom or Ireland, without the consent of the EFL board. This includes: (a) holding or applying to hold any shares or securities of another club; (b) issuing any shares or granting any holding to another club; (c) lending money to or borrowing money from another club to guarantee its debts or obligations; and (d) having any power to determine or influence the management or administration of another club or permitting another club to do the same.6 The Premier League imposes a similarly-worded restriction but it is: (a) an absolute prohibition (rather than subject to board approval); and (b) only applicable to English and Welsh clubs.7

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Since these restrictions generally only apply to clubs in England and Wales (with the exception of some of the EFL Regulations that also apply in Ireland and Scotland), it is possible for an individual to own a football club in the Premier League or EFL while also owning and/or having an interest in foreign clubs throughout Europe or worldwide (although UEFA’s rules would prevent any such clubs from competing against one another in UEFA competitions). 1 See Art 5.01 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2018-21 Cycle, 2019/20 Season. The UEFA Club Financial Control Body considered the test for “decisive influence” under Art 5.01.c.iv in case no AC-01/2017 in the context of Red Bull’s influence over Red Bull Salzburg and Red Bull Leipzig. It concluded that the bar was ‘a high one, requiring the ability to direct the decision making of both Clubs by any means’ (para 41) and that Red Bull’s relationship with Red Bull Salzburg was a standard sponsorship relationship that did not reach the level of decisive influence. 2 Premier League Rule F.1.2 and EFL Regulations Appendix 5. 3 Premier League Rule F.1.3 and A.179 (and also I.5) and EFL Regulations Appendix 5. 4 Premier League Rule I.5. 5 EFL Reg 105.1. 6 EFL Reg 104.1. 7 Premier League Rule I.1.

B5.17 UEFA’s rules against multiple ownership were the subject of unsuccessful challenge in the landmark AEK Athens case.1 After three of the quarter-finalists at the 1997/98  UEFA  Cup Winners’ Cup (AEK  Athens, Slavia Prague and Vicenza) were majority-owned by subsidiaries of the same British company, ENIC plc, UEFA implemented restrictions against ownership of multiple teams in the same UEFA competition. Under the new restrictions, since AEK Athens and Slavia Prague had both qualified to compete in the 1998/99 UEFA Cup competition, AEK Athens was removed from the competition on the basis that it had a lower coefficient than Slavia Prague. Both clubs then challenged the rule on several grounds, including infringement of Swiss and European competition law and the EU guarantee of free movement of capital. Having initially stayed the implementation of the restrictions for the 1998/99 season due to the lack of time given to affected clubs to comply,2 the CAS eventually held that: (a) the aim of the rule, ‘preserving the authenticity and uncertainty of results – by preventing the conflict of interest inherent in commonly owned clubs participating in the same football competition – is certainly to be considered in principle as a legitimate justification’;3 (b) the UEFA rule ‘is an essential feature for the organization of a professional football competition and is not more extensive than necessary to serve the fundamental goal of preventing conflicts of interest which would be publicly perceived as affecting the authenticity, and thus the uncertainty, of results in UEFA competitions’;4 (c) however, ‘there is an obvious need for a reasonable period of time before entry into force, or else the implementation of the Contested Rule may turn out to be excessively detrimental to commonly controlled clubs and their owners’.5 Accordingly, the CAS upheld the validity of the UEFA rule but declared that there should be a further delay in its implementation (until the 2000/01 season) to allow commonly owned clubs to adjust their plans. 1 2 3 4 5

AEK PAE and SK Slavia Praha v UEFA, CAS 98/2000, discussed at paras B1.36 and E11.123. See para B1.21. AEK PAE and SK Slavia Praha v UEFA, CAS 98/2000, para 153. Ibid, para 136. Ibid, para 161.

C Third-party interests B5.18 Ownership of specific club assets can also raise regulatory concerns. For example, in certain territories, most notably South American countries, Spain, Italy,

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and Portugal, a system had developed whereby the rights in relation to the registration of a player are divided into three distinct transactions: (a)

the employment contract between the club and the player, whereby the player agrees to play for the club;1 (b) the ‘registration right’, being the right of the club to register the player with the relevant national federation and to have the player play for the club in the national federation’s competitions;2 and (c) the ‘economic right’, being the right to receive the proceeds from any transfer of the player’s registration to another club.3 Ownership of or interest in the third type of right, the ‘economic right’, is now commonly referred to as ‘third-party ownership’, or (depending on the extent of the economic right held) ‘third party investment’. 1 See Chapter F1 (Playing Contracts). 2 Sometimes described as a ‘federative right’. For an early example of litigation on other questions but involving a player so owned, see Sunderland FC  v Uruguay Montevideo, Nunez and Betencur [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 828, 26 April 2001, Blofeld J  (attempt by Sunderland to avoid transfer contract and player contract on the grounds of misrepresentation and mistake as to the identity of the club transferring the player. Blofeld J held on the hearing of an interim injunction that fraud was not made out; action in relation to innocent misrepresentation and mistake settled before trial. The confusion over the identity of the club transferring the player arose out of the disparate ownership of the registration right and economic rights in him). 3 The authority for the existence of these separate rights can be found in RCD Espanyol De Barcelona Sad v Club Athletico Velez Sarsfield, CAS 2004/A/635, para 64, where the panel said: ‘In the Panel’s opinion, in professional football a basic legal distinction is to be made between the registration of a player and the economic rights related to a player’. See also discussion along similar lines in RCD Mallorca v Club Atletico Lanus, CAS 2004/A/781.

B5.19 This model has allowed investors to put money into bringing players out of poverty and having them trained at clubs, and to profit from doing so if the players succeed and are sold on by the club for a significant fee. The players benefit, as they otherwise might have been deprived of a chance to play at the highest level. The clubs benefit, because they had the use of talented players that they would not have had the financial means to bring on themselves. The investors benefit through the very substantial profit that they make if a player they have invested in turned out to be major talent. Rather like record companies justifying the profits they make on recording artists, the investors would justify the return they made by reference to the many players whom they brought on who did not succeed. B5.20 The first difficulty, however, is that the third-party investors’ interests in the player could conflict with those of the club that holds his registration. While the club may want to keep the player, the third-party investors would want to maximise their return by seeing him transferred (not always only to reap an immediate financial reward, but also to advance his career), and would seek to include provisions in the agreement to protect that interest. On the face of it, that affords third parties influence over the playing decisions of the club. The second difficulty is that the model appears to remove to a substantial degree the player’s autonomy and freedom of choice as to where he plays. The third issue is the impact of the financial arrangements with the third party in the context of financial controls imposed on member clubs. As a result of these concerns, SGBs have felt it necessary to intervene by regulation to restrict or even prohibit such investments.1 1 In addition to the following paragraphs, see also para F3.36 et seq.

(a) Third-party influence B5.21 Third party influence is considered to arise where someone other than the employer or employee has influence over the affairs of the club or player in

588  Regulating Sport

an employment relationship. In football, such arrangements are now expressly prohibited by Article 18bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), which provides: ‘No club shall enter into a contract which enables any other party to that contract or any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.’

That regulation is deemed to be binding at national level and is to be incorporated into the national association’s rules without modification.1 FIFA published a detailed guide to the regulation, and cases interpreting and applying it, in September 2020.2 1 FIFA  Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Art 1(3)(a). Even where the national association has failed to implement the regulation directly in its own statutes, it has been held that the direct applicability wording of Art 1 is such as to enable the national association to take action in any event. See the commentary by Pekka Albert Aho on the case of the Finnish FA v Tampere United in (2011) 9(6) World Sports Law Report. In that case the rules of the Finnish Football Association did not contain a provision implementing Article 18bis at the national level. They did, however require all members to abide by the rules and decision of FIFA. The Finnish domestic dispute resolution body agreed with FIFA’s representations that this was sufficient for the domestic governing body to apply Art 18bis. In any event, many national associations have complied with the requirements of Art 1(3) (a) and introduced their own provisions. See for example Football Association Rule C1.2.3 and Third Party Interest in Players Regulations Rule A.1, and Art 60.2 of the Swiss Football Association’s Game Regulations. 2 FIFA Manual on ‘TPI’ and “TPO’ in Football Agreements, September 2020, available at img.fifa.com/ image/upload/jhre73qeqmjn6hzi81rn.pdf [accessed 29 November 2020].

B5.22 In the most famous case involving third party influence, the economic rights in the Argentine international players Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano were owned by third parties that wished to find them clubs in Europe to showcase their talents and so increase their transfer value. Arrangements were made for the players to sign with West Ham on a basis that effectively allowed the third parties to determine when the players would be transferred from West Ham and at what price. As a result, West Ham obtained the playing services of two highly talented players without having to pay the type of transfer fee that would have been required to sign the players without such third-party rights over their future transfers. When West Ham registered the players, it failed to disclose the nature of the third-party interests, and in particular its contractual arrangements with the third parties. When the Premier League discovered the arrangements, it charged the club with breaching the Premier League’s rules requiring the exercise of good faith1 and prohibiting third party influence.2 While Mascherano had been transferred to Liverpool in the January 2007 transfer window, before West Ham’s breaches had emerged, Carlos Tevez had almost single-handedly kept West Ham in the Premiership in 2006/07, at the expense of Sheffield United, who were relegated in West Ham’s place, so that West Ham got a significant benefit from its serious breach of the rules. Despite this, the Premier League disciplinary panel decided not to deduct points from West Ham (a decision open to it under the rules), and instead imposed a fine of some £5 million, a sanction that was considerably less than the transfer value of the players and did nothing to redress the competitive imbalance created by the club’s breach.3 Sheffield Utd sought unsuccessfully to challenge the sanction as too lenient, contending that the only sanction that would restore competitive balance was a deduction of points, which would have led to West Ham being relegated in place of Sheffield Utd. The FA Rule K arbitrators held that Sheffield Utd had standing to challenge the decision of the disciplinary body. They also held that if they had made the initial decision, they would have imposed a deduction of points. However they concluded that the decision to impose only a fine was not outside the range of decisions rationally open to the disciplinary body, and that they therefore could not set it aside in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction.4 The Commercial Court rejected the club’s attempt to appeal the arbitration award on a point of law, concluding that the appeal was in reality as to the application of the law, and not as to what the law was.5

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Sheffield Utd was left having to play its next season in the Championship, and to sue West Ham for compensation.6 1 See para B5.7 fn 1. 2 Premier League Rule I.7, on which FIFA based Art 18bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 3 FAPL v West Ham United, FAPL Disciplinary Commission decision dated 27 April 2007, discussed further at para E2.40. 4 Sheffield United v FAPL, FA Arbitration Panel (Sir Philip Otton, David Pannick QC and Nick Randall), reported in (2007) ISLR-SLR 77, and see paras E7.27–E7.30. 5 Sheffield Utd v FAPL, 13 July 2007, Smith J [Comm Ct]. 6 Sheffield United and West Ham jointly announced a settlement in March 2009, without making details of the settlement terms public: telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-league/4981170/ West-Ham-and-Sheffield-United-reach-out-of-court-settlement-over-Carlos-Tevez-affair.html [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.23 More recently, following investigations into alleged breaches by Chelsea FC of FIFA regulations relating to overseas transfer of minors, FIFA also identified two cases where the players had been registered with overseas clubs but Chelsea had entered into option agreements with those clubs (Rangers and Ajax) to acquire the registrations of the minor players at a future date. The options included what Chelsea and the other clubs regarded as relatively standard terms to protect Chelsea’s interests pending the transfer of the player to Chelsea. For example, one agreement provided that the overseas club would: (a) retain the player’s registration until the due transfer date; (b) ‘release [the player] for such periods of training and development or participation in friendly matches or tours as Chelsea shall reasonably require’; and (c) not negotiate the transfer of the player to any other club without Chelsea’s consent. After investigation FIFA charged Chelsea with breach of the Article 18bis prohibition on third party includes (as well as breach of the rules on overseas transfer of minors). In response, Chelsea argued that there was no actual influence, and that the clauses complained of were in effect ‘boilerplate’ standard clauses. In January 2019, the FIFA  Disciplinary Committee found that Chelsea had breached Article  18bis by ‘having concluded agreements which enable it to influence other clubs’ policies and transfer-related matters’, and had breached Article 19 in relation to transfer of minor players, and banned the club from signing players for two successive transfer windows and imposed a fine of CHF  600,000.1 In April 2019, the FIFA  Appeal Committee rejected Chelsea’s appeal against that decision. It found that the intent of Article 18bis was clear, being aimed at: ‘prohibiting clubs from signing any agreement that would entitle another party to that agreement or a third party to practice any sort of influence on it with respect to employment and transfer-related matters. Additionally, the provision prohibits clubs from entering into an agreement that entitles them to influence another club. Therefore, it is evident from the plain understanding of such article that the legislator’s intention was to ensure that clubs could always take their decisions independently of any external body. […] Furthermore, it must be clarified that a club would violate art. 18bis of the RSTP not only if it has materially influenced the independence and policies of another club with respect to employment and transferrelated matters, but also when the contract in question effectively entitles the club to have an influence on the other club in such matters, regardless of whether or not this influence actually materialises’.2

It found that the provisions in question clearly breached Article 18bis because they prevented the other clubs holding or loaning their players as they saw fit.3 1 FIFA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 6 January 2019, 160620 TMS ENG ZH.

590  Regulating Sport 2 FIFA Appeal Committee decision dated 4 April 2019, paras 51-53, copy available for download at resources.fifa.com/image/upload/apc-160620-11-04-2019-club-chelsea-fc.pdf?cloudid=xoyz3gkc4u1 8rbsellqr [accessed 1 November 2020]. 3 Ibid at paras 174–181.

B5.24 Chelsea appealed to the CAS. Its application for provisional measures (getting the transfer ban suspended pending appeal) was rejected, and therefore it was barred from signing players during the 2019 summer transfer window. However, in December 2019 the CAS upheld Chelsea’s appeal in part, finding that the club had breached the rules in significantly fewer and less serious cases than had been determined by the FIFA Appeal Committee: (a)

The CAS reduced the club’s violations in relation to the transfer/first registration of minors from the 98 found by the FIFA Appeal Committee to just 18,1 and concluded that ‘the Club’s overall degree of guilt was quite low, and in any event much less than that found by the FIFA disciplinary bodies’.2 (b) In relation to the third-party ownership violations (RSTP, 18bis para  1), the CAS overturned the Appeal Committee’s finding in its entirety on the basis that: ‘to have contractual rights vis-a-vis a club for just a single player normally does not amount to having the level of influence on another club required to trigger the application of Article l8bis, para 1, RSTP, ie “the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams”. In the vast majority of cases the proper interpretation of the terms “independence”, “policies” and “performance of teams” requires much more than a contractual obligation related to one player. In the Sole Arbitrator’s view, unless a single player is so exceptionally important for a given club that an agreement like the ones at hand can demonstrably influence that club’s sporting and economic behaviour, there must be a network of similar agreements for various players that, aligned together, can truly influence the “independence”, “policies” or “performance of teams” of a club’.

(c) The panel also noted that it was important to consider ‘the relative standing, prominence and market power of the involved clubs. It would be illogical, after all, to consider that important clubs such as Rangers or Ajax, well-known on the European stage, could be influenced in their “independence”, “policies” or “performance of teams” based just on the obligations respectively undertaken in reference to’ the two players.3

The CAS panel therefore decreased the two-window ban to one (which had already been served at the time of the award) and reduced the fine to CHF 300,000.4 1 Chelsea Football Club Limited v FIFA, CAS 2019/A/6301, paras 128, 149-151, 159, 164 and 170 (as summarised at para 180). 2 Ibid at para 196. 3 Ibid at paras 177–179. 4 Ibid at para 198.

(b) Third-party investment B5.25 Club A may own the economic rights in a player registered with Club B (for example, because Club A has loaned the player to Club B but the registration will be transferred back to Club A at the end of the loan period). As a result, it is presently lawful in most jurisdictions not only for another club but also for a third party to hold or be assigned the economic rights in a player, so long as the third party has no ability to influence the club to which the player is registered. This is commonly referred to as ‘third-party investment’ (or ownership).1 1 The validity of arrangements where investors have an economic interest in the proceeds of the sale of the registration of a player, but no influence over when he is sold or for how much, was addressed in relation to the player Fabiano in Rio Football Services v Sevilla [2010] EWHC 2446 (QB), 6 October 2010, summary judgment hearing before Edwards-Stuart J. A range of challenges to the lawfulness

Regulating Financial Fair Play  591 of the arrangements (including slavery, restraint of trade, penalty, and breach of the FIFA Rules) was brought. The challenges failed, where the arrangements were limited to contractual obligations owed by the signing club to pay to the investor a calculable amount upon the player being sold, or upon an offer above a certain amount being made, when the signing club could not be obliged to sell or not to sell. A critic of third party investment might however say that in practice, because the club might not be able to afford to buy out the investment in this way upon the receipt of an offer that it did not wish to take up but that was over the threshold, it might in practice be forced to sell a player it wished to retain.

B5.26 However, in addition to the generic prohibition of third party influence, some national football associations and some leagues chose to regulate (and in some cases even prohibit) third party investment specifically, on the basis that while there may be no express ability to affect a club’s decisions, in practice there may be considerable influence, which will often be nearly impossible to prevent, or even to discover. As the CAS put it in RFC Seraing: ‘the TPO has raised significant concerns among the public and football institutions over issues such as the integrity of competitions, the opacity of the activities of TPO investors, the risk of manipulation of results, money laundering and other criminal activities, as well as ethical issues such as the concepts of ownership and trade in the economic rights of the players themselves’.1 1 RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, para 18.

B5.27 Examples of such regulation in Europe included: (a)

The French Football League, which led the way, having introduced in the early 1990s what is now Art 220 of the 2019/20 Regulations, which provides that a club cannot conclude a contract with any third party (with the exception of another club) that directly or indirectly results in such person acquiring or being granted all or some of the economic rights in the player (ie  in the transfer fees to which the club is entitled when transferring the registration of that player to another club). Failure to comply will result in a fine equivalent (at least) to the amount of the third-party interest, and may lead to restrictions on future player signings.1 (b) The English Premier League has Premier League Rule U.36, which provides that clubs may only ‘make or receive a payment or incur any liability as a result of or in connection with the proposed or actual registration (whether permanent or temporary), transfer of registration or employment by it of a Player’2 in specified circumstances that are linked directly to other parts of the regulations, eg payment of transfer fees,3 levies,4 or wages.5 Clubs may assign future instalments of incoming transfer fees only where the transfer agreement has already been concluded, and only then to recognised financial institutions.6 (c) The EFL’s Regulation 50.1 mirrors Premier League Rule U.36. (d) The Football Association’s Third-Party Interest in Players Regulations adopt provisions similar in effect to the Premier League and EFL rules.7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

lfp.fr/reglements/ 2019_2020/reglement_integral.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020], Art 220. Premier League Rule U.36. Premier League Rule U.36.1 Premier League Rule U.36.2 Premier League Rule U.36.4 Premier League Rule U.36.10 See FA  Handbook Season 2019/20, p  357. The FA  Regulations were considered in The Football Association v (1) Queens Park Rangers FC and (2) Gianni Paladini (FA  Regulatory Commission, 20th May 2011). The independent FA  Regulatory Commission fined the club a record amount for failing to notify arrangements that might allow third party influence over a signed player. The FA had however also charged the club with breach of what is now FA Rule C1.2.3, which provides (amongst other things) as follows: ‘No Club shall enter into a contract which enables any party to that contract to acquire the ability to materially influence the Club’s policies or the performance of its teams in Matches and/or Competitions’. A third party had rights in respect of the QPR player Alejandro Faurlin, but

592  Regulating Sport those rights were suspended by an oral agreement between the club and the third party for the duration of the playing contract. On this basis that charge was held not to have been made out. The case is a good illustration of the difficulty in proving violations of the rules with respect to third party interests, and the importance of properly framing charges. Breaches of ancillary non-disclosure regulations (requiring the disclosure of the existence of third-party agreements) are more straightforward to prove.

B5.28 In contrast, other European leagues, for example the Portuguese league, argued that to prohibit such arrangements  was unnecessarily restrictive of a mechanism that promoted player development in poorer nations. Examples include the so-called ‘Benfica Stars Fund’ in Portugal, established in 2009, and raising €40m for the benefit of the club. FC Porto annually published details of those players who are subject to third party interests, including breaking down the percentages owned by third parties. As of June 2011, the economic rights of only three members of FC Porto’s 19-man squad were owned outright by the football club; the rights of all the remaining 16 players were partially owned by third parties. B5.29 A club in a country that does not prohibit third-party ownership of players (eg Portugal, Spain, or Italy) could follow the Benfica model and sell a proportion of the value of its playing squad to generate a surplus in player trading that would help the club to meet UEFA’s break-even requirement.1 Since 2012, however the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations have provided that such proceeds could only be recognised as income for purposes of the break-even requirement when the player’s registration was permanently transferred to another club, a restriction that remains in effect to this day.2 1 See paras B5.73-B5.90. 2 UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations 2018, Annex X  Section B(m) provides that ‘Appropriate adjustments must be made such that any income/profit in respect of a player for whom the licensee retains the registration is excluded from the calculation of the break-even result. For the avoidance of doubt, any income/profit arising from the disposal of a player’s economic rights can only be included as relevant income for the calculation of the break-even result following the permanent transfer of the player’s registration to another club’.

B5.30 In September 2014, the FIFA  Executive Committee banned third party ownership of players’ economic rights outright, with effect from 1  May 2015. RSTP Article 18ter was explicit: ‘No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation’.1 1 FIFA  Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Art 18ter. See generally FIFA  Manual on ‘TPI’ and “TPO’ in Football Agreements, Sept 2020, available at img.fifa.com/image/upload/ jhre73qeqmjn6hzi81rn.pdf [accessed 29 November 2020].

B5.31 The prohibition was challenged almost immediately. On 30 January 2015, a Belgian club, Royal Football Club Seraing, concluded a third-party ownership contract with Doyen Sports Investment Limited (Malta), an investment fund that had entered into similar transactions with clubs across the world. The contract provided that Doyen would pay the club 300,000 euros for 30 per cent of ‘the financial value deriving from the federative rights’ of three specific players, meaning that Doyen would receive 30 per cent of the proceeds of any future transfer of the registration of any of those players. On 4 September 2015, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee found RFC Seraing in breach of RSTP Article 18ter, banned the club from signing players for four transfer windows, and fined it CHF 150,000. The FIFA Appeal Committee upheld the original decision, and the club appealed to CAS, and as part of its appeal challenged the legality of Articles 18bis and 18ter on the grounds that the restrictions constituted unlawful obstacles to the free movement of capital, workers and services,

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as well as unlawful restrictions on free competition.1 The CAS panel rejected the challenges on the basis the restrictions on these freedoms were necessary to the achievement of legitimate objectives and proportionate to the achievement of those objectives. The panel’s reasoning was set out most fully in relation to the arguments about movement of capital (but was repeated in respect of the other arguments):2 ‘96. Articles  18bis and 18ter of the RSTP prohibit certain types of financing agreements for football clubs if they would have the effect of allowing any party “to acquire, in the course of work or transfers, the capacity to influence the independence or policy of the club or the performance of its teams” (Article 18bis of the RSTP) or to allow a third party “to be able to make claims, in whole or in part, to compensation payable in connection with the future transfer of a player from one club to another club, or to be granted any right in connection with a future transfer or transfer compensation” (article 18ter of the RSTP). This is an outright ban on the financing of clubs by certain investors from certain financing schemes. 97. Therefore, the Panel notes that Articles 18bis and 18ter introduce a restriction on the movement of capital from, to or between EU Member States relating to the financing of clubs. […] 100. But if there are obstacles, restrictions to the freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU are not necessarily prohibited obstacles. Beyond the justifications expressly provided for by the TFEU, which are not invoked in the present case, the CJEU accepts restrictions to those freedoms where the restrictive measure “pursues a legitimate aim and is justified by imperative requirements in the general interest” and “the application of such a measure [is] suitable for securing the attainment of the aim in question and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that goal” (CJEU December 15, 1995, Case C-415/93 “Bosman”, §§104 et seq.; CJEC March 31, 1993, case C-19/92 “Kraus”, § 32). The Panel notes that the case law of the CJEU thus focuses in practice on the determination of the legitimacy of the goal pursued as well as the necessity and adequacy of the measure in question to achieve this goal (CJEU  December 15, 1995, case C-415/93 “Bosman”, §§104 et seq.; CJEU April 13, 2000, case C-176/96 “Lehtonen”, §§ 53 et seq.; CJEU March 16, 2010, case C-325/08 “Olympique Lyonnais”, §§38 et seq.). 101. In the present case, FIFA invokes several goals pursued by the measures in question, which should be reiterated: preserving the stability of players’ contracts, guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of clubs and players as regards recruitment and transfers, safeguarding integrity in football and the fair and equitable nature of competitions, preventing conflicts of interest and maintaining transparency in transactions relating to players’ transfers. 102. The Panel notes that RFC Seraing does not challenge the legitimacy of these goals and expressly recognizes the legitimacy of the goals of preserving the integrity of competitions and commercial integrity, combating the lack of transparency of investment in clubs and protecting the professional freedom of players. 103. Without it being necessary to analyse in detail the legitimacy of these goals since it is not challenged, the Panel notes, without this being exhaustive, that the goal of preserving the regularity of sporting competitions (CJEU April 13, 2000, case C-176/96 “Lehtonen”, §§ 53 et seq. ), the balance between clubs and the uncertainty of results (CJEU  December 15, 1995, case C-415/93 “Bosman”, § 106), the sporting integrity of competitions, the prevention of conflicts of interest and public confidence in the fairness of competition (European Commission, June 25, 2002, case COMP/37 806 “ENIC”, §§ 28 and 37), the integrity and objectivity of the competition (CJEU  July 18, 2006, case C-519/04 “Meca- Medina”, § 43), the protection of the image and ethics of football (Paris Court of Appeal April 13, 2016, no. 13/20972 “P. v. International Football Federation”), have been deemed legitimate by the CJEU, the European Commission or courts of EU Member States. 104. Consequently, the Panel, which also endorses the solutions found by the European Commission and the CJEU in this respect, considers it established that the goals invoked by FIFA to justify the measures in question and their restrictive effects

594  Regulating Sport are legitimate goals within the meaning of EU case law on the freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU. […] 108. Following an analysis of the practice of TPO, the Panel considers that this practice gives rise to numerous risks, in particular: risks linked to the opacity of the investors in question, who are not subject to any control by the football regulatory bodies and who are free to sell their investment without any control; risks of infringing professional freedom and players’ rights by being able to influence their transfer in a speculative interest; risks of conflicts of interest, or even match-fixing or manipulation, which are contrary to the integrity of competitions, since the same investor may carry out TPO in several clubs in the same competition; ethical risks, since the aim pursued is a speculative financial interest, not based on sporting or even moral considerations. […] 109. As for the proportionate nature of the prohibition, first of all, the Panel notes that while Articles  18bis and 18ter of the RSTP are prohibitory measures, these prohibitions are limited. As FIFA points out, articles 18bis and 18ter do not prohibit any investment by third parties within the meaning of the RSTP in football clubs. The only investments prohibited by these measures are those of the so-called “TPO” type, ie those that allow any person “to acquire, through work or transfers, the ability to influence the independence or policy of the club or the performance of its teams” (Article 18bis) and in particular those that allow third parties within the meaning of the RSTP “to be able to make claims, in whole or in part, to compensation payable in connection with the future transfer of a player from one club to another club, or to be granted any right in connection with a future transfer or transfer compensation” (Article  18ter). Thus, these measures do not prohibit third party investors within the meaning of the RSTP from financing football clubs, but only prohibit financing which gives the investor the power to influence the independence and policy of a club (ie not simply to have an indirect impact on the management of a club as might be the case with the granting of a loan to be repaid, but may directly impede a club’s managerial autonomy by being able to bind certain of its decisions), or involve a contingent right or compensation for the transfer or transfer allowance of players or its employment relationship (salary, length of employment, etc.). The measures in question therefore only prohibit certain financing schemes and do not prohibit other types of financing of football clubs. Therefore, investors wishing to invest capital in football clubs are free to do so under the many other possible financing schemes. 110. Nor do the measures prohibit the financing by third parties within the meaning of the RSTP of transfer operations, the financing of specific transfer operations remains possible, as long as they do not contravene Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP. 111. Thus, contrary to the assertions of RFC Seraing, the measures in question do not prohibit clubs from using certain sources of funding to finance their recruitment of players, but only certain funding schemes. 112. Consequently, the Panel notes that the prohibition introduced by Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP has a limited character, does not have the consequence of prohibiting certain investors from having access to the financing of football clubs or, as claimed by the Appellant, of establishing a “circularity” in the economy or financing of football. […] 121. Consequently, the Panel considers that the restrictions on the free movement of capital resulting from Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP are justified and adapted to the achievement of the legitimate goals pursued by these measures.’ 1 RFC  Seraing v FIFA, CAS  2016/A/4490. See case discussion at asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/rfcseraing-at-the-court-of-arbitration-for-sport-how-fifa-s-tpo-ban-survived-again-eu-law-scrutiny [accessed 1 November 2020]. The club also argued that FIFA’s rules were contrary to the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (as a violation of privacy rights), Swiss law, and CAS case law. The CAS dismissed the arguments on Article 8 of the ECHR and Swiss law on the basis that they were insufficiently developed by the club (paras 147 and 160 respectively). It then held that Art 7 of the Charter was inapplicable (para 148) and that the cited CAS case law was not binding and was not relevant to the case (paras 163 and 165 respectively). 2 RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, paras 123 and 138.

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B5.32 The club and Doyen appealed the CAS award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal on a number of procedural grounds but also on grounds of substantive public policy.1 On 20 February 2018, the Swiss Federal Tribunal dismissed the appeal.2 In addition, the European Commission declined to open a formal investigation into the compatibility of RSTP Article 18 with EU competition rules.3 1 See para D2.14. 2 X v FIFA, 4A_260/2017, decision of Swiss Federal Tribunal dated 20 February 2018, discussed in sportlegis.com/2018/09/10/the-swiss-federal-judgment-in-the-third-party-ownership-case-fc-seraingv-fifa-and-the-decision-of-the-brussels-court-of-appeal-a-parallel-universe/ [accessed 1  November 2020]. See further para D2.14. 3 football-legal.com/content/tpo-the-european-commission-rejects-the-claim-of-doyen-sports-and-thebelgian-club-of-nbsp-rfc-seraing (31 December 2017) [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.33 Separately, the club and Doyen had also commenced proceedings against FIFA and UEFA in the Belgian state courts, again challenging the legality of FIFA’s ban on third party ownership arrangements. The attempt to have five questions referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the validity of Article  18bis and 18ter was rejected at first instance on jurisdictional grounds. On appeal, the Belgian Court of Appeal issued an interim ruling that the arbitration clause in favour of CAS in the FIFA statutes did not bind RFC Seraing to submit the dispute to CAS arbitration,1 but in December 2019 the Belgian Court of Appeal rejected the club’s claims on the merits. FIFA reported that the court ruled that the CAS award and the SFT judgment had res judicata effect, and so confirmed the validity of the disciplinary sanctions imposed on RFC  Seraing for infringing the FIFA RSTP, and in addition confirmed that ‘the appellants did not bring to the Court convincing arguments to doubt about the legitimate objectives of the FIFA rules’.2 1 18th Chamber of the Brussels Court of Appeal of August 29, 2018 (2018/6348), discussed in sportlegis. com/2018/09/10/the-swiss-federal-judgment-in-the-third-party-ownership-case-fc-seraing-v-fifa-andthe-decision-of-the-brussels-court-of-appeal-a-parallel-universe/ [accessed 1 November 2020]. 2 fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-welcomes-brussels-court-of-appeal-ruling-on-fifa-s-tpo-and-tpi-rules, 13 December 2019 [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.34 With the RFC  Searing case finally over, the chances appear small of a successful challenge in the future to the FIFA prohibitions (and, consequently, the respective domestic prohibitions) on both third-party influence and third-party investment.

D Inter-game debt B5.35 Clubs participating in the same competitions are forced to trade with one another, most pertinently in the purchase and sale of registrations of players, but also in relation to gate receipts and the like. Allowing one club to default on payment of its debts to another club undermines the integrity of the competition, as one club is playing by the (off-field) rules but the other is not and is thereby gaining an advantage. It also has a potential domino effect, since a club not receiving expected payments from debtor clubs may therefore have to delay payments to creditor clubs. B5.36 Various SGBs therefore require full payment of all inter-game debts as a condition of ongoing membership. Although it is the EFL’s version of this rule (referred to as the ‘Football Creditor Rule’) that has attracted most attention (unsurprisingly, given football’s high profile and the number of football clubs that have experienced financial difficulties), similar rules operate in other UK-based team sports, as well as at a European level: (a) Article 48 of the EFL Articles of Association gives the EFL board the power to impose sanctions on any member club that defaults on payment to any of

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the creditors listed within Article 48, and requires the board to redirect central distributions that would otherwise be paid to a defaulting club to satisfy those creditors. Creditors include the EFL itself, the Premier League, The Football Association, central pension schemes, other clubs, and the club’s employees (but only in respect of arrears of remuneration due prior to termination of employment, and expressly excluding claims relating to termination of employment and damages for wrongful dismissal).1 (b) Premier League Rules E.26 to E.29 give the Premier League board similar powers in relation to its member clubs. (c) RFL Operational Rule A3:14 gives the RFL the power to deduct any amounts that a club owes to the RFL, Super League Europe, any of their respective ‘commercial partners or suppliers’, and any club or other person subject to the Operational Rules (which would include players), from any amounts ‘then due or which at any time thereafter may become due to that Club’ from RFL distributions, to be ‘used to meet such debt/s’. (d) RFU Regulation 5.8.3 gives the RFU the power to set off against any funding that it gives to a club any sums that the club owes to it for whatever reason. (e) Article 49 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations (2018) provides that an applicant club must not have any ‘overdue payables’ to other football clubs as at 31  March immediately preceding the competition in question, relating to transfer activities that occurred prior to the previous 31 December. Similarly, under Art 50, the club must also be able to demonstrate that it has no ‘overdue payables’ to employees or (under Art 50bis) social/tax authorities dating from prior to the previous 31 December.2 Given the revenues that the club would lose if it is not licensed to play in UEFA competitions the following season, this is a strong incentive to ensure such debts are paid as a priority. 1 Those creditors are referred to as ‘Football Creditors’ and accordingly reference to the so-called ‘football creditor rule’ is technically a reference only to Art 48. However, in common parlance it instead refers to the obligation to meet similar debts in full as a condition of continuing membership following insolvency, which is dealt with at paras B5.144–B5.147. 2 In a manner similar to the HMRC reporting imposed by the RFL and EFL in England: see para B5.5(b).

B5.37 The RFU provision effectively creates an express contractual right of set off as between governing body and member1 that arguably does no more than confirm what would be permitted in any event under the doctrine of equitable set off. Equitable set off applies where party A is indebted to party B, but at the same time party B is indebted to party A, and the two claims are so closely connected that it would be manifestly unjust to allow party B to enforce payment against party A without taking into account party A’s claim against party B.2 The PL, EFL and RFL provisions also mirror that principle, but they go further in permitting those SGBs to set off against amounts they owe a member club the debts owed by the member club to other clubs, employees, and other third parties. In such circumstances, the principle of equitable set off is unlikely to apply because there is no mutuality as between the various parties, ie party A cannot set off some of its liability to party B simply because party B owes money to party C.3 1 It is already established that the Articles of Association of a company operate as a contract as between the company and its members (Companies Act 2006, s 33), and that the rules of a governing body also constitute a contract as between the governing body and the members (see paras A1.55, B1.51, and E8.3, and see EFL Reg 3.1). 2 Geldof Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667 at para 43(vi). 3 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785.

B5.38 The operation of the principle of set off in the context of the Football Creditor Rule has been much criticised in the press, courts, and Parliament. However, those criticisms have focused not on the operation of the rules as outlined above, but

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on the application of the same rules within the context of the insolvency of member clubs, which is discussed in Section 5, below. B5.39 The EFL also incentivises financial prudence, and protects all member clubs from financial imprudence by other member clubs, by providing in Article 45.3 of its Articles of Association that ‘payments [of central distributions] to Member Clubs under the Articles only become a legal liability of The League to a Member Club if the Member Club completes all of its fixture obligations to The League for the relevant Season’. The rationale for that approach was considered by the High Court in HMRC v The Football League Limited,1 a case that rejected the argument that the preference given to football creditors on a football club’s insolvency infringed the insolvency laws.2 The court observed that: ‘[…] there are valid reasons for viewing participation in the [EFL’s] competitions as a single venture for the entire season. For example, the point of The League competition, and its value, lies in the fact that each club plays every other club in the same division twice in the season. Failure by a club to finish a season creates obvious problems for the competition, meaning for example that all previous results of matches involving that club have to be disregarded. The competition is devalued even if only one club drops out during the season and would in effect be destroyed if a number did so.’ 1 [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch). 2 See para B5.146.

B5.40 Where a party has performed only part of an entire contractual obligation, it can normally recover neither the agreed price (since it is not due under the terms of the contract) nor any smaller sum for the value of its partial performance (since the court has no power to apportion the consideration).1 Thus, by setting up an entire performance contract, and applying the Art 48 right prior to the crystallisation of the right to payment, the EFL (by agreement with its member clubs) incentivises all clubs to complete the season, and protects the central pot for the benefit of other member clubs if any club does fail mid-season. 1 Beale (Ed), Chitty on Contracts, 33rd Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) at para  21-031 and Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 TR 320. Similarly, parties to an agreement are able, by express words, to make entire performance a condition precedent to payment of the contract price. See Hoenig v Isaacs [1952] 2 All E R 176 at 181.

3 CLUB LICENSING B5.41 One standard way of regulating the financial affairs of clubs is a licensing system1 whereby a competition organiser requires the clubs to meet certain requirements in order to be permitted (‘licensed’) to participate in its competitions. Clubs may be denied access to the competitions if they fail to meet the relevant criteria, even if they would otherwise qualify on sporting merit. 1 See generally para B1.7.

A Licensing systems in rugby union B5.42 The regulations of Premier Rugby include minimum standards criteria1 that the club being promoted from the Championship must satisfy in order to be eligible for promotion (and that all clubs in the Premiership must satisfy in order to avoid sanction). One criterion is primacy of tenure: the club must have sufficient control over scheduling at its stadium so that it can plan matches to satisfy the requirements of the league and broadcasters. When London Welsh was denied promotion to

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the Premiership in 2012 on the basis that it did not satisfy that requirement, the club challenged the requirement, arguing it distorted competition and therefore contravened EU and UK competition law. The panel agreed, finding that the restriction was ‘disproportionate to the objectives it was set to serve, and is accordingly void’.2 Three existing Premiership clubs had been granted an exemption from the primacy of tenure requirement, but no further exemption was permitted for London Welsh. The panel found that ‘there was insufficient justification for the current rule, in particular having regard to the restrictions that it placed on aspirant Championship clubs’. On the evidence, when the matter was considered by the Premiership clubs in 2011, it was clear that the rule could be further relaxed to accommodate as many as five clubs who did not have primacy of tenure; and there would have been no difficulty in accommodating five clubs at an earlier stage. The RFU ought to have given anxious consideration to the question whether the restrictive rule could be relaxed further for London Welsh, and had it done so would have seen that the rule could be relaxed; having failed to do so, it was not entitled to any margin of appreciation.3 The Welsh Rugby Union’s licensing rules were also the subject of challenge in 2012, when Pontypool challenged its relegation to the Welsh Championship on sporting merit on the basis that other clubs in the Premier Division had failed to satisfy the league’s licensing requirements, and so Pontypool should not be relegated while they remained in the Premier Division. The High Court rejected the club’s claim and confirmed that the WRU had discretion when applying its rules and its ‘discretion to deal with a situation should not be usurped by the court’.4 1 Premiership Reg 2.6. 2 In the matter of an appeal involving London Welsh Rugby Football Club Limited and the Rugby Football Union and Newcastle Falcons Rugby Football Club, decision of panel (James Dingemans QC, Ian Mill QC, Tim Ward QC) dated 29 June 2012, para 49. See also similar decision in 2003 by the Office of Fair Trading, discussed at para E11.116. 3 London Welsh, ibid, at para 73. A different decision on comparable subject-matter was reached in an FA Rule K arbitration that same year between Handsworth Football Club and The FA. Handsworth had been relegated on the basis that it had failed to meet the ground grading standards and appealed on various grounds including breach of UK and EU competition law. However, the club only raised arguments in relation to the restriction of competition two days before the hearing (having seen the London Welsh decision) and the panel dismissed these arguments as improperly pleaded and having been raised too late. In News Limited v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited, the High Court of Australia considered an SGB’s restriction of a league competition to 14 clubs, each granted a three-year ‘franchise’. Existing clubs were allowed to apply to participate and participation was determined in a transparent and fair process according to objective criteria. Unsuccessful clubs were in effect unable to compete at all professionally since the closed league was the only available viable tournament in rugby league. The High Court of Australia rejected a competition law challenge by an excluded club, finding that no club had been deliberately excluded in the sense of being targeted, that the 14–team limit was rationally chosen for good commercial and sporting reasons, and that the closed league was itself justified and proportionate for good commercial and sporting reasons. 4 Park Promotions Ltd t/a Pontypool Rugby Football Club v Welsh Rugby Union [2012] EWHC 2406 (QB), para 45.

B Licensing systems at national level in football B5.43 The German Bundesliga (DFL) is widely credited with implementing the first licensing system in football, codifying various regulatory controls over a club’s operations into a formal licensing regime.1 Any club that fails to meet the terms of the licence is potentially subject to disciplinary sanction, including (in the severest cases) being barred from participating in the competition. An excluded club has two opportunities to appeal to DFL disciplinary bodies, and then a further right of appeal to the CAS. The German model is rarely criticised and was described by the Culture Media and Sport Select Committee as a model that English football should emulate.2 1 The Bundesliga provides a summary of its operations in this area on its English language website – dfl. de/en/topics/licensing/strict-system-of-success-the-licensing-system/ [accessed 1 November 2020].

Regulating Financial Fair Play  599 2 Seventh Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 29 July 2011 (HC 792-I, p 3). For a historical overview of the German licensing model, see the submission of Christian Müller, former Chief Financial Officer of the DFL to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (HC 792-III, p EV w201).

B5.44 In evidence to the Culture Media and Sport Select Committee’s Inquiry into Football Governance in April 2011, the Premier League’s CEO responded to claims that English football should operate a club licensing system by asserting that: ‘the reality is we have a licensing system. We have a very much more robust licensing system now than we did two or three years ago. Our rulebook is effectively the licensing system for clubs within our league’.1

His point was that the Premier League achieves the same goals as a licensing system by requiring clubs to accept its rules as a condition of entry and ensuring effective enforcement of those rules (including any rules as to financial conduct) through the robust sanctioning of breaches. It would seem the Select Committee did not agree this was sufficient, as one of its key recommendations was for: ‘[…] the introduction of a formal licensing model imposed rigorously and consistently throughout professional English football to underpin the self-regulation measures already introduced by the Premier League and The Football League’.2

Neither body implemented this recommendation. Instead, they continue to permit entry to the competition based on sporting merit alone,3 and rely on compliance with the terms of participation in the competition to ensure (among other things) financial stability and fair play. On the other hand, Premier League clubs that wish to compete in UEFA competitions (should they qualify based on sporting merit) must obtain a UEFA licence, as described in the next section. 1 Oral evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 5 April 2011 (HC 792-II, p EV146). 2 Seventh Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 29 July 2011 (HC 792-I, p 3). 3 Although clubs will not be accepted into the EFL from the National League unless they meet the Qualification Criteria set out at Part 1 of Appendix 1 of the EFL Regulations. This requires the club to have a ground capacity of at least 4,000 with at least 400 seats and the ability to expand to 5,000 and 500 respectively (which must be achieved by 30 April of the club’s first season in the EFL).

C The UEFA licensing system B5.45 UEFA first introduced a limited club licensing system in 2004,1 but it was in 2009 that it first introduced detailed financial requirements that clubs have to meet in order to be licensed to compete in UEFA competitions.2 The current edition of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (‘UEFA Club Licensing Regulations’) was adopted by the UEFA  Executive Committee in May 2018. Its stated objectives are set out at para B5.2. Its key elements of the licensing system are discussed below. 1 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-licensing/ [accessed 1 November 2020]. 2 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/financial-fair-play/ [accessed 1 November 2020].

(a) The licensing process B5.46 For two reasons, UEFA delegates responsibility to its member national associations to grant or deny applications by their respective member clubs for a UEFA licence:1 (a) First, UEFA only has direct relationships with FIFA, its member national associations, and clubs who participate in its club competitions. Clubs that aspire to qualify for UEFA club competitions may not, at the time of application,

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be subject to UEFA’s regulations. However, they are members of and therefore subject to the authority of their respective national associations. (b) Secondly, for the 2017/18 season, almost 700 clubs applied for UEFA licences across the 55 member national associations, even though only a fraction of that number actually qualified to participate in UEFA club competitions. Further, variances in local law/football regulations across the 55 national associations mean that clubs in different territories have to comply with differing obligations. To analyse and pass judgment on the financial results of each applicant club would prove an overwhelming task even for the largest and most well-funded governing body. 1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 5(1). In certain circumstances the national association may delegate this matter to a domestic league organiser, but in England The FA retains responsibility for the task under the auspices of its Professional Game Board. See Terms of Reference for the Operation of the Professional Game Board, para 3.1.14 (FA Handbook 2019/20, p 27).

B5.47 This approach brings with it other advantages. For example, if a national association is spending time and money administering a licensing regime on behalf of UEFA, that may encourage it to extend the licensing scheme to all clubs wishing to participate in its own national-level competitions; in any event the national association will still be benefiting from the additional skills developed by the people it employs to administer the UEFA licensing system. In this way, the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations have been instrumental in improving regulatory standards across much of European football. B5.48 To avoid inconsistent application, UEFA has invested heavily in the training and monitoring of national associations, and also sets out in Article  9 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations a standardised process for the verification of the club licensing criteria.1 UEFA monitors the actions of the national associations and has the right to sanction national associations that fail to apply the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations in accordance with their terms. For example, in the 2017/18 and 2018/19 seasons UEFA subjected 15 national associations to in-depth compliance assessments, including on-site compliance audits conducted on UEFA’s behalf by Deloitte and PwC. Four associations were referred for formal investigation, and three (Albania, Kazakhstan and Serbia) were required to enter into settlement agreements including undertakings as to future conduct.2 1 Article 9(3) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations: ‘The core process consists of the following minimum key steps: (a) Submission of the licensing documentation to the licence applicants; (b) Return of the licensing documentation to the licensor; (c) Assessment of the documentation by the licensing administration; (d) Submission of the written representation letter to the licensor; (e) Assessment and decision by the decision-making bodies; (f) Submission of the list of licensing decisions to the UEFA administration’. 2 Details of the settlement agreements are available at uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/clubfinancial-controlling-body/ [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.49 Article  7 of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations requires the national federation to set up a two-tier process for licensing decisions. The first instance body decides whether a licence should be granted to the applicant club and whether a licence that has been granted should be withdrawn.1 The second instance body is an appeals body to which a club may appeal against the decision of the first instance body.2 1 Article 7(2) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. 2 Ibid, Art 7(3).

(b) Financial criteria for grant of UEFA licence B5.50 The financial criteria that a club must satisfy to be granted a UEFA licence may be summarised as follows:

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(a) The Article  49 requirement not to have overdue payables to other football clubs, to its employees, and/or to the social/taxation authorities, has already been mentioned above.1 (b) Article  47 requires clubs to produce finalised and audited annual accounts by the 31 March deadline for applications (Annual Accounts). If the Annual Accounts cover a period ending more than six months before 31 March, Art 48 requires the club to submit reviewed or audited interim accounts covering at least the period up to six months prior to the application date (Interim Accounts). (b) Where the Annual Accounts and/or Interim Accounts include any kind of qualified opinion in respect of the club’s ability to continue as a going concern, and/or reveal a net liabilities position (negative equity) that has deteriorated relative to the prior year’s accounts, Article  52 requires the club to prepare and submit audited ‘future financial information’ (budgeted profit and loss and cash flows for the period in question, with comparisons against the prior season, with full commentary and details of assumptions) covering the period starting from the end of the period covered by the Annual Accounts or Interim Accounts (as appropriate) and ending no earlier than the end of the season in which the club hopes to participate in UEFA competitions. The intention, obviously, is to ensure that the applicant club has the ability to continue as a going concern at least until the end of the season in which it seeks to participate in a UEFA competition. 1 See para B5.36.

B5.51 The Premier League and EFL have imposed the same requirements on clubs in the Premier League and Championship respectively (irrespective of whether they qualify for UEFA club competitions). Further, the obligation to file future financial information applies automatically each year to every club, not only where the club’s annual accounts or interim accounts are qualified.1 However, where the Premier League and EFL differ from UEFA is that adverse information in a club’s annual accounts, interim accounts, or future financial information would not result in the removal of the club from the competition, or prevent it from commencing the following season. Instead there is a power to impose protective measures, such as embargos on the signing of new players, and even the ability to require a club to adhere to a business plan agreed with the Premier League or EFL (as applicable).2 1 Premier League Rule E.11; EFL Reg 16.16. 2 Premier League Rules E.14 and E.15, EFL Regs 16.19 and 16.20.

(c) Conditions not satisfied B5.52 Where a club demonstrates one of three adverse indicators,1 additional reporting requirements may be imposed. A breach of some of the requirements of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations (such as the provisions that a club has a racial equality practice,2 a minimum infrastructure of training facilities,3 or a supporter liaison officer4) will not lead to denial of a licence but rather to a fine in an amount to be determined by the national football association. If any club reports a wageto-turnover ratio of 70 per cent or more, or net debt exceeds 100 per cent of total revenue, further action could be taken, including denial of a UEFA licence.5 1 UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations, Art 62(3) (annual accounts or interim accounts containing an emphasis of matter or qualified opinion in respect of going concern, annual or interim accounts demonstrating the club has a worsening net liabilities position, and/or overdue payables). 2 Ibid, Art 23. 3 Ibid, Art 26. 4 Ibid, Art 35. 5 Ibid, Art 62(4).

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(d) Ongoing financial monitoring B5.53 The decision to issue a licence is necessarily based on a set of circumstances at a pre-determined date some time prior to the commencement of the season in which the club would actually participate in a UEFA competition. To address the risk that a club’s financial position may deteriorate after that point, including during the competition itself, the 2010 edition of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations introduced the concept of ongoing Club Monitoring, which is conducted not by national associations but rather by the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB).1 The CFCB monitors clubs’ ongoing compliance with the following requirements by requiring them to submit ‘monitoring documentation’ to the national FA licensor that demonstrates the following: (a) No overdue payables to other football clubs as at 30  June, ie  immediately prior to the start of the relevant season.2 Where a club does have such overdue payables as of this date, or where UEFA otherwise requests, the club must demonstrate by 30 September that there are no longer any overdue payables to other clubs. (b) No overdue payables to employees and/or social/taxation authorities as at 30  June for any liability accruing up to and including 30  June (ie, there is no delayed assessment).3 Where the club does have such overdue payables as of this date, or where UEFA otherwise requests, the club must demonstrate by 30 September that there are no overdue payables to employees or social/ taxation authorities. (c) The ‘break-even’ requirement is met (see detailed discussion below).4 (d) The requirement to notify UEFA immediately of any events of ‘major economic importance’ occurring during the licence season.5 1 Part III of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations (Arts 53–68) sets out the CFCB’s monitoring responsibilities and requirements and is supplemented by Procedural Rules governing the CFCB’s operations (uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/Clublicensing/02/60/83/59/2608359_ DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed 1  November 2020]). The CFCB itself is divided into two parts – the investigatory chamber (which investigates clubs’ compliance) and the adjudicatory chamber (which decides cases referred to it by the Chief Investigator). 2 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 65. 3 Ibid, Art 66. 4 Ibid, Art 64. 5 Ibid, Art 67.

(e) The exception policy B5.54 UEFA reserves to itself (but not to any national association) the right to grant certain limited exceptions to the requirements of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations.1 These give UEFA the power, for example, to accommodate variances due to national law (as long as they do not conflict with UEFA’s objectives) or to extend implementation dates for specific requirements. 1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 4 and Annex 1.B5

B5.55 One key area for the potential grant of exceptions is Art 12(2) and (3) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, which requires a club to have been a registered member of a UEFA member association and/or its affiliated league (or to have had a contractual relationship with such a registered member) for at least three consecutive years. Any change to the legal form, legal group structure, or identity of the club may be deemed an interruption of such membership or contractual relationship. The point of this rule, as one CAS panel noted, is to avoid clubs circumventing the requirements of the UEFA licensing system:

Regulating Financial Fair Play  603 ‘The panel recognises that this so-called three years rule has been adopted to avoid, as UEFA put it, “circumvention of the UEFA licensing system”. In particular, clubs are not to be permitted to create a new company or change their legal structure so as to “clean up” their balance sheet while leaving their debts in another legal entity (which is likely to go bankrupt). If allowed, this kind of device would obviously harm the integrity of competition and would contradict the interest of the sport as well as putting at risk the interests of creditors’.1

However, there obviously may be situations where a club wishes or needs to change its legal form for good and valid reasons that do not undermine the objectives of the UEFA Club Licensing System. In such cases, exceptions are usually granted by the CFCB Investigatory Chamber (to whom responsibility for considering applications for exceptions was transferred from the UEFA Executive Committee in 2018). 1 Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v UEFA, CAS 2011/A/2476, para 3.15.

(f) Policing compliance B5.56 Art 68 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations states: ‘If one of the monitoring requirements is not fulfilled, then the UEFA Club Financial Control Body makes a decision, including the possibility to conclude a settlement agreement with the licensee, taking into consideration other factors as defined in Annex XI, and takes the appropriate measure(s) without delay in accordance with the procedure defined in the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body.’

The disciplinary measures that the CFCB may impose include a warning; a reprimand; a fine; deduction of points; withholding of revenues otherwise due from participation in a UEFA competition; prohibition on registering new players in UEFA competitions; restriction on the number of players that a club may register for participation in UEFA competitions, including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the employee benefits and expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purposes of UEFA club competitions; disqualification from competitions in progress and/or exclusion from future competitions; and withdrawal of a title or award.1 Decisions of the CFCB may be appealed to CAS, which will decide whether the sanction imposed for the breach is proportionate in all the circumstances, which will include comparing it to sanctions imposed by UEFA in similar cases.2 1 Procedural Rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body Art 29 (referred to in UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 72.2). 2 Ibid, Art 34.2. See, in particular, the discussion in paras B5.59-B5.65 of Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821.

B5.57 There may be an overlap between the jurisdiction or supervision of the different bodies set up under the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations, in particular the national licensing authority and the UEFA supervisory body. The fact that the national licensing authority may have found a club to have complied with the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, or may have already passed some sanction for non-compliance, does not prevent the CFCB from exercising its own jurisdiction.1 1 Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821, para 108.

B5.58 A  large number of cases has been determined since the adoption of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, including by the CAS on appeal from decisions of the CFCB. Copies of the decisions are published on UEFA’s website.1 The jurisprudence establishes that clubs that are transparent and report accurately their overdue payables at the assessment dates are usually given additional time to pay before facing stricter disciplinary measures. On the other hand, if compliance

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procedures establish the existence of hidden overdue payables, the clubs concerned faces harsher disciplinary measures, including exclusion from future participation in UEFA competitions. 1 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-financial-controlling-body/#Cases [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.59 The case of Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA provided a good case study of some of the issues that are likely to arise in enforcement of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, including the different roles of the national licensing body (the national football association) and UEFA, the importance of the reporting requirements, proportionality of sanctions, and the role of the CAS.1 1 CAS 2012/A/2821.

B5.60 Bursaspor had agreed to pay Portsmouth FC €500,000 for the transfer of Collins Mbesuma from Portsmouth to Bursaspor in July 2007, payable by four instalments of €100,000 each in August and October 2007 and €150,000 each in April and August 2008. Bursaspor paid the first two instalments in 2007 but by June 2008 had not paid the third instalment of €150,000. The FA filed a claim against the Turkish club with the FIFA Players’ Status Committee in January 2011. B5.61 In March 2011, Bursaspor applied to the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) for a licence to participate in UEFA competitions in season 2011/12. Article 49 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations requires clubs to prepare and submit with the licence application all transfer activities occurring prior to the previous 31 December. Bursaspor disclosed that there was a pending dispute with Portsmouth regarding an overdue payment. On 9 June 2011 the TFF granted Bursaspor a licence to participate in the 2011/12 UEFA Europa League. Bursaspor generated €250,000 of income from that participation. B5.62 In September 2011, the CFCB characterised the overdue payment of the transfer fee as a breach of indicator 4 in Art 62(3) of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations,1 and asked the club to provide it with a clear explanation of why the overdue payment was a genuine dispute. The club protested that it would not be fair to apply any sanction whilst there was a dispute pending before FIFA and then, in November 2011, paid the sums owed to Portsmouth. UEFA commenced disciplinary proceedings against the club on the basis that it had failed to meet the requirements of Art 65,2 because of its overdue ‘payables’ to Portsmouth as at 30 June 2011 and had failed to meet the requirements of Art 49 by failing to report the overdue payables. 1 Article 62(3) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations provides that if a licensee exhibits conditions described by various indicators it is in breach; indicator 4 is that the licensee has overdue payables as of 30 June of the year that the UEFA club competition commences. 2 Article 65 requires that there are no overdue payables to football clubs as of 30 June of the year that the UEFA club competition commences.

B5.63 The UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body (CDB) found both breaches to be proven, fined the club €200,000 and excluded it from one UEFA competition for which it qualified in the next four years, but suspended the exclusion for a probationary period of three years, on the basis that, in comparison with sanctions imposed in other cases, it would be disproportionate not to suspend the exclusion, and because Bursaspor was otherwise strong financially, and did eventually pay Portsmouth the overdue amount. B5.64 UEFA appealed against the decision of the CDB to the UEFA Appeals Body, arguing that Bursaspor’s offences were so serious that its exclusion from UEFA competitions should not be suspended. The Appeals Body found that Bursaspor had

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‘grossly violated the applicable Regulations’ by creating a false impression that it did not have any overdue payables on 31 March 2011. It found that the CDB had shown ‘unjustified lenience’ towards the club. The breaches were serious and an exclusion of at least one year was proportionate. The fact that the club paid the overdue amount after disciplinary procedure had been opened against it was not a mitigating factor (presumably because that would act as an incentive for clubs to delay payment). The Appeals Body decided to exclude the club from one UEFA competition for which it qualified in the next three years, without suspending that exclusion, but reduced the fine to €50,000. B5.65 The club then appealed to the CAS, which made a number of important findings. (a) (b)

(c)

(d)

First, there was no dispute that the CAS had jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Its jurisdiction derived from Art 62.1 of the UEFA Statutes 2010 and Art R47 of the CAS Code.1 Secondly, UEFA had jurisdiction to impose the sanctions. The club had argued that the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations delegated not only the licensing but the sanctioning powers under Articles 1–52 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations to national associations. But while it was true that the TFF was the licensor,2 the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations set up a monitoring process for all licensees that qualified for a UEFA competition,3 and UEFA had competence to impose sanctions in respect of Art 49 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations as with the other articles.4 Thirdly, the club had breached Art 65 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations – there was an overdue payment to Portsmouth at the relevant time. There was no agreement between Portsmouth and the club to extend the deadline for payment and Bursaspor had not initiated any legal proceedings contesting its liability for the claim. Fourthly, on the other hand, the club had not breached the disclosure obligations in the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. The CAS underlined the importance of these obligations, citing the decision in the Győri case that: ‘the disclosure obligations are essential for UEFA to assess the financial situation of the clubs that are participating in its competitions and for this reason […] the disclosure must be correct and accurate’.5

(e)

Bursaspor had disclosed the overdue amount and not hidden it. UEFA argued that by declaring that there was a ‘pending dispute’ regarding the overdue payables when there was never any ‘real dispute’, the club had provided misleading information. However, the club had disclosed the true facts: the overdue amount and the fact of a pending dispute. The TFF should have asked the club to provide a clear explanation concerning the grounds of the dispute, and the FIFA dispute arose before the disclosure obligations under Art 65 of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations came into force. The case was distinguishable from the Györi case, which was a case about concealing information.6 Finally, the CAS ruled that the sanction imposed by the UEFA Appeals Body, excluding the club from participating in one UEFA competition for which it qualified in the next three years, was disproportionate.7 Whilst UEFA has a wide discretion when it comes to sanctioning, account must be taken of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the principles of proportionality and equal treatment required a comparison with how other clubs had been sanctioned for breaching the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. The UEFA Club Licensing Regulations did not impose any standard sanction, but in view of the specific circumstances of the case, and given that the breach of Art 65 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations occurred during a transitional period, the CAS decided

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to suspend the ban for a period of three years, but to increase the fine back up to €250,000, being the amount by which the club said it had benefited from competing in the 2011/12 UEFA Cup competition. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821. paras 72–74. By Art 5 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. Article 53 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821. paras 86–108. Győri ETO v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702 (discussed at para B5.66), para 136. Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821, paras 114–127. Ibid, paras 128–146.

B5.66 In the Győri case, the club committed two breaches: it had overdue payables; and it failed to disclose that fact. The CAS panel found that exclusion for one season was not disproportionate.1 A different CAS panel also dismissed the appeal of Beşiktaş against the UEFA Appeals Body’s decision to ban it from UEFA competitions for one season due to its five different overdue payables totalling €4m.2 Finally, in the Málaga case, the CAS demonstrated that it would be prepared to uphold a strict and severe application of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations, dismissing the club’s appeal against a sanction fining it €300,000 and disqualifying it from participating in the next UEFA competition it would otherwise have qualified for in the next four seasons.3 1 Győri ETO v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702. In Győri, the UEFA Appeals Body found that the original sanction was harsh on the basis that the national association had not bothered seeking an explanation for the overdue payable despite being on notice. Győri had relied on the national association having issued a licence and could not therefore be judged too harshly, notwithstanding that the club had provided misleading documentation. It may therefore be that sanctions will be less harsh where national associations are complicit in any breach. 2 Beşiktaş JK v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2824. 3 Málaga Club de Futbol SAD v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3067.

(7) The impact of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations B5.67 On 21 March 2012, the European Commission issued a joint statement with UEFA extolling the virtues of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations: ‘UEFA, as a governing body for football in Europe, will promote [the objectives of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations] in a balanced and proportionate way, acting in accordance with all applicable legal rules, and, in particular, within the framework of EU law. […] ‘The central principle of FFP (namely that clubs should “live within their means” or “break even”) is based on the notion that football-related income should at least match football-related expenditure. No business can lay solid foundations for the future by continually spending more than it earns, or could reasonably be expected to earn. Thus, the “break even” rule reflects a sound economic principle that will encourage greater rationality and discipline in club finances and, in so doing, help to protect the wider interests of football’.

The statement went on to summarise how the measures would be compatible with EU state aid legislation, and the Commission committed to work with UEFA on fiscal treatment of clubs across the EU, and compensatory measures that can be requested from clubs receiving rescue and restructuring aid from public authorities.1 1 Joint Statement of UEFA and the European Commission, 21 March 2012.

B5.68 In January 2020, UEFA published its annual club licensing benchmarking report for financial year 2018. The report found that 2018 was the second consecutive

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year in which there was net aggregate profitability for clubs in Europe’s top divisions. While profits were down to €140m in 20181 (from €579m in 2017), this was still a major improvement on the €1.67bn net losses from 2011 (ie  before the 2009 amendments to the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations started to have an effect). Operating profits also contracted from €1.41bn in 2017 to €697m in 2018. The report suggests that the reduction in operating profit ‘is primarily driven by [a] recent spike observed in club wages (+9.4 per cent in FY2018)’2 and the reduction in net profit ‘can be attributed to the compression of clubs’ operating margins as a result of their cost bases growing faster than their revenue bases’.3 In the introduction, the UEFA President Aleksander hailed the report as further evidence of the positive impact of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations: ‘As financial performance has improved, clubs’ financial position has become significantly healthier, with net assets increasing from less than €2bn to more than €9bn in the space of a decade, a testament to the success of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations, the stable European football ecosystem and sustained and sensible investment’. 1 English clubs were particularly profitable, taking in more than double the aggregate net profit of any other European league (€382m) (The European Club Footballing Landscape, UEFA Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year 2018, p 112). 2 Ibid, p 110. 3 Ibid, p 111.

4 COST CONTROLS B5.69 While there is no direct, absolute correlation between amounts spent on players and success on the field, statistically speaking the more a club spends on players, the more likely it is to be successful on the field.1 It is therefore not surprising that clubs tend to increase spending on players in an attempt to win promotion up the league ladder, hoping eventually to reap the riches offered by the highest levels of club competition (for English football clubs, the Premier League and UEFA competitions). This leads to two problems: competitive imbalance (because some teams can afford to spend a lot more than others) and financial instability (as clubs gamble for the riches available by spending well beyond their means). Many SGBs have therefore sought to regulate to control costs, in particular (but not only, or always) expenditure on player wages. 1 See eg S Szymanski, (1998) ‘Why is Manchester United So Successful?’, Business Strategy Review, 9: 47–54 (‘We can state two general principles based on our research: (i) better league performance leads to higher revenue (ii) increased wage expenditure leads to better league performance’).

B5.70 Cost control measures will vary from sport to sport, and in some cases within an individual sport. However, the different approaches can be broadly summarised as follows: (a) The ‘spend what you earn’ approach (aka ‘break even’), effectively requiring clubs not to spend more money on player transfer fees and wages than they generate in income. (b) The ‘salary cap’ approach, whereby a club’s spending on player wages is limited to a fixed amount or to a percentage of turnover or other financial parameter. (c) The ‘luxury tax’ approach, whereby clubs may spend as much as they want, but to the extent they exceed certain pre-determined limits they are required to pay a ‘tax’ to the SGB, usually (but not always) for redistribution to their competitors.

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A Break-even requirements B5.71 In contrast to a straight salary cap,1 a break-even requirement does not limit what a club may spend on player wages to a fixed amount. Instead, the club may spend whatever qualifying income it generates, even if that is far more than its competitors. So this approach incentivises clubs to maximise their income sources, and may lessen the chances of a legal challenge from player unions, but it does nothing to promote competitive balance between the different clubs participating in the competition. 1 See para B5.100.

B5.72 In addition, the degree to which the ‘break-even’ requirement promotes sustainability may depend on what income qualifies to be counted for purposes of the break-even requirement. Clubs have four main sources of cash inflow that may be used to fund expenditure: (1) Trading income –amounts generated through trading, including ticket sale revenue, sponsorship revenue,1 merchandise revenue,2 proceeds of sale of player registrations,3 and amounts received as central distributions from the competition organiser in return for participation in a competition (usually, a share of the revenues from the central sale of broadcasting and sponsorship rights).4 (2) Equity – money invested by shareholders that is available for the club to use in meeting its outgoings. These funds would not be returned to the shareholders unless there is a solvent winding up of the club. (3) Donations – amounts gifted to the club, whether conditionally or otherwise. Subject to any conditions, the club is free to use the funds as it pleases. (4) Loans – an amount lent to the club on condition of repayment at some future point or on the happening of a specific event. Whilst the cash is received and may be utilised, the debt will sit on the club’s balance sheet and interest will be payable at the agreed rate until the debt is discharged or waived. The question is whether all four should be taken into account for purposes of assessing compliance with the break-even requirement. In accounting terms, ‘income’ consists only of amounts generated through trading activities and reflected in a profit and loss account, and therefore excludes equity infusions (ie  proceeds from the issue of new shares) and shareholder loans, which appear only on the balance sheet.5 In policy terms, allowing clubs to count shareholder loans and equity infusions as income for purposes of the break-even requirement permits clubs to take on spending commitments that they can meet only for so long as their owners remain ready, willing and able to continue to fund them, which carries with it obvious risks.6 1 2 3 4

See Chapter H3 (Sponsorship). See Chapter H5 (Merchandising and Licensing). See Chapter F3 (Player Transfers). Competition organisers usually require participating clubs to agree to the central sale of broadcasting rights to matches played in the competition, in order to ensure the broadcasting of the competition complements the other elements of the competition’s commercial programme but also to ensure that the revenues are distributed in a manner that promotes competitive balance between the participating clubs. See para E11.238 et seq. 5 Wigan Athletic FC v EFL, League Arbitration Panel decision dated 4 August 2020, paras 65-68 (owner funding is not income in accounting sense and therefore a failure of an owner to provide promised funding is not a force majeure event for purposes of the sporting sanction rule – as to which, see para B5.150). 6 See eg Bury Review para 8.4 (‘the real problem is that the EFL’s Salary Cost Management Protocols do not require League One and Two Clubs to pay player wages out of normal operating income, but instead permit them to fund much higher spending through cash injections from the Club owner. That means the Club becomes entirely dependent on the owner remaining ready, willing and able to sustain that level of funding, and if the flow of funds is cut off, the Club is immediately plunged into financial

Regulating Financial Fair Play  609 crisis. I do not see how this furthers the stated objectives of the EFL’s financial fair play rules (viz., to introduce more discipline and rationality in Club football finances; to encourage Clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; and to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of EFL football)’).

(a) UEFA competitions B5.73 The UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations require clubs competing in UEFA club competitions in a particular season to meet the so-called ‘break-even requirement’ in the three prior seasons (the monitoring period), ie  to ‘break even’ in terms of its profit or loss.1 The profit or loss is calculated by reference to relevant income and relevant expenditure.2 1 UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations, Art 59. For a detailed description of this requirement, see Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, paras 116–121 and passim. 2 A club with income and expenditure of less than €5m in each of the two previous seasons is excluded from the break-even requirement (Art 57(2)).

(i) Relevant income B5.74 Relevant income is defined in Annex X  of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations. It consists of income relating to gate receipts, sponsorship and advertising, broadcasting rights, commercial activities, UEFA solidarity payments and prize money, other operating income, profit on transfers of player registrations, finance income and foreign exchange results, and any excess proceeds on disposal of ‘tangible fixed assets’, eg land, buildings or hardware.1 It specifically excludes2 nonmonetary credits, amounts by which income transactions with related parties exceed fair value, income from non-football operations not related to the club, income in respect of a player for whom the club retains the registration (so-called third party investment),3 and credit arising out of use of insolvency processes.4 Contributions from related third parties or equity participants are not included in relevant income5 but may be used to increase the acceptable deviation (the ‘maximum aggregate breakeven deficit possible for a licensee to be deemed in compliance with the break-even requirement’) from €5m up to €30m.6 Applicable contributions include share capital increases (less capital reductions), unconditional gifts (including debt waivers), and income transactions (to the extent that they are above fair value).7 Equity participant or related-party loans are excluded altogether.8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 1(a) to (i). Ibid, Annex X, Pt A, paras 1(j) to (n). See para B5.25. See para B5.133. UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt B, section (k). Ibid, Art 61(2). See further para B5.80. Ibid, Annex X, Pt E(1) to (3). See further para B5.81. Ibid, Annex X. Pt E(4)(iv).

B5.75 In November 2018, Der Spiegel published details of emails hacked from Manchester City’s computer systems, which it said showed that the club had misreported owner equity funding as sponsor funding and so falsely claimed to have met the break-even requirement. The CFCB  Investigatory Chamber investigated, concluded the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations had been breached, and referred the matter to the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber on 15 May 2019.1 On 14 February 2020, the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber announced that it had found Manchester City FC to have committed ‘serious breaches of the UEFA  Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations by overstating its sponsorship revenue in its accounts and in the break-even information submitted to UEFA between 2012 and 2016’, in that the club’s owners had arranged to pay 85 per cent of the fees promised by

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sponsors Etisalat and Etihad (more than €200 million), as well as breaching its duty of cooperation by failing to turn over documents, and that as a result the Adjudicatory Chamber had banned the club from UEFA competitions for two seasons (2020/21 and 2021/22) and fined it €30 million.2 1 In Manchester City v UEFA, CAS 2019/A/6298, Manchester City’s attempt to overturn the decisions of the CFCB Investigatory Chamber (a) to refer the allegations of breach of the break-even requirement to the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber; and (b) to refuse to suspend the process and first conduct an enquiry into leaks, was found to be inadmissible on the basis that not all internal remedies had been exhausted in relation to (a), and (b) was a procedural decision not a final decision that could be appealed to CAS directly. 2 uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/newsid=2638659.html [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.76 Manchester City appealed to CAS, which found in July 2020 that: (a)

(b)

(c) (d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Article 37 of the CFCB Procedural Rules, which says breaches of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations must be prosecuted within five years of their occurrence, means that prosecution of alleged breaches based on information submitted by the club before 16 May 2014 was time-barred, because the prosecution of the pending case was not commenced until the referral of the case from the Investigatory Chamber to the Adjudicatory Chamber on 15 May 2019.1 The fact that information submitted prior to 16  May 2014 (relating to sponsorship fees paid in June 2012 and January 2013) was re-submitted after that date as part of the rolling three-year monitoring period did not re-start the limitations period, and therefore no alleged breach could be pursued in relation to that information based on its re-submission in club filings made after 16 May 2014.2 As a result, the alleged breach consisting of disguised equity funding through Etisalat in June 2012 and June 2013 and through Etihad in season 2012/13 was time-barred and could no longer be prosecuted.3 The rest of the charges were not time-barred, but they charged very serious wrongdoing and therefore particularly cogent evidence was required to support them. The leaked emails provided prima facie evidence of a rule breach, as they describe an arrangement by which equity funding by the club’s owners would be disguised as sponsorship income from Etihad, but they did not prove that the transactions were in fact executed as described in the emails, nor did the accounting evidence submitted by UEFA, and the oral and written evidence submitted by the club (including from Etihad executives) was to the contrary and was considered by the panel to be reliable.4 Instead the evidence showed that Etihad had transferred to the club the full amounts due under its sponsorship contract with the club, and there was ‘no meaningful evidence’ that funding to cover those payments was provided by the club’s owners to Etihad.5 Therefore the charges of breach of the breakeven requirements by disguising equity funding as sponsor funding had to be dismissed.6 However, the club seriously breached its duty under Article 56 of the Procedural Rules to cooperate with the national licensor and UEFA and to provide them with all information required to show that the break-even requirements were met. In fact, by failing to produce the authors of the leaked emails to testify before the Investigatory Chamber and by refusing to provide related documents and other information, the club obstructed the investigation.7 The majority of the panel found that no ban on participation was warranted based on the club’s failure to cooperate alone, but a fine of €10 million was warranted given the importance of cooperation in investigations conducted by CFCB ‘because of its limited investigative means’, and because the club’s lack of cooperation was so serious and a clear deterrent to such behaviour was required.8

Regulating Financial Fair Play  611 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, paras 163–174. Ibid, paras 190–92. Ibid, paras 196, 198. Ibid, para 213–244. Ibid, para 273. Ibid, para 324. Ibid, paras 321, 326. Ibid, paras 334–35, 337.

(ii) Relevant expenditure B5.77 Relevant expenditure is also defined in Annex X of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. It consists of cost of sales and materials, all employee (both playing and non-playing as well as directors) benefits expenses (including wages and all shortterm and long-term benefits), other operating expenses, amortisation/impairment of player registrations, loss on disposal of/cost of acquisition of player registrations, and finance costs and dividends.1 Relevant expenditure will also be increased to the extent that any expense transactions with related parties are at less than fair value.2 1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 2(a) to (e). 2 Ibid, Annex X, Pt A, para 2(f).

B5.78 However, certain areas of expenditure are exempted for policy reasons, including expenditure on youth and community development activities, expenditure on women’s football activities, non-monetary debits or charges, finance costs relating to investment in infrastructure, costs of leasehold improvement, and expenses of non-football operations not related to the club.1 The effect of the exclusions is to enable owners to invest funds without restriction for the purposes of worthwhile projects such as stadium development, or youth academies, but otherwise to control the ability of wealthy owners to support wage costs far in excess of a club’s relevant income. 1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 2(g) to (m).

B5.79 Finally, the break-even result does not include profit/loss on disposal and depreciation/impairment of certain tangible fixed assets, certain intangible assets (other than player registrations), and tax expense/income.1 1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 3(a) to (c).

(iii) ‘Acceptable deviation’ B5.80 Where relevant expenses are less than relevant income, the break-even requirement is met. Where relevant expenses exceed relevant income, the club could still meet the break-even requirement provided that the difference (ie loss) is less than €5m (the so-called ‘acceptable deviation’). Where the difference is greater than €5m, the club can still meet the requirement provided the additional amounts are no more than a stated maximum (currently €30m) and are covered: (a) by surplus generated in the previous two seasons; and/or (b) by contributions from shareholders.1 1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 61(2).

(iv) Transactions with related third parties B5.81 Of particular interest is the concept of adjustment to fair value of transactions with related third parties. An owner of a football club who also owns other companies might procure that one of other companies buys sponsorship rights from the club at

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an inflated value, thereby helping the buying company to reduce its profits and so limit its tax bill, while inflating the relevant income of the club (and therefore its spending capacity) for purposes of UEFA’s break-even requirement. The UEFA Club Licensing Regulations therefore give UEFA the right to order a club to reduce a particular income amount or increase a particular expenditure commitment where the relevant transaction was concluded with a related third party1 at less than fair value.2 The corresponding reduction/increase is then treated as a contribution from a related party and falls within the cap on allowable contributions set in Article 61(2) of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations. UEFA has issued further guidance on the approach it will adopt in respect of sponsorship agreements, which involves commissioning third party specialist global marketing agencies to conduct market assessments taking into account tangible elements (eg  what the sponsor would have spent to get the same media exposure through classic advertising methods), intangible elements (an inherently subjective assessment dependent on individual circumstances of the sponsor and its objectives) and then a ‘return on investment’ rate. This is an area that is likely to give rise to extensive disputes between experts when conflicting assessments make the difference between admission to or exclusion from UEFA competitions. 1 Annex X, Pt E of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations sets out in detail the definition of Related Third Party. It includes group undertakings, joint venture partners (directly or indirectly), and entities under common control. The regulations require any assessment to have regard to the substance of any relationship, and not merely legal form. 2 Part E, para 7 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations provides that fair value is deemed to be the amount by which an ‘asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s length transaction’. A transaction is not deemed to be at arm’s length where it is ‘on terms more favourable than would have been obtained if there had been no related party relationship’.

B5.82 In 2011, Paris Saint-Germain FC was acquired by Qatar’s sovereign investment fund, Qatar Sports Investments. It was subsequently sponsored by the Qatar Tourism Authority, thereby increasing its turnover and so its allowable spend on player expenditure. In May 2014 it entered into a settlement agreement with UEFA that included a number of agreed sanctions for breach of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, in which context it was noted that ‘the contract between PSG and the Qatar Tourism Authority has been carefully considered and a fair value, significantly below that submitted by the club, has been assigned’.1 1 See uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/ClubFinancialControl/02/10/68/99/ 2106899_DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020].

B5.83 When Paris St-Germain embarked on a further round of significant player transfers in 2017, questions were again asked about the club’s ability to sustain that expenditure based on its normal operating income. UEFA’s review of the club’s financial results was concluded on 13  June 2018, when the CFCB  Investigatory Chamber determined no further action was required. On 22 June 2018, the Chairman of the CFCB ordered the Adjudicatory Chamber to review that decision, and the Adjudicatory Chamber ruled on 19 September 2018 that the case should be referred back to the Investigatory Chamber for further investigation. However, Paris SaintGermain appealed to the CAS against that referral back, on the basis that Article 16(1) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations required any review to be instigated and completed within ten days, and therefore the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber was manifestly late. UEFA accepted the merits of the club’s case before the CAS and accepted that the 13 June 2018 decision should stand.1 It has subsequently removed the 10-day deadline, but with prospective effect only.2 1 Paris St German v UEFA, CAS 2018/A/5937, para 64. 2 Presumably because of concerns that a retroactive rule change would be challenged as unlawful: see para B1.40.

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(v) Challenges to the legality of the UEFA ‘break-even’ requirement B5.84 Unlike a (hard) salary cap, the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations do not prevent a rich club spending much more on top players than another club in the same competition. What they restrict is a club spending more than a certain amount relative to its income. Thus, a rich club with a substantial income can spend much more on players than a club with a more limited income competing in the same competition. The UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations prevent the latter club borrowing to finance big spending on players to compete with the more established and richer club. From this perspective the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations could actually reinforce the gap between rich established clubs and clubs trying to compete with them. They may ensure more financial stability, but it might be argued that they do so at the price of actually diminishing, and not encouraging, a more level playing field between football clubs.1 1 See eg  Daniel Geey, ‘The UEFA  Financial Fair Play Rules: a difficult balancing act’ (2011) 9(1) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal. In addition, because the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations apply only to those seeking to compete within a UEFA competition, and not to those competing in domestic leagues generally, they may have a distorting effect on domestic leagues, although that argument becomes weaker with the growing prevalence of similar controls at a domestic level1, for example, in the context of English football: see paras B5.92 and B5.94.

B5.85 On 5  May 2013, Daniel Striani, a Belgian football agent, filed a formal complaint with the European Commission, arguing that the ‘break-even rule’ (Art 57 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations) has the following anti-competitive effects, and therefore violated Art 101 of the Treaty Founding the European Union (TFEU), or, alternatively, Art 102 of the TFEU, and/or articles 45, 56, and 63 of the TFEU:1 (a) (b)

restriction of investment; fossilisation of the existing market structure (current top clubs likely to remain at the top); (c) reduction of the number of transfers, or the transfer amounts, and of the number of players under contracts per club; and (d) consequently, a deflationary effect on the revenues of players’ agents. On 20 June 2013, Mr Striani also brought a private action before the Brussels Court of First Instance seeking damages from UEFA for its alleged breaches of EU law, as well as a declaration that the relevant provisions of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations are void. That action gave the European Commission grounds to reject the complaint lodged with it, without taking a position on whether he had a legitimate interest in filing the complaint or the merits of that complaint, but rather on the basis that the Brussels Court of First Instance was well-placed to deal with the matter.2 1 See generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport) and Chapter E12 (The EU Free Movement Rules). 2 Decision in Case AT.40105 (UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules), C(2014) 8028 final, 24 October 2014.

B5.86 On 29 May 2015 the Brussels Court of First Instance held that it had no jurisdiction to hear a case against UEFA, and that the challenge should have been brought in Switzerland (UEFA’s country of domicile) pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Lugano II Convention. However, it went on to determine that it remained competent to order provisional measures under Article  31 of the Convention. Consequently, it decided to grant the provisional measure requested by Mr Striani by prohibiting UEFA from activating the ‘break-even’ requirement of the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations until the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had ruled on three questions referred to it by the Brussels Court of First Instance, namely: (1) Must Article  101 of the TFEU (or Art 102 of the TFEU) be interpreted as meaning that the UEFA rule known as the ‘break-even requirement’ or

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‘break-even rule’ infringes that provision of EC law in so far as the UEFA rule gives rise to a restriction of competition (or the abuse of a dominant position), in particular a restriction ‘by its object’ in that it limits the right to invest, which is either ‘by its object’ anti-competitive or is not necessary for the achievement of the objectives pursued by UEFA, namely the longterm financial stability of football clubs and the sporting integrity of UEFA’s competitions, or, in the alternative, which is not proportionate to the achievement of those objectives? (2) Must Articles  63, 56 and 45 of the TFEU (as well as Articles  15 and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) be interpreted as meaning that the UEFA rule known as the ‘break-even requirement’ or ‘breakeven rule’ infringes those provisions of EU law in so far as that UEFA rule gives rise to an obstacle to freedom of movement (capital, services, persons) which is not necessary for the attainment of the objectives pursued by UEFA, namely the long-term financial stability of football clubs and the sporting integrity of UEFA’s competitions (and which is not justified by ‘overriding grounds of public interest’) or, alternatively, an obstacle which is not proportionate to the achievement of those objectives? (3) Must the above provisions of EU law (or some of them) be interpreted as meaning that those provisions (or some of them) are infringed by Articles 65 and 66 of the UEFA regulations entitled ‘UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations’ in so far as the UEFA rule – even if a restriction or obstacle to which it gives rise is logically connected to the protection of the sporting integrity of UEFA interclub competitions – is disproportionate and/ or discriminatory in so far as it gives preference to the payment of certain creditors and, as a corollary, treats the payment of non-protected creditors, in particular football agents, less favourably? B5.87 On 16  July 2015, the Ninth Chamber of the CJEU determined that the referral by the Brussels Court of First Instance did not comply with the requirements of the procedure established in Article 267 TFEU. The Brussels court had already granted interim relief and otherwise declined jurisdiction. There were no further matters for it to consider on which it required the guidance of the CJEU. It was not sufficient that the issue of compatibility of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations with EU law was a hotly contested issue. The referral was ‘manifestly inadmissible’, and therefore the questions went unanswered.1 1 C-299/15, Striani and others v Union européenne des Sociétés de Football Association (UEFA) and Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football – Association (URBSFA), Order of 16  July 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:519.

B5.88 Both UEFA and Mr Striani appealed the decision of the Brussels Court of First Instance to the Brussels Court of Appeal, which ruled that the damage that Mr Striani suffered from UEFA’s alleged breach of competition law was too indirect to give the Belgian courts jurisdiction over UEFA. It noted that ‘the challenged UEFA  Regulation does not prohibit M. Striani and MAD  Management […] from exercising the activity of an intermediary in Belgium or abroad, nor does it regulate the conditions in which this activity is to be exercised’. Moreover, the targeted provisions ‘do not prohibit the relevant clubs from having recourse to agents […] nor do they limit this activity’. In fact, the prejudice alleged by Striani and MAD Management ‘is only an indirect consequence of the adoption of the challenged UEFA Regulation’, as ‘it is not related directly to the activity of the claimants and does not have direct consequences on this activity in Belgium or abroad’. The Brussels Court of Appeal therefore concluded that the courts of Switzerland (where UEFA is located) have sole jurisdiction over the matter. It also criticised the first instance court for ordering a stay of the UEFA regulations in the absence of any jurisdiction to do so.1

Regulating Financial Fair Play  615 1 UEFA v Striani & co, Cour d’appel Bruxelles, judgment dated 11 April 2019, 2015/AR/1282, paras 40, 41 and 42. The Brussels Court of Appeal also rejected the attempt to give it jurisdiction by naming the Belgian national football association as a co-defendant, pointing out that ‘the fact that URBSFA is a member of UEFA does not turn it into a co-author of the regulations; the reasoning of the claimants ignores the separate legal personality of UEFA’ (ibid para  48). The court ruled that the argument that the national federation enforced UEFA’s rules was ‘confusing the licensing role conferred to the national federations […] with the specific rules regarding the financial balance of clubs enshrined in Articles 57 to 63 of the attacked regulations’; the rules of the national federation ‘do not impose any constraints, or sanctions, with regard to the challenged break-even rules; these are the sole competence of UEFA’ (ibid).

B5.89 Meanwhile, however, in 2016 the CAS had reached a decision on the merits of a claim by Galatasaray that the decision of the CFCB to exclude it from UEFA competitions in seasons 2016/17 and 2017/18 should be overturned because inter alia the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations on which it was based (and, particularly, the break-even rule) were anti-competitive and therefore unlawful and unenforceable.1 The panel dismissed the appeal in its entirety and confirmed that the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations were a breach of neither Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU nor Swiss competition law (which is similar in nature and effect to EU competition law). Regarding Article 101 of the TFEU, the panel held that the regulations did not have the object or effect of restricting competition, stating: ‘The Panel’s view is that the declared objectives of the CL&FFP Regulations, and in particular their provisions relating to financial fair play, the legality of which is challenged by the Club, are legitimate […]. ‘[…] the Panel notes that the CL&FFP  Regulations do not appear to prevent the clubs from competing among themselves on the pitch or in the acquisition of football players. The Panel agrees with the Respondent that, on the contrary, they produce the effect that competition is not distorted by “overspending”, ie by those clubs that, operating at a loss, allow themselves operations that could not be conducted on a sound commercial basis, and gain an advantage over those clubs which respect the constraints of financial balance (ie which take a behaviour that should be expected by any reasonable entity in normal market conditions). In other words, their effect is to prevent a distortion of competition. Further, they do not limit the amount of salaries for the players: clubs are free to pay as much as they wish, provided those salaries are covered by revenues. In addition, they do not “ossificate” the structure of market (large dominant clubs have always existed and will always exist) and do not exclude clubs from “essential facilities”: the UEFA professional club competitions cannot be compared to railway infrastructures or to grids in the electric market. Finally, it is to be noted that the “break-even” calculations take place over rolling periods of three years. Therefore, “overspending” is allowed during one or two football season, provided it is covered in the following one(s)’.2

Regarding Article  102 of the TFEU, the panel found that even if UEFA was in a dominant position on a relevant market, the club had failed to explain how the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations could possibly constitute abuse of that position.3 1 Galatasaray v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, also discussed at para E11.172. 2 Ibid, paras 76 and 78. 3 Ibid, para 82.

B5.90 In recognition of the severe financial difficulties faced by many European football clubs as a result of the lockdown measures imposed to prevent the spread of COVID-19, UEFA established an emergency working group to consider a regulatory response. This led, on 18 June 2020, to the publication of a four-page addendum to the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations.1 The addendum provided that: (a)

there would be a one-month delay (to 31 July rather than 30 June) to the date on which clubs must prove they have no overdue payables; and

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(b)

the assessment of the break-even requirement would be postponed for financial year 2020, ie instead the average combined deficit of 2020 and 2021 would be assessed during the 2021/22 monitoring period.

When announcing the addendum, UEFA emphasised that, although it was providing some flexibility to clubs in light of the circumstances, it was committed to ‘retaining the spirit and intent of financial fair play for football’s long-term viability’.2 1 See uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/FinancialFairPlay/02/64/22/29/2642229_ DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020]. 2 uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/025e-0fb60fd017ba-82857c2a2217-1000--temporaryemergency-measures-for-financial-fair-play/ [accessed 1 November 2020].

(b) The Premier League B5.91 The Premier League faced a number of issues regarding the implementation of its own cost controls, mainly due to the enormous discrepancies in wealth between the biggest clubs in the Premier League (who have some of the largest trading income of all clubs globally) and the smaller clubs (who generate far smaller amounts from their own ticketing, sponsorship and merchandising arrangements, and so depend to a much greater extent on central distributions from the Premier League’s broadcasting deals). In such circumstances, a fixed costs cap would be very unfair on the bigger clubs, while a break-even requirement based on percentage of turnover would risk entrenching the bigger clubs towards the top end of the table and restrict the ability of smaller clubs to compete with them by using benefactor funding. B5.92 Effective from the 2015/16 season, the Premier League adopted Profit & Sustainability Rules incorporating a rolling three-year break-even requirement similar to that used in the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations.1 Clubs losing an aggregate of £15m across the relevant reporting period have to demonstrate their ability to meet future payments to football creditors as well as their obligations to the Premier League. Traditionally this has required a letter of support from owners that they would provide the necessary funding to cover the losses. Clubs losing more than £15m but less than £105m in aggregate across the reporting period are required to: (a) (b)

provide future financial information for the next two seasons; and provide evidence of secure funding (to the satisfaction of the Premier League).2

Any failure to satisfy these requirements could lead to the Premier League: (a) requiring the club to agree and adhere to a budget; (b) requiring the club to provide further financial information; and (c) refusing an application by the club to register new players or enter into new contracts.3 In addition to these measures, any club losing more than £105m in aggregate across the reporting period4 may be charged with breach of the Premier League rules and referred to a disciplinary commission with broad powers to: reprimand the club, impose an unlimited fine, suspend the club from playing, deduct points from the club, order matches to be replayed, recommend expulsion of the club, order compensation, ban registrations, or impose such other penalty as it thinks fit.5 To date, no club has been found to have such losses and therefore no sanctions have been imposed. 1 2 3 4

Premier League Rules E.52 to 59. Ibid, E.57.1 and 2. Ibid, E.57.3 and E.15 Premier League Rule E.59 states that the £105m figure will be reduced by £22m for each season (out of the previous three) that a club was in an EFL division rather than the Premier League. 5 Premier League Rules E.58, W.17 and W.49.

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B5.93 Similar to the UEFA  Club Licensing Regulations, the Premier League’s rules allow clubs to obtain credit for expenditure on youth development, community activities, and women’s football, and transactions with related third parties will be assessed for fair value.1 The Premier League also has the power to make determinations regarding fair market value of related party transactions.2 1 Premier League Rule A.1.5. 2 Ibid, Rule E.53.

(c) The Championship B5.94 The EFL has now had several ‘financial fair play’ measures in place for a number of years, which are stated to have the same objectives as the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, namely: (a) improving the economic and financial capability of clubs; (b) increasing the transparency and credibility of clubs; (c) placing the necessary importance on the protection of creditors by ensuring that clubs settle their liabilities with players, HMRC and other clubs (or clubs) punctually; (d) introducing more discipline and rationality in club football finances; (f) encouraging clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; (g) encouraging responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; and (h) protecting the long-term viability and sustainability of League football.1 1 EFL Reg 18.1.

B5.95 For the clubs in the Championship (its top division), the EFL adopted a break-even requirement, starting from the 2013/14 season. Like the Premier League, it borrowed heavily from the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, including allowing ‘acceptable deviation’ (ie overspend),1 excluding expenditure on youth development and community-related activities, and requiring clubs to report the true value of related party transactions. However, the EFL assessed clubs’ compliance on a seasonby-season basis, effectively in arrears. For example, the compliance of any club participating in the Championship in the 2013/14 season was assessed in December 2014. If a club was found to have overspent, the sanction imposed depended on whether or not it had been promoted to the Premier League at the end of the 2013/14 season. If it had not been promoted, the club was subjected to a transfer embargo with effect from January 2015 until such time as it could demonstrate that it would comply with the requirements of the regulations in season 2014/15. If the club had been promoted in 2013/14, it would be subject to a financial penalty commensurate to the amount by which it had overspent.2 1 In the 2013/14 season, the so-called ‘acceptable deviation’ (which represented a combination of funded losses and equity contributions) amounted to £8m, reducing to £5m over the following two seasons. 2 The sanctions escalated depending on the amount by which the club failed to meet the break-even requirement. For example, a club overspending by £500,000 would be fined £100,000 whereas a club overspending by £1m would be fined £600,000. Financial penalties were re-distributed amongst those clubs who were compliant with the regulations in the same season.

B5.96 At the end of season 2013/14, QPR was promoted from the Championship to the Premier League. It was subsequently found to have incurred a loss of £45.284 million in 2013/14, resulting in a financial penalty of £41.965 million. It challenged the legality of the EFL’s rules on the basis that: (a) they infringed Article  101(1) of the TFEU as they prevented, restricted or distorted competition, both by object and also by effect; and (b) they were ‘contrary to common law principles in Bradley v Jockey Club’.1

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The panel dismissed the QPR challenge on both counts. It found that there was no appreciable impact on competition arising from the rules,2 and in any case the rules were ‘pursuing legitimate aims’ and were proportionate.3 It dismissed the Bradley claims (mainly, that the sanctions were disproportionate) ‘for the same reasons’.4 Though not initially raised as an issue by the parties, the panel also found that the rules were not invalid as a penalty clause, since the sanction imposed ‘is not a penalty for breach of contract or a secondary obligation arising on breach of the 2012 FFP Rules’.5 1 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164, aff’d EWCA Civ 1056, discussed at para E7.15–E7.21. 2 QPR v EFL, decision of Football Disciplinary Commission panel (Lord Collins of Mapesbury, James Flynn QC, Thomas de la Mare QC) dated 19 October 2017, para 289. 3 Ibid, para 338. 4 Ibid, para 366. 5 Ibid, para 374.

B5.97 QPR appealed but before the appeal was heard the proceedings were settled with QPR agreeing to pay the EFL £17 million plus costs, and with the club’s owners being required to write off shareholder loans to the value of £21.965 million. Similarly, at the end of the 2014/15 season AFC Bournemouth and Leicester City were promoted to the Premier League, and in each case they were subsequently found to have spent more than permitted under the Championship’s financial fair play rules, and so received fines commensurate with their respective overspends. B5.98 However, it was not tenable for the Championship to have different financial fair play rules from the Premier League, when clubs could be promoted between the two divisions, and so with effect from season 2016/17 the EFL adopted the Premier League’s Profit & Sustainability Rules for the Championship, albeit with reduced permitted loss levels (£13m per season, or £39m over the rolling three-year period).1 1 See EFL  Regulations 2019/20, Appendix 5 (Financial Fair Play Rules), Part Two (Championship Profitability and Sustainability Rules).

B5.99 On 22  March 2019, Birmingham City received a nine-point deduction from an EFL Disciplinary Commission for incurring losses totalling £48.9m over three seasons (2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17) in breach of section 2.9 of the EFL’s Profit & Sustainability Rules.1 On 14  May 2019, the EFL commenced further proceedings against the club arising out of its failure to comply with a business plan imposed on 1 August 2018. This focused on the requirement to adhere to a player-related expenditure budget. The Disciplinary Commission held that there was no absolute obligation to comply with the budget; rather, there was an implied term requiring the club to use its best endeavours to comply. The panel considered that the EFL had not established that the club had failed to use best endeavours, and accordingly the charge of misconduct was dismissed.2 On appeal that ruling was reversed. The obligation to comply with the budget was held to be an absolute one, and there was no basis for implication of a term that it required the club only to use best endeavours. The club was found to be in breach and received a reprimand.3 On 30 July 2020, it was announced that Sheffield Wednesday had received a 12-point deduction for breach of the Profitability & Sustainability Rules due to the fact that it had wrongly including profits from the sale of its stadium in its financial statement for the period ending July 2018.4 The club’s appeal against that decision was still pending at the time of writing. 1 2 3 4

SR/Adhocsport/199/2018, 22 March 2019. SR/Adhocsport/253/2019, 6 March 2020. SR/Adhocsport/086/2020, 29 June 2020 SR/Adhocsport/372/2019, 4 August 2020.

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B Salary caps B5.100 A salary cap seeks to limit directly what a participant may spend on player wages. It almost always applies on a squad basis, never dictating a maximum amount payable per player at any club, as that would go further than is necessary to achieve the objective and would likely be quickly challenged by individual players. The most common forms of salary cap are:1 (a) The fixed cap. No club or team may spend more than a prescribed amount on player wages. The RFL operates a fixed salary cap for its Super League competition,2 and Premier Rugby does the same for the Premiership.3 The rule does not differentiate between the smaller and larger clubs participating in the relevant competition: all clubs are subject to the same cap. (b) A cap set by reference to the turnover of the club. The EFL used to operate a cap on player expenditure for League One and League Two clubs that was based on a percentage of relevant turnover, although that could be supplemented with extraordinary funding.4 (c) A  hybrid cap, which combines elements of both the fixed cap and the ‘percentage of turnover’ cap. For example, a club may spend up to 60 per cent of its turnover on players, or £1m, whichever is the greater. The hybrid cap helps limit the potential for polarisation of a league as between the larger turnover clubs and those smaller clubs who would otherwise find it difficult to compete (assuming that the smaller clubs have owners or other sources of funding to make up the shortfall from turnover), but it limits risk-taking and competitive imbalance by providing an overall fixed cap. When the RFL first introduced a salary cap, in 1997, it was a hybrid cap.5 (d) The ‘luxury tax’ model permits clubs to exceed prescribed spending limits on player wages but levies a tax on the excess spend. For example, in Major League Baseball, the cap (referred to in the rules as the ‘threshold’) for the ‘Competitive Balance Tax’ was set at $195m for the 2017 season, rising to $210m over the lifetime of the current collective bargaining agreement, which ends after the 2021 season. A club exceeding the threshold for the first time must pay a 20 per cent tax on the excess amount. A club exceeding the threshold for a second consecutive season will see that figure rise to 30 per cent, and three or more straight seasons of exceeding the threshold triggers a 50 per cent luxury tax. If a club dips below the luxury tax threshold for a season, the penalty level is re-set. Clubs that exceed the threshold by $20 million to $40 million are also subject to a further 12 per cent surtax. Meanwhile, those who exceed it by more than $40 million are taxed at a 42.5 per cent rate the first time and a 45 per cent rate if they exceed it by more than $40 million again in subsequent years. From 2018, clubs that are $40 million or more above the threshold also have their highest selection in the next draft moved back 10 places.6 No club exceeded that threshold in season 2019, with only three clubs incurring a luxury tax bill, which generated circa $25m in luxury tax payments.7 1 Other measures have been developed over time under the generic umbrella of salary caps but which of themselves would not amount to what is commonly regarded as a cap. One example is the so-called ‘20/20 rule’ operated by the English Rugby League in the early in 2000, where a club could not pay more than 20 players a salary over £20,000 per annum (see para B5.101). 2 See para B5.101 et seq. 3 See para B5.108 et seq. 4 See para B5.118 et seq. 5 See para B5.101. 6 The full terms of the Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement 2017/2021 can be found at mlbplayers.com/cba [accessed 1 November 2020]. 7 See spotrac.com/mlb/tax/2019/ [accessed 1 November 2020]. Unlike in other US sports, for example the NBA, the MLB Competitive Balance Tax is not redistributed amongst the other competing teams who comply with the relevant spending limits. Instead it is used to fund player-related benefit schemes.

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(a) The RFL’s salary cap B5.101 The RFL first adopted a salary cap in September 1997, effective from 1 January 1998. At inception, the cap was a hybrid, where no club could spend more than the greater of (a) 50 per cent of turnover (as defined), and (b) £700,000. That initial cap helped redress the financial difficulties that clubs were beginning to feel as a consequence of wage inflation. However, the downside was that bigger clubs were advantaged, as 50 per cent of their turnover might greatly exceed £700,000. For example, a club with turnover of £1m would be able to spend up to £700,000 on player wages; whilst a club with turnover of (say) £3m would be able to spend £1.5m on player wages. As a consequence, for the 2000 season the RFL adopted what was commonly referred to as the 20/20 rule – no club could pay a salary of £20,000 or more to more than 20 players.1 The intention was to help avoid the possibility of bigger clubs retaining the services of all the best players, thus restricting the size of the talent pool available to others. B5.102 As the first SGB to introduce a salary cap to British sport, the RFL can be credited as a trailblazer, but the original salary cap did not prevent three clubs entering into administration in the 2011 and 2012 seasons, most notably Bradford Bulls in June 2012. The RFL’s salary cap rules were therefore refined and strengthened over the years to what are now the Salary Cap Regulations and Financial Sustainability Regulations. B5.103 The RFL’s Salary Cap Regulations are stated to have the following objectives: (a) to protect the integrity of the Super League competition by ensuring that the determinative factor in the sporting outcome is on-field sporting merit and not off-filed financial considerations; (b) to ensure that the Super League competition remains competitive and therefore attractive to spectators and commercial partners; (c) to protect and nurture a broad competitive playing structure by preventing clubs trading beyond their means and/or entering into damaging and unsustainable financial arrangements; and (d) to protect the welfare and interests of all players participating or aspiring to participate in the Super League competition.1 1 See section 1.11 of the Super League Salary Cap Regulations, 2020 Edition.

B5.104 Meanwhile the stated objectives of the RFL’s Financial Sustainability Regulations are: (a)

to encourage financial discipline, self-sustainability, and responsible spending, and therefore protect the long-term viability of clubs; (b) to protect and nurture a broad competitive playing structure by preventing clubs trading beyond their means and/or entering into damaging and unsustainable financial arrangements; (c) to protect all other clubs and the competition’s integrity by ensuring that clubs do not suffer insolvency events during a playing season; (d) to protect the reputation of the sport as regards existing and potential broadcasters and other commercial partners and suppliers; (e) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of the sport; and (f) to protect the welfare and interests of all players.1 1 See section 1 of the Super League Financial Sustainability Regulations, 2020 Edition.

B5.105 The effect of the two sets of regulations combined is as follows:

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(a) Clubs are restricted to spending on player wages in the 2020 season the lower of: (i) the hard cap of £2.1m;1 and (ii) the amount necessary to limit club losses in the season to £100,000 (the maximum permitted loss under the Financial Sustainability Regulations). (b) A club may apply to spend in excess of that amount, but it has to show that the excess amount (including employer’s National Insurance contributions and PAYE tax2) will be invested either: (i) by way of equity contributions; or (ii) by way of a loan that is not repayable within the relevant year or on less than three months’ notice thereafter, or that is the subject of a personal guarantee or other appropriate form of security from persons connected with the club.3 (c) Where any club incurs losses in excess of the permitted amounts under the Financial Sustainability Regulations, the club’s overall cap in the following season will be reduced by an equivalent amount.4 (d) Both sets of regulations include detailed reporting requirements, in respect of player-related expenditure but also in respect of ‘agreed operational budgets’, to enable the RFL to monitor club compliance on a real-time basis. Monitoring is the responsibility of the Head of Delivery for Professional Game Competitions and Salary Cap (HDPGS).5 (e) Clubs may apply to the Chairman of the Operational Rules Tribunal to review any decision of the HDPGS. However, this is expressed as a sole remedy, and all clubs agree that they waive any other right of appeal or challenge that might otherwise exist in respect of such decision. Further, the decision of the Chairman of the Operational Rules Tribunal is expressed to be ‘the full, final and complete disposition of the matter and will be binding on all relevant Parties’.6 (f) Sanctions range from warnings to a recommendation to the board of the Rugby Football League to remove the club’s licence to participate in the Super League.7 1 The hard cap covers the highest paid 25 players. Excluded from the cap are players under the age of 21 and those paid £20,000 or less (unless they are otherwise in the top 25 players). A number of other dispensations may be available for clubs that retain club-trained players, incur London allowances, recruit ‘new and returning talent pool players’, or sign ‘marquee players’. No cap applies to players registered with a club but who do not feature in the top 25 earning players or who have not featured in any first team match. 2 See Chapter I1 (Taxation of Sports Organisations). 3 Rule 3.1.4 of the Super League Salary Cap Regulations, 2020 Edition. 4 Rule 8(a)(ii) of the Super League Financial Sustainability Regulations, 2020 Edition. 5 Rule 7.1 of the Super League Salary Cap Regulations, 2020 Edition 6 Ibid, Rule 9.6. However, this is unlikely to shield such decisions from review by the High Court, which does not take kindly to attempts to oust its jurisdiction: see para D3.64 et seq. 7 Ibid, Rule 7.9.

B5.106 Wigan RFLC was found to have breached the cap in each of seasons 2005 and 2007, and was docked two points and four points respectively, in addition to being fined. The club was charged for a third time in 2018 for breaches associated with the 2017 playing season, and was originally deducted two points, but on appeal the points deduction was suspended.1 1 Wigan RLFC  v Rugby Football League, Off Field Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal Decision, March 2019.

B5.107 In 2016 Salford Red Devils and its owner Dr Marwan Koukash were sanctioned for breaches that included an alleged overspend of £94,200. The panel found that there had been ‘a deliberate and contrived attempt to circumnavigate

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the Salary Cap. Since then it appears attempts have been made to cover up these payments in an attempt to justify them’. The club was deducted six points and fined £5,000. Its appeal against that decision was dismissed.1 1 Salford Red Devils and Dr Marwan Koukash v Rugby Football League Limited, Off Field Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal Decision, 14 July 2016.

(b) Premiership Rugby’s salary cap B5.108 Premier Rugby Limited, the organiser of the premier club league in England, introduced its first salary cap in 1999, with an absolute cap on playerrelated expenditure of £1.8 million. The objectives of Premier Rugby in applying a salary cap are: ‘(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

ensuring the financial viability of all Clubs and of the […] competition controlling inflationary pressures on Clubs’ costs providing a level playing field for Clubs; and ensuring a competitive […] Premiership competition; and enabling clubs to compete in European Competitions’.1

Premier Rugby asserts that the salary cap ensures the ‘competitiveness of the league’ by ‘providing equal opportunity for clubs […] where on any weekend any team can beat any other team,’ ensuring ‘the competition is exciting and unpredictable which attracts fans, sponsors and broadcasters,’ and ensuring its financial sustainability by ‘helping ensure that the clubs build their businesses in a sustainable way’. 1 Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Reg 2.2.

B5.109 The amount of the salary cap is linked to the distributions made by Premier Rugby to its clubs of revenues generated by central broadcasting and sponsorship deals.1 By July 2008 the cap had risen to £4 million, and for the 2019/20 season the cap stood at £7 million. Exceptions and provisos are made to the salary cap to promote other policy objectives. In particular, a club can exclude the salaries of two players from the cap, enabling it to recruit world class talent. Within the £7 million ceiling, clubs may access up to £600,000 of ‘Home Grown Player Credits’ for wages payable to home-grown talent (capped at £50,000 per player). Also, they can provide an unlimited education (academic or vocational) fund to their players, and can replace long-term injured players without breaching the cap. Injury dispensations up to a maximum of £400,000 per season continue to be available to each club; a new ‘England Senior EPS or International Player Credit’ of up to £80,000 per player has been introduced to cover for player absence during international periods; and there is an overrun tax on any salary spend of up to 5 per cent over the base level (so currently £350,000).2 Premier Rugby has also set a cap on expenditure in relation to so-called academy players3 (in contrast to football, where expenditure on youth development activities is specifically excluded from cost control measures4). 1 See premiershiprugby.com/about-premiership-rugby/about-us/salary-cap/ [accessed 2  November 2020]. 2 Regulation 10 of the Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20 3 Ibid, Reg 3.1, sets the academy player payment ceiling at £100,000 for the 2019/20 season. This applies to players aged between 16 and 24 and earning less than £30,000 per season. However, explanatory notes issued by Premier Rugby indicate that the average salary of an academy player is circa £10,000, meaning on average clubs should be able to retain up to 20 academy players. 4 See eg UEFA Club Licensing Regulations break-even requirement discussed at para B5.73 et seq.

B5.110 The 2019/20 Premiership Salary Cap Regulations impose a positive obligation on clubs to notify Premier Rugby’s Salary Cap Manager of any ‘potential

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or actual loopholes, lacunae or errors in the Regulations’.1 The CEO of each club is made individually responsible for ensuring that the club complies with the relevant reporting obligations;2 there is specific provision for confidential whistle-blowing;3 and in case of breach disciplinary action may be taken against the club’s CEO and other officers signing declarations, eg  the chairman or finance director, including potentially requiring their removal from the club and the competition.4 1 2 3 4

Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Reg 2.3(a)(i). Ibid, Reg 4.1. Ibid, Reg 2.6. Ibid, Reg 14.7. The consequences of such a finding are that the other clubs would be asked to consider requiring the removal of the individual concerned from the club. If such a resolution is passed, no other club is permitted to recruit that individual (Reg 14.7). In practice, this would also disqualify the individual from taking a role in football, because they would not pass the owners’ and directors’ test: see para B5.12. Where the individual concerned is a regulated professional (eg a lawyer or accountant), this may also result in disciplinary action under the auspices of their professional body’s regulatory regime.

B5.111 The Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations give Premier Rugby extensive powers of audit to determine compliance with the regulations and impose general duties of good faith on the clubs to co-operate with any such audit. For example, Regulation 8.1(d) requires clubs to ‘answer as fully and honestly as possible all queries of the accountants’ appointed by Premier Rugby to audit their accounts. It is a breach of the rules to fail to co-operate with any request made by Premier Rugby’s Salary Cap Manager or its auditors.1 1 Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Reg 11.2.

B5.112 Up to and including the 2012/13 season, jurisdiction to consider alleged salary cap breaches sat with a sub-committee of Premier Rugby, comprising Premier Rugby’s Rugby Director and four club representatives, but with effect from the 2013/14 season that jurisdiction was given to an independent Disciplinary Panel appointed by Sports Resolution UK. The following sanctions may be applied for proven breaches: (a) Where a club fails to lodge documents as required under the rules, this is in effect an administrative breach, addressed by imposition of a series of escalating financial penalties.1 (b) For any failure to co-operate, a club can be warned as to future conduct, fined up to £100,000 and/or deducted up to six points.2 (c) There is an automatic sanction for cases of limited overspend arising from budgeting errors and the like, is calculated as follows:3 Level of Overrun £0 to £49,999.99 £50,000 to £199,999.99 Over £200,000 (d)

(e)

Overrun Tax £0.50 for every £1 overspend £1 for every £1 overspend £3 for every £1 overspend

Where the Salary Cap Manager reasonably considers that a breach of the salary cap by more than £350,000 has occurred, the Disciplinary Panel may apply a range of sanctions, including both financial penalties and deduction of points. In the context of the ‘senior ceiling’, ie payments to professional players, the financial penalty is that for every £1 overspend over and above the £350,000 threshold, a further fine of £3 is payable (in addition to the overrun tax).4 The club is also ordered to pay all costs incurred by Premier Rugby. The overspend could also trigger a deduction of points.5

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Level of Breach £0 to £349,999 £350,000 to £399,999.99 £400,000 to £449,999.99 £450,000 to £499,999.99 £500,000 to £549,999.99 £550,000 to £599,999.99 £600,000 to £649,999.99 Over £650,000

Points Sanction 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

The above sanctions are regarded as entry points, meaning that the Disciplinary Panel has discretion to reduce or increase them having regard to the circumstances of the case. Factors to be considered include a guilty plea, whether a breach was deliberate or reckless, prior conduct, and co-operation with the process generally.6 1 2 3 4 5

Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Reg 11.3. Ibid, Reg 4.5(a). Ibid, Reg 10. Ibid, Reg 11.3(a). Ibid, Reg 14.3(b). Whist these penalties may seem significant for a relatively small overspend, they need to be considered in the context of the fact that Premier Rugby operates a fixed cap, so that everyone knows from the beginning exactly what they can spend, and that amount never changes (instead, allowances are made within the rules for exigencies such as player injuries and loss of players to international duty). This contrasts with a percentage of turnover cap or break-even requirement, where outside influences can impact upon the eventual wage to turnover ratio/break-even result. 6 Ibid, Reg 14.3(d).

B5.113 Even with a comprehensive rulebook creating stringent disciplinary sanctions for breach, Premier Rugby found it difficult to shake off suggestions that its clubs were finding ways around the salary cap regulations.1 This was not helped by the fact that in October 2015 it was reported that Premier Rugby had entered into confidential agreements with a number of clubs relating to ‘certain issues’ relating to the salary cap regime. Premier Rugby was forced to deny that any club had been found to have breached the ceiling on payments for senior players, but maintained that if breaches were identified, disciplinary action would follow. No further details were made public, leading only to further speculation.2 The controversy surfaced again in March 2019, with a former club chairman alleging that he had been told by several other club owners how they had been breaching the regulations.3 1 See eg Gavin Mairs, Daily Telegraph, 28 April 2010, ‘Salary Cap Abuses Put Clubs at Risk’, telegraph. co.uk/sport/rugbyunion/club/7647789/London-Irishs-Andy-Martin-warns-that-salary-cap-abusesput-clubs-at-risk.html [accessed 2 November 2020]. 2 bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/34611419 [accessed 2 November 2020]. 3 bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/47481608 [accessed 2 November 2020].

B5.114 On 20  June 2019, Premier Rugby charged Saracens with breaching the salary cap rules. Saracen defended on the grounds (among others) that: (a) the salary cap rules infringed Article 101(1) of the TFEU as they prevented, restricted or distorted competition, both by object and also by effect; and/or (b) they were an abuse of a dominant position in breach of Article  102 of the TFEU.1 The independent panel chaired by Lord Dyson rejected these competition law defences in full in its decision of 4  November 2019. Citing the QPR  v EFL case referred to at B5.96, the panel held that:

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(a) none of the objectives of the salary cap rules ‘can reasonably be described as having the purpose of restricting competition’,1 and, in any case, financial stability is a legitimate objective;2 (b) Saracens has not demonstrated ‘that the salary cap has an appreciable adverse effect on competition […]’,3 and in fact it ‘continues to operate in a procompetitive manner’;4 and (c) ‘there is also no question of the Regulations constituting any abuse of an individual or dominant position […]’.5 1 2 3 4 5

Premier Rugby v Saracens Limited, SR/Adhocsport/201/2019, 4 November 2019, para 34. Ibid, para 35. Ibid, para 105(b). Ibid, para 106. Ibid, para 110.

B5.115 Having dismissed Saracens’ competition law defences, the panel then went on to set out the scale of the breaches in some detail in the judgment. In all, along with breaches of disclosure obligations, the club had breached the senior ceiling in each of seasons 2016/17, 2017/18, and 2018/19, though only the breaches in 2016/17 and 2018/19 were large enough to warrant a points deduction.1 Applying the guideline sanctions set out in the regulations, the club faced an overall deduction of 70 points plus a fine of £5.36m. However, the panel then considered whether to exercise its discretion to increase or decrease these sanctions.2 Although the panel determined that there were several factors relating to the club’s conduct that could justify an increase in the sanctions, in view of the fact that Premier Rugby did not request such an increase, the panel did not ‘consider it right to exercise’ its discretion to do so.3 Instead, the panel determined that the impact of a 70 point deduction was ‘disproportionate and is not required to satisfy the underlying purpose of the Regulations’,4 especially in view of the fact that the club’s breaches were not deliberate, and so applied a deduction of 35 points together with the fine of £5.36m. In spite of the reduction in sanction, the decision demonstrated that the salary cap rules were enforceable, and that even the league’s most successful club could be held to account, although questions were raised as to why it had taken so long.5 1 2 3 4 5

Premier Rugby v Saracens Limited, SR/Adhocsport/201/2019, 4 November 2019, paras 282 to 294. Pursuant to Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Res 14.2 and 14.3(d) and (e). Premier Rugby v Saracens Limited, SR/Adhocsport/201/2019, 4 November 2019, para 306. Ibid, para 319. For further discussion of the Saracens case and of whether salary caps are compatible with competition law, see paras E11.165–E11.169.

B5.116 The club chose not to appeal the decision and then found itself having to demonstrate that it would be compliant with the salary cap requirements for the 2019/20 season. It quickly became apparent that the club would be unable to do so and, rather than be the subject of further proceedings, it instead chose to accept relegation via an agreement with Premier Rugby. The club’s relegation to the Championship was announced on 18 January 2020. B5.117 In December 2019 Premier Rugby commissioned Lord Myners to conduct a detailed review of the Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations. His report, published on 14 May 2020, made 52 recommendations on how the salary cap rules and processes might be improved.1 These included: (a) improved independence, particularly appointing a cap governance monitor to separate investigation of salary cap breaches from the decision to prosecute; (b) greater transparency, including early announcement of charges and publishing an annual report detailing all breaches and sanctions; (c) drafting recommendations, designed to make the rules clearer;

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(d) increased accountability for owners/executives, players and agents; (e) more flexibility regarding sanctions, including explicitly permitting the stripping of titles and return of prize money; and (f) providing more resources (and stronger investigatory powers) to the salary cap manager. In light of the report’s recommendations, Premier Rugby has stated its intention to reform the rules in consultation with the clubs. 1 The full report and the full list of recommendations are available at premiershiprugby.com/news/ premiership-rugby-publishes-report-of-myners-review [accessed 2 November 2020].

(c) EFL Leagues One and Two: first Salary Cost Management Protocols, now a salary cap B5.118 In contrast to the break-even requirements adopted in the Championship (to align with the Premier League),1 the EFL originally adopted (slightly different) Salary Cost Management Protocols (SCMP) for its lower two divisions (League One and League Two) that required the clubs in those divisions to limit their spending on player wages and bonuses each year2 to: (a)

(b)

a specified percentage (currently 60 per cent in League One and 50 per cent in League Two) of the club’s ‘Relevant Turnover’ (which included normal operating income, such as gate receipts and other match revenues, net commercial revenues, as well as distributions from the EFL and Premier League); plus 100 per cent of extraordinary income, referred to as ‘Football Fortune Income’ (which included cup prize money/facility fees, net transfer income, donations, cash and equity injections, and accumulated profit).

Thus, the SCMP rules neither placed a cap on the amount that can be spent on player wages, nor required clubs to fund player wages entirely out of normal operating income. Instead clubs could spend as much as they wished on player wages, provided their owners funded any shortfall. 1 See para B5.95. 2 All player contracts have to be lodged with the EFL before a player can participate in any match, so that there is transparency of player costs. Serious consequences follow should a club engage in side payments to players. For example, in May 2001 Chesterfield Football Club was deducted nine points and fined £20,000 for making additional undeclared payments to a number of players, including Luke Beckett.

B5.119 To police compliance with the SCMP rules, in June of each year all League One and League Two clubs had to submit to the EFL details of their player expenditure commitments and their estimated Relevant Turnover and Football Fortune Income for the forthcoming season, and they then had to update those forecasts in December. The EFL Finance Department reviewed SCMP submissions against information held in the EFL’s files, performance of comparable clubs, and past performance of the club in question (as verified by its accounts filed at Companies House). The EFL could require further information to support the figures submitted (eg any significant year-on-year increase in forecasted revenue), and disallow any items of income that it considered to lack sufficient support. Where it was apparent from that process that a club has breached or may be at risk of breaching the cap, the EFL could impose a registration embargo on that club, preventing it from registering any more players until such time as the club generated additional income or investment (normally by way of equity or gift donations) to support the additional spending.1 1 See eg the situation faced by Swindon Town in October 2012 when the club was ordered to make a compensation payment for an under-24 player signed from another EFL club. As a consequence, Swindon breached the threshold (then 65 per cent) and an embargo was imposed by the EFL that was only lifted when the club’s owners introduced new funding into the club. See bbc.co.uk/sport/0/ football/20229134 [accessed 2 November 2020].

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B5.120 The EFL’s broadcasting deals are much smaller than the Premier League’s,1 and as a result central distributions to clubs are vastly smaller, which means that many EFL clubs do not generate enough trading income to cover player costs, and instead rely heavily on equity and donations from their owners to cover the shortfall, which means they are horribly exposed if the owners lose interest or run out of money. That raised the question of whether League One and Two clubs (at least) should be prevented from funding player expenditure from owner funding. The Bury Review pointed out:2 ‘[…] the real cause of Bury FC’s collapse is the fact that Clubs are able to fund player wages not just from normal operating income but by means of cash injections from their owners. This can make Clubs completely reliant on owner funding to remain competitive on the pitch. If such an owner becomes no longer ready, willing and/or able (for whatever reason) to provide such funding, the Club is inevitably plunged into deep financial crisis. In such cases, unless a new owner comes along with sufficient funding to meet the Club’s commitments, there is nothing that the EFL can do to save the Club. The real question the Bury FC case raises, therefore, is whether the SCMP rules need to be revised to remove, or at least limit, the risks attendant on reliance on owner funding to underwrite player expenditure.’ 1 See para H2.2. 2 Bury FC Review (see para B5.13 n 2), at para 1.3.

B5.121 No one wants to stop owners investing money in their clubs. But (the argument goes) owner funding should be invested in revenue-generating infrastructure (such as larger stadia, and player academies) that will increase the club’s sustainable trading income (and hence its spending power) in the long term, rather than being used to plug the shortfall between current trading income and playing expenditure. For example, Arsenal FC invested heavily in its income-generating infrastructure with the relocation from Highbury to the Emirates Stadium, almost doubling turnover as a consequence, while managing expenditure carefully. Similarly, Manchester United has traditionally been held out as a club that finances on-pitch success by consistently increasing commercial revenue. The counter-argument is that this favours the established elite over clubs such as Manchester City, who will take many years to catch up in terms of building sustainable trading income, and in the meantime need to rely on cash infusions from their owner, the Abu Dhabi United Group, to remain competitive. B5.122 The Bury Review identified two alternative potential solutions:1 ‘8.6.1 One solution would be to change the SCMP rules to require Clubs to live within their means, funding player wages and other operating costs out of operating income, and using owner funding to finance improvements to the ground, training facilities, the academy, and other infrastructure projects, which would then generate greater income and so boost the Clubs’ spending power. Undoubtedly there would be difficult transitional issues, and some Clubs would become less competitive on the field of play and so drop down the pyramid. However, all Clubs would be financially sustainable, and the risk of loss of a Club from membership of the EFL because of a financial crisis would greatly diminish. The tension between the two potentially competing models of club ownership would be resolved, and the EFL could monitor the Clubs’ financial affairs and help to prevent any problems from developing, instead of being forced into crisis/rescue mode. Ambitious owners could still put money into their Clubs, but to build academies and other infrastructure that would generate promising young players and sustainable revenue streams to support increased spending on players. Clubs could therefore still strive for promotion up through the divisions, but based on a solid and sustainable financial platform, not dependent on the continuing financial support of a wealthy owner. 8.6.2 A less radical alternative, which is less of a constraint on the freedom of Clubs and their owners, would be to extend some of the elements of the Championship’s

628  Regulating Sport Profit & Sustainability Rules to Leagues One and Two, by requiring League One and League Two Clubs to produce – both as a condition of any proposed change of Control and each year thereafter – a business plan that covers the upcoming season but also any subsequent seasons for which the Club already has player expenditure commitments (ie, the plan should extend at least to the termination date of the Club’s longest player contract). The business plan should set out expected operating income and outgoings during the relevant period, and identify any funding requirements (where expected income does not cover expected outgoings). Along with the business plan, the Club should be required to provide evidence satisfactory to the EFL of sufficient committed and secure funding to meet those requirements. The concept of ‘Secure Funding’ as defined in the Championship Profit & Sustainability Rules could be used, ie, the Club would have to be able to point to (a) cash deposited into the share capital account to pay for shares; or (b) a legally binding and irrevocable commitment from the owner to make such payments, secured by security satisfactory to the EFL, which might be a personal guarantee from the owner, or a guarantee from a parent company, or a letter of credit, or funds held in escrow, or such other security as the EFL sees fit. This would reduce the risks attendant on permitting Clubs to finance growing wage bills from extraordinary (owner) income rather than normal operating income, by ensuring that committed and secure funding is in place to meet all of the Club’s expenditure commitments. The risk would remain, however, that the owner stops being ready, willing and able to provide the further funding (or further funding commitment) required to sustain that spending once the original commitments are discharged. In that event, the Club would have to find a new owner of sufficient means, or else slash its player expenditure and other outgoings dramatically so that they can be covered entirely by normal operating income.’ 1 Bury Review (see para B5.13 n 2).

B5.123 In the event, the financial crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to the early curtailment of the 2019/20 season, a rebate of central broadcasting revenues, and the prospect of no crowds (and therefore no gate money) continuing into the 2020/21 season, prompted the League One and League Two clubs to agree to replace the SCMP rules with new salary cap rules, coming into effect as from the 2020/21 season. The key features of this new regime are as follows: (a) Fixed caps of £2.5m for League One clubs and £1.5m for League Two clubs. (b) Future caps will be index-linked to reflect changes in domestic broadcast revenues (Rule 2.3). (c) The following players are excluded from the calculations: (i) any under-21 player (Rule 4.1.1); and (ii) in the 2020/21 season, any player not included in the club’s squad list (Rule 4.1.3). (d) The following amounts are excluded from the calculations: (i) promotion bonuses (Schedule 2, paragraph 1.1); (ii) severance pay under clause 19 of the standard player contract (Sch  2, para 1.3); and (iii) cup bonuses in any squad bonus schedule (Sch 2, para 1.4). (e) The value of any contract entered into prior to the date of adoption of the rules (7 August 2020) is capped at a divisional average figure, meaning no club is penalised for existing contracts, for their duration (Rule 3.1.1) and any extension on the same terms for any under-24 player (Rule 3.1.4). (f) Clubs relegated from (i) the Championship into League One, and (ii) League One into League Two, will be subject to equivalent transitional arrangements (Rules 3.2.1 and 3.2.4), together with an additional relaxation whereby any player not then included in the club’s squad list will be excluded from the calculation in the first season following relegation (Rule 4.1.2). (g) Expenditure in excess of the cap will be addressed via an overrun tax (Rule 7) for breaches of up to 5 per cent (£125,000 and £75,000 respectively) (this

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is in effect a luxury tax which will be redistributed and amongst compliant clubs) and thereafter referral to a Disciplinary Commission in line with Rule 8 (sanction guidelines have been published alongside the Salary Cap Rules). The obligations imposed on clubs, and the ability to audit them to ensure compliance, are comprehensive and clearly laid out (Rule 5). The focus is on transparency, with serious consequences for intentional misconduct.

C Formula One B5.124 Uncompetitive or financially unsustainable teams are as much a problem in Formula One as in any professional sport, and therefore the regulatory response has become more and more robust here as well. In contrast to the other sports detailed in this section, however, the cost base of Formula One is not primarily dictated by salary costs. Formula One drivers and their technical colleagues are of course very well remunerated, but it is the cars that are the key performance differentiator, and research, development, testing and equipment costs greatly outstrip wage costs, running into tens and often hundreds of millions of pounds. B5.125 The difficulty that Formula One teams had in sourcing sponsorship revenues in the recession that followed the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 prompted them, acting under the umbrella of the Formula One Team Owners’ Association (FOTA), to agree to a Resource Restriction Agreement (RRA) that limited: (a) the amount of track testing and wind tunnel testing that a team could undertake; (b) the number of staff it could employ; and (c) external spend. Williams F1 credited these cost controls with helping it increase its profits in its 2010 accounts by 25 per cent. However, there were important limitations to this approach: the RRA restrictions were not regulations issued by the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), the governing body of the sport; the only sanction for overspend was a reduction in spending in future seasons; and in 2011 Ferrari and Red Bull resigned from FOTA because they disagreed with the other teams over the future direction of cost control. B5.126 Starting with the 2012 season, the FIA began to introduce various cost control measures into its Formula One Sporting Regulations and Technical Regulations, including limiting the number of drivers that a team could use and the number of engines and gear boxes that a driver could use per season; limiting teams on race day to a spare chassis, not a spare car; and limiting the amount of track testing and wind tunnel testing that a team could carry out during a calendar year. B5.127 By 2019 there was enough support among the teams for the FIA to introduce a comprehensive set of cost control regulations intended to ‘define the future of Formula One from 2021 onwards’.1 The 2021 Formula One Financial Regulations2 are designed to promote the competitive balance and sporting fairness of the FIA  Formula One World Championship, while strengthening the long-term financial stability and sustainability of the teams. They introduce a cap on the amount that each team may spend during a calendar year on defined costs, starting at US $175 million in the 2021 calendar year, with that figure then decreasing gradually over future editions of the Championship. Speaking on announcement of the 2021 Financial Regulations, FIA President Jean Todt remarked: ‘This is still a high figure, but we consider it a first step’.3

630  Regulating Sport 1 ‘FIA and Formula One present regulations for the future’, 31  October 2019: fia.com/2021-f1regulations [accessed 2 November 2020]. The announcement stated: ‘Taking a holistic approach to the future success of the pinnacle of motor sport, the new suite of Technical, Sporting and Financial regulations are targeted at promoting close racer and more balanced competition, as well as bringing economic and sporting sustainability to Formula One. From 2021 onwards Formula One will have: Cars that are better able to battle on the track; A more balanced competition on the track; A sport where success is determined more by how well a team spends its money not how much it spends – including, for the first time, a fully enforceable cost cap (starting at 175M$, with plans to reduce this number in the future) in the FIA rules. A sport that is a more sustainable business for those participating. A sport that continues to be the world’s premier motor racing competition and the perfect showcase of cutting edge technology’. 2 The 2021 FIA Formula One Financial Regulations, published on 31 October 2019 and available at fia. com/multimedia/publication/2021-formula-1-financial-regulations-2020-03-06 [accessed 2  November 2020]. 3 See note 1 above.

B5.128 Since in Formula One it is the car that is the key performance differentiator, the cap covers expenditure that relates primarily to design and performance of the car and excludes drivers’ salaries and other elements such as marketing costs and the remuneration of each team’s three highest paid personnel. In the words of Ross Brawn, managing director of the Championship promoter, Formula One Management: ‘It is absolutely essential for the future of F1 that we control spending. […] We tried to capture the areas that make a difference between teams, where they can gain a competitive advantage’.1 1 bbc.co.uk/sport/formula1/50255770 [accessed 2 November 2020].

B5.129 The FIA has established a specialist body (referred to as the Cost Cap Administration) to monitor compliance with the Financial Regulations, using standard reporting and audit mechanisms,1 with suspected cases of non-compliance being referred to the Cost Cap Adjudication Panel, a panel of independent judges.2 The possible sanctions for proven non-compliance range from financial penalties (in amounts to be determined on a case by case basis) to sporting penalties in the form of driver and/or constructor team points deductions and even (in extreme cases) outright exclusion from the Formula One World Championship.3 1 2021 FIA Formula One Financial Regulations, Art 6.2. 2 Ibid, Art 7.1. 3 Ibid, Art 9.1.

B5.130 In May 2020, the World Motor Sports Council announced that changes would be made to the Formula One Financial Regulations, ‘primarily due to the ongoing need to reduce costs and safeguard the sport in light of the COVID-19 pandemic’.1 Most importantly, the cost cap was reduced to $145 million for 2021, $140 million for 2022, and $135 million for 2023–2035, but at the same time various items were re-classified from costs included in the cap to excluded items.1 1 ‘World Motor Sport Council approves changes to 2020, 2021 and 2021 FIA Formula One Regulations’, 27  May 2020, fia.com/news/world-motor-sport-council-approves-changes-2020-2021-and-2022-fiaformula-1-regulations [accessed 2 November 2020].

5 WHEN IT ALL GOES WRONG – INSOLVENCY B5.131 If financial controls fail, cash flow deficits may arise, and have to be met either by way of equity injection or debt funding. If debt levels increase so as to exceed the asset value of a business, or cash flow deficits are unaddressed so that bills go unpaid, a member club may well be considered to be insolvent, and will need to take steps to reduce its expenditure to more sustainable levels or seek to reduce the

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levels of historic debt through formal restructuring processes. Whilst in the UK there is no statutory definition of being insolvent, the Insolvency Act 1986 sets out certain factors that raise a presumption of insolvency: ‘A company is deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due’.1 ‘A company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the value of the company’s assets is less than the amounts of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities’.2 1 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(1)(e). 2 Ibid, s 123(2) and BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK-2007-3BL Plc and others [2011] EWCA Civ 227.

B5.132 The Insolvency Act 1986 imposes strict duties on company directors to have regard to the position of creditors in such circumstances,1 with serious consequences, including assumption of personal liability for debts, if they trade on and thereby worsen the position for creditors.2 On the other hand, the Act also offers relief from impending creditor actions and opportunities for formally restructuring of the company’s debts. Faced with those choices, clubs in financial difficulties quickly turn to an insolvency practitioner for help and advice. The financial consequences for a club that avails itself of such protection can be significant for the club itself, the competition in which it participates, and its competitor clubs. The competition organiser has to determine what the regulatory consequences should be. 1 ‘The question is not whether the directors knew or ought to have known that the company was insolvent. The question is whether they knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation’, per Lewison J in Re Hawkes Hill Publishing [2007] BCC 172. 2 See for example ss 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which enable the court to order directors to contribute to the assets of the company where they have engaged in conduct that amounts to (a) fraudulent trading, or (b) wrongful trading.

A Some basic principles of insolvency law (a) Types of insolvency proceedings B5.133 Based on the Insolvency Act 1986, in England and Wales the insolvency proceedings most often seen in the context of sport clubs are: (a)

Administration This is the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner to manage the affairs, business, and property of an insolvent company. The administrator is appointed either by way of an order of the court (on the application of the company, the directors, or creditors), or directly by the company, its directors, or a ‘qualifying floating charge holder’, ie  the holder of a floating charge that grants the right to make the appointment. The statutory purpose of the administration is: (i) to rescue the company as a going concern; (ii) achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in administration); or (iii) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.1 The administrator must perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole, unless he considers that it is not reasonably practicable to meet either of the first two purposes, in which case his duty is to not harm unnecessarily the interests of the company’s creditors.2 The appointment of

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the administrator triggers an automatic moratorium on creditor enforcement action. Any outstanding proceedings, eg  distress, litigation or enforcement may not be continued without the leave of the court. Where the administrator is appointed by the court, any winding up petitions are automatically dismissed.3 Where the appointment is by the company or its directors, any winding up petitions are suspended and may be resurrected following the discharge of the administration order.4 (b) Administrative receivership This is the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner by the holder of a ‘floating charge’. The role of the administrative receiver is to realise assets for the benefit of the charge holder; no duties are owed to the general body of unsecured creditors. The powers and duties of the administrative receiver are not as comprehensive as those of an administrator, and no moratorium on creditor enforcement action is triggered by his appointment. (c) Company voluntary arrangement (CVA) This is effectively a compromise agreement (otherwise referred to as a composition or arrangement) between an insolvent company and its creditors whereby the creditors agree to settle their claims against the company by accepting (for example) payments over time and/or at a reduced rate. The exact form of the CVA will vary from case to case and depend on the extent of the assets and liabilities of the company concerned. A  CVA has to be approved by a majority (in excess of 75 per cent) by value of those creditors present and voting at a specially convened meeting, having had not less than 14 days’ notice of the detail of the proposed CVA. The CVA must also be approved by a majority vote of unconnected creditors. If approved, it binds all creditors, including those who may have objected to the proposal. A CVA usually follows a period of administration, but it need not do so. (d) Liquidation Liquidation follows a resolution of the shareholders of a company to cease trading, or the making of an order of liquidation by the court on the application of the company or its creditors. The liquidator is generally voted in by the creditors. The liquidator will not usually operate the company but instead will wind it up while realising as many assets into cash as possible, and then distribute those funds pari passu to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme. In high profile cases, it is likely that the conduct of the matter will be handled by the Public Interest Unit of the Insolvency Service. 1 2 3 4

Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 3(1). Ibid, para 3(4)(b). Ibid, para 40(1)(a). Ibid, para 40(1)(b) and HMRC v Portsmouth City Football Club Limited and Others [2010] EWHC 2013 at 46–47 per Mr Justice Mann. The difference between the two approaches is significant where a creditor has presented a winding up petition prior to the appointment of an administrator. Section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986 renders void any disposition of a company’s property made after the commencement of the winding up, unless the court otherwise orders or the disposition is made by an administrator during the period of suspension. The commencement of the winding up is the date of the presentation of the winding up petition: see s 129(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. HMRC had presented a winding up petition in respect of Portsmouth FC on 23  December 2009. The hearing on the petition was adjourned in February 2010, but before the next return date administrators were appointed by a qualifying floating charge holder. HMRC alleged that circa £23.5m had been paid by the Premier League to ‘football creditors’ post presentation of the winding up petition out of monies that were otherwise due to the club and this was therefore a disposition of the club’s property made after the presentation of the winding up petition and so void under s  127. If those sums could be recouped by the eventual liquidator of the old company, it would have generated a significant return for unsecured creditors, including HMRC. Had the club itself applied to the court for an order appointing an administrator, the December 2009 petition would have been dismissed and the potential claim lost. The issue was not dealt with by Mann J, both because the Premier League was not a party to the proceedings (see para [13]) but also because it was not necessary to do so to determine the issues at stake. The court was able to proceed on an assumption that the s 127 claims were unanswerable, but did stress that the existence of a defence ‘could not be ruled out’ (see para [60]).

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(b) The ‘anti-deprivation’ principle B5.134 The anti-deprivation principle ‘renders void any provision by which a debtor is deprived of assets by reason of insolvency with the effect that they are not available in the insolvency proceeding’.1 The rule is not absolute. As the Supreme Court has noted: ‘The policy behind the anti-deprivation rule is clear, that the parties cannot, on bankruptcy, deprive the bankrupt of property which would otherwise be available for creditors. It is possible to give that policy a common sense application which prevents its application to bona fide commercial transactions which do not have as their predominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, the deprivation of the property of one of the parties on bankruptcy’.2

The importance of this in the context of sports club insolvencies is dealt with below.3 1 Per Richards J in The Commissioners For Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v The Football League Ltd (FA Premier League Ltd intervening) [2012] EWHC 1372, at para 5. 2 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2012] 1 AC 383, per Lord Collins at para 104. 3 See paras B5.140–B5.141 and B5.145.

(c) Preferential and non-preferential claims B5.135 Unsecured creditors are divided into two different classes – preferential and non-preferential: (a)

The following claims have always ranked as preferential: (i) employee claims for arrears of wages (not exceeding four months or £800, whichever is the smaller amount); (ii) accrued holiday pay (uncapped); and (iii) unpaid contributions to occupational pension schemes that have been deducted from salaries during the immediately preceding four-month period. (b) Up until 15  September 2003, amounts due to HM  Customs & Excise (for example, VAT), the Inland Revenue (for example, amounts deducted from gross salaries for PAYE tax) and claims relating to social security contributions (for example, amounts deducted from gross salaries for employee national insurance contributions, together with employer contributions) all ranked as preferential claims.1 From 15  September 2003, however, the preferential status afforded to those claims was removed – commonly referred to as the ‘loss of Crown preference’. Accordingly, any debts due to HMRC (formed by the merger in 2005 of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs & Excise) are unsecured non-preferential claims. For non-preferential creditors to receive any payment by way of distribution from an administrator following realisation of assets, or from a liquidator following liquidation of the company, or under the terms of a CVA, all preferential claims would first have to be discharged in full. 1 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch 6, paras 1 to 7.

(d) The pari passu principle B5.136 Any distribution to creditors must be made pari passu, ie there must be equal treatment for all creditors in the same class (ie  secured or unsecured, preferential or non-preferential). This means (for example) that where the funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors equate to 50 per cent of the total amount of unsecured claims, every unsecured creditor must receive 50 per cent of their claim.

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No priority is afforded based upon any other criteria, eg oldest debt cleared first. The pari passu principle cannot be displaced by agreement.

(e) Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations B5.137 Whilst not strictly a principle of insolvency legislation, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 20061 address the consequences of a transfer of employees following the onset of insolvency proceedings. The regulations differentiate between ‘non-terminal proceedings’ (ie administration or CVA) and ‘terminal proceedings’ (ie  liquidation). In the former case, the law mandates transfer of the contract of employment of any person employed by the old insolvent company to the new company acquiring the business. In the context of a sports club, this means the buyer of an insolvent club from its administrator becomes responsible for players’ wages, past, present and future. 1 SI 2006/246, which implemented into domestic law the provisions of the ‘Acquired Rights Directive’ (Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998).

B A typical club insolvency B5.138 When a club starts to be unable to pay its debts as they become due, the directors have a choice to make: carry on trading in the hope that they are able to find a solution whilst creditors increase pressure to obtain payment, or instruct an insolvency practitioner. If significant inward investment is not secured, creditors such as HMRC may issue and serve a winding up petition and/or the club or a qualifying secured creditor may apply to the High Court for the appointment of an administrator.

(a) The withdrawal of membership B5.139 At that point, many SGBs reserve the right to withdraw the club’s membership of the governing body: (a) Each EFL member club is the holder of one ordinary share in The Football League Limited. The par value of each share is five pence. If a member club suffers an insolvency event,1 the Articles of Association of The Football League Limited give the EFL board of directors the power2 to serve notice on the club to transfer its share to such person or company as the board may direct (usually the EFL Company Secretary).3 (b) Similarly, each Premier League member club is the holder of one ordinary share in the FA Premier League Limited, with a par value of £1. If a member club suffers an insolvency event, the board of directors of the Premier League may ‘at any time thereafter’ serve notice on the member club to transfer its share to such person or company as the board may direct.4 (c) Every club is a member of the RFL. On the happening of an insolvency event (which, in contrast to the EFL and Premier League definitions, includes the presentation of any winding up petition and the service of a ‘statutory demand’ on the club), the RFL’s bylaws provide that ‘the member concerned shall immediately cease to be a member upon written notice from the Company’.5 Bylaw 4.6 then affords the RFL’s board of directors absolute discretion as to whether to serve such notice.6 (d) The Rugby Football Union is a co-operative originally registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, now the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014.7 Its governing document is its rules, as published from time to time and lodged with the Financial Services Authority and maintained on its Mutual Public Register. The Rugby Football Union is granted the power by its members to determine the criteria and conditions of

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membership,8 and to cancel the membership of any club that fails to comply with those requirements,9 or is otherwise in breach of its regulations.10   1 The general rule is that the EFL may only issue a notice of withdrawal once an insolvency practitioner has been appointed, but there are two exceptions to that rule: (a) where notice is filed of intention to appoint administrators pursuant to para 26 of Sch B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Of itself that process does not result in the appointment of an insolvency practitioner to run the club, but it does create a moratorium on creditor action, and that moratorium of itself is perceived to gain a competitive advantage, justifying a notice of withdrawal; and (b) where the directors of a club apply for an administration order.   2 The Football League Limited Articles of Association, Art 4.5.   3 Ibid, Art 4.7.   4 Premier League Articles of Association, Art 10.1.   5 Rugby Football League Handbook, Bylaw 4.5.   6 RFL Bylaw 4.6 states: ‘The Board is under no obligation to serve notice within any time limit upon being notified of an Insolvency Event and may delay in serving notice and take steps to assist the member, but such delay or assistance will not preclude its right to serve a notice of withdrawal of membership at any point in the future’. Given that the insolvency event is analogous to a repudiatory breach of contract by the club, the question arises whether a delay in serving the notice would be considered an implied wavier of the breach and affirmation of the membership agreement. See eg Vitol v Norelf [1996] AC 800 per Lord Steyn at 811 to 812.   7 See para A2.48.   8 Rugby Football Union Rules 2019/20, Rule 5.3.   9 Ibid, Rule 5.6. 10 Ibid, Rule 5.12.

B5.140 In 2012, HMRC challenged a number of provisions in The Football League’s Articles of Association, alleging that they were unlawful individually because they were contrary to public policy and collectively because they were ‘expressly designed’ to enable full payment of football creditors in preference to other creditors.1 As part of its case, HMRC challenged Article 4.8 (giving the EFL the power to withdraw a club’s share in the League) as contravening the anti-deprivation principle,2 because it deprived the club of its most valuable asset, viz membership of the EFL.3 1 HMRC v The Football League Limited [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch). 2 See para B5.134. 3 HMRC v The Football League Limited [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), para 51.

B5.141 The EFL, supported by the Premier League as intervener (given its similar rules) cited cases relating to membership of stock exchanges1 where it had been found that ‘the loss of membership of a financial institution, such as a stock exchange, where one has failed to meet one’s debts or has gone bankrupt cannot […] be said to fall foul of the principle’ of anti-deprivation.2 The High Court felt able to distinguish those cases on the facts because in each of them the holding of the share was ancillary to the actual membership of the stock exchange,3 whereas in the EFL’s case there was no distinction between the share in The Football League Ltd and the membership of the league competition: it was the share that conferred the right to play in the EFL’s competitions, own player registrations, and receive distributions from the EFL. However, the High Court did accept that the cases demonstrated that ‘members of a trading association cannot be required to deal with, or play against, a member which defaults in its obligations to other members and the loss of membership for no consideration is a permissible response to such default’.4 Having made that finding, the court was able to hold that Article 4.8 was a bona fide commercial transaction (as described by Lord Collins in Belmont5) and therefore did not infringe the antideprivation principle. 1 The Official Assignee of Bombay v Shroff (1932) 48  TLR  443 and Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1150. 2 Per Neuberger J in Money Markets International, at para 110. 3 Per Richards J in HMRC v The Football League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), at para 172. 4 Ibid, para 173. 5 See para B5.134, n 2.

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(b) The exit from insolvency B5.142 By activating a withdrawal of membership in accordance with the relevant rules or regulations, the SGB gains the ability to determine whether, and under what conditions the insolvent club should be permitted to retain its membership of the competition. For example, Article  4 of the EFL Articles of Association gives the EFL’s board of directors discretion to suspend the withdrawal of membership that is served upon the insolvency event, in order to give the club time to re-organise its affairs and so to retain its membership if it satisfies certain conditions. If those conditions are met, the board may withdraw the notice and the club remains in membership of the EFL. Alternatively, if they are not met, the EFL board can reinstate the notice of withdrawal of the club’s membership, leading to its eventual expulsion, where it considers that it is not tenable to retain the club as a member of the EFL (as happened, for example, in August 2019, in the case of Bury FC, when it was unable to fulfil its 2019/20 fixtures). B5.143 In deciding whether to suspend the expulsion from membership, and (if so) what conditions have to be met to retain membership, the SGB has to balance a number of conflicting factors. For example: (a) By compromising debt, sometimes at very low levels, clubs coming out of insolvency establish themselves on a more solid financial footing, freed of the debt obligations that existed prior to insolvency. Would other clubs, who have lived throughout within their means and not defaulted on their obligations, be prepared to continue to participate against such clubs on this basis? (b) Would the public reputation of the sport be intrinsically damaged by the readmittance of a club that has defaulted on its financial obligations to creditors inside and outside the game, including HMRC? (c) What are the effects on a local community of permanent withdrawal of a club’s membership (which may end the club’s very existence)? The EFL’s ‘Insolvency Policy’ describes the dilemma that the SGB faces in such situations: ‘[…] the choice for the League is whether to automatically withdraw membership from (and so expel) any club which cannot pay its creditors in full or whether there is some compromise. It is a fact that a policy of expulsion would have a significant impact on the constitution and continuity of the League’. B5.144 The starting point of the EFL’s Insolvency Policy is that ‘no Club should gain (or seek to gain) any advantage within the context of professional football over other Clubs by not paying all its creditors in full at all times’. However, the policy also recognises that automatic expulsion upon insolvency would have a significant impact on the integrity and continuity of the EFL’s competitions. The Insolvency Policy therefore explains what the insolvent club needs to do in order to avoid losing its membership of the EFL. Reflecting the EFL’s longstanding ‘rescue culture’, it provides that the notice of withdrawal of the club’s share in The Football League Ltd will be suspended to give the insolvent club a chance to re-establish its finances and continue in membership, and will be withdrawn (ie the club’s membership of the EFL will be maintained) if the club pays or secures all football creditors in full (to safeguard the integrity of the EFL competitions),1 reaches agreement with secured creditors, pays unsecured creditors a minimum dividend of an immediate 25 pence in the pound or a deferred 35 pence in the pound,2 and provides a fully underwritten business plan that demonstrates there is sufficient funding in place to enable the club to complete its scheduled fixtures that season (and for the next one or two seasons, if the EFL deems appropriate). 1 The EFL is not alone in this approach. For example, the Rugby Football Union requires a club seeking to exit insolvency by way of a transfer of the club to a new entity to comply with a series of conditions,

Regulating Financial Fair Play  637 one of which is the obligation to pay what it refers to as ‘Rugby Creditors’. Rugby Creditors includes employees for wage arrears, amounts due to the Rugby Football Union and its group companies, and payments due to other rugby clubs: see Rugby Football Union Reg 5.3.12, and para 21 of Appendix 2 to those regulations. Similarly, when granting membership to the new company established to take over the operation of Rangers Football Club in the summer of 2012, the Scottish Football Association required as a condition of the new membership that the club honour payments to certain football-related creditors in full. The Scottish FA also took the opportunity to re-impose a ban on transfer activity that had originally been overturned by the Court of Session in R v Scottish Football Association ex parte Rangers Football Club Plc [2012] CSOH 95, effectively side-stepping future legal wrangling over the power to impose such a sanction via the disciplinary route. 2 A failure to pay the minimum dividend to unsecured creditors might not lead to expulsion but it would lead to an additional 15-point deduction on top of the 12-point deduction imposed pursuant to Reg 12.3 (see para B5.150). In Leeds United Football Club v The Football League FA Rule K arbitration, 2007 (unreported), the club’s challenge to the imposition of a 15-point deduction following the failure of the proposed CVA failed because the claims brought had already been validly compromised; and they were brought so late as to justify refusal of relief (following Stevenage Borough Football Club Limited v The Football League Limited Carnwath J (1996) Times, 1 August and in the Court of Appeal at (1997) 9 Admin LR 109). However, the arbitral panel did determine that (a) the Football League’s board of directors had the requisite authority to impose a 15-point deduction, (b) the League’s insolvency policy document, properly construed, did not prevent the board imposing that condition, and (c) given the absolute discretion afforded to the board, and having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to an SGB in the exercise of such discretion, the decision did not fall outside the scope of what a rational decision maker in their position could make.

B5.145 The ability to impose such conditions is well-founded in company law. First, the articles of association of a company normally give the board of directors absolute discretion to refuse to register any purported transfer of shares (and therefore of membership).1 Secondly, such absolute discretion to refuse to accept a transfer encompasses a discretion to accept the transfer subject to conditions.2 Thirdly, the cause of action that allows a challenge to the imposition of such conditions is breach of fiduciary duty by the directors, and that challenge can only be exercised by the existing shareholders to whom that duty is owed.3 Fourthly, the courts will not impose a contractual relationship on unwilling parties.4 1 The Table A Model Articles reflect this position at Model Article 26(5) – ‘The directors may refuse to register the transfer of a share’. See also Art 6 of The Football League Ltd’s Articles of Association. 2 It is an established canon of construction that the greater can include the less – ‘Omne majus continet in se minus’. See Bailey and Norbury (Eds), Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 7th Edn (LexisNexis, 2017), Part 3 Chapter 7.1 and Part 4 Chapter 9.7. 3 See re Gresham Life Assurance Society ex parte Penney (1872)  LR  Chancery Appeals 446 per James LJ. 4 See HMRC  v The Football League [2012]  EWHC  1372 (Ch), discussed at para B5.140-141 and B5.146, and Lee v Showman’s Guild [1952] 2 QB 329 and Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633, CA (discussed at para E7.6).

B5.146 The specific requirement that an insolvent club must pay all ‘football creditor’ claims in full as a condition of ongoing membership of The League is particularly controversial.1 The reasons the EFL imposes this particular condition were set out at length by Richards J in his judgment in HMRC v The Football League, and include in particular: (a)

preventing clubs gaining a competitive advantage by not paying their debts to other clubs;2 (b) avoiding putting other clubs – who have no choice but to trade with each other – into financial difficulties (the ‘domino effect’);3 (c) securing the survival of clubs;4 and (d) protecting the integrity of the competition.5 HMRC challenged this condition as being contrary to the anti-deprivation rule and the pari passu principle.6 Richards J  rejected the HMRC’s challenge on the basis that no specific set of facts had been put before him and any decision would be fact-

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sensitive.7 However, he also stated that, in most circumstances, the EFL’s rules would not be rendered void by the principles invoked by HMRC.8 As well as the findings in relation to the anti-deprivation principle discussed at B5.140–B5.141, he explained that, in administration proceedings, the pari passu principle does not apply from the commencement of administration; rather, it only applies at the point where there is a distribution to creditors (if any).9 However, in closing, he cautioned that ‘The FL should not regard the result of this case as an endorsement of its approach to football creditors.’10   1 It has been criticised in particular by the DCMS, see Seventh Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 29 July 2011 (HC 792-I) para 97.   2 [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch) para 178 (‘Serious problems can arise, from a “sporting” perspective, when a club spends more than it can afford in chasing that dream. It is very damaging to the integrity of The League’s competition if member clubs working hard to live within their means, (only taking on player wages and other commitments that they can afford) have to compete with others that do not feel so constrained. A club that spends beyond its means is able to acquire better players and so achieve better results than those that operate prudently. It is cheating. It achieves an obvious and improper competitive advantage, in particular (but not only) where some of the debts in question are owed to clubs against which it is competing, which are more socially and financially responsible. The actions of the reckless risk tempting other clubs also to act imprudently just to compete on equal terms. Those that resist the temptation are further disadvantaged’).   3 Ibid, para 179.   4 Ibid at para 181.  5 Ibid.   6 See also paras B5.134, B5.136 and B5.140–B5.141.  7 HMRC v The Football League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), paras 59 and 187.   8 Ibid, para 187.   9 Ibid, para 87–90. 10 Ibid, para 189.

B5.147 So-called ‘Football Creditors’ are regarded as unsecured creditors in law and as such rank equally with all other unsecured creditors for payment (in accordance with the pari passu rule discussed above1). However, it is now clear that the pari passu rule only applies to the assets of the insolvent entity and cannot attach to independent third-party funds. In the context of club insolvency, there is nothing to stop a purchaser of the club using its own resources to pay certain creditors in full whilst leaving all other creditors to claim a dividend through the insolvency process, provided that the requirement to pay those creditors in full does not depress the price it is prepared to pay for the company (and so decrease the dividend paid to the other creditors).2 1 See para B5.136. 2 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Wimbledon Football Club and Others [2004] EWHC 1020 (Ch) at [17], upheld on appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 655; In the matter of Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd (In Administration) [2010] EWHC 2013 (Ch), para 68 (‘even if the CVA actually does provide for the football creditors to be paid in full, it does not do so at the expense of the other creditors at all, so it is not, in my view, unfair to those creditors. Subject to a particularly successful attack on the Premier League’s insolvency policy and the corresponding provisions of its rules, so far as football creditors are paid in full they are not being paid out of assets which would otherwise fall into the CVA, so they are not being paid at the expense of the other creditors. The money out of which they are being paid is money which would not otherwise come into the CVA (or into the club) in the events which have happened or in any events which are likely to happen’). Where, for example, a purchaser acquires assets from the insolvent company at an undervalue because of an obligation to pay certain creditors in full, that might infringe the pari passu principle. See Neuberger LJ in the Court of Appeal, at [62].

B5.148 It can also be argued that the requirement that a club pay its players in full is only a relatively modest extension of the rights already afforded to employees under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006.1 As already explained, the effect of those regulations is to transfer the contracts of employment, with almost all of the obligations relating to them,2 to the new business following a sale of the business by an administrator.3 1 See para B5.137.

Regulating Financial Fair Play  639 2 By virtue of Reg 8(4), liabilities for unpaid arrears of wages or holiday pay up to the date of the appointment of administrator will not automatically transfer, and the ‘football creditor’ rules and their equivalent s in other sports thereby afford an additional level of protection in that respect. Some elements of those claims rank as preferential creditors (see para B5.135) but the remainder would otherwise be non-preferential unsecured creditor claims. 3 There had been some doubt as to the application of Reg 8 in the context of so-called ‘pre-pack administrations’ but this doubt was removed following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Key2Law (Surrey) LLP v De’Antiquis and Others [2011] EWCA Civ 1567.

(c) Sporting sanctions for insolvency B5.149 While the notice of withdrawal of membership triggered by the insolvency event enables the SGB to ensure that the club only retains membership of the competition if it exits from insolvency on terms acceptable to the SGB, it does not redress the competitive advantage that the club obtains from the compromise of its debts, both retrospectively (in that it has obtained a false position by living beyond its means) and prospectively (in that it no longer is encumbered with the obligation to service those debts, and so has more money to fund performance). Otherwise clubs may not be dissuaded from spending beyond their means and so risking insolvency, and owners may not be dissuaded from ceasing to fund a club and opting for insolvency proceedings.1 1 Many clubs expressed concern when Leicester City FC went into administration in October 2002, suffered no points penalty (because no rule was then in place), and won promotion at the end of that season. The EFL’s member clubs responded by approving the adoption of the sporting sanction at an Extraordinary General Meeting in October 2003 in order to (a) dissuade clubs from pending beyond their means; (b) dissuade owners from ceasing to fund a club and opting for insolvency proceedings; and (c) redress any disadvantage unfairly imposed on other clubs.

B5.150 There are various ways to avoid this potential unfairness: (a) In the EFL, a sporting sanction of 12 points is automatically imposed when the member club suffers an insolvency event.1 The EFL’s board of directors also has discretion to deduct up to 12 points where a group company of the member club suffers an insolvency event but the club itself does not.2 The timing of any deduction depends on when it happens: after the fourth Thursday in March, there is a risk of carry-over into the following season. Any appeal must be lodged within seven days, the short deadline being justified by the need for certainty as to the effect on the competition. The only ground of appeal permitted is that the insolvency event was solely due to an event of force majeure, defined as an event that: ‘having regard to all of the circumstances, was caused by and resulted directly from circumstances, other than normal business risks, over which the Club and/or Group Undertaking (as the case may be) could not reasonably be expected to have control and its Officials had used all due diligence to avoid the happening of that event’.3

The costs of any appeal are borne by the club even if successful, on the basis that the other member clubs should not have their distributions reduced in any event. If it upholds the appeal, the League Arbitration Panel may overturn the entire points deduction, or else reduce the amount of points deducted. (b) The board of directors of the Premier League has the power, but not the obligation, to impose a deduction of nine points where a member club and/or a group company of the member club suffers an insolvency event.4 Where the deduction occurs during the season it applies immediately. Where it occurs out of season, it will apply in the following season. The deadline and grounds for appeal are the same as in the EFL’s rules, but the panel appointed to hear the case can only allow or dismiss the appeal, with no opportunity to substitute its

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own sanction (with the exception of making an order dealing with the costs of proceedings and/or the deposit).5 (c) Despite its rules containing no express power to impose a sporting sanction on the occurrence of an insolvency event, the RFL has on at least three occasions (Wakefield and Wrexham in 2011, and Bradford in 2012) imposed a deduction of points on clubs entering administration. (d) Under the Rugby Football Union’s rules, a sporting sanction is automatically imposed when a member club suffers an insolvency event. Where an insolvency event occurs mid-season, a club in the Premiership will suffer a deduction of 20 per cent of the total number of available points in the relevant competition (including any bonus points) and clubs in lower divisions suffer a 25 per cent deduction.6 If the club either is not relegated after the deduction, or would have been relegated anyway (regardless of the deduction), a further deduction of 10 per cent if the club is in the Premiership (or 15 per cent for others) will apply the following season.7 Where the insolvency event occurs out of season, the regulations give the RFU the right to back-date the deduction to the previous season or apply it in the next season, but states that, ordinarily, if the insolvency occurs prior to the setting of the fixtures for the coming season, the points deduction should apply to the previous season.8 1 EFL Reg 12.3.1. 2 EFL Reg 12.3.2. 3 EFL Reg 12.3.11. On 4 August 2020, a League Arbitration Panel ruled that the decision by the owner of Wigan Athletic to stop funding the club’s trading deficit just weeks after paying more than £17 million and assuming more than £23 million of debt to buy the club was the sole cause of the club’s administration, but it did not qualify as a force majeure event because (a) the owner’s decision was deemed to be a normal business risk, and (b) as both owner and director, the owner fell within the definition of ‘Official’ of the club under the EFL Regulations and had failed to use all due diligence to avoid the decision to stop funding. Therefore, the club’s appeal against the 12-point deduction was rejected, meaning the club was relegated to League One for season 2020/21. Wigan Athletic FC v EFL, League Arbitration Panel decision dated 4 August 2020. 4 Premier League Rule E.40. 5 Premier League Rule E.48. 6 Rugby Football Union Reg 5.5.2. 7 Ibid, Reg 5.5.3. 8 Ibid, Reg 5.5.5. The provisions have not been without controversy. On 28 June Leeds Rugby Union Football Club Limited, the operating company of Leeds Carnegie, concluded a CVA with its creditors that would see (a) the parent company waive entitlement to dividends related to its debts of c.£4.75m, and (b) a dividend to unsecured creditors of 11 pence in the pound. Importantly, the arrangement received approval of 100 per cent of all creditors, which meant the provisions of what is now RFU Regulation 5.5.7 applied. It provides that ‘where all outstanding creditors of that Club are paid in full (or the outstanding creditors agree to waive or agree a repayment programme for outstanding amounts) […] within six weeks of the [relevant insolvency event] then the Club shall not suffer a points deduction[…]’. Accordingly, Leeds Carnegie finished season 2018/19 with no deduction (the insolvency event occurring after the fixtures were announced for the following season), and started season 2019/20 with no deduction because of the 100 per cent approval of creditors for the CVA, whilst at the same time compromising liabilities of claims that were not waived (circa £1.2m) for a payment of £175k.

B5.151 When first introduced in the English Football League in 2003, sporting sanctions for insolvent clubs were viewed with suspicion. They were perceived as further harming a club when it was at its lowest point. However, the SGBs mentioned above have maintained the principle ever since and to date no member club has sought to challenge the legality of such a sanction, presumably because it is accepted that the sanction is necessary to deter financial mismanagement and to avoid insolvent clubs getting an unfair competitive advantage. B5.152 Mr Justice Marcus Smith provided some legal support for such sanctions, albeit obiter, in the context of the challenge by New Saints FA to the decision by the FA of Wales to end the 2019/20 season early (due to the Covid-19 pandemic)

Regulating Financial Fair Play  641

and decide final rankings based on criteria other than the results of the matches that had not yet been played. He stressed the importance, as a general rule, of deciding competition outcomes exclusively by ‘sporting merit’ (ie results on the pitch), but acknowledged that the Welsh FA’s Rule 17.10, which imposed a ten-point deduction on any club that entered into administration, was an exception to that general rule. He said: ‘Rule 17.10 affects, in a manner entirely devoid of “sporting merit”, the ranking of a Club in administration by deducting points for reasons other than “sporting merit”. The reason for this is, I infer, to preserve the financial health of the League. Viewed in this light, the derogation from “sporting merit” is understandable, provided it is narrowly construed’.1 1 New Saints FC v Football Association of Wales, [2020] EWHC 1838 (Ch), para 64(d).

B5.153 It is important, however, to make clear in the rules that the imposition of a sporting sanction is automatic upon the occurrence of the insolvency event, and not contingent upon the operation of due legal process (eg by way of a disciplinary charge). In Hudson v Gambling Commission,1 Mr Justice Norris held that a regulator’s bringing of disciplinary action against a company in insolvency (as opposed to the exercise of summary powers by an executive) is subject to the moratorium on ‘legal process’ imposed by paragraph 43(6) of Sch B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, meaning it cannot proceed without the consent of the office holder (the administrator or liquidator) or the High Court. However, in HMRC v The Football League, Mr Justice Richards held that the Football League is not a regulator in the true sense of the word (in contrast to, for example, Ofcom or Ofwat) but rather is a private governing body.2 It is therefore questionable whether the principle in Hudson would be followed in a sporting context. 1 [2010] EWHC 1229 (Ch). 2 [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), para 186.

CHAPTER B6

Safeguarding Kate Gallafent QC (Blackstone Chambers) and Richard Bush (Bird & Bird LLP) Contents .para 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B6.1 2

KEY TERMINOLOGY....................................................................................... B6.4 A Who is a ‘child’?.......................................................................................... B6.5 B Who is an ‘adult at risk’?............................................................................. B6.7 C ‘Safeguarding’ and ‘child protection’........................................................... B6.9 D ‘Harm’ and ‘significant harm’...................................................................... B6.10 E ‘Abuse’......................................................................................................... B6.12 F ‘Poor practice’.............................................................................................. B6.18

3

THE CHILD PROTECTION/CARE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND......................... B6.19 A Sport and the child protection/care system.................................................. B6.19 B Overview of the child protection and care systems in England................... B6.25

4

SAFEGUARDING IN SPORT............................................................................ B6.32 A The importance of safeguarding in sport..................................................... B6.32 B The Child Protection in Sport Unit (CPSU) and CPSU Standards.............. B6.35 C Key roles and responsibilities...................................................................... B6.39 D Safeguarding policies and developing awareness........................................ B6.40 E Codes of conduct.......................................................................................... B6.44 F Positions of trust.......................................................................................... B6.45 G Reporting...................................................................................................... B6.48 H Information sharing...................................................................................... B6.49 I Safer recruitment and criminal record checks............................................. B6.54 J Safeguarding regulations and case management......................................... B6.82 K Monitoring and evaluation........................................................................... B6.104 L Dealing with non-recent/historic abuse cases.............................................. B6.105 M ‘Duty of Care’ and the scope of safeguarding in sport beyond children and adults at risk.......................................................................................... B6.107 N The international dimension........................................................................ B6.113

1 INTRODUCTION B6.1 Everyone should be able to participate in sport in a safe environment that is free from abuse. While abuse might not perceived as compromising the integrity of sport in the same way that doping and corruption can, in the sense of directly affecting results on the field of play, it represents just as much of a corrosive threat to sport, if not more, and it calls for an equally robust regulatory response. B6.2 The UK is recognised as a world leader in safeguarding and child protection in sport,1 although it must be acknowledged that this position has been reached in significant part because sport in the UK has had to react to a number of serious abuse cases in the past,2 which is reflective of the development of the domestic child protection system more generally.3 1 See Lang and Hartill (Eds), Safeguarding, Child Protection and Abuse in Sport, 1st Edn (Routledge, 2015), Introduction. 2 Ibid, Chapter 1 (Safeguarding and child protection in sport in England). 3 See Lindon and Webb, Safeguarding and Child Protection, 5th Edn (Hodder Education, 2016), Chapter 3 (The legislative and policy framework).

Safeguarding  643

B6.3 Since the last edition of this book, there have been a significant number of high-profile abuse cases reported as taking place in sport, both in the UK1 and elsewhere,2 which have had the effect of focusing considerable attention onto the areas of safeguarding and child protection. Some of these cases have been ‘historic’ or ‘non-recent’3 in nature, whereas others have been recent, but they have all served to highlight the ongoing need for sports organisations, and in particular sports governing bodies, to remain vigilant in seeking to prevent abuse, to respond effectively when abuse takes place, and to work alongside other stakeholders (such as the police and local authorities).4 1 The most widely reported of these domestic cases is probably that of Barry Bennell, a prolific sex abuser of children and a former junior football coach and scout, convicted of numerous charges of child sexual abuse spanning the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (see eg ‘Football sex abuse: Who is Barry Bennell?’, BBC  News, 15  February 2018, available at bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38104681 [accessed 30  October 2020]). Following ex-professional footballer Andy Woodward coming forward in November 2016 with his account of abuse by Mr Bennell, in turn prompting others to come forward with their accounts of abuse, The FA launched an independent review into alleged non-recent child sexual abuse in football, which The FA’s chairman, Greg Clarke, is reported as calling ‘one of the biggest crises in the history of the governing body (see ‘Eighty sports coaches convicted of child sex abuse, says Offside Trust’, BBC  Sport, 5  December 2018, available at bbc.co.uk/sport/ football/46453955 [accessed 30 October 2020]). As at the time of writing, the report of The FA’s independent review is yet to be published. 2 For example, the horrifying case of Larry Nassar, the former USA  Gymnastics team doctor who committed thousands of sexual assaults between the early 1990s and 2016. Nassar was ultimately sentenced to between 140 and 360 years in prison. The case will have a lasting impact on USA Gymnastics and the US Olympic Committee (among others) for many years to come (see ‘15 months on from Larry Nassar, USA Gymnastics struggles to find its way’, Guardian, 24 April 2019, available at heguardian.com/sport/2019/apr/24/15-months-on-from-larry-nassar-usa-gymnasticsstruggles-to-find-its-way [accessed 30 October 2020]). 3 ‘Historic’ or ‘non-recent’ abuse is an allegation of neglect, physical, sexual or emotional abuse made by or on behalf of someone who is now 18 years or over, relating to an incident which took place when the alleged victim was under 18 years old. For more information, see the Non-recent abuse section of the NSPCC’s website, at nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/signs-symptoms-effects/non-recent-abuse/ [accessed 30 October 2020]. How sports organisations can address such allegations is considered at paras B6.105–B6.106. 4 An independent report into Nassar’s abuse highlights this issue well: ‘While Nassar bears ultimate responsibility for his decades-long abuse of girls and young women, he did not operate in a vacuum. Instead, he acted within an ecosystem that facilitated his criminal acts. Numerous institutions and individuals enabled his abuse and failed to stop him, including coaches at the club and elite level, trainers and medical professionals, administrators and coaches at Michigan State University (“MSU”), and officials at both United States of America Gymnastics (“USAG”) and the United States Olympic Committee (the “USOC”). These institutions and individuals ignored red flags, failed to recognize textbook grooming behaviours, or in some egregious instances, dismissed clear calls for help from girls and young women who were being abused by Nassar. Multiple law enforcement agencies, in turn, failed effectively to intervene when presented with opportunities to do so. And when survivors first began to come forward publicly, some were shunned, shamed or disbelieved by others in their own communities. The fact that so many different institutions and individuals failed the survivors does not excuse any of them, but instead reflects the collective failure to protect young athletes’. See McPhee and Dowden, Report of the Independent Investigation: The Constellation of Factors Underlying Larry Nassar’s Abuse of Athletes (Ropes & Gray, 2018), pp 2–3, available at nassarinvestigation.com/en [accessed 30 October 2020].

2 KEY TERMINOLOGY B6.4 There are a number of specific and frequently used terms in the field of safeguarding and child protection (used both inside and outside of sport), many of which do not bear precise definition, and not all of which are used in a consistent manner. Unfortunately, this can act as a barrier to understanding of the subject matter. This section therefore seeks to provide some clarity in respect of some of the more fundamental and commonly used of these terms.

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A Who is a ‘child’? B6.5 According to the UN  Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by the UK Government in 1991, ‘a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’ (see art 1). Under English law, in the context of child protection legislation, a ‘child’ is defined at s 105(1) of the Children Act 1989 as ‘a person under the age of eighteen’. B6.6 Therefore, while safeguarding and child protection measures in sport can quite properly take into account the fact that some children will be more mature than others (and the term ‘young people’ can be used to refer to older children),1 such measures will typically seek to protect all children, ie, all those under the age of 18. 1 See eg General Medical Council, Protecting children and young people: the responsibilities of all doctors (2012, updated 2018), p  50, available at gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-fordoctors/protecting-children-and-young-people [accessed 30 October 2020], a guidance document for doctors, which states ‘We use the term ‘children’ to refer to younger children who do not have the maturity and understanding to make important decisions for themselves. We use the term ‘young people’ to refer to older or more experienced children who are more likely to be able to make these decisions for themselves’.

B Who is an ‘adult at risk’? B6.7

An ‘adult at risk’ is defined by statute as someone aged 18 or over who:

(a) has needs for local authority care and support; (b) is experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect; and (c) as a result of his/her needs is unable to protect him or herself against the abuse or neglect or the risk of it.1 1 This definition is set out at s 42 of the Care Act 2014 (and it is also reflected at Data Protection Act 2018, Sch 1, Pt 1, para 18(4)). Prior to the introduction of the Care Act 2014, the ‘No Secrets’ statutory guidance, published in 2000, defined a ‘vulnerable adult’ (similarly) as a person ‘who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of mental or other disability, age or illness, and who is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation’. Older safeguarding policies and procedures often refer to ‘vulnerable adults’, although ‘adults at risk’ is now generally considered to be the more appropriate terminology.

B6.8 Sports organisations’ safeguarding measures should extend to affording protection to ‘adults at risk’ as well as children, and recently some have begun to afford regulatory protection further to all participants (regardless of their age or whether they might be considered ‘at risk’) (see further paras B6.107–B6.112). While what will be an appropriate approach to safeguarding will differ between different sports and sports organisations, safeguarding measures can address both children and adults,1 while allowing for any differences in context. 1 See eg RFU Regulation 21 – Safeguarding, Reg 21.5.1 (‘The provisions of RFU Regulation 21 are applicable to Adults at Risk in Rugby Union and those working with them in the same way as they apply to Children in Rugby Union and those working with them’).

C ‘Safeguarding’ and ‘child protection’ B6.9 ‘Safeguarding’ and ‘child protection’ are terms that are often used synonymously, but there is a distinction between the two: (a) ‘Safeguarding’ concerns all activities that support the wellbeing of children generally.1 The term can also be used to refer to activities that support the wellbeing of adults.2

Safeguarding  645

(b) ‘Child protection’ refers to prevention and response activity that is undertaken to protect specific children who are suffering, or are likely to suffer, significant harm.3 ‘Child protection’ is therefore a critically important part of ‘safeguarding’, but it is only one part of it. Best safeguarding practice in sport encompasses a wide range of matters aimed at maintaining or improving the wellbeing of children and adults, although of course child protection is an essential part of any approach to safeguarding. 1 There is no statutory definition of what is meant by ‘safeguarding’, but statutory guidance defines ‘safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children’ as (i) protecting children from maltreatment; (ii) preventing impairment of children’s health or development; (iii) ensuring that children grow up in circumstances consistent with the provision of safe and effective care; and (iv) taking action to enable all children to have the best outcomes. See HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 5–6, and 102. 2 For the purposes of illustration, see Department of Health & Social Care, Care Act factsheets, Factsheet 7: Protecting adults from abuse or neglect, last updated 19 April 2016, available at gov. uk/government/publications/care-act-2014-part-1-factsheets/care-act-factsheets [accessed 30 October 2020], which states ‘”Adult safeguarding” is working with adults with care and support needs to keep them safe from abuse or neglect. It is an important part of what many public services do, and a key responsibility of local authorities’. 3 There is also no statutory definition of what is meant by ‘child protection’, but the same guidance defines child protection as ‘Part of safeguarding and promoting welfare. This refers to the activity that is undertaken to protect specific children who are suffering, or are likely to suffer, significant harm’. See HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, p 102.

D ‘Harm’ and ‘significant harm’ B6.10 In the legislative context, ‘harm’ is defined by s 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 as: ‘ill-treatment (including sexual abuse and non-physical forms of ill-treatment) or the impairment of health (physical or mental) or development (physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural)’.

Safeguarding policies adopted by sports organisations will often include a definition of ‘harm’ that is the same as, or very similar to, this statutory definition (or reference to ‘harm’ may be construed accordingly). B6.11 There is no statutory definition of ‘significant harm’, which is the threshold for state intervention in child protection cases (see para B6.27). Case law however has defined ‘significant’ as meaning that the ‘harm must […] be significant enough to justify the intervention of the State and disturb the autonomy of the parents to bring up their children by themselves in the way they choose’.1 That this definition is somewhat circular highlights that ‘harm’ is a flexible concept, which is entirely appropriate given how highly fact sensitive and subjective safeguarding and child protection matters can be.2 1 Re MA (Care: Threshold) [2009] EWCA Civ 853, per Ward LJ at para 54. 2 The immediately preceding version of this chapter noted the following (in considering the boundaries of emotional abuse and the harm caused): ‘This is a very difficult area. For example, how is a sports body to determine when the actions of a coach transgress the bounds of acceptable coaching process into the realms of bullying and emotional/physical abuse? The difficulty is that no clear objective criteria exist to determine when ‘tough’ (but acceptable) coaching strays into bullying/emotional abuse […] What is necessarily involved is not an objective determination as to conduct/demands that are right or wrong, but rather a child-focused assessment relating to the circumstances and character of the child in question. By way of example, out of a group of ten athletes participating in a coaching programme, at one end of the spectrum one or two of such athletes will positively thrive on the challenges presented by a tough coaching regime. Being made the subject of constructive criticism (or even less constructive

646  Regulating Sport cajoling) will spur them on to ever-greater levels of achievement. There is perhaps a middle category of five or six who are not particularly adversely affected by the coaching regime but equally they do not positively benefit by these methods. There will be one or two children for whom such tough coaching methodologies are positively harmful, amounting to emotional child abuse. Such children may exhibit characteristics of emotional or physical harm consequent upon their experience. This may manifest itself in such young persons themselves engaging in bullying or other inappropriate behaviour, weight loss of inattention/disruptiveness in schooling, and (on the most serious cases) even self-harm’.

E ‘Abuse’ B6.12 ‘Abuse’ is another flexible concept, although (at its highest level) it can generally be considered as conduct that is harmful, ie  in the sense that it impairs health or development. B6.13 ‘Abuse’ is defined in ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ (the principal statutory guidance in respect of child protection and safeguarding) in the following terms:1 ‘A  form of maltreatment of a child. Somebody may abuse or neglect a child by inflicting harm, or by failing to act to prevent harm. Children may be abused in a family or in an institutional or community setting by those known to them or, more rarely, by others. Abuse can take place wholly online, or technology may be used to facilitate offline abuse. Children may be abused by an adult or adults, or another child or children’. 1 HM  Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A  guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, p 102.

B6.14 Working Together to Safeguard Children goes on to identify the following types of abusive conduct:1 (a) ‘Physical abuse’, being ‘a form of abuse which may involve hitting, shaking, throwing, poisoning, burning or scalding, drowning, suffocating or otherwise causing physical harm to a child. Physical harm may also be caused when a parent or carer fabricates the symptoms of, or deliberately induces, illness in a child’. (b) ‘Emotional abuse’, being ‘the persistent emotional maltreatment of a child such as to cause severe and persistent adverse effects on the child’s emotional development. It may involve conveying to a child that they are worthless or unloved, inadequate, or valued only insofar as they meet the needs of another person. It may include not giving the child opportunities to express their views, deliberately silencing them or “making fun” of what they say or how they communicate. It may feature age or developmentally inappropriate expectations being imposed on children. These may include interactions that are beyond a child’s developmental capability, as well as overprotection and limitation of exploration and learning, or preventing the child participating in normal social interaction. It may involve seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another. It may involve serious bullying (including cyber bullying), causing children frequently to feel frightened or in danger, or the exploitation or corruption of children. Some level of emotional abuse is involved in all types of maltreatment of a child, though it may occur alone’. (c) ‘Sexual abuse’, being ‘forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in sexual activities, not necessarily involving a high level of violence, whether or not the child is aware of what is happening. The activities may involve physical contact, including assault by penetration (for example, rape or oral sex) or nonpenetrative acts such as masturbation, kissing, rubbing and touching outside of clothing. They may also include non-contact activities, such as involving children in looking at, or in the production of, sexual images, watching sexual activities,

Safeguarding  647

encouraging children to behave in sexually inappropriate ways, or grooming a child in preparation for abuse. Sexual abuse can take place online, and technology can be used to facilitate offline abuse. Sexual abuse is not solely perpetrated by adult males. Women can also commit acts of sexual abuse, as can other children’. (d) Finally, ‘neglect’ is ‘the persistent failure to meet a child’s basic physical and/or psychological needs, likely to result in the serious impairment of the child’s health or development. Neglect may occur during pregnancy as a result of maternal substance abuse. Once a child is born, neglect may involve a parent or carer failing to: a. provide adequate food, clothing and shelter (including exclusion from home or abandonment) b. protect a child from physical and emotional harm or danger c. ensure adequate supervision (including the use of inadequate caregivers) d. ensure access to appropriate medical care or treatment It may also include neglect of, or unresponsiveness to, a child’s basic emotional needs’. 1 HM  Government,’ Working Together to Safeguard Children: A  guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 102–104.

B6.15 The World Health Organisation’s definition of ‘child maltreatment’ is similar to the definition of ‘abuse’ in ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ – ‘child maltreatment’ is: ‘The abuse and neglect of people under eighteen years of age. It includes all forms of physical and/or emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or commercial or other exploitation, resulting in actual or potential harm to the child’s health, survival, development or dignity in the context of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power. Four types of child maltreatment are generally recognized: physical abuse, sexual abuse, psychological (or emotional or mental) abuse, and neglect’.1 1 See World Health Organisation, ‘Child Maltreatment: 1,952 studies’, available at apps.who.int/ violence-info/child-maltreatment/ [accessed 30 October 2020].

B6.16 Similar forms of abuse are identified as being applicable to adults at risk in ‘Care and support statutory guidance’, issued under the Care Act 2014.1 1 Department of Health & Social Care, Care and support statutory guidance, October 2018, paras 14.16 and 14.7 (What constitutes abuse and neglect?).

B6.17 It is possible to identify further forms of abuse, which are usually variants of those listed above.1 And while there is no ‘closed list’ of what might constitute abusive conduct, the following forms of physical, sexual and psychological abuse have been identified in sport:2 Threats to children Individual Injury Depression Self-harm Eating disorders Disordered eating

Relational Sexual harassment Sexual abuse Physical abuse Forced physical exertion Emotional abuse Virtual maltreatment Neglect Bullying Doping

Organisational Abuse from spectators Discrimination Cultures which normalise abuse Unhealthy training programmes Hazing Medical mismanagement Systematic doping Age cheating

648  Regulating Sport 1 For example, the NSPCC’s website additionally identifies bullying and cyberbullying, child sexual exploitation, child trafficking, domestic abuse, female genital mutilation, grooming, and online abuse: see nspcc.org.uk/what-is-child-abuse/types-of-abuse/ [accessed 30 October 2020]. 2 See Mountjoy, M., et al, ‘Safeguarding the child athlete in sport: a review, a framework and recommendations for the IOC youth athlete development model’, British Journal of Sports Medicine, Volume 49, Issue 13, available at bjsm.bmj.com/content/49/13/883 [accessed 30 October 2020].

F ‘Poor practice’ B6.18 It is also important to note that some conduct will not be so bad as to be considered ‘abusive’ or to cause harm but might nevertheless adversely affect those subject to it. Such conduct falling short of abuse is generally considered to be ‘poor practice’. Again, this is a flexible concept, and it is for respective sports organisations to establish the boundaries of what they consider ‘poor practice’ to be.1 1 By way of example, the Premier League Safeguarding Policy (available at premierleague.com/ safeguarding [accessed 30  October 2020]) addresses poor practice in the following terms: ‘Poor practice: This is behaviour that falls short of abuse but is nevertheless unacceptable. It is essential that poor practice is challenged and reported even where there is a belief that the motives of an individual are well meaning. Failure to challenge poor practice can lead to an environment where abuse is more likely to remain unnoticed. Incidents of poor practice occur when the needs of Children and Adults at Risk are not afforded the necessary priority, compromising their welfare, for example, allowing abusive or concerning practices to go unreported, placing Children and Adults at Risk in potentially compromising and uncomfortable situations, failing to ensure the safety of Children and Adults at Risk, ignoring health and safety guidelines, or giving continued and unnecessary preferential treatment to individuals’.

3 THE CHILD PROTECTION/CARE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND A Sport and the child protection/care system B6.19 Sports organisations do not have any general statutory legal duties in respect of safeguarding or child protection. However, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ nonetheless makes clear that sports organisations do have a role to play:1 ‘Sports Clubs/Organisations 63. There are many sports clubs and organisations including voluntary and private sector providers that deliver a wide range of sporting activities to children. Some of these will be community amateur sports clubs, some will be charities. All should have the arrangements described in this chapter in place and should collaborate to work effectively with the safeguarding partners as required by any local safeguarding arrangements. Paid and volunteer staff need to be aware of their responsibilities for safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, how they should respond to child protection concerns and how to make a referral to local authority children’s social care or the police if necessary. 64. All National Governing Bodies of Sport, that receive funding from with Sport England or UK Sport, must aim to meet the Standards for Safeguarding and Protecting Children in Sport’. 1 This section of this chapter is focussed on the position in England and does not address the position in other parts of the United Kingdom. It should be noted that the law and structure in each of the home nations varies, although they are all based on similar principles. Information about the child protection system in England and other parts of the United Kingdom can be found on the NSPCC’s website, at learning.nspcc.org.uk/child-protection-system/ [accessed 30 October 2020].

B6.20 Furthermore, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ makes clear that safeguarding is a responsibility for everyone who works with children: ‘16. Everyone who works with children has a responsibility for keeping them safe. No single practitioner can have a full picture of a child’s needs and

Safeguarding  649 circumstances and, if children and families are to receive the right help at the right time, everyone who comes into contact with them has a role to play in identifying concerns, sharing information and taking prompt action. 17. In order that organisations, agencies and practitioners collaborate effectively, it is vital that everyone working with children and families, including those who work with parents/carers, understands the role they should play and the role of other practitioners. They should be aware of, and comply with, the published arrangements set out by the local safeguarding partners’.

B6.21 In respect of adults at risk, the ‘Care and support statutory guidance’ is similarly clear that concerns of ill-treatment are everyone’s concern: ‘14.37 Anyone can witness or become aware of information suggesting that abuse and neglect is occurring. The matter may, for example, be raised by a worried neighbour […] a concerned bank cashier, a GP, a welfare benefits officer, a housing support worker or a nurse on a ward. Primary care staff may be particularly wellplaced to spot abuse and neglect, as in many cases they may be the only professionals with whom the adult has contact. The adult may say or do things that hint that all is not well. It may come in the form of a complaint, a call for a police response, an expression of concern, or come to light during a needs assessment. Regardless of how the safeguarding concern is identified, everyone should understand what to do, and where to go locally to get help and advice. It is vital that professionals, other staff and members of the public are vigilant on behalf of those unable to protect themselves. This will include: • knowing about different types of abuse and neglect and their signs • supporting adults to keep safe • knowing who to tell about suspected abuse or neglect • supporting adults to think and weigh up the risks and benefits of different options when exercising choice and control’

B6.22 It is therefore necessary for sports organisations to have a good (or at the very least, working) understanding of how the child protection and care systems operate (including any relevant local arrangements), in order to enable them to engage effectively with relevant external safeguarding/child protection bodies when it is necessary or desirable for them to do so. However, while the relevant statutory guidance makes it clear that everyone who works with children and adults at risk has a level of responsibility for sharing information in order to identify concerns, there is no specific reporting law that requires sports organisations, or participants in sport more generally, to report suspicions of abuse to the police or local authorities (or any other party).1 1 Section  5B of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 introduced a mandatory reporting duty that requires regulated health and social care professionals and teachers in England and Wales to report ‘known’ cases of female genital mutilation in children that they identify in the course of their professional work to the police. This duty came into force on 31 October 2015.

B6.23 When a sports organisation becomes aware of a concern and considers that a child or adult at risk is in immediate danger, the most appropriate body to first report the concern to will be the police. In cases where a sports organisation becomes aware of a concern but the relevant individual is not considered to be in immediate danger, the report should instead be made to the relevant department of the local authority – each local authority will have an officer, or a team of such officers, with responsibility for the management and oversight of allegations. Depending on the factual circumstances giving rise to a report, it might well be appropriate to report the concern to both the police and the relevant local authority. If the sports organisation is a charity should also consider whether a serious incident report should be made to the Charity Commission.

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B6.24 The workings of the child protection and care systems might also be relevant to a sports organisation if the local safeguarding agencies wish to engage the sports organisation in any response to a concern (whether or not first reported by the sports organisation) and/or in the event information is shared with the sports organisation to which the sports organisation may wish to respond in accordance with its own safeguarding procedures (for example, if it receives information that suggests a licensed coach presents a risk of harm to children).

B Overview of the child protection and care systems in England B6.25 The legislative framework for child protection in England is provided by the Children Act 1989. It established some key principles, including that: (a) the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration; (b) children should be safe and protected by effective intervention if they are at risk of significant harm; and (c) agencies working with children should cooperate and work together in the best interests of the child. The Children Act 2004 (significantly amended by the Children and Social Work Act 2017) strengthened the legislative framework introduced by the Children Act 1989, principally by encouraging partnerships between relevant agencies and creating more accountability in the child protection system; however, it did not amend much of the Children Act 1989. B6.26 Under s 17 of the Children Act 1989, every local authority has a general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need. A child will be considered as being ‘in need’ if: (a) (b) (c)

he or she is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health and development without the provision of services by a local authority; his or her health or development is likely to be significantly impaired or further impaired without the provision of such services; or he or she is disabled.

B6.27 Under s 47 of the Children Act 1989, when a local authority has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is suffering or is likely to suffer ‘significant harm’, it has a duty to make such enquiries as it considers necessary to decide whether to take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. B6.28 Until recently, the duties of local authorities were fulfilled largely through the work of local safeguarding children’s boards (LSCBs), which were multiagency bodies set up in every local authority featuring representatives from the local authority, the police, health services, probation services, the local youth offending team and the Children and Family Courts Advisory and Support Service. However, from 29  June 2019, as a consequence of changes introduced by the Children and Social Work Act 2017,1 LSCBs have been replaced by ‘safeguarding partners’ who, in relation to each local authority area, comprise: (a) the local authority; (b) the local clinical commissioning group; and (c) the local police. All three partners have equal and joint responsibility for local safeguarding arrangements, and they will work together with other relevant agencies, which

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includes (among various others) any person or body involved in the provision, supervision or oversight of sport or leisure’.2 1 Resulting in amendment to the Children Act 2004, at s 16E. 2 See s 16E of the Children Act 2004 and the Child Safeguarding Practice Review and Relevant Agency (England) Regulations 2018, reg 18.

B6.29 In the event that a child is considered to be in imminent danger, then local authorities can take immediate action, including by seeking an emergency protection order to remove a child to a place of safety,1 or an exclusion order to remove an abuser from the family home.2 The police can remove a child to a place of safety for up to 72 hours without obtaining a court order.3 If a child is not in immediate danger, there will be an assessment of the child’s needs, which will include (but is not limited to) determining whether the child is in need and should be assessed under s 17 of the Children Act 1989, and whether there is reasonable cause to suspect that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm under s 47 of the Children Act 1989.4 1 2 3 4

Children Act 1989, s 44. Children Act 1989, s 44A. Children Act 1989, s 46. The process for such assessment is determined at the local level. See HM  Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A  guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 15–16.

B6.30 Consideration of the various child protection measures that might ultimately be appropriate in any given case are beyond the scope of this chapter, but include: (a) child protection plans, which set out what action needs to be taken, by when and by whom (including parents and carers), to keep the child safe from harm and promote their welfare;1 and (b) care proceedings, where professionals conclude that the parents or carers are not able to provide safe or appropriate care, so the local authority seeks to take the child into care (if successful, an appropriate care order will be made by the court).2 1 Children Act 1989, s 31A. 2 Children Act 1989, s 33.

B6.31 The position in respect of adults at risk and the care system is broadly similar to that in respect of children and the child protection system. There are two key duties imposed upon local authorities by the Care Act 2014 that concern adults at risk: (a) under s 9, local authorities have a duty to assess needs for care and support where it appears to a local authority that an adult may have such needs; and (b) under s 42, local authorities have a duty to undertake, or cause to undertake, an adult safeguarding enquiry when it has a reasonable belief that an adult in its area has care and support needs, is experiencing or is at risk of abuse or neglect, and is unable to protect him/herself from that abuse or neglect because of their care and support needs. Pursuant to s  43 of the Care Act 2014, each local authority must establish a Safeguarding Adults Board (SAB) for its area, the objective of which is to help and protect adults in its area in cases of the kind described by s 42. Membership of the SAB must include: (a) the local authority; (b) the local clinical commissioning group; and (c) the local police, although other organisations and individuals may also be included.1 1 See s 43 of and Sch 2 to the Care Act 2014.

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4 SAFEGUARDING IN SPORT A The importance of safeguarding in sport B6.32 Participation in sport has many physical, psychological and social benefits, and getting children active has long played an important part in government strategy relating to children.1 However, the benefits of sport are not automatic, and sport participation may have inherent underlying threats or dangers if there is an unhealthy culture within a sport or sports organisation that allows harm to occur.2 1 See eg House of Commons Digital Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Changing Lives: the social impact of participation in culture and sport’, Eleventh Report of Session 2017-2019, May 2019, para  80, available at publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/734/734.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020]. 2 See M  Mountjoy et al, ‘Safeguarding the child athlete in sport: a review, a framework and recommendations for the IOC youth athlete development model’, (2015) British Journal of Sports Medicine, Vol 49, Issue 13, available at bjsm.bmj.com/content/49/13/883 [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.33 There are a number of reasons why safeguarding in sport is important, including: (a) First and foremost, the health and welfare of participants is of course exceptionally important in its own right – there is a clear moral duty to provide a safe environment, particularly those who might be more vulnerable to harm, including children and adults at risk. (b) Secondly, if a sport/sports organisation does not operate a sufficiently safe environment, then that carries reputational risk (if, for example, such failures manifest themselves in a high profile scandal), which in turn might: (i) have an adverse impact on participation numbers (eg, children and their parents/carers may be less likely to participate where there is not a safe environment, whether that is real or perceived); and (ii) potentially discourage commercial partners from investing in the sport/ sports organisation. (c) Thirdly, because there is a clear risk of legal liability. In short, because abuse of children and adults at risk is a foreseeable risk (at least in general terms), in the event that such abuse occurs and a sports organisation has not taken sufficient steps to mitigate that risk, it might well face a negligence claim.1 1 While a detailed discussion of the law of tort/negligence is outside of the scope of this chapter, as a general principle, sports organisations owe a legal duty of care to children and young people under their jurisdiction to take appropriate steps to address the known risks of participating in the sport. See eg CPSU, ‘CPSU Briefing – Duty of Care’, May 2020, available at thecpsu.org.uk/resource-library/ best-practice/duty-of-care/ [accessed 31 October 2020]. See also para G1.66 et seq.

B6.34 In general terms, the principal aims of a sports organisation in respect of safeguarding and child protection will include: (a) Raising awareness of safeguarding and child protection issues and creating a safe and secure environment for participation. (b) Ensuring that there are clear procedures in place in order to: (i) receive reports of abuse; and (ii) refer reports of harm/abuse to the appropriate external agencies and/or the police. (c) Ensuring that appropriate disciplinary procedures are in place in order to respond to instances of harm/abuse, or potential harm/abuse and, where necessary, remove individuals from participation. (d) Monitoring and maintaining appropriate policies and procedures in order to ensure that safeguarding standards remain at an appropriate level.

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B The Child Protection in Sport Unit (CPSU) and CPSU Standards B6.35 In 2000, in light of cases of abuse in the 1990s and pressure from stakeholders, Sport England partnered with the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) to convene a Child Protection in Sport Task Force. The group produced an action plan for child protection in sport that led to the creation in 2001 of the CPSU, a government-backed agency with responsibility for safeguarding and child protection in sport.1 1 See Lang and Hartill (eds), Safeguarding, Child Protection and Abuse in Sport, 1st Edn (Routledge, 2015), Chapter 1 (Safeguarding and child protection in sport in England).

B6.36 The CPSU publishes and maintains standards for safeguarding and protecting children in sport,1 which are based on current practice in child protection and sport and are informed by safeguarding legislation and guidance, evidence from research, and practical experience. The purposes of the standards are threefold: (1) to help create a safe sporting environment for children and young people and protect them from harm; (2) to provide a benchmark to assist those involved in sport to make informed decisions; and (3) to promote good practice and challenge practice that is harmful to children. 1 The standards are available on the CPSU’s website at thecpsu.org.uk/resource-library/tools/standardsfor-safeguarding-and-protecting-children-in-sport/ [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.37 The funding agreements between Sport England/UK  Sport and national governing bodies require national governing bodies to implement and adhere to the CPSU standards. However, whether or not a sports governing body or other sports organisation is in receipt of public funding, the standards operate as a good benchmark for the implementation of safeguarding policies and procedures. B6.38 The CPSU standards are, in overview, as follows (and each is supplemented by further CPSU guidance): (a)

(b)

(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

Standard 1: Policy and procedures for responding to concerns. The organisation should have linked procedures that provide clear step-by-step guidance on what to do in different circumstances if concerns arise about children’s welfare or protection. Standard 2: Operating Systems. Operating systems are needed to ensure that policies and procedures are effectively implemented in practice and provide clear step-by-step guidance on what to do in specific circumstances. They clarify roles and responsibilities, and lines of communication. Standard 3: Prevention. Measures to help minimise the possibility of children and young people being abused by those in a position of trust. Standard 4: Codes of ethics and conduct. Codes of ethics reflect the values and principles that the organisation wants to promote and provide a moral basis for policies and systems. Standard 5: Equity. Measures to ensure that the needs of all children and young people to be protected from abuse are addressed. Standard 6: Communication. Ways of informing, consulting and listening to all relevant parties about how children involved in the sport are to be safeguarded. Standard 7: Education and training. Opportunities to develop and maintain the necessary knowledge, skills and understanding to safeguard children. Standard 8: Access to advice and support. Arrangements made to provide essential information and support to those responsible for safeguarding

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(i) (j)

children. Children and young people who are being abused are assisted to get help. Standard 9: Implementation and monitoring. Action taken to ensure that the organisation’s intentions in relation to safeguarding children are taking place, and to monitor and evaluate effectiveness. Standard 10: Influencing. Action taken by the organisation to influence, encourage and promote the adoption and implementation of measures to safeguard children by partner organisations.

C Key roles and responsibilities B6.39 In order to effectively deliver any approach to safeguarding, a sports organisation will need to establish the key roles and responsibilities that it requires. This will vary between sports organisations, depending on such things as, for example, the structure of the sport/the sports organisation and the available level of resource. However, key safeguarding roles include:1 (a)

Board safeguarding champion. The role of a board safeguarding champion is to lead and inform safeguarding discussion and planning within board meetings, to ensure the board prioritise these discussions and resource appropriately, and to act as a link between the organisation’s lead safeguarding officer and the board. (b) Lead safeguarding officer. The lead safeguarding officer is the designated person within a sports organisation with primary responsibility for managing and reporting concerns, for putting into place safeguarding procedures, and supporting club, county and regional welfare officers (where relevant). Where an organisation has a case management group (see below), the lead safeguarding officer will typically report to that group. (c) Regional safeguarding officers. Regional safeguarding officers are persons within a sports organisation with regional responsibility for managing and reporting concerns, for putting into place safeguarding procedures, and supporting club welfare officers (where relevant). (d) Club safeguarding officer. A club safeguarding officer is a person within a sports club with primary responsibility for managing and reporting safeguarding concerns and for putting into place safeguarding procedures. (e) Case management group. Case management groups typically comprise a relatively small number of individuals with identified and relevant skills, knowledge, and experience within the organisation, and at least one member with practitioner expertise, eg a child protection expert. The primary role of a case management group is to manage the sports organisation’s response to reported safeguarding concerns, and the identifiable potential safeguarding risks individuals pose (where a sports organisation does not have a case management group, this role is usually fulfilled by the lead safeguarding officer). 1 See CPSU, ‘Putting safeguards in place’, available at thecpsu.org.uk/help-advice/putting-safeguardsin-place/#article-top [accessed 31 October 2020].

D Safeguarding policies and developing awareness B6.40 The adoption of a safeguarding policy by a sports organisation serves as a public statement of intent in respect of its commitment to safeguarding, and also typically provides further information in respect of reporting safeguarding concerns and the organisation’s various safeguarding procedures.

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B6.41 Safeguarding policies will typically include the following key information: (a) A ‘mission statement’ and guiding principles in respect of safeguarding. (b) Definitions as to what constitutes ‘abuse’. (c) Details as to how to identify possible abuse and how to respond to any safeguarding concerns that may arise, including how to report such concerns. (d) Details as to how the sports organisation will respond to any concerns reported to it, including its relevant procedures. B6.42 Safeguarding policies may be supported by other documents, which can contain additional detail and can be targeted towards certain audiences. Examples include guidance as to transporting children or taking them away on trips, and the safe and appropriate use of photography, mobile phones, and social media. B6.43 Obviously, a safeguarding policy (and any related information and documents) will be more effective if there is a high level of awareness among participants and other stakeholders. That being so, safeguarding information should be communicated widely and prominently, providing a sufficient level of detail while at the same time being easily digestible. Further, appropriate training should be provided to all persons who either work with children/adults at risk or who are responsible for persons who work with them. Ultimately, a sports organisation should look to achieve a culture in which the voices of participants, and particularly those of children and adults at risk, are heard and in which their welfare is actively promoted.

E Codes of conduct B6.44 Codes of conduct can serve to further embed an organisation’s commitment to child protection and safeguarding. They also serve an important purpose in clearly setting out expectations as to proper behaviour and best practice, as well as what constitutes unacceptable conduct, ie ‘poor practice’ (and can thereby give the sports organisation a clear basis to address poor practice as and when it might arise).1 1 The CPSU has published a number of sample codes of conduct, which are available at thecpsu.org. uk/resource-library/policies/sample-codes-of-conduct-for-parents-children-and-staff/ [accessed 31 October 2020].

F Positions of trust B6.45 Under ss 16 to 19 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is criminally unlawful for persons in specific roles and settings to engage in sexual activity with 16- or 17-year-olds over whom they hold a position of trust, responsibility or authority (and, as a result, have a considerable amount of power and influence in their lives). Examples of these specific roles include teachers, care workers, and youth justice workers, and specific settings include educational institutions, hospitals, and youth offender institutions. B6.46 However, roles within sport, eg  coaches, instructors, officials, etc are not covered (unless otherwise caught by the legislation, eg sports coaching in schools), despite the fact that those in authority in sport can have substantial influence over young people. That being so, the NSPCC/CPSU’s view is that because the current legislation covering abuse of trust does not regulate coaches, etc sports organisations should extend and adopt the principles of the legislation through their codes of conduct, rules and disciplinary processes.1 1 See CPSU, ‘Preventing Abuse of Positions of Trust in Sport’, January 2015, available at thecpsu. org.uk/media/2489/preventing-abuse-of-position-of-trust-jan15.pdf [accessed 31  October 2020]. To

656  Regulating Sport similar effect, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson concluded in her ‘Duty of Care in Sport’ report, that ‘the definition of “position of trust” should be reviewed with regard to sports coaches. At the moment teachers fall within this definition, which places restrictions on the relationship they can have with people under 18 years of age under their tutelage. Sports coaches should be subject to these same restrictions’. See Baronness Tanni-Grey Thompson DBE, DL, ‘Duty of Care in Sport: Independent Report to Government’, April 2017, p 20, available at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/610130/Duty_of_Care_Review_-_April_2017__2.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.47 In November 2017, the then Sports Minister Tracey Crouch announced that the Department for Culture Media and Sport and Ministry of Justice had agreed that the position of trust laws would be extended to sports coaches, but the Ministry of Justice apparently subsequently backtracked from that position.1 As such, there is apparently no imminent prospect of a change in the law in this area. 1 See NSPCC, ‘Government U-turn on pledge to protect young people in sport’, 8  August 2018, available at mandatenow.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Government-backtracks-on-pledge-toprotect-children-in-sport-_-NSPCC.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

G Reporting B6.48 Sports organisations should establish clear reporting procedures to ensure that any safeguarding concerns are reported to the organisation in a timely manner so that action can be taken to address and manage them appropriately.1 Such procedures should be clear, well-publicised, and easily accessible, with appropriate support made available to those making reports, or those who wish to do so. Sports organisations can receive reports of safeguarding concerns through a variety of means, such as phone, email, and online safeguarding referral forms. 1 The CPSU has published a number of example reporting flowcharts, which are available at thecpsu. org.uk/media/319549/safeguarding-reporting-procedure-flowcharts-watermarked.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

H Information sharing B6.49 ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’1 makes clear that information sharing is a crucial part of effective safeguarding. Further non-statutory guidance, published by HM  Government, ‘Information sharing: Advice for practitioners providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers’2 underlines this in no uncertain terms, stating: ‘Sharing information is an intrinsic part of any frontline practitioner’s job when working with children and young people. The decisions about how much information to share, with whom and when, can have a profound impact on individuals’ lives. Information sharing helps to ensure that an individual receives the right services at the right time and prevents a need from becoming more acute and difficult to meet. Poor or non-existent information sharing is a factor repeatedly identified as an issue in Serious Case Reviews (SCRs) carried out following the death or serious injury to, a child. In some situations, sharing information can be the difference between life and death’. 1 See HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 5–6, and 102. 2 Available at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/721581/Information_sharing_advice_practitioners_safeguarding_services.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.50 To illustrate the importance of information sharing, take the example of an individual participant whose conduct harms (or poses a risk of harm to) children. If

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he/she were to move between clubs, and those clubs did not report that conduct to their governing body, there is no central record of those concerns and the individual might continue to move on to other clubs without any form of intervention. By way of further example, a local authority might receive a report from a sports organisation which, when taken alongside other information in its possession, means it can identify and/or more effectively respond to a child protection concern. B6.51 Information sharing in any given child protection/safeguarding matter might, unavoidably, be an exceptionally difficult and sensitive matter. In particular, the individual or body making the decision as to whether or not to share information will often feel that if the information is shared, it will result in serious harm to an individual’s reputation (which might not be warranted), whereas on the other hand, if it is not shared, a child (or children) will suffer harm. However, fears about sharing information cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the need to safeguard against abuse or neglect, and the most important consideration is whether sharing information is likely to support the safeguarding and protection of an individual that might have been harmed, or is at risk of being harmed. B6.52 In order to guide practitioners, ‘Information sharing: Advice for practitioners providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers’ sets out seven golden rules to sharing information. These ‘rules’ are of equal application to safeguarding practitioners in sport, and the rules are as follows:1 1.

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

Remember that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Data Protection Act 2018 and human rights laws are not barriers to justified information sharing, but provide a framework to ensure that personal information about living individuals is shared appropriately. Be open and honest with the individual (and/or their family where appropriate) from the outset about why, what, how and with whom information will, or could be shared, and seek their agreement, unless it is unsafe or inappropriate to do so. Seek advice from other practitioners, or your information governance lead, if you are in any doubt about sharing the information concerned, without disclosing the identity of the individual where possible. Where possible, share information with consent, and where possible, respect the wishes of those who do not consent to having their information shared. Under the GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 you may share information without consent, if, in your judgement, there is a lawful basis to do so, such as where safety may be at risk. You will need to base your judgement on the facts of the case. When you are sharing or requesting personal information from someone, be clear of the basis upon which you are doing so. Where you do not have consent, be mindful that an individual might not expect information to be shared. Consider safety and well-being: base your information sharing decisions on considerations of the safety and well-being of the individual and others who may be affected by their actions. Necessary, proportionate, relevant, adequate, accurate, timely and secure: ensure that the information you share is necessary for the purpose for which you are sharing it, is shared only with those individuals who need to have it, is accurate and up-to-date, is shared in a timely fashion, and is shared securely. Keep a record of your decision and the reasons for it – whether it is to share information or not. If you decide to share, then record what you have shared, with whom and for what purpose.’

1 The same ‘rules’ have also been referred to in the context of addressing concern relating to adults at risk. See NHS England, Safeguarding Adults (section on information sharing), available at england. nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/adult-pocket-guide.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

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B6.53 Data protection is addressed in detail in Chapter A4. However, in the safeguarding context specifically, the sharing of information that is sensitive and personal ‘special category personal data’ (which information relevant to safeguarding often will be) can be shared legally without consent, if it is not possible or reasonable to gain consent from the relevant individual, or if to gain such consent could prejudice the well-being of a child or adult at risk.1 While obtaining consent from the relevant individual should therefore be considered in all cases, it is likely that in many (if not most) cases it will not be reasonable to gain consent from the relevant individual, or possible without prejudicing the well-being of a child or adult at risk. 1 Data Protection Act 2018, s 10 and Sch 1, Pt 1, para 18, discussed at para A4.69 et seq.

I

Safer recruitment and criminal record checks

(a) Safer recruitment processes B6.54 An obvious way in which harm to children and adults at risk may be prevented is to seek to ensure that those who pose an identifiable/known risk of harm are not able to undertake roles that would allow them to have an inappropriate level of access to them. B6.55 Sports organisations should therefore put in place policies and procedures across their sport/organisation in respect of the recruitment of staff and volunteers who have contact with children and adults at risk. In particular, all those who have significant contact with children and adults at risk should be subject to criminal record checks, although such checks are only part of a safer recruitment process, not a substitute for it.

(b) The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) B6.56 In England and Wales, the criminal records checking regime is administered by the DBS. The DBS is also responsible for making decisions regarding whether individuals should be barred from engaging in ‘regulated activity’ with children and/ or adults and maintaining statutory lists of those individuals who are barred from working with children and adults.

(c) DBS certificates B6.57 There are four levels of disclosure, each provided by way of certificate: (1) (2) (3) (4)

basic disclosure; standard disclosure; enhanced disclosure without barred list check; and enhanced disclosure with barred list check.

B6.58 The type of information and amount of detail provided by each level of disclosure is prescribed by Pt V  of the Police Act 1997 and the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002. Under s 80 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, disclosure can be sought only by (and therefore only in respect of) individuals aged 16 or over. B6.59 The basic DBS certificate1 will contain details of any ‘unspent’ criminal convictions, conditional and unconditional cautions, or a statement that the individual has no such convictions or cautions. Save that any applicant must be aged 16 or over, there are no eligibility requirements in respect of an application for basic disclosure. The basic DBS certificate will not detail any convictions or cautions that are ‘spent’

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for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, ie those that are removed from an individual’s criminal record after a certain period of time (depending on the offence committed). 1 Police Act 1997, s 112.

B6.60 An application for a standard DBS certificate can be made by an individual but must also be countersigned, or submitted electronically, by a ‘registered person’ (see para B6.75), who must confirm the individual’s entitlement to apply for the certificate. A standard certificate will contain details of ‘spent’ and ‘unspent’ convictions and/or cautions, and it will also contain details of any police reprimands and warnings, unless it is ‘filtered’ out.1 Standard disclosure may only be sought if an exception exists under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 such as to permit the potential employer to ask a question to include reference to spent convictions and cautions (which includes assessing the individual’s suitability to work with children).2 1 For example, offences will be ‘filtered’ out and not subject to disclosure where the offence is not one of those defined as a serious or violent offence, and the applicant has no other convictions. 2 Police Act 1997, s 113A(1) and (2).

B6.61 An application for an enhanced DBS certificate can be made by an individual but, again, must be countersigned, or submitted electronically, by a ‘registered person’ confirming entitlement to apply for the certificate. An enhanced certificate will contain details of ‘spent’ and ‘unspent’ convictions and/or cautions, any police reprimands and warnings, and any relevant police information.1 Where the individual will be undertaking ‘regulated activity’, the disclosure will also contain any information stored about the individual in respect of the relevant statutory barred list(s). Enhanced disclosure may only be sought where: (a)

an exception exists under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975; and (b) the post applied for is covered by the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002. 1 Under s 113B(4) of the Police Act 1997, before an enhanced DBS certificate is issued the chief officer of every relevant police force is asked to provide any information they ‘reasonably believe to be’ relevant, having regard to the purpose for which the certificate is sought. In this respect, chief police officers must have regard to statutory guidance.

B6.62 The DBS maintains a collection of guidance documents to assist in determining whether a role is eligible for basic, standard or enhanced DBS checks, including a helpful ‘eligibility tool’.1 1 See gov.uk/government/collections/dbs-eligibility-guidance [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.63 While the process of criminal record checking is obviously a very helpful tool in preventing harm to children and adults at risk, it should be noted that the DBS has very limited access to criminal records held overseas.1 1 See Home Office, ‘Guidance on the application process for criminal records checks overseas’, December 2019, available at gov.uk/government/publications/criminal-records-checks-for-overseasapplicants/guidance-on-the-application-process-for-criminal-records-checks-overseas [accessed 31 October 2020].

(d) ‘Regulated activity’ B6.64 Schedule 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 as amended, most notably by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, sets out activities that will constitute ‘regulated activity’ in the context of dealing with both children and adults.

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B6.65 ‘Regulated activity’ is an important concept for the following reasons: (a) First, an organisation is required by law to refer an individual to the DBS if it removes them from a regulated activity because they have caused, or may cause, harm to a child or an adult at risk (an organisation must understand what regulated activity is in order to know if they have removed an individual from it).1 (b) Secondly, it is an offence to allow an individual to engage in regulated activity where it is known or believed that the individual is barred from such activity (and so an organisation should take steps to establish whether or not an individual is barred prior to engaging them to perform regulated activity).2 (c) Thirdly, while an organisation can request other levels of disclosure, barred list information will be provided only for individuals who are in regulated activity (and an organisation must obviously understand what regulated activity is in order to know if they can request barred list information). 1 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, s 35. 2 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, s 9.

B6.66 As noted above, the DBS has issued various guidance documents in respect of eligibility for levels of DBS certificate disclosure – helpfully, this includes guidance concerning ‘regulated activity’ in the context of sport.1 Most relevant for sports organisations, when considering roles that involve contact with children: (a) The following activities, if carried out more than three times in any 30-day period, or at any time between 2am and 6am with the opportunity for faceto-face contact with children, will constitute regulated activity in respect of children: (i) Teaching, training or instructing children, unless the teaching, training or instruction is merely incidental to teaching, training or instruction of persons who are not children. (ii) Caring for or supervising children, unless the care or supervision is merely incidental to care for or supervision of persons who are not children. (iii) Providing any form of advice or guidance wholly or mainly for children relating to their physical, emotional or educational well-being (this does not however include legal advice). (b) Driving a vehicle specifically for children, including anyone supervising or caring for children, will also constitute regulated activity, but only if it is carried out more than three times in a 30-day period. 1 See DBS, ‘DBS Checks in Sport – Working with Children’, November 2018, available at assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758272/ENGLISH_-_DBS_ Checks_in_Sports_-_Working_with_Children_LATEST.pdf [accessed 31  October 2020].and DBS, ‘DBS Checks in Sport – Working with Adults’, November 2018, available at assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758275/ENGLISH_-_DBS_Checks_ in_Sports_-_Working_with_Adults.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.67 In the cases of teaching, training, instructing, caring for, or supervising children (which may cover a number of roles in sport, but perhaps most obviously coaches), if the individual performing these activities (person A) is supervised by someone else who is in regulated activity with children (person B), then the individual (person A) is not in regulated activity him or herself. By way of simple illustration, with the caveat that the analysis in any case will always be fact-specific, if one head coach who is undertaking regulated activity is supervising a number of assistant coaches, then the assistant coaches will not themselves be undertaking regulated activity. This was a significant change that was introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, with the intention of fewer individuals being classified as conducting ‘regulated activity’.

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B6.68 Whether or not activities are ‘supervised’ is therefore an important consideration for sports organisations, because (in the cases of teaching, training, instructing, caring for and supervising) it determines whether activity is ‘regulated’ or not. There is statutory guidance in relation to the meaning of ‘supervision’,1 which is supported by further (non-statutory) guidance issued by the CPSU and Sport and Recreation Alliance (SRA).2 1 See Department for Education, ‘Statutory guidance: Regulated Activity (children) – supervision of activity with children which is regulated activity when unsupervised’, 2013, available at assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280881/ supervision_of_activity_with_children_which_is_regulated_activity_when_unsupervised.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020]. 2 See SRA/CPSU, ‘Defining “Supervision” and Regulated Activity – Sport and Recreation Sector Guidance’, January 2017, available at thecpsu.org.uk/media/298545/defining-supervision-and-raguidance-rev-jan17.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.69 The statutory guidance states that an activity will be considered to be ‘supervised’ where: (a) there is supervision by a person who is in regulated activity; (b) the supervision is regular and day-to-day; and (c) the supervision must be reasonable in all the circumstances to ensure the protection of children. B6.70 The statutory guidance recognises that reasonableness will be determined by the organisation having regard to all relevant circumstances. However, the following are listed as standard considerations for all organisations: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

the number of children the individual is working with; the ages of the children, including whether ages differ widely between them; whether or not others are helping to look after the children; the nature of the individual’s work; how vulnerable the children are; and how many workers would be supervised by each supervising worker.

B6.71 Both the statutory guidance and the CPSU/SRA guidance provide example case studies, and the CPSU/SRA guidance is particularly helpful for sports organisations in applying the standard considerations above. For example, the CPSU/SRA guidance notes that the statutory guidance tends to focus on the nature of the activity instead of the type of relationship between the individual and the child/children, but that in sport the position of the individual and the interaction with children which is possible should also be considered when making a judgement on the level of supervision required to reasonably protect children, ie consideration should be given as to whether there is a ‘position of trust’. Further, a number of sports governing bodies promulgate their own guidance in respect of regulated activity and supervision, with reference to positions within their sport and their own rules and regulations. B6.72 In the event that an individual is not eligible for an enhanced disclosure with a barred list check, he/she will still be eligible for other levels of disclosure in accordance with their respective eligibility requirements. In particular, if an activity to be carried out by an individual would have met the definition of ‘regulated activity’ before its amendment by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (which is substantially the same as the current definition save for the ‘supervision’ element), the individual may still apply for an enhanced disclosure without barred list check. B6.73 Activity that will constitute ‘regulated activity’ in respect of adults at risk is much narrower than that in relation to children, and concerns adults who need care and assistance in relation to their day-to-day lives – it includes:

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(a) (b)

providing health care; providing personal care (eg physical assistance with eating, drinking, toileting, washing etc); (c) providing social work; (d) assistance with general household matters (managing cash, paying bills, and shopping); (e) assistance in the conduct of personal affairs (eg power of attorney); and (f) conveying (ie providing transporting assistance as a consequence of the adult’s age, illness, or disability).

(e) Process for obtaining DBS disclosure B6.74 The process for obtaining a basic disclosure certificate is very simple and can be done by individuals online.1 1 See gov.uk/request-copy-criminal-record [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.75 However, as above, in order to obtain a standard or enhanced certificate it is necessary for the application to be counter-signed by a ‘registered person’, ie a body registered with the DBS. Organisations can either register with the DBS directly if they submit more than 100 check applications per year, or they can use an organisation offering ‘umbrella body’ services to apply for DBS checks.1 The latter option is often preferable from the perspective of a sports organisation, largely because umbrella bodies offer specialist services, can provide support accordingly, and act as an intermediary between the sports organisation and the DBS. 1 See HM Government, ‘DBS checks: guidance for employers’, available at gov.uk/guidance/dbs-checkrequests-guidance-for-employers#using-umbrella-body-services-to-submit-dbs-checks [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.76 All registered bodies must comply with the DBS Code of Practice,1 which requires umbrella bodies to take reasonable steps to ensure that organisations on whose behalf they countersign/submit applications comply with their relevant obligations, including that they are entitled to the information requested. If the DBS considers that an organisation has failed to comply with the DBS Code of Practice, it can refuse to provide the information requested. 1 See Home Office, ‘Revised Code of Practice for Disclosure and Barring Service Registered Persons’, November 2015, available at gov.uk/government/publications/dbs-code-of-practice [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.77 The DBS charges a fee for applications, although this is waived in respect of voluntary positions.1 Many positions in grassroots/community sport will qualify for such dispensation. 1 The DBS definition of a volunteer is defined in the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002, at reg 2, as ‘Any person engaged in an activity which involves spending time, unpaid (except for travel and other approved out-of-pocket expenses), doing something which aims to benefit some third party and not a close relative’.

B6.78 Assuming that the DBS issues the information requested following an application, the certificate will be provided to the individual applicant, thus affording the individual the opportunity to review and challenge its content before showing it to the sports organisation. Failing such a challenge, the individual would be expected to provide a copy of the certificate to the sports organisation.

(f) Dealing with any information disclosed B6.79 In the event that a disclosure reveals any information, it will be necessary for the sports organisation to determine whether that information makes the individual

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unsuitable for the role/post he/she applied for. The following are appropriate considerations:1 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

whether the information revealed is relevant to the position applied for; the seriousness of any offence revealed; the age of the applicant at the time of the offence(s); the length of time since the offence(s) occurred; whether the applicant has a pattern of offending behaviour; the circumstances surrounding the offence(s) and the explanation(s) offered by the person concerned; and (g) whether the applicant’s circumstances have changed since the offending behaviour. 1 See, NACRO/CPSU, ‘National governing bodies of sport – Making safe and fair decisions about membership for people with criminal records’, 2018, available at thecpsu.org.uk/download/ media/423492/NACRO-NGBs-Making-safe-and-fair-membership-decisions.pdf [accessed 31  October 2020].

B6.80 The above, or any other suitable criteria adopted by a sports organisation, will obviously need to be applied on a case-by-case basis dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of the applicant, and the role for which the application has applied.

(g) Keeping DBS information up to date B6.81 It is best practice to ensure that DBS information is updated on a regular basis. To that end, the DBS provides an update service for standard and enhanced disclosure, which allows applicants to keep their DBS certificates up to date.1 1 See gov.uk/dbs-update-service [accessed 31 October 2020].

J

Safeguarding regulations and case management

B6.82 In order to effectively manage safeguarding risk within a sport, it is necessary for sports governing bodies, and where relevant other sports organisations, to introduce and maintain regulations and regulatory processes that are specific to safeguarding. More general disciplinary regulations and procedures are very unlikely to be adequate to address the specificities and sensitivities of safeguarding cases. While many of the general principles of regulation apply to safeguarding regulations as to any other form of sports regulation, eg  as to jurisdiction, ensuring a fair procedure, etc there are a number of aspects in respect of safeguarding that require a context-specific response.

(a) Safeguarding offences B6.83 The paramount consideration in respect of safeguarding regulations is to ensure the welfare of participants, particularly children and adults at risk. A significant part of this involves seeking to ensure that those who are involved in sporting activity behave in an appropriate manner, and that those individuals who present an identified risk are not afforded access to those they might harm (or that such access is suitably controlled). B6.84 Therefore, the cornerstone of any set of safeguarding regulations is usually a ‘harm offence’ that allows the sports organisation to take action where: (a) an individual has harmed one or more children/adults at risk; and/or (b) an individual poses or may a risk of such harm.

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In light of the broad nature of what might constitute ‘harm’ and ‘abuse’ generally (as noted at paras B6.10–B6.17), this should be (entirely appropriately) a broadly worded provision. It should also be made clear that a risk of harm can be founded upon conduct that takes place outside of the sporting context, eg by reference to an individual being investigated for, charged, cautioned and/or convicted of a relevant criminal offence.1 1 For example, the safeguarding regulations of both The FA and the RFU both give the governing body the power to suspend participants in circumstances where information suggests that an individual poses or may pose a ‘risk of harm’, which may arise (among other things) as a consequence of a conviction for a criminal offence or as a result of an investigation by the police or a local authority (see Reg 3 of The FA’s Safeguarding Children Regulations, Reg 4 of The FA’s Safeguarding Adults at Risk Regulations, and Reg 21.3 of the RFU’s Regulations). By way of further examples, England Hockey’s Safeguarding and Protecting Young People in Hockey Complaints and Disciplinary Regulations provide that ‘It shall be a ground for disciplinary action to be taken under these regulations where an organisation/person over whom EH has jurisdiction is found to have harmed the safety and/or welfare of a young person or young people in hockey, or whose conduct (whether in hockey or not) is deemed to pose actual or potential risk of harm to the safety and/or welfare of a young person or young people in hockey’ (see Reg 5.1), and the BHA’s Safeguarding Regulations provide that ‘No Person may (i) engage, or attempt or threaten to engage, in conduct that directly or indirectly harms the welfare of one or more Young Persons or Adults at Risk, and/or (ii) pose a risk of harm to one or more Young Persons or Adults at Risk’ (see Reg 4.1), which is accompanied by a note that makes clear that it is ‘not necessary for conduct (or attempted or threatened conduct) to take place in the context of racing activities.’

B6.85 Further, as noted above, safeguarding regulations will typically address safe recruitment and set out relevant requirements in this respect. Safeguarding regulations should therefore provide for consequences in the event that such procedures are not complied with.

(b) Suspension/provisional suspension B6.86 Depending on the seriousness of the case at hand, it might well be intolerable for an individual to continue in their role (at the very least insofar as they are engaged in activity with children/adults at risk) in circumstances where they have harmed a child/adult and risk and/or they pose or may pose a risk of such harm. B6.87 Safeguarding regulations should therefore give sports organisations the power to suspend individuals from their activities (on such terms and conditions as they see fit) where the organisation has reasonable cause/grounds to suspect that an individual has harmed a child/adult at risk, or poses or may pose a risk of such harm. Based on case law from the arena of public authority childcare law, the ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ evidential threshold is very low, and ‘reasonable cause’ is capable of existing on the basis of generalisation, without specific evidence or intelligence.1 1 S v The Swindon Borough Council and Wiltshire County Council [2001] EWHC Admin 334; Re H and others (minors): (Sexual Abuse: Standards of proof) [1996] AC 563.

B6.88 Broadly, there are two ways in which a sports organisation could suspend an individual, and safeguarding regulations could provide for either or both. First, a sports organisation could simply suspend the individual on a sine die basis, ie  indefinitely, in which case the individual should be afforded the opportunity to appeal/challenge that suspension. Secondly, a sports organisation could provisionally suspend the individual, pending a full hearing of the matter before a safeguarding body. The most appropriate approach will vary between sports organisations, in particular depending on their willingness to impose a suspension by way of executive decision (which willingness may be greater if the organisation considers that it has sufficient safeguarding knowledge and experience).

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(c) Responding to safeguarding concerns – investigation B6.89 Serious safeguarding concerns require a robust and immediate initial response, informed and directed by the sport organisation’s lead safeguarding officer and/or (where it has one) its case management group. B6.90 A sports organisation will wish to ensure that it has the necessary powers to fully and effectively investigate any safeguarding concerns. As with other areas of sports regulation, this will include such things as: (a) the power to compel individuals to provide information and documents; (b) an obligation on individuals to cooperate with the investigation; and (c) the power to suspend an investigation while any investigation by the police or other authorities is ongoing (eg a local authority). B6.91 One particular issue that often needs to be considered in child protection matters (but which can arise in other disciplinary matters) is the interrelationship between any governing body investigation and any investigation by the police or other authorities. If a serious matter concerning child protection issues is referred to a governing body, the governing body will need to decide whether or not to refer the matter to the police or social services. If the issues are of a serious (potentially criminal nature1), it is very likely that the governing body should involve the police and social services. There then follows the question as to what the governing body should do where a criminal investigation is also underway.2 1 Consider in particular the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 2 As to which see paras D1.95–D1.98.

B6.92 Investigations should be undertaken by those with the requisite skills, knowledge and experience of investigating safeguarding concerns. This includes having an understanding of the nature and context of the sport/sports organisation and its policies and procedures, safeguarding experience, and general investigative experience. Individuals with professional police, forensic or social work backgrounds can often demonstrate these attributes. Investigators may be individuals already working or volunteering with the organisation in some role or could be external consultants specifically commissioned for the investigator role. Whoever undertakes the investigation should follow a clear, documented and transparent procedure that embeds a child-focused approach, understanding the role that children may play in an investigation (eg as alleged victims, witnesses, or as the accused).1 1 Sport Resolutions UK operates the National Safeguarding Panel, which provides support to UK sports governing bodies in the professional management of safeguarding complaints and concerns. Sport Resolutions UK has published a number of guidance notes and template documents relating to safeguarding investigations, which are available at sportresolutions.co.uk/services/nationalsafeguarding/investigations [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.93 At the end of the investigation, the investigator should produce a professional, comprehensive report, which may conclude: (a) A  child has suffered or is likely to suffer abuse. This will likely result in a referral by the sports organisation to the relevant local authority (if one has not already been made), and the instigation of safeguarding proceedings against the accused individual. (b) The concern relates to poor practice only. This will likely trigger some form of response from the sports organisation, whether it be through a warning/ guidance as to future conduct, or the instigation of formal disciplinary proceedings.

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(c) The concern appears to be without foundation. This will likely result in no further action being taken by the sports organisation (save perhaps to acknowledge the outcome of the investigation).

(d) Responding to safeguarding concerns – risk assessment B6.94 A  tool that can enable a sports organisation to establish the actual or potential harm presented by an individual is risk assessment. Such assessments can be particularly instructive in cases that are complex either by reason of the available evidence or the child protection/safeguarding issues presented. In order to be in a position to require an individual to submit to risk assessment, the sports governing body must ensure that an appropriate provision is incorporated within its regulations. B6.95 The aim of risk assessment is to establish the actual or potential harm presented by an individual.1 The assessment may be undertaken by an independent expert (or experts), who will produce a report assessing the degree of risk presented by the individual in question, considered against a range of factors, including: (a) ‘static’ risk factors that are known to increase risk, such as age at conviction (if any), previous convictions or concerns (if any), and alcohol or substance misuse; (b) ‘dynamic’ risk factors that are also known to increase risk, such as a lack of victim empathy, escalation in angry behaviour, cognitive distortions, rationalising behaviour, and impulsivity; and (c) the nature of the relevant individual’s concerning behaviour, the damage/harm that would result from such behaviour, and the probability it will recur and in what circumstances. 1 See CPSU guidance in relation to the risk assessment process, available at cpsu.org.uk/help-advice/ case-management/ [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.96 The sports organisation will then decide, based on the report, whether the conclusion as to an individual’s degree of risk warrants further action and, if so, the nature of such action. For example, depending on the conclusion, it might be appropriate to instigate safeguarding proceedings, or it might be appropriate to seek to address the individual’s case in another manner, such as getting the individual to undertake training and/or for him/her to be monitored for a period of time. B6.97 If safeguarding proceedings are considered appropriate, then the sports organisation can present the report to the safeguarding panel, together with any recommendations as to measures to be imposed. The panel is thus invited to determine whether it has been established that the individual presents or may present a risk of harm to children, and it is not (as in other disciplinary contexts) asked to determine guilt or innocence.

(e) Safeguarding panels and procedures B6.98 Those who hear safeguarding cases and/or appeals brought under safeguarding regulations should have sufficient safeguarding skills, knowledge and experience to determine such cases. Further, the disciplinary procedures should specifically address the risk of harm to children arising from proceedings themselves, in particular the giving of evidence. For example, a disciplinary panel can be given the power to determine the manner in which children’s evidence might be given (eg on paper, behind screens or through a video link), bearing in mind (for example) the objective of achieving a fair hearing, the possible damage to a child’s welfare

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from giving evidence, and the possible advantages that the child’s evidence will bring to the determination of the truth.1 1 See eg the procedural rules of the National Safeguarding Panel, available at sportresolutions.co.uk/ images/uploads/files/NSP_Rules_2015_redraft_7_April_2015_-_SB_approved_17_April_2015.pdf (in particular, para 10, dealing with the evidence of children) [accessed 31 October 2020].

(f) Risk management measures B6.99 Where an individual is found to have harmed one or more children or adults at risk, or to present a risk of such harm, a sports organisation’s regulations should provide for appropriate risk management measures, reflecting the paramount consideration of ensuring the welfare of participants and the fact that this might in certain cases require on-going risk management support. More general sanctions, eg fixed term suspensions and fines, might well not be appropriate in safeguarding cases. B6.100 Appropriate risk management measures for safeguarding cases might include: (a) an order to undertake specified training; (b) an order requiring an individual to be monitored in specific matters; or (c) Suspension for a specific period (up to and including permanent suspension) on such terms and conditions as are considered appropriate.

(g) Sports organisations as the ‘prosecutor of last resort’ B6.101 Where a case is referred, or referred back, to a sports organisation by the police and/or a local authority – because no criminal charge is issued, or there is no determination of unsuitability to come into contact with children – this can place the sports organisation in an invidious position. B6.102 For example, in the context of criminal investigations, matters have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. Investigations may be discontinued, or prosecutions may fail, because that high standard cannot be met. In contrast, a sports organisation’s disciplinary process will commonly apply a less stringent standard of proof, such as the balance of probabilities. B6.103 So, while there might be a discontinued criminal investigation or a failed criminal prosecution, substantial evidence might nonetheless exist that would give rise to ‘successful’ action under a sports organisation’s own procedures. Ultimately, whether or not to proceed with any action under the sports organisation’s regulations will inevitably be a highly fact-specific decision that will lie with the sports organisation itself.

K Monitoring and evaluation B6.104 A  sports organisation should ensure that its safeguarding policy and procedures remains effective and up to date. This requires, among other things, that all incidents, allegations of abuse and complaints are recorded and monitored so that key messages and learnings are identified and shared, processes are in place to monitor compliance with the sports organisation’s safeguarding policies and procedures, and policies and practices are reviewed (and revised if appropriate) at regular intervals.

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L Dealing with non-recent/historic abuse cases B6.105 Sports organisations may find that they receive reports of abuse that took place some time ago, perhaps even decades ago. Reporting of such abuse can be delayed due to such things as the culture within a sport, fear of reprisals, the degree of control exercised by the abuser, and a sense of shame or fear. B6.106 Sports organisations should put procedures in place in order to address such reports, which need to balance the protection of children in the present, and support for the individual who has come forward.1 It is particularly important that action is taken to investigate reports where there is a possibility that the alleged abuser is still within the sport or may otherwise still be engaged in activities involving children. The individual reporting the abuse should be provided with or otherwise directed to appropriate support services, eg  counselling services. The sports organisations should report such allegations to the police and/or local authority on the same basis as it would for non-historic allegations. 1 The CPSU has published guidance to support sports organisations in responding to reports of non-recent historic abuse. See CPSU, ‘Responding to reports of non-recent historic abuse in sport – CPSU  Guidance’, February 2018, available at thecpsu.org.uk/resource-library/best-practice/ responding-to-reports-of-non-recent-abuse-in-sport/ [accessed 31 October 2020].

M ‘Duty of care’ and the scope of safeguarding in sport beyond children and adults at risk B6.107 Since the last edition of this book, there have been a number of high-profile concerns affecting sports governing bodies relating to conduct and the welfare of participants in British sport.1 In 2017, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson’s ‘Duty of Care in Sport’ report was published,2 which adopted a deliberately broad definition of ‘Duty of Care’, ‘covering everything from personal safety and injury, to mental health issues, to the support given to people at the elite level’ (so is certainly not to be confused with the legal ‘duty of care’ in tort law). The report contained a number of recommendations relating to athlete welfare generally and safeguarding specifically. In 2018, UK Sport published a survey in which a third or so of the 682 respondent athletes stated that they had either personally experienced or witnessed ‘unacceptable behaviour’.3 1 See generally ‘Was 2017 the year British sport lost its way?’, BBC News, 29 December 2017, available at bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42353175 [accessed 13 November 2020]. Prominent examples (referred to in the BBC News report) have included the case of international cyclist Jess Varnish, who alleged that she had been the victim and bullying and discrimination, and international footballer Eniola Aluko, who alleged that she had been subject to bullying and racist comments. More recently, at the time of writing, British Gymnastics is under scrutiny in respect of the treatment of gymnasts. See, ‹British Gymnastics head ‹appalled and ashamed› at multiple abuse stories›, Guardian, 10 July 2020, available at theguardian.com/sport/2020/jul/10/british-gymnastics-head-appalled-and-ashamed-at-multipleabuse-stories [accessed 13 November 2020]. For completeness, it should be noted that this chapter considers safeguarding matters from a sports regulatory perspective and not an employment law perspective, but in the event that an employee of a sports governing body or other sports organisation engages in misconduct against athletes (or others), that can of course be a disciplinary matter in an employment context (as well as a sports regulatory issue). 2 See Baroness Tanni-Grey Thompson DBE, DL, ‘Duty of Care in Sport: Independent Report to Government’, April 2017, available at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/610130/Duty_of_Care_Review_-_April_2017__2.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020]. 3 See UK Sport, ‘2017 Culture Health Check Report’, May 2018, available at uksport.gov.uk/~/media/ files/chc-report-final.pdf?la=en [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.108 In demonstrating increased concern about abuse and unacceptable behaviour, sport is certainly not unique. Outside of sport, there have been matters

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such as allegations of bullying in Parliament, the Harvey Weinstein scandal, various other entertainment scandals, and the birth of the #MeToo movement, all of which things might be said to reflect a shift (or, if not a shift, certainly increased vocalising) of attitudes as to what kinds of behaviours are not to be tolerated in modern society. B6.109 In consequence, sports organisations are likely to continue to come under increased scrutiny in cases where allegations of unacceptable behaviour arise in connection with their activities, and not just in cases that concern children or adults at risk.1 Accordingly, sports organisations might wish to consider what they consider the boundaries of ‘unacceptable behaviour’ to be, and whether their regulations will enable them to respond as they would wish to in cases concerning allegations of unacceptable behaviour – regardless of the age or vulnerability of any victim/complainant, and whether or not the behaviour took place in the context of a participant’s sporting activity.2 1 For example, in the cases of Ched Evans, and Paddy Jackson and Stuart Olding, each of which concerned rape allegations, the responses of the respective sports governing bodies, The FA and the Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU), were subject to close scrutiny in a sports regulatory context. See The FA’s statement in respect of the Ched Evans case , 9 January 2015 (before Mr Evans was ultimately acquitted), available at thefa.com/news/2015/jan/09/statement-ched-evans-090115 [accessed 31 October 2020], in which The FA’s then Chairman Greg Dyke said ‘We have reviewed the Ched Evans case in some detail at The FA and we have examined both the legal requirements and our rules and regulations and there is no basis for us to intervene directly in this particular case. That said, it is important that we continue to look at the issue of behaviour and attitudes within football, and recognise the unique privileges and responsibilities that come with being a participating member of the national game’. See also, in the context of the Jackson and Olding case, a joint statement between the IRFU and the players’ former club Ulster Rugby, dated 14 April 2018, available at ulsterrugby. com/2018/04/irfu-and-ulster-rugby-statement-on-paddy-jackson-and-stuart-olding/ [accessed 31 October 2020], in which it is stated, ‘Following a review, conducted in the aftermath of recent court proceedings, the Irish Rugby Football Union and Ulster Rugby have revoked the contracts of Patrick Jackson and Stuart Olding with immediate effect. In arriving at this decision, the Irish Rugby Football Union and Ulster Rugby acknowledge our responsibility and commitment to the core values of the game: Respect, Inclusivity and Integrity. It has been agreed, as part of this commitment, to conduct an in-depth review of existing structures and educational programmes, within the game in Ireland, to ensure the importance of these core values is clearly understood, supported and practised at every level of the game’. Jackson and Olding were subsequently found not guilty of rape in their criminal trial. 2 In Australia, the National Rugby League introduced a ‘No-Fault Stand Down’ rule that automatically suspended players from playing in the National Rugby League while facing serious criminal charges (being an offence punishable by 11 years’ imprisonment or more). The rule was brought in following the so-called ‘summer from hell’ in which there were a number of allegations made against National Rugby League players concerning sexual and domestic violence against women. The rule was challenged by a player in the Australian courts as a restraint of trade. However, the rule survived that challenge, with the judge in the case finding compelling evidence of the risk of sponsors, broadcasters and fans being alienated and the financial viability of the game being compromised if players facing such charges were permitted to continue playing pending the determination of the charges against them. An important consideration in the decision was that the National Rugby League’s evidence had established that the repercussions from the ‘summer from hell’ posed an immediate and significant danger to its legitimate interests, and that nothing short of the urgent implementation of the ‘No-Fault Stand Down’ rule would address this. See De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Limited [2019]  FCA  688. In cross-examination, the National Rugby League accepted that the rule did not have parallel in any other sports it has researched. While the decision is clearly fact-specific, it is an interesting case for any sports organisation that might wish to bring in a similar rule.

B6.110 A sports organisation might feel that it can rely on a ‘catch-all’ disciplinary provision, such as ‘bringing the sport into disrepute’,1 and (in the absence of anything more specific) such provisions might readily be invoked from time-to-time in order to respond to unacceptable behaviour, eg serious cases of sexual harassment. However, the primary difficulty with relying on a ‘catch-all’ provision (at least exclusively) is that it is by its very nature broad in scope, which potentially leads to uncertainty in marginal cases, ie where people might reasonably differ as to whether behaviour is acceptable or not.2 For example, if there might be some disagreement as to whether it is appropriate for a sports governing body to take action in relation to an incident of

670  Regulating Sport

behaviour that occurs, say, late in the evening after a match at a club’s facilities (and so possibly something of a grey area as to whether it occurs in the context of sporting activity),3 the governing body could seek to remove any doubt by specifically stating that conduct that takes place on club premises, at club events, on club tours, etc is covered. 1 As discussed at paras B3.97–B3.99. 2 See discussion of such clauses, in the context of the doctrine of legal certainty, at para B1.19 et seq. 3 See eg ‘City lawyer Alastair Main sentenced for slapping woman’s bottom’, BBC News, 26 January 2017, available at bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-38757990 [accessed 31  October 2020]. Mr Main, a former England rower, committed the act in question at the London Rowing Club’s Christmas party in Putney in 2015.

B6.111 Sports organisations might however consider that they should adopt specific safeguarding regulations/provisions, or widen the scope of existing safeguarding regulations, to provide regulatory protection to participants beyond the more ‘traditional’ protection for children and adults at risk. Indeed, a number of international governing bodies have begun to adopt this approach.1 Adopting such an approach provides a sports organisation with a more tailored approach for dealing with inevitably sensitive cases of unacceptable behaviour, which might include, for example, providing the sports organisation with the power of provisional suspension where necessary to protect other participants, provisions addressing how sensitive evidence might be dealt with at hearings, and providing for sanctions such as supervision orders, education orders, and other risk management measures. 1 See eg the FEI’s Safeguarding Policy Against Harassment and Abuse, and the ICC’s Safeguarding Regulations, neither of which is limited to the protection of children or adults at risk (the ICC’s regulations are designed to protect ‘Protected Person(s)’, meaning ‘Any person(s) engaged in activities in connection with an ICC Event (whether as a Participant or otherwise), including (but not limited to) Young Persons and Adults at Risk’). See also the Decision of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee dated 8 June 2019, in which the former President of the Afghanistan Football Federation and former FIFA  Standing Committee member was found guilty of having abused his position by sexually abusing various female players, in violation of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which Code specifically prohibits, among other things, harassment and sexual harassment. That decision was later fully confirmed by CAS in July 2020.

B6.112 By way of very general proposition, the further removed a participant’s conduct is from the sporting context, the less obvious the need for a sports organisation to take any action. However, set against that, consideration should also be given as to whether the conduct in question is of such a nature that it: (a) brings the sport into disrepute (which is more likely if, for example, the participant has a prominent, senior or officiating role within the sport); and/or (b) suggests that the wrongdoer is a risk to other participants within the sport. Such considerations might suggest that a sports organisation should be more inclined to take action: in the former case, the conduct might perhaps suitably be addressed by a charge of bringing the sport into disrepute (or other form of misconduct charge), whereas in the latter case, the conduct might be more appropriately considered as a safeguarding matter.

N The international dimension B6.113 International sports organisations, such as international sports federations, can have an important role to play in safeguarding and child protection. B6.114 Of particular note, in 2017 the International Olympic Committee published a ‘toolkit’ for International Federations and National Olympic Committees in respect of safeguarding athletes from harassment and abuse in sport. The toolkit aims to assist

Safeguarding  671

International Federations and National Olympic Committees in the development of policies and procedures to safeguard athletes from harassment and abuse in sport.1 Similarly, FIFA published its own ‘toolkit’ in 2019, which provides a framework to assist its member associations in considering how they can prevent any risk of harm to children in football and respond appropriately.2 The promulgation of such ‘toolkits’ can assist in raising standards across national sports organisations. 1 A  copy of the IOC toolkit can be accessed at olympic.org/athlete365/safeguarding/ [accessed 31 October 2020]. 2 A  copy of the FIFA toolkit can be accessed at fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-guardiansand-new-fifa-child-safeguarding-toolkit-for-member-associations-p [accessed 31 October 2020].

B6.115 Some international federations have also begun to introduce regulations applicable to participants competing at the international level: for example, in 2019, both the Fédération Équestre Internationale and the International Cricket Council introduced such regulations. B6.116 One particular challenge in respect of safeguarding and child protection internationally is the movement of abusers across borders. There have been cases of convicted paedophiles, banned by a sports organisation from participating in a sport in one country, pursuing that sport in another country.1 In such cases, international federations could operate as important hubs to help ensure that such individuals cannot continue to participate in sport under their jurisdiction, eg by keeping a record of those who have been sanctioned by national member federations and sharing that information where necessary. 1 The most high-profile case being that of Graham James, the championship-level ice hockey coach in the Canadian Ice Hockey League, who was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison for the sexual abuse of two of his teenage players. Mr James was banned for life from coaching in Canada by the Canadian Ice Hockey Association. However, after he had served his prison sentence, he moved to Spain where he continued coaching ice hockey (see ‘Graham James coaching in Spain’, CBC News, 26 April 2001, available at cbc.ca/news/canada/graham-james-coaching-in-spain-1.301122, [accessed 31 October 2020]). Another example is Brett Sutton, a triathlon coach who was barred for life from coaching in Australia after he admitted to five offences against a teenage girl in Australia, who went on to coach in Europe (see ‘Every parent’s nightmare’, Observer Sport Monthly, 7 April 2002, available at theguardian.com/observer/osm/story/0,,678189,00.html [accessed 31 October 2020]).

B6.117 However, while it is clear that in recent years there has been increased focus and development in relation to safeguarding, there are obviously many obstacles to the development of an international pan-sport approach, including the ability to share information across sports and various differences in standards of acceptable conduct between nations, and indeed between sports. A response to safeguarding and child protection that might be considered as analogous to the international response to doping therefore appears some way off, even if it is desirable. However, there is no reason in theory why such an approach should not be possible, at least to combat the most serious abuse, ie conduct that is unacceptable by any standard.

Part C

Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

CHAPTER C1

Introduction Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers)

C1.1 Part C  covers the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport, and the efforts that are made to combat that use in light of the harm that it does to the integrity of sporting competition. Doping is an area of interaction between law and sport that has seen a dramatic development over the last decades, and in particular since the inception of the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code) in 2004. While it bears similarities to other actions harmful to sporting integrity, doping involves a number of aspects that are quite distinct to it. In the light of that dramatic development and of those aspects, the fight against doping in sport now warrants being addressed separately and in detail. C1.2 Part C first provides an overview of the regulatory framework that has been established in accordance with the Code1 to combat the use of drugs in sport, both globally (under the auspices of the World Anti-Doping Agency, or WADA) and specifically in the UK (under the auspices of UK Anti-Doping, or UKAD).2 It deals with parties and jurisdiction,3 then discusses the practical issues involved in bringing and defending disciplinary proceedings for breach (or, in the US terminology used in the Code, ‘violation’) of Code-compliant anti-doping rules (an ‘Anti-Doping Rule Violation’, or ‘ADRV’).4 After discussing the burdens of proof and the standards of proof that apply under the Code,5 it takes the practitioner step by step through each ADRV, from the point of view both of the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the proceedings and of the athlete (or coach, trainer, team doctor, or other person) who is the defendant in those proceedings.6 It then takes the reader through the steps a hearing panel will follow to determine the period of ineligibility that should apply if an ADRV is found to have been committed,7 as well as the other consequences that might apply.8 In each case, it sets out what the relevant rules provide and how they have been applied, as well as how hearing panels and the courts have responded to challenges to the fairness and proportionality of those rules. 1 Unless otherwise stated, references in this Part C are to the 2015 version of the World Anti-Doping Code. However, revisions to the Code were adopted at the World Anti-Doping Conference in Katowice in November 2019 that came into effect on 1 January 2021. The key changes to be brought in with the 2021 Code are therefore also highlighted in this Part. 2 See Chapter C2. 3 See Chapter C3. 4 See Chapter C4. 5 See Chapter C5. 6 See Chapters C6–C15. 7 See Chapters C16–C22. 8 See Chapter C23.

C1.3 Disciplinary proceedings brought to enforce the anti-doping rules involve many of the same considerations as disciplinary proceedings brought to enforce other rules of (sporting) professional misconduct. Readers are therefore also referred in particular to the law and practice relating to disciplinary proceedings generally discussed in Chapter D1, ‘Disciplinary and Other Internal Proceedings’. Several other chapters also bear on doping in particular contexts, and readers should also have reference to them.1 1 For example, Chapter A1 discusses international federations’ treatment of national members who fail to apply the Code properly in their national jurisdictions. Chapter D2 deals with the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the final instance court in many anti-doping cases. Part E deals with challenges to the actions of sports governing bodies, which may involve anti-doping.

CHAPTER C2

The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers) Contents .para 1

A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION............................. C2.1

2

THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: AN OVERVIEW.................................. C2.15

3

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE IN THE UK... C2.20

1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION1 C2.1 It has been suggested that the use of performance-enhancing drugs has always been part of sport, going right back to Ancient Greece.2 However, the regulatory response started in earnest only in the late 1960s, after the deaths from amphetamine abuse of Danish cyclist Kurt Jensen during the 1960 Rome Olympics and English cyclist Tony Simpson during the 1967 Tour de France. The Council of Europe first tabled a resolution against the use of drugs in sport in 1960. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) established its Medical Commission in 1967, and introduced a programme for testing for stimulants and narcotics at the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, the sole stated purpose being to protect athletes’ health. At the 1972 Games in Munich, over 2,000 samples were tested. In 1974, the IOC expanded the programme to encompass the prevention of cheating, by banning the use of anabolic steroids. It started testing for steroids at the 1976 Montreal Olympics, although it was only in 1983 that the ability to detect steroids in urine samples took a great leap forward with the introduction of gas chromatography and mass spectometry techniques (news of which breakthrough led to the withdrawal of a substantial number of athletes from that year’s Pan-American Games). There have been several further advances since then. Advanced techniques of chromotographic and spectroscopic analysis now make it possible to detect tiny quantities of drugs (or their markers or metabolites) in a sample, sometimes even well after their administration.3 Expansion of drug-testing programmes to encompass testing of blood samples4 has allowed detection of peptide hormones and mimetics and their analogues, as well as of blood-doping by means of homologous blood transfusions,5 while two different methods have been developed to detect abuse of human growth hormone from analysis of blood samples.6 1 See generally Mottram, ‘An evolution of doping and anti-doping in sport’, in Mottram and Chester, Drugs in Sport, 7th Edn (Routledge, 2018). 2 Mike Rowbottom notes that Galen, writing in the third century BC, observed the practice of Olympic competitors consuming, apparently for performance-enhancement purposes, ‘the rear hooves of an Abyssinian ass, ground up, boiled in oil and flavoured with rose hips and petals’: (2006) Independent, 1 August. 3 The increasing ability to detect ever smaller traces of prohibited substances has increased the ability to detect past misuse but has also on occasion raised the question of environmental contamination. 4 It was during the 1980s that concerns about blood-doping first emerged. Cycling was the first sport to introduce collection of blood samples (to be tested for erythropoietin, or ‘EPO’: see para C6.30), followed by biathlon, skating, skiing, swimming, and athletics. For example, blood and urine samples were collected for analysis at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, the 2001 IAAF World Championships

The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework  677 in Edmonton, and (for the first time in Britain) at the 10th World Half Marathon Championships in Bristol in October 2001. All endurance sports at the Winter Olympics at Salt Lake City in 2002 were subject to blood-testing, as were footballers at the FIFA  2002 World Cup in Japan and Korea: see ‘FIFA acts to boot out World Cup drug fears’ (2002) The Times, 28 February. 5 See para C6.31. 6 See para C6.34 and C6.42.

C2.2 If these developments caused any complacency among regulators, that vanished when Ben Johnson tested positive for stanozolol, a powerful anabolic steroid, after his victory in the 100 metres sprint final at the 1988 Seoul Olympics and had to be stripped of his gold medal. ‘This drew attention, as never before, to the problem of drug use in sport. It did not, by any means stop such use, but it served notice that the problem was far greater than sports officials had yet acknowledged’.1 The Dubin Inquiry in Canada, established in response to that debacle, found that ‘the use of drugs as a method of cheating has reached epidemic proportions’, and concluded: ‘the evidence shows that banned performance-enhancing substances and in particular anabolic steroids are being used by athletes in almost every sport, most extensively in weightlifting and track and field’.2 Further, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, evidence emerged of systematic state-sponsored misuse of drugs in the former East Germany, prompting criminal prosecutions of doctors and coaches for causing grievous bodily harm by giving steroids to minors.3 1 Pound, Inside the Olympics (Wiley, 2004), p 53. 2 Mr Justice Charles Dubin, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (Ottawa 1990), p 517. 3 Franke W  and Berendonk B  (1997), ‘Hormonal doping and androgenization of athletes: a secret program of the German Democratic Republic government’, Clinical Chemistry, 43:1262–1279; Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine (St Martins Press, 2001).

C2.3 In September 1988, the IOC adopted the ‘International Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport’. In 1994, it signed an agreement with the Summer and Winter Olympic Federations and National Olympic Committees to unify anti-doping rules and procedures based on a list of the prohibited substances and methods established by the IOC  Medical Commission, and in September 1994 it duly presented a Medical Code relating to the use of drugs in sport, which included the first IOC List of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods.1 1 IOC Preventing and Fighting against Doping in Sport (Lausanne, 1994).

C2.4 This first attempt at harmonisation of anti-doping rules had limited success. There remained significant differences from sport to sport in terms of what was banned, what was permitted, and what sanctions were imposed.1 This lack of harmonisation was seen as a substantial weakness in the regulatory framework, reflecting a lack of unity within the sports movement in the face of the drugs threat, and significantly undermining the fight against drugs in sport. In November 1998, therefore, the IOC adopted a single unified Anti-Doping Code, which it said should be applied throughout the Olympic Movement. That Code became the basis for the World Anti-Doping Code. 1 See generally Vrijman, ‘A  Commentary on Current Issues and Problems’ in Drugs and Doping in Sport (Cavendish, 2001), p 147.

C2.5 In July 1998, the Festina team was expelled from the Tour de France after French criminal investigators seized evidence of systematic drug use. Further evidence implicated other teams, some of which withdrew, leaving only 15 of the original 21 teams to compete. This scandal (and in particular the opprobrium heaped on sport for its perceived failure to police itself) prompted the IOC to organise the World Anti-Doping Conference at Lausanne in February 1999, to discuss the establishment of an independent anti-doping agency.1

678  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 1 Pound, ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency’ [2002]  ISLR  53 (‘Few international federations have the resources to implement significant anti-doping programs. Still others have preferred to turn a blind eye to the practice or to engage in institutional denial of the existence of a problem. It is safe to say that progress designed to eradicate the practice has been, at best, sporadic. The seminal event that led to the creation of WADA was the Tour de France in 1998. During this event, the French police found doping substances in the possession of certain of the teams and proceeded to arrest not only officials, but also athletes. The sight of athletes being led away by the police, to face possible criminal charges, was most dramatic. It also delivered a “wake-up” message to all other sports; if this could happen to one of the major European sports, in its showcase event, then it could also happen to them. The prospect of sport being governed by criminal law, with a concomitant intervention of the state, was thoroughly unattractive’); Hanstad, Smith, Waddington, ‘The Establishment of the World AntiDoping Agency: A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes’, International Review for the Sociology of Sport 2008; 43; 227.

C2.6 At the 1999 World Anti-Doping Conference, delegates from the Olympic Movement, international federations, the United Nations, governments, national anti-doping agencies, athletes and the medical profession acknowledged that the only effective strategy to fight doping in sport was a uniform approach, coordinated on a global scale through a partnership between sport and government. In the ‘Lausanne Declaration’, they agreed to establish an independent international antidoping agency, with a mandate ‘to co-ordinate the various programmes necessary to realise the objectives that shall be defined jointly by all the parties concerned’.1 They also declared their commitment to make the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code ‘the basis for the fight against doping in sport’.2 That Code came into effect on 1 January 2000. 1 Declaration on Doping in Sport, World Anti-Doping Conference (Lausanne, 1999). See Pound, Inside the Olympics (Wiley, 2004), pp 69–74; Houlihan ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for Success’ in Drugs and Doping in Sport (Cavendish, 2001), p 125. 2 Declaration on Doping in Sport, World Anti-Doping Conference (Lausanne, 1999).

C2.7 The World Anti-Doping Agency was formally established on 10 November 1999, with a mission to coordinate and monitor the fight against doping in sport on a worldwide basis.1 With headquarters in Montreal, Canada, it has a Foundation Board of 36, of whom 18 are from the Olympic Movement and 18 from public authorities, as well as an Executive Committee of 12, including five sports movement representatives and five public authority representatives, one from each continental region.2 This formal joint venture of government and the private sports movement, coming together to address one of the key regulatory challenges facing the world of sport, was then, and remains now, unique.3 It is a remarkable partnership, even if (according to one of its principal architects) the commitment of governments only came about because their bluff was called on all of their criticism of the sports movement for failing to regulate itself effectively.4 Whatever the provenance of the partnership, ‘this unusual structure is recognition of the fact that governments and the sporting movement must act together to fight doping and that neither sector will be successful without the collaboration and cooperation of the other’.5 1 According to its ‘constitutive instrument of foundation’, WADA’s objects are ‘(1) to promote and coordinate at international level the fight against doping in sport in all its forms including through in and out-of-competition; to this end, the Foundation will cooperate with intergovernmental organizations, governments, public authorities and other public and private bodies fighting against doping in sport, inter alia the International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Sports Federations (IF), National Olympic Committees (NOC) and the athletes; it will seek and obtain from all of the above the moral and political commitment to follow its recommendations; (2) to reinforce at international level ethical principles for the practice of doping-free sport and to help protect the health of athletes; (3) to establish, adapt, modify and update for all the public and private bodies concerned […] the list of substances and methods prohibited in the practice of sport; […] (4) to encourage, support, coordinate and, when necessary, undertake, in full cooperation with the public and private bodies concerned, […] the organization of unannounced out-of-competition testing; (5) to develop, harmonize and unify scientific, sampling and technical standards and procedures with regard to analyses and equipment, including the homologation of laboratories, and to create a reference laboratory; (6) to promote

The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework  679 harmonized rules, disciplinary procedures, sanctions and other means of combating doping in sport, and contribute to the unification thereof, taking into account the rights of athletes; (7) to devise and develop anti-doping education and prevention programmes at international level, in view of promoting the practice of doping-free sport in accordance with ethical principles; [and] (8) to promote and coordinate research in the fight against doping in sport’. 2 Initially, various governmental bodies expressed concern about the (perceived lack of) independence and transparency of WADA, and its ‘precise remit’, given the IOC’s heavy involvement. See eg European Commission press release IP/99/767. The Commission said that ‘Governments would not accept an agency which was merely an appendage of sports Organizations’: ‘The Fight Against Doping in Sport’, Working paper for the First European Sports Conference (Olympia, May 1999). Various steps were taken to resolve these concerns, including agreeing on equal representation of sports bodies and governments on the WADA Foundation Board, and a rotation of the chair between the two constituencies (although that last measure was blighted in controversy in 2007, when the term of Richard Pound, the IOC’s nominee as WADA’s first Chairman, came to end. The government stakeholders failed to agree on a single nominee, with Australian politician John Fahey being put up against French sports minister Jean-Francois Lamour. Lamour eventually withdrew and Fahey was elected chairman unopposed, but with great acrimony, at the World Anti-Doping Conference in Madrid in November 2007). In November 2013, Sir Craig Reedie was installed as successor to Fahey; and in November 2019 former Polish athlete Wittold Banka succeeded Reedie as WADA President. As a result of governance changes agreed in 2019, the first two independent members of the WADA Executive Board were appointed in December 2020, and the successor to Wittold Banka as WADA President will also be independent both of the sports movement and of the public authorities. 3 Although there are those who have called for it to be replicated in the field of match-fixing and related corruption, given that the threat such conduct causes, and the practical problems involved in fighting it, are so similar to what is encountered in the anti-doping field. See para B4.55. 4 Pound, Inside the Olympics (Wiley, 2004), pp 72–73. 5 UNESCO Director-General’s Final Report on the Preparation of the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, ED/2005/CONV-DOP Rep1 (Paris, February 2005), para 7.

C2.8 WADA immediately turned its attention to creating a new worldwide anti-doping code, incorporating an agreed list of prohibited substances, a uniform definition of doping offences, common standards for sample collection and analysis, a harmonised set of sanctions (with carefully limited mechanisms for departure from the specified norm), and the Court of Arbitration for Sport1 as the ultimate arbiter of how the code should be interpreted and applied. After an extensive consultation process, the draft code was presented to the delegates to the second World Conference in Doping on Sport, held in Copenhagen in March 2003, and they voted to adopt it as the first World Anti-Doping Code with effect from 1 January 2004. 1 See Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport).

C2.9

As the CAS has noted:

‘The WADC is not per se legally binding. The Signatories of the WADC are required to implement applicable provisions through policies, statutes, rules or regulations according to their authority and within their respective spheres of responsibility’.1

International Federations were required to sign up to the Code and implement Codecompliant anti-doping rules prior to the 2004 Athens Olympics. All International Federations who participate in the Olympic Games did so, as did most International Federations who do not participate in the Games but whose members receive public funding channelled through National Olympic Committees and are required to be Code-compliant to be eligible for such funds.2 FIFA’s initial adoption of the Code was qualified,3 but that qualification was eventually dropped when the CAS rejected FIFA’s purported legal objections to aspects of the Code.4 Today there are 690 Signatories to the Code, including the IOC and International Paralympic Committee (‘IPC’), International Federations, Major Event Organizations, National Olympic Committees and National Paralympic Committees, and National Anti-Doping Organizations. 1 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 15. 2 ‘IOC: “Mind” sports must drug test too’ (2003) Tribune Review, 16 April (chess and other ‘mind sports’ to sign up to Code, and undertake drug testing, not because they perceive a drugs threat to their sports, but because they receive public funding through their National Olympic Committees).

680  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 3 FIFA  Congress Declaration of 21  May 2004, declaring only FIFA’s ‘respect for the World AntiDoping Code’, which FIFA subsequently argued constituted acceptance of the Code with the reservation of ‘factors specific to football and generally recognized principles of law’. FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 20. 4 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 and 986. The CAS was asked (a) if the FIFA rules are substantially different to the provisions of the Code; and (b) if the Code provisions on sanctions are compatible with Swiss law. It answered both questions in the affirmative.

C2.10 While governments were able to signal their political commitment to the Code by signing the Copenhagen Declaration, many governments cannot bind themselves legally to a non-governmental document like the Code. Therefore it was agreed to develop a UNESCO Convention that governments could ratify, and then incorporate by legislation into their national laws.1 The International Convention against Doping in Sport was adopted unanimously by the 33rd UNESCO General Conference on 19 October 2005. It came into effect on 1 February 2007, once 40 countries had ratified it. As of March 2020, 189  UNESCO  Member States had become state parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport.2 1 See Pound, ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency’ [2002] ISLR 53, 58 (governmental process of ratifying a convention and then incorporating its norms into national law by legislation ‘is, perhaps, somewhat short of ideal, but it would at least provide notice, that could be taken into account by state courts, of the recognised international norms in respect of doping in sport and that, in the interim, before the legislation actually becomes part of the domestic law, act to inhibit state court awards that might differ from those made within the sport movement’). 2 unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E [accessed 2 November 2020].

C2.11 The UNESCO Convention1 gives governments a practical tool for aligning their domestic policies with the Code. In particular: (a) Article 1 defines the purpose of the Convention, ie to promote the prevention of, and the fight against, doping in sport. (b) Article 3 outlines the means to achieve this purpose, including an obligation for State Parties to encourage all forms of international cooperation, particularly with WADA, and also underlines the importance of ensuring that any measures adopted against doping are consistent with the Code. (c) Article 4 commits State Parties to the principles of the Code as the basis for appropriate measures, to be taken at national level, including legislation, regulation, policies or administrative practices, to achieve the objectives of and to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Those obligations include the following: (i) ensuring that national laws contain appropriate measures against trafficking of prohibited substances and methods to athletes (Art 8); (ii) applying financial sanctions (ie  withdrawal of/ineligibility for public funding) with respect to individuals who commit anti-doping rule violations and organisations that do not comply with the Code (Art 11); (iii) encouraging and facilitating cooperation between public and private agencies in the fight against doping in sport (Art 13); (iv) supporting the mission of WADA in the international fight against doping (Art 14); and (d) Article  9 calls for State Parties to take measures and to encourage relevant organisations to take action against athlete support personnel who commit an anti-doping rule violation. In short, the Convention ‘impose[s] a legal obligation on all governments to work with sport, under the auspices of the World Anti-Doping Agency, to eradicate doping in sport’.2 1 unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/international-convention-againstdoping-in-sport/. See generally UNESCO Director-General’s Final Report on the Preparation of the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, ED/2005/CONV-DOP Rep1 (Paris, February 2005).

The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework  681 2 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Explanatory Memorandum on the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping In Sport, 1 February 2006, Cm 6742. But see comments of IAAF President Lamine Diack to the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Madrid, 16 November 2007: ‘The fatal flaw in the Convention is that the World Anti-Doping Code and the International Standards are not an integral part of the Convention itself and they do not create binding obligations on the Governments as a matter of international law. The Convention commits the Governments only to the principles of the Code and the IAAF would respectfully suggest that this falls some way short of the type of legally binding commitment that was called for in Copenhagen and which is so fundamental to the principle of harmonisation that the Code is intended to achieve. As the leadership of WADA passes to the Governments for the next four year period, this is an issue of critical importance that must be addressed through amendment to the UNESCO Convention itself’. No such amendment was ever introduced, and even today there are no meaningful consequences for breach by a State Party of its obligations under the Convention.

C2.12 In April 2006, WADA started a consultation process on proposed revisions to the Code based on lessons learned during its first three years of implementation.1 Three successive drafts were circulated for consultation between then and August 2007, and in November 2007 the delegates to the World Anti-Doping Conference in Madrid passed a resolution welcoming the Foundation Board’s adoption of revisions to the Code, which came into effect on 1  January 2009 (the ‘2009 Code’). The major changes introduced included a clarification of the rules as to management of atypical findings, standardisation of whereabouts requirements, making provisional suspension mandatory in certain cases, incentivising admissions and cooperation with anti-doping authorities, and (perhaps most importantly) changing the sanctions regime to increase the flexibility given to hearing panels to depart (both upwards and downwards) from the fixed sanctions specified in the Code. C2.13 From November 2011 to May 2013, WADA conducted another consultation exercise on proposed revisions to the 2009 Code and the supporting International Standards, with (again) three successive drafts being circulated for comment. A revised Code was adopted by delegates to the World Anti-Doping Conference in Johannesburg in November 2013 and came into effect on 1 January 2015 (the ‘2015 Code’). The major changes introduced by the 2015 Code included a new anti-doping rule violation (Prohibited Association), a new four-year sanction for intentional violations (but no more provision for aggravated sanctions), and greater emphasis on more intelligent testing and on use of investigative techniques. C2.14 From December 2017 to February 2019, WADA conducted a third global consultation exercise on proposed revisions to the 2015 Code and the supporting International Standards, again circulating three successive drafts to stakeholders for comment. A revised Code was adopted by delegates to the World Anti-Doping Conference in Katowice, Poland in November 2019, and will come into effect on 1 January 2021 (the ‘2021 Code’). The major changes to be introduced by the 2021 Code include providing that officers and employees and other persons involved in Anti-Doping Organizations are bound by and liable for breach of certain parts of the Code, adding a new anti-doping rule violation to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation, potential reduction in sanctions for certain refusal and tampering violations and increase in the maximum sanction for complicity, strengthening the standards for fair hearings before independent panels, allowing greater scope for mitigation of sanction in cases involving recreational drugs, and reintroduction of the power to increase the sanction in cases of aggravating circumstances.

2 THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: AN OVERVIEW C2.15 The Introduction to the 2015 Code states: ‘The Code is the fundamental and universal document upon which the World AntiDoping Program in sport is based. The purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-

682  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement doping effort through universal harmonization of core anti-doping elements. It is intended to be specific enough to achieve complete harmonization on issues where uniformity is required, yet general enough in other areas to permit flexibility on how agreed upon anti-doping procedures are implemented. The Code has been drafted giving consideration to the principles of proportionality and human rights. […] ‘All provisions of the Code are mandatory in substance and must be followed as applicable by each Anti-Doping Organization and Athlete or other Person. The Code does not, however, replace or eliminate the need for comprehensive anti-doping rules to be adopted by each Anti-Doping Organization. While some provisions of the Code must be incorporated without substantive change by each Anti-Doping Organization in its own anti-doping rules, other provisions of the Code establish mandatory guiding principles that allow flexibility in the formulation of rules by each Anti-Doping Organization or establish requirements that must be followed by each Anti-Doping Organization but need not be repeated in its own anti-doping rules’.

Code Article 23.2.2 specifies that the Code provisions that must be incorporated into Signatories’ anti-doping rules ‘without substantive change’ are Arts 1 (Definition of Doping) and 2 (Anti-Doping Rule Violations), Art 3 (Proof of Doping), Art 4.2.2 (Specified Substances), Art 4.3.3 (WADA’s Determination of the Prohibited List), Art 7.11 (Retirement from Sport), Art 9 (Automatic Disqualification of Individual Results), Art 10 (Sanctions on Individuals), Art 11 (Consequences to Teams), Art 13 (Appeals),1 Art 15.1 (Recognition of Decisions), Art 17 (Statute of Limitations), Art 24 (Interpretation of the Code), and Appendix 1 (Definitions). Code Article 23.2.2 also states that ‘no additional provision may be added to a Signatory’s rules which changes the effect of [these mandatory] Articles’.2 1 Except Code Arts 13.2.2, 13.6 and 13.7. 2 This is the provision that the IOC fell foul of with its ‘Osaka rule’ excluding from the next Olympic Games athletes who had been banned for doping for more than six months, and the British Olympic Association fell foul of with its bye-law excluding athletes who had been banned for doping for more than six months from selection for the GB Olympic team for life: see para B1.11 n 23 and D2.197.

C2.16 The other provisions of the Code ‘establish mandatory guiding principles that allow flexibility in the formulation of rules by each Anti-Doping Organization or establish requirements that must be followed by each Anti-Doping Organization but need not be repeated in its own anti-doping rules’.1 Thus, the Code leaves each Signatory to decide, when incorporating the requirements of the Code into its own rules: (1) what the results management process should be;2 (2 whether an athlete charged with an anti-doping rule violation should be provisionally suspended pending determination of the charge (save where there is an adverse analytical finding for a non-Specified Substance, when provisional suspension is mandatory);3 (3) what form the disciplinary process and hearing should take;4 and (4) the route of appeal for a national-level athlete (ie whether to a national-level appeal body or to the CAS).5 The Code also allows particular sports to apply to have additional substances and methods added to the Prohibited List for that sport only (but not to have substances or methods deleted from the list for that sport only).6 1 See Introduction to 2015 Code, p.16. 2 See Code Art 7 and the comment thereto: ‘Various Signatories have created their own approaches to results management. While the various approaches have not been entirely uniform, many have proven to be fair and effective systems for results management. The Code does not supplant each of the Signatories’ results management systems. This Article does, however, specify basic principles in order to ensure the fundamental fairness of the results management process which must be observed

The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework  683

3 4 5 6

by each Signatory. The specific anti-doping rules of each Signatory shall be consistent with these basic principles’. See Code Art 7.9 and paras C4.25–C4.30. See Code Art 8. The types of issues that an Anti-Doping Organization has to address when formulating its disciplinary procedures are discussed in Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and other Internal Proceedings). See Code Art 13.2.2. See Code Art 4.2.1.

C2.17 Therefore, the Code provides a mandatory framework for the regulation of drug use within a particular sport and/or a particular country. The Code requires every Anti-Doping Organization to put in place rules and procedures to ensure that all athletes and other persons under the Anti-Doping Organization’s jurisdiction are informed of and agree to be bound by its anti-doping rules. In practice, that agreement is likely to be evidenced by conduct (participation in the sport in the knowledge that such participation is subject to rules and regulations to protect the integrity of the sport) rather than in writing.1 1 See paras C2.9 to C2.11.

C2.18 Sitting below the Code in the World Anti-Doping Program are the International Standards, which formalise different technical and operational areas within standard anti-doping programmes. ‘Adherence to the International Standards is mandatory for compliance with the Code’.1 In other words, an Anti-Doping Organization is not Code-compliant, even if it has adopted anti-doping rules that comply with the mandatory provisions of the Code, if it has not also incorporated the International Standards by reference into those rules. The Code does, however, create a substantial incentive for following the International Standards, by providing that ‘compliance with an International Standard (as opposed to another alternative standard, practice or procedure) shall be sufficient to conclude that the procedures addressed by the International Standard were performed properly’.2 1 Introduction to the Code, p 12. While the Code may only be changed by the Foundation Board (Code Art 23.7), amendments to the Standards may be made at any time by the WADA Executive Committee. The International Standard for the Prohibited List is changed at least annually: see para C6.35 et seq. 2 Strangely, although this provision is of great practical importance (see para C2.74 et seq), it does not appear in the operative provisions of the Code, but instead is buried in Appendix One to the Code, in the definition of the term ‘International Standards’.

C2.19 The current International Standards are: (a) The List of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods, a cornerstone document that is discussed at para C6.35 et seq.1 (b) The International Standard for Testing and Investigations, the main purpose of which is help signatories: ‘to plan for intelligent and effective Testing, both In-Competition and Out-ofCompetition, and to maintain the integrity and identity of the Samples collected from the point the Athlete is notified of the Test, to the point the Samples are delivered to the Laboratory for analysis’.2

Its provisions on test distribution planning and on the sample collection process itself,3 as well as storage and transport of samples after collection, are of huge practical importance. It was expanded in 2009 to incorporate mandatory whereabouts requirements,4 and in 2015 to incorporate standards for the gathering of intelligence and the conduct of investigations. (c) The International Standard for Laboratories, which sets out what laboratories must do in order to secure and thereafter to maintain their WADA accreditation (including following a proficiency testing programme).5 In conjunction with a series of WADA Technical Documents on specific issues,

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the ISL then sets out the standards that such laboratories must follow in taking custody of and analysing samples to test for the presence of prohibited substances, and reporting its findings to the Anti-Doping Organization with results management authority over the case. Together with the International Standard for Testing and Investigations, the ISL is a cornerstone of any case where there is an allegation that a prohibited substance has been found in an athlete’s sample.6 ‘Its main purpose is to ensure laboratory production of valid test results and evidentiary data. It is also intended to ensure that the accredited laboratories achieve uniform and harmonised results and reporting thereon’.7 (d) The International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions, which identifies the criteria to be used to determine whether there is medical justification for athletes to be granted permission to use prohibited substances or methods, outlines the process to be followed in applying for a TUE, provides for the confidentiality of such process, and explains the types of evidence required to support an application. (e) The International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information, the purpose of which is ‘to ensure that Anti-Doping Organizations apply appropriate, sufficient and effective privacy protections to the Personal Information they Process when conducting anti-doping programs, in recognition of the fact that Personal Information gathered in the anti-doping context can impinge upon and implicate the privacy rights and interests of persons involved in and associated with organised sport’.8 (f) The International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories, brought into effect as from 1  April 2018, which sets out how WADA will monitor compliance by Code Signatories with their obligations under the Code and the International Standards, and identifies the procedure to be followed in cases of non-compliance, which mirrors as closely as possible the procedures followed in cases of Code non-compliance by individuals, including WADA sending a formal notice alleging non-compliance and proposing consequences from the range specified in Article  11 of the International Standard (from 2021, in Art 24.1.12 of the 2021 Code), and the Signatory either admitting the non-compliance and accepting the proposed consequences, or else disputing them, in which case the matter is referred to the CAS Ordinary Division for determination, and it is WADA’s burden to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Signatory is non-compliant as alleged, and to argue for the imposition of the consequences it has proposed. And, in addition, from 1 January 2021: (a) The International Standard for Results Management, which sets out the core responsibilities of Anti-Doping Organizations in relation to results management, from initial review and notification of alleged anti-doping rule violations, through provisional suspension, to hearings on the merits, issue of a decision on the merits, and appeal. (b) The International Standard for Education, the main purpose of which is to establish mandatory standards to support Signatories in the planning and implementation of effective education programmes. 1 For an overview of the categories of prohibited substances and the reasons why they are prohibited, see Bird et al, Doping in sport and exercise: anabolic, ergogenic, health and clinical issues, Annals of Clinical Biochemistry 2016, Vol 53(2) 196–221. 2 ISTI (March 2019), section 1.0. 3 See para C6.5 et seq. 4 See para C2.12. 5 ISL Part Two. 6 See para C6.20 et seq. 7 E. & A. v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 7. 8 ISPP (June 2018), pp 1–2. See para A4.110 et seq.

The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework  685

3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE IN THE UK C2.20 Consistent with its non-interventionist approach to the regulation of sport generally,1 the UK Government historically took a relatively hands-off approach to the regulation of drug use in sport. It endorsed the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code,2 and was an early signatory to the Council of Europe’s  1989 Anti-Doping Convention.3 However, it never passed any specific legislation to incorporate the provisions of these international instruments into domestic law, or to require sports bodies to adopt anti-doping programmes reflecting their provisions. Instead, the regulation, policing and enforcement of anti-doping rules in sport in the United Kingdom were left largely to the national governing bodies of the respective sports.4 1 See generally Chapter A3 (Government Intervention in the Sports Sector). In contrast, interventionist states such as France and Italy issued codified anti-doping regulations that sports federations had to adopt and enforce, or else face being stripped of their right to govern their respective sports. See eg French Law no 99 222 of 23 March 1999 and the Italian Law no 376 of 14 December 2000, both on ‘Discipline of health protection in sports activities and of fight against doping’. 2 See para C2.4. 3 The Anti-Doping Convention (Council of Europe – European Treaties – ETS  No  135) was adopted in 1989. Forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe have signed it, including the UK, and eight non-members, including Australia and the United States. Until the introduction of the UNESCO  International Anti-Doping Convention, it was the main legal instrument for the harmonisation of doping rules at government level. 4 See para A3.117.

C2.21 However, the creation of the public-private partnership of WADA in 1999 and the issue of the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 shifted the anti-doping paradigm in the UK fundamentally. Between the advent of the Code in 2003 and late 2009, working within the ‘policy’-based framework of conditioning access to public funding and benefits on compliance with government policy,1 the Drug-Free Sport Directorate of UK  Sport managed to introduce elements of centralisation and harmonisation to anti-doping rule-making and adjudication among the UK’s national governing bodies. It implemented a National Governing Body Anti-Doping Agreement, requiring a national governing body, if it wished to be eligible for public funding, to adopt, police and enforce Code-compliant anti-doping rules. It issued model Anti-Doping Rules that national governing bodies could adopt to fulfil the first part of that commitment. It started to exercise the right of appeal given to it under those rules to ensure that anti-doping decisions issued by tribunals appointed by those national governing bodies were consistent with the Code. It established an independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear all cases arising under the antidoping rules of the UK’s national governing bodies. It thereby introduced a level, Code-compliant playing field across the whole of UK sport in terms of the rule making and adjudication functions. And in 2007 the UK  Sport board announced that it was recommending that the government require national governing bodies, as a further condition of eligibility for public funding, to transfer exclusive results management authority (ie the authority to investigate matters and determine whether there is a case to answer under the doping rules) to a new independent National AntiDoping Organization.2 1 See para A3.119. 2 UK Sport press releases dated 25 July 2007 and 16 October 2007.

C2.22 Following extensive consultation with the sports movement, in December 2009 the UK Government finalised and published its National Anti-Doping Policy,1 the introduction to which states: ‘The UK Government and the Devolved Administrations condemn doping in sport and are committed to the pursuit of clean sport. They consider that this objective is

686  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement best pursued through a partnership between government and the sports movement (in line with that represented on a global level by the World Anti-Doping Agency, or “WADA”), and through the harmonisation of anti-doping rules using the framework provided by the World Anti-Doping Code (the “Code”). Accordingly, by ratifying the UNESCO  International Convention Against Doping in Sport (the “UNESCO  Convention”), the UK  Parliament has formally committed the UK Government as well as the Devolved Administrations to the pursuit of dopingfree sport based on the principles set out in the Code. Acting with the guidance of the UK’s National Anti-Doping Organisation (the new non-departmental public body known as “UK Anti-Doping”, which has succeeded the Drug-Free Sport Directorate of UK Sport in this role) and with the support of UK Sport and each of the four Home Country Sports Councils, the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations have sought to satisfy the requirements of the UNESCO Convention by adopting the anti-doping policy framework set out in this document (the “UK National Anti-Doping Policy”, or “Policy”). The purpose of the UK National Anti-Doping Policy is to set out the policy objectives and requirements of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations in the field of doping in sport, and to identify the roles and responsibilities of each of UK Anti-Doping, the Sports Councils, and the national governing bodies of sport in the UK (ie any sports organisation that serves as the ruling body for a sport or for an event involving one or more sports) (“NGBs”), as well as of the National Anti-Doping Panel, in delivering on and/or otherwise supporting those objectives and requirements’.

The National Anti-Doping Policy establishes a truly unified UK approach to the fight against doping in sport under the auspices of UK Anti-Doping as the National AntiDoping Organization (NADO) for the UK. It requires the national governing bodies of sport in the UK to adopt either the UK Anti-Doping Rules issued by UK AntiDoping or other Code-compliant anti-doping rules mandated by their international federations, to delegate results management and case prosecution responsibility to UK Anti-Doping (save where UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own systems are Code-compliant), and to appoint the independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear and determine all charges that the anti-doping rules have been breached (save where UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own tribunals are Code-compliant). 1 UK National Anti-Doping Policy, version 1.0, 14 December 2009.

C2.23 The creation of UK Anti-Doping and the powers given to it by the National Anti-Doping Policy have significantly enhanced the fight against doping in sport, and not just by harmonising rule making, results management, and case adjudication across all sports. It was UK Sport’s view that giving one central and independent body a clear public mandate and authority to investigate violations and manage results across all sports would help clear the path towards proper cooperation between public and private anti-doping authorities. It was also UK  Sport’s view that centralising results management authority in this way would also facilitate information-sharing by law enforcement agencies with the sports anti-doping movement. And this has proved correct: since UK Anti-Doping opened its doors in December 2009, it has applied significant resources to the investigation and pursuit of ‘non-analytical’ cases, based in particular on the sharing of intelligence and information with the police, Customs, and other public agencies, with some considerable success.1 1 For example, UK Anti-Doping used evidence supplied by the police to obtain aggravated sanctions against an athlete in UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10  December 2012, paras 46–47 (four-year ban imposed based on admissions made at police interview that steroids found in athlete’s home were for his personal use in training for competition); in UK Anti-Doping v Olubamiwo, NADP Consent Order dated 13 June 2012 (boxer banned for four years for using multiple prohibited substances repeatedly and intentionally over a period of several years as part of a doping scheme or plan, based on evidence supplied by US law enforcement as part of Operation Raw Deal); and in UK Anti-Doping v Fletcher, issued decision dated 29 November 2011 (four-year ban imposed for trafficking in human growth hormone and various steroids).

CHAPTER C3

Parties Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers) .

Contents

para

1

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS?.. C3.1

2

WHO IS SUBJECT TO ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS?.............................. C3.5

1 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS? C3.1 Although many different organisations are signatories to the Code, only those signatories referred to in the Code as ‘Anti-Doping Organizations’1 are ‘responsible for adopting rules for initiating, implementing or enforcing any part of the Doping Control process’.2 Most anti-doping proceedings are brought by international federations3 or by National Anti-Doping Organizations (‘NADOs’) such as UK Anti-Doping.4 The Code definition of ‘Anti-Doping Organization’ also encompasses the organisers of major events (such as the IOC, as organiser of the Olympic Games, and the IPC, as organiser of the Paralympic Games), but if there is an anti-doping rule violation at those Games the IOC or IPC (as applicable) brings proceedings only to disqualify the athlete from further participation in the Games. It is for the international federation to bring its own disciplinary proceedings if it considers that the ADRV also warrants banning the athlete from participation in other events for a period.5 1 That American spelling is followed in this Part. 2 Code App 1, p 130, definition of ‘Anti-Doping Organization’. For a discussion of ‘Doping Control’, see para C6.3. 3 Although many international federations are now responding to allegations of conflict of interest (actual or apparent) by delegating their anti-doping functions to the International Testing Agency (website: ita.sport) or to operationally independent units (eg World Athletics and the International Biathlon Union delegate all of their integrity functions, including anti-doping, to – respectively – the Athletics Integrity Unit and the Biathlon Integrity Unit). 4 UK Anti-Doping’s website is ukad.org.uk. 5 Code Art 7.1.1.

C3.2 The international federation’s anti-doping rules will apply to athletes competing at international level. However, as part of the classic ‘pyramid’ model of sports governance and regulation,1 the international federation’s rules will also require its member national federations to apply the same or equivalent anti-doping rules to athletes competing at national level. In many cases, the national federation is ill-equipped to perform this role, and/or it is a condition of public funding that the role be assigned to an independent body. It is also WADA policy, and in the 2021 Code it will become a requirement, that national federations recognise the authority of their respective NADOs and delegate their anti-doping testing to the NADOs. Therefore, WADA’s model anti-doping rules for international federations include a provision acknowledging that the national federation’s anti-doping responsibilities may be discharged by the NADO in its country. In the UK, for example, it is a requirement of the UK  National Anti-Doping Policy that national federations delegate responsibility for managing results and bringing proceedings under their anti-doping rules to UK  Anti-Doping.2 Opt-outs are permitted on an exceptional

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basis, but the only national federations in the UK that have reserved the right to bring their own disciplinary proceeding for violation of their anti-doping rules are the Football Associations of England and Wales, the Rugby Football Union, and the England & Wales Cricket Board. UK Anti-Doping is responsible for policing and enforcing the anti-doping rules of all other national federations in the UK, including UK Athletics, the Rugby Football League, British Cycling, and the Lawn Tennis Association. A NADO also has stand-alone jurisdiction, under Code Art 5.2.1, over all athletes who are nationals or residents of, or members of or licensed by sports organisations in, its country (wherever they may be at any one time) as well as any other athletes who are present in its country (eg for training or competition). 1 See para A1.22. 2 See para C2.22.

C3.3 Usually the party that conducts or commissions drug testing (the ‘Testing Authority’) is also the ‘Results Management Authority’, ie the party that manages the results of the test, including taking any adverse analytical finding to a hearing,1 but not necessarily. For example, a NADO may test a foreign athlete while he is training in its country.2 If it is doing so by agreement with and as an agent of another AntiDoping Organization (eg  the athlete’s international federation), usually that other Anti-Doping Organization will have responsibility for managing the test results. In the absence of prior agreement, Code Art 7.1 determines who has the authority (and the responsibility) to manage the results. In accordance with Code Art 7.1.1, if there is no other candidate, results management responsibility defaults to the international federation, although it may then delegate that responsibility to its relevant member national federation, which may in turn have agreed (or been required) to delegate it to its NADO.3 1 Code Art 7.1 states: ‘Except as provided in Articles 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 below, results management and hearings shall be the responsibility of, and shall be governed by, the procedural rules of the AntiDoping Organization that initiated and directed Sample collection (or, if no Sample collection is involved, the Anti-Doping Organization which first provides notice to an Athlete or other Person of an asserted anti-doping rule violation and then diligently pursues that anti-doping rule violation)’. 2 Code Art 5.2.1; WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 64 (US NADO has authority to test Egyptian athlete while he is in the US). 3 See para C3.2. See also comment 46 to 2021 Code Art 7.3.1: ‘The Athlete’s or other Person’s International Federation has been made the Anti-Doping Organization of last resort for Results Management to avoid the possibility that no Anti-Doping Organization would have authority to conduct Results Management. An International Federation is free to provide in its own anti-doping rules that the Athlete’s or other Person’s National Anti-Doping Organization shall conduct Results Management’. Code Art 7.1.1 gives WADA the right to resolve any dispute between Anti-Doping Organizations as to which of them should exercise results management authority in a particular case. This was in response to a high-profile dispute that blew up in 2012 between the US NADO (the US Anti-Doping Agency, or ‘USADA’) and the UCI over which of them had results management authority with respect to evidence of anti-doping rule violations by Lance Armstrong and others. The UCI initially insisted that it should have results management authority over the case, because the allegations involved samples that it had collected and/or it had discovered the alleged violations. USADA took a different view in USADA v Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility, dated 10 October 2012, p 157 et seq, on the basis that the violations had not been revealed by the testing of Armstrong’s samples but instead had been discovered by USADA’s intelligence-gathering efforts, and that in any event Armstrong was an American athlete who had subjected himself to US Cycling’s rules. The UCI did not take the matter any further, noting that even if it was right that it had results management authority under its rules, those rules delegated that authority to US Cycling, which was required by virtue of its membership of the US Olympic Committee to delegate it again to USADA. UCI decision regarding USADA  v Armstrong, 22  October 2012. And nor did Armstrong test these jurisdictional points, because after a federal court in Texas ruled that he was required to submit to arbitration of USADA’s allegations he chose to take no further part in the proceedings, allowing what was in effect a default judgment to be entered against him. Certain of the other individuals charged as co-conspirators by USADA did dispute the charges, and challenged USADA’s assertion of jurisdiction over them, but that challenge was rejected by the AAA panel in USADA v Bruyneel and others, AAA Panel decision dated 7 June 2013. The AAA Panel

Parties  689 held that the defendants were subject to the UCI Rules, under which the body first discovering the violation had jurisdiction, and therefore when they had submitted themselves to those rules they had in effect agreed to the results management authority of USADA. That ruling was upheld in Bruyneel v USADA, Marti v USADA, and WADA v Bruyneel et al, CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599 and 3618. This was a robust rejection of the proposition that there was no arbitration agreement between USADA and the defendants and that therefore there could not be jurisdiction. In a slightly different context, other courts dealing with sports arbitration clauses may also be prepared to hold that an agreement arises between two participants on the basis that each of them is individually bound by a governing body’s arbitration clause: see Bony v Kacou [2017]  EWHC  2146 (Ch), where it was held there was no arbitration agreement and Mercato Sports (UK) Limited v Everton Football Club Co Limited [2018] EWHC 1567 (Ch), where it was held that there was. See also para D3.8.

C3.4 In the case of whereabouts violations, where each of the athlete’s international federation, his NADO, and the NADO of any country in which he trains or competes has the right to use the whereabouts information filed by the athlete in the central database, ADAMS, to locate and test him,1 it is the Anti-Doping Organization with which the athlete files his whereabouts information (ie his international federation or his NADO) that manages the results of any filing failures or missed tests, and has authority to charge the athlete with an anti-doping rule violation once three whereabouts violations have been declared against the athlete in one 12-month period.2 1 See para C9.2. 2 Code Arts 7.1.2 and 7.6; Annex I, section I.5 (Results Management) of the International Standard for Testing & Investigations (March 2019).

2 WHO IS SUBJECT TO ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS? C3.5 All athletes competing in a major event will be subject to the anti-doping rules issued by the organiser of that event.1 They may also be tested by the NADO in whose country the event is held, where such testing is out-of-competition testing or where (if in-competition) it is agreed with the event organiser in accordance with Code Art 5.3.2 Athletes will also be subject to their international federation’s antidoping rules if they compete at international level, and to their national federation’s anti-doping rules (or, by delegation, the rules of their country’s NADO) to the extent they compete at national level. They will also be subject to the anti-doping jurisdiction of any NADO in whose country they live or train or compete.3 1 See Code Arts 5.2.3, 5.3.1. 2 Code Art 5.3.2 (WADA to decide in case event organiser and NADO cannot agree on NADO testing at event). 3 See Code Art 5.2.1 (‘Each National Anti-Doping Organization shall have In-Competition and Outof-Competition Testing authority over all Athletes who are nationals, residents, license-holders or members of sport organizations in that National Anti-Doping Organization’s country’).

C3.6 A hearing panel convened to hear and determine a charge that an athlete has committed an anti-doping rule violation will expect the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the case to identify the ‘legal instrument’ that binds the athlete to the antidoping rules under which the proceedings have been brought.1 It will also want to be satisfied that the athlete was aware (or should be deemed to have been aware) of the rules and agreed (or should be deemed to have agreed) to be bound by and to comply with them.2 1 Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 9.1.2. See also Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 105 (‘The Athlete can only be sanctioned for an ADRV according to the TADP if he was bound by the respective rules at the relevant time, ie, at the time the ADRV was committed’). This reflects the fact that the regulatory authority of most sports bodies is based on the athlete’s acceptance of and agreement to abide by their rules, which therefore represent a contract between the governing body and the athlete. See generally para A2.13. See also Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.16 (‘It is clear as a matter of English law that the relationship between UKA and Ohuruogu is

690  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement contractual in nature. Ohuruogu agreed to be subject to the UKA’s new regime when she signed the form that contained those procedures on 25 July 2005 […]’). Where the ADRV charged is presence of a prohibited substance in the athlete’s sample, the athlete cannot avoid liability by arguing that he used the substance before he became bound by the anti-doping rules. Scott v ITF, CAS  2018/A/5768, para  106 (‘the alleged ADRV in question here is TADP Article  2.1, ie  the presence of a Prohibited Substance in the Athlete’s urine sample (not the administration or use of a prohibited substance). […] Such an ADRV is committed whenever the laboratory analysis of an athlete’s urine or blood sample reveals that such sample contains a Prohibited Substance. The Athlete – while competing at the Czech Republic Futures tournament – had a Prohibited Substance in his system, ie at a point in time at which he was undoubtedly bound by the TADP. Therefore, there is no question here of any retroactive application of the TADP. Instead, for the Appellant to be bound to the TADP at the relevant time it suffices that the Appellant (allegedly) had a prohibited substance in his body when he submitted to the July 2017 doping control. To find differently would permit any athlete to abuse an assortment of performance enhancing substances prior to joining the professional ranks and later to claim innocence just because substances were ingested (whether intentionally or unintentionally) prior to his or her being bound by the rules’). 2 Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 9.1.2 (‘The question remains through which legal instrument the Appellant is bound by the FINA  Rules. In particular the following questions arise: Is there a chain of references to the FINA Rules in the by-laws (starting from the Appellant’s swimming club over the by-laws of the Italian Swimming Federation to the FINA Statutes)? Is there an agreement / licence/“swimming passport” through which the Appellant has accepted that she is subject to the FIA  Rules?’); International Rugby Board v Troy & ARU, CAS  2008/A/1664, para  38 (‘[…] the [ARU Anti-Doping] By-Law is only enforceable by reason of contract. Thus there must be some evidence that the Respondent undertook contractually to be bound by the By-Law’).

C3.7 However, the anti-doping rules are now so well-known that athletes’ claims of ignorance are generally given short shrift.1 Furthermore, the hearing panel will not generally require proof of a specific written agreement to abide by the rules, signed by the athlete.2 Instead, it will readily infer acceptance of the rules and agreement to abide by them simply from the athlete’s participation in the sport.3 Indeed, the 2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules4 proceed expressly on that premise.5 1 See eg Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 88 (‘The Panel agrees with the FIA that the CAS jurisprudence is clear that all those participating in organised sport are deemed to know that, in order to ensure a level playing-field for all, there are strict anti-doping rules that must be complied with, and they are deemed to be bound by those rules whether or not they have ever explicitly signed up to them or even read them’, citing cases); FEI v Stroman, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 79 (‘[…] it is part of the lex ludica that athletes […] who are subject to particular anti-doping regimes of their chosen sport must themselves take steps to familiarise themselves with the content of those regimes’, even where the rules, being international, are not in the athlete’s mother tongue); I. v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 93 (‘[…] it is a well-known facet of anti-doping law that every athlete has the duty to be acquainted with the contents of the Prohibited List and to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his or her body. In accordance with the legal principle ignorantia legis neminem excusat, an athlete may not escape antidoping liability merely because he or she was unaware of the content of anti-doping rules’); UK AntiDoping v Llewellyn, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 14 February 2013, para 5.3 (‘[…] the time must surely by now have come when it is not open to any athlete, save perhaps in the most exceptional circumstances, to contend that he or she is unaware of the WADC or of Anti-Doping Rules generally’). See also cases cited at para C8.3, n 3. 2 Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697, para 84 (‘[…] a tacit declaration of will may be deduced from a conduct of a party. The execution of a contract requires two concurrent declarations of intent, ie an offer by one party and an acceptance by the other party. Absent any specific provision to the contrary, the declaration of intent may either by expressly or tacitly. No written form requirement needs to be met’); and cases cited in footnote 3, below. If there is a written agreement, however (for example, an event entry form signed by the athlete, agreeing to abide by the rules in question), that is likely to be dispositive. See eg Korda v ITF Ltd [1999] All ER (D) 84 (Lightman J). The athlete denied that he had agreed to comply with the ITF’s Anti-Doping Programme. In his May 1998 entry form for that year’s Grand Slam event at Wimbledon, however, he had acknowledged the application of anti-doping regulations ‘imposed on the Championships […] by the governing bodies of the game’. Mr Justice Lightman therefore had ‘no doubt that such a contractual relationship has been established’. He rejected the athlete’s suggestion that the acknowledgement in the form was simply a submission to the jurisdiction of the Appeals Committee sitting to hear cases arising under that Programme, ‘rather than such as to establish in the circumstances the creation of a contractual relationship. This appears to me to be totally unreal. Any submission to the jurisdiction of the Appeals Committee sitting to hear cases arising under that programme, must in the circumstances be part of an acceptance of a contractual relationship on the terms of the Programme which defines the status, jurisdiction and procedures of the Appeals Committee’. See also Ohuruogu v UK Athletics

Parties  691 and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.16 (‘It is clear as a matter of English law that the relationship between UKA and Ohuruogu is contractual in nature. Ohuruogu agreed to be subject to the UKA’s new regime when she signed the form that contained those procedures on 25 July 2005 and it is clear in the Panel’s view that she committed a doping offence under those procedures’); Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6  January 2009, pp 9-10 (‘The Appellant signed a Player’s Registration Form on 27 August 2004 which provided – “[…] and I hereby undertake to observe the by-laws, resolutions and regulations of the Welsh Rugby Union and Rules of the National League and the Konica Minolta competition and any such replacement, substituting or successor competition”. On 31 May 2004 the Player had previously signed a Registration of Contract Player Form which provided – “[…] and I hereby undertake to observe the by-laws, resolutions and regulations of the Union from time to time and the Rules of the National League and the Principality Cup or any such replacement, substitute or successor competitions”. […] Having expressly agreed on two occasions to be subject to the regulations of the Respondents and those regulations incorporating IRB Regulation 21, the Appeal Tribunal had considerable difficulty in understanding what the Appellant’s criticism of the decision of the Judicial Committee [that he was contractually bound to observe the WRU’s anti-doping rules] was in relation to this matter. The Appellant had by express contractual provision agreed to be bound by all of the Respondent’s regulations which must include its anti-doping regulations which in turn incorporate the relevant IRB Regulations. It follows that the Appellant was bound to submit to the Out of Competition Doping Control Procedures in which the Appellant, without objection, took part on 27 January 2005’). In such circumstances, arguments that it was not clear from the form what the athlete was being asked to agree to (eg because the rules were not easily accessible) are also likely to be given short shrift. See eg I. v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, paras 72–75; ASADA v Atkins, CAS 2009/O/A1. The hearing panel in Atkins ruled that a lifeguard was subject to his national association’s anti-doping policy by virtue of his signature of an application for membership of the national association that included an agreement to be bound by ‘any regulations, policies and codes of conduct’ made under its constitution. The arbitrator rejected the lifeguard’s claim that the anti-doping rules needed to be brought specifically to his attention in order to be binding on him. The Cologne Regional Court adopted similar reasoning in Lagat v WADA and IAAF, judgment dated 13 September 2006, pp 5–6, in upholding the defendants’ argument that certain of the athlete’s claims were subject to arbitration by virtue of provisions in his sport’s anti-doping rules giving the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) jurisdiction over those claims. By signing the doping control form: ‘the Claimant in principle also submitted himself as non-member to the rulebook and therefore to the disciplinary power or arbitration of [the IAAF]. […] Indeed, normally the rules which competitors in sporting events have to subject themselves to are stipulated in largely standardised competition rules of the leading organisations responsible for the sporting discipline concerned and which apply to all participants equally. This does not at all constitute a sanction unduly restricting the personal or professional freedom of the individual, but is a necessary condition for sporting activity and the participation in organised competitions. Therefore, every athlete […] assumes that written rules have been drawn up by the relevant federation for the sport practised by him which must be complied with equally by all athletes. As the Claimant declared by providing his signature that he was submitting to the rulebook of [the IAAF] he cannot claim that he knew nothing about the sanctions to be expected if rules were breached. The Claimant does not need to have intimate knowledge of the rules for the submission to the rulebook of [the IAAF] to be valid. It is sufficient if he could have had knowledge of them. There is no indication that the Claimant was unable to gain knowledge in a reasonable way of the content thereof. The Claimant as a top athlete is aware that sport is operated in accordance with fixed rules. As a professional athlete he is obliged in his own interest to have knowledge of these rules, to inform himself so as not to suffer economic or legal disadvantages. […] Therefore the Panel does not join the view of the Claimant that he was forced to sign the document. It is a part of his profession to submit to doping tests between competitions as well as a condition for eligibility for sporting competitions. He did not plead that he was not aware of this general rule or that he had reservations about subjecting himself to the rules of [the IAAF] on that day, and if necessary why. It is also not clear how the Defendant is supposed to have coerced the Claimant into signing’. 3 Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 86 (rejecting driver’s argument that he was not bound by anti-doping rules because he never signed any document agreeing to be bound by them, and agreeing with the FIA that ‘tacit agreement suffices. […] The regulation of international sports is important in order to ensure sporting fairness, safety and in essence maintain the attractiveness of sports to fans, media and sponsors thus ensuring the sports’ viability. Sportsmen and women often engage in sport, even at its highest level, without analysis of the legal principles and regulations governing such sport. Yet, the legitimate expectation of other participants, fans and persons involved is that all participants will be bound by the same legal system and this is logically understood by all athletes. Such tacit consent, stemming, for example, from the mere participation in international events, suffices to bind these sportsmen and sportswomen by the regulations of the specific sport’) and para 87 (‘The Panel further agrees with the FIA that just because some athletes are required to sign a consent form explicitly agreeing to be bound by the FIA ADR and are thus bound by express consent, does not mean that other participants in the same sport cannot be bound by implied consent’); Chicherova v IOC, CAS 2016/A/4839, para 316 (‘[…] there was an implied contractual acceptance of the rules and

692  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement regulations including the Beijing ADR through participation and accreditation at Beijing 2008’) and para 317 (‘Under Swiss law (namely Article 11 of the CO), contracts do not have to be in writing’); Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, para 93 (‘While obtaining a licence to compete from a federation or when participating in a sport event, an athlete accepts that the anti-doping rules of that federation or event organizer bind him/her’); Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697, paras 84-86 (‘The execution of a contract requires two concurrent declarations of intent, ie an offer by one party and an acceptance by the other party. Absent any specific provision to the contrary, the declaration of intent may either be expressly or tacitly. No written form requirement needs to be met. Furthermore, the declarations of intent must be corresponding in order for there to be a valid contract. Thus, the Parties must agree on the essentialia negotii of the contract, ie – in this specific case that the TADP is applicable between them […]. The Sole Arbitrator notes that […] a tacit declaration of will may be deduced from a conduct of a party. A  conduct from which one might typically infer that someone agrees to be bound to the rules is […] if the person participates in the sport’); Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.26 (‘[…] the Appellant, when she entered the IWF European Championships, accepted the IWF Regulations and the sanctions provided in the IWF ADP. As Respondent correctly submitted, by participating in an IWF competition, the Appellant entered into a contractual relationship with the Respondent, and, consequently, subjected herself to the IWF ADP with respect to doping matters’); I v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 70 (‘It is inconceivable that an athlete – whatever his age – might take part in an international competition sanctioned by an international federation without, at the same time, submitting to the sporting rules duly adopted and duly published (in particular on the internet, as is the case here) by that international federation. Sport requires for all competitors a level playing field, both in a literal and in a metaphorical sense, without which it would not be true sport’); Pechstein, DESG  v ISU, CAS  2009/A/1912-1913, paras 98–99 (‘Ms Pechstein has been participating in “international activities” for more than two decades […]. In willingly registering for international skating competitions sanctioned by the ISU, she obviously expressed her acceptance of ISU rules and regulations, including the ISU ADR. [99]. In the Panel’s view, anti-doping rules are as necessary to ensure a “level playing field” as, for example, the racing rules obliging the skaters to change from inner to outer lane and vice versa when they arrive at the crossing straight. […] When they accede to competition, athletes cannot pick and choose the rules they like; accordingly, the Panel finds that Ms Pechstein has been at all times during her international career under an obligation to comply with all ISU regulations, including all applicable anti-doping rules’); USADA v Reed, CAS 2008/A/1577, para 5 (‘R, by virtue of his membership in USATT and by participation in the US trials organised by USATT, agreed to be bound by the USOC  National Anti-Doping Policies and, specifically, the USADA Protocol. Accordingly, he submitted to binding arbitration before the AAA and to appeal any decision of the AAA  Panel to CAS’); WADA  v FECNA & Prieto, CAS 2007/A/1284, para 47 (‘[…] competitors generally submit themselves to all applicable regulations of the relevant competition (including doping rules) by their participation in the competition’); Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032, para 68 (‘Concerning the player’s rights as a minor and as an athlete, the Panel finds that no violations of such rights have been established. In that connection, the Panel considers that, at the very least, the player became bound by the TADP by participating in Roland Garros because by her doing so with her father’s consent they both demonstrated their intention that she be subject to the rights and obligations stemming therefrom […]’); Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, p 10 (‘Even if there had been no such registration forms signed by the Appellant we would have been satisfied that the Appellant had agreed to be subject to the Respondent’s anti-doping regulations and Regulation 21 by virtue of having taken part in organised rugby within the geographical jurisdiction of the respondent and by taking part in competitions organised by the Respondent’); CCES v Galle, SDRCC Doping Tribunal decision dated 23 April 2009, p 22 (‘As a member of CABA [the Canadian Amateur Boxing Association], Ms Galle is bound [by] the CADP by virtue of her participation in sport and there is no requirement for her to sign a particular document to that effect’); Watt v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2015, para 10 (‘A player is deemed to accept the rules of the league in participating in competition, including the applicable anti-doping rules, so that the principles set out by Mance LJ in Modahl v British Athletic Federation [2001] EWCA Civ 1447 at paragraph 105 apply so as to create an implied contract incorporating the Rules’). This approach has been confirmed by a number of courts in different jurisdictions. For example, in Modahl v British Athletics Federation [2001] All ER (D) 181, the English Court of Appeal held that by entering competitions staged under and in accordance with the BAF’s rules, the athlete tacitly entered into a binding contract with the BAF to abide by those rules, even though she signed no entry form stating that expressly. (See further para E7.13 and E7.14). Similarly, in Korda v ITF Ltd [1999] All ER (D) 84, the English High Court found that even though Mr Korda had not expressly agreed (in writing or orally) to abide by the TADP, such an agreement was ‘plainly to be inferred’ from the facts and circumstances of the case, including that ‘(a) Mr Korda was when he entered and participated in the Meeting [the 1998 Wimbledon Championships] a person on whom an obligation was purported to be imposed by Section (B) [of the Programme]; (b) There is no evidence as to Mr Korda’s state of knowledge, but Mr Korda concedes that at all times he knew of the existence of the Programme, though he does not concede that he knew its detailed provisions; […]’. The same is true of the Swiss courts: see Roberts v FIBA, SFT decision 4P 230/2000, 2001 ASA Bull 523, 7 February 2001; and A v

Parties  693 Association B, SFT decision 5A.805/2014 dated 22 June 2015, para 5.4.3 (’The fact that the appellant regularly participated in competitions as an elite athlete, without contesting her submission to the rules of D and B, could be considered a sufficient basis to justify in fact the appellant’s submission to the federation’s rules, the connection linking the athlete to the federation of which he is not directly a member is based on a contractual link and not a connection of belonging to an association’) (unofficial English translation). It is also true of the German courts: see Oberlandesgericht Dresden (Dresden Appeal Court) decision dated 18 December 2003 (published in SpuRt 2004, p 75 et seq), where the Appeal Court found that an athlete had submitted to the disciplinary rules of the German athletics federation (Deutscher Leichtathletik-Verband, (DLV)), and to the jurisdiction of the DLV’s disciplinary panel, even though he had not signed the annual athlete agreement for the relevant year, because he had requested an authorisation to compete and it was undisputed that he had participated in competitions organised by the DLV in that year. The Appeal Court cited (at p 76) a German Supreme Court decision of 28 January 1994 for the proposition that ‘submission to the rules of the relevant sports federation is not to be decided solely based on the competitor’s membership, but instead may arise through participation in an event advertised by the sports federation or the obtaining of a general authorisation to start or play’ (unofficial English translation). Nor has the argument that there is no real consent because the athlete has no choice but to accept the rules obtained any purchase. See eg Hill v NCAA, 1994 7 Cal 4th 1 (Supreme Court of California) (‘[…] athlete participation is not a government benefit or an economic necessity that society has decreed must be open to all. […] Participation in any organised activity carried on by a private nongovernmental organization necessarily entails a willingness to forego assertion of individual rights one might otherwise have in order to receive the benefits of communal associations […]’); Legal Opinion of Claude Roullier dated 25  October 2005 on Art 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code, pp 34–35 (‘Naturally, we cannot ignore the fact that a professional athlete can hardly be said to have any freedom of choice when, in order to start a career, he or she requests a licence and applies for membership in a federation. But the consent that is given at that time has to be considered an enlightened consent […]. If the athlete’s prior acceptance of the sanctions set out in Article 10.2 of the Code can be so characterized as enlightened consent, it is because the person concerned agrees to become a professional athlete, and in order to accede to that eminently public role, naturally agrees to abide by the “rules of the game” in the world he or she is entering, one of the most essential of which is fair play – the practical expression of the principles of fairness and equality of treatment – which holds it as an imperative that one refrain from using substances that can distort results. The interests of a loyal athlete can only coincide at that point with those of the association that will offer him or her the means to demonstrate his or her talent […] and ultimately, to make a living from it. This is an ethical rule that must apply to the athlete in a world where professional solidarity cannot be lacking. Accordingly, in this context of an association, there is no place for a requirement identical to the one that the constitutional system imposes on the State where it wishes to restrict personal liberty or economic liberty. On the other hand, standards of an association that would be comparable to acts of the State infringing upon the essence of those fundamental rights, such as sanctions that society as a whole would perceive as injurious or degrading, would clearly not be admissible, in spite of the athlete’s prior acceptance. But experience shows that this is not the case for suspensions imposed on professional athletes for reasons such as those on which the Code is based’). See also cases cited at para C4.15. 4 2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules, version 2.0, in effect as from 1 October 2019, para 1.2.2. These are the relevant rules for most anti-doping proceedings brought in the UK: see para A3.121. 5 Ibid, Art 1.2.2: ‘To be a member of the NGB and/or of member or affiliate organisations or licensees of the NGB, or to be eligible to participate (in the case of an Athlete) or assist any participating Athlete (in the case of Athlete Support Personnel) in any Event, Competition or other activity organised, convened or authorised by the NGB or any of its member or affiliate organisations or licensees, a person must agree to be bound by and to comply with these Rules. Accordingly, by becoming such a member or by so participating or assisting, an Athlete/Athlete Support Personnel (as applicable) shall be deemed to have agreed: (a) to be bound by and to comply strictly with these Rules (without prejudice to any other anti-doping rules applicable to him/her); (b) to submit to the authority of the NGB and of the NADO to apply, police and enforce these Rules; (c) to provide all requested assistance to the NGB and the NADO (as applicable) in the application, policing and enforcement of these Rules, including (without limitation) cooperating fully with any investigation, results management exercise, and/or proceedings being conducted pursuant to these Rules in relation to any potential Anti-Doping Rule Violation(s); (d) to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any NADP first instance tribunal convened under these Rules to hear and determine charges and related issues arising under these Rules; (e) to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any NADP appeal tribunal and/or CAS panel convened under these Rules to hear and determine appeals made pursuant to these Rules; and (f) further to Article 16, not to bring any proceedings in any court or other forum that are inconsistent with the foregoing submission to the jurisdiction of the NADP first instance tribunal, the NADP appeal tribunal and CAS’.

C3.8 The 2015 Code also imposes specific obligations on (and specifies serious sanctions for non-compliance with those obligations by) many non-athletes, including coaches, trainers, team doctors, and other ‘Athlete Support Personnel’,1

694  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

as well as (in certain cases) other ‘Persons’.2 Where such non-athletes are part of the team that accompanies the athlete to the competition venue, they may sign terms of accreditation for the event (or similar document) that expressly require them to acknowledge their agreement to comply with the anti-doping rules applicable to the sport. Alternatively, they may be required to obtain a licence from the national federation to act as athlete support personnel in the sport, which may again include an express acknowledgement of and submission to the applicable anti-doping rules.3 Even if not, again hearing panels may be happy to find that the coach or doctor or similar has tacitly agreed to abide by a sport’s anti-doping rules simply by working in support of athletes participating in the sport.4 However, the more attenuated the non-athlete’s connection with the sport, the more difficult it may become for the Anti-Doping Organization to establish to the satisfaction of the hearing panel that the non-athlete should be deemed to have agreed to comply with the anti-doping rules of that sport, and to submit to the jurisdiction of the hearing panel to hear and determine charges that he or she has failed to comply.5 1 The Code defines ‘Athlete Support Personnel’ (App One, p  132) as: ‘Any coach, trainer, manager, agent, team staff, official, medical, paramedical personnel, parent or any other Person working with, treating or assisting an Athlete participating in or preparing for sports Competition’. An Athlete Support Person may be charged with an ADRV under Art 2.5 (Tampering or Attempting Tampering), Art 2.6 (Possession), Art 2.7 (Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking), Art 2.8 (Administration), Art 2.9 (Complicity or Attempted Complicity), Art 2.10 (Prohibited Association), and (under the 2021 Code) Art 11 (Retaliation). 2 The Code definition of ‘Trafficking’ (Appendix 1 of the Code) refers to conduct by ‘an Athlete, Athlete Support Personnel or any other Person subject to the jurisdiction of an Anti-Doping Organization’, thereby suggesting that an ‘other Person’ may be liable for Trafficking, without explaining who might be in this third, catch-all category who would not also be in the first two categories. Similarly, Code Art 2.10 prohibits ‘association by an Athlete or other Person subject to the authority of an Anti-Doping Organization in a professional or sport-related capacity with any Athlete Support Person who’ is serving a doping-related ban. 3 Bruyneel v USADA, Marti v USADA, and WADA v Bruyneel et al, CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599 and 3618, paras 118, 179 (USADA had anti-doping jurisdiction over Mr Bruyneel from the date he signed his licence with his national federation, agreeing to be bound by the UCI ADR). 4 Patrugan v Romanian Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2017/A/5209, para 92 (‘[…] the Appellant, in her own words, treated the athletes while they were in the training camp preparing for the 2015 World Championships, and that she had received allowances from or on behalf of the RKCF in connection with the support provided by her. […] [N]either [Romanian law] nor the WADC […] require for a physician to qualify as “Athlete Support Personnel” that a specific written contract has been entered into between the relevant sports federation and the physician, nor that the physician in question has a specific certification in sports medicine’); USADA  v Bruyneel and others, AAA  Panel decision dated 7 June 2013, para 36 (set out in full in AAA Panel decision dated 21 April 2014, p 19) (‘Dr Celaya and Mr Marti are not License-Holders under the UCI ADR. There is no dispute on this point. Nevertheless, as non-License-Holders, Dr Celaya and Mr Marti are still subject to the UCI ADR through Article  18(1) and Article  1. As provided above, Article  18(1) states that any person who “without being a holder of a license, participates in a cycling Event in any capacity whatsoever […] shall be subject to these Anti-Doping Rules […] as they apply to a License-Holder.” Article 1 confirms that the UCI ADR “shall also apply to other Persons as provided in article 18.” Here, USADA has presented substantial evidence […] that Dr Celaya and Mr Marti participated in cycling events as athlete personnel and accordingly meet the threshold requirements to be categorized in Article 18(1). The Panel therefore finds that the UCI ADR apply to Dr Celaya and Mr Marti’), upheld on appeal, Bruyneel v USADA, Marti v USADA, and WADA v Bruyneel et al, CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599 and 3618, para 285; UK Anti-Doping v Skafidas, NADP Tribunal decision dated 22 February 2016, para 13 (‘So in 2015 Dr Skafidas did not hold a licence to act as a coach but it is clear from the evidence that in administering prohibited substances to Bernice Wilson in January or February he was assisting in her preparation for competition […]’) and paras 14-15 (‘It is not necessary for a coach to be subject to the UKA ADR that he should hold a valid licence from UKA or participate in events organised by UKA. 15. In acting as Bernice Wilson’s coach, trainer or manager between 2011 and 2015 Dr Skafidas was bound by the UKA Anti-Doping Rules, and the contraventions alleged in this case fall within the jurisdiction of this tribunal’); UK Anti-Doping v Philip Tinklin, NADP Tribunal decision dated 28 May 2014, paras 5.4 to 5.6 (by transporting his own and other children to WABA events and competitions, the respondent tacitly agreed to be bound by the anti-doping rules as an ‘athlete support personnel’); USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 7 (‘Respondent [a coach] was a registered member of USA Track and Field […]. He actively participated in the IAAF and USATF events […]. He is the principal in charge of a group of elite distance athletes subject to IAAF and

Parties  695 USATF rules, known as the NOP. He provided athlete support services to many individuals associated with the NOP during the relevant period. As such, he is an “Athlete Support Person” subject to the USADA Protocol, the USOPC Anti-Doping Policies, and the Code’); USADA v Brown, AAA Panel decision dated 30  September 2019, para  4.1 (‘Respondent [a doctor] was a registered member of USATF, the national governing body for the sport of Track and Field in the United States during the relevant period. He provided athlete support services to many individuals associated with the NOP [Nike Oregon Project] during the relevant period. As such, he is an “Athlete Support Person” subject to the USADA Protocol, the USOPC Anti-Doping Policies, and the Code’). Similarly, outside the anti-doping context but relevant by analogy nevertheless, in ERC v Williams et al, Appeal Committee decision dated 1 September 2009, pp 33–36, the tournament rules clearly imposed obligations not just on players in teams competing in the tournament but also on coaches, physiotherapists and other support staff working for those teams. The appeal panel rejected an argument that a team coach and a team physiotherapist were not bound by those rules because they had not signed a consent form agreeing to be bound, stating: ‘[…] both Mr Richards [the team coach] and Mr Brennan [the team physiotherapist)] had entered into an implied contract with the [tournament organiser] ERC on the basis of their conduct by which they submitted to the rules, including the Disciplinary Rules, of the Tournament as contained in the Participation Agreement. The Appeal Committee rejected the submission […] that this could only be achieved by an express agreement on the part of Mr Richards and Mr Brennan. […] It may well be the case that neither Mr Richards nor Mr Brennan had read the entirety of the Participation Agreement. However, failure on the part of an individual to read the whole of the Participation Agreement does not mean that they are not bound by the agreement if they actively and freely participate in the Tournament, operate the rules of the Tournament, and therefore subject themselves to those rules’. 5 Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS  2016/A/4697, para  86 (‘A  conduct from which one might typically infer that someone agrees to be bound to the rules is […] if the person participates in the sport. It appears evident to the Sole Arbitrator that the term “participation in sport” within the above meaning refers to entering into the “sphere of control” of the sports organisation. […] only a (moral or natural) person having control over a certain sphere can set up “condition for participation”. This, in case an athlete participates in a competition organised by a federation the athlete agrees to be bound by the applicable rules in said competition in turn for being admitted to the federation’s sphere of control. However, in the case at hand the Appellant [a medical doctor] never participated in any of the competitions organised and governed by the ITF. The Appellant never entered the Respondent’s “sphere of control” and never had any connection to or ties with the ITF before the ITF  Tribunal exercised disciplinary authority over her. Once the Appellant entered the ITF’s sphere of control she clearly and unequivocally contested the ITF Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This, it cannot implicitly be inferred that the Appellant by participating in the disciplinary proceedings before the ITF Tribunal accepted to be bound by the respective provisions’) and para 87 (‘The Sole Arbitrator cannot accept Respondent’s argument that merely by becoming an expert in the field of sports, eg by becoming a more or less renowned sports physician and treating or advising professional athletes one automatically agrees to be bound by the TADP. If one were to follow this line of argument, the Appellant – by the mere fact of becoming a sports physician – would have agreed to be bound by every existing anti-doping rule of this world. Not only does it appear completely fictitious to deduce such a will from this rather neutral conduct of the Appellant. In addition, it should be noted that one of the essentialia negotii of a contract is that the parties are aware of the identity of their contractual partners. If one were to follow Respondent’s submission not only would the Appellant have entered (tacitly) into submission agreements with all anti-doping organisations around the world, but also ITF would have executed – tacitly – contracts with all sports physicians around the world. Such intent, however, cannot be followed from the Appellant’s conduct and, therefore, the Sole Arbitrator is not willing to accept such legal construction’). The evidence in that case was that the sports physician advertised her services to professional sportsmen and women on the basis that she was knowledgeable of the anti-doping rules of their sport and would ensure that the treatment she gave them would not breach those rules, and she specifically assured the tennis player in issue in her case that what she was recommending contained nothing that was prohibited under the tennis rules. The evidence was also that it was agreed that the sports physician was to be paid in part by a share of the player’s prize money from competing in the sport. The ITF submitted that these facts showed the sports physician was aware of the tennis antidoping rules, including the rules imposing specific obligations on athlete support personnel such as herself, and in the circumstances should be deemed to have agreed to abide by those rules, particularly since that was what the player she treated would have expected. The Sole Arbitrator agreed that the player and the sports physician had made an agreement on those terms, but rejected the suggestion that ‘the Athlete and the Appellant when executing the contract had in mind to confer upon the Respondent any disciplinary competence with respect to the Appellant’. Ibid, para 92. See also para D3.8 n 4.

C3.9 One of the key lessons learned from the Russian scandal that blew up after the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games was that the Code needs also to apply to various actors who could interfere significantly with the integrity of the anti-doping framework, such as officials and staff members working at international federations,1

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NADOs,2 anti-doping laboratories,3 government ministries,4 and so on. The 2021 Code seeks to address this, at least in part. The Introduction specifies that not only athletes and athlete support personnel but also ‘other Persons (including board members, directors, officers, and specified employees and volunteers of Signatories, and Delegated Third Parties and their employees) accept these rules as a condition of participation or involvement in sport and shall be bound by these rules’. The comment to that remark states: ‘Where the Code requires a Person other than an Athlete or Athlete Support Person to be bound by the Code, such Person would of course not be subject to Sample collection or Testing, and would not be subject to an antidoping rule violation under the Code for Use or Possession of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method. Rather, such Person would only be subject to discipline for a violation of Code Arts 2.5 (Tampering), 2.7 (Trafficking), 2.8 (Administration), 2.9 (Complicity), 2.10 (Prohibited Association) and 2.11 (Retaliation). Furthermore, such Person would be subject to the additional roles and responsibilities according to Article 21.3. Also, the obligation to require an employee to be bound by the Code is subject to applicable law’. Article 20 of the 2021 Code puts an obligation on Code Signatories: ‘subject to applicable law, as a condition of such position or involvement, to require all of its board members, directors, officers, and those employees (and those of appointed Delegated Third Parties), who are involved in any aspect of Doping Control, to agree to be bound by anti-doping rules as Persons in conformity with the Code for direct and intentional misconduct, or to be bound by comparable rules and regulations put in place by the Signatory’. 1 For example, IAAF President Lamine Diack and IBU President Anders Besseberg were both accused of accepting bribes from Russia to bury or at least delay the prosecution of anti-doping charges against Russian athletes: WADA Independent Commission report dated 14 January 2016; ‘Biathlon president steps down after police raid in Austria’, AP News, 12 April 2018. 2 For example, officials at the Russian NADO, RUSADA, were found to have been involved in the scheme to dope athletes and corrupt the drug-testing system to cover up evidence of that doping: WADA Independent Commission report dated 9 November 2015, Chapter 12. 3 Dr Grigory Rodchenkov, the director of the Moscow anti-doping laboratory, masterminded the coverup of the doping of Russian athletes by burying positive test results for samples analysed at the laboratory between 2012 and 2015 and by swapping ‘dirty’ samples for ‘clean’ ones at the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, albeit that he subsequently turned whistle-blower and exposed the entire conspiracy, which he said was sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Sport: Report of Richard H. McLaren of Investigation into Sochi Allegations, 9 December 2016. 4 Dr Rodchenkov accused Russian Minister of Sport Vitaly Mutko and Deputy Minister of Sport Yuri Nagornykh of directing the organised scheme of doping and protection from exposure of Russian athletes. The IOC’s Schmid Commission accepted that Nagornykh was directly involved, but ruled that there was no evidence that Minister Mutko was directly involved, albeit that he was held responsible for the actions of his officials. Schmid Commision Report to the IOC Executive Board, 2 December 2017. The IOC’s subsequent decision to ban Minister Mutko from attending the Olympics for life was overturned by the CAS because there was no basis in the IOC’s rules to impose such a sanction. See para B1.22.

CHAPTER C4

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers) .

Contents

para

1

GIVING NOTICE OF THE CHARGE................................................................ C4.7

2

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATHLETE OR OTHER PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AN ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATION........................................................................................................ C4.11 A Jurisdictional and procedural issues............................................................. C4.12 B Could the athlete be eligible for a retroactive TUE?.................................... C4.21 C Should the charge be dismissed due to delay or other unfairness?.............. C4.22 D If a provisional suspension is imposed pending resolution of the charge, should the athlete or other person contest it?............................................... C4.25 E Should the athlete request confirmatory analysis of the B sample?............. C4.31 F Responding to the charge on the merits....................................................... C4.35 G Negotiating a consensual settlement of the charge...................................... C4.46

C4.1 Being accused of an anti-doping violation is not only enormously stressful and expensive for an athlete; it will also be very damaging to his reputation, even if eventually the charges are all dismissed. And in the meantime, the athlete may also be provisionally suspended from competition,1 which could mean he misses out on the Olympic Games, or a World Cup Final, or some other irreplaceable opportunity. Therefore, the Anti-Doping Organization needs to satisfy itself, before it charges an athlete with an anti-doping rule violation, that the athlete has a clear case to answer on the evidence before it. That evidence must be competent,2 credible, and sufficient if accepted by the hearing panel,3 to prove each element of the violation(s) charged4 to the rigorous ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard of proof required under the Code,5 bearing in mind that the more serious the alleged misconduct is, the stronger the hearing panel will require the evidence to be.6 1 See para C4.25. 2 In Modahl the Court of Appeal suggested that the assessment that there is a case to answer under anti-doping rules may be based on evidence that would not be admissible in a court of law: Modahl v BAF Ltd (28 July 1997, unreported), CA (Lord Justice Morritt). That is consistent with the fact that the panel hearing an anti-doping case is not required to apply strict judicial rules as to admissibility of evidence. Rather, it must simply decide whether the evidence is ‘reliable’. See para C5.5. 3 Cf R v Galbraith, 1 WLR 1039 (CA) (no case for a criminal defendant to answer if there is no evidence that he has committed the crime alleged or if the evidence is tenuous and taken at its highest would not be enough to found a conviction; but if the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s case depends on the credibility of a witness or other matters generally within the province of a jury, and on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly convict, then there is a case to answer that should be submitted to the jury). 4 These are identified and discussed at Chapters C6 to C15. 5 Code Art 3.1, discussed at para C5.1. 6 See para C5.2.

C4.2 The most common, and usually1 straightforward, case is one based on an ‘adverse analytical finding’ reported by a WADA-accredited anti-doping laboratory that a prohibited substance (or its metabolite or marker) is present in a urine sample provided by an athlete. For example, a urine sample undergoes a number of screening

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tests in the form of instrumental analysis, usually immunoassay or gas chromatography, followed by confirmation of any positive findings by mass spectrometry analysis.2 After a review by at least two certifying scientists, an adverse analytical finding is reported.3 The International Standard for Laboratories and related Technical Documents specify exactly what the documentation pack reporting the adverse analytical finding must contain.4 Given that an Art 2.1 ‘presence’ ADRV requires only proof of the presence of the prohibited substance in the sample, and does not require proof of how it got there, or of the athlete’s knowledge or intent, or that it enhanced the athlete’s performance,5 receipt of that laboratory documentation package, together with proof of the chain of custody of the athlete’s sample from collection until delivery to the laboratory, constitutes good prima facie evidence of a case to answer. 1 On occasion, cases based on adverse analytical findings can be anything but straightforward, particularly if the analytical methods used by the laboratory are new or untested (see para C6.22 et seq) and/or the substance in question is also produced naturally and the evidence that the substance in the athlete’s sample is synthetic is not analytical but rather inferential (see paras C6.52 and C6.54). It is therefore not uncommon for the Anti-Doping Organization to need expert assistance at the earliest stages, to make a proper assessment of whether or not sufficiently reliable evidence exists of an antidoping rule violation for a case to be brought. 2 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.6. For a detailed account of the analytical process using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry, see eg  Gasser v Stinson (15  June 1998, unreported), QBD (Scott J); USADA  v Landis, AAA Case No: 30 190 00847 06, decision dated 20 September 2007, para 102 et seq; and USADA v Jenkins, AAA Case No. 30 190 00199 07, decision dated 25 January 2008, para 37. See also USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA-CAS No 30 190 00686 04, decision dated 9 December 2004 (discussing analytical techniques for detection of EPO); Sheppard v CCES, SDRCC DT-05-0028, decision dated 12 September 2005 (same). See further the CAS cases discussed at para C6.25. See generally Prof Dr J Segura, ‘Doping Control in Sports Medicine’ (1996) 18(4) Ther Drug Monit; D Catlin et al, ‘Testing Urine for Drugs’ (1992) 207 Clinica Chimica Acta S13-S26; Donike, ‘Laboratory Procedures’, paper presented at the IAAF’s First World Anti-Doping Seminar, Germany, March 1994. 3 ISL  Arts 5.3.5.1.2. See generally Prof D  Cowan, ‘When is a positive finding a doping offence?’ UK Sport Seminar, ‘Tackling Ethical Issues in Drugs and Sport’ (October 1996). 4 ISL  Art 5.3.5.2.1 and the WADA  Technical Document on Laboratory Documentation Packages, TD2019LDOC. 5 See para C6.1.

C4.3 Code Art 7.1 requires the evidence supporting the adverse analytical finding to be reviewed prior to charge to ensure that: (a)

there is no therapeutic use exemption (TUE) on file for the substance found in the sample;1 and (b) there have been no departures from the procedures set out in the International Standard for Testing & Investigations or in the International Standard for Laboratories that might have caused the adverse analytical finding.2

In athlete biological passport cases, there are also detailed requirements for review of the evidence by a panel of experts, including giving the athlete an opportunity to comment on any suspicious readings and having the experts consider those comments, before any charges are filed.3 Similarly, in Art 2.4 cases (whereabouts violations), the International Standard for Testing & Investigations requires that an athlete be given a chance to comment on the evidence before any ‘filing failure’ or ‘missed test’ is declared.4 In other cases involving non-analytical evidence, Code Art 7.7 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to ‘conduct any follow-up investigation as may be required under applicable anti-doping policies and rules adopted pursuant to the Code or which the Anti-Doping Organization otherwise considers appropriate’.5 Subject to those basic principles, however, the Code leaves it to Anti-Doping Organizations to determine how to manage results.6 Arguments that departures from the applicable results management procedures mandate dismissal of a charge have been given short shrift by hearing panels.7 1 The criteria for granting a TUE are set out in Art 4 of WADA’s International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions.

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  699 2 See paras C6.6 and C6.22. For example, UK Anti-Doping retains independent scientific experts to review every laboratory documentation package for possible departures from the procedures set out in the International Standard for Laboratories that might have caused the adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory before charging an athlete based on that report. 3 See para C7.4 et seq. 4 International Standard for Testing & Investigations (March 2019), Annex A, Art I.5.2(d). 5 If there is a dispute as to the facts, then unless the evidence is clear-cut one way or the other, the dispute is likely to have to be submitted to the hearing panel for resolution. Sometimes, however, it will not be a question of disputed fact but instead a judgment call, eg does the excuse offered for an admitted failure to provide a sample amount to ‘compelling justification’ under Code Art 2.3? (See para C8.4). Again, this is something that the Anti-Doping Organization may conclude should be submitted to the hearing panel to decide, in which case it should proceed to charge the athlete with the anti-doping rule violation in question. 6 See comment to Code Art 7 (‘Various Signatories have created their own approaches to results management. While the various approaches have not been entirely uniform, many have proven to be fair and effective systems for results management. The Code does not supplant each of the Signatories’ results management systems. This Article does, however, specify basic principles in order to ensure the fundamental fairness of the results management process which must be observed by each Signatory. The specific anti-doping rules of each Signatory shall be consistent with these basic principles’). 7 For example, in Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, the CAS panel rejected the athlete’s argument that the charge against him should be dismissed because the original charge alleged that the metabolite found in his system came from DHCMT, and it was only an amended charge that alleged that it could have come from other (also prohibited) parent substances (‘125. The Panel finds no prohibition either in principle or the applicable rules against the ITF amending its charge. This is all the more true considering that the amendment occurred well before the hearing of the ITF  Independent Tribunal took place. There is no evidence put before the Panel establishing that the Athlete’s case was prejudiced by this amendment. Indeed, as the ITF notes, this amendment appears prompted by the Athlete’s written submission that the M4 metabolite could have come from a substance other than DHCMT’), and it also rejected the athlete’s argument that the amended charge should be dismissed because it had not been submitted to an independent review board for review, as the applicable anti-doping rules allegedly required (‘126. Moreover, contrary to the Athlete’s assertion, the Panel agrees with the ITF that there is no requirement under TADP Articles 7.3 and 8.1.1 that the Review Board approve a subsequent charge or any amendment to that charge. Nevertheless, and at best, the ITF’s failure to seek a re-review by the Review Board for such amendment is minor and following TADP Article  8.7.4, such technical departure of the TADP would not invalidate the amended charge. In conclusion the Panel finds that there are no procedural impediments to preclude this Panel from establishing an ADRV’). Similarly, in Ohlsson v WRU, NADP  Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, p12, the hearing panel held that the WRU’s failure to carry out the preliminary review required by its regulations caused no prejudice to the athlete, because it did not invalidate or cast any doubt on the analytical results from the laboratory on which the charge of an anti-doping rule violation was based. See also UCI v Ullrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, para 32b (failure to issue summons to athlete by deadline specified in UCI rules did not entitle athlete to relief: ‘This Panel concludes that Ullrich did not suffer prejudice in this regard, not least because he was fully aware of the UCI’s investigation at the time, in particular by reason of his dismissal from his team for suspicion of involvement in Operation Puerto. There is no evidence that Ullrich’s ability to mount a defence has not [sic] been compromised, and Ullrich’s procedural objections to the UCI Rules have not featured any factual allegation that his ability to put forward any facts or arguments or otherwise mount his defence has been compromised’); ITF  v Burdekin, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 4 April 2005, paras 59, 61–62 (‘The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the athlete] should have been notified of the adverse test result by about the last week of August 2004. It does not follow that the entire charge should be dismissed. The Tribunal, having heard and weighed all the evidence, does not accept that the player suffered any real rather than theoretical prejudice through lapse of time’); USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 26 (permitting USADA to add further charge because doing so would not cause ‘substantial prejudice’ to the respondent). Cf USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 5.17 (‘The Panel believes that it is important to strictly enforce Rule R-5 [requiring panel’s permission for any amendment to charge letter] to ensure that an athlete has timely, clear notice of the specific anti-doping charges against him in order to adequately defend himself against USADA’s allegations, particularly when a lifetime suspension and retroactive invalidation of competition results are sought. Doing so potentially helps to foster settlement (thereby avoiding formal adjudication) by clearly informing an athlete in writing of the precise claims USADA seeks to prosecute’)’.

C4.4 As a general rule, in the case of an adverse analytical finding, the athlete does not have a right at the review stage to make any submissions. Indeed, he is not likely even to be aware that the review is taking place. Theoretically, however, there could be cases where information is required from the athlete at this stage

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in order to complete the review, in which case the athlete might be contacted. For example, if the substance found in the athlete’s sample is one that might have been used therapeutically, and the applicable rules provide that an athlete may apply for a TUE retroactively, ie after being tested,1 then the Anti-Doping Organization will have to find out whether the athlete was indeed using the substance therapeutically and (if so) give him an opportunity to apply for a TUE, which (if granted) would end the matter.2 1 For example, the Code suggests that a NADO may permit a recreational-level athlete not to get a TUE in advance of competition; instead he would only need to apply retroactively if tested at the competition. (See Code App 1, p  131, comment to definition of ‘Athlete’). Cf WTC  v Moats, AAA  Panel decision dated 10  October 2012 (rules were clear that masters-level athlete who used testosterone therapeutically committed an anti-doping rule violation by competing without obtaining a TUE in advance, but his sanction was reduced under Art 10.5.2 because WTC had issued pre-race documentation that suggested masters-level athlete could obtain TUE retroactively). 2 On occasion, involvement of the athlete at the review stage has led to unwelcome consequences for both the regulatory body and the athlete, particularly if the decision as to whether or not there is a basis for charge is drawn out as a result of the complexity of the investigation and dialogue. Chris Froome had an atypical salbutamol reading at the 2017 Vuelta, and the UCI was still in dialogue with him and had not made a decision as to whether to charge him by the time the run up to the 2018 Tour de France started. The Tour organisers threatened to exclude him from the race on the basis that he was under suspicion, but the UCI was able to reach a conclusion before the race that the finding was within the bounds of the rider’s therapeutic use of the asthma medication. See wada-ama.org/ en/media/news/2018-07/wada-will-not-appeal-uci-decision-in-christopher-froome-case, 2  July 2018 [accessed 6 December 2020],

C4.5 If the substance found in the athlete’s sample is one that could have been produced naturally in the body, the finding will be classified as ‘Atypical’ rather than ‘Adverse’, and a further investigation is required to determine whether the substance found was produced by the body naturally (ie whether it is an ‘endogenous’ substance) or else added from the outside (ie it is an ‘exogenous’ substance);1 or to determine whether it falls within the parameters of cases caused by meat contamination.2 If it is concluded, as a result of that investigation, that the substance is endogenous, or caused by meat contamination, there is no case to answer. If it is concluded that the substance is or may be exogenous, or does not fall within the parameters specified for a meat contamination case, the finding is treated as an adverse analytical finding and progressed accordingly. 1 For a discussion of the form of the investigation in such cases, see para C6.40 et seq. The athlete must cooperate with that investigation or face sanctions for misconduct under his sport’s general disciplinary rules, or (in appropriate cases) for an anti-doping rule violation under Code Art 2.3 (refusal or failure to submit to sample collection). 2 WADA Stakeholder Notice regarding Meat Contamination, 30 May 2019 (wada-ama.org/sites/default/ files/resources/files/2019-05-30-meat_contamination_notice_final.pdf [accessed 2 November 2020]). The notice refers to the possibility that meat farmed in Mexico, China, or Guatemala might contain clenbuterol. It says that WADA will update the notice if other prohibited substances are identified as meat contaminants.

C4.6 There are two possible findings as a result of the review of an adverse analytical finding: (1) If there is a valid TUE that covers the adverse analytical finding in question, or the adverse finding was caused by a departure from either the International Standard for Testing & Investigations or the International Standard for Laboratories, there is no case to answer and no disciplinary action will be taken based on that finding.1 (2) If there is no valid TUE to cover the adverse analytical finding, and nor is there any departure from the applicable Standards that could have caused the adverse analytical finding, the athlete should be charged with an anti-doping rule violation under Code Art 2.1 (for having a prohibited substance present in his sample).2

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  701

The review of non-analytical evidence of an anti-doping rule violation may be more involved, depending on the nature and scope of the facts likely to be in dispute, but the options on conclusion of the review are the same: charge the athlete/athlete support personnel, or not. 1 See Art 7.3.4 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules. This is subject to the fact that several parties will have the right to appeal to CAS against the decision that there is no case to answer: see Code Art 13.2. 2 See Art 7.3.5 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules: ‘If pursuant to Article 7.3.3 UKAD determines that there is neither a valid and applicable TUE with which the Adverse Analytical Finding is consistent, nor a departure from either the ISTI or the ISL that caused the Adverse Analytical Finding, and nor is it apparent that the Prohibited Substance was ingested by a permitted route, UKAD shall send the Athlete a Notice of Charge in accordance with Article 7.8’.

1 GIVING NOTICE OF THE CHARGE C4.7 The Anti-Doping Organization’s rules should provide for the athlete or other person to receive proper details of the charge against him1 (including particulars of the facts relied upon to support the charge2), of the procedure that will be followed in determining the charge, and of the possible sanctions if the charge is upheld. The Anti-Doping Organization will not be able to pursue charges at a hearing that it cannot prove were duly notified to the athlete or other person, along with the facts relied on in support of the charge, so that he has due notice of the case brought against him.3 To ensure transparency and accountability, the charge letter will be copied at the same time to WADA and those other parties that have a right of appeal under the Code4 (but those parties must maintain strict confidentiality unless and until the charge is upheld5). 1 That is the defendant’s right under English law: see paras D1.85 and E7.64. 2 See eg Art 7.8.1(b) of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules: ‘[The Notice of Charge should include] a summary of the facts and evidence relied upon’. 3 See eg USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 5.17 (‘The Panel believes that it is important to strictly enforce Rule R-5 [requiring panel’s permission for any amendment to charge letter] to ensure that an athlete has timely, clear notice of the specific anti-doping charges against him in order to adequately defend himself against USADA’s allegations, particularly when a lifetime suspension and retroactive invalidation of competition results are sought. Doing so potentially helps to foster settlement (thereby avoiding formal adjudication) by clearly informing an athlete in writing of the precise claims USADA seeks to prosecute’); but cf cases referenced at para C4.3 n 7. 4 See Code Art 14.1.2. 5 See Code Art 14.1.5.

C4.8 The notice of charge will also need to advise the athlete if he is being provisionally suspended pending determination of the charge1 and (in Article  2.1 ‘presence’ cases) of his right to have his B  sample analysed to confirm (or not confirm) the adverse analytical finding reported in respect of his A sample.2 1 See para C4.25. 2 Code Art 7.3. See para C4.31.

C4.9 In addition, the Anti-Doping Organization is well advised to flag up to the athlete in the charge letter the benefits of an early admission,1 and (in the context of explaining the potential sanctions under the Code for the anti-doping rule violation(s) charged) the possibility of agreeing an outcome without a hearing.2 In that context, the Anti-Doping Organization may want to highlight in particular Code Art 10.6.1, which allows suspension of a period of ineligibility in return for the athlete’s provision of ‘Substantial Assistance’.3 1 In terms of potentially avoiding a four-year ban for presence or refusal (see para C17.1) or enabling the start of the ban to be back-dated (see para C22.12). 2 See para C4.47. 3 See para C21.2.

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C4.10 Having sent the notice, the Anti-Doping Organization is justified in pushing for a determination of the charges as quickly as possible. For example, Mr Justice Lightman said in Korda v ITF1 that: ‘a tight timetable designed to secure an expeditious procedure for the final determination of charges of doping offences […] [is] plainly necessary for the proper conduct of the sport of tennis, to ensure public confidence in its administration and to safeguard the interests of players. Any sustained period of uncertainty as to the outcome of proceedings whilst they take their course is likely to be highly damaging to all concerned.’

For example, Art 7.8.1 of the 2019 Rules of the UK’s National Anti-Doping Panel provide that the hearing should be held within 40 days of receipt of the request for arbitration, ‘save where fairness requires, or the parties otherwise agree’.2 If the athlete is subject to an interim suspension pending such determination,3 then he will presumably also want the matter to be resolved without delay. In fact, Art 7.4.3 of the Code gives him the right to an expedited hearing, as does Art 6.5 of the 2019 Rules of the National Anti-Doping Panel. 1 Korda v ITF [1999] All ER (D) 84, QBD (Lightman J), cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in that case: [1999] All ER (D) 337, CA. See also Bray v New Zealand Sports Drug Agency [2001] 2 NZLR 160, 166 (NZCA), which notes ‘the public policy concern that, in the interest of those tested, those that may be competing against before the test results are known and the wider public interest in encouraging drug free sport, the processes under the sports drug testing regime be carried out without any undue delay’. 2 This reflects the fact that while justice delayed may be justice denied, not least if the athlete is suspended in the meantime, the point will always be to endure that justice is done, which may include ensuring that the athlete has a proper opportunity to prepare their case. 3 See para C4.25 et seq.

2 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATHLETE OR OTHER PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AN ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATION C4.11 A  lawyer instructed to defend an athlete or other person who has been charged with an anti-doping violation is likely to have to address a number of separate but related issues in very short order, in particular where the charge is based on an adverse analytical finding made in respect of a sample collected from his athlete client (because of the urgent questions of B sample analysis and potential provisional suspension). In particular, the lawyer will need to consider as a matter of urgency:1 (a) jurisdictional and procedural issues (who is bringing the proceedings, under what rules, what law governs, and who will be adjudicating?); (b) whether the athlete might be eligible for a retroactive TUE for the substance found in his sample or in his possession; (c) limitation and delay/fairness issues (are the proceedings time-barred, or has there otherwise been delay or other unfairness such as to preclude them?); (d) whether to contest any provisional suspension that has been or is proposed to be imposed (or else whether to have his client voluntarily suspend himself pending determination of the charge); (e) how to respond to the invitation to have the athlete’s B sample analysed; (f) how to respond to the charge on the merits; and (g) whether to seek to negotiate a consensual settlement of the charge with the Anti-Doping Organization. Each of these issues is considered in turn below. 1 Each of which will be informed by a prior understanding from the athlete of how the prohibited substance came to be in the athlete’s sample, so far as is possible. Most often the lawyer is confronted

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  703 with the instruction that the athlete does not know how the substance came to be there, in which case the investigation and the consideration of these matters will be informed by the possible need to establish contamination or error in sampling or testing. But if the athlete accepts ingestion, the approach to these matters may be different.

A Jurisdictional and procedural issues C4.12 To avoid any argument that an objection as to jurisdiction or law or procedure has been waived by a delay in raising it, the athlete’s lawyer will want to establish a number of points as quickly as possible. C4.13 First, what anti-doping rules is the athlete charged with infringing?1 Is the athlete or other person bound by those rules?2 1 An athlete cannot be charged with violating the World Anti-Doping Code itself, because the Code is not itself a set of rules binding on athletes. Instead, it is the responsibility of the international federation, NADO/national federation, event organiser, or other Anti-Doping Organization to put in place binding anti-doping rules that implement the mandatory provisions of the Code in the sport or event in question (see para C2.21), and it is those anti-doping rules that determine the rights and obligations of the participants in the sport or event. See eg Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 872 (‘[…] the WADC is not a law but simply an instrument of a private organisation, the implementation of which into another body’s regulations requires a contractual agreement to this effect’); Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.5 (‘To become applicable, the WADA Code must be accepted and implemented according to the Signatory’s authority and within its relevant spheres of responsibility. In other words, the WADA Code and its provisions need to be transformed into the regulations of a Signatory to become applicable’, citing Code Article 23) and para 7.6 (‘The WADA Code is not selfexecuting and applicable by substitution. In order to be applicable, wholly or in part, the applicable Code provisions must be implemented into the Signatory’s own regulations’); WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS 2009/A/1844, para 131 (‘[…] the fact that FIFA is a signatory to the WADC does not mean that the WADC applies between FIFA and its affiliates. As made clear by the Introduction to the WADC (both in its 2003 and 2009 versions), in order to be applied, the provisions of the WADC require implementation in the rules of the relevant organisation. Indeed, the WADC can be used to help with interpretation, where the content of the FIFA rules is equivalent to the WADC: however, it is not possible to have recourse to the WADC to alter or amend the FIFA provisions where their content is not equivalent to the WADC’); Gatlin v USADA, CAS 2008/A/1461, pp 7–8 (‘The WADA Code does not apply as between a signatory organisation and its members, unless the signatory organisation has expressly incorporated the WADA  Code into its own relevant rules. Even though some provisions of the WADA Code have been incorporated into the 2006 IAAF Rules, the WADA  Code as a whole has not been expressly incorporated. Therefore, the WADA  Code is not directly applicable to this case’); IBU v Yaroshenko, IBU Doping Hearing Panel decision dated 11 August 2009, para 48 (‘[…] the WADA Code is not directly applicable to athletes in a particular case. Therefore, the rules and regulations of the IBU which are adopted in order to implement the WADA Code, ie IBU’s ADR, in particular, apply exclusively’). As a result, if the rules and regulations of the sports body bringing the anti-doping case do not properly incorporate the Code, the athlete or other person cannot be sanctioned based on the Code but instead can only be sanctioned based on the anti-doping provisions that have been incorporated into those rules and regulations; Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS 2008/A/1452 (decision imposing sanction for use of prohibited method vacated where League had not fully implemented Code provisions prohibiting such use). By the same token, however, if the international federation’s rules impose a greater sanction than the Code mandates, the international federation may be in breach of its duty as a signatory to the Code to implement the Code’s sanction provisions without amendment (see Code Art 23.2.2, USOC  v IOC, CAS  2011/O/2422, and BOA  v WADA, CAS 2011/A/2658, discussed at B2.18 et weq), but that does not make the greater sanction any less enforceable as against the athlete. See Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 99 (‘[…] the sheer fact that the WADC differs from the IWF ADR has no impact on the – distinct – legal relationship between the Appellant and Respondent. The autonomy of Respondent in relation to Appellant is, therefore, not restricted by any contractual engagements entered into by IWF vis-à-vis third parties’). However, the CAS panel in Liao Hui arrived at the same result by finding that ambiguities in the IWF Anti-Doping Rules should be resolved in favour of the athlete, with the four-year ban stipulated in those rules ‘read down’ to comply with the two-year ban stipulated in the World Anti-Doping Code. Ibid, 107. See also IAAF v Hellebuyck, CAS 2005/A/831, para 7.3.4.2 (‘The fact that the Appellant is a “signatory” to the WADC does not mean that the WADC applies as between the Appellant and the athletes affiliated to it. The Introduction to the WADC specifies that the WADC can apply in the relationship to the athletes only if the provisions of the WADC have been “incorporated into the rules of the relevant Anti-Doping Organization”. Of course, it does not follow from this that the WADC has no relevance whatsoever

704  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement in the relationship between the Appellant and the athletes affiliated to it. In certain circumstances the WADC can be used to help with interpretation when the content of the IAAF Rules is equivalent to the WADC. The limits of an explanatory or supplemental interpretation are, however, exceeded if, by having recourse to the provisions of the WADC, the content of the IAAF Rules is altered or its meaning reversed’) and para 7.3.4.3 (‘In the present case the Appellant did not adopt the exact same wording of the provision in Art 10.8 WADC in their Rules. Whether the Appellant thereby breached an obligation in relation to WADA can be left unanswered in this case. Even if this were the case, the Panel cannot override the expressed will of the Appellant. Instead the Panel is bound by the content of the properly established IAAF Rules’). The CAS sole arbitrator in IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 78, took a different view: ‘Considering that Article 10.8 of the World Anti-Doping Code 2009 […], in force at the relevant time, included a fairness exception, that this provision was a part of the obligatory commitment of the IAAF as signatory to the WADC according to Article 23.2.2 WADC and that the IAAF was not allowed to include any substantial change to this provision, the Sole Arbitrator sees an obligation to understand Rule 40.8 IAAF Rules 2012-2013 harmoniously with Article 10.8 WADC. For whatever reason, the fairness exception was not mentioned explicitly in the IAAF Rules 2012-2013, but had nevertheless to be applied based on IAAF’s commitment to Article 10.8 WADC. In a case where the WADC did not allow for any substantial deviation of the IAAF Rules from the WADC, the provision of Rule 47.5  IAAF  Rules 2012-2013, otherwise providing that “in case of conflict between these Anti-Doping Rules and the Code, these Anti-Doping Rules shall apply” is not applicable’). See also FINA v Tagliaferri, CAS 2008/A/1471 and CAS 2008/A/1486, para 9.1.1 (where anti-doping rules were intended to implement the Code, but had a different effect because of an error in translation, the rules should be applied as if they accurately implemented the Code). 2 The answer is likely to be that he is bound, either because he explicitly agreed to be bound by those rules or because his participation in the sport is deemed tacit agreement to be bound by all applicable rules (see para C2.17). An athlete can always retire, and so no longer be subject to the rules, in which case he could not be held liable under those rules for anything he does after his retirement is effective. See eg Manjeet Kaur, NADA  Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11  June 2012 (athlete found to have retired from active sport prior to attempt to test her, so that she was not subject to the anti-doping rules at that point, and therefore was not liable for her refusal to submit to sample collection). However, the applicable rules may require specific notice of retirement to be given (eg  Art 1.4.1 of the UK  Anti-Doping Rules provides that an athlete in the National Registered Testing Pool or Domestic Pool must give UK Anti-Doping written notice of retirement), and hearing panels have been firm in rejecting claims of retirement from athletes who cannot show that they clearly and unambiguously retired from the sport (including complying with any applicable notice provisions) before the alleged violation took place. UK Anti-Doping v Canaveral, NADP decision dated 7 October 2019, para 28 (rejecting claim athlete had retired before he was notified he had to provide a sample, due to lack of evidence he communicated any intent to retire to any governing body: ‘there clearly must be evidence of at least some form of communication from Mr Canaveral to some organisation connected with the governance of the sport of Weightlifting in relation to retirement for him to be deemed to have retired for the purpose of Article 1.4.1 of the ADR’); UK Anti-Doping v Colclough, NADP Tribunal decision dated 30 January 2014, para 42 (same); Watt v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2015, para 12 (‘[…] the application of the Rules cannot depend on the subjective intention of the athlete, nor the extent to which he is actively participating in the sport at the time when he is required to give a sample. […] There is no provision in the Rules that the testing regime terminates when a player ceases actively to participate in matches. On the contrary, Article 1.4.1 states that the athlete continues to be bound by and required to comply with the Rules unless and until he has given written notice of retirement to the national governing body. […] The fact that he was not under contract to play any further games that season, or for the following season, did not relieve him from his duty to submit to out-of-competition testing’); USADA v Davis, AAA Panel decision dated 15 April 2014, para 3.16 (rejecting athlete’s claim that he had retired and so was no longer required to provide whereabouts information, where he had announced that he was going to retire but ‘failed to follow through on his announcement by notifying USADA or USATF of his retirement and failed to act in a manner that is fully consistent with that of a retired USATF registered athlete’); DFSNZ v Newman, Sports Tribunal of New Zealand decision dated 31  January 2012, para  15 (rejecting claim athlete had retired prior to refusing to submit to test); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP decision dated 7 June 2011, paras 3.4.12-3.4.23 (rejecting claim athlete had retired before providing sample that tested positive, because he did not send his governing body formal notice of retirement, as was required under the rules to remove him from its anti-doping jurisdiction); FINA  v Aleshin, FINA  Doping Panel decision No. 09/10 (athlete’s presentation of retirement form did not relieve him of the obligation to make timely whereabouts filings prior to that date); USADA v Mortenson, AAA Panel decision dated 25 September 2006, para 26 (‘In this case, Mr Mortenson made no gestures towards retirement; he simply stopped complying with the [whereabouts] requirements’). An Anti-Doping Organization retains jurisdiction to seek sanctions against a retired athlete for ADRVs that he committed prior to such retirement. See Code Art 7.11 and UCI v Ulrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, paras 50-57 (rejecting athlete’s argument that he cannot be subjected to discipline by a member association after he has resigned as a member).

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  705

C4.14 Do the rules that are said to apply give the Anti-Doping Organization authority to bring the case against the athlete, or does results management authority lie with another party?1 1 See paras C2.17 to C2.20.

C4.15 Are there errors, omissions or ambiguities in the rules that could be exploited? In particular, do the rules actually prohibit the conduct that the athlete is charged with committing? The doctrine of legal certainty prohibits punishment for particular conduct unless the rules in place at the time of the conduct clearly state that such conduct is prohibited and that any transgression will attract a sanction.1 As the CAS panel stated in the seminal Quigley decision: ‘The fight against doping is arduous, and it may require strict rules. But the rulemakers and the rule-appliers must begin by being strict with themselves. Regulations that may affect the careers of dedicated athletes must be predictable. […] Athletes and officials should not be confronted with a thicket of mutually qualifying or even contradictory rules that can be understood only on the basis of the de facto practice over the course of many years of a small group of insiders’.2

If there is any ambiguity in the rules, the CAS jurisprudence is clear that it should be interpreted contra proferentem, ie against the Anti-Doping Organization and in favour of the athlete.3 1 This doctrine applies with full force in the anti-doping context: CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17 (‘In sport, like all other areas of society, any disciplinary measure on sanction requires a legal basis’) and para 44 (‘[…] based on the WADC, […] a sanction is possible if there is an anti-doping rule violation; absent any such anti-doping rule violation, the WADC does not provide for any possible sanction’). Such an omission was more likely in pre-Code days, when the various sports all followed their own (different) anti-doping rules. For example, in USA  Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS  94/129, the UIT accepted that the athlete had not intended to use the drug found in his system to gain a performance advantage, but said athletes should be held strictly liable for the presence of prohibited substances in their system. The CAS panel accepted that such an approach might be appropriate in principle, but ‘the fact that the Panel has sympathy for the principle of a strict liability rule obviously does not allow the Panel to create such a rule where it does not exist. […] The UIT had the right to punish Q. only on the basis of rules in force’ (paras 21, 22). Furthermore, given the stringent nature of a strict liability rule, ‘if such a standard is to be applied, it must be clearly articulated’ (para 17). The UIT rules in place at the time the athlete’s sample was collected did not satisfy that test; to the contrary, they provided that ‘Doping means the use of one or more substances mentioned in the official UIT Anti-Doping List with the aim of attaining an increase in performance’. Nor did any other provisions overrule this clear requirement of intent to gain a performance advantage. As a result, ‘the UIT had no legal basis for the sanctions it pronounced against the Appellants. The sanctions must therefore be reversed’ (para 35). Similarly, in Rebagliati v IOC, CAS OG/98/002, para 26, a CAS panel dismissed the anti-doping charges brought by the IOC against the snowboard gold medallist at the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, notwithstanding that his urine sample had tested positive for a metabolite of marijuana, because his international federation, the FIS, had not specifically prohibited marijuana in its rules. The panel explained: ‘We do not suggest for a moment that the use of marijuana should be condoned, nor do we suggest that sports authorities are not entitled to exclude athletes found to use cannabis. But if sports authorities wish to add their own sanctions to those that are edicted by public authorities, they must do so in an explicit fashion. That has not been done here […]. We must decide within the context of the law of sports, and cannot invent prohibitions or sanctions where none appear’. See also Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10 (accepting athlete’s argument that rules only allowed disqualification of results after a positive result from an incompetition test, not from an out-of-competition test, on the basis that ‘CAS has to rule on the basis of sports law and cannot invent new sanctions. In other words, if regulatory documents define sanctions and how they should be applied to particular offences, they should be strictly interpreted by the sports authorities and the CAS. In this case, neither the IJF Anti-doping Regulations nor the IOC Medical Code provide for disqualification as the consequence of a positive out-of-competition test. Since it has no legal foundation, the respondent’s decision to disqualify the appellant and withdraw his medal should therefore be set aside’). Omissions of this sort can still happen even in the era of the World Anti-Doping Code. See Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS 2008/A/1452 (decision imposing sanction for use of prohibited method vacated where League had not fully implemented Code provisions prohibiting such use). See also USOC et al v IOC & IAAF, CAS  2004/A/725 (vacating disqualification of results of US relay team based on ADRV of one of its members where

706  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement rules provided only for disqualification of individual results of doping offender, not of results of teams in which he played); IAAF v ARAF and Yegorova and others, CAS 2008/A/1718, para 218 (rejecting IAAF’s request for an increased sanction on the ground that the rules in force at the relevant time did not provide for aggravated sanctions). 2 USA  Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS  94/129, para  55. This passage has been cited with approval in many subsequent doping cases. For example, in WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27, a AAA hearing panel cited Quigley as authority for its warning that ‘WTC should take care to provide its athletes with clear, easy to understand rules so athletes need not struggle to determine what conduct constitutes an anti-doping rule violation’. 3 USADA v Gatlin, AAA Panel decision dated 1 January 2008, para 8.18 (‘Mr. Gatlin’s position that the contract was not negotiated by him, and therefore any terms, if ambiguous, ought to be construed in a light most favorable to him, is a long established maxim of contract interpretation’), aff’d, CAS 2008/A/1461; and see cases cited at para B1.61. In Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 4.28, the Beijing Games consent form required the athlete to submit to the IOC anti-doping rules and the 2003 World Anti-Doping Code, but there was a conflict between those documents because the IOC anti-doping rules anticipated a change in the burden of proof that was only to come into effect with the 2009 Code. (See para C6.22). The CAS panel resolved that conflict (and therefore the case) in favour of the athlete, on the basis that ‘contradictions in the applicable rules must be interpreted contra proferentem, ie to the detriment of the promulgator of the conflicting or contradictory provision’. The fact that the provision in question is only in the Anti-Doping Organization’s rules because it is a mandatory provision of the Code does not provide an escape route: in such circumstances, the ADO ‘nevertheless must be perceived as the drafter of the FINA DC. Thus, [it] must bear the legal consequences of any ambiguity of the relevant provisions.’ Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 80. The result could be that the athlete avoids liability for an anti-doping rule violation completely, as in Quigley, where the CAS found that the (pre-Code) rules required proof of an intent to enhance performance, and there was no such proof in the record in that case. USA Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 35. Alternatively, ambiguity in the rules could lead to reduction in sanction, as in WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27, where the hearing panel reduced the otherwise applicable two-year ban by 12 months for No Significant Fault or Negligence, under Code Art 10.5.2 (as to which, see para C18.6, n 10, on the basis that the athlete’s failure to understand and comply with the TUE requirements in the rules was caused in part by confusing statements on the WTC’s website. See also WADA v Batan & IPF, CAS 2013/A/3316, para 50 (‘[…] in such cases [of ambiguity in a rule], and particularly in doping cases, CAS decisions have consistently applied the principle of “contra proferentem” […]’) and para 51 (applying principle to prefer a restrictive interpretation of a provision on mitigation of doping sanctions that favoured athletes charged with violation of the rules in question); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 107 (ambiguities in the IWF Anti-Doping Rules should be resolved in favour of the athlete, with the fouryear ban stipulated in those rules ‘read down’ to comply with the two-year ban stipulated in the World Anti-Doping Code).

C4.16 Did the rules prohibit the conduct at the time it took place, or is the AntiDoping Organization seeking to apply a new rule retroactively?1 Alternatively, have there been any changes to the rules since the conduct took place2 that are favourable to the athlete and therefore should be applied based on the doctrine of lex mitior?3 1 There is a strong general presumption, recognised in both common law and civil law systems, and displaced only by the clearest contrary language, that new rules should not be applied retrospectively to matters occurring before they came into effect, to render acts unlawful that were lawful when done: see para B1.40. The same presumption is also well-established in CAS jurisprudence: ‘The Panel confirms the principle that “tempus regit actum”: in order to determine whether an act constitutes an anti-doping rule infringement, it has to be evaluated on the basis of the law in force at the time it was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that occurred prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’. CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 51; WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS 2009/A/1844, para 133 (‘[…] in order to determine whether an act constitutes an anti-doping rule infringement, the Panel applies the law in force at the time the act was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that occurred prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’); WADA  v Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16 (same). See also 2019 ISL Art 1.2.1 (‘If the application of a newly approved Technical Document results in an Adverse Analytical Finding for a Sample collected before the effective date of that new Technical Document, which would not have resulted in an Adverse Analytical Finding with the application of the currently effective version of the Technical Document (for example if the Decision Limit for a Threshold Substance has been lowered in the newly approved Technical Document), the Laboratory shall report the finding as a Negative Finding’). Cf 2019 ISL Art 1.1 (‘A failure by a Laboratory or WADA-Approved Laboratory for the ABP to follow a requirement

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  707 in effect at the time of Analytical Testing, which has subsequently been eliminated from this ISL or applicable Technical Document or Technical Letter at the time of a hearing shall not serve as a defense to an anti-doping rule violation’). Where an Art 2.2 use charge is brought based on longitudinal profiling in the Athlete Biological Passport of the values of an athlete’s blood samples taken over a long period (see para C7.4), if the rules change in that period it is the rules that were in force when the first ABP sample was collected (or at least the first ABP sample relied upon in support of the charge) that should apply to substantive issues in the case (subject to application of any lex mitior in the new set of rules): IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, paras 72-76. On the other hand, ‘in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, laws and rules relating to procedural matters apply immediately upon entering into force regardless of when the facts at issue occurred’. S  v FINA, CAS  2000/A/274, paras 72–73. This exception has been interpreted broadly, to include (for example) not only new provisions applicable to disciplinary proceedings (Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 133 (‘[…] given that burden of proof is a procedural principle, the Panel must apply in the present proceedings the rule on burden of proof set out in Article  52  FCE  (2012 edition)’) (citations omitted)) but also evidentiary matters, specifically new evidentiary methods of proving pre-existing disciplinary offences. Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/ A/1912-1913, para 109 (‘The Panel would have no hesitation in holding that new scientifically sound evidentiary methods, even not specifically mentioned in anti-doping rules, can be used at any time to investigate and discover past anti-doping rule violations that went undetected, with the only constraint deriving from the eight-year time limitation and the timely initiation of disciplinary proceedings. As long as the substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as doping is in force prior to the conduct, the resort to a new evidentiary method does not constitute a case of retrospective application of the law’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS  2010/A/2174, para  9.5 (same); Caucchioli v CONI & UCI, CAS  2010/A/2178, para  33 (same), citing E  & A  v IBU, CAS  2009/A/1931, para  8.10 (‘It simply cannot be the intent that this rule would allow an accused to afford itself of the more favourable science. Applying such an argument to a criminal case would be tantamount to requiring the court to find an accused innocent of a crime, even if the DNA proves the accused is the culprit simply because the crime was committed prior to the availability of DNA testing. This Panel finds that this simply cannot be the case’); WADA v Lallukka, CAS 2014/A/3488, paras 113–114 (research paper and guidelines that post-dated alleged ADRV were not rules but evidence relied upon by WADA to support ADRV finding, and therefore ‘the rule against retroactivity’ did not prevent such reliance); Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648, para 112 (2015 Code provision that an ADRV may be proved by analysis of B sample split into two bottles is an evidentiary rule and therefore not a substantive rule that may not be applied retroactively). CAS panels have also applied without objection Article 25.2 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, which states that the new ten-year statute of limitations introduced in Article 17 of that Code is a procedural rule that ‘should be applied retroactively’ to claims arising under the 2003 or 2009 versions of the Code, as long as the previous (eight year) statute of limitations period applicable to such claims had not already expired when the 2015 Code came into effect (see para C4.22, n 1). After a number of cases were dismissed on the basis that the athlete had proved a departure from the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories, and the Anti-Doping Organization had not proved that that departure did not cause the laboratory’s adverse analytical finding (see para C6.19), in 2009 the Code was amended so that the athlete had to prove not only that the laboratory had departed from the requirements of the ISL but also that that departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding. Only then would the burden shift to the Anti-Doping Organization to show that the departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding. (See para C6.18). In Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 6.2.1.3, USADA argued that the amended rule should be applied even though the athlete’s sample had been collected in December 2008, ie  one month before the amendments came into effect, on the basis that the amendment related only to the burden of proof and so was a ‘procedural’ rule and not a ‘substantive’ one (‘substantive’ rules being rules that affect an athlete’s behaviour). The CAS panel decided there had been no departures from the ISL and so did not reach the issue. 2 Although the CAS panel in DFSNZ  v Gemmell held that the new, more lenient, sanctions regime must be in force by the time of the hearing, ie rule changes not yet in effect cannot be anticipated (CAS 2014/A/2, para 109), an NADP tribunal has taken into account imminent rule changes (then in the context of specific provision in the 2015 Code Art 25.2, although not technically engaged): UKAD v Gareth Warburton and Rhys Williams, NADP Tribunal decision dated 12 January 2015. 3 If the rules change in favour of the athlete between the time the acts in question occur and the time the hearing panel comes to determine the charge, either in terms of what constitutes a violation (for example, if a substance is dropped from the Prohibited List) or in terms of what the sanction is for a particular violation (for example, the sanction for a second violation going from a blanket life ban in the 2003 Code to a ban of eight years to life in the 2009 Code), the CAS jurisprudence is clear that the criminal law doctrine of lex mitior applies by analogy, ie the athlete is entitled to the benefit of the more lenient rule. For the doctrine generally, see para B1.44. For its application in the anti-doping context, see eg Strahya v FINA, CAS 2003/A/507, para 6 (after the athlete had provided a sample that was found to have a prohibited substance present in it, but before the hearing on the resulting doping

708  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement charge, FINA adopted new anti-doping rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code, including a two year ban for a first doping offence, which was shorter than the ban that would have applied under the FINA doping rules in force when the athlete provided the sample; applying the doctrine of lex mitior, the CAS Panel imposed only a two year ban for his offence); V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/493, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), pp 17, 23 (following doctrine of lex mitior by applying two-year sanction based on new Code-compliant rules rather than four-year sanction under rules in place when case was commenced); Kop v IAAF & TAF, CAS 2008/A/1586, para 125, and BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision dated 4 May 2009, para 41 (giving athlete benefit of 2009 Code change that made the sanction for a second violation eight years to life rather than a blanket life ban). The doctrine of lex mitior can be important when a substance on the Prohibited List is re-classified as a ‘Specified Substance’, thereby triggering greater discretion to mitigate sanction under the Code (see para C6.64, n 6). See eg  WADA  v CBJ & Penalbar, CAS  2009/A/1954, para  5.5 (accepting that furosemide should be treated as a Specified Substance even though it was not classified as such when it was found to be present in a sample collected from the athlete, but was only re-classified thereafter); USADA  v Brunemann, AAA  Panel decision dated 26  January 2009, para  10.3 (same). This happened, for example, when methylhexaneamine (MHA) was re-classified in the 2011 Prohibited List as a specified substance. See eg  SARU  v Ralepelle and Basson, SARU  Judicial Committee decision dated 25 January 2011, para 10 (MHA found in sample collected in November 2010 treated as Specified Substance, due to its re-classification as such in 2011 Prohibited List); UK  Anti-Doping v Duckworth, NADP  Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10  January 2011 (giving athlete benefit of 2011 reclassification of MHA as a Specified Substance, by imposing a six-month ban under 2009 Code Art 10.4). Indeed, one hearing panel even anticipated that change, in a hearing that took place just before the 2011 Prohibited List came into force. See DFSNZ  v BrightwaterWharf, STNZ decision dated 29 November 2010, para 6 (‘The principle of lex mitior allows a later law, which is in force at the time of the hearing, to be applied if that law is more lenient than the law in force at the time of the offending. […] The WADA statement in relation to the application of the principle to the change in status of methylhexaneamine in the 2011 Prohibited List appears to extend this principle beyond its established application to cases which occur before a new law or rule comes into force’). Generally, however, attempts to anticipate such changes should not work, at least where they have only been mooted and not yet agreed. Kambala and WADA v FIBA, FIBA Appeals Tribunal, p11 (declining invitation to anticipate that cocaine would be re-classified as a Specified Substance: ‘according to the law at present, cocaine is not to be classified as such a substance. Whether this will change in future is uncertain and is of no relevance to the present decision; for the Single Arbitrator must – in principle – decide the case in accordance with the rules and regulation in force at the time the offence was committed. […] There is likewise no scope for applying the principle of lex mitior in the present case; for said principle requires that conflicting rules are or were in force. However, this is not the case’); FINA v Mellouli & FTN, CAS 2007/A/1252, paras 75–76 (‘To be sure, the Panel does not ignore the debate surrounding the introduction of amphetamine into the list as part of the revision project of WADA. In any case the current list has to be applied which excludes amphetamine as a specified substance’). The CAS panel in DFSNZ v Gemmell, in addition to holding that the new, more lenient, sanctions regime must be in force by the time of the hearing, ie, rule changes not yet in effect cannot be anticipated: CAS 2014/A/2, para 109, also identified a second important limitation to the doctrine, namely that ‘the principle applies to sanctions and not to the elements of [the] violation’, and therefore the athlete is not entitled to the benefit of a subsequently adopted rule that changes the elements of an offence in a way that means what he did would no longer amount to an offence (eg, by saying that he must have committed three whereabouts failures in just 12 months, rather than in 18 months). Ibid, paras 103, 109. The CAS panel in Millar v BCF identified a third limit to the doctrine, which is that it may be displaced by expressly providing that the new rules are not intended to apply retrospectively to matters pending before they came into effect: CAS 2004/A/707, para 39. See further para B1.44, nn 10–12.

C4.17 Alternatively, is there a viable argument that the rules are contrary to applicable law, and therefore void and unenforceable? Whatever law applies,1 the basic test is likely to be whether the Anti-Doping Organization can show that the provisions in question are necessary and proportionate to the legitimate underlying objective of protecting the integrity of the sport,2 in which assessment it will generally be afforded a significant ‘margin of appreciation’, since it is considered best placed to determine what is necessary and appropriate for its sport.3 In that context, the global sporting consensus that the Code represents as to what is necessary and appropriate to protect sport from the scourge of doping presents a substantial obstacle for any challenger to surmount.4 As a result, to date the authors are unaware of any decision, whether by a court or by the CAS or other arbitral tribunal, that an anti-doping rule

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  709

derived from the Code is unlawful. To the contrary, challenges to the legality of such rules have been uniformly rejected.5 1 See para C3.5. 2 See para B1.31 (proportionality as general principle of law); para E7.83 (proportionality as principle of English law). 3 See para B1.6 and para E6.1 et seq. In relation to anti-doping rules in particular, see Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.12 (‘Professor Lundqvist’s evidence […] was that out-of-competition testing is at the heart of any effective anti-doping programme. To carry out effective testing of this nature, it is vital that athletes produce accurate whereabouts information so that they can be tested by surprise. The IAAF has great experience and is at the forefront of the fight against doping in athletics and its position is that it is important to have an effective penalty against athletes that do not provide adequate whereabouts information, “pour encourager les autres”. It is not the CAS panel’s role to second-guess the IAAF’s decision or policy in this regard’); WADA & Kurtoglu v FIBA, FIBA AC 2005-6 decision dated 16 February 2006 at pp 10–11 (‘[…] not every curtailment of this principle by the Respondent’s rules is incompatible with the human rights and the general legal principles of Swiss Law. Rather the principle of proportionality for the athlete’s benefit must be weighed against the legitimate interests of the sports federations. This particularly includes the legitimate aim of effectively fighting against doping and the objective of the sports federations to harmonise doping penalties. As regards the question of how the opposing principles are to be reasonably harmonised in the rules and regulations, the Respondent has a certain amount of latitude for deciding without interference by the courts’). 4 See Introduction to the 2015 Code, p  17: ‘These sport-specific rules and procedures, aimed at enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonized way, are distinct in nature from criminal and civil proceedings. They are not intended to be subject to or limited by any national requirements and legal standards applicable to such proceedings, although they are intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights. When reviewing the facts and the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and other adjudicating bodies should be aware of and respect the distinct nature of the anti-doping rules in the Code and the fact that those rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders around the world with an interest in fair sport’. See also Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS  2006/A/1165, para  7.10 (‘The WADA  Code was drafted in consultation with world sports governing bodies and has been approved by the IOC and EU governments. It is therefore rightly regarded as the oracle of the antidoping movement’). 5 Standard of proof: In Pechstein v ISU, SFT, 10 February 2010, 4A_612/2009, para 6.3.2, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the athlete’s argument that it was a violation of Swiss public policy (and so unlawful) to apply the Code’s ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard of proof to a doping charge (see para C4.18) rather than the criminal standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Strict liability rule: In Gasser v Stinson, 15  June 1988 (unreported), Mr Justice Scott (as he then was) rejected a Swiss athlete’s claim that IAAF rules imposing a mandatory ban for a strict liability offence were in unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore void and unenforceable. See also Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude, 19 March 1996, unreported, Lightman J; (1996) Times, 8 April (CA); Lightman J, [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 195; CA [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep 293 (rejecting same argument in respect of Tennis Anti-Doping Programme); Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, para 20 (citing cases where Swiss Federal Court upheld validity of strict liability anti-doping rules under Swiss law). In IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.10, the CAS Sole Arbitrator noted: ‘It was well recognised that the continued battle to eliminate doping from competitive sport waged by lawyers and laboratories on one side against (some) scientists and sportsmen on the other is necessary if sport is to preserve its integrity and its attraction. It is also recognised that there may in consequence of that battle be innocent victims. In the seminal case of Q  v UIT CAS  94/129 in considering the strict liability rule – now enshrined in the [UK Anti-Doping] Rules and Code – the Panel while recognising the argument that such a standard “is unreasonable and indeed contrary to natural justice because it does not permit the accused to establish moral innocence” (para 16) rejected it. In an earlier case in England Gasser v Stinson 1988 15 June Scott J was prepare to accept that the then rule of the International Association of Athletics Federations which did not allow an athlete even at the stage of sanction to establish his moral innocence was not in unreasonable restraint of trade. Neither decision, in particular the second, bears directly on the issue before the Sole Arbitrator but each provides a reminder that a rule which at first sight may appear to be unfair to one athlete may on mature consideration be justified as fair to athletes as a whole’. See also Unnamed tennis player and WADA, ATP, & ICAS, European Commission decision dated 12  October 2009, COMP/39471, para 34 (‘According to the principle of objective liability (strict prohibition) breach of the anti-doping rules occurs when a prohibited substance is found in a sample taken from the player and this can lead to penalties even in the absence of fault or negligence. This strict prohibition backed up by effective penalties would appear to be inherently necessary in the fight against doping as any other rule would afford athletes, with the presence of certain substances in their systems, to avoid the imposition of penalties when there is no positive proof of fault or negligence. As it is for the athlete to decide which substance to consume, the rule would not on the face of it appear out of proportion’). The legality of

710  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement the strict liability rule was reviewed and re-affirmed by the CAS panel in Purevdorj v United World Wrestling, CAS 2019/A/6190, paras 108-112. Proof of exogenous source: In Meca-Medina v Commission, European Court of Justice (C-519/04P) [2006] ECR I-6991; [2006] ISLR SLR-175; [2006] All ER (EC) 1057 (discussed at para E11.50–E11.52), the ECJ rejected the athletes’ argument that the presumption that more than 2ng/ml of nandrolone in urine was exogenous breached EC competition law. Similarly, in Schafflützel and Zöllig v Fédération Suisse de courses de chevaux, SFT decision 5C.248/2006 dated 23 August 2007, para 4.6.3.2.2, the Swiss Federal Tribunal confirmed that threshold values are better determined by sports federations than by courts (‘It is not for the judicial body to determine for which substances thresholds should be introduced, nor to set those thresholds. It is an issue that requires particular and specific expertise and it is for the equestrian federations to decide it – within the context of their autonomy (art. 63 para 1 Swiss Civil Code) – on the basis of consultations with parties concerned and serious scientific studies’) (unofficial English translation). See also Slaney v IAAF, 244 F 3d 580, 593 (7th Cir 2001) (rejecting challenge to legality of rule creating presumption that T:E ratio of greater than 6:1 reflects doping: ‘Reduced to its essence, Slaney contends that the burden-shifting approach adopted by the IAAF  violates United States public policy. We disagree. According to the parties, proving the presence of exogenous testosterone in the body by scientific tests is not possible at the present time. Therefore, the IAAF has adopted the rebuttable presumption of ingestion from a high TE ratio in an athlete’s urine. […] Were the IAAF not to make use of the rebuttable presumption, it would be nearly impossible, absent eyewitness proof, to ever find that an athlete had ingested testosterone’). The rules for providing testosterone use have since changed (see para C6.44 et seq) but the analysis of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remains instructive. No need to prove substance enhances performance: In Schafflützel and Zöllig v Fédération Suisse de courses de chevaux, SFT decision 5C.248/2006 dated 23 August 2007, para 4.6.3.2.2, the Swiss Federal Tribunal also confirmed that it is not disproportionate to exclude challenges based on the absence of performance-enhancing effect in an individual matter. Reliance on indirect evidence of use: In UCI  v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 103, the CAS rejected the athlete’s claim that UCI rules permitting proof of use of a prohibited method based not on direct evidence but rather on indirect evidence (longitudinal profiles of the athlete’s doping results: see para C7.3 et seq) were discriminatory and/or disproportionate and therefore anti-competitive. Whereabouts rules: Courts in France, Spain and Belgium, and the European Court of Rights, have rejected arguments that the Code’s rules requiring athletes to provide ‘whereabouts’ information to facilitate out-of-competition testing (see para C9.1) infringe constitutional rights to privacy and/ or other laws (although in the Belgian case, the challenge was rejected on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits): L’Union Nationale des Footballeurs Professionnels, judgment of Conseil d’Etat, dated 24 February 2011, No 340122 (Code whereabouts requirements do not infringe athletes’ human rights or the principle of equality, the EU charter of fundamental rights, or the TFEU provisions on restrictions on competition, because the whereabouts information is needed in order to carry out unannounced testing, which is essential to the fight against doping, and the requirements are proportionate to that aim); Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Sportifs and Others v France, non-final judgment of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights dated 18 January 2018, application no. 48151/11 (whereabouts provisions impinge upon athlete’s Article 8 rights to respect for private and family life, but are justified on important public interest grounds, including the protection of health and the fairness of sporting competition, and the broad consensus among medical, governmental and international authorities that unannounced out-of-competition testing is required to combat doping, and strike a fair balance between the different interests at stake); ‘Spanish court upholds UCI’s drug testing measures’, sportcal.com, 7  September 2007 (rejecting challenge on the merits); ‘Belgian court says it doesn’t have jurisdiction in key anti-doping case’, Associated Press, 28 November 2007 (rejecting on jurisdictional grounds challenge brought by cyclist to UCI’s asserted right to test cyclists out of competition). Sanction for whereabouts violation: In Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, the CAS panel rejected the suggestion that the IAAF’s one-year fixed sanction for whereabouts violations was disproportionate, noting: ‘The WADA  Code was drafted in consultation with world sports governing bodies and has been approved by the International Olympic Committee and EU governments. It is therefore rightly regarded as the oracle of the anti-doping movement’. It further noted the discretion given to Anti-Doping Organizations under the Code to determine the sanction for whereabouts violations based on the experience of their own sport, and said that ‘it is not the CAS panel’s role to second-guess the IAAF’s decision or policy in this regard’. Ibid, paras 7.10, 7.12. This was despite the CAS’s post-script that ‘there is no suggestion that [Ohuruogu] is guilty of taking drugs in order to enhance her performance or otherwise and, indeed, this case can be viewed in all the circumstances as a busy young athlete being forgetful’. (The 2009 Code harmonised this issue, requiring all Anti-Doping Organizations to impose a sanction in the range of one to two years for whereabouts violations, depending on the athlete’s degree of fault. See para C20.1 Two-year ban for first offence: In WADA  v Jobson, CAS  2010/A/2307, para  177, the CAS panel upheld the two-year ban for many first offences established by the Code, finding that ‘both CAS jurisprudence and various legal opinions confirm that the WADC [sanction] mechanisms are

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  711 not contrary to human rights legislation’. See also A  v UEFA, 4A_522/2012, SFT judgment dated 21 March 2013, para 4.2.2 (two-year ban for a first doping offence is not so disproportionate as to be a violation of public policy); WADA v ASSIS & FPF, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 70 (same); FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, paras 150-154, in particular para 151 (‘[…] the two years’ ineligibility for doping offenses where the athlete may not demonstrate “no significant fault or negligence” is not excessive, and does not violate mandatory Swiss law’); and cases cited at para C20.16 et seq. The opinions mentioned by the CAS panel in Jobson were Kaufman-Kohler et al, ‘Legal opinion on the conformity of certain provisions of the draft World Anti-Doping Code with commonly accepted principles of international law’, 26 February 2003, eg at para 164 (‘Based upon the weight of legal authority, we conclude that a two-year suspension for a first doping offence is not disproportionate, considering the gravity of the offence committed. In our view, a more lenient sanction for a first offence is likely to seriously jeopardise the effectiveness of the fight against doping’); and Prof Dr Claude Rouiller, Legal Opinion dated 25 October 2005, at p 50 (‘In spite of its severity, the system providing for a fixed two-year suspension applicable – subject only to the exculpatory evidence and limited attenuating mechanisms set forth in Articles 10.2, paragraph 2 and 10.5 of the Code – in the case of a first anti-doping rule violation is compatible with the fundamental rights and the general principles enshrined in or recognised by autonomous Swiss law; the athlete’s fundamental rights with respect to a defence would of course have to be respected, which the Code requires at least implicitly’). On the other hand, on two occasions CAS appeal panels have found that the Code provisions on sanctions produced a disproportionate (and therefore unlawful) result on the particular (and unique) facts of the case at hand. See para C20.19. Different sanctions for Specified Substances: The CAS panel in WADA  v Jobson, CAS  2010/A/2307, par 120, also rejected the athlete’s argument that it violated ‘the principle of equal treatment and proportionality of sanction’ to apply different sanctions to violations involving Specified Substances under Code Art 10.4 than to violations involving non-Specified Substances (in particular cocaine). The CAS panel reasoned that that approach ‘does not violate the principle of equal treatment, due to the fact that all cases involving a non-”specified substance” in the world of organised football are treated alike under the FIFA ADR. Additionally the application of 47(1) FIFA ADR only to “specified substances” does not violate the principle of proportionality. The Panel finds that this principle is guaranteed under the WADC and that FIFA is entitled under Swiss law to limit in its rules the circumstances to take into account when fixing the sanctions and restrict the application of the doctrine of proportionality’. The argument was also rejected in Santos v FINA, CAS 2019/A/6482, paras 53-60. Rule conditioning mitigation of sanction on athlete proving source of prohibited substance found in sample: In IWBF  v UK  Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS  2010/A/2230, para  11.25, a CAS sole arbitrator rejected a submission that the requirement that the athlete prove (as a prerequisite to mitigation of sanction) how the prohibited substance got into his system was unfair and disproportionate and therefore unlawful under human rights legislation and the competition rules. (See discussion at para C18.6). Rule conditioning mitigation of sanction on athlete proving lack of fault or negligence: Similarly, the CSA panel sitting in Eder v Ski Austria, CAS 2006/A/1102, para 52, rejected an argument that the requirement that the athlete prove lack of fault or negligence as a pre-condition to elimination or reduction of sanction under Code Art 10.5 (see para C18.5 et seq) was contrary to Austrian law and the European Convention on Human Rights: ‘The shifting of the burden of proof to the athlete to demonstrate that he or she acted without (significant) fault does not conflict with the presumption of innocence. Athletes have a rigorous duty of care towards their competitors and the sports organisation to keep their bodies free of prohibited substances. Anti-doping rule violations do not “just happen” but are, in most cases, the result of a breach of that duty of care. This justifies (i) to presume that the athlete acted with fault or negligence and (ii) to shift the burden of proof from the sanctioning body to the athlete to exonerate him- or herself. On the other hand, to impose on the sanctioning body to demonstrate that the athlete acted with fault or negligence would make the fight against doping extremely difficult or impossible’. See also IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.25 (noting that a system of fixed sanctions based on a presumption of fault, with the athlete having the burden to prove no or no significant fault, ‘is, in the Sole Arbitrator’s judgment, an entirely proper and proportionate approach, achieving the requisite equilibrium’). Similarly, in A. v UGFN, 4A_522/2012, judgment dated 21 March 2013, para 4.2.2, the Swiss Federal Tribunal followed prior decisions in rejecting the argument that the rule presuming fault from the presence of a prohibited substance (see para C18.6) violates public policy. Four year ban for intentional violation: CAS panels have also firmly upheld the proportionality of a four year ban for an intentional violation of Art 2.1. Zielinski v IWF, CAS  2017/A/5178, para  97 (‘The rules contained in the IWF ADP according to which the period of ineligibility may be reduced based on fault-related and non-fault-related criteria are an expression of this principle of proportionality. The Appellant has not brought forward any valid argument that the possibilities to reduce the period of ineligibility built into the IWF ADP only insufficiently incorporate or implement the general principle of proportionality. In addition, no facts have been established by the Panel that would justify a reduction based on such principle’); Villanueva v FINA, CAS  2016/A/4534, at paras 50 and 51 (‘[50.] The history of sanctions since the creation of WADA can be, if only

712  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement broadly, summarised in three chapters. Under WADC  2003, the basic sanction for a first offence ADRV was two years. Under WADC  2009, it became two years, subject to increase to four years in circumstances of aggravation. Under WADC  2015, it became four years, subject to decrease in circumstances of mitigation. The sanctions screw was tightened in an effort to rid sport of the scourge of doping. Guarding against doping is so fundamental to the ability to hold fair sporting events and fund them that its presence jeopardizes the existence of sports itself. [51.] The WADC  2015 was the product of wide consultation and represented the best consensus of sporting authorities as to what was needed to achieve as far as possible the desired end. It sought itself to fashion in a detailed and sophisticated way a proportionate response in pursuit of a legitimate aim. At the request of WADA, Jean-Paul Costa, former President of the European Court of Human Rights, wrote a Legal Opinion regarding the draft World Anti-Doping Code, which examines the issue of the compatibility of several provisions of the draft revision of the WADC  2015 with the accepted principles of international law and human rights (published in June 2013). In the Panel’s view it would be a wholly exceptional, if any, case to allow particular circumstances to trump the provisions of the WADC  2015 relating to sanctions for an ADRV. However, the Panel considers that there is nothing exceptional about the present case’), followed in Gonçalves v IWF, CAS  2016/A/4761, para 46, and Ferreira v IWF, CAS 2016/A/4758, para 51; WADA v Comitato Permanente Antidoping San Marino NADO & Karim Gharbi, CAS 2017/A/4962 (‘55. Accordingly, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the Athlete wholly failed to meet his burden of proof; his doping violation must be deemed to be intentional and he must therefore be sanctioned with a 4-year period. 56. Unfortunately the CPA seems to have ignored the clear wording of Article 10.1.1 of the NADO Rules and the reinforcing commentary in CAS cases and elsewhere, and both its submissions and those on behalf of the Athlete confuse the rule, and its proportionality, with the allegedly mitigating factors in this case and a subjective perception of the Athlete’s good character. 57. The Athlete’s family and financial means and his apparent cooperation and truthfulness, do not demonstrate in any way that his violation was unintentional under the clear test in the NADO  Rules. To reverse the burden so that it must be established in the face of the Athlete’s bare assertions of innocence that the violation was intentional (whether “beyond reasonable doubt” or to a lesser standard) is to flout the relevant rules and to undermine the fight against doping. 58. That fight is a global fight requiring the cooperation and collective effort of all the countries and agencies involved including San Marino and its NADO. To allow personal appearance and circumstance in the present case to reduce the required sanction, contrary to harmonised rules, is to damage sport not only in the relevant country (where the athlete concerned may be especially valued) but internationally, by diluting the reciprocity and “level playing field” which fairness in international sport demands. 59. The collateral qualities of the athlete concerned, and even previous local “heroism”, must not detract from this principle. On the contrary this encapsulates why the rules must be followed in word and in spirit. There is nothing remotely “disproportionate” in consistently applying the anti-doping measures now in place; and this cannot depend on personal considerations without damaging the system as a whole. 60. Accordingly, the full, 4-year sanction should and shall apply in this case and there is no justification in principle or on the facts of this case for seeking to depart from it’). See also Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.29 (upholding legality of a four-year ban for a first offence in weight-lifting, even though that was two years more than the Code prescribed, on the basis that ‘weightlifting is a sport in which doping can significantly enhance the performances. It is notorious that anabolic steroids are used in weightlifting. It is in the interest of the fight against doping to apply a high threshold as a deterrent to commit a doping violation in weightlifting’). Rule mandating automatic disqualification of results without proving performance-enhancing effect: In Aloyan v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4927, paras 78-81, a CAS panel endorsed the rulings of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (in decision of 4 August 2006, 4P.105/2006, para 8.2; and in decision of 23 August 2007, ATR 13 III 193, para 4.6.3.2.2) that Code Art 9, providing for the automatic disqualification of results of a competition where a sample collected in connection with that competition tests positive for a prohibited substance, is proportionate and lawful. Rule mandating arbitration of anti-doping disputes: Pechstein v ISU, German Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 7  June 2016, KZR  6/15, para  59(2) (requiring athletes to submit to CAS arbitration as a condition of pursuing their profession as athletes is not an abuse of a dominant position, because ‘Sports federations such as the Second Defendant promote sports in general and particularly their own sport by creating the prerequisites for organised sport. To achieve the relevant goals, it is of fundamental importance to ensure that the rules apply to all athletes and are implemented everywhere in accordance with uniform standards. It is therefore generally recognised, particularly in the area of international sport, that arbitration agreements determining the jurisdiction of a particular court of arbitration are required to ensure a uniform procedure with regard to the implementation of the rules of sports law. Particularly in the area of doping, uniform application of the anti-doping rules of the federations and of the WADC is indispensable to ensure fair international sporting competitions for all athletes. Furthermore, a uniform court of arbitration for sport can contribute to the development of international sports law. Further advantages of an international sports arbitration, as compared to state courts, include the specialist knowledge of the arbitrators, the speed of the decision-making process, which is of paramount importance for the athlete involved in such proceedings, and the international recognition and execution of arbitral awards’) (citations omitted) and paras 64–65 (‘An arbitration

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  713 agreement naming the CAS as the relevant court of arbitration does not violate the rights of the Plaintiff in the light of Art. 6 ECHR, either. [65] Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR provides that, with respect to civil law claims, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. However, like the claim of access to the courts established by the German Constitution, this right of access to ordinary courts may also be waived. In particular, the jurisdiction of ordinary courts may be excluded in arbitration agreements if the arbitration agreement has been entered into voluntarily, is lawful and clearly worded, if further the arbitration procedure has been designed in accordance with the guarantees given in Art. 6 ECHR and if the arbitral awards can be set aside by a court of law in case of procedural errors. According to the statements set out above under bb), these requirements have been fulfilled. According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the fact that the Plaintiff is obliged, to be able to exercise her profession, to sign the registration form imposed by the Second Defendant does not mean that the arbitration agreement has not been voluntarily signed and therefore infringes the Convention’) (citations omitted). Cf Canas v ATP, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment dated 22 March 2007, 4P.172/2006, para 4.3 (whereas athlete accepted that he was required under the rules to submit to the jurisdiction of the CAS to arbitrate any disputes with the governing body, his acceptance of a further rule purporting to waive his right to appeal a subsequent CAS arbitration award to the Swiss Federal Tribunal was not enforceable against the athlete, because the right to recourse to the courts is a fundamental one, and he was given no choice but to agree that waiver as a condition of participate in the sport).

C4.18 Which hearing panel will hear and determine the charge(s) against the athlete, and which procedure will it follow in doing so? The Code is not prescriptive on this topic: it identifies certain basic principles of procedural fairness that must be respected, including that the hearing panel must be ‘fair and impartial’,1 and that there must be certain rights of appeal from its decisions,2 but otherwise leaves it to the Anti-Doping Organization to determine the applicable process.3 Most Anti-Doping Organizations specify that the charge will be determined not by any court but by a specially convened disciplinary hearing panel. Due to the specialist nature of the charges, some Anti-Doping Organizations specify in their rules that the hearing panel must include, in addition to a legal chair, wing members with medical and/or scientific expertise. In the UK, for example, most cases are heard by the members of the National Anti-Doping Panel, an independent panel of expert lawyers and lay persons, pursuant to a detailed set of procedural rules that are intended to ensure fairness at each stage.4 If the process set out in the rules is not fair, however, eg because the athlete is not given proper opportunity to defend himself,5 or the hearing panel is not impartial,6 or there is no right of appeal against that hearing panel to an independent appeal body,7 again there may be grounds for challenge.8 1 Code Art 8.1 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to provide the athlete or other person charged with ‘a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a fair and impartial hearing panel. A timely reasoned decision specifically including an explanation of the reason(s) for any period of Ineligibility shall be Publicly Disclosed as provided in Article 14.3’. The 2021 Code introduced a requirement that the first instance hearing panel be ‘Operationally Independent’ (2021 Code Art 8.1), meaning that ‘(1) board members, staff members, commission members, consultants and officials of the Anti-Doping Organization with responsibility for Results Management or its affiliates (eg member federation or confederation), as well as any Person involved in the investigation and pre-adjudication of the matter cannot be appointed as members and/or clerks (to the extent that such clerk is involved in the deliberation process and/or drafting of any decision) of hearing panels of that Anti-Doping Organization with responsibility for Results Management and (2) hearing panels shall be in a position to conduct the hearing and decision-making process without interference from the Anti-Doping Organization or any third party. The objective is to ensure that members of the hearing panel or individuals otherwise involved in the decision of the hearing panel, are not involved in the investigation of, or decisions to proceed with, the case’ (2021 Code, App One, definition of ‘Operationally Independent’). Cf paras D2.12 et seq and para E13.39 (discussing ‘right’ under Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to have a charge heard by an independent tribunal). At the appeal stage, the requirements change: 2015 Code Art 13.2 requires that the athlete be given a right of appeal against an adverse first instance decision either (a) to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, which is an independent body (see para D2.18), or (b) in the case of a nationallevel athlete, either to the CAS or to ‘an independent and impartial body in accordance with rules established by the National Anti-Doping Organization’). Article 13.2 of the 2021 Code clarifies that the appeal body must be both ‘Operationally Independent’ (as to which, see the foregoing paragraph

714  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

2

3 4

5 6 7 8

of this note) and ‘Institutionally Independent’, ie  ‘fully independent institutionally from the AntiDoping Organization responsible for Results Management. They must therefore not in any way be administered by, connected or subject to the Anti-Doping Organization responsible for Results Management’ (Code App One, definition of ‘Institutional Independence’, p.91). See Code Art 13.2, mandating that decisions involving a national-level athlete may be appealed to ‘an independent and impartial body in accordance with rules established by the National Anti-Doping Organization’; while decisions involving an international-level athlete or international events may be appealed to CAS. See comment to Code Art 8.1: ‘This Article is not intended to supplant each Signatory’s own rules for hearings but rather to ensure that each Signatory provides a hearing process consistent with these principles’. The National Anti-Doping Panel’s procedural rules can be found at sportresolutions.co.uk/images/ uploads/D_1_-_2019_NADP_Rules.pdf [accessed 3  November 2020]. As the UK  National AntiDoping Policy (para C2.22) expressly confirms, the National Anti-Doping Panel is entirely independent of the national governing bodies and also of UK Anti-Doping, notwithstanding that it is appointed under their rules and is funded by DCMS. See para D1.90. See para D1.76 et seq. See para D1.121 et seq. See Chapters D1 and D2.

C4.19 To answer each of these questions – how are the rules to be construed, are the rules legal, is the procedure fair? – the athlete’s lawyer will need to determine the law that governs the proceedings and the rules in question. The rules may provide expressly that a particular national law applies.1 However, just as under English law the meaning of international conventions is to be determined by reference to international jurisprudence,2 there will be limits on the impact of national law in interpreting and applying anti-doping rules that implement the World Anti-Doping Code.3 It would clearly be contrary to the fundamental harmonising purpose of the Code4 if the same Code-compliant anti-doping rules were to be given different meanings and legal effect in different jurisdictions and/or different sports. Therefore the Code requires hearing panels to construe and apply Code-compliant anti-doping rules ‘as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the signatories or governments’.5 And that means following the general principles of international sports law that have been developed by the CAS and other bodies in interpreting the Code,6 and adopting an interpretation that is consistent with the jurisprudence of the CAS interpreting the Code and/or Code-compliant rules.7 1 2 3 4

See eg Art 16.1.1 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules (applying English law). Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL). See para B1.14 et seq. See Code p  11: ‘The purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-doping effort through universal harmonisation of core anti-doping elements’. 5 Code Art 24.3 and 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules Article 1.5.3. 6 See para B1.15 and (for a discussion of what those ‘general principles of law’ are) para B1.18 et seq. See also Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 59 (FIA anti-doping rules ‘should be interpreted and applied based on “general principles of law drawn from a comparative or common denominator reading of various domestic legal systems”, quoting AEK Athens v UEFA, CAS 98/200); UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24  February 2004, para  27 (‘The phrase that requires to be interpreted […] is expressed in the rules of an international organization, the IAAF, which rules are in turn derived from the IOC  Anti-Doping Code. The rules apply to all athletes engaged in international athletic competition and are intended to operate in a uniform manner across all jurisdictions. It is thus clear that the rules must be interpreted consistently so as to accord with generally accepted principles of law which would be applied by tribunals of other jurisdictions and by CAS, to which any appeal lies under IAAF Rule 21. In the CAS jurisprudence an acceptance is emerging of the general principles of sporting law governing doping offences, independent of the municipal law of the state in which the sporting body happens to be located. That approach can only be strengthened as the World Anti-Doping Code is brought into force’); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006 (same). 7 WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 126 (‘[…] the FIFA ADR has been established on the basis of the WADC, whose main intention was the harmonisation of the worldwide fight against doping. As recognised by CAS jurisprudence, in order to achieve this goal of harmonisation “it is necessary to interpret anti-doping rules that have been established on the basis of the WADC in harmony with the

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  715 WADC, the respective set of rules of other international sport federations and the respective CAS case law”’), quoting Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, para 71.

C4.20 An athlete’s lawyer who believes that there are grounds for challenge will also want to consider whether it is necessary to bring that challenge before the disciplinary hearing panel or else whether, and in what circumstances, a court will intervene in the internal sporting process to hear that challenge. English courts at least are generally likely to be reluctant to intervene in that process.1 In the anti-doping context in particular the proceedings are likely to be characterised as arbitration proceedings, and the disciplinary hearing panel as an arbitral panel,2 which substantially limits the right of either party to seek judicial intervention in the process in any event3 (as well as diminishing the role of substantive and procedural national law even further4). As a result, an athlete facing anti-doping proceedings before an English-based tribunal acting under Code-compliant anti-doping rules should in principle find it very difficult to persuade an English court to set aside or intervene in those proceedings. But in those very narrow circumstances when an English court might be persuaded to intervene, that court should take the same approach to applicable law as would the disciplinary hearing panel. Those English cases that have proceeded on a contrary basis have failed adequately to recognise the international dimension of sports anti-doping regimes.5 1 See para E6.2. 2 The rules may state expressly that the proceedings before the hearing panel are to be treated as arbitration proceedings. See eg Art 16.1.2 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules: ‘These Rules shall constitute an agreement to arbitrate, and proceedings before an NADP first instance tribunal pursuant to Article 8, or before an NADP appeal panel pursuant to Article 13, shall constitute arbitration proceedings with a seat in England or Wales to which the Arbitration Act 1996 shall apply’. Even if they do not say that expressly, however, that is how the proceedings are likely to be construed. UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, paras 25–26 (‘Under IAAF Rule 21 each member federation is required to incorporate provisions requiring doping disputes to be referred for decision to a tribunal, with an appeal exclusively to the [CAS], whose decision shall be final and binding. […] Accordingly the jurisdiction of this Committee is derived from contract, under which by virtue of UKA  Rule 25, UKA and the athlete agree to accept its determination, subject to the right of appeal to CAS. [26] The rules thus constitute an arbitration agreement in writing. As the arbitration is held in England it is, under English procedural law, subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996’); England and Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm) (discussed at paras B4.22 and D1.4) (ECB’s disciplinary procedures for enforcement of match-fixing rules constitute arbitration proceedings to which the Arbitration Act 1996 applies). That is particularly so where (as under any Code-compliant rules) explicit provision is made for the decision of the first instance hearing panel to be appealed to the CAS in Lausanne, thus as a matter of contract impliedly excluding any right to seek court intervention (see Code Art 13), thereby precluding any challenge in the English courts. Furthermore, while the Court of Arbitration for Sport is subject to the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts, the Swiss Federal Tribunal recognised in 1993 that the CAS offers sufficient guarantees of independence and objectivity for its awards to be final and enforceable by the Swiss courts: Gundel v FEI & CAS, Fed. Tribunal, judgment of 15 May 1993, 1st Civil Division, extracted in Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne 1998), p 561, discussed at para D2.8 3 In such circumstances, under English law, by virtue of the Arbitration Act 1996, the substantive determination of facts and law is to be left by the courts to the arbitral tribunal. The English courts retain a residual power to make orders in support of the arbitration (as in England and Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm), where the court issued a witness summons to require a non-party to attend the hearing to give evidence), but no power to review the substance of the decision of the arbitral tribunal, and only a very limited power to call in the award for serious irregularity in due process: Arbitration Act 1996 ss 67 and 68 (see para D3.18). And even the narrow procedural protections of the Arbitration Act 1996 will generally only apply to that part of the process under which determinations are being made by a national tribunal whose seat is in England and Wales, and not to that part of the process that is determined by an international arbitral body whose seat is outside the jurisdiction of the English courts. See s  2 of the Arbitration Act 1996. There are only limited exceptions to this rule: see further para E2.105 et seq. So, for example, if the arbitration is before CAS, it is the Swiss courts that have jurisdiction over CAS awards, which again will be exercised only on limited grounds of illegality, serious procedural irregularity, or violation of public policy. See para D2.45. It should be noted, however, that the European Court of Justice will apparently not feel constrained from ruling on any competition-law-based challenge brought before it, even if the underlying matter is

716  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement a doping dispute that has been resolved on appeal by CAS. In C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina, 18 July 2006 (ECJ), when CAS banned two swimmers for having nandrolone in their samples (see para C6.48, n 2), the swimmers filed suit in the European courts on the basis that the 2 ng/ml cut-off used to distinguish endogenous nandrolone from exogenous nandrolone infringed EC competition law. The ECJ rejected the claim, but on the merits, not based on any deference to CAS’s arbitral jurisdiction: see para E11.50. 4 Even considerations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights may have very limited application, as the effect of submission to arbitration is to waive many of the protections derived from Art 6 of that Convention: see Stretford v The FA [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch), para 45, discussed at paras D3.28–D3.31 and F2.35 et seq. See also Haas, ‘Role and application of Article  6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in CAS Procedures’ (2012) 12(3) ISLR 43–60. In UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, the athlete submitted that his agreement (as set out in the UCI anti-doping rules) to submit disputes relating to those rules to CAS was trumped by Spanish national law forbidding the arbitration of doping disputes. The CAS rejected that submission on the basis (among others) that Spanish law permitted waiver of the right to go to court in favour of arbitration of disputes. The CAS noted that ‘to decide otherwise would lead to a veritable race for the most lenient national legislation’. Ibid, para 41. 5 For example, in Modahl v British Athletics Federation Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1192 (CA) (discussed at para C3.7, n 2), although the breach of contract claim was argued through the English courts exclusively by reference to English law, on the basis that the contract (the disciplinary rules propounded by the British Athletics Federation) was governed by English law, to the extent that the substance of the doping dispute remained in issue the rules in question were actually the international rules of the IAAF, and the alleged doping offence occurred in Portugal. The role of the BAF’s anti-doping tribunal was solely to hear and determine the case in accordance with those international rules, and an appeal lay to the IAAF Arbitration Panel sitting in Monaco. The IAAF rules did not provide for their meaning or effect to be governed by any national system of law, and it would clearly be contrary to the interests of sport for the same international rules to be given a different meaning and legal effect in different jurisdictions (as to which, see further para B1.11). Similarly, in the leading English case of Gasser v Stinson (15 June 1988, unreported), QBD, Sandra Gasser was Swiss, the doping offence occurred in Italy, and the defendant was an English representative of the IAAF. The fortuitous location of the headquarters of the IAAF in England led the English court to assume jurisdiction and to apply English principles of restraint of trade to an international regime. The IAAF has since moved to Monaco in an attempt to avoid the jurisdictional reach of the English courts, an approach that initially at least did not prove particularly successful, mainly because the national governing body is generally sued as well, making the joinder of the IAAF legitimate as a ‘necessary and proper party’. See Walker v UKA and IAAF (7 July 2000, unreported), QBD (Toulson J) where a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction over the IAAF was rejected. See also Edwards v BAF and IAAF [1998] 2 CMLR 363 (Lightman J).

B Could the athlete be eligible for a retroactive TUE? C4.21 The Anti-Doping Organization will have checked before charging the athlete for having a prohibited substance in his sample that he did not have permission to use that substance for medical reasons (a ‘Therapeutic Use Exemption’, or TUE).1 However, if he was using it for medical purposes, but had not obtained a TUE in advance, it might be possible in certain (narrow) circumstances to obtain a TUE after the fact to cover that use.2 If a retroactive TUE is granted, the charge will be withdrawn.3 If a retroactive TUE is not granted, but a prospective TUE is granted, indicating that the athlete would have got a TUE if he had asked for it on a timely basis, he will have committed an ADRV but the sanction may be mitigated.4 1 See para C4.40. 2 See Art 4.3 of WADA’s International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions (Jan 2019): ‘An Athlete may only be granted retroactive approval for his/her Therapeutic Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method (ie, a retroactive TUE) if: a. Emergency treatment or treatment of an acute medical condition was necessary; or b. Due to other exceptional circumstances, there was insufficient time or opportunity for the Athlete to submit, or for the TUEC to consider, an application for the TUE prior to Sample collection; or c. The applicable rules required the Athlete (see comment to Article 5.1) or permitted the Athlete (see Code Article 4.4.5) to apply for a retroactive TUE; or d. It is agreed, by WADA and by the Anti-Doping Organization to whom the application for a retroactive TUE is or would be made, that fairness requires the grant of a retroactive TUE’. A retroactive TUE must be obtained from the Anti-Doping Organization with TUE jurisdiction over the athlete; it cannot be granted by the hearing panel that has been asked to determine the charge that the presence of the substance in the athlete’s sample constitutes an anti-doping rule violation. WADA v Qatar FA & Alanezi, CAS 2007/A/1446, paras 6.10–6.11. However, the CAS can hear an athlete’s

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  717 appeal against the Anti-Doping Organization’s refusal to grant a retrospective TUE. See O’Hara v WADA & UEFA, CAS 2008/A/1511. In such a case, ‘the burden is on the Appellant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the conditions that must be met to grant the TUE are fulfilled’. Ibid para 81. But see Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 102 (based on comment to ISTUE Art 4.3 stating that there is no right of appeal against a decision that fairness does not require the grant of a retroactive TUE, CAS cannot ‘replace the TUEC’s fairness assessment with that of CAS’; instead it may only be overturned if it is shown to be ‘arbitrary, grossly disproportionate, irrational or perverse or otherwise outside of the margin of discretion, or taken in bad faith or without the due process rights provided to the athlete’). See also Stewart v FIM, CAS 2015/A/3876, para 80 (‘There would have been no requirement of fairness that required Mr Stewart to be granted a retrospective TUE simply because he had failed to carry out his obligations and so through ignorance to apply timeously for a TUE’). Art 4.1 of the 2021 ISTUE adds a new clause permitting grant of a retroactive TUE to an athlete who ‘Used Out-of-Competition, for therapeutic reasons, a Prohibited Substance that is only prohibited In-Competition’. The comment to that provision states that it ‘seeks to address situations where, for Therapeutic reasons, an Athlete Uses a substance Out-of-Competition, but there is a risk that the substance will remain in their system In-Competition. In such situations, the Anti-Doping Organization must permit the Athlete to apply for a retroactive TUE (where the Athlete has not applied in advance)’. In addition, the previous ‘where fairness requires’ ground for granting a retroactive TUE becomes a standalone exemption allowing grant of a retroactive TUE when it would be ‘manifestly unfair’ not to grant one, even if all the Art 4.2 criteria for grant of a TUE may not be fulfilled, but WADA’s prior approval is required. 3 See eg USADA v McCall, USADA press release dated 9 June 2017 (‘On February 10, 2017, McCall, 32, received an intravenous infusion of normal saline solution at the recommendation of his physician to treat an acute medical condition. At the time of the intravenous infusion, McCall was scheduled to compete at UFC  208 in Brooklyn, New York, on February 11, 2017, but he was subsequently removed from the card due to illness. Although saline is not prohibited under the UFC Anti-Doping Program, according to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Prohibited List, which has been adopted by the UFC Anti-Doping Policy, all intravenous infusions and/or injections of more than 50mL per 6-hour period are prohibited at all times unless the athlete obtains a TUE in advance, or if the infusion is legitimately received in the course of hospital admissions, surgical procedures, or clinical investigations. After a thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding the potential violation, which included the retroactive TUE application process, USADA determined that the athlete had a diagnosed acute medical condition for which the use of an intravenous infusion is consistent with the standard of care. Because McCall’s TUE application was granted retroactively, his use of a prohibited method will not result in an anti-doping policy violation’). 4 See para C18.28 et seq.

C Should the charge be dismissed due to delay or other unfairness? C4.22 An Anti-Doping Organization ordinarily has ten years to bring a charge against an athlete for violation of Code-compliant anti-doping rules.1 However that limitation period may be subject to extension if warranted on the facts of a particular case.2 1 See Code Art 17 (‘Statute of Limitations’): ‘No anti-doping rule violation proceeding may be commenced against an Athlete or other Person unless he or she has been notified of the anti-doping rule violation as provided in Article 7, or notification has been reasonably attempted, within ten (10) years from the date the violation is asserted to have occurred’. Code Art 25.2 provides that the ten-year limitations period applies retrospectively to any claim that was previously subject to the eight-year limitations period in the 2009 Code, provided the eight-year period had not already expired when the 2015 Code came into effect on 1 January 2015. See IAAF v RusAF and Pyatykh, CAS 2017/O/5039, para 76 (eight-year limitations period on claim against athlete had not expired as of 1 January 2015 and therefore it became subject to the new 10-year limitations period); IAAF  v RusAF & Yushkov, CAS 2018/A/5675, para 60 (same); Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 50 (claim dismissed because eight-year statute of limitations had already expired before 2015 Code came into effect). 2 The CAS panel in CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 78, stated that the ‘interruption, suspension, expiry or extension of such time-bar […] should be dealt with in the context of the principles of private law of the country where the interested sports authority is domiciled’. That is inconsistent with the goal of harmonisation, but in USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA Panel decision dated 30 January 2012, para 1.2, where an athlete had testified falsely in AAA and CAS proceedings back in 2004 that he had never taken EPO, and then in 2011 confessed to using EPO in 2001–2003, USADA brought proceedings in 2011 seeking disqualification of the results he had obtained in 2001–2003. The athlete argued that USADA’s proceedings were time-barred under Code Art 17 and an earlier IAAF six-year limitations period, but the AAA Panel rejected that plea on the basis that ‘Hellebuyck’s perjury in a proceeding

718  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement before the anti-doping tribunal established by the USOC, WADA and IAAF precludes Hellebuyck from arguing for any protection under IAAF or WADA rules regarding limiting the time USADA has to pursue charges against him’. It gave two alternative legal bases for this ruling: (1) the doctrine that he who seeks equitable relief must come with clean hands (see para 8.8: ‘Hellebuyck came to this Panel with unclean hands. He committed perjury in his 2004 hearings before the AAA when he testified that he had not used EPO. He did not have to testify at those hearings. Now, having admitted he committed multiple doping offenses during the relevant time period that he lied about in the 2004 hearing, he cannot assert that some procedural or substantive rule designed for the purpose of ensuring the adequate presentation of timely and reliable evidence should work to his benefit to avoid a determination that he committed the doping offence’); and (2) the doctrine of equitable tolling of the running of a statute of limitations due to the athlete’s fraudulent concealment of the claim now said to be tolled. Ibid, para 8.17. In October 2012, USADA relied on the Hellebuyck precedent (among other things) in sanctioning Lance Armstrong for doping dating back to 1998. See USADA v Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility, dated 10 October 2012, pp 154–55 (‘The eight-year statute of limitation found in Article 17 of the Code was suspended by Mr Armstrong’s fraudulent concealment of his doping. […] The running of a statute of limitations is suspended when the person seeking to assert the statute of limitations defense has subverted the judicial process, such as by fraudulently concealing his wrongful conduct’). The UCI disputed this aspect of USADA’s decision – see UCI decision regarding USADA v Armstrong, 22 October 2012, p 2 (‘It is UCI’s view that USADA’s reference to national law is not appropriate. First article 24.3 of the Code states that that Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the Code signatories or governments. Secondly it would be in full contradiction with the purpose of harmonisation of the Code that an action could be commenced against one athlete but not against another because of different national legislations governing the statute of limitations. Where WADA emphasises the need for harmonisation of sanctions, there should be no disharmony in the possibility to sanction an athlete at all’) – but did not appeal it.

C4.23 Even where a charge is filed before the statute of limitations has run, the person charged may argue that the Anti-Doping Organization’s delay in bringing the charge causes unfairness that mandates dismissal of the charge without consideration of the merits. For example, Article  5.1.2.1 of the 2021 International Standard for Results Management says that once an Anti-Doping Organization has confirmed that there is no TUE and no apparent departures from the sample collection and analysis requirements that explain an adverse analytical finding, the Anti-Doping Organization ‘shall promptly notify the Athlete of the Adverse Analytical Finding’. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, a plea of ‘laches’ should in principle be particularly difficult to sustain in the anti-doping context, where the purpose of the proceedings being challenged is not to right a private wrong but rather to vindicate the public interest in the integrity of sport.1 Such a plea is therefore unlikely to get off the ground unless it can be shown that the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the claim has ‘slept on its rights’ and that the delay has prejudiced the athlete, eg by making it more difficult for him to gather the evidence he needs to defend himself.2 And even then, unless the circumstances are ‘extreme’, ie unless the delay was ‘protracted, grave and culpable’ and has caused ‘serious prejudice’ to the athlete, the hearing panel is likely to prefer to determine the charge on the merits and (if the charge is upheld) to address any perceived unfairness caused by the delay in bringing the charge by back-dating the deemed start-date of any ban imposed.3 If the person charged can point to a prior representation by the Anti-Doping Organization that a charge would not be brought, he can argue that the doctrine of estoppel or the doctrine of legitimate expectation mandates dismissal of the charge,4 which might strengthen their hand somewhat, although the same public interest arguments would still apply.5 Alternatively, if they can show that the delay has prejudiced them in their ability to investigate and determine how the prohibited substance found in their sample got into their system (which they would have to prove in order to get the standard sanctions set out in the Code reduced), they may argue that the charge should not be dismissed but the requirement to prove source as a pre-condition to any mitigation plea should be waived, or at least watered down significantly.6 1 Crews v AIBA, CAS 2009/A/1985, para 5.16 (although there was an ‘unacceptable delay on the part of AIBA’ in bringing the case against the athlete, dismissal of the charge was not appropriate, because ‘[w]hilst it is important to bring home to AIBA the importance of dealing properly and promptly with

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  719 anti-doping matters, it does not follow that the appropriate way to do this is by allowing an athlete to escape the consequences of her actions. This would merely advantage the athlete and act to the disadvantage of those other athletes who had not committed doping offences’); ITF  v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9  June 2016, paras 41–42 (agreeing with ITF submission that if the rules had intended that delay would lead to dismissal of the charge, they would have said so expressly, ‘especially since the dismissal (otherwise that on the merits) of an anti-doping charge would clearly be contrary to the public interest in the fight against doping in sport’), appeal upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697. 2 Muralidharan v NADA et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, paras 90–91 (rejecting submission that a delay in pursuing anti-doping charges – meaning that the case took nearly four years to resolve at domestic level – was a fundamental breach of the rules that should lead per se to dismissal of the charges, holding instead that the athlete had to show that he ‘lost any chance’ to defend himself, because the delay ‘unduly prejudice[d] his right to obtain evidence, interview witnesses, or adequately defend the claims brought against him’); UCI v Ullrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, para 32b (failure to issue summons to athlete by deadline specified in UCI rules did not entitle athlete to relief, because it did not result in ‘any prejudice to Ullrich that will affect these proceedings. This Panel concludes that Ullrich did not suffer prejudice in this regard, not least because he was fully aware of the UCI’s investigation at the time, in particular by reason of his dismissal from his team for suspicion of involvement in Operation Puerto. There is no evidence that Ullrich’s ability to mount a defence has not [sic] been compromised, and Ullrich’s procedural objections to the UCI Rules have not featured any factual allegation that his ability to put forward any facts or arguments or otherwise mount his defence has been compromised’); ITF v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, para 42 (declining to dismiss charge due to delay in prosecuting it where, among other things, the respondent ‘does not point to any prejudice which she has suffered due to the period of avoidable delay’), appeal upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697; ITF v Burdekin, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 4 April 2005, paras 59, 61–62 (‘The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the athlete] should have been notified of the adverse test result by about the last week of August 2004. It does not follow that the entire charge should be dismissed. The Tribunal, having heard and weighed all the evidence, does not accept that the player suffered any real rather than theoretical prejudice through lapse of time. We regard it as unlikely in the extreme, to the point of being fanciful, that there was some critical loss of memory, between late August and 19 October 2004, of an event relevant to the likelihood of the player’s drink being spiked’). See also Lei Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, para 91 (athlete suffered no prejudice from bringing of case based on re-analysis of sample almost eight years after sample was provided, even if the delay meant she was unable to establish the source of the substance found in her sample, because IOC was seeking only finding of Art 2.1 violation and disqualification of her results in the competition following which she tested negative, as to which issues of fault or negligence are irrelevant); WADA v Covert & FEI, CAS 2012/A/2960, para 102 (‘Finally, the Athlete submits that destruction of the sample was a violation of substantive justice that alone warrants dismissal of the appeal. The Panel disagrees. The Athlete has no standalone right to retain her sample. The potential harm that could be visited on an athlete as a result of a premature sample destruction comes only from actual prejudice to her right to a fair hearing, not from an inherent right to retain her sample. In other words, because the Athlete failed to demonstrate prejudice there was no violation of substantive justice’); Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032, para 129 (argument that delay in bringing charges prejudiced athlete’s ability to prove the supplements she had been taking were contaminated was rejected because all athletes have a stand-alone duty, which exists independently of any drug-testing, to keep careful records of the supplements and medications they ingest); World Athletics v Marimuthu, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/287/2019 dated 26 May 2020, para 118 (alleged delay in notifying adverse analytical finding to athlete deemed irrelevant where athlete did not show how alleged delay could cast doubt on the laboratory finding or that it prejudiced her in any way). Cf Volandri v ITF, CAS  2009/A/1782, paras 98–99 (citing delays in results management that left athlete in state of uncertainty and made it difficult for him to gather evidence to support his defence as factors in only reprimanding athlete rather than banning him under Code Art 10.4.) See by way of analogy R v Soneji and Another [2005] UKHL 49 (where Criminal Justice Act 1988 provided that an order for confiscation of proceeds of crime had to be obtained within six months of sentencing, but did not say what the consequence would be if the CPS missed that deadline, Lord Steyn said that ‘the emphasis ought to be on the consequences of non-compliance, and posing the question whether Parliament can fairly be taken to have intended total invalidity’ (para 23). He decided that it could not, and that instead the question was whether the defendant had suffered prejudice as a result of the delay that outweighed the clear public interest in enforcing the confiscation provisions: ‘counsel for the accused relied on an alleged injustice caused to the accused by the delay of the confiscation procedures. In my view this argument was overstated. The prejudice to the two accused was not significant. It is also decisively outweighed by the countervailing public interest in not allowing a convicted offender to escape confiscation for what were no more than bona fide errors in the judicial process’ (para 24). 3 Given the public interest in enforcement of a sport’s anti-doping rules, the hearing panel in ITF  v Burdekin, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 4  April 2005, para  63, queried, in obiter dictum, ‘whether a doping charge could ever, in principle, fall to be dismissed by reason of protracted,

720  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement grave and culpable delay leading to serious prejudice to a player, for example through the death or incapacity of a crucial defence witness’. However, it noted that, ‘at least in the absence of such extreme circumstances, the Tribunal considers that any culpable delay can be met by adjustment of the starting date of any period of ineligibility, through exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion under Article M.8.3(b) of the Programme [to back-date the start date of the period of Ineligibility]’. Similarly, in USADA v Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, the AAA Panel held it was not an ‘abuse of process’ for USADA not to charge an athlete support personnel until several years after it obtained evidence against him, because the charge was still brought within the limitations period, but it noted that ‘[t] here does not seem to have been a compelling reason, however, why USADA could not have brought this case much earlier. In this case, there has been no new evidence brought forward since 2004. There is nothing unique about this case or the evidence ultimately presented by USADA that would require it to sit for 6 or 7 years before being charged, and in fact it might perhaps have been presented more expeditiously at the time the other BALCO cases were brought, such as Collins, Korchemney, and Harrison. Under WADA Code Article 10.9.1, the Panel has discretion to modify the start date for its sanction. The Panel will avail itself of that discretion here because the conditions for doing so are present. The anti-doping system is benefited by having cases of this sort brought to a hearing or resolution sooner rather than later. This provides certainty to the accused and all of those affected, it eliminates the involvement in sport of those engaged in doping at the earliest reasonable opportunity, and it furthers the interest of athletes and governing bodies to have cases heard expeditiously. The Panel understands that often there are competing priorities and resource limitations bearing on the ability of an anti-doping agency to bring cases immediately. In addition, the system of anti-doping is benefitted by anti-doping agencies being able to present the strongest case they can against an accused, especially where evidence is being developed for that case during the statute of limitations period. Having said that, the Panel is also of the view that the competing consideration of fairness to the accused dictates that in cases like this – where there is seemingly no new facts or evidence developed for several years – the period of time following investigation should properly be considered in determining the appropriate start date for any sanction under WADA Code Article 10.9.1’. Ibid, para 9.14. The panel therefore backdated the start date for the ten-year ban that it imposed on the athlete support personnel by 26 months. See also ASADA v Wyper, CAS A4/2007, para 50 (‘I accept that under the enforcement procedures which must be followed by ASADA, there will inevitably be a period before a decision is made whether an infraction has occurred and before any period of ineligibility can commence. This period should not be prolonged […]. In the exercise of my discretion under Article 13.9 as a matter of fairness, I find that the start date for the period of ineligibility should be 7 February 2008 which is twelve months from the date of Mr Wyper’s interview with the investigator from ASADA on 7 February 2007. This is a reasonable period for the initial process to occur and reach a conclusion after making allowances for such delay as may be attributable to Mr Wyper’). Cf Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, p 28 (where it took more than 40 months to get from charge to decision, such delay was not cited as a ground of appeal but the NADP Appeal Tribunal noted, obiter, that ‘National Governing Bodies and other bodies with anti-doping jurisdiction should be aware that in another case delay of such magnitude, indeed delay of a lesser magnitude, might provide grounds for the dismissal of the charge by reason of prejudice caused by delay’). The exception to this line of authority is WADA  v FPF & Costa Fernandes, CAS  2012/A/2922, para 142, where a catalogue of errors, including the laboratory losing its WADA accreditation between analysis of the A sample and analysis of the B sample, and the athlete being misled as to the status of analysis of his B sample, meant that ‘the Player was in truth deprived of any possibility of establishing how the Prohibited Substance – if any – entered his system’, which fact, in combination with the laboratory’s loss of accreditation, led the panel to uphold the domestic panel’s dismissal of the charge. The panel noted: ‘The provisions of [the] regulatory framework must be properly applied if sanctions are to be administered to an athlete. It should always be borne in mind that such sanctions would seriously impact his – by definition – relatively short career, and it is because of the brevity of an athlete’s career, that he has the right to expect his anti-doping results management to be dealt with appropriately at every stage of the process as well as to have access to an expedited and comprehensive hearing on the merits. It is the responsibility and duty of all international sports federations to conduct themselves in a fashion which is beyond reproach and is scrupulously in accordance with their antidoping rules and policies contained within their organization’s rulebook’. Ibid, para 140. 4 See para B1.39. 5 In IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, the IAAF asked its US member federation, USA Track & Field, to disclose decisions it had taken exonerating its athletes of doping charges, so that the IAAF could consider whether to exercise its right of appeal against those decisions, but when asked to identify the rule it was relying on to require such disclosure, and when told that US law (and therefore the USATF rules) prohibited such disclosure, the IAAF failed for a period of four years to identify the provisions in its rules that required such disclosure (because it had a mistaken understanding of its own rules) and did not challenge USATF’s assertion that US law prohibited such disclosure. When the IAAF finally realised its mistake and brought proceedings against the USATF to enforce the disclosure obligation, the CAS panel agreed that the IAAF anti-doping rules did require such disclosure (and by that time the USATF had dropped its argument that US law prohibited such disclosure), and therefore ruled that the USATF was required to disclose any decisions exonerating athletes moving forward.

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  721 However, the CAS panel also held that by its previous conduct in not disputing USATF’s assertion that it was not required to disclose such decisions to the IAAF, and in failing upon challenge to identify the IAAF rules that required such disclosure, the IAAF had led USATF to believe that it could keep such decisions confidential, and so had induced USATF to promise the athletes concerned that the decisions exonerating them would be kept confidential. Reneging on that commitment, the CAS panel said, would frustrate the legitimate expectations of those athletes that ‘questions which they thought were resolved should not now be re-opened’, which would lead to ‘dramatic and undoubtedly painful consequences for the athletes in question – no matter the eventual disposition of their cases – if disclosure were made obligatory so long after the events in issue, and so long after they were led to believe that their cases were closed’. Therefore, the CAS panel did not require the USATF to disclose those previous exoneration decisions to the IAAF. (For a critique of that decision, see para B1.39. 6 In FINA v Palmer, FINA Doping Panel decision 03/15 dated 14 September 2015, a low concentration of furosemide (a diuretic) was found in the athlete’s sample taken in July 2013, but she was not notified of that finding until 20 months later, in April 2015. She sought to mitigate sanction under FINA’s equivalent of Art 10.4 of the 2009 Code, and the hearing panel agreed that ‘the requirement [in that rule] of proving how the substance entered an athlete’s body may be excused in these extraordinary circumstances where the anti-doping organization with results management responsibility knew that there was a positive test and still waited over 20 months to notify the athlete of the positive test’ (para  6.18), because the delay ‘undermined the prospect of her being able to meet this threshold burden’ (para  6.14) and decreased her chances of determining the cause of her positive test (paras 6.16–6.17). It noted however: ‘Every situation where there is a delay after sample collection in notifying the athlete of a positive test does not necessarily require that the athlete gets a lower burden. For instance, in a re-testing scenario there is no reason to balance the equities as the FINA DP has in this case because the anti-doping organization has not deprived an athlete of timely notice. (Further, when retesting for serious doping substances like anabolic agents and hormones there is not an issue because these substances do not entitle an athlete to specified substances treatment)’ (para  6.20), whereas the classification of a diuretic such as furosemide as a specified substance is a recognition that such a substance ‘can result in an unintended anti-doping rule violation’ (para 6.19). In FINA v Schoeman, FINA Doping Panel decision 01/20 dated 3 April 2020, the hearing panel found that FINA’s unexplained failure to notify the athlete of his positive test until nearly two months after his sample was collected meant that ‘through no fault of his own the Athlete was deprived […] of his best opportunity to identify the precise source of his positive test by testing the batches of the supplements he was using at the time of his positive test’ (para 6.3.3(f)). It concluded: ‘Under these circumstances, where the best opportunity to precisely identify the product which caused his positive test was deprived by the entity which is prosecuting the case against him, the FINA DP finds that the burden upon the Athlete to precisely identify the specific product which caused his positive test must be lessened’ (para 6.3.3(h)). It therefore upheld his No Significant Fault or Negligence plea despite his failure to identify that product, notwithstanding that that is a standard requirement under constant CAS jurisprudence: see para C18.5 et seq. WADA’s appeal against that decision (on the basis that the athlete had not shown that the delay had materially decreased his ability to prove source) (CAS 2020/A/7083) was still pending at the time of writing. See also Volandri v ITF, CAS 2009/A/1782, paras 98–99 (citing delays in results management that left athlete in state of uncertainty and made it difficult for him to gather evidence to support his defence as factors in only reprimanding athlete rather than banning him under 2009 Code Art 10.4). Cf Lei Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, para 91 (athlete suffered no prejudice from bringing of case based on re-analysis of sample almost eight years after sample was provided, even if the delay meant she was unable to establish the source of the substance found in her sample, because IOC was seeking only finding of Art 2.1 violation and disqualification of her results in the competition following which she tested negative, as to which issues of fault or negligence are irrelevant).

C4.24 Alternatively, it might be argued that some other unfairness means the charges should be dismissed, but again the facts will have to be compelling to persuade a hearing panel to dismiss a charge other than on the merits. For example, a Mexican rugby player argued that it was unfair, and in breach of the fundamental principle of equal treatment,1 to charge him based on low levels of clenbuterol found in his sample when other Anti-Doping Organizations had not charged athletes with similar findings on the basis that those findings were likely due to meat contamination. However, low level concentrations of clenbuterol could also reflect the end of excretion of doses of clenbuterol administered to enhance sport performance some days or weeks before the sample collection. The hearing panel held that it had no power to dismiss the charge on theground of unequal treatment, and that even if it did, it would not do so, as there were examples of athletes being pursued for violations based on similar adverse analytical findings for low levels of clenbuterol.2

722  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 1 As to which, see para B1.27. 2 World Rugby v Perinchief, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 29 June 2015, para 75 (World Rugby’s anti-doping rules do not give hearing panel ‘any power to dismiss the charge on the basis of what was asserted to be (in our word) unfairness’) and para 76 (‘We are enjoined to consider any alleged ADRV on the basis of the evidence presented to us and consider the individual charge on its merits. By that we mean the BJC is required to consider whether or not an ADRV has been proved. In so doing it may consider, for example, whether certain procedural irregularities are such that the ADRV cannot be proved. We concluded that it does not have some general and inherent “supervisory power” or jurisdiction over the bringing of proceedings. Even if we had such power, we would not have used it in this case. There are examples of athletes being pursued for alleged ADRV where the Prohibited Substance in clenbuterol. Contador is but one example’. Contador’s case was decided in UCI v Alberto Contador Velasco and RFEC and WADA v Alberto Contador and RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386.

D If a provisional suspension is imposed pending resolution of the charge, should the athlete or other person contest it? C4.25 Where a prohibited substance that is not classified as a ‘Specified Substance’1 is found in an athlete’s sample, and he is charged with the presence and/ or use of that substance, Code Art 7.9.1 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to suspend the athlete provisionally pending determination of the charge. In all other cases, including when a Specified Substance is found in the athlete’s sample, but also in cases based on non-analytical evidence, Code Art 7.9.2 gives the Anti-Doping Organization discretion to impose a provisional suspension, but does not mandate it.2 Any provisional suspension, whether mandatory or discretionary, may be challenged. 1 See para C6.35 et seq. 2 For example, the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules provide (at Art 7.10.2) that in cases involving the presence of Specified Substances and in non-analytical cases, UK Anti-Doping may provisionally suspend the athlete upon charge, subject to the athlete’s right (Art 7.10.3) to apply to the National Anti-Doping Panel for an order that the provisional suspension should not be imposed (or should be lifted).

C4.26 The power (or even the obligation) to impose an interim suspension prior to any final finding that an anti-doping rule violation has been committed is a controversial one, especially given the harm that will be done to the athlete’s reputation. An instructive analogy is to an application for a preliminary injunction in a civil matter, where the court will be guided by the well-known American Cyanamid principles of serious issue to be tried and balance of convenience:1 (a)

The strength of the case on the merits may vary: (i) Where there is an adverse analytical finding from a WADA-accredited laboratory that there is a prohibited substance present in the athlete’s sample, that is strong evidence of at least a prima facie case for violation of Art 2.1 (presence of prohibited substance in sample), given that Art 2.1 is a strict liability offence, ie intent, knowledge or other fault is not a requisite element of the charge.2 (ii) In other cases, particularly non-analytical cases, the position may not be nearly as clear-cut. However, the CAS has ruled that an AntiDoping Organization may impose a provisional suspension where it has ‘sufficient evidence of individual guilt’ to establish at least ‘a “reasonable possibility” that the suspended athlete has engaged in an ADRV. […] A reasonable possibility is more than a fanciful one; it requires evidence giving rise to individualized suspicion. This standard, however, is necessarily weaker than the test of “comfortable satisfaction” set forth in Article  3.1. Accordingly, a reasonable possibility may exist even if the Federation is unable to show that the balance of probabilities clearly indicates an ADRV on the evidence available. […] The provision would permit, for example, a conclusion that “reasonable prospects of success” exist where documents are insufficient (individually or collectively) to ground an ADRV but nonetheless indicate misconduct for which further

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  723

investigations hold out the prospect of more and better proof’.3 In that case, non-analytical evidence gathered and reported in the McLaren report that the athlete may have been involved in the Russian doping and protection scheme was held sufficient to justify a provisional suspension. (b) The balance of convenience is finely set: (i) The justification usually offered for the provisional suspension is that sport depends entirely upon the supporter’s faith in the sporting spectacle as a contest on a level playing-field, to be determined by sporting prowess alone, and also in the supporter’s faith that the Anti-Doping Organization will do whatever is necessary to protect that sporting integrity. The argument is that that faith will be utterly undermined if it later transpires that someone charged with (and later found to have committed) an ADRV was allowed to compete.4 (ii) In addition to protecting the integrity of the competition, the AntiDoping Organization must also protect participants from an opponent who has potentially cheated.5 There is no reliable way to compensate the non-tainted athlete whose place was taken by the drugs cheat, and although individual results and even team results may be retroactively disqualified,6 that in itself may or may not be effective to wipe out the effects of the tainted competitor. For example, in a tennis tournament, there is no way to know how far an individual contestant may have progressed if he or she had not been knocked out by the athlete whose win over them is later disqualified. (iii) On the other hand, if an athlete is suspended on an interim basis and subsequently the doping charge is not made out, not only will the athlete’s reputation be damaged forever. In addition, the athlete will have missed out on competing in events during that suspension, the effect of which on his career could never be known, which clearly constitutes irreparable harm.7 Therefore, even if the athlete could show that the charges were brought in breach of some contractual or other duty, so that the governing body is theoretically liable to him in damages,8 his losses are unquantifiable and therefore cannot be compensated by money damages. Nevertheless, the (rare) judicial pronouncements on interim suspension provisions in anti-doping programmes have not been hostile (as long as those provisions were not retrospectively applied9). In particular, Lord Justice Pill remarked in Modahl that: ‘the effect of suspension may be very serious for the athlete and [involve missing important athletics events] […] I understand the need for that sequence of measures in order to guard against the damages of drug-taking immediately before a big event. It would be little comfort to other competitors if the defaulter could be punished only after the event had taken place’.10

When the same case reached the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman noted, without criticism: ‘I  think that the IAAF adopted its system of instant suspension followed by disciplinary proceedings in the belief that although it might sometimes cause injustice in the individual case, it was necessary in the wider interests of the sport’.11

This is consistent with the CAS jurisprudence, which generally considered the private interest of the athlete in competing to be outweighed by the public interest of the Anti-Doping Organization and its stakeholders in excluding the athlete from participation until the allegation that he or she has breached the anti-doping rules has been resolved.12 That is why CAS has held that stays of provisional suspensions in doping cases should be granted only ‘parsimoniously’.13

724  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement  1 American Cyanamid v Ethicom Ltd [1975] AC 396 [HL].   2 See para C6.1 et seq. See also Guest v Commonwealth Games Federation and Triathlon Canada, CAS CG02/001, para 7.13 (‘[…] while, of course, we are in no position to determine whether or not the Applicant has committed a doping offence and note that he has publicly protested his innocence and lack of understanding how a positive result could have been produced on a test of his samples, he has not been able hitherto to identify the basis of his potential defence to a doping charge, and has certainly not cast any doubt on the chain of custody, the integrity of the samples, the testing procedures, or cognate matters’).  3 Legkov v FIS, CAS  2017/A/4968, paras 175-78. See also ibid, para  229 (‘Article  7.9.2 of the FIS ADR, while requiring sufficient evidence of individual guilt to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility of an ADRV, can and sometimes must be satisfied by reference to inferential reasoning. This is appropriate, in the Panel’s view, considering that a provisional suspension is often necessary precisely in situations where misconduct is reasonably possible, even probable, but is not yet proven. In such cases, a suspension serves the interests identified by the FIS in its comments to the Appellant’s Application for Provisional Measures: safeguarding the integrity of competitions and protecting the interests of third-party athletes’) and paras 188–89 (rejecting arguments that provisionally suspending an athlete based on evidence showing a reasonable possibility of an ADRV infringes the athlete’s Swiss law rights to a fair hearing or to be presumed innocent: ‘Since there is no finding of guilt, the Panel does not consider a provisional suspension to implicate, still less violate, a presumption of innocence’).   4 See cases discussed at para B4.39, n 4. See eg Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 229 (referencing the public interest in ‘safeguarding the integrity of competitions and protecting the interests of thirdparty athletes’ by keeping a potential cheat out of the sport); Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, p 28 (‘Given that the charge against the Appellant was upheld by the Judicial Committee, there can be little doubt that the integrity of sport as a whole and Rugby Union in particular was prejudiced by the Appellant not being subject to Provisional Suspension during the period from 6 April 2005 (at the latest) until 30 November 2006’). The situation is distinct from other disciplinary situations, where the sports governing body may be sufficiently vindicated by a sanction whenever served, and the possibility of acquittal makes an interim suspension seem unfair. It is distinct because in those situations, the integrity of the sport is not so obviously threatened by the competitor competing in the interim before being found guilty. At an earlier stage in the development of anti-doping rules, the farcical result was reached that an athlete was found guilty by a first instance IOC tribunal, lodged an appeal, competed and won, and then lost the appeal, all within the space of 24 hours.  5 Legkov v FIS, CAS  2017/A/4968, para  229; Report of the Independent International Review Commission on Doping Control – USA Track & Field, 11 July 2001, pp 65 and 66 (‘As a policy matter, the Commission believes that by not allowing pre-hearing suspensions under any circumstances, any incentive for an athlete to co-operate in the prompt adjudication of a doping case is reduced. The footdragging tactics employed by some athletes and their trainers contribute significantly to the chronic delays in the disposition of the USATF doping cases. Some athletes may have no reason to seek swift resolution, because as long as the final adjudication is put off, they can continue to compete. Moreover, the notion that athletes who have positive “A” and “B” samples may continue to compete and enjoy the benefits of successful competition is an imposition on the rights of all clean athletes, who are entitled to a level playing field. Accordingly, the Commission believes that consideration should be given to a policy that would permit the suspension of athletes, at least upon a receipt of a confirming “B” sample and a preliminary review of the case, during which the athlete has the opportunity to make a submission’).   6 In accordance with Code Art 10.8. See para C20.6. Even if the forfeited prize money is given to the athlete who lost to the doping athlete (see 2015 Code Art 10.9; 2021 Code Art 10.11), that will not compensate him for his lost opportunity. His loss would be just as unquantifiable of that of the charged athlete who is suspended and then cleared.  7 Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2020/A/6781, para 54 (‘CAS has consistently recognised that, given the finite and brief career of most athletes, a suspension, subsequently found to be unjustified) can cause irreparable harm (see Preliminary Decisions in CAS  2008/A/1453; CAS  2014/A/3571; CAS  2016/A/4710), especially when it bars the athlete from participating in a major sports event or if the athlete is unable to compete in qualifying events necessary to compete in such major events (CAS 2015/A/3925)’).   8 Emphasis on the ‘theoretically’; no one has yet succeeded in such a claim: see para E15.5. And the CAS decision in Legkov strongly suggests that as long as the Anti-Doping Organization has evidence establishing a reasonable possibility that the athlete engaged in an ADRV, it need not fear liability if later the further evidence required to bring an ADRV charge does not transpire. Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 195 (‘The ultimate failure of an ADRV allegation in this case would not and could not retrospectively invalidate the provisional suspension. Rather, a reasonable possibility alone is sufficient to justify a provisional suspension’). In any event, the authors are aware of no anti-doping programme that provides for a governing body to give a suspended athlete a cross-undertaking in damages in case it is subsequently unable to make out its charges.   9 In 1999, GB athlete Dougie Walker launched a High Court challenge to (a) the IAAF’s right to refer the decision of a UK Athletics Disciplinary Committee exonerating Walker to an IAAF Arbitration Panel; and (b) UK Athletics’ ability to comply with any IAAF Arbitration Panel ruling overturning its

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  725 decision. Walker advanced two grounds for the challenge: (1) that there was no contract between him and the IAAF that gave the IAAF Arbitration Panel jurisdiction to declare him ineligible; and (2) that on the basis of double jeopardy principles, the final decision of UK Athletics’ internal appeal tribunal could not be overturned. UK Athletics contended that its decision to exonerate Walker was correct, but also accepted that the IAAF did have the power to refer the matter to arbitration. UK Athletics therefore defended both the IAAF’s challenge to its decision and Walker’s challenge to its ability to abide by the result of the IAAF’s challenge. The IAAF sought first to escape the jurisdiction of the English courts on the basis that it was based in Monaco. This was rejected by Toulson J: Walker v UKA and IAAF (7 July 2000, unreported), QBD (Toulson J), 25 July 2000 (Hallet J). The matter came on for a hearing before Hallet J as an application for an injunction restraining UK Athletics and the IAAF from holding an appeal arbitration or from acting on the result: Walker v UKA and IAAF (25 July 2000, unreported), QBD (Hallet J). The IAAF claimed that the athlete should be suspended pending the IAAF arbitration hearing on the basis of IAAF Rule 59.4, which stated that even where an athlete had been exonerated by his national federation, he could be suspended by the IAAF pending the IAAF’s challenge to the exoneration. Both Walker and UKA contended that that rule could not apply to Walker, because it had been introduced after his offence and could not validly be applied retrospectively. Hallet J  in argument showed support for this contention. The matter was settled on the basis that Walker withdrew his allegation that the IAAF could not challenge UK Athletics’ decision, and the IAAF accepted that pending an arbitration award actually overturning UK Athletics’ decision, Walker could not be suspended. This left the athlete free to seek to qualify for the 2000 Sydney Olympics. For fitness reasons, however, and because he had nearly served out the two-year ban that an adverse IAAF arbitration award would re-impose, Walker decided not to run. This decision proved wise, as the IAAF arbitration decision went against Walker and UK Athletics: see para C6.51. 10 Modahl v BAF Ltd (28 July 1997, unreported), CA. 11 Modahl v BAF Ltd (22 July 1999, unreported), HL. 12 See eg  S  v UCI & FCI, CAS  2002/A/378, order of 2  May 2002, p.4 (‘[…] the Appellant’s wish to take part in some forthcoming events cannot prevail on the application by the UCI of its own rules and its desire to fight doping in cycling’); Abdelrahman v Egyptian NADO, CAS OG  16/23, para  7.11 (‘In coming to this conclusion [that the provisional suspension should not be lifted] the Panel has also considered the interests of the Athlete in not being able to compete and possibly obtain a medal as well as of the other athletes who would be deprived of their opportunity to be awarded medals at the Rio Olympic Games should the Athlete successfully medal and is later determined to have committed an ADRV. The Panel has further considered the interests of sports in general and the IAAF in particular, noting the importance of protecting the image of sport from being tarnished by the participation of athletes in competitions who are facing proceedings against them for the use of prohibited substances’). 13 R. v UEFA, CAS 2005/A/958, order dated 9 November 2005, para 8.

C4.27 In Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority, 1 a Horseracing Regulatory Authority (HRA) appeal panel affirmed a first instance panel’s imposition of a provisional suspension on jockey Kieran Fallon pending resolution of criminal charges that Fallon had agreed to fix races. Fallon challenged the legality of that ban in the High Court, alleging (among other things) that it was unjustified and disproportionate. The High Court accepted that the ban ‘will be of very significant and irremediable detriment to Mr Fallon and those connected to him, including his dependants and those otherwise wishing to use his services as a jockey’, and also agreed ‘that it is a strong thing to prevent someone from plying his trade and from earning a living, at least in Great Britain, by reason of charges which have been brought but which have not yet been proved’, such that ‘strong counteracting factors’ were required to justify it. However, the High Court said that, ‘having regard to the upholding of the perceptions of integrity of horseracing’, it would not disturb the HRA panel’s judgment that such factors existed in this case, which judgment had been expressed as follows (see para 58 of the High Court judgment): ‘We realise the hardship that suspension and the length of time over which such hardship may last will cause, but we also recognise the damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely damaged both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such; and by the adverse reaction of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged with an offence which is so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate. In our view, the damage done would be very hard to repair and, as the Regulator, we are anxious to avoid that damage.’

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Given the at least partial2 similarities between the damage that match-fixing does to the integrity of sport and the damage that doping does to the integrity of sport, it is likely that the High Court would be similarly supportive, at least in principle, of a provisional suspension imposed pending determination of an anti-doping charge, certainly where the evidence in support of that charge consists of an adverse analytical finding by a WADA-accredited laboratory. 1 [2006] EWHC 2030 (QB). 2 There is a difference between cheating to win and cheating to lose in terms of impact on other competitors, but both devalue the spectacle and (crucially) undermine confidence in its integrity.

C4.28 However, a defendant in civil proceedings always has the right to be heard on an application for an interim injunction against him. The Code also provides that an athlete who is provisionally suspended should be heard before or immediately after the provisional suspension is imposed, or at least that there should be a full hearing on the merits as soon as possible thereafter.1 It is arguable that the omission of such a right would be unlawful.2 On the other hand, the rules may limit the grounds on which such challenge may be brought. 2015 Code Art 7.9.1 states only that: ‘[a] mandatory Provisional Suspension may be eliminated if the Athlete demonstrates to the hearing panel that the violation is likely to have involved a Contaminated Product’.3

2021 Code Art 7.4.1 adds that it may also be eliminated: ‘if the violation involves a Substance of Abuse and the Athlete establishes entitlement to a reduced period of Ineligibility under Article 10.2.4.1’.

However, an Anti-Doping Organization may add other grounds for eliminating a provisional suspension. For example, the 2015 Model Rules produced by WADA for International Federations and those produced for NADOs give the Anti-Doping Organization the option to include the following provision: ‘The Provisional Suspension shall be imposed (or shall not be lifted) unless the Athlete or other Person establishes that: (a) the assertion of an anti-doping rule violation has no reasonable prospect of being upheld, eg, because of a patent flaw in the case against the Athlete or other Person; or (b) the Athlete or other Person has a strong arguable case that he/she bears No Fault or Negligence for the anti-doping rule violation(s) asserted, so that any period of Ineligibility that might otherwise be imposed for such a violation is likely to be completely eliminated by application of Article 10.4 [No Fault or Negligence]; or (c) some other facts exist that make it clearly unfair, in all of the circumstances, to impose a Provisional Suspension prior to a final hearing in accordance with Article 8. This ground is to be construed narrowly, and applied only in truly exceptional circumstances. For example, the fact that the Provisional Suspension would prevent the Athlete or other Person participating in a particular Competition or Event shall not qualify as exceptional circumstances for these purposes’.

The 2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules include such a provision, as do the rules of various international federations, including the ITF and FIS,4 but there have been very few reported decisions in relation to the provision to date. 5 1 See Code Art 7.9.1: ‘Provided, however, that a Provisional Suspension may not be imposed unless the Athlete is given either: (a) an opportunity for a Provisional Hearing, either before imposition of the Provisional Suspension or on a timely basis after imposition of the Provisional Suspension; or (b) an opportunity for an expedited hearing in accordance with Article 8 on a timely basis after imposition of a Provisional Suspension’. The CAS panel in Sinkewitz v UCI, CAS  2011/A/2479, para  76(i), suggested that if a provisional suspension was imposed before disciplinary proceedings were brought, and such proceedings were not brought quickly thereafter, it would have the power ‘to cure the “denial

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  727 of justice” implied in a provisional suspension, which, not being followed by disciplinary proceedings, would be de facto turned into a final sanction without a hearing’. 2 See Mrs Justice Ebsworth in Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (1997) Times, 6  March: ‘it is properly arguable that a system which in effect prohibits a party from challenging by question or by evidence the factual basis of the allegations against him on its face lacks basic fairness, even if the end result may seem to have been justifiable […]’. But see Guest v Commonwealth Games Federation and Triathlon Canada, CAS CG02/001, para 7.9: ‘[…] under English law […] or indeed under general principles of law, a hearing before an interim suspension is not normally required by principles of fairness (see eg Lewis v Heffer [1978] 1 WLR 1061); moreover an interim or provisional suspension without a hearing is common in the rules of other governing bodies concerned with the problem of doping in sport: see eg those of the IAAF referred to in CAS arbitration SYD 15 Melinte v IAAF, para 8a). The rationale for summary reaction to a positive test is obvious: the public interest of the sport trumps the private interests of the athlete. It should be emphasised that such suspension, decided on an urgent basis, does not deprive the applicant of a proper hearing at a later stage with the potential for an appropriate remedy’. In the United States, there is clear authority that an athlete must be given an opportunity to be heard before an interim suspension is imposed: Harding v US Figure Skating Association 624 NYS 2d 723 (1994); Lindemann v American Horse Shows Association 851 F Supp 1476 (1994). See also Report of the Independent International Review Commission on Doping Control – USA Track & Field, 11 July 2001, p 12 (‘While USATF declined to impose provisional suspensions before final adjudication of a case, its refusal to do so is premised on its understanding that a federal US statute and the USOC consultation prohibit USATF from depriving an athlete of the opportunity to compete without a full adjudicatory hearing’). 3 In CCES v Thompson, SDRCC DT decision 19-0316 dated 3 October 2019, para 83, the sole arbitrator ruled that at this provisional stage (ie in contrast to when the hearing on the merits arrives), the athlete challenging a provisional suspension on this ground only has to show that it is ‘likely’ (ie there is ‘a superior degree of conviction’ than merely ‘possible’, but not as much as ‘more likely than not’) that the anti-doping rule violation involved a Contaminated Product. As to the definition of Contaminated Product, see para C20.3, n 1. 4 So did the 2015 FIS rules, as discussed in Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968. See also Sinkewitz v UCI, CAS 2011/A/2479 (considering similarly limited grounds in UCI anti-doping rules). 5 In terms of ground (i) (charge has no reasonable prospect of success), see Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 178 (‘Demonstrating […] no reasonable prospects […] requires more than an assertion as to shortcomings with current evidence, such as a patent flaw in the case against the Athlete’). In terms of ground (ii) (‘strong arguable case that he/she bears No Fault or Negligence for the anti-doping rule violation(s) charged’), see UKAD v X, NADP panel decision dated 8 October 2019, para  33 (‘strong arguable case’ should be interpreted similarly to ‘good arguable case’ in freezing injunction cases, ie applicant must show case which is more than barely capable of serious argument yet not necessarily one that has a better than 50% chance of success), para 43 (provisional suspension could also be lifted based on likelihood source of substance in sample was a Contaminated Product). In terms of ground (iii) (other facts that make it ‘clearly unfair’ to impose a provisional suspension), see Legkov v FIS, CAS  2017/A/4968, para  238 (it would be ‘clearly unfair’, for these purposes, if provisional suspension is in place for so long that it loses its ‘essential interim character’); UK AntiDoping v X & Y, NADP Tribunal decision dated 3 August 2016 (it would be unfair for athletes to be provisionally suspended in circumstances where there had been a lengthy delay in charging them following analysis of their samples, and they had provided subsequent samples that had tested negative for any prohibited substances).

C4.29 As already noted, a challenge to the legality of a provisional suspension on the grounds it is disproportionate would appear unlikely (always dependent on the facts) to succeed in the light of the High Court’s decision in Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority.1 However, the analysis may change if too much time passes before the case is heard on the merits. In Legkov v FIS, a very experienced CAS panel found that the McLaren Report and the evidence it referred to established a reasonable possibility that the athlete had engaged in an ADRV, and the athlete had not shown that the FIS had no reasonable prospect of establishing an ADRV against him. However, it noted: ‘At the same time the Panel is sensitive to the concern of the Appellant who stands under the shadow of a suspension undefined in length (which must be balanced, inter alia, against the legitimate interest of other athletes not to find themselves competing against athletes who may well be cheaters). Competitions cannot be repeated; the form and motivation of athletes wax and wane. Occupying in principle

728  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement the space between suspicion and conviction, suspensions gradually lose their essential interim character with the passage of time. What conclusions the Oswald Disciplinary Commission may draw is necessarily open to question but the Panel believes it must and will one way or the other draw such conclusions. […] The Panel appreciates the unusual magnitude and complexity of cases awaiting Mr Oswald’s attention. It cannot however endorse an indefinite and indeterminable suspension as proportionate. Noting the Appellant’s reasonable entitlement to legal certainty, the Panel accordingly deems it appropriate and just that the current provisional suspension expire after 31 October 2017, at which time it will be for FIS to decide whether or not to seek a further suspension justified by new developments and within the framework of the FIS ADR. This approach is entirely in accord with Article  7.9.3.2, particularly point (c), as in the Panel’s view to impose a longer suspension in the present circumstances would be clearly unfair’.2 1 See para C4.27. 2 Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 238.

C4.30 In deciding how to react to the provisional suspension, athletes must also weigh the fact that if they do not sit out of competition while the charge is pending, not only will any final ban subsequently imposed not be back-dated,1 but the results that they secured in the interim will likely be disqualified (and any points and prize money forfeited) in any event.2 Therefore, in cases where a ban seems likely, the athlete may be best advised not to fight the provisional suspension, on the basis that: (a)

their decision not to challenge will not be taken as an admission of the merits of the charge(s);3 and: (b) the period for which they sit out of competition will be credited against any ultimate ban.4

1 Pursuant to Code Art 10.11.3, discussed at para C22.1. 2 See Code Art 10.8, discussed at paras C23.6. 3 See comment to Code Art 10.11.3.2 (‘An Athlete’s voluntary acceptance of a Provisional Suspension is not an admission by the Athlete and shall not be used in any way to draw an adverse inference against the Athlete’). 4 Even if the Anti-Doping Organization does not seek to suspend the athlete provisionally pending determination of the charge, the athlete can get credit for sitting out of competition voluntarily against any ban subsequently imposed on him: see Code Art 10.11.3.2, discussed at para C22.9. Art 7.4.4 of the 2021 Code introduced a requirement to accept a voluntary provisional suspension within a specified period (ie within 10 days of receiving report of analysis of B sample or from notice of any other ADRV).

E Should the athlete request confirmatory analysis of the B sample? C4.31 Whenever a urine sample is collected from an athlete for testing under Codecompliant rules, it is split into two (an ‘A’ sample and a ‘B’ sample) prior to transport to the laboratory.1 Where testing of the A  sample returns an adverse analytical finding and the athlete is charged with an Article 2.1 presence violation, Code Art 7.3 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to offer the athlete the opportunity to have the reserve sample (the ‘B sample’) analysed to confirm that finding, with the athlete and his representative(s) having the right to attend at the laboratory to witness the B sample analysis in person.2 This is a protection against analysis of the wrong sample, against possible tampering with the sample after it has been collected,3 and against inadequacies in the analysis, and is seen by CAS as a fundamental right for the athlete, denial of which leads to automatic dismissal of the charges.4 In practice, it allows the athlete to confirm for himself: ‘that the correct container with the code number of the athlete’s urine sample is being opened and that at the time of opening the seal was intact; in addition the representative may also check the state of the urine sample. In the event that at this

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  729 stage variations or irregularities are apparent then these can be noted and can be used later to challenge the test results’.5

If the athlete finds a scientist to attend at the laboratory for the B sample analysis on his behalf, that scientist will also be able to confirm that appropriate procedures are followed during the analytical process itself.6 To prevent anomalies occurring because of variations in sensitivity of equipment from laboratory to laboratory,7 the International Standard for Laboratories (ISL) mandates that the B sample analysis must take place at the same laboratory as analysed the A sample.8 As a general rule, it is almost always be wise to have the B sample analysed: the competing considerations are cost, and awareness that the substance was indeed in the athlete’s body.9 1 ISTI Art D4.14. 2 See eg Art 7.8.1(e) of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules, establishing ‘the right of the Athlete and/or the Athlete’s representative to attend the analysis of the B Sample’. The athlete cannot dictate the date the B sample analysis will take place, but some flexibility may be required if he genuinely cannot make the date specified, to avoid claims of unfair prejudice. See para C6.22 n 2. 3 De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.6 (‘The principal reason why the [B Sample] is provided for in order to ascertain “the presence of a prohibited sample” (cf Article 2.1 WADC) is to avoid any possible manipulation of the sample after the latter has been provided. In particular, the B sample is needed to exclude the – remote – possibility that the prohibited substance is added to the athlete’s sample after sample taking. In order to eliminate this risk – which is beyond the control of the athlete – the predominant view holds that a safeguard in the form of a B sample is needed to protect the athlete’s fundamental rights’). 4 See para C6.23. 5 Tchachina v FIG, CAS  2002/A/385, para  15. If the athlete does not attend, in person or by a representative, ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.7 provides that the testing authority or results management authority ‘shall instruct the Laboratory to proceed regardless and appoint an Independent Witness to verify that the ‘B’ Sample container shows no signs of Tampering and that the identifying numbers match that on the Sample collection documentation’. The CAS panel in Del Pino v UIM, CAS  2015/A/3892, para 56, rejected the athlete’s argument that the witness used was not sufficiently independent because he came from another department of the university to which the laboratory was attached. 6 WADA  v FME & Carmona, CAS  2006/A/1149, para  55 (‘Such analysis would have been carried out in the presence of whomever the Player might have chosen, in order to verify the integrity of the sample, the Laboratory’s compliance with protocol, and the methods used and readings recorded by the Laboratory. In this manner, any legitimate procedural concerns could have been dealt with in such a way as to ensure perfect compliance with his rights’). See also McLaren, ‘WADA  Drug Testing Standards’ (2007) 18:1 Marquette Law Review 1, 5 (‘The ‘B’ sample requirement provides an informal process comparable to formal peer review. Although the athlete’s own experts cannot perform the testing procedures themselves for reasons of perceived conflicts, they can keep a watchful eye over the entire process, assuring the athlete that no step was skipped and no result was reached unfairly from the standpoint of methodology’). 7 For example, in an unreported Jockey Club case dating back several years, a jockey’s A sample tested positive for cocaine metabolites but at an extremely low level. The jockey exercised his right under the applicable anti-doping rules (which did not follow the Code) to have his B sample tested at a different accredited laboratory. The Jockey Club could not find a second accredited laboratory with equipment sensitive enough to test down to the levels of the A sample test result. The B sample was eventually tested at a second laboratory that was unable to detect any cocaine metabolite in the sample, and so the case against the athlete had to be dropped. This would no longer be possible. 8 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8. 9 For an instance where failure by the athlete’s representatives (there the national governing body) to take up the opportunity to have the B sample analysed and to attend the analysis gave rise to significant issues, see Wen Tong v IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161. A further consideration may be the availability of an expert to attend on behalf of the athlete, and indeed to give expert evidence later. WADA takes the view that scientists at WADA-accredited laboratories should not act for athletes if they are also involved in work for governing bodies, on the basis that they may have access to privileged information and so be conflicted. Some have questioned the fairness of this approach, if it precludes an adequate selection of experts for respondents.

C4.32 If the analysis of the B sample does not confirm the presence in the athlete’s sample of the prohibited substance found in the A sample, the result of analysis of the entire sample is considered negative,1 meaning no further action may be taken based on the original adverse analytical finding, and any provisional suspension that had previously been imposed must be lifted immediately.2 If the analysis of the B sample

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does confirm the presence in the athlete’s sample of the prohibited substance found in the A sample, however, that will be deemed sufficient to establish the presence of the substance in question in the athlete’s sample,3 unless a departure from the ISTI or ISL is established that caused the adverse findings.4 1 2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.12. 2 Code Art 7.9.2. 3 Code Art 2.1.2: ‘Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1 is established by […] presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete’s A Sample, where […] the Athlete’s B Sample is analyzed and such analysis confirms the presence in the B Sample of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found in the Athlete’s A Sample’. See further para C6.1 et seq. For details of confirmation requirements, see 2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.13 (‘“B” Sample Confirmation Procedure for Non-Threshold Substances and exogenous Threshold Substances: For Non-Threshold Substances (including those with reporting limits as specified in the TD MRPL) and exogenous Threshold Substances, the “B” Sample results shall only confirm the “A” Sample identification (in compliance with the TD IDCR) for the Adverse Analytical Finding to be valid. No quantification or reported estimation of concentrations of such Prohibited Substance, or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s) is necessary’) and Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.14 (‘“B” Sample Confirmation Procedure for endogenous Threshold Substances: For endogenous Threshold Substances, Adverse Analytical Finding or Atypical Finding decisions for the “B” Sample results shall be based on the confirmed identification (in accordance with the TD IDCR, applicable to Confirmation Procedures based on chromatography-mass spectrometry) of the Threshold Substance or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s) and their quantitative determination in the Sample at a level exceeding the value of the relevant Threshold as specified in the TD DL or other applicable Technical Document(s) or Laboratory Guidelines. The mean value determined in the “B” Sample does not need to be identical to the mean value determined in the “A” Sample’). 4 See para C6.6 et seq.

C4.33 If the athlete waives analysis of his B sample, the adverse analytical finding from the A Sample will suffice to establish the presence of the substance in question in his sample.1 Where the athlete knows that the adverse finding reported in respect of the A Sample is accurate (for example, because he knows the substance is contained in a medication that he was taking at the time his sample was collected), it is likely to be appropriate to waive the B sample analysis.2 This would avoid him having to pay the costs of that analysis,3 and it would also avoid any possible argument that an insistence on analysis of the B sample means that the athlete did not ‘promptly admit’ the charge, and so cannot rely on Code Art 10.6.2 to get a four-year ban reduced,4 or on Code Art 10.11.2 to get the start date of any ban backdated.5 In most cases, however, notwithstanding that the chances of exoneration through the B sample analysis may not be great,6 the athlete is usually best advised to insist on the B sample being analysed. 1 See Code Art 2.1.2: ‘Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1 is established by […] presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete’s A Sample, where the Athlete waives analysis of the B Sample and the B Sample is not analyzed […]’. See further para C6.19. ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.3 allows the Anti-Doping Organization to have the B sample tested even if the athlete waives that right. See eg Art 8.2.2 of the ITF’s 2020 Tennis Anti-Doping Programme, which provides that the ITF may arrange for analysis of the B sample even if the athlete does not request it. Even if the athlete waives analysis of the B sample, however, and it is the Anti-Doping Organization that requests such analysis, the athlete still has the right to be present for the opening and analysis of the B sample, and a failure to respect that right may lead to dismissal of the case. Wen Tong v IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161, paras 9.7, 9.11. 2 And, possibly, admit the ADRV and seek to mitigate sanction: see paras C4.46 and C4.47. 3 Art 7.9.6 of the 2015  UK Anti-Doping Rules provides: ‘Where Article  7.9.5 applies [ie  where the B sample analysis confirms the results of the A sample analysis], UKAD may require the Athlete to pay the costs of the B Sample analysis.’ 4 See C18.1. 5 See C22.1. 6 Non-confirmation of the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A  sample is very much the exception rather than the norm, but it does happen. See eg USADA v Leogrande, AAA Panel decision dated 1 December 2008, para 2 (analysis of B sample did not confirm EPO positive from analysis of A sample); UCI v Hamberger, CAS 2001/A/343 (amount of EPO in the B sample did not cross the designated threshold, and therefore the case against the cyclist was dismissed). Similarly, the analysis

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  731 of the B sample of a urine sample taken from Kenyan middle distance runner Bernard Lagat in 2003 showed a different EPO isoform profile to that of the A sample (possibly because of ‘active urine’ phenomenon: McLaren ‘WADA Drug Testing Standards’ (2007) 8:1 Marquette Law Review 1, 1011), leading to Lagat’s exoneration: ‘IAAF: analysis of Lagat B  sample is negative’, sportcal.com 2 October 2003. The same thing happened to Marion Jones in 2006: bbcsport.co.uk, 8 September 2006 (although suspicions remained that were vindicated by her confession of doping in October 2007: ‘Disgraced Jones could face further sanctions’, sportcal.com, 10 October 2007). See also Report of the Independent International Review Commission on Doping Control – USA Track & Field, 11 July 2001, p 86 (discussing B samples that did not test positive for substances found in A sample, most likely because of delay in undertaking B  sample test); McLaren ‘WADA  Drug Testing Standards’ (2007) 18(1) Marquette Law Review 12–14 (same). In Gasser v Stinson (15 June 1988, unreported), QBD (Scott J), the test of the B sample confirmed the presence of methyl-testosterone, ie  the same finding as had been made upon analysis of the A sample. However, other steroids were also detected in the B sample that had not been detected in the A sample. Gasser’s representatives argued that this raised a doubt as to the reliability of the test results, suggesting that the A and B samples were not from the same person. Evidence was given, however, that the different results were the result of oxidisation of the ether reagent used in the testing of the B sample, and on that basis both the IAAF Arbitration Panel and the English High Court accepted that the different findings did not undermine the reliability of the positive finding of methyl-testosterone. See also NADA v Sinkewitz, CAS 2012/A/2857, para 182 (‘The Respondent claimed that the difference between the ratios established on the basis of the A- and B-sample (A-sample: 2.45 for kit 1 and 2,42 for kit 2; B-sample: 3,16 for kit 1 and 2.34 for kit 2) invalidated the test. However, Article 21.1.2 UCIADR does not require that the analyses of the A- and B-samples show identical results but rather that the analysis of the B-sample “confirms the presence of the Prohibited Substance”. That is confirmed when the B-sample analysis shows values which indicate the presence of the prohibited substances. Moreover, the Panel is satisfied with the explanations given by expert witnesses at the hearing that the B-sample analysis is performed by using different anti-bodies and, therefore, leads to different values’); Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 165 (‘[…] in the case of a non-threshold substance such as methandienone, the laboratory method for analysing the B sample is not aimed at having identical analytical results or at gaining information on the background or the quantification, but only at confirming the presence of the prohibited substance. In other terms, the ISL only requires the identification in the B sample of the same prohibited substance that was found in the A sample, and it does not require the chromatograms or the quantities or the “background noises” to be exactly the same’); FIFA v SOAC et al, CAS 2016/A/4596, para 110 (same); Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 9.5.9 (‘After evaluation of Mr Blanco’s IRMS test results and weighing the opinions of the parties’ respective experts, the Panel does not take the view that the variances between his A Sample and B Sample results are of such a nature and dimension as to constitute a demonstrated lack of robustness or reproducibility. To this extent, the Panel rejects the view that the variances cited by Mr Blanco constitute conditions or circumstances which place the confirmation of his A  Sample results into question. In the view of the Panel, his B Sample analysis has succeeded in confirming the A Sample results’); IAAF v CBA and Dos Santos, CAS 2002/A/383 (athlete’s plea for exoneration rejected where the T:E ratio reported for his A sample was 37.82 and the T:E ratio reported for his B sample was 79.31). Another possibility is that the laboratory may depart from the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories when it analyses the B sample. If the departure is material, then the case may fail even if the B sample analysis confirms the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A sample: see para C6.22 et seq. For a very lucky athlete, a request for confirmatory analysis of the B sample may lead to exoneration by unexpected means. Tyler Hamilton retained the gold medal he won at the Athens Olympic Games despite analysis of his A  blood sample revealing evidence of blood-doping, because the laboratory inadvertently destroyed his B  blood sample by freezing it: Hamilton v USADA & UCI, CAS 2005/A/884, para 41. See McLaren, ‘The CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games’, (2004) 15(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 175, 181. Hamilton’s luck did not hold out; he was banned after analysis of a subsequent sample also revealed evidence of blood-doping: see para C6.31. And he has since confessed all in a book – ‘The Secret Race: Inside the Hidden World of the Tour de France: Doping, Cover-ups, and Winning at All Costs’ (Transworld Publishers, 2012) – that contributed, through its detailed admissions of concerted use of prohibited substances in the US Postal Team, to the downfall of Lance Armstrong. More curious still was the case of the horse Waterford Crystal, which won gold for its show-jumper rider at the 2004 Olympics. The A sample collected after that event tested positive for a prohibited substance, but that finding could not be pursued because the B sample was stolen while on its way to the laboratory for confirmatory analysis: ‘Plot thickens in Olympic horse doping case’, sportcal.com, 8 November 2004. It was with these cases in mind that a comment was added to Art 2.2 of the 2009 Code, stating that ‘Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the analysis of an A Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B Sample […] where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a satisfactory explanation for the lack of confirmation in the other Sample’.

732  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement Occasionally, although the B  sample analysis confirms the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A sample, there may be something about the finding that exonerates the athlete. For example, in SRU v Macleod, SRU press release dated 24 November 2008, analysis of the athlete’s B sample confirmed the elevated T:E ratio found in respect of his A sample, but also confirmed the presence of ethanol (which had not been tested for in his A sample), and so supported the athlete’s explanation that the elevated ratio was caused by acute ingestion of alcohol, warranting dismissal of the charge.

C4.34 Assuming the B sample is tested, should the athlete attend at the laboratory for the analysis of the B sample, and/or send a representative to attend on his behalf? By attending personally, he can certainly satisfy himself, by personally inspecting the B sample bottle prior to analysis, that the sample is properly sealed and there is no evidence of tampering.1 However, an analytical expert will also be able to observe the analytical procedures followed and note any discrepancies.2 1 In S v International Equestrian Federation, CAS 91/A/56, Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne 1998), pp 93, 97, at the analysis of the B sample the athlete’s scientific representative noticed that the bottles containing the B sample analysis were not properly sealed and therefore could have been tampered with, which was held to invalidate the analytical results. The athlete (or his representative) will be asked to confirm in writing that the B  sample was properly sealed and there was no evidence of tampering: see ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.6. If that confirmation is provided, then it will be very difficult for the athlete to argue later that there is doubt about the integrity of the B sample bottle. Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 65 (relying on confirmation by athlete representative that B sample was properly closed and correctly sealed prior to analysis as sufficient evidence of the identity and integrity of the B samples); Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, paras 2.6.5, 7.8.11 (same); Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235, para 7.7 (rejecting any argument that the time taken to transport the sample or the means by which they were transported cast doubt on the integrity of the samples and/or the validity of the test results, where athletes signed forms after inspection of the B sample bottles, confirming that they were satisfied with the integrity of the B samples); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para 42 (‘Mr Wade’s representative was present for the opening of the B sample coded 859294 and verified the integrity of the shipping container, the bottle, and the seal, as well as the transfer of the sample into a sealed container for analysis’). 2 See para C4.31. In contrast to the position in relation to the integrity of the B sample seal (see para C4.34), the athlete does not lose his right to raise issues about the propriety of the testing procedures used to analyse the B sample if his representative does not note those issues when he signs the testing protocol upon completion of the process. Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 239 (‘IRMS procedural claims raised by the Appellant are not to be regarded as waived merely because the Appellant’s expert […] observed the B Sample analysis and signed off on the protocol’). This ruling contradicted earlier decisions that had suggested that if no discrepancies are noted, any subsequent arguments that proper procedures were not followed will be very difficult to sustain. USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, paras 269-270; WADA v Portuguese Football Federation and Nuno Asis Lopes de Almeida, CAS 2006/A/1153, p17; N. v FINA, CAS 98/208, para 30.

F Responding to the charge on the merits C4.35 Article 7.1 of the International Standard for Results Management confirms the right of the athlete to respond to the asserted anti-doping rule violation and resulting consequences.1 However, the rules may only give the athlete a limited period to provide such response, failing which he could be deemed to have admitted the violation and to have acceded to the consequences specified in the charge letter.2 Therefore, in addition to all the jurisdictional, legal and procedural issues identified above, the athlete’s lawyer will also want to address the following issues as a matter of urgency. 1 Although again this would be his right under English law anyway, and in any event the Anti-Doping Organization will want to know as soon as possible the nature of the athlete’s response to the charge and the basis of that response, so that (where appropriate) it can start organising scientific and other rebuttal evidence. 2 See eg 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules, Art 7.11.3(e): ‘[charge letter to include] a warning that if the Athlete or other Person does not deny the Anti-Doping Rule Violation(s) asserted or the proposed Consequences or request a hearing by the prescribed deadline, the Athlete or other Person will be deemed to have waived their right to a hearing and admitted the Anti-Doping Rule Violation(s) asserted and the Consequences proposed in the Charge Letter’.

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  733

C4.36 The Anti-Doping Organization must prove each element of the charge to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel,1 and therefore the athlete’s lawyer will want to be sure exactly which anti-doping rule violation(s) his client has been charged with, and what facts are relied upon in support of the charge(s).2 For example, if the athlete is charged with an Art 2.1 ADRV, so that the Anti-Doping Organization has to prove that a prohibited substance was present in a sample collected from the athlete,3 the charge letter should identify where and when the sample was collected, whether the test was in-competition or out-of-competition (because certain substances are only prohibited in-competition4), at what laboratory the sample was tested, and what prohibited substance (or metabolite or marker thereof) was found in the sample. If the laboratory documentation package supporting the adverse analytical finding is not enclosed with the charge letter, a copy should be requested as a matter of urgency, so that the accuracy and completeness of the laboratory’s work can be checked by experts on behalf of the athlete. Unless the athlete knows how the substance reported got into his sample, the athlete’s lawyer will want to determine whether there is any apparent defect in the sample collection procedures followed by the testing authority or in the sample analysis procedures followed by the laboratory that could have caused the adverse finding,5 as well as whether the substance found in the sample is one that is expressly listed in the Prohibited List,6 or, for example, is said to be ‘similar to’ an expressly-listed substance,7 what concentration of the substance was found in the sample,8 and exactly what analytical procedures were used to detect that substance.9 If the substance can be produced in the body naturally, the athlete’s lawyer will want to know the basis for the Anti-Doping Organization’s assertion that the substance found in the athlete’s urine is exogenous.10   1 See para C5.1.   2 The elements of each Code violation are analysed in turn at Chapters C6 to C15.   3 See para C6.1 et seq.   4 See para C6.38.   5 See para C6.20 et seq and para C6.29 et seq.   6 See para C6.35 et seq.   7 See para C6.60 et seq.  8 If the substance is one to which a ‘threshold’ applies (see para C6.40), the laboratory will have quantified the concentration of the substance in the sample as part of its reporting of the adverse analytical finding. If not, it will not have done, but the quantity may still be important, for example to determine whether the analytical finding is consistent with a TUE held by the athlete (see para C4.3), or with a theory of how the substance got into the system (see para C18.13), and therefore the Anti-Doping Organization should be asked to get the laboratory to estimate the concentration of the substance in the sample. ISL Art 5.3.5.2.6.3 provides that ‘the Laboratory should provide estimated concentrations when possible and for information purposes only, upon request by the Testing Authority, Results Management Authority or WADA, if the detected level of the Non-Threshold Substance, its Metabolite(s), or Marker(s) may be relevant to the results management of an anti-doping case. In such instances, the Laboratory should indicate the estimated concentration while making it clear to the Testing Authority, Results Management Authority or WADA that the concentration was obtained by an Analytical Testing Procedure, which has not been validated for quantitative purposes’.   9 See para C6.29. 10 See para C6.42 et seq.

C4.37 If the anti-doping rule violation charged is not a strict liability offence, ie if fault is an element of the violation,1 or if the Code creates or permits a defence to the charge,2 then there may be several fruitful avenues of enquiry for the defence lawyer. If the charge is violation of Code Art 2.1 (presence of prohibited substance in athlete’s sample), however, that is a strict liability offence,3 and if there is no obvious issue with the identity or integrity of the sample or with the reliability of the adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory following analysis of that sample, the first pressing question will be: does the athlete have any explanation for the apparent presence of the substance in his sample? 1 As in the case of anti-doping rule violations under Code Art 2.2 (Attempted Use) (see para C7.1), Art 2.3 (refusal or failure to submit to, or otherwise evading, sample collection) (see para C8.1), Art 2.4

734  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement (whereabouts violations) (see para C9.1), Art 2.5 (Tampering) (see para C10.1), Art 2.6 (Possession) (see para C11.1), Art 2.7 (Trafficking) (see para C12.1), Art 2.8 (administration) (see para C13.1), and Art 2.9 (complicity) (see para C14.1). 2 For example, refusal or failure to submit to sample collection is not an anti-doping rule violation where ‘compelling justification’ exists for such refusal or failure: see para C8.3. 3 See para C6.1.

C4.38 The explanation could of course be that the athlete was knowingly cheating, particularly where the substance found in his system is a performance-enhancing substance that cannot be inadvertently consumed,1 in which case his lawyer should be counselling a prompt admission (to avoid a four-year ban under Code Art 10.6.32 or to bring forward the start date of the ban3) and an offer of substantial assistance to the Anti-Doping Organization in establishing anti-doping rule violations by others (such as the coach, physician or other athlete who supplied the prohibited substance to his client) in an effort to obtain suspension of part of the ban.4 1 See USADA v Youngquist, AAA Panel decision dated 28 February 2005, para 5.2 (‘[…] as dictated by common sense, an athlete who tests positive for r-EPO cannot contend that she was unaware of, or simply negligent in, how that happened. This is not a substance found in over-the-counter supplements or that occurs naturally. Youngquist had to know that she was taking a banned substance, or was grossly negligent in not knowing’); CCES  v Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated 12 September 2005, para 40 (‘The human body does not normally produce rEPO, and its presence in the body of an athlete is therefore indicative of the intentional administration of an external substance’); USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 10.8 (‘Because Mr O’Bee used or attempted to use rhEPO, a prohibited substance that is administered by injection and used intentionally to gain a competitive advantage, the Panel concludes there is no basis for finding Mr O’Bee has “no fault or negligence” or “no significant fault or negligence” for his second doping violation under Article 10.5’). 2 See para C18.6. If an athlete comes to his lawyer and confesses cheating before he has even been caught, then if he can be persuaded to come forward and admit the offence to the Anti-Doping Organization before it suspects anything (and in any event before it tries to test him), he can seek mitigation of up to one half of the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility for the violation admitted under Code Art 10.6.2 (discussed at para C18.6(c)). 3 See para C22.1. 4 See para C18.6(a).

C4.39 Alternatively, the substance might be one of the ‘recreational’ drugs found on the Prohibited List, such as cannabis, and the athlete may acknowledge taking it deliberately, but insist he did so out of competition, for ‘recreational’ reasons rather than to enhance performance. In that case, again a prompt admission would be sensible, combined with a plea of mitigation under 2015 Code Art 10.5.1.11 or 2021 Code Art 10.2.4.1.2 1 See para C18.4, n 2. 2 Under Art 10.2.4.1 of the 2021 Code, the athlete could receive a ban of just three months, or even less if he undergoes an agreed treatment programme (see para C17.2).

C4.40 If the athlete denies deliberate ingestion, careful consideration needs to be given to the possibility that he inadvertently ingested the prohibited substance. An athlete will benefit greatly from expert scientific advice in this context. In particular, prohibited substances are often ingredients in medication. If medication is the source, and the athlete has a therapeutic use exemption for the substance,1 that should be complete defence, at least if the amount found in the sample is consistent with the dose prescribed.2 This is a point that the Anti-Doping Organization is supposed to have checked specifically, and therefore the matter ought never to have got this far if there is a TUE in place,3 but the point still ought to be checked by the athlete’s lawyer, in case there has been an error,4 or indeed in case there is an opportunity to apply for the TUE retroactively.5 1 See para C4.3. 2 See eg Nose v Slovenian Cycling Federation, CAS 2007/A/1356, para 7.4.1 (‘The basic finding of the

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  735 “use of a prohibited substance” is not the end of the considerations. The next question is whether the Appellant was in possession of a legitimate TUE which allowed him to train and race still under the influence of a prohibited substance. In that case, the use of a prohibited substance would have been justified and the appellant would not have violated the applicable Anti-Doping Rules’). The TUE must have been issued (or recognised) by the international federation if the athlete was competing in international competition (Ibid, para 7.4.6) and it must be for the specific substance found in the sample, and not for a substance in the same category of medication, even if it has the same therapeutic purpose and effect. ATP v Perry, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 November 2005, para 51 (TUE for terbutaline was no defence to charge based on presence of salbutamol dispensed by doctor without player’s knowledge. However, it was the basis for a finding of No Fault or Negligence, as to which, see para C18.19(b)). Furthermore, the concentration of the substance found in the sample must be consistent with the timing and amount of therapeutic dose(s) specified in the TUE. See Code Art 4.4 (‘The presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers, and/or the Use or Attempted Use, Possession or Administration or Attempted Administration of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method shall not be considered an anti-doping rule violation if it is consistent with the provisions of an applicable therapeutic use exemption issued pursuant to the International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions’). 3 See para C4.3. 4 For example, there can sometimes be confusion over who has authority to grant a TUE to a particular athlete, and so the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the charge may not be aware of a TUE issued by another Anti-Doping Organization. 5 See para C4.21.

C4.41 If there is no TUE, but the substance found in the athlete’s sample is a substance that is produced naturally in the body,1 what is the basis for the AntiDoping Organization’s allegation that the substance found in the sample was not produced naturally but rather is exogenous in source? If the basis is the level of the substance found in the sample, is there any evidence that the athlete has naturally elevated levels of that substance?2 Or could the finding be explained by a medical or other condition? For example, in the case of a female athlete whose sample has tested positive for nandrolone metabolites, could it be explained by pregnancy?3 Again, an athlete will benefit greatly from expert scientific advice in this context. 1 See para C6.42. 2 See para C6.42 et seq. 3 See para C6.52, n 6.

C4.42 If medication or a medical condition is not the explanation, has the athlete been eating any food or taking any nutritional supplement that could be the source of the substance in his system?1 Alternatively, has any family member or other close associate been taking any medication or supplement with which the athlete’s food or drink could have been contaminated?2 Are there any grounds for suspecting sabotage, for example by the deliberate spiking of the athlete’s drink or food?3 Or could anyone with whom the athlete has been intimate have been an inadvertent source of contamination, through the passing of bodily fluids?4 Once again, an athlete will benefit greatly from expert scientific advice in this context. 1 In rare instances, meat may contain residues of prohibited substances that have been used as a growth promoter in the livestock in question: see paras C18.10–C18.13 and C18.19. The sports supplement industry is largely unregulated, and manufacturers of such supplements often use prohibited substances (in particular, stimulants and steroids) as the active ingredients that provide the ‘buzz’ or the ‘kick’ promised in the marketing puff for the product. Sometimes such substances are listed as ingredients on the product label, but often they are not. For example, in September 2001 an IOC-commissioned study reported that a quarter of 600 over-the-counter nutritional substances had tested positive for prohibited substances not mentioned on the packaging: ‘IOC: 20 per cent of supplements contain nandrolone’: sportcal.com, 21  September 2001; ‘IOC  Medical Commission Reissues Supplements Warning’ sportcal.com, 28  September 2001. See also UK  Sport Nandrolone Report and 19-Norsteroids Fact Sheet (January 2000); ‘British products fail IOC dope tests’, Independent, 5 April 2002. And now the cases involve legions of athletes testing positive for prohibited substances that were ingredients (including unlisted ingredients/contaminants) of supplements they were taking. See para C18.19.

736  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 2 As in Puerta v ITF, where the athlete inadvertently ingested a few drops of his wife’s PMT medicine after she used his water glass to mix the medicine (see para C18.17), or in La Barbera, where the athlete alleged that he inadvertently ingested stanozolol when he crushed his dog’s medication tablets (containing stanozolol) and then did not wash his hands before eating (see para C18.7), or in Errani, where it was found that the source of the athlete’s adverse finding was likely one of her mother’s anti-cancer pills, inadvertently dropped into the pasta that her mother was preparing for the family’s evening meal (see para 18.16 n 4). 3 See para C18.19(j). 4 See para C18.19(l). For example, in ITF v Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1926, kissing was enough to pass a tiny amount of cocaine, the trace metabolites of which were found in the athlete’s sample.

C4.43 If the athlete can find a potential source, it needs to be investigated thoroughly, and evidence gathered with the assistance of a scientific expert. Although inadvertent ingestion is not a defence to the charge, there is significant scope for mitigation of sanction in such cases, provided the athlete can show how the substance got into his system.1 However, it is important to be sure that the explanation offered is consistent with the data contained in the laboratory’s report of the adverse analytical finding, or else it is unlikely to be accepted.2 1 See para C18.1 et seq. The charge is still made out, but in particular circumstances a plea of No (or No Significant) Fault or Negligence might be accepted, resulting in a lesser or even no sanction: see paras C18.2–C18.4. 2 See para C18.6.

C4.44 If the source of the substance found in the athlete’s sample is reliably identified, the focus of the athlete’s case is likely to be on mitigation, with no issues taken about the identity or integrity of the sample or the reliability of the reported adverse analytical finding. On the other hand, where the athlete is not able to establish how the substance got into his system, there is no possibility of mitigation under Code Art 10.4 or Code Art 10.5: acknowledgements of ignorance, accompanied with declarations of innocence and even speculation as to possible sources (malign or otherwise) will not suffice.1 Instead, in such circumstances, if the athlete maintains his innocence, his lawyer needs to consider whether there is any basis to argue that there were any defects in the procedures used to collect and analyse the athlete’s sample that render unreliable the adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory in respect of that sample. For example: (a) Is it clear that the sample that produced the adverse analytical finding is the sample that was provided by the athlete? Does the sample reference number in the laboratory report match the number noted on the doping control form? (b) Did the athlete note any discrepancy in relation to the sample collection process on that form that might cast doubt on the identity of the sample, or that might have enabled it to be tampered with after collection? If not, does he now recollect any such discrepancy?2 (c) Does anything in the manner in which the sample was stored after collection and then transported to the laboratory raise any doubts as to the identity or integrity of the sample?3 (Analysis of this issue may have to wait until the Anti-Doping Organization has filed evidence in support of its prima facie case, with the position protected by the athlete in the interim not admitting that the sample in question is the sample that he provided). (d) Alternatively, does the laboratory documentation package reflect any departures from the International Standard for Laboratories that might call into question the validity or reliability of the adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory in respect of the athlete’s sample?4 1 See para C18.14 et seq. 2 The hearing panel is likely to be highly sceptical of any allegation that the doping control officer departed from the normal sample collection process if no mention was made of it at the time in the space provided for such comments on the doping control form. See para C6.17.

Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge  737 3 See para C6.10 et seq. 4 See para C6.22.

C4.45 Pre-hearing disclosure of documents and information may become an issue. The Anti-Doping Organization will obviously have to produce materials relating to the collection, transportation and analysis of the athlete’s sample in order to establish its prima facie case (unless the athlete stipulates to the identity and integrity of the sample, and/or to the accuracy of the analytical results), but what if the athlete wants disclosure of further documents on which the Anti-Doping Organization might not need to rely? Article 7.8.4 of the 2019 NADP Procedural Rules gives the chair of the hearing panel the power to: ‘make such order as he/she shall deem appropriate in relation to the production of relevant documents and/or other materials between the parties; provided that save for good cause shown no documents and/or other materials shall be ordered to be produced in relation to the laboratory analysis resulting in an adverse analytical finding beyond the documents that are required, pursuant to the International Standard for Laboratories, to be included in the laboratory report pack’.

‘The documentation of the analysis procedure performed on the sample is an essential source of information for an athlete if he is to defend his case. Therefore, the ISL and the WADA Technical Document for Laboratory Documentation Packages clarify what kind of material shall be produced and provided by a laboratory to support the finding of an Adverse Analytical Finding’.1 However, the scope of potential disclosure is getting wider, and may include the athlete having to provide disclosure of documents and information to the Anti-Doping Organization. In ITF v Sharapova, the first instance panel noted: ‘Previously orders for disclosure have not generally been considered in anti-doping cases but the changes brought into effect by the WADA  Code 2015 now require tribunals to make findings, inter alia, as to whether an athlete has acted intentionally in taking a substance on the Prohibited List. In the case of this player it was likely that she would rely on evidence about advice and assistance she had received from a number of persons. In those circumstances the determination of contested issues of fact and intention might require the production of all documents relevant to those issues’.2

Any disclosure order can obviously only cover disclosure of documents that are actually in the party’s possession or control, not documents that are held by third parties who are outside the control of that party.3 The likeliest source of controversy is requests for disclosure of the laboratory’s standard operating procedures or other laboratory documentation.4 In theory at least, a refusal to order disclosure could be serious enough to amount to an infringement of the athlete’s right to defend himself, and so give grounds for appeal.5 1 Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 5.140. 2 ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016, para 11, not challenged on appeal, Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643. 3 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 81 (‘The contractual regime governing determination of charges of doping offences does not include any obligation on either party to the contract to make witnesses available to give oral evidence against the will of the witness or the party asked to produce the witness’). In such circumstances, consideration should be given to seeking assistance from the courts in the form of a witness summons issued ‘in aid of arbitration’ under the Arbitration Act 1996: see para D3.86 and D3.87. 4 USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, paras 36–63 (discussing disputed disclosure requests by athlete in relation to laboratory data), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also USADA v Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008, para 25 (order granted for disclosure of laboratory’s Standard Operating Procedures); Blanco v USADA, CAS  2010/A/2185, para 3.18 (TD2009LDOC did not preclude production of laboratory’s Standard Operating Procedures), citing Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 5.152. 5 If it were CAS that refused to order disclosure, the challenge would be in the Swiss courts on the basis that the athlete’s right to be heard had been infringed. See eg Pechstein v ISU, Swiss Federal Tribunal, 10 February 2010, 4A_612/2009, para 5.1 (rejecting such an argument on the facts).

738  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

G Negotiating a consensual settlement of the charge C4.46 The athlete will also need to note that fighting doping charges can be prohibitively expensive. Legal aid is not generally available, although CAS can grant it in particular cases, and both CAS and Sport Resolutions (which acts as Secretariat to the National Anti-Doping Panel), and CAS both maintain lists of lawyers who may be prepared to take on cases pro bono. Any Lottery funding the athlete may normally receive will probably have been suspended pending resolution of the charges. Under the NADP Procedural Rules and the CAS Rules, there are only very limited costshifting provisions.1 Therefore, a losing athlete is generally not exposed to an order to pay the Anti-Doping Organization’s costs, but by the same token he is unlikely to recover his costs from the Anti-Doping Organization if he is successful in defending the charge. As a result, unless there are strong reasons to believe that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the charge(s) made, the athlete may want to consider admitting the anti-doping rule violation and concentrating his efforts on securing as much mitigation of the sanction as possible. 1 See 2019 NADP Procedural Rules, Art 11.2: ‘Where the Anti-Doping Tribunal finds that an argument advanced by a party was frivolous or otherwise entirely without merit, the Tribunal may award costs as it deems appropriate against that party. Otherwise, however, each of the parties shall bear its own costs, legal, expert or otherwise, and the Tribunal shall not have the power to order any other party to pay such costs, or the costs of convening the Tribunal’. CAS Code R.65.3 provides: ‘The costs of the parties, witnesses, experts and interpreters shall be advanced by the parties. In the award, the Panel shall decide which party shall bear them or in what proportion the parties shall share them, taking into account the outcome of the proceedings, as well as the conduct and financial resources of the parties’. However, it often leaves the costs to lie where they fall, and even when it decides to order one side to pay the other’s costs, it usually requires little more than a token contribution: Kutrovsky v ITF, CAS 2012/A/2804, para 11.3 (‘In accordance with the constant practice of the CAS, any amount granted on the basis of Article R65.3 of the Code is a contribution towards the legal fees and other expenses incurred by the prevailing party in connection with the proceedings and not the full amount spent by such party for his/her claim or defence’).

C4.47 In cases where the facts are clear, and support the athlete’s contention that his use of the prohibited substance was inadvertent (eg  it was an ingredient in a medication he was taking) and in no way intended to enhance his performance, it may even be possible to ‘plea-bargain’ with the Anti-Doping Organization that has brought the charge, seeking to negotiate a more lenient sanction in return for a plea that avoids the expense and burden of a hearing.1 Any such resolution will have to be transparent and subject to the rights of appeal of other parties that are enshrined in Code Art 13, to ensure accountability and to avoid decisions favouring ‘home-town’ athletes. 1 Anti-Doping Organizations such as USADA, UK Anti-Doping and the ITF have been following this practice for several years, and it was codified in a comment to Art 7 of the 2015 Code, which states: ‘Not all anti-doping rule proceedings which have been initiated by an Anti-Doping Organization need to go to hearing. There may be cases where the Athlete or other Person agrees to the sanction which is either mandated by the Code or which the Anti-Doping Organization considers appropriate where flexibility in sanction is permitted. In all cases, a sanction imposed on the basis of such an agreement will be reported to parties with a right to appeal under Article 13.2.3 as provided in Article 14.2.2 and published as provided in Article 14.3.2’. In the 2021 Code, Art 10.8 provides explicitly for Results Management Agreements and Case Resolution Agreements (to which WADA would also be a party).

CHAPTER C5

Burden and Standard of Proof at the Hearing on the Merits Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers) .

Contents

para

1

INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION... C5.1

2

STANDARD OF PROOF THAT THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION MUST MEET....................................................................................................... C5.2

3

THE ATHLETE’S BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF........................... C5.4

4

ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE................................................................................. C5.5

5

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE.................................................................................... C5.9

1 INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION C5.1 Code Art 3.1 provides that ‘the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred’. This is an important requirement of fairness and means that unless the Anti-Doping Organization submits sufficient evidence of each of the factual elements of the antidoping rule violation with which the athlete is charged,1 the athlete has no case to answer and is entitled to have the charge dismissed without having to submit any proof of his innocence.2 1 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 36 (‘The burden remains upon the [Anti-Doping Organization] to prove each of the constituent elements of the alleged anti-doping rule violations …’); Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 695 (‘the Panel must carefully consider the ingredients of liability under each of the relevant provisions of the WADC that the Athlete is alleged to have contravened. It must then consider whether the totality of the evidence presented before the Panel enables it to conclude, to the requisite standard of comfortable satisfaction, that the Athlete personally committed the specific acts or omissions necessary to constitute an ADRV under each of those separate provisions of the WADC’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 727 (same). 2 FINA v J, FINA Doping Panel decision 06/01, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA 2006), p 83 (charge based on alleged presence of 19-norandrosterone in athlete’s sample dismissed where, among other things, there was no evidence regarding the chain of custody of the sample, ie how it was transported from the collection site to the laboratory). Such an application was also made, albeit unsuccessfully, in ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 66–68, and in ASADA v Marinov, CAS (Oceania) 2007/A1, para 3.

2 STANDARD OF PROOF THAT THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION MUST MEET C5.2 Code Art 3.1 also specifies that the Anti-Doping Organization must establish the anti-doping rule violation ‘to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made. This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt’.1 Thus,

740  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement ‘the Panel must carefully consider the ingredients of liability under each of the relevant provisions of the WADC that the Athlete is alleged to have contravened. It must then consider whether the totality of the evidence presented before the Panel enables it to conclude, to the requisite standard of comfortable satisfaction, that the Athlete personally committed the specific acts or omissions necessary to constitute an ADRV under each of those separate provisions of the WADC’.2

The CAS has been clear that ‘the standard of proof itself is not a variable one’ depending on the nature of the ADRV alleged.3 In other words: ‘this standard of proof is to be applied, irrespective of whether allegations of antidoping rule violations are based on Adverse Analytical Findings or other reliable evidence’.4

However, while the standard remains constant: ‘inherent within that immutable standard is a requirement that the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the supporting evidence must be in order for the allegation to be found proven’.5

On that basis, there is some authority for the proposition that, at least in cases where the allegations are of particularly grave misconduct, ‘the comfortable satisfaction standard may not be much different from the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”‘.6 However, this proposition was emphatically rejected in the seminal Bellchambers case.7 Furthermore, various CAS panel have suggested that the application of the standard ‘must take into account the circumstances of the case’, which include ‘[t]he paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also considering the nature and restricted powers of the investigation of authorities of the governing bodies of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities’.8 Nevertheless, where the facts (or, in particular, the scientific issues) are in dispute, and there is competent and credible evidence on both sides, the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard can be decisive.9 1 Zubkov v IOC, CAS  2017/A/5422, para  681 (‘This standard is higher than a mere balance of probabilities, meaning that it is insufficient for the IOC simply to establish that it is more likely than not that the Athlete committed an ADRV. At the same time, however, a criminal standard of proof is not applicable and the Panel is not required to be satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt of the Athlete’s guilt’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 713 (same). This standard comes from the Korneev case at the Atlanta Olympics, where the CAS panel ruled that the requisite standard of proof under the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code ‘is greater than a mere balance of probabilities but less than a standard which may be expressed as beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, an appropriate expression of the standard of proof required is that the ingredients must be established to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made. It follows that the more serious the allegation being considered the greater is the degree of evidence which is required to achieve the requisite degree of comfortable satisfaction necessary to establish the commission of an offence. In addition, the nature of the offence is one of strict liability if a prohibited substance is used. Accordingly, this is a further factor which may require a higher degree of satisfaction than may otherwise be appropriate’. Korneev and Gouliev v IOC, CAS (Atlanta) No 003-4L, pp 17-18; followed in N. v FINA, CAS  98/208. See McLaren, ‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical Viewpoint, [2012] ISLR Issue 4, p77, at p 84 (‘This standard affords athletes protection from unfounded claims of an anti-doping rule violation as such accusations can have a grave effect on their reputation and economic well-being while also recognising that the conviction of athletes must not be impossible since the use of PEDs in sport is unfair to all participants’). 2 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 695; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 727 (same). See also IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 36 (‘The burden remains upon the [Anti-Doping Organization] to prove each of the constituent elements of the alleged anti-doping rule violations to our comfortable satisfaction’). 3 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 674); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 706 (same). 4 WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 9.3; Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/ A/1912-1913, para 125 (rejecting the athlete’s suggestion that ‘the standard of proof must be very close to “proof beyond reasonable doubt” because of the particular seriousness of the allegation against Ms Pechstein. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is typically a criminal law standard that finds no application in anti-doping cases. Obviously, the Panel is mindful of the seriousness of the allegations put forward by the ISU but, in the Panel’s view, it is exactly the same seriousness as any

Burden and Standard of Proof at the Hearing on the Merits  741 other anti-doping case brought before the CAS and involving blood doping; nothing more, nothing less’). The athlete went to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that it was a violation of public policy to apply the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard of proof to a doping charge rather than the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ criminal standard, but the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected that argument: see para C4.17, n 5. 5 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 674; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 706 (same). See Zubkov, ibid, para 686, and Legkov, ibid, para 718 (‘At the same time, however, the Panel is mindful that the allegations asserted against the Athlete are of the utmost seriousness. The Athlete is accused of knowingly participating in a corrupt conspiracy of unprecedented magnitude and sophistication. Given the gravity of the alleged wrongdoing, it is incumbent on the IOC to adduce particularly cogent evidence of the Athlete’s deliberate personal involvement in that wrongdoing. In particular, it is insufficient for the IOC merely to establish the existence of an overarching doping scheme to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel. Instead, the IOC must go further and establish, in each individual case, that the individual athlete knowingly engaged in particular conduct that involved the commission of a specific and identifiable ADRV. In other words, the Panel must be comfortably satisfied that the Athlete personally committed a specific violation of a specific provision of the WADC’); Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 204 (same). See also IAAF v RusAF and Khanafeeva, CAS 2018/O/5673, para 61 (‘The Athlete is accused, inter alia, of having used Prohibited Substances and having knowingly benefited from a doping scheme and system that was covering up her positive doping results and registered them as negative in ADAMS. Given the gravity of the alleged wrongdoing, it is incumbent upon the IAAF to adduce particularly cogent evidence of the Athlete’s deliberate personal involvement in that wrongdoing. In particular, it is insufficient for the IAAF merely to establish the existence of an overarching doping scheme to the Sole Arbitrator. Instead, the IAAF must go further and establish, in each individual case, that the individual athlete knowingly engaged in particular conduct that involved the commission of a specific and identifiable ADRV’); IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov, CAS 2018/A/5675, para 63 (same); IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, para 86 (‘The gravity of the particular alleged wrongdoing is relevant to the application of the comfortable satisfaction standard in any given case. In CAS  2014/A/3625 (para  132), the panel stated that the comfortable satisfaction standard is “a kind of sliding scale, based on the allegations at stake: the more serious the allegation and its consequences, the higher certainty (level of proof) the Panel would require to be ‘comfortably satisfied’”); IAAF v RUSAF & Bespalova, CAS 2018/O/5676, para 63 (‘[…] the Sole Arbitrator is mindful that the allegations asserted against the Athlete are of the utmost seriousness. The Athlete is accused, inter alia, of having used Prohibited Substances and having knowingly benefitted from a doping scheme and system that was covering up her positive doping results and registered them as negative in ADAMS. Given the gravity of the alleged wrongdoing, it is incumbent on the IAAF to adduce particularly cogent evidence of the Athlete’s deliberate personal involvement in that wrongdoing. In particular, it is insufficient for the IAAF merely to establish the existence of an overarching doping scheme to the comfortable satisfaction of the Sole Arbitrator. Instead, the IAAF must go further and establish, in each individual case, that the individual athlete knowingly engaged in particular conduct that involved the commission of a specific and identifiable ADRV. In other words, the Sole Arbitrator must be comfortably satisfied that the Athlete personally committed a specific violation of a specific provision of the 2012-2013 IAAF Rules. […] Ultimately, the Sole Arbitrator has the task of weighing the evidence adduced by the Parties in support of their respective allegations. If, in the Sole Arbitrator’s view, both sides’ evidence carries the same weight, the rules on the burden of proof must break the tie’); IBU v Sleptsova, ADHP decision dated 11 February 2020, paras 277-78 (‘In other words, evidence must be more persuasive as the consequences the allegation carries increase. Applying these legal principles and this logic to the allegations at hand, and as eventually conceded by the Athlete at the hearing, it follows that the standard of proof to establish that an ADRV has occurred, even in a “use” case, remains that of a “comfortable satisfaction”, and not that of beyond a reasonable doubt. However, IBU’s evidence supporting the charge of aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 10.6 IBU ADR and which carries up to a four year period of ineligibility, must be even more persuasive than the evidence supporting the charge of “use” pursuant to Article 2.2 IBU ADR […]’). The same approach is taken in English courts. If an event is prima facie unlikely, then under English law there will need to be good evidence to establish it: see para D1.103 and Re B [2008] UKHL 35. The principle in that case extends outside care proceedings, which it involved. See for example most recently Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2020] EWCA Civ 408. For further discussion of the concept of proof in the context of anti-doping, see UCI v. Alberto Contador Velasco and RFEC and WADA v. Alberto Contador and RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, which exposes some of the difficulties. The cyclist was held not to have established ingestion of clenbuterol through contaminated meat (notwithstanding that it was common ground that he had eaten beef from a farm that had in the past been convicted of clenbuterol misuse in cattle), and the UCI and WADA were held not to have established ingestion through blood doping. The CAS panel based its finding on a point not fully argued by the UCI or WADA, or indeed the cyclist, and which may seem surprising on the facts, namely that the cyclist had not shown that the substance might not have come into his body inadvertently but negligently through a supplement (notwithstanding that his team checked all his supplements and there would have been no reason, and in fact the opposite, for him to have taken an unchecked one). See further para C18.10.

742  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 6 Hamilton v USADA & UCI, CAS 2005/A/884, para 47, citing USADA v Montgomery and USADA v Gaines, in which the CAS panel held that ‘in general, the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the alleged event occurred and, hence, the stronger the evidence required before the occurrence of the event is demonstrated to be more probable than not. […] In view of the nature and gravity of the allegations at issue in these proceedings, there is no practical distinction between the standards of proof advocated by USADA and the Respondents. […] Either way, USADA bears the burden of proving, by strong evidence commensurate with the serious claims it makes, that the Respondents committed the doping offences in question’; USADA  v Montgomery, CAS  2004/O/645, para  36; USADA v Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, para 36. See to the same effect Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, paras 9.13-9.14; and USADA v Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, para 5.1. 7 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 105 (‘The Panel does not accept that there is no material difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof of comfortable satisfaction. The dictum in USADA v Tim Montgomery was manifestly and expressly case specific’) and ibid (‘The Panel does not accept that WADA is obliged to “eliminate all possibilities” which could point to the Players’ innocence’). See also DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, para 50 (‘[…] a panel must be comfortably satisfied with the ambit of the evidence that the allegation is proven beyond the balance of probability test but the panel does not require the application of the rigorous standard of beyond reasonable doubt’). 8 Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 110, quoting from other CAS awards; IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS  2018/O/5667, para  84 (‘CAS jurisprudence provides guidance on the meaning and application of the “comfortable satisfaction” standard of proof. The test of comfortable satisfaction “must take into account the circumstances of the case” (CAS  2013/A/3258 para. 122). Those circumstances include “[t]he paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also considering the nature and restricted powers of the investigation authorities of the governing bodies of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities” (CAS  2009/A/1920; CAS 2013/A/3258)’); Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 204 (same). 9 As it was, for example, in Calle Williams v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, where the CAS panel found that the IOC had not sustained its burden of proving to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that isometheptene was sufficiently similar to any substance expressly mentioned on the Prohibited List to be treated itself as a prohibited substance: see para C6.23. See also Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 687 (‘If, in the Panel’s view, both sides’ evidence carries the same weight, the rules on the burden of proof must break the tie’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 719 (same).

C5.3 In Code Art 2.1 cases, where the only elements of the violation are the presence of a prohibited substance in a sample provided by the athlete,1 a laboratory report that a sample taken from the athlete returned an adverse analytical finding for that prohibited substance will suffice to make out a prima facie case, if the B sample analysis confirms that finding (or is waived).2 It will then be up to the athlete to submit evidence that disturbs that showing.3 It is to be noted, however, that where there is doubt, for example, as to whether the substance found is a prohibited substance,4 or as to whether it might have been endogenously produced,5 or as to whether a metabolite found in the sample was derived from a prohibited substance,6 the AntiDoping Organization’s obligation to discharge the standard of proof may become much more significant, even in a Code Art 2.1 case. And in a non-analytical case under one of the other provisions of Code Art 2, the position may be more difficult still.7 1 See para C4.29 et seq. 2 See Code Art 2.1.2. Diane Modahl’s counsel contended that ‘although the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is upon the Federation, the certified result of the test goes so far to discharge that burden that in practice the athlete will have to adduce evidence which raises a reasonable doubt’: Modahl v BAF  Ltd (22  July 1999, unreported), HL (Hoffman LJ). The former President of the IAAF Arbitration Panel agreed that ‘in practice the burden of proof moves rapidly to the athlete’s side’: Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000) at p 66. 3 In the Court of Appeal in Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude (No 2) (26 March 1996, unreported), Lord Justice Neill ruled that this was not unreasonable: ‘prima facie, scientific evidence establishes that certain facts exists and it seems not unreasonable, in the context of a code of this kind, that it should be for the player to rebut the prima facie case against him’. On the other hand, Lord Justice Neill also said that the athlete’s burden should be sustainable by proof ‘on the balance of probabilities’, ie the civil standard rather than the criminal standard or something in between. And that is the approach adopted in the Code: see para C4.17. The establishment of the prima facie case shifts the evidential burden onto the athlete to refute what it indicates, and if he does that on the balance of probabilities, the Anti-Doping Organization cannot satisfy its legal burden to the comfortable satisfaction of the tribunal.

Burden and Standard of Proof at the Hearing on the Merits  743 4 5 6 7

See para C5.5 et seq. See para C5.10 et seq. See para C6.19 et seq. See eg French v Australian Sports Commission & Cycling Australia, CAS 2004/A/651, where the CAS panel held that the non-analytical evidence proffered of knowing use of prohibited substances was not sufficient to meet the required standard, given the gravity of the charges (para C7.15); and IBU v Klimina Ussanova, ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, para 160 (‘Taking into consideration the whole picture of the above factual circumstances presented to it, the Panel finds that there are some indications or even a certain likelihood that the Athlete received prohibited infusions of more than 50 mL. A mere likelihood, however, does not meet the standard of comfortable satisfaction […]’).

3 THE ATHLETE’S BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF C5.4 ‘Where the Code places the burden of proof upon the Athlete or other Person alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to rebut a presumption or establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance of probability’.1 So, for example, where the athlete has the burden to prove that his ADRV was not intentional (under Art 10.2.1.12) or to show how a substance got into his system for purposes of a mitigation plea under Code Art 10.2.1.13 or 10.4 or 10.5,4 he must make that showing on the balance of probabilities, ie he must persuade the hearing panel ‘that the occurrence of the circumstances on which the Athlete relies is more probable than their non-occurrence’.5 1 2 3 4 5

Code Art 3.1. See para C17.2(a). See para C17.4 et seq. See para C18.5. WADA v IWF & Caicedo, CAS 2016/A/4377, para 51; Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, para 12.1; WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 & 1844, para 156; IAAF v AFS & Javornik, CAS  2008/A/1608, para  58; IRB  v Keyter, CAS  2006/A/1067, para  6.4. See also ITF  v Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1926, para 5.9 (‘[…] for the Panel to be satisfied that a means of ingestion is demonstrated on a balance of probability simply means, in percentage terms, that it is satisfied that there is a 51% chance of it having occurred. The Player thus only needs to show that one specific way of ingestion is marginally more likely than not to have occurred’), followed in Van Snick v Federation Internationale de Judo, CAS 2014/A/3475, para 79, and in Sheikh Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 196; WADA v FIVB & Berrios, CAS 2010/A/2229, para 82 (‘In other words, a panel should simply find the explanation of an Athlete about the presence of a Specified Substance more probable than not’). See further para C18.12.

4 ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE C5.5 Code Art 3.2 provides that ‘facts related to anti-doping rule violations may be established by any reliable means, including admissions’.1 In other words, strict rules as to admissibility of evidence that might apply in court do not apply in antidoping hearings. Instead, objections to evidence in anti-doping proceedings go to ‘weight rather than admissibility’.2 As the CAS panel noted in Hamilton v USADA and UCI: ‘this rule gives great leeway to […] anti-doping agencies to prove violations, so long as they can comfortably satisfy a tribunal that the means of proof is reliable. As a result, it is not even necessary that a violation be proven by a scientific test itself. Instead, as some cases have found, a violation may be proved through admissions, testimony of witnesses, or other documentation evidencing a violation’.3

Indeed, entirely circumstantial evidence may be sufficient,4 so long as it comfortably satisfies the panel of facts from which the requisite elements of the violation charged may be properly inferred.5 This is particularly so when the wrongdoing alleged includes alleged covering up of doping activities, since it is to be expected in such cases that an Anti-Doping Organization, which lacks state powers of search and

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seizure, will not have direct evidence but instead will necessarily have to rely on indirect evidence.6 1 The comment to Code Art 2.2 adds as further examples of reliable means of proving Use ‘witness statements, documentary evidence, conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling, including data collected as part of the Athlete Biological Passport, or other analytical information which does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish “Presence” of a Prohibited Substance under Article 2.1. For example, Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the analysis of an A  Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B  Sample) or from the analysis of a B Sample alone where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a satisfactory explanation for the lack of confirmation in the other Sample)’. Article 6.1.1 of the 2021 Code has added as further examples of reliable means of proving ADRVs ‘reliable laboratory or other forensic testing conducted outside of WADA-accredited or approved laboratories’, eg DNA analysis, finger-printing. 2 ICC  v Amir, Asif and Butt, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5  February 2011, para  29 (construing identical clause to Code Art 3.2 in the ICC Anti-Corruption Code). 3 Hamilton v USADA & UCI, CAS 2005/A/884, para 48, citing the Montgomery and Gaines decisions (as to which, see para C7.14). 4 See eg  WADA  v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS  2008/A/1470, para  67 (‘The Panel may consider any evidence, even circumstantial evidence’); WADA v FIBA & Morgan, FIBA AC decision 2005-1, dated 22  June 2005, p  7 (‘[…] both forms of determining the facts (direct evidence and circumstantial evidence) are, in principle, equal’). 5 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 683 and para 685; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, paras 715 and 717. See eg Kolasa v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 22 May 2014, para 4.26 et seq (discussing difference between proving intent to evade sample collection directly and providing it ‘based on the circumstantial evidence of the circumstances in which he left the scene’). For example, the CAS held that it was enough, to sustain a charge of manipulation, to satisfy the hearing panel that the athlete was the only person who at the relevant time had the motive, opportunity and technical skill to manipulate the sample in a manner that would be undetected. Boevski v IWF, CAS  2004/A/607, para  7.9.5, citing Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS  1998/A/211, para  12.3. In such circumstances, it would be for the athlete to put forward an alternative theory identifying a plausible alternative culprit, that is sufficiently supported by evidence to undermine the panel’s satisfaction on the point. Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.9.6 (‘Once the probability that manipulation occurred in this phase of the chain of custody [ie  when the sample was in the athlete’s control] becomes apparent then some explanation or plausible hypothesis that the athlete was not involved must be brought forward to refute the circumstantial evidence as to the probability of the manipulation either being carried out by the Appellant or with his consent and approval’). Similarly, a hearing panel may be asked to infer the use of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method from circumstantial evidence in the form of ‘markers’ of such use found in the athlete’s sample. See paras C7.1 and C7.9, n 4. 6 Zubkov v IOC, CAS  2017/A/5422, para  683 (‘The alleged doping scheme was, by its very nature, intended and designed to conceal evidence of wrongdoing to the maximum extent possible. As a result, the more successful the alleged conspiracy was at achieving its objectives, the less direct evidence of wrongdoing is likely to be available to the IOC. The absence of direct evidence, therefore, is not necessarily indicative of innocence, but may equally be indicative that serious wrongdoing has been effectively concealed’) and para  685 (‘In view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme and the IOC’s limited investigatory powers, the IOC may properly invite the Panel to draw inferences from the established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Panel may accede to that invitation where it considers that the established facts reasonably support the drawing of the inferences. So long as the Panel is comfortably satisfied about the underlying factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has committed a particular ADRV, it may conclude that the IOC has established an ADRV notwithstanding that it is not possible to reach that conclusion by direct evidence alone’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, paras 715 and 717 (same); Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 204 (‘the IOC is not a national or international law enforcement agency. Its investigatory powers are substantially more limited than the powers available to such bodies. Since the IOC cannot compel the provision of documents or testimony, it must place greater reliance on the consensual provision of information and evidence and on evidence that is already in the public domain. The evidence that it is able to present before the CAS necessarily reflects these inherent limitations in the IOC’s investigatory powers. The Panel’s assessment of the evidence must respect those limitations. In particular, it must not be premised on unrealistic expectations concerning the evidence that the IOC is able to obtain from reluctant or evasive witnesses or other sources’) and (‘in view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme and the IOC’s limited investigatory powers, the IOC may properly invite the Panel to draw inferences from the established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Panel may accede to that invitation where it considers that the established facts reasonably support the drawing of the inferences. So long as the Panel is comfortably satisfied about the underlying factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has committed a particular ADRV, it may conclude that the IOC has established an ADRV notwithstanding that it is not possible to reach that conclusion by direct evidence alone’).

Burden and Standard of Proof at the Hearing on the Merits  745 See also IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, paras 99–100 (‘Second, in considering whether he is comfortably satisfied that an ADRV has occurred, the Sole Arbitrator will consider all the relevant circumstances of the case. In the context of the present case, the relevant circumstances include, but are not limited to, the following. 100. The IAAF contends that the Athlete “was part of a centralised doping scheme”. The alleged doping scheme was intended and designed to conceal evidence of wrongdoing. As a result, the more successful the alleged scheme was, the less direct evidence of wrongdoing is likely to be available to the IAAF. The Sole Arbitrator thus notes that the absence of direct evidence is not necessarily an indication of innocence, but may equally be indicative that the wrongdoing has been effectively concealed. 101. The IAAF is not a national or international law enforcement agency, and its investigatory powers are more limited than the powers available to such bodies. The Sole Arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence shall take these limitations into consideration’); IAAF  v RUSAF & Bespalova, CAS  2018/O/5676, para  63 (‘Further, when evaluating whether he was comfortably satisfied that an ADRV had occurred, the Sole Arbitrator did take into consideration all relevant circumstances of the case. In the context of the present case, and by analogy to other cases handled by the CAS concerning similar issues relating to similar evidence (CAS 2017/A/5379 and CAS 2017/A/5422), the relevant circumstances include, but are not limited, to the following: – the IAAF is not a national or international law enforcement agency. Its investigatory powers are substantially more limited than the powers available to such bodies. Since the IAAF cannot compel the provision of documents or testimony, it must place greater reliance on the consensual provision of information and evidence and on evidence that is already in the public domain. The evidence that it is able to present before the CAS necessarily reflects these inherent limitations in the IAAF’s investigatory powers. The Sole Arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence must respect those limitations. In particular, it must not be premised on unrealistic expectations concerning the evidence that the IAAF is able to obtain from reluctant or evasive witnesses and other source. – in view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme and the IAAF’s limited investigatory powers, the IAAF may properly invite the Sole Arbitrator to draw inferences from the established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Sole Arbitrator may accede to that invitation where he considers that the established facts reasonably support the drawing of the inferences. So long as the Sole Arbitrator is comfortably satisfied about the underlying factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has committed a particular ADRV, he may conclude that the IAAF has established an ADRV notwithstanding that it is not possible to reach that conclusion by direct evidence alone. […] – in considering whether the IAAF has discharged its burden of proof to the requisite standard of proof, the Sole Arbitrator will consider any admissible “reliable” evidence adduced by the IAAF. This includes any admissions by the Athlete, any “credible testimony” by third parties and any “reliable” documentary evidence or scientific evidence […]’).

C5.6 The hearing panel decides whether the party with the burden of proof has met that burden by considering the ‘cumulative effect’ of all the evidence adduced.1 The CAS panel in Bellchambers explained:2 ‘107. In Attorney General for Jersey v Edmond-O’Brien, in a decision of the Privy Council (2006 1  WLR  1485), Lord Hoffman said this in criticism of the Jersey Court of Appeal’s judgment, which the Board overturned (para 25): Although they said they had reviewed the evidence “separately and together”, there is little indication that they had regard to the cumulative weight of the various items of evidence, to each of which they had, sometimes not altogether plausibly, assigned a possible innocent explanation. It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation but, taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 108. Although that statement was articulated in the context of a criminal case, in the Panel’s view Lord Hoffman’s reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to the situation where a Tribunal is mandated to have ‘comfortable satisfaction’ before it can inculpate a sportsperson of a disciplinary offence, a fortiori where certain pieces of evidence are themselves suspicious. 109. Wigmore in his classic treatise on the Law of Evidence distinguishes between two analytical methods in an engineering metaphor: links in a chain and strands in a cable. ASADA, before the AFL Tribunal, relied exclusively on an analysis of links in a chain […] 110. By the time of the hearing (as foreshadowed in their skeleton argument), WADA preferred the strands in the cable analysis. […] […]

746  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 113. Yet further analogies (jigsaws; Danish arthouse films) were thrown into the forensic mix. However, metaphor is ultimately no substitute, in the Panel’s view, for evaluating all relevant and credible items of evidence and asking itself whether, considered cumulatively, they satisfied the test of comfortable satisfaction.’

Using the ‘strands in the cable’ analogy, the Bellchambers panel went through the different strands of evidence submitted by WADA of the athletes’ use of a prohibited substance, and concluded that taken together they created a cable that was ‘sufficiently strong’ to satisfy it comfortably of such use.3 The analogy also explained why it upheld the charge even though it did not rule in WADA’s favour on every single issue.4 1 WADA  v Bellchambers et al, CAS  2015/A/4059, paras 107-08 (in the context of Anti-Doping Organization’s burden to prove use of a prohibited substance); Alabbar v FEI, CAS  2013/A/3124, para 12.3 (in context of athlete’s burden to prove how the prohibited substance got into his system). See eg  cases cited at para C7.14 in the context of the athlete’s burden to prove the source of the prohibited substance found in the athlete’s system. 2 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, followed in DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, paras 51–53, and in IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, para 85 (‘[…] a panel is allowed to consider the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence. Therefore, even if single items of evidence may each be inadequate to establish a violation to the comfortable satisfaction of a hearing panel, considered together they may suffice’). See also Report No. 2 of Professor Richard to WADA, 9 December 2016, pp 35–36 (‘The different types of evidence provided with respect to any individual athlete are like strands in a cable. It will be up to each Results Management Authority to determine whether the provided strands of evidence, standing alone or together build a sufficiently strong cable to support an ADRV in an individual case’). See also Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 212 (‘circumstantial evidence may have some probative value insofar as individual strands of evidence, which are, taken separately, not sufficient to prove that an ADRV occurred, could, when taken together, establish such ADRV to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction. However, to do so, such strands of evidence have nonetheless to be established and in a case such as the present, which concerns allegations of doping that may entail heavy sanctions for the Athlete, there must be cogent evidence establishing a personal and direct involvement of the Athlete in the commission of the relevant ADRV’). 3 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 120 et seq, and see para 139 (‘The Panel does not find it necessary to resolve this issue. It accepts that there are arguments in favour of each hypothesis. In its view, were WADA’s analysis to be correct, it would do no more than add another strand to a cable which was already sufficiently strong’). 4 Ibid.

C5.7 Reliance may also be placed on evidence that was illegally acquired, at least where the Anti-Doping Organization proffering the evidence was not involved in the illegality, and the public interest in exposing the wrongdoing in issue outweighs the interest of the defendant in not having illegally obtained evidence used against him.1 ‘Under Swiss law […] such evidence can be used, even if it was collected with violation of certain human rights, if there is an overriding public interest at stake. In the case at hand, the internationally accepted fight against doping is a public interest, which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr Valverde’s personal rights’.2 It seems clear that the result would be the same if English law governed.3 1 IAAF v ARAF & Mokhnev, CAS 2016/O/4504, para 72 et seq (use of tape recordings of incriminating conversations recorded by an athlete with her coach without the permission of the coach, in alleged breach of Russian law); IAAF v ARAF & Kazarin, CAS 2016/A/4480, paras 76–80 (same). 2 WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 10.5(c). The same principle applies in the context of anti-corruption cases: see para B4.38(c). 3 Subject to certain narrow exceptions (including privileged documents, confessions, and evidence obtained by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), evidence obtained ‘unlawfully, improperly or unfairly is admissible as a matter of law’ in English criminal proceedings (Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2021, para F2.1) and in English civil proceedings. See Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The Queen, [1955]  AC  197, 199 (‘In their Lordships’ opinion, the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the Court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained’). It is argued by some that there may be circumstances under English law where probative value is weighed against the extent of the illegality and the court exercises a discretion to exclude.

Burden and Standard of Proof at the Hearing on the Merits  747

C5.8 The person charged may want to test the strength of the Anti-Doping Organization’s evidence by cross-examination of its witnesses. For example, he may want to cross-examine members of the sample collection team, or members of the laboratory’s staff involved in analysis of the sample. If the rules do not entitle him to do so, or if the Anti-Doping Organization is unable or unwilling to produce the witnesses required, and the hearing panel lacks the power to enforce their presence,1 and it is not possible to get an English court to issue a witness summons under the Arbitration Act 1996,2 the basis exists for a challenge to any adverse award on the ground that the process was unfair because the person charged was denied a proper opportunity to defend himself.3 1 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 81 (‘The contractual regime governing determination of charges of doping offences does not include any obligation on either party to the contract to make witnesses available to give oral evidence against the will of the witness or the party asked to produce the witness’). 2 As happened, in the anti-corruption context, in England & Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (discussed at para B4.28, n 3). 3 See further para E7.65 et seq. However, the panel may seek to pre-empt such a challenge by making clear that it will give less weight to evidence that has not been subjected to cross-examination: WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, paras 117–18 (as a matter of law the panel was entitled to admit hearsay evidence, and it therefore did not exclude written evidence of witnesses who could not be compelled to attend and so could not be cross-examined, but it did place less weight on that evidence than it might otherwise have done); IBU  v Sleptsova, ADHP decision dated 11  February 2020, para 398 (‘The contents of the inventory cannot be verified and Dr Rodchenkov has not testified as to the accuracy or reliability of the information, nor has the Athlete been able to test or challenge his evidence through the process of cross-examination before the Panel. Therefore, the Panel gives this evidence little weight’). Cf Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 95 (‘The Appellant claims that his right to be heard has been violated because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Professor Cowan. The Panel observes that there is no inalienable right under the Code for a party to cross-examine an expert. The Panel is only called upon to ensure that the parties’ right to be heard is guaranteed. This, however, can be done also through other means than by cross-examination, eg by an additional round of written submissions’). That last dictum is perhaps surprising, and CAS should and would probably seek to ensure that such an opportunity should be available. A difficult question may be where the Anti-Doping Organization wishes to rely on the evidence of anonymous witnesses, whether with or without anonymous cross examination. On occasion it may be very important for anonymity to be preserved, but generally, the inability of the athlete to know the identity of the witness and so effectively to cross examine means that such evidence should carry little weight, at least unless supported by other, empirical and indisputable, evidence. See further para B4.38.

5 REBUTTAL EVIDENCE C5.9 Assuming the Anti-Doping Organization’s evidence does establish a prima facie case to the requisite standard, the athlete’s lawyer will have to consider what witness evidence may be required to rebut that case, or else to support any defence or plea in mitigation to be advanced on behalf of the athlete. Depending on the nature of the case brought and/or the defence or plea in mitigation, fact witnesses (eg character witnesses) may or may not be necessary. In Art 2.1 cases, it is very likely that an expert witness will be required to speak to the sufficiency of the analytical evidence presented against the athlete, and/or to support any theory offered by the athlete, for example as to how the sample may have got into his system.1 The expert witness will be able to opine, for example, on the extent to which the results of other drug tests taken by the athlete may assist his defence;2 although the Anti-Doping Organization may then offer competing expert evidence to rebut any such opinion.3  WADA’s stance that employees of other WADA-accredited laboratories because of a conflict of interest should not give expert evidence against that of the laboratory that has undertaken the sample analysis poses a significant problem for athletes in securing an expert. 1 See para C7.14.

748  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 2 C  v FINA, CAS  2002/A/430, para  9.3.6 (‘[…] the Panel remains unconvinced by the Appellant’s arguments that the negative result of the samples collected by the Athens laboratory on 10 September 2001 effectively disqualified the positive findings of the “A” and “B” samples analyzed by the Tunis laboratory during the prior week. A  doping procedure such as that initiated on 6  September 2001 following the Appellant’s participation in the 4 × 100 mixed relay event represents only a “snapshot” of the athlete’s physiological condition at the time the samples were collected. On the basis of this “snapshot”, the Appellant has no basis upon which to contend that she never used prohibited substances prior to the taking of the positive samples; nor can she argue that the absence of a prohibited substance in the samples collected on 10 September 2001 in Athens proves that the testing done on 6 September 2001 was not “credible”‘). 3 Lazutina v IOC, CAS  2000/A/310, para  98 (‘[…] the Panel does not accept that Prof. Franke’s hypothesis [ie  that the elevated levels of nandrolone in the athlete’s sample were a ‘spike’ caused by contusion of the testicles] is corroborated by the fact that the Appellant did not test positive for nandrolone in other doping control procedures conducted immediately before and immediately after the Olympic Games. Professor Cowan testified, and the Panel accepts, that nandrolone and its precursors are very rapidly metabolised and eliminated from the body. Accordingly, the results of the other doping control procedures cannot be given any weight in assessing the cause of the elevated concentration of 19-norandrosterone detected in the Appellant’s urine at the Olympic Games immediately after the gold medal match’).

C5.10 Should the athlete give evidence in his own defence? He is not required to do so, and cannot be forced to do so,1 but he may have to, in order to dispute the case presented against him, or to support his own defence and/or plea in mitigation. There is no ‘right to silence’ in anti-doping proceedings,2 and therefore Code Art 3.2.5 permits an adverse inference to be drawn against an athlete who fails to answer questions from the Anti-Doping Organization or the hearing panel.3 Even when such considerations do not apply, however, the authors would suggest that as a general rule the athlete should testify in any event, if only to drive home to the hearing panel members the potential impact on a fellow human being of the decisions they have to make.4 1 USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA Panel decision dated 30 January 2012, paras 6.21, 6.29. 2 See para B4.38. 3 Code Art 3.2.5 states: ‘The hearing panel in a hearing on an anti-doping rule violation may draw an inference adverse to the Athlete or other Person who is asserted to have committed an anti-doping rule violation based on the Athlete’s or other Person’s refusal, after a request made in a reasonable time in advance of the hearing, to appear at the hearing (either in person or telephonically as directed by the hearing panel and to answer questions from the hearing panel or the Anti-Doping Organization asserting the anti-doping rule violation’. For example, adverse inferences were drawn in the BALCO cases (discussed at para C7.14); and in USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA Panel decision dated 30 January 2012, paras 6.21, 6.29. 4 Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 57 (‘The Panel was not afforded the opportunity to form its own impression of the athlete. It is difficult for the Panel to identify further mitigating circumstances if an athlete decides not to appear before the Panel for the hearing of his/her case which may have a very substantial impact on his/her future professional career. The Panel encourages the athletes in their own interest to participate in the hearings before the CAS’).

C5.11 On the other hand, an athlete’s direct testimony on a particular issue may not be enough to satisfy a panel.1 Therefore defence counsel should always be looking for independent corroboration of that testimony. 1 See eg ASADA v O’Neill, CAS 2009/A/1591, para 57 (‘Mr O’Neill provided no corroborative evidence as to his asserted research on the substance Phentermine. We do not accept, without such corroborating evidence, that Mr O’Neill has established he conducted adequate research into the clearance time of the substance or if he conducted any research at all. In any event we would have to be satisfied that such research would have allowed the conclusion to be drawn. Further, Mr O’Neill asserted he relied upon advice from his father, a qualified pharmacist. The father should have been made available to corroborate Mr O’Neill’s assertion he relied upon such informed advice. No statement, nor record of opinion, was tendered by the athlete to give credence to his assertion’).

CHAPTER C6

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s Sample Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers) .

Contents

para

1

ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAMPLE..... C6.4 A Proving a departure from a relevant requirement........................................ C6.10 B Proving that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding.......................................................................................... C6.11

2

ESTABLISHING THE RELIABILITY OF THE LABORATORY’S ADVERSE ANALYTICAL FINDING................................................................................... C6.19 A Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on ‘procedural’ grounds......................................................................................................... C6.20 B Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on ‘substantive’ grounds......................................................................................................... C6.28

3

ESTABLISHING THAT THE SUBSTANCE FOUND IN THE SAMPLE IS IN FACT PROHIBITED...................................................................................... C6.35 A Is the substance expressly listed on the Prohibited List?............................. C6.37 B If the substance is a ‘threshold substance’, ie one where a certain concentration has to be shown to be present in the sample in order for it to be a violation, was the concentration found in the athlete’s sample over the threshold?....................................................................................... C6.40 C If the substance found in the athlete’s sample may be produced naturally, can the Anti-Doping Organization prove that the substance in the sample was exogenous?........................................................................................... C6.42 D Testosterone................................................................................................. C6.44 E Nandrolone................................................................................................... C6.47 F Peptide hormones, growth factors, and related substances.......................... C6.54 G Does the substance fall within a category of substances included on the Prohibited List?............................................................................................ C6.55 H Is the substance in issue ‘similar’ to a substance on the Prohibited List?.... C6.56 I Is the substance a metabolite or a marker of a prohibited substance?......... C6.61

C6.1 What must the Anti-Doping Organization prove (to the requisite standard) in order to establish a prima facie case? That depends, of course, on which anti-doping rule violation is alleged to have been committed. The rules must make the requisite elements of the violation clear, so that there is no doubt as to what the Anti-Doping Organization must plead and prove, but there may be room for argument as to exactly what is required to be proved in a particular case.1 The various elements of each of the Code anti-doping rule violations are considered in turn below, starting with the Art 2.1 Presence violation. If the Anti-Doping Organization is alleging an Art 2.1 antidoping rule violation, it must establish to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel ‘the presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s Sample’. This is a ‘strict liability’ offence, meaning that ‘it is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated in order to establish’ the violation.2 Nor does the Anti-Doping Organization have to show how the prohibited substance got into the athlete’s sample,3 or indeed that it

750  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

went through the athlete’s body first.4 Nor does it have to show that the substance did in fact enhance the athlete’s sports performance.5 1 Any ambiguity in the rules will likely be interpreted against the Anti-Doping Organization and in favour of the athlete: see para C4.15, n 3. 2 Code Art 2.1.1. See WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 111 (‘As a result [of the FIFA equivalent of Code Art 2.1.1], the Panel finds that the objective presence of cocaine-metabolites in the Player’s bodily samples, regardless of the Player’s subjective attitude (ie his possible intent, knowledge, fault or negligence) constitutes an anti-doping rule violation under article  5  FIFA ADR proven to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation’); Meca-Medina and Mejcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235, para 10.17 (‘Strict liability rules do not require investigation of motive or even consideration of what sensible competitors might have done: it can indeed be surmised that those who use prohibited substances are by definition risk takers’). On the other hand, the athlete’s intent (or lack thereof) and/or degree of knowledge, fault or negligence will be highly relevant as a mitigating factor when it comes to sanction. See Chapters C17–C20. Therefore, the Anti-Doping Organization will need to be prepared to address the issue, even in an Art 2.1 case. 3 Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 67 (‘As it is a strict liability offence, the question of how the Prohibited Substance entered the Player’s sample is not relevant to the commission of an ADRV’); Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312, para 141 (‘Because this is a strict liability violation, we find that the mere presence of BE in the Appellant’s Sample is in and of itself a violation. The manner in which the BE entered the sample is irrelevant (unless caused by a rule departure […])’); Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS/A/690, para 55 (‘[…] the principle of strict liability means that an athlete is responsible for whatever substance is in his body, without having regard to the reasons for such presence and the degree of any respective fault of the athlete’); Watt v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2015, para 22 (‘Under article 2.1 evidence as to whether or how or when the athlete used or ingested a prohibited substance is irrelevant; the fact which constitutes the contravention is the presence of a prohibited substance in the sample’). The rule could not be otherwise: ‘it would put a definite end to any meaningful fight against doping if the federations were required to prove the necessary subjective elements of the offence, ie intent or negligence on the part of the athlete. In fact, since neither the federation nor the CAS has the means of conducting its own investigation or of compelling witnesses to give evidence, means which are available to the public prosecutor in criminal proceedings, it would be all too simple for an athlete to deny any intent or negligence and to simply state that he/she has no idea how the prohibited substance arrived in his/her system’. Aanes v FILA, CAS 2001/A/317A, p 19 (citations omitted). See also USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 36 (‘[…] a requirement of intent would invite costly litigation that may well cripple federations – particularly those run on modest budgets in their fight against doping’); Gasser v Stinson, (15  June 1988, unreported), QBD  Scott J. (‘But the consequences if the absolute nature of the offence were removed or if the length of the sentence became discretionary and not mandatory must be considered. Suppose an athlete gives evidence that he or she did not take the drug knowingly and that it must therefore be inferred that the drug was ingested unknowingly. How is the IAAF to deal with such an explanation? How can credibility be tested? Suppose a third party, perhaps a member of the athlete’s team of coaches, perhaps a medical adviser, perhaps a malicious prankster, gives evidence that he or she administered the drug to the athlete and that the athlete had no knowledge that this was being done. How is the credibility of that third party’s evidence to be tested? The pressure for success in international athletics, as well as in domestic athletics, and the national pride and prestige that have become part of international athletics have to be borne in mind. Will the credibility of the athlete or the third party vary depending upon the nation to which he or she belongs? If a competitor or third party from nation A is to be believed, what will be the position when similar evidence is given by a competitor or third party from nation B? The lengths to which some people will go in order to achieve the appearance of success for their nation’s athletes in athletics competitions is in point […]. Cynicism, sadly, abounds. Mr Holt, in his evidence, said that in his view, if a defence of moral innocence were open, the floodgates would be opened and the IAAF’s attempts to prevent drug-taking by athletes would be rendered futile. He had, in my opinion, reason for that fear’), followed in Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude by both Mr Justice Lightman (19 March 1996, unreported), QBD and the Court of Appeal ((1996) Independent, 26 April, unreported); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006, para 7 (‘It is a fundamental principle of the WADA Code that this is a strict liability offence for which no intent on the part of the player needs to be proved. This is an essential principle of the anti-doping regime, necessary to make the controls effective. As the evidence in this case shows, if it were necessary in order to prove the offence that a tribunal should be able to form a clear view as to how a prohibited substance entered the body of a player, where he denies knowing ingestion, then the anti-doping regime would be practically unenforceable, save in most unusual circumstances’); ARU  v Sailor, ARU Judicial Committee decision dated 20 July 2006, para 61 (Code Art 2.1 ‘is a violation which is in the nature of an offence of strict liability […]. And that was for good reason, as the ARU argued. There are many instances in which it is not possible to determine when a player may have ingested a substance. That may be because, as in the case of cocaine, there is no scientific test available from

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  751 which it can be deduced when the substance was taken. Or it may be that available factual evidence does not enable a reasonably certain answer to the question to be reached. It may also be that because of the nature of a particular substance, it may not be possible to tell when it began to take effect or have any performance enhancing effect’). 4 Code Art 2.1.1 reads: ‘It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters his or her body. Athletes are personally responsible for any Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found to be present in their bodily Specimens’. In Hansen v FEI, CAS  2009/A/1768, para 15.1, the athlete argued that the second sentence of Art 2.1.1 had to be read in light of the first sentence, and therefore the FEI had ‘to prove that the substance found in the urine [sample taken from the horse] was a substance that came from the horse’ (rather than being added after it had passed from the horse). The CAS panel rejected that argument, holding that the Art 2.1 and Art 2.1.1 language was clear that ‘Presence indicates offence’. Ibid, para 15.4. ‘The presumption is that what is in the sample – be it from horses (as here) or athletes (as in other sports) must have been in the body, as will, of course, be the position in all but exceptional cases. The presumption may be rebuttable; but the burden of rebuttal lies on the person charged’. Ibid, para 15.5. See also Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312, para  141 (‘Because this is a strict liability violation, we find that the mere presence of BE in the Appellant’s Sample is in and of itself a violation. The manner in which the BE entered the sample is irrelevant (unless caused by a rule departure […])’). 5 Van Snick v Federation Internationale de Judo, CAS  2014/A/3475, para  64 (‘Cocaine falls under the category of non-specified substances and the Prohibited List does not specify any quantitative threshold for that substance. The amount of the substance and/or its lack of impact on sporting performance are therefore irrelevant. Once the presence of the substance in the athlete’s system is established, including where it is only a small amount, that constitutes an anti-doping rule violation’); Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312, para 153 (‘[…] performance enhancement is simply not a factor that may be considered under the CADP Rules or the WADA Code in determining whether an antidoping rule violation has occurred […]’); WADA v FIG & Vysotskaya, CAS 2007/A/1413, para 69 (‘The Respondents contend that Furosemide has no doping effects in the world of athletes and that its only purpose is loss of weight for aesthetic reasons. The Panel is not convinced this allegation necessarily corresponds to reality since being a diuretic Furosemide can be used as a masking agent for other doping products and can be used to lose weight in sports where athletes need to fit into weight categories. However, in this case that issue can be left open since the intended purpose for using the substance is irrelevant’); FINA  v Kreuzmann & German Swimming Federation, CAS  2005/A/921, para  32 (‘Once a substance has been put on the List, it is the fact that such a substance has been detected in the athlete’s body which is deciding. The List and the agreed procedure for its elaboration and enforcement leave no room for a counter-analysis to determine whether a substance was effectively used as a masking agent or not’). See also USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 296 (same), appeal dismissed Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. As to whether lack of performance-enhancing effect is relevant as a mitigating factor when it comes to sanction, see para C20.11.

C6.2 The importance of the strict liability rule was illustrated in a series of antidoping cases brought by the ATP. In ATP  v Ulihrach, the ATP confirmed that no fewer than 30 players on the ATP  Tour had tested positive for nandrolone, with the chromatographic analysis in each case revealing the same ‘unique analytical fingerprint’, thereby suggesting a common source. The ATP also stipulated that electrolyte tablets supplied by one of its trainers to Ulihrach at two different ATP events ‘may have been the source of nandrolone contamination’.1 The hearing panel found that the ATP had represented by its conduct that the tablets were acceptable for use under the ATP anti-doping rules, and that the ATP was therefore estopped from relying on the strict liability rule.2 Instead it was required to show that the anti-doping rule violation was caused by something other than the tablets. Since the ATP was unable to meet that burden, the player was exonerated on the basis that the allegations against him had not been proved. However, that was an unusual (and pre-Code) case that should (as its author specifically warned) be considered confined to its facts.3 Several subsequent hearing panels have found that as a matter of principle, given the clear public interest in the effective enforcement of the anti-doping rules, application of the doctrine of estoppel ‘ought to be restricted to the most extreme and egregious of cases’.4 1 ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 7 July 2003, reopening and reversing an earlier decision of the same tribunal dated 1 May 2003. 2 See discussion of doctrine of estoppel/legitimate expectation as a general principle of law at para B1.36 et seq.

752  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 3 The hearing panel in Ulihrach took pains to make clear that it was not seeking to undermine the basic principle of strict liability, which would continue to apply with full rigour in most cases. See ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 7 July 2003, para 30: ‘This situation is, in the experience of this Tribunal, and we suspect in the experience of the world of sport, a unique set of circumstances. These reasons should not be read as placing any sort of qualification on the strict liability principle because of an assertion by an athlete that the analytical results being challenged may have arisen because of a supplement made available to the athlete by competition sponsors or its sports federation. […] The principles applied in this case are not to be read as a qualification or refinement of the principles of strict liability’. The cases against a number of other players were dismissed on the same basis, with the acquiescence of the ATP in the circumstances. In the subsequent case of ATP v Rusedski, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2004, the player argued that his positive test for nandrolone, which bore the same unique analytical fingerprint as the prior nandrolone positives, must also have been caused by the electrolyte tablets handed out by the ATP trainers. Even though his test was conducted after the ATP had issued a general alert not to use the tablets, the player contended that he had not seen that alert and therefore had taken the tablet just prior to the test. The hearing panel dismissed the charge against him on the basis that the ATP had not done enough to bring the risk to his attention. However, the analysis was very different in ATP  v Perry, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30  November 2005, the first case considering an estoppel argument after the first Code had come into effect. An ATP tournament doctor gave a player a salbutamol inhaler to treat his asthma, rather than the terbutaline inhaler that the player had requested, but did not tell the player, so that the player believed he was taking a medicine for which he had a TUE. It was argued on the player’s behalf, citing Ulihrach, that the ATP was estopped from enforcing its rules against the player and the charge against the player should therefore be dismissed. The ATP for its part accepted that in such circumstances the player should not be found to have committed a doping offence. However, the Perry hearing panel, chaired by Professor Richard McLaren, who had also chaired the Ulihrach hearing panel, declined to apply the Ulihrach reasoning, because the different facts did not meet all of the legal elements of the doctrine of estoppel (in contrast to Ulihrach, the tournament doctor in Perry was an employee or a representative not of the ATP, but rather of the tournament organisers; as such, he did not have actual or apparent ostensible authority to act on behalf of the ATP, and therefore his conduct could not be deemed to vary the anti-doping rule ‘contract’ between the ATP and the player), but more fundamentally because ‘the development of principles such as estoppel in sports cases ought to be restricted to the most extreme and egregious circumstances as they were known at the time’ (para 46). Professor McLaren explained: ‘In this case before me, there are Anti-Doping Rules of the ATP Tour including the principle of strict liability that can and were intended to have effect and application to the facts at hand. The principle of estoppel ought not to be brought into consideration merely to frustrate the application of a comprehensive Code of harmonised doping rules that the WADA Code represents and which are the parent derivative rules. Within that Code are rules and remedies dealing with the situation at hand that are the appropriate rules within which to work out a resolution of this dispute. The very nature and essence of a Code is to make it comprehensive and to preserve its integrity by not referring to extraneous principles that upset the intricate balancing of interests reflected in the achievement of an international agreement to harmonise sport-doping rules in the Code. Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons the application of the doctrine of estoppel is rejected as a matter of principle as well as the facts not being in compliance with the requirements of the doctrine’ (para 49). Since then, arguments based on estoppel have received short shrift. See eg Taylor v World Rugby, CAS 2018/A/5583, paras 100–01 (‘The Panel does not consider that the Respondent’s conduct created prejudice such as would estop the Respondent from pursuing the charge’; even assuming Anti-Doping Organization misrepresented to the athlete that only DHCMT could be the parent of the metabolite found in his sample, ‘the Appellant would need additionally to prove his reliance upon it. In the Panel’s view, the Appellant signally failed to adduce any evidence that his delay in investigating the source of the M3 at a time when the Alpha Laboratories [which made the supplement he believed caused his positive test] were still operating was caused by such misrepresentation as distinct from other factors such as his lack of means or legal advice. In short, the Appellant is unable to show that he could or would have done anything differently if the initial reference by the Respondent to the substance that led to the ADRV had been more accurate’); Mohammed Shafi Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS 2015/A/4190, para 47 (‘The Appellant cannot rely on the alleged failure of the FEI to inform him as a member of the FEI community about any problems with the use of Fustex. Such attempted shifting of responsibility to the governing body is not vouched for in the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADC”) or in its derivatives such as the EAD rules, indeed is antithetical to the fundamental principle that the PR’s responsibility to ensure that his Horse had no prohibited substances in its system on the day of the Event was his own and no-one else’s’); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, paras 206–25 (rejecting estoppel arguments on the facts); ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016, para 96 (‘On the facts of this case it is only necessary to state that the ITF did not bring about the situation in which the player decided to take Meldonium at the 2016 Australian Open. There was no representation or assurance giving rise to any legitimate expectation on the part of the player that she could safely continue taking Meldonium before matches, a fact of which the ITF was unaware. The finding as to the player’s deliberate and sustained non-disclosure of her use of Meldonium on

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  753 doping control forms precludes any reliance on the principle of good conscience’) and para 97 (‘Even if, contrary to the findings made above, the ITF had not adequately publicised changes made to the Prohibited List this would not excuse the serious fault of the player, nor give rise to any estoppel, by representation or otherwise’), but cf on appeal, Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643, para 92(iii) (finding that player’s perception of risk from using medication that she had checked against Prohibited List many times in the past was reduced because ‘no specific warning had been issued by the relevant organizations (WADA, ITF or WTA) as to the change in the status of Meldonium (the ingredient of Mildronate). In that respect, the Panel notes that anti-doping organizations should have to take reasonable steps to provide notice to athletes of significant changes to the Prohibited List, such as the addition of a substance, including its brand names’); ATP  v Rodriguez, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 18 September 2003, para 49 (rejecting estoppel-based argument on the facts, because ‘there is no pattern of behaviour on the part of the ATP nor any representation by it that would suggest the positive lab result might be contributed to or caused by the ATP or its employees or agents in the conduct of their duties’); ITF v Mak, Independent Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2017, para 67 (‘Whatever Mr Mak felt about the ITF’s reasons for allowing or asking him to give a urine sample, he cannot reasonably have concluded or have had a “legitimate expectation” that the whole of the previous process of request/refusal was overridden. Nor did he rely on the ITF’s change of position in the sense of acting to his detriment as the equitable doctrine of waiver/estoppel might require: all he did was give a urine sample in circumstances where he may have thought that he would be in no further difficulty but where nevertheless he was maintaining a resolute refusal to give blood’); FEI v Filho, FEI Tribunal decision dated 25 April 2019, paras 15.15–15.16 (rejecting suggestion FEI was estopped from charging athlete because he had relied on advice of vet linked with FEI, because the athlete had his own experience in treating animals, clearly knew what he was doing, and could not now blame others for his oversight in not wearing gloves and so becoming contaminated with the drug he was injecting into a horse: ‘The Athlete’s estoppel argument fails because he cannot claim he is experienced when it suits him and not, when it does not suit him. His estoppel argument is not convincing given his particular circumstance’). 4 ATP v Perry, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 November 2005, para 46 (‘The development of principles such as estoppel in sports cases ought to be restricted to the most extreme and egregious circumstances as they were known at the time’); ITF  v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016, para 95 (‘It is not necessary to decide whether that very wide principle is consistent with English law, which by article  1.8 applies to these rules, or whether such a principle could be applied to WADA Code provisions, save in the most exceptional circumstances. On the latter point this tribunal would agree with the comments in ATP v Perry (ATP Tour Tribunal 2015) at paragraph 49’), not challenged on appeal, Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643; UK Anti-Doping v X., confidential NADP Tribunal decision dated 3 August 2017, para 98 (same).

C6.3 Where the strict liability rule applies, the Anti-Doping Organization establishes its prima facie case under Art 2.1 by establishing to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel: (a) the identity and integrity of the sample (ie  that the sample in question was collected from the athlete in accordance with the procedures set out in the International Standard for Testing & Investigations, stored appropriately between collection and transport, and then transported safely and securely to the laboratory, such that the identity and integrity of the sample are assured);1 (b) that the adverse analytical finding that the laboratory reported in respect of the sample is reliable, both ‘procedurally’ (ie the laboratory analysed the sample in accordance with the procedures set out in the International Standard for Laboratories)2 and ‘substantively’ (ie the test used is reliable);3 and (c) that the substance found in the sample is indeed a prohibited substance (or a metabolite or marker of a prohibited substance).4 Each of these elements is considered in turn below.5 1 See paras C6.4 et seq. 2 See paras C6.20-C6.27. 3 Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 62 (‘[…] an anti-doping rule violation is nevertheless not established if either (i) the chain of custody is incomplete, ie that the results cannot be attributed to the Athlete; or (ii) the sample analysis was performed “incorrectly”‘). See paras C6.28-C6.34. 4 See para C6.35 et seq. 5 Although not strictly an element of its prima facie case, the Anti-Doping Organization should also be ready to show that the athlete did not have a TUE, or else (if he did have a TUE) that the adverse analytical finding is not consistent with his TUE. Otherwise, the athlete will have a complete defence to the charge. See para C4.40.

754  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

1 ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAMPLE C6.4 The first requirement in any Art 2.1 case is to establish that the sample in question came from the athlete and was not tampered with after collection, so that the hearing panel can feel comfortably satisfied that he should be held responsible for what the laboratory subsequently found in the sample. This is done by the AntiDoping Organization proving that the sample was properly collected from the athlete and that there is a clear chain of custody showing that it was transported safely and securely from the place of collection to the laboratory.1 1 Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418, para 37 (‘The next major issue related to the chain of custody. It is axiomatic that the links in such chain must be robust; there must be no chance that the samples which arrive at the doping control centre were not those taken at the doping control room or that they can have been tampered with en route’); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 62 (‘[…] an anti-doping rule violation is nevertheless not established if […] the chain of custody is incomplete, ie that the results cannot be attributed to the Athlete […]’). See para C6.6, n 12.

C6.5 Code Art 5.2 requires Anti-Doping Organizations to collect athletes’ samples in accordance with the procedures set out in WADA’s International Standard for Testing and Investigations (ISTI). Those procedures are carefully designed to ensure the identity and integrity of the sample collected, and therefore compliance with those procedures is deemed to confirm such identity and integrity.1 Lawyers defending athletes will ask the hearing panel to police such compliance strictly, on the basis – well-recognised in the CAS jurisprudence – that an Anti-Doping Organization that is seeking to apply strict liability to the athlete should itself be held strictly liable for compliance with the prescribed procedures.2 1 The Code provides (at p 136, App One, definition of ‘International Standard’) that ‘compliance with an International Standard […] shall be sufficient to conclude that the procedures addressed in the Standard were performed properly’. 2 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS  2014/A/3487, para  147 (‘[…] there is considerable force to the proposition that, in order to justify imposing a regime of strict liability against athletes for breaches of anti-doping regulations, testing bodies should be held to an equivalent standard of strict compliance with mandatory international standards of testing’)’; Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS  2009/A/1752 and CAS  2009/A/1753, para  6.11 (‘Doping is an offence which requires the application of strict rules. If an athlete is to be sanctioned solely on the basis of the provable presence of a substance in his body, it is his or her fundamental right to know that the Respondent, as the Testing Authority, including the WADA-accredited laboratory working with it, has strictly observed the mandatory safeguards. Strict application of the rules is the quid pro quo for the imposition of a regime of strict liability for doping offences’); USA Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 50 (‘The Panel nevertheless point out that if the UIT adopts a strict liability test, it becomes even more important that the rules for the testing procedure are crystal clear, that they are designed for reliability, and that it may be shown that they have been followed’); dissenting opinion in USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 61 (‘As athletes have strict liability rules, the laboratories should be held strictly liable for their failure to abide by the rules and sound scientific practice’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS  2007/A/139. See also discussion at para C4.15 and cases cited at para C6.21, n 1.

C6.6 Whereas the drug-testing laboratories are WADA-accredited, giving rise to a presumption that they will carry out their analytical procedures in accordance with the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories,1 sample collection agencies are not accredited by WADA, and therefore there is no presumption that the agency collecting the sample complied with the sample collection procedures set out in the ISTI. Instead, the Anti-Doping Organization will need to submit affirmative evidence that those procedures were followed, such that the panel can therefore be sure of the identity and integrity of the athlete’s sample.2 In particular, in a case involving a urine sample,3 the evidence should establish the following: (a) The athlete was offered a selection of collection vessels and lids, chose one vessel and lid from that selection, and was asked to check to confirm that the packaging that the selected vessel and lid came in was sealed and had not

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  755

been tampered with; the athlete was observed while he passed urine into the collection vessel;4 if insufficient urine was passed initially, then the partial sample was retained securely until the athlete was able to produce further urine to top it up;5 the athlete was then given a selection of transportation kits to choose from, and checked to confirm that the packaging of the kit he selected was sealed and tamper-free prior to use; the athlete poured the urine from the collection vessel into the two bottles in the transportation kit (creating an ‘A’ sample and a ‘B’ sample) and sealed the bottles properly, so that they were leak-proof and locked (and the Doping Control Officer [‘DCO’] tested them to check that was the case);6 the athlete checked that the DCO recorded the code number from the bottles accurately on the doping control form;7 and the DCO then used urine residue from the collection vessel to test the specific gravity of the sample to ensure it was within acceptable limits.8 (b) The A  and B  bottles in which the sample was stored and transported to the laboratory are tamper-evident, ie it would not be possible to open the bottles and tamper with the sample without leaving visible signs of doing so.9 (c) From the point of collection of the sample at the doping control station until the point of its transfer from the doping control station, the sample was stored in a secure fashion.10 For example, if the sample was left at the collection site overnight, there should be evidence that the room and/or the fridge in which it was left was locked, and that during periods when it was unlocked only authorised personnel had access.11 (d) The sample was transported safely and securely from the doping control station to the laboratory.12 (e) The sample was inspected upon receipt by the laboratory, and was found to be in good condition, with the sample bottles properly sealed and with no signs of tampering.13   1 See para C6.20.  2 Del Pino v UIM, CAS 2015/A/3892 (where athlete put UIM to proof of the identity and integrity of the sample, UIM met its burden by providing documentation establishing identity and integrity); WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 12 (analysing the sufficiency of sample collection, storage and transportation procedures in order to satisfy the panel of the identity and integrity of the sample); Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 43 (setting out evidence of sample storage and transportation at each stage of journey to laboratory); Garcia v FECNA, CAS 2013/A/3170, paras 68–70 (where there was no DCO evidence and no documentation evidencing how and by whom a sample was taken or how it was transported to the laboratory, and no documentation proving the sample was taken from the athlete, ‘the sample collection process was not proven by the Respondent and the sample was unaccounted for during this three day time period […], making it uncertain whether the sample and its results can be unequivocally linked to the Athlete. On these grounds alone this appeal could be allowed and the decision below set aside’).   3 The requirements for collection and transportation of blood samples are broadly similar, but with important variations relating to (inter alia) the need for qualified technicians to draw blood, the different equipment required to collect and store the blood, and the need to transport the blood to the laboratory at a certain temperature. See generally 2019 ISTI Annex E (Collection of Blood Samples) and Annex K (Collection, Storage and Transport of Blood ABP Samples).   4 There is no requirement to collect the sample under sterile conditions or to store it in cool conditions (ie in order to avoid contamination with bacteria and microbes that could change the profile of the substances present in the urine). The laboratory is able to determine if a sample has degraded due to microbes/bacterial activity; and in any event, such degradation would lead only to false negatives, not to false positives. Balciunate v LAF & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2414, paras 9.3.2-9.3.3; Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 119 (claim that EPO finding could have been caused by degradation of sample rejected where ‘no signs of sample degradation were observed in the analyses performed: […] several factors (pH value, steroid profile, stability test, molecular weight) allow the conclusion that Chepalova’s sample was not degraded’). If the substance found in the sample does not occur naturally, there cannot be any argument that the adverse analytical finding was due to bacterial degradation during storage of the sample at room temperature: ATP v Braga, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated May 2004, paras 28, 30 (‘Stanozolol being a purely exogenous steroid cannot be formed by microbial degradation, unlike some endogenous steroids’); Del Pino v UIM, CAS 2015/A/3892, para 46 (if urine sample is not refrigerated, cocaine and its metabolites in that urine may degrade and so decrease in concentration, but they cannot be formed from other, non-prohibited substances); ITF v Hingis, AntiDoping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 51 (‘[…] the substance subsequently detected

756  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement – benzoylecgonine – cannot be produced inside the bottle under any storage conditions. It is produced inside the body when a person ingests cocaine. Nothing in this case turns on the conditions under which the player’s sample was stored’); Raula v RADA, CAS 2014/A/3668, para 52 (‘[…] there is no way that EPO can appear in a urine sample, unless the urine sample was spiked with EPO. This means that the conditions during which the sample has been stored including the temperature during transportation and handling of the sample could not affect the presence of the Prohibited Substance in this case’). See also paras C6.7 and C6.17.   5 2019 ISTI Annex F (Urine Samples – Insufficient Volume), discussed in IAAF v CBat & Da Silva, CAS 2012/A/2779, paras 197-202; UK Anti-Doping v Wilson, National Anti-Doping Panel decision dated 28 September 2011, paras 37–44.  6 2019 ISTI Art D4.15.  7 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 39–48.   8 2019 ISTI Art D4.16, discussed in Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, pp 17–18. See ATP v Braga, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated May 2004, para 30 (‘The purpose of such action is only to determine if it might be desirable to obtain an additional sample at the time of collection’); B. v FINA, CAS 98/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), pp 255, 259 (purpose of testing specific gravity is ‘to determine if urine is sufficiently concentrated to enable the sample to be satisfactorily analysed’). The test for specific gravity is done after the urine has been sealed in the A and B bottles in order to avoid allegations that use of the same pipette to collect urine from all samples to test for specific gravity may have caused cross-contamination from one sample to another. See eg V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/493, FINA Doping Panel Judgements 2001–2005 (FINA 2006), p 17.   9 The CAS has accepted, for example, that ‘Berlinger’ bottles, once sealed, cannot be opened and resealed without such tampering being evident. Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, paras 7.4 to 7.8.15; WADA  v Wium, CAS  2005/A/908, paras 6.6 and 6.7. See also ITF  v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 104 (‘[…] the A and B [Berlinger] sample bottles used to collect the player’s sample were capable of being properly sealed and were tamper evident provided they were properly sealed in the present case’). In Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 255, another CAS panel made the same finding (if a little less convincingly) in respect of ‘Versapak’ kits. If the hearing panel is satisfied that the athlete’s urine was put into tamper-evident bottles and that those bottles were properly sealed (see eg ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 51), and that upon receipt at the laboratory the bottles showed no sign of tampering (Ibid, para 54; see also para C6.17, n 2), there can be little room for argument as to the identity and integrity of the sample. WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, discussed at para C6.18. 10 Because sample collection missions can take place in such a wide variety of situations (from a fully equipped modern stadium to a tent in the desert), the International Standard for Testing & Investigations is not prescriptive on this point, but rather simply requires the Anti-Doping Organization to define criteria for storage of the sample that ensure the identity, integrity and security of the sample. See 2019 ISTI Art 8.3.1. 11 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 30–34, 48–50. 12 See 2019 ISTI Art 9.3, as well as WADA TD2009LCOC, which requires a record of chain of custody that ‘ensures that the Samples and the results generated by the Laboratory can be unequivocally linked to the Athlete’. The need for careful and detailed provisions should be clear. As Lord Justice Neill observed in Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude (No 2) (26 March 1996, unreported), CA: ‘It will be obvious that any system which requires an athlete to be subject to tests of body fluids which are then sent away for analysis requires a very careful arrangement to make certain, first, that the fluids are properly preserved and, secondly, that there exists no possibility of confusion of one sample with another. It is for that reason that a chain of custody procedure should be laid down and observed’. The CAS panel in Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 65, found that this requirement was met by (inter alia) evidence that the samples were poured into Berlinger bottles, were taken to the airport by the DCOs, were transported to the laboratory by TNT  Express, and were checked on receipt by the laboratory and found to be intact. See also X v IWF, SFT judgment of 28 February 2018, 4A_576/2012, para 3.2.2 (rejecting argument that there was no sufficient external chain of custody of the samples, and deciding the results of analysis of the samples ‘can be unequivocally linked to the Appellant’, where the DCOs explained how the samples were sealed in tamper-evident Berlinger bottles, placed into a locked suitcase, taken on a plane, then stored in an office, before being couriered to the laboratory, where the seals and samples were checked upon receipt and found to be intact); Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/211, paras 31–33; USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, paras 38–43; Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 113 (applying same requirements in Art 2.2 use case, where charge was based on analytical values derived from screening of blood samples taken from the athlete). Cf FINA v J, FINA Doping Panel decision 06/01, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), p 83 (doping charge based on alleged presence of 19-norandrosterone in athlete’s sample dismissed where, among other things, there was no evidence regarding the chain of custody of the sample, ie how it was transported from the collection site to the laboratory).

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  757 The chain of custody only has to start from the time the sample is first moved from the collection site; contemporaneous documentation of each time the sample was handled while at the collection site is not required. ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 133–135. 13 2019 ISL Arts 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.5 specify that the laboratory must check the integrity of the sample upon receipt, and proceeds to analysis only if satisfied with the external chain of custody and that there is no evidence of tampering. See eg UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal decision dated 7 June 2011, para 3.4.30 (‘While the Athlete appeared to raise the possibility that his sample could have been interfered with during transport, this seems to amount to no more than conjecture, not based on any factual evidence. The Athlete confirmed in his testimony that he had seen the samples himself in tamper-evident bottles, and the documentation pack for Sample A filled out on receipt of the sample by the Laboratory confirmed that the sample was received intact and without irregularities’). See also para C4.34, n 1, for further cases where the hearing panel relied on such evidence in its findings.

C6.7 To prove these facts, the Anti-Doping Organization will need to be ready to produce the DCO who carried out the mission (and potentially any other person involved, such as a Doping Control Assistant, or a chaperone) as a witness before the hearing panel. Clear testimony on the DCO’s part can be enough on its own to satisfy the hearing panel as to the procedures followed.1 Even where the DCO is not able to remember the specific mission involving the athlete (which would not be surprising where it was just one of many missions he has conducted), the hearing panel is entitled to accept his evidence that he ‘would have’ followed the standard procedures as sufficient, at least where that is backed up by the mission paperwork, ie the standard forms that are filled out during or after the mission, which are designed to provide contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous evidence of compliance with the relevant procedures.2 The Anti-Doping Organization should therefore also be ready to produce in evidence: (a)

The sample collection form (aka doping control form), which records (among other things) where and when the sample was collected, whether partial samples were collected and then ‘topped up’ with further urine passed subsequently to make up the final sample, and the code number of the transportation bottles into which the sample was poured for transportation. It also contains boxes for the athlete to record any medications or supplements that he has taken in the past seven days, and to record any comments or concerns he has about the sample collection process just undertaken.3 Crucially, at the end of the process the sample collection form is signed both by the DCO who collected the sample, to ‘certify that sample collection was conducted in accordance with the relevant procedures’, and by the athlete himself, to ‘declare that, subject to comments made in section 4, sample collection was conducted in accordance with the relevant procedures for sample collection’. The sample collection form is therefore of great evidential importance, both in establishing the Anti-Doping Organization’s prima facie case and in respect of any subsequent attempt by the athlete to cast doubt on the sample collection process.4 (b) The post-mission report (aka the DCO report form), which provides an overview of the entire mission, including confirming the conditions in which collected samples were stored at the doping control station prior to transport to the laboratory. (c) The ‘chain of custody’ form, reflecting when the sample left the doping control station, and recording each subsequent transfer of the sample from one person or place to another thereafter. In particular, there should be contemporaneous documentation of the transfer of the sample from the DCO to a courier for shipment to the laboratory. (d) Thereafter, evidence that the sample was couriered to the laboratory, with detail of the courier’s tracking log identifying the location of the sample for the entire time it was in courier’s custody, is sufficient to satisfy the Anti-Doping Organization’s burden as to that part of the chain of custody.5 (e) Also, the laboratory documentation package should contain a form documenting the fact that the sample was checked upon receipt at the laboratory and found to be intact and with no evidence of attempted tampering.6

758  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 1 UK  Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP  Tribunal decision dated 7  June 2011, para  3.4.29 (‘Mr Dean [the DCO] gave evidence of the sample collection procedure and denied any departure from the International Standard for Testing. Although his recollection as to the exact sequence of notification was unclear, we did not find that this in any way undermined the credibility of his evidence. Mr Dean was an experienced DCO, and could clearly demonstrate his methodical and well-practised routine. Mr Dean’s evidence left us in no doubt that, in the absence of any cogent evidence to question the integrity of the process, that [sic] the sample was collected properly’); WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 80 (‘The Panel does not see any reason to doubt their [the DCOs’] testimonies [as to how they notified the athlete and advised him of his rights and responsibilities] as they are both experienced USADA agents […]. With such backgrounds, they no doubt have a routine in place where they identify themselves and tell the notified athlete of his rights and duties’); WADA  v Fedoriva, CAS  2016/A/4700, paras 55–57 (preferring evidence of DCOs to conflicting evidence of coach, because their evidence was credible, they had ‘no personal interest to fabricate or consort any facts, or to bring false accusations against the Respondent’, and the coach ‘did not present any evidence to substantiate such a claim of impartiality, bias or corruptness on the part of the doping control officers’) and para 58 (‘In cases such as this one, where no other evidence than sworn witness statements from the doping control officer in charge can reasonably be presented as evidence, the Sole Arbitrator finds that, indeed, very substantial counter-evidence must be presented to rebut the doping control officer’s version of the facts’); IAAF v HAA & Kovago, CAS 2012/A/2843, para 76 (‘While the fact that Mr Holdhaus is an experienced DCO does not mean that his evidence is entitled to any special treatment, his lengthy and unimpeached service and the absence of any motive whatsoever for concocting his evidence weigh in favour of accepting it’). Cf UK Anti-Doping v Barlow, NADP Tribunal decision dated 27 June 2016, para 58 (‘If there are situations where an official’s evidence might appropriately be cloaked with a “presumption of credibility”, this was not one of them. While the fact he was a DCO explained why MD attended the property, there is no feature of that occupation or his experience which in our judgment warranted his evidence being afforded some (unspecified but) elevated status. We judged his evidence by exactly the same (fair) standards we applied to (for example) the Respondent’s evidence’), aff’d, Barlow v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 September 2016. See also WADA v Fedoriva, CAS 2016/A/4700, para 58 (‘In this context, the Sole Arbitrator concurs fully with the reasoning expressed in the case of Dobud v. FINA (CAS 2015/A/4163 at paragraphs 91-93) in which the statement of facts by a doping control officer was also relied upon as credible and trustworthy evidence. In cases such as this one, where no other evidence other than sworn witness statements from the doping control officer in charge can reasonably be presented as evidence, the Sole Arbitrator finds that, indeed, very substantial counter-evidence must be presented to rebut the doping control officer’s version of the facts. Thus, the Sole Arbitrator is comfortably satisfied that WADA carried its burden of proof pursuant to Article 3.1 RUSADA ADR that an anti-doping rule violation has been committed by the Respondent in her attempt to tamper with the doping control process of Mr Khasanov’). 2 Lazutina v IOC, CAS  2000/A/310, paras 30-31 (contemporaneous documentation, backed up by testimony of event doping control manager, who had not been personally involved in the collection of the sample in issue but was familiar with the steps to be followed and the documentation, was sufficient to establish that there were no irregularities in the collection or transportation of the sample); ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 37–38 (‘37. The lack of detailed recall on the part of all three witnesses is not surprising, since the [two DCOs involved in the mission] between them collected some 146 urine samples during the 2007 Wimbledon Championships, while the player has undergone many doping tests during her career, and all have proved uneventful apart from this one. In those circumstances, Mr Morton-Hooper, for the player, submitted that we did not have reliable evidence of what happened during the sample collection process. [The DCOs] could only say what they believe “would” have happened, based on their standard practice. 38. We do not accept that argument for the following reasons. First, it was accepted that [the DCOs] were honest witnesses doing their best to perform their functions at Wimbledon competently and professionally. Secondly, on the evidence we have, we do not have any reason to find that [the DCOs’] standard practice was departed from. Thirdly, the following of standard practice is in no way contradicted by, and indeed is corroborated by, the doping control form which is intended to provide a contemporaneous record of the process precisely because accurate and detailed recollection is unlikely. Fourthly, the record of what happened to the sample after it left the doping control station is in no way inconsistent with the [DCOs’] account’), cited with approval in La Barbera v IWAS, CAS  2010/A/2277, para  4.9, and followed in Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2012, para 36.4. See also IRB v Hitch, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 10 August 2012, para 56 (‘we are satisfied the Doping Control Officer (Mr Barranco) did not indicate to the Player only daily medication or supplements should be included (as was suggested). This assertion is contrary to the established protocol which is printed on the form requiring a declaration of medication and/ or supplements taken during the last seven days. Given Mr Barranco’s experience and evidence we do not accept he departed from the usual process when he questioned the Player’); UK Anti-Doping v Wilson, NADP  Tribunal decision dated 28  September 2011, para  30 (‘Witnesses were called to establish how the process of testing was conducted in this particular case. It is fair to observe that they acknowledged that they had little or no direct recollection of the sequence of events. But we do not

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  759

3

4 5

6

accept that that weakens the case that UK Anti-Doping present: on the contrary, our view is that some of the alleged departures from established procedure would have been so substantial that the witnesses spoke compellingly when they denied that it could have happened. Their answer, shortly summarised, was that, if that had happened, such a departure would have been an entirely exceptional event which they would have remembered’) (emphasis in original), aff’d, Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2012. See also para C6.10, n 3. While declaring a medication on the form does not excuse its use if it turns out to contain a prohibited substance (Lehtinen v FINA, CAS 95/A/142, para 42: ‘it should be noted that a declaration in the test form […] is not in itself sufficient to turn a banned substance into a permitted one. If a certain banned substance has been identified, a prior declaration in the test form still does not justify the use of such substance’), it may assist the athlete (if he is trying to mitigate sanction under Art 10.4 or 10.5 of the Code, and therefore has to establish how the prohibited substance came to be in his sample: see para C16.4 et seq) to establish that he was taking a medication or supplement prior to sample collection that contained the prohibited substance and therefore caused his adverse analytical finding. Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.26 (‘In the Panel’s view, the fact that Pinter did not list Thiogamma or even inform team officials about it reinforces the likelihood that he was not actually taking this medication at the time’); FIFA v STJD & CBF & Mr Ricardo Lucas Dodô, CAS 2007/A/1370, para 67 (‘[…] on the occasion of the doping control that yielded Dodo’s adverse analytical finding, neither the team doctor nor Dodo declared the use of caffeine on the same forms. Therefore, the proof that the Player did ingest a caffeine capsule on the day of his positive testing is left to the Player’s own words […]’); Canas v ATP, CAS 2005/A/951, para 8.4 (failure to note a medication on the doping control form undermined – albeit not fatally – the player’s claim that such medication was the source of the diuretic in his sample). See also WADA v Lund & USADA, CAS OG 06/001, para 4.15 (declaration of finasteride on doping control form did not avoid finding of anti-doping rule violation, but did establish athlete’s good faith); The Football Association v Armstrong and Kendall, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 3  October 2017, para  47 (rejecting the player’s claim that he did not know the ‘fat burner’ he was taking contained a steroid and so his violation was not intentional, because the name of the steroid was on the packaging, he was an experienced user of such substances, it takes only a few minutes to find out what it is, and he did not declare it on the doping control form. ‘That is not insignificant. A reason why one who was knowingly taking steroids might not declare it, is (1) not wanting to alert the authorities to the fact you are taking a banned substance (2) in the hope you do not test “positive”. The explanation he gave (could not recall the name and thought “fat burner” looked amateurish) was, frankly feeble’). Similarly, an athlete’s failure to note any concerns about the sample collection procedure in the space provided on the doping control form will make it very difficult for him to rely on such concerns later in an effort to prove those procedures were not carried out properly. (See para C6.10, n 3). See para C6.10, n 3. Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.8.14; USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para  39. See also Ohllson v WSU, NADP Appeal Tribunal award dated 6  January 2009, pp 21–23 (use of DHL satisfies ISTI requirement to use transportation system that ensures samples and documents will be transported to laboratory safely and securely). See para C6.6, n 13. The copy of the doping control form that accompanies the samples to the laboratory does not identify the athlete, so that the objectivity of the laboratory’s analysis is safeguarded, and the laboratory is protected against allegations that it acted out of malice towards the athlete. USADA v Landis, AAA Case No: 30 190 00847 06, decision dated 20 September 2007, para 256 (‘The difficulty with the theory of conspiracy is that the Lab was conducting the analysis of the Stage 17 sample without knowing on whose sample they were working’), aff’d Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394.

C6.8 Such evidence will be sufficient to establish prima facie the identity and integrity of the sample, and the burden will then switch to the athlete to try to establish that there was a departure from the relevant procedures that calls the identity or integrity of the sample into question. 2015 Code Art 3.2.3 states: ‘Departures from any other International Standard [ie other than the International Standard for Laboratories1] or other anti-doping rule or policy set forth in the Code or Anti-Doping Organization rules which did not cause an Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation shall not invalidate such evidence or results. If the Athlete or other Person establishes a departure from another International Standard or other anti-doping rule or policy which could reasonably have caused an antidoping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation.’

760  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

As a first step, then, the athlete must prove, on the balance of probabilities,2 that there was a departure from a mandatory requirement3 of an International Standard (other than the ISL) ‘or other anti-doping rule or policy set forth in the Code or Anti-Doping Organization rules’.4 If he satisfies that requirement, as a second step he must prove5 that that departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the facts on which the alleged violation is based (eg the adverse analytical finding made in respect of the athlete’s sample).6 If he satisfies that requirement as well, the burden shifts back to the AntiDoping Organization that charged him to prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel ‘that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation’.7 1 Departures from the ISL are addressed by Code Art 3.2.2, which is discussed at paras C6.21 and C6.22. 2 See Code Art 3.1 (‘Where the Code places the burden of proof upon the Athlete or other Person alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to rebut a presumption or establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance of probability’). 3 Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 82 (‘[…] in order to invalidate the AAF, the alleged departure must be from a mandatory requirement. Accordingly the rule must use obligatory language (such as “shall” or “must”) as opposed to optional language (such as “may” or “should”)’) (citations omitted), and para 102(b)(iv) (‘Regardless, notification in the presence of an adult is not a mandatory requirement. ISTI  Article C4.4 provides that “Athletes who are Minors should be notified in the presence of an adult […].” (emphasis added). Thus, notification in the presence of an adult is not a mandatory requirement and therefore failure to notify in the presence of an adult is incapable of invalidating the AAF’), and para  102(e)(v) (‘Contrary to what the Player seems to suggest, these Articles make clear that it is entirely up to the Sample Collection Authority, DCO or Chaperone, as applicable, to decide whether another third party ought to be present where the Minor refuses the presence of an adult representative. Therefore, even if it cannot be said that Mr Rooney acted as a third party in observing Mr Panos observe the collection of the Sample from the Athlete, this was not a breach of a mandatory requirement of the ISTI as it was not even necessary for such a third party to be present’). See also ibid, para 87 (‘The Player does not point to any International standard or other anti-doping rule or policy set out in the Code or the TADP that requires certificates to be provided as to the sterility of water provided in the DCS. Quite to the contrary, ISTI Article 5.4.1(g) states clearly: “should the Athlete choose to consume food or fluids prior to providing a Sample, he/ she does so at his/her own risk”‘), and para 102(a)(vii) (‘The Panel is satisfied that, through the IPIN registration process, the parental consent to testing as part of the ITF Tennis Anti-Doping Programme at ITF Events was secured. There is no separate requirement that parental consent be obtained on each specific instance of doping control’). See also Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 162 (‘[…] consideration of the evidence presented by the Parties concerning the circumstances of the doping control would have to show that violations of mandatory requirements, if any, could have reasonably caused the ADRV’) and para 179 (‘The Panel also notes that Article 5.4.1(e)(iii) of the ISTI stipulates “the Athlete should be advised of the possible Consequences of Failure to Comply”. The Panel does not read “should” as a must”. The word “should” implies some form of recommendation or guideline and therefore does not impose an obligation on [the DCO]’); Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, para  138 (alleged absence of chaperone not material, because ‘the presence of a Chaperone is a possibility, but is not mandatory according to the IST’, citing ISTI Art H.5.5); WADA v Chernova & RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112, paras 102–103 (although IST says the athlete ‘shall pour’ at least 60 ml of urine into the A sample bottle, the IST itself states that a failure to meet these requirements ‘in no way invalidates the suitability of the Sample for analysis’, and therefore it follows that there is no minimum volume required for analysis). See further the cases cited at para C6.10. 4 It is not enough to prove a departure from a requirement of local law (IAAF  v CBat v Da Silva, CAS 2012/A/2779, para 196; WADA v FCL & Villareal, CAS 2011/A/2336, para 89; WADA v FCF and Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 133 (‘The Athletes suggested that the doping control officer lacked the proper authorization under Colombian law […]. However, […] Colombian law is irrelevant’)) or from best practice. ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 135 (‘The Tribunal agrees that the player must establish a departure from the ISTI, not merely a departure from best practice’). Nor is it enough to prove a departure from guidelines that have not been incorporated into the applicable anti-doping rules: Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4458, para 90; WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, para 227 (‘[…] WADA’s Guidelines are not binding. Such Guidelines are merely intended to promote best practices, whereas binding provisions are only set out in the ISTI’), para 258 (‘The Panel notes that the matter is to be assessed by reference to the requirements set out in the ISTI, since WADA’s Guidelines are not mandatory’); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 199 (‘the Panel agrees with the IIHF that the RMHD Guidelines and the DCO Manual contain guidelines, not requirements. These guidelines contain guidance as to how best to comply with the mandatory requirements in the ISTI or the anti-doping rules, but they do not themselves constitute mandatory

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  761 requirements’) and para 200 (‘[…] the requirements set out in the WADC (Article 3.2.3), the ISTI and the applicable anti-doping rules are mandatory while the RMHD Guidelines and DCO Took Kit manual are instead suggestions for best practice, a distinct matter’). Instead the athlete must show that there has been a departure from a mandatory requirement that is set out in an International Standard or in the charging Anti-Doping Organization’s anti-doping rules. Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4458, para 92 (‘The Appellant also testified that she was not requested by the DCO to wash her hands after the passing of the sample. This has been contested by the DCO. Again, the Appellant failed to point at a provision in the WADA International Standards which might have been breached by this conduct’); Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 17.3 (rejecting argument that test result should be rejected because DCO did not permit Person Responsible to witness her putting on gloves, because ‘[w]e can find nothing in the Manual (or Article 10.18 para 1 of the Veterinary Regulations) to suggest that the PR has to witness the putting on of the gloves’); Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 65 (ISTI does not require DCO to leave place of collection of sample blank in order to avoid a laboratory staff member working out that the sample must have come from the athlete in question) and para 69 (ISTI does not require DCO to keep sample under personal supervision at all times after collection, and therefore leaving it in locked car while stopping for a meal is not a departure). 5 Under the 2015 Code, on the balance of probabilities: see Code Art 3.1. However, the comment to Art 3.2.2 in the 2021 Code (comment 21) states: ‘once the Athlete or other Person establishes the departure by a balance of probability, the Athlete or other Person’s burden on causation is the somewhat lower standard of proof—”could reasonably have caused”‘. 6 See para C6.10 et seq. 7 Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 109. See para C6.28.

C6.9 Art 3.2.3 has been revised in the 2021 Code to identify more specifically the requirements that, if departed from, might reasonably cause an anti-doping rule violation. It reads: ‘Departures from any other International Standard or other anti-doping rule or policy set forth in the Code or in an Anti-Doping Organization’s rules shall not invalidate analytical results or other evidence of an anti-doping rule violation, and shall not constitute a defense to an anti-doping rule violation; provided, however, if the Athlete or other Person establishes that a departure from one of the specific International Standard provisions listed below could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding or whereabouts failure, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or whereabouts failure: (i) a departure from the International Standard for Testing and Investigations related to Sample collection or Sample handling which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding, in which case the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding; (ii) a departure from the International Standard for Results Management or International Standard for Testing and Investigations related to Adverse Passport Findings which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation, in which case the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the anti-doping rule violation; (iii) a departure from the International Standard for Results Management related to the requirement to provide notice to the Athlete of the B Sample opening which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding, in which case the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding; (iv) a departure from the International Standard for Results Management related to Athlete notification which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation based on a whereabouts failure, in which case the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the whereabouts failure.’

Therefore, from 1 January 2021 on, departures from requirements in International Standards and from rules and policies set out in the Code or an Anti-Doping

762  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement

Organization’s anti-doping rules are irrelevant1 unless the athlete or other person proves2 that: (a)

the departure is from one of the particular ISTI or ISRM requirements specified in Code Art 3.2.3.3; and (b) that departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse analytical finding or ADRV or whereabouts failure that forms the basis of the charge against the athlete or other person.3 Only if he satisfies those two requirements does the burden switch to the Anti-Doping Organization that charged him to prove that the departure did not cause the antidoping rule violation charged.4 1 See 2021 Code comment 22: ‘Departures from an International Standard or other rule unrelated to Sample collection or handling, Adverse Passport Finding, or Athlete notification relating to whereabouts failure or B Sample opening – eg, the International Standards for Education, Data Privacy or TUEs – may result in compliance proceedings by WADA but are not a defense in an anti-doping rule violation proceeding and are not relevant on the issue of whether the Athlete committed an anti-doping rule violation’. 2 On the standard of proof, 2021 Code comment 21 states: ‘The burden is on the Athlete or other Person to establish, by a balance of probability, a departure from the International Standard for Laboratories that could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding. Thus, once the Athlete or other Person establishes the departure by a balance of probability, the Athlete or other Person’s burden on causation is the somewhat lower standard of proof—”could reasonably have caused”‘. As to how that lower standard is to be interpreted and applied, see paras C6.12 and C6.13. 3 Presumably it remains the case that a departure from a provision in the ISTI or ISRM that falls within one of these categories but is not a mandatory requirement is irrelevant, as per the cases discussed at para C6.8, n 3. 4 2021 Code comment 23, relating to departures from the ISRM requirement to provide notice to the athlete of the B sample opening, ie Art 3.2.3(iii), states: ‘An Anti-Doping Organization would meet its burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding by showing that, for example, the B Sample opening and analysis were observed by an independent witness and no irregularities were observed’. This is an attempt to reverse a series of CAS cases that held that a departure from the requirement to let the athlete and/or his expert observe the B sample opening and analysis was such a fundamental infringement of the athlete’s rights that it always leads to invalidation of the adverse analytical finding reported in respect of the A sample, irrespective of the fact that it could not have caused that adverse analytical finding: see para C6.23, n 2.

A Proving a departure from a relevant requirement C6.10 Most of the departure cases involve alleged departures from the mandatory ISTI sample collection and transport procedures. In such cases, the doping control form for the mission in question is likely to be extremely important evidence. It contains a box that invites the athlete to document any concern he/she may have about how the sample collection session was conducted. If the DCO or athlete notes facts on the doping control form that establish there was a departure from the mandatory sample collection procedures, the issue will turn to whether or not that departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding.1 If no such discrepancy was noted at the time, however, ie if each of the athlete and the DCO signed the doping control form at the end of the sample collection session without adverse comment, thereby expressly confirming that sample collection was conducted in accordance with the relevant procedures,2 it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the athlete to persuade the hearing panel that in fact there were material departures from the proper procedures,3 unless the alleged departure was from the requirements for storage and transport of the sample after its collection from the athlete4 (and even then most allegations that departures occurred that undermine the identity or integrity of the sample are resolved by evidence that the sample arrived at the laboratory intact and without any evidence of tampering5). Speculation is not enough to sustain a departure claim: the athlete will have to provide specific evidence that there was a departure from a particular mandatory requirement of the

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  763

ISTI.6 If the DCO maintains that there was no departure during the process of sample collection, the athlete will have to persuade the hearing panel to reject the DCO’s evidence, which may be hard to do absent specific and cogent reason.7 The athlete will also need to be ready to show that it was not his own actions that caused the departure.8 1 See para C6.10. The Anti-Doping Organization will clearly have decided, as part of the results management process (see para C4.1 et seq), that the departure identified in the paperwork did not happen, or was not a departure from a mandatory requirement, and/or could not have caused the adverse analytical finding, or else the charge would not have been brought. 2 See para C6.7(a). 3 For example, in Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS  99/A/234 and CAS  99/A/235, para  7.4, the CAS panel rejected the athletes’ attack on the procedures that had been followed in collecting their samples on the basis that each of them had signed the declaration on the doping control form confirming their satisfaction with the testing procedure, and had not put any comment in the box provided for noting any discrepancies. It said: ‘In the Panel’s judgment, this effectively estops them from raising these complaints. The Panel find unconvincing their explanation that they wished to terminate the procedure as soon as possible. Those competitors who do not make use of opportunities designed to provide protection for them have only themselves to blame for the consequences of such failure’. Similarly, in the Butch Reynolds case, the IAAF Arbitration Panel rejected Mr Reynolds’ attack on the reliability of the procedures followed in collecting his sample on the basis of (among other things) his declaration on the doping control form that he was satisfied with the sample collection procedures used: Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000), p 121, para 8. See also p v FINA, CAS 2002/A/399, para 9.4.35 (‘The athlete’s failure to note irregularities in sample collection on the doping form can result in estoppel’), citing Bunn v FEI, CAS 2000/A/313; V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/493, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), p 21 (‘In the Panel’s view, the Appellant’s plain signature of the doping control records expresses his approval of the procedure and prevents him – short of compelling evidence of manipulation of the records or fraud or any similar facts – from raising any such issue at a later stage’). CAS panels have since taken the same approach in cases decided under the Code. See eg Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418 para 29 (‘It could be argued that the Appellants were estopped from challenging from the satisfaction recorded in that declaration: but on any view the declaration required that only subsequent contradictory challenge to be assessed with care’); ITF v Karatantcheva, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 11 January 2006, para 56 (argument that test was illegal under local law waived by submitting to test without noting objection in ‘comments’ section of doping control form), aff’d CAS 2006/A/1032. In ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 99, the first instance hearing panel held that the player’s signature of the doping control form, and her failure to comment adversely on the procedure followed in the box provided on the form for that purpose, did not amount to a formal waiver of ‘her right to allege later that the requirements of the ISTI had been breached’. Nevertheless, such signature and lack of adverse comment were said to be ‘of potential evidential value in determining whether [the relevant sample collection procedures] have been complied with’, and the hearing panel duly relied on them as ‘corroborative’ evidence that the DCO followed the standard procedure in that case. Ibid, para  38. See also ibid, para  107 (‘[…] we are comfortably satisfied that [the DCO] performed these requirements in the collection room with the player present. [The player’s lawyer] was not in a position to challenge [the doping control officer’s assistant’s] evidence to that effect, for his client was unable to recall anything untoward in the sample collection process, as indicated by her contemporaneous comment, “All good!”‘); Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 105 (‘The Player’s signature on the doping control form weighs against a subsequent claim that there were material departures from proper procedures (CAS  99/A/234 and 235; CAS 2002/A/399; CAS 2003/A/493). This is so regardless of the Player’s comprehension of the English language. (CAS 2010/A/2277)’); La Barbera v IWAS, CAS 2010/A/2277, para 4.9 (‘While Mr La Barbera argues that his signature at the bottom of the doping control form cannot be construed as an acceptance of the way the doping control procedure took place as he does neither speak Dutch, nor English nor French, such an argument cannot be accepted. In ITF  v Hingis, 3  January 2008, the Anti-Doping Tribunal has correctly made it clear that the doping control form is intended to provide contemporaneous record of the process precisely because accurate and detailed recollection is unlikely; while an athlete signature does not amount to a waiver of the athlete’s right to later allege that the requirements of the ISTI have been breached, such signature is of potential evidential value in determining whether the procedures set out in the IST have been complied with. Going even further, the CAS held in V  v FINA (CAS  2003/A/493, 22  March 2004) that the appellant’s plain signature of the doping control records expresses his approval of the procedure and prevents him – short of compelling evidence of manipulation of the records or fraud or any similar facts – from raising any such issue at a later stage. As correctly held by the IWAS Tribunal, it was up to Mr La Barbera to ask for further explanation if he did not understand the form; by having omitted to do so, Mr La Barbera has to support the consequences of his own negligence’); Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-

764  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement 1913, para 137 (rejecting challenge to suitability of sample collection procedures where ‘at the time of collection the Athlete has never protested against any of the blood sampling procedures performed by the ISU on her. Indeed, the bar code lists shown to the Panel had sufficient space for athletes to handwrite comments or record objections, if any, but the Athlete has always inserted her signature without further ado’); Hansen v FEI, CAS  2009/A/1768, para  16.3 (signature on form confirming no objection to the way the sample was collected ‘would ensure that subsequent objections were less frequently made and, if made, less likely to be believed’); UCI v Sohrabi, UCI Anti-Doping Panel decision dated 17 January 2020, para 50 (‘The Single Judge notes that the Rider is experienced and that – according to his own accord – he had undergone already several sample collection sessions. The Rider has been a professional cyclist for 20 years. He successfully took part in many races at national, continental, WorldTour and Olympic level and was fully aware of the doping collecting procedures within his sport (see letter of the Rider as of 1 March 2019). It is, thus, obvious, that the Rider has already filled out DCFs numerous times and was well aware of their content. In addition, the Single Judge notes that an interpreter is only to be provided if available and only upon the request of the Rider. There is no indication on file that the Rider requested the presence of an interpreter. In addition, there were several other people in the room, whose assistance the Rider cold have requested if indeed he had a language issue. Furthermore, there is no record on file that the Rider requested any additional information from the DCO on the sample collection procedure. To conclude, the Single Judge finds that there is nothing on file that would indicate that the Rider’s signature on the DCF does not constitute a willful and knowledgeable acceptance of the doping control procedure. Consequently, the Rider’s acknowledgement stands according to which the sample collection procedure was conducted in conformity with the applicable International Standards’); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal decision dated 7  June 2011, para  3.4.32 (‘We did not accept the Athlete’s evidence in relation to signing the declaration form confirming his satisfaction with the sample collection procedure. He states that he had not realised there were departures until after he had signed it. However, the Athlete is an experienced athlete who had been tested on nine previous occasions. We therefore find that he would have been well aware of what was standard collection procedure and what was not, and yet no adverse comment was made by the Athlete at that time and no refusal was made to accede to the request to sign the declaration’); Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2012, para 36.20 (rejecting athlete’s argument that no weight should have been put on her signature of the form because she had no expertise in or special knowledge of such matters). Most recently, in Romero v IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6319, para 74, the CAS panel held: ‘CAS panels have consistently held that by signing a DCF, an athlete is estopped from claiming violation of the ISTI at a later stage, short of evidence of manipulation of the records, or fraud, or any similar fact (CAS  2003/A/493, para  1.33; CAS  2012/2779, para  202; CAS  201  O/A/2277, para  4.9). Thus, by signing the DCF, the Appellant confirmed her approval and satisfaction with the ADC process. The fact that she only raised the allegation of irregularity in this appeal does not lend support to her allegations of fraud’. 4 Willes v IBSF, CAS  2016/A/4776, para  60 (‘Any retreat from this position [acknowledgment by signature of DCF that the procedures were carried out correctly] would need to be justified by reference to some facts undiscovered or undisclosable at the time of signature’). One such requirement would be the ISTI Art 9.3.2 requirement that the sample be transported to the laboratory ‘as soon as practicable after the completion of the Sample Collection Session’. Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 100 (no departure from that requirement where it took three-and-a-half days to get the sample to the laboratory, at least ‘in the absence of any evidence from the Appellant to prove that the sample was tampered with during this period of time’), citing Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS  2010/A/2296, para  125; Xuen v OCA, CAS AG  14/03, para  3.24 (transport to laboratory in 16 hours not a departure from IST Art 9.3.2). 5 Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418, para 37 (‘The next major issue related to the chain of custody. It is axiomatic that the links in such chain must be robust; there must be no chance that the samples which arrive at the doping control centre were not those taken at the doping control room or that they can have been tampered with en route. On the facts of these cases, the second matter can be swiftly disposed of. The bottles containing the A and B samples arrived at the DCC with seals unbroken: there were no signs of tampering, and the Appellants produced no evidence to suggest that it could have – or indeed did – take place en route (any more than before the journey)’). See also para C6.18. 6 B  v FINA, CAS  2002/A/430, para  9.3.7 (‘The mere hypothetical possibility that the samples were misplaced or manipulated will not satisfy the Appellant’s burden of proof, especially if she is unable to cite specific procedural error such as gaps in the chain of custody of the bottles, defects in their sealing, irregularities in the administration of the test, etc’); UK  Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP  Tribunal decision dated 7  June 2011, para  3.4.30 (‘While the Athlete appeared to raise the possibility that his sample could have been interfered with during transport, this seems to amount to no more than conjecture, not based on any factual evidence. The Athlete confirmed in his testimony that he had seen the samples himself in tamper-evident bottles, and the documentation pack for Sample A filled out on receipt of the sample by the Laboratory confirmed that the sample was received intact and without irregularities’); World Athletics v Kibarus, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/069/2020 dated 14 July

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  765 2020, para 43 (‘Under the currently applicable regulatory framework it is not sufficient for an athlete to merely argue that there may have been a departure from an International Standard and that this may have caused the AAF, without providing any concrete evidence to corroborate such allegation. Absent such particularisation, the presumption set forth in Article 3.2.3 comes into play’). 7 Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, accepting DCO’s insistence that she wore gloves during sample collection, despite coach’s testimony that she did not, because the DCO’s evidence was clear and consistent (para  16.5), it was corroborated by her colleagues (para  16.4: ‘We are conscious of the fact that persons might not willingly admit to a breach of proper procedure, and might close ranks around a colleague, but we could not conclude this to be so without cogent proof, which was entirely lacking’), and also because ‘we have to bear in mind [the DCO]’s considerable experience, not least at Olympic games; the training she and others involved in this vital stage of doping control had received; the absence of any good reason why on this occasion she would have deviated from proper practice of a function she performed on up to twenty occasions during the Beijing Games (Ms Kleppe could only suggest that the collection process was running behind schedule); her natural appreciation of the importance of the collection process; her intrinsic professional pride and her lack of motivation to distort or misrepresent the true position’ (para 16.6); Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418 para 31 (‘Another allegation relates to the alleged failure to use sealed (and therefore sterile) equipment for urine sample collection: cf: the qualification on Grant, DCF. The evidence of Mr Jones was clear that he received the collection vessels in a box, and each one of them is independently sealed and tamper proof. Kittiwake, the supplier, states that their collection vessels are sterile at source. I accept this evidence. Regularity in this area can be presumed: and Mr Jones would certainly have noticed any departure from the norm, and would not sensibly have used non-sterile vessels’). See also cases cited at para C6.7. 8 WADA  v FCL & Villareal, CAS  2011/A/2376, para  88 (‘[…] the fact that the weightlifters were together in the doping control room was not a condition imposed upon them but occurred at their own request […]. Something voluntarily done by the weightlifters cannot be used by them to try to contest the correctness of the sample collection process’) and para  90 (‘[…] the departure of [the athlete] from the doping control station before the completion of her sample collection process was due to her decision to answer a phone call and, thus, cannot in any way be used to dispute the accuracy of the sample collection process’); WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 7.12 (endorsing first instance decision that ‘[i]t would be somewhat of an anomaly to allow an athlete to contest his/her refusal to submit to sample collection on the basis that Article 5.4.1 of the International Standards was not complied with in circumstances where that athlete’s refusal was the cause of the non-compliance’); UKAD v Bailey, NADP Tribunal decision dated 8 December 2017, para 46 (‘It could perhaps be said that, if Mr Bailey had been told that he drank water “at his own risk”, he might not have drunk the water at all and this was what resulted in his refusing to provide the sample. However, the difficulty with this argument is that the warning in question was on the reverse of the Athlete Selection Order and Mr Bailey himself declined to read the document because, so he said, he was very familiar with the testing procedure and had heard it all before’); FIS v Veerpalu, FIS Doping Panel decision dated 21 August 2011, para 44 (where athlete caused delay between analysis of A sample and analysis of B sample, he ‘waived his argument that the extensions of the time period had a detrimental impact on the accuracy of the analysis results’); Wium v IPC, IPC Management Committee decision dated 7 October 2005, para 2 (‘[…] the Athlete could not behave in a way that made it impossible for the DCO to comply with procedural guidelines and then use those alleged procedural breaches as grounds for appeal’); WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 7.12 (endorsing first instance decision that ‘it would be somewhat of an anomaly to allow an athlete to contest his/her refusal to submit to sample collection on the basis that Article  5.4.1 of the International Standards was not complied with in circumstances where that athlete’s refusal was the cause of the non-compliance’)

B Proving that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding C6.11 Proof of a departure from the required sample collection procedures is not enough, on its own, to justify dismissal of an Art 2.1 charge. Rather, Code Art 3.2.3 is clear that the athlete must also show that that departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse analytical finding that is the basis of the charge. However, the CAS has not stuck rigidly to that requirement in all cases. C6.12 The Code states that an Art 2.1 charge requires an adverse analytical finding in the A sample and either a confirmatory finding following analysis of the B sample or else waiver by the athlete of analysis of the B sample.1 Where an athlete has been denied the right given to him in the Code to attend the opening and analysis of the B sample,2 two CAS panels have ruled that in such circumstances the athlete suffers

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an irreparable prejudice, since the sample is now open and his opportunity to check its integrity has been lost forever. This means that the B sample results are inadmissible, and so the evidence that the Code requires to sustain the Art 2.1 charge does not exist, and therefore the charge must be dismissed, without the athlete having to prove that the failure to respect his B sample rights could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical findings reported by the laboratory in respect of his A and B samples.3 1 See para C5.3, n 2. 2 See para C6.23, n 2. 3 See para C6.23, n 2.

C6.13 The CAS panel in Campbell-Brown v IAAF noted that: ‘there is considerable force to the proposition that, in order to justify imposing a regime of strict liability against athletes for breaches of anti-doping regulations, testing bodies should be held to an equivalent standard of strict compliance with mandatory international standards of testing’.1

It also acknowledged: ‘the CAS jurisprudence that recognises the existence of certain international standards which are considered to be so fundamental to the fairness of the doping control regime and so central to ensuring the integrity of the sample collection and testing process that any departure from them will result in the automatic invalidation of the outcome of the testing procedure’.2

The jurisprudence it was referring to was these B sample cases. It suggested they ‘reflect a position whereby, notwithstanding Rule 3.2.1, certain IST requirements are considered to be so fundamental to the just and effective operation of the doping control system that fairness demands that any departure should automatically invalidate any adverse analytical finding. In other words, certain IST departures will be treated as so serious that, by their very nature, they will be considered to undermine the fairness of the testing process to such an extent that it is impossible for a reviewing body to be comfortably satisfied that a doping violation has occurred’.3 It did not explain why it expressed this as a general rule, when the cases cited dealt only with the special case of denial of B sample rights. Nor did it explain how to reconcile this supposed per se rule with the clear wording of Code Art 3.2.1 that a departure is only material if it ‘could reasonably have caused’ the ADRV charged. However, it declined the invitation of the athlete’s counsel to extend the rule to cover ‘knowing, systematic and persistent’ departures from the ISTI procedures for partial sample collection (such as the intentional departure from the partial sample procedures that took place in her case). Instead it applied the Code Art 3.2.1 test, and decided that that departure could reasonably have caused her adverse analytical finding, and so the charge should be dismissed based on Code Art 3.2.1, without the need to resort to any per se rule.4 As a result, the panel’s comments on ‘fundamental breach’ were obiter. 1 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 147. 2 Ibid, para 148. 3 Ibid, para 152. See also Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 68 (‘[…] certain international testing standards and ADR rules are considered to be so fundamental and central to ensuring the integrity in the administration of sample collection and the rules that follow that certain departures therefrom could result in the automatic invalidation of the test results. In other words, certain departures will be treated as so serious that, by their very nature, they will be considered to undermine the fairness of the testing and adjudication process to such an extent that it is impossible for the Sole Arbitrator to be comfortably satisfied that an anti-doping rule violation occurred’). 4 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 152.

C6.14 Subsequent panels have also uniformly rejected arguments that they should extend the per se rule identified in Campbell-Brown beyond B sample cases to cases involving departures from other rules:

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  767

(a) In Muralidharan, a CAS sole arbitrator did not rule out ‘a situation where an athlete’s right to a timely and fair hearing in the first instance procedure was so fundamentally violated that such omissions in the underlying procedure results in an automatic dismissal of a violation (see for example in cases where an athlete is not aware at all that a procedure is ongoing […])’, but only if the athlete could show that as a result of the violation of his rights he ‘lost any chance to demonstrate that no anti-doping violation took place’. The athlete could not make any such showing in that case, because ‘at no time did the delay unduly prejudice his right to obtain evidence, interview witnesses, or adequately defend the claims brought against him’.1 (b) The CAS panel in Smikle (which included a member of the Campbell-Brown panel) ruled: ‘Consistent with CAS  2012/A/2779, the Panel declines to establish a per se rule that non-compliance with IST partial sample collection procedures automatically invalidates the sample’s test results. It rejects the Appellant’s assertion that JADCO’s breaches of the IST partial sample collection procedures constitutes a fundamental breach so serious that it necessarily cannot be comfortably satisfied he committed a doping violation. Doing so would invalidate a positive test result even if the possibility of contamination is factually implausible based on the evidence and conflict with the express language of Article 3.2.2 of the JADCO Anti-Doping Rules and the 2009 WADC, which requires an athlete to establish a departure from an IST “could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding.” As the CAS panel in CAS  2014/A/3487 [Campbell-Brown] observed, “whether or not a particular event caused a particular outcome is a matter of fact.” CAS 2014/A/3487 at ¶143’.2

(c)

The CAS panel in Gorgodze (which included the chair of the Campbell-Brown panel), cited Smikle and noted: ‘A  per se rule that non-compliance with the IST automatically invalidates the sample’s test results is rejected, because it would invalidate a positive test result even if the possibility of contamination is factually implausible and because it would contradict the express language of Art 3.2 of the WADC (and that of its implementing regulations)’.3

It also noted that the alleged departures in the case before it ‘are not as serious as to justify the application of a possible strict compliance rule’.4 It therefore declined to automatically invalidate the adverse analytical finding.5 (d) Similarly, in Ralepelle v World Rugby, a first instance tribunal rejected another request from an athlete to extend the per se rule purportedly identified in Campbell-Brown beyond the B  sample denial cases to a case where the B sample was damaged during analysis. The tribunal noted that this submission: ‘[…] begs a number of questions: First, how can [such a rule] exist over and above or separate from WADC Article 3.2.1 or any Rules or Regulations derived therefrom? Second, what departure […] will be so fundamental to the just and effective operation of the doping control system so as to guillotine the process? […] [The statement in Campbell-Brown that some departures are so serious that by their nature they will be considered to have undermined the fairness of the testing process to such an extent that a panel cannot be satisfied that an ADRV has occurred] does not state what departures will be so serious as to undermine the fairness of the testing process. That is an inherent ambiguity that we find unhelpful and militates against the efficacy of any such principle’.6

The hearing panel specifically noted that the only cases applying the per se rule are cases of an athlete being deprived of the right to attend the opening and testing of the B sample.7 It considered that the departure at issue before it did not create more than a fanciful risk of contaminating the sample, and it declined to hold that such a departure undermined the fairness of the testing process to such an extent that it could not be satisfied that a violation had been committed.8

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(e) In Schwazer v IAAF & NADO  Italia & FIDAL & WADA, the athlete cited Campbell-Brown for the proposition that ‘certain IST departures will be treated as so serious that, by their very nature, they will be considered to undermine the fairness of the testing process to such an extent that it is impossible for a reviewing body to be comfortably satisfied that a doping violation has occurred’. In response, the CAS panel noted that it follows from the wording of Code Art 3.2.1 (as transposed into the IAAF’s anti-doping rules) that ‘in principle, a breach of the applicable International Standards as such does not automatically lead to the invalidation of the analytical results’.9 It also noted that in any event the alleged departures in that case did not meet the test proposed by the athlete, and therefore he had failed to demonstrate that the alleged departures might have reasonably caused exogenous steroids to be present in his sample: ‘The fairness of the testing process was at no time undermined’.10 (f) Finally, the CAS panel in Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA held that ‘there is no independent basis, derived from general principles of contract law, allowing the conclusion that a departure from the rules by the anti-doping organization prevents per se the finding of an anti-doping rule violation’. The panel accepted that if an athlete shows ‘a breach of the rules [that] concerns the rights which are deemed “fundamental” for safeguarding the athlete’s interests in the analysis of his/her B sample, the causality requirement imposed in Article 3.2.2 of the WADC shall not be applied and the analysis result shall be deemed invalid regardless of the actual effect – or any potential effect – of the breach on the result of the analysis’; but it was clear that if he cannot show a breach of his B sample rights, then he must show that the departure from the rules ‘could reasonably have caused’ the violation in issue.11 Therefore, there is no general per se rule, or ‘fundamental breach’ doctrine.12 There is only (at most) a CAS-made sui generis exception to the general rule requiring proof that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding, which exception is strictly limited to cases where an athlete’s right to attend the opening and analysis of his B sample has been denied him. In such a case, the B sample evidence is rendered inadmissible, and therefore the panel by definition cannot be comfortably satisfied that the ADRV charged has been committed.13 In all other cases, however, the athlete must show that the departure in question ‘could reasonably have caused’ the factual basis on which he has been charged with an anti-doping rule violation.  1 Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, paras 90-91.  2 Smikle v JADC, CAS 2015/A/3925, paras 111, 114, 116, 118, 127 and 128.  3 Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, para 93. The alleged departures in that case were from the IST procedures relating to collection of a urine sample from the athlete.   4 Ibid, para 95.   5 Ibid, para 96, cited with approval in UK Anti-Doping v X., confidential NADP Tribunal decision dated 3 August 2017, para 69, in which the panel declined to find that any breach of the requirement to notify an athlete as soon as practicable that he/she has a case to answer (para 74) or any breach of the ISTI investigation obligations (para 89) is a fundamental breach of the rules that warrants automatic dismissal of the charge.  6 World Rugby v Ralapelle, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 16  June 2015, paras 112 and 123. See also ibid, para 89 (‘[…] WADC Article 3.2 does not impose absolute standards from which any deviation will result in an annulment of the process or of proceedings. It is a question of balance, between strict liability and the rights of athletes. WADC Article 3.2 (and its derivatives) seeks to strike that balance’).   7 Ibid, para 123.   8 Ibid, para 125.  9 Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 62. 10 Ibid, para 85. 11 CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, paras 96, 99, 110. See also Romero v IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6319, para 76 (‘Finally, the Panel is not convinced by the Appellant’s submission that any irregularity, be it ever so minor, should invalidate an AAF, nor that the alleged procedural irregularities (which the Panel does not accept) in the present matter are so fundamental that they should invalidate the AAF. The Panel notes that several CAS panels have invalidated an AAF for procedural irregularity where

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  769 the evidence established significant departures from the ISTI, such as the violation of the athlete’s right to attend the opening and analysis of his/her B-sample (CAS 2002/A/385; CAS 2008/A/1607; CAS  2010/A/2161; CAS  2014/A/3487). However, as was stated by the panel in CAS  2014/A/3487, there must be “an appropriate balance between the rights of the athletes to have their samples collected and tested in accordance with the mandatory testing standards, and the legitimate interest in preventing athletes from escaping punishment for doping violations on the basis of inconsequential or minor technical infractions of the IST’ (CAS  2014/A/3487, para  156). In the Panel’s view, the facts asserted by the Appellant, even if proved, namely that the identity of the chaperone indicated on the DCF is wrong, or that the DCO and the chaperone are spouses do not of themselves, and in the context of the whole of the evidence, constitute a fundamental irregularity to the IST such as would invalidate the AAF of the Appellant in this appeal’); Phillip v Panam Sports Organisation, CAS 2019/A/6637, para 110 et seq (by disclosing disqualification of athlete’s results while his appeal to CAS was pending, the respondent had breached the confidentiality requirements of Code Art 14.3.2 and the ISPPPI, but the CAS panel declined to declare that as a result the entire case against him, based on an adverse analytical finding, should be declared null and void, because such relief ‘is neither prescribed nor within its jurisdiction and authority to grant’, since the applicable rules do not identify any consequences for a breach of confidentiality, and the CAS precedents cited by the athlete ‘mostly present fundamental departures to doping control procedures or to the right to analyse or be present for the analysis the B sample, (e.g. CAS 2002/A/385; CAS 2008/A/1607; CAS 2010/A/2161), and not to premature public disclosure of the disposition of a matter whilst still in the results management process. 116. The right to restrictions to public disclosure and reporting in the course of results management procedures is not “one of the few rights an athlete has in the course of the sample collection and test procedures”, as stated in CAS 2002/A/385, ¶ 24 & 27, relied upon by the Appellant. The sample collection and test procedures are separate from the results management process. 117. In this case, the Appellant does not dispute the findings of the Respondent’s preliminary review under Article 7.1 of the PASO ADR, to the effect that there were no departures to any International Standard during the sample collection or analysis procedures which could reasonably have caused the AAF, and has admitted his anti-doping rule violation. He also does not argue that his any of his rights were breached in the course of the sample collection, test or analytical procedures. Therefore, logic dictates that the remedy for the Respondent’s confidentiality breach cannot be the invalidation of the undisputed test process or sample collection procedure or analytical result which led to the Appellant’s admitted antidoping rule violation. 118. While the actions of the Respondent in prematurely reporting the Athlete’s disqualification for his admitted anti-doping rule violation were erroneous, they cannot be remedied by invalidating the entire anti-doping rule violation’); UKAD v Bailey, NADP Tribunal decision dated 8  December 2017, para  45 (rejecting request to treat alleged departure as breach of fundamental requirement mandating dismissal of charge irrespective of lack of causative impact, because ‘[w]e do not believe it is open to us simply to disregard the explicit provisions of ADR Article 8 [UK equivalent of Code Art 3.2], however seriously any procedural defects are to be viewed’). 12 Arashov v ITF, CAS  2017/A/5112, para  83 (‘CAS bodies have confirmed that deviations from applicable standards do not per se invalidate an AAF. There is no general rule of strict compliance with International Standards […]’) (citations omitted); Ferreira v IWF, CAS 2016/A/4758, para 38 (‘The Panel finds it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which alleged procedural flaws or even denial of fundamental rights which could have no bearing on the findings of an ADRV would ever justify ignoring such findings’). 13 See paras C6.23–C6.26 for discussion of the relevant cases, and of the attempt made in the 2021 Code to reverse this line of authority.

C6.15 The CAS panel in Campbell-Brown considered the ‘could reasonably have caused’ wording to be ambiguous: ‘Whether or not a particular event caused a particular outcome is a matter of fact. The application of the evaluative qualification “reasonably” in that context makes little sense, as a matter of ordinary English, and tends to impede rather than assist the determination of the standard of proof required of the athlete […], in order to shift the burden back to the IAAF. [144] To resolve that ambiguity, it is necessary to have regard to the underlying purpose of the provision and the reason for introducing the adverb “reasonably” into Rule 33.3(b)’.1

It concluded that: ‘Rule 33.3(b) requires a shift in the burden of proof whenever an athlete establishes that it would be reasonable to conclude that the IST departure could have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding. In other words, the athlete must establish facts from which a reviewing panel could rationally infer a possible causative link between the IST departure and the presence of a prohibited substance in the athlete’s sample. For

770  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement these purposes, the suggested causative link must be more than merely hypothetical, but need not be likely, as long as it is plausible. […] 157. […] The mandatory IST are designed to eliminate the possibility of contamination affecting the outcome of antidoping tests. To ensure that anti-doping bodies strictly adhere to those standards, and to ensure that athletes are not unfairly prejudiced if they failed to do so, IAAF Rule 33.3(b) must be interpreted in such a way as to shift the burden of proof onto the anti-doping organisation whenever a departure from an IST gives rise to a material – as opposed to merely theoretical – possibility of sample contamination’.2

Because there was evidence that hydrochlorothiazide (HCT) (the substance found in the athlete’s sample) was a contaminant of local water sources, and because such water was available in the waiting room where the athlete sat with her unsealed partial sample, and there was ‘a more than negligible possibility that water and/or sweat containing HCT could have entered the Athlete’s sample collection vessel in the doing control area’,3 a majority of the panel concluded that ‘it cannot exclude the possibility that environmental contamination arising out of the failure to comply with the partial collection procedure could have been the cause of the Adverse Analytical Finding. Accordingly it would be reasonable to conclude that the departures from the IST could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding’.4 The CAS panel in Smikle interpreted this to mean the athlete’s evidence ‘must be sufficient to enable the Panel to reasonably conclude that the Respondent’s breach of the IST partial sample collection procedures plausibly caused his positive test for HCTZ’,5 and found that that test was not met on the evidence before it because that evidence did not establish that it was ‘more than a negligible possibility’ that the departure caused the ADRV.6 1 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, paras 143 and 144. 2 Ibid, paras 155-156, followed in Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 105. 3 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 173. 4 Ibid, para 170. See also Morales v Guatemalan National Anti-Doping Association, CAS 2016/A/4694 (finding that departures from required sample collection procedures could have caused mishandling of sample, and therefore dismissing charge based on presence of prohibited substance in that sample). 5 Smikle v JADC, CAS  2015/A/3925, para  118. See also UCI  v Diniz, UCI  Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 September 2017, para 62 (‘[…] only if the rules were breached severely enough to plausibly affect the outcome of the analysis is there a need for the Single Judge to examine whether or not the analysis results should be discarded’). 6 Smikle v JADC, CAS 2015/A/3925, para 128. Cf WADA v Chernova & RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112, para 85 (‘Therefore, the Panel deems a mere reference to a departure from the ISL insufficient, in the absence of a credible link of such departure to a resulting Adverse Analytical Finding. In other words, in order for an athlete to meet his/her burden and thus effectively shift the burden to an anti-doping organization, the athlete must establish, on the balance of probabilities, (i) that there is a specific (not hypothetical) departure from the ISL; and (ii) that such departure could have reasonably, and thus credibly, caused a misreading of the analysis’), followed in IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS  2014/A/3614 & 3561, paras 359-360, and in Ruffoni v UCI, CAS  2018/A/5518, para 86.

C6.16 If the athlete cannot discharge that burden, the departure was clearly immaterial and is to be disregarded.1 In many cases, it is obvious that the departure alleged could not plausibly have caused the adverse analytical finding,2 eg  where the requirement in issue is designed to prevent the athlete having an opportunity to adulterate the sample,3 and therefore the argument will end there. If the departure led to the sample being left unattended for a period, and the athlete’s case is that it may have been tampered with during that period, he cannot just speculate, but has to produce evidence as to who could have tampered with his sample, how, and why.4 1 Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, passim; UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 September 2017, para 65 (rejecting alleged departures as unevidenced). For example, in Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, an athlete disputed an Art 2.1 charge on the basis that (inter alia) the partial sample she initially provided had been left unsealed while the DCOs waited for her to provide further urine. The NADP tribunal sitting at first instance rejected the submission on the facts, but also ruled that in any event the athlete had not shown that such departure could reasonably have caused her sample to

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  771 become contaminated with the two steroids subsequently found in it. On appeal, the athlete argued that the tribunal had ‘misdirected itself as to the weight to be given to the evidence of a departure or partial departure from “standard procedure”. That departure may have led to contamination of a type or in a way which neither the Appellant nor the Panel recognises or understands and may have led to an incorrect analysis. It would be inappropriate to expect the Athlete to have submitted in “scientific detail” a full explanation for or of an incorrect reading which may have resulted from the departure from “standard practice” in the collection of a urine sample. In this the Panel should have accepted that UK Anti-Doping had not discharged the burden of proof which fell upon it’. The NADP Appeal Tribunal rejected that argument by noting that, under IAAF ADR 33.3(b) (the equivalent of Code Art 3.3.2), the burden was on the athlete to show that the alleged departure could have caused the adverse finding, and ‘it is only if she discharges this burden that the burden switches to UKAD to prove that the departure did not cause the AAF’(Wilson v UK  Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19  January 2012, para  36.10). See also Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS  2016/A/4458, para  92 (‘[…] even if a breach of a provision of a WADA International Standard has been committed [by the DCO not requesting the athlete to wash her hands prior to sample collection, the Appellant failed to establish […] how such a violation may have reasonably caused the AAF’); WADA v FCF and Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 134 (‘The Athletes suggested that mishandling and/or very hot temperatures during the three-hour journey from Neiva to Ibague could have caused the Adverse Analytical Findings, but this was nothing more than bare speculation. They offered no evidence supporting these assertions, such as scientific articles or expert testimony (such as doctors or laboratory scientists or professors). The Panel is mindful of the Athletes’ financial constraints, but believes that, even within those financial constraints, they could have, but did not, adduce evidence as to how hot temperatures or mishandling could have caused boldenone to appear in their samples’); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal decision dated 7 June 2011, para 3.4.31 (‘[…] even if the Panel had accepted that there were some departures [from the sample collection procedures set out in the IST], no explanation was put forward by the Athlete as to how any of the alleged departures could have produced the adverse findings of exogenous Testosterone and Clostebol metabolites in his sample’); Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, pp 19–20 (‘Per Article 6.3.2 the Doping Control Station was not used solely as such a station for the duration of the Sample Collection Session. There was no record made of any deviations from this requirement. However, there is no indication of any interference by any third parties in the sample collection procedure. The Appeal Tribunal was satisfied that the Judicial Committee was entitled to conclude that such departures as had been accepted/established did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding’). 2 Willes v IBSF, CAS  2016/A/4776, para  44 (‘[…] erroneous naming of the testing authority in the DCOR [Doping Control Official Record] could not have affected the test results’) and para 61 (‘That they [the sample collection personnel] may have chosen the wrong line for their signatures cannot affect the efficiency of the sample collection’); Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, para 104 (‘[…] a possible notice [of doping control] sent to his coach [before him] or possible lack of information regarding the rights and responsibilities could not have caused the AAF […]’) and para 108 (‘[…] the lack of adhesive film [covering the spout of the collection vessel] is irrelevant, because the parties agree that the urine sample was immediately poured from the collection vessel to the A and B bottles and was not stocked in the collection vessel’); WADA v FCL & Villareal, CAS 2011/A/2336, para 94 (‘[…] the Second Respondents’ allegations concerning the sample collection and storage procedures […] could in no manner cause their adverse analytical findings. Therefore, the Panel must conclude that the anti-doping tests performed on the weightlifters were properly carried out’); IAAF v AFS & Javornik, CAS 2008/A/1608, para 103 (‘[…] the presence of a dog and of naked people at the doping control station, as well as the fact that Ms Javornik was not offered the use of sterile gloves while providing the sample, clearly had no impact on the result of the analysis, showing the presence of rEPO in the sample provided by Ms Javornik’); N’Sima v FIBA, FIBA Appeal Commission decision dated 16 January 2006, para II.2.c (‘Even if there was a procedural error in selecting the First Appellant [not by lot but by his coach] this can only lead to the result of the analysis being ignored if the procedural error is able to influence the result of the analysis […]. However, this is obviously not so in the present case’); Jonsson v IPF, CAS 2007/A/1332, para 56 (even if DCO did not have his official identification card with him, given that there were no circumstances indicating that this could have affected the results of analysis of the sample, the IPF was deemed to have discharged its burden of proving that the departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding); RFU v Price, independent panel decision dated 10 March 2016, para 64 (even if athlete should have been permitted to shower while he waited to urinate, ‘to do so would not, even on the facts as he was describing them, have cured the issue and as such it could not possibly be said to undermine the validity of the anti doping procedure’ such as to vitiate his subsequent departure from the doping control station without providing a sample). In the Gasser case, a failure to collect more than 45ml of urine was ruled irrelevant, because it did not affect the laboratory’s ability to test both the A sample and the B sample properly. Gasser and SLV v IAAF, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 18 January 1988, in Tarasti Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice 2000) at p 118. See also Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 86 (‘As a preliminary point, since the Player admits that the departures could not have caused the AAF in this case, the Panel deems it unnecessary to assess the following alleged departures: (a) Failure to provide certificates of sterility for the glass Berlinger bottles. (b) Failure to test the Player’s blood sample

772  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement for all types of Prohibited Substances and concomitant Metabolites and Markers, not simply for the isoforms GH, HBOCs, and ESAs (including recombinant epics and analogues. (c) Failure to store the samples from the tournament in accordance with the applicable guidelines’). Cf Willes v IBSF, CSA 2016/A/4776, para 51 (absence of warning that consumption of food or drink is at athlete’s own risk is irrelevant because athlete is under a constant duty to avoid consuming prohibited substances). 3 IAAF v CBAt & Da Silva, CAS 2012/A/2779, para 207 (alleged failure to chaperone athlete irrelevant because ‘an unchaperoned athlete actually has an advantage in the sense that he or she can interfere with the sample to his or her benefit’). 4 In a pre-Code case, S  v International Equestrian Federation, CAS  91/A/56, Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne 1998), pp 93, 97, a CAS panel ruled that analysis of the B sample could not confirm the positive result of the A sample analysis ‘unless all of the provisions of Annex III of the Veterinary Regulations have been scrupulously observed, in such a way as to eliminate any possibility of manipulation’. The panel accepted the rider’s evidence that the B sample jars had not been sealed in the manner required by the FEI rules, so that it was ‘not possible to exclude definitely the possibility of manipulation and thus contamination’. As a result, the CAS panel ruled, ‘doubt exists which must be to the benefit of’ the rider, and therefore the upholding of the doping charge at first instance was overturned). However, hearing panels applying rules implementing the Code have taken a more robust approach, requiring proof not only that departure(s) from the required sample collection procedures made tampering theoretically possible, but also evidence (rather than mere speculation) that such tampering might actually have taken place. X. v IWF, SFT judgment of 28 February 2018, 4A_576/2012, para  3.2.2 (appeal rejected where the athlete ‘gives no explanation which could make plausible a mistaken manipulation of the samples or a wrongful intervention by a third party who would have been able to contaminate his samples or substitute them with others with the same identification number without traces’); Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 101 (‘Again, this allegation of sabotage must be rejected. The Player has not substantiated it with any evidence as to who would have committed such an act or why they would have the incentive to do it’); Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 90 (‘[…] the Appellant’s submission related to sabotage amounts to a mere hypothesis or speculation. This is not enough to make the Panel satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the results of the analysis of the January 1 Sample cannot be attributed to the Appellant. The Appellant did not submit a scenario which “could make plausible a mistaken manipulation” of the 1  January Sample “or a wrongful intervention by a third party who would have been able to contaminate” his sample or substitute it with another with the same identification number without traces (see Judgement of the Swiss Federal Tribunal of 28  February 2013, 4A_576/2012). The Appellant’s case in essence is that it cannot be excluded that there are persons in this world with a motive and the capacity to sabotage him. The identity of such persons having a motive and the capacity to conspire against the Athlete, however, was left in the dark as well as the time and place when such manipulation occurred’) and para 91 (‘[…] the Athlete was unable to submit a plausible scenario how and when the sabotage of his sample could have occurred’); WADA v FCL & Villereal, CAS 2011/A/2336, para 90 (‘[…] the departure of [the athlete] from the doping control station before the completion of her sample collection process was due to her decision to answer a phone call and, thus, cannot in any way be used to dispute the accuracy of the sample collection process. In any case, no evidence or even allegation of the manipulation of her sample in her absence has been raised during the proceedings’); Pechstein and DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 148 (procedures followed provided adequate assurance of the identity and integrity of the blood samples tested where ‘neither Ms Pechstein nor any of the experts or witnesses who testified before the Panel gave any clue as to how and why one could have manipulated the Athlete’s anonymous samples’); La Barbera v IWAS, CAS  2010/A/2277, para 4.10 (‘Even if the Panel was to accept that there had been any departure from the ISTI, which it does not, Mr La Barbera has been unable to prove that any alleged departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding. Mr La Barbera merely assumes that, due to his attendance to the medal ceremony, “the chain of custody of the samples was broken and there is no prove [sic] that the urine examined in the lab is really coming from the athlete”. Mr La Barbera’s line of argument amounts to mere speculation without any supporting facts. Mr Van Weert [the DCO] made it clear that there had always been at all times a DCO to supervise and to secure the samples, so that there has never been any break in the chain of custody. Mr La Barbera does not allege that the samples referred to in the doping control form were not his own; he even admits that he has no basis to argue that “someone did something to stitch him up”. No evidence was presented by Mr La Barbera neither that someone could have tampered with his sample nor how such tampering could have happened. Arguably, nobody knew precisely when Mr La Barbera has been required to provide a sample and, if they did, nobody would have known that he had only been able to provide a partial sample and that, assuming that such sample was left unattended – which the Panel excludes – that Mr La Barbera would leave to attend the medal ceremony thus providing someone with the opportunity to tamper such sample’); Jonsson v IPF, CAS  2007/A/1332, para  48 (even if there was a departure from the required procedures in that the chaperone left before the sample collection was concluded, the claim that the sample could have been tampered with was pure speculation unsupported by any evidence, where it was not alleged that the DCO had tampered with the sample, and on the verification protocol from the opening of the B sample there was no evidence of tampering); WADA v ASSIS & FPF, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 66 (the athlete ‘also suggests that he is the victim of a conspiracy. Such a statement is not credible absent a basis in fact.

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  773 He adduced no evidence to ascertain a credible plot hatched against him. In particular, he did not give any plausible reasons on why and how somebody would try to harm his interests. The alleged questionable attitude of the CNAD does not explain the positive findings of his samples’); Azevedo v CBDA, CAS 2003/A/510, paras 4.1-4.2 (rejecting tampering claim as speculative and unsubstantiated); Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 116 (‘With regard to the allegation that the samples were left unattended alone with the DCO, the Panel observes that the Appellant has never claimed that the samples were not his own, nor has he provided any evidence whatsoever that the samples were manipulated before the bottles were sealed. In addition, the Appellant has not provided any explanation as to the motives that would have induced the DCO to tamper with the samples in order to frame Mr Vroemen, if suspicion had arisen’); CCES v Lelievre, SDRCC decision dated 7 February 2005, para 34 (‘I am not satisfied that the Athlete’s sample was, in fact, left unattended as he claims. Even if it was, however, the Athlete has offered no evidence that could lead me to conclude that his sample was tampered with or that there was a departure from the Doping Control Rules which caused the adverse analytical finding for cocaine metabolite. No evidence was presented by the Athlete that someone could have used such an opportunity, let alone actually took the opportunity, to tamper with his sample. There was no evidence of any unauthorised persons in the doping control station itself where the sample was said to have been unattended’); Wilson v UK  Anti-Doping, NADP  Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19  January 2012, para 36.13 (alleged departures could not have caused the subsequent adverse findings, because no one had either motive or opportunity to take advantage of the alleged lack of sealing to adulterate the samples: ‘36.12 In any event, on the basis of the Appellant’s own account, she was in the same room with DCOs Kelman and Anderson and her partial sample throughout. No one could have touched it without her seeing them do so (except DCO Anderson momentarily handling it to pick it up and put it down, behind a wall). 36.13 For adulteration of the sample to have occurred, DCOs Kelman and Anderson would have had to be involved in a conspiracy. Asked before the Arbitral Tribunal if they had adulterated the sample, they denied and were not pressed on the matter, and the Appellant disclaimed any suggestion that anyone at UK Athletics or UKAD might have had motive to harm the Appellant’).

C6.17 If the athlete does establish a departure from the required procedures that could plausibly have caused the adverse analytical finding (or, in non-Art 2.1 cases, the other factual basis for the violation charged), the burden shifts to the Anti-Doping Organization ‘to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation’.1 In some cases, expert evidence may be required to meet this burden.2 If the Anti-Doping Organization does meet this burden, the departure will again be discounted as a harmless ‘slip’, and the charge will stand. If it fails to do so, the charge will be dismissed. 1 Code Art 3.2.3. See paras C6.8 and C6.9. 2 For example, if it is proved that a substance could only be added to a urine sample in parent form, and not as a metabolite, then the fact that the laboratory detected the metabolite in the sample rules out contamination of the sample after it was provided by the athlete. Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, paras 18.1-18.3; ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 51 (‘[…] the substance subsequently detected – benzoylecgonine – cannot be produced inside the bottle under any storage conditions. It is produced inside the body when a person ingests cocaine’). See also IAAF v CBat & Da Silva, CAS 2012/A/2779, para 210 (fact partial sample was not sealed could not have caused adverse finding because it was always under athlete’s control, and scientific evidence showed no spiking could have taken place); Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS  2016/A/4458, para 80 et seq (concluding after thorough analysis of evidence produced that athlete had not met her burden of showing that the DCO who collected her sample had spiked it with EPO when she left it alone and unsealed with the DCO for a couple of minutes, because there was no direct evidence of spiking, because the DCO did not know that the IAAF had suggested the sample be analysed for EPO, because the athlete failed to mention at the time or on the form that the samples were left unattended, and because it would be very difficult to spike the sample and achieve the same concentration in the A  and B  samples, given that they had different volumes); Muralidharan v National AntiDoping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 106 (‘[…] as Dr Botre testified, various delays in the transportation and testing of the sample would not create bio transformations of the Appellant’s urine such that MHA would suddenly appear in the sample’); Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS  2006/A/1032, paras 64-67 (expert scientific opinion established that alleged departures from the IST could not have caused the subsequent adverse analytical findings for 19-norandrosterone); WADA  v Assis & FPF, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 60 (stability test proved that delay in sending samples to laboratory had not led to degradation of sample); WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, para 6.7 (leaving sample unattended for 45 minutes could not have caused adverse finding because sample was in a sealed and tamperevident bottle during that time); ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 126 (‘We are confident that the omission to define with sufficient clarity and precision the criteria needed to ensure that any sealed sample will be stored in a manner that protects its integrity, identity

774  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement and security prior to transport from the doping control station, had no causative impact on the adverse analytical finding in this case. The fact that the criteria were not defined as they should have been does not mean that [the DCO’s] practices with regard to storage of samples were inadequate or resulted in any breach of security’); Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418 para 32 (‘A further allegation from Mr Grant was that something in the air might have contaminated his sample. Evidence from Professor Cowan and Professor James was clear that even if there was something in the air arising from the use of the room as a changing room, and even if that something found its way into Mr Grant’s sample, is highly unlikely to have any effect whatsoever on the measure of HCG. Further, had some degradation occurred, this would be likely to reduce the level of HCG. Finally Mr Grant’s sample was not degraded, since none of the signs of degradation were present’).

C6.18 The case of WADA v Wium demonstrates that even a clear departure from the mandatory sample collection and transport requirements of the International Standard for Testing & Investigations is irrelevant if it could not have caused the adverse analytical finding. The DCO collected a sample from an athlete out-of-competition, but inadvertently left the collection site without the sample, which was therefore left unattended for at least 45 minutes. The CAS accepted that this was a profound break in the chain of custody and therefore a clear departure from the requirements of the International Standard for Testing (as it then was), but nevertheless upheld the Art 2.1 charge against the athlete because it was comfortably satisfied that such departure did not cast any doubt on the reliability of the test results, mainly because of ‘the practical impossibility to destroy a Berlinger bottle and the fact that the seal was intact at the sample’s arrival at the laboratory’.1 1 WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, paras 6.6 and 6.7, citing Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, for the proposition that a Berlinger bottle cannot be opened without it being apparent that it has been tampered with. See also Azevedo v CBDA, CAS  2003/A/510, para  6.2 (leaving urine sample unattended and unsealed for about a minute was ‘extremely regrettable […]. However, it does not, of itself, mean that the chain of custody was broken, and there is no indication of, and there was no evidence which suggested, any other possible breach of the chain of custody throughout the entire testing process’); Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 99 (‘Nor can this Panel make an assumption that the Berlinger equipment used was contaminated. Berlinger kits are used in tens if not thousands of drug tests each year, without problem. For example, Professor Ayotte testified at the hearing before the Tribunal that her laboratory in Montreal receives 25,000-28,000 samples a year, half of which are collected with Berlinger equipment and that, therefore, it must have analysed to date hundreds of thousands of such samples. She has not been aware of any incident involving Berlinger equipment being contaminated by a substance that could cause an AAF. In such circumstances, specific evidence would be required as to how the Berlinger equipment used for the sampling of the Player’s urine was contaminated. The Player has not provided any such evidence’).

2 ESTABLISHING THE RELIABILITY OF THE LABORATORY’S ADVERSE ANALYTICAL FINDING C6.19 Assuming that the Anti-Doping Organization is able to establish the identity and integrity of the sample to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel, it must then establish that the prohibited substance reported by the laboratory was present in that sample when the laboratory came to analyse it. To meet that burden, the Anti-Doping Organization has the analytical report produced by the laboratory, reporting the presence of the prohibited substance in the sample. If the Anti-Doping Organization can satisfy the hearing panel that that finding is reliable, it will have made out its prima facie case on the point.1 1 See Code Art 2.1.2: ‘Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1 is established by any of the following: presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete’s A Sample where the Athlete waives analysis of the B Sample and the B Sample is not analyzed; or, where the Athlete’s B  sample is analyzed and the analysis of the Athlete’s B  Sample confirms the presence of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found in the Athlete’s A Sample; […]’. See eg Football Federation of Australia v Hearfield, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 4 June 2013, para 9 (‘In the absence of any issue such as chain of custody, laboratory error or a TUE, the doping control forms and laboratory analyses are evidence that satisfies the elements of the alleged ADRV of presence’).

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  775

A Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on ‘procedural’ grounds C6.20 ‘Sample analysis is part of the Analytical Testing process and involves the detection, identification, and in some cases demonstration of the presence above a Threshold of Prohibited Substance(s) and/or their Metabolite(s), or Marker(s) of Use of Prohibited Substances or Prohibited Methods in human biological fluids or tissues’.1 Sample analysis is governed by the International Standard for Laboratories (ISL), which ‘sets out the requirements to be followed by Laboratories and WADAApproved Laboratories for the ABP that wish to demonstrate that they are technically competent, operate within an effective Management System, and are able to produce forensically valid results’.2 Further mandatory requirements are set out in Technical Documents, which are considered part of the ISL,3 and ‘provide direction to Laboratories […] on specific technical or procedural issues’,4 and in Technical Letters, which ‘provide direction to the Laboratories […] on particular issues on the analysis, interpretation and reporting of results for specific Prohibited Substance(s) and/or Prohibited Method(s) or on the application of specific Laboratory procedures’, and again are ‘an integral part of the ISL’.5 There are also laboratory guidelines and technical notes, but these contain (respectively) best practice recommendations and guidance, and therefore are not mandatory requirements.6 ‘Any aspect of Analytical Testing or management not specifically discussed in this document [the ISL] or in the relevant Technical Documents, Technical Letters or Laboratory Guidelines shall be governed by ISO/IEC 17025’.7 1 2019 ISL Art 1.3. In relation to the analytical process generally, see Catlin et al, ‘Testing urine for drugs’, (1992) Clinica Chimica Acta 207, S13–S26. 2 2019 ISL Art 1.1. 3 Code p 136, App One, definition of International Standards: ‘International Standards shall include any Technical Documents issued pursuant to the International Standard’. 4 2019 ISL Art 1.2.1. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, Art 1.2.3 and Art 1.2.4. 7 Ibid, Art 5.1.

C6.21 The Anti-Doping Organization will need to show that the laboratory followed the applicable procedures set out in the ISL and the Technical Documents and Technical Letters when it analysed the sample in question.1 It is greatly assisted in this task by Code Art 3.2.2, which provides that ‘WADA-accredited laboratories, and other laboratories approved by WADA, are presumed to have conducted Sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard for Laboratories’. This ‘presumption of regularity’2 means that the Anti-Doping Organization, ‘in the establishment of an anti-doping rule violation, is not called to give evidence of the application of the relevant rules concerning the conduct of the analysis and the custodial procedures’.3 Instead, as long as the Anti-Doping Organization can show that the laboratory that carried out the analysis was WADAaccredited,4 and that that accreditation covers the analytical procedures used in the case in question,5 the presumption arises under Code Art 3.2.2 that the analytical procedures were carried out by the laboratory in accordance with the ISL, and therefore that they were carried out properly, and so the adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory is reliable.6 1 See Code p 136, App One, definition of ‘International Standards’ (‘Compliance with an International Standard (as opposed to another alternative standard, practice or procedure) shall be sufficient to conclude that the procedures addressed in the Standard were performed properly. International Standards shall include any Technical Documents issued pursuant to the International Standard’); ISL Art 1.2. See also Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS  2009/A/1752 and CAS  2009/A/1753, para  5.15 (‘A  WADA-accredited laboratory such as the Beijing Laboratory must conduct sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard of Laboratories in order to justify the burden of strict liability and the severe penalties which are imposed by the IOC

776  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement ADR  2008 on an athlete’) and at para  6.10 (‘Doping is an offence which requires the application of strict rules. If an athlete is to be sanctioned solely on the basis of the provable presence of a prohibited substance in his body, it is his or her fundamental right to know that the Respondent, as the Testing Authority, including the WADA-accredited laboratory working with it, has strictly observed the mandatory safeguards’); dissenting opinion in USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 61 (‘As athletes have strict liability rules, the laboratories should be held strictly liable for their failure to abide by the rules and sound scientific practice’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/139. 2 Freibergs v IOC, CAS 2014/A/3604, para 41 (‘[…] the Panel reminds itself of the principle “omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta” – the presumption of regularity. In the context of the sensitive area of drug testing in sport, the presumption is codified in Article 3.2 of the WADC […]’). 3 IAAF v AFS & Javornik, CAS 2008/A/1608, para 56. 4 WADA v FPF & Costa Fernandes, CAS 2012/A/2922, para 142 (‘Given […] the revocation of the LADETEC’s WADA accreditation, the Panel cannot reasonably rely on the presumption set forth in article 14 ADR’ (the equivalent to Code Art 3.2.2). The laboratory that reported the presence of testosterone in Diane Modahl’s sample was IOCaccredited (this was the pre-WADA era), but had failed to notify the IOC that it had moved the site of its facilities, and had carried out the analysis of Modahl’s sample at the new site. Modahl’s argument that it therefore did not qualify as an IOC-accredited laboratory received short shrift in the House of Lords: Modahl v BAF Ltd (22 July 1999, unreported) (Hoffman LJ). See also Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 51 (rejecting athlete’s submission that laboratory and/or method it used to detect testosterone in athlete’s sample were not accredited, and therefore holding the laboratory was entitled to the presumption that it conducted sample analysis in accordance with the ISL). See also Freibergs v IOC, CAS 2014/A/3604, paras 43-45 (‘The Appellant’s challenge is based on the contention that the Sochi Laboratory was not registered in Russia as a legal entity, and according to the Appellant, such an unregistered organization is not authorized to carry out any activity in Russia, indeed did not even exist in a point of law. […] The Panel notes that the Appellant’s approach to this issue is a very formalistic one. While it might have been preferable for all the formal requirements of local laws to be strictly observed, the Panel emphasizes that, in the context of international sport, the competence of laboratories to carry out analysis of doping samples is defined in the WADC. The Panel had no expert evidence from either side as to the consequences of non-registration in Russian law but, in its view whatever those consequences might be matters not. The Sochi Laboratory was a satellite facility of the WADA accredited laboratory in Moscow. Before the Sochi Games, the World AntiDoping Agency (“WADA”) had evaluated the capability of the Sochi Laboratory in due course and issued its official accreditation for the Sochi Laboratory for the time period running from 27 January 2014 to 15 April 2014. The accreditation certificate confirms that the Sochi Laboratory was properly recognised as such by the President of the WADA’). On the other hand, the accreditation procedures for laboratories include provisions for penalty points for laboratories that have reported false positives or false negatives, and for suspension or even revocation of accreditation in cases of serious non-conformity. See 2019  ISL Art 7.3. In Anderson Luis de Souza v CBG & FIFA, CAS 2013/A/3395, the footballer Deco challenged the reliability of the Brazilian laboratory’s report that HCT and tamoxifen were present in his sample on the ground that a few months after reporting that finding, the laboratory had had its accreditation revoked by WADA. The case was closed after the Lausanne laboratory re-tested the sample and returned a negative finding, and so the argument in relation to revoked accreditation was not addressed in that case. A similar argument was addressed, however, in UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13  September 2017, para  57, where the sole arbitrator ruled as follows: ‘The starting point of the analysis is Article  3.2.2 ADR. According thereto “WADA-accredited laboratories, and other laboratories approved by WADA, are presumed to have conducted Sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard for Laboratories.” The Laboratory where the analysis of the Rider’s blood sample was conducted is WADA-accredited. Thus, the presumption contained in Article 3.2.2 ADR applies. The Rider submits that on 24 June 2016 the accreditation of the laboratory had been withdrawn by WADA. However, this allegation does not change the fact that at the time when the analysis was performed the Laboratory was accredited. In fact, all samples included in the Rider’s ABP were analysed at a time when the Laboratory was validly accredited. The Rider has not submitted why the withdrawal of the accreditation in June 2016 would also affect the analysis of a sample in September 2015. The only argument advanced by the Rider is that “any irregularities [on which the withdrawal of the accreditation on 24 June 2016 is based] must have occurred prior to that period”. However, the Rider did not explain when the (alleged) irregularities occurred and to what kind of analysis they related. Thus, the Single Judge sees no reason not to apply Article 3.2.2 ADR to the case at hand. Contrary to the Rider’s submission, it is, therefore, not up to the UCI to establish that “the testing and analytical process did reliably and validly demonstrate the presence of a prohibited substance.” In addition, there is no evidence on file that the analysis of the sample by the Laboratory produced any incorrect values to the detriment of the athlete’). See also IBU  v Sleptsova, ADHP decision dated 11 February 2020, para 298 (accepting that after a site visit to the Moscow laboratory, WADA reported a departure from the ISL requirements relating to chain of custody, and imposed a corrective action that required the Moscow laboratory to review and evaluate its entire chain of

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  777 custody system, nevertheless ‘[a] signalled corrective action does not cast sufficient doubt on the appropriateness of the Laboratory’s chain of custody nor does it cast sufficient doubt on the integrity of all samples analysed at the time so as to invalidate the Athlete’s analytical results within the LIMS data’, in circumstances where other evidence exists that adequately identifies the athlete’s sample, and given that ‘the fact that no Chain of Custody Forms are available is likely to result from the many efforts undertaken to hide and manipulate data at the time’) and para 324 (‘The Panel accepts that every single assessment, either by an ISO body or by WADA, identifies some room for improvement of the laboratory procedures. The laboratory must react by adjusting its procedures and implementing corrective actions to improve the processes within the laboratory. Because the Moscow Laboratory was not suspended after these assessments but rather remained fully operational before and during the 2014 Olympic Winter Game (ie the time frame of the samples in question), there is no evidence that WADA’s recommendations after the site visit invalidated any of its analytical data or caused the PAAF [presumptive adverse analytical finding]’). In addition, the CAS panel in WADA v Chernova & RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112, at para 90, noted that ‘WADA-accredited laboratories must also maintain their accreditation under the international “ISO/IEC  17025” standard, through accreditation with a relevant nationally recognized body for accreditation of laboratories (Article  4.4.1)’, and required proof that such accreditation had been maintained in order to accept that ‘the Laboratory was duly accredited during the testing of Ms Chernova’s sample’. On the other hand, it also found that ‘even if the Laboratory were not accredited to the international “ISO/IEC 17025” standard, quod non, this would itself be insufficient for a finding that such a departure could reasonably have caused an Adverse Analytical Finding, in particular in light of the Laboratory’s WADA-accreditation during the testing period’. Ibid, para 92. 5 Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 110 (‘[…] not only must the Laboratory that conducts the analysis be accredited but the Test method used must also be validated and covered by the Laboratory’s accreditation’). The CAS panel in Veerpalu rejected the athlete’s argument that the laboratory was not accredited to carry out the analytical technique it had applied to detect hGH in his sample. Ibid, paras 111–112. See also Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 147 (‘The Panel is of the opinion that a CAS panel cannot place in question whether an ISO accreditation was correctly attributed to a laboratory, because this would render the whole international standardization and certification system meaningless and because, notoriously, compliance with ISO accreditation requirements is regularly checked by external auditors. However, a CAS panel may certainly verify whether a given method used by a laboratory is covered by the accreditation or not’). 6 Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 9.12 (‘[…] the presumption under the rules is that WADAaccredited laboratory results are reliable’); Lei Cao v IOC, CAS  2017/A/4974, paras 77–78 (‘[…] The Appellant is of the opinion that it is the onus of the IOC to prove that no departure from the ISL occurred. 78. Contrary to the Appellant’s view and according to Article  3.2.1  IOC ADR, it is not the IOC’s but the Athlete’s burden to establish “that a departure from the International Standard occurred which could reasonably have caused” the AAF’); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9  November 2005, paras 34–35 (‘WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to have conducted testing and custodial procedures in accordance with the appropriate standards. […] Therefore, USADA met its initial burden of proving Mr Wade’s doping violation based on producing Mr Wade’s positive test results from a WADA-approved laboratory’); IBAF v Luque, IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 December 2010, para 4.4 (‘According to the definition of “International Standard” in the IBAF ADR, if that [adverse analytical] finding is a product of procedures that complied with the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories, then that is sufficient to conclude that the procedures were sound (and therefore the findings are reliable). And IBAF ADR Art 3.2 provides that WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to have complied with the International Standard for Laboratories and that it is for the athlete to prove otherwise. In other words, it is presumed that adverse analytical findings issued by WADA-accredited laboratories are reliable, and the burden is on the athlete to adduce evidence that suggests otherwise’). An adverse analytical finding by a WADA-accredited laboratory is not undermined by a negative finding by a non-accredited laboratory; the latter is to be disregarded. WADA  v FMF & Carmona, CAS 2006/A/1149, paras 49–50.

C6.22 However, the Code Art 3.2.2 presumption of regularity is rebuttable. Code Art 3.2.2 states: ‘The Athlete or other Person may rebut this presumption by establishing a departure from the International Standard for Laboratories occurred which could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding’.

According to the case law, this means the athlete must first show, on the balance of probabilities,1 facts that demonstrate a departure from one of the mandatory requirements2 of the International Standard for Laboratories3 or one of the supporting

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WADA Technical Documents.4 It is not enough to show a departure from any other rule or standard,5 or from a requirement of national law.6 However, the athlete cannot stop there: as well as showing a departure from a mandatory ISL/TD requirement, the athlete must also show (in a change introduced by the 2009 Code) that the departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse analytical finding7 (or, following Campbell-Brown, could plausibly have caused the adverse analytical finding8). The athlete will need evidence to discharge this burden, not just speculation.9 1 Code Art 3.1. 2 It is not enough to show that (for example) the laboratory technicians involved in the analysis did not seem to have full training or experience on particular instruments, unless that showing demonstrates a departure from the requirements of the ISL: USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 311, aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also NADA v Sinkewitz, CAS 2012/A/2857, para 183 (‘The difference between the ratios found in kit 1 of the Aand B-sample, respectively, was claimed to be beyond the intra-assay variability of 10% provided in the hGH  Guidelines. However, this figure is not a requirement provided in the ISL but a mere recommendation formulated in the hGH Guidelines and, according to the expert witnesses heard at the hearing, an exceeding of this figure cannot reasonably cause a false AAF’). In addition, it is not enough to show that the laboratory did not do something that the ISL states it ‘should’ do, because ‘should’ is not mandatory (see para B1.56 n2). Instead, the athlete must show that the laboratory did not do something that the ISL states it ‘shall’ or ‘must’ do: USADA v Landis, AAA  Panel decision dated 20  September 2007, para  240 (‘Had the drafters intended that matrix interference be avoided it would require wording such as “shall” or “must”‘) and para  267 (‘The actual language of the document is not obligatory. The word “should” would have to be replaced by mandatory language such as “shall” or “must” had the draftsperson intended this to be an obligatory requirement’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS  2007/A/1394. See also WADA  v FMF & Cermona, CAS 2006/A/1149, para 42 (ISL provision that analysis of B Sample ‘should be completed within 30 days’ of notice of the A sample result ‘simply states a best standard to be applied if the analysis of the ‘B’ sample is requested; it does not suggest that if the analysis takes place more than 30 days after notification of the result of the ‘A’ sample analysis, the result of the ‘B’ sample analysis must be disregarded’); E  & A  v IBU, CAS  2009/A/1931, para  42 (‘[…] the language in this section is permissive and while it may be ideal to have the results reported within that timeframe, it is not always possible, or even advisable. There is, therefore, no departure from the 2008 ISL, such that it could have caused the AAF, or even contributed to it’); WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 126 (‘[…] the timeline set by Article 5.2.6.5 of the ISL expresses the intent of the rule that the laboratories should proceed without undue delay, especially when taking in consideration the wording of the provision (“should”) rather than, for example, “must”). See further cases cited at para C6.8, n 3. 3 The athlete will need to produce evidence of such a departure, not just speculation. Lei Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, paras 77-78 (‘[…] The Appellant is of the opinion that it is the onus of the IOC to prove that no departure from the ISL occurred. 78. Contrary to the Appellant’s view and according to Article 3.2.1 IOC ADR, it is not the IOC’s but the Athlete’s burden to establish “that a departure from the International Standard occurred which could reasonably have caused” the AAF’) and para 81 (‘The mere allegation that departures of whatever kind might have occurred does not meet the standard of proof necessary under Article  3.2.1  IOC ADR to rebut the presumption that WADA-accredited laboratories have conducted the sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the ISL’); UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, para 61 (‘Mr Landaluce may not simply indicate that “something could potentially be wrong”, but must indeed prove that there was a violation of the ISL’); UCI v Forde, CAS 2006/A/1057, para 62 (‘The Panel, based on objective criteria, must be convinced of the occurrence of alleged errors to put into question the reliability of the GC/C/IRMS. In the present case, the exculpatory evidence required could have been disclosed in the form of an expertise enabling to question the entire testing and reporting process, by indicating different indices of inconsistencies in the LNDD testing process, such as errors during transmittal of electronic data to paper, poor recordkeeping processes, inaccuracies of the testing procedures and reporting procedures. The contentions made by the Respondents [ie that ‘according to scientific literature, the GC/C/IRMS analysis is a very complex method, which has been proven to be faulty’ (para 61)] were not substantiated by anything concrete. As a result, the Panel considers that their allegations are not established and do not suffice to put into question the quality of the GC/C/IRMS test itself or to reverse the presumption implemented by Art 18 of the Anti-Doping Rules, according to which WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to have conducted sample analysis in accordance with the international standards for laboratory analysis’); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para 46 (‘Mr Wade next argues that third-party gross negligence or tampering must have occurred. However, Mr Wade provides no evidence in support of this assertion. The Barcelona Laboratory, a WADA-credited laboratory, is “presumed to have conducted sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard.” IAAF Rule 33.4(a). Since Mr Wade has not presented any evidence to rebut this presumption, the Panel must reject this argument’); UCI  v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 72 (‘The Single Judge finds that the Rider’s allegations are simply

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  779

4

5

6

7

not sufficiently substantiated within the above meaning. The Rider does not refer to a single provision of the ISL that has allegedly been breached. This, however, is the very first condition that must be fulfilled in order for the Rider to discharge his burden of the presentation of facts. Since the Rider wants to derive his legal position from a rule that requires a deviation from the ISL, the Rider must explain which provision of the ISL and how it has been breached. It is simply not sufficient to dump a bucket of generic allegations with no link to the applicable provisions on the table of the Single Judge and expect the latter to make any sense out of it. This is all the more true, considering that the Rider is assisted by legal counsel’). See also by way of analogy the cases cited at para C6.10, n 4; and pre-Code case Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/A/156, para 12.3.2.6 (‘[…] the general suggestion that laboratory error is always a possibility and more likely than commonly believed is no evidence that a laboratory error was made in this particular case’). The athletes satisfied this requirement in Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS  2009/A/1753, paras 5.52–5.59 (variances in values reported from IRMS analysis of A  and B  samples constituted a departure from the ISL requirement that results must be reproducible), para  5.124, and para  5.137 (departure from requirement to document quality control procedures properly). Cf Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 81 (rejecting a similar argument on the facts). USADA  v Landis AAA  Panel decision dated 20  September 2007, paras 154–157 (noting that the ISL incorporates the WADA  Technical Documents and – where the ISL itself makes no specific provision on a particular point but ISO 17025 does – ISO 17025 as well, so that ‘violations of the ISO 17025 or of WADA Technical Documents can be violations of the ISL for purposes of rebutting the initial presumption favouring the Lab that an AAF has been established’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. Landis v USADA, CAS  2007/A/1394, para  53 (‘[…] the Panel must take the ISL as it is written and reasonably construed and not proceed by expanding or raising the ISL and then judging the performance of the LNDD by that revised more stringent standard. […] Proving some other alternative standard and its breach is of no consequence in attempting to rebut the presumption favouring the laboratory’); UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 72 (‘Insofar as the Rider refers – inter alia – to (alleged) violations of the ISO 17025 this is of no avail in the present context and within the scope of the ADR 2012’). For example, it is irrelevant to show that a scientific research laboratory or a criminal analysis laboratory might be required to comply with higher standards; all that matters is whether the WADAaccredited laboratory met the requirements of the ISL on the point in question. USADA  v Landis, AAA  Panel decision dated 20  September 2007, para  151 (‘[…] the Rider may only successfully rebut the presumption favouring the Lab by showing a deviation or departure from an [International Standard]. This is the only relevant evidence to determine if the Athlete’s attempt to rebut the presumption of Art 18 may be successful. Proving some other procedure, practice or alternative standard is of no consequence in rebutting the presumption favouring the Lab’), para 240 (‘[…] only a deviation or departure from the ISL is relevant. Therefore, evidence of scientific or criminal labs and their standards and practises is of no consequence in rebutting the presumption favouring an antidoping Lab’) and para 273 (same), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also USADA v Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008, para 110 (‘[…] the purpose and scope of the ISL preclude an adjudicative body or panel from imposing a higher or other standard on a USADAaccredited laboratory in order to establish the laboratory’s compliance with the rules’). WADA v FCF and Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 130 (‘Even though Ms Barragan, Ms Gonzalez and Ms Toscano were independent contractors, the Panel agrees with WADA that Article 5.4.2.1 of the ISL specifically contemplates that laboratory staff includes both employees and those “under contract to” the laboratory and, as such, there was no departure from the ISL. The Athletes and FCF refer to Colombian law in an effort to distinguish Ms Barragan, Ms Gonzales and/or Ms Toscano from laboratory staff and argue that they were not authorized staff. However, the Panel notes that the ISL are international standards intended to achieve harmonization across WADA-accredited laboratories, and interpreting them based on national law would defeat this purpose’). Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS  2009/A/1752 and CAS  2009/A/1753, para  4.10 (‘[…] in addition to being charged with the burden of showing that a departure from the ISL has occurred as required under the WADC 2003, the athlete is now forced to bear the burden of proof to establish that the departure had not only occurred, but also that it had reasonably caused the Adverse Analytical Finding. This is a substantial change from the burden of proving the mere fact of a departure from the ISL. As before, the IOC bears the burden of disproving reasonable causality’); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS  2011/A/2612, para  68 (confirming requirement on athlete to prove not only departure from required procedures but also that that departure ‘could reasonably have caused the AAF’); Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 98 (‘[…] the standard to rebut a presumption of ISL compliance is to show that there was an ISL violation and that it is more likely than not that this non-compliance led to a false positive. If this is shown, the relevant respondent would then have to establish that the noncompliance did not cause the AAF’), para 99 (‘[…] given that the Test was performed by a WADAaccredited laboratory, the Appellant has to show that it is more likely than not that any deviation from the ISL could have caused a false positive finding. Only if the Appellant can establish this would the burden of proof shift to the Respondent’), and para 134 (rejecting argument that finding should be disregarded because delay between collection and centrifugation of blood sample was longer

780  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement than the 36 hours recommended by the WADA  Guidelines for Blood Sample Collection, because the evidence was that that delay would if anything cause a false negative finding rather than a false positive finding); IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, paras 359-360 (‘IAAF Rule 33.3(b) provides as follows: “Methods of Establishing Facts and Presumptions […] The following rules of proof shall be applicable in doping cases: […] (b) Departures from any other International Standard or other antidoping rule or policy which did not cause an Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation shall not invalidate such results. If the Athlete of other Person establishes that a departure from another International Standard or other antidoping rule or policy has occurred which could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation, then the IAAF, the Member or other prosecuting authority shall have the burden of establishing that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation.” The Panel [citing WADA v Chernova & RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112, para 85] also recalls the CAS jurisprudence: “therefore, the Panel deems a mere reference to a departure from the ISL insufficient, in the absence of a credible link of such departure to a resulting Adverse Analytical Finding. In other words, in order for an athlete to meet his/her burden and thus effectively shift the burden to an anti-doping organization, the athlete must establish, on the balance of probabilities, (i) that there is a specific (not hypothetical) departure from the ISL; and (ii) that such departure could have reasonably, and thus credibly, caused a misreading of the analysis. Further, the Panel remarks that such athlete’s rebuttal functions only to shift the burden of proof to the anti-doping organization, which may then show, to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction, that the departure did not cause a misreading of the analysis”‘); World Athletics v Marimuthu, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/287/2019 dated 26  May 2020, para  132 (‘According to Articles  3.2.2 and 3.2.3 IAAF ADR quoted above, an athlete must establish a specific departure(s) from ISL and/or ISTI and to demonstrate that such a departure could have reasonably caused an AAF. Crucially, in this case all arguments put forward by the Athlete did not satisfy this condition – not only she did not indicate a certain rule of the ISL and/or the ISTI from which an alleged departure occurred, she did not even try to demonstrate a possible scenario, mentioning concentrations of 19-NA, that could have possibly caused the presence of 19-NA in her samples which, as evident from the relevant LDPs, were all sealed, with Sample numbers matching’). See eg  De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS  2010/A/2174, para  9.16 (‘[…] the Appellant does not indicate a particular part of the chain of custody where a mixing up of samples (and not just the documents issued for the various samples) could have occurred. He generically contests its validity, without giving any explanations other than the notification of a wrong Adverse Analytical Finding on 6 October 2009. However, this does not cast doubt on the reliability of the chain of custody. Therefore, the Panel does not follow the Athlete’s arguments that the tested sample was possibly not his’); UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS  2010/A/2235, para  82 (endorsing first instance panel’s conclusion that athlete had shown departures but had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the departures caused the analytical results now under challenge); Ohlsson v WSU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6  January 2009, pp 27–28 (endorsing first instance panel’s finding that a failure to include list of lab staff involved in test in test documentation package was a departure from TD2003LDOC but did not cause the adverse analytical finding); IBU  v Yaroshenko, IBU  Doping Hearing Panel decision dated 11 August 2009, paras 55–56 (‘The alleged irregularities, submitted by the Athlete, however, are not of a kind to be able to cause a false positive. Furthermore, the expert testimony of Dr Gmeiner confirmed to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that the errors which were corrected later do not affect the original results of the analysis and, hence, the adverse analytical finding. Moreover, these corrections pertain to the A sample analysis, exclusively’). In Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, the athlete, whose sample had tested positive for DHEA, alleged that the laboratory had departed from the requirements of the ISL by failing to run negative controls during IRMS analysis, and because a deviation between the etio and andro values in the athlete’s A  and B  samples showed that the laboratory had departed from the ISL requirement for robust and reproducible results. He also argued that the 2009 version of Code Art 3.2.1, requiring the athlete to show the ISL departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse finding, should not apply in his case, because his sample was collected in December 2008. He noted that the amended rule ‘imposes a much heavier burden on the athlete because he now has to prove a causal link between the ISL violation and the AAF. This burden is rendered all the heavier by the fact that the evidence of such a link will often be in the possession of the laboratory or no longer in existence. [6.1.1.3] Further, the Appellant argued that ISL 5.4.4.2.1 and 5.4.7.3 are unique, because they speak to the reliability of the laboratory’s results. A breach of these ISLs means that it can never be known if the analysis that results in the AAF was performed properly or if the results are reliable. This renders any requirement on the athlete to prove a causal link between the ISL violation and the AAF inapplicable’. Ibid, paras 6.1.1.23. The CAS panel found that neither alleged failing amounted to a departure from the requirements of the ISL (Ibid, paras 9.4 and 9.5), and therefore did not have to address that argument. The requirement of proof that the alleged departure could have caused the adverse analytical finding originates in pre-Code case law such as SLV and Gasser v IAAF, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 18 January 1988, reported in Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP  Editrice, 2000), pp  117–119, where the hearing panel held that mere proof by the athlete of departures from the guidelines was not enough; the athlete also had to show that the failures ‘affected

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  781 or could have affected the finding on the analysis of his or her urine of a doping substance therein’. Gasser took her argument to the English High Court, where she argued that a failure to follow the procedural guidelines for the collection and testing of samples ‘in any material respect’ renders the result of the test inadmissible as a basis for the suspension of the athlete concerned. Mr Justice Scott rejected this submission, accepting instead the submission of the IAAF that the defect in procedure must have ‘rendered the result of the test unreliable or unfair to the athlete’. He did not specify who should bear the burden on this point, but he did say: ‘If important safeguards for the athlete provided by the Guidelines have not been observed, prima facie at least it seems to me that the failure would require a conclusion that the testing procedure adopted could not be regarded as reliable or fair […]’. On the facts, however, he found that the failures did not render the test results unreliable in Gasser’s case. See Gasser v Stinson (14 June 1988, unreported), QBD (Scott J). In Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 15, the CAS panel affirmed ‘consistent CAS case law which makes clear that deviations from the testing procedures prescribed by the relevant federation rules will only invalidate the results of an analysis where they are sufficiently material as to call into question the reliability of the test’. However, the athlete was not required to prove that the departure could have caused the adverse analytical finding in the 2003 Code, but only from the 2009 Code on. 8 See para C6.15. 9 Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 131 (‘In the Panel’s view, the degradation of the samples due either to the temperature at which they were transported or to freezing/thawing is only a speculative assumption made by the Appellant’s experts, respectable as such in general terms, but uncorroborated in any manner by scientific evidence concerning the actual samples analysed by the Cologne Lab. Mere speculation that something might have occurred is not probable proof that it did actually occur’); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS  2011/A/2612, para  137 (‘[…] the Appellant has not demonstrated that any shortcomings or violations of the ISL in the pre-analytical handling, alleged or otherwise could have led to a false positive finding. Although the Appellant argues that the alleged deviations from the ISL increased the chance of false positive results, the Appellant has not provided evidence to indicate that the particular departures at stake in these proceedings could reasonably have led to an AAF’); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para 46 (‘Mr Wade next argues that third-party gross negligence or tampering must have occurred. However, Mr Wade provides no evidence in support of this assertion. The Barcelona Laboratory, a WADA-credited laboratory, is “presumed to have conducted sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard.” IAAF Rule 33.4(a). Since Mr Wade has not presented any evidence to rebut this presumption, the Panel must reject this argument’).

C6.23 Under the 2003 Code, once the athlete established there had been a departure from the requirements of the ISL, the burden immediately switched to the Anti-Doping Organization to show that that departure did not cause the adverse finding reported by the laboratory.1 However, CAS panels stretched the analysis in a number of cases to find that charges should be dismissed where the athlete had not been given a fair opportunity to attend the analysis of his B sample,2 or where the laboratory had allowed the same staff member to be involved in the analysis of both the A sample and the B sample,3 even though there was little or no evidence that these clear departures from the requirements of the ISL could have caused the laboratory’s adverse analytical findings in respect of those samples. In effect, the CAS was adapting a per se rule, saying that the rights of the athlete are so limited in respect of analysis of samples that any failure to respect such rights should lead to dismissal of the charges, irrespective of whether or not that failure could have had any impact on the analytical results. In response, the Code was changed in 2009 so that the athlete must show not only a departure but also that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse finding. In addition, the requirements of the ISL in respect of B sample analysis were diluted.4 However, a CAS panel was persuaded in 2010 to maintain the per se doctrine notwithstanding this express language (perhaps because it does not appear to have been made aware of the change).5 In 2017, the CAS panel in Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA noted that: ‘CAS jurisprudence […] developed a distinction according the nature of the breach of the relevant rules affecting an athlete’s rights with respect to the B  sample analysis: in “normal deviations”, the principle imposed in Article  3.2.2 of the WADC […] applies, and therefore departures which could not have caused the AAF do not invalidate the test result; however, if the breach of the rules concerns the

782  Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement rights which are deemed “fundamental” for safeguarding the athlete’s interests in the analysis of his/her B sample, the causality requirement imposed in Article 3.2.2 of the WADC shall not be applied and the analysis result shall be deemed invalid regardless of the actual effect – or any potential effect – of the breach on the results of the analysis. [100] In such context, this Panel would be called to verify whether any departure from the ISL occurred when the Athlete’s samples were analysed by the Laboratory, and, if so, whether it constituted a “fundamental breach”, before examining the existence and relevance of any impact on the AAF’.6

The 2021 Code attempts to limit this CAS-made doctrine by giving the Anti-Doping Organization the opportunity to prove that the lack of notice could not reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding, although it remains to be seen whether this attempt fares any better than the previous attempt, in the 2009 Code.7 Where the exception does not apply, however, the athlete will have to show that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding.8 1 Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 162 and passim. 2 There were two pre-Code cases on this issue, and one case under the 2003 Code: (a) In Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 15, the athlete argued that the analytical results in respect of his sample should be ignored because the FIG had breached the requirement in its own rules to give the athlete notice of and an opportunity to attend the confirmatory analysis of the B sample. The panel noted (paras 24–25): ‘The Appellant argues that the Respondent’s failure to communicate the relevant information to her federation violated one of the few rights an athlete has in the course of the doping test procedure. […] In order to assess the consequences of the Respondent’s breach of its own rules, the Panel has to examine the importance of this provision. It must take into account the reasons for which an athlete should ordinarily be informed of the time and date of the opening of the B-sample. As a matter of principle, the Panel is of the opinion that, even if a procedural error is unlikely to affect the result of a B-sample analysis, such error can be so serious as to lead to the invalidity of the entire testing procedure’. The panel noted that the purpose of the requirement to give notice of and an opportunity to attend the B sample analysis was to enable the athlete to confirm for himself ‘that the correct container with the number of the athlete’s urine sample is being opened and that at the time of opening the seal was intact; in addition the representative may also check the state of the urine sample at that time. In the event that at this stage variations or irregularities are apparent then these can be noted and can be used later to challenge the test results’. The panel said it was ‘inclined to view the procedural error committed in this case as compromising the limited rights of an athlete to such an extent that the results of the analysis of the B sample and thus the entire urine test must be disregarded’, but expressly noted that it could leave the issue undecided, because other evidence in the case established the ADRV to the required standard of proof. (b) See also Beaton and Scholes v Equestrian Federation of Australia, CAS 2003/A/477, paras 27– 30 (dismissing charge where riders were not given opportunity to attend B sample analysis). (c) In Varis v IBU, CAS 2008/A/1607, para 108, the athlete’s sample tested positive for rEPO. This was her second violation and therefore the IBU Executive Board imposed a life ban. However, the CAS panel found that the IBU had departed from the requirement in the ISL to make reasonable attempts to accommodate an athlete’s preferred dates for analysis of the B sample. The panel noted that the departure did not render the adverse analytical finding invalid, but rather put the burden on the IBU to show that the departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding. Ibid, para 112. However, it decided on a different test: ‘In our view, the issue is not whether the IBU can prove that presence of the Appellant’s representative would have made no difference to the outcome. The issue is whether the IBU’s failure to follow the applicable rules by failing to make reasonable attempts to accommodate the Appellant’s request for a different testing date invalidates the “B” sample result’. Ibid, para 115. It noted: ‘Because of the significance of the consequences for an athlete facing a life ban as a result of an alleged anti-doping rule violation, it is important that procedures are followed correctly and that information concerning the rights and remedies of an athlete is communicated clearly’. Ibid, para 107. Noting that ‘athletes’ rights during the course of the sample collection and testing process are relatively limited. This makes it even more important that those rights are respected and adhered to’, the CAS panel ruled that the B sample analysis ‘should not be accepted as part of the IBU’s case against the Appellant’. Ibid, para 119. It therefore upheld her appeal against the finding she had committed a second violation, and so vacated the lifetime ban that had been imposed on her. 3 In a pre-Code case, B v FINA, CAS 2001/A/337, para 54, a CAS panel found that, contrary to the requirements of FINA’s doping procedural rules, the same laboratory staff member had analysed both the athlete’s A  sample and his B  sample, but concluded that this departure had not influenced the reliability of the analytical results. See also Wang Lu Na & others v FINA, CAS 98/A/208 (upholding sanction where same analyst who analysed the A sample was involved in at least testing the controls in the analysis of the B  sample). Cf FINA  v J, FINA  Doping Panel decision 06/01, FINA  Doping

Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample  783 Panel Judgements 2001–2005 (FINA  2006), p  83 (doping charge based on alleged presence of 19-norandrosterone in athlete’s sample dismissed where, among other things, B sample was analysed by same personnel as had analysed A sample). In a 2003 Code case, UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, the laboratory acknowledged that the same analyst who conducted the B sample analysis had been materially involved in the A sample analysis (ie  actually touching the sample, not just performing instrument set-up, or performance checks, or verifying results), which was therefore a clear departure from the requirements of ISL Art 5.2.4.3.2.2. In a split decision, a majority of the CAS panel found that the UCI had not demonstrated that this departure ‘was not at the origin of the adverse finding’ (it had simply asserted that the athlete had not established a departure that could have caused the finding, which was not enough, in the panel’s view), and therefore the CAS was required to exonerate the athlete. The majority distinguished Wang Lu Na v FINA, on the facts, and noted: ‘109 Although aware of the imperatives of costs and organisation faced by laboratories, the Panel must watch over the respect of fundamental rules, considering the implications that its decision could have on the reputation, and therefore, the career of the athlete, if a disciplinary sanction were to be pronounced against him. […] 111 It is virtually impossible to prove a negative fact, in this case that the involvement of the same analyst in both analyses did not affect the result. Therefore certain laboratory directors consider this rule too rigid; in reality, sufficient protection of the athletes is already ensured in that the system of identification of samples by codes ensures that their identity is not known to the analysts. 112 This reasoning, although rational and plausible, fails before the CAS for a very simple reason: the arbitrators do not create the rules, they apply them. This is all the more true because the authors of the antidoping regulation kept the rule which requires another analyst for the analysis of the B sample, even though they had heard the comments of the laboratory directors. The rules can certainly be modified or refined, but such is not the role of CAS. 113 The applicable rule is clear and devoid of flexibility. The CAS arbitrators’ mission is not to modify the rules nor is their mission to appropriate discretionary power when no text allows them to do so. 114 Note in passing that if cases are rare where the CAS exonerated the athlete based on the hypothesis that a laboratory failed to respect the protocols, this is explained by the fact that the disciplinary authorities know how strict the arbitrators are in this domain and do not charge athletes – even in very suspect cases – when the analyses have not been done according to the rules. 115 The Panel does emphasise the LNDD’s Staff’s good faith, which is not in question. … 117 In any case, the present decision does not constitute a declaration of innocence of Mr Landaluce with regard to the antidoping rules. Mr Landaluce merely benefits from a rule that is formal and yet fundamental, which aims to guarantee the rights of persons subject to doping control tests’. This reasoning is open to question. Proof of a departure from the mandatory requirements of the ISL does not mandate automatic dismissal of the charge. Instead, Code Art 3.2.2 (or Code Art 3.2.1, as it then was) requires the hearing panel to determine whether such departure caused the adverse analytical finding in question. The implicit reasoning of the hearing panel in Landaluce appears to be that, because the Anti-Doping Organization is looking to apply a rule of strict liability, it must be able to show clearly that it has followed its own rules, whether or not non-compliance has any material effect. See cases cited at para C6.21, n 1; and the dissenting opinion in USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20  September 2007, para  61 (‘As athletes have strict liability rules, the laboratories should be held strictly liable for their failure to abide by the rules and sound scientific practice’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/139. Two first instance hearing panels followed Landaluce in dismissing doping charges based on adverse analytical findings where the same analyst was materially involved in analysis of both the A  and B  samples. FINA  v Oliva, FINA  Doping Panel decision dated 18  January 2007; USADA  v Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008. In Jenkins, the AAA Panel found there had been a departure in that the same analyst had ‘handled the sample in both ‘A’ and ‘B’ sample procedures’. Ibid, para 45 (rejecting USADA argument that there was no departure because the analyst conducted a different part of the procedures in respect of the B sample to those he had conducted in respect of the A sample). The panel ruled (ibid, para 136): ‘In view of the grave implications for athletes, such as Ms Jenkins, who are held strictly to account for any transgression of applicable anti-doping rules, testing laboratories must also be held strictly to account for any non-compliance with those same rules. Failure to comply with the mandatory standard contained in ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 cannot be viewed as a mere technicality. The strict liability regime which underlies the anti-doping system requires strict compliance with the anti-doping rules by everyone involved in the administration of the antidoping regime in order to procure the integrity of fair and competitive sport’. The panel noted that that departure in itself did not invalidate the test results, but USADA had the burden of showing that the departure did not undermine the validity of the test results, and it did not discharge that burden by showing that IRMS analysis at another laboratory had confirmed the positive finding, because the second laboratory had made the same departure from the ISL, and ‘[t]wo wrongs do not make a right’. Ibid, 155. The AAA Panel therefore dismissed the charges, even while noting that ‘the Panel has not

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found that the violation of the ISL caused the Respondent’s test results; nor has it determined whether the Respondent did or did not use a prohibited substance such as to account for the test results at issue’. Ibid, para 162. Cf Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, paras 137–143 (analyst only prohibited from involvement in the B sample analysis where she came into direct physical contact with the A sample while it was open). Version 6.0 of the International Standard for Laboratories, which came into force on 1 January 2009, abolished the ‘same analyst’ prohibition. See discussion at E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 21 et seq and at Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 3.21. Wen Tong v IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161, para 9.8. The CAS panel followed Varis and Tchachina (see para C6.23, n 2) in ruling that the Anti-Doping Organization’s failure to observe the athlete’s ‘fundamental’ rights in respect of analysis of the B sample meant the results of the analysis ‘must be disregarded […] even if denial of that right “is unlikely to affect the result of the B sample analysis”‘, quoting Tchachina at para 26 and citing Varis at para 123. It appears from the decision that the IJF did not argue sufficiently or persuade the panel that the 2009 Code amendments effectively overturned Varis and Tchachina. Cf Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 167 (ruling that athlete only has right to attend ‘the performance of those analyses which are required to confirm the initial adverse analytical finding’); IOC v Chicherova, IOC Disciplinary Commission decision dated 4 October 2016, para 220 (right of athlete to attend B sample analysis were respected when IOC made several attempts to accommodate her and her representatives before going ahead with the analysis). Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & 5036, paras 99-100. The panel did not challenge the doctrine so developed but avoided having to apply it by finding on the facts that the athlete’s B sample rights had been materially respected. Ibid, paras 102–110. The panel did not detail the CAS cases that created this doctrine but they are Varis, Tchachina, and Wen Tong. Similarly, the CAS panel in Guinez v UCI et al, CAS 2016/A/4828, para 3, accepted that ‘according to well-established CAS jurisprudence, the athlete’s right to attend the opening and analysis of the B Sample is of fundamental importance and if not respected, the B Sample results may be disregarded’, making the analytical results for both samples inadmissible to establish an Art 2.1 presence violation. It continued: ‘That conclusion does not, however, apply to article  2.2 of the UCI ADR. Indeed it equally follows from the CAS jurisprudence, that the fact that the analytical results of a B Sample cannot be used to establish an ADRV for “Presence” of the prohibited substance because it was obtained in breach of the athlete’s fundamental right to attend the opening and analysis of said sample does not preclude the competent authorities to take this sample into account for a “Use” violation. In such a situation, the sample in question must be regarded with particular care and cannot by itself be sufficient to establish a “Use” violation (CAS 2015/A/3977, WADA v Belarus Athletic Federation & Mr Vadim Devyatovskiy, para 173)’. The panel decided that the results of the urine analysis indicating the presence of FG-4592 were sufficiently corroborated by variations in the athlete’s blood profile that ‘are fully consistent, on temporal, physiological and scientific bases, with the use of FG-4592’, to comfortably satisfy it that the athlete used FG-4592, in violation of Art 2.2. Attempts to extend this per se rule/doctrine of fundamental breach to departures from requirements of the ISTI have been rejected: see para C6.14. 2021 Code comment 23, relating to Code Art 3.2.3(ii), relating to departures from the ISRM requirement to provide notice to the athlete of the B sample opening, states: ‘An Anti-Doping Organization would meet its burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding by showing that, for example, the B  Sample opening and analysis were observed by an independent witness and no irregularities were observed’. Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & 5036, para 110, and see para 111 (‘[…] any departure that may have occurred because the seal of the sample was partially broken when the director of the Laboratory was still completing the Sample Inspection Form cannot have caused the AAF. In fact, it is common ground, and cannot be disputed, that no (metabolites of a) substance (corresponding to those detected in the A sample) could have entered a closed bottle, properly sealed (as verified, at least visually, by all attending the test) up to the moment the process of the breaking the seal was started. In any case, the Athlete failed to establish how such departure could reasonably have caused the AAF. Therefore, the Athlete’s contentions, based on the allegedly untimely partial breaking of the seal of the bottle containing the B sample, have to be dismissed’) and para 115iii (‘[…] the alleged breach of the rules on confidentiality and public disclosure, in the same way, cannot have caused the AAF, not least because they occurred after the AAF had been reported by the Laboratory’); WADA  v FCF and Garcia, CAS  2017/A/5315, para  131 (rejecting suggestion laboratory scientists mishandled the samples and caused them to become contaminated, because the evidence showed they were properly trained, and the athlete provided no evidence to doubt their abilities).

C6.24 Hearing panels have confirmed that the same ‘plausibility’ test developed by the CAS panel in Campbell-Brown for assessing departures from the IST also applies to the assessment of departures from the ISL,1 ie  (assuming that it is not a case where the athlete was denied the right to attend analysis of the B  sample,

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and so the per se rule does not apply) the athlete ‘must establish facts from which a [panel] could rationally infer a possible causative link between the ISL departure and the presence of a prohibited substance in his/her sample’.2 In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that ‘it is likely to be relatively rare for an ISL departure itself to directly cause an AAF. Instead, it appears that the rule is principally intended to tackle situations where an ISL breach creates the opportunity (for example) for accidental contamination or deliberate sabotage to compromise the integrity of the sample’.3 Where either is asserted, ‘to evaluate that risk one needs to look at the evidence of what happened in this case and the scientific findings’.4 1 See para C6.22. 2 World Rugby v Ralepelle, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 16 June 2015, paras 90-91. See also ibid, para 97 (‘The suggested causative link must be more than merely hypothetical. It need not be likely but it must be more than fanciful; it must be plausible’). See UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 74 (‘[…] the Rider […] did not explain how the individual breach of a provision of the ISL could have reasonably caused the AAF. The allegations of the Rider are generic in nature, speculative and completely insufficient to establish or even to demonstrate a link between the individual breach of a provision in the ISL and the AAF’); Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648, para 131 (‘[…] a mere reference to a departure from the ISL is insufficient in the absence of a credible link of such departure to the resulting Adverse Analytical Finding’). 3 World Rugby v Ralapelle, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 16 June 2015, para 96. 4 Ibid, para 97. The panel went on to explain carefully by reference to the evidence why it did not accept that the fact that the B sample bottle broke and the frozen B sample thereby came momentarily into contact with laboratory equipment could plausibly have caused the sample to become contaminated with drostanolone.

C6.25 If the athlete makes the required showing, the burden shifts back to the Anti-Doping Organization to prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel that the departure established by the athlete did not in fact cause the adverse analytical finding in question.1 If the Anti-Doping Organization makes such a showing, the departure will be discounted as a harmless ‘slip’, and the charge based on the alleged adverse analytical finding will stand.2 If it fails to do so, the charge should be dismissed.3 1 Code Art 3.2.2: ‘If the Athlete or other Person rebuts the preceding presumption by showing that a departure from the International Standard for Laboratories occurred which could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding’. 2 UCI v Landaluce & RFBC, CAS 2006/A/119, para 94 (although the athlete established a departure from the requirements of the ISL, in that the A sample results were not reported within 10 working days of receipt of the sample, and the B sample analysis was not carried out within 30 days of notification of the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A sample, the Panel noted that ‘such a demonstration, however, has only a purely theoretical effect, since the group of experts present at the Hearing observed that the departure observed could not be at the origin of the positive results of the A and B sample analysis’); WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, paras 13–15 (even assuming there had been a departure from the ISL in relation to the conditions in which the sample was stored and transported, which could in theory have led to microbial activity in the sample, the IRMS analysis confirmed that the testosterone found in the athlete’s urine was exogenous); USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, paras 201, 225 (even assuming athlete could show a departure from the ISL in producing the IRMS results relied upon to support the charge of presence of exogenous testosterone, the record reflected that such departure did not cause the adverse analyti